The Oxford Handbook of the Economy of Cameroon [1 ed.] 0192664654, 9780192664655

Citation preview

1

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON

2

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON Edited by

CÉLESTIN MONGA

3

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2022 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2022 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2022937024 ISBN 978–0–19–284852–9 eISBN 978–0–19–266465–5 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192848529.001.0001 Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

4

CONTENTS

List of Contributors Introduction: The Economics and Poetics of Sorrow CÉLESTIN MONGA

PART I CONTEXT, LEGACIES, AND MINDSETS 1.

The Cameroon Economy: Historical Overview JOHN MUKUM MBAKU

2.

Cameroon as Part of Central Africa’s Political Economy ANDREAS MEHLER

3.

The Interplay Between Colonial History and Postcolonial Institutions: Evidence from Cameroon MARIE CHRISTELLE MABEU AND ROLAND PONGOU

4.

The Political Economy of Ethnicity CÉLESTIN MONGA

5.

The Political Economy of Reform Consensus (or Lack thereof) in Cameroon CONSTANT LONKENG

6.

The Homo Economicus in Cameroon: A View from Below AMBROISE KOM

7.

Untold Perspectives about Cameroon’s Economy FABIEN NKOT

PART II ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 8.

Monetary and Multidimensional Poverty in Cameroon: Measurements, Determinants, and Policy Implications FRANCIS ANDRIANARISON, BOUBA HOUSSEINI, AND CHRISTIAN OLDIGES

9.

Cameroon’s Economic Assets and Production: Documenting and Analyzing a Mismatch FULBERT TCHANA TCHANA

10.

The Economics of Infrastructure in Cameroon: State, Challenges, and Policy Reforms THÉOPHILE BOUGNA AND PAUL NOUMBA UM

11.

Structural Transformation and Productivity Growth in Cameroon DÉSIRÉ AVOM AND YSELLE FLORA MALAH KUETE

12.

Economic Diversification in Cameroon: A Trade—DSM analysis JEAN-MARC M. KILOLO, MARTIN CAMERON, ANTONIO PEDRO, AND JEAN-LUC N. MASTAKI

13.

Cameroon: Trade Costs, Trade Facilitation, and Regional Integration ZAKARIA SORGHO

14.

The Political Economy of Contemporary Youth in Cameroon PARFAIT ELOUNDOU-ENYEGUE, SARAH C. GIROUX, AND MICHEL TENIKUE

15.

Cameroon’s Labor Market Dynamics and Prospects BOUBA HOUSSEINI AND BRAHIM BOUDARBAT 5

34.

16.

Cameroon’s Informal Labor Market EBENEZER LEMVEN WIRBA, FIENNASAH ANNIF’ AKEM, AND FRANCIS MENJO BAYE

17.

Drivers of Earnings Inequalities in Urban Cameroon CHRISTIAN ZAMO-AKONO AND SIMON ALAIN SONG-NTAMACK

18.

Education: The Hypothesis of Negative Returns BERNADETTE DIA KAMGNIA AND CYRILLE BERGALY KAMDEM

19.

Early Human Capital Accumulation and Decentralization GUY TCHUENTE

20.

Comments on Decentralization in Cameroon ROGER B. MYERSON

21.

Determinants of the Performance of the Education System: The Role of Institutions ISSIDOR NOUMBA

22.

Health Outcomes and Health Care Financing in Cameroon AUGUSTIN NTEMBE

23.

Economic Evaluations of Health Financing Programs ERIC TCHOUAKET NGUEMELEU, STEPHANIE ROBINS, EMILIE BÉLANGER, DRISSA SIA, AND ISIDORE SIELEUNOU

24.

Agriculture Transformation MARTIN FREGENE AND GRACIA KAHASHA

PART III MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES 25.

Fiscal Policy Effectiveness through the Lenses Useful of Government Consumption JOHN NANA FRANCOIS AND ANDREA MATA

26.

Fiscal Decentralization, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Productivity in Cameroon THÉOPHILE BOUGNA AND PIERRE NGUIMKEU

27.

Public Debt: Beyond Accounting CÉLESTIN MONGA

28.

Withholding Trust: Business Taxpayers and the Value-Added Tax in Cameroon JOSÉ-MARÍA MUÑOZ

29.

The CFA Franc: The Financial Sector and Economic Growth in CEMAC ALOYSIUS AJAB AMIN

30.

The Monetary and Financial Sector in Cameroon: Structure, Performance, and Vulnerabilities JACQUES LANDRY BIKAI, GUY ALBERT KENKOUO, PATRICK-NELSON DANIEL ESSIANE, AND MOUSTAPHA MBOHOU MAMA

31.

Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Cameroon REGINA NSANG TAWAH

32.

Female Entrepreneurship in Africa: Characteristics and Determinants in Cameroon AHMADOU ALY MBAYE, FATOU GUEYE, AND NANCY BENJAMIN

33.

Models of Governance in Cameroon’s Public Administration VIVIANE ONDOUA BIWOLÉ

PART IV LOOKING FORWARD The Economy of Corruption in Cameroonian’s Cartoons CHRISTELLE AMINA DJOULDÉ 6

35.

The Analytics of Natural Resource Management ERIC BAHEL, OCTAVE KEUTIBEN, AND DIDIER TATOUTCHOUP

36.

Testing the Dynamic Efficiency of Extraction of Nonrenewable Resources FRANCIS DIDIER TATOUTCHOUP, OCTAVE KEUTIBEN, AND ERIC BAHEL

37.

Oil Revenue Management: Cameroon’s Experience OCTAVE KEUTIBEN, DIDIER TATOUTCHOUP, AND ERIC BAHEL

38.

Comparing Nonrenewable Resources Stocks and Capital Goods JOHNSON KAKEU

39.

Electricity Supply and Manufacturing Exports ISMAILA AMADU AND EPO BONIFACE NGAH

40.

A Blueprint for Employment Creation CÉLESTIN MONGA

41.

The Economics of Migration and Remittances: New Opportunities NADEGE D. YAMEOGO

42.

Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Analytics in Cameroon: Challenges, Benefits, and Potential Applications SAMUEL FOSSO WAMBA AND MACIEL M. QUEIROZ

43.

The Economy of Humanitarianism CILAS KEMEDJIO

44.

When Kamerun Will Awaken… DANIEL ETOUNGA-MANGUELLE Index

7

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Aloysius Ajab Amin, Clayton State University Ismaila Amadu, Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation Francis Andrianarison, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Fiennasah Annif’ Akem, University of Dschang Désiré Avom, University of Yaoundé 2 Eric Bahel, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Émilie Belanger, University of Québec Nancy Benjamin, University of Cape Town Cyrille Bergaly Kamdem, University of Yaoundé 2 Epo Boniface Ngah, University of Yaoundé 2 Brahim Boudarbat, University of Montreal Théophile Bougna, World Bank Martin Cameron, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Bernadette Dia Kamgnia, CIRES, University of Abidjan Christelle Amina Djoulde, University of Ngaoundere Parfait Eloundou-Enyegue, Cornell University Patrick-Nelson Daniel Essiane, Bank of Central African States (BEAC) Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, University of Yaoundé 1 Martin Fregene, African Development Bank Sarah C. Giroux, Cornell University Fatou Gueye, Cheikh Anta Diop University Bouba Housseini, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Gracia Kahasha, African Development Bank Johnson Kakeu, University of Prince Edward Island Cilas Kemedjio, University of Rochester Guy Albert Kenkouo, Bank of Central African States (BEAC) Octave Keutiben, University of Moncton Jean-Marc M. Kilolo, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Ambroise Kom, College of the Holy Cross Jacques Landry Bikai, Bank of Central African States (BEAC) Ebenezer Lemven Wirba, University of Bamenda Constant Lonkeng, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Marie Christelle Mabeu, Stanford University 8

Yselle Malah Kuete, University of Yaoundé 2 Jean-Luc N. Mastaki, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Andrea Mata, World Bank Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Cheikh Anta Diop University Moustapha Mbohou Mama, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Andreas Mehler, University of Freiburg Francis Menjo Baye, University of Yaoundé 2 Célestin Monga, Harvard University John Mukum Mbaku, Weber State University José-María Muñoz, University of Edinburgh Roger B. Myerson, University of Chicago John Nana Francois, World Bank Pierre Nguimkeu, Georgia State University Fabien Nkot, University of Yaoundé 2 Issidor Noumba, University of Yaoundé 2 Paul Noumba Um, World Bank Augustin Ntembe, Bowie State University Christian Oldiges, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Viviane Ondoua Biwolé, University of Yaoundé 2 Antonio Pedro, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Roland Pongou, University of Ottawa Maciel M. Queiroz, Paulista University—UNIP Stephanie Robins, University of Québec Drissa Sia, University of Québec Isidore Sieleunou, Research for Development International Simon Alain Song-Ntamack, University of Yaoundé 2 Zakaria Sorgho, FERDI and University of Laval Didier Tatoutchoup, University of Moncton Regina Tawah, Bowie State University Fulbert Tchana Tchana, World Bank Eric Tchouaket Nguemeleu, University of Québec Guy Tchuente, University of Kent Michel Tenikue, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research Samuel Fosso Wamba, Toulouse Business School Nadege D. Yameogo, World Bank Christian Zamo-Akono, University of Yaoundé 2 9

INTRODUCTION The Economics and Poetics of Sorrow CÉLESTIN MONGA

Cameroon? Rumor has it that the word “Cameroon” is valid only when the national football team, the famed Indomitable Lions, bursts into a stadium, makes the turf tremble, and sends the stands into apoplectic fits by the mere force of their arrogance. “Cameroon” would then exist only occasionally, when eleven men in green jerseys, red shorts and yellow stockings run like fools after a round ball, go wild in sliding tackles, chest traps, scissors moves, outside foot controls, curling inside foot shots, or downward headers into the penalty area. “Cameroon” would thus have—provisional—meaning only when these crazy athletes bustle about and get out of breath under the—often alcoholic—yells of the crowd and the voyeuristic lenses of the cameras. A variant of the same argument, expressed with the necessary philosophical emphasis to give it some semblance of elegance, stresses particularly the random character of the historical accident that this country was—like almost all African States for that matter. This other argument mentions the fortuitous nature of the genesis of this geographic triangle with long uncertain borders that are still questioned today by certain anglophone citizens who feel suppressed in the corset of a tropicalized French-speaking world. In short, for some people, since “Cameroon” is recognized on the large map of nations only by its football team or its bad reputation of being another of the last vestiges of Franco–British colonial fantasies, it should be systematically surrounded by quotation marks, or simply amalgamated into this single, indivisible Africa that serves as an ideological junk cupboard for some, and a political business for others. However negative it may be, there is a legitimate side to this rumor. After all, like most of the present African States, “Cameroon” was hastily drawn up by French and English colonists, probably after a night of negotiations and orgies, this in the framework of a political theatre known as the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885). An entity so arbitrarily drawn up and carved out would thus merit only the furtive episodes of recognition offered by the fleeting excitement of sports competitions. The contributors to this Handbook have not let themselves be intimidated by the strength of this rumor or the weight of these prejudices. With admirable abandon that does not, however, contain the slightest bit of naïveté, they sovereignly decided to present economic knowledge and images of their “Cameroon.” In so doing, they ignored the quotation marks that some would like to inflict upon this country which always proclaims its desire to be a nation. In a varied thematic register, the authors of this work cast light on the context, the contours and mechanisms of the Cameroonian economy, the processes of socialization of the economic agent in this country and the emergence of new rituals of thought, action, and deviance. Finally, they offer elements of a response to the well-known problem of historical causality and obliquely outline a grammar of sorrow and melancholy.

10

I.1 CAMEROON WITHOUT QUOTATION MARKS The matter of the validity of the territory studied remains, however. What is the legitimacy of an economic work on Cameroon in this Africa that officially consists of fifty-five States arbitrarily drawn by the colonizers? Must we accept the very idea of this “Cameroon” bequeathed to us by yesterday’s oppressors? Must we be satisfied with the geographical and above all psychological borders that the European colonists bequeathed to us and that we interiorize like infallible prescriptions? Should we, on the contrary, begin by questioning the legitimacy of the term “Cameroon” and its validity, especially in the context of the great number of identity and political frustrations that feed demands of all sorts? Should we redefine the concept of the nation-State in Africa, reinvent the territory it refers to, and satisfy, for example, the broken dreams of Kwame Nkrumah? Or rather deplore the nativist risk hiding behind the vision of a world of nation-States presented implicitly as sealed-off entities developing in isolation and whose communities and socioeconomic groups sometimes live side by side in an atmosphere of rancor and suspicion? These questions do not arise only in Africa. In a January 1995 speech to the European Parliament that has remained famous, the former head of the French State François Mitterrand received a standing ovation when he cried out: “Nationalism is war!” Admittedly, Europe was at the time moaning under the battering of the ethnic wars that had torn ex-Yugoslavia apart. It was easy in such a context to refer to the skeptical sally of the metaphysically Stateless Emil Cioran for whom “the homeland is a camp in the desert.” Yes, of course, nationalism is at times the breeding ground of nativism because, in some forms, it constantly needs an enemy to validate itself; this despite the arbitrariness of the delineation, the forms of organization, the cultural sediments that found the nation, and the fact that it is always the product of the fortuity of the historical adventure. Today, under the cover of a certain legalism, international law provides a normative approach inspired by the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, positing “objective” criteria to fulfill in order to be considered a nation: territory, sovereignty of a State, language, religion, culture, history, etc. The promoters of this mechanical and superficial legalism omit mentioning that their model nations would themselves never have passed that test: the borders of France in 1789 were not at all natural, no more than those of the United States in 1776 or of Belgium in 1830. As for the supposed sociological or cultural homogeneity of current America, it would provoke smiles if it were compared to that of Rwanda, Mali, or Cameroon. Italy is populated by Gauls, Etruscans, Greeks, and many other peoples. Great Britain is Celtic and Germanic, among other things. France too is Celtic, Germanic, Iberian, Arab, Jewish, and even Sahelian … These unstable mixtures do not prevent those countries from proclaiming that they are nations—a label that it is handy to refuse to Cameroon or Guinea. It is advisable to take seriously Ernest Renan’s observation, according to which “the essence of a nation is that all of its individual members have a great deal in common, and also that they have all forgotten many things.” The contributors to this Handbook implicitly accept this “subjective” and modest approach to the nation. They have no need to put into quotation marks the idea of the Cameroon that is concerned in the present work because the nation is here considered in its most immaterial sense. “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle,” said Renan (1992). “The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices and devotions.” This is the stoical and generous conception adopted by the authors of this book. Thus Cameroon appears here as the result of a fermentation process that led to the acceptance of a common destiny. Neither exclusive nor arrogant, that Cameroon is the sum of the common memories of the peoples who compose it, the symbol of the mutual consents, the reflection of the desire to live together and to take on a rich intellectual and spiritual heritage for which entire generations of men and women from all regions of the country sacrificed themselves. This collection is therefore, above all, the epic and analytic chronicle of a long journey and an invitation to the knowledge and discovery of a Cameroonian imaginary whose texture is constantly changing.

11

I.2 CAMEROON’S ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE: MEANING AND RELEVANCE Cameroon was the first of the African territories under French colonial rule to regain independence in 1960. Yet, its history as a sovereign nation has been so far one of economic underperformance. It is also one of paradoxes, missed opportunities, erroneous strategies and policies, but ultimately, resilience. Cameroon’s economic experience sheds light on broader issues of Africa’s economic narrative and provides valuable development economics knowledge. It deserves scrutiny. Cameroon is classified as a lower-middle-income country by the World Bank. Located along the Atlantic Ocean, it shares its borders with Chad, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria. Two of its border regions with Nigeria (northwest and southwest) are Anglophone, while the remaining eight are Francophone. Cameroon is endowed with talented people, rich natural resources, including oil and gas, minerals, high-value species of timber, and agricultural products, such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, maize, and cassava. While Cameroon’s informal economy is quite diverse and resilient, and rooted in old business traditions, its formal economy has exhibited low productivity and employment growth over much of the past 60 years. Cameroon’s growth rates climbed in the two decades following independence, as public policies initially focused on expansion of educational facilities, diversification of farm production, industrialization, and rural development. Yet that growth was largely fueled by export of raw materials to the production centers of Europe. The commodity price boom supported Africa’s rapid growth. In the 1970s and 1980s, oil made a significant contribution, as did higher prices for metals and agricultural products. But domestic manufacturing, which has been central to those countries which earlier achieved sustainable growth, lagged as a contributor of growth. In the mid-1980s, economic mismanagement, coupled with the drop in price of important export commodities—particularly cocoa, coffee, and oil—forced Cameroon into a lengthy recession. Unsustainable budget deficits compelled the authorities to resort to external borrowing and to seek support from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the form of various forms of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment programs. Cameroon’s economy continues to depend heavily on the sale of its commodities on the world market, and fluctuations in the global prices of its primary goods—petroleum and cocoa—have led to a decline in terms of trade and have made its economic situation fragile; with a currency pegged to a strong French franc and subsequently a strong euro within a French–African monetary union (the Franc Zone), the Cameroonian economy experienced appreciation of its real exchange rate and lost external competitiveness; with fewer profitable investment opportunities, the country also experienced capital flight and high unemployment and underemployment. Corruption, a persistent problem, also hampered economic development. In much of the past three decades, more reliance on private enterprise and free trade became the dominant trends but has yielded disappointing results—especially in the context of rapid demographic growth. While Cameroon has many of the inputs and markets that would support the rise of a large manufacturing sector, the country has a small industrial footprint and arguably saw a degree of deindustrialization in the commodity boom of the mid-2000s—a continuation of deindustrialization trends that have been in place since the structural adjustment programs. The basic structure of the economy, as measured by sectoral contributions to GDP, has changed little in the past 60 years. The main question is whether Cameroon’s growth model will yield enough decent employment to meet the needs of its young and educated workforce. For several years, Cameroon was ranked on perception surveys (most notably by Transparency International) as the most corrupt country in the world. Poor governance has indeed stifled the country’s economic development—though it is important to define governance in much broader terms than corruption, State capture, and even dishonest practices by government officials: honest economic policy mistakes can be even costlier than narrowly defined corruption and State capture. This is particularly the case in countries like Cameroon where the economic costs of political sclerosis have been high (the same political party and two individuals have been in power for six decades). The country’s history has also 12

been marked by sustained social unrest (since 1990), separatist armed rebellion and military conflicts in the two English-speaking regions (since 2016), and insecurity due to jihadist terrorism in the northern regions (since 2009). The absence of structural transformation is especially evident in the labor market. Economic growth in recent years has taken place in capital- and skills-intensive sectors, creating few jobs. Traditional agriculture still employs most of the workforce. Only 5% of new entrants to the labor market work in the formal and modern sectors. Formal employment has grown too slowly to absorb the influx of young and educated workers, particularly in urban areas. The household enterprise sector is Cameroon’s fastest growing employment source. Cameroon’s growth pattern needs to be more pro-poor, with consumption growing faster for lower income segments of the population. Manufacturing matters, and especially so because Cameroon, like all African countries, must create a large number of new jobs to meet the needs of its young people and the growing pressures of urbanization. And it has to create higher quality jobs that can raise incomes on a large scale—especially in the regions currently marred by violent conflicts. Manufacturing is central to any sustainable job creation effort. It creates jobs directly, and of generally good quality employment. It generates more jobs in supplier industries, from mineral processing to services. And its labor force supports still more jobs in agriculture, retail, production of consumer goods, and infrastructure. Manufacturing generally has a positive impact on foreign exchange earnings and the balance of payments, both increasing export earnings and reducing the import bill. Recent economic history has shown that it is still possible for countries at low-income levels, such as Cameroon, to achieve substantial growth in manufacturing, despite the rise of automation. Many of the success stories occurred in Asia, from Japan’s early lead to Korea’s development as an industrial economy, and today with the rise of China as the factory of the world. But successes can also be found on a smaller scale for specific industries on the African continent, in countries as diverse as Mauritius, Ethiopia, Morocco, South Africa, or Tunisia. What these examples point to is the return of industrial policy as a valid focus of public policy. But modern industrial policy is not just concerned with expanding the traditional industrial sector. It includes a wide range of activities, from sustainable transformation in agriculture to tradable services. Modern economic growth is a process of continuous technological innovation, industrial upgrading, and economic diversification. No country in the world has been able to move from low- to middle- and high-income status without undergoing the process of industrialization. Structural transformation is always taking place because of changes in technology, in comparative advantage, and in the global economy. There is a need for some guiding principles on how “best” Cameroon and other developing nations should move human, capital, and financial resources from low- to high-productivity sectors. For the process to be efficient, coordination and externality issues must be addressed. Markets typically do not manage such structural transformations well on their own. Moreover, most increases in per capita income arise from advances in technology—about 70% of growth comes from sources other than factor accumulation. In developing countries, a substantial part of growth arises from closing the technology (or knowledge) gap between themselves and those at the frontier. And within any country (especially one like Cameroon), there is enormous scope for productivity improvement simply by closing the gap between best practices and average practices. If improvements in standards of living mainly come from a diffusion of knowledge, learning strategies must be at the heart of the development strategies. These elements of an emerging intellectual consensus provide further justification for studying how economics should apply in developing country contexts such as Cameroon’s—well beyond the traditional theoretical discussion of market failures based on coordination and conventional externalities. This new theoretical perspective focuses on the reasons why markets, by themselves, are not likely to produce sufficient growth enhancing investments, such as those associated with learning, knowledge accumulation, and research. However, the issues of diffusion of learning throughout society to equip and empower all private agents have received little attention, in marked contrast to those of resource allocation. Indeed, much of the focus has been on narrow conceptions of industrial policy and its suspicious connotation of “picking winners” and generating private rents without social rewards. Externalities in learning and discovery support an 13

infant economy argument for government intervention that is far more robust than the conventional infant industry argument. The consensus among economists and policymakers has grown wider on the need for governments to focus on promoting learning, infant industries and economies, exports, and the private sector, not only in manufacturing but also agriculture and services such as, health, information technology, or finance. Industrial policy is therefore not just about manufacturing. Tackling all these questions in the context of Cameroon provides useful knowledge and—hopefully—sparks new research on the fundamental dynamics of economic development. This Handbook examines the reasons for Cameroon’s unsatisfactory economic performance and draws lessons from successful development experience to help tackle these issues. Through Cameroon’s economic story, the Handbook discusses the evolving conceptions of economic policy, takes stock of intellectual progress, documents the challenges of implementation, and outlines the remaining intellectual and policy agenda. The Handbook also provides a critical assessment of the history, patterns, and strategies of economic development in Cameroon, and outlines new approaches to economic inquiry for prosperity and social change. It is therefore intended to be a contribution in the body of ongoing analytical work that focuses on and Africa’s economic development strategies in the global economy.

I.3 UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON—AND CONTRIBUTING TO KNOWLEDGE

Various strands of growth research since World War II have yielded some insights on the type of strategies and policies that a country like Cameroon should implement in its quest for economic prosperity: on the theoretical front, the analysis of endogenous technical innovation and increasing returns to scale has led to a general framework for capturing the broad picture and the mechanics of economic growth; on the empirical side, cross-country regressions highlight systematic differences between high-growth and low-growth countries with regard to initial conditions (such as productivity levels, human capital, demographic features, infrastructure, financial development, and inequality), institutional variables (such as rule of law, protection of property rights, and governance indicators), and policy variables (such as macroeconomic stability, financial regulation, or trade openness). Yet, it has proven much harder for developing countries to achieve convergence with high-income countries. Even the often-celebrated success stories of Asia only represent a handful of economies that have moved from low- to high-income status during the past decades. As noted by Lin (2012), “between 1950 and 2008, only 28 economies in the world—and only 12 non-Western economies—were able to narrow their per capita income gap with the United States by 10 percentage points or more. Meanwhile, more than 150 countries have been trapped in low- or middle-income status. Narrowing the gap with industrialized high-income countries continues to be the world’s main development challenge.” Some unavoidable questions arise: what is the economic power of history? How does the political economy of memory play out in country contexts with multiple colonial legacies and randomly set boundaries? Such questions have not been studied systematically and empirically in the economic literature on Cameroon. Most studies of African economies explain the continent’s poor growth and development performance as resulting from markets or national government interventions. Part I on the“Context, Legacies, and Mindsets” of the Handbook reexamines such claims and revisits the arguments that the organization of pre-colonial States affects long-run prosperity. As a territory subjugated by Germany, France, and Great Britain, Cameroon is a good laboratory for exploring and testing some of these theories: the intellectual benefits of studying the long-term impacts of Cameroon’s colonial history and its interplay with postcolonial institutions go well beyond a handbook on Cameroon. Mbaku’s opening chapter 1 on “The Cameroon Economy: A Historical Overview” surveys Cameroon’s modern history, its institutional and cultural landscape, and sets the stage for such analyses. His chronicle of the changing economic priorities during colonial times helps understand the economic dynamics observed in Cameroon for more than a century. It starts with European colonialism—German, British, and French—which brought various ethnolinguistic groups together to form what is now Cameroon, and introduced the people to Western forms of capitalism and their associated institutions (e.g., private 14

ownership of the means of production). Second, Christianity and Christian missions, which significantly affected the people’s worldview, forced a restructuring of family relations, and paved the way for more intergroup interaction and cooperation, are explored. Mehler’s chapter 2 on “Cameroon as Part of Central Africa’s Political Economy” outlines a short history of political developments in Cameroon since independence from a subregional perspective. Cameroon’s violent history had an impact on its neighbors just as those neighbors had a, generally overlooked, impact on Cameroon. Contagion via transnational networks and their dynamics is highly relevant. This contribution also looks into the subregional status of dysfunctional institutions and the absence of checks and balances in overly presidential, personalized, and undemocratic political systems. Autocratic regimes and coup-makers clearly learned from each other. In fact, the wave of democratization of the 1990s all over the continent did not produce tangible results in Central Africa, despite intense (but short-lived) street mobilization to achieve political rights and civil liberties. Both the impact of a former colonizer (France) and the relative dysfunctionality of subregional organizations (above all, the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC)) were additional factors slowing down necessary political and economic reforms: Ordinary Cameroonian citizens (just as citizens of the entire subregion) saw their objective interests relegated behind the selfish interests of ruling families. In their chapter 3, “The Interplay Between Colonial History and Postcolonial Institutions: Evidence from Cameroon,” Mabeu and Pongou exploit both the arbitrary division of the German Colony of Kamerun between France and Britain after World War I and the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the French-speaking République du Cameroun. Comparing individuals from the same ethnic homeland, but living on either side of the British–French border within Cameroon, they find that individuals on the British side had higher educational attainment before the reunification. However, that this initial advantage was partially erased by post-reunification governance. Despite achieving higher educational attainment overall, individuals on the British side have worse employment outcomes and roughly similar infant mortality rates. Mabeu and Pongou provide further evidence of the interaction between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions by analyzing how the outcomes of individuals in the former Southern Cameroons differ from their hypothetical outcomes, had they instead opted to join Nigeria in the 1961 plebiscite. They find that the people of Southern Cameroons have lower educational attainment, higher infant mortality rates, and worse employment outcomes relative to their “co-ethnics” living on the Nigerian side of the border between the former Southern Cameroons and Nigeria. Picking up from where Mbaku and Mabeu-Pondou left off, Monga’s chapter 4 on “The Political Economy of Ethnicity” examines the question of ethnicity and the economy of belonging. It deconstructs the ethnic categorizations in Cameroon and emphasizes their contradictions and their arbitrary character. It also discusses the empirical challenges for measuring ethnic inequities. Lonkeng’s chapter 5 on “The Political Economy of Reform Consensus (or Lack Thereof) in Cameroon” proposes a rationale for the apparent lack of economic reform consensus in Cameroon. Drawing on the political economy literature, he provides model-based evidence that the quasi status quo may have resulted from a systematic strategy by the rent-seeking elite to buy off groups to counter reform proposals by any reform-minded team. The chapter focuses on the interaction between different interest groups and not on specific reforms, many of which are explored throughout the Handbook. Kom’s chapter 6 on “The Homo Economicus in Cameroon: A View from Below” proposes a reading of the Cameroonian economy based on an economic agent’s view from below. Its intent is to cast complementary light on the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analyses constituting most of this work. It is therefore written from the point of view of the citizen who interacts daily with the institutions designing and implementing public policies, and small and medium-sized businesses that make up the economic fabric. The perspective adopted here is also long-term, briefly covering the economic and social approaches of the precolonial era as well as those of the colonial and post-independence eras. Kom’s sobering analysis emphasizes the richness and the paradoxes of the Cameroonian economy, of its ruling elites, its private sector, and economic agents of various levels. Nkot’s contribution titled “Untold Perspectives About Cameroon’s Economy” (chapter 7) is both an epistemological and empirical challenge to economists working on Cameroon. Examining a large sample of works by well-known authors, Nkot argues that the analyses have often been limited to the formal economy whose size and significance are nevertheless limited. He discusses the problems posed by an 15

exclusive focus on the formal sector of a national economy and suggests that analyses directed toward the less formal aspects of this economy would more appropriately state its truths. Part II on “Economic Structure and Structural Transformation” analyzes the fundamental elements for structural change in Cameroon. Economic studies of structural transformation have evolved over the decades to cover both macro and micro issues, and to hold different meanings (Lin and Monga, 2014). The first wave of researchers working on low-income countries, which emerged in the 1940s, conceived development to be an interrelated set of long-run processes. Their focus was therefore on structural change in production structure and on economy-wide phenomena such as agricultural transformation, industrialization, urbanization, and “modernization.” Kuznets (1966) who studied the genesis and patterns of the evolution of modern economic growth in high-income countries approached structural analysis mainly through the lenses of sectoral changes—that is, the evolution over time of the relative contributions of agriculture, industry, and services to gross domestic product (Syrquin, 1988). In the second wave of development thinking that dominated policymaking in low-income countries in the 1980s and 1990s, structural analysis was carried out indirectly. Like Mr. Jourdain in Molière’s play, economists approached structural change almost inadvertently through broad analysis of the general functioning of economies, their markets, institutions, mechanisms for allocating resources, regulatory and incentives systems, etc. The designers of the “structural” adjustment programs implemented in many developing countries viewed the restoration of external and internal balances as an essential precondition for launching the process of economic transformation and change. A third and more recent wave of the development literature has sought to refine structural analysis and bring back to the agenda some of the specific issues of the process of economic transformation: the strategic selection of competitive industries according to the comparative advantage of developing countries; the determinants of the dynamics of sectoral contributions to growth; the evolution of the capital intensity of sectors over time—within and across countries; the factors that help or hinder the reallocation of resources from low- to high-productivity sectors and the policy environment that facilitates such changes; the processes that allow economies to move up the value chain; the various ways of organizing and fostering the adaptation and adoption of new technologies in poor countries; the determinants of a country’s ability to create good jobs; the respective roles of the government and the private sector; and the institutional arrangements that are necessary to support structural transformation, especially in the context of low-income countries where infrastructure, skills, and long-term financing are scarce. In this Handbook, the concept of “economic structure” is used in its broadest meaning, referring to “the composition of production activities, the associated patterns of specialization in international trade, the technological capabilities of the economy, including the educational level of the labor force, the structure of ownership of factors of production, the nature and development of basic State institutions, and the degree of development and constraints under which certain markets operate (the absence of certain segments of the financial market or the presence of a large underemployed labor force, for example)” ( Ocampo et al., 2009, p. 7). Cameroon has recorded positive economic growth in the new millennium, while poverty reduction has been limited and inequality has worsened. In their chapter 8, “Monetary and Multidimensional Poverty in Cameroon: Measurements, Determinants and Policy Implications,” Andrianarison, Housseini, and Oldiges investigate the different facets of poverty in Cameroon, the factors affecting them, and policy options to tackle poverty and achieve inclusive and sustainable development. They apply two prominent poverty measurement methods (Alkire–Foster and Foster–Greer–Thorbecke) to a series of household consumption and living standards surveys, as well as demographic and health surveys, and perform various empirical analyses to elucidate poverty dynamics and features. Their results show that both monetary and multidimensional poverty have decreased in Cameroon during the two decades prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, albeit slowly and to varying degrees across the different demographic, socioeconomic, and spatial groups of the population. They also find that the proportion of multidimensional poor people is always higher than the proportion of the monetary poor. At the same time, multidimensional poverty has reduced much faster than monetary poverty at the national level. Lastly, they find that higher levels of poverty in Cameroon are strongly associated with rural livelihoods, large family size, less education, and employment in agriculture and the northern regions of the country. The microeconomic analysis is complemented with a review of structural factors affecting poverty at the macro level. They point out the 16

need to accelerate the structural transformation of the Cameroonian economy, to reduce inequalities across the different regions and subgroups of the population, and expand economic opportunities for the youth of the country to achieve the demographic dividend. Tchana Tchana’s chapter 9 on “Cameroon’s Economic Assets and Production: Documenting and Analyzing a Mismatch” documents and analyzes the mismatch between Cameroon’s perceived wealth and its economic production. It shows that, although not as wealthy as some analysts perceive, Cameroon’s natural resources are underused as it is not transformed at its full potential to economic production (GDP). The inadequate level of produced capital relative to the country’s total wealth mainly explains this shortcoming. The country should focus on increasing public and private investments in infrastructure while ensuring greater efficiency and building its human capital to fix the mismatch. In their chapter 10, “The Economics of Infrastructure in Cameroon: State, Challenges, and Policy Reforms,” Bougna and Noumba Um provide a critical assessment of infrastructure development and its role in enabling business and growth in Cameroon. They explore the current state of Cameroon infrastructure and the main challenges it faces. They use a simple econometric framework to link Cameroon GDP growth with the stock of different infrastructure assets. They reveal an infrastructure-led growth potential gap in Cameroon because the country’s infrastructure stock is not at the level of the average African country. Also, the marginal productivity of its highways infrastructure is higher compared to other transport infrastructures in Cameroon. In addition, there are potential efficiency gains and economic benefits of investing conjointly in different infrastructure subsectors, especially in highways, electricity, railways, and ports. Bougna and Noumba Um highlight the institutional failures and deficiencies in Cameroon’s infrastructure, which constrain the implementation of structural infrastructure projects. Tapping into domestic and regional savings, improving the business environment, implementing public–private partnerships effectively, and attracting private equity investors to support infrastructure development are necessary conditions for putting infrastructure at the heart of Cameroon’s economic transformation. Avom and Malah Kuete’s chapter 11 on “Structural Transformation and Productivity Growth in Cameroon” evaluates the contribution of structural transformation to labor productivity growth in Cameroon over a 40-year period. Using the McMillan–Rodrik decomposition approach, they show that structural transformation, viewed as a progressive reallocation of the workforce from sectors with low productivity to those with high productivity, has contributed little to the increase in labor productivity growth. It is actually the so-called “within component” that explains most of the productivity gains, while the “between component” has been rather weak. Even more, the dynamic share of this structural transformation was negative throughout the period covered by the study. This is not surprising. As explained in the chapter 12 by Kilolo, Cameron, Pedro, and Mastaki on “Economic Diversification in Cameroon: A Trade–DSM Analysis,” despite its rich endowments of natural resources, the Cameroonian economy remains undiversified and vulnerable to exogenous shocks as an exporter of unprocessed primary products. With the ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2021, the Cameroonian authorities intend to follow an export-led industrialization strategy. They expect the country to become the “factory of the new industrial Africa” through its Plan Directeur d’Industrialisation (PDI; industrial masterplan). The chapter examines such ambitions using the Trade–DSM approach and finds that Cameroon has the largest export potential for food-related products and other products not prioritized in the PDI, unfortunately. Sorgho’s chapter 13 on “Cameroon: Trade Costs, Trade Facilitation, and Regional Integration” studies the challenges related to governance and trade costs, which hinder its development and ability to attract investment and promote trade. It focuses on trade-related issues, in particular trade facilitation and Central Africa’s regional integration. The empirical analysis shows that Cameroon can substantially reduce its trade costs by reducing time-waiting for customs procedures at its borders and playing a stronger leadership role in Central Africa. Structural transformation also depends critically on the stock, quality, and use of human “infrastructure.” As a theory of earnings, human capital theory has provided the rationale for policies to combat poverty around the world. It aims to explain people’s decisions to invest in education and training and the pattern of their lifetime earnings. Individuals’ different levels of investment in education and 17

training are then explained in terms of their expected returns from the investment. Investments in education and training entail costs in both the form of direct expenses and foregone earnings during the investment period, so only those individuals who will be compensated by sufficiently higher lifetime earnings will choose to invest. It follows that, people who expect to work less in the labor market and have fewer labor market opportunities, such as women or minorities, are less likely to invest in human capital, and more likely to remain in poverty. The standard neoclassical theory of human capital is to view it as the set of marketable skills of the labor force. It is the stock of knowledge or characteristics the worker has (either innate or acquired) that determines his or her “productivity” and marketability. Such knowledge is a form of capital in which workers make a variety of investments in order to remain attractive to firms throughout their career. The fundamental argument is that investing in education leads to economic growth through increased productivity, social stability, and healthier lifestyles. The remaining chapters of this section of the Handbook highlight the rigidity, the limitations, and the failures of the policy frameworks derived from traditional human capital theory. There are so many market failures and nonmarket dynamics in education and training that the assumptions underlying human capital theory make it a shaky basis for policy. Various structural factors (from demography to financing and social norms) and fundamental distortions invalidate the basic dynamics of supply and demand. Most of the individuals and social groups often excluded from the human capital market do not have the opportunity and freedom to make such a choice. Besides, for most women and minorities around the world, investing in their human capital yields low returns in lifetime earnings. “The Political Economy of Contemporary Youth in Cameroon,” chapter 14 by Eloundou, Giroux, and Tenikue, is once a case study of Cameroon’s political economy, a substantive hypothesis, and a methodological tool for forecasting the future of African societies in a context of educational expansion, demographic transition, and economic divergence. Its central thesis is that Cameroon has a real opportunity to turn its current generation of youth into its greatest. Seizing this potential depends on strategic efforts to cultivate and empower this generation along economic, demographic, social, and political spheres. To put it differently, this entails a holistic development of youth and their human capital along four concentric circles that include inner personal growth, family life, cognitive and labor market skills, and civic life. A genuine policy commitment to such holistic development is a non-negotiable prerequisite for harnessing a sizable dividend for the country and averting the specter of social crises that would befall the country in the absence of deep and timely investments in youth. Housseini and Boudarbat’s chapter 15 on “Cameroon’s Labor Market Dynamics and Prospects” provides a comprehensive assessment of Cameroon’s labor market, with a focus on the dynamics and patterns of key labor market indicators and factors affecting performance in the labor market. Their analysis uses both macro- and microeconomic approaches and combines country-level times-series data from the World Bank World Development Indicators and household survey data produced by Cameroon’s National Institute of Statistics. They observe an overall limited increase in the capacity of the Cameroonian economy to absorb its labor force, with a fluctuating pattern over time. Second, Housseini and Boudarbat show that the positive dynamics observed in labor force participation, employment, and unemployment actually hide the precarity of jobs and poor working conditions prevailing in the country. Third, their results reveal that significant gaps persist across different groups of the population in terms of labor market outcomes, and women, youth, low-educated people, and the population of northern regions of the country are the most affected groups by the scarcity of formal and decent jobs. This analysis also corroborates previous findings of the literature showing that gender, education, area of residence, and economic sector of employment are key drivers of labor market outcomes in Cameroon. To mitigate the growing demographic pressure in Cameroon’s labor market and convert it into a demographic dividend, there is a need to accelerate the structural transformation of the Cameroonian economy, invest more in education and human capital, and therefore set up conditions for extensive job creation in more formal and more productive sectors. Additionally, targeted economic policies aiming to formalize the labor market and expand social protection programs, especially for women and youth, would help in improving employment and earning prospects for the growing and young Cameroonian population. In Chapter 16, Wirba, Akem, and Baye analyze the other side of the coin, that is “Cameroon’s Informal Labor Market.” It largely harbors female workers, engaged mainly in low-productivity and low-paying 18

jobs. They investigate the sticky-floor—a wider earnings gap at the top end of the earnings distribution, and the glass-ceiling phenomena—a wider earnings gap at the bottom in the informal labor market as a whole and across its segments. Using labor market survey results and a framework to account for selectivity bias and resolve the index number problem of the standard decomposition, Wirba, Akem, and Baye examine earnings differentials across the unconditional earnings distribution. They find compelling evidence of a sticky-floor phenomenon in the informal labor market, manifested essentially among wage earners. Returns to experience mitigate the gender earnings gap at the mean, and 10th and 50th percentiles of the unconditional earnings distribution. Female workers have an unambiguous human-capital-based advantage over their male counterparts at the mean, lower tail, and median of the distribution. Zamo-Akono and Song-Ntamack’s chapter 17 on “Drivers of Earnings Inequality in Urban Cameroon” analyzes the dynamics and extent of earnings inequality in urban areas in Cameroon. Using data from the National Institute of Statistics, covering nearly two decades, they show that earnings inequality fell sharply between 2001 and 2010, and rose between 2010 and 2014, with persistent inequality at the upper tail of the distribution. They use the Recentered Influence Function regression to examine the impact of supply and demand factors on wage distribution and inequality indicators. Their results indicate that while secondary education is likely to reduce earnings inequality, higher education, job informality, and self-employment appear to be factors that increase inequality. There is strong consensus among economists on the social and private benefits of education, which increases people’s productivity and creativity, enhances innovation and the use of advanced technologies, and promotes economic and social progress. But while some argue that investment in education has a positive effect, such as profitability,others contend that the effect of investment on education can be small or even negative. Some others even claim the existence of a Laffer curve on returns to education. Dia Kamgnia’s and Kamdem’s chapter 18, “Education: The Hypothesis of Negative Returns,” uses household survey results, in which only 9% of the individuals worked in the formal sector under a contract, to study the issue. They find positive and significant returns to education, as high as 80% for women. But they highlight the predominance of the informal sector, which has become the only viable option for making a modest living, even for those with secondary, vocational, and tertiary education. Decentralization is a centerpiece in Cameroonian’s government institutions’ design. Tchuente’s chapter 19 on “Early Human Capital Accumulation and Decentralization” takes the study of human capital accumulation at the local level. He elaborates a simple hierarchy model for the analysis of the effects of power devolution. The model predicts overall positive effects of decentralization with larger effects when the local authority processes useful information on how to better allocate the resources. The estimation of the effects of 2010’s power devolution to municipalities in Cameroon suggests a positive impact of decentralization on early human capital accumulation. The value added by decentralization is the same for Anglophone and Francophone municipalities; the effects of decentralization are larger for advanced levels of primary school. Myerson has long promoted the benefits of decentralized democracy (2015). In his chapter 20, “Comments on Decentralization in Cameroon,” he argues that decentralization can be a driving force for development, democracy, and better government in Cameroon; but the recent decentralization reform seems unlikely to achieve its promise without some further reforms. It is suggested that the system for the popular election of municipal councils should be changed to an open-list proportional representation system. Where higher officials of municipal and regional governments are indirectly elected by municipal councilors, the municipal councilors should also have the power to recall and replace these officials. The powers of the centrally appointed prefects and governors should be limited to monitoring and advising their municipal and regional councils. In his chapter 21, “Determinants of the Performance of the Education System: The Role of Institutions,” Noumba investigates the effect of institutions on primary and secondary school enrollment, controlling for other key variables. His empirical analysis, based on a standard education production function, which is specified and estimated using the SURE method (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations), finds some heterogeneity in the effect of institutions on the performance of the education system. Institutional factors seem to have had a positive and significant effect on primary school enrollment but no effect on secondary school enrollment. Heterogeneity is also observed in the effect of public spending on education as a share of GDP, which appears to be positive and significant on primary school enrollment and not on secondary 19

school enrollment. He concludes that a high level of GDP growth rate would not be a necessary and sufficient condition for improving the Cameroonian education system performance. Therefore, to boost educational performance, the Government should implement reforms beyond the education sector and adopt measures to reduce political instability and improve good governance. An effective health policy would also help to achieve the same goal. Good health is an essential component of human capital. In advanced economies, healthcare systems matter for the macroeconomy because of their large size in outputs, employment, and research. They also have major implications for the long-term sustainability of public finance, while healthcare spending can have substantial multiplier effects in the short term. In developing countries such as Cameroon, good health can influence productivity and labor force participation. Spending levels on healthcare are often determined by income levels, population age structures, epidemiological profiles, and other factors. Ntembe’s chapter 22 on “Health Outcomes and Health Care Financing in Cameroon” discusses trends in health outcomes and health expenditures. It develops a fully modified Ordinary Least Squares estimator for cointegrating regressions that include deterministic variables as regressors and allows an integration process so that the stationary errors can be serially correlated and the regressors to be independent of each other. His empirical analysis shows that public expenditure, immunization, and per capita income have a significant long-run relationship with infant and under-5 mortality in Cameroon. These results suggest that more public resources could improve health outcomes. The chapter 23 by Tchouaket Nguemeleu, Robins, Belanger, Sia, and Sieleunou on “Economic Evaluations of Health Financing Programs” examines Cameroon’s healthcare system, which has faced many challenges. Health outcomes are poor and the country’s medical infrastructure and available human resources fail to meet the demand for care. The chapter stresses the need for the continuous monitoring and evaluation of Cameroon’s healthcare sector financing, both in the current COVID-19 pandemic as well as in the post-pandemic period. Such critical appraisal of current health financing programs is necessary to achieve optimal, effective, efficient, and sustainable investment that can promote healthcare for the Cameroonian population over the long term. Last, Fregene and Kahasha’s chapter 24 on “Agriculture Transformation” focuses on another critical element of Cameroon’s economic transformation. The chapter examines the main challenges of the country’s agriculture sector. It presents the Government’s strategy to transform agriculture, and lessons from successful approaches that are relevant to Cameroon’s objectives. Part III on “Macroeconomic Policies and Institutional Practices” focuses on what is usually considered the fundamental requirements for effective economic transformation. Sound macroeconomic policies and effective institutions are universally considered prerequisites for sustained growth and economic development. But what exactly constitutes “sound macroeconomic” policies and “effective institutions” in a particular country context and time? Perhaps more than any other external economic shock in recent times, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the fragility and inadequateness of the conventional macroeconomic framework, long promoted by international financial institutions for developing countries such as Cameroon. The generic macroeconomic objectives of simultaneously achieving and maintaining internal balance (the situation where the economy is in full employment and the level of activity consistent with a very low and stable rate of inflation) and external balance (the situation where the economy has a balance of payments on current and capital accounts combined, which is sustainable, at least in the medium run) at all costs have been endorsed by Cameroon and other African countries since the early 1990s. After several decades of IMF and World Bank programs, the country has “successfully” designed and implemented macroeconomic adjustment programs and policy measures to achieve these twin goals. Numerous positive IMF Article IV reports, which are broadly consistent in their analysis with the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, indicate that the quality of macroeconomic management has improved, or remained broadly stable, in Cameroon over a decade despite the severe negative shocks recorded (most notably the 2014 slump in commodity prices). Yet, like most African countries, Cameroon experienced very low growth in recent decades. In 1990, its GDP per capita measured PPP (purchasing power parity) (constant 2017 international dollars), was $3,200.1 In 2020, it was $3,600—an almost insignificant increase for a country of about 30 million inhabitants in 2022, and one well-endowed with natural wealth, decent levels of physical capital, and enormous human talents. 20

Cameroon’s economic performance is even weaker when observed through the lens of GDP per capita (measured in constant local currency): in 2020, after six decades of independence, it was CFAF 640,000, compared to CFAF 786,000 in 1986 (a decline of 18.6% in 34 years). This decline was not due to the pandemic: in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 shock, Cameroon’s GDP per capita (measured in constant local currency) was CFAF 652,000—that is, a decline of 17% compared to the 1986 peak. Clearly, the evidence of improved economic wellbeing due to macroeconomic policies geared toward internal and external imbalances is flawed. There is something profoundly inadequate in Cameroon’s macroeconomic framework and policies, which the proforma focus on internal and external balance does not capture. Analytical and policy justification for rigid adherence to the objectives of internal and external balance, narrowly defined, is quantified arbitrarily and measured with indicators reminiscent of the European Union’s Growth and Stability Pact for economic convergence (inflation rate of less than 2% inflation, annual government deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP, government debt not to reach 60% of GDP, current account balance in equilibrium with a limited deficit and to be fully financed by concessional funds, etc.). Cameroon’s macroeconomic prescription could not have yielded the expected benefits. Its objective of strictly achieving internal balance was misguided and unrealistic. Internal balance is a situation in which consumption in an economy roughly equals production—which is not necessarily desirable for a low- or lower-middle-income economy such as Cameroon’s. Moreover, treating full employment and price stability under the same single umbrella of “internal balance” has been justified by the belief or the assumption that if one maintained a level of effective demand, which preserved full employment, one would also find that the money price level was reasonably stable. As noted by Meade, “The reason for making this tacit or open assumption was, of course, due to a tacit or open assumption that the money wage rate was normally either constant or at least very sluggish in its movements … This may have been a very sensible assumption to make in the 1930s. It is more doubtful whether it was a sensible assumption to make in the immediate post-war years” (1978, pp. 424–425). Meade’s commentary was meant for advanced economies. It is even more relevant for developing economies such as Cameroon’s, which can be viewed as being in “post-war”-type situations given their enormous savings and investment challenges, and their urgent needs for some type of (re)construction. Likewise, the external balance objective was defined too rigidly and unrealistically for Cameroon. External balance occurs, roughly speaking, when the value of production in the economy and the value of spending are never too far from being even. This happens theoretically when the revenues a country brings in from exports is roughly equal to the money it spends on imports. That is, external balance occurs when the current account is neither “excessively” positive nor “excessively” negative. In other words, external balance is a current account position “that can be sustained by capital flows on terms compatible with the growth prospects of the economy without resort to restrictions on trade and payments, so that the level of international reserves is adequate and relatively stable” (Wong, 2002, p. 11). The chapters in this section of the Handbook show that such a rigid macroeconomic view was idealistic at best in Cameroon, and certainly impractical and improbable. Francois and Mata’s chapter 25 on “Fiscal Policy Effectiveness Through the Lenses of Useful Government Consumption” lays out, in a pedagogical manner, the logic of useful public consumption in the context of Edgeworth substitutability/complementarity between public and private consumption and why it matters for fiscal policy effectiveness in Cameroon. Government consumption is useful when it is directly internalized by households in their utility such that it generates positive or negative externalities that alter households’ utility. The chapter presents some empirical evidence of Edgeworth substitutability of government consumption based on a permanent income theory of consumption. This naturally leads to the examination of the implication of this empirical evidence of useful government consumption and its relevance to fiscal policy design and effectiveness in Cameroon. Francois and Mata conclude with a brief discussion on why workhorse general equilibrium models need to explicitly incorporate useful government consumption when evaluating the impact of fiscal policy involving changes in government consumption in Cameroon. Bougna and Nguimkeu’s chapter 26 on “Fiscal Decentralization, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Productivity in Cameroon” examines the country’s macroeconomic framework from an institutional perspective. They investigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on entrepreneurship and firm productivity. They simulate counterfactual changes in taxation policy on the regional distribution of firm outcomes. Their results show the potential of optimal and adapted tax reforms in fostering business 21

creation, increased formalization, and aggregate income gains across and within regions in Cameroon. These findings suggest that a well-targeted regionally decentralized taxation policy has the potential to improve the overall socioeconomic ecosystem by attracting an optimal size of entrepreneurship in each region and hence favoring a more efficient cross-regional distribution of income. Monga’s chapter 27 “Public Debt: Beyond Accounting” addresses fears and facts about the Cameroon government’s indebtedness and the country’s financing framework. Public debt (deficits) should be decomposed to reveal its origins: change between macro factors, public investment, or politically motivated measures and other misbehavior. This is essential for assessing both whether or not the increase in debt was justified, and whether debt is sustainable. Monga argues that public debt is an indispensable financing instrument for developing countries. By definition, they are low- or middle-income countries often with great needs in public services, which they cannot finance with tax revenue alone. Like others, Cameroon has large infrastructure needs, that, despite an increase in saving, it cannot finance internally. To the extent that debt finance is used to fund useful and productive public infrastructure, increases in public debt are justified. The chapter argues that under plausible assumptions, infrastructure improvements can, both directly and through their effect on foreign direct investment (FDI), increase growth sufficiently to eventually decrease the debt–GDP ratio. The effects of specific infrastructure dimensions on FDI, and in turn of FDI on growth, should be the focus of more research. Rather than setting arbitrary limits on debt–GDP ratio, the focus of international development institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the African Development Bank should be on making sure that increases in debt, if they take place, are indeed used for the right purposes, including and especially public infrastructure. The focus should be on governance and surveillance structures aimed at allowing a good use of debt, thus reassuring investors and decreasing spreads. The chapter 28 by Muñoz on “Withholding Trust: Business Taxpayers and the Value-Added Tax in Cameroon” provides a micro analysis of fiscal policy and tackles a serious hindrance to economic activity in the country. Looking at a feature of the tax system known as the value-added tax (VAT) withholding, Muñoz shows that commercial might and managerial standards are equated and couched in terms of civic morality. The result is a deeply discriminatory tax system that treats all but a small minority of businesses as untrustworthy. Amin’s chapter 29 on “The CFA Franc Zone: The Financial Sector and Economic Growth in CEMAC” examines Cameroon’s macroeconomic policies from the perspective of monetary and financial policies. The CFA franc zone is one of the world’s oldest currency arrangements. Amin assesses the financial sector of the zone and analyzes the role of the financial sector on the growth of the private sector and economic expansion. He concludes that the weak financial system of the CFA franc zone, which results from the monetary union, has hindered the economic expansion because of limited private sector financing. The chapter 30 by Bikai, Kenkouo, Essiane, and Mbohou Mama, “The Monetary and Financial Sector in Cameroon: Structure, Performance, and Vulnerabilities,” also assesses the performance of Cameroon’s financial system and outlines its main vulnerabilities and the challenges facing the conduct of monetary policy. It confirms that in Cameroon, as well as in CEMAC in general, the financial sector remains shallow, poorly developed, and with little involvement in the creation of added value in member economies. Tawah’s chapter 31 on “Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Cameroon” also addresses macroeconomic policies from a microeconomic angle. It examines bank financing to small and medium-sized enterprises. It carries out empirical analyses to determine the effect of the characteristics of the firm on small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to working capital from banks. It shows that the size of the firm, its legal status, and some foreign activities could improve access to bank finance for SMEs. Because access to funding is significantly related to the size of the firm, medium to large firms have a clear advantage relative to smaller firms in obtaining bank financing for both working capital and investment. The chapter 32 by Mbaye, Gueye, and Benjamin on “Female Entrepreneurship in Africa: Characteristics and Determinants in Cameroon” echoes some of the findings of the Tawah chapter. They examine data on formal and informal firms in Cameroon and explore the links between female direction of firms and the obstacles known to keep firms from reaching their full potential. The strong presence of women in the informal sector can be explained by several factors, including the size of their business activities, their 22

poor access to education and training as well as to financing, and institutional and sociocultural constraints. Using a survey of formal and informal enterprises in Yaoundé and Douala (Cameroon’s two largest cities), they show women to be more exposed to symptoms of informality and precariousness than men. The types of activities most associated with female entrepreneurship are very small businesses, which are more excluded from most public infrastructure services including water, electricity, telephone, and Internet infrastructure services than are male-directed firms. A very strong case has been made by economists to put institutions—defined as “the rules of the game” by North (1990)—at the top of the list of economic performance. They have done so by challenging the standard economic explanation for the failure of countries like Cameroon to improve their GDP per capita despite their natural resources and endowments. In his Lionel Robbins Lectures, Acemoglu lists and refutes the traditional economic explanation of underdevelopment: “Physical capital differences (poor countries don’t save enough); Human capital differences (poor countries don’t invest enough in education and skills); ‘Technology’ differences (poor countries don’t invest enough in R&D and technology adoption, and don’t organize their production efficiently)” (Acemoglu, 2004). He then suggests that institutions, defined more precisely as “the formal and informal rules governing economic and political interactions, are the major determinant of the cross-country differences in economic performance. Understanding the effect of institutions on economic outcomes and why institutions vary across countries must be a first step in any attempt to improve the long-run performance of less-developed nations in the world.” Even African countries such as Cameroon, ranked low on the “effectiveness” of their political institutions and labeled “not democratic,” still must have a very strong and effective institutional security apparatus to maintain an authoritarian regime for many decades. Could it be the case then that political leaders in some countries deliberately pick and choose the type of institutions that they truly want to build and make highly performing (State security for instance), while deliberately neglecting and even actively weakening other institutions whose role is not viewed as essential for their purposes and goals? This would explain the mystery of “poor governance” in low- or lower-middle-income countries where political settlements have not been well negotiated among the most powerful groups (Khan, 2018 and 2012). Viviane Ondoua Biwolé’s chapter 33 on “Models of Governance in Cameroon’s PublicAdministration” concludes this section of the Handbook. While it does not directly discuss these theoretical debates over institutional design, it provides insights into ways of building a prosperous economy in a fragile, even inoperative administrative environment. She questions the pertinence of the governance model of Cameroon’s public administration, where free-market levers do not necessarily correspond to the values that Cameroonian society identifies with; hence the necessity to re-think another governance model that would promote an endogenous social imaginary. Finally, Christelle Amina Djouldé’s chapter 34, “The Economy of Corruption in Cameroon’s Cartoons” analyzes editorial cartoons with a view to decoding paradigms of corruption in Cameroon, a major obstacle to the country’s economic progress. In the light of the “pictorial turn,” it examines how satiric images are material that make it possible to understand the complexity of corruption. Her contribution combines the comparison of various sources to show how the editorial cartoon offers a painting of corruption. It also discusses the relationship between “the tyranny of corruption” and the persistence of Cameroon’s underdevelopment. A last set of studies grouped in Part IV, “Looking Forward” suggests the way forward for the Cameroonian economy, focusing on natural resource management, the comparative analysis of nonrenewable resource stocks and capital goods, electricity supply for manufacturing (which should be the main engine of growth for Cameroon to reach its medium- and long-term economic goals), employment generation strategies, the challenges and opportunities of artificial intelligence and big data analytics, the economics of migration, the economy of reliance in humanitarianism as a development finance tool, and a rethinking of Cameroon’s role as a potential driving engine of the economies of the central African region and beyond. The section starts with three chapters co-authored by Bahel, Keutiben, and Tatoutchoup. In chapter 35, “The Analytics of Natural Resource Management,” they present the theoretical framework of how society allocates scarce natural resources. They distinguish between the cases of nonrenewable resources and renewable resources. Nonrenewable resources differ from renewable resources because they have a fixed 23

stock of reserves that, once removed, cannot be replaced. Extracting a unit of resource today means that a lower resource stock will be available for future extraction. For both renewable and nonrenewable resources, the economic analysis aims to determine the flow of production over time and whether and when the resource stock will be depleted. In the case of nonrenewable resources, they present Hotelling’s theory of the mine as well as its extensions. In the case of renewable resources, they examine the derivation of Faustmann’s optimal rotation for even-aged forests. These building blocks are used in the next chapter to test the dynamic efficiency of Cameroon’s resource management. In the second chapter 36, “Testing the Dynamic Efficiency of Extraction of Nonrenewable Resources,” Tatoutchoup, Keutiben, and Bahel examine whether nonrenewable resources are extracted and managed efficiently in Cameroon. The analysis is performed by empirically evaluating the consistency between the theoretical extraction path dictated by the Hotelling model and its various extensions and the actual extraction path. They test the dynamic efficiency of the theoretical path of the main nonrenewable resources produced in Cameroon and conclude that the Hotelling model cannot explain the evolution of the observed price path of these resources. In their third chapter 37 on “Oil Revenue Management: Cameroon’s Experience,” Keutiben, Tatoutchoup, and Bahel start with the observation that Cameroon’s growth performance and development outcomes have not reached the level expected from the country’s oil wealth and abundant resources endowments. They review the theory and practice of oil revenue management in the context of developing countries and highlight many political economy factors to explain why Cameroon has not harnessed its natural resources (especially oil) for sustained growth and shared prosperity. The chapter underscores that if Cameroon has ever suffered, or is suffering, from any “curse,” it should be referred to as an “institutional curse.” Keutiben, Tatoutchoup, and Bahel conclude that accountability to the people of Cameroon, not to donors, is essential for transparency and good governance. Kakeu’s chapter 38 on “Comparing Nonrenewable Resources Stocks and Capital Goods” uses shadow pricing for comparing nonrenewable natural resource stocks and capital goods. It shows that, from a social welfare perspective, there are situations where the social worth of nonrenewable natural resource stocks is greater than the social worth of capital goods. Numerical examples on shadow pricing are provided for illustration. The shadow pricing metric and the market pricing metric do not lead to the same conclusion when it comes to comparing natural resource stocks and capital goods. The chapter emphasizes the importance of incorporating information on natural resource stocks in optimally managing a country’s public wealth. Public policy recommendations relating to the optimal management of natural resource stocks in Cameroon are discussed. Electricity shortages are a serious threat to manufacturing exports—trade will be the driving engine to Cameroon’s economy for the foreseeable future. Amadu and Ngah’s chapter 39 on “Electricity Supply and Manufacturing Exports” estimates the impact of power deficits on manufacturing exports. Using a vector error correction model, they show that a percentage decrease in electricity supply causes a reduction in the exports of manufactured products by 1 percentage point in the short term and 6 percentage points in the long term. Other covariates suggest that a 1% increase in manufacturing causes the labor force to increase by 7% in the short term with the long-term value not being significant. They conclude that increasing electricity supply and making it more affordable and accessible to manufacturing industries should be at the core of Cameroon’s industrial policy, economic development programs, and the national development strategy. Few issues have done more damage to the credibility of economics as a “scientific” discipline and to the reputation of economists than unemployment and underemployment. This is not surprising: As noted by Solow, “the labor market connects quickly with everything else in the economy and its performance matters more directly for most people than that of any other market” (1980, p. 2). Despite major advances in contemporary macroeconomic theory, policymakers and citizens in most countries have been particularly frustrated by the inability of economists to provide reliable general blueprints and actionable policy frameworks to cure pervasive and persistent joblessness, which is perhaps the worst of economic and social ills. Monga’s chapter 40 on “A Blueprint for Employment Creation” observes that the policy prescriptions derived from traditional, dominant models have aimed at making labor markets work better. Their results have been often disappointing, especially in Africa and in countries like Cameroon, where the labor 24

markets should be analyzed mainly in disequilibrium, because transactions take place there at non-market-clearing wages, or where the markets are missing. There is evidence of involuntary unemployment and massive underemployment, which suggests that the wage structure cannot receive, or respond to, the typical policy signals. The chapter discusses the challenges to employment creation in developing country contexts—especially through industrialization—and the fears generated by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and offers a policy framework for creating employment. Yameogo’s chapter 41 on “The Economics of Migration and Remittances: New Opportunities” analyzes Cameroon’s international emigration patterns, which turned from an elite education-type of migration to a more adventurous type following the 1980s economic crises. More young Cameroonians aspired to escape economic hardships and find employment especially in developed countries. Migration is more a family’s decision where the family invests in the costs of migration and in return, expects the migrant to send remittances. Remittance inflows spiked over the past few decades and have replaced foreign direct investments. With a strong and educated diaspora abroad, especially in the OECD, Cameroon has a great opportunity to tap into their human, financial, and social capital to boost its economic transformation and create decent employment for those left behind. The chapter 42 by Fosso Wamba and Queiroz on “Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Analytics in Cameroon: Challenges, Benefits, and Potential Applications” explores the dynamics and behavior of a representative lower-middle-income country, namely Cameroon, toward the digital transformation, specifically regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data Analytics (BDA) as the key cutting-edge technologies for the economy’s digitalization. Despite Cameroon’s poor performance in different international rankings, mainly related to infrastructure and information and communications technology (ICT) adoption, the country is an attractive market for digital transformation projects. This chapter discusses the drivers and enablers of Cameroon’s digitalization supported by AI and BDA and a framework for action by the government, universities, practitioners, industries, international organizations, scholars, and other interested stakeholders. The book ends with two reflective contributions: Kemedjio’s chapter 43 “The Economy of Humanitarianism” analyzes the contradictions of humanitarianism as a benevolent approach to nation-building in Cameroon and beyond. It then addresses the shame associated with foreign aid, through the works of several thinkers, including Mongo Beti and Imbole Mbue, two major literary figures from Cameroon. It also examines the shame associated with humanitarian aid and concludes with thoughts on the fictional nature of a humanitarian State. The final contribution to this Handbook, chapter 44 by Etounga-Manguelle, is more optimistic with caution. Endowed by its history and geography with considerable assets for its development, the country initially called Kamerun, which was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1918, before being placed under a mandate of French and English trusteeship from 1918 to 1960, is today at a crossroads. For since 2016 (with the eruption of an armed rebellion in the country’s English-speaking regions), it has been subjected to a sociopolitical crisis that endangers its State institutions and threatens its national integrity and its survival as a flagship nation with a rich and diverse history. Etounga-Manguelle’s chapter sums up the challenges of the new sociopolitical situation of the country, whose economy shows a great deal of resilience, despite the gravity of the ills that weigh it down. These ills are due essentially to poor governance and the lack of leadership. But the current daunting challenges facing Cameroon do not in any way mortgage its future when the country, reconciled with itself, will awaken and shine with all its radiance.

25

I.4 ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, INSOCIALIZATION, AND THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY The requirement to adhere to academic standards in this Handbook does not, however, forbid either nostalgia, or at times even anger. But transcending these emotions, the texts assembled in this volume above all throw light upon the modes of economic interactions, actors’ decisions, management of households, businesses, and public institutions, socialization, even re-socialization very particular to Cameroonians. Traditional sociology claims that the genesis of the self, which is the first stage of socialization, is an automatic process essentially driven by institutions like the family, the school, and the social groups to which one belongs. This linear view of the modes of fashioning social textures does not really suit the environment described here. The sites where socialization occurs—those often-informal spaces where a Cameroonian becomes aware of being either “fully part” of the economic and social action or a piece of social rubbish “fully apart”—are very different from the sugary reality described in sociology books. And with reason: over in Douala or Yaoundé the family and the educational system often have very different roles from what can be seen in Brasilia or Helsinki. Their aims of socialization are generally the same as those of traditional sociology—teach the fundamentals of life in society, transmit ways of living, inculcate values like a taste for effort, and work toward aims that society considers important. However, in a Cameroon where the political leadership and the elites often have shown neither vision nor ethical concern, the socialization of the economic agent in households, businesses, and administrations is a chaotic and unstable process of legitimizing the philosophies of oppression, exchanging survival techniques, appropriating instruments of power, and validating the symbolics of self-hatred—that is, of others. The short and insightful commentaries of Ambroise Kom and Fabien Nkot are, in this respect, particularly revealing. It is difficult to read them without catching a glimpse of the many dimensions of what could be called insocialization—Cameroonian society’s extraordinary capacity for exhibiting and deploying its stock of inhumanity and thus refusing to integrate into itself the citizens it produces, as if inadvertently. A panorama of existences marked out on one hand by, at times rigid, public policies and economic systems derived from colonial certainties and on the other by the ingenuity and indocility of economic agents whose creativity and energy know no law, rule, or constraint, the texts of this volume also shed light on original modes of knowledge and practices. This Handbook also approaches obliquely, almost surreptitiously, a few epistemological questions like the problem of historical causality. This could, in fact, not be avoided, for the different contributions essentially are expressed as freeze frame shots of a country caught in the act of self-questioning, at a particularly interesting moment of its historical trajectory. What are the cause-and-effect relationships between the phenomena that form the narrative framework of this work? Is the failure of the elite the cause or simply the reflection of a mass resignation of social groups? Does the chicken precede the egg or the reverse? The answers to these questions are neither one-directional nor one-dimensional. They integrate what is in econometrics called multi-collinearity, that is, the fact that explanatory variables identified as having an impact on a dependent variable already influence each other. Therefore, before studying the causality relationship between explanatory variables on one hand and dependent variables on the other, one should examine the interaction existing between the explanatory variables themselves. The sociology of Cameroon that is reflected in this book illustrates this problem and the fact that the country’s history mingles several orders of causality: there are the material or “objective” data that one sets out in advance to try to explain the changes and the phenomena of rupture; there are the data of fortuity, those incidents, at times superficial but that play the role of the dissipative structures described by Ilya Prigogine (those particles as trivial as they are unexpected that, by themselves, completely disrupt and upset an equilibrium that was thought to be forever stable); and there are the final causes, as Paul Veyne would call them, those obvious events on which the news tends to focus and to which the contributors of this book give priority. The authors of this Handbook well know that the history of contemporary Cameroon is, however, neither a simple superposition of these three types of histories nor a “multi-story construction” with a 26

material and economic basement, a sociocultural ground floor, all of it capped by a superstructure consisting of events of current politics. They know that this history expresses itself in mixtures, non-scientific amalgams, and the introduction of plots. Thus, the historical explanation consists in clarifying the depth of a plot, in showing its progression, even if through a narrative schema that highlights little causes. This is the approach followed by many authors of this collection: they tell touching and delightful stories with a subjectivism not at all shameful—even when they are sad. According to their preferences, they pick off the torments of a country to which they are all very attached, freely analyzing the causes of the phenomena they describe and unapologetically expressing the reasons for their certainties. In such an approach, the imagination plays a crucial role in the selection of historical facts, the search for the causes, and the modes of understanding and interpreting the real. It is the well-known problem of causal imputation in the social sciences: as soon as one differentiates oneself from the quantitative methods privileged by economists or statisticians to identify not only the significant variables but also the important coefficients assigned to them and the meanings of the causalities, one exposes oneself to the risk of a counter-narration able to support reverse theses with the same arguments. One must then transfer explanatory schemes tested at that moment to situations observed in the past, or even to those to come. The imagination gives life to the material that one observes and identifies. The memory and reminiscence then take on a capital importance, with the risks of excess which that implies. That is no problem: several chapters of theoretical economics in this Handbook ask us to be satisfied with suppositions of the sociologist, anthropologist, or historian and with the novelist’s and poet’s dreams. The reader will therefore be neither surprised nor disappointed to find in some contributions a strong dose of pessimism or nostalgia.

I.5 POETICS OF SORROW AND THE GRAMMAR OF HAPPINESS This Handbook also poses the uncomfortable questions: why such a disappointment? Why such a waste of resources, competences, talents, and imagination? How can some citizens of this territory, which proudly proclaims itself a Republic, put up with that? As of 2022, Douala, Cameroon’s largest city and economic capital, has neither a museum, nor a library, nor a bookstore, nor a theater, nor a cinema or performance hall worthy of the name. Even football, which everyone is mad about and which brings together social classes and generations, is often played in pitifully sad stadiums. Only neighborhood bars, as noisy as they are run-down, and a few nightclubs where each person reveals the social identity to which he aspires, seem to constitute places of leisure. How in the world, wonders the New Yorker or Chilean passing through, do they manage to overcome such stifling tedium? What justifies these big smiles, these bursts of laughter in the torrid, humid heat, this contagious delight in life in places and at a time that seem cursed? How can one decipher the grammar of happiness in this Cameroon that intrigues as much as it beguiles? The secret of this informal art of living resides in the ability of Cameroonians to experience micro-sensations. They assume their existences with a great deal of appetite, magnifying events that others would find ordinary, celebrating without qualms the tiny rhythm intervals of days and nights, insisting on the value of the slightest punctuation, picking off time like a melody played out in diatonic half steps. The most amazing thing is that there is nothing artificial in their enthusiasm, and nothing self-conscious in the solemnity with which they are able to show themselves happy. “Wise is the man who monotonizes his existence, for then each minor incident seems a marvel” recommends Fernando Pessoa … “Monotonizing existence, so that it won’t be monotonous. Making daily life anodyne, so that the littlest thing will amuse.” Having become experts in the daily management of melancholy and tedium, the Cameroonians didn’t have to read Pessoa in order to appropriate this exhortation. Esthetics of disenchantment at the same time as poetics of the sorrow of existing, the collection proposed here is also a chronicle of nostalgia. Nostalgia not of a mythical past reinvented to make one feel good, but nostalgia of a dreamed future, a future that could have been if the collective imaginary had not for so long been held hostage by a band of usurpers disguised as the country’s political elite.

27

At a workshop to discuss the draft chapters of this Handbook and hosted by Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government (April 2–3, 2021), Joseph Stiglitz, Roger Myerson, Dani Rodrik, and Richard Joseph, whose works have inspired research on Africa in general and Cameroon in particular for decades, provided thoughtful and challenging reflections on the state of the world economy, the limits of export-led growth strategies in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and trade wars, and the fragilities of global and domestic governance systems. They also offered a rich set of ideas on the possible paths forward for African economies. I would like to thank them for their guidance, generosity, and support. I am glad to report that the contributors to this Handbook took up their challenges and did their best to outline credible strategies for growth and more effective governance in Cameroon. Without claiming absolute comprehensiveness, this Handbook aims to offer a broad survey of knowledge, debates, and current thinking and research on the economics of Cameroon. It examines the macroeconomic, microeconomic, and institutional issues faced by Cameroon using several approaches that combine discussions of historical events and their hysteresis effects, theoretical arguments, results from empirical studies, and relevant policy experiences. It includes technical and methodological contributions on governance, growth, and transformation, but also think pieces on mindsets, behavior, and social norms. It brings together a wide range of well-established economists and researchers who address issues from various perspectives. The contributors tried to strike a balance between academic literature and policy issues, between economic theory and practice, and between past knowledge and the unexplored ideas for future research. I am grateful to their commitment to this intellectual venture and to their hard work. I would like to acknowledge the enormous debt owed to Madeleine Velguth and Mankan Mohammed Koné who translated several chapters in this volume from French; Bouba Housseini and Ambroise Kom who helped me identify some great contributors and evaluate some of the early drafts; Nyemb Popoli who graciously provided cartoons for the chapter on the economy of corruption; my colleague Kevin Drumm who helped me to organize the work and managed the logistics of this project; and my students at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government who always raised the big questions that allowed me to identify the most relevant issues to be covered. This Handbook would not be nearly the one that it is without the strong support and careful attention to detail of all these colleagues. Last but not least, I would like to thank Cameroonian visual artist Samuel Dallé for granting us the use of his artwork on the cover of this handbook. The painting, entitled The Lighthouse, depicts the aesthetics of suffering, the brilliant agony of some unrepentant characters, and also the resilience of ordinary people and the celebration of life and its possibilities—all themes that seems appropriate to convey some of the messages of this Handbook.

NOTE 1.

The data in this section is from the World Bank. See GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $)—Cameroon | Data (worldbank.org).

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D. (2004), Understanding Institutions, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, February 23–25. Khan, M. (2012), “Governance During Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa,” New Political Economy, 17(5): 667–675. Khan, M. (2018), “Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions,” African Affairs, 117(469): 636–655. Kuznets, S. (1966), Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lin, J. Y. (2012), “Development 3.0,” Project Syndicate, June 14. Lin, J. Y. and C. Monga (2014), “The Evolving Paradigms of Structural Change,” in B. Currie-Adler, R. Kanbur, D. M. Malone, and R. Medhora (eds.), International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 277–294. Meade, J. (1978), “The Meaning of ‘Internal Balance,”’ The Economic Journal, 88(351, September): 423–435. Myerson, R. (2015), “Democratic Decentralization and Economic Development,” in C. Monga and J. Y. Lin (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 756–769. North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

28

Ocampo, J. A., Codrina Rada, and Lance Taylor (2009), Growth and Policy in Developing Countries: A Structuralist Approach. New York: Columbia University Press. Renan, E. (1992). “What is a Nation?” Text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? Translated by Ethan Rundell. Paris: Presses-Pocket. Solow, R. M. (1980), “On Theories of Unemployment,” The American Economic Review, 70(1): 1–11. Syrquin, M. (1988), “Patterns of Structural Change,” in H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 203–273. Wong, Chorng-Huey (2002), “Adjustment and Internal-External Balance,” in M. S. Khan, S. M. Nsouli, and C.-H. Wong (eds.), Macroeconomic Management: Programs and Policies. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 10–37.

29

PART I

CONTEXT, LEGACIES, AND MINDSETS

30

CHAPTER 1

THE CAMEROON ECONOMY Historical Overview JOHN MUKUM MBAKU

1.1 INTRODUCTION The Republic of Cameroon (République du Cameroun), which is often referred to as “Africa in miniature,” lies on the Gulf of Guinea and shares physical characteristics with both the Congo and Niger river basins and the cultures of both regions meet and mingle freely in the country ( LeVine, 1971: 1–3). Cameroon consists of 250 ethnocultural groups that were involuntarily brought together through colonialism, a process that has significantly affected the country’s political economy. Cameroon has been governed additionally by Germany, Great Britain, France, the now defunct League of Nations, and the United Nations. In addition, Cameroon’s cultural history, and to a certain extent, its political economy, has been influenced by Christianity, Islam, traditional religions, and several other factors, including globalization, and the influx of various groups (e.g., Nigeria’s Igbos and Yorubas) from across the region into the country (Mbaku, 2005: 1), as well as the internal migration of various groups, some of them occasioned by population pressures and/or the search for opportunities for self-actualization in the country’s urban areas. Cameroon is found on the Gulf of Guinea with Chad and the Central African Republic to the northeast; the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea to the south; and Nigeria to the west. With a surface area of 183,567 square miles (475,440 km2), a population of 26.55 million people (as of 2020) and an average growth rate of 2.59 percent, Cameroon is located slightly north of the equator. During the period 2015–2020, the adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 for women ages 15–19) was 105.8 (UNDP, 2020: 363). The country’s landforms can be grouped into four regions: the northern plains; the central and southern plateaus; the western highlands and mountains; and the lowlands along Cameroon’s coastline. While the northern plains extend as far as Lake Chad, the central and southern plateau lies between 7 N and 9 N latitude and extends to both the eastern and western borders of the country. The western highlands extend southeastward from the country’s border with Nigeria and include the highest mountain peak in West Africa, Mount Cameroon, which has an elevation of 13,436 feet (4,095 meters), covers 800 square miles (2071.99 square kilometers), and rises from the waters of the Gulf of Guinea. Cameroon has a coastal zone that measures less than 20 miles, lies in the area northwest of Mount Cameroon, and has many swamplands, all of which are covered by mangrove trees and several types of vegetation.

31

1.2 THE FOUNDING OF MODERN CAMEROON On July 14, 1884, the German imperial flag was raised on the right bank of the Cameroon (Wouri) River, officially establishing the colony of Kamerun. Further explorations would eventually expand the boundaries of the colony to as far as Lake Chad (Mbaku, 2005: 24). On November 4, 1911, France ceded territories (295,000 km2 of land called Neu-Kamerun) from French Equatorial Africa to German Kamerun as part of the settlement of the Agadir (Morocco) Crisis, which was resolved by the Treaty of Fez ( Maderspacher, 2009: 453). During World War I, Kamerun was occupied by French, Belgian, and British troops. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Germany officially renounced sovereignty over all its African colonies, including Kamerun. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers (1919), also decided the issue of who should have control over the territories previously under German control (see Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles). The Neu-Kamerun territories were returned to French Equatorial Africa and the rest of the German Protectorate was partitioned into British and French zones of influence, to be managed, first as League of Nations Mandates, and later as UN Trust Territories, with France and Great Britain as the administering powers (Mbaku, 2005: 27–33). France received four-fifths of the territory and administered it separate from its other colonies in the region. Britain, which received one-fifth of the former German colony, divided it into two administrative regions—British Northern Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons (Konings, 1999: 291). In December 1958, the UN terminated France’s administering power over the UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration (“French Cameroons”) and subsequently, French and Cameroonian authorities agreed to a timetable for independence, which was achieved on January 1, 1960, with the new country taking the name République du Cameroun (Mbaku, 2005: 33; Joseph, 1977). In UN-supervised plebiscites held in 1961, British Southern Cameroons voted to integrate with the République du Cameroun and British Northern Cameroons opted to join Nigeria (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003: 37–40). Independence of British Southern Cameroons and unification with the French-speaking République du Cameroun took place on October 1, 1961 to found the two-state Federal Republic of Cameroon with Ahmadou Ahidjo as its first president (Johnson, 1970: 201). On May 20, 1972, the federation was abolished in favor of a unitary state called the United Republic of Cameroon and in November 1982, Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned and handed the apparatus of government to his prime minister, Paul Biya—the latter has remained the country’s president to this day (2022). On May 26, 1990, the Anglophone Cameroonian politician, Ni John Fru Ndi, founded the Social Democratic Front (SDF), which became the first “opposition political party in Cameroon since multiparty competition was outlawed in the country in 1966” (Mbaku, 2020a: 76). While Biya and his government were opposed to efforts to return the country to multiparty democracy, domestic and external pressure eventually forced them to capitulate and agree to open up national political spaces for competition, as well as allow the formation of opposition political parties. In December 1990, the government officially announced the return of multiparty competition to Cameroon (Mbaku, 2020a: 76). Cameroon held its first presidential election after the legalization of multiparty politics on October 11, 1992 and Biya and his Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) emerged victorious after capturing 39.98 percent of the votes cast to 35.9 percent for Fru Ndi and the SDF (Fombad, 2019: 348). The country’s next presidential election was held on October 12, 1997 and it was won by Biya and the CPDM with most opposition political parties boycotting the election (Mbaku, 2020a: 77). In 1996, Cameroon amended the Constitution of June 2, 1972 and introduced the principle of separation of powers, with what was expected to be an independent judiciary, and, in addition, introduced presidential term limits and extended the presidential term from five to seven years—under this new provision, the president’s term of office was limited to two seven-year terms. Biya, who was still serving the presidential term that he had won in 1992 subsequently won the 1997 and 2004 presidential elections and, under the provisions of the 1996 constitutional amendments, he was expected to retire from politics in 2011. However, in 2008, and in anticipation of the 2011 presidential election, Biya, who was constitutionally barred from standing in that election as a candidate for the presidency, had the constitution changed to eliminate the two-term presidential term limit. As a result of the 2008 constitutional amendments, Biya is 32

expected to remain President of Cameroon until at least 2025. Since he came to power in 1982, Biya has structured the economy to allow him to use “repression or appeasement” to significantly increase the survival of his regime (Harrijvan and Weerdesteijn, 2020: 315). Over the years, Biya has used corruption to gain elite support and repressive measures to stem peaceful protests against his activities (Fombad, 2004: 357–394). For example, in response to the 2016 peaceful protests in the country’s Anglophone Regions, Biya sent federal security forces, who brutally suppressed any efforts by the Anglophones to petition their government to address their grievances (Mbaku, 2019a: 1–12). In addition, the Biya regime banned Internet access to the two Anglophone Regions and effectively cut off 20 percent of the population from the rest of the country and the world ( Mbaku, 2019a: 81). By the summer of 2018, the international press was reporting that “as many as 2,000 Anglophone [Cameroonians] had been killed and 170 [of their] villages had been burned down, effectively destroying valuable farmland and homes” and creating an enormous economic and humanitarian crisis (Mbaku, 2019a: 81). The peaceful protests that began in the Anglophone Regions in 2016 were designed to inform the government and the rest of the world of the plight of Anglophone Cameroonians who were arguing that, since reunification in 1961, they and their territory have suffered significant economic and political marginalization at the hands of the Francophone-dominated central government. The decision by Biya to respond to the peaceful protests with extremely repressive measures not only destroyed any prospects for deepening and institutionalizing democracy in the country but also destroyed economic capacity and brought Cameroon to the brink of disintegration.

1.3 THE MODERN CAMEROON ECONOMY AND ITS FOUNDATIONS 1.3.1 Germans and the Colonial Constitution The laws and institutions that govern political economy in Cameroon today trace their origins to European colonialism. Shortly after the establishment of the Kamerun Protectorate, Berlin took steps to provide its newly acquired and highly prized territories with locus standi in the German legal system through a constitution that could serve as a foundation for its governance structures, as well as for the development of its economic resources (Rudin, 1938: 126–129). The colonial constitution was also expected to provide a legal basis for all financial transactions between the Reichstag and the colonial territories ( Rudin, 1938: 126). Although the new constitution provided the institutional foundation for the development of an exchange economy, most of the inhabitants of Kamerun did not participate in its development (Mbaku, 2018: 25; Rudin, 1938: 126–129). The bill that became Kamerun’s constitution was presented to the Reichstag on January 12, 1886 and subsequently enacted into law on April 10, 1886 and vested all the powers to control the peoples and resources of Kamerun in the hands of the Kaiser. This “concentration of the authority in [the hands of the Kaiser] was the legal device through which [German] traders sought to be as unhampered in administering and exploiting the colonies as they had been in acquiring them” (Rudin, 1938: 129).

1.3.2 Christian Missions and European Traders Before colonization, the economy of the territories, which later became the Kamerun Protectorate, was characterized by “groups of indigenous cultivators, most of whom belonged to semi-autonomous or autonomous tribal groups” (DeLorme, Kamerschen, and Mbaku, 1988: 146). The economy was dominated by agricultural production, with foodstuffs and raw materials, such as cotton, raffia palms and palm kernels, constituting the bulk of output. Shifting cultivation was the principal method of farming (Ntangsi, 1979: 24–26; Rudin, 1938: 106). However, there were other forms of economic activities—many people weaved cloth, tilled the soil, produced pottery and also worked with metal (Rudin, 1938: 112–113). Additionally, trade was quite important to the economy of these territories—before official annexation in 1884, trade in these territories was controlled by Europeans (who included English, French, and German traders) and indigenous, mostly Duala, middlemen. Although British traders had “monopolized trade along the coastal region of [the Cameroon River District], after 1860 the Germans, led by the Woermann firm, became [increasingly] 33

involved in trade with the [Dualas]” (Ngoh, 1979: 4). C. Woermann, along with Jantzen & Thormählen, were the only two German firms that operated in these territories (Rudin, 1938: 162, 219). Although Duala monopolists served as effective middlemen between interior villages and European traders at the coast, the Europeans were eager to seize and control these lucrative trade positions. Located to the south and east of the Duala group of villages were the people of the Bakoko and the Bassa, who controlled trade in the interior of the Kamerun Protectorate. These peoples fought bravely to keep the Europeans or anyone else from usurping their middleman monopoly trade positions. Along the slopes of Mount Cameroon could be found various villages belonging to the Bakweri ethnocultural group—these peoples were mostly farmers and they would later be involved in a bitter struggle with German planters for control of fertile farmlands (Ardener, 1996: 41). European Christian missions played an important role in shaping economic conditions in the pre-colonial territories. After the slave trade was abolished in the British Empire in the early 1830s, many freed slaves from Jamaica desired to participate in an evangelical mission that would bring them back to their African homeland (Ngoh, 1979: 3). Under the sponsorship of the London-based Baptist Missionary Society (BMS), which had been involved in missionary work in Jamaica since 1813, the Jamaican colonists established themselves on the Spanish island of Fernando Po, which, at the time, served as a British naval base. The pioneering work of Jamaican Baptist missionary Joseph Merrick and his assistant, Joseph Jackson Fuller, who arrived in Fernando Po in 1814 and began evangelical work among the Isubu and Bimbia, is noteworthy (Joseph, 1980: 7). Before he died in 1848, Merrick had accomplished a great deal “in printing, translations, teaching and proselytizing” in the Cameroon River District (Joseph, 1980: 7). While the main objective of these pioneering missionaries was the saving of souls, there was an important secular side to their work, which would have a significant impact on the development of the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial economy in Cameroon. Besides preaching the gospel, Merrick, for example, was engaged in offering classes in the English language to converts, operating schools, running a printing press, and teaching converts carpentry and agriculture. Through these activities, he helped young Cameroonians develop necessary human capital and significantly enlarged the ability of the BMS to create economic and development opportunities for converts (Joseph, 1980: 7). BMS missionary Alfred Saker continued Merrick’s efforts, introduced a brick factory and provided practical economic activities that were quite attractive to many local parents. It has been noted that “it was enhanced communication with the English and other traders plying the coast, rather than communion with the God of the missionaries, that most excited these Africans” and that it was “the capacity of these churchmen to provide a much needed practical service that facilitated their peaceful acceptance” (Joseph, 1980: 7). After fleeing Fernando Po in response to Spanish suppression of Protestant missions, Alfred Saker moved to the mainland, settling in an area that he later named Victoria in honor of Queen Victoria (Ngoh, 1979: 3). Victoria was founded on land ceded to Saker by King William I of Bimbia, through a treaty signed between the two on August 23, 1858 (Ardener, 1996: 159; Brackney, 2021: 129). As the settlement at Victoria grew, it attracted Christian converts from Bimbia, Bota, and various neighboring Bakweri villages. Saker, now serving as the governor of the Victoria settlement, drafted a constitution, set up a Court of Justice, a Town Council, churches, and schools, and effectively established an institutional foundation for trade, missions, and economic development (Rudin, 1938: 18; Enonchong, 1967: 46). Before Germany founded the Kamerun Protectorate in 1884, the BMS “had enjoyed four decades of proselytizing free of interference from any state power other than the [the territory’s] multifarious African kingdoms” (Joseph, 1980: 8). However, extensive Christian proselytizing, for example, among the Bamiléké of the Western Highlands, the Beti of what is now Cameroon’s Centre Region, and various groups of the coastal regions, did not lead to “the erosion of traditional authority simply as a consequence of these conversions to Christianity” (Joseph, 1980: 8). Missionary activity also introduced languages that helped significantly in promoting communication among the various groups that were migrating to the emerging settlements of Victoria and Akwa Town (Douala) and other evolving urban centers. In addition to introducing their languages and making them a unifying lingua franca for the emerging metropolitan centers whose populations were made up of converts from various subcultures in the coastal and interior regions of what would become the Kamerun 34

Protectorate, the missionaries also studied indigenous languages and established written forms of these languages. They then translated the Bible into these languages. For example, by 1847, Jamaican missionary Joseph Merrick had completed the translation of the Gospel of Matthew into the Isubu language (Mbu, 1991: 66). A year later, Saker started translating the scriptures into Duala and, by 1872, Saker had translated the entire Bible into Duala (Delisle and Woodsworth, 2012: 86). Dr. Adolf Vielhauer, a German missionary working with the Basel Mission, translated the Bible into Mungaka (Vielhauer, 1956 : 122–130; Delisle and Woodsworth, 2012: 86). The translation of the Bible into local languages and the use of these languages in the missionaries’ “general publications, teaching and evangelical work (even among peoples of differing languages) was to have far-reaching social and political effects” (Joseph, 1980: 9). The activities of these missionary translators provided a lot of impetus “to literary work in African languages” and the training of individuals who were to become leaders in business and government (Delisle and Woodsworth, 2012: 86). It has been noted that “[t]he missionaries were of undoubted use to the state in promoting the educational advance of the population and improvements in social welfare, inculcating work discipline and establishing a moral order suited to the colonial enterprise, and, finally, in fostering an ideological commitment to the ‘civilizing mission’ of Western colonialism” (Joseph, 1980: 13). Yet, in some issues, such as the German expropriation of lands belonging to the Duala, many missionaries sided with the “native peoples” and against the colonial administration.

1.3.3 Germans Introduce Plantation Agriculture German entrepreneurs introduced capitalism into Kamerun and transformed indigenous cultivators and gatherers into wage laborers and, in the process, created “uniquely capitalist institutions such as a capitalist class, wage labor, a labor market, production and exchange and private ownership of land,” which were important parts of the colonial enterprise (DeLorme, Kamerschen, and Mbaku, 1988: 150). The most important German entrepreneur in Kamerun was Adolf Woermann “whose firm had the greatest holdings in the colony” (LeVine, 1964: 24). Woermann also served as a representative of German traders in the colony and was influential in establishing a constitution that created the legal link between the colony and the German Reichstag. On July 3, 1885, Julius von Soden took office as the first governor of Kamerun and proceeded to “set up a three-man advisory council to assist him, appointed a legal counselor (chancellor), and created the forerunner of the Mixed Courts (Schiedsgerichte) to supplant the abolished Court of Equity” (LeVine, 1964: 25). In December 1885, Governor von Soden dispatched his financial deputy, Jesko von Puttkamer, and the explorer Krabbes, to establish German authority over the Bakweri people who occupied the fertile slopes of Mount Cameroon. The German flag was eventually raised at Buea, which would become the capital of German Kamerun (1902–1916) (Rudin, 1938: 79). Convinced by “[t]he excellent climate at Buea and the fertility of the volcanic soil around the mountain,” the Germans proceeded to establish “extensive plantations in the area” and by 1913, the German firms of Woermann and Jantzen & Thormälen had built plantations on the lower slopes of Mount Cameroon (LeVine, 1964: 25). In addition to consolidating German control of the coastal regions of Kamerun, von Soden’s administration also enhanced and facilitated the ability of German commercial interests to expand their contacts with various groups in the interior of the Protectorate and helped establish a botanical garden at Victoria. Under the administration of Eugen von Zimmerer, who took over from von Soden, efforts to open the interior to German trade and administrative control began in earnest. One of the earliest efforts to penetrate the interior was led by explorer Eugen Zintgraff, whose work resulted in the establishment of stations at Barombi and Bali (in the present South West and North West Regions respectively) (Rudin, 1938: 81). Von Zimmerer was succeeded by von Puttkamer (1895–1907), whose administration was responsible for the establishment of large-scale plantations in Kamerun. He contributed significantly to the establishment of the private trading corporation, Gesellschaft Süd-Kamerun in 1898, specifically to exploit the rich resources of the southeast region of the protectorate. In July 1899, another private corporation called the Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun, was created and granted permission to exploit the Bamoun and Bamiléké regions (LeVine, 1964: 26–27; Rudin, 1938: 93–94). Von Puttkamer, like many colonialists of his time, believed that his only mission was to exploit the 35

enormous resources of the Kamerun Protectorate for the benefit of his homeland—Germany. He meted out extremely harsh treatment on the “natives” and ignored complaints against his draconian governing methods. However, in 1906, Akwa chiefs took their case to the Reichstag and after an investigation, “von Puttkamer was recalled and tried by the Potsdam Disciplinary Court and after conviction, he was removed as Governor of Kamerun” (LeVine, 1964: 28). Harry R. Rudin, an expert on the German period in Cameroon, has noted that although von Puttkamer “prided himself on being a realist in all things” and “took the very frank view that the purpose of the colonial administration was to further the economic exploitation of the colony,” he played a critical and prominent role in establishing large-scale plantation agriculture in the colony (Rudin, 1938: 182). However, he was also known for “his hard policies toward the blacks, stories of immorality, and his dislike of the principles for which missionaries worked” (Rudin, 1938: 182). Theodor Seitz, who took over from von Puttkamer on May 9, 1907 and served until August 1910, “held sincerely to a native policy that was the very opposite of Puttkamer’s; he made the protection of natives and their rights a fundamental principle of his rule” (Rudin, 1938: 182). It was during the governorship of Seitz that Neu-Kamerun was added to Kamerun, significantly increasing the latter’s geographic area ( LeVine, 1964: 29). Two more governors served Kamerun before the arrival of Allied Expeditionary Forces to occupy the territory. Under these successors—Dr. Otto Gleim and Karl Ebermaier—the “interest in natives and their well-being was maintained but without the zeal manifested by Seitz” (Rudin, 1938: 182).

1.3.4 Germans Leave Behind a Decent Infrastructural Foundation Germans developed many plantations which produced palm oil, palm kernels, cocoa, rubber, tobacco, and bananas. For example, in 1894, Governor Zimmerer “reported that plantations were showing greater progress than trade because of the lack of roads and other hindrances to communication with the interior” ( Rudin, 1938: 249). By January 1, 1913, there were as many as fifty-eight plantations and 195 planters, all of whom were Europeans. There were 17,827 wage laborers on these plantations, all of them African ( Rudin, 1938: 249). In addition to establishing agricultural plantations, the Germans left behind a significant amount of economic infrastructure, which was to serve as an important foundation for the post-independence economy. The physical plant left by the Germans included “harbor facilities at Douala, Kribi, Campo, and Tiko-Victoria; the Nordbahn and Mittelbahn rail lines, as well as the Victoria plantation narrow-gauge railway, a large number of bridges, roads, and paths; and well-constructed government and private buildings, many of which are still in use today” (LeVine, 1964: 36). In fact, one cannot underestimate the “value of the many plantations and development projects started during the [German] protectorate” ( LeVine, 1964: 36). The French and the British inherited “a basic infrastructure and a productive agricultural economy, both with considerable potential” (LeVine, 1964: 36). The Germans also left behind an “intangible legacy” that has had significant long-lasting and wide-ranging effects. First, the Germans “initiated the Cameroonian Africans into the novelties of the exchange economy by drawing them into the cash-wage nexus, and by introducing notions of ownership foreign to the native societies” (LeVine, 1964: 36), Second, the Germans “inculcated habits of obedience and deference to authority without which the successors to its regime would have been unable to function” (LeVine, 1964: 36). Third, and perhaps, more importantly, the German colonial government’s repressive policies, including especially their decision to forcefully remove the Duala from the city of Douala to make way for European settlers, “fostered protest movements containing the seeds of future political action” ( LeVine, 1964: 36). In fact, through their activities, the Germans “encouraged the growth of an African social stratum capable of mediating between the Europeans and the African Cameroonians of the hinterland; in this the administration consciously used education and Christian missionary activity as instruments of penetration and modernization” (LeVine, 1964: 36).

36

1.4 THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH After the city of Douala was captured by Allied forces on September 14, 1914, a condominium was established to administer the city jointly until the enemy was fully defeated and peace secured. However, on March 14, 1916, the condominium was terminated and Kamerun (without Neu-Kamerun, which had been returned to French Equatorial Africa) was partitioned into French and British zones of influence and converted into League of Nations Mandates, with France and Britain as the administering powers (Mbaku, 2005: 26–27). Economic development in the French mandate must be “viewed within the framework of political developments in the colony” (Mbaku, 2005: 27). The first factor of this framework was the set of institutional arrangements that were imposed on the colony in order to enhance the ability of France to govern the territory and to deal with the problems that arose from such rule. The second factor was the reaction of indigenous groups to French rule. The third and final factor was the influence of German planters, many of whom had returned after the war to reclaim the plantations that they had abandoned after being ousted by Allied forces (Mbaku, 2005: 27). Initially, French policy in colonial Africa was based on assimilation (politique d’assimilation), which was expected to develop the colonies and metropolitan France “into a single, integrated political and economic unit” (LeVine, 1964: 89). However, many officials in Paris believed that the cultural gap between metropolitan France and the inhabitants of the colonies made it virtually impossible to implement the politique d’assimilation. It was decided that instead of “all-out political assimilation, there would be a kind of functional collaboration between French [colonial] rulers and the native elite who had accepted French civilization. Education would gradually raise the social standard of the masses to the point where, eventually, assimilation might be possible” (LeVine, 1964: 89–90). This alternative policy to assimilation was called association (politique d’association) (see Betts, 1960; Joseph, 1975). Cameroonian elites, all of whom had been educated and trained in French language and administrative procedures and had accepted French culture and civilization, were granted privileged positions in the “colonial bureaucracy and served as a vital link between the government and the African peoples” and in many rural areas of French Cameroons, the Gallicized Africans “served as minor colonial officers, representing French authority in the villages” (Mbaku, 2005: 27). France “applied different policies and standards to inhabitants of the colonies depending on the degree to which they had ‘evolved’ toward the French social ideal” (LeVine, 1964: 90). The population of French Cameroons was divided into “français or européen (covering any white Frenchman or non-African), assimilé (‘assimilated,’ or as close as an African could come to being européen), and évolué (‘evolved,’ or Africans educated and considerably Gallicized)” (LeVine, 1964: 90). These classifications significantly impacted the ability of individuals to participate in the colony’s political economy. For example, while citoyens were granted “the civil and political rights of persons of French origin,” sujets (that is, those subject to native customs) were subjected to the forced labor policies of the régime de l’indigénat (LeVine, 1964: 90–91). The indigénat was a cruel and insidious colonial system in which the “distribution of various primary social goods (e.g., liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of honor and self-respect) was based on racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic status” ( Mbaku, 2018: 167–168). Such a legal and administrative system had a significantly negative impact on the political economy in French Cameroons (Hargreaves, 1967; Mann, 2009; Thompson and Adloff, 1969). The British neglected the economy of their part of the erstwhile German colony during the mandate period. In fact, there was little or no activity in the plantations that had been left behind by the Germans. This was due, inter alia, to the fact that the British treasury was neither willing to finance capital expenditures in the colony nor facilitate British private capital to do so. After the plantations were sold to their former German owners, there was a rise in trade in British Cameroons but most of that trade was directed toward Germany. For example, of a total export bill of 155,432 marks, Britain received only 6,341 marks of that value, while Germany received 109,603 marks’ worth of exports from British Cameroons. In 1937, Germany provided 47.57 percent of British Cameroons’ imports and received 79.75 percent of the colony’s exports (Mbaku, 2005: 29). During this period, it was German economic activity, particularly in 37

the management of the plantations and the expansion of the infrastructure, that accounted for most of the economic prosperity enjoyed by citizens of the British Cameroons (Welch, 1966: 155–156). After the formation of the United Nations in 1945, the mandates eventually became UN Trust Territories under the administration of France and Britain. However, acceptance of the trusteeship system by both France and Britain implied that these countries were willing to abide by Article 76 of the UN Charter, which mandated the promotion of “the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence” (UN Charter, Article 76(b)). While this was antithetical to France’s more expansionist colonial policy, reforms in colonial policy made possible by the French Constitution of 1946; agitations against colonialism from emerging African elites, including Cameroon’s Ruben Um Nyobé, Félix-Roland Moumié, and other members of the anti-colonialist organization, Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC); and developments at the UN, forced France to grant independence to the UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration on January 1, 1960 (Joseph, 1977). Several studies have concluded that despite administrative neglect in “both the colonial and post-independence eras, rural areas of West Cameroon [now the Anglophone Regions], perform better than rural areas of East Cameroon [now the Francophone Regions] with essentially similar pre-existing conditions” (Lee and Schultz, 2012: 42). The studies show that British Southern Cameroons benefited from indirect rule and the lack of forced labor. However, higher levels of investment in the colonial and post-colonial periods, centrally provided public goods, including roads, and a larger concentration of urban areas, has made East Cameroon much richer and more developed than West Cameroon (Lee and Schultz, 2012: 7, 42).

1.5 THE POST-REUNIFICATION ECONOMY Federation President Ahmadou Ahidjo adopted an economic policy that was based on socialist and capitalist principles, called planned liberalism. He formally launched this development policy at the inaugural congress of the ruling Cameroon National Union (CNU) in the city of Baffousam and formally elaborated the concept in two important publications (Ahidjo, 1967, 1980). Planned liberalism granted the government the leading role in economic development while at the same time encouraging the creation and nurturing of a private sector and an entrepreneurial class. Under this approach, “the state was expected to bring together, through five year development plans, both private and public resources to develop the country’s economic capacity” (Mbaku, 2004a: 395). A key part of planned liberalism was the establishment of an investment code that favored foreign investment and the creation of parastatals, which were expected to undertake projects that the government believed could not be efficiently undertaken by the private sector. This development approach, however, created a lot of problems for the economy. First, the investment code offered foreign investors a series of benefits that placed domestic investors at a competitive disadvantage. These generous benefits included tax credits; subsidies to secure human capital; preferential access to public contracts; subsidized loans from public financial institutions; and enhanced access to production inputs from domestic and external sources (Mbaku, 2013: 164). Second, most of the businesses established by foreign investors were capital intensive and hence, employed only a relatively small amount of labor, most of which was foreign. As a consequence, most local labor did not benefit, at least not directly, from a lot of the investments that came into the country through planned liberalism. In fact, most foreign businesses failed to create the jobs that the government had hoped would come with increased foreign direct investment flows, and the general tax benefits granted to foreign capital “implied that the activities of these foreign entrepreneurs did not contribute significantly to raising the national taxable base” (Fonge, 2005: 343). Finally, this approach to economic development significantly enhanced the ability of foreign entrepreneurs, particularly French business interests, to dominate and control the Cameroon economy, particularly the industrial and manufacturing sectors. This process significantly stunted the development and sustaining of the indigenous entrepreneurial class that was expected to form the foundation for sustainable development in the post-independence economy ( Mbaku, 2013: 164). 38

Parastatals, which were 55 percent owned by the government, served as the instrument through which the government intervened in the economy. Although he considered state intervention important, Ahidjo believed in liberalism in the economic domain and this informed his approach to the design of the investment code, which “regarded private initiative as an important force in economic growth” (Fonge, 2005: 343). A salient objective of the generous packages granted to foreign investors by the investment code was “to bring badly needed capital resources to the struggling Cameroon economy,” with the hope that the presence of this foreign capital would pave the way for the development of an indigenous entrepreneurial class (Fonge, 2005: 343). After he became President of Cameroon in 1982, Paul Biya maintained Ahidjo’s planned liberalism and continued to prioritize foreign over domestic investment. As a consequence, Biya’s government failed to create the robust domestic entrepreneurial class that would have developed industries that were more likely to employ local labor and contribute to the national tax base. Thus, even after more than sixty years since reunification, the country’s industrial and mining sectors remain dominated by foreign firms, with the management of these firms still controlled by foreigners (Fonge, 2005: 343). Studies of the “triangular relationship between the state, indigenous capitalists, and foreign economic agents” in the Cameroon economy have revealed the continuing domination of important sectors of the economy by foreign capital (see, e.g., Ndongko, 1986: 107). In his analysis of the Cameroon economy from independence to the mid-1980s, Cameroonian economist, Professor Wilfred A. Ndongko, concluded that despite a national policy to foster the development of a domestic entrepreneurial class, Cameroonian capitalists “have yet to provide an effective challenge to or even to supplant foreign capital” and that “80 percent or more of industrial value-added [was] in import-substituting activities” (Ndongko, 1986: 107–108). Import substitution, especially in “food and beverage processing, textiles, garment manufacture, wood products, paper, and printing along with a sprinkle of capital intensive projects in petroleum refining, cement, and fertilizers,” constituted an important part of economic growth in Cameroon in the 1970s and 1980s (Ndongko, 1986: 108). However, despite massive state aid, “many of the state enterprises/parastatals designed to promote the development of the agro-industrial sector suffer from poor management, an inability to integrate the peasantry into their projects, and a failure to substitute national products for food imports” (Mbaku, 1988: 367; Willame, 1986). By the mid-1980s, the country’s agricultural sector was no longer able to feed the growing urban population. Research revealed that agriculture’s decline was caused less by occasional droughts and more by the government’s preference for investments in economic sectors that were considered politically more important, as well as by price-control regimes for agricultural products that constrained production. Although Cameroon was able to maintain “solid economic growth as well as acceptable growth in the agricultural sector,” the country’s elaborate development plans were often not implemented and “only 51.2 percent of the planned investment in the agricultural sector was actually made during the Fourth Development Plan” (DeLancey, 1986: 156). Since the late-1970s, Cameroon’s economy has benefited significantly from the production and export of oil. Since 1977, when oil production began in Cameroon, revenues from the export of crude oil have represented an increasingly significant part of public revenues, rising from “one-fifth to two-thirds of total merchandise exports in the last five years” (Benjamin and Devarajan, 1986: 165). With significant endowments of natural resources, Cameroon “has the potential to be one of the richest countries in sub-Saharan Africa” (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 155).

39

1.5.1 Oil and the Cameroon Economy Economists have long known that revenues generated from natural resources are likely to induce “rent-seeking and corruption in those countries that have not developed sufficient quality of governance before the natural resource discovery” (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 155). Cameroon, with its dysfunctional governing processes, has suffered significantly from the resource curse. Economists have argued that “countries blessed with natural resources such as oil and gas can base their development on these resources, and use them as a key path for sustained economic growth” (Badeeb, Lean, and Clark, 2017: 123). However, research has determined “that resource-rich nations, especially in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East tend to grow at a slower rate than countries with fewer natural resources. These countries are said to suffer from what [has been referred to as] a resource curse” (Badeeb, Lean, and Clark, 2017: 123). Cameroon has received significant rents from oil and, according to Gauthier and Zeufack, “a large proportion [of these rents] was not properly accounted for in the [national] budget” (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 155). World Bank data show that during the period 1977–2006 in Cameroon, “the oil revenue gap [was] US$5.9 billion” (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 155). However, investigations using production data from Cameroon’s national oil company—the Société nationale des Hydrocarbures)—determined the gap to be actually “US$7 billion or 35.2 percent of the estimated total oil revenue that should have accrued to the government” but which was not accounted for (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 156). The authors concluded that “lack of transparency and accountability in oil revenue management, including diversion of revenue away from the state budget, has significantly slowed the pace of development in Cameroon over the long run” (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 156). Although there have been some improvements in transparency and accountability in Cameroon’s oil sector during the last several decades, corruption and rent-seeking remain major problems. Of particular importance is the fact that civil society is still not empowered to function effectively as a check on the exercise of government power. Although some scholars have suggested that Cameroon should establish a truly independent energy regulatory agency, as a well as an audit court and an anticorruption commission, such institutions can only function effectively within a governing process that is characterized by adherence to the rule of law. Thus, any efforts to improve the allocation of oil revenues should be made part of comprehensive reforms to provide the country with a governing process that is characterized by separation of powers with effective checks and balances, and this must include, at the very least, a truly independent judiciary, a civil society that is capable of effectively checking on the exercise of government power, a free and independent press, and constitutionally created and mandated institutions (e.g., the Auditor General and the Public Protector), which are empowered to guard the country’s democracy (see, e.g., Mbaku, 2020b: 631). During the period 1972–1979, Cameroon averaged an economic growth rate of 5.7 percent. However, with the advent of commercial oil production in 1977, the economy was able to achieve a growth rate of 9.4 percent between 1977 and 1986 (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 157). But, a drop in commodity prices, including oil, “coupled with inadequate policy responses plunged the country into a severe economic crisis” (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2012: 157) and between 1985 and 1994, the real GDP growth rate was – 2.7 percent (World Bank, 2004: 15). Cameroon’s economic regression was interrupted by the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, which appeared to help the slumping economy rebound, and this was due primarily to a huge surge in timber exports. Unfortunately, that increase produced significant external costs, which included deforestation and ecosystem degradation. In addition, the surge in exports did not help significantly improve the country’s real GDP growth, as the rate of 1.3 percent between 1990 and 1999 was much lower than the 4.5 percent achieved during the period 1980–1989 (World Bank, 2011: 8).

40

1.6 ANGLOPHONE-FRANCOPHONE CONTRADICTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY In the federation, the former British Southern Cameroons was known as West Cameroon and the République du Cameroun took the name East Cameroon. West Cameroonians (also called Anglophone Cameroonians) were afraid that “the proclivity of [federation president] Ahidjo and his colleagues toward centralized governmental systems would force the union into a unitary state and subsequently jeopardize the political autonomy of the English-speaking state” (Mbaku, 1997: 86). Several events soon made these fears prophetic. First, at reunification, West Cameroon was asked to “surrender its customs receipts and other sources of revenue to the central government in favor of temporary appropriations from the latter” and that arrangements would then be made later to secure the financial autonomy of West Cameroon (Mbaku, 1997 : 86). Unfortunately, such an arrangement was never made and West Cameroon became totally dependent on the federal government for all its finances, a process that effectively destroyed the “political autonomy that was supposed to be granted the federated state as part of the federalist political system to be established through reunification” (Mbaku, 1997: 86). Second, after 1961, West Cameroon continued to use the pound sterling as its currency. However, in January 1962, authorities in Yaoundé, through a presidential decree, “introduced the CFA franc (the currency of the République du Cameroun) into West Cameroon without consulting state leaders and without any considerable effort to properly prepare the people for its arrival” ( Mbaku, 1997: 86). Of course, West Cameroon officials were quite aware that federation implied the eventual harmonization of laws and institutions, including the adoption of a common currency. However, they believed that such a process would be gradual, participatory, inclusive, and with adequate and effective consultation of not just West Cameroon leaders, but also the state’s citizens. Third, many West Cameroonians believed that the central government under Ahidjo and Biya had left them to suffer in extreme poverty. Data show that West Cameroon’s share of the federation GDP in 1960 was 16.5 percent or 19,000 million francs CFA, but by 1970, that percentage had fallen to 12 percent or 27,000 million francs CFA. East Cameroon’s share of the GDP, on the other hand, increased rapidly from 83.5 percent in 1960 to 88 percent in 1970 (Ndongko, 1975: 156–157). As noted by Professor Ndongko, economic conditions in West Cameroon continued to deteriorate as the federal government used national development plans to allocate development resources primarily to East Cameroon (Ndongko, 1975: 156–157). By the early-to-mid-1970s, frustrated by their continued poverty, as well as a lack of political participation, many Anglophones were calling for secession and the formation of an independent and sovereign West Cameroon. Finally, due to Southern Cameroons’ extremely weak negotiating position during the constitutional talks in Foumban in 1961, the République du Cameroun made only nominal changes to its laws and institutions in order to enter the federation. On the other hand, Southern Cameroons was forced to abandon virtually all its institutions and adopt those of its partner in the new federal republic (Mbaku, 2014: 26). As explained by Professor Kofele-Kale, “[i]t was difficult to tell in many instances where [East Cameroon] jurisdiction left off and where that of the federal government began. The lines were blurred, and this only reinforced anglophone perception of francophone domination” (Kofele-Kale, 1986: 63). In fact, throughout the federation (1961–1972), Yaoundé served as both the federal capital and that of East Cameroon and “their respective institutions were essentially one ‘in origin as well as in function”’ (Kofele-Kale, 1986: 63). This only reinforced the belief by Anglophone Cameroonians that they were being marginalized and pushed to the economic and political margins.

41

1.7 CAMEROON’S ECONOMY TODAY Cameroon continues to encounter significant levels of economic and political fragility. In addition to the insecurity and violence that pervades the Anglophone Regions, the East Region, which borders the Central African Republic (CAR), has been affected by a significant influx of refugees into many villages along Cameroon’s eastern border. Also, economic conditions in the country’s northern regions, which historically have exhibited high levels of inequality and poverty, have deteriorated significantly due to low agricultural productivity, the impact of climate change, poor infrastructure, limited access to critical services, especially health and education, and perhaps, more importantly, the high levels of insecurity and violence made possible by the activities of the extremist religious group Boko Haram (World Bank, 2017: 3). Food insecurity, failure of children to attend school, acute malnutrition, homelessness, and deterioration in the humanitarian situation, are all problems that continue to challenge development in the Anglophone Regions, as well as the eastern and northern regions of the country. Due to these high levels of insecurity and violence, young people in various regions across the country, particularly in the Anglophone Regions, have not been able to attend school to secure the training and skills that they need to evolve into productive adults and contributing members of their communities. Hence, the violence is likely to have a significantly negative impact on the country’s long-term economic prospects. Unfortunately, Cameroon’s dysfunctional and unaccountable institutions have only exacerbated the problem and have forced young people into untenable situations. Cameroon achieved middle-income status in the mid-1980s, in large part because of contributions from its oil sector. In 1987, the World Bank listed Cameroon as a middle-income country with a GNP per capita of US$970 (1987 dollars) and a GNP per capita growth rate of 3.8 percent (1965–1987) (World Bank, 1989: 164). However, Cameroon was plunged into severe recession during the next few years, as evidenced by the fact that in 1994, Cameroon had lost its middle-income status and was listed by the World Bank as a low-income country with a GNP per capita of US$680 and an average annual growth rate in GNP per capita of –6.9 percent (World Bank, 1996: 188). However, economic growth in Cameroon improved after the 1994 CFA franc devaluation and accelerated after the country “reached the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point in 2006” (World Bank, 2017: 4). Large public investments in infrastructure, especially in energy and transport, and which averaged 7.5 percent of GDP during 2014–2016, contributed to an acceleration of economic growth in the country (World Bank, 2017: 4). Table 1.1 provides data on the economies of the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC). Although Cameroon’s performance compares favorably to that of other CEMAC members, it is important to note that Cameroon’s growth relies less on the production and export of natural resources, including oil, than the other members of CEMAC. Natural resources rents represented only 5.7 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 13.35 percent for CEMAC members (Table 1.1). In an assessment of debt sustainability in Cameroon by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the latter noted that “Cameroon remains at high risk of external and overall public debt distress, but debt remains sustainable” (IMF, 2020: 1). The IMF noted that Cameroon’s “[p]ublic external debt is projected to peak in 2020 at 30.6 percent of GDP and to decline gradually thereafter” (IMF, 2020: 10). The IMF concludes that “[s]teadfast implementation of fiscal and structural reforms is crucial to mitigate risks” and that “deep structural reforms [are needed in order] to improve competitiveness and achieve economic diversification,” while “fiscal consolidation, revenue mobilization and a prudent borrowing policy, skewed towards concessional loans, remain essential to keep public debt dynamics on a sustainable path and rebuild buffers ahead of upcoming high debt repayments” (IMF, 2020: 12–13).

42

Table 1.1 Development Indicators for CEMAC Countries

Country

Population (millions) 2019

Total Natural Resources Rents as % of GDP 2016

Purchasing Power Parity Gross National Income ($) billions, Per capita capita 2019 ($), 2019

Gross National Product (GNP?) % Per capita % growth, growth, 2019 2019 3.7 1.1 3.0 1.3 3.2 0.2 3.5 6.0

Cameroon 25.9 5.7 96.5 3,730 CAR 4.7 13.0 5.0 1,060 Chad 15.9 13.3 25.9 1,620 Congo, 5.4 20.2 16.0 2,980 Rep. of E. Guinea 1.4 16.1 19.9 14,640 5.6 8.8 Gabon 2.2 11.8 31.2 14,350 3.9 1.4 Note: CAR = Central African Republic; E. Guinea = Equatorial Guinea, and Congo, Rep. of = Republic of Congo, also known as Congo (Brazzaville). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2019, Washington, DC: World Bank.

During the period 2014–2016, lower oil prices reduced revenues accruing to the government by about “2 percent of GDP” and this was only “partly offset by a reduction in fuel subsidies” (World Bank, 2017: 4). The country’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio, “which had declined from 52 percent before the completion of the HIPC process to 10 percent in 2008, rose to 28 percent of GDP at the end of 2015” and was projected to rise to “36 percent of GDP by 2020” (World Bank, 2017: 4). Thus, “[c]ombined with lower oil exports, higher debt levels have led to a deterioration of the present value of debt to exports ratio” in Cameroon ( World Bank, 2017: 4). Various assessments show that Cameroon’s economy remains unattractive to investments in the private sector. In addition to the fact that the economy is not competitive, it lacks diversification. The World Bank notes that, despite the fact that Cameroon has an “abundance of natural assets, and tremendous climatic and land potential, the primary sector’s contribution to growth is very limited, about one percentage point of GDP p.a., and is dominated by food crops grown by smallholder farmers” (World Bank, 2017: 5). Cameroon’s competitiveness index—which is defined as the “set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity”—deteriorated from 121st/140 in 2018 to 123rd/141 in 2019 (Schwab and WEF, 2019: 134–137). In terms of the ease of doing business—starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting access to electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency—Cameroon ranked 167 out of 190, with New Zealand, Singapore, and Hong Kong (SAR, China) emerging as the most business-friendly economies in the world, with ranks of 1, 2, and 3 respectively (World Bank, 2020).

1.8 CONCLUSION Cameroon’s economy has been influenced, over the years, by various groups and institutions. First is European colonialism—German, British, and French—which brought various ethnolinguistic groups together to form what is now Cameroon and introduced the people to capitalism and its associated institutions (e.g., private ownership of the means of production). Second is Christianity and Christian missions, which significantly affected the people’s worldview, forced a restructuring of family relations, and paved the way for more intergroup interaction and cooperation. By increasing inter-ethnic interaction, Christianity also created more avenues for trade and exchange between the various subcultures within Cameroon. In addition, Christian missions introduced schools and apprenticeship centers, where young people could acquire skills that enhanced their ability to function as productive adults. Of course, education significantly improved the economic mobility of many Cameroonians, allowing them to freely migrate to where they could earn their opportunity cost, a process that contributed significantly to the development of an exchange economy. 43

While the introduction of European languages (e.g., German, English, and French) did have a negative impact on the further development of several indigenous languages, it, nevertheless, provided a lingua franca, which significantly enhanced communication across cultures and across ethnic boundaries, and helped in the development of urban centers, large agricultural plantations, and an exchange economy. Missionaries also studied indigenous languages (e.g., Mungaka and Duala), established written forms for them, and translated the Bible into these languages. For example, Alfred Saker, the Baptist missionary who founded the metropolitan center of Victoria (now called Limbe), translated the Bible into Duala. In addition, the activities of the various missionary translators paved the way for the creation of knowledge (e.g., poetry, short stories, and essays) in indigenous languages. While producing an important crop of indigenous knowledge creators, the work of missionaries also created, in many Cameroonian intellectuals, a moral idealism that would undergird their opposition to colonialism and the struggle for independence and the recognition and protection of human rights. Third, migrants from neighboring countries have significantly enriched the country’s cultural mix and have also made important contributions to the development of the country’s economy. For example, in urban areas such as Kumba and Bamenda, one can find Cameroonians of Nigerian heritage performing important functions in trade, commerce, and the construction of rental real properties. A study of Kumba showed that Igbos, whose ancestors migrated from southeastern Nigeria into Cameroon before and during the colonial period, are important entrepreneurs in “the market trade in local foodstuffs and imported goods as well as the transport industry and the retail and wholesale distribution of palm oil” and many of them have also entered “the restaurant business, photography, baking, shoe repairing, and a wide variety of other small enterprises” (Kleis, 1980: 91). Fourth, large internal migrations, many of them occasioned by population pressures and the search for opportunities for self-actualization and economic advancement, have also contributed to the growth of urban economies in Cameroon. During the German period, a significant number of the people who worked as laborers in rubber and palm plantations throughout the southern regions of Kamerun were immigrants from the interior of the country. Finally, in addition to Christianity, Islam and Cameroon’s various traditional religions have also been responsible for inculcating in the people values, such as probity and morality, which have been critical to the development of economic and financial institutions. For example, many of the country’s various traditional religions “require their members to be devout, honest, faithful and spiritual,” values that augur well for the development of a fully functioning and sustainable economy. In 2020, the economy was affected significantly by the combined impacts of three important stimuli: the COVID-19 pandemic; the persistence of security and political crises, notably in the Anglophone Regions, and the East and Far North Regions; and the decline in world oil prices. From a health and economic perspective, “Cameroon was the hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020” among the CEMAC countries (AfDB, 2021: 107). In 2020, Cameroon’s real GDP contracted by 2.4 percent, compared to an average annual growth of 3.7 percent in 2019. There was a 6.1 percentage point decline in economic activity in Cameroon, which the African Development Bank noted was due primarily to the decline in global prices for oil. Economic growth in Cameroon has also been negatively affected by the deteriorating security situation in various parts of the country. The closure of the border between Nigeria and the Anglophone Regions, for example, brought to a halt the significant amount of trade that had been taking place between Nigeria and major Anglophone metropolitan areas such as Limbe, Buea, Kumba, and Bamenda. In addition, the burning of many Anglophone villages by government security forces destroyed important agricultural land and significantly impeded farming and the production of foodstuffs, as well as cash crops, such as cocoa, coffee, and palm oil and palm kernel. The availability of a vaccine against COVID-19 at the beginning of 2021 is expected to eventually and gradually extinguish the virus and improve global economic conditions ( World Bank, 2021). Improvements in health conditions in Cameroon, including especially a general decline in COVID-19 infection rates, should create the opportunity for economic recovery in the country. However, for such a recovery to occur, Cameroon must deal fully and effectively with its security issues, including in particular he conflict in the Anglophone Regions. Perhaps, most importantly, Cameroon must undertake necessary institutional reforms to provide itself with a governing process that is undergirded by the true separation of 44

powers with checks and balances. Such checks include a truly independent judiciary; a robust and politically active civil society, one that is capable of effectively guarding the government in order to force it to be accountable to both the constitution and the people; civil society institutions (e.g., a free and independent press) that can check on the exercise of government power and provide citizens with the information that they need to remain politically active; and a virtuous public and virtuous leaders.

REFERENCES AfDB (African Development Bank) (2021), African Economic Outlook 2021: From Debt Resolution to Growth: The Road Ahead for Africa. Abidjan: AfDB. Ahidjo, A. (1967), The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo. Yaoundé: Imprimerie nationale. Ahidjo, A. (1980), Anthologie des Discours, 1957–1979, Four Volumes. Dakar: Les Nouvelles éditions africaines. Ardener, E. (1996), Kingdom on Mount Cameroon: Studies in the History of the Cameroon Coast, 1500–1970, Edited and with an Introduction by Shirley Ardener. Providence, Rhode Island & Oxford: Berghahn Books. Badeeb, R. A., H. H. Lean, and J. Clark (2017), “The Evolution of the Natural Resource Curse Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey,” Resources Policy, 51: 123–134. BBC News (2018), “Burning Cameroon: Images You’re Not Meant to See,” BBC News, June 25. Available at: https:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44561929 (accessed March 1, 2022). Benjamin, N. C. and S. Devarajan (1986), “Oil Revenues and the Cameroonian Economy,” in M. G. Schatzberg and I. W. Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Cameroon. New York: Praeger, pp. 161–188. Betts, R. F. (1960), Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914. New York: Columbia University Press. Brackney, W. H. (2021), Historical Dictionary of the Baptists. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. Constitution du 1er Septembre 1961 Modifiée et Complétée par Les Lois 69/LF/14 du 10 Novembre 1969 et 70/FL/1 du 4 Mai 1970 (This is the official name of The Federal Constitution of 1961). Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1972 (as amended through 1996), art. 6(2). The constitution’s official name is Law No 96/6 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972. Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1972 (as amended through 2008), art. 6(2). The official name of this amended version of the constitution is Law No 2008/001 of 14 April 2008 to amend and supplement some provisions of law No 96/6 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972. DeLancey, V. (1986), “Agricultural Productivity in Cameroon,” in M. G. Schatzberg and I. W. Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Cameroon. New York: Praeger, pp. 133–160. Delisle, J. and J. Woodsworth (eds.) (2012), Translators Through History, Revised Edition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co. DeLorme C. D., Jr., D. Kamerschen, and J. M. Mbaku (1988), “Land and Labor Problems in the German Colony of Kamerun, 1884–1914,” Journal of Third World Studies, 5(1): 146–159. Enonchong, H. N. A. (1967), Cameroon Constitutional Law: Federalism in a Mixed Common-Law and Civil-Law System. Yaoundé, Cameroon: CEPMAL. Fombad, C. M. (2004), “The Dynamics of Record-breaking Endemic Corruption and Political Opportunism in Cameroon,” in J. M. Mbaku and J. Takougang (eds.), The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 357–394. Fombad, C. M. (2019), “Cameroon and the Anomalies of Decentralization with a Centralist Mindset,” in C. M. Fombad and N. Steytler (eds.), Decentralization and Constitutionalism in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 326–364. Fonge, F. P. (2005), “Cultivating an Economic Crisis in Cameroon: The Rhetoric Versus the Reality of Planned Liberalism,” in J. M. Mbaku and J. Takougang (eds.), The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 337–355. Gauthier, B. and A. Zeufack (2012), “Cameroon’s Oil Wealth: Transparency Matters,” in B. Akitoby and S. Coorey (eds.), Oil Wealth in Central Africa: Policies for Inclusive Growth. Washington, DC: IMF, pp. 155–182. Hargreaves, J. D. (1967), West Africa: The Former French States. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Harrijvan, M. and M. Weerdesteijn, “To Appease or to Repress: How Dictators Use Economic Dynamics to Increase Their Regime Longevity,” Crime, Law and Social Change, 74(1): 315–338. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2020), Cameroon: Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for a Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion and Modification of Performance Criteria—Debt Sustainability Analysis. Washington, DC: IMF. Johnson, W. R. (1970), The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Joseph, R. A. (1975), “The German Question in French Cameroun, 1919–1939,” Comparative Studies in Society and

45

History, 17: 65–90. Joseph, R. A. (1977), Radical Nationalism in Cameroun: Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion. London: Oxford University Press. Joseph, R. A. (1980), “Church, State, and Society in Colonial Cameroon,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 13(1): 5–32. Kleis, G. W. (1980), “Confrontation and Incorporation: Igbo Ethnicity in Cameroon,” African Studies Review, 23(3): 89–100. Kofele-Kale, N. (1986), “Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Political Power: A Post-Mortem of Ahidjo’s Cameroon,” in M. G. Schatzberg and I. W. Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Cameroon. New York: Praeger, pp. 53–82. Konings, P. (1999), “The Anglophone Struggle for Federalism in Cameroon,” in L.-R. Bastia and J. Ibrahim (eds.), Federalism and Decentralization in Africa: The Multicultural Challenge. Fribourg, France: L’Institute du Fédéralisme, pp. 289–325. Konings, P. and F. B. Nyamnjoh, Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Lee, A. and K. A., “Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 7: 1–46. LeVine, V. T. (1964), The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. LeVine, V. T. (1971), The Cameroon Federal Republic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Maderspacher, A. (2009), “The National Archives of Cameroon in Yaoundé and Buea,” History in Africa, 36: 453–460. Mann, G. (2009), “What was the Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” Journal of African History, 50: 331–353. Mbaku, J. M. (1988), “Review: The Political Economy of Cameroon edited by Michael G. Schatzberg and I. William Zartman,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 26(2): 366–368. Mbaku, J. M. (1997), Institutions and Reform in Africa: The Public Choice Perspective. Westport, CT: Praeger. Mbaku, J. M. (2004a), “Economic Dependence in Cameroon: SAPs and the Bretton Woods Institutions,” in J. M. Mbaku and J. Takougang (eds.), The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 395–423. Mbaku, J. M. (2004b), Institutions and Development in Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Mbaku, J. M. (2005), Culture and Customs of Cameroon. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Mbaku, J. M. (2007), Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Cleanups. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Mbaku, J. M. (2013), “What Should Africans Expect from Their Constitution,” Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, 41(2): 149–183. Mbaku, J. M. (2014), “The State and Cameroon’s Stalled Transition to Democratic Governance,” in G. K. Kieh, Jr. and P. O. Agbese (eds.), Reconstructing the Authoritarian State in Africa. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 18–53. Mbaku, J. M. (2018), Protecting Minority Rights in African Countries: A Constitutional Political Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Mbaku, J. M. (2019a), “International Law and the Anglophone Problem in Cameroon: Federalism, Succession or the Status Quo?” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 42(1): 1–126. Mbaku, J. M. (2019b), “International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 42(1): 73–202. Mbaku, J. M. (2020a), “Coups, Constitutional Democracy, and the Rule of Law: Why Africans Must Care,” Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review, 4(1): 35–231. Mbaku, J. M. (2020b), “The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Adjudication of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa,” Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 8(2): 577–722. Mbaku, J. M. and J. O. Ihonvbere (2003), “Introduction: Issues in Africa’s Political Adjustment in the ‘New’ Global Era,” in J. M. Mbaku and J. O. Ihonvbere (eds.), The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 1–32. Mbu, W. (1991), Education of the Christian Clergy in the Cameroon Since 1957: Implications for and Problems in Religious Reconstruction and Nation-Building, Ph.D. Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA. Ndongko, W. A. (1975), Planning for Economic Development in a Federal State: The Case of Cameroon, 1960–1971. Weltforum-Verlag, Munich, Germany. Ndongko, W. A. (1986), “The Political Economy of Development in Cameroon: Relations Between the State, Indigenous Business, and Foreign Investors,” in M. G. Schatzberg and I. W. Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Cameroon. New York: Praeger, pp. 83–132. Ngoh, V. J. (1979), The Political Evolution of Cameroon, 1884–1961, M. A. Thesis, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. Ntangsi, J. V. (1979), The Political Economy of Rural Development in Cameroon, Ph.D. Thesis, University of

46

California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, U.S.A. Rudin, H. R. (1938), Germans in the Cameroons, 1884–1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Schwab, K. and World Economic Forum (WEF) (2019), The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. Geneva: WEF. Thompson, V. and R. Adloff (1969), French West Africa. New York: Greenwood. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2020), Human Development Report 2020. New York: Oxford University Press. United Nations General Assembly (1945, October 24), “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,” 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. Vielhauer, A., Dr. (1956), “A Glimpse into the Workshop of a Bible Translator,” Bible Translator, 7(3): 122–130. Welch, C. E. (1966), Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Willame, J.-C. (1986), “The Practices of a Liberal Political Economy: Import and Export Substitution in Cameroon (1975–1981),” in M. G. Schatzberg and I. W. Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Cameroon. New York: Praeger, pp. 111–132. World Bank (1989), World Development Report 1989. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (1996), World Development Report 1996. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2004), African Development Indicators, 2004. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2011), African Development Indicators, 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2017), World Bank Country Partnership Framework for The Republic of Cameroon for the Period FY17–FY21. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2019), World Development Indicators, 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2020), Doing Business 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2021), Global Economic Prospects. Washington, DC: World Bank. Zongo, P. (2018), “‘This is a Genocide’: Villages Burn as War Rages in Blood-Soaked Cam-eroon,” The Guardian, May 30. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate -anglophone-crisis (accessed March 8, 2021).

47

CHAPTER 2

CAMEROON AS PART OF CENTRAL AFRICA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY ANDREAS MEHLER

In private conversation, outside observers and Cameroonians themselves frequently point at the vast potential of this country: natural resources, climate, dynamic and relatively well-educated citizens and yet the country lags behind other places around Africa that experience worse conditions. Why is that so? “It’s politics, stupid” might be too short an answer, but points in the right direction. It might also be hazardous to attribute failure to domestic actors alone. This chapter wants to shed light on the broader subregional political conditions in which decisions on economic policies are taken (or shelved). My argument is that formal and informal institutions, just as violent conflicts, count strongly and may explain the reality of socioeconomic relations better than pure economic rationality. As will be argued, fear and habits, therefore expectations play a vital role in explaining behavior. Finally, the size and the shape of the arena matters. I will concentrate myself on the Central African CFA zone for good reasons: common history, weight of the former colonial power France, common subregional institutions, and transnational networks. Cameroon is a key country within Central Africa. It obviously has one particularly big neighbor, Nigeria, the West African powerhouse with which it shares a number of features: oil deposits in the Gulf of Guinea, a wide variety of climate zones reaching from Coast to hinterland, and a border zone that is today particularly insecure with the Boko Haram rebellion raging in both countries. There is no doubt that Nigeria matters to Cameroon—potentially strongest to Anglophone Cameroonians. However, this contribution will rather focus on the Central African neighbors which were all former French colonies with the exception of Equatorial Guinea: Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. The membership of those countries within the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) is another uniting factor.1 CEMAC’s existence points to France as a joint pole of orientation, foremost in economic terms (and here mostly with regard to the common currency, the CFA franc), but also in more political terms. My first simple argument will be that Cameroon’s violent history had an impact on its neighbors just as those neighbors—and their violent history—had a generally overlooked impact on Cameroon. Contagion is the keyword here, transnational networks and their dynamics are relevant, too. Secondly, dysfunctional institutions, the absence of checks and balances in overly presidential, personalized, and undemocratic political systems are characteristic for the entire subregion, despite some variety. Thirdly, the wave of democratization of the 1990s utterly failed in Central Africa, accounting for sharp differences of political economies to (most of) West Africa. The fourth argument refers to the relative dysfunctionality of subregional organizations: Those only rarely served the objective interests of Central African, including Cameroonian, citizens. This chapter is structured along those arguments, but necessarily starts with a short historical introduction.2

48

2.1 THE COLONIAL LEGACY Central Africa’s formal decolonization had already started by the end of World War II ( Martin, 1998; M’Bokolo, 1998). The process accelerated in the aforementioned zone with the so-called “Loi Cadre” (“framework law”) in 1956. This was a key moment leading to the dissolution of French Equatorial Africa 2 years later and CAR, Chad, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo were all at this point recognized as French segment States with limited autonomy. Only Cameroon (or its Eastern part under French tutelage) had a slightly different legal basis. But just as in all other countries, ambitious political actors had to learn quickly about legal proceedings and probably more so tactical behavior in only a few formative years, often in direct contact with political parties based in Paris. Dramatic events overshadowed this last episode of colonial rule, not least in Cameroon: a colonial patrol killed nationalist leader Ruben Um Nyobè as part of an extremely brutal anti-insurgency operation against the “Union des Populations du Cameroon (UPC)” (1958). But a strict national focus would ignore that some features of continued French influence also played out in most neighboring States: In Oubangui-Shari, the territory to later become CAR, Barthélémy Boganda, a staunch pan-Africanist and leading politician, died in a suspicious plane accident in 1959. In Congo, hundreds of people were killed in street fights between two rival political parties before independence ( M’Bokolo, 1998; Mehler, 1998). In 1960, Paris granted all four French colonies, plus the UN trust territory (Eastern Cameroon), formal independence. The Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea only became independent in 1968. The degree of real independence, however, was frequently disputed, and arguably more so in (French) Equatorial than in West Africa. In fact, some strings remained attached when France did not even discuss the continuous existence of a joint currency, the CFA franc,3 with a fixed exchange rate to the French franc. The second pillar of continued French dominance was military cooperation with agreements signed with most countries of the subregion after independence. Until the 1990s, a quite visible French military presence could be observed, although this did not avoid coups and mutinies.4 Only with the setback in Rwanda did this change, France notably closed two military bases in CAR and maintains only one formal military base (in Gabon) today, though the military ties remain particularly strong with Chad, too. Conversely, successful coups were all believed to have the blessings of Paris. French advisers in key ministries continued to operate, most prominently in the CAR. Economically, the dominance of French business partners also continued for a long period in time and only slowly diminished over the 1990s. Numerous overt and covert relations between private and State representatives, both in Africa and in the French metropole, provided for a solid mutual dependence (epitomized as the “Franco-African village” or “Françafrique”; Verschave, 2006). Cameroon had a more complex colonial legacy: the former German colony (until 1916) was administered at first as two separate League of Nations mandate territories, subsequently as UN trust territories by France and Great Britain. When, in 1961, a quite disputed referendum in British Cameroon resulted in a decision whereby its Northern part joined Nigeria, the southern part Cameroon, the latter grew by one-tenth of its original size and received an Anglophone minority, which developed many grievances against central authorities over the years (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997). Despite a declining weight and geographical distance, it is not absurd to talk of France as a regional power in Central Africa.

49

2.2 VIOLENCE IN THE POST-COLONY The 1960s witnessed coups and restrictions of civil liberties more or less everywhere—and a not very discrete intervention culture by the former colonizer. A coup attempt in Gabon failed in 1964 and France reinstated President Leon Mba in power a few days later. After his death in office, his much stronger successor Omar Bongo established a one-party system in 1967. Jean-Bédel Bokassa, in the CAR, did away with David Dacko on New Year’s Eve 1965/66. Chad’s first President François Tombalbaye, in 1963, disbanded all other parties than his own and slowly moved the country toward a first civil war. A tax revolt caused 500 deaths in 1965, a year later the historic rebel movement Front National de Libération du Tchad (FROLINAT) formed. Most governments were solidly in the pro-Western camp, with one exception: A military intervention ended the reign of unpopular Fulbert Youlou in the Republic of Congo in 1963; his successor established a leftist one-party system, only to be followed by still more strongly socialist-minded army officers in 1968. Congo’s regime was the strongest reference point to Marxism in the subregion—a reminder that the Cold War also played out in Central Africa. In retrospect, this exception was a useful reference point as well for Central African elites and, potentially, for blackmailing Paris. Subsequently, the only formal adherence to socialism did not mean that leaders of the “Parti Congolais du Travail” would have cut ties to France. In fact, France’s Total started its operations in Congo in 1968. Close ties to France became more obvious when Denis Sassou Nguesso became president in 1979—and when France (or Elf-Acquitaine) sided with the Sassou camp in the violent civil war in 1997. But to be sure: Far from being passive objects under French command, Central African presidents were influential in the former metropole with Omar Bongo believed to hand out cash to rivaling parties in France. Still, however, what Cameroon’s political elite, just as its citizens, learned from Day 1 after independence—from their own country just as from what happened all around—was that politics was a violent affair where only coups and rebellions would topple a sitting government and in which the French government had superior means. But Cameroon’s trajectory and government policies were no less observed by its neighbors. Amadou Ahidjo enjoyed a relatively positive media coverage in Western Europe though he acted heavy-handedly in almost all regards. His domestic challengers were harassed, forced into lopsided alliances with Ahidjo’s party or even imprisoned or killed. The UPC, though mostly “nationalist” by its program, was easy prey when it turned fully to the socialist world for assistance during the Cold War. Significantly, the UPC did not enjoy support in the subregion. The regime branded those opponents as communists, only to garner unconditional support from Western quarters, particularly Paris. Cameroon’s regime was comparatively stable, it did not witness constant destabilization operations, which were frequent in CAR (and mostly instigated by Chad). Ahidjo used all means to consolidate his power, by merging all remaining parties into a single party in 1966 and by abandoning federalism in 1972. This lesson was learned elsewhere. Only 2 years after independence (1969) President Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea changed the constitution and elections were not held for nearly 20 years. Macias Nguema also nominally chose the socialist camp and quickly became one of the most blood-thirsty dictators worldwide. He was toppled by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (and killed). Obiang “normalized” relations with Spain, but otherwise did not change the “family style” of politics. Until 1990, all countries of the subregion saw coups, bloody coup attempts, or at least severe attempts at destabilization.5 But violence also came in different forms. Urban riots have accompanied price hikes for basic commodities, but also contested elections: Ali Bongo’s election victory announcement in Gabon in August 2016 triggered revolts in the two main cities. During mounting tensions, as many as 100 people were reported to have been killed, making these confrontations the most serious in Gabon’s history. Repression could turn into full-scale civil war. When English-speaking lawyers went on strike in October 2016, teachers and students in the two provincial capitals of Bamenda and Buea quickly followed suit. Government repression led to the arrest of dozens of activists and the first deaths. Calls for secession or at least a return to federalism rose. Although the potential for further escalation mounted steadily, the government did not show any willingness to negotiate or to seek compromise until 2019 when a flawed dialogue forum was held (Mehler et al., 2021). 50

Probably the strongest potential for destabilization stems from the periphery of States. Whether in Chad or CAR, rebellions formed in border zones to neighboring countries; the same can be said of Boko Haram. Weaponry and even the rebel fighters had easily transited borders and are not always citizens of the countries where they engage in battles for control of territory or power (Debos, 2011). Even peacekeeping in neighboring countries could become a lucrative affair—for example, the Cameroonian contingent of the MINUSCA mission in CAR tried to profit from their military superiority and capacity to protect local traders. In fact, while the civilian population of northeastern Cameroon were mostly negatively affected by the inflow of refugees and incursions of armed rebel groups, the crisis in the CAR was also profitable to some Cameroonian actors. Most illegally exported diamonds from CAR transited via Cameroon and profited brokers and customs officers. Two other aspects need to be stressed: The history of center–periphery relations shows some variety over the subregion: while the elites of CAR never cared much about their periphery, this was certainly much less the attitude in Cameroon where the first President came from the comparatively neglected North. Furthermore, there are clear material incentives for engaging in rebellion. “Politico-military entrepreneurs,” a designation formerly used for warlords in Chad, have also become a common occurrence in CAR. Controlling checkpoints, and gold and diamond mines, is a lucrative occupation. The quite real danger of being removed from office by force (even to be killed) has to be taken into account when judging the actions of Central African heads of State. Lack of trust and outright fear is a motive for action: whether in a pre-emptive strike, outright repression, or—now with a perspective from below—revolt. Violence has costs. But violence also pays and could offer access to positions and wealth.

2.3 “L’HOMME LION” AND THE EMPEROR: THE PROMINENCE OF A PATRIMONIAL LEADER

Family politics became contagious in Central Africa: Dynastic rule in Gabon and Chad (the father-to-son transition when Omar Bongo died in 2009 and when Idriss Déby was killed in 2021), family members occupying key formal positions in Congo, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, in particular, the more informal, but substantial role of first ladies, particularly in Chad (Hinda Déby). Biya’s subsequent wives, Jeanne-Irène and Chantal, were, or are, feared and influential personalities (Eboko, 2004). Omar Bongo famously married Sassou Nguesso’s daughter Edith in 1989, in some sort of marriage diplomacy. But the marriage of Idriss Déby to Amani Musa, daughter of a Janjaweed militia leader from Sudan in 2012, also had diplomatic overtones (Van Wyk et al., 2018). Even in CAR where a family hegemony could not develop, it is significant that, in presidential elections in 2020, three sons of former heads of State (Bokassa, Kolingba, and Patassé) stood as candidates. Whether one applies a purely patrimonial or a “neopatrimonial” reading of politics in Central Africa ( Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994), it is abundantly clear that the position of the head of State as the ultimate head of a large patronage network, bolstered with immense constitutional prerogatives, is so powerful that it has an extraordinary bearing on politics. The longevity of Central African presidents is simply a translation of this power. Omar Bongo’s four decades’ rule in Gabon was linked to his ability to co-opt most opponents (“neo-petromonialism” is a neologism attributed to Yates (2005)). But Obiang Nguema has reached that level as well.6 Many leaders of the region added their personal imprint by developing a cult of personality. This was most visible in the case of Jean-Bédel Bokassa. He even changed the name of the country (into Central African Empire). In a widely echoed self-coronation ceremony Bokassa became “emperor” of a country rich in mineral resources but depleted of any infrastructure. Bokassa epitomized the State itself (Bigo, 1988). In other Central African regimes, the talk was of “barons” of the regime (see Rothchild, 1986), pointing to the mutual benefit in power and resources that the top personnel and the president received when engaging in an exchange that frequently was meant to control the peripheries (and their resources) of large territorial States. In such a system, “subregional spokesmen” and central-State elites are connected. Another explanatory model that took its inspiration first from Central Africa (namely Cameroon) is Bayart’s “politics of the belly” alluding to the insatiable search for privileges via both legal and illicit channels (Bayart, 1989). Cameroon is indeed a good example of personalization of power: the largely 51

uncharismatic Paul Biya changed the country’s official name from “United Republic” to simply “Republic of Cameroon.” After surviving a bloody coup attempt in 1984, he also changed the name of the single party. Such symbolic moves were clearly meant as a show of power. Less symbolic are the numerous examples of “rise and fall” in such systems. Even close associates of the head of State could fall in disgrace—usually linked to allegations of corruption—mostly when they threatened to become too influential. It was easy to collect information about the shady deals of such individuals and use those in supposed anti-corruption campaigns. In 2011, the electoral campaign saw posters of the president with a Lion as a background. The official Cameroon Tribune had already baptized Biya “L’Homme Lion” a long time ago, in an allusion to the popular national football team “Les Lions Indomptables,” but now one interpretation pointed to the similarities of the president with a dangerous predatory big cat of prey. But family rule is not a particularity of Cameroon. Obiang Nguema’s son Teodorin occupied ministerial positions and became known in the “ill-gotten-gains scandal”—together with members of ruling families in Gabon and Congo—for spending misappropriated public money on private luxury cars and a villa in Paris, with full impunity. Equally important were the consequences of personalization on political parties. While the ruling parties rarely offered programmatic depth, and congresses were held just as it pleased the party president who was also head of State, the opposition parties fared even worse. With most opposition party leaders of the early 1990s (when multiparty systems were readmitted all over the subregion) either coopted into the regime, dead, or simply forgotten, and with only a few party structures so stable that they had survived a leadership change, one was wondering how they could remain a strong political force over time. In Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon the former single parties clearly offered the most effective pathways to both power positions and State-sponsored spoils, making their competitors mostly unattractive for young ambitious personalities with the best formal education. Those properties of most Central African political systems have a number of consequences on aspirant elites: opportunism and cronyism, looking for quick enrichment as one may not last long in a “predatory position,” investing in personal relations instead of investing in expertise and—again—fear.

2.4 FAILED DEMOCRATIZATION While some West African countries experienced a major political change in the early 1990s—with Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal opening up quite strongly, this could hardly be observed in Central Africa. However, contestation was brewing as strongly in this subregion. Only two countries experienced regime change via elections: CAR and the Republic of Congo, but these experiments collapsed after a few years. It is, however, worth having a closer look into the pro-democracy movements of the 1990s in the subregion, their composition and their achievements. By their composition, pro-democracy movements had some commonalities: Everywhere lawyers and human rights activists were at the forefront and challenged the authoritarian regimes in politically motivated trials. Those were often launched against political activists who dared to form political parties. Older political parties, surviving in clandestineness or exile, rarely played a major role. University professors and students staged strike actions; trade unions, particularly in the education sector, played an important role; and myriad new media outlets quickly spread the news about such contestations. But business circles lent their support only rarely and covertly. Cameroon serves to exemplify the powerful concerted strategy of such forces: It all started with the secretive attempt to form a new party by former president of the Law Society Yondo Black and nine other activists dating back to late 1989. These plans were immediately detected by the secret services and resulted, in February 1990, in a secret trial of which most details were leaked to the press. In both major cities, Douala and Yaoundé, protest actions started. In May 1990, another party was launched in the provincial capital Bamenda (North West province): the Social Democratic Front (SDF). After a solemn declaration by party chairman Ni John Fru Ndi, security forces brutally dispersed sympathizers, killing six. Thus, the first “martyrs of democracy” were created. Under external pressure President Biya conceded reforms in several sectors at a party convention in June 1990, liberalizing inter alia the press laws. A highly publicized trial opened against the public intellectual Célestin Monga and the editor of the, arguably, most important independent newspaper “Le Messager,” Pius Njawe. Both were indicted of 52

having insulted the head of State. Crowds assembled in front of the tribunal and were the start of nationwide strike actions known as “opérations villes mortes.” Hundreds of demonstrators were killed during that year. One influential event in the francophone “world” was the sovereign national conference in Benin (in 1990). This major elite gathering, inspired by the “états généraux” as part of the French revolution of 1789, sent shockwaves to practically all other former French colonies plus DRC (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1993). Opponents in those countries called for a similar temporary institution that would deliberate over the political future of entire countries: the calls were particularly loud in CAR, Gabon, in both Congos, and in Cameroon. In CAR, President Kolingba refused to accept such a gathering, organized manipulated elections, but was forced by the donor community to organize new elections and let a collective body of all major competitors rule the country until new elections were held, which he lost. In Chad, warlord Idriss Déby had toppled his predecessor Hissène Habré only in December 1990. Chad’s national conference, held in May 1992, had therefore not the same anti-régime meaning as in other places, but resulted in the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly. Congo’s Sassou Nguesso at first “survived” the national conference in his country but had to give up most of his executive prerogatives to an interim Prime Minister, and finally lost in free elections to one of his fiercest opponents, Pascal Lissouba. In Gabon, Bongo was able to remain in control of the workings of the National Conference which, however, called for immediate elections. Those were held amidst violent protests against allegations of fraud. Cameroon’s president carefully watched such events and wanted to avoid any risk. Biya, in fact, did not give in to the call by radical opponents to hold a national conference—which would most probably have also resulted in the end of his rule. Instead, he held a much more limited tripartite conference (government, opposition, civil society) under the auspices of his Prime Minister. Participating or boycotting the tripartite conference became one main dividing factor within the opposition movement. The regime managed to drive a wedge into the formerly quite united opposition front (Mehler et al., 2021). However, it was still necessary to heavily manipulate elections to avoid victory by SDF leader Fru Ndi in the 1992 scrutiny. Early elections led to regime change in only two out of six countries of the region (i.e., CAR and Congo). The first heroic struggle for multiparty politics was practically terminated in the second half of the 1990s, when Sassou Nguesso was able to win an armed confrontation with discrete outside assistance—only in CAR did freely elected Ange-Félix Patassé manage to survive a number of mutinies until the coup in 2003, but he also behaved quite undemocratically. This quick end to popular contestation also showed the limited sustainability of pure street mobilization. The fact that most business tycoons operated in close conjunction with the State also meant that it was difficult for opposition groups to motivate private sponsors to invest in regime change—if it would not materialize quickly. Why is that so? Rulers of autocratic political systems can resort to a wide range of tools to extend their political survival. Repression and intimidation are the most obvious choices, but there are others. An important strategy to prevent the rise of challengers is to forge alliances and strike elite bargains (Arriola, 2013). Allocating and regulating access to economic opportunities for followers is key and promotes the premises that loyalty is bolstered when giving a stake in the ruler’s personal survival. This brings to the fore the structure and development of the economy. Even after independence, the most important enterprises remained in foreign hands. State-owned enterprises have been created since the 1970s, however they quickly turned out to be inefficient. Cameroon, for example, faced a severe economic crisis in 1985/1986, mostly due to falling prices for its export commodities. The Gross National Product decreased by about 26 per cent between 1984/1985 and 1991. Within a few years the successes achieved throughout the late 1970s were annihilated. What did this mean politically? Local businessmen had invested in the secondary sector since the 1980s. They focused mainly on import–export transactions, an area with blurry transitions between legal imports and smuggling.7 In essence, they remained dependent on State authorities, on the granting of import licenses and other favors. It was essential for political survival that now the—IMF- and World Bank-inspired—privatization of State-owned enterprises remained firmly controlled and would profit only those who promised loyalty. Amid the political contestation of the early 1990s, Central African governments by and large succeeded in retaining control over the liberalization process. This, in turn, meant that opposition movements could not gain support by business circles and became fragmented, as premised by Arriola (2013, p. 37). The principle of a multiparty system with pluralist elections was accepted and practically all countries 53

had changed their constitution in a more liberal direction. However, the backlash of authoritarianism also started early and most visibly in the Republic of Congo, where former President Sassou Nguesso formed a militia and successfully defeated the forces of the elected government. He was back in power as early as 1997. Much more significant than the temporary gains in formal democracy was that in all other places the autocrats could either consolidate their reign after surviving a crisis phase (Cameroon, Chad, Gabon) or simply repress any opposition (Equatorial Guinea). Nowhere did an elite pact leading to a peaceful transition to democracy materialize (which was arguably different in places like Benin or Mali, or later in Nigeria). The 2000s saw a further significant trend: with the exception of CAR, threatened by waves of insurgencies, the ruling parties confirmed their status, often with the help of intimidation and the manipulation of elections and systematically scored better in second and third elections after the return to multiparty politics. However, one generation after the frustration with first elections, new contestations surfaced in the mid-2010s with widespread protests and again manipulated elections in Chad, Gabon, Congo, and Cameroon. A change in government by-elections still looked unrealistic, but resignation subsided and the lukewarm popular support for the autocrats in those countries shrunk again. As an innovation, some of the opposition campaigns used social media that were subsequently banned (Carter, 2016). In summary, the entire subregion witnessed a strikingly similar political history with very limited exceptions: (1) Very soon after independence all democratic appearances had waned; (2) the more or less unlimited power of heads of States came with a strong personalization of power; (3) only a change by military means looked a realistic alternative to access power for politicians with strong ambitions (see Appendix). Politics in Central Africa played out in an extremely violent and repressive environment, which actually was also an integral part of it. Critical throughout was the control of the security forces who gained exceptional political importance while preserving the habits of a colonial police force, specializing in repression and providing very limited protection to the population. The frequently criticized “extraversion” of an elite political culture—first lobbying in Paris before consulting a domestic audience—was equally established soon after independence.

2.5 A SHORT OUTLOOK Prospects for a future allowing for more participation, truly competitive elections, and a peaceful change of government are grim in such circumstances, not only in Cameroon, but in the entire subregion. However, both violent and peaceful forms of contestation since about 2015 are also signs of renewed mobilization of citizens for political causes across Central Africa. New topics, including consumer defense and ecological issues, plus the, by now ubiquitous, social media, may be drivers for a new episode of engagement, potentially also of new transnational networks, after two decades of frustration. However, the main pillars of a meanwhile established political economy remain intact. A source of frustration is the absence of any positive dynamic stemming from subregional organizations. It is true that Biya never cared much for regional integration and frequently snubbed subregional summits. Although Cameroon was meant to be its most important member, CEMAC never became a major tool nor factor, despite a population of over 50 million, and covering a total surface of around 3 million square kilometers. Looking at CEMAC makes more sense when analyzing what it fails to do or achieve. It is in the face of declining importance of a European power, that is, France, that CEMAC was believed to take up regulatory roles: for the economy, potentially for security, and also as coordinating bodies for political issues—though here the competing, partly overlapping CEEAC gained more profile. Unfortunately, both were not up to their task. CEMAC’s frequently professed main policy goals made no significant progress over time, whether on the prospects of free movement of people within the zone or on much smaller projects like the intended merger of the two stock exchange markets in Libreville and Douala. Ambitious plans for a community airline (Air CEMAC) stagnated and finally collapsed. The quite active Chadian diplomacy managed to place a close confidant of Idriss Déby at CEEAC’s head (a Chadian is equally the current chairperson of the African Union Commission). Unfortunately, the Chadian influence does not augur well for the political ambitions of these organizations, with the Chadian regime—even after the 54

violent death of Idriss Déby—clearly not interested in a pro-democracy course. Compared to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), there is little commitment to the rule of law or against an unconstitutional change of government from within the subregion. What is worse: Congo’s Sassou Nguesso remains the main mediator between conflict parties in CAR. This means that a two times coup leader and staunch autocrat is presiding over the political fate of this country. This could potentially explain his leniency toward an experienced coup-plotter and former President (Bozizé) all along the different phases of crisis. In summary, Cameroon as a polity, economically the most important country in the CEMAC area, has not profited from its neighbors, but the balance sheet for governing elites and political entrepreneurs might be different. Contagion worked: Models of governance have rather converged throughout the subregion—meaning that the control of the security forces, and the use of violence, opportunism, and fear are the main features of a political system that impacts deeply on the economy.

APPENDIX ELECTION RESULTS IN EARLIEST AND LATEST MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS (PRESIDENT, FIRST CHAMBER)

Cameroon CAR

Presidential elections, percentage of votes for incumbent in earliest multiparty elections (year) 40.0 (1992) 12.1 (1993, 1st round)

In latest elections: percentage (year) 71.3 (2018) 53.9 (2020)

Parliamentary elections: seats won by the dominant party in first chambers 88/188 (1992) 13/85 (1993)

Chad

71.6 (1996)

79.3 (2021)

63/125 (1997)

88.4 (2021) 50.7 (2016) 93.5 (2016)

18/125 (1992) 63/120 (1990) 68/80 (1993)

Congo 16.9 (1992, 1st round) Gabon 51.2 (1993) Equatorial_Guinea 97.8 (1996)

In latest elections: seats (year) 152/180 (2020) 7/131 (2016) #results 2021 not yet announced Elections postponed since 2011 90/151 (2017) 96/120 (2018) 99/100 (2017)

Source: Elections in Africa. A Data Handbook; Africa Yearbook, different editions; various Internet sources.

NOTES 1.

The Communauté Economique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) is another uniting factor in some respects, but it also comprises Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Burundi, and Rwanda, all with other colonial masters. All those countries do not share a land border with Cameroon, which is a further reason why they are not included in this analysis. 2. This chapter draws strongly on arguments developed in a further OUP handbook contribution (Mehler, 2019) which is, however, neither focusing on Cameroon nor CEMAC. New developments, particularly in Chad, are also reflected in this chapter. 3. CFA: Communaturé Financière Africaine. The CFA franc is issued by the Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC). Equatorial Guinea joined the CFA zone in 1985. Fifty percent of all currency reserves of the six countries are held in accounts of the Banque de France. France on the other hand has guaranteed the free convertibility of the currency. A separate CFA zone exists for West Africa. 4. Dwyer (2015) lists eighteen mutinies in Central Africa for 1960–2012 (with seven of them occurring in DRC and six in CAR). 5. In chronological order the following coups or coup attempts were recorded in the CEMAC zone: 1963 Congo—military coup after three days of turmoil; 1964 Gabon—coup attempt, reversed by French intervention; 1965 CAR—military coups; 1968 Congo—military coup; 1969 CAR—coup plot denounced; 1975 Chad—military coup; 1979 Congo—Military coup; 1979 Equatorial Guinea—Palace coup; 1979 CAR—French

55

military intervention to topple Bokassa; 1981 CAR—Military coup; 1982 Chad—military victory of rebel alliance; 1983 Cameroon—coup plot detected; 1984 Cameroon—bloody failed coup attempt; 1986 Chad—rebellion with Libyan backing, French intervention; 1990 Chad—military victory of rebel group; 1996–1997 CAR—series of three mutinies/coup attempt, French intervention; 1997 Congo—Military victory of former President after 1 year of militia confrontation; 2001 CAR—bloody failed coup attempt, Libyan intervention; 2003 CAR—military coup; 2004 Chad—bloody coup attempt; Equatorial Guinea—mercenaries stage failed coup attempt; 2006 Chad—bloody coup attempt, massive French intervention; 2013 Chad—bloody coup attempt; CAR—military victory of rebel alliance; 2020 CAR—Coup attempt by new rebel alliances inspired by former President; 2021 Chad—Military coup after the obscure killing of President Déby. 6. The longest serving heads of State in Central Africa were/are: Omar Bongo/Gabon 1967–2009 (42 years in power); Obiang Nguema/E. Guinea 1979– (2022, 43 years); Paul Biya/Cameroon 1982– (2022, 40 years); Sassou Nguesso/Congo 1979–1992 and 1997– (2022, 37 years); Idriss Déby/Chad 1991–2021 (30 years). Source: Author’s own compilation. 7. On entrepreneurs and accumulation, see Warnier, 1993; Geschiere and Konings, 1993.

REFERENCES

Arriola, L. (2013), Multi-ethnic coalitions in Africa: Business financing of opposition election campaigns. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bayart, J.-F. (1989), L’Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre. Paris: Fayard. Bigo, D. (1988), Pouvoir et obéissance en Centrafrique. Paris: Karthala. Birmingham, D. and P. Martin (eds.) (1998), History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960. London and New York: Longman. Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1994), “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics, 46(4): 453–489. Carter, B. L. (2016), “How International Pressure Can Help,” Journal of Democracy, 27(3): 36–50. Debos, M. (2011), “Living by the Gun in Chad: Armed Violence as a Practical Occupation,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 49(3): 409–428. Dwyer, M. (2015), “Tactical Communication: Mutiny as a Dialogue in West and Central Africa,” Africa Spectrum, 50(1): 5–23. Eboko, F. (2004), “Chantal Biya: ‘fille du peuple’ et égérie international,” Politique africaine, 3: 91–106. Eboussi-Boulaga, F. (1993), Les conférences nationales en Afrique noire: une affaire à suivre. Paris: Karthala. Geschiere, P. and Konings, P. (eds.). (1993), Les itinéraires de l’accumulation au Cameroun/Pathways to Accumulation in Cameroon. Paris. Konings, P. and F. B. Nyamnjoh (1997), “The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35(2): 207–229. Martin, P. (1998), “Beyond Independence,” in D. Birmingham and P. Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960. London and New York: Longman, pp. 1–19. M’Bokolo, E. (1998), “Comparisons and Contrasts in Equatorial Africa: Gabon, Congo, and the Central African Republic,” in D. Birmingham and P. Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960. London and New York: Longman, pp. 67–95. Mehler, A. (2005–2021), “Central Africa,” Africa Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara, Vols 1–17. Leiden: Brill. Mehler, A. (1998), “Cameroon and the Politics of Patronage,” in D. Birmingham and P. Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960. London and New York: Longman, pp. 43–65. Mehler, A. (2019), “Central Africa: Regional Politics and Dynamics,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 24pp. Mehler, A., D. Tull, and M. Glund (2021), Dialogue as the New Mantra in Responding to Political Crisis in Africa? The Cases of Mali and Cameroon. ABI Working Paper 17, Freiburg. Rothchild, D. (1986), “Hegemonial Exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa,” in D. Thompson and D. Ronen (eds.), Ethnicity, Politics, and Development. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 65–104. Schatzberg, M. G. (2001), Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Van Wyk, J.-A. K., A. Muresan, and C. Nyere (2018), “African First Ladies, Politics and the State,” Politeia, 3(2): pp. 1–20. Verschave, F.-X. (2006), La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République. Paris: Stock. Warnier, J.-P. (1993), L’esprit d’entreprise au Cameroun. Yates, D. A. (2005), “Neo-Petromonialism and the Rentier State in Gabon,” in M. Basedau and A. Mehler (eds.),

56

Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, pp. 173–190.

57

CHAPTER 3

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN COLONIAL HISTORY AND POSTCOLONIAL INSTITUTIONS evidence from cameroon MARIE CHRISTELLE MABEU AND ROLAND PONGOU

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we examine the long-term impacts of the colonial history of Cameroon, with a particular focus on the interplay between its colonial origins and postcolonial institutions in determining the long-term outcomes of men, women, and children in the country. The colonial era in Cameroon was characterized by the rule of three different European empires. Between 1884 and 1916, Cameroon was part of the German colony of Kamerun. Following its defeat at the end of World War I, Germany lost its colonies, and the erstwhile Kamerun territory was partitioned between France and the United Kingdom into two distinct territories as Mandated Territories of the League of Nations. French Cameroons and British Cameroons became Trust Territories of the United Nations following World War II. These two territories were delimited by an arbitrary border, drawn up in Europe, that cut across regions that were culturally, politically, economically, demographically and geographically homogeneous. For more than four decades, Britain and France governed their respective territories as colonies. The main territorial borders of present-day Cameroon were established in 1961. After a referendum was organized in British Cameroons on February 11, 1961, the northern population voted to join Nigeria while the southern population voted to join the French-speaking “République du Cameroun” following its independence. The reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun became effective on October 1, 1961 and gave birth to the Federal Republic of Cameroon.1 We exploit this historical experiment in combination with household data and data from several other sources to conduct an empirical analysis of how colonial legacies interact with postcolonial institutions to shape long-term outcomes. Different colonial powers brought with them different kinds of institutions. The British and the French colonial systems significantly differed in terms of their administrative rules, legal systems, educational systems, labor policies, and population policies (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2001); La Porta et al. (2008); La Porta et al. (1998); Lee and Schultz (2012); Anderson (2018); Guarnieri and Rainer (2018); Dupraz (2019); Canning et al. (2020)). Studies have found that these institutional differences tend to result in significant disparities in present-day economic and political outcomes across African countries, with former British colonies outperforming former French colonies in most cases. While the cross-country comparison followed in most of the studies is useful in analyzing the long-term effect of colonial institutions, it does not address the issue of how colonial legacy is modified or undermined by postcolonial institutions. Cameroon presents a unique experiment that can be exploited to investigate this question. Prior to the 1961 reunification of Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun, the Anglophone minority advocated for a loose form of federalism (Ebune (2016); Awasom (2002); Konings (1999)), with a view that the positive elements of the administrative traditions inherited from the French and British colonial experience would be blended together to offer Cameroon a unique administrative system in Africa. According to Konings (1999), this form of federalism was to guarantee equal partnership for both partners and preserve the cultural heritage and identity of each. The kind of federalism favored by the leaders of the Anglophone minority contrasted with the highly centralized form of administration established by the leaders of the Francophone majority. Although the Francophone majority under the eadership of President Ahmadou Ahidjo promised before the plebiscite that the reunification would not be an annexation or assimilation of Southern Cameroons by the République du Cameroun,2 in practise, this 58

was not the case (Nfi (2014; 2021)). The reunified Cameroon was crafted as a highly centralized two-state federation (West Cameroon and East Cameroon), with almost all power concentrated within the hand of the President. The constitution reserved for the President excessive powers which gave him the latitude to appoint and dismiss all federal and state officials, including the Prime Ministers of West Cameroon and East Cameroon. He unilaterally controlled all government actions. A process of centralization was then set in motion beginning with the creation of a single national political party. This was followed by the concentration of administrative decision-making in the capital city Yaoundé and culminated in the dissolution of the federation and the installation of a unitary state in 1972. In 1972, the country was also renamed the United Republic of Cameroon. The name of the country changed again to the Republic of Cameroon in 1984, two years after President Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned and was succeeded by Paul Biya, the current President of the country. The highly centralized state that emerged following this political development meant that the Anglophone system, which was rooted in the Anglo-Saxon culture, gradually changed into a French-based system. The influence of the Francophone system became predominant and superseded the British impact, as all traces of British inspired local government had virtually disappeared ( Adamolekun et al. (1988)). Some scholars have likened this predominance of the Francophone system through the centralized administration of Cameroon to an annexation and assimilation of Southern Cameroons and argued that this has prompted the Anglophone minority to develop a sense of political, economic, and socio-cultural marginalization (Takougang and Amin (2018)). We exploit the unique nature of Cameroon’s colonial and postcolonial experience to address our main research question of how colonial origins interact with postcolonial institutions to determine long-term outcomes. The outcomes we analyze are education, employment, and infant mortality, with the latter being a usual proxy of child and household poverty. When analyzing these outcomes, we also seek to understand how the impacts differ for males and females. Analysis is performed using a combination of individual-level data from the Demographic and Health Surveys and historical data on the spatial location of precolonial ethnic homelands in Africa derived from George Peter Murdock’s Ethnographic Map of Africa (Murdock (1959)). Empirical analysis is done through the implementation of a spatial Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with ethnic homeland fixed effects. Specifically, we exploit the arbitrarily drawn British-French border within Cameroon to compare individuals residing close to the border and who are within the same ethnic group but are living on different sides of the border. Thus, our identification strategy accounts for hard-to-observe cultural and geographic characteristics associated with the outcomes of interest. Since focusing on areas very close to the border might not be sufficient to fully control for geographic differences that could potentially bias our estimates, we augment our main empirical strategy with a set of controls for geographic characteristics and natural endowments including elevation, soil suitability for agriculture, and geodesic distance to national border. Our main finding is that colonial origins not only matter, but they also significantly interact with postcolonial institutions. Indeed, educational attainment is greater for Anglophone men and women than for their Francophone counterparts. However, this effect is larger among cohorts who were likely to have completed these levels of education before the 1961 reunification took place. This finding implies that the positive effect of the British rule on education has been partially erased by policies adopted following the reunification. Indeed, despite the constitutional biculturalism of the Cameroon Federation, which recognized two educational subsystems, namely the Anglophone and Francophone subsystems with two examination systems, in practice, the Anglophone educational system was gradually dominated by the Francophone culture in the post-reunification era (Nfi (2014)). It is argued that this led to a “Francophonization” of the Anglophone educational system (Nfi (2014)), with this “Francophonization” mainly affecting educational outcomes at the secondary level. Despite having higher educational attainment overall, Anglophone men and women are less likely to find employment in the non-agricultural sector. Agricultural activities are among the lowest-paid jobs in most developing countries (Christiaensen et al. (2020)). In addition to receiving low salaries, agricultural workers have very poor work conditions that expose them to different kinds of environmental hazards. Our finding therefore implies that Anglophones are less likely to be found in better paid employment and more likely to be poor compared to their Francophone counterparts. Finally, we do not find that infant mortality differs between Anglophone and Francophone boys and girls. In our sample, all the children were born after 1969, which is after the 1961 reunification. This finding is in line with the fact that post-reunification 59

education—a key determinant of child health in developing countries—does not differ significantly for Anglophones and Francophones. Our findings seem to support the view that the centralized administration that emerged following the 1961 reunification was detrimental to the Anglophone minority. This is a fact that raises the question of whether this minority would have been better off today had its members voted to join Nigeria instead of the République du Cameroun. We answer this question by comparing the outcomes of Anglophone Cameroonians to those of their Nigerian co-ethnics. We find that the people of former Southern Cameroons had similar educational attainment as their Nigerian co-ethnics before the 1961 reunification, but they became worse off following reunification. Moreover, Anglophone Cameroonians are less likely to work in the non-agricultural sector and have higher infant mortality rates compared to their Nigerian counterparts. These findings effectively suggest that the Anglophone minority in Cameroon would have been better off by joining Nigeria in 1961. Additionally, the findings are consistent with the view that the Anglophone minority has been marginalized by the Francophone majority through the centralization of administration (Takougang and Amin (2018)). This investigation again underscores the significant interplay between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions in the determination of long-term outcomes. This chapter contributes to the broad literature documenting the historical origins of comparative economic development. The main historical events examined in the African context include the transatlantic slave trade, colonization and various colonial policies, and European missionary activities (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2001); La Porta et al. (2008); Nunn (2008); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Lee and Schultz (2012); Cogneau and Moradi (2014); Okoye and Pongou 2014; 2017; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016); Anderson (2018); Guarnieri and Rainer (2018); Dupraz (2019); Okoye et al. (2019); Archibong and Obikili (2020); Dev et al. (2016); Canning et al. (2020); Nunn (2020)). Studies by Lee and Schultz (2012); Guarnieri and Rainer (2018); and Dupraz (2019) are the closest in spirit to this chapter. These studies exploit, as we do, the British-French division of Cameroon after World War I. Lee and Schultz (2012) study the effect of the British-French colonial legacy on household wealth, while Guarnieri and Rainer (2018) and Dupraz (2019) focus on female empowerment and education, respectively. Although these authors exploit the same setting as we do, the questions they address differ markedly from ours. This chapter assesses how colonial origins interact with postcolonial institutions to determine long-term outcomes. Indeed, as a by-product of our main findings, we will show that the established positive long-run effect of British colonization on economic outcomes in Cameroon is largely driven by the period before the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun. This chapter further contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical evidence on whether the Anglophone minority in Cameroon would have been better off today had its members voted to join Nigeria instead of the République du Cameroun. The rest of this chapter unfolds as follows. In the second section, we provide a brief background on the history of Cameroon. The third section discusses the data. The fourth section explains our estimation strategy. The fifth section presents our main results highlighting how colonial institutions interact with postcolonial institutions to shape long-term outcomes for men, women, and children in Cameroon. The final section concludes.

3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 3.2.1 From Colonization to Independence The colonial era in Cameroon is characterized by the presence of three colonial powers, with Cameroon first being colonized as a German protectorate then subsequently colonized by the French and the British concurrently.

60

3.2.1.0.1 German Kamerun (1884–1916) The colonial period of Cameroon’s history began in 1884 when the German explorer and imperialist Gustav Nachtigal signed protectorate treaties with Kings Bell and Akwa of Douala, bringing Cameroon under German control. The borders of the German Cameroon known as Kamerun (top left of the map in Figure 3.1) were settled in the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). The German colonial policy in Cameroon initially prioritized exploration over administration. The colony relied heavily on a system of forced labor in order to create plantations and to build the roads and railways necessary for exporting plantation products and the country’s natural resources (Le Vine (1964); Gardinier (1967); Rubin (1971); O’Neil et al. (1996); and Nana (2016)). During the period of German rule, the territories of Kamerun expanded vastly. As part of the settlement of the “Agadir Crisis,” France ceded to Germany its territories in the French Equatorial African colony of Middle Congo (now the Republic of Congo). By 1911, the so called Neu-kamerun (including portions of present-day Chad, Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon) was also absorbed into the German colony of Kamerun, as shown by the first two maps at the top of Figure 3.1. In World War I, German Kamerun was invaded by Allied Expeditionary Forces as part of the Kamerun campaign. By February 1916, the Germans had been defeated and ousted from Cameroon by British, French, and Belgian Forces (Nfi (2021)).

3.2.1.0.2 British Cameroons (1916–1961) and French Cameroons (1916–1960) Following Germany’s defeat during World War I, the territories of Neu-kamerun were reintegrated into the French colonies which had been dispossessed of them five years earlier. The erstwhile Kamerun territory was partitioned between Great Britain and France into two distinct territories, first as “Mandated Territories” of the League of Nations and later as “Trust Territories” of the United Nations following World War II (Gardinier (1967); Le Vine (1964); Konings (1999)). The borders of the British-French Mandates/Trusts in Cameroon were settled by the so called “Picot Line.” On March 4, 1916, Lancelot Olyphant, an official of the British Foreign Office, met with George Picot, a French diplomat in London. Olyphant presented a map of Cameroon to Picot and the latter drew a line running from North to South ( Yearwood (1993); Nfi (2021)). The French chose the area to the East of the line, referred to as Cameroun or French Cameroons (the darker area on the top right map in Figure 3.1), and the British chose the area to the West of the line, referred to as British Cameroons (the brighter area on the top right map in Figure 3.1). British Cameroons was further divided into two parts known as Southern Cameroons (the West part of the actual Cameroon) and Northern Cameroons (Nfi (2021)). For more than four decades, Britain and France administered their respective portions of Cameroon as colonies. While French Cameroons was administered by France as a separate unit, the British ruled their portion of Cameroon as an extension of Nigeria by integrating Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons into Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, respectively. By the end of the colonial period, the territories administered by these two colonial powers had undergone very different colonial experiences (Nfi (2021)).

61

FIG. 3.1 Cameroon over time. Note: the first two at the top of this figure show the borders of the German Kamerun. The brighter areas on the top right and the bottom left maps are the British Cameroons (British Southern Cameroons and British Northern Cameroons). The brighter area of the second map in the bottom of this figure represents Southern Cameroons. The darker area on the top right map represents the French Cameroons. The darker areas in the first two maps at the bottom of this figure represent the République du Cameroun. The third map at the bottom of this figure represents the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

French Cameroons gained independence on January 1, 1960, becoming the “République du Cameroun” with Ahmadou Ahidjo as the Country’s first President. Ahidjo and his party, the “Union Camerounaise,” pledged to build a capitalist economy and to maintain close ties to France. Ahmadou Ahidjo’s presidency was immediately contested by nationalist leaders as they believed that he was brought to power by the French (Bayart (1978)). This resulted in a violent rebellion spearheaded by the “Union des Populations du Cameroun (U.P.C.),” the first Cameroonian nationalist movement created by Ruben Um Nyobé in 1948 and which was officially banned by the French government in 1955.3 By contrast, the political evolution of British Cameroons took place in a much more peaceful political atmosphere. It was due to divisions among the political leaders in Southern Cameroons that the United Nations organized a plebiscite in British Southern Cameroons in February 1961 (Konings (1999); Nfi (2021)). While the majority of Southern Cameroons’ population wanted continued UN Trusteeship under the British leading to independence, they were not offered this option during the plebiscite as the British believed that Southern Cameroons was not 62

economically strong enough to survive on its own (Ebune (1992); Chem-Langhë (1995); Fanso (2009)). Indeed, the electorates were to choose between independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria and independence by reunifying with the independent République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons). The majority in Southern Cameroons opted for independence through reunification with the République du Cameroun under the leadership of John Ngu Foncha as Prime Minister ( Nfi (2021)). The reunified Cameroon took the name of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. In the federation, British Southern Cameroons became the Federated State of West Cameroon (or West Cameroon), and the République du Cameroun became the Federated State of East Cameroon (or East Cameroon). At unification, British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun differed significantly in their institutions, reflecting differences in British and French rules. British Southern Cameroons had economic and administrative systems that were influenced significantly by the British. For example, the territory’s legal system was based on the Common law of England and Wales, its educational system was modeled after that in Britain, and the language of government business was English. However, institutions of the République du Cameroun were inherited from France. For example, in addition to educational and administrative systems that were modeled after those in France, the République du Cameroun also had a legal system that was based on the French Civil law, and French was the official language for government communication. An important issue at unification in 1961 was whether to create uniquely Cameroonian institutions, harmonize those inherited from colonialism, or maintain dual administrative and legal systems. The Foumban Accords, which were the foundation for reunification, opted for a dual system, which however, was later abandoned by the Francophone-dominated central government. In doing so, the central government effectively abrogated most Anglophone institutions and replaced them with those of the République du Cameroun, as the next section will show.

63

3.2.2 The Post-Independence Era: A Francophone-Dominated State The diverging trajectories of West Cameroon (former British Southern Cameroons) and East Cameroon (former République du Cameroun) began to converge in the early 1960s with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The structure of the Cameroon federation was the outcome of uneasy compromises between the centralist view of the Francophone leadership and the federalist approach of the Anglophone leaders. Anglophones and Francophones agreed that reunification was to be undertaken in an atmosphere of equality between the representatives of the République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons (Nfi (2014)) and should preserve the cultural heritage and identity of each. However, in practice, the leaders of the Francophone majority favored instead a highly centralized unitary state. They regarded the 1961 constitutional arrangements as an unavoidable stage in the establishment of a strong unitary state and employed various tactics to achieve this objective. Essentially, the Federal Republic of Cameroon was a centralized two-state federation. At federation in 1961, there were two Prime Ministers for West Cameroon and East Cameroon, respectively, and a federated President assisted by a Vice President who had virtually no constitutional powers. The Vice President’s only powers were potential since the Federal Constitution states that “In the event of a vacancy of the Presidency by death or by permanent incapacity established by the Federal Court of Justice to which effect has been taken by the President of the Federal National Assembly, the powers of the President of the Republic shall be exercised ipso jure by the Vice President until the election of the new President.” A process of centralization was launched with the creation of a single national political party—the Cameroon National Union (CNU) in 1966, followed by the concentration of administrative decision-making in the capital city Yaoundé, and culminating with the dissolution of the federation and the installation of a unitary state in 1972. As time went on, the Anglophone system, which was rooted in the Anglo-Saxon culture, gradually changed into a French-based system. It has been claimed that the French influence which became predominant entirely superseded the British impact after independence, as all traces of British inspired local government had virtually disappeared (Adamolekun et al. (1988)). This view is also shared by Mawhood (1983), when he asserts that as from 1972, following the “neutralization” of Southern Cameroons and the destruction of its political and administrative institutions, the East Cameroon system of administration was imposed in all essentials throughout the national territory. Some scholars liken this reality to an annexation and assimilation of British Southern Cameroons by the République du Cameroun and argue that this has prompted the Anglophone minority to develop a sense of political, economic, and socio-cultural marginalization (Takougang and Amin (2018)). This has culminated in the recent Anglophone crisis in the country. It follows that the colonial institutions inherited from British rule have been modified and undermined in important ways following reunification. In the analysis that follows, we will examine how the interplay between colonial origins and postcolonial governance have shaped the long-term outcomes of men, women, and children in Cameroon.

3.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS This section describes our main data sources for the empirical investigation.

64

3.3.1 Individual Level Data The first dataset used in our empirical analysis is drawn from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS are a nationally representative survey program carried out in over seventy-five countries in the global South since 1986. DHS are administered at regular intervals and are standardized to allow comparisons across countries and over time. These surveys collect detailed information on a host of demographic, health, and socio-economic characteristics at both the individual and household level.4 For the purpose of this study, this chapter focuses on DHS data collected in Cameroon and Nigeria. We excluded from our analysis any observations for which the location coordinates of enumeration areas (typically villages in rural areas or neighborhoods in cities) are unavailable. In addition, we only consider Demographic and Health Surveys conducted before the start of the Cameroon’s armed conflict (also known as the Anglophone crisis) in 2017. Thus, our empirical analysis relies upon two recent Demographic and Health Surveys of Cameroon (CDHS 2004 and CDHS 2011) and three Demographic and Health Surveys of Nigeria (NDHS 2003; NDHS 2008; and NDHS 2013). For identification purposes (see the fourth section), we further restrict our sample to individuals living in ethnic homelands divided by either the former British-French border within Cameroon (also referred to the border between Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon) or the border between Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria.5 This leaves us with a sample of 5, 446 respondents living across the British-French border within Cameroon and 1, 046 respondents living across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border. On average, one third of the sample across the British-French border within Cameroon reside on the British side (former Southern Cameroons) of the border. Similarly, around 31% of the sample across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border reside on the Nigerian side of the border (see Panels A and B in Table 3.1).6 The DHS contain rich individual-level information on education and labor force participation. We use this data to construct two measures of school participation (dummies for the completion of primary and secondary cycles), and a measure of employment in the non-agricultural sector. In both Cameroon and Nigeria, children normally attend primary school between the ages of 6–12 (though with high repetition rates, students up to age 14 are often included (Dupraz (2019)), and students generally attend secondary schools between the ages of 12–19. To ensure full exposure to primary and secondary education, our empirical analysis will focus on respondents aged 20 or older. On average, 77% of the sampled individuals living across the British-French border within Cameroon and 56% of the sampled individuals living across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border have completed primary education. These figures fall to 9% and 15% for completion of secondary school (see Table 3.1). Moreover, Table 3.1 shows that, on average, close to 50% of the respondents in our analysis are working in the agricultural sector. Alongside the rich socio-economic information, the DHS gathers information on the fertility history of women of reproductive age. For each live birth per interviewed woman, the DHS collect information on the date of birth of the child and its date of death if the child is not alive. Using this information, we construct our fourth variable of interest, which is a measure of infant mortality, that is, mortality occurring within the first year of life. To reduce statistical bias, our analysis will consider only children fully exposed to the risk of mortality in their first year of life. In particular, the empirical analysis below excludes children less than one year old at the time of the survey. On average, less than 10% of children in our analysis died before their first birthday (see Table 3.1).

65

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics N Mean Std. de. Min. Max. Individual and Birth Recode datasets Panel A: Sample across the British-French border within Cameroon Age 5,446 32.68 9.46 20 59 Year of birth 5,446 1974 9.94 1944 1991 Christian 5,446 0.78 0.41 0 1 Male 5,446 0.31 0.46 0 1 Living in Southern Cameroons 5,446 0.35 0.48 0 1 Living in urban area 5,446 0.52 0.50 0 1 Completed primary school 5,446 0.77 0.42 0 1 Completed secondary school 5,446 0.09 0.29 0 1 Currently working 5,423 0.83 0.38 0 1 Non-agricultural worker 4,498 0.52 0.50 0 1 Infant mortality 12,761 0.06 0.24 0 1 Panel B: Sample across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border Age 1,046 32.64 8.93 20 59 Year of birth 1,046 1977 9.59 1945 1993 Christian 1,046 0.36 0.48 0 1 Male 1,046 0.28 0.45 0 1 Living in Nigeria 1,046 0.31 0.46 0 1 Living in urban area 1,046 0.18 0.39 0 1 Completed primary school 1,046 0.56 0.50 0 1 Completed secondary school 1,046 0.15 0.36 0 1 Currently working 1,046 0.86 0.34 0 1 Non-agricultural worker 904 0.42 0.49 0 1 Infant mortality 2,964 0.09 0.29 0 1 Household Member Recode data Panel C: Sample across the British-French border within Cameroon Age 10,572 40.97 16.72 20 95 Year of birth 10,572 1966 16.97 1909 1991 Male 10,577 0.44 0.50 0 1 Living in Southern Cameroons 10,578 0.34 0.47 0 1 Completed primary school 10,507 0.64 0.48 0 1 Completed secondary school 10,507 0.08 0.27 0 1 Panel D: Sample across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border Age 1,897 40.12 15.88 20 95 Year of birth 1,897 1969 16.39 1911 1993 Male 1,901 0.45 0.50 0 1 Living in Nigeria 1,901 0.34 0.47 0 1 Completed primary school 1,877 0.51 0.50 0 1 Completed secondary school 1,877 0.16 0.36 0 1 Note: In Panels A and B we use the sub-samples of eligible women (IR file) and men (MR file) who were selected to provide information on individual-level socio-economic and demographic characteristics, as well as the sample of children (BR file). In Panels C and D we use the sample with every household member.

66

3.3.2 Ethnicity Level Data Our empirical strategy relies on the arbitrary division of ancestral ethnic homelands across the British-French border within Cameroon and the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border (see the fourth section), in order to control for hard-to-observe ethnocultural differences.7 To implement this strategy, it is necessary to identify historical ethnic homelands that were divided by the aforementioned borders. To this end, we draw historical data on the spatial location of pre-colonial ethnic homelands in Africa from George Peter Murdock’s Ethnographic Map of Africa (Murdock (1959)). This map portrays the spatial boundaries of 826 ethnic groups across Africa in the eve of the colonial era. By superimposing the 1961 country boundaries of the République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons), British Southern Cameroons and Nigeria on the ethnic pre-colonial settlements in Murdock’s map, we create a dataset of country-ethnicity areas. We identify ten ancestral ethnic homelands divided by the historical British-French border within Cameroon and eleven ancestral ethnic homelands divided by the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border (see Figure 3.2).8 Most DHS data also contain geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude) for the enumeration areas, which we use to associate each individual in the DHS to their ancestral ethnic homeland. Thus, we include in our estimations ethnic homeland fixed effects to control for hard-to-observe cultural differences that are relevant for human capital accumulation.

FIG. 3.2 Ethnic homelands divided across the British-French border within Cameroon and across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border

3.3.3 Pixel-Level Data Because the validity of our spatial RDD design rests on continuity of all factors besides treatment at the historical borders, our empirical strategy also accounts for geographic characteristics that are likely to vary at the historical borders of interest and which could potentially bias our results if unaccounted for. We measure these geographic characteristics at a pixel unit of 12 km × 12 km. For each pixel, we rely on different sources (see the first section in the Appendix) to collect information on the following measures of geographic and natural endowments: elevation, soil suitability for agriculture, and closest distance from the centroid of a pixel to the national border. In the empirical analysis, we control for these potential confounding factors and show that our results are not driven by differences in geographical endowment. 67

3.4 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY To assess the long-term impact of colonial origins on present-day outcomes in Cameroon, we exploit the internal border across the former British and French areas in this country (see the brighter line in Figure 3.2). Specifically, we implement a Regression Discontinuity Design which compares Cameroonians who are from the same ethnolinguistic background but are living on different sides of the former British-French border within Cameroon. Our main empirical specification is represented by the following equation: (3.1)(3.1) where

is the outcome variable of interest for an individual , born at time , and whose current

residence is in the historical homeland of ethnic group , located in pixel . is equal to one if pixel is located in Anglophone Cameroon (former British Southern Cameroons) and equal to zero if it is located in Francophone Cameroon (former French Cameroons). is the coefficient of interest. It measures the local average effect of British (vs. French) rule on the outcome of interest. and correspond to ethnic homeland fixed effects and cohort of birth fixed effects, respectively. is a vector of individual controls including age dummies, religion dummies, and whether the respondent is living in an urban or rural area. The validity of our empirical strategy rests on the continuity of all factors besides treatment at the historical borders. Thus, our main identification assumption is that there are no systematic differences in dimensions relevant to our outcomes across the two sides of the historical borders of interest in this chapter. For example, we may “wrongly” conclude that the treatment effect given by the coefficient in equation (3.1) is causal and driven by differences in colonial legacy if the areas on the two sides of the border differed systematically in geographical features and ethnic characteristics that matter for human capital accumulation.9 While we are not directly testing for this continuity assumption, in addition to the inclusion of ethnic homeland fixed effects in our specification, we account for the possibility that geographical features may drive our results by controlling for a rich set of location and geographical variables including the shortest distances from the centroid of the pixel to the national border, mean elevation in the pixel, soil suitability for agriculture, and the pixel area. These variables are measured at the pixel level and are denoted by the vector . The variable represents a second-order RD polynomial of the minimum distance from the centroid of each pixel to the British-French Cameroon border. This variable controls for smooth functions of geographic location of pixel . Standard errors are clustered at the DHS survey cluster level. A potential threat to our identification strategy comes from the fact that spillover effects induced by migration from other regions and by migration across the historical British-French border could possibly bias our results. Indeed, using the current place of residence to identify the ancestral ethnic homeland of an individual, as we do in our main empirical strategy, has potential limitations. First, if areas close to the border attract individuals from other regions of the country and from different cultural backgrounds, then including those individuals in the analysis could bias our baseline estimates, as they do not properly control for culture. Second, it is most likely that, at a certain point in their lifetime, some people might have permanently or temporarily migrated from the British side to the French side of the historical British-French border in Cameroon and vice-versa. These individual are therefore likely to be exposed to both British and French colonial legacies, leading to an attenuation bias. It follows from this second limitation that estimates from the following analysis can be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the true effect of colonial origins. When investigating the interaction between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions, we modify equation (3.1) accordingly (see section 3.5.2). This question is addressed using both the samples of 68

individuals living across the British-French border in Cameroon and of individuals living across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border. We describe the methodology used to address this question latter.

3.5 FINDINGS In this section, we present the main results from our estimations of equation 3.1. We focus on four outcomes variables: completion of primary education, completion of secondary education, employment in the non-agricultural sector, and infant mortality (see the description of these variables in the third section). We first present estimates of the long-term effect of British rule on present-day human capital and employment outcomes in Cameroon by comparing individuals across the British-French internal border in this country. Second, we investigate how this effect interacts with post-colonial institutions. Then, to address our second research question, we present results from an analysis that compares outcomes across the Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria border.

3.5.1 The Long-term Impacts of Colonial Origins Before presenting the results for our estimation of equation 3.1, we first provide a graphical illustration of the Regression Discontinuity estimates. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 offer a visual display of the relationship between distance to the British-French border and our outcomes of interest. The X-axis shows the geodesic distance (in kilometers) from the centroid of each pixel to the British-French border in Cameroon. The vertical line marks the British-French border in Cameroon (the cut-off at zero). The dots on the figures mark local averages of the outcome of interest within 2-kilometer bins. Overlaid on the scatter plot is the fitted line showing the linear correlation between the distance to the British-French border in Cameroon and the outcome of interest, along with the correlations’ 95% confidence intervals. In each RD graph, the brighter color is used for Francophone Cameroon while the darker color is used for Anglophone Cameroon. In Figure 3.3 the outcomes of interest are the probability of completing primary education (top of the figure) and the probability of completing secondary education (bottom of the figure). In Figure 3.4 the outcomes of interest are the share of respondents who are working in the non-agricultural sector (top of the figure) and the share of children who have died before their first birthday (bottom of the figure).

69

FIG. 3.3 Discontinuity at the British-French border within Cameroon—education

We see from Figure 3.3 that the share of individuals with primary education is higher in Anglophone Cameroon (compared to Francophone Cameroon). However, Figure 3.4 shows that Anglophones in Cameroon are less likely to work in non-agricultural sectors than their counterparts in Francophone Cameroon. In addition, we can see from the RD-graphs that there is no strong discontinuity at the British-French border in Cameroon when the outcome of interest is either the probability of completing secondary education (bottom of Figure 3.3) or the risk of dying within the first year of life (bottom of Figure 3.4). We find similar results when analyzing the RD-graphs for men and women separately. It will be seen below that these general patterns are confirmed in a regression-based analysis.

70

3.5.1.0.1 Education. The results obtained from estimating the long-term impact of British rule on educational attainment in Cameroon using equation (3.1) are displayed in Table 3.2. Each specification controls for ethnicity fixed effects, the set of controls listed in Section 3.4, and a second-order polynomial of the distance from the centroid of the pixel to the British-French border in Cameroon. The first three panels at the top of the table (Panels A, B, and C) display results from the RDD analysis, where the outcome of interest is the probability of completing a primary education. The three panels at the bottom of the table ( Panels D, E, and F) show the RDD results where the dependent variable is the probability of completing secondary education. In Panels A and D, we estimate equation (3.1) for the whole sample of men and women. We see that the probability of completing primary education is significantly higher in Anglophone Cameroon (compared to Francophone Cameroon). On average the estimates show that the probability of completing primary education is percentage points higher for Anglophone Cameroonians than for Francophone Cameroonians. This estimate is about 12% of the mean primary education completion rate observed in the sample. By contrast, British rule has no statistically significant effect on the probability of completing secondary education (Panel D). For both outcomes we also estimate equation (3.1) for different sub-samples of individuals located close to the historical British-French border. Specifically, in columns (2)–(4) we estimate the effects for different bandwidths (or distances to the border). Overall, our results are robust to alternative bandwidth choices. Additionally, the results on primary educational attainment are qualitatively similar when we examine men and women separately. Estimates in Panels B and C show that the legacy of British colonial rule significantly increases the primary education rates in Cameroon for both Anglophone men and Anglophone women (relative to their counterparts in Francophone Cameroon). Similarly, the effects on secondary education remain small and statistically insignificant when we examine males and females separately (Panels E and F).

71

Table 3.2 Comparison of Primary Education Across the British-French Border Within Cameroon RDD–Bandwidth Full sample < 80 km of bound. < 60 km of bound. < 30 km of bound. (1) (2) (3) (4) Dependent variable is completion of primary education Panel A: Whole sample Anglophone (vs. Francophone 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** Cameroon) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) Observations 10,502 10,261 9,930 8,650 Panel B: Men Anglophone (vs. Francophone 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** Cameroon) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) Observations 4,587 4,482 4,341 3,817 Panel C: Women Anglophone (vs. Francophone 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06** Cameroon) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) Observations 5,914 5,778 5,588 4,832 Dependent variable is completion of secondary education Panel D: Whole sample Anglophone (vs. Francophone -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 Cameroon) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) Observations 10,502 10,261 9,930 8,650 Panel E: Men Anglophone (vs. Francophone -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 Cameroon) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) Observations 4,587 4,482 4,341 3,817 Panel F: Women Anglophone (vs. Francophone 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Cameroon) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) Observations 5,914 5,778 5,588 4,832 Ethnic homeland FE Poly RD Individual controls Geographic controls Note: in this table, we refer to Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon to designate respectively the two territories that took the names of West Cameroon and East Cameroon in the federation following the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons). Individual controls include age at time of survey, year of birth, religion, and urban-rural dummies. Geographic controls measured at the pixel level include distance from the centroid of the pixel to the national border, mean elevation, mean soil suitability for agriculture, area of the ethnic homeland, and area of the pixel.

72

FIG. 3.4 Discontinuity at the British-French border within Cameroon—employment and infant mortality

3.5.1.0.2 Labor Force Participation. Another outcome variable that we examine is labor participation in the non-agricultural sector. Employment in the agricultural sector is among the lowest paid activities in developing countries ( Christiaensen et al. (2020)). In Cameroon, although the agricultural sector is a major contributor to the economy with agricultural activities accounting for roughly percent of the gross domestic product in 2019 (World Development Indicators, 2019), percent of individuals working in this sector live below the poverty line (Kumase (2018)). It follows that employment in the non-agricultural sector can be viewed as a proxy for having a higher socioeconomic status for the individuals in the sample. Results from estimating equation (3.1), where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for employment in the non-agricultural sector, are shown in Table 3.3. Panels A, B, and C in this table show results for the whole sample, the sample of men, and the sample of women, respectively. As we can see, the probability of working in the non-agricultural sector is percentage points lower for Anglophones compared to their Francophone co-ethnics. The magnitude of the effect is equally important for men and women as shown in Panels B and C of Table 3.3, and it changes little with distance to the historical British-French border. These findings suggest that, despite having higher levels of educational attainment, individuals belonging to the Anglophone minority in Cameroon have less access to higher-paying jobs. The analysis therefore tends to support the view that these individuals continue to be subjected to marginalization from the centralized administrative system that has been in place since the 1961 reunification. 73

3.5.1.0.3 Infant Mortality. We also analyze the effect of colonial origins on infant mortality. This latter outcome is defined as the probability of dying before reaching the first birthday. In African countries, the majority of deaths occurring before the age of five take place during the first year following birth ( Pongou et al. (2019)). In addition, death rates are generally higher for male than for female children, due to a combination of prenatal and biological factors (Pongou 2013; 2015; Pongou et al. (2017)). Declining trends in infant mortality have been observed in sub-Saharan Africa in general (Kudamatsu (2012)). In Cameroon, infant mortality decreased from 32.7 percent in 1965 to 14.5 percent in 2019 (World Development Indicators, 2019). The survival disadvantage of male children has also decreased in recent years, and this has been partly attributed to improvement in the quality of institutions (Pongou et al. (2017); Mabeu and Pongou (2020)). Infant and child mortality is considered a key indicator of child well-being, and its high sensitivity to income also makes it a privileged measure of household poverty (Ross (2006)). The RD analysis where infant mortality is the outcome of interest is presented in Table 3.4. We do not find that British rule affects infant mortality. Its estimated coefficient is almost zero, and this is true for both male and female children. Again, this finding is intriguing, especially in light of the fact that, relative to Francophones, Anglophones have higher levels of educational attainment (Table 3.2), and parental education has been found to positively affect child survival rates (e.g., Breierova and Duflo (2004); Grépin and Bharadwaj (2015); Andriano and Monden (2019)). The analysis therefore seems to imply that other factors which are detrimental to Anglophone individuals offset the benefits of higher parental education. It is worth mentioning that all the children in our sample were born after 1969, that is, after the reunification. If the political development that followed this latter historical event did not preserve the institutional legacy of British rule as some scholars have argued (e.g., Mawhood (1983); Adamolekun et al. (1988); Takougang and Amin (2018)), then this might explain the null effect of British rule on infant mortality.

Table 3.3 Comparison of Labor Force Participation in Non-Agricultural Occupations Across the British-French Border Within Cameroon

Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) Observations Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) Observations

RDD–Bandwidth Full sample < 80 km of bound. < 60 km of bound. (1) (2) (3) Dependent variable is non-agricultural worker Panel A: Whole sample -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 4,488 4,389 4,244 Panel B: Men -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 1,556 1,521 1,475 Panel C: Women -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 2,932 2,868 2,769

< 30 km of bound. (4)

-0.09** (0.041) 3,714 -0.09* (0.050) 1,296

Anglophone (vs. Francophone -0.09** Cameroon) (0.044) Observations 2,418 Ethnic homeland FE Poly RD Individual controls Geographic controls Note: in this table, we refer to Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon to designate respectively the two territories that took the names of West Cameroon and East Cameroon in the federation following the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons). Individual controls include age at time of survey, year of birth, religion, and urban-rural dummies. Geographic controls measured at the pixel level include distance from the centroid of the pixel to the national border, mean elevation, mean soil suitability for agriculture, area of the ethnic homeland, and area of the pixel.

74

3.5.2 The Interplay between Colonial Origins and Postcolonial Institutions The analysis in this section addresses the question of how colonial origins interact with postcolonial institutions to shape long-term outcomes. As noted in the Introduction, the British and the French significantly differed in terms of their administrative rules, legal systems, and educational systems (see for example La Porta et al. (1998); Acemoglu et al. (2001); La Porta et al. (2008); Lee and Schultz (2012); Cogneau and Moradi (2014); Anderson (2018)). Studies examining the long-term impacts of colonial origins generally find that British colonization is associated with higher economic development in Africa ( La Porta et al. (1998); Acemoglu et al. (2001); La Porta et al. (2008); Lee and Schultz (2012); Cogneau and Moradi (2014); Guarnieri and Rainer (2018); Dupraz (2019); Canning et al. (2020)). However, no study has so far examined the question of how colonial legacy can be modified or undermined by postcolonial institutions. We exploit Cameroon’s colonial and postcolonial experiment to address this question. Specifically, we exploit the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the “République du Cameroun.” According to some scholars, following the reunification, the influence of the francophone system became predominant and superseded the British impact as all traces of British-inspired local government had virtually disappeared (Adamolekun et al. (1988)). Others have likened this predominance of the francophone system through the centralized administration of Cameroon to an annexation and assimilation of British Southern Cameroons (Takougang and Amin (2018)). We investigate the validity of such claims by examining if differences in educational attainment between Anglophones and Francophones changed for the cohorts that went through the educational system before and after the 1961 reunification. Table 3.4 Comparison of Infant Mortality Across the British-French Border Within Cameroon

Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) Observations Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) Observations

RDD–Bandwidth Full sample < 80 km of bound. < 60 km of bound. (1) (2) (3) Dependent variable is infant mortality Panel A: Whole sample -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 12,097 11,806 11,373 Panel B: Boys -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 6,141 5,979 5,754 Panel C: Girls 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 5,956 5,827 5,619

< 30 km of bound. (4)

-0.00 (0.008) 9,842 -0.00 (0.010) 4,973

Anglophone (vs. Francophone 0.00 Cameroon) (0.011) Observations 4,869 Ethnic homeland FE Poly RD Individual controls Geographic controls Note: in this table, we refer to Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon to designate respectively the two territories that took the names of West Cameroon and East Cameroon in the federation following the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons). Individual controls include twin status, year of birth of child, year of birth of mother, religion, and urban-rural dummies. Geographic controls measured at the pixel level include distance from the centroid of the pixel to the national border, mean elevation, mean soil suitability for agriculture, area of the ethnic homeland, and area of the pixel.

We estimate the following regression:

75

(3.2)

where all variables are defined as in equation (3.1) except for the new variable . is a dummy variable for being partially or fully treated by the post-reunification era; it is equal to one if an individual is born after or alternatively after . When the outcome is a binary variable indicating whether an individual has completed primary education, we assume that all individuals born before (that is, individuals who were born at least years before the reunification) were part of the cohorts which were supposed to complete their primary education prior to the reunification. Similarly, when the outcome is a binary variable indicating whether an individual has completed secondary education, we assume that the cohorts which were supposed to complete this level of education prior to the reunification is the set of individuals born before (that is, individuals born at least years before the reunification). The cohorts born after for the first outcome and after for the second outcome are therefore assumed to be partially or fully treated by the political developments that followed the reunification as far as education is concerned. Despite the constitutional biculturalism of the Cameroon Federation, which recognized two educational subsystems, namely the Anglophone and Francophone subsystems with two examination systems, in practise, the Anglophone educational system was gradually dominated by the Francophone culture in the years after the reunification. This led to a “Francophonization” of the Anglophone educational system (Nfi (2014)). Indeed, Anglophone schools, especially technical colleges in Anglophone Cameroon were predominantly staffed with Francophones who taught lessons and set examinations in French and/or in Pidgin English. It is estimated that Francophones in the Government Technical Colleges of Anglophone Cameroon constituted more than percent of the staff in these schools in the 2011–2012 academic year. Moreover, Government Technical Colleges in Anglophone Cameroon had Francophone examinations such as the “CAP,” “PROBATOIRE,” and “BACCALAUREAT,” rather than the G.C.E Anglophone examination as their end-of-course examinations. According to Nfi (2014), these examinations did not promote values cherished by the Anglophones especially self-reliance, civility, moral probity, and honesty. Nfi (2014) notes that the gradual domination of Anglophone education by the Francophone majority has been seen by some authors as an attempt to eradicate the Anglophone culture through the adulteration or pollution of its subsystem of education. The estimates of the separate and joint effects of colonial origins and exposure to policies that were implemented after the reunification are presented in Table 3.5. We find that exposure to British colonial rules is associated with a higher probability of completing primary education (Panel A of Table 3.5). However, the negative coefficient on the interaction term between British rule and the post-reunification dummy shows that the effect of British colonization on primary education decreases for cohorts exposed to post-reunification institutions, that is cohorts born after 1949. These results hold when we examine men and women separately (Panels B and C of Table 3.5). A similar pattern arises when we consider the probability of completing secondary education but with lower statistical precision. The estimates in Panels D, E and F of Table 3.5 show that British colonization increases the probability of completing secondary education but this effect is attenuated for cohorts exposed to post-reunification institutions as suggested by the negative coefficient on the interaction term. The significant negative coefficients on the interaction term in Panel E of Table 3.5 show that the negative effect of post-reunification institutions on the Anglophone-Francophone gap in the probability of completing secondary education is mainly driven by men. In fact, the effect is close to zero for women (Panel F of Table 3.5). These results suggest that the “Francophonization” of the Anglophone system in the post-reunification era erased the pre-reunification advantage in secondary education that Anglophone men had. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that the positive effect of the British rule on education has been diminished or cancelled by policies adopted following the reunification.

76

Table 3.5 Interplay Between Colonial Origins and Postcolonial Institutions

77

RDD–Bandwidth Full < 80 km of < 60 km of sample (1) bound. (2) bound. (3) Dependent variable is completion of primary education Panel A: Whole sample Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) Post-reunification 0.51** 0.52* 0.39 (0.256) (0.267) (0.275) Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) × -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** Post-reunification (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) Observations 10,502 10,261 9,930 Panel B: Men Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) Post-reunification 0.16 0.06 -0.01 (0.260) (0.246) (0.255) Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) × -0.08* -0.08* -0.09** Post-reunification (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) Observations 4,587 4,482 4,341 Panel C: Women Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) Post-reunification 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.63** (0.236) (0.256) (0.255) Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) × -0.06** -0.06** -0.05* Post-reunification (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) Observations 5,914 5,778 5,588 Dependent variable is completion of secondary education Panel D: Whole sample Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) 0.02 0.02 0.02 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) Post-reunification 0.25* 0.25* 0.24* (0.126) (0.128) (0.133) Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) × -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 Post-reunification (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) Observations 10,502 10,261 9,930 Panel E: Men Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) 0.03 0.03 0.03 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) Post-reunification 0.09 0.14 0.15 (0.209) (0.209) (0.214) Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) × -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** Post-reunification (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) Observations 4,587 4,482 4,341 Panel F: Women Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) 0.01 0.01 0.00 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) Post-reunification 0.24** 0.08 0.10 (0.109) (0.100) (0.100) Anglophone (vs. Francophone Cameroon) × 0.00 0.00 0.01 Post-reunification (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) Observations 5,914 5,778 5,588 Ethnic homeland FE Poly RD Individual controls Geographic controls

< 30 km of bound. (4)

0.15*** (0.029) 0.31 (0.318) -0.09*** (0.028) 8,650 0.16*** (0.046) 0.05 (0.243) -0.09* (0.046) 3,817 0.10*** (0.031) 0.61** (0.275) -0.05 (0.031) 4,832

0.01 (0.019) 0.24* (0.143) -0.02 (0.017) 8,650 0.02 (0.026) 0.01 (0.221) -0.04 (0.024) 3,817 0.00 (0.018) 0.09 (0.107) 0.01 (0.016) 4,832

78

Note: in this table, we refer to Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon to designate respectively the two territories that took the names of West Cameroon and East Cameroon in the federation following the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons). The variable “Post-reunification” refers to the cohorts that partly or fully attended primary school (cohorts born after 1949) or secondary school (cohorts born after 1941) after the reunification of Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun in 1961. In Panels A, B and C where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for primary education, we define this variable as a dummy equal to one if an individual is born after 1949. In panels D, E and F where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for secondary education, we define this variable as a dummy equal to one if an individual is born after 1941. Individual controls include age at time of survey, year of birth, religion, and urban-rural dummies. Geographic controls measured at the pixel level include distance from the centroid of the pixel to the national border, mean elevation, mean soil suitability for agriculture, area of the ethnic homeland, and area of the pixel.

3.5.3 Cameroon’s Anglophone Minority versus Nigeria The findings of the previous section are consistent with the view that the centralized administrative system that gradually emerged following the reunification was detrimental to Cameroon’s Anglophone minority. This fact raises the question of whether individuals belonging to this minority group would have been better off today had British Southern Cameroons voted to join Nigeria in the 1961 plebiscite. Answering this question will provide further evidence of the interaction between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions. Prior to 1961, the British administered Southern Cameroons and Nigeria similarly, as these two territories had similar administrative, legal, and educational systems.10 The reunification of Southern Cameroons with the République du Cameroun in 1961 therefore represents a major political and administrative shift for the Anglophone minority. We exploit this experiment to answer the question of how this shift has impacted Anglophone individuals, especially when compared to their Nigerian neighbors and co-ethnics. To conduct our analysis, we use a Regression Discontinuity Design framework, similar to the one in equation (3.2), but with the British dummy equal to one for British Southern Cameroons and zero for Nigeria. In the first column of Table 3.6, we control for the binary indicator for British Southern Cameroons, ethnic homeland fixed effects, a polynomial function of distance to the border, and individual controls. In the second column, we add controls for geographic characteristics. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that the probability of completing primary education is larger for individuals in former Southern Cameroons (or Anglophone Cameroonians for short), but the difference is not statistically significant and becomes smaller after controlling for geographic characteristics. Panel B of Table 3.6 shows that the probability of completing secondary education is significantly lower for Anglophone Cameroonians (column (1)). However, the magnitude of this effect drops and the statistical significance disappears after controlling for geographic characteristics in Column (2). In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6, we add a binary indicator for cohorts exposed to post-reunification institutions. We also add an interaction term between this variable and the dummy for British Southern Cameroons. The positive coefficients on the interaction term in Panel A indicate that the probability of completing primary education improved for Anglophone Cameroonians after the reunification. The negative coefficients on the interaction term in Panel B show that, relative to their Nigerian co-ethnics, Anglophone Cameroonians had a lower probability of completing secondary education after the reunification. While the magnitude of these effects is globally small and insignificant, the direction of the effect suggests that Anglophone Cameroonians and their Nigerian co-ethnics neighbors did not differ significantly in terms of educational outcomes prior to the 1961 reunification. However, Anglophone Cameroonians were less likely to complete secondary after reunification. This finding is in line with previous scholarship indicating that the gradual “Francophonization” of the Anglophone educational system, in the years following the reunification, mainly affected educational outcomes at the secondary level (Nfi (2014)).

79

Table 3.6 Comparison of Human Capital and Non-Agricultural Employment Outcomes Across the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria Border (1) Panel A: Completion of primary education Anglophone Cameroon (vs. Nigeria) 0.10 (0.103) Post-reunification

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.05 (0.092)

0.09 (0.087) 0.92** (0.387) 0.01 (0.079) 1,875

0.03 (0.098) 1.04** (0.405) 0.02 (0.081) 1,875

-0.11 (0.076) 0.62** (0.301) -0.02 (0.091) 1,875

-0.03 (0.103) 0.94** (0.370) -0.04 (0.093) 1,875

Anglophone Cameroon (vs. Nigeria) × Post-reunification Observations

1,875 Panel B: Completion of secondary education Anglophone Cameroon (vs. Nigeria) -0.13* (0.066) Post-reunification Anglophone Cameroon (vs. Nigeria) × Post-reunification Observations

1,875 -0.08 (0.082)

1,875 1,875 Panel C: Work in the non-agricultural sector Anglophone Cameroon (vs. Nigeria) -0.23** -0.45*** (0.085) (0.138) Observations 524 524 Panel D: Infant mortality Anglophone Cameroon (vs. Nigeria) 0.05** 0.25*** (0.020) (0.071) Observations 1,188 1,188 Ethnic homeland FE Poly RD Individual controls Geographic controls Note: in this table, we refer to Anglophone Cameroon to designate the territory that took the name of West Cameroon in the federation following the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun (former French Cameroons). The variable “post-reunification” refers to the cohorts that partly or fully attended primary school (cohorts born after 1949) or secondary school (cohorts born after 1941) after the reunification of Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun in 1961. In Panel A where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for primary education, we define this variable as a dummy equal to one if an individual is born after 1949. In Panel B where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for secondary education, we define this variable as a dummy equal to one if an individual is born after 1941. In Panels A, B and C, individual controls include age at time of survey, year of birth, religion, and urban-rural dummies. In Panel D, individual controls include twin status, year of birth of child, year of birth of mother, religion, and urban-rural dummies. Geographic controls measured at the pixel level include distance from the centroid of the pixel to the national border, mean elevation, mean soil suitability for agriculture, area of the ethnic homeland, and area of the pixel.

We also compare Anglophone Cameroonians and their Nigerian neighbors and co-ethnics in terms of employment and mortality outcomes. The inclusion of an interaction term between the dummy variable for Southern Cameroons and the post-reunification dummy when analyzing these outcomes was not possible, as no observations for these outcomes were available for the period before the 1961 reunification. So, we mainly rely on a specification similar to equation (3.1), where we define the variable British as a dummy variable which is equal to one if an individual is from a pixel p which is located in Anglophone Cameroon (former British Southern Cameroons) and equal to zero if the individual is from a pixel p which is located in Nigeria. All other variables are defined as before. We find that, relative to their Nigerian co-ethnics,

80

Anglophone Cameroonians are significantly less likely to work in the non-agricultural sector (Panel C in Table 3.6). We also find that, relative to their Nigerian counterparts, infant mortality is much higher for the Anglophone children of Cameroon (Panel D in Table 3.6).11 Overall, these findings suggest that the Anglophone minority of Cameroon would have been better off had they joined Nigeria in the 1961 plebiscite. Additionally, the findings lend credence to the view that this minority has been marginalized by the Francophone majority through the centralization of administrative systems (Takougang and Amin (2018)). The analysis tends to underscore the significant interplay between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions in the determination of long-term outcomes.

3.6 CONCLUSION In this chapter, we examined the long-term impacts of the colonial history of Cameroon, focusing on the outcomes of men, women, and children. Cameroon was first colonized by Germany. However, following its defeat at the end of World War I, Germany lost its colonies, and the western territories of today’s Cameroon were arbitrarily divided between France and the United Kingdom under a League of Nations mandate. We exploited the arbitrary nature of this division in order to compare the outcomes of Anglophones and Francophones who live close to the historical British-French border in Cameroon and who share the same ethnicity and ancestral traditions. We found that Anglophones have a higher level of educational attainment in general. Specifically, we find that British rule has a strong positive effect on the completion of primary education but a much smaller, albeit positive, effect on the completion of secondary education. For both outcomes, the effect is larger for women than for men. The higher educational attainment of the Anglophones does not however translate into better paid employment or greater well-being for children. Indeed, Anglophones are less likely to work in the non-agricultural sector compared to Francophones, and infant mortality is equally high among children born to parents from these two groups. We also analyzed the interplay between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions in determining long-term outcomes. We find that the reunification of Southern Cameroons with “La République du Cameroon” in has been detrimental to the Anglophone minority. Indeed, the advantage enjoyed by Anglophones in terms of educational attainment largely vanished after the reunification. Also, while the Anglophones of Cameroon had levels of education comparable to their Nigerian neighbors before the reunification, evidence suggests that they became worse off afterwards. We also find that, compared to their Nigerian neighbors, Anglophone Cameroonians are significantly worse off in terms of non-agricultural employment and infant mortality rates in the post-reunification era. Our analysis is consistent with the view that the institutions inherited by the Anglophone minority of Cameroon from the British colonial power have been undermined by the centralized state that emerged following the reunification (Adamolekun et al. (1988)). Our findings suggest that post-reunification institutions have erased the positive pre-reunification impact of the British on educational attainment, ultimately resulting in Anglophone men, women, and children becoming worse off overall. Our findings also shed light on the sense of political, economic, and socio-cultural marginalization that has gradually built up in this minority group (Takougang and Amin (2018)), culminating in the recent political crisis in Cameroon.

81

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Between 1919 and 1960, the French territory in Cameroon was called Cameroun. Following its independence on January 1, 1960, this territory was renamed République du Cameroun. The British territory, called British Cameroons between 1919 and 1961, was initially formed of Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. Following the reunification that led to the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the République du Cameroun took the name of the Federated State of East Cameroon (or East Cameroon for short), and Southern Cameroons took the name of the Federated State of West Cameroon (or West Cameroon for short). In present-day Cameroon, these territories are no longer called by these names. When referring to them in a precise historical context, each will be called by the name it had in that context. Otherwise, they will simply be referred to as Francophone Cameroon and Anglophone Cameroon, respectively. Today, the territory of Anglophone Cameroon corresponds administratively to the Northwest and Southwest Regions, and the territory of Francophone Cameroon represents the rest of the country. It is argued that in July 1960, before the constitutional talks proper, Ahidjo had made several declarations in Tiko, Victoria, and Buea (cities in Southern Cameroons) claiming unambiguously that reunification was to be undertaken in an atmosphere of equality between the representatives of the République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons (see for example Nfi 2014; 2021). Joseph (1975) suggests that the French-German rivalry over French Cameroons between World War I and world War II was an important factor in the emergence of this radical nationalist movement. The U.P.C. demanded both the independence of French Cameroons and its reunification with British Cameroons. Joseph (1975) notes that “although the U.P.C. was eventually crushed by French troops, its two goals of independence and reunification were finally achieved, albeit in circumstances favorable to preserving French influence […].” Information collected through DHS is generally recorded at different levels. The analysis in this paper relies mainly on the Household member Recode (HR) files, the Individual Recode (IR) files, the Men Recode (MR) files and the Birth Recode (BR) files. The HR file contains one record for every household member. For each household member, we have information on the level of education. Thus, for the purpose of our analysis, we use the HR database to measure education. However, the HR file does not collect information on employment or health. The IR and the MR files have one record for every women aged 15–49 and men aged 15–59. In addition to the level of education, the IR and the MR files also have information on employment, which we use to define our measure of non-agricultural worker. Finally, the BR file provides information on the birth history of all women interviewed. We use this file to measure infant mortality. As noted in the Introduction, we refer to Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon to designate respectively the two territories that took the names of West Cameroon and East Cameroon in the federation following the 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroons and the République du Cameroun. Prior to the reunification, these territories had had other names, and they are no longer called by the names they took in the federation in present-day Cameroon. Because individuals in our sample were born between 1909 and 1993, the different names taken by the territory of present-day Cameroon or by the two aforementioned territories that form this country can be used. We refer to these territories as Francophone Cameroon and Anglophone Cameroon for simplicity and for expositional purposes. Similarly, the border between Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria is the same as the British Southern Cameroons-Nigeria border in the period 1919–1961. This is based on the subsample of eligible women (IR file) and men (MR file) that were selected to provide information on personal socio-economic and demographic characteristics, as well as the sample of children (BR file). See Panels C and D of Table 3.1 for the sample with every household member. Most African countries are characterized by rich ethnic and cultural diversity, with Cameroon being one of these countries (Mbaku (2005). Our identification strategy accounts for the influence of ancestral cultures and traditions. This approach is common in the literature analyzing the long-term economic impacts of colonial and pre-colonial institutions in Africa; see, for example, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2014; 2016; Anderson (2018); and Canning et al. (2020). Guarnieri and Rainer (2018) find no discontinuity of geographic features (climate and altitude) and ethnic characteristics (dependence on gatherings, the use of plough, the prevalence of bride price, and the practice of polygamy) at the British-French border in Cameroon. In fact, prior to 1954, Southern Cameroons was administered as part of Eastern Nigeria. In results not shown here, we find that this disparity is primarily driven by boys.

REFERENCES 82

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review, 91(5):1369–1401. Adamolekun, L., Olowu, D., and Laleye, O. M. (1988). Local Government in West Africa since Independence. Lagos: University of Lagos press. Anderson, S. (2018). “Legal Origins and Female HIV.” American Economic Review, 108(6):1407–1439. Andriano, L. and Monden, C. W. (2019). “The Causal Effect of Maternal Education on Child Mortality: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Malawi and Uganda.” Demography, 56(5):1765–1790. Archibong, B. and Obikili, N. (2020). “Prison Labor: The Price of Prisons and the Lasting Effects of Incarceration.” African Economic History Working Paper Series, (52). Awasom, N. F. (2002). “Negotiating Federalism: How Ready were Cameroonian Leaders before the February 1961 United Nations Plebiscites?” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines, 36(3):425–459. Bayart, J. F. (1978). “The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime.” Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadu Ahidjo, pages 45–65. Breierova, L. and E. Duflo (2004), “The Impact of Education on Fertility and Child Mortality: Do Fathers Really Matter Less Than Mothers?” NBER Working Paper No. 10513. Brodeur A. and Mabeu M. C. and Pongou R. (2020). “Ancestral Norms, Legal Origins, and Female Empowerment,” Working Papers 2002E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics. Canning, D., Mabeu, M., and Pongou, R. (2020). “Colonial origins and fertility: Can the market overcome history.” Unpublished Manuscript. Chem-Langhëë, B. (1995). “The Road to the Unitary State of Cameroon 1959–1972.” Paideuma, pages 17–25. Christiaensen, L., Rutledge, Z., and Taylor, J. E. (2020). “The Future of Work in Agriculture: Some Reflections.” The World Bank. Cogneau, D. and Moradi, A. (2014). “Borders that Divide: Education and Religion in Ghana and Togo Since Colonial Times.” The Journal of Economic History, 74(3):694–729. Dev, P., Mberu, B. U., and Pongou, R. (2016). “Ethnic Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Formal Education in Nigeria.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 64(4):603–660. Dupraz, Y. (2019). “French and British Colonial Legacies in Education: Evidence from the Partition of Cameroon.” The Journal of Economic History, 79(3):628–668. Ebune, J. B. (1992). The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons, 1916–1960. Yaoundé: CEPER. Ebune, J. B. (2016). “The Dilemma of the Federal System in West Cameroon, 1961–1972”. Journal of Scientific Research and Studies, 3(7):133–145. Fanso, V. (2009) “The Latent Struggle for Identity and Autonomy in the Southern Cameroons, 1916–1946.”, in Fowler, I. and Fanso, V. (eds) Encounter, Transformation and Identity. Peoples of the Western Cameroon Borderlands 1891–2000. New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 14–150. Gardinier, D. E. (1967). The British in the Cameroons 1919–1939. Yale University Press. Grépin, K. A. and Bharadwaj, P. (2015). “Maternal Education and Child Mortality in Zimbabwe.” Journal of Health Economics, 44:97–117. Guarnieri, E. and Rainer, H. (2018). Female Empowerment and Male Backlash. CESifo Working Paper no. 7009. Joseph, R. A. (1975). “The German Question in French Cameroun, 1919–1939”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17(1):65–90. Konings, P. (1999a), “The Anglophone Struggle for Federalism in Cameroon”, in L.R. Basta and J. Ibrahim (eds.), Federalism and Decentralisation in Africa: The Multicultural Challenge., pp. 289–325, Fribourg: Institut du Fédéralisme. Kudamatsu, M. (2012). “Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data”. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(6):1294–1317. Kumase, Wokia-azi Ndangle (2010). “Aspects of Poverty and Inequality in Cameroon.” Frankfurt am Main, New York: Lang (v. 28). La Porta, R., de Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1998). “Law and Finance”. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6):1113–1155. La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2008). “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins”. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2):285–332. Le Vine, V. T. (1964). The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lee, A. and Schultz, K. A. (2012). “Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon”. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 7(4):365–410. Mabeu, M. and Pongou, P. (2020). “Democracy, Genes, and the Male Survival Disadvantage” (Tech. Rep.), Working Paper. Mawhood, P. (1983). Applying the French Model in Cameroon. Local Government in the Third World, pages 189–209.

83

Mbaku, J. M. (2005). Culture and Customs of Cameroon. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Michalopoulos, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2014). “National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1):151–213. Michalopoulos, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2016). “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa.” American Economic Review, 106(7):1802–48. Murdock, G. P. (1959). “Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History.” New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. Nana, G. (2016). “Language Ideology and the Colonial Legacy in Cameroon Schools: A Historical Perspective.” Journal of Education and Training Studies, 4(4):168–196. Nfi, J. L. (2014). “The Anglophone Cultural Identity in Cameroon 50 Years after Reunification.” International Journal of Advanced Research, 2(2):121–129. Nfi, J. L. (2021). “The Structure of the Post-Colonial State and the Survival of the Anglophone Education at the Origins of the Cameroon Civil War.” Africana Studia, (33). Nunn, N. (2008). “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades.” Quaterly Journal of Economics, 123(1):139–176. Nunn, N. (2020). “The Historical Roots of Economic Development.” Science, 367(6485). Nunn, N. and Wantchekon, L. (2011). The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. American Economic Review, 101 (7):3221–3252. Okoye, D. and Pongou, R. (2014). “Historical Missionary Activity, Schooling, and the Reversal of Fortunes: Evidence from Nigeria.” Schooling, and the Reversal of Fortunes: Evidence from Nigeria (August 20, 2014). Okoye, D. and Pongou, R. (2017). “Sea Changes: The Transatlantic Slave Trade and Missionary Activity in Africa” Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved December, 6:2017. Okoye, D., Pongou, R., and Yokossi, T. (2019). “New Technology, Better Economy? The Heterogeneous Impact of Colonial Railroads in Nigeria.” Journal of Development Economics, 140:320–354. O’Neil, R., Fowler, I., and Zeitlyn, D. (1996). “Imperialisms at the Century’s End: Moghama Relationships with Bali-Nyonga and Germany, 1889–1908.” African Crossroads: Intersections between History and Anthropology in Cameroon, pages 81–100. Pongou, R. (2013). “Why is Infant Mortality Higher in Boys than in Girls? A New Hypothesis Based on Preconception Environment and Evidence from a Large Sample of Twins.” Demography, 50(2):421–444. Pongou, R. (2015). “Sex Differences in Early-Age Mortality: The Preconception Origins Hypothesis.” Demography, 52(6):2053–2056. Pongou, R., Kuate Defo, B., and Tsala Dimbuene, Z. (2017). “Excess Male Infant Mortality: The Gene-Institution Interactions.” American Economic Review, 107(5):541–545. Pongou, R., Shapiro, D., and Tenikue, M. (2019). “Mortality Convergence of Twins and Singletons in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Demographic Research, 41:1047–1058. Ross, M. (2006). “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of Political Science, 50(4):860–874. Rubin, N. (1971). Cameroun: An African Federation. Takougang, J. and Amin, J. A. (2018). Post-Colonial Cameroon: Politics, Economy, and Society. Yearwood, P. J. (1993). “In a Casual Way with a Blue Pencil: British Policy and the Partition of Kamerun, 1914–1919.” Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines, 27(2):218–244.

DATA APPENDIX Elevation. Average elevation above sea level of each pixel. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colorado. Available at http://nelson.wisc.edu/sage/data-and-models/atlas/data.php?incdataset =Topography. Soil suitability for Agriculture. Average land quality for cultivation within each pixel. This index is based on the temperature and soil conditions of each grid cell. Source: Ramankutty, N., J. A. Foley, J. Norman, and K. McSweeney. The global distribution of cultivable lands: current patterns and sensitivity to possible climate change. Available at http://nelson.wisc.edu/sage/data-and-models/atlas/data.php ?incdataset=Suitability%20for%20Agriculture. Distance to the National Border. The geodesic distance to the nearest national border from the centroid of each pixel. Constructed using the border from the digital chart of the world projection. Available at https://worldmap.harvard.edu/data.

84

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ETHNICITY CÉLESTIN MONGA

4.1 INTRODUCTION The beginning of the 1990s was a turning point in Cameroon’s political history regarding the State’s management mode. The authoritarian regime that had, practically since independence in 1960, been based on a single-party system was shaken by popular protests demanding liberty. The Cameroonian authorities then resorted to various survival techniques to repress, divide, and weaken the developing opposition movements in the country. One of the most effective strategies used by President Paul Biya’s regime, and still in vogue today, was the ethnicization of public debate and State management. The Cameroonian authorities’ simple answer to the intellectuals and new dissident leaders who were speaking out against the failure of the single-party system, the bad management of a State riddled with corruption and incompetence, and the ineffectiveness of public policies, was to put forward their supposed “ethnic” origins (Monga, 1990, 1996). All objective criticism of the power in place was thus dismissed and even trivialized by the official narrative, according to which all the members of the opposition were simply “tribalist” individuals who, in reality, wanted to start an “ethnic war” in Cameroon. It was a crude strategy but it enabled them to evade all serious debate, particularly since this discourse was disseminated and amplified by the public media and many of the so-called private newspapers that were actually financed by the government (Tcheuyap, 2014). As Cameroon, like just about all African countries, is a State whose borders were drawn up arbitrarily during negotiations between colonial powers at the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), and whose postcolonial management has been disappointing, it remains a nation perpetually in the making. The incomplete attempts to transpose the model of a centralized State (inspired by French Jacobinism) into some of these countries, with borders drawn without consideration for old political and administrative traditions, modes of governance, customs, or political practices, resulted in illegitimate and incompetent States, including in their governing functions (Pambou Tchinvounda, 1982; Michalon, 1984, 1995). Under the political single-party regimes that prevailed in Africa in the course of the first three decades of independence (1960–1990), such a failure of the postcolonial State could only further complicate the difficult process of transforming and modernizing political institutions (Eboussi, 1997; Bayart, 1989; Ela, 1990). The official centripetal discourse, tirelessly repeating the need for national unity (while laws, regulations, and public policies were going in the opposite direction; see Monga, 1986), was progressively replaced by a proliferation of intellectual and political discourse promoting centrifugal forces, denouncing the failure of the nation-State project, at times questioning the ambition to be a nation, celebrating ethnic and regional particularisms and encouraging wishes to fragment the country. Since the late 1980s, we have thus seen in Cameroon a rash of political writings concerning what Kemedjio called “the study of the problem of ethnic nationalities in the context of a strongly centralized postcolonial state” (1993, p. 284). An intellectual Cameroonian collective has actually documented and analyzed this “identitary industry,” which goes well beyond academic debates to dominate the media and public discourse (Collectif Changer le Cameroun, 1990). Criticized, and fearing the wave of democratization sweeping through Africa after Nelson Mandela was released from prison (February, 1990), the Cameroonian authorities thought it would be smart to support the identitarian closures as a means of dividing and weakening the opposition movements. The January 1996 revision of the Constitution even validated and institutionalized ethnicity (by creating the status, not legally defined, of “autochthonous” populations). The regime reaped high political returns from this, for the political

85

opposition was deeply divided on the subject, and thus considerably weakened. But popular frustrations and anger were exacerbated, to the point that an armed rebellion has been ongoing since September 2016 in Cameroon’s two anglophone regions. This chapter examines the question of ethnicity (and the tribe)1 in Cameroon, its uses and manipulations. The next section is a brief recall of the debates on racial segregation and reparations based on ethnicity in the United States. They inspire some of the promoters of ethnicity in Cameroon. The following section deconstructs the ethnic categorizations in Cameroon and emphasizes their contradictions and their arbitrary character. The penultimate section discusses the empirical challenges for measuring ethnic inequities. The final section offers concluding thoughts.

4.2 SETTLING PAST GRIEVANCES: THE ECONOMY OF BELONGING Dissatisfaction and the perpetual search for individual and social happiness are peculiar to human beings the world over. In rich countries as well as in the poorest, people every day invent reasons and ways of life they find suitable, as well as new spaces of dreams and liberty. They fight to improve their quality of life and give ever more satisfying meanings to their existence. This constant quest often takes the form of various social claims: debate on the organization, time, and remuneration of work, demand for better working conditions, higher incomes, more liberty, and democracy—factors considered sources of more happiness for the individual and the strongest defense against violence, war, and poverty. In the West, this has at times been picked up and hijacked by populist political movements, some of whose leaders have achieved spectacular success (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Because of the weakness and illegitimacy of the political institutions inherited from the colonial era, and misrepresented as “modern” political systems that were above all ineffective and authoritarian (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997), Africa has, since the first decades of independence, developed various forms of a tropical populism that is aggressive and at times grounded on cultural and religious bases (Magassouba, 1985). In high-income countries, populism often appears in terms of geographical arguments (oppositions and comparisons between inhabitants of urban and rural areas) and corporatist quarrels (outbursts of anger about the badly treated socioprofessional categories, opposition voiced between labor unions and employers’ organizations). In such a context, shrewd political entrepreneurs sometimes seize on the authentic demands of marginalized groups, surf on their anger and frustrations, and impose themselves as populist—and popular—leaders (Case and Deaton, 2020). African populisms are rarely based on corporatist approaches, and with good reason: with the notable exception of a few rare countries, like South Africa where there is a very strong labor union tradition, the African versions of capitalism are often continuations of dual economies (formal and informal) that did not allow the development of solid institutions within which corporatism could derive true legitimacy (Monga, 2021a). In such a context, the strongest demands of groups often take on identitary forms. And among these, those that “legitimize” themselves through ethnicity are the most significant. This is an astonishing paradox, for in a country like Cameroon ethnicity is at best vague and arbitrary, and both rigorously and legally indefinable. In some parts of the world, people try to affirm their existential quest by broadening their citizenship and integrating large geographical areas, for they believe it’s better to be American than Alaskan, and European than Portuguese. In Cameroon, some populist political entrepreneurs proclaim themselves leaders of “ethnic” communities not clearly identified. They thus define themselves primarily “Bamilékés,” “Betis,” “Sawas,” “Musgums,” “Haoussas,” “Etons,” “Bafias,” “Babimbis,” “Nsos,” and “Makéas,” before eventually being Cameroonians or Africans. Their political, economic and social demands concerning democracy, equality of citizenship, liberty, education, health, property ownership, purchasing power, quality of life, unemployment, or inflation are heard only through the prism of their randomly assigned micro-identities. The sole password in vogue among these populists seems to be the “tribe” or “ethnic” group. The same thing is true even in churches: in March 1987, some fifty Catholic priests of the Douala diocese addressed an angry memorandum to Pope John Paul II and the entire Vatican hierarchy to protest vigorously the appointment of a “Bamiléké” auxiliary bishop to the Douala diocese (a diocese in which said “Bamilékés” are, by the way, ethnically in the majority). Entitled “Pour un éclairage nouveau” [For a new insight], the 86

argument of the self-proclaimed “autochthonous” Catholic priests of the Doula region was in reality a manifesto of ethnic hatred toward Bamiléké priests, accused of being favored by the Vatican (Collectif Changer le Cameroun, 1992). Posing the identitary question through the prism of ethnicity is certainly not exclusive to African countries. Since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the heart of Europe and the fratricide wars that followed this implosion, secessionist movements based on regional and even ethnic particularisms continue to dominate political debate in Spain (Catalonia), Great Britain (Scotland), and even in wealthy countries whose States have long been considered nations (Belgium and Canada). Ethnic identity is therefore not the sole preserve of African countries like Cameroon. But in countries like the United States and Canada, where the memory of racial discrimination is still very much alive because it was long ignored and buried under the rubble of an “economic progress” thought to automatically benefit all ethnic groups, identitary claims often have a moral basis: they are based on the consequences of a long history and practices of discrimination and bad treatment, often codified in laws and regulations. As the State was the promoter of policies of excluding targeted groups of populations, the ethnic demands have a historical and ethical motive that justifies empirical discussions on the theme of reparations. In the United States, for example, African Americans were not only subjected to slavery but they were also subsequently victims of specific laws and regulations that maintained their social subordination even after their emancipation (Darity and Mullen, 2020). In such a context, the demand for reparations for the descendants of the former slaves is based on the painful heritage of a past that has produced political, economic, and social inequalities and has left hysteresis effects that are well documented and largely recognized by the State. A great number of empiric studies have shown it to be so, and the American federal government has created several institutions especially charged with finding solutions to the inequalities and injustices linked to the ethnic question. A recent economic proposal, among the boldest, is that of Darity and Mullen (2020) who advocate for a national plan of reparations for African Americans with the aim of compensating for the wealth inequality resulting from centuries of slavery, segregation, and discrimination. The two researchers first note that some of the architects of the American Revolution (1775–1798), like Thomas Paine (1776–1783), had recommended granting lands to former slaves as a symbolic form of compensation for their long subjugation. But this idea aroused little interest before the Civil War (1861–1865). Next, Darity and Mullen (2020) calculate the effects of cumulative intergenerational decades of discriminatory policies regarding housing, education, police violence, and mass incarceration, and calculate the role of slavery in the economic development of the United States, and then go on to evaluate the literal cost of racial inequality and propose a reparations plan, often cited in public debates. After the abolition of slavery, former slaves were, after all, promised “40 acres and a mule.” The process was launched but checked by President Andrew Johnson (1808–1875). As the years went by, the plan of agrarian reform that was to make this promise a reality was abandoned, putting an end to any official steps aimed at providing significant reparations to American Blacks. In the United States, the demand for reparations based on ethnicity is therefore founded on historical, legal, and empirical considerations. In such an approach, the reparations concern descendants of slaves, but they are not exclusively based on slavery for they also take into account a century of legal segregation (the period of the Jim Crow laws from 1876 to 1964) as well as prejudices that still exist today: massive incarceration, executions of unarmed African Americans by the police, continued discrimination in the matter of credit, housing, employment, and the ultimate indicator of the cumulative intergenerational effects of racial injustice that is the large racial disparity in wealth in the United States. Official statistics confirm the persistence of the racial gap: African Americans descended from slavery represent about 12% of the current United States population, but possess less than 2% of the national wealth. The poorest white Americans, those with the lowest 20% of income, have a higher median wealth level than that of all African-American families considered together. As to the poorest African Americans, their median wealth level is lower than that of other ethnic groups in the same category. Education, scholarship, and even affirmative action policies have not resolved the hysteresis effects of discrimination, since African-American heads of family with college degrees have wealth equivalent to two-thirds of the net value of that of white heads of family who have not completed their secondary school studies. 87

These official statistics explain Darity’s bold recommendation: “Our focal point is the elimination of the wealth gap If one sets as objective to make the wealth share of Blacks equal to their percentage in the total population, that would cost a minimum of 11 to 12 trillion dollars” (Darity, 2021). The beneficiaries eligible for his reparations plan should be American Blacks who are descendants of slaves; the reparations plan should eliminate the racial wealth gap that amounts to an average difference in value of $840,000 between a Black household and a white household; finally, it involves direct payment to the beneficiaries by the federal government. The American case is obviously unique. The memory of slavery, of the violence and legal discrimination specifically directed against African Americans (considered as an “ethnic group” and legally defined) justifies the intellectual debates and “remedial” public policies proposed by Darity and other researchers. The American experience is thus not transferable to countries like Cameroon whose historicity is very different from that of the United States. This does not keep ethnic claims and demands for compensation from being angrily and vigorously stated. Through books, but also in a great number of newspaper articles, speeches by more or less well-known politicians, corporatist petitions, and memoranda drawn up and signed in the name of various social groups, professional categories, ethnic groups or clans, and often anonymously distributed tracts, Cameroon has seen, since the official launching of a timid democratization process in February 1991,2 a veritable explosion of micro-identitary anger. These populist discourses, notably associated with ethnic labels, implicitly reject the old conception of the State defined by Carré de Malberg (1921) as a “community of men, established on a territory belonging to them and possessing an organization from which results for the group considered in its relations with its members a supreme power of action, command and coercion.” For the self-proclaimed theoreticians of ethnicity whose opinions are grouped in Collectif Changer le Cameroun (1992), there is no Cameroonian State because there is not a community corresponding to it. In their view, the State is therefore not the melting pot of a nation in the making but rather an abstract entity with the concrete power of extracting public resources that are then put to the exclusive service of the ethnic groups and the unseen networks that are sufficiently well organized to profit from them. Hence the need for each clan or micro-community to publicly dissociate itself from the intellectual project called “Cameroon” and to demand its share of a mythical “national cake” that would be constituted of the fiscal resources collected by an authoritarian State from abandoned and drained populations. Collectif Changer le Cameroun’s introductory text clearly explains this rejection of the State by the various groups that have proclaimed themselves the representatives and spokesmen of the country’s ethnic groups: “The only obvious result of the 30 years of national unity in the name of which the authorities have forgotten the security and liberty of the citizens and sacrificed the nation’s economic development, is an open, permanent invitation of each ethnic group to fight, notably by the exclusion of merit, by falsehood and impunity, to place their protégés in power, in order to guarantee them a share of the national cake. The disjunction between the asserted principle of unity and this practice of ethnocentrism leads today to the fatal risk of a civil war, once one wants to discuss frankly the national question by calling things by their real name” (Collectif Changer le Cameroun, 1992, p. 19). Some groups do not hesitate to demand “reparations” for their “ethnic groups” or for their regions along the lines of what is being discussed in the United States. But besides the fact that American history and that of the African-American community is in no way comparable to that of the Cameroonian “ethnic groups,” these demands are not based on inequalities analyzed rigorously and empirically. How can one conceive of “ethnic” discussions in a country where the groups in question, amalgamated arbitrarily, have neither an historic itinerary comparable to the tragedies of American slavery and racial segregation, nor even a particular homogeneity? The ethnic algebra is all the more complicated in the Cameroonian context in that it is virtually impossible to estimate the wealth and income gaps and other indicators of inequality between these undefined groups for which there are, for that matter, no official statistics.3 And even if these statistics were available and ethnic labels were officially assigned to populations, it would be quite complicated to draw from them credible empiric conclusions and to deduce from them needs for “ethnic” reparations without giving rise to interminable polemics. For in Cameroon, as in most African countries, wealth and poverty do not have tribal colors. Inequalities and material poverty strike the broadest layers of populations indiscriminately (Monga 2017). Destitution, 88

lack of opportunities, unemployment, and various injustices touch nearly everyone. The general failure of the State,4 including in its basic governing functions, spares no “ethnic” group. In various neighborhoods of large cities and in villages across the country’s ten regions, many children of poor families no longer attend school (this whatever the “tribe” or “ethnic group” of their parents); ad hoc surveys show that most of the graduates of the national universities are unemployed or underemployed (whatever the sound of their surname); the majority of the country’s dispensaries and public hospitals have neither the minimal technical facilities nor the necessary expertise and therefore cannot care for the ill (whatever their “ethnic group” or birthplace). How can one believe in tribalism in this country where destitution and death have no tribe?

4.3 DECONSTRUCTING ETHNIC CATEGORIZATIONS

Some researchers have awkwardly attempted to justify the political use of ethnicity in Cameroon by arguing first of all that it made it possible to combat the supposed domination of three “ethnic” groups over national political life. In a television broadcast in 1992, the influential jurist Roger Gabriel Nlep thus denounced what he considered an “equilateral triangle,” presented as the predominance of “Northerners,” “Bamilékés,” and “Betis” in Cameroon’s senior civil service.5 Besides the conceptual confusion on the subject of ethnic groups and the arbitrary amalgam of groups of populations locked into geographic labels and linguistic families to try to give sense to his theory of the “triangle,” Nlep was also unconvincing on the empiric level. Case studies devoted to Cameroon, including those that study ethnic groups as a tool to distribute power in high State offices, invalidate the idea that there exists an ethnic “triangle” having priority in handing out important public responsibilities (Ngayap, 1983; Bayart, 1985). On the contrary, they emphasize a distribution of important roles within the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary among “elites” chosen by the president of the Republic. These lucky chosen ones are identified above all by their loyalty to the head of State, and supposedly represent regions or “ethnic groups” and “tribes” also selected by him. Realizing a few years later that his theory of a “triangle” among three “ethnic groups” actually had no empiric basis, Nlep tried to improve it by putting forward the notion of the “electoral village,” every bit as convoluted and conceptually caricatured and yet later adopted by the Cameroonian authorities. In substance, it was a matter of setting as an eligibility condition that candidates for local or legislative elections belong to the “village” where they campaign for votes. Asked about the criteria and indicators of the validity of this belonging, Nlep explained that “the electoral village of a Cameroonian would then be understood [as] that in which he had his affective and material interest, in their decisive proportion” (1986, p. 18). Besides the impossibility of seriously measuring “the decisive proportion of affective interests” of a citizen in a geographic place where he would want to stand as a candidate for an election, Nlep’s proposal is intrinsically anti-democratic for it denies the judgment of the voters and disregards the electorate’s freedom of choice. “Deep affections resemble honest women; they are afraid of being discovered, and pass through life with downcast eyes.” These words by Flaubert (1869) stress the intangible and immeasurable character of affection. It is at the very least presumptuous for a jurist stating the principles and conditions of eligibility for democratic elections to recommend that such considerations be removed from the objective or subjective judgment of the voters and transferred to a superior political body endowed with the competence to measure and evaluate them And if an indispensable condition of eligibility is “the decisive proportion of material interests” of the potential candidates in the “electoral village” where they stand for election, a Cameroonian citizen originally from Bertoua and living there but having invested his savings in the Douala stock exchange as the government often recommends, would be disqualified in his own city. He would be eligible only in Douala, even if he’s never gone there. Along the same lines, a Cameroonian citizen from Garoua and living there, would automatically lose his eligibility in the legislative, senatorial, or local elections in his city if he has used his savings to buy bonds issued by the Cameroonian State in Yaoundé (for the “decisive proportion of his material interests” would be in the country’s capital and not in his “electoral village”)! As for Cameroonians living in Cameroon but who invested in the New York stock market or bought shares or 89

apartments in Paris or London, they would be totally ineligible for elections in their country and in their “electoral villages.” In reality, Nlep’s dangerous ethnic theories were intended to exclude from the democratic system, even before elections were held, any candidate who would not be considered “legitimate” in certain constituencies by mysterious authorities in charge of making the decision. Some citizens could thus be denied eligibility for the demonstrable reason that they didn’t “sufficiently” belong to an “electoral village,” or that although they were residents and taxpayers they didn’t come from “the good ethnic group” for that particular place—and that they did not truly merit full and indivisible Cameroonian citizenship in the entire national territory. The conceptual and empiric deficits of the ethnic debate nonetheless did not prevent the Cameroonian authorities from exacerbating it and trying to draw political benefits from it. In January 1996, the government thus had the Constitution modified to introduce into it the seeds of the debate on differentiated belonging among the country’s citizens. The first paragraph of the revised Constitution’s Preamble proclaims the desire for unity and the construction of one single nation: “We, the people of Cameroon, Proud of its cultural and linguistic diversity, an element of its national personality that it helps to enrich, but profoundly conscious of the imperious need to perfect its unity, solemnly proclaim that it constitutes a single and same nation, engaged in the same destiny and affirms its unshakable will to construct the Cameroonian homeland on the base of the ideal of fraternity, justice and progress.” And yet, a few paragraphs further along, the same Preamble affirms that “the State ensures the protection of minorities and preserves the rights of the autochthonous populations in conformity with the law.” This falsely innocent provision sounds like a platitude. But, in the Cameroonian context, where neither the Constitution nor the laws and regulations define what an “autochthonous” citizen means, the partisans of ethnicity seized upon this language to give a semblance of legality to policies of exclusion. Public discourse was thus enriched not only with the word “autochthonous,” now constitutionalized and established as a label of prestige, but also with its opposite, “allogenous,” or “allogens,” stuck with a negative connotation and with ineligibility for certain high offices of the State. This especially since the revised Constitution creates decentralized territorial collectivities (regions and communes) and provides that the regional council, which constitutes the deliberative body of the region, can be presided over only “by an autochthonous personality of the region” (article 57, paragraph 3). Naturally, no criterion and no legal definition is given of this “autochthony,” which not only deliberately officializes a dangerous legal vagueness, but also incites uses and abuses of ethnic labels to exclude some and privilege others. In other words, the habitual criteria of democratic legitimacy (policies put forward by candidates validated by the informed choices of the voters) are no longer sufficient to accede to elective positions in Cameroon; the purity of an “ethnic” identification, moreover not defined but arbitrarily assigned by the authorities in power, is the indispensable condition to be eligible for the highest political positions in each of the country’s ten regions. The constitutional revision of January 1996 thus consecrates the idea, contrary to the first paragraph of the constitutional Preamble, of a citizenship with variable geometry—for the political authority now decides to arbitrarily grant rights to, or withdraw them from, certain candidates for political office in decentralized territorial collectivities of the Republic (Monga, 1997). This approach to politics via “ethnic groups” and “tribes” not legally defined and rigorously indefinable has unfortunately fired the Cameroonian political imaginary and fueled an often violent-sounding debate on the “autochthons” and “allogens”6 of each geographical place. But who is a foreigner in Cameroon? How is such a person identified? By what objective, legitimate, and constitutional criteria? Are a Bassa, a Bamiléké, or an Ewondo foreigners in Doula as thought by certain self-proclaimed “elites” of the Sawa group who assign to themselves an immemorial ownership of a territory where none of all these “ethnic” groups lived only a few centuries ago? Before the Sawas, what populations inhabited the place known today as Douala and the Littoral region of which it is part? Were they groups of Bassa populations as some historians claim? By the fact of their precedence in the territory, would those “tribes” then be the “true” autochthons? And before the Bassas settled there, what populations inhabited this region? Bakwéris? Pahouins? Pygmies? One could, for that matter, continue to go back further in time. And ask oneself the

90

same questions for all the regions of Cameroon: before the Bamilékés, what “tribes” lived in the mountains of West Cameroon? And before the Betis, who owned the fine forest of the South? Before the “Kirdis,” who owned the beautiful mountains of Mayo-Louti? If a law were adopted by the parliament of this Cameroon, which Freedom House and various organizations monitoring freedoms classify as a non-democratic country, and were such a hypothetical law to assign certificates of autochthony in every city and village to various “ethnic” groups, on what objective basis would such an exercise be done? What would be the criteria of differentiated belonging of Cameroonian citizens to the lands of the country? Would there be a magic date from which the legislator—moreover illegitimate in an authoritarian, repressive political regime—would carve up Cameroon’s history to identify the “autochthons” and the “allogens”? Does the Constitution whose preamble proclaims the people to be “profoundly aware of the imperative need to further consolidate our unity, solemnly declare that we constitute one and the same Nation, bound by the same destiny, and assert our firm determination to build the Cameroonian Fatherland on the basis of the ideals of fraternity, justice and progress” also make do with geographical and temporal restrictions to the citizenship of some Cameroonians? It is clear: even if today the legislator decided to grant the principle of primacy of the “first” person arriving qualified as autochthonous, it would be virtually impossible to seriously and indisputably classify by order of arrival the various homogenous groups of occupants of Cameroonian lands. Any land and political hierarchy based on the rhythms of settlement would therefore necessarily be arbitrary. For it would suppose choosing a key period and a landmark date to validate such a decision. What criteria of seniority and dates would one then choose to distinguish the “true” from the “false” first occupants in every city, village, or region? This problem of periodization is an insurmountable obstacle with which one is confronted every time one tries to govern a country by playing on the fantasies of memory, for each person then chooses a date that suits him. Another major problem in the debate on ethnicity is the identification of the groups supposedly constituting “ethnies.” The question must be asked: who precisely is meant when one speaks, for example, of the Sawas? Who are the Bamilékés? Who are the Betis? Who are the “Nordists”? Who are the Kirdis? Asking these questions highlights the fact that the tribal labels that the theoreticians of ethnicity take for granted actually aggregate groups that don’t have the homogeneity ascribed to them. Even when there is a fairly large uniformity in cultural and cosmogonic practices, these social groups are very often disparate, and their members don’t feel the theoretical solidarity that some attribute to them from the outside. Let us take, for example, those improperly called the Betis. A Boulou civil servant from Ebolowa obviously does not necessarily think like an Eton businessman from Monatelé. The two are perhaps Betis in a broad sense, but the ethnic identity imposed upon them does not involve an identity of view. The basic truths within a family are even more real within an ethnic group constituted arbitrarily: two individuals can have close kinship relations without having either the same ambitions, nor necessarily the same interests, nor the same worldview. Mind has its reasons that blood does not know. The same kind of question can be asked regarding the homogeneity of all the ethnic groups of Cameroon: does a billionaire of Douala have the same interests as a little fisherman of Bonamikanou simply because both are called Sawas? Do the important merchants from Bandjoun have the same interests as the Bamiléké drivers of shared taxis from Ndokotti simply because they are all from the same “ethnic group”? Is President Paul Biya representative of poor farmers of Akonolinga or Mvomeka? Absolutely not. One could give infinite numbers of these sorts of examples. Who are the Sawas anyway? Who are the Bamilékés? Who are the Betis? Who are the “Nordists”? The administrative and academic carving up that one makes do with is necessarily haphazard (Nkot 2018). How can one then draw up an “official” list of the accredited ethnic groups in Cameroon whose label one must use to enter politics? If a person’s national identity card and criminal record are no longer enough to establish citizenship and eligibility for a legislative or local election, where are we headed? On what ethical bases do Nlep and other ethnicity theoreticians rely to promote the idea that a Sawa cannot be mayor in Bafang, or an Ewondo in Ngaoundéré? Such reasoning contradicts the very principle of citizenship as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It is legally unfounded (if one considers the primacy of international law over national law), politically dangerous, economically counterproductive, and morally unjust. If the 91

Cameroonian political leaders, who often publicly express their pride at seeing that the country has produced sports figures who have become global icons, had reasoned the same way in that field, the international careers of great athletes Samuel Eto’o, Roger Milla, and Joseph-Antoine Bell would have been confined to their “electoral villages” and not to cities where their talents have enabled Cameroon to shine on the world stage. Moreover, “ethnic groups” and “tribes” are neither neutral concepts nor static notions. They are not pure entities like chemical materials that one could identify and cut into molecules through time and space. The way in which lineages have been formed and deformed over time in Cameroon and throughout Africa requires us to reject easy categorizations. The populations that are today said to be Sawas include large groups of persons who, only two generations ago, were considered Bamilékés, Guineans, Senegalese, Dahomeans, or Togolese. This is one of the sources of this group’s great cultural wealth. And it is the same for all the “tribes” or “ethnic groups” of Cameroon. Why begin now to speak of “allogens” and autochthons in a country located at the very crossroads of all African cultures? Why mortgage the common future by trying to conceptualize exclusion and hatred in often senseless ethnic labels? What will we say to Cameroonians born of a union between a Beti man and a Sawa woman? What will we say to the child whose father is from Bertoua and whose mother from Bamenda? In which city could he stand for election? Could he buy land in Kousséri if he wants to settle, live, and die there, without being labeled an “allogen” in his own land? Could he marry a woman from Bafia without running the risk of seeing his “ethnic legitimacy” and that of his children invalidated? Will ethnic passports soon have to be established to move about, work, settle, and buy land in Cameroon? Are we heading toward the generalization of the ethnic quotas policy instituted by President Ahmadou Ahidjo, and whose bad outcomes Cameroon is today enduring? Finally, the representativity and motivations of those who speak in the name of this or that ethnic group ought to be questioned. Does a traditional Deido chief have the authority to speak in the name of a fisherman from Malimba or Yabassi, simply because both are Sawas? Has the lamido of Rey Bouba been given a mandate to state publicly the political preferences and choices of the Foulbé populations of North Cameroon? Does a minister from the city of Es’eka speak in the name of the Bassas? Does a prime minister born in the anglophone South-West region represent the political interests of the populations of Limbé or Kumba? Was Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, a former minister of an authoritarian regime and Sultan of Foumban, elected by the Bamoun people to speak in their name? The answer to all of these questions is obviously no. These men are simply political entrepreneurs trying to use the ethnic label as a vector of political action and a source of personal income and power. None of them was given a mandate to speak in the name of the population groups which they claim to represent. We can extend the reasoning further and wonder about the geographic dimensions of the ethnicity and the tribality claimed by certain politicians. Let us even suppose that a constituent assembly truly representing the Cameroonian people endorsed the idea that all the mayors of Douala must from now on be only Sawas. What allocation key would then be used to attribute the town halls to the various components of this Sawa group? Why wouldn’t the Dualas, a Sawa subgroup in the city of Doula (“pure-blood”) demand to be the sole beneficiaries of such a regulation? Why wouldn’t the Deidos demand to enjoy such a privilege, on the basis of their number or the economic and fiscal contribution of their part of the city? Why wouldn’t the many Dibombaris living in Douala demand that the Constitution guarantee them high-level jobs, particular to the city administration, no matter which party won the elections? Would the Aboh populations have the same political rights in the city as the Akwas or the Bells? What would keep certain people from demanding a hierarchization between the “true” and the “false” autochthons within the very Sawa group? For the word Sawa can be transformed into a Russian doll set, that can be taken apart infinitely. The same goes for the words Bamilékés, “Betis” Such a subversion of the concept of tribe would make Cameroon a postmodern perversion, an endless series of micro-sectarianisms: some would oppose the legitimacy of the micro-tribes to that of the “large” ethnic groups. The discourse of exclusion, of ethnic legitimacy, and of the minorities’ play of mirrors is in the end an intellectual impasse: each of us is someone’s minority Each of us is, at some time or other in our lives, someone’s “allogen”

92

4.4 THE MISSING STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF “ETHNICITY” The discourse on ethnic inequalities in Cameroon rests on two underlying ideas, often stated in the media as absolute truths: First, the members of groups called allogens are said to have bought large portions of land in Cameroonian cities and the autochthons (having sold these lands) progressively became “foreigners in their own homes.” Then, the allogens are said to constitute wealthy “ethnic” groups, while the autochthons are poor; this disparity in standards of living is said to aggravate frustrations and anger. Such assertions are astonishing, particularly when they come from political leaders, opinion leaders, or traditional chiefs. Let us set aside the semantic, conceptual, and operational problems of ethnicity and autochthony discussed above, and the principle according to which any citizen has the right to sell and buy land anywhere on the national territory without being subject to restrictions based on his ethnicity. In the absence of property, cadastral, and “ethnic” statistics corroborating these assertions, one must be receptive to conspiracy theories to believe that there is a deliberate will on the part of “allogen” groups to buy lands belonging to “autochthons” with the sinister motive of chasing them from their lands. Besides, it must be noted that because of the rapid demographic growth of the country and the rural exodus, Cameroon’s large cities have spread so much in the course of the past decades that the area of lands involved in officially registered financial transactions between “allogen” and “autochthon” individuals is certainly marginal in relation to the total area. In Douala and Yaoundé, for example, most of the surface inhabited today by citizens who migrated from other regions of the country (the “allogens”) is in fact constituted of lands belonging to the State (this is true in all the shantytowns popping up like mushrooms around Cameroonian cities). This can be verified simply by consulting the services of land registry and issuance of land titles. As for the assertions concerning the economic disparity between Cameroonian “ethnic” groups, they are never based on conceptual frameworks and rigorous empiric analyses. This is never an easy exercise, not even in industrialized countries where official and widely accepted ethnic classifications exist, and where rigorous governmental statistical surveys are regularly conducted. For the notion of inequalities between social groups covers many dimensions, particularly when these groups are as contestable and poorly defined as the “ethnic groups.” In his thoughts on racial inequalities and economic development, Lewis (1985) postulates that two ethnic groups are equal from an economic perspective if the proportion of persons with an income higher than a given amount is the same in the two groups. His approach is open to criticism in several respects: first, he does not really distinguish between income and wealth. Lewis believes that it is preferable to use income (and not total wealth) to measure inequalities between social groups because the wages earned at work convey better the labor endured, and also make it possible to get a better understanding of the borrowing capacity that each citizen allows himself. Next, the notion of poverty and the inequities it involves covers many dimensions, as Sen (1976, 1981) and Ela (2007) have shown: beyond material poverty, measurable by indicators for measuring consumption, income, and wealth, there is access to basic public services like education and health, which offer each citizen opportunities to build his human capital, indispensable for social success. To that, one can also add indicators for measuring vulnerability (access to potable water, to public safety) and civic rights, to which every citizen should have the right but which, in countries like Cameroon, are increasingly dependent on belonging to a certain social class or one’s place of residence. Identifying pertinent indicators of these various dimensions of inequality and standards of living, quantifying and measuring them comparatively across randomly determined “ethnic” groups is a complex exercise. Even supposing that ethnic groups could be conceptualized and rigorously defined and that statistics were available to measure the monetary poverty rates and the inequality for each of them, it is important to avoid inappropriate generalizations. In the case of Cameroon, to assert that the Sawas’ purchasing power is lower than that of the Bamilékés one must be able to show, for example, that 70% of the Sawas living in Douala have an income of less than 100,000 CFA francs per month, while the proportion is only 30 or 50% for the Haoussas, the Bamilékés, or the Betis. Other questions follow: what is the representativeness of the “rich” population segments compared to the population of the ethnic groups to which they belong? Are the financial and economic successes of 93

Bamiléké or Haoussa billionaires, who are regularly featured in newspaper headlines and journalistic reporting, a reflection of their groups’ higher standards of living than average or are they symptoms of greater wealth and income inequalities within their own groups? The social success of a few exceptions (success moreover fragile and artificial) is deceptive: after more than six decades of independence, Cameroon remains a lower-middle income country, where most of the population is financially destitute and should be classified as being poor—all ethnic groups included—in various dimensions. It is true that in a sampling of ten millionaires in Douala, there is perhaps a chance that one will find a majority of Bamilékés or Haoussas. But because of the statistical law of large numbers, the Bamilékés and Haoussas that one would supposed to be so rich are also, in proportion, the most numerous to suffer poverty in Douala. Indeed, it is an elementary mathematical law: the more numerous a group is within a population, the stronger the probability to see this group reflect more than the others the general characteristics of the entire population. In other words, if one takes a random sampling of the people in Douala who are suffering, one would find there a larger proportion of Bamilékés than of people classified in smaller ethnic groups. Even if the definitional and categorization issues of ethnicity discussed in the previous sections could be addressed satisfactorily, the empirical path to assess “ethnic” inequities would remain challenging. Public commentary about economic inequality and poverty among “ethnic” groups in Africa in general, and in Cameroon in particular, are all too often based on speculation. Few countries collect data that would allow for the kind of rigorous analyses and statistical methodologies necessary for objective inference. Inequality in the distribution of disposable income and poverty can be assessed for the population at the national or regional levels but not at the “ethnic” levels. Related to income are taxes and transfers, which can substantially reduce income inequality and poverty. In most African countries, taxes and transfers cannot be assessed analytically due to a lack of disaggregated data. Besides income, wealth inequality is even more revealing, as many people may not have regular income but still command affluence from various forms of capital. It is therefore important to expand the analysis of monetary inequality beyond income. Affluence and prosperity are about more than money. Non-monetary aspects of well-being (especially opportunities for education, health, unemployment/underemployment, security, civil liberties, human rights, security, etc.) should also be considered. Even with detailed and reliable data, cross-ethnic group differences might be highlighted in static analyses while changes in income distribution and in other relevant variables over time are overlooked because of methodological choices. Moreover, even within each population and ethnic” group, there are inequality and poverty dynamics that must be accounted for in comparative analyses. Different measures of inequality can yield major differences in observed changes over time or across population groups. A common basic approach for venturing into the economics of “ethnic” comparisons would be to start with an analysis of data on the distribution of income. This would require data collected on the basis of a questionnaire completed by national authorities or by experts. Another option could be to use tax information for “ethnic” groups, which probably do not exist—moreover, in the case of Cameroon, some of the so-called ethnic groups (such as the “Pygmies”) might not have enough representatives in the public service for a robust representative sample to be established. Even with comparative data, several methodological questions would remain to be addressed. First, the selection of the specific years for cross-group analyses would have to be justified rigorously. Second, the sample sizes of the population coverage are likely to vary widely. For “ethnic” groups with particularly small samples, or for small changes over time, the movements may not be statistically significant. However, the risks of flawed statistical analyses would become high for decompositions by household or family types, especially when considering the sub-population of the poor within each “ethnic” group. And cross-sectional data on poverty typically do not take into account dynamic changes in the situation of individuals over time. “Snapshots” of their situations change between periods, and individuals in the bottom 10% of the distribution in one particular period are rarely the same as those in another period. Moreover, measurement problems are worsened in the African context, especially at the extremes of the distribution. Problems of underreporting occur both at the higher end for property income, capital gains, and at the lower end for transfers (particularly for income-tested benefits). 7 Underreporting is also prevalent for self-employment and for some often-large groups of people with no fixed residence who do not appear in household surveys. Recording some households or family as “zero income” leads to their 94

elimination from the samples, which may weaken the cross-country comparability of some inequality indices.8 While underreporting and other measurement issues may not remain constant over time and some partial corrections could mitigate their effects on calculations, there should be extreme caution in the interpretation of the results of comparative statistical analyses of ethnicity in Africa. The main concept for measuring the distribution of income and patterns of poverty is equivalent income per household member. The unit of observation is typically the household, although in some contexts one should use the family, which reflects more accurately how income is distributed in many African countries. It is assumed that all incomes, taxes, and benefits are reported on an annual basis. It is also assumed—unrealistically in the African context—that all members of the household or the family generally pool income so that equivalent household disposable income can be attributed to each individual in the household or the family through a simple division.9 As a result of this methodological assumption, children are supposed to benefit equally from household or family income, even though only the working parents actually receive income. Household or family disposable income then includes earnings, self-employment incomes, property incomes, and cash transfers less direct taxes paid by the members of the unit. With these assumptions, equivalent disposable income per family or household member is total household disposable income divided by household size, with an additional correction to allow for household economies of scale. Each individual is then attributed the adjusted income of the household. If is the total disposable income of family or household i, then the “adjusted” income of each individual j in that unit i is

calculated as: (4.1)

where is the number of people in family or household i and (value between 0 and 1) is the adjustment for family or household economies of scale (the equivalence-scale elasticity).10 This basic formulation highlights the tall statistical order of measuring consistently from household surveys, not only for each individual but also across predetermined and credibly defined “ethnic” groups, and tracking its dynamics over time and space. Economists generally use three inequality indices for comparative analyses: variations of the Gini coefficient; the Squared Coefficient of Variation (SCV) index, calculated as the sum of the squared deviations of the income of each individual from that of the population mean, divided by the square of mean income; and the mean log deviation (MLD) index, which is the average of the log ratios of the income of each individual to the mean income. Populists engaged in “ethnic” claims in Cameroon and in many African countries do not base their statements on empiric analyses. Even if disaggregated statistics were available by “ethnic” groups, it would still be a major analytical challenge to carry out such conclusions. A first challenge would be to draw firm conclusions from complex pictures that may be given by different types of dimensions of inequality and poverty. Figure 4.1 provides a basic, stylized picture of contrasting performances by different ethnic groups on just four measures of welfare.

95

FIG. 4.1 Overlapping “Ethnic” Inequities: A Contrasting Picture.

In theory, several measures of inequality could be used to assess differences in income, wealth, and other well-being indicators among “ethnic” groups—again, assuming that such groups are defined rigorously enough to meet the scientific statistical thresholds for analytically rigorous comparisons.11 However, even under such a scenario, the data requirements for conducting such exercises in the Cameroonian and African contexts would remain quite substantial. Most analyses of inequality focus on the Gini coefficient, which is generally available—though not at the disaggregated, “ethnic” level. One could therefore approach “ethnic” inequality from the perspective of Gini coefficients derived from Lorenz curves for various social groups. These Loren curves provide straightforward visuals of the distribution of wealth by plotting the proportion of total wealth belonging to the bottom x% of the population under study. They are equal to the 45-degree line in (unlikely) situations of complete equality and lie below that line in almost all cases. A stylized representation of intersecting Lorenz curves is presented in Figure 4.2.

96

FIG. 4.2 Lorenz Curves and “Ethnic” Inequality: A Stylized Representation

While the Gini coefficient yields some basic insights, it does not allow for useful decompositions over time or across “ethnic” groups, and it may not be as sensitive to changes in the distribution. Several other popular indicators are also used in studies of wealth inequality, among which is the share of wealth owned by specific groups of households, such as the wealthiest 5%, and the ratios of quantiles of the distribution (see Neves Costa and Pérez-Duarte, 2019). One could modify and adjust them to investigate what they reveal about the wealth status and “ethnic” labels of some people or some quintiles in any given country. However, comparative analyses of “ethnic” inequality drawn from such calculations would lack statistical rigor, as they would only offer snapshots of the wealth status of some people who may not be representative of their “ethnic” groups. Each of the variables identified as an indicator to measure a particular dimension of inequality among and within “ethnic” groups within the Cameroonian population could be expressed in a way that sheds light on the type of data that would be needed. Taking the example of the variable net wealth, it could be expressed as a sum of components such that (4.2) where is the value of component for family or household . One could then denote as the sample average of component , and as the theoretical distribution of the wealth component Several indices, such as the Gini, the Atkinson comparison criterion, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer sequences, could be used to assess “ethnic” inequality—provided that detailed data is available. But the General Entropy measures (GE) would be among the most rigorous indicators to perform the kind of statistical analyses that underline inequality among “ethnic” groups. GE indicators are based on a parameter that expresses reflects the sensitivity of the measure to different parts of the distribution.12 The larger the value of the GE index, the larger the inequality in the distribution. 97

Considering an empirical distribution with a total of n elements where

is the wealth of family or

household , and denotes the sample average, the typical GE index with and 1 is generally expressed as:

falling between 0 (4.3)

Among inequality measures, GE indices are well suited for investigating the contributions to total inequality of different subgroups of the population (such as “ethnic” groups, age groups, net wealth quintiles, number of household members) or of components that add up to the analyzed variable. Again, this obviously assumes the existence of disaggregated data for such subgroups. Let represent the complete population formed by families or households that can be divided into “ethnic” groups each, such that and . The sample average of “ethnic” group is . Because GE measures have the property of additive decomposability, they can be broken down by “ethnic” groups and expressed as a weighted sum of a within-group and a between-group component. The within component would account for the inequality that exists inside each “ethnic” group whereas the between component accounts for the inequality across the groups. The within component would be calculated as the weighted sum of the value of the inequality indicator being studied (net wealth for example) in each of the “ethnic” groups. The between-group component would be computed as the value of the indicator of a distribution with elements, each having as net wealth the mean of net wealth in the corresponding group and as weight the population share of the corresponding group.13 The GE measure for the entire population of Cameroon, could then be decomposed as follows: (4.4)

Where

is the value of the GE measure calculated for the households belonging to “ethnic” group

. It can be expressed as (4.5)

and

is the between-“ethnic” group component, computed as: (4.6)

This type of analytical approach sheds light on important issues that may not be obvious to politicians or researchers who are interested in “ethnic” inequality. Even without carrying out the detailed empirical analyses derived from the above statistical framework, one can draw important conclusions on the sources of inequality. If we decompose inequality as a sum of two elements as in equation (4), with the second component in the right-hand side representing the element that comes from differences between “ethnic”

98

groups [(

] in the population, and the first component in the right-hand side representing the

element that comes from differences among members of each of these groups [

], the

latter accounts for much of all net wealth inequality. It is also quite likely that inequalities within the smaller “ethnic” groups in Cameroon are substantial, and probably as great if not much greater than inequality in the country’s population as a whole. This reflects the fundamental imbalances of high poverty rates in the population and even higher in smaller “ethnic” groups. In addition, Cameroon has been ruled by an informal coalition of elites from all large or influential “ethnic” groups (Ngayap, 1983). In such a context, inequalities between “ethnic” groups may contribute only little to inequality overall (this also holds for gender, age, etc.).14 Policymakers concerned with understanding the sources and extent of wealth inequality, or attempting to tackle “ethnic” inequality should be made aware that “ethnic” differences actually matter very little. Because of the high level of heterogeneity of wealth and incomes within “ethnic” groups in Cameroon, policies aiming at equalizing wealth between “ethnic” groups would not reduce the spread of wealth and the overall level of inequality. However, it may become a legitimate public policy goal to monitor differences in inequality and poverty (in various dimensions) across social groups because there are often higher levels of poverty among small “ethnic” groups (regardless of the validity of the “ethnic” label) than for the larger groups. This poses a major social justice challenge.

4.5 LOOKING FORWARD: DEALING WITH ETHNICITY

Even if the ethnic illusion is originally a colonial invention, the reality of its political use is today such that we must not pretend to ignore its emotional gravity. In Cameroon and elsewhere, the tribe has become an inexhaustible business asset in which, at times, cynical elites can find means to put together a career representing a particular group—and thus as “leader.” The ethnic question is therefore potentially a factor of division, of promotion of micro-nationalisms, and of conflicts and costly social disorder whose significations, possible uses, and implications in the political domain and public policies must be analyzed. A first approach, pessimistic and defeatist, postulates the incapacity of different “ethnic groups” to live together and constitute a nation. It consists of completely rejecting the idea that a State like Cameroon—a result of the colonial geographic carving up of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885)—is capable of having live within it harmoniously different social and linguistic groups. This approach would then suggest making the ethnic and linguistic secessions official and considering the partition of the country. The logic of such a diagnosis would be to partition the country, as was done in the former Yugoslavia. It is a costly logic, with enormous risks of violence, massacres, and genocides, for it involves first classifying the populations into ethnic categories, a process known to be arbitrary, assigning each one to a given geographical territory, and expelling the new minorities from territories where they are judged not to have the right to live. This tyrannical logic is in reality that of a conception of nations as a constellation of “pure” entities, not intermingling, and having only relations of exclusion. It is also what the Afrikaners practiced in South Africa under the Apartheid regime with the Bantustan Policy. And it is what was considered in Ethiopia in the early 1990s when some politicians encouraged each province of the country to ask for independence. The political result of this move was, as in Yugoslavia, an explosion of hatreds and ambitions, and tragic civil wars. It is unfortunately the path that the Cameroonian authorities chose by putting into the Constitution and laws the status of autochthons and that of allogens, on the basis of arbitrary considerations. A second approach would consist not in making Cameroon implode into micro-pseudo-nation-States drawn up on the principle of “ethnic groups” or “tribes” still to be defined and thus subject to controversy and contestation, but in maintaining the present State by attempting to legitimize it through an affirmed recognition of local particularisms—real or imaginary. This second approach would aim to take account of he widely accepted “ethnic” identities in public policies and in political and institutional organization. It’s the principle of “ethnic” pluralism made official, expressed for example by having the State officially 99

accept and value all the languages, religions, and regional particularisms in the public sphere. It’s the path tried by post-apartheid South Africa (since 1994) by adopting, for example, twenty-seven official languages (even the least important document printed by the town hall is translated into twenty-seven languages). It is an ambitious, costly solution that is difficult to manage, for it favors the regular emergence of new micro-identities within ethnic groups initially identified, which demand also to be recognized and treated like the others. These two solutions are as radical as they are ineffective. A third approach would consist in banishing from public policies the far-fetched and impracticable idea of “ethnic” legitimacies and consider only one principle: ensure the equality of opportunities for all citizens. The State would then be “de-ethnicized,” de-tribalized, which would not forbid each self-proclaimed group to highlight, including in the public sphere, its specificities and cultural and historic riches. The governmental institutions (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) would then be organized to reflect the sensibilities and interests of each region of the country and to mediate the particularisms, fears, resentments, and ambitions of all the social groups. Living together could thus be collectively codified in an essentially federalist system, permitting each region or “ethnic group” to create and organize the funding of public services while maintaining a solid and credible partnership with the central government. The first 30 years of the return to political pluralism in Cameroon (1991–2021) have been disappointing, since they opened up to neither to political alternation, democratic consolidation, nor to the improvement of the populations’ living conditions. On the contrary, the country is the theater of an armed rebellion in the two anglophone provinces and is tugged at by centrifugal forces militating in the name of hastily formed ethnic groups. In such a context, it is tempting for candidates for political office to surf on the populations’ legitimate frustrations, on their anger and resentment, and to celebrate identitarian closure. Cameroonian political leaders and elites should launch a pedagogical campaign on the theme of tribalism. They should explain to the voters, who expect democracy to improve their standard of living, that this will not necessarily be done by leaders from this or that “ethnic group,” but by electing leaders who are competent, motivated, and responsible before public opinion for their acts. It must be explained to the Cameroonians that democracy forbids “ethnic” juggling and rigging. They must be told that the country urgently needs good elected officials, and not officials elected because they are Bamilékés, Bassas, Sawas, Nordists, or Anglophones. Those who believe in the idea of a country named Cameroon must proclaim loud and clear their faith in the incompressible equality of all the citizens of this country. For the cacao planter of Ebolowa, the coffee planter of Bafoussam, the cotton planter of Garoua, and the fisherman of Douala have exactly the same problems: beyond their artificial ethnic labels, they each need potable water, schools and dispensaries, jobs for their children, and to be able to enjoy all their civic rights. A radical overhaul of the political system is thus necessary and urgent. This reform could be set out in a dispassionate conversation on the nature and future of Cameroonian society. For it is necessary that the Cameroonians find themselves and find the paths of a lasting reconciliation. There is no alternative to a negotiation between the political leaders of all regions of the country, to a renewal of the moral and institutional imagination, and to a radical overhaul of their political system. This reform could take the form of a national conference or national meetings, which would result in a constituent assembly. To a new Constitution based on the principle of a federative decentralization would be added an election reform. This would necessarily include an amount of proportional representation able to ensure a minimal representation of the diversity of “terroirs” [local areas], while an honorary federal president would be elected by universal suffrage. This said, there will be no progress for democracy in Cameroon and in Africa as long as the populations will not be able to freely choose their leaders, or dismiss those whom they no longer want. In order to achieve a renewal of the elites and of the culture and practices of power, it is absolutely imperative that the number of terms in power at the head of the State be limited and that alternance in power become a reality. One of the reasons for the encystment of African political structures is indeed that many peoples find it impossible to peacefully rid themselves of tyrants who have decided to die in power. But to create the conditions of a peaceful political alternance, the politics, economy, and architecture of elections must be rethought. This remodeling must be the work of the Cameroonians and Africans hemselves who must adopt a legal framework and means of pressure against delinquent powers. These means of constraint could include—in very rare narrowly circumscribed cases—military interventions by 100

the African Union. Democracy is not, however, limited to a multiparty system, nor to elections, even if it is unthinkable without these ingredients. Serious divisions exist in contemporary African societies. Most are exacerbated by the acceleration of their objective structuring into antagonistic classes, even if for now class consciousness is, if not deflected, at least subsumed by other forms of subjectification like ethnicity. In these conditions, the democratic game on the continent could not be a zero-sum game. It is consequently imperative that the status and rights of the opposition be “constitutionalized” and that, where possible, government by coalitions prevails over purely majoritarian arithmetic. More generally, a major intellectual effort should be devoted not only to an in-depth exploration of the meaning of democracy itself, but also to a progressive extension of its many denotations in contemporary African conditions. This implies that, in shaping the institutions of democracy, the complex morphology of societies be taken seriously, and especially the daily practices by which people strive to tend to the social tie where it has been damaged, to maintain the minimum of cohesion necessary to the reproduction of life, in short, to “create community.” Beyond the political and administrative organization of the State, it is important that the education programs in Cameroon accord an important place to the demystification of the Other. Cameroonian schools and universities currently produce many illiterates and socially alienated individuals (Kom, 1996). It is high time to inscribe in the Cameroon Constitution the basic equalizing principle of citizenship that “All Cameroonians enjoying their civil rights are free and equal and are at home everywhere in Cameroon.”

NOTES 1.

I use the terms “ethnic group” and “tribe” equally, without distinction in this chapter. See Godelier (2010). The words “ ethnic” and “ethnicity” are used in quotation marks throughout the text to express their artificiality. 2. During the colonial period (after 1946), Cameroon experienced a progressively robust multiparty system, but it became a façade after the nationalist Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC) was banned in 1955 and its leaders, Ruben Um Nyobe, Félix Moumié, and Osende Afana were assassinated. The forced installation of the Cameroonian National Union as a “unified” party in 1962 de facto established a single-party system that was particularly repressive and gave rise to an armed rebellion that was overcome only by the arrest and execution of the UPC’s clandestine leaders in January 1971 (Deltombe et al., 2019). It was only in February 1991 that opposition parties were again authorized in Cameroon. 3. Neither the official censuses of the Cameroonian population, nor the Demographic and Health Surveys collect or provide “ethnic” statistics. The figures published for each of the country’s ten administrative regions thus do not distinguish the “ethnic” specificities of the populations residing there. 4. The failure of the Cameroonian State has been documented by various authors. See, for example, Enonchong (2022), Mbembe (1984, 1993), and Monga (2016, 1986). 5. (Nkot, 2019) presents and explains the context of this statement by Nlep. He also attempts to justify it, without however getting himself out of the contradictions and the conceptual and empirical insignificance of the ethno-regional paradigm in Cameroonian political and social life. 6. I use of the word “allogen,” as a neologism to follow the French language and express the opposition to “autochthon.” The two other options in the English language (“non-native” and “foreigner”) do not express what “Alloène” means in the Cameroonian political discourse: a native of Douala can be classified as an “allogène” in Douala if he doesn’t belong to the “right” ethnic group, whereas a person born and raised in Beijing, China, for example, from Cameroonian parents, and living in China is still considered an “autochtone” in Douala if his parents or ancestors belong to the ethnic group currently (and randomly) considered “autochtone” in Douala. 7. Statisticians often assign an arbitrary income to households at the top of the distribution in order to maintain confidentiality (top coding). However, with such arbitrary amounts, changes at the very top of the distribution may be distorted or completely missed if rules for top coding change, or major changes in the distribution occur in this segment of the population. This often happens in Cameroon and across Africa where enrichment patterns can change very quickly: the wealthiest individuals are often those connected to the political system (Monga, 2021b). 8. This is the case most notably for the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) index, which is very sensitive to individuals at the bottom of the distribution. 9. The way this is typically done is to combine the income of all members of the household or the family and then divide it by the square-root of the number of individuals, to allow for differences in household or family size and for the existence of “economies of scale” in consumption—so that additional “needs” do not emerge in direct

101

proportion as the number of persons in the household or family increases. See, for instance, Oxley et al. (1997). The smaller the value for , the higher the assumed economies of scale in consumption. “A value of one implies no economies of scale, and is equivalent to per capita income. A value less than one implies that household welfare can be maintained with a less than proportionate increase in resources as an additional member is added. A value of zero is equivalent to using household income, i.e. it assumes no increase in needs with household size. There is no consensus on the correct elasticity” (Oxley et al., 1997, p. 60). 11. The basic requirements for an inequality indicator to be valid include: (i) anonymity (the indicator must remain unchanged if the individuals in the distribution are permuted—everyone is interchangeable and all that matters is their wealth, not their name; (ii) the indicator must remain unchanged if the distribution is replicated a finite number of times (the so-called population principle); (iii) a transfer that takes from the wealthy and channels resources to the poor while leaving the wealthy richer than the poor, can only cause inequality to decrease—this is the so-called Pigou–Dalton transfer, expressed as follows: if a transfer of value t > 0 is made from an individual with wealth Yi to another with wealth Yj such that Yj - t > Yi + t, the net effect must be a decline in that inequality indicator; and (iv), the indicator must remain unchanged if the distribution is scaled by a constant factor—this helps avoid “monetary illusion” in the measurement of inequality. See Neves Costa and Pérez-Duarte (2019), Cowell (1998), Bourguignon (1979), and Shorrocks (1980, 1982, 1984). 12. GE measures include some special cases such as the Theil index and the mean log deviation, with = 1 and = 0, respectively. 10.

13.

An important caveat is that we assume that all families or households have the same weight

. Some minor

14.

adjustments would be required to account for different family or household weights. For a detailed discussion, see Neves Costa and Pérez-Duarte (2019), in their appendix. See, for instance, Nandi and Platt (2010) and Platt (2011).

REFERENCES

Bayart, J. F. (1985), L’Etat au Cameroun, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Bayart, J. F. (1989), L’Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre, Paris: Fayard. Bourguignon, F. (1979), “Decomposable Income Inequality Measures,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(4): 901–920. Bratton, M. and N. van de Walle (1997), Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Carré de Malberg, R. (1921), Contribution à la théorie générale de l’État (2 vols). Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey (réimprimé par les éditions du CNRS en 1962). Case, A. and A. Deaton (2020), Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Collectif Changer le Cameroun (1990), Changer le Cameroun: pourquoi pas? Yaoundé, Editions C3. Collectif Changer le Cameroun (1992), Le Cameroun éclaté: une anthologie commentée des revendications ethniques. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Editions C3. Cowell, F. (1998), “Measurement of Inequality,” LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science. Darity, W. (2021), “Nous devons adopter un plan de réparation de l’esclavage pour tenter de guérir le monde,” Interview, Le Monde, May 14. Darity, W. and K. Mullen (2020), From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black Americans in the Twenty-First Century. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Deltombe, T., M. Domergue, and J. Tatsita (2019), Kamerun! Paris: La Découverte. Eboussi Boulaga, F. (1997), La démocratie de transit au Cameroun. Paris: L’Harmattan. Ela, J.-M. (2007), Afrique, l’irruption des pauvres: Société contre ingérence, pouvoir et argent. Paris: L’Harmattan. Ela, J.-M. (1990), Quand l’Etat pénètre en brousse: les ripostes paysannes à la crise. Paris: Karthala. Enonchong, L.-S. E., (2022), The Constitution and Governance in Cameroon, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, Routledge. Flaubert, G. (1869), L’éducation sentimentale: histoire d’un jeune homme. Paris, Michel Lévy frères. Godelier, M. (2010), Les tribus dans l’Histoire et face aux États. Paris: CNRS Editions. Kemedjio, C. (1993), “Le Cameroun éclaté? Anthologie commentée des revendications ethniques by Changer le Cameroun,” Review in Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, 27(2): 284–288. Kom, A. (1996), Education et démocratie en Afrique: le temps des illusions. Paris: L’Harmattan. Levitsky, S. and D. Ziblatt (2018), How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. Lewis, W. A. (1985), Racial Conflict and Economic Development: The W.E.B. Dubois Lectures, 1982. Cambridge,

102

MA: Harvard University Press. Magassouba, M. (1985), L’islam au Sénégal, demain, les mollahs? Paris: Karthala. Mbembe, A. (1984), “Les hoquets du changement et les pesanteurs de la continuité au Cameroun,” Le Monde diplomatique, June, pp. 1, 18–19. Mbembe, A. (1993), “Crise de légitimité, restauration autoritaire et déliquescence de l’État,” in P. Geschiere and P. Konings (eds.), Itinéraires d’accumulation au Cameroun. Paris: Karthala, pp. 347–374. Michalon, T. (1984), Quel Etat pour l’Afrique? Paris: L’Harmattan. Michalon, T. (1995), A la recherche de la légitimité de l’Etat. Communication au colloque La création du droit en Afrique, Université de Bordeaux, 27–28 octobre. Monga, C. (1986), Cameroun: quel avenir? Paris: Editions Silex. Monga, C. (1990), “La tribu du ventre,” Le Combattant (Douala). Monga, C. (1996), The Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Monga, C. (1997), L’inflation du politique en Afrique: une théorie de la consolidation démocratique. GRAF Papers, Boston University African Studies Center. Monga, C. (2016), “Le mouvement immobile: Mémorandum pour Osende Afana,” Terroirs-Revue africaine de sciences sociales (Yaoundé), pp. 139–149. Monga, C. (2017), “Penser la famine et la peur,” in A. Mabanckou (ed.), Penser et écrire l’Afrique aujourd’hui. Paris: Editions du Seuil, pp. 32–49. Monga, C. (2021a), “Capitalism: Obituary and Resurrection,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 37(4), 743–757. Monga, C. (2021b), “The Interim Balance Sheet of Democracy: A Machiavellian Memo,” in K. Basu and R. C. Hockett (eds.), Law, Economics, and Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 11–54. Nandi, A. and Platt, L. (2010), Ethnic Minority Women’s Poverty and Economic Well-Being. London: Government Equalities Office. Neves Costa, R. and S. Pérez-Duarte (2019), Not All Inequality Measures Were Created Equal: The Measurement of Wealth Inequality, Its Decomposition, and an Application to European Household Wealth. ECB Statistics Paper Series No. 31, December. Ngayap, P.-F. (1983), Cameroun: qui gouverne? De Ahidjo à Biya, l’héritage et l’enjeu. Paris: L’Harmattan. Nkot, F. (1998), Révision constitutionnelle du 18 Janvier 1996 au Cameroun: commentaires de quelques avis informés . Penant, No. 826, Janvier–Avril, Paris, pp. 82–96. Nkot, F. (2019), “Gestion étatique de la question ethnique et instrumentalisation politique de l’ethnicité,” in F. Nkot (ed.), Revue Africaine d’Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques—Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de l’Université de Yaoundé II. Paris: L’Harmattan. Numéro spécial en hommage à Fabien Eboussi Boulaga et Jacques Zylberberg, pp. 15–33. Nlep, R. G. (1986), Interview with La Nouvelle Expression, Dossiers et Documents, May 23, no. 1, p. 18. Oxley, H., J.-M. Burniaux, T.-T. Dang, and M. M. d’Ercole (1997), “Income Distribution and Poverty in 13 OECD Countries,” OECD Economic Studies, 2(29): 55–94. Pambou-Tchinvounda, G. (1982), Essai sur l’Etat africain postcolonial. Paris: LGDJ. Platt, L. (2011), Inequality within Ethnic Groups. JRF Programme Paper: Poverty and Ethnicity, London, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, May. Sen, A. K. (1976), “Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement,” Econometrica, 44(2): 219–231. Sen, A. K. (1981), Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shorrocks, A. F. (1980), “The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 48(3): 613–625. Shorrocks, A. F. (1982), “Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 50(1): 193–211. Shorrocks, A. F. (1984), “Inequality by Population Sub-Groups,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 52(6): 1369–1685. Tcheuyap, A. (2014), Autoritarisme, presse et violence au Cameroun. Paris: Karthala.

103

CHAPTER 5

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM CONSENSUS (OR LACK THEREOF) IN CAMEROON CONSTANT LONKENG

5.1 INTRODUCTION Like many other Sub-Saharan African countries, Cameroon went through boom-and-bust cycles since its independence in 1960 (Figure 5.1). A rapid increase in real GDP per capita through the mid-1980s, fueled by the commodity super cycle, was followed by an equally sharp contraction through the mid-1990s, triggered by the collapse in commodity prices. This relatively bumpy two-phase episode was followed by a timid recuperation that coincided with the devaluation of the CFA franc. Against the background of large and persistent terms of trade shocks and ensuing fiscal deficits, the devaluation of the currency was meant to restore price competitiveness. However, little followed on the structural reform front, leading to relatively modest growth—real income per capita was still about 20 percent below its peak of the mid-980s prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.1 This evidence suggests that the country didn’t manage to capitalize on the post-independence commodity boom to durably transform its economy (see also Chapters 35, 36, and 37 of this handbook on a set of issues that hampered the economic development of Cameroon). A natural question is therefore why a reform to sustainably expand the pie has not occurred in Cameroon to date, notwithstanding the country’s large natural potential. We argue that the answer to this question lies in the specific configuration of interest groups, together with the country’s initial conditions, and rent seeking by the elite class. The chapter is related to the literature that explores the reasons why some African nations have not developed fast. That literature evolved from theories of dependency that emphasize the role of external constraints to the political interaction approach that focuses on the complex relationships between policymakers and social groups (see Chazan et al., 1999). More recently, Mushtaq Khan (2018a, 2018b) put forward the political settlements approach which emphasizes the importance of distribution of organizational power (“political settlement”) in shaping the economic and political effects of institutions and policies. Contrary to the new institutional economics, the author argues that understanding the emergence and effectiveness of institutions requires looking at the social context, beyond institutions themselves. This chapter departs from most of those papers in that it formalizes the interactions among socio-economic groups. In that regard, the framework presented in this chapter builds on Acemoglu et al. (2004) but differs from it along two important dimensions. First, the focus is different—the authors develop an infinite horizon model to explain personal ruling by a kleptocrat while we explicitly analyze economic reform and how its disproportionate impact on various socio-economic groups shapes its success in the presence of a powerful elite. Second, we apply the framework to Cameroon, reflecting the country’s features in the model, including fractionalization, the prevalence of subsistence activities and the large shadow economy.

104

FIG. 5.1 Cameroon: GDP Per Capita (PPP) and Terms of Trade, 1960–2020.

Building on Acemoglu et al. (2004), we consider a model in which a privileged rent-seeking elite prefers the status quo. The elite has controls over the country’s natural resource rent and taxation, which it uses to manipulate the society to prevent a coalition toward economic reform. While economic reform would expand the pie, the elite resists it because it inevitably leads to a rebalancing of economic powers to its disadvantage. When faced with a reform threat from a reform-minded group, the elite bribes away the non-reformist group by implementing lower taxes and/or higher rent transfers for the members of the non-reformist group and punishes the reform-minded group by means of higher taxes/or lower transfers for the members of the reform-minded group. Internalizing the fact that the elite has unlimited access to the State’s resources to successfully buy off the non-reformist group, and in fear of retaliation, none of the groups has the incentive to make a reform proposal in equilibrium. The equilibrium is stable because the natural resource rent available to the elite for bribing is large enough to offset any expected benefit from reform to each group. In what follows, we first present the conceptual framework and then describe how the status quo can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a game between the elite, the middle class and the poor. Finally, we use the model to explore conditions that could take the economy away from that bad political equilibrium.

105

5.2 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 5.2.1 The Economic Environment The economy is populated by a relatively small elite class ( ) of mass and two major socio-economic groups, reflecting a relatively high degree of fractionalization in Cameroon.2 The elite is a class that leverages its proximity to the center to hold the State captive. Without loss of generality, it is assumed in what follows that there are only two socio-economic groups beyond the elite: the poor with members and the middle class (

) with

members.3 The elite is a small enough class that the structure

of the population can be summarized by the share of the middle class ). There is no hard split between the middle class and the poor, except for the condition that none of the groups is large enough to form an absolute majority in the democratic state of the nature (the two groups therefore need to join forces to challenge the elite/status quo). The middle class has more skin in the game, given that its group members works and pays labor income tax (see model specification below) and therefore has a better appreciation of the benefit of reform. In fact, as we will show below, it is relatively hard for the elite to buy off the middle class, unless the natural resource rent is very large.

5.2.1.1 The Optimization Problem of the Poor and the Middle Class The poor engage in subsistence activities and earn a fixed income . Subsistence activities are not subject to taxation, either because they occur in informal settlements (informality is large in Cameroon) or because the related income falls below the personal income tax threshold. A standard example of subsistence activity is traditional agriculture in rural areas.4 The middle class engage in formal activities, earn labor income , subject to taxation at a rate set by the elite. The elite makes transfers to the middle class and the poor, using part of the tax proceeds and the economy’s natural resource rent (the optimization problem of the elite is presented below). To develop the intuition, and without loss of generality, we consider a two-period model. A period can therefore represent many years in our set-up. For instance, the first period could represent the commodity boom through the mid-1980s, with the second period representing the bust and subsequent years. The model can easily be extended to an infinite horizon, with the same game repeated overtime. As typical in micro-founded models, the middle-class value income and enjoys leisure. It discounts the future at a rate like the poor. The elite discounts the future at a rate , with , reflecting the fact that it may lose its privilege sometime in the future. Economic and political decisions are made in the first period and implemented in the second period. We therefore assume, without loss of generality, that agents work and consume in the second period.5 The utility function of the middle class writes: income in the second period:

where

where is labor income.

is the post-tax labor

is the transfer received from the

elite in the first period. The elasticity of substitution of supply under this specification is ,0 ; it is increasing in . The poor receive a transfer from the elite in the first period and work a constant number of hours, normalized to unity, in the second period, earning a fixed subsistence income, . The derived utility reads: .

106

5.2.1.2 The Optimization Problem of the Elite To reflect the large natural resource endowment of Cameroon, we assume the existence of a large resource endowment, , over which the elite has full control (see Chapter X of this Handbook on Cameroon’s economic assets, including natural assets). We also assume that the elite is close enough to the State to be able to influence taxation (this is equivalent to assuming that the State is a captive of the elite). For tractability, we assume that the elite escapes taxation through lobbying and by exploiting tax loopholes.6 The elite uses the State’s resources (tax receipts and natural resource rent) to finance its consumption, after deciding on the level of transfers to the poor and the middle class. The elite maximizes its utility function , subject to the State’s resource constraint. We consolidated the resource constraint over the two periods, under the implicit assumption that the elite has access to the financial market to bring forward the tax proceeds expected in the second period, as needed:7 (5.1)

Absent a threat of eviction, the optimization problem of the elite leads to (5.2) The optimal tax rate, , is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution of labor supply. This is because the higher the elasticity of substitution the higher the disincentive to work as the labor income tax increases. Because fewer hours worked reduced labor income tax revenues, the elite faces a trade-off in setting the tax rate.

5.3 THE POLITICAL GAME The timing of events is as follows: 1. 2.

3.

In the first period of the game, nature endows the economy with a fixed natural resource rent, the elite, . The elite sets the distribution rule of the natural resource rent

, and sets and announces the next

period’s income tax rate, . The poor and the middle class each decide whether to make a reform proposal or not. a. If none of the two groups makes a reform proposal, (2) is implemented b. If one of the two groups makes a reform proposal, the elite sets a new distribution rule for the natural resource,

4.

, and chooses

, and sets and announces a new income tax rate for the next period,

Considering (3a) or (3b), the middle class chooses the number of hours worked consumption occurs.

.

in the next period and

Reform in our framework leads to an increase in aggregate productivity by a factor , with labor income increasing accordingly. However, peculiar to our framework, reform does not lead to an increase in subsistence income under the baseline. While this assumption reflects the current reality of Cameroon where a fringe of the population seems disconnected from the country’s economic reality, we later examine how making the reform/growth proposal more inclusive could help challenge the status quo. Importantly, reform also leads to a new distribution rule for the natural resource rent. While reform increases the size of the pie and generates higher tax revenues for a given tax rate, the elite may oppose it because of the foregone resources—in addition to losing access to tax receipts, the elite also loses access to the natural resource rent under the reform scenario. 107

Let us solve the game backward. For a given tax rate, , the middle class chooses the number of hours worked in the next period. He works until the marginal disutility from an additional unit of work equates the marginal post-tax labor income. The optimization problem of the middle-class leads to: (5.3) The wage rate corresponds to productivity in the economy, which we normalize to unity for the first period, so that in the second period of the game under the reform scenario. Assuming the scenario (3a), which corresponds to the optimization of the elite’s problem in the absence of a reform threat, the elite chooses the level of taxation that maximizes revenue intake Substituting by its expression from Equation (3), the optimization problem of the elite leads to the optimal tax rate . The elite obviously sets the lump-sum transfers at . Scenario (3b) is most interesting. One needs to solve for the optimal taxation and distribution rule that the elite chooses when one of the groups makes a reform proposal. It is instructive to start with payoffs under successful reform. A mutually dominant reform strategy for the poor and the middle class under a successful reform proposal consists in a flat distribution of the resource rent, so that goes to the middle class and to the poor, proportional to the population size of each group. Any tax rate would support such an equilibrium. This is superior to the status quo because the poor receive a fraction of the resource rent (previously fully captured by the elite under the status quo) and the middle class keeps more of its labor income, in addition to receiving its share of the natural resource. Let us examine the best response of the elite when subjected to a reform threat, starting with the simpler and more natural case in which the reform proposal comes from the middle class. Because the poor are in informal settlements (subsistence activities) and do not benefit from the reform in the baseline (see discussion below for the case in which the middle class makes an inclusive reform proposal), a very slight alteration of the distribution rule of the resource rent by the elite would be enough to discourage the poor from supporting the reform proposal. The elite simply transfers a small part of the natural resource rent, , to the poor, pocketing the rest —recall that the elite captures the full natural resource rent in the absence of reform threat. The elite then sets the same labor income tax rate as above, , so as to maximize tax intake from middle class workers. The most interesting case is the one in which the reform proposal comes from the poor. Intuitively, buying off the middle class (if the poor are reform-minded) is more challenging for the elite, given that the middle class has more skin in the game—reform entails higher productivity and therefore higher labor income for middle-class workers. By backward induction, in order for the middle class not to support the reform proposal, it must be that the rent transfer from the elite and the impact of a potential reduction of the tax rate is higher than the productivity gain from the reform. The elite should obviously also have the incentive to bribe away the middle class (i.e., secures a positive payoff for him/herself). These can be summarized by the following constraints on parameters (to ensure incentive-compatibility): (5.4)

It is clear from Equation (4) that the larger the economy’s natural resource rent, the more likely the elite will be able to buy off the middle class. This is because can always be set high enough to make the no-reform scenario incentive compatible for the middle class. If the natural resource rent is high enough, the elite can ensure status quo by setting , and a high enough . For instance, for = 0,

108

the elite would set such that . Now, a higher expected growth dividend from reform (i.e., high ) makes the status quo less likely. The first expression of Equation (4) also suggests that the more patient the middle class is (high ), the harder for the elite to bribe away. The elite faces an important trade-off when it comes to setting the tax rate. Economic reform expands the pie for the middle class, generates more tax liabilities for a given tax rate, increasing the opportunity cost of the status quo for the middle class. This opportunity cost increases with the tax rate (the middle class has skin in the game). Internalizing this, the elite necessarily sets a tax rate low enough to prevent the middle class from rebelling ( . The higher the elasticity of substitution of labor the more binding is this trade-off for the elite. This is because any attempt to increase taxation reduces the supply of labor by the middle class and the tax intake as a consequence. In sum, unless the natural resource rent is small (which has not been the case in Cameroon) or the growth dividend from reform very high and certain, the elite is able to manipulate the different groups to prevent them from forming a reform coalition.

5.4 CONCLUSION: HOW TO GET THE ECONOMY OFF THE BAD EQUILIBRIUM? We argue in this chapter, developing a political game that builds on the divide-and-rule theory by Acemoglu et al. (2004), that the status quo in Cameroon has resulted from an elite class manipulating population groups to prevent them from coeluting towards reform. Getting the economy off the bad equilibrium entails making it more difficult for the elite to buy off either of the two income groups. As articulated in the chapter, the middle class has more skin in the game and is therefore more likely to make a reform proposal; the main challenge is therefore to bring the poor onboard. This can be done naturally by increasing the perceived benefit from reform to that population group as this would make it harder for the elite to bribe it away. In other words, the middle class should make its reform proposal more inclusive. This proposition has important political economy implications and can be achieved via an ex-ante commitment device on the distribution of the reform’s dividends. While tractable in the conceptual framework presented in this chapter entailing only three interest groups (elite, poor, and middle class), implementing such a commitment device in practice would require coordination among a large set of stakeholders in a fragmented society like Cameroon. The reform-minded group(s) face the challenge of designing a reform proposal that meets the needs of a critical mass of the population that can root for it. This implies extensive consultations in practice, and deliberate communications on the benefits of the reform as these may not always be obvious to some people (e.g., the non-educated or those feeling disenfranchised with limited visibility on the conduct of the country’s economic affairs). Also, extending the framework to include external resources (e.g., from the diaspora or development partners) and conditioning those resources on inclusive make economic reform more palatable to the wider population.

5.5 ACKNOWLEDGMENT The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.

NOTES 1.

4.

Real GDP per capita declined from $4,356 (constant prices, PPP 2017 international dollars) in 1986 to $3,647 in 2019. 2. For instance, Cameroon ranked second to only The Democratic Republic of Congo in a measure of fractionalization that captures politically relevant ethnic groups (see Posner, 2004). 3. We assume without loss of generality that the various groups are homogenous. There is no unemployment in the model, as the informal sector absorbs the agents who do not find a job in the formal sector. However, not all informal sector workers need be part of the poor class as they would otherwise

109

exceed the threshold number of members needed to secure the absolute majority in a democracy. 5. The number of hours worked and level of consumption in the first period of the model reflect past decisions. 6. This assumption is innocuous, given that a similar problem could be solved considering the State’s resource net of tax contributions by the elite. 7. We make the standard assumption that, if need be, the elite borrows at an interest rate that is equal to the inverse of its discount rate.

REFERENCES Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier (2004), “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule,The Alfred Marshall Lecture”, Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, pp. 162–192. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2012),Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishers. Chazan, N., P. Lewis, R. Mortimer, D. Rothchild, and S. Stedman (1999), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa , Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Daniel N., Posner (2004),“Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science, 48(4): 849–863. Khan, Mushtaq (2018a), “Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions,” African Affairs, 117(469): 636–655. Khan, Mushtaq (2018b), “Power, Pacts and Political Settlements: A Reply to Tim Kelsall,” African Affairs, 117(469): 670–694.

110

CHAPTER 6

THE HOMO ECONOMICUS IN CAMEROON A View From Below AMBROISE KOM

6.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter proposes a reading of the Cameroonian economy based on an economic agent’s view from below. Its intent is to cast complementary light on the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analyses constituting most of this work. It is therefore written from the point of view of the citizen who interacts daily with the institutions designing and implementing public policies, and small and medium-sized businesses that make up the economic fabric. The perspective adopted here is also long term, briefly covering the economic and social approaches of the precolonial era as well as those of the colonial and post-independence eras. This analysis emphasizes the richness and the paradoxes of the Cameroonian economy, of its ruling elites, its private sector, and economic agents of various levels. The next section sketches the genesis of the economic system and draws attention to the advent of the colonial economy whose objectives and broad lines of strategy were continued after the country’s independence in 1960, with little success. The section that follows analyzes the reasons for the country’s lack of industrialization focusing on the quality of the educational and training system. Finally, there is a summary of the chapter’s principal argument with an emphasis on the need to improve the business environment in Cameroon, and to reform the education and training system.

6.2 THE GENESIS OF TODAY’S ECONOMIC SYSTEM In the precolonial era, the economic system of the territory today called Cameroon followed precise rules. Subsistence agriculture was practiced, but enabled people to live decently and even improve their existence (Fotso, 1994). Food products were treated in various ways to preserve them. Meats and fish were smoked, vegetables and cereals like corn and peanuts were dried and preserved in sizable granaries, while tubers like macabo, yams, and others were sometimes reconditioned with ash and buried in the ground wrapped in dry banana tree leaves to slow or rather avoid sprouting. In the absence of irrigation systems, marshes were used sparingly for planting vegetables at all seasons and as watering places for animals grazed on the hillsides. Without grocery stores and other shops, the trading system was based on periodic markets in each village or town where the families came to sell the surplus of their agro-pastoral production and could thus buy salt or iron products for field work, hunting, housebuilding, and other things. The financial system functioned on a cooperative mode and was based on tontines whose survival still today enables individuals or groups of individuals to build a certain amount of wealth. This system was very quickly demolished by the arrival of the colonial power, which introduced cash crops by dangling before the natives, prospects of wealth that turned out to be quite illusory. The introduction of the culture of coffee, cocoa, tea, and later, rubber trees, cotton, etc. remains problematic when it comes to evaluating it in the light of the well-being of their producers. This significant change that the colonial authorities (German, French, and British) introduced into the Cameroonian space also resulted in the introduction of a new educational system and of a preventive health system (admittedly rudimentary, but that very broadly took the place of traditional methods of care). These were progressively followed by road construction, an embryonic postal service and telecommunications, all capped by a generally basic administration to see to the good functioning of the new State apparatus and the management of the territory. 111

It is noteworthy, however, that one of the management principles adopted by the European colonists at that time was the constant recourse to local solutions to satisfy a certain number of local needs. A public service example illustrating this approach concerns road upkeep, done by national agents called roadmen. The colonial government recruited them in the lands located along the roads and equipped each one with a shovel, a pickax, and a wheelbarrow. Each one was responsible for the upkeep of a section of the road: filling potholes, cleaning out gutters, cutting down brush in the right of way, etc. Small local dams were built, where possible, to provide electricity for the needs of towns. Thus, thanks to the small dam below the bishopric, even medium-sized cities like Nkongsamba, for example, did not lack energy. It was the same for towns even farther from large cities like Dschang, where water from the municipal lake was led into a funnel-shaped sewer and directed to a hydraulic turbine to provide electrical energy for the town. The Cameroonian economy was progressively linked to that of France for everything concerning modern industrial production. And yet, the colonizer preferred launching development based on the promotion of local resources, human and material, without a doubt to avoid undertaking big projects that would necessitate large-scale investments. Conscious of the fact that colonial education was to mold the “natives” to a way of life and a world of consumption from elsewhere, the colonial government moreover encouraged the establishment of small industry, able to satisfy certain essential needs. Thus was created, for example, a shoemaking entity, the Bata company, whose products were adapted to the tropical environment and the standard of living of the target population. A company was also created to make bicycles and carryalls useful to transport merchandise and tools for fieldwork. A mechanical manufacturing unit was set up to produce not tractors, but tools essential for gardening and agriculture (hoes, rakes, spades, axes, machetes, etc.) and masonry (shovels, trowels, pickaxes, wheelbarrows, etc.). Small units to make clothing were also developed, producing ready-to-wear clothes with local or imported fabrics. One of the most famous brands at the time was called “Jam.” The many neighborhoods called “Nylon,” found today in some Cameroonian cities, inherited this nickname from the name of shirts made of nylon fabric, very sought after in the colonial era. The fabric was perhaps not very comfortable, but “nylon” was easy to care for and accessible to the colonized, who were less well off. Similarly, during the colonial era a unit to manufacture or assemble electronic equipment, “Equatronics, for Equatorial Electronics,” was created in Douala. Its objective: the production and distribution in the Central African colonies and territories under French domination of what was at the time called transistors, portable radios, record players, tape recorders, etc. Likewise, the French company Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann, owner of its Cameroonian subsidiary Alucam, created under the label Alubassa a unit that manufactured kitchen utensils (pots, skillets, etc.) and aluminum sheet metal at prices affordable for the colonized. Although this industry survived political changes, it did not develop to produce, in quality and quantity, products adapted to the current needs of a population that, with the exception of sheet metal and a few other construction materials, buys its kitchen utensils and household accessories from dealers in second-hand goods or a few artisan foundries. After independence in 1960, the Cameroonian economy could have been built on all these little units if the postcolonial leaders had had a credible vision and overall plan and a strategy to implement the industrial development of the territory.1 But that would have required a development philosophy based on the principle of not getting from the exterior what was available locally in order to ensure the pursuit of said development plan by transforming the existing units. The leaders of the post-independence period committed the original sin consisting in opening up the national economy to the industrialized countries and in supplying only raw materials (mineral resources, logs, hydrocarbons, etc.) and a few agro-pastoral products, among them cash crops like coffee, cocoa, bananas, tea, and cotton. Even more serious: the Cameroonian authorities followed the colonial educational model and imported and reproduced its system of higher education; this without truly trying to adapt it to the sociocultural environment and Cameroon’s technological development needs. Thus, instead of training a sizable workforce, the educational system produced bureaucrats and mediocre administrators. In short, the Cameroonian post-independence economy was not organized to produce creative economic agents and civil servants. It essentially turned toward the consumption of imported products. In short, Cameroon’s political and managerial elite remained deaf to Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s ambiguous dialectic. Its ambition was to train citizens and economic agents “to join wood to wood—to make wooden buildings” and “learn how to construct dwelling houses that resist the weather” (Kane, 1963, p. 9). But this adventure, like that 112

of Samba Diallo, Kane’s hero, ended in resounding failure. Cameroonian economic agents are not good at reproducing recipes from elsewhere and prefer to fall back on the ready-to-consume. This is why today’s Cameroonian economy looks a lot more like a huge “Buyam-sellam” (Kengne Fodouop, 2015) market than a modern industrial system capable of absorbing and making the best use possible of new technologies. The buyam-sellam concept spread in Cameroon along with urbanization. The absence of a minimum of infrastructures and a system to organize and distribute agricultural production penalized producers and favored intermediaries, those who buy to resell. This is particularly notable in the agricultural domain. Since the farmers often have neither rural roads nor the means to transport their agricultural and animal husbandry products from the fields to the cities themselves, they transport them to little village markets in makeshift vehicles or sell them off cheaply to wholesale dealers. Sometimes these dealers go to the fields to pick up the farmers’ products for very low prices and then offer them to urban consumers, thus garnering the best profits. In most Cameroonian cities, those selling various vegetables in the markets are almost never the producers of said vegetables. They are generally intermediaries, much better remunerated than the poor farmers. There have certainly been a few positive changes in some activity sectors. Not so long ago, almost all poultry consumed in Cameroon came from abroad, in the form of frozen products. Thanks to Bernard Njonga (1955–2021) with SAILD (Services d’Appui aux Initiatives Locales du Développement), a non-governmental organization created in 1988 and his popular newspaper, La Voix du paysan, poultry and other frozen meat imports have diminished drastically. Although the transportation and preservation infrastructures are still precarious, if not archaic, Cameroon produces and exports eggs and poultry to neighboring countries. Intensive poultry-raising, supported by producers of suitable feed, is beginning to take shape throughout the territory. Other stock raising (cattle, goats, hogs, etc.) satisfies national needs in animal proteins, but derivative products (dairy and meat products) are not yet available. However, the Cameroonian food economy remains, for the most part, a vast market of fresh foodstuffs distributed in precarious conditions because modern processing and preservation techniques are still beyond the reach of the family farms and small and medium-sized industries that make up the production fabric. In the agricultural and agro-alimentary domains, as in that of industry, the failures of the national economic system reflect above all the educational and training deficits of the designers of public policies and the country’s administrative elite.

6.3 EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE In the beginning there was mimicry in the matter of education and training strategies and policies. Like many former territories that had long been under European colonial domination, Cameroon did not undertake broad consultations and in-depth studies on the central question of development, which is that of the kind of citizens to train in order to build a prosperous nation in peace. Having thought little about the pertinent objectives and the choice of the best training model adapted to the country’s means and trajectory, the Cameroonian government was content to constantly copy and recycle often outdated educational models, inherited from the former mother country. While the former colonial powers themselves are constantly reforming their educational systems to adapt them to the requirements of their economic systems and the needs of their socio-economic and cultural development, Cameroonian education has remained as if frozen in time (Kom, 2017). Empirical studies devoted to it show that it remains low-performing and is not at all inventive.2 It is also insufficiently funded (Devarajan et al. 2011). In the absence of a national policy on books, the “raw material” of education, most of the tools required to train youth, from kindergarten to the university, are imported. Since its independence, and since the collapse of the short-lived CEPER (Centre d’Édition et de Production pour l’Enseignement et la Recherche), Cameroon has been functioning without even the embryo of a book industry. The economics of books is limited to the production of stationery, more profitable in the opinion of the industrialists. Dissident writer Mongo Beti said that Cameroonian education essentially produces semi-literates (Mongo Beti, 1996). It must be said that throughout Cameroon, people read little, for books are expensive and buyer power is weak. Book consumption is most often limited to the required schoolbooks for students or for works helping prepare for official examinations and professional competitive examinations. 113

The inadequacy of the Cameroonian educational and training system in relation to the needs of a dynamic and high-performing economy has serious consequences for the mentalities of the economic agents and for the strategic choices made by leaders who seem, above all, obsessed with attempting to copy the colonial models as best they can. The determinants of the industrial competitiveness of nations have been widely studied and debated in economic science. Recent work emphasizes the economic cost of intellectual mimicry in the matter of the choice of priority sectors for industrialization, as well as the importance of the type of manufactured goods and services that national economies produce. To these “technical” economic explanations is added the weight of the colonized mentalities that survived colonization and even seem to have strengthened within the Cameroonian ruling and corporate elites in the course of recent decades (Eboussi 1991). This “rentier” mentality, which is admittedly not immutable but has great resonance, results once more from the ineffectiveness and the ethical deficits of the education received. It is a mentality that opts for easy, mimetic choices. In the senior levels of government, as well as among heads of companies, the fundamental reflex that serves as a strategic base is to copy the choices made by yesterday’s colonists, adopt the same approaches, and try as much as possible to “resemble” them. The ultimate validation and the legitimacy of public and private action is the opinion of the former colonizers, to whom the Cameroonian elite is much more strongly attached today than it was half a century ago. These preferences in the microeconomic sense are perceptible in all sectors of production and consumption. They explain the fact that, even when it comes to clothing, very many Cameroonian economic agents rely on the importation, whether of clothes, shoes, or other accessories. In this domain, moreover, the second-hand clothing market seems to have installed itself durably. Many Cameroonians are essentially happy with second-hand clothing to dress their entire family. And yet, in today’s global economy and in accordance with the theory of comparative advantage, the developing countries of Africa (Mauritius, Egypt, Ethiopia, etc.), Asia (Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, etc.) or South America (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, etc.) produce most of the clothing and shoes sold in the industrialized countries. Here is the supreme paradox: the clothes that Cameroon imports from Europe or North America, new or second-hand, were originally made in countries where the workforce is generally at the same level as in Douala or Yaoundé. But those countries have visionary leaders who are not inhibited by a colonial relationship, along with solid public and private institutions capable of formulating effective economic development strategies supported by an industrial infrastructure and a skilled workforce. The intellectual and industrial mimicry goes far beyond clothing and labor-intensive industries in which Cameroon has comparative advantages. Mimicry is also perceptible in light manufacturing, which the Cameroonian economy seems incapable of producing. The streets of the country’s villages and countryside are crowded with motorcycles imported from Asia while local industry could well have produced them by modernizing the local factory built in the 1950s and turning it to manufacturing motorcycles. Importing and reselling requires no significant technicity, while producing on site would have necessitated know-how and an investment to which the country does not seem ready to consent. A strategy of industrial upgrading would have enabled the national economy to create added value in these sectors, jobs, know-how, and also to save the precious foreign exchange that all nations must use to pay for their importations. Along the same lines, it is paradoxical that, in the course of the first two decades of independence (the 1960s and 1970s), the automobiles in circulation and serving as taxis in the large cities or as a means of inter-urban transport, were generally new, whereas today they are almost exclusively used cars, often in very poor working condition. There has certainly been a deterioration in the terms of trade, an overvalued exchange rate, and the loss of competitivity of the Cameroonian economy. But the risk premium should also be emphasized: investing in a new vehicle (and in any costly material or equipment) has, through the decades, become a huge risk and this especially since, in the automobile and quite a few other sectors, after-sales service is virtually non-existent. Finding certified garages with skilled, competent mechanics, and equipment adequate for effective maintenance in the automobile industry, is a real challenge. The bankruptcy of the educational system has resulted in a real failure of the maintenance culture. Today’s Cameroonian economy thus seems to never have been envisioned as an integrated structure. This is even more significant in capital-intensive industries. One of the best-known “white elephants” of Cameroonian industrial policy was the failure of the State firm Cellucam, which was to produce paper pulp. Created in 1976, it started production in 1980 and was 114

finally inaugurated with great pomp by the president of the Republic himself in 1981. A few months later, two fires caused by technical and managerial failures partially destroyed the factory. Only 3 years after the inauguration, its activities were completely halted. So, this project, costly for the Cameroonian taxpayer, was liquidated. The liquidation process itself, begun in 1986, was concluded in 2008—22 years later! If this State company had been better conceived and managed, it could have helped develop Cameroonian industry in several sectors of activity. Starting with paper produced locally from Cameroonian cellulose, one could have, for instance, initiated the manufacture of all the paper consumed in the country and begun the manufacture of books and other school and office supplies. The effect of such an initiative would have been to develop a book industry with the technicians associated with it, whether those specialized in the maintenance of machines used in the various book trades or the specialists in the publishing supply chain. In doing this, a good part of the educational material could have been produced locally at very little cost, given the density of Cameroon’s great forest reserve. Moreover, on the subject of the exploitation of the Cameroonian forest, inadequate public policies lead to missed opportunities for the State and the economic agents who could invest in them. The wood produced in the country is then almost always exported in the form of logs, with only minute quantities processed locally. The country has not ensured the training of a sufficient number of experts skilled in this field and has no rules or certification systems to manufacture and export quality furniture, unlike many Asian and European countries. But the State could at least create a legal and regulatory framework to encourage the private sector to build large sawmills in order to encourage local processing and reduce the exportation of logs. More than 60 years after independence, the only industry truly integrated in the entire national territory is that of the production of beer and lemonades manufactured by the various breweries. Whether in bottling, transport and the distribution network, or in supplying the factories with raw material (corn, sugar, etc.), it is obvious that everything necessary is in place and that no other agro-alimentary industry performs as well as the brewing companies. It is almost as if the breweries were the Republic’s priority industry, even essential for the new identity of the Cameroonian land. Brewery products are the best distributed of the country, much better distributed than medicines and other pharmaceutical products. In this latter domain, it should be noted that Cameroon, like most African countries, produces less than 5% of the medicines needed by its populations. Even the factory making quinine, which existed during colonization to prevent malaria, has permanently closed its doors and the country imports this medicine from Asia and Europe—including the generics. In Cameroon, the construction of the slightest kilometer of road, the smallest bridge, or even buildings of a certain size require the expertise of a foreign buildings and public works company (i.e., the BTP, Entreprise de Bâtiment et Travaux Public). And yet, the construction sector is considered a highly labor-intensive field, generating jobs. Whether it is a matter of dirt roads, paved major roads or motorways, the investment required is generally fairly large but the results are extremely important for the rest of the economy. The State should have encouraged and facilitated the development of this kind of activity, which stimulates general economic development. BTPs, and particularly the construction of roads and bridges are at the heart of the physical and structural transformation of all countries. Transportation routes make barriers fall and permit exchanges between diverse regions since they favor the movement of people and the transport of industrial goods and products of everyday consumption. A public policy giving priority to the construction of buildings and road infrastructure cannot be implemented without a duly skilled workforce trained in respected institutions. Effective economic development cannot be successful without an overall strategy. From this perspective, the educational system must necessarily be linked to the needs of said economy. As Cameroonian economic development is essentially based on an informal system and resourcefulness, the educational system seems also to adjust downward and is deteriorating decade after decade. The various training programs that have been developed, whether the advanced technician’s certificate (BTS), the Bachelor’s degree, the Master’s, or the Ph.D., do not correspond at all to specific socioeconomic demands or even to the desire to train individuals who could raise the general quality of the social body. One has to wonder if the widely shared social aim isn’t simply to obtain a diploma/degree that one can brandish to try to justify a qualification without necessarily justifying true competence or expertise. At independence, Cameroon inherited British and French educational systems, but the authorities were 115

not able to re-examine, synthesize, and merge them to adapt them to the specific needs of a developing nation. And yet they could have combined the pragmatism of the British system with the Latin theoretical and speculative focus, without forgetting the contributions of local cultures and endogenous modes of economic organization, and made of it a true system of production of competences. For endogenous economic modes can inspire effective public policies. It is worth remembering, for example, that the national economy was long based, and still functions, in a large measure by resorting to the tontine as the privileged mode of savings and credit. The vitality of the network of microfinance institutions throughout the territory proves this. One of Cameroon’s largest commercial banks today, Afriland First Bank, began as a microfinancing institution, the Caisse Camerounaise d’Épargne et d’Investissement (CCEI). The CCA Bank (Crédit Communautaire d’Afrique) was also a microfinancing institution. Microfinance institutions proceed via dissemination, for they open counters in the remotest areas of the Republic, in places where no classical bank would dare establish an agency. Furthermore, they base their modus operandi on the indigenous habits of the financial transaction. These are initiatives that should have led the public authorities to pay more attention to local customs in a global reflection on the territory’s economic development. Good economic initiatives inspired by traditional practices are notable in other sectors. This is the case with the postal service or the distribution sector. Since the State missed out on computerizing the service, the rapid delivery of mail, and the rapid transfer of money, Cameroonian entrepreneurship stepped up and excels in the sector by increasing strategies of mail transport and instant fund transfer. Today in Cameroon, the mail and a good part of domestic postal freight are delivered very efficiently by intercity bus. Only sending mail and packages abroad has remained in the hands of the State and international companies like Fedex or DHL. And well before multinationals like Orange and MTN entered the sector of sending money quickly, small local companies controlled the sector and did very well. In the field of large-scale distribution, public policies ought to encourage endogenous development. This would incentivize local entrepreneurs to compete in devising ingenious methods of preserving goods and distributing them throughout the national market in acceptable conditions. Cameroonian foodstuffs are already being sold in Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Chad, and even in Sudan. The consequence: internal and regional trade is growing, local production is encouraged, and the State can save foreign exchange on the invoice of its importations. Public policies favoring intra-African trade would encourage local producers to process still greater quantities of products and foodstuffs to preserve them better. Just like the processing of agro-alimentary products, that of other cash crops (coffee, tea, cacao, etc.) and even natural resources (minerals) now exported as raw products would be a great benefit to the Cameroonian economy. But the tendency is rather to install multinational chain stores in Cameroon’s large cities. These encourage the consumption of imported products but will not be accelerators of local development.

116

6.4 A DELETERIOUS GENERAL ENVIRONMENT AND MENTALITIES TO BE CHANGED The governance of the business environment in Cameroon constitutes a last important project of public policy. In the days following independence, the leaders had worked out an overall plan aiming to give the country a certain number of large State companies and public institutions to prepare the territory’s economic take-off. Thus were created the Société Nationale d’Investissement and a conglomerate of private or semi-public companies tasked with supporting national development: Cimencam (cement works of Cameroon); Cellucam (Cellulose of Cameroon); Sonara (national refining company); the Alucam company (aluminum of Cameroon), etc. Large agro-industrial structures were also created. Alongside the various private brewing companies (Brasseries du Cameroun, Union Camerounaise des Brasseries, Guinness, etc.), the State over the years created or consolidated CDC (Cameroon Development Corporation); Mideviv (Mission de Développement des Cultures Vivrières); SODEPA (Société de Développememt et d’Exploitation et des Productions Animales ); SODECOTON (Société de Développement du Coton); SODECAO (Société de Développement du Cacao); SOSUCAM (Société Sucrière du Cameroun); SEMRIZ (Société d’Expansion et de Modernisation de la Riziculture), etc., as well as service companies, Camtel (Cameroon Telecommunications); Sotuc (Société des Transports Urbains du Cameroun); Camair (Cameroon Airlines), etc., and financial companies like Crédit Agricole; SCB (Société camerounaise de banque); BICEC (Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie du Cameroun); Fonader (Fonds National de Développement Rural); Fogape (Fonds de Garantie pour la Petite Entreprise); ONCPB (Office National de Commercialisation des Produits de Base), etc. In the education sector specialized training institutions were created, such as ESSEC (École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales); ENSA (École Nationale Supérieure d’Agronomie); ESIJY ( École Supérieure Internationale de Journalisme de Yaoundé); ENSIAAC (École Nationale Supérieure des Industries Agro-Alimentaires du Cameroun); and ENSPY (École Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique de Yaoundé), to train a skilled workforce and upper management to head these companies and institutions. Unfortunately, many of these companies have disappeared or are mired in financial and managerial difficulties (Monga, 1997). Even the few rare State companies that have not been liquidated and privatized and that are still operating have not been able to play the part assigned them to promote Cameroon’s industrialization. Thus, the advent of the Société de développement du Coton (SODECOTON) did not generate the development of a true clothing industry based on local cotton, this despite the creation of CICAM (Cotonnière Industrielle du Cameroun) that was supposed to encourage the emergence of this value chain. The strategic and public policy errors in the management of State companies have become worse since the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, which resulted in serious reductions in civil service salaries. This large loss in purchasing power of civil servants and State agents worsened the corruption that is today eating away at the Cameroonian administrative system. The civil servants and State agents decided to make up for their loss of revenue by having users of public services pay them. Since then, civil servants have been vying with each other in extorsion techniques and misappropriation of public funds. Overbilling, kickbacks, fictitious markets, rackets, and crafty set-ups to plunder the State have become national habits, as is shown by Cameroon’s low scores in the matter of fighting corruption in Transparency International’s annual rankings. Civil service examinations and all entry into public service are bargained for all the more fiercely because, for many citizens, it is essentially a matter of obtaining a registration number to gain access to a group of employees where few people work, and thus receive “free” remuneration. The civil servant or State agent is thus essentially seeking a job with undoubted advantages: a set salary at the end of the month; a job guaranteed until retirement; little demand for profitability; rare sanctions. Obtaining a job in the public sector is like the right to a salary without performance obligations. This is why Cameroonians are ready to pay enormous sums of money to obtain a job in the public sector. The civil servant is, however, seen as a lazy person whom the State pays to do nothing since many of them never file reports and their performance is hardly ever evaluated. In an environment where few 117

people have notions of integrity and responsibility, many civil servants and State agents “privatize” their jobs and serve only those who give them illegal “commissions.” The same is true of the police officer or the magistrate, the nurse or the doctor, the teacher or the tax collector, the civil registrar or the customs officer, etc. In such an environment, the private sector is subjected to the extra financial costs of the practices of State capture and the dysfunctioning of the State apparatus and tries to adapt to the rhythm of the public sector. This is how contraband and fakes develop in commercial transactions. In Cameroon, the State inspection and audit reports show that BTP companies can win a construction contract for a road, bridge, dispensary, or school and get paid without ever doing the work.3 All the company has to do is get together with the inspectors assigned to check the work, share the contract amount with them and vanish into thin air. The CovidGate4 scandal that the country is presently experiencing is very symptomatic of the level of corruption the nation has reached. Among other things, makeshift hospitals were built and equipped for several hundred million CFA francs on soccer stadiums in Douala, Yaoundé, and Limbe. They were dismantled weeks after without ever accommodating any patient. The operation was obviously another funds embezzlement strategy. Cameroon is a country where tradespeople can deliver the same consumables to a department many times since all they have to do is arrange things with the storekeeper so that he certifies that the merchandise was delivered, even if that’s not the case, and this sometimes occurs several times for the same transaction. It has happened that civil servants in the Ministry of Finance gave themselves several fictitious registration numbers and for years received salaries of non-existent agents. Once again, the absence of an in-depth reform of the educational project to adapt it to the country’s needs is a great handicap in economic development. Primary, secondary, and higher education should have been evaluated to take account of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon heritage and the world’s technological evolution. Instead of such an evaluation, the State has practically renounced its mission in the field and abandoned academic training to a private sector dominated by unscrupulous knowledge dealers. Thus, in urban and rural environments training offers appear whose promoters are essentially interested in the lure of profit. Some religiously affiliated establishments (Collège Evangélique de Libamba, Collège Sacré Coeur de Makak, Collège Saint-Paul de Bafang, Collège Saint Michel, Collège Alfred Saker, etc.) that were formerly highly thought of are now only a shadow of their former selves, for the attention they received from religious hierarchical institutions and even the State has almost vanished. For lack of a coherent and well mastered educational policy, the Cameroonian educational sector is also evolving like an unauthorized market. Some educational programs are not accredited and their degrees are not recognized by an official body. Private teaching establishments are mushrooming without the authorities’ being able to formulate a policy for this evolution. The secular private sector is growing in a disorganized way because there appears to be no guidance enabling one to describe the profile of the young Cameroonian to be trained to take charge of the development challenges of the twenty-first century. The intervention of public authorities in regulating the creation of educational institutions should have as its chief objective to create safeguards guaranteeing the quality of the education and training. But in educational matters as in other sectors, leadership has been largely ineffective. The presence of officials who are supposed to oversee things has turned out to be, above all, a factor that worsens crises, this because of the corruption that they support. One of the consequences of the degeneration of the Cameroonian educational system is seen in the production of numerous semi-literate graduates whose degrees have no relationship with their real competence. As a result, they can at best be content with minor jobs (motorcycle taximen, street vendors, etc.), that pay little and lock them into poverty. The occasional recruitment of large groups of new civil servants and State agents, based on criteria generally lacking in transparency, resolves neither the public service crisis nor that of the training of economic agents capable of undertaking a true process of industrialization. These arbitrary recruitments, incidentally, create frustrations among the youth. The small essentially public industrial units created before the 1980s functioned thanks to a workforce trained by the colonial educational system or inherited from the colonizer. Since the economic crisis of the 1990s jeopardized these units, a new model must be adopted in order to reinvent the country’s economic transformation. From this point of view, the COVID-19 pandemic raging in the world since March 2020, which is forcing practically all the other world economies to reassess themselves, is perhaps the opportune time for Africa and Cameroon to rethink their development strategy. 118

Whatever the strategy adopted, laws and regulations must be updated to avoid administrative burdens that often paralyze economic activity. This could also be the opportunity to set standards codifying the processes and normal duration for all basic public services, and the system of rewards and sanctions within the administration and in the functioning of the judiciary, for the Cameroonian legal system is so unstable that it is difficult for the judges to truly exercise justice in good conscience. Cameroon also needs an integrating vision of the various initiatives for its inclusive economic development. The first six decades of independence were quite chaotic and the strategies and public policies were often haphazard and laborious, this chiefly because of intellectual mimicry and the obsession of the elites and political leaders with constantly seeking models from elsewhere. Cameroon must renegotiate its future by taking into account its past experience and that of other developing nations that have had better economic results. This will involve working out economic development policies corresponding to the country’s requirements and assets, and rejecting those imposed by bilateral partners, however powerful they may be. From this point of view, thought must be given to the conceptual framework and the kind of training needed to be set up in order to prepare economic agents capable of seizing the opportunities of the times and create shared wealth. The training of human resources must therefore be at the heart of the strategy for tomorrow’s Cameroon. The current economic model is that of an economy organized around public service that has led to an informal and ineffective system. In all parts of the country, civil servants and State agents determine the work and productivity rhythm. The lax attitude that characterizes the entire public sector tends to spread to all as the model to follow, including those in the private sector. For the mentality of the civil servant is also to be found in those working in the private sector. Although here the employee does not demand a bribe or extra pay to render a service, he does not necessarily perceive his contractual obligation in terms of needing to contribute to the company’s profitability. This way of seeing things poses enormous governance problems for private companies, whether large or small. This is all the more so because many promoters of private businesses are happy to recruit a family workforce, which allows them to fulfill their social responsibilities. In such an operating mode, some behaviors and the nonchalance that encumber the company’s performance are largely tolerated in a private sector supposedly motivated by a desire for productivity and profit. The transformation of Cameroon’s economy thus remains a vast building site.

NOTES 1.

Instead of taking his inspiration from local knowledge and practices, Ahmadou Ahidjo’s administration chose a recurrent 5-year development plan, a model completely controlled by the State. Unfortunately, the system collapsed after five sequences. The sixth plan, which started in 1986, folded shortly afterwards because of the 1987 economic crisis that brought interventions from the World Bank and the IMF. See https://www.camerlex .com/les-plans-quinquenaux-au-cameroun-93/. See also Touna Mama (2008); Gérard Amougou, “Esquisse d’histoire des politiques de développement au Cameroun. Un regard contextuel,” available at: https://f .hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/3813/files/2019/01/Ge%CC%81rard-AMOUGOU-Politiques-de%CC %81veloppement-Cameroun.pdf. 2. See Quelle Université pour le Cameroun de demain? 2004. Rapport du Comité Technique de Réflexion pour l’Amélioration du Système National de l’Enseignement Supérieur. Yaoundé: Cameroon University Press. 3. See the list of companies officially excluded from public bids for their fraudulent practices: https://armp.cm /Sanctions.php?WD_ACTION_=SCROLLTABLE&A67=3#tzM52. 4. See https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-investigates-missing-335-million-covid-funds.

REFERENCES Devarajan, S., C. Monga, and T. Zongo (2011), “Making Higher Education Finance Work for Africa,” Journal of African Economies, 20(3, August): iii133–iii154. Eboussi Boulaga, F. (1997), La démocratie de transit au Cameroun. Paris: L’Harmattan. Eboussi Boulaga, F. (ed.) (2009), L’état du Cameroun 2008. Yaoundé: Terroirs. Fotso, V. (1994), Le Chemin de Hiala. Paris: Éditions de septembre. Hausmann, R., C. Hidalgo, S. Bustos, M. Coscia, S. Chung, J. Jimenez, A. Simoes, and M. A. Y[[cmr10-10.png]]ld[[cmr10-10.png]]r[[cmr10-10.png]]m (2013), The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping

119

Paths to Prosperity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kane, C. H. (1963), Ambiguous Adventure. London: Heinemann. Kengne Fodouop (ed.) (2015), Le Cameroun. Jardin sacré de la débrouillardise. Paris: l’Harmattan. Kom, A. (2006), Education et démocratie en Afrique: le temps des illusions. Paris-Yaoundé: L’Harmattan, Editions du CRAC. Kom, A. (2017), Université des Montagnes. Pour solde de tout compte. Rouen: Éditions des Peuples Noirs. Lin, J. Y., and C. Monga (2011), “Growth Identification and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change,” Development Policy Review, 29(3): 264–290. Lin, J. Y. and C. Monga (2017), Beating the Odds: Jump-Starting Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Monga, C. (1997), L’argent des autres: Banques et petites entreprises en Afrique—le cas du Cameroun. Paris: LGDJ. Mongo Beti (1996), “Mourir pour le livre, ou illettrisme et sous-développement,” in P. Bissek (ed.), 2003. Mongo Beti à Yaoundé 1991–2001. Rouen: Peuples Noirs, pp. 253–257. Tchundjang Pouemi J. (1981), Monnaie, servitude et liberté. La repression monétaire de l’Afrique. Paris: j. a. Touna Mama, A. (2008), L’économie camerounaise: Pour un nouveau départ. Yaoundé: Afrédit.

120

CHAPTER 7

UNTOLD PERSPECTIVES ABOUT CAMEROON’S ECONOMY FABIEN NKOT

7.1 INTRODUCTION What is meant by the economy of a country? It is commonly understood that it means the way in which the country organizes the production and distribution of its goods and services. One could also argue that the economy of a country refers to the way in which the country mobilizes the resources offered it by nature, as well as those produced by the work of its inhabitants, to satisfy the needs of its population. Through the general prism of this subject, this chapter analyzes the work of a sampling of the most important specialists on the Cameroonian economy. I will thus touch on work by Touna Mama (2008, 2019), Touna Mama and Kamdem Simeu (2018), Bruno Bekolo Ebe et al. (2003, 2006), Désiré Avom (2007, 2019, 2020), Désiré Avom and Bobbo (2018), Désiré Avom and Mignamissi (2018), Séraphin Magloire Fouda (1996), Fouda and Blancheton (2007), Roger Tsafack Nanfosso (2003, 2007, 2013), Nanfosso et al. (2014), Nanfosso and Fotso (2014, 2016), Chicot Eboue (2005, 2007), Eboue et al. (2007b), Georges Ngango (1973), Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi (1980), Célestin Monga (1995, 1997, 2019), Monga and Tchatchouang (1996), and Monga and Lin (2015). The works mentioned above are of excellent quality, in the mainstream of such literature. Their authors are unquestionably among Cameroon’s most renowned economists. However, their work seems to limit itself to the formal economy whose size and significance are nevertheless limited. This chapter identifies the problems posed by an exclusive focus on the formal sector of a national economy and suggests that analyses directed toward the less formal aspects of this economy would more appropriately state its truths. This chapter is organized as follows: I will first discuss the difficulties in grasping the Cameroonian economy in its entirety—beyond its official aspects observed empirically. Then, I will attempt to show how this “analytical misunderstanding” informs the disconnect between the knowledge conveyed about the Cameroonian economy and the country’s overall economic reality. Furthermore, I will underline the essentially extraverted structure of Cameroon’s economy. Finally, I will suggest paths for better analyses of the nature and structure of the economy of Cameroon.

7.2 THE PROBLEM OF THE SIZE OF CAMEROON’S ECONOMY This problem is that of a misunderstanding around what the economy is. In the context of their work, the authors mentioned draw, for the most part, on data coming from official structures. Thus, for example, to evaluate the size of Cameroon’s foreign trade, they examine freight as it is transported by airlines serving Cameroon. In the same way, they mobilize data relative to economic goods transported by ships that dock at or leave the ports of Douala and Kribi. The work of these authors does not take sufficient account of the economic flows at work along the border of more than 1700 kilometers that separates Cameroon and Nigeria. They don’t have exact data relative to the economic activities seen, for example, at the common borders of Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. When these same authors deal with Cameroon’s internal trade, they measure its vitality through the figures furnished by the government tax and customs authorities. But generally, the true Cameroonian economy outwits customs and avoids taxes. One could, for that matter, maintain that the Cameroonian economy, that is, the way in which this country mobilizes the resources offered it by nature, as well as 121

those produced by the work of its inhabitants, to satisfy the needs of its population, is essentially driven by women who, throughout the country, try their hand at selling peanuts, corn, ripe plantains, and plums. In these conditions, to measure the vitality of said economy, one must know the sales revenue of the vendors of braised meat (50/501) in the neighborhood called Briqueterie in Yaoundé, and all the similar places throughout the country. One must master the volume of eru vegetables moving every day between Cameroon and Nigeria. One must collect and convert into exact figures the transactions around bundles of second-hand clothing; one must understand the dynamics of the transactions in the large Nkololoun or Congo markets in Douala, or in the indistinct bays of Yaoundé’s central market. Now, no one has figures on any of this. Thus, regarding the Cameroonian economy, one ends up confusing shadow with substance, ripple with groundswell, and empty space with depth. Let us be quite clear about this, however: it is not a matter of denying all relevance to the unquestionably significant data of the formal economy. My intention is, above all, to restore to their dignity the figures of the economy called informal, emphasizing what both research and the country lose by neglecting them. It should nonetheless be noted that attempts to understand the informal sector have been the subject of research in some developing countries (Journal Monde en développement, n 166, 2014). In Cameroon, a few economists are exploring this problem using terms like resourcefulness (Kengne Fodouop, 2015), solidarity economy (Tsafack Nanfosso, 2007), or economics of death (Monga, 1995), without really exhausting its complex and diversified character within the economic environment. Moreover, local work devoted to the informal sector approaches it from the perspective of marketing ( Abba, 2016) or the imported sectors of second-hand clothing (Kengne Fodouop, 2006), for example. In short, the economic potential of the informal sector is not yet being dealt with in its exhaustive diversity and its cultural and/or historical rootedness.2 This lack seriously poses the question of the relationship between science and social experience.

7.3 THE PROBLEM OF THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN STATED KNOWLEDGE AND THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC REALITY This problem is closely tied to that just discussed. It consists in drawing intellectual conclusions from the situation described above: if the knowledge conveyed by renowned economists is not in line with the country’s massive economic reality, then scientific activity is not necessarily a driver of social progress. It follows that the notions and concepts put forward to describe the economic situation of Cameroon—and probably of Africa—could be disconnected from endogenous and indigenous realities (Nubukpo and Samuel, 2017). This problem arises not only in economic science, it also arises in law and political science, disciplines in which some researchers, among the most publicized, promote an institutional approach that does not take into account the density of the social and political experience of Cameroonians. It is this qualitative leap that the authors of politics from below have tried to achieve in political science (Bayart et al., 1992). Setting up a research program on economics from below should therefore be considered, with the aim of doing justice to the economic dynamism of the cadets sociaux,3 whom the dominant literature erroneously considers marginal. In fact, the formal economy, which has the favor of the dominant literature, suffers from a lack of local anchorage.

7.4 THE ISSUE OF THE EXTRAVERSION OF THE CAMEROONIAN ECONOMY The formal economy bears the original sin of its extraversion. In works implicitly claiming exhaustivity as to the treatment they accord to the various stages of the evolution of the Cameroonian economy, we note that the themes principally treated deal, for the most part, with the economy of extraversion (Kengne Fodouop, 2012). This is more noticeable when reading the doctoral theses in economic science regularly defended in Cameroonian universities (Nzomo Tcheunta, 2000). In the same way, we can note that the important products of the Cameroonian economy are essentially colonial products, like cacao, bananas, coffee, and rubber trees, etc. These principal products of the formal 122

economy are intended to be exported into the mother countries, to then undergo processing. There is rather little local consumption of these products. The formal economy is also extraverted at the infrastructure level and, notably, in its transport routes. In fact, the railroad map of a country like Cameroon essentially covers the areas in which these rent products are grown, and the lines lead from these areas toward the ports or airports from which they are exported. Finally, the formal economy is extraverted regarding consumption habits. In this regard, the easy path is to emphasize the local bourgeoisie shops in supermarkets that for the most part offer consumers imported products, or to note the extent to which it is attracted to Western-style lifestyles (cars, champagnes, Canal+, etc.). The question goes deeper, however, when ordinary people buy their clothes and underwear from bundles of second-hand clothing which are actually part of the informal economy. It must be acknowledged that this extraversion gets in the way of creating the conditions that could have made possible the judicious creation of wealth in Cameroon, with a view to raising the standard of living of the Cameroonian populations. The president of the Republic of Cameroon, Mr. Paul Biya, touched on this matter when on several occasions he urged the Cameroonians to consume what they produce. But rubber, coffee, and cacao, which are at the heart of the formal economy, are not the Cameroonians’ principal products of local consumption. Most of them eat corn porridge, beans, and omelets in the tournes-dos4 of urban areas, or food products and various vegetables grown in rural areas and sold from carts and makeshift sheds in the same urban spaces. Of course, works by Bayart on the historical sociology of the State in Africa (Bayart, 2006) and on the political economy(Bayart, 1994) defend the thesis of the autonomy of the State in Africa, particularly in Cameroon (Bayart, 1985). This position explains his reading of extraversion that is poles apart from dependentist theses (Bayart, 1999). Jean-Pierre Warnier (1994) holds to the same line of thought. A cold analysis of everyday reality shows that the colonial exploitation model still predominates in our day. This dominant reading of extraversion leads me to adopt—strictly on this point—the theses of Samir Amin (Amin, 1986).

7.5 WHAT IS TO BE DONE? The point now is what to do to put right what has thus been thwarted. Education, which should be the appropriate solution, is unfortunately part of the problem. There is a kind of colonial capture of education, an extraversion of education. Two Bantus have to speak to one another in French or English to understand one another, which is a scandal, one among the most improbable of humanity. In most Sub-Saharan African countries, the educational system remains notoriously colonial, and has not sufficiently endogenized. Abdou Moumouni’s work on education in Africa, published in 1964, remains topical, as it deeply understood education’s importance in an Africa that was to enter what Wallerstein calls the “world-system” (Wallerstein, 2006). After recalling the specifically African humanism that structured the traditional education system, the Nigerian author opposes it to the system applied under the colonial regime. He plots out in detail the lines of a true system of teaching that would take into account both traditional African features and the urgent necessities of the rapid expansion that African countries must embrace. It seems indeed that this cultural and human factor should constitute the point of departure of education in Africa. In reality, it is a disciplined and well managed education that could have allowed the concerned African countries to reappropriate their imaginary, which was badly damaged by the colonial event. This economic science from above that I have just described is not accidental. Without the authors I’ve referred to realizing it, they reproduce on the local level categories inherited from intellectual practices current in some mother countries. Célestin Monga touches on this problem when, in a text that did not have the resonance it merits, he denounces the two chief cognitive biases and methodologies that inform most of the economic solutions advocated for Africa by the world economic establishment. Monga writes particularly: “ First, in thinking about convergence and the task of transforming low-income countries into industrialized economies, we have too often selected the wrong comparators and benchmarks and set the wrong objectives for our works—and obviously that of the policy makers who follow our advice. The 123

wrong choice of model economies has led many theoreticians and empiricists to adopt some profoundly misleading assumptions that no sensitivity analyses could correct. Second, these compounding mistakes have generated a false economics of preconditions, and the wrong policy prescriptions” (Monga, 2019). One might think that an effective education system could have enabled the populations of Sub-Saharan Africa to become reconciled with themselves, in particular by offering them the opportunity to discipline their view of what they are, of the resources at their disposal, and of the most pertinent means of ensuring their social progress. Effective education could enable these populations to think about the conditions of a judicious processing of the products of their environment in order to create wealth. But the imaginary of these populations, fruit of their education, has remained a prisoner of colonial categories. Let us give a quick illustration. On April 13, 2021, Ms. Nalova Lyonga, Cameroon’s Minister of Secondary Education, made a visit to Zoatoupsi, a village located in a forest in the department of Nyong et So’o, Centre region of Cameroon. She wished to promote students’ training in the use of local materials to construct houses and other buildings. That was when Mr. Augustin Mvondo, a specialist in the construction of clay-brick houses, surprised the audience in his speech for the occasion. Mr. Mvondo stated that clay, the raw material used to make earthen bricks, is available over a large part of the territory of Cameroon. He claimed that houses built of clay bricks are more resistant to bad weather than those built of concrete blocks. He stated that they cost less to construct, notably because they don’t need rebar. He emphasized that houses built of clay bricks have better weather and sound insulation and are resistant to bullets. To understand the astonishment that Mr. Mvondo’s speech caused among those attending this meeting, one has to know that, despite the unquestionable benefits of building with clay bricks, about 99% of the houses and buildings in Cameroon are built of concrete blocks—contrary to all economic and security rationality; totally distrusting the simple happiness given by the comfort of clay-brick houses. The question is to know how this is possible. How, with such a “cognitive” deficit, can one hope to “come out of the great night” (Mbembe, 2010) of the colonial capture of our imaginaries? And yet, one must imagine Sisyphus happy (Camus, 1942).

NOTES 1. Name given to the roasted meat sold on the sidewalks of the popular neighborhood Briqueterie in Yaoundé. 2. It should nonetheless be mentioned that sociologist Jean-Marc Éla brings out the innovative potential of this sector, presented as the high point of social creativity. According to him, Africa’s Renaissance is necessarily through the unsuspected innovations of this “world below” (Éla, 1998). 3. Translator’s note: These are social, non-firstborn, subordinates in a society governed by filiation, the concept broadened to include other potential or actual dominated groups in African societies (women, youths, people of modest means, precarious workers, etc.). 4. Public, informal, inexpensive eating places made of temporary material (boards, umbrellas, curtains, and picnic tables).

REFERENCES

Abba, B. (2016), Les pratiques marketing dans le secteur informel. Une appréhension par les détaillantes du secteur informel camerounais. Paris: L’Harmattan. Aerts, J.-J., D., Cogneau, J., Herrera, G., Monchy, and F. Roubaud (2000), L’Économie camerounaise. L’espoir évanoui. Paris: Karthala. Avom, D. (2007), “Intégration régionale dans la CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community): des problèmes institutionnels récurrents,” Afrique contemporaine, 222(2): 199–221. Avom, D. (2019), “Quelques réflexions prospectives sur la Zone franc,” L’Europe en Formation, 388(1): 81–102. Avom, D. (2020), “Zone franc: fin et réincarnation,” Politique étrangère, Été(2): 115–127. Avom, D. and A. Bobbo (2018), “Réglementation de l’industrie bancaire et exclusion financière dans la Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale,” Afrique contemporaine, 266(2): 175–190. Avom, D. and D. Mignamissi (2018), “Pourquoi le commerce intra-CEEAC est-il si faible?” Revue française d’économie, xxxii(3): 136–170. Bayart, J.-F. (1985), L’État au Cameroun. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Bayart, J.-F. (ed.) (1994), La réinvention du capitalism. Paris: Karthala.

124

Bayart, J.-F. (1999), “L’Afrique dans le monde: Une histoire d’extraversion,” Critique Internationale, 5(1): 97–120. Bayart, J.-F. (2006), L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre. Paris: Fayard. Bayart, J.-F., A. Mbembe, and C. Toulabor (1992), Le politique par le bas en Afrique. Contribution à une problématique de la démocratie. Paris: Karthala. Bekolo Ebe, B., Touna Mama, and S. M. Fouda (2003), Dynamiques de développement: Débats théoriques et enjeux politiques. Paris: Montchrestien. Bekolo Ebe, B., Touna Mama, and S. M. Fouda (2006), Mondialisation, Exclusion et développement africain, 2 vols. Paris: Maisonneuve Larose. Camus, A. (1942), Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard. Eboue, C. (2005), La Réflexionéconomique et financière contemporaine des Banques Centrales. Dakar: Editions Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO). Eboue, C. (2007), “Les Coûts Réels des Crises bancaires en Afrique: Quels enseignements pour l’UMOA?” Revue économique et monétaire de la BCEAO, Dakar: N1 juin, pp. 39–76. Eboue, C., Touna Mama, and K. Wolmuth (2007), Africa Dependence, Diversification Curse and Manufactures Exports Promotion. Ouvrage de récherche co-édité pour la série African Development Perspectives Yearbook, Volume 12, Verbeke Verlag Editions. Université de Brême, Allemagne. Éla, J.-M. (1998), Innovation sociale et renaissance de l’Afrique noire. Les défis du “monde d’en-bas,” Paris: L’Harmattan. Fouda, S. (1996), “Cycles politico-monétaires et indépendance de la Banque centrale dans une union monétaire: une vérification empirique.” Revue d’économie du développement, 4e année N 4, Zone franc et dévaluation des francs CFA. Politique de change—II, 121–143. Fouda, S. M. and B. Blancheton (2007), L’actualité scientifique en économie: vues croisées francophones: actes des doctorales de Yaoundé. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose. Kengne, F. (2006), Le marché de la friperie vestimentaire au Cameroun. Paris: L’Harmattan. Kengne, F. (2012), Le Cameroun face au défi du développement: atouts, obstacles et voie à suivre. Paris: L’Harmattan. Kengne, F. (ed.) (2015), Le Cameroun. Jardin secret de la débrouillardise. Paris: L’Harmattan. Konings, P. (2010), Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: Civil Society and Agro-Industry in Anglophone Cameroons Plantation Economy. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG. Mbembe, A. (2010), Sortir de la grande nuit. Essai sur l’Afrique décolonisée. Paris: La Découverte. Monga, C. (1995), Cercueils, orgies et sublimation: le coût d’une mauvaise gestion de la mort. Paris: Afrique 2000. Monga, C. (1997), L’argent des autres. Banques et petites entreprises en Afrique. Le cas du Cameroun. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. Monga, C. (2019), “Truth is the Safest Lie: A Reassessment of Development Economics,” in C. Monga and J. Y. Lin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Structural Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 659–671. Monga, C. and J. Y. Lin (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics. Volume 1: Context and Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Monga, C. and J. C. Tchatchouang (1996), Sortir du piège monétaire. Paris: Economica. Moumouni, A. (1964), L’éducation en Afrique. Paris: Présence africaine. Ngango, G. (1973), Les Investissements d’origine extérieures en Afrique noire: statuts et incidence sur le développement. Paris: Présence Africaine. Nkongho, T.-M. (2012), A Critical Analysis of State Transformation through Privatisation. Explaining the State Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of the Transformation of the Cameroonian State through Privatisation . Saarbrücken: Lap Lambert Academic Publishing. Nubukpo, K. and B. Samuel (2017), “Entre les plans d’émergence sans vision et des visions sans émergence: la difficile appropriation par l’Afrique de ses trajectoires de développement,” Politique Africaine, 145: 51–63. Osendé, A. (1966), L’économie de l’Ouest africain: Perspectives de développement. Paris: Maspero. Samir, A. (1986), La déconnexion. Pour sortir du système Mondial. Paris: La Découverte. Tchundjang Pouemi, J. (1980), Monnaie, Servitude et Liberté. Paris: Jeune Afrique. Touna Mama (2008), L’économie camerounaise. Pour un nouveau départ. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Afrédit. Touna Mama (2019), L’économie camerounaise à l’épreuve de l’émergence. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Afredit. Touna Mama and M. Kamdem Simeu (2018), Les politiques de la ville en question. À la recherche d’une meilleure gouvernance urbaine en Afrique subsaharienne. Paris: L’Harmattan. Tsafack Nanfosso, R. (2003), Le Pipeline Tchad-Cameroun et l’emploi: quelles leçons? Yaoundé: Presses universitaires d’Afrique. Tsafack Nanfosso, R. A. (2007), L’Économie solidaire dans les pays en développement. Mouvements économiques et sociaux. Paris: L’Harmattan. Tsafack Nanfosso, R. (2013), Environnement des affaires et systèmes productifs en Afrique Centrale. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Afredit. Tsafack Nanfosso, R. and A. Fotso (2014), 100 propositions pour l’émergence du Cameroun. Yaoundé, Cameroon:

125

Editions Clé. Tsafack Nanfosso, R. and A. Fotso (2016), L’entreprise offensive. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Editions Clé. Tsafack Nanfosso, R., J. C. Awomo, and P. A. Mahieu (2014), “Mutuelles de santé et État de santé des populations au Cameroun: une enquête conduite dans la région du Centre pour estimer l’effet de l’adhésion à une mutuelle sur l’état de santé déclaré,” Journal de gestion et d’économie médicales, 32(4): 263–279. Wallerstein, I. (2006), Comprendre le monde. Introduction à l’analyse des systèmes-monde. Paris: La découverte. Warnier, J.-P. (1993), L’esprit d’entreprise au Cameroun. Paris: Karthala. Warnier, J.-P. (1994), “La bigarrure des patrons camerounais,” in J.-F. Bayart (ed.), La réinvention du capitalisme. Paris: Karthala, pp. 175–201.

PH.D. DISSERTATIONS Mboudou, A.-M. (1982), Le financement du développement au Cameroun. Thèse pour le doctorat de 3e Cycle en sciences économiques, Université de Yaoundé, Cameroon. Nzomo Tcheunta, J. (2000), Le processus de retrait de l’Etat de la production des biens et services au Cameroun. Premier bilan et perspectives. Thèse de doctorat de 3e cycle en sciences économiques, Université de Yaoundé II, Cameroon. Schouame, A. M. (1994), Politiques d’ajustement au Cameroun. La nécessité d’un recentrage. Thèse de doctorat de 3e Cycle en Analyse et Politique Économiques, Université de Yaoundé II, Cameroon. Tamo (1985), Problématique des politiques économiques en Afrique au sud du Sahara. Thèse de doctorat 3e cycle es-sciences économiques, section: Analyse et politique économique, Université de Yaoundé, Cameroon.

OTHER Journal Mondes en développement (2014), No. 166. Available at: https://www.cairn.info/revue-mondes-en -developpement-2014-2.htm.

126

PART II

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

127

CHAPTER 8

MONETARY AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY IN CAMEROON: MEASUREMENTS, DETERMINANTS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FRANCIS ANDRIANARISON, BOUBA HOUSSEINI, AND CHRISTIAN OLDIGES

8.1 INTRODUCTION Since its independence in 1960, Cameroon has repeatedly faced severe economic shocks and crises resulting from fluctuations in international trade and exports revenue. Following an extended period of prosperity after independence with an average growth rate of 7%, the country’s economy has plunged into severe recession over the period 1985-1995, resulting from the collapse of international commodity prices (IMF, 2003). The crisis lasted a decade before the economy regained the path of growth in the mid-90s after the January 1994 devaluation of the Central African CFA franc. Between 2003 and 2019, the country has implemented two major national development plans successively, namely the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from 2003 to 2009 and the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper from 2010 to 2019. While these development plans generated substantial economic growth, the impacts on jobs creation, poverty reduction and human development have been limited. Between 2001 and 2019, average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Cameroon was 4.3%, while the consumption-based poverty rate has stagnated at around 40% between 2001 and 2014, the multidimensional poverty rate decreased slightly from 54% to 43% between 2004 and 2018, and the Gini index of inequality has worsened from 0.40 in 2001 to 0.44 in 2014. The country did not achieve most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remains uncertain. Overall, economic growth in Cameroon has not been inclusive, and huge disparities persist across regions and sub-groups of the population. In this context, this chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of poverty in Cameroon using both the monetary and multidimensional approaches, with an emphasis on the dynamics and determinants of poverty. We also discuss policy implications for poverty reduction programs and the achievement of the 2030 SDGs Agenda. Poverty has traditionally been and is still widely considered as a lack of income and is measured via income or consumption based indices, predominantly using the FGT-class of decomposable poverty measures developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). This approach has been operationalized and popularized by the World Bank and United Nations (UN) organizations and widely adopted by countries worldwide. In recent years, poverty has been increasingly viewed from a human development perspective, mainly relying on Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, which argues that income is only a “means to an end” (Sen, 1985, 1992, 1999). Now widely understood as multidimensional (Atkinson, 2017; Alkire and Foster, 2011b; Ferreira, 2011), new measures of poverty go beyond income alone and focus more on “the end”, encompassing various aspects of well-being, including for example quality of health, education, and living standards. This multidimensional notion of poverty is exemplified by the UN’ adoption of the SDGs – 17 goals in itself – and the explicit targets of ending both monetary as well as multidimensional poverty as laid out in SDG targets 1.11 and 1.22. In practice, the measurement of multidimensional poverty largely relies on the Alkire-Foster (AF) counting method as developed by Alkire and Foster (2011a) and prominently applied for the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) at the University of Oxford. First applied by Alkire and Santos (2014), global MPI updates are published annually and jointly by OPHI and the United Nations Development

128

Programme (UNDP). In this chapter, we apply both the FGT-class of poverty measures and the Alkire-Foster counting method for the measurement of monetary and multidimensional poverty in Cameroon, respectively. Between 1990 and 2020, Cameroon has produced a series of four household consumption surveys (ECAM 1996, 2001, 2007, and 2014) used for the measurement of monetary poverty and a series of five Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS 1991, 1998, 2004, 2011, and 2018) used for the analysis of non-monetary poverty. In addition to survey reports produced by the National Institute of Statistics (INS, 2002, 2008, 2014), several studies have used these datasets to measure and analyze poverty trends and determinants (see for example Fambon, 2005; Ningaye et al., 2011; Epo and Baye, 2012; Fambon et al., 2016; Kumase, 2018; Arrey, 2020). This literature essentially addresses three aspects of monetary poverty research: (i) estimation of poverty levels and trends, (ii) estimation of the determinants of well-being and poverty, and (iii) decomposition analysis of key factors affecting poverty and exclusion. Only two of the papers explored multidimensional poverty using a statistical approach – the principal component analysis ( Ningaye et al., 2011) and the dashboard approach (Fambon et al., 2016). Moreover, two OPHI country briefings showcase the global MPI results for Cameroon in 2018 and changes in the global MPI between 2011 and 2014 (OPHI, 2020a,b). A few salient features emerge from this literature. For one, Cameroon has experienced a modest decrease in poverty between 1996 and 2014, with fluctuating patterns that are quite similar to those of economic growth during the same period. Second, poverty in Cameroon as is the case in most African countries is predominantly a rural phenomenon, mostly affecting northern regions (Adamawa, North, and Far-North) and households with less education, female heads of household, poor health conditions, large household size, low fraction of active members, and low proportion of members working in the formal sector. Third, the regression-based decomposition analysis reveals that poverty reduction can be largely attributed to economic growth between 1996 and 2014 rather than as an effect of redistribution. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first to analyze jointly the two types of poverty and to perform an in-depth analysis of multidimensional poverty over time for Cameroon. In this chapter, we delve deeper and provide a dual analysis of both monetary and multidimensional poverty between 2001 and 2018. We focus on diverging trajectories across Cameroon’s regions and socio-economic sub-groups of the population. Our approach includes both a microeconomic analysis of trends and features of poverty at the household level as well as a review of structural factors affecting poverty at the macro level. The contribution of the chapter is thus twofold. First, the chapter provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of both monetary and multidimensional poverty in Cameroon using the FGT-Method and AF-Method, respectively. Second, the chapter explores determinants of poverty at both micro and macro levels and discusses options for poverty reduction policies. Overall, the chapter offers a joint analysis of the two types of poverty and sheds light on similarities and differences between the two measures in terms of poverty levels, trends and determinants, along with a macroeconomic outlook. Our findings reveal that both monetary and multidimensional poverty have declined between 2001 and 2018, albeit at varying pace and pattern across the different demographic, socioeconomic, and spatial groups of the population. Our results show that multidimensional poverty is always higher than monetary poverty at the national, rural, and urban level. At the national level, we find that multidimensional poverty has reduced much faster than monetary poverty, declining from 54% in 2004 to 43% in 2018. Monetary poverty remained almost stagnant at around 40%, resulting in a closing gap between the two measures. The pictures look very different at the rural and urban level. In rural areas, multidimensional poverty has been much higher than monetary poverty (75% versus 52%) and it has reduced over time, whereas monetary poverty has in fact increased. In urban areas, both multidimensional and monetary poverty have declined over time, almost in parallel trends. The spatial decomposition shows very diverging trajectories for the different regions with worsening of poverty for the poorest ones (northern regions). We also find that the number of poor people increased over the studied period due to the rapid growth of population. Both the decomposition and regression analyses reveal that higher levels of poverty in Cameroon are strongly associated with rural livelihoods, larger family size, less education, employment in agriculture and northern regions of the country. These results highlight four policy areas for poverty reduction in Cameroon revolving around the need to: (i) create conditions for the achievement of the demographic dividend, (ii) promote solutions to accelerate structural transformation and productivity gains in the 129

agricultural sector, (iii) optimize the allocation of public spending across the different regions and sub-groups of the populations, and (iv) address security crises and their impacts on the society. The chapter is organized as follows. The second section presents the methodology and data used. The third section presents and discusses our empirical findings on levels, trends, and correlates of poverty, both monetary and multidimensional. In the penultimate section, we discuss structural factors affecting poverty in Cameroon and in the final section, we conclude with policy implications.

8.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA We briefly review here the different methodological approaches of poverty measurement used in the literature and introduce the AF and FGT methods. We then discuss the data used for the subsequent analyses.

8.2.1 Methods of Poverty Measurement for Cameroon For the measurement of the monetary poverty, we use the FGT-class of indexes of poverty and the poverty line estimated by the Cameroon’s National Institute of Statistics. Indicators of living standards used to analyze the evolution of poverty over the period 2001–2014 include: food and non-food expenditures (clothing and footwear, household equipment, transports and communications, various services and housing services), use of durable goods, and auto-consumption and transfers in-kind received. The poverty line – made of food and non-food poverty lines – was defined and computed by the National Institute of Statistics using the basic needs approach (INS, 2014). The food poverty line is calculated based on consumption costs of 2,900 kilo calories per adult equivalent per day. The non-food poverty line is calculated from costs imputation. According to INS (2014), the poverty lines of 2001, 2007, and 2014 are respectively CFAF 232,547, CFAF 269,443, and CFAF 339,715.3 per adult equivalent per year. For the inter-temporal comparisons, we have deflated the household consumption expenditures per adult equivalent of 2007 and 2014 to bring them back to the level of those of 2001. This deflation of aggregate consumption makes them directly comparable for the stochastic dominance tests to be conducted. Three different poverty measures are used for our analysis: (i) the poverty ratio ( ), (ii) the index of the depth of poverty ( ), and (iii) the index of the severity of poverty ( ). All three measures are members of the additive and decomposable class of poverty measures proposed by Foster et al. (1984), and the general formula to compute is as follows. (8.1)

where is a “poverty aversion” parameter (larger gives greater weight to larger poverty gaps, i.e. poorer people), and is the poverty line. To measure multidimensional poverty, we compute the MPI, which was first released in 2010 by OPHI and UNDP and is now widely used. It is a measure of acute poverty, reflecting three dimensions of health, education, and living standards. The methodology of computing the global MPI is based on the Alkire-Foster counting method (Alkire and Foster, 2011a). Spanning 10 indicators in total, each dimension is weighted by and equal weights are applied within each dimension. The indicators for health are nutrition and child mortality; for education they are school attendance and years of schooling; and for living standards they are drinking water, sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel, housing, and assets. In this chapter, we use the most recent version of the global MPI, which is aligned explicitly to the SDGs following Alkire, Kanagaratnam et al. (2021) and Alkire, Kanagaratnam, Nogales and Suppa (2020). For detailed indicator definitions and cut-offs see, Alkire, Kanagaratnam and Suppa (2020). The MPI is computed by multiplying its two components: the incidence and the intensity of poverty. The incidence or the proportion of the multidimensionally poor people is referred to as the headcount ratio (H) of multidimensional poverty. With a poverty cut-off of , any person that is deprived in at least 130

of the weighted indicators is identified as MPI poor. In other words, if a person’s counting vector, which sums up all weighted deprivations, is greater than , a person is multidimensionally poor. In the robustness and dominance analyses, we make use of the counting vector and implicitly apply all possible poverty cut-offs to test for dominance in trends poverty trends. The average intensity ( of multidimensional poverty reflects the average deprivation share among the poor. The is thus the product of and : (8.2) Since for each indicator an indicator-specific cut-off is applied, the global MPI relies on a dual cut-off approach – the poverty cut-off and the indicator cut-offs (Alkire and Foster, 2011a). We strictly follow OPHI’s methodology applying the indicator definitions of the most recent global MPI 2020 as outlined in Alkire, Kanagaratnam and Suppa (2020), and replicate the most recent do-file for Cameroon as posted online.3 We then replicate this with several rounds of available survey data and harmonize indicators where necessary. Overall, we found that the three rounds of DHS data used were very much comparable requiring only very minor harmonization steps in indicator specifications.

8.2.2 Data Sources For the measurement of the monetary poverty, we used three rounds of Cameroonian household living conditions surveys ECAM2, ECAM3, and ECAM4 which were conducted respectively in 2001, 2007, and 2014 by the National Institute of Statistics (INS, 2014). The monetary value of household consumption expenditure is chosen as the measure of welfare for the analysis of poverty. Consumption is a preferred welfare measure in developing countries for a number of reasons (Deaton, 1997; Atkinson, 2017). The three ECAM surveys (2001, 2007, and 2014) are representative at the national level and comparable in terms of sampling procedure, questionnaire, and data collection methodology (INS, 2002, 2008, 2014; Fambon et al., 2014, 2017). For the analysis of multidimensional poverty, we use three rounds of the DHS for the years 2004, 2011, and 2018. The DHS are unique for including questions that allow to calculate anthropometric measures of underweight and stunting as well as various indicators of education and living standards. Standardized globally and largely available over time, the DHS allow for comparisons over time and across countries and across all sub-national regions of Cameroon. We use region-level population shares from the DHS and year-wise national population totals from UNDESA (2020) to calculate regional population totals.

8.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: LEVELS, TRENDS, AND DETERMINANTS OF POVERTY In this section, we present levels, trends and determinants of monetary and multidimensional poverty. We begin by examining monetary poverty over time, followed by multidimensional poverty. We then juxtapose the two measures and compare levels and trends. In a robustness and dominance analysis of the two measures, we implicitly apply all possible poverty cut-offs. We also estimate correlates of poverty using logistic regressions.

131

8.3.1 Monetary Poverty: Levels and Trends At the national level, our results show that monetary poverty remained stable between 2001 and 2007, and decreased slightly thereafter (Table 8.1). All three poverty indexes, namely P0, P1, and P2 indicate some rigidity of poverty. The proportion of Cameroonian who are poor declined from 40.2% in 2001 to 39.9% in 2007, reaching 37.5% in 2014. This downward rigidity in poverty at national level did not only concern the rigidity of the poverty rate, but is also visible in the indexes of depth and severity of poverty which assign a greater weight to the poorest of poor. The index of the depth of poverty (P1) went from 12.8% in 2001 to 12.3% in 2007 and 14.4% in 2014. The severity of poverty (P2) rose from 5.0% in 2007 to 7.2% in 2014, reflecting an increase over this period in inequality or consumption gaps among the poor. Trends in poverty by area of residence have moved in two opposite directions (Table 8.1). All three indices indicate a reduction of poverty in urban areas while showing a worsening of poverty in rural areas. The poverty rate went up in rural areas, from 52.1% in 2001 to 56.8% in 2014. At the same time, the depth of poverty in rural areas increased from 17.3% in 2001 to 22.9% in 2014 while the severity of poverty rose from 17.3% in 2001 to 22.9% in 2014. However, the urban poverty rate is much lower and has declined from 17.9% in 2001 to 8.9% in 2014. Indicators of depth and severity of poverty in urban areas also show a clear reduction of poverty during the studied period. In 2014, households headed by farmers (informal agricultural enterprises) are by far the poorest group with poverty rate of 62.8%, much poorer than the group of households headed by non-working people (with a rate of almost 28.4%). Over the period 2001–2014, all the poverty measures are deteriorating for farmer households. The poverty rate increased from 31.7% in 2001 to 62.8% in 2014 while the depth (respectively the severity) of poverty rose respectively 8.9% in 2001 to 26.1% in 2014 (respectively 3.4% in 2001 to 13.7% in 2014). An analysis by gender of the household head reveals that there are no significant disparities in the level and trend of poverty between male– and female–headed households at the national level. All the poverty measures indicate comparable levels and trends over 2001–2014. However, gender disparities are observed within rural areas. In urban areas, there is no gender difference, while the poverty rate is relatively higher for women than for men in rural areas. This gender disparity observed in rural areas reflects inequalities between men and women in the agricultural sector (Pérez et al., 2002; Yengoh, 2012). Regional decomposition of monetary poverty shows that the 12 regions of the analysis (Table 8.1) can be divided into four groups according to the patterns of poverty observed between 2001-2007 and between 2007-2014:

132

Table 8.1 Monetary Poverty: 2001–2014 P0 2007 0.399 0.550 0.122 0.529 0.412 0.055 0.504 0.659 0.308 0.637 0.510 0.293 0.275 0.289 0.059 0.103 0.090

Change Abs. t Rel. -0.027 -6.6 -6.69 0.047 8.6 9.04 -0.089 -25.9 -49.95 -0.012 0.4 -2.57 -0.179 -12.9 -37.11 -0.067 -12.2 -61.79 -0.140 -8.7 -31.87 0.180 17.8 31.91 -0.160 -13.0 -44.99 0.178 14.7 35.53 0.028 2.2 5.41 0.025 1.6 8.06 -0.156 -11.2 -46.15 -0.187 -15.3 -46.31 -0.080 -12.6 -59.74 0.002 0.2 1.98 -0.188 -7.6 -56.22

P1 2007 0.123 0.175 0.028 0.145 0.095 0.009 0.157 0.246 0.077 0.210 0.166 0.074 0.069 0.066 0.010 0.025 0.027

Change Abs. t Rel. 0.016 8.6 12.44 0.056 20.7 32.05 -0.025 -26.3 -57.84 0.031 4.4 19.97 -0.075 -14.3 -50.16 -0.015 -12.1 -73.09 -0.061 -8.4 -39.68 0.147 27.0 78.01 -0.055 -12.6 -54.14 0.121 21.6 77.75 0.019 2.8 9.17 0.026 4.8 35.52 -0.055 -10.4 -52.24 -0.066 -16.9 -59.51 -0.016 -10.5 -59.37 0.010 2.6 38.16 -0.070 -6.0 -56.42

P2 2001 2007 0.0555 0.050 0.077 0.072 0.016 0.010 0.064 0.054 0.066 0.031 0.007 0.002 0.068 0.062 0.082 0.112 0.042 0.027 0.064 0.086 0.107 0.068 0.024 0.026 0.045 0.025 0.042 0.023 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.061 0.010

2001 2014 2001 2014 2014 National 0.402 0.375 0.128 0.144 0.072 Rural 0.521 0.568 0.173 0.229 0.117 Urban 0.179 0.090 0.043 0.018 0.006 Adamawa 0.484 0.471 0.154 0.185 0.095 Center 0.482 0.303 0.150 0.075 0.026 Douala 0.109 0.042 0.021 0.006 0.001 East 0.440 0.300 0.154 0.093 0.039 Far-North 0.563 0.743 0.188 0.335 0.185 Littoral 0.355 0.195 0.101 0.046 0.017 North 0.501 0.679 0.155 0.276 0.137 North-west 0.525 0.553 0.209 0.228 0.117 South 0.316 0.341 0.074 0.100 0.040 South-west 0.338 0.182 0.105 0.050 0.020 West 0.403 0.217 0.111 0.045 0.014 Yaounde 0.133 0.054 0.027 0.011 0.003 Public sector 0.117 0.119 0.026 0.035 0.014 Public 0.335 0.147 0.124 0.054 0.026 company Formal 0.141 0.096 0.090 -0.051 -5.5 -36.45 0.036 0.020 0.026 -0.010 -2.6 -28.34 0.013 0.006 0.012 private enterprise Informal 0.569 0.230 0.216 -0.354 -60.4 -62.14 0.190 0.057 0.067 -0.124 -49.6 -65.00 0.085 0.021 0.029 Non-agric. Informal 0.317 0.596 0.628 0.311 43.3 98.09 0.089 0.194 0.261 0.173 52.7 194.77 0.035 0.081 0.137 agric. Non-working 0.311 0.252 0.285 -0.027 -2.4 -8.62 0.094 0.071 0.097 0.003 0.7 3.32 0.040 0.028 0.045 Notes: Authors’ calculations with data from Ecam 2001, 2007, 2014. The columns ‘Abs.’, ‘t’, and ‘Rel.’ indicate the absolute change, the t-test of the change, and relative change, respectively. •

•

•

•

Group 1: regions that have known a continued decrease of poverty over the whole period 2001–2014, namely Douala, Yaounde, Center, Littoral, South-West, and West. Douala, Yaounde, Littoral, and the South-West are regions whose incidence of poverty was already below the national average in 2001 and whose incidence fell further at a level below the national average in 2014. The Center whose poverty incidence was higher than the national average in 2001 and 2007, and which dropped significantly by more than 10 percentage points to settle below the national average in 2014. Group 2: regions that have known an increase of poverty from 2001 – 2007, but then a decrease of poverty from 2007 – 2014. This includes regions of Adamawa and the East, whose poverty rates were higher in 2001 and 2007 than the national average and which decreased in 2014, but not enough to prevent them from remaining well above the national average. Group 3: regions that have known a decrease of poverty from 2001 – 2007 but then an increase from 2007 – 2014. The regions North West and the South, characterized by relatively high poverty rates in 2007, had levels that continued to rise in 2014 to settle further above the national average. The South, whose poverty rate increased in 2014, but not enough to prevent it from remaining below the national average in 2014 and 2007. Group 4: the poorest regions that have known a continued increase in poverty over the whole period 2001–2014, namely the regions of Far-North and North. All the three poverty indexes have worsened in those regions over the whole period 2001–2014. In the Far-North which had the highest poverty rates in 2001, the poverty rate increased to nearly 65.8% in 2007 and 74.2% in 2014. Likewise, the depth of poverty rose from 18.8% in 2001 to 24.5% in 2007, reaching 24.6% in 2014. The severity of poverty has known the same pattern; it increased from 8.1% in 2001 to 11.2% in 2007, reaching 18.5% in 2014.

The limited reduction in poverty rate between 2001 and 2014 did not compensate for population growth. On the one hand, the proportion of poor did decline at national level but not everywhere at the same level or in the same pattern. On the other hand, Cameroon’s population grew by nearly 40% between 2001 and 133

2014 (Table 8.2). As a result, the number of monetary poor people increased from 6.2 million in 2001 to 8.1 million in 2014. This change is mainly due to the increase in the number of poor people in rural areas, which rose by the same rate 40%, from 5.3 million to 7.3 million. The Far North and North regions experienced the largest increase in the number of monetary poor, with the North tripling its number of monetary poor in less than a decade (see Table 8.2).

8.3.2 Multidimensional Poverty: Levels and Trends As documented in Table 8.3, the value of the MPI at the national level decreased between 2004 and 2018 from 0.288 to 0.228, a statistically significant reduction of 21% in relative terms. Mostly, this was driving by an equally sizable reduction in the headcount ratio, which reduced from 54% in 2004 to 43% in 2018. Notably however, the pace of multidimensional poverty reduced somewhat over time, while the average intensity of multidimensional poverty (A) stayed constant over time at 53%. Table 8.2 Demographics and monetary poverty ratio in 2001, 2007 and 2014 Area

Population P0 Number of Monetary-poor 2001 2007 2014 2001 2007 2014 2001 2007 2014 National 15,473 17,900 21,600 40.2 39.9 37.5 6,217 7,139 8,098 Rural 10,089 11,580 12,887 52.1 55.0 56.8 5,255 6,369 7,319 Urban 5,383 6,320 8,713 17.9 12.2 9.0 962 770 780 Adamawa 692 928 1,168 48.4 52.9 47.1 335 491 551 Center 1,214 1,365 1,387 48.2 41.2 30.3 585 562 420 Douala 1,501 1,783 2,681 10.9 5.5 4.2 163 98 112 East 745 834 838 44.0 50.4 30.0 328 420 251 Far-North 2,745 3,241 3,903 56.3 65.9 74.3 1,545 2,135 2,898 Littoral 754 627 588 35.5 30.8 19.5 268 193 115 North 1,123 1,762 2,393 50.1 63.7 67.9 563 1,122 1,624 North-west 1,782 1,817 1,938 52.5 51.0 55.3 935 926 1,072 South 534 582 716 31.5 29.3 34.1 169 171 244 South-west 1,165 1,351 1,414 33.8 27.5 18.2 394 371 258 West 1,867 1,894 1,898 40.3 28.9 21.7 753 548 411 Yaounde 1,349 1,717 2,676 13.3 5.9 5.4 180 102 144 Notes: Authors’ calculations with data from Ecam 2001, 2007, 2014. Population and number of poor are in thousands.

The major reductions in multidimensional poverty took place in urban areas, where the MPI was halved between 2004 and 2018 and the headcount ratio nearly halved, decreasing from 31% in 2004 to 16% in 2018. In rural areas on the other hand, levels were much higher to begin with – the MPI for rural areas was 0.419 and almost three times higher than in urban areas. Yet it reduced at lower rates, both in absolute and relative terms. While the MPI for rural areas reduced only by 9% and thus much slower than for urban areas, the headcount ratio decreased barely. It declined from 76% in 2004 to 72% in 2011, and to 70% in 2018. In combination with Figure 8.1a, it is evident that most of the improvements in multidimensional poverty occurred in urban centers and regions. In contrast, the northern regions of the Far-North, North, and Adamawa as well as the East have been let further behind between 2004 and 2018. As a result, and most worryingly, the number of MPI poor people has increased in many regions. This is evident from both Figure 8.1 and Table 8.4. On the one hand, headcount ratios did reduce over time, yet not everywhere at the same pace and pattern. On the other hand, Cameroon’s population grew by almost 50% between 2004 and 2018. In sum, the number of MPI poor people increased from 9.4 million in 2004 to almost 10.8 million in 2018. This is driven solely by an increase in the number of poor in rural areas which increased by 30% from 6.8 million to 8.8 million. The Far-North and the North regions have seen the highest increase in the number of MPI poor people, with the North doubling its number of MPI poor people within less than a decade (see Table 8.4). Yet at the same time, the headcount ratio declined over time while the overall population almost doubled. 134

Table 8.3 Main results for changes in MPI, H, and A between 2004, 2011, and 2018 MPI Year 2011 0.257 0.403 0.098 0.283 0.166 0.021 0.302 0.543 0.115 0.458 0.180 0.185 0.116 0.141

Change Abs. t -0.061 5.1 -0.038 2.4 -0.074 5.7 -0.003 0.1 -0.029 1.0 -0.037 3.2 -0.003 0.1 -0.112 3.4 -0.057 2.4 -0.110 3.2 -0.022 0.5 -0.143 6.0 -0.053 2.6 -0.161 6.0

H Year 2004 0.54 0.76 0.31 0.70 0.49 0.11 0.59 0.90 0.34 0.86 0.52 0.52 0.43 0.43

Change Abs. t -0.11 5.86 -0.06 2.79 -0.15 6.33 -0.02 0.41 -0.08 1.15 -0.09 3.15 -0.02 0.28 -0.14 3.31 -0.13 2.41 -0.13 3.07 -0.04 0.49 -0.29 5.98 -0.11 2.25 -0.34 5.51

A Year 2004 0.53 0.55 0.48 0.55 0.44 0.41 0.50 0.60 0.43 0.62 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.46

Change Abs. t 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.44 -0.02 1.05 0.01 0.45 0.01 0.93 -0.04 2.32 0.01 0.95 -0.03 2.10 -0.01 0.58 -0.04 1.86 -0.01 0.33 -0.04 2.80 -0.02 1.69 -0.08 4.66

2004 2018 Rel. 2011 2018 Rel. 2011 2018 National 0.288 0.228 -20.98 0.47 0.43 -20.89 0.54 0.53 Rural 0.419 0.382 -8.97 0.72 0.70 -8.23 0.56 0.54 Urban 0.148 0.074 -50.07 0.21 0.16 -48.33 0.47 0.46 Adamawa 0.386 0.383 -0.70 0.53 0.68 -3.06 0.53 0.56 Center 0.215 0.187 -13.30 0.38 0.41 -15.51 0.44 0.45 Douala 0.046 0.008 -81.63 0.05 0.02 -79.47 0.39 0.37 East 0.295 0.292 -0.95 0.61 0.57 -3.63 0.50 0.51 Far-North 0.544 0.432 -20.59 0.87 0.76 -15.76 0.62 0.57 Littoral 0.146 0.089 -39.15 0.26 0.21 -37.72 0.45 0.42 North 0.536 0.426 -20.49 0.77 0.73 -15.26 0.60 0.58 North-West 0.249 0.227 -8.95 0.41 0.48 -7.41 0.44 0.47 West 0.239 0.096 -59.92 0.40 0.23 -55.94 0.46 0.42 South 0.182 0.129 -28.91 0.28 0.32 -25.41 0.41 0.40 South 0.196 0.034 -82.47 0.32 0.09 -79.01 0.44 0.38 -West Yaounde 0.047 0.030 0.005 -0.042 4.7 -89.76 0.12 0.08 0.01 -0.11 5.12 -89.95 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.01 0.24 Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS 2004, 2011, and 2018. The columns ‘Abs.’, ‘t’, and ‘Rel.’ indicate the absolute change, the t-test of the change, and relative change, respectively.

Table 8.4 Demographics and MPI headcount ratio in 2004, 2011, and 2018 Population H Number of MPI-poor Area 2004 2011 2018 2004 2011 2018 2004 2011 2018 National 17,259 20,906 25,216 54.3 47.4 43.0 9,379 9,906 10,841 Rural 8,943 10,926 12,626 76.3 71.7 70.1 6,826 7,834 8,844 Urban 8,316 9,980 12,590 30.7 20.8 15.9 2,553 2,072 1,997 Adamawa 763 998 1,270 70.0 53.0 67.9 534 529 862 Centre 1,479 1,505 2,496 49.1 37.8 41.5 726 569 1,036 Douala 1,533 1,883 2,639 11.1 5.3 2.3 170 100 60 East 903 896 1,567 58.8 60.8 56.7 532 545 888 Far-North 3,101 4,037 4,540 90.0 87.5 75.8 2,792 3,531 3,443 Littoral 749 870 967 34.2 25.7 21.3 256 224 206 North 1,615 2,456 3,461 86.2 76.6 73.1 1,393 1,882 2,530 North-West 2,040 1,856 1,620 52.0 40.9 48.2 1,062 759 781 West 1,790 2,407 2,627 51.6 40.0 22.7 924 962 597 South 746 604 1,135 43.5 28.2 32.4 324 170 368 South-West 1,183 1,505 461 42.8 32.3 9.0 506 487 41 Yaounde 1,356 1,889 2,434 11.8 7.8 1.2 160 148 29 Notes: Authors’ calculations with data from DHS 2004, 2011, 2018. Population and number of poor are in thousands.

The absence of any pro-poor poverty reduction between 2004 and 2018 is illustrated in Figure 8.2. We plot every region’s absolute change in the headcount ratio (H) over its respective starting level in 2004 and find that the poorest regions did not reduce faster than richer ones. In fact, there is no correlation at all, and some of the richer regions (South-West, West) saw faster poverty reduction than the poorer Northern regions. This contrasts sharply with observations in other developing countries such as India, where the poorest regions move fastest out of multidimensional poverty between 2005/2006 and 2015/2016 (Alkire, Oldiges and Kanagaratnam, 2021). The MPI can also be decomposed into its components of ten indicators, making it a unique tool for policy guidance. The MPI is the mean of all weighted and censored deprivations.4 The censored headcount ratio of each indicator informs on the proportion of people who are MPI-poor and deprived in a given indicator. In our trend analysis, these provide useful information on how the many forms of poverty have 135

changed over time among the poor. In Figure 8.3, we plot the 2004 level of each censored headcount ratio on the horizontal axis. Accordingly, 53% of all Cameroonians were MPI poor and did not use SDG-standards cooking fuel, around 40% were MPI poor and deprived in housing, drinking water, and assets. Worryingly, close to 30% were MPI poor and deprived in nutrition (i.e., did have a malnourished (stunted or underweight) member in their family). The censored headcount ratio for child mortality stood at around 12%, for school attendance at 20% and sanitation at 22% in 2004. On the vertical axis of Figure 8.3, we plot the absolute change for each censored headcount ratio between 2004 and 2018. For an eradication of poverty in indicator (100% relative change), the indicator dots would need to align along the diagonal line through origin. We notice, however, that the estimated change is far away from the diagonal line, implying that the censored headcount ratios did not change much in both absolute and relative terms. In the case of cooking fuel, the highest censored headcount ratio of 2004, there was a reduction of 10 percentage points to the starting level of 53%. The highest relative reduction can be found for the censored headcount ratio in assets, which reduced from 40% to 20%. In contrast, several other censored headcount ratios barely changed between 2004 and 2018 – see for example school attendance, nutrition, and housing near the zero on y-axis. To make matters worse, censored headcount ratios in sanitation increased by 10 percentage points, implying that 30% of Cameroonians were MPI poor and deprived in sanitation in 2018, compared to 20% in 2004.

136

137

FIG. 8.1 Change in the MPI, headcount ratio (H) and number of MPI-poor at regional level in 2004, 2011, and 2018. Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data of 2004, 2011, and 2018.

FIG. 8.2 No pro-poor poverty reduction in the MPI headcount ratio (H) between 2004 and 2018. Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data of 2004 and 2018.

8.3.3 Two Types of Poverty: Same Levels and Trends? Up until this section, we have discussed levels and trends in both monetary and multidimensional poverty. Rightly, one may wonder whether they are just two sides of the same coin and thus redundant. In Figure 8.4, we juxtapose trends in both headcount ratios – monetary ( ) and multidimensional ( ) – for the 5 two respective 3 year time intervals. For one, it is clear, that multidimensional poverty is always higher than monetary poverty at the national, rural, and urban level. At the national level, it evident that multidimensional poverty has reduced much faster than monetary poverty, declining from 54 percent in 2004 to 43 percent in 2018. Monetary poverty on the other hand remained almost stagnant at about 40 percent, resulting in a closing gap between the two measures.

138

FIG. 8.3 Change in censored headcount ratios at national level, 2004 - 2018. Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data of 2004, 2011, and 2018. The diagonal line goes through origin and indicates how far away the absolute change in a headcount ratio is from complete eradication.

The pictures look very different at the rural and urban level. In rural areas, multidimensional poverty has been much higher than monetary poverty (75 percent versus 52 percent) and it has reduced over time, whereas monetary poverty has in fact increased. In urban areas, both multidimensional and monetary poverty have declined over time, almost in parallel trends. Zooming into the regional level, changes in both measures have been heterogeneous, as shown in Figure 8.5. On the one hand, most regions have seen reductions in both (horizontal axis) as well as in (vertical axis). The lower left quadrant in Figure 8.5 captures regions that saw reductions in both measures. Yet, the magnitude of the two absolute changes differ. The West for example reduced monetary poverty by 20 percentage points and multidimensional poverty by 30. The East saw reductions in monetary poverty of almost 15 percentage points, yet multidimensional poverty reduced by less than 5 percent. In Adamawa, neither of the two measures reduced significantly and remained almost constant over time. In stark contrast, four regions (South, North-West, North, Far North) saw increases in monetary poverty while multidimensional poverty declined (see lower right quadrant). This implies that while certain living conditions (e.g., assets, drinking water, years of schooling, refer to Figure 8.3) may have improved over time, consumption expenditure in real terms did not in these regions. Accounting for the outliers of North and Far North, the broad pattern depicted in Figure 8.5 does suggest a positive correlation between changes in both measures.

139

FIG. 8.4 Change in headcount ratios of monetary and multidimensional poverty at national, rural, and urban level. Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data of 2004, 2011, 2018, and ECAM 2001, 2007, 2014.

8.3.4 Robustness and Dominance Analysis 8.3.4.1 Monetary Poverty

To probe our results and test whether the drawing of poverty lines has implications for the trends over time in monetary poverty, we undertake a first-order stochastic dominance analysis at the national, urban, and rural levels. Figure (8.6a) compares the poverty incidence curves of Cameroon over the period 2001-2007. It shows that for any poverty line starting from CFAF 200,000 per adult equivalent per year, the distribution of the expenditures of 2014 dominates that of year 2017 which in turns dominates that of year 2001. In other words, for any poverty line considered from this minimum level (CFAF 200,000), level of poverty is lower in 2014 than in 2007. Figure (8.6b) and (8.6c) respectively present the poverty incidence curves for the urban and rural areas. These figures corroborate spatial patterns of poverty previously highlighted. Figure (8.6b) shows that poverty has decreased in urban areas, no matter what poverty line is used. For rural areas, Figure (8.6c) indicates that poverty increased over the period 2001 and 2007 for any poverty line in the range of CFAF 200,000 – CFAF 250,000 per adult equivalent per year. Acknowledging the different poverty trends across regions and building on the four groups of regions as developed previously, Figure 8.7 presents a first order stochastic dominance test. It corroborates the preceding conclusion on the spatial pattern of poverty over the period 2001–2014. For a large range of poverty lines and with no additional hypothesis on the poverty threshold, it seems that poverty decreased 140

unequivocally in regions of Group 1, whereas it increased in regions of Group 4 over the period 2001–2014 (see Figure 8.7a and 8.7d). The results for regions of Group 3 are confirmed without additional assumptions (Figure 8.7c) while the conclusion for regions of Group 2 is consistent from a poverty line level of approximately CFAF 150,000 per adult equivalent per year (Figure 8.7b).

FIG. 8.5 Change in multidimensional poverty headcount ratio (2004–2018) over change in monetary poverty headcount ratio (2001–2014). Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data of 2004 and 2018, and ECAM 2001 and 2014.

8.3.4.2 Multidimensional Poverty For the dominance analyses in multidimensional poverty, we follow techniques by Alkire, Oldiges and Kanagaratnam (2021) as applied for their trend analysis of multidimensional poverty in India between 2005/2006 and 2015/2016. First, we plot the multidimensional poverty headcount (H) over all possible values of - the poverty threshold (Figure 8.8). The 33 percent line, shown as a red vertical line, shows the applied poverty cut-off. Clearly, near the 33 percent line, any poverty cut-off would yield a poverty reduction between 2004 and 2018, along with a slightly higher reduction between 2004 and 2011 than in the period 2001 – 2018. This holds up to a poverty line of 55 percent, where the two lines of 2004 and 2011 intersect, implying that there would be no reduction in multidimensional poverty between 2004 and 2011, given higher poverty lines starting from 55 percent. The 2018 line is always unequivocally lower than both the 2004 and 2011 line, indicating poverty reduction irrespective of the chosen cut-off. In Figure 8.9, we plot cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the attainment and deprivation (counting) scores for 2004 and 2018 at the national level (subfigure 8.9a), and deprivation scores at the urban and rural level (subfigure 8.9b). They show that, irrespective of where we would set the cut-off, there is an improvement in attainments and lessening in deprivations, albeit at small magnitude. The CDFs for both rural and urban areas confirm the overall improvement in urban areas, and the near-stagnation in rural areas. Clearly, the gap between urban and rural areas has widened between 2004 and 2018.

141

FIG. 8.6 Poverty incidence curves 2001-2014 at national, urban, and rural level

142

FIG. 8.7 Monetary poverty incidence curves 2001-2014 for four groups of regions

143

FIG. 8.8 Multidimensional poverty headcount ratio (H) over all levels of k

8.3.5 Likelihood of Being Poor To underscore our analysis of levels and trends, in this subsection, we present findings of a simple regression analysis that aims to find correlates of the two forms of poverty. It complements the trend analysis by estimating the probability of being poor due to several socio-economic factors available in the ECAM and DHS data. In our logit regression framework of predictors of poverty, year-wise and pooled, we include demographic factors as available in both the DHS and ECAM datasets; the following explanatory variables are used: (i) sex, age, marital status, and religion of household head, and household size, (ii) education, occupation, land ownership, and access to credit (as socioeconomic factors), and (iii) area of residence – urban/rural and agro-ecological zones – defined by the administrative regions of the country (as spatial factors). Being one of the three MPI dimensions and thus directly correlated, the education variable is not included for the multidimensional poverty analysis. Also, being available only in ECAM datasets (but not DHS), the variable membership to an association capturing the social capital of the household is added only for the monetary poverty case. The final lists of explanatory variables included in the model are provided in Tables 8.A.1 and 8.A.2 presenting the results.

144

145

FIG. 8.9 CDFs of attainment and deprivation scores, 2004–2018. Notes: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data of 2004, 2011, and 2018.

For each poverty status – monetary and multidimensional – as the dependent variable we estimate two year-wise and one pooled logit regression. To estimate the likelihood of being monetary poor, we use ECAM 2007 and 2014, and for multidimensional poverty we use the DHS 2011 and 2018, leaving out the earlier rounds of ECAM and DHS due to missing data. Appendix Tables 8.A.1 and 8.A.2 display the estimates of correlates of poverty. The majority of estimated coefficients are robust, statistically significant, and have the expected signs. Coefficients for the variables age, sex, and marital status are not statistically significant in the monetary case and are sensitive to model specification and type of poverty. To highlight some of the emerging patterns, the odds of being monetary poor decrease by -36% for households headed by a primary educated person, by -67% for those headed by a secondary educated person and by -91% for those headed by someone who completed tertiary education, ceteris paribus. This shows a continuous poverty reducing effect of education. In terms of occupational factors, working in agriculture is the only status that leads to greater probability of being poor, compared to the odds of being poor for unemployed people. All the other employment types are associated with lesser probability of being poor, compared to the unemployment status. The odds of being monetary poor (multidimensional poor) increase by 28% (75%) for households headed by someone working in the agriculture sector compared to those headed by unemployed individuals. This finding is also corroborated by the estimates obtained for both the variables area of residence and land ownership. We find that households living in rural areas are more likely to be poor than their counterparts living in urban areas. The odds of being monetary poor (respectively multidimensional) is four times (respectively five times) greater for households living in rural areas compared to their counterparts in urban areas. Similarly, land ownership increases the probability of being poor by 20% for the monetary case and by 42% for the multidimensional case, ceteris paribus. While land is considered as productive asset, its use in a very low–productive rural farming sector significantly limits its impact on poverty. We find that being in a household headed by someone holding a bank account or someone who obtained a credit in the 12 months preceding the survey decreases the chance of being monetary poor by -38% and MPI poor by -77%, respectively, compared to someone in a household that does not have a bank account or did not obtain a credit. The effect of financial inclusion is more pronounced for the MPI estimate. In order to account for climatic and ecological conditions, we group the ten regions of Cameroon into five agro-ecological zones that combine both spatial (regions) and ecological factors: (i) the Humid Savannah zone made of the West and North-West regions, (ii) the Savannah zone that includes the Adamawa region, (iii) the Sahelien zone that includes the regions of Far-North and North, (iv) the Forestry zone made of the regions of Center, East, and South, and (v) the Mangrove zone made of the regions of Littoral and South-West. Our results indicate that the odds of being poor significantly increase for households living in the Sahelien zone (five times more for the multidimensional poverty and almost twice for the monetary poverty). Results for the forestry zone differ, likely because of the presence of the East region which is quite poor in both senses but is part of that zone along with the Center and South regions which are among the least poor regions of the country. Overall, these findings are consistent with results from the bivariate analysis performed in previous section as well as with previous findings from the literature clearly highlighting that northern regions of Cameroon are significantly poorer than southern regions. The results also confirm that climate and ecological factors are key determinants of poverty. For the monetary poverty case, we can test the importance of being a member to certain associations. We find that the odds of being poor decrease by -38% for households who have a member of an association, compared to households with none. This result is consistent with findings from the literature on informal institutions in Africa such as informal saving groups which are found to play a significant role in poverty reduction. Turning to the demographic correlates of poverty such as age, sex, marital status, and religion of the households as well as household size, results are heterogeneous. Household size is the only demographic variable significantly and robustly associated with both types of poverty. An increase of household size by one person increases the odds of being monetary poor (respectively multidimensional poor) by 21% 146

(respectively 8%). Coefficients for other demographic variables, which are mostly socio-cultural variables (sex, age, marital status, and religion), are sensitive to the year of survey or the type of poverty considered, and are therefore rather inconclusive. These results are however consistent with findings from the previous trend analysis. For instance, it was found in the previous decomposition analysis that the monetary poverty level for female-headed households was not significantly different to that of male-headed households. Overall, the results seem to indicate that the determinants of poverty in Cameroon are mainly socioeconomic and spatial rather than demographic or socio-cultural.

8.4 STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING POVERTY IN CAMEROON To put our previous empirical results within a broader macroeconomic context, we discuss in this section the structural factors – inherent to either demographic changes, structural transformation of the economy, or policies effectiveness and conflicts issues – that all shape steadfast poverty. This discussion relies on lessons from the literature, mainly grew literature and policy documents produced by the government, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and multilateral development agencies.

8.4.1 Demographic Transition in Cameroon and Poverty The phenomenon of demographic transition is an important factor to consider in the analysis of poverty and well-being. Cameroon’s population is estimated at 7.7 million in 1976, 10.5 million in 1987, 17.5 million in 2005, and 22 million in 2015 (MINEPAT, 2012). This evolution corresponds to an annual average growth rate of 2.9% over the period 1976–1987, 2.8% over the period 1987–2005. If the observed trend continues, the population of the country will reach almost 40 million in 2035. At the same time, fertility rates in Cameroon have been declining slowly following a steady decline of child mortality rates. The total fertility rate remained high with 4.8 births per woman in 2018 against 5.8 births per woman in 1991 while child mortality rate decreased from 77 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1998 to 48 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2018, resulting in a very high youth dependency ratio of the population (INS, 2020). Three salient facts are worth-noting from these demographic dynamics. First, the trend of sex ratio shows a progression towards a relative predominance of men. The sex ratio increased from 96.1 men for every 100 women in 1976, 97.7 in 2005, 98.0 in 2010, to 100 in 2019. Second, the Cameroonian population is essentially made of young people. In 2010, the median age of the population is 17.7 years and the average age is 22.1 years. The population under 15 years of age represents 43.6% of the total population, while those under 25 years of age represent 64.2%. Third, urbanization in Cameroon has continued to grow over the years. In 1976, the urbanization rate was 28.1%, rising to 37.9% in 1987, 48.8% in 2005, and is estimated at 52.0% in 2010, and 57.0% in 2019. This galloping urbanization is the result of a rural exodus marked by a strong concentration of population in the metropolises of Douala, the economic capital, and Yaounde, the political capital (MINEPAT, 2012).

8.4.2 Slow Structural Transformation Impede Substantial Poverty Reduction Poverty reduction in Cameroon primarily depends on the ability of the economy to create sufficient formal and decent jobs to meet the needs of the growing and youth population. Over the last few decades, employment response to growth has been weak. Besides the slow rate of job creation is the dominance of vulnerable employment, notably in informal sector (more details in Housseini and Boudarbat, 2022, chapter 15). The two general enterprises surveys held in 2009 and 2016 show that on average only 38,072 new jobs per year were created, given an estimated total of 822,985 unemployed people in 2014, and a net job creation target of 495,000 per year set out in the first phase of “Vision Cameroon 2035” (UNDP, 2019 ). Therefore, poverty reduction would require significant gains of productivity across all sectors resulting in higher wages and higher shares of workers shifting to higher productivity jobs, and this will only be achieved trough greater and faster structural transformation of the economy. Since 1980, Cameroon’s GDP has experienced inter and intra-sectoral changes. These were reflected in he gradual decline of agriculture, a marked reduction of manufacturing activities and a significant increase of services. Before becoming an oil-exporting country in 1978, cocoa and coffee were the main pillars of 147

the economy and agriculture accounted for an average of 30% of GDP. After a poor experience with liberalization policies that lasted two decades, from 1980 to 2000, the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 27% to 14.8% and the share of manufacturing in GDP fell from 30.2% in 1982 to 25.2% in 2015 (World Bank, 2020). The decrease in the share of agriculture and the manufacturing industry in GDP was absorbed by an increase in the share of services. While its share in total employment also decreased over time, agriculture remains the largest employer with 47.1 percent of the labour force in 2015 (UNDP, 2019). The concern, however, has been that these sectoral changes were not led by productivity gains. Agriculture, mainly performed by smallholder farmers, still faces numerous challenges such as low agricultural productivity and underemployment (Molua, 2007; Yengoh, 2012; UNDP, 2019). The ratio of labour productivity in non-agricultural sectors to labour productivity in the agricultural sector is 6.8 between 1960 and 2001 (Kobou et al., 1960). These gaps in labour productivity have not been reduced since 2001. In 2015, agriculture was still the sector with the lowest labour productivity. For instance, the added value per worker in agriculture is 700 times lower than in extractive activities. The construction sector and the service industry (commercial activities, catering and hotels activities) have the highest levels of added value per worker (UNDP, 2019). Labour productivity is also relatively low in manufacturing industries. Diversification of the economy has not yet led to substantial export sophistication. The diversification remains horizontally concentrated on commodities with low technological intensity ( Nations Unies, 2018).

8.4.3 Poor Allocation of Public Spending and Ineffectiveness of Public Policies The observed spatial patterns of poverty and inequality in Cameroon relate to the poor allocation of public spending and ineffectiveness of public policies across different regions and segments of population. First, the persistence of spatial inequality, in both monetary and multidimensional achievements, suggests an ineffective allocation of resources and opportunities. Second, the increase in the number of poor raises questions about the efficiency of public expenditures and poverty targeting policies. Cameroon’s total public spending has increased substantially from 13% of GDP in 2006 to 21% of GDP in 2016, but the country still spends little compared to its African peers. In 2015, Cameroon’s public expenditures were representing 19% of GDP, while the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), upper middle-income countries (UMIC), and lower middle-income countries (LMIC) averages were 28%, 25%, and 31.5%, respectively (World Bank, 2018). This poor allocation of public expenditures manifests itself at two levels. First, productive public expenditures were limited. Cameroon spends more on general and administration costs than its non-oil exporting peers. General and financial administration services and sovereignty expenditures absorbed roughly a quarter of the total budget between 2013 and 2015. If debt service was added, less than half of the budget was allocated to infrastructures, social sectors, production, commerce, and communication. Second, unsuitable regional allocation was noted. The public resources were not always directed towards the neediest regions or localities. For instance, the Far-North, which has the lowest socio-economic indicators and is the poorest region as highlighted above, receives significantly less per capita budget transfer than the national average (UNDP, 2019). In the education sector, unequal distribution of key educational inputs such as public expenditures, teachers, and qualified teachers, classrooms create disparities between schools and regions. The analysis of the allocation of public expenditures reveals substantial variations in education spending across the country, with the lowest levels of student spending observed in the areas with the greatest needs (World Bank, 2018). For example, students in the impoverished North Region receive 2.2 times less than students in the wealthier Littoral Region. Per student spending on teacher salaries is systematically lower in designated Priority Education Zones (Zones d’Éducation Prioritaires, ZEPs)6, which include the North, Far North, East, and Adamawa Regions, than in other regions, particularly the Center, Littoral, and South. Similarly, public health spending is also unevenly allocated across the country. Health outcomes and the coverage of essential maternal and child health services vary substantially across regions.

148

8.4.4 Growing Security Concerns and Worsening of Poverty Since 2013, Cameroon is plagued by several conflict and violent extremism challenges, posing a variety of threats to the Central Africa’s most resilient economy. These security concerns are fall-outs of the activities of the Boko Haram in the Far-North as part of Lake Chad conflicts, the consequences of the influx of Central African refugees into the eastern regions as well as the growing climate of insecurity resulting from socio-political unrest in the North-West and South-West regions. These three crises impose significant economic impacts on the society and not only led to direct human and physical capital damage but also to long-term effects on the local economy and livelihoods of the population. Conflict and violent extremism affected poverty in several ways. They exacerbated the already delicate economic situation for the poor. Indeed, the crises hurt the poorest part of the country, the Far-North region, even before the outbreak of the conflict. The destruction of social infrastructure affects the education system and weakens the health of individuals and communities. Violent extremism acts as an asymmetric taxation on local economy and had also a negative effect on economic growth by diverting resources away from spending on socially and economically productive sectors that promote development. The economic consequences in the mid and long terms can be damageable as conflict and violent extremism affect human capital. One of the obvious costs includes damage and destruction of infrastructures, and stunted development due to insecurity and instability (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003). Boko Haram’s attacks in the Far-North region has caused physical destruction of properties, houses, schools, markets, roads, and health centres. Between 2014 and 2017, the destroyed or damaged facilities in the three border divisions of Mayo Tsanaga, Mayo Sava and Logone et Chari include more than 40,000 houses, dozens of villages, hundreds of markets, 128 schools, and 30 health centres. The total damage is estimated at US$450m (International Crisis Group, 2017). Attacks in these villages force farmers to flee, leaving their fields abandoned. Nearly 70% of farmers have deserted their farms, and many more have missed out on key farming activities, such as timely planting. The insecurity has contributed to the reduction of about 15% of cereals planted areas compared to the situation in normal years and agricultural production has fallen by two–thirds. The damage and destruction of infrastructures can also have secondary effects such as increase in transportation costs, which in turn rise wholesale prices and consumers’ prices. This prices increase has likely had an impact on inflation given the importance of the illicit market of fuel in the region. Conflict and violent extremism were placing enormous pressure state budget. In the national budget, budgetary allocation to the General Delegation for National Security (GDNS)7 increased by 46% between 2011 and 2015. Likewise, the budgetary allocation to the ministry of defence amounted to 209,264 million FCFA in 2015, that is a 30% increase over 2011. An estimation by IMF in 2016 suggested a budgetary impact of around 1 – 2% of GDP (IMF, 2016).

8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Inclusive and sustainable growth is linked to reduction in poverty in all its forms. Despite the multiple economic crises experienced in Cameroon over the past few decades, economic growth in Cameroon has been substantive, although not always inclusive and sustainable. Poverty rates have slightly decreased while the number of Cameroonian living in poverty has been increasing. This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of poverty levels, trends and determinants to better understand the different facets of poverty in the country, the distribution of poverty across different locations and socioeconomic groups, and policy recommendations for poverty elimination. We apply two prominent methods of poverty measurement (AF and FGT methods) to a series of household living standards (ECAM) and DHS surveys and perform various empirical analyses to elucidate poverty dynamics and features. Three salient facts emerge from our results. First, poverty (both monetary and multidimensional) has decreased at the national level between 2001 and 2018, at varying pace and pattern across the different demographic, socioeconomic, and spatial groups of the population. This overall trend in the headcount atio is however mitigated by an observed increase in the number of people living in poverty (both monetary and multidimensional) due to rapid population growth. Second, multidimensional poverty is 149

always higher than monetary poverty and multidimensional poverty has reduced much faster than monetary poverty at the national level. Third, higher levels of poverty in Cameroon are strongly associated with living in rural areas, large family size, less education, employment in agriculture, and living in northern regions of the country. In our review of structural factors, we direct to four priority areas in poverty reduction policies for Cameroon. These include: (i) the need to create conditions for the achievement of the demographic dividend, (ii) the promotion of solutions to accelerate structural transformation and productivity gains in the agricultural sector, (iii) an optimal allocation of public spending across the different regions and sub-groups of the population, and (iv) the need to address security crises and its impacts on the Cameroonian economy and its population. To reap a demographic dividend in the near term, there is a need for polices that accelerate the reduction in fertility rates and child mortality rates along with higher investments in human capital. A faster demographic transition will make the short-term benefits of the demographic dividend much larger (Bloom et al., 2012). Policies that allow families to make informed decisions and provide the means to implement these decisions are critical. These decisions relate to their family planning, investments in education, health, and support for the youth in transition to labour market. The slow pace of structural transformation of the Cameroonian economy limits its ability to generate enough decent jobs for the young and growing population. Its ability to reduce unemployment and underemployment therefore depends on the successful implementation of structural reforms to boost productivity, notably in the agriculture sector. Patterns of both monetary and multidimensional poverty show that most poor people live not only in rural areas but also depend on agriculture. Thus, improving agricultural productivity is essential to both improve the well-being of the population and to trigger structural transformation of the economy. Reinforcement of linkages with the secondary sector is essential to avoid the commodity trap. The notable absence of agro-industrial activities currently undermines this connection. This is even more alarming given that in the literature on the structural transformation, the lack of inter-sectoral synergies between agriculture and industry is perceived as a vector of structural economic stagnation, likely to open a wider trap of agricultural underemployment (Gollin and Rogerson, 2014). The connection between urbanization and industrialization is viewed traditionally as synonymous. The linkage is so strong that urbanization rates are often used as a proxy for income per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2005). This expected relationship between urbanization and the level of industrialization is absent in Cameroon. Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas where agricultural activities occur and where nearly two-thirds of the country’s population live. Poverty in rural areas rose despite increasing urbanization. The urbanization that accompanied economic growth, combined with the embryonic nature of the secondary sector, confirms the presence in Cameroon of two major facts recently documented by the developing literature: (i) urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa has no link to industrialisation (Gollin et al., 2016) and in Cameroon, it occurs without major industrialisation; (ii) urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa is not accompanied by an increase in agricultural productivity (Gollin and Rogerson, 2014), which is also the case in Cameroon. Persistent poverty and spatial inequalities are still among the main challenges that need to be addressed to create an inclusive society in Cameroon. Policy effectiveness can play a significant role in the expansion and distribution of both capabilities and incomes across individuals and regions. Additionally, there is a need for spatially informed analysis and policy-making capable of responding to the challenge of policy effectiveness. Such policies must address both regions-specific characteristics and population’s needs to ensure the quality of public goods and services are efficiently delivered to citizens. In practice, such policies operate in the middle ground between strictly universal and strictly targeted approaches. Universal policies can provide basic floors but may not be enough to eliminate spatial inequalities and pockets of poverty. The deepening of decentralization as foreseen in the National Development Strategy (MINEPAT, 2020) can deliver effective solutions. It is of particular importance both in terms of improving the effectiveness of public policies and in terms of improving regional equity. The pre-condition for the success of the different policies highlighted above is the resolution of the different conflicts and security crises that Cameroon has experienced in the recent past. The different conflicts and insecurity situations (Boko Haram in the North, the Anglophone crisis in North-West and 150

South-West regions, political turmoils in neighboring countries) come with huge economic and social costs and are all serious threats to the future of the Cameroon’s economy and poverty eradication efforts. These needs to be taken account in future research on poverty in Cameroon.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day. By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women, and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions, according to national definitions. See https://ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/data-tables-do-files/. “Censored” in this context implies, that only the deprivations of the MPI poor people are counted, but the denominator includes the entire population. Recall that ECAM data used for monetary poverty are available for the years of 2001, 2007, and 2014, and DHS data used for multidimensional poverty for 2004, 2011, and 2018. In 2000, the limited availability and poor quality of educational service in the North, Far North, East and Adamawa have forced the authorities to consider these regions as Education Priority Zones or ZEP (Zones d’Education Prioritaire in French). The lack of teaching staff paid by the State in ZEPs has increased by the weakness of their institutional infrastructures leading to a low yield in education. GDNS is the governement department in charge of peace and security.

REFERENCES Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2005). The rise of europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change, and economic growth, American economic review 95(3): 546–579. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution, The Quarterly journal of economics 117(4): 1231–1294. Alkire, S. and Foster, J. (2011a). Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, Journal of Public Economics 95(7): 476–487. Alkire, S. and Foster, J. (2011b). Understandings and misunderstandings of multidimensional poverty measurement, The Journal of Economic Inequality 9(2): 289–314. Alkire, S., Kanagaratnam, U., Nogales, R. and Suppa, N. (2020). Revising the global multidimensional poverty index: Empirical insights and robustness, OPHI Research in Progress 56a, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, University of Oxford. Alkire, S., Kanagaratnam, U. and Suppa, N. (2020). The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2020, OPHI MPI Methodological Note 49, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, University of Oxford. Alkire, S., Kanagaratnam, U. et al. (2021). Revisions of the global multidimensional poverty index: indicator options and their empirical assessment, Oxford Development Studies 49(2): 169–183. Alkire, S., Oldiges, C. and Kanagaratnam, U. (2021). Examining multidimensional poverty reduction in india 2005/6–2015/16: Insights and oversights of the headcount ratio, World Development 142: 105454. Alkire, S. and Santos, M. E. (2014). Measuring Acute Poverty in the Developing World: Robustness and Scope of the Multidimensional Poverty Index, World Development 59: 251–274. Arrey, M. A. (2020). Explaining wellbeing and inequality in cameroon: A regression-base decomposition, AERC Research Paper (No. 378). Atkinson, A. (2017). Monitoring global poverty: Report of the commission on global poverty, World Bank, Washington. Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., Fink, G., Finlay, J. E. et al. (2012). Microeconomic foundations of the demographic dividend, Technical report, Program on the Global Demography of Aging. Deaton, A. (1997). The analysis of household surveys: a microeconometric approach to development policy, Geneva: The World Bank. Epo, B. N. and Baye, F. M. (2012). Determinants of well-being and poverty changes in cameroon: 2001–2007, African development review 24(1): 18–33. Fambon, S. (2005). Croissance économique, pauvreté et inégalité des revenus au cameroun, Revue d’économie du développement 13(1): 91–122. Fambon, S., McKay, A., Timnou, J.-P., Kouakep, O. S., Dzossa, A. D. and Ngoho, R. T. (2016). Slow progress in growth and poverty reduction in cameroon, in A. Channing, A. McKay and T. Finn (eds), Growth and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, chapter 13, pp. 293–317.

151

Fambon, S., McKay, A., Timnou, J.-P., Kouakep, O. S., Dzossa, A. and Tchakoute, R. (2014). Growth, poverty, and inequality: The case study of cameroon, Technical report, WIDER Working Paper. Helsinki, Finland: UNU-WIDER. Fambon, S. et al. (2017). Poverty changes in cameroon over the 1996-2007 period, International Journal of Sciences 6(04): 48–64. Ferreira, F. H. (2011). Poverty is multidimensional. but what are we going to do about it?, The Journal of Economic Inequality 9(3): 493–495. Foster, J., Greer, J. and Thorbecke, E. (1984). A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 761–766. Gollin, D., Jedwab, R. and Vollrath, D. (2016). Urbanization with and without industrialization, Journal of Economic Growth 21(1): 35–70. Gollin, D. and Rogerson, R. (2014). Productivity, transport costs and subsistence agriculture, Journal of Development Economics 107: 38–48. Hoeffler, A. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2003). Measuring the costs of conflict, Washington, DC: World Bank. Housseini, B. and B. Boudarbat (2022). “Cameroon’s Labor Market Dynamics and Prospects.” In C. Monga (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economy of Cameroon, Chapter 15. Oxford University Press. IMF (2003). Cameroon: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper., International Monetary Fund. IMF Country Report No. 03/249. August 2003. Washington, DC: The International Monetary Fund. IMF (2016). Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Time for a Policy Reset., International Monetary Fund. April 2016. Washington, DC: The International Monetary Fund. INS (2002). Deuxième Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des Ménages 2001-2002, Rapport principal de l’ECAM 2. Cameroun: Institut National de la Statistique. INS (2008). Deuxième Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des Ménages, ECAM3: Tendances, profil et déterminants de la pauvreté au Cameroun en 2007. Cameroun: Institut National de la Statistique. INS (2014). Quatrième enquête Camerounaise auprès des ménages, ECAM4: Tendances, profil et déterminants de la pauvreté entre 2001-2014. Cameroun: Institut National de la Statistique. INS (2020). Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Cameroun 2018, Institut National de la Statistique (INS) et ICF. Yaoundé, Cameroun et Rockville, Maryland, USA. International Crisis Group (2017). Cameroon’s far north: Reconstruction amid ongoing conflict. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kobou, G., D. Njinkeu, and B. P. Fosso (2008). “The political Economy of Cameroon’s Post-independence Growth Experience.” In B. J. Ndulu, S. A. O’Connell, J.-P. Azam, R. H. Bates, A. K. Fosu, J. W. Gunning, and D. Njinkeu (Ed.), The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000, pp. 547–587. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kumase, W.-a. N. (2018). Aspects of poverty and inequality in Cameroon, Berlin: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, Berlin. MINEPAT (2012). Etude sur les conditions de bénéfice du dividende démographique au cameroun, Technical report. Cameroun: Republique du Cameroun. MINEPAT (2020). National Development Strategy 2020-2030, Ministry of the Economy, Planning and regional Development (MINEPAT). Cameroon: Republic of Cameroon. Molua, E. L. (2007). The economic impact of climate change on agriculture in cameroon, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (4364). Nations Unies (2018). Transformation structurelle, emploi, production et société: Cameroun 2018. Commission Économique pour l’Afrique; Nations Unies. Addis Abeba: © NU. CEA. Ningaye, P., Ndjanyou, L. and Saakou, G. M. (2011). Multidimensional poverty in cameroon: determinants and spatial distribution, AERC Research Paper (No. 211). Nairobi, Kenya: AERC. OPHI (2020a). Changes over Time Country Briefing 2020: Cameroon (Sub-Saharan Africa), Changes Over Time Country Briefing July 2020 (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, University of Oxford.). OPHI (2020b). Global MPI Country Briefing 2020: Cameroon (Sub-Saharan Africa), Country Briefing July 2020 (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, University of Oxford.). Pérez, M. R., Ndoye, O., Eyebe, A. and Ngono, D. L. (2002). A gender analysis of forest product markets in cameroon, Africa today pp. 97–126. Sen, A. (1985). Commodities and capabilities, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, A. (1992). Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDESA (2020). World Population Prospects 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/, accessed on January 5, 2020. Development Programme.

152

World Bank (2018). Cameroon Public Expenditure Review: Aligning Public Expenditures with the Goals of Vision 2035, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (2020). World development indicators 2020, Washington DC: World Bank. Yengoh, G. T. (2012). Determinants of yield differences in small-scale food crop farming systems in cameroon, Agriculture & Food Security 1(1): 1–17.

8.A TABLES Table 8.A.1 Estimates of the determinants of monetary poverty using a Logit model (dependant variable = monetary poverty status—being poor or not) Independant variables Sex (Male = ref) Female Age Age squared Marital Status (Never married = ref) Currently married Other (divorced or widowed) Household size Religion (Christian = ref) Muslim Other Education (Not educated = ref) Primary Secondary Tertiary Occupation (not working = ref) Agriculture Industry Sales Services Access to credit (No = ref) Yes Land ownership (No = ref) Yes Membership to an association Yes Area of residence (Urban = ref) Rural Agroecological zones (Humid savannah = ref) Forestry Mangrove Savannah Sahelien Year 2014 Constant N Pseudo-R2 Significance levels: * p