The Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations 9780190097356, 9780190097363, 9780190097387, 9780190097370, 0190097353

Citation preview

T h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

PE AC E F U L C H A NGE I N I N T E R NAT IONA L R E L AT IONS

The Oxford Handbook of

PEACEFUL CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Edited by

T. V. PAUL, DEBORAH WELCH LARSON, HAROLD A. TRINKUNAS, ANDERS WIVEL, and

RALF EMMERS

1

1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2022 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Paul, T. V., editor. Title: The Oxford handbook of peaceful change in international relations / edited by T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, Harold A. Trinkunas, Anders Wivel, and Ralf Emmers. Other titles: Handbook of peaceful change in international relations Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2021008570 (print) | LCCN 2021008571 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190097356 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190097363 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190097387 (epub) | ISBN 9780190097370 (ebook other) Subjects: LCSH: Peaceful change (International relations)—History— 20th century. | Peaceful change (International relations)—History— 21st century. | World politics—20th century. | World politics—21st century. Classification: LCC JZ5560.O84 2021 (print) | LCC JZ5560 (ebook) | DDC 327.1/72—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021008570 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021008571 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America.

Contents

About the Editorsix Contributorsxi Acknowledgmentsxv

PA RT I   I N T RODU C T ION 1. The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics T. V. Paul

3

PA RT I I   H I STOR IC A L P E R SP E C T I V E S 2. Peaceful Change: The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context Torbjørn L. Knutsen

29

3. Peaceful Change after the World Wars Peter Marcus Kristensen

47

4. Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution Jeffrey W. Taliaferro

67

PA RT I I I   T H E OR E T IC A L P E R SP E C T I V E S 5. Realism and Peaceful Change: A Structural and Neoclassical Realist First-­Cut Joshua Shifrinson

89

6. Liberalism and Peaceful Change Alexandra Gheciu

111

7. International Institutions and Peaceful Change Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot

129

8. Economic Interdependence, Globalization, and Peaceful Change John Ravenhill

147

vi   contents

9. Constructivism and Peaceful Change Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann 10. Peaceful Change in English School Theory: Great Power Management and Regional Order Cornelia Navari

169

191

11. Critical Theories and Change in International Relations Annette Freyberg-­Inan

205

12. Gender and Peaceful Change Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond

221

13. Civilization, Religion, and Peaceful and Non-­Peaceful Change in Asia Victoria Tin-­bor Hui 14. Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes Shiping Tang

239 261

PA RT I V   T H E S OU RC E S OF C HA N G E 15. International Law and Peaceful Change Jennifer M. Welsh

281

16. Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change Michal Smetana

301

17. The Political Economy of Peaceful Change Lars S. Skålnes

319

18. Climate Change, Collective Action, and Peaceful Change Ashok Swain

337

19. Democracy, Global Governance, and Peaceful Change Thomas Davies

351

20. Status Quest and Peaceful Change Xiaoyu Pu

369

21. Science, Technology, and Peaceful Change in World Politics Anne L. Clunan

385

22. Transnational Social Movements and Peaceful Change Alejandro Milcíades Peña

407

contents   vii

PA RT V   G R E AT P OW E R S , R I SI N G P OW E R S , A N D P E AC E F U L C HA N G E 23. Peaceful Change in US Foreign Policy Deborah Welch Larson

429

24. China’s Peaceful Rise: From Narrative to Practice Kai He and Feng Liu

445

25. Russia and Peaceful Change: From Gorbachev to Putin Andrej Krickovic

463

26. Germany and Peaceful Change Klaus Brummer

481

27. Japan and Peaceful Change in the International System: The Persistent Peace Nation Thomas U. Berger

501

28. India and Peaceful Change Manjeet S. Pardesi

515

29. South Africa and the Idea of Peaceful Change Peter Vale

535

30. Indonesia’s Contributions to Peaceful Change in International Affairs551 Dewi Fortuna Anwar

PA RT V I   R E G IONA L P E R SP E C T I V E S 31. Peaceful Change in Western Europe: From Balance of Power to Political Community? Anders Wivel 32. Origins and Evolution of the North American Stable Peace David G. Haglund 33. Latin America’s Evolving Contribution to Peaceful Change in the International System: A Stony Road Harold A. Trinkunas 34. Peaceful Change in Africa Markus Kornprobst

569 587

603 621

viii   contents

35. Peaceful Change in Southeast Asia: The Historical and Institutional Bases Ralf Emmers and Mely Caballero-­Anthony 36. South Asia’s Limited Progress toward Peaceful Change Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada 37. Peaceful Change in Northeast Asia: Maintaining the “Minimal Peace” Bhubhindar Singh

643 663

683

38. The Middle East and Peaceful Change Arie M. Kacowicz and Galia Press-­Barnathan

703

39. Explaining Peaceful Change in Central and Eastern Europe Alexander Tabachnik and Benjamin Miller

721

40. Central Asia: A Decolonial Perspective on Peaceful Change Timur Dadabaev and John Heathershaw

745

PA RT V I I   C ON C LU SION S 41. A Research Agenda for the Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, Harold A. Trinkunas, Anders Wivel, and Ralf Emmers Index

763

779

About the Editors

T. V. Paul is the James McGill Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He served as the president of the International Studies Association (ISA) from 2016 to 2017. He is also the founding director of the Global Research Network on Peaceful Change (GRENPEC). Paul has published twenty-­one books and over seventy-­ five scholarly articles and book chapters in the fields of international relations, international security, and South Asia. His most recent book is Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era (Yale University Press, 2018). Deborah Welch Larson is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, with a research interest in international security and political psychology. Her publications include Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2019; with Alexei Shevchenko); Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton University Press, 1985); and Anatomy of Mistrust: US–Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 1997). Harold A. Trinkunas is the deputy director of and a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Prior to arriving at Stanford, Trinkunas served as the Charles  W.  Robinson Chair and senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. Trinkunas has also previously served as an associate professor and chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He has authored or edited eight books, the most recent of which is Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict (Hoover Institution Press, 2020). Anders Wivel is professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. His research interests include foreign policy, in particular the foreign policies of small states, and international relations theory, in particular the realist tradition. His work has been published in academic journals including Cooperation and Conflict, International Studies Review, Journal of Common Market Studies, and European Security, among others. His recent books include International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide (Georgetown University Press, 2019; coedited with T. V. Paul) and Handbook on the Politics of Small States (Edward Elgar, 2020; coedited with Godfrey Baldacchino).

x   about the editors Ralf Emmers is professor of international relations and dean at the S.  Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His research interests cover security studies, international institutions in the Asia Pacific, and the security and international politics of Southeast Asia. Emmers is the author and editor of eleven books and has published numerous scholarly articles and book chapters on Asian security. His books include Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia (Routledge, 2010), and Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific (Melbourne University Press, 2018; with Sarah Teo).

Contributors

Karin Aggestam is professor of political science at Lund University. Dewi Fortuna Anwar  is research professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) Center for Political Studies. Rajesh Basrur  is senior fellow at the S.  Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Thomas U. Berger is professor of international relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. Annika Bergman Rosamond is associate professor in political science and international relations at Lund University. Klaus Brummer  is professor of international relations at Catholic University Eichstätt-­Ingolstadt. Erna Burai  is postdoctoral researcher at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. Mely Caballero-­Anthony  is professor and head of the Centre for Non-­Traditional Security Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Anne L. Clunan is associate professor of national security at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California. Timur Dadabaev is professor of international relations and the director of the Special Program for Japanese and Eurasian Studies at the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Thomas Davies  is senior lecturer in international politics at the City University of London. Ralf Emmers  is professor of international relations and dean at the S.  Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Annette Freyberg-­Inan  is professor of international relations at the University of Amsterdam. Alexandra Gheciu  is professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and associate director of the Centre for International Policy Studies at the University of Ottawa.

xii   contributors David  G.  Haglund  is professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario. Kai He is professor of international relations and Director of the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, Australia. John Heathershaw is professor of politics at the University of Exeter. Stephanie C. Hofmann is professor in the Department of International Relations and Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. Victoria Tin-bor Hui  is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. Arie  M.  Kacowicz  is professor in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Torbjørn L. Knutsen is professor in the Department of Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Markus Kornprobst  is professor of international relations at the Vienna School of International Studies. Andrej Krickovic  is associate professor in the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow. Peter Marcus Kristensen is associate professor of political science at the University of Copenhagen. Deborah Welch Larson is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Feng Liu professor of international relations at the School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Frédéric Mérand is professor of political science and scientific director of the Centre for International Studies (CÉRIUM) at the University of Montréal. Benjamin Miller is full professor of international relations at the University of Haifa. Cornelia Navari  is Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the University of Buckingham. Manjeet S. Pardesi is senior lecturer in the Political Science and International Relations Programme at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. T. V. Paul is the James McGill Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

contributors   xiii Alejandro Milcíades Peña  is senior lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of York. Vincent Pouliot is James McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University. Galia Press-­Barnathan is professor in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Xiaoyu Pu is associate professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Reno. John Ravenhill is professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. Joshua Shifrinson is assistant professor of international relations at Boston University. Bhubhindar Singh is associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Lars S. Skålnes is associate professor of political science at the University of Oregon. Michal Smetana  is research fellow and assistant professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Kate Sullivan de Estrada is associate professor in the international relations of South Asia in the Department of Politics and International Relations, and director of South Asian Studies, at the University of Oxford. Ashok Swain is professor of peace and conflict research, UNESCO Chair of International Water Cooperation, at Uppsala University. Alexander Tabachnik is research fellow at the Center for Cyber, Law and Policy (CCLP) at the University of Haifa. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro is professor of political science at Tufts University. Shiping Tang  is Fudan Distinguished Professor and the Dr. Seaker Chan Chair Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, Shanghai. Harold A. Trinkunas is deputy director of and senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Peter Vale is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria, and Nelson Mandela Professor of Politics Emeritus, Rhodes University, South Africa. Jennifer M. Welsh is professor of international relations, Canada 150 Research Chair in Global Governance and Security, and director of the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies (CIPSS) at McGill University. Anders Wivel  is professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen.

Acknowledgments

This Handbook is a major collaborative endeavor initiated by the Global Research Network on Peaceful Change (GRENPEC), which was inaugurated in March 2019 at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention in Toronto. The network consists of numerous scholars and institutions from various parts of the world who share an interest in furthering research and scholarship in the subject area of peaceful transformation. GRENPEC originated from the 2017 ISA annual conference theme “Change in World Politics” during the presidency of T. V. Paul and a realization among collaborators that there was a dearth of studies on peaceful change in IR. Accordingly, we have tried to reinvigorate research on this subject through this Handbook and several other collaborative projects currently underway. We want to thank our contributors, who despite the extraordinary challenges posed by the Covid-­19 pandemic crisis produced excellent chapters. We thank Alice Chessé for her outstanding work in copyediting and formatting the chapters. We appreciate the interest of Oxford University Press in the Handbook and the enthusiastic support extended by the editors Molly Balikov and Alyssa Callan as well as the editorial work of Preethi Krishnan, P. Jayaprakash and their team. We acknowledge the financial support of Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture (FRQSC) Québec, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Canada (SSHRC), James McGill Chair at McGill University, Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) at the University of Copenhagen, and the Minerva Research Initiative (OUSD(R&E)). Last but not least, we thank our respective families for their support and patience in these difficult times. Our hope is that the Handbook will encourage more scholarship and policy interest in a subject area of much importance in these rapidly changing times when war and peace are back in the forefront of international politics. T. V. Paul Deborah Welch Larson Harold A. Trinkunas Anders Wivel Ralf Emmers October 2020

pa rt I

I N T RODUC T ION

chapter 1

The Stu dy of Pe acefu l Ch a nge i n Wor ld Politics T. V. Paul

The contours of international politics in the past half a millennium have been heavily determined by war and conflict, in particular among the great powers. During the past two centuries, many efforts have been made to obtain peaceful change and reconciliation of warring states. This is largely due to the prominence of liberal ideas in international relations (IR), originally generated by the European Enlightenment thinkers, who called for rational analysis in every walk of social and political life including IR. Liberal scholarship has been increasingly focused on the three pillars inherent in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy—democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions— as mechanisms for peace and peaceful change. The Concert of Europe (1815–1854) contained elements of conference diplomacy to deal with conflicts of the day, although it was primarily aimed at maintaining the dominance of the monarchies among the five great powers and at protecting them from revolutionary forces engulfing Europe. In 1919, in the aftermath of World War I, US president Woodrow Wilson proposed fourteen points to deal with international conflict that included national self-­determination and the institutional mechanism of the League of Nations for settling disputes. The idealism-­realism debate that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, but more prominently in the aftermath of World War II, focused on the possibility or impossibility of peaceful change in IR. Yet mainstream scholarly efforts still lag behind in unraveling the causes, sources, and mechanisms of peaceful change or their consequences. This is not to deny the fact that the contending IR perspectives offer differing viewpoints on patterns of change and persistence of international politics as their key markers of differentiation. This Handbook, consisting of forty-­one chapters, aims at giving the existing scholarship in this subject area of peaceful change the prominence it deserves while developing new pathways for future research agendas.

4   T. V. Paul

Defining Peaceful Change The first task is to define peaceful change as it pertains to IR. Definitions vary along a continuum, from minimalist conceptions stressing international change and transformation without the use of military force and war to maximalist notions that entail not only the absence of war but also the achievement of sustained nonviolent cooperation for creating a more just world order.1 For the purposes of this project, a minimalist definition of peaceful change would be change in international relations and foreign policies of states, including territorial or sovereignty agreements that take place without violence or coercive use of force. We offer a maximalist definition: transformational change that takes place non-­violently at the global, regional, interstate, and societal levels due to various material, normative and institutional factors, leading to deep peace among states, higher levels of prosperity and justice for all irrespective of nationality, race or gender. In addition, we adopt an in-­between category, or a mini-­max definition as offered by Karl Deutsch and collaborators: “the resolution of social problems mutually by institutionalized procedures without resort to largescale physical force” (Deutsch 1957, 5). This definition emphasizes the role of institutions as agents of peaceful change. It should be noted that peaceful resolution of a conflict need not be equal to peaceful change, as change could be short-term or could be reversed at some point. Maximalist versions of peaceful change focus on the sustainability of the process by which change is carried forward to obtain greater collective goods, emphasizing both process and outcome. The logic of peacekeeping versus peacebuilding in societies plagued by divisions and conflicts is also derived from these conceptions. We also note that not all peaceful changes lead to desirable outcomes in world politics. First, we turn our attention to systemic perspectives on change. Many IR perspectives tend to privilege systemic over societal level changes, although they carry maximalist implications in some sense, except for the justice and collective goods dimensions. A key assumption here is that changes in the distribution of power and status ranking of the most powerful states matter more than anything else for international peace and security, including regional orders. Looking through the prism of the international system, the core element of peaceful change involves power transitions among major powers, an umbrella framework among a variety of scholars who focus on power transitions, power cycle, and world systems (Organski and Kugler  1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1987; Kennedy 1987; Mearsheimer 2000; Allison 2017; Doran 1971; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Wallerstein 1974). The concepts of “system change” and “systemic change” as delineated by Gilpin (1981, 39–40) are useful here to understand power transitions. Accordingly, system change involves an alteration in the fundamental actors of the international system (e.g., empires to nation-­states), while systemic change comprises change in the governance of the system, a process largely generated by the changing distribution of power. To Gilpin, systemic change “is a change within the system rather than a change of the system itself. It entails changes in the international distribution

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   5 of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and rights embodied in the system, although these changes seldom, if ever, occur simultaneously” (1981, 41). A third category in Gilpin’s theory is called “interaction change,” that is, “at the level of interstate interactions (viz., formation of diplomatic alliances or major shifts in the locations of economic activities) may be the prelude to systemic change and eventually systems change” (Gilpin 1981, 41). Peaceful interaction changes may be observed as expectations of nonviolence in specific relationships, as evidenced in popular attitudes, elite opinion, and military planning of states (Rock 1989, 22). Change in the nature of the system as it is organized versus change in systemic leadership roles are the two dimensions that have often commanded attention in IR theory (Thompson 2009). In a minimalist view of systemic leadership change, peaceful transition occurs when a rising power achieves a dominant power position among the hierarchy of states without substantial violence and no great power contests the subsequent order with revisionist strategies. In a more maximalist understanding, peaceful transition involves effective mechanisms for dispute resolution; recognition of legitimacy of states, in particular great powers and other pivotal states; and the presence of institutional arenas where states can participate and find solutions to collective action problems on a sustainable basis. The assumption here is that due to long-­term changes in technological, economic, military, and demographic capacities, power capabilities will alter in the international system, and actors with the highest material indices need to be  peacefully accorded their deserving systemic leadership roles and accompanying international status. From a systemic perspective of a minimalist variety, peaceful change occurs when new great powers are accommodated without violence. More concretely, as I have discussed in a previous work, great power accommodation “involves mutual adaptation and acceptance by established and rising powers, and the elimination or substantial reduction in hostility between them. . . . It involves status adjustment, the sharing of leadership roles through the accordance of institutional memberships and privileges and acceptance of spheres of influence. . . . Although some view ‘deep peace’ or ‘sustained peace’ as necessary for accommodation, partial accommodations, region-­specific, or even acceptance of the legitimacy of rival great power states as important stakeholders in the international decision-­making process are also possible” (Paul 2016, 6–7). Realists in general see systemic changes involving the peaceful accommodation of a rising power as a highly improbable occurrence (Mearsheimer 2000). According to Graham Allison’s estimation, only four out of the sixteen power transition cases since the late fifteenth century occurred without war (Allison 2017). What the skeptics often ignore are the changing conditions, including the presence of nuclear weapons, and economic and normative restraints and incentives that make conquest of territory and the sustaining of power grabbed illegitimately difficult for rising powers as well as established powers who would have considered preventive wars in the past, a possibility that Allison ­considers in his work. Moreover, alternate institutional and economic mechanisms for the rising and established powers to adjust their power relations probably did not exist in many of the historical instances that the skeptics highlight.

6   T. V. Paul More idealistic versions by scholars in the maximalist-­globalist traditions go beyond the great powers for obtaining peaceful change. Proponents of maximalist peaceful change would argue that temporary adjustments among great powers are not sufficient for obtaining such a transformational change. Genuine peaceful change demands that states and societies coexist in a harmonious manner in which disputes are settled via institutional and diplomatic means, and joint solutions to collective action problems such as global inequality, poverty, internal violence, arms races, climate change, cybersecurity, and pandemic diseases are obtained. The creation of just societies in which individuals can prosper irrespective of differences in race, gender, or national origins is necessary for enduring peace. Change here is perceived as not episodic or limited but deep rooted, transformational, and multifaceted. From maximalist global perspectives, peaceful change implies transformation of a conflict-­ridden system into a peaceful one wherein change is possible through democratic and humane governance and proper institutional mechanisms whereby nations and nonstate actors strive for the creation of a just world order (Falk 1995, 241–255; Richmond 2005, 70; Davies 2019). The achievement of genuine justice and the avoidance of perceptions of injustice are critical for obtaining the objectives of a just world order. Since international level peaceful change may affect regional or subsystemic level changes, the latter needs a definition as well. At a minimum, peaceful regional change implies a condition in which states in a region coexist, accepting the rights and responsibilities of each other, and resort to institutional and diplomatic mechanisms for dispute resolution, thereby avoiding war to settle their differences (Paul 2012). Peaceful territorial change is a crucial dimension that encompasses both interstate and regional changes. A maximalist understanding of peaceful change in a region would imply the existence of a highly pluralistic security community in which war is not even thought of as an option and change within this order is the result of institution-­based dialogue and compromises among states and nonstate actors. Beyond the systemic and regional subsystemic levels, many peaceful changes can occur at the domestic level that may affect the former. At the domestic or nation-­state level, peaceful foreign policy change occurs when countries adopt strategies to achieve their foreign policy goals without violence and resort to institutional and diplomatic mechanisms to resolve disputes with other states, especially their neighbors. It also implies domestic power holders pursuing and seeking peaceful strategies, especially in territorial disputes, while those in favor of hard-­line positions are restrained and contained. For minimalists, this will entail a foreign policy by diplomacy and soft power rather than through coercive use of force; for the maximalists, it will demand a moral and humane foreign policy, promoting the greater good of domestic and international society rather than a narrow pursuit of national interests. From a maximalist perspective, countries would reduce their armed forces and defense spending to the bare minimum required for self-­defense rather than preparing for offensive operations. Security policies will be based on “most-­probable threat assessments” as opposed to “worst case assumptions,” which dominate the policies of hard-­line states. These differing conceptions mirror the practicality of obtaining peaceful change in an international

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   7 system characterized by anarchy and self-­help, even when some question the veracity of the claims on anarchy itself. They also reflect the differing temporal and spatial logics of peace as a concept, as well as its sources and durability. It should be noted that we do not assume all peaceful changes are good by definition; some may produce unwanted outcomes or even intense conflicts later on. This topic could receive more attention in future research.

The Study of Peaceful Change in Historical Perspective The study of peaceful change has largely been conducted in Europe during certain periods of the evolution of the modern international system. These periods involved great debates about war and peace as the Continent teetered toward cataclysmic wars in the first half of the twentieth century (Kristensen 2019; Knutsen 2016). It must be recognized that in the nineteenth century the Concert of Europe, for a period of time, attempted to create normative and institutional mechanisms for curtailing “the power political ambitions and warlike dispositions of the great powers of the day and to restrain revolutionary movements” (Wivel and Paul 2019, 5). This does not mean other societies and cultures do not offer ideas for peaceful change, but in the discipline of IR, they barely find a place. Mohandas Gandhi’s peaceful resistance and its global impact on other movements for peaceful change, such as that of Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Lech Walesa in Poland, or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, are yet to gain their due place in IR discourses.2 This absence of serious discussion of contributions of non-­Western societies remains a major drawback of the IR discipline, which is heavily European centered (Acharya and Buzan 2019). The many chapters in this Handbook attempt to partially rectify this situation by discussing ideas generated by key regions, states and civilizations on peaceful change and coexistence.

The Interwar Period Debate The big debate between idealists and realists, as some call it, took place in interwar Europe. The major event was the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which redrew the map of the world; selectively recognized many nationalities in the previous European imperial orders by giving them statehood; and made efforts to restructure the world ­economic and military order, also by imposing retribution and isolation on the losers of World War I (Kunz 1998; Eichengreen 2019). Faced with the rise of Hitler’s Germany and the possibility of an impending war, many argued for accommodation of the challengers in a peaceful manner, led by E. H. Carr (1939) in his influential book The Twenty Years’

8   T. V. Paul Crisis. From Carr’s perspective, similar to strategies of accommodation that offer peaceful outcomes in domestic societies, peaceful change at the international level requires reasonable accommodation by established powers of the demands of challengers (1939, 168). The status quo powers, as beneficiaries of the system, have a moral responsibility to make reasonable accommodations, while the rising power should have the ability to pressure the former for meaningful change without war, something both Britain and Germany, respectively, lacked (Gilpin 1981, 206). Thus, to Carr finding an equilibrium between considerations of power and morality was pivotal to achieving lasting peace. Carr was critical of theories that posited harmony of interests among states as propagated by idealists. Carr concurred that power alone cannot bring about peaceful change, but legitimacy and a sense of community are essential (Miall 2007, 6). Subsequently, critics questioned accommodation as appeasement and kept raising as an example British prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy toward Hitler’s Gemany in Munich in 1938 (Morgenthau, 1948). Today, as China rapidly makes material advancements, this question of accommodation versus appeasement has returned to prominence. For our purposes, accommodation may be defined as partial or full acceptance of the changed material power position of pivotal states and accordance of institutionalized status to reflect that position. Appeasement may be defined as the tacit acceptance of the aggressive policies of a challenging power, especially its territorial expansion. Even though Carr and others made much sense on accommodation as opposed to war, a question that is difficult to answer is when accommodation becomes appeasement, even if it is necessary to avoid war. It is also important to know the conditions under which the appetite of the challenger increases with every accommodation that is made. Moreover, it is difficult to predict the pace of the growth of material capabilities of the challenger and at some point, limited accommodation is of little value for the challenger, as it can obtain dominant status from the established power if it achieves overwhelming superiority. That process itself could be hampered by violent conflicts. The larger question is whether war avoidance is better than partial adjustment, and whether evolutionary acceptance of changing power positions is better than revolutionary change through cataclysmic warfare, which need not guarantee the survival of the established powers or the rising power even if the latter wins the war.

The Cold War Era Efforts The Cold War (1949–1989) was an intense global rivalry involving two superpowers and their allies. Peaceful change was not something the superpowers considered in their strategic competition, although minimal coexistence appeared episodically in their foreign policies. The chief US approach was premised on deterrence theory and containment, based on the idea that a challenger with an expansionist ideology like the Soviet Union could not be appeased or accommodated and that deterrence, relying on active threats of retaliation and denial, would be essential to prevent war. The question

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   9 of peaceful change was ignored, as the assumption was that change was unlikely and concessions would not work. However, within the West, the United States pursued a largely liberal, peaceful change strategy focused on building institutions and strengthening liberal democracy and trade relations, especially with Western European states and close allies such as Japan and Korea (Lundestad 1998), even though the larger motivation was fighting Communism. The US track record in the developing world for those efforts was mixed, as Washington supported many authoritarian regimes and engaged in forceful regime change largely for geopolitical reasons. The contending superpowers were more focused on achieving strategic stability and geopolitical influence than peaceful change. However, during the Cold War, multiple efforts at minimal peaceful change were made at different locations by diverse states and nonstate actors. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the superpowers themselves had initiated policies of detente and arms control as management mechanisms to regulate their relations, although few efforts were made to change the relations on a sustainable basis until the late 1980s. The European Union (EU; formerly known as the European Economic Community) was the most significant institutional effort to create a peaceful order in Western Europe among erstwhile enemies that may be termed a maximalist regional effort. The global peace movement against nuclear weapons was active in creating a tradition or taboo against the use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 2007; Paul 2009; Smetana 2020). Many such movements pressured for arms control as a mechanism for regulating behavior among the superpowers. Some European states made attempts at peaceful change individually and collectively. The smaller Nordic states made many contributions to peaceful transformation. The Helsinki process, which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor, the Organization of Security and Co-­ operation in Europe (OSCE), were concrete examples. The Ostpolitik of Germany had a bearing on peaceful change possibilities. However, it was the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev who profoundly crystallized the peaceful change strategy, through his glasnost and perestroika policies, initiated in the 1980s. This led to the dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact, the liberation of Eastern European states and some fifteen republics within the Soviet Union, and the subsequent ending of the Cold War rivalry, all of which took place with very limited violence. The Gorbachev reforms were rooted in a conscious peaceful change strategy, adopting the notion of common security as opposed to alliance-­based security to manage superpower relations, abandoning the dogma of irreconcilable struggle between socialism and capitalism, and delegitimizing the use of force as an efficacious or desirable method to deal with the internal freedom of republics as well as the choices of erstwhile regional allies to exit the Soviet hegemonic system (Möller 2007, 109–110; MccGwire 1991). Beyond the superpower level, the most significant global level peaceful change that has occurred since 1945 has been the decolonization process (Jansen and Osterhammel 2017; Getachew 2019). Although there were pockets where violence took place, this process had been largely peaceful considering the magnitude of change that was brought about by the independence of some 150 new states. Yet the issues of justice and reconciliation

10   T. V. Paul remained as crucial challenges to this process (Lu 2017). The newly emerging states also attempted in their own way to create a peaceful order, first through the Bandung process in 1955 and later through the Non-­aligned movement in 1961 (Luthi 2020; Rajan 1990). The largely peaceful dismantlement of the colonial empires and the efforts by newly emerging countries to achieve a new equitable world order received only limited attention in IR, partially due to the intense focus of Western scholars, who have been the main source of IR theory, on the Cold War and the biases or absence of knowledge among them on this subject.

The Post–Cold War Era The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 ushered in many changes internationally and regionally. The European landscape changed as many Eastern European states joined the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Russia for a while peacefully accepted the substantial shrinking of its sphere of influence, it came to question the status depreciation it suffered (Clunan 2009; Pouliot 2010). The efforts by Vladimir Putin to resurrect Russian nationalism and elevate Russia’s international status through aggressive postures put a dent in peaceful change at the great power level (Krickovic, 2016; Larson and Shevchenko 2019). The proliferation of international institutions also helped the rising powers, although the debate on the two-­way relationship between institutions and power politics remains inconclusive (Wivel and Paul 2019). China, in the meantime, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, came out with a “peaceful rise” strategy. This was later christened as “peaceful development.” It specifically called for the rise of China as a global power through institutional and economic means and not via military confrontation with established powers (Pu 2019; He 2016). The entrance on the scene of Xi Jinping in 2012 changed this dynamic, as he began to push for China to rise at a faster pace and engaged in some aggressive moves in the South China Sea and restive territories such as Xinjiang and Hong Kong. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in some sense is a strategy for expansion and global domination through economic means, but it also is helping China’s rise with minimal resistance to it. The absence of intense hard balancing coalitions against China provides empirical support for this argument (Han and Paul 2020). Affected states tend to follow a hedging strategy involving soft balancing, limited hard balancing, and diplomatic engagement (Paul 2018). Up until 2020, China has not militarized the trading network in a substantial manner, unlike the previous European East India trading companies, which brought their navies and armies along with them. There is no guarantee though that this state of affairs will continue. Beijing seeks to engage in a wedge strategy as Chinese interests expand, interfering in the domestic affairs of countries and creating dependencies as well as weakening possible coalitions of resistance. Potential resistance could develop among affected states, especially the great power ­contenders and regional stakeholders such as Japan, India, and Australia (Feng and He  2020). The greater possibility is the emergence of a rivalry or a new Cold War

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   11 between China and the United States as the Chinese perceive the need to break the ­latter’s hegemony in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean if they ever want to obtain global dominance and the United States takes preventive military and economic actions to arrest this development. The post–Cold War era has been characterized by the major economic changes brought about by economic globalization (Friedman 2005; Held 1999; Ravenhill 2017; Ripsman and Paul  2010). Although globalization has political, social, technological, ecological, and many other dimensions, economic globalization is the most palpable area in which changes have taken place with ramifications for domestic and international level peaceful changes. In the post–Cold War era, especially after the world financial crisis of 2008–2009, the rising powers have been engaging in their own institution building for changing the international order peacefully. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the G-­20 are the most significant venues for such changes, while other subgroupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have been in operation for some time. Since 2016, the blowback effects of globalization are visible, as the emergence of winners and losers of economic globalization among societal groups has generated the rise of populist leaders in key countries, especially the United States.

Theoretical Perspectives and Their Challenges Michael Wesley (2015) offers a useful characterization of the divisions over change in IR theory. He characterizes the contending approaches to change as teleological, cyclical, and episodic. Those who adhere to teleological change believe in human agency’s ability to change as well as in the linear nature of change due to the operation and eventual victory of rationality. Cyclical scholars are the most critical of the idea of fundamental change, as they see international politics as one cycle after another based on the same principles of conflict and dominance by one or another empire or great power. Episodic approaches view change as happening in bits and pieces, but not in a teleological or linear fashion. Each of these perspectives arises out of differing assumptions about and conceptions of human nature; the role of conflict and cooperation in social and political life; and the shifting nature of ideas and material forces, especially technology and factors of production, in causing and sustaining change. Among the IR paradigms, realism is perhaps the most adamant about cyclical perspectives and the absence of linear change in IR. Most realists see only a limited role for peaceful change as a strategy or outcome for promoting change and achieving peace without the direct use of military force, with only modest implications for transforming the power politics of IR. Stable orders will remain the outcome of a proper balance of power, in particular among great powers (Morgenthau 1973; Kissinger 1994; Waltz 1979;

12   T. V. Paul Mearsheimer 2000). But no state of balance of power is permanent, as material fortunes change among states. Peaceful change is not the usual outcome of radical shifts in the material—economic, technological, and demographic—strengths of countries, although in rare cases rising powers have engaged in supportive policies toward declining powers for strategic or economic reasons (Shifrinson 2018). Neoclassical realism may have a better handle on peaceful change, although some such scholars contest the desirability of peaceful change under some circumstances (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016; Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2018). However, the subject is yet to receive sufficient attention by the adherents of this perspective. Liberals focus on change more concretely, as they believe in the essentially peaceful nature of humans and the possibility of improving the human condition through proper education and rationality, by bringing about harmony of interests through free international trade, democratic principles, and institutional mechanisms of cooperation (Smith 1776; Bentham 1780; Locke 1764; Kant 1795). The liberal tradition goes back to the European Enlightenment era and is associated with modernity, while at the same time it also had an unsavory association with racism and empire (Ikenberry 2020). The nineteenth century saw not only liberalism but nationalism, socialism, and “scientific racism” coming to the fore (Buzan and Lawson 2015). More concretely, the three mech­ an­isms aimed at perpetual peace in the Kantian conception—widespread availability of international institutions, deep economic interdependence, and proper liberal democratic order—are expected to bring enduring peace despite efforts to thwart it by illiberal forces (Kant 1795; Doyle 1986; Russett and Oneal 2001). While these mechanisms seem prevalent in regions where liberal practices hold sway, their impact globally, especially on states that are not internally liberal, needs further elaboration. Liberal interventions are a crucial part of liberal efforts at peace, from regime change to the protection of individuals affected by wars, natural disasters, communal violence, and above all state failures. Many such interventions have produced violent outcomes in regions such as the Middle East, as liberal states fail to offer proper mechanisms for the societal transformation of deeply divided societies or are unable to devise proper exit strategies (Sørensen 2011). Liberal institutionalism has been a key component of the liberal approach to peaceful change. Scholarly and policy focus has been on devising institutional and legal mech­an­ isms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the International Criminal Court of Justice, the UN Arms Trade Treaty, and the Mine Ban Treaty. These have attracted much attention among both liberal and constructivist scholars. To some, the United Nations and its affiliated institutions, such as the WHO, UNESCO, UNHCR, FAO, UNDP, UNEP, World Food Program, UNODC, UNIDIR, WTO, IMF, World Bank, ILO, and IAEA, have been arenas for peaceful change. Examples of peaceful change in the security sphere include the permanent extension of the nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty (NPT); conclusion and operation of various nuclear-­free zones; and efforts by nonnuclear states to ban nuclear use, including the 2017 Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and associated regimes. The adoption of human security as part of national foreign

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   13 policies has been a major change in the landscape on approaches to security. There has also been increased focus on the relationship between security and development in many countries. In the most recent IR paradigm, constructivist approaches to change highlight social learning, socialization, and social norms, as well as social identities (Checkel  2001; Katzenstein  1996; Wendt  1999; Finnemore and Sikkink  1998; Kubalkova, Onuf, and Kowert 2008; Kornprobst 2017). Some such accounts consider peaceful order equivalent to the establishment of pluralistic security communities, wherein war is not considered an option and states and societies are deeply enmeshed with collective norms, identities, and ideas. Globalists would go beyond the nation-­state and envision the creation of a just and peaceful world order in which all nations and societies prosper simultaneously while war, both internal and external, is eliminated through powerful institutional mechanisms and democratic processes (Hoffmann 1970). English school perspectives have discussed peaceful change more concretely than others (Navari 2009; Dunne 2007). Marxist, neo-­Marxist, and Gramscian theories also view peaceful change as improbable and not desirable if it reinforces the dominance of powerful states and social classes (Cox 1981; Freyberg-­Inan 2019). Feminist discourses challenge masculine and patriarchal values and their embodiment in power structures within and among nation-­ states as not conducive to peaceful change (Tickner  1997; Aggestam and Towns 2019). Strategies such as “naming” and “shaming” may be necessary to obtain change. International law perspectives point at increasing “lawyerization” (Nuñez-­ Mietz  2018) in the legitimation of force and its impact in constraining violent and unlawful behavior of states. Although the preceding discussion shows some theoretical advancement, the big and small transitions that have occurred peacefully as well as violently throughout the past millennium call for IR theory to adopt better foundational approaches and tools to understand change. One can notice considerable weaknesses in the IR discipline in capturing transformational change, especially the manner in which the Cold War ended and the subsequent pace of change ushered in by intensified economic globalization. The economic fortunes of countries such as China and India—due to their insertion into economic globalization and the adoption of crucial technologies as well as their becoming active trading states—have propelled a momentum somewhat unparalleled in terms of speed, intensity, and global consequences. These in-­progress changes will produce far-­reaching effects on power transitions as well as global governance patterns in the years to come. The technological revolutions—especially in the information and cyber arenas, generated by social media as the tool of dissemination—have created further challenges to capturing or understanding change of the peaceful and not-­so peaceful varieties through disinformation campaigns. Climate change (Swain and Öjendal 2018) is fast approaching as a fundamental challenge to humanity’s existence as a species on the planet, and the implications are yet to be understood. Much of realism is ill-­equipped to capture change, as persistent and recurring patterns hold sway in the approach. Liberal approaches have the most to offer on peaceful change, but many of these arguments are relevant largely to Western liberal states and

14   T. V. Paul the mechanisms inherent in the Kantian tripod. Further, nondemocracies and populist democracies can use some of the liberal elements like international institutions and economic interdependence to further their interests vis-­à-­vis liberal states, as China is doing today. Democratic elections can be exploited by illiberal forces to gain power. Constructivists have made many contributions to understanding change, although even here the efforts at theorizing change are not as prominent as one would expect. The liberal/Western biases of constructivism are major impediments to understanding ideational changes taking place in the non-­Western world. A premium is placed on “good norms” and their evolution, and there is a tendency to equate those with Western liberal norms as opposed to universal civilizational norms.

Perspectives beyond Paradigms Scholars who do not subscribe to a specific IR paradigm have probably been more vocal about peace and peaceful change of the normative varieties. Johan Galtung (1964), for instance, who popularized the concepts of “structural violence” and “structural aggression,” has also offered many ideas on “positive” and “negative peace.” Kenneth Boulding (1978) discusses “deep peace” versus “shallow peace.” In a similar vein, Charles Kupchan (2010), Benjamin Miller (2007), and Arie Kacowicz (2000) offer distinctions between “cold peace,” “cold war,” “hot war,” and “stable peace.” These variations suggest that change from one form of peace to another would require considerable attitudinal and procedural alterations. Change that seems to have occurred can reverse, as Jennifer Welsh (2016) warns: “The reappearance of trends and practices many believed had been erased: arbitrary executions, attempts to annihilate ethnic and religious minorities, the starvation of besieged populations, invasion and annexation of territory, and the mass movement of refugees and displaced persons” seem to be happening periodically. Thus, sustaining peaceful change even after desirable change has occurred is a big concern, as change in the positive direction is rarely linear but rather curvilinear. Among the linear, teleological accounts, John Mueller’s Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (1989) stands out, as it provided a powerful account of the abandonment of war among the advanced countries as having become obsolete over a period of time, similar to social institutions such as slavery and dueling. Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) optimistic rendition of liberal democracies defeating authoritarian forms of governing systems such as Communism and dictatorships falls within this teleological approach, although twenty-­five years later the premise is being challenged, as many liberal democracies are falling short of achieving greater equality, justice, or efficiency in governance. Neta Crawford (2002) has identified nuanced arguments, such as reasoning and persuasion based on practical as well as scientific logic, and their relationship to beliefs translated into practical action as a major source of change. The examples of slavery and colonialism are discussed as cases in which powerful arguments made the difference in their formal abolition. A question that deserves

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   15 more attention is why some arguments win while others do not, or why change did not happen even when persuasive arguments existed. Most recently, Steven Pinker offered two key works (2011, 2018) in the teleological tradition on the progressive achievement of peaceful change and the conditions that allowed for greater human prosperity and reduction in suffering. To him, the progressive reduction in violence of all forms occurred due to the presence of improved governments, increased literacy, ideas of cosmopolitanism, increased empathy, and the decline of toxic ideologies that preach violence (Pinker 2011). Pinker, however, calls for the adoption of Enlightenment principles of scientific reasoning and humanism for preserving and expanding the peaceful changes that have come about (Pinker  2018). Shiping Tang’s work (2013) is another example of an evolutionary perspective on global change and the different trajectories it took in different regions and the global system itself. These scholarly efforts suggest that peaceful change as a subject matter demands an understanding of both structure and agency, the latter including individual leaders as champions of change-­generating ideas. Policy entrepreneurs can often provoke change, sometimes differently than they originally envisaged. However, we need a proper understanding of different structural changes that can be caused by macro mechanisms such as the distribution of power, technological innovations, economic capabilities, economic globalization, ecological changes, and the spread of big ideas and ideologies that capture the global imagination. A crucial challenge is figuring out if and when change is taking place, as in-­process change is often not understood until clear manifestations occur in power positions, governance structures, or normative articulations. The processes and manner through which change takes place are often as important as eventual change itself. Sources of change matter, and in this context figuring out the motivations for change in state policies would help us understand which of the sources mattered the most. Technological changes need to be incorporated to understand the practices of peaceful change at both the structural and nation-­state levels. Analysis of agent level change would explain when and how domestic level policy shifts affect global and regional changes. Agents can be transnational movements or actors who successfully campaign for change. The most recent examples are the #MeToo movement spearheaded by women’s groups across the world; the young campaigners advocating for improving climate change policies, led by Swedish activist Greta Thunberg; and the Black Lives Matter campaign by a variety of groups in different countries, addressing systemic racism and police brutality. Individual level sources would focus on statecraft, especially the grand strategies of change initiated by leaders for smaller level changes in foreign policy that can sustain or create new opportunities for peaceful change within and between conflict-­ridden societies. The role of deft diplomacy in obtaining peaceful change among former rivals has been a focus of Charles Kupchan (2010), who argues that reconciliation can start as unilateral accommodation, producing reciprocal restraints, followed by societal integration and the generation of new narratives and identities. These causal pathways to peaceful change can produce “rapprochement,” “security

16   T. V. Paul community,” and “union.” A challenge to this theory is the potential for disruption and the absence of linear progression in the identified patterns. Further, other hybrid forms can emerge even when conditions are ripe for progress in the desired direction. The upsurge of populism in different democracies such as the United States; some members of the European Union; and countries such as India, Brazil, and Turkey is difficult to explain using teleological approaches. Changing structural conditions such as deep inequalities generated by globalization or migratory pressures can produce virulent nationalisms, often affecting peaceful change that was achieved by previous generations. More attention is needed to ecological changes such as global warming and their impact on IR and state capacity itself. Incorporating these nontraditional areas in IR theory, without losing sight of traditional interstate issues, has been a continuing challenge for the discipline.

Incremental versus Revolutionary: Macro versus Micro, Episodic versus Deep Change The extent of the scope of change has always been a topic of contention in IR theory. As Gilpin (1981, 47) rightly points out, system change and systemic change can take place through hegemonic wars, similar to how revolutions can change domestic systems. Incremental change can take place through diplomatic bargaining and limited adjustments to governance structures, somewhat similar to domestic adjustments through negotiations among different political groups. Some key notions that Kal Holsti (2004, 13–17) has offered, such as change as “replacement,” “addition,” “dialectical,” “transformation,” “reversal,” and “obsolescence,” are useful for capturing different types and levels of change. A good example of transformational change is the distinction Holsti (2004, 26–27) makes between change in the foundational institutions of the state system, such as sovereignty, territoriality, and international law, and change in the procedural institutions, such as diplomacy, trade, colonialism, war, market, and the international monetary system. However, these changes sometimes occur cumulatively, and distinguishing one from the other may be more difficult than is argued here. The rise of the nation-­state in Europe itself occurred through war and postwar settlements and legitimation strategies used by states relying on civic or ethnic nationalism (Tilly  1975). However, war-making is no longer considered the most effective mech­an­ism for building nation-­states. Developmental and welfare states have replaced much of the role war played in the past in creating strong states. The changing attitude toward territorial revisionism through force is another example of peaceful change that has occurred in international politics since 1945. This aversion to territorial revisionism has produced a territorial integrity norm despite some exceptions since 1945 (Zacher 2001). Further, territorial accommodations without war have been some of the most important examples of peaceful change at the regional and interactive levels. More importantly, many cases of decolonization occurred through peaceful means (Kacowicz 1994).

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   17

Great Powers, Rising Powers, and Peaceful Change As the major agents of systemic change in the modern international system, great power relations and distributions of power matter tremendously in determining peace, order versus instability, and war in any given period. Great powers are also the foremost sources of violence and coercion in the international system. Changes taking place within the societies of great powers can have major implications for the world order and whether relations among them will remain hot or cold, as great powers are both agents and detractors of peaceful change. They can help transitions, but their wars and rivalries have major consequences for international peace in any given era. Their policies toward various regions are also important in determining whether conflictual relations change to peaceful outcomes. Great ­power interventions have generated many changes in the regions, but some such interventions have produced violent outcomes, as we witness in the Middle East today. When great power rapprochement occurs or a “Concert” system develops, they can affect peace in different regions and states. As custodians of peace in international institutions, great powers often have major responsibilities, which they can misuse or divert for their narrow interests. Moreover, the internal changes within great powers and the emergence of domestic coalitions of interest groups that favor peace versus expansion or aggrandizement deserve more attention.

Peaceful Change in the Regions Just as significant to understanding change globally, it is important to know change regionally, as these two are intimately connected. Change in regional orders from conflict to cooperation and the possibilities of producing security communities in which stable peace exists and member states do not envision or prepare for war to settle disputes among themselves (e.g., Deutsch  1957; Adler and Barnett  1998; Gheciu  2008) deserve our increased attention. This is partly because in the key region where a security community arose—that is, Europe—we see some reversals taking place (Wivel and Wæver 2018). Is regional transformation a linear process, or is it possible to achieve a semblance of order only to return to disorder at different points in time? Some regions are mired in perpetual conflicts or enduring rivalries, although over time these conflicts could assume new societal dimensions (Paul 2012, 3). Other regions have made significant progress toward gradual peaceful change. Some regional orders even model alternative solutions to major international cooperation issues that are distinct from those that prevail in the global international order. Peaceful territorial compromises are a big part of any regional transformation, without which the potential for violence persists.

18   T. V. Paul Beyond Europe, many regions have made their own efforts and produced ideas to obtain peaceful change (Kulnazarova and Popovski 2019). The ten-­nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the most successful among these regional efforts (Emmers 2012; Caballero-­Anthony 2018). The African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have been credited with the absence of territorial revisionism in the region, although some violations have taken place. In Latin America, peaceful change has been occurring among states even when internal violence has been prevalent in many states (Kacowicz 1994). The contributions of many subregional organizations such as Mercosur need to be acknowledged here. Peaceful co­ex­ist­ence is a theme that regional states have embraced, ranging from India (Basrur and de Estrada 2017; Pardesi 2015) and China during the 1950s, to Indonesia’s Pancasila (Anwar 1994), Brazil’s soft power approaches (Mares and Trinkunas 2016; Abdenur 2014), and South Africa’s ubuntu (Tiky 2019; Vale 2003). Japan’s and Germany’s postwar anti-­militarism (Berger  1998) also deserve our attention. Why some regions remain nonviolent and resort to peaceful change strategies more than others demands better understanding. Eclectic explanations for regional transformations may be useful here. Such an approach is captured by Norrin Ripsman (2016), who contends that peace usually breaks out from the top when principal policy makers make the move for rapprochement. However, over the long term peace can only be sustained at the societal level. Regional approaches would require explorations of civilizational peace (Katzenstein 2009) and conceptions arising from religious traditions. The problem with religion is its dual nature when it comes to social transformations, as it can be an agent of both peaceful and violent change (Appleby 2000). IR theory has been reluctant to incorporate civilizational peace ideas inherent in major religions of the world, partly because of the dominance of liberal/secular traditions and the separation of the church and the state in much of the West. This weakness of IR theory may be partly to blame for the lack of understanding of peaceful change or of the persistence of violence in the Middle East and South Asia, where civilizational/religious ideas hold sway in state behavior. Political religion as a source of peace or conflict or as an agent of change is yet to be properly assessed in world politics.

The Chapters The Handbook is divided into seven substantive parts. Part I covers this introductory chapter. In part II, three chapters address the historical origins of peaceful change as an IR subject in particular in the interwar, Cold War, and post–Cold War eras. The reasons for the “highs” and “lows” in the study of peaceful change in the IR discipline are discussed. Some questions that the papers explore are: (1) What motivated scholars and policy makers to address the questions of peaceful change? (2) What were the logics of their arguments? (3) In what sense were these ideas for peaceful change? (4) What were the mechanisms they proposed? (5) Why did their efforts fail? (6) Did they leave a

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   19 lasting legacy on the formation and evolution of the IR theoretical and foreign policy perspectives in future years? Torbjørn L.  Knutsen discusses the interwar origins of peaceful change ideas in the context of the rise of Germany, Japan, and Italy as violent system-­challenging actors. Peter Marcus Kristensen offers an analysis of post–World War II evolution of peaceful change theories and policies and their marginalization due to the intense Cold War conflict. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro engages the key transformations that took place during the post–Cold War era in terms of rising power and globalization phenomena and their unintended consequences. In part III, the chapters turn their attention to each of the IR theoretical traditions and paradigms that have distinct views on peaceful change. Ten chapters address theories ranging from realism, liberalism, and constructivism to critical perspectives and their different variations. While realists in general reject the feasibility of maximalist peaceful changes, liberals are optimistic about them, provided proper liberal strategies are implemented. The key questions discussed are: (1) What assumptions do the theories hold about international politics and the role of peaceful change within them? (2) Why do some perspectives favor peaceful changes while others are neutral or noncommittal? (3) What do the theoretical perspectives have to say about the big questions of war and peace as they pertain to change? (4) What are the mechanisms of change and the alternate explanations they offer? Joshua Shifrinson offers a contrarian analysis of realism, especially the structural and neoclassical varieties, by arguing that despite their focus on conflict, several elements of peaceful change can be explained by these perspectives. Alexandra Gheciu provides a historical take on liberalism, in particular the postwar liberal international order. Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot offer a sober analysis of the role that international institutions play in peaceful change as well as nonpeaceful outcomes, while John Ravenhill explains the role and challenges of economic interdependence, especially generated by globalization, in understanding peaceful change. The constructivist paradigm’s ideational insights on nonviolent and possibly violent change are explored in Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann’s chapter, while Cornelia Navari brings forth the English school and its approaches toward peaceful change in both great power and regional contexts. While Annette Freyberg-­Inan offers a succinct discussion of critical theories and their perspectives on both revolutionary and peaceful change to unseat entrenched power structures, Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond in their chapter provide a discourse on the transformative role gender has played in IR. Victoria Tin-­bor Hui’s analysis focuses on civilization and religion as sources of both nonviolent and violent changes in Asia, while Shiping Tang offers a social evolution paradigm for understanding change, including peaceful variations. In part IV, eight chapters address the key material and ideational sources from which change originates. These vary from international law to political economy, ideas of democracy, status quest, and transnational social movements. The key questions are: (1) Do military, economic, and technological factors determine whether international change will be peaceful or violent? (2) What role do ideas and identities play in obtaining or reversing peaceful change? (3) Do social movements play any significant role as entrepreneurs of peaceful change and if so, how? In her chapter, Jennifer  M.  Welsh

20   T. V. Paul explores the role international law has played in bringing forth peaceful change in some key practices and patterns of interstate relations, while Michal Smetana explores the myriad roles nuclear weapons have played in developing a cold peace among great powers in particular. Lars S. Skålnes looks at the political economy sources, especially economic statecraft and economic interdependence, in bringing about peaceful change, and Ashok Swain examines the effects of climate change on international conflict and cooperation. Thomas Davies analyzes the role and limitations of democracy in national, transnational, and global governance arenas in bringing about peaceful change, while Xiaoyu Pu offers an analysis of status quest as a source of nonviolent as well as violent transformation in world politics. Anne L. Clunan explores the different ways in which science and technology contribute to peaceful change in IR. Alejandro Milcíades Peña illuminates the role of transnational social movements in bringing about both peaceful and nonpeaceful change in IR. In part V, eight chapters explore selected pivotal states in the world today and their perspectives and contributions to peaceful change, realizing that many of them have violent pasts or tend not to pursue peaceful policies consistently. These include three permanent members of the UN Security Council and some key regional states. The central questions are: (1) What policies did they propose for peaceful change and for what reasons, domestic or international, did they subsequently alter them, if they did so? (2) Was it material weakness or the need for systemic adaptation that led to the proposed policy for peaceful change? (3) Did they expect reciprocity from other significant states, and if so, in what form? (4) Do individual leaders, their supporting domestic coalitions, and their ideas play a larger role in the peaceful change strategies and their perusal or reversal vis-­à-­vis systemic factors? In her chapter, Deborah Welch Larson explores the peaceful change contributions of the United States largely through liberal mechanisms. Kai He and Feng Liu examine the role of peaceful rise in China’s ascendancy, the reasons for developing such a strategy, and the challenges Beijing will face in the future. Andrej Krickovic offers an examination of the bold experiments of the Soviet Union and Russia with peaceful change, from Gorbachev’s revolutionary transformations to Putin’s retraction of many such strategies as a result of unfulfilled expectations. Klaus Brummer offers a discussion of postwar Germany’s multipronged contributions to peaceful change. Thomas U. Berger discusses Japan’s efforts at peace and peaceful change in the postwar era and the challenges it has faced, both domestic and international, in translating the original lofty goals to national policies. Manjeet S. Pardesi examines India’s key efforts at peaceful change during various historical phases and their outcomes. Peter Vale discusses the successes and failures of South Africa’s efforts at peaceful change, while the nexus between domestic and regional peaceful change is the focus of Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s chapter on Indonesia. We realize the cases we include comprise only a sample of countries that have made contributions to peaceful change, and much work is needed to examine the ­nonviolent strategies of all states, both large and small, on all continents of the world. In part VI, ten chapters evaluate peaceful change in the world’s key regions, explaining the variations in outcomes. The major questions they address are: (1) Have the regional states maintained or reversed their peaceful trajectories, and what are the

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   21 causes of such changes? (2) What is the role of systemic and subsystemic causes of regional transformation? (3) What is the role of domestic factors in contributing to or inhibiting peaceful change internationally? (4) What part do ideational and institutional factors play in regional transformations? In his chapter, Anders Wivel discusses Western Europe’s transformation as a pluralistic security community and the explanations for it based on realist, liberal, and constructivist factors. David G. Haglund offers an account of North America’s transition to a stable region forming a security community, while Harold A. Trinkunas examines South America’s limited but significant progression toward a region of “negative peace” despite the lack of deep economic integration, effective institutions, or a security community. Markus Kornprobst offers an assessment of the notions of peace and change in Africa and the institutionalization efforts there, while Ralf Emmers and Mely Caballero-­Anthony discuss Southeast Asia’s historical and institutional evolution as a quasi-­security community and the emerging challenges the region faces. Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada analyze the causes for South Asia’s scant progress toward peaceful regional order, while Bhubhindar Singh analyzes Northeast Asia’s minimal successes in peaceful change caused by realist and liberal factors. Arie M. Kacowicz and Galia Press-­Barnathan examine examples of limited peaceful change in the Middle Eastern region at international, regional, interactive, and domestic levels. Alexander Tabachnik and Benjamin Miller explain variations in Central and Eastern Europe’s regional orders and their causes, while Timur Dadabaev and John Heathershaw offer a postcolonial framework on change in Central Asia emanating from regional ideas and practices conditioned by intensified globalization. Finally, in part VII the editors offer a concluding chapter that explores the areas in which future research can be conducted effectively while emphasizing the need and significance of re-­establishing peaceful change as a legitimate domain of enquiry in IR.

Notes 1. The definitional part has been helped by input from the other four editors of the Handbook. I also thank Arie Kacowicz, Galia Press-­Barnathan, and Annette Freyberg-­Inan for their useful comments on an earlier version. For the historical evolution of the concept of peaceful change, see also Kristensen (2019). 2. Some exceptions exist, such as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) on the not so insignificant success rates of nonviolent resistance compared to violent resistance. However, the names “Gandhi” and “King” appear only in passing reference in this otherwise excellent work.

References Abdenur, Adriana. 2014. “Brazil as a Rising Power: Coexistence Through Universalism.” In BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order, edited by Cedric de Coning, Thomas Mandrup, and Liselotte Odgaard, 49–74. London: Routledge. Adler, Immanuel, and Michael Barnett, eds. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

22   T. V. Paul Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan. 2019. The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Aggestam, Karin, and Ann Towns. 2019. “The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 21, no. 1: 9–28. Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. 1994. Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism. Singapore: ISAS. Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Basrur, Rajesh, and Kate Sullivan de Estrada. 2017. Rising India: Status and Power. London: Routledge. Bentham, Jeremey. 1780. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: T. Payne and Sons. Berger, Thomas. 1998. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Boulding, Kenneth A. 1978. Stable Peace. Austin: University of Texas Press. Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. 2015. The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and Making of International Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Caballero-Anthony, Mely. 2018. Negotiating Governance on Non-traditional Security in Southeast Asia and Beyond. New York: Columbia University Press. Carr, E. H. 1939. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939. New York: Harpertorch Books. Checkel, Jeffrey  T. 2001. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.” International Organization 55, no. 3: 553–588. Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Clunan, Anne  L. 2009. The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Social Interests. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Cox, Robert W. 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2: 126–155. Crawford, Neta. 2002. Argument and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Davies, Thomas  R. 2019. “Transnational Society as a Mirror of International Society: A  Reinterpretation of Contemporary World Order.” International Theory 11, no. 3 (November): 264–292. Deutsch, Karl. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Doran, Charles F. 1971. The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4: 1151–1169. Dunne, Tim. 2007. “The English School.” In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 127–147. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eichengreen, Barry. 2019. “Versailles: The Economic Legacy.” International Affairs 95, no. 1: 7–24. Emmers, Ralf, ed. 2012. ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia. London: Routledge.

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   23 Falk, Richard, 1995. On Humane Governance. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Feng, Huiyun, and Kai He, eds. 2020. China’s Challenges and International Order Transition: Beyond the “Thucydides Trap”. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Katherine Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 54, no. 4: 887–917. Freyberg-Inan, Annette. 2019. “The Dynamic Relations between Power Politics and Institutionalization: A Neo-Gramscian Intervention.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T.  V.  Paul, 185–196. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Friedman, Thomas  L. 2005. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books. Galtung, Johan. 1964. “A Structural Theory of Aggression.” Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 2: 95–119. Getachew, Adom. 2019. Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gheciu, Alexandra. 2008. Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO and the OSCE in the Post-9/11 World. New York: Oxford University Press. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Han, Zhen, and T. V. Paul. 2020. “China’s Rise and Balance of Power Politics.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 13, no.1: 1–26. He, Kai. 2016. “China’s Bargaining Strategies for a Peaceful Accommodation after the Cold War.” In Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future, edited by T. V. Paul, 201–221. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Held, David, et al. 1999. Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hoffmann, Stanley. 1970. Conditions of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Holsti, K.  J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2020. A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crisis of Global Order. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Jansen, Jan C., and Jurgen Osterhammel. 2017. Decolonization: A Short History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kacowicz, Arie M. 1994. Peaceful Territorial Change. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Kacowicz, Arie  M. 2000. “Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework.” In Stable Peace among Nations, edited by Arie M. Kacowicz et al., 11–35. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Katzenstein, Peter, J. ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein, Peter, J. 2009. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. London: Routledge. Kant, Immanuel. 1795. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House. Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster.

24   T. V. Paul Knutsen, Torbjørn Lindstrøm. 2016. A History of International Relations Theory. 3rd ed. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Kornprobst, Markus. 2017. “Arguing Deep Ideational Change.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1: 1–20. Krickovic, Andrej. 2016. “The Failure of Institutional Binding in NATO-Russia Relations.” Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 2: 175–199. Kristensen, Peter Marcus. 2019. “ ‘Peaceful Change’ in International Relations: A Conceptual Archaeology.” International Theory: 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971919000204. Kubalkova, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert. 2008. International Relations in a Constructed World. London: M. E. Sharpe. Kulnazarova, Aigul, and Vesselin Popovski. 2019. The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. Kunz, Diane M. 1998. “A Comment.” In The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerld D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, 523–532. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kupchan, Charles  A. 2010. How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. 2019. Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Locke, John. 1764. Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis. London: A. Millar, et al. Lu, Catherine. 2017. Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lundestad, Geir 1998. “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Luthi, Lorenz. 2020. Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mares, David, and Harold Trinkunas. 2016. Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. MccGwire, Michael. 1991. Perestroika and Soviet National Security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Mearsheimer, John. J. 2000. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Miall, Hugh. 2007. Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change. Houndsmills, UK: PalgraveMacmillan. Miller, Benjamin. 2007. States, Nations and Great Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Modelski, George. 1987. Long Cycles in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Modelski, George, and William  R.  Thompson. 1989. “Long Cycles and Global War.” In Handbook of War Studies, edited by Manus Midlarsky, 23–54. Boston: Unwin Hyman. Möller, Frank. 2007. Thinking Peaceful Change: Baltic Security Policies and Security Community Building. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948. “The Political Science of E. H. Carr.” World Politics 1, no. 1 (October): 127–134. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1973. Politics among Nations, 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Navari, Cornelia, ed. 2009. Theorising International Society: English School Methods. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Nuñez-Mietz, Fernando G. 2018. The Use of Force under International Law: Lawyerized States in a Legalized World. New York: Routledge.

The Study of Peaceful Change in World Politics   25 Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Pardesi, Manjeet  S. 2015. “Is India a Great Power: Understanding Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations.” Asian Security 11, no. 1: 1–30. Paul, T.  V. 2009. The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Paul, T. V., ed. 2012. International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Paul, T. V., ed. 2016. Accommodating Rising Powers: Past Present and Future. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Paul, T. V. 2018. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing in World Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York, Viking. Pinker, Steven. 2018. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Science, Reason, Humanism and Progress. New York: Viking. Pouliot, Vincent. 2010. International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pu, Xiaoyu. 2019. Rebranding China: Contested Status Signalling in the Changing Global Order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Rajan, M. S. 1990. Nonalignment & Nonaligned Movement. New Delhi: Vikas. Ravenhill, John. 2017. Global Political Economy. [5th ed.] Oxford: Oxford University Press. Richmond, Oliver P. 2005. The Transformation of Peace. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. Ripsman, Norrin  M. 2016. Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict between Regional Rivals. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ripsman, Norrin  M., and T.  V.  Paul. 2010. Globalization and the National Security State. New York: Oxford University Press. Ripsman, Norrin  M., Jeffrey  W.  Taliaferro, and Steven  E.  Lobell. 2016. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Rock, Stephen R. 1989. Why Peace Breaks Out. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton. Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itkowitz. 2018. Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Smetana, Michael. 2020. Nuclear Deviance: Stigma Politics and the Rules of the Nonproliferation Game. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. Smith, Adam. 1776. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Classic House Books. Sørensen, Georg. 2011. A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing Between Imposition and Restraint. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Swain, Ashok, and Joakim Öjendal, eds. 2018. Routledge Handbook of Environmental Conflict and Peacebuilding. London: Routledge. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2018. “Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” International Studies Review 20, no. 2: 283–291. Tang, Shiping. 2013. The Social Evolution of International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.

26   T. V. Paul Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. The Nuclear Taboo. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, William R., ed. 2009. Systemic Transitions: Past, Present and Future. New York. Palgrave-Macmillan. Tickner, J. Ann. 1997. “ ‘You Just Don’t Understand’: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists.” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4: 611–632. Tiky, Lembe. 2019. “Building Peace through Ubuntu in the Aftermath of Electoral Violence in Divided African Societies.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace, edited by Aigul Kulnazarova and Vesselin Popovski, 279–297. New York: Springer International. Tilly, Charles, ed. 1975. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vale, Peter. 2003. Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press. Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. Welsh, Jennifer. 2016. The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century. Toronto: House of Anansi Press. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wesley, Michael. 2015. “Teleology, Cyclicality and Episodism: Three Competing Views of Change in International Relations.” In Change: Combining Analytical Approaches with Street Wisdom, edited by Gabriele Bammer, 43–53. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press. Wivel, Anders, and T. V. Paul. 2019. International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Wivel Anders, and Ole Wæver. 2018. “The Power of Peaceful Change: The Crisis of the European Union and the Rebalancing of Europe’s Regional Order.” International Studies Review 20: 317–325. Zacher, Mark W. 2001. “The Territorial Integrity Norm.” International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring): 15–50.

Pa rt I I

H ISTOR IC A L PE R SPE C T I V E S

chapter 2

Peacefu l Ch a nge The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context Torbjørn L. Knutsen

“Peaceful change” is the key issue of our times, said Albert Sarraut, the French ­minister of state, in June 1937, as he opened the 10th International Studies Conference (ISC) in Paris. The concept had been introduced to the vocabulary of political scholarship two years earlier at the ISC conference in London, which discussed the international impact of Germany, Italy, and Japan withdrawing from the League of Nations. Why did these countries withdraw? What would be the consequences of their withdrawals for the League’s ability to play a stabilizing role in the international system? How could its stabilizing policy of collective security best be adjusted and fine-­tuned? The answer to the last question seemed to be by way of “peaceful change.” This first debate on peaceful change was a reaction among international relations (IR) scholars of the Atlantic states to Germany’s, Italy’s, and Japan’s withdrawals from the League. It was also a way to express worries about the diminishing role and declining authority of the League in an increasingly unruly world and to find remedies to deal with the consequences. The debate took place in three main sites of interwar IR discourse: institutions of education, foreign policy research institutes, and the IR conference system sponsored by the League of Nations. The latter was decisively important. The ISC was the primary site of IR conversations during the 1930s. It brought IR teachers and researchers together in annual meetings, encouraged cooperation, and coordinated activities. A closer examination of the first discussion of peaceful change is also an examination of a formative phase in the evolution of the scholarly study of IR. The first part of this chapter sets the stage: it briefly sketches how the ISC emerged as an important node in a growing IR network. The second part discusses how the concept of peaceful change was introduced, explored, and made the subject of a thorough discussion at the 1937 ISC meeting in Paris. The chapter then places this discussion in a

30   Torbjørn L. Knutsen larger IR context and makes an assessment of the nature and contribution of the ISC discussions of peaceful change. It identifies key contributors to the discussion, notes tensions among them, and briefly assesses their arguments in light of the philosophy of science of the era.

The Institutional Context: The League and Its Commissions The central site of the interwar discussion of peaceful change was the ISC. Its origin lay in an initiative taken by Léon Bourgeois in August 1922. Bourgeois was a veteran peace activist, a socialist, a senior French politician with broad ministerial experience, and chair of the League Council. He admired the work of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and argued that a similar organ should be created for “the knowledge workers” of the world. The Council enthusiastically supported Bourgeois’s argument and agreed to establish the International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC). Some of the best, brightest, and most famous intellectuals and scientists of the world were invited to run it. Among them were Christine Bonnevie, Béla Bártok, Marie Curie, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, and Gilbert Murray. The ICIC in turn established a permanent secretariat, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC). The Radical-­Socialist government of France volunteered to fund the IIIC and to provide office space in Paris. Budgets were tight, and the French initiative was generally considered a generous offer. After a few years of preparations, the IIIC invited scholars from League member states to a Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations (or CISSIR). It took place in Berlin in 1928 and was attended by delegates from six countries. The participants discussed ways in which the IIIC could coordinate the work of scholars from various states. This discussion continued in a second meeting in London in 1929 and a third in Paris in 1930. Results were mixed. On the one hand, there was optimism among the delegates, triggered by reports on the establishment of new professorships in IR and of new institutions of research and education. On the other hand, there was a sense of bewilderment, of not quite knowing what to do. The discussions about international cooperation on research and dissemination of knowledge were abstract and vague. At the 1930 CISSIR meeting Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Toynbee, and others proposed to shift the focus of the conference and change its procedures. Frustrated by the lack of progress, they proposed to end discussions on methods of intellectual cooperation and instead discuss concrete international issues. They also proposed that members or­gan­ ize in working groups and prepare papers or reports (Pemberton 2019). This proposal was eagerly embraced. At the next year’s meeting, which took place in Copenhagen, the delegates agreed to adopt the new conference model. They dissolved CISSIR, thereby ending the abstract

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   31 discussions about the pacific effects of intellectual cooperation. Then they established the ISC in its stead and initiated a series of new, substantial discussions about world order and the stability of international society. During the next few years, the ISC found its form. Its Executive Committee would announce a topic or theme. The various national committees would debate this theme internally and then prepare for discussions at the international conference. The procedure was so complex and time consuming that it required two years to complete. At the end of this two-­year cycle, the IIIC would publish a report on the proceedings—and the ISC Executive Committee would announce a new theme. The first theme was announced at the Copenhagen meeting in 1931: the influence of the economic crisis on international politics. The theme addressed the economic recession that was washing across the industrial states of the West. The first ISC meeting cycle began in Milan in 1932 and continued in London in 1933. The first ISC report was issued later that year, under the title The State and Economic Life (IIIC 1933). The Executive Committee chose “collective security” as the theme for the ISC meetings in 1934–1935. The choice was inspired by announcements by the Italian and German governments that they were withdrawing from the League of Nations. “Peaceful change” was the theme for the 1936–1937 cycle. It was explored in the shadow of Japan’s operations in Manchuria, Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia, and Nazi Germany’s insistent demands for revision of the Versailles Treaty (1919). The ISC arranged twelve meetings in all, discussed four themes, and produced three reports.1 Table 2.1, below, lists the twelve CISSIR/ISC meetings and their four biannual themes. Table 2.1  The CISSIR/ISC Meetings (1928–1939) Year/Host City

Rapporteur

Conference theme

1932 Milan

M. J. Bonn, H. Dalton

“The State and Economic Life”

1933 London

Arnold Wolfers

“The State and Economic Life”

1934 Paris

Maurice Bourquin

“Collective Security”

1928 Berlin 1929 London 1930 Paris 1931 Copenhagen

1935 London

Maurice Bourquin

“Collective Security”

1936 Madrid

Maurice Bourquin

“Peaceful Change”

1937 Paris

Maurice Bourquin

“Peaceful Change”

1938 Prague

J. B. Condliffe

“Economic Policies and World Peace”

1939 Bergen

J. B. Condliffe

“Economic Policies and World Peace”

Source: Knutsen (2018)

32   Torbjørn L. Knutsen

Preparing for Paris: Introducing Peaceful Change The concept of peaceful change was introduced at the ICS’s conference in London in 1935. The concept was considered so important that it was selected as the conference theme for the 1936 and 1937 meetings. The selection was justified by the increasing tension in world affairs. Japan had broken international law by invading Manchuria and establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1934; Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1935; and Germany was remilitarizing the Rhineland in clear violation of the Versailles Treaty and was beginning to demand that its old colonies be returned. Germany, Italy, and Japan were dissatisfied powers. They argued that the international order was unjust, that it prevented their access to raw materials, blocked their entry to international markets, and denied them relief from growing population pressures at home. Germany’s National Socialist government was particularly insistent in its arguments. It denounced the Versailles Treaty upon which the extant order was founded and demanded changes in the status quo. How should the League respond? How should the great powers—primarily France and Great Britain—tackle the demands of the dissatisfied powers? This was the question that the delegates to the 10th ISC had come to Paris to discuss. The ISC Executive Committee prepared these conferences carefully. It actively encouraged discussions within the various national committees. In addition, it or­gan­ ized international study groups and facilitated cooperation of scholars from different countries. These activities introduced the concept of “peaceful change” into the political vocabulary with a big bang.2 This is indicated by figure 2.1, which shows a clear spike in the use of the term in books and articles during the late 1930s. The figure also shows that the concept was actively used for the next half century, before a decline in usage set in during the late 1980s. Members at the 1935 ISC meeting had connected peaceful change with collective security. The 1936 and 1937 conferences consolidated that connection. Delegates argued that a “peaceful solution of certain international problems” was a precondition for collective security (IIIC 1938, 12). Some of them pointed out that states like Japan, Italy, and Germany were dissatisfied with the Versailles Treaty (Dunn 1937, 3); that their governments thought the treaty unjust (e.g., Webster 1937, 10; Mair 1937, 83) and demanded changes in it and in the security arrangements that were implied in it. The ISC meeting in 1936 was hosted by Spain. When the ISC scholars assembled in Madrid in July, they found the Spanish capital boiling hot in more senses than one. A  radical popular front alliance had narrowly won Spain’s national elections four months earlier. The country’s political situation was tense. There were rumors that military officers would stage a coup to prevent the left-­wing alliance from taking power.

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   33 0.0000450% 0.0000400% 0.0000350% 0.0000300% 0.0000250% 0.0000200% 0.0000150% 0.0000100% 0.0000050% 0.0000000%

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 2.1  Frequency of the use of the term “peaceful change” (English-­language Google books, 1919–2019). Source: Google ngram.

The ISC leaders had chosen Madrid as a venue to make a point. They wanted to draw attention to the confrontation between the ideals of democracy and the revisionism of  the fascist powers. They held that the ideals of democracy were protected by the Versailles Treaty and the international law that flowed from it. But they also acknowledged that the treaty of 1919 favored some powers and disfavored others, that some powers were dissatisfied with the status quo, and that their demands had to be taken seriously. After Madrid, as the national committees began to prepare for the 1937 ISC meeting, there was no doubt that change brought about by violence and war was not peaceful. But the situation also illustrated the related point that change was not necessarily peaceful just because it was bloodless; change enforced by a threat of overwhelming force could not be described as peaceful either (Cruttwell 1937, 1). The British and Americans were particularly preoccupied with peaceful change. In  New York, the Council of Foreign Relations established a special study group. In London, Chatham House and the London School of Economics (LSE) arranged a lecture series and a symposium on peaceful change. At the London symposium, Toynbee argued that when law is simply upheld and enforced, pressure will be built up against it. He noted that the problem was not how to preserve the status quo by preventing change, but rather to ensure that change could occur in ways that would avoid the use of threats and violence and that would maintain justice, peace, and international order. International lawyers like Hersh Lauterpacht agreed. But they also demonstrated how difficult this was. Lauterpacht pointed out that international law alone could not produce change. The law could not just change itself, he continued. To change the law, it was necessary to establish an international legislative assembly. Only such an assembly could change international law peacefully. And in order to institutionalize peaceful change, this assembly would have to be permanent. This was “the only proper meaning of peaceful change as an effective legal institution of the international society,” argued Lauterpacht (1937, 141).

34   Torbjørn L. Knutsen This was the proposed approach. Several participants at the London symposium noted that this argument was complex, abstract, and general. Besides, the great powers of the world might see in Lauterpacht’s permanent international legislature a superstate or the contours of a world government and might find it hard to accept. In the real world, states are neither just nor generous. Yet they all tend to appeal to justice and fairness when they argue for change. Germany, for example, demanded its old colonies back, and its politicians justified the claim by arguing that the country had a problem with excess population at home and the international system was denying it access to necessary raw materials and markets abroad. The participants at the London symposium discussed the German arguments carefully. They generally concluded that these were disingenuous (Robbins 1937; Gregory 1937). Charles A. W. Manning (1937) delivered the concluding lecture at the London symposium. In his effort to summarize and systematize the presentations, he observed that the presenters could be divided into two groups. On the one hand were those who invoked justice and law and relied on voluntary state action within formal international institutions to ensure peaceful change. On the other were those who saw states as self-­ interested actors and their behavior as driven by national interest, power, and security. He singled out Lauterpacht as representative of the first group. By criticizing him, Manning indicated that he himself belonged to the second group.

Discussing Peaceful Change I: Tensions in the Discourse When ISC delegates met in Paris at the end of June 1937, the participants were well prepared. The rapporteur of the conference, Maurice Bourquin, who had read the working groups’ reports, praised their scholarly quality. Then he noted that he saw a tension in them. On the one hand, there were arguments that treated peaceful change in abstract terms and constructed “attractive systems which would perhaps correspond to the true ideal.” On the other, there were approaches that proceeded “from the world as it is” and which explored “the possibilities of the times in which we live.” This was an echo of the tension that Manning had noted in London a few months earlier. The discussions that followed Bourquin’s opening lecture were not affected by this tension. The delegates paid little or no attention to it. They did not deepen it, and at no point were the two approaches presented as contradictory in the sense that one approach would exclude the other. Rather, on the few occasions when Bourquin referred to them, he presented them as complementary. At one point he commented that both were important, that it was necessary to have one’s eyes fixed on an ideal goal but also to keep one’s feet on the ground. “We are all, I think, agreed on the actual principle of peaceful change,” Bourquin began, and concluded by saying that “[r]ealism must be the law of true idealists” (IIIC 1938, 260).

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   35 Two years later, Edward H. Carr elaborated on the distinction in Twenty-­Years’ Crisis ([1939] 2001). He was inspired by Karl Mannheim’s (1936) sociology of science, echoed a distinction that Halford Mackinder (1919) had made twenty years earlier, and called Toynbee and Lauterpacht “utopians.” He distinguished them from “realists,” with whom Carr expressed more sympathy. Carr presented the two approaches as complementary but as relating to each other as a thesis relates to an antithesis. He thus introduced the impression that the scholarly study of IR had developed through an internally driven dialectic. During the years that followed, much was made of Carr’s distinction between “utopians” and “realists.” After the Second World War, the relationship between the two would be referred to as “the First Great Debate,” and it marked the entire scholarly field of IR for a generation, if not two (Knutsen 2016).

Discussing Peaceful Change II: Assumptions of Scholarship and Science “Scholarship” and “science” were commonly used words at the CISSIR/ISC meetings: when Bourquin opened the 10th ISC conference, he praised the scholarly qualities of the conference reports; when Carr discussed the emergence of IR as a scholarly field, he referred to it as the “science of international politics.” Scientific analysis had long been one of the driving concerns of the teachers, researchers, and champions of IR. But what did they mean by “science”? How did the ISC delegates understand the term? They were all obviously aware of the necessity for scientific tools: precise definitions, special concepts, analytical distance, and logical rules of procedure. However, they discussed none of these tools in any depth. Neither did they engage in any general discussions of the philosophy of science. There are therefore few sources from the ISC meetings that can help answer the question of what its participants meant by “science” and by “scientific research.” However, it should be possible to infer an answer by examining their practice and usage. The three component branches of the field of philosophy of science serve here as a guide: methodology, ontology, and epistemology. The first (methodology) involves concepts, tools, and procedures; the second (ontology) deals with visions of the nature of the world; and the third (epistemology) discusses our access to knowledge about that world (Moses and Knutsen 2019, 4).

Methodological Assumptions At the first CISSIR/ISC meetings there was much talk about “method.” However, the concept was used in a curious way. It referred neither to research techniques nor to questions of human knowledge; rather, it concerned pedagogical arrangements. It referred to forms of academic coordination and cooperation. When the CISSIR ­delegates discussed “methods,” they referred to structures of institutes, procedures of

36   Torbjørn L. Knutsen conferences, and other ways of organizing and coordinating activities of scholars from different countries. The discussions of CISSIR were premised on the notion that scientific research was all about finding facts and using reason. It was assumed that those two activities had a useful output—that they produced impartial knowledge. It was also assumed that the activities involved a useful process—that sustained scientific cooperation produced understanding, consensus, solidarity, and harmony among scientists. The dissolution of CISSIR and the establishment of ISC in 1931 involved a change in conference purpose. The focus switched from process to output: whereas CISSIR had been predicated on the idea that the scientific process would increase understanding and solidarity among intellectuals and thus contribute to a harmonious world, ISC was based on the idea that science would produce knowledge—which in turn could be used by political decisionmakers to create a more orderly and stable world. This also reflected a change in outlook: a move away from the 1922 proposal of Léon Bourgeois and his French, rationalist orientation based on reason and solidarity toward an Anglo-­American empiricism preoccupied with IR events and issues. This change was not attended by any debate on methodologies and methods. The CISSIR/ISC delegates rarely, if ever, discussed the nature of “science” or “the scientific method.” They did not discuss how IR scholars could acquire accurate information about international politics. If we find few clues to the methodology of early IR in the conference debates, we may instead find them in the scholars’ practice. What kind of understanding of “science” is suggested by their scholarly practice? It largely reflected an understanding of science as investigative procedures such as those used by historians and lawyers. The reports from the ISC working groups reflected the source criticism commonly used by historians. Oral presentations and debates were respectful and polite and governed by formal rules, reminiscent of the formal rules of address used during court trials or debates in legislative assemblies. Great emphasis was placed on impartial presentations. Much attention was paid to relevance of content, precision in language, and clarity in style. The debates were marked by formal procedures and linguistic precision that later methodologists would refer to as “effective semantics” (Næss 1966) and that German philosophers might call Sachlichkeit. Three study groups submitted reports with hints of quantitative evidence to the 1937 ISC meeting. The group that examined population pressures presented demographic statistics for various countries: rates of population growth, immigration statistics, assessments of overpopulation and underpopulation, and so forth. The study groups on raw materials, trade, and markets, and on colonies, presented production figures and numbers on the movement of people and goods. It would, however, be an exaggeration to characterize this use of numbers as statistical analysis. There were no tables or charts in the reports. There was no bivariate analysis, no systematic effort to separate de­pend­ ent from independent variables and to measure covariations. Numbers were simply inserted in sentences and used as indications of quantity or instruments of precision. Numbers would at most be used as simple, univariate descriptions and were not submitted to any statistical techniques. Throughout the 1930s, IR had a limited toolkit of social

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   37 science methods at its disposal. The field was obviously in an early stage of methodological awareness.

Ontological Assumptions The discussions at the ISC meetings were marked by an ontological consensus. It was commonly accepted that it was meaningful to talk about an international system and that the basic units of that system were sovereign states. It was also commonly accepted that some states—the great powers—were more important than others. Finally, it was accepted that norms of behavior and international law were important because they restrained the behavior of the great powers and added order to the system. This state-­focused and materialist ontology was undoubtedly a product of the Great War (1914–1918), which had been an unmitigated catastrophe. The Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations were predicated on the intention to prevent such a catastrophe from ever happening again. The ultimate purpose of ISC was to achieve that goal by providing statesmen and civil servants with factual information and accurate knowledge about world affairs. Academic discussions about international change were generally predicated on the notion of a mismatch between traditional practices of statecraft and a new political reality to which the old practices were not properly attuned. Among the key elements of that new reality were industrialism and interdependence. Industrialism accounted for much of the enormous destruction of life and property wrought by the Great War, because it had brought forth new weapons systems of unprecedented power. Interdependence, too, accounted for much of the destruction, but indirectly. The Great War had disrupted international trade and finance, upon which all industrial economies depended. Thus, to the direct destruction of armed battle was added that of institutions of trade and finance that underpinned the well-­being of entire societies. The Great War had, in effect, destroyed states as well as their interrelations and caused the old international system to collapse. This was not a novel argument. It was essentially the argument presented by Norman Angell (1910) in his runaway bestseller, The Great Illusion. After the Great War, Angell’s argument was generally accepted: that the established ways in which the statesmen and soldiers had made their decisions were unsuitable for a world that was based on industrialism and interdependence. Angell’s basic ontology echoed throughout the ISC debates. It was based on the premise that humans were ra­tional creatures who could observe and learn. Through reason and experience humans would understand that war was neither profitable nor sensible anymore, and consequently they would change their international behavior. Human nature, in other words, was malleable. It would adapt to historically changing circumstances. Human ­societies would leave their old belligerent behavior behind and adapt to a new age of in­ter­de­pend­ence, in which contest, competition, and conflict would be replaced by a new diplomacy based on cooperation and mutual aid. At the London symposium, Karl Mannheim was the sole voice to dispute this simple argument. Addressing the question of human nature explicitly, he first expressed agreement with the claim by noting that there is “a great plasticity in man” (Mannheim 1937, 102). But then he qualified that statement. Human behavior is not exclusively driven by

38   Torbjørn L. Knutsen reason, he argued. First, humans, like other animals, are equipped with basic biological drives and instincts. Second, unlike other animals, humans are symbolic creatures. They construct societies and institutions of government that are informed by values, myths, and meaning. Human beings are “living in a community whose reaction is not based simply on instinct but on symbols of his own creation” (114). Under certain circumstances, such symbols and symbolic activities may serve as substitutes for real activities, ­overriding reason. During a period of change and insecurity, for example, when routine behavior is disrupted and desired objects are withdrawn from them, people may be seized by symbolic goals, which become “the new driving force for new forms of spontaneous group integration” (116). Mannheim’s assumption about the rational properties of humans dovetailed nicely with the optimistic (or “utopian”) arguments in the debate about peaceful change; since human beings were rational and malleable, it would be possible to alter the fundamental behavior and attitudes of citizens by reforming and reorganizing the ordering ­institutions of society. However, since human behavior was, according to Mannheim, also affected by instincts and symbols, reform would be difficult. Anthropologist Lucy Mair (1937) entertained similar ideas. But it is unclear how much the other ­participants at the London symposium took on board Mannheim’s arguments ­concerning the instinctive and symbolic limits of human reason. At the Paris ISC meeting there was not a trace of any such limits. Indeed, the Paris discussion of peaceful change was itself limited; the arguments of the Paris conference were expressed within the mainstream, Western—largely Anglo-­American—reason-­based assumptions of the times. The ISC discussion did not reflect the full spectrum of IR arguments of the age. An important reason for this was limited conference participation. The scholars came from League of Nations member states only. By 1937, Germany, Italy, and Japan had withdrawn from the League; their nationalist, fascist, or geopolitical perspectives were not represented. The USSR was a League member (it had joined in 1934), but Stalin’s dictatorial regime sent no representatives to conferences to discuss with bourgeois academics. Consequently, the conference lacked voices from both the illiberal right and the radical left of the political spectrum. The same ontological limits characterized the whole scholarly field of IR. Early IR curricula excluded approaches such as Marxism (Bukharin [1915]  1973; Lenin [1917] 1975) and geopolitics (Kjellén  1916; Mackinder  1919; Haushofer  1928). This had ­epistemological consequences, limiting the debates that were conducted and the understanding and knowledge that they produced.

Epistemological Assumptions The ISC meetings discussed neither method nor methodology. But they tended to rely implicitly on a philosophy of science that was informed by the epistemology of British empiricism. This is apparent in the way the discussants framed the two basic objects of their discussions on peaceful change: the sovereign nation-­state and the international system. Their definition of the “state” was simple and straightforward: a

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   39 territory with a permanent population and a government with the capacity to enter into relations with other states.3 The definition of “international system” was less clear. The concept was used by some, but by no means all, of the ISC participants. It was employed in a matter-­of-­fact fashion and without any explicit definition, and in two different ways. The first (and dominant) usage was derived from international law and was used interchangeably with “international society.” This is how it was used by Bourquin, who in his opening lecture to the 1937 meeting made a distinction between the international legal system (by which he meant the norms and rules that govern the actions and interactions of states) and the real world—the international society (which was composed of actually interacting states) (IIIC 1938, 18ff.). The second usage of “system” relied on a more naturalist or mechanical understanding of the world. Toynbee (1937) provided an example as he tried to grasp the core issue of peaceful change in historical rather than legal terms. If we are to have a system of collective security that avoids war, Toynbee began, then we need to make sure that the system is just. He continued: In a changing society (such as human society is . . .), two things have to be secured if justice is to reign. There must be constitutional means of reconsidering and revision of the law, as well as constitutional means of upholding and enforcing it. In a changing society, a law which is simply enforced as it stands, without any possibility of altering it in consonance with changing facts and changing needs, will degenerate sooner or later into an inequitable and lawless régime of force; and in the end, such force inevitably evokes a stronger counter-­force to overthrow it. Collective security without peaceful change would be like a boiler without a safety-­valve. In preventing perpetual escapes of steam it would merely be boiling up for a final shattering explosion.  (Toynbee 1936, 27)

Toynbee’s usage dovetailed nicely with a British notion that was developed by Isaac Newton and later applied to human relations by authors like David Hume and Adam Smith, for whom a system is simply an entity composed of units (in this case, sovereign states) and of relations among those units. However, there were also scholars who relied not on mechanical images alone but included elements of human agency, who saw peaceful change as an outcome of interactions among human beings moved by self-­interest, will, and tactical reason. This was the approach of many international lawyers. They operated on a domestic analogy and preferred “international society” to the concept “international system.” They noted that the ordering principles of society were provided by social norms, rules, and international institutes or institutions. These institutions, they averred, were created by people—by statesmen and diplomats—through interaction and negotiation. In other words, the ordering institutions of international society were the products not of states but of human beings—of rational, interacting humans who come to mutually advantageous agreements about the basic principles of interaction and who impose these principles upon the world. Through human interaction, state behavior is regulated and a semblance of order is created in the international society of states.

40   Torbjørn L. Knutsen This was also the approach of Fredrick Dunn (1937). He observed that Germany and Italy were dissatisfied powers which complained about having been treated unfairly. They demanded international change and justified their demands by invoking common conceptions of fairness and justice. In reality, Dunn remarked, these countries were driven by national interest and a quest for greater influence and power. Germany and Italy were not unique in this respect, Dunn continued. All states ultimately pursue national interest and power. For Dunn (1937, 9) the international system was “based in large measure upon the notion of ‘self-­help,’ which means that the individual member of the community must eventually rely upon their own strength to defend their rights and possessions or to obtain what they want.” Dunn agreed with the lawyers who claimed that international law provided order to interstate relations. However, Dunn believed that in a self-­help system, order was provided by another mechanism as well: by the formation and ­dissolution of alliances. In other words, by a shifting balance of power among states. For Dunn, the problem with Germany and Italy was not that they were driven by concerns for power and self-­interest; all states were. Rather, the problem was that Germany and Italy were informed by norms and ideals that were out of tune with the modern world. The demands of the dissatisfied powers, Dunn averred, were driven by archaic ideals of autocratic and self-­sufficient states. Italy and Germany were oblivious to the fact that in the modern world, no state could be self-­sufficient. They did not understand that although a single state might lack a full supply of raw materials at home, all kinds of materials were constantly available for purchase on the world market. The problem with Germany was that its government wanted to possess resources and raw materials and to control access to them. This way of thinking flew in the face of all economic theories of a modern, interdependent world. Besides, it paid no attention to the will and rights of the native populations who lived on the territories that Germany wanted to colonize. If a modern, industrial state wants to develop its economy and maintain its wealth, it is dependent upon substantial trade with other states. Countries like Germany and Japan reject this modern idea, Dunn argued. These states industrialize but at the same time insist on retaining the archaic ideals of self-­sufficiency and territorial control. As a result, they will starve their economies, create scarcities, and deprive their peoples of wealth and development. To remedy their economic stagnation, they will adopt an expansionist, even aggressive, foreign policy. In the modern world, industrial states are interdependent, Dunn concluded. And since interdependence makes war very costly, it makes industrial states more risk averse and careful, less prone to act with aggression. Germany and Japan do not accept the interdependence argument. They counteract it by trying to become self-­sufficient. As a result, they increase the likelihood of conflict and war in the system. Their demand for self-­sufficiency, then, not only increases opportunity costs for themselves; it also destabilizes the international system as a whole. Finally, there was Karl Mannheim, the only lecturer at the London symposium who formulated social constructivist arguments and invoked the Marxist concept of social “superstructure.” Mannheim was preoccupied with how the ideas, attitudes, and political

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   41 culture of nations shape human reason. Culture, he argued, was affected by the history and geography of the individual state. The collective experiences of a nation shape its common outlook, its political culture, and its social-­psychological nature, he argued. Mannheim’s argument is notable in itself. In the context of the 1930s, however, the interesting thing is that he seems to have been the only scholar to invoke biological and constructivist theories in the early debates about peaceful change. This reflects a telling aspect of these debates: they did not reflect the full spectrum of the IR arguments of the age. The discussions were conducted among scholars from League of Nations member states and were marked by scholarly consensus. Radical left-­wing governments, like that of the Soviet Union, sent no delegates to the ISC meetings. Radical right-­wing governments, like those of Germany, Italy, and Japan, had withdrawn from the League by 1937. In other words, the conference lacked voices from both the extreme left and the extreme right. The ISC debates reflected a moderate, pro-­League consensus. Yet there was room within the latter for a variety of outlooks and viewpoints. Maurice Bourquin commented on this. On the one hand, he found members who argued that international change could come about through international law adjusted by reason. On the other hand, he saw members who perceived international change “as won by force” (IIIC 1936, 13). Similar observations were made by Manning (1937) and Dunn (1937) and later developed by Carr ([1939] 2001), who participated in ISC’s Paris meeting in 1937.

Conclusions “Peaceful change” was the topic of the times, Albert Sarraut said as he opened the 10th ISC meeting in the summer of 1937 and spoke on behalf of the French hosts. Christian Lange, speaking on behalf of the foreign guests, used even bigger words: “Peaceful change,” he said, “is at the heart of the preoccupation of every man and every woman who cares about the future of humanity” (IIIC 1938, 595). His opinion was echoed by the French Foreign Office a few hours later when it hosted a reception for the conference participants at Quai d’Orsay. The importance of peaceful change was echoed during lunch, which was arranged by the French Ministry of National Education. The French hosts emphasized the importance of the conference theme and made the ISC delegates—teachers and researchers from many countries—feel welcome and significant. Figure 2.1 shows how the usage of the term “peaceful change” spiked during the second half of the 1930s and indicates that the theme was the question of the times. But it also suggests that it was neither the question of all times nor the defining question of IR. The figure shows that after having been introduced with a bang in 1935, the term’s use peaked during the next handful of years, before its frequency substantially declined. After the Second World War it stabilized for the next half century, until, after a brief revival in the mid-1980s, it dropped off toward the end of the Cold War.4

42   Torbjørn L. Knutsen This chapter has examined three institutional sites of IR discourse that emerged during the interwar era: education, foreign policy research, and League-­sponsored conferences. A first concluding point concerns the importance of the latter site. This was where the early discussions of collective security and peaceful change were initiated and coordinated. The conference site was also decisive for the evolution of the scholarly study of IR, because it brought international scholars together. It encouraged cooperation and coordinated activities among teachers and researchers. A second concluding point concerns the importance of the conference organizers and key participants. Recent literature has paid increasing attention to individuals like Lionel Curtis, Alfred Zimmern, and Arnold Toynbee and to the institutions to which they belonged: the British Round-­Table group and Chatham House (Quigley  1981; Thakur, Davis, and Vale  2017; Grandjean  2018; Pemberton  2019). The importance of continental participants, on the other hand, has been neglected. Léon Bourgeois, for example, who had already proposed a League of Nations before the Great War (Bourgeois 1910) and who initiated the League-­sponsored conference system, has been overlooked in the English-­language literature. The same may be said of Maurice Bourquin, who was an important figure during the discussions of both collective security and peaceful change. Bourquin was rapporteur for the ISC meetings from 1935 to 1938 and left formative marks on all four conferences. Through his introductory lectures, he defined the conceptual framework for the discussions on both collective security and peaceful change. He participated actively in the meetings, keeping the discussions on track. After the conferences he edited the reports (IIIC 1936, 1938). Yet he remains virtually unknown. This neglect indicates a third concluding point: that continental inputs declined over time, whereas Anglo-­American scholarship had an increasing impact and came to dominate, first, the site of League-­sponsored conferences and later, the scholarly field of IR as a whole. What were the reasons for this increasing impact? What drove this Anglo-­ American rise toward disciplinary hegemony? One likely answer lies in the realms of ideas and institutions: partly in the early failure of CISSIR to establish an international elite of cooperating intellectuals along lines drawn up by Léon Bourgeois and partly in the success of ISC, which explored the big, interstate questions of the age. Another likely answer is material concerns about the financing of sites and institutions, especially during the early 1930s, when the world economy was in a recession and academic funds were cut. Teachers and researchers from Britain and the United States rose to dominance because the institutions to which they belonged were sponsored by large, wealthy, private organizations. British and Americans sites of teaching and research successfully solicited funds from philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie Memorial Trust and the Rockefeller Foundation (1936, 243ff.). The French, by contrast, were reluctant to accept such support. A fourth concluding point concerns the consequences of this Anglo-­American rise to prominence in the ISC and, eventually, in the field of IR. It meant a shift toward an Anglo-­American view of a “science of international relations.” Its purpose was to build a solid base of robust and factual knowledge, which the statesmen of the world could draw

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   43 on to make informed decisions. The idea was to replace myth, ideology, and ob­scu­rant­ ism with accurate information and scholarly knowledge derived from systematic observation of states and state relations. Although many participating scholars sought to derive lessons from history (Toynbee 1937), the concrete application was to the current international situation. As a consequence, IR discussions were driven by current events. This is quite apparent in the case of the conference site; the themes discussed at the ISC were always selected on the basis of contemporary events. The conferences in 1934–1935 were informed by the Great Depression, and those of 1936–1937 and 1938–1939 by Germany’s actions in Europe, Italy’s in North Africa, and Japan’s in China. This suggests a fifth concluding point about the interwar debate on peaceful change. It was a reaction on the part of status quo, pro-­League powers to challenges posed by the unlawful acts of dissatisfied powers. The debate was conducted within a liberal, centrist discourse. It confronted illiberal arguments that existed outside the Atlantic community. It represented moderate, pro-­League viewpoints and lacked voices from the extreme left and the extreme right. Theories of imperialism (Bukharin [1915] 1973; Lenin [1917] 1975) and geopolitics (Kjellén 1916) were excluded from the ISC debates. Indeed, such approaches were excluded from the entire field of IR. Finally, although interwar IR was dominated by an Anglo-­American philosophy of science, different approaches existed. These gave rise to different understandings of the concept of “peaceful change.” However, they were encased in a broad, common understanding that was well expressed by Maurice Bourquin. The “actual principle of peaceful change,” he said, was that “the international order, like internal order, needs to adapt itself to changing conditions of social life, and . . . it is desirable that this adaptation should take place by regular and peaceful procedures” (IIIC 1938, 260). This definition represented the attitudes of the status quo powers. It reflected a conservative project designed to introduce to the world order some principles or means of change in order to preserve the international order that was drawn up at Versailles in 1919.

Notes 1. No report was published from the 1938/1939 meetings on “Economic Policies and World Peace” due to the outbreak of World War II. 2. Discussions within the ISC network stimulated discussions outside it as well. The American Society of International Law, for example, devoted its 1936 conference to “peaceful change.” Cf. the special issue of the Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 1936, with articles by, for example, Quincy Wright, which suggests that nestors in IR and members of ISC may also contribute to other fields. 3. This definition was adopted by the League as recently as 1936. It was an outcome of the 7th International Conference of American States that met in Montevideo in late December 1933. It was later registered with the League of Nations and has since been the standard definition in international law (cf. League of Nations 1936). The introductory chapter in Dunn (1937) cleaves faithfully to the definition in this so-­called Montevideo declaration. 4. It is tempting to speculate that the post–Second World War employment of the term varied with the shifting temperature of the Cold War and that the usage of the term increased

44   Torbjørn L. Knutsen during the tensions that followed the Korean War (early 1950s), decolonization, the Vietnam War (1960s), and the “second Cold War” (1975–1985). The frequency of use fell steadily after the breakup of the Eastern bloc and the USSR.

References Angell, Norman. 1910. The Great Illusion. London: Heineman. Bourgeois, Léon. 1910. Pour la société des nations. Paris: E. Fasquelle. Bukharin, Nikolai. (1915) 1973. Imperialism and World Economy. New York: Monthly Review Press. Carr, Edward H. (1939) 2001. The Twenty-Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939. London: Palgrave. Cruttwell, C. R. M. F. 1937. A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World. London: Oxford University Press. Dunn, Frederick. 1937. Peaceful Change. New York: CFR. Grandjean, Martin. 2018. “Les réseaux de la coopération intellectuelle: La Société des Nations comme actrice des échanges scientifiques et culturels dans l’entre-deux-guerres.” PhD thesis, Université de Lausanne. Gregory, T.  E. 1937. “The Economic Bases of Revisionism.” In Peaceful Change, edited by Charles Manning, 63–81. London: Macmillan. Haushofer, Karl. 1928. Bausteine zur Geopolitik. Berlin: Vowinkel IIIC. 1933. The State and Economic Life. Paris: IIIC IIIC. 1936. Collective Security: A Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences. Paris: IIIC. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.66102/page/n3/mode/2up. IIIC. 1938. Peaceful Change: Proceedings of the Tenth International Studies Conference. Paris: IIIC. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.275473/mode/2up https://archive.org/ stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.275473/2015.275473.Peaceful-Change_djvu.txt. Kjellén, Rudolf. 1916. Staten som Lifsform. Stockholm: Hugo Gerbers förlag. Knutsen, Torbjørn. 2016. A History of International Relations Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Knutsen, Torbjørn. 2018. “The Origins of IR: Idealists, Administrators and the Institutionalization of a New Science.” In SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations, edited by Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati, and Nicholas Onuf, 193–207. Los Angeles: Sage. Lauterpacht, Hersh. 1937. “The Legal Aspect.” In Peaceful Change, edited by C. Manning, 135–168. London: Macmillan. League of Nations. 1936. “Convention on Rights and Duties of States.” League of Nations Treaty Series 165, no. 3802: 20–43. Lenin, V. I. (1917) 1975. “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.” In The Lenin Anthology, edited by R. C. Tucker, 204–275. New York: W. W. Norton. Mackinder, Halford J. 1919. Democratic Ideals and Reality. New York: Holt. Mair, Lucy. 1937. “Colonial Policy and Peaceful Change.” In Peaceful Change, edited by C. Manning, 81–100. London: Macmillan. Mannheim, Karl. (1926) 1936. Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge. Mannheim, Karl. 1937. “The Psychological Aspect.” In Peaceful Change, edited by C. Manning, 101–134. London: Macmillan. Manning, Charles, ed. 1937. Peaceful Change. London: Macmillan.

The Interwar Era and the Disciplinary Context   45 Moses, Jonathon W., and Torbjørn L. Knutsen. 2019. Ways of Knowing. London: Palgrave. Næss, Arne. 1966. Communication and Argument: Element of Applied Semantics. London: Allen & Unwin. Pemberton, Jo-Ann. 2019. Cold-Blooded Idealists: The Story of International Relations, Part I. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Quigley, Carrol. 1981. The Anglo-American Establishment. New York: Books in Focus. Robbins, Lionel. 1937. “The Economics of Territorial Sovereignty.” In Peaceful Change, edited by C. Manning, 41–62. London: Macmillan. Rockefeller Foundation. 1936. Annual Report 1936. https://assets.rockefellerfoundation.org/ app/uploads/20150530122125/Annual-Report-1936.pdf. Thakur, Vineet, Alexander E. Davis, and Peter Vale. 2017. “Imperial Mission, Scientific Method: An Alternative Account of the Origins of IR.” Millennium 46, no. 1: 3–23. Toynbee, Arnold. 1936. “Peaceful Change or War?” International Affairs 15, no. 1: 26–56. Toynbee, Arnold. 1937. “The Lessons of History.” In Peaceful Change, edited by C. Manning, 27–40. London: Macmillan. Webster, Charles  K. 1937. “What is the Problem of Peaceful Change?” In Peaceful Change, edited by C. Manning, 3–26. London: Macmillan.

Chapter 3

Peacefu l Ch a nge a fter the Wor ld Wa rs Peter Marcus Kristensen

“Peaceful change” is a fundamental problem in International Relations (IR) and was subject to intense debate as the discipline institutionalized in the interwar period. The argument, advanced by some realists (e.g., Carr 1939; Gilpin 1981), that peaceful change is a “perennial” problem is somewhat deceptive, however. Concepts are not part of a timeless canon but are always embedded and embodied in specific historical contexts. “Peaceful change” was in important ways an interwar concept and debate (Kristensen 2019), and this chapter aims to trace and explain the diachronic life of the concept of “peaceful change” in the IR discipline after the world wars. It contends that what appears to be the same concept (“peaceful change”) recurring over time may in fact be different conceptions deployed differently in different contexts to address different problems. “Peaceful change” did not mean the same in the 1950s or 1970s as it did in the 1930s. The chapter traces these conceptual changes, as well as how the concept generally retreated into a more marginal space in the postwar discipline. The explanation for its postwar travelogue—and marginalization in particular—is to be found in various factors, including (1) a changing postwar geopolitical and technological context, (2) a changing view of appeasement and (3) colonialism, (4) institutional and disciplinary changes, and (5) intellectual currents disavowing “interwar idealism” but endorsing a postwar realist version of peaceful change. The final two sections trace two ostensibly “idealist” lineages in (6) international law discourse and (7) (neo)functionalism.

48   Peter Marcus Kristensen

Geopolitical and Technological Developments: From Peaceful Change to Peaceful Coexistence The flourishing interwar debate on peaceful change was deeply influenced by its geopolitical context and “reflected the main trends in contemporary international relations,” specifically the mounting calls for treaty revision, growing aggression by the so-­called imperial have-­nots, and the looming threat of war (Antola 1984, 229, 233). When the delegates met in Paris for the 1937 conference on peaceful change, Japan had already invaded Manchuria, Italy had occupied Ethiopia, and Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland. Although contributors from many countries participated, it has been argued that the peaceful change agenda reflected “Anglo-­American ideas of peaceful international relations” (Antola 1984, 229) in that it interwove the British debate about collective security versus appeasement with the American debate about intervention versus abstention (Ashworth 2002, 34). This geopolitical context changed dramatically after the Second World War and provides part of the explanation for the postwar demise of peaceful change. One of the curiosities of the early Cold War order was that, unlike at Versailles, a status quo had not yet been established after the Second World War due to the East-­West conflict between the victors of the war. As Thompson pointed out, “the question of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo” at the core of peaceful change was therefore “superseded by an earlier and prior question” of simply working out a practical arrangement on which a postwar status quo acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United States could be founded (1953, 758–759). As the bipolar Cold War structure crystallized and the threat of nuclear war loomed, the concern was more with settling and stabilizing, than changing, the postwar order. The main problem for early Cold War IR, Neal and Hamlett argued, was “peaceful coexistence” involving acceptance, rather than change, of the status quo balance of power (Neal and Hamlett 1969, 301). This conservatism is exemplified by Butterfield, who saw IR as a “science for the preservation of a civilized order” and “the maintenance of a general status quo” (Butterfield 1951, 416). Cold War IR was focused on maintaining (European) order and stability rather than pursuing change and justice (Bull 1977). Apart from the bipolar rivalry, the advent of nuclear deterrence also put the problem in a different light, although scholars disagreed on whether this made the problem of peaceful change redundant or more pertinent. As an example of the former, Hedley Bull contended that the problem of peaceful change had “lost its urgency” in the Cold War (Bull 1969, 633). In the 1930s, Bull argued, war was still seen as the main historic agent of change, and thus the maintenance of peace required another method of change in order to avoid the confrontation between states demanding change and states opposed to it. In the bipolar post–World War II world, he held, the two top

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   49 powers were both winners of the last great war and thus mainly concerned with conserving the status quo and their position in it. Moreover, they both possessed nuclear weapons, which meant that peace, understood as the avoidance of great power war, became so “supreme” an objective of both “that it cannot be supposed that it depends on the satisfaction of the demands they have for change” (Bull 1969, 634). Peaceful change thus had relevance only in minor conflicts that did not involve the superpowers (Bull 1969, 634). Other scholars argued exactly the opposite: in a nuclear world, changes of the international order must be peaceful because the alternative to peaceful change is not violent change, but cataclysmic change. Both liberals and realists argued that innovations in technologies of destruction made peaceful change both more difficult and more urgent for the preservation of peace because nuclear weapons had vastly increased the costs of pursuing political change in the status quo through force (Bloomfield 1957, 1; Dunn 1959, 278–285; Herz 1959, 181; Gilpin 1981, 217; Keohane 1986, 197–198). Quincy Wright (1946, 882) argued that the postwar balance of power, with fewer great powers whose relative superiority over others had increased, combined with more destructive war technologies, made the need for continuous change more urgent. John Herz, too, stressed that nuclear weapons made the problem of finding alternative and peaceful means of change more pertinent because nuclear deterrence rendered the “resort to nuclear or even conventional war no longer possible.” But if war, or the threat thereof, which had been a classical tool of diplomacy, was no longer available, how could nations protect the status quo or change it (Herz 1959, 181)? Frederick Dunn, a central scholar of peaceful change in the interwar period, also noted that the Cold War, “with its sharp rivalry between the two polar blocs,” made it more difficult to develop procedures of peaceful change, yet pressures for change remained “as strong as before,” voluntary change as difficult to achieve as ever, and the advent of nuclear weapons had “restricted the use of military power as an instrument for bringing about political change in the international system, and increased the use of  non-­violent means of seeking change” (Dunn 1959, 285). Dunn had written the introduction to The Absolute Weapon (Dunn et al. 1946), which argued that nuclear weapons had made war redundant and contended that the bomb affected peaceful change in two ways. First, nuclear weapons limit the use of force for great powers seeking or blocking change of the status quo, which enables smaller powers to present faits accomplis otherwise not compatible with their relative power. Second, nuclear weapons alter the calculus of the great powers because they change the strategic value of certain territories that would previously have been subject to claims for change (Dunn 1959, 284). Compared to the pre-­nuclear age, when diplomats could resolve disputes and find compromise because the alternative was a “decision on the battlefield,” Robert Gilpin (1981, 217) argued two decades later, the advent of nuclear weapons was a serious impediment to diplomacy and the “goal of instituting a mechanism of peaceful change, yet one that made the problem of peaceful change as pertinent as ever.” In sum, while most of these postwar scholars acknowledged that peaceful change was increasingly difficult in a nuclear and bipolar world, they still considered it to be

50   Peter Marcus Kristensen an, if not the most, important problem in international relations. The geopolitical and technological context alone is therefore an insufficient explanation of the marginalization of peaceful change.

Peaceful Change and the Postwar Politics of Appeasement and Containment Another explanation for the demise of peaceful change was that it was increasingly viewed as providing the rationale for appeasement policies, which had little currency in the post-­Hitler and burgeoning Cold War era. This is not entirely unfounded. Some interwar articulations of peaceful change, notably Carr’s, conceptualized it as a way to avoid war by appeasing the “have-­nots” threatening war with territorial redistribution, and these views were later (rightly) discredited as justifying appeasement. During the war, Carr (1946) himself even decided to revise his argument that Munich was a case of peaceful change for the second edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Others continued to advocate for peaceful change as appeasement, for instance Charles Manning, who during the war advanced the (at that point very politically incorrect) argument that peaceful change should come about through an “institutionalized Munich” (Manning cited in Long  2012, 80). But equating peaceful change per se with appeasement is misleading and ignores the nonrealist and nonappeasing conceptualizations of peaceful change. Many interwar scholars explicitly objected to the equation of peaceful change with appeasement. In any case, the experiences of Munich and appeasement ‘filtered through’ the concept, discrediting peaceful change after the Second World War. Martin Wight’s critique in Power Politics was that the interwar argument about peaceful change suffered from two “radical vices”: it was begun too late, after change was conceded, and it was conducted “not by the strong to the weak on grounds of justice, but by the comfortable to the violent because of alarm.” For the Nazis therefore peaceful change “acquired the appearance of sacrificing small powers to the aggressor” (Wight [1946]  1995, 212). Peaceful change in the appeasement mode depended on the premise that the dissatisfied have limited and satisfiable aims—an idea that was severely challenged post-­Hitler and in the context of the Cold War (Bloomfield 1957, 18). Postwar critics who read peaceful change mainly through Carr dismissed it simply as a cynical and amoral policy of “prudent yielding” and “give and take” that could come about only in response to a “threat of force” rather than through arbitration, judicial settlement, and an element of morality (Bull 1969, 626–627; Fox 1985, 5–7). Peaceful change, in Carr’s version, was a ruthful standing by and letting go in order to, by all means, avoid war. For a contrast, W. T. R. Fox argued that Frederick Dunn’s (1937) Peaceful Change not only anticipated

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   51 The Twenty Years’ Crisis, but importantly also did not prescribe appeasement to the same extent (Fox 1962, 13). That peaceful change need not amount to appeasement is also evident in Gilpin’s later treatment of the topic. Gilpin did not equate peaceful change with appeasement understood as simply nonviolent changes that preserve the peace. Gilpin, like many interwar scholars of peaceful change, emphasized that rather than simply maintaining peace, changes had to be consistent with morality and values: “In the absence of shared values and interests, the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of success” (Gilpin  1981, 209). But during the Cold War, shared values and interests were few. Consequently, the combination of the experience with an unappeasable Hitler and growing anticommunist sentiment, particularly in the United States, made the times hard for peaceful change. The ‘lesson learned,’ from a Cold War perspective, was that in the face of structural change, one should not succumb to the demands of rising powers, but rather stand firm and be prepared to fight them in a hegemonic war. In Fox’s view, the realism of the 1950s provided “a rationale for not appeasing the presumably unappeasable and therefore for cold war” (Fox 1985, 7). A related reason that the peaceful change agenda faded, at least in Anglo-­American IR, had to do with the specific “have-­not.’ ” Like Hitler’s Germany, many scholars and policy makers saw the Soviet Union as a revolutionist, expansionist, and ideological power rather than a normal dissatisfied or revisionist one. An illustrative example is John Foster Dulles, a long-­term advocate of peaceful change, who was even dubbed the “hero of peaceful change” by Life magazine (Life 1959, 32). During and after the Second World War, Dulles restated that a durable peace “can be achieved only by a world order which will permit of peaceful change” (Dulles 1941, 498; 1957, 38). However, there was a change in the scope and moral underpinnings of his conception of peaceful change during the Cold War. Dulles increasingly based his postwar arguments about the possibility for peaceful change on religious grounds and moral law—and contrasted this view with the “atheistic and materialistic” Marxian communism, which views law as a mere reflection of those in power (Dulles 1959, 15). The coercive and terrorizing practices that follow from the “methods of communism are incompatible with peaceful change,” Dulles argued (Dulles in Sohn 1948, 1126; Dulles 1959, 18). Demands for peaceful change were therefore increasingly seen in the light of the Soviet threat and not viewed in terms of their justice but whether or not they were in favor of communism (Dulles 1957, 41). President Dwight D. Eisenhower also subscribed to a vision of peaceful change: “We must not think of peace as a static condition in world affairs. That is not true peace, nor in fact can any kind of peace be preserved that way. Change is the law of life, and unless there is peaceful change, there is bound to be violent change” (Eisenhower 1955, 1006). But his conception of peaceful change was also coupled to a liberal, antitotalitarian project encouraging only peaceful changes toward the goals of freedom, justice, and human rights (Eisenhower 1955, 1007). Peaceful change simply became more difficult in a political climate that viewed all concessions and any type of rapprochement as appeasement and giving in to communism,

52   Peter Marcus Kristensen as was the case at the height of the Cold War. Only with détente did peaceful change vis-­à-­vis the Eastern bloc and in the territorial status quo in Europe become a topic. Particularly the European debate in the 1960s and 1970s was more attuned to the peaceful change agenda. Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik can be read as a “quest for peaceful change” (Niedhart 2016). The Helsinki Final Act (1975) committed itself (at least ­rhetorically) to the defense of the status quo, mainly territorial, and the inviolability of borders, but at the same time was open to subtle and peaceful change. The West particularly emphasized the document’s “dynamic potential, insisting on the possibility of a peaceful change of frontiers or least their greater permeability” (Niedhart 2017).

From Colonial to Anticolonial Peaceful Change The interwar discourse on peaceful change was conducted largely by Euro-­American (and male) scholars and was markedly Eurocentric, colonial, and imperialist. The main problem was how to effect peaceful changes so as to avoid war in Europe, and the only demands for change that were taken seriously were those of European powers threatening war. The 1937 Peaceful Change conference was subtitled “procedures, population, raw materials, colonies,” and substantial parts of it discussed whether a peaceful redistribution of Europe’s colonial possessions could satisfy the imperial “have-­nots” and their alleged need for raw materials and population outlets (Lebensraum). Colonial subjects were not represented at the conference, but were for the most part treated as objects to be exchanged for a new equilibrium of peace in Europe, even though some participants objected against treating colonies as pawns to sacrifice and called for decolonization (Kristensen 2019, forthcoming). The political context clearly changed as decolonization proceeded. Although colonialism persisted in various forms in the 1970s, as Chadwick Alger (1972, 14) noted in the reissue of the Peaceful Change volume, “[I]t is not thinkable that a conference in the 1970s would include the following items that were on the agenda of the Colonial Study Group as possible ‘solutions’ to colonial problems: Participation of nationals of non-­colonial Powers in the colonial administration. International cooperation in the exploitation of colonial resources. International cooperation with regard to cultural penetration. Transfer of territory from a colonial Power to another national sovereignty.” Yet the colonial character of the interwar debates on peaceful change did not necessarily imply that peaceful change was redundant in a decolonizing world. Decolonization and the move from a European imperialist to a global international society raised the question of a peaceful revision of the international political, economic, and legal order. Soon after the Second World War it was realized that national movements for self-­determination also required mechanisms for peaceful change of treaties and the territorial status quo (Catlin 1947, 79). Even though some at the Bandung Conference

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   53 saw the United Nations (UN) as inadequate for “peoples seeking peaceful change and development” (Wright 1956, 150), others argued that “the United Nations is able to channel such movements into processes of peaceful change” toward decolonization and self-­determination (Wright 1955, 164; Ward 1957, 331; Bloomfield 1957; Dunn 1959, 279) and even that nonviolent decolonization had been the “most impressive showing” of peaceful change (Dunn 1959, 279). Apart from the very process of decolonization, which was certainly not always peaceful, the problem also became relevant at the level of change in the global order. Although post-­ war studies of peaceful change remained dominated by Euro-­ American scholars, the concept of peaceful change was also used by proponents of postcolonial or Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) to argue for the revision of the colonial and imperialist system of international law. Several “TWAIL I scholars,” such as Georges Abi-­Saab, F.  Garcia-­Amador, R.  P.  Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Taslim Elias, and J.  J.  G.  Syatauw, discussed peaceful change in the 1960s (Anghie and Chimni  2003, 79). The paradox for postcolonial states, Abi-­Saab (1962, 100) argued, was that the “international law that they are now asked to abide by, sanctioned their previous subjugation and exploitation and stood as a bar to their emancipation.” In sanctioning and justifying the creation of colonial empires before the Second World War, “traditional international law” has been a hindrance rather than a help for colonies aspiring for independence, Syatauw (1961, 230) argued, and “has not given enough attention to the creation of ways to peaceful change.” Therefore, there were numerous calls for revision of international rules by postcolonial states that were not involved in their shaping. The “new” countries, R. P. Anand stated, “want to change the status quo, and are striving to restructure their societies and the international society to reach a more equitable situation in which they can share the blessings of modern civilization on an equal footing” (Anand 1962, 390). The challenge for international law, as for any “legal system which does not keep up with the fundamental changes in its social environment,” in Abi-­Saab’s words, is to develop or fade into disregard: “The obvious answer to the dilemma is the doctrine of ‘peaceful change.’ It implies the adoption in international law of means to judge the claims for change and to affect them in a peaceful and institutionalized way.” There are vehicles for change in international law and organization (Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant and Article 14 of the UN Charter). However, they have never been used, Abi-­Saab argued, at least partly because revision in the interwar period and afterward was regarded “as a dirty word, an excuse for the aggressors to grab what they can lay their hands on.” But “the situation is now radically different,” he continued. “Revision is needed not to redistribute colonies and spheres of influence between a few big powers, but to redress the balance of centuries of domination and exploitation by these big powers of the newly independent states” (Abi-­Saab 1962, 119). These calls for peaceful change—which not incidentally coincided with the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)—are not so much about the peacefulness of decolonization per se as they are about the subsequent renegotiation of a more just postcolonial world order.

54   Peter Marcus Kristensen

Disciplinary and Institutional Changes: International Politics and Law A fourth factor affecting the postwar fate of peaceful change in IR has less to do with its intellectual or geopolitical relevance after the war than with the changing institutional and disciplinary context, particularly the postwar split between international politics and international law. The interwar debate on peaceful change primarily took place under the auspices of the multidisciplinary International Studies Conference (ISC), initiated in 1928 by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, which received necessary funding from American foundations, particularly Rockefeller. However, the ISC, under which the peaceful change debate had taken place, became marginalized after the war due to its affiliation with the League, its multidisciplinary nature, and its “less realistic and more academic” approach (Rietzler 2008, 27; Long 2006, 619). It bears noting that the Rockefeller Foundation later entered into a “de facto alliance with Hans Morgenthau” and organized the 1954 “conference on international politics,” at which leading scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Arnold Wolfers begun the pursuit of (realist) IR theory and advocated the subsumption of IR under political science (Guilhot 2008, 290, 295). This stood in contrast to the interdisciplinary ISC, which Morgenthau directly described as “an incoherent collection of fragmentary knowledge ranging the whole gamut of academic disciplines” (Morgenthau 1952, 648). The postwar disciplinarization of IR under political science is important in this context, because the interwar discourse on peaceful change was essentially interdisciplinary and had a particular relation to international law. The postwar boundary struggles in the attempt to constitute IR as a separate discipline (or subdiscipline to political science) changed the field and resulted in the loss of much of the interdisciplinary richness of the 1930s (Kahler 1997, 29). The growing postwar skepticism toward peaceful change was therefore also connected to the wider disciplinary move against interwar IR as idealistic, utopian, normative, legalistic, and not least overly interdisciplinary. Fox’s survey of interwar IR described it as not only interdisciplinary, including everything that involved more than one country as “international,” but also emotional and missionary, arising out of the peace movement and international law (Fox 1949, 67–68). Fox also notes, and commends the fact, that international law became more marginal and that the multidisciplinary field of international studies (e.g., in ISC) became the narrower “international politics,” a subfield of political science: “International politics is moved to the focus and other subjects are related to it” (Fox 1949, 79). The postwar split between international law and international relations meant that peaceful change essentially continued on separate tracks: the realist version of peaceful change and the international law discourse on peaceful change (dismissed by some interwar scholars as “idealist” peaceful change). Peaceful change continued to receive consistent attention in international law during and after the Second World War. In the early years of the war, Hersch Lauterpacht noted,

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   55 “many” believed that the League had failed because it did not provide effective means for peaceful change. Lauterpacht argued that the problem of peaceful change could only be solved through legislation and a “super-­state” with effective authority to impose decrees—and criticized the “flippancy of the realist” who reduces peaceful change to a question of power, threats, and pressure short of war (Lauterpacht 1941, 131–132). The problem of how to institute a legal mechanism for peaceful change—so as to displace war as a mechanism for change—therefore continued to play a role in wartime discussions about the coming postwar settlement, including at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences, leading up to the peaceful change provision in the UN Charter (Wright 1958, 846). Franklin D. Roosevelt and the US State Department specifically recognized the need for “an international organization both strong enough to preserve the peace against aggressors and flexible enough to relax pressures on boundaries by an orderly process of peaceful change” (Campbell 1947, 196). If one accepts that change is a constant, the legal argument went, then the coming peace settlement would become outdated, too, and the organization of peace would thus depend on the possibility of peaceful change (Hamilton 1942, 547; Kunz 1944, 361; Whitton 1944, 436). The “old friend” of peaceful change, Dunn argued at the American Society of International Law, was sure “to trouble the sleep of the peacemakers after the present war” (Dunn 1944, 60). One of the central lessons learned from the failed attempts at peaceful change in the interwar years was that the coming peace should not be equated with a status quo but institutionally organized around ordered change and must “develop law and procedures for peaceful change” (Jessup 1947; Borchard 1943, 51; 1944; Kunz 1944). The more general interwar lesson was to separate the organization of peace (the League) from the specific status quo settled in peace treaties (Versailles), thus allowing for change in the latter without necessarily changing the former (Wilcox  1948, 175). Lincoln Bloomfield, a scholar of peaceful territorial change and the UN, argued that the UN challenged traditional thinking about law and politics, that is, the League, which had been “an agency for inflexible support of the status quo” and “maximum rigidity.” The UN legal order was not synonymous with the political status quo, but instead had a “machinery available for peaceful change,” and a “genuinely new bias exists toward change and away from the status quo, for example, in the realm of colonialism” (Bloomfield 1960, 72; 1957, 2, 14). Quincy Wright, in his review of Bloomfield, believed this was overemphasizing differences but conceded that the UN was more guided by principles and justice in its peaceful change, even though the veto prevented its full realization (Wright 1958, 847). Despite the continuing interest in peaceful change, a growing number of international lawyers became increasingly skeptical of its importance. What was needed was stability, order, and conservation. Although “we hear much about peaceful change,” as one skeptical observer argued during the war, “the world needs stability for a little while” (Chafee 1942, 42). Brierly directly argued that “we have heard too much of the problem of peaceful change,” which was no longer “a very urgent problem,” and that most wars could not be prevented by an international organization providing reasoned and just peaceful changes. What was needed was order (imposed through power) as the basic condition for law, he further argued, and the acceptance that law is “by its nature a

56   Peter Marcus Kristensen conservative force” that introduces a “strong bias” in favor of the status quo (Brierly 1946, 357–358; Lauterpacht 1955, 12; Brierly 1942 cited in Cheng 1959, 561). Lauterpacht later commended Brierly’s relegation of peaceful change (Lauterpacht 1955, 13). Lauterpacht’s biographer noted the immense shift, largely resulting from the war, from “virtual unanimity” among interwar international lawyers in regarding peaceful change as the central problem of international law to a Cold War generation of lawyers seeking “a minimum of stability and continuity in a world with an unprecedented rate of change” (Jenks 1960, 34–35). Especially as the political foundations of the UN gradually crystallized into the East-­West divide in the early Cold War, international lawyers became skeptical about the prospect for peaceful changes, or any change at all, through law (Wilcox 1948, 183). Yet the problem resurfaced in discussions about revision of the Charter. According to some lawyers, “the problem of ‘peaceful change’ at the international level [became] increasingly acute” because of the East-­West conflict and decolonization. The “new forces” could not be satisfied through the application of existing rules of international law, and accordingly the political structure of the United Nations had to adapt itself to this unexpected situation in order to endure (Black 1955, 56–57; Wright 1955, 157). The broader question about the adaptability of international law, not just the UN Charter, to changing social realities was a key arena for postwar discussion of peaceful change, which cannot be fully elaborated here. Suffice it to say that the international law literature conceptualizes the problem of peaceful change quite differently from the realist power transition literature, as one of how to accommodate a legal order to changed circumstances. It focuses especially on treaties, rights, and laws in the light of changed circumstances, often taking on a specialized technical-­legal character revolving around the tension between pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) and rebus sic stantibus (as things stand, i.e., as long as the circumstances remain basically the same) (Lissitzyn 1967; Stein and Cabreau 1968). Although it has been somewhat marginalized in IR, the specialized legal concept “peaceful change” retains separate dictionary entries in international law to this day (Owada 2007).

Intellectual Developments: A Swing from Idealist to Realist Peaceful Change? A fifth possible explanation for the postwar demise of peaceful change is that the violent changes of the Second World War itself revealed the idealism of peaceful change and thus exposed its postwar irrelevance. This argument was made by several postwar scholars, who read the attempt to refine and perfect methods of peaceful change as part of the idealist interwar spirit, the League, and its focus on “good” things (Fox  1949,

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   57 67–75; Bull 1972, 35; Smith 1987, 191). This is misleading, however. Despite the pacifist and progressivist connotations, peaceful change was never an exclusively “idealist” or “interwar” concept but central to classical realism and neorealism, as the chapters by  Reichwein (this volume) and Shifrinson (this volume) elaborate. Entire chapters of  Carr’s (1939) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Schwarzenberger’s (1941) Power Politics, Morgenthau’s (1948) Politics among Nations, and Gilpin’s (1981) War and Change were devoted to peaceful change. Moreover, Manning, who edited the 1937 volume Peaceful Change, has been described as “more realist and rather less constructivist” than some biographers acknowledge (Long 2012, 84), and Dunn’s (1937) Peaceful Change has been claimed for realism too (Kenneth Waltz borrowed the notion of “self-­help” from the book). Contra the legal literature outlined earlier, the focus here is on diplomatic mechanisms of change and specifically on change in the underlying political and economic foundations, rather than on the legal-­institutional order, which stands upon those foundations. Postwar realists were generally sympathetic to the idea that peaceful changes can be necessary to maintain peace, but they also argued that such changes will not necessarily be legal and just and cannot be enforced through international law and in an international system of collective security. To these authors, only concert diplomacy guided by force, power politics, and a pragmatic willingness to accommodate and compromise on issues that are not vital were viable routes to peaceful change. Schwarzenberger (1941, 231) directly argued that “it would be untrue to think that peaceful change and power politics are incompatible” and contended that peaceful changes had historically come about either through agreement between the great powers or unilaterally through faits accomplis—but rarely on the basis of justice or legal principles (Schwarzenberger  1941, 231–232). Nicholas Spykman also argued that the problem of peaceful change, which the League and its collective security system had failed to solve, was more successful in the Concert of Europe, where force played a larger role both in stabilizing and in effecting “necessary and just changes” in the status quo (Spykman  1942, 463). Kenneth Thompson also saw the nineteenth-­century Concert system as more conducive to peaceful change than the twentieth century experiments with collective security, which had ignored political realities, obscuring them in “constitutional verbiage and formal legalistic arguments,” and in essence was “probably incompatible with peaceful change” because it reinforced a rigid status quo (Thompson 1953, 757–759). John Herz commended Thompson’s analysis. He argued that the best solution to the problem would be peaceful, not necessarily just, changes through diplomatic bargaining resting on the threat of force: “All we can aim at is its ‘peacefulness,’ and it would not seem utopian to believe that such solutions could be had even where states no longer rely on the threat of individual force as ultima ratio; that is, to expect that even after a successful outlawry of force a status quo might be modified through the timehonored means of diplomacy which comprise pressures, compromise, accommodation, etc.” (Herz 1959, 89–90). Morgenthau also saw peaceful change as “one of the most important problems upon  whose solution the preservation of international order and the maintenance

58   Peter Marcus Kristensen of international peace depend” (Morgenthau 1948a, 494–495). The problem could be solved domestically by competition through established political and legal institutions. However, the international realm lacks the moral consensus, the authority, and the universal legal-­institutional mechanism to support peaceful change in politics among nations where challenges to the status quo are likely to divide the international community “into two hostile camps” and be decided by “the preponderance of power” (Morgenthau 1948b, 412–417; see also Thompson 1953, 768–770). Legal mechanisms and international organization cannot lead to significant peaceful changes in the distribution of power. They will either be superfluous if all agree or resisted if a powerful party disagrees. Consequently, to Morgenthau the problem of peaceful change was “intimately tied up with the over-­all social structure of the international community” and required “a fundamental change of that structure” for its solution (Morgenthau 1948a, 496; 1948b, 417–419). Classical balance-­of-­power realists thus continued to discuss peaceful change in the decades after the Second World War. They maintained that major changes, particularly constitutional changes, were brought about by war, but that a peaceful restructuring of the status quo was possible via statesmanship. The 1980s also saw a resurgent realist interest in change, often theorized from a neorealist viewpoint, which treated the question of peaceful change mainly in relation to global power transitions (Modelski 1978; Holsti, Siverson, and George 1980; Buzan and Jones 1981; Gilpin 1981). In Gilpin’s words, “to substitute methods of peaceful change for the historical recourse to war as the principal means of making the fundamental adjustments in the system necessitated by the differential growth of power among states” (Gilpin 1981, 206). But structural realism or neorealism generally has less room for statecraft and sees significant changes as the product of war, rather than of peaceful changes. Critics of neorealism have also not failed to single out its inability to explain peaceful change. As Keohane argued in Neorealism and Its Critics, “the problem of peaceful change is fundamental to world politics,” but realism “fails to answer” it, and “what we need to do now is to understand peaceful change by combining multidimensional scholarly analysis with more visionary ways of seeing the future” (Keohane 1986, 199–200). The birth and rise to prominence of structural realism within IR was therefore another intellectual factor that affected the demise of peaceful change. Although Gilpin’s War and Change reaffirms the fundamental importance of the problem of peaceful change, it explicitly studied “the role of war in the process of international political change” (Gilpin 1981, 7). The theoretical argument is that uneven growth rates constantly redistribute power in the international system. If the distribution of privileges and prestige remains static, this leads to a discrepancy between the social system and the growing forces for change which, if unsatisfied, eventually results in a hegemonic war between a hegemon(ic alliance) and a challenger(s) over the fundamentals of international order, values, and power (Gilpin 1981, 33). Major changes of the international system therefore usually come about via political violence and war, whereas peaceful changes in systems, such as redistributions of power, are possible (Gilpin 1981, 44, 208). To summarize, classical realists and neorealists continued to treat peaceful change as an important problem, even if sporadically and with growing skepticism, but the

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   59 argument that peaceful change per se is somehow idealist is untenable. Yet (neo)realism has a problem in explaining major peaceful change of international systems. Although it falls somewhat outside the temporal scope of this chapter, Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy and the end of the Cold War have been widely read as such an example of major peaceful change in international politics, and indeed, one realism fails to explain convincingly (Genest 1994).

Peaceful Change in Functionalist and Neofunctionalist IR The final postwar trace of peaceful change that I will pursue here stems from David Mitrany’s functionalist theory of peace and international organization, and from subsequent postwar developments in neofunctionalism, theories on regional integration, and security communities. Like the international lawyers mentioned previously, Mitrany (1943, 5–6) argued that the League failed because “it could not further that process of continuous adjustment and settlement which students of international affairs call ‘peaceful change.’ ” Consequently, the problematique remained relevant in the organization of A Working Peace System: “We shall have to speak of this again, but what peaceful change should mean, what the modern world, so closely interrelated, must have for its peaceful deve1opment, is some system that would make possible automatic and continuous social action, continually adapted to changing needs and conditions” (Mitrany 1943, 6). Compared to most of the interwar literature, and indeed to most realist conceptualizations, Mitrany rejected the excessive focus on changing borders, that is, peaceful territorial change. If the cause of war is the “division of the world into detached and competing political units,” simply redrawing their boundaries will not remove the causes of war. On the contrary, it is likely to disturb the social life of the groups concerned: “The purpose of peaceful change can only be to prevent such disturbance; one might say indeed that the true task of peaceful change is to remove the need and the wish for changes of frontiers” (Mitrany 1943, 6, 26). Turning the problem on its head, Mitrany saw the world not in territorial, but functional, terms—as economic and social activities—thus stressing cooperative over conflictual relations. Peaceful change, in this conceptualization, is not about getting states to yield territory, but rather about lessening the extent to which borders frustrate functional cooperation and thus reduce the demand for redrawing them. The absence of war is not enough for peaceful change, which requires the gradual dissolution of boundaries and the formation of a world community. To reach this goal, Mitrany advocated a pragmatic functionalist approach to peaceful change in which the function of international government is not to solve the problem of war and peaceful change directly, once and for all, but indirectly and gradually, by meeting the practical and technical needs of cooperation in specific task areas. Put differently, a working peace system is based on continuous peaceful

60   Peter Marcus Kristensen change. It envisions a pragmatic and elastic order arising from “active organic development” of cooperation and integration in certain functional areas rather than from a formal “written act of faith” with “fixed and final” rigid rules of the negative, “thou shall not” type of international organization that aims to protect states from each other—such as that perfected by the League (Mitrany 1943). Mitrany’s functional approach to peaceful change left traces on subsequent developments in neofunctionalism, regional integration, and security communities. (Neo)functionalist peaceful change is less about the major “constitutional” changes in international society and more about how certain regions start settling interstate disputes peacefully, start integrating in certain functional areas, and eventually develop “dependable expectations of peaceful change.” Peaceful change thus played a central, if somewhat neglected, role in Cold War debates about European integration, the formation of the European Community/Union, and the European security order. As noted in the introductory chapter (Paul, this volume), the European Community/Union could be read as one of the primary Cold War attempts to institutionalize peaceful change. It is notable that Ernst Haas (1961) put peaceful change at the center of the definition of international integration: “[P]olitical community exists when there is likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic claims” (Haas 1961, 366). Cold War scholarship on the formation of security communities was also particularly interested in the conditions of permanent peace and social processes of peaceful change, “defined as an institutionalized, continuous, adaptive resolution of social problems without the use of violence.” A security community is a group of people or countries that agree their common problems must be resolved by “peaceful change” and can dependably expect that if controversies should arise in the future, they will be handled peacefully. Indeed, Deutsch defined a security community as a group of people who have become integrated, where integration is taken to mean a “sense of community and institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population” (Deutsch 1957, 5). Deutsch’s argument was that regional integration processes characterized by transaction flows and shared values and understandings will gradually evolve into more institutionalized interaction and eventually into stable expectations of peaceful change, wherein states believe that other members of the security community will not resort to force for dispute resolution. Contra realism, the security community invocation of “dependable expectations of peaceful change” implies more than a “no-­war” or negative peace community. It is a community with a common identity in which war is entirely unimaginable and peace is defined by a “we-­feeling” (Deutsch 1957, 36; Adler 1998, 171). Peaceful change is conceptualized as (inter)subjective: elites in the region expect peaceful change. Functionalist peaceful change is thus neither a system wherein great powers make one-­off bargains to avoid war nor a legal mechanism as in the international law discourse, but a “continuous learning process” that gradually evolves into institutionalized interaction, shared understandings, “mutually compatible self-­images,” and eventually stable expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch 1957, 130; Haas 1958, 443). This connects to the more con-

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   61 structivist literature on peaceful change and security communities, in which war is unthinkable and peaceful change is expected due to a sense of “we-­ness” (Adler and Barnett 1998; Kupchan et al. 2001; Patomäki and Wæver 1995; Möller 2007). The (neo) functionalist perspective thus provides an alternative to both realist and international law perspectives on peaceful change. But where Mitrany’s original focus was on global peaceful change, post-­war (neo)functionalist and constructivist work focused less on creating an elastic global order adaptive to changing needs and conditions than on regional integration and the formation of regional security communities, especially in  Europe and the transatlantic but also in other regions (Goodspeed  1959). The regional (particularly European) focus may explain why this post-­war strand gradually disconnected from the other two lines of research.

Conclusion This Handbook itself is evidence that peaceful change seems to be emerging, once again, as a central problem in IR. As the concept resurfaces, it is important to be aware of its conceptual history. Peaceful change clearly emerged in the tumultuous 1930s and has a troubled legacy associated with appeasement, colonialism, and the particular political and disciplinary context of the interwar period. But as this chapter has shown, there were traces of peaceful change scattered throughout Cold War IR, with the negative concept of peaceful change continuing in the realist lineage and the more positive concept in international law and (neo)functionalism. The reappropriation of previous debates on ‘peaceful change’—and indeed the use of the concept itself—for present debates on power and order transitions requires a historically reflexive approach. As outlined in this chapter, the political and intellectual context has changed immensely over the past century, and ‘the problem of peaceful change’ has taken different forms. Present attempts to resuscitate the concept of peaceful change require a deeper understanding of its conceptual history, its institutional embeddedness, the different ways scholars have historically deployed it in debate, and how it has interacted with other ideas and the world of international policy. There are obvious contextual differences from the multipolar system prevalent in the interwar period, through the bipolar and nuclear Cold War system, to today’s more diffuse global and regional power structures.

References Abi-Saab, Georges. 1962. “The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline.” Howard Law Journal 8: 100. Adler, Emanuel. 1998. “Condition(s) of Peace.” Review of International Studies 24: 165–192. Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

62   Peter Marcus Kristensen Alger, Chadwick. 1972. “Introduction.” In Peaceful Change Vol. II: Population and Peace, edited by Fergus Chalmers Wright. New York: Garland Publishing. Anand, R. P. 1962. “Role of the ‘New’ Asian-African Countries in the Present International Legal Order.” American Journal of International Law 56: 383–406. Anghie, Antony, and B. S. Chimni. 2003. “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts.” Chinese Journal of International Law 2: 77. Antola, Esko. 1984. “Peaceful Change as a Model for Europe.” Current Research on Peace and Violence 7: 229–246. Ashworth, Lucian. 2002. “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations.” International Relations 16: 33–51. Black, Joseph. 1955. “The United Nations Charter: Problems of Review and Revision.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 24: 26. Bloomfield, Lincoln. 1957. Evolution or Revolution? The United Nations and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bloomfield, Lincoln. 1960. “Toward a More Lawful World—Hopes and Hazards.” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921–1969) 54: 71–77. Borchard, Edwin. 1943. “The Place of Law and Courts in International Relations.” American Journal of International Law 37: 46. Borchard, Edwin. 1944. “Flaws in Post-War Peace Plans.” The American Journal of International Law 38: 284–289. Brierly, J. L. 1946. “International Law: Some Conditions of Its Progress.” International Affairs 22: 352–360. Bull, Hedley. 1969. “The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On.” International Journal 24: 625–638. Bull, Hedley. 1972. “The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969.” In The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969, edited by Brian Porter, 30–55. London: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Butterfield, Herbert. 1951. “The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach in International Affairs.” International Affairs 27: 411–422. Buzan, Barry, and R. J. Barry Jones. 1981. Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Campbell, John C. 1947. “The European Territorial Settlement.” Foreign Affairs 26: 196. Catlin, George. 1947. “The New Basis for Politics.” Sociological Review 39: 68–81. Carr, Edward H. 1939. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. London: Macmillan. Carr, Edward H. 1946. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. 2nd edition. London: Macmillan. Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. 1942. “International Utopias.” Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 75: 39–53. Cheng, Bin. 1959. “Review of the Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers by the Late James Leslie Brierly by Hersch Lauterpacht, C.  H.  M.  Waldock.” Modern Law Review 22: 559–562. Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dulles, John F. 1941. “Peaceful Change.” International Conciliation 20, no. 369: 493–498. Dulles, John F. 1959. “The Role of Law in Peace.” International and Comparative Law Bulletin 3: 15–21.

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   63 Dulles, John F. 1957. “Challenge and Response in United States Policy.” Foreign Affairs 36: 25–43. Dunn, Frederick S. 1937. Peaceful Change. New York: Council of Foreign Relations. Dunn, Frederick S. 1944. “Law and Peaceful Change.” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 38: 60–76. Dunn, Frederick S. 1959. “Peaceful Change Today.” World Politics 11: 278–285. Dunn, Frederick S., Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, Percy Ellwood Corbett, and William Thornton Rickert Fox. 1946. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1955. “The Spirit of John Marshall: Crusader for Ordered Liberty and Justice.” American Bar Association Journal 41: 1005. Fox, W. T. R. 1949. “Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience.” World Politics 2: 67–79. Fox, W.  T.  R. 1962. “Frederick Sherwood Dunn and the American Study of International Relations.” World Politics 15: 1–19. Fox, W.  T.  R. 1985. “E.  H.  Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision.” Review of International Studies 11, no. 1: 1–16. Genest, Marc. 1994. “Realism and the Problem of Peaceful Change.” Perspectives on Political Science 23: 70–78. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goodspeed, Stephen. 1959. “The Latin American Community: An Exploratory Note.” Social Science 34: 144–148. Guilhot, Nicolas. 2008. “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory.” International Political Sociology 2: 281–304. Haas, Ernst. 1958. “The Challenge of Regionalism.” International Organization 12: 440–458. Haas, Ernst. 1961. “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process.” International Organization 15: 366–392. Hamilton, Kingsley. 1942. “Aspects of the Coming Postwar Settlement.” International Conciliation 21: 545. Herz, John. 1959. International Politics in the Atomic Age. New York: Columbia University Press. Holsti, Ole, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George. 1980. Change in the International System. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Jenks, C. Wilfred. 1960. “Hersch Lauterpacht—The Scholar as Prophet.” British Year Book of International Law 36: 1. Jessup, Philip C. 1947. “The Crime of Aggression and the Future of International Law.” Political Science Quarterly 62: 1–10. Kahler, Miles. 1997. “Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945.” In New Thinking in International Relations Theory, edited by Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry, 20–53. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Keohane, Robert, ed. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. Kristensen, Peter M. 2019. “ ‘Peaceful Change’ in International Relations: A Conceptual Archaeology.” International Theory, online first. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971919000204. Kristensen, Peter M. Forthcoming. “Nothing Human is Foreign to Us: Imperialism, Institutionalization and the Subject Matter of International Relations.” In Is International Theory International?, edited by Allan Layug and John Hobson. London: Routledge.

64   Peter Marcus Kristensen Kunz, Josef. 1944. “International Affairs: The International Law of the Future.” American Political Science Review 38: 354–369. Kupchan, Charles, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foong Khong. 2001. Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Lauterpacht, Hersch. 1941. “Resurrection of the League.” Political Quarterly 12: 121–133. Lauterpacht, Hersch. 1955. “Brierly’s Contribution to International Law.” British Year Book of International Law 32: 1. Life. 1959. Editorials: The Hero of Peaceful Change. February 23, 1959, p. 32. Lissitzyn, Oliver  J. 1967. “Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus sic Stantibus).” American Journal of International Law 61: 895–922. Long, David. 2006. “Who Killed the International Studies Conference?” Review of International Studies 32: 603. Long, David. 2012. “C.A.W. Manning and the First Great Debate.” In International Relations and the First Great Debate, edited by Brian C. Schmidt, 78–93. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Mitrany, David. 1943. A Working Peace System. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Modelski, George. 1978. “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20: 214–235. Möller, Frank. 2007. Thinking Peaceful Change: Baltic Security Policies and Security Community Building. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948a. “International Affairs.” Review of Politics 10: 493–497. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948b. Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1952. “Area Studies and the Study of International Relations.” International Social Science Bulletin 4: 647–648. Neal, Fred Warner, and Bruce Hamlett. 1969. “The Never-Never Land of International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 13: 281–305. Niedhart, Gottfried. 2016. “Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change.” Journal of Cold War Studies 18: 14–59. Niedhart, Gottfried. 2017. “East-West Conflict: Short Cold War and Long Détente.” In The Long Détente, edited by Oliver Bange and Paul Villaume, 19–30. Budapest: Central European University Press. Owada, Hisashi. 2007. “Peaceful Change.” In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1452. Patomäki, Heikki, and Ole Wæver. 1995. “Introducing Peaceful Changes.” In Peaceful Changes in World Politics, 3–27. Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere. Rietzler, Katharina. 2008. “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Search for International Order.” Rockefeller Archive Center Newsletter 4: 4–5. Schwarzenberger, Georg. 1941. Power Politics: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations and Post-War Planning. London: J. Cape. Smith, Steve. 1987. “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16: 189–206. Sohn, Louis. 1948. “The Development of International Law.” American Bar Association Journal 34: 1125–1127.

Peaceful Change after the World Wars   65 Spykman, Nicholas. 1942. America’s Strategy in World Politics. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Stein, Eric, and Dominique Cabreau. 1968. “Law and Peaceful Change in a Subsystem: Withdrawal of France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” American Journal of International Law 62: 577. Syatauw, J. J. G. 1961. Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Thompson, Kenneth. 1953. “Collective Security Reexamined.” American Political Science Review 47: 753–772. Ward, Charles. 1957. “Review of The Trusteeship System of the United Nations.” African Affairs 56: 331–332. Whitton, John  B. 1944. “Security and Peace.” American Journal of International Law 38: 434–436. Wight, Martin. [1946] 1995. Power Politics. Rev. ed. New York: Continuum. Wilcox, Francis. 1948. “The United Nations and the Peace Treaties.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 257: 175–183. Wright, Quincy. 1946. “Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization.” Yale Law Journal 55: 870–888. Wright, Quincy. 1955. “International Organization and Peace.” Political Research Quarterly 8: 149–165. Wright, Quincy. 1958. “Review of Evolution or Revolution? The United Nations and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change.” American Political Science Review 52: 845–848. Wright, Richard. 1956. The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi.

Chapter 4

Peacefu l Ch a nge The Post–Cold War Evolution Jeffrey W. Taliaferro

This chapter traces the evolution of thinking about peaceful change at the systemic (or global) and regional levels during the post–Cold War era. The sudden end of the Cold War in late 1989, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, left the United States as the lone superpower (or the unipole). Unipolarity, the (liberal) he­gem­ony of the United States, and the acceleration of economic globalization were just some of the independent variables that various scholars argued might facilitate peaceful change at the systemic (or global) and/or regional levels (Buzan and Wæver  2003; Paul 2012; Ripsman 2016; Taliaferro 2019). Each has yielded unintended consequences, including, but not limited to, the overreach of the United States during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and its subsequent retreat from global leadership, the emergence of China as a peer competitor to the United States and its increasingly assertive posture in East Asia, Russia’s efforts to undermine the United States and its allies through hybrid interference, and the uneven impact of globalization on the security strategies of different types of states across several regions. In sum, the effects of unipolarity, US liberal hegemony, and economic globalization on peaceful change at the systemic and regional levels during the post–Cold War era have been decidedly mixed. Before continuing, a few caveats are in order. First, unlike the chapters by Knutsen and Kristensen on peaceful change during the interwar and Cold War eras, this ­chapter deals with an era that is ongoing. One could argue that certain events over the past two decades—the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; the Great Recession in 2008; China’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013; Russia’s hybrid interference to sway the 2016 US presidential election; or the novel coronavirus (COVID-­19) pandemic of 2020 and the geopolitical disruptions resulting from it— constitute what Robert Gilpin calls an “interaction change,” that is, change “at the level of interstate interactions (viz., formation of diplomatic alliances or major shifts in the locations of economic activities) [that] may be the prelude to systemic change and eventually systems change” (Gilpin 1981, 41).

68   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro Conceivably, these events might even be harbingers of what Gilpin calls systemic change, namely “changes in the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and rights embodied in the system” (Gilpin 1981, 41). There is consensus that a US-­China power transition is now underway, but less agreement over the pace of that transition and the strategic implications for the United States, China, and other states (Friedberg 2011; Brooks and Wohlforth 2016; G. T. Allison 2017; Beckley 2018; Ikenberry 2018; Pu and Wang 2018; Foot 2020). However, there is no consensus over whether the post–Cold War era has ended, and if it has, when the exact transition point was or how we should characterize the new (or current) era in international politics. Second, any discussion of peaceful change in the post–Cold War era should begin with acknowledgment of the overall decline in the incidence of interstate warfare since the late 1980s. This decline, however, is overdetermined; it cannot be fully attributed to unipolarity, US liberal hegemony, or economic globalization. Nuclear weapons, the norms of territorial integrity and national self-­determination, advances in conventional weapons systems, the maturation of pluralistic security communities in particular regions of the globe (e.g., Western Europe), and a host of other variables might explain the so-­called New Peace (Mueller 1989; Zacher 2001; Jervis 2002; Fazal 2007; Ripsman and Paul 2010; Pinker 2011; Fettweis 2017). Furthermore, explaining the non-­occurrence of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia or between any other pair of nuclear-­armed adversaries (e.g., India and Pakistan) raises a host of methodological and epistemological conundrums. As the historian Francis  J.  Gavin observes, “[t]he problem is that we are trying to understand something that never happened, and we hope will never happen—a thermonuclear war” (Gavin 2020, 6). In the introductory chapter to this volume, T.  V.  Paul writes that conceptions of peaceful change vary along a continuum. As Paul states, a minimalist conception might be defined as “change in international relations and foreign policies of states, including territorial or sovereignty agreements that take place without violence or coercive use of force.” A maximalist conception would entail “transformational change that takes place non-­violently at the global, regional, interstate, and societal levels due to various material, normative and institutional factors, leading to deep peace among states, higher levels of prosperity and justice for all irrespective of nationality, race, or gender.” (Paul this ­volume, 4). Such peaceful change can occur at the systemic, regional, and/or national levels. This chapter takes as its starting point the “in-­between” definition of peaceful change first articulated by Karl Deutsch, which Paul this volume, 4 endorses: “[t]he ­resolution of social problems mutually by institutionalized procedures without resort to large-­scale physical force (Deutsch 1957, 5).” Elsewhere, Paul argues that peaceful change at the systemic and regional levels requires some degree of great power accommodation, which he defines as “mutual adaptation and acceptance by established and rising powers, and the elimination or substantial reduction in hostility between them.” The process of accommodation is complex, since it entails “status adjustment, the sharing of leadership roles through the accordance of institutional membership and privileges, and acceptance of spheres of influence: something established powers rarely offer to newcomers” (Paul 2016, 6–7).

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   69 The operative question is whether any of the above-­mentioned variables—unipolarity, US liberal hegemony, and the acceleration of economic globalization—have had any effect on the ability of the United States and other major powers to resolve social problems, particularly in the areas of global and regional security, mutually by institutionalized procedures without recourse to large-­scale armed force. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the first section considers the extent to which unipolarity, in and of itself, has been a mechanism for peaceful change in the post–Cold War era. The second section examines the related, yet distinct, impact of US liberal hegemony on the prospects for peaceful change at the regional and systemic levels. The third section considers the hypothesized effects of economic glob­al­i­za­tion on peaceful change at the systemic and regional levels. The conclusion summarizes the argument.

Unipolarity and Peaceful Change Has unipolarity itself been a mechanism for peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels of analysis? A unipolar international system has three defining features. First, as Robert Jervis notes, “[u]nipolarity implies the existence of many juridically equal nation-­states, something that an empire denies” (Jervis 2009, 190–191). Second, a unipolar system has only one great power (the unipole), a single state whose relative share of material power—especially its extant military and economic capabilities—is too great to be counterbalanced in the near-­term by any other state or possible combination of states (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 2016). Third, the unipole’s power preponderance does not give it complete control over the external behavior of all other states (Monteiro 2011). However, the systemic constraints on the unipole are considerably less than systemic constraints on the two great powers in a bipolar system or the ­several great powers in a multipolar system (Walt 2005; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016). For better or worse, r­ elatively weak systemic constraints and the availability of opportunities to further improve its strategic position afford the unipole a wide latitude in the pursuit of foreign and defense policies (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, 2018; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016). While much of the debate among structural realists centered on the likely duration of the post–Cold War unipolar system and the near-­term likelihood of balancing—whether of the hard or soft varieties—by major powers against the United States (Waltz 1993, 2002; Layne 1993, 2006, 2012; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Pape 2005; Paul 2005, 2018; Wivel and Paul 2019b; Lieber and Alexander 2005), William C. Wohlforth advanced the bold proposition that unipolarity itself is prone to peace: “The raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the

70   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro United States in a war or an extended rivalry” (Wohlforth 1999, 5). Unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other major powers because the unipole would have an incentive to “maintain key security institutions in order to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition among [them].” Other major powers would have an incentive to jump on the bandwagon with the United States, since the expected costs of balancing are prohibitive (Wohlforth 1999, 6). Wohlforth further argues that an unambiguous status hierarchy reinforces the peaceful nature of unipolarity. In a bipolar or multipolar system, the intensity of status competition between the great powers varies depending upon the symmetry of the distribution of key capabilities. Those capabilities are themselves tangible status markers. But under unipolarity, only one state has an “unambiguous preponderance in all relevant dimensions” of capabilities (Wohlforth 2009, 41). Therefore, “while second-­tier states would be expected to seek favorable comparisons with the unipole, they would also be expected to reconcile themselves to a relatively clear status ordering or to engage in strategies of social creativity” (Wohlforth 2009, 41). Nuclear weapons do make the expected costs of war between the unipole and the major powers prohibitive. But unipolarity has not necessarily led to peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels. On the contrary, Nuno Monteiro contends, “[u]nipolarity will generate abundant opportunities for war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers that do not have the capabilities or allies necessary to deter it.” In a bipolar or multipolar system, the great powers have an incentive to restrain their weaker allies and to mitigate the risks of entrapment or entanglement (Snyder 1997; Kim 2011). But in a unipolar system, in which great power allies are not available, conflicts among minor powers and between those minor powers and the unipole become more likely. As a result, Monteiro argues, “unipolarity will be prone to produce asymmetric and peripheral conflicts” (Monteiro 2014, 5). The fact that the United States has continually been at war with a succession of recalcitrant minor powers—Serbia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—and various nonstate actors operating within the borders of failed states—the Taliban, al-­Qaeda, the Islamic State (or ISIS), and their respective offshoots—over the past thirty years calls into question the argument that unipolarity is more conducive to peace than bipolarity or multipolarity. Monteiro’s (structural realist) theory of unipolar politics holds that recalcitrant, yet vulnerable, minor powers, like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, actually have an incentive to actively balance against the unipole. Major powers like China and Russia have a far greater margin of security against the unipole because they possess nuclear weapons (Monteiro 2014). The US military’s command of the global commons—defined as the oceans beyond fifteen nautical miles from shore, outer space, and airspace above fifteen thousand feet, along with its network of forward military bases (Posen  2003)—enables the United States to project force and conduct sustained military operations in the Middle East and South Asia, two regions it had contested with the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Montgomery 2016; Taliaferro 2019). The other major powers lack the military capabilities to deter the unipole from plunging into “wars of choice” against minor powers and

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   71 nonstate actors in those regions. They also lack the means to coerce the unipole into withdrawing from such conflicts. US command of the commons has also had unintended consequences. Barry Posen observes that “[m]ost of the adversaries that the United States has encountered since 1990 have come to understand US military strengths and have worked to neutralize them” (Posen 2003, 23). Minor power and major power adversaries have done this by pursuing asymmetric strategies such as luring US forces into fighting in the contested zones of the globe, for example the littorals, urban environments, and air below fifteen thousand feet (Posen 2003), or by developing and deploying conventional weapons platforms to support anti-­access/area denial (A2/AD) (Montgomery 2014; Biddle and Oelrich 2016; Erickson et al. 2017). Hybrid interference, defined as “the synchronized use of multiple non-­military means of interference tailored to heighten divisions within target societies,” is another asymmetric strategy that Russia, and to a lesser extent China, employ against the United States and its allies (Wigell  2019, 262). Mikael Wigell notes that hybrid interference employs a variety of state-­controlled but non-­kinetic tools “that are concealed to provide the divider with official deniability and manipulate targeted actors without elevating threat perceptions” (Wigell 2019, 256). These tools include clandestine diplomacy (e.g., covert assistance to opposition groups, criminal organizations, or insurgents), geoeconomics (e.g., the use of economic inducements and threats with select members within the target community), and disinformation (e.g., the introduction of false or misleading information into the communication stream of the target state). To date, the most famous (or infamous) use of hybrid interference has been Russia’s two-­year-­long campaign of cyberespionage and disinformation to sway the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election (Wigell 2019; Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness 2019; Dawson and Innes 2019). China has also utilized the BRI, the technology firm Huawei’s dominance of the market in 5G network infrastructure, and disinformation campaigns on social media to drive wedges between the United States and various allies in Western Europe, South Asia, and East Asia (Zhou and Esteban 2018). Russia and China employ a variety of asymmetric strategies, some of which utilize non-­kinetic tools of statecraft, to offset American conventional military preponderance, but without risking escalation to war. The prolonged US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq actually worked to the advantage of Russia and China, as well as recalcitrant minor powers like Iran, in the following ways. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and that state’s subsequent descent into sectarian civil war created a power vacuum in the heart of the Middle East. By backing various Shiite militias and political parties, Iran became a major power broker in the region in the 2000s (Juneau 2015; Ostovar 2019). When the 2011 Arab Spring unrest spread to Syria, it soon metastasized into a civil war to oust Syrian president Bashar al Assad. President Barak Obama’s administration, which had just extricated US combat troops from Iraq in late 2011, was reluctant to intervene in Syria. Russia and Iran responded by dispatching their air forces and militant clients (Lebanese Hezbollah), respectively, to bolster Assad’s forces, thus turning the tide of the Syrian civil war (Ostovar 2019; Korolev 2018). For a

72   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro minimal investment, Russian president Vladimir Putin preserved his one Middle Eastern ally and demonstrated Russia was capable of projecting military force beyond the former Soviet region. China was also a beneficiary of the US “forever wars” in the Middle East and South Asia, exploiting the opportunity to assert maritime claims and augment its naval presence in the East China and South China Seas. The construction and fortification of artificial islands in the South China Sea accelerated after President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013. The Obama administration publicly announced its “pivot to [East] Asia” strategy in late 2011, but it was the George W. Bush administration that actually started this diplomatic, military, and economic reorientation toward that region in response to China’s rise. The preservation of the existing distribution of power in East Asia, which favors the United States, was the core objective. According to Nina Silove, the means toward that end included “regularizing, expanding, and elevating US diplomatic engagement with China and balancing against China’s rise both internally and externally” (Silove 2016, 46). If unipolarity, in and of itself, may not be a mechanism for peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels, then what about the impact of US hegemony and the acceleration of economic globalization? The following sections consider those variables in turn.

US Liberal Hegemony and Peaceful Change Has the US liberal hegemony been a mechanism for peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels in the post–Cold War era? The terms unipole and hegemon have numerous, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting definitions in international relations literature. Nonetheless, they are two distinct concepts. Unipolarity refers to an international system with only a single great power (the unipole), regardless of its grand strategy or the specific foreign policies it pursues. By contrast, hegemony refers to an active effort by a powerful state (the hegemon) to establish and maintain a set of international rules and institutions (Wilkinson 1999). As Christopher Fettweis puts it, “[u]nipolarity is a fact; hegemony is (or is not) a goal.” He further notes that while in principle “unipolarity can be distinct from hegemony, in practice it is difficult to imagine the former unaccompanied by some form of the latter, since central to the very definition of polarity is the willingness to exert power” (Fettweis 2017, 433). Even realists in the hegemonic or power preponderance tradition recognize that a hegemon cannot simply use military force to preserve its privileged position at all times and in all places; the costs would be prohibitive. Gilpin writes that “[a]lthough the rights and rules governing interstate behavior are to varying degrees based on consensus and mutual interest, the primary foundation of rights and rules is the power and interests of

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   73 the dominate group or states in a social system” (Gilpin 1981, 35). Hegemonic states create international orders, which are defined as “settled arrangements that define and guide relations between states. . . . States operate according to a set of organizational principles that define roles and the terms of interaction” (Ikenberry 2014, 85). International institutions, defined as “associational clusters among states with some bureaucratic structures that create and maintain self-­imposed and other imposed constraints on state policies and behaviors,” are key components of such orders (Wivel and Paul 2019a, 8). However, hegemony necessitates voluntary compliance. Weaker states should not only be cognizant of the power differential, they should also accept the hegemon’s higher status and the legitimacy of the rules and institutions the hegemon creates and maintains. Therefore, it behooves the hegemon to preserve the legitimacy of those rules and institutions. Liberal institutionalism links US hegemony, or more precisely, the liberal international order, and the prospects for peaceful change. John Ikenberry traces the origins of this order to a bargain reached in the decade following World War II: other states agreed to live within an American-­dominated international order. In exchange, the United States agreed to voluntary restraints on the unilateral exercise of its economic and military capabilities. While the creation of this postwar order was driven in part by American economic interests, “it also reflected a set of calculations about virtues of a durable and legitimate international order that provide a long-­term flow of economic and security benefits not just for the United States but to the wider world” (Ikenberry 2011, 333–334). Ikenberry posits crucial roles for shared liberal democratic governance and economic openness and US acceptance of voluntary restraints through international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). “So although the United States ran the liberal order and projected power, it did so within a system of rules and institutions—of commitments and restraints. It underwrote order in various regions of the world. It provided public goods related to stability and openness, and it engaged in bargaining and reciprocity with its allies and partners” (Ikenberry 2011, 334). While some of these rules and institutions clearly reflected the interests of the hegemon, most resulted from negotiated agreements, whether between the hegemon and other states or among those other states themselves. The formal institutions, as well as more informal forums (e.g., the G7), “cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations” (Ikenberry 2018, 20). During the Cold War, the center of gravity of this liberal order was the “West”: the industrialized states of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. After the Cold War, the liberal order expanded to include much of the globe. Even as the Soviet Union teetered in 1990–1991, the George H. W. Bush administration moved rapidly not only to secure the inclusion of a reunified Germany in NATO, but also to suppress any Soviet or Western European alternatives to a post–Cold War security architecture on the continent (Ikenberry 2011; Shifrinson 2018, 2020).

74   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro President Bill Clinton’s administration pushed NATO to admit former Soviet satellite states, beginning with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, despite objections from Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Successive rounds of NATO expansion continued into the 2010s. With the accession of North Macedonia in 2020, the alliance now has thirty members. Whether NATO enlargement achieved its stated objective of consolidating liberal democratic governance and free market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe is debatable (Poast and Chinchilla 2020). Clinton attempted to mollify Yeltsin by including Russia in the Group of 7 leading industrialized states, which became the G8 (until Russia’s expulsion from that gathering during the 2008 Russo-­Georgian War). The net effect of NATO’s preservation and eastward expansion was to perpetuate the US role as the security guarantor of Europe, but at the cost of exacerbating the alliance’s burden-­sharing problems and alienating Russia (Shifrinson  2020; Menon and Ruger 2020; Sushentsov and Wohlforth 2020; Marten 2020; Kay 2020). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George  H.  W.  Bush and Secretary of State James Baker went to great lengths to obtain UN Security Council resolutions imposing economic sanctions and later authorizing the use of force to liberate Kuwait. Bush and Baker did so not only to overcome domestic opposition (especially among Democrats in the US Senate) to war, but also to persuade other states to join a US-­led coalition against Iraq. But eight years later, when the threat of veto by Russia or China precluded a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Serbia, the Clinton administration chose to prosecute the Kosovo War under the auspices of NATO. Finally, at the urging of British prime minister Tony Blair, the George W. Bush administration tried unsuccessfully to secure a UN Security Council mandate for war in early 2003, which it launched ostensibly to dismantle Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s chemical and biological weapons programs (Ripsman 2019). The George H. W. Bush administration negotiated the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, as well as closer economic ties with South America. The Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 as a mechanism to institutionalize cooperation among Pacific-­rim states, ensure that Asian regionalism developed in a trans-­Pacific direction, and demonstrate US commitment to the region (Ikenberry  2011). The chapter by Skålnes in this Handbook examines in greater depth the impact of these and other preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and regional trade agreements on peaceful change. But these “post–Cold War regional trade initiatives,” as Ikenberry notes, “were envisaged as steps that would reinforce the expansion, liberalization, and continued openness of the world economy” (Ikenberry  2011, 233). Of particular significance were the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to supersede the GATT in 1995 and the efforts by the Clinton and George  W.  Bush administrations to facilitate China’s accession to the WTO. By adjudicating international trade disputes, the WTO would serve as a cornerstone of a neoliberal “Washington consensus” favoring deregulation and market integration (Ikenberry 2011). China’s accession to the WTO would not only accelerate the economic reforms the Chinese vice premier (and paramount leader) Deng Xiaoping initiated in the late 1970s, but also encourage this rising power to be a “responsible stakeholder”

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   75 within the existing international order. Engagement through international trade and investment would empower a reform-­minded Chinese middle class, and eventually the Chinese political system would evolve into something approximating a liberal democracy (Friedberg 2018; Friedberg and Boustany 2020). As Norrin Ripsman notes, states, including hegemons, invest in security institutions for several reasons: (1) to conserve their own military capabilities over the long term by sharing the short-­term cost of military operations with other states; (2) to overcome domestic mobilization hurdles to participation through appeals to international legitimacy and claims that the burden will be shared with allies and partners; (3) to leverage the legitimacy of institutions to generate domestic pressure on other states for their participation; and (4) to assist in signaling intent to adversaries, which might prevent unnecessary wars in the first place (Ripsman 2019, 45–50). Over the past thirty years, the United States has variously used the UN Security Council and/or NATO for each of these four reasons. At times, NATO had a marginal impact on the manner in which the United States used force. For example, at the outset of the Kosovo conflict in March 1999, German and French opposition to a possible NATO invasion of Serbia and Kosovo led Clinton to publicly rule out the deployment of ground troops and to restrict military operations to air strikes. By doing so, however, he ceded escalation dominance to Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, who ordered the displacement of 435,000 Kosovar civilians, precipitating an international refugee crisis. It was only when Clinton took “the ground option” off the table by deploying US airborne units to the Balkans, and Russia let it be known that it lacked the military capabilities to stop a NATO invasion in May 1999, that Milosevic capitulated (Posen  2000; Kay  2020). In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deliberately excluded NATO from offensive military operations against al-­Qaeda and the Taliban. However, the Bush administration would later call upon the NATO allies to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan (Posen 2014). Neither the UN Security Council nor NATO could restrain the United States from  invading Iraq and toppling Saddam’s regime in 2003. But the failure to obtain a UN  or NATO mandate for the invasion had broader consequences for the liberal international order. First, the United States undermined its legitimacy as a liberal hegemon. “The contradiction in the Bush foreign policy is that it offered the world a system in which America rules the world but does not abide by rules,” Ikenberry writes, adding that this hypocrisy was “both unsustainable at home and unacceptable abroad” (Ikenberry 2011, 266). By denying UN Security Council mandates for the Iraq war, Russia and China effectively delegitimated US behavior in the eyes of third parties (Wivel and Paul 2019a). Second, the prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with perennial complaints about burden sharing within NATO, fed into a narrative that maintaining the liberal international order was not worth the cost to the American taxpayer. During the 2016 presidential election, Republican nominee Donald J. Trump rallied his base in part by accusing longtime allies of taking advantage of the United States economically and

76   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro promising to bring American troops home. As Mira Rapp-­Hooper notes, “the foreign policy positions that Trump staked out as a candidate and has pursued as president arise from basic doubts about the US role in the world” (Rapp-­Hooper 2020, 156). As president, Trump withdrew from the 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (the JCPOA, popularly known as the Iran nuclear deal), the 2016 Paris Climate Agreement, and the 2016 Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP)—all multilateral agreements that the Obama administration negotiated. Trump’s hostility toward NATO and the other institutions underpinning the liberal order; the deference he shows toward Putin, Xi, and other autocratic leaders; and his administration’s erratic foreign policy alienated longtime allies and further diminished US global leadership. Meanwhile, Germany, France, South Africa, and Australia, as well as smaller states like the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have tried to preserve existing institutions like the UN and NATO because, at present, they see no other alternatives for promoting peaceful change (Abrahamsen, Andersen, and Sending 2019; Andersen, 2019; Wivel and Crandall 2019). Third, the Kosovo and Iraq wars, and later the Obama administration’s backing for NATO air operations to assist rebels fighting to oust Libyan leader Col. Muammar al-­Gaddafi in 2012, emboldened Russia and China to engage in their own legal and territorial revisionism vis-­à-­vis former Soviet republics—Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014—and by asserting territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, respectively (R.  Allison  2017; Heritage and Lee  2020). Russia and China also exploited the crisis in the US-­led liberal international order by creating rival international institutions, such as the Eurasian Union, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the BRI. By investing billions of dollars in telecommunications and transportation infrastructure projects throughout South Asia, Central Asia, and sub-­Saharan Africa, China is establishing a quasi-­tributary system in these regions (Boni  2019; Khurana 2019; Nouwens 2019; Alden and Lu 2019). By 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy behind the United States. However, China’s accession to the WTO did not transform it into a “responsible stakeholder” within the existing liberal international order, let alone nudge the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a more democratic direction. In retrospect, the expectation that WTO membership would have such a transformative impact on China’s external behavior and domestic politics seems naïve, bordering on delusional. For its part, the United States has chosen not to resolve its trade disputes with China through the WTO but rather bilaterally. Since coming into office in January 2017, the Trump administration has pursued a dual strategy of raising tariffs on an increasing number of Chinese imports to the United States and demanding structural reform, while concurrently imposing additional restrictions on the procurement of Chinese-­ made information technology (IT) equipment by the US government and private firms and limiting Chinese investments in US industries deemed critically important (Friedberg and Boustany 2020). Like the Bush and Obama administrations, the Trump administration showed no willingness to acknowledge a Chinese sphere of influence in the South China Sea.

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   77 NATO’s enlargement was not the sole cause of the overall downturn in US-­Russian relations. The alliance posed no serious threat to Russia’s physical security and territorial integrity. But as Kimberly Martin writes, “NATO enlargement was a marker for Russia’s declining status and the growing influence of the USA in the world; it reflected, rather than caused, a shift in the relative global power balance” (Marten 2020, 403). Also notable is the steadfast refusal of four US presidential administrations—H. W. Bush, Clinton, W.  Bush, and Obama—to acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. President Donald Trump, however, expressed disdain for long time NATO allies and was obsequious in his dealings with Putin. In all, the record of US liberal hegemony in facilitating peaceful change at the systemic and regional levels during the post–Cold War era has been mixed. The expansion of the liberal order stabilized Central and Eastern Europe, but at the cost of alienating Russia. China’s membership in the WTO neither nudged its domestic political system in a more democratic direction nor made it a responsible stakeholder within the existing liberal order. Finally, the United States has repeatedly undermined the legitimacy of the very rules and international institutions it created. The next section considers the effects of globalization on peaceful change.

Globalization and Peaceful Change Has globalization been a mechanism for peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels during the post–Cold War era? More precisely, has the acceleration of globalization over the past thirty years shaped the way that different categories of states seek security? Like the terms unipolarity and hegemony, the term globalization has multiple definitions and connotations. And like the liberal international order, globalization actually predates the end of the Cold War. For example, the globalization of production of advanced conventional weapons systems and information technology contributed to the Soviet Union’s steep relative decline in the late 1970s and 1980s (Brooks  2005). For the purposes of this analysis, I am referring to the acceleration of globalization after the Soviet collapse in 1991. Although globalization has political, cultural, and social dimensions, I restrict the discussion to economic globalization, which comprises two parallel phenomena: economic interdependence and transnationalism. Interdependence “refers to the interconnectedness of the world economy, such that a change in the economic conditions of one country would bring about changes in the economy of others.” Consequently, “a disruption of mutual economic relations would impose costs upon multiple states” (Ripsman and Paul 2010, 6). Transnationalism refers to the extent to which goods, services, and business entities can move across state borders and through the global commons due to rapid advances in transportation and communications technologies (Frieden and Rogowski  1996). Globalization, therefore, is a

78   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro multidimensional phenomenon that occurs both within and outside state borders and involves a variety of state and nonstate actors, individual consumers, private firms, social groups, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In the 1990s and early 2000s, various scholars and pundits argued that the forces of globalization were so pervasive that all states, regardless of their geographic locale or relative power, would fundamentally alter the ways they pursue security. At the systemic level, globalization would lead to a sustained reduction in military spending and a proliferation of international institutions and NGOs operating in the security arena. At the regional level, globalization would alter the types of security threats that states face and the types of strategies that states use to redress those threats, and even challenge the monopoly of the state as a security provider. Consequently, across various regions states would dramatically reduce their military spending and force levels, reorient their military doctrines away from fighting traditional interstate wars and toward participation in humanitarian interventions and counterterrorism operations, and eschew unilateralism in favor of a greater reliance on regional security institutions. Globalization would make peaceful change more likely among the major powers at the systemic level as well as among the minor powers and other states at the regional level (Ōmae 1990, 1995, 2005; O’Brien 1992; Shaw 2000; Scholte 2000; Friedman 2005). Norrin Ripsman and T.  V.  Paul subject these hypotheses to empirical scrutiny, because “most of the writings on globalization and security operate in the realm of theory, rather than rigorous empirical analysis” (Ripsman and Paul 2010, 161). They conclude that globalization has had an uneven impact on the prospects for peaceful change across different geographic regions and different types of states. States in stable regions, such as Western Europe, have embraced globalization to the greatest extent because they face no real existential threats. Consequently, these states have expanded their conception of security to include a range of nontraditional threats, such as the environment and the economy. They also have adopted defensive military postures, largely avoided hard balancing, and become increasingly reliant on regional institutions, such as NATO and, to a lesser extent, the European Union (EU). States in regions of enduring conflict, such as the Middle East and South Asia, have been less affected by globalization. Since war remains a real possibility, states like Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Pakistan maintain large and well-­funded militaries; engage in hard balancing toward their adversaries; and generally eschew relying on regional security arrangements, private security firms, or NGOs (Ripsman and Paul 2010). Globalization has had a major effect on the security behavior of weak or failed states, despite the fact that these states have received few economic benefits. For example, weak and failed states in sub-­Saharan Africa looked to private security firms, NGOs, and international institutions (e.g., the African Union) to provide their security. But, Ripsman and Paul caution, “we cannot blame globalization for the collapse of sub-­ Saharan Africa’s national security establishments. State failure, rather than glob­al­i­za­ tion, is the principal cause of crisis of the national security state in Africa” (Ripsman and Paul 2010, 168).

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   79 The impact of globalization on the security strategies of the United States, China, and Russia between 1990 and 2008 was mixed. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, all three adopted counterterrorism as one of the primary missions for their national security establishments. That said, there was variation in their degree of conformity with the glob­al­i­za­tion hypothesis. The United States tended to rely on multilateral alliances and institutions in pursuit of its security interests to a far greater extent than China or Russia. Nevertheless, as noted above, the United States has been willing to act independently if it cannot get its way in those institutions and multilateral alliances. While claiming to uphold institutions like the UN, Russia and China nonetheless used counterterrorism as a subterfuge to violently suppress ethnic minorities within their borders or to engage in hybrid interference against neighboring states (Greitens, Lee, and Yazici 2020; Lutz, Lutz, and Lutz 2019; Wigell 2019). As Ripsman and Paul observe, “[a] major weakness of the globalization literature is its inattention to considerations of power competition among major powers in the international arena. Globalization is itself largely a product of American hegemony and cooperative major power relations in the wake of the Cold War and could be further shaped by major powers for their own interests” (Ripsman and Paul 2010, 175). Instead of facilitating peaceful change among the major powers and other states, the uneven wealth distribution resulting from globalization can generate conflict within and among the major powers. For example, the six crises that shook the EU in the 2010s—Brexit, the Eurozone, North African and Middle East refugees, the rise of internal protectionism, Russia’s revanchism vis-­à-­vis Ukraine, and the rise of nationalist populism—are all unintended consequences of globalization (Hall and Mérand 2019). Indeed, much of the backlash against globalization has organized along ethnonationalist lines, rather than around economic class (Snyder 2019; Wimmer 2019).

Conclusions This chapter traced the evolution of thinking about peaceful change at the systemic (or global) and regional levels during the post–Cold War era. Unipolarity, the US-­led liberal international order, and the acceleration of economic globalization were just some of the variables that scholars and pundits argued might facilitate such peaceful change. The operative question was whether any of these three variables had any effect on the ability of the United States and other major powers to resolve social problems mutually by institutionalized procedures without recourse to large-­scale armed force. Unipolarity is not necessarily conducive to peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels. In the 1990s and 2000s, the United States enjoyed overwhelming preponderance in all categories of material capabilities, and its military had command of the global commons. But unipolarity did not eliminate security competition between the unipole and major powers or prevent the unipole from using force against recalcitrant minor powers and nonstate actors. Furthermore, the extreme imbalance of power created an

80   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro incentive for US adversaries—major powers, recalcitrant minor powers, and nonstate actors—to pursue a variety of asymmetric strategies. Russia’s use of hybrid interference targeting the United States and its European allies and China’s deployment of A2/AD capabilities in the East and South China Seas are examples of such asymmetric strategies. US liberal hegemony has not necessarily been a mechanism for peaceful change at the systemic or regional levels. The liberal international order established after World War II was predicated on a bargain: weaker states agreed to live within an American-­ dominated order, and in exchange the United States agreed to voluntary restraints on the unilateral use of its military and economic power, through international institutions. This order, which had been largely confined to the West during the Cold War, spread to encompass much of the globe in the 1990s. NATO not only persisted after the Soviet Union’s collapse but expanded to include most Eastern European states, despite Russian objections. The WTO superseded the GATT. US officials hoped that China’s accession to the WTO would transform it into a “responsible stakeholder” on the international stage and facilitate its evolution from a one-­party state to something approximating a liberal democracy at home. The United States set up a variety of new institutions and agreements dealing with regional trade, climate change, and nuclear nonproliferation. However, in the post–Cold War era, the United States was not about to be restrained by the very economic and security institutions it had created. Most notably, neither the absence of a UN Security Council mandate nor opposition by close NATO allies restrained the United States from invading Iraq in 2003. The Iraq war and its aftermath laid bare the various fissures and contradictions in the liberal order. Finally, the effects of economic globalization on the prospects for peaceful change at the systemic and regional levels during the post–Cold War era have been uneven. Ironically, globalization appears to have had a profound impact on the security behavior of weak and failed states in sub-­Saharan Africa: the states that derived few economic benefits from globalization were precisely those more likely to rely on private military firms, NGOs, and regional security institutions. States in stable regions, like Western Europe, have tended to focus on nontraditional security issues, such as climate change, and to rely on regional security institutions, whereas states in conflict-­prone regions, like the Middle East and South Asia, maintain large and well-­funded militaries, prioritize traditional security issues, and eschew nascent regional security institutions. But while the United States, China, and Russia all updated their military doctrines to prioritize counterterrorism after the 9/11 attacks, globalization has done little to mitigate competition among them.

References Abrahamsen, Rita, Louise Riis Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending. 2019. “Introduction: Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?” International Journal 74, no. 1: 5–14. Alden, Chris, and Lu Jiang. 2019. “Brave New World: Debt, Industrialization and Security in China–Africa Relations.” International Affairs 95, no. 3: 641–657.

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   81 Allison, Graham T. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Allison, Roy. 2017. “Russia and the Post-2014 International Legal Order: Revisionism and Realpolitik.” International Affairs 93, no. 3: 519–543. Andersen, Louise R. 2019 “Curb Your Enthusiasm: Middle-Power Liberal Internationalism and the Future of the United Nations.” International Journal 74, no. 1: 47–64. Beckley, Michael. 2018. Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Biddle, Stephen, and Ivan Oelrich. 2016. “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia.” International Security 41, no. 1: 7–48. Boni, Filippo. 2019. “Protecting the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Cooperation with Pakistan to Secure CPEC.” Asia Policy 14, no. 2: 5–12. Brooks, Stephen G. 2005. Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brooks, Stephen  G., and William  C.  Wohlforth. 2005. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security 30, no. 1: 72–108. Brooks, Stephen  G., and William  C.  Wohlforth. 2008. World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brooks, Stephen  G., and William  C.  Wohlforth. 2016. America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dawson, Andrew, and Martin Innes. 2019. “How Russia’s Internet Research Agency Built Its Disinformation Campaign.” Political Quarterly 90, no. 2: 245–256. Deutsch, Karl. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Erickson, Andrew S., Evan Braden Montgomery, Craig Neuman, Stephen Biddle, and Ivan Oelrich. 2017. “Correspondence: How Good Are China’s Antiaccess/Area-Denial Capabilities?” International Security 41, no. 4: 202–213. Fazal, Tanisha M. 2007. State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fettweis, Christopher J. 2017. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace.” Security Studies 26, no. 3: 423–451. Foot, Rosemary. 2020. “China’s Rise and US Hegemony: Renegotiating Hegemonic Order in East Asia?” International Politics 57, no. 2: 150–165. Friedberg, Aaron  L. 2011. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Friedberg, Aaron L. 2018. “Competing with China.” Survival 60, no. 3: 7–64. Friedberg, Aaron  L., and Charles  W.  Boustany. 2020. “Partial Disengagement: A New US Strategy for Economic Competition with China.” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1: 23–40. Frieden, Jeffry A., and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview.” In Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Helen  V.  Milner and Robert  O.  Keohane, 25–47. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Friedman, Thomas L. 2005. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

82   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro Gavin, Francis  J. 2020. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici. 2020. “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang.” International Security 44, no. 3: 9–47. Hall, John A., and Frédéric Mérand. 2019. “Variable Geometry: Power and Institutions in the European Union.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T. V. Paul, 167–184. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Heritage, Anisa, and Pak K. Lee. 2020. “The Sino-American Confrontation in the South China Sea: Insights from an International Order Perspective.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33, no. 1: 134–156. Ikenberry, G.  John. 2011. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2014. “The Logic of Order: Westphalia, Liberalism, and the Evolution of International Order in the Modern Era.” In Power, Order, and Change in World Politics, edited by G. John Ikenberry, 83–106. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive.” Ethics & International Affairs 32, no. 1: 17–29. Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. 2009. “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences.” World Politics 61, no. 1: 1–27. Jensen, Benjamin, Brandon Valeriano, and Ryan Maness. 2019. “Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 2: 212–234. Jervis, Robert. 2002. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2002.” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1: 1–14. Jervis, Robert. 2009. “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective.” World Politics 61, no. 1: 188–213. Juneau, Thomas. 2015. Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kay, Sean  I. 2020. “Realist Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Security Institutions.” Security Studies 29, no. 3: 493–514. Khurana, Gurpreet S. 2019. “India as a Challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Asia Policy 14, no. 2: 27–33. Kim, Tongfi. 2011. “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States.” Security Studies 20, no. 3: 350–377. Korolev, Alexander. 2018. “Theories of Non-Balancing and Russia’s Foreign Policy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 6: 887–912. Layne, Christopher. 1993. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.” International Security 17, no. 4: 5–51. Layne, Christopher. 2006. “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment.” International Security 31, no. 2: 7–41. Layne, Christopher. 2012. “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana.” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1: 203–213. Lieber, Keir A., and Gerard Alexander. 2005. “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back.” International Security 30, no. 1: 109–139.

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   83 Lutz, Carol K. G., Brenda J. Lutz, and James M. Lutz. 2019. “Russian Foreign Policy Management and Manipulation with the Soviet Successor States.” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 1: 84–97. Marten, Kimberly. 2020. “NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia.” International Politics 57, no. 3: 401–426. Menon, Rajan, and William Ruger. 2020. “NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment.” International Politics 57, no. 3: 371–400. Montgomery, Evan B. 2014. “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific.” International Security 38, no. 4: 115–149. Montgomery, Evan B. 2016. In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Monteiro, Nuno  P. 2011. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful.” International Security 36, no. 3: 9–40. Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. Theory of Unipolar Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mueller, John  E. 1989. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books. Nouwens, Meia. 2019. “China’s Use of Private Companies and Other Actions to Secure the Belt and Road Across South Asia.” Asia Policy 14, no. 2: 13–20. O’Brien, Richard. 1992. Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Ōmae, Ken’ichi. 1990. The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked World Economy. New York: Harper Business. Ōmae, Ken’ichi. 1995. The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New York: Free Press. Ōmae, Ken’ichi. 2005. The Next Global Stage: Challenges and Opportunities in Our Borderless World. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing. Ostovar, Afshon. 2019. “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War.” Security Studies 28, no. 1: 159–188. Pape, Robert A. 2005. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security 30, no. 1: 7–45. Paul, T. V. 2005. “Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy.” International Security 30, no. 1: 46–71. Paul, T.  V. 2012. “Regional Transformation and International Relations.” In International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation, edited by T. V. Paul, 3–21. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Paul, T. V. 2016. “The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics.” In Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future, edited by T.  V.  Paul, 3–32. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Paul, T. V. 2018. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking. Poast, Paul, and Alexandra Chinchilla. 2020. “Good for Democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO Expansion.” International Politics 57, no. 3: 471–490. Posen, Barry. 2014. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

84   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro Posen, Barry R. 2000. “The War for Kosovo: Serbia’s Political-Military Strategy.” International Security 24, no. 4: 39–84. Posen, Barry  R. 2003. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” International Security 28, no. 1: 5–46. Pu, Xiaoyu, and Chengli Wang. 2018. “Rethinking China’s Rise: Chinese Scholars Debate Strategic Overstretch.” International Affairs 94, no. 5: 1019–1035. Rapp-Hooper, Mira. 2020. Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ripsman, Norrin  M. 2016. Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict between Regional Rivals. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ripsman, Norrin M. 2019. “A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of International Institutions.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T. V. Paul, 41–53. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Ripsman, Norrin  M., and T.  V.  Paul. 2010. Globalization and the National Security State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ripsman, Norrin  M., Jeffrey  W.  Taliaferro, and Steven  E.  Lobell. 2016. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Scholte, Jan A. 2000. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Shaw, Martin. 2000. Theory of the Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. 2018. Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Shifrinson, Joshua  R. 2020. “NATO Enlargement and US Foreign Policy: The Origins, Durability, and Impact of an Idea.” International Politics 57, no. 3: 342–370. Silove, Nina. 2016. “The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia.” International Security 40, no. 4: 45–88. Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Snyder, Jack. 2019. “The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back.” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3: 54–60. Sushentsov, Andrey  A., and William  C.  Wohlforth. 2020. “The Tragedy of US–Russian Relations: NATO Centrality and the Revisionists’ Spiral.” International Politics 57, no. 3: 427–450. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2019. Defending Frenemies: Alliance Politics and Nuclear Nonproliferation in US Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Taliaferro, Jeffrey  W., Steven  E.  Lobell, and Norrin  M.  Ripsman. 2009. “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 1–41. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2018. “Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” International Studies Review 20, no. 2: 283–291. Waltz, Kenneth  N. 1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security 18, no. 2: 44–79. Waltz, Kenneth N. 2002. “Structural Realism after the Cold War. In America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power,” edited by G. John Ikenberry, 29–67. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. 1st ed. New York: Norton.

Peaceful Change: The Post–Cold War Evolution   85 Wigell, Mikael. 2019. “Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External Interference in Liberal Democracy.” International Affairs 95, no. 2: 255–275. Wilkinson, David. 1999. “Unipolarity without Hegemony.” International Studies Review 1, no. 2: 141–172. Wimmer, Andreas. 2019. “Why Nationalism Works: And Why It Isn’t Going Away.” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3: 27–34. Wivel, Anders, and Matthew Crandall. 2019. “Punching Above Their Weight, but Why? Explaining Denmark and Estonia in the Transatlantic Relationship.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, no. 3: 392–419. Wivel, Anders, and T. V. Paul. 2019a. “Exploring International Institutions and Power Politics.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T. V. Paul, 3–22. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Wivel, Anders, and T. V. Paul. 2019b. “Maximizing Security Through International Institutions: Soft-Balancing Strategies Reconsidered.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T.  V.  Paul, 89–100. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Wohlforth, William C. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24, no. 1: 5–41. Wohlforth, William C. 2009. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” World Politics 61, no. 1: 28–57. Zacher, Mark W. 2001. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force.” International Organization 55, no. 2: 215–250. Zhou, Weifeng, and Mario Esteban. 2018. “Beyond Balancing: China’s Approach Towards the Belt and Road Initiative.” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 112: 487–501.

Pa rt I I I

T H E OR ET IC A L PE R SPE C T I V E S

chapter 5

R ea lism a n d Pe acefu l Ch a nge A Structural and Neoclassical Realist First-Cut Joshua Shifrinson

Is peaceful change in interstate relations possible? As the Introduction to this Handbook underscores, what constitutes “peaceful change” in international relations (IR) is ill-­ defined, referring variously to the peaceful accommodation of new state roles amid shifts in the distribution of power, or to the transformation of international relations toward something like a pluralistic security community. Despite the ambiguity, however, prominent arguments—often in the liberal and constructivist IR traditions—flag peaceful change’s feasibility if only states embraced some combination of international institutions, good domestic governance, norms conducive to international accommodation, and/or economic exchange. Though not a unified approach, the underlying premise seems to be that peaceful change is viable if states are simultaneously disincentivized to use force and have avenues to resolve the conflicts of interest that inevitably erupt in a competitive international system. That these approaches enjoy purchase in policy discussions (especially in the United States and Europe) reinforces the point, highlighting that hope springs eternal for peaceful change through wise state decisions and individual agency. In contrast, the primary sticks in the mud are said to be realists (and realpolitik practitioners). Indeed, with realism’s emphasis on power, competition, and (in)security, the view that realist approaches are antithetical to peaceful change is widespread—and especially so when discussing the possibility of peaceful change today vis-­à-­vis a rising China. John Ikenberry, for one, contends that “[r]ealist scholars [. . .] in some sense offer the most dramatic and troubling arguments” by ostensibly suggesting that managing a power shift “can be quite difficult. It can be quite threatening and you can expect a lot of conflict” (Ikenberry 2014; also Morini 2011, 93). Likewise, Thomas Wright argues realists ignore the potential for economic interdependence to assuage international tensions (Wright 2013), just as Barry Buzan charges that “realists [. . .] take the view that China’s rise will inevitably lead at minimum to a rivalry and tension, and at maximum to a major

90   Joshua Shifrinson confrontation” (Buzan 2010, 23). And, in an apt summary, Richard Rosecrance lambasts realism for overpredicting states’ tendency to compete as power shifts and for underappreciating how global supply chains and the diminishing value of territory constrain conflict (Rosecrance 2006). Interestingly, however, realist scholars do not universally make the pessimistic ­predictions that critics allege. Of course, “offensive realist” arguments suggest that change in the distribution of power tends to promote conflict between rising and declining states (Mearsheimer  2010). Still, this view is far from ubiquitous. Thus, Charles Glaser finds that there is “no general tendency for intense security competition between a rising power and a declining power” (Glaser 2010a, 272). Similarly, Kenneth Waltz— the father of modern realist theory—claims nuclear weapons tend to “keep the peace among those who enjoy their protection” and dampen “the tensions and conflicts that intensify when profound changes in world politics take place” (Waltz  2000, 36; also Waltz 1981). Along similar lines, Barry Posen argues geography and the limited scope of US interests create room in contemporary Asia for the United States to accommodate a rising China (Posen 2014, 93). From a “neoclassical realist” perspective, meanwhile, Randall Schweller contends shifting power can create incentives for incumbent powers to turn inward, allowing other states to peacefully expand (Schweller  2018). Other realist research echoes these findings in suggesting that states facing an adverse shift in power often retrench and so help new powers to arise (MacDonald and Parent  2018); that cooperation depends on states’ time horizons (Edelstein  2017); that expectations of future threats can dampen competition (Itzkowitz Shifrinson  2018); and that rising states often avoid escalating tensions with incumbent powers (Priebe 2014). Not all realists, it seems, are sold that all forms of peaceful change are impossible. Which view is correct? Does realism mean pessimism when it comes to peaceful change, or are there grounds for some degree of optimism? No single chapter can address the broad range of realist theories, and other chapters in this volume aptly engage with classical and hegemonic stability realist insights on these questions. Still, a review of structural realism (including its “offensive” and “defensive” variants) and neoclassical realism highlights that critics overstate the case. Peaceful transformation of the international system as a whole is difficult, but peaceful change between states and for portions of the international system is possible. To be sure, structural and neoclassical realist arguments acknowledge that international politics remains competitive, but they are not the caricatures of internecine international conflict that critics suggest. Core variables central to realist theories individually and collectively identify conditions under which peaceful change is possible. The remainder of this chapter proceeds in several sections. Following this preamble, I build on the introduction to this volume (see Paul, this volume) to define two distinct varieties of peaceful change in world politics. Next, I review the core tenets of structural and neoclassical realism, alongside the variables conditioning their operation. I subsequently use this framework to identify the prospects for and conditions under which either variety of peaceful change might be possible. Along the way, I apply and

Realism and Peaceful Change   91 illustrate these arguments using cases of peaceful and nonpeaceful change in world politics. Finally, I conclude by discussing avenues for future research and policy implications.

What Is Peaceful Change? As the Introduction showcases, “peaceful change” carries a variety of meanings. To avoid unduly narrowing the analytic aperture, as well as showcasing the range of arguments modern realism provides to explain the phenomenon, I first delineate two distinct forms of peaceful change: change between and among two or more great powers, and change in the fundamental operating principles of international relations itself.1 Subsequent sections then discuss what structural and neoclassical realisms would expect for each outcome.

Type I Peaceful Change The first type of peaceful change-what I refer to as Type I peaceful change-refers to the peaceful adjustment of relations between states as the distribution of power shifts. The most studied form of shifting power occurs during a power transition, when one major state overtakes another in net material capabilities (Organski  1968; Gilpin  1981; Davidson and Sucharov 2001; Allison 2017). More common, however, are power shifts that, even if not inducing a power transition, still affect different actors’ relative strength (Itzkowitz Shifrinson 2018; MacDonald and Parent 2018). This relative shift can influence the degree of security different states enjoy, as well as their options for addressing external threats and pursuing nonsecurity interests (Morrow 1993). Power shifts of this kind prime international politics for conflict in two ways. First, they generate uncertainty over the distribution of power, leading states to misjudge the attractiveness of using force (Fearon 1995) and miscalculate what they can obtain at the bargaining table rather than the battlefield (Blainey 1988). Second, shifting power can lead relatively rising states to seek more influence, authority, and security, just as relatively declining states look to hold on to the influence, security, and authority they presently enjoy (Levy 1987; Copeland 2000, chap. 1; Legro 2007). Conflict can then emerge because one or more parties use force to either obtain new ends or hold on to an established position. Peaceful change in these circumstances refers to the accommodation of shifting power relations between two or more states without resort to sustained force. In context, this means that rising and declining states successfully avoid war as the distribution of power changes. Note that the emphasis on war and the sustained use of force is critical. This approach to peaceful change does not assume power shifts are free of tensions or even competition: given that world politics regularly sees states at odds even when enjoying durable peace, treating peaceful change as tension-­free change is a bridge too far.

92   Joshua Shifrinson The Anglo-­American rapprochement in the nineteenth century, for instance—perhaps the canonical example of Type I peaceful change—saw the United States supplant Britain as the dominant actor in much of the Atlantic world. This transition was peaceful, but nevertheless saw regular crises and near-­conflicts as American power grew (Kupchan 2010; Priebe 2014; Zeran and Hall 2016; Schake 2017). A similar dynamic occurred more recently when the decline and fall of the Soviet Union saw the world peacefully shift from bipolarity to unipolarity without a World War III (Wohlforth 1994; Wilson 2014) despite severe geopolitical tensions. Both are episodes of peaceful change: tensions were present, but force was not. In contrast, the rise of Prussia and decline of Austria and France in the mid-­nineteenth century on the back of the German Wars of Unification is the opposite of peaceful change: violence predominated (Mosse 1958; Clark 2006).

Type II Peaceful Change Type I peaceful change concerns whether relations between two or more states can be adjusted without warfare. In contrast, Type II peaceful change is broader, referring to whether interstate relations can be transformed to significantly reduce—if not eliminate—the shadow of violence in IR. This approach would minimally involve regularized mechanisms to adjudicate international disputes (Ikenberry et al. 2009); at maximum, it would allow for “transformational change” in international politics and movement away from anarchy as the central organizing principle of world politics—actors (not necessarily including states) would interact based on norms and principles of justice without the threat of force entering the equation (Deutsch 1957). This approach, as the Introduction to this volume highlights, has some of its origins in idealist thinking during the interwar period. It garnered renewed attention after World War II when theorists such as Karl Deutsch discussed the creation of pluralistic security communities in which war would virtually be off the table. Extending this work, some scholars argue that most of Europe—if not the entirety of the transatlantic area—is now part of such a community (Risse-­Kappen  1995; Williams and Neumann  2000; Adler 2008); building on this notional development, others propose emulating the institutions, norms, and conflict resolution mechanisms undergirding Europe/transatlantic relations in other areas (Acharya 2014). If successful, such steps would progressively create regions in which peaceful change prevailed—potentially and progressively changing the fundamental operating principles of the international system.

Realism: Review and Reprise As others observe, much of the thinking behind peaceful change comes from liberal and constructivist approaches to IR. Realist theories can therefore suggest both useful critical perspectives on the likelihood of such outcomes (Wivel  2017) and highlight

Realism and Peaceful Change   93 alternate pathways to similar ends. To engage the specific implications of structural and neoclassical realism—the focus of this chapter—for either form of peaceful change, it thus helps to review the basic tenets of each approach. “Realism,” after all, is not a unified theory, so much as a family of paradigms sharing certain core assumptions yet also differing in profound ways (Brooks  1997). This is especially true surrounding what we can call “modern” realist approaches—those arguments and theories emerging after Waltz’s theoretical interventions in the 1960s and 1970s—of which structural (Waltz 1979) and neoclassical realism (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016) are among the leading types. Both structural and neoclassical approaches start from the premise that international politics is primarily—absent a global hegemon—an anarchic environment in which states are the principal actors. Notably, this logic differs from classical realism, which assumed the individual’s animus to power was the core driver of international competition, and hegemonic stability realism, which presumes hierarchy and hegemony rather than anarchy is the default position in IR. In turn, states in structural and neoclassical realist theories are assumed to minimally wish to survive as sovereign units, and they are differentiated from one another in terms of their material power defined primarily by economic and military resources (and the political aptitude to generate it) (Waltz 1979, 129–131; Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 3). This situation induces a baseline competitiveness into the international system. Without a sovereign to adjudicate disputes, states eager to safeguard their well-­being are pushed by dint of calculation and socialization to remain on guard against the potential threat posed by other actors (on what constitues a threat, see Walt 1987; Levy 2004). Hence, faced with powerful external actors, states tend to balance by acquiring and aggregating economic and military capabilities. Although, critically, balancing may fail at any given moment, the tendency for balances of power to form over time perpetuates anarchy by generally denying any single state permanent hegemony, and it sustains a system in which a baseline level of competition is both regularized and accepted.

Structural Defensive Realism From here, however, structural and neoclassical realism diverge. Structural realism is composed of two subtypes. The first, defensive realism, is associated with Robert Jervis (e.g., Jervis 1978), Stephen Van Evera (e.g., Van Evera 1984, 1999), Charles Glaser (e.g., Glaser 1992, 1996, 2010b), Stephen Walt (Walt 1987, 1996), Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder (e.g., Christensen and Snyder 1990), Barry Posen (e.g., Posen 1984, 2006), Waltz himself (Waltz 1979, e.g., 2000) and others (e.g., Grieco 1996; Fiammenghi 2011). This branch builds on the idea that survival is states’ irreducible goal, such that states primarily seek security in IR. What security means is sometimes opaque (Wolfers 1952), but generally refers to whether states can operate broadly free of coercion and threats of violence visited upon them by other states. Security and power are therefore not identical: because acquiring more power can trigger counterbalancing, states are expected to be cautious and risk-averse.

94   Joshua Shifrinson Still, this situation is probabilistic, and heavily conditional on whether actors can avoid (or overcome) security dilemmas that can prompt competition even among security-­seeking actors (in addition to Glaser and Jervis, see Kydd 1997; Montgomery 2012). In turn, security dilemmas are influenced by “structural modifiers” (Snyder 1996), including geography and military technology—which encompasses nuclear weapons (Waltz 1981; Jervis 1989; Glaser 1990)—that affect the ease with which states can threaten others’ security and their ability to signal their nonaggressive nature (Lynn-­Jones 1995; Van Evera 1999). Although there have been situations where g­ eography and technology allow security dilemmas to erupt and escalate, defensive realist arguments suggest most situations enable security-­seeking states to step back from the brink (Schweller 1996). Competition may be endemic due to ­anarchy,  but states’ risk-­averse nature and the mutability of security dilemmas cap violence itself.

Structural Offensive Realism The other branch of structural realism is offensive realism (Labs  1997; Zakaria  1998; Copeland 2000; Mearsheimer 2001; Layne 2002; Lieber 2005; Rosato 2014), which differs from defensive realism on several dimensions. First, it assumes states are inherently uncertain over others’ intentions; there is no way for even security-­seeking actors to indicate their benign goals (Rosato  2014). Second, states—unless separated by large bodies of water—always have some ability to harm one another through force. Thus, where defensive realism allows that geography and technology influence states’ ability to engage in meaningful aggression, offensive realism argues that the system nearly always allows for war (Mearsheimer 2001, 44; Layne 2002).2 Third, in conjunction with anarchy, these dynamics mean that power and security are functionally identical: security hinges on maximizing power to keep threats in check (Mearsheimer 1990, 53; 2001, 32–34; Labs 1997). Hence, all actors end up seeking power as the surest route to security and survival (Mearsheimer 2001, 37). This does not mean offensive realism predicts wars of all against all. For one thing, power-­hungry states focused on relative gains must first hold on to the power they have rather than gamble it in contests that may harm their position (Shifrinson 2018, chap. 1). Moreover, even exceedingly powerful states do not have unlimited capacity to expand. In particular, large water barriers (‘the stopping power of water’) limit outright aggression by impeding military power projection, though states can still use other tools— including political subversion and alliances—to compete. Competition is thus strategic, proceeding to the point where a state has attained regional hegemony, and carefully attuned to costs and benefits along the way.

Neoclassical Realism Both offensive and defensive structural realist arguments treat competition as a product of the structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities within it.

Realism and Peaceful Change   95 Neoclassical realism, in contrast, incorporates the particular characteristics of different states and leaders alongside structural variables (Rose  1998; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Paul 2016). Like structural realism, scholars here allow that anarchy is pervasive and generates broad uncertainty over others’ intentions; akin to defensive realism, the approach also assumes there can be meaningful limits on international aggression (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016). Breaking with structural realism’s claim that state behavior often flows from systemic and structural forces, however, neoclassical realism argues this tendency is less prevalent than one might anticipate. Because which states pose the greatest threats and the timeframe over which threats manifest may both be uncertain, states often have significant latitude in the policies they adopt. Unless threats are clear and the international environment restrictive, there is no a priori reason to expect state behavior to follow from systemic forces. Instead, a range of unit- and individual-­level variables can shape when and how states compete or cooperate with other actors (Onea 2012; Sears 2017). These variables include leaders’ political attitudes and coalitional preferences (Lobell 2003; Schweller 2006; Narizny 2007), strategic culture and ideology (Dueck 2006; Green 2012; Schweller  2018), state–society relations, and domestic institutions (Taliaferro  2006). The result can be a more contingent approach to international politics than structural realism allows.

Prospects for Type I Peaceful Change: Arguments and Illustrations Though the specific implications remain to be unpacked, it should be obvious from the preceding discussion that each of the realist approaches covered creates some room for optimism that peaceful change in some form is possible (Table 5.1). In this section, I use the basic parameters of each argument to theorize circumstances under which peace can hold between leading states as power changes hands (Type I change) while illustrating with suggestive historical examples; the subsequent section covers more fundamental transformations (Type II change).

Defensive Structural Realism Of the three approaches, defensive realism is the most optimistic surrounding the possibility of Type I change. Because defensive realism assumes states seek security rather than power, the approach contains what Schweller terms a “status quo bias,” whereby states are primed to value the security they enjoy and fret losing it (Schweller 1996). This has implications for peaceful change. When considering war, for instance, rising or declining states are likely to ask not only what they might gain from a contest but also to consider the security they might lose; this can act as a brake to conflict.

96   Joshua Shifrinson Table 5.1  Summary of Conditions for Type I and II Change Theory

Key Elements

Conditions for Type I Change Conditions for Type II Change

Defensive Realism

Anarchy drives states to seek security; structural modifiers (geographic barriers to conquest; military technology) affect intensity of international competition

Type I change may be possible if geography and military technology create “defense dominant” systems that enable even relatively weak states to obtain security

Offensive Realism

Anarchy drives states to seek relative power and, ultimately, regional hegemony; large water barriers are primary impediment to conquest

Type I change may be possible if states (1) confront a common adversary; (2) face several opponents; (3) are insular powers that can buck pass to other actors; and/or (4) obtain regional hegemony

Neoclassical Realism

Similar to defensive realism, with domestic politics and mobilization capacity conditioning state responses to systemic conditions

Type I change may be possible if (1) elites are divided; (2) states are particularly advantaged or disadvantaged at mobilizing resources; or (3) national ideas/identity militate against the use of force

Type II change may be possible if states (1) face overwhelming external threats that require political integration, and/ or (2) attain regional hegemony (enabling hegemons to suppress competition, or socialize clients away from the use of force)

The same holds for miscalculation: even if states misjudge the distribution of power or end up in an insecurity spiral, the prospect of compromising their existing security ought to predispose them to rectify the miscalculation. Still, these are general tendencies. Whether they hold stems heavily from the aforementioned structural modifiers, with geography and military technology at the top of the list. In terms of geography, states that are separated from one another by large distances or defense-­friendly barriers (e.g., oceans, mountains) ought to have an easier time accommodating shifts in power than those that are closer together or lack natural defenses. After all, distance and defensive barriers make it comparatively difficult for states to attack one another while also reinforcing the level of security they enjoy (Walt 1987; Taliaferro 2000). This may have the effect of (1) increasing states’ valuation of the status quo, (2) leaving war—because of the difficulty of using force—a less attractive tool of statecraft than other means, and (3) decreasing the immediacy of external threats, thereby limiting the intensity of insecurity spirals. Conversely, states without defensible borders or existing near one another are more vulnerable to aggression, have greater

Realism and Peaceful Change   97 capacity to use violence, and—owing to the immediacy of threats—can be subject to more intense security dilemmas. The result can make peaceful change more difficult. Britain’s contrasting approaches to the rise of Germany and the United States might illustrate these dynamics at work. Separated from one another by the Atlantic Ocean—so this argument might go—British leaders could acquiesce (albeit not without tension) to American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, reasonably confident that America’s rise would not threaten Britain’s survival (Kennedy 1976; Friedberg 1988). In contrast, geography primed the Anglo-­German relationship for conflict. Not only did proximity render Germany’s naval aspirations threatening to Britain, but it allowed German leaders to contemplate wresting naval mastery from Britain—just as British leaders could and did envision strangling the German economy from the sea (Kennedy 1980; Osborne 2004; Lambert  2012). Though not the immediate cause, the resulting Anglo-­Germany rivalry played a role in triggering World War I. A parallel dynamic applies to military technology. Technology is not stagnant. Across time and space, some technological discoveries may aid international aggression; others facilitate defense. Of course, there is rarely a single technology that decisively allows for either offense or defense (nuclear weapons may be an exception). Instead, the question is whether the sum of military technology at a given time generally makes it advantageous for states to attack others or defend themselves when seeking security (Jervis 1978). When the offense is advantaged, attacking becomes attractive as states look for opportunities to strike knockout blows, and suffer through especially intensive security dilemmas (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Van Evera 1999). Peaceful change would thus be difficult as states are primed to use force when the balance of power changes. The opposite occurs in defense-­dominant systems. When defending is comparatively easier than attacking, even relatively weak states can gain security against strong challengers (Van Evera 1999). This bodes well for peaceful change by muting the effects of power shifts, dampening security dilemmas, and enabling status quo states time and opportunities to clarify their intentions toward other actors. Nuclear weapons fit neatly into this category. Although capable of subsidizing a state’s foreign policy (Bell 2015), nuclear devices are primarily devices to threaten retaliation; they are defensive weapons par excellence (Jervis 1989; Posen 1991). Hence, states with robust nuclear arsenals can watch changes in the distribution of power with confidence in their own survival, just as even very strong actors confronting a nuclear-­armed state are strongly incentivized to think twice before challenging the latter’s vital interests. Though not dispositive, this particular defensive realist argument might account for the peaceful end of the Cold War. Many factors drove the events that led to the peaceful end of the US-­Soviet rivalry. Still, that both the Soviet Union and United States were armed with large nuclear arsenals may have contributed to this situation. With nuclear weapons, Soviet leaders did not need to fear that decline would threaten the USSR’s very survival. By the same token, American leaders—recognizing the risks of provoking the Soviet Union—may have held back in attempting to exploit Soviet problems or, at the least, did so to a lesser degree than if conventional weapons alone had been present.

98   Joshua Shifrinson Nuclear weapons, in short, may have helped American and Soviet leaders to successfully negotiate the Cold War’s denouement (Deudney and Ikenberry 1991; Oye 1995).

Offensive Structural Realism At first glance, offensive structural realism augurs poorly for peaceful change. With its focus on uncertain intentions, power-­seeking states, and the pervasive possibility of attack, one state’s rise would seem to be another’s fall—setting the stage for both aggrandizement and preventive conflict. Under such conditions, there might look to be little room for states to peacefully manage shifting power without risking their own security and survival. Nevertheless, and though anarchy and uncertainty would continue, peaceful change may still be possible. Four circumstances stand out. First, states may be able to peacefully manage changing power relations if the states experiencing growth or reduction in their relative position confront a common adversary. This may give both parties reasons to see the utility of the other as a partner or ally (Shifrinson 2018). Even if a relatively rising state would like to see another wane in relative terms, and even if a declining state worries about shifting power, they may then nevertheless mute bilateral competition given an external threat. Relatedly—second—a rising or declining state might be deterred from war as power shifts by the prospect of needing to fight several great powers to bolster its position; in this scenario, the costs would again exceed the benefits even for power-­hungry states (Copeland 2000). Both of these drivers may have been on display in the several decades following German reunification. To be clear, unification itself was a violent affair as a surging Prussia attacked Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–1871) (Goddard 2018). For the next four decades, however, Germany’s rise proceeded peacefully: not only did other wars not erupt, but Germany formed a durable alliance with Austria-­ Hungary. Much of this quiescence, it seems, stemmed from German leaders’ recognition that (1) Germany and Austria in particular faced a common potential threat in Russia; and (2) that further German aggrandizement could trigger an overwhelming counterbalancing coalition (Glosny 2012). On the other side of the pre-­1914 European schism, meanwhile, Britain’s acceptance of Russia’s ascendance in the early 1900s may have similarly been driven by the need to counter the German-­Austrian coalition (Williams 1966). Third, peaceful change may be possible if insular great powers—major states ­surrounded by large bodies of water—are the ones confronting shifting power. Though invasion is always a potentiality, insular powers in offensive realism enjoy significantly more security than their continental counterparts. All things being equal, they are thus able to stand aside when facing continental threats—they can buckpass in expectation that continental powers handle the problem (Mearsheimer 2001; Elman 2004). For sure, this may be problematic for the continental powers and, if balancing fails, require an

Realism and Peaceful Change   99 insular power to act against a still more ­powerful threat. In the interim, however, the insular power can maintain peaceful relations with a rising challenger, just as water barriers enable it to survive even if continental balancing falters; the result might be a tense standoff between an insular power and empowered continental challenger, but peace may still hold. This approach would provide an offensive realist account of the divergence in the Anglo-­American and Anglo-­German power shifts before 1914. Finally, peaceful change may occur if one or more of the parties is already a regional hegemon—a state which dominates a geographically bounded area. To be clear, prominent offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer argue the rise and fall of regional hegemons create conditions ripe for conflict as extant hegemons seek to extend their influence abroad and/or try to prevent rival hegemons from emerging (Mearsheimer  2010). Nevertheless, the logic of offensive realism can support the opposite position. Separated from other regions by large bodies of water and dominant in their own neighborhoods, regional hegemons ought to recognize that power projection abroad is neither advantageous nor necessary for their security.3 As such, although the emergence or growth of another hegemon abroad is not necessarily to be welcomed, it can nonetheless be tolerated. Again, international relations might become tense and fractious, but war itself might be avoidable. Insofar as regional hegemons are exceedingly rare, it is difficult to illustrate this argument in action. Still, suggestive evidence comes from the response of the United States—the modern world’s only true regional hegemon—to the respective rises of Japan and China in East Asia. Secure in North America, American strategists could view Japan’s rise in East Asia in the interwar period with some degree of equanimity: though concerned with Japanese ambitions, US strategists were nevertheless disinclined to go to war for the privilege of stopping Japan’s ascent. Indeed, as Marc Trachtenberg compellingly shows, war only erupted in 1941 because US policy makers sought a “backdoor” into war with Nazi Germany; eliminate the German factor, and a case can be made that the United States might have hung back from East Asian imbroglios (Trachtenberg 2009; Schuessler 2015). Nor was this an isolated incident. Half a century later, US strategists not only allowed China to grow, but abetted China’s post-­Cold War ascendance; despite growing Chinese-­American tensions today, among the most striking features of US strategy after the Cold War has been the calm with which a regionally hegemonic United States greeted the rise of another power in a distant region (Campbell and Ratner 2018).

Neoclassical Realism Compared to defensive and offensive realism, the range of variables central to neoclassical realism makes it difficult to hypothesize when the approach predicts Type I peaceful change (for some sketching, see Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman  2018). Given its ontological links to defensive realism, many of the conditions discussed earlier might

100   Joshua Shifrinson apply. With, however, neoclassical realist theory emphasizing the influence of domestic politics in mediating systemic pressures, it is worth considering what some of these domestic elements might entail and how they might induce peaceful change. One issue concerns the unity of national elites (Schweller 2006). The more divided elites are over the nature of international threats—a situation that may, for example, stem from, distinct economic interests (Narizny  2007) or ideological preferences (Haas 2005)—the less a state can muster the focus and mobilize resources in response to international events (Miller 2016). Even if some policy makers seek to use force given shifting power, the resulting divide can hinder their doing so—sustaining peace as a byproduct (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman  2018). Thus, one factor contributing to China’s peaceful rise to date may be division among American elites over whether China presents a threat to American interests; absent such cohesion, hardline policies that might block China’s ascendance and risk confrontation are proportionally more difficult (Friedberg 2005; Edelstein 2017). Another factor concerns mobilization capacity (Taliaferro  2006). Not all states are equally adept at extracting resources from their domestic base and converting them into capabilities useful for international purposes. This can affect peaceful change in two directions. First, lack of mobilization capacity may inhibit states from using force by precluding options for rolling the iron dice; by extension, it can further compel states to turn to diplomatic channels for addressing international tensions. By this logic, Austria’s reconciliation with Germany after 1866—which, again, facilitated European peace as power continued shifting after the events of 1864–1871—may have stemmed from the reality that the Austrian state could not readily match the might of its continental neighbors, and so incentivized it to accept German patronage (Taylor  1976; for a contrary view, see Judson 2016). Second, and paradoxically however, the opposite trend can also occur: if one party to a power shift has an especially efficient ability to generate power from its domestic base, it may conclude that it has no need to use force—it can use other tools to obtain security. This applies as much to a rising state, which may defer challenges to a declining state, as to a declining state, which faces reduced preventive war incentives. The result could give parties to a power shift more time to adjudicate conflicts of interest. A final element might concern the effects of what I will term “national purpose”: the content of a state’s nationalism, ideology, or political culture. National purpose can also facilitate peaceful change in two ways. On one level, national purpose might prescribe certain international behaviors weighing against the use of force. Several analysts, for instance, argue the liberal tradition in the United States long militated against a militarized foreign policy against other great powers (Friedberg 2000; Green 2012); similarly, others propose that certain types of nationalism can induce a more or less aggressive foreign policy (Schweller 2018). As neoclassical realism is ultimately about the primacy of international factors and the conditioning effects of domestic forces, national purpose is unlikely to cause peaceful change alone. Still, it may reinforce the conditions under which peaceful change is likely or, under other situations, push against incentives for the use of force.

Realism and Peaceful Change   101

Type II Change: Arguments and Illustrations In sum, each realist approach here suggests conditions under which Type I change is possible. Type II peaceful change, on the other hand, faces a less sanguine situation. The reason is simple. Structural and neoclassical realism build on the idea that anarchy is pervasive and generates enduring uncertainty, mistrust, and relative gains concerns (Grieco 1988). As a result, there is an ingrained pessimism baked into these approaches over whether the shadow of violence in IR can be eliminated. Still, this does not mean that modern realism views Type II change as an impossibility. In fact, there are at least two possible conditions where a shallow version of Type II peaceful change—whereby states would find institutionalized mechanisms to resolve disputes and significantly reduce the threat of force—might be possible. Neither is particularly common; indeed, one has never occurred and remains largely theoretical. Nevertheless, both are worth discussing. The first situation is one in which relatively weaker states confront a clear, long-­lasting, and near-­overwhelming external threat. Under such conditions, actors seeking to ensure their own security face reasons to set aside past disputes—militating against the use of force among them. Seeking, moreover, to balance a common adversary, they need to pool resources and coordinate their foreign and defense policies. Indeed, the longer-­lasting the threat is, the greater the reason to find efficiencies in combating the external threat through coordinated and deep cooperation; logically, participants may even need to develop mechanisms to avoid major disputes among themselves in order to avoid disrupting counterbalancing efforts. Sustained over time, the net effect can be a de facto subsystem in which the use of force among members of the counterbalancing coalition is significantly reduced both due to a common external threat and the intermingled nature of state policy. Of course, this system may only endure so long as its members confront a sustained threat—reduce the threat, and anarchy is poised to reap its effects. This situation is reflected in realist accounts of the origins of the United States and European Union. In this telling, the formation of the United States and the formation of the European Union were not primarily domestic affairs. Rather, sovereign states in North America and Europe (respectively) set aside existing disputes in the face of sustained and near-­overwhelming pressures from external actors (Britain and other European empires in the US case, the Soviet Union for the EU case) (Parent  2011; Rosato  2011b,  2011a). Looking to balance, states pooled their economic and political livelihoods in an extreme form of external balancing one expects states to undertake in the face of external challenges—creating an environment in which Type II change largely prevailed. Once, however, external threats waned, some degree of political stagnation took hold: the depth and scope of EU integration have fluctuated since the

102   Joshua Shifrinson end of the Cold War, just as the United States faced several major domestic crises that challenged the foundation of the union itself throughout the nineteenth century. A second scenario involves a situation where one state attains hegemony at either the regional or, especially, global level. For sure, the process of gaining hegemony is unlikely to itself be peaceful as, at root, emerging hegemons must find ways of overcoming counter-balancing.4 If and when hegemony is attained, however, hegemons are by definition sufficiently strong that other states lack effective ways to counter the hegemon’s sheer capabilities. In a narrow sense, the use of force is banished not because states transcend violence, but because of hegemonic domination. States operating in the hegemon’s shadow must then find ways of resolving conflicts of interest with the hegemon without resort to force. The crudest form of doing so would simply be to accede to the hegemon’s demands—a form of peaceful change, but perhaps not a benevolent one. They may also attempt to regularize and bind the hegemon to patterns of international behavior that give them whatever opportunities they can have to advance their interests in the face of hegemonic might. The result is a form of peaceful change, albeit one whose quality (again) depends on the hegemon’s own preferences (Grieco 1995). The operation of the American and Soviet spheres of influence during the Cold War provides some evidence of these dynamics. Neither the USSR nor the United States was a global hegemon. Within their respective camps, however, they dominated as each developed tools to limit the use of force among their respective member states, regulated—sometimes coercively (e.g., Suez 1956) the behavior of clients, and delivered club goods to members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact/COMECON, respectively (Trachtenberg 1999; Mastny and Byrne 2005). Clients, in turn, often bargained hard with patrons to obtain different security, economic, and diplomatic benefits (Heiss and Papacosma 2008). The consequences were dramatic: where Europe was previously the scene of internecine conflict, no conflicts erupted within the American or Soviet spheres in the 1945–1991 period (unless sanctioned by the pseudo-­hegemons) despite substantial changes in the distribution of power, domestic politics, and economic relationships within and among the spheres (Gaddis 1986). That said, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and concerns over the effects of an American withdrawal from Europe underlines that a key issue again concerns the durability of this kind of change. From one perspective, hegemonic-­induced peaceful change is unlikely to prove resilient. Even supremely powerful states do not last forever. Decline eventually takes hold, creating fresh opportunities for states that were once in the hegemon’s shadow to counterbalance and/or escape the (former) hegemon’s influence. Freed of hegemonic domination, one might expect the problems of anarchy to resume. The peaceful change fostered by hegemony would then fall into the dustbin of history.5 Still, there is some possibility that hegemony can produce more durable peaceful change via socialization—an understudied aspect of structural realism. In principle, socialization under hegemony might condition states to prefer conflict resolution and cooperation to competition and balancing. To do so, the hegemon would presumably

Realism and Peaceful Change   103 need to ensure its clients regularly gained from peaceful interactions and all states recognize as much. Moreover, this situation might need to last for a significant period to supplant prior understandings. Still, hegemony that fostered such an environment might establish a durable sort of peaceful change in a portion of world politics.

Conclusion: Toward a Research Agenda To summarize, this chapter has argued that structural and neoclassical realist approaches suggest conditions under which different kinds of peaceful change in international ­relations might be possible. This challenges a widespread claim that realism as a whole is broadly pessimistic on the prospects for peaceful international transformations. Future research might expand on these themes. One issue concerns the relative effect of the conditions identified in this chapter. The preceding analysis was not intended to decide whether and which of the possible conditions for peaceful change best explained the empirical record for either Type I or Type II change. Additional research might therefore fruitfully extend this study by identifying the relevant universe of cases and assessing which of the arguments carries the greatest explanatory weight. In the process, researchers would also be well-­served elaborating upon the particular set of realist factors contributing to peaceful transformations and the mechanisms by which they operate. Along the way, it could be fruitful to further compare these dynamics to those contained in other, nonstructural or neoclassical realist arguments such as Robert Gilpin’s (Gilpin 1981). A second issue concerns whether and how the structural factors at the heart of the preceding are reflected in state decision-making. Waltz famously drew a distinction between theories of international relations and those of foreign policy (Elman 1996). Although it may be possible for the structural forces discussed in this chapter to abet peaceful change irrespective of whether policy makers are aware of the trends, it seems likely that policy makers eventually become aware of the systemic incentives for peaceful change and consciously adapt their policies accordingly. One therefore wants to know: under what conditions and how do state leaders recognize shifting international conditions and adapt policy given such pressures? This work would not only contribute to ongoing scholarship connecting realist theories of international relations with theories of foreign policy but would also showcase how the dynamics of peaceful change shape domestic deliberations over state strategy. Finally, additional work might apply the above arguments to understand prospects for peaceful change in the contemporary world. To reiterate, many analysts today suggest that realist arguments make some of the more pessimistic predictions surrounding the future of world politics. Yet, although some realist elements, under some circumstances, predict competition between rising and declining states and/or diminishing opportunities for international transformation, the above analysis underscores that realist accounts are by no means universally foreboding. Scholars might therefore explore whether and how the

104   Joshua Shifrinson preceding arguments map onto contemporary discussions surrounding, for example, China’s rise and the collapse of US unipolarity, and the resulting implications for IR theory. Ultimately, understanding the dynamics of peaceful change is central to engaging the drivers of international politics more generally. Here, structural and neoclassical realism offer a useful corrective to constructivist and liberal approaches by directing attention to the critical roles of uncertainty, power, and security concerns in shaping the prospects of peaceful change. In doing so, a strong argument can be made that, despite its popular portrayal, realism need not mean pessimism—cooperation and change remain possible even under anarchy.

Notes 1. Regional dimensions of peaceful change are covered in other chapters. 2. To unpack this point, offensive realism proposes states can always attack. Defensive realists would not dispute this point, but they counter that geography and technology limit the salience of the act: one state may attack another with sticks and rocks, but, if the target is in a favorable geographic or military position (e.g., defended by machine guns and tanks), the attack should matter little for the target’s security. 3. Of course, distant regional hegemons might become rivals. Still, whether that results in conflict and undermines prospects for peaceful change is less clear: if distance and water truly limit power projection, it is theoretically possible for states to be rivals, yet peace continues. 4. Structural and neoclassical realisms do not predict that balances of power will form at any particular moment—only that (1) states will attempt to balance threats; and (2) balances of power will eventually emerge. In the interim, there may be periods of unbalanced power— including the potential for hegemony. 5. This parallels the difficulty of peaceful change suggested in Gilpin’s work, where the ascendance of a challenger threatens to upend the international order created by a hegemon. Unless bilateral tensions are addressed, peaceful change of both types may prove impossible.

References Acharya, Amitav. 2014. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. New York: Routledge. Adler, Emanuel. 2008. “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post—Cold War Transformation.” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 2: 195–230. Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Bell, Mark S. 2015. “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy.” International Security 1: 87. Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. The Causes of War. 3rd ed. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Brooks, Stephen G. 1997. “Dueling Realisms.” International Organization 51, no. 3: 445–477.

Realism and Peaceful Change   105 Buzan, Barry. 2010. “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 1: 5–36. Campbell, Kurt  M., and Ely Ratner. 2018. “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations.” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2: 60–70. Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. 1990. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44, no. 2: 137–168. Clark, Christopher. 2006. Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Copeland, Dale C. 2000. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Davidson, James, and Mira Sucharov. 2001. “Peaceful Power Transitions: The Historical Cases.” In Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order, edited by Charles Kupchan, Emmanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foong Khong. New York: United Nations University Press. Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. 1991. “The International Sources of Soviet Change.” International Security 16, no. 3: 74–118. Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area?: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dueck, Colin. 2006. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Edelstein, David M. 2017. Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Elman, Colin. 1996. “Horses for Courses: Why nor Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6, no. 1: 7–53. Elman, Colin. 2004. “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to Regional Hegemony.” The American Political Science Review 98, no. 4: 563–576. Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3. Fiammenghi, Davide. 2011. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis.” International Security 35, no. 4: 126–154. Friedberg, Aaron. 1988. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Friedberg, Aaron L. 2000. In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Friedberg, Aaron  L. 2005. “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2: 7–45. Gaddis, John L. 1986. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.” International Security 10, no. 4: 99–142. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Glaser, Charles. 1990. Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glaser, Charles L. 1992. “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models.” World Politics 44, no. 4: 497–538. Glaser, Charles L. 1996. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” Security Studies 5, no. 3: 122. Glaser, Charles L. 2010a. Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

106   Joshua Shifrinson Glaser, Charles L. 2010b. Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glosny, Michael A. 2012. “The Grand Strategies of Rising Powers: Reassurance, Coercion, and Balancing Responses.” PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Goddard, Stacie. 2018. When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Green, Brendan R. 2012. “Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition.” International Security 37, no. 2: 9–43. Grieco, Joseph. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42, no. 3: 485–507. Grieco, Joseph M. 1995. “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the NeoRealist Research Programme.” Review of International Studies 21, no. 1: 21–40. https://doi .org/10.1017/S0260210500117504. Grieco, Joseph  M. 1996. “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union.” Security Studies 5, no. 3: 261–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429281. Haas, Mark  L. 2005. The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Heiss, Mary Ann, and S. Victor Papacosma, eds. 2008. NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press. https://oaks.kent.edu/new_foreign_relations/ nato-and-warsaw-pact-intrabloc-conflicts. Ikenberry, G. John. 2014. “The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal World Order.” Douglas Dillon Lecture, Chatham House, May 7. http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/ IRreadingsbank/ChinaRiseOfNotEndLiberalismIdenberry2014talk.9pp.pdf. Ikenberry, G. John, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, eds. 2009. The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2: 167–214. Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Judson, Pieter  M. 2016. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kennedy, Paul. 1976. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London: A. Lane. Kennedy, Paul. 1980. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914. London: Allen & Unwin. Kupchan, Charles. 2010. How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kydd, Andrew. 1997. “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other.” Security Studies 7, no. 1: 114–155. Labs, Eric  J. 1997. “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims.” Security Studies 6, no. 4: 1–49. Lambert, Nicholas. 2012. Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Layne, Christopher. 2002. “The ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon.” Security Studies 12, no. 2: 120–164.

Realism and Peaceful Change   107 Legro, Jeffrey  W. 2007. “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3: 515–534. Levy, Jack S. 1987. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.” World Politics 40, no. 1: 82–107. Levy, Jack S. 2004. “What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?” In Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, edited by T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 29–51. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lieber, Keir. 2005. War and the Engineers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lobell, Steven. 2003. The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Lobell, Steven  E., Norrin  M.  Ripsman, and Jeffrey  W.  Taliaferro, eds. 2009. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 1995. “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics.” Security Studies 4, no. 4: 660. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419509347600. MacDonald, Paul K., and Joseph M. Parent. 2018. Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mastny, Vojtech, and Malcolm Byrne. 2005. A Cardboard Castle?: An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991. Central European University Press. Mearsheimer, John  J. 1990. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” International Security 15, no. 1: 5–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Mearsheimer, John J. 2010. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4: 381–396. Miller, Manjari. 2016. “The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Powers.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 2: 211–238. Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2012. “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” International Security 31, no. 2: 151–185. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.151. Morini, Daryl. 2011. “Paradigm Shift: China’s Rise and the Limits of Realism.” Security Challenges 7, no. 1: 91–112. Morrow, James D. 1993. “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security.” International Organization 47, no. 2: 207–233. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027922. Mosse, Werner Eugen. 1958. The European Powers and the German Question, 1848–71: With Special Reference to England and Russia. University Press. Narizny, Kevin. 2007. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Onea, Tudor. 2012. “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War.” International Relations 26, no. 2: 139–164. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117811430674. Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics. 2nd ed. (rev.). New York: Knopf. Osborne, Eric W. 2004. Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919. London: Routledge. Oye, Kenneth A. 1995. “Explaining the End of the Cold War: Behavioral and Morphological Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace.” In The End of the Cold War & International Relations Theory, edited by Thomas Risse-Kappen and Lebow. New York: Columbia University Press. Parent, Joseph. 2011. Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics. Oxford University Press. Paul, T. V., ed. 2016. Accommodating Rising Powers. Cambridge University Press.

108   Joshua Shifrinson Posen, Barry R. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Posen, Barry R. 1991. Inadvertent Escalation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Posen, Barry  R. 2006. “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15, no. 2: 149–186. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410600829356. Posen, Barry R. 2014. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Priebe, Miranda. 2014. “Fear and Frustration: Rising State Perceptions of Threats and Opportunities.” PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Ripsman, Norrin  M., Jeffrey  W.  Taliaferro, and Steven  E.  Lobell. 2016. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Oxford University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rosato, Sebastian. 2011a. Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Rosato, Sebastian. 2011b. “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project.” International Security 35, no. 4: 45–86. Rosato, Sebastian. 2014. “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers.” International Security 39, no. 3: 48–88. Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51, no. 1: 144–172. Rosecrance, Richard. 2006. “Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and Its  Effects.” International Studies Perspectives 7, no. 1: 31–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1528-3577.2006.00227.x. Schake, Kori. 2017. Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schuessler, John  M. 2015. Deceit on the Road to War: Presidents, Politics, and American Democracy. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Schweller, Randall L. 1996. “Neorealism’s Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5, no. 3: 90–121. Schweller, Randall L. 2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Schweller, Randall  L. 2018. “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 1: 23–48. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy003. Sears, Nathan A. 2017. “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers.” International Politics Reviews 5, no. 1: 21–31. https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41312-017-0020-x. Shifrinson, Joshua R. I. 2018. Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Snyder, Glenn. 1996. “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory.” In Realism: Restatement and Renewal, edited by Benjamim Frankel, 173–193. London: Frank Cass. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.” International Security 25, no. 3: 128–161. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2006. “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State.” Security Studies 15, no. 3: 464–495. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09636410601028370.

Realism and Peaceful Change   109 Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2018. “Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” International Studies Review 20, no. 2: 283–291. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy023. Taylor, A. J. P. 1976. The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Trachtenberg, Marc. 2009. The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War.” International Security 9, no. 1: 58–107. Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen M. 1996. Revolution and War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1981. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” Adelphi Paper 121 (September). https://doi.org/10.1080/05679328108457394. Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. “Structural Realism After the Cold War.” International Security 25, no. 1: 5–41. Williams, Beryl J. 1966. “The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907.” The Historical Journal 9, no. 3: 360–373. Williams, Michael C., and Iver B. Neumann. 2000. “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity.” Millennium 29, no. 2: 357–387. https://doi.org/10 .1177/03058298000290020801. Wilson, James G. 2014. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wivel, Anders. 2017. “Realism and Peaceful Change.” In Realism in Practice: An Appraisal, edited by Davide Orsi, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus, 102–118. E-International Relations. Wohlforth, William C. 1994. “Realism and the End of the Cold War.” International Security 19, no. 3: 91–129. Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4: 481–502. Wright, Thomas. 2013. “Sifting through Interdependence.” The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4: 7–23. Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zeran, Ali, and John Hall. 2016. “Seizing the Day or Passing the Baton? Power, Illusion, and the British Empire.” In Accommodating Rising Powers, edited by T.  V.  Paul, 111–130. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 6

Liber a lism a n d Peacefu l Ch a nge Alexandra Gheciu

In recent years the discipline of international relations (IR) has experienced a growing chorus of voices lamenting the crisis of the post-­1945 international order and casting doubt on attempts to promote liberal projects in the twenty-­first century. While some analysts, particularly in the realist camp, regard this crisis as the inevitable consequence of the decline of US power, others—mostly liberal scholars and practitioners—remain more optimistic and seek to identify policies and practices that would enable the liberal order to endure. For the latter analysts, the liberal order has brought unprecedented peace and prosperity to large numbers of people around the world. In particular, over the course of the twentieth century, visions that once seemed naively optimistic—of stable peace in Europe, a world free of formal empires, low interstate conflict, and high economic interdependence among most countries—became reality (Owen  2018). It stands to reason, according to this logic, that the liberal order deserves to be protected against forces and actors that threaten it—be they illiberal states or political movements that seek to undermine liberalism from within the domestic arenas of liberal states. In the context of intense debates among IR scholars on the question of what the twenty-­first century might bring for world politics, it is useful to reflect on the nature and source of liberal ideas of peaceful change, their institutionalization in the course of the twentieth century, and some of the key contemporary challenges to those ideas and institutions. That is precisely what this chapter attempts to do.

Liberal Ideas about International Order and Peace As T. V. Paul explains in his introduction to this volume, “During the past two centuries, many efforts have been made to obtain peaceful change and reconciliation of warring states. This is largely due to the prominence of liberal ideas in international relations

112   Alexandra Gheciu (IR), originally generated by the European Enlightenment thinkers, who called for rational analysis in every walk of social and political life including IR (Paul in this volume, 3).” Of all IR theories, liberalism is arguably the most optimistic about the possibility of peaceful change; consequently, liberal scholars and practitioners have long placed a strong emphasis on developing strategies for achieving it. The liberal tradition is particularly rich and complex, and it would be impossible to do it justice in this brief chapter. Instead, in the following pages I highlight a few core propositions that are generally recognized as characteristic of this broad tradition, before moving on to explore the ideas developed by arguably the most influential liberal philosopher, Immanuel Kant. As we shall see, Kant’s conception of international peace continues to have a profound impact on thinking about—and practices of—international politics. In IR circles, it has become customary to position liberalism in stark contrast to realism. It is true, on the surface at least, that there are some sharp differences between these influential schools of thought. Realism is associated with the view that humanity is trapped in a world in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides in Strassler and Crawley 1998, 352), insecurity is pervasive, and the best that one can hope for is a stable distribution of power (Owen 2018, 102). This view has led a host of scholars associated with the realist school of thought to reject liberalism as naive. In Stanley Hoffmann’s famous words, “international affairs have been the nemesis of Liberalism.” This is because “the essence of Liberalism is self-­restraint, moderation, compromise and peace,” whereas “the essence of international politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace, at best, or the state of war” (1987, 396). Liberals, for their part, find those propositions unnecessarily pessimistic and insist that progress is possible and that some types of behavior and institutions can help address the problems highlighted by realists. Power politics may be real, but it does not have to represent the perpetual condition of humanity. Crucially, the ideas and actions that give rise to the type of international politics depicted by realists can change, and lasting peace and security can be achieved—provided the right institutions are in place. It should be noted that the security that concerns liberals is first that of the individual, particularly his or her person and property; in this view, national and international security “are instrumental to individual security” (Owen 2018, 101; 2010). To understand liberal views on international politics, we need to shed light—if only briefly—on some core liberal ideas about individuals and the proper ways of governing them. Liberalism is based on the argument that ensuring the right of individuals to life, liberty, and property is central to the role of government. Consequently, liberals emphasize the well-­being of individuals—regarded as perfectible given their capacity for reason and education—as the fundamental building block of a just polity. For early liberals like John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, and for many others who came after them, perfectibility meant the possibility of substantial individual improvement and social progress—provided the right institutions were in place (Mill 1828; Kant [1795] 1970; Bentham 1974; Locke in Pangle and Burns 2014). In an often-­cited piece, Michael Doyle defined liberalism along four dimensions (Doyle 1997, 207). To begin with, all citizens are juridically equal and possess certain

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   113 basic rights. Hence, liberal societies must be built on institutions that respect those rights. Second, and linked to the first, the legislative assembly of the state has only the authority vested in it by the people, whose rights it is not allowed to abuse. Third, a fundamental dimension of the liberty of the individual is the right to possess property. In addition, liberals claim that the most effective system of economic exchange is one that is primarily market-driven. While these provisions seem to concern primarily the relationship between individuals and arrangements in the domestic arena, liberal scholars do not draw a sharp dividing line between the realm of “inside” politics and the world “outside.” What happens in the “outside” realm is shaped by, and in turn has a profound effect on, the world “inside.” One of the key assumptions underpinning liberal approaches to IR is that states, similar to individuals, have different characteristics, and these have a tangible effect on their behavior both domestically and internationally. It is only fair to acknowledge that under a liberal logic, even though the character of states may vary, all states deserve to be accorded certain “natural rights,” such as the right to noninterference in domestic affairs (Dunne 2014, 114). However, there are limits to those rights—and in some cases the liberty of certain states can and should be limited in the name of peace and security. To understand this—and more broadly, to shed light on connections between domestic and international politics—I now turn to the writings of a leading Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant, whose ideas have had a profound impact not only on liberal IR theory but also on political practices that continue to this day. Writing in a context in which, as he argued in his Metaphysics of Morals, “in their external relationships with one another, states, like lawless savages, exist in a condition devoid of right,” Kant became famous, among other things, for his vision of perpetual peace (Kant [1797] 1991, 102). For him, the imperative to achieve perpetual peace—going far beyond the fragile security provided by arrangements such as the balance of power—imposed the transformation of individual consciousness, the promotion of republican constitutionalism within states, and a federal contract between states to abolish war. In a nutshell, Kant advocated the construction of virtuous polities—based on principles and institutions that today would be identified as liberal democratic—claiming that such states are pacific in their interactions with one another. The Kantian vision of perpetual peace involves a very ambitious project of ­transforming—in an intrinsically interlinked manner—both domestic life and international politics. As I have argued elsewhere, Kantian philosophy—and liberal projects that rely on that philosophy—involves a shift from an “outside” to an “inside” approach to the pursuit of peace, order, and security in the modern international system (Gheciu  2005). In contrast to the “outside” solution, which emphasizes geostrategic arrangements among sovereign units operating in an arena, the “inside” approach focuses on the idea that it is possible to achieve orderly, peaceful interactions among particular states by (re)shaping entities so that they become predictable, peaceful, trustworthy participants in international interactions. The tension between a universal system and entities endowed with particular wills would thus be resolved by having those particular entities internalize a universally valid (liberal-­democratic) set of norms and

114   Alexandra Gheciu establish institutions based on those norms, at both the domestic and international levels. As scholars writing in the Kantian tradition have explained, peace among liberal-­ democratic states is based on three complementary influences. First, republican constitutions eliminate “autocratic caprice in waging war.” Second, “an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play” as a result of the spread of democracy. This creates a moral basis for the liberal peace, upon which “eventually an edifice of international law can be built.” Finally, economic interdependence “reinforces constitutional constraints and liberal norms” by creating transnational ties and institutional arrangements that facilitate and encourage accommodation rather than violent conflict (Oneal et al. 1996, 12; also Doyle 1986; Russett and Oneal 2001). It would be wrong, however, to assume that Kant naively envisaged the evolution toward perpetual peace as a simple, straightforward process, or that he cast his vision of international politics in opposition to arguments about power. On the contrary, as Michael C. Williams has argued, Kant’s political philosophy is filled with arguments about power (Williams 2007; also Oren 1995). These arguments are linked to a series of reflections on the production of liberal selves—the kinds of selves needed for the establishment and success of liberal-­democratic institutions—and the mutual recognition among such selves (Williams 2007, 48). Kantian liberalism relies on liberal selves as actors who are committed to the struggle to discipline the irrational, violent side of themselves and to govern their lives in ac­cord­ ance with the universal moral precepts revealed by reason. Self-­discipline, from this liberal perspective, is the basis of respect and admiration of self and others, as well as a central element in the processes of identity definition. From the point of view of liberal-­ democratic polities, only those self-­disciplined communities who live according to the same moral precepts—embodied in liberal-­democratic norms and institutions—are entitled to full respect and to be recognized as trustworthy, like-­minded polities. As such, they are to be included in relations of community (Kant [1797] 1991; Williams 2007, 55–59). Key to this liberal definition of subjectivity is a refusal of essentialist determinism; by virtue of their capacity for reason, all humans are seen as capable of grasping the moral law and hence have the potential to evolve into the kind of actors who understand and accept the self-­disciplinary duties of “correct” subjectivity. Within international relations practice, this view of subjectivity translates into the argument that even the people of deviant (antiliberal) polities can, through the use of reason and education, come to accept the responsibility of learning to conform to liberal-­democratic norms. In other words, all polities embody the potential to evolve into rational and ethical communities, entitled to the full respect and benefits accorded to liberal democracies in international society. The view of changeable, fluid human nature renders practices of socialization reasonable, for it entails the idea that even citizens of previously antiliberal polities can learn the norms and institutions of liberalism. The same idea also translates into a series of obligations and legitimizes the use of power by those who have accepted the responsibility to act according to liberal norms. Self-­discipline, as the fundamental basis of respect for both oneself and others, also functions as an element of identity and identification with others—and as a reason for exclusion of those who fail to exercise it. Liberals only grant full respect to, identify with,

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   115 and recognize as full members of their community those individuals who exercise the self-­discipline of commitment to the moral law that liberal individuals and communities claim to have achieved (Kant [1797] 1991). According to the Kantian logic, this disciplinary structure functions not only within the moral community but also outside of it, where liberals only grant full recognition to like-­minded, self-­disciplined actors. Those who refuse or are unable to live up to the demands of liberal subjectivity may be tolerated, but this toleration has limits. Thus, the expectation is that those who seek full respect must learn to exercise self-­discipline and adopt the liberal norm; if non-­liberals fail to do so they may be tolerated, but only to the extent that they do not threaten liberal societies and their mode of life. Nonliberal communities are therefore always subject to being depicted as threats, to being excluded from liberal relations of community and full respect, and potentially to being subject to coercion by liberals if they are deemed a threat to liberal societies and their mode of life. Consequently, part of the “power of liberalism lies in the fact that this can be presented as a disinterested process of toleration, self-­limitation, neutrality and respect: all persons have a right to choose their own ways of living. But this hides the fact that this basic recognition can also imply a powerfully normalizing and disciplining set of judgements, an equally powerful process of communal inclusion and exclusion, and an implicit threat of coercive action” (Williams 2007, 53). In Kant’s analysis of the relationship between the liberal pacific federation and nonliberal states outside of it, communities who continue to exist “in the state of nature” could be coerced to join the pacific federation even if they do not actively threaten its members. This is because the mere existence of nonliberal, undisciplined subjects can legitimately be regarded as a potential threat by liberals (Kant [1797] 1991). It is important to keep in mind these aspects of the Kantian vision of peace and of the practices of “pacific federations,” for they have come to inform in tangible—and arguably very problematic—ways liberal practices enacted in the name of national and international security. As a series of scholars have noted, while a Kantian approach predicts and prescribes peaceful interactions among liberal democracies that recognize each other as such, the relations between liberal states and communities regarded as nonliberal can be expected to be difficult and potentially violent (Owen 1994; Oren 1995; Risse-­Kappen 1995). In foreign policy practice, this approach to respect and recognition has often served to legitimize coercive actions by liberal states against polities and peoples regarded as nonliberal and thus considered to be a potential threat to liberal communities.

Implementing Liberal Ideas in International Politics Over the past two centuries, Kant’s vision of a “pacific federation” designed to “end all wars for good” and, more broadly, his—and other liberals’—prescriptions for both domestic politics and the international arena, have had a powerful impact on world

116   Alexandra Gheciu politics. While a full survey of that impact is well beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worthwhile to highlight some of the most remarkable accomplishments. Kantian ideas became one of the key currents in the stream of European thought and political practice and were reflected in the policies of a number of influential political actors in the nineteenth century. These included, among others, Lord Palmerston, one of the most powerful yet controversial British politicians during the reign of Queen Victoria. His belligerent actions as foreign secretary could be considered prototypes of the future practices of liberal interventionism. More broadly, the most important expressions of Kantian ideas about international politics emerged in the twentieth century. Consider in particular the vision of international order put forward by President Woodrow Wilson in the aftermath of the First World War. For Wilson, lasting peace required the establishment of an international organization to regulate anarchy and outlaw war. In his famous “Fourteen Points” speech of 1918, he outlined a vision of peace and security that had clear Kantian echoes (Wilson 1918). In his quest to transcend a history of secret bilateral diplomatic deals and a strong reliance on the balance of power, President Wilson called for the creation of a general association of nations, the League of Nations, to deter aggression and, if necessary, be able to use a preponderance of power to enforce peace. The key principle behind the League was collective security, wherein “each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression” (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993, 30). According to the League’s covenant, in the event of war all member states were required to cease normal relations with the offending state, impose sanctions upon recommendations issued by the League Council, and support one another in the implementation of actions deemed necessary to protect the principles of the covenant. For its part, the League Council was expected “to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League” (Covenant of the League of Nations 1919, art. 16). Conventional wisdom about international politics holds that the experience of the League was a disaster (Dunne 2014, 118). It is true that, in part due to the US Congress’s decision not to join the very institution championed by President Wilson, the League did not have the power needed to prevent or effectively respond to the acts of aggression carried out by Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s. Therefore, it was unable to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to depict the League as a complete failure. Despite its limitations, that Kantian-­inspired institution was able to find peaceful solutions to a number of regional conflicts, including those between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands in 1921, between Germany and Poland in Upper Silesia (also in 1921), and between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925. Furthermore, the League helped to promote liberal norms both in the domestic arenas of states and on the international stage via initiatives such as the Slavery Convention (1926) and measures designed to protect prisoners of war and refugees.

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   117 Most notably, the principle of collective security survived, despite the inability of the League to prevent the Second World War. After that war, the principle found expression in the charter of the United Nations. However, in an attempt to protect the new ­organization from the weaknesses that had plagued the League, the UN’s founders acknowledged the need for a consensus among the great powers in order for enforcement action to be taken. This found expression in the veto system, which allows any of the five permanent members of the Security Council to block UN actions. While that provision was designed to protect the new collective security system, in the context of the ideological polarity of the Cold War, which started just a few years after the founding of the UN, it translated into virtual paralysis of the Security Council. The UN was still able to play a constructive role in the peaceful settlement of a series of disputes, most notably via the peacekeeping system created as a compromise solution in response to the constraints associated with the Cold War. But it was only following the end of the Cold War that cooperation among the great powers was strong enough for collective security to be implemented, as was evident in the response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. The principle of collective security was arguably the most important liberal principle that found institutional expression in the international order created in 1945. But the impetus to (re)organize international politics on the basis of liberal principles and norms—and on this basis to try to make “the world safe for democracy”—did not stop there. Indeed, the world that emerged from the ashes of the Second World War had a powerful liberal imprint. One of the most comprehensive analyses of the influence of liberal ideas on the international order over the past century can be found in the works of G. John Ikenberry. According to Ikenberry, in 1945 the United States embarked on an ambitious campaign to construct a comprehensive liberal order by embedding certain liberal principles in the institutions of international society (Ikenberry 2018, 14). The institutions of the transatlantic security community created after the Second World War were aimed at protecting liberal-­democratic norms from a variety of domestic and international, military, and nonmilitary threats and challenges. One of the most visible examples of successful promotion of liberal principles was the institutionalization of the Euro-­Atlantic pluralistic security community. That community, which defined itself around liberal-­democratic norms and values, reconciled historical enemies and embedded them in a set of institutional structures—most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU)—designed to make another war among those polities impossible. Thus, in sharp contrast to centuries of violence, the guiding principle that emerged among Euro-­ Atlantic allies after 1945 was that of dependable expectations for peaceful interactions and change (Deutsch 1957; Risse-­Kappen 1995; Adler and Barnett 1998). For liberal scholars and practitioners, a new era of hope and progress appeared to be born with the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the start of the 1990s, leading Western politicians hailed a “new world order,” as the appeal of communist ideas and practices appeared to have been irrevocably defeated, and international institutions such as the Security Council were finally able to operate as envisaged by the

118   Alexandra Gheciu founders of the UN back in 1945. In parallel to those developments, globalization and economic integration reached unprecedented levels, former rivals including Russia and China appeared to move closer to liberal principles, and the institutions of the Euro-­Atlantic security community embarked on ambitious processes of enlargement. Reflecting a widespread wave of optimism, then British prime minister Tony Blair declared in the 1990s that “we are all internationalists now” (Blair 1999). A similar sense of optimism was reflected in a series of academic works. According to Ikenberry, for instance, the end of the Cold War made possible the worldwide expansion of the liberal order created after 1945: “The early postwar western liberal order was primarily an Atlantic regional community, while the post-­Cold War liberal system has had a wider global reach” (2018, 12). In the early years of the post–Cold War era, as both scholars and practitioners in the West rushed to reaffirm Kantian principles, there seemed to be no limit to the possibilities for promoting liberal-­democratic principles on the international stage (Russett 1993; Owen 1997; Cederman and Gleditsch 2004). A new era seemed to have dawned for the Kantian-­inspired “inside” approach to international security—designed, as previously noted, to enhance both national and international security and peace by turning polities into “virtuous” liberal democracies. For example, in the Euro-­Atlantic world both NATO and the EU launched processes of enlargement designed to fundamentally reshape polities emerging from the former communist bloc, to integrate them into the institutions of the transatlantic security community, and thus to turn them into a source of security and lasting peace both for their citizens and for the international community (Schimmelfennig 1998; Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005). A new commitment to (re)shape polities on the basis of liberal-­democratic norms and institutions also found expression, after 1989, in the UN-­sponsored peacebuilding missions. Under the label “robust peacebuilding,” the UN authorized a series of missions that departed in significant ways from the principles of impartiality and minimal involvement that had characterized Cold War–era peacekeeping operations. The new missions involved massive international involvement in the reconstruction of societies emerging from conflict (Ford and Oppenheim 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009). In places ranging from the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) to East Timor and Cambodia, this translated into the establishment of ambitious arrangements—including within the framework of international administrations—that assumed many of the functions of governance traditionally associated with the sovereign state and set out to rebuild societies in the aftermath of war. The notion behind those arrangements was that only through a systematic reconstruction of post-­conflict polities, conducted with the assistance and under the supervision of international experts, could peace operations lead not only to a cessation of violence but also to the establishment of the kinds of structures and institutions needed for long-­lasting peace. However, as T.V. Paul explains in the introduction to this volume, many of the interventions that constituted “a crucial part of the liberal peace” have “produced violent outcomes,” as “liberal states fail to offer proper mechanisms for the societal transformation of deeply divided societies (this volume, 12).” Those interventions seem to have resolved the dilemma between a liberalism of restraint—which

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   119 accepts a pluralist international society with diverse societal models—and a liberalism of imposition—which seeks, sometimes by coercive, nonliberal means, to disseminate liberalism around the world—in favor of the latter (Sørensen, 2006). The post–Cold War political climate also facilitated the evolution of the global normative fabric in the direction of a stronger, liberal-­inspired focus on human security. In contrast to the traditional focus on state-­centric definitions and practices of war/ peace, human security approaches take the individual as the key referent of security (Acharya 2001; MacFarlane and Khong 2006). Some of the most potent expressions of this evolution were the adoption of the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm and, linked to this, the creation of special international courts, most notably the International Criminal Court (ICC), designed to bring to justice individuals responsible for egregious human rights violations. The R2P norm, which was unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit, stipulates that when a state or a government is unable or unwilling to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the international community must take action (Bellamy and Dunne 2016). At the heart of R2P lies the (liberal) principle of conditional sovereignty: each sovereign state is responsible for protecting its own population from massive human rights violations. And if a state is unable or unwilling to do so, then the international community will do it instead—by force if necessary, if/when all other means fail. Since its adoption, R2P has been invoked by the UN Security Council dozens of times, to remind states of their responsibility and, on occasion, to authorize military actions aimed at protecting civilian populations at risk. One of the best known but also controversial uses of R2P was the crisis in Libya in 2011, when a NATO military operation was authorized with the aim of protecting the large numbers of civilians whom Muammar Gaddafi had threatened to kill. Linked to this normative evolution, the ICC was established in 2002 as a permanent institution, in contrast to temporary tribunals such as those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Designed as a “court of last resort,” the ICC was invested with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression” (Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones 2002). The ICC and the regional war crimes tribunals have been involved in the indictment and prosecution of a series of high-­level individuals in places as different as the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Congo. All these initiatives illustrate the success of liberal ideas on a number of fronts, but that success should not be taken to mean an unproblematic, power-­free triumph of some natural harmony of interests operating at the global level. In foreign policy practice, even the most ardent defenders of the liberal order navigated in a gray zone between liberal ideals and pragmatism, which often translated into deviations from those ideals (Abrahamsen, Andersen, and Sending  2019). Furthermore, the practices associated with each of the previously mentioned developments were filled with complex forms of coercive and/or noncoercive power, reminiscent of Kant’s views of the relationship between the “peaceful federation” of liberal democracies and polities that are not (yet) recognized as liberal democratic. In many instances, policies that followed the logic of

120   Alexandra Gheciu that relationship gave rise to systematic forms of contestation and opposition to ­liberalism. For example, the expansion of the transatlantic security community via the processes of EU and NATO enlargement involved what could be seen as Kantian-­ inspired disciplining practices aimed at producing liberal selves. Those translated into complex processes of socialization of acceding states into the Western-­prescribed norms of liberal democracy. At the heart of that socialization were extensive processes of education, legal reformation, and institutional transformation that were filled with power: the power to define and shape ‘correct’ subjectivities and to delegitimize political discourses, practices, and institutions that may have been popular among significant domestic constituencies but were regarded by Western experts as incompatible with the liberal-­ democratic model of good governance (Gheciu  2005; Williams  2007; Epstein  2008). Western disciplining practices conducted in the name of producing responsible liberal selves and polities in the context of NATO and especially EU accession generated resentment among key constituencies in Central/Eastern Europe. In recent years that resentment has been effectively mobilized by illiberal leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán to justify their attacks on liberal norms and institutions (Tóth 2014). For their part, the ‘robust practices of peacebuilding’ frequently involved situations in which the international community replaced local officials, vetoed legislation, and dismantled/reconstructed institutional arrangements that enjoyed at least a certain degree of support in their societies but were deemed inappropriate or inefficient by international officials. These, among other power-­filled interventions, led a series of critical scholars to portray post–Cold War forms of peacebuilding as unacceptable forms of neocolonialism (Chandler 2006; Ford and Oppenheim 2008). In a similar vein, developments linked to the human security agenda have often been criticized as normatively problematic Western actions. For instance, the 2011 NATO-­led intervention in Libya clearly revealed the deep divisions, resentment, and opposition generated by Western leadership (Welsh 2018). Shortly after the launch of the intervention, Russia and China argued that the Western permanent members of the Security Council had illegitimately shifted the mandate from one of protecting civilians to regime change (Dunne 2014, 121). This raises serious doubts about the extent to which, in the future, Western and non-­Western members of the Security Council might be able to agree to work together in promoting the R2P norm or, if necessary, to implement the norm of collective security. In recent years the Security Council’s inability to address a series of crises, most notably in Syria—despite massive evidence of human rights atrocities as well as widespread concerns regarding the impact of that conflict on an already unstable region—should alarm all those who wish to ensure that the Security Council will have some meaningful role to play in promoting international security in the twenty-­first century. In a similar vein, the ICC, the institution that was supposed to advance universal human rights principles, has been heavily criticized, particularly by states in the Global South. Many of them have accused the ICC of systematic bias against the ‘South’; consequently, several states have either refused to accede to the ICC’s Rome Statute or, as in the cases of

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   121 Burundi and the Philippines, have withdrawn from the ICC (Ralph and Gallagher 2015). Furthermore, the US-­led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were legitimized at least in part by liberal arguments about promoting democracy, have been widely criticized for repeated violations of liberal-­democratic principles and have come to be seen by some as expressions of a “frustrated empire” (Ryan 2007). Such operations have undermined trust in liberal internationalism both at home and abroad and have made it increasingly difficult to defend claims about the moral superiority of actors and polities that claim to act on behalf of liberal norms. In essence, even a cursory analysis of the post–Cold War world reveals that the optimism that prevailed among liberals after 1989 was not exactly justified. While the merits and relative success of each of these developments may be debatable, what cannot be contested is that the project of ‘making the world safe for [liberal] democracy’ has turned out to be more complicated and controversial than liberal leaders and scholars had anticipated. From the perspective of many, the practices of Western states and international institutions employed in the name of promoting liberal peaceful change have been profoundly unequal and often violent.

The Crisis of Liberalism? Contemporary Challenges to the Liberal Order The euphoria that characterized the liberals’ response to the end of the Cold War appears to have vanished. In the eyes of many scholars and practitioners, the liberal order constructed after 1945 is in deep crisis, on many fronts. As Duncombe and Dunne have recently argued, “What mainstream and critical theories share is a perspective that the liberal world order is being challenged in fundamental ways: first, through a crisis of authority, and second, through ‘the rise of the rest’ ” (2018, 27). Even liberal scholars acknowledge that liberalism faces a number of significant challenges (Hopgood 2013; Owen 2018, 102–109). According to Ikenberry, for instance, part of the problem is a crisis of authority generated by the behavior of the global liberal hegemon, the United States (Ikenberry 2015, 451). According to this logic, when the United States, as the key international actor responsible for establishing and shaping the international order, is moving away from a commitment to liberal values in its discourse and practices, the leadership of that order is bound to be called into question. A series of recent illiberal policies and practices enacted by the United States, including the post-­9/11 “war on terror,” can thus be regarded as powerful illustrations of a retreat from liberal values and norms. To make matters worse, this type of behavior has also been copied by several states that once played a significant role in institutionalizing human rights internationally and, more broadly, in supporting the liberal order (Rampton and Nadarajah 2017). Increasingly, critics around the world—including in established liberal democracies— are articulating vocal attacks on liberalism, highlighting its unwillingness or inability to

122   Alexandra Gheciu acknowledge and address the limits of its political and economic models. For many, what is particularly problematic is that, contrary to the liberal discourse, the post-­1945 order led by a global class of liberal elites has benefited only some groups while generating large categories of victims. The ‘losers’ of liberal globalization often see themselves as victims not only in material terms, wherein they face systematic income disparities due to economic liberalization, but also in the political and cultural arenas. In their eyes, the political values and cultural traditions cherished by large societal segments have been systematically marginalized and undermined by unaccountable national and transnational liberal elites (Abrahamsen et al. 2020). In the face of the liberal inability to effectively address problems ranging from humanitarian crises to poverty, cultural/ political alienation, and climate change, it is not surprising to see growing and increasingly open contestations of liberal principles and foundational norms of the liberal order around the world. In this context, the concern expressed in liberal circles is that the world that could be emerging in the twenty-­first century is going to be not only less American but also less liberal (Abrahamsen, Andersen, and Sending  2019; Andersen  2019; Gheciu  2019; Græger 2019). The liberal fear is that “the hallmarks of liberal internationalism—openness and rule-­based relations enshrined in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism—could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries” (Ikenberry 2011, 56). The contemporary challenges to the liberal world order are numerous and multifaceted. They emerge not only from the growing assertiveness of China, the aggressive and subversive policies of Russia, and increased discontent in the Global South, but also from within Western states that have witnessed the rise of right-­wing populism and nationalism fueled by the previously mentioned sense of economic marginalization and cultural/political alienation. While most scholars and practitioners agree that the liberal order built after 1945 is in crisis, or at least facing unprecedented challenges, they are sharply divided over the question of how these challenges might be addressed. One argument that has been put forward within the liberal camp is that the solution to current challenges is more, not less, liberalism. According to this logic, the norms and institutions established after 1945 still provide sufficient benefits to motivate key international actors to defend them. This is because—according to the liberal logic—defending liberal-­democratic norms and protecting multilateral institutions, as the bedrock of liberal internationalism, still offers the best hope for accommodating differences, deepening interdependence, generating incentives and opportunities for international cooperation, and thus facilitating the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In short, “The best news for liberal internationalism is probably the simple fact that more people will be harmed by the end of some sort of global liberal international order than will gain” (Ikenberry 2018, 23). Yet this can only be good news for the defenders of liberalism if there is sufficient international determination to protect progressive liberal norms, while also recognizing and finding more effective ways of addressing the problems and abuses associated with some of the practices conducted in the name of liberalism. In recent years, however,

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   123 even optimistic liberal scholars have hardened their assessments of the difficulty involved in securing support for the defense of liberalism. Thus, “the future of this liberal order hinges on the ability of the United States and Europe—and increasingly a wider array of liberal democracies—to lead and support it” (Ikenberry 2018, 22). This in turn depends on the ability of leading liberal democracies to build new coalitions of allies among developing democracies and to find effective solutions to twenty-­first-­ century problems. More profoundly, it requires that liberal democracies “remain stable, well functioning and internationalist. Can these states recover their stability and bearings as liberal democracies?” (Ikenberry 2018, 22–23). At the time of writing this chapter, it is far from clear that leading liberal democracies can perform the role prescribed by Ikenberry and other liberals. The situation with the United States, the leader of the liberal world, is particularly alarming. This is due in no small part to the rise of an aggressive type of conservatism and—most recently and spectacularly under President Donald Trump—its assault on liberal institutions and principles both at home and abroad (Drolet and Williams  2019). While it might be tempting to dismiss Trump’s policies as a passing problem on the US political stage, one needs to acknowledge that his legacy will likely have lasting implications (Drolet and Williams 2019; Abrahamsen et al. 2020). Whether one considers the attack on liberal institutions at home, dismantling arms control regimes, attacking established alliances and multilateral institutions, undermining trust in the United States as an ally, or attacks on the human security front via his ‘immigration control’ policies, the damage to the US ability to play a leading role in supporting the liberal order is substantial and will take a long time to heal—if, indeed, a full healing is even possible. It is also important to note that the United States is not alone in experiencing the rise of political forces with aggressive antiliberal political platforms. Indeed, in recent years there has been a substantial increase in right-­wing populism and authoritarianism around the world (Abrahamsen et al. 2020). In many instances, right-­wing movements have forged alliances across borders, learning from and supporting one another in challenging liberal visions of domestic politics and international orders. For instance, the actions of right-­ wing governments in countries like Poland and Hungary and the growing support for illiberal ideas in many other European states have undermined the EU’s efforts to protect and promote liberal norms both in Europe and abroad and have raised doubts about the future ability of the transatlantic security community to act as a defender of liberalism (Gheciu 2019). Meanwhile, the growing influence of right-­wing political forces in countries like Brazil, Turkey, India, Israel, and the Philippines, in conjunction with the growing assertiveness of Russia and China, has translated into unprecedented attacks on liberal-­ democratic norms and institutions. To further compound the problem, there has been growing criticism of liberal economic institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Many scholars and practitioners have accused them of perpetuating inequality and poverty, particularly in the Global South, rather than promoting a type of interdependence that benefits everyone (Brown 1997; Harrigan and El-­Said 2009). Yet, it would be premature to conclude that all is lost for liberals and liberalism. In key European countries, including France, Germany, and the Nordic states, as well as in

124   Alexandra Gheciu Canada, the governments have restated their commitment to the liberal order. Moreover, recent research on the ideational foundation of Western hegemony indicates that support for some liberal norms is reasonably solid in emerging powers (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). This suggests that new global alliances in support of liberalism might be possible. But attempts to protect support for liberal norms—against populist, nationalist voices—in Western states, and to forge new global alliances in defense of liberal internationalism, will require a more sustained effort to acknowledge and deal with the discontent, alienation, inequalities, and violence produced by practices conducted in the name of liberalism. In a situation in which Kantian-­inspired politics of recognition and the “liberalism of imposition” have become so unpopular around the world, liberals should reflect carefully on the ways they might be able to build new relations based on respect—even vis-­à-­vis some polities that are not recognized as established liberal democracies. More broadly, defenders of the liberal order will need to pay closer attention to the powerful critiques articulated by those who regard themselves as the losers in liberal globalization. The defenders will have to engage in a critical analysis to identify—and formulate strategies for implementing—reforms aimed at changing liberal institutions, both domestic and international, so as to minimize the danger of producing harm and to better embody and enact the principles preached by liberalism. Writing in 2018, John Owen argued that if a century ago liberals wanted to “overturn the existing global order,” today they want to “retain and extend it” (2018, 100). Liberalism’s conservatism, Owen continued, is a tribute to its “hard-­won success over the past century.” It is true that the twentieth century was one of substantial—though not uncontroversial—gains for liberal ideas and institutions, and those gains have had a profound impact on world politics. In the first decades of the twenty-­first century, however, the domestic and international landscapes that liberals have to navigate are more complicated. If liberals are to be “conservative” in the sense of acting to protect liberal norms and institutions, they will have to be far more innovative in finding solutions to liberalism’s inequalities and harmful effects. It remains to be seen if those who champion liberalism will be able to rise to this challenge in the coming decades.

References Abrahamsen, Rita, Louise Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending. 2019. “Introduction: Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?” International Journal 74, no. 3 (March): 5–14. Abrahamsen, Rita, Jean-Francois Drolet, Alexandra Gheciu, Karin Narita, Srdjan Vucetic, and Michael Williams. 2020. “Confronting the International Political Sociology of the New Right.” Collective Discussion Forum. International Political Sociology 14 (February): 94–107. Acharya, Amitav. 2001. “Human Security: East Versus West.” International Journal 56, no. 3 (September): 442–460. Adler, Emanuel, and Michael  N.  Barnett. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Allan, Bentley, Srdjan Vucetic, and Ted Hopf. 2018. “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects.” International Organization 72, no. 4: 839–869.

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   125 Andersen, Louise Riis. 2019. “Curb Your Enthusiasm: Middle-Power Liberal Internationalism and the Future of the United Nations.” International Journal 74, no. 1 (March): 47–64. Bellamy, Alex J., and Tim Dunne. 2016. “R2P in Theory and Practice.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, edited by Alex  J.  Bellamy and Tim Dunne, 3–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bentham, Jeremy. 1974. Ten Critical Essays. Edited by Bhikhu Parekh. London: Routledge. Blair, Tony. 1999. “Doctrine on the International Community.” Speech delivered in Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26026 .html. Brown, Michael. 1997. Africa’s Choices. New York: Routledge. Cassese, Antonio, Paola Gaeta, and John  R.  W.  D.  Jones. 2002. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court a Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. “Conquest and Regime Change: An Evolutionary Model of the Spread of Democracy and Peace.” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (September): 603–629. Chandler, David. 2006. Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building. London: Pluto Press. Covenant of the League of Nations. 1919. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1. Deutsch, Karl  W. [Karl Wolfgang]. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” American Political Science Review 80 (December): 1151–1169. Doyle, Michael W. 1997. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: Norton. Drolet, Jean-Francois, and Michael Williams. 2019. “The View from MARS: US Paleoconservatism and Ideological Challenges to the Liberal World Order.” International Journal 74, no. 1 (March): 15–31. Duncombe, Constance, and Tim Dunne. 2018. “After Liberal World Order.” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January): 25–42. Dunne, Tim. 2014. “Liberalism.” In The Globalization of World Politics, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 113–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Epstein, Rachel A. 2008. In Pursuit of Liberalism?: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Flockhart, Trine. 2004. “ ‘Masters and Novices’: Socialization and Social Learning through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.” International Relations 18, no. 3 (September): 361–380. Ford, Christian, and Ben Oppenheim. 2008. “Neotrusteeship or Mistrusteeship? The ‘Authority Creep’ Dilemma in United Nations Transitional Administration.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 41, no. 1: 55–105. Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Gheciu, Alexandra. 2019. “NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community.” International Journal 74, no. 1 (March): 32–46. Græger, Nina. 2019. “Illiberalism, Geopolitics, and Middle Power Security: Lessons from the Norwegian Case.” International Journal 74, no. 1 (March): 84–102. Harrigan, Jane, and Hamed El-Said. 2009. Aid and Power in the Arab World: IMF and World Bank Policy-Based Lending in the Middle East and North Africa. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

126   Alexandra Gheciu Hoffmann, Stanley. 1987. Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hopgood, Stephen. 2013. The Endtimes of Human Rights. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2015. “The Future of Liberal World Order.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 16, no. 3 (September): 450–455. Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January): 7–23. Ikenberry, G.  John. 2011. “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May 1): 56–68. Kant, Immanuel. (1795) 1970. “Perpetual Peace.” In Kant’s Political Writings, edited by H. Reiss. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. (1797) 1991. Political Writings. Edited by H. Reiss. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. MacFarlane, S. Neil, and Yuen Foong Khong. 2006. Human Security and the UN: A Critical History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mill, John Stuart. 1828. “Speech on Perfectibility.” https://www.utilitarian.org/texts/perfectibility .html. Oneal, John, et al. 1996. “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950–85.” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1: 11–28. Oren, Ido. 1995. “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing  U.S.  Perceptions of Imperial Germany.” International Security 20, no. 2 (October): 147–184. Owen, John. 1994. “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.” International Security 19, no. 2 (October): 87–125. Owen, John. 2010. “Liberalism and Security.” In The International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Denemark, 4920–4939. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Owen, John. 2018. “Liberal Approaches.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexandra Gheciu and William Wohlforth, 100–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Owen, John M. 1997. Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pangle, Thomas, and Timothy Burns. 2014. “Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.” In The Key Texts of Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 276–306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paris, Roland, and Timothy  D.  Sisk. 2009. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. London: Routledge. Ralph, Jason, and A.  Gallagher. 2015. “Legitimacy Faultlines in International Society: The Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute after Libya.” Review of International Studies 41, no. 3 (July): 553–573. Rampton, David, and Suthaharan Nadarajah. 2017. “A Long View of Liberal Peace and Its Crisis.” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 2 (June): 441–465. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. “Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument.” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (December): 491–517. Roberts, Adam, and Benedict Kingsbury. 1993. United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Liberalism and Peaceful Change   127 Russett, Bruce M., and John R. Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton. Ryan, David. 2007. Frustrated Empire: US Foreign Policy, 9/11 to Iraq. London: Pluto Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 1998. “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation.” Security Studies 8, nos. 2–3 (January): 198–234. Sørensen, Georg. 2006. “Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium.” International Relations 20, no. 3 (September): 251–272. Strassler, Robert B., and Richard Crawley. 1998. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Free Press. Tóth, Csaba. 2014. “Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad of 26 July 2014.” Budapest Beacon, July 20. https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/. Welsh, Jennifer. 2018. “Humanitarian Intervention.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexandra Gheciu and William Wohlforth, 457–470. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, Michael C. 2007. Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security. London: Routledge. Wilson, Woodrow. 1918. “Transcript of Fourteen Points Speech.” https://www.ourdocuments .gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62&page=transcript.

Chapter 7

I n ter nationa l I nstitu tions a n d Peacefu l Ch a nge Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot

Since the development of the organized peace movement in the second part of the nineteenth century, the quest for universal peace has been premised on the creation of international institutions. Although most such institutions, from the Universal Postal Union to the Summit of G20 Leaders pursue functional ends, several have established peace as their primary objective. The first international institution with a political ambition, the Inter-­Parliamentary Union, was founded by a group of French, British, and a few other self-­declared pacifists in 1889. Three decades later, the preamble of the League of Nations Covenant sought “to achieve international peace and security” (League of Nations 1924). In its opening sentence, the successor United Nations Charter explicitly aims at “sav[ing] successive generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations 1945). There is a deep, positive connection between international institutions and peaceful change in international relations (IR) practice and scholarship. As T. V. Paul explains in the introduction, international institutions are seen as one of the three pillars of peaceful change in world politics, along with democracy and economic interdependence. In the first part of this chapter we explore how international institutions constrain state behavior, foster norms, promote interdependence and trust, and encourage social interaction and the development of collective identities. All of these mechanisms may lead to a reduction in violent international conflict. Aiming for peace is not the same as aiming for peaceful change, however. If one defines peaceful change as the “resolution of problems . . . by institutionalized [emphasis added] procedures,” like Karl Deutsch (1957: 4), the presence of institutions and the prospect of peace become, to some extent, tautological. But as shown in the second part of this chapter, there can also be a negative connection between international institutions and the possibility that change will be peaceful. When institutions lock in an unjust

130   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot status quo, produce exclusion, or generate grievances that turn into struggles, they may in fact induce conflictual change. Overall, the chapter offers a reminder that, inherent to peaceful change as international institutions may be, this connection is worth renewed critical scrutiny by scholars and policy makers alike, if only to better identify the conditions under which the equation actually obtains.

How Institutions Promote Peaceful Change According to Wivel and Paul (2019, 8), international institutions are “associational clusters among states with some bureaucratic structures that create and manage self-­ imposed and other-­imposed constraints on state policies and behaviors.” At its most basic level, an institution is a stable set of rules. These rules can be more or less explicit, more or less binding, and more or less internalized by the actors. In IR, rational-­ choice scholars tend to focus on formal, constraining arrangements among states that affect their decision-­making calculus (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal,  2001). Constructivists, for their part, pay attention to intersubjective conventions, practices, and the possible transformation of identities that may also affect state behavior (Duffield 2007). In and of themselves, rules are not necessarily good or bad. To the extent that they prescribe nonviolent behavior, institutions can be considered to be vectors of peace. As the introductory chapter to this volume makes clear, peaceful change is about the resolution of social problems “without resort to largescale physical force” (Deutsch quoted in Paul, this volume, 4) Without a doubt, several international institutions were created precisely to serve the purpose of curtailing the use of organized violence. Think about the rule of noninterference, the delegation of authority to the Security Council, the provisions of humanitarian law, or even collective defense provisions such as Article 5 of the NATO agreement. In what follows, we focus on the international side of institutional dynamics, although clearly domestic politics also plays a role in explaining their effects (Putnam 1988).

Constraining State Behavior Some international rules are considered to be fairly binding. In theory, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the highest guarantor of international law. Article 24 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” on behalf of states, which “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter” (United Nations 1945). If the UNSC passes a resolution under Chapter VII, all

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   131 UN members have to enforce it, including through armed force if they so will. No other institution enjoys such powers in the international system. Not all constraining international rules coalesce around the UNSC, however. Even before the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, it was expected that states would not imprison foreign diplomats. Since the signature of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in 1947, member states cannot unilaterally and without cause increase trade tariffs. Even when there is little international law to back it up, there exist well-established international rules that states should not kill foreign leaders and repay their sovereign debt (Eichengreen and Lindert 1992; Thomas 2000; Melzer 2008). Of course, states break rules. Like criminals in well-­ordered societies, states default, kill, kidnap, and racketeer. When we say that a rule is binding, we do not mean that it is never broken. But whether ancient or recent, formal or informal, basic institutions like the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards minimize causes for conflict because they force states to engage in self-­restraint. Parties may do so for fear of retaliation, for fear of being punished by markets, because they care about their reputation, or because they actually do not care much about the issue at hand. Still, most of the time, even powerful states comply with international institutions, and that is good for peace. This was not always the case. Up to the seventeenth century, it was customary for kings to kidnap foreign emissaries, expropriate indiscriminately, or perhaps more frequently, imprison their bankers. Wars were often initiated to take revenge on such acts, provoking endless cycles of retribution. In a world where state sovereignty was less secure, there were fewer international institutions, and leaders did not feel as obliged to follow rules—with the exception, perhaps, of the dynastic institution of marriage, which was used as a way to consolidate and make peace between realms (Teschke 2003). There is often confusion in IR between international institutions and organizations (Simmons and Martin 2001). Although some institutions, including treaties and conventions, float freely, they tend to be more effective when they are backed by resources, such as an organizational secretariat or a budget. They are then turned into formal organizations, with a leadership, staff, and resources. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nobel Prize–winning Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons exert their diplomatic engagement, political leverage, and technical expertise to ensure that “rules for the world” are applied in an impartial and constant manner (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). These organizations are often lasting, and to the extent that they succeed in accommodating rising powers, they should facilitate peaceful change. Some literature suggests that states that are densely connected in interorganizational networks may be less likely to engage in conflicts. Russett, Oneal, and Davis (1998) find for the 1950–1985 period that when two states belong to the same international organization, they are less likely to engage in a militarized dispute. For Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004), this finding may only hold for “institutionally sophisticated” organizations that have security as their primary mandate. But in general, it makes sense to think that states that agree to sign on to an international organization are less likely to pick fights with other members.

132   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot

Fostering Norms Although international law scholars treat most international treaties and conventions as if they were formally binding rules, these rarely are that constraining in practice. This does not mean they have no positive impact on peaceful change. Between the illusions of international lawyers and the cynicism of realist scholars, many international ­institutions shape behavior simply by making expectations converge around socially sanctioned ways of doing, which we call norms (Elster 1989). The stability of expectations brought about by these norms—or what legal scholars call soft law—is usually a factor of peace. Some norms are explicit rules that several states do not follow even though almost all states agree they should. One illustration is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which commits non-­nuclear-­weapon states to make civilian use of nuclear energy, and nuclear-­weapon states to progressively forego their weapons. In theory, it is an explicit, binding rule enshrined in international law, which 190 states have signed onto. The vast majority of these states do follow the treaty. But the fact that nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) have been pushing back on their commitment for more than fifty years testifies that when a rule is systematically broken by a large or a powerful enough group of states, it should be considered no more than a norm. Perhaps the most foundational norm is that of sovereignty (Holsti 2004). Inviolable de jure since the Treaty of Westphalia and enshrined in the UN Charter, territorial sovereignty is in fact constantly interfered with. In Stephan Krasner’s (1999) famous phrase, it is an “organized hypocrisy.” Aren’t all norms hypocritical, in fact? Borrowing from Rebecca Adler-­Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-­Hansen (2008), we prefer to speak of “sovereignty games”: sovereignty is a norm that is constantly re-­enacted and reinterpreted by state players, who most often buy into some version of it—until they don’t. The norm is understood by everyone as something that should be aspired to, but it is also routinely broken and can be used as a rhetorical weapon. This is apparent in disputes over international interventions, in which the United States, Russia, and China accuse each other of double standards in their proclaimed respect for sovereignty. Other norms are nonexplicit rules that are nonetheless followed quite strictly, often to protect one’s reputation. When we see no deviation from the norm, or the norm is not challenged for a long time, it becomes akin to a tradition. The “no-­first-­use” of nuclear weapons, or nuclear taboo (Paul 2009; Tannenwald 2009), comes to mind as an example. This norm is not registered in any existing treaty or organization. Some countries have pledged to it; others have rejected it while implying they would follow it. As long as it is not broken, there is no way to know what would happen if a state decided to defect. But there is no doubt that the endurance of this norm is closely linked to peaceful change among nuclear states during and after the Cold War. Norms change. In some times and places, norms carry peace-­inducing content and are internalized or enforced. In others, they are not. The English school of IR has

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   133 identified a set of norms that make it possible to talk about an international society. These norms cover the conduct of war, the responsibilities of and deference to great powers, the practice of diplomacy, the balance of power, and adherence to basic principles of international law (Bull  1977). They provide an apt description of the Concert of Europe, the informal international institution that ushered in a relatively peaceful era in mid-­nineteenth-­century Europe. They are less appropriate for understanding the Great Lakes region in 1998 or the Middle East today, where a weakening norm of state sovereignty has led to complex civil and interstate conflict. In recent years there have been attempts to formally limit or reinterpret the norm of sovereignty as a means to lower domestic state violence. Discussions among state representatives within the International Commission on Human Rights and State Intervention produced the responsibility to protect (R2P), which stipulates new principles under which the “international community” may break the sovereignty norm to defend a purported higher order of norms pertaining to human rights. These principles were taken up by the UNSC, which endorsed and referred to R2P in resolutions authorizing the use of force, for example in Libya and Mali. These are rare cases, however, which could have been blocked by a single one of the five permanent Security Council members; so far, the norm of sovereignty has proved extraordinarily resilient (Welsh 2013).

Promoting Interdependence and Trust In Montesquieu’s doux commerce thesis, trade leads to peace. States tend to avoid war with a trading partner because they are reluctant to endanger the prosperity as well as the domestic vested interests that flow from economic interdependence. This argument receives significant support in the contemporary literature, under various names such as “commercial peace” or “capitalist peace” (Dorussen and Ward  2010; Schneider and Gleditsch  2010). Trade treaties, such as NAFTA (now United States-­Mexico-­Canada Agreement) and Mercosur, are important international institutions that regulate economic interdependence and thus make it in the self-­interest of states to choose peace over conflict. That was the rationale, for example, for including China in the World Trade Organization (WTO) even though its “market economy status” was disputable. Beyond trade, belonging to an international institution may increase one’s financial dependence and thus willingness to accept the peace imposed by others. For example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank use conditional grants and loans to encourage liberal values among aid recipients (Babb and Carruthers  2008). The European Union has taken this logic of building interdependence a step further: a state that foments territorial disputes with its neighbors cannot join the EU, and if it tried to do so after it became a member, it could face the loss of voting rights and subsidies. Even if the possibility of backsliding remains, the effectiveness of this “conditionality” is one of the reasons the EU was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2012.

134   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot Interdependence can also be based specifically on security considerations. NATO’s Article 5, for instance, commits allies to come to each other’s assistance because an “attack on one member state will be considered an attack on all” (NATO  1949). This is the famous Musketeers’ motto: one for all, and all for one. Here, the international institution is good for peace because it provides a security guarantee that minimizes incentives to attack any member of the alliance (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999). But as the case of NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries illustrates, an alliance may also create conflicts with other alliances. That is why certain security organizations, such as the African Union, are based on nonexclusionary collective security. In addition to rational, cost-­benefit calculations, interdependence can be bolstered by the development, over time, of trust between potential belligerents. The resolution of conflicts often depends on the creation of confidence-­building mechanisms. In the midst of the Cold War, the United States, the USSR, and European nations created the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The CSCE was never a strong institution. Its rules were vague, there was no real secretariat, and the Helsinki process did not lead to significantly increased interactions between the two camps. Yet in what Daniel Thomas (1998) calls the “Helsinki Effect,” the CSCE was an important force for building trust and lowering geopolitical tensions, at least in the years immediately before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). A further step toward trust building is taken when formal institutions lock in credible commitments that secure their interdependence in the long term. International institutions such as the International Court of Justice or the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body ensure that even when a rival state has lost interest in making good on its promises, there is a way to keep a predictable framework for dispute resolution in place. As current US opposition to the WTO illustrates, no commitment is eternal. One exceptionally durable exception, however, is the Court of Justice of the European Union, which was designed to make long lasting France and Germany’s economic bargain, one offering market access in exchange for the other’s agricultural subsidies (Moravcsik 1998).

Social Interaction and Collective Identities A final mechanism through which international institutions promote peaceful change is social interaction and, in some cases, the formation of collective identities. Thanks to international institutions, leaders and people socialize in two ways. First, they become acquainted with each other. Personal contact helps clarify misunderstandings that could have led to disputes. Second, they may come to shift their preferences and identity in a way that is conducive to peaceful change. Getting to know each other over drinks, food, or chitchat—the first meaning of socialization—is key to diplomacy, which state leaders have long considered to be the alternative to war (Aron 1966). Through a summit, a congress, or a peace conference, often held in a palace or a conference center over a period of several weeks or months, diplomats explore possibilities for a ceasefire, a settlement, or a peace treaty. From a

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   135 sociological perspective, summitry—the rules of etiquette, multilateralism, or caucusing among the like-­minded—is made up of patterns of collective behavior that, without being explicitly codified, are socially enforced (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015). These ritualistic practices provide a social context to address differences in a predictable and peaceful manner; although the deceptive 1938 Munich conference and various meetings between Donald Trump and Kim Jung-­un are often derided as diplomatic overtures that led to nothing, “jaw-­jaw” is, to quote British prime minister Harold Macmillan’s paraphrasing of his predecessor Winston Churchill, usually better than “war-­war.” While diplomatic interaction may be less scripted today than it was in the past, the rise of soft power as a means of influence has increased the importance of “being in the loop.” With its dense network of informal summits, speaking invitations, investment funds, and leaders’ groups, the “new diplomacy” of global governance is replete with opportunities to interact and reward state leaders who behave well, with prestige, influence, or funding. Although the literature on this topic is sparse, it is conceivable that the fear of being excluded or stigmatized on the global stage encourages leaders to refrain from overtly belligerent behavior, even when they may have domestic support for it. Even though there are many exceptions—for example, Vladimir Putin deciding to invade neighboring countries after Russia joined the G8 and hosted the Olympics— social interaction makes peace more likely because leaders tend to want to remain in others’ good graces. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an interesting example of international socialization around weak mutual commitments but frequent—and highly ritualized—interactions (Martel 2017). At ASEAN, during infamous “skits,” leaders even sing and perform together. Even when two states are not interdependent, as is the case with the United States and North Korea or Iran, institutions such as regular summits or strategic dialogues “humanize” relations among officials, who get to know each other and smooth things over, just because that’s what humans do when they meet each other in person. Leaders of rising powers such as Xi Jinping or Narendra Modi are experts at that kind of socialization, which smoothens out relations with neighbors and potential rivals. In the long run, socialization may take on a deeper meaning. Under certain ­circumstances, institutions may shape preferences in a way that makes them more compatible, more peaceful, and perhaps even able to converge with each other. This is what Karl Deutsch calls a “security community,” in which leaders and peoples develop a sense of “we-­feeling” that is by nature conflict reducing (Adler and Barnett 1998). Although rational-­choice theorists argue that rules channel behavior, historically and sociologically minded scholars tend to believe that, over time, they shape preferences. The less you engage in violence, the less you want to do it; the more you attend summits, the more you believe that is the way to engage in international relations. Institutions also shape preferences because they simply take options off the table; colonialism, no longer thought to be an acceptable form of state behavior, is a case in point.

136   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot Ultimately, strong international institutions are constitutive of the world that states live in. They shape collective identities. The democratic peace thesis, which suggests that democratic regimes are less likely to go to war with each other, is one of the strongest arguments in favor of joining democratic clubs, such as the European Union or NATO. At the societal level, establishing an agency for youth exchange or allowing foreign workers to move freely brings about several consequences that are positive for peaceful change: Today, there are 600,000 Chinese students in the United States. In a generation, many of them will have made friends, married, created businesses, or become involved in politics. As the world order changes in China’s favor, this makes it more likely—but never certain—that the transition will be peaceful.

How Institutions Inhibit Peaceful Change Very clearly, a great many international institutions are explicitly aimed at facilitating peaceful change. In this section we want to qualify this apparent fit. The notion that international institutions operate separately from or in parallel to power politics is misguided. On the contrary, institutions are deeply political, and they generate several effects that may inhibit the pursuit of peaceful change. Here we identify and discuss three such effects in turn: (1) international institutions lock in the status quo, (2) they produce exclusion, and (3) they generate new forms of political struggle.

Locking in the Status Quo Institutionalists of all stripes have long observed that international institutions tend to foster political stability, by framing expectations, circulating information, and monitoring compliance (Krasner 1982; Keohane 1984). In fact, the very act of institutional design is meant to guard against the shadow of the future. At a deeper level, then, institutions may be said to be inherently conservative, because they tend to freeze the existing distribution of power in time. Any rule, at the time of its promulgation, is likely to represent the interests of dominant players. Likewise, international organizations are generally structured so as to provide institutional advantages to their creators. Institutions become mechanisms that create privileges for some, especially at the level of decision-­ making, and possibly freeze the status quo. As Schattschneider (1960) once quipped, in that sense international institutions represent “the mobilization of bias.” As Ikenberry (2001) famously noted, this logic operates in all three major “constitutional moments” in the modern history of the global governance of international security. Upon victory, the winners of major wars gang up—in Vienna, Versailles, or Yalta—to decree a new institutional structure that puts them at the helm (Pouliot and

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   137 Thérien 2015). Within the United Nations, this takes the form of permanent seats (with attendant vetoes) on the Security Council. Several other forms of “informal governance” (Stone  2011) reinforce this position of influence in practice. By circumventing rules when they need to, the strong obtain from the weak the flexibility they want to meet their interests from inside the organization. As a result, concludes Stone (2013, 127), “informal governance serves the interests of powerful countries.” Combined, formal privileges and informal means of influence help lock in the status quo far beyond the conditions that presided over institutional design. In order to counter this status quo bias, several international institutions contain amendment procedures to adapt their structure to shifting conditions. For example, the UN Charter was amended in the 1960s to account for the explosion in membership, especially in the postcolonial world. Yet while an expanded Security Council does allow for more voices to be heard, it has not displaced the privileges that the permanent members acquired by winning the Second World War. Worse, after more than three decades of fierce debate in New York, there are no signs that any further Security Council enlargement will ever pass through the Charter’s amendment procedure, which requires a two-­thirds majority at the General Assembly (and attendant ratification including by the permanent members themselves). This means that international institutions often have a hard time responding to shifts in the balance of power. From both a realist and a critical perspective, international institutions are tools of power that the dominant players set up in order to establish their domination (Mearsheimer 2001; Murphy 2005). International law, for instance, is sometimes depicted as the brainchild of colonialism (Anghie  2007). What is more, once established by the winners, institutions entrench and create vested interests for incumbents. At the same time, they also generate new forms of dissatisfaction—and eventually of conflict—on the part of rising powers. For instance, the selective application of rules often structures the struggle between challengers and incumbents. Status competition ensues, and the system potentially becomes more unstable than it would be but for international institutions. Peaceful change is clearly hindered. The history of the League of Nations and of the United Nations provides telling lessons about this dynamic (Paul 2018, ch. 3). In the 1930s, a major power such as Germany preferred to leave the organization rather than suffer from rules that it thought were prejudiced against the country. In control of the organization, the winners of the First World War (especially Paris and London) used the League to enforce settlements and sanctions for their benefit. Beyond its failure to prevent the Second World War, then, one may ask whether the League’s very existence, which prolonged the privileges of a few through all kinds of institutional mechanisms, including sanctions and international inquiries, may not have exacerbated the root causes of the conflict by favoring the status quo so much. At the same time, though, it is doubtful that any international institution could have dealt with Axis aggression at the time. The United Nations has performed slightly better on this count, since its history contains no cases of “exit,” to borrow Hirschman’s term (Indonesia in the 1960s being a brief exception). During tense crises, dissatisfaction has so far been expressed through

138   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot “voice”—even in the face of seemingly illegitimate privileges held by the Permanent Five. That said, the question is open of how much longer such dissatisfaction will remain institutionally jugulated. India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and some African nations have been calling for new permanent seats for many years, yet their inclusion in the cenacle of power seems quite unlikely at this stage. It is not impossible that, should acute crises arise in the future, such states would prefer to defend their interests outside of existing institutions, to the extent that these are skewed against them. After all, precedents already exist in which even the most dominant actor in the system preferred to do so (e.g., Iraq in 2002). Indeed, the status quo bias of international institutions flows both ways. In this discussion, scholars generally focus on rising powers—and for good reasons. As we just saw, the lock-­in effect is particularly problematic when incumbents decline, relative to challengers, but remain at the helm thanks to institutions. And yet over time privileged actors may also become dissatisfied with the institutional status quo. The all-­out attacks on the UN and the WTO by the Trump administration offer a useful reminder that, even shielded by them, dominant states may still chastise international institutions for their apparent inability to contain the concerted rise of challengers. The role of domestic politics, especially nationalism, remains to be fully explored here. From a constitutional point of view, it is of course quite logical that international institutions have stringent amendment procedures. If founding documents were easy to change, we could see the opposite problem, in which incumbents would have no interest in staying in. At the same time, granting some countries a veto (as is the case in the UN Charter) could be a recipe for disaster over the long run. Institutions create vested interests, paving the way to a conservative political dynamic. Those who benefit will consequently be reluctant to make any changes. The status quo thereby entrenches to the point of creating frustrations and dissatisfactions among nonincumbents, which may severely inhibit the very possibility of peaceful change.

Producing Exclusion Modern international institutions are for the most part premised on multilateralism: “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct” (Ruggie 1992, 571). For many an IR theorist, the very nature of multilateral institutions makes them particularly inclusive, as “equalizing institutions” (Panke  2013) that rest on “rules rather than simple power” (Finnemore 2005, 195). In the conventional account, multilateral institutions provide the majority of members, usually small states, with more voice opportunities, while constraining the arbitrary use of power (Ikenberry 2001). This sanguine view of liberal international institutions should be qualified in significant ways; exclusionary effects also inhere in them. For one thing, inclusion and exclusion often are two sides of the same coin; institutions generally co-­opt certain actors at the expense of others. For example, during the Cold War regional organizations often served

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   139 the purpose of containing rivals out (e.g., NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Organization of American States). Today, global conferences may indeed be more inclusive than intergovernmental meetings, but they nonetheless leave several actors on the margins due to arbitrary criteria and dynamics of normative homogeneity (Pouliot and Thérien 2018). Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from the Global South, for instance, stay clear of (or are pushed aside from) major gatherings where corporations loom large, from Davos to sustainable development initiatives. Smaller states’ and organizations’ resources are also challenged by institutional overstretch. Finally, institutions inevitably rest on certain rules of access, participation, or membership, and there is an irreducible politics of exclusion involved. In some cases, institutions even function like clubs, in which any movement toward inclusion sparks new forms of exclusion to maintain privileges and prevent the dilution of membership (think of select intergovernmental summits such as G8/G20). In addition, international institutions often create costs for those uninvited or more simply uninterested in joining. In other words, outsiders suffer doubly from institutionalization, a dynamic generative of resistance and inconducive to peaceful change. This critical insight was pioneered by Gruber (2000, 7), looking at the European Union: “[I]nstitutionalized cooperation by one group of actors (the winners) can have the effect of restricting the options available to another group of actors (the losers), altering the rules of the game such that members of the latter group are better off playing by the new rules despite their strong preference of the original, pre-­cooperation status quo.” In this scheme, institutions hinder peaceful change not only by excluding some but also by transforming the playing field for everyone, outsiders included. More generally, international institutions are often flexible enough in their implementation that they open the door to their own capture by the powerful. For instance, formal institutional rules may be egalitarian in their letter but stratifying in practice. Procedures of committee chairmanship, for instance, are meant to ensure fair treatment, but they also lend themselves to the enforcement of the pecking order (Pouliot 2016). Even where formal privileges are granted, such as Security Council permanent membership, they are often compounded at the level of action. As Schia (2013, 149) explains: Delegates from permanent member-­states often serve longer, which gives them much better opportunities to learn, master, and define the game and the skills needed in the informal processes. The permanent members are in a favorable position not only because of their status with veto powers but also because their knowledge, cultural capital, network, and being permanent players of the game in the informal processes matter. These members have an informal power base not reflected in any formal structures of the Council. The exclusionary effects of permanent membership, then, run deeper than what Charter provisions say. By definition, rules are incomplete and such openness often benefits the powerful.

Finally, in broader terms, sociological institutionalism suggests that international institutions produce epistemic baselines, or taken-­for-­granted realities, that exclude certain actors or courses of action from the horizon of possibility. For example, organizational

140   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot setup can reinforce status hierarchies. These effects run much deeper and often remain below the radar of calculation and reflection. Historical works show clearly that the ways in which we handle security problems today bear limited resemblance to previous eras (e.g., Reus-­Smit 1999). The dominance of international law, for instance, is a modern phenomenon; so is the Concert-­of-­Europe-­like management system that still dominates the global governance of security (Mitzen 2013). Things have worked differently in the past, and they will, too, in the future. By limiting the options on the table, prevalent institutions may inhibit functional roads toward peaceful change. One illustration of this dynamic may be found in the challenges of civil conflicts, which have yet to be fully met by existing international institutions. When the nature of warfare changed and the level of intrastate violence surged after the end of the Cold War, global governors resorted to existing rules, practices, and organizations to deal with a problem that none of them were created to handle. For instance, great power intergovernmentalism remains central to Security Council resolutions even though these politics are often deleterious to conflict dynamics on the ground. Peacekeeping, inherited from an era of ceasefire monitoring, is still mired in the painful process of adapting to new circumstances of state failure and humanitarian catastrophe. While these older institutions continue to structure the international response, more heterodox initiatives, such as well-­resourced prevention or large-­scale redistribution, are not even attempted. International institutions may therefore inhibit the kind of ‘outside-­of-­the-­box’ thinking that peaceful change often requires.

Generating New Forms of Struggle Intended to curtail the use of force as they may be, international institutions nonetheless create opportunities for power politics that otherwise would likely be absent from the global stage. This is particularly obvious in terms of the political resources that are generated endogenously, that is, from within the institutions. For instance, while it is true that international organizations produce information, thus benefiting all members in terms of monitoring and compliance, the distribution of such benefits is often unequal. Carson and Thompson (2019, 104) document the “specific ways in which information can create (dis)advantages for different actors,” depending on access to bureaucracy for example. What is more, international secretariats themselves play up their advantage by “creating information silos” (109) conducive to an unleveled playing field. For their part, Barkin and Weitsman (2019) observe that international institutions may reinforce other power inequalities, including a military advantage. Henke (2019) similarly documents the multiplying effects of international institutions on the deployment of force. All in all, it seems like institutions, through mechanisms such as the instrumentalization of international bureaucracy, can exacerbate existing disparities. In Stone’s (2011, 13) words: “A leading state . . . enjoys organizational advantages when it participates in decision-making within international organizations: superior information, better access to the key agents, and greater cooperation with its requests.” Despite

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   141 this tendency, it is worth pointing out that institutional effects can also flow in the opposite direction. Ambassadors from weaker parties, for instance, are often better situated to play a go-­between role given their limited substantive interests. Overall, though, the efficacy of institutions for peaceful change is far from automatic, as it depends on rather contingent practices. In addition, international institutions may inhibit peaceful change by creating new terrains for violent struggle (or struggle over violence). United Nations peace operations are a prime example of this dynamic. As Cunliffe (2009, 334) observes, peacekeeping “grants the tantalizing opportunity to exercise power and influence over the direction of international affairs in excess of what would otherwise be possible if they relied purely on their own will and capacities.” Not only are UN missions in the field driven by Security Council dynamics that often have little to do with the conflict itself, they often turn into political objects that local and regional actors use to further their own interests (Martin-­Brûlé, Pingeot, and Pouliot 2019). Going back to our previous point, it is clear that peace operations are not only sites but also tools of power politics. Great powers, troop contributors, regional actors, and host states make use of this core institution to advance their interests. The institutionalized setup of peace operations, in other words, becomes a toolbox at the disposal of a variety of actors. A similar logic informs international law, all the more so when it comes to the use of force. It is common criticism, for instance, that R2P has provided Western states with a new rationale for military intervention in the postcolonial world. Hurd (2016) similarly shows how the UN Charter’s ban on war actually has “permissive” consequences, opening new avenues for the (legalized) use of force on the international stage. The same can be said of arms control treaties, which have led to new forms of militarization (e.g., ‘mini-­nukes’). Once again, these political dynamics suggest that the link between international institutions and peaceful change is far from direct. In some cases, it may actually work in reverse order. Wight (2019, 189) goes so far as to conclude: “We have constructed institutions that attempt to control the use of violence at the global level, although paradoxically just as those institutions seem to declare old forms of war inadmissible, they supply us with new reasons to engage in war.” Colonial mandates and more recent international interventions in Kosovo and Libya illustrate how international rules sometimes provide rationales for the use of force that would otherwise not be available. Similarly, collective defense organizations such as NATO may be thought of as guardians of peace by its members but be felt as threatening by the rest of the world. As tools of “collective legitimization” (Claude 1966), international institutions will always be at risk of serving dominant actors and, by implication, the status quo. Yet the historical track record helps identify general features conducive to peaceful change: adaptable institutions able to uproot vested interests, provide equalizing voice opportunities, and facilitate flexible expressions of influence. The extent to which existing institutions can deliver these goods remains indeterminate. International law helps legitimize policies, but it is also a cheap way to buy consent. IOs provide arenas for consultation and deliberation but also for naming and shaming along normative standards

142   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot whose legitimacy remains contested. Great power concerts facilitate leadership and ­collective action, yet they reinforce dominant positions in favor of the status quo. All in all, then, the association between institutionalization and peaceful change is a contingent and ambiguous one at best.

Conclusion This chapter has sought to take a sober look at the connections between peaceful change and international institutions. This is important because, at its core, the idea of peaceful change rests on institutionalized dispute resolution, as opposed to the use of force. Put differently, international institutions are implied by peaceful change. As we saw, this conceptual proximity also expresses itself in practice. Modern history is replete with various institutional forms devised precisely to avoid war and facilitate the nonviolent settlement of disputes. Nonetheless, we have argued here that there is nothing inherent to international institutions that inevitably fosters peaceful change. On the contrary, several of their political dynamics inhibit nonviolence and even generate new causes for conflict. Institutional effects can go either way, depending on the substance of rules, their evolution over time, and the political playing field that they create. As a generic social form, then, international institutions—including liberal ones such as multilateralism and international law—need to be closely scrutinized by scholars and policy makers alike. Their effects are far from always and automatically peace inducing. Yet their existence remains constitutive of the very possibility for nonviolence in world politics.

References Adler, Emmanuel, and Michael Barnett. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen. 2008. Sovereignty Games. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave. Anghie, Antony. 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Aron, Raymond. 1966. Peace and War. A Theory of International Relations. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company. Babb, Sarah, and Bruce Carruthers. 2008. “Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4: 13–29. Barkin, J.  Samuel, and Patricia  A.  Weitsman. 2019. “Realist Institutionalism and the Institutional Mechanisms of Power Politics.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T.V.  Paul, 23–39. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   143 Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. “Do International Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics 57, no. 1: 1–38. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of International Order. New York: Columbia University Press. Carson, Austin, and Alexander Thompson. 2019. “The Power in Opacity: Rethinking Information in International Organizations.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T.  V.  Paul, 101–115. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Claude, Inis L. 1966. “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations.” International Organization 20, no. 3: 367–379. Cunliffe, Philip. 2009. “The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping.” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 3: 323–336. Deutsch, Karl W. et al. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dorussen, Han, and Hugh Ward. 2010. “Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1: 29–42. Duffield, John. 2007. “What Are International Institutions?” International Studies Quarterly 9, no. 1: 1–22. Eichengreen, Barry, and Peter Lindert. 1992. The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Elster, Jon. 1989. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Finnemore, Martha. 2005. “Fights About Rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in Changing Multilateralism.” Review of International Studies 31: 187–206. Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Haftendorn, Helga, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander. 1999. Imperfect Union: Security Institutions over Time and Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Henke, Marina. 2019. Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Holsti, K.  J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hurd, Ian. 2016. “The Permissive Power of the Ban on War.” European Journal of International Security 2, no. 1: 1–18. Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert  O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Krasner, Stephen. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Krasner, Stephen  D. 1982. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables.” International Organization 36, no. 2: 185–205. League of Nations. 1924. Covenant of the League of Nations. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_ century/leagcov.asp. Martel, Stéphanie. 2017. “From Ambiguity to Contestation: Discourse(s) of Non-Traditional Security in the ASEAN Community.” Pacific Review 30, no. 4: 549–565.

144   Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot Martin-Brûlé, Sarah-Myriam, Lou Pingeot, and Vincent Pouliot. 2019. “The Power Politics of United Nations Peace Operations.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T. V. Paul, 149–165. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Melzer, Nils. 2008. Targeting Killing in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitzen, Jennifer. 2013. Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Murphy, Craig  N. 2005. Global Institutions, Marginalization, and Development. New York: Routledge. NATO. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_17120.htm. Panke, Diana. 2013. Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions: Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Paul, T.  V. 2009. The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Paul, T. V. 2018. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Pouliot, Vincent. 2016. International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pouliot, Vincent, and Jean-Philippe Thérien. 2015. “The Politics of Inclusion: Changing Patterns in the Governance of International Security.” Review of International Studies 41, no. 2: 211–237. Pouliot, Vincent, and Jean-Philippe Thérien. 2018. “Global Governance in Practice.” Global Policy 9, no. 2: 163–172. Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3: 427–460. Reus-Smit, Christian. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ruggie, John G. 1992. “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution.” International Organization 46, no. 3: 561–598. Russett, Bruce, John R. Oneal, and David Davis. 1998. “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–1985.” International Organization 52, no. 3: 441–468. Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Schia, Niels Nagelhus. 2013. “Being Part of the Parade: ‘Going Native’ in the United Nations Security Council.” Political and Legal Anthropology Review 36, no. 1: 138–156. Schneider, Gerald, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2010. “The Capitalist Peace: Origins and Prospects of a Liberal Idea.” International Interactions 36, no. 2: 107–114. Sending, Ole J. Vincent Pouliot, and Iver  B.  Neumann 2015. Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Simmons, Beth, and Lisa Martin. 2001. “International Organizations and Institutions.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, 192–211. London: Sage.

International Institutions and Peaceful Change   145 Stone, Randall. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Stone, Randall. 2013. “Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Review of International Studies 8, no. 2: 121–136. Tannenwald, Nina. 2009. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Teschke, Benno. 2003. The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations. London: Verso. Thomas, Daniel. 1998. The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thomas, Ward. 2000. “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination.” International Security 25, no. 1: 105–133. United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/charter -united-nations/. Welsh, Jennifer. 2013. “Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect.” Global Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 4: 365–396. Wight, Colin. 2019. “Violence in International Relations: The First and the Last World.” International Relations 33, no. 2: 172–194. Wivel Anders, and T. V. Paul. 2019. “Exploring International Institutions and Power Politics.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T. V. Paul, 3–19. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

chapter 8

Economic I n ter depen dence , Gl oba liz ation, a n d Peacefu l Ch a nge John Ravenhill

We inhabit a world characterized by unprecedented levels of economic in­ter­de­pend­ence, intensified by globalization. It is also an era in which the incidence of interstate warfare has declined markedly (Human Security Report Project  2009; Pinker  2011). To the casual observer, the link between these two trends may seem obvious. Demonstrating a more robust relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful change has proved challenging, however—fraught with problems such as how best to define and measure the two concepts, endogeneity issues (What is the direction of causality? Does economic interdependence produce peaceful change, or does peaceful change ­foster economic interdependence?), and how to disentangle the independent effects of economic interdependence from a host of intervening (confounding) variables and their interactive effects. This chapter first examines the principal traditions that theorize the relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful change. It then reviews the challenges that have faced scholars who have sought through large-­N studies to demonstrate a statistically significant association between these concepts. Globalization has brought new linkages among countries that further complicate investigation of this relationship. Whether economic interdependence will bring peaceful change has divided scholars of international relations for more than three centuries. Legitimate concerns about the role of “isms” in the study of international relations notwithstanding (Lake 2011), the traditional distinction between liberalism, realism, and Marxism/neo-­Marxism generates three schools with internally consistent views on the relationship. To these three we add arguments derived from the literature on international conflict that focus on the role of signaling in mitigating the possibilities for conflict.

148   John Ravenhill

Economic Interdependence Enhances the Prospects for Peaceful Change The liberal tradition that sees economic interdependence as fostering peaceful interstate relations originated with Eméric Crucé (1972), whose The New Cyneas was published in 1623, during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). His central thesis was that humanity would benefit from engaging in trade and peaceful international relations rather than waging wars between countries, races, or religions. Crucé put forward several measures through which he believed trade and thus the prospects for peace could be enhanced (Reza 2015). The argument was taken up by numerous liberal writers over the next three centuries. In Montesquieu’s words, first published in 1748: “Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities” (quoted in Dorussen and Ward 2010, 31). Beginning with the work of Norman Angel (1910), the relationship between in­ter­de­ pend­ence and peaceful change typically became expressed in terms of “opportunity costs,” the benefits given up when one alternative is chosen over another. War was not a rational instrument for pursuing economic welfare because it would sacrifice the benefits from international trade. The potential gains from conflict (which itself would be costly to wage) could never offset the losses caused by disruption to trade (see also Polachek 1980). Rosecrance (1986) elaborated on Angel’s argument: modern economic development had fundamentally altered the balance between the potential gains from war and those from peace. The benefits from commercial relations had increased as technology reduced the transaction costs of international trade. Meanwhile the economic costs of war had also risen with contemporary industrialization. So, too, had the political costs. It was far more cost effective for governments to become “trading states” rather than warring states; the benefits of interdependence could be reaped through commerce and would far outweigh any net gains that could feasibly be achieved through territorial expansion. Somewhat paradoxically, given the customary liberal emphasis on competition among diverse groups in the political system being the driver of policies (Moravcsik 1997), some classical liberal writings on the relationship between in­ter­de­pend­ence and peaceful change portrayed the state as a unitary actor (e.g., the reference to “nations” in the quote from Montesquieu or John Stuart Mill’s argument that “commerce first taught nations to see with good will the wealth and prosperity of one another”; Mill 1884, 453). For the most part, however, liberal writings had at least an implicit theory of domestic political economy. The context in which classical liberals were writing is important. They strove to differentiate their arguments from various mercantilist proposals that equated national wealth with state power, strong armies, and overseas expansion through international conflict. For liberals, the commercial peace would come about because domestic groups

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   149 would appreciate the benefits of international trade, and (for some authors) pro-­trade elements would be strengthened politically by these economic benefits.1 Evident here is the expectation that the rising middle class would be able to constrain any warmongering by the sovereign and overcome a reactionary alliance between precapitalist elements: the landed aristocracy and the military. Commercial peace arguments consequently frequently spilled over into democratic peace propositions—because a democracy would more effectively enable domestic interests to constrain the sovereign (Cobden 1867; Schumpeter 1975). Disentangling the independent effects on peace of economic interdependence and democracy (or the interaction between these variables) consequently has posed a significant challenge to those seeking to test liberal arguments. The presence of international institutions that could help build confidence among states and potentially arbitrate disputes was another potentially confounding factor in the relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful change. Although it was best known as part of the mutually supportive Kantian trinity of democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and organization, Crucé had pioneered this argument, basing his plans for “universal peace” on the creation of a permanent assembly of ambassadors from all sovereign states (Fenet 2004). Contemporary studies have explored how a variety of economic and other international institutions (ranging from regional trade agreements—Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Bearce  1999–2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 20002—to utilization of the International Court of Justice— Davis and Morse 2018—to intergovernmental organizations more generally—Russett, Oneal, and Davis  1998) can enhance the pacifying effects of commerce. Again, the ­challenge for those attempting to establish a causal relationship between interdependence and peace is how to estimate the influence of commerce independent from that of joint membership in international institutions.

The Bargaining Theory of Conflict A second literature that posits a positive relationship between economic in­ter­de­pend­ ence and peaceful change rests not on the opportunity costs of war but on the potentially positive impact that interdependence can have on the capacity to signal intentions to a potential adversary. The argument, sometimes referred to as the bargaining theory of conflict, builds on Blainey’s (1973) insight, formalized by Fearon (1994, 1995), that international conflict frequently results from parties’ misperceiving the intent of potential adversaries and consequently being unable to strike an appropriate bargain that would avoid war. Two propositions follow from this line of reasoning. The first is that economic in­ter­de­pend­ence, by fostering regular interaction among states and thus informational exchange, reduces the chance of misperception and is a confidence-­building exercise (the classic political argument, for example, for regional economic integration). The second is that economic interdependence affords states the opportunity to send “costly signals,” making it less likely that their intent will be misperceived (Morrow 2003).

150   John Ravenhill International crises, in Morrow’s (1999) terminology, are often a matter of “relative resolve”: if a state perceives another as lacking resolution, then it will be more likely to take the risk of escalating a crisis to seek concessions from the other party. Credibility in conveying resolve rests upon the sending of “costly signals”: the willingness of a state to incur a not-­insignificant cost to attain its goals. Higher levels of i­n­ter­de­pend­ence provide more options for sending costly signals; states can impose restrictions on trade or financial flows that hurt their domestic populations as well as the foreign target. A potentially aggressive state should be deterred by such effective signaling from escalating crises into all-­out war. In the original formulation of the bargaining theory of conflict, states were treated as unitary actors whose rationality is constrained by imperfect information. Further elaborations of the perspective, however, allowed for the possibility that the incentive structures for domestic actors to reach a negotiated settlement will vary according to their roles in the economy. If powerful domestic interests—and political leaders—do not benefit as much as others from economic interdependence, they will have less interest in sending the credible signals necessary to avoid conflict (Jackson and Morelli 2007; McDonald and Sweeney 2007; Chatagnier and Kavaklı 2017).

Alternatives to the Liberal Approach: Economic Interdependence Enhances the Prospects for Interstate Conflict Writers in the realist tradition dating back to Thucydides (1972) have perceived enhanced economic interdependence as a potential source of conflict. The starting point for the realist position is that interdependence is rarely symmetrical and can be manipulated by the stronger party (Waltz 1979, 141). Where the context is one of asymmetrical interdependence, a state is vulnerable to a disruption of relations and to the leverage this threat provides to the stronger party (as elaborated, for instance, in Hirschman’s 1945 study of relations between Eastern European countries and Nazi Germany). Trade can be a vehicle for exacerbating asymmetries and thus vulnerabilities. In an anarchical world, states will be concerned about relative gains issues and the possibility that disproportionate gains accruing to a potential adversary will be translated into enhanced military capabilities. They will therefore do what is required to reduce their sources of vulnerability, engaging in armed conflict if this is perceived to be necessary to protect their economic interests. E. H. Carr (1946, ch. 4) asserted that the liberal idea of a harmony of interests was as illusory at the international level as it was at the domestic. It was naïve for liberal economists to consider welfare in terms of the world as a whole. The availability of lands for new settlement may have suppressed economic nationalism in much of the nineteenth century, but uneven development soon exposed the underlying conflict of interest among countries. Realists assert that rather

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   151 than promoting confidence among partners, the increase in interactions associated with interdependence provides more opportunities for conflict to occur (Waltz 1979; Gartzke 2003). For realists, states can be regarded as unitary actors because political elites will take whatever action is necessary in the rational pursuit of national interests. Writers who studied late nineteenth-­century imperialism from other intellectual traditions also saw economic interdependence (in this instance defined in terms of competition over international markets) as leading to interstate conflict. The challenge to capitalism of domestic underconsumption, an argument originally developed from a social democratic perspective (Hobson 1902), fueled an expansionary logic that ultimately produced conflict among rival imperial powers. Subsequently, Marxist theorists of imperialism added two other reasons for capitalist adventures overseas and consequent conflict: the problem of finding outlets for ever-­increasing capital surpluses and the quest for less-­expensive raw materials (Lenin 1933; Bukharin 1929). Neo-­Marxist writers, such as those who examined US policies toward Central and South America, built on these arguments about the quest for security of supply of inexpensive raw materials; their focus, however, was primarily on conflict between the United States and less-­ developed economies rather than on how imperialism inflamed antagonisms among industrialized economies. Marxists and neo-­Marxists have a straightforward interpretation of domestic political economy in capitalist countries. The interests of the bourgeoisie dictate foreign policies. In the instrumental Marxist tradition (Miliband  1969), the influence of particular fractions of capital, pursuing their interests, will push countries into warfare even if it damages broader economic welfare (and possibly the interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole)—hence, for example, US military intervention in Guatemala in 1954 in support of the interests of the United Fruit Company. The theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful change rest largely on deductive reasoning. The next section reviews attempts to examine the relationship empirically.

Conceptualizing and Measuring the Independent Variable Examinations of the effects of interdependence on peaceful change have typically focused on trade as the measure of the independent variable. This might seem a straightforward relationship to examine but immediately encounters several challenges. The first is data availability. The time series on international trade produced by international agencies do not go back before 1945. Previous patterns of trading have to be pieced together from a variety of national sources. And even for the post–Second World War period, data for many pairs of countries are frequently missing—and as would be anticipated, missing data are not distributed randomly but are more common for countries

152   John Ravenhill that are the least democratic, have the smallest economies, and are the least developed and least powerful (Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll 2011). How to treat missing data (to avoid dropping a large number of dyads from their analysis, analysts frequently estimate the missing values) can bias the results and has been a major controversy in the literature (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009; Gleditsch 2010; Barbieri and Keshk 2011). Controversy has also surrounded the issue of how to measure interdependence through trade. One problem is that dependence on trade typically varies with the size of the economy; as Waltz (1979, 145) reminded us, great powers typically are less de­pend­ent than others on international trade. Adjusting trade for the size of national income, however, introduces further complications regarding the measurement of economic size itself. A second issue is how to measure the importance of trade with a given partner: Should it be relative, for instance, to the country’s overall reliance on trade, or to the size of its economy? A third issue is how to incorporate asymmetries in interdependence within dyads—a key theme in realist writing being that asymmetries may encourage states to engage in conflict. A final issue is whether there should be some time lag introduced to allow for the possibility that changes in trade may take time to influence the likelihood of conflict—or for the possibility that conflict, in turn, will impact trade volumes. The choice of measures has had a profound impact on the conclusions that authors have reached about the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict. Some of the foundational work in the field found that trade either has no effect on conflict or is associated with more incidences of conflict (Barbieri 1996, 2002). In contrast, other pioneering researchers in the field, such as Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999), reached the opposite conclusion using different measures of trade interdependence; consistent with liberal arguments, they found that trade was negatively associated with incidence of conflicts. These contradictory results raise fundamental questions about conceptualizing the relationship between interdependence and conflict. The first is whether treating trade in the aggregate really addresses some of the important issues raised in the theoretical literature. The second, examined in the next part of this chapter, is whether trade itself is a sufficient measure of in­ter­de­pend­ence in an era of globalization. There are two dimensions to the liberal opportunity cost argument: the costs that would be imposed by conflict and the potential costs of the counterfactual, those that would be imposed by the pursuit of alternative policies. Measuring the costs of conflict is far from straightforward; radically different estimates reflect alternative methodologies—whether, for instance, the focus is solely on direct costs such as the replacement value of goods destroyed in conflict or whether it includes potential indirect costs such as the impact on education, health (including future costs of caring for veterans, etc.), inequality, and investment—and for how long in the postwar period these need to be measured (see Gardeazabal 2012; Brück and De Groot 2013). For the commercial peace argument, the key variable is the losses imposed by the disruption to international trade. Measurement complications notwithstanding, various studies provide strong evidence that war in general is costly (especially among major

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   153 powers) and has a particularly disruptive impact on international trade (for an overview see Barbieri and Levy 1999; Blomberg and Hess 2012 provide an alternative perspective). Although estimates of the costs of conflict among major powers would cause most reasonable observers to question whether they could conceivably be outweighed by any benefits, the same conclusion does not necessarily apply to specific conflicts, particularly those that involve parties of substantially unequal power. The US intervention in Central America in support of the United Fruit Company, for instance, imposed few direct costs on the US economy. Findlay and O’Rourke (2012) offer a variety of examples for which they argue that access to specific markets and resources, gained through the projection of military power, was crucial to the industrialization of Europe. Reference to raw materials suggests another complication. When considering ­vulnerability—that is, the costs of breaking a relationship and having to secure alternative sources of supply or new markets—some trade is more equal than others. Certain “strategic goods” are much more important for the military security of states (Reuveny and Kang 1998). Only a limited number of countries may be cost-­effective suppliers of essential resources, such as petroleum. The characteristics of the goods being traded therefore may impact the likelihood that the partners will enter into a militarized dispute (Dorussen 2006; Goenner 2010). While the aggregate trade between a country and the exporter of a coveted resource may be small relative to the importing country’s overall trade, it may be much more consequential in terms of vulnerability than larger volumes of trade in products for which substitutes are readily available. Treating trade in the aggregate consequently may lead to misleading conclusions about the relationship between interdependence and peaceful change; countries may be more inclined to undertake aggressive action against relatively small partners that supply what are regarded as critical resources. For some authors, the growing demand for a finite supply of natural resources increases the likelihood of interstate conflict (Klare  2001; Reuveny  2002). These may be as seemingly esoteric as fish stocks, the cause of the 1970s conflict between Iceland and the United Kingdom (Mitchell 1976). The COVID-­19 crisis illustrates how conceptions of “strategic” goods may be context specific. Moreover, the export profile of countries may make some of them more war prone; Colgan (2010, 2013) notes this is particularly the case for oil-­exporting countries (cf. Park, Abolfathi, and Ward 1976). The decision to wage war may also be easier to make because of the characteristics of the exporting countries. Ross and Voeten (2015), for example, find that oil producers are less likely to be members of intergovernmental organizations or to agree to compulsory third-­party jurisdiction of conflicts, attributes identified by several studies as reinforcing the relationship between economic in­ter­de­ pend­ence and peaceful change. If some varieties of trade are more likely to generate armed conflict among the partners, others (associated with contemporary globalization) may be more facilitative of peaceful change. Much of the literature treats economic interdependence as if we are still living in the 1950s, an era before intra-­industry trade became prominent and largely

154   John Ravenhill before the advent of global value chains (GVCs). Chatagnier and Kavaklı (2017), for instance, argue that countries that produce and export similar goods are “generally more likely to fight” than those that produce complementary goods. The study ignores how intra-­industry trade has affected the economic—and political—consequences of competition in international markets. Dating back to the pioneering study by Bela Balassa (1966), a substantial literature has noted how intra-­industry trade substantially reduces the adjustment costs (economic and political) associated with trade liberalization (Brülhart and Hine  1999; Alt et al.  1996). Moreover, horizontal ­intra-­industry trade, the dominant structure of trade among industrialized economies since the 1960s and now constituting three-­quarters of global commerce, is less likely to generate the concerns regarding potential vulnerability, prominent in realist ­analysis, that rest on the idea that interdependence will provide political leverage to a trading partner. For most political economists, the hypothesis put forward by Chatagnier and Kavaklı (2017, 1528) that “dyads that produce similar manufactured goods may be especially violent because they compete over a larger number of issues” has little relevance in a world of intra-­industry trade and GVCs. Peterson and Thies (2012) provide one of the few investigations of the impact of intra-­industry trade on conflict, finding that intra-­industry trade is associated with peace within dyads, whereas overall trade interaction has an ambiguous effect on conflict.

The Opportunity Costs of Not Going to War Much liberal theorizing appears to assume that the policy alternatives to armed conflict are relatively costless. That may not be so if maintenance of the status quo has the potential, for example, to deny access to critical raw materials. And the use of alternative policy instruments, such as economic sanctions, can impose significant welfare losses on the country imposing these policies. Costly signals can indeed be costly, particularly if they do not achieve their desired policy outcomes. Davis, Murphy, and Topel (2009) offer a rare comprehensive assessment of the possible opportunity costs that would have been incurred in the absence of one major militarized conflict: the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. These include the direct costs associated with sustaining a military presence sufficient to implement a containment strategy against Iraq, including those required to compel Iraqi compliance with a rigorous inspections and disarmaments regime, as well as those associated with the possibility of future terrorist attacks. Their estimates are that the cost to the United States of a containment policy would have been of a magnitude similar to the initial cost associated with the 2003 military interventions. Inevitably, some would regard the assumptions underlying the modeling as a flight of imagination, but the study shows clearly that the opportunity costs of not going to war can be formidable (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2012 provide much higher estimates of the costs of US intervention in Iraq).

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   155

Interdependence Beyond Trade? Whether trade is the best measure of interdependence in an era of globalization is questionable, particularly when the focus is on the opportunity costs of breaking ties. Foreign direct investment can often be a substitute for trade, enabling local ­production of goods that might otherwise have been imported. Today, the annual value of the sales of the international subsidiaries of transnational corporations (which amounted to $27.3 trillion in 2018) substantially exceeds the annual value of global trade ($19.67 trillion merchandise trade plus $5.63 trillion in services) (UNCTAD  2019; WTO  2019). To fully gauge the significance of financial flows, ­however, a further $4.2 trillion in portfolio flows and bank lending (UNCTAD 2019) must be added to the annual flows of $2.3 trillion in foreign direct investment. Few  studies of the relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful change have attempted to factor in the role of international financial flows—Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001), Rosecrance and Thompson (2003), Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang (2007), and Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang (2012) are rare exceptions; a much earlier study (Gasiorowski 1986) included a (largely incomplete) measure of financial flows. Even adding financial flows, however, still provides only a limited conceptualization of contemporary interdependence. Divergent interests in local, regional, or global “commons,” such as river basins or the atmosphere (or, as seen in the COVID-­19 ­pandemic, global health), have the potential to generate interstate conflict. Studies of the relationship between various environmental scarcities and conflict generally find that the relationship is indeterminate and contingent on a range of political and ­economic conditions as well as on the specific characteristics of the environmental issue (Bernauer, Bohmelt, and Koubi 2012; Gartzke 2012; Salehyan and Hendrix 2014; Zografos, Goulden, and Kallis 2014). It may also depend on the quality of institutions created to manage joint resources (Tir and Stinnett 2012) and on actor expectations (Bas and McLean 2020). Studies continue to echo the conclusion of Homer-­Dixon’s early work on shared river resources that “conflict and turmoil . . . are more often internal than international” (Homer-­Dixon 1994, 20).3 These conclusions raise an important question regarding how we conceptualize “peaceful change.” Most of the literature focuses on interstate conflict. The editors’ definition in their introductory essay for the present volume, however, goes far beyond this characterization in quoting Deutsch et al.’s (1957) identification of peaceful change with “the resolution of social problems mutually by institutionalized procedures without resort to largescale physical force” (quoted in Paul, in this volume, 4). Clearly the impact of economic interdependence on conflict within countries would be embraced by this definition. Civil wars would be the most extreme example (Collier et al. 2003), but the spectrum of nonpeaceful change also embraces violent protests; ethnic, class, and religion-­based conflicts; and crime (Rodrik  1999; Anderton and Carter  2019). Space constraints ­preclude going beyond acknowledging that another broad set of questions and large

156   John Ravenhill literature exist in relation to economic interdependence and peaceful change within countries. This acknowledgement does, however, provide a convenient segue into a discussion of the dependent variable.

The Dependent Variable Interstate wars are relatively rare and have become rarer over the last half century. Few commentators would lament this trend. For students of the relationship between ­economic interdependence and peaceful change, however, it does pose significant challenges. Writers in the liberal and realist traditions agree on one thing in examining the consequences of economic interdependence: it is all about vulnerability and the opportunity costs of breaking a relationship. For liberals, the argument is that warfare will lead to a complete disruption of economic relations with the other party/parties. The scope of this disruption will ensure that its costs, together with those of prosecuting the war, will inevitably outweigh any potential gains and will therefore constrain state behavior. If, for instance, the ‘conflict’ is merely a short-­lived exchange of shots across a border, the likely damage to economic relations would be of a significantly lesser magnitude. One of the pioneering studies of the factors associated with international conflict found that only 85 of the more than 200,000 dyad years in his study (just over 0.04 percent) were characterized by war (Bremer 1992). As another pioneering study (Oneal and Russett 1997, 273) noted, the relatively small number of wars renders unreliable statistical analysis that includes only that small population. Many analysts, accordingly, have focused on broader definitions of interstate conflict. Most frequently, they have used one of the data sets on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) derived from the Correlates of War project. The authors of one of the original compilations of these data define ­militarized interstate disputes as “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force. To be included, these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned” (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). MIDs explicitly are not interstate wars. The literature specifically refers to them as “sub-­war” conflicts. They may be such relatively minor incidents as an increase in the military readiness of a state’s forces or the issuance of threats. Several problems are evident in using such data to test the arguments regarding economic interdependence and peaceful change. The first is whether many of the disputes would be likely to impose the magnitude of opportunity costs central to the theorizing. The severity of the disputes included in the data set varies significantly. In the Gochman and Maoz (1984, 587) study, for instance, the modal length of disputes (constituting 22 percent of the total) was a single day. If only the subset of MIDs that include a fatality is used, authors encounter the same issue as if the focus were on interstate war; Peterson

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   157 and Thies, who do include only fatal MIDs in their study, acknowledge that “our D[ependent] V[ariable] is an exceptionally rare event” (Peterson and Thies  2012, 757 n52). Problems are typically compounded by how the data are then manipulated. The usual procedure in the studies that use MIDs is to dichotomize the dependent ­variable: dyads are coded as either experiencing or not experiencing an MID. The problem here lies in aggregating very different types of incident and treating them in the same way. Many disputes would be unlikely to come close to generating the opportunity costs associated with war. Nonetheless, some analysts who employ the MIDs data frequently use the terms war, hostility, military conflict, and dispute interchangeably. As one example among many, Chatagnier and Kavaklı (2017) employ the terminology of “fighting” and “military combat.” And even those who are careful in referring only to “disputes” or “conflicts” nonetheless begin their studies with a recounting of the theoretical perspectives on economic interdependence and war (see, for instance, some of the most frequently cited studies, such as Polachek 1980 and Oneal and Russett 1997). The argument about relatively insignificant opportunity costs applies a fortiori to those studies that have used events data to enumerate conflicts among states. No one pretends that interdependence is costless. Conflicts will inevitably occur among economic partners over, for instance, the pricing of goods. But such frictions will rarely escalate to the point that there is any possibility of the relationship being severed. A second problem is one of interpretation. As Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996, 170) note, “threats are verbal indications of hostile intent, and since these are expressed in diplomatic language, they are not always easy to interpret.” The compilers of the MIDs data sets utilize standard procedures to establish inter-­coder reliability. But subjectivity inevitably creeps in, which can lead to coding errors that, in turn, can generate misleading results. An examination of the coding of the MIDs data set through version 3.1 found that more than two-­thirds of the entries needed revision. Using the revised data, the authors found that in several studies that used the data set, the “interpretation of several key relationships depends wholly on improperly coded cases in the original data” (Gibler, Miller, and Little 2017, 720). Examining the relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful change using data on militarized disputes is equally problematic if the objective is to evaluate the bargaining theory of conflict. Many incidents coded as constituting a militarized dispute are exactly the type of “costly signal” that figures prominently in this theorizing. They are the independent variables rather than the dependent variable. If one treats war as the dependent variable, and MIDs as the independent, then exponents of the bargaining theory of war may find support for their arguments—insofar as very few militarized disputes actually lead to interstate war (in the third iteration of the MIDs database, only 4 percent of the total of slightly over two thousand disputes escalated into war; see Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 197). The small numbers involved, however, again make it risky to draw any conclusions.

158   John Ravenhill

Interdependence and Peaceful Change in an Era of Globalization Classical liberal theorizing is ambiguous on whether the key relationships are among pairs of states or between a state and all its (major) partners in a global society of states. Several prominent liberal theorists can be quoted in support of the latter approach— notably Immanuel Kant, who repeatedly made reference to a “universal community” (see Kinne 2012, 309). Studies, however, have typically examined relationships between pairs of states. This approach has the advantage of being relatively easy to measure. It also maps neatly onto the major databases on international conflict, which focus on dyads. Whether such a method is appropriate, either as a test of the classical liberal propositions or as a measure of the opportunity costs of disruptions to trade in the contemporary era of GVCs, is questionable. An initial consideration is that a state may be deterred from engaging in conflict with a partner not because of the opportunity costs of breaking that specific relationship but because it may jeopardize economic relations with more significant third parties, which might either impose sanctions or break an economic relationship because of the country’s military adventurism. An illustration of the logic would be if Russia were deterred from military intervention in Ukraine not because of the direct or opportunity costs of that conflict with Ukraine itself but because this aggression would prompt sanctions from other countries. Peterson (2011), on the other hand, suggests that taking third parties into account may have an entirely different logic. Building on the relative gains concerns expressed in realist theorizing, he contends that trade between one member of a dyad and a third party risks shifting the balance of capabilities within the dyad sufficiently that the relatively disadvantaged state may be tempted to engage in conflict. He finds some support for this argument (again using MIDs data), but only in politically dissimilar dyads with relatively low levels of trade between the parties. Yet another alternative deductive argument regarding third parties is that because their own well-­being rests on trade between two members of a dyad, they will have an incentive to try to prevent any conflict between the two parties (Dorussen and Ward  2010, 29; see also Kleinberg, Robinson, and French 2012; Chen 2020). To date, no conclusive evidence is available to support one alternative rather than another. Including third parties goes only a small way toward accommodating the complexities of the contemporary global economy. Final goods are frequently assembled from hundreds of components sourced from multiple countries. The spread of vertically integrated intra-­industry trade within value chains has been a major motivation behind preferential trade agreements linking industrialized and less-­developed economies (Manger 2012). Moreover, the advent of GVCs has been associated with a nearly universal increase in the share of trade in countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). Consequently, the costs that would be imposed by a disruption in supply chains have

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   159 increased (Ravenhill 2009), and nowhere is this more evident than in the COVID-­19 outbreak. Studies have applied various forms of network analysis in attempting to address these new complexities (Maoz et al. 2006; Dorussen and Ward 2010; Kinne 2012; Lupu and Traag 2013; Jackson and Nei 2015; Maoz and Joyce 2016; Dorussen, Gartzke, and Westerwinter 2016; Amador and Cabral 2017). Authors, however, face formidable challenges in attempting to measure networked trading relations. One difficulty in examining a universe comprising all members of the global trading system is the sheer number of observations—as Maoz et al. (2006, 683) noted of their study, “Due to the exceedingly large ns, almost any correlation is statistically significant.” Disruptions to value chain trade can be particularly costly—and the complexities of inter-­firm and international trade within them make it difficult to predict how the costs of conflict will be distributed. US measures to restrict imports from China during the Trump presidency inevitably affected companies from US allies such as Japan and Korea that assembled goods in China. Moving the assembly point elsewhere (to Vietnam in this instance) reduces the impact on allies. But the location of plants is not arbitrary. They usually tie into specific infrastructure, concentrations of suppliers and expertise, and other factors that are not easily replicated elsewhere. Relatively few industries are genuinely footloose, at least in the short term. A fundamental problem not addressed in the literature is whether conventional national trade data are meaningful in a world of GVCs. Bernard and Ravenhill (1995) first pointed out how misleading national trade statistics can be by examining the example of a calculator, assembled in Thailand, which was classified for the purposes of trade statistics as a Thai export even though almost all its cost came from components imported from other countries. Subsequent studies, most notably of various Apple products (Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2007; Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick 2011; Xing and Detert 2011; Xing 2015), have reinforced the argument. Moreover, because components frequently cross international boundaries on multiple occasions before being assembled into a final product, conventional trade data substantially overstate the value of trade because multiple counting of intermediate goods and ­services occurs. International economic institutions have increasingly recognized the problems with conventional national trade statistics, launching a major project to measure trade on a value-­added (TVA) basis (see OECD and WTO 2011; Mattoo, Wang, and Wei 2013). While these data provide a far better understanding of the interdependencies (and potential vulnerabilities) among economies in contemporary global trade, they are far from complete; in the most recent release, data are available for only sixty-­four countries and for only thirty-­six industrial sectors (nonetheless, these provide potentially twenty-­eight quadrillion combinations; OECD 2019, 15). They are also only available for a handful of years.4 Although TVA data provide a much better estimate of networked trade than do conventional national trade data, the relatively small number of countries and years for which they are available would make it difficult to utilize them for assessing the relationship between globalization and peaceful change.

160   John Ravenhill

Conclusion Four decades on, and scores if not hundreds of large-­N studies later, we still lack definitive conclusions about the relationship between economic interdependence, globalization, and peaceful change. A majority of the studies do find that interdependence has a mitigating effect on the occurrence of interstate conflict. But this positive impact is frequently found to be contingent on other factors such as joint democracy (with some finding that the interaction between trade and democracy is a particularly powerful predictor; Gelpi and Grieco 2003), on the types of goods involved (manufactures versus natural resources), and/or on the expectations of actors regarding the future course of the relationship (Copeland 1996, 2015; Morrow 1999; Benson and Niou 2007). Difficulties in measuring the independent and dependent variables cast doubt on the usefulness of the findings of many of the studies. The sophistication of the statistical techniques employed is not matched by the quality of the data. Particularly problematic is the conceptualization of the dependent variable. Most studies have used the MIDs databases, often conflating different types of dispute and then dichotomizing the variable into dyads that have experienced “disputes” and those that have avoided them. If the dependent variable is peaceful change, particularly in the broadest interpretation of the concept discussed by this volume’s editors, then MIDs might be relevant. They are far less so for testing the propositions drawn from the theoretical literatures, which explicitly reference war as the dependent variable because of the magnitude of the opportunity costs it would generate. Peterson (2011, 190) argues that states are aware of the possible escalatory consequences of relatively low-­hostility acts like threatening or displaying force that are included in the MIDs data set. That may be so, but a threat, in itself, does not give rise to the opportunity costs associated with war. Moreover, the use of MIDs is unlikely to help in testing arguments derived from the bargaining theory of war because many of the MIDs may be exactly the “costly signals” that the theory suggests economic interdependence will facilitate, and which will act as a deterrent to full-­ scale conflict. Conceptualizing the independent variable is equally challenging. Even national trade statistics are problematic because of missing values. One study acknowledged that “far more work is needed to improve trade statistics, if we hope to use these data in meaningful ways in scientific research” (Barbieri and Keshk 2011, 171). More fundamentally, discussions of trade within GVCs have exposed how misleading national trade data can be. Yet trade in value added data are only available for a limited number of years. Moreover, the complexities of value chains make it very difficult to link TVA data to propositions derived from our theories of international cooperation and conflict. Trade (and the damage from a breaking of commercial relations) is central to liberal theorizing of the commercial peace. Adding other measures of economic interdependence, such as investment linkages, may seem appropriate in a globalized world. The challenge becomes how other measures can be combined with trade data. What respective weighting should be applied, for instance? And how do the two interact? While foreign direct

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   161 investment may be a substitute for trade where import substitution occurs, it may be complementary to trade in the operations of GVCs. As Copeland (2015, 54) reminds us, large-­N studies tell us nothing about individual cases of interdependence and conflict, which may fall well outside of the regression line (and be driven, for instance, by misperceptions by key actors, by power asymmetries that influence the opportunity costs of conflict, or by the nature of the particular commodities that dominate trade between the parties). In the absence of data that are accurate measures of the independent and dependent variables, case studies may be the most appropriate means going forward for exploring the relationship between in­ter­de­pend­ ence, globalization, and peaceful change. International institutions have frequently been identified as an important intervening variable in the relationship between interdependence and conflict. Contemporary challenges to the liberal international economic order—and its supporting institutions, most notably the World Trade Organization (WTO)—consequently will inevitably trigger alarm bells. Globalization rests on free flows of capital and goods. For almost all years between the end of the Second World War and the global financial crises of 2008 –2009, international trade grew more rapidly than global GDP. Domestic groups with an interest in trade consequently were strengthened in many countries, very much in accordance with classic liberal theorizing, and the assumption is that they had vested interests in avoiding international conflict. Moreover, trade was a central factor in lifting millions of people out of poverty in East Asia—thereby playing an important role in enhancing the prospects for peaceful change within these countries. Since 2009, the increase in global trade has barely kept pace with global GDP, and global trade actually fell in 2019 before the onset of the COVID-­19 pandemic. By 2020 the trade trajectory was already much lower than the trend before 2009; the shutdown of the global economy in response to the COVID pandemic was projected by the WTO in early 2020 to lead to a decline in global trade of between 13 and 32 percent, with trade within value chains expected to decline most steeply (WTO  2020). Globalization is reversible, which was all too evident in the interwar period (McGrew 2020). Even if a contemporary reversal does not precipitate interstate war, the risk is that it will produce frictions that will endanger peaceful change at both domestic and international levels.

Notes 1. Classical liberals paid little attention to the distributive effects of trade liberalization, in particular, that it would create losers (in Ricardo’s original formulation of comparative advantage, the cloth manufacturers in Portugal and the winemakers in England) as well as winners. The focus is on aggregate national welfare; the expectation in mainstream economics is that gains will exceed losses and that any losers from liberalization can be compensated from the aggregate gains. What this argument ignores is the possibility that the losers from actual or potential trade liberalization may wield disproportionate influence in the political system, with potential implications for interstate conflict (see McDonald and Sweeney 2007).

162   John Ravenhill 2. But cf. Peterson (2015), who argues that countries excluded from such arrangements may be more prone to hostile action. 3. For other work in this field see, for example, Hall and Hall (1998); Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (1998); Diehl and Gleditsch (2001); Nelson (2010); and Bergholt and Lujala (2012). 4. For further discussion of the methodological challenges in constructing TVA databases, see Miroudot and Yamano (2013).

References Alt, James E., Jeffry Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry.” Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 6: 689–717. Amador, João, and Sónia Cabral. 2017. “Networks of Value-added Trade.” World Economy 40, no. 7: 1291–1313. doi:10.1111/twec.12469. Anderton, Charles H., and John R. Carter. 2019. Principles of Conflict Economics: The Political Economy of War, Terrorism, Genocide, and Peace. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Angell, Norman. 1910. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Balassa, Bela. 1966. “Tariff Reductions and Trade in Manufacturers among the Industrial Countries.” American Economic Review 56, no. 3: 466–473. Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1: 29–49. Barbieri, Katherine. 2002. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Barbieri, Katherine, and Omar M. G. Keshk. 2011. “Too Many Assumptions, Not Enough Data.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 2: 168–174. doi:10.1177/0738894210396626. Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins. 2009. “Trading Data: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 5: 471–491. doi:10.1177/0738894209343887. Barbieri, Katherine, and Jack S. Levy. 1999. “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade.” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4: 463–479. doi:10.1177/0022343399036004005. Bas, Muhammet A., and Elena V. McLean. 2020. “Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict.” Political Research Quarterly. doi:10.1177/1065912920911204. Benson, Brett V., and Emerson M. S. Niou. 2007. “Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 1: 35–59. doi:10.1017/ S1598240800004847. Bergholt, Drago, and Päivi Lujala. 2012. “Climate-Related Natural Disasters, Economic Growth, and Armed Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1: 147–162. doi:10.1177/0022343311426167. Bernard, Mitchell, and John Ravenhill. 1995. “Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia.” World Politics 45, no. 2: 179–210. Bernauer, Thomas, Tobias Bohmelt, and Vally Koubi. 2012. “Environmental Changes and Violent Conflict.” Environmental Research Letters 7: 1–8. Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press.

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   163 Blomberg, S. Brock, and Gregory D. Hess. 2012. “The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, edited by Michelle  R.  Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, 413–446. New York: Oxford University Press. Boehmer, Charles R., Bernadette M. E. Jungblut, and Richard J. Stoll. 2011. “Tradeoffs in Trade Data: Do Our Assumptions Affect Our Results?” Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 2: 145–167. doi:10.1177/0738894210396630. Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2: 309–341. doi:10.1177/002200279203 6002005. Brück, Tilman, and Olaf  J.  De Groot. 2013. “The Economic Impact of Violent Conflict.” Defence and Peace Economics 24, no. 6: 497–501. doi:10.1080/10242694.2012.723153. Brülhart, Marius, and R.  C.  Hine, eds. 1999. Intra-Industry Trade and Adjustment: The European Experience. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press. Bukharin, Nikolaĭ. 1929. Imperialism and World Economy. New York: International Publishers. Carr, Edward H. 1946. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Chatagnier, J. Tyson, and Kerim Can Kavaklı. 2017. “From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 7: 1510–1536. doi:10.1177/0022002715613565. Chen, Frederick  R. 2020. “Extended Dependence: Trade, Alliances, and Peace.” Journal of Politics. doi:10.1086/709149. Cobden, Richard. 1867. Political Writings. 2 vols. London: W. Ridgway. Colgan, Jeff D. 2010. “Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict.” International Organization 64, no. 4: 661–694. doi:10.1017/S002081831000024X. Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War.” International Security 38, no. 2: 147–180. Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: Oxford University Press. Copeland, Dale. 1996. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.” International Security 20, no. 4: 5–41. Copeland, Dale C. 2015. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Crucé, Émeric. 1972. The New Cineas. New York: Garland. Davis, Christina L., and Julia C Morse. 2018. “Protecting Trade by Legalizing Political Disputes: Why Countries Bring Cases to the International Court of Justice.” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 4: 709–722. doi:10.1093/isq/sqy022. Davis, Steven  J., Kevin  M.  Murphy, and Robert  H.  Topel. 2009. “War in Iraq versus Containment.” In Guns and Butter: The Economic Causes and Consequences of Conflict, edited by Gregory D. Hess, 203–270. Boston: Kluwer. Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang, Sidney  A.  Burrell, Robert  A.  Kann, Maurice Lee Jr, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Lowenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Publications of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

164   John Ravenhill Diehl, Paul  F., and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds. 2001. Environmental Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Dorussen, Han. 2006. “Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict: What You Trade Matters.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 1: 87–107. doi:10.1177/0022002705283013. Dorussen, Han, Erik A. Gartzke, and Oliver Westerwinter. 2016. “Networked International Politics: Complex Interdependence and the Diffusion of Conflict and Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 3: 283–291. doi:10.1177/0022343316637896. Dorussen, Han, and Hugh Ward. 2010. “Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1: 29–42. doi:10.1177/0022343309350011. Fearon, James  D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3: 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. Fearon, James  D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3: 379–414. Fenet, Alain. 2004. “Emeric Crucé aux origines du pacifisme et de l’internationalisme modernes.” Miskolc Journal of International Law 1, no. 2: 21–34. Findlay, Ronald, and Kevin H. O’Rourke. 2012. “War, Trade, and Natural Resources: A Historical Perspective.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, edited by Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, 557–584. New York: Oxford University Press. Gardeazabal, Javier. 2012. “Methods for Measuring Aggregate Costs of Conflict.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, edited by Michelle  R.  Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, 227–251. New York: Oxford University Press. Gartzke, Erik. 2003. “The Classical Liberals Were Just Lucky: A Few Thoughts about Interdependence and Peace.” In Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, 96–100. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Gartzke, Erik. 2012. “Could Climate Change Precipitate Peace?” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1: 177–192. doi:10.1177/0022343311427342. Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization 55, no. 2: 391–438. Gasiorowski, Mark  J. 1986. “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence.” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1: 23–38. doi:10.2307/ 2600435. Gelpi, Christopher, and Joseph M. Grieco. 2003. “Economic Interdependence, the Democratic State, and the Liberal Peace.” In Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, 44–59. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Gibler, Douglas M., Steven V. Miller, and Erin K. Little. 2017. “An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816–2001.” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 4: 719–730. doi:10.1093/isq/sqw045. Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2010. “On Ignoring Missing Data and the Robustness of Trade and Conflict Results: A Reply to Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollin.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 2: 153–157. doi:10.1177/0738894209359123. Gochman, Charles  S., and Zeev Maoz. 1984. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (4):585–616. doi: 10.1177/0022002784028004002. Goenner, Cullen  F. 2010. “From Toys to Warships: Interdependence and the Effects of Disaggregated Trade on Militarized Disputes.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5: 547–559. doi:10.1177/0022343310371881.

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   165 Hall, Jane V., and Darwin C. Hall. 1998. “Environmental Resource Scarcity and Conflict.” In The Political Economy of War and Peace, edited by Murray Wolfson, 176–199. Boston: Kluwer. Hirschman, Albert  O. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hobson, J. A. 1902. Imperialism: A Study. New York: J. Pott. Homer-Dixon, Thomas  F. 1994. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” International Security 19, no. 1: 5–40. doi:10.2307/2539147. Human Security Report Project (Simon Fraser University). 2009. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. 2007. “Political Bias and War.” American Economic Review 97, no. 4: 1353–1373. doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1353. Jackson, Matthew  O., and Stephen Nei. 2015. “Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 50: 15277–15284. doi:10.1073/pnas.1520970112. Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2: 163–213. doi:10.1177/073889429601500203. Kinne, Brandon J. 2012. “Multilateral Trade and Militarized Conflict: Centrality, Openness, and Asymmetry in the Global Trade Network.” Journal of Politics 74, no. 1: 308–322. doi:10.1017/s002238161100137x. Klare, Michael T. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. 1st ed. New York: Metropolitan Books. Kleinberg, Katja B., Gregory Robinson, and Stewart L. French. 2012. “Trade Concentration and Interstate Conflict.” Journal of Politics 74, no. 2: 529–540. doi:10.1017/s0022381611001745. Kraemer, Kenneth  L., Greg Linden, and Jason Dedrick. 2011. Capturing Value in Global Networks: Apple’s iPad and iPhone. Irvine: Personal Computing Industry Center, University of California Irvine. Lake, David  A. 2011. “Why “Isms” Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2: 465–480. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00661.x. Lenin, Vladimir I. 1933. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York,: International Publishers. Linden, Greg, Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Jason Dedrick. 2007. Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System? The Case of Apple’s iPod. Irvine: Personal Computing Industry Center, University of California Irvine. Lupu, Yonatan, and Vincent A. Traag. 2013. “Trading Communities, the Networked Structure of International Relations, and the Kantian Peace.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 6: 1011–1042. doi:10.1177/0022002712453708. Manger, Mark  S. 2012. “Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs.” World Politics 64, no. 4: 622–658. Mansfield, Edward  D., and Jon  C.  Pevehouse. 2000. “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows and International Conflict.” International Organization 56, no. 3: 477–513. Mansfield, Edward  D., Jon  C.  Pevehouse, and David  H.  Bearce. 1999–2000. “Preferential Trading Arrangements and Military Disputes.” Security Studies 9, nos. 1–2: 92–118. Maoz, Zeev, and Kyle A. Joyce. 2016. “The Effects of Shocks on International Networks: Changes in the Attributes of States and the Structure of International Alliance Networks.” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 3: 292–309. doi:10.1177/0022343316632854.

166   John Ravenhill Maoz, Zeev, Ranan  D.  Kuperman, Lesley Terris, and Ilan Talmud. 2006. “Structural Equivalence and International Conflict: A Social Networks Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5: 664–689. doi:10.1177/0022002706291053. Mattoo, Aaditya, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei, eds. 2013. Trade in Value Added: Developing New Measures of Cross-Border Trade. Washington, DC: World Bank. McDonald, Patrick  J., and Kevin Sweeney. 2007. “The Achilles’ Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era.” World Politics 59, no. 3: 370–403. doi:10.1017/S0043887100020864. McGrew, Anthony. 2020. “The Logics of Economic Globalization.” In Global Political Economy, edited by John Ravenhill, 247–281. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books. Mill, John S. 1884. Principles of Political Economy. Edited by J. Laurence Laughlin. New York: D. Appleton. Miroudot, Sébastien, and Norihiko Yamano. 2013. “Towards the Measurement of Trade in Value-Added Terms: Policy Rationale and Methodological Challenges.” In Trade in Value Added: Developing New Measures of Cross-Border Trade, edited by Aaditya Mattoo, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei, 17–40. Washington, DC: World Bank. Mitchell, Bruce. 1976. “Politics, Fish, and International Resource Management: The BritishIcelandic Cod War.” Geographical Review 66, no. 2: 127–138. doi:10.2307/213576. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4: 513–554. Morrow, James  D. 1999. “How Could Trade Affect Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4: 481–489. Morrow, James D. 2003. “Assessing the Role of Trade as a Source of Costly Signals.” In Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, edited by Edward  D.  Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, 89–95. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Nelson, Travis. 2010. “When Disaster Strikes: On the Relationship between Natural Disaster and Interstate Conflict.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 2: 155–174. OECD. 2019. Guide to OECD’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Indicators. 2018 ed. OECD and WTO. 2011. Trade In Value-Added: Concepts, Methodologies and Challenges. Paris: OECD and WTO. Oneal, John  R., and Bruce Russett. 1999. “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4: 423–442. Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985.” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2: 267–293. doi:10.1111/1468-2478.00042. Park, Tong-Whan, Farid Abolfathi, and Michael Ward. 1976. “Resource Nationalism in the Foreign Policy Behavior of Oil Exporting Countries (1947–1974).” International Interactions 2, no. 4: 247–262. doi:10.1080/03050627608434444. Peterson, Timothy M. 2011. “Third-Party Trade, Political Similarity, and Dyadic Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2: 185–200. doi:10.1177/0022343310396266. Peterson, Timothy M. 2015. “Insiders versus Outsiders: Preferential Trade Agreements, Trade Distortions, and Militarized Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 4: 698–727. doi:10.1177/0022002713520483. Peterson, Timothy  M., and Cameron  G.  Thies. 2012. “Beyond Ricardo: The Link between Intra-Industry Trade and Peace.” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4: 747–767. doi:10.1017/S0007123412000129.

Economic Interdependence, Globalization & Peaceful Change   167 Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking. Polachek, Solomon, Carlos Seiglie, and Jun Xiang. 2007. “The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on International Conflict.” Defence and Peace Economics 18, no. 5: 415–429. doi:10.1080/10242690701455474. Polachek, Solomon W., Carlos Seiglie, and Jun Xiang. 2012. “Globalization and International Conflict: Can Foreign Direct Investment Increase Cooperation Among Nations?” In The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, edited by Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, 733–762. New York: Oxford University Press. Polachek, Solomon W. 1980. “Conflict and Trade.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1: 55–78. Ravenhill, John. 2009. “The Economics-Security Nexus in the Asia-Pacific Region.” In Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?, edited by William Tow, 188–207. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Reuveny, Rafael. 2002. “Economic Growth, Environmental Scarcity, and Conflict.” Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 1: 83–110. doi:10.1162/152638002317261481. Reuveny, Rafael, and Heejoon Kang. 1998. “Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation: Do Goods Matter?” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 5: 581–602. doi:10.1177/0022343398035 005003. Reza, German A. De La. 2015. “The 1623 Plan for Global Governance: The Obscure History of Its Reception.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 58: 146–160. Rodrik, Dani. 1999. The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work. Policy Essay no. 24. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press for the Overseas Development Council. Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books. Rosecrance, Richard, and Peter Thompson. 2003. “Trade, Foreign Investment, and Security.” Annual Review of Political Science 6, no. 1: 377–398. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085631. Ross, Michael L., and Erik Voeten. 2015. “Oil and International Cooperation.” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 1: 85–97. doi:10.1093/isq/sqv003. Russett, Bruce, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis. 1998. “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85.” International Organization 52, no. 3: 441–467. doi:10.1162/002081898550626. Salehyan, Idean, and Cullen S. Hendrix. 2014. “Climate Shocks and Political Violence.” Global Environmental Change 28: 239–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.007. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1975. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row. Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Linda J. Bilmes. 2012. “Estimating the Costs of War: Methodological Issues, with Applications to Iraq and Afghanistan.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, edited by Michelle  R.  Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, 275–317. New York: Oxford University Press. Theisen, Ole M., Helge Holtermann, and Halvard Buhaug. 1998. “Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict.” International Security 36, no. 3: 79–106. Thucydides. 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War. Rev. ed. The Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. Tir, Jaroslav, and Douglas M Stinnett. 2012. “Weathering Climate Change: Can Institutions Mitigate International Water Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1: 211–225. doi:10.1177/0022343311427066.

168   John Ravenhill UNCTAD. 2019. World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones. Edited by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. New York: United Nations. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. WTO. 2019. World Trade Report 2019: The Future of Services Trade. Geneva: World Trade Organization. WTO. 2020. “Trade Set to Plunge as COVID-19 Pandemic Upends Global Economy.” World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm. Xing, Yuqing. 2015. Global Value Chains and China’s Exports to High Income Countries. Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. Xing, Yuqing, and Neal Detert. 2011. How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the People’s Republic of China. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Zografos, Christos, Marisa  C.  Goulden, and Giorgos Kallis. 2014. “Sources of Human Insecurity in the Face of Hydro-Climatic Change.” Global Environmental Change 29: 327–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.002.

chapter 9

Constructi v ism a n d Peacefu l Ch a nge Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann

System-­wide peaceful change gave birth to the mainstream constructivist international relations (IR) research agenda. The bipolar world, which most scholars working within the neorealist and neoliberal traditions predicted would be enduring and stable, collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. While some realists expected such a systemic change to occur through hegemonic wars (Gilpin 1981, 1988), the bipolar order was dismantled without resort to large-­scale physical force between the United States and the USSR.1 Both the end of the Cold War and its largely peaceful nature constituted a puzzle for existing IR paradigms and theories. The lack of theoretical tools to explain this largely peaceful global change provided an opening to a more socially informed study of the world and an opportunity for the constructivist paradigm to become a cornerstone of IR theorizing. In this chapter we argue that scholars working in the constructivist tradition have emphasized three theoretical building blocks that explain peaceful change and how peaceful relations can be maintained in times of upheavals and transitions: factors (such as culture or identity), actors (such as norm entrepreneurs), and mechanisms (such as persuasion and socialization). These help us understand and explain peaceful change on the individual, social, and global levels. By showing how constructivist research on peaceful change is continuously expanding rather than refining existing explanations, we argue that there is no ‘core’ research program or approach but instead a kaleidoscope of theories that variably emphasize different factors, actors, or mechanisms. Consequently, while constructivist theorizing has contributed to our understanding of peaceful change, room for conversation between the different theories and approaches remains. We believe that such conversations are a fruitful engagement. First, given their historical momentum and proximity to liberal political thought in the 1990s, constructivist theories have implicitly focused on peaceful change and sidestepped the question of what scope conditions lead to violent or nonviolent outcomes. A second, related line of inquiry that needs more theoretical development is how

170   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann the different factors, actors, and mechanisms of existing theories interact with one another. We know that norm entrepreneurs can work towards peaceful change and that socialization is as important a mechanism as norm diffusion. However, constructivist scholars could emphasize more how these factors can strengthen each other to lead to peaceful change by looking into how different levels of analysis are related. A third challenge, not particular to theories of peaceful change, is the question of how to demonstrate empirically the purchasing power of these theories. Constructivist scholars are still to find common definitions of such concepts as norms or culture. In this chapter, we first discuss constructivism’s rise to become a major IR paradigm and the epistemology on which theories of peaceful change rest by touching upon constructivism’s rich and variable research tradition, comprising conventional, critical, and postpositivist approaches. In a second step, we turn to constructivist ontologies and present the factors of change, the actors that drive change, and the mechanisms that can lead to peaceful change. Third, we discuss biases in the constructivist research agenda, such as the initial emphasis on “good,” “Western” norms, identities, and values, which left the conditions of violent versus peaceful change unexplored. We conclude with a discussion on understanding and explaining the prospect of peaceful change, especially as the potentially waning global predominance of the United States drives a renewed quest to define changes in the global order.

The Origins of Constructivism: Peaceful Change While the end of the Cold War gave birth to the mainstream constructivist research agenda, constructivist theorizing had developed before that. Critics of the dominant, ‘rationalist’ theories of IR, and of international regimes in particular, showed that sociological factors matter in defining behavior, beyond the material distribution of power (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Actors follow rules as they simplify choices and provide templates for recurring social situations, thus facilitating overall coordination (Kratochwil 1984, 707). The role of institutions thus goes well beyond simply coordinating given interests; they constitute interests that cannot be defined independent of the context in which they are formed. This theoretical groundwork became more prominent across IR scholarship with the end of the Cold War. Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994) argued that the end of the bipolar world is not a result of a shift in exogenous variables such as the distribution of material capabilities, but a change in domestic and international practices, beliefs, and identities. The Soviet leadership conceding to German reunification and allowing national elites to liberalize their political systems across the former Communist bloc (Risse-­Kappen 1994) were significant changes in the constitutive rules of the Cold War. Such new ideas, ­however, were ‘not floating freely’; they were embedded in interlocking domestic and

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   171 international processes such as empowering liberal internationalist groups across Europe and the United States, and within the Soviet Union (Risse-­Kappen 1994, 195). Conventional constructivists showed that concepts such as identity, norms, and culture, long considered epiphenomenal to material variables (Keohane 1984; Mearsheimer 2003; Waltz 2010), can meaningfully influence actors’ behavior (Wendt 1992; Checkel 1999; Risse-­Kappen et al. 1999). Critical constructivists shifted the focus to how social phenomena are constituted in the first place (Hopf  1998; Finnemore  2004a). Postpositivist constructivist scholars, in turn, revealed the hegemonic nature of such constructs and the power relations they perpetuate, reminding us that we as scholars also need to situate ourselves first before we can understand the social fabric of the political (Laffey and Weldes 1997; Milliken 1999). Constructivist scholars emphasized not only a new ontology—akin to liberal scholars in this respect—but also a new epistemology that facilitated the study of change over time and across places.

Open to Change: The Power of Collective Meanings Explaining the end of the Cold War gave credit to the idea that social and political order is not solely the outcome of material factors. Material attributes such as economic and military preponderance have to be interpreted in their context. “Constructivism,” writes Stefano Guzzini, “does not deny the existence of a phenomenal world,” but it opposes the idea that “phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independent of discursive practices” (2000, 159). “What makes the world hang together” (Ruggie 1998), “a world of our making” (Onuf 1989), and “what states make of it” (Wendt 1992), in other words, are the interpretive frames, ideas, identities, norms, rules, and culture that define the attributes of social phenomena. Social phenomena, constructivists argue, ultimately rest on social conventions. These social conventions, such as the value of money or the force of law, are ultimately created and re-­created based on people’s belief that they are part of social reality. Their endurance depends on conscious social actors behaving in a way that sustains that collective belief. Social phenomena are thus created in an “intersubjective” manner: in-­between, and through the interactions of, self-­reflexive social actors. In situations governed by collectively held meanings, actors acquire understandings about who they are and how they should behave. These identities, or “relatively stable, role-­specific understandings and expectations about self ” (Wendt 1992, 397), often define their reasons or possibilities for action. If social and political order is not the reflection of material capabilities alone, but of those collectively held meanings and feelings of belonging that social actors attribute to them, the conditions and pathways of change are different from those in an order defined purely by material factors.

172   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann This makes constructivist scholars well placed to study change. Change happens through transforming collectively held social beliefs and meanings that sustain social institutions and conventions. If this transformation happens without resorting to force, or without leading to violence, we speak of peaceful change. Change is violent if the primary means of transforming ideational factors is force, or if their transformation results in violence. Constructivists show that both peaceful and violent changes may be legitimate if they are so defined by dominant social institutions, conventions and beliefs.

Peaceful Change: Concepts and Mechanisms The constructivist research agenda has expanded widely since the 1990s. It has opened up foundational concepts of IR to scrutiny, such as anarchy (Wendt  1992), power (Guzzini 2005), regimes (Ruggie 1992, 1993), preferences (Duffield 2003; Rathbun 2004; Hofmann 2013), sovereignty (Osiander 2001; Bartelson 2014), security (Baldwin 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 1998), and the state (Reus-­Smit 1999). It has shown that these categories are constructed both in the social world and in academic discourse, and that they are historically contingent. The study of peaceful change has benefited from these broader theoretical and conceptual contributions. We reconstruct the constructivist contributions to debates on peaceful change in three thematic groups: the factors that constructivist research prioritizes to reveal the social construction of the world and the ‘sites’ where change might happen; the actors that drive change; and the mechanisms through which change happens and which are conceptualized as the theoretical combination of actors and factors. We review these aspects by asking under what conditions they contribute to peaceful change rather than change per se. The review shows that, first, constructivist scholars mainly focus on ‘reasonable’ states and transnational ‘good’ actors that contribute to the spread of ‘good’ norms, such as human rights or democracy, as opposed to actors that openly challenge these norms. The implicit alignment with the liberal notions of progress and lack of engagement with the conditions of violence and war (Adler 1997, 346; Jackson 2008) initially formed a major blind spot in the constructivist research agenda that was only partly counterbalanced by critical constructivist contributions. Second, the constructivist research program remains in the phase of expansion rather than of consolidation when it comes to peaceful change. Through this evolving process, the paradigm accumulates more and more concepts and theories rather than solving conceptual tensions and relationships. Instead of prioritizing conceptual and theoretical comparison and working toward a ‘core’ of constructivist peaceful change research, constructivist scholarship presents a kaleidoscope of factors, actors, and mechanisms. This lack of consolidation is

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   173 exemplified, for instance, by constructivist writing being juxtaposed with other IR ­paradigms rather than with other constructivist approaches.

Factors of Change Some constructivist work primarily focuses on what we call factors, ideational and social concepts, based on which scholars explain or understand peaceful change. Of the several factors that have been introduced to the literature, we focus here on ideas, culture, norms, identities, discourses, practices, and visuals.2 Individually held ideas are one factor that constructivists have emphasized to understand peaceful transitions. Craig Parsons, for example, shows that peace on the European continent followed from a particular idea of European integration that transformed former enemies such as France and Germany into partners (Parsons  2002). Ideas can play the same role on the global level. The institutional shape of the post– Second World War international order, inspired by multilateralism, could be understood in terms of the effort to preserve peaceful international relations. Collectively held ideational factors can also help us in understanding and explaining peaceful change. One such factor is culture, understood by conventional constructivists as a “set of evaluative [and] cognitive standards that define what social actions exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another” (Katzenstein 1996, 6). Scholars have focused predominantly on national or organizational cultures. What prompts national security strategies and doctrine to be defensive rather than offensive, leading ultimately to a more peaceful national position? Kier (1997) answers by showing how the organizational cultures within militaries can explain whether they opt for an offensive or defensive posture. Focusing on national security cultures, the German domestic debates on whether to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) operation in Kosovo (Hyde-­Price 2001) or the Japanese ones on whether to engage in peacekeeping (Singh 2011) attest to the resilience of national security cultures in defining defensive or offensive foreign policy. Another collectively held factor is norms. Norms, for conventional constructivists, are “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996, 5; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). They supply understandings of what is appropriate behavior in a given situation, without determining the exact course of action (Kratochwil  2000). Peaceful change then follows when there are norms in place that rule out violence as a desirable or permissible course of action. Constructivist research has contributed widely to our understanding of how to generate norms that make violence less permissible or reasonable. The prohibition of certain weapons and the origins of violence-­constraining rules such as international humanitarian law are prominent examples (Finnemore 1999). The taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, for instance, was conditioned on the perception of American administrations that their use would generate global moral outrage (Tannenwald 1999). The prohibition against using chemical weapons, on the other hand, was built on the perception that they are

174   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann uncivilized weapons. This contributed to an absolute moral prohibition against their use even if these characteristics did not single out chemical weapons from other weaponry (Price 1995). Yet another factor that contributes to understanding and explaining peaceful change is identity. Similar to culture, this can be held by different collectives such as nations or social groups. Identity may be the most studied factor in terms of both peaceful and violent relations and change. Scholars have shown that identity, or actors’ perceptions of who they are, can both facilitate and hinder peaceful change. The process of ‘othering,’ or creating the self through distinguishing it from non-­self, is as present on the international level as on the domestic one. Constructivists show how particular identity constructions legitimize oppressive foreign policy practices and international hierarchies between states, as well as how they create subaltern positions that are difficult to challenge peacefully (Doty 1993; Zarakol 2011; Morozov and Rumelili 2012). On the other hand, identity might be constructed so that it reduces perceived differences and facilitates cooperation. An example is that of former Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, who framed the question of occupied territories in relation to Israeli identity in a way that opened the possibility of the Oslo peace process (Barnett 1999). While conventional constructivists understand norms, culture, and identity as collectively stable, coherent, and bounded social systems, critical and postpositivist scholars have challenged this view by showing that they are “strange multiplicities” (Tully 1995) of internally contested, loosely integrated, and overall heterogeneous social products (Lapid 1996; Laffey and Weldes 1997). Therefore, through three consecutive ‘turns,’ critical constructivists have focused on mediums of meaning making as factors of change: discourses, practices, and most recently, visuals. Conceptualizing language as a system of signification that is not merely descriptive but also constitutive of the reality it represents (Searle 1969; Austin 1975), constructivists understand discourses as “grids of intelligibility” that define social subjects, objects, and their relationship to each other (Milliken 1999, 230). Discourses, however, are essentially unstable and need to be reproduced time and again to sustain the social phenomena they constitute. The focus on discourses prompted constructivists to analyze language games (Fierke 1998), in which meaning is generated by the reliance on dominant metaphors that structure understanding. Peaceful change at the end of the Cold War, for instance, resulted from gradual changes in which the dominant metaphor of enmity was transformed into that of cooperation between the United States and the USSR (Fierke 1998). Another medium constructivists focused on as a site of reproducing collective meanings is practices, sets of situated knowledge (Adler-­Nissen and Pouliot 2014) that characterize professional communities. These sets of knowledge are habitually enacted as deep-­seated beliefs about what things are and how things are done. Practitioners thus inhabit and reproduce the social world based on such sets of situated knowledge that are the subject of constructivist theorizing (Neumann 2002; Adler and Pouliot 2011). The study of practices took constructivism in new directions (McCourt  2016), including theorizing peaceful change as a change either in the subjectivity of practitioners, the

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   175 practices themselves, or in the broader social orders they constitute (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 18). Studying the politics of representation outside the medium of language led to a so-­ called aesthetic or visual turn in critical constructivist scholarship (Bleiker 2001). Visual representation is often beyond the scope of discourse analytical methods, due to the idiosyncratic ways in which it generates meaning (Saugmann Andersen et al.  2014; Bleiker 2015). What becomes visible potentially generates a more powerful impact on spectators than words do. Security, war, and violence, which remain the main focus of studying visuals in IR, are often represented by images, which are destined not only to show, but also to exert strong emotional responses (Bleiker 2018). International icons, that is, internationally circulated, freestanding images, intervene in the course of international politics as they are appropriated in international discourses and change their meanings (Hansen 2015). The images from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, for instance, induced widespread condemnation and moral outrage over torture in American detention centers in the context of the war on terror, mobilizing toward a change in these practices. Finally, constructivist scholars turned the gaze of the discipline upon itself, showing that the analytical categories of IR are far from being neutral descriptions of an ‘objective’ reality (Guzzini 2000; Hamati-­Ataya 2012). The discipline is therefore also a factor of change, as it supplies the analytical vocabulary through which scholars and practitioners create the world. Feminist constructivist scholars, in particular, have shown that the emphasis of mainstream theories on deterrence, war, self-­help, survival, rule, and domination encapsulate a worldview in which violence and destruction is an ever-­ present occurrence (Cohn 1987; Tickner 1992). They point to alternative vocabularies and ontologies of IR, which, by looking at human resilience and the capacity to heal, are more conducive to peaceful change. Elina Penttinen, for instance, documents the female experience of war beyond suffering and advocates focusing not on “what is going wrong” but on “what is working” (Penttinen 2013, 14). By embracing such positive ontologies, IR and IR scholars themselves are potentially agents of peaceful change (Ingersoll 2016; Penttinen 2019; Choi et al. 2020).

Actors of Change If the factors of change responded to the question of what, in constructivist thinking, can be changed or contributes toward peace, it is also important to consider the kinds of actors that can elicit change in a peaceful direction. Constructivist ontology is open to a wide range of actors and identifies agency beyond and within the state, and most recently even in inanimate objects. Here we pay particular attention to norm entrepreneurs, epistemic communities, international bureaucracies, transnational and subnational actors, pivotal states, and images/objects. Agency is where social interaction creates and sustains politically influential ideas that potentially drive peaceful change.

176   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann On the individual level, constructivists have introduced norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) as actors that can generate change toward peace. They can do so by developing policy proposals, mobilizing wide-­ranging support for such proposals, commissioning expert input, and disseminating knowledge (Ratner 1999). Constructivist accounts of the peaceful end of the Cold War included the role of Mikhail Gorbachev’s conviction of pursuing cooperation and the trust he developed with Ronald Reagan (Lebow 2010). This crucial role of individuals, however, is predicated upon the right context, which often means being surrounded by like-­minded individuals or institutional structures. The cessation of forcible sovereign debt collection in the early twentieth century is a case in point. What facilitated stopping the practice was not only Argentinian norm entrepreneurship but also the gradual replacement of military officials by international ­lawyers as representatives of the state at international negotiations. This epistemic community of international lawyers shared an understanding of the value and meaning of state sovereignty and of forcible debt collection as a practice breaching that sovereignty. In contrast to military professionals, lawyers were more predisposed to rule out force as a means of settling sovereign debt (Finnemore 2004b). Another example of epistemic communities inducing peaceful change is that of American defense intellectuals, who were instrumental in providing technical expertise and policy options for nuclear arms control. Institutionalizing these ideas in both policy and academic circles and thus strengthening their legitimacy, they created the conditions for nuclear arms control both domestically and internationally (Adler 1992). International bureaucracies share the constitutive function of epistemic communities in the sense of creating and institutionalizing discursive categories and practices that sustain social phenomena. The authority of bureaucracies derives from four main characteristics: they are hierarchical, they provide a continuity to the categories and activities they define, they generate expertise, and they impersonally represent the reality they create (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 18). While this kind of organizational form displays its own pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), international bureaucracies can also push for peaceful change through creating a social environment in which differences are being tolerated and socialization is possible over time (Johnston 2001). International bureaucracies, for example, can foster peaceful change through three roles: as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators and capacity builders (Andler et al. 2009, 47–49). An achievement of constructivist scholarship is to have shown that nonstate actors, such as transnational nongovernmental organizations, have agency in international politics. Some have followed transnational civil society actors in fighting for a ban on antipersonnel land mines and cluster munitions or the regulation of small and light weapons (Price 1998; Petrova 2016). Price, for example, shows how an unlikely alliance of diverse groups managed to successfully convince decisionmakers that antipersonnel land mines are costly and indiscriminate weapons that do not advance military goals (Price 1998). More broadly, Keck and Sikkink, as well as Risse-­Kappen and his ­colleagues, show the instrumental role of transnational advocacy networks in eliciting compliance with

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   177 international norms (Keck and Sikkink  1998; Risse-­Kappen et  al. 1999). These ­scholars have demonstrated that transnational groups can achieve peaceful change even vis-­à-­vis powerful states by generating and disseminating information, organizing networks, fashioning their normative proposals in accordance with accepted normative standards, and forcing governmental actors to publicly account for their conduct. Constructivists have also shown that the constellation of subnational actors, such as the relationship between the civilian political elite and the military, can help us explain how war prone or offensive a state is (Kier  1997). Others, like Brian Rathbun and Stephanie Hofmann, have looked into the role of political parties and showed that depending on these actors’ value constellations—carried by the party but also constructed by party leadership—we can point to which party will be more interventionist in power (Rathbun 2004; Hofmann 2013, 2019). Many constructivists have pointed to pivotal states and their potential to change normative discourses. Canada and Norway played such a pivotal role in shaping the notion of human security (Paris  2001). Constructivists often emphasized that small states, which according to rational IR theories should not have much bargaining power on the international scene, contribute to the social construction of meaning, prompting other actors to rethink security (Ingebritsen 2002). The case of Sweden in promoting norms of conflict prevention through norm construction, agenda shaping, coalition building, and supporting institutionalization both at the United Nations (UN) and the European Union is such an example (Björkdahl 2013). Most recently, scholars of the visual turn have proposed to think about the materiality of the world as an actor in its own right. Moving away from both discourses and practices enacted by human actors, scholars have drawn our attention to the power of images and objects that in and of themselves can have agency and impact social interactions, because they structure what humans perceive as possible or permissible. Adler-­Nissen and Drieschova (2019) focus on the role of internet and communication technologies as structuring diplomatic documents; Anna Leander shows the inescapable questions drones pose for legal expertise (Leander 2013); and, drawing on psychological work, Jonathan Austin argues that prison cameras restrain prison guards (Austin 2019).

Mechanisms and Processes of Peaceful Change The actors and factors identified in the preceding discussion combine into mechanisms of change. We can distinguish among micro-, meso-, and macro-­level mechanisms. Many of these mechanisms have been analyzed in isolation, often through case studies, paying less attention to how they interact with each other across time and space. In the following we present a few of the most prominent mechanisms of peaceful change, with a particular emphasis on persuasion, norm life cycle and norm localization, norm contestation, socialization, systems change, and hegemonic transitions, eliciting the particular factors and actors they combine.

178   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann The micro-­ level mechanisms that potentially elicit change in the behavior of i­ndividuals range from coercion through social influence to affective mechanisms (Finnemore 2004a). Among them, a peaceful mechanism that excludes not only violence, but also any form of coercion, is persuasion. What makes persuasion an outstanding mechanism of peaceful change is the conditions in which it unfolds. It is predicated upon a social setting in which participants—norm entrepreneurs, (pivotal) states, international or transnational organizations—come together as equals, irrespective of the differences in their relative power (Johnstone  2003; Ratner  2012). Having access to deliberation on an equal basis, they can all in principle put forward a better argument in order to change other participants’ ideas, norms, or those evaluative and cognitive standards that constitute their culture. Persuasive arguments often change underlying beliefs by being emotionally appealing, accounting for evidence better than competing arguments, or being articulated by persons of authority or expertise. Crawford demonstrates this empirically with the examples of decolonization and the abolition of slavery (Crawford 2002, 35). Constructivists are aware of the difficulty of empirically discerning genuine persuasion (Krebs and Jackson  2007), and they theoretically distinguish between persuasion (Checkel 2001; Payne 2001; Deitelhoff 2009) and strategic adjustment of behavior, such as rhetorical entrapment (Schimmelfennig  2001; Risse  2004; Petrova 2016). However, we can observe persuasion when states agree to an outcome at the end of the negotiation process that they opposed beforehand, a tangible example of which is the creation of the International Criminal Court (Deitelhoff 2009). Mechanisms that connect the micro to the meso level are the norm life cycle model and norm localization. Norm entrepreneurs can contribute with normative proposals for peaceful change. Once a sufficient proportion of a relevant audience, whether states, transnational actors, or international bureaucracies, accepts this new normative proposal, norms reach a tipping point and “cascade” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). A different understanding of norm life cycles derives from the logic of adjusting generic rules to specific circumstances, then learning from specific cases and adjusting the generic rules accordingly (Sandholtz 2008). In this latter model, the relevant actors that shift normative understandings are major states, whose agreement is necessary for norm change. Norm localization concerns not the creation but the spread of normative standards among different contexts. Constructivists have shown the prominent role of transnational actors in this context. In the process, global standards are often reinterpreted to the extent of modifying their normative content (Acharya  2004; Kurowska  2014a; Zimmermann 2017a). Neither norm localization nor the mechanism of norm diffusion is, however, limited to transnational actors. Norm diffusion implies an actor, individual or collective, that actively promotes its normative standards, and other actors emulating norms on the receiving end (Börzel and Risse 2012, 5; Winston 2018). To problematize the concept of emulation at the receiver’s side, constructivist scholars showed that normative and cultural standards are re-­evaluated at every encounter between different actors. The research program on norm contestation theorizes this as the default mode of all norm application (Wiener  2018). For constructivists, the ­contestation involved in the previously mentioned mechanisms—persuasion, norm life

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   179 cycles, norm localization, and norm diffusion—is not an indicator of violent and illegitimate change. Instead, it is a process through which different socially stratified groups negotiate and interact with one another (Wiener 2018). For this to happen peacefully, contestation needs to unfold under certain conditions, through frequent and sustained interaction between participants and in an established institutional setting. This way, participants become aware of their normative baggage and can resolve their issues even under conditions of global diversity (Zimmermann 2017b). In other words, contestation has to be inclusive and regular enough to accommodate dissenting views. On the meso level, collectives such as international bureaucracies or epistemic communities can pass on their prevalent norms by socializing actors into their standards and practices. Socialization means that an actor—often a new member state in an international organization, or its officials joining an epistemic community or international bu­reauc­ racy—learns to comply with the dominant ideas, norms, cultural standards, discourses, and practices of a community and adopts them as the appropriate course of action in that social environment (Checkel 2005, 804). Institutions are primary sites of socialization, the site of generating peaceful change in the beliefs and/or in the behavior of old- and newcomers by initiating them into various roles and standards of behavior. For example, Alexandra Gheciu shows how former enemy countries were socialized into the Western understanding of civil-­military relations before entering NATO (Gheciu 2005). NATO is also an example of a particular kind of socialization that happens through the continuous articulation of security communities. Adler and Barnett (1998, 30) define a pluralistic security community as a “region of states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” Based on continuous interactions, for example in organizations, actors establish mutual trust and a collective identity over time, and security communities sustain themselves in changing structural conditions. This is why NATO persisted after the end of the Cold War, even if its primary raison d’être had vanished. Moving to the macro level, constructivist researchers distinguish between “systems change,” or the transition from one international system to the other, and “systemic change,” a shift in actors’ relative positions under the same organizing principle (Reus-­Smit 2013, 198–202)—as realist scholars such as Gilpin have done before them. Systems change is understood in terms of process rather than mechanism, because it unfolds over a longer time (Reus-­Smit 2013, 200; Nexon 2009), and involves interlacing mechanisms on different levels and multiple sites. Instead of an episodic and radical disruption, constructivist scholars view systems change as gradual and reconfigurative (Phillips 2016, 488). Within this multilayered process, however, they point to concrete mechanisms of peaceful change. One example is the transition from colonial empires to the community of sovereign states. Although decolonization was not peaceful on all levels, Reus-­Smit argues that the main mechanisms of bringing about this change were the radicalization of subject peoples’ elites to demand statehood instead of reforms, combined with the newly independent states’ rhetoric at the UN to frame self-­determination as the extension of individual civil and political rights (Reus-­Smit 2011, 234–235). Systems change can therefore be the result of subnational actors addressing legitimacy claims not only through armed conflicts and revolts but also through institutionalized forums.

180   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann Elsewhere, and drawing on constructivist, English school, sociological, and anthropological insights, Reus-­Smit defines systems as “diversity regimes,” which legitimize certain units of political authority on the one hand and recognized categories of cultural difference on the other (Reus-­Smit 2017, 876). Just as in the case of decolonization, diversity regimes are challenged by grievances of unequal recognition. Change follows especially if an actor with sufficient material power sets out to have its cultural difference recognized, although we need more theorizing on when this unfolds peacefully. Challenging existing diversity regimes is a mechanism of systems change, which also involves transforming ideas, identity, norms, discourses, and practices of recognition within that regime. The challenge is more significant if the actor is materially powerful; in this mechanism, therefore, the key actors will be states, especially great powers. Constructivist scholars have also addressed existing realist and liberal theories such as hegemonic stability and transition theory. Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf have argued in favor of a thicker understanding of hegemony (Hopf 2013; Allan et al. 2018). They argue that the systemwide distribution of identity among great powers matters for our understanding of peaceful change. They combine identity with pivotal states (in this case great powers) as well as the mass public to formulate their mechanism of hegemonic transition and stability. They argue that we can expect peaceful relations when an emerging hegemonic ideology is consistent with the distribution of identity at both the elite and public levels among great powers. Should a rising state—in terms of material power—challenge the distribution of identity with a counterhegemonic discourse, it is unlikely to succeed. This theory, for example, can explain the peaceful change from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana. Kori Schake argues that the declining Great Britain and the rising United States came to perceive each other as being politically alike. While Allan et al. do not theorize how identities can change and accommodation occur, Schake demonstrates empirically nine political encounters over a century, in which Britain gradually became more democratic, while the United States became more imperial, and the resulting “unique sense of political sameness” played a role in avoiding a major conflict (Schake 2017, 271). Shake’s theory would thus foreclose the possibility of China’s accommodation in the current international order as long as it does not buy into its dominant ideological discourse. This is just one of the many examples in which an interaction and elaboration of scope conditions of several mechanisms—such as socialization and normative contestation—could benefit a broader picture of peaceful change.

Biases: Are All Changes Peaceful? Given the major impact of the end of the Cold War on the constructivist research agenda and that of the “golden” 1990s, in which some proclaimed the end of history (Fukuyama 2006) and heralded the international liberal order (Deudney and Ikenberry

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   181 1999), constructivist scholarship emphasized peaceful change over other dynamics and outcomes. This led to at least two analytical biases. The first is a focus on progressive, unidirectional change; the second, related bias is the initial focus on ‘good’ norms often associated with Western and supposedly universal values such as democracy or respect for the rule of law. The emphasis on progressive change is exemplified in the concept of norm cascade of Finnemore and Sikkink or in the focus of norm diffusion literature and socialization as a top-­down process, in which actors around the globe become more alike with time. Some scholars addressed these biases and introduced localization mechanisms (Acharya 2004; Lenz 2013) or postcolonial resistance (Anghie 1999; Anghie et al. 2003; Morozov 2013) to our understanding of change. As democratic movements accompanied the end of the Cold War and democratic transformations happened around the globe, constructivist scholars emphasized the liberal repertoire of norms and values that shaped identities and cultures. The research agenda then expanded to ‘good’ norms and values, such as conventional and nuclear disarmament; humanitarianism; and the abolition of slavery, colonialism, or apartheid. However, nothing in the constructivist research program forecloses the study of ‘bad’ norms and ‘bad’ actors. Indeed, the rise of populism or the cruelty in the conduct of extremist groups triggers more and more scholarly reflection on normative changes that move away from universally agreed upon standards (Welsh 2016). To correct the bias toward liberal values as global values, constructivists inquired about the violent implications of liberal practices (Geis and Wagner 2011; Zehfuss 2011) or showed that peaceful social standards are not unique to liberal ideologies but are also found in collectives whose priorities are different (Crawford 1994). A last potential bias that should be mentioned briefly here is methodological. Early on, many scholars criticized constructivist scholarship for being primarily conceptual and theoretical and for supporting their arguments with only qualitative methods, often focusing on a few and selective cases (Keohane  1988; Finnemore and Sikkink  2001; Chernoff 2008)—and this criticism arguably still lingers. While this might strike some as a problem, we argue that the use of crucial and hard cases as well as macro-­historical processes has significantly contributed to IR’s understanding of peaceful change. In addition, some constructivist work is built on large-­N studies (see, e.g., Allan et al. 2018), trying to combine interpretivist methods with large-­scale data collection. As Brigden and Gohdes (2020) have shown, it is possible to “study violence across methodological boundaries.” The same should be possible for studying peace. And if we focus on peace and violence, theories’ scope conditions will be refined in the process.

Conclusion As outlined in this chapter, one of the achievements of constructivism (i.e., conventional, critical, postpositivist approaches) has been to ‘denaturalize’ the discourses and

182   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann practices that make up the world’s social fabric but arguably overemphasize the p ­ otential for peaceful change compared to violent change. Constructivism accords a genuine role to ideational actors and factors and acknowledges both the benefits of following them and the social costs of breaching them. Given also its epistemology, which embraces reflexivity both concerning the objects of study in IR and in knowledge production by practitioners of IR theory, it opens potential avenues for change, peaceful or not, in the world and in our scholarly communities. As constructivist scholarship is able to address traditional questions asked in liberal and realist schools of thought, postpositivist and critical constructivists can also help us understand how core-­periphery relations lead not only to change but to peaceful change that might not be universal. What does the constructivist paradigm say about the world of today and tomorrow? The preponderance of the United States is challenged by, among other factors, the rise of China and the Russian contestation of liberal practices and norms. Populist and nationalist ideas around the world challenge ideas of peaceful coexistence and change. With the change or demise of the so-­called liberal order (Ikenberry 2018; Eilstrup-­Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2019), many normative ‘advancements’ appear to be contested and reversible. The emerging research programs on normative contestation (Wiener  2018), regional specificities and interwoven global-­regional dynamics (Acharya 2017; Kurowska and Reshetnikov 2020), and cultural diversity (Reus-­Smit 2017; Phillips and Reus-­Smit 2020) enable constructivist researchers to make sense of these dynamics. Future theoretical developments could spell out more precisely the conditions of peaceful versus violent change. As constructivism is agnostic to units and levels of analysis, it exhibits a certain theoretical openness and flexibility that enriches our understanding of the cultural and normative diversity that unites and divides the globe. However, while scholars have identified various actors, factors, and mechanisms, they have paid less attention to how these interact with one another. It might well be that global changes are peaceful in some regions but less peaceful in others. Or changes might initially be violent but later consolidate into peaceful change. The constructivist research agenda on peaceful change is in full bloom; it has been host to many theories that variably emphasize factors, actors, and mechanisms that contribute to peaceful change. It is time to think about possible cross-­fertilization, as well as about specifying the exact scope of constructivism’s various branches.

Acknowledgments Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann’s research for this chapter was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number #100017_172667).

Notes 1. This is not to say that no violence occurred. The disintegration of the USSR at first involved peaceful movements, but the tidal wave that followed was accompanied by civil wars, displacement, and ethnic cleansing (Beissinger 1993).

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   183 2. Power is omnipresent in these factors. Depending on the theory, these factors comprise structural, diffuse, or institutional power (Barnett and Duvall  2005; Katzenstein and Seybert 2018). Power can be, inter alia¸ institutional position, access to information, membership in an epistemic community, access to a set of situational knowledge, or the capacity to change language games or to organize an alliance to achieve a particular normative purpose. In these various reincarnations, power is primarily wielded in a peaceful manner.

References Acharya, Amitav. 2004. “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism.” International Organization 58, no. 2: 239–275. Acharya, Amitav. 2017. “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order.” Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 3: 271–285. Adler, Emanuel. 1992. “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control.” International Organization 46, no. 1: 101–145. Adler, Emanuel. 1997. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3: 319–363. Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. 2011. “International Practices: Introduction and Framework.” In International Practices, 3–35. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Alena Drieschova. 2019. “Track-Change Diplomacy: Technology, Affordances, and the Practice of International Negotiations.” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 3: 531–545. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Vincent Pouliot. 2014. “Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya.” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 4: 889–911. Allan, Bentley B., Srdjan Vucetic, and Ted Hopf. 2018. “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects.” International Organization 72, no. 4: 839–869. Andler, Lydia, Steffen Bauer, and Steffen Behrle. 2009. Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Anghie, Antony. 1999. “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in NineteenthCentury International Law.” Harvard International Law Journal, no. 1: 1–80. Anghie, Antony, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson, and Obiora C. Okafor, eds. 2003. The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization. Leiden: Brill—Nijhoff. Austin, John L. 1975. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Austin, Jonathan L. 2019. “Towards an International Political Ergonomics.” European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 4: 979–1006. Baldwin, David A. 1997. “The Concept of Security.” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1: 5–26. Barnett, Michael. 1999. “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo.” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1: 5–36. Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics.” International Organization 59, no. 1: 39–75.

184   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53, no. 4: 699–732. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bartelson, Jens. 2014. Sovereignty as Symbolic Form. New York: Routledge. Beissinger, Mark  R. 1993. “Demise of an Empire-State: Identity, Legitimacy, and the Deconstruction of Soviet Politics.” In The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?, edited by Crawford Young, 93–115. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Björkdahl, Annika. 2013. “Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy.” Swiss Political Science Review 19, no. 3: 322–337. Bleiker, Roland. 2001. “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory:” Millennium 30, no. 3: 509–533. Bleiker, Roland. 2015. “Pluralist Methods for Visual Global Politics.” Millennium 43, no. 3: 872–890. Bleiker, Roland. 2018. “Visual Security: Patterns and Prospects.” In Visual Security Studies: Sights and Spectacles of Insecurity and War, edited by Juha Vuori and Rune Saugmann Andersen, 189–200. London, UK: Routledge. Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2012. “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction.” West European Politics 35, no. 1: 1–19. Brigden, Noelle  K., and Anita  R.  Gohdes. 2020. “The Politics of Data Access in Studying Violence across Methodological Boundaries: What We Can Learn from Each Other?” International Studies Review 22, no. 2: 250–267. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1999. “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1: 84–114. Checkel, Jeffrey  T. 2001. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.” International Organization 55, no. 3: 553–588. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2005. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework.” International Organization 59, no. 4: 801–826. Chernoff, Fred. 2008. “International Relations, Paleontology, and Scientific Progress: Parallels between Democratic Peace Studies and the Meteor Impact Extinction Hypothesis.” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 1: 90–98. Choi, Shine, Anna Selmeczi, and Erzsébet Strausz. 2020. Critical Methods for the Study of World Politics: Creativity and Transformation. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Cohn, Carol. 1987. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs 12, no. 4: 687–718. Crawford, Neta. 1994. “A Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois Nations.” International Organization 48, no. 3: 345–385. Crawford, Neta. 2002. Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Deitelhoff, Nicole. 2009. “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case.” International Organization 63, no. 1: 33–65. Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. 1999. “The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order.” Review of International Studies 25, no. 2: 179–196.

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   185 Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1993. “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S.  Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines.” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3: 297–320. Duffield, John S. 2003. “The Limits of ‘Rational Design.’ ” International Organization 57, no. 2: 411–430. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2019. “Of the Contemporary Global Order, Crisis, and Change.” Journal of European Public Policy 27, no. 7: 1–13. Fierke, Karin M. 1998. Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Finnemore, Martha. 1999. “Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State Violence.” In Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, edited by John Boli and George  M.  Thomas, 149–168. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Finnemore, Martha. 2004a. “How Purpose Changes.” In The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, 141–161. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, Martha. 2004b. “Sovereign Default and Military Intervention.” In The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, 24–51. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4: 887–917. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1: 391–416. Fukuyama, Francis. 2006. The End of History and the Last Man. Reissue. New York: Free Press. Geis, Anna, and Wolfgang Wagner. 2011. “How Far Is It from Königsberg to Kandahar? Democratic Peace and Democratic Violence in International Relations.” Review of International Studies 37, no. 4: 1555–1577. Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe.’ ” International Organization 59, no. 4: 973–1012. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gilpin, Robert. 1988. “The Theory of Hegemonic War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4: 591–613. Guzzini, Stefano. 2000. “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 2: 147–182. Guzzini, Stefano 2005. “The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis.” Millennium— Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3: 495–521. Hamati-Ataya, Inanna. 2012. “Reflectivity, Reflexivity, Reflexivism: IR’s ‘Reflexive Turn’—and Beyond.” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 4: 669–694. Hansen, Lene. 2015. “How Images Make World Politics: International Icons and the Case of Abu Ghraib.” Review of International Studies 41, no. 2: 263–288. Hofmann, Stephanie  C. 2013. European Security in NATO’s Shadow: Party Ideologies and Institution Building. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hofmann, Stephanie C. 2019. “Beyond Culture and Power: The Role of Party Ideologies in German Foreign and Security Policy.” German Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008 .2019.1611783

186   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann Hopf, Ted. 1998. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security 23, no. 1: 171–200. Hopf, Ted. 2013. “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics.” International Organization 67, no. 2: 317–354. Huysmans, Jef. 1998. “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier.” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2: 226–255. Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2001. “Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?” German Politics 10, no. 1: 19–34. Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94, no. 1: 7–23. Ingebritsen, Christine. 2002. “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics.” Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 1: 11–23. Ingersoll, Karin Amimoto. 2016. Waves of Knowing: A Seascape Epistemology. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Jackson, Richard. 2008. “Constructivism and Conflict Resolution.” In The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, edited by Jacob Bercovitch, I. William Zartman, and Victor Kremenyuk, 172–189. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Johnston, Alastair I. 2001. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4: 487–515. Johnstone, Ian. 2003. “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument.” European Journal of International Law 14, no. 3: 437–480. Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein, Peter J., and Lucia A. Seybert. 2018. Protean Power. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keohane, Robert  O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4: 379–396. Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1984. “The Force of Prescriptions.” International Organization 38, no. 4: 685–708. Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2000. “How Do Norms Matter?” In The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, edited by Michael Byers, 35–68. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State.” International Organization 40, no. 4: 753–775. Krebs, Ronald R., and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. 2007. “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric.” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1: 35–66. Koslowski, Rey, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. 1994. “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System.” International Organization 48, no. 2: 215–247. Kurowska, Xymena. 2014a. “Multipolarity as Resistance to Liberal Norms: Russia’s Position on Responsibility to Protect.” Conflict, Security & Development 14, no. 4: 489–508.

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   187 Kurowska, Xymena, and Anatoly Reshetnikov. 2020. “Trickstery: Pluralising Stigma in International Society.” European Journal of International Relations. https://doi .org/10.1177/1354066120946467 Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. 1997. “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 2: 193–237. Lapid, Yosef. 1996. “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory.” In Culture, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 3–20. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Leander, Anna. 2013. “Technological Agency in the Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and the US Drone Program.” Leiden Journal of International Law 26, no. 4: 811–831. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2010. “Leadership and the End of the Cold War: Did It Have to End This Way?” In Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations, 103–133. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lenz, Tobias. 2013. “EU Normative Power and Regionalism: Ideational Diffusion and Its Limits.” Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 2: 211–228. McCourt, David M. 2016. “Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism.” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3: 475–485. Mearsheimer, John  J. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Reprint. New York: W. W. Norton. Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods.” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2: 225–254. Morozov, Viatcheslav. 2013. “Subaltern Empire? Toward a Postcolonial Approach to Russian Foreign Policy.” Problems of Post-Communism 60, no. 6: 16–28. Morozov, Viatcheslav, and Bahar Rumelili. 2012. “The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers.” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 1: 28–48. Neumann, Iver B. 2002. “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy.” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 31, no. 3: 627–651. Nexon, Daniel  H. 2009. The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Onuf, Nicholas G. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Osiander, Andreas. 2001. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organization 55, no. 2: 251–287. Paris, Roland. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 2: 87–102. Parsons, Craig. 2002. “Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union.” International Organization 56, no. 1: 47–84. Payne, Rodger A. 2001. “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction.” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1: 37–61. Penttinen, Elina. 2013. Joy and International Relations: A New Methodology. 1st ed. London, UK, and New York: Routledge. Penttinen, Elina. 2019. “Emotions and Mindfulness in IR: Moving beyond ‘Anti-Humanism.’ ” In Methodology and Emotion in International Relations: Parsing the Passions, edited by Eric Van Rythoven and Mira Sucharov, 43–57. London, UK, and New York: Routledge. Petrova, Margarita  H. 2016. “Rhetorical Entrapment and Normative Enticement: How the United Kingdom Turned from Spoiler into Champion of the Cluster Munition Ban.” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3: 387–399.

188   Erna Burai and Stephanie C. Hofmann Phillips, Andrew. 2016. “The Global Transformation, Multiple Early Modernities, and International Systems Change.” International Theory 8, no. 3: 481–491. Phillips, Andrew, and Christian Reus-Smit, eds. 2020. Culture and Order in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Price, Richard. 1995. “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo.” International Organization 49, no. 1: 73–103. Price, Richard. 1998. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.” International Organization 52, no. 3: 613–644. Rathbun, Brian C. 2004. Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ratner, Steven  R. 1999. “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict.” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32: 591–698. Ratner, Steven R. 2012. “Persuading to Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of Legal Argumentation.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, 568–590. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Reus-Smit, Christian. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2011. “Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International System.” International Organization 65, no. 2: 207–242. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2013. Individual Rights and the Making of the International System. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2017. “Cultural Diversity and International Order.” International Organization 71, no. 4: 851–885. Risse, Thomas. 2004. “Global Governance and Communicative Action.” Government and Opposition 39, no. 2: 288–313. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1994. “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War.” International Organization 48, no. 2: 185–214. Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ruggie, John G. 1992. “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution.” International Organization 46, no. 3: 561. Ruggie, John G. 1993. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press. Ruggie, John G. 1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization 52, no. 4: 855–885. Sandholtz, Wayne. 2008. “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder.” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1: 101–131. Saugmann Andersen, Rune, Juha A. Vuori, and Can E. Mutlu. 2014. “Visuality.” In Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis, edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, 85–117. Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge. Schake, Kori. 2017. Safe Passage. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2001. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” International Organization 55, no. 1: 47–80.

Constructivism and Peaceful Change   189 Searle, John R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Singh, Bhubhindar. 2011. “Peacekeeping in Japanese Security Policy: International–Domestic Contexts Interaction.” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 3: 429–451. Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.” International Organization 53, no. 3: 433–468. Tickner, J.  Ann. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Tully, James. 1995. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Waltz, Kenneth  N. 2010. Theory of International Politics. 1st ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press. Welsh, Jennifer. 2016. The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the TwentyFirst Century. 1st ed. Toronto: House of Anansi Press. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2: 391–425. Wiener, Antje. 2018. Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Winston, Carla. 2018. “Norm Structure, Diffusion, and Evolution: A Conceptual Approach.” European Journal of International Relations 24, no. 3: 638–661. Zarakol, Ayşe. 2011. After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Zehfuss, Maja. 2011. “Targeting: Precision and the Production of Ethics.” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 3: 543–566. Zimmermann, Lisbeth. 2017a. “ ‘Inter-National’ Habermas: Contestation and Understanding under Conditions of Diversity.” Polity 49, no. 1: 149–155. Zimmermann, Lisbeth. 2017b. Global Norms with a Local Face. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

chapter 10

Peacefu l Ch a nge i n English School Theory Great Power Management and Regional Order Cornelia Navari

The first arguably substantive argument over ‘peaceful change’ took place in Britain in 1937, as storm clouds gathered over Europe, engaging Hersch Lauterpacht, E. H. Carr, and C.  A.  W.  Manning in what has been characterized as a first “great debate” (Kristensen n.d.; Long 2012). Initiated by the then International Studies Association,1 its  subject fed into the emerging political thought of both Martin Wight and C. A. W. Manning informing what subsequently became known as “English School” theory (Hadano 2014). Hedley Bull’s thesis on order and justice in international relations derived directly from Manning’s position in the debate over peaceful change. All these authors accepted that the international order had produced injustices for the ‘have-­not’ nations—the rising powers of the time. The question was how these injustices could be remedied without at the same time undercutting a fragile world order. It was about ethical possibilities and the amelioration of structural inequalities in an anarchical society requiring Great Power management (GPM) and institutional continuity. The answer for some would lie in the ‘club of powers,’ the concept of international responsibility and Great Power forbearance. Others would come to stress ‘successful institutionalization’ at the regional level and regional rules of the game.

The Men (and One Woman) of 1937 The debate was initiated by a symposium, organized by Manning at the London School of Economics early in 1937 preparatory to a general conference on the subject to be

192   Cornelia Navari held later that year. The legal problem around which the participants circled was the territorial settlement of the Versailles Treaty and Article 10, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of all members of the League of Nations. The larger issues involved the moral status of a victor’s peace, the apparent maintenance of colonialism through the façade of a trusteeship system, and the unequal access to resources attendant upon the closed imperial systems. Associated with such “complicated phenomena” were what Webster in his introduction to the symposium also called “complicated emotions” and which he summarized as, in effect, different political agendas. He identified them as (1) peaceful change to avoid war; (2) peaceful change to remedy justice; and (3) peaceful change to produce a world order better adapted to “material and mental processes” (Webster 1937, 5)—at the time the large power shifts occasioned by German rearmament and confirmed by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the ideological confrontations of liberalism, fascism, and communism. It is scarcely surprising that, confronted with such a “vast and complicated subject,” the participants and eventual authors eschewed total solutions. The symposium was intended in any event as but the first stage in a broader study.2 But, guided by Manning, the participants—all senior professors—went fairly directly to the central issues: the economics of territorial sovereignty and the consequences of closed empires for territorial inequalities; colonialism and the trusteeship system; the social psychology of what we would currently call ‘populism’; and the constitutional and institutional changes that peaceful change would require. Lionel Robbins on “The Economics of Territorial Sovereignty” opened with a proposition that would dominate discussions in the Federal movement, would be taken up by the officials planning for the postwar settlement and, joined by others, would set the basic framework for “peace.” Peace was not a temporary absence of war but a permanent condition requiring a specific economic, political, and institutional structure. In economic terms, the existence of powers with exclusive and absolute sovereignty was not coherent with the needs of the modern industrial and financial system and led to unavoidable conflicts. Peace in economic terms required “federalism,” in which national states “learn to regard themselves as the function of international government” (Robbins 1941, 60). His colleague at the LSE, T. E. Gregory, supported the analysis with an account of the dysfunctions of a system of imperial closures in which many political formations (in effect colonies) were within imperial systems while others, accorded sovereignty, were not (Gregory 1937). Robbins moved inexorably over the next two years to “federalism” (more accurately confederation) in which the imperial systems would be replaced by general treaties setting the rules of economic exchange (Robbins 1941). Lucy Mair’s analysis of the colonial question was equally tough-­minded. An anthropologist and a specialist on Africa, she argued that restoration of Germany’s colonies would do little for either the colonial subjects or the German economy. The colonial question that so exercised the “have-­nots” was, she argued, largely a matter of prestige and social status (Mair 1937, 82–84), a view that was widely shared.3 The colonial subjects were (among themselves) in a relatively peaceful condition, and the best prospect of keeping them so lay in their new sovereign authorities’ respect for traditional African authority as

Peaceful Change in English School Theory   193 “the foundation for the adaptation to modern circumstances which must be made” (Mair 1937, 96). Mannheim’s analysis supported Mair’s on the relevance of prestige and sought for a theory as to how concern with individual and personal economic insecurity could become a collective drive for national enhancement and competition for power. Mervyn Jones’s review of 1938 for the Cambridge Law Journal accorded to Lauterpacht the toughest analysis and the one requiring the most intellectual honesty: that the demand for peaceful change in the society of states as then constructed required a revolution in both thought and practice. In thought it meant recognizing that Article 19 of the League was so dilatory and promised so little that it actually rendered war the more promising means of change. Without a legal mechanism for peaceful change, international law risked perpetuating in Lauterpacht’s words an “obnoxious status quo” that eventually leads to the conclusion that “a just war is better than an unjust peace” (Lauterpacht 1937, 6). Secondly, peaceful change required institutionalization, and not merely constitutionalizing, or setting general principles. It was necessary to create supranational authorities with some legislative powers. Nor could this be done via what Lauterpacht characterized as the “immoral doctrine of equality”—the notion that all states were equal and had equal rights and responsibilities. In “realistic terms” (in terms of what we might now call ‘structural facts’), it was only the Great Powers who could create such authorities. Accordingly, it was up to the Great Powers to initiate such a revolution and “assume in common the mission which in the past each has appropriated to himself.” Manning concluded the symposium (and the published volume) with what he considered to be the fundamental problem of peaceful change: the conflict between order and justice. Concrete proposals for peaceful change were never disinterested and were never based solely on reason or justice, but in the interest of those, satisfied powers, who benefited from peace, who wished to preserve a presently existing order and avoid “otherwise anticipated warlike change” (Manning 1937, 174). In the ideal international society, he argued, “the case for change is understood in terms not of abstract justice—or vested rights—but of realism, compromise, and common sense” (Manning 1937, 190). At the subsequent conference on the subject, the conflict between those supporting “order” and those supporting “justice” came out in full force. One lot, arguing that war was mainly a threat emanating from the leading powers, located peaceful change in what Kristensen has called “negative measures”—diplomatic adjustments that might require sacrifice on the part of lesser states and colonies. The other side, supporting “positive” peaceful change, advocated for justice, including justice for small states and colonies. Manning castigated those colleagues who insisted on not merely peaceful but also just change, for wishing for more than had been obtained in domestic politics (IIIC, 1938, 271). Reporting on the results, the rapporteur for the conference, Maurice Bourquin, noted unanimity on the need to replace violent with peaceful methods but disagreement on the procedures. Kristensen has summarized them in terms close to Webster’s original categories: One ‘school’ held that peaceful change must be solved through statecraft, ‘political constructions’ and ‘direct negotiations,’ implemented in the existing self-­help

194   Cornelia Navari s­ystem where each state provides its own security. Another school stressed that peaceful changes should be implemented by legal ‘imperative procedures’ and in a collective security system if they are to produce a lasting peace that guarantees the established order, the application of existing international law, and that modifications are just, consensual, and not implemented at the expense of weak states. A third position, ‘between’ the two, stressed mechanisms like persuasion, reason, information and community-­building.  (Kristensen n.d., drawing on IIIC 1938, 52–54)

Order and Justice after Manning In 1939, E. H. Carr joined the debate with his Twenty Years’ Crisis in which he both concurred with Manning and went further. He agreed that the clash between order and justice was a “direct clash of interests between conservative Powers satisfied with the status quo and revolutionary Powers determined to overthrow it” (see Carr 1942, xv). But his basic argument was the anti-­idealist and (at best) meliorist argument: there is no naturally occurring harmony of interests; consensus is achieved either through self­sacrifice or through the “realist consideration that it is in the interests of the individual to sacrifice voluntarily what would otherwise be taken from him by force” (Carr 1939, 168). In The Twenty Years Crisis, he advocated for a third position—a synthetic realist-­utopianist mechanism of peaceful change that could compromise between the utopian “common feeling of what is just and reasonable” and the realist “mechanism of adjustment to a changed equilibrium of power” (Carr 1939, 222). “Order” and “justice” were at either end of a thought experiment that disclosed the limits to what was ethically possible in a political order constituted by sovereign states. Hedley Bull set the problem within a structural context. It was not merely that justice was subjective and all too prone to be determined by interests; it was that in the decentralized international order, made up of a congeries of territorial jurisdictions, it was not possible to legislate justice (Bull 1977, 142–145). The same point is made by Terry Nardin (1983), who argues that international law is based on procedural norms, not on desirable end states; and Robert Jackson (2000), who argues that the only agreed-­upon justice in the international order is justice in the law. The basic dilemma was outlined in Andrew Linklater’s doctoral thesis, submitted to the University of London in 1978. Published as Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, it argued a tension in the theory and practice of the modern state between “two concepts of obligation, two modes of moral experience.” The tension was between “the obligations which men may be said to acquire qua men and the obligations to which they are subject as citizens of particular associations” (Linklater 1982). In The Anarchical Society, Bull formalized the relationship of order to justice in terms of value pluralism, that is, contending values. Order is not merely an actual or possible condition or state of affairs in world politics; it is also very generally regarded as a value. But it is not the only value in relation to

Peaceful Change in English School Theory   195 which international conduct can be shaped, nor is it necessarily an overriding one.  At the present time, for example, it is often said that whereas the Western ­powers, in the justifications they offer of their policies, show themselves to be primarily concerned with order, the states of the Third World are primarily ­ ­concerned with the achievement of justice in the world community, even at the price of disorder.  (Bull 1977, 77)

He based his argument on the different ideas of justice evident in the public debate at the time—individual, interstate, and cosmopolitan justice, in a manner reminiscent of Isaiah Berlin in his essay on “Two Concepts of Liberty” (Berlin 1958). Historically and analytically, these were different ideas of justice, which were not capable of resolution in terms of one another. Ideas of interstate, individual, and cosmopolitan justice clashed, and there was no way in which they could be compromised. Accordingly, an order built on one must necessarily offend the others. Bull did not argue that justice was unachievable. In the Hagey lectures (Bull 1984), he argued that developing countries, and the Third World in general, had a just claim for redress; and that it could and should be honored. But he was arguing a situational ethic, based on what situationists call “relevant moral facts.” These were that the claim was widely recognized by both individuals and governments in the Western countries, that a good deal of the change had already been accomplished, and that the West had a case to answer. It was on such grounds that the West “should seek an accommodation” and “be prepared to make adjustments to their positions . . . of undue privilege” (Bull 1984, 244), not any abstract consideration of justice. Wheeler and Dunne (1996) applied Bull’s categories to thinking about the ethics of statecraft in the post–Cold War world, focusing on the responses of the society of states to humanitarian crises. They argued that “solidarist” sentiments had penetrated the consciousness of state leaders and that a more solidarist world order was, therefore, a conditional possibility. The limits to change is Order. The argument concerns both international and domestic order—in specific terms, the fragility and prone-­to-­be-­disturbed nature of the international order, and the threats to “unreformed” domestic orders posed by ill-­ considered liberal demands and liberal pressures. In the latter aspect, “order versus justice” is a critique of the liberal project. In relation to peaceful change, the corollary is the anti-­perfectionist argument and an argument to accept the ‘second best.’ In terms of Bull’s Hagey lectures, while it was possible to meet the contemporary demands of the Third World “in a context of order,” it was “foolish to imagine that this can always be done.” Some conceptions of justice would always threaten order and would necessarily place “peace and security in jeopardy,” and it was the “deeper wisdom” to recognize that “terrible choices have sometimes to be made” (Bull 1984, 227). Andrew Hurrell took Bull’s arguments forward without changing the fundamentals. Drawing on social constructivism, he argued, first, that power was a social construct involving notions of right, and that the theorists of international society “sought to understand order and cooperation in terms of both power and the operation of legal and moral norms” (Hurrell 2014, 146). Second, that at the “heart of politics lies the need to

196   Cornelia Navari turn the capacity for crude coercion into legitimate authority,” which created space for normative argument and debate (Hurrell 2014, 147). And third, that international law and international society provided for a “stable institutional framework within which substantive norms can be negotiated.” Given this framework, the “challenge” or critical questions were “moral accessibility, institutional stability, and effective political agency” (Hurrell 2014, 148). These should be the focus of any project on peaceful change.

The Club of Powers To the men (and one woman) of 1937 it was obvious that the problem of peaceful change was the problem of power shift and Great Power aspirations. Webster outlined these early and explicitly in his exegesis of the problem: Italy and Japan, each building capacity, who wanted to join the imperial game; Germany seeking to restore its prewar position. The ‘have-­nots’ of 1937 were aspiring ‘Great Powers’ and Great Powers who wanted redress. Hence, Lauterpacht’s conclusion, that peaceful change required an adjustment among the Great Powers. The argument for ‘GPM’ derives from an observation on the course of history and a posited structural determinant arising from the gross material and organizational inequalities among states. Historically, the idea that the Great Powers had a particular responsibility in relation to peace is a post-­Napoleonic notion, arising from the guarantor status that was attached to the Vienna Treaty—the four powers and France serving as the guarantors. The named powers “concerted” on revisions to the treaty, in the first instance in response to the 1830 collapse of the union between Belgium and Holland, whose separation, in contradiction to the Vienna settlement, had to be agreed by the guarantor powers. The idea of a permanent general responsibility for peaceful revision became evident only after the Crimean War, in the initiation of the laws of humanitarian warfare, and seems to have become solidified by the time of the Berlin Congress of 1878. The final declaration of St. Petersburg (November 29, 1868) stated that: The Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn up in view of future improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have established, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.  (Conventions and Declarations 1915, italics added)

The final act of the Berlin Congress, whose fifty articles settled the borders, freedoms, and statuses of the Ottoman Empire’s European possessions, drew on the 1856 Peace of Paris, by which the Sultanate joined the Concert powers and declared them uniformly “desirous to regulate, with a view to European order . . . the questions raised in the East

Peaceful Change in English School Theory   197 by the events of late years.” In the initial paragraphs, the Congress’s “unanimous opinion” was given as “the best means of facilitating an understanding” (Treaty 1878). “Concerting” or “management” by the Great Powers did not arise spontaneously. It was theorized and negotiated. Castlereagh, preparing for the Congress of Vienna, reported to Lord Liverpool that “the conduct of the business must practically rest with the leading powers” (Clark 2011, 87) and prepared the oft-­quoted memo for the Foreign Office as to how the business might be managed: The advantage of this mode of proceeding is that you treat Plenipotentiaries [of the lesser states] as a body with early and becoming respect. You keep the power by concert and management in your own hands, but without openly assuming authority to their exclusion. You obtain a sort of sanction from them for what you are determined at all events to do, which they cannot well withhold. . . . And you entitle yourselves, without disrespect to them, to meet together for dispatch of business for an indefinite time to their exclusion.  (Webster 1920)

Mark Jarret (2013) has sourced it in the British model of deferential parliamentary politics writ large. It became solidified as a legal responsibility in association with the League of Nations. The League Covenant established a Council made up of the “Principle Allied and Associated Powers” and gave it defined responsibilities for disarmament, maintenance of the peace, and adjudication of disputes. Manning placed much more weight on Great Power responsibility to defend and uphold the compact of international society, represented particularly by Article 11, than on deficiencies in the Covenant (Long  2012, 87–89). The structural case was first put forward by Carr in the chapter on “Peaceful Change” in The Twenty Year’s Crisis. An exegesis on the role of power in relationship to change, he argued that the rising or aspirant power had to be ready to use or threaten force in the interests of a desirable change. Peaceful change was possible if revisionist states had the ability to put pressure on the status quo powers and the latter were not only pushed to make adequate concessions but recognized the necessity of doing so (Carr 1939, 221–222). He blamed the interwar crisis mainly on the satisfied powers who had mistakenly equated peace with the maintenance of the status quo. But the question was also beyond history: unfairness was inevitable in a political system built on the accidents of territorial sovereignty. The present conflict between the haves and have-­nots was not a matter of particular circumstances but rather a structural inevitability in an international order of unequal states. This led him to argue that peaceful change required a permanent negotiating table, at which the rising powers presented the status quo powers with some fait accompli (such as, for example, “islands” in the South China Sea), and the satisfied powers came willing to make concessions (Carr 1939, 270–272). The theorist who pinned down the foundational conception is, again, Hedley Bull in the famous chapter 9 of The Anarchical Society. There he identified great powered-­ness, and an associated responsibility, as foundation institutions of international society.

198   Cornelia Navari Together the two were a central means of maintaining order. In Bull’s analysis, great powered-­ness had a role function in the international order: powers “play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole” and are given a right to do so. To that right, Bull added a consequent duty: “to modify their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear” (Bull 1977, 202). As to their material ranking, Great Powers are in the “first rank of military strength,” which he defined as “comparable in military strength”; that is, they are to be compared to one another and not merely ranked in a general list. But comparable military power is not sufficient to being a Great Power. Powers that are not regarded by others or by their leaders as contributing to peace and security (Bull’s example was Nazi Germany) are not, properly speaking, Great Powers. In order to be what Ian Clark has denoted as “hegemons,” they had to demonstrate leadership, and a leadership that contributed to a common good (Clark 2007, 101–102). Clark’s Hegemony argued that international society, while being shaped by Great Powers, is also the condition of their very existence—as with the other “master” institutions, so that “the absence of a great power directorate entails the demise of international society altogether” (Clark 2011, 7). In other words, international society requires a leadership function—a directorate, which he termed “hegemony” and which he distinguished from the realist concept of “primacy.” It was the Great Powers that performed this function. There is a small literature on the science of GPM. Richard Little has demonstrated how, in the absence of the institutionalization of GPM, no stable balance of power can emerge or persist (Little 2006). Cui and Buzan (2016) observe that GPM is implicit in all of the big war-­settling congresses from 1648 onward. They suggest that the material factor by itself has “neither determined GPM in the past, nor defines its potential in the future,” that GPM can work “within any distribution of power,” and that ideological “multi-­polarity” is not a necessary obstacle to Great Powers working together. Most importantly, they have suggested that the widening of the security agenda to include human rights and ecology among a host of other issues has widened the scope of GPM and increased its legitimacy (see also Astrov 2013). It is noteworthy that the first set of meetings between America and China in respect of “concerting” was in July 2009 in response to the economic crisis, where they agreed to maintain the liberal trading order, to find ways to cooperate to stem global warming, and to address issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and humanitarian crises. At the same time, history has shown that the Great Powers have often been responsible for the absence of peaceful change. Bull coined the term the “Great Irresponsibles,” citing the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1970s when competitive balancing began to destabilize world order (Bull 1980). The proposition that peaceful change is in the gift of wayward Great Powers has rendered the theory a journalistic truism and feeds the machine in the basement of social science theorizing, where conspiracy theories spew forth. It tells liberal institutionalists that they are looking at the wrong place to source peaceful change and negates their argument that enhancing organizational resources is the key to peace. In that part of the academy which still hankers after social engineering, the theory is positively

Peaceful Change in English School Theory   199 ­ oisonous, in that it consigns progressive developments to highly contingent historical p processes and brings into question the whole enterprise of ‘designing peace.’ For feminists, it is paternalism writ large; and in the salons of postcolonial studies, it is the past in the present. From the internal perspective of the theory itself, one could be forgiven for taking a more positive view, and even a mildly progressivist one. It is a historicist theory, after all, and what history tells us is that Great Powers learn. First, they have learned not to allow disagreement on one issue to interfere with the ability to work together on others. Second, as T. V. Paul (2018) has so elegantly argued, leading powers have engaged in “soft balancing,” which seeks to restrain threatening powers through the use of international institutions, informal alignments, and economic sanctions. These are learned techniques and they have been learned largely through the institutionalization of GPM in the Security Council. Knudsen and Navari (2019) have argued, fairly persuasively, that International Organizations are both the deposits of fundamental institutions and the locus of change within them. In respect of GPM, the Security Council has become a prime source of learning, as Tonny Brems Knudsen has demonstrated (Knudsen 2019; see also Suzuki 2009 and Kopra 2018).

Regional Rules of the Game The notion that regional international societies can be peacemakers is not unique to the English School. Karl Deutsch first proposed the idea in relation to the Atlantic community, where “there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch 1957, 5). What is unique to the English School is the idea that any region can be a form of international society with its own distinctive rules and adjudicative procedures, and that accordingly, any region is potentially able to become a “security community.” The ontological grounding was provided by Barry Buzan (1991, 186), who posited that, because of the increasing autonomy of regional relations that followed the end of the Cold War, regional systems could be themselves objects of analysis. The historical point has been supported by Fawcett and Hurrell (1995). Buzan initially defined a region as “a distinct and significant sub-­system of security relations that exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other” (Buzan 1983, 105; Buzan 1991, 190; Buzan and Wæver 2003, 47). His regional security complex theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Wæver 2003) went further and identified world regions in a classification based on the degree of enmity and amity among sets of states. The theory was applied to South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan 1983), and then elaborated and applied in depth to the case of Southeast Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986) and Africa (Ayoob 1995, 1999). In 2004, he widened the concept of a region to include distinct sets of norms and practices, arguing that regions constituted differentiated “mini” international societies that “receive” the norms and practices of the global international

200   Cornelia Navari society but in different ways, adjusted to their own histories, identities, and interests (Buzan 2004). That some of these regions or security complexes might, additionally, be suitable frameworks for peaceful change was argued by Buzan and his then colleague at Copenhagen, Ole Wæver, in their 2003 volume (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 144–171). They distinguished between three forms of security complex: a system of “conflict formation,” where war possibilities are clearly in evidence; a security “regime”; and a security “community.” A security regime simply secures the status quo and is directed against a common enemy, whereas a security community obviates the use of force in the resolution of disputes among the members of the group. They related their classification system to Wendt’s (1999) socially constructed Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian “cultures of anarchy” theory, which focuses upon the manner in which system members view each other: as enemy, rival, or friend. Regional complexes are classed in terms of enmity, rivalry, or friendship essentially by the degree to which member states anticipate violent conflicts and the extent to which mutually agreed-­upon rules of conduct restrain the use of violence when disputes arise between members. In terms of such criteria, Western Europe could have been a security regime as early as 1949, but not yet a security community because of the nationalistic and border dispute in the Alto Adige between Italy and Germany. It could only become a security community with the full incorporation of West Germany into NATO in 1954 and the eventual signing of the Rome Treaty initiating the European community. By 2001, Southeast Asia had moved from “conflict formation” to security regime, but it was not properly yet a security community, given the still possible use of force between Singapore and Malaysia (and hence not yet in a position where peaceful change was the norm). Barnett and Adler’s Security Communities suggested that Mercosur in Latin America might also qualify. Outlining the requirements for a security community, Buzan and Wæver had ­stipulated “a strong shared view of the status quo, allied to a shared culture and/or well-­developed institutions” (2003, 173). They opined that democracy might not be a necessary condition for a security community to form but, “as suggested by the democracy and peace literature (and by the empirical cases to date), it is a huge asset” (Buzan and Weaver 2003, 173). Andrew Hurrell provided a more theoretical elaboration in his contribution to the Barnett and Adler volume on the subject (Barnett and Adler 1998; Hurrell 1998). Like Buzan and Wæver, he drew from constructivism’s “historically located interests and identities,” but he also referenced the English School’s insights on the requisites of Order, putting forward three requisites: ideological coherence, a common Other (which he called the “normative logic”), and domestic institutional constraints (which he called the “institutional logic”). Drawing on the society of states idea, he identified Buzan and Wæver’s security community as a “regional society of states which . . . conceived of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and shared in the workings of common institutions,” directly quoting Bull on the nature of a society of states (Hurrell 1998, 229). Hurrell also went further than Buzan and Wæver to suggest causes and processes by which an antagonist relationship in a particular region might become the basis for a

Peaceful Change in English School Theory   201 “security community,” referencing the meaning Karl Deutsch first proposed in relation to the Atlantic community, where “there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch 1957, 5; Hurrell 1998, 229). The exemplar relationship was that between Brazil and Argentina, and the developing security community was the Mercosur, established in 1991 among Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The relevant processes were “norm externalization” (in the case of Brazil and Argentina led by the national leader) and the development of permanent international institutions with some adjudicative functions that were integrated into domestic institutions. The causal mechanisms he identified were a changing political economy, which favored “peace,” and a political leadership. “Externalization” is the psychological process by which an individual “projects” one’s own internal characteristics onto the outside world. In relation to the development of a security community, it refers to the process by which domestic norms become internationalized among a relevant group of states. The process has been considered central in the construction of the “democratic peace” and the end of the Cold War (Maoz and Russett 1993; Risse-­Kappen 1994). The carapace of Hurrell’s “normative and institutional structures within which state interests are constructed and redefined” (1998, 230) is a two-­level structure in the manner modelled by Knudsen and Navari (2019). It consists of fundamental institutions at one level, conceived as the basic norms and practices which have evolved in a particular region, or security community in the making (“economic development” in the case of Mercosur), and common organizations at a second level (the Integration and Cooperation Program and the Joint Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy in the case of Mercosur). They are linked and sustained by the continuous interaction of leaders, diplomats, business organizations, and domestic interest groups who take their identities from them but who also introduce changes into them. They provide the locus for “identity shifts,” as agents undergo “learning” and experience “ideational forces” (Hurrell 1998, 230).

Conclusion Zhang recently has identified three “hierarchical institutional constructs” that currently cohabit in global international society. They are the legalized hegemony embodied in the United Nations Charter; the changing normative order of an emerging “solidarist and anti-­pluralist formation,” with its “deliberate creation of unequal sovereigns” (in the form of just and unjust states); and the liberal global governance order, which calls for leadership and responsible management on the part of Great Powers. He argues that China has achieved peaceful change and sustained a “resilient status quo” via three differentiated strategic approaches: namely, defending pluralism in the legalized hegemony of the UN order; contesting liberal cosmopolitan solidarism in the changing normative order; and promoting state-­centric solidarism among Great

202   Cornelia Navari Powers in constructing global governance (Zhang  2016). China’s road to peaceful change and its claim to be a responsible Great Power rests on the legal status of the Great Powers in the UN order and an accepted social order of GPM of the institutions of global governance. Barnett and Adler, from the constructivist stable, consider the emergence of regional security communities along three “tiers” of development. The first tier consists of precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and coordinate their policies. The second tier consists of the “structural” elements of power and ideas, and the “process” elements of transactions, international organizations, and social learning. The reciprocal relationship between these variables leads to a third, and for constructivism, the critical tier: the development of trust and collective identity formation (Barnett and Adler 1998). For the English School, it is not so much trust, much less the dubious category of a “collective identity” in the age of nationalism, that is the critical factor. It is structures and processes: foundation institutions and regional organizations at the structural level, and leadership and the redefinition of interests at the level of processes.

Notes 1. Formed in 1928, in association with the League of Nations, the International Studies Association was a group of historians, political scientists, and international lawyers with interests in international affairs (see Buzan 2019). It held annual conferences on those subjects considered by ‘public opinion’ to be the critical problems of the day. It had chosen the topic of peaceful change in 1936 for its next study. 2. The topic, entitled “The Peaceful Solution of Certain International Problems; Peaceful Change,” was divided into a number of different headings, of which the symposium, organized by Manning, was to begin the consideration of Part 1: Difficulties of the Problem and Solutions Suggested. Part II, The Procedures Applicable to the Peaceful Settlement of These Difficulties, never appeared. The rapporteur for the conference summarized the different approaches (see later discussion). 3. On prestige as a source of revisionism, see Kristensen (n.d.), 24, 27.

References Astrov, Alexander. 2013. “Great Power Management: English School Meets Governmentality?” E-International Relations, May 20. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/20/great-power -management-english-school-meets-governmentality/. Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ayoob, Mohammed. 1999. “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3: 247–260. Barnett, Michael, and Emmanuel Adler, eds. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peaceful Change in English School Theory   203 Berlin, Isaiah. 1958. Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. Bull, Hedley. 1980. “The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order.” International Journal 35, no. 3: 437–447. Bull, Hedley. 1984. “Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures.” In Hedley Bull on International Society, edited by Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, 206–245. London: Macmillan. Buzan, Barry. 1983. People, States and Fear. Hemel Hempstead, UK: Wheatsheaf. Buzan, Barry. 1991. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Hemel Hempstead, UK: Wheatsheaf. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry. 2019. Before BISA: the British Coordinating Committee for International Studies, S. H. Bailey, and the Bailey Conferences. International Politics 57, no. 1: 523–587. Buzan, Barry, and Gowher Rizvi. 1986. South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carr, E. H. 1939. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Carr, E. H. 1942. Conditions of Peace. New York: Macmillan. Clark, Ian. 2007. International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, Ian. 2011. Hegemony. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conventions and Declarations between the Powers Concerning War, Arbitration and Neutrality. 1915. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Cui, Shunji, and Barry Buzan. 2016. “The Evolution of Great Power Management in International Society.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 2: 181–210. Deutsch, K. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fawcett, Louise, and A. Hurrell. 1995. Regionalism in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gregory, T. E. 1937. “The Economic Bases of Revisionism.” In Peaceful Change: An International Problem, edited by C. A. W. Manning, 63–80. London: Macmillan. Hadano, Takamitsu. 2014. “Peaceful Change and International Society: The English School.” International Relations 2014, no. 176: 97–110. Hurrell, Andrew. 1998. “An Emerging Security Community in South America?” In Security Communities, edited by M. Barnet and E. Adler, 128–164. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hurrell, Andrew. 2014. “Order and Justice.” In Guide to the English School in International Studies, edited by C. Navari and D. Green, 143–158. Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell. IIIC (International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation). 1938. Peaceful Change: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual International Studies Conference. Paris: IIIC. Jackson, Robert. 2000. The Global Covenant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jarret, Mark. 2013. The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon. New York: I. B. Taurus. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 2019. “Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Solidarist Architecture.” In International Organization in the Anarchical Society, edited by T. B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 176–202. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

204   Cornelia Navari Knudsen, Tonny Brems, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Kopra, Sanna. 2018. China and Great Power Responsibility for Climate Change. London: Routledge. Kristensen, Peter. 2021 “ ‘Peaceful Change’ in International Relations: A Conceptual Archaeology.” International Theory, 13, no.1. 36–67. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international -theory/article/peaceful-change-in-international-relations-a-conceptual-archaeology/ B7ED04369C6902AB62720AA9C1D78925 . Lauterpacht, Hersch. 1937. “The Legal Aspect.” In Peaceful Change: An International Problem, edited by C. A. W. Manning, 135–142. London: Macmillan. Linklater, Andrew. 1982. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Little, Richard. 2006. “The Balance of Power and Great Power Management.” In The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, edited by R. Little and J. Williams, 97–120. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Long, David. 2012. “C. A. W. Manning and the First Great Debate.” In International Relations and the First Great Debate, edited by Brian C. Schmidt, 78–93. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Mair, Lucy P. 1937. “Colonial Policy and Peaceful Change.” In Peaceful Change: An International Problem, edited by C. A. W. Manning, 81–100. London: Macmillan. Manning, C. A. W., ed. 1937. Peaceful Change: An International Problem. London: Macmillan. Manning, C. A. W. 1937. “Some Suggested Conclusions.” In Peaceful Change: An International Problem, edited by C. A. W. Manning, 169–190. London: Macmillan. Maoz, Zeeve, and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986.” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 3: 624–638. Nardin, Terry. 1983. Law, Morality and the Relations of States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Paul, T. V. 2018. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Risse-Kappen, T. 1994. “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War.” International Organization, 48, no. 2: 185–214. Robbins, Lionel. 1941. The Economic Aspects of Federalism. London: Macmillan. Suzuki, Shogo. 2009. “Seeking ‘Legitimate’ Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China’s and Japan’s Participation in UNPKO.” International Relations 22: 1. Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878. https://archive.org/stream/ jstor-2212670/2212670_djvu.txt. Webster, C. K. 1920. “The Congress of Vienna.” Appendix III, “Two Projects of Castlereagh of Opening the Congress.” In C. K. Webster, Peace Handbooks, No. 153, 153–154. London: UK Gov. https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11872/view/1/172/. Webster, C.  K. 1937. “What Is the Problem of Peaceful Change?” In Peaceful Change: An International Problem, edited by C. A. W. Manning, 3–26. London: Macmillan. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wheeler, Nicolas J., and Timothy Dunne. 1996. “Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will.” International Affairs 72, no. 1: 91–107. Zhang, Yongjin. 2016. “China and Liberal Hierarchies in Global International Society: Power and Negotiation for Normative Change.” International Affairs 92, no. 4: 795–816.

chapter 11

Cr itica l Theor ies a n d Ch a nge i n I n ter nationa l R el ations Annette Freyberg-­I nan

The International Relations (IR) theory family we label “critical theories” is by d ­ efinition critical of the status quo. These theories all therefore consider change desirable. They further have in common that the sort of change they seek is fundamental; their aim is to reshape the underlying structures and processes of international politics, not merely their surface or outcomes. The most important contribution critical theories make to the analysis of international politics is to draw attention in various ways to the stubborn obstacles that exist to such desirable structural change. Often (loosely) following Marxist tradition, they draw attention to the distribution of socioeconomic power as a strong predictive force. The strong, in essence, get what they want, and the weak suffer. In this diagnosis, they align with Realists. However, they add two crucial observations that earn them the label “critical.” The first is the recognition of the fact that politics never begins from a level playing field. Power inequalities are always already stacking the game, so it is naïve to expect interest to prevail—as Liberals hope—unless it is the interest of the powerful. Unlike Realists, critical theorists tend to explicitly expose this unlevel playing field as normatively undesirable and ask for removal of entrenched inequalities. Second, critical theories recognize that, and explain how, material power works in tandem with ideational power. Ideas are not neutral. Instead, the way we think and in which we communicate our thoughts works through in the real world and becomes ammunition in struggles of power. While all theory may not be ideology, all can be used in the service of ideology, and IR theories themselves are no exception. Dominant IR theories reify and privilege existing orders. The implications of such a position for the possibility of peaceful change are twofold and potentially contradictory. On the one hand, the vision of change supported by

206   Annette Freyberg-Inan c­ ritical theories is drastic and requires disempowering the powerful, and the normative commitment of critical theorists to such change is strong. Evidently this can support a readiness to employ violence, and it is then also not uncommon for work written from such a theoretical perspective to be sympathetic to violent resistance or rebellion, such as in the context of indigenous uprisings, democratic revolutions, or wars of liberation. On the other hand, the attention paid by critical theories to the crucial role of ideational dimensions of power, or superstructures, also offers a possible pathway to peaceful change. If there is a possibility to rob the status quo of its mantle of common sense, if the emperor, in this sense, can be revealed to have no clothes, then power can find itself reduced to its material dimension. In this form, it is substantially weakened, more difficult to sustain over space and time. (Relatively) peaceful fundamental change might, then, not be impossible. In either case, an activist attitude is part of this theoretical position. This chapter begins by clarifying what critical theories in IR are and then explains why and how they problematize the notion of “peaceful change.” The changes desired by critical theories are fundamental and urgent, which imbues them with a level of radicalism that can justify violent means. At the same time, critical theories spotlight dimensions of power beyond the material on which material power vitally depends. This reveals possibilities for transformation by peaceful means.

What Are “Critical IR Theories”? Critical T/theory has both a narrow and a broader meaning. Both signal a normative task for scholarship, to be accomplished by uniting philosophy and science in social research (Bohman 2019). In its narrow sense, Critical Theory (capitalized) is synonymous with the Frankfurt School, which famously distinguished “critical” from “traditional” theory based on the theory’s purpose: critical theory serves the practical purpose of liberating human beings from various kinds of “enslavement” (Horkheimer  1972, 1993), while traditional theory essentially serves to naturalize the status quo. Critical is pitched against traditional theory through “immanent critique,” a methodology of identifying contradictions in reigning bodies of thought and practice that suggests openings for emancipatory social change. In its broader sense, critical theory (lowercased) denotes the many social theories that have since been formulated with the purpose of emancipating disadvantaged groups. They focus their diagnoses on a broad range of different dimensions of domination and oppression but are united by the normative aim of social empowerment and their critical take on the function of mainstream social theory. They include, among others, feminism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory. The discipline of IR knows its own set of critical theories, which are focused on interor transnational aspects of domination and oppression as well as on the role mainstream theories have played in supporting them (Ashley 1987). In a famous contribution in 1981, Robert Cox imported Horkheimer into IR by distinguishing critical from so-­called

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   207 problem-­solving theory. The latter “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-­solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble” (Cox 1981, 128–129). Critical theory, by contrast, “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1981, 129). Critical IR theories extend across the epistemological spectrum (i.e., can be more or less “positivist”) and include Marxist and neo-­Marxist approaches, neo-­Gramscian and other “critical” international political economy, postcolonialism, critical geopolitics, “critical” constructivist approaches (including a part of the English School), much of feminism, some of historical and international political sociology, and the so-­called new materialism (see, e.g., Hobden and Hobson 2002). This chapter explains what unites these diverse theories, as well as how they differ from the ‘mainstream’ approaches of realism and liberalism when it comes to their view of change in world affairs.1

Violence as Ubiquitous, Commitment to Peace as a Handicap Critical theories are critical of the status quo. They are also, to various degrees, radical. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves of the literal meaning of that term. The Latin noun radix means “root.” Radicalism denotes a commitment to get to the roots of a problem and to “root out” its causes to transform society, in the manner in which a gardener has to get to the roots of an intruder plant to successfully landscape her garden. Entailed here is a readiness to “uproot” society, to cause some turmoil. Order becomes something not to be preserved but to be challenged. This may entail violence. This Handbook is concerned with “peaceful change,” and the first thing a critical theorist must do with this notion is to question the bias it contains, as framed by the mainstream theories of IR. Realism prioritizes stability and is therefore wary of change; it is furthermore skeptical of the possibility of both fundamental transformation and achieving much of anything new by peaceful means. Liberalism prizes progress but insists that it should be peaceful and led by liberal states. The first attitude supports the status quo (Ashley 1984), the second incremental reformism. With both, critical theories have a fundamental problem. Not only do we need more fundamental change than that envisioned by Liberals, we also need to see the limitations of insisting on an abdication of violent means to reach our political aims. Here, a fundamentally realist insight is married to radical normative commitment: If we ask, as we do, for an end to domination and oppression, we are asking for a redistribution of power, and this the powerful are unlikely to simply let happen. We may need force.

208   Annette Freyberg-Inan This may sound shocking but isn’t if we realize that as long as power relations are unequal, violence is always already there anyway. Eschewing violent means to reach one’s goals thus means that this violence keeps working in favor of the powerful. One body of literature in which this idea has received expression is critical peace studies. Another is world systems analysis. Both are presented briefly here to illustrate how critical theories see world politics as prestructured by unequal and violent power relations, which require a radical departure from the status quo to make true on their normative commitments. Critical peace studies emerged in the 1970s as a result of dissatisfaction with existing instruments and definitions of traditional peace research, most prominently the definition of peace as the absence of war. Johan Galtung, the most prominent critical peace theorist, defined the absence of war as “negative peace”—and not all we should want. From his perspective, “positive peace” is what we should strive for, and it can only be achieved in the absence of structural, as opposed to merely direct, violence. Structural violence exists where social structures avoidably harm groups of human beings by preventing them from meeting their basic needs (Galtung 1990). It derives from exploitative and unjust social, political, and economic institutions, so it is closely related to inequality and to economic and social injustice. It can function in an indirect manner, because it is built into social structures and emerges as unequal power relations and unequal life chances (Galtung 1969). Via violations of the basic human needs of individuals and communities, it results in deficits in human growth and development, precarious living conditions, and even premature death (Christie 1997). The resulting human suffering and deterioration of communities feed further violence, in both its physical and structural manifestations. Breaking such a cyclical relationship demands addressing both direct and structural forms of violence, in a manner that provides human security (Schnabel 2008). The by now well-­worn concept of human security rose to prominence within a broader “critical turn” in IR at a time when post–Cold War complacency gave way to an increasing concern with the root causes of misery, instability, and violence around the world. It has helped draw attention to the fact that the range of political concerns with security implications is considerably broader than allowed for by a focus on military or state security. By prioritizing the human being as its unit of analysis, this approach revealed that the state could often be the biggest violator of security, instead of its guarantor. This reconceptualization shaped the policies of bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994) as well as national governments, for example in Canada (Moher 2012). The idea gained traction that ignoring the structural causes of violence leads to failure of efforts at establishing peace; according to critical peace studies, we should act upon that insight by seeing human security concerns as key causes of conflict and addressing human security concerns as key to conflict resolution. Yet critical peace studies remain relatively marginal. The agenda of peace research is still widely dominated by traditional and narrow conceptions of security threats relating to collective rivalries and fought out with military means—of state security (Diehl 2016). This is due to the dominance of mainstream IR theories, in particular realism, which support national security establishments in neglecting intrastate development in favor

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   209 of interstate rivalry. We know that human rights violations, environmental degradation, economic deprivation, and social inequality all foster conflicts, but little research has been systematically based on these insights (or set out to question them). On the other hand, scholarship that focuses on human security concerns generally fails to connect these insights to national security problematics and rarely studies the relationship of such concerns to the evolution of conflicts or their possible resolution. We know that distributional grievances often lie at the heart of political conflict, inasmuch as politics is, by Lasswell’s well-­worn definition, about “who gets what, when, and how” (1936). And these grievances can align with national, ethnic, racial, gendered, or other identity-­ based cleavages, in which case conflict escalation becomes especially likely and resolution more complicated. Conflict arises over the distribution of material resources such as income, land, and water, but also over less immediately tangible benefits, such as opportunities for professional success, freedom of movement, or access to positions of power. Galtung’s concept of structural violence (1969) captures both material and immaterial distributional grievances and in this manner can usefully be linked to the concept of human security in the service of a fundamental transformation toward a meaningfully more peaceful world. Addressing structural violence and creating human security and positive peace evidently require a radical transformation of world politics as we know it. The desire for this transformation is driven by a normative agenda centered on social justice and a cosmopolitan humanism. We also see how enabling such a transformation requires scholars to reconceptualize their empirical referents, most importantly by redefining the core IR notion of security. All of this makes this school of thought a “critical” IR theory. For another example, consider world systems analysis. World systems analysis, associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1979, 2002a, 2002b), Giovanni Arrighi (2005, 2007), and Christopher Chase-Dunn (2014; see also Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997), among others, is a systems approach toward describing and explaining world history: it focuses not on nation-­states or other components of the system as its units of analysis, but rather on the system as a whole. Strongly inspired by Marxism and building on dependency theory (Gunder Frank 1967), which had emerged in opposition to the modernization school of development ­economics, it identifies an exploitative interregional and transnational division of labor in which wealth is constantly transferred from so-­called periphery and semiperiphery countries toward a core. The core is specialized on higher skill, capital-­intensive production, for which it exploits the low-­skill cheap labor and raw materials extracted from the rest of the world through unequal terms of trade. This system is characterized by structural inequality, but it is not static. Hegemonic powers have risen and fallen, leading to a succession of different world systems, while global capitalism has spread to the far corners of the earth and intensified through progressive commodification (Gill 1995). Most recently, the United States seems to be losing its previous hegemonic status, while China is emerging as its main competitor. World systems analysis has been widely applied to explain not only different trajectories of economic development, but also social unrest, political upheaval, conflict, and

210   Annette Freyberg-Inan war (see, e.g., Freyberg-­Inan 2005, 2013 on the Kosovo and Iraq wars, respectively). The inequality and ongoing exploitation that are structural to capitalist world systems are identified as root causes of manifold undesirable outcomes in world politics. World systems analysis emphasizes that in order to understand these structures and processes properly, they need to be studied over long stretches of time (in the longue durée),2 as well as in an interdisciplinary manner. What makes world systems analysis “critical” is not least its contradiction of disciplinary orthodoxies that separate economics, politics, history, sociology, and philosophy—and thereby perplex immanent critique of the legacy of liberalism, on which our world economy is based. This legacy of liberalism also links contemporary global capitalism to colonialism, which is thereby revealed as not ‘a thing of the past,’ for which Western liberal states bear no current responsibility, but rather a structural and very much still operational component of today’s political economy. As long as capitalism endures, colonial history is not over. Here, world systems analysis can link up with postcolonial approaches in IR (see, e.g., Krishna 2009; Chowdhry and Nair 2004). Both recognize that capitalism has been global ever since its emergence in (roughly) the sixteenth century. Within this system, inequality between rich and poor, between a “North” and a “South,” cannot be removed, because the system relies for its very survival upon this inequality and the dynamic of accumulation it enables. Today, we can see this inequality as further exacerbated by the fallout from anthropogenic climate change and increasing labor precarity, leading to a variety of reactions, from protectionist retrenchment to trade wars. The manner in which we should instead address this problem, according to the late Wallerstein, is through transnational class struggle—“where ‘class’ stands for an integrated fight against capitalism, racism, paternalism and neo-­colonialism” (Ypi 2019). The postcolonial school of thought in IR shares in much of this critique yet also deeply problematizes the notion of transnational class struggle. As a broader school of thought, postcolonialism emerged after the Second World War as a critique of colonial practices and their harmful legacies, with a focus on their sociocultural and psychological dimensions. In The Wretched of the Earth, psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon (1961) decried the harmful mental effects of colonialism on subjugated peoples, calling for violent rebellion in response (see also Nandy 1983). In Orientalism, Edward Said (1979) explained how Western Europe had divided the world into an “Occident” and an “Orient,” establishing a binary relation of mutual social construction with pernicious effects on both sides. In “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) problematized the utter disempowerment resulting from the social construction of the colonized and popularized the use of the Gramscian term “subaltern” to designate colonial populations as discursively and materially excluded by the operation of hegemony (see also Ashley and Walker 1990). These and other key thinkers and texts have shaped postcolonial IR theory. Today, contributions to this body of thought continue to provide important new readings of colonial history (Getachew 2019), to draw attention to the persistence of colonial forms of power and racism in world politics (and in IR), and to challenge the Eurocentrism of IR and its insistence on the universal utility of Western Enlightenment thinking

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   211 (Grovogui 2006). They are critical IR theories in that they draw attention to obstinate relations of structural inequality, with a focus on the inequalities created and maintained by colonialism and racism; in that they demand justice, in the form of recognition, repair, and redress; and in that they are actively engaged in a struggle to decolonize both world politics and the discipline of IR. Clearly this is calling for fundamental change. And the change envisioned seems compatible with that called for by the schools of thought discussed here. However, while the human security and positive peace agenda is driven by Enlightenment values and led by liberal institutions, and world systems analysis is based on a class analysis and looks to class struggle for change, postcolonial IR functions as an important reminder that more than half the world has had no chance to help make the agenda, that there are deep divisions within the global proletariat, and that we cannot fix global inequality without stopping to realize and recognize just how it has felt to those at the bottom. Wallerstein equivocated between a cyclical and an episodic vision of change (Wesley 2015). That perhaps explains why, shortly before his death in August 2019, he wrote that we have a “50-­50 chance that we’ll make it to transformatory change, but only 50-­50” (quoted in Ypi 2019). This is of course rather unsatisfactory and raises the question of what the success of non-­cyclical transformation depends on. So far, we have seen that radical commitment to fundamental change is required, as is a problematization of realist and liberal preoccupations with stability and the avoidance of violence, respectively. The next section of this chapter further develops critical theories’ take on the possibilities for peaceful fundamental change.

The Need for Fundamental Change, and Where It Might Come From As T. V. Paul points out in the introduction to this Handbook, “the contending IR perspectives offer differing viewpoints on patterns of change and persistence of international politics as their key markers of differentiation” (this volume, 1). In a nutshell, critical theorists demand fundamental change: unlike Realists, they believe that such change is possible; unlike Liberals, they see that it requires immanent critique of the (neo)liberal order in which we live, as well as radical changes to it. Critical theorists are skeptical of teleological visions of change (Wesley  2015), because the dominant ra­tion­al­ity structuring world affairs today is not emancipatory but governmental in nature (Foucault 2008). Instead, they tend to waver between the pessimism of cyclical views on progress and hopes for episodic change.3 There is no coherent vision uniting critical theories on how change can or will come about. However, it is clear that critical theories work not with a minimalist but with a maximalist vision of peaceful change. This has three linked reasons: the previously introduced problematization of the notion of “peaceful change” as bearing a status quo bias; an (often implicit) normative aversion

212   Annette Freyberg-Inan to violence; and the recognition of the relevance of ideational aspects of power, which provides some (sparse) hope of dislodging domination and oppression by nonviolent means. I address each aspect in turn. First, given the depth of critique entailed in the diagnoses of world affairs offered by critical theories, it is difficult to see how their plans for progress could embrace a minimalist definition of “peaceful change” as taking place “without violence or coercive use of force” (see introduction, 4). In other words, it is difficult to see how a fundamental change to power relations such as that demanded by critical theories could take place without violence. Indeed, as laid out earlier, it may well be overly self-­limiting to commit to peaceful means, given that the power structures to be replaced are built on violence and keep employing violence to defend themselves. How can we ever get anywhere if we do not do the same? Emphasizing that change must be peaceful benefits those who benefit from the status quo.4 That is why critical theorists typically do not go out of their way to demand that the change they desire must come about peacefully. That being said, and second, few critical theorists call for armed revolution, either. This is perhaps not only because doing so might cost them their jobs. Calling for social violence is normatively difficult to reconcile with the cosmopolitan humanism at the heart of critical theories’ emancipatory vision. Violence harms people, after all. Even if the goal is highly noble, making human lives the means to achieve such a goal is incompatible with the Enlightenment-­inspired morality that critical theorists ultimately share with Liberals (and with IR as a discipline more generally). Now we end up in a most uncomfortable position, realizing that peaceful fundamental change is probably impossible, but we don’t want to (ask others to) fight for it, either. When speaking about “class struggle” today, for example, the vision of a global army of peasants and workers armed with pitchforks storming stock exchanges and hedge fund headquarters is less inspiring than cynically humorous. We suspect that even if we could get such an attack off the ground, it would not get us very far. To be sure, we need force, because there will be significant resistance. But what sort of force, and how should it be applied? Is there another way to destabilize, perhaps dislodge, existing power structures? Here we must, third, turn to Antonio Gramsci, whose legacy, together with that of the Frankfurt School, forms the intellectual backbone of the critical theoretical tradition. Gramsci (1971) conceptualized hegemony as a form of domination that relies on a combination of force and consent and that integrates the state and civil society by being embodied in myriad political, cultural, and social practices. In this manner socioeconomic elites can rely on subordinated classes internalizing their values and interests as the “general interest.” The status quo becomes common sense, and dominant groups can frame their rule as legitimate, even inevitable. They obtain consent, which is vital to support their rule, as it would be impossible to uphold by sheer force alone. There have been several important research paths branching out from Gramsci’s original ideas. One, inspired by constructivist and post-­structuralist approaches, has placed especially strong emphasis on the relevance of discursive power. Here we find, for ­example, securitization theory, which focuses on how policy issues are discursively

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   213 c­ onstructed as collective security concerns and thence become legitimized as targets for governmental control (e.g., Buzan et al. 1998). Another path, influenced more heavily by structuralism, has tended to emphasize the relevance of powerful states’ vying for military and economic dominance. An example is world systems analysis (see, e.g., Wallerstein 2002b, 357; Arrighi 2005). Both are important lines of inquiry, yet both tend to fail to cash in on what was arguably Gramsci’s key point: hegemony merges the material and ideational components of power, makes them inseparable, and reveals their intrinsic interdependence. As I have argued elsewhere (Scholl and Freyberg-­Inan 2013, 2018; see also Cox with Sinclair 1996, 151; Klein 2007), to understand possibilities for change in world affairs, it is useful to return to a more dogmatically Gramscian understanding of hegemony as linking state and civil society and as inherently comprising both material and ideational aspects of power. Gramsci’s work turned our attention to the complex of institutions that connect state and society and to the way in which consent is organized through organizations of civil society, including schools, churches, and unions, to name but a few. For Gramsci, civil society was the terrain upon which power relations came to be established, and thus it was also within civil society that opposition would need to be constructed. Given the combination of the evident structural and material power of capital and the expanding ideological hold and institutionalization of neoliberalism as a set of ideas and a discourse, neo-­Gramscian scholarship perceives the contemporary international political economy as characterized by neoliberal hegemony, or a neoliberal historic bloc (Cox 1986; Rupert 2003; Harvey 2007; Chomsky 1999).5 Following Gramsci, we can see this hegemony as produced not by powerful states so much as by a combination of nationally based as well as inter- and transnational, public and private actors—a diverse and transnational capitalist elite. By the same token, the construction of counterhegemony, working for change within the present hegemonic system, also does not depend on a single privileged agent, like a rival state or alliance, but rather has to emerge broadly across civil society. Gramsci argued that counterhegemonic forces should call into question the forms of power (both ideational and material) that perpetuate marginalization by “slowly build[ing] up the strength of the social foundations of a new state” through “creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society” (Cox with Sinclair  1996, 128–129), in a process he described as “war of position” (Gramsci 1971, 229–239, 242–243).6 This requires a cultural shift, because culture shapes people’s “ability to imagine how [the world] might be changed, and whether they see such changes as feasible or desirable” (Crehan 2002, 71). What is needed are broad alliances in civil society that actively support real alternatives to the status quo. As a Marxist, Gramsci believed that leadership of this counterhegemonic struggle lay with the proletariat, but his vision called for alliances to be built that brought in all of the “subordinate classes.” An important role is also given to “organic intellectuals”: intellectual leaders who actively identify with the political struggle, as opposed to maintaining a position of scientific detachment (Birchfield and Freyberg-­Inan 2005). Counterhegemony,

214   Annette Freyberg-Inan in short, depends on a multiplicity of actors (Laclau and Mouffe  1984; Hardt and Negri 2004). For many, the emergence of the counterglobalization movements in the late 1990s and 2000s raised the hope that such a critical multiplicity was taking shape. Stephen Gill (2000, 140, 131), for example, in a famous essay on the Seattle WTO protests of 1999, suggested that the social movement protests of the time “may prove to be the most effective political form for giving coherence to an open-­ended, plural, inclusive, and flexible form of politics and thus create alternatives to neoliberal globalization” and a “global and universal politics of radical reconstruction.” Note the contrast to liberal IR theory. The introduction to this volume emphasizes the role of institutions as agents of peaceful change. That is a quintessentially liberal institutionalist vision. Critical theories object that before institutions can carry out an emancipatory mission, the superstructural basis on which they function has to come to reflect such a vision. Without fundamental cultural change, institutions will continue to work for the status quo by embedding and enacting preexisting power relations, aiding their legitimation, and stabilizing the current order (Freyberg-­Inan 2019). It is true that institutions can ‘embed’ realism in the sense of guiding states into trajectories of change. But this is unlikely to produce radical transformation. What we need is fundamental debate about the values our institutions should reflect and promote and about our institutions themselves. This debate has to come from civil society. To stimulate it, social movements play a crucial role. A vitally important insight of critical theories is that the battle for greater social justice, in economic but also broader social terms, is most fundamentally a struggle for hearts and minds. This does not mean that physical action is not required. But any such action must be sustained and guided by a societally based vision for change, without which force will be exerted in vain. To be transformative at the level of world politics, such a vision for change needs to be broadly shared across the globe and made actionable through innovative institutions and practices. This then makes clear why critical theories can do nothing with a minimalist definition of peaceful change or with the institutionalist compromise definition offered in this Handbook’s introduction. Instead, a critical theoretical definition of peaceful change has to be maximalist: “transformational change” has to take place “at the global, regional, interstate, and societal levels due to various material, normative and institutional factors, leading to deep peace among states, higher levels of prosperity and justice for all irrespective of nationality, race or gender” (Paul in this volume, 4). This is the form in which peaceful change comes closest to the ideals of critical theory. This also means that it has to be both foundational and procedural at the same time, obliterating the distinction made by Holsti (2004, 26–27), as discussed in the introduction to this volume. It could go without saying at this point that the change critical theories ask for is “system change,” in the terminology coined by Gilpin (1981, 39–40). As opposed to “systemic” change, which takes place within a system and entails “changes in the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and[/or] the rules and rights embodied in the system” (1981, 41), system change “involves a change in the fundamental actors of the international system” and therefore constitutes a change of the

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   215 system (introduction to this volume). To hark back to our earlier example of critical peace studies, a turn to human security, for example, is a reconceptualization of human beings rather than states as the fundamental actors for our theories of security.7

Conclusion The preceding discussion allows us to succinctly answer the questions raised in this book’s introduction. The assumptions critical theories hold about international politics and the role of peaceful change within them are that fundamental change is necessary and that peaceful fundamental change is desirable while difficult to accomplish. As Sorensen (2019: 57) has summarized Cox with Sinclair (1996), “order is founded on a fit between a power base […,] a common collective image of order expressed in values and norms, and an appropriate set of institutions.” It thus rests on material, ideational, and institutional resources operating together. To dislodge such an order to create fundamental change, this interplay has to be recognized and addressed. Let us consider rival IR theory families by comparison. Realism is characterized by a state-­centric ontology and predominantly material and relational conceptions of power (see also Freyberg-­Inan  2019). It expects dynamism in the international system to emerge primarily from material contestation. Ideas and institutions are epiphenomenal. Deep transformation, away from power politics, is in any case not possible. The best we can do is exchange overlords. Liberals, in comparison, emphasize the relevance of institutional change. They fail to take sufficiently into account (or take no issue with) the fact that without a cultural and material power shift, institutional progress will remain incrementally reformist and reversible. Post-­structuralists focus on ideational resources with near-­exclusivity, which makes it even more difficult to see where real change could ever come from. By contrast, following critical theories, we need to see power as both material and ideational, as drawing on “collective understandings and intersubjectivities” (Rosamond 2019; see also Strange 1996), and as structurally embedded in institutions and discourses. We need to address the inherent interplay between these different dimensions of power, if we truly want to change the world. Such agency naturally has to emerge within the existing system, but it cannot be expected from the institutions that maintain the status quo. The manner in which the current order operates to benefit its elites, and in which our common sense operates to support their rule, is best visible from the margins. It is to movements within civil society that critical theories look for the impetus for change (Rupert 2003). And indeed, if we look at progress on many fronts, with respect to race, gender, sexual rights, or apartheid—the abolition of slavery, in which religious groups, notably the Quakers, played an important role; women’s emancipation; the labor movement; debt relief for the poorest countries; environmentalism; and from Fridays for Future to Black Lives Matter—so many arguable improvements upon earlier times, and so many changes we are still

216   Annette Freyberg-Inan ­ itnessing today, have been carried by critical theories and their associated social w ­movements. Progress came from the margins. That it could succeed, to the extent that it did, is in part because other positions, notably liberalism, take on some of the insights generated by critical theories and mainstream them. But for all of this progress, we need the analytical sharpness, the strong normative commitment, and the radicalism of Critical Theory. And there is a long way to go.

Notes 1. I do not contrast critical theories with constructivism here because these bodies of thought partly overlap. Constructivism is “critical” where it weds critique of the status quo and normative commitment to emancipatory social change to its social constructivist ontology. It is not, where it does not. 2. World systems analysis employs this expression, coined by the French Annales school of historical writing. 3. For a discussion of this distinction by Wesley (2015), see the introductory chapter of this book. 4. This resonates with E. H. Carr’s (1940) critique of the liberal assumption of a harmony of interests. Realists and critical theorists share this critique. 5. Gramsci defined historic blocs as the stable, institutionalized relationships between socioeconomic structures and superstructures, wherein “the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production” (Gramsci 1971, 366). Neoliberalism can be defined with Hay (2007, 54) as entailing “a defense of labour market flexibility and the promotion and nurturing of cost competitiveness; [. . .] and, more generally, [. . .] the allocative efficiency of market and quasi-­market mechanisms in the provision of public goods.” 6. Inspired by reflections on the Western Front in the Second World War, Gramsci distinguished two strategies to oppose hegemony: “war of manoeuvre” and “war of position.” “War of manoeuvre” aims to physically overwhelm the coercive apparatus of the state. But this is unlikely to succeed where elite authority is firmly rooted in civil society, such as in today’s liberal democracies. This grants priority to “war of position,” essentially an attempt to change the dominant culture. 7. Gilpin’s third category, “interaction change,” just like systemic change, may help work toward system change but does not get us where we want yet, according to critical theories (Gilpin 1981, 41).

References Arrighi, Giovanni. 2005. “Hegemony Unravelling” (I and II). New Left Review 32 and 33: 23–80 and 83–116. Arrighi, Giovanni. 2007. Adam Smith in Beijing. London: Verso. Ashley, Richard. K. 1984. “The Poverty of Neorealism.” International Organization 38, no. 2: 225–286. Ashley, Richard  K. 1987. “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics.” Alternatives 12, no. 4: 403–434.

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   217 Ashley, Richard  K., and R.  B.  J.  Walker. 1990. “Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3: 259–268. Birchfield, Vicki, and Annette Freyberg-Inan. 2005. “Organic Intellectuals and CounterHegemonic Politics in the Age of Globalisation: The Case of ATTAC.” In Critical Theories, World Politics and the “Anti-Globalization Movement”, edited by Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca, 154–173. London: Routledge. Bohman, James. 2019. “Critical Theory.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 ed., edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/ critical-theory/. Buzan, Barry, et al. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Carr, Edward H. 1940. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2014. “Continuities and Transformations in the Evolution of World-Systems.” Journal of Globalization Studies 5, no. 1 (May): 11–31. Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Thomas  D.  Hall. 1997. Rise and Demise: Comparing WorldSystems. Boulder, CO: Westview. Chomsky, Noam. 1999. Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. New York: Seven Stories. Chowdhry, Geeta, and Sheila Nair, eds. 2004. Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations. New York: Routledge. Christie, Daniel J. 1997. “Reducing Direct and Structural Violence: The Human Needs Theory.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 3, no. 4: 315–332. Cox, Robert W. 1986. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” In Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by R.O.  Keohane, 204–254. New York: Columbia University Press. Cox, Robert W. 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium 10, no. 2: 126–155. Cox, Robert W. 2001. “The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order.” In Critical Theory and World Politics, edited by Richard Wyn Jones, 45–60. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Cox, Robert  W., with Timothy Sinclair. 1996. Approaches to World Order. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Crehan, Kate. 2002. Gramsci, Culture, and Anthropology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Diehl, Paul F. 2016. “Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace.” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 1 (March): 1–10. Fanon, Franz. 1961. The Wretched of the Earth. Paris: François Maspero. Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Freyberg-Inan, Annette. 2005. “World System Theory: A Bird’s Eye View of the World Capitalist Order.” In Making Sense of IR Theory, edited by Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 225–241. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner. Freyberg-Inan, Annette. 2013. “World-Systems Theory: Iraq Overreach—US Overkill.” In Making Sense of IR Theory II: Iraq, edited by Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 246–261. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Freyberg-Inan, Annette. 2019. “The Dynamic Relation between Power Politics and Institutionalization: A Neo-Gramscian Intervention.” In International Institutions and

218   Annette Freyberg-Inan Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by T.  V.  Paul and Anders Wivel, 185–196. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Galtung, Johan. 1969. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3: 167–191. Galtung, Johan. 1990. “Cultural Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3: 291–300. Getachew, Adom. 2019. Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gill, Stephen. 1995. “Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism.” Millennium 24, no. 2: 399–423. Gill, Stephen. 2000. “The Postmodern Prince.” Millennium 29, no. 1: 131–140. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Grovogui, Siba. 2006. Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Order and Institutions. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gunder Frank, Andre. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2004. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Penguin. Harvey, David. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Hay, Colin. 2007. “The Genealogy of Neoliberalism.” In Neoliberalism: National and Regional Experiments with Global Ideas, edited by R. K. Roy, et al., 51–70. Abingdon: Routledge. Hobden, Stephen, and John  M.  Hobson, eds. 2002. Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Holsti, Kai  J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Horkheimer, Max. 1972. Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press. Horkheimer, Max. 1993. Between Philosophy and Social Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Klein, Naomi. 2007. The Shock Doctrine. London: Penguin. Krishna, Sankaran. 2009. Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-First Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1984. Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Practice. London: Verso. Lasswell, Harold. 1936. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Whittlesey House. Moher, Jennifer. 2012. “Canada’s Human Security Agenda.” Humanitarian Practice Network. https://odihpn.org/magazine/canada%C2%92s-human-security-agenda/. Nandy, Ashis. 1983. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Rosamond, Ben. 2019. “Making Power Politics Great Again? Discursive Institutionalism and the Political Economy of World Politics after Globalization.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T.  V.  Paul, 73–86. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Rupert, Mark. 2003. “Globalizing Common Sense: A Marxian-Gramscian Revision of the Politics of Governance/Resistance.” Review of International Studies 29, no. S1: 181–198. Said, Edward W. 1979. Orientalism. London: Vintage.

Critical Theories and Change in International Relations   219 Schnabel, Albrecht. 2008. “The Human Security Approach to Direct and Structural Violence.” In SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 87–95. Stockholm: SIPRI. Scholl, Christian, and Annette Freyberg-Inan. 2013. “Hegemony’s Dirty Tricks: Explaining Counter-Globalization’s Weakness in Times of Neoliberal Crisis.” Globalizations 10, no. 4 (August): 619–634. Scholl, Christian, and Annette Freyberg-Inan. 2018. “Imagining Another Europe: Building a Pan-European Counter-Hegemonic Bloc around an Anti-austerity Master Frame.” Comparative European Politics 16, no. 1: 103–125. Sørensen, Georg. 2019. “Pyrrhic Victory: A World of Liberal Institutions, Teeming with Tensions.” In International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide, edited by Anders Wivel and T.V. Paul, 53–72. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Spivak, Gayatri C. 1988. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271–313. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. http:// www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2002a. “The Itinerary of World-Systems Analysis; or, How to Resist Becoming a Theory.” In New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory, edited by Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, 358–376. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2002b. “Three Hegemonies.” In Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001, edited by Patrick K. O’Brien and Armand Clesse, 357–376. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Wesley, Michael. 2015. “Teleology, Cyclicality and Episodism: Three Competing Views of Change in International Relations.” In Change: Combining Analytical Approaches with Street Wisdom, edited by Gabriele Bammer, 43–53. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press. Ypi, Lea. 2019. “Why the World Needs Immanuel Wallerstein’s Radical Vision More Than Ever.” New Statesman, September 10. https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2019/09/ why-world-needs-immanuel-wallersteins-radical-vision-more-ever.

chapter 12

Gen der a n d Pe acefu l Ch a nge Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond

Diplomacy is a historical institution that manages peaceful relations between states. Women have a long-­standing track record of political engagement and global activism in the area of war and peace. Yet world politics has historically been the domain of men, while women’s participation has been marginalized by states and the international community. It was only in the twentieth century that women were allowed to partake in diplomatic practices when the formal and informal bans on their participation were lifted. Thus, diplomacy is a field of practice that historically has been defined by homosocial values, norms, and contexts. This remains the case, with 85 percent of all ambassadors in the world being men. In peace diplomacy, 97 percent of all mediators and 92 percent of all negotiators are men (Aggestam and Towns 2018, 2019). However, changes have taken place in recent decades, resulting in a range of initiatives that have enhanced women’s presence in global politics. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action that were adopted in 1995 ensured the emergence of gender mainstreaming and the promotion of women’s rights, defined as human rights, as key norms in global politics.1 The quest for gender equality and rights figures large in the ambitions and agendas of a range of global institutions, expressed in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women Peace and Security (WPS) in 2000. Moreover, states such as Canada, Sweden, Norway, and France have integrated UNSCR 1325 into their foreign and security policies, adopting national action plans to further its goals (Aggestam and True  2020; Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond, and Kronsell 2019; Shepherd 2016; Hudson 2017). The promotion of gender mainstreaming, coupled with the emphasis placed on UNSCR 1325, has begun to transform global governance practices, providing a gender-­just context for peaceful transformations of diplomatic and foreign policy practice. Here, it is interesting to note that nearly all United Nations (UN) bodies and agencies now formally endorse gender mainstreaming as a methodology and a toolset for gender-­just and peaceful change in global politics.

222   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond This shift has been widely studied within feminist-­informed international theory and peace and conflict studies. This work centers on the quest for peaceful and gender-­just change through new institutional frameworks (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019; Davies and True 2019; Shepherd 2016; True 2016a, 2016b; Jansson and Eduards 2016). Such scholarship reflects diverse theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, and contexts, though sharing the aim to highlight how gender-­based injustices in global politics inhibit peaceful change. Feminist scholars, working within the broad tradition of peace studies, have also challenged traditional studies of war and peace by insisting that peaceful change cannot be fully understood without problematizing the gendered logics and everydayness of conflict and peace (Wibben et al. 2019). This involves recognizing the continuum between different forms of violence (Wibben et al.  2019) and reflecting on how gender (in)equalities and power structures determine the prospects for sustainable peace. Gender then is a major fault line in global politics (Inglehart and Norris 1992). Moreover, a number of studies identify a linkage between women’s sense of security and the prevalence of gender equality, justice, and security at the national and global levels. Here, Caprioli et al. (2009, 1) have analyzed data gathered within the Women Stats project, which is “a multidisciplinary creation of a central repository for cross-­national data and information on women available for use by academics, policy makers, journalists, and all others,” to track the correlation between gender equality and a state’s peacefulness (see also Hudson 2014; Melander 2005). Feminist international relations and peace scholars have also called for an expanded notion of peaceful change that is inclusive, transformative, and expansive (Duncanson 2015) and takes account of gender justice and norms (True 2016a, 2016b). This requires emphasis being placed on the roles that women (and other marginalized groups) play in violent conflicts and peace processes and ensuring that those roles are made more visible in times of peace, war, and violence (Alison 2007). Such an approach brings nuance to understandings of peace and puts gender and relations of power at the center of the analysis of peaceful change (Confortini 2006). It should also be noted that feminist scholarship has taken issue with conventional understandings of power grounded in violence and dominance, since there needs to be more recognition that power involves acquiring the “power to” transform inequalities and challenge gendered hierarchies, without acquiring “power over” another human being in the process (see Boulding 2000; Tickner 1992). The aim of this chapter is to explore the interplay between gender and peaceful change by drawing upon feminist scholarship on peace, conflict, and war. We elaborate on the ways in which the concept of peace is inherently gendered, disabling peaceful change in war and conflict. We also address the theory-­policy divide on gender and peaceful change, in particular by exposing the tendency among the international community and states to envisage women as more peaceful, without paying much attention to women’s and men’s varied experiences in war and peacemaking. Our study is located within theoretical feminist and gender-­based reasoning but also highlights key developments within policy practice, related to gender-­just peace. This involves considering the relevance of the UNSCR 1325 and the emergence of feminist foreign policy in furthering peaceful change.

Gender and Peaceful Change   223 The chapter is structured as follows. The first part introduces feminist scholarship on the intersections between gender, war, and conflict. Next we turn to the conceptualization and interplay between gender and peaceful change, considering the so-­called women-­peace hypothesis, which assumes a proximity between women’s peacefulness and their experiences of maternal care. We argue that such constructions need to be treated with caution because transformative peace requires deconstruction of that thesis, while staying attentive to women’s contributions to peacemaking. We also consider the relevance of debates on strategic essentialism and inclusive peace as well as notions of transformative peace and the deconstruction of gender in reaching deeper and more meaningful understandings of gender-­just peaceful change. The third part focuses on policy practice, with emphasis on the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 and the reorientation of Swedish foreign policy, as an illustration of its adoption of feminism as a platform for peaceful change (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019).

Gender, War, and Conflict Feminist security studies and feminist peace research (Confortini 2004; Shepherd 2011; Wibben et al.  2019) offer a range of opportunities to investigate the intersections between gender, war, and conflict. Gender here refers to “a relation of power, and something produced and reproduced in social processes” and “patriarchal power relations, and thus gender hierarchy” (Cockburn 2007, 6). Hence, a feminist approach to the study of peaceful change seeks to identify and unsettle gendered power hierarchies and relations, to highlight their impact on gender justice. It does so by critically exploring the structural and institutional dynamics of war and conflict as well as staying “attentive to lived experience” so as to “focus on what goes on during war and on individuals, both civilian and military, and how their lives are affected by conflict” (Shepherd 2011, 437). Unpacking such individual experiences entails disrupting the gendered attributes that historically have been assigned to men and women in war, in particular the protection myth that prevails in global politics (Alison 2007). That myth assigns bodily strength and rationality to men, charging them with the protection of vulnerable women and children in war, what Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987) famously defined as “just warriors.” Women, on the other hand, have throughout history been assigned the role of peaceful “beautiful souls” reproducing the nation through child bearing (Elshtain  1987). As Elshtain (1987, 44) noted, “we in the West are the heirs of a tradition that assumes an affinity between women and peace, between men and war, a tradition that consists of culturally constructed and transmitted myths and memories.” However, assigning ster­e­ o­typ­i­cal roles to men and women disregards the plurality of intersectional experiences and roles that men and women, and individuals with other sexual orientations, acquire in conflict and war. Meanwhile, women and girls are proportionally more exposed to violence and injustice in war, with a considerably higher number of women being ­sexually assaulted in conflict, or see their reproductive and human rights being

224   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond c­ ompromised by brutal male leaders (Nicholas and Agius 2018). While “women and girls are the predominant victims of sexual violence and men and boys the predominant agents, we must also be able to account for the presence of male victims and female agents” (Alison 2007, 75; see also Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). More women are also joining national armed forces and taking part in international military operations (Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell 2018; Duncanson and Woodward 2017). A critical investigation of the co-­constitutive relationship between gender and peaceful change should therefore be grounded in an intersectional analysis and be committed to the uncovering of marginalized voices in conflict and post-­ conflict locations (Sjoberg 2008). Without such dialogue and the disruption of the gendered logics of war, peaceful change remains but a notional ideal, since a peace settlement that excludes the knowledge and experiences of marginalized groups will not be durable. We propose that a gender-­just driven approach to peaceful change requires open-­ended dialogue and recognition that many aspects of violent conflict persist beyond its formal ending. Here feminist peace research can provide a platform for critical analysis of the intersections between gender and conflict. Such research is grounded in a commitment to the analysis of both “spectacular instances of violence or peace” while nuancing “our analysis of the everydayness of reconciliatory measures and the mundaneness of both violence and peace” (Wibben et al.  2019, 86). This invites the analysis of war as experience, with Christine Sylvester (2013, 65) noting that “[t]o study war as experience requires that the human body come into focus as a unit that has agency in war and is also the target of war’s violence.” The study of personal narratives and embodied experiences is “essential because they are a primary way by which we make sense of the world around us, produce meanings, articulate intentions, and legitimate actions” (Wibben 2011, 2). That recognition is present in feminist thinking on just war, with Laura Sjoberg’s work (2006) being seminal here. Her aim is to disrupt the conceptual and empirical links between “the just war tradition” and “gendered notions of warfare” in an effort to identify and rethink “gendered nature not only of war ethics, but also of war justificatory narratives, war practices and war experiences.” This involves recognizing that war is an emotional experience (Sjoberg  2008, 8) located within the everydayness of war and conflict (Wibben et al. 2019). War is more than military power and dominance; it involves dealing with economic destruction, gendered oppression, and environmental concerns (Sjoberg 2008), what could be defined as “slow violence” (Nixon 2011). Sjoberg (2008, 8) also notes that “jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules should recognize [. . .] the human impacts ‘before’ and ‘after’ a war caused by the continual state of violence and conflict in international politics.” Along with a range of feminist scholars, we argue that scholarly engagements with peaceful change are served well by a feminist approach to notions of just war (Sjoberg 2008) since it allows for multiple voices to be accounted for and, as such, facilitates peaceful dialogues. This requires “empathetic cooperation,” which according to Sjoberg (2006, 2008) and Sylvester (1994) is an expression in care ethics. Such “an ethics of care recognizes war as an emotional experience, and the victims of war (soldiers and civilians) as human beings with dignity” (Sjoberg 2008, 8). By highlighting empathy, care, and dialogue as

Gender and Peaceful Change   225 well as individual experience, a feminist perspective on just war and post-­conflict can inspire peaceful transformations of war-­torn regions by disrupting gendered practices of militarism and violence, which sit at the heart of violent conflict. This involves adopting a wider conception of security that is not couched within militarism alone but includes the everydayness of war and conflict (Wibben 2011).

Gender, Feminism, and Peaceful Change Peaceful change is related to the remaking of societies in the aftermath of war and conflict. Johan Galtung’s (1964) distinction between negative and positive peace provides a common point of departure for assessing peace. Negative peace entails a minimalist understanding of the concept that centers on the absence of inter- or intrastate violence. Positive peace rests on an expansive definition, which includes the ending of structural violence, societal injustices, and gendered oppression. Feminist studies, broadly located within peace research, tend to focus on gender equality and women’s empowerment and participation in peace processes and as such resonate more with the notion of positive peace. A feminist perspective on positive peace rests on a forward-­looking approach, aiming at achieving a gender-­just peace that affords rights and participation to women and other marginalized groups while recognizing their everyday experiences (Wibben et al. 2019). For instance, Caprioli’s (2000) seminal work highlights the significance of domestic gender equality and its pacifying and peaceful effects on state behavior. Moreover, women’s equal right to participate in formal and informal institutions as well as peacemaking is central to the realization of gender-­just peacebuilding and peace itself (Björkdahl 2012). Yet the interplay between gender and peaceful change is contested, both within the academy and in practice, since there is a range of understandings of how this correlation actually works. We discuss in this chapter three distinct analytical approaches to this interplay, all centering on the links between gender and peaceful change: (1) the women-­peace hypothesis, (2) strategic essentialism and inclusion, and (3) transformative peace and the deconstruction of gender. Although we present them separately for analytical purposes, they are frequently overlapping in policy debates and academic conversations.

The Women-­Peace Hypothesis The women-­peace hypothesis focuses on women as a monolithic group, with peaceful qualities emerging from their experiences of maternal care (Reardon 1985). The argument centers on the assumption that women are fundamentally different from men, in particular by being more empathetic, caring, and cooperative (Maoz 2009). Men, on the other hand, are constituted as power oriented and competitive, though this is an argument that begs for unpacking. The construction of women as more peaceful and suited

226   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond for care work within the confines of the home means that they historically have been marginalized and excluded from public life and peace diplomacy. However, there is more recognition that women’s distinct experiences and abilities enable them to bring new ideas and practices to peacemaking (Maoz 2009). Yet there is a tendency to populate peace processes and negotiations with warlords and military leaders, whose mindsets tend to be dominated by the logic of power politics and militarized solutions to conflict. We should be mindful of the assignment of distinct qualities to men and women in times of peace and war, while recognizing that women’s historical location within care work has equipped them with certain communicative skills that generally have been undervalued (Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell 2018; Aharoni 2016). Indeed, the women-­peace hypothesis has been key to mobilizing women’s activism and has undergirded historical struggles for gender equality and peaceful change. For instance, the suffragettes of the early twentieth century contended that ending women’s exclusion from peace diplomacy would have enhanced the prospects for peace and the ending of war (International Encyclopedia 2018). This thesis has continued to inform debates on women’s participation in solidarity movements, such as MeToo and the International Women’s Strike initiative, by enhancing the quality of the decision-­making process and as such contributing to peaceful and feminist change. The women-­peace hypothesis has been the subject of many critical engagements, in particular the essentialism inherent in its normative logics (Alison 2007). Sara Ruddick’s (1989) research on maternal care and peace is seminal here because she puts more emphasis on process and practice rather than women’s distinct nurturing qualities. Ruddick argues that maternal care, defined by compromise and fairness, is central to peaceful change. However, Ruddick (1989; see also Robinson  2011) does not equate maternal care with biological mothers alone; rather, she stresses that care work can be carried out by both men and women. Yet a number of scholars have sought to identify variations in the ways women and men negotiate and mediate within peace processes. Such scholarship holds that the skills required for successful peacemaking are usually more compatible with feminine rather than masculine characteristics (see, e.g., Florea et al. 2003). Those femininities are not the product of biological difference but gender identities, binaries, and assumptions about men’s and women’s aptness in various situations that are socially constructed and subject to change (Cockburn 2007; see also Bergman Rosamond 2013). While the portrayal of women as inherently more prone to peace and relational dialogue suffers from essentialism, their preference for problem-­solving dialogue in peacemaking and peace negotiations should be recognized, in particular since male negotiators often opt for a more confrontational mode of conflict resolution. Florea et al. (2003, 230) have noted that women bring a personalized component of empathy to peace negotiations, which is a skill undervalued in male-­dominated negotiating settings. Furthermore, masculine traits are frequently associated with a competitive transactional negotiation behavior, whereas feminine characteristics are linked to transformational problem-­ solving (Florea et al. 2003). These assumptions also prevail in policy practice pertaining to gender-­just peace, in particular within the WPS agenda and as a key component in

Gender and Peaceful Change   227 the making of feminist-­informed foreign policy. Next, we examine the significance of women’s inclusion in various stages of the peace process.

Strategic Essentialism and Inclusive Peace While a lot of recent work conducted by feminist theorists and gender scholars takes issue with the women-­peace hypothesis, there is recognition that women tend to hold different perspectives than men on questions of war and peace, given their distinct experiences (Wibben et al.  2019). Bringing such experiences into peacebuilding can enable the achievement of sustainable and peaceful change, in particular since women are assumed to employ more empathetic care in relation to their dialogical partners (Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell 2018), ensuring a more inclusive peace settlement. This position prevails in transnational women’s movements and within advocacy that centers on the enhancement of women’s participation in peace processes. For instance, transnational women’s advocacy groups laid the ground and lobbied intensively for UNSCR 1325. As such, the diffusion and empowerment of women’s peace organizations expanded swiftly and globally (Cockburn 2007; Garner 2010; True 2016a, 2016b). These efforts culminated in the adoption of UNSCR 1325, which made women much more visible in times of war and across conflicts. Recent empirically oriented approaches to women’s participation in peace processes have recognized that women remain marginalized and excluded from formal political decision-­making on security and peace. The UN and other bodies therefore advocate their inclusion in such processes, in particular by noting that women’s unique experiences should be considered alongside those of men (UN Women 2018). Hence, the overarching aim has been to make women more visible by probing the basic question “where are the women” in peacemaking (Enloe 2000). To this end, scholars have compiled data sets to examine the correlation between gender equality, empowerment, women’s participation, security, and peace. Some studies have indicated that states with poor records on gender inequality are more likely to be involved in intrastate conflicts (Caprioli 2000; Melander 2005). Such studies have often been cited in policy making processes and by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote gender mainstreaming and inclusion. Moreover, UNSCR 1325 was instrumental in providing a global framework for the promotion of gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding processes (Anderlini  2007; Cohn 2013a, 2013b; True 2016b). Indeed, contemporary policy discourses stress that women’s participation in peace processes increases the likelihood of gender-­specific provisions in peace agreements (UN Women 2018), which is a step toward peaceful change. This has been corroborated in several studies showing that since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, a growing number of peace agreements have contained gender provisions (Bell  2015). Moreover, in UN-­ sponsored peace processes, the WPS agenda plays an integral part in 67 percent of all peace agreements (Bell 2015). This pattern most likely reflects the growing practice of including members with gender expertise on negotiation teams. Paffenholz et al. (2016)

228   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond found a positive correlation in those cases in which women had been able to exercise strong influence in the peace negotiations and the drafting of the subsequent peace agreements. The case of Liberia showed that women’s groups outside the formal negotiations were able to exert powerful pressure on the negotiating delegations. The Women in the Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) successfully mobilized effective mass actions in parallel to the official peace negotiations, demanding that the parties should reach an agreement (O’Reilly et al. 2015). Yet Paffenholz et al.’s (2016) study does not confirm a correlation between greater representation of women and actual influence over the negotiation process and the peace agreement. The Paffenholz study concludes that rather than counting women, the focus should be on assessing their activities and the degree to which they can influence decision-­making bodies within the peace negotiation process. This involves exploring how much they are able to influence the commencement of the peace negotiations, set the negotiation agenda, add gender provisions to an agreement, and push for its signature. It includes assessing the extent to which a peace agreement is gender sensitive and just and if it addresses women’s rights in a meaningful way. In the context of peace agreements, it seems that women’s participation as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and negotiators has a positive impact on the transformative qualities of peace itself. According to Laurel Stone (2015), women’s participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding increases the prospects for peace agreements being kept over time by 20 to 35 percent. However, according to Christine Bell (2015, 1), this requires that gender-­sensitive peace agreements are fully implemented. References to women and gender issues tend to be infused with “constructive ambiguity” and “holistic interpretations” that often reflect the absence of shared understandings among the parties. In the next section we turn to transformative peace, a process that is central to peaceful change.

Transformative Peace and the Deconstruction of Gender Feminist scholars have raised concerns regarding the tendency to emphasize women’s and men’s distinct qualities and weaknesses on the basis of biological difference and sex categorizations. Women’s lack of agency in peace processes and participation in public life more broadly have been derived from assumptions about their biological sex and aptness for care work rather than official policy processes. Moreover, women tend to be treated as a monolithic group, associated with peacefulness and care, and as such their differences are disregarded (Elshtain 1987). Yet that tendency has also been used in a strategic fashion, what has been defined as strategic essentialism, to enhance women’s participation in peacemaking. This tendency has been criticized by feminist scholars, who have pointed to the danger of stereotypically assigning peacefulness and care to women (Duncanson 2015, 52; Cohn 1987). Such stereotypical identity constructions may reinforce gender-­based exclusion from power structures, since they fail to challenge gender(ed) hierarchies and power relations that obstruct women from being taken seriously as political actors.

Gender and Peaceful Change   229 To strengthen and further transformative notions and practices of peaceful change, we argue, requires challenging such gender hierarchies and taking account of their location within particular historical and sociopolitical contexts. Given that, and in line with our previous argument, it is central to conceptualize gender as a socially constructed analytical category and as a social relational process (Cockburn 2007). This entails a critical analysis of how masculinities and femininities are constructed in relation to war and peace. This renders visible the multiple roles that women and men play in war and peace and moves away from the commonplace construction of women as primarily nurturing mothers by also taking account of their roles in war and violence (Alison 2007). Moreover, by adopting an intersectional approach to the analysis of conflict and peace, it is possible to probe how gender intersects with class, geographical location, age, race, and sexuality. Gender identities are always interconnected and fluid across contexts and time, and that insight is central to the construction of durable and peaceful change. In the third part of the chapter we explore how the overarching goal of peaceful change is furthered within policy formulations pertaining to the WPS agenda and feminist-­ informed foreign policy.

Policy Formulations on Gender and Peaceful Change The WPS Agenda Here we unpack the normative commitment to peaceful change that prevails in the WPS agenda. UNSCR 1325 was adopted in 2000 to “further the international community’s broad commitment to the protection of women exposed to violence and repression, and to increase their representation within national armed forces and peace processes” (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019). The resolution has since then been bolstered by the adoption of eight additional resolutions. The contents, ethics, gender logics, and success of the WPS agenda have been extensively investigated, giving rise to many studies of its dual commitment to protection and participation (Davies and True 2019), as well as its location within gendered assumptions about women and men, militarism, securitization, and colonialism (Shepherd 2011; Basu 2016; Hudson 2009). Though we do not dismiss the agenda’s location within practices of militarism and gendering, we contend that it also provides arenas for collaboration between nonmilitary and military actors that challenge and contest the use of militaristic language and practice (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019, 35). The WPS agenda is firmly situated within a commitment to transformative change by seeking to reduce gendered violence and by enabling more women to actively and meaningfully participate in peace processes. Women are central to “the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-­building, peacekeeping, humanitarian

230   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond response and in post-­conflict reconstruction” (UN Security Council 2000). They should be allowed “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” (UN Security Council 2000). Participation alone is not sufficient in bringing about gender-­just peace; for that to happen the international community needs to protect “women and girls from gender-­based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict” (UN Security Council 2000). While ethically commendable, UNSCR 1325 has not been able to end gender-­based violence in conflict or to ensure equity in women’s representation in peace processes. In that absence new resolutions were adopted, including UNSCR 1820 in 2008. By adopting the latter the UN Security Council recognized the lack of change within the WPS agenda: “Despite its repeated condemnation of violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict . . . and despite its calls addressed to all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of such acts with immediate effect, such acts continue to occur, and in some situations have become systematic and widespread, reaching appalling levels of brutality” (UN Security Council 2008). It was also recognized that more measures were needed to ensure women’s participation “in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding” and the recognition of “women’s capacity and legitimacy to participate in post-­conflict public life and its impact this has on durable peace” (UN Security Council 2008). Two years later resolution 1060 was adopted, which further committed the world to the eradication of gendered violence by noting that “despite its repeated condemnation of violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict, including sexual violence such acts continue to occur and they have become systematic” (UN Security Council 2010). To address the lack of measurable results in the area of sexual violence, the UN established a new position, that of UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. UNSCR resolution 2122, adopted in 2013, shifted the WPS agenda somewhat by identifying a strong connection between women’s empowerment, human rights, gender equality, participation in key decisions, and “efforts to maintain international peace and security.” While pushing for such emancipatory change, UNSCR 2122 also recognized that some “progress” and “good practice” have emerged in terms of both prevention and protection (UN Security Council  2013). However, the resolutions outlined here tend to equate gender with women and girls, and, as such showing little or no attention to male sexual violence in conflict or the vulnerability of young boys in war. UNSCR resolution 2467 on WPS: sexual violence in conflict, adopted in 2019, begins to address this silence. It states that “acts of sexual and gender-­based violence in conflict can be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of . . . armed conflict, including non-­state armed groups. The victims of such violence should have access to such things as health care, psychosocial care, safe shelter, livelihood support, and legal aid,” and there should be recognition that “men and boys . . . may have been victims of sexual violence in conflict” (UN Security Council 2019). The adoption of an intersectional position on gendered violence might serve to demilitarize and de-­gender the WPS agenda and in so doing enhance the prospects for peaceful change in the global security structure.

Gender and Peaceful Change   231 Having introduced the formulation of peaceful change within the WPS framework, we briefly reflect on some of its shortcomings. As noted previously, the UNSCR 1325 agenda is located within narrow conceptions of gender, pertaining to the protector-­ protected dichotomy that still prevails in global politics. In this context, Shepherd (2008) argues that “in 1325, I identify constructions of gender that assume it largely synonymous with biological sex and, further, reproduce logics of identity that characterized women as fragile, passive, and in need of protection and construction of security that locate the responsibility of protection firmly in the hands of elite political actors in the international system.” Such gendering practices risk embedding the gendered hierarchies and power relations that underpin war and conflict. A related point here is that the WPS agenda tends to frame sexual and gender-­based violence in conflict within racialized language by often constituting men in conflict-­affected areas as the only perpetrators of sexual and gender-­based violence, disregarding the prevalence of such violence in “peacetime” states or among peacekeepers (Heathcote  2018, 380). What is more, the WPS agenda is individual centric in many ways and as such does not address the systemic underpinnings of gendered violence (Heathcote 2018, 380) or women’s frequent absence from participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Nonetheless, UNSCR 1325 constitutes a strong normative global framework and provides for arena shifting through its emphasis on inclusion and enhancement of women’s wider political participation in the field of peace and security (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019, 35).

Feminist Foreign Policy There has been a rise in the adoption of pro-­gender-­equality norms in foreign policy practice. Gender mainstreaming and a commitment to women’s participation in peacemaking and their entitlement to gender equality, justice, and bodily and reproductive integrity have become key features of a growing number of states’ foreign policies (Aggestam and True 2020). A key feature of this turn is the recognition that women’s security is increasingly linked to national and international security, which was a prominent feature of the “Hillary doctrine” pursued by Secretary of State Clinton while in office (Hudson and Leidl 2015). This is reflected in states’ promotion of women’s security and human rights as a priority in their international peace and security strategies. A large number of states have adopted national action plans (NAPs) in their quest to implement UNSCR 1325 and the wider WPS agenda within domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, the WPS agenda has become a key pillar of the foreign policies of a range of states, including Canada, Norway, Colombia, Sweden, and South Africa (Aggestam and True  2020). Through their foreign policies they promote gender equality in global affairs, framing the advancement of women’s representation and gender equality as “smart diplomacy and economics” (Clinton 2010). While progress has been made in advancing pro-­gender-­equality norms in various international fora, individual states’

232   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond foreign policies vary in how much they include gender-­based justice in their foreign policy commitments. Next, we illustrate Sweden’s commitment to peaceful change as a central component of its feminist foreign policy platform. Gender justice and equality have risen to prominence in the making of Swedish foreign and security policy (Bergman Rosamond 2020). The Swedish Social Democrat-­ Green coalition government, in office since 2014, has adopted an overtly feminist foreign policy that seeks to “improve conditions for women and contribute to peace and development” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2015, 3). The Swedish government is a self-­proclaimed “feminist government,” which states “that gender equality is central to the Government’s priorities—in decision-­making and resource allocation. A feminist government ensures that a gender equality perspective is brought into policy making on a broad front, both nationally and internationally. Women and men must have the same power to shape society and their own lives. This is a human right and a matter of democracy and justice.” (Government Offices of Sweden n.d., 1) Feminist foreign policy is imbued with an explicit anti-­militaristic and de-­securitizing logic and a wish to involve women and other intersectional categories in all aspects of global peacebuilding (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019; Bergman Rosamond 2020). This commitment is linked to the country’s active engagement with the WPS agenda, having to date adopted three national action plans, among other things committing the country to furthering women’s human and reproductive rights and their active participation in peace operations and peace processes and ensuring their protection from sexual and gender-­based violence in conflict. Feminist foreign policy then is a platform for peaceful change and dialogical and relational foreign policy practice, though not without its inconsistencies. The Swedish government has been particularly active in terms of women’s inclusion and participation in peace processes and has formulated a range of proposals to achieve that goal. Those proposals are undergirded by a wish to redesign peace negotiations, locally and globally. Underpinning those initiatives is the question of how women’s organizations and individuals can be made part of peace processes. However, as we have noted, peace negotiations are dominated by masculine values and militarism and offer limited possibilities for women to participate in or make an active contribution to postwar reconstruction. Further complicating matters is the fact that peace negotiations are surrounded by secrecy and exclusion, making it even harder for women’s organizations to acquire access to the formal negotiation process (Aggestam 2019). Yet ensuring women’s presence at the negotiating table is a central component of Swedish feminist foreign policy. This objective rests on the assumption that the inclusion of more women in peace-­related decisions will strengthen the efficiency and design of peace diplomacy (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2017). Peace mediation and women’s inclusion within it are viewed as central aspects of peaceful change, and part of this normative platform is to ensure that women chief mediators play a key part in peacemaking (Aggestam and Svensson 2018). Relevant to such change is the protection of vulnerable people in times of conflict and war and in their aftermath. This involves unpacking the damaging effects of patriarchy

Gender and Peaceful Change   233 and gendered power relations as well as militarized masculinity on women’s security and bodily integrity and rights (Local  2018). As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Sweden promoted protection of women and girls from gender-­based violence as a weapon of war. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has located that commitment within the global combat of “the gender-­related and sexual violence of terrorist groups by pushing these issues in international antiterrorism forums and by supporting actors, including civil society organisations, that are working to address violent extremism, radicalisation, recruitment and destructive masculinities” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2017, 6). So, key to feminist foreign policy is Sweden’s commitment to gender-­just peaceful change through the inclusion of women in more peace processes as well as pushing for their protection in conflict and post-­conflict locations. While few would dispute the significance of such initiatives, it is important to stay attentive to the Swedish tendency to equate gender with women and girls and in so doing employ essentialist strategies. That tendency also involves constructing women as natural born agents of peace, with the risk of reinforcing prevalent gender relations and damaging peacebuilding processes locally. Thus, in many ways Sweden employs a women-­peace hypothesis by idealizing certain forms of femininity and assuming that women’s inclusion in peace processes automatically leads to peaceful change. This risks reproducing broader depoliticized global strategies of simply “counting” women and “adding” them to peace processes, without questioning the militarized infrastructure and power dynamics that underpin peace negotiations (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019).

Conclusion This chapter has examined the interplay between gender and peaceful change. While women have a long history of global activism in the areas of war and peace, they have been marginalized and excluded in politics and diplomacy. However, in recent decades a number of important changes have taken place. We now see how the quest for gender equality and women’s rights figures large in the ambitions and agendas of a range of global institutions. The chapter has addressed some of these policy formulations on gender and peaceful change by focusing on the WPS agenda and the trend of adopting a feminist framing and platform for the conduct of foreign policy. In the chapter, we have assessed two dominant understandings of gender and peaceful change that are frequently used in advocacy, namely those of the women-­peace hypothesis and strategic essentialism. While they have been central in mobilizing women’s activism and historical struggles for gender equality and peaceful change, we argue that there is a danger of treating women as a monolithic group and as such assigning essentialist qualities to them, most pronouncedly those of peacefulness and care. Instead we argue that there is a need to strengthen a transformative notion of gender-­just peaceful change by focusing on gendered structures and hierarchies, which are located in particular historical and

234   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond sociopolitical contexts. Here, gender is understood as a socially constructed analytical category and as a relational process, which highlights how masculinities and femininities are constructed in relation to war and peace. As such, it renders visible the multiple roles that women and men play in peaceful change.

Note 1. “Gender mainstreaming” refers to policies and strategies to resolve inequalities between men and women.

References Aggestam, Karin. 2019. “WPS, Peace Negotiations and Agreements.” In Oxford University Press Handbook on Women, Peace, Security, edited by Sara Davies and Jacqui True, 815–828. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aggestam, Karin, and Annika Bergman Rosamond. 2019. “Re-politicising the GenderSecurity Nexus: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy.” European Review of International Studies 5, no. 3: 30–48. Aggestam, Karin, Annika Bergman Rosamond, and Annica Kronsell. 2019. “Theorising Feminist Foreign Policy.” International Relations 33, no. 1: 23–39. Aggestam, Karin, and Isak Svensson. 2018. “Where Are the Women in Peace Mediation?” In Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation, edited by K. Aggestam and A. Towns, 149–169, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Aggestam, Karin, and Ann Towns, eds. 2018. Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Aggestam, Karin, and Ann Towns. 2019. “The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 21, no. 1: 9–28. Aggestam, Karin, and Jacqui True. 2020. “Gendering Foreign Policy: A Comparative Framework for Analysis.” Foreign Policy Analysis 16, no. 2: 143–162. Aharoni, Sarai. 2016. “Who Needs the Women and Peace Hypothesis? Rethinking Modes of Inquiry on Gender and Conflict in Israel/Palestine.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 19, no. 3: 311–326. Alison, Miranda. 2007. “Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity.” Review of International Studies 33, no. 1: 75–90. Anderlini, Sanam N. 2007. Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Basu, Soumita. 2016. “The Global South Writes 1325 (Too).” International Political Science Review 37, no. 3: 362–374. Bell, Christine. 2015. “Text and Context. Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their Gender Perspective.” UN Women. October. http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/ attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/text-and-context_en.pdf?vs=4743. Bergman Rosamond, Annika. 2013. “Protection beyond Borders: Gender Cosmopolitanism and Co-constitutive Obligation.” Global Society 27, no. 1: 319–336. Bergman Rosamond, Annika. 2020. “Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy and ‘Gender Cosmopolitanism.’ ” Foreign Policy Analysis 16, no. 2: 217–235.

Gender and Peaceful Change   235 Bergman Rosamond, Annika, and Annica Kronsell. 2018. “Cosmopolitan Militaries and Dialogic Peacekeeping: Danish and Swedish Women Soldiers in Afghanistan.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 20, no. 2: 172–187. Björkdahl, Annika. 2012. “A Gender-Just Peace: Exploring the Post-Dayton Peace Agreement.” Peace & Change: A Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 2: 286–317. Boulding, Elise. 2000. Cultures of Peace. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Caprioli, Mary. 2000. “Gendered Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1: 51–68. Caprioli, Mary, Valerie Hudson, Rose McDermott, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Chad Emmett, and Matthew D. Stearmer. 2009. “The WomanStats Project Database: Advancing an Empirical Research Agenda.” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 6: 1–13. Clinton, Hillary. 2010. “Development in the 21st Century.” Foreign Policy, January 6. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/hillary_clinton_on_development_in_the_21st_century. Cockburn, Cynthia. 2007. From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis. London: Zed Books. Cohn, Carol. 1987. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 12, no. 4: 687–718. Cohn, Carol. 2013a. Women & Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Cohn, Carol. 2013b. “Maternal Thinking and the Concept of Vulnerability in Security Paradigms, Policies and Practices.” Politics and Ethics Review 10, no. 1: 46–69. Confortini, Catia. 2004. “Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion? Women’s Movements and International Relations.” International Politics 41: 282–283. Confortini, Catia. 2006. “Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case for a Peace Studies/ Feminism Alliance.” Peace & Change: Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 3: 333–367. Davies, Sara  E., and Jacqui True, eds. 2019. The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duncanson, Claire. 2015. Gender and Peacebuilding. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Duncanson, Claire, and Rachel Woodward, eds. 2017. The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Elshtain, Jean B. 1987. Women and War. New York: University of Chicago Press and Basic Books. Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. Berkeley: University of California Press. Florea, Natalie  B., Scott  W.  Brown, Michael. J.  Butler, and Magnolia Hernandez. 2003. “Negotiating from Mars to Venus: Gender in Simulated International Negotiations.” Simulation Gaming 24: 226–248. Galtung, Johan. 1964. “An Editorial.” Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1: 1–4. Garner, Karen. 2010. Shaping a Global Women’s Agenda: Women’s NGOs and Global Governance, 1925–85. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Government Offices of Sweden. n.d. A Feminist Government. https://www.government.se/ government-policy/a-feminist-government/ Heathcote, Gina. 2018. “Security Council Resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security: Progressive Gains or Dangerous Development?” Global Society 32, no. 4: 374–394. Hudson, Heidi. 2017. “The Power of Mixed Messages: Women, Peace, and Security Language in National Action Plans from Africa.” Africa Spectrum 52, no. 3: 3–29. Hudson, Natalie, F. 2009. “Securitizing Women’s Human Rights.” Journal of Human Rights 8, no. 1: 53–70. Hudson, Valerie. 2014. Sex and World Peace. New York: Columbia University Press.

236   Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond Hudson, Valerie, and Patricia Leidl. 2015. The Hillary Doctrine: Sex and American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 1992. Rising Tide and Cultural Change among the World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. 2018. “Suffragettes.” https://encyclopedia.1914 -1918-online.net/article/suffragettes. Jansson, Maria, and Maud Eduards. 2016. “The Politics of Gender in the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 18, no. 4: 590–604. Local, The. 2018. “Sweden Pushes Feminist Foreign Policy in the Wake of #MeToo.” Maoz, Ifat. 2009. “The Women and Peace Hypothesis? The Effect of Opponent Negotiators’ Gender on the Evaluation of Compromise Solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” International Negotiation 14, no. 3: 519–536. Melander, Erik. 2005. “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4: 695–714. Nicholas, Lucy, and Christine Agius. 2018. The Persistence of Global Masculinism. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Nixon, Rob, 2011. Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. O’Reilly, Marie, Andrea Ó. Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz. 2015. “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes.” June. New York: International Peace Institute. Paffenholz, Thania, N. Ross, S. Dixon, Anna-Lena Schluchter, and Jacqui True. 2016. “Making Women Count—Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations.” January 4. Report of ITI and UN Women. Reardon, Betty A. 1985. Sexism and the War System. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Robinson, Fiona. 2011. The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon Press. Shepherd, Laura. 2008. Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice. London: Zed Books. Shepherd, Laura. 2011. “Sex, Security and Superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and Beyond.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 13, no. 4: 504–521. Shepherd, Laura. 2016. “Making War Safe for Women? National Action Plans and the Militarisation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.” International Political Science Review 37, no. 3: 324–335. Sjoberg, Laura. 2006. Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq: A Feminist Reformulation of Just War Theory. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Sjoberg, Laura. 2008. “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever.” International Politics 45: 1–18. Sjoberg, Laura, and Caron Gentry. 2007. Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics. London: Zed Books. Stone, Laurel. 2015. “Annex II: Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Participation in Peace Processes.” In Reimagining Peacemkaing: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes. edited by M. O’Reilly, A. Suilleabhain, and T. Paffenholz, 34. New York: International Peace Institute. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2015. “Swedish Foreign Action Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy 2015–2018 Including Indicative Measures for 2016. Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet.

Gender and Peaceful Change   237 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2017. Swedish Foreign Action Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy 2015–2018 Including Focus Area for 2017. Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet. Sylvester, Christine. 1994. “Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23, no. 2: 315–334. Sylvester, Christine. 2013. War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis. New York: Routledge. Tickner, Ann. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press. True, Jacqui. 2016a. “Explaining the Global Diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.” International Political Science Review 37, no. 3: 307–323. True, Jacqui. 2016b. “Is Gender Mainstreaming in Peace and Security Effective?” In Handbook on Gender and International Relations, edited by Jill Steans, 43–63. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. UN Security Council. 2000. Resolution 1325. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1325. UN Security Council. 2008. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B -6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20RES%201820.pdf. UN Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1960. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1960. UN Security Council. 2013. Resolution 2122. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2122. UN Security Council. 2019. Resolution 2467. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2467.pdf. UN Women. 2018. Series on Inclusive Peace Processes. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital -library/publications/2018/12/series-on-inclusive-peace-processes. Wibben, Annick. 2011. Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach. London: Routledge. Wibben, Annick, C.  Confortini, S.  Roohi, S.  Aharoni, L.  Vastapuu, and T.  Vaittinen, 2019. “Collective Discussion: Piecing-Up Feminist Peace Research.” International Political Sociology 13, no. 1: 86–107.

chapter 13

Ci v iliz ation, R eligion, A N D Peacefu l a n d Non-Peacefu l Ch a nge i n Asi a Victoria Tin-­b or Hui

For scholars interested in peaceful change, the best laboratory is Asia. Asia should be ­geographically defined to include not just East Asia, but also Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Asia is home to multiple ancient civilizations—Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Jewish, nomadic, Turkic, Persian—and world religions—Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Judaist, Shinto, Taoist, and more. Asia thus offers an ideal site to examine peaceful and non-­peaceful change in diverse civilizational and religious contexts. There is a general impression that while Abrahamic religions tend to justify violence, the Eastern traditions of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism are more conducive to peace. Jessica Stern, who studies Christian, Islamist, and Jewish terrorism, suggests that it is much harder for followers of monotheistic religions “to be pluralist . . . to recognize more than one ultimate principle or pathway to God—and to see these as equally valid” (2004, 137). Christopher Reuter even maintains, along Huntington’s oft-­quoted line that “Islam has bloody borders” (1993, 35), that Islam is “a well-­suited ideology for war” because the “mental image of Muhammad and his crowd of followers setting off on a conquest under the Prophet’s banner is easily conjured”; in contrast, “a group of Buddhists doing something similar is hard to picture” (Reuter 2004, 17). Asia has produced many Nobel Peace Prize winners: Eisaku Sato of Japan, the fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet, Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, Bishop Carlos Belo and José Ramos-­Horta of East Timor, Kim Dae-­Jung of South Korea, Shirin Ebadi of Iran, Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh, Liu Xiaobo of China, Kailash Satyarthi of India, and Malala Yousafzai of Pakistan (Szczepanski 2019). Most of all, Asia claims the world’s most renowned advocate for peaceful change: Mahatma Gandhi.

240   Victoria Tin-bor Hui Yet Asia has also witnessed a wide range of violent means for change: rock throwing, self-­immolation, suicide terrorism, ethnic cleansing and genocide. How should analysts reconcile the most extreme forms of violence with the most pacifist religions? The first key to unlocking the puzzle is to unpack essentialized views of Asian ­civilizations and religions. Paradoxically, “the portrait of spirituality, asceticism, magic, transcendental wisdom” is the product of nineteenth-­century European orientalism (Frydenlund 2013, 110; Rudolph 2010, 141). Scott Appleby argues that all religions have the capacity to both “spiritualize militancy” and “channel energies toward nonviolent peacebuilding” (2015, 40). Buddhism and Hinduism have produced “anti-­secular, anti-­ modernist, absolutist, boundary-­setting, exclusionary, and often violent movements that bear startling resemblances to fundamentalism within the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic worlds” (Appleby and Marty 2009, 17). If all civilizations and religions contain both pro-­peace and pro-­violence elements, then the more relevant question is why advocates of peace triumph in some contexts while agents of violence win out in others. This volume defines peaceful change as “the resolution of social problems mutually by institutionalized procedures without resort to large-­scale physical force” (Deutsch 1957, 5). This chapter focuses on the domestic institutional landscape that tilts the balance between peaceful change and violent change. The next section examines Asia’s heterogeneity. It suggests that the plural nature of civilizations and religions is conducive to the construction of both peaceful and violent changes. The second section unpacks how canonical duality creates the same enabling environment. The third addresses how civilizational plurality and canonical ambiguity are translated into practices by advocates for peace and agents of violence competing for support in institutional contexts. The rest of this chapter then analyzes the cases of Islam in Afghanistan and Indonesia; Hinduism in India; Buddhism in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Tibet; and Confucianism in China.

Clash of Civilizations in Plural and Pluralist Asia Ram Madhav, the general secretary of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), declared, “[f]rom now on, Asia will rule the world, and that changes everything because in Asia, we have civilizations rather than nations” (Macaes 2020). Such rhetoric echoes Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” idea (1993). Huntington defined civilization by “common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions” along with the “subjective self-­identification of people” at “the broadest level of identification” (1993, 24). In his view, different civilizations necessarily clash because civilization fault lines are “basic,” “more fundamental,” and “less mutable” than political and economic cleavages (1993, 25, 27). Huntington’s thesis has been extensively criticized. Amartya Sen argues that the partitioning of humanity into “distinct and discrete civilizations” ignores not just individuals’ “plural affiliation and social contexts” but also the “internal diversities

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   241 within these civilizational categories” and the “connections and interdependence across civilizations” (2006, 1, 23, 58). Peter Katzenstein similarly highlights that civilizations should be understood as both internally “pluralist,” with multiple traditions, and externally “plural,” in coexistence with other civilizations (2010, 1). Nonetheless, Sen, who witnessed in his childhood the outbreak of violence during the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, understands that civilizational identity can “kill with abandon”—he recalls “the speed with which the broad human beings of January were suddenly transformed into the ruthless Hindus and fierce Muslims of July” (2006, 1–2). Sen attributes this horrific transformation to “the imposition of singular and belligerent identities” (2006, 2). Katzenstein agrees that “pluralism can give way to unity as political and discursive coalitions succeed in imposing a singular view and set of core values over alternatives” (2010, 1). How are plural and pluralist civilizations, which should be conducive to peaceful change, reduced to singular identities that are amenable to violent change? Patrick Jackson cautions against an “anti-­essentialist” position that “simply reject[s] civilizational essentialism” or wishes away clashes of civilizations (2010, 194). He offers instead a “post-­ essentialist” framework to understand how such clashes are “a consequence not of deep civilizational essences but of a set of ways of inscribing civilizational boundaries in practice” (Jackson 2010, 194). Katzenstein agrees that civilizations are “political, specifically rhetorical, practices” that construct “coherent narratives of civilizational destinies” and put up boundaries between such constructed identities (2010, 10). For instance, the term Islamic world is often used to refer to the Middle East, glossing over the fact that the world’s largest Muslim-­majority country is Indonesia (195 million, 88 percent of the population), and the second largest is India (Lawrence 2010, 159). “India” is defined as “Hindu civilization” by Hindu nationalists, even though it is also the birthplace of Buddhism and the home of 120 million Muslims (compared with 850 million Hindus) (Rudolph 2010, 153). “China” is taken to reflect an uncontested Confucian civilization, which implies that Tibetans, Muslims, and Mongols are ‘Others’ to be assimilated. A post-­essentialist framework suggests that peaceful change is possible if practices become more tolerant and inclusive. However, Jackson observes that “so long as civilizations are inscribed in the Huntingtonian way, the Huntingtonian consequences follow” (2010, 194). This is akin to Alexander Wendt’s argument that while “anarchy is what states make of it,” it is immensely difficult to unmake it once it is made (1992). Thus, once plural and pluralistic civilizations are essentialized into singular identities and inscribed in boundary-­drawing practices, violent clashes are likely.

Canonical Ambiguity, and Peaceful and Violent Change All religions promote peace and social justice in addition to devotion. Buddhism and Hinduism further cultivate self-­discipline through ascetic practices such as fasting and self-­imposed poverty (Appleby 2000, 12). Buddhism in addition maintains an absolute

242   Victoria Tin-bor Hui prohibition against killing any living beings (Victoria 2010, 125). How could these religions that champion the sanctity and dignity of human life be ever associated with extreme forms of violent change, including terrorism and genocide? Analysts tend to make a distinction between true religion and political religion. Scholars of Islam, in particular, argue that “Islam is a religion of peace” (Omar  2015; Smock 2002b, 3). Boroumand and Boroumand underscore that terrorism goes against Islam, and so the proper adjective for terror committed in the name of Islam is not “Islamic” but “Islamist” (2002, 6, 12). Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have praised Islamic history and counseled Muslims to embrace a “true Islam” (Starr 2014). As for Buddhism, Brian Victoria similarly holds that actions that “purposefully inflict pain and suffering, let alone death” necessarily represent “hijacking,” “violation,” “denial,” and “betrayal” of “Buddhism’s fundamental tenets” (2010, 105, 116–117, 121, 123). However, another Buddhism scholar, Iselin Frydenlund, disagrees with the “degeneration theory,” which treats any support for violent change among Buddhist monks as “un-­Buddhist” (2013, 110–112). He argues that the “canonical ambiguity on violence” in Buddhism means that a “return to the canon” would not give unequivocal support for peace (Frydenlund 2013, 112). Appleby concurs that any presumption that there is true Islam or Buddhism or Hinduism or Christianity smacks of “reductionism” (2000, 10). This is because all religions take an “ambivalent attitude” toward “the utility of violence as an instrument of self-­defense and enforcement of religious norms” (Appleby  2000, 10–11). Once “just war” is sanctioned, it is “too often used to justify war” (Smock  2002a, xxxii, 8). For instance, Sri Lankan monks, who were accused of being “anti-­peace” by international mediators, claimed that they wanted peace but that the only way to achieve peace was through a military response to Tamil terrorism (Frydenlund 2013, 101). Indeed, if canonical heterogeneity offers justification for violence, the very pluralistic nature of civilizations and religions highlighted by Katzenstein and Sen is the source of violent as well as peaceful change. When “canonical ambiguity” is combined with “differential practices” that harden civilizational divides (Frydenlund 2013), Huntingtonian outcomes follow.

Change Agents, Institutional Weaknesses, and Peaceful and Violent Change Civilizations and religions should be unpacked into not only justifications for both peaceful and violent change, but also individuals who agitate for peace versus violence. Sen counsels analysts to examine individuals’ multiple affiliations and social contexts (2006, 23). Omar urges non-­Muslims to avoid seeing violence as “fundamental to Islam rather than committed by individuals” (2015).

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   243 In discussions of political movements that have adopted violent methods for change, it is common to hear this question: “Where is this and that case’s Gandhi?” Such a question reflects highly essentialized assumptions. It supposes that a particular culture does not produce advocates for peaceful change. It also presumes that Gandhi’s nonviolence represents the totality of the Indian experience and glosses over other Indians’ recourse to violence. It is more productive to examine how advocates for peace and agents for violence compete in different institutional contexts. Individuals can achieve change by creating new institutions. They are also incentivized or disincentivized by preexisting institutions. If liberal institutions that promote free speech, tolerance, multiculturalism, citizen participation, and elite accountability empower forces for peace and marginalize those for violence, the weakness and even absence of such institutions may have the opposite impacts. Terrorism in the name of Islam, for instance, has “local and readily identifiable causes” (McGlinchey  2005, 342). Violence seems so prevalent in the Islamic world because Muslim-­majority countries host many personalized and military dictators who are not just repressive but also dysfunctional. Military strongmen deploy security forces to inflict daily injustices on their people and discrimination against minorities. At the same time, corrupt elites, who control valuable national resources, are unable and unwilling to provide for the basic needs of the population (Berman 2003, 266). This is a recipe for revolutionary movements. Confronted with popular grievances, the powerful try to hold onto power by enhancing their religious credentials. Acharya (2020) ­contends that self-­proclaimed civilization-­states are first and foremost motivated by regime security. The powerless are similarly tempted to summon religion to recruit supporters. Such processes of radicalization and politicization are not unique to Islam but also common to other religions. The rest of this chapter examines how cultural pluralism, canonical ambiguity, and institutional weaknesses have combined to shape identities and practices.

Islam in Afghanistan and Indonesia Asia hosts not just the world’s largest number of Muslims, but also a wide variety of Islam. Frederick Starr suggests that if one is searching for moderate Islam, “look to Central Asia” (2014). Central Asia along the Silk Road was where Europe, the Middle East, and Asia historically met for trade and cultural exchanges. Similarly, Southeast Asia along the ocean Silk Road was famed not just for the spice trade but also for its cultural and religious pluralism. Yet both regions have experienced the rise of religious terrorism. While Uzbekistan was historically the center of intellectual scholarship, Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov’s dictatorship gave rise to the radical Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, which first fought social injustice and then transformed itself into a jihad group (Chivers  2002; McGlinchey  2005, 338). In Southeast Asia, Abu Sayyaf of the Philippines pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). Nevertheless, the rise of

244   Victoria Tin-bor Hui religious militancy is driven not by inherent civilizational traits but by institutional weaknesses, from the absence of security to democratic backsliding (Kurlantzick 2016, 231). Moderation has prevailed where political leaders allow some degree of opposition and deliver basic socioeconomic services (McGlinchey 2005, 336–337).

Afghanistan Long before Iraq and Syria became synonymous with Islam and ISIS, Afghanistan dominated news headlines as the shelter of Osama bin Laden. Two decades after September 11, 2000, the country is still mired in daily terrorist attacks. It is not Islam itself that has created bloody borders. Afghanistan’s Islam is moderate, like the rest of Central Asia’s. Indigenous religious scholars have sought to reclaim Islam from extremists and to leverage “traditional Islamic values” to construct “principled and permanent—rather than tacit and tactical—opposition to violence” (Bakhiet 2018). However, foreign intervention has created the radical ideational and institutional landscape. The proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States facilitated the rise of the Taliban, which hosted al-­Qaeda. The arrival of Saudis, the most famous of which was bin Laden, brought radical Wahhabism as well as jihadists. The US involvement since 2000 has failed to provide security, which in turn has doomed efforts to run free and fair elections, form legitimate government, and provide basic services to the population as peace dividends (Kubba 2008; Worden 2010). The US-­Taliban peace deal signed behind the back of the Afghan government in early 2020 has only allowed Taliban warlords to grow stronger vis-­à-­vis government forces (Glinski 2020). Bakhiet notes that “the word Islam means peace” and wonders if “it can also create peace” (2018) in Afghanistan. The answer is negative but not because of Islam or the absence of peace-­makers.

Indonesia Indonesia offers a positive case for how agents of violence can be tamed by institutions. Indonesia is home to not just the largest Muslim population in the world but also “the most democratic” regime in Southeast Asia (Aspinall 2010, 29; Kurlantzick 2016, 231). This is not because Indonesia is a peaceful society by civilizational nature. After the Suharto dictatorship collapsed in 1998, radical forces agitated for an Islamic state and “stoked ethnic, religious, and separatist violence,” causing approximately nineteen thousand deaths (Aspinall 2010, 20, 25, 29). Terrorist groups launched church bombings on Christmas Eve in 2000, with more bombings in subsequent years. Yet a decade later, communal conflicts had receded, and extremist forces had been absorbed into mainstream politics (Aspinall 2010, 20). Indonesia remains a “flawed democracy” today (Bisara 2020), but it has two institutional features that are conducive to peaceful change. First, local parties that are more prone to

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   245 mobilize on narrow ethnic interests are effectively excluded from national politics by the requirement that parties maintain a broad national presence, with functional branches in the majority of provinces and districts. Second, Indonesia introduced “big bang decentralization” to mollify local groups. Parties are similarly required to build cross-­ communal alliances to win local offices (Aspinall 2010, 26). Moreover, with democratic oversight, Detachment 88 enjoys a reputation for effective counterterrorism without committing massive abuses (Kurlantzick 2016, 228, 231). Indonesia offers instructive lessons for how other democracies with weak moderating institutional mechanisms have provided fertile ground for violent change. Elsewhere in Asia, Muslims have often been victims rather than perpetrators of violent change.

Hinduism, and Peaceful and Violent Change in India Contrary to Islam, which is often mentioned with violence in the same sentence, India’s Gandhi stands for peaceful change. Gandhi argued that Indians’ goal of national independence had to be achieved through satyagraha (nonviolence) because there was an “inviolable connection between the means and the end” (Dalton 1993, 9, 29). Nonviolence could work because all rulers were dependent on the cooperation of the ruled. The way to challenge the British Raj was not by attacking it but by refusing to cooperate with it. To put his ideas into practice, he mobilized mass civil disobedience campaigns, including a boycott of British textiles, resignation from official positions, and nonpayment of taxes (Dalton 1993, 7, 31, 66). The most famous campaign was the 1930 salt march, which called for the masses to make salt on beaches to defy the salt tax. The question “Where is the Gandhi of this or that movement?” presumes the above well-­known knowledge. However, India itself is not a case of untainted peaceful change even with Gandhi’s leadership. Gandhi’s core followers could always adhere to the instruction that “[y]ou will be beaten but you must not resist” (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 90). Beyond his narrow circle, he complained that while “nonviolence is my creed,” it was merely “a policy” for the Indian National Congress (Dalton 1993, 42). It was even more difficult to enforce among the “dumb millions” (Dalton 1993, 32). At a demonstration meant to be part of a noncooperation civil disobedience campaign in Chauri Chaura in 1922, protesters responded to police brutality by setting fire to the local police station and killing all twenty-­two officers on duty (Dalton 1993, 47–48). The incident showed that “the more that civil disobedience sprang from local grievances rather than from national strategy, the more it was likely to stray from the nonviolent standard” (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 101). Gandhi’s decades-­long campaigns made “scant progress toward either dominion ­status within the empire or outright independence” (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 106).

246   Victoria Tin-bor Hui During the Second World War, Subhas Chandra Bose broke ranks with Gandhi. Arguing that “all means to Indian independence were permissible,” Bose formed the Indian National Army in 1943 by collecting British Indian prisoners of war from Germany and Japan, and participated in the Japanese invasion of India in 1944 (Borra  1975, 311; Gordon 2006, 104, 107). After Bose was killed in a plane crash, Gandhi declared that “his patriotism is second to none” and “his bravery shines through all his actions” (Gordon 2006, 103). Upon independence, India promulgated an unmistakably liberal constitution to secure “justice,” “liberty,” “equality,” and “fraternity” for all citizens (Bambrick 2020). Nevertheless, success in achieving independence was accompanied by unspeakable communal violence surrounding the partition. Hindu nationalists criticized Gandhi for giving too much to Muslims, while Muslims feared a Hindu raj worse than the British raj. Despite his godlike stature, Gandhi was killed by three shots fired by Nathuram Godse, an activist with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which viewed India as a Hindu civilization and non-­Hindus as “traitors and enemies” (Bhattacharjee 2019). This ideology has been institutionalized in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), whose leader, Narendra Modi, ran Gujarat in 2001–2014 and oversaw the pogrom against Muslims in 2002. In 2014, Modi defeated the secular Congress Party and became the prime minister. In 2019, he passed the discriminatory Citizenship Amendment Act, which could strip Muslims of citizenship (Human Rights Watch 2020). Gandhi’s “India” was plural and pluralistic. The fact that the world’s pioneering philosopher and activist for peaceful change could not prevent his fellow citizens from pursuing violent change illustrates the futility of the question “Where is the Gandhi of this or that movement?” It is more productive to follow Jackson’s (2010) approach to examine how “Indian civilization” can be transformed into “Hindu civilization” with periodic outbreaks of violent clashes. Indian democracy is often criticized for being majoritarian and lacking protection for minority rights. Nevertheless, the very possibility of peaceful change through the ballot box has helped to keep exclusive identities and practices somewhat in check.

Buddhism, and Peaceful and Violent Change in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Tibet Buddhism spans India, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Mongolia, Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan. It is generally seen to enjoy a “relative lack of violence” (DeVotta 2007, 1). Buddhism’s first ethical precept is the prohibition against killing any living beings, not just humans (Harris 1999, 7). As a polytheistic religion, Buddhism does not emphasize a monopoly of truth, which allows its adherents to be “among the most accommodating of people of other faiths” (DeVotta 2007, 1). The

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   247 faithful should strive for personal enlightenment and karma by living a life full of love and compassion; abstaining from wrongful gratification of one’s senses; and resisting the unwholesome impulses of greed, envy, and anger, which provide the prime motives for violence (Payne and Nassar 2012, 41). Buddhism shares with other religions the same doctrinal ambiguity about violence. Buddhist ethics contains multiple moral theories rather than a single one (Frydenlund 2013, 112). The dual qualities of wisdom and compassion can come into conflict, depending on the context. While compassion dictates nonviolence, wisdom may sanction “expedient methods,” including the use of armed force if the “intention” is to “help ease the suffering of people, introduce them to the Dharma, or aid them in their quest for Nirvana” (Kent 2010, 146; Victoria 2010, 126, 128). Buddhism emphasizes “positive intention” and karma rather than justice; thus it does not have the same just war theory as Christianity. Nonetheless, Sinhalese monks such as Pannasiha, Bellanwila, and Rathana, who saw themselves as the “only true defenders of the nation and Buddhism,” developed a just war ideology (Bartholomeusz 2002; Frydenlund 2013, 103). When Buddhism is perceived to be in peril, whether real or imagined, nonviolence can be overruled (Frydenlund 2013, 102). Contradictory statements by Pannasiha are illustrative. On the one hand, “Buddhism, more than any other religion, has indeed contributed most towards promoting world peace. It is the teaching of tolerance and love” (Frydenlund 2013, 96). On the other hand, “it is the duty of the leader to protect the country. We can’t  tell the president to go to war, but we can tell her to protect the country” (Frydenlund 2013, 97). Buddhism also resembles other religions in its “ambiguous symbiosis” between the sangha (monastic order) and political power (Harris 1999, 19). In a relationship of “reciprocal protection” (Victoria  2010, 128–129), monks as ceremonial masters have lent legitimacy to state-­organized violence by bestowing spiritual protection on the army (Frydenlund 2013, 104, 106, 109). Frydenlund observes that the presumed pacifism of early Buddhists is as “questionable” as that of early Christians (Frydenlund 2013, 112). The Buddha himself was “reserved in advocating absolute pacifism vis-­a-­ vis kings” (Frydenlund  2013, 112). In more contested relationships, such as under antireligious communist and military rule, Buddhist orders have been targets of political repression, and monasteries have provided shelter to rebels and fugitives (Harris 1999, 2).

Sri Lanka Sri Lanka is a prominent example of how a “polyethnic heritage” has been remolded into an exclusivist ideology of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism (DeVotta  2007, 2), with Huntingtonian outcomes. The Sri Lankan military’s final offensive to wipe out the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2010–2011 incurred forty thousand civilian deaths (Lynch 2011). The Tamil Tigers, who were well known for using suicide terrorism to agitate for minority rights, had their share of violations. Nonetheless, the United

248   Victoria Tin-bor Hui Nations judged that the Sri Lankan military should bear the primary responsibility for the “patterns of grave violations, including indiscriminate shelling, extrajudicial ­killings, enforced disappearances, harrowing accounts of torture and sexual ­violence, and recruitment of children” committed between 2002 and 2011 (2015). Support for the military solution was “the hegemonic position” within the sangha (Frydenlund 2013, 97, 99). How could the Buddhist Sinhalese justify seeking political change through war crimes and crimes against humanity? At the heart of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideology is the conflation of “the land, the race and the faith” (Kent  2010, 162; McGowan 2012). The belief that “the country is Sihadipa (island of the Sinhalese) and Dhammadipa (the island ennobled to preserve and propagate Buddhism)” sets up the primacy of Sinhalese Buddhism and tells other ethnoreligious communities that they can live on the land “only due to Sinhalese Buddhist sufferance” (DeVotta 2007, vii). In 2002, leading monks petitioned against a ceasefire agreement, stating that the LTTE is not interested in peace but in the establishment of a powerful Tamil state within the territory of Sri Lanka. . . . [T]he failure to prevent [the ceasefire] will result in the subjugation of the majority race by the minority Tamils and the extermination of the Sinhala race and the Buddha Sasana from this island. (Frydenlund 2013, 98–99)

This civil war should be traced to institutional problems rather than civilizational characteristics. It originated from the British colonial policy of giving preference to the Tamil minority over the Sinhalese majority. Upon independence, leading monks championed the “restoration” of Buddhism by introducing discriminatory linguistic, educational, and economic policies against minorities (DeVotta 2007, vii). In response to Tamil protests, the Senanayake-­Chelvanayagam Pact of 1965 sought to grant protection to the Tamil language and Tamil land rights, but it was abandoned as a result of opposition from leading Buddhist monks (Frydenlund 2013, 97). The Tamils called for a separate state in the 1970s and began to kill soldiers in 1983 (DeVotta 2007, viii). India and Norway mediated rounds of peace talks and proposed devolution of autonomy to the Tamils. While international mediators viewed suppression of minorities as the root of the conflict, Sinhalese saw the Tamil demand for autonomy as a threat to national and territorial unity (Frydenlund  2013, 97–98). The Tamils’ escalation to suicide t­ errorism only reinforced the Sinhalese position that the “terrorists” should be eradicated by military means (Frydenlund  2013, 96–97, 101–102). In 2004, Buddhist monks formed the National Sinhala Heritage Party (Jathika Hela Urumaya, JHU) and won nine seats in the parliament on a “Buddhist revivalist and anti-­ negotiation ticket” (Frydenlund 2013, 99). In 2005, Mahinda Rajapaksa became the president on an ­antinegotiation platform (Frydenlund 2013, 100). The civil war intensified in 2006, and the government withdrew from peace talks in 2008, paving the way for the final solution in 2010–2011.

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   249

Myanmar Myanmar is not just another example of Buddhist repression of Muslim minorities. It is also the mirror image of Indonesia, demonstrating how the absence of moderating institutions correlates with the rise of radicalism during democratic transition. What the Myanmar military called “clearance operations” began in August 2017 after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacked police and security posts. In The Gambia v. Myanmar, filed at the International Court of Justice in 2019, the former stated that the “systematic destruction by fire” of villages, “often with inhabitants locked inside burning houses,” along with the “widespread and systematic killing of women and girls, the systematic selection of women and girls of reproductive ages for rape, attacks on pregnant women and on babies, the mutilation and other injuries to their reproductive organs,” marked a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and constituted “genocidal acts” to “destroy the Rohingya as a group, in whole or in part” (United Nations 2019). More than 700,000 people escaped to neighboring Bangladesh. Aung San Suu Kyi attended the hearing on behalf of Myanmar and denied “genocidal intent” (United Nations 2019). The same Aung San Suu Kyi once campaigned for regime change through peaceful ballots. Her father, Aung San, was not unlike India’s Bose in founding the Myanmar Armed Forces and collaborating with Japanese forces to oust the British. However, unlike India, where democracy has been the norm since independence, Myanmar has been subject to various forms of military rule. In 1988, longtime dictator Ne Win allowed elections but then declared martial law when the opposition won a landslide. Aung San Suu Kyi became the leader of the newborn democracy movement, both because of her father’s legacy and because of her own “model of courage” (Silverstein 1996, 200–201). Under house arrest, she eloquently articulated “freedom from fear” as “the sharpest weapon” against regime violence (Aung San Suu Kyi 1991, 20). Nevertheless, many were silenced by fear, and others were radicalized to take up arms. Between 1988 and 1990 more than ten thousand Burman students fled to border areas under the control of ethnic minority armies (Beer 1995, 76). Buddhist monks, outraged by mass shootings of unarmed Burmese students, joined the resistance. They went on strike by refusing to accept offerings from soldiers and their families or perform any religious rites for them, effectively excommunicating the military. In retaliation, the army did not hesitate to move against even the most respected segment of Burmese society (Lintner  2009, 35). Monasteries were raided. Monks were forced to disrobe, sent to hard labor camps, and used as porters at the front lines of the civil war in the ethnic border states (Lintner 2009, 35). In 2007, monks again marched in the streets in the “Saffron Revolution” and suffered another bloody crackdown (Human Rights Watch 2007). In the darkest years, Myanmar was spoken in the same breath as North Korea. In March 2011, another former general, Thein Sein, came to power. He released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and other political prisoners from jails, lifted press censorship,

250   Victoria Tin-bor Hui and opened peace talks with ethnic armies (Strangio 2020, 179). Most dramatically, he allowed elections in 2015, and Aung San Suu Kyi led the National League for Democracy (NLD) to a staggering victory. By 2015, however, a Buddhist nationalist movement that portrayed Islam as a religion of violence and Myanmar’s Muslims as foreigners in their own country was brewing. The Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, with ties to radical monks, succeeded in pressing the government to pass a series of laws on interfaith marriage, polygamy, family planning, and religious conversion. During the election campaigns, the NLD excluded Muslims from its candidate list in order to avoid criticism from Buddhist nationalists (Zin 2016, 122). While the elections were generally free, approximately half a million Rohingya Muslims, the national and religious ‘others,’ were disenfranchised (Walton 2017; Zin 2016, 124). Aung San Suu Kyi once argued that “it is not power that corrupts but fear”—the “fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it” (1991; 1980, 184). Now in power, she explained away anti-­Muslim discrimination and anti-­Rohingya violence as “rule-­of-­law deficiencies rather than taking a clear moral position against violence” (Zin 2016, 123). Sitagu Sayadaw, one of Myanmar’s most revered monks, who once resisted the military and went into exile in 1988, has made a more dramatic turn in openly agitating for military actions against Muslims. His sermons had a “chilling purpose: to provide a religious justification for the mass killing of non-­Buddhists,” telling soldiers that “those they kill are not fully human” (Walton 2017). The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s attacks on government targets in October 2016 and August 2017 further consolidated Burmans’ belief that Islam was inherently violent and posed an existential threat to Buddhism. Once all Rohingya came to be seen as “terrorists,” “genocidal acts” could be justified “in Buddhism’s name” (Walton 2017).

Tibet Tibet has similarly struggled for independence and autonomy. At issue is whether Tibet was historically independent, so that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conquered it by force, as in the Tibetan narrative, or it was historically a part of China, so that the PLA arrived to “peacefully liberate” it, as in the Chinese account. According to the late Tibetologist Elliot Sperling, “Tibet was not ‘Chinese’ until Mao Zedong’s armies marched in” (Sperling 2008). The International Commission of Jurists concluded in the report “The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law” that “Tibet [had] been to all intents and purposes an independent country and [had] enjoyed a large degree of sovereignty” (1959). It ruled that there was “a prima facie case of genocide against the People’s Republic of China,” which committed acts that were “intentionally directed towards the destruction of the Tibetan religion and the Tibetan nation” (International Commission of Jurists 1959). Beijing’s “violation” of the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951, which promised autonomy to Tibet and religious and social rights to Tibetans, should be

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   251 regarded as a release of the Tibetan government from its obligations (International Commission of Jurists 1959). Tibet long believed in the protection of isolation. The government maintained only a small contingent of troops, who were quickly overrun by the PLA. When monks and nuns, the most respected members of Tibetan culture, were violated, a well-­connected elite, Gompo Tashi, organized the Chushi-­Gangdruk armed resistance, with military training and weapons drops from the US Central Intelligence Agency (Dunham 2004, 191). In 1956–1959, thousands of monks “returned the vow” and joined Gompo Tashi. The youthful Dalai Lama formally appointed Gompo Tashi commander in chief before fleeing to India. The Dalai Lama has since stated that the guerrilla fighters followed Buddhism’s “right intention,” but armed resistance was doomed to fail because Tibetans were vastly outnumbered and outgunned by the PLA (The Dalai Lama  1990, 287; Dunham 2004, foreword, 149, 289, 411). Inside Tibet, Tibetans who have dared to wave Tibet’s national flag and called for the return of the Dalai Lama have been routinely crushed (Dorjee 2015). During a major uprising in 2008, Tibetans set fire to Chinese-­owned shops in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama announced that he would step down if Tibetans continued with any violent means of protest. Since then, monks and nuns have turned to self-­immolations, hurting themselves instead of Han Chinese (Shakya 2012). Even self-­immolations have been subject to collective punishment, with family members and fellow monks or nuns being subjected to years of imprisonment and torture. Tibetans also started Lhakar cultural re­sist­ance to speak in Tibetan and buy only at Tibetan-­owned shops to counter “cultural genocide” (Shakya 2012). Yet a Tibetan who tried to save the Tibetan language, as promised by the Chinese constitution, has been sentenced to five years in prison (Buckley 2018). Tibet shows that, in some cases, the regime is so repressive and competent that there are few, if any, options for change, peaceful or otherwise. As Pankaj Mishra puts it, “China’s repressive policies and an efficient network of spies have ensured that no Gandhi-­style mass movement emerges” (Mishra 2005).

Confucianism, Chinese Civilization, and Peaceful and Violent Change in China “Always remember that China is a civilization rather than a nation-­state,” Bruno Macaes recounts he was repeatedly told by Chinese officials and intellectuals (2020). The bleakness of Tibet offers a cautionary tale that the civilizational rhetoric could mean the opposite of what was intended. Mao Zedong famously declared that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (1938). Since being consolidated in power, the Communist Party has taken violent

252   Victoria Tin-bor Hui ­ easures not just to achieve political change but also to prevent bottom-­up regime m change. The newly born People’s Republic of China (PRC) championed “peaceful coexistence” but invaded Tibet in 1951–1959 and committed genocide against Tibetans. Against Han Chinese, the party persecuted all religions and launched multiple deadly campaigns. According to R. J. Rummel’s estimate, Mao killed 37.8 million noncombatants between 1923 and 1976 (1991, 8). Mao tops the list of “megamurderers” of the twentieth century, second only to Stalin’s 42.6 million and ahead of Hitler’s 21 million (Rummel 1991, 8). His predecessor, Chiang Kai-­shek of the Nationalist Party, was not far behind, ranking fourth, with 10.2 million deaths in half the time, from 1921 to 1948 (Rummel 1991, 8). Since the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 (Lim  2014), Chinese leaders seem to have adopted a minimalist understanding of “peace”—the absence of outright killing—to ward off regime change. The ruling party has turned to “stability maintenance” by deploying the tools of economic incentives, dismissal from employment, surveillance, arrest, imprisonment, and torture. Among Han Chinese, many have focused on improving their economic lot, so that only isolated dissidents have been subject to repression. In Tibet and Xinjiang, by comparison, the majorities have undergone waves of “strike hard” campaigns (Doyon  2019; Economist  2019). Tibetans and Uighurs in exile have accused Chinese leaders of “cultural genocide,” attempting to eliminate their identity by persecuting cultural leaders, transferring children away from their families, restricting the use of the native language, banning the display of religious identity, and more (Samphel et al. 2017).1 Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang have fared the worst. Similar to the authorities in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, Beijing has exploited the global “war on terror” against Muslims. Uighurs are banned from Islamic practices, including growing beards, wearing veils, and fasting during Ramadan (Cronin-­Furman 2018; Robertson 2020). Large portions of the adult population have been put in “reeducation camps” and forced labor facilities (Millward  2019). By 2020, even Hong Kong was falling to the fate of Xinjiang and Tibet. As the majority of Hong Kongers have developed a distinctive identity and staged sustained protests, Beijing has likewise labeled protesters “terrorists” and imposed a draconian national security law to make the once free city safe for the regime (Davis and Hui 2020). How should analysts make sense of Chinese leaders’ century-­long repression? Isn’t China’s civilization Confucian? Confucius shunned “matters of armies and campaigns” (Hui 2018, 150). Mencius decried those who claimed “I am skilled in making formations” or “I am skilled in making war” as “criminals” (Hui 2018, 150). He also called for peaceful change of international politics by unity under “the one who has no proclivity toward killing” (Hui 2018, 152). How can megamurder and genocide be squared with Confucianism? The answer is familiar by now: Huntingtonian outcomes follow when a plural and pluralist civilization is reduced to a singular Sinocentric nationalism. Henry Kissinger takes for granted “the singularity of China” and its “cultural cohesion” grounded in Confucianism (2012, 5, 19, 60). However, as Fudan University’s Ge Zhaoguang argues, “Chinese cultural tradition is plural, not singular” (Ge 2018, 95). Like India, “China” was not always politically “one” (Ge 2018, 120). The Chinese term for “China,” zhongguo, originally meant “central states” in the plural form, rather than

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   253 “Middle Kingdom” in the singular form. Kissinger faithfully regurgitates the Chinese narrative that “[e]ach period of disunity was viewed as an aberration,” so that “[a]fter each collapse, the Chinese state reconstituted itself as if by some immutable law of nature” (2012, 6–7). Yet as historian Peter Lorge points out, “[h]owever compelling the idea of a unified empire was in the abstract,” competing central states “did not reflexively or ‘naturally’ condense into a large, territorially contiguous . . . state ­following a period of disunity” (2005, 27, 9). Ge Jianxiong, also of Fudan University, is the most blunt: “[U]nity—this sacred term—has been repeatedly associated with war” (Ge 1994, 184). China’s civilization was also ethnically plural and pluralist. The very notion of “Han Chinese” was forged out of an immense cultural and ethnic diversity in early China (Hui 2020). The Qin dynasty was built on “a mixed space that intermingled a wide variety of races, ideas, cultures, and regions” (Ge 2018, 101). Early Han emperors formed diplomatic marriages with the Xiongnu. The Xianbei Tuoba, who dominated Northern China in the fifth century, also cultivated marriage ties with fallen ruling houses (Graff 2002, 73). The Sui’s and the Tang’s early emperors emerged from this mixed-­blood elite and could claim the titles “the Sage Khan” and the “Great Khan” as well as the “Son of Heaven” (Ge  2018, 102–103). Nevertheless, the Sinocentric narrative of the Han Chinese as the civilized and foreigners as the barbarous, once constructed, was conducive to extermination and genocide (Hui forthcoming). David Kang argues that China maintained a “Confucian society” with Confucianized neighbors but a “parabellum society” with “nomads” (Kang  2010, 9). He omits the logical conclusion of this Huntingtonian rhetoric. The Han dynasty’s Emperor Wu (martial), while promoting Confucianism as the state doctrine, depicted the Xiongnu as “enem[ies] of virtue and humanity” to whom Confucian benevolence did not apply (Zhu and Wang 2008, 273). His campaigns killed or captured 489,500 Xiongnu from 133 to 91 BCE (Psarras 2003, 150). The Qing’s Emperor Qianlong even inflicted a “genocide,” a “final solution,” on Zunghar Mongols because they had “turned their back on civilization” (Perdue 2005, 155, 285, 431–432). The traditions of the Han Chinese were no less composed of “paradoxes and tensions” (Pines  2012, 4–5). It is erroneous to take Confucianism as all of China’s tradition. Confucianism was one among a “hundred [meaning many] schools of thought” born in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770–221 BCE). It had to contest with a multitude of conflicting traditions, especially the legalist and military schools that explicitly advocated change by winning victories in war and maximizing state domination over society. Sun-­tzu’s Art of War reads in the very first line, “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction” (Sawyer 1994, ch. 1). The Sima fa (the Marshal’s Art of War) contends that “if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible” (Brooks and Brooks 2015, 116). As John Fairbank pointed out, Chinese emperors “took great pains to claim that their rule was based on the Confucian teachings of social order, even while they used the methods of the Legalists as the basis for their institutions and policy decisions” (1974, 11). All ensuing dynasties followed this policy of “Legalism with Confucian façade” (Hsiao 1977, 137).

254   Victoria Tin-bor Hui Confucianism itself is not unlike other world philosophical thoughts in that it contains both elements that support peace and those that justify war. Yan Xuetong contends that Confucianism should not be equated with pacifism, because Confucius and Mencius “support just wars” to “uphold the norms of benevolence and justice between states” (Yan 2011, 35, 41). However, the Qin state vanquished all other states through violence and cunning (Hui 2005, ch. 2). Indeed, Yan observes that Qin practiced not just territorial annexation but also population annihilation, because the survivors would otherwise “seek to restore their state and annex you in turn” (Yan and Huang 2011, 131). This is a crime against humanity that cannot be defined away as just war. Nonetheless, Qin’s First Emperor understood the need for legitimacy. He “declared himself Sage,” celebrated the success of “punitive expeditions” against “bandit rebels,” and claimed that he put “the black-­haired people . . . at peace” (Pines 2012, 20, 55). Shi Yinhong of People’s University observes that Qin pioneered a tradition of total conquest that was “more Napoleonic than Napoleon and more Clausewitzian than Clausewitz” (Shi 2011, 6). How, then, was China’s plural and pluralist civilization rendered singular? Ge Zhaoguang zooms in on the practice of narrating “one history” (Ge 2018, 25–26; Hui 2020). The Qin-­commissioned text Lushi chunqiu promoted the ideology that “there is no turmoil greater than the absence of the Son of Heaven; without the Son of Heaven, the strong overcome the weak, the many lord it over the few, they incessantly use arms to harm each other” (Pines 2012, 44). If disunity was defined as war by fiat while unity was defined as peace, then it followed that the very success of winning “all under Heaven” represented a virtue. After vanquishing other states and populations, Qin burned defeated states’ records to bury alternative histories. The ensuing Han dynasty appointed the Grand Historian, Sima Qian, to write the Historical Records (Shiji), the first effort to trace China’s origins to mythical times. After the Han, China would experience centuries of division and hybridization. Nevertheless, the Tang’s Emperor Taizong, of mixed descent, claimed Han lineage and ordered the writing of singular official histories for previous eras. His efforts established the tradition of “the continuity of the Way” ­(daotong), which further strengthened the construction of a singular civilization (Ge  2018, 19). Subsequent dynasties, whether established by Hans or “barbarians” or “semi-­barbarians,” would all claim that “they were ‘China’ ” (Ge 2018, 19). Katzenstein notes that today’s Chinese scholars readily take the notion of “­all-­embracing unity (dayitong)” as the uncontested, “profound and essential value deeply embedded in Chinese culture and history” (2010, 13). Some call China a “­civilizational state” (Zhang  2012) and the ruling party the “Chinese Civilization (rather than Communist) Party” (Mahbubani 2020). This essentialization of civilization may be intended to project “peaceful rise” but may send the opposite message. The civilizational rhetoric not only glosses over the long practice of genocide against minorities and neighbors but also gives fuel to the “fear” that “China is a ‘civilizational power’ that will seek to remake the international order in its own image” (Allison 2017; Reus-­Smit 2018, 223).

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   255

Conclusion A post-­essentialist framework sheds light on why seemingly pacifist civilizations and religions have been associated with terrorism, communal violence, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Asia. All religions promote peaceful change but justify violent change. All civilizations have Gandhi-­like advocates for peaceful change but also leaders who agitate for violent change. Paradoxically, it is the very plural and pluralist nature of various religions and civilizations that has provided the fertile ground for the reduction to singular identities. The prevalence of conflicts and weakness of inclusive institutions have supplied the contexts for the politicization of religion. The important question is not “Where is the Gandhi of this or that movement?” but why the Gandhis have had a hard time converting their opposites in various societies. Although practices can theoretically be undone, they have tended to become hardened. Once violent clashes have started, it is immensely difficult for even committed peace advocates to redirect events toward peaceful change. The rise of self-­proclaimed civilization-­states and the global retreat of democracy in recent years have only exacerbated the surge of ethnonationalism (Macaes 2020).

Note 1. The adjective cultural is meant to highlight the absence of mass killing. However, the legal definition of genocide includes but is not restricted to killing (Rummel 1994, 33).

References Acharya, Amitav. 2020. “The Myth of the ‘Civilization State’: Rising Powers and the Cultural Challenge to World Order.” Ethics and International Affairs 34, no. 2: 139–156. Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. 2000. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Palgrave. Allison, Graham. 2017. “China vs. America: Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 5: 80–89. Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Appleby, R. Scott. 2015. “Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, edited by Scott Appleby, Atalia Omer, and David Little, 33–60. New York: Oxford University Press. Appleby, R. Scott, and Martin E. Marty. 2009. “Think Again: Fundamentalism.” Foreign Policy, November 12. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/12/think-again-fundamentalism/. Aspinall, Edward. 2010. “Indonesia: The Irony of Success.” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2: 20–34. Aung San Suu Kyi. 1991. Freedom from Fear and Other Writings. New York: Viking.

256   Victoria Tin-bor Hui Bakhiet, Tariq A. 2018. “The Taliban Has Used Islam as a Weapon of War: This Is How Afghanistan Can Use It for Peace.” Time, July 16. https://time.com/5339926/afghanistan -war-islam-peace/. Bambrick, Christina. 2020. “Horizontal Rights: A Republican Vein in Liberal Constitutionalism.” Polity 52, no. 3: 401–429. Bartholomeusz, Tessa J. 2002. In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka. New York: Routledge Curzon. Beer, Michael  A. 1995. “Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a Unified Strategy Workable?” In Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective, edited by Stephen Zunes, Sarah Beth Asher, and Lester Kurtz, 174–184. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. Berman, Sheri. 2003. “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 2: 257–272. Bhattacharjee, Manash Firaq. 2019. “BJP’s Gandhi Paradox: Despite Not Having a Common Ideology with Gandhi, the Ruling Party in India Insists on Celebrating Him.” Al Jazeera, October 2. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/bjp-gandhi-paradox-191001121023091 .html. Bisara, Dion. 2020. “Indonesia’s Flawed Democracy Improves as Civil Liberty, Political Culture Stagnate.” The Jakata Globe, January 22. https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesias-flawed -democracy-improves-as-civil-liberty-political-culture-stagnate. Boroumand, Ladan, and Roya Boroumand. 2002. “Terror, Islam, and Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2: 5–19. Borra, Ranjan. 1975. “Subhas Chandra Bose: After Three Decades.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 2, no. 5: 308–320. Brooks, Bruce, and Taeko Brooks. 2015. The Emergence of China: From Confucius to the Empire. Amherst: Warring States Project, University of Massachusetts. Buckley, Chris. 2018. “A Tibetan Tried to Save His Language: China Handed Him 5 Years in Prison.” New York Times, May 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/world/asia/tibetan -activist-tashi-wangchuk-sentenced.html. Chivers, C. J. 2002. “Threats and Responses: Central Asia; Uzbek Militants’ Decline Provides Clues to U.S.” New York Times, October 8. https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/08/world/ threats-and-responses-central-asia-uzbek-militants-decline-provides-clues-to-us.html. Cronin-Furman, Kate. 2018. “China Has Chosen Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang—For Now.” Foreign Policy, September 19. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/19/china-has-chosen -cultural-genocide-in-xinjiang-for-now/. The Dalai Lama. 1990. Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama. New York: HarperCollins. Dalton, Dennis. 1993. Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action. New York: Columbia University Press. Davis, Michael C., and Victoria Tin-bor Hui. 2020. “China’s New National Security Law for Hong Kong Will Erode Hong Kong’s Autonomy. Monkey Cage (blog), Washington Post, May 26, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/26/chinas-new-national -security-law-hong-kong-will-erode-hong-kongs-autonomy/. Deutsch, Karl. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press. DeVotta, Neil. 2007. Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka. Policy Studies 40. Washington, DC: East-West Center. https://www .eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ps040.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32212.

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   257 Dorjee, Tenzin. 2015. The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis. ICNC Monograph Series. Washington, DC: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Doyon, Jérôme. 2019. “ ‘Counter-Extremism’ in Xinjiang: Understanding China’s CommunityFocused Counter-Terrorism Tactics.” War on the Rocks, January 14. https://warontherocks .com/2019/01/counter-extremism-in-xinjiang-understanding-chinas-community-focused -counter-terrorism-tactics/. Dunham, Mikel. 2004. Buddha’s Warriors: The Story of the CIA-Backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet. New York: Penguin. Economist. 2019. “China’s Successful Repression in Tibet Provides a Model for Xinjiang.” December 10. https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/12/10/chinas-successful-repression -in-tibet-provides-a-model-for-xinjiang. Fairbank, John K. 1974. “Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience. In Chinese Ways in Warfare, edited by Frank Kierman and John K. Fairbank, 1–26. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Frydenlund, Iselin. 2013. “Canonical Ambiguity and Differential Practices: Buddhism and Militarism in Contemporary Sri Lanka.” In Buddhism and Violence: Militarism and Buddhism in Modern Asia, edited by Vladimir Tikhonov and Torkel Brekke, 95–119. New York: Routledge. Ge, Jianxiong. 1994. Tongyi yu fenlie [Unification and division]. Beijing: Sanlian. Ge, Zhaoguang. 2018. What Is China? Territory, Ethnicity, Culture, and History. Translated by Michael Gibbs Hill. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Glinski, Stefanie. 2020. “Resurgent Taliban Bode Ill for Afghan Peace.” Foreign Policy, July 7. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/07/taliban-al-qaeda-afghanistan-united-states-peace -deal-resurgence/. Gordon, Leonard A. 2006. “Legend and Legacy: Subhas Chandra Bose.” India International Centre Quarterly 33, no. 1: 103–112. Graff, David A. 2002. Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900. New York: Routledge. Harris, Ian. 1999. “Buddhism and Politics in Asia: The Textual and Historical Roots.” In Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, edited by Ian Harris, 1–25. London: Pinter. Hsiao, Kung-chuan. 1977. “Legalism and Autocracy in Traditional China.” In Shang Yang’s Reforms and State Control in China, edited by Yu-ning Li, 125–143. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hui, Victoria T. 2005. War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hui, Victoria T. 2018. “Confucian Pacifism or Confucian Confusion?” In The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations, edited by Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Nicholas Onuf, 148–161. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Hui, Victoria T. 2020. “Cultural Diversity and Coercive Cultural Homogenization in Chinese History.” In Diversity and Its Discontents: Culture and Order in World Politics, edited by Andrew Phillips and Christian Reus-Smit, 93–112. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hui, Victoria T. Forthcoming. “Genocide, Extermination and Mass Killing in Chinese History.” In Cambridge World History of Genocide, edited by Ben Kiernan, Tristan Taylor, and Tracy Lemos. New York: Cambridge University Press. Human Rights Watch. 2007. “Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma.” December 6. https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/12/06/crackdown/repression-2007 -popular-protests-burma.

258   Victoria Tin-bor Hui Human Rights Watch. 2020. “Shoot the Traitors: Discrimination Against Muslims under India’s New Citizenship Policy.” April 9. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot -traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy. Huntington, Samuel. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3: 23–49. International Commission of Jurists. 1959. “New Report: ‘The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law.’ ” July 24. https://www.icj.org/new-report-the-question-of-tibet-and-the-rule-of-law/. Jackson, Patrick. 2010. “How to Think about Civilizations.” In Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, edited by Peter  J.  Katzenstein, 176–200. New York: Routledge. Kang, David. 2010. East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein. Peter J. 2010. “A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations.” In Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, edited by Peter  J.  Katzenstein, 1–40. New York: Routledge. Kent, Daniel  W. 2010. “Onward Buddhist Soldiers: Preaching to the Sri Lankan Army.” In Buddhist Warfare, edited by Michael Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, 157–178. New York: Oxford University Press. Kissinger, Henry. 2012. On China. New York: Penguin Books. Kubba, Laith. 2008. Islamist Parties and Democracy: Institutions Make the Difference. Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3: 37–42. Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2016. “Democratic Backsliding and the Reach of ISIS in Southeast Asia.” Current History 115, no. 782: 226–232. Lawrence, Bruce B. 2010. “Islam in Afro-Eurasia: A Bridge Civilization.” In Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, edited by Peter  J.  Katzenstein, 157–175. New York: Routledge. Lim, Louisa. 2014. The People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited. New York: Oxford University Press. Lintner, Bertil. 2009. The Resistance of the Monks: Buddhism and Activism in Burma. New York: Human Rights Watch. Lorge, Peter. 2005. War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China. London: Routledge. Lynch, Colum. 2011. “U.N.: Sri Lanka’s Crushing of Tamil Tigers May Have Killed 40,000 Civilians.” Washington Post, April 21. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-sri-lankas -crushing-of-tamil-tigers-may-have-killed-40000-civilians/2011/04/21/AFU14hJE_story.html. Macaes, Bruno. 2020. “The Attack of the Civilization-State.” Noema Magazine, June 15. Mahbubani, Kishore. 2020. “Why the Trump Administration Has Helped China.” National Interest, June 8. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-trump-administration-has-helped -china-161641. Mao, Zedong. 1938. “Problems of War and Strategy.” In Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. II. Marxists Internet Archive (transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project). Retrieved June 4, 2020. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/ index.htm. McGlinchey, Eric. 2005. “Autocrats, Islamists, and the Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia.” Current History 104, no. 684: 336–342. McGowan, William. 2012. “Buddhists Behaving Badly: What Zealotry Is Doing to Sri Lanka.” Foreign Affairs (August 2) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2012-08-02/buddhists -behaving-badly.

Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Change in Asia   259 Millward, James  A. 2019. “Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims.” New York Review of Books, February 7. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/02/07/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims/. Mishra, Pankaj. 2005. “The Restless Children of the Dalai Lama.” New York Times Magazine, December 18, 58–63. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/18/magazine/the-restless-children -of-the-dalai-lama.html. Omar, Manal. 2015. “Islam Is a Religion of Peace.” Foreign Policy, November 9. https://foreignpolicy .com/2015/11/09/islam-is-a-religion-of-peace-manal-omar-debate-islamic-state/. Payne, Richard, and Jamal Nassar. 2012. Politics and Culture in the Developing World. New York: Routledge. Perdue, Peter C. 2005. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Pines, Yuri. 2012. The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Psarras, Sophia-Karin. 2003. “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations.” Monumenta Serica 51: 55–236. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2018. On Cultural Diversity: An International Theory in a World of Difference. New York: Cambridge University Press. Reuter, Christopher. 2004. My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Robertson, Matthew P. 2020. “Counterterrorism or Cultural Genocide? Theory and Normativity in Knowledge Production about China’s ‘Xinjiang Strategy.’ ” Made in China Journal, June 12. https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/06/12/counterterrorism-or-cultural-genocide/. Rudolph, Susanne H. 2010. “Four Variants of Indian Civilization.” In Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 137–156. New York: Routledge. Rummel, R. J. 1991. China’s Bloody Century. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Rummel, R. J. 1994. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Samphel, Thubten, Bhuchung  D.  Sonam, Dr. Rinzin Dorjee, and Dr. Tenzin Desal. 2017. Cultural Genocide in Tibet: A Report. Tibet Policy Institute. https://tibetpolicy.net/wp -content/uploads/2017/10/Tibetocide.pdf. Sawyer, Ralph D., trans. 1994. Sun-tzu: The Art of War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sen, Amartya. 2006. Identity and Violence. New York: W. W. Norton. Shakya, Tsering. 2012. “Self-Immolation: The Changing Language of Protest in Tibet.” Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, December 25, 19–39. Shi, Yinhong. 2011. “Wuzhuang de zhongguo: Qiannian zhanlue chuantong” [Armed China: Millennia-old strategic traditions]. World Economics and Politics 6: 4–33. Silverstein, Josef. 1996. “The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political Thought of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” Pacific Affairs 69, no. 2: 211–228. Smock, David R. 2002a. Religious Perspectives on War: Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force. Herndon, VA: United States Institute of Peace Press. Smock, David  R. 2002b. “Islamic Perspectives on Peace and Violence.” United States Institute of Peace special report, January 13. https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/01/ islamic-perspectives-peace-and-violence. Sperling, Elliot. 2008. “Don’t Know Much about Tibetan History.” New York Times, April 13. Starr, S. Frederick. 2014. “Moderate Islam? Look to Central Asia.” New York Times, February 27. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/opinion/moderate-islam-look-to-central-asia.html.

260   Victoria Tin-bor Hui Stern, Jessica. 2004. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins. Strangio, Sebastian. 2020. “The Myanmar Mirage: Why the West Got Burma Wrong.” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 3: 179–185. Szczepanski, Kallie. 2019. “Nobel Peace Prize Laureates from Asia.” April 13. https://www .thoughtco.com/asian-nobel-peace-prize-laureates-195704. United Nations. 2015. “UN Urges Creation of Special Court in Sri Lanka after New Report Confirms ‘Horrific’ Abuses.” UN News, September 16. https://news.un.org/en/ story/2015/09/508942-un-urges-creation-special-court-sri-lanka-after-new-report-confirms -horrific. United Nations. 2019. “Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar from Accusations of Genocide, at Top UN Court.” UN News, December 11. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/12/1053221. Victoria, Brian. 2010. “A Buddhological Critique of ‘Soldier-Zen’ in Wartime Japan.” In Buddhist Warfare, edited by Michael Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, 105–130. New York: Oxford University Press. Walton, Matthew J. 2017. “Religion and Violence in Myanmar: Sitagu Sayadaw’s Case for Mass Killing.” Foreign Affairs, November 6. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma -myanmar/2017-11-06/religion-and-violence-myanmar. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2: 391–425. Worden, Scott. 2010. “Afghanistan & Iraq: Afghanistan—An Election Gone Awry.” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3: 11–25. Yan, Xuetong. 2011. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Yan, Xuetong, and Yuxing Huang. 2011. “Hegemony in the Stratagems of the Warring States.” In Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, edited by Xuetong Yan, 107–145. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Zhang, Weiwei. 2012. The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State. Singapore: World Scientific. Zhu, Zhongbo, and Ning Wang. 2008. “Discourses on Salt and Iron and China’s Ancient Strategic Culture.” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 2: 263–286. Zin, Min. 2016. “Burma Votes for Change: The New Configuration of Power.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 2: 116–131.

chapter 14

Evolu tiona ry Theor iz ation of Peacefu l I n ter nationa l Ch a nges Shiping Tang

Ever since Charles Darwin (1859), social scientists have been attracted to evolutionary theorizing or thinking in social sciences (e.g., Donald Campbell, Alfred Marshall, George Herbert Mead, and Thorstein Veblen, to name just a few). Despite their various (mis-) understandings about biological and social evolution, these giants have shared a fundamental conviction with which I concur: the complex system called human society is an evolutionary system; consequently, social sciences must be evolutionary sciences. For these advocates of evolutionary social sciences, nothing in human society makes sense unless in the light of (social) evolution, to paraphrase Dobzhansky (1973). Unsurprisingly, after a brief hiatus after World War II due to our repulsion against social Darwinism (or more accurately, “social Spencerism”), evolutionary thinking and theorization has enjoyed a vigorous comeback in the social sciences (for a more detailed treatment, see Tang 2020), including international relations (IR). This essay examines evolutionary theorization of peaceful international changes.1 The rest of this essay is divided into four sections. After this brief introduction, the first section explains why an evolutionary approach is a powerful paradigm, perhaps the ultimate paradigm, for theorizing social changes. The second section clarifies several misunderstandings regarding evolution and then highlights a few key aspects of social evolution. The third section briefly summarizes several key studies of international relations (IR) with an evolutionary flavor. Section four singles out a few key directions for promising research. I conclude by highlighting the power of the social evolutionary approach and calling for more students of IR to embrace the approach when tackling peaceful international changes.

262   Shiping Tang A brief caveat is in order. Due to space constraints, I have kept references to the literature of evolutionary biology and social sciences to a minimum. Interested readers should refer to Tang (2020) for a more detailed discussion of a host of issues addressed here.

Why an Evolutionary Approach toward Human Society? Ever since Heraclitus uttered the words, “[N]o man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river, and he’s not the same man,” students of the natural and social worlds have appreciated that explaining continuity and change of the world around us, or more precisely, change with continuity, is the most fundamental challenge for all sciences. Broadly speaking, we can identify two types of change (i.e., nontransformational and transformational) and two levels of analysis (i.e., units and system). Once we differentiate the two types of change and the two levels of analysis, it becomes clear that in social sciences there are three positions regarding the challenge posed by change with continuity. The first position is to deny any change at both the unit level and the system level: only this position is genuinely static. Obviously, this position is untenable, and few, if any, social scientists take such a position. The second position has three variants: (1) admitting only nontransformational changes at both the unit level and the system level; (2) admitting transformational changes at the unit level but not at the system level; (3) admitting transformational changes at the system level but not at the unit level. The first and the third variants have been rare, and the closest thing might have been those schools that can only contemplate cyclical changes at the system level but admit no transformational changes at the unit level (e.g., Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1990). The second variant has been far more common, prominently represented by structural functionalism in sociology and structural realism in IR (e.g., Waltz 1979, 66; Mearsheimer 2001, 2). Crucially, all three variants within the second position can claim to be dynamic, to a various degree. None of them, however, can claim to be genuinely evolutionary. The third position is to admit both types of change at both levels and thus has the potential to be genuinely evolutionary. Obviously, in the long history of human society, both units (e.g., individuals, collectives), different human societies, and the whole humanity have undergone both nontransformational and transformational changes. It is this presence of both nontransformational and transformational change with continuity at both the unit level and the system level that demands all social sciences to acquire a genuinely evolutionary approach. This is because only a genuinely evolutionary approach is up to the task. So where does evolutionism’s power come from? Its power primarily rests on three fronts. Foremost, evolutionism is exceptional at explaining the wonders of life—the great diversity, the marvelous adaptation of organisms to their environment, the similarities

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   263 and differences among organisms of the same species, and the similarities among different but related species—on Earth and other places in the universe; the same evolutionary central mechanism of variation-­selection-­inheritance (VSI) applies. No other theory or approach (i.e., nonevolutionary and partially evolutionary approaches) has ever come close.2 Second, evolutionism subsumes or unifies all other micro- or meso-­level mechanisms in biological evolution. Evolutionism, as Daniel Dennett (1995, 62) puts it, proves to be “a universal acid” that dissolves everything. Finally, evolutionism makes most exogenous (i.e., driven by external factors or force) explanations of life unsatisfactory and, more importantly, unnecessary.3 In sum, evolutionism is elegant, powerful, and endogenous: it triumphs over all other explanations for the wonder of life on (and very likely, beyond) Earth, and it is my contention that the evolutionary approach holds equally powerful potential for understanding the complexities, wonders, and tragedies of human society, including IR.

Evolution: From Biological to Social Although Darwin made his revolutionary theory known to the world over 150 years ago, and evolutionary biology has established the core facts of biological evolution beyond any reasonable doubt in the past half-­century, misunderstandings about evolution and the evolutionary paradigm abound (for a classic introduction, see Mayr 2001). Here, I  merely single out several common misunderstandings of (biological and social) evolution before I move on. 1. “Evolution means ‘survival of the fittest.’ ” This is perhaps the most prevailing misunderstanding about evolution and evolutionism. In truth, as Darwin recognized long ago (1859, 201–202, 472), biological evolution does not dictate survival of the fittest at all: biological evolution only means the survival of the fitter among individual organisms within the same species and the survival of the fitter species in a specific environment. As such, fitness in biological evolution is always relative but can never be absolute in any sense. In other words, biological evolution only dictates survival of the fitter in a specific environment, but never the survival of the fittest in an absolute sense. 2. Evolution means adaptation with will (or destiny). An organism’s adaptation to its environment is the outcome of evolution via natural selection. Adaptationism via will (or destiny) has no explanation for the origin of organisms’ will to adapt in the first place. 3. Evolution is essentially equivalent from development, or an unfolding of destiny or design in stages, progressively. This is due to Herbert Spencer’s equating evolution with development.

264   Shiping Tang 4. Biological evolution is purely neo-­Darwinian. Not anymore. Four discoveries, namely epigenetic inheritance, transmission of prion-­like diseases, niche construction, and parental effect, have all called for some admission of non-­neo-­Darwinian inheritance. These new discoveries imply that the transmission of instruction or information (with gene being only one form) and phenotype in biological evolution is far more complex than the gene-­centric and externalist Modern Synthesis has anticipated: evolutionary biology is now moving toward an Extended Synthesis (Danchin et al. 2011; Danchin 2013). As a result, labeling biological evolution as a whole as Darwinian, Lamarckian, and Spencerian has become increasingly unhelpful, if not counterproductive (Tang 2020, chap. 2, n.d.) Social evolution is even less neo-­Darwinian (Tang 2017b, n.d.). Although social evolution shares some key similarities with biological evolution, there are also fundamental differences between the two. All the differences between biological evolution and social evolution can be traced to the coming of a transformational new force—the ideational force—to social evolution. Ideas play a role in social evolution but not in biological evolution. Moreover, the coming of ideational forces does not mean that material forces no longer operate in social evolution. Rather, the two forces interact with each other to drive social evolution, thus making social evolution a phenomenon far more complex than biological evolution. Altogether, the central mechanism in the ideational dimension of social evolution can be both artificial variation-­selection-­ inheritance (VSI) and selection-­variation-­inheritance (SVI). Moreover, only theorization with the central mechanism of artificial VSI or SVI can be genuinely evolutionary.

Information and Expression/Phenotypes in Social Evolution In biological evolution, there is only one kind of information (or replicator, in a loose sense) and interactor (or phenotype, in a loose sense)—the material or biological kind. In social evolution, there are two broader types of replicator and interactor; in addition to the material kind, there is also an ideational kind. Moreover, in the ideational dimension of social evolution, there can be multiple pairs of replicator and interactor, depending on the level of analysis.

Mutations in Social Evolution: Random and Blind versus Nonrandom and Directed In biological evolution, mutations are generated essentially randomly by three major mechanisms: DNA damages/nucleotide changes, recombination or genetic material exchanges (e.g., chromosome transposition, genetic crossing-­over), and external invasion. More critically, these mutations are also generated blindly, in the absolute sense:

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   265 organisms cannot know whether a mutation is advantageous or not. In the biological dimension of human evolution, these mechanisms and principles still hold. In social evolution, however, ideational variations (or mutations) can be random and blind but also nonrandom and directed. Yet just because ideas are not generated randomly and blindly does not mean that a phenotype expressed from an idea will always be ‘fit’ in a given social system: ideational phenotypes or expressions are still subjected to artificial selection.

Complex Multilevel Selection in Social Evolution Selection in social evolution is also far more complex. In biological evolution, there is only one source of selection pressure: the physical environment. In contrast, in social evolution, there are two sources of selection pressure: the physical environment and human beings themselves. These two sources of selection pressure interact with each other to drive social evolution. Furthermore, because of the coming of ideational forces in social evolution, there are also two different types of selection pressure: material and ideational. Three critical aspects of selection in social evolution are worth emphasizing. Most critically, artificial selection rather than natural selection dominates the ideational dimension of social evolution, although this artificial selection still has to operate within the constraints dictated by the physical environment. Moreover, within the ideational dimension, different forces of selection may operate at different levels, while at the same time the same force of selection may operate differently at different levels. Finally, because human beings are creatures with (high) consciousness, human agents are not only producers of ideational mutations, but equally importantly, agents of selection in the ideational evolution of social evolution. Meanwhile, from the interaction between material forces and ideational forces, there arises a critical selection force in social evolution: (social) power.

Evolutionary Theorization of International Relations: From Anti/Pseudo to Genuine Despite some evolutionary elements scattered around (which I cannot discuss here due to space constraints), much of mainstream IR theorization has been nonevolutionary and even anti-­evolutionary. Most prominently, by seeking to explain the whole history of international politics with a single grand theory, major IR theorists have been implicitly assuming that the fundamental nature of international politics has remained roughly the same or, more precisely, that human society has experienced a single phase of international politics (Tang 2013). As such, all major grand IR theories have been

266   Shiping Tang nonevolutionary theories. Waltz provided the clearest statement on this implicit assumption: “The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly,” and he attributed the cause of this “striking sameness in the quality of international politics” to “the enduring anarchic character of international politics” (1979, 66, emphasis added; see also Gilpin 1981, 7; Mearsheimer 2001, 2). Modelski (1990) touted his “long cycle” of power shift as an evolutionary theory of IR. Yet his whole enterprise is metaphorically evolutionary at best, and pseudo-­evolutionary at worst. Modelski did not grasp the basics of biological or social evolution. Evolution, whether biological or social, does not go through cycles. More critically, the central mechanism of evolution—the mechanism of variation-­selection-­inheritance—has no role in his whole enterprise. Indeed, even his scheme of “long cycles” is merely an observation with dubious validity. Thayer (2004) advanced a theory on the origins of war and the necessity of offensive realism as states’ guiding theory in their pursuit of security, drawing exclusively from sociobiology. Unfortunately, the sociobiological approach toward the origin of war is inherently invalid (for detailed critique, see Tang 2013, chap. 2 and the citations there). Hendrik Spruyt’s (1994) explanation for the rise of the sovereign territorial state in the European international system between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries was a genuinely social evolutionary theory. Critically building upon Mann (1986), Tilly (1975, 1992), and many others, Spruyt emphasizes variation and selection as two crucial steps for understanding why and how a particular form of state (i.e., the sovereign territorial state) eventually came to dominate the system. Spruyt argues that the sovereign territorial state was more capable of protecting trade and extracting revenue and thus had a long-­term advantage in competing against the other two possible forms of gov­ern­ ance (i.e., city leagues, city state). His overall thesis represents a major step toward a more adequate explanation of the rise of the territorial state and sovereignty within the medieval to early modern European system. First appearing in an article and then a volume, Tang (2010, 2013) advanced the first systematic statement regarding the evolution of the international system from around 8000 bce to the present. Briefly, Tang first identified four “worlds” or epochs in human history: the peaceful paradise before the onset of war in different subsystems; the bloody offensive realist world after the onset of war in which states either conquered or were conquered; the defensive realist world after the rise of sovereignty and nationalism circa 1648–1945; and the more rule-­based system that is still unfolding today. Throughout, Tang deployed the central mechanism of artificial VSI/SVI for explaining the transformations from one world to the next. Tang’s social evolution paradigm (SEP)-based account of the grand transformations of the international system shows that the three grand theories of international politics are from and thus for different epochs of international politics. More specifically, offensive realism was right, but it is wrong and will be wrong: its policy prescriptions will produce disasters in today’s and tomorrow’s world. In contrast, defensive realism was wrong—its policy prescriptions would be suicidal in an offensive realist world—but it has been right and may remain right for a while. Finally, neoliberalism was wrong—its

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   267 policy prescription, too, would be suicidal in an offensive realist world—but it might have become more right after World War II and may become more right in the future. Put differently, whereas offensive realism is a theory for the past, defensive realism is a theory for the present and a limited future, and neoliberalism is a theory for a limited present and more for the future. Tang’s SEP-­based account of the grand transformations of the international system thus has neatly dissolved the debates between the three grand theories. In two articles, Tang (2008) and Tang and Long (2012) also deployed SEP to explain changes and continuities in states’ security behavior. Tang (2008) sought to explain China’s shifting from a security strategy of offensive realism under Mao Tse-­tung to one of defensive realism under Deng Xiaoping. Briefly, China under Mao adopted an ideology of overthrowing all imperialist and “reactionary” regimes in Asia and the world at large. Thus, China under Mao, like the former Soviet Union, actively supported revolutions and insurgencies in many developing countries, thereby intentionally threatening those countries, which were identified as imperialists, or their lackeys and proxies. Moreover, as a staunch Marxist, Mao believed that conflicts in international politics are necessary and inevitable—to transform the world into a socialist world, struggles, including armed struggles, against imperialists and their proxies are inevitable and necessary. Furthermore, China under Mao largely believed that all of the People’s Republic’s security problems were due to other countries’ evil policies, rather than the interactions between China and other states. China under Mao thus had little understanding about the dynamics of the security dilemma (Tang 2009). After the launching of open-­and-­reform in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, however, China has firmly settled into a defensive realism strategy. So what explained this profound change? Tang (2008) argued that the setbacks brought by Mao’s disastrous domestic and foreign policies made a fundamental rethinking of China’s domestic and foreign policies inevitable after Mao’s death. After Deng had wrestled power from Mao’s anointed successor, Deng renounced Mao’s disastrous policies and adopted a fundamentally new set of domestic and foreign policies that included open-­and-­reform and improving relations with both superpowers and China’s neighbors. This profound change has been an outcome of (negative) artificial selection via learning. Tang and Long (2012) deployed SEP to explain the continuity in post–World War II United States (US) military interventionism. After the US invasion of Iraq, there was a heated debate regarding this puzzle that often pitted ideas against material forces (especially US military power), with even many realists stressing the overwhelming power of ideas embodied in the minds of neoconservatives. Tang and Long (2012) contend that this one-­sided emphasis on the power of ideas is incomplete and misleading. Taking advantage of SEP’s synthesizing power, their explanation combines both ideas and material forces via the central mechanism of VSI/SVI. Specifically, they argue that US military interventionism cannot be understood as the product of ideational forces alone. Rather, two crucial material variables, namely ­geography and aggregate power amplified by superior technological prowess, are

268   Shiping Tang i­n­dis­pen­sa­ble for understanding the propensity for America to intervene militarily abroad. Briefly, due to America’s unique geographical location and enormous power advantage over other states, the majority of American elites and citizens have been shielded from the devastation of war. Compared to citizens in other major states, American citizens in general have consequently tended to be less repelled by the use of force as an instrument of statecraft. Likewise, American elites have tended to support the use of force abroad more enthusiastically than the elites of other major countries. Consequently, ideas that support military interventions abroad are more likely to win in the American marketplace of ideas, and thus America since World War II has been far more active in military interventions overseas than other major states.

Peaceful International Changes: Five Issue Domains By any measure, international politics has become more peaceful, measured by the number of both interstate and intrastate wars (Cederman et al. 2017). As such, we should expect more peaceful international changes than we are used to. So what useful lessons can we draw from SEP, regarding theorizing peaceful international changes? This section identifies five key issue domains. For the first three issue domains, I have some concrete ideas, whereas the last two are emerging new phenomena about which I can only offer some speculations.

The Future of a Rule-­Based International System: Power, Ideas, and Artificial Selection Judged by the total numbers of rules and the general tendency of states to obey some of the rules, the international system has become more rule-­based or institutionalized (Simmons  2000). A major driver behind this development has been the dramatic decrease in interstate war (Tang 2013, chap. 5). Moreover, there is a feedback mechanism between rule-­making and peaceful changes. Many international institutions (rules) and norms were made or established for the sake of preventing interstate (and then intrastate) violence, and a more peaceful international system has made and strengthened more rules and norms. Rule-­making in international politics thus represents a most fertile field for evolutionary theorization in IR. Institutions are simply codified ideas. Because there is diversity of knowledge among agents (i.e., there will always be more than one idea about how a future institutional arrangement should look), the process of institutional changes is essentially about how to turn a very limited few of those numerous ideas into institutions. As such, we can take ideas (for a particular institutional arrangement) as genes and institutional arrangements

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   269 as phenotypes, and then apply SEP—with the mechanism of artificial VSI/SVI at its core—to institutional change. Based on this bedrock evolutionary take on institutions and institutional change, I have developed a SEP-­based general theory of institutional change (Tang 2011a). Here I introduce the general theory of institutional change and then underscore some of its most critical implications for understanding international institutions. First and foremost, the struggle for the power to make rules is at the heart of the matter. Institutions are often made by power (or under the shadow of power) and backed by overt or covert power. Most of the time, power and institutions are inseparable. Second, the process of institutional change consists of five distinct phases: (1) generation of ideas for specific institutional arrangements; (2) political mobilization by supporters of specific ideas; (3) struggle for power to design and dictate specific institutional arrangements (i.e., to set specific rules); (4) setting the rules; and (5) legitimatizing/stabilizing/ reproducing. These five phases correspond to the three phases of mutation (variation), selection (reduction in variation), and inheritance (stabilization) in evolution: generation of ideas corresponds to mutation; political mobilization and struggle for power to selection; and setting the rules and legitimatizing/stabilizing to inheritance. Third, the notion that institutions are usually welfare-­improving public goods is misleading, inspired by the invalid harmony approach toward institutions, exemplified by functionalism and a neoclassical economics-­inspired new institutional economics approach toward institutions. More often than not, institutions are private goods that serve private interests, and institutions that improve agents’ collective welfare are products of power struggle in a long haul rather than instant gratification from rational design (for details, see Tang 2011a, chap. 2). From the general theory and SEP, we can draw some explicit implications for understanding institutions and rule-­making in the international system. First and foremost, like institutional change in domestic politics, the heart of institutional change in international politics, too, is the struggle for the power to make rules, and this process almost inevitably needs power. In international politics, most of the time, it has been states (rather than individuals) that have created international institutions, and the state (as the ultimate hierarchical organization) itself symbolizes the monopoly of power. Hence, at the very beginning, international institutions have been instruments and products of statecraft. International institutions are also the product of power politics: most international institutions are backed by explicit or implicit power, just as most domestic institutions (Tang 2011a). Second, because power is the key for making and maintaining institutions (and thus order), an actor or a coalition of actors that won the struggle for power to impose rules will have more, sometimes decisive, effect over the exact nature of institutions. In international politics, this means that a hegemonic state or a coalition of states that won the last major war or major debate will have a more, sometimes decisive, effect over the exact nature of international institutions and thus order. This was indeed the case when it comes to sovereignty (Spruyt 1994), territorial integrity (Zacher 2001), decolonialization (Spruyt 2000), trade (Keohane 1984), abolition of slave trade and piracy (Clark 2007,

270   Shiping Tang chap. 2; de Nevers 2007), racial equality (Clark 2007, chap. 4), and perhaps the whole international law apparatus (Anghie 2004). Third and more relevant for our discussion here, now that the number of major interstate wars has greatly decreased, making new international rules may require a new mixture of power, most likely a mixture of economic, ideological, and political power (Mann 1986). In light of this new development, should we expect the making of international rules to be more based on controlling information and knowledge, despite the coming of the informational age?

Niche Construction of the International and Regional System and Order One of the most exciting progresses that extends the Modern Synthesis has been niche construction, first introduced by Lewontin (1983). Since then, niche construction has received significant theorization and elaboration (e.g., Odling-­Smee 2010; Odling-­Smee and Laland 2011). Briefly, niche construction theory (NCT) has four central components: niche, niche construction, ecological inheritance, and coevolution of organisms and niche. NCT starts with the self-­evident observation that organisms not only adapt to the environment in which they operate but also actively modify their environment. In other words, an organism’s environment is not externally independent from an organism’s life cycle. Rather, there is feedback from an organism’s life cycle to the environment and thus it entails possible “stable and directional changes in environmental conditions” in the long run, and constructed niches very often pass from one generation to the next, resulting in “ecological inheritance.” These modified niches therefore come back to shape the fitness of its offspring (and other organisms). In short, organisms and their environment coevolve. Hence, niche construction is a process and a mechanism just as VSI/SVI, even though the former is less central than the latter. By any measure, human beings have been the most powerful niche constructor as we know it (Odling-­Smee and Laland 2011). Humans impact their environment via their metabolism and activities either unintentionally and intentionally, just as other organisms. Far more impressively, however, human beings engineer both their physical and social environment, pervasively and profoundly. Take, for example, the coming of settled agriculture. When initiating settled agriculture, our ancestors had to clear underbrush to make fields, construct settled living spaces (e.g., pots, hamlets), and domesticate animals by keeping them alive and reproducing them rather than killing them for instant consumption. Besides settled agriculture, the Industrial Revolution, megacities, the Internet revolution, and global warming are just a few examples of the grand cultural and physical niche constructions by our species. Equally critical, humans create organizations and institutions, two of the most critical niches for our daily life. Hence, NCT is a potentially

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   271 powerful theorization tool for understanding human society, especially for understanding the relationship between human agents and the social system (Tang 2020). Indeed, NCT may be an ideal tool for theorizing international relations, especially peaceful changes of international system and international order. More concretely: 1. States and other agents are organisms, whereas the international system is the environment. But their relationship is not entirely external. Human beings construct their niches (as aspects or pockets of the social system) all the time. A social niche construction approach calls for a figuration and relational construction perspective, as exemplified by Elias’s ([1939] 1994) majestic The Civilizing Process and then restated by Emirbayer (1997) and Emirbayer and Mische (1998). 2. A constructed environment impacts the agent itself but also other agents. Whether the constructed environment benefits the organism itself or other organisms depends on artificial selection within the new constructed system. Hence, SNC is not parallel, but secondary, to the central mechanism of social evolution (i.e., artificial VSI/SVI). 3. Agents, especially more powerful ones, do not merely adapt to the social system, but also actively seek to shape or modify it to suit them better. All else being equal, the more powerful the agent is, the larger the impact of its niche construction. 4. There are always multiple agents who can construct the niche, and they inevitably have different preferences over outcomes (as conflict of interest). Moreover, their attempts at niche construction interact with each other. 5. Agents pick a domain (or a niche) within a social system to modify. Agents deploy strategic behaviors to achieve the niche construction, but the exact outcomes include both intended and unintended ones. Agents also learn from their own and others’ experiences to draw lessons for constructing their environment. All the resources, whether material (e.g., wealth, number of allies and opponents) or ideational (e.g., religious, ideological, and cultural), can enter agents’ calculation of picking niches and specific strategies of construction (Elias [1939] 1994; Bourdieu 2005). 6. Most of the time, agents can only construct a niche that has been handed down to them from earlier rounds of construction, perhaps by other agents. In other words, an agent can only construct a niche within existing constraints. Thus, more often than not, the scope of niche construction is limited and gradual, even though the impact of the new niche can be quite significant, in the long run.

Changes of States’ Security Strategies: Beyond Epistemic Communities Evidently, SEP is well-­equipped for explaining states’ behavioral changes, including peaceful behavioral changes. From the two applications earlier (Tang 2008; Tang and Long 2012), several useful points can be summarized.

272   Shiping Tang First, the social evolutionary approach toward foreign policy changes synthesizes realism’s mostly material stance and constructivism’s mostly ideational stance toward state behavior and international politics in general. Material forces and ideational forces work together, rather than independently, to drive social changes. Hence, neither a purely materialistic position nor a purely ideationalistic position is tenable for understanding human society. The challenge for social scientists thus becomes how to bring material forces and ideational forces together to formulate a coherent understanding of human society. The social evolutionary approach is the ideal instrument for bringing the two forces together into a coherent understanding of international politics (as a domain of human society). Briefly, although ideational forces do come back to influence the evolution of the material world, material forces retain ontological priority (Tang  2011a), because the material world serves as the ultimate testing ground (or the source of selection pressure) of ideas. Ultimately, humans must anchor their ideas upon the material world, although at any given time our knowledge may not capture the objective material reality. As such, states’ security strategies tend to reflect the objective reality in the long run because states are punished, sometimes severely, if they persist in adopting wrong ideas. Second, (social) learning is an integral part of any theory of foreign policy changes, and human learning itself is an evolutionary process (Levy 1994; Tang 2013, chap. 5). Indeed, as Hayek (1978, 291) pointed out, the capability of learning gives social evolution a fundamental edge over natural evolution in terms of speed because acquired phenotypes can now be directly transmitted to the next generation through learning, and the next generation does not have to go through the same selection process. At the beginning, there are multiple ideas for a possible strategy, and states do not simply pick one idea and deploy it as a strategy. Instead, these ideas engage in a competition for the right to be adopted as the primary strategy through debates and political struggles in the marketplace of ideas. Eventually, some ideas will be selected out, and some ideas will emerge as winners, and only the ideas that win become part of a strategy (see also Tang 2011b). SEP thus easily subsumes subthemes such as epistemic community, securitization via speech act, and lobbying for policies as competition and selection (e.g., Adler 2005). As a result, SEP is widely applicable for explaining agents’ ideational and behavioral changes. Third, one of the major weaknesses of ideational explanation of social changes has been that even if one identifies an idea to be a major cause of social change, one still has to explain how the idea comes into existence and then matters in the first place. According to SEP, selection and learning (which includes rationality) work together in driving the evolution of the system.4 Hence, a conspicuous time for changing policies is when an agent realizes that his or her previous policies did not work, and the agent is suffering from the consequences of his or her failed policies. In other words, negative learning may be a more powerful force than positive learning in driving changes. Finally, a social evolutionary approach toward foreign policy changes can easily integrate many of the insights from realism, institutionalism, and constructivism, especially regarding how the international system impacts states as agents. According to SEP, any social system, with international system being one of them, impacts agents via six major

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   273 channels (Tang 2016; 2020, chap. 3). The first channel is constraining and enabling by purely physical or material forces. The next four channels, learning, constraining/ enabling by the interplay of material and ideational forces, artificial selection, and constituting/constructing, make up of what we usually mean by “socialization,” broadly speaking. The sixth channel, which most IR theorists and social scientists do not recognize, is “anti-­socialization.”

The Future of State and State Building without Wars Tilly’s (1985) aphorism that states made wars and wars made states in history still rings true in some parts of the world (see also Elias [1939] 1994). Yet, as Jervis (2002) noted two decades ago and now supported with extensive data (Cederman et al. 2017), interstate wars have decreased significantly and even intrastate (especially ethnic) wars have decreased significantly (Tang 2017a). Yet weak states still abound today. So what does the diminishing prospect of war mean for the future of state and state building, especially for weak states? Intuitively, if territorial expansion or conquest has ceased (at least in some parts of the world), a major function of the state has also ceased. If so, how can elites justify certain measures (really, sacrifices) for national defense? This question has been a new phenomenon that has yet to receive much attention, partly because part of human history had been so bloody until quite recently. Again, the social evolutionary approach is well-­suited for tackling this problem. To begin with, states will have to select new means and rhetoric to justify certain measures for building a strong state now that the selection pressure via survival has gone. One possible option may be economic development, now that even mainstream economics have admitted the critical role of state in jump-­starting and sustaining economic development (Bardhan 2016). Yet, even with this justification, states may have to select and implement new measures for state building. Second, even for states that are in tense rivalries (e.g., Iran versus Saudi Arabia; India versus Pakistan), will their people continue to sacrifice their well-­being in the danger of war or will they try to wrestle more resources for social welfare? Finally, without existential external threat, states can actually afford to allocate more material and human resources to more productive activities (e.g., education, research). If this is what has been happening, what does this hold for the future of state building itself (Paul 2018)?

Nontraditional Security: Climate Change, Epidemics, and Artificial Intelligence Power Mainstream IR literature has been about traditional security issues. Yet the recent Covid-­19 epidemic must have alerted even the most hard-­core traditional IR to these looming nontraditional security challenges. With over a quarter of a million deaths and

274   Shiping Tang trillions (in US$) of economic loss, the Covid-­19 epidemic has caused more loss of life and economic damages than a region-­wide war. Unfortunately, the two leading economies (i.e., United States and China) have been throwing punches at each other rather than cooperating to combat the crisis. Moreover, even the European Union has failed to orchestrate a unified rapid strategy when the epidemic hit its member countries. What does the lack of cooperation and coordination when facing clear and present nontraditional danger mean for the future of international governance? The coming of global warming (or artificial climate and ecological change) presents one of the most pressing challenges facing humankind. After more than two centuries since the Industrial Revolution (c. 1780), the ecological impact of our modernity may have finally reached a threshold. In this sense, the coming of global warming is the archetypal manifestation of how social changes have induced profound changes to our natural environment and this artificial and natural environment has now forced us to invent new adaptations or face severe consequences. Understanding how different human groups have reacted to the coming of artificial climate and ecological changes and how they have fared is critical for us to take a fresh look at how we have engaged with nature. The coming of artificial intelligence (AI, including robots) and the coming of genuinely artificial (if not ‘alien’) organisms bring both exciting possibilities that can extend human beings’ capabilities beyond what has been conceivable but also pose some profound questions for the role and fate of our species. Although we do not want to exaggerate the possibility that our species may cease to exist in the hands of robots, the enormous implications of these new technological advancements for the evolution of human society are yet to be explicitly tackled head-­on. In this vast unchartered territory that needs our urgent, sustained, and deep attention, SEP may also provide us with powerful glimpses into our future. These emerging and growing challenges and even threats have not received adequate attention from the mainstream IR literature. Meanwhile, existing nontraditional security literature has generated more practical lessons than theoretical insight. Although I do not hold a crystal ball for how we may adequately understand these emerging challenges, SEP, due to its immanent capacities for explaining both unit-­level and system-­ level transformational changes, may be a powerful tool for understanding how these emerging challenges transform both units and the system (e.g., with the social niche construction approach mentioned earlier).

Conclusions A social evolutionary account of the transformation of the international system has shown that the international system has indeed evolved from an extremely violent system (or the offensive realist world) to a mostly peaceful system (or the defensive realist world) and perhaps to a more rule-­based system (Tang 2013). Because evolution does

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   275 not go through cycles (i.e., there is no ‘back to the future’), the world we now live in will most likely see more peaceful changes than violent ones. If this is the case, the social evolutionary approach (or SEP) is destined to play a more significant role in explaining and anticipating the future of international politics. Moreover, when it comes to (peaceful) social changes, evolutionary theorizing triumphs over nonevolutionary theorizing on at least three fronts. First, evolutionary theorizing more effectively organizes and integrates a wider body of social facts (i.e., idea, behavior, and social outcome) than nonevolutionary theorizing. Second, evolutionary theorizing provides a more integrative, coherent, parsimonious, endogenous, and thus foundational explanation for a more diverse and often seemingly contradictory body of social facts than nonevolutionary theorizing. Third, evolutionary theorizing synthesizes many competing and often seemingly incompatible theoretical approaches, a feat that nonevolutionary theorizing is hard-­pressed to achieve. Evolutionary theorizing thus often transcends and even dissolves many prominent debates between different theoretical approaches in social sciences (Tang 2020). It is on these grounds that I hope more students of IR can embrace the social evolutionary approach when tackling existing and emerging phenomena and puzzles.

Notes 1. Some of the discussions and texts draw from my recent book, On Social Evolution: Phenomenon and Paradigm (New York: Routledge, 2020). 2. For instance, a creationist explanation of the diversity of the biological world must employ numerous designs and divine interventions to explain why birds have feathers and chameleons can camouflage themselves. 3. The most prominent external force and factor, of course, has been God or ‘the Creator.’ 4. In contrast, Waltz suggested that the selection of balancing behavior does not need ra­tion­ al­ity (i.e., learning), even though he explicitly stated that “if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside” (Waltz  1979, 118) and emulation is a form of learning.

References Adler, Emanuel. 2005. Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations. London: Routledge. Anghie, Antony. 2004. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bardhan, Pranab. 2016. “State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature.” Journal of Economic Literature 54, no. 3: 862–892. Bourdieu, Pierre. 2005. The Social Structures of the Economy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Julian Wucherpfennig. 2017. “Predicting the Decline of Ethnic Civil War: Was Gurr Right and for the Right Reasons?” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 2: 262–274. Clark, Ian. 2007. International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

276   Shiping Tang Danchin, Étienne. 2013. “Avatars of Information: Towards an Inclusive Evolutionary Synthesis.” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 28, no. 6: 351–358. Danchin, Étienne, Anne Charmantier, Frances A. Champagne, Alex Mesoudi, Nenoit Pujol, and Simon Blanchet. 2011. “Beyond DNA: Integrating Inclusive Inheritance into an Extended Theory of Evolution.” Nature Reviews Genetics 12, no. 7: 475–486. Darwin, Charles. 1859. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. London: John Murray. De Nevers, Renee. 2007. “Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement.” International Studies Review 9, no. 1: 53–80. Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. London: Allen Lane. Dobzhansky, Theodosius. 1973. “Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution.” The American Biology Teacher 35, no. 3: 125–129. Elias, Norbert. (1939) 1994. The Civilizing Process. Rev. ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology.” The American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 2: 281–317. Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Ann Mische. 1998. “What Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 4: 962–1023. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hayek, Friedrich  A. 1978. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Jervis, Robert. 2002. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace.” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1: 1–14. Keohane, Robert  O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Levy, Jack  S. 1994. “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.” International Organization 48, no. 2: 279–312. Lewontin, Richard C. 1983. “Gene, Organism, and Environment.” In Evolution from Molecules to Man, edited by D. S. Bendall, 273–285. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mann, Michael. 1986. A History of Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760, vol. 1 of The Sources of Social Power. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mayr, Ernst. 2001. What Evolution Is. New York: Basic Books. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Modelski, George. 1990. “Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?” International Organization 44, no. 1: 1–24. Odling-Smee, John. 2010. “Niche Inheritance.” In Evolution: The Extended Synthesis, edited by Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd B. Müller, 175–207. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Odling-Smee, John, and Kevin  N.  Laland. 2011. “Ecological Inheritance and Cultural Inheritance: What Are They and How Do They Differ.” Biological Theory 6, no. 3: 220–230. Paul, T. V. 2018. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Simmons. Beth A. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4: 819–835. Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Evolutionary Theorization of Peaceful International Changes   277 Spruyt, Hendrik. 2000. “The End of Empire and the Extension of the Westphalian System: The Normative Basis of the Modern State Order.” International Studies Review 2, no. 2: 65–92. Tang, Shiping. 2008. “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy.” In China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, 141–162. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Tang, Shiping. 2009. “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis.” Security Studies 18, no. 3: 587–623. Tang, Shiping. 2010. “Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis.” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 1: 31–55. Tang, Shiping. 2011a. A General Theory of Institutional Change. London: Routledge. Tang, Shiping. 2011b. “Foundational Paradigms of Social Sciences.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41, no. 2: 211–249. Tang, Shiping. 2013. Social Evolution of International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tang, Shiping. 2016. “The Reaches of the International System: Six Channels.” Working Paper. Available at https://www.academia.edu/25924033/The_Reaches_of_the_Social_System_ Six_Channels. Tang. Shiping. 2017a. “Understanding Ethnic Conflict: Four Waves and Beyond.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.340. Tang. Shiping. 2017b. “Toward Generalized Evolutionism: Beyond Generalized Darwinism and Its Critics.” Journal of Economic Issues 51, no. 3: 588–612. Tang, Shiping. 2020. On Social Evolution: Phenomenon and Paradigm. London: Routledge. Tang, Shiping. n.d. “Various Notions of Evolutionism: (Neo-)Darwinian, (Neo-)Lamarckian, and Spencerian.” Unpublished manuscript. Tang, Shiping, and Joey Shi-Ruey Long. 2012. “America’s Military Interventionism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation.” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 3: 509–538. Thayer, Bradley A. 2004. Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Tilly, Charles. 1975. “Reflections on the History of European State-making.” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly, 3–83. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter  B.  Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 169–191. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990–1992. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Zacher, Mark W. 2001. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force.” International Organization 55, no. 2: 215–250.

Pa rt I V

T H E S OU RC E S OF C H A NGE

chapter 15

I n ter nationa l L aw a n d Peacefu l Ch a nge Jennifer M. Welsh

One of the definitions of peaceful change provided by the editors of this volume, drawn from Karl Deutsch, emphasizes “the resolution of social problems mutually by institutionalized procedures without resort to largescale physical force” (Deutsch 1957, 5, quoted in Paul, this volume, 4). This particular framing already suggests that international law has a significant contribution to make to the phenomenon of peaceful change in international relations (IR), given that the body of rules acknowledged by states and international organizations to have the status of law is in large part aimed at facilitating just such a resolution. As a “foundational institution” of international society (Holsti 2004), international law specifies the nature and content of agreements among states and facilitates a host of peaceful interactions, whether on land, in the sea or skies, or even in outer space. It also provides a means by which “states can advertise their intentions” about core aspects of that interaction and reassure one another about future policies in relation to matters of joint concern (Bull 1977, 136). Deutsch’s definition also implies that the change to which law contributes need not always entail a fundamental transformation of the international system itself; instead, it can involve alterations in the practices and patterns of relations among the units of that system or an increase and decrease in the number of those units (Holsti 2004, 13–16). International law, as we shall see, has been part of both kinds of change, most notably through its prohibition on the use of force by states and its rules for the recognition of new states. Law has not only affected the behavior and discourse of actors within a given structure, but also helps to constitute that structure, particularly through the ways in which it interacts with states’ identities (Reus-­Smit 2004, 5). Nonetheless, this chapter ultimately argues that while international law has contributed to forms of peaceful change—through both its codification of changing social ideas and practices and its catalytic effect in setting out aspirational principles—it has also been profoundly implicated in the preservation of a system of sovereign states that assumes both the political and territorial legitimacy of those sovereign units. In short, law has also been a force for peaceful continuity that has, in some instances, perpetuated forms of injustice.

282   Jennifer M. Welsh

Understanding International Law Before turning to the specific question of law’s relationship to peaceful change, it is important to underscore the limitations of conceiving of and analyzing international law through the lens of either realist or neoliberal institutionalist approaches to IR.

Realist Perspectives The realist view of international politics as a struggle for material power between states usually relegates international law to an epiphenomenal role, whereby the law either rests on a particular balance of power and thus has no independent effect or merely furthers—but never challenges—the purposes of powerful states (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985; Carr 1946). Seen in this way, law can neither be decoupled from politics nor serve the advance of peace. Although some realist scholars do acknowledge the ways in which international law has helped to make power transitions less violent—particularly by adding to the incentive structure that works against the right of conquest and by limiting the justifications that can be forwarded in the contemporary international system for the use of force— these theorists still cannot fully account for the observable ways in which legal norms can constrain states from pursuing actions that cannot easily be legitimated (Wheeler 2004). The core problems with the realist perspective on international law are thus twofold. First, it assumes that violations of the law are proof that law has no impact on state behavior. But as many scholars have noted (Holsti 2004; Bull 1977; Franck 1990; Finnemore 2003; Reus-­Smit 2004), what matters is not that violations occur, or that there may at times be a lack of conformity between actual and prescribed behavior, but whether states continue to accept the validity and binding quality of legal obligations. Only “unreasoned disregard” (Bull 1977, 133) for the law, or the appeal to a completely different social principle, would stand as evidence that law has no impact on the actors making up international society.1 Second, as Ian Hurd argues, realism assesses legality as a potential (if ineffective) source of external judgment or constraint on states, rather than accepting the possibility that it can be derivative of state interests and enable states to do more effectively what they already want to do (Hurd 2016). In fact, far from being marginal or unimportant in day-­to-­day power politics, international law can actually enhance state power by providing new resources of legitimation. It is by recognizing what Hurd calls the frequent “merger of law and state interests” (Hurd 2016, 15) that we overcome the conceptual distinction between “following the law” and “following interests” that is so prominent in realist and positivist approaches that are fixated on measuring states’ compliance. Ultimately, the importance of international law “does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it” (Bull 1977, 134).

International Law and Peaceful Change   283

Neoliberal Institutionalist Perspectives The rationalist view of politics as a strategic game, adopted by neoliberals, accepts the possibility that states, in seeking to maximize their interests, will see the possibility of achieving greater security or prosperity through cooperation. Yet states also need institutions—defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules” that shape both behavior and expectations (Keohane 1989, 3)—to bring about such cooperation. When formally codified, these rules constitute law. The weakness of the neoliberal institutionalist perspective on law, however, is that it posits cooperation as a perennial problem and therefore cannot account for the “historical uniqueness” (Reus-­Smit 2004, 18) of our modern system of positive international law, which was consolidated in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, it limits the role of law to a functional or regulatory one, neglecting to acknowledge two realities: first, that states see the rules of international law not only as regulatory but also as binding upon them— largely as a function of their legitimacy; and second, that law plays a more fundamental role in both constituting the key units in international society and shaping their interests. This means that both the preferences and actions of states are more variable than what materialist explanations might predict. In the end, while the neoliberal institutionalist perspective helps to explain why we might find rules for cooperation in a particular issue area (Goldstein et al. 2001), it cannot explain why states would attach legitimacy to the larger international legal system, or indeed why, once a new entity is recognized as a sovereign state, it instantly takes on the entire body of rules and legal practices that apply to contemporary sovereign states (Holsti 2004). Nor does neoliberal institutionalism fully capture the phenomenon of custom as an authoritative source of law. In contrast to realism and liberal-­institutionalism, I follow Hedley Bull in defining international law as “a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law” (Bull 1977, 122). This definition not only considers international law as a process of authoritative decision-­making (though this is one crucial aspect of what law is), but also recognizes the existence of a discernible set of “imperative propositions” comprising international law, which are logically connected and form part of a common structure. In addition, this definition does not require this set of rules, in order to have the status of law, to be backed by a centralized system of sanction or coercion; rather, it leaves open the possibility that reactions to or reprisals for violations of the law can take the form of self-­help or actions by some on behalf of others. What defines law is not the presence of coercive sanction, but rather the “union of primary and secondary rules” (Bull 1977, 127), whereby primary rules require actors to do or refrain from certain things, and secondary rules establish the procedural “rules about rules.”

A Constructivist Understanding of International Law In proposing this definition, I also adopt a specific constructivist understanding of law  that has three core elements. First, constructivism posits a close and symbiotic

284   Jennifer M. Welsh r­elationship, rather than a clear divide, between international law and international ­politics. More specifically, it regards politics as a form of discourse and action that is shaped not only by instrumental reason or strategic action, but also by forms of reason that “ordain certain actors with legitimacy, define certain preferences as socially acceptable, and license certain strategies over others” (Reus-­Smit 2004, 5). This means that institutions, such as international law, are not simply functional solutions to dilemmas of cooperation among states or tools of regulation but are also expressions of the conceptions of legitimate action that prevail in international society. International law thus plays a role in conditioning international politics—through its particular language, practices of justification, and multilateral form—but it is international politics, in turn, that gives international law its distinctive decentralized shape and content. Second, and relatedly, constructivism understands international law as having other important roles beyond regulative ones (Reus-­Smit 2004; Finnemore and Toope 2001; Hurd 2016). As noted previously, international law plays a crucial constitutive part in international society because it is the application of legal rules, particularly the rules of state recognition, that literally brings particular actors into being as sovereign states. But it is also the case that international law will empower some actors while disempowering others. In addition, international law plays a permissive role by creating legal categories that legitimize particular behaviors and outlaw others—often in ways that further the interests of sovereign states. As I show in this chapter, the United Nations (UN) Charter’s prohibition on the use of force has enabled states to justify more expansionist interpretations of the right of self-­defense while simultaneously delegitimizing the use of force for other purposes. Third, a constructivist perspective implies the need for attention to the historical contingency of our current, modern system of international law. As Reus-­Smit contends, if strategic rationality is assumed to drive the actions of states in all circumstances, and the anarchical structure of our system generates a recognizable spectrum of cooperation problems, it is difficult to account for the historical variation in types of institutional and legal formulations (Reus-­Smit 2004, 32). Our modern system of international law, which coalesced in the nineteenth century, established a particular “constitutional structure” for international society, based on the sovereign state, legitimated through popular sovereignty, as the key locus of political authority, as well as on “self-­legislation” and “non-­discrimination” as the key operating principles for that structure (Reus-­Smit  1999; Cohen  2012). As a consequence, the authoritative source of international law evolved from the dictates of God or natural law, to the explicit consent of nation-­states. These two shifts, which were inspired less by interstate war and more by the ideologies of the French and American Revolutions (Bukovansky 2002), led to the development of a large corpus of positive international law, including a legally-­based mechanism for conflict resolution (the Permanent Court of Arbitration) and a notable jump in the number of multilateral (as opposed to purely bilateral) treaties, on issues as diverse as the regulation of the slave trade, river navigation, the creation and maintenance of diplomatic relations, and the laws of war and neutrality. As Holsti reminds us, as important as the increase in interstate treaties and

International Law and Peaceful Change   285 agreements was to the development of international law, of equal significance was the growing practice of incorporating international legal principles and standards into domestic law. In the United States, for example, the Constitution states that international treaties constitute the “law of the land” and trump domestic law when conflicts of obligation arise (Holsti 2004, 171). It was also in the nineteenth century that states developed a distinctive language and practice of legal argumentation, which drew on the ideas of prominent international lawyers and was embraced by a growing cadre of legal professionals, including in the foreign ministries of states (Kratochwil 1989, 42). Henceforth, state representatives and international tribunals became increasingly engaged in the practice of “finding and interpreting” international law, thereby giving more content and form to the rules structuring IR. Finally, it is crucial to acknowledge the degree to which the particular body of rules that constitutes the foundation for modern international law was formed through the process of Europe’s engagement with the non-­European world. Although international lawyers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries established the intellectual building blocks for a global international society based on the principle of sovereign equality, international relations until at least the mid-­twentieth century (and arguably beyond) were bifurcated into civilized and uncivilized zones. Positive international law often reinforced these distinctions by codifying principles to humanize relations among the states of Europe, while simultaneously loosening the restraints that earlier legal theorists had asserted should govern relations between Europe and the non-­European world (Keene 2002). This was evident, for example, in the development of the Hague Conventions, which, as Mark Mazower demonstrates, aspired to regulate warfare only between civilized powers and thus enabled massacres, bombings, and systematic detentions in conflicts in the non-­European lands “deemed to be beyond law’s sway” (Mazower 2012, 78). It is not an exaggeration to say that the content of modern international law—particularly the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty that had begun to be articulated by Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century—was sharpened by, and asserted its authority through, the European imperial project (Anghie  2005; Bowden 2009). Moreover, several IR scholars have demonstrated how both de jure and de facto inequality have continued to underpin the formal infrastructure of global international society well into the contemporary period (Keene  2002; Simpson  2004; Zarakol 2011). The constructivist perspective on international law I propose here matters concretely for how we assess the relationship between law and peaceful change. More specifically, it proposes that we account for the ways in which international law—despite the principle of sovereign equality—continues to rest upon and promote elements of hierarchy. In addition, it reveals that while international law can contribute to important changes in state practice and, in some cases, offers weaker states resources with which to ‘tame’ the behavior of great powers, it has also privileged those powers in at least two ways: first, by enabling earlier practices of expansion and colonialism; and second, by contributing since 1945 to the reification of an existing political and territorial status quo.

286   Jennifer M. Welsh

The Laws of War and Peaceful Change Legal reasoning and argumentation are a pervasive feature of contemporary international politics. We only need to cast our minds back to the autumn and early spring of 2002–2003, in the run-­up to the use of force against Iraq, when not only the British attorney general but also media pundits, peaceful protesters, and even London taxi drivers were all musing about the legality of using military means to counter Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the notion that one can “do things with international law”—as a mode of justification—is becoming widespread within IR (Hurd 2018). The larger question, however, is what kind of meaningful effect such discourse has, or what it tells us about the role of international law and its relationship with international politics. It is particularly within the realm of the use of force that political actors themselves seem to want to depict international law as a distinct system apart from politics, with its own logic, rules, and language. Indeed, the embrace of legal argumentation has become one of the “staple features of state practice” (Kritsiotis 2004, 47). When states use military force today, they also use law—and increasingly, military lawyers (Nuñez-­Mietz 2018)—as a crucial resource to define, explain, and defend what they are doing. This reiterates the point that law is more than a set of rules applied to ‘situations of fact’; it is also a political process of argumentation over legitimate action. But it also suggests that law may have played some role in the delineation of legitimate and illegitimate behavior, and potentially (as I suggest later) in the decline of the incidence of interstate war itself. As the editors of this volume note, the literature features a broad consensus that one of the most dramatic transformations in IR over the past two centuries is the delegitimation of acts of conquest and aggression as acceptable means of changing the territorial and political status quo (Zacher  2001; Franck  2002; Finnemore  2003; Holsti  2004; Byers 2005; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017; O’Connell 2012). More broadly, some international lawyers and IR scholars have connected the system of rules on the causes and conduct of war (often referred to as jus ad bellum and jus in bello) to the very existence and preservation of international order (Bull  1977; Franck 2002; Ikenberry 2011). The value of law, from this perspective, lies in its ability to provide an alternative to the recourse to violence for actors in the international system. “In this sense,” writes Mary Ellen O’Connell, “all of international law is law of peace” (O’Connell 2012, 272). As I argue later, the evolution of international law in relation to the use of force over the past century has had mixed effects—particularly with respect to both systemic and domestic peaceful change. On the one hand, the cumulative effect of individual “norm entrepreneurship,” interwar state practice, and the agreements among states at the end of the Second World War transformed what Ian Brownlie has referred to as the “legal regime of indifference to the occasion for war” into a regime with substantial limitations on the competence of states to use military force to achieve their aims (Brownlie 1963, 424). But not all uses of force have been outlawed, as aspects of the

International Law and Peaceful Change   287 current legal regime permit wars of self-­defense and third-­party intervention. What is more, international law’s attempt at “self-­imposed isolation” (Fox 2015, 826) from the causes, conduct, and resolution of civil wars is not matched by the behavior of interested states, or even by the actions of the UN Security Council, and has often had the effect of favoring incumbent governments. Finally, while international criminal law has progressed to establish individual accountability for war crimes and acts such as genocide, the rules regulating the conduct of war are still widely permissive of actions that can be taken in the name of military necessity but expose civilian populations to significant suffering.

Jus ad Bellum: Prohibiting the Use of Force to Change Interstate Boundaries Until the early twentieth century, the right of conquest was both a legal right derived from sovereignty and an uncontroversial expression of the political logic of raison d’état (Holsti 2004, 163). The wresting of control, through force, over a territory and the proclamation of legal jurisdiction over its population was widely practiced by state leaders, giving rise to recognized changes in sovereignty. Stirrings of change came with the renunciation of the forcible acquisition of territory in the French Constitution in 1791, which was collectively modified by the European great powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It took more than a century, however, for a more fundamental transformation to occur (Korman 1996). The first systematic step in the move toward the restriction of the resort to war was the elimination of the widespread practice of using military force to protect investments and collect debts owed to a state’s nationals by other states. The 1907 Hague Treaty’s abolition of this practice not only reflected a shift in “understandings . . . of the relationship between sovereignty and contractual obligation” (Finnemore 2003, 25) but also contributed to the growing argument that self-­defense was the only legitimate purpose for the use of military force. These arguments were reinforced and extended in the period after the First World War, generating a variety of proposals—forwarded by intellectuals and public figures as diverse as Leon Bourgeois, Norman Angell, Robert Cecil, and, toward the end of the war, both Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson—for alternative normative rules to replace the unrestricted compétence de guerre that had previously been accepted in international law. In the case of the latter two men, the motivating principle for the renunciation of conquest was self-­determination, which—in Wilson’s famous words—meant there no longer existed a right “to hand peoples about from sovereign to sovereign as if they were property” (Wilson 1917, in Holsti 2004, 164). The growth in nationalism over the course of the nineteenth century clearly worked against the continued legitimacy of annexation—outside of the colonial world—when it lacked the consent of a territory’s inhabitants and thus helped to transform the Great War into a “moral turning point” in attitudes toward the right of states to use force for territorial aggrandizement (Korman 1996, 93, 161).

288   Jennifer M. Welsh For others, the horrors of the First World War had confirmed that, in an age of interdependence and mechanized weaponry, states could no longer be allowed to engage in war as a “regular” extension of their objectives (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). Article X of the League of Nations Covenant therefore attempted to qualify states’ individual exercise of the right to wage war, effectively terminating the old right of conquest and forwarding a new system of collective security and peaceful dispute resolution. The particular formulation of this article was too abstract and indeterminate, however, leaving it open to more than one interpretation—especially when read alongside other provisions that still acknowledged states’ legitimate right to use force (Kritsiotis 2004, 51).2 Interestingly, the Covenant did have an explicit provision for peaceful change and addressing dissatisfaction with the status quo through Article XIX, which was to allow for the correction of “inequities and errors” in the peace settlement. But the provision was not used for the first two decades of the Covenant’s existence—a fact that helped inspire E. H. Carr’s famous lament about the failure to peacefully accommodate “restless” states in the interwar period (Carr 1946). In the end, the Second World War was less about the failure to make use of Article XIX and more about the inadequacy of the machinery set out in Article X.3 The Kellogg-­Briand Pact of 1928 took the further step of explicitly placing the right to wage war beyond the legal capacity of states, thereby marking the emergence of a new jus contra bellum. But while this pact aimed to outlaw war “as an instrument of national policy” in states’ relations with one another, its two significant shortcomings soon became apparent. First, there were no particular sanctions envisaged in the case of a breach of the Pact. And second, the Pact specifically outlawed war and not the use of force in general, thereby creating a large loophole for states to exploit (Schrijver 2015). Kellogg-­Briand depended upon states’ explicitly engaging in war in the “technical sense” (Kritsiotis 2004, 52)—that is, instances of military force accompanied by formal declarations of war that terminate with a peace treaty—and thus still enabled uses of force short of formal war. In one of the most infamous cases of the interwar period, Japan’s intervention to take Manchuria in 1931, neither Japan nor China admitted the existence of a war—the latter out of fear that a formal state of war would have activated the international laws relating to neutrality, thereby jeopardizing its trading relationship with the United States (Brownlie 1963, 85). As a result, the incident was described euphemistically by one prominent international lawyer at the time as “hostilities on a considerable scale” (Brierly 1932, 312)—an example of the linguistic gymnastics that states have continued to employ up to the present day in their efforts to avoid the label “war” (Fazal 2018). The subsequent violations of Kellogg-­Briand and the outbreak of the Second World War exposed the unsustainability of a weak prohibition on warfare—thereby demonstrating how law’s capacity to contribute to peaceful change is partly dependent upon its determinacy and coherence but also on underlying political forces. In the context of the mid-­1940s, peaceful change had at least two meanings. First, it referred to the general procedure for bringing about change in the system of legally protected rights and interests of states without resort to war. But second, it encapsulated a broader theory about

International Law and Peaceful Change   289 how to get rid of war itself, based on assumptions tested but also revised in light of the painful lessons of the interwar period. As developments in the 1930s revealed, the successful application of that theory clearly depended upon all states accepting and participating in procedures designed to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes and to nonviolent revisions to the political and territorial order. As two scholars noted at the time, peaceful change was much like “pacifism, which in turn . . . is like fertilizer—it is no good unless evenly spread” (Dunn and Marshall Brown 1944, 61). It was therefore not the number of institutions or legal procedures that would ultimately matter, as much as the disposition to use such tools, particularly on the part of the Great Powers. Their full participation in the collective security system of the UN Charter was crucial to its success and would be ensured by careful delineation of the kinds of principles they could voluntarily adhere to (Luck 2006). This observation underscores two further points about law’s contribution to peaceful change. First, in the early part of the twentieth century, international law did not really ‘cause’ the delegitimation of the raison d’état justification for the resort to force; rather, it gave expression to a broader societal transformation in ideas about war and conquest. Although individual international lawyers played a significant part in leading diplomatic negotiations to develop formulations of the prohibition on the use of force (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017), the underlying political will for change was also (necessarily) present. In short, law was partly leading and partly following. Second, when attempting to account for the striking empirical phenomenon of the decline in interstate war in the decades following the Second World War (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015), it is clear that law is only one of several factors inhibiting states from resorting to war— again making it difficult to assign law a clear causal role. Equally significant, according to scholars, has been the increased cost of major war, broadly conceived (Mueller 1989); the increase in the number of democracies (Brown, Lynn-­Jones, and Miller 1996); the particular impact of nuclear weapons (Waltz 1964; Jervis 1989); and states’ perceptions about the declining utility of war (Kaysen 1990). Despite the difficulty of making clear causal claims about a general decline in war between states, the particular prohibition on the use of force to alter the territory of member states of the United Nations, as set out in Article 2.4 of the Charter,4 has contributed to a more specific empirical trend: the notable reduction since 1945 in the proportion of conflicts that have resulted in territorial redistribution.5 Given the fact that interstate wars have so often involved territorial issues and, in the past, exchanges of territory (Vasquez 1993), this change is particularly noteworthy. Part of the strength of Article 2.4 is its location within a normatively ambitious but politically pragmatic system of collective security centered around the Great Powers. But its capacity to shape state behavior is also enhanced by the specificity and clarity of the text itself, when compared with earlier formulations: it sets out a clear prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of members of the United Nations. As is clear from the drafting history of the Charter, the phrases “territorial integrity” and “political independence” were not inserted into the text in order to qualify the scope of Article 2.4, and thus leave an opening for other “purposes”

290   Jennifer M. Welsh for which force could be used, but rather to reinforce the prohibition in the eyes of small states that required additional reassurance that powerful states would not meddle in their domestic jurisdiction (Brownlie 1963). In addition, Article 2.4 “makes sense”—to borrow Thomas Franck’s formulation of legal coherence (Franck 1990, 75)—in light of the nature and strength of the commitment elsewhere in the UN Charter to prohibit force, most notably in the preamble’s call to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Since then, only on very rare occasions have states attempted to justify their use of force by trying to show that it does not undermine territorial integrity or political independence.6 Instead, they have claimed that their actions conform to the legitimate exceptions to the Article 2.4 prohibition set out in the Charter: self-­defense under Article 51 or collective security actions authorized by the UN Security Council. While undoubtedly these legal exceptions have enabled states to continue to legitimate their use of force in some instances and thus speak to law’s permissive effects (Hurd 2016), the availability of exceptions has not “heralded an era of systematic violations” in which powerful states regularly “consume” territories in the name of self-­ defense (Kritsiotis 2004, 63). Finally, the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2.4 is reinforced by efforts to limit incidences of intervention—especially through Article 2.7, which seeks to protect states’ domestic jurisdiction from various forms of external interference. It is worth recalling that this article was initially designed to apply to “relations between the United Nations as an organization and its several members,” not primarily to relations between the members themselves (Vincent 1974, 235). But while the idea that states should refrain from intervening in each other’s affairs—or what we now understand as the principle of nonintervention between states—is not explicitly stated in the Charter’s text, it is clearly implicit in Article 2.1’s principle of sovereign equality, which gave legal expression to the growing political opposition to efforts by third-­party states to assist (through military force) populations struggling against “tyranny” (Chesterman 2001). In the early modern period, prominent international lawyers ranging from Alberico Gentili, to Hugo Grotius, to Emer de Vattel had all argued that taking up arms “on behalf of the oppressed” was a legitimate practice (Recchia and Welsh 2013), and during the nineteenth century European states had in certain instances used force to protect oppressed national minorities (Finnemore 2003). The signatories of the UN Charter, by contrast, were seeking to delegitimize intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of other states and thus indicated that they were, in John Vincent’s words, primarily concerned with “building an order between states not within them” (Vincent 1974, 236). Indeed, newly independent states—for whom the principle of nonintervention represented an important tool to shield the weak from the strong—embarked upon a sustained diplomatic effort to make the implicit noninterventionism of the Charter much more explicit through a series of important resolutions in the General Assembly.7 These resolutions, combined with Articles 2.4 and 2.7, also effectively closed the legal door to humanitarian intervention (Chesterman 2001; Welsh 2004).8 Although the legal debate on this issue was reignited following the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Kosovo, the weight of state discourse and practice continues to indicate

International Law and Peaceful Change   291 r­ eluctance to accept such a unilateral right of intervention for humanitarian purposes, outside of the procedures for collective security outlined in the Charter (Lowe and Tzanakopoulos 2012; Kress 2019). For our purposes here, the delegitimization of intervention could be interpreted as an indirect expression of support for domestic peaceful change, as it suggests that a violent attempt to change one’s own government is not a strategy that outside states have been willing to support—at least not outside the colonial context.9 At the same time, international law’s posture toward civil war can be seen as enabling more support for incumbent governments and presuming their legitimacy, rather than as circumscribing international intervention or ensuring a ‘level playing field.’ Even though the nineteenth-­century legal doctrine related to the recognition of belligerent status has largely fallen into disuse (Dinstein 2011, 110),10 many states—as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ 1986)—still assert the legitimacy of “intervention by invitation” in civil war contexts when that invitation comes from a sitting government (Fox 2015). By enabling outside parties to legitimize action to support governments experiencing domestic challenges, international law could thus be viewed as indirectly affecting both the likelihood of and context for peaceful political change within states.

Jus in Bello: The Permissive Effects of the Laws of War International law’s role in promoting peaceful change in the twentieth century primarily consisted of a treaty-­based commitment to ensuring that any territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force would be deemed illegal, coupled with a call for peaceful resolution of disputes. But this evolution in the laws of war did not delegitimize all uses of force. In fact, some provocatively suggest that, far from reducing the incidence of war, UN Charter rules merely changed the “politics of legitimation” around the use of force by making some forms of war, such as wars of self-­defense, more possible (Hurd 2016). Since 1945, and particularly during the post–September 11, 2001 “war on terror,” states have expanded the scope of the practice of self-­defense, both temporally— by legitimating action in response to a threat of force rather than an actual armed attack (Schachter  1989)—and spatially—by claiming that the protection of one’s nationals abroad and action against nonstate armed groups operating in the territory of another state are legitimate practices. This permissive effect of the laws of war extends to the rules regulating the conduct of war, which were also deepened and strengthened after 1945 in the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols (1977). Contrary to the earlier suggestion that all international law is effectively the “law of peace,” jus in bello rules exist not primarily to make change peaceful, but rather to make the pursuit of change through war less barbaric by delineating who can be killed in war and by what means (Slim 2008). Ultimately, this body of rules can be viewed as straddling two views of suffering in war—that it is to be minimized at all cost or that it is to be balanced against the ultimate aims of a war (Witt  2014)—both of which find expression in the Geneva Conventions. As a

292   Jennifer M. Welsh c­ onsequence, while what has become known more recently as “international humanitarian law” (Alexander 2015) contains a principle requiring distinction between combatants and noncombatants, it also permits belligerents to engage in a number of practices that directly or indirectly harm civilians—including, for example, besieging cities11 or attacking so-­called dual-­use facilities—in the name of military necessity (Kinsella 2011; Shue and Wippman 2002; Crawford 2013). This delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations is even more challenging in the context of civil conflict, wherein warring parties are rarely symmetrical in strength and the power of mutual restraint is arguably weaker. In short, many civil wars are emphatically not civil in their conduct. Moreover, the legal frameworks regulating international and noninternational armed conflicts are not the same, with significantly more detailed legal protections applying in the former.12 These differences speak once more to international law’s posture toward those seeking to challenge incumbent governments. From its earliest exponents, the laws of war have sought to set boundaries around those who can legitimately fight by insisting that only sovereigns have the “right authority” to wage war (Vergerio 2017). It is therefore telling that it was not until the adoption of the Additional Protocols in 1977 that nonstate armed groups fighting in civil wars incurred obligations to comply with the Geneva Conventions—in large part a function of states’ reluctance to legitimize such entities as well as the larger project of challenging the domestic political status quo.

International Law and Systemic Change: The Creation of New States One of international law’s primary functions is to create or “constitute” an international society, by specifying the sovereign state as the universal form of political organization (Bull 1977, 135). One of the most striking systemic changes in modern IR is the growth in the number of these sovereign units over the past 150 years, through various waves of state creation. Some of these episodes followed large-­scale conflict, armed struggles for independence, or violent state breakdown and thus can hardly be called examples of “peaceful” change. But the expansion in the membership of international society, particularly after 1945, also occurred through the dissolution of empire—a structural transformation that was long overshadowed by the centrality of the Cold War to the discipline of IR. In all of these cases, international law played a constitutive role, through the development and application of rules of state recognition. As suggested earlier, nineteenth-­century international lawyers became key architects of a stratified international system, codifying a clear set of rules for peaceful coexistence within the European “core” and contrasting it with the anarchy, despotism, and backwardness of the “Oriental” world (Anghie 2005; Kayaoglu 2010). One key tool for operationalizing this discriminatory framework was the legal “standard of civilization,” which

International Law and Peaceful Change   293 regulated membership of the “family of nations” and assigned an inferior and non-­ sovereign juridical status to large parts of the non-­European world (Gong 1984). Migration from one world to the other—that is, formal recognition as a sovereign state—was based on the capacity and willingness of entities in the periphery to, inter alia, fulfill their obligations under international law; guarantee the basic rights and protection of foreign nationals and, in some cases, particular national minorities; maintain a system of courts, legal codes, and published laws; and develop institutions and an administrative structure for governance. In his examination of recognition practices in the nineteenth century, Miklaus Fabry finds that while in general terms an approach of de facto recognition was followed—whereby the basis of a new entity’s boundaries was to be the territory on which a people freed themselves from their former colonial master—there were frequently civilizational conditions attached to the legal reification of effective statehood (Fabry 2010). In the early twentieth century, the continuation of hierarchical practices was manifest in the particular ways in which self-­determination—the new standard of membership in international society—was applied to the crumbling Ottoman and Austro-­Hungarian Empires. First, it was clear that self-­determination would not, despite its promise, have universal implications; it would be limited to territories in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. Second, international recognition of new states was not only premised on the fulfillment of criteria that extended deeply into matters of domestic jurisdiction, as specified by the Minority Treaties, but also closely controlled and manipulated by the great powers (Jackson-­Preece 1998). Third, under the mandates system of the League of Nations, “advanced nations” were to administer those peoples “not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.” Though in theory mandated territories were conceived as a way station on the road to independent statehood, those charged with implementing the mandates system were committed to ensuring that colonial control was maintained, and in some cases even enhanced, in a less overt form (Pedersen 2015). Despite some notable examples of continuity, including the creation of the trusteeship system, the United Nations gradually broke free from its close ties to the defense of empire. Through the process of decolonization, the prevailing view in international society was that the right to self-­determination—in most cases cashed out in terms of independent statehood—was no longer something that could be bestowed on a people by others based on their perceived capacity to meet a particular standard of development, but rather a universally recognized and unconditional right (Getachew  2019). While in the nineteenth century the notion of civilization had been used to justify hierarchy and the denial of sovereignty, now it was used to delegitimize colonialism and facilitate the globalization of the sovereign political form (O’Hagan 2017). In the process, however, self-­determination was also limited in its application and was wedded to the growing commitment to the norm of territorial integrity (Zacher 2001). Although the collective right of peoples to self-­government was repeatedly elevated in the declarations by Allied powers during the Second World War, the UN Charter’s drafters responded to state fears that such a right might legitimize intervention to support national minorities seeking independence and thereby foster civil strife and secessionist

294   Jennifer M. Welsh movements. This spoke to nationalism’s capacity to exert both pacifying and disruptive effects: on the one hand, the notion that territory belonged to a national group had contributed to the delegitimization of wars of conquest; yet on the other, the claim that nations were entitled to their own states could foster territorial irredentism and state fragmentation (Zacher 2001, 217). In light of this dual possibility, the committee crafting Article 1.2 insisted that the text only referred to “the right of self-­government of peoples and not the right of secession” (Glanville  2014, 142). Furthermore, the right of self-­ determination as independent statehood was clearly associated with the particular proc­ess of decolonization, not an ongoing right. Outside of the context of colonial territories, self-­determination would henceforth refer to the right of peoples to self-­ government within their existing juridical states, making it almost indistinguishable from the norm of democracy (Zacher 2001). In other words, the principle of sovereign equality would imply not only equal political legitimacy, but also equal territorial legitimacy (James 1992). The 1960 UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples thus boldly stated that “any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a country” was “incompatible with the purposes and principles” of the UN Charter.13 Recognition practices in the early post-­1945 period followed suit, conforming closely to a more classically Westphalian understanding of sovereignty as territorial control— or what Jackson refers to as “negative sovereignty” (Jackson 1990). These practices constituted not only new states but also a broader international society that valued “international civility”—that is, mutual respect for sovereignty among entities with equal legal status—while allowing for pockets of “internal incivility” (Jackson 2013). In addition, despite the ongoing power of nationalism as a legitimating force, for much of the Cold War sovereignty was vested primarily in a bordered territory, rather than in a distinctive people or nation. The failed Biafran bid for statehood in the late 1960s, which generated a bloody internal conflict and one of the most severe humanitarian crises of the postwar period, demonstrates the degree to which newly independent states of the Global South, and bodies such as the Organization for African Unity, were invested in a narrow application of self-­determination and a steadfast commitment to preserving territorial integrity (Mayall 1990). International law thus sanctified the existing territorial status quo, regardless of its potentially awkward fit with minority populations, through the principle of uti possidetis juris: “may you continue to possess such as you do possess.” Seen in this way, the legal regime for state creation after 1945 followed the “conservative” impulse of the earlier League of Nations Covenant (Jackson 2013, 85–86), which in Article X had pledged to protect and preserve “the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members.” This approach was also applied to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia after 1990. In both cases, the vast majority of successor states have kept their former internal administration boundaries as their new international frontiers—even when these did not correspond to ethnographic realities or the aspiration of those living within them—in large part as a result of outside pressure in favor of stability (MacFarlane 1999). The International Court of Justice, in its various

International Law and Peaceful Change   295 adjudications of boundary disputes since 1975, has also based its decisions on uti possidetis (Prescott 1998). The post–Cold War period saw the rise of a particular liberal discourse that suggested that state recognition would (again) apply more substantive criteria to entities aspiring to statehood, along with claims in the academic literature that statehood should rest on the fulfilment of human rights (Buchanan 2003). Nonetheless, actual state practice— most notably the recognition of states of the former Yugoslavia (Caplan  2005; Hillgruber 1998) and of South Sudan, as well as the nonrecognition of entities such as South Ossetia—suggests that it is strategic and geopolitical considerations, not so much the application of legal rules, that shape how existing members of international society act collectively to open the door to new members. The ongoing commitment to territorial legitimacy has also perpetuated the existence of a particular political (as opposed to legal) entity—the “contested state”14—which includes Taiwan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Kosovo. These entities are not universally recognized as sovereign, yet in many cases they have high degrees of empirical statehood, including in some instances governmental structures responsible for conducting foreign policy. They also affect stability both within their regions and beyond, thus raising questions about the impact of legal principles and processes that leave aspirations for self-­determination unfulfilled.

Conclusion My examination of two branches of international law,15 relating to the use of force and the recognition of new states, has demonstrated how the modern legal regime largely works in the service of protecting a particular, post-­1945 peace, both politically and territorially. This is not unduly surprising, given that sovereign states are the creators and ‘enforcers’ of international law, and their interests are wrapped up in its form and content. But the discussion prompts two further questions about law and peaceful change. The first relates to the logic of the relationship: whether the object of international law is to promote peace or whether the object of the peace created by states is to create a space within which law can flourish. The second relates to the longevity of the postwar peace, which is being undermined, in different ways, by today’s dominant powers: one that is ‘on the rise’ (China), one that is struggling with its relative decline (the United States), and one that is clinging to its former status (Russia). All three states have challenged legal norms surrounding jus ad bellum and territorial integrity—the United States through its practice of targeted killing, Russia through its annexation of Crimea, and China through its rejection of international law in the South China Sea—thereby reminding us of the limitations of law in restraining the behavior of great powers. The respective approaches of these great powers to crucial norms of peaceful coexistence— including sovereignty itself (Paris 2020)—suggest an unsettled future for international law’s contribution to managing our contemporary systemic transition.

296   Jennifer M. Welsh

Notes 1. This argument does not imply that respect for the law is always the principal motive for compliance. States may obey international law out of habit or out of pressure from others and may view compliance as valuable and mandatory for non-­legal reasons—including a desire to bring about reciprocal action from other states. 2. For example, while the League Covenant hoped to prevent war through its famous three-­ month “cooling off ” period in Article XII, it did not prohibit recourse to force altogether. 3. The Interwar system of promoting peaceful change did have some success in facilitating compromises on status and boundary issues, including, for example, the Shantung Settlement. 4. The Charter’s prohibition has also been incorporated in various multilateral treaties since 1945, primarily in those establishing defense organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Pact of the League of Arab States, the Inter-­American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. 5. While approximately 80 percent of territorial wars led to redistribution of territory between 1645 and 1945, that proportion dropped to just below 30 percent after 1945 (Zacher 2001). 6. Two examples of this strategy—the United Kingdom in the 1949 Corfu Channel incident and Belgium in the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo—were unsuccessful in attracting support from other member states. 7. See, for example, the “Essentials of Peace Resolution” (1949) and the “Peace through Deeds Resolution” (1950). Intervention was further delegitimized through the 1965 Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-­operation among States. 8. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as “the use of force by a state (or group of states acting together) aimed at preventing or ending a humanitarian catastrophe affecting individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (Kress 2019). In this legal definition, humanitarian intervention is distinct from those instances in which the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, authorizes the use of force for humanitarian purposes or civilian protection. 9. It is important to note that in the early post-­1945 period, there was widespread support for movements of national liberation to use “all available means” and “to seek international assistance” in their struggle against colonialism, alien occupation, and racist regimes. See, for example, UN document GA/3070 (November 30, 1973). 10. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries states generally delayed or refrained from granting belligerent status to an opposition group in the context of civil war until it had demonstrated a high degree of territorial control, thereby enabling incumbent governments to reassert their authority. Once belligerent status was granted, rebel or insurgent groups were granted jus in bello rights and obligations for third parties were activated— most notably the laws of neutrality. 11. While the laws of war do not expressly prohibit siege warfare, they do have provisions against the intentional targeting of civilian objects, starvation, and the prevention of civilian escape. 12. One of the biggest differences is the obligation relating to the treatment of prisoners of war.

International Law and Peaceful Change   297 13. This rejection of the “disruption” of territorial units has been repeated in other declarations and agreements, including the 1975 Helsinki Act, which insists that frontiers can only be changed “in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.” 14. I borrow this term from Shpend Kursani. 15. This chapter has not engaged with other important elements of international law, such as international human rights law, which has been mobilized both domestically and internationally to bring about changes to the status quo.

References Alexander, Amanda. 2015. “A Short History of International Humanitarian Law.” European Journal of International Law 26, no. 1 (February): 109–138. Anghie, Anthony. 2005. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bowden, Brett. 2009. The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Brierly, J. L. 1932. “International Law and Resort to Armed Force.” Cambridge Law Journal 4, no. 3 (November): 308–319. Brown, Michael  E., Sean  M.  Lynn-Jones, and Steven  E.  Miller, eds. 1996. Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Brownlie, Ian. 1963. International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buchanan, Allen. 2003. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bukovansky, Mlada. 2002. Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Politics Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Byers, Michael. 2005. War Law: Understanding International Law in Armed Conflict. 1st ed. New York: Grove Press. Caplan, Richard. 2005. Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Carr, E. H. 1946. The Twenty Years’ Crisis. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. Chesterman, Simon. 2001. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press Cohen, Jean. 2012. Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Crawford, Neta. 2013. Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America’s Post-9/11 Wars. New York: Oxford University Press. Dinstein, Yoram. 2011. War, Aggression, and Self-Defence. 5th ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dunn, Frederick S., and Philip Marshall Brown. 1944. “Law and Peaceful Change.” American Society of International Law 38 (April): 752–772. Fabry, Miklaus. 2010. Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1776. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

298   Jennifer M. Welsh Fazal, Tanisha. 2018. Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, Martha. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen Toope. 2001. “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics.” International Organization 55, no. 3: 743–758. Fox, Gregory H. 2015. “Intervention by Invitation.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, edited by Marc Weller, 816–841. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Franck, Thomas. 1990. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press. Franck, Thomas. 2002. Recourse to Force. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Getachew, Adom. 2019. Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glanville, Luke. 2014. Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert  O.  Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. Legalization and World Politics: Special Issue of International Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gong, Gerrit. 1984. The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hathaway, Oona H., and Scott J. Shapiro. 2017. The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World. New York: Simon & Schuster. Hillgruber, Christian. 1998. “The Admission of New States to the International Community.” European Journal of International Law 9, no. 3: 491–509. Holsti, Kal J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hurd, Ian. 2016. “The Permissive Power of the Ban on War.” European Journal of International Security 2, no. 1 (August): 1–18. Hurd, Ian. 2018. How to Do Things with International Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ikenberry, John. G. 2011. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. International Court of Justice. 1986. “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Merits.” International Court of Justice (ICJ), June 27. https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a44d2.html Jackson, Robert. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. 1st ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Jackson, Robert. 2013. Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Jackson-Preece, Jennifer. 1998. National Minorities and the European Nation-States System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. James, Alan. 1992. “The Equality of States: Contemporary Manifestations of an Ancient Doctrine.” Review of International Studies 18, no. 4 (October): 377–391. Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kayaoglu, Turan. 2010. “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory.” International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (June): 193–217. Kaysen, Carl. 1990. “Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay.” International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring): 42–64.

International Law and Peaceful Change   299 Keene, Edward. 2002. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Keohane, Robert. 1989. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kinsella, Helen. 2011. The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Korman, Sharon. 1996. The Right of Conquest. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press. Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1989. Rules, Norms and Decisions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kress, Claus. 2019. “On the Principle of Non-Use of Force in Current International Law.” Just Security, September 30. https://www.justsecurity.org/66372/on-the-principle-of-non-use -of-force-in-current-international-law/. Kritsiotis, Dino. 2004. “When States Use Armed Force.” In The Politics of International Law, edited by Christian Reus-Smit, 45–79. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lowe, Vaughan, and Antonios Tzanakopoulos. 2012. “Humanitarian Intervention.” In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, edited by Rudiger Wolfrum. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Luck, Edward C. 2006. UN Security Council: Practice and Promise. London: Routledge. MacFarlane, S.  Neil. 1999. Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Mayall, James. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mazower, Mark. 2012. Governing the World: The History of an Idea. New York: Penguin Press. Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson. 1985. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf. Mueller, Hans. 1989. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books. Nuñez-Mietz, Fernando G. 2018. The Use of Force under International Law: Lawyerized States in a Legalized World. New York: Routledge. O’Connell, Mary Ellen. 2012. “Peace and War.” In The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, 272–293. Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Hagan, Jacinta. 2017. “The Role of Civilization in the Globalization of International Society.” In The Globalization of International Society, edited by Timothy Dunne, and Christian Reus-Smit, 185–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paris, Roland. 2020. “The Right to Dominate: How Old Ideas about Sovereignty Pose New Challenges for World Order.” International Organization 74, no. 3 (Summer): 453–489. Pedersen, Susan. 2015. The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettersson, Therese, and Peter Wallensteen. 2015. “Armed Conflicts: 1946–2014.” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 4 (July): 536–550. Prescott, Victor. 1998. “The Contribution of the United Nations to Solving Boundary and Territorial Disputes.” In The United Nations at Work, edited by Martin Ira. Glassner, 239–284. Westport, CT: Praeger. Recchia, Stefano, and Jennifer Welsh, eds. 2013. Just and Unjust Interventions: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

300   Jennifer M. Welsh Reus-Smit, Christian. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2004. “Introduction” and “The Politics of International Law.” In The Politics of International Law, edited by Christian Reus-Smit, 1–13. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Schachter, Oscar. 1989. “Self-Defense and the Rule of Law.” American Journal of International Law 83, no. 2 (April): 259–277. Schrijver, Nico. 2015. “The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN Charter.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, edited by Marc Weller, 465–487. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shue, Henry, and David Wippman. 2002. “Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions.” Cornell International Law Journal 35, no. 3: 559–579. Simpson, Gerry. 2004. Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Slim, Hugo. 2008. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War. New York: Columbia University Press. Vasquez, John A. 1993. The War Puzzle. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vergerio, Claire. 2017. “Alberico Gentili’s De Iure Belli: An Absolutist’s Attempt to Reconcile the Jus Gentium and the Reason of State Tradition.” Journal of the History of International Law 19, no. 4: 1–38. Vincent, R.  J. 1974. Nonintervention and International Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1964. “The Stability of a Bipolar World.” Daedalus 93, no. 3: 881–909. Welsh, Jennifer  M. 2004. “Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention.” In Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, edited by Jennifer M. Welsh, 52–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Welsh, Jennifer M. 2017. “Empire and Fragmentation.” In The Globalization of International Society, edited by Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit, 145–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2004. “The Kosovo Bombing Campaign.” In The Politics of International Law, edited by Christian Reus-Smit, 189–216. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wilson, Woodrow. 1917. “A World League for Peace”. Speech to the United States Congress, Washington, D.C. 22 January. Witt, John Fabian. 2014. “Two Conceptions of Suffering in War.” In Knowing the Suffering of Others, edited by Austrian Sarat, 129–157. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Zacher, Mark. 2001.“The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force.” International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring): 215–250. Zarakol, Ayse. 2011. After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

chapter 16

N uclea r W e a pons a n d Peacefu l Ch a nge Michal Smetana

In the wake of the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it soon became clear that the invention of nuclear weapons would have a major impact on many aspects of international peace and security. For some, nuclear weapons represent the proverbial sword of Damocles, constantly threatening to end human civilization as a consequence of their accidental, miscalculated, or deliberate use. For others, the unprecedentedly destructive character of nuclear technology in particular has led great powers to be more cautious in their conduct and prevented the Cold War from turning into a hot one. Either way, few would dispute the transformative effect of the introduction of nuclear weapons into world politics.1 The aim of this chapter is to discuss the key aspects of the nuclear revolution that have been pertinent to the problem of peaceful change in international affairs (see Paul 2017a and in this volume). In turn, I elaborate on five primary institutions of global nuclear order: nuclear deterrence, nuclear arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear nonuse, and nuclear disarmament.2 I conceptually unpack and discuss the contributions and limitations of these five institutions, mindful of the extraordinary violence nuclear war can cause and the underlying fear that prevents nuclear powers from engaging in reckless behavior. In the second part of the chapter I explore the linkages between the five institutions as well as their logical incompatibilities, which are relevant in the context of peaceful and violent change. I conclude by sketching possible avenues for future scholarly research in this area.

Nuclear Deterrence Shortly after the use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945, US strategists such as Bernard Brodie formulated the very first tenets that would inform the coming of the

302   Michal Smetana nuclear age. These early writings suggested that the nuclear weapon is not just a mere powerful addition to the US arsenal but the “absolute weapon” that completely alters the logic of military strategy: we should not be concerned anymore about winning but rather about preventing wars, as atomic bombs “can have almost no other useful purpose” (Brodie 1946, 46, cf. 1978; Steiner 1984).3 During the decades that followed, this idea was repeatedly contested in US strategic circles (see Gray and Payne 1980; Jervis 1984; Paul, Harknett, and Wirtz 1998); nevertheless, the logic of nuclear deterrence— employment of coercive threats to use nuclear weapons in order to dissuade military attacks against oneself or one’s allies—has become one of the main pillars of the global nuclear order (Freedman 2013; Tannenwald 2013). Except for Israel, which maintains a policy of nuclear opacity (Cohen 2010), all current possessors of nuclear weapons (as well as NATO as a nuclear alliance) have explicitly embraced the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and rely on nuclear weapons in their broader security and defense strategies. With respect to the possibility of peaceful change in international affairs, the institution of nuclear deterrence corresponds to the “minimalist conceptions” of peaceful power transformation taking place in the absence of war—or a peaceful change in its “weak sense” (see the chapter by Paul in this volume; Miall 2007, 12). Conceptually, this relationship is based on an ostensible paradox: by making a credible threat of unacceptable damage to our adversary, we accomplish our foreign policy goals without the need to resort to the actual use of direct military force. If this logic holds for both parties in a dyad, they become mutually deterred from attacking each other, and the possibility of a rational, calculated use of large-­scale force is ruled out within their mutual relationship.4 While a majority of nuclear weapons scholarship has focused on nuclear deterrence as a coercive strategy to maintain the status quo, there is an inherent logic in the concept of nuclear deterrence that is also conducive to major systemic change by peaceful means: the existence of mutual nuclear deterrence relationships not only prevents the violent change from taking place, it also allows for both gradual and rapid peaceful change even in situations when we would expect a turn to violence under other circumstances, such as hegemonic wars in the context of major power shifts (Gilpin 1983; Kennedy 1989). Perhaps the most prominent empirical example of such dynamics among great powers is the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Despite conflicting interests and numerous crises, more than four decades passed without either resorting to the direct use of military force between them, and the bipolar system underwent a profound yet essentially peaceful power transformation at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Although there are scholars who seriously question the relevance of nuclear deterrence in this regard (e.g., Wilson 2008; Mueller 2012), most academic literature on the subject suggests that it was the existence of secured second-­strike nuclear capabilities that introduced the “balance of terror” into the relationship between the two adversaries and significantly contributed to the strategic stability and increased caution in mutual interactions (Jervis 1989; Waltz 1990).

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   303 We may now be witnessing yet another case of power transition in the world order that is potentially perilous yet so far has occurred in the absence of armed conflict: the decline of American power and the simultaneous rise of China (Allison 2017). Whereas China is conventionally inferior to the United States, and its nuclear arsenal lags significantly behind the latter’s in absolute numbers (Kristensen and Korda  2019a,  2019b), Beijing has been rapidly modernizing its nuclear forces, expanding its stockpile, and significantly improving its capability for assured retaliation (Cunningham and Fravel 2015; Schreer 2015; Bojian 2018). The capability to deter both nuclear and conventional challenges from the United States could underpin the process of peaceful power transition as envisioned in the minimalist view of peaceful change, in which the rising power repositions itself in the international hierarchy without the need to resort to the use of military force and the declining power refrains from the use of military force to reverse this dynamic. Nevertheless, one needs to be mindful of the extent to which the modus operandi of the institution of nuclear deterrence relies on human emotions that are difficult to reconcile with the usual idea of ‘peace’—that is, an extreme anxiety connected with the ­possibility of nuclear war and the imagery of nuclear Armageddon, or what Frank Sauer described as “the collectively experienced fear of death en masse” (Sauer 2015, 174). In addition, while we often look at the Cold War as an era of relative stability in the nuclear domain, there is a growing recognition of accidents, miscalculations, and ‘close-­call’ events that easily could have spiraled out of control and escalated to the level of nuclear war; some new research into these events also highlights the extent to which nuclear use was prevented only through the mindful intervention of exceptionally prudent individuals (Lewis, Williams, and Pelopidas 2014). With respect to the rising powers, it is also important to note the extent to which ‘nuclear cover’ enables assertive territorial advances without an adequate response from the international community that are hardly reconcilable with the notion of a peaceful change—such as the case of China in the South China Sea and Russia in Ukraine. The institution of nuclear deterrence also faces some serious challenges in the twenty-­ first century—challenges that could, in the worst-­case scenario, negatively impact the process of peaceful change and enable violent change to take place in its stead. Technological advances in missile accuracy and remote sensing threaten to shatter one of the main pillars of successful mutual deterrence: survivability of second-­strike forces to respond to an attempted counterforce strike (Lieber and Press 2017). The advent of new hypersonic missiles—such as those envisioned for the US “Prompt Global Strike” program—threatens the foundations of strategic stability and paves the way for escalation to the nuclear level in response to strategic conventional strikes (Acton  2013; Gormley 2015; Naylor 2019). These technological developments, together with qualitative and quantitative expansion of missile defenses and advances in artificial intelligence and cyberweapons, make the tenets of Cold War–era deterrence theory ever more difficult to apply, bring about new layers of complexity in strategic interactions, and provide prospective tools for efforts to transcend nuclear deterrence and return to the offense-­ dominated world.

304   Michal Smetana

Nuclear Arms Control In the early 1960s, several pragmatically oriented scholars in the Western strategic ­community laid the conceptual foundations of the institution of bilateral strategic arms control (Brennan 1961; Bull 1961; Schelling and Halperin 1961). Unlike nuclear disarmament, considered by many of these scholars to be an essentially utopian project, the theory and practice of nuclear arms control has been philosophically fully compatible with the logic of nuclear deterrence (Mutimer 2011). Instead of the “maximalist conception” that would seek to achieve nuclear peace by global abolition of nuclear weapons, the “minimalist conception” primarily aimed at achieving nonviolent coexistence through strategic stability based on mutual vulnerability. The idea of mutual vulnerability as a path to national security has been both counterintuitive and controversial. Nevertheless, both the US and Soviet governments eventually accepted this logic as a “realistic” approach to limitation of their stockpiles (see Nye 1987; Adler 1992; Krause and Latham 1998). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which resulted in the signing of the 1972 SALT I interim agreement and antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, represented the first major attempt to curb the nuclear arms race and formalize the practice of bilateral arms control as a basis for the US-­Soviet mutual deterrence relationship. As argued by Adler (1992, 104), the diffusion of the arms control idea “was not inconsequential for peaceful change. The outcome of a lack of such shared understanding might have been nuclear war, rather than the temporary demise of detente.” While the validity of arms control theory premises has been repeatedly contested in practice through the development of counterforce capabilities to “prevail” in a hypothetical nuclear war (Jervis  1984; Mlyn  1998), the process of arms control brought much-­ needed transparency to the strategic dialogue between the two nuclear superpowers. The gradual sedimentation of verification practices and their expansion to relatively intrusive on-­site inspections in the INF (1987) and START (1991) treaties served not only as a source of information about treaty compliance but also as a critically important confidence-­building measure. In consequence, the risk of miscalculation in the US-­Soviet strategic relationship was significantly decreased, and mutual deterrence was stabilized to the extent of preventing violent change and allowing peaceful change to take its course. Nevertheless, developments since the early 2000s highlight the fact that the existence of arms control as an enduring institution of global nuclear order should not be taken for granted. The George W. Bush administration’s ideological disregard of arms control practices led to the abolishment in 2002 of the ABM treaty and the formally unrestrained development of US missile defenses, in violation of the basic axioms of strategic arms control theory (Bohlen 2003). In addition, relevant actors have never managed to extend the practice of strategic arms control beyond Washington and Moscow to meaningfully involve other nuclear-­armed countries in the strategic dialogue (Smetana and

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   305 Ditrych 2015). The deterioration of the US-­Russian relationship and concerns about rising China contributed to the US withdrawal from the INF treaty in 2019. Finally, following this downhill path, the extension of the soon-­to-­expire New START, the last arms control treaty in force limiting nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, seems to remain an unlikely prospect at the time of the writing of this chapter.

Nuclear Nonproliferation In the 1960s, the growing pressures to facilitate global diffusion of civilian nuclear power brought about the need to find a multilateral solution to the “nonproliferation problem”: the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons among states in the international system (Walker 2012, 73). The United Nations (UN)–based process eventually culminated in the signing of the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968.5 Together with the regional nuclear-­weapon-­free-­zone agreements, the NPT and its quinquennial review process laid normative foundations for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In spite of some academic accounts suggesting that a (gradual and selective) process of nuclear proliferation can prevent violent conflicts (Waltz 1981, 2012; Mearsheimer 1990, 1993), the NPT preamble expresses a clear cause and effect conviction that “proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war” (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968). According to this view, shared by a majority of scholars,6 security experts, international organizations, and governments, nuclear nonproliferation as one of the primary institutions of the global nuclear order contributes to global and regional stability as well as prevention of violent change. There is, however, a deeper strategic logic in nuclear nonproliferation arrangements that is conducive to peaceful change. For non-­nuclear-­weapon states, the NPT not only imposed a set of binding obligations but also established an increasingly complex and verifiable “system of restraint” (Horovitz 2015, 134). As many decisions to “go nuclear” would be driven by a security dilemma and a need to balance a (potential) nuclear rival (Sagan  1996), the NPT rules and the related verification system provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency gave the actors a (relatively) high level of confidence that while they were forgoing the nuclear weapons option, their rivals would do so as well (Bellany 1977; Nye 1985). Once adversaries jointly access the NPT and subject themselves to inspections that will verify their compliance with the treaty, the worry over a potential nuclear breakthrough by one of the parties is diminished, and a new path opens for a peaceful transformation of mutual relationships. This logic is particularly applicable on a regional level, where it is sometimes further strengthened by the establishment of regionally defined nuclear-­weapon-­free zones (Goldblat 1997; Thakur 1998). Nevertheless, the logic of nuclear nonproliferation has been somewhat problematic for the process of global peaceful change to the extent that nuclear weapons are broadly perceived as symbols of prestige and great power status (Sagan 1996). In the absence of

306   Michal Smetana war, there may be a need to resort to “status accommodation” of rising powers, as was the case in the 2005 US-­India nuclear deal (Paul 2017a). For New Delhi, an extra-­NPT agreement struck with Washington regarding mutual civilian collaboration not only paved the way for the normalization of India’s “deviant” status in the global nuclear order but also symbolically acknowledged its rising power status in the international order more broadly (Smetana 2018; see also Paul 2007; Kienzle 2014; Lantis 2015). This dynamic was further strengthened by the successful negotiation of the India-­specific waiver in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—the very export-­control group that was brought into existence in response to India’s 1974 nuclear test in the first place (Wastler 2010). As one Indian newspaper aptly noted, “If the Beijing Olympics was China’s coming-­out party, the NSG waiver was India’s” (Times of India  2008). Nevertheless, while the US-­India deal arguably succeeded as a status accommodation measure, it also represents a significant challenge to core nonproliferation norms based on the principle of universality, with a large part of the NPT’s membership objecting to the double standard and unequal treatment of India as an NPT nonmember in comparison with other states. Together with concerns about insufficient steps being taken toward nuclear disarmament, similar practices threaten the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime and make agreement on new joint initiatives increasingly difficult (Tannenwald 2013).

Nuclear Nonuse That nuclear weapons have not been used in a military conflict since 1945 remains one of the most intriguing puzzles in our field. As many cases of nuclear nonuse cannot be explained solely by deterrence, social constructivist scholars tend to ascribe such restraint to the effect of a powerful intersubjective international norm on nuclear nonuse: the “nuclear taboo” (Tannenwald 1999, 2005, 2006, 2007; see also Paul 1995; Gizewski 1996; Price and Tannenwald 1996; Herring 1997; Farrell and Lambert 2001; Quester 2006). Rationalist scholars then refer to the norm of nonuse as a prudent “tradition” that has gradually emerged in the strategic interaction among nuclear-­armed states (Sagan 2004; Paul 2009, 2010). Whatever the sources of the nuclear nonuse norm are, it has been arguably instrumental in preventing an ultimate violent change through nuclear war or the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries. It is likely that the hypothetical violation of the nonuse norm would have a major transformative effect on the global nuclear order and perhaps also the international order as such (Zuberi 2003, 45; Quester 2005; cf. Tannenwald 2007, 14–15). Nevertheless, by itself, the relevance of the nonuse norm as a driver of peaceful change has been rather limited. The normative barrier against the use of force on the nuclear level does not prevent the parties from engaging in a conventional conflict to achieve their goals. In fact, to the extent that the parties are convinced that the use of nuclear weapons would not be credible in a given situation, they would be

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   307 even more tempted to engage in a limited conventional challenge—a situation that has been aptly termed the stability-­instability paradox (Snyder 1961). In addition, there have been signs that the nuclear nonuse norm may be gradually weakening in the current political climate. The latest experimental research into public attitudes about nuclear weapons shows that, at least in Western countries, the public is more supportive of nuclear weapons use than previously thought (Press, Sagan, and Valentino 2013; Sagan and Valentino 2017b; Dill, Sagan, and Valentino 2019; Haworth, Sagan, and Valentino 2019). At the same time, the ongoing nuclear modernization programs and the changes in nuclear doctrines once again suggest an increasing role of nuclear weapons in national security of the major nuclear-­armed countries, while the populist leaders in these states often exhibit much more belligerent rhetoric and generally refrain from both the practices of restraint and the necessary “taboo talk” that would prevent the nonuse norm from further erosion (Tannenwald 2018a, 2018c).

Nuclear Disarmament The idea of the abolition of nuclear weapons appeared at the very beginning of the nuclear age. The first resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1946 called for the “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons,” and the notion of “disarmament” was frequently summoned in political proclamations of both ideological blocs during the Cold War. As all the actual proposals, such as the Baruch plan, were short lived (Gerber 1982), the commitment to nuclear disarmament eventually found its way to the NPT. Nevertheless, among other commitments enshrined in the treaty, Article VI, on disarmament, received the shortest and simultaneously the most ambiguous text of all, and the battles over its correct interpretation are today at the core of the legitimacy crisis in the global nuclear order (Müller 2010; Tannenwald 2013; Smetana 2016; Müller and Wunderlich 2018). For many, the process and outcome of nuclear disarmament correspond to the “maximalist conception” of peaceful change, in the sense that the change would not only take place in the absence of war but would also contribute to the achievement of a world order that is more just than the one we currently live in (see the chapter by Paul in this volume). Such peaceful change in the “strong sense” (Miall 2007, 12) of the term would arguably require finding a solution to many contemporary issues that are linked to the logic of nuclear deterrence, such as the Indo-­Pakistani conflict over Kashmir (Kapur and Ganguly  2015; Ganguly et al.  2019), the protracted standoff between the United States and North Korea in East Asia (Ogilvie-­White 2010; Grzelczyk 2019), and the status of Israel in the Middle East (Cohen 2010). A satisfactory diplomatic resolution of these issues would bring about a profound transformation of regional conflict dynamics and thereby an unprecedented peaceful change in both regional and global contexts. From the perspective of most states without nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament would also represent a peaceful transformation of the global nuclear order that has been

308   Michal Smetana envisaged in the NPT. In this view, the NPT was constructed merely as a temporary solution to the proliferation problem, with the end-­state being the world without nuclear weapons. As such, the very nature of the global nonproliferation regime would be transformative, eventually shifting from “micro-­justice” principles (Brickman et al. 1981) of prohibiting further spread of nuclear weapons to “macro-­justice” nuclear abolition. At this end point, the unequal distinction between nuclear “haves” and “have nots” introduced in the NPT would disappear, and all countries would share an equal nonnuclear status. The actual meaning of NPT Article VI, however, has been subject to vigorous contestation over the decades. At this point, the five nuclear-­weapons states under the NPT approach nuclear disarmament as a (very) long-­term goal akin to achieving world peace and reject any new binding commitments in this direction. At the same time, the remaining “nuclear holdouts” (Hagerty  2012)—India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea—do not participate in the NPT process and do not show any signs of disarming by themselves. To offset these dynamics, some states without nuclear weapons, with the support of pro-­disarmament civil society, have launched an extra-­NPT process inspired by the earlier campaigns to ban landmines and cluster ammunition, framing disarmament as a moral obligation of all states because of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons and of their incompatibility with the principles of international humanitarian law (Borrie 2014). The so-­called Humanitarian Initiative culminated in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the UN General Assembly in July 2017, the first international agreement banning nuclear weapons and providing a framework for their elimination (Onderco  2017; Potter  2017; Sagan and Valentino 2017a; Ruff 2018; Williams 2018). However, as expected, none of the nuclear-­ armed countries or NATO-­allied states joined the treaty, and they continue to reject its validity and refuse to abide by its terms. In this sense, the rift between nuclear “haves” and “have nots” has gradually widened, and the prospects for meaningful reconciliation remain bleak at this point.

Key Linkages and Conflicts The five aforementioned primary institutions of global nuclear order—nuclear deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, nonuse, and disarmament—do not exist in a normative vacuum but are mutually interconnected through various linkages. In this section, I discuss some of these linkages and their relevance for the processes of peaceful change. One such complex and, in fact, rather ambiguous linkage is the one between deterrence and nonproliferation. One the one hand, a “nuclear umbrella” provided to allies through US-­extended deterrence has been instrumental in many of their decisions not to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own—a choice that they may reconsider if these

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   309 extended deterrence guarantees are withdrawn (Smith  1987, 258; Krause  2007, 494; Freedman 2013, 97). On the other hand, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons for allied assurance reproduces the value of nuclear weapons in world politics and thereby contributes to the systemic pressures to acquire nuclear weapons. As such, in the context of global nonproliferation efforts, “a security-­oriented strategy of maintaining a major role for US nuclear guarantees to restrain proliferation among allies will eventually create strong tensions with a norm-­oriented strategy seeking to delegitimize nuclear weapons use and acquisition” (Sagan 1996, 86). As noted previously, the relationship between deterrence and arms control is principally complementary and jointly contributes to the prevention of violent change, while allowing peaceful change in the absence of nuclear war to take its course. The logics of deterrence and disarmament, however, are by their nature largely incompatible. The strategy of deterrence, implicitly or explicitly, is based on the acknowledgment of the value of nuclear weapons for security management; current strategies to promote nuclear disarmament nevertheless rely on deep devaluing of nuclear arms as legitimate tools of national, regional, or global security (Ritchie 2013, 2014). In the recent debates over the need for practical steps toward nuclear abolition, nuclear deterrence has increasingly been portrayed as a morally abhorrent practice (Ifft  2017; Tannenwald 2018b). At the same time, the opponents of nuclear abolition see a world without nuclear weapons as inherently unstable and more prone to violent change than the status quo (Glaser 1998; Schelling 2009). There is also a certain conceptual tension between the institution of nuclear deterrence and the norm of nuclear nonuse, as the credibility of the deterrent threats necessarily requires a belief that nuclear weapons would be used under certain circumstances. Tannenwald (2007, 19) argued that the “nuclear taboo” constitutes a “part of the practice of deterrence itself.” Later she added that “[t]he taboo reinforces mutual deterrence between nuclear powers while undermining the credibility of deterrent threats between nuclear and nonnuclear states” (Tannenwald 2018b, 16). The explanation for this difference lies in the (often implicit) conceptualization of the nonuse norm as a normative prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons (implied in the strike against a nonnuclear country), while the retaliatory use against a nuclear opponent would not be subject to such prohibition (and thereby remain credible). However, the contemporary approach to deterrence in major nuclear-­armed states—including the development of lower-­yield, more ‘usable’ nuclear weapons—generally contributes to lowering the threshold for nuclear use in general, thereby weakening the nonuse norm. Other scholars also argue that “[a] taboo on the use of nuclear weapons can logically not co-­exist with the maintenance of nuclear deterrence as security doctrine [. . .]. Deterrence ideology, paradoxically, presumes the planning, preparing, and therefore thinking and speaking about nuclear use in order to avoid nuclear use” (Müller 2020; see also Sauer 2015; Sherrill 2018). Finally, strengthening of the nonuse norm to the extent that the employment of nuclear weapons would be truly ‘unthinkable’ is sometimes seen as a possible (or even necessary) path toward nuclear disarmament. This process would in principle represent a major peaceful change toward a qualitatively different world order than the one in

310   Michal Smetana which we live now. The Humanitarian Initiative, which underlies the movement that culminated in the adoption of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, similarly views gradual stigmatization of nuclear weapons as a feasible disarmament strategy that would, in time, render nuclear weapons unusable and therefore politically dispensable (Hanson 2018; Considine 2019). Paradoxically, however, this strategy can also backfire. One of the current shortcomings of the campaigns for nuclear abolition is the fact that there is very low active support for nuclear disarmament among the general public—especially in comparison with the Cold War era, when the threat of nuclear war seemed pressing enough to bring large crowds in the West to protest against nuclear arms races and to demand nuclear disarmament. Efforts to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in world politics simultaneously reduce the public perception of the urgency to proceed to nuclear disarmament compared to other pressing issues of our time. The tragic and rather disturbing prospect is that the momentum that would likely move the world’s public to demand nuclear disarmament may only be possible once people see the horrifying impact of a nuclear strike in the news—that is, at the moment when the world experiences the brutality of violent change in consequence of the first military use of nuclear weapons after decades of restraint.

Conclusions In his seminal 1977 book The Anarchical Society, English school theorist Hedley Bull noted that “[t]he international order is notoriously lacking in mechanisms of peaceful change, notoriously dependent on war as the agent of just change” (Bull  1977, 183). Authors of this Handbook, however, suggest that not only is peaceful change in international relations possible, but the study of its mechanisms should be at the core of scholarly endeavors in our field (see also Paul 2017b). The aim of this particular chapter is to explore the intersection of nuclear weapons and peaceful change in world politics. To this end, I have identified five primary institutions of global nuclear order—nuclear deterrence, nuclear arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear nonuse, and nuclear disarmament—and their mutual linkages that have been conducive to peaceful change or at least instrumental in preventing violent change. While the first four would correspond to the “minimalist conception” of peaceful change—as a change taking place in absence of war—the logic of the fifth institution of global nuclear order, that is, nuclear disarmament, would conform to the “maximalist conception” of peaceful change, which would also contribute to the achievement of a world order that is more just than the one we currently live in. Nevertheless, throughout the chapter I also highlight the limits of these institutions and their inherent incompatibilities, as well as the ‘double-­edged’ nature of nuclear weapons, which threatens peaceful coexistence and carries the risk of violent change of an unprecedented character. In the context of contemporary developments, I particularly highlight the risks connected with technological developments and the gradual

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   311 disintegration of arms control institutions and other pillars of strategic stability. I also point to the miscalculations, accidents, and other ‘close calls’ that put our beliefs in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in question and show that the extreme anxiety connected with the possible use of nuclear weapons not only stops great powers from openly attacking each other but also enables assertive territorial advances of rising powers without an adequate response from the international community that are hardly reconcilable with the notion of a peaceful change. The limited space of this chapter only allows me to provide a basic overview of the issue at hand, and there are several avenues that should be explored by future research in this area. First, scholars should employ a diverse range of methods to further examine the complexity of interconnectedness of institutions, norms, rules, and practices in global nuclear order and the implication of this interconnectedness for the mechanisms of peaceful change. Second, there should be new research on the linkages between nuclear and nonnuclear aspects of peaceful change and their mutual compatibilities and conflicts. Finally, drawing on the conceptual elaborations in this chapter and other relevant scholarly literature, scholars should develop specific policy-­oriented strategies of peaceful change that would be applicable in the current volatile state of international politics.

Notes 1. On the privileged position of nuclear weapons in international affairs and the notion of “nuclear exceptionalism,” see Hecht (2012). For the rare argumentation that nuclear weapons have been “essentially irrelevant” in world politics, see Mueller (2012). 2. The term institution here does not necessarily imply a formalized international organization or a regime but rather an institution in an understanding of the English school: a recognized set of fundamental practices that constitute actors’ identities and underpin the legitimacy of their interactions in a given social order (see Buzan  2004; Bull  1977). Global nuclear order is then a more general “bulk of norms, rules, and institutions that regulate the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear technology in international politics” (Smetana 2019, 96; see also Walker 2000; 2012; Jasper 2016; Tannenwald 2018b). 3. On Bernard Brodie and the (in)contestability of nuclear weapons, see also Harknett (1998). 4. A detailed review of nuclear-­deterrence-­related literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a thorough conceptual discussion, see, for example, Schelling (1966), Morgan (1977), Jervis (1989), Freedman (1989), Powell (1990), or Kroenig (2018). For a comprehensive critique of rational deterrence literature, see Lebow and Stein (1989). 5. To date, only India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan have not acceded to the NPT, while North Korea is so far the only country that has withdrawn from it, in 2003. For a more detailed discussion of the process of NPT negotiations, see Burns (1969), Epstein (1976), Unger (1976), Shaker (1980), Nye (1981), Müller et al. (1994, chap. 2), Bourantonis (1997), Paul (2003), Krause (2007), Bunn and Rhinelander (2008), Walker (2012, chap. 3), and Popp, Horovitz, and Wenger (2016). 6. For an overview of the proliferation of the “optimist–pessimist debate,” see Feaver (1993, 1995, 1997), Lavoy (1995), Knopf (2002), Karl (2011), Sagan and Waltz (2012), or Cohen (2016).

312   Michal Smetana

References Acton, James M. 2013. Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Adler, Emanuel. 1992. “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control.” International Organization 46, no. 1: 101–145. Allison, Graham T. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Bellany, Ian. 1977. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Inequality of States.” Political Studies 25, no. 4: 594–598. Bohlen, Avis. 2003. “The Rise and Fall of Arms Control.” Survival 45, no. 3: 7–34. https://doi .org/10.1093/survival/45.3.7. Bojian, Liu. 2018. “China’s Modernising Nuclear Forces: In the Face of US Nuclear Primacy.” East Asia Policy 10, no. 3: 108–117. Borrie, John. 2014. “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban.” International Affairs 90, no. 3: 625–646. Bourantonis, Dimitris. 1997. “The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965–1968: A Note.” International History Review 19, no. 2: 347–357. Brennan, Donald G., ed. 1961. Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security. Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Brickman, Philip, Robert Folger, Erica Goode, and Yaacov Schul. 1981. “Microjustice and Macrojustice.” In The Justice Motive in Social Behavior, 173–202, edited by Melvin J. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner. Critical Issues in Social Justice. Boston: Springer US. Brodie, Bernard, ed. 1946. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Brodie, Bernard. 1978. “The Development of Nuclear Strategy.” International Security 4, no. 2: 65–83. Bull, Hedley. 1961. The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Bunn, George, and John B. Rhinelander. 2008. “Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now.” Arms Control Today (July/August): 1–7. http://www.armscontrol .org/print/3097. Burns, E. L. M. 1969. “The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects.” International Organization 23, no. 4: 788–807. Buzan, Barry. 2004. “The Primary Institutions of International Society.” In From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, 161–204. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Cohen, Avner. 2010. Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press. Cohen, Michael D. 2016. “How Nuclear Proliferation Causes Conflict: The Case for Optimistic Pessimism.” Nonproliferation Review 23, nos. 3/4: 425–442. Considine, Laura. 2019. “Contests of Legitimacy and Value: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of Prohibition.” International Affairs 95, no. 5: 1075–1092. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz103.

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   313 Cunningham, Fiona  S., and M.  Taylor Fravel. 2015. “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability.” International Security 40, no. 2: 7–50. Dill, Janina, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. 2019. “Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Non-Combatant Immunity Norms in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel.” Working Paper, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Epstein, William. 1976. The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. New York: Free Press. Farrell, Theo, and Hélène Lambert. 2001. “Courting Controversy: International Law, National Norms and American Nuclear Use.” Review of International Studies 27, no. 3: 309–326. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210501003096. Feaver, Peter D. 1993. “Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations.” Security Studies 2, nos. 3–4: 159–191. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347523. Feaver, Peter  D. 1995. “Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management: Debate.” Security Studies 4, no. 4: 754–772. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09636419509347602. Feaver, Peter  D. 1997. “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation.” Security Studies 6, no. 4: 93–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429323. Freedman, Lawrence. 1989. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Freedman, Lawrence. 2013a. “Disarmament and Other Nuclear Norms.” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 2: 93–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.791085. Ganguly, Sumit, Michal Smetana, Sannia Abdullah, and Ales Karmazin. 2019. “India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: Unpacking the Dynamics of a South Asian Frozen Conflict.” Asia Europe Journal 17, no. 1: 129–143. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0526-5. Gerber, Larry G. 1982. “The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 6, no. 1: 69–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1982.tb00364.x. Gilpin, Robert. 1983. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gizewski, Peter. 1996. “From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics.” International Journal 51, no. 3: 397–419. Glaser, Charles L. 1998. “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament.” Survival 40, no. 1: 112–128. Goldblat, Jozef. 1997. “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment.” Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 3: 18–32. Gormley, Dennis M. 2015. “US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions: Assessing the Risks, Benefits, and Arms Control Implications.” Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 2: 123–139. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2015.1117735. Gray, Colin S., and Keith Payne. 1980. “Victory Is Possible.” Foreign Policy, no. 39: 14. Grzelczyk, Virginie. 2019. “Threading on Thin Ice? Conflict Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.” Asia Europe Journal 17, no. 1: 31–45. Hagerty, Devin T. 2012. “The Nuclear Holdouts—India, Israel, and Pakistan.” In Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, 219–248. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Hanson, Marianne. 2018. “Normalizing Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Road to the Prohibition Treaty.” Contemporary Security Policy 39, no. 3: 464–486. https://doi.org/10 .1080/13523260.2017.1421344. Harknett, Richard J. 1998. “State Preferences, Systemic Constraints, and the Absolute Weapon.” In The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order,

314   Michal Smetana 47–72, edited by T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Haworth, Alida R., Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. 2019. “What Do Americans Really Think about Conflict with Nuclear North Korea? The Answer Is Both Reassuring and Disturbing.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4: 179–186. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00963402.2019.1629576. Hecht, Gabrielle. 2012. Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Herring, Eric. 1997. “Nuclear Totem and Taboo: Or How We Learned to Stop Loving the Bomb and Start Worrying.” Paper Presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, Leeds. Horovitz, Liviu. 2015. “Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, nos. 1–2: 126–158. Ifft, Edward. 2017. “A Challenge to Nuclear Deterrence.” Arms Control Today 47, no. 2: 6–14. Jasper, Ursula. 2016. “Dysfunctional, but Stable—a Bourdieuian Reading of the Global Nuclear Order.” Critical Studies on Security 4, no. 1: 42–56. Jervis, Robert. 1984. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. 1st ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kapur, S.  Paul, and Sumit Ganguly. 2015. “India, Pakistan, and the Unlikely Dream of a Nuclear-Free South Asia.” In Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives, edited by Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana, 268–282. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Karl, David  J. 2011. “Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited.” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 4: 619–641. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.592013 Kennedy, Paul M. 1989. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Vintage Books. Kienzle, Benjamin. 2014. “The Exception to the Rule? The EU and India’s Challenge to the Non-Proliferation Norm.” European Security 24, no. 1: 36–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662 839.2014.948863. Knopf, Jeffrey. 2002. “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate.” Security Studies 12, no. 1: 41–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410212120003. Krause, Joachim. 2007. “Enlightenment and Nuclear Order.” International Affairs 83, no. 3: 483–499. Krause, Keith, and Andrew Latham. 1998. “Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: The Norms of Western Practice.” Contemporary Security Policy 19, no. 1: 23–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523269808404178. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2019a. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4: 171–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2019b. “United States Nuclear Forces, 2019.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3: 122–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503. Kroenig, Matthew. 2018. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lantis, Jeffrey  S. 2015. “Nuclear Technology and Norm Stewardship: US Nonproliferation Policies Revisited.” International Studies Perspectives 16, no. 4: 423–445. https://doi .org/10.1111/insp.12070. Lavoy, Peter R. 1995. “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay.” Security Studies 4, no. 4: 695–753. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419509347601.

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   315 Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1989. “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter.” World Politics 41, no. 2: 208–224. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010408. Lewis, Patricia, Heather Williams, and Benoît Pelopidas. 2014. “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy.” Chatham House Report, London. Lieber, Keir  A., and Daryl  G.  Press. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Security 41, no. 4: 9–49. Mearsheimer, John  J. 1990. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” International Security 15, no. 1: 5–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981. Mearsheimer, John  J. 1993. “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent.” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): 50–66. Miall, Hugh. 2007. Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mlyn, Eric. 1998. “U.S.  Nuclear Policy and the End of the Cold War.” In The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, edited by T.  V.  Paul, Richard  J.  Harknett, and James  J.  Wirtz, 11–50. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Morgan, Patrick M. 1977. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Mueller, John  E. 2012. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Müller, Harald. 2010. “Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime.” Strategic Analysis 34, no. 2: 189–201. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160903542740. Müller, Harald. 2020. “Taboo or Tradition or What? A Critical Look at the Terminology and Conceptualization of Nuclear Non-Use.” (Unpublished manuscript). Müller, Harald, David Fischer, and Wolfgang Kötter. 1994. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Müller, Harald, and Carmen Wunderlich. 2018. “Not Lost in Contestation: How Norm Entrepreneurs Frame Norm Development in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” Contemporary Security Policy 39, no. 3: 341–366. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017. 1394032. Mutimer, David. 2011. “From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire.” Contemporary Security Policy 32, no. 1: 57–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/1 3523260.2011.556844. Naylor, Jenny  L. 2019. “The Third Nuclear Age.” Comparative Strategy 38, no. 4: 276–288. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633185. Nye, Joseph S. 1981. “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime.” International Organization 35, no. 1: 15–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004069. Nye, Joseph S. 1985. “NPT: The Logic of Inequality.” Foreign Policy, no. 59: 123–131. Nye, Joseph  S. 1987. “Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes.” International Organization 41, no. 3: 371–402. Ogilvie-White, Tanya. 2010. “The Defiant States: The Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran.” Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1: 115–138. Onderco, Michal. 2017. “Why Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Is Unlikely to Fulfil Its Promise.” Global Affairs 3, no. 4–5: 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1409082. Paul, T. V. 1995. “Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 4: 696–717. Paul, T. V. 2003. “Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16, no. 1: 135. https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757032000075753.

316   Michal Smetana Paul, T.  V. 2007. “The US-India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime.” International Journal 62, no. 4: 845–865. Paul, T.  V. 2009. The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Paul, T. V. 2010. “Taboo or Tradition? The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics.” Review of International Studies 36, no. 4: 853–863. Paul, T.  V. 2017a. “Recasting Statecraft: International Relations and Strategies of Peaceful Change.” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1: 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw059. Paul, T. V. 2017b. “Global Peaceful Change and Accommodation of Rising Powers: A Scholarly Perspective.” All Azimuth 6, no. 2: 85–94. https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.319910. Paul, T. V., Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, eds. 1998. The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Popp, Roland, Liviu Horovitz, and Andreas Wenger. 2016. Negotiating the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Potter, William C. 2017. “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty.” Survival 59, no. 4: 75–108. Powell, Robert. 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Press, Daryl  G., Scott  D.  Sagan, and Benjamin  A.  Valentino. 2013. “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1: 188–206. Price, Richard, and Nina Tannenwald. 1996. “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos.” In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 114–152. New York: Columbia University Press. Quester, G. H. 2005. “If the Nuclear Taboo Gets Broken.” Naval War College Review 58, no. 2: 71–91. Quester, George  H. 2006. Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ritchie, Nick. 2013. “Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.” Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1: 146–173. Ritchie, Nick. 2014. “Waiting for Kant: Devaluing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons.” International Affairs 90, no. 3: 601–623. Ruff, Tilman. 2018. “Negotiating the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of ICAN.” Global Change, Peace & Security (April): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/14 781158.2018.1465908. Sagan, Scott. 2004. “Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, edited by Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee, 73–95. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sagan, Scott, and Benjamin  A.  Valentino. 2017a. “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Opportunities Lost.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 16. https://thebulletin.org/ nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-opportunities-lost10955. Sagan, Scott D. 1996. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” International Security 21, no. 3: 54–86. Sagan, Scott  D., and Benjamin  A.  Valentino. 2017b. “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants.” International Security 42, no. 1: 41–79.

Nuclear Weapons and Peaceful Change   317 Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2012. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. 3rd ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Sauer, Frank. 2015. Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S.  Nuclear Weapons. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137533746. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Schelling, Thomas C. 2009. “A World without Nuclear Weapons?” Daedalus 138, no. 4: 124–129. Schelling, Thomas C., and Morton H. Halperin. 1961. Strategy and Arms Control. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. Schreer, Benjamin. 2015. “China’s Development of a More Secure Nuclear Second-Strike Capability: Implications for Chinese Behavior and U.S. Extended Deterrence.” Asia Policy 19, no. 1: 14–20. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2015.0010. Shaker, Mohamed I. 1980. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959–1979. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana. Sherrill, Clifton W. 2018. “The Myth of the Nuclear Taboo.” Asian International Studies Review 18, no. 1: 1–21. https://doi.org/10.16934/isr.18.1.201706.1. Smetana, Michal. 2016. “Stuck on Disarmament: The European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference.” International Affairs 92, no. 1: 137–152. Smetana, Michal. 2018. “(De-)Stigmatising the Outsider: Nuclear-Armed India, United States, and the Global Nonproliferation Order.” Journal of International Relations and Development, October 23: 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-018-0165-x. Smetana, Michal. 2019. Nuclear Deviance: Stigma Politics and the Rules of the Nonproliferation Game. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Smetana, Michal, and Ondrej Ditrych. 2015. “The More the Merrier: Time for a Multilateral Turn in Nuclear Disarmament.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 3: 30–37. Smith, Roger K. 1987. “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory.” International Organization 41, no. 2: 253–81. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0020818300027466. Snyder, Glenn  H. 1961. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Steiner, Barry H. 1984. “Using the Absolute Weapon: Early Ideas of Bernard Brodie on Atomic Strategy.”JournalofStrategicStudies7,no.4:365–393.https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398408437198. Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.” International Organization 53, no. 3: 433–468. Tannenwald, Nina. 2005. “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo.” International Security 29, no. 4: 5–49. Tannenwald, Nina. 2006. “Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4: 675–722. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600766148. Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tannenwald, Nina. 2013. “Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” Ethics & International Affairs 27, no. 3: 299–317. Tannenwald, Nina. 2018a. “How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 3: 89–109. Tannenwald, Nina. 2018b. “The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order.” In Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age of Technological Innovation and Changing Nuclear Doctrines, 6–31, edited by Nina Tannenwald and James M. Acton. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

318   Michal Smetana Tannenwald, Nina. 2018c. “The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? How Disarmament Fell Apart.” Foreign Affairs 97: 16–24. Thakur, Ramesh Chandra. 1998. Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. New York: Macmillan. Times of India. 2008. “After NSG Waiver, All Eyes Now on US Congress.” September 6, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/After-NSG-waiver-all-eyes-now-on-US -Congress/articleshow/3453734.cms. UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. 1968. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html. Unger, Bruce. 1976. “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: An Unsuccessful Attempt to Stem the Tide.” World Affairs 139, no. 2: 87–111. Walker, William. 2000. “Nuclear Order and Disorder.” International Affairs 76, no. 4: 703–24. Walker, William. 2012. A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1981. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1990. “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3: 731–745. Waltz, Kenneth  N. 2012. “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.” Foreign Affairs (July/August). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb. Wastler, Benjamin. 2010. “Having Its Yellowcake and Eating It Too: How the NSG Waiver for India Threatens to Undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 33, no. 1: 201–218. Williams, Heather. 2018. “A Nuclear Babel: Narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 1–2: 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/1073 6700.2018.1477453. Wilson, Ward. 2008. “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence.” Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 3: 421–439. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700802407101. Zuberi, Matin. 2003. “Uncertain Future: NPT and the Global Nuclear Order.” RUSI Journal 148, no. 6: 42–45.

chapter 17

The Politica l Econom y of Pe acefu l Ch a nge Lars S. Skålnes

At least since the end of the Cold War, policy makers and scholars alike have turned to foreign economic policies to promote peaceful change. Attempting to make former enemies into responsible stakeholders, the United States and its allies used membership in international institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO), to demonstrate the economic benefits of joining the international economic order created in the aftermath of Second World War. Although it was by no means universally accepted, the belief was that the economic benefits of economic interdependence would gradually transform autocratic regimes into democracies (see, e.g., Blackwill and Harris 2016, 225). Because democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other—another much-­debated proposition—liberal economic policies thus would become a major source of peaceful change. The rise of the BRICS1 powers, particularly China, to economic prominence and the perception that these powers are especially adept at using foreign economic policies for strategic ends have renewed interest among scholars and policy makers in the links between strategic considerations and such policies. Thus, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued in 2011 that “the economic is strategic and the strategic is economic” and that the “foreign and economic relations [of the United States] remain indivisible . . . at a time when power is more often . . . exercised in economic terms” (quoted in Scholvin and Wigell 2018, 73). More generally, the 2017 “National Security Strategy” of the United States asserts that “economic security is national security” (White House 2017, 17). The still considerable gap in military power between the United States and the other great powers, a gap that is likely to remain for the foreseeable future (Brooks and Wohlforth  2015/2016), may be a major reason why great power conflict has so far remained largely confined to the economic arena. Here, the power discrepancy is much smaller. While China still lags behind the United States on economic measures such as

320   Lars S. Skålnes gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, its GDP (measured in purchasing power terms) is already larger than that of the United States. The use of economic instruments for national security ends might significantly affect the prospects for peaceful change in international politics in the short to medium term. Because the imposition of, say, economic sanctions often appears less threatening than the use of military force, their use is sometimes thought to exacerbate international tensions less. This assumes that economic conflict does not escalate to military conflict, the likelihood of which should be lower in an economically interdependent world. The degree to which economic interdependence will serve to contain economic conflict and thus promote peaceful change is an important topic, to which I turn next. The second section discusses contributions to the analysis of economic statecraft in the literatures on geoeconomics and international political economy (IPE) as well as the potential for cross-­fertilization between these two literatures. Whether the use of the tools of economic statecraft will promote peaceful change is often unclear, and likely to vary depending on which specific tools states use. The chapter concludes by suggesting some possible directions for future research.

Economic Interdependence and Peaceful Change The possible positive effects of economic interdependence on conflict continue to be a topic of great interest in international relations. The core argument is that high levels of interdependence increase the costs of war, thereby making peace more likely. Space does not permit a full discussion of the extensive literature on this subject here.2 Instead, I focus on several relatively recent arguments with particular relevance for the question of how economic interdependence might affect the prospects for peaceful change. Copeland (1996, 2015) asserts that the liberal argument that economic in­ter­de­pend­ ence will reduce conflict and the realist argument to the contrary are both wrong. What matters are the expectations states have about whether the international economy will remain open to trade in the future. If states expect the international economy to close, security-­maximizing states will fear economic decline and adopt aggressive policies, which will increase conflict and possibly lead to war. The US trade war with China would seem to be exactly the kind of policy that would reduce China’s faith that the world economy will remain open in the future. Of course, the US domestic market is not the world market, and as Copeland (2015, 443) notes, China’s extensive trade ties with Europe and Asia would allow it to divert trade to these markets. This has indeed already happened; Chinese exports to Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines, in particular, have increased significantly in the wake of the trade war (Economist 2019). The easier it is for Chinese producers to find substitutes for the American market, the less likely it is that

The Political Economy of Peaceful Change   321 the trade war will escalate to a military conflict. The ability to divert exports to other markets of course assumes that those markets remain open to Chinese exports. Copeland’s (2015, 35–36) discussion of trade relies on standard notions of specialization according to comparative advantage, which leads to inter-­industry trade. Others have argued that whether economic interdependence will promote conflict or cooperation will depend