The Oxford Handbook of Management in Emerging Markets 0190683945, 9780190683948

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T h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

M A NAG E M E N T I N  E M E RG I N G MARKETS

The Oxford Handbook of

MANAGEMENT IN EMERGING MARKETS Edited by

ROBERT GROSSE and

KLAUS E. MEYER

1

3 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: Grosse, Robert, editor. | Meyer, Klaus E., 1964– editor. Title: The Oxford handbook of management in emerging markets / edited by Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer. Other titles: Handbook of management in emerging markets Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2019] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018022158 | ISBN 9780190683948 (hardcover) Subjects: LCSH: Management—Developing countries. | Marketing—Developing countries—Management. | Small business—Developing countries—Management. Classification: LCC HD70.D44 O94 2018 | DDC 658.009172/4—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018022158 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

Contents

About the Editors Contributors

ix xi

PA RT I   T H E BU SI N E S S E N V I RON M E N T I N E M E RG I N G M A R K E T S 1. Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse 2. Conceptual Approaches to Managing in Emerging Markets Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer 3. International Business and Emerging Markets in Historical Perspective Geoffrey Jones

3 35

55

4. Economics, Transitions, and Traps in Emerging Markets John M. Luiz

77

5. Institutional Theory Perspectives on Emerging Markets Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano

99

6. Emerging Markets and the International Investment Law and Policy Regime Karl P. Sauvant

127

PA RT I I   M A R K E T S A N D G OV E R NA N C E 7. Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance in Emerging Markets Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung 8. Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi

161 185

vi   Contents

9. Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets Raquel Castaño and David Flores

219

10. Examining Base of the Pyramid (BoP) Venture Success Through the Mutual Value CARD Approach Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam

241

11. Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies in Emerging Markets Farok J. Contractor

267

12. Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets Pei Sun

291

PA RT I I I   F OR E IG N M N E S I N E M E RG I N G MARKETS 13. Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy in Responding to the Rise of Local Competitors in an Emerging Market J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie

311

14. Global Production Networks, Territoriality, and Political Authority Stephen J. Kobrin

333

15. Innovation in Emerging Markets George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham

351

16. Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business Florian Wettstein

373

17. Spillovers from FDI in Emerging Market Economies Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Nigel Driffield, Meng Song, and Priit Vahter

399

18. Risk Management for Companies Operating in Emerging Markets Donald Lessard

427

PA RT I V   L O C A L F I R M S A N D E M E RG I N G MARKET MNES 19. Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright

457

Contents   vii

20. Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs in Emerging Markets John Child

495

21. Family Business in Emerging Markets Rodrigo Basco

527

22. The Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research on Business Groups in Emerging Markets 547 Chi‐Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo 23. State-​Owned Multinationals in International Competition Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini 24. Local Firms Within Global Value Chains: From Local Assembler to Value Partner Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip 25. Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh 26. Investments by Emerging-​Market Multinationals in Other Emerging Markets Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro 27. Human Resource Management in Emerging Markets Dana Minbaeva

569

591 609

631 657

PA RT V   C O U N T R I E S A N D R E G ION S 28. Managing Multinationals in Brazil: Opportunities and Challenges Jorge Carneiro 29. Managing Emerging Markets in Russia Sheila M. Puffer, Daniel J. McCarthy, Ruth C. May, Galina V. Shirokova, and Andrei Yu. Panibratov 30. How Technology-​Based Firms from India Deal with Legitimacy Challenges in International Markets S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan 31. How Real Are the Opportunities for Multinationals in China? Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan

677 703

725 745

viii   Contents

32. Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass 33. Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy: Insights from South Africa’s Setting in Wider Africa and the World Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-​Benson

763

797

34. Management in Southeast Asia: A Business Systems Perspective Michael A. Witt

821

Index

843

About the Editors

Robert Grosse is Director for Latin America at the Thunderbird School of Global Management. He has lived and worked in four emerging markets on three continents over 20 years. He writes mainly about multinational companies' strategy and dealing with governments, particularly in emerging markets. Klaus E.  Meyer is Professor of International Business at the Ivey Business School, Canada. He recently spent six years at China Europe International Business School in Shanghai and previously held professorial appointments at Copenhagen Business School, University of Bath, and University of Reading. He has been widely published in the Journal of International Business Studies, Strategic Management Journal, and Journal of Management Studies, among others.

Contributors

Ruth V. Aguilera, Northeastern University Preet S. Aulakh, York University Helena Barnard, University of Pretoria Rodrigo Basco, American University of Sharjah Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Sheffield University Jorge Carneiro, FGV São Paulo Raquel Castaño, EGADE Business School John Child, University of Birmingham & University of Plymouth Chi‐Nien Chung, National University of Singapore Farok J. Contractor, Rutgers University Lin Cui, Australian National University Krzysztof Dembek, University of Melbourne Nigel Driffield, Warwick University Saul Estrin, London School of Economics David Flores, Tecnológico de Monterrey Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management Ilir Haxhi, University of Amsterdam Emir Hrnjic, National University of Singapore Geoffrey Jones, Harvard University Kálmán Kalotay, United Nations Stephen J. Kobrin, University of Pennsylvania Tatiana Kostova, University of South Carolina Sergio G. Lazzarini, Insper

xii   Contributors Donald Lessard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Jing Li, Simon Fraser University J.T. Li, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology John M. Luiz, University of Sussex & University of Cape Town Rose Xiaowei Luo, INSEAD Valentina Marano, Northeastern University Ruth C. May, University of Dallas Daniel J. McCarthy, Northeastern University Klaus E. Meyer, Ivey Business School Tomasz Mickiewicz, Aston University Dana Minbaeva, Copenhagen Business School Felipe Monteiro, INSEAD Aldo Musacchio, Brandeis University Theresa Onaji-​Benson, University of Pretoria Jaykumar Padmanabhan, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore Andrei Yu. Panibratov, St. Petersburg University Shameen Prashantham, CEIBS Sheila M. Puffer, Northeastern University S Raghunath, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore David M. Reeb, National University of Singapore Magdolna Sass, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Karl P. Sauvant, Columbia University. Daniel Shapiro, Simon Fraser University Galina V. Shirokova, St. Petersburg University Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam, Duquesne University Meng Song, Cardiff University Ute Stephan, Aston University Pei Sun, Fudan University Priit Vahter, University of Tartu

Contributors   xiii Feng Wan, University of East Anglia Florian Wettstein, University of St.Gallen Peter J. Williamson, University of Cambridge Michael A. Witt, INSEAD Mike Wright, Imperial College London Zhenzhen Xie, Tsinghua University Bernard Yeung, National University of Singapore George S. Yip, Erasmus University

Pa rt   I

T H E BU SI N E S S E N V I RON M E N T I N  E M E RG I N G MARKETS

Chapter 1

In t rodu c t i on to Managing i n E m e rg i n g Markets Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse

Objectives of This Handbook Emerging markets, also known as emerging economies, have become major players in the global economy and a primary source of growth in the twenty-​first century. Many emerging markets have a track record of economic growth ahead of global averages; others have laid the foundations for growth by enacting economic reforms. Standards of living, life expectancies, and personal wealth have risen, though not uniformly. Thus, companies from Europe, North America, and Japan (the Triad) face opportunities to grow their sales, to invest capital, and to organize their supply chains on a global scale. At the same time, local firms in emerging markets are expanding, becoming more international, and competing extensively with companies from the historically advanced economies. Emerging markets are low-​or middle-​income economies with high economic growth potential. Yet, they tend to be less stable and still imperfect with respect to the efficiency and impartiality of markets due to imperfections in the institutional framework—​ commonly known as institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Meyer & Peng, 2016). Management practices in emerging markets are not categorically different from advanced economies in the sense that business is business. However, what is different is the environment for business. For example, Xu and Meyer describe the characteristics that typically distinguish emerging markets from developed economies: • Markets are less efficient due to less transparency, more extensive information asymmetries, and higher monitoring and enforcement costs. • Governments and government-​related entities are not only setting the rules, but are active players in the economy, for example through state-​owned or state-​controlled  firms.

4    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse • Network-​based behaviours are common, in part as a consequence of the less efficient markets, but arguably also due to social traditions, and they influence how firms interact with each other. • Risk and uncertainty are high due to high volatility of key economic, political, and institutional variables. Hence, businesses find it harder to predict parameters they need for strategic decisions, including, for example, business cycles, government actions, and the outcome of legal proceedings. (2013: 1323) To this, we would like to add the often (but not always) weak physical infrastructure and the weak skill and innovation bases available locally. On the other hand, some emerging markets are rich in natural resources ranging from agricultural produce to oil, gas, and minerals. Also, the institutional environment varies across emerging markets. While, most emerging markets rely on markets as primary coordination mechanisms, their business systems vary substantially especially with respect to the role of the state in business affairs through regulation, industrial policy, and equity ownership (Witt & Redding, 2014; also see Chapter 34). Understanding these contextual features is essential both for businesses crossing borders into and out of emerging markets and for scholars theoretically or empirically investigating management phenomena in emerging markets. This Handbook provides an overview of managerial challenges in emerging markets for both local and foreign-​invested companies, and it offers the latest scholarly insights on how businesses can succeed in these contexts. Our aim is to identify key elements of the business environment and to analyze competitive strategies and business practices. The Handbook contributors offer a wide range of theoretical and conceptual approaches to analyzing the opportunities and challenges that businesses face in emerging markets. This chapter (1)  introduces key concepts and trends. First, we discuss the sometimes confusing plethora of terms used to designate emerging markets, or to describe subgroupings. Then, we provide some data regarding the importance of emerging markets within the global economy. Finally we briefly introduce each of the chapters of this Handbook, highlighting key ideas and themes that the authors develop. In Chapter 2, we outline conceptual frameworks that run across the contributions in this Handbook, namely, the evolving global value chains and the tenuous balance between global theories and practices and indigenous ones for explaining management in emerging markets.

What Are Emerging Markets? Management scholars are often pragmatic in defining the scope of emerging markets, essentially including all economies that are not considered “advanced” (Grosse, 2015;

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    5 Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Xu & Meyer, 2013; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).1 Some economies achieved advanced status in the 1990s, notably Israel, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea in this book). Others have been reclassified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank more recently, for instance, Central and East European countries. The latter held “emerging” status until recently, and studies on those countries continue to be an important source of knowledge relevant to emerging markets. Therefore, we include them as emerging markets in this Handbook. This perspective ensures broad scoping for relevant insights, though contributors may adapt the scope of their analysis as appropriate for the topic of their chapter. A number of alternative terminologies have been used to refer to the countries covered in this Handbook. The term “emerging markets” was coined in 1981 by an economist at the International Finance Corporation, Antoine van Agtmael (Van Agtmael 1984; Wharton 2008), who was seeking an attractive label for an investment fund that would invest in a portfolio of minority stakes in companies in what was hitherto known as the Third World. The term quickly became popular among financial market analysts (e.g., Errunza, 1983; Harvey 1995) and was later adopted by management scholars studying business organizations operating in these economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The term “emerging economies” is mostly used synonymously with emerging markets (see, e.g., Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer 2013); its advantage is that it indicates that these economies play a variety of different roles for businesses, for example, as production bases within global value chains, or as home bases for emerging market MNEs (multinational enterprises). Management scholars have primarily focused on the economically most dynamic of the emerging markets, especially on China. These are mostly middle-​ income economies—​neither rich nor poor—​with actual or potential economic catch-​up and an imperfect but improving institutional framework for business (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2000; Xu & Meyer, 2013). On the other hand, management scholars have not paid much attention to low-​income economies.2 An older terminology distinguishes “industrialized economies” from “developing economies.” This terminology was popular in the discourse on economic development in the 1960s (e.g., Akamatsu, 1962; Baer & Hervé, 1966; Vernon, 1979) when industrialization was seen as essential to raise per capita incomes. However, the traditionally industrialized economies have moved to service industries while some emerging markets, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, have seen a high degree of industrialization but are lagging the advanced economies in economic prosperity. Second, many people in emerging markets find the term “developing” somewhat patronizing as they have their own rich history and culture that they perceive to be belittled by this terminology. Other terms largely rejected by the countries concerned are “underdeveloped economies” (e.g., Singer, 1949) and “third world” which refer to countries that are neither early-​industrialized economies nor the “second world” of the former socialist bloc

6    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse led by the Soviet Union (Turner, 1974; Worsley, 1964). We advise against continued usage of these terms.

Classifications Multilateral organizations each employ their own classification of countries, varying with the purpose of the organization (Table 1.1). The World Bank classifies countries in four categories based on the per capita income as low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and high income. The thresholds are continuously adjusted; in 2016 they were: over $1025 = lower middle income; over $4035 = upper middle income; over $12,475 = high income economies. The IMF uses a similar classification but adjusts it, for example, for members of the eurozone which are considered advanced. The UN categorizes countries in three categories: developed, developing, and transition. Apart from countries that joined the EU and thence are classified as “developed,” this classification has not been updated to reflect the economic evolution of the past 25 years.3 The member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-​ operation and Development (OECD) are generally considered advanced economies, and some studies define emerging markets as non-​OECD-​member countries. However, in recent years the boundary has blurred as Chile, the Czech Republic, Korea, and others have joined the OECD (Table 1.1, column 5). In fact, Turkey has been member of the OECD since 1961, and Mexico joined with the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, even though both are still upper-​middle-​income economies. For the purposes of this Handbook, we adopt the operationalization of the IMF. However, we believe that the intellectual discourse on management challenges in emerging markets can greatly benefit from insights gained in countries that recently “graduated” from emerging to advanced. Therefore, for this Handbook, we use the status of a country in the IMF classification in the year 2000 as baseline (see Table 1.1). In other words, we consider Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Israel, Taiwan, Spain, Portugal, and Greece advanced economies. Financial investment professionals and scholars of financial markets tend to use a definition of emerging markets that starts from the perspective of internationally operating financial investors who invest some of their assets abroad to enhance their risk diversification. For them, critical criteria include the ability of foreign investors to buy and sell financial instruments in the country. The MSCI index developed by Morgan Stanley Capital International has become most popular in the finance community (e.g., Harvey, 1995), and is also used by some management scholars (e.g., Kalasin, Dussage, & Rivera-​Santos, 2014). To be included in the MSCI emerging markets index, a country needs to have a high degree of free movement of capital and stock market liberalization. Countries not meeting these criteria or lacking depth of financial markets due to their small size may be considered “frontier markets” (Table 1.2).

Table 1.1 Classification of selected countries by different organizations GDP per capita in 20161

Country

IMF classified as advanced since3

United Nations4

OECD member since

Countries not normally considered “emerging” Singapore

52,960.7

1997

Developing

Not member

Hong Kong, China

43,681.1

1997

Developing

Not member

Korea (Republic of)

37.538.8

1997

Developing

1996

Israel

37.292.6

1997

Developing

2010

Taiwan, China

n.a.

1997

Developing

Not member

Spain

26,528.5

From the outset

Developed

1961

Portugal

19,813.3

From the outset

Developed

1961

Greece

18,104.0

From the outset

Developed

1961

High-​income

economies2

considered “emerging” by other criteria

United Arab Emirates

37,622.2

Emerging

Developing

Not member

Bahamas

23,124.4

Emerging

Developing

Not member

Bahrain

22,354.2

Emerging

Developing

Not member

Slovenia

21,304.6

2007

Developed

2010

Saudi Arabia

20,028.6

Emerging

Developing

Not member

Czech Republic

18,266.5

2009

Developed

1995

Estonia

17,574.7

2011

Developed

2010

Slovakia

16,496.0

2009

Developed

2000

Lithuania

14,879.7

2015

Developed

Not member

Latvia

14,118.1

2014

Developed

2016

Chile

13,792.9

Emerging

Developing

2010

Hungary

12,664.8

Emerging

Developed

1996

Upper middle income economies (2) Poland

12,273.4

Emerging

Developed

1996

Croatia

12,090.7

Emerging

Developed

Not member

Turkey

10,787.6

Emerging

Developing

1961

Romania

9474.1

Emerging

Developed

Not member

Russia

8748.4

Emerging

Transition

Not member

Mexico

8201.3

Emerging

Developing

1994

China, P.R.

8123.2

Emerging

Developing

Not member

Bulgaria

7350.8

Emerging

Developed

Not member

Notes: 1 

Per capita income in current US$ at market exchange rates;

2 

World Bank thresholds in 2016: > $ 1025 = lower middle income; > $4035 = upper middle income; > $12475 = high income; 3 

IMF classifies eurozone member countries as advanced but not necessarily other EU countries;

4 

United Nations defines all EU member countries as developed independent of income level.

Sources: World Bank, 2017a; IMF, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016; United Nations, 2017; OECD, n.d.

8    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse Table 1.2 Financial markets as classified by MSCI European Union

Other Europe, CIS

Middle East and Africa

Index

Americas

MSCI World Index (developed markets)

Canada, USA Austria, Belgium Norway Denmark, Switzerland Finland France, Germany Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

Israel

Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore

MSCI Emerging Markets Index

Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru

Czech Republic, Russia Greece, Hungary, Poland

Egypt, Pakistan,1 Qatar, South Africa, Turkey, United Arab Emirates

China,2 India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand

MSCI Frontier Markers

Argentina

Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia

Bahrain, Jordan, Bangladesh, Sri Kenya, Kuwait, Lanka, Vietnam Lebanon, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Tunisia, WAEMU3

Kazakhstan, Serbia

Asia Pacific

Notes: 1   Pakistan is included since June 2017; 2

  China is to be in the Emerging Markets Index from June 2018 onward;

3

  West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Source: MSCI, 2017.

The MSCI classification is somewhat different than the classifications used by the multilateral organizations. For example, Korea and Taiwan are still considered emerging markets although they fall in the high-​income category of the World Bank and the IMF. Also, OECD member countries Chile, Czech Republic, Greece, Mexico, and Poland are considered emerging markets. China was admitted to the emerging markets index only effective June 2018 following long-​running negotiations with the free flow of capital being a sticky point; the ability of foreign investors to invest in domestic stock markets in China is still restricted. EU member countries are found in all three categories, with Croatia, Slovenia, and Romania considered frontier markets and Bulgaria and Latvia not covered at all. Also, the relatively rich gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman are considered

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    9 frontier markets. For financial analysts to cover a market meaningfully, the market needs to have a substantive number of assets traded, which results in small rich countries appearing in the frontier index alongside large lower-​middle-​income economies.

Dynamics of Emergence of Economies The inconsistency of the classifications points to an important conceptual issue:  no black and white distinction exists between advanced and emerging economies. Rather, the differences are a matter of degree—​and the critical challenge is not to decide which country should be labeled emerging but to develop suitable scales for the degree of development. What then are appropriate indicators of the “emergence” of economies? A  variety of different indicators have been proposed (Table 1.3). The above discussed categorization used by the IMF and the World Bank implies a priority of economic development with (average) per capita income as a key indicator. A broader perspective is taken by the Human Development Index (HDI) published annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016), which focuses on the quality of life. It aggregates three indicators considered drivers of peoples’ development: life expectancy, education, and per capita income. Many management scholars focus on the prevalence of “institutional voids,” defined as imperfections in the institutional framework that cause markets to operate ineffectively, as defining criterion of economic advancement (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Meyer & Peng 2005). Related definitions focus on property rights in the sense of protection against expropriation by the government or the elites of the country (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005) or on institutions enabling private contracting, such as the effectiveness and independence of the court system (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985). These constructs of institutions are commonly proxied by selecting sub-​indices from a range of popular indices, such as the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) (World

Table 1.3 Example indicators of emergence Economic

Institutions

Resource Endowments

• GDP per capita • GDP growth rate • Human Development Index (HDI)

• Global competitiveness index (GCI), • World Governance indicators (WG), • Economic Freedom Index (EF), • Polity IV indices of democracy • Transparency Index (TI)

• Sub-​indices within the GCI, e.g. technology readiness • Secondary/​tertiary school enrollment • R&D expenditures • Rail/​road network • Broadband network

10    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse Economic Forum, 2016), the World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2017b), the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2017), Polity IV for the quality of government (Center for Systemic Peace, 2017), or the Corruption Perception Index capturing the absence of corruption (Transparency International, 2016). These indices reflect a wide variety of different operationalizations of the idea of institutional development. Economic theory, moreover, suggests that resource endowments are critical for the prosperity. Many emerging markets are rich in natural resources. Yet, to assess economic prosperity it is more useful to focus on created assets, which include both human capital in various forms and man-​made physical assets such as transportation infrastructure and digital networks (Narula & Dunning, 2000; Estrin, Meyer, & Pelletier, 2018). In a similar spirit, Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, and Peng (2013) suggest using two indicators to classify countries: institutional development and infrastructure development. Within the GCI, sub-​indices such as innovation and technology readiness capture aspects of created assets.

Taxonomies of Emerging Markets A number of studies have developed taxonomies of emerging markets that create meaningful subgroupings. A  common starting point is the assertion that the varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and business systems (Whitley, 1999) literatures that market economies vary in the ways in which economic activity is coordinated, with economies varying in their inherent logic. The original work on advanced economies distinguished coordinated market economies and liberal market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Recent extensions of this work have derived taxonomies of emerging markets from the analysis of multiple economic, social and institutional indicators (Amable, 2004; Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009; Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018; Witt & Redding, 2014). For example, Witt, Kabbach de Castro, Amaeshi, Mahroum, Bohle, and Saez (2017), in addition to liberal market economies and coordinated market economies, distinguish socialist economies, emerging economies, Arab oil-​based economies, advanced city economies, advanced emerging economies, and European peripheral economies. Fainshmidt et  al. (2018) distinguish emerging economies as state-​led, family-​led, emergent liberal market economies, collaborative agglomerations, fragmented with weak state, centralized tribe, and hierarchically coordinated. Popular discussions of emerging markets tend to use conceptually easier groups that focus on the size or on the geography of the countries (Table 1.4). For example, the term “Asian Newly Industrialized Economies” (also known as Asian NIEs or Asian Tigers) comprise four economies in East Asia that distinguished themselves in terms of economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, and, arguably, graduated from developing to

Table 1.4 Popular country taxonomies Name

definition

Usage

Origin (if known)

Asian NIEs

Newly industrialized economies in East Asia: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore

Common term in the 1980 and 1990s when these four economies stood out in economic performance

1970s, original source unknown

(East) Asian Tigers

Same as Asian NIEs

Journalistic term for Asian NIEs

1970s

BRICs

Brazil, Russia, India, and China

The four largest emerging markets by GDP; sometimes extended to include South Africa as “BRICS”

Attributed to Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill, who used it in 2001

MINT

Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey

Next four largest emerging Attributed to markets; apart from size, Goldman Sachs they have no commonalities economist Jim O’Neill who used it in 2013

CIVETS

Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa

Emerging markets outside the BRICs believed to be promising because they have reasonably sophisticated financial systems, controlled inflation, and soaring young populations

Robert Ward of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) used it in 2009.

Transition economies

Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, China, and Mongolia

Historically planned economies that embarked on transition toward a market economy in the 1990s

World Bank, e.g., 1996

Bottom billion

58 poor countries

Poor countries with 1 billion Paul Collier, 2007 people

Least developed countries

49 poorest countries

Countries with the lowest per capita income

United Nations

Triad

Originally North America, Historically industrialized Western Europe and economies Japan; recent uses include less clearly defined North America, Western Europe, and Asia-​Pacific advanced economies

Kenichi Ohmae, 1985

12    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse advanced economies in the 1990s: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The term “Asian NIEs” is often associated with the “flying geese” model of Asian economic development, which posits that development is trickling down from the more advanced Asian economies to the less advanced ones with the help of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Akamatsu, 1962; Kojima, 1973). BRIC is an abbreviation for the four largest emerging markets by GDP—​Brazil, Russia, India, and China—​coined by Jim O’Neill around 2000. The term is sometimes extended to include South Africa in “BRICS” (with capital S). This grouping reflects the size of the economies and their importance to financial investors rather than any structural similarities among the four or five countries (see Chapters 28 to 31). In fact, only China continued its fast economic growth in the 2010s. Since the political leaders from the BRICS countries have started holding political summits, the term has also attained political significance. At times when some of the BRIC countries are showing sluggish economic growth, investors may seek further investment opportunities. Further acronyms thus have become popular for other relatively large emerging markets, notably MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) for the next largest emerging markets and CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa) for the six countries predicted to experience substantive economic growth. The term “transition economies” evolved in the policy discussions after the fall of the Berlin Wall when economists associated with the World Bank, the IMF, and other think tanks were debating economic reform in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, China, and Mongolia. The underlying assumption was that these economies would “transition” from a central plan-​led economy to a market economy resembling Western advanced economies (e.g., Meyer & Peng, 2005; World Bank, 1996). Not all countries have joined the economic growth of the past two decades, some countries find it hard to catch up, be it due to economic hardship or incompetent political leadership. Paul Collier (2007) coined the term “bottom billion” for the people in 58 countries that he argues are failing their citizens. More formally, the United Nations classifies 49 countries, the majority of which are in Africa, as least developed countries using per capita income as the criterion (United Nations, 2017). These countries have rarely attracted attention from management scholars. On the other end of the global income scale, we refer to the countries not considered emerging markets as advanced economies or high-​income leaders. Another commonly used label is “Triad countries,” which is unfortunate, because the original construct by Kenichi Ohmae (1985) included just the USA and Canada in North America, the European Community, and Japan. Recently, the term has been used to talk about the rich, post-​industrial countries of North America (sometimes including Mexico), Europe (EU plus Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland), and Asia-​Pacific (Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand).

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    13

Emerging Markets in the Twenty-​First Century Numerous indicators show that emerging markets have gained in importance in the global economy over the past three decades.

Economic Catch-​up Trends Figure 1.1 shows the share of emerging markets in global economic activity using a variety of indicators. For example, they account for 84% of the world’s population, 49% of all cars are manufactured in emerging markets, and 48% of world exports of goods originate from emerging markets. Among emerging markets, China accounts for the largest share by most indicators, but other countries such as India, Brazil, and Russia are important by some measures. On the other hand, emerging markets account for only 21% of world stock market capitalization and 22% of world outward FDI stock. The share of emerging markets has increased substantially over the past 25 years. For example, in 1990, they contributed 16% of global GDP, compared to 36% in 2015. In 1990, they attracted 17% of global FDI inflows compared to 45% in 2015; and they accounted for 7% of FDI outflows, compared to 28% in 2015. The rapid catch-​up of emerging markets over the past decades is also evident in the macroeconomic data presented in Table 1.5 and the analysis of the economic data by John Luiz in Chapter 4.

Market Capitalization GDP Exports of Services Exports of Goods FDI inward (flow) FDI inward (stock) FDI outward (flow) FDI outward (stock) Car production Population 0%

10%

20%

30%

Brazil

40%

50%

Russia

60% India

Other emerging markets

70%

80%

90%

100%

China Developed

Figure 1.1  Emerging markets as share of the global economy, 2015 Data sources: Online databases of World Bank, WTO, UNCTAD, and OECD.

2010

2005

2000

2,143.1

7.5

11,104

Growth Rate

GDP/​capita

11,095

GDP/​capita

GDP

3.2

Growth Rate

7,906

GDP/​capita

882.2

4.3

GDP

644.7

Growth Rate

7,714

GDP/​capita

GDP

4.4

Growth Rate

7,175

GDP/​capita

785.6

−4.3

Growth Rate

GDP

461.95

GDP

1990

1995

Brazil

Year

Country

7,156

10.4

5,930.5

4,843

11.3

2,256.9

2,667

7.6

1,198.5

1,849

10.9

734.6

1,101

3.8

360.9

China

3,374

10.3

1,708.5

2,898

9.3

834.2

1,741

3.8

476.6

1,417

7.6

366.6

1,217

5.5

326.6

India

4,259

6.2

709.2

5,101

5.7

285.9

2,679

4.9

165.0

2,785

8.4

202.1

2,073

9

106.1

Indonesia

13,627

5.1

1,051.6

14,643

3.0

866.3

11,406

5.3

683.6

9,524

−6.2

343.8

9,785

5.1

262.7

Mexico

19,647

4.5

1,524.9

18,589

6.4

764.0

8,613

10.0

259.7

7,851

−4.1

395.5

12,626

−3

516.8

Russia

10,181

3.1

365.2

11,328

5.3

247.1

7,641

4.2

132.9

7,490

3.1

155.5

7,975

−0.3

112

South Africa

46,936

2.5

14,958.3

47,744

3.4

13,095.4

39,545

4.1

10,289.7

33,874

2.5

7,664

31,899

1.9

5,980

United States

36,848

4.0

3,304.4

31,816

0.7

2,766.3

30,298

3.1

1,886.4

27,809

1.7

2,592

25,881

5.3

1,765

Germany

33,471

4.7

5,495.4

29,478

1.3

4,571.9

28,889

2.3

4,731.2

28,026

1.9

5,449

26,523

5.6

3,104

Japan

Table 1.5 GDP (market size), GDP/​capita, and GDP growth rate, selected countries and years (in billions of current $US and in annual percentage rates)

3.9

15,347

growth rate

gdp/​capita

8,677.8

GDP/​capita

2,447.2

−3.8

GDP

1,803.6

11,939

GDP/​capita

Growth Rate

1.0

Growth Rate

GDP

2,248.8

GDP

13,938

5.9

15,066.7

8,069.2

6.9

11,064.6

8,391

7.7

8,229.5

5,813

6.1

3,252.7

1,593.3

7.9

2,088.8

3,855

4.7

1,858.7

6,179

4.7

1,320.1

3,346.5

4.8

861.9

4,634

6.3

876.7

17,794

4.1

1,153.3

9,005.0

2.5

1,143.7

14,296

4.0

1,186.5

29,249

2.9

1,712.0

9,329.3

−2.8

1,365.8

21,565

3.4

2,017.5

12,720

3.4

353.4

5,718.2

1.3

314.5

10,620

2.5

382.3

55,175

2.2

22,063.0

56,115.7

2.6

18,036.6

48,828

2.8

16,244.6

Source: data obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://​data.worldbank.org/​indicator/​NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

*IMF forecasts of GDP for 2020 from World Economic Outlook 2017.

2020*

2015

2012

44,264

1.5

3,727.7

41,178.5

1.7

3,363.4

38,193

0.7

3,426.0

40,923

1.8

5,163.8

34,523.7

1.2

4,383.0

34,604

1.4

5,937.8

16    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse For people who grew up in the twentieth century, the share of emerging markets in the global economy may look surprisingly high. In the late 1970s, China’s share in global GDP was estimated to be about 2% compared to 15% in 2015 (see Figure 1.1). However, seen in a historical perspective, the numbers are not high at all. Historically, China and India accounted for about half of the global economy. Historians estimate that at the end of the eighteenth century, China accounted for 25% to 30% of the global economy (Maddison, 2006). Yet, with the industrial revolution that started in England in the eighteenth century and then spread to continental Europe and to North America in the nineteenth century, the “Western” societies became the “advanced economies” of the twentieth century. Yet, this distinctive advantage is rapidly diminishing in the twenty-​first century as the capital and knowledge base of the rest of the world is strengthening, and institutional obstacles to economic prosperity are removed.

Markets for Goods and Services While the importance of emerging markets is evident for the 84% of the world population living in these countries, there are also compelling reasons why business leaders and management scholars in advanced economies should be concerned with the latest development in emerging markets. First and foremost, the size and rapid economic growth has made emerging markets attractive for goods and services from around the world. In the 2010s, China, India, and Brazil are among the ten largest national markets based on GDP, and Russia and Mexico are not far behind. Consumer demand is expected to grow faster than in advanced economies, not only because the economies are on a catch-​up growth path, but because the average age of consumers in emerging markets is far below that of consumers in the USA, EU, and Japan. They will be around longer, and they are reproducing at a faster rate. So, a range of factors is pushing emerging markets as the source of future growth in the world economy. Consumers in emerging markets are explored further in Chapter 9 by Raquel Castaño and David Flores, while Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam discuss consumers at the bottom of the pyramid in Chapter 10. As one example, which is not representative but which is enormous, consider China (see Chapter 31, by Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan). This country of 1.4 billion people has moved more than 500 million people out of poverty during the past 30 years, according to World Bank estimates.4 This growth has made China the largest market in the world for many products, from cars to chemicals. Within the next few years it is predicted to become the world’s largest economy. China thus is important for international companies, be it as a market for their goods and/​or as base for their production. India presents a second major case of emerging market opportunity. With a population of 1.3 billion people that is growing at a rate of about 1.3% per year, India will pass China in population by about 2025. Despite a similar population size, India’s economy is much smaller than China’s, and per capita income in 2016 was US$1709 per person versus China’s US$8123. Even so, the size of India’s economy is very large, and it presents

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    17 an opportunity for international firms too big to be ignored. And, because of the low per capita incomes, India offers a production environment that will have lower labor costs than China and lower than those of any Triad country for decades to come.

Sources for Raw Materials and Labor-​Intensive Manufacturing Throughout the twentieth century, emerging markets were seen by business as sources of raw materials and locations for the assembly of manufactured goods for sale in the Triad countries. Table 1.6 shows the countries that have the greatest output in several major categories of commodities. Emerging markets dominate the production of many (and probably most) commodities in the early twenty-​first century. Commodity-​ based companies feature prominently among the largest companies in many emerging markets. It is also fascinating to note that China is one of the largest producers of every one of these commodities, while at the same time being a major importer. Even in manufacturing, emerging markets are taking an ever-​greater share of world markets, due to both growing local markets and export to Triad markets. Table 1.7 presents the top six exporting nations for a range of manufactured goods, including both high-​and low-​tech ones. Emerging markets dominate low-​skill/​labor-​intensive sectors and also made substantial inroads in more sophisticated sectors. China has been the world’s largest manufacturing nation since 2010. For example, China became the largest manufacturer of cars with 28.1 million units in 2015. Yet, these are primarily produced for domestic markets; China is not (yet) a major car exporter.

Table 1.6 Natural resource production by commodity, 2015 Rank

Crude oil

Coal

Iron ore

Copper

Wheat

Corn

Cattle

Cotton

1

Russia

China

China

Chile

EU

USA

India

India

2

Saudi Arabia

USA

Australia

China

China

China

China

China

3

USA

India

Brazil

Peru

India

Brazil

Brazil

USA

4

China

Indonesia India

Australia

Russia

EU

USA

Pakistan

5

Iraq

Australia

Russia

Russia

USA

Argentina EU

6

Canada

Russia

Ukraine

USA

Canada

Ukraine

Brazil

Argentina Australia

Note: Emerging markets in bold. Sources: Crude oil and coal: www.indexmundi.com/​energy/​; iron core and copper: www.indexmundi.com /​minerals/​; wheat, corn, cattle, and cotton: www.indexmundi.com/​agriculture/​. All accessed August 14, 2017.

18    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse Table 1.7 Manufacturing exporters by sector, 2016 Rank

Cars

Cell phones

T-​shirts

Leather shoes

Computers

Air conditioners

1

Germany

China

China

China

China

China

2

Japan

Vietnam

Bangladesh

Italy

USA

Thailand

3

USA

Hong Kong

Turkey

Vietnam

Mexico

Mexico

4

Canada

Netherlands

India

Germany

Netherlands

USA

5

UK

USA

Germany

Indonesia

Hong Kong

Czech Republic

6

Korea

Korea

Vietnam

India

Germany

Germany

Note: Emerging markets in bold. Sources: Cars: www.worldstopexports.com/​car-​exports-​country/​; cell phones: www .worlds topexports.com/​cellphone-​exports-​by-​country/​; t-​shirts: www.worldstopexports.com/​t-​shirt -​exports-​by-​country/​; leather shoes: www.worldstopexports.com/​leather-​shoes-​exports-​country/​; computers: www.worldstopexports.com/​computer-​device-​exports-​country/​, air conditioners: www .worldstopexports.com/​air-​conditioners-​exports-​country/​. All accessed August 14, 2017.

Many opportunities for manufacturing in emerging markets, however, arise from the fine slicing of global value chains where different stages of the production are conducted in different geographies dependent on their comparative advantages (also see Chapter 2). Thus, many manufacturing operations in emerging markets concern components assembled into other products at other locations, which are not captured by statistics of major product categories such as those in Table 1.7.

Markets for Services Emerging markets have also been catching up in international markets for services, both as buyers and as suppliers. For example, India has been leading the global business process outsourcing center, providing services ranging from information technology to call centers and administrative tasks. Others export business services such as software development or personal services such as medical services. In tourism, emerging markets have emerged as a popular destination; they also have become major sources of tourists themselves. As tourism destinations, emerging markets still remain generally behind the USA and Western Europe, although China is currently by far the largest single tourism market in the world, while countries like Turkey earn a substantive share of their export revenues through inbound tourism. Although people living in emerging markets are joining global travels, many emerging markets have a deficit on their tourism account (i.e., their nationals spend more abroad than foreigners bring to their country). Table 1.8 provides international tourism industry-​related data for BRICS and MINT countries, along with selected

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    19 Table 1.8 Inbound and outbound tourism from emerging markets, 2015

Country

Inbound tourism expenditures (bn US$) (service exports)

Outbound tourism expenditures (bn US$) (service imports)

International tourist International arrivals (million tourist departures people) (million people)

Brazil

6.3

20.4

6.3

9.5

Russia

13.2

38.4

33.7

34.6

India

21.5

17.7

13.3

20.4

China

114.1

292.2

56.9

116.9

South Africa

9.1

5.7

8.9

n.a.

Mexico

18.7

12.7

32.1

19.6

Indonesia

12.1

17.7

10.4

8.2

0.5

9.2

1.3

n.a.

Nigeria Turkey

35.4

5.7

39.5

8.8

246.2

148.4

77.5

73.5

Germany

47.4

88.8

35.0

83.7

Japan

27.3

23.2

19.7

16.2

USA

Source: World Bank (2017), table 6.14.

Triad countries for comparison. The Chinese have become the largest group of tourists with 116.9 million trips abroad, spending US$292.2 billion. Yet, this represents less than one trip per ten inhabitants, and the growth potential remains substantial—​ in Germany the number of tourism departures (83.7  million) exceeds the number of inhabitants (82.7 million), so on average every resident took more than one trip abroad.

Investment Opportunities Portfolio investors have been fascinated by the opportunities of emerging markets since the 1980s. Following capital account liberalization, stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments have become attractive investment opportunities that often offer high rates of return. The trends had been led by markets such as Hong Kong and Singapore that nowadays are no longer considered emerging markets. Recently more markets have been accessible for international investors (See Table 1.2), including to some extent China, which has gradually created opportunities for foreigners to invest in local stocks and other financial instruments. However, due to economic volatility, emerging market currencies often fluctuate wildly, making returns more volatile than in the Triad countries. Even so, financial investment in these countries creates substantial diversification benefits for investors.

20    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse Thus, Vihang Errunza and co-​authors (Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs, & Langlois, 2012; Errunza, 1983; Errunza, Hogan, & Hung, 1999) have found on repeated occasions that the returns from portfolio investment that include emerging market securities have improved overall portfolio performance very significantly relative to investment only in advanced economy securities. Chapter 7 by Hrnjic, Reeb, and Yeung further explores the financial markets of emerging markets.

New Competitors With the growth of emerging markets, firms from these economies have become major players in the global economy. Thus, over the past decade, emerging markets not only attract FDI worldwide but have become the source of MNEs that undertake major investment overseas. Thus, in 2016, 28% of global FDI capital was invested by firms from emerging economies. The rise of emerging economy firms is also reflected on the growing number of Fortune Global 500 companies originating from emerging markets. In 2017, China alone had more than 100 companies on the list (and 17 in the Top 100, see Table 1.9), many of which focus on the vast and fast-​growing domestic market and are not well known outside China. Beijing has become the city with the largest number of headquarters of Fortune 500 companies, including 12 in the Top 100 (Table 1.9). These data illustrate not only the important role Chinese companies play in the global economy, but also the vast domestic market that in many industries—​including utilities, energy and banking—​is dominated by local firms. Far fewer companies from other emerging markets make into the Fortune Global 500; Table 1.10 provides the largest 20. The largest companies from other emerging markets are typically oil and gas companies, including Russia’s Gazprom (rank 63), Lukoil (rank 102)  and Rosneft (rank 158), Brazil’s Petrobras (rank 75), Mexico’s Pemex (rank 98), India’s Indian Oil (rank 161), Malaysia’s Petronas (rank 184), and Indonesia’s Pertamina (rank 289). The largest non-​oil businesses from an emerging market other than China are three Brazilian banks: Itau Unibanco, Banco do Brazil, and Banco Bradesco (ranks 113, 151, and 154). Chapter 27 by Lin Cui and Preet Aulakh and Chapter 28 by Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro further analyze these firms.

Sources of Innovation and Technology Emerging markets are not usually thought of as hotbeds of innovation or R&D. Traditionally, one of the major competitive disadvantages of most emerging markets is their relatively poor performance in innovation, as measured by indicators such as patents registered with the US Patent and Trademark Office, R&D spending as a percentage of national income, and numbers of scientific articles published by scholars in these countries. However, R&D spending has grown importantly in a number of emerging markets, and indeed China is already number 2 worldwide in R&D spending after the United States. Chinese companies registered more patents than anyone else

Table 1.9 Top 20 Chinese companies

Company name

Headquarters Industry

Annual sales 2016 (bn USD)

2

State Grid

Beijing

Utilities

315.2

926067

State: 100%

2

3

Sinopec Group

Beijing

Oil & gas

267.5

713288

State: 70.86%

3

4

China National Petroleum (PetroChina)

Beijing

Oil & gas

262.5

1512048

State: 86.01%

4

22

Industrial Beijing Commerce Bank of China (ICBC)

Bank

147.6

461749

State: 69.31%

5

27

China State Construction Engineering

Beijing

Construction 144.5

263915

State: 100%

6

22

China Construction Bank

Beijing

Bank

135.0

362482

State:57.11%

7

38

Agricultural Bank of China

Beijing

Bank

133.4

501368

State:79.24%

8

39

Ping an insurance

Shenzhen

Insurance

116.5

318588

CP Group

Rank

Rank in Fortune

1

Main shareholder Employees (if known)

9

41

SAIC Motor

Shanghai

Cars

113.8

97582

State: 100%

10

42

Bank of China

Beijing

Bank

113.7

308900

State:64.02%

11

47

China Mobile Beijing Communications

Telephone services

107.1

463712

State: 72.72%

12

51

China Life Insurance

Beijing

Insurance

104.8

143676

State: 68.37%

13

55

China Railway Engineering

Beijing

Construction 96.9

292215

State: 54.39%

14

68

Dongfeng Motor Wuhan

Cars

86.1

189795

State: 100%

15

83

Huawei

Shenzhen

Electronics

78.5

180000

Private

16

89

Pacific Construction

Nanjing

Construction 74.6

362128

Private

17

100

China Southern Power Grid

Guangzhou

Utilities

71.2

302421

State: 100%

18

101

China South Industries

Beijing

Aerospace & 71.1 Defence

232817

State: 100%

19

103

China Beijing Communications Construction

Construction 70.7

152666

State: 100%

20

114

People’s Insurance Co of China

Insurance

172,213

State: 100%

Beijing

64.6

Note: Column 2 shows rank in the Fortune Global 500. Sources: Companies from Fortune Global 500 list 2016, http://​fortune.com/​global500/​list, (accessed August 16, 2017); data on ownership from Bloomberg terminal database (accessed July 2017).

Table 1.10 Top 20 non-​China emerging market companies

Company name Headquarters Industry

Annual sales 2016 (bn USD)

Main shareholder Employees (if known)

63

Gazprom

Oil & gas

91.3

476,400

State: 50.23%

2

75

Petrobras Brazil

Oil & gas

81.4

68829

State: 64.00%

3

102

Lukoil

Oil & gas

70.8

105500

State: 92.15%

4

113

Itaú Brazil Unibanco Holding

Bank

66.8

94779

IUPAR 51%, Itausa 38.66%

5

151

Banco do Brazil

Brazil

Bank

58.0

100622

State:50.73%%

6

152

Pemex

Mexico

Oil & gas

57.7

125689

State: 100%

7

154

Banco Bradesco

Brazil

Bank

57.4

94541

Cidade de Deus Participacoes: 48.5%

8

158

Rosneft Oil

Russia

Oil & gas

56.5

295800

State: 50.00%

9

161

Indian Oil India

Oil & gas

53.5

34999

State: 58.3%

9

176

America Movil

Mexico

Telecommunications 52.2

194193

Private: Carlos Slim family

10

184

Petronas

Malaysia

Oil & gas

49.4

510346

State: 64.4%

11

191

JBS

Brazil

Food processing

48.8

237061

Private: Batista family 44.4%

12

192

PTT

Thailand

Oil & gas

59.2

24,790

State: 51.1%

13

203

Reliance India Industries

Oil & gas

46.9

140483

Private

14

217

State Bank of India

India

Bank

44.3

278872

State

15

232

SBER Bank

Russia

Bank

42.1

325075

State: 52.3%

16

247

Tata Motors

India

Cars

40.3

79558

Private: Tata family 34.6%

17

289

Pertamina Indonesia

Oil & gas

36.4

27227

State: 100%

18

295

Rajesh Exports

India

Trading

36.1

328

Private

19

299

SABIC

Saudi Arabia

Chemicals

35.4

35,000

State

20

360

Bharat India Petroleum

Oil & gas

30.3

13395

State: 54.9%

Rank 1

Rank in Fortune

Russia Russia

Note: Consistent with the definition of emerging markets adopted in this Handbook, companies from Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are not included; column 2 shows rank in the Fortune Global 500; ownership data refer to the holding company of the group; some groups may have subsidiary companies that are listed on stock markets (notably Chinese companies).

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    23 (World Bank, 2017a), even though this patenting activity is concentrated among a small number of companies (Eberhardt, Helmers, & Yu, 2017). Even so, the bulk of R&D does remain in the rich countries, and this activity does not show signs of shifting to emerging markets nearly as dramatically as manufacturing has done. Innovation in emerging markets has traditionally focused on the local adaptation of products from advanced economies:  local firms might reverse-​engineer products of their foreign competitors, while foreign investors would simplify their products to meet local demand. Beyond adaptation, local firms developed products meeting local needs at locally affordable prices in a process known as frugal innovation. With these locally designed products, local entrepreneurs can challenge global players in “good enough” markets, the fastest-​growing market segment in many emerging markets. Some foreign investors responded by providing their local subsidiaries high degrees of autonomy to develop products for this segment to preempt the emergence of local competitors (Chang & Park, 2012; Zeschky, Widenmayer, & Gassmann, 2011). Innovations in emerging markets do not stay local; some spread from one emerging market to other emerging markets, where people have similar needs. Others take ideas from emerging markets back to advanced economies in a phenomenon known as reverse innovation (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011). George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham discuss the changing global landscape of innovation in Chapter 15. Many innovations originating in emerging markets concern business models or product offerings rather than new technologies, which tend to be the primary focus in innovation discourses in advanced economies. Indeed, business model innovation has been the driving force in the recent growth of the Internet businesses such as Alibaba and Tencent in China, which have moved beyond transferring ideas from Silicon Valley to creating new forms of O2O (online-​to-​offline) business models and offer services (e.g., in terms of delivery speed) not available in North America. Others develop new consumer-​oriented fintech-​based services or business logistics solutions, such as Aramex from the United Arab Emirates, a global package delivery service that operates through a network of partners around the world to provide service far from its own network in the Middle East. Arguably, new forms of leading diverse business groups, such as Tata Group from India and Grupo Carso in Mexico represent innovative approaches to managing in volatile environments (Colpan, Hikino, & Lincoln, 2010; see also Chapter 22 by Chi-​Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo). Business model innovation thus likely is at the core of many success stories from emerging markets.

Structure of This Handbook This Handbook provides an overview of research on key managerial challenges and solutions for businesses operating in emerging markets. We have a diverse set of scholars who provide a comprehensive coverage and a variety of views. The invited authors

24    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse are experts on the respective themes and many are (or have been) based in emerging markets and know the challenges of managing in those contexts first-​hand.

Part I—​The Business Environment in Emerging Markets In Part I we offer conceptual perspectives. In Chapter 2, we as editors of this Handbook offer overall conceptual frameworks that tie the different topics together. The first theoretical theme concerns the relevance of existing theory to explaining business phenomena in emerging markets, and the need to integrate local insights. We argue for the need to both apply concepts developed in global management research, and integrate local insights through contextual moderators, boundary conditions, or even indigenous theorizing. The second theme concerns the role of emerging markets within changing global value chains and production networks. Chapter 3, by Geoffrey Jones of Harvard Business School takes a historical perspective on international business (IB) in emerging markets. He looks at the first era of globalization from about 1850 until World War I, and then at subsequent times through the mid-​2010s, tracing the activities of (largely Western) multinational firms in emerging markets. Looking at the second era of globalization after World War II, he presents a wide range of multinational company activities from market-​seeking investments in large and medium-​sized emerging markets to activities of emerging market-​based MNEs that have arisen in the more recent period. Chapter 4, by John M. Luiz of the University of Cape Town and Sussex University provides an overview of the economic environment of emerging markets from the period from the British-​led gold standard beginning in about 1850 to the contemporary period after the global financial crisis of 2008–​2009. He focuses on the challenges of the “middle-​income trap,” which is the barrier that seems to affect most countries as they attempt to move from low-​income or lower-​middle-​income to advanced levels of economic development as seen in the Triad. Many countries have moved away from extreme poverty in the twentieth century and early twenty-​first century, but few have joined the ranks of the post-​industrial economies—​with the very large exception of China. Luiz explores the reasons for the middle-​income trap and possible ways to overcome it, as well as warning managers to beware of an expectation that emerging markets will simply follow the USA and EU into advanced post-​industrial status. In Chapter 5, Tatiana Kostova (University of South Carolina) and Valentina Marano (Northeastern University) review the contribution of institutional theory to explaining management phenomena in emerging markets. They distinguish three distinct intellectual traditions developing theory around the notion of institutions, and identify their contributions to our understanding of emerging markets, focusing on the context of emerging markets, firm-​context interfaces, and the strategies and organizations of firm. In Chapter 6, Karl P. Sauvant, formerly of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) and now at Columbia University, explores the impact of the international investment regime on emerging markets. Bilateral and multilateral

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    25 agreements on free trade and investment protection have become popular in recent years, supplementing the global systems such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). These agreements shape how emerging markets develop their trade and investment relationships with other countries.

Part II—​Markets and Governance The chapters in Part II analyze a range of important issues in the structure and functioning of markets in emerging markets. These analyses range from financial markets to consumer behavior to a variety of governance issues, including government-​ business relations broadly and in the narrower context of corruption and also in the poorest segments of emerging markets (the bottom of the pyramid). Emir Hrnjic of the CIBFM Monetary Authority of Brunei Darussalam, along with David M. Reeb and Bernard Yeung of National University of Singapore, start in Chapter 7 by analyzing financial markets and governance of financial behavior of firms in emerging markets. They look specifically at the differences in financial market operation that occur as a consequence of the largest firms being either controlled either by families (who may sell shares in the stock market, but who maintain control) or by the government (state-​owned enterprises). This reality may lead to inefficient allocation of financial resources on both the investment side and the borrowing side. Chapter 8 by Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi reviews challenges for corporate governance in emerging markets in a comparative perspective. Based on a comprehensive review of the management literature on corporate governance (CG), they identify four major areas of research: ownership, boards of directors, top management teams, and CG practices and reform. They then review these CG features for each of the BRIC countries, using OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines as a benchmark. Integrating existing research and issues arising from the review of practice in the BRIC countries, they offer directions for future research. In Chapter 9, Raquel Castaño and David Flores of Monterrey Tec discuss consumer behavior in emerging markets. They propose a framework that identifies the main differences between emerging markets and developed markets consumers. The framework describes how consumers in these societies recognize a need and select, evaluate, buy, and use products. Having identified the key differences between the two groups of markets, they suggest some strategic directions for managers operating in both contexts. Chapter 10, by Krzysztof Dembek of the University of Melbourne and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam of Duquesne University, addresses the business opportunities at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP), the poorest section of society in many emerging markets. The authors take a mutual value perspective and explore how MNEs can create value through their business in social, economic, and environmental forms, simultaneously for themselves, local communities, and other parties. They highlight that value creation and retention within BoP communities is central to achieving long-​term advances in key issues such as poverty alleviation.

26    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse The relationships between government and MNEs in emerging markets are discussed by Farok J. Contractor of Rutgers University in Chapter 11. Liberalization policies that have removed barriers to foreign investment since the 1980s in many emerging markets and the regulatory environment shaped by host-​country governments continue to be major factors in attracting foreign investors. Contractor looks specifically at the relationship between economic opening around the world and flows of FDI, showing that countries that have liberalized their policies more have attracted more FDI since the fall of the Soviet Union. He also shows which policies tend to be associated with greater success in attracting FDI. In Chapter 12, the final chapter of the second part, Pei Sun of Fudan University in Shanghai reviews the recent literature on political ties and political capabilities in emerging markets. He highlights the multitude of ties between private and government actors, and how businesses can use such ties to their advantage, which also being subjected to institutional pressures through such ties to align themselves with policy agendas.

Part III—​Foreign MNEs in Emerging Markets The chapters in Part III focus on the challenges faced by foreign MNEs that operate in emerging markets. Their local operations are subject to the risks and challenges and opportunities that arise in the local context. From risk management to human resources management, this section looks at some of these issues. J.T.  Li of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and Zhenzhen Xie of Tsinghua University start in Chapter 13 by discussing the export strategies for MNEs operating in an emerging market. Specifically, they analyze subsidiaries of MNEs competing with local firms in China, and find that local Chinese manufacturing firms tend to increase their exports when faced with competition from foreign MNEs. Then the MNE subsidiaries either react by increasing their own export intensity, if they are relatively independent of their home office—​or they tend to do nothing if they act as local unit within a tightly controlled MNE that sets strategy more from the home office. In Chapter 14, Stephen J. Kobrin of the Wharton School analyzes management and policy challenges related to globally dispersed value chains extending into emerging markets. He focuses on the political economy challenge arising because governments are national while global value chains are both transnational and comprised of multiple company participants. He argue that the sovereignty and policy options of national governments are challenged by this organization of economic activity, and explores some of the implications of this reality. In Chapter 15, George S. Yip of Imperial College London and Shameen Prashantham of CEIBS discuss the changing landscape for innovation in emerging markets. They highlight the shift in the global geography of knowledge creation by documenting examples of innovations led by both foreign MNEs and local players in emerging markets. They conclude that innovation is no longer the prerogative of the historically

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    27 advanced economies alone, which has major implications for the paths of future development of both advanced and emerging economies. In Chapter 16, Florian Wettstein of the University St. Gallen discusses challenges arising in the interface between business and human rights in emerging markets. Approaching the topic from the perspective of business ethics, he traces the evolution of what is now called the “business and human rights debate” in the context of emerging markets and provides a comprehensive overview to this emerging discussion. This agenda poses particular challenges both for “Western” companies expanding their value chains to emerging markets as well as for emerging economy MNEs expanding into “Western” markets, in which they have to cope more demanding expectations from consumers, investors, and citizens with respect to social, environmental and human rights. In Chapter 17, Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Nigel Driffield, Meng Song, and Priit Vahter discuss the benefits that local firms in emerging markets may attract via spillovers from MNE investing in their country. They consider theoretical and conceptual explanations for the variations in technology transfer or spillovers between inward investors and host country firms under the contextual conditions of emerging markets. In Chapter 18, Donald Lessard of MIT discusses the challenges of risk management in emerging markets for both foreign MNEs and domestic firms, some of which are also MNEs. He explores the sources of risk for different types of firms and value chains operating in emerging markets, and he evaluates risk management practices available to foreign and domestic firms. He offers four perspectives on emerging market risks: identification of the relevant kinds of risks, who has comparative advantage in risk bearing, the pecking order of risk management tools available, and the integral nature of risk management in overall operational and strategic management.

Part IV—​Local Firms in and from Emerging Markets In Part IV, the focus shifts to local firms in emerging markets, and the challenges they face both in their local environment as well as in their efforts to grow beyond their home country. Chapter 19 by Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright explores challenges and opportunities for entrepreneurship in emerging markets with a focus on the interplay between institutions and entrepreneurship, starting from the observation that human capital is utilized differently in emerging markets and in advanced economies. This leads into a discussion of theoretical perspectives on entrepreneurship in emerging markets at the individual level, and the attraction of human capital in the form of returnee entrepreneurs. In Chapter 20, John Child of the University of Birmingham explores the challenges for small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs) in emerging markets with a focus on their innovation and internationalization strategies. He argues that innovation and internationalization tend to be mutually reinforcing, though the role they play in SME business models varies across countries and industries. The chapter is organized in

28    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse terms of four major analytical perspectives which inform studies of international business and international entrepreneurship:  (1) the contextual perspective (with special reference to institutions); (2) the resource-​based view; (3) the network perspective; and (4) the entrepreneurial perspective. In Chapter 21, Rodrigo Basco of American University of Sharjah discusses family business in emerging markets. He focuses on three dimensions of this subject: family dynamics and their relation to business and society; family ownership of a business; and business in the emerging market context. He looks at organizational, institutional, social, temporal, and spatial forces across contexts for studying family and business dimensions in emerging markets. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to explain how family firms contribute to regional economic development, and how they could be “optimized” through government policy and company strategy to pursue this end. In Chapter 22, Chi-​Nien Chung of National University of Singapore and Rose Xiaowei Luo of INSEAD explore the persistent leading role of business groups in many emerging markets. They provide an updated review of contemporary research on business groups by comparing and synopsizing different theoretical views on business groups. The chapter thus organizes the literature according to four theoretical perspectives rooted in economics and sociology: the internal market view, the resource bundle perspective, the network perspective, and the institutional logic perspective. In Chapter 23, Aldo Musacchio of Brandeis University, Felipe Monteiro of INSEAD, and Sergio G.  Lazzarini of Insper review the role of state-​owned enterprises from emerging markets in international competition. They examine the complex agency issues that state-​owned enterprises face, the advantages they get from government ownership, and how those factors affect their performance and internationalization patterns. They argue that in contrast to the old Soviet state-​owned firms, modern state-​owned MNEs are often publicly traded corporations, with corporate governance and financial reporting practices similar to those of private firms. They thus face simultaneously the pressures of private shareholders and state owners, while in many cases benefiting from preferential access to critical resources. In Chapter 24, Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip explore the evolution of global value chains, focusing especially on aspects of governance and the upgrading of local firms in emerging markets. The increasing geographic and organizational fragmentation of global value chains creates opportunities for business in emerging markets, but also competitive threats that depress the wages in segments newly exposed to international competition. This raises questions as to who actually controls these value chains and how to address the backslash in advanced economies triggered by the perceived migration of jobs to emerging markets. Two chapters are devoted to MNEs originating from emerging markets. Chapter 25, by Lin Cui of Australia National University and Preet S. Aulakh of York University, provides a comprehensive review of the literature on strategies and operations of emerging market MNEs in advanced economies. The authors focus on the why and how questions of such investment and explore the influence of institutional contexts on both aspects of EMNE strategies. In this context, the development of capabilities through

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    29 FDI is at least as important as the traditional motive for FDI, the exploitation of existing resources. In Chapter 26, Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro of Simon Fraser University analyze emerging market MNEs bridging across emerging markets, a theme popularly known as “South-​South investment.” They focus on the motivations behind South-​South investments, the firm-​specific and country-​specific advantages associated with multinational enterprises from emerging markets, and the spillovers effects of such South-​ South FDI on local economic and institutional development. In Chapter 27, Dana Minbaeva of Copenhagen Business School reviews challenges and solutions to developing human resources in emerging market firms. She argues that the way human resources are managed by a company is dependent on interactions between the focal company and other companies present in its local business ecosystem, which in turn is nested in the wider global business environment. Accordingly, she explores how human resource management (HRM) is practiced by actors within emerging market business ecosystems, how these actors interact, and how these interactions are affected and affect the business environment.

Part V—​Countries and Regions Part V provides country and regional perspectives on management challenges in emerging markets. In Chapter 28, Jorge Carneiro of the Fundaçao Getulio Vargas Business School reviews management in Brazil. He offers a fascinating account of the history of business in Brazil, the cultural traditions that exist today and their sources, and the style of management that is most common in Brazil today. His explanation of the reasons for various policies and practices in Brazil will serve foreign business people who want to operate in Brazil very well. He will also enlighten Brazilian businesspeople about some of the strengths and foibles of their own business system. Chapter 29 by Sheila M. Puffer, Daniel J. McCarthy, Ruth C. May, Galina V. Shirokova, and Andrei Yu. Panibratov, reviews management in Russia. The authors analyze how the evolving political environment has over time lifted and created constraints on the operations of private businesses. They argue that doing business in Russia is challenging for both domestic and foreign firms due to the country’s negative institutional environment, except for those Russian MNEs favored by the government. This has profound implications for both domestic and foreign firms engaged in, in particular, knowledge transfer, management and leadership, and innovation. Chapter 30 by S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan of the Indian Institute of Management-​Bangalore examines management and strategies of domestic tech industry multinationals in India. The authors argue that emerging market companies can compete in technology-​ intensive industries by building legitimacy through partnering with existing multinationals and building their capabilities through that process. They look at several Indian multinationals in the information technology (IT) sector, demonstrating how they have used alliances with foreign multinationals and

30    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse participation in standard-​setting to gain international credibility and competitiveness. This may be a useful lesson for firms in other emerging markets and possibly other sectors for succeeding in international competition. In Chapter 31 , Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan discuss management by foreign multinationals in China. They warn foreign company managers to recognize that China is not a “typical” emerging market, with lagging technology and relatively inexperienced company management. China has become the world’s second leading producer of new technology, and many Chinese companies populate the Fortune Global 500. So, these authors describe the twenty-​first-​century Chinese business reality that attracts both foreign business to the large market and low-​cost production opportunities—​but also threatens foreign business with new competition at home and abroad. The authors highlight the importance of learning from Chinese competitors as a key element of strategy for foreign firms competing in China. Chapter 32 by Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass reviews management in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), with a focus on the patterns of inward and outward FDI. They are concerned with how multinational firms utilize countries in this region for parts of their global value chains and also as markets. CEE countries have much higher production costs than in Southeast Asia and many other emerging markets—​while their per capita incomes are much closer to those of the Triad countries than to those of India or Brazil. These conditions present a challenge for the CEE countries, since they are also quite small in relation to BRICs or Triad countries. The chapter presents a useful view of how MNEs currently integrate CEE countries in their overall business. Chapter 33 by Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-​Benson of the GIBS Business School in South Africa, reviews management of multinational firms in Africa. The authors focus particularly on the challenges South African companies face, and the strategies they deploy, competing at home and in other African countries, to catch up with global leaders. They develop a strategic framework that leads to six alternative methods for competing in Africa, for both foreign MNEs and local companies. They look also at how African countries fit into global value chains led by the MNEs. Last but not least, Michael A. Witt of INSEAD discusses management challenges in Southeast Asia in Chapter 34 from a varieties-​of-​capitalism perspective. This perspective identifies substantial variations across the countries of the region, with varying similarities to major players outside the region. Witt places Singapore in a separate category as a city state and hub for regionally operating MNEs and Vietnam as a post-​socialist economy while the remainder of the region is classified as emerging markets.

Conclusion Together, these 34 chapters provide a state-​of-​the art perspective from the scholarly community on key themes of concern to management in emerging markets. Due

Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets    31 to space limitations, we have not been able to cover all relevant themes. For example, changes in technology, especially the digital economy, are having profound impact on how firms compete in emerging economies, creating new opportunities not only for economic catch-​up that jumps over certain stages of economic developmenbut also to challenge businesses in advanced economies. Moreover, the global geopolitics is evolving with important shifts of power between the major political powers and increasing anti-​ globalization sentiments in some parts of societies in advanced economies, which in turn suggest the possibility of new protectionism and a relative decline of some aspects of global integration (Kobrin, 2017; Meyer, 2017).

Notes 1. In firm-​level empirical studies, the number of observations in each country often is an important practical consideration, while the concept emerging markets is not formally defined. For example, Khanna and Rivkin (2001) include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey; Delios and Henisz (2000) include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam, while Estrin, Meyer, and Pelletier (2018) include Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 2. A notable exception is a recent special issue on business in Africa in the Global Strategy Journal (Mol, Stadler, & Ariño, 2017). 3. For example, Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2011) use the UN definition to design their sample. 4. The number of people who have escaped poverty in China since the great opening started by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s has been estimated to be between 400 and 800 million people. The World Bank estimates it to be 500 million people (http://​www.worldbank.org /​en/​country/​china/​overview#3).

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34    Klaus E. Meyer and Robert Grosse World Bank. 1996. World development report 1996:  From plan to market. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2017a. World Development Indicators, online database. Accessed July 25, 2017. World Bank. 2017b. World Governance Indicators, online database. Accessed August 14, 2017. World Economic Forum. 2016. Global competitiveness report 2016-​2017. http://​www3.weforum .org/​docs/​gcr. Accessed August 14, 2017. Worsley, P. 1964. The Third World: A vital new force in international affairs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E., & Peng, M. W. 2005. Strategy research in emerging economies:  Challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management Studies, 41(1): 1–​33. Xu, D., & Meyer, K. E. 2013. Linking theory and context:  Strategy research in emerging economies, Journal of Management Studies, 50(7): 1322–​1346. Zeschky, M., Widenmayer B., & Gassmann, O. 2011. Frugal innovation in emerging markets. Research Technology Management, 54(4): 38–​45.

Chapter 2

C on cep tual A pproac h e s to Managing in E me rg i ng Markets Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer

How can we best analyze emerging markets in the context of global business in the twenty-​first century? In recent years, emerging markets have been the greatest sources of growth in global demand while also contributing the largest increase in production of output of goods and services. Supply and demand in emerging markets are linked to the Triad countries (i.e., countries in North America Europe, and Japan) via exports and imports, as well as foreign direct investment and a variety of additional services and financial flows. However, emerging markets are also a major source of volatility in political and social terms, and they are on widely divergent growth paths (Ohmae, 1985). These and other characteristics discussed in Chapter 1 differentiate emerging markets from the advanced economies of the Triad. For the study of management phenomena in emerging markets, the critical question is to what extent our logic for understanding activities of companies can be extended from the Triad to explain business in the emerging markets. For example, does Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1977, 2000; Dunning & Lundan, 2009) apply to emerging market multinational enterprises (MNEs)? Does the resource-​based view of competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Wernerfeld, 1984) apply similarly to emerging market companies? More generally, do theoretical approaches to business developed in the USA, Europe, or Japan apply to businesses in these economies? And, if they are found to provide unsatisfactory explanations, should these theories be extended to incorporate contextual variables, modified to broaden their relevance, or replaced by entirely new theoretical perspectives? In this chapter, we will explore these questions. For ease of argument, we limit our consideration to theories that explain international business activities such as exports and imports, direct investment, capital flows, and managing companies that operate in more than one country.

36    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer When theorizing on emerging economies, the contextual boundary conditions refer to a set of conditions that may be transient. If we consider the United States in the eighteenth century, it might be considered as an emerging market that by the late nineteenth century was catching up to the United Kingdom. If we consider Japan in the post-​World War II era, it was an emerging market for a decade or more, before becoming an industrial powerhouse in the 1980s that challenged the United States as the leading industrial country. Then Korea (i.e., South Korea) followed a similar path during the 1960s through the 1980s, moving from developing to developed market status. China appears to have followed a similar trajectory. Based on this reality, it might be appropriate to view “emerging market” as a transient stage in economic development that could lead to advanced, post-​industrial status in the future. Hence, the quest for appropriate theories for emerging markets is about explaining phenomena in economies at certain intermediate stages of development, not about specific geographies. We outline two perspectives in this chapter. First, we explore whether or not new theories are needed to explain (international) business phenomena in emerging markets, as contrasted with extending existing theories to this context. This discussion leads to the question if and how theorizing ought to be contextualized (e.g., Jia, You, & Du, 2012; Tsui, Schoonhoven, Meyer, Lau, & Milkovich, 2004; Whetten, 2009). Second, we position emerging markets in the context of global value chains (or global production networks). As many value chains have been extended internationally, the position of emerging market firms and even national economies within such value chains represents an important contextual condition for any catch-​up strategies they may pursue.

Do We Need New Theory to Deal with Emerging Markets? Scholars of emerging market businesses are navigating between the quest for general theories and calls for appropriate contextualization of their theoretical frameworks to explain important phenomena and relationships in these contexts (Child & Marinova, 2014; Meyer, 2006, 2015; Tsui, 2004; Tsui et al., 2004; Whetten, 2009). At the core of these debates is the question whether the same theories that help understand, for example, the internationalization of companies from the United States or Germany can help to explain the international expansion of Chinese companies. Likewise, is the context in India sufficiently similar to that in the United Kingdom or Japan to use the same theories to explain how companies relate to governments and pressure groups in this country? At least with respect to the political environment, these emerging market countries have important differences in comparison with the

Conceptual Approaches   37 Triad countries. Yet, it is less clear when new theories are needed to explain business activities, and when existing theoretical perspectives can adequately explain the phenomena at hand. Of course, if “business is business” regardless of context, then a general theory of management may suffice. Key constructs such as competitive advantages and core competencies just have to be applied to new countries and other conditions. This view implies that no special theory is needed. However, as international business scholars, we are acutely aware of the importance of geographical, regulatory and cultural context for business (Buckley, Doh, & Benischke, 2017; Meyer, 2013). Thus, we recognize the need for theories specifically designed to address cross-​border phenomena, such as Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm or Vernon’s International Product Cycle. Moreover, most international business scholars would probably agree that “institutions matter” (e.g., Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Meyer & Peng, 2016), and thus attention to differing cultures, laws, languages, and other institutions is necessary to explain both variations in business practices across countries and the strategies adopted by companies crossing borders between countries. Scholarly work on management in emerging markets tends to take one of two approaches. Many research papers ask questions very similar to those asked by their predecessors studying different contexts; in such research the case for applying existing theories is strong. On the other hand, other scholars investigate new types of questions or explicitly explore the consequences of contextual differences. The latter type of work is more likely to require new or modified theoretical perspectives, as is evident in many of the chapters of this Handbook. In the next few pages, we offer brief reflections on the relevance to emerging markets of some of the traditional theoretical perspectives of international business scholarship. Vernon’s (1966) international product cycle has largely been put aside, such that Dunning’s view has become the principal paradigm for explaining MNEs, and for integrating the internalization theory developed by Buckley and Casson, Hennart, Rugman and others. Johanson and Vahlne’s internationalization process model and its variations are the main tool to explain longitudinal processes of internationalization, especially for new or small businesses around the world. In addition, international business scholars have been applying and advancing several mainstream business theories focusing on firm-​specific strengths, including Porter’s competitive advantages, Prahalad and Hamel’s core competences, and the resource-​ based view (which are not discussed here). As highlighted in many reviews of the emerging markets management literature, these traditional theories have played at best a supportive role in recent emerging economy research as institutional perspectives have motivated most recent studies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Meyer & Peng, 2005, 2016; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2013). In this Handbook, the variety of theoretical works commonly summarized as “institutional perspective” are reviewed and assessed in Chapter 5 by Kostova and Marano.

38    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer

Traditional Theories: Dunning’s OLI Paradigm Dunning’s (1980) OLI paradigm, also known as the eclectic paradigm, is probably the clearest example of a theory that can be readily extended to emerging markets. Dunning aims to explain international production patterns by examining the Ownership, Location, and Internalization advantages of companies. Depending on the configuration of advantages in a particular company-​country-​context, different strategies (e.g., exporting, using foreign direct investment, and contracting out to other companies) are called for. When considering an emerging market as a location for a production activity, a potential investor needs to consider local conditions and local competitors in formulating a strategy based on the three elements of OLI. When considering emerging market MNEs going abroad, they likewise need to formulate strategies based on the same three considerations with respect to the specific country they consider investing in (Table 2.1). Thus, the OLI paradigm provides a foundation how and why such contextual differences lead to different strategies (e.g., Narula, 2012). Emerging market firms may not have the same level of technology and reputation-​based advantages that are common in the Triad, while markets are often more fragmented. Thus, ownership advantages of firms originating from emerging economies are typically of different types compared to Triad companies because they are, at least at early stages, developed primarily within the home context (Meyer, 2018; Narula, 2012; Verbeke & Kano, 2016). At the same time, location advantages in emerging markets are different from advanced economies, which influence firms’ strategies of entering and growing businesses in the country. Internalization incentives are influenced by contextual variables such as the institutions governing cross-​border transactions into and out of emerging economies. Therefore, each of the three elements, O, L, and I, are potentially moderated by contextual influences. When operationalizing these constructs, thus, scholars can capture emerging economy specific issues. From an OLI perspective, what would be an appropriate strategy for South Africa-​ based brewer SAB-​Miller when entering an Asian emerging market, or when entering a particular western European country where the firm competes minimally thus far? Probably not much different from the strategy recommended to other multinational brewers such as AB Inbev (based in Belgium) or Heineken (based in the Netherlands), except that (prior to the merger with Miller), SAB’s portfolio of ownership advantages was different than that of its global peers, especially in that SAB lacked a globally recognized premium brand but exceled at operational practices suitable for emerging economies. Similarly, comparing China-​based Alibaba with its global peer, US-​based Amazon, shows that Alibaba has developed a broader portfolio of Internet-​based business activities, including critically Alipay which enabled the take-​off of e-​commerce in China. At the same time, it would be a latecomer in many Triad countries where Amazon already

Conceptual Approaches   39 Table 2.1 The determinants of international production Types of international production

Ownership advantages

Location advantages

Inernalization advantages

Illustration of types of activity which favor MNEs

1. Resource-​based

Capital, Possession of technology, access resources to markets

To ensure stability Oil, copper, tin, zinc, of supply at right bauxite, bananas, price; control of pineapples, cocoa, tea markets

2. Import substituting manufacturing

Capital, technology, management, and organizational skills; surplus R&D & other capacity, economies of scale; Trade marks

Material & labor costs, markets, government policy (with respect to barrier to imports, investment incentives, etc.)

Wish to exploit technology advantages, high transaction or information costs, buyer uncertainty, etc.

Computers, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, cigarettes

3. Export platform manufacturing

As above, but also access to markets

Low labor costs Incentives to local production by host governments

The economies of vertical integration

Consumer electronics, textiles & clothing, cameras, etc.

4. Trade and distribution

Products to distribute

Local markets. Need to be near customers. After-​sales servicing, etc.

Need to ensure sales outlets and to protect company's name

A variety of goods—​ particularly those requiring close consumer contact

Markets

Broadly as for 2/​4 Insurance, banking and consultancy services

5. Ancillary services Access to markets (in the case of her foreign investors) 6. Miscellaneous

Variety but include Markets geographical diversification (airlines and hotels)

Various (see above)

Various kinds (a) Portfolio investment—​ properties (b) Where spatial linkages essential (airlines and hotels)

has an extensive distribution network. Thus, Alibaba’s ownership advantages suggest that it would focus on markets where its distinct competences are in demand, such as India or Brazil, while (initially) avoiding markets where local e-​businesses and Amazon are already well established. Hence, the OLI paradigm provides a theoretical explanation for the frequently observed phenomenon that emerging economy firms first expand in other emerging

40    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer economies. The ownership advantages that enable this growth path include not only a product portfolio meeting the demand of consumers in emerging markets but experience in similar regulatory, political, and cultural environments (del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Henisz, 2003). Thus, Cuervo-​Cazurra argues that: EMNEs [emerging-​market MNEs] emerge in countries in which the advantage provided by the resources is more difficult to protect because of the under-​development of institutions such as the patent or judicial system. This forces EMNEs to focus on developing advantages that are not protected externally but rather internally via secrecy, causal ambiguity, and systemic relationships such as new business models, organizational capabilities, and process innovations. (2012: 161)

Hence, the home-​country contexts under which EMNEs arise are distinctly different from those in Triad countries; and theorizing about such firms therefore requires incorporating home-​base context in the analysis. The OLI paradigm is very flexible; that is why it is also known as “eclectic” paradigm. However, scholars have to be rigorous in considering which types of O-​advantages they expect to find in different types of firms.

Existing Theories: Internalization Buckley and Casson (1976) developed their internalization theory1 to explain why MNEs exist though the concept of internalization—​the choice between an internal-​to-​the-​firm versus a market-​based form of coordination. This fundamental decision emerges equally in domestic contexts and concerns whether to carry out some business activity (production, assembly, marketing, etc.) within the company, or if the company should contract out to a third party to carry out the activity. According to Buckley and Casson, this decision should focus on cost minimization (including opportunity costs of forgone business opportunities), in which the lowest-​cost alternative helps to maximize the firm’s profits. Internalization is one element of Dunning’s eclectic theory discussed above. However, Buckley and Casson focus on internalization as the driving force for determining the optimal size and scope of the firm,2 and particularly for making the decision of whether to use foreign direct investment (FDI) or a contractual mode such as licensing to serve a foreign market (Buckley & Casson, 1998). They recognized that internal transfers often prevail over market transactions especially in R&D-​intensive sectors, and thus associate inefficiencies in the markets for knowledge with the emergence of MNEs. Internalization theory can easily be applied to business in and with emerging markets. The critical aspect in the application of the theory is to rigorously consider the nature of the business relationships that may or may not be internalized. Buckley and Casson focused in particular on imperfections in markets for knowledge. However, patterns of knowledge sharing vary with the types of transactions that MNEs undertake. While

Conceptual Approaches   41 Triad MNEs may be primarily concerned about the transfer of knowledge from headquarters to subsidiaries, emerging market MNEs may often acquire assets in advanced economies (e.g., Cui, Meyer & Hu, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008) and thus are primarily concerned about the control over those acquired assets. In either case, the internalization decision is driven by the relative advantages of an internal organization over a market transaction, and hence the same theory applies.

Existing Theories: Johanson and Vahlne’s Internationalization Process Theory A highly influential perspective in international business research has been Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977, 2009, 2017) internationalization process model, which proposes that the process of internationalization is an iterative process of commitments to foreign markets with learning and capability building. In each foreign market, commitments enable accumulation of experiential knowledge, which in turn generates new opportunities and lowers costs of the next step of commitment. In recent versions of the model, Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009, 2017) focus on network positions rather than foreign market positions, but the iterative nature of the process remains at the core of the model. Firms thus are viewed as growing internationally within networks of suppliers and customers, including global value chains discussed below in this chapter. They can succeed internationally by becoming “insiders” in such international business networks. One consequence of this iterative process is that many studies have been able to identify distinct stages that companies in a given context go through. For example, the classic study by Johanson and Weidersheim-​Paul (1975) identified four stages: (1) no regular export activities, (2)  export via independent representatives (agents), (3)  establishment of an overseas sales subsidiary, and (4)  overseas production/​ manufacturing units. Many subsequent studies found similar patterns (Bilkey & Tesar, 1977; Luostarinen, 1979; Welch & Luostarinen, 1988; Welch & Wiedersheim-​ Paul, 1980). However, such stage models tend to be specific to the industry in which firms operate, as well as to the historical and institutional context. Thus, the original four-​stage model reflects the conditions of manufacturing firms that first build a strong home market position before venturing abroad in a global economy with significant barriers to flows of trade, capital, and people, as well as substantial communication challenges. Applications of the internationalization process model to emerging market MNEs tend to focus on the underlying mechanisms rather than the stage models (Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, & Forsans, 2016; Elango & Pattnaik, 2011; Kotabe & Kothari, 2016; Meyer & Thaijongrak, 2013). Despite the often considerable size in their home economy, and access to certain resources due to their affiliation with business groups

42    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer or a government owner, emerging market MNEs often lack international business capabilities. Since such capabilities are often grounded in experiential knowledge, emerging market MNEs have to “learn” about doing business outside their home environment, and such learning then enables them to make further commitments. This means that, when emerging market MNEs try to jump aggressively ahead by exploiting their access to financial resources, they also face higher risks of failure (Santangelo & Meyer, 2017).

Existing Theories: Vernon’s International Product Cycle Perhaps the first theoretical model of international business was developed by Raymond Vernon, who called it the “international product cycle.” Similar to the marketing-​based product life cycle, Vernon’s cycle focused on the launch, maturing, and standardization of (manufactured) products in a three-​stage cycle, see Figure 2.1. In the new product stage, products would be launched first in the United States (later restated as launching in one of the Triad countries), where new technology was most often introduced, and where the market possessed a large number of potential buyers with sufficient income to pay for the innovations. Incomes and technology were the key drivers of this cycle. From the outset, Vernon included emerging markets in the theory, seeing them as target markets for products after they had succeeded in the USA. Then ultimately emerging markets would become locations for the production of standardized products, where production costs were the key element of competitiveness (panel 3 in Figure 2.1). While this model does not consider the fragmentation of production, in which parts of the overall production process can be carried out in low-​cost emerging markets, it certainly presages this development. Vernon already acknowledged in 1979 that his model is to a high degree specific to the conditions of the global economy of the 1950s and 1960s (Vernon, 1979), yet the model continues to linger in many textbooks. In an integrated global economy where many products are launched in multiple markets simultaneously, where production is organized in fine-​sliced global values chains, and important innovations occur in some of the emerging economies, it is hard to apply this model meaningfully.

Do We Need a New Theory? It is very tempting to argue that companies coming from many emerging markets need a separate theory to explain their expansion and to guide them in competing in international business. For example, Carlos Slim’s telephone companies, Telmex in Mexico and America Movil across Latin America, are not just analogs of Verizon Wireless or Vodafone. The Dangote Group conglomerate based in Nigeria (involved in cement manufacturing and importing; sugar manufacturing and refining; salt refining;

150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

UNITED STATES

IMPORTS

S

ORT

EXP

PRODUCTION

CONSUMPTION

OTHER ADVANCED COUNTRIES

S

ORT

EXP

PRODUCTION

CONSUMPTION RTS

O

IMP

LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

EXPORTS

CONSUMPTION

PRODUCTION

TS

IMPOR

NEW PRODUCT

MATURING PRODUCT

STANDARDIZED PRODUCT

STAGES OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

Figure 2.1  Vernon’s International Product Cycle Reproduced from Vernon (1966), p.199, by permission of Oxford University Press.

44    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer flour milling; pasta manufacturing; and several other businesses) is not just a clone of Berkshire Hathaway or General Electric, and its business is almost exclusively in Africa. And very similarly, the Ayala Group in the Philippines (involved in real estate, financial services, telecoms, water, power, transport, and other businesses) is quite distinct from the US-​based and other conglomerates listed here, with its businesses primarily in the domestic economy and elsewhere in Asia. To explain the activities of these companies may very well require a new theory. As we have argued above, existing theories can be appropriately adapted to explain many research questions related to business in emerging markets if these research questions are similar to those asked previously. However, where phenomena or relationships appear distinctly different from those observed in advanced economies, then new types of questions may lead to new theoretical concepts or frameworks, and eventually new theories. Thus, new research questions may focus for example on business groups or state-​ownership as phenomena, rather than on emerging economy MNEs in general. In this Handbook, several chapters address specific types of firms, including entrepreneurial firms (Chapter 19, by Estrin et  al.), small and medium-​sized firms (Chapter 20 by Child), family businesses (Chapter 21, by Basco), business groups (Chapter 22 by Chung and Luo) and state-​owned firms (Chapter 23, by Musaccio et al.). However, in a review of three decades of management research related to China, Jia, You, and Du (2012) observe that only three concepts from China-​related research have made a substantive impact on mainstream management research: market transition, network capitalism, and guanxi. Looking further to research on other emerging economies, other concepts come to mind, such as institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) or principal–​principal conflicts (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Yet, so far not many popular concepts in management research can trace their roots to research in emerging economies.

Theorizing on Emerging Market MNEs A fruitful line for theorizing has emerged with emerging economy MNEs where new concepts have been proposed—​though it is too early to evaluate their sustained contribution. Several phenomena seem to distinguish EMNEs from traditional MNEs, which can become the focus of efforts to develop new theory or to extend existing views (Hernandez & Guillen, 2018; Meyer, 2018; Ramamurti, 2012; Ramamurti & Hillemann, 2018). First, emerging market MNEs tend to have different competitive advantages than firms from the Triad, specifically not possessing proprietary technology or advanced marketing skills—​two advantages that typify traditional MNEs. Second, they often have developed new business models, they are especially attuned to consumers/​customers in emerging markets, and they are more adept or willing to

Conceptual Approaches   45 operate in high-​risk, high-​uncertainty environments. And third, they internationalize differently from traditional MNEs; for example, they seem to go abroad more quickly, often through immediate mergers or acquisitions, and they go to countries that are farther away than their Triad counterparts. Ramamurti (2012) argues that these differences may be because times have changed, and the conditions for going abroad now facilitate the EMNE strategies (e.g., due to low transportation and communication costs today). The differences also have something to do with the evolution of industries and global value chains, including the emergence of e-​commerce-​based intermediaries. As an example of a novel framework, Matthews (2006) observed that “dragon multinationals” from Asian countries show distinct features in the way they have internationalized in comparison with Triad companies. He proposed a three-​part, linkage-​leverage-​learning framework that emphasizes three key differences. First, MNEs from (non-​Japan) Asia tend to use partnerships and other alliances with existing firms abroad, to gain access to technology, market entry, and skills needed to compete internationally. These linkages with other firms enable them to move more rapidly than a company trying to extend its own capabilities abroad. Second, these emerging market MNEs aim to leverage the capabilities that they obtain from alliance partners for use at home and in foreign markets. And third, they learn from their allies/​partners, internalizing the knowledge and skills that can be used to expand their competitiveness. Matthews’s focus on learning processes recalls research on the internationalization process model, as discussed above, especially the branch focusing on the interaction of networks, learning and firm internationalization (reviewed by Johanson & Vahlne 2009). The types of networks he identifies create opportunities for a “second-​mover” strategy based on identifying valuable resources possessed by potential alliance partners and then taking advantage of those capabilities through the alliance. Matthews’s view fits with the global value chain idea discussed below, in which emerging market firms can integrate themselves into such chains and become international competitors through the networks (e.g., Hertenstein, Sutherland, & Anderson, 2017; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015). In another example of a novel concept, Luo and Tung (2007) propose that emerging market MNEs often follow a “springboard strategy” in which FDI projects abroad serve to build rather than exploit the resources and capabilities of the MNE (or ownership advantages in Dunning’s terminology). Thus, emerging market MNEs follow strategic asset-​seeking motives when establishing operations abroad, and the assets thus acquired serve in the first instance to strengthen the competitive position in existing markets (Cui et al., 2014; Rui & Yip 2008). In the longer run, the combination of resources acquired abroad with home-​country-​based resources may enable the development of a competitive position on global markets. While the phenomenon of strategic asset seeking is not new (it has been observed, for example, in Korean and Japanese MNEs in the past), it has received renewed attention in the recent literature.

46    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer For fuller reviews of the emerging economy MNE literature, and new theoretical ideas within that literature, see Chapter 25 by Cui and Aulakh, and Chapter 26 by Li and Shapiro.

A Conceptual Approach to Emerging Markets: Global Value Chains A very useful way to view emerging market companies, and management of companies operating in emerging markets, is through the global value chain (GVC) framework (Buckley & Strange, 2015; Grosse, 2015). For example, Grosse (2015) argues that emerging market firms should be evaluated in the context of global value chains, and that their strategies depend on the firms linking themselves to other firms in these value chains. This is especially applicable in the context of offshore assembly activities in countries of Southeast Asia, plus China and Mexico. Companies such as HonHai (FoxConn) in Taiwan and FEMSA in Mexico function completely as downstream providers of product assembly and (in the case of FEMSA) final sale of products originated in the United States (viz., Apple and Coca-​Cola). Companies such as Embraer in Brazil and Acer from Taiwan have moved from downstream component providers for Triad company products and services to developing their own products and services under their own brand names. Global value chains, earlier known as global commodity chains (Gereffi, 1994), have attracted substantial amounts of research over the past two decades (e.g., Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Yet, the idea of looking at business in emerging markets within the context of global value chains is still relatively new to management research. At early stages, in the 1990s, a typical global value chain in electronics or textile industries may have looked as illustrated in Figure 2.2. For the past three decades, global value chains have become more fine-​grained and frequently include stages or activities in both emerging markets and traditional industrial countries such as the USA, EU, and Japan. This perspective considers the full range of activities involved in producing a final product or service, starting from obtaining raw materials and other inputs, moving through the production and distribution process, and even considering after-​sale serv­ ice. Each stage of the process can be carried out at one or more locations, including locations in emerging markets. From this perspective, emerging markets provide companies that fit into global value chains and locations where multinational firms carry out parts of their overall value chain activity. For emerging market firms, global value chains offer opportunities to participate in international business by contributing to global chains, and to grow within them. At the outset, EM firms would only be able to provide a limited range of products or services in mainly labor-​intensive stages of the value chain. However, emerging market firms have

Conceptual Approaches   47

PURCHASE OF INPUTS

Triad country

Emerging market

BASIC PRODUCTION ASSEMBLY R&D

R&D

Each Step in the Chain Technology Financial resources

Management of the step

Human resources Risk management

DISTRIBUTION

SALES AFTER SALE SERVICE

Figure 2.2  Grosse’s Value-​added Chain Adaped from Grosse (1989), p. 159.

been shown to develop partnerships with advanced economy firms that help them build critical capabilities (e.g., Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; Patibandla & Petersen, 2002). So far, they generally do not include the basic R&D that is used to generate new products or the production of highly differentiated and high-​tech products,3 though some emerging market firms are rapidly catching up, for example, Indian business service providers or Chinese automotive suppliers. Through skillfully designed partnership with “flagship firms” (Rugman & D’Cruz, 1993) at the hub of global value chains, emerging market firms can grow internationally within the partner’s global business network (Hertenstein, Sutherland, & Anderson, 2017; Prashantham & Birkinshaw, 2008; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015). Thus, global value chains represent the relevant context within which firm growth is taking place. Yet, they also raise questions as to who controls this context, and hence the governance of global value chains (Gereffi et al. 2005; Kano 2018; Prashantham & Yip, Chapter 24, in this Handbook). The nature of global value chains is changing. In geographically fine-​sliced value chains, firms are trading not only goods but services and data, and they manage flows of ideas and technology across national borders. Thus, international trade economists have moved to analyzing comparative advantages on the basis of “trade in tasks” performed within disaggregated value chains, rather than trade in goods (Baldwin & Robert-​Nicoud, 2014; Grossman & Rossi-​Hansberg, 2008). This perspective recognizes the new realities of global value chains but still finds evidence for the traditional theoretical notion of national comparative advantage.

48    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer The organizational and geographic disaggregation of global value chains adds to the complexity of business networks. Recent visualizations developed by Bloomberg offer new opportunities to depict and analyze global value chains by focusing on the principal suppliers, customers, and competitors of a focal firm. These become particularly complex for companies at the hub of global e-​commerce networks such as Amazon.com (Figure 2.3). As a consummate middleman, Amazon is producing nothing other than services, and selling products and services from other vendors to consumers around the world who reach Amazon via the Internet. Yet, it provides a platform to connect buyers and sellers, and it arranges shipment of physical products to customers (and provides other services such as cloud computing and data storage). Notice that Amazon’s main suppliers are US-​based companies, although its largest supplier is Sony Corporation from Japan; and Panasonic is also among the top dozen suppliers, along with the Chinese firm Lenovo and HonHai (Foxconn) from Taiwan. The suppliers are mainly providing (electronics and health care) products that Amazon sells to its customers, although delivery services FedEx and UPS are major suppliers as well. On the other side of the business, customers include millions of individuals who buy online, with other middleman clients such as Capgemini and Thomson-​Reuters, who purchase cloud computing services from Amazon to resell to their own customers. Emerging market companies play an important role on both sides of Amazon’s value-​ added chain: they are producers or assemblers of manufactured goods that may originate with a company such as Apple or Sony, but which use an emerging market(s) for the assembly process. And emerging market customers are people just as in the USA or EU,

Sony Corp

Capgemini SA

Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.

Thomson Reuters Corp. Tech Data Corp.

Procter & Gamble Company

Netflix Inc.

Lenovo Group Ltd.

Hitachi Ltd.

FedEx Corp. HP Inc. United Parcel Services Brocade Communications Systems

222 Suppliers (largest 12)

Amazon.com Inc.

Panasonic Corp.

95 Customers (largest 12)

Enel SpA Verizon Communications Vodafone Group PLC Unilever

Johnson & Johnson

Pfizer Inc.

Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd.

Comcast Corp.

Facebook Inc.

Gol Linhas aereas inteligentes

Figure 2.3  Amazon in its global supply chain Source: information from Bloomberg (2017).

Conceptual Approaches   49 who buy through online platforms such as Alibaba, JD.com, or Amazon, and thereby directly or indirectly gain access to global value chains.

Conclusion Some insights from global management scholarship are certainly transferable to new contexts, especially theoretical ideas and models at high levels of abstraction. Yet, other aspects of theory need modification or even entirely new bottom-​up thinking to understand and guide business in emerging markets. This applies in particular to lower levels of abstraction such as the operationalization of theoretical constructs in decision-​making. Thus, a theory of management for emerging markets may fall into either category. An overall conceptual view of (international) business in emerging markets probably should have sufficient generality to apply to business most anywhere. Dunning’s eclectic view fits this category. However, conceptual models for actual decision-​makers in companies and government regulators probably need to be more narrowly specified to account explicitly for those key differences between emerging and Triad markets. A challenge to developing theory for business in emerging markets is that countries sometimes leave the group of emerging markets to join the group of advanced economies. This happened in Japan and Korea in the twentieth century, and some Central European countries at the turn of the twenty-​first century. Once a country moves into the other category of markets, then theories specially tailored to emerging markets become less relevant, while the widely used concepts developed for the Triad gain in relevance. At the end of the day it is not necessary to choose between the more-​specialized view and the broader view of international business in emerging markets. What is important is to be flexible enough to observe the (institutional) context in question, and to think clearly about whether the lessons to be drawn are more important in the local context or in the global context.

Notes 1. From the outset, Buckley and Casson (1976) applied the internalization concept to multinational companies. However, the concept does not imply or require cross-​border business activity. Inspired by his own students, Dunning (1977) incorporated internalization into his eclectic theory, which also emphasizes firm-​specific and country-​specific advantages. 2. This idea responds to Edith Penrose’s question about the optimal size of the firm, raised in Penrose (1959). 3. There are of course exceptions to this statement. China alone is a major source of R&D and production of both standardized and differentiated products. See also Chapter 30 on

50    Robert Grosse and Klaus E. Meyer high-​tech Indian MNEs for another exception. However, most emerging markets, with these exceptions, follow the pattern described here.

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Chapter 3

In ternationa l Bu si ne s s a nd Emerging Ma rk ets i n Historical Pe rspe c t i v e Geoffrey Jones

This chapter provides a long-​run perspective on international business in emerging markets. It focuses on the role of Western MNEs (multinational enterprises), and examines their strategies and the management challenges they faced. It should be stressed from the outset that this chapter has to operate at a high level of abstraction. Both MNEs and emerging markets are heterogeneous, and both have changed enormously over time. Countries have also shifted between the “emerging” and “developed” categories over time. Japan is the most obvious example, given its progression from developing status in the 19th century to the world’s third largest economy in the contemporary global economy. This chapter suggests broad long-​run patterns but acknowledges the risks of generalizing over time and between geographies.

Evolution of International Business in Emerging Markets Globalization has a long history. The dramatic geographical expansion of the ancient Roman Empire, or of Islam centuries later, or the Mongol Empire of the 13th century, were manifestations of globalization trends. The Voyages of Discovery by Columbus and de Gama from Europe over 500 years ago saw transfers of technology—​and disease—​ never seen before. Yet a combination of high transport costs, wars, and government-​imposed barriers handicapped sustained and deep globalization until the 19th century. During that century radical improvements in transport and communications and the withdrawal of

56   Geoffrey Jones the state from economies, including trade regulation, enabled unprecedented flows of people, capital, and trade, and unprecedented integration of markets (O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999). Business enterprises were key to this first wave of globalization. Firms put in place a global banking and trading infrastructure. A global transportation and communications network was built by cable and telegraph and shipping companies. Manufacturers transferred the production of goods ranging from sewing machines to automobiles and aspirins internationally. While World War I (1914–​1918) exercised a major political and economic shock, globalization persisted through the 1920s, only to undergo a major meltdown in the wake of the Great Depression. There followed a sharp downturn of globalization which can be called the Great Reversal. Beginning in the late 1970s, a second wave of globalization took hold which took the integration of global markets much deeper (Jones, 2005a, 2014; Ghemawat & Jones, 2017). There was massive investment by Western firms in emerging markets during the first wave of globalization. As Table 3.1 shows, foreign direct investment (FDI) reached high levels relative to the size of the world economy—​and majority of it was in developing countries. Latin America and Asia were especially important as host regions, representing 33% and 21%, respectively, of the total world stock of FDI. According to Wilkins (1994), the ten largest hosts included Russia, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, India, China, Egypt, and Mexico. The drivers of this investment in emerging markets are well-​understood. As the Western world industrialized and urbanized, firms launched a search for the minerals, commodities, and foodstuffs needed by the developed world, and constructed the physical and services infrastructure needed to exploit them. The low incomes of the non-​ Western world meant that they were of little interest as markets, except for basic clothing. Famously, exports of British and other Western textiles flooded into India and other countries, helping to decimate their traditional textile industries.

Table 3.1 Multinational investment in emerging markets 1914–​2007 World FDI Stock % of world ($billion) output

% in emerging markets

World FDI inflows ($billion)

% in emerging markets

1914

14

9.0

63

n.a.

n.a.

1960

54

4.4

32

n.a.

n.a.

1980

551

4.8

22

59

34

1990

1941

8.5

27

225

14

2007

15,602

27

29

1833

27

n.a. = not available Sources: Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 175; World Investment Report, 1992, 1995; World Investment Report, 2008:10, 257–​260.

International Business in Historical Perspective    57 The Great Reversal was triggered by the Great Depression, and in particular the policy response in the form of exchange controls and tariff barriers. There was a dramatic fall in international trade, and the growth of multinational investment virtually ceased. The spread of nationalistic, anti-​foreign governments sharply raised political risks during the 1930s, further prompting firms to form cartels rather than risk investing in foreign countries, or employ other non-​equity forms. The growth of tariffs in interwar Latin America, for example, led US MNEs to subcontract production of their brands to local manufacturers. World War II devastated Europe and much of Asia, and eventually led to the expropriation of German and Japanese FDI. As is evident from Table 3.1, the Great Reversal saw a sharp fall in the relative importance of emerging markets in world FDI. This was driven in part by wide-​ranging expropriation combined with divestment as a response to political risk. The Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917 had resulted in the expropriation of a large amount of Western FDI, as Russia had been one of the world’s largest host economies. The spread of Communism to China and Eastern Europe after World War II shut off further large parts of the globe to capitalism. The dismantling of Western colonial empires and the spread of government restrictions on foreign firms in most of postcolonial Asia and Africa further decimated Western multinational investment in developing countries. There was a widespread expropriation of foreign ownership of natural resources during the 1970s, although it is important to note that in significant industries such as oil, this was effectively a shift in mode of entry from ownership in the form of concessions to contracts. In 1929 India, China, and many other emerging markets where still among the top 20 hosts for FDI (Wilkins, 1994). By 1980 levels of FDI in those countries were zero, or close to zero. Overall only just over one-​fifth of world FDI stock was located in developing countries, and around a third of inward FDI flows. By that date, the integration of worldwide capital, commodity, and labor markets as a whole remained much less than 600 years previously. There is no consensus regarding when the contemporary era of globalization began. A good case could be made for dating it to the 1960s, especially because of the appearance and growth of global financial markets, which eventually undermined governmental restrictions on capital movements. However, insofar as political factors had driven de-​globalization, it is more appropriate to take China’s adoption of market-​ oriented policies in 1978 as chronological starting point for the new global economy. The subsequent growth of the Chinese economy set off a chain of pressures and events which encouraged developing countries, especially India to 1991, to follow suit. The advent to power of the right-​wing, free-​market governments in Britain and the United States, respectively, in 1979 and 1980, and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, fueled the momentum which drove down barriers to global capitalism and foreign investment. During the 1990s globalization was given a further massive push by the advent of the World Wide Web and the digital age. Table 3.1 shows the subsequent growth of FDI stock and flows, which assumed an unprecedented importance of foreign direct investment in the world economy in 2007, the year before the global financial crisis which has led to nearly a decade of stagnation or even decline in investment levels.

58   Geoffrey Jones The new political environment transformed the opportunities for Western MNEs in emerging markets, at least until the new century. Restrictions on foreign ownership, pressures to make joint ventures with local firms, trade barriers, and exchange controls melted away or were greatly reduced. Deregulation and privatization opened up sectors such as telecommunications which had long been closed to foreign companies. Indeed, practically every government on the planet offered incentives for MNEs to invest in them. It was striking, however, that although FDI in developing countries increased rapidly, it showed no signs of recovering to the relative importance it had once held in the first global economy (see Table 3.1). A major reason was that FDI stock and flows were so concentrated geographically. In 1990 Asia accounted for two-​thirds of all FDI inflows into the developing world. In 2007 China and Hong Kong alone accounted for nearly one-​third of total FDI inflows into the developing world, and Brazil accounted for a further 7%. In contrast, India, Russia, and most of Africa and Latin America received limited investment, despite large-​scale liberalization of regulation. The nature of political risk assumed new, and often more subtle, forms. There was no reversion to the era when Western firms, supported by their home governments, could dictate their terms to developing countries. International law was clear that property could only be taken for a public purpose, and that compensation had to be prompt and adequate, but countries sometimes ignored the law, and there were many arguments about what constituted prompt and adequate compensation. Nor was the protection of intellectual property effectively secured by international law. The extent of Western multinational investment in emerging markets, then, has varied considerably over the last 150  years. The following sections look at multinational strategies and management in the three distinct eras in the history of the global economy.

IB Strategies in the First Global Economy International business (IB) strategies are in part fully explicable by existing theories. Western firms had ownership advantages in organization and technology. Emerging markets had locational advantages in natural resources and cheap labor. Transactions cost theory explains patterns of vertical integration in minerals and agricultural products. Problems of quality control from situations of information asymmetry, for example, encouraged vertical integration in tropical fruits such as bananas. However, many emerging markets had characteristics that were distinctive from those of developed countries, whose setting was the basis for the development of the theory of multinational enterprise, and this shaped distinctive managerial strategies. Among these distinctive characteristics was a legacy of constrained autonomy and colonialism,

International Business in Historical Perspective    59 institutional voids or at least frailty, and long bouts of turbulence (Austin, Davila, & Jones, 2017). Management strategies were shaped by context in each historical period which provided a mixture of opportunity and risk. Four broad environmental factors determined the trade-​off between opportunity and risk. The first was the prevailing political economy, including the policies of both host and home governments, and the international legal framework. The second was the market and resources of the host emerging market. The third factor was the state of transport and communications infrastructure within countries, and connecting them to the rest of the global world. The fourth factor was competition from local firms. Table 3.2 shows the impact of these factors on multinational strategies during the three eras of globalization. The strategies of Western firms benefited from a favorable political context. The spread of Western imperialism dramatically reduced the political risks of doing business in colonies. By the late 19th century European colonial governments rarely acted as direct agents of Western firms, and their general impact is better seen as improving the environment for all entrepreneurs, because of both improved institutions and investment

Table 3.2 Multinational strategies in emerging markets in the three eras of globalization First global economy 1850-​1929

Great Reversal 1929-​1978

Second global economy 1978-​

Political economy

High receptivity; international law and imperialism support Western firms; institutional frailty

Expropriation; Import Substitution; exchange controls; foreign ownership restrictions; institutional frailty; turbulence

Liberalization; sovereign and assertive governments; institutional frailty; turbulence

Markets and resources

Low incomes; cultural Limited convergence; differences; vast foreign ownership natural resources restricted

Globalization; tribalization; low-​cost labor; rising middle-​class incomes

Transport and communication infrastructure

Costly, but costs falling

Transport improving

Sharp fall in communications cost with Web

Local competition

Embryonic

State-​owned companies; private enterprise curbed

Growing private-​sector; state-​owned enterprises

IB strategies

Co-​opt local elites as partners; seek home country support; overcome logistical challenges; build global value chains

Divest; invest in West; forced negotiations; use joint ventures and local participation

Access low labor costs; adapt to local markets and politics; build and distribute global value chains

Context

60   Geoffrey Jones in infrastructure. Yet by imposing and enforcing Western laws, they made it much safer for Western firms to invest. Oftentimes they awarded such firms huge concessions as incentives to invest in territories whose infrastructure was completely undeveloped and whose terrains were often challenging. A classic instance was when the colonial government gave the British soap manufacturer Lever Brothers an exclusive concession over a huge area of the Belgian Congo in 1911, which was intended to be used as plantations to supply the company with palm oil (Wilson, 1954). In countries that were not formal colonies, local governments were even more desperate to attract modern technology and skills, as economic development offered the only way to resist the power of the Western nations. Western firms were able to negotiate exclusive and very favorable concessions with local political elites, who often preferred to award such contracts to foreign entrepreneurs rather than build up domestic rivals. In Mexico, which lost half its territory over the course of the 19th century to the United States, British and American firms negotiated exclusive concessions with Porfirio Diaz, the dictator between 1876 and 1913, who sought to modernize his country to prevent its further humiliation at the hands of the Americans. The British firm of S. Pearson & Son, for example, was given vast construction contracts for harbors and railroads, and from 1902 onward also oilfields (Garner, 2011). In Central America, dictators in Guatemala and elsewhere gave United Fruit and other firms huge concessions to develop banana plantations and related infrastructure (Bucheli, 2005). Throughout Latin America, as well as elsewhere, Western firms negotiated concessions to construct and generate power and light systems—​resulting in the electrification of many of the cities of the sub-​ continent, and most of the developing world, by 1914 (Hausman, Hertner, & Wilkins, 2008). Typically concessions were generally free of tax and most other regulations. American or British diplomats, or gunboats, made sure such contracts were enforced. In terms of the theory of multinational enterprise, in the age of imperialism, Western MNEs experienced few “liabilities of foreignness.” Indeed, they could be considered to have captured many of the benefits of being “insiders” in their business systems (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). This was not only because of social and cultural connections to colonial regimes, but often, more important, because of close connections with other Western firms active in those countries. Western banks, trading companies, shipping companies, and plantation and mining ventures not only interacted regularly in host economies but were also quite frequently linked through equity, non-​equity, and other links into the same business group (Jones, 2000). MNEs rarely had to adjust or innovate in their strategies in response to competition from locally owned firms, as there was limited competition. The major exceptions occurred in Japan, where local firms succeeded in challenging Western banks, shipping, and trading companies; in India, where a modern cotton textile industry was created by the small Parsee ethnic community; and in some Latin American countries. For example, in Uruguay, Argentina, and other countries, there was a growth of locally owned banks from the late 19th century, which successfully challenged Western banks (Jones, 1993). More unusual was the success of the Bolivian entrepreneur Simon Patiño in displacing the foreign companies which had initially developed the Bolivian tin industry

International Business in Historical Perspective    61 to become the largest Bolivian producer of tin concentrates before 1914. Subsequently Patiño bought smelters in Britain and Malaya, becoming one of the leading players in the global tin monopoly (Geddes, 1972). There is limited evidence, then, on the impact of local competition on the strategies of Western firms before the 20th century. One of the most interesting examples occurred in the opium trade between India and China in the 19th century. This trade was initially dominated by Scottish merchants, primarily the trading houses of Jardine Matheson and Alexander Dent. Vast fortunes were made. By mid-​century, their business was challenged by the Sassoons and other Baghdadi Jews who had fled from the Ottoman Empire and settled in British India. The Sassoons were able to rapidly gain market share from the British trading companies selling opium to China. They integrated vertically by becoming bankers to the opium crop dealers in India, enabling them to control production, and they took control of the local opium auctions in India along with other Baghdad Jewish families. Dent’s went bankrupt in 1867, but Jardine Matheson responded to lower-​cost local competition in a fashion which later other Western MNEs would follow. It withdrew from opium trading, itself under an increasingly cloud of legitimacy as its dangerous medical consequences were realized, and shifted into higher value-​ added and more respectable activities, including shipping, ports, and railroad building, in which it held stronger advantages in management and access to finance (Connell, 2004; Jones, 2000). The major strategic challenges faced by Western MNEs, then, lay more in execution in the face of the poor transport and communications infrastructure. Finding oil when exploration techniques were primitive, transporting oil from where it was found to where it could be shipped to consumers, building bridges and railroads in inhospitable and physically dangerous terrains, and turning malaria-​infested tropical lands into banana plantations were all massive technological, financial, and organizational tasks. They were, however, essential because investment strategies were heavily focused on supplying commodities and foodstuffs—​whether minerals, petroleum, bananas, tea, or beef—​to global value chains. Most minerals and agricultural commodities were exported with only the minimum of processing. This meant that most value was added to products after they left producer countries. The MNEs that succeeded in this era, then, needed the technological, and especially the organizational, capabilities required to overcome major logistical challenges. In the case of Pearson in Mexico, for example, the firm transferred best-​practice engineering capabilities to its construction projects, proceeding where others failed. In contrast, the firm’s oil exploration efforts failed miserably until high-​quality geologists were hired from the United States (Jones & Bud-​Frierman, 2016). However, organization mattered more than technology. The Singer Sewing Machine Company, a rare case of a manufacturing company which sold products to emerging markets, expanded globally from the 1860s until it held a 90% share of world sewing machine sales by 1914, including in India and other emerging markets. The firm’s technology was broadly comparable to other firms, and its success lay in a series of organizational innovations including enabling potential consumers to buy the product using hire purchase, and establishing a

62   Geoffrey Jones direct sales force which enabled it to sell machines and collect payments. A striking feature of this firm was that these organizational innovations originated in host economies as the firm expanded globally, being subsequently transferred throughout the organization (Carstensen, 1984). This firm depended more on its organizational capabilities than insider advantages, and more developed markets remained the most important part of its business. An important managerial capability was to adapt to the quite different legal, market, and cultural contexts of emerging markets without losing original capabilities. The overall strategy of successful British overseas banks in Asia and elsewhere, for example, showed little innovation. They focused on trade finance and foreign exchange, and as in Britain, short-​term lending was the norm, and equity stakes in industrial or agricultural ventures were never taken voluntarily. The execution of this strategy, however, was more radical. While in Britain, banks would always lend on the basis of security, usually property; in many developing countries this was not an option, sometimes, as in Iran, because of legal restrictions on the foreign ownership of property. British banks ended up, as a result, lending against share certificates, commodities, and even a person’s reputation. They also engaged in extensive lending and borrowing with indigenous bankers, whether compradors in China, shroffs in Sri Lanka, or sarrafs in Iran (Jones, 1993). The MNEs which succeeded most in developing countries in the first global economy, then, combined contact capabilities with colonial regimes and other Western business networks with organizational capabilities, especially the ability to respond flexibly but effectively to often more unpredictable and challenging operating conditions than in their home countries. The logistical challenges of doing business in the emerging markets were by far the greatest managerial challenge.

IB Strategies in Emerging Markets During the Great Reversal The previous strategies of Western MNEs contributed significantly to the growth of restrictive, anti-​foreign policies which now excluded them from many emerging markets. The close links between companies, colonial regimes, and oppressive dictators served to undermine the legitimacy of global capitalism in the eyes of many people. There seemed to be few benefits to countries and their peoples of foreign MNEs, and huge downsides. Many of the natural-​resource investments in the first wave of globalization had been highly enclavist. Foreign firms had been large employers of labor. US mining and smelting properties in Mexico alone are estimated to have employed more than 500,000 in 1915, but here and elsewhere expatriates held all the skilled and managerial posts (Headrick, 1988; Wilkins, 1970). It was a similar story with the French-​controlled Suez Company, which built and operated the Suez Canal in Egypt between 1854 and its

International Business in Historical Perspective    63 nationalization in 1956. The canal had a major stimulus on the Egyptian economy, but until 1936 the Egyptian staff was almost exclusively unskilled workers (Piquet, 2004). Given that the major challenges faced by Western multinational firms were political and regulatory, responses to political risk rose to the forefront of corporate strategies. The end of imperialism, and the adoption of more assertive government policies in many emerging markets, did not initially prompt MNEs to divest their investments. Indeed, there was initially considerable optimism among Western firms after 1950 about the economic prospects of Latin American, West African, and Asian countries. This prompted new Western multinational investment, as firms were anxious to get a share of what looked fantastic growth opportunities. German MNEs, for example, invested heavily in a number of developing countries, especially Brazil, but also Argentina, India, and Iran. By 1961 38% of all German FDI was in emerging markets. But as political and economic problems mounted, German firms shifted their attention to Europe. By 1971 only 20% of German FDI was in developing countries (Schröter 1993). During the 1960s and 1970s there was a general exodus from emerging markets. As taxes and regulations grew in India, British firms and shareholders sold their interests and investments to Indian-​owned business groups such as the Tata’s and Birlas (Jones, 2000). Most major US firms, including IBM, also fled from India in response to government insistence on majority ownership of their affiliates. In Malaysia, British companies remained prominent during the 1960s, in part because the new ethnic Malay government was concerned to keep a check on the minority, ethnic Chinese business sector. However the strategies of the British firms were molded by the postcolonial government, and as frustration with the government mounted, and concerns about the future grew, the long-​established merchant houses began to seek opportunities outside the country (White, 2004). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, steps were taken to reduce the role of British and other Western firms in the plantation and mining sector even in Malaysia. In 1981 the Malaysian government, using adroit moves on the London Stock Exchange, secured control over the largest British rubber and oil palm business in Malaysia, the Guthrie Corporation (Yacob & White, 2010). As tensions mounted between governments and firms, sometimes MNEs sought the assistance of their home governments to resist expropriation. In the early 1950s, United Fruit lobbied extensively, making expert use of public relations consultants, to secure US intervention against the democratically elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatelama, after he had sought to expropriate the millions of unused lands which they held as part of their banana empire. Arbenz was overthrown by a CIA-​orchestrated coup in 1954, and a military dictatorship installed (Jones & Bucheli, 2016). The nationalization of the Anglo-​Iranian Oil Company’s oil concession in Iran in 1951 was also eventually met by a British and American orchestrated coup which overthrew the government in 1953, although in this instance Anglo-​Iranian, and its stake in the Iranian oil industry, was marginalized during the years leading up to the coup (Bamberg, 1994). By the 1970s Western companies were rarely able to directly topple governments, even when they wanted to, but involvement in the politics of developing countries with fragile governance systems did not cease. In 2004 a US Senate report carefully documented

64   Geoffrey Jones the role of US oil companies and financial institutions in making and laundering corrupt payments over the previous decade to political leaders in Equatorial Guinea, a poor West African country rich in oil and other natural resources, whose government was deeply implicated in human rights abuses. Oil companies paid for scholarships for children of the country’s leaders, went into joint ventures with government officials, and rented property from the ruling family and their supporters, with the apparent complicit knowledge of the US Embassy (US Senate, 2004). Most MNEs, if they did not divest, strove to adjust their strategies to postcolonial realities rather than thwart them. In British colonial Africa, there was a widening rift between British firms and colonial governments as states such as Nigeria and Ghana approached independence (Stockwell, 2000; Tignor, 1998). The firms shifted their political networks to the emerging elites of these countries. British banks, traders, and manufacturing companies used their advertising to remold their corporate images as agents of modernity and economic development in West Africa. This strategy met with considerable success, at least until the 1970s when the spread of dependency and socialist ideologies seriously challenged the legitimacy of capitalist enterprise (Decker, 2007). There were other strategies also to align the interests of MNEs with changing political realities. Among the most important was the localization of staff. The Anglo-​Dutch consumer products company Unilever began experimenting with appointing nationals to managerial positions in India and Ghana in the 1930s. The localization of its management in developing countries intensified thereafter, driven in part by a desire to reduce costs. While in 1940 virtually all of Unilever’s managers in Hindustan Lever, its Indian affiliate, were expatriates; by 1950 it only had 50 expatriates, and by 1966 there were only 6 expatriates in a total of 360 managers in what had become one of India’s biggest companies. Encouraged by the government, Unilever also sold 10% of the equity of Hindustan Lever in 1956, and appointed an Indian national as chairman in 1961. Although Unilever disliked selling equity in its affiliates, it pursued localization of management vigorously. By 1966, of the 2965 Unilever managers in developing countries, only 8% were expatriates (Jones, 2005b, 2013). The localization of staff is significant in explaining the scale and scope of Unilever’s business in developing countries during these decades, which was strikingly large compared to its major US competitor Procter & Gamble, which only had operations in a handful of emerging markets, including Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, and Venezuela, before the 1970s, primarily because of fears about political risks and hyper-​inflation (Dyer, Dalzell, & Olegario, 2004). It provides an important part of the explanation how Unilever was able to retain control over large businesses in countries such as India and Turkey where FDI as a whole dropped to low levels as a result of government exchange and price controls, as well as demands for majority equity participation in local subsidiaries. The early localization of senior management was critical in providing voice, contacts, and legitimacy in such countries, embedding the firm in local business and political systems. Unilever identified, and promoted to the most senior positions, some of the best business leaders of their generation in these and other developing countries. This meant not only that Unilever’s businesses were managed by good people

International Business in Historical Perspective    65 but also that it was able to function as a quasi-​insider within governmental and business networks in countries (Jones, 2013). In Unilever’s case, there were other considerations also. It was already selling and manufacturing in India in the interwar years, and entered Turkey in 1950. As Import Substitution Industrialization regimes were adopted, Unilever was well-​situated inside protected domestic markets, even though it had to contend with price and capacity controls, dividend limitations, and other government regulations. Unilever was able to transfer brands, technologies, and marketing methods from its businesses in developing markets and exploit them behind tariff walls. Unilever’s decentralized management structure permitted flexibility in adjusting to the different environments in these countries. In countries such as India and Turkey, the company made margarine from sunflower oil and toilet soap from palm oil. It invested in tomato puree, jasmine plantations, and chemicals. It exported shoes to meet government-​imposed export quotas. It engaged in rural development in India, and built its own power plants to run factories. This flexibility helped the local managers of the company, especially during the fraught 1970s, to engage in prolonged negotiations to delay government plans for local subsidiaries to become locally owned. In both countries, as a result, Unilever was able to retain majority control until the early 1980s, when pressures for localization abated (Jones, 2013). Unilever’s strategy in developing countries rested on patience regarding rates of return. Unilever took a long-​term view that sooner or later, as incomes rose, people in every country would want to consume the company’s products. It accepted low-​ dividend remittances for years, or decades, from both Indian and Turkish businesses, as well as from many countries in Africa, both to build up businesses and to wait for better times. It made large investments in plant and equipment—​often at the expense of short-​term remittances for dividends to its shareholders—​in order to build sustainable businesses. Only a firm of its size and financial strength, as well as willingness to put managerial imperatives ahead of shareholder interests, could make such decisions (Jones, 2013). Learning to negotiate with the governments of emerging markets was the key to corporate success in this era. The case of the Brazilian automobile industry illustrates its importance. During the 1950s the government of President Juscelino Kubitschek implemented strategies to encourage foreign firms to build an automobile assembly industry in his country. The strategy involved both foreign exchange and tax subsidies, alongside the progressive closure of the market to imported finished vehicles. Despite multiple pleas from the government, Ford, which assembled vehicles from kits and had dominated the market, refused to invest in automobile assembly, as did its major US rival, General Motors. Instead Germany’s Volkswagen, which had no production beyond its home country before 1956, successfully entered vehicle production. By the mid-​1960s, Volkswagen had captured over 40% of the expanding Brazilian market, while former market leader Ford had been reduced to 6%, and General Motors to 7% (Shapiro, 1994). MNEs in the resource sector had less scope to negotiate with governments. From the late 1960s governments in most developing markets moved to take over foreign

66   Geoffrey Jones ownership of the natural resources in their countries. Often this was done by outright nationalization, which left companies little to negotiate about except, if they were fortunate, compensation terms. In more pro-​Western countries, such as Malaysia, state-​ owned companies were used as vehicles to buy the foreign companies which owned the country’s vast rubber and oil palm plantations, with domicile then being transferred back to Malaysia and the management localized (Jones, 2000). While local ownership over natural resources became a matter of principle for many governments, control was another matter. In the case of plantations, Western companies often negotiated long-​ term purchasing and technical contracts with local producers, leaving them with the most valuable parts of the commodity value chain—​transport and distribution—​while relieving them of the embarrassment of employing and managing tens of thousands of impoverished plantation workers (Jones, 2005b). The limited scope for negotiation was especially evident in the petroleum sector. The large Western oil companies, which counted among the largest capitalist enterprises on the planet, found themselves especially exposed to growing political risk in the Middle East and Latin America. Although the attempt to nationalize the oil industry in Iran in 1951 was thwarted, there was growing pressure from host countries for more control over their own resources, and for more participation in the benefits of oil, as energy consumption boomed during the postwar era of economic miracles in Europe and Japan, and as the United States was transformed from being an oil exporter to an oil importer. In 1960 Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1968 OPEC issued a statement declaring the inalienable right of oil producers to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. In 1970 Libya began a process of countries demanding greater shares of the profits from their oil; by 1972 countries were demanding shared participation; and after the Arab-​Israeli War of 1973, governments in the Arab world began nationalizing their industries. Venezuela nationalized its large oil industry, in which Shell was a major investor, in 1975. These events undermined the business model based on vertical integration which was central to how the oil industry had operated since the late 19th century. The momentum behind the new policies left the oil companies little negotiating flexibility to stop them. Instead there was innovation in new strategic directions. The most successful new strategy involved switching their exploration efforts toward finding oil in Western countries, such as the North Sea and Alaska. Both terrains posed challenging geological and logistical conditions, making exploration a high-​risk endeavor. In the end BP, which was heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and faced a threat to its existence, secured its future by making major discoveries, just in time, in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska and the Forties, and the North Sea, in 1969–​1970. Shell also made major exploration efforts offshore, and was especially successful in the North Sea. Two other strategies were pursued. First, as developing countries established their own oil companies on the basis of the nationalized assets, Shell in particular, but also the other companies, sought to enhance their technical skills and become providers of technical services to these companies. This proved quite successful also, although the Kuwait Oil Company and other national

International Business in Historical Perspective    67 oil companies quickly developed managerial and technological competences (Bamberg, 2000; Sluyterman, 2007). In the first era of globalization, Western MNEs had paid limited attention to the consumer markets of developing countries, as they were too poor to buy anything but basic items. After World War II, this strategy slowly began to change, but there were major issues of what to sell, and how to sell it. In consumer products, firms initially transferred products from developed countries to developing markets as their incomes rose. There was little product innovation as such, therefore, although sometimes brand images were changed, and sometimes consumers themselves found new uses for products. Because little attempt was made before the 1980s to reformulate shampoos for none-​ white ethnicities, for example, Vaseline petroleum jelly, created in mid-​19th-​century America and used as soothing skin cream, became widely used in postwar Africa as a hair product (Jones, 2005b). The direct transfer of Western consumer products to developing countries was sometimes highly problematic. The adverse consequences of the marketing of baby food by Nestlé became a cause célèbre, as it emerged that mothers regularly mixed the formula with polluted water, or else effectively starved their babies as they could not pay for a sufficient amount of the product (Bader, 1980). As deleterious was the spread of cigarette consumption. From the early 20th century Western tobacco companies had played an inglorious role in using their marketing and distribution capabilities to grow cigarette consumption in Asian and other developing countries. During the second half of the century, as health concerns and consequent regulation mounted in developed countries, cigarette MNEs expanded their businesses in developing countries (Shepherd, 1989; Yach & Bettcher, 2000). In many other cases, the attempt to transfer Western consumer products to developing country markets was just commercially unsuccessful. During the 1960s, for example, Unilever tried to sell its margarine in Thailand, only to discover that in countries that ate rice rather than bread, the market was strictly limited. Similarly, Unilever’s early attempts to sell ice cream in countries where electricity supplies were unreliable were not successful. Nor were attempts to sell branded convenience foods to countries where the urban middle class ate out cheaply on street stalls or in restaurants, while the rest of the population was too poor to buy branded products. It proved somewhat easier to sell some beverages to developing countries. Nestlé’s Nescafe instant coffee, invented in 1938, proved to be remarkably global food product (Jones, 2005b). There were also innovations in how to market consumer products to emerging markets in the era of the Great Reversal. In the beauty industry, for example, Western MNEs made markets and created consumer desires in Latin America. Marketing strategies were skillfully adjusted to local conditions. In interwar Brazil women seldom read newspapers, the traditional medium used elsewhere by toiletries and cosmetics companies for advertising. So Unilever switched to the more popular medium of radios. Latin American women were enticed with the opportunity to emulate the latest beauty fashions of the United States and Europe. American and European models were used in advertisements by the big cosmetics companies such as Max Factor. However,

68   Geoffrey Jones Ponds cream was advertised using Mexican celebrities during the 1930s, while Colgate-​ Palmolive, Unilever’s US competitor, featured famous Mexican singers such as the Aguilar Sisters on its weekly radio program (Jones, 2017). It was Colgate-​Palmolive which pioneered the radionovela concept in interwar Cuba, drawing on its promotion of the so-​called soap opera radio serials in the United States. It proved an effective tool to grow the market for toiletries in Latin America. The same firm sponsored the first radionovela in Brazil in 1941. The advent of television during the 1950s provided a new medium. A pioneering Mexican telenovela, which became such a distinctive Latin American cultural genre, came in 1958, when Televisa’s Canal 4 showed the Colgate-​Palmolive-​ sponsored Senda prohibida (Jones, 2017). The most important multinational in the Latin American beauty industry was Avon, the company which pioneered direct selling of cosmetics in the United States. In 1954 Avon, opened a new manufacturing businesses in Puerto Rico. Over the following decade manufacturing and selling operations were started in Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, and Brazil. Direct selling was perfect for Latin America. In most countries, there were few department stores and only fragmented retail channels. Direct selling by sales representatives enabled Avon to reach women in their workplaces and homes. By 1960 Avon had secured strong market positions in many countries, including Venezuela, where it controlled half of the cosmetics market. Avon was enormously skilled at marketing cosmetics. When it entered a new market, it began with acquainting representatives and customers with the Avon line. It provided representatives with the desirable products at good prices, so providing them with an attractive earning opportunity. It tailored its strategy to local circumstances. It invested heavily in cosmetics education in countries such as Venezuela, which at the time used few cosmetics. In Brazil Avon responded to prevailing gender norms which disapproved of women working outside the home by a campaign to portray direct selling as a respectable activity akin to marriage. It also created a new accounting system in response to escalating inflation rates during the 1960s (Jones, 2017). In the 1970s a handful of Western firms began to invest in product innovation designed to deliver products especially for emerging markets. Unilever’s large Indian affiliate, Hindustan Lever, which had created its own research facilities in the 1950s, was among the pioneers. It began selling its own distinctly Indian shampoo and toothpaste brands, as well as brands from Unilever’s global portfolio. More interesting, was the creation of Fair & Lovely skin-​lightening cream in 1978. This was cream designed to appeal to a traditional regard for fairer skin in India. The origins of such preferences lay deep in Indian history, which some traced back to the origins of the caste system 2500 years ago, when fair-​skinned foreigners established a class system with the indigenous darker-​skinned local population at the bottom. Much later, the era of British rule introduced a new set of rulers with lighter skins. Hindustan Lever now applied its scientific and branding capabilities to translate such cultural preferences into a highly successful brand, which became the best-​selling skin care brand in India. Fair & Lovely was based on a patented formulation containing an active ingredient which controlled the dispersion of melanin in the skin. The brand’s advertising promised greater fairness

International Business in Historical Perspective    69 within six weeks of using the product, and from the beginning the brand emphasized the improved marriage prospects of fair-​skinned women. Considerable use was made of endorsement by celebrities from the huge Indian cinema industry known as Bollywood, whose leading actors and actresses were overwhelmingly fair-​skinned (Jones, 2010). In most countries, if Western MNEs stayed, or were allowed to stay, they faced limited competition from local firms. Indeed, the government policies of this era were often as destructive of local capitalist enterprises as they were of foreign investment. In 1952, Bolivia, for example, became the first country to take over its tin industry. Although the Patiño group remained important in the marketing and smelting of tin, it was fragmented because of the loss of ownership of the mines. The same phenomenon was seen in Africa. Egypt had a highly developed private sector in an African context. Yet, by the 1960s, its large-​scale private sector had been entirely dismantled by government policies. Nigeria’s business communities, which had once appeared as dynamic forces, lost energy as they became deeply engaged in the ethnic and regional rivalry that became a feature of the country. As governments imposed extensive regulatory regimes, local entrepreneurs in developing markets grew their businesses more by using “contacts” rather than building technological and organizational capabilities. This did not necessarily prevent the creation of large firms, although it usually provided a weak foundation for competitiveness against Western firms, apart from their close connections to their government. India provided one case where local firms were able to slowly build organizational capabilities, despite the inefficiency and corruption of the country’s quasi-​socialist planning system. Indeed, the era laid the basis for India’s subsequent success in information technology. During the 1960s and 1970s a handful of locally owned firms were established to develop and run applications software for Indian companies and research institutions that had brought or leased mainframes from IBM and other US companies. Tata, which was India’s largest business group, established the first of these firms, Tata Consulting Services in 1968. In 1977 when the Indian government tightened the laws on foreign ownership of firms in the country, IBM and other US firms divested, opening new opportunities for the Tata venture, and for subsequent start-​ups such as Infosys. The Indian firms built a strong trade association, NASSCOM, which sought to enhance and certify the quality of Indian firms. By the time policy regulation got under way in 1991, which gave Indian information technology (IT) firms a freer hand in establishing marketing offices abroad and serving foreign clients, it had built strong organizational capabilities (Parthasarathy & Aoyama, 2006). One early challenger to MNEs came in detergents, where Nirma Industries challenged the long-​established hold on the Indian market by Unilever by introducing a game-​changing low-​priced detergent. The Indian fabrics market until then had been dominated by hard soap, and Unilever’s expensive, premium powder brand Surf was decimated after 1975 when Nirma launched a powder at parity with hard soaps but with much better washing powder, providing a new value for money concept. Having begun with such low-​price products, Nirma moved up-​market with products which

70   Geoffrey Jones directly competed with Unilever’s customer base and took market share from them. It was only after a significant delay that Hindustan Lever was able to respond with a low-​cost but quality product, although it turned out that this traumatic episode exercised a long-​term impact on Unilever’s strategy in developing markets (Jones, 2005b). The MNEs that succeeded best in developing markets in this environment tended to have decentralized management systems which were capable of turbulent economic and financial environments, dealing with high levels of intervention by governments, and the disruption of global value chains.

IB Strategies in Emerging Markets in the Second Global Economy The era of the second global economy enabled MNEs to pursue new strategies. In particular, the lowering of barriers to foreign companies in many emerging markets, combined with transport innovation such as container shipping and by digital communication, enabled Western firms to exploit the low-​cost labor of developing countries. The transfer of assembly facilities to low-​wage locations in developing countries, which were frequently free trade and low tax zones, had been pioneered by the semiconductor industry as long ago as the 1960s. Southeast Asia and Mexico were initially the major locations. By 2000 1.3 million Mexicans were employed in foreign multinational-​owned factories that assembled imported components for export, mostly located just over the border with the United States. These maquiladoras accounted for over 40% of total Mexican exports (Jones, 2005a). By then the outsourcing of multinational production to China had become a major trend, making that country essential to global value chains. Apple provided a prominent example. Apple began outsourcing to the Taiwanese company Foxcomm in the late 1990s. The company had close relations with local government officials in China who provided cheap land and subsidies. When the iPhone was launched in 2007, Foxcomm secured agreement with the local government in Zhengzhou to subsidize the building of an industrial park located inside a bonded zone, with customs facilities at the factory gate to facilitate iPhone exports. The local government provided billions of dollars of subsidies, and recruited and trained a manufacturing workforce which by 2016 amounted to 350,000 workers. Foxcomm manufactured 90% of Apple’s iPhones (Barboza 2016). The heavy reliance on China in global value chains required the managers of Western firms to abide closely to Chinese political and legal requirements, in complete contrast to the case of opium trading in the first global economy. In 2017 Apple had to stop selling virtual private network software which had allowed users in China to access content banned by Chinese censors in the so-​called Great Firewall of China (Kuchler & Seddon, 2017).

International Business in Historical Perspective    71 The offshoring of services to developing countries also gained major momentum. In particular, the revolution in the speed of communications through the World Wide Web, satellites, and optical fiber cables provided new opportunities for MNEs to reduce costs by locating parts of their value chain in developing countries and by making outsourcing in information technology and offshore services feasible. The offshoring of IT services from the United States to India which began in the 1980s drove the dramatic growth of Bangalore (Jones, 2005a). There were new complexities arising from the changing nature of markets. On the one hand, globalization appeared to be working toward a further homogenization of markets worldwide. Ohmae’s “borderless world” and Friedman’s “flat world” were among the popular descriptions of such homogenization trends (Friedman, 2005; Ohmae, 1990). The evidence of flattening seemed visible in everything from the worldwide spread of English to the presence of McDonald’s hamburger stores in 120 countries. The growing populations of emerging markets, especially their urban middle classes with rising incomes, resulted in fast-​growing markets for industries extending from pharmaceuticals to automobiles. On the other hand, there were also other processes at work. The globalization of the ubiquitous hamburger helped stimulate, around the world, a local, cultural, ethnic, religious reaction, which was termed “tribalization” by the political theorist Benjamin Barber (Barber, 1995). As global markets spread, existing consumer and social groupings began to fragment as local cultures asserted themselves with greater confidence. To revert to the example of the beauty industry, the result was a new set of marketing opportunities and challenges for MNEs. The opportunities in emerging markets were enormous. In the 1980s the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were the dominant markets for the industry. China’s consumption of beauty products other than toiletries was close to zero. By 2010 Brazil, China, Russia, and India had become the world’s third, fourth, eighth, and fourteenth largest beauty markets (Jones, 2010). The culturally specific beauty industry was a particularly good example of the tensions between flatness and tribalization in the second global economy—​the spread of mega-​brands such as L’Oréal Paris skin cream and cosmetics to this new generation of consumers in emerging and transition economies; the globalization of celebrity culture; and the diffusion of the aspirational appeal of New York and Paris. Yet there was also a resurgence of pride in local beauty identities throughout emerging markets. This obliged firms to innovate in ways to make global brands seem locally relevant. These conflicting trends were evident in the booming China beauty market. As the market began to grow during the 1980s, local brands had been perceived as poor quality and lacking aspirational qualities. As a result, Japanese and Western brands rapidly gained market share, even if product formulations were changed, and if firms responded to local preferences for skin-​whitening products. Over time more complex trends became apparent. Chinese consumers seemed to combine great enthusiasm for the aspirational nature of Western-​sounding beauty brands with a growing desire for local relevance. As a result, US and European MNEs experimented with Asian-​specific executions of global platforms. Many Chinese consumers wanted to see Chinese faces as models, but there

72   Geoffrey Jones remained uncertainty within the industry about how far localization should be taken, and what form it should take. L’Oréal Paris, which had once only used white, preferably French, models, had four leading Chinese celebrities, including Gong Li and Zhang Ziyi, as spokesmodels by 2008, chosen in part to reflect the diversity of China’s population. The localization of spokesmodels in China was only one aspect of the search for local relevance. Western companies employed local talent for photographical shoots as a means to getting greater local aesthetic sensitivity. Local ingredients were also featured in global brands, not as in the past for reasons of availability and cost but to enhance their appeal. Chinese consumers wanted their Western shampoos to include black sesame and ginseng, or to have local herbs in their toothpaste (Jones, 2010). During the second global economy, MNEs faced much more effective competition from locally owned companies, at least in some developing countries. In pharmaceuticals, for example, Western MNEs now encountered successful local companies in India and elsewhere. They were sometimes favored by policies of national preference in contracts and regulations, often out of concern to provide their populations with cheaper drugs. Some firms in India and China in particular developed skills to manufacture low-​cost versions of goods for mass markets. This so-​called frugal engineering posed a major threat to the higher-​cost structures of MNEs from developed countries (Kumar, 2008). Only a few MNEs were able to develop production and marketing strategies which kept their costs down, and were capable of selling to the world’s poorest at the “bottom on the pyramid” (Prahalad, 2005). These included Unilever, which after experiencing the onslaught by Nirma pioneered strategies such as selling consumer products in small sachets which the very poor could buy. In some cases local firms based in large and fast-​growing emerging markets became powerful global competitors to Western MNEs. The most dramatic examples included China’s Huawei and the Gulf airlines, Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar. In another break from the past, emerging market firms also acquired global businesses and brands from Western MNEs. Examples included Lenovo’s acquisition of the IBM personal computer division in 2005; Tata Motor’s acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover from Ford in 2008; and Natura’s acquisition of The Body Shop from L’Oréal in 2017. There were several drivers behind the growth of more competitive locally owned firms in developing markets. The dynamics of the global economy lowered the barriers for new entrants from emerging markets because of the disintegration of production systems and their replacement by networks of interfirm linkages. The rapid growth of outsourcing and subcontracting to contract manufacturers created new opportunities for firms to grow. The growth of global capital markets made it much easier to raise funds, at least if a company was in a well-​regarded country, such as India or Chile. The barriers to building managerial capabilities were reduced. Returning diaspora became important sources of managerial knowledge to Chinese and Indian firms (Pandey, 2004). Both business schools and management consultants provided much easier access to new management knowledge, and assumed important roles in building organizational capabilities. The leaders of many of the largest firms in emerging markets were typically educated at leading American business schools. In some cases, as in China and the Gulf, governments provided

International Business in Historical Perspective    73 powerful financial support to local firms, often state-​owned or at least state-​affiliated, for strategic reasons. As local firms in emerging markets gained competitiveness, MNEs with strong proprietary technologies and well-​regarded brands were best-​placed to compete with local firms which were expert in frugal engineering. MNEs with global design and product capabilities were also able to retain advantages competitive against local rivals, especially if their marketing and other strategies were able to combine their global capabilities with local relevance. Both Western and Japanese MNEs were also able to build advantages in emerging markets, including China, by emphasizing that their products were of the highest quality and safe to both consumers and the environment.

Conclusion In the first era of globalization, the strategies of MNEs in the developing world had been straightforward. They had sought access to their resources, and governments had frequently given them exclusive contracts and favorable deals in order to build businesses. Innovation had rested more in overcoming logistical challenges to enable minerals and other commodities to be exported into global value chains. During the Great Reversal, the main challenges faced by MNEs were political. Mounting hostility led many firms to divest, and to invest elsewhere. Politics, exchange controls, and trade restrictions curbed the role of emerging markets in global value chains. The MNEs that remained needed to build political contacts with local governments, and attempt to strengthen their local identities, especially by localizing their managements. There was relatively little attempt to adjust products to highly protected markets. There was also relatively little need to adjust to local competition. In the contemporary global economy, political risks declined with the spread of liberalization and the abandonment of anti-​foreign restrictions. There was no sudden reversion to the pre-​1929 situation, however, and in major emerging markets, corporate strategies needed to carefully manage relations with the government. China was in an special category in this regard by virtue of the country’s size, its accelerating development and technological level, and the special position of the ruling Communist Party. Emerging markets, or at least the larger and more fast-​growing ones in Asia and Latin America, were increasingly seen as indispensable by MNEs in every industry. They were a place both to assemble manufactured goods and locate activities in the lower end of global value chains and a growing market. However, there was a growing need in some at least emerging markets to incorporate local relevance into global products.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the editors and Stephen J. Kobrin for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

74   Geoffrey Jones

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International Business in Historical Perspective    75 Jones, G. 2014. Firms and global capitalism. In L. Neal & J. G. Williamson (Eds.), The Cambridge history of capitalism (vol. 2):  169–​ 200. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Jones, G. 2017. Globalizing Latin American beauty. ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America, 16(3): 10–​14. Jones, G. 2000. Merchants to Multinationals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jones, G. 2005a. Multinationals and global capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jones, G. 2005b. Renewing Unilever. Transformation and tradition. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Jones, G., & Bucheli, Marcelo 2016. The octopus and the generals: The United Fruit Company in Guatemala. Harvard Business School Case 9-​805-​146: revised  July. Jones, G., & Bud-​Frierman, L. 2016. Weetman Pearson and the Mexican oil industry. Harvard Business School Case 9-​804-​085: revised  May. Kuchler, H., & Seddon, M. 2017. Apple removes apps that bypass China’s censors. Financial Times, July 30. https://​www.ft.com/​content/​e83e8034-​7543-​11e7-​90c0-​90a9d1bc9691. Accessed August 1 2017. Kumar, N. 2008. Emerging MNCs:  Trends, patterns, and determinants of outward FDI by Indian enterprises. In R. Rajan, R. Kumar, & N. Virgill (Eds.), New dimensions of economic globalization: 141–​169. Singapore: World Scientific. Ohmae, K. 1990. The Borderless World:  power and strategy in the Interlinked economy. New York: HarperBusiness. O’Rourke, K., & Williamson, J. G. 1999. Globalization and history. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pandey, A., Aggarwal, A. Devane, R., & Kuznetsov, Y. 2004. Evalueserve India’s transformation to knowledge-​based economy—​Evolving role of the Indian diaspora. http://​info.worldbank.org /​etools/​docs/​library/​152386/​abhishek.pdf. Accessed July 8 2017. Parthasarathy, B., & Aoyama, Y. 2006. From software services to R&D services: Local entrepreneurship in the software industry in Bangalore, India. Environment and Planning A, 38: 1269–​1285. Piquet, C., 2004. The Suez Company’s concession in Egypt, 1854-​1956: Modern infrastructure and local economic development. Enterprise & Society, 5(1): 107–​127. Prahalad, C. K. 2005. The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing. Schröter, H. G. 1993. Continuity and change:  German MNEs since 1850. In G. Jones & H. G. Schröter (Eds.), The rise of MNEs in continental Europe:  28–​48. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar. Shapiro, H. 1994. Engines of growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shepherd, P. 1989. Transnational corporations and the denationalization of the Latin American cigarette industry. In A. Teichova, M. Lévy-​Leboyer, & H. Nussbaum (Eds.), Historical studies in international corporate business:  201–​228. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Sluyterman, K. 2007. Keeping competitive in turbulent markets, 1973-​2007. A history of Royal Dutch Shell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stockwell, S. 2000. The business of decolonization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Tignor, R. 1998. Capitalism and nationalism at the end of empire:  State and business in decolonizating Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya, 1945-​ 1963. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press.

76   Geoffrey Jones UNCTAD. 2008. World investment report 2008. Transnational corporations and the infrastructural challenge. New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. US Senate. 2004. Permanent subcommittee on investigations, money laundering and foreign corruption: Enforcement and effectiveness of the Patriot Act, July 15. https://​www.hsgac.senate.gov /​.../​report-​money-​laundering-​and-​foreign-​corruption-​en. White, N. J. 2004. British business in post-​colonial Malaysia, 1957-​70 London:  Routledge; Curzon. Wilkins, M. 1994. Comparative hosts. Business History, 36(1): 18–​50. Wilkins, M. 1970. The emergence of multinational enterprise. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press. Wilson, C. 1954. The history of Unilever. A study in economic growth & social change (vol. 1). London: Cassel. Yach, D., & Bettcher, D. 2000. Globalization of tobacco industry influences and new global responses. Tobacco Control, 9: 206–​218. Yacob, S., & White, N. J. 2010. The “unfinished business” of Malaysia’s decolonization: The origins of the Guthrie “dawn raid.” Modern Asian Studies, 44(5): 919–​960.

Chapter 4

E c onomics, Tra nsi t i ons , and Traps in E me rg i ng Markets John M. Luiz

Future drivers of world growth will be emerging markets. This is as a result of factors related to a confluence of forces in both developed and emerging economies. There are indications that “zero-​growth could be the new long-​term normal in developed economies” (Perotti, 2016). Per capita incomes have been stagnating in these countries since the global crisis of 2008 and there are no immediate indications of a reversal of this trend. The debt overhang and a “secular stagnation” related to demographic factors and a flattening of productivity growth have been put forward as possible reasons. Emerging markets, on the other hand, despite recent slowdowns, have underlying growth potential and thus warrant further exploration. However, these emerging economies are not predestined to an exponential growth trajectory—​the potential is there, but the path ahead will be more complex with multiple outcomes possible. The economic environment of emerging markets is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. This is a function of these countries undergoing complex transitions politically, economically, and socially. This process of change triggers economies of disequilibria and businesses will have to be flexible and have strategies that allow for operating in such environments. Higher returns will go hand in hand with greater risks and higher transaction costs associated with the institutional complexity of doing business in these settings, evidenced by political and policy uncertainty. The chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the economic characteristics of emerging markets and the costs of doing business there. I then examine their economic prospects and the challenges they may face. In particular, I put forward the notion of middle-​income traps (MITs) as a possible structural impediment to the realization of high growth and the implications for business when operating within these traps.

78   John M. Luiz

The Economics of Emerging Markets Emerging markets have been defined in many different ways based on GDP per capita, above-​average economic growth, newly industrializing status, and rising trade and investment patterns, among other factors. In this chapter I focus on emerging markets as middle-​income countries (MICs) and exclude high-​income countries (HICs) that may have newly industrialized and low-​income countries (LICs) that are below industrial thresholds and levels of development. I use World Bank definitions regarding income levels for my categorization. Low-​income economies are defined as those with a gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $1025 or less in 2015; lower middle-​income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $1026 and $4035; upper-​middle-​income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $4036 and $12,475; high-​income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,476 or more. Using this classification, 79 countries qualify as high income, 108 as middle income, and 31 as low income. Within the middle-​income group, 52 are classified as lower-​middle-​and 56 as upper-​middle-​ income countries. I  differentiate between upper-​middle-​income and lower MICs because of the structural changes often triggered in this transition which I discuss further below. Whereas MICs show significant variation among socioeconomic characteristics, World Bank data demonstrate that a “typical” MIC would have an income per capita of about $4700, have achieved an annual economic growth rate of 5.2% over the past two decades, an adult literacy rate of 84%, an infant mortality rate which has improved by almost half since 1995, a life expectancy approaching 71 years, a working-​age population proportion of 67%, a rural population which has just recently dropped below 50%, and a rapidly declining poverty ratio. Im and Rosenblatt summarize it as follows, a “typical MIC still has substantial shares of its population toiling at relatively low productivity occupations, with limited access to capital, and with earnings that are relatively low on a global scale. . . . MICs are countries that made substantial progress in social and economic outcomes, but still lag significantly behind the rich countries in most social and economic indicators” (2013: 2). In 2015, a world GDP of almost $74 trillion was still largely composed of GDP from HICs with MICs contributing $26.3 trillion and LICs less than $0.4 trillion. But the trend is in the direction of MICs that have seen their share of world GDP rise from 22% in 1960 to 36% by 2015. This increasing share has been the consequence of higher levels of GDP growth for MICs over this protracted period. This, in turn, has triggered structural changes in these economies as they shift from large primary sectors to industries with increasing levels of innovation, reflecting their status as important hubs of manufacturing (see Table 4.1). Emerging markets have become noteworthy players in international markets and are generally relatively open economies. They export roughly 30% of their GDP, and import close to 25%. They are significant exporters of raw materials and manufactured goods

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    79 but there are regional variations. Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East are major exporters of commodities and feature less prominently with manufactured exports whereas the reverse is true with the East Asian economies. This affects trade patterns within and between groupings with two-​thirds of exports from MICs being destined for HICs (World Bank, 2017). Concerning foreign direct investment (FDI), Asia continues to account for the dominant share of FDI inflows into developing regions. Within regional emerging markets the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) feature prominently and are growing sources of investment into other developing regions. For instance, 35% of Indian outward FDI stock is in Asia, 50% of South African outward FDI stock is in Asia and Africa, and 75% of Chinese FDI stock is invested in Asia economies (UNCTAD, 2016: 12). Doing business in emerging markets is not without costs and pitfalls. The World Bank (2005: 3) concludes that businesses in less developed countries face much higher regulatory burdens than those in developed countries. In fact, they face three times the administrative costs, and nearly twice as many bureaucratic procedures and delays associated with them, and have less than half the protections of property rights of wealthier countries. Since the 2005 report, developing economies have undertaken some of the most significant reforms in terms of improving the regulatory environment and lowering the cost of doing business in these economies. The trend in terms of business regulation and transaction costs is therefore positive, and repeatedly developing economies are showing the greatest improvements year on year within these measures. For example, sub-​Saharan African businesses generally face some of the worst regulatory burdens, but the region accounts for over a quarter of all reforms undertaken globally in the past year. Emerging economies are increasingly realizing the importance of improving business regulatory conditions and undertaking the necessary reforms as a result. But the burdens are still relatively higher in these economies despite the reforms and this is a consideration when investing in these countries. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (2016) ranks economies (with 1 being the best, and 190 the worst) in terms of the regulatory environment and whether it is conducive to business operation, and the average ranking for MICs is 106 (compared to 27 for the OECD countries).

Future Economic Prospects and Challenges for Emerging Markets Economic growth in emerging markets is not inevitable. Higher growth has been the result of positive changes, and reforms undertaken in these countries and their continued success will require additional reforms. The challenges these economies experience as their income levels rise will be different from those faced in the past and will require a new set of reforms. Often the second or third round of reforms is tougher to undertake than the initial reforms as vested interests organize to block these1 and countries as a

6056

1598

3346

9768

9005

2640

9093

5724

5815

9126

618

Colombia

India

Indonesia

Malaysia

Mexico

Nigeria

Russia

South Africa

Thailand

Turkey

Low income

47,151bn

26,367bn

394bn

717bn

395bn

315bn

1,331bn

481bn

1,143bn

296bn

861bn

2,095bn

292bn

11,008bn

240bn

1774bn

583bn

GDP (US$)

Source: World Bank (2016, 2017)

39717

8028

China

High income

13416

Chile

4776

8539

Brazil

Middle income

13432

Argentina

GDP per capita (US$)

1.5

9.3

30.8

8.5

9.1

2.4

4.6

20.9

3.6

8.5

13.5

17.0

6.8

8.9

3.9

5.2

6.0

Agric (%GDP)

24.7

33.4

21.2

26.5

35.7

28.9

32.6

20.4

32.8

36.4

40.0

29.7

34.0

40.9

32.8

22.7

27.8

Industry (%GDP)

14.8

20.0

8.2

17.6

26.9

13.2

14.2

9.5

18.4

22.8

20.8

16.2

12.2

29.7

11.9

11.4

17.2

Manuf (%GDP)

73.8

57.1

47.6

65.0

55.1

68.7

62.8

58.8

63.6

55.1

43.3

53.2

59.2

50.2

63.3

72.0

66.2

Services (% of GDP)

72

95

132

63

37

84

161

195

108

31

79

86

109

143

43

55

92

Time required to get electricity (days)

585

655

666

580

440

600

307

510

389

425

471

1420

1288

453

480

731

660

Time required to enforce a contract (days)

Table 4.1 Economic characteristics and costs of doing business in economic regions

36

40

51

41

33

29

47

33

52

40

30

61

70

68

29

68

138

Total tax rate (% of commercial profits)

1006

1598

2494

990

595

1830

2401

1564

1499

525

572

1332

2355

823

910

2323

1770

Cost to export (US$ per container)

1110

1883

3338

1235

760

2080

2595

1960

1888

560

647

1462

2470

800

860

2323

2320

11

26

43

14

13

21

19

34

11

8

26

21

13

24

12

17

30

Cost to import Time to (US$ per import container) (days)

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    81 result get stuck at stages of underdevelopment. This is particularly true for MICs and has resulted in the coining of the term “middle-​income traps” (MITs). Understanding the nature of these traps is important as it will affect the business environment going forward. Extrapolating growth patterns from the past into the future ignores the challenges that growth itself triggers.

Are Middle-​income Traps Inevitable? The past decade has seen the proliferation of research attempting to explain MITs both conceptually and empirically (Bulman, Eden, & Nguyen, 2017; Doner & Schneider, 2016; Vivarelli, 2016).2 This work exists alongside an even larger body of papers which suggests a changing geoeconomic momentum with MICs becoming future engines of economic growth. Various scenarios have been modeled to illustrate what the future composition of world GDP will look like and almost all of these capture a very different world order with today’s MICs soaring up GDP rankings. How do we reconcile these diverging narratives? It is possible for both of these to be realized. The momentum being experienced by today’s emerging markets may push them into the top echelons of size while future growth slowdowns may prevent them from reaching the high-​income-​per-​ capita range. This implies that while they may see significant changes in GDP, the GDP per capita may still find it hard to transcend the range implied by the traps. MITs refer to the experience of countries that achieved high economic growth rates in the past but which have become marooned in this middle-​income zone that has seen their growth rates decline and their struggle to transition to high-​income status. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2013: 2) analyze the incidence of growth slowdowns in fast-​growing MICs, and find dispersion in the per capita income at which slowdowns occur. They find two modes, one in the $10,000–​$11,000 range and another at $15,000–​ $16,000 in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars. At these points, the growth rate of GDP per capita slows from 5.6% to 2.1%. They argue that these growth slowdowns are essentially productivity growth slowdowns—​with a drop in total factor productivity growth accounting for about 85% of the absolute reduction in the growth rate (Agenor & Canuto, 2012: 5–​6). Felipe, Abdon, and Kumar (2012) argue that a country is in a MIT if it has been in the middle-​income group longer than other countries have on average. They calculate this to be “more than 28 years in the lower-​middle-​income group and more than 14 years in the upper-​middle-​income group. These imply that a country that becomes lower-​middle-​income has to attain an average growth rate of at least 4.7% to avoid falling into the lower-​MIT and that a country that becomes upper-​middle-​income has to attain an average growth rate of at least 3.5% to avoid falling into the upper-​MIT” (2012: 45). Using these parameters they find that 35 of the 52 MICs in 2010 were in the MIT. By region, 13 are in Latin America, 11 are in the Middle East and North Africa, 6 are in sub-​Saharan Africa, and 3 are in Asia. The large number of countries in MITs suggests that there is something structural about the nature of MICs which results in their becoming marooned in this zone. They

82   John M. Luiz are able to generate high growth to transition into middle-​income status but then are unable to jump to the next phase. There is the infamous statement attributed to Charles de Gaulle about Brazil when he stated that “Brazil is the country of the future . . . and always will be.” This comment may well ring true for many currently much vaunted emerging markets that may find themselves in the process of “emerging” well beyond what might be considered a reasonable time period to transition into high-​income adulthood. Alternative explanations have been proposed as to why MITs arise. But the basic idea is that they find themselves struggling to compete with the low wages of LICs and the technological aptitude of advanced countries. Because wages and incomes have risen in MICs they are increasingly unable to compete in lower-​skilled, labor-​intensive activities but have not acquired enough human capital (and perhaps physical capital) or the necessary national innovation systems to compete with HICs in more sophisticated products (Im & Rosenblatt, 2013: 2). They are therefore squeezed from below and above and find themselves increasingly with less economic space to perform. The result is the increasing deindustrialization of MICs and a growth slowdown as countries are unable to transition to higher-​value activities. Kharas and Kohli (2011) state that moving up the value chain requires three fundamental transitions: “(i) from diversification to specialization, in moving away from only producing a wide range of mass products that require little skill, technology and know-​how; (ii) from the physical accumulation of factors to raise overall productivity to productivity-​led growth; and (iii) from centralized to decentralized economic management, so that government and institutions can respond faster to new information” (the latter referring to a move toward a more market-​based economy) (Van der Hout, 2014: 7). Understanding this phenomenon requires us to go back to early development economists who spoke about the structural changes economies need to go through to progress. They maintained that the problem facing Third World countries lay in the apparent vicious circle they found themselves in, whereby underdevelopment perpetuated itself. Kuznets wrote about a stage theory of long-​term development which implied “distinct time segments, characterized by different sources and patterns of economic changes” (1971: 243). The focus of these early development economists on structural changes and phases of economic development have direct bearing on my analysis of MITs. This literature suggests that these countries have become stuck in a trap and are struggling to adapt to the demands of the next phase which requires new institutions and new sources of competitive advantage to maneuver through complex product value chains necessitated by changing patterns of development and new competitive pressures.

The Politics of Transitions and Traps The political science literature comes at this discussion from a different angle. The focus here is less on structural changes within an economy as it develops and more on the political consequences and drivers of economic processes. Modernization theory’s basic tenet is that an overall economic expansion (measured in GDP per capita, the degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education) would lead to the complete

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    83 transformation of society which, in turn, would give rise to modern political institutions and a democratic dispensation. It was believed that a general social mobilization would ensue, which Deutsch defined as “the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior . . . away from a life of isolation, traditionalism and political apathy, and . . . into a different life of broader and deeper involvement in the vast complexities of modern life, including potential and actual involvement in mass politics” (1961: 78). In other words, it was expected that socioeconomic progress would promote educational attainment, which would further understanding of political issues and increase expectations for political participation and civil liberties. Increasing prosperity would also lead to the expansion and mobilization of the working class. All these factors would culminate in a revolt against the political status quo controlled by the traditional elites, in favor of competition for political power and the development of more modern sets of institutions. While Deutsch did not specify the form of this relationship, it would appear from his work that he regarded political modernization as a linear positive function of economic growth. History, however, does not vindicate such a linear correlation. Neubauer refined this theory by arguing that democratic political development may be a “threshold phenomenon” (1967: 1007): Certain levels of “basic” socioeconomic development appear to be necessary to elevate countries to a level at which they begin to support complex, nationwide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy. Once above this threshold, however, the degree to which a country will “maximize” certain forms of democratic performance is no longer a function of continued socioeconomic development. This literature on the relationship between economic and political outcomes has a direct bearing on the analysis of MITs. It proposes that economic progress may elicit sociopolitical change; and that political systems themselves have consequences for overall stability and the capacity of countries to grow economically. Given that MICs are moving between low-​and high-​income status, they are especially appropriate as a unit of analysis. It is then of little surprise to witness the ongoing political and economic travails of this group and the fact that so many appear to find themselves marooned in this zone of transition. Huntington argues very strongly against the tenets of modernization. He maintains that: “It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich” (1970: 319). He suggests that the poorest nations tend to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries just above them, but that wealthy countries tend to be the most stable. In other words, you either want to be poor and content in a low-​level equilibrium, or rich and content in a high-​level equilibrium. But trying to move between these two equilibria triggers processes of social mobilization which can result in political and economic extremism. This ties in with the MIT literature as it suggests that countries between low-​and high-​income status are subject to extraordinary pressures of social and institutional change, which result in high levels of volatility—​the outcome of which is uncertain. Fukuyama (2014: 7, 531) relates

84   John M. Luiz Huntington’s thesis to the case of emerging markets and says that the problem that many face is one of social change outstripping existing institutions. As economies grow, different social structures emerge and new technologies disrupt the status quo. How institutions are able to accommodate these new actors influences the ability of a country to transition from LIC to HIC status. Where institutions are unable to accommodate the new scenario it can lead to either political decay or a stable system of clientelism and elite coalitions built around the distribution of rents. Politics then centers on state capture and zero-​sum games over rent distribution rather than productive activities. Olson writing on the complexities of collective action and how this affects bargaining by interest groups especially during periods in which new orders are attempted says that new institutional frameworks are difficult to establish: “The interest of organizational leaders insures that few organizations for collective action in stable societies will dissolve, so these societies accumulate special interest organizations and collusions over time. . . . These organizations . . . have little incentive to make their societies more productive, but they have powerful incentives to seek a larger share of the national income even when this greatly reduces social output. . . . The barriers to entry established by these distributional coalitions and their slowness in making decisions and mutually efficient bargains reduces an economy’s dynamism and rate of growth” (1982: 75). There is therefore no guarantee that good institutions drive out the bad in an automatic, evolutionary process through modernization. At these critical dislocative junctures there is a need to leap (a big push—​a critical effort) beyond evolutionary dynamics. In recent history we have seen only a few MICs make this leap to a new equilibrium state. Often this leap itself is a function of some form of massive social upheaval. Charles Tilly makes the point concerning Europe and why it was the first to industrialize when he wrote: “War made the state and the state made the war.” And Thomas Jefferson once observed that “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants” (quoted in Olson, 1982: 141). Extreme turmoil is not the only way, and four countries that have recently escaped the MIT did so without a revolution (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Their authoritarian states were able to maneuver and accommodate a new political dispensation, building on the existing economic model, by capitalizing upon the legitimacy afforded by generating high levels of economic growth. For MICs facing slowdowns there is the prospect of aspirations running ahead of capability and generating high volatility. Another important characteristic of these four successes is that they all had relatively equitable income and wealth distributions at the outset of their take-​off phase which allowed for a focus on economic growth. But today MICs, in general, have comparatively unequal distributions. How is the pressure for distribution affected by economic and political systems and how is this related to MICs? Huntington states that “some measure of economic development is necessary to provide the means for instability” (1970: 326). It is this economic dynamic which triggers the effects of instability. In MICs with high levels of inequality there are questions about the appropriate level of redistribution, and this creates tensions between those who are net contributors to state revenue and those who

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    85 are the recipients of public goods; between those who are in favor of the status quo (the current insiders) and those who call for radical change (the outsiders); between macroeconomic conservativism and macroeconomic populism. Economic growth brings these challenges to the fore as it highlights the winners and losers as a result of this structural change. As societies change, so politicians also redirect their political positioning to capture the emerging median voter. What this all points to is the importance of the interplay between the political and economic dimensions which are always at play but where the consequences are particularly pivotal as countries transition from one stage to another. Thus trying to untangle the causes and consequences of MITs necessitates a closer examination of the underlying processes of social mobilization and how this connects with existing institutions.

A Comparison of Middle-​Income Countries: Who is Trapped? Using the Maddison (2013) dataset we examine per capita GDP for various countries starting in 1700 (or the most recent year for which data exists).3 A snapshot in 1870 shows Chile’s GDP per capita (1990 Int. GK$) at $129, South Korea $337, Thailand $608, Malaysia $663, Brazil $713, South Africa $807, Sweden $1345, Argentina $1468, USA $2445, England $3190, and Australia $3273. The industrialized world starts to pull away from the rest during the 19th century and the Asian economies do so from the 1950s. While South Africa and Brazil are in the middle of the pack in 1870, by 2010 they are at the bottom (see Figure 4.1).

35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000

0

1700 1802 1808 1814 1820 1826 1832 1838 1844 1850 1856 1862 1868 1874 1880 1886 1892 1898 1904 1910 1916 1922 1928 1934 1940 1946 1952 1958 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006

5,000

Sweden

England

Australia

USA

Brazil

Chile

S. Korea

South Africa/(Cape)

Malaysia

Figure 4.1  Per capita GDP for various countries from 1700 until 2010 (in 1990 international dollars) Source: Maddison data

86   John M. Luiz SA Malaysia Thailand S.Korea Chile Brazil Argentina USA Canada Australia England Sweden 0%

100%

200%

300%

1870–1924

400%

500%

1925–1950

600% 1951–1975

700%

800%

900%

1000%

1976–2010

Figure  4.2  Percentage growth in per capita gross domestic product for selected countries, 1870–​2010 Source: Author’s calculations based on Maddison data

We can explore this further by examining different phases of this performance (Figure 4.2). The period of high growth in England precedes this timeline, but it reflects the high growth in the late 19th century in the other HICs such as the USA and Sweden, and the rapid growth take-​off in the Asian economies post-​1950. But for two of the larger emerging economies, namely, Brazil and South Africa, there is a protracted period toward the end of the 20th century of relatively anemic growth. Both of these countries are considered quintessential examples of being trapped and have been stuck in the lower-​ middle income zone for over five decades despite showing high promise mid-​20th century. Likewise, Malaysia is regarded as an upper-​middle-​income trapped country, having spent 27 years as lower-​middle-​income and 20 years as an upper-​middle-​income country. We can show the numbers in many different ways but the picture which emerges continues to be the same. Figure 4.3 illustrates per capita GDP of Latin American and Asian countries and South Africa relative to the USA (in 1990 Int. GK$) from 1924. For Latin America the story is one of relative stagnation. We see the spectacular collapse of Argentina throughout the 20th century which is well documented. Brazil and South Africa trade places but stagnate. For Asia, we see the rise of Japan, followed by South Korea, then Malaysia, and finally more recently India. Van der Hout (2014: 21) examining growth trends from 1970 onward finds that the most stable income groups are the low-​and high-​income categories with 98.5% of the LICs remaining in the low-​ income category, and 99.8% of the HICs remaining in their income category. The most

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    87 90.00 80.00 70.00 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00

0.00

1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939 1942 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008

10.00

India

Japan

S. Korea

South Africa

Argentina

Brazil

Malaysia

Figure  4.3  Per capita gross domestic product of Asian and Latin American Countries and South Africa relative to the USA (in 1990 international dollars) Source: Maddison data

unstable group are the MICs that may transition from lower-​to upper-​middle-​income and then frequently fall back into a lower-​income category. Transitioning beyond MIC status has, however, proved remarkably elusive with just over two-​thirds of today’s MICs qualifying as being trapped using the definitions above.

Structural Changes in Middle-​income Economies: Constraints on Innovation Companies, and countries, compete on the basis of price/​cost, quality, and the level of innovation associated with their product space. The level of productivity affects the efficiency with which resources are employed to produce and compete on the basis of those three criteria. At lower levels of development countries generally compete on the basis of low-​cost structures, especially related to wage costs. This stage relies heavily on low-​skilled workers and relatively low levels of product sophistication. As countries develop and wage structures start to rise they need to transition to compete more effectively on the basis of quality and innovation which requires a more sophisticated skills set with higher levels of human capital. Moving up the value chain allows countries to absorb the higher cost structure by gaining a premium for greater levels of quality and, in time, a more sophisticated and innovative product portfolio. This is the challenge facing MICs (Lewin, Kenney, & Murmann, 2016). For example, Awate, Larsen, and Mudambi (2012) compare the production and technological capabilities of a growing global competitor in wind energy, Suzlon from India, with that of Vestas, a leading player from Denmark. They demonstrate that although Suzlon has caught up in terms of scale of production

88   John M. Luiz and cost structures it still lags significantly on innovation capabilities and continues to struggle to make that breakthrough in terms of innovation. Or, at a more basic level, Premier, the South African-​based multinational founded in 1820 and focused on fast-​ moving consumables, has grown into a significant player in this sector in Africa and parts of the Middle East but remains focused on low-​technology products. Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) use network theory methods to illustrate that a country’s trajectory is influenced by its capacity to develop capabilities that are required to produce more sophisticated products. Thus they see development as a process of not only producing the existing product set more effectively but also acquiring new complex capabilities to develop new products with higher levels of productivity. What this literature argues is that not all products matter equally for growth. Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and Felipe et al. (2012) maintain that MITs are associated with the product space and the export profile of these countries. Countries that have successfully transitioned out of middle-​income status are those that had more diversified, sophisticated export baskets which allowed them to leap to higher levels. Felipe et al. (2012: 39–​42) use a probabilistic measure of how close a product is to others and whether it is likely that the country can acquire the revealed comparative advantage in them through the transferability of capabilities. Of the 779 products that they analyzed, 352 are in the mid or high proximity (“good” products) and 427 are in the “bad” product space. They find that countries in MITs (especially lower income) export a substantial share of products that are both unsophisticated and not well connected to other products. Thus their explanation of what is affecting some MICs is that they never fully industrialized the way most developed countries did (due to their lower levels of sophistication and product connectedness), and now are undergoing some early deindustrialization. They link this to Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff ’s argument that deindustrialization is the result of the differential of labor productivity between manufacturing and services: “economies end up in a situation of ‘asymptotic stagnancy’, where the long-​run growth is essentially determined by the growth of productivity in the service sector, which is lower than that in manufacturing” (1989: 43). Examining the long-​term structural changes in terms of contribution toward GDP reveals a definite pattern for Brazil and South Africa. For the sake of space I do not provide the time series data here, but using World Bank numbers the following is apparent (see Table 4.2). Manufacturing, value added as a percentage of GDP remained fairly stagnant in the mid-​20% throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s before starting its decline during the 1990s and more so during the 2000s to the point where in 2013 it contributed only 11.56% in South Africa and 13.13% in Brazil. Turkey and Malaysia have likewise seen a sharp fall in the same time period. These four also happen to be the countries most closely associated with MITs. This decline in manufacturing has been accompanied by a rising contribution of the services sector. The picture that emerges is thus one in which the manufacturing sector is growing relatively smaller, pointing to a process of deindustrialization which might well be argued to be premature given the levels of development. MITs are partly explained by countries struggling to move up the value chain and produce more sophisticated products, less reliant on low-​cost structures. To make this

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    89 Table 4.2 Selected proxies for technology readiness of various countries, 2013 China

South Korea

Malaysia

Thailand

Turkey

South Africa

Public spending 5.82 on education, total (% of GDP)

NA

5.25

5.94

5.79

2.86

6.60

Gross domestic 15.41 savings (% of GDP)

51.85

34.05

35.37

32.53

14.07

16.55

Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)

18.18

47.30

29.66

26.86

26.73

20.32

19.33

Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)

13.13

31.83

31.10

23.92

32.94

17.63

11.56

Industry, value added (% of GDP)

24.98

43.89

38.55

40.51

42.55

27.07

27.58

Services, value added (% of GDP)

69.32

46.09

59.11

50.18

45.47

64.44

70.03

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)

12.55

26.41

53.92

81.68

73.57

25.65

31.14

Foreign direct 3.60 investment, net inflows (% of GDP)

3.76

0.94

3.70

3.27

1.57

2.32

High-​technology exports (% of manufactured exports)

10.49

26.27

26.17

43.71

20.54

1.83

4.55

Patent applications, residents

4804

535313

148136

1114

1020

4434

608

Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

1.21

1.98

4.04

1.07

0.25

0.86

0.76

Brazil

Source: World Bank Data

leap requires a more effective use of inputs and an improvement in the quality of these inputs. South Africa is an interesting case, and it performs poorly on both counts. On the human capital side, it spends more on public education as a percentage of GDP than any other country in the sample and yet its performance is dismal on almost any measure. This education crisis has long-​standing roots and the efficiency with which inputs in the

90   John M. Luiz educational production function are converted into quality outputs is questionable. In the natural and engineering sciences, which have been shown to be central to the process of economic growth, output has been limited and this has implications for competition and innovation and access to new ideas. South Africa underperforms on various technological readiness measures. Outside of Thailand, South Africa’s R&D spending as a proportion of GDP at 0.76% is the lowest among my sample. South Korea, which is one of the few which has successfully negotiated the treacherous transition beyond middle-​ income status in recent decades, has an R&D spend of 4.04% and China which is acutely aware of the pressure to innovate for further success is spending almost 2% of GDP. The key dimensions that facilitate transitions from middle-​income to high-​income status are precisely the dimensions where South Africa fares poorest—​namely, those related to technological innovation and human capital. A key component of modernization is the ability to more efficiently translate inputs into output and more effectively harness technological forces to accomplish this. Figure 4.4 illustrates total factor productivity (TFP) levels for several countries at current purchasing power parities (PPPs) relative to the USA (which equals 1) between 1950 and 2011. While measuring TFP presents particular problems especially across countries, it is nonetheless instructive. Within the sample, Turkey and South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s are the clear leaders in terms of TFP levels (approximating US levels) but while Turkey remains steady, South Africa experiences the sharpest decline of my sample during the 1980s and 1990s. During the past two decades South Africa’s TFP growth 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4

0

1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

0.2

Brazil

China

India

Ireland

Malaysia

Thailand

Turkey

South Africa

S.Korea

Figure  4.4 Total factor productivity level at current purchasing power parities (United States = 1), 1950–​2011 Source: Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer (2013)

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    91 placed it around the levels of Greece and Argentina (not shown here). We see the familiar picture of low TFP growth for China and India with growth being very much input driven, although both have seen improvements since 2000. Brazil’s so-​called economic miracle under Lula is questionable looking at the country’s falling TFP, and may explain some of the difficulties being experienced in that country presently, once one strips out the rising commodity prices of the early 2000s.

A Case Study on the Political Economy of Middle-​Income Traps: South Africa as a Quintessential Example MITs are not inevitable but the result of policy failures to recognize the malaise and to implement appropriate strategies to move countries through successive value chains. This brings us back to the political economy of MITs—​why are states unable or unwilling to formulate and execute appropriate strategies to catapult countries between different stages of development? In South Africa, there is a broad understanding of what the issues are that are holding the country back. The National Planning Commission, established in 2010, undertook a comprehensive diagnosis of the development challenges and developed a coherent plan for the way forward. But it has remained stuck in a limbo and contested within the very party that claims it as its overall framework. Ministers and departments that are meant to implement it often openly disagree with it or ignore it. South Africa’s economic inequality shows up repeatedly as among the worst in the world. This increasingly puts pressure on decision-​makers as they struggle to mediate the tensions between a focus on production and one on distribution. Business, government, and labor have not been able to formulate a social contract to govern a way forward and the result is policy paralysis and indecision. In Luiz (I argue that the South African post-​apartheid dispensation was a negotiated settlement between elite groups that left the majority of the population without “voice”: “They were pacified through the introduction of an elaborate welfare system which does not seek to address their dispossession but rather seeks their silence. The black establishment was bought through the promise of black economic empowerment (BEE) which gave a small black elite the chance for rapid economic mobility, and big white capital was co-​opted in return for the drop of nationalization and radical redistribution as a policy option” (2014: 240–​241). Recall the earlier discussion of Olson (1982: 75) on the difficulties of collective action especially when new orders are attempted. He suggests that during these transitions few organizational interests will dissolve and instead countries fudge a consensus by accumulating more special interests and collusions. This was the reality of the 1994 transition and he warns that these accumulated interests have little incentive to make their societies more productive, but strong incentives to seek a larger share of the national income for themselves. This accommodation of elites in 1994 established barriers to entry and this bargain makes it difficult to pursue economic dynamism when the interest groups have to be pacified at every turn. Huntington (1970: 325) almost seems to be referring to post-​apartheid South Africa when he writes about how economic progress can be highly destabilizing as it disrupts traditional social groupings, produces nouveaux riches who are imperfectly assimilated by the existing order, increases the

92   John M. Luiz incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction, and intensifies group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy. It may also explain why vested interests may opt for a low-​level equilibrium that is stable and guarantees existing interests over one that increases social output. He concludes by saying that to the extent that these relationships hold, economic growth increases material well-​being at one rate but social frustration at a faster rate. Thus in the case of South Africa, the lack of a consensus on a growth strategy might well be explained through a political economy explanation of interest groups protecting the status quo of which they benefit. When challenged they may gradually accede to greater inclusion either by expanding the small pool of the elite (as we see with BEE) or through a tokenistic redistribution to pacify the masses (through social grants) but never an undermining of the overall equilibrium outcome. High growth cannot guarantee that the existing social order will not be unsettled. This system of appeasement may result in stability but comes at the price of a low-​level equilibrium trap. The casualty of this is the lack of focus on expanding the productive capacity of the economy. This would require innovation and moving up the value chain which will result in a process of creative destruction and of new winners and losers. In this sort of milieu, pursuing economic policy that puts the productive capacity upfront is extremely difficult. Tough choices are not made, and the result is stasis and policy indecision—​conditions very conducive to MITs.

Implications of Middle-​Income Traps for International Business Teece warns that “economists have been very slow to recognize that much organizing is necessary before there are goods and services to exchange in markets” (2014: 345)—​ before Adam Smith’s pin-​making comes into play. He explains that firms require dynamic capabilities to compete and generate superior profits by developing differentiated products and services by reconfiguring the “internal and external resources to maintain leadership in continually shifting business environments” (2014: 329). This moves beyond the realm of efficiencies and toward the production of something that is idiosyncratic and difficult to imitate. It is these capabilities that allow “firms to stay congruent with market and technological developments.” Increasingly for organizations to compete they need to be able to link, leverage, and learn to ensure that they develop resources that can support durable competitive advantage that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-​substitutable (as cited by Teece, 2014: 332–​333). In a rapidly changing global economy, MICs need to create systems whereby their organizations are able to move up the value chains through innovation. This requires a very different set of capabilities that moves beyond the ordinary to the dynamic and that integrates the role of organizational action and resources with countrywide systems of competitive advantage. The latter includes national innovation systems, appropriate human capital

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    93 strategies, and industrial policies. Agenor, Canuto, and Jelenic (2012: 4) further highlight the importance of developing advanced infrastructure in the form of high-​speed communications networks, attracting more high-​ability workers into the design sector, and improving productivity which not only enhances innovation but also allows for higher wages. This is tied into the work on global value chains (GVCs) around which the global economy is increasingly centered. UNCTAD (2013) reports that the majority of developing countries are progressively participating in GVCs with their share in global value-​added trade increasing from 20% in 1990 to 40% by 2013. GVCs often provide a springboard for firms to participate into the global economy. However, for many developing countries their comparative advantage within these chains are tied to their low wages or resource endowments and they may not be able to deepen their value contribution. Even MICs may struggle to move up this value chain. While research highlights successful cases of capability upgrading and moves up the value chain with innovation advancements and the potential for reverse innovation (Contractor, 2013; Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Kotabe & Kothari, 2016; Kumar, Mudambi, & Gray, 2013), these are not the norm. The Brazilian case is instructive and even though there are good examples of local innovation and global integration such as Embraco (in white goods), Sabo (automobile supplies), Marcopolo (buses), and Embraer (aircrafts); “most Brazilian multinationals are expanding in traditional sectors of the global economy, and not necessarily in those regarded as knowledge-​intensive and technologically dynamic. Moreover, when examining their innovation portfolio, it seems plausible to infer that there are no technological catching-​up or leapfrogging strategies similar to those employed by Japanese and Korean multinationals which rose in the previous internationalization wave” (Fleury, Fleury, & Borini, 2013: 271). There are several implications of MITs for international companies wishing to do business in emerging markets. First is the importance of recognizing that high levels of volatility are part and parcel of operating in these countries. The fact that they are transitioning and are undergoing processes of institutional, political, and economic change implies that there are structural underpinnings to this volatility. This has consequences for how businesses adapt their strategies to operate in these settings. Second, companies using these countries as bases for production may have difficulty moving up the value chain given the local infrastructure, national innovation systems, and human capital endowment. They may also experience difficulty in sourcing highly skilled labor. For example, during the period of high growth in Brazil in 2010 the lack of skilled labor was identified as one of the economy’s biggest shortcomings with two-​thirds of Brazilian employers having difficulty recruiting suitable staff (Langellier, 2011), and similar shortages have been identified in South Africa. Third, while emerging markets are sources of new consumer markets with rising income levels, this will not be uniform and cyclical downturns may have a severe dampening effect on local consumption, given income vulnerabilities. A case in point is the retail industry in oil-​producing countries in Africa, which as a result of the falling price of oil have seen tough economic conditions, and this has hit the earnings of major retailers like Walmart (through its

94   John M. Luiz African subsidiary Massmart). Many of these countries will also have relatively high consumer debt levels as consumption patterns outstrip increases in income. Companies often overestimate the immediate returns to be made by exploiting new emerging consumer markets and then being disappointed with the results. For example, several South African retailers have made a hasty retreat from Nigeria in recent years. Clothing retailer Truworths withdrew in 2016 after finding not only that as the Nigerian economy slowed it dampened consumer demand but also that the government resorted to import and foreign exchange controls which made it tough to get stock into Nigeria and cash out of the country. Recently, Christensen, Ojomo, and Van Bever (2017) writing on the challenges of doing business in Africa, highlight that despite Africa having all the ingredients necessary for high growth, a number of multinationals have recently left the continent discouraged by the lack of progress attached to corruption, deficiency of infrastructure and ready talent, and an underdeveloped consumer market. This could well apply to emerging markets more widely. They argue that those companies that have succeeded in this environment have done so by innovating and developing products and strategies that meet the needs of the people in that environment and create markets not by pushing products but by designing in such a way that people want to pull these goods and services into their lives. This requires a different approach that is fit for the purpose and specific to the economics of these business environments. Finally, many emerging markets will not stop emerging and will not complete the transition to high-​ income status. They may therefore not live up to their initial promise. New emerging markets will arise with new acronyms to replace today’s BRICS and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) countries. These too may experience high growth before running into some of the structural constraints and political instability triggered in MITs. There are no quick paths to prosperity via emerging markets—​they are not the El Dorado or Shangri-​La of the modern world.

Conclusion Emerging markets represent future sources of power and markets, and businesses will need to continue investing in these countries while remaining mindful of the pitfalls associated with countries in transition. Money will be made and lost in these emerging markets and the high-​growth environment cannot compensate for poor business practice and inadequate strategy. Sound management principles are universal, but context matters and businesses will need to adapt their strategies and product offerings to these different settings. High growth and high risk are likely to be continued features in the foreseeable future. This transition from one economic stage to the next creates winners and losers and the disruption unleashes uncertainty and new interest groups. Managing this in a way that enhances international competitiveness and creates enough opportunities to compensate the losers is not a trivial exercise. This is the challenge facing emerging markets.

Economics, Transitions, and Traps    95 There has been a proliferation of research by economists predicting the linear progression of emerging markets in the future and that these countries will soon dominate as some of the largest economies in the world. However, while we have seen a slowdown in many major economies of the industrialized world and its demographic aging does not bode well, what this chapter seeks to do is to highlight that these studies have partly ignored the difficulties associated with economies transitioning between political and economic systems and equilibrium thresholds. The path forward for emerging markets is by no means a smooth, linear one and to assume it to be so is problematic. Many investors are likely to find themselves on the wrong side of a bet on a “sure thing.” The future does lie with emerging markets and the next tier of developing countries that will move into middle-​income status. But it is going to be a process of high volatility with winners and losers and with many emerging markets vacillating between sharp progress and collapse. Social and political unrest is likely to be a feature associated with these transitions in countries that do not fulfill the high expectations that have been generated about their future prospects—​caveat emptor!

Notes 1. Examples of this are plentiful. President Obasanjo in Nigeria undertook significant reforms in the early 2000s which triggered a period of prosperity for the country, but successors have struggled to persist with the next round of reforms as vested interests have blocked these especially in the energy sector. Likewise, South Africa, India, and Brazil undertook important reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s but have struggled to continue with these, although elections in India in 2014 triggered a new set of stalled reforms. 2. This section draws on Luiz, 2016. 3. The South African data prior to 1910 is based upon the Cape Colony data and is incomplete but nonetheless provides us with some indication of the trends. It becomes more consistent from 1850 onward.

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Chapter 5

In stitu tional T h e ory Per spectives on E me rg i ng Markets Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano

The literature on emerging markets and emerging market firms is dominated by the institutional perspective. This perspective has been among the most commonly used in the field of international business in general, because it gets at the core of what makes multinational enterprises (MNEs) conceptually distinct from domestic firms—​ namely, the cross-​border condition and the fact that MNEs are embedded in multiple and diverse institutional environments and face distinct challenges and opportunities as a result (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). Institutional theory provides a rich theoretical foundation for exploring a wide range of issues related to MNE management at multiple levels of analysis (Kostova & Hult, 2016; Kostova et al., 2008; Meyer & Peng, 2016). The institutional perspective is particularly insightful for research on emerging markets. It allows us to conceptually capture the distinctiveness of these markets and the uniqueness of the management issues and questions that become salient in these contexts. What are the distinct characteristics of the environment in emerging markets that need to be considered when foreign MNEs enter them? What are the particular risks and challenges when investing and operating in such countries? How do foreign investors relate to emerging countries: are they viewed positively or in a discriminatory way? How do foreign MNEs achieve and maintain legitimacy in these countries? How can foreign firms ensure not only a successful entry but also their long-​term viability there? On the flip side, what is distinct about emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) and how does their being headquartered in emerging markets contribute to shape their capabilities? What are the unique challenges faced by such firms as they rise to lead positions in their home markets and expand abroad? How do these MNEs develop technological and organizational capabilities for sustainable global competitiveness?

100    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano In this chapter, we provide a critical review and assessment of the applications of the institutional perspective in research on emerging markets. As a starting point, we recognize that the institutional tradition is rather diverse and incorporates at least three distinct institutional strands—​institutional economics (North, 1990), organizational institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008), and comparative institutionalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999), which vary with regard to the conceptualization of institutions and the institutional environment and their main propositions about the impact of institutions on organizations (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). Institutional economics emphasizes institutional quality in a given country and distinguishes between formal and informal institutions, as well as their salience and role (North, 1990). Organizational institutionalism is primarily concerned with institutionalization, that is, the establishment of certain ways of social life as legitimate and widely used, and the impact of these institutionalized arrangements on organizations (e.g., Scott, 2008). Comparative institutionalism takes a “systems” or “gestalt” perspective, proposing typologies of national institutional systems such as the liberal market economy or the coordinated market economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001). All three institutional strands have been applied in emerging markets research; however, institutional economics seems to be the most commonly used framework in this context. Furthermore, for analytical purposes, the primary research focus of this vast literature could be grouped into three domain areas—​(a) the evolution of the business environment, including, for example, political, economic, cultural, and legal conditions in a given country or region; (b) the interface between the firm and the institutional context in their home and host countries; and (c) the unique strategies and ways of organizing and managing of firms operating in emerging markets. This analytical framework allows us to capture the multifaceted nature of institutional theory-​driven research on emerging markets. Specifically, work on the environment has produced rich insights into the specific contextual characteristics of emerging markets, including the notions of informality, risk, corruption, institutional imperfection, and, most notably, institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), a term which refers to institutional deficiencies in emerging markets. This area also includes the topic of institutional change where scholars have studied issues such as market reforms, liberalization, and privatization. At the firm/​environment interface, scholars have explored, among others, the issues of liability of foreignness (LOF) and legitimacy of foreign firms operating in emerging markets as well as EMNEs expanding abroad, and the challenges associated with functioning in contexts with institutional voids, handling informality, and corruption. Finally, scholars have studied the distinct strategic challenges and solutions that firms in and from emerging markets face, including topics like non-​ market strategies, adoption of global organizational practices by emerging market firms, and others.

Institutional Theory Perspectives    101 We use these two dimensions—​specific institutional perspective used, and specific topical domain addressed—​to organize the rest of the chapter. Table 5.1 below provides examples of studies that represent the cells in this 3x3 framework. We note that although pretty comprehensive, our review of the literature is not exhaustive; it is meant to illustrate the state of research on emerging markets from an institutional theory perspective. In the following sections, we first analyze the current state of research along the three institutional perspectives and the three topical domains and provide a critical summary of this body of work. In the last section of the chapter, we present our ideas on how to further utilize institutional theory for studying emerging markets, specifically identifying high-​potential research questions for each strand of institutional theory to better address the existing gaps in our understanding of this context.

Institutional Economics Institutional economics sees institutions as those humanly devised constraints that help reduce uncertainty among transacting economic actors and, thus, affect the costs of production (North, 1990; Williamson, 1975). Institutional economics explains firms’ actions through logics of economic rationality and efficiency within the constraints posed by the institutional environment.

The Evolution of the Business Environment Applied to the emerging markets context, institutional economics has led to the essential insight that the quality of a country’s institutions is of critical importance for the functioning of a market economy, and therefore, for the strategies and operations of firms embedded within it (Meyer & Peng, 2005). A distinctive characteristic of emerging markets, which sets them apart from advanced economies, is the lower level of development and effectiveness of market institutions. Several constructs derived from institutional economics have been utilized to capture such institutional deficiencies in emerging markets. Institutional quality refers to the degree to which a country has established market institutions. Institutional quality is high, or the institutional arrangements are defined as “strong,” “if they support the voluntary exchange underpinning an effective market mechanism” (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009: 63). Conversely, institutional quality is low, or institutions are considered “weak,” “if they fail to ensure effective markets or even undermine markets (as in the case of corrupt business practices)” (Meyer et al., 2009: 63). Another derivative construct introduced by Khanna and Palepu (1997) that captures the low end of the institutional quality spectrum is institutional voids. A national environment is said to have institutional voids when it lacks strong formal institutions enabling the effective functioning of markets, such as governance mechanisms that prevent

Table 5.1 Summary of institutional theory applications to the emerging markets context1 Institutional economics The • Institutions are the humanly evolution of devised constraints that help the business reduce uncertainty among environment transacting economic actors, therefore affecting the costs of production • Institutional quality (or the effectiveness of a country’s national institutional framework) affects the functioning of the market economy as well as the strategies and operations of firms within it • Emphasis on the unique institutional characteristics of emerging markets, including: overall lower levels of institutional development and effectiveness, greater role of government and government-​related entities in the economy, key role of informal institutions such as social norms and culture, and overall higher risk and uncertainty for economic actors due to the high volatility of key economic, political, and institutional variables • In addition to institutional quality, other analytical tools used to conceptualize unique aspects of emerging markets’ institutional context include: institutional voids, which reflect a country’s lack of strong formal institutions enabling the effective functioning of markets; and institutional distance, or the differences in the institutional characteristics of an MNE’s home and host countries Exemplary references: Khanna & Palepu (1997); Meyer et al. (2009); Meyer & Peng (2005, 2016); Xu & Meyer (2013); North (1990); Williamson (1975)

Organizational institutionalism

Comparative institutionalism

• Institutions are systems of shared meanings and understandings, which are gradually institutionalized and internalized over time to assume a taken-​for-​granted  status • Research in this tradition developed several useful analytical tools that could be more fully leveraged in the emerging market context, including: institutional profiles, institutional distance as the difference/​similarity between home-​host countries’ institutional profiles, and a focus on the effects of EMNEs’ complex institutional embeddedness in transnational organizational fields, which stretch multiple countries, and include multiple and possibly conflicting institutional arrangements • Recognition of dynamic processes of national institutional change at the country level, and co-​ evolutionary processes between firms and local institutions, for example, through (a) initiatives taken by firms to minimize or work around poorly developed local institutions, especially in areas of corporate governance, political, judicial and economic rules, and (b) progressive weakening or discontinuity of established organizational practices, in an effort to move the governance system to a market-​based  model

• Emphasis on the interdependence and complementarity among a country’s institutional domains, which generate specific national logics of economic action • Research in this tradition has developed novel country-​level typologies aimed at capturing unique institutional conditions of emerging markets • Traditional dichotomies of coordinated market economies (CMEs) vs. liberal market economies (LMEs) may not be useful to understand emerging markets’ institutional environments, given the different importance and nature of social capital (in the form of interpersonal and institutional trust), culture (e.g., hierarchical values), informality (unwritten norms, codes and conventions) and multiplexity (i.e., presence of multiple business systems within the same emerging markets).

Exemplary references: Ahlstrom & Bruton (2001, 2010); Ahlstrom et al. (2008); DiMaggio & Powell (1983); Kumar et al. (2005); Kostova and Zaheer (1999); Kostova et al. (2008); Luo et al. (2017); Marano & Kostova (2016); Marano et al. (2017); Pant and Ramachandran (2012, 2017); Roth & Kostova (2003); Scott (2008)

Exemplary references: Estrin & Prevezer (2011); Fainshmidt et al. (2018); Jackson & Deeg (2008); Steier (2009); Whitley (1999); Witt et al. (2018); Witt & Redding (2013, 2014)

Table 5.1 Continued Institutional economics Firm/​ context interface

Organizational institutionalism

Comparative institutionalism

• Institutions are exogenous to firms, which follow logics of economic rationality and efficiency within the constraints posed by the institutional environment • Emerging markets’ less efficient formal institutional frameworks, rapid processes of institutional change, and strong informal institutions lead to business model adaptations by both local and foreign firms operating in these contexts • More recent interest for co-​ evolutionary processes of institutional change, whereby local actors, in particular EMNEs, may contribute to deepen pro-​market reforms in their home countries • Emphasis on the mechanisms through which FDI can generate knowledge spillovers among emerging market firms, by spreading new technical and managerial knowledge through demonstration effects, local linkages, employment and labor turnover, and competition

• EMNEs are seen as embedded • Despite globalization, in complex transnational country of origin is still institutional fields with multiple, a very strong factor in conflicting, legitimating shaping organizations, in authorities, both from their terms of their ownership home countries and more patterns, access to institutionally developed host resources, property countries rights, trust in formal • For EMNEs, managing complex institutions, dominant institutional embeddedness firm type, growth requires active agency and patterns, innovation institutional work to make sense strategies, control of the institutional field and systems, and others implement effective legitimation • Evidence of strategies interdependence and • Institutional voids are co-​evolution between interpreted through the lens firms and institutions in of legitimacy, including a emerging markets (e.g., significant cognitive and family business groups normative component. For in Asia are seen as both example, institutional voids are a product and a source seen as a source of liabilities of of their institutional origin for EMNEs (i.e., negative environments) institutional attributions • While dominant about their competences and organizational forms, competitiveness by global and such as family business advanced economy-​based host groups in Asia, can create country stakeholders) appropriate conditions • Extensive government’s power in for successful economic emerging markets underscores performance, these the importance of local firms’ strategies can also run political strategies. Also, their course: strategies government ownership can that may have worked become a source of illegitimacy in a specific set of Exemplary references: in host countries, especially circumstances may not Banalieva et al. (2015); Cuervo-​ those with less dominant do so later on, because Cazurra (2015); Luo & Peng government’s role in the of changes in those very (1999); Meyer (2001); Meyer economy initial conditions that had et al. (2009); Spencer (2008); enabled them Jiang et al. (2011) Exemplary references: Luo et al. (2017); Nell et al. (2015); Cuervo-​Cazurra et al. (2014); Kostova (1999); Kostova & Zaheer (1999); Marano et al. (2017); Pant & Ramachandran (2012)

Exemplary references: Carney et al. (2013); Carney & Gedajlovic (2002); Carney et al. (2009a)

(Continued )

Table 5.1 Continued Institutional economics Firm • Emphasis on strategies that strategies help domestic and local and companies reduce emerging organization markets’ institutionally driven transaction costs, including business model adaptation, host market selection, entry modes and ownership structures • Focus on emerging market firms’ internationalization as a way to access resources, capabilities, and markets (springboard perspective), as well as on their endowment of coping skills because of difficult home country’s institutional environment, which can translate into competitive advantages in less developed economies • Focus on mechanisms through which timing, scope and pace of pro-​market reforms can affect firms’ performance outcomes • Nascent focus on local and foreign firms’ development of organizational capabilities for dealing with emerging markets’ institutional complexities, e.g., development of structures and practices that enable strategic and operational flexibility and buffering of risks Exemplary references: Banalieva et al. (2015); Chang & Hong, 2000; Chen et al. (2017); Dau (2013); Cuervo-​Cazurra & Genc, (2008); Dieleman & Boddewyn, (2012); Dixon et al., (2010); Holburn & Zelner (2010); Luo & Tung (2007); Mathews, 2006; Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al. (2009); Meyer & Peng (2016); Peng & Luo (2000); Ramamurti (2005, 2012a, 2012b); Uhlenbruck et al. (2003) 1 

Organizational institutionalism

Comparative institutionalism

• Focus on domestic firms’ and EMNEs’ legitimation strategies, ranging from individual firm action to collective actions by networks of firms, sometimes in collaboration with the government • Strong emphasis on domestic and EMNEs’ adoption of non-​ market strategies (especially CSR-​related practices) as a way to gain legitimacy with both domestic and foreign stakeholders, and address potential liabilities of origin • Nascent interest for ceremonial adoption of non-​market strategies by local firms.

• Applications to emerging markets emphasize the notion that the appropriateness and effectiveness of specific firm strategies depend on the institutional context within which the firm operates. For example, the performance effects of corporate boards, ownership concentration, and executive incentives vary depending on the national institutional characteristics of the firm’s home country • Focus on co-​evolutionary processes between Exemplary references: local firms and local Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Doh et al. institutions. For example, (2016) Kumar et al. (2005); Luo local entrepreneurs et al. (2017); Meyer et al. (2014); responding to Tashman et al. (2018); Marquis weak institutional & Qian (2014); Luo et al. (2017); arrangements in their Montiel et al. (2012) home countries may internalize transactions within business groups that create increasing returns to scale, which then inhibit the emergence and growth of independent firms. Exemplary references: Aguilera et al. (2015); Carney et al. (2009a, 2009b); Filatotchev et al. (2013); Heugens et al. (2009)

Rather than providing a complete list, we reference select articles that exemplify the main types of applications.

Institutional Theory Perspectives    105 corruption, protect property rights, ensure the rule of law, and provide adequate public investments and infrastructure (Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-​Helmhout, & Makhija, 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Institutional voids obstruct the flow of information and other resources, and therefore limit economic opportunities by creating social, regulatory, and political uncertainty (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Furthermore, due to their weak and constantly evolving formal institutional frameworks, emerging markets tend to display stronger informal institutions such as business networks, corruption, and particularism (Meyer & Peng, 2005). The importance of informal institutions for coordinating market activities has been discussed with regard to a broad range of international business phenomena in emerging markets. For example, Ault and Spicer see the emergence of the commercial microfinance business model as an “innovation in formal corporate governance in the context of the highly informal economies often found in low-​income markets” (2014: 1820). Also, Meyer et al. argue that both formal and informal rules affect MNEs’ entry decisions in emerging markets: “[ . . . ] legal restrictions may limit the equity stake that foreign investors are allowed to hold [ . . . ] and informal norms, such as norms concerning whether bribery is acceptable, may favor locally owned firms over [ . . . ]” (2009: 63). To underscore the distinctiveness of the institutional conditions in emerging markets, scholars have also used the construct of institutional distance, which refers to the differences in the institutional characteristics of an MNE’s home and host countries (Kostova, 1996). Higher institutional distance always leads to greater strategic uncertainty and more managerial and organizational challenges as companies expand to such “distant” foreign countries. For example, with higher levels of institutional distance it becomes more difficult to gain legitimacy and support in the host country (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and transfer parent company practices to the host country (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Moving not only to a “distant” but to a distant emerging market means that companies will face even more difficulties as they will be confronted not only with unfamiliar but also with institutionally underdeveloped environments (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011; Sartor & Beamish, 2014). These constructs—​institutional quality, institutional voids, and institutional distance—​have helped to conceptualize the distinctive characteristics of emerging markets relative to their advanced economy counterparts, including their less efficient market conditions, a greater role of government and government-​ related entities in the economy, the key role of informal institutions such as social norms and cultures, and an overall higher risk and uncertainty for economic actors, due to the high volatility of key economic, political, and institutional variables (Xu & Meyer, 2013). It is important to note that some of the early international business (IB) research in this tradition implicitly assumed that emerging markets’ “regulatory institutions would converge toward those of contemporary Western economies” (Meyer & Peng, 2016:  8). However, consistent with comparative institutionalism’s prediction of path dependency, this process of convergence has mostly proven elusive, as economic and institutional conditions remain highly differentiated between advanced and emerging

106    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano markets, especially following the 2008–​ 2009 financial crisis (Berry, Guillén, & Hendi, 2014; Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015), and the unique aspects of the emerging markets’ context continues to be an essential piece of studying firms operating within them.

Firm/Context Interface The institutional context, which in the institutional economics perspective is exogenous to the firm, influences firms’ strategies and organization. Thus, studies in this tradition have investigated how emerging markets’ less efficient formal institutional frameworks, rapid processes of institutional change, and strong informal institutions lead to business model adaptations by both local and foreign firms operating in these contexts. For example, Luo and Peng (1999) showed that for foreign subsidiaries operating in China, host country’s institutional characteristics significantly affect the relationship between subsidiaries’ experience and performance. This is because in a country with poorly developed and more turbulent institutions, foreign firms’ experience in that particular host country may become more valuable by helping them deal with uncertainties. Researchers also place a great deal of emphasis on the impact of emerging markets’ institutions on MNEs’ foreign market entry modes (Shaver, 2013). For instance, Meyer (2001) found that higher levels of institutional quality in emerging markets are associated with investors’ preference for internalization, making wholly owned subsidiaries (vs. joint ventures) more likely. Also, in a related four-​country study (Egypt, India, South Africa, and Vietnam), Meyer et al. (2009) found that stronger host-​country institutions reduce the need for joint ventures and increase the use of acquisitions and greenfields. They further explained that host-​ country institutions influence entry mode choices by shaping the incentives to internalize resource acquisition. More recently, the focus of this research stream has shifted toward a more dynamic conceptualization of the relationship between emerging markets’ institutional environments and firms, both local and foreign (Banalieva, Tihanyi, Devinney, & Pedersen, 2015). For example, researchers have begun to examine co-​evolutionary processes of institutional change, whereby local actors, in particular EMNEs, may contribute to deepen pro-​market reforms in their home countries (for an in-​ depth review of the scholarship on EMNEs, see Chapter 27 by Cui and Aulakh and Chapter 28 by Li and Shapiro in this Handbook). As Cuervo-​Cazurra (2015) explains, the implementation of pro-​market reforms by emerging markets’ governments in the 1980s and 1990s created favorable conditions for the emergence of EMNEs due to three mechanisms. First, pro-​market reforms reduce constraints on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), thus enabling emerging markets’ firms to enter the global arena. Second, by increasing competition in the home market, these reforms prompt domestic firms to engage in more OFDI to gather the sophisticated resources that are now required to successfully compete at home. Third, decreasing constraints on OFDI

Institutional Theory Perspectives    107 enable domestic firms to internationalize to escape the weak institutional conditions of their home markets. In turn, more global EMNEs strengthen pro-​market reforms in the home country by learning “more sophisticated rules and governance practices abroad, which they then apply in their relationships with customers, distribution channels, and suppliers at home, improving rules and norms of behavior in the home country”; by sharing their improved knowledge with home country competitors “via demonstration, employee mobility, and training of common suppliers and distribution channels”; and by lobbying their home governments to deepen the pro-​ market reforms that benefited them in the first place (Cuervo-​Cazurra, 2015: 72–​73). Relatedly, researchers have begun to examine the mechanisms through which FDI can generate knowledge spillovers in emerging markets, by spreading new technical and managerial knowledge through demonstration effects, local linkages, employment and labor turnover, and competition (Spencer, 2008). For example, Jiang, Yang, Li, and Wang (2011) show that for firms operating in China, which has weak intellectual property rights protection, intangible resources can negatively affect firms’ financial performance. However, in regions with dense FDI, the local appropriability regime can improve, resulting in local firms’ ability to benefit from their intangible resources. The institutional environment distinctly impacts the strategies and operations of MNE subsidiaries operating in emerging markets. For example, Chan, Isobe, and Makino find that foreign subsidiary performance varies greatly in “institutionally underdeveloped” countries due to the variation in host countries’ level of institutional development. They explain that subsidiaries do not always have the ability to manage the higher transaction costs and the local “institutional idiosyncrasies.” In addition, “a lack of information on legitimate ways of doing business prompts foreign affiliates to engage in a wider range of strategic actions with uncertain performance outcomes” (2008: 1180). Similarly, in a six-​ country emerging markets study (Egypt, Hungary, India, Poland, South Africa, and Vietnam), Estrin, Meyer, Wright, and Foliano (2008) find that host countries’ institutional characteristics influence subsidiaries’ exporting strategies and that their relative position within the MNE network determine their capacity to serve a given market. de Jong, van Dut, Jindra, and Marek (2015) examine headquarters–​subsidiary relationships and find that greater geographic and economic distances are associated with less decision-​making autonomy for foreign subsidiaries in Central and Eastern European countries. This stream of research also emphasizes the strategic complexities faced by emerging market MNEs in their foreign expansion efforts (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Luiz, Stringfellow, & Jefthas, 2017; Shi, Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017), including the complexities of managing overseas subsidiaries when they are at the early stages of internationalization, and when headquarters have limited international competences (Meyer & Thaijongrak, 2013). Thus, EMNEs’ internationalization needs to be examined through more complex and dynamic approaches taking into account both host-​and home-​country institutions (Luiz et al., 2017: 84).

108    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano

Firm Strategies and Organization Since institutions in this perspective are viewed as the country-​level “rules of the game” that to a large extent determine transaction costs incurred by firms, the emphasis here has been on strategies that help companies reduce such institutionally driven transaction costs including business model adaptation, host market selection, entry modes, and ownership structures (Chen, Cui, Li, & Rolfe, 2017; Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009; Meyer & Peng, 2016). To compensate for the adverse effects of institutional voids, local firms tend to rely on business groups’ internal markets (Chang & Hong, 2000; see also Chapter 24 by Chung and Luo in this Handbook for a comprehensive review of the literature on business groups), alliances with foreign firms (Siegel, 2004), development of political strategies to change regulatory institutions (Ramamurti, 2005; see also Chapter 14 by Pei Sun in this Handbook for a comprehensive review of the literature on political capabilities), and use of social networks as a tool to reduce opportunistic behaviors (Peng & Luo, 2000). While possibly effective at home, when such firms internationalize, they face unique and serious challenges mostly because their home country’s institutional environment has hindered access to important resources and development of strategic capabilities. Quite often, it is in fact the search for such resources, capabilities, markets, and legitimacy that propels emerging market firms to expand abroad (Aulakh, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007), and also to enter early in countries that are substantially institutionally distant from their home. This is clearly in contrast with traditional theories of internationalization, which suggest an incremental expansion process starting with the most psychologically “proximate” foreign countries. Due to their unique firm and home-​country characteristics, EMNEs seem to be skipping some of the Uppsala model’s stages or to be engaging in some of them sooner than predicted by the model (Mathews, 2006; Ramamurti, 2012a, 2012b). This bold expansion comes with serious risks and challenges, which, on the flip side, can help make these firms more resilient and flexible, and allow them to develop coping skills that could translate into competitive advantages over firms from advanced economies, especially when entering less developed economies (Cuervo-​ Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Landau, Karna, Richter, & Uhlenbruck, 2016; Luiz et al., 2017; Luo & Tung, 2007). Finally, researchers have captured a dynamic aspect of the impact of home-​country institutional environment on emerging market firms’ strategies and capabilities. For example, Dau (2013) shows that the performance benefits of market reforms are stronger for companies that are already international at the time such reforms are enacted in their home countries. This is because through internationalization they have acquired business and institutional knowledge that allows them to more effectively respond to such changes and take advantage of the new opportunities. In addition, Banalieva (2014) and Banalieva, Eddleston, and Zellweger (2015) find that the pace of reforms, that is, the speed with which market liberalization is pursued in a given country, significantly impacts firm performance: “Speed of reforms captures not only the change in

Institutional Theory Perspectives    109 the scope of reforms between periods [ . . . ], but also how quickly the economy achieves the new scope of reforms [ . . . ]” (Banalieva et al., 2015). They also find that the scope of pro-​market reforms has a positive effect on firm performance, while their speed has a negative effect. Interestingly, non-​family firms are better able to handle the fast pace of reforms than family firms. The authors conclude that the gradual implementation of pro-​market reforms helps firms effectively deploy their capital for modernizing their resources, and that in rapidly reforming areas, non-​family firms have a performance advantage “given the heightened need for efficiency, flexibility and quick adaptation” (Banalieva et al., 2015: 1364). Finally, research has begun to examine the processes through which local and foreign firms develop organizational capabilities for dealing with the institutional complexities of emerging markets, including, among others, the development of structures and practices that enable strategic and operational flexibility and buffering of risks (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Dixon, Meyer, & Day, 2010; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003), and of political and market capabilities (Holburn & Zelner, 2010).

Organizational Institutionalism Organizational institutionalism sees firms as embedded in “organizational fields,” which refer to those “organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life:  key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 64). Organizational fields are characterized by established institutionalized structures and practices, to which firms conform in order to become legitimate with their relevant stakeholders (Scott, 2008). Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). In this institutional tradition, firms pursue isomorphism with relevant rules, norms, or cultural-​cognitive frameworks because it enhances their chances of legitimacy and survival (Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995). Here, institutions operate at the level of the organizational field (as opposed to the nation state as in much institutional economics-​inspired research). Furthermore, in a significant departure from institutional economics’ conceptualization of institutions as exogenous formal constraints on firms’ behaviors, organizational institutionalism also views institutions as systems of shared meanings and understandings, which are gradually institutionalized and internalized over time to assume a “taken-​for-​granted” or “infused with value” status (Selznick, 1996; Sewell 1992; Swidler, 1986). Understanding these cognitive and cultural aspects of institutions, in addition to their formal rule-​based dimensions, is extremely important in the international business context including emerging markets. Organizational institutionalism has been widely used in studying and interpreting many international business phenomena. Scholars in this tradition have developed

110    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano several useful analytical tools for analyzing the institutional context (which are yet to be fully leveraged in the emerging markets context). For example, the national institutional environment has been examined through the lenses of institutional profiles, “a three-​ dimensional construct, including regulatory, cognitive, and normative dimensions,” and institutional distance, “difference or similarity between the institutional profiles of two countries on a particular issue” (Kostova, 1997, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008: 995). Since many organizational fields are formed within nation states, MNEs, which by definition operate across borders, exhibit complex institutional embeddedness, whereby they are exposed to multiple and possibly conflicting institutional arrangements in the many countries where they operate. This complex, internally diverse, and multilayered environment, often referred to as the transnational organizational field (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008; Marano & Kostova, 2016), creates challenges for firms’ legitimation across the countries of their operation (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), and integration of their multiple subsidiaries through transfer of strategic organizational practices and structures (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). In light of this institutional perspective, it has been emphasized that the most difficult aspect of cross-​border transfer of knowledge is related to internalization, that is, “infusion with value” of the practice at the recipient unit, whereby the unit employees develop an appreciation, commitment, and a taken-​for grantedness view toward the practice (Kostova, 1999).

The Evolution of the Business Environment Building on this tradition and the existing IB research in this area, scholars have examined the unique characteristics of emerging markets’ institutional environments (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010) and the legitimacy challenges they create for local and foreign firms (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001, 2010; Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008; Kumar, Rangan, & Rufın, 2005; Luo, Wang, & Zhang, 2017; Marano, Tashman, & Kostova, 2017; Pant & Ramachandran, 2012, 2017). While organizational institutionalism has been accused at times of having developed a rather static and deterministic approach to interpreting the institutional environment (Seo & Creed, 2002), emerging markets-​ focused research in this tradition has recognized the co-​evolutionary processes of firms and local institutions (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Roth & Kostova, 2003). Indeed, the significant reforms in emerging markets challenge the assumption of much prior research that institutions change slowly (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010). Roth and Kostova (2003) discuss two general institutional strategies that firms in emerging markets use to cope with the changing institutional landscape, which may further enhance the process of institutional change. First, “informal substitutes,” which refer to the initiatives taken by a firm to minimize or work around poorly developed local institutions, especially in areas of corporate governance, political, judicial and economic rules. They argue that: “if property rights are underdeveloped and ill protected, a firm cannot rely on the formal infrastructure. It may, therefore, seek alternative ways of securing those rights, possibly through ‘private payments’ to public officials and

Institutional Theory Perspectives    111 politicians [ . . . ]” (Roth & Kostova, 2003: 317). Second, firms may engage in a process of deinstitutionalization, or progressive weakening or discontinuity of established organizational practices, in an effort to move the governance system to a market-​based model. To do so, they can, for example, rely on external change agents that carry and convey the new market-​based practices: “[d]‌einstitutionalization efforts will include inviting equity ownership by foreign enterprises, engaging in outside alliances, and participating in foreign markets through activities such as exporting” and investment abroad (Roth & Kostova, 2003: 317). Another distinctive characteristic of emerging markets is the significant role of the government. Through their legislative and regulatory power to decide on the scope and pace of institutional reform, their control of most national resources as well as the significant sector of state-​owned enterprises (SOEs), governments can uniquely shape the domestic and international competitive landscapes for both local and foreign firms.

Firm/​Context Interface Due to the under-​institutionalized and changing environment, firms operating in emerging markets experience dynamic, fragmented, and possibly competing institutional templates, which require complex, multipoint, and multilayer strategic responses. China is a good example of this—​characterized by immature and continuously evolving institutions, a dominant government, a complex administrative structure of central, provincial, and municipal governments, and also the existence of at least two very distinct classes of companies following distinct organizational templates—​the private and the state sector (Luo et al., 2017). Take, for example, the almost unlimited power of the government. It underscores the importance of political strategies in these markets (Nell, Puck, & Heidenreich, 2015), whereby firms build political connections and political capital to ensure support and favorable treatment from the government. Without it, firms are most likely to fail as evidenced, for instance, by the fate of Google in China, which found itself in a major conflict with the authorities over censorship and eventually lost the market. On the flip side, the dominant role of governments in emerging markets creates problems for SOEs as well. As they go abroad, these firms are likely to face additional legitimacy challenges “since government ownership can become a source of illegitimacy in the host country” (Cuervo-​Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014: 935). This is because “the host country government and citizens may view [these firms] as an instrument of another government aiming to exercise control in the host country economy” (Cuervo-​Cazurra et  al., 2014:  935). Thus, a key strategic consideration for SOEs is the locational decision of which countries to expand to, and how to position themselves in those host countries to minimize the negative biases global stakeholders are likely to hold regarding such firms. Some research in the organizational institutionalism tradition has borrowed the construct of institutional voids from institutional economics, employing, however, a rather different interpretation of their impact on organizational action. Instead of a

112    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano transaction cost mechanism, here the effects of institutional voids are explained primarily through the lens of legitimacy, including a significant cognitive and normative component. Meyer, Ding, Li, and Zhang (2014) and Marano et al. (2017) argue that MNEs from emerging markets experience more legitimation challenges when going abroad compared to advanced economy MNEs because of their “liability of origin” (Pant & Ramachandran, 2012). Liabilities of origin reflect the negative attributions about the competences and competitiveness of those firms by global stakeholders stemming from their home countries’ poor institutions and the associated organizational deficiencies. Such negative biases against EMNEs’ subsidiaries by global stakeholders, especially those based in advanced economies, make the task of establishing and maintaining legitimacy abroad even more difficult than it already is for MNEs in general (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). From a slightly different angle, Mair, Marti, and Ventresca (2012) see institutional voids not only as obstacles to the proper functioning of markets but also as opportunities for embedded agency and institutional change, stating that:  “apparent institutional voids can be seen as useful problem-​sensing tools. They can help to diagnose conditions that need to be addressed for inclusive market initiatives to develop. They are analytical spaces [ . . . ]in which elements from a variety of institutional spheres, each built around central systems of meanings and social practices [ . . . ], come together and affect the interpretation, enforcement, or embodiment of certain focal institutions—​such as, in our case, property rights and autonomy [ . . . ]” (Mair et al., 2012: 843). These conditions are not only practically but also theoretically interesting. In both cases (whether institutional voids in the firm’s home country are strictly a liability or also present opportunities), they bring forth several important theoretical issues. First, EMNEs operate in complex “transnational” institutional fields with multiple, conflicting, and likely biased legitimating authorities, some from their home countries, but importantly, many from more institutionally developed host countries where the firms operate. Second, due to the deficiencies in their home base, these firms do lack certain technological and organizational capabilities, which partly motivates their international expansion to more competitive markets for the purposes of acquiring and developing such capabilities. Third, maneuvering through these circumstances requires “active agency” (Oliver, 1991) and “institutional work” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006)—​to make sense of the institutional field in which they operate, to weigh competing demands based on the salience of certain stakeholders for the firm, to design and implement effective legitimation strategies to satisfy those important stakeholders, and throughout this whole institutional process, to learn and develop novel organizational capabilities. Several studies have found that one common strategy used by EMNEs is the adoption of globally legitimate practices such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting (Fiaschi, Giuliani, & Nieri, 2017; Marano et al., 2017; for a review of the literature about EMNEs’ CSR initiatives, see: Doh, Husted, & Yang, 2016). Consistent with the argument that they need to overcome additional liabilities of origin, Marano et al. (2017) find that higher levels of institutional voids in the home country and greater exposure to more developed institutional environments abroad increase how intensely they engage in such

Institutional Theory Perspectives    113 practices. This is also consistent with Meyer and Thein’s (2014) study about Myanmar, which suggests that home-​country institutional pressures in advanced economies may reflect perceptions of the host country’s institutional environment.

Firm Strategies and Organization An important extension of the research discussed above is the work on legitimation strategies of local firms and EMNEs based on their particular ownership type (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Kumar et al., 2005). For example, Ahlstrom et al. (2008) find that private firms in China use a variety of legitimating strategies ranging from individual firm action to collective actions by networks of firms, sometimes in collaboration with the government. These strategies help firms address the relatively low levels of local institutional support for private enterprise in most industries, a challenge that firms in advanced economies are less likely to experience. Looking at internationalizing state-​owned EMNEs, Meyer et  al. (2014) argue that they are likely to face particularly strong legitimacy challenges in countries where a strong rule of law limits direct government interference in business. In response, these companies have been found to avoid acquisitions and limit their level of control in acquired units. Although rather limited, there is emerging research on the use of non-​market strategies in emerging markets and by emerging market firms vis-​à-​vis their domestic and foreign stakeholders. For example, Marquis and Qian (2014) and Luo et al. (2017) interpret the adoption of certain CSR practices by local firms in China as political strategies aimed at fostering legitimacy with the government, which controls important resources. Also, the adoption of non-​market strategies helps EMNEs to address the illegitimacy problems due to their liabilities of origin. For example, Montiel, Husted, and Christmann (2012) show that in countries with high levels of corruption, local firms tend to adopt CSR practices as a way to distance themselves from the problematic government and to signal to foreign stakeholders that they are legitimate and trustworthy partners. As mentioned above, EMNEs may adopt CSR reporting to reduce negative institutional attributions in host countries. Given the strong legitimacy concerns driving the adoption of these practices, some researchers have begun to investigate the potential for domestic and multinational firms from emerging markets to engage in “ceremonial adoption” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) of such practices (Luo et al., 2017; Marano et al., 2017; Marquis & Qian, 2014). In a recent study, Tashman, Marano and Kostova (2018) show that the pervasiveness of institutional voids in EMNEs’ home countries drive them to engage in CSR decoupling by increasing the pressures for adoption of globally legitimate practices and, at the same time, weakening their capacity for strong CSR performance. CSR decoupling is a symbolic strategy whereby firms overstate their CSR performance in related disclosures to strengthen legitimacy. In addition, this study shows that the internationalization of these firms reduces their propensity to engage in CSR decoupling by increasing exposure to global stakeholders with strong

114    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano expectations about substantive engagement with CSR (for an interesting assessment of the effectiveness of global accountability standards, see also Allred, Findley, Nielson, & Sharman, 2017).

Comparative Institutionalism Comparative institutionalism finds its origins in political economy (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Research in this tradition emphasizes the interdependence and complementarity among a country’s institutional domains, which generate specific national logics of economic action; the notion of comparative institutional advantage, whereby “the institutional structure of a particular political economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in particular types of activities there. Firms can perform some types of activities, which allow them to produce some kinds of goods, more efficiently than others because of the institutional support they receive for those activities [ . . . ] the institutions relevant to these activities are not distributed evenly across nations” (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 37); and an implicit assumption of institutional path dependence among the different components of a country’s institutional domains. This means that countries’ institutions (e.g., financial systems, corporate governance, industrial relations, education, and inter-​company relations) develop in an interdependent and mutually reinforcing manner (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). Research in this area has produced insightful classifications of economic systems based on the presence and nature of specific institutional arrangements. Hall and Soskice (2001) developed one of the better-​known typologies in this area, which identifies two main types of capitalist regimes based on the nature of the strategic interactions among firms, employees and shareholders, namely, liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). This typology is primarily focused on North America (e.g., USA) and Western Europe (e.g., Germany) (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Another stream of research in this area has focused on East Asian market economies, and has identified some of the unique local institutional features, including, for example, Korea’s patrimonialism and Taiwan’s familial networks (Biggart, 1991). Building on this tradition, Whitley (1999) has developed a more comprehensive comparative business systems framework, which classifies market economies based on four key institutional dimensions, namely, the role of the state, the financial system’s characteristics, the skill development system, and the norms and values that guide labor relations.

The Evolution of the Business Environment Although limited, there are some applications of this institutional perspective to emerging markets research. Most notably, scholars have used it to identify important characteristics of emerging markets’ institutional environments and implications for the

Institutional Theory Perspectives    115 corporate governance models of local firms. For example, Steier (2009) points to family ownership, state ownership, and financial industrial groupings as important ownership governance arrangements in emerging markets. Family ties and state ownership are viewed as effective mechanisms for working around the weak economic, legal, and judicial infrastructures in those markets. In addition, in emerging market economies such as Russia and China, property rights continue to be poorly defined and enforced, which drives companies to engage in corruption and black or gray markets, as well as rely on family and ethnic ties for maneuvering in the complex institutional environments. Also, in a study of ownership structures in BRIC countries (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, and China), Estrin and Prevezer find that in all four countries, there is “relatively concentrated ownership structures and not much in the way of protection of minority shareholders” (2011: 60). In addition, “[o]‌wnership rights in China [ . . . ] are neither protected nor especially transparent; it is advantageous to disguise an enterprise’s ownership as being state-​owned or collectively-​owned when in fact there is a private entrepreneur or family behind the scenes. India’s formal legal framework is more transparent, but less so in terms of where actual control resides because of pervasive family or group control” (2011: 60). Thus, corporate governance ownership-​control structures vary significantly among these countries, as does the role of informal control mechanisms. In reality, ownership structures work fairly well in China because of a de facto recognition of ownership rights by the government, and because of the government’s interest in attracting FDI and commitment to protecting foreign ownership rights. In India, business groups’ control is, to some degree, a substitute for the weak formal rules. Russia represents a different case. While formal legal protection for all, including minority shareholders, exists, the reality is one of weak law enforcement, widespread corruption, undermining of minority rights, and a fuzzy relationship between large corporate owners and the government (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). As a result, local and foreign businesses alike fear possibility of expropriation, arbitrariness in the enactment of existing laws, and lack of appropriate mechanisms for addressing grievances through the courts, and for controlling managerial behavior (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011: 60). Recent contributions develop novel country-​level typologies aimed at capturing unique institutional conditions of emerging markets (e.g., Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018; Steier, 2009; Tsai, 2006; Witt, Kabbach de Castro, Amaeshi, Mahroum, Bohle, & Saez, 2018; Witt & Redding, 2013, 2014). For example, Fainshmidt et al. (2018) lament the narrow focus on advanced economies of some of the leading typologies produced by the comparative institutionalism tradition. In particular, they argue that Hall and Soskice’s (2001) typology “does not systematically account for the ways in which firms interact with the state and, perhaps more importantly, the heterogeneity of how autonomous states influence firms” (2018: 309). To address this gap, these authors develop a new typology of market economies, classifying 68 understudied economies in Africa, Middle East, East Europe, Latin America, and Asia, based on the characteristics of five central institutions—​the state, financial markets, human capital, social capital, and corporate governance. This typology acknowledges the state dimension to be of central but also varying importance across

116    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano countries. Therefore, it identifies four different types of government’s roles, namely: (a) “Regulatory State,” which “sets and enforces the rules of the game, particularly the protection of property rights” (Fainshmidt et al., 2018: 310); (b) “Welfare State,” which focuses on the “protection and promotion of the economic and social well-​being of its citizens, primarily through the redistribution of wealth by the state (Carney & Witt, 2012, p. 10)” (Fainshmidt et al., 2018: 310); (c) “Developmental State,” which “exerts substantive control over the economy, primarily by looking to long-​term national interests and engaging in the development of business sectors via industrial policy” (Fainshmidt et al., 2018: 310); and (c) “Predatory State,” which is governed by “elites who monopolize power through the use of opaque decision-​making procedures, weak institutions, and a lack of market competition (Carney & Witt, 2012, p. 11)” (Fainshmidt et al., 2018: 310). Another important insight from research in this area is that traditional dichotomies of CMEs versus LMEs may not be useful to understand emerging markets’ institutional environments and their evolution over time. This is because of the varying importance and nature of factors such as social capital (in the form of interpersonal and institutional trust), culture (e.g., hierarchical values), informality (i.e., unwritten norms, codes, and conventions), and multiplexity (i.e., presence of multiple business systems within the same emerging markets) (Witt & Redding, 2013, 2014; the study by Witt et al. (2018) provides references to other relevant works examining emerging markets’ institutional environments from a comparative institutionalist perspective).

Firm/​Context Interface A consistent finding in this research area is that despite globalization, country of origin is still a very strong factor in shaping organizations. Firms, both domestic and multinational, tend to be strongly affected by their home countries’ national systems with regard to ownership patterns, access to resources, property rights, trust in formal institutions, dominant firm type, growth patterns, innovation strategies, control systems, and others (Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013). Furthermore, there is clear evidence of interdependence and co-​e volution between firms and institutions in emerging markets (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009a). In this spirit, Carney and Gedajlovic examine Southeast Asian family business groups (FBGs) as “both a product as well as a source of their institutional environments” (2002: 21). Consistent with the key tenets of comparative institutionalism, “firms reflect the institutional conditions in which they emerged. However, firms and their human actors also shape the environment both directly (through their strategies and resource allocation patterns) and indirectly with the passive development of infrastructure and other institutional structures to support their needs” (2002: 21). Thus, the emergence of FBGs in South East Asia can be seen as an indication that dominant organizational forms are both shaped and contribute to shape their institutional contexts in

Institutional Theory Perspectives    117 a path-​dependent manner. As a result, the collective outcome of a dominant organizational form can engender appropriate conditions for successful economic performance. However, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) also point out that even successful strategies can run their course, since what may have worked in a specific set of circumstances may not do so later on, because of change in those very initial conditions that had enabled them.

Firm Strategies and Organization Comparative institutionalism has been leveraged to examine a number of relevant international phenomena, including, for example, the effects of home and host countries’ institutional system on the strategies, structures and organizational practices of MNEs (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2001), and the impact of MNEs on host countries’ institutional conditions (Morgan, 2009). Similarly, applications to emerging markets emphasize the notion that the appropriateness and effectiveness of specific firm strategies “may depend on the institutional context within which the firm operates and the extent of their conformity to the legitimized norms and expectations prevailing in that market” (Filatotchev et al., 2013: 969; see also: Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015). For example, the performance effects of corporate boards, ownership concentration, and executive incentives vary depending on the national institutional characteristics of the firm’s home country. Specifically, in a meta-​analysis of firms in Asia, Heugens, van Essen, and van Oosterhout (2009) find a positive relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial performance. National-​level institutions can also impact the extent of complementarity or substitution among different firm-​level governance practices. For instance, Carney et al. (2009a) and Carney, Shapiro, and Tang (2009b) argue that local firms’ participation in business groups in many Asian countries reflects the absence of formal institutions that could guarantee efficient business transactions. Business groups’ interactions create quasi markets for resources that would otherwise be costly or inaccessible. Theorizing on the co-​evolutionary processes that shape Asian “varieties of capitalism,” Carney et  al. (2009a) identify three strategies through which firms may influence institutional change. First, “filling institutional void,” which refers to local entrepreneurs responding to weak institutional arrangements in their home countries by internalizing transactions within business groups. Second, “retarding institutional development,” whereby the establishment of these compensatory mechanisms, such as business groups, may create increasing returns to scale, which inhibit the emergence and growth of independent firms. Third, “deploying institutional escape,” whereby “the creative act of institutional entrepreneurship may lead to domination by a few corporate groups” (Carney et al., 2009a: 370). For example, the business strategies of ethnic Chinese-​owned firms in Southeast Asia can be seen as a creative response to the lacking support for entrepreneurial activities in their host countries.

118    Tatiana Kostova and Valentina Marano

Discussion In summary, the institutional perspective in its three main variations has been extensively applied to the study of emerging markets and emerging market firms. Based on the distinct institutional characteristics of both these countries and their firms, research has developed some understanding of key business phenomena in this context. While some can be viewed as mere applications of existing theory to a different context, others are less trivial in that they have tried to extend or modify existing institutional explanations (e.g., legitimacy of EMNEs) and thus have made an impactful contribution not only to international business research but also to the institutional perspective (Roth & Kostova, 2003). In conclusion, we would offer several more concrete observations and questions that in our view are important for moving this research forward but have been only scantly addressed in the literature so far. Examining these issues has the potential to make significant contributions to both theory and practice on emerging markets. It is our observation that current work in this area focuses primarily on the macro (country, national systems) and organizational (MNE, subsidiary) level but the micro level (individuals, teams, managers) is almost completely missing. Incorporating the micro level is of paramount importance especially in the organizational institutionalism tradition, where institutions are conceptualized not only as regulatory but also as cognitive and normative arrangements, which are “held” by individual cognitions, values, and norms. In existing research, this approach is most often reduced to the regulatory dimension and kept mainly at the country level. This bias can perhaps be explained at least partly by the availability of secondary data on country-​level institutional indicators such as governance indicators, ease of doing business, rule of law, corruption, economic freedom, and so on, from the World Bank, Heritage Foundation, World Economic Forum, and others, which makes it easier for scholars to conduct empirical work. However, in some cases and for certain research questions, the cognitive and normative dimensions of the institutional environment may be equally important to, if not more important than, the formal regulatory parameters. We see several potential research inquiries within the institutional perspective that might particularly benefit from incorporating the individual level and the cognitive/​ normative aspects. For example, most of the work that describes institutional change in emerging markets focuses on market reforms, which are introducing new pro-​business legal and regulatory arrangements, such as economic liberalization, privatization, and competition. While regulatory change is essential, a change in the cognitive and normative pillars of the institutional environment in a given country is also necessary for these reforms to be effective and sustainable over time. Only when people change the way they fundamentally think about the economic system and how it works, will market reform be successful. As evidenced, for example, from the ongoing “experiment” of market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, regulations may change overnight, but the social cognition, the templates that people take for granted, and accept and approve as

Institutional Theory Perspectives    119 legitimate, may require a generation to pass. Similarly, when firms, for instance, EMNEs, adopt legitimating strategies such as CSR, how do these new ways of doing business become accepted and institutionalized internally by the company? Distinguishing between formal adoption and the “internalization” of such new practices by its employees will provide more insights on effective institutional change. We would like to see more work on the role of MNEs as institutional change agents in emerging markets. As discussed above, we know that when EMNEs go abroad, especially to advanced economies, they are pretty active in upgrading their organizational practices to achieve legitimacy with global stakeholders. But we did not find any research on potential spillovers of such upgrades from EMNEs to the domestic companies in their home country. Similarly, there is very little research (primarily in the context of global supply chains) that examines the role of advanced economy MNEs in these processes. We believe it would be important to understand how multinationals contribute to institutional change, which types of firms (EMNEs or advanced economy MNEs) and under what conditions are more effective in exacting these influences. We expect that the particular home/​host and host/​home pairs for these two types of MNEs will be an important factor to consider, along with other variables. Finally, it is quite fascinating to think about the internal complexity of MNEs, especially those emanating from emerging markets. As they internationalize and implement modern technologies and organizational arrangements abroad, those subsidiaries are likely to develop a more prominent role within the MNE. Take for example Haier, a Chinese manufactures of white goods, which expanded aggressively into the USA, and was able to leverage the competitive US market for acquiring and developing new capabilities. One could expect therefore that the US subunit of Haier would be the leader within the whole company with regard to new practices and technologies. Yet, this is only a foreign subsidiary of a Chinese company and might have limited power within the organization. The question then arises—​under what type of overall organizational strategy and structure would companies like Haier benefit the most from their exposure to advanced economies that facilitate their organization-​wide learning? It seems that this can only be achieved if the MNE has a transnational orientation with differentiated and networked subunits in different countries around the world (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). But how likely is that EMNEs would be organized in this manner, given their administrative heritage of central planning and top-​down management and the continuing control, or at least influence, by the home-​country government? In a way, one could view these internal organizational changes as part of the broader institutional reforms in these markets.

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Institutional Theory Perspectives    125 Steier, L. P. 2009. Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3): 513. Suchman, M. C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20: 571–​610. Swidler, A. 1986. Culture in action:  Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51: 273–​286. Tsai, K. S. 2006. Adaptive informal institutions and endogenous institutional change in China. World Politics, 59: 116–​141. Uhlenbruck, K., Meyer, K. E., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). Organizational transformation in transition economies:  Resource‐based and organizational learning perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 40(2): 257–​282. Whitley, R. 1999. Divergent capitalisms: The social structuring and change of business systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Witt, M. A., Kabbach de Castro, L. R., Amaeshi, K., Mahroum, S., Bohle, D., & Saez, L. 2018. Mapping the business systems of 61 major economies: A taxonomy and implications for varieties of capitalism and business systems research. Socio-​Economic Review, 16(1): 5–​38. Witt, M. A., & Redding, G. 2013. Asian business systems: Institutional comparison, clusters and implications for Varieties of Capitalism and business systems theory. Socio-​Economic Review, 11(2): 265–​300. Witt, M. A., & Redding, G. (Eds.). 2014. The Oxford handbook of Asian business systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies:  Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press. Xu, D., & Meyer, K. E. 2013. Linking theory and context:  “Strategy research in emerging economies” after Wright et al. (2005). Journal of Management Studies, 50(7): 1322–​1346.

Chapter 6

Em erging M arkets a nd the Internat i ona l Investm ent L aw a nd P olicy  Re g i me Karl P. Sauvant

All firms operating abroad are subject to the laws and regulations of their host countries, including the rights and responsibilities that these rules confer upon them. This includes the foreign affiliates of firms headquartered elsewhere. National rules, in turn, are complemented by international investment agreements (IIAs) and other instruments that, together, constitute the international investment law and policy regime that governs the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their foreign affiliates. This regime sets the parameters for national regulatory frameworks relating to foreign direct investment (FDI) and for the actions of enterprises. This chapter focuses on the international investment regime from the perspective of emerging markets.1 The structure of the chapter is as follows. It begins with delineating the universe of international investment rules—​which consists of both binding and non-​binding rules, the former primarily addressed to governments, the latter to MNEs—​before reviewing the substantive and procedural coverage of these rules. This coverage, as the next section shows, has changed over time, for a number of reasons and with various implications. Specifically, the growth of outward FDI from emerging markets is leading to a new constellation of interest of these economies: their defensive approach to the regime as host countries (which focuses on preserving policy space and avoiding the risk of arbitral disputes) is being balanced by an offensive approach as home countries (which focuses on protecting and facilitating their firms’ investments abroad). At the same time, MNEs are increasingly being expected to conduct their operations in a responsible manner, in particular by observing a number of international instruments that define responsible business conduct.

128   Karl P. Sauvant

The Universe of Investment Rules While MNEs and their foreign affiliates are subject to national laws and regulations, they are also endowed with additional rights by binding international investment agreements, that is, treaties that address significant issues related to the activities of MNEs and their foreign affiliates.2 These treaties are concluded between and among governments at the bilateral, regional, inter-​regional, and global (multilateral) levels. As of the end of 2016, 3324 of such treaties had been concluded (UNCTAD, 2017: 11),3 involving 237 countries and territories of the 258 listed on UNCTAD’s website.4 The great majority (2957) of these treaties are bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between a developed and a developing country, namely, Germany and Pakistan, entitled “Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes).”5 But it was only in the 1990s that their number rose substantially (Figure 6.1). Eventually, economies in transition also concluded BITs with developed and developing countries, as did developing countries and economies in transition between themselves. At the end of 2016, 40% of all BITs were between developed and developing countries, 13% between developed countries and transition economies, 8% between developing countries and transition economies, 28% between developing countries, and 3% between transition economies; there are also a few BITs between developed countries (8%).6 Apart from BITs, 367 other treaties (31 December 2016) contain significant binding provisions regarding the activities of MNEs and their foreign affiliates. These “other IIAs” include, among others, bilateral free trade agreements (e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between EFTA States and Georgia, 2016 (http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org

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Figure 6.1  Trends in international investment agreements signed, 1980–​2016 Source: UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, available at http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/​

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    129 /​Download/​TreatyFile/​4854); regional trade and investment agreements (e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, 2009 (http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org /​Download/​TreatyFile/​3095)); sector-​specific agreements (e.g., International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty, 1994 (http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad .org/​Download/​TreatyFile/​3281)); and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and its Trade-​Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement.7 The focus of the investment chapters of these other IIAs (except the WTO’s) typically is the same as that of BITs, except that these chapters are normally part of agreements that cover a number of additional subject matters. Finally, there are also a number of other instruments that deal with MNEs and their foreign affiliates and have been adopted by governments. However, these instruments are non-​binding. Most prominent among them are, first, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy of the International Labour Organization (ILO),8 negotiated and adopted by home and host country governments and global representative bodies of employers and workers; second, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of the United Nations9; and third, the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD),10 developed primarily by governments of the home countries of MNEs, to guide the behavior of their companies in host countries.11 These instruments focus largely on the responsibilities of international investors, complementing in this manner the focus of IIAs on protection. However, as these instruments are not legally binding, their application depends on the goodwill of the actors involved. Further, they are as a rule not subject to a binding dispute-​settlement process. But these three instruments have an implementation and compliance monitoring mechanism that can increase their effectiveness. Thus, the OECD Guidelines—​ adhered to by 48 governments (35 OECD members and 13 other economies)—​have a long-​standing implementation process that includes National Contact Points (NCPs) for responsible business (see OECD, 2018; see also Nieuwenkamp, 2018), to deal with complaints against MNEs and their foreign affiliates for non-​compliance with the Guidelines. Complaints can be raised by individuals, communities, and civil society groups (particularly trade unions and non-​governmental organizations (NGOs)) in any country in which a firm has a link to a MNE in any of the 48 adhering countries, regardless of whether that link is through affiliates or other arrangements of global value chains. In fact, even if an MNE is headquartered in a non-​adherent country but also listed on a stock exchange of an adherent country, it is expected to adhere to the OECD Guidelines (see the examples in Box 6.1). So far, NGOs have by far been the most active group bringing complaints under the Guidelines. The NCPs seek to find solutions via mediation, and about half of the complaints accepted for meditation lead to a mediated agreement between the parties. If agreement cannot be reached, the NCPs make authoritative recommendations on the conduct of the company. Moreover, parties can make substantiated submissions about

Box 6.1. Soft law with hard consequences: Three examples Soft law, especially if combined with follow-​ up mechanisms, can have—​ and has—​ consequences for the behavior and strategies of MNEs. A  prime example is the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (which, as discussed in the text, also cover the substance of the ILO MNE Declaration and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of the United Nations). The Guidelines are implemented primarily through National Contact Points (NCPs). As can be seen from the examples below, the OECD Guidelines can have concrete implications in case of non-​observance. 1.  Canada Tibet Committee vs. China Gold Int. Resources In January 2014, the Canada Tibet Committee requested the Canadian NCP to review a case alleging that China Gold Int. Resources (China Gold), a Chinese state-​owned enterprise also listed on the Toronto stock exchange, had breached various provisions of the OECD Guidelines. Specifically, the Canada Tibet Committee alleged that China Gold had breached general policies, disclosure, human rights, employment and industrial relations, and environment provisions of the Guidelines. It was a major landslide burying 83 mine workers alive in the Gyama Copper Polymetallic Mine in Central Tibet at one of China Gold’s wholly owned subsidiaries, the Tibet Huatailong Mining Development Ltd, that triggered the request. In addition to the allegations of inadequate environmental due diligence leading to environmental degradation and loss of life, and other health and safety issues, China Gold was accused of not respecting human rights through discriminatory hiring practices, forced evictions, the expropriation of land, violations of freedom of expression and information, and of the failure to disclose accurate information on the environmental, health and safety risks to local communities.1 China Gold was unwilling to enter into mediation after multiple requests of the NCP. Consequently, the NCP concluded that China Gold had not prima facie demonstrated that it was operating consistently with the OECD Guidelines. The NCP’s final statement of April 8, 2015 included six recommendations designed to promote dialogue and disclosure2: (i) for China Gold to familiarize itself with, and incorporate, the OECD Guidelines, as well as other corporate social responsibility standards recommended by Canada; (ii) for China Gold to engage in a dialogue with the Canada Tibet Committee and stakeholders affected by the raised issues, including its workers and local communities; (iii) for the Canada Tibet Committee to continue to reach out to China Gold to engage in a dialogue; (iv) for China Gold to conduct a due diligence by reviewing its environmental, human rights, labor, and health and safety activities through audits of past and current activities, and to undertake assessments of the potential impacts of anticipated activities on the environment, human rights, labor, and health and safety; (v) for China Gold to take steps to address the environmental, human rights, labor, and health and safety issues raised, in particular by aligning its operations with local and international corporate social responsibility standards in collaboration with the affected stakeholders; and

(vi) for China Gold to improve its transparency toward its stakeholders about its policies and practices and their implementation. Moreover, the NCP imposed sanctions for the first time in the NCP system for failing to engage in the complaint process. Based on Canada’s enhanced corporate social responsibility strategy3 (which includes new measures to be applied in case of non-​participation in the NCP process), China Gold faces withdrawal of the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service and/​or Export Development Canada financial services. More concretely, China Gold will likely be ineligible for economic diplomacy instruments of the government of Canada, unless it submits a request for review to the NCP or shows the government of Canada it has engaged in good-​faith dialogue with the Canada Tibet Committee. 2.  Paracuta vs. Kinross BrasilMineração On June 18, 2013, the Brazilian NCP received a request for review from residents of the districts of Machadinho, a rural community near Paracatu, and three urban districts, Bela Vista II, Alto da Colina, and Amoreiras II, alleging that Kinross Brasil Mineração (Kinross), a subsidiary of the Canadian Kinross Gold Corporation Group, had breached the general policies, human rights and environment provisions of the OECD Guidelines. More specifically, it was alleged that Kinross’ use of explosives damaged surrounding homes, and that some of the infrastructure built by Kinross made access from the rural area of Machadinho to Paracatu difficult.4 In August 2013, the NCP accepted the submission for further examination. After conducting a preliminary analysis and meeting with each of the parties individually, three mediation meetings took place between September 2015 and September 2016. Although several studies found no causality between Kinross’s use of explosives and the damage to homes, the parties reached an agreement that Kinross would repair the damaged homes through a partnership project with Paracatu City Hall and active participation of the community.5 The NCP’s final statement of December 21, 2016, included the following recommendations for Kinross: (i) to invite the Machadinho community and give guidance on how to apply for the company’s other existing programs in cooperation with Paracatu’s City Hall through which compensation could be offered (such as, e.g., the Generation of Work and Income Program); (ii) to inform residents from neighboring areas of Kinross’s work and future plans that may interfere with residents’ lives, to foster a relationship of trust between Kinross and Paracatu’s residents; and (iii) to conduct due diligence processes to assess the adverse impacts of mining activities. The NCP has also requested to remain informed of the partnership project between Kinross and Paracatu City Hall. Kinross’s 2016 Corporate Social Responsibility Report stated: “A mediation process regarding allegations of damage to houses as a result of vibration from mining activities was successfully concluded in late 2016.”6 3.  Former employees of Bralima vs. Bralima and Heineken On December 14, 2015, the Dutch NCP received a request for review from three former employees of Heineken, alleging that the company and its subsidiary operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Bralima, had breached the OECD Guidelines when dismissing 168 employees in the DRC during the civil war between 1999 and 2003.7 More specifically, the request concerned allegations regarding human rights violations,

cooperation with the rebel movement RDC-​Goma, serious errors in mass dismissals by Bralima (including unjustified dismissal of 168 Bralima employees), and irregularities and deliberate omissions in the individual redundancy schemes of the dismissed employees.8 Both parties accepted the Dutch NCP’s mediation services in September 2016 and reached an agreement less than one year later. In this agreement, a monetary compensation of more than US$ 1 million was awarded to a group of former Bralima employees, a unique result of an NCP procedure.9 The NCP’s final statement of August 17, 2017, included the following recommendations for Heineken and Bralima: (i) to provide employees and their representatives with information to help them form a true and fair view of the company’s performance; (ii) to provide reasonable notice of upcoming changes in the company’s operations that could have a major impact on employees’ livelihoods; (iii) to implement this transparency and communication approach to employees in its policies for dealing with conflict settings; and (iv) to monitor and evaluate the handling of complaints by current or former employees within the company group. In addition, the NCP was asked by the parties to monitor the recommended steps, and it further encouraged Heineken to continue actively to monitor, evaluate, and improve its business conduct code. As a result, Heineken also indicated that it would draw up a policy on how to operate in volatile and conflict-​ affected countries. 1 See a summary of the case by the OECD at https://​mneguidelines.oecd.org/​database/​instances /​ca0012.htm. 2 See the “Final statement on the request for review regarding the operations of China Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd., at the Copper Polymetallic Mine at the Gyama Valley, Tibet Autonomous Region” at http://​www.international.gc.ca/​trade-​agreements-​accords-​commerciaux /​ncp-​pcn/​statement-​gyama-​valley.aspx?lang=eng. 3 See “Doing business the Canadian way: A strategy to advance corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Canada’s extractive sector abroad” as Annex 4 at http://​www.international.gc.ca/​trade-​agreements -​accords-​commerciaux/​ncp-​pcn/​statement-​gyama-​valley.aspx?lang=eng. 4 See a summary of the case by the OECD at http://​mneguidelines.oecd.org/​database/​instances/​br0020 .htm. 5 See the “Final statement on the request for review regarding the operations of Kinross” at http://​www.pcn.fazenda.gov.br/​assuntos/​english/​final-​statements. 6 See “Kinross Corporate Responsibility Report: 2016 supplement and communications on progress,” at http://​s2.  q4cdn.com/​496390694/​files/​doc_​downloads/​corp-​responsibility/​2016/​Kinross-​2016 -​Corporate-​Responsibility-​Supplement.pdf, p. 8. 7 See a summary of the case by the OECD on http://​mneguidelines.oecd.org/​database/​instances /​nl0027.htm. 8 See the “Final statement on the request for review regarding the specific instance of former employees Bralima vs. Bralima and Heineken” at https://​www.oecdguidelines.nl/​notifications /​documents/​publication/​2017/​08/​18/​final-​statement-​notification-​bralima-​vs-​heineken. 9 See http://​oecdinsights.org/​2017/​09/​15/​beer-​conflict-​and-​compensation-​heineken-​congo -​agreement/​ and https://​www.nrc.nl/​nieuws/​2017/​08/​18/​heineken-​betaalt-​congolezen-​na-​klacht -​12563201-​a1570284 for a further analysis of this case.

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    133 a non-​functioning NCP to the OECD’s Investment Committee and can also ask for clarifications about the Guidelines. The ILO’s MNE Declaration, as a result of its 2017 revisions, provides for a set of operational tools to enhance its implementation. These tools include regional follow-​up mechanisms, tripartite appointed national focal points to promote the instrument, ILO technical support in all its member states, ILO company-​union dialogue facilitation, and a procedure for the examination of disputes concerning the application of the Declaration (International Labour Organization, 2017:  Annex II).12 The compliance mechanism of the United Nations’ Guiding Principles is comprised of the following three components:  policy commitment, human rights due diligence, and remediation. Under this compliance mechanism, business enterprises are required to develop policies and procedures to ensure their effective management of human rights risks. Since the ILO’s MNE Declaration and the United Nations’ Guiding Principles are reflected in the OECD Guidelines, the NCPs also provide a complaint mechanism for alleged violations of more specific labor and human rights. Moreover, the OECD has prepared due diligence guidance for various industries, namely, the mining (OECD, 2016a), agriculture (OECD, 2016b), extractives (OECD, 2017a), garments (OECD, 2017b), and financial (OECD, 2017c) industries, which help MNEs implement the OECD standards. Still, when everything is said and done, any non-​binding rules are typically not enforceable. Despite these weaknesses, though, a number of these instruments, as “soft law,” are influential. For example, they serve as models or as benchmarks against which the activities of MNEs and their foreign affiliates can be evaluated. More important, as Box 6.1 illustrates, even soft law instruments can have hard consequences for MNEs and influence their actions and strategies (Nieuwenkamp, 2018). Increasingly, therefore, MNEs will need to pay attention to such instruments lest they risk adverse action to be taken against them. This applies not only to MNEs headquartered in emerging markets adhering to the OECD Guidelines but also to MNEs headquartered in non-​adhering countries that are listed (also) on stock exchanges of adhering countries. Together, these various distinct and separate instruments constitute the international investment law and policy regime. It is a regime in the sense that it constitutes a governance construct for the relationships between international investors and governments, consisting of “principles, norms, rules, and decision-​making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982: 186), including the manner in which conflicts are resolved (Puchala & Hopkins, 1982) (see Salacuse, 2010, for discussion of the applicability of the regime concept to international investment law). (A more expansive interpretation of the concept “regime” could also include various other, primarily non-​governmental, instruments.13) The regime covers, in one way or the other, virtually every country in the world. It is multilayered and multifaceted, as it involves instruments of various levels of coverage, degrees of strength, types of rights and responsibilities, and levels of enforcement. Its coverage ranges from bilateral to multilateral, its strength varies from mandatory to voluntary, its content differs in terms of the rights and responsibilities that governments

134   Karl P. Sauvant and international investors have, and its enforcement ranges from no enforcement to binding decisions of dispute-​settlement panels.

The Substantive and Procedural Coverage of International Investment Rules Originally, IIAs—​and especially BITs—​were primarily concluded between developed and developing countries. From the perspective of developing countries, the principal reason for concluding such treaties was to attract higher amounts of FDI flows, to advance their growth and development. This was expected to happen because of an indirect mechanism:  by subjecting developing countries to international treaty disciplines, IIAs would strengthen the stability and predictability of their national investment regimes, further enhanced by the dispute-​settlement mechanism provided for in these treaties. This, in turn, was expected to help countries attract FDI, even at the cost of restricting countries’ freedom to implement domestic policies on account of the substantive and procedural provisions contained in IIAs.14 It was a “grand bargain” (Salacuse & Sullivan, 2005). From the perspective of developed countries (and their MNEs), the principal reason for concluding IIAs was that their foreign investments would benefit from the enforceable international treaty disciplines provided by these treaties.15 Such protection was considered necessary, as the legal systems of especially the newly independent developing countries were considered to be weak and cumbersome.16 Hence international investors—​at the time the BITs movement began, overwhelmingly based in developed countries—​sought additional protections under international law. These protections (see Box 6.2 for excerpts from a recent treaty) relate, in particular, to: • Non-​discrimination of foreign investors vis-​à-​vis national firms in host countries (national treatment) and foreign investors from other countries (most-​favored-​ nation treatment), both relative standards as they relate the treatment of foreign affiliates to that of other firms. • Fair and equitable treatment, which is an absolute standard and reflects, at its root, the rule of law (Schill, 2010: 154). • Expropriation (both direct and indirect), unless it is done for a public purpose, in a non-​discriminatory manner and upon payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in accordance with due process of law. • Unencumbered transfers of funds into and out of a host country relating to a given investment. • Free entry of key personnel. • Prohibiting performance requirements.

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    135

Box 6.2 Key protections in the Canada-​China BIT Minimum Standard of Treatment (Article 4) “Each Contracting Party shall accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security, in accordance with international law.” Most-​Favoured-​Nation Treatment (Article 5) “Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of a non-​ Contracting Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.” National Treatment (Article 6) “Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less favourable than that is accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.” Performance Requirement (Article 9) “The Contracting Parties reaffirm their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-​ Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), as amended from time to time.” Expropriation (Article 10) “Covered investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to measures having an effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting Party [ . . . ], except for a public purpose, under domestic due procedures of law, in a non-​discriminatory manner and against compensation.” Compensation for Losses (Article 11) “Investors of one Contracting Party who suffer losses in respect of covered investments owing to war, a state of national emergency, insurrection, riot or other similar events, shall be accorded treatment by the other Contracting Party, in respect of restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less favourable than it accords in like circumstances, to its own investors or to investors of any third State.” Transfers (Article 12) “A Contracting Party shall permit transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay . . . ” Claim by an Investor of a Contracting Party (Article 20) “An investor of a Contracting Party may submit to arbitration under this Part a claim that the other Contracting Party has breached an obligation. . . and that the investor or a covered

136   Karl P. Sauvant investment of the investor has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.” Source: Excerpts from the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, available at http://​international.gc.ca/​trade-​commerce/​trade-​agreements-​accords-​commerciaux/​agr-​acc /​china-​chine/​fipa-​apie/​index.aspx?lang=eng.

Most of the key protections of IIAs have remained largely unchanged since the early BITs. However, some new ones have become more widespread over time. In particular, a growing number of treaties address the issue of market access by providing for national treatment at the pre-​establishment stage of a project, that is, the right of foreign investors to invest in a country. In addition, the list of performance requirements that are prohibited has become lengthier. Moreover, IIAs have become longer as they have become more detailed, partly as a result of a learning process. Their key concepts also have become more clearly defined, partly to preclude too expansive an interpretation by arbitral tribunals, partly to narrow certain protections, like indirect expropriation. Accepting these various protections in their IIAs did not mean, however, that emerging markets did not have defensive interests, especially in terms of seeking to protect their policy space in the investment area. In particular, most of them resisted granting pre-​establishment national treatment (i.e., market access) to foreign investors, and they sought to limit national treatment and to keep the list of prohibited performance requirements short.17 Moreover, and very important, the great majority of IIAs also contain procedural provisions for dispute settlement. In particular, in addition to state-​to-​state dispute settlement, many of them provide for investor-​state dispute settlement (ISDS) through ad hoc arbitral tribunals consisting of three members.18 By being able to bring claims directly to international arbitral tribunals, investors can bypass the domestic judicial processes of host countries. Moreover, ISDS makes investors independent of their home country governments (unlike in the case of the WTO, where they have to go through their government) when they wish to bring a claim. In fact, only investors can initiate the ISDS process—​governments only can, at best, bring counterclaims in cases brought by foreign investors if they have grounds for such counterclaims. Awards given by ISDS tribunals are enforceable worldwide through the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958). The ISDS mechanism makes the international investment regime one of the strongest international regimes in existence. Granting these substantive and procedural treaty-​based protections to international investors reflects the approach increasingly taken by developing countries since the mid-​1980s at the national level: after a decade or so of restrictive national policies on FDI (which included, for example, a surge in nationalizations (Kobrin, 1984: 329–​348)), developing countries gradually opened up to FDI and actively sought to attract it (see Sauvant, 2015: 11–​87, for discussion of the changing policies of developing countries and

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    137 the principal reasons for these changes). The data on national changes in FDI laws tell the story: between 1991 and 2000, 95% of the 1185 FDI policy changes undertaken by all countries during this period went in the direction of making the investment climate more welcoming (Table 6.1). In addition, governments began to establish investment promotion agencies (IPAs) whose principal brief was—​and remains—​to attract FDI. Today, some 8000 such institutions exist at the national, subnational, and city levels (Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment and Millennium Cities Initiative, 2009: 1). One additional observation is in order. Because IIAs were initiated to safeguard the protection of investors and their investments (i.e., they focus on the rights of investors and the responsibilities of host countries), they do not, as a rule, provide for rights of host countries and the responsibilities of investors. The purpose of these treaties was, by design, to limit the rights of the governments of host countries; the governments of home countries, again by design, did not want to impose the potential costs of behavioral obligations on their firms operating abroad. This does not mean, however, that efforts were not made to seek to balance the rights of investors with responsibilities. The earliest comprehensive example of such efforts, driven by developing countries, was made by the United Nations in intensive negotiations between 1978 and 1983, when the members of that organization sought to negotiate a code of conduct dealing with MNEs. This code sought to define, in a balanced manner, the rights and responsibilities of MNEs and host country governments. By way of illustration, investors’ responsibilities were meant to include respect for national sovereignty and observance of domestic laws, regulations, and administrative practices; adherence to economic goals and development objectives, policies, and priorities; review and renegotiation of contracts; adherence to sociocultural objectives and values; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; non-​interference in internal political affairs; non-​interference in intergovernmental relations; and abstention from corrupt practices (Sauvant, 2015). The United Nations code negotiations were never successfully completed (see Sauvant, 2015, for analysis of these negotiations and why they eventually failed). But (as mentioned earlier), other—​parallel and subsequent—​efforts have led to instruments that were adopted. Most prominent among them are the ILO MNE Declaration, the OECD Guidelines, and, most recently, the United Nations Guiding Principles (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2011). These three instruments are the most important (albeit non-​binding) international instruments addressing the responsibilities of MNEs. In sum, the international investment law and policy regime arose largely out of the desire of developed countries to protect the investments of their firms in developing countries. Developing countries, in turn, concluded IIAs (in particular BITs) out of a desire to attract FDI and, for that purpose, were prepared to accept a number of restrictions concerning the treatment of foreign investors. Developing countries were rule-​takers in this regime, with developed countries largely determining the substantive and procedural contents of these treaties. Accordingly, IIAs focused, by design, on the protection of

25 82 80 2

Number of countries that introduced changes in their investment regimes

Number of regulatory changes of which:

  More favorable to FDIa

  Less favorable to FDIb -​

79

79

43

1992

1

101

10

57

1993

2

108

110

49

1994

6

106

112

64

1995

16

98

114

65

1996

16

135

151

76

1997

Source: UNCTAD, 2001: 6

  Including changes aimed at increasing control as well as reducing incentives.

b

  Including liberalizing changes or changes aimed at strengthening market functioning, as well as increased incentives.

a

1991

Item

Table 6.1 National foreign direct investment regulatory changes, 1991–​2000

9

136

145

60

1998

9

131

140

63

1999

3

147

150

69

2000

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    139 investors and their investments, that is, the rights of investors and the responsibilities of host countries. Both national and international investment policies of developing countries, joined in the 1990s by the economies in transition, were geared toward creating a welcoming investment climate for MNEs. Efforts to include rights of host countries and responsibilities of investors were, in the international context, undertaken only in non-​ binding agreements. In the course of the growth of the international investment law and policy regime, its substantive rules have become parameters for national investment policymaking. Thus, for example, if governments discriminate in their policies in favor of their domestic firms or in favor of MNEs from one home country compared to another one, or if they do not provide fair and equitable treatment (e.g., by infringing on the legitimate expectations of an investor concerning the performance of its investment in a host country), investors—​be they from developed countries or economies in transition—​can take direct recourse to international arbitration if they so choose. Prior to the early 2000s, the parameters that were imposed by the regime on national policymaking and the possibilities that these parameters could be enforced through the ISDS mechanism were not much of an issue, as few investors made use of the ISDS mechanism. However, since the beginning of this century, more and more investment disputes have arisen, contributing to a change of how the international investment regime is accepted by a number of developing countries. But this, in turn, needs to be seen against the change brought about by the rise of emerging markets as outward investors, and its implications for the constellation of interest of emerging markets and developed countries vis-​à-​vis the international investment regime. Both changes may lead to a certain rebalancing of the investment regime, driven by the defensive and offensive interests of countries.

Changes Over Time, Their Reasons and Implications Defensive Interests Assert Themselves The rise of investment disputes is one of the principal factors driving changes in the international investment regime, by strengthening the defensive interests of all groups of countries vis-​à-​vis this regime. Although the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID—​a part of the World Bank) was established in 1965, it has only been since the end of the 1990s that the number of investment disputes that were brought for arbitration began to rise substantially (Figure 6.2). In 2015 alone, investors initiated 74 known treaty-​based investment disputes, followed by 62 in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017: 114). This indicates that MNEs increasingly pay attention to—​and take advantage of—​IIAs and the protections that they contain.

140   Karl P. Sauvant 900

80 767

70 60

600

50 40 30

300

20

0

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

10

Annual number of ISDS cases

0

Number of ISDS cases, accumulative

Figure 6.2  Known treaty-​based investor-​state dispute settlement cases, 1987–​2016 Note: Information has been compiled on the basis of public sources, including specialized reporting services. UNCTAD’s statistics do not cover investor-​state cases that are based exclusively on investment contracts (state contracts) or national investment laws, or cases in which a party has signaled its intention to submit a claim to ISDS but has not commenced the arbitration. Annual and cumulative case numbers are continuously adjusted as a result of verification and may not match case numbers reported in the previous years. Source: UNCTAD, 2017: 115

This growing number of ISDS cases highlights the fact that the substantive protections enshrined in IIAs, combined with the ISDS mechanism, can have direct and serious consequences for national policymaking. In particular, actions that governments were able to take in the past to promote their national policy objectives increasingly need to be considered against the international (investment policy) obligations governments have entered into. This is because some of these actions might lead to conflicts with foreign investors who, in turn, could invoke the dispute-​settlement mechanism in a country’s IIAs. And the potential for conflicts is substantial. To begin with, FDI is much more intrusive than, say, trade, as it involves the entire range of issues that relate to the production process over the life cycle of a given foreign affiliate and, more broadly, the relationship of foreign affiliates with host country governments. Therefore, it is unavoidable that, in this situation, disputes arise from time to time. This is compounded by the fact that, in many jurisdictions, various national government agencies—​let  alone subnational ones—​may violate IIAs simply because they are unaware of the protections enshrined in these agreements. Other factors that may amplify the potential for conflict are the large number of MNEs (which is easily substantially over 100,000), foreign affiliates (which is easily substantially over one million), and investors in these affiliates (which can involve individual persons), all of which may have a right to initiate arbitral proceedings, depending on the applicable IIA. Add to this situation that many key concepts (such

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    141 as fair and equitable treatment) in investment treaties are not clearly defined, leaving tribunals often wide latitude as to whether or not a given protection has been violated. As a result, the potential for conflict between host countries and foreign investors (and hence the potential for arbitral cases) is indeed substantial—​in fact it is not even possible to estimate the potential liabilities involved. Moreover, the costs of conflict can be very high, in terms of both reputational damage for host countries and litigating disputes (with costs easily reaching millions of dollars) and settling awards. While not typical, of the 231 awards that had been rendered (131) or for which a settlement had been reached (100) as of May 2017 (Investment Policy Hub, n.d.), nine were higher than US$1 billion, all involving emerging markets (Table 6.2).19 While the highest awards so far have involved emerging markets only, developed countries, importantly, have also become respondents in international investment disputes. This was unexpected because, as discussed earlier, ISDS provisions were incorporated in investment treaties because foreign investors did not trust the legal systems of developing countries. Hence, it was assumed that only governments of developing countries would be respondents, including because, at that time, the outward FDI of these countries was negligible. This changed in the late 1990s, when the United States became the respondent in a growing number of cases in the framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). By the end of 2016, 228 of the total number of 767 investor-​ state disputes had an OECD member as a respondent (Investment Policy Hub, n.d.). No wonder, then, that the current dispute-​settlement mechanism, for these and other reasons, has attracted widespread criticism. Concerns include “inconsistencies in [arbitral] decision-​making, insufficient regard by some arbitral tribunals to the host State’s right to regulate in interpreting IIAs, charges of bias of the system in favour of foreign

Table 6.2 Known treaty-​based disputes Rank

Short case name

Amount awarded or settled for (US$ million)

Year of initiation

1

Hulley Enterprises v. Russia

40,000

2005

2

Veteran Petroleum v. Russia

8203

2005

3

Repsol v. Argentina

5000

2012

4

Eureko v. Poland

4379

2003

5

Yukos Universal v. Russia

1846

2005

6

Occidental v. Ecuador (II)

1769

2006

7

Mobil and others v. Venezuela

1600

2007

8

Abaclat and others v. Argentina

1350

2007

9

Crystallex v. Venezuela

1202

2011

Source: UNCTAD ISDS Navigator, available at http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/​ISDS /​FilterByAmounts

142   Karl P. Sauvant investors, concerns about the lack of independence and impartiality of arbitrators, limited mechanism to control arbitral tribunals and to ensure correctness of their decisions, and increasing costs for the resolution of investment disputes” (Schill, 2009: 1). Some of these concerns may well be overstated, some are more troubling than others, and a number do not reflect a consensus view. Yet, these (and other) criticisms have made the international investment regime in general a matter of widespread discussion and have led to proposals for reform. In particular, the current dispute-​settlement mechanism has led to a mobilization of defensive interests of governments. This has taken various forms. A number of developing countries have sought to disengage from (part of) the international investment regime by terminating their BITs (Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016:  571–​576).20 In particular, Bolivia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, and South Africa have terminated (unilaterally or jointly) their BITs (or at least some of them), in some cases (e.g., India) with the intention to renegotiate them on the basis of new models (UNCTAD, 2017:  143).21 In addition, many treaties have been, are being, or could be renegotiated, normally upon expiration of the initial period for which they were negotiated (typically 10–​15 years): as shown in Figure 6.1, most treaties were concluded during the 1990s and, therefore, could probably be unilaterally terminated by any one of the contracting parties, if they so desire. This change in attitude toward the regime is further strengthened by the perception that the costs of being part of the regime in terms of limiting policy space and exposing a country to possible litigation do not seem to be balanced by benefiting from additional FDI inflows on account of IIAs. The reason is that the causal link between IIAs and investment flows is not clear—​which, perhaps, is not surprising, given the importance of the economic FDI determinants in attracting such investment (Sauvant & Sachs, 2009; see, Berger, Busse, Nunnenkamp, & Roy, 2013; Busse, Königer, & Nunnenkamp, 2010; Williams, Lukoianova, & Martinez, 2017, for more recent analyses). In other words, the “grand bargain” of protection in exchange for more investment does not seem to hold (Salacuse & Sullivan, 2005). Moreover, under public pressure from NGOs, the Commission of the European Union has made a far-​reaching proposal to replace the current ad hoc ISDS mechanism with a multilateral investment court with a first-​instance standing court and an appeals mechanism (European Commission, 2016; for documents on the proposal for a multilateral investment court, see European Commission, 2016). Importantly, such a court system would allow for the full participation of judges from emerging markets and establish a high degree of transparency. Naturally, the establishment of such a system presents a number of important challenges, including the question of how to deal with all the treaties that are already in force and that foresee only the ISDS mechanism (see Kaufmann-​Köhler & Potestà, 2016, for a proposal). However, if a multilateral investment court could be established and dispute settlement institutionalized in this manner, it would greatly improve the current dispute-​settlement regime and strengthen therefore the legitimacy of the investment regime.

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    143 This legitimizing effect would be further improved if an advisory center on international investment law were to be established. Such an advisory center would address another important shortcoming of the current regime, namely, the difficulties that many emerging markets have in actually making use of the investment regime’s dispute-​ settlement mechanism: many emerging markets typically do not possess the human and financial resources to defend themselves adequately in arbitral tribunals. The establishment of such a center would alleviate this shortcoming by providing administrative and substantive support to emerging markets that face arbitrations (see Sauvant, 2016: 31–​33, for an elaboration).22 Finally, in order to reduce the risks of conflicts and, hence, the likelihood that investors take recourse to the dispute-​settlement regime, governments of both developed countries and emerging markets have begun to define key concepts in IIAs more precisely. In some cases, this is done by limiting the reach of key protections, to avoid that arbitral tribunals interpret these very expansively, leading to awards against governments. This process was led by the United States (which, as noted above, had become a respondent of investment disputes during the 1990s), and it involves such important concepts as fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. This approach is further enhanced by an explicit recognition, in IIAs, of the government’s right to regulate. Regardless of the precise future nature of the dispute-​settlement mechanism, it seems very likely that this mechanism will remain at the heart of the investment regime, as it underpins the various protections provided by the regime. However, it can be expected that a reformed dispute-​settlement mechanism will increasingly be combined with more precise and narrow definitions of key concepts in IIAs and an explicit recognition of the right to regulate that more clearly delineates the policy space of governments.

Offensive Interests are Coming to the Fore While the defensive interests discussed in the previous section concern both developed countries and emerging markets, the rising outward FDI from emerging markets is altering the configuration of interests of emerging markets vis-​à-​vis the international investment regime. In particular, this development is giving rise to offensive interests of emerging markets. The growth of FDI from emerging markets—​various aspects of which are discussed elsewhere in this volume—​has been impressive indeed (Figure 6.3). Outflows amounted to an average of US$26 billion during 1990–​1994, rising to an average of US$460 billion during 2012–​2016 (see UNCTAD, 2017: Annex tables). In 2016, FDI outflows from emerging markets were US$409 billion, roughly nine times of average world FDI flows during the first half of the 1980s (UNCTAD, 2017: Annex tables). During 2012–​2016, 131 emerging markets reported outflows at least for one of these five years. As a result, the share of emerging markets in world FDI outflows rose from an average of 11% during 1990–​1994 to an average of 33% during 2012–​2016 (UNCTAD, 2017: Annex tables). In 2016, their share amounted to 28% of world outflows (Figure 6.4). More than 30,000

600000

50%

43.53%

500000

40% 28.13%

400000 30% 300000 20% 200000 100000

5.38%

10%

0% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

0

Values FDI outflow from developing and transition economies (USD million) Share in world FDI outflow

Figure  6.3 The growth of outward foreign direct investment from emerging markets, 1990–​2016 Source: UNCTAD 2017, Annex tables, available at http://​unctad.org/​en/​Pages/​DIAE/​World%20Investment%20Report/​Annex-​Tables.aspx

100%

95% 56%

80%

72%

60% 40%

Developed economies

2016

28% 2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

44% 1992

1991

0%

5% 1990

20%

Developing and transition economies

Figure 6.4  The share of foreign direct investment outflows by group of economies, 1990–​2016 Source: UNCTAD 2017, Annex table 02, available at http://​unctad.org/​en/​Pages/​DIAE/​World Investment Report/​Annex-​Tables.aspx

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    145 firms located in emerging markets were responsible for these outflows (UNCTAD, 2011: Annex table 34). In other words, a large number of emerging market firms have become sufficiently competitive to invest abroad (see Freund, 2013; Marinov & Marinova, 2013; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009; World Bank, 2017, on the rise of emerging market firms). This development is leading to a fundamental change in the manner in which a growing number of developing countries and economies in transition view the international investment regime. As mentioned earlier, originally emerging markets concluded IIAs primarily for the purpose of attracting FDI and the tangible and intangible assets it represents. While, in return, they were willing to incur the costs of limiting their own policy space, they maintained a defensive posture in terms of seeking to protect at least some of this policy space to pursue policies they deemed necessary to advance their growth and development. With the growth of their outward FDI, the leading outward investors among emerging markets in particular are realizing that they have not only defensive interests but also offensive ones: they (like the established home countries, i.e., the developed countries) increasingly desire to protect and facilitate their firms’ investments abroad and to ensure that their firms have access to foreign markets. Accordingly, they are beginning to look at the investment regime from a different perspective than in the past. This is most notable in China’s change of approach to the investment regime.23 Traditionally, China’s BITs clearly reflected its position as a host country. This can been seen from its limited approach to national treatment and ISDS, opposition to pre-​establishment national treatment, and insistence on a positive list approach to exceptions in its older treaties (Vadi, 2013:  705–​724). Since then, and especially with China becoming the single most important outward investor among emerging markets and its investments being considered with some suspicion in some quarters (Sauvant & Nolan, 2015: 893–​934), it revised its position on some treaty issues. As a result, the country’s IIAs have become quite similar to those of the traditional principal home countries.24 In particular, China now accepts more comprehensive substantive provisions in its IIAs and full investor-​state dispute settlement, in line with the practice of the developed countries. What is more, Chinese outward investors have become active users of the investment regime. With the first arbitration initiated in 2007, Chinese firms had begun four publicly known treaty-​based international arbitrations against host countries by May 2017 (firms from Hong Kong and Macao initiated an additional one dispute each) (Investment Policy Hub, n.d.).25 In recent IIAs, moreover, China has also recognized the importance of maintaining health, safety, and environmental measures while promoting and protecting investment.26 It is even possible to pinpoint the date on which China’s home country interests became equal to, or more important than, its host country interests: July 11, 2013. On that day, China agreed, in the framework of the United States-​China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to continue negotiations of a BIT with the United States on the basis of pre-​establishment national treatment and the negative list approach to exceptions to such treatment27—​both of which were strongly opposed by China in the past.

146   Karl P. Sauvant China, in addition, has led the effort within the G20 to adopt the “Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policy Making” (G20, 2016), and it initiated efforts within the G20 to adopt guidelines on investment facilitation.28 Together with a number of other developing (and developed) countries, China also drives the discussion of investment facilitation that began in 2017 in the WTO in the framework of an informal “Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development” group. China had announced the creation of the group at a WTO’s General Council meeting at the end of February 2017, encouraging other WTO members to join. The group focuses its discussion on new and cooperative approaches to facilitating investment rather than on more controversial subjects such as investment establishment (market access), protections, and dispute settlement (Hees & Cavalcante, 2017). Many emerging markets (as well as developed countries) have so far attended the group’s meetings. All countries ought to be interested in investment facilitation because they all seek to attract investment. Home countries, and especially emerging markets, in addition, may also be motivated by the fact that, since the beginning of the past decade, national investment regulations have become less welcoming (UNCTAD, 2017:  99, table III.1) and investment protectionism seems to be rising (Sauvant, 2009: 197–​216).29 With the rise of China as an outward investor, its interests as a host country to protect its policy space have increasingly been complemented by its interests as a home country to protect the investments of the country’s firms abroad and to facilitate their operations. More generally, with the rise of outward investment from emerging markets, more and more of the countries involved now have a (home country) stake in the investment regime, very similar to that of developed countries:  they seek to protect their firms abroad and facilitate their operations (including in other emerging markets). In their investment treaty making, this interest needs to be balanced against their interest as host countries to preserve their policy space. This evolution is reflected in the number of treaty-​based international investment arbitrations initiated by firms from emerging markets: the number of such disputes rose from below 5 in 2007, to over 15 in 2016, for a cumulative total of almost 140 by end of 2016 (Figure 6.5). This makes firms from emerging markets increasingly active users of the international investment regime. If anything, emerging market MNEs are likely to make even more use, in the future, of the regime’s dispute-​settlement mechanism as their outward FDI grows, they become more aware of the opportunities the regime offers them to protect themselves, and their governments begin to value the constraints the regime places on policymakers in host countries, especially if FDI protectionism becomes more widespread. Three examples illustrate how emerging market MNEs are using the dispute-​ settlement mechanism enshrined in IIAs vis-​à-​vis both developed countries and other emerging markets whose governments are alleged to have violated certain treaty protections: • The first case exemplifies a situation in which an investor from a developing country brought a case against the government of a developed country. More specifically, in

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    147

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

0 2006

0 2005

20 2004

5 2003

40

2002

10

2001

60

2000

15

1999

80

1998

20

1997

100

1996

25

1995

120

1994

30

1993

140

1992

35

1991

160

1990

40

Year Annual number of disputes

All disputes, cumulative

Figure 6.5  Number of treaty-​based disputes initiated by firms located in emerging markets, 1990–​2016 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, available at http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org

1997, Mr. Emilio Agustin Maffezini, an Argentinian national, filed a request for arbitration with ICSID against Spain concerning the treatment that his firm EAMSA received from Spanish authorities in connection with his investment in an enterprise for the production and distribution of chemical products in Galicia, Spain (Maffezini v. Spain, 2000). This production was supposed to be carried out as a joint venture with the Sociedad para el Desarrollo Industrial de Galicia (SODIGA), a public-​private state entity with a mandate to encourage industrial development in Galicia. The claims were brought against Spain on the basis of the 1991 Argentina-​ Spain BIT and, via the most-​favored-​nation clause, the 1991 Chile-​Spain BIT. The tribunal found that some of the acts of the government “amounted to a breach by Spain of its obligation to protect the investment as provided for in Article 3(1) of the Argentine-​Spain Bilateral Investment Treaty ” (Maffezini, 2000: 27). The tribunal continued with observing: “[m]‌oreover, the lack of transparency . . . is incompatible with Spain’s commitment to ensure the investor a fair and equitable treatment in accordance with Article 4(1) of the same treaty” (Maffezini, 2000: 27). Accordingly, the claimant was awarded 57,641,265.28 Spanish pesetas in the award issued by the tribunal Spain (Maffezini, 2000: 31). • The second case exemplifies a situation in which an investor from an economy in transition brought a case against a developing country. More specifically, in 2012, Rusoro Mining Ltd., a Russian-​backed company incorporated in Vancouver, Canada, with extensive gold production investments in Venezuela, filed a request for arbitration with ICSID against Venezuela. It claimed that

148   Karl P. Sauvant the decree nationalizing the Venezuelan gold sector violated the 1996 BIT between Canada and Venezuela because Rusoro’s investment was expropriated without payment of compensation (Rusoro Mining Ltd v.  Venezuela, 2016). Rusoro also claimed that the government failed to accord its investments fair and equitable treatment; failed to accord its investments full protection and security; failed to accord the company treatment no less favorable than the treatment it grants to its own investors; failed to guarantee it the unrestricted transfer of its investments and returns, and imposed restrictions on the exportation of gold, in contravention of the BIT (Rusoro Mining Ltd., 2016: 51). During the arbitration, the government did not deny that an expropriation had taken place, but it claimed that it was done in a legal manner. However, the tribunal found that the government of Venezuela “breached Art. VII of the [Canada-​Venezuela] BIT by expropriating Rusoro’s investment in Venezuela without payment of compensation” (Rusoro Mining Ltd., 2016: 197). It therefore ordered the government of Venezuela to pay Rusoro US$966,500,000 as compensation for the expropriation of its investment (Rusoro Mining Ltd., 2016). It furthermore ordered the government to pay Rusoro US$1,277,002 as damages suffered as a consequence of the breach of paragraph 6 of the Annex to the [Canada-​Venezuela] BIT because it had imposed additional restrictions on the export of gold (Rusoro Mining Ltd., 2016). Furthermore, the government of Venezuela was ordered to pay interests on these two amounts for the period between September 16, 2011, and the date of actual payment,30 and it ordered it to pay Rusoro US$3,302,500 as costs of this arbitration.31 All other claims and counterclaims were dismissed. • The third case exemplifies a situation in which investors from a developed country whose ultimate parent was a firm in a developing country brought a case against the government of another developing country. More specifically, in October 2008, Cemex Caracas Investments B.V. and Cemex Caracas II Investments B.V., companies incorporated in the Netherlands but whose ultimate parent firm was Cemex, Mexico, filed a request for arbitration with ICSID against Venezuela (CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V.  et  al. v.  Venezuela, 2010). The claims were brought under the 1991 Netherlands-​Venezuela BIT. The claimants had an indirect ownership interest32 in the Venezuelan cement production company Cemex Venezuela, and the claims arose out of the government’s 2008 nationalization of foreign-​ owned cement companies in Venezuela, including the claimants’, and disagreements over the amount of compensation owed to CEMEX. After the tribunal found in favor of the claimants, the parties settled for a payment of US$600  million by Venezuela to CEMEX (see CEMEX Caracas Investments, 2010: 6). What these cases show is that there are various ways in which international investors can make use of IIAs to protect their investments against government actions that

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    149 they consider have violated their rights. This applies also to investors headquartered in emerging markets, and, as the data cited earlier show, they have done so. In fact, there are further ways in which emerging markets firms might use the current investment regime, in particular through “treaty shopping” (Lee, 2015) (or “nationality planning”) and “round-​tripping.” Round-​tripping refers to an investment made by a national firm abroad that, however, is routed back to the firm’s country to obtain certain benefits—​including the protection of an IIA (Lee, 2015: 16).33 Treaty shopping, in turn, “refers to the conduct of foreign investors who deliberately shop at their convenience for home countries that have favourable IIAs with the host countries where their investments are to be made” (Lee, 2015: 2) or, for that matter, when the foreign investors’ home countries do not have IIAs with the host countries in which the investments are to be made, or when the home countries do have IIAs with the prospective host countries, but an IIA of a third country with the prospective host country has more favorable procedural and/​or substantive provisions. That treaty shopping is not just a theoretical possibility is documented by one study: of 420 ISDS cases considered, 66 (16%) were potential treaty shopping cases (Lee, 2015: 11).)34 Both practices are legally possible in many circumstances. However, they are considered undesirable by a growing number of governments and are legally disputed. In the case of round-​tripping, host countries would not benefit from the extra investment that IIAs are meant to attract; all they would do is give special privileges to a group of domestic enterprises. Treaty shopping, in turn, is likely normally an unintended consequence of the conclusion of IIAs, exposing host countries potentially to claims by investors not otherwise eligible for treaty protection; at the same time, the home countries of these investors do not assume any obligations toward host countries that they otherwise might assume. Hence, governments are increasingly seeking to protect themselves, especially against treaty shopping, by including a “denial of benefit” clause in their IIAs that denies treaty protection to firms that do not have substantial business interests in their alleged home country. However, it may be difficult to determine whether treaty shopping has taken place, as many MNEs have full-​fledged regional headquarters or foreign affiliates outside their home countries, with substantial business operations, from where they invest in third countries for purely business-​based reasons. This may give MNEs the flexibility legitimately to make investments from countries that have an IIA with the intended host country and, hence, benefit from the protection that the IIA provides.

The Responsibilities of Investors Governments currently largely drive the discussions that bring about changes in the international investment law and policy regime. However, as to meeting the challenge to improve the investment regime’s dispute-​settlement mechanism, NGOs are very important (if not more important) drivers as well, in particular in the European context. When it comes to the challenge of balancing the regime by complementing the rights of

150   Karl P. Sauvant investors with responsibilities, however, the principal driver is—​and will remain—​civil society (including trade unions). Until recently (and as discussed earlier in this chapter), emerging markets (apart from civil society) were the principal drivers of the notion that MNEs and their foreign affiliates ought to have responsibilities vis-​à-​vis their host countries, as exemplified by the negotiations of the United Nation Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. Developed countries, on the other hand, have resisted the inclusion of responsibilities for their firms in binding international instruments, to avoid imposing the burden of additional rules on their firms. With emerging markets becoming important outward investors, their governments, too, may well be expected to come to share this interest. The implication is that it is likely that, in the future, progress in this area may no longer be driven by emerging markets but rather by civil society. However, two reasons suggest that the picture of the development of IIA is not clear. For one, a new generation of IIAs, as represented, for example, by the new Brazilian BITs (Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement, Bra.-​Moz., 2015)35 and the Morocco-​Nigeria BIT (Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Mor.-​Nga., 2016), explicitly make reference to corporate social responsibility and investors’ responsibilities, as do (although typically in weaker language, and often in preambles), some treaties involving other countries (Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nld.-​UAE, 2013; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-​EU, 2017. See, e.g., Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Mor.-​Nga., 2016, for a reference to investor responsibilities in the preamble). Second, since the responsibilities of MNEs and their foreign affiliates (including in the context of corporate social responsibility) typically include an encouragement to make a maximum contribution to the economic, social, and environmental development of host countries, the notion of “sustainable FDI” could well gain traction (see Sauvant & Mann, 2017, for a discussion of the concept “sustainable FDI” and, in particular, the “sustainability characteristics” that emerge from an examination of various stakeholder groups). Developing countries in particular ought to be interested in facilitating sustainable FDI (although this interest may be tempered by the fact that this notion would also apply to their own firms investing abroad), to increase the contribution that FDI can make to their development. This should be particularly the case in an age in which the sustainable development goals are meant to be the lodestar of national and international policymaking.

Conclusion As a result of this change in the configuration of interests of the world’s principal country groups, the discussions surrounding the international investment law and policy regime are more and more losing the North-​South dimension that characterized this issue during the past. To put it differently, both country groups are increasingly interested in

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    151 an investment regime that balances the defensive interests of countries in their capacity as host countries (including with more clearly defined key protections that safeguard sufficient policy space) with the offensive interests of the same countries in their capacity as home countries, and the usefulness of a strong dispute-​settlement mechanism to enforce the regime. In the case of emerging markets, this recognition of the changing configuration of interest is led by China, but other emerging markets can increasingly be expected to share this recognition as well, namely, when their firms become important outward investors. At the same time, it can be expected that MNEs, including those headquartered in emerging markets, will increasingly have to realize that responsible business conduct is no longer optional, that is, that they will have to live up to certain economic development, social and environmental standards and expectations and conduct their operations in the framework of fair governance mechanisms. Looking further ahead, this convergence of interests could eventually lead to a multilateral investment regime that would also be shaped by emerging markets. Should this occur, it would turn these countries from investment rule-​takers into investment rule-​ co-​makers, both as far as the international dimension of these rules are concerned and insofar as these rules become the parameters for domestic rules and regulations. The discussion launched in the WTO on investment facilitation may well lead eventually to broader discussions of the desirability and feasibility of such a multilateral regime.

Acknowledgments The author is grateful to Hamed El Kady, Roel Nieuwenkamp, and Githa Roelans for their helpful comments, and to Emma Leonore A. De Koster, Ting-​Hsuan Kuo, and Thor Petersen for excellent research assistance.

Notes 1. The definition of the country groups used in this chapter follows that of UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports, Annex table 1. See, e.g., UNCTAD, 2017. “Emerging markets” consist of developing countries and economies in transition. 2. Treaties normally do not speak about “MNEs” and “foreign affiliates” but rather about “investors” and “investments.” Such investments are typically defined in terms of a list of “assets,” a list that can be quite long. For example, the bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Uruguay (2005) contains the following in “Article 1: Definitions . . . ‘investment’ means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an enterprise; (b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; (c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; (d) futures, options, and other derivatives; (e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-​sharing, and other similar contracts; (f) intellectual prop­ erty rights; (g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to

152   Karl P. Sauvant domestic law; and (h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges. . . .” (footnotes omitted). 3. Not all treaties have been ratified. This number does not include double-​taxation treaties that are also of great importance to MNEs. As of the end of 2014, over 3000 double-​ taxation treaties were in force worldwide (UNCTAD, 2015: 107). At that time, as UNCTAD noted (ibid.), two-​thirds of the bilateral investment treaty relationships were also covered by double-​taxation treaties, and half of the double-​taxation treaty relationships were also covered by bilateral investment treaties. 4. Data courtesy of the UNCTAD Secretariat. Note that some territories may not have the right to conclude treaties. 5. These treaties, however, have their antecedents in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties of the United States (Vandevelde, 2017). 6. Data courtesy of the UNCTAD Secretariat. 7. Available, respectively, at General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1995: Annex 1B (available at https://​www.wto.org/​english/​tratop_​e/​serv_​e/​serv_​e.htm, last accessed 24 May 2018); Agreement on Trade-​Related Investment Measures, 1994 (available at https://​www .wto.org/​english/​tratop_​e/​invest_​e/​trims_​e.htm, last accessed 24 May 2018). However, the two WTO agreements are not included in the UNCTAD count of “other IIAs.” 8. The ILO MNE Declaration was originally adopted in 1977 and updated in 2017. 9. The Guiding Principles were endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. 10. The OECD Guidelines were originally adopted in 1976 and updated most recently in 2011. 11. If one wants to cast the net wider, one could also include a great number of other non-​ binding instruments, including standards of intergovernmental organizations; global codes of international business organizations; standards of private institutional investors; industry codes; company codes; and models and codes of non-​governmental organizations. (For a listing of such instruments, see Sauvant & Mann, 2017, Annex II). These instruments, too, reflect what the actors involved expect that MNEs and their foreign affiliates should/​should not do in host countries. 12. The MNE Declaration establishes a dispute-​settlement procedure (“Procedure for the examination of disputes concerning the application of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by means of interpretation of its provisions by the ILO Governing Body”) that has the purpose to resolve a disagreement on the meaning of the provisions of the Declaration, arising from an actual situation, between the parties to whom the Declaration is commended. But there are many restrictions to the receivability of possible requests (including unanimity of the tripartite groups), as there cannot be any overlap when other ILO supervisory bodies and committees are concerned. On the other hand, since the MNE Declaration incorporates a number of ILO conventions, these are binding when ratified and become part of national law (with which firms have to comply with). Moreover, the MNE Declaration is aligned with the OECD Guidelines and the United Nations Guiding Principles (but goes into more detail as far as social issues are concerned) and takes the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals into account. 13. See note 11. 14. Governments that so desired could also use the disciplines enshrined in these treaties to move domestic reforms forward. A national treatment provision, for example, would not allow governments to discriminate in favor of domestic firms.

The International Investment Law and Policy Regime    153 15. Through an “umbrella clause” contained in IIAs, treaty protections can be extended to contracts between MNEs and host country governments. 16. At the beginning of this process, the United Nations resolutions relating to a New International Economic Order (NIEO) also strengthened the case for BITs, as the United Nations resolutions challenged customary international investment law that, in any event, was quite weak at that time, as described in the following quote: “foreign investors who sought the protection of international investment law encountered an ephemeral structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few questionable customs, and contested general principles of law.” See Salacuse & Sullivan, 2005. The United Nations resolutions particular relevant in this context were the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1974), the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1974), and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974). 17. The last of these efforts is also reflected in the fact that the TRIMs agreement (see note 7) prohibits only four trade-​related investment measures. 18. One member appointed by the claimant investor, one member by the responding government, and one member designated by the two members or an independent institution, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 19. Amounts awarded or settled are typically below (at times considerably so) of the amounts claimed. As of January 1, 2017, there were 85 disputes for which the damages claimed were known and in which the amounts claimed by firms were US$1 billion or more; see http://​ investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/​ISDS/​FilterByAmounts. In litigating disputes, international investors may have the possibility of third-​party funding, i.e., that another firm finances the costs of litigation, for a share in the award, if successful. This, in turn, may make it easier for some investors to initiate arbitration. 20. Also, a number of European countries have terminated (or are terminating) their intra-​ European Union BITs as a result of their accession to the European Union, and Italy and Russia withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty. These countries may, however, have stayed in free trade agreements with investment chapters and, in any event, the WTO. Note, furthermore, that, at the same time, other developing countries and economies in transition further strengthened their integration into the regime by concluding new IIAs. 21. However, the protections granted by IIAs to investments typically remain in place, through sunset provisions, for ten or more years after the end of the treaty involved. 22. Such a center could be patterned on the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (see http://​www .acwl.ch). That Centre advises its developing country members on all issues relating to WTO law, including by assisting them through all stages of the WTO’s regular panel and Appellate Body proceedings as complainants, respondents and third parties. 23. It is noteworthy, though, that, for the other BRICS countries, defensive interests remain paramount, although Brazil seems to be moving in the direction of a change in approach. 24. To quote Schill, the new generation of China’s BITs (starting with the BIT with The Netherlands (2001) and Germany (2003)) “conform, despite some remaining limitations, in all major aspects to what can be considered standard treaty practice in approximately 2,500 BITs world-​wide,” turning the country’s BITs “into effective and powerful tools of investment protection.” See Schill, 2007: 76–​77; see also Cai, 2006: 621–​652; Gallagher & Shan, 2009. 25. Russian firms had initiated 14 cases, Chilean firms 9, and Czech and Indian firms 4 each.

154   Karl P. Sauvant 26. See, e.g., the preambles of the Agreement between the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (2004) and the Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Guyana on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2003). 27. This is particularly relevant in the case of exceptions to national treatment. When exceptions are negotiated on the basis of a negative list approach, all sectors for which national treatment is not granted need to be listed. When a positive list approach is used, all sectors for which national treatment is granted are listed. The negative list approach implies that, when any new sectors should emerge (e.g., various information technology sectors over the past decade), these are automatically covered by a national treatment provision. 28. In the end, these efforts were not successful—​but not for lack of trying on the part of China. 29. See also the various editions of OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD, “Reports on G20 trade and investment measures,” available on the websites of these institutions. 30. Calculated at an interest rate per annum equal to US$ LIBOR for one-​year deposits, plus a margin of 4%, with a minimum of 4% per annum, to be compounded annually. 31. Ibid. 32. Actually, according to the government of Venezuela, a complicated one, as it submitted that: “a Mexican company, Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V. (‘Cemex’) owns 100% of Cemex España S.A., which owns 100% of one of the Claimants, a Dutch company called Cemex Caracas. In turn, Cemex Caracas owns 100% of the other Claimant, another Dutch Company called Cemex Caracas II. Cemex Caracas II owns 100% of Vencement Investments (‘Vencement’) a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Finally, as of 2002, Vencement owns 75.7% of Cemex Venezuela (CemVen), the cement company that was operating in the territory of the Respondent.” CEMEX Caracas Investments, 2010: 6. 33. Lee (2015) reports that there was at least one case in which the claimant’s parent firm had the nationality of the respondent state, namely, in the case of Azpetrol International Holdings B.V. and others v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 2009, brought under the Energy Charter Treaty. 34. Developing countries were respondents in about four-​fifths of these potential treaty shopping cases (Lee, 2015: 24). 35. The English version is available in a side-​by-​side comparison of the Brazil-​Mozambique and Brazil-​Angola Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015).

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Pa rt   I I

MARKETS AND G OV E R NA N C E

Chapter 7

F inancial De c i si ons , Behavioral Biase s , a nd Governance in E me rg i ng Markets Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung

Financial economists analyze how managers raise funds from financial markets and how they allocate these funds within the firm. In developed economies this primarily consists of firms managed by professional executives. The officers and directors of the prototypical developed economy firm decide on the types and venues of various financial instruments to fund the firm and design various mechanisms to allocate these funds across divisions and projects. Furthermore, to protect outside stakeholders from managers pursuing private or personal objectives, these firms enact formal governance mechanisms to evaluate and monitor capital acquisition and allocation decisions. These formal processes differ among various developed market firms, but each stresses the role of oversight and democratic decision-​ making, creating a series of checks and balances in the firm to limit managerial discretion. This democratic decision-​making model underpins many modern financial management textbooks. Yet, in most emerging markets, organizational structures substantially differ from this specific model, and instead, controlling shareholders lead large firms or firm groups (La Porta, Lopez-​de-​Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Morck et al., 2000, Morck, Wolfenson, & Yeung, 2005). Founding family control of listed firms is pervasive, especially in emerging markets due to limited internal and external oversight (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Anderson, Ottolenghi, & Reeb, 2017). State-​ owned firms are also prevalent, often comprising the largest and most important firms in the economy. Kowalski, Buge, Sztajerowska, and Egeland (2013) report that states control over 50% of the largest firms in

162    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung many emerging markets, suggesting the firm potentially focuses on state objectives over those of other investors in the firm. Moreover, market institutions continue to evolve and provide only limited oversight in emerging countries. Conceptually, the codified rules and laws in many emerging markets provide extensive protection to outside shareholders. In practice, the implementation and enforcement by the legal system of these regulations often lack credibility. Consequently, corporate funds primarily originate from private wealth, retained earnings, and state-​controlled banks; thus, the allocation of funds is tilted toward large established enterprises or government-​controlled businesses. In this kind of environment, concentrated decision-​making represents the norm rather than the exception, and financial management generally falls under the concentrated decision-​making model. A substantial academic literature focuses on the rational economic foundations of raising and allocating capital. An important consideration in the study of financial markets centers on the role of rational arbitragers seeking to exploit mispricing, purportedly driven by investors affected by behavioral biases. Yet, a spate of recent research highlights that financial markets often suffer price distortions due to decision heuristics and behavioral biases. Managers often rely on psychological attributes, rather than economic motivations, in making decisions. Recent financial economics research examines how behavioral biases influence firm behavior. Well-​known issues like “managerial overconfidence” or “status quo bias” have gained substantial traction in expanding our understanding of anomalies in the economics of financial management (e.g., Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008). Corporations adopt financial management practices to compel managers to provide economic justifications for their decisions. Checks and balances in developed economies mitigate not just agency costs by rational agents but also decision errors arising from behavioral biases. For instance, it is much easier to become overconfident if one never needs to provide economic justifications for the decision to either internal or external monitoring agents. Furthermore, corporate governance and market institutions mitigate agency problems that arise in sourcing and allocating capital. We argue that the governance structures and strong institutions observed in developed economies serve to limit the impact of behavioral biases on corporate decisions. Even an insightful and scrupulous manager may have to submit herself to a board or outside monitors that rely on their own heuristic decision rules and behavioral biases. In contrast, we posit that behavioral biases significantly affect fund-​raising choices and the allocation of capital in emerging market firms. In principle, these firms possess governance protections similar to those of their developed economy peers. In actuality, however, the governance, regulatory, and legal system often lacks the ability to interfere in corporate decisions. Typically, transactions that occur outside the firm involve arm’s-​length prices, which act to limit economic deviations. In contrast, transactions that take place within the firm derive from the hierarchal decision structure of the firm. Due to information asymmetry between decision-​makers and monitoring agents, behavioral biases are harder to detect within a firm and, thus, arise more readily within a

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    163 firm than in market transactions. This suggests greater behavioral biases in emerging market firms, relative to developed economy firms, where the allocation of capital primarily occurs within a firm or group. To initiate systematic research efforts, we classify various behavioral biases under differing economic models of financial management. We further argue that different behavioral biases will fare differently under different firm structures and corporate goals models (i.e., the democratic decision-​making model versus the concentrated decision model). In the globalized economy, companies from these two broad categories of financial management and governance systems compete across industries and countries. Firms domiciled in locations with mature economies tend to engage in numerous transactions outside the firm. Consequently, external market participants exploit and constrain behavioral biases in corporate decision-​making. In addition, external pressure leads to the use of internal governance mechanisms that also serve to limit behavioral biases and protect corporate investors and employees. In contrast, financial management in fast-​growing economies often entails autocratic decision-​making within the firm. Asymmetric information with external constituents and high transactions costs limit the ability of the market for corporate control to limit behavioral biases. These differences lead to important considerations regarding the allocation of capital in the firm and society. Importantly, the financial management or governance practices in emerging markets potentially limit the development of external capital markets, which serves to help maintain these autocratic decision styles.

The Economics of Financial Management Our understanding of the roles of economic and psychological incentives in financial management grew at different paces. The theory of corporate finance came to life in the 1960s when Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that under a certain set of conditions (M-​M assumptions), the firm’s financial decisions regarding corporate policies such as capital structure and dividend payout are irrelevant. These conditions comprised the absence of any frictions including agency costs, information asymmetry, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, and taxes (among others). Soon after that, researchers started relaxing M-​M assumptions. For example, an important feature in a corporation with diffused ownership is the separation of ownership and control. In other words, managers, who are decision-​makers, often own a minuscule fraction of shares. The capability of managers to potentially make decisions that bring them private benefits while not maximizing shareholder value has been dubbed “agency costs” as depicted in the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This notion of developing incentives and mechanisms to align managers’ interest with those of shareholders’ gives rise to corporate governance.

164    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung Traditionally, corporate governance is defined as ways in which shareholders and creditors assure themselves of getting the maximized return on their investments. From the perspective of the firm’s managers, corporate governance refers to ways insiders can credibly commit to maximize the return and, hence, be able to attract capital from outside investors. Anglo-​American firms tend to emphasize structures that protect minority shareholders, while Continental-​European firms tend to utilize structures that also protect creditors and employees from insider manipulations. There are many ways managers may fail to act in the interest of those who possess human or monetary capital: Self-​dealing—​the most obvious agency cost—​refers to the ways managers benefit their own interests through engaging in the activities or investments that benefit them personally. These activities range from illegal activities such as outright theft, bribery, accounting irregularities, or insider trading to less obvious methods such as cronyism or favoritism of their family members, political partners, or business partners in awarding the business or employment contracts. (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-​de-​Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Self-​dealing is closely associated with corruption. Extravagant perks—​another way managers do not maximize shareholder wealth is through consumption of excessive perks. These include extravagant offices, private jets, memberships in expensive golf clubs, exaggerated entertainment bills, and so on. Arguably, one may include executive compensations although the evidence is less clear-​cut. High executive compensation, similar to the pay of professional athletes, may simply reflect a scarcity of talent or alternatively stems from managerial dominance of the pay-​setting process (Beaumont, Ratiu, & Reeb, 2016). Shirking—​this simply refers to the ways managers do not expend enough effort in doing their job. They may be less focused on maximizing investor returns and more focused on the activities that bring them direct or indirect personal benefit (board memberships, consulting, personal investments, charity involvement, political activities, etc.). Empire building—​ Roll (1986) proposed a “hubris” hypothesis and argued that managers may be driven by “empire-​building” incentives. Since being a manager of larger firm is more prestigious, managers may undertake value-​reducing mergers and acquisitions in order to create business empires. Inappropriate risk-​taking—​managers may be inclined to take investments with excessive risks, as potential adverse consequences are disproportionately born by outside investors; or, they may be inclined to excessively avoid risks to protect their private benefits as losses may attract scrutiny (John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008).

Monitoring Agency costs may be alleviated through mechanisms such as accountability and transparency. Specifically, firms are obliged to disclose company information following government-​stipulated rules and regulations and these reports require validation or certification by independent auditing firms. The accounting literature finds strong

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    165 evidence that executives manage earnings and thus compromise accountability and transparency (Dechow, Kim, Hutton, & Sloan, 2012; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). Evidence also suggests that supposedly diligent and credible auditing firms relax their standards for other business purposes. In addition to these internally driven and publicly validated disclosures, the business press and financial analysts arguably serve as important information intermediaries that uncover company’s mischief. However, the reliability and independence of both the business press and financial analysts remain an important concern. Boards represent another mechanism to control agency problems as they monitor and safeguard executives to dutifully carry out their fiduciary duties. They have the power to set executive compensation and remove CEOs. They also monitor the principal decisions by managers through the power to approve companies’ strategic decisions such as large investments and divestments as well as takeover offers by other companies. Frequent criticisms of boards’ effectiveness center on the notion that many “non-​executive” directors are not truly independent and may be ineffective advisors or monitors. Executive compensation contracts represent an important mechanism to align the objectives of managers with outside investors. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued in a seminal (but controversial) paper that this sensitivity is insufficient as an average manager receives U$3.25 in compensation for every U$1000 increase in shareholders’ wealth. This 0.325% sensitivity seems insufficient incentive to eliminate agency costs. Moreover, recent studies documented that managers manipulate incentive contracts through activities like “backdating” of stock options or that they can induce managers to manipulate the market’s perception of firm value. Last, activist investors with sizable shareholding may convince other investors that management change would be beneficial for shareholders’ wealth. Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that active (“pressure resistant”) institutional investors prefer to invest in firms in strong legal environments and that the presence of these investors is positively related to value of the firm (Tobin’s Q), operating performance, and investment policy. This suggests that emerging markets have lower ownership by active investors which adversely affects firms’ value. There is a considerable difference between investor activism in developed economies and in emerging markets. Shareholder and creditor activism relies on substantial proportions of shares available to the public or bank influence, such that outsiders can potentially influence corporate insiders. Activism can act as important disciplinary action whereby outside investors pressure firm’s management for change. Of course, such activism can also entail disruptive activities by malcontents that disrupt long-​term corporate operations.

Market for Corporate Control The most extreme form of corporate governance is the market for corporate control. If the above-​mentioned governance mechanisms fail to improve the

166    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung performance, then a firm may find itself a target of takeover. 1 While most mergers are negotiated with management and often behind “closed doors,” mergers can take various forms in developed economies and occur on a more frequent basis than in emerging markets.

Ownership Concentration The above discussion about “insiders vs. outsiders” naturally leads to the question of how insiders are monitored in developed and emerging market economies. Faccio and Lang (2002) analyze European countries and Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) focus on US firms, both reporting that families control less than half of the listed firms. In contrast, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) examine Asian countries and find that more than two-​t hirds of the firms are family controlled, with the remainder often controlled by the state. The fraction of family control is even higher in countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Fogel (2006) documents the global prevalence of family groups and their control of substantive corporate resources in emerging markets.2 In short, family firms are the dominant structure in most emerging markets. Ranked among the largest corporations in the world, state-​controlled enterprises also dominate many emerging market economies. For example, China and India control 112 and 246 central state-​owned enterprises (SOEs), respectively (Kowalski, Buge, Sztajerowska, & Egeland, 2013). In both countries, SOEs are prevalent at both the central and state government levels. Some Chinese SOEs are now ranked among the largest corporations in the world (e.g., Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is the largest bank in the world). Moreover, in many economies these various state-​controlled firms account for substantial portions of economic activity. Arguably, these firms influence the allocation of capital within their own economies and influence both procurement and allocation of capital by external competitors.

Interesting International Differences Financial economists have been very active in investigating the variations in corporate governance and capital market system across countries. Corporate governance mechanisms like those discussed previously (see sections “Monitoring” and “Market for Corporate Control”) need government enforcement of laws and regulations to protect investors’ interest. However, many emerging market countries do not have strong state-​ enforced protection (Djankov et al., 2008). Glaring examples are Latin American countries and many countries in Asia (Djankov, Lopez de Silanes, La Porta, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-​de-​Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Predictably, countries with poor

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    167 investor protections do not have vibrant equity or debt markets. Coincidentally, these countries tend to have a strong presence of family business groups and most of them have a complicated web of subsidiaries with a controlling patriarch at the top (see, e.g., Fogel, 2006). The explanation is straightforward. When well-​defined rights are absent and regulatory enforcement mechanisms have limited power, companies cannot credibly pre-​commit to be conscientious agents/​representatives of outside shareholders or bondholders, nor would investors have any reasons to trust them (see La Porta, Lopez-​de-​Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998, 1999). Also, the limited property rights lead to poorly compensated monitoring agents, and potential candidates have little incentive to invest in human capital. Hence, the economy is stuck in an equilibrium without trust among potential equity and bond users, equity and bond providers, and monitoring specialists (e.g., lawyers, accountants, and auditors). In such an environment, wealthy people become dominant shareholders and banks provide lending, but at the same time, these controlling shareholders have to retain strong decision rights. Hence, these “concentrated corporate decision makers” also have to monitor fund users—​their employees and subsidiaries. In other words, corporate governance is personalized and internalized (La Porta et  al., 1999). Naturally, wealthy firm owners possess incentives to sustain their corporations’ and families’ financial health. Yet, in emerging markets, external institutions often fail to induce these family firms to develop robust internal checks and balances and lack monitoring capabilities on their own. International disparities in property rights are manifested in substantial differences in the relative size of the stock markets around the world. In 2016, the World Bank reports that the US stock market had a market capitalization of 147% GDP (gross domestic product), Singapore stood at 215%, and Japan at 100%. In contrast, in emerging markets the numbers are often much smaller than in these developed economies. For instance, in Argentina the stock market comprises only 12% of GDP, in Kazakhstan 30%, and in Sri Lanka 23% (World Bank, 2018). Differences in institutional development and corporate governance also affect the quality and reliability of corporate disclosures to investors. Since investors have little interest in equity investment, getting firm-​specific information to “buy low, sell high” is limited (see Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000). In such markets, investors are not willing to lend to corporations, nor can corporations gain trust easily. The corporate bond market, much like the equity market, does not fully develop and financing originates predominantly from bank intermediaries. The characteristics of firms in emerging markets are as follows:  (i) corporate governance is rather ineffective, (ii) a large fraction of companies have dominant shareholder(s) with concentrated decision rights, (iii) investment funds are mostly drawn from personal savings, family wealth, retained earnings, and banks, and (iv) established corporations, especially those with government or bank connection, possess the best access to capital.

168    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung

Goals of Financial Management With the danger of oversimplifying the subject matter, we propose to capture the goals of financial management using two extreme cases. At one extreme, firms in developed economies focus on developing structures to protect outside shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders of the firm. These structures often stem from the nature of the regulatory environment and center on maximizing either shareholder value (Anglo-​American) or firm profits (Continental-​European). At the other extreme, in firms operating in emerging markets, the dominant shareholder often focuses on developing structures that ensure their control of corporate resources for the family or the state. While it may be a futile endeavor to search for a single corporate goal in any firm, discussions with family firms in emerging markets often boil down to the sustainability of the family’s wealth and their political influence within the country. A large literature on cronyism builds on the assumption that family firms are geared to preserve their financial status quo in emerging markets. In many large, emerging market economies, such as China and India, SOEs’ decision-​ makers are subject to numerous bureaucratic hurdles. Governance checks and balances supposedly help direct decision-​makers toward value maximization. Yet they are often called upon to make decisions favorable to political agendas or governing bodies’ government official political and personal interest. Indeed, politically powerful individuals often heavily influence decisions in SOEs. Thus, concentrated decision-​making and bureaucratic entrenchment may make SOEs focus on corporate “sustainability,” a common refrain among government employees that centers on doing no wrong. Importantly, sustainability is rarely defined and typically includes a host of issues that benefit the careers of corporate insiders or agenda of the political party in power. While we propose these two extreme objectives of financial management, maximizing capital provider value versus controlling owner influence, to facilitate our subsequent discussion, most firms actually lie somewhere between these two extremes. One can draw some preliminary conclusions from the interactions between firms focused on maximizing value versus those controlling shareholder influence. The due diligence requirements and checks and balances procedures that arise in democratic decision-​making systems to protect providers of human and physical capital likely impede managerial decision speed but result in decisions more in line with these stakeholders’ interests. In the case of concentrated decision-​making, the controlling owner’s preferences lead to quick and speedily executed decisions that reflect the personal preferences of the dominant decision-​maker at that point in time. Complicated dynamics can arise. For example, the slow decision-​making in democratic decision-​making companies could hinder their ability to compete with concentrated decision-​making firms for investment opportunities. Alternatively, the limited orientation on efficiency in concentrated-​decision making firms potentially affects their ability to raise equity capital, or avoid excessive risk-​taking, or recognize subsequent

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    169 investment opportunities. However, additional important considerations also play important roles, which we turn to next.

Behavioral Biases and Financial Management Financial management and, more generally, economic behavior reflects decisions made by human beings. Historically, financial economists assumed that people are rational and reliably update their decisions. In the early 1970s, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974) (who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002) demonstrated that humans make intuitive judgments, often imperfect or even erroneous, and they often make decisions inconsistent with the rational expected utility framework. Active research on how humans make judgments in the real world, termed “heuristics and biases,” spread into finance and economics. Undeniably, we are human and the artificial analytical framework, no matter how elegant and convenient, has to be challenged. Modern-​day finance does not reject the notion that people use less than fully rational decision rules. The efficient market hypothesis, which dominated finance research for decades, assumes that market players search for and analyze the information to value assets as they seek profits. When an asset’s price is different from their estimation, they buy low or sell high. The more informed and better users of information will make profits. Milton Friedman (1953) asserted that irrational traders won’t survive and, therefore, cannot influence long run equilibrium asset prices. Thus, the efficient market hypothesis stipulates that well-​traded assets have prices that reflect rational valuation based on the latest available information. Paradoxically, “irrational traders” are critical to market efficiency, since an arbitrageur has to believe that he or she has superior private information or that others are not interpreting the information correctly (Black, 1986; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Indeed, while rational investors should hold well-​diversified portfolios and trade infrequently, empirical evidence documents that individual investors (presumably noise traders) hold poorly diversified portfolios, trade frequently, and, in general, behave in less than rational ways (Barber & Odean, 2013). At the same time, there is growing evidence that prices occasionally deviate from their fundamental values. Indeed, if arbitrage is risky, or if frictions in the market prevent arbitrageurs to take positions opposite to noise traders, the mispricings could potentially remain for extended periods of time. In fact, the argument is not whether less than fully rational traders make mistakes or if they individually survive in the market but how long it takes arbitrage traders to bring prices back to fundamental values (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The troubles that befell Long-​Term Capital Management (see Appendix 1) illustrate the

170    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung 15% 10% 5%

Percent Deviation

0% –5% –10% –15% –20% –25% –30% –35% –40% –45% 1/2/80 1/2/81 1/4/82 1/3/83 1/3/84 1/2/85 1/3/86 1/5/87 1/5/88 1/4/89 1/4/90 1/4/91 1/6/92 1/5/93 1/4/94

Figure 7.1  Long-​Term Capital Management Source: Reprinted from K. A. Froot & E. M. Dabora. 1999. How are stock prices affected by the location of trade? Journal of Financial Economics, 53(2): 189–​216. Copyright © 1999, with permission from Elsevier.

danger. Figure 7.1 highlights how long these mispricings can persist using the example of Dutch-​Shell. Theoretical conjectures and empirical research document that noise traders can survive as a group and cause prices to deviate from fundamental values. As a consequence, distortions in asset prices could last for an extended period of time, even in highly liquid and robust stock markets such as the USA. In short, even highly liquid markets cannot eliminate price distortions due to decision heuristics and behavioral biases.3 Behavioral biases also influence the managers of the firm. The board of directors, shareholder activism, and the market for corporate control cannot completely eliminate behavioral decisions by firm executives. Due to information asymmetry between the decision-​makers and monitoring agents, heuristic biases are not easy to detect within a firm. Still, transactions outside the firm center on observable prices, while transactions in the firm arise within the hierarchal structure of the firm. We argue these behavioral biases arise more readily within a firm than in transactions outside the firm, where arbitragers can more readily mitigate these frictions. Moreover, due to difficulties in changing the decision-​making practices in the executive suite, many suboptimal behavioral managerial decisions will be executed before the market realizes their true (biased) nature. That behavioral biases exist and survive in financial markets as well as in executive suites leads to intertwined considerations on financial management. The following questions naturally arise: • How can executives incorporate investors’ behavioral biases in their financial management decision? • How does corporate governance mitigate or amplify various behavioral biases in executive suites? In other words, how will a focus on investor protection versus allowing controlling shareholder influence affect managerial behavioral biases?

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    171 • Thus, how will these varied behavioral biases and differing financial management systems (democratic decision-​making vs. concentrated decision-​making) affect capital markets? Before we turn to this discussion, we describe some important managerial behavioral biases.

Behavioral Biases of Managers Among the numerous cognitive biases discovered in behavioral studies, we concentrate on the following five: overconfidence (often referred to as optimism), conservatism (often referred to as status quo bias), familiarity (often referred to as home bias), myopia, and disposition effect. This non-​exhaustive list seems appealing in our attempt to discuss differences between the emerging and developed economies. We note however that behavioral studies point to numerous different heuristics and behavioral biases. Overconfidence bias refers to one’s belief that one’s skills are higher than they actually are. The best-​known variety of overconfidence bias (“better-​than-​average” effect) refers to the notion that overwhelming majority of people consider their driving ability higher than the median driving ability of the peer group. This bias is present at the individual investor level as well as the manager level. At the individual investor level, researchers found strong evidence that overconfident investors trade more and experience lower returns on average (e.g., Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2009). At the manager level, overconfident CEOs tend to underestimate the risks and overestimate future cash flows associated with an investment. In addition, overconfident CEOs feel that they have superior decision-​making abilities.4 Academic research indicates that overconfident CEOs prefer internal financing over debt and that they prefer debt over equity. These preferences arise because overconfident managers overestimate future cash flows of the company and prefer to keep (mis)perceived upside potential within the firm. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) document among US firms that overconfident CEOs issue roughly 33 cents more debt than comparable firms to cover an additional dollar of external financing. Moreover, capital market participants enjoy greater protection providing debt capital, relative to equity capital, to overconfident managers. Overconfident CEOs thus tend to overuse internal funds; they are not well disciplined by corporate governance mechanisms or by the capital market. In the case of insufficient internal funds, they underinvest, presumably because they believe their equity is undervalued. Similarly, overconfident CEOs undertake value-​destroying mergers, especially if they don’t have to raise external funds. As a result, the market reacts more negatively to mergers undertaken by overconfident CEOs than for non-​overconfident CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Theoretical models predict that overconfident managers can potentially achieve higher productivity by accepting good but risky projects (Gervais, Heaton, & Odean, 2011; Goel & Thakor, 2008). Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2018) find overconfident CEOs tend

172    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung to over-​report their R&D (research and development), while cautious CEOs under-​ report R&D even though they tend invest more in R&D than their overconfident counterparts. Many firms in emerging markets are managed by wealthy families which form the upper class of society or by founders who exhibit extreme confidence and risk-​ taking behaviors. The implication is that confident managers in family-​controlled firms may act more rashly than their professional counterparts in developed economies. Status quo bias, or conservatism, simply refers to the preference of not making changes ( Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Viable explanations include lack of required information or sheer reluctance to exert the effort to make changes. However, it could be a cognitive bias. First, the initial anchor affects decision-​makers. One may estimate the price of a new car by starting with a totally irrelevant number that just catches one’s attention and mistakenly adjusts from there. Thus, how one is “primed” matters and inevitably the current status represents “initial prime.” Furthermore, when decision-​makers are prompted to weigh potential loses in contemplating a switch or change, they often choose to follow the maxim “if it ain’t broken, do not fix it.” Finally, one may simply fall into the sunk cost fallacy, as many studies have shown (Ho, Png, & Reza, 2014). Status quo bias can manifest itself in interesting and relevant ways. For example, status quo bias leads a person to demand a higher price to give up an object than the price she would be willing to pay to obtain the identical object. This implies that one may not be willing to rationally relinquish investment/​business. Alternatively, it leads one to resist disruptive changes in a business. Perhaps status quo bias may explain some well-​ documented difficulties in mobile phone companies like Nokia and Blackberry. Familiarity/​home bias refers to the individuals who prefer to invest in familiar industries or familiar locations. Researchers found that individual investors overweight their portfolios toward the stocks that are closely related to them in professional or geographical sense (see Doskeland & Hvide, 2011; Massa & Simonov, 2006). Kang and Stulz (1997) examine foreign portfolio equity ownership in Japan and conclude that foreign ownership of shares is much smaller than one would expect in the absence of barriers to international investment. In addition, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001) document that the home bias prevails in the USA as well—​people tend to invest in companies closer to home in spite of high level of information flow and corporate governance. This evidence stands in contrast to the diversification argument posed by the conventional finance theory. In other words, this phenomenon provides compelling evidence that people exhibit behavioral investing patterns, rather than investing according to a rational portfolio theory. The implication of such behavior elicits the classic observation in Feldstein and Horioka (1980)—​location-​by-​location investment is correlated with savings in spite of globalization. From a business strategy point of view, home bias blindfolds managers from seeing changes arising from non-​familiar industries or technology or geographic regions; home bias shields managers from seeing opportunities or needed adjustments. The disposition effect refers to investors’ tendency to sell winners and keep losers. A sizable literature uncovers the evidence of disposition effect in the USA (e.g., Ferris,

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    173 Haugen, & Makhija, 1988; Odean, 1998; Shefrin, Hersh, & Statman, 1985). The disposition effect has been found across countries and investor types (e.g., Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Frazzini, 2006). It is the most pronounced for unsophisticated investors and hard-​to-​value stocks and it declines with the investor’s experience. Thus, non-​price transactions potentially suffer greater disposition bias. In-​firm transactions likely suffer more from the disposition effect relative to external market transactions. Moreover, the more unique the asset, the more pronounced the disposition effect. Consequently, the disposition effect can cause fixed assets like property to have sluggish downward movement. Firms suffering from the disposition effect may take too long to divest away from segments that they should exit. Another pertinent bias is managerial myopia. Myopia is a behavioral bias in the sense that people give more weight to near-​term events than to more future events, even after adjusting for normal discount rates; accordingly, this bias filters into asset valuations. There could be strong implications. For example, myopic shareholders potentially over-​ react to near-​term earning reports and act with less than appropriate intensity to information on more distant considerations. Asker, Farre-​Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) document that US public firms tend to invest less than half as much as comparable private firms. Public firms’ sensitivity to changing investment opportunities goes down and this discrepancy is particularly high in industries where stock prices are more sensitive to earning news. Note that even though this evidence refers to public firms’ investors’ impatience and preoccupation with quarterly earnings, it seems plausible that managers have a similar bias. Critically, we aspire to connect behavioral biases to financial management and corporate governance within the context of emerging and developed economy firms. This list of behavioral bias is by no means exhaustive but does provide illustrative examples.5 There could be other important considerations.

Managerial Behavioral Biases, Corporate Governance, and Objectives Extant research documents the prevalence of behavioral biases regardless of whether the decision-​maker works under rigorous governance scrutiny or commits a serious amount of personal wealth. Two issues serve as our starting point. First, the boundaries of the firm matter in evaluating behavioral biases. Transactions within the firm undoubtedly involve greater potential for behavioral biases than arm’s-​ length transactions in highly liquid markets. Second, the effect of behavioral biases on corporate decisions depends on the effectiveness of governance and oversight. For example, the relative focus on investor protection versus controlling shareholder influence potentially affects how differing behavioral biases impact corporate decisions.

174    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung The interaction of objectives, governance, and behavioral biases and their impact on corporate decisions and financial management remains an under-​researched area. It is therefore fruitful to develop a taxonomy to guide future research and managers in this area. We reiterate the stylized differences in the structures of firms in developed economies versus those in emerging markets. In developed economies, democratic decision-​making dominates the firm. Management and the board arguably focus more on safeguarding the interests of shareholders, creditors, or employees. In emerging market economies, corporate decision rights are concentrated, institutions are weak, and management often aims toward promoting the interests of the controlling shareholder (family or state). We depict these as extremes in financial management, but in practice most firms lie on a continuum between these two extremes—​democratic decision-​making vs. concentrated decision-​making. We analyze how they interact with behavioral biases in the executive suite.

Behavioral Bias in the Firm Intuitively, concentrated decision-​making magnifies overconfidence because fewer people are involved in decision-​making; but this is arguable as the dominant decision maker may not necessarily be overconfident. However, governance makes a difference. A well-​functioning board typically mitigates personal consumption of managers and incentivizes the manager with share price-​sensitive compensation and profit-​ based bonuses. In short, the board oversees and monitors the decisions of the CEO in a developed market firm. For instance, investments above certain thresholds typically require board approval, which in emerging market firms with limited separation between managers and the controlling shareholders provides only limited oversight. Moreover, decision-​makers likely attribute the firm’s success to their own abilities, but they attribute potential failure to the environment/​economic circumstances. This self-​ attribution bias can lead to overconfidence and it varies around the world (see Figure 7.2). In short, CEOs in both developed and emerging market economies likely suffer from overconfidence. The key issue is the extent to which the financial management practices and governance mechanisms of the firm serve to dampen this bias. In democratic decision-​making, corporate governance is geared toward maximizing the returns to capital providers (both physical and human). Consequently, managers with a tendency to focus on the status quo face a high risk of replacement by more innovative and progressive candidates. In contrast, in firms with concentrated decision-​ making, especially when the objective is protecting controlling shareholder influence, status quo seeking is legitimized. Thus, status quo bias is potentially more prominent in emerging market firms and less constrained by financial management practices than found in developed economy firms. Ubiquitous home bias represents the most established bias in financial markets. Yet, globalization favors enterprises that venture internationally and managers who push the limits and step outside their comfort zone. We conjecture that it is easier to overcome home bias in decisions made by one person, which is the case in concentrated decision-​ making environments, than in a group’s decision assuming that group members

9.8 34.9 92.3 71.2 65.7 80.2 8.5 32.8 15.6 54.1 1159.8 10.4 33.9

US CEOs

vs 16.7*** 48.2*** 94.4 69.3*** 56.9*** 54.1*** 19.7*** 41.4** 25.3*** 50.0*** 1208.7 9.0** 33.6

Non-US CEOs

8.4 51.8 90.4 71.0 65.1 65.3 13.2 26.4 86.7 48.6 1113.5 6.8 3.8

US CFOs

vs 13.9*** 33.6*** 87.6 69.1*** 63.4 47.9*** 13.9 37.9*** 85.3 43.3*** 1118.8 5.9*** 6.1**

Non-US CFOs 7.1 52.0 92.6 70.9 64.9 65.1 13.3 24.5 85.5 48.8 1117.6 6.9 4.0

US CFOs

vs

13.9*** 31.7*** 90.0 68.7*** 64.4 47.7*** 14.1 38.8*** 85.2 43.5*** 1100.0 5.8*** 6.4*

Non-US CFOs

vs 17.1** 48.9 94.7 69.2*** 55.7 53.1*** 19.7*** 41.1 25.0 49.7** 1201.5 8.5* 33.6

Non-US CEOs

vs

14.9*** 34.3*** 89.3 69.2*** 63.9** 51.6*** 12.8 35.3*** 87.0 43.5*** 1093.0 5.5*** 5.3

Non-US CFOs

(3) Size Matching ~ 430 7.7 52.3 90.2 71. C 65.1 64.9 13.6 26.8 86.4 48.8 1115.1 6.7 3.9

US CFOs

9.2 39.9 94.7 71.7 66.8 78.7 8.6 36.2 19.0 52.9 1157.5 10.3 40.2

US CEOs

(3) Size Matching ~ 153

Source: Reprinted from J. R. Graham, C. R. Harvey, & M. Puri. 2013. Managerial attitudes and corporate actions, Journal of Financial Economics, 109: 103–​121. Copyright © 2013, with permission from Elsevier.

Figure 7.2  Optimism of US CEOs/​CFOs vs. non-​US CEOs/​CFOs

Highly risk averse (%) MBA Degree (%) Male (%) Male Height (inches) Female Height (inches) Very Optimistic (%) Averse to sure losses (%) Impatient (%) Focused in Fin. & Acc. {%) Age University SAT Score Tenure (Years) Stock Ownership (%)

17.6*** 51.9*** 95.0 69.7*** 53.1 57.6*** 17.9*** 38.7* 26.9 49.7*** 1189.6 8.0* 33.4

Non-US CEOs

(2) Public /Private Matching ~ 431

5.8 33.9 92.5 70.9 67.1 80.7 4.3 28.3 183 54.9 1154.2 10.0 31.7

vs

(2) Public /Private Matching ~ 120

US CEOs

Panel D: Comparisons between US CFOs and Non-US CFOs based on three sampling methods (1) Unconditional ~ 534 US /707 Non-US

Highly risk averse (%) MBA Degree (%) Male (%) Male Height (inches) Female Height (inches) Very Optimistic (%) Averse to sure losses (%) Impatient (%) Focused in Fin. & Acc. (%) Age University SAT Score Tenure (Years) Stock Ownership (%)

Panel C: Comparisons between US CEOs and Non-US CEOs based on three sampling methods (1) Unconditional ~ 1011 US/162 Non-US

176    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung share a common home bias. Following the same logic, executive suites in economic democracies are more likely to exhibit home bias.6 At the same time, in the case of concentrated decision-​making, the factors that drive home bias are prominent—​inadequate information and risk avoidance. Observationally, foreign expansion occurs by emerging market firms, especially into more developed economies. We conjecture that foreign expansion often reflects the concentrated decision-​maker pursuing other personal goals or political agendas (as in the case of China’s SOEs). Consequently, the relative home bias in emerging and developed market firms is an empirical question. Following the same logic, democratic decision-​making could be more conducive to myopia. If the objective function of decision-​makers is investor wealth maximization, managers will focus on stock prices, debt financing costs, and the cost of labor. However, financial markets sometimes may have a tendency to incorrectly value benefits of long-​term projects such as research and development. In such cases, managers may focus on increasing quarterly earnings at the expense of long-​term projects (Bushee, 1998, 2001). This is especially problematic in tournament models where managers may not even survive until the realization of future benefits of long-​term projects (see Kaplan, 2017, for an alternative perspective). On the other hand, the decisions of concentrated decision-​makers are less affected by financial market actions and the objective of these decision-​makers is to maximize family influence. Also, their longevity depends less on the markets. Hence, they can afford to wait until the realization of the long-​term project. Consequently, they would be less affected by potential myopic market behavior. We note that such managerial be­havior may result from behavioral bias or potentially represent a rational response to behavioral biases by investors in the markets. Disposition effects are likely equally present in all firms. However, firms that focus on protecting controlling shareholder influence seem less likely to recognize losses and suffer visible price volatility. Moreover, in economies where transactions occur more within the firm, relative to economies where transactions occur between firms, firms should exhibit greater problems with disposition bias. Sociologists argue that conglomerates exemplify the disposition effect, which led to their decline in the 1980s in the USA (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994). Intuitively, conglomerates suffering from disposition effects reacted slowly to changing markets and continued to invest in weak opportunities. Ultimately, their values declined and corporate raiders eventually moved in to take advantage of these investments driven by behavioral biases. However, poor financial market development influences the efficacy of the market for corporate control (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005), suggesting that controlling shareholders have an incentive to thwart financial market development. This suggests the disposition effect strongly influences emerging market firms and markets.

Managerial Biases and Financial Markets Markets consist of firms. In some economies, transactions take place within the confines of a single firm, while others exhibit more transactions across firms.

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    177 In economies with greater vertically and horizontally diversified firms, more transactions occur within the firm. In contrast, when the boundaries of the firm are fairly narrow and the firm transacts outside the firm for supplies, services, and customers, behavioral biases play a less important role. As in financial markets, arm’s-​ length negotiations serve to limit behavioral biases in decision-​making, at least in the long term. Consequently, we posit the economies with more focused firms, relative to those with more diversified firms, behavioral biases will exhibit lower effects on the allocation of resources in the economy. Emerging market firms often seek to keep transactions within the firm and often become conglomerates. Managers dealing with or competing in economies with more diversified firms should expect greater behavioral bias. Likewise, economies greatly affected by non-​democratic public policy decision-​making that sets investment trends are more likely to be affected by the behavioral biases of the influential. Thus, we contend that emerging market economies collectively suffer from greater behavioral biases. Our arguments imply that a portion of the high price volatility that we observe in emerging markets may be due to the influence of behavioral biases in corporate decision-​making.

Conclusions and Implications Behavioral biases in raising and allocating capital influence a wide range of financial issues. These behavioral biases are hard to observe and lead to distorted asset prices, which influences investment choices of even completely rational investors. Of course, the big issue here is that these deviations from rational investment choices, which are difficult to arbitrage away, lead to distorted resources allocations. In emerging market economies such as China and Indonesia, governments typically play important and direct economic roles via state-​controlled banks and enterprises. Similarly, external transparency and accountability and internal corporate governance practices leave a lot to be desired in many fast-​growing economies. Typically, the stock and corporate bond markets in these economies are still defining and developing their roles. Thus, economies that exhibit greater within-​firm or within-​business group transactions, relative to those with arm’s-​length firm-​to-​firm transactions, will suffer greater biases and investment distortions. Limited internal and external governance in emerging markets often exacerbates, or fails to control, the influence of behavioral biases on a firm’s decision-​making. Behavioral biases arise because people by nature take shortcuts in decision-​making. The biases (e.g., overconfidence, status quo, disposition, home bias, and myopia) stem from a lack of awareness, due diligence, self-​reflection, and independent voice. One managerial implication is that rigorous internal corporate governance can potentially mitigate internal behavioral bias, which seems especially critical in emerging market firms. However, one must recognize that tightening internal corporate governance

178    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung comes with a cost: it slows down decisions and thus execution speed. Management and the governance board have to balance this trade-​off. The solution is to spread an intensive governance mind-​set into all levels of the corporation: inculcate a full-​time and widespread culture of awareness, diverse and vertically connected discussions, judgment based on sound causal logic and factual evaluation, and internalization of corporate objectives in serving stakeholders.

Firm Implications In a world of high-​speed globalization and disruptive changes behavioral biases can inhibit the recognition of new investment opportunities. There is an additional consideration in many emerging market economies where firms get preferential access to investment funds, creating limited sensitivity to the real cost of capital. The mix of behavioral biases and insensitivity to cost of capital can lead to accelerated overinvestment, e.g., as a result of overconfidence or myopia. Or, the mix can lead to a partners’ prolonged insistence on pursuing a non-​profitable strategy, say, as a consequence of disposition effect. Consequently, managers must defend against their own inability to see change, yet to counter overpriced bids, hasty over-​investment by competitors, or inertia due to membership in a vertically related business network. The positive side is that informed and rational management can take advantage of competitors’ behavioral biases. The value of a corporation is not just in owning current innovations but also in developing the ability to see future innovations (avoid status quo bias). This again raises the importance of internal preparation issues: (a) collection of information, i.e., well-​ known sequential strategy with learning, (b) getting ready in advance, i.e., get funds in advance, and (c) recognizing that behavioral biases often stem from making shortcuts in decision-​making (intuitive rather than logical).7 Getting funds ready in advance often reflects the notion of taking advantage of investor behavioral biases by raising funds in hot markets with momentum.

Market Implications Throughout the chapter, we describe how investors’ behavioral biases in financial markets create prolonged distortions. Specifically, asset prices deviate from fundamentals due to various frictions, leading to higher costs of capital demands from investors. If distortions persist in highly liquid and robust equity markets such as the USA, it seems indisputable that behavioral biases would play an even larger role in executive suites. In addition, the expanding groups of international players who are insensitive to the cost of capital and driven by sustainability motives exacerbate the concerns about distorted investment. Their ability to act without some of the conventional “checks and balances” inadvertently magnify the intensity of behavioral biases. Consequently, the evolving competitive pressures affect firms with the value maximization objective.

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    179 Perhaps this is one of the concerns underlying the USA’s caution regarding newly rich countries, e.g., previously Japan and now China. Increased globalization, accompanied with the surge of Asian economies, has led to intense global competition in the last few decades. The increased competition fueled managerial risk appetite (i.e., reduced their risk aversion), and, in turn, increased managers’ inclination for speedy action. However, making rushed decisions, or merely feeling the pressure to rush into decisions, provides fertile ground for decision heuristics and behavioral biases. Yet, in an ideal world, managerial biases would be corrected through both internal governance mechanisms in the firm and external mechanisms and institutions. In the real world, distortions occur at the expense of players with value-​creating investment opportunities that face capital constrains. Not only do the distortions exist in asset prices and managerial decisions, but they also affect returns to human capital and R&D as well as global labor cost. For example, China’s policy-​related low labor wages in the past affected global labor wages. Governance structures vary across developed markets but seek to promote external monitoring and democratic decision-​making to protect various stakeholders of the firm. These corporate governance mechanisms and market institutions limit opportunistic activity and serve to limit the impact of behavioral biases on corporate decision-​ making. Emerging market firms often exhibit similar oversight on paper, but in practice these governance structures often fail to optimize the allocation and sourcing of corporate funds. Consequently, outside investors are less willing to fund firms in emerging economies because of concerns that managerial biases distort corporate investments. As a result, transactions often occur within the firm and without arm’s-​length prices in emerging markets, which exacerbates economic deviations. Thus, behavioral biases influence corporate decision-​making more readily within emerging firms, allow greater behavioral-​based influences on the allocation of corporate capital, retard the development of financial markets, and contribute to the misallocation of funds among projects in emerging market economies. As emerging economies’ share of the global economy increases, these distortions could have greater spillover effects on firms in developed economies.

Appendix: Long-​Term Capital Management A Tale of Arbitrage Failure Inefficiencies happen in seasoned stocks with perfect substitutes as well. Perhaps the most telling example of the limits to arbitrage is the case of Long-​Term Capital Management (LTCM). The hedge fund—​run by Nobel Prize winners in Economics—​ identified mispricings in the market and took opposite positions. Specifically, LTCM fund managers recognized an arbitrage opportunity in Royal Dutch/​Shell shares. These two companies agreed on a constant 60–​40 ratio in dividends (and all other financial interests) and, hence, share prices should reflect this 60–​40 ratio. In other words, in efficient markets the share price of Royal Dutch should always be 50%

180    Emir Hrnjic, David M. Reeb, and Bernard Yeung higher than the share price of Shell. As the prices diverged from the 60–​40 ratio, LTCM took a long position in relatively undervalued stock and a short position in relatively overvalued shares. Even though LTCM made a correct decision (in the sense that prices were expected to converge to a 60–​40 ratio in efficient markets), the prices continued diverging, creating even larger inefficiency. In fact, Froot and Dabora (1999) showed that Royal Dutch/​Shell prices deviated as much as 40% from the 60–​40 ratio. As a result of this bet and some other unfavorable developments, LTCM ran out of funds and had to liquidate, creating one of the more glaring crises in modern financial history.

Notes 1. There were several merger waves in the USA, the most visible one in the 1980s (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001). 2. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family ownership in the USA is more frequent than most participants realize and document a key difference with European family firms. Specifically, they show that families control firms in the USA with substantially smaller equity stakes than observed in European firms. Effective control in the USA requires lower percentage of ownership than in Europe due to the different governance structures (e.g., dual boards in Germany). 3. This is consistent with the noise-​trader risk model developed by De Long, Summers, Shleifer, and Waldmann (1990) and extended by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In addition, arbitrageurs may be aware that noise traders can even exacerbate mispricing in the short run. Consequently, arbitrageurs may trade in the direction of mispricing to take advantage of noise traders and, in the process, increase mispricing in the short run. Hence, the combination of noise traders and the costs of arbitrage (including short sales constraints) may keep prices away from fundamental values for prolonged periods of time. See DeLong et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) for theoretical models. For empirical evidence, please refer to Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), Froot and Dabora (1999), Baker and Wurgler (2006), and Kumar and Lee (2006). Furthermore, Barberis and Thaler (2003), Baker and Wurgler (2007, 2011), and Barber and Odean (2013) provide excellent surveys of the literature. 4. Malmendier and Tate (2005) construct frequently used measures of overconfidence. First, they use the propensity of managers to hold in-​the-​money equity options and buy their company stock as their measure of managerial overconfidence. As a second measure, they record the number of press articles related to the firm that refer to the CEO using the following terms: “confident” or “confidence,” “optimistic” or “optimism,” “not confident,” “not optimistic,” and “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” “frugal,” or “steady.” They use a simple algorithm to classify CEOs based on the press description. 5. Herding bias, where a manager or investor mimics the decisions of other firms, provides another prominent economic deviation. Arguably, executives who mimic the decisions in others firms are more likely to be replaced by more innovative managers in developed economies relative to their emerging market peers.

Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance    181 6. This line of thinking leads to interesting propositions. For example, do companies with an exogenously diverse or international board exhibit less home bias than their peers? Alternatively, do investors, who may also suffer from home bias, exhibit a preference for a less diversified board of directors? 7. Kahneman (2011) and his colleagues posit that there are two models of thinking: system 1 operates automatically, fast, with limited effort, and with little sense of control and is closely associated with intuition; system 2 operates based on effortful activities that demand complex computation and logic audit. Heuristic-​based decision making is a part of system 1 thinking while due diligence-​based checks and balances activate system 2 thinking. The gist of our argument is to activate system 2 thinking while not abandoning the efficacy of system 1 thinking.

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Chapter 8

C om parative C orp orat e Governance in E me rg i ng Markets Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi

This chapter seeks to take stock of what we know about corporate governance (CG) in emerging markets (EMs) and what research questions scholars should focus on moving forward. Although, the chapter adopts a systematic cross-​national comparative approach, we draw on the national cases of the BRIC1 (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. BRIC countries are four major emerging national economies that cover about 40% of the world population (or 3.6 billion people), representing a large share of the world economy in terms of trade and access to natural resources (nominal GDP of US$16.6 trillion, equivalent to approximately 21% of the gross world product). These four countries share similar features of both centralized and pro-​ market economies, recording a high economic growth and degree of foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness. However, in most other respects particularly referring to political regimes and strength of institutions, they differ substantially, which has critical repercussions to the patterns of CG and makes their cross-​national comparison interesting. We begin this chapter by identifying the main tenants of CG in EMs as well uncovering key country-​level idiosyncrasies. We then turn to a thorough literature review of managerial research post-​2000. Our core exercise is to empirically compare BRICs along different governance dimensions as defined by the OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines. We conclude with a discussion of ideas for future research. There exists extensive conceptual and empirical research on the CG of developed markets, particularly the USA and the UK, as well as Continental European countries. This is the context where the main theoretical contributions have been established and testes. Two main CG models exist:  shareholder-​oriented and stakeholder-​oriented (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), although more recently, there

186    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi is refinement in terms of how different dimensions of CG align with each other into different governance configurations or types (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015; Haxhi & Aguilera, 2017). CG research in EMs is less extended and started later due to the initial lack of interest to improve CG and empirically the dearth of available and reliable data. This trend is changing rapidly. CG in EMs firms is important from the investors’ point of view because effective CG might make up for country weakness in the overall national governance system—​for example, in terms of enforcement of minority shareholder protection rights. Khanna and Zyla corroborate in an IFC survey this firm-​level filling in for institutional voids. It is interesting to learn that surveyed investors valued and were willing to pay higher premiums for well-​governed EM firms, yet as noted by these authors there is a lot of ambiguity regarding what is the CG threshold for investment and what governance practices matter the most for well-​governed firms in EMs. CG related reforms suggested by survey respondents had to do with “improved and more consistent enforcement of investor protection laws and contracts” (2017: 14). In particular, they referenced to: “(1) less opacity in China; (2) fewer judicial and bureaucratic delays in India; (3) reduction in the number of multiple class structures in Brazil; and (4) improvements to the rule of law in Russia” (2017: 14). It is critical to highlight at the outset that governance practices that might be considered key and effective in developed countries, such as independent boards, might likely not apply or be less of a priority for EM firms, which are typically controlled by either the state or families. Firms in EMs face greater concerns associated with minority expropriation than firms in more developed markets, and as a consequence, EM investors need to equip themselves with self-​protection measures given the weaker legal enforcement and institutional structures. Self-​protection strategies might include greater due diligence, third-​party arbitration, larger discounts on price, or greater focus on firm-​level governance attributes. Law and finance scholars have explored the connection between good CG, interpreted as strong legal systems, and dispersion of ownership structures (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999)—​although this thesis has been disputed on the causality between the strength of a country’s the law and its economic development (Aguilera & Williams, 2009). In the context of EMs, reducing tunneling schemes within business groups seems to be one of the most effective ways to improve governance and in turn enhance firm performance (Grosman, Aguilera, & Wright, 2018). Management and finance scholars mostly agree that effective CG in EMs might be a form of investor protection, particularly given the absence of strong institutions and presence of key institutional voids. In this chapter, we will focus on the formal CG practices, which are observable and taken at face value. However, moving forward, it is imperative to incorporate some of the insights that we gain from mainstream international business (IB) such as non-​ linear and discontinuous dynamics in explaining business processes (Santangelo & Meyer, 2017), from organizational theory such as neo-​configurational perspectives to explain outcomes (Misangyi, Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, Crilly, & Aguilera, 2017), and

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    187 from sociology and economics in terms of thinking more about the ecosystem and the power informal relations (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007).

Taking Stock of What We Know It is intriguing that there are only a handful of reviews or surveys on the CG of EMs across different fields. We now describe some of them to give a sense of what they cover. These reviews vary in terms of countries they cover and how systematic they are in the literature review. The first set of literature reviews take a finance approach yet they are interested in the firm-​country fit. Gibson (2003) examines CG in eight EMs through the drivers and consequences of CEO turnover, as a prominent Western governance practice. He concludes that CG across these countries tends to be ineffective, and firm performance is unrelated to this practice, particularly in family-​ owned firms. Klapper and Love (2004) explore the effectiveness of firm CG in a cross-​ national study of 11 EM economies. They stress how country-​level institutions play a critical complementary role to firm level governance. In a related article, Claessens and Yurtoglu’s (2013) finance survey uncovers that firms with better CG in EMs have a series of benefits such as easier access to capital, better financial performance, and more favorable treatment from shareholders and non-​shareholder stakeholders. They also demonstrate that voluntary and formal CG practices are less effective when firms are embedded in weak institutional environments. Fan, Wei, and Xu (2011) provide the introductory review chapter to a special issue on government quality, state ownership, and financial development in EMs (relative to developed economies) with a special focus on institutional settings. Black, De Carvalho, and Gorga (2012) challenge the universality of CG practices, and after examining Brazil in depth, they conduct a cross-​country study of Brazil, India, Korea, and Russia and conclude that country institutional features strongly influence the effectiveness of CG and its relationship with market value. Turning the focus on the owners, Claessens and Fan (2002) in a cross-​national study of CG in Asia, which includes several EMs, highlight the salience of the weak minority shareholder rights, and the risk of majority owners’ expropriation. A  related agency problem is raised in the management field by Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang (2008)’s article, where they introduce the principal-​principal perspective CG in EMs, particularly with majority owners such as families or the state. Estrin and Prevezer (2011) develop a CG framework in the BRIC countries by focusing on the strength of informal institutions as well as the fit between formal and informal CG institutions with an emphasis on ownership and external investors. Aguilera, Kabbach de Castro, Lee, and You (2012), and Kabbach de Castro, Aguilera, and Crespí-​Cladera (2013) illustrate with empirical data the ownership changes in publicly traded companies in EMs due to privatization trends, focusing in particular on South Korea, Brazil, Chile, and Central European countries. They show that often the goals of dismantling or weakening

188    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi ownership concentration and empowering minority shareholders are rarely accomplished due to weak minority shareholder protection rights. In this chapter, we seek to take a different approach to a literature review by conducting a thorough bibliometric search of what has been written on CG in the BRIC countries by surveying the management literature post-​2000. We chose this cutting point because the year 2000 is considered a milestone of emerging CG reforms among BRIC countries, signaling globally their desire to enhance CG by developing national CG codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-​Cazzura, 2009; Haxhi, 2010; Haxhi & van Manen, 2010). These codes represent a transition to the country’s adoption of governance practices that comply with international (Western) standards in an effort to attract foreign investment, particularly following the Asian crises. Post-​2000 also coincides with China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). In order to conduct a systematic literature review of the existing research, we relied on three search strategies. First, we looked over the 14 leading journals2 across the disciplines of IB, management, and CG that have published articles on the CG of emerging markets since 2000. In searching these journals, we used the following search terms:  (1) “emerging market” and “corporate governance”; (2)  “Brazil” and “corporate governance”; (3) “Russia” and “corporate governance”; (4) “India” and “corporate governance”; (5) “China” and “corporate governance.” Second, we used the same keyword combinations and searched for the first 20 results for each keyword combination on Google Scholar. This resulted in 191 unique articles (repeated results are discarded) examining different facets of EMs governance. Finally, to further expand our parameters, we conducted additional search with the individual search terms (without the boundary of journals) to look for books, book chapters, and other relevant publications by collecting the first 40 articles from 2000 to 2017 for each keyword used. Combined with the result above, we receive a total of 269 unique entries. Our systematic literature review yield four main CG research streams, namely, (1)  ownership; (2)  board of directors, (3)  top management team (TMTs); and (4) CG practices. Generally, labor would be another key research domain of CG which includes the overall labor participation, human capital skills, and labor market mobility. However, in the context of BRIC countries very few studies (e.g., Ardichvili, Jondle, Kowske, Cornachione, Li, & Thakadipuram, 2012; Earle, Spicer, & Peter, 2010) focus on this important governance dimension. Therefore, it is not included in our literature search. Our review discusses these four core streams of existing research of CG in BRIC countries and we summarize the main references in Table 8.1. Ownership is the cornerstone of CG research. While a decade earlier much of the political economy work was devoted to privatizations, in the 21st century, governance research has been devoted to explore the post-​privatization or at least the new role of the state in the economy. As such, this research stream incorporates various country-​level research topics on the structure and size of capital and equity market as well as the firm-​ level type and structure of ownership. We identify four main areas of research in the existing literature on ownership and capital in the BRIC countries.

Black, Gledson de Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010

None known

Black, Gledson de Carvalho, & Buck, 2003; Jesover & Oliveira Sampaio, 2014; Rabelo & Kirkpatrick, 2005; Judge & Vasconcelos, 2002 Naoumova, 2004; Lyubashits, Mamychev, Vronskaya, & Timofeeva, 2016; McCarthy & Puffer, 2003

Boards -​ Weak independence -​ Politically tight

TMT -​ Political connections -​ Dual leadership -​ Succession & issues in business groups

CG Practices -​ Discrepancy between de jure & de facto practice -​ Lack of enforcement -​ Efforts toward CG enhancement -​ Strong informal institutions substitute for weak formal institutions

Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pa, 2010; Black & Khanna, 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Patibandla, 2006; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2008; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014

India

Vasilieva, Rubtcova, Kaisarova, Kaisarov, & Pavenkov, 2015

Balasubramania, Black & Khanna, 2010; Chakrabarti, Megginson. & Yadav, 2008; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2012; Goswami, 2000; Reed, 2002

Kumar & Singh, 2012; Saxena, 2013

Judge, Naoumova, & Koutzevol, Jackling & Johl, 2009; Singh & 2003; McGee, 2006; Melkumov, Delios, 2017 2009; Robertson, Gilley, & Street, 2003.

Carvalhal da Silva & Camara Leal, Black, Kraakman, & Tarassova, 2005; Leal & Carvalhal, 2005; 2000; Black, Love, & Rachinsky, Lopes & Walker, 2012 2006

Ownership -​ Concentrated -​ Family  SEO -​ Principal–​principal perspective -​ Weak minority shareholder protection

Russia

Brazil

CG actors

Table 8.1 Summary of selected key references of the CG in BRIC countries (2000–​2017)

Chen, Chen, & Huang, 2013; Clarke, 2003; Guo & Miller, 2010; Lin, 2004; Lin, Ming, & Xu, 2006; Luo, Huang, Wang. & Lu, 2012; Schipani & Liu, 2002; Tam, 2002

Conyon & He, 2011, 2012; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Jia & Zhang, 2013; Jing & McDermott, 2013; Lau, Lu, & Liang, 2016; Li, Yao, Sue-​Chan, & Xi, 2011; Wen, Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek, 2002.

Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao, & Yang, 2003; Jia, Ding, Li, & Wu, 2009; Lin & Liu, 2009; Lo, Wong, & Firth, 2010; Ma & Khanna, 2016; Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007.

Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Chen, Chung, Lee, & Liao, 2007; Jiang, Kim, Nofsinger, & Zhu, 2017; Li, Guo, Yi, & Liu, 2010; Li, Tsang, Luo, & Ying, 2016; Liu, Li, & Xue, 2011; Lu, Xu, & Liu, 2009; Luo, Wan, Cai, & Liu, 2013; Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007; Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008; Wang, Guthrie, & Xiao, 2012.

China

190    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi First, considering the growing research about ownership effects on firm financial performance across the EMs (Aguilera & Crespi-​Cladera, 2016; Claessens & Fan, 2002; Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011), a body of work focuses on the effect of ownership structure on firms’ performance and valuation across the BRIC countries (Black & Khanna, 2007; Black, Love, & Rachinsky, 2006). For example, in the context of Brazil, several studies investigate how the introduction of the new listing segment Novo Mercado of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has affected firms’ performance and strategic decisions (e.g., Carvalhal da Silva & Pereira Camara Leal, 2005; Leal & Carvalhal, 2005; Lopes & Walker, 2012). They assess whether publicly traded firms perform better than private ones, and to what degree the new listing standards are improving firm performance. However, in the Chinese context it is vital to explore the transformation of state-​owned enterprises (SOEs) through asset management, business affiliation, and ownership concentration (Li, Guo, Yi, & Liu, 2010; Su, Xu & Phan, 2008; Wang, Guthrie, & Xiao, 2012). For example, Li, Tsang, Luo, and Ying (2016) study the impact of different control modes in China and uncover that non-​state-​controlled firms are more likely to have post-​state withdrawal enhanced performance and reduced agency costs than fully state-​controlled firms. While, Wang, Guthrie, and Xiao (2012) analyze how the changing ownership patterns following the rise of State-​Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) positively influenced firm performance. A second large body of work analyzes different organizational outcomes contingent on the type of ownership. The role of the state prevails in the Russian and Chinese settings (Black et  al., 2006; Lyubashits, Mamychev, Vronskaya, & Timofeeva, 2016), while family firms and business groups are ubiquitous in Brazil and India (Gaur & Delios, 2015; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Contrary to the Russian case where the governmental economic policy led to mass privatization, in the Chinese context, the state kept a stronger controlling role in the economy. Research demonstrates that political connections are critical in the acquisition process in China (Buck, Filatotchev, Nolan, & Wright, 2000; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007). Nevertheless, both China and Russia face important institutional and regulatory challenges related to corruption and poor transparency (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006). For example, Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova, (2000) argue that due to a lack of good CG regulation and infrastructure for controlling self-​dealing, mass privatization in Russia led to massive self-​dealing by managers and controlling shareholders, who used their wealth to further corrupt the government and block governmental reforms that might rein in their rent-​ seeking actions. Also, Chen, Chung, Lee, and Liao (2007) investigate the effects of disclosure, and other CG mechanisms, on equity liquidity, arguing that those companies following poor information transparency and disclosure practices will experience serious information asymmetry and higher costs for the shareholders. A third body of research within the ownership stream analyzes the relationship between the ownership structure and broader formal and informal institutional and governance mechanisms (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Patibandla, 2006; Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002; Singh & Gaur, 2009). For example, Sarkar and Sarkar (2008) explore the role of institutional investors in India and emphasize the

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    191 beneficial effect that foreign equity ownership can have on the CG of EM firms as well as the conflicting effect of institutional investors and financial institutions when they both are government controlled. In addition, Luo, Wan, Cai, and Liu (2013) focus on the principal–​principal perspective in multiple large shareholders’ (MLS) structure in the context of Chinese family firms. They argue that the competition over control among large shareholders and the number of MLS involved can shape the ability of these multiple owners to exert governance. Finally, a few studies focus on how the ownership structure affects the internationalization of EM firms, and especially the outward FDI (Liu, Li, & Xue, 2011; Lu, Xu, & Liu, 2009; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014). Among other scholars that explore this research question, Bhaumik, Driffield, and Pal (2010) find that ownership type is determinant with respect to the FDI outward in EMs. More particularly, in the cases of Indian automobile and pharmaceutical sectors, their two main takeaways are that family firms and firms with concentrated ownerships are less likely to invest overseas, and that strategic equity holding by foreign investors is likely to facilitate outward FDI. The board of directors research stream is concerned with two main areas of interest. First, a rich body of empirical research examines the structure, composition, and functioning of the boards in BRIC countries (Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao, & Yang, 2003; Melkumov, 2009; Singh & Delios, 2017). For instance, focusing on Indian large firms, Jackling and Johl’s (2009) findings suggest that while larger boards impact positively performance, independent directors have limited effectiveness in the EMs context. A second, and more sizable body of work explores the degree of independence, auditing, and transparency (Black, Gledson de Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010; Jia, Ding, Li, & Wu, 2009; Kumar & Singh, 2012; Lin & Liu, 2009; Ma & Khanna, 2016; Robertson, Gilley, & Street, 2003), and the effect of board structure, independence, and reporting on firm performance (Judge, Naoumova, & Koutzevol, 2003). For example, for a sample of 266 companies listed on the Shanghai stock exchange, Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) find that firms with higher percentage of independent directors, separated chair, and CEO functions are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulations, resulting in higher transparency of their CG practices. Likewise, focusing on transparency and reporting, McGee (2006) studies the telecommunications industry in Russia. He concludes that Russian companies compared to foreign firms take longer to report financial results, although due to the scarcity of the data it is premature to conclude whether there is any real improvement over time in the reporting of companies in Russia. It is interesting to observe that typically the performance outcomes are related to reducing corporate misconduct and overall institutional uncertainty. The top management team (TMT) research stream covers areas related to the background, career paths, and compensation structure of TMTs. We identify three main areas of research in the existing literature on TMTs in the BRIC countries. First, several scholars have studied the role of TMTs’ characteristics, particularly political connections (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Li, Yao, Sue-​Chan, & Xi, 2011) vis-​à-​vis post-​IPO firm performance (Kumar & Singh, 2012), CSR (corporate social responisiblity (Lau, Lu, & Liang, 2016), or corporate philanthropy (Jing & McDermott, 2013). For example, Jia and

192    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi Zhang (2013) find that corporations with CEOs who hold political affiliations have a significantly higher probability of making donations. A second more sizable body of work looks at the relationship between CEO turnover, compensation, and firm performance in both private and public sectors (Conyon & He, 2011, 2012; Gibson, 2003; Vasilieva, Rubtcova, Kaisarova, Kaisarov, & Pavenkov, 2015; Wen, Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek, 2002). An illustrative example of research on this topic is Conyon and He’s (2012) article. They use data on CEO compensation in China’s publicly traded firms from 2000 to 2010 and show that CEO pay is positively correlated to both accounting and stock market performance for non-​state firms, and that CEO equity ownership and grants are influenced by the composition of the board and presence of state ownership. The main takeaway is that the TMTs in EMs are heavily influenced by ownership structure. Finally, several studies examine succession-​related issues in business groups especially in the Indian context. For example, Saxena (2013) highlights that succession in business groups in India has frequently entailed family feuds and business splits and acknowledges the emergence of business groups in the broader historical, economic, political, and sociological context. To conclude, CG practices are the fourth stream of research, which is concerned with the implementation of broader CG reforms in BRIC countries, the diffusion of CG practices in a cross-​country perspective, and the adoption of CG or legal practices at the firm level. The majority of studies on CG reform zooms in one specific country by exploring the process and outcome of the implementation of CG reforms in one of the BRIC countries. For example, most studies on Brazil focus on three aspects of this reform: its effect on firm’s value creation (Black, Gledson de Carvalho, & Oliveira Sampaio, 2014), on the quality of CG firm-​level practices, and on the structural changes of the Brazilian CG system. While in the Indian country case, several studies cover multiple dimensions ranging from the effect of CG firm-​level practices on firm value to the enforcement mechanism as one of the weak spots of Indian CG regime (e.g., Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 2010; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2012; Goswami, 2000). In the Russian setting most of the studies take a historical and institutional approach in explaining the path-​dependent nature of its economic reform (Buck, 2003; Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005; Judge & Naoumova, 2004; Lyubashits, Mamychev, Vronskaya, & Timofeeva, 2016; McCarthy & Puffer, 2003). Alternatively, in the Chinese context, governance reform research addresses the central role of the state as the implementer and pacer of CG reform (e.g., Clarke, 2003; Lin, 2004; Lin, Ming, & Xu, 2006) and the role of business ties or Guanxi (Chen, Chen, & Huang, 2013; Guo & Miller, 2010; Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012). Another set of studies has adopted a cross-​national comparative approach by contrasting two or more BRIC countries, along several CG dimensions (e.g., Black, Gledson de Carvalho, & Gorga, 2012; Haxhi, 2015; Klapper & Love, 2004; Li & Nair, 2009; Lazareva, Rachinsky & Stepanov, 2008; Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). For example, Buck, Filatotchev, Nolan, and Wright (2000) argue that while economic reform in Russia driven by rapid privatization, price liberalization, and political

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    193 system changes led to insider control of most manufacturing firms with important consequences for FDI, China’s incremental reforms, without privatization or democratization, facilitated foreign joint ventures as the dominant means of reforming SOEs. Finally, a few studies related to overall CG practices focuses on how the US or shareholder-​oriented type of CG or legal practices affect performance and behavior of firms in EM and BRIC countries (Klapper & Love, 2004; Li & Nair, 2009; McCarthy & Puffer, 2003; Reed, 2002). For example, Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003) find that similar to US firms, EM firms adopt behavioral practices such as dividends, explained by the same financial parameters such as profitability and debt; however, they differ in terms of institutional features related to financial policies resulting in different outcomes across operating environments. It is clear from this review of the existing CG research on BRIC countries that there is quite a bit of interest in better understanding how CG is evolving in these countries by focusing on how both economic transformations toward market-​oriented models and better availability of data have triggered a spur of research. The challenge continues to be to understand each of these countries in their own contextual constraints and opportunities.

Comparative Corporate Governance in BRIC Countries The diffusion of CG practices through codes of good governance differs across countries (Aguilera & Cuervo-​Cazurra, 2004, 2009; Haxhi & Aguilera, 2012, 2014; Haxhi, 2010; Haxhi & van Ees, 2010; Haxhi, van Ees & Sorge, 2013; Haxhi & van Manen, 2010); however, the “Principles of Corporate Governance” issued by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) have served as a benchmark for developing and upgrading national codes, especially in EM countries. The codes, despite not being legally binding practices, provide recommendations about the firm governance behavior and structure to overcome or mitigate some of the broader national CG deficiencies. The role of the OECD has been crucial in diffusing these CG tools and in promoting CG best practices across the BRIC countries through the issuance of several White Papers and Guidelines of CG in these countries (Pargendler, 2015), such as the 2011 OECD “Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China.” In this section, we systematically compare the BRIC countries by taking as a template the 2015 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. These principles are useful because they are meant to offer guidance on the desired nature of the main governance dimensions. They include the (1) corporate governance framework, (2) ownership and shareholders’ rights, (3) information disclosure and reporting, as well as (4) responsibility boards and supervision, and (5) stakeholders’ rights and CSR.

194    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi A country’s path-​dependent socioeconomic development is critical in understanding its national CG framework. Embedded in the country’s legal system and capital, product, and labor markets, the CG framework is part of a broader macro-​economic and societal context. The four BRIC countries share several comparable historical paths regarding their economic transformation, state intervention, and governance structures. All of them followed similar paths of structural change from centralized economies to more open market economies, where the state continues to have an interventionist role but modified from prior to the opening of the economy. As a result, these countries have experienced an ownership shift from strong state ownership control to differing waves of privatizations, leading to an increase in private and foreign ownership, and to indirect ways of state intervention in the economy. These changes have paved the way to the adoption of more effective forms of CG practices, the implementation of which varies substantially across the four BRICs. For this purpose and in an effort to facilitate a systematic comparison, we discuss in turn each country’s overall CG dimensions following the OECD Principles. In Table 8.2, we include a summary of each country CG dimensions, staring with the CG framework.

Corporate Governance Framework The notion of CG emerged in Brazil in 1999 with its first code of good governance, alongside the early privatization programs, which transformed the ownership structure of large SOEs, not only in the telecommunication and transportation sectors but also in the natural-​resource (e.g., oil company Petrobras) and financial sectors (e.g., Banco do Brasil). This increase in private and foreign equity led to pressures in strengthening corporate and stock market regulation, creating, for instance, the three new listing segments of Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), where Novo Mercado has stricter CG standards—​including the one-​share-​one-​vote model and higher transparency and accounting requirements. To gain legitimacy and credibility, large Brazilian firms tend to cross-​list in both, Bovespa and the New York Stock Exchange. The introduction of Novo Mercado also led to an increase in the number of listed firms; however, the majority of Brazilian family-​owned small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs) remain unlisted (Black et al., 2010) and have difficulties raising capital. The following are the main institutional challenges. First, external financing is not readily accessible, in part because of the underdeveloped domestic capital market. Thus, only large Brazilian firms have access to foreign capital, and due to high interest rates, banks are more likely to lend to large firms than to SMEs. Second, given the gaps between written and de facto law, the inefficient legal system allows many appeals that create enormous backlogs and huge legal delays, resulting in onerous costs. This is particularly pervasive in non-​listed family-​or group-​controlled businesses that dominate the corporate landscape in Brazil. Finally, since the informal economy is widespread in Brazil, informal institutions substitute for the weak rule of law leading to corruption, uncertainty, and inefficiency (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011).

-​ Sao Paulo Stock Exchange -​ Brazilian CG Associations -​ Inefficient CG framework, backlogs & huge delays due to strict labor & complex tax laws

-​ -​ -​ -​

Civil  Law 1976: Company  Act Bylaws of companies 2002: New Civil Law Code -​ 2013: Corporation  Act -​ 2013: Securities Act

-​ Legal system & state intervention varies across different federal states

Institutional framework

Legal framework

State intervention

CG framework

Brazil

- ​Strong & centralized

-​ Civil Law Judicial review of legislative acts -​ 1995: Company  Law -​ 1999: Investor Protection Law -​ 1996: Securities Market Law -​ 2016: Civil Code of the Russian Federation -​ 2016: marketNo 39-​ FZ of Federal Law On securities 22.04.1996 -​ 2016: Bank of Russia regulation, Listing rules,

-​ State -​ FCSM -​ World  Bank, Ratings Agencies, Consultants -​ Conflict between informal & formal Institutions

Russia

Table 8.2 Summary of selected key CG dimensions in BRIC countries

-​ Legal system & state intervention varies across different states

-​ Common-​Law -​ Hindus, Muslims & Christians Distinct codes -​ Judicial review of legislative acts -​ 2013: Companies  Act -​ Clause 49 Listing Agreement -​ 2014: SEBI  Act -​ 2015: Securities Contract Act -​ 2015: SEBI Listing Obligations & Disclosure Requirements

-​ Bombay Stock Exchange -​ Control  SMEs -​ Informal mechanisms of trust & reciprocity a substitute for poorly performing states, security of property rights & law enforcement

India

Financial: CSRC Government Agencies Capital & Stock Market Informal institutions complement inefficiencies of formal institutions

-​ Strong & centralized -​ State intervention varies across different provinces

-​ Civil Law mixed Soviet & Continental Civil Law -​ 1993: Company  Law -​ 1999: Securities  Law -​ 2014: The Company Law of the People`s Republic of China -​ 2014: Securities Law of the PRC -​ 2014: Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-​Owned Assets of Enterprises

-​ -​ -​ -​

China

(Continued )

-​ Depends on specific countries

Effective CG requires: -​ Consistency with law system in place -​ Legislation -​ Regulation & Control -​ Self-​regulation, soft-​ law, (Comply-​or-​explain /​  Codes) -​ Enforceability -​ Design to serve public interest

-​ Stock market regulations needs to support CG -​ Provide incentives for investors -​ Promote cross-​border collaboration -​ Clear division of responsibilities

OECD

Brazil

-​ Voting & non-​voting -​ Access to meeting is not shares held by majority guaranteed shareholders -​ Approve financial statement, remuneration of directors & managers, amending bylaws, appoint a fiscal board & new executive directors

-​ Mandatory annual dividend: in interest or net equity (JCP)

General shareholders’ meeting

Access to information & dividends

-​ Shareholders do not have access to full information -​ Weak enforcement of laws regarding dividend payments

-​ Family-​owned business groups -​ 70% of listed firms controlled by a single shareholder, foreign firms or via pyramidal business groups in 2016

-​ SOE & business groups -​ 43% of listed firms have an owner or a group of interrelated owners holding 75% of company shares in 2014

Russia

Dominant type of ownership

Ownership & Shareholders’ Rights

Table 5.1 Continued China

OECD

-​ Greater disclosure -​ Dividend payments are -​ Approval-​based rare control: Special majority, -​ Company Law Tribunal -​ Related party transaction problem

-​ Appoint the board of -​ Shareholders have directors, vote at general access to the general meetings, corporate meeting financial statements & -​ Not all decisions are statutory registers voted -​ Not associated with statutory duties, not liable for acts or omissions

-​ Shareholders should be able to access relevant and material information; and are entitled to dividends

-​ Shareholders should be able to participate and vote in the general meeting -​ Certain matters can only be decided by votes

-​ Conglomerates, family-​ -​ SOE & foreign equity -​ Private equity owned business groups -​ By the end of 2016, a in the form of pyramids total of 2887 listed firms, with a wide basis in 1019 (47% of market many different activities, cap.) of which were -​ SOE about 10% of the state-​owned GDP in 2016

India

-​ Concentrated -​ Companies Act 2013 grants minority shareholders (a minimum of 10% of the shareholders)

-​ Relatively concentrated -​ Large state involvement -​ Still limited protections for minority shareholders

-​ Concentrated -​ Protection of minority shareholders (25% free floating voting shares) -​ Minority shareholders can elect one board executive member & temporary fiscal board for the auditing, by majority vote of at least 15% of votes or 10% of shares

Ownership structure & protection of minority shareholders -​ Relatively concentrated -​ Large insider & state involvement -​ Abuse mainly by state

-​ Key requirements for the -​ Key requirements for the -​ Key requirements for the -​ Key requirements for minimum-​bidding  price: minimum-​bidding  price: minimum-​bidding  price: the minimum-​bidding -​ At least 80% of the price -​ Weighted average -​ Highest negotiated price: highest price paid paid to the controlling market price of the last price per share for any by offer or within last entity 6 months (or appraiser’s acquisition under the 6 months. report price if not listed); agreement attracting -​ Highest price paid by the obligation to the offer or its affiliated make a mandatory parties in last 6 months takeover offer -​ Volume-​weighted average price payable by acquirer during 52 weeks -​ Highest price payable by acquirer during 26 weeks -​ Volume-​weighted average market price of such shares for a period of 60 trading days

Takeovers

(Continued )

-​ No restrictions -​ Rights of minority shareholders must be respected

-​ Information about material changes, such as takeovers, should be available in order for shareholders to understand their rights

Brazil

India

-​ Undertake obligations -​ Firm’s management and exercise rights in the -​ Risk management & interest of the company internal control system -​ Defines corporate policy, -​ Monitor activities of appoint officers & firm’s executive bodies independent auditors

Board Responsibilities

Unitary board

Unitary & two-​tier boards

Two-​tier board

-​ Composition: Non-​ -​ Loyal & protect firm & executive & independent shareholders interests, directors, -​ Supervisory board a -​ Draw a Code of Conduct permanent body under -​ Auditing, remuneration the leadership of the & nominations shareholders’ meeting committee

Unitary board

OECD

-​ Monitor management -​ Objective corporate strategy -​ Accountable to shareholders & stakeholders

Unitary & two-​tier boards

-​ Timely & accurate disclosure on all material matters & events: -​ Financial situation, performance, ownership, remuneration, -​ Board independence, -​ Related party transactions, -​ Issues regarding employees & stakeholders, -​ Annual audit by an independent auditor

-​ Abuse observed -​ Insider trading is prohibited -​ Successfully monitored by institutional investors

China

-​ Hesitant attitude -​ Disclosures in the annual -​ All basic principles & towards information report of the company core procedures of disclosure and periodic disclosures international audit -​ Use voluntary disclosure to stock exchange standards to gain credibility/​ -​ CEO/​CFO certification -​ No formal agreement on legitimacy with investors -​ Auditor/​Audit a significant event for -​ A 2004 amendment to Committee disclosure the Russian Criminal -​ Information related to Code declared it a crime stakeholder interest & to knowingly withhold employees disclosed information more often than issues classified as “sensitive”

-​ Management owns a large part of shares -​ Transfer pricing

Russia

Board structure

Board and Supervision

Type of information to be -​ Stock exchange disclosed requirement includes statutory auditing -​ Fiscal board (permanent or by request) instead of auditing is required

Information Disclosure & Reporting

Insider trading

Table 5.1 Continued

-​ -​ -​ -​

-​ CSR not codified, however important for large firms counting for 35% of GDP

-​ Listed firms use CSR to measure performance, value & engagement. -​ CSR communicative

-​ Relatively  strong -​ Brazilian Labor Code -​ Employees on the board: no minimum requirement

Stakeholders’ rights

Socially Responsible Behavior of Firms

Employee involvement

Investors, creditors Employees,  unions Customers, suppliers State, banks

-​ Novo Mercado listed-​ firms minimum ratio of 30-​33% independent board members. -​ Board contract appointment max. 3 years, possible reappointment once

Stakeholders

Stakeholders’ rights & CSR

Board Independence

Investors, creditors Employees,  unions Customers, suppliers State, banks

-​ Medium -​ Employees on the board: no minimum requirement

-​ Seen as obligation -​ Not voluntarily done -​ Lack of understanding why it is important

-​ Role of state limited in increasing stakeholders’ rights -​ Employees’ rights the highest /​Social services available

-​ -​ -​ -​

-​ Loosely defined eligibility criteria for independent directors -​ Executive directors may not make up more than 1/​4 of the board of directors -​ Minimum 30-​33% independent directors -​ Board contract appointment max. 1 year, possible reappointment once.

-​ Weak -​ Employees on the board: no minimum requirement

-​ CSR obligation prescribed by New Companies Act

-​ Codified duty of CSR

-​ Stakeholders Relationship Committee -​ Codified duty of CSR

-​ Investors, creditors -​ Employees, customers, suppliers, Active companies-​stakeholders cooperation

-​ An effective Board is comprised of both executive directors & outside, independent directors

-​ Medium -​ Employees on the board: 33% minimum requirement

-​ Focused on short-​term gains and competition -​ Slow change toward social responsibility

-​ Mixed

-​ Voluntary activities are expected -​ Should be related to creating wealth and jobs

-​ Expected by law to -​ Should be constituted by consider stakeholders law or mutual agreements -​ Enforce environmentally -​ Enforcement of creditors’ responsible actions rights & information access -​ Focus on charity & -​ Employee participation anti-​bribery should be permitted

-​ Employees -​ Creditors -​ Customers, Suppliers

-​ If Chairman a non-​ -​ 1/​3 of the Board of executive, 1/​3 of the directors must be board shall be composed independent of independent directors -​ Supervisory board must -​ If chairman an executive, include representatives 1/​2 of the board of the shareholders & shall be composed of employees independent directors. -​ Board contract -​ Every company is appointment max. required to appoint 1 3 years, possible Indian resident director reappointment once -​ Board contract appointment max. 3 years, possible reappointment once

200    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi The emergence of first CG practices in Russia was triggered by the rapid political and economic changes in the early 1990s accompanied by a radical process of privatization, and the emergence of a new class of owners, the oligarchs or domestic tycoons backed up by the government. Russia sought to put some order in the post-​privatization era by issuing its first corporate conduct code in 2002. Regulating CG was acutely critical in the context of newly privatized SOEs, acquired by managers and private owners, who knew little or nothing about governance (Heinrich, 2005). Due to the lack of regulation and the nescience of the benefits of an open market, the expected changes in the CG structures were substituted by inefficient and short-​term solutions, which led to several cases of violations of shareholders’ rights and corporate conflicts (McCarthy & Puffer, 2003). Putin’s leadership increased state involvement and FDI attraction policy, but Russia was required to establish international CG standards, including information disclosure and shareholders’ rights; however, a number of CG problems related to equity market and protection of property rights prevail, especially regarding the dilution of stock, corruption, and asset stripping (Zhuplev & Shein, 2005). The nascent state of CG in Russia remains fragile. First, despite an abundant written CG legislation, its implementation and enforcement are limited as a result of a combination of weak formal and strong informal institutions (Guriev, Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Tsukhlo, 2004). Second, in order to comply with OECD standards, the CG framework requires further improvement through three types of actions: to pursue the government administrative reform and cooperation with influential business groups, to strengthen independent financial institutions, and to collaborate with international institutions such as global ratings agencies and OECD (Judge & Naoumova, 2004). Finally, informal institutions, e.g., culture and religion, by affecting the behavior of managers and owners, have a deterring effect on the Russian regulatory reforms (Buck, 2003). Compared to the other BRIC countries, India has developed the first and most advanced CG framework. Its first code of corporate governance was issued in 1998, but it was able to build on its British legal legacy—​for instance, as early as in 1956 the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) set the first Companies Act of Listing Agreement, governing the operation of joint-​stock companies and protection of investors’ rights. The Act provided a framework for disclosure and shareholders’ rights, although in practice minority shareholders and creditors remained unprotected despite the Act (Chakrabarti, Megginson, & Yadav, 2008). In the early 1990s, confronted with several corporate scandals, the Indian government initiated a series of economic reforms and liberalization programs leading to rapid changes in laws, regulations, and CG landscape (Sharma, 2012). The most important was the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992 with a growing jurisdiction on CG ever since. India also faces several institutional challenges. First, the CG system in Indian SMEs, consisting mainly of family firms, is mostly controlled by informal mechanisms based on trust, reciprocity, and reputation, making the SMEs face issues of corruption and limited recourse to the legal system (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005). Second, although the national legal framework applies in all Indian states, the enforcement of the legal system

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    201 varies across states. Thus, in poorly performing states, property rights and rule of law are weak, and informal CG institutions largely substitute for the ineffective formal framework (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). Due to significant economic and political changes, the CG framework in China has undergone major transformations over the last 30  years. Prior to 1978, the government played a central role in all corporate decisions in a scenery dominated by SOEs (Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, & Lu, 2010); while, during the period 1978–​1991, the changes in ownership of SOEs led gradually from a planned centralized to a socialist market economy (Guo, Smallman, & Radford, 2013). The launch of both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in early 1990s represents most likely the biggest step toward market-​oriented reform and privatization (Jiang & Kim, 2015), although shares were only gradually released as tradable. Therefore, by slowly changing the corporate ownership structure from state to partially private owned, and by joining the WTO in 2001, Chinese firms became increasingly more responsible for operating in line with the OECD governance principles. In addition, the government took more a regulatory stance rather than being involved in a multiple-​tier governance monitoring system (Tam, 2002; Wei, 2003). The first code of good governance for listed companies was issued in 2001. Shen, Zhou, and Lau (2016) offer an insightful review the empirical research on CG in China with a focus on the internal and external governance mechanisms and identify several key concepts such as the importance of the social context and a new conceptualization of governance and its different outcomes. Yet, as shown by Haveman, Jia, Shi, and Wang (2017), China still faces important institutional challenges. First, governance in China is very much focused on de jure regulations to solve conflict among the various interests groups; however, governance de facto focuses mostly on agency problems within the SOEs and listed firms (Clarke, 2003). Thus the implementation of CG heavily relies on the capability of Chinese institutions to perform their task (Tam, 2002). Second, although the transition of the SOEs to limited liability companies changed significantly, the institutional framework, inefficacies, and redundancies persist in terms of role and responsibilities among these institutions such as the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC), government agencies, and the capital market (Cheung et al., 2010). Finally, in the Chinese context it is important to consider the role of informal institutions, which complement the ineffective CG by the informal rules (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). The Chinese culture and traditions, by shaping the norms and values of all parties involved, will continue to define Chinese CG, including the unique role of boards (Wei, 2003).

Legal Framework To better understand the legal skeleton of CG rules and regulations; we briefly describe each legal framework of the four BRICs. First, the CG legal framework in Brazil was established in the Corporation Act of the Federal Law (1976) regulating all matters related to publicly or

202    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi privately held companies. All listed companies should comply with Bovespa’s listing rules and regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM). Since the liberalization policies in the 1990s, foreign companies can register at the CVM or national bank and are required to act toward the long-​term commitment of Brazilian national interests. All forms of foreign direct investment are allowed, except golden shares in areas of national strategic interest. Publicly listed business groups seek to establish a sound CG system, in part to overcome the liability of emerging CG countries that it is tied with weak legal enforcements and property rights (Penna, 2016). Second, the mass and rapid privatization in Russia triggered several legal advancements including the passing of the Joint Stock Company Law that theoretically strengthened shareholders’ rights (McCarthy & Puffer, 2003). Built upon the civil law tradition, the Russian legal framework consists mainly of three pillars: the Joint Stock Company Law (1995) regulates board structures and audits, the Investor Protection Law stipulates rules on shareholders’ rights, aiming to reduce legal uncertainty among companies during the mass privatization, and the Securities Market Law was introduced to simplify shareholders exit and address CG abuses that occurred before its implementation (Judge & Naoumova, 2004). However, as noted, despite the abundance of legislation, law enforcement in Russia is extremely weak. Following the 2009 financial crisis, the state decided to implement more targeted CG regulations in an attempt to ease the integration of Russia as an OECD member, yet it does not seem to have had a strong positive effect (Belyaeva & Kazakov, 2015). Third, the Indian CG legal framework is broadly covered in the New Companies Act (2013) and the regulations issued by SEBI. The New Act, as the principal CG legislation, contains provisions on shareholder rights, disclosure requirements, and board responsibility including board constitution, meetings, and processes (SEBI, 2013). All listed firms are required to follow the directives issued by SEBI and standard listing agreement of Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange. The listing rules consist of mandatory and non-​mandatory provisions, aligned with New Act. In sum, India adopted a hybrid voluntary and rule-​based approach of compliance with CG practices, where the voluntary principles provide a broad direction, while the legal rules enforce specific aspects of CG. In the Indian scenario, this hybrid approach is considered the most effective mechanism for improving CG (Ghosh & Jatania, 2016). Finally, legal experts refer often to the Chinese legal system as nascent, which affects companies operating in this market (Liu, 2005). There are two main hard laws:  the Company Law and the Securities Law is enforced by the CSRC and the two stock exchanges (Jiang and Kim, 2015) and were both revised in 2014, granting stronger investors’ protection (Yang, Chi, & Young, 2011). Finally, the full CG Code, issued in 2007 (updated in 2016) functions as an extension of the Company and Securities Law and provides guidelines rather than explicit rules on CG matters such as shareholders’ rights, board structures and meetings, and information disclosure (Jiang & Kim, 2015). In sum, regardless of variations across CG systems and despite persisting noticeable efforts, the current CG frameworks of the BRICs are characterized by poorly enforced legal systems or state strategic loopholes in CG regulation. The latter is more observable

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    203 in the cases of China and Russia, although Brazil and India still lag behind OECD countries’ CG standards. As noted by Estrin and Prevezer (2011), due to the lack of implementation and enforcement mechanisms, informal institutions often substitute for the deficiencies in the legal landscape.

Ownership and Shareholders’ Rights The predominant ownership pattern among the BRIC countries is a configuration of concentrated ownership, either in business groups or SMEs, and either family-​owned or state-​owned enterprises. As in most EMs, their weak institutional context fails both to fully protect property rights and to expediently enforce contractual agreements. These institutional flaws require different compensatory mechanisms. For example, the lack of property rights protection may lead to state concentrated ownership (Pargendler, 2015). However, there exist large differences among the four BRIC countries in terms of ownership structures and shareholder treatment as shown in Aguilera et al. (2012) or in the special issue on ownership and family firms in EMs (Aguilera et al., 2015). Ownership structures tend to be pretty sticky or not to change radically over time unless there is a major transformation such as the Russian privatization in the 1990s or China’s adherence to the WTO in 2001. Below we summarize the main ownership traits in terms of shareholder rights for each of the BRICs. Brazilian firms are highly concentrated and mostly owned by family business groups. The state is present as blockholder in a few large firms such as Vale and Petrobras, or as debtholders in other firms such as JBS, through the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) (Musacchio, Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015). Brazilian law allows both voting and non-​voting shares, which is often considered a weakness of Brazilian corporate governance, given minority investors’ non-​voting shares. Most listed firms are controlled by a majority shareholder—​prior to 2000, ownership concentration, dual class share structure, and low levels of disclosure introduced the risk of minority shareholders’ expropriation. New Bovespa listing rules are intended to enhance protection of minority shareholders but have yielded limited results. As a result of the Russian mass privatization program, the ownership structure became relatively concentrated in favor of company insiders, initially employee ownership and subsequently domestic private business groups, colloquially referred to as oligarchs. Both employees and the state eluded some influence to managers and foreign capital, although the outsiders, who often have strong ties to the government, lost some control through the re-​nationalization movement in the 2000s when the state continued its substantial presence in a number of strategic sectors (Buck, 2003; Chernykh, 2011; Guriev et al., 2004). Main regulations to ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders tackle conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. Even though Russia struggles to improve minority shareholders’ protection, the enforcement mechanisms have been weak (McCarthy & Puffer, 2003), although there are signs of improvement (Grosman, Aguilera, & Wright, 2018).

204    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi A distinctive feature of Indian CG is the concentrated ownership structure with diversified family-​ owned business groups. Two-​ thirds of the largest 500 Indian companies are business group-​affiliated (Chakrabarti et al., 2008). The conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders appears in the three main company types: family-​owned business groups, SOEs, and MNEs (Ghosh & Jatania, 2016), which, accompanied by weak legal protection of minority shareholders, trigger rent-​seeking behaviors, such as related party transactions (Khaitan, Jhunjhunwala, & Jalan, 2015; OECD, 2014). In China, the state continues to be the main owner through block shareholdings and with high ownership concentration (Jiang, Kim, Nofsinger, & Zhu, 2017). The state, which includes different levels and legal persons who are not individuals but mostly state-​owned or partially state-​owned entities, are both categorized as “ordinary institutional investors” and operate under the oversight of the State-​Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Until the 2005 split share reform, most of these ordinary institutional investors owned non-​tradable shares, and tradable shares were owned by domestic and foreign parties. Conflicts between majority and minority shareholders remain a major challenge to ensure equitable treatment (Clarke, 2003; Wang, 2014), which is mitigated through as one-​share-​one-​vote or a cumulative voting. However, because these governance mechanisms are not mandatory, majority shareholders still control most decisions (Cheung et al., 2010), and puts minority shareholders at risk Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2011; OECD, 2011). In sum, the current ownership landscape of BRICs consists of concentrated ownership either by family, by individuals (Russia and India), or by SOEs (Brazil and China), with weak protection for minority shareholders that results in principal–​principal agency conflicts with high risk of expropriation. This is more visible in China and Russia (Chen, 2009), while Brazil and India, even though more advanced in terms of shareholders’ rights protection, still lag behind the OECD CG standards.

Information Disclosure and Reporting Information disclosure and reporting is one of the weakest BRIC governance dimensions reflecting the scarce mechanisms of enforcement of CG rules in these emerging economies. In Brazil, the new Bovespa listing standard (2000) improved the information disclosure of listed firms required to publish an annual consolidated financial statement as well as financial disclosures and a quarterly financial reporting meeting the international standards (Black et al., 2014). Auditing committees are an uncommon practice, especially for family firms or business groups, but many Brazilian firms use a fiscal board as an alternative approach to ensure financial statements. While Russia has made progress toward better CG over the last few years, particularly in the area of information disclosure, transparency of state-​owned firms lags behind the standard of the OECD countries. A particularly affected area is the transparency of related party transactions, executive compensation, and board practices (OECD, 2012).

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    205 In response to weak regulatory enforcement, Russian stock exchanges have taken coercive measures to strengthen disclosure requirements; however, enforcement is far from being perfect and a set of sanctions or delisting may be necessary to respond to compliance failures (Vasilyev, 2000). The Indian Companies Act requires company boards to disclose financial information to shareholders, registrars of companies, and the stock exchanges (Amarchand, 2012). Similar to Anglo-​American legislation, financial reports must be certified by the CEO and CFO, who are legally responsible for internal controls). When disclosing annual financial reports, listed Chinese firms must follow the General Regulations on Financial Reports established by the CSRC (2002). The annual reports must be audited by qualified accounting firms and officially stamped. The adequacy and transparency of disclosure in Chinese companies is a primary concern of both foreign and domestic investors (OECD, 2015). Poor and ineffective regulation and law enforcement was traditionally believed to be a major source of inefficiencies in the Chinese stock market (Allen et al., 2005). Information disclosure by listed companies has improved over time, with progress in accuracy, scope, and depth of disclosed information as well as its use by investors and intermediaries (OECD, 2011), although there is still a long way to go for China to meet the OECD disclosure standards.

Board and Managerial Supervision Most of the BRICs attempt to follow the OECD recommendations in terms of board and supervision; nevertheless, important structural differences exist regarding the board structure and composition. Most notably, the degree and internalization of director independence as it is understood in the advanced industrialized economies differs substantially from and across the BRICs. Table 8.2 summarizes the core information for each country in terms of board structure, responsibilities, and independence. First, in Brazil firms can adopt either a unitary or a two-​tier board system consisting of both an executive and supervisory boards. The board of directors is mandatory in cases of publicly held corporations, and consistent with international standards, the board is responsible for defining the corporate policy and appointing officers and independent auditors. The executive board should be composed of at least two or more individuals for non-​listed companies and a minimum of five for the listed ones, and dual leadership is not allowed (see Gallo, Chiachio, & Muniz, 2016, for specific details). In 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission and CG committees jointly issued the revised Unified Code of Good Governance, although it is thought that some of the recommendations are unrealistic and too costly for companies to endorse. Institutional investors, such as private equity funds, pension funds, and the BNDES are influential role models in terms of setting the appropriate governance standards. Russian corporate law is fairly similar to global standards, stating that the board of directors is responsible for monitoring executives, offering advice on business and strategic decisions, including the appointment and dismissal of the TMT. Regulation

206    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi requires joint stock companies with more than 50 shareholders to have a dual tier board with a supervisory body and an executive body as it intends to grant non-​executive directors the opportunity to more effectively monitor management (Bezemer, Peij, de Kruijs, & Maassen, 2014). Current code recommends a minimum of three independent board members, although the code is voluntary. In reality, most directors are representatives of major shareholders and vote as instructed, which often leads to rent-​seeking behaviors (Grosman et al., 2018). In India, the boards are entitled to practice all the powers complying with the Companies Act, including the appointment of the TMT. Furthermore, governance regulation requires that the board of a listed company is comprised of at least half of non-​ executive directors and one female director. To ensure independent auditing, the audit committee shall be comprised of at least three directors and two-​thirds of those should be independent and all members shall be financially literate (Ghosh & Jatania, 2016). Chinese listed companies have adopted the two-​tier board system, loosely based on the German model, with both boards of directors and supervisors (Dahya et  al., 2003), and where two-​thirds of the directors are meant to be independent. The board of directors is the principal decision-​making authority, whereas the supervisory board is independent and serves to contribute impartial opinions and monitor executives and board directors (CFA, 2007). Dual leadership where the CEO and chairman are the same individual is fairly widespread in China, although there are some notable exceptions such as Petro China, China Construction Bank, China Shenhua Energy, and China Southern Airlines, which have separated these two roles (CFA, 2007). Theoretically, the two-​tier board structure should help managerial monitoring; however, these directors’ incentives and ability to exercise internal controls are mostly aligned with the dominant shareholder, i.e., the state and its Chinese Communist party. This calls into question the effectiveness of such a structure due to additional costs, the strong presence of Communist party members in boards, and administrative obstacles related to the functioning of two boards (Cho & Rui, 2009).

Stakeholders’ Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility Stakeholders’ rights and CSR-​related activities vary substantially across the BRICs. While Brazil is the most CSR-​oriented country, India is the only country in the world with codified duty of CSR, and Chinese and Russian firms are less unified as managers lack full understanding of the competitive advantages of attending to stakeholder and CSR demands. We discuss the main country highlight below. First, although Brazil faces large economic inequalities, the labor market is firmly regulated by the law, protecting employees likely better than in the other BRICs. Due to the high bureaucracy per region, employer and employee relations are mainly based on the consolidation of 1943 Labor Code. Other than this attention to labor, the Brazilian CSR is not codified, although most large firms have a CSR report. Established in 1988 as a non-​governmental organization, the Brazilian Instituto Ethos is the main driver for

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    207 CSR, developing recommendations in the form of non-​binding rules and standards to improve the relationships with stakeholders. The vast majority of the listed companies (representing 35% of the Brazilian GDP) utilize CSR in their firm policies in order to measure performance, value, and engagement. Among the BRIC countries, Brazilian firms are the most communicative about their CSR initiatives such as sponsorship, health and environment (Alon, Lattemann, Fetscherin, Li, & Schneider, 2010). Second, conducting socially responsible strategic initiatives in Russia is, for the most part, still seen as a burden or window-​dressing activity. While Russian companies comply with official regulation on stakeholders’ rights, such as those related to creditors’ rights, and incentivizing charity donations, only a limited number of companies engage in voluntary actions aimed at better relations with their non-​shareholder stakeholders (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). The state has been largely ineffective in addressing socioeconomic and environmental issues, and only due to an increasing demand from their stakeholders, Russian companies are becoming more involved in CSR activities (Belyaeva & Kazakov, 2015). Third, India is so far the only country in the world with codified requirements to engage in CSR. The New Companies Act (2013) prescribes that all companies with a certain annual net profit (currently over INR 50 million) are required to devote at least 2% of the average net profits during the three consecutive financial years to CSR activities. In addition, they should also constitute a CSR committee, formulate a CSR policy, and make CSR recommendations to the board on CSR activities that should have a broader beneficiary scope beyond the company’s employees or their family members (Ghosh & Jatania, 2016). Finally, in China, in recent decades, stakeholders have been able to put a great amount of pressure on companies in particular, in terms of employees’ rights and environmental issues (Hussain, Rigoni, & Orij, 2018). The CG code and other regulations, explicitly require Chinese companies to comply with environmentally responsible actions, devote resources to charity, and set mechanisms to prevent bribery (Jiang & Kim, 2015; OECD, 2011). The change of the ownership structure of Chinese firms had a significant impact on their CSR, since most of the SOEs used to provide a great deal of social services, while the private companies seem to focus more on market competition and less on social and environmental issues (Tam, 2002). Although, focusing on issues related to stakeholders and environment improves the international legitimacy of Chinese companies, these firms continue to prioritize their financial growth and political goals, and it remains debatable whether acting socially responsible will help in achieving these dual goals (Lau et al., 2016).

Discussion: Future CG Challenges and Opportunities Overall BRIC countries face corporate challenges derived from weak institutional environments, which could partly be tackled by improving CG practices. There also

208    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi exist macro-​level challenges characteristic of rapidly growing economies such as social and economic inequality, political risk, environmental spillovers, corruption, food security, etc., all of which make the institutional environment uncertain. It is fascinating to observe that these countries tend to operate in a two speed economies, one in which navigate large firms versus the informal economy of SMEs. The former is fully integrated into the global economy, while the latter is embedded in the local constraints and flows more informally. Some of the classic governance practices widely adopted in advanced industrialized countries simply will not work in these environments; they might in fact have unintended outcomes, and therefore often governance solutions might need to be implemented at the firm level or at the sectorial level in order to have a competitive plain field. It seems that a core difficulty in these markets has been the principal–​principal agency problem between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and the risk of expropriation. A firm-​level governance solution to attract investment and build confidence is to improve the levels of corporate transparency and disclosure quality in EMs. Khanna and Zyla (2017) share that about 40% survey respondents were concerned that non-​domestic firms operating in EM violate the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This interface between foreign (non-​domestic) firms and domestic firms is worth exploring. There are some interesting and important areas of future research that we would like to highlight. A first key avenue for future research is the globalization and internationalization of EM companies. First, it is important to take a multilevel multidisciplinary approach. Research on the globalization of EM firms is slowly developing, yet we must include the cultural dimensions in the equation as illustrated by Erdener and Shapiro (2005), who trace the role of cultural and economic factors in the success of Chinese MNEs. However, should Western-​centric theory prevail, be adapted, or abandoned in favor of new indigenous approaches to theorizing, based on context? Utilizing a hybrid approach of adapted theory, controlling for the various multinational contexts, Alon, Child, Li, and McIntyre (2011) argue that no theory has a monopoly on explanation and a multilevel, multidisciplinary, and, perhaps, Eastern-​centric theory may prove to show great potential in future theories of EM MNCs. Furthermore, it makes sense to adopt a dual home-​host-​country approach and study the internationalization through the lens of institutional arbitrage. This calls for an analysis that is sensitive to both home-​and host-​country contexts, and that takes into account how the institutions and political systems in those contexts establish institutional and resource capital needs for the overseas-​investing firm (Child & Marinova, 2014). Moreover, Boisot and Meyer (2008) argue that due to the fragmentation of the Chinese economy whose firms are small by global standards, SMEs’ internationalization is driven by an institutional arbitrage of relative transaction costs of crossing domestic (or provincial in the case of China) and international borders. In the case of China, local protectionism and inefficient domestic logistics increase the costs of doing business domestically; moreover, protection of property rights in the West and the advantages afforded Chinese-​owned firms reconstituted as foreign entities operating in China decrease the costs of “going out.” They argue that strategic exit from the home country

Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets    209 rather than strategic entry into foreign markets may explain the internationalization of many Chinese firms. Finally, we must underscore the critical multinational advantages in the internationalization of EM business groups. Yiu (2010) argues that business groups, an organizational form that emerged to substitute market imperfections in China, constitute a micro-​institutional environment for generating ownership, location, and internalization advantages, as well as for capitalizing on the linkage, leverage, and learning opportunities for internationalization. Chinese business groups facilitate such an internationalization process via their unique attributes including internal market, inward linkages, and institutional support. A second area of future research is to explore the consequences of changes in ownership and ownership rights—​this is slightly more salient in the context of China as this country is at the crossroad of significant changes in ownership structure and identity. Delios, Wu, and Zhou (2006) argue that official categorization in state shareholding, legal person shareholding, and A-​shares obscures the ultimate identity of a shareholder. They refine the existing classification by re-​categorizing shareholders into 16 types, such as government or private, to enable analysis of ownership identity and ownership concentration issues in China’s listed companies. With the opening of the two stock markets and the legitimation of the Hong Kong market, this is an area where we need to understand better its firm governance outcomes. Third, while we have explored quite a bit the political liaisons between politicians and business in China (He & Tian, 2008; Lin, 2011), there is less known on the effects of crony capitalism in the other BRICs. Political implications of Chinese government intervention toward a more controlled centrally managed capitalism and ideological transformation from Marxist ideology of communism and socialism moves toward the maintenance of economic growth and social order. The second step then allows the legitimacy of party rule to be based on indigenous Confucian ideology that emphasizes enlightened leaders, moral institutions, and social relations (i.e., Xiaokang) (Lin, 2011). Finally, it seems imperative that in order to move research forward in the corporate governance of EMs, we need to get closer to the data and collaborate with scholars who are very familiar with the context in its path-​dependent sequence. In other words, to understand what we observe today, it is essential to know how things looked before today. The data availability and reliability were a problem that seems to become less of an issue given the demands for corporate transparency and disclosure. Thus, while we have made great progress in understanding CG in China and this work is also published in international journals in English, there is less progress in empirical research on the other BRICs, and even much less focusing on other small and medium firms so salient in EMs. The research opportunity is to design comparative studies just like political economists, political scientists, and economic sociologists did comparing Germany and Japan or France and the UK. It seems that the transition to market economies in post-​ 2000 should be the departing point comparison to assess the evolution. We conclude from our own literature review that there is much to be done to better understand CG in EMs. We urge scholars to move away from applying Western models

210    Ruth V. Aguilera and Ilir Haxhi to the EM reality and seek to apply context-​dependent concepts such as trust, informal norms, process, political power, rule of man, etc., that can help capture the important nuances of these countries that have changed so dramatically so quickly, and how they compete in their integration into the global markets.

Notes 1. More recently, the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is incorporated in the BRICS; however, considering the high degree of similarity of RSA institutions with those of liberal market economies, we have excluded RSA from our analysis. 2. The journals included in the search are the following:  Academy of Management Journal, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Global Strategy Journal, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Business Ethics, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Management, Journal of Management, Journal of World Business, Journal of Management Studies, Management International Review, Management and Organization Review, and Organization Science.

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Chapter 9

C onsum er Be hav i or i n Em erging M a rk ets Raquel Castaño and David Flores

The rise of emerging markets, and especially the growth of the middle class in emerging countries, has attracted the interests of multinational firms. More than half of the world’s economic growth already comes from emerging markets (International Monetary Fund, 2017). The middle class in emerging markets is between 800 million and 2 billion people and will reach more than 4 billion people by 2030 (Kharas, 2017). This market potential presents enormous opportunities for multinational firms but also significant challenges. To market to these consumers, multinational firms based in high-​income countries first need to understand how these consumers think, feel, and behave. Despite growing interest in emerging markets and the potential they hold for multinational firms, relatively little academic work has been devoted to systematically studying consumers in emerging markets, and especially the new middle class in these countries. Most of what we know about consumer behavior has been gleaned from research conducted with consumers in high-​income countries (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006). In many ways, the study of the behavior of consumers in emerging countries is in the incipient stage. However, reflecting the growing importance of these markets, more research—​much of it from academics from emerging markets—​has begun to fill in some of the areas where emerging consumers differ from their counterparts in developed countries. In this chapter, we explore the behavior of emerging market consumers, with a focus on their buying decision process and the attitudes and values of the new middle class.

The Behavior of Emerging Market Consumers Many principles of consumer behavior science involve basic human psychological and sociological processes that are common across countries and cultures. For example,

220    Raquel Castaño and David Flores

Socioeconomic system

Need recognition

Regulatory and political system

Alternatives search

Evaluation Cultural system

Marketing system Purchase decision

Figure 9.1  Contextual influence on emerging consumers’ buying decision process Source: Based on Burgess and Steenkamp (2006)

research in both developed and emerging markets has supported the validity of many consumer behavior constructs, such as consumer ethnocentrism (Batra, Ramaswamy, Alden, Steenkamp, & Ramachander, 2000), consumer socialization (Bush, Smith, & Martin, 1999; Singh, Kwon, & Pereira, 2003), brand loyalty (Nguyen, Barrett, & Miller, 2011; Sarkar, 2014), and materialism (e.g., Eastman, Fredenberger, Campbell, & Calvert, 1997; Ger & Belk, 1999), just to name a few. However, there is little doubt that many aspects of consumer behavior are influenced by specific contextual conditions. Burgess and Steenkamp (2006) suggest that socioeconomic, cultural, and regulatory and policy systems can impose constraints on consumers in emerging markets. Together with the marketing system, the socioeconomic, cultural, and regulatory and political systems influence how consumers in emerging markets recognize a need for, evaluate, select, buy, and use products (see Figure 9.1). The socioeconomic system can significantly influence the needs and motivations of consumers in emerging markets. Socioeconomically, emerging markets are characterized by relatively young populations, income inequality, and the emergence of a new middle class (Sheth, 2011). Many emerging countries have undergone a process of transformation, liberalizing the economy and adopting market-​based institutions. This has increased income levels and given many consumers in emerging countries access to a modern consumer lifestyle. However, pervasive low incomes, unemployment, and unequal income distribution keep many emerging market consumers on the margins and hinder their ability to participate in the market system. An exploratory study on rural and urban Chinese consumers presented empirical evidence about the impacts of socioeconomic development on consumer lifestyles. It was found that socioeconomic progress influences consumers to use different products to reflect the improvement of their living standards (Sun & Wu, 2004).

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    221 The cultural system includes the beliefs, customs, attitudes, norms, and behaviors of people in a society, all of which shape their interpretation and understanding of reality. Thus, cultural influences can significantly influence the motivations, attitudes, evaluations, and choices of consumers. Schwartz’s (2004) framework on cultural values and Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions framework have been extensively used in consumer research on emerging markets. For instance, previous research has revealed that teenage children influence greatly family decision-​making regarding family purchases in the USA (Beatty & Talpade, 1994). Further research on emerging markets has found that teenage children from low power‐distance countries (a Hofstede cultural dimension) have higher influence on family decisions than US teens. On the other hand, teenage children from high power-​distance cultures have less influence on family purchases (Shoham & Dalakas, 2003). The regulatory and political system includes the political and regulatory structures and constraints that provide the boundaries for business and individual activity. Political and legal systems, governance, the rule of law, and corruption can limit the accessibility of and access to products and marketing activities for consumers in emerging markets. One good example would be the North American Free Trade Agreement which was signed by Canada, USA, and Mexico in 1994. This trade liberalization helped increase wages in Mexico and made Mexican consumers able to purchase products from foreign brands (Hanson, 2003).

How Emerging Market Consumers Recognize a Need for, Evaluate, Select, Buy, and Use Products A key aspect of emerging markets that must be considered in order to understand the behaviors of consumers is the diversity or market heterogeneity caused by the extreme variations in income within emerging markets (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006; Sheth, 2011). Emerging markets exhibit large disparities in income inequality. Despite rising income in many emerging markets, income inequality has increased as income growth has tended to benefit higher income consumers (Dabla-​Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka, & Tsounta, 2015). For example, in China, the top 1% concentrates one-​third of all wealth, while the majority of the population remains poor (Hairong, 2014). Income inequality in India has also increased, especially within urban areas (Deaton & Dreze, 2002). This income polarization means that emerging markets can be described by two prototypical consumer segments with substantially different income levels, living standards, and access to market infrastructure. The largest segment, or “the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad 2006), comprises those consumers living below the poverty level (e.g., $2 or less per day; World Bank, 2016). These consumers are mostly rural and usually lack access to basic infrastructure such as sanitation, running water, and electricity. Most are illiterate, and many lack labor skills, limiting their employment opportunities. As a result of the constrained economic resources of this segment, consumers focus their consumption behaviors on satisfying the most basic

222    Raquel Castaño and David Flores human necessities. Some of these are satisfied through self-​production, such as growing some of their own food, sewing their own clothes, and building their own shelter and housing. For these consumers, the need for basic, functional, long-​lasting products is a key purchasing motivation (Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2002). Furthermore, because many bottom-​of-​the pyramid (BOP) consumers live in “media dark” zones where they do not have access to the print media due to illiteracy, have limited access to the radio, have little access to TV, and have no access to the Internet, promotion strategies rely heavily on product demonstrations, word of mouth, and performing plays as ways to promote products (Chikweche & Fletcher, 2012). The second consumer segment is smaller in terms of number of consumers but has a much higher purchasing power due to the unequal income distribution that emerging markets exhibit. This segment comprises mostly urban consumers, who are more educated and have better access to infrastructure and marketing organizations compared to those of the first segment. This segment includes both the elite and the rapidly developing new middle class. Their product preferences and motivations tend to be more similar to those of consumers in developed countries, and many prefer brands and products from developed countries (Batra et al., 2014; Verlegh & Steenkamp, 1999). In many aspects of their consumption, they have adopted a Western lifestyle while balancing the influence of their local culture (Alden, Steenkamp, & Batra, 2006). Research on emerging markets consumers has adopted this dual market perspective and has focused on studying BOP consumers or middle-​class and wealthy consumers. The limited experience emerging consumers have with many product categories, along with cultural norms such as those of collectivist and family-​oriented societies, means that emerging consumers prefer to obtain product information from family members and friends. The extended family can be an important source of product and brand information. For example, parents can act as facilitators, cultural mentors and patriarchs on household purchases of their adult children (Lien, Westberg, Stavros and Robinson, 2018). Cultural values such as embeddedness, which emphasizes the role of social relations, and group identification are emphasized in emerging markets (Schwartz, 2004). In countries with embedded cultures, the opinion of others matter more, and thus influences one’s purchase intentions more, than one’s own opinion. For example, one survey reported that 93% of Chinese consumers obtain and trust recommendations from family and friends (Atsmon, Kuentz, & Seong, 2012). A  recent study found that Word of Mouth is more effective in shaping consumer brand preferences and obtaining product information than print advertisement and public relations among emerging market consumers (Jiang, Luk, Cardinali, 2018). Among middle-​class consumers, social networks are increasingly becoming key sources of information (e.g., Chikweche & Fletcher, 2014; Uner & Gungordu, 2016). Consumers in emerging markets tend to use different evaluation criteria and evaluation strategies compared to those of consumers in high-​income countries. Whereas the latter tend to use compensatory evaluation processes that consider many product attributes simultaneously, emerging consumers tend to use hierarchical processes focusing only on one or a few key product features (Johansson, 2003). Emerging

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    223 consumers’ more limited experienced with product evaluations, as well as their lower incomes and the traditionally more limited selection of products in emerging markets, can help to explain these differences. The product features consumers consider in product evaluation also seem to vary considerably between emerging and high-​income countries’ consumers. For example, one study comparing French and Malaysian consumers found that Malaysians’ product evaluations are driven more by tangible product attributes, such as functionality, safety, and price, than are French evaluations (Hult, Keillor, & Hightower, 2000). Regarding clothing consumption decisions, it has been found that American consumers value fashionability (fashionable and trendy) and versatility (can be easily mixed and matched with other wardrobe items), while Indian consumers prefer clothing suitable for long‐ term use and a brand name that is popular, is reliable, and makes them look distinctive and different (Bennur & Jin, 2013). Emerging consumers tend to be more value-​conscious and price-​sensitive than consumers in high-​income countries due to their relatively lower income, higher price elasticity, and lower access to credit (Brouthers & Xu, 2002). Thus, pricing has tended to have a greater influence on emerging consumers’ purchase decisions than quality or brand (Batra, 1997; Cui & Liu, 2001). Moreover, price is such an important factor in many emerging countries that bargaining is a common practice in these economies (Dawra, Katyal, & Gupta, 2015). However, as a result of this dual market structure of emerging markets, there is variation within emerging countries regarding the importance of price, quality, brand, and other product characteristics on consumer product evaluations. Lower-​income or BOP consumers place more importance on product characteristics such as affordability, durability, functionality, and tangible attributes, due to their limited economic resources. Middle-​class consumers also prefer functional products, but they place more emphasis on other product characteristics, such as appearance and design. BOP and middle-​class consumers also vary on the use of brand cues for product evaluation. For middle-​class consumers, the possession of certain brands, especially Western brands, can signal success and the achievement of a desirable living standard, and many prefer to buy well-​known brands, especially for public consumption products such as mobile phones, electronics, and clothes (Chikweche & Fletcher, 2014; Uner & Gungordu, 2016). This may reflect a cultural desire to conform and fit in with the in-​ group through public displays of possessions and wealth (Wong & Ahuvia, 1998). BOP consumers consume mostly unbranded products, as many branded products are unavailable in rural areas due to access and infrastructure constraints, and these consumers produce many of the products they consume (Sheth, 2011). Perhaps the most widely studied influence on consumer evaluations is the country of origin (COO). COO effects refer to the evaluation that consumers form of a product based on their perceptions of the manufacturing and marketing capabilities of the country that produced it (Roth & Romeo, 1992). Studies of COO evaluations of consumers in emerging countries suggest that emerging consumers prefer products from developed countries over local products (e.g., Essoussi & Merunka, 2007;

224    Raquel Castaño and David Flores Ettenson, 1993; Gurhan-​Canli & Maheswaran, 2000; Okechuku & Onyemah, 1999; Wang & Yang, 2008). For consumers in emerging markets, buying and possessing products from developed countries may signal higher levels of material achievement and success, which may impress others around them (Cleveland, Laroche, & Papadopoulos, 2009). This may help to explain the popularity of products and brands from high-​income countries among emerging consumers (e.g., Almonte, Falk, Skaggs, & Cardenas, 1995; Huddleston, Good, & Stoel, 2001; Kinra, 2006; Wang & Yang, 2008). Consumers from emerging markets traditionally have tended to have negative perceptions of the quality of products from other emerging markets (Amine & Shin, 2002; Ettenson, 1993; Huddleston et al., 2001). However, as more manufacturing has been outsourced to emerging countries, especially China, acceptance of products from emerging countries has grown (e.g., Kinra, 2006). Studies also show that the influence of COO is stronger for consumers in emerging markets than for consumers in developed countries (Sharma 2011). Product characteristics can moderate the influence of COO in consumer evaluations. Product evaluations of necessities (e.g., meat, cereal, fruit, and shoes) are less influenced by COO than product evaluations of non-​essential products (e.g., automobiles, televisions, and watches; Huddleston et al., 2001). The influence of COO evaluations is higher for complex products but lower when price information is available (Bandyopadhyay & Banerjee, 2003). Product evaluations are also less influenced by COO when consumers have better perceptions of domestic products (Kinra, 2006). Purchasing and consumption situations can also influence the importance emerging consumers place on COO in their evaluation of a product. For example, products purchased as gifts are more likely to be influenced by COO, as emerging consumers tend to prefer cheaper local brands for private consumption but more expensive imported brands for public consumption (Hu, Li, Xie, & Zhou, 2008). Other studies have found that different dimensions of COO, such as the country of design, country of manufacture, and country of parts, can influence product evaluations of emerging consumers independently. For example, Kohinoor, Chowdhury, and Kabir (2011) suggest that quality perceptions are higher when the country of design is a developed country. Consumers also perceive products manufactured locally with foreign parts to be higher quality than products completely made domestically. The cultural context can have an important influence on COO perceptions and product evaluations. For example, COO perceptions seem to be more influential in product evaluation in countries demonstrating high uncertainty avoidance (Lee, Garbarino, & Lerman, 2007). Cultural characteristics can also interact with product characteristics to moderate the effect of COO on product evaluations. For example, COO has a stronger influence on product evaluations of utilitarian products for emerging consumers from collectivist and long-​term oriented countries, whereas the influence of COO is stronger on the evaluation of hedonic products of consumers from individualistic and short-​term oriented countries. The influence of COO is

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    225 also stronger on the evaluation of public-​consumption products of consumers from high-​power-​distance and masculine-​oriented countries, while COO influence is stronger on private products for consumers from low-​power-​distance and feminine-​ oriented countries (Sharma, 2011). Finally, some studies suggest that the COO of the brand is more influential than the country of manufacture of the product (Thakor & Lavack, 2003). There are also differences between emerging and high-​income consumers in purchase decisions. Likely as a result of their limited experience and income, consumers in emerging markets perceive a higher purchase risk. Thus, they tend to spend more time deciding to purchase a product compared to consumers in high-​income markets. For example, they are likely to visit more stores more often before making a decision. This is especially true of big-​ticket items, such as consumer electronics or major appliances, where the perceived risk is higher. In one survey of the decision process for major consumer electronics, it was found that Chinese consumers take at least two months and more than four visits to stores before making a purchase decision (Atsmon et al., 2012). Another survey found that nearly 75% of consumer spent more than 10 hours researching a car compared to roughly 50% in the United States, Germany, and Japan (Bu, Durand-​Servoingt, Kim, & Yamakawa, 2017). There is also evidence that cultural factors can influence store selection. One study of eight Asia-​Pacific countries found that countries with high scores on uncertainty avoidance and long-​term orientation cultural dimensions were less likely to use online channels than telephone channels (Lu, Pattnaik, Xiao, Voola, 2018). There is little information about the post-​ purchase behavior of emerging consumers, but the available studies suggest that emerging consumers are cautions and often seek reassurance about the quality and authenticity of the products they purchase. For example, one study of Chinese wealthy consumers indicated that they prefer to shop at official channels such as department stores or brand stores to ensure they are getting an original product (Bu et al., 2017). We summarize the main differences in purchase behavior between bottom-​of-​the-​pyramid and middle-​class/​ wealthy consumers in Table 9.1.

Taking a Closer Look at the Emerging Market Middle Class In this section we will analyze with more detail the rise of “new middle classes” in emerging markets. This segment is a professional-​managerial segment that depicts a comfortable life and the aspiration of continuing economic flux (Yueh, 2013; see also Heiman, Freeman, Leichty, 2012). It has been stated that to maintain the current level of production, a greater scale of consumption is required, and future demand depends on the new middle classes in emerging economies (Dobbs, Remes, Manyika, Roxburgh,

226    Raquel Castaño and David Flores Table 9.1: Comparison of consumer behavior of bottom-​of-​the-​pyramid and middle-​class/​wealthy consumers in emerging markets Bottom-​of-​the-​pyramid consumers Middle-​class/​wealthy Needs

Subsistence needs and basic products; very few “luxuries”

Higher-​order needs; consumer products, personal care, appliances, cars, entertainment, luxury products

Product information

Less information search; family members and friends are main sources of information

More information search; family members, friends, and social network sites are main sources of information

Evaluation process

Hierarchical evaluation

Hierarchical and compensatory evaluations

Evaluation criteria

Affordability, durability, functionality, and tangible characteristics

Value, appearance, design, brand, country of origin, image

Brand preference

Unbranded products and self-​consumption

Branded products; well-​known, global, and luxury brands important for public consumption and status products.

Purchase decision

Takes more time to decide a purchase; visits multiple stores

Takes time to decide a purchase; more time for higher-​priced items; visits multiple stores

Smit, & Schaer, 2012; Sheth 2011). Some of the main characteristics of this class segment include higher levels of education, greater urbanization, and more formal employment compared to lower-​class groups. Middle-​class households typically have fewer children (less than one child per household on average) as well as more women in the labor force (60%–​70% are working or looking for a job; World Bank, 2013). Leisure activities are also very relevant to middle-​class life (López & Weinstein, 2012). Middle-​class attitudes and purchasing patterns can differ among emerging markets. However, according to Euromonitor (2015), some values, attitudes, and characteristics are shared worldwide by emerging middle-​class consumers, making it a more homogenous market segment and thus easier to reach. Family focus, planning for the future, and high importance of their image are the most notable shared characteristics because they influence most of the purchasing decisions of these consumers. Moreover, Kravets and Sandikci (2014) proposed three salient socio-​ideological sensibilities shared across all middle-​class consumers in emerging markets:  (1) Best self-​Inc. referring to an overt approach to fashion, self-​capabilities, and education to become ones “best-​self ”; (2) Average, referring to the concerns regarding balancing an

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    227 imperative for individualization and, at the same time, with “the middle”; and (3) Un-​ confident cosmopolitan, referring to a feeling of being part of a global marketplace while facing a not-​quite global reality Marketers targeting these consumers must address these shared sensibilities while developing their marketing strategies. With rising incomes, the habits, tastes, and needs of middle-​class consumers are evolving. These consumers are seeking aspirational purchases and accessible luxury brands at a good value. Emerging market shoppers are not prepared to compromise on quality: in general, they would rather save up their money to buy fewer products from prestige brands than purchase a large number of inferior products (Euromonitor, 2016). Middle-​class consumers tend to prioritize education for their children and to take their family into account when making important purchase decisions, taking up financial products such as mortgages and consumer credit to purchase their home and big-​ticket items, and choosing branded products that carry (and enhance) the status of success. Furthermore, as middle-​class consumers have more disposable income, they pay more attention to health, well-​being, and sustainability issues, resulting in an increased demand for health goods, medical services, and environmentally friendly products (Euromonitor, 2015). However, although middle-​class consumers in emerging economies express positive attitudes toward green products, their behavior does not show high levels of environmentally friendly behavior. When it comes to reducing, households frequently strive to save energy and water, although these behaviors are often based on economic considerations rather than the desire to improve the natural environment. Carrete, Castaño, Felix, Centeno, & González (2012) show that confusion, lack of credibility, and lack of compatibility still inhibit the green behaviors of consumers in emerging markets. The middle class in both emerging and developed economies is expected to continue to grow in coming years for several reasons, including improved income distribution, fast urbanization, increasing education opportunities, more women in the workforce, and improved business performance (Euromonitor, 2015). It is important to mention that the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries were not the only ones to drive the global middle-​class expansion; countries like Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam, along with the BRICS, drove the global middle-​ class expansion between 2009 and 2014. However, it is predicted that the size of the “global” middle class will rise from 1.8 billion in 2009 to 3.2 billion by 2020 and 4.9 billion by 2030 (Kharas, 2017). The majority of this growth will come from Asia; in fact, by 2030, Asia will represent 66% of the global middle-​class population and 59% of middle-​ class consumption, compared to 28% and 23%, respectively, in 2009 (Pezzini, 2012). In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico have the largest middle class (Euromonitor, 2017). According to McKinsey (2015), Brazilians see consumption as an important indicator of life improvement and as a sign of financial well-​being. Their consumption is now more sophisticated than it was 10 years ago, as they have settled into their middle-​ class lifestyles and desire more leisure goods and brand-​name products. Spending on education—​university degrees, exchange programs, and language courses—​has also increased dramatically among lower middle-​class consumers, now accounting for 42%

228    Raquel Castaño and David Flores of all education spending. Importantly, these consumers are multichannel and digitally connected, primarily via mobile devices. The Mexican middle class is both the fastest growing and the largest single segment in Mexico. In 2016, it represented 25% of all households in the country, and it is expected to grow to 9.4 million households by 2030 (Euromonitor, 2017). Boston Consulting Group (2015) reported that 64% of Mexican middle-​class consumers plan to spend more on education, 54% for health care, 40% for personal care and housing, 36% for clothing and footwear, and 33% for travel. As the Mexican middle class shows strong aspirations for more education, they also will demand basic banking products like payroll services. Overall, Mexican middle-​class consumers are more interested in products and services that can enhance their quality of life. In Asia, China and India have the largest middle-​class populations. Chinese middle-​ class consumers will represent 76% of all urban Chinese households by 2022. More important, the fastest growing market segment will be the upper middle class by increasing from 14% in 2012 to 54% in 2022 (Barton, Chen, & Jin, 2013). This rapid economic expansion is stimulating accelerated growth in luxury-​goods consumption such as luxury clothes, cars, electronic devices, travel, and entertainment. As their income rises, Chinese middle-​class consumers are becoming more demanding, more selective about their spending, and more brand loyal. One large survey of 10,000 Chinese middle-​class consumers in 44 Chinese cities found that they are spending more in lifestyle services and experiences and proportionally less on food and beverages. These consumers are also trading mass products for premium products with over 50% selecting the best option instead of the lowest priced, and are becoming more loyal with less than a third willing to consider a new brand not in their consideration set (Zipser, Chen, & Gong, 2016). Shopping has also become one of the main activities of the Chinese middle class. One survey found they spend 9.8 hours a week shopping, compared to only 3.6 hours for American consumers, while another survey found that two-​thirds of consumers say that shopping is the best way to spend time with the family (Chan & Tse, 2007; Zipser, Chen, & Gong, 2016). According to Boston Consulting Group and Ali Research (2017), there are five emerging middle-​class segments in China: (1) The savvy shopper:  brand-​aware and knowledgeable of new trends. They are connected through technology and are better equipped to research products and find exactly what they want. (2) The single person: among urban populations, 16% now live alone, compared with just 5% 10 years ago. The decision not to get married is no longer stigmatized in Chinese culture. As a result, these consumers now have a different lifestyle. In general, single people seek smaller product volumes, greater convenience, and higher-​quality  goods. (3) The eco-​conscious consumer: these consumers want healthy and organic food, apparel made from natural products, energy-​saving electronics, and natural skin

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    229 care products. They are also more willing to support environmentally friendly companies. (4) The passionate trend seeker: they are passionately taking up new interests, and they are increasingly willing to spend money on those wide-​ranging interests—​ not only on goods but also on experiences that will enrich their lives such as traveling and extreme sports. (5) The connected consumer:  since they are fully digitized and connected, e-​ commerce is attractive to them. They are also particularly open to early adoption of new products and technologies. In addition, digitization is changing consumers’ lifestyles and product needs and desires. For example, digital entertainment means that people are likely to socialize with friends at home rather than go out. Chinese consumers have traditionally exhibited a preference for Western and Japanese brands (e.g., Sin, Suk-​ching Ho, & So, 2000; Zhang, 1996). However, this preference seems to be moderated by other characteristics, such as type of product and income level. For example, one study found a stronger preference for local brands in product categories such as wine, washing machines, shoes, and mineral water and among higher-​income consumers (Laforet & Chen, 2012). Interestingly, one study suggests that while middle-​class consumers believe it is important to buy local brands of fast-​moving consumer products such as milk, rice, soy sauce, or bottled water, their actual purchase behavior does not necessarily reflect those preferences (Kwok, Uncles, & Huang, 2006). This suggests that other considerations such as brand familiarity, brand trust, brand liking, product perceptions, and price (Liu, Smith, Liesch, Gallois, Ren, & Daly, 2011; Rosenbloom, Haefner, & Lee, 2012) are more influential in the purchase of local or foreign products for Chinese consumers. In general, research suggests that the purchase of global brands is driven by symbolic benefits such as modernity, prestige, and association with foreign lifestyles; thus, foreign brands higher in symbolic value are more likely to be preferred by Chinese consumers (Zhou & Hui, 2003). This is supported by research on global and local advertising appeals which suggests that global advertising appeals foreign models are valued as signs of status, modernity, quality, and beauty and enhance the image of luxury and status goods such as fashion and beauty products (Zhou & Belk, 2004). Research suggests that brands may hold different meanings for consumers compared to consumers in developed countries. For instance, Chu and Sung (2011), analyzed the structure of brand personality dimensions in China and found evidence of only three of the six dimensions of the original brand personality framework developed in the USA by Aaker (1997):  competence, excitement, and sophistication. However, they also found three additional dimensions specific to Chinese culture: traditionalism, joyfulness, and trendiness. India provides another great example of enormous middle-​class consumption potential. It is estimated that by 2025, India’s middle class will have expanded to 583 million people, representing 41% of the entire Indian population (Farrell & Beinhocker, 2007). One important cultural change India’s society is now experiencing is the shifting

230    Raquel Castaño and David Flores of the family structure from joint households to nuclear households. Traditionally, several Indian families lived together in one joint household, now thanks to rising income levels, each nuclear family is able to afford their own home. Nuclear families spend 20% to 30% more per capita than joint families. Moreover, 30% of consumers in India are willing to spend more on products that they perceive are “better.” Over the next years, it is expected that India’s consumption behaviors and spending patterns will change dramatically as incomes rise and Indian society evolves (Boston Consulting Group, 2017).

Implications for International Managers As the growth of developed markets slows, multinational firms are increasingly looking to international markets for growth. With their large and young populations, rising income, fast-​growing economies, and rapidly developing infrastructure, emerging markets provide significant opportunities for growth and profits. To be able to take advantage of these opportunities, firms need to understand the unique characteristics of emerging market consumers and develop appropriate marketing strategies to target them. In many ways, the contextual conditions of emerging markets influence and constrain the behavior of emerging consumers. The socioeconomic, cultural, regulatory, political, and marketing systems of emerging markets shape how emerging consumers select, evaluate, buy, and use products, thus requiring multinational firms to use different approaches to market to these consumers than those used in developed countries. In this section, we discuss some managerial implications of the research on emerging markets we discussed previously. One of the most salient characteristics of emerging markets is their skewed income distribution, which results in two main consumer segments at opposite ends of the income spectrum: the bottom-​of-​the-​pyramid consumers and the wealthy elite and new middle-​class consumers. Thus, the first decision with which managers are faced in emerging markets is whether to target the small but wealthy elite segment or the much larger but significantly poorer mass market. The needs of the mass market tend to center around basic human needs and demand functional products. Thus, managers should emphasize functional benefits to find appeal among emerging market consumers. Mass market consumers in emerging markets are characterized by their low income and resource constraints. Affordability is a key concern to make products accessible to these consumers. Strategies such as reduced product sizes, individual packages, limited features, and simpler products can be used to reduce the price point of products and make them more affordable to low-​end emerging consumers. Consumers in emerging countries also face a chronic shortage of resources and infrastructure constraints, such as limited access to running water or an unreliable power supply; thus, products that are adapted or designed specifically for emerging

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    231 market conditions have a higher probability of success. On the other hand, many of these consumers are accustomed to producing some products and services themselves. This situation can be used to reduce prices by asking consumers to perform some production and marketing activities, such as light assembly or dispensing or transporting the product. A low price point is required to generate the high sales volume needed to overcome the very slim margins that this market offers and thus turn a profit. These consumers are by necessity very sensitive to price variations, and price reductions can be used to increase demand, drive sales, and increase market share. Education levels are low among these consumers, which also can have an impact on marketing strategies. For example, low literacy rates limit the effectiveness of printed product information and advertising. Elite and middle-​class consumers’ preferences are more similar to those of consumers in developed countries than to those of bottom-​of-​the-​pyramid consumers. Increasing exposure to global media and content has created a desired for developed country lifestyles and products. Thus, marketing to these consumers can be achieved through means similar to those designed for consumers in higher-​income countries. These consumers tend to prefer products and brands originating from developed countries (Essoussi & Merunka, 2007; Ettenson 1993; Gürhan-​Canli & Maheswaran, 2000; Okechuku & Onyemah, 1999; Wang & Yang, 2008). Thus, emphasizing that the product and/​or the brand is from a developed country can be a useful strategy to appeal to these consumers. Despite their similarities to consumers in developed markets, emerging consumers are still influenced by the socioeconomic, cultural, political, and marketing conditions of their country. Thus, some degree of adaptation may be necessary. For example, the income of emerging middle-​class consumers is significantly lower than that of the middle class in developed countries. Due to the need of middle-​class consumers for individualization and being part of the “middle,” companies should organize their product lines into basics and complements that individualize an ensemble An example of this would be a regular dress that can be used for business casual wear (basic product) or transformed by some complements (belts, top sweaters, etc.) into a cocktail dress, for example. These kinds of strategies enable managers to develop safe and efficient products that offer a great value and still meet the needs of this segment. Companies should also consider developing specific products in emerging markets. For example, In Africa, SABMiller replaced some imported ingredients with equally high-​quality local ingredients to develop a high-​quality beer that is affordable for the African middle class. Regarding positioning strategies, brand managers should consider changing their positioning statement when entering an emerging market. Some brands are considered commonplace in developed countries, whereas when entering an emerging market, they are sometimes perceived as a premium brand. For example, the department store Sears is considered a low-​middle brand in the USA, but in some emerging markets like Mexico it is considered a middle-​upper brand. Brands should take these discrepancies into account when developing their branding and positioning strategies.

232    Raquel Castaño and David Flores Brands—​and especially well-​known brands—​are an important consideration for emerging middle-​class consumers. Developed country brands provide a measure of quality that attracts these consumers. For many emerging consumers, local brands are associated with poor-​quality products manufactured by state-​controlled enterprises and protected local industries. Brands from developed countries also project an image of material success and achievement that can be important in the construction of the identity of middle-​class consumers. Familiar brands also tend to reduce the uncertainty of high-​end purchases (e.g., appliances and automobiles) being made for the first time by these consumers, and emerging consumers tend to remain loyal to familiar brands (Nguyen, Barrett, & Miller, 2011). Even though, emerging consumers value and prefer foreign brands, they are still part of their nation and proud of their heritage. Companies should be aware of this, as, if consumers perceive that the company does not recognize them as an individual market segment, they might reject the brand and perceive it as discriminatory. Companies can launch some advertising campaigns addressing these local/​regional aspects to show consumers that the brand is not only global but also local. Emerging middle-​class consumers also tend to be price conscious as a result of traditionally lower incomes and product shortages in the past. Therefore, strategies that emphasize the price value of the product can be appealing to these consumers. The banking and credit systems in most emerging nations is underdeveloped. The penetration rates for consumer credit, housing loans, and credit card use in emerging markets is significantly lower than in developed markets (International Monetary Fund, 2006). For example, 35% of consumers in Brazil, 24% in Mexico, and only 2% in India have a credit card (Verma, 2017; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). For this reason, companies must look for other financing options to offer to their consumers. This is especially important for big-​ticket items. For example, in Colombia, leading supermarket Exito offers its store card to shoppers without a banking history or formal income (Euromonitor, 2014). Since price bargaining and haggling are commonplace in many emerging countries, a fixed price structure might not be well received by these consumers, especially for groceries or other commodity products. Instead, companies can use coupons, discounts, and other sales promotional tactics to make emerging consumers feel they are getting a better price. Regarding advertising campaigns, emerging middle-​class consumers value products and services that enhance their quality of life. One possible advertising strategy is to claim that the product or service is an investment that will make their lives better in both the short and the long term. In addition, since these consumers are family-​focused, the advertising claim might be more effective if it presents a benefit for the whole family rather than only the direct consumer. Emerging consumers tend to rely on word-​of-​mouth communication for product information and recommendations. Thus, marketing communication strategies that use word of mouth can be very effective to reach consumers. Among the elite and the new

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    233 middle class, the increasing use of social media can make them important in spreading product recommendations (Chikweche & Fletcher, 2014). Emerging consumers are digitally connected, which means that they are exposed to information from all over the world. They can see new products and advertising campaigns in the developed countries. Emerging consumers can feel discriminated against, unsatisfied, and frustrated if these new products take a long time to arrive to the emerging nation’s stores. Apple, for example, has significantly shortened its delay times when launching its new iPhone models in emerging countries. In fact, the iPhone 7 was launched simultaneously in developed countries like the USA and Japan and emerging countries like China and Mexico. Since these consumers are digitally connected, companies must heavily rely on social media to connect to them. Moreover, e-​commerce can be a fast option for companies wanting to enter emerging economies.

Directions for Future Research Despite growing interest in emerging market consumers, there is still a dearth of studies exploring the behavior of consumers in emerging markets. In this section, we discuss some potential avenues of research to help close the gaps in the literature and enhance our understanding of emerging consumers. Most studies on this topic analyze consumers in a single emerging country. This approach is likely driven by the researchers’ familiarity with a specific emerging market. While this approach facilitates the research process by limiting the context of the research and provides a certain measure of depth within a country, it provides only a partial understanding of consumer behavior in emerging markets, thus limiting the generalizability of the results. Although emerging markets share many contextual characteristics, as a group emerging markets are much more heterogeneous than developed countries. This issue arises from grouping countries under the label of “emerging” based on only certain (and mostly economic) characteristics, such as income or economic growth. To build a more comprehensive description of emerging consumers, research set in different emerging markets should be undertaken. Replication can be a useful approach to build theory on emerging markets and to identify common patterns of behav­ ior among consumers from different countries as well as to identify distinctions. Further, most research on emerging countries has come from a much smaller pool of countries, including Eastern Europe, China, and India, as well as, to a lesser extent, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa. This pattern likely reflects the size of these countries’ economies and the interest in them. Thus, most research on emerging consumers represents only a subset of emerging markets. More research is needed from less-​studied emerging countries, such as Indonesia, Colombia, Kenya, and Nigeria. Emerging markets also exhibit substantial variation within each country. As discussed previously, emerging markets consist of two main groups: the large but low-​income

234    Raquel Castaño and David Flores segment and the smaller elite and middle-​class segment. Research studies have traditionally focused on only one of these segments. For example, research on COO has traditionally been conducted among higher-​income consumers in emerging markets (e.g., Almonte et al., 1995). Thus, research that includes consumers from different socioeconomic strata is needed. This research could shed light on within-​country variations in consumer behavior and could also be an important tool to understand consumer behavior across emerging countries by comparing data and results from studies of one segment across countries. The contextual environment also suggests interesting directions for further research. While cultural characteristics such as values have been commonly used in research on emerging consumers, very little research has explored the influence of the regulatory and political system on consumer decision processes. Exploring socioeconomic conditions can also be a fruitful avenue of research. Emerging consumers are characterized by lower education levels and limited experience with the market system. Limited literacy and numeracy skills can affect the way consumers accomplish consumption-​ related tasks (Adkins & Ozanne, 2005; Viswanathan, Rosa, & Harris, 2005). More research is needed to understand how emerging consumers obtain, process, and use product information. For example, what mechanisms do emerging market consumers use to cope with low consumer literacy? How do they evaluate product information, and what processes do they use? Low levels of education can also affect the measurement instruments used in research with emerging consumers. Most instruments used to measure consumer-​related constructs have been developed from and for high-​income populations with higher education levels. As a result, these instruments may be too complex for emerging market consumers. Some efforts have been made to address the limitation of current measurement instruments by making them shorter and less cognitively demanding. For example, Schwartz, Lehmann, and Roccas (1999) developed a short form of the widely used Schwartz Value Survey. In some cases, the contextual environment of emerging markets might preclude researchers from using instruments developed in high-​income countries, as certain items on these instruments might be inappropriate in the emerging market context. For example, items about carpooling and leasing versus owning a car from Belk’s (1985) widely used Materialism scale will likely not be relatable for a substantial portion of emerging consumers who do not own a car. Indeed, using an adapted form of Belk’s (1985) materialism scale, Ger and Belk (1996) were able to measure and identify cross-​cultural similarities and differences among a sample of countries including Romania, Ukaraine, Turkey and India. Thus, adapting or developing specific measurement instruments for emerging markets is a key step toward enhancing the quantity and quality of research on emerging consumers. For example, Flores, Ayala, and Quintanilla (2014) developed a specific instrument to measure consumer attitudes toward and use and knowledge of nutrition labels for consumers in Spanish-​speaking Latin American countries. Increasingly, research that integrates cultural, political, socioeconomic, and marketing conditions is needed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of emerging consumers.

Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets    235 Finally, as consumption-​related problems such as obesity increase in emerging markets there is a need to explore the dark-​side of consumption and its effects on emerging consumers. Incipient research suggests that the motivations contributing to maladaptive consumption behaviors like compulsive buying vary between developed and emerging-​market consumers (Horváth & Adıgüzel, 2018).

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Chapter 10

E x amining Base of t h e P yr amid ( B oP ) V e nt u re Suc cess Throu g h t h e Mu tual Valu e C A RD Approac h Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam

Nearly two decades ago Prahalad and Hart proposed that “low income markets present a prodigious opportunity for the world’s wealthiest companies—​to seek their fortunes and bring prosperity to the aspiring poor” (2002: 1). The base-​of-​the-​pyramid (BoP) field has come full circle, focusing primarily on profits then poverty and back on profits (Dembek & Sivasubramanian, 2016). Despite the changes experienced in the field, BoP ventures1 still struggle to deliver on the initial promise and the dual goal of profit creation and poverty alleviation (Simanis, 2012). According to Hart “. . . most BoP ventures and corporate initiatives over the past decade have either failed outright, or achieved only moderate success at great cost” (2015:1). This dual focus is often referred to as mutual value, and constitutes one of the pillars of the BoP approach (Hart, 2010; London, Anupindi, & Sheth, 2010). In other words, mutual value means that companies through their business generate value for themselves and for the BoP. Value for the company has been framed as a discussion about the appropriate financial returns to investors, and value for the BoP has often been defined as alleviating their poverty (London, 2009, 2016). While mutual value is a useful lens to define and evaluate success of BoP ventures, developing a value proposition from the perspective of the BoP has only received limited attention (see, for example, London, 2009; London & Esper, 2014). As a result, a significant gap remains in our understanding of how to assess the full value proposition for the BoP and the success of BoP ventures.

242    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam Despite the premise of building BoP initiatives on the principle of mutual value, most of the BoP literature and ventures adopt a narrow view of value, seeing success for both the company and the BoP community predominantly in terms of economic value creation. This is a reasonable approach when evaluating company returns,2 but it is insufficient when considering the multidimensional nature of poverty. Seeing poverty solely through economic lens leads to oversimplification of one of the world’s most complex challenges. As a result, BoP initiatives may often try to offer simple economic value-​creation solutions to complex multidimensional problems, which results in underspecified value propositions. To address these issues, we analyze success of BoP ventures through the introduction of the mutual value CARD (creation, appropriation, retention, and destruction) approach using the mutual value lens. The chapter proceeds as follows. We first provide a brief review of the BoP field focusing on how the poverty-​alleviation value proposition has been conceptualized. We then introduce the mutual value CARD framework as a tool to develop a more robust and holistic value proposition. We highlight not only how value is created but also how it is appropriated within and across BoP communities, how it is retained by the BoP communities, and how it can be destroyed. These four components of the mutual value CARD incorporate and extend existing work focused on understanding a venture’s value proposition from the perspective of the BoP. We apply the value CARD framework to four different archetypes of BoP ventures—​ (1) BoP as consumers, (2) inclusive supply chains, (3) self-​reliant BoP, and (4) BoP as producers—​to show how each provides important differences in the full value proposition for the BoP and the success of the BoP ventures. We provide examples from the field to illustrate these differences. This chapter contributes to the BoP literature by focusing on and extending the way in which success is viewed from the perspective of the BoP. By proposing the use of the mutual value CARD, we extend the BoP value proposition to include what value is created for the BoP; how that value is allocated within the BoP; how long this value is retained by the BoP; and what value is destroyed. The latter point is worthy of further comment. It is very rare indeed for any intervention to not have both position and negative impacts. Microcredit, for example, provides access to additional finance resource but also imposes debt on the borrower. New ventures can put existing local-​owned small enterprises, such as street vendors or local moneylenders, out of business. The development of the full value proposition provides a lens into an array of different dimensions and forms of success, taking it far beyond the economic aspect that currently dominates much of the discourse in the BoP literature. We close with a discussion of the implications of our new perspective on designing BoP ventures that seek to be sustainable over time. From a practice perspective, this chapter offers a new tool for managers that will allow them to address the complex problem of building a mutual value proposition that will better align a venture’s economic returns with its aggregate impact on alleviating poverty, both currently and over time.

Examining BoP Venture Success     243

A Brief History of the Base of the Pyramid Literature Prahalad and Hart drew global attention to a “prodigious opportunity for the world’s wealthiest companies to seek their fortunes and bring prosperity to the aspiring poor” (2002: 2) by providing over 4 billion people living in poverty with access to basic goods and services and engaging them in the global markets (Hart, 2005). Over the last 15 years, this proposition has developed into a large body of BoP literature and practice, and has gone through a number of modifications creating new approaches. Initially, BoP literature was focused on extending the distribution channels of multinational corporations (MNCs) to “sell to the poor.” This involved mostly “top-​down initiatives” based on adapting existing products by large companies to suit BoP price-​ sensitive markets, able to pay only small amounts of money for the products (e.g., single-​serving packages of consumer goods such as shampoo) (Arora & Romijn, 2012; Cañeque & Hart, 2015). Criticized for being a form of corporate imperialism (De Soto, 2000) based on old theories and driven by strategies imported from Western context (Landrum, 2007), as well as for creating problems such as a negative environmental footprint (e.g., Hart, 2005; Newell, 2008), BoP moved from “finding a fortune” to “creating a fortune” at the BoP (London & Hart, 2011). The idea of “creating a fortune,” or BoP 2.0, placed a greater emphasis on the empowerment of local communities and on allying with local businesses. It changed the focus from “selling to the poor” to “engaging the poor” through bottom-​up partnerships. Emphasis also shifted to “business co-​venturing” through co-​designing products and services in an effort to provide the poor with the opportunity to co-​create value (Arora & Romijn, 2012; Simanis & Hart, 2008). The BoP approach is still evolving. Recent work builds on BoP 2.0 by broadening engagement efforts while integrating environmental sustainability concerns along with a stronger triple bottom-​line perspective (Cañeque & Hart, 2015). Others have proposed a stronger focus on developing ventures using the traditional knowledge of the BoP communities, but that has not been fully developed (Gupta & Khilji, 2013). Together, the BoP approaches assume different roles for the members of impoverished communities, seeing them as consumers, producers, entrepreneurs, and employees (London, 2009). Despite these different iterations, BoP approaches have not yet delivered on the initial dual promise of profit generation for interested enterprises and poverty alleviation for BoP participants (Pirson, 2012; Simanis, 2012). While some modern consumer goods like aspirin and clean water sachets have had positive “poverty” benefits, promoting consumption of other Western consumer goods to the poor not only does not alleviate poverty but often encourages unsustainable consumption behaviors (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Including the poor into the economic system as producers and portraying them as resilient entrepreneurs could result in insufficient emphasis upon the legal,

244    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam regulatory, and social mechanisms that protect them and overemphasize microcredit instead of focusing on providing lasting employment opportunities (Karnani, 2006). Cumulative reviews of the BoP literature reveal that studies have tended to concentrate on challenges to the companies seeking to enter the BoP markets focusing purely on business aspects of the BoP (Dembek & Sivasubramanian, 2016; Kolk, Rivera-​Santos, & Rufin, 2014). Research themes of these studies include organizational capabilities, alliances, and partnerships (Van den Waeyenberg & Hens, 2012), marketing (Reficco & Márquez, 2012; Schuster & Holtbrügge, 2014), supply chain and operations management (Santos & Laczniak, 2009; Sridharan & Viswanathan, 2008; Usman Khalid & Seuring, forthcoming; Wood, Pitta, & Franzak, 2008), and innovation (Gold, Hahn, & Seuring, 2013). Addressing problems such as weak institutional environment and lack of infrastructure are also commonly and widely discussed topics. At the same time, the social and poverty aspects of BoP ventures are less often addressed, to say the least (Berger & Nakata, 2013; Hart & Christensen, 2002; Simanis & Hart, 2009). A recent systematic review of the BoP literature found that one-​third of the 203 articles included in the review do not even define what poverty is (Dembek & Sivasubramanian, 2016). Three-​fourths of papers included in this review viewed BoP participants exclusively as consumers or as both consumers and entrepreneurs. The same review also found that sustainability was the least explored theme, with only 12.5% of the BoP articles examining this theme. There is little supporting evidence for and knowledge about the social benefits of BoP business initiatives as the effects of the ventures’ activities on the BoP communities remain largely unreported (Smith & Pezeshkan, 2013). Finally, it seems the field has not yet overcome what Hart calls a “Great Trade-​Off Illusion” (2010: 21) between being locally embedded and large in size and the ability to meet the needs of the poor and of the planet’s ecological systems. It does not come as a surprise then that most researchers frame the success of BoP ventures from the perspective of the enterprise developing them as the level of profits and financial returns (Dembek & Sivasubramanian, 2016). Further this success is often assumed rather than defined (Kolk et al., 2014). Across its different iterations, the BoP discourse has presented success in terms of achieving economic goals of a firm developing the BoP venture. More specifically, the ventures focused on poor as consumers and distributors view success largely through sales figures. Ventures developing BoP entrepreneurs, similarly, see success in business terms while any poverty-​related outcomes are assumed to follow from the financial, business success (Rahman et al., 2016). In the few cases when success in alleviating poverty is directly discussed, it is also defined through economic lens as increase of income or purchasing power of the poor (Karnani, 2007). While income is a key factor in fighting poverty, viewing the success of the BoP venture in such narrow economic terms does not reflect the complexity of poverty and may lead in extreme cases to failure of an entire venture.

Examining BoP Venture Success     245

Mutual Value as a Lens to View Success Defining success narrowly from the economic perspective does not reflect the idea of creating mutual value. It is creation of mutual value that BoP approaches have been grounded in from their inception. London highlights the importance of mutual value arguing that BoP ventures “will thrive only if their economic success is tied to creating value for BoP communities” (2011:  37). The proposition of mutual value suggests a “synergistic connection between business strategy and poverty alleviation” where “by employing business strategies that alleviate local poverty, a venture will also generate greater economic returns” (London et al., 2010: 590). This mutual value approach has two main implications for the definition of success of BoP ventures. First, unlike most of the current literature, this proposition suggests a different direction of the relationship, that is, it proposes employing strategies focused on alleviating poverty and having economic returns as a secondary focus. It does not mean that the economic returns are not important or should be disregarded. It means that poverty alleviation needs to receive the primary attention, and it is unlikely to occur as a result of a firm generating profits. Second, poverty is one of the most complex problems in the world and it may vary greatly in causes and symptoms from one location to another (Chmielewski-​Raimondo, Dembek, & Beckett, 2017). Therefore, an “enterprise-​led approach may have very different poverty-​alleviation implications for different stakeholders in its business model” (London & Esper, 2014: 90), and approaches working in one place may fail when they are replicated elsewhere. This reinforces the previous point and indicates the need to dedicate time and attention to poverty alleviation, as companies are likely to discover that they face different problems depending on the location and will need to modify their approach to alleviating poverty. Indeed, poverty has many different faces, and income is just one of many indicators. Hence, success may look very different in varied contexts, with financial returns being only one of its indicators. Poverty alleviation should indeed be approached and success should be measured taking a broad well-​being perspective. For example, the quasi-​ governmental organization, Kudumbashree, in the southern state of Kerala in India, uses a holistic measure of social, environmental, and economic well-​being. The poverty index is composed of nine indicators that are customized for urban and rural population, and includes lack of proper housing, access to clean water and sanitation facilities, irregular income, adult literacy level, and belonging to socially disadvantaged groups. Families checking at least four out of the nine risk factors (resulting in 382 unique combinations) are considered “at risk” or “poor” families (see Appendix I for more details on the organization). Seeing poverty alleviation in terms of increasing the overall well-​being of communities (not just their income) allows for addressing the multiple, interrelated needs and capabilities.

246    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam In sum, a mutual value perspective converts companies developing BoP ventures into engaged members of a larger society with responsibilities to a multitude of stakeholders (Davidson, 2009). Creating mutual value thus underlies and summarizes the promise of a dual benefit including alleviating poverty while creating profitable ventures (Hart, 2010; London et al., 2010).

Mutual Value and Shared Value Researchers have repeatedly indicated that mutual value resembles shared value as proposed by Porter and Kramer (2011) (Crane, Matten, Palazzo, & Spence, 2013; Dembek, Singh, & Bakoo, 2016). There are without a doubt important areas of overlap between the two concepts which include addressing social needs in profitable way, referring to value in both economic and non-​economic forms, and relying on redesigned products and reconfigured value chains (Dembek et al., 2016). In terms of context, BoP has been seen as an aspect of shared value (Porter & Kramer, 2014). Indeed some of the examples of BoP products such as genetically modified seeds, ChotuKool (a compact, portable fridge with low power consumption developed by Godrej and Boyce in India) as well as initiatives such as Unilever Project Shakti have been also used as examples of shared value (Porter, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2011). On the other hand, shared value refers to addressing needs in a variety of problems and contexts, while mutual value is specifically dedicated to poverty alleviation. The relationship between the business strategy and poverty alleviation in mutual value is not yet sufficiently explored, but it is clearly necessary to address an array of interrelated needs (many of them resulting from the constraints faced by BoP communities) that may shift over time, to create real possibilities for poverty alleviation (London et al., 2010). The nature of addressed societal needs and their treatment is an important difference between shared value and mutual value. Shared value focuses on one or a few needs that do not tend to change. Addressing this need is directly related to increasing company profits or to decreasing its costs (e.g., saving water in technological processes cuts production costs). In contrast, for mutual value aiming to alleviate poverty, addressing one or few needs is not enough. For example, Hybrid Social Solution in the Philippines creates shared value by providing solar lamps to villagers in remote areas without access to electricity (i.e., addressing the need for light after dark). However, doing this is unlikely to alleviate poverty. Alleviating poverty requires addressing many other related needs, such as building skills and increasing education. Hybrid Social Solution takes this step further working with Stiftung Solarenergie Philippines. Together they address a wide range of needs in villages including education by providing solar light libraries, health care, and more. The above indicates also that developing a BoP initiative is not equal to creating mutual value. A BoP initiative may or may not create mutual value. Alleviating poverty and creating profits (creating mutual value) is much more complex than addressing a particular need profitably (creating shared value). The confusion between shared and mutual

Examining BoP Venture Success     247 value in the current literature is largely due to the fact that very few BoP initiative cases presented in the literature actually create mutual value. Hence, the success at the BoP has been largely defined through a narrow economic lens. In this chapter, we propose to extend this view and look at success using mutual value lens.

Success Through Mutual Value: Defining Mutual Value CARD In order to look at success using the mutual value lens, it is necessary to realize that creating mutual value requires us to consider a number of value processes beyond creation of value. Mutual value is the sum of value creation, value appropriation, value retention, and value destruction. We call this mutual value equation a mutual value CARD.

Value Creation Value needs to be created for both the company developing the BoP venture, and the BoP communities (and other stakeholders if applicable). From the firm perspective, both financial and non-​financial aspects of value can be considered. Non-​financial value can account for aspects such as brand reputation that can have positive spillover effects in different non-​BoP markets, and for the ability to develop processes and technologies that provide competitive advantage (Hart, 2010). From the perspective of BoP communities, value creation relates to one or more social benefits defined broadly as poverty alleviation. Since poverty is multifaceted with income being just one of many aspects, BoP communities may see value in many different ways. Value creation here should be approached from a broader well-​being perspective, which indicates numerous interrelated needs that change over time shifting the way in which BoP communities perceive value. Value can be created in a number of different ways including scale, replication of business model, and replication of process used to design solutions to poverty. Scale refers to the venture’s ability to grow in size and geographical reach to provide the venture with scale-​based cost advantages and help overcome liability of smallness. Successful cases such as MPesa and Aravind Eye Hospitals strengthen the view that economies of scale (if possible with minimum amount of adjustments) are the right tool to achieve success (Chliova & Ringov, 2017). Scaling up has been identified as a key principle of venture development at the BoP. Gündel, Hancock, and Anderson (2001) identified two types of scaling strategies that are applicable to BoP ventures: vertical and horizontal (Lecomte, Blanco & Boissin 2012). Vertical scale-​up refers to a firm’s attempts to grow in volume, leading to economies of scale. Horizontal scale-​ups are attempts by the firm to expand

248    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam successfully the initiative to other geographical locations, in the hope that learning and spillover effects will lead to cost reductions over time. Despite some successes, however, scaling creates a number of challenges and successfully scaled ventures are an exception (Chliove & Ringov, 2017; Kayser & Budinich, 2015; Kistruck, Sutter, Lount, & Smith, 2012). Further, it is possible that scale may actually decrease the positive social impact of the venture (Schumacher, 2011). More recently, replication (horizontal scale-​up) has received attention as an alternative way for BoP ventures to grow and succeed (Chliova & Ringov, 2017). Replication proposed for BoP venture development consists of copying the business model or so-​ called template repeatedly in different locations. A template refers to a “working system of organizational routines that serves as the referent or guiding example for an organization that intends to grow by replication” (Chliova & Ringov, 2017: 49). Franchising is an example of such replication where new ventures are established based on standardized business models and operations. Both scaling and replication of business models or templates rely on a high level of standardization and reflect traditional best business logic and practice. In the BoP context, such level of standardization may be difficult to achieve and if in place may become problematic. Therefore, another approach to value creation is replicability consisting of repeating and standardizing the processes that lead to the creation and the implementation of solutions instead of standardizing the solution itself through scaling the size of operations or replicating the business model or template. Such replicability refers to the ability to reproduce the processes that gave rise to the innovation in other contexts as opposed to replicating the business model where the initial venture is cloned several times over at other locations.

Value Appropriation Value appropriation, also called value capture, is about ensuring that the company developing the BoP venture benefits from it. The most common form of this benefit are profits, which depend on the level of sales and cost structure. Profits, however, are not the only form of benefiting from the BoP venture. Other examples include competitive advantage in other markets, technology advancements including frugal innovations, and sustainability. Mechanisms of value appropriation at the BoP context include price, intermediation, and collaboration with third parties, such as microfinance organizations.

Value Retention In order to build success and create mutual value through BoP ventures, it is necessary to look closely at all the processes related to mutual value, namely, creation, appropriation,

Examining BoP Venture Success     249 retention, and destruction of value. The first two processes, value creation and appropriation, are commonly referred to in the literature. The latter two, value retention and destruction, however, have been largely neglected. Value retention indicates the extent to which value created through the activities of a BoP venture stays within a BoP community. In other words, value retention is value captured by the communities. According to the mutual value principles, this relates to both financial and non-​financial form of value. London et al. provide an example of financial value retention. A venture can source raw unprocessed milk from BoP dairy farmers to process into other products (such as butter, yogurt, etc.) at a central location, which is not necessarily in close proximity to the BoP producers, before selling the output for a much higher price. In this case, the venture retains the majority of the total value for the product by transforming a raw good into a processed one. However, if a venture taught local farmers to pasteurize their own milk, or churn into butter, the BoP themselves could add more value to their good and perhaps receive a better price, potentially generating greater local value. (2010: 390)

In its non-​financial forms, value retention relates to the ability of the venture to ensure that its activities create lasting benefits for BoP communities. For example, a BoP venture can create social value by increasing the level of education among young people in the community. In order to retain this value, it is necessary to ensure the young educated people remain in the community or at least stay actively engaged and contributing to increasing its well-​being. If they leave to live and work elsewhere the value created is not retained. Hence, the BoP ventures “will thrive only if their economic success is tied to creating value for BoP communities” (London, 2011:  37) and ensuring this value is retained in the communities for their lasting benefits. In order to ensure both value creation and retention in the BoP communities, business models of BoP ventures need to include dedicated mechanisms that provide both. In the example of the dairy farmer above, the mechanism ensuring the retention of social value created in the form of educating young members of BoP community could consist of creating workplaces and development opportunities for the young generation. This requires dedicated efforts of planning, designing, testing, and implementing such mechanisms.

Value Destruction Similar to value retention, BoP ventures need to ensure they do not destroy value in the communities in which they operate. As London indicated, while introducing the concept of BoP 2.0, ventures “that fail to develop a holistic understanding of potential value creation (and value destruction) will face challenges at each stage of the venture

250    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam development process” (2011:  38). Surprisingly however, the BoP research so far has developed a tendency to not consider potential value destruction, thereby failing to create a holistic picture of the value processes. As London and Esper (2014) found, even when providing basic needs such as sanitation, the poverty alleviation impacts vary depending, for example, on the role of the stakeholder in the business model and their age, and it may not always be positive. To address the omission of value destruction, BoP ventures can resort to research and tools provided by sustainable business models research. One especially useful tool for accounting for value destruction in the business model is the value mapping framework developed by Bocken et al. (2013), which allows for mapping different types of value created and destroyed for multiple stakeholders.

Success Seen Through Mutual Value Lens in Different BoP Contexts The mutual value CARD processes behave differently depending on the type of BoP venture in order to achieve success. The two dominant types of BoP ventures in the current literature are those that deliver goods and services to the BoP and those that build so-​called inclusive value chains to source products from the BoP. Using two aspects, the focal agent and the market served, we draw attention to two additional, less frequently presented, BoP ventures, those where BoP community members deliver products and services directly to external markets (we call these BoP producers) and those where BoP community members deliver products and services to local or nearby markets (we call these self-​reliant BoP).

Focal Agent Most BoP research has focused attention on an external agent (MNCs, large domestic firms, or non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) from outside the BoP market) considering entry into the BoP market—​usually as a seller of goods or to offer new business opportunities as suppliers of commodities or components in extended value chains. However, little attention has been given to entities or agents embedded within these BoP communities who start new initiatives that arise organically from within these communities. Since the success or failure of a venture is often seen from the focal agent’s perspective, a focus on local agents from within the BoP market could yield better insights on how they define success of their initiatives. In addition, a focus on agents from within the BoP communities could lead to a better understanding of their motivations, capabilities, and resources and

Examining BoP Venture Success     251 start-​up conditions that help facilitate successful initiatives with or without an external partner.

Markets Served The markets targeted by the focal agents could either be the BoP markets or the traditional, non-​BoP markets. In the former case, products or services produced outside or within BoP markets are sold to BoP communities, while in the latter case, products produced within the BoP communities are sold to non-​BoP markets as is or as inputs to other products or services intended for traditional markets. The nature of markets targeted, whether BoP or not, has a significant influence on the kind of product or serv­ ice offered, and may create new challenges for the focal firm in terms of market access and reach, sophistication of the consumer, scope of competition, and scalability of operations. Figure 10.1 presents all four archetypal BoP ventures identified by two dimensions: focal agent and markets served. As mentioned before, the mutual value CARD processes differ among the four archetypes. We summarize these processes across all four archetypes in Table 10.1. We now briefly describe each of BoP venture archetypes and illustrate the mutual value CARD processes using examples from the field.

BoP as consumer

Focal Agent

External

Examples: • P&G Always Basico (Brazil); Rejoice Shampoo (China) • HLL Project Shakthi (India) • Grameen Danone (Bangladesh) I

III Self-Reliant BoP*

Local

Examples: • Amrutham NutriMix (India) • Husk Power Systems (India)

Inclusive Supply Chains

Examples: • Sula Vineyards (India) • Net-Works by Interface (USA)

II IV BoP as Producer

Examples: • Unnathi Society IT Consortium (India) • Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad (India)

Local (within-BoP)

External (non-BoP)

Markets Served

Figure 10.1  Four archetypes of BoP ventures * Self-​reliant BoP does not necessarily involve an external organization’s venture as required in the traditional BoP literature.

Sourcing products and Replication of services from the BoP in a business model; way that satisfies the needs capability development of the firm and creates sustainable communities

Development of well-​ being through creating sustainable local economies

Market development that allows profitable introduction of local products and services

Inclusive supply chains

Self-​reliant BoP

BoP as producer

Retention

Embedded sustainability; capacity development

Cost dependent

Consumerism; cultural deterioration; dependence

Destruction

Brand and capacity development; power relationships

Appropriation = retention

Loss of market access; social fabric

Scale as a destructive agent

Dependent on relationships Dependence; company withdrawal; stranded assets; unsustainable practices

Price, scale, and transaction Dependent on product cost dependent utility

Appropriation

Scale-​based; market Access Agent-​based Intermediation

Replication of process; capability development

Sales that create profit and Sales/​scale based; social address effectively a need-​ benefit; based problem (e.g., lack of product dependent sanitation)

BoP as consumer

Creation

Definition of Success

BoP Context

MUTUAL VALUE CARD

Table 10.1 Mutual value “CARD” and the archetypal BoP ventures

Examining BoP Venture Success     253

BoP as Consumer Quadrant I  in Figure 10.1 shows the most often examined practice, where an external agent—​an MNC or a domestic large firm, either alone or in partnership with NGOs and other locally embedded organizations—​seeks to enter the BoP markets to sell existing products or services specifically designed for these BoP segments. Success in creating mutual value depends here on the types of products and services. That is, those products or services that directly address a critical need of the BoP communities such as banking, crop and health insurance, and health care, create value for the focal enterprise as well as for the communities served. In other cases involving traditional consumer goods marketed to the BoP communities, benefit for the communities could be limited and it is often quite difficult to make a case that mutual value is created. A well-​discussed example involving a traditional consumer product that fails to create mutual value, and was actually criticized for destroying value, is the case of whitening cream sold by Hindustan Unilever (HLL) (Agnihotri, 2013; Karnani, 2007). Value destruction may happen in many ways, for example, when BoP communities are affected by waste generated from increased consumption or due to conflicts with existing social norms and culture. In instances where the products or services meet an essential need (such as personal hygiene products), BoP consumers may benefit from increased access to and use of such products. In cases like Project Shakthi by Unilever’s Indian subsidiary (HLL), the firms have employed BoP participants in sales roles thereby allowing some economic value to be retained by BoP participants. Given the focus on treating BoP as consumers, the success of such ventures is often defined by traditional financial metrics like sales and profits, rather than social benefits and impacts on BoP communities. HLL was able to scale the initial success by replicating the same marketing and sales approach all over India and, by centralizing manufacturing operations, achieve economies of scale. Similarly, Proctor & Gamble was able to replicate the lessons from its experiences in Brazil with Always Basico to other product lines (Pampers and Tide) and to other South American markets. Grameen Danone was started in 2006 as a joint venture between Grameen Bank and Group Danone. Grameen Danone was founded to bring affordable healthy nutrition in the form of fortified yoghurt to children in the BoP markets (Humberg & Braun, 2014). The company involved the local communities in all parts of its value chain, as suppliers of raw milk, as employees in the yoghurt factory, and as salespeople engaged in rural distribution. In the absence of infrastructure to keep the products cold and prevent spoilage, the company redesigned its demand-​side logistics to emphasize a quick turnaround from factory to consumer. The company also engaged in additional activities related to educating consumers about nutrition and health. The company had aggressive goals of opening several small plants throughout Bangladesh but has not grown beyond increasing capacity at its existing plant (Humberg & Braun, 2014). While the company has created value for the communities through new economic activities and increased

254    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam focus on positive social and environmental impacts, it is not clear that this initiative has led to increased value retention as the alternative to the product (locally produced sweet yoghurt) was cheaper though not of the same quality. The inability to scale despite having access to accumulated local knowledge and capabilities via its joint venture partner, Grameen Bank, is surprising highlighting the challenges of growth even in favorable environments.

Inclusive Supply Chains There is an increasing emphasis in both research and practice to design inclusive value chains on the supply side in addition to the initiatives to be inclusive on the demand side (treating BoP as consumers). Several companies in the food industry like Nestlé and Starbucks have extended their supply chains to source coffee and other agricultural commodities from BoP communities. In this case, these economic opportunities for BoP communities either create new value by bringing in economic activities to the community or allow greater value capture by dealing directly with focal firms under fair trade practices. Additionally, firms engaged with the BoP communities as their primary buyers may invest in capacity development by offering training and access to technology to improve water and land management, crop yield, etc. Value destruction is a possibility when resources committed to becoming a supplier are stranded when the buyer’s needs change or forces outside the buyer’s control affect the buyer’s ability to stay in business. The cases of Sula Vineyards and Interface offer examples of innovative and inclusive supply chains that help transform the targeted BoP communities. Sula Vineyards (www.sulawines.com), the largest Indian winery, contracts with local farmers to supply wine and table grapes. When the company started in 1996, the region had no vineyards and farmers grew mostly seasonal food crops subjected to the vagaries of weather. The company offered guaranteed purchase contracts and technical assistance to farmers unfamiliar with growing wine grapes. In addition to increased incomes from crop selection and increased yields, farmers also learned to control input costs by reducing fertilizer and water use. Sula Vineyards’ commitment to their farmers even during the economic recession of 2008–​2009 was demonstrated by the company’s successful attempts to launch lower-​priced wines to maintain demand, and their decision to buy and crush weather-​damaged grapes from growers (Bhosale, 2015). The company has dealt with supply constraints by expanding its outreach to neighboring regions suitable for grape growing and attracting farmers there to participate in their programs. The company also invested in infrastructure including new schools and hospitals for the community, providing additional benefits with the partnerships. The success of Sula Vineyards has attracted several other wineries to the region creating positive benefits for the whole region.

Examining BoP Venture Success     255 Another example is Interface, a commercial carpet manufacturer. The company’s late CEO, Ray Anderson, envisioned a zero-​waste company and challenged the executives to implement closed-​loop supply chains to fully recover and reuse materials. One of the initiatives launched by the company was the Net-​Works program, an inclusive business initiative that is aligned with the company’s sustainability goals (Saldinger, 2017). The company partnered with the London Zoological Society and one of its suppliers, Aquafil, to provide jobs to coastal communities in Cameroon and the Philippines to collect discarded fishing nets. Aquafil buys these discarded nets which are then used to make Interface carpets. Not only has this initiative provided an economic livelihood to about 900 families but it has also helped clean up the ocean by collecting over 100 tons of discarded plastic nets in the last five years (Saldinger, 2017). Interface is exploring additional options to scale the program to other communities as well as extend it to other plastic material that pollutes the oceans. In both the cases above, the inclusive business models created new economic opportunities (in the case of Interface) or increased the value created (in the case of Sula Vineyards) for the BoP communities while also benefiting the focal firms directly (Sula Vineyards) or indirectly (Interface). The social and environmental benefits of these initiatives to the BoP communities is also quite clear. The communities around Sula Vineyards now had access to better schools and hospitals, and the reduced use of water, fertilizers, and pesticides greatly improved the environmental quality as well. The select coastal communities in Cameroon and the Philippines benefited from the removal of harmful plastic pollutants from the oceans on which they were dependent for their livelihood.

Self-​Reliant  BoP In contrast to the quadrant I model, quadrant III in Figure 10.1 describes the context where locally embedded enterprises produce and sell products within their and/​or nearby communities. This is not the traditional form of BoP initiative as conceptualized by Prahalad and his colleagues. In the current BoP literature, a BoP initiative requires an external company developing the venture to serve the BoP communities while the self-​ reliant BoP has been a self-​determining initiative with possible government support (London, 2008). While this may not be consistent with the current conceptualization of BoP initiatives, we include self-​reliant BoP here both to be comprehensive in coverage and to illustrate how the mutual value processes may differ when the focal initiative arises from within the BoP communities. The self-​reliant BoP enterprises are likely be small, scaled to meet local needs, and employ labor-​intensive processes. Instead of the value leaving the communities with the external agent, the value created is appropriated and retained within the BoP communities. These ventures may need technological know-​how and capital from outside BoP markets, and partner with MNCs and NGOs

256    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam to gain access to resources and capabilities needed to start and sustain the initiatives. Growth is often capped to serving local demand that is not met by existing firms, hence the niche served by these new ventures remains profitable until a larger, well-​resourced firm enters these niche segments. Amrutham Nutrimix is a producer consortium using a franchising model sponsored by Kudumbashree (see Appendix I for more information on Kudumbashree). Under the federal supplementary nutrition program for poor children three years old or younger, the local village panchayat (the lowest unit of the self-​governance structure in India) receives central and state funds to distribute supplementary nutrition through mother and child-​care centers called Anganwadi. In 2005, Kudumbashree made available a formula created by a research lab to manufacture the product that met the central and state guidelines for supplementary nutrition. Over the last 11 years, this has grown from a small pilot program to a statewide initiative supported by over 250 independent manufacturing units, employing over 2000 women, and distributing the product via the regional Anganwadis. The units range in size from 5 to 150 metric tons in annual output, and they adhere to quality standards set by the consortium. Given that Nutrimix is a low-​cost alternative to Horlicks, a hot drink mix marketed by GSK in India, or Infant fortified milk formula marketed by Nestlé, the economic value is retained within the BoP communities. In addition, this has helped create new women entrepreneurs from within these communities under the auspices of the Kudumbashree program. Husk Power Systems (www.huskpowersystems.com) is a provider of decentralized power systems that utilize agricultural waste (rice and wheat husk) to generate electricity. The company offered access to electricity in underserved villages by setting up a self-​operated micro-​grid (Goyal, Esposito, Kapoor, Jaiswal, & Sergi, 2014). Customers received six to eight hours of access to electricity adequate to power two lamps and a cell phone charger using a prepaid system. This new source of energy replaced kerosene lamps and allowed villagers to extend the active hours for both leisure and commerce. The company has focused on creating a self-​sustaining ecosystem in the villages it serves, enabling economic development along with environmental protection, physical well-​being, and strengthening of the rural communities. Husk for the gasifier is a waste by-​product of rice and wheat farming, and farmers are paid for this waste. In addition, village women are trained to use the waste-​product of the husk gasifier to make incense sticks and char briquettes, creating new income generating opportunities for the village. Employees for power generation as well as power sales are drawn from the villages served by each generation unit. The company also uses its connection to villagers as a distribution platform to make available products from other manufacturers to the villagers. In the four years since the first project went live, the company has installed about 80 power plants ranging in size from 25 KW to 100 KW, serving 200,000 people in over 300 villages. Given that a majority of villages in India are not connected to the grid, Husk Power Systems has filled a need at a cost 30% lower than kerosene, created new economic value for agricultural waste, and provided a cleaner environment for the community. Because of the local embeddedness of the solution and with support from

Examining BoP Venture Success     257 the Indian Government’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, the company has been able to scale quite rapidly by customizing plant size and feedstock input variety to community needs. It has also created innovative solutions to lower costs through cloud-​ based remote management of power plants and prepaid electric meters that work like prepaid cell phone service and prevent the theft of electricity. In the two cases described above, the enterprises address a local need and are designed to serve just the BoP markets. The two models that have successfully expanded their operations have based their expansion on two different scale-​up strategies; Nutrimix units have used a producer consortium (microfranchising) model to expand statewide while Husk Power Systems has grown through financing from external investors as well as support from the Indian government. There has also been a concerted effort to retain value within the BoP communities as well as create new income-​generating activities along the firm’s supply chain.

BoP as Producer The fourth quadrant is an uncommon case of enterprises formed within BoP for the explicit purpose of marketing their goods and services to non-​BoP markets. While handicrafts and other traditional products are often produced by BoP participants and sold in non-​BoP markets, the artisans usually are not owners but are employed or contracted by well-​resourced and connected external agents to produce the products. This is often how the BoP as producer has been referred to in the existing literature. Instead, extending this view, we draw attention specifically to non-​artisanal products and services explicitly targeted at non-​BoP markets in direct competition with firms already in these markets. As in quadrant III, these enterprises may need technological know-​how and/​or financial resources to scale-​up the enterprise to be competitive in meeting the demands of non-​BOP markets. The two cases we describe below offer contrasting examples of BoP as producer. Unnathi Society is another example of Kudumbashree’s microenterprise initiative. Small information technology (IT) service enterprises had been created by women entrepreneurs from BoP communities, and these small-​scale enterprises were to serve the data-​entry and IT service needs of small and medium enterprises in their respective regions. Over 60 enterprises employing more than 1200 women across the state formed a consortium called the Unnathi Society of IT Enterprises. The society actively competes for large data-​entry projects from potential clients including government departments, banks, and other large corporations. The society divides and assigns the work between the participating units, monitors the quality and timeliness of execution, takes corrective measures as and when required, delivers the output to the clients, and ensures collection and disbursement of money to the member units. By forming a producer cooperative, the individual IT enterprises are able to compete successfully for large data-​ entry projects. Through the consortium, individual member units are able to create new value they would have been unable to create independently.

258    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad (www.lijjat.com) is the market leader in papads (a thin, disc-​shaped, fried-​food accompaniment that looks like fried tortilla) in India. The cooperative was started in 1959 by seven women looking for ways to augment their income to support their families. Rolling a papad is a traditional skill, a task the women were quite familiar with, and the women chose to make high-​quality papads to sell to more discerning customers. They did not want to be in debt or dependent on others, so they started small with an investment of about 80 rupees (about $80 now adjusted for inflation). They branded their products “Lijjat” and formed a cooperative soon after. The company has a simple policy—​ “any women who can render physical work in their institution without distinction of caste, creed and color and agrees to abide by the objective of the institution can become a member of the institution from the date on which she starts working” (www.lijjat.com). Women who join the cooperative (referred to as sister members) are considered self-​employed and paid on a piece-​rate basis (about $0.25 a pound of dough rolled). Since their founding nearly 60 years ago, they have grown from the modest start of seven women rolling a few packets of papad a day to a cooperative of over 45,000 women working at 82 production facilities all over India. The central office supplies all the input materials to the branch units and provides quality assurance and control services to individual branches. The company’s annual sales are over $200 million and exports account for about a quarter of their sales (Chaki, 2013). Individual branches are responsible for all operations including distribution, the central office collects only 2% of profits toward central administration, and the rest of the profits are distributed to individual members. The company also provides scholarships for the children of sister members who complete high school to attend college. They also promote from within, and all plant supervisors, area representatives, and board members have at one time or the other rolled papads for a living. The company has also introduced a range of new products targeting the same quality-​ conscious customers who have been loyal to the Lijjat brand. The company’s efforts to enter into other services targeted at women such as banking have not been successful, as the cooperative and decentralized model that works well in manufacturing has not transferred well to other businesses. While Lijjat expanded carefully to minimize risks and avoid debt to capture a dominant domestic and export market share, Unnathi formed a consortium of independent IT service enterprises to achieve the same scale effect. The social benefits of Lijjat are also clear: promoting education and overall improvement in the social well-​being of the communities engaged with Lijjat. Their open-​door policy for membership has not resulted in anyone being turned away. However, the company has no formal retirement or savings plans for members, something it is now considering (Bhawnani, 2012). Based on the descriptions of the four BoP venture archetypes, it is clear that by looking through the lens of mutual value and using the mutual value CARD, success is very different in different venture contexts. Table 10.1 summarizes the definition of success as well as the characteristics of the value CARD for each of the four archetypes.

Examining BoP Venture Success     259

Directions for Future Research The four archetypes are the extreme conditions and we acknowledge that there are several hybrid models that operate in between. The goal was to highlight the unique challenges and opportunities for venture success across the four archetypal contexts, with each presenting unique mutual value CARD portfolios. We have also highlighted the mutual value processes and the challenges of scaling and replicating the business model using illustrative company case studies. Much work remains to be done to realize the promise of the BoP framework. As Dembek and Sivasubramaniam (2016) found in their review of BoP literature, only 17 of 203 articles used quantitative models to address their research questions. In general, we need more empirical examination of the BoP framework to provide a greater understanding of why, how, and when the BoP framework, as conceptualized by Prahalad and Hart (2002) and extended by London and his colleagues, helps to address poverty alleviation by engaging businesses, both domestic and multinational, in those markets. In the case of BoP as consumers, we know very little about how to effectively scale vertically or horizontally when operating in heterogeneous BoP markets. While the template approach recommended by Chliove and Ringov (2017) seems to have promise, it has not been subjected to an empirical examination to understand the extent to which the template approach may work when entering new BoP markets that may differ in many ways from the initial entry point. BoP markets are characterized by scarcity—​of financial, natural, and social capital. In these markets, how do companies determine what to market? Health care and banking services seem to fill an obvious need, but the same cannot be said of many consumer products. Given the importance of user-​centered product designs, particularly in BoP markets, it would be invaluable to examine the decision frameworks that help product development efforts specifically address BoP needs. Given the potential for value destruction, future research could also address how negative effects on the environment or local culture could be minimized when companies target BoP markets for their products. Inclusive supply chains are becoming more common with companies recognizing the importance of including marginal and vulnerable populations as participants on both the demand and supply side of their value chains. However, on the supply side, BoP participants might be part of lower-​tier suppliers, shielding the company from potential negative exposure. This seems to be common practice in the manufacture of apparel, footwear components, and cheap consumer goods. We need more research on new models that allow for direct trade, creating better price recovery for BoP suppliers and enhanced transparency across the value chain. We also need additional research to understand how BoP suppliers can become resilient and what roles companies can play in capacity building in those communities. While there are a few examples of BoP suppliers moving up the value chain by taking on additional activities as they build the resources and capabilities to do so, we do not know the specific policies and practices that may encourage such capacity development, and the enabling mechanisms that

260    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam allow for upward mobility along the value chain. While attention has been on building resilient supply chains that can quickly recover from unforeseen disruptions, little research attention has been given to building resilient and inclusive supply chains that allow for BoP suppliers to adapt to technological or market changes. Bruton, Ketchen, and Ireland (2013), in their editorial to a special issue on entrepreneurship as a solution to poverty, argued against viewing those in poverty as a market for goods. They propose that the solution lies in understanding how to help those living in poverty create their own businesses. This was the focus of quadrants III and IV described above. In line with the call by Bruton et al. (2013), there is a need for more attention on understanding the motivations of BoP entrepreneurs, particularly the start-​up conditions and processes that facilitate success. Given that BoP entrepreneurs operate in resource-​starved environments, future research needs to address how these entrepreneurs can accumulate resources and capabilities that help build resilience to operate in resource-​starved environments but also to build long-​term sustainable competitive advantage. As illustrated by the two cases for BoP as producer, there seem to be different governance structures that might be particularly relevant to BoP environments. More research is needed to understand the role of producer consortia and cooperative structures to scale the ventures and institutionalize the core values and operational logic to ensure long-​term survival of the enterprise.

Conclusion The BoP framework, by combining the creativity and transformative potential of businesses and the need for innovative solutions to address poverty alleviation in BoP markets, has the potential to be a game-​changer, but the promise has not been fully realized. We argued that this is partly due to a narrow definition of success from the focal firm’s perspective. We offer mutual value CARD as a powerful way to help realize the potential and promise of the BoP framework. The BoP venture archetypes described in this chapter highlight the differences in the perspectives of the focal agent when locally embedded as opposed to being from outside, and how value could be retained or destroyed. By adopting a broader definition of “value” and considering the perspectives of multiple stakeholders, we can better understand the challenges and opportunities facing BoP ventures, and how these ventures can create and sustain success. We also identify several gaps in the BoP literature, and suggest new directions for future research that can help advance our understanding of the BoP venture process.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Ted London for sharing his perspectives on the state of research in this field, and for providing very helpful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

Examining BoP Venture Success     261

Appendix I Kudumbashree: A Community Network Model for Poverty Alleviation The name Kudumbashree in Malayalam language means “prosperity of the family.” As part of a participatory development movement in the early 1990s, the government of Kerala in Southern India, in May 1998, initiated the State Poverty Eradication Mission under the name—​Kudumbashree—​to empower women through collective action (www. kudumbashree.org). The inspiration for the statewide rollout between 2000 and 2002 were two successful pilot projects, one each in urban and rural setting that demonstrated the transformative power of multi-​tiered, women-​led community-​based organizations (CBO). The mission of the Kudumbashree is “to eradicate absolute poverty in ten years through concerted community action under the leadership of Local Governments, by facilitating organization of poor for combining self-​help with demand led convergence of available services and resources to tackle the multiple dimensions and manifestation of poverty holistically.” Kudumbashree employs four key strategies to promote community development convergence of various government programs and resources at the community development societies’ (CDS) level, participatory antipoverty planning and implementation, formation of thrift and credit societies, and the development and nurture of microenterprises (Kadiyala, 2004). By delegating resources and power to the local governments (village panchayat) and facilitating empowerment of women-​led CBOs, Kudumbashree was able to scale up quickly with political support at all levels. The organization also built up its resources through extensive partnerships with diverse institutions including commercial and development banks, universities, and a large number of government departments. Kudumbashree has a three-​tier structure for its women community network, with neighborhood groups (NHGs) at the lowest level, area development societies (ADS), at the middle level, and community development societies (CDS) at the local government level. The Kudumbashree network in early 2017 had over 270,000 NHGs affiliated to 19,854 ADSs and 1073 CDSs with a total membership of over 4.3 million women making it the largest women community network in India. Kudumbashree membership is open to all adult women,3 limited to one membership per family. Kudumbashree, with its central objectives of poverty eradication and women empowerment, has three strategic domains covering their programs and initiatives. The three strategic domains and related activities are: • Economic empowerment (microenterprise formation, microfinance, collective farming, collectives, and consortia) • Social empowerment (social rehabilitation and child development) • Women empowerment (adult education and prevention of violence against women)

Programs directed at economic empowerment have attracted the most attention in the Indian press and won several awards for Kudumbashree. As part of encouraging

262    Krzysztof Dembek and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam microenterprise formation, the organization emphasizes capacity building at the grassroots level, by conducting workshops on general administrative and entrepreneurial skills as well as industry-​specific training. The results are quite impressive. There are over 30,000 microenterprise units currently in operation in the Kudumbashree network. They range from very small, one-​person businesses that are primarily designed to augment household income, to firms involved in marketing branded consumer products targeted at both BoP and non-​BoP markets. Kudumbashree also supports the formation, development, and maintenance of producer collectives and consortia in farming, livestock, manufacturing, and services.

Notes 1. In this chapter, we refer to profit-​seeking initiatives targeting the base of the pyramid markets as BoP ventures or BoP initiatives; these could be for-​profit start-​ups, initiatives by existing firms, cooperatives, or non-​profit-​led initiatives. 2. There remains a debate about the appropriate returns to investor capital, but that is outside the scope of this chapter. 3. Kudumbashree uses a nine-​item poverty index that is self-​rated by women to determine if a family is below poverty level. A family checking at least four of the nine factors is considered “below poverty line.” While all adult women are eligible to become members, state subsidies and other financial assistance are provided to only women members considered “below poverty line.”

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Examining BoP Venture Success     265 Santos, N. J. C., & Laczniak, G. R. 2009. Marketing to the poor: An integrative justice model for engaging impoverished market segments. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 28: 3–​15. Schumacher, E. F. 2011. Small is beautiful: A study of economics as if people mattered. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers. Schuster, T., & Holtbrügge, D. 2014. Benefits of cross-​sector partnerships in markets at the base of the pyramid. Business Strategy and the Environment, 23: 188–​203. Simanis, E. 2012. Reality check at the bottom of the pyramid. Harvard Business Review, 90: 120–​125. Simanis, E. & Hart, S. L. 2008. The base of the pyramid protocol: Toward next generation BoP strategy (version 2.0). Working Paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Simanis, E., & Hart, S. L. 2009. Innovation from the inside out. MIT Sloan Management Review, 50: 77–​86. Smith, A., & Pezeshkan, A. 2013. Which businesses actually help the global poor? South Asian Journal of Global Business Research, 2: 43–​58. Sridharan, S., & Viswanathan, M. 2008. Marketing in subsistence marketplaces: Consumption and entrepreneurship in a South Indian context. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 25: 455–​462. Usman Khalid, R., & Seuring, S. forthcoming. Analyzing base-​of-​the-​pyramid research from a (sustainable) supply chain perspective. Journal of Business Ethics. Van den Waeyenberg, S., & Hens, L. 2012. Overcoming institutional distance: Expansion to base-​of-​the-​pyramid markets. Journal of Business Research, 65: 1692–​1699. Wood, V. R., Pitta, D. A., & Franzak, F. J. 2008. Successful marketing by multinational firms to the bottom of the pyramid: Connecting share of heart, global “umbrella brands,” and responsible marketing. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 25: 419–​429.

Chapter 11

Re gul atory In st i t u t i ons and Multinat i ona l C ompanies in E me rg i ng Markets Farok J. Contractor

This chapter is about the role of governments and regulations in fostering, or inhibiting, foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational companies (MNCs) in emerging nations. Its main focus is on the relationship between economic liberalization, deregulation, and more welcoming policies toward multinational companies after the turn of the millennium. The 21st century has seen an almost global, or across-​the-​board, retreat of emerging nation states from ownership of businesses, control, and intervention in commercial affairs. However, across the 149 or so emerging countries, this has not been even and is still a “work in progress.” As a result, I hypothesize that FDI capital is attracted to countries that have gone further down the deregulation path, and that there is a correlation between the nation’s “ease of doing business” and the FDI it receives. As an introduction, this chapter first takes a worldwide historical perspective, tracing the changes in the relationship between the state and business in four eras: (i) prior to the 1890s, when the relationship was cozy and mutually supportive; (ii) 1890–​1920 when several governments became more skeptical and regulative; (iii) 1920–​1980, an era which saw the heaviest involvement by the state in economic affairs, underpinned by socialist ideologies; and (iv) 1980–​present when an almost worldwide retreat of state control is spurring an era of unprecedented globalization.

Bedfellows in Commerce: Until 1890 Until the 1890s, intervention by governments in economic affairs was light or non-​ existent, and generally promotive of business, in the form of facilitating royal charters or

268   Farok J. Contractor grants. In the 11th century, craft guilds in Europe evolved into larger merchant guilds with government backing, to promote intercity and international trade. For example, various merchants got together under the aegis of the Cologne government and received a charter from the English King Henry II in 1157 to not only trade anywhere in England but also be exempt from tariffs and tolls. An alliance between the city-​states of Lubeck and Hamburg in 1241 saw the beginning of the Hanseatic League in Northern Europe and the Baltic, growing eventually to comprise a coalition of as many as 170 trading cities (Baudel, 1992). The interests of the merchants (although trading an enormous variety of different products to many countries) being aligned and supported by the city-​states, and ultimately by the Holy Roman emperor, the Hanseatic League exemplifies the emergence of a Northern European “social contract” or a common social consensus (Fink, 2011). Individuals played dual roles, with merchants becoming government officials and vice versa. Monopoly rights to inventors, were issued by the English monarch under royal patents, starting in 1331 (Hulme, 1896), and much later by the US government after the passage of the Patent Act of 1790. Magistrates in the principality of Sienna in Italy founded in 1472, guaranteed, and later financially supported the oldest bank in the world, Monte dei Paschi di Sienna. In other cases, the state was not just the facilitator but also the owner of enterprises—​ some of which remain operational today—​such as Hofbräu München started as a brewery in Munich by the Duke of Bavaria in 1589, or the Gobelins Manufactory purchased by Louis XIV from its former owners in 1662. In general, through the 19th century, many states facilitated, underwrote, and even owned enterprises in the “public goods” sphere such as postal services, water, toll roads, and railways. In emerging countries, until recent times, almost nothing is known about state sponsorship or support for enterprises, except for companies run by Westerners. Royal charters to the English and Dutch East India Companies (in 1600 and 1602) were trading monopolies but effectively became akin to FDI, and the companies later even began to act like sovereign governments in parts of India and Indonesia.

An Era of Skepticism and Scrutiny: 1890–​1920 For the most part, until 130  years ago, governments took a favorable, benevolent, and promotive view of business. A more skeptical and hostile view began to surface by the 1880s, exemplified by the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 in the USA, aimed at regulating collusive behavior by “trusts” that dominated entire industrial sectors. Gerber (1992) describes how public pressure to regulate cartels also grew in Austria-​Hungary and Germany. The influential Verein fur Sozialpolitik think tank in Vienna (Gerber, 1992), comprising notable economists and government officials, put together proposals for legislation in 1897 to empower the finance ministry to gather all available data on business cartels and trusts, publicize the data to the public, and, if

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    269 needed, prohibit mergers, acquisitions, business combinations and collusion. This era saw a Europe-​wide turning of sentiment against big business (Hobsbawm, 2010).

The Height of Government Control: 1920–​1980 For much of the 20th century between the 1920 and the 1980s the state became even more intrusive in commercial affairs, with a series of nationalizations in Europe in sectors deemed to be strategic, to prop up economies following the Great Depression or to meet the materiel needs of world wars and reconstruction following World War II. An even more extreme step was taken in Russia. March 8, 1921, is a little-​noticed, but significant, date in world economic history, when Vladimir I. Lenin announced, an unprecedented “New Economic Policy” at the 10th Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), under which the “commanding heights” of the economy would thenceforth be appropriated and occupied by state firms, with private enterprise relegated to the smallest of retail transactions (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002). The ideology of state intervention, nationalization, and Leninist appropriation spread beyond the communist world and Europe to other newly independent emerging nations, so that for a half-​century following Lenin’s speech, it was deemed acceptable, even desirable, to discourage or rebuff private enterprise. In the 1950s in India, a leading member of the so-​called non-​aligned nations, its Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru forbade privately owned enterprises from many sectors of the Indian economy and restricted incoming FDI. India’s example of state controls and inward-​looking policies were then followed by much of the rest of the emerging world in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Rajadhakshya, 2017).

The Pendulum Swings Back Toward Liberalization: 1980–​P resent  Day It was not until the 1980s that the tide began to turn in the era of Reagan (USA) and Thatcher (UK), who actually sent abroad emissaries and commercial ambassadors to persuade governments around the world to abandon their inward-​looking socialist policies, to give greater breathing room to their own private firms, and to allow in FDI. The emerging country governments did not need much persuasion. By the late 1980s the ideology of state control had run its course. Socialist controls had resulted in moribund economic growth and panics like the “Tequila Crisis” in the Mexican peso in 1995, or the larger Asian financial crisis in 1997, which culminated in sharp devaluations, and

270   Farok J. Contractor capital flight. The one-​time ideological leader of the “Third World,” India, had its foreign currency reserves dwindle to near zero in 1991, following decades of hostility toward private enterprise. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were ready with bailouts in the form of loans and grants. But these bailouts were, for the first time, accompanied by conditions designed to make these governments adopt more productive economic principles under the so-​called Washington Consensus. A ten-​point program was enunciated (Williamson, 2000). 1) Trade barrier reduction (reduction of tariffs and regulatory barriers to imports) 2) FDI liberalization (more of an open door to incoming FDI) 3) Realistic exchange rates (in general conformity with purchasing power parity theory1) 4) Fiscal discipline 5) Removal of bureaucratic obstacles for domestic entrepreneurs 6) Privatization 7) Protection of property rights 8) Pro-​growth and pro-​poor policies 9) Market-​based interest rates 10) Tax reform

The Ebb and Flow of Globalization 1800 to 2015 Globalization has been measured by several indicators such as the ratio of Exports to World GDP, FDI Stock divided by World GDP, and the number of cross-​border migrants (or people flows), as well as cross-​border data flows (in say terabits2 per year), as we see in Figure 11.1. The left side graph is for the world as a whole (Ghemawat & Altman, 2016) whereas the right side graph is for emerging countries only (Chandy & Seidel, 2016). Globalization (as tracked by Exports or FDI or Migrants as a % of overall population) first crested around 1914, but following the onset of World War I and the Great Depression declined significantly. After hitting a nadir in 1950, the Exports/​GDP ratio began to grow once again in both emerging and advanced nations. As noted earlier, the period 1920–​1980 saw governments in communist as well as emerging countries practice inward-​looking or closed-​door policies that restricted the inflow of foreign investment capital. It was not until after the 1980s that the pendulum swung again toward a more welcoming attitude towards FDI, and foreign capital as a percentage of GDP began to rise once more. Aside from a slowdown after the recession of 2009 in many nations, the overall picture in Figure 11.1 is a huge increase in the penetration of international business into the typical or average economy since the middle of the 20th

% Global Population

0

20 20

0

20 10

.5

20 00

5

19 90

1

19 80

10

19 70

1.5

19 60

15

19 50

2

19 40

20

19 30

2.5

19 20

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19 10

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19 00

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18 80

35

18 70

% GDP

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    271

Year Foreign Capital Stock (% Developing World GDP) Merchandise Exports (% Global GDP) Migrant Stock (% Global Population)

Figure 11.1  Global investment and trade 1870–​2015 Source: Chandy and Seidel (2016), who drew data from the IMF, UNCTAD, and World Bank. Reprinted with permission from The Brookings Institution.

century. (Recall also that the three indicators are ratios (with GDP or population as the denominators), so that the absolute size of foreign capital, trade, and migrants registered an even faster increase (since the denominator—​host nation economies—​and population kept growing.) The left side graph in Figure 11.1 also illustrates an important development in human and economic evolution. Whereas in 1800 only 5% of humans lived in urban areas, by 2015 urbanization has exceeded 55%. Physical proximity is crucial to the speed at which ideas get exchanged, networks form, innovations occur, and corporate alliances are formed. The Internet has accelerated the interchange of thought across global distances, but the persistence of industrial (or geographic) clusters suggests the importance of propinquity to the development of ideas and economic growth (Boschma & Frenken, 2010; Whittington, Owen-​Smith, & Powell, 2009).

How Sea Change in Government Attitudes Toward MNCs After the 1980s Was Implemented The ideology of state dominance in economic affairs and suspicion of private enterprise in emerging countries began a dramatic turnabout after the early 1980s. In

272   Farok J. Contractor India the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1974 included a provision forcing MNC subsidiaries in India to reduce their shareholding to 40%, and share technology with local partners. At least 54 prominent and large MCS, including IBM, Mobil, Kodak, and Coca-​Cola, withdrew or were expelled from the Indian market (Panchal, 2014). But the tide was beginning to turn. Two years following the death of Mao Zedong, his successor Deng Xiaoping, having consolidated his power, launched a series of liberalizing reforms, including the Chinese-​Foreign Venture Law of July 1, 1979, laying out China’s first welcome mat for foreign investment. Indian liberalization followed later in 1991, when facing a foreign exchange crisis, rules restricting FDI were relaxed—​under prompting from the IMF under what later became known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2000). In 1990, the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC)—​ UNCTAD’s think tank on FDI 3—​b egan to create indicators for a study which scrutinized the legislation and regulations passed by nations around the world controlling FDI inflows. Changes in national regulations, each year, were classified into six groups, and then labeled as a positive or “liberalizing” change if the change in a country’s policy amounted to investment liberalization, promotion, and facilitation or negative if the policy change introduced new restrictions or regulations on inward FDI (Contractor, 1991:  in accordance with UN policy at that time, even though I wrote the entire manuscript, my name as author was anonymized and replaced in the publication by UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations)). It was apparent that, as far back as the early 1980s, long before the collapse of socialist or protectionist ideologies, the number of liberalizing changes around the world (and particularly in formerly protectionist emerging nations) far outnumbered cases where additional restrictions on FDI were introduced. Since 1990, UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) has continued compiling these data annually, published each year by its Investment Policy Monitor database: http://​investmentpolicyhub .unctad.org/​I PM). Figure 11.2 shows a recent summary of thousands of changes in FDI regulations worldwide:  until the turn of the millennium, liberalizing changes exceeded new restrictions, annually, by more than 10 to 1. Even after 2008, with a global recession inducing more protectionism, an increased emphasis on localization and local value-​a dded mandates, liberalizing policy changes outnumber new restriction by a ratio of 4 to 1 (Dunning & Lundan, 2009; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Doors have been opening around the world, even in nominally socialist nations, to international firms and products. Cumulatively, over the period 1990–​2 016, liberalizing regulatory changes which open the door wider to FDI have outnumbered restrictive regulatory changes by many thousands. This illustrates the “sea change” in attitudes worldwide—​a nd especially in emerging nations—​toward foreign direct investment. This sea change in government

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    273 100% 79 75%

50%

25% 21 0%

1992

1997

2002

2007

2012

2016

Year Liberalization/Promotion

Restriction/Regulation

Figure  11.2 Changes in the percentage distribution of policies toward incoming FDI (1992–​2016) Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2017: 99).

attitudes has been further catalyzed by the World Bank compiling detailed data on the “Ease of Doing Business” for 189 nations, ranking each nation against the other and tracking their liberalization.

A Liberalizing Regulatory Environment and Its Relationship to FDI Inflows In the rest of this chapter I examine the relationship between liberalizing government policies and FDI in emerging nations and the magnitude of the inward FDI each country receives. Certainly, the size of the local market, human capital, and skills remain powerful determinants of FDI flows. But, ceteris paribus, what role does the regulatory and institutional environment play? In this chapter I  propose that World Bank data be used to statistically analyze the link between FDI flows and various formal indicators for which data are available, such as the difficulty in starting a business, registering property, credit availability, taxes, infrastructural and procedural barriers to trade, rule of law, protection to minority investors, and the time and cost of insolvency.

274   Farok J. Contractor

The World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” Index Comparing 189 Nations As a typical illustration of the new welcoming attitudes, and the importance given by emerging nations to FDI, shortly after taking office in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced his goal of elevating India’s rank from a dismal 142nd of 189 countries to a target rank of 50, in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” index (Mishra, 2014). The “Ease of Doing Business” index covers 11 major regulatory areas or categories as indicated in Figure 11.3. Hundreds or executives, officials, bankers, and lawyers are carefully surveyed each year by the World Bank, using a standardized format. For the most part the methodology minimizes subjective opinions about the “business climate” in each nation. Across all countries, to the extent possible, objective numbers are sought, for example, (i) costs of complying with a regulation, (ii) time or delay until approvals are granted, and (iii) effectiveness of legal recourse. For instance, in the “Trading Across Borders” variable in Figure 11.3, the cost to load a container at the export harbor, or the numbers of forms

Indicator set

What is measured

Starting a business

Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum captial to start a limited liability company

Dealing with construction permits

Procedures, time and cost to complete all formalities to build a warehouse and the quality control and safety mechanisms in the construction permitting system.

Getting electricity

Procedures, time and cost to get connected to the electrical grid, the reliability of the electricity supply and the cost of electricity consumption

Registering property

Procedures, time and cost to tranfer a property and the quality of the land administration system

Getting credit Protecting minority investors

Movable collateral laws and credit information systems Minority shareholders’ rights in related-party transactions and in corporate governance

Paying taxes

Payments, time and total tax rate for a firm to comply with all tax regulations

Trading across borders

Time and cost to export the product of comparative advantage and import auto parts Time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and the quality of judicial processes Time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for a commercial insolvency and the strenth of the legal framework for insolvency Flexibility in employment regulation and aspects of job quality

Enforcing contracts Resolving Insolvency Labor market regulation

Figure 11.3  11 categories measuring institutional and regulatory climate in each nation Source: World Bank (2016: 20).

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    275 that have to be submitted to each authority, and the length of time taken for each approval are measured. Objective measures of this kind enable reasonably valid comparisons across the 189 nations in the survey. The data are obtained from the best authoritative sources in each nation, and cross-​country comparability is checked. From the 11 categories in Figure 11.3 an overall “Ease of Doing Business” score and ranking are then computed for each country. Figure 11.4 shows the overall ranking for each of the 189 nations (World Bank, 2016). Each nation has a DTF (Distance to Frontier)4 score, with 100 representing an aspirational ideal. DTF scores range from 87.34 for Singapore (rank 1) down to 27.61 for Eritrea (rank 189). Governments around the emerging world seem to be falling over each other to liberalize their institutional and regulatory environment to attract FDI. The upward-​ pointing arrow in Figure 11.4 indicates nations whose scores have improved between 2014 and 2015. Continuing the remarkable liberalizing trend observed since the 1980s, most of the 189 nations improved their scores—​although considerable variation remains, across countries, in their institutional setup. For example, India, under new leadership and further relaxation of FDI rules, managed to elevate its ranking from 142 in 2014, to 130. President Putin also declared his objective to improve the Russian Federation’s rankings in the World Bank’s indicators. Even provincial ministers are beginning to espouse the same objectives (Besley, 2015), since regulatory impediments to FDI occur at both the central level as well as the province where the investment or affiliate is to be located. The issues touched upon in the following sections as research questions are: 1) Dunning’s OLI framework is mainly concerned with strategic choices from the MNC’s point of view, and how the characteristics of a country location “L” combines with the other sources of the firm’s competitive advantage such as ownership “O” and internalization “I” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, what is the point of view from the receiving side of the host nation? 2) Why do some emerging countries continue to attract far more FDI (in relation to their GDP) than others? 3) To what extent do institutional factors alone (as opposed to macroeconomic variables) explain the variation in FDI inflows across emerging nations? 4) Which institutional factors are more important in attracting FDI than others?

How Does Institutional Quality Affect FDI Flows to a Country? The recent focus on institutional quality influencing corporate strategy and strategy (e.g., Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008) has renewed interest about the determinants of

Rank

Dominica Uruguay Dominican Republic Vanuatu Seychelles Samoa

Economy

Netherlands Slovak Republic Slovenia United Arab Emirates Mauritius Spain

Rank Jamaica Bahrain Kosovo Kyrgyz Republic Qatar Panama Oman Bhutan Botswana South Africa Tunisia Morocco San Marino St. Lucia Tonga Bosnia and Herzegovina Malta Guatemala Saudi Arabia Ukraine Brunei Darussalam China El Salvador Uzbekistan Fiji Tinidad and Tobago Vietnam

DTF score

Singapore New Zealand Denmark Korea, Rep. Hong Kong SAR, China United Kingdom United States Sweden Norway Finland Taiwan, China Macedonia, FYR Australia Canada Germany Estoria Ireland Malaysia Iceland Lithuania Austria Latvia Portugal Georgia Poland Switzerland France

Economy

DTF score

Rank

Comoros Zimbabwe Suriname Bolivia Berlin Sudan

Burundi Senegal

Cambodia Maldives West Bank and Gaza India Egypt, Arab Rep. Tajikistan Mozambique Lao PDR Grenada Palau Guyana Pakistan Tanzania Marshall Islands Malawi Côte d’Ivoire Burkina Faso Mali Papua New Guinea Ethiopia Sierra Leone Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Kiribati Togo

Economy

DTF score

Sri Lanka Kenya Indonesia Honduras St. Vincent and the Grenadines Solomon Islands Jordan Ghana Lesotho Brazil Ecuador Iran, Islamic Rep. Barbados Belize Argentina Uganda Lebanon St. Kitts and Nevis Nicaragua Cabo Verde

Albania Zambia Nepal Paraguay Kuwait Namibia Philippines Antigua and Barbuda Swaziland

Niger Iraq Gabon Algeria Madagascar Guinea São Tomé and Príncipe Myanmar Mauritania Nigeria Yemen, Rep. Djibouti Cameroon Timor-Leste Bangladesh Syrian Arab Republic Congo, Rep. Afghanistan Guinea-Bissau Liberia Equatorial Guinea Angola Haiti Chad Congo, Dem. Rep. Central African Republic Venezuela, RB South Sudan Libya Eritrea

Source: World Bank (2016: 5).

Note: The rankings are benchmarked to June 2015 and based on the average of each economy’s distance to frontier (DTF) scores for the 10 topics included in this year’s aggregate ranking. For the economics for which the data cover two cities, scores are a population-​weighted average for the two cities. An arrow indicates an improvement in the score between 2014 and 2015 (and therefore an improvement in the overall business environment as measured by doing business), while the absence of one indicates either no improvement or a deterioration in the score. The score for both years is based on the new methodology.

Figure 11.4  The World Bank’s overall Ease of Doing Business country rankings (2015)

Peru Russian Federation Moldova Israel Colombia Turkey Mongolia Puerto Rico (U.S.) Costa Rica Serbia Greece Luxembourg Rwanda Azerbaijan

Japan Armenia Czech Republic Romania Bulgaria Mexico Croatia Kazakhstan Hungary Belgium Belarus Italy Montenegro Cyprus Chile

278   Farok J. Contractor FDI flows, cross-​sectionally (i.e., across countries), as well as over time. The older FDI determinants literature focused on the obviously important role of macroeconomic variables, such as the size of the host nation market, its growth rate, per capita income level, exchange rate, etc. These remain important considerations in the mind of MNC decision-​makers when choosing between nations as investment destinations. But the more interesting question today is the extent to which formal regulatory and institutional factors, taken alone, influence (statistically explain) FDI flow patterns in the liberalizing era, post-​1980. Some studies such as Buchanan, Le, and Rishi (2012) suggest that the “usual policy prescription of attracting FDI into countries by offering the ‘correct’ macroeconomic environment would be ineffective without an equal emphasis on institutional reform.” The regulatory and institutional environment of a country can be tracked in two categories. Formal institutions are the explicit rules, regulations, standards, and procedures that businesses have to follow in each nation (North, 1990). Informal institutions may be described as commonly accepted values or implicit norms of behavior and cultural practices preferred by the population at large (Scott, 2001). Trevino, Thomas, and Cullen (2008) disaggregate “informal” institutions into two further categories—​cognitive and normative—​and describe formal institutions as “regulative.” Cultural distance measures tracked by scholars like Hofstede (2001) enable studies to use cultural variables as explanatory factors or independent variables. In this chapter, however, I  focus on only the formal regulatory variables (from the 11 categories from the World Bank database—​Figure 11.3 above). Why? For one thing, the subfield of cultural distance in international business studies has been fraught with contradictory conclusions so that there is little consensus in the literature (Shenkar, 2012). Second, culture, cognition, and societal norms do not change quickly over time, whereas governments are able to change regulations quickly. Over, say, a 15-​year time span (since the World Bank began to compile comparative data) culture and societal norms have changed relatively slowly. By comparison, nations have relaxed protectionist barriers against FDI at the stroke of a pen. Formal regulatory changes occur more frequently in a 15-​year period, and their measurement (using the objective World Bank criteria) are less ambiguous compared with measurements of cultural differences or societal value changes. Third, changes in culture and norms are anyway reflected, incorporated, and seen in changes in formal institutions and regulations (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013). That is, a government will liberalize its FDI policies only as and when underlying changes in the culture of its population allow. For example, in the case of India, the inclination of the Modi federal government is to introduce administrative reforms more quickly. But this is resisted by counter-​pressures from his own party (the BJP), the public, and interest groups and because of future election considerations (“India’s prime minister . . .,” 2017). Finance Minister Jaitley was quoted as saying, “The Economist does not need to win votes. The BJP does.”

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    279

A Proposed Empirical Analysis: How Are FDI flows to 149 Emerging Nations Influenced by Their Institutional Climate? An interesting research study would tackle the question regarding which formal regulatory changes affect FDI flows, acting alone, as well as in combination with traditional macroeconomic variables (introduced as control variables). The analysis would encompass 149 countries defined as “emerging” by the IMF. A mixed hierarchical random-​effects panel regression is likely an appropriate methodology, although one important caveat in studies of this kind is the likely hindrance of multicollinearity in the institutional variables as well as controls. A multicollinearity check would be needed. Data are available from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” and “Doing Business” databases (http://​databank.worldbank.org/​data/​ databases.aspx. For many nations, the data for “ease of doing business” started in 2004, and the most recent FDI data available in World Development Indicator is 2016. There is a small incidence of missing data. The number of countries covered in each year is not uniform, due to missing observations (some countries started being included in the survey in 2006, and data for some conflict areas are not available). Another caveat is the growing realization that global FDI data may be partially compromised by the fact that a significant fraction of multinational company subsidiaries may actually be dummy or shell companies which no operations, but set up merely for tax avoidance reasons (Contractor, 2016). (However, this type of potential error is common in statistical analyses and can be controlled for. For example, clinical trial studies of potential new drugs are often “contaminated” by unknown previous drug compounds coursing through the veins of subjects, or variations in their diets. If, despite such contaminating or distorting data, the overall results are significant, then there is moderate assurance of a statistical association supporting the efficacy of a new drug. Moreover, an ex post analy­sis of the data can reveal the direction of the biases introduced by the contaminating variables). Given the big variation in the size of country markets, using the absolute amount of FDI for each country as a dependent variable would introduce a substantial bias. Instead, the dependent variable is the ratio of net FDI inflow over GDP for each of the 149 nations. The 11 institutional variables tracked by the World Bank were shown above in Figure 11.3, of which 8 relevant to FDI are selected for analysis in Table 11.1 as explanatory variables. Each country receives a score (on a 0 = worst to 100 = theoretical best) for each year. Hence the hypothesis for each institutional variable that a nation’s FDI/​GDP ratio will be positively related with the country’s scores for the institutional variables shown in Table 11.1.

280   Farok J. Contractor Table 11.1 Dependent and explanatory variables Dependent Variable

Institutional Factors

Control Variables

Net FDI inflow/​GDP ratio:a 149b emerging countries over 13 years

Country i Score in Year j for • Starting business • Registering property • Getting  credit • Protection for minority investors • Paying  taxes • Trade across borders • Contract enforcement • Resolving insolvency

• • • •

Country i; Year j i = 1 . . . 149; j = 2004 . . . 2016

• • • •

GDP  growth Gross capital formation GDP per capita Financial Development Index Economic Freedom Index Human Development Index Real interest rate Change in exchange rate

a

  This is defined by the World Bank as net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other long and short-​term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP. b

  The IMF counts 149 nations as “emerging countries.”

Hypotheses or Research Questions Based on Eight Measures for Institutional Quality Since the World Bank computes an overall “Ease of Doing Business” score and rank for each nation, why not just use that aggregate indicator? Why use the eight sub-​indicators shown in Table 11.1? Institutional polycentrism theory developed by the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom suggests that formal institutional influences and rules emanate from multiple (poly) sources and the effect of each on society and economics are not the same (Ostrom, 2010). Governments are not monolithic. For example, in the ease of difficulty of “Trade Across Borders” variable the World Bank measures not only tariff rates—​something under the purview of the central government—​but also port delays and loading/​unloading costs which are a function of the local port authority. A central government may enact laws, but then their interpretation is up to the judiciary, which also administers the courts, its backlogs, and delays. Hence management scholars have begun to use multiple criteria for institutional quality, rather than using one overall indicator (Batjargal, Hitt, Tsui, Arregle, Webb, & Miller, 2013). However, the main objective for testing eight disaggregated indicators for institutional quality (discussed below) is to identify which of them—​in an emerging country context—​more powerfully influences FDI inflows. This finding will have obvious policy

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    281 implications for governments, if we can zero in on the subset of institutional factors that would be most useful for a government, hoping to attract FDI, to focus upon.

Ease of Starting a Business A country’s “Starting Business” score rates it on the ease with which a business can be started, in terms of delays, costs, number of regulatory procedures, and minimum paid-​ in capital. Delays in time, the number of applications, and bureaucratic impediments to get permissions affect all businesses, local or foreign, although the minimum size of paid-​in capital is unlikely to be an impediment for an MNC, Similarly, I make the a priori assumption that once a foreign investor is given the “go-​ahead” by the country government, getting electricity and construction permits would—​for a MNC—​be a routine matter and not an impediment of any consequence for a foreign investor, as opposed to a small local business wishing to start up. Hence these two variables in the World Bank’s rankings (see Figure 11.3) are not used in this study as independent variables.

Registering Property Included as explanatory variables in this study are institutional variables that would affect multinational investors and FDI inflows to the nation, such as registering property. In many emerging nations whose land registration laws and procedures are still a work in progress, where a good fraction of the population is still in agriculture, and where occupation of land is important to the cultural fabric of society, MNCs have found difficulty in getting clear title to real estate. In some cases ongoing resistance by former residents displaced by the foreign firm’s operations have resorted to blockages and protests (Beckert, Dittrich, & Adiwibowo, 2014; Oh & Oetzel, 2017). In India, after violent protests affected foreign investors in extractive industries and agribusiness, the Modi government took steps to simplify and clarify property registration procedures (Mukerji, 2017). Hence the hypothesis to be tested, that reducing the number of procedures, time, cost, and administration overheads involved in property acquisition and registration will positively influence the FDI/​GDP ratio for a country.

Ease of Borrowing Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) indicate that MNCs substantially depend on local borrowing for their capital needs. MNCs are often biased in favor of local borrowing for two reasons. First, local currency debt service costs can be netted out against local currency revenues to reduce foreign exchange exposure. Second, local credit availability and borrowing substitutes for the foreign firm having to bring its own capital to the country,

282   Farok J. Contractor thus reducing exposure to country risk (Lehmann, Sayek, & Kang, 2004). Better credit information systems and collateral laws, ceteris paribus, should promote FDI.

Protection for Minority Investors The next institutional variable is the extent of protection given by the host country to minority investors. International joint ventures (IJVs) are commonplace in emerging markets and serve to mitigate the risks posed by institutional constraints in such nations (Henisz, 2000). IJVs exist either because of government mandates restricting foreign ownership or voluntarily (absent government restrictions) on the part of MNCs which feel that the local help, reputation, and insights provided by a local partner are worth the loss of some share of profits (Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014). When the MNC is in a minority equity position, the country’s score in terms of protecting minority shareholder rights is of direct consequence and influences the FDI inflow the nation receives. Of course, not all IJVs have the MNC as a minority partner. But even in cases where the MNC is a majority partner, or even a 100% owner of the affiliate, this variable serves as a surrogate for the attractiveness of the nation as a destination, I hypothesize.

Tax Levels and Compliance Costs The “Paying Taxes” variable tracks for each nation (over the 12 years) not only the effective corporate tax rate but also compliance costs in terms of number of payments and time wasted in meeting all tax requirements. The higher (better) the country’s score on this variable, ceteris paribus, it should receive greater FDI in relation to its GDP. There is unmistakable evidence that tax havens and countries such as Ireland where corporate taxes are capped at 12.5%, receive FDI inflows disproportionate to their GDP (Contractor, 2016; Kato, 2015 ). Moreover, there is weak evidence that for the subset of nations that have signed tax treaties, FDI flows subsequently increased (Blonigen & Davies, 2004). However, there is as yet no compelling evidence that, across as many as 149 emerging nations, the tax (rate and compliance) variable influences FDI. Hence the hypothesis proposed in this chapter is novel.

Trading Across Borders The ease or difficulty of “Trading Across a Country’s Border” should be a powerful influence on FDI decisions because trade and FDI are closely linked. There are hardly any foreign affiliates that operate entirely locally—​that is, 100% of their costs and inputs are sourced locally and 100% of sales made locally. On the contrary, a study by UNCTAD (2013) concluded that in 80% of all world trade (amounting to around $21 trillion in 2016), a MNC is either an exporter or an importer, on one side of the deal—​or

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    283 participates as an orchestrator of a global value chain. Equally remarkably, the same MNC is frequently both the importer and the exporter in the import/​export simultaneously. For example, “in 2009, 58% of US goods imports from OECD countries were intra-​firm . . .” (Lanz & Miroudot, 2011). Hence FDI and trade are more or less two sides of the same coin, or comprise an integrated global strategy. The ease or difficulty of moving products across borders measures capacity and congestion in ports, the time or delays in moving cargo through a country’s ports, and the number of forms and procedures required to be fulfilled, as well as the quality of internal transport infrastructure between the factory and ports. For example, “throughput per ship per day” exceeds 1300 containers in Thailand and Sri Lanka but is only 800 in Mumbai and 310 in Chennai in India (Prasad, Sathish & Singh, 2014: 17). The number of forms, procedures, delays, and tariffs are also lower in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Hence the ease or difficulty of conducting trade across borders is hypothesized to be a crucial factor in influencing FDI decisions.

Contract Enforceability The appropriation of profits by a firm diminishes when it has to devote time and money to legal enforcement (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). This is especially important for the MNC whose “ownership” advantages comprise proprietary knowle­ dge transferred to the host nation (Dunning & Lundan, 2008) and even more crucial when its intellectual property needs to be protected in the country (Dunning & Lundan, 2009). In a world of outsourcing, where the value chain is sliced and fragmented over several nations, the ability to enforce a supply chain contract quickly is an issue that not only affects the nation where the contract was written but also has a knock-​on effect in all other nations logistically linked in the global supply chain (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & Pedersen, 2010; UNCTAD, 2013) The time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute, as well as the overall quality of the judicial process are measured across countries in the World Bank’s (2016) report on the ease of doing business: it takes an average of 471 days to enforce a contract in India, while the same contract can be enforced in the USA within 42 days. With local suppliers and partners, contract enforcement reduces opportunistic behav­ior and helps the MNC also in an agency problem with local managers or fighting corruption cases (La Porta, Lopez-​de-​Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). In sum, the hypothesis is that the better a country’s contract enforcement, ceteris paribus, it will attract more FDI to the emerging nation.

Ease of Exiting a Business or Resolving Insolvency Recently, there has been a greater focus on the speed and ease of insolvency, or exiting a business, as a determinant of entry choice. Lee, Peng, and Barney (2007) and Sauvant

284   Farok J. Contractor (2016) theorize that firms are more likely to enter a businesses or country where bankruptcy laws allow an efficient exit. The World Bank tracks the time, cost, and recovery rate for a comparable commercial insolvency across countries. For example, Indian bankruptcy rules and regulations make it extremely difficult for firms with over 100 employees to exit the market. Firms have to pay their employees even when they cease operations. Kang and Nayar (2004) indicate that the time taken to resolve bankruptcies ranges from 6½ to 11 years. To remedy this problem, and to encourage more investment in information technology (IT) and service sector start-​ups, India passed a new bankruptcy law in 2016 (Mundy, 2016). Large MNCs assess the risk of being embroiled in a country where it is difficult to disengage. The net present value (NPV) of an MNC’s foreign investment includes the residual value of its businesses, and a country’s rules and regulations governing liquidation of businesses can significantly influence it. To the extent that a country’s bankruptcy rules and regulation require large settlements for labor and other stakeholders, that leaves little residual value for shareholders. Comparing countries cross-​sectionally for firm formation Klapper, Amit, and Guillén “highlight the importance of (both) sound entry and exit regulations” (2010: 8) (parenthetical added). While it may sound strange to argue that the shadow of eventual termination of a business can influence the beginning entry decision, this factor has been discussed by government and multilateral bodies. For example, UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) and Sauvant (2016) propose a “model law” for cross-​border insolvency (Mannan, 2015). The World Bank has been urging governments to address reforming their bankruptcy laws (Cirmizi, Klapper, & Uttamchandani, 2012) to make their countries more attractive to FDI. Hence the hypothesis of a positive association between ease of exit and FDI inflows.

Policy Implications The foregoing eight hypotheses (for eight institutional variables describing a nation’s attractiveness to multinational company investors) were proposed as a possible research exercise, as well as for policy discussion. They represent a shift from trying to explain FDI flow patterns (cross-​sectionally or comparing across nations) using aggregate macroeconomic variables such as GDP, GDP per capita, or size of the nation’s market—​ drilling down to a more disaggregated level of analysis that is more tangible to company executives as well as government officials. For example, the much lower ranking for “Trading Across Borders” for India compared with China or Thailand is a significant explanation for India’s surprisingly low participation in global value chains (UNCTAD, 2013) despite its large labor force and average wages lower than China’s. Despite a mobile handset market with over 900 million users, Apple, Inc. (and its assembler partner such as Foxxconn) has only just started taking tentative steps to build iPhones in India, although now that the World Bank’s “Trading Across Borders” has highlighted India’s

Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies    285 low ranking in port infrastructure and customs procedures, the Indian government has promised Apple quicker clearances. In this way, the World Bank reports influence and accelerates changes at the country and local levels. Or take the case of aluminum whose production require large inputs of electricity. Despite its electricity rates nominally being among the lowest in the world, India exports bauxite and imports finished aluminum. FDI or investment in the aluminum sector has so far been hindered not because of electricity cost per kilowatt-​hour but because of the unreliability of supply and connections. In the last three years, since 2014, the Indian government has significantly increased its investments in the power sector. The World Bank rankings thus help to highlight bottlenecks in countries and to catalyze their policy responses.

Conclusion Over the past 150 years, the relationship between governments and firms has been a pendulum swinging between the historically cozy relationship between governments and companies until the late 19th century and greater skepticism and scrutiny on corporations after 1890 during the “robber-​baron” days of unbridled corporate power, with antitrust and anti-​cartel legislation in Europe, and the passage of the Sherman Act (1890) in the United States. The regulatory climate turned decidedly chilly for business, especially in the socialist and communist world, including newly independent emerging nations during the 1920–​1980 period. Private firms were viewed with varying degrees of suspicion, several emerging countries limited investment for private enterprise in key sectors, and, in the extreme case, anti-​business sentiment reached its height under Soviet and Chinese communism, with state-​owned enterprises occupying the “commanding heights” of the economy (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002). Most of the emerging nations listed in Figure 11.4 did not exist until the 1950s. The newly independent nations, freed from colonial domination, veered close to socialist doctrines until the late-​1970s. MNCs were viewed with suspicion and excluded. Then a remarkable change began to happen, as recorded in UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor database (see Figure 11.2) which records instances of both regulatory changes that liberalized or relaxed rules toward incoming FDI in each nation as well as changes in regulations that further constrained MNCs in the country. The sea change in attitudes regarding FDI—​almost universally across the entire spectrum of emerging governments—​is reflected in the UNCTAD data showing ratios of 10 to 1 in some years, or at least 4 to 1 in others, for liberalizing overrestrictive regulatory changes. Today, presidents, prime ministers, provincial ministers, and even city mayors seem to be falling over each other in laying out the welcome mat for foreign investment. And yet, as this study illustrates (i) the progress toward liberalization is far from complete and the World Bank’s rankings (Figure 11.4) show a large variation across nations, and (ii) it is not government regulations alone but the overall institutional climate that either attracts or deters FDI. Following Ostrom (2010) and Batjargal, Hitt, Tsui, Arregle,

286   Farok J. Contractor Webb, and Miller (2013), this chapter takes a multidimensional and fine-​grained view of the institutional climate faced by MNCs, proposing an analysis based on eight of the World Bank’s disaggregated indicators (rather than the simple aggregate index) for each nation. This is a more nuanced or disaggregated approach which drills policy decisions down to an actionable subset of institutional factors that can most powerfully influence FDI inflows into emerging nations. The strategist in a multinational enterprise contemplating expansion has many countries to choose from. The World Bank data now provide objective rankings across nations, disaggregated into eight or more specific regulatory areas that can impact the proposed business—​enabling the MNC strategist to assess risk and opportunity in a more fine-​grained manner than before. For emerging country governments, these data and proposed analysis can provide clear indication of where further changes can make the country more attractive to foreign investment and best induce future FDI flows.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Klaus Meyer and Robert Grosse, editors of this volume, and Valentina Marano for valuable suggestions, as well as Rutgers University doctoral candidate N. Nuruzzaman and Prof. Ramesh Dangol of Youngstown University with whom a conversation at an earlier conference sparked ideas included in this chapter.

Notes 1. Purchasing power parity (PPP) theory suggests that a government should allow adjustments to its currency exchange rate commensurate with the differential between its domestic inflation rate and the inflation rate of its trading partners. Previously, and even today, several emerging nation governments meddle in exchange markets with the result that their exchange rate deviates from PPP. 2. 1 terabit = 1 trillion bits or 1012bits. 3. I spent a sabbatical in 1990 in the UN with this project. 4. This indicator or score may be a bit mislabeled and may cause confusion since it actually measure proximity to frontier, and not distance to the frontier.

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Chapter 12

C orp orate P ol i t i c a l T i e s in Em erging Ma rk ets Pei Sun

Corporate political ties (CPTs) involve a variety of boundary-​spanning personal and institutional linkages between focal firms and the constituent parts of public authorities (Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012a). They are a widespread inter-​organizational arrangement and a key component of corporate nonmarket strategy in advanced and emerging markets alike (Faccio, 2006; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Studies of CPTs have been an interdisciplinary undertaking that has generated a large body of literature in accounting, economics, finance, and management since the start of this century (e.g., Chaney, Faccio, & Parsley, 2011; Fisman, 2001; Leuz & Oberholzer-​Gee, 2006; Siegel 2007; Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016). This chapter does not attempt to offer a comprehensive review of this voluminous literature; rather, it builds upon recent reviews of this subject (Sun et al., 2012a; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016) to elaborate on the latest research developments and crucial research frontiers that can further advance our understanding of CPTs in emerging economies. The chapter is organized as follows: First, I offer a detailed categorization of CPTs and outline the major theoretical perspectives that have been invoked to examine the antecedents and consequences of CPTs. Next, I identify and highlight specific research areas where latest studies have generated considerably new insights into the functioning of CPTs and their impacts on firm outcomes in emerging markets. Specifically, the presentation starts from a micro-​level examination of rent generation and rent appropriation mechanisms involving political actors and focal firm stakeholders (e.g., owners and managers). I focus on the dynamics in which value or relational rent is first created by the two parties and subsequently captured or even misappropriated by them over time. I then proceed to discuss current research on the interrelationships between CPTs and two firm-​level market and nonmarket strategies, respectively. In particular, they concern complementarity and tension between CPTs and market-​based capabilities and strategies and those between CPTs and strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR). The final topical issue is the macro-​level investigation

292   Pei Sun into how the interplay of CPTs and complex sociopolitical institutions in emerging economies shapes corporate outcomes. I conclude by discussing directions for future research on this key form of nonmarket strategy, with insights provided for both scholars and reflective practitioners on the formation of nonmarket strategies and management of business-​government relations in emerging economies.

CPTs in Business-​government Exchanges Firms are embedded in networks of exchange relationships with other organizational actors such as suppliers, customers, and regulators (Granovetter, 1985). Among these socially embedded inter-​organizational relations, business-​government interactions play a crucial role in determining corporate outcomes (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). As suggested in Figure 12.1, explicit or implicit exchange relationships develop between the two parties. Focal firms can provide political agencies and actors with tax revenues, campaign financing, and sociopolitical support (e.g., votes). In return, the state can help focal firms enhance their legitimacy and competitive positions via a variety of policy tools and resources at its disposal (Sun et al., 2012a). Linking these constituent parts of business and government are a multitude of formal and informal personal and organizational ties to enforce the aforementioned exchanges. Figure 12.1 demonstrates four archetypes of CPTs that have been the primary objects of existing research. The first (1 in Figure 12.1) concerns formal organizational linkages established between focal firms and political institutions through structural connection or affiliation, notably ownership arrangements. For example, governments remain an influential, albeit minority, shareholder group in many business firms in both developed and emerging economies despite the privatization waves of recent decades (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013; Sun, Mellahi, Wright, & Xu, 2015; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). Multinationals establishing strategic alliances and joint ventures with host country state-​owned enterprises (SOEs) are another case in point (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010a). Ideally, these formal organizational linkages help align the strategic goals and incentives between focal firms and political institutions. The second type of CPTs concerns interpersonal relationships between firm managers and political actors (2 in Figure 12.1) such as politicians, bureaucrats, and SOE managers. They range from “old boy” networks in social elite systems (Siegel, 2007), which are subsequently exploited to further their common interests, to reciprocal personal ties purposefully developed for the exchange of particularistic favors between economic and political agents. Strategy research in emerging markets abounds on the rationales and consequences of managerial networking with government officials and SOE managers (Li & Zhang, 2007; Peng & Luo, 2000). Further, the development

Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets    293 Finance and Sociopolitical Support

①

Focal Firms

③ Owners and Managers in Focal Firms

Political Agencies

④

②

Political Actors

Information, Legitimacy, Resources, and Policy Support

Figure 12.1  Corporate political ties in business-​government exchanges

of long-​term, reciprocal relationships between firm managers and political actors facilitates and strengthens inter-​organizational exchanges detailed in the first type of CPTs (Park & Luo, 2001). The remaining two types of CPTs involve, respectively, personal-​organizational linkages developed directly between political actors and focal firms (3 in Figure 12.1) and those between firm managers and political institutions (4 in Figure 12.1). In the former, board-​and management-​level political ties through former or retired politicians sitting on corporate boards and other top management positions have been a focus for existing empirical research (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). In the latter case of business people entering politics, studies have paid close attention to instances where a firm’s owners and senior executives serve in appointed or elected political positions (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Li & Liang, 2015). In sum, these two categories have received substantial academic scrutiny as they are relatively easy to measure and capture both interpersonal and inter-​organizational dimensions of business-​ government exchange relationships (Zhang, Marquis, & Qiao, 2016). It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the four archetypes of CPTs are not mutually exclusive and can be combined or selectively employed by a focal firm. Moreover, this classification does not exhaust the typology of CPTs. Prior research has also

294   Pei Sun explored political ties with the central-​local distinction (Li, Meyer, Zhang, & Ding, 2018; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015) and with the administrative-​legislative distinction (Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2017). Recent studies have realized the heterogeneity of political ties in many contexts and generated a more nuanced picture regarding the effects of such heterogeneity on corporate outcomes, which is an important subject of our subsequent review. Nonetheless, the functioning of emerging market CPTs in general invites similar theoretical logics; in what follows I sketch out dominant theoretical perspectives that have been used to understand CPTs.

Theoretical Perspectives on CPTs Resource dependence theory (RDT) posits that organizations can use political means to produce a more favorable external environment, thus influencing the flow of the critical resources on which they depend (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978/​2003). In particular, firms may seek to co-​opt political agencies and actors by a variety of tactics, such as nurturing connections to political institutions and actors. By so doing, potentially hostile elements of environmental uncertainties can be neutralized and even absorbed into focal firms. Consequently, performance benefits accrue to firms that have successfully created well-​ functioning co-​optive linkages with the political environment (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). The resource-​based view (RBV) of the firm suggests that companies can develop and deploy political resources and capabilities to generate economic returns (Barney, 1991). To the extent that firms’ ability to cope with political process is unevenly distributed, political resources/​capabilities largely fit the requirement of the RBV, because they are frequently in scarce supply and are difficult for rivals to match (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). In the case of CPTs, the RBV logic can be combined with the social embeddedness perspective to understand their strategic value. The social embeddedness perspective conceives firms as embedded in inter-​ organizational networks, the content, strength, and structure of which have profound ramifications on focal firms’ performance and behavior (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Zaheer, Gozubuyuk, & Milanov, 2010). Relational ties developed between business and government give rise to political capital that can be enjoyed by focal firms. In effect, the use of relationship-​based political strategy is “akin to the development of social capital that is embedded in a continued exchange relationship between parties” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999: 829). As such, the ties embedded in business-​political networks can be an important source of rent leading connected firms to achieve competitive advantages over their unconnected rivals (Michelson, 2007). In brief, the converging logics of social embeddedness theory and RBV imply substantial strategic value of CPTs. Institutional theory emphasizes the crucial roles of regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions in shaping organizational strategy and behavior (Scott, 2008). A  key tenet of the institution-​based view is that firms and their managers make

Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets    295 strategic choices in response to formal and informal institutional constraints (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009). In emerging economies characterized by deficient legal/​ regulatory systems, malfunctioning contract-​ enforcing mechanisms, and underdeveloped market intermediaries (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), firms have long relied on network-​based strategies to navigate the weak institutional environment by creating informal linkages with political actors and other powerful stakeholders (Peng, 2003; Xin & Pearce, 1996). In addition to mitigating political and transaction hazards, firms can act to manipulate the weak institutions by generating and capturing “influence rents,” which are “the extra profits earned by a firm because the rules of the game (laws, regulations, and informal rules) are designed or changed to suit it” (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011:  1631). In other words, CPTs create value for focal firms by responding to and shaping sociopolitical institutions to their own advantages (Marquis & Raynard, 2015). The foregoing brief review suggests a broad consensus that CPTs are of substantial strategic value to emerging market firms. However, prior research has also recognized that their value is contingent upon a host of firm-​level and environment-​level factors (Sun et al., 2012a). Further, different types of CPTs vary in many aspects and can have different impacts on firm behavior and outcomes (Li et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016). Finally, firm-​specific political capital created by business-​government network ties can, under some circumstances, turn into significant liabilities for focal firms (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2010a; Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016). In the subsequent sections, I use the latest exemplar works in this field to demonstrate how cutting-​edge scholarly research has shed fresh light on the contingent value of CPTs in emerging economies.

Rent Creation/​capture in Politically Connected Firms Consistent with the relational view of competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998), the value of CPTs lies in the relational rent jointly generated in the business-​government exchange relationships. Once the relational rent is created, however, it is up for grabs in the subsequent rent bargaining and appropriation stage (Coff, 1999). In the context of CPTs, government agencies and politicians have multiple objectives that cannot be perfectly aligned with those of the firms. This in turn leads to government partner opportunism that can result in excessive extraction of relational rents (in the form of politically motivated redistributive activities) from the corporate counterpart through the standard use of political powers (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012). In addition, CPTs at the managerial, board, and ownership levels further facilitate rent appropriation, as political agencies and actors can exert direct interference in firms’ corporate governance and operational processes.

296   Pei Sun For instance, Okhmatovskiy (2010) shows that different types of political ties give rise to varying magnitudes of potential costs, which concern excessive political intervention in corporate governance and the associated misappropriation of firm wealth. Specifically, while ties to SOEs led to higher profitability of Russian banks, ownership and board ties to the government did not result in better performance for focal banks. Thus, strong CPTs may not be always value-​enhancing, since a strong political partner can demand more from the focal business firm. Further, there is even a danger in the eventual break-​up of the CPTs under certain circumstances. Excessive appropriation of rents by political actors may impair the incentives of the firms to contribute to rent generation in the next round, thus resulting in a gradual erosion of the relational rent. Meanwhile, it may also encourage firms to devote more resources to enhancing their bargaining powers in the later rounds of rent bargaining. In the end, a downward spiral might occur, leading to the risk of CPT dissolution. Longitudinal case studies in the emerging market context have confirmed that this is not a remote possibility, and conceptual development in this regard identifies a set of factors affecting the evolving bargaining powers of respective parties and the stability of the partnerships (Sun, Mellahi, & Liu, 2011; Sun, Wright, & Mellahi, 2010b). Besides the direct rent capture by political actors and institutions, current research also draws on agency theory to identify subtler rent dynamics within business firms (Liedong & Rajwani, 2018; Mellahi et al., 2016). Concretely, political capital may not necessarily benefit the firm as a whole but may be leveraged by certain stakeholder groups to appropriate rent, thereby exacerbating extant agency problems. For example, Chizema, Liu, Lu, and Gao (2015) find that politically connected boards in China serve to reduce executive pay dispersion and weaken the pay-​performance link. That is, political ties make it more challenging for firms to address managerial agency problems in emerging market firms. Moreover, in a sample of high-​technology entrepreneurial firms, Stuart and Wang (2016) find that firms with politically connected founders are more likely to commit financial fraud. Finally, Sun et al. (2016) explore the tension between RDT and agency theory in the context of board-​level political ties by demonstrating a dark side of CPTs—​enabling rent misappropriation by large blockholders. Given the ubiquity of the principal-​ principal agency problem in emerging economies (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008), Sun and his colleagues find that board political capital enhances large shareholders’ power advantages over minority investors, thus inviting more blockholder opportunism and rent appropriation. While political directors are invited on boards primarily to help generate rents for focal companies, an unintended consequence of these co-​optive linkages is the creation of a shield for blockholders against disciplinary forces in the legal/​regulatory and market-​based mechanisms. As a result, political ties not only facilitate rent capture by politicians and government agencies but also exert an indirect but profound effect on the rent distribution in other stakeholder groups. In sum, theories focusing on rent creation mechanisms, such as RDT and RBV, can be integrated with theories emphasizing rent appropriation (e.g., agency theory) to better understand the conditions under which the dark side of CPTs may manifest themselves.

Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets    297 While some prior research postulates that agency theory might explain the lack of a relationship between political strategy and firm performance (e.g., Hadani & Schuler, 2013), the latest studies have started to identify specific mechanisms through which corporate political capital can aggravate existing agency problems (Chizema et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2016).

CPTs and Market-​based Capabilities/​ Strategies The highly intertwined market and nonmarket environments facing an emerging market firm entail formulating a concerted strategy integrating both market and nonmarket components (Baron, 1995; Li, Peng, & Macaulay, 2013). According to the RBV logic, firm-​specific resources and capabilities that can achieve integrative configurations in managing both market competition and nonmarket challenges are valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and non-​substitutable (Frynas et al., 2006; McWilliams, van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). Nevertheless, empirical studies exploring the relationship between market strategies and political networking strategies are much less developed. Frynas et  al. (2006) studied the dynamic link between firm-​specific political resources and the creation and maintenance of first-​mover advantages of multinational enterprises in host emerging economies. Their empirical findings suggest that political resources in gen­ eral and CPTs in particular can lead to first-​mover advantages, but given changing resource interdependences, sustaining these advantages requires additional market and nonmarket resources/​capabilities. Furthermore, late movers can also develop and use political resources to neutralize first-​mover advantages. Kotabe, Jiang, and Murray (2017) examined how emerging market firms’ political networking capabilities may complement their absorptive capacity in conducting innovation activities. On the basis of survey evidence, they found that the complementary effect of political networking capability with absorptive capacity is particularly significant in enhancing radical innovations. And the effect is stronger when firms are facing more intense industry competition. The authors suggest that such complementary effect helps firms gain access to both market and nonmarket resources and compensate for weak institutions, resulting in better performance in radical innovation. Ironically, some research has revealed the inherent tensions or negative interactions between market and nonmarket strategies. For instance, Li, Zhou, and Shao (2009) found that the positive performance effect of product differentiation strategy adopted by MNEs in China was weakened by the managerial political connections they developed with Chinese government officials. Theoretically, Ahuja and Yayavaram postulated that political networking strategies “may well imply a weakening in the development of

298   Pei Sun some other productive capabilities and thus weaken firms’ ability to earn other forms of rents such as efficiency and innovation rents” (2011: 1648–​1649). Consistent with this spirit, Sun et al.’s (2010a) longitudinal study of the MNE political strategies in the Chinese auto industry delineated the underlying process in which erstwhile effective nonmarket activities may generate unintended adverse impacts on market-​based competitive capabilities over time. Drawing upon RDT, RBV, and the social embeddedness perspective, they showed that when rapid and fundamental changes occurred in the business environment, strong connections developed between MNEs and local political institutions could turn into a liability: since the emergence of new level playing field was largely beyond the control of local politicians, the original relationship-​based strategies became increasingly obsolete and resulted in cost inefficiency and underdevelopment of market-​based skills in marketing and new product development. On the other hand, firms were obliged to maintain reciprocal relationships with political actors even if they were no longer valuable. Thus, they were locked into increasingly unbalance exchange relationships, where the considerable resources invested to maintain the relationships were less likely to be compensated by fewer benefits offered by the political partners. In sum, our understanding of the role of complementarity and tension between market and nonmarket strategies remains limited and we need more conceptual developments and empirical studies to investigate these issues.

CPTs and Strategic CSR Moving beyond the business-​government dyad, the value of the CPTs can be influenced by the ways in which focal firms engage with other stakeholders in civil society. Recently, a growing body of literature has explored if and how firms may align corporate political strategy with a broader set of nonmarket strategies, notably strategic CSR (Mellahi et  al., 2016), which refers to corporate actions that appear to advance some social good that allows a firm to enhance organizational performance, regardless of motive (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). Studies in the emerging economy context suggest that nurturing CSR activities can help strengthen an organization’s political connections, which in turn can lead to improved performance. This perspective posits that CSR-​CPA complementarity in response to government pressures can help strengthen a firm’s legitimacy and facilitate the inflow of critical government-​controlled resources (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Wang & Qian, 2011). Accordingly, CSR activities can be subservient to corporate political activities in reaching their strategic goals. For example, Choudhury, Geraghty, and Khanna (2012) document how a multinational firm with no direct access to core host government actors can successfully navigate host country political environments by actively engaging with a set of quasi-​state

Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets    299 and civil society actors. These “periphery” actors, they argue, can change the information set of the core or help align incentives of multiple core actors. Additionally, a firm’s social performance may moderate the severe sanctions on the firm by the incoming sociopolitical group. Research on the value of CSR during negative events suggests that a strong CSR reputation acts as an “insurance policy” (Peloza, 2006) shielding the firm from nonmarket environmental jolts (Godfrey, 2005). Therefore, the decline in the value of CPTs upon a political regime change is expected to be less severe in firms with substantial CSR reputation. This prediction receives support from a recent study of multinationals in Libya before and after the Arab Spring. Darendeli and Hill (2016) explore how multinationals may engage in a variety of market and nonmarket activities designed to cultivate legitimacy in the eyes of the social sector to hedge against political hazards. While all foreign firms had to develop ties to Qadhafi to succeed during his rule, those that also invested in social-​benefits projects and in building ties to social-​sector actors are found to exhibit greater resilience to survive Qadhafi’s overthrow. Overall, this finding suggests that strategic CSR activities can help politically connected firms mitigateubiquitous political hazards in emerging economies. However, some research on the interaction between CPTs and strategic CSR suggests that they are not necessarily complements. When managers are unable or unwilling to react to external pressures to improve CSR, certain types of CPTs may substitute and weaken CSR activities. In the Chinese context, Zhang et al. (2016) examined how CPTs affect firms’ donation decisions. To this end, they distinguish two types of CPTs: ascribed bureaucratic connections that represent political background an individual obtained before entering business and achieved political connections that result from political appointments to state organs (such as congresses and political councils) after executives became successful business leaders. They found that firms connected to the former type of ties were less likely to make charitable donations through buffering government pressures, whereas firms connected to the latter type of ties were more likely to serve a binding function that facilitates donation. Overall, the research suggests the different types of CPTs may serve as a substitute for or a complement with a firm’s CSR activities, depending on the level of the firm’s dependence on the government, which is in turn reflected in the types of CPTs.

CPTs and Sociopolitical Institutions The value of CPTs is critically contingent upon the sociopolitical environments in which focal firms are embedded ( Bucheli & Salvaj, 2018; Sun et al., 2012a). This contingency is of particular relevance to emerging market firms. On the one hand, political ties may confer substantial returns to focal firms: firms need political connections to guard against government extortions and obtain financial and regulatory resources at the government’s disposal (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005; Xu & Meyer,

300   Pei Sun 2013). On the other hand, emerging economies feature considerable sociopolitical pluralism and volatility, such that a variety of interest groups and factions compete for political and economic benefits (Henisz & Zelner, 2010; Kozhikode & Li, 2012). When erratic political rivalry leads opponents to dominate the political process, firms linked with the incumbent political group are at considerable risk of suffering from “negative cascades of discrimination, resource exclusion, and even expropriation and sabotage” (Siegel, 2007: 625). Leuz and Oberholzer-​Gee (2006) document the financial impacts of regime changes in Indonesia at the turn of this century on firms with strong political ties to Suharto. They find that closely connected firms significantly underperformed after Suharto fell from power, which suggests that they had difficulty reestablishing connections with the new political group who was critical of the Suharto regime. Siegel (2007) found that South Korean firms experienced a reversal of fortune to their advantage (increased rates in forming strategic alliances with multinationals during 1987 to 2003) when the political elites to whom the company CEOs/​chairmen were attached gained power, and that firms experienced a reversal of fortune to their detriment in the form of decreased rates of alliances formation when the political elites to whom they were tied lost power. Given such risk-​return duality of political ties, firms need to develop deeper understanding about the nature of the shocks by treating the political actors as a collection of heterogeneous interest groups. While sociopolitical pluralism is present in developed economies, emerging market political institutions experience a key institutional weakness: a lack of institutional checks and balances that effectively constrain the discretion and opportunism of interest groups in power (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). Consequently, incumbent political interest groups both provide sizable preferential treatment to firms with which they connect and can enforce dramatic discriminatory or wealth-​ redistribution policies against businesses connected to the disadvantaged groups. Drawing on the political embeddedness perspective, Sun et al. (2015) advance the concept of political tie heterogeneity by contending that different types and combinations of political ties vary in their vulnerability and resilience to negative political shocks. This variance stems in turn from distinct exchange processes and mechanisms underlying different political tie compositions. Specifically, they examine stock market responses to an unanticipated, high-​profile political event in China. They find a negative valuation effect of managerial political ties but an insignificant effect of government ownership ties. Further, companies combining managerial and ownership ties experienced less post-​shock reduction in market value than those holding only managerial political ties. These findings shed light on the values of different configurations of corporate political ties and inform firms of potential ways to manage ubiquitous political hazards in emerging economies. Concretely, while developing personal-​based connections with politicians can result in significant benefits for focal firms, they have to be balanced by the vulnerability of the ties to adverse political shocks. Government ownership ties, on the other hand, can play an important risk absorption role in buffering firms from these shocks. Therefore, a combination of personal and organizational ties to the incumbent political regime can

Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets    301 be beneficial for focal firms, since they can enjoy their managerial connections absent adverse shocks, while relying on organizational ties to reduce the likelihood of falling victim to unpredictable power struggles. Recent research also starts to address the feasibility and consequences of a scenario where focal firms simultaneously develop multiple “bets-​hedging” ties to competing political groups (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Zhu & Chung, 2014). For instance, Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) offer a detailed account of how compartmentalized business-​group structure served as an effective buffering and defense mechanism against the risks of CPTs. Noting the dark side of political ties emanating from exogenous political shocks and misappropriation of relational rents by their political partners, firms may find it desirable to manage their linkages to disparate sociopolitical networks through a fragmented, loosely coupled business group structure. That is, ties to different political partners are formed by different member companies in a group, the structure of which is far from transparent to the public. By so doing, firms can segregate incompatible ties to rival sociopolitical groups into different subunits, detach fallen and failed political ties to limit political liabilities, prevent political partners from spreading legal and reputational damages to the entire organization, and limit the ability of political partners to excessively misappropriate rents from the entire group. The extant literature is also concerned about the temporal dimension of the sociopolitical institutions, i.e., institutional transitions in emerging economies. Earlier studies posit a gradual decline in the value of CPTs during the transition from a relationship-​ based system to a rule-​based one (Nee, 1992; Peng, 2003). As universalistic and contractual transactions come to dominate the web of particularistic ties, know-​how will eclipse know-​who and network-​based strategy will give way to market-​based strategy. However, numerous empirical findings of persistent returns from political ties in both emerging and developed countries call this prophecy into serious question. Siegel even concluded that “the debate over the value of political ties after liberalization should shift away from a discussion of whether the ties matter . . . toward a discussion of how they operate under various institutional rules of the game after liberalization” (2007: 658). In view of this controversy, recent research has undertaken more disaggregate and contextual analyses to explore the coevolution of CPTs and sociopolitical institutions (Liu, Yang, & Augustine, 2018; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014). For instance, Sun, Zhang, and Mellahi (2012b) explore the ways in which the network-​based strategy of private ventures co-​evolves with transition in China. They offer evidence that, alongside transition and liberalization, strong isomorphic pressures of networking with government officials are increasingly giving way to behavioral patterns dictated by the logics of resource dependence theory and new institutional economics. Haveman, Jia, Shi, & Wang (2017) examined the relationship between political embeddedness and firm performance in China from 1992 to 2007. They found that business-​state ties increasingly improve firm performance. Thus, there is little evidence suggesting that a tipping point for the decline in the value of political connections is on the horizon in emerging economies.

302   Pei Sun

Future Research on CPTs in Emerging Economies CPTs are by no means unique to emerging economies; rather, political networking has been a common organizational practice in the advanced economies for many decades and likely remains the case (Hillman, 2005; Vidal, Draca, & Fons-​Rosen, 2012). In fact, recent studies document substantial returns of political connections in the advanced economy context, where market-​supporting institutions are presumably robust (Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak, & Mitton, 2016; Amore & Bennedsen, 2013). As such, CPTs are unlikely to serve only as a substitute for weak institutions in emerging economies. However, we lack detailed research on if, how, and why CPTs function differently across different institutional contexts. In view of the scope of this Handbook, we do not discuss CPTs in the advanced economies in detail, but putting the studies of CPTs in a comparative perspective will prove rewarding in future research to identify specific underlying mechanisms through which CPTs impact corporate outcomes. Concretely, I outline the following aspects as potential research directions for scholars to consider. First, the preceding review of the literature has shown that an emerging stream of studies has examined the heterogeneity of CPTs in shaping corporate outcomes (Sun et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Zheng et al., 2015). Future research can further this line of inquiry to generate a more nuanced picture of political tie utilization. By unpacking the nature of exchange processes embedded in different types of combinations of CPTs, we can unravel how different types and combinations of political ties influence firm value and behaviors in varying contexts. In addition, we know little about if and how the political ties of emerging market firms travel across national borders. Will home country state ownership and political connections become liabilities when emerging market firms invest in advanced economies? If so, how could firms manage and mitigate this particular type of politically related liability of foreignness? While some recent studies have already touched upon this important issue (Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014; Li et al., 2018; Li, Xia, & Lin, 2017), we call for more research to explore this fascinating research topic. Second, future research can pay more attention to the heterogeneity of business organizations and their associated stakeholder groups to which the political ties are attached. While some research has examined the development and consequences of political ties in entrepreneurial firms (Armanios, Eesley, Li, & Eisenhardt, 2017; Li & Zhang, 2007), we know very little about if and how CPTs function differently in different types of organizations, such as family firms and business groups (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012). Research on this aspect is still in its infancy and more studies need to be undertaken to understand the specificity of political ties at the organizational level. Third, the prior nonmarket strategy literature highlights the complementarity between RBV and RDT in terms of understanding the rent-​generating processes of CPTs. However, our knowledge is still relatively limited on how the sustainability of the rents

Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets    303 depends on environmental, inter-​organizational, and intra-​organizational factors. For example, political and regulatory shocks and evolutionary changes can erode the effectiveness of the original rent-​generating mechanisms (Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2010a), powerful politicians and stakeholders may appropriate the rents once created from the buffering mechanisms (Okhmatovskiy, 2010), and managerial agency considerations may drive the nonmarket activities (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). In short, we still have very limited knowledge about how the process in which the rent-​generating buffering activities predicted by RBV and RDT interacts with subsequent rent appropriation to impact on performance across different institutional contexts (Coff, 1999; Sun et al., 2016). In fact, CPTs can be beneficial to the whole firm unless such political capital is employed by one party to take advantage of other corporate stakeholders. Therefore, addressing the question of “resource provision for whom” from the agency theory perspective can be a particularly fruitful avenue through which to enrich the RDT and RBV account of the CPT research. Fourth, there are ample research opportunities ahead for deepening our understanding of the relationship between CPTs and market-​based strategies and that between CPTs and strategic CSR. Regarding the former, although the existing literature consistently points to the importance of integrating market and nonmarket strategies, the empirical evidence available on this front is very limited. In particular, we lack detailed understanding of how emerging market firms could possibly achieve business-​ political ambidexterity by exploiting complementarity and managing tension between their political resources and market capabilities (Chen, Li, & Fan, 2018). Moreover, recent theoretical development suggests that firms may use market actions/​strategies to influence the implementation and interpretation of formal policies (Funk & Hirschman, 2017). Emerging economies can be an ideal context for future research to employ to examine the ways in which firms use market strategies influence and/​or change the dynamics of their relationships with the political actors and institutions. With respect to the latter relationship, studying CPTs and strategic CSR in combination can yield unique insights on the complementary/​substitution effects between political and social strategies of firms and on the outcomes of integrated nonmarket strategies for other stakeholder groups outside the focal organization. For instance, future research may explore multinational firms’ integration of nonmarket activities at the emerging economy subsidiary level, the subsidiary-​headquarter relationship with regard to this integration, and the characteristics of institutional environments in different host countries that impinge on this integration. Future scholarship could also investigate the extent to which this CSR-​CPA complementarity differs among different types of CPTs and CSR activities. There is no guarantee that all types of CSR practices will complement CPTs. An interesting future avenue would be to explore how the degree of complementarity between heterogeneous CSR activities and political ties affects organizational outcomes. Finally, future research should also attempt to bridge the micro-​macro divide that pervades nonmarket strategy research (Mellahi et al., 2016). Most research on CPTs has been conducted at the institutional and firm level but is largely silent about the impact

304   Pei Sun of micro-​level factors. Political networking activities are conducted by corporate leaders whose motives, judgment, and choices may differ significantly. Therefore, research is needed on the role of heterogeneity of leaders and their interface with the nonmarket environment in driving firm activities and outcomes. As a starting point, scholars may want to integrate the proposed micro-​foundation of CPTs with existing theories such as agency theory and institutional theory (Li & Liang, 2015; Zhu & Yoshikawa, 2016). The key assumption here is that leaders are active agents within institutions and are sometimes able to break through the institutional blinders imposed by institutional arrangements (Marquis & Raynard, 2015). In order to better understand managerial/​ leader choices with respect to nonmarket strategies, scholars may also draw on and theories from other disciplines such as social psychology (Mellahi et al., 2016).

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Pa rt   I I I

F OR E IG N M N E S I N  E M E RG I N G MARKETS

Chapter 13

Adjustm ent of MNE Geo graphic Ma rk et Str ategy in Re sp ondi ng to the Rise of L o c a l C om petitors i n a n Emerging Ma rk et J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie

Defined by low but quickly increasing resident income, emerging economies typically attract foreign direct investment (FDI) seeking efficiency as well as new markets (Buckley & Meng, 2005; Lecraw, 1991; UNCTAD, 2016). Efficiency-​seeking subsidiaries of multinational enterprise (MNE) typically take advantage of the low-​ cost inputs in emerging economies and export their products to countries with greater purchasing power. Market-​seeking MNE subsidiaries are mainly interested in the emerging economies’ large populations with increasing income as potential customers (Buckley & Meng, 2005; Zhang, Li, Hitt, &, 2007). Many MNE subsidiaries of course seek both efficiency and new markets in emerging economies, exporting only part of their products. These strategic orientations are never static (Buckley & Meng, 2005). MNE subsidiaries adjust their market strategies in response to external changes to improve their overall performance (Buckley & Casson, 1998). Local firms in emerging economies seek to profit from FDI spillovers and usually encouraged by home government policies to gradually build their own exporting capabilities (Jenkins, 2008; Thun, 2006). Some have become major players in the international competitive landscape and have started to challenge the market position of MNE incumbents (Jenkins, 2008). Do MNEs’ emerging economy subsidiaries adjust

312    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie their geographic market strategy as a response to the rise of local exporters in their host countries?This research was designed to investigate that question. We propose an inverted-​U-​shaped relationship between an MNE subsidiary’s exports (more specifically export intensity defined as exports as a percent of total sales) and the volume of local exporters’ exports to the subsidiary’s markets. Compared with products sold by MNE subsidiaries, those sold by local exporters tend, initially at least, to suffer from unfamiliarity and what might be termed “liability of emergingness”(Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). Importers may be reluctant to trust the quality of products that are not only manufactured but also designed and branded in an emerging economy (Chao, 1993; Fetscherin & Toncar, 2010). If an MNE subsidiary observes increasing penetration of local exporters’ products in its destination markets, it may perceive this as a strong signal of better customer acceptance of products from its host emerging economy and increase its export intensity as a response. However, if local exporters’ penetration becomes too great the competition may drive down the export intensity of MNE subsidiaries. Adjusting a firm’s geographic market strategy involves substantial resource reallocation along the global value chain and a high level of organizational flexibility (Buckley & Casson, 1998; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). The flexibility of an MNE subsidiary is determined not only by its own operations but also by its relationship with the MNE parent and the host institutional environment. The autonomy allowed by a subsidiary’s parents would be expected to influence its flexibility (Buckley & Casson, 1998). If the headquarter is not responsive, a subsidiary’s response to increased exporting by local firms is likely to be hindered. Since organizational inertia increases with a firm’s age (Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2007; Ranger-​Moore, 1997), older MNE subsidiaries may respond less readily to increasing exporting by local firms. Strategic change involves not only resource reallocation withing a firm but also resource exchange beyond the firm’s boundaries (Buckley & Casson, 1998). Market-​supporting institutions that facilitate transactions are crucial for such resource exchange (Peng, 2003), so being located in an emerging economy region with relatively well-​developed institutions may help a subsidiary restructure its resources to respond to the rise of local exporters by changing its geographic market strategy. These intuitions were tested in an empirical study of 25,161 manufacturing MNE subsidiaries located in China during 2005–​2007. The results tend to support their validity. The data show that a MNE subsidiary’s export intensity first increased and then decreased with the value of products exported by Chinese local firms in the same industry to their destination markets. The inverted-​U-​shaped relationship is flatter if the MNE subsidiary is older, and if the MNE parent’s control via original equipment manufacturing (OEM) orders is tigher. If the MNE subsidiary was located in a Chinese province with better-​developed market-​supporting institutions, the inverted-​U-​shaped relationship was steeper. These findings may serve to shift some scholarly attention from weak institutions in emerging economies to their sometimes very dynamic competitive landscapes. While the internationalization of emerging market firms has already drawn a lot of scholarly attention (Luo & Tung, 2007), how the rise of such local competitors influences the

Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy    313 strategies and performance of MNEs investing in emerging economies has remained underexplored (Chang & Park, 2012; Mutlu, Zhan, Peng, & Lin, 2015). Indeed, studies of interactions between local firms and MNE subsidiaries in emerging markets have largely focused on how the subsidiaries may influence local firms rather than the other way around (e.g., Chang & Xu, 2008; Xie & Li, 2017; Zhang, Li, & Li, 2014; Zhang, Li, & Zhou, 2010). It is generally believed that local firms facing competition from foreign firms are weak and reactive, sampling hoping to profit from spillovers. This chapter addressed to what extent local firms’ success may alter the geographic market strategy of foreign firms. The MNE subsidiaries that originally planned to sell more in China were encouraged to export more when they saw the increasing popularity of Chinese local exporters’ products in their overseas markets. Those MNE subsidiaries that originally planned to export turned to selling more of their products in China when they found too much competition from Chinese local exporters abroad. The study’s findings depict the responses of MNE subsidiaries in China during the years in which China gradually grew into the world’s factory as well as an attractive market. This study also bridges the research on strategic change between the international business literature and the research on emerging economies. Previous research has examined how organizational factors (age, size, resources, previous performance, corporate governance, etc.) and environmental factors (regulatory changes, technological disruptions, failed takeover attempts, etc.) may influence strategy change (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh, 2003; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2014; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993), but strategy change in international business and particularly in emerging economies has received less attention. The findings show that the specific context introduces more contingencies which influence strategy change in ways deserving of greater scholarly attention.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses MNEs have been playing a very prominent role in emerging economies. In addition to investing capital and generating local employment, they transfer knowledge and capabilities to local firms which some of those firms use to help them to establish international trade linkages (Swenson, 2008), to improve their productivity (Zhang, Li, & Li, 2014), and to innovate (Mahmood & Zheng, 2009).

MNEs Dynamic Market Strategy in Emerging Economies Scholars have worked extensively on how MNEs enter emerging economies, how they influence the host economy, and what determines the performance of their investments.

314    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie They have often focused on the weak and complex institutional environments in host countries. Underdeveloped institutions such as a weak legal system, poor intellectual property protection, and an unstable political environment have been shown to influence MNEs’ FDI location choices, entry modes, and knowledge management (e.g., Bartels, Napolitano, & Tissi, 2014; Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Zhao, 2006) as well astheir subsidiaries’ performance (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2005; Jiang, Peng, Yang, & Mutlu, 2015; Luo, 2003). Correspondingly, firm-​level factors that may help to cope with weak institutions such as international experience, local experience, intra-​organizational resource flow, and inter-​organizational networking have been found to be very important for MNEs in emerging economies (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 2013; Huett, Baum, Schwens, & Kabst, 2014; Lei & Chen, 2011; Luo, 2003; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015; Tuschke, Sanders, & Hernandez, 2014). In addition to their typically weak and complex institutions, emerging economies are also often characterized by fast-​growing market potential and a very dynamic competitive landscape, suggesting the importance of adjusting a subsidiary’s strategy as the specific business context evolves Buckley & Meng, 2005; Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). Global flexibility tends to be a hallmark of MNEs. They adapt readily to changes in host-​ country environments (Buckley & Casson, 1998). They increasingly let go subsidiary mandates (Birkinshaw, 1996) and encourage subsidiary initiatives (Ambos, Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010; Lieberthal, 2011) to take advantage of local growth opportunities (Verbeke & Yuan, 2013). A dynamic market strategy is one result. Low-​cost inputs attracted export-​oriented MNEs to an emerging economy, but the economy’s own market potential may also attracte market-​oriented FDI(Li, Qian, Lam, & Wang, 2000; UNCTAD, 2016). MNE subsidiaries with different orientations tend to have very different value chains. Export-​oriented subsidiaries typically carry out manufacturing or assembly tasks only. If any R&D is conducted its outcome is aimed at overseas markets (Zhang et al., 2007). Market-​seeking subsidiaries, by contrast, need to localize and internalize more upstream and downstream activities. They sponsor R&D for local product adaptation and product development for the local market. They invest in local distribution channels, and a sales force. And their marketing is usually adapted as well (Buckley & Meng, 2005). Such adjustments often require a lot of resource reallocation along the global value chain, but many MNEs are prepared to do so, especially for a large market like China’s (Buckley & Meng, 2005). MNEs’ market strategies in emerging economies have been found to be determined by the mandate implanted by MNE parents, subsidiary-​specific resources and capabilities, and the institutional environments in host locations. Research has shown that subsidiaries of smaller MNE, farther geographically from the parent, located in more free markets, and with a larger share of foreign ownership and control are more likely to export rather than selling their products in host market (Estrin, Meyer, Wright, & Foliano, 2008; Filatotchev, Stephan, & Jindra, 2008). However, those are only static explanations. More recent research has paid more attention to the emergence of a new group of competitors and their ability to trigger changes in MNEs’ geographic market strategies (Hutzschenreuter & Gröne; Mutlu et  al., 2015). Figure 13.1 illustrates the

Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy    315

Host Institutions

Mandate of Parent MNE

Market Strategy of MNE Subsidiary

Subsidiary-specific Resources & Capabilities

Local Competition

Figure  13.1 Factors influencing the market strategies of MNE subsidiaries in emerging economies

influences now considered the most important. The following conceptual framework is developed based on these factors.

The Rise of Local Exporters Strategic change should be a rational adaptation to changes in a firm’s environment(Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). The rise of a new group of competitors is an important environmental change that may stimulate a change of strategy (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). For an MNE subsidiary located in an emerging economy that sells some of its products outside the host country, local exporters in the host economy constitute a highly visible group of competitors. They may even have a similar cost structures if many of the inputs come from the same host economy. And well they might, as that may be why the MNE parent located the subsidiary in that host location in the first place. Deliberate learning, as well as the intentional and unintentional knowledge spillovers will tend eventually to equip local firms with similar manufacturing technologies and management know-​how that the MNE subsidiaries exploits (Chang & Xu, 2008; Xie & Li, 2015, 2018; Zhang et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2010). The local exporters may be the MNE subsidiary’s suppliers, or OEM suppliers of the subsidiary’s customers or their competitors (Evenson & Westphal, 1995; Hobday, 1995; Wu, Sinkovics, Cavusgil, & Roath, 2007). Their proximity, business relationships, together with their similar resource profiles, make local exporters a highly salient reference group for export-​ oriented MNE subsidiaries in an emerging economy (Greve, 1998, 2000). The salience would be even greater if the subsidiary comes across the products of local exporters in the same destination markets. Previous research has found that firms

316    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie may adjust their geographic target markets in response to international competition (Hutzschenreuter & Gröne, 2009). When local exporters start to sell in its overseas market, an MNE subsidiary may not initially perceive it as much of a threat. Indeed, it could be interpreted as good news that customer will accept products exported from that emerging economy. Products exported from emerging markets usually bear an extra burden simply because they come from an emerging economy (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). Customers in developed countries generally perceive products imported from an emerging economy as of inferior quality (Gurhan-​Canli & Maheswaran, 2000), and customers in other emerging economies may do so too (Hu, Li, Xie, & Zhou, 2008; Kinra, 2006). The country where a product was manufactured, assembled and designed is taken into consideration when customers make such inferences (Chao, 1993; Fetscherin & Toncar, 2010). This is especially a problem for local exporters whose products are not only manufactured, but also designed and branded in an emerging economy. If even local exporters’ products manage to gain traction in an overseas market, it could be a sign that the market is ready to accept more products from the same emerging economy. It could signal MNE subsidiaries in that same economy to increase their export intensity. However, the number of customers ready to accept emerging economy products will always be limited in any overseas market. When an MNE subsidiary finds too many local exporters’ products selling in an overseas market, it may decide to reduce its export intensity to avoid that competition. If fierce competition of local exporters is reducing profit margins overseas, the host emerging economy may begin to look relatively more attractive as a potential market with increasing purchasing power. Hypothesis 1: The export intensity of an MNE subsidiary first increases and then decreases with the volume of exports to its overseas markets by local firms in the same industry.

The Moderating Effect of Organizational Flexibility Adjusting geographic market strategy is rarely easy. Like any other strategic change, it usually involves substantial resource reallocation (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Meyer et al., 2011). The resources and capabilities specific to the old geographic markets are obsolescent, while those specific to the new geographic markets need to be built or acquired. In fact, flexibility has long been considered a hallmark of the modeling of MNEs (Buckley & Casson, 1998). However, organizational flexibility decreases as a firm ages (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan et al., 2007; Mens, Hannan, & Pólos, 2015; Ranger-​Moore, 1997). As time goes by, organizational members exposed to the firm’s architectural features for a long time become more resistant to change (Mens et al., 2015). The external audience that has over time developed a taken-​for-​granted image of the firm, together with the other organizations that have over time developed formal or informal relationships with the firm, becomes a source of external resistance to strategy change. They all see it as deviating from the firm’s legitimate image or breaking up established ties. Both impose

Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy    317 serious costs (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Schumpeter, 1934). Older firms may thus be more resistant to any change in strategy even when there are environmental pressures to do so. Younger MNE subsidiaries may tend to be more flexible. Hypothesis 2: Any inverted-​U-​shaped relationship as proposed in Hypothesis 1 is likely to be flatter if the MNE subsidiary is older.

Of course, the organizational flexibility of an overseas subsidiary is determined not only by its own situation, but also by the autonomy or voice allowed by its MNE parent (Buckley & Casson, 1998). At one extreme the headquarters possesses all the specific knowledge and centralizes all strategic decision-​making functions (Hymer, 1976). At the other, the headquarters acknowledges that it lacks any relevant knowl­ edge and allows its subsidiaries to rely on them own judgement in deciding even strategic matters (Ciabuschi, Forsgren, & Martín, 2011). In most cases the reality lies somewhere between. Both headquarters and the subsidiary realize that neither has perfect knowledge about what to do next. The headquarters and its subsidiaries bargain over the allocation of resources, power and control (Ambos, Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010; Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007). Subsidiary managers need to direct the headquarters’ attention to its country-​specific issues and help the headquarters understand them (Balogun, Jarzabkowski, & Vaara, 2011; Ling, Floyd, & Baldridge, 2005) while bargaining for more resources, power and control (Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). A headquarter with limited country-​specific knowl­ edge may delegate some degree of autonomy to an overseas subsidiary, hoping to promote local responsiveness and learning (Luo, 2003; Wang, Luo, Lu, Sun, & Maksimov, 2014) A subsidiary in an emerging economy is usually better informed about the rise of local exporters due to its geographic proximity and business -​relationships. Compared with an MNE parent, it will be more likely to respond if allowed to do so. If the subsidiary doesn’t have the necessary autonomy, it may try to sell the issue to headquarters and argue for adjusting the geographic market strategy as a response. However, if the subsidiary is positioned by the parent as an OEM center, it is less likely to have much autonomy. In an OEM arrangement the buyer normally provides the supplier with any necessary technology and then takes all of the output in which the transferred technology is embedded (Hobday, 1995). OEM suppliers are anonymous in the final product’s market, with very limited bargaining power over the buyer, who controls both the upstream and downstream ends of the value chain (Chen, 2005; Jean, Sinkovics, & Cavusgil, 2010). Country-​specific knowledge is not very relevant for an OEM supplier. An MNE parent is not likely to endow much autonomy or voice to an overseas subsidiary with an OEM mandate. Subsidiaries engaging intensively in OEM activities are therefore less able to respond to the rise of local exporters. Hypothesis 3: Any inverted-​U-​shaped relationship as proposed in Hypothesis 1 is likely to be flatter if the subsidiary engages intensively in OEM activities.

318    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie

The Moderating Effect of Environmental Flexibility Adjusting a firm’s geographic market strategy, in addition to internal resource reallocation, also may require resource exchange with the external environment (Buckley & Casson, 1998). It may involve divesting the resources specific o the old geographic markets and acquiring resources specific to the new ones. Interorganizational exchanges which are relationship-​based takes place between acquaintances. The terms are usually quite personalized and enforced by informal institutions such as norms and culture. Rule-​based exchanges take place between strangers, and there the terms are usually enforced by formal institutions like the legal system (Peng, 2003). Suffering liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976), MNE subsidiaries often lack embeddedness in their host countries’ informal institutions. That makes it difficult for them to organize relationship-​based transactions (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Oeng, 2009; Peng, 2003). Their resource exchanges must rely more on the host environment’s formal institutions that facilitates information flow and enforces contracts between strangers (Peng, 2003). As a result, subsidiaries in locations with better-​developed market-​supporting institutions should be better able to restructure their resources and capabilities, and should thus be more responsive to the rise of local exporters, includingchanging their geographic market strategy. Hypothesis 4:  Any inverted-​U-​shaped relationship as proposed in Hypothesis 1 is likely to be steeper if a subsidiary is located in a region with better-​developed market-​supporting institutions.

Method These ideas were tested using data on MNE subsidiaries in China. A substantial volume of inward FDI, together with the extensive exports by both MNE subsidiaries and local firms make China a suitable context for studying these issues empirically.

Data The hypotheses were tested using data from two databases. One was archival data collected in annual censuses of industrial enterprises conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) between 2005 and 2007. Each year the NBS collects financial information on industrial firms in China with annual sales of at least US$600,000 (roughly, at the 2006 exchange rate) and publishes aggregated information in the official China Statistics Yearbooks. That database has been used in prior studies, including those of Buckley (Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002), Chang and Xu (2008), Pan (Pan, Li, & Tse, 1999), and Park’s group (Park, Li, & Tse, 2006). The 2005–​2007 data were used here

Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy    319 mainly because some of the most important measures for this study, such as export intensity, have only been available during that period. The yearly data were matched using unique company identifiers to assemble an unbalanced panel database. The information about export destinations is published by China’s General Administration of Customs. Their database contains information about each cross-​ border transaction during 2001–​2006. For each transaction, the database reports whether it was importing or exporting; the first origin or final destination country of the goods; the type, quantity, unit price, and total value of the goods; and the name, location, and contact information of the Chinese firms involved. The sample used to test the hypotheses consisted of all manufacturing MNE subsidiaries with two-​digit China Standard Industry Classification (CSIC) codes from 13 to 43 covered by the census (482 four-​digit CSIC sectors in total) with above-​zero export sales. Sino-​foreign joint ventures were not included in the sample to avoid unnecessary complexity. Firms with incomplete information were also deleted, so were that changed their primary sector during the period studied. A change in primary sector usually means a change in the firm’s primary business, or at least substantial product diversification. The complex interaction between product diversification and exporting was beyond the scope of this study. Combining the customs database and NBS databases yielded a two-​year panel of data where the explanatory variables were measured in 2005 and 2006, and the dependent variables were measured in 2006 and 2007. All the explanatory variables were lagged by one year in the analyses to deal with causality. The final sample had 25,161 firm-​year observations, among which 11,481 were observed in 2006 and 13,680 were observed in 2007. There were 15,477 MNE subsidiaries covered.

Measures In this study we had one dependent variable, one independent variable and three moderators. The operationalized measures were presented below.

Dependent Variable The dependent variable in the analyses was a subsidiary’s export intensity—​the ratio of its annual export value to its annual sales. That followed the lead of a study by Li, Chen and Shapiro (2010). Some previous research has used export volume (Clerides, Lach, & Tybout, 1998; Salomon & Shaver, 2005) but export intensity was considered better suited to capturing a subsidiary’s geographic market focus—​the relative importance of overseas and China domestic sales. Greater export intensity indicates greater focus on the overseas market (Zhang et al., 2007).

Independent Variable Local export was a firm-​level independent variable designed to capture local firms’ exporting to a subsidiary’s overseas markets. All the destination markets of each exporting

320    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie MNE subsidiary were first identified. The export value to each of those destination markets by Chinese exporters with the same two-​digit CSIC code was then calculated. Those numbers were then weighted by the proportion of the subsidiary’s exports (by value) to each destination country and summed up. Formally, for each MNE subsidiary i exporting to nit-​1 different countries in year t-​1, nit −1

local export it −1 = ∑ local firms export valuekt −1 × Exporting sales ikt −1 k =1 nit −1



/ ∑ Exporting salesikt −1 k =1



describes the weighted sum of local exports (by value) to a subsidiary’s destination markets by local firms in the same industry.

Moderators There are three potential moderators included in the analyses. One was firm age calculated by subtracting a subsidiary’s setup year from the year of observation. OEM intensity was the value of a subsidiary’s OEM sales as a proportion of its total exports in each year. China’s import and export shipment records include the classifications such as processing of exported material, processing of imported material, processing and assembly using imported machinery and processing with assembly. Following the lead of Tao, Liu, and Hong (2014), those classifications were taken as OEM activities. As in most emerging economies, institutional development in China varies greatly from place to place (Kwon, 2012; Lu & Ma, 2008). Some regions have developed much better market-​supporting institutions than others (Peng, 2003; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, & Peng, 2014). Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2010) have developed a province-​based marketization index to capture such regional differences. Their composite index is constituted from information in five categories: (1) government and market forces; (2) development of enterprises which are not state-​owned; (3)  development of commodity markets; (4)  development of factor markets; and (5) development of market intermediaries and the legal environment. The index was reported annually between 2003 and 2006. Following the lead of previous research in management and international business (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010; Markóczy, Sun, Peng, Shi, & Ren, 2013; Shi, Sun, & Peng, 2012; Shi et al., 2014), that index was used to quantify the level of development of market-​supporting institutions in each province each year. The variable was named regional marketization. A larger value indicates better development of market-​supporting institutions.

Control Variables There are some other factors that might influence a subsidiary’s export intensity such as the general attractiveness of its overseas markets. For the purposes of this study a destination country’s attractiveness to the rest of the world was quantified using the value of

Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy    321 a country’s annual imports minus the value of China’s exports to that country in year t-​1. An MNE subsidiary’s export proportion to each destination country was then used to weight those attractiveness values for its destination countries, resulting in the variable overseas attractiveness. Research on firm-​specific advantages suggests that a firm’s intangible capabilities may be the driver for its internationalization (Cassiman & Golovko, 2011; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Rodriguez-​Duarte, Sandulli, Minguela-​Rata, & López-​Sánchez, 2007; Salomon & Shaver, 2005). Each subsidiary’s intangible asset intensity was quantiflied as its intangible assets as a proportion of its total assets. Dividing each subsidiary’s annual R&D expenditure by that year’s sales generated an R&D intensity variable. Each subsidiary’s return on assets (ROA) was taken as an indicator of firm performance. Firm size was measured in terms of a subsidiary’s total number of employees. In order to control for the industry effects, all the firm level explanatory variables were adjusted using the mean of each two-​digit CSIC sector.

Analytical Methods The resulting panel of data had a large N but a small T. This makes any unobserved heterogeneity hard to estimate and less of a concern in the models’ specification. Pooled ordinary linear regression (Pooled OLS) with two-​digit sector clustering was therefore used in the modelling. All of the explanatory variables were lagged by one year to make sure of the direction of any causality. In order to enhance the interpretability of the regression results and to reduce potential multicollinearity, all explanatory variables were standardized (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013).

Results Table 13.1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix describing the key variables and their inter-​relationships. The unit of local export and overseas attractiveness was US$100 billion. There was no high correlation between explanatory variables. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were computed to test for multicollinearity. The mean VIF obtained in the full model was around 2.45, and the maximum VIF was 4.41. Both are substantially below 10, which is suggested as the rule-​of-​thumb cutoff (Ryan, 1997), minimizing multicollinearity concerns. Table 13.2 reports the results of the polled OLS regressions. All of the models included the control variables. The independent variables and moderators were added sequentially. Model 1 is the baseline model with the control variables only. Model 2 tests hypothesis 1, and model 3 tests hypothesis 2. Model 4 tests hypothesis 3. Model 5 tests hypothesis 4. Model 6 is the complete model testing hypotheses 1–​4. The significance level of the F statistics in all of the models indicates that the explanatory variables explained

0.630

5.847

7.376

0.438

8.869

4.522

0.049

0.002

0.023

440.533

1. Export intensity

2. Local export

3. Firm age

4. OEM intensity

5. Regional marketization

6. Overseas attractiveness

7. Firm performance

8. R&D intensity

9. Intangible assets intensity

10. Firm size

1569.089

0.047

0.111

0.204

5.403

0.938

0.477

4.603

43.713

0.404

S.D.

0.067*

-​0.003

-​0.011*

-​0.079*

0.117*

0.076*

0.271*

0.074*

0.085*

1

0.247*

-​0.023*

0.001

-​0.007

0.015*

0.080*

0.108*

0.019*

2

*  indicates a correlation significant at the p ≤0.05 level of confidence.

Notes: N = 25,161.

Mean

Variables

Table 13.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix

0.071*

0.021*

0.007

-​0.043*

0.012*

0.008

0.092*

3

0.109*

-​0.070*

-​0.033*

-​0.078*

-​0.004

0.117*

4

0.029*

-​0.023*

0.015*

-​0.055*

0.029*

5

0.014*

-​0.001

-​0.013*

-​0.010*

6

0.004

-​0.038*

-​0.002

7

0.001

0.029*

8

-​0.01*

9

Table 13.2 Coefficients of Pooled OLS regression predicting MNE subsidiaries’ export intensity Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

H1: Local export

0.0441*** (0.00213)

0.044*** (0.002)

0.043*** (0.002)

0.046*** (0.002)

0.045*** (0.002)

H1: Local export square

-​0.00134*** (0.000)

-​0.001*** (0.000)

-​0.001*** (0.000)

-​0.001*** (0.000)

-​0.001*** (0.000)

H2: Firm age x Local export

-​0.006* (0.002)

-​0.005* (0.002)

H2: Firm age x Local export square

0.0002* (0.0001)

0.0004*** (0.0001)

H3: OEM intensity x Local export

-​0.017*** (0.002)

-​0.017*** (0.002)

H3: OEM intensity x Local export square

0.0005*** (0.000)

0.0005*** (0.000)

H4: Regional marketization x Local export

0.005* (0.002)

0.006*** (0.002)

H4: Marketization x Local export square

-​0.0003*** (0.000)

-​0.0003*** (0.000)

Firm age

0.023*** (0.003)

OEM intensity

0.017*** (0.003) 0.091*** (0.003)

Regional marketization

0.089*** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003)

0.013*** (0.003)

Overseas attractiveness

0.043*** (0.002)

0.037*** (0.002)

0.037*** (0.002)

0.038*** (0.002)

0.036*** (0.002)

0.037*** (0.002)

Firm performance

-​0.038*** (0.002)

-​0.039*** (0.002)

-​0.039*** (0.002)

-​0.031*** (0.002)

-​0.037*** (0.002)

-​0.031*** (0.002)

R&D intensity

0.004† (0.002)

0.004† (0.002)

0.004† (0.002)

0.004† (0.002)

0.004† (0.002)

0.003 (0.002)

Intangible assets intensity

0.040*** (0.003)

0.035*** (0.003)

0.030*** (0.003)

0.036*** (0.002)

0.034*** (0.003)

0.033*** (0.003)

Firm size

0.038*** (0.002)

0.033*** (0.002)

0.029*** (0.003)

0.023*** (0.002)

0.032*** (0.002)

0.020*** (0.002)

Constant

0.641*** (0.002)

0.623*** (0.003)

0.625*** (0.003)

0.623*** (0.003)

0.622*** (0.003)

0.624*** (0.003)

R-​squared

0.044

0.061

0.063

0.107

0.064

0.111

F-​value

228.8***

231.61***

169.56***

302.03***

172.22***

195.21***

Notes: N = 25,161. Standardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. *  indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.05 (*** p ≤ 0.001) level of confidence.

324    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie a significant portion of the variation in the dependent variable. The significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables supports the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicts an inverted-​U-​shaped relationship between MNE subsidiaries’ export intensity and local export. The coefficients of local export were positive and significant (p ≤ 0.001 in models 2–​6), while the coefficients of local export squared terms were negative and significant (p ≤ 0.001 in models 2–​6). Hence, hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. MNE subsidiaries’ export intensity first increases and then decreases with the rise of local exports. Hypothesis 2 expects that older MNE subsidiaries tend to respond less to the rise of local export. The coefficients of the terms representing the interaction of local export with firm age were negative and significant (p ≤ 0.05 in models 3 and 6), and the coefficients of the terms representing the interaction of the square of local export with firm age were positive and significant (p ≤ 0.05 in model 3; p ≤ 0.001 in model 6). This indicates that the inverted-​U shape proposed in hypothesis 1 is flatter for older MNE subsidiaries. Hypothesis 2 is also supported. Hypothesis 3 predicts that MNE subsidiaries engaged heavily in OEM activities tend to respond less to the rise in local exporting. The coefficients of the terms representing the interaction of local export with OEM intensity were negative and significant (p ≤ 0.001 in models 4 and 6), and the coefficients of the terms representing the interaction of the square of local export with OEM intensity were positive and significant (p ≤ 0.001 in models 4 and 6). This indicates that the inverted-​U shape proposed in hypothesis 1 is flatter for MNE subsidiaries with higher OEM intensity. Hypothesis 3 is supported. Hypothesis 4 expects that subsidiaries located in regions with better-​developed market-​supporting institutions tend to be more alert to the rise of local exports. The coefficients of the terms representing the interaction of local export with regional marketization were positive and significant (p ≤ 0.05 in model 5; p ≤ 0.001 in model 6), and the coefficients of the term representing the interaction of the square of local export with regional marketization were negative and significant (p ≤ 0.001 in models 5 and 6). This indicates that the inverted-​U shape proposed in hypothesis 1 is steeper for MNE subsidiaries located in regions with better-​developed institutions. Hypothesis 4 is thus supported. In addition to its moderating effect, the main effect of firm age also proved significant and positive (p ≤ 0.001 in models 3 and 6). This is not surprising. MNE subsidiaries that entered China earlier would tend to have had access to cheaper inputs but faced a less attractive domestic market, as incomes were lower at that time. They would be more likely to pursue efficiencies and to export their production to countries with higher purchasing power. The main effect of OEM intensity is also significant and positive (p ≤ 0.001 in models 4 and 6). This is a very intuitive result, as pure OEM involves exporting all of the final products. While the moderating effect of regional marketization is opposite to that of firm age and OEM intensity, its main effect is in the same direction. The coefficient is significant and positive (p ≤ 0.001) in models 5 and 6. It seems that MNE subsidiaries located in better-​developed Chinese regions tend to export more.

Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy    325 As expected, MNE subsidiaries with more attractive overseas markets (p ≤ 0.001 in all models), richer intangible assets (p ≤ 0.001 in all models), and bigger size (p ≤ 0.001 in all models) tend to have higher export intensity. However, subsidiaries with better performance tend to have lower rather than higher export intensity (p ≤ 0.001 in all models). More competitive MNE subsidiaries apparently prefer exploring China’s domestic market, which is consistent with observations reported by Buckley and Meng (2005) and by Estrin’s group (Estrin et al., 2008).

Discussion and Conclusion What determines the export intensity of an MNE subsidiary in an emerging economy? In addition to any export mandate from its MNE parent and the subsidiary’s own capabilities (Dunning, 1980; Mudambi, 1999; Young & Tavares, 2004), the environment may influence itsexport decisions (Birkinshaw, 1996). The influence of weak institutions has been extensively discussed in previous research, but this study has shown that the rise of local exporters can constitute another important aspect of the environment in emerging economies. MNE subsidiaries in emerging markets are likely to be alert to an increase in exporting among their close neighbors. Their own exporting is then likely to be influenced. Compared with the products exported by an MNE subsidiary, the products exported by local firms may tend to suffer as a result of their emerging economy origins that clearly distinguish them from products from other countries (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). This on the one hand makes it more difficult for local exporters to market their products overseas, but on the other hand allows each item successfully sold overseas to deliver more legitimacy to their peers (Kuilman & Li, 2009). Increases in local exports to a destination country thus delivers a strong signal of increasing legitimacy that might benefit all products exported from the same emerging economy. That should encourage an MNE subsidiary targeting the same destination country to export more. Eventually, however, too much volume from local exporters will tend to crowd out the products exported by MNE subsidiaries. That eventually occurs as local exporters grow into sophisticated international marketers, but it is usually accompanied by wage increases and increases in the prices of other inputs in the emerging economy. In that case some MNE parents may choose to relocate their manufacturing to aother emerging economy with cheaper inputs. However, that means forgoing the country-​specific knowledge the firm has accumulated, as well as any predicted increase in the original host country’s market growing accompanying the income growth. It might be a good idea for an MNE subsidiary to instead reduce its export intensity and sell more of its products in the host country. That seems to be what this research shows. In China, MNE subsidiaries’ export intensity first increases and then decreases with the local exporting to their overseas markets.

326    J.T. Li and Zhenzhen Xie In this study such changes in export intensity were considered strategic adjustments which require flexibility provided not only by the organization but also by the environment. Younger subsidiaries doing less OEM business and located in regions with better-​developed market-​supporting institutions were found to be more responsive to increases in local exports. The identification of these three contingencies links research on exporting with the research on strategy change, and further with findings on the headquarter–​subsidiary relationship in international business literature and on weak institutions in emerging economies. One limitation of this research is the panel’s short duration. The data covered only three years, which limits our ability to explore the longer-​term dynamics involved. Work expanding the time window is underway. The rise of local exporters and the pressures on efficiency-​seeking FDI has been an increasingly salient issue in China in last five years. Future research should try to collect more recent data and to capture more recent phenomena. This study’s conceptual framework should still apply, but more MNE subsidiaries should now fall on the downside of the inverted-​U curve this study has demonstrated. Another promising direction for future research is to explore what distinguishes the subsidiaries that shift from efficiency-​seeking to market-​seeking from those which simply move to cheaper places, either within the same host country or to another. In addition to MNE subsidiaries, many local exporters in emerging economies are also considering refocusing on their domestic markets. How is their decision influenced by MNE subsidiaries’ behaviors? Scholars believe that many interesting research topics may stem from the multiple rounds of competition between MNE subsidiaries and local firms in emerging economies (Chang & Park, 2012; Mutlu et al., 2015).

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Chapter 14

Gl obal Produ c t i on Net works , T erritoriali t y, a nd P olitical Au t h ori t y Stephen J. Kobrin

In the depths of the Great Depression John Maynard Keynes argued against economic interdependence, urging that “. . . goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, . . .” (Keynes, 1933: 755). Domestic manufacture, in the narrow sense of goods “spun at home,” became obsolete with the rise of the factory system and specialization during the 19th century. In the late 20th century, reliance on homespun or nationally produced goods became problematic due to dramatic changes in the structure of international production: the disaggregation of the value chain and the rise of spatially dispersed global production networks. As a result of a volatile and uncertain environment, increased technological complexity and the digital revolution vertically integrated “Fordist” firms have disintegrated into production networks comprised of interdependent, non-​spatially proximate, specialized units, tasks or “slivers of activity” (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004, Grossman & Rossi-​ Hansberg, 2006). Production networks became global in scope as the interconnections among nodes extended spatially across national borders (Coe, Dicken, & Hess, 2008). Global production networks (GPNs) are organizational arrangements, interconnecting both economic and noneconomic actors, which produce goods or services across multiple locations under the coordination of a lead firm (Yeung & Coe, 2014). Critically, they are complex political-​economic systems which construct markets and actively shape their sociopolitical context (Levy, 2008). Susan Strange famously argued that there has been a shift in power from states to markets, that “the authority of the governments of all states, large and small, has been weakened as a result of technological and financial change and of the accelerated integration of national economies into one single global market economy” (1996:  13,

334   Stephen J. Kobrin 14). Strange observed a vacuum at the heart of the international political-​economy: “a yawning hole of non-​authority” or “ungovernance.” While that is clearly hyperbole at this point—​and may well have been at the time—​I will argue that, in many critical industries, the restructuring of international production in terms of spatially dispersed, mutually dependent production networks has direct implications for the national control of economies and economic actors. GPNs represent a change in the underlying mode of organization of international production from markets (trade) and hierarchy (multinational firms) to networks. These relational networks are structurally inconsistent with the idea of “economic sovereignty,” with governance based upon the Westphalian principle of mutually exclusive territoriality. There is an asymmetry between what Castells (1996) calls a “space of places” and a “space of flows”. First, the political-​economic significance of “place” becomes questionable in a global network where relations among the nodes are the dominant factor. Second, the multiscalarity of the nodes—​they are simultaneously local, national, and global—​ compromises the fundamental Westphalian idea of the state as a bounded society (Giddens, 1990) and the core systemic construct of mutually exclusive territoriality. As a result, the basic Westphalian assumption of geographic congruence among polity, economy, and society can no longer be taken for granted. The disjunction between an increasingly networked global world economy and sovereign territoriality has taken on markedly increased salience in an era of increased nationalism and a widespread backlash against globalization (Kobrin, 2017). The potential conflict between GPNs and economic nationalism was epitomized by Donald Trump’s campaign promise that “(W)e’re going to get Apple to build their damn computers and things in this country instead of other countries” (Lapowsky, 2016). Whether or not that promise, in its more general sense, can be kept depends to a large degree on the prevalence and structural effects of GPNs. There is no question that GPNs play an increasing important role in international trade and production. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) estimates that 60% of global trade is in intermediate products, and that as much as 80% of global trade (gross exports) is linked in one way or another to international production networks (UNCTAD, 2016). As I have argued elsewhere (Kobrin, 2017), GPNs combined with deep integration and the globalization of technology may limit the range of feasible modes of organization of the world economy. In many critical industries, the cost of a return to protected, or even relatively independent, national markets has risen to the point where it may not be politically feasible. Devolution, the unraveling of GPNs and their replacement by domestic production or homespun goods, may no longer be possible. That said, it is reasonable to expect continued pressure from economic nationalists for both domestic production and domestic control over economies and economic actors. GPNs will continue to be an obvious focal point, and an obvious stumbling block, for anti-​globalists for the foreseeable future. However, I will argue that the structure and characteristics of production networks will inherently limit the authority of

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     335 national governments based on sovereign territoriality:  authority that is based on a “space of places” is compromised by the emergence of a parallel “space of flows.” This has implications for both industrialized and industrializing countries. This chapter should be taken as a speculative inquiry into the possible impact of GPNs on both the international political economy and national politics. It asks what effects the emergence of networks will have on political authority based on the meaning of place. It is speculative both conceptually and phenomenologically: evidence about the importance of GPNs and their ability to withstand shocks such as an economic crisis or rising energy costs is still mixed. Furthermore, as Sassen (2008) reminds us, the emergence of a new order relies on previously established capabilities: the ascendance of the new does not mean the immediate disappearance of the old.

Disaggregation of the Value Chain The industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries involved the spatial and temporal “bundling” of tasks: the shift from value creation through direct human labor and dispersed craft production to large-​scale manufacturing utilizing the tangible assets of plant and equipment (Mudambi, 2008). Taking full advantage of specialization required the coordination of a large number of workers or tasks which necessitated spatial proximity and geographic concentration. In contrast, Baldwin (2006) describes 20th-​century globalization as a process of two “great unbundlings” facilitated by dramatic improvements in transport and communications. The first was the spatial separation of manufacturing from consumption: the internationalization of production. The proportion of international trade in manufactured goods expanded dramatically in the 20th century from 40% of merchandise exports in 1900 to 75% by 2000 (Rodrigue, 2017). The second, which is relatively recent, involves unpacking the production of goods and services into “increasingly specialized slivers of activity” which can be separated in space and time (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004): the emergence of “trade in tasks” as opposed to trade in goods (Grossman & Rossi-​Hansberg, 2006). Both “unbundlings” reflect attempts to take advantage of the efficiencies of specialization internationally, to exploit differences in capabilities across borders. The “detailed disaggregation of stages of production and consumption across national boundaries” into dense networks (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, & Korzeniewicz, 1994: 1) is a function of a number of factors. First, technological developments in transport and communications—​particularly the digital revolution—​allow for the coordination of complex processes across space and time reducing the need for the geographic and temporal proximity of interdependent components of the value chain. Second, disaggregation is a response to changed environmental conditions. Increasing environmental volatility and uncertainty reward the flexibility and the “open-​ended” nature of networks. Third, disaggregation can increase the capacity

336   Stephen J. Kobrin for innovation by “utilizing and enhancing intangible assets such as tacit knowledge” (Powell, 1990: 322) and from the emergence of production units which specialize in specific technologies or facets of development and manufacture (Herrigel & Zeitlin, 2010). Last, and perhaps most important here, is the combination of the dramatic increase in the scale and complexity of technology with the geographic dispersion of capabilities over the past decades. The motivation for international production has evolved from exploiting a firm’s ownership-​specific advantages to strategic asset-​seeking geared to “protecting, or augmenting, that advantage by the acquisition of new assets, or by a partnering arrangement with a foreign firm” (Dunning, 2009:  9). While these assets certainly include productive and efficient labor, it is knowledge—​of technology, design, production processes, or marketing—​that is likely to be the more important motivation for extending the firm’s operations abroad. Firms access strategic knowledge-​based assets located in diverse geographic locations by disaggregating the value chain into “tasks,” and then locating each “task”—​whether it is product development or a stage in production—​where it can be performed most efficiently. Put differently, geographically specific clusters of capabilities are integrated into global networks where the individual tasks (or components or designs) achieve coherency and value. Furthermore, as a result of the increased complexity of technology in some industries, the range of knowledge necessary for successful product development may extend beyond the capacity of any single firm (or country, for that matter). “The response has been collaborative innovation across organizational boundaries with, for example, upstream and downstream participants in the supply chain specializing in particular technologies and the ultimate product resulting from cooperation among different organizations” (Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, 2009: 431). Fortunately, the need for collaborative innovation comes at a time when scientific knowledge and development capabilities increasingly are dispersed geographically. The rapid gains being made by China in electric vehicles and artificial intelligence provide an example as does the increase in MNCs’ research and development centers located in India from 3 in 1987 to 200 in 2007 (Leahy, 2010). The upgrading of skills and facilities in developing and emerging economies has increased the benefits of disaggregation and dispersion by allowing—​at least in theory—​ each element of the value chain to be located where it can be “produced” most efficiently (Herrigel & Zeitlin, 2010). By disaggregating and dispersing the value chain, firms can take full advantage of differences in capabilities across locations; they can—​again in theory—​find the optimal location for “each sliver of activity” (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Gereffi, 2005; Mudambi, 2008). In short, global production networks provide the benefits of international specialization in technology as well as manufacture: indeed, at this point it is difficult to separate knowledge and science from goods or research and development from production. That raises a critical question: is the cost of foregoing the benefits of specialization that

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     337 flow from GPNs sustainable? Can threats to re-​nationalize production actually be implemented?

Global Production Networks The value chain has been defined as the “full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the intermediary phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 121). Value chains have become important vehicles for understanding changes in the nature of international production, the organization of multinational firms, and the strategic interaction between firms and countries in the global economy (Kogut, 1985). Global value or commodity chains, however, are linear or vertical; they represent the sequence of events from research and development of a good or service through its final delivery to the consumer (Dicken, 2007; Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Wai-​ Chung Yeung, 2002; Sturgeon, 2001). Economic processes tend to be non-​linear, and it is more useful in the present context to think in terms of global production networks of intra-​and inter-​firm linkages and relationships (Dicken, 2007: 14). A global production network is then “one whose interconnected nodes and links extend spatially across national borders, and in so doing, integrates parts of disparate national and subnational territories” (Coe et al., 2008: 274). It is important to note that the term network in global production networks (GPNs) is used specifically in the sense of a distinct mode of economic organization as opposed to market or hierarchy (Kahler, 2009). A number of characteristics of GPNs as networks are directly relevant to questions about the territorialization of production. First, they are structural: it is the pattern of relationships or associations among the nodes rather than the attributes of the nodes themselves that is the critical determinant of outcomes (Dicken, Kelly, Olds, & Yeung, 2001). In a network, power depends on “structural position in a field of connections to other agents” as well as actor attributes (Kahler, 2009: 3). Second, networks are relational, “. . . constituted by the interactions of variously powerful social actors” (Dicken et al., 2001: 94). These relationships can give rise to norms, conventions and values, they can “define, enable or restrict the behavior of nodes” (Hafner-​Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 2009: 562; Smith-​Doerr & Powell, 2005). Third, the meaning of space and distance change within a network from absolute geographic or Euclidian constructs to “relational scopes of influence, power and connectivity” (Henderson et al., 2002: 442). Castells (1996: 412) argues that with the emergence of networks, the basic organizational form of the global economy itself has been transformed: the space of places has been replaced by a space of flows. (I will return to this concept shortly.) Thus, in a GPN the concept of “location” is ambiguous referring both to the physical location of the nodes and their structural position within the

338   Stephen J. Kobrin network. As will be discussed below, the nodes are multiscalar: simultaneously local, national, and global. Last, and most important here, GPNs as networks are characterized by mutual or relational dependence: the individual units do not exist autonomously, but only in relation to other units (Hafner-​Burton et al., 2009; Powell, 1990). Even in the more traditional global supply chains power relations are “far from asymmetrical . . . involving complex and subtle power relations” among the elements of the network (Locke, Amengual, & Mangala, 2009: 325). Many of the more important GPNs involve complex technologies or manufacturing processes. UNCTAD, for example, identifies industries in which global value chains are important by the share of foreign value added in exports. Four of the top six industries include: office, accounting and computing machinery; motor vehicles; radio, television and communication equipment; and electrical machinery (UNCTAD, 2013: 128). In these networks involving complex technology, “mutual dependence” is created by both the co-​design of products and the need to aggregate competencies (Herrigel & Zeitlin, 2010). In a GPN, value creation flows from systemic rather than point efficiency, as each of the elements of the network is dependent on the system as a whole to extract value from its operations: all of the elements of the network are dependent, to varying degree, on one another. The idea of relational dependence within a network is similar to the idea of complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977) in international politics: it implies “mutual dependence” arising from the integration of the world economy. The reciprocal (but not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions limit freedom of action. GPNs are characterized by this relational or mutual dependence. The finer grained disaggregation of the value chain associated with GPNs—​the narrower “slivers of activity” or tasks—​markedly increases the dependence of each individual operation on the network. The narrower the individual operation or task, the less likely that it will have significant intrinsic value in itself and, correspondingly, the more likely that its value will depend on its integration into a global production network. As value chains (or GPNs) become increasingly disaggregated, the returns from improving the efficiency of individual “links in the chain” become increasingly limited (Kaplinsky, 2000: 121). The electronics industry provides a tangible example of relational dependence in global production networks. Vertically integrated firms have outsourced production and design to global networks comprised of contract manufacturers (CMs), original design manufacturers (ODMs), and components suppliers (Linden, Kraemer, & Dedrick, 2007). The PC industry has been described as “horizontally specialized” with the “branded firms” serving as systems integrators who do product design and then outsource development and manufacturing to the CMs and ODMs. The CMs and ODMs, in turn, rely on suppliers of key components such as displays, disk drives, optical drives, memory, batteries and the like, some of whom are the integrators of their own multinational supply chains (Dedrick & Kraemer, 2008; Linden et al., 2007). What is important for my purposes here is the mutual dependence of suppliers and lead firms, the fact that efficiency is systemic rather than point specific. Suppliers are

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     339 dependent on lead firms who often conceptualize the product, set strategy, sell it to the final consumer and serve as systems integrators. They have “buyer power,” the ability to choose suppliers. On the other hand, suppliers have their own sources of power flowing from technical competence and service capabilities (Sturgeon, 2007). Most of the innovation in the PC industry occurs upstream, by firms like Intel and Microsoft who control key “platforms” and by component and subsystems suppliers:  producers of disk drives, display devices, memory and the like (Dedrick, Kraemer, Linden, Brown, & Murtha, 2007). This is clearly reflected in R&D spending at various points in the network: in 2005, for example, the lead PC makers spent 1.4% of revenue on R&D; the ODMs and CMs 1.3%; and the upstream suppliers 11.8% (Dedrick & Kraemer, 2008: 38). GPNs in the electronics industry have become global knowledge networks characterized by both structural differentiation of the nodes and the need for intense coordination or relationships among them. As a result of differences in contexts, specialization, path dependence and scale economies, suppliers have developed capabilities that would be extremely difficult to replicate downstream. Both value and knowledge are systemic: firms located at any point in the network are dependent on the network as a whole. “Going it alone is not an option in an industry marked by rapid technological change across all sectors, as firms simply cannot keep up in all or most of the relevant technologies. They need access to outside knowledge to compete” “ (Dedrick et al., 2007: 27). President Trump’s example of Apple’s iPhone is also very relevant here. Chinese assembly of iPhones represents the final stage of a very complex global production network involving 200 suppliers in a very large number of countries. The dispersion of “tasks” across this network reflects, to a large extent, dispersion of the underlying technological and production capabilities across countries (Minasians, 2016; Tweney, 2013). As a recent analysis of Foxconn’s (Apple’s primary manufacturer in China) failed attempt to establish operations in Brazil noted, exporting their Chinese strategy is “virtually impossible” as the global supply chain for electronics remains rooted in Asia due to low cost labor, and imporantly, “an abundance of skilled engineers” (Barboza, 2017).

The Meaning of Place The importance of Euclidian conceptions of place and space in international economics is reflected in the critical role geographic distance plays in the standard Gravity Model of international trade (Bergstrand, 1985). The international world economy is an aggregation of geographically bounded and territorially defined national markets where international transactions take the form of discrete cross-​border flows: it is a “space of places.” The traditional multinational firm inhabits this world of spaces and places, of mutually exclusive territoriality and borders. It requires access to territory to function

340   Stephen J. Kobrin and most of the conflicts it has engendered have been conflicts of jurisdiction resulting from the ambiguity of territorial control (Kobrin, 2001). The MNC integrates the activities of subsidiaries, which have limited autonomy, by internalizing transactions within its hierarchy. It is defined strategically by the tradeoff between fragmenting pressures to respond to differences in local environments—​ places—​and the gains from integration across borders. It is concerned with the avoidance of sub-​optimization, of the centrifugal tendency to maximize point (local) rather than systemic (global) efficiency. Hymer (1979) suggested a correspondence principle which imposes the hierarchical structure of the firm on the international economy as corporations create a world order in their own image. He envisioned a hierarchical division of labor between geographic regions corresponding to the vertical division of labor within the multinational firm: headquarters cities where wealth and resources are concentrated; regional “sub-​ capitals” where lower levels of management are located; and “branch plant” countries relegated to lower levels of activity and income. Hymer’s correspondence principle serves as a useful, if metaphorical, link between the micro and macro levels of economic organization. His argument is consistent with the spatial construction of the modern international economy:  local, national and global scales of production are geographically separate and distinct. Thus, cross-​border linkages among subunits of the traditional multinational firm take place through the firm’s organizational structure. They are nested in the sense that transactions move from the local to the national to the global sphere through the mediation of hierarchy. MNCs mediate scalar geographies, and in doing so, may replicate their organizational structure in the broader economy. It is of interest here that Hymer foresaw the possibility of the emergence of a networked or relationally structured world economy made possible by developments in communications. “Communications linkages could be arranged in the form of a grid in which each point was directly connected to many other points, permitting lateral as well as vertical communication. This system would be polycentric since messages from one point to another would go directly rather than through the center; each point would become a center on its own . . .”(Hymer, 1979: 395). In fact, as Hymer forecast, there has been a dispersal of authority within organizational structure of the MNC and the corresponding emergence of the networked view of the multinational firm (Goshal & Bartlett, 1990). By providing simultaneity in time without regard for space, digital communications facilitate the construction of markets in terms of relational networks of flows rather than a “string of places” (Amin, 2002). “(F)lows are not just one element of the social organ­ ization: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political and symbolic life” (Castells, 1996: 412, emphasis original). When flows rather than places dominate, networks “become the foundational unit of analysis for our understanding of the global economy” (Dicken et al., 2001: 91). The intrusion of physical reality, however, requires that every node in a global production network has to be located two-​dimensional geographic space. Each operation

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     341 of a GPN is grounded materially in terms of fixed assets of production and less tangibly in terms of local social relationships and distinctive local institutions (Coe et al., 2008). As a result, the meaning of place is very different in a relational world of flows than in a geographic world of places. The difference reflects both the structural properties of networks and the multiscalarity of the individual nodes. If the interactions within the network rather than the attributes of the individual nodes dominate, position becomes a function of the structure and properties of the network rather than geographic location and Euclidian distance. As Castells notes, “places do not disappear, but their logic and their meaning become absorbed in the network” (1996: 412). Giddens’ (1990: 18, 21) argument that modernity results in the separation of “place” (the physical or geographic setting of social activity) and “space” is consistent with a network view. Social systems are “disembedded” or “lifted out” of local contexts of interaction and restructured “across indefinite spans of time-​space.” He argues that both local conditions and “distantiated relations” determine the nature of any given locale. In an integrated relational network, the distinction between “local,” “national,” and “global” as separate geographies or scalar fields becomes problematic (Amin, 2002). Thus, within a GPN place becomes multiscalar, each node existing simultaneously as local, national, and global. Once it becomes difficult to make easy distinctions between local and global geographies, the idea of location as territory loses meaning: it becomes necessary to think of space in non-​territorial or relational terms (Amin, 2002). Processes and interactions are no longer confined to “moving through a set of nested scales from the local to the national to the international but can directly access other such local actors in the same country or across borders” (Sassen, 2008: 371). That said, new, emergent modes of organization do not immediately replace the existing order: the space of flows will exist alongside the space of spaces for some time to come (Ruggie, 1983; Sassen, 2008). The operations of a global production network exist as both entities located in two-​dimensional geographic space and nodes in a relational network.

National Control of Production Networks, and specifically GPNs, raise complex questions about the limits of national economic authority, the ability to exert complete control over economic actors based on territorial sovereignty. Global production networks are “embedded” in both territory and networks, the former referring to the GPN’s elements grounded in specific places and the latter to the “network structure, the degree of connectivity within a GPN, the stability of its agents’ relationships and the importance of the network for the participants.” While the contexts within which the nodes are embedded are territorially specific, the networks themselves are not (Henderson et al., 2002: 446, 552).

342   Stephen J. Kobrin Thus, the process is “mutually constitutive”: the elements of GPNs are embedded in specific territorial locations and national territories become embedded in GPNs (Coe et al., 2008). Henderson et al (2002: 438, 445) note that places and flows have a dialectical connection: at one and the same time places are being transformed by flows and flows by places, non-​place-​specific processes penetrate and transform place specific processes and vice versa. The individual elements of a GPN may become “embedded” in specific places “in the sense that they absorb, and in some cases become constrained, by the economic activities and social dynamics that already exist in those places” (Henderson et al., 2002: 446, 552). It is certainly reasonable to argue that network structure alone is not the only determinant of a GPN; one also has to take the social, political, and institutional contexts of the locations of the nodes into account: places certainly affect flows. That said, arguments that production networks are inherently geographic because of their differentiated spatial configurations and their territorial embeddedness in specific places (Dicken, 2007) ignore the characteristics of GPNs as networks and, critically, the idea of mutual dependence. Individual nodes in the network are multiscalar: simultaneously local, national, and global. The core Westphalian concept of mutually exclusive territoriality assumes that there is geographic congruity between politics, economics and social relations, that the sovereign state is a “container” (McGrew, 1997). That implies that the space encompassed by borders has meaning as a political-​economic construct: that the economy, society, and polity are all defined in terms of mutually exclusive jurisdiction. The market is embedded within a society because both (as well as the political order) are contained within the borders of a sovereign state that has the authority to provide public goods and regulate transactions. A world economy organized in terms of flows or relational networks could render the critical assumption of congruity invalid. The concept of “position” of any given operation in a GPN is ambiguous, a function of both its location in physical space and the pattern of relationships or structure of the network: each operation is located in both a space of places and a space of flows. Furthermore, as noted above, GPNs are characterized by multiscalarity: the nodes in a GPN are simultaneously local or national and global. The result is a very imperfect congruence between any given element of a GPN and the society or polity where it is located: individual operations exist both in a specific geographic place and as part of a relational network where both efficiency and value added are systemic and mutually dependent. The disembedding of a social system breaks the assumption of boundedness, of the state as container, which is essential in the Westphalian international system. “While each of the elements of a GPN is located within a specific jurisdiction and is regulated by a political structure whose basic unit is the nation state” (Coe et al., 2008: 274), a global production network as an entity cannot be seen as embedded in a society as that term is conceived in the Westphalian system. In his definitional article, Hardin (1968) defined the commons spatially in terms of a pasture open to all subject to the authority of none. The idea of a global commons can be defined either in terms of places such as the oceans or Antarctica outside the territorial

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     343 jurisdiction of any or all states or in terms of jurisdictional gaps between states. The fact that part of the world economy is organized in terms of relational networks, suggests the possibility of a global commons that is non-​territorial, that exists alongside but apart from the world of spaces. It is an area where territorial jurisdiction may be irrelevant rather than unclaimed. This non-​territorial region in the world economy is “a decentered yet integrated space-​of-​flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the space-​of-​places we call national economies” Ruggie (1993: 172). Ruggie goes on to note that while the conventional space-​of-​places continues to engage in external economic relations mediated by the state, in the non-​territorial global economic region distinctions between internal and external become problematic and any given state is but one constraint among others. This difference in structure between spatial or geographic and relational forms of organization becomes as important as, if not more important than, the lack of coherence between a global economy and national law and regulation. There is a substantive difference in mode of organization between societies (and polities), which are organized in terms of places and networks, which are organized in terms of relational flows. It is difficult, if not impossible, to impose one upon the other, a world of flows cannot be “enclosed” geographically. It is not possible to delimit a diffuse network spatially. One can think of networks in terms of the nodes, the relations among them, and the network structure itself. Only the first has tangible, physical, or spatial properties. Both the relations among the nodes and the network as an entity exist outside geographic space. That places limits on the effectiveness of any given state’s authority vis-​à-​vis any specific node and of all states—​as territorial jurisdictions—​over the network as a whole. It is to that problem I now turn.

Nationalization of Production Westphalian economic governance is based upon territorial jurisdiction in a state-​ centric system. It assumes national markets as the constituent unit of the world economy and a geographic congruity between economics, politics and social relations: that the space encompassed by borders has meaning political-​economic. An international economy is perfectly consistent with the structural characteristics of the Westphalian system, as the public domain, interstate sphere, and “realm of governance” are largely coterminous (Ruggie, 2004). Control over both economic actors and the economy at large is based upon control over geography, over the space of spaces. Economic control rooted in mutually exclusive territoriality and discrete national markets becomes problematic as GPNs and networked forms of economic integration increase in importance. While both local law and regulation and the local socio-​ institutional environment—​ the nature of place—​ can affect the characteristics of local operations or nodes, their value remains dependent on relationships within the

344   Stephen J. Kobrin network. If the value of an operation is a function of its role in the network, then any attempt at local control which negatively affects that role may be value destroying. That directly affects the meaning of “place” as a basis for economic governance. The freedom of action of any territorially defined authority is thus limited by the relational dependence of local operations on the network as an entity. While the state may have some degree of influence over a given node, that influence fades when one considers the network in terms of relations among nodes or the network as an entity. The ability of any given state, and perhaps all states, to exert territorially based control over the network is limited, to some degree, by relational dependence. Furthermore, while the GPN perspective certainly “accords a degree of relative autonomy to domestic firms, governments and other economic actors” (Henderson et al., 2002: 446, 552), it is unreasonable to assume that the network as a whole is somehow subject to the law and regulation of those territories, either individually or collectively. As noted above, a network is comprised of nodes, relations among them, and the network as an entity. Only the first—​the nodes—​are physical entities located in geographic space subject to territorial control. There is a significant structural disconnect between governance constructed in terms of mutually exclusive territoriality and networks which are organized relationally.

Global Production Networks and Development The intellectual heritage of global commodity chains (GCCs) flows, at least in part, from world systems theorists who were interested in GCCs as a mechanism for structuring a stratified and hierarchical world system (Bair, 2005). That heritage is reflected in the concern in the literature over the developmental role of value chains; that is, can a country move “up the chain” to more technologically or capital intensive “tasks”? Similarly, UNCTAD argues that, at least for smaller developing economies, there are few alternatives to development strategies that involve participation in GPNs (global value chains, or GVCs). They note that for these countries, the critical question is not whether to participate but how (UNCTAD, 2013: 175). In their study of machinery parts and components networks in ASEAN, Obashi and Kimura (2017) found “strikingly high” percentages of machinery parts and components in both exports and imports of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, reflecting the active participation of these countries in machinery production networks. They concluded that participation in GPNs was critical to development strategies calling for jump-​starting and upgrading industrialization. Urry’s (2000: 189) distinction between the “gardener state” and the “gamekeeper state” is relevant here. The former presumes concern with “pattern, regularity and ordering, with what is growing and what should be weeded out.” Legislators, and legislation are

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     345 central to the gardening state. Gamekeepers, on the other hand, face a world of mobility, where animals roam “around and beyond the estate.” The gamekeeper is concerned with regulating this mobility, with making sure that there is sufficient stock for hunting rather than the cultivation of each animal. Urry argues that the new global order involves a return to the gamekeeper state where states are “increasingly unable or unwilling to garden their society, only to regulate the conditions of their stock . . .” (2000: 189). The idea of the state as a gamekeeper as a metaphor for a world of flows is directly relevant to developmental strategies that call for moving up the value chain to more technologically or capital-​intensive operations. While stretching metaphors always raises the danger of beating a dead horse, the gamekeeper’s task is attracting higher-​ value animals rather than cultivating them locally. In a networked world economy, the state will focus on incentives and regulation of flows rather than exerting a high level of control over operations on the ground: gardening will be replaced by gamekeeping. In that regard, the physical location of a node retains importance and the idea of “embedding” as used in the GPN literature retains meaning. In this more limited sense the state can still garden: it can prepare the ground for a higher value crop. The ability of operations in any given locale to “move up the value chain” to more capital or technologically intensive activities can be directly influenced by host government policies. Gaining access to GPNs (GVCs) and benefiting from them to upgrade capabilities to more capital and technology intensive operations requires a structured approach by government (UNCTAD, 2013).

GPNS and Economic Nationalism Global production networks are the most visible and perhaps the most important manifestation of globalization: of the rise of a globally integrated, networked world economy comprised of units that are multiscalar—​simultaneously local, national, and global. It is not surprising that they are at the epicenter of the conflict between economic nationalism and globalization. Nationalism assumes that the nation—​ the political community—​and the state should be territorially congruent—​encompassed within the same geographic border (Anderson, 2016). Economic nationalism then assumes that the economy, or at least control over the economy and economic actors, is territorial, that a sovereign state has authority over its economy. That conflicts directly with the idea of a networked world economy as a space of flows, existing alongside and, to some degree, apart from the space of places. Economic nationalism also conflicts with the idea of deep integration characteristic of GPNs (Orefice & Rocha, 2014). President Trump expressed this conflict directly when he called for protecting the USA from “the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs” in his inaugural address. BREXIT provides a second, very relevant example.

346   Stephen J. Kobrin In many ways, NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) epitomizes the impacts global supply chains have had on domestic economies. As a recent analysis noted, “(L)ike it or not, the fortunes of North American firms, workers and consumers are now deeply intertwined through a dense network of regional and global supply chains” (Blanchard, 2017). The auto industry, for example, is regionally integrated with production in Mexico, the USA, and Canada. While the current US administration has called for renegotiation of NAFTA, the genie cannot be put back in the bottle. The cost of attempting to return to domestic production, of unraveling the cross-​border production networks, would rebound on producers and consumers alike. In fact, it might actually reduce the USA’s share of global auto production (Blanchard, 2017). As noted above, the same would hold true for an attempt to force Apple to produce its iPhones in the USA or to unravel the supplies chains in the electronic industry. As I have argued elsewhere (Kobrin, 2017), the technological developments that have resulted in global production networks function as a constraint limiting the range of feasible modes of organization of the world economy. The reorganization—​of at least a number of critical industries—​as integrated global networks has increased the cost of a return to independent national production to the point where it may not be politically feasible. That said, given the rise of populism and economic nationalism, it is reasonable to expect GPNs to be at the center of conflict for some time to come.

Governance of GPNs While the populist reaction to globalization and the rise of economic nationalism may have replaced the emergence of a post-​Westphalian or transnational world order as a focus for discussion, the underlying changes in the international political economy have not disappeared. Three aspects of that transition are immediately relevant: changes in the political-​economic meaning of space, borders, and territoriality; the fragmentation of political authority and the rise of a multiple actors with political authority; and the blurring of the once clear distinction between the private and the public spheres. The first, the loss of meaning of borders and territoriality, is a theme that has run through this chapter, particularly in the context of the digital revolution. The second and third require further discussion. Political authority is fragmenting in the sense that governance is no longer the sole province of states exercising sovereignty through territorially based authority. As Rosenau notes “to presume the presence of governance without governments is to conceive of functions that have to be performed in an viable human system irrespective of whether the system has evolved organizations and institutions explicitly charged with performing them” (1992: 3). In a transnational order, governance involves multiple actors: private authorities including business firms and civil society organizations assume roles traditionally associated with government (Ruggie, 2004). While states may still occupy the “seat at the head of the table,” MNCs, NGOs, international organizations, and regional authorities are all

Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Political Authority     347 part of the process. Private political authority is no longer an oxymoron: private actors have gained power perceived as legitimate in the international system (Cutler, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002). The breakdown of the once clear distinction between the public and private spheres, between government and the market, follows. States have become, at least to some extent, market actors through state-​owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds. Multinational firms have taken on roles that were previously considered “public” in areas such as health care and human rights (Scherer & Plazzo, 2009). Despite the rise of populism and the resurgence of economic nationalism, we are in the in the early stages of a post-​Westphalian transition and can only dimly perceive the emerging outlines of a transnational world order: the emergence of effective global economic governance will be a difficult and drawn-​out process. The reorganization of international production in terms of networks is both a result and a cause of the transnational transition: the diminished efficacy of borders, the rise of multiple authoritative actors in international politics, and the blurring of the line between the public and private spheres. In a post-​Westphalian world order, a space filled with overlapping global production networks, traditional multinational firms, civil society organizations, and international organizations, governance will be complex and multidimensional. In some respects, polity and society will be continued to be defined in terms of mutually exclusive territoriality: borders and the idea of the state as a container will retain meaning. Increasingly, however, both society and polity may have to be redefined in terms of relational rather than geographic constructs, in terms of flows rather than spaces. Under those circumstances, neither entirely public nor entirely private governance mechanisms will be effective. During the extended period of the transnational transition, economic governance may require hybrid mechanisms that involve firms, civil society organizations, states, and perhaps international organizations, what Rosenau (1997) characterized as “governance without government.”

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Chapter 15

Innovation in E me rg i ng Markets George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham

Multinational companies (MNCs) have traditionally conducted R&D (research and development) and other innovation activities in developed markets (DMs) rather than emerging markets (EMs) (Chester, 1994; Howells, 1990; Medcof, 1997; Vernon, 1979). At the same time, most local companies in EMs have traditionally imitated and adapted rather than innovated. But recent years (mostly since 2000) have seen a new phenomenon of MNCs conducting R&D activities in emerging markets, and EM companies becoming significant innovators (Chen, 2004; Lu & Liu, 2004; von Zedtwitz, 2004). This chapter examines the reasons for this change, especially the increases in EMs of science and technology capability, per capita income, customer sophistication, unique local needs, and market size. In this chapter we examine the innovation activities in EMs of both local and foreign companies, focusing on the four BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), particularly the two most dynamic BRICs, China and India, and non-​BRIC EMs. We ignore countries that have already emerged to DM status, notably South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We will report on how innovation in EMs for both home and foreign markets is now an established and growing factor in international business. We will also discuss the distinctive approaches to and challenges of innovation in selected EMs. The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) has defined innovation as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations” (OECD, 2005. That definition supports our view that innovation in the business context is not just about technological or scientific innovation but about any commercialized innovation that makes money for a company. For example, Yip and McKern (2014) identified eight types

352    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham of innovation: technological, process, application, product, cost, supply chain, business model, and non-​customer innovation.1 As Yip and McKern say: “. . . these eight types are all outputs of innovation efforts. The primary input is, of course, research and development (R&D) activity, which is the central, although by no means the only, driver of innovation. Other input activities are also less developed (e.g., customer innovation labs), much more disparate (e.g., business planning), or hard to observe (e.g., executive insights)” (2014: 3). So most researchers focus on R&D as a proxy for all innovation activities. Examples of innovation in EMs now abound: China •​ Huawei’s Single RAN (radio access network)—​one single base station that can cover 1G, 2G and 3G telephony. •​ Innovative start-​ups, such as Suzhou Nano-​Micro Bio-​Tech’s world-​beating nano-​ particles for purification of biopharmaceuticals, medical diagnosis, and flat panel displays. •​ Tencent’s WeChat (Weixin) live chat application, highly popular in China and now expanding to other countries. •​ Xiaomi’s mobile phone business model, which makes clever use of an Android platform coupled with rapid adaptations based on customer feedback. •​ Most prominently, Alibaba, which has become the world’s largest business-​to-​ business Internet portal. Its platforms (Taobao, Tmall, and Juhuasuan) enabled 8 million small entrepreneurs to set up online businesses, serving 231 million active buyers (Alibaba, 2014). •​ China has become a global leader in alternative energy such as solar and wind (Gallagher, 2014; Lewis, 2013). India •​ The Mars Orbiter Mission (also known as “Mangalyaan”), India’s first interplanetary exploration effort, which reached Mars in 2014 which cost $74 million (inexpensive by Western standards; by comparison, NASA’s Maven Mars mission cost $671 million, nearly 10 times more). •​ Tata’s Nano car, touted as the world’s cheapest car (but which perhaps was its undoing in terms of commercial success). •​ General Electric’s portable electrocardiogram machines, developed in India and then “reverse innovated” into other markets including the West. •​ The Jaipur foot, a sub-​$50 prosthetic. •​ Mumbai’s dabbawalas, a delivery system for delivering 200,000 lunchboxes by “dabbawalas,” individuals using mainly bicycles and public transportation.

Innovation in Emerging Markets    353 Russia •​ Kaspersky anti-​virus software sold throughout the world. •​ Anti-​ ship “unstoppable,” hypersonic, 4600 mph, anti-​ ship, Zircon missile announced in March 2017. Brazil •​ Tigre PVC tubes and connectors for hydraulic installations. •​ Alpargatas’s low-​cost but fashionable plastic Havaianas sandals (a free pair was given to every attendee at the Academy of International Business’s annual conference when that was held in Rio de Janeiro in 2010).

Rise of Innovation in Emerging Markets Until recently, researchers did not think it likely that firms based in EMs could quickly develop much capability for innovation. But this is happening for five different reasons: (1) catch-​up factors, as might be expected, (2) less expected is that some EMs actually have advantages for innovation relative to DMs, (3) conduct of R&D by local firms in EMs, (4) the setting up of R&D centers in EMs by foreign MNCs, and (5) the creation of national innovation systems (NIS) in EMs.

EM Innovation Catch-​up Factors There are two major catch-​up factors.

Education Catch-​up As EMs catch up in per capita income, there is a corresponding catch-​up in education. Furthermore, as many EMs have larger populations than most DMs, the absolute numbers of those educated in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects have been rising very quickly in countries such as China and India. Even though the quality of these EM educated STEM graduates may be relatively low, more and more EM nationals can afford to get their training at top DM universities. Many then return home, particularly in the case of China. In 2013, Chinese returning from abroad totaled 353,500 of a total of 3 million who had gone abroad since 1979 (Xinhuanet, 2014). Top Chinese scientists trained in the best Western universities and companies are being

354    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham lured back to China with tax incentives and other privileges, first by the “1,000 talents” program, now supplemented with a “10,000 talents” program. These haigui (“sea turtles,” a pun on the homophones hăi “ocean” and guī “to return”) have the benefit of top education and experience in globally leading companies, and often a patriotic zeal to help build China. These researchers are able to work independently and take on more responsibility, in return for high salaries or entrepreneurial equity. Although they are no longer a cost advantage, as they command global-​level salaries, they are valuable drivers of local R&D. According to the World Economic Forum, India had 2.6 million STEM graduates in 2016, second only to China, and nearly 5 million students enrolled in engineering degree programs (AISHE, 2016). Initially, government institutions like the Indian Institutes of Technology and Regional Engineering Colleges (now called National Institutes of Technology) set the standards for engineering education. In the last three decades there has been a significant increase in the role played by private-​sector engineering schools as well. However, while the quantity may be impressive, the quality of these graduates—​ apart from those from the relatively few reputed engineering schools—​is often a concern. Many graduates are considered to have “bookish” theoretical knowledge requiring companies that hire them to compensate through major training programs. According to the 2016 National Employability Report, only one in five engineering graduates was deemed employable in the software services industry (Aspiring Minds, 2016). Russia is the one EM that has not had to catch up in STEM education, as that had been strongly emphasized in the Soviet era. On the other hand, more and more of Russia’s best scientists have been leaving for politically more stable and economically more prosperous countries. Brazil, in contrast, is a laggard in STEM, as are nearly all other EMs.

Diffusion and Learning A major driver of EM economic growth is participation in technology-​based global supply chains of MNCs from DMs. Indeed, without such participation, most EMs remain trapped as commodity exporters (the case of most African countries) or as producers of low-​technology consumer products such as clothing (the case of Bangladesh and many other South Asian countries). Those EMs that do participate in technology-​based global supply chains have rapidly benefited from diffusion and learning. The Chinese companies based in the Pearl River Delta, Beijing, and Shanghai that began by making components for global supply chains in the information, computing, and telecommunications industries quickly developed capabilities in incremental innovation that have made them key players in supply chains for products sold in DMs (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011). These early innovators were often greatly aided by an open market for standardized components, such as Intel microprocessors and other components for personal computers, MediaTek wireless chipsets for mobile phones, and later Google’s Android mobile operating system (Yip & McKern, 2016: ch. 1).

Innovation in Emerging Markets    355

EM Innovation Advantages EMs’ innovation advantages come from both supply and demand enablers.

Supply Enablers One of the most obvious enablers of innovation in EMs such as China and India has been their very large number of relatively low-​cost engineers and scientists. Both Chinese and foreign companies are using this skilled labor force to develop innovations that would be too expensive to develop in advanced market economies. And Chinese companies can afford to allocate significantly more skilled people to innovation projects than their multinational competitors, enabling faster results. India also has a high number of engineers being employed in multinationals’ R&D facilities. A  consulting firm, Zinnov, has found that in 2016 India had 1208 R&D centers operated by 943 multinationals which collectively employed 363,000 people and spent an estimated $23 billion. While the Indian government has supported research through its space program and other grants, the scale is generally seen to be smaller relative to that in China. Going by total expenditure figures (not just the government’s spend), China’s over $400 billion of R&D expenditure in 2015 vastly outweighs India’s estimated $66.5 billion. However, somewhat surprisingly, one study found that the government share of R&D spending in India was higher than in China: Basant and Mani (2012) indicate that nearly two-​ thirds of R&D spending in India was accounted for by the government, compared to one-​fifth in China. However, the study also noted that “the R&D expenditure of Chinese enterprises is almost 16 times that of its counterparts in India” (Basant & Mani, 2012: 13), and that the role of the private sector as a source of R&D in India was rapidly rising. Government support is the second supply enabler. China’s investments in its NIS have provided many initiatives and support for innovation in order to catch up with the developed world. Chinese government funding for R&D has increased fivefold to over 50 billion RMB from 2004 to 2103 in universities and over fourfold to 150 billion RMB in research institutes (Lewin, Kenney, & Murmann, 2016: 9, Figure 1.2).

Demand Enablers The first demand enabler for innovation in EMs is the very rapid growth of their home markets. Rapid growth makes it easy to introduce new products and services without having to displace incumbents. In addition, rapid growth is much more forgiving of innovation failures, so companies can take more risks and try out new ideas. Companies can quickly experiment and find a market for their innovations. Customer reactions in one part of the country may not transfer to another part, so loss of reputation is less a problem. In the case of China, Chinese consumers are also relatively forgiving, so experimentation is less risky. Second, because of the discontinuity created by the early years of the Communist system, China has many empty market spaces and little heritage in terms of customer habits, which provides opportunities both for Chinese firms and for MNCs. India has

356    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham similarly empty market spaces, but this enabler is not available in countries other than China and India. The third demand enabler is EMs’ need for simpler, cheaper products than those offered by companies from developed countries. Chinese companies’ superior understanding of the niches in Chinese markets enables them to address this “good enough for China” market successfully through a range of products and services. While DM companies have the same opportunity, they are often hampered by the organizational pressure to protect an existing global portfolio and global standards of quality (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2012) and often by their sheer ignorance of the diversity of customer segments and special needs. Although both Chinese and foreign companies are creating such products (Gadiesh, Leung, & Vestring, 2007), foreign companies have been considerably less successful. A fourth demand enabler is fast-​moving large-​scale government projects. Despite the increasing rise of a market economy, China’s government remains very active in many sectors of the economy, with the ability to undertake large-​scale projects which in other countries might take years to implement. This means that the national government, and sometimes provincial ones, can rapidly implement large-​scale projects such as high-​ speed rail or new airports, which in turn drive many opportunities for innovation. Indian consumers are often perceived to be price-​sensitive and partly in response to this Indian companies have pursued frugal innovation resulting in, for instance. Tata’s Nano and GE’s portable ECG machine. It should, however, be noted that the aspirations of Indian consumers are rising; Tata Nano was not a commercial success, perhaps because of its label as “the cheapest car in the world,” which made it socially undesirable.

EM Innovation Disadvantages Of course, EMs also have significant disadvantages for innovation. These include poor protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), immature NISs, and weak venture capital setups.

Poor IPR Protection A defining characteristic of EMs is that they have immature institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). The IPR regime is the most important institution for innovation and all EMs are weak in this regard. Multinationals hesitate to innovate in China because of valid concerns about loss of intellectual property. But Chinese courts and regulators increasingly recognize and defend IPR in China (Keupp, Beckenbauer, & Gassmann, 2009; Quan & Chesbrough 2010). The framework for intellectual property (IP) protection in China is improving and there are growing instances of firms that have successfully taken legal action. Indeed, more Chinese than foreign firms now sue other Chinese firms for IP infringement. China’s government is paying more attention to IP protection and has made several recent announcements and taken several actions, including increasing the number of IP courts (see Yip & McKern, 2016: ch. 7).

Innovation in Emerging Markets    357 According to Krishnan (2013), India’s primary IPR-​related challenges are enforcement-​ related rather than inadequate laws. Specific to the pharmaceutical industry, in order to make drugs affordable to common man, the Indian government amended the Patents Act in 1970 to remove product patent protection for drugs and certain other products, although this has had to be reversed over time as a result of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty. India signed up in 1995 and undertook to strengthen its intellectual property laws by 2005. But controversies continue with pharmaceutical companies expressing concern about higher standards of novelty, compulsory licensing procedures, and data protection. Nevertheless, Krishnan (2013) avers that new laws have created reasonable levels of IP protection, and that India arguably does not have the reputation for copycats that China has (although this is perhaps partly because the manufacturing sector is not as well developed in India as it is in China). In Russia, weak IPR protection and the weak legal system in general both discourage innovation by local and foreign companies.

Conduct of R&D by Local Firms in EMs In the past, local firms in EMs did not conduct any R&D. This has changed for four reasons. The first is rising demand in EMs for locally tailored products and services. The second is competition both at home and abroad, which spurs the drive for innovation to create differentiation. The third is the increased learning mentioned above. The fourth is that, with growth of revenues and profits, many EM firms can now afford R&D. China’s TCL Communications Technology is now one of the world’s largest consumer electronics companies. A senior TCL executive told one of us that when TCL was just an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) supplier to Western companies, it conducted no R&D, but as the Western companies’ global market shares shrank, these companies spent less and less on R&D. In contrast, as TCL gained share it could afford to invest more and more in R&D. In India, the pharmaceutical industry is the most R&D-​intensive industry (NSTMIS, 2013), with Indian companies emerging as leaders in drugs by developing new, low-​cost processes for drugs whose patents have expired. In addition, some health care organizations have achieved process innovations enabling astonishing cost reductions. A prominent example is Arvind Eyecare which developed a methodology for cataract surgeries that increased the number of surgeries performed by a surgeon from 5 to 6 to 25 to 30 per day. The process uses an “assembly-​line” approach that utilizes paramedical staff undertaking relatively simple steps (Rangan & Thulasiraj, 2007).

Setting Up of R&D centers in EMs by Foreign MNCs Starting in the 1990s, MNCs began to conduct R&D activities in some EMs. This has been the subject of several papers (e.g., Chen, 2004; von Zedtwitz, 2004)2. Accessing

358    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham cost-​effective local engineers has been shown to be a driver for foreign MNCs willing to carry out R&D activities in developing countries (Reddy, 1997), and specifically in China (Lu & Liu, 2004). Interestingly, those references appeared when China was not yet on the world map as a source for R&D. Drawing on various sources, Jolly, McKern, & Yip (2015) estimated 1500 foreign R&D centers in China in 2013 and projected an increase to 1800 by 2018. India, increasingly recognized as a source of engineering talent, has also seen a rise in MNE R&D activity. Basant and Mani (2012) found that 851 MNEs had established India-​based R&D centers within two decades of the introduction of economic reforms in the early 1990s. They found that the information and communication technology (ICT) sector accounted for 52 of the 59 most active patenting MNEs in India. Subsequent estimates suggest that there are over 1200 MNE R&D centers in India, employing over 350,000 people and representing R&D expenditure of $12.3 billion (Times of India, 2016). Adaptation of centrally developed products and processes to local market conditions has been designated as “market proximity” (Hakanson & Nobel, 1993). This is about adapting established home-​country or corporate-​level products for the local market (Pearce, 1999). The idea is that R&D labs in a foreign country allow for the formation of locally developed technology (von Zedtwitz & Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz, 2004) that adapts MNC parent technology to the specific requirements of local demand. While undertaking R&D in an EM for reasons of cost reduction or market access is not surprising, another less obvious driver comes from the fact that more and more sources of potentially relevant knowledge are emerging across the globe (Kuemmerle, 1997). Previous works have noted the role of MNC subsidiaries in knowledge sourcing (Phene & Almeida, 2008), but there has been little work done on MNC knowledge sourcing in developing countries. As mentioned by Castellani et al. (2013), MNCs set up their labs as close as possible to specialized technology clusters where valuable knowl­ edge is concentrated, regardless of the distance from their home base. Traditionally, in the past, this has been within DMs. The more recent phenomenon is that DM MNCs also conduct R&D in EMs in order to source knowledge that can be applied worldwide. In a study of 50 foreign R&D centers in China, Jolly et al. (2015) found that by 2013, 28% were primarily focused on knowledge creation rather than cost saving or market adaptation. This was a significant increase in the proportion in 2008 and the study projected a further increase by 2018. Knowledge-​driven R&D in an EM has the deliberate intention of strengthening a DM MNC’s global innovation capabilities. A very interesting special case is the non-​ deliberate one of so-​called reverse innovation, defined by Immelt, Govindarajan, and Trimble (2009) as an innovation being developed initially in and for an EM, then later introduced into DMs. The best known examples come from General Electric. First, in India in 2009 GE developed a hand-​held, battery-​charged, electrocardiogram machine that could be used by doctors in rural areas where electricity supply was uncertain, dust was prevalent, and affordability a huge issue (Immelt et al., 2009). Then GE China developed a portable ultrasound machine developed by its Medical Systems’ subsidiary in Wuxi in 2012 in China for the Chinese market, but later marketed in the USA for

Innovation in Emerging Markets    359 applications that did not supplant the much larger and more expensive US machines. Strictly speaking, “reverse innovation” applies only when a product created in an EM is sold in a DM, but there are still many more examples of EM-​developed products sold into other EMs than those sold into DMs.

Creation of NIS in EMs Most innovation activities in a country benefit from its NIS, comprising its universities, research institutes, government policies, innovation personnel such as scientists and researchers, and the ecosystem of innovative companies, both domestic and foreign. Hence, an EM’s NIS integrates and supports the previous four factors for innovation that we have just discussed. Therefore, it is crucial for both local EM companies and DM MNCs to participate in an EM’s NIS. This is particularly true for China, both because innovation there is at an emerging stage and because of the large role of government in most aspects of business. Understanding the NIS is critically important for any MNC serious about either competing in or learning from China. But it is questionable whether there are genuine national innovation systems in EMs other than China.

China’s Developing National Innovation System The Chinese government is strongly fostering “indigenous innovation” through the development of a NIS. A detailed view of China’s development strategy is provided in Development Research Center of the State Council and World Bank (2013). Key features of this system include sustained and growing investment in innovation, strengthening major research institutions and the top 100 universities, funding for commercial research that fits with national priorities, a push for transfer of foreign technology, and gradual reforms to the intellectual property regime. Its focus is clearly on strengthening local companies to succeed against foreign competitors, in both Chinese and overseas markets. Over the last 10 years, the Chinese NIS has been greatly transformed (Fu, 2015; Zhou & Leydesdorff, 2006). Selected universities are generously supported by the government to develop research capabilities. Public research centers are also funded by government to transform them into leading institutions. Reliable sources show a significant increase in the number of Chinese scientific publications in reputable journals, particularly in chemistry, physics, and computer science (Fu, Frietsch, & Tagscherer, 2013). Consequently, the leading universities and public research institutes are increasingly a source of ideas that can be translated into innovative products and processes. Another impressive impetus from the central government led to the opening of more than 100 science and technology parks. Some of them, such as Zhangjiang in Shanghai or Zhonguancun in Beijing, have attracted major MNCs. Thanks to start-​ups, incubators, and venture capitalists, these are important locations for tapping into the innovation eco-​system. Chinese technological intensity (R&D expenditure divided by GDP) has now reached 1.9%, the level of Europe, and is closing on that of the United States (2.9%).3

360    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham And last, but not least, the number of patent applications in the country has surpassed 600,000 a year, exceeding the USA in terms of number. Lewin et al. (2016: 7) show a huge rise from 1963 to 2014 in utility patents granted to China compared with other countries such as the USA, Japan, and India.

India’s Developing National Innovation System India’s gross R&D expenditure in 2016 was estimated to be $71.48 billion which is less than 1% (0.85%) of GDP, considerably lower than China’s 1.98% and the USA’s 2.77% (R&D, 2016). India’s education system, which includes the world-​class Indian Institutes of Technology, has been described as higher on quantity than quality in terms of producing engineers (Krishnan, 2010). Krishnan (2007) notes that following independ­ ence from the British in 1947, the government sought to emulate the Soviet model of investing in R&D laboratories that would come up with designs and products which would then be mass produced. He suggests that this approach had mixed results: it was considered a success primarily in strategic areas like space and atomic energy. In other sectors, a complex industrial licensing system and high import tariffs protected domestic firms from foreign competition, leading to a lack of incentives for undertaking innovation. This changed in the 1990s when the economic liberalization program introduced by the then Finance Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, supported innovation through tax breaks and low-​cost loans for private-​sector firms. However, such assistance has been provided on a relatively small scale, resulting in a generally frugal approach to innovation in India, referred to as “jugaad.” Some large domestic companies such as Tata Steel and Reliance did make investments in technical improvements, but this primarily involved importing technology (Krishnan, 2007). Krishnan (2010) suggests that the propensity for an improvisational “jugaad” approach resulted in part from the Indian government’s complex regulatory structure which, for instance, reserved certain products for small firms. This placed a cap on the incentive to grow resulting in these resource-​constrained firms developing quick fixes and low cost (Krishnan, 2010). Arguably a frugal approach pervades the government’s own innovation efforts as exemplified by the Indian Space Research Organization’s successful and inexpensive Mars mission, Mangalyaan. Notable sectors in relation to innovation are generic pharmaceuticals and software services, although the focus has been on process rather than product innovation (Krishnan, 2013). However, while Indian companies themselves have tended to innovate within the technological frontier, Indian inventors (individuals) working in places such as Bangalore, for multinationals in India, have been successful in obtaining international patents, albeit for intellectual property owned by non-​Indian companies (Krishnan & Prashantham, 2018).

Russia’s Developing National Innovation System Winston Churchill said of Russia in October 1939: “It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” Churchill was referring to Russian politics, but the same paradox

Innovation in Emerging Markets    361 applies to Russian innovation. Despite its many scientific capabilities, Russia continues to be weak in commercially relevant innovation. Loren Graham, a historian of science at MIT, said at the 2016 St. Petersburg Economic Forum that Russia had been successful at invention but failed at innovation. For example, Russian scientists and engineers invented the laser and fracking, but the country has failed to really make money from its scientific capabilities, likely because of the adverse social, political, and economic environment (The Economist, 2016).4 According to Filippov and Settles (2013), Russia inherited the Soviet science and technology complex so that it enjoyed success in many technological domains. However, the institutional collapse at the breakup of the USSR has had a profound effect on innovation, science, and technology since the early 2000s. The Soviet leadership regarded the science and technology (S&T) complex as a matter of national pride, but S&T was directed to primarily serve the defense sector. As a consequence, innovation for other sectors of the Soviet economy was weak. In addition, the command economy was inherently resistant to innovation. Disruptive technologies were not suited to the Soviet model and were actively discouraged. As Soviet enterprise directors and managers were evaluated primarily on production goals for standard goods, any innovation tended to disrupt production in the short term and be viewed as a negative by the organization. The transition to a market economy did not improve the situation, and even worsened it in many respects. While elimination of the command economy was a necessary condition for resistance to innovation to disappear, it was not a sufficient one (Berliner, 1988). With the systemic collapse of the 1990s, Russia needed to reorient its S&T sector to the market economy. At the same time there was a sharp fall of investment in S&T, with correspondingly bad results for innovation. R&D activities in Russia primarily occur in state-​owned or state-​financed institutions, while innovation in Russia tends to be concentrated in large companies. The current Russian NIS is fragmented, with many different efforts among the universities, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and private research institutes. Furthermore, there is poor involvement of Russian universities in the global academic community (Filippov, 2013). One major effort by the Russian government is the Skolkovo project in Moscow, announced on November 12, 2009, by then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. This center includes the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, Skolkovo Moscow School of Management, and the Skolkovo Innovation Center, which is a high-​tech park with a new R&D center with partners such as Microsoft, IBM, General Electric, and Cisco (Filippov 2013). Other government initiatives to boost the NIS had run into classic Russian problems of corruption. For example, Rusnano was set up in 2011 to support nanotechnology. Any company working on that technology could apply to it for funding. But in reality some unqualified companies can be found in its portfolio. Rusnano’s offices were even raided by the police in November 2016 in an investigation of embezzlement and the earlier arrest of its previous head Leonid Melamed.

362    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham In summary, there seems to be nothing systematic about Russian innovation activity.

Distinctive Approaches to Innovation in EMs Do companies in EMs take a different approach to innovation than companies in DMs? We found significant evidence to support that view. These differences between EM and DM innovation vary somewhat by country, are more consistent by country of origin than by country of activity, and have commonalities based on general differences between EMs and DMs.

China: Innovating the Way it Manufactures China’s huge success in manufacturing is based on its use of large numbers of low-​cost and diligent workers coupled with a management style that focuses on speed of operation. Innovation in China takes a similar approach, adding frequent experimentation. Zeng and Williamson (2007) identified this approach as applying China’s “cost wedge” to innovation. Williamson and Yin (2014) extended this idea to describe it as “accelerated innovation.” Yip and McKern (2016:  84–​85) elaborated how Chinese companies use very large numbers of engineers and scientists, whose costs to employ are still well below those in DMs. Of course, multinationals with innovation operations in China can hire the same staff, but generally not the large numbers that Chinese firms are willing to hire. Having these large numbers of staff allows Chinese firms to take more of a “brute force” approach to innovation. So they will put large teams to work on many aspects of an innovation, such as in Chinese pharmaceutical companies, which put many low-​level scientists to work conducting tests on multiple compounds or formulations. The head of the China R&D center of a major Western pharmaceutical company told us that while in the West scientists might spend time deciding which one possible test to conduct, in China they will conduct all six tests. Because Chinese firms use large numbers of staff, they can divide the innovation process into a number of small steps and then assign teams to work on each stage. The goal is an assembly-​line system that accelerates the processes of innovation. WuXi AppTec, a pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, and medical company has adopted this industrialized form of new product development. To do so, the company hires thousands of R&D workers each year who are graduates of trade colleges (Williamson & Yin 2014). Related to the penchant for speed in innovation, Chinese companies are also more willing to take risks in fast trial and error, and to fail fast, the mantra of successful

Innovation in Emerging Markets    363 Western design firm IDEO. They do so because the fast-​growing Chinese markets are more forgiving than in the slow-​growing markets in developed countries. They have rapidly learned that in such markets the bigger risk is not to try something, rather than to make a mistake and lose some money. This trial-​and-​error approach fits in very much with the Chinese culture of pragmatism. Indeed, China’s first reforming Communist leader Deng Xiaoping liked to talk about “crossing the river by feeling the stones.” Kevin Wale, president and managing director of GM China, put it this way: “What China does better than any place else in the world is to innovate by commercialization, as opposed to constant research and perfecting the theory, like the West” (Leibowitz & Roth 2012). The large scale and diversity of Chinese markets make it worthwhile for companies to serve special needs of some customers by tailoring their products or creating separate categories of goods and services. Large market sizes also make it more affordable for companies to experiment with new ideas. This feature, combined with relatively informal organizational structure and style, permits Chinese companies to have faster and shorter cycles of trial and error in product and service development. Chinese companies have thus become very adaptable to local market conditions and newly available technologies. Chinese companies are also more capable than MNCs at incremental innovation, as they can better afford the engineering hours needed to create product variants. Indeed, Chinese companies do not just innovate incrementally; they often flood the market with huge numbers of product variants.

India: Beyond Jugaad? Indian customers’ limited affordability and organizations’ resource constraints has led to a distinctive approach referred to as “jugaad”—​improvising with ready-​to-​ hand materials, tools, and resources (Krishnan, 2010). Radjou, Prabhu, and Ahuja (2012) portray jugaad as frugal, flexible, and inclusive; in other words, it represents ingenuity being brought to bear to solve local problems with limited resources. But some India-​based experts express concern that jugaad also represents shoddy processes resulting in unreliable products (Dabholkar & Krishnan, 2013). They therefore call for a progressive shift to more systematic approaches. At present, however, jugaad continues to characterize much of India’s innovation, such as in the case of a truck-​like farm vehicle developed by local mechanics to undertake basic farming functions (Krishnan & Prashantham, 2018). That said, the frugality that characterizes much of the innovation taking place in India has its virtues and could, for example, have a positive impact on Western multinationals undertaking R&D in India. To illustrate, Cisco’s R&D center in Bangalore developed a new telecommunication-​ related product for Indian mobile service providers by adopting a frugal approach while at the same time incorporating the latest relevant technology (Jha, Parulkar, Krishnan, & Dhanaraj, 2016). Impressively, Cisco was also able to generate revenues

364    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham from this product in advanced markets as well, thus representing reverse innovation (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2012).

Russia: Soviet Heritage Most of the distinctiveness of Russian innovation lies in the Soviet heritage and the problems with its national innovation system, which we discussed. So this section on the approach of Russian companies will be short. There are a minority of Russian firms that engage in the development of international research networks as a means to enhance the innovation activities and absorptive capacity to utilize their inventions. Many Russian companies started internationalization in the 2000s. Managers of Russian MNCs do recognize the importance of innovation and in that respect are no different from those in other EM MNCs. Among surveys of the world’s companies that spend the most on R&D, only one Russian company usually features, Gazprom. Sometimes, carmaker AvtoVaz, oil and gas producer Lukoil, and micro-​electronics company Sitronics are included (Filippov & Settles, 2013: 35).

Brazil: Idiosyncratic Innovation Unlike the other three BRIC members, Brazil does not have any special factors favoring innovation other than its large size. Indeed, a study by de Miranda Oliveira, Mendes Borini, and Fleury characterized the Brazilian approach to innovation as “idiosyncratic, local conditions being the most important factors in shaping” (2013:  27). This study recognizes that Brazil is not considered a good performer in innovation (2013: 11), and that “the approach to innovation adopted by Brazilian companies takes a perspective different from the traditional scientific research leading to technological breakthrough” (2013:  11). According to this study, Brazilian innovation has taken a path-​dependent approach related to how the economy has developed. Because of the history of “disorder, uncertainty, attrition and fluidity . . . (in) the business environment” Brazilian companies have adopted an opportunistic approach to strategy. Such an approach has in consequence not favored spending innovation. In addition, Brazilian enterprises have spent less on R&D (1.5% in the period 1997–​2007) than have Indian (1.4 to 1.8%) and Chinese ones (2% rising to 9%), according to InnovaLatino (2011), as cited by de Miranda Oliveira et al. (2013: 14). This study also concludes that Brazilian companies are more concerned with process than product innovations. (We ourselves have seen that Chinese companies started in the same way but have now extended to product and many other types of more technology-​based forms of innovation.) The exception in Brazil of product innovation is found in commodity innovations, especially for oil and biofuels, both critical parts of the Brazilian economy. This commodity innovation seeks to create

Innovation in Emerging Markets    365 points of differentiation or competitive advantage for what would otherwise be undifferentiated commodities. Sustainable innovation has also become important, with companies such as Natura, a major cosmetics producer, aiming for full commitment to the “triple bottom line.” One of the internationally best known Brazilian companies is Embraer, producer of regional jets. Its success has been based more on business model than product innovation, resulting in lower-​cost products that meet global standards. This business model innovation included risk partnerships with four foreign suppliers from Chile, Spain, Belgium, and the United States. A later innovation was to reduce delivery time from the usual 60 months to 38 months via “an innovative project management model that integrated 400 engineers from 16 firms in several countries, with 600 engineers in Brazil” (de Miranda Oliveira et al., 2013: 22). In conclusion, while there are some internationally successful Brazilian companies that use innovation, there is no systematic Brazilian approach to innovation or one or more clear paths to innovation advantage.

Beyond the BRICs EMs beyond the BRICs have even weaker positions in innovation. We use the cases of Turkey and South Africa to typify the problems faced by these other EMs.

Turkey •​ Innovation in Turkey is advancing along with its economic development, although spending on R&D is still only about 1% of GDP.5 One source of innovation is large Turkish conglomerates such as Koc and Sabanci, sometimes in collaboration with foreign partners. A second source is small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that show entrepreneurialism typical in EMs. A third source is innovation centers opened by foreign MNCs largely in response to incentives offered by ISPAT (Investment Support & Promotion Agency of Turkey), but spillover effects have been very limited. As with China, much of the innovation has been in process or incremental product innovation for manufactured goods, the latter being the heart of Turkey’s export economy. Barriers to innovation include weak protection of IPR and insufficient number of R&D scientists and engineers. Examples of innovations in Turkey include6: •​ “clean” paint developed by DYO using nanotechnology •​ Techno-​textiles of fireproof cloth maker Akin Tekstil •​ Arcelik’s oven that chills food in the day and cooks in the evening We predict that Turkey will follow the path of China in innovation as in manufacturing, but with a huge disadvantage of a much smaller home market. On the other hand, Turkey has varying degrees of access to the markets of the European Union. The current

366    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham situation in relation to the EU is highly uncertain but will play a critical role in the development of Turkey’s innovation capabilities. Our study of MNCs’ efforts to partner with start-​ ups in emerging markets (Prashantham & Yip, 2017) included a set of interviews in South Africa, which suggested that the scale of innovation was much smaller compared to China and India. At the same time, some MNCs seemed determine to support the local economy. One example is Microsoft’s 4Africa initiative, one element of which was working with local SMEs to help them improve their competitiveness. Another strand of this MNC’s support to local firms was through government-​required black empowerment programs whereby it worked with a set of carefully chosen ventures with non-​white co-​founders, supporting them in terms of both technological and business development. It is also notable that Naspers, a South African firm, is an investor in Tencent. That said, the mood we found was relatively downbeat as the economic prospects of South Africa as a whole were not perceived to be promising, largely because of concerns that the political leadership was not as effective as it might be. Perhaps reflective of this was the decision of one very successful start-​up that had worked closely with Microsoft to relocate its headquarters to London not long after our interviews. Many of our respondents in South Africa pointed to Kenya as an important innovation hub for the future.

Innovation by Foreign MNCs in EMs We have already discussed the setting of foreign R&D centers in EMs as a driver in the growth of EM innovation ecosystem. Here we will provide a broader overview of innovation by foreign MNCs in EMs. But as systematic patterns of foreign innovation occur only in China and India, we will focus on just these two countries.

China: Why Not, Not Why China is now a huge part of multinational companies’ plans for globalizing their R&D activities. For example, since 2003, General Electric has established three major R&D centers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuxi, as well as three regional innovation centers. In 2013 alone, Oracle opened its fourth China R&D center while centers were also opened by Daimler AG, Medtronic, Covidien, Boston Scientific, Continental AG, Toyota, Arkema, and others. In 2010, in Suzhou’s industrial park, Johnson & Johnson set up a new R&D center responsible for all medical diagnostics and devices product development in the Asia-​Pacific region. In addition, many multinationals, such as the Bosch Group, General Electric, IBM, Philips, and Shell, are continuing to upgrade and enlarge their China R&D facilities. These investments have contributed to China’s global lead in attracting greenfield R&D investment over the five years from 2010 to 2014, a total of $5.5 billion. The USA in the same period attracted less than half this amount (Fingar, 2015).

Innovation in Emerging Markets    367 The expansion of MNCs into China has not traditionally been motivated by the desire to develop new capabilities but rather to exploit those already developed in their home country (or through previous international experience). The capabilities MNCs already possess have usually provided competitive advantages over local incumbents. MNCs have traditionally begun in China with products or services for needs that are most like those at home—​higher-​income consumers or technologically sophisticated industrial clients. They initially entered the Chinese market by exporting home-​based products based on their proprietary technologies, brands, or superior management skills, fitting the traditional product life cycle. This was followed by local manufacturing or service operations; R&D centers were set up to support them, mainly for cost reasons. MNCs then adapted their products or processes to suit the Chinese market, setting up market-​driven R&D centers and introducing new products designed for local requirements. For a foreign newcomer, while surging market growth has been a positive driver, as it is for local firms, understanding customers and dealing with culture (and particularly the powerful role of government) has been the biggest challenge. So it is not surprising that they did not initially focus on exploiting the innovation ecosystem. China was not even considered as a knowledge source to be tapped by foreign subsidiaries during the 1990s. A weak national system of innovation plus a lack of intellectual property rights protection discouraged MNCs. Then, in the 2000s, the rationale for international location decisions began to change. Early studies of foreign R&D efforts show that foreign R&D centers in China are not only important vehicles for local market development but also, contrary to expectations, increasingly important sources of locally developed technology, especially inside the many industrial clusters that were established by the national government’s innovation initiatives (Bin & Guo, 2011). Several MNCs have recognized the threat, as well as the opportunity, presented by the growth of Chinese firms’ capabilities, under what appears to be acceleration of the product cycle, and are actively tapping the China knowledge base. They are attempting to benefit from the same sources of advantage that Chinese firms are tapping. In conclusion, innovation in China by both domestic and foreign companies is now so extensive that the default question for MNCs is shifting from why innovate in China to why not.

India: The Frugal Innovation Capital of the World? India has also emerged as a major destination for MNC R&D activity. As previously noted, over one-​third of a million people are employed by nearly 1000 foreign MNCs in India. A particular flavor of this work is likely to be frugal innovation. To illustrate, Jha et al. (2016) document how a telecoms product was conceptualized and developed by Cisco’s R&D center in India to address the needs of Indian mobile service providers dealing simultaneously with old (2G) and new (4G) technologies. This was done by incorporating contemporary in a frugal way, which was eventually sold in DMs as well. However, efforts such as this and those of GE in developing a portable ECG machine

368    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham will only work if headquarters are supportive of the India subsidiary’s work, rather than concerned about the dilution of its brand by perceived inferior technology. It remains to be seen whether these anecdotes foreshadow more systematic efforts to conduct frugal innovation in India-​based MNC R&D centers.

Globalization of Innovation by EM MNCs A few EM companies now also globalize their innovation activities. Chinese companies increasingly conduct R&D overseas. Many have expanded globally through foreign acquisitions, initially acquiring foreign companies mostly in the sector of natural resources, now increasingly targeting foreign companies with new knowledge or cutting-​edge technology. The most current example is that of automaker Geely acquiring in May 2017 majority control of the UK’s iconic Lotus Cars in order to access that company’s advanced technology bred in the arena of motor racing. To further penetrate global markets, some Chinese companies have begun to set up R&D facilities in foreign countries to tap into local knowledge and to be closer to their customers. Huawei, one of the most important Chinese company innovators, has a large number of overseas R&D centers set up specifically to access local, special expertise. For example, a center in Italy focuses on microwave technology because Italy has the world’s leading microwave scientists and research capabilities. Haier, the Chinese appliances company, has sometimes followed a foreign innovation path of collaboration followed by acquisition. It did this with a New Zealand company, Fisher and Paykel, to innovate a quick washing cycle—​non-​stop washing in 15 minutes. Haier runs four R&D labs outside China:  in the USA, Japan, Europe, and Australasia. Haier is also a Chinese pioneer in seeking ideas globally through its open innovation platform and it sees itself as a global company with a “three-​thirds” ambition: to produce one-​third of its sales in China for China; one-​third in China for world markets; and one-​third abroad for global markets (Yip & McKern, 2016: 50–​51). But there is some question whether Chinese firms can manage a global innovation network (Doz & Wilson, 2016). In India, the development of global innovation networks is even more nascent than in China. Prominent examples of Indian companies making acquisitions overseas include Tata’s acquisition of Jaguar Land Rover and Corus (formerly British Steel). While the former is seen as relatively successful, the latter has been problematic, and the acquired company was briefly put on the market in 2016. While information technology (IT) and pharma companies have also made overseas investments in recent times, it seems too early to tell just how these companies are able to integrate their acquisitions and fashion a global R&D organization. Examining how this process unfolds represents a potentially important area for future research. Another approach that does not involve acquiring another company entails partnering with start-​ups. Tata Consulting Services

Innovation in Emerging Markets    369 (TCS), India’s largest software services company, operates what it calls the “COIN” (collaborative innovation) ecosystem as a way to engage with start-​ups around the world, including in North America, Western Europe, Australia, and Singapore. It offers four-​ to eight-​week engagements with start-​ups to jointly develop proofs-​of-​concept and prototypes for offerings targeted at specific customer pain-​points. Again, this is not yet a widespread practice among Indian companies but may well become one of the ways in which they develop global innovation networks in the future.

Conclusion For innovation, China has a unique advantage of having a combination of a massive manufacturing capacity, a strong science and engineering capacity, and an enormous home market. In comparison, India lags behind China on manufacturing capacity and has its own distinctive approach to innovation based on jugaad, but it is now starting to move beyond that. Russia is suffering from the Soviet heritage of the command economy and prioritization of the defense sector. But with its educational excellence in science and technology, Russian innovation has great potential if only its NIS can be modernized and rationalized, and its companies start to take a long-​term view of investing in innovation. Brazil has yet to advance beyond its idiosyncratic and opportunistic approach. Other EMs are significantly less advanced than are the BRICs. But the five reasons that we have identified for the rise of innovation in EMs will continue to strengthen in many EMs. MNCs from DMs now need to seriously rethink from where to source innovation. EMs are no longer just potential markets or suppliers of factors of production but potential sites for R&D and innovation not just for local markets but even for the world.

Notes 1. Non-​customer innovation occurs when a business is able to serve a customer segment not previously served in this category in the world or in a country. An example is the Tata Nano car, designed at such a low price point to serve first time auto buyers who had previously used motorcycles or other modes. 2. This section draws on unpublished work by Dominique Jolly, Bruce McKern, and George S. Yip. 3. Authors’ estimate, based on National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (September 2013) and Batelle Memorial Institute estimates of other funding sources, in Battelle Memorial Institute and R&D Magazine, 2013 R&D Funding Forecast. Cleveland, OH (2012). 4. The authors thank Anna Grossman, Loughborough University London, for her advice on this section.

370    George S. Yip and Shameen Prashantham 5. This section draws partly on a presentation by S. Tamer Cavusgil at a panel on “Innovation in Emerging Markets,” Academy of International Business Annual Conference, Istanbul, July 2013. 6. These examples were provided by S. Tamer Cavusgil at a panel on “Innovation in Emerging Markets,” Academy of International Business Annual Conference, Istanbul, July 2013.

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Chapter 16

Hum an Ri g h ts , Em erging M arkets , a nd In ternationa l Bu si ne s s Florian Wettstein

Corporations and human rights have not traditionally been theorized in tandem. Not even the well-​established discussion on corporate social responsibility (CSR), which emerged as early as the 1950s and 1960s (Bowen, 1953; Davis, 1960; Frederick, 1960; Votaw, 1961), has given much thought to the relation between companies and human rights (Wettstein, 2012a). Human rights were—​and partly still are today—​ perceived as applying exclusively to governments; corporations, on the other hand, were not perceived to have any direct human rights obligations (Muchlinski 2001). At best, such was, and partly still is, the view that corporations can have indirect human rights obligations, insofar as national governments ask them to comply with certain human rights requirements through domestic laws and regulations. Such obligations, however, are then understood as a part of a corporation’s legal compliance rather than of its extra-​ legal social responsibility. Challenges to this perception emerged in the 1970s, but they started to gain real traction throughout the 1990s, in the wake of Western companies operating in and partly bolstering the South African apartheid regime, and later against the background of emerging sweatshop practices or the lasting detrimental impact of oil companies in the Niger Delta. A series of critical reports of prominent human rights organizations triggered a more systematic discussion on the responsibilities of business vis-​à-​vis human rights in the late 1990s (see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, 1999a, 1999b). Twenty years in, what is now called the “business and human rights debate” (Chandler, 2003) has turned into one of the most influential drivers within the larger discussion on corporate responsibility. In this chapter, I trace the evolution of this fast-​paced and increasingly prominent debate, specifically as it pertains to and is relevant for the context of emerging economies. The goal and ambition of this chapter is to provide a (reasonably) comprehensive

374   Florian Wettstein overview—​and introduction—​to this emerging discussion, specifically for international business (IB) scholars with an interest in emerging markets. Furthermore, it shall outline the relevance of business and human rights (BHR) for the field of study of IB and emerging market scholars, as well as research needs and opportunities at the intersection of BHR and emerging markets scholarship. The chapter proceeds as follows: after this brief introduction, section two outlines the basic shape and rationale of the BHR debate. It starts with the most fundamental question why corporations ought to have human rights responsibility to begin with. To answer this question, I distinguish legal, moral, and political accounts of BHR and briefly outline some of the main strands of argumentation found within these approaches. Section three delineates the BHR debate from the more established CSR discussion. Despite the close connection between the two fields, they have evolved largely in parallel (Wettstein, 2012a) and it is critical for a proper understanding of the developments in today’s BHR space to take note of both the similarities and the conceptual differences between these two discussions. I analyze the relation between CSR and BHR in three dimensions: normative, institutional, and operational. Section four briefly maps the institutional landscape in the BHR space at the international level. I specifically emphasize UN-​driven initiatives. In section 5, readers can take a closer look at the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) on business and human rights. The UNGPs are the authoritative global policy instrument today and the “focal point” (Ruggie, 2011: 3) on which the BHR debate centers. The section discusses the content and structure of the UNGPs, but also emerging new instruments particularly at the domestic level, to which the implementation of the UNGPs have given rise. Outlining developments in the policy, legislative, and adjudicative space, the section traces a clear international trend for binding human rights regulation, which is, however, modeled after the soft-​law provisions stipulated in the UNGPs. More generally, the mapping of the institutional landscape in sections four and five paints a picture of a complex interplay between binding and non-​binding governance approaches in the BHR space. Section six outlines some of the key themes and open research needs deriving from the current scholarly discussion on BHR against the background of this evolving institutional infrastructure. The section is structured into research themes at the global, state, and operational level. Section seven maintains a focus on research themes with specific emphasis on the intersection between BHR and the context of emerging economies research. The eighth and final section concludes.

Why Corporate Human Rights Responsibility As outlined in the introduction, corporations have not traditionally been perceived as having human rights responsibilities. Rather, such responsibility was assigned exclusively to governments (Muchlinski, 2001). This state centrism underlying traditional

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    375 human rights thinking is rooted most prevalently in legal scholarship and practice, but it is common also in political and ethical thinking on human rights (Wettstein, 2009: 156–​164). It is one reason why, as we will see, the established debate on CSR has been reluctant to engage with human rights in a systematic manner until very recently. However, the accelerating globalization of markets and the rise of multinational business in the 1970s and particularly throughout what Joseph Stiglitz (2003) called the “roaring nineties” increasingly put this state-​centric approach to human rights to the test (Kobrin, 2009). The expansion of global markets and multinational value chains meant that multinational companies increasingly operated in contexts of weak institutions, of governments unable or unwilling to protect the rights of its citizens or of abusive and authoritarian regimes actively engaged in their violation. Thus, there was a growing mismatch between the global expansion of economic forces and inadequate, spatially and territorially limited human rights protection (Wettstein, 2009). This raised new issues of collusion between multinationals and authoritarian governments in the oppression and violation of rights (Muchlinski, 2001; White, 2004), of exploitation of cheap labor in form of sweatshops and child labor (Arnold, 2003), or of forced dislocation of indigenous communities, among other things. With home state governments increasingly incapacitated to effectively regulate and fully control the multinational operations of “their” corporations, the focus started to shift on those corporations themselves as a locus of human rights responsibility. Such “governance gaps,” as John Ruggie famously stated later on, turned into the “root cause of the business and human rights predicament” (2008: 3) that attracted increasing attention by NGOs (non-​governmental organizations), international policymakers, and academics in the mid-​1990s and onward. However, as we know at least since David Hume (1985 [1740]), “is” does not imply “ought”; thus the de facto existence of governance gaps in and of itself can hardly ground corporate human rights obligations—​a normative argument is needed in addition to the context raising the issue as a policy concern. Keeping this discussion brief for the sake of this chapter, three broad approaches to clarifying the underlying normative grounds for corporate human rights responsibility can be distinguished. I call them legal, moral, and political approaches.

Legal Approaches Legal approaches to business and human rights have dominated the discussion since its very beginning (Wettstein, 2012a). Thus, such approaches look for the normative justification of corporate human rights responsibility in international or domestic law. Early approaches, for example, argued that both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the two International Covenants offer room for interpretation when it comes to the inclusion or exclusion of corporations as potential duty bearers (see, e.g., Frey, 1997). In addition, as John Ruggie points out, where corporations are involved in most egregious human rights violations such as, for example, genocide, war crimes and some crimes against humanity, “customary international law standards may apply directly to

376   Florian Wettstein corporate entities under certain circumstances” (2013: 39). However, the enforcement of such responsibilities would have to occur in domestic courts in jurisdictions that allow for it. A related discussion deals with the status of multinational corporations under international law, that is, with the question of whether or not multinational companies possess international legal personality, which is a condition to be a subject and thus obligation-​bearer of international law (see, e.g., Muchlinski, 2001). Others have argued that the undisputed legal obligation of states to protect human rights against corporate abuse implies, by matter of contradiction, a similar obligation of business to respect human rights (Bilchitz, 2013). More recent approaches have focused on domestic law in addition to international law. Rather than deriving corporate human rights obligations directly from international law, they are interested in whether or not, or to what extent, international law implies a duty for governments to regulate and adjudicate multinational corporations’ business conduct abroad (Simons & Macklin, 2014). That is, they analyze the extraterritorial obligations of home states in regard to the business conduct of “their multinational companies” in host countries. Finally, instead of reinterpreting existing international law, there has been a growing discussion on the need and justification for a new international legal regime that deals specifically with corporate human rights obligations. Most prominently, this strand of research includes discussions on the need and nature of a binding international treaty on business and human rights (see, e.g., Bilchitz, 2016; De Schutter, 2016; Deva & Bilchitz, 2017), as well as on the possibility to expand the jurisdiction of international human rights courts to corporate conduct (see, e.g., Scheinin 2012).

Moral Approaches Business ethicists in particular have been searching for the moral grounds of corporate human rights responsibility (see Brenkert, 2016, for an overview). Rather than corporations’ (international) legal personality, the foundation of corporate human rights responsibility from a moral perspective is their moral agency (see Arnold, 2016; Werhane, 2016, in regard to corporate human rights responsibility, and Donaldson, 1982, more generally). Based on the moral agency of corporations we can distinguish between limited and expansive accounts of corporate (moral) human rights responsibility. Limited accounts hold that corporations’ human rights responsibilities are limited to duties of non-​violation (see, e.g., Arnold, 2010). Hsieh even argues that such limited duties must be derived from different moral grounds and thus do not amount to corporate human rights responsibilities in a more narrow sense (see Hsieh, 2015, 2017). Expansive accounts, on the other hand, argue that corporate human rights responsibilities entail not only negative responsibilities of non-​violation but also positive ones to protect and realize human rights (see, e.g., Santoro, 2000, 2009; Wettstein, 2009, 2012a; Wood, 2012). In other words, such expansive accounts see a role for corporations also in the advancement and realization of human rights and in providing

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    377 and contributing to solutions for some of the pressing human rights problems we are facing today.

Political Approaches Political approaches do not refer to international law or to ethical norms and principles to ground corporate human rights responsibility, but, rather, to political processes and social expectations. Most prominent among such approaches is John Ruggie’s UN Respect, Protect and Remedy Framework and its operationalization by the UNGPs. Ruggie makes it clear that the UNGPs are not meant to ground and give rise to any new legal duties for businesses. Similarly, he abstains from providing a foundation grounded in moral normativity (Bilchitz, 2013). Instead, Ruggie derives the corporate responsibility to respect human rights from the changing social expectations toward companies as well as their instrumental interest not to fall out of favor of their key stakeholders and thus to maintain their social license to operate. The yardstick for corporate legitimacy in regard to its human rights conduct, according to Ruggie, are the “courts of public opinion” (2008: 16), which makes corporate human rights responsibility essentially a political responsibility. Not surprisingly, Ruggie was criticized both by legal scholars as well as by ethicists for neglecting the legal and moral dimensions of corporate human rights responsibility. Others proposed political accounts of corporate human rights responsibility are rooted in the publicness of corporations (Karp, 2014) or in their political power that needs to be balanced with public responsibility (Kobrin, 2009). In sum, while the grounds on which to argue for corporate human rights responsibility vary widely, there is a strong and growing interdisciplinary case to be made that corporations indeed do have such a responsibility. However, how far such responsibilities reach and what they entail are subject to ongoing discussion.

BHR as a CSR Issue? There is a danger that this newly evolving BHR debate may be seen as a mere subset of the broader and long-​established CSR field or even only as a “CSR issue.” However, while the two discussions—​BHR and CSR—​share significant overlaps in terms of the issues they cover as well as in their overarching objective to promote and advance responsible business practices beyond and, in part, in opposition to the profit-​and shareholder value maximization mantra that has dominated management theory and practice for the last three or four decades, they do emanate from distinctly different starting points. Accordingly, the two discussions have followed separate and largely parallel paths and, as some scholars argue (Ramasastry, 2015; Wettstein, 2016) are currently in a process of divergence rather than convergence.

378   Florian Wettstein More specifically, while CSR emerged as a concept and discussion back in the 1950s and 1960s, driven by corporate practice and management scholars, BHR only emerged as a systematic debate in the mid-​to late 1990s, driven first and foremost by NGO investigations and campaigns as well as by legal scholars (Ramasastry, 2015). Accordingly, the dominant focus of the two discussions has been rather different: while CSR has traditionally focused on voluntary business initiatives and the transformation of business conduct from within, BHR has had a strong emphasis on law-​driven approaches, drawing on legal and policy instruments to demand and enforce responsible business conduct from outside (Wettstein, 2016). Against this background, rather than emerging as a subtheme of the CSR field or even as a CSR issue, BHR can be interpreted as a critical response to what has been perceived by some as a stalling or even failing CSR discussion (see, e.g., Banerjee, 2008; Fleming & Jones, 2013). Digging deeper, we can observe differences between the two approaches at the normative or foundational level and at the institutional level as well as at the operational level (Wettstein, 2016).

Differences at the Normative Level CSR is commonly seen as a voluntary responsibility that corporations adopt beyond compliance with laws. It is often perceived as an expression of going above and beyond what is required of businesses. Thus, CSR vocabulary alludes to voluntarism and desirable business conduct rather than to ethical imperatives and duties owed by businesses. As a result, businesses have often perceived CSR to provide ample leeway both in regard to what issues to focus on and by what means to address them (Wettstein, 2012a). However, such voluntarism runs counter to the common understanding of human rights. Human rights, whether interpreted through the lens of morality (Sen, 2004), the law (Shelton, 2014), or distinct cultural practices (Kurasawa, 2014), aim at the protection and promotion of our fundamental dignity as human beings. However, the urgency and fundamental nature of the claims emanating from our unconditional human dignity do not sit well with the perceived voluntarism of conventional interpretations of CSR. Respecting and protecting human rights is not a matter of goodwill or an expression of going above and beyond; it is what John Ruggie called “a baseline expectation” (2008: 17) for all businesses. Thus, equating BHR with CSR comes at a normative cost: conceptually, it risks turning human rights responsibility and indeed an increasingly critical part of realizing human rights as such into mere acts of corporate goodwill, which threatens to undermine the very core of what human rights aim to protect: the unconditional and equal dignity of all human beings. Practically, it encourages corporations to selectively meet human rights standards on their own terms. Politically, it fosters public indifference toward corporate human rights conduct and promotes hands-​off public policy, which sees little need to hold companies accountable for their human rights impact.

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    379

Differences at the Institutional Level As outlined above, CSR is often perceived as the responsibilities that corporations have beyond legal laws and government regulations. This is due to CSR traditionally presupposing a functioning state and a strong institutional framework (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Within such a framework, corporate responsibility is seen as private responsibility, while the public domain is the responsibility of governments alone. As a consequence, CSR can be conceptualized independently of the role and responsibility of governments. BHR, on the other hand, becomes relevant particularly and perhaps predominantly in contexts of dysfunctional or weak state institutions (Karp, 2014), that is, in contexts in which governments fail to meet their public responsibilities. It is against this background that BHR emerges as a discussion of particular relevance not least for the emerging markets context, whereas CSR, at least in its dominant conventional interpretation, may have significant limitations in addressing the challenges emanating from them. In such contexts, corporate human rights responsibility often extends far into the public realm and the separation of private and public domains often breaks down entirely. For better or for worse, in such contexts, corporate human rights responsibilities are closely intertwined with the role and responsibility of governments. Thus, as opposed to CSR, which is perceived as private responsibility beyond the realm of the government’s public responsibility, BHR denotes the extension of corporate responsibility into the public sphere. As such, it entails a renegotiation of public responsibility between the government and corporations; we cannot conceptualize corporate human rights responsibility without due consideration of the respective responsibilities of governments (Wettstein, 2016). It is thus not a coincidence that the UNGPs do not merely address business responsibilities like so many other CSR standards but tackle the responsibilities of both corporations and of governments in an integrated way. This being said, the newer discussion on political CSR, which started to emerge in the mid-​2000s, has proposed to conceptualize CSR along such lines of weakening states, of global governance gaps, and of a dissolving public-​private dichotomy (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). As such, political CSR has the potential to serve as a conceptual bridge between the two discussions. The consequence of this blurring of the lines between public and private in the BHR space, I  believe, can be twofold. Where institutions are strong, we can observe that governments take a much more active role as actual players in the BHR space, rather than a passive role in merely shaping the context in which corporations rather selectively meet their social responsibilities. The recent “wave” of national action plans (NAPs) on business and human rights issued by a good two dozen states bears witness to this difference. Where institutions are weak, on the other hand, there is a danger that governments retreat from the human rights space altogether and leave it to the corporations to deal with the respective responsibilities in their stead (Ruggie, 2008). While such processes may occur particularly in notoriously weak and dysfunctional states, emerging markets might occupy various positions on this spectrum between weak and strong institutional

380   Florian Wettstein settings. As we will see below, while most NAPs have been published by Western, particularly European, countries to date, the second wave of NAPs will include a number of emerging economies as well. Similar things can be said also about the role of the law in the BHR space (Wettstein, 2016). In traditional CSR, the role also of the law is rather peripheral and indirect. Rather than to actively intervene and enforce CSR, it shapes, defines, and sets the boundaries for the context within which corporations meet their private social responsibilities. At best it may encourage and facilitate CSR by enhancing the conditions for corporations to do so. BHR, on the other hand purports a much more active and interventionist role of the law. The quest for legal accountability, as argued above, is enshrined fundamentally in the identity of the BHR movement. This push for legal accountability is mirrored particularly in intensifying discussions on home-​state obligations in regulating and adjudicating the extraterritorial conduct of “their” multinationals as well as in an increasing number of human rights litigation cases, which are brought to domestic courts in a growing number of home states. Against this background, the reopening of treaty negotiations at the UN level only four years after the publication of the non-​ binding UNGPs, in 2015, seems like an almost logical step on the trajectory of the BHR debate.

Differences at the Operational Level There naturally is some overlap between operational CSR measures and initiatives and such in the BHR space. Many of the various CSR initiatives and instruments that companies have in place do address human rights issues directly or indirectly. However, as mentioned above, CSR initiatives and instruments have traditionally addressed a large range of issues and, accordingly, vary substantially in nature and appearance between sectors, industries, and companies. Moreover, many of such initiatives and projects are only loosely connected to the companies’ core business and management processes and have often been criticized to serve as mere add-​ons to companies’ business activities and thus to change little to nothing about the way those companies conduct their business (Ulrich, 2008). Accordingly, organizational policies relating to CSR are often incoherent and conflict across departments and functions and their impact on a company’s core business is often piecemeal and unsystematic. This seems to apply both to Western and to emerging market MNCs, as the difference between the two in respect to their CSR approaches are reportedly small (Baskin & Gordon, 2005). While initiatives and approaches certainly vary also for BHR, the publication of the UNGPs serves not only as an umbrella for those different initiatives, but established human rights due diligence (HRDD) as an overarching process and instrument to ensure human rights respect across all different sectors and industries. Accordingly, in order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, companies have to engage in a process of assessing their human rights impact, of taking adequate measures to mitigate or eliminate negative impacts, and of reporting on such measures publicly.

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    381 While the implementation and operationalization of HRDD must be specific to the respective industry context, the UNGPs provide clear boundaries within which such operationalization ought to take place. Importantly, by definition, HRDD connects directly to the daily business and operations of companies, rather than being disconnected from it. While HRDD should not be seen as a magic potion or silver bullet, it seems that, if carried out with proper care, it has the potential if not to change the culture and value foundation of a company at least to cut through to corporations’ core business processes and to provide effective safeguards against violations of human rights within and through them. Nevertheless, some emerging market contexts, in which human rights do not enjoy strong political backing and where human rights discourse and practices are not only neglected but openly suppressed by governments, admittedly pose particular challenges to corporations’ willingness to engage with human rights in explicit terms. With the rise of populist movements putting increasing pressure on human rights, companies may become more reluctant to address human rights in their own right rather than through a “CSR filter” also in the West. On the other hand, both of those contexts also offer opportunities for corporate champions to leave a positive mark by supporting human rights movements and defenders (Ineichen, 2018) and by standing up for human rights (Wettstein, 2010; Wettstein & Baur, 2016)

Institutional Landscape (International Level) Early attempts to institutionalize human rights responsibility particularly for multinational corporations can be traced back to the 1970s. Most prominently, the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises were established in 1976 and included one paragraph specifically devoted to human rights responsibility. The OECD Guidelines have continuously enhanced their human rights provisions in subsequent iterations. Most recently, in 2011, they included a human rights section, which is closely aligned with the UNGPs. The UN, too, launched an early attempt of a code of conduct for multinationals back in 1977, along with the foundation of a center for transnational corporations. Similar to the OECD Guidelines, the so-​called UN Draft Code included a paragraph on human rights as well as a provision on corporations’ interaction with authoritarian and racist governments. However, unlike the OECD Guidelines, the UN Draft Code was abandoned in the 1990s and the center was dissolved. Interestingly and relevant for the context of this book, the UN Draft Code was an initiative that was pushed decisively by developing countries and it was aimed at countering the perceived neo-​colonialism and exploitation of the South emanating from the global expansion of Western multinationals (Ramasastry, 2013). It was met by the resistance precisely of those Western multinationals and their governments. As we will see shortly, four decades later we are facing a similar constellation in regard to the new treaty negotiations,

382   Florian Wettstein which are currently under way. While the treaty negotiations were initiated and have since been supported predominantly by emerging and developing economies, Western governments have yet to play a more constructive role in the process. While these precursors of the current wave of institutionalization were able to plant a seed, the first international initiative on responsible business conduct, which truly put human rights center stage, was the UN Global Compact (Wettstein, 2012b). The UN Global Compact was launched in the year 2000 by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and is a voluntary, normative standard consisting of ten principles for responsible business. Principles one and two, respectively, ask signatory organizations to neither violate human rights directly through their business conduct nor contribute indirectly to human rights violations committed by other actors. Some 17 years after its launch, the UN Global Compact counts more than 10,000 signatory organizations and is often seen as the most successful corporate responsibility standard globally. Importantly, the UN Global Compact established human rights responsibility as a key component of responsible business conduct and introduced some of the key terms and vocabulary of the ensuing business and human rights discussion. Even two years earlier, in 1998, the UN Sub-​Commission on Human Rights put in place a working group tasked with drafting what was eventually meant to become a mandatory standard specifically for corporate human rights responsibility. The drafting process, spearheaded by University of Minnesota law professor David Weissbrodt, lasted five years, producing what is now known as the UN Draft Norms (see Weissbrodt, 2005; Weissbrodt & Kruger, 2003). The UN Draft Norms faced harsh criticism and opposition, again, by many predominantly Western governments as well as from the private sector. They were eventually shelved by the UN Commission on Human Rights, which argued that it had never tasked the sub-​commission with developing such an instrument and thus would not consider adopting it. Nevertheless, the UN Draft Norms were important for two reasons: first, it was the first initiative at the global level that not only put human rights center stage, as the UN Global Compact had, but turned them into its exclusive focus and purpose. While in the UN Global Compact only two of ten principles address human rights, the UN Draft Norms consist of human rights norms exclusively. Second, the heated discussion evolving around the UN Draft Norms and ultimately leading up to their failure showed the urgent need for a systematic discussion on BHR at the international policy level. Thus, it was this discussion that paved the way to the creation of the mandate of a UN special representative for business and human rights (SRSG) in 2005. It was Harvard professor John Ruggie who was appointed to pursue this new mandate, which was initially limited to a period of two years but eventually extended twice until mid-​ 2011. In 2008, the SRSG published the “Respect, protect and remedy Framework” (Ruggie, 2008) which provided the conceptual foundation for the subsequent UNGPs (Ruggie, 2011), which were published in June 2011. John Ruggie succeeded in getting the BHR unstuck after the UN Draft Norms failure and to turn the UNGPs into a focal point in the debate around which the various stakeholders could rally. Up to this day, the UNGPs remain the main policy instrument and the most important force in driving the implementation

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    383 of human rights responsibility within companies. Therefore, we will analyze the UNGPs in more detail in the following section. While the UNGPs remain the most significant policy initiative in the BHR field at the global level, there have been significant other developments since their publication in 2011. Most important, perhaps, is the above-​mentioned successful new attempt by the governments of Ecuador and South Africa to start new negotiations on a binding treaty on BHR at the UN level (see Lopez 2017; Lopez & Shea, 2016). It is not surprising, perhaps, that the initiative to start such negotiations came from emerging economy governments. Facing much of the world’s human rights violations with company involvement while being dependent on those very companies and their foreign direct investment places a dilemma on such governments and often forces them to prioritize economic goals over human rights (Giuliani & Macchi, 2014). Global rules can help to resolve the dilemma by easing the competitive pressure on emerging economies and thus allowing them to raise standards without paying an unreasonably high economic prize. After Ecuador and South Africa’s petition passed the UN Human Rights Council, an open-​ended intergovernmental working group was put in place and treaty discussions started in 2015. Thus, ten years after John Ruggie put an end to the discussions around the UN Draft Norms—​what is now referred to as John Ruggie’s “Normicide” (Ruggie, 2013: 158)—​the pendulum may swing back in the direction of a legally binding instrument. Considering the ongoing global power shift and the increasing readiness of emerging economies to assert their growing collective influence in the global arena, the trajectory of the current treaty negotiations, while naturally uncertain, may be significantly different from the negotiations of the UN Draft Norms 15 years ago. A similar push for mandatory rules can be observed also at the domestic level in various countries as a result of the UNGPs’ implementation process. We will have a look at such developments in more detail in the following section.

The UNGPs in Particular As introduced above, the UNGPs were published in June 2011, resulting from a six-​year mandate of the SRSG. They are the authoritative policy instrument at the global level today and the “focal point” on which the BHR debate centers. In a nutshell, the UNGPs rest on three pillars:  first, governments’ duty to protect human rights from corporate abuse. Second, companies’ responsibility to respect human rights. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights is understood as a responsibility of non-​violation, that is, a responsibility to violate human rights neither directly through their own conduct nor indirectly by contributing to or being linked with human rights violations committed by third parties, such as suppliers, host governments, or business partners. Third, a joint governmental and business responsibility to improve victims’ access to effective remedies. While the first pillar of the UNGPs

384   Florian Wettstein outlines legally binding duties for governments, which are derived from existing international law, the second pillar is not meant to create new binding norms or rules but ought to be understood as a voluntary business responsibility derived from changing social expectations toward corporations. Thus, the UNGPs adhere to the tradition of soft-​law governance and lack any direct enforcement mechanisms. Rather, the UNGPs count on national governments to put the respective mechanisms toward their effective implementation in place. For doing so, they suggest that governments should use a “smart mix” of measures, both national and international, as well as binding and non-​binding (Ruggie, 2011: 8). It is peculiar that the UNGPs hand the task of enforcement exclusively back to national governments after locating the root cause of the BHR predicament, which gave rise to the need for the UNGPs in the first place, precisely in such governance gaps, emanating from governments lacking will or capacity to regulate businesses in the human rights space. In the emerging markets context in particular, the expectations that governments will or can ensure human rights respect through legislative and policy measures in a comprehensive way is illusory, given that their competitiveness often hinges on keeping labor and environmental standards relatively low. Against this background, it is of little surprise that most of the activity that has been catalyzed by the UNGPs at the domestic (as opposed to the global) level so far, can be observed in the Western European context. Some of the most recent developments indeed point in the direction of turning the UNGPs, or parts thereof, into domestic law. At the policy level, growing number of governments have recently released NAPs on BHR. However, of the 18 published NAPs at the time of writing this chapter, only three are from countries outside Europe (USA, Colombia, Chile), none are from Africa, and none from Asia. Thus, while emerging economies were no early starters in terms of developing NAPs, some of them have recently started to develop them or have launched alternative government-​sponsored initiatives. Among them are nations like Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Indonesia, or Malaysia. A  total of 27 countries (including a number of advanced economies) have recently started engaging in such processes, indicating that seven years after the publication of the UNGPs, their implementation process is increasingly reaching emerging economies.1 Such NAPs outline the basic commitment of national governments to the UNGPs and their prospective strategies in implementing them. While, by and large, those NAPs remain vague and rather noncommittal, they do signal BHR has arrived on governments’ agenda and will likely remain there for the foreseeable future. This relates directly to the above insights on institutional differences between CSR and BHR. At the legislative level, there has been a recent push by lawmakers and grassroots organizations to render human rights due diligence mandatory at domestic levels. This is despite the fact that most of such NAPs are cautious in proposing new legislation in the BHR space. A number of countries have adopted new legislation in the most recent past or are in the process of negotiating such. By and large, such are Western European countries (and in the United States) with strong progressive forces in their governments (e.g., the USA under the Obama Administration) and parliaments (e.g., France) as well

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    385 as influential civil society sectors (e.g., Switzerland). The aim of such legislation is to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of companies’ foreign operations, thus filling the regulatory gaps in the environmental and social realm that such companies may encounter when operating in contexts of institutional voids. Most prominently, France has adopted a new duty of vigilance law, which mandates HRDD according to the UNGPs for large multinationals headquartered in France. In the UK, the UK Modern Slavery Act, which was adopted in 2015, requires UK businesses to report on their efforts—​in essence, their HRDD—​to eliminate slave and forced labor in their operations and supply chains. A similar law exists in California, i.e., the California Supply Chain Transparency Act. Negotiations for similar legislation are under way also in Australia. Meanwhile, the Netherlands are in the process of adopting legislation that will require companies to conduct HRDD in order to combat child labor in their operations and supply chains. The Dutch law will cover not only Dutch companies but all companies that serve Dutch markets, even if they are headquartered outside the Netherlands. In a similar vein, Section 1502 of the Dodd-​Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act establishes mandatory due diligence relating to conflict minerals. Similar regulation has been adopted in 2017 by the EU, mandating supply chain due diligence for importers of conflict minerals. In Switzerland a broad and growing coalition of nearly 100 NGOs and civil society organizations have launched a popular initiative aiming to establish comprehensive mandatory HRDD legislation. The Swiss people will vote on their proposal in 2019. There has been some controversy around such new laws in regard to whether or not they denote an imposition of legal rules and moral values of “home states” onto the context of “host states” (Kobrin, 2009). Interestingly, it seems that such objections are voiced predominantly by critics in home states rather than in host states. This is noteworthy and perhaps somewhat ironic particularly against the background that, as seen above, most support for similar binding rules at the international level has traditionally come from emerging economies—​in the case of the UN Draft Code specifically based on the fear that the unchecked economic activity of multinationals itself denotes a form of Western imperialism. At the adjudicative level, the past 20 years have heralded a growing number of human rights litigation cases in domestic courts in the home states of multinational companies. Initially, most such cases were brought to US courts based on the Alien Tort Statute, but recent years have seen a diversification in terms of both litigation strategies as well as targeted jurisdictions. This is mainly due to a seminal Supreme Court ruling in 2013 on a lawsuit brought against Shell by the widow of the murdered Ogoni activist Barinem Kiobel. This ruling established a presumption against ATS’s extraterritorial application, which raised the bar to bring such cases to US courts. Furthermore, in the most recent Jesner v. Arab Bank case, the Supreme Court denied applicability of ATS to foreign corporations across the board. As a consequence, victims of human rights abuse and their lawyers had to look for other avenues to take cases to domestic home-​country courts of multinationals. One way to do so is to base such lawsuits on different legal grounds, such as the above-​mentioned California Supply Chain Transparency Act;

386   Florian Wettstein another way is to bring them to countries other than the USA, such as, for example, the Netherlands, UK, Germany, or Canada. Irrespective of where such lawsuits have been brought to court and on what grounds, most of them were dismissed in the past. Very few of them led to out-​of-​court settlements and none of them ended in a guilty verdict against a Western parent company (Schrempf-​Stirling & Wettstein, 2017). In one case, Milieudefensie v. Shell, adjudicated in the Netherlands, a Nigerian subsidiary of Shell was found guilty of human rights abuse, while the parent company was acquitted from any wrongdoing. The case has been appealed. Despite the lack of “guilty verdicts” there is a progression toward more rather than fewer such cases and in an increasing number of different countries. In combination with the above legislative innovations, it may be a matter of time until some first cases will succeed and set important precedents. As these elaborations on UNGPs implementation at the policy, legislative, and adjudicative levels imply, the evolving governance infrastructure in the business and human rights space shows a significant blurring of the traditional categories of hard versus soft law. The domestic enforcement of global soft law and their use as a reference point in domestic court cases leads to a process of hardening of soft law. Having a closer look particularly at such lawsuits we can observe that they tend to fail particularly in the legal domain. However, in most cases they push companies to adopt and commit to soft-​ law initiatives, to start reporting on their human rights performance, or to implement other measures and safeguards to ensure human rights respect (Schrempf-​Stirling & Wettstein, 2017). Thus, while the lawsuits seem not to lead to the desired “hard” results, they strengthen and promote soft measures. We can thus observe an opposite process of a softening of hard law at the same time. It seems that such processes in the space of global governance are of significant relevance particularly to businesses operating at a global scale. Thus, assessing the BHR space based on the traditional dichotomy between hard and soft measures will likely lead to an incomplete understanding of the dynamic interrelation between hard and soft law today and thus fall short on providing good guidance for companies to adequately navigate the increasingly complex business and human rights space.

Key Themes and Open Research Needs in BHR There are a number of key research themes and open research questions that derive from the current scholarly discussion on BHR more generally and against the background of this evolving institutional infrastructure more specifically. I will attempt to outline just a few of them, structuring them along global, domestic, and operational levels. More specific, emerging market-​oriented research themes and gaps will be addressed in the subsequent section.

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    387

Global Level Not surprisingly, the treaty negotiations in the UN Human Rights Council has been a key research focus of BHR scholars in recent times. Such research has addressed normative arguments surrounding the treaty discussions (Bilchitz, 2016) as well as questions relating to form and scope of a potential treaty (DeSchutter, 2016) and to the broader context in which it ought to be embedded (Deva & Bilchitz, 2017). There has been much discussion about the danger that such treaty negotiations may stall and delay the implementation process of the UNGPs (Ruggie 2014). Arguments in this regard tend to adhere to the common dichotomy between mandatory and voluntary approaches as two distinct and potentially opposing governance mechanisms. However, looking at these instruments from the vantage point of a complex interplay between binding and non-​binding approaches as outlined above may open new perspectives on their potential complementarities and synergies in promoting human rights respect of companies. More generally, understanding the blurring between soft and hard law in different dimensions is a key research area that needs to be explored, not least to understand better what effective business and human rights governance can and ought to look like. A more specific question related to the changing governance structure at the global level is how the established BHR framework and the UNGPs in particular relate to and ought to engage with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework (see, e.g., Gneiting, Bloch Veiberg, & Mehra, 2017). There is a danger, for example, that shifting the focus to the SDGs and thus to the positive potential of businesses to contribute to their realization may divert our attention from preventing businesses to do harm and making sure they do not violate human rights in the first place. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the broad range of issues addressed by SDGs will lead to a selective approach by businesses, cherry-​picking certain goals, which can be served effortlessly while dropping others that would require substantial organizational investments and changes. Such approaches are readily commensurable with current CSR thinking and thus there is a danger that companies will latch on to the SDGs agenda not in addition or as a complement to a commitment to human rights but as a replacement of it. This possibility is supported by recent research showing that companies tend to avoid human rights language in their communication, because of its potential political sensitivity (Obara, 2017). From this perspective, the vocabulary of the SDGs may be seen as a welcome alternative by many companies. As a consequence, BHR advocates increasingly call for embedding human rights and the business responsibility to respect them at the very core of the SDGs (UN Working Group on BHR, 2017). However, little scholarly work has been done so far that analyzes in depth the relation between the SDGs and the UNGPs and on the implications of the SDGs for the implementation of the business and human rights agenda. There seems to be a more conflictual relation between the SDGs and recent developments in the legislative arena at both the domestic and the international level. In current political discourses on such legislation, there seems to be a tendency to put the SDGs in direct opposition with potential binding BHR legislation

388   Florian Wettstein in current policy discussions. Opponents of such legislation in particular perceive the SDGs as an alternative and indeed opposing approach to binding BHR legislation and regulation, whereas proponents tend to dismiss them based on their non-​binding character. Infused with ideologically hardened positions, such polarized policy debates tend to obscure, rather than advance, a deeper understanding of the interdependence and interplay of such different governance initiatives. As a result, there is a need for systematic scholarly engagement with them.

State Level There are some underemphasized areas in the UNGPs which are currently emerging as key research themes at the state level. Among them are the state’s role in providing access to justice and remedy to victims of human rights violations committed by home-​state companies abroad. Access to remedy is one of the three central pillars in the UNGPs, but it has been much neglected in current implementation efforts. While most attention has been given to the first two pillars, the issue of remediation has been neglected both in the NAPs of governments as well as in company policies on human rights respect. Accordingly, there is a need for more and better research on effective remedy mechanisms, both judicial and non-​judicial, and particularly on the interrelation between them. There is an evolving discussion, for example, on the use of the so-​called National Contact Points of the OECD Guidelines for business and human rights issues (Nieuwenkamp 2014; Ochoa Sanchez 2015). However, their relation to and potential complementarity with evolving legislation in the business and human rights field remains underexplored. More generally, keeping in mind the complex interplay between voluntary and mandatory measures as well as the transformation of their respective mode of operation when combined, raises the question about the nature and shape of what John Ruggie called a “smart mix” of measures to promote human rights respect of businesses at the domestic level. A directly related, normative discussion that has received increasing attention as of late refers to potential extraterritorial obligations of home states in preventing and possibly adjudicating human rights violations committed or contributed to by “their” companies abroad (Simons & Macklin, 2014). The area of extraterritorial obligations of states has been addressed only superficially in the UNGPs; the SRSG avoided taking a position on this thorny issue in the UNGPs for pragmatic reasons: taking a forceful stance on extraterritorial obligations would likely have irritated the business community whose support was deemed critical for the successful adoption of the UNGPs by the Human Rights Council. Apart from the need to understand better both such obligations in and of themselves as well as their adequate implementation through home-​state legislation, regulation, and adjudication, this discussion raises related questions, e.g., on the potential economic impact of such measures on home states and host states, on the legitimacy of extraterritorial measures in relation to host-​state sovereignty, or more generally on their impact on institutional development, e.g., of the judiciary, in host states.

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    389 Such questions seem of particular relevance for emerging market contexts and will therefore be addressed in more detail in the following section.

Operational Level There has been a surge in empirical, management-​oriented research on BHR as of late. Such research has looked at the sense-​making and framing processes at play, when corporations grapple with the implementation of human rights respect (Goethals, 2016; Obara, 2017), at the role specifically of CSR in such sense-​making processes (Obara & Peattie, forthcoming), on the implementation of HRDD (McCorquodale, Smit, Neely, & Brooks, 2017) as well as on the shortcoming of such HRDD processes conceptually (Fasterling, 2017) and their limitations in addressing the structural root causes of many human rights violations (Tuta, 2017; Wettstein, 2015). However, there is still a lack of information about the general uptake and impact of the UNGPs among companies, about the way they are implemented and embedded within the core business processes and how they are or will be affecting the structural and cultural dimensions of corporations and the business models on which they are built. A further area in which sound empirical research is needed is in regard to the economic impact of both human rights respect and human rights abuse, that is, on the so-​called business case for human rights respect. While much of companies’ commitment to human rights and social responsibility more generally is driven by the belief that it will pay off economically, evidence of such a correlation is mixed at best (see, e.g., Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Rost & Ehrmann, 2017). Thus, there is much value to new and innovative research in this area conceptually as well as practically. Such research should focus not only on the positive potential of human rights respect, but also on the limits of business case thinking. It should thus include contexts and circumstances in which human rights abuse may go unpunished by the market or even pay off for companies, that is, it should assess critically also the potential business case for human rights abuse.

BHR in Emerging Market Contexts After outlining some key research themes and questions of the BHR debate more generally, we will now reflect on their implications in the more specific context of emerging economies and emerging economies research. Fast economic growth paired with high inequality levels and an often underdeveloped human rights infrastructure render the context of emerging economies particularly relevant and interesting from a business and human rights perspective. While developed economies are not immune to human rights violations committed or contributed to by companies, a large percentage of such violations on record arguably occur in less developed and emerging economies (Ruggie 2013: 24). However, many of

390   Florian Wettstein them are connected to the operations of Western multinationals and their global value chains. Certain industries which are prone to such occurrences are characteristic for and in many cases dominant in emerging economies, such as the garment and apparel sector, extractive industries, fishery or construction sectors, among others (Ruggie 2013: 25). But also knowledge-​driven sectors such as the information technology (IT) and telecommunication sector are becoming of increasing importance in emerging markets and can often be connected to specific kinds of human rights violations, such as the suppression of freedom of speech or arbitrary detention and imprisonment for political advocacy. Accordingly, the business and human rights agenda poses particular challenges both for “Western” companies expanding their value chains and doing business in emerging economies as well as for emerging economy multinationals keen to expand into “Western” markets, in which they have to cope with a tighter regulatory framework as well as a more demanding consumer, investor, and citizen base in regard to social, environmental, and human rights expectations. These are the two main contexts from which an emerging market-​related research agenda in BHR emerges. The following paragraphs will structure this twofold research agenda again into implications at the global, the state, and the company level.

Implications and Research Themes at the Global Level There are two emerging trends and developments impacting on emerging economies that seem of particular relevance from a global BHR perspective. First, there is the looming shift from (South)east Asia to Africa as the future “factory of the world.” Not only will this have an effect on the work situation in the impacted countries both in Asia and in Africa, but the shift is driven not least by the increasing global investment and sourcing activities of emerging economies themselves. China in particular is heavily driving this shift toward Africa. Second, automation and artificial intelligence (AI) will likely impact emerging markets in profound ways, as it may replace much of traditional factory labor and drive production from emerging markets back into developed economies. While this may reduce the risk of Western multinationals to be linked to and implicated with gross labor rights abuses in emerging economies, it may have devastating impacts on the livelihood of affected workers and on broader socioeconomic development in those countries more generally. Thus, the digital revolution will bring with it its own structural human rights challenges, which will be of existential importance for emerging economies. Much will depend on how companies will manage the large-​scale human rights implications deriving from their full transition into the “digital age.”

Implications and Research Themes at the State Level As indicated above, one of the central evolving discussions within the business and human rights field deals with the obligations of home states to regulate and possibly

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    391 adjudicate human rights violations committed by multinationals in host states. There is much discussion about the implications of such measures on home states themselves, particular in regard to multinationals threatening to relocate their headquarters to countries with looser regulative frameworks. With emerging market multinationals becoming more competitive in global markets, Western multinationals may increasingly perceive themselves to be put in competitive disadvantage by stricter and more extensive home-​state regulations. As a result, they may advocate for loosening regulatory frameworks aimed at the protection of human rights in their home states. However, perhaps of more relevance are the possible implications of such regulation on the host states, particularly in emerging economy contexts. Critics of such home-​state regulation of transnational business activities in particular have warned that there may be adverse or even counterproductive side effects of such measures. More specifically, they fear that Western multinationals would pull out of high-​risk markets altogether if subjected to costly due diligence requirements and litigation risk, which would end up hurting local populations, rather than helping them. More independent, scholarly research on such unintended consequences, but also on the potential positive impact of such regulation on the rights of affected communities and stakeholders, is needed to provide a more holistic picture of how such measures impact emerging economies. As an example, looking at some of the available assessments of Section 1502 of the Dodd-​Frank Act provides an ambiguous picture indeed. While some laud the provision for reducing the presence of armed groups controlling mining areas and dramatically increasing the export of conflict free minerals from eastern Congo (Dranginis, 2016), others assert that it drives countless artisanal miners out of business and point to endemic difficulties in regard to the law’s enforcement on the ground (Wolfe, 2015). Thus, there is a need to take a differentiated look at such regulatory tools, and to research and anticipate more precisely the intended and unintended impacts and to design them as “precision tools” (Ruggie, 2013: xlvi) with the potential to amplify the positive impacts and avoid the negative ones. Another key research theme at the intersection of BHR and emerging economy scholarship deals with the institutional impact of Western multinationals in emerging economies (see, e.g., Santoro, 2000, 2009). It may be of particular relevance to explore if and how such multinationals do or do not help to raise the bar in institutional human rights protection in emerging markets by, e.g., modeling responsible business conduct and pushing for progressive economic and political reform (positive), or by exploiting regulatory gaps and pressuring governments to ease regulation aimed at the environmental and social protection (negative). There may be similar value to tracking the responses of developed economies to the increasing presence of emerging economies multinationals in the global economy. More specifically, will the push of emerging economy multinationals into the global markets increase Western governments’ caution to regulate their own companies due to fears of decreasing their competitiveness? Such findings would support the idea that global structural problems require global solutions, as proposed, e.g., by a binding international treaty on BHR. As pointed out

392   Florian Wettstein above, such binding solutions at the international level tend to be supported first of all by the governments of emerging economies.

Implications and Research Themes at the Operational Level As emerging economy multinationals are pushing into global markets, the question arises not only if and how Western governments are prepared to receive them, but also how those companies themselves are prepared to meet the potentially higher demands and expectations in established markets abroad. Human rights have been a rather marginal focus within research on emerging market multinationals (Giuliani, Santangelo, & Wettstein, 2016). Human rights respect may be an area in which liabilities of foreignness (see, e.g., Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) may be of particular relevance for emerging market multinationals (Giuliani et  al., 2016). That is, emerging market multinationals originating from contexts in which human rights protections may be low, freedom of speech and information may be systematically suppressed, and oppression of minorities in terms of race or political, sexual, and religious orientation may be rampant, face an uphill battle for legitimacy when operating in markets where human rights protection is more advanced and where expectations of key stakeholder are higher. Such emerging market multinationals may struggle to bridge the institutional distance between home and host markets and to achieve sufficient legitimacy in foreign economies. Nevertheless, the drivers of change particularly in regard to responsible business conduct and respective emerging market institutional frameworks and policies may be changing. Commonly, the focus has been on Western multinationals doing business in emerging markets and their impact through positive spillovers (Giuliani & Macchi, 2014) such as knowledge and technology transfer and their role as a driver of socioeconomic development more generally. However, we may need to shift some of this attention from inward to outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and assess how the growing pressure on emerging market multinationals to adopt responsible business practices (see, e.g., Marano, Tashman, & Kostova, 2017) including human rights policies and due diligence processes drives institutional and organizational changes also at home. Marano et al. (2017), for example, showed that multinationals engage in more intensive CSR reporting if they come from countries with pervasive institutional voids. They do so as a legitimation strategy in order to mitigate the liabilities of origin. In a similar vein, Fiaschi, Giuliani, & Macchi (2012; see also Giuliani & Macchi, 2014) argue that for the same reason multinationals from the BRIC countries are more proactive in undertaking CSR initiatives and managing human rights than Western MNCs. On the other hand, such processes of adaptation under pressure may be particularly susceptible to distortions based on decoupling and greenwashing (Bansal & Kistruck, 2006; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Giuliani and Macchi (2014) point to inconclusive evidence

Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business    393 overall and thus to a need for further comparative research on these issues. The same goes for the conduct of emerging market multinationals when they expand into other developing and emerging economies, rather than into advanced markets. Due to weaker legitimation pressure particularly in contexts of weak protections of free speech and an independent press, as Fiaschi, Giuliani, and Nieri (2017) allege, emerging market multinationals tend to be more, rather than less, prone to irresponsible conduct then their Western peers. Western multinationals may find it challenging to navigate institutional voids in emerging economies particularly when coping with government requests that run counter their own human rights policies and/​or the expectations of key stakeholders in their home markets. For example, Internet companies may be faced with requests of Internet shutdowns or to provide sensitive data of their customers to emerging market governments. They may have to tolerate discriminatory policies against minority employees or even be asked to actively contribute to such discrimination through their workplace policies. Emerging economy contexts may be of particular relevance in regard to such dilemmas since, increasingly, companies are faced not with weak and dysfunctional states but with growing governmental power that diminishes the companies’ room to maneuver and to resist problematic government requests and policies. Still, there may be opportunities for progressive multinationals to work toward progress as “institutional entrepreneurs” (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007) or even use their leverage to push for political reform and the strengthening of human rights protections in such contexts (Wettstein, 2009; Wood, 2012). There is much insight to be gained still in regard to how companies navigate the fine line between imposing their own values and asking for much-​needed transformations and in regard to a plethora of other open questions that relate to non-​market strategies and human rights conduct of Western multinationals operating in emerging economies. Generally, the relation between Western multinationals and the human rights situation in emerging economies is a complex one with their positive or negative impacts depending on a variety of different variables (Giuliani & Macchi, 2014), which are in need of further exploration.

Conclusion This chapter has introduced BHR as a young but fast-​evolving debate and field at the heart of the wider discussion on corporate responsibility. It is a discussion that has emerged not least as a critical response to current approaches to CSR, which have been criticized for their non-​committal nature and their general lack of impact. The relation of BHR to the theme of this volume goes two ways. On the one hand, the evolving BHR discussion will likely impact the trajectory of emerging markets in profound ways. The UNGPs in particular have created unprecedented momentum both in the practical and the policy arena. Many governments have published or are in the process of developing NAPs on BHR, signaling a basic commitment to the concern

394   Florian Wettstein and outlining some (often modest) measures to address it in the future. Businesses have started to implement human rights policies and due diligence measures to assess and address their human rights impacts. Civil society is increasingly using the UNGPs to push for increased accountability among companies for their human rights conduct. This development, while still predominantly occurring in OECD countries, is shaping the context in which emerging economy multinationals enter global markets today and it inevitably affects emerging economies more generally, which are not only competing for foreign direct investment but increasingly claiming a share of the global markets themselves. On the other hand, the rise of emerging economies, the increasing relevance of emerging market multinationals in global markets, and the rising power and assertion of emerging market governments will influence the trajectory also of the BHR debate. The successful initiation of new treaty negotiations in the UN Human Rights Council is an example of the new, more influential role such countries are able to play in international politics. Similarly, the presence of Chinese multinationals in Africa and increasingly elsewhere raises new challenges and opportunities for BHR. All of this calls for a closer integration of scholarship on BHR with scholarship on IB and emerging markets. While BHR has put little emphasis on the specificity of emerging markets and emerging market multinationals, scholarship on emerging markets has largely ignored human rights in their research so far. A closer integration of the two fields promises a host of new and intriguing research perspectives with a potential to advance both fields in significant ways.

Note 1. For a comprehensive and up-​to-​date overview see the toolkit on NAPs developed by the Danish Institute for Human Rights in collaboration with the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR): https://​globalnaps.org/​.

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Chapter 17

Spill overs from FDI in Emerging Ma rk et Ec onom i e s Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Nigel Driffield, Meng Song, and Priit Vahter

Emerging market economies (EMEs) have long sought foreign investment. In contrast perhaps to the main driver for Western economies to seek foreign investment, which is employment creation, the focus in EMEs has been the upskilling and technological upgrading of their economies—​which we call “technology transfer” in the rest of this chapter, along with the (expected) positive impact of such investment on exporting. This emphasis on technology transfer also draws on the increasing emphasis on the nature of secondary or additional benefits of attracting inward investment—​ from hereon, foreign direct investment (FDI)—​even in the Western context, in the first instance because the employment generation figures did not seem promising. The observed productivity and technology differences between inward investors and domestic firms further emphasized the “technology transfer” role of inward investment and, with a few exceptions (see Bhaumik, Estrin, & Meyer, 2007, and the references therein), the literature has largely focused on technology transfer and productivity implications of FDI. While this question has been hotly debated in the West for some time, dating back to Caves (1974), it may be argued that the extent to which FDI results in technology transfers into an economy and the extent to which this knowledge is disseminated beyond the boundaries of the recipient firms (i.e., subsidiaries or joint venture partners of multinational enterprises) is of potentially greater importance for EMEs, because of the emphasis the policymakers in EMEs have placed on FDI as a source of technology. For example, attracting foreign capital and technologies has been an important economic strategy for China since its economic reform starting in 1977 (Xia & Zhao, 2012). Correspondingly, significant resources have been devoted to attract

400    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. FDI, including infrastructure upgrading and taxation exemptions. More generally, there has been a move towards policies that are favorable towards and involve fewer restrictions on FDI.1 Government effort to attract FDI notwithstanding, technology transfer from inward investors has been widely debated. In particular, there is much debate about the extent to which any technology transfer is disseminated beyond the direct recipients of the technology, or the extent to which we observe “spillover” effects of the aforementioned technology transfer. There are perhaps three main reasons for this: the first is theoretical, based on the fundamental principles of international business, the second is essentially empirical, and the third is driven by policy considerations. The theoretical basis for the importance of spillovers is driven by the obvious extensions to Dunning’s eclectic paradigm which starts with the premise that in order to successfully compete in a foreign country, a multinational enterprise (MNE) must have some form of ownership advantages, often in the form of intangible assets. One can characterize these ownership advantages in a number of ways; aside from a pure technological advantage, intangible assets can include managerial ability, economies of scale and scope, brands and other forms of non-​technological intellectual property, or even, for example, favorable access to finance. Much of the conceptual and theoretical literature on spillovers has, building on Cantwell (1989), taken a perspective based on technological advantages, such as superior products or processes, which may or may not be subject to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. There is a large related literature, building on, for example, Driffield (2001), which we do not intend to explore in detail here. As such, this literature builds on the apparent productivity differences between inward investors (Temouri, Driffield, & Higón, 2008) and local firms and interprets this as evidence of the MNEs’ technological advantage. In turn, therefore, standard theories relating to competition, innovation, or dispersion of innovation predict that over time the technology embedded in the MNEs would disperse into the local economy by various mechanisms that we explore later in this chapter. However, it is interesting to note that analysis of the productivity gap between inward investors and local firms, which diminishes as one controls for multinationality, export-​orientation, and size, has remained more or less constant since the analysis of Davies and Lyons (1991), at some 40% in the aggregate, reducing to some 14% once one compares like with like (Temouri et al. 2008), at least for the richest countries in Europe. In part, the friction may result from strategies and actions of the MNEs themselves; even as a MNE locates these intangible assets at an overseas location to generate higher returns, it seeks to retain ownership of and control over these assets. Further, as implied by the arguments of Bhaumik, Driffield, and Zhou (2015, 2016), even if the control of MNEs over these assets is imperfect, resulting in flow of the associated “technology” from the MNEs to local firms, a local firm’s (in)ability to absorb the technology may itself prove a barrier to spillover of this technology beyond the MNE subsidiaries and joint venture (JV) partners. The second aspect of the spillover debate (Driffield & Jindra, 2012; Görg & Strobl, 2001; Meyer & Sinani, 2009) is the variation that one finds in estimates of spillovers,

Spillovers from FDI    401 based on data and econometric issues.2 The most common empirical approach, for example, involves estimating productivity of the host-​country firms, and relating productivity growth in these firms to the incidence of FDI, thereby inferring technology transfer from MNEs to host-​country firms. To summarize, this literature finds that overall the productivity effects of inward FDI appear more persuasive when one distinguishes between horizontal and vertical effects (i.e., spillover to local firms at roughly the same node of the value chain as the MNEs versus spillover to downstream firms in the MNEs’ supply chains), and where the researcher allows for crowding-​ out effects (as the spillover estimates may otherwise understate productivity growth effects). It is also important to allow for selection bias, namely, the propensity of higher-​performing sectors to attract higher-​performing FDI, so as not to over-​ estimate spillovers. Nevertheless, even allowing for these methodological nuances, there are large variations in apparent spillover effects reported in the literature, with both negative and positive associations between FDI and technological spillover reported, especially in studies using sectoral-​level data and relying on productivity estimates.3 Finally, the third and potentially most important reason for seeking to explain and explore this spillover relationship is the one that justifies policy interventions to attract FDI. In the West, FDI policy has become almost synonymous with regional policy (Driffield, Munday, & Roberts, 2004), with FDI incentives being used to stimulate employment in locations that have suffered structural decline. However, there are some very well-​rehearsed examples from particularly the 1990s and early 2000s, where the scale of the incentive offered could never be justified on purely economic grounds, if one were to focus on employment creation alone. One could think of, for example, the Mercedes plant in Alabama, or the DeLorean factory in Northern Ireland, as perhaps the best-​known examples of investment incentives that could never be justified on a “cost per job” basis. On a larger scale, the final evaluation of UK’s Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) scheme (Hart, Driffield, Roper, & Mole, 2008) found that the returns in terms of job creation or protection were much lower where foreign inward investors received the subsidy, compared with support given to local firms. In other words, the concept of knowledge transfer (or spillover) has to be used to justify policy-​driven promotion of inward investment; job creation as a potential outcome cannot justify these policies on its own. To further complicate matters, there may actually be a trade-​off between spillovers and policy objectives such as employment generation. As Driffield and Love (2007) point out, inward investments either generate productivity growth and technology transfer or employment for hitherto underemployed labor, but seldom do they generate both. This chapter therefore proceeds by conceptualizing spillovers, and exploring some of the interpretations that are found in the literature, focusing on the key distinction between horizontal (intra-​industry) and vertical (typically referred to as inter-​industry) effects. We then go on to explore the scale and scope of these effects, linked to both the international business literature on FDI motivation and ownership structures, and link those to absorptive capacity. Finally, based on our discussion of the extant literature, we

402    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. develop a framework by which spillovers in EMEs may be discussed; local institutional quality lies at the heart of this framework.

Conceptualizing Spillovers Any analysis of the spillovers literature has to start with a precise definition of what precisely is meant by spillovers in this context. Following Caballero and Lyons (1989, 1990, 1992), if one takes the standard definition of an externality as “a consequence to an individual or individuals of an industrial or commercial activity which affects other parties without this being reflected in market prices,” then spillovers in their purest form should be taken to be an externality. It is a form of technology transfer from (in this case) inward investors to local firms, but one that is not fully captured through the market mechanism. To be more precise, it occurs when technology or any other form of knowledge that may be transferred by an MNE to a local subsidiary or JV partner spills over to other local firms in which the MNE does not have any ownership stake. In the literature, the channels through which spillovers occur are conceptually limited to informal mechanisms such as labor mobility across firms, reverse engineering of the MNEs’ products, or demonstration effects that facilitate learning-​by-​doing in local firms. All of these mechanisms are arguably linked to agglomeration economies, and the role that multinationals have in stimulating or supporting these economies (De Propris & Driffield, 2005; Menghinello, De Propris, & Driffield, 2010). Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde (2001) were perhaps the first to quantify the spillovers from FDI generated through labor mobility. The importance of this mechanism has increased in recent years, as high-​tech firms constantly face skill shortages and are engaged in what has become known as “the war for talent.” In the context of FDI, this mechanism typically involves workers receiving training and exposure to new knowl­ edge or technology at an MNE subsidiary or JV, and then leaving this firm for a local one. The knowledge that was initially embedded in the MNE thereby spills over into the local economy and becomes embedded in local firms as well. Barry, Görg, and Strobl (2003) characterized demonstration effects from FDI, as an extension of the more management-​based literature exploring inter-​firm learning. The central argument, developed from Caves (1996), is that local firms observe FDI achieving higher productivity and seek to copy practices and processes. While initial attempts at copying these practices and processes may be unsuccessful, learning-​by-​doing leads to gradual refinement of these practices and processes in the local firms, and eventually there is a significant transfer of these “technologies” from MNE subsidiaries to local firms. An extension of this is adoption of so-​called reverse engineering where local firms seek to unlock and thereafter mimic the technological advances made by MNEs. Such activity is, of course, limited by patenting and other forms of intellectual property (IP) protection. However, as we explore later, the very nature of this mechanism may make it more significant in emerging markets with weaker institutional quality.

Spillovers from FDI    403 Many other knowledge transfer effects are often potentially mislabeled as spillovers, because of the problem of identification within the empirical literature. Caves (1996), for example, outlines a number of reasons why one may expect knowledge transfer between inward investors and domestic firms, those that result from formal agreements between MNE subsidiaries and local firms. Licensing, training agreements, and technology sharing along supply chains are often put in place by inward investors as a mechanism for improving the quality and resilience of their local supply chains. The empirical literature is essentially unable to distinguish between these market-​based technology transfers and the “pure spillovers”, leading to many of these effects being labeled spillovers or externalities. What is undeniable, however, is that while these effects are not externalities and hence not spillovers in the strict conceptual sense, they are perhaps most important in terms of determining the social returns to resources deployed to attract FDI, and potentially why the literature has found stronger evidence for vertical spillovers than for horizontal spillovers from FDI (Driffield, Munday, & Roberts, 2002; Javorcik, 2004). In the next section, we discuss, in detail, the empirical evidence about the extent of spillovers. This evidence has to be interpreted in light of the wider debates regarding the motivation for technology transfer, and the challenges associated with empirically isolating pure spillovers. As we demonstrate in our discussion, the support for pure externality-​based spillovers is unclear and, by contrast, there is greater evidence to support the existence of market-​based technology transfer. For emerging markets, where local firms are often part of supply chains of global MNEs, therefore, it would be more meaningful to view spillovers though a broader prism than that of externality.

Evidence about Spillovers This section discusses mixed evidence on horizontal versus vertical spillovers.

Horizontal Spillovers The empirical studies based on firm-​level panel data have been known for their mixed results about the spillover effects on productivity (Görg and Strobl, 2001; Demena and van Bergeijk, 2017; Rojec and Knell, 2017). These meta-​analysis papers, along with the analyses of Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Driffield and Love (2007) explore some of the sources of heterogeneity that characterize the findings in this literature (in no particular order): the extent to technology transfer by the MNE into its affiliates, the absorptive capacity of the host country firms, and the nature of inter-​and intra-​industry linkages between the foreign owned and domestic sector. A case in point is the research on spillovers in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) context where, in common

404    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. with research done elsewhere, the findings for such effects range from negative or zero estimated horizontal effects of FDI presence in Konings (2001) for Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland; negative in Halpern and Muraközy (2007) for Hungary and in Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic; and positive in Damijan, Knell, Majcen, and Rojec (2003) in the case of five of eight studied CEE countries—​the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, and Slovenia. In some other contexts, there is little evidence about horizontal spillovers. In the Indian context, for example, Kathuria (2010) found no evidence of spillovers across a range of industries. In part, this may be on account of empirical strategies and measurement issues. To begin with, an examination of spillovers at a point of time may be misleading. For example, based on nine CEE EU members and Ukraine, Damijan, Rojec, Majcen, and Knell (2013) argue that horizontal spillovers in CEE countries are in fact becoming more positive and stronger over time.4 Second, the study by Görg and Strobl (2001) highlights the measurement error in many early studies, exploring why this, in conjunction with potential publication bias, may have led early studies to over-​state spillover effects. Third, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, there may be selection bias if MNEs are systematically more likely to enter industries with high productivity. Indeed, studies that correct for this selection bias tend to find little consistent evidence of horizontal spillovers, as confirmed also in the meta-​analyses of studies from CEE in Hanousek, Kočenda, and Maurel (2011) and Iwasaki and Tokunaga (2016), and multi-​country studies of transition economies in Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell (2014, 2015). Finally, as pointed out by Girma, Gong, Görg, and Lancheros (2015), empirical strategies in the horizonal spillover literature are based on the assumption that there are no interactions between firms. They demonstrate that once this assumption is relaxed, spillover effects (and also the direct impact of foreign ownership on FDI-​recipient firms) vary with the level of foreign presence within clusters. One potential, and conceptually more important, shortcoming in this literature is how the researcher distinguishes between knowledge spillovers and competition effects of MNE entry. The positive knowledge transfer through demonstration effects or labor mobility may be simply balanced out by the negative crowding-​out effect of local competitors’ market share (Aitken & Harrison, 1999). This is particularly important in the context of emerging markets, where the average productivity gap between inward investors and local firms may be larger than in a more technologically advanced economy with better-​functioning capital markets. For example, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) report that 48% of firms surveyed in Czech Republic, and 41% of surveyed firms in Latvia, experienced tougher competition after the entry of foreign owned firms; and 29% of firms in both countries reported losing market shares to foreign owned firms. As Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2004) and Driffield et al. (2004) illustrate for the UK, this competition effect can potentially lead to increased productivity through the necessity to compete, but the latter also argue that it can also lead to local firms becoming less competitive through a reduction in economies of scale and scope.

Spillovers from FDI    405 In addition, in emerging market contexts, local firms that are relatively far away from the global technological frontier at which the MNEs reside, or belong to local industries that are far away from the aforementioned frontier, may not have the incentive to innovate (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, & Howitt, 2005; Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, & Prant, 2009), even though technology transfer may benefit local firms with large technology gaps than those with small technology gaps (Blalock & Gertler, 2009). Further, we would expect more limited knowledge transfer within the same sector, as MNEs have strong incentive to limit the knowl­ edge transfer to local competitors. Equally, spillovers by way of inter-​firm labor mobility may be conditional on the nature of the knowledge (Maliranta, Mohnen, & Rouvinen, 2009), and therefore not realizable across firms and industries. Taken together therefore, whether knowledge spillovers dominate over competition effects is thus an empirical issue that depends on the characteristics of the country and type of FDI (such as market-​seeking and efficiency-​seeking). However, the mixed evidence about spillovers notwithstanding, there is additional evidence about both technology adoption by local firms in response to MNE competition, which we may attribute to demonstration effect, and some evidence about the labor market pathway to spillovers. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), for example, find that 25% of surveyed domestic-​owned firms in the Czech Republic and 15% of surveyed firms in Latvia report adoption of new technologies as a result of MNE entry. Similarly, Masso and Vahter (2016) confirm the importance of the labor mobility channel of spillovers, based on employer-​employee-​level data from Estonia. They show positive productivity spillovers due to the mobility of high-​wage employees from foreign-​to domestic-​owned firms, with stronger effects in the case of intra-​industry mobility. In the case of China, Girma, Gong, and Görg (2009) find positive horizontal spillovers of FDI on state-​owned firms if the local firms invest in human capital or have prior innovation experience. Hu and Jefferson (2009) observe that higher FDI share increases patent applications of domestic firms in the same industry, because competing with foreign firms has improved the awareness of domestic firms of the strategic value of patents, particularly in highly competitive industries such as electric machinery, transportation equipment, and chemicals.

Vertical Spillovers In contrast with the mixed evidence about horizontal spillovers, empirical studies generally find positive backward spillovers from FDI to local firms in the supplying industries. This literature can be traced back to the innovative empirical paper by Javorcik (2004), who uses firm-​level panel data and information from sector-​level input/​output tables from manufacturing industry of Lithuania from 1996 to 2000. Her estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in terms of FDI share in a sector is associated with about 15% higher productivity of domestic-​owned firms

406    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. in the supplying sectors. The existence of vertical spillovers is also confirmed by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009), Hanousek et al. (2011), and Gorodnichenko et al. (2014, 2015), in the context of the transition economies in CEE. Similarly, it has been argued that in China, the largest spillover effects accrue through mechanisms such as R&D collaboration, learning-​by-​doing, and outsourcing from MNEs to domestic firms (Cai, Todo, & Zhou, 2007). However, state-​owned Chinese firms that lack absorptive capacity are not able to benefit from vertical spillovers from FDI (Girma & Gong, 2008a). The spillovers—​though not in the strict sense of externality—​through backward linkages may take place when MNEs provide technical and managerial assistance to their suppliers. While MNEs are careful about limiting (or preventing altogether) technology transfer to competitors, they have incentives to create and sustain linkages with their local suppliers (Blalock & Gertler, 2008), and thereby transfer technology to firms in their supply chains, to benefit from better or cheaper inputs. These firms in the supply chain may also be able to learn well or at a fast pace, if the relationship with the MNEs leads to increased sales, and thereby results in economies of scale and gains from specialization, as outlined in theoretical models by Rodriguez-​Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999). Indeed, available empirical evidence suggests that the estimated “spillovers” are captured primarily by the firms directly supplying to the MNEs. For example, Javorcik (2004) observes strong evidence of backward spillovers, even though she finds no consistent evidence of positive horizontal spillovers or forward spillovers to clients of foreign-​owned firms.5 Evidence of knowledge transfer through MNE-​local firm linkages has also been found in other contexts, such as the auto components industry in India (Kumaraswamy, Mudambi, Saranga, & Tripathy, 2012). A  well-​known example from another context is the entry of Wal-​Mart in Mexico. Javorcik, Keller and Tybout (2008) show that this resulted in substantial upgrading of suppliers from the local soap, detergent, and surfactant sector that were efficient enough to meet Walmex’s terms and survived its entry. Similar effects of entry of global retailers have been observed in the food manufacturing sector in Romania (Javorcik & Li, 2013). Apart from the spillover effects on firms in supplying sectors, there is less evidence on significant effects of FDI on downstream firms. However, based on data from the Czech Republic, Arnold, Javorcik, and Mattoo (2011) suggest that the increased foreign entry into the services industry has functioned there as a channel through which the liberalization of services positively affects the performance of downstream manufacturing firms. Some recent studies shift from analysis of productivity to a more detailed investigation of the knowledge production function, investigating the spillovers on innovation activities of the domestic-​owned firms (Falk, 2015; Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, & Terrell, 2010; Gorodnichenko et al., 2015; Javorcik, Lo Turco, & Maggioni, forthcoming; Vahter, 2011). They confirm the role of FDI in increasing the complexity of production structure of domestic firms in the host economy (Javorcik et al., 2017), and in product and process innovation. As in the case of vertical spillover-​led productivity gains of local firms, these effects on innovation tend to work especially through backward linkages to suppliers,

Spillovers from FDI    407 implying that MNEs and their links to local suppliers need to be seen as a part of the innovation system, especially in emerging market contexts.

Determinants of the Scale of Spillovers Much of the spillovers literature is based on the premise that research seeks to determine the extent of knowledge transfer between the home and host country of a MNE, rather than between the parent MNE and its local subsidiaries-​JV partners and, eventually, other local firms. In this setting, a country-​level analysis following the footsteps of Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) can be deemed appropriate, especially in the absence of firm-​level data on technology transfer between parents and affiliates. However, while the benefits of spillovers are experienced at the country level, any transfer of technologies and processes is between firms (i.e., between MNE affiliates and local firms), by way of contracts, market mechanisms, or other mechanisms such as labor mobility. The spillovers are affected by firms’ motivations, strategies, capabilities, and the environment in which they operate. In the rest of this section, we identify the individual factors that affect spillovers, and thereafter use this discussion as a basis to propose a framework that can facilitate the discussion about spillovers in a structured manner.

MNE Motivation To re-​emphasize, while technology transfer may, as such, be an outcome of technology differences between home and host country of a MNE, the transfer itself takes place between the parent MNE and its foreign affiliates. Thereafter, this technology can spread to local firms in the MNE’s supply chain or even to competing firms through contractual-​ market as well as non-​market mechanisms. The initial transfer to the affiliates may be encompassed in the physical technology that accompanies the original investment, or continue over time as both the parent and affiliate develop. The extent of this technology transfer is not exogenously determined, and is influenced by the parent MNE’s strategic considerations. Jindra, Giroud, and Scott-​Kennel (2009) argue, based on a survey of MNE subsidiaries in a number of CEE economies, that the extent of spillovers among local suppliers is dependent on the subsidiary’s technological capabilities and, perhaps more important, the existence of intense knowledge transfer from the MNE to the subsidiary. In a seminal piece, Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) outline the dynamic capabilities approach to subsidiary development, and argue that the development of foreign affiliates is linked to the motive for the firms that undertake FDI. Indeed, as Driffield and Love

408    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. (2007) point out, perhaps the single most important driver of differences in technology transfer between parent and affiliate is the motivation for FDI, which is often ignored in spillovers analysis. FDI motivation affects the level of embedded knowledge associated with FDI, the linkages the MNEs establish with local firms, and the channels via which spillovers take place. In the Chinese context, Ito, Yashiro, Xu, Chen, and Wakasugi (2012) find that MNEs’ local R&D activities contribute to domestic firms’ innovation, and Wang and Wu (2016) suggest that an FDI presence in China leads to knowledge diffusion only when FDI has localized innovative activities. Giroud, Jindra, and Marek (2012) extend this analysis and show that subsidiary’s autonomy over technology-​related business functions combined with their technological embeddedness in the networks of the MNE facilitate knowledge diffusion thorough backward linkages. Arguably, the nature of the parent-​subsidiary relationships discussed (or alluded to) in these studies depends significantly on MNE motivation. Indeed, building on Driffield and Love (2007), it is also possible to argue that there is a hierarchy in terms of FDI motive and spillover effects. Market-​seeking FDI, driven by ownership advantages in the parent MNE, is likely to lead to the greatest knowl­ edge transfer between parent and affiliate. The objective is to lever firm-​specific assets embedded in the MNE into new markets, requiring these advantages to be transferred to local firms, subject to some local adaptation. In a similar vein, resource-​seeking FDI may also be considered to involve knowledge transfer between a parent and its local affiliates, specifically knowledge that is required to fully extract the benefit of local resources. Efficiency-​seeking may also involve knowledge transfer between a parent MNE and its affiliates, but this transfer is likely to be at a lower level, involving more mundane activities or products that are based on older technology and are in the latter phases of their life cycles (Vernon, 1979). Ironically, as older technology seeks cheaper locations, with potentially some adaptation to local conditions, the spillover effects may actually be larger for efficiency-​seeking FDI because technologies transferred to the host country may not be cutting edge but may still be new to the host location and yet easier for local firms to absorb. Equally, the FDI motivation may itself change over time (Kim, Driffield, & Temouri, 2016). For example, while initial FDI to China may have been motivated by the size of the local market, with large FDI crowding out domestic firms’ sales in the short term (Lin, Liu, & Zhang, 2009), over time, many MNEs investing in China have raised their commitment to on-​location activities such as R&D.

Ownership and Technology Transfer Given the motivation for investment in a given location, a MNE has to determine whether and/​or how much technology (or know how) to transfer to the local affiliate. Driffield, Love, and Menghinello (2010; Driffield, Love, & Yang, 2016a) discuss in detail the literature that explores the nature of knowledge transfer between parents and affiliates, and the conditions under which multinationals engage in knowledge transfer

Spillovers from FDI    409 to affiliates. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, technology transfer may be necessary for a variety of reasons including overcoming the liability of foreignness, obtaining better or cheaper products from firms in its supply chain, and leveraging advantages associated with local resources such as cheap labor or natural resources. If one takes the well-​established conceptualization of multinational strategy of Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990), it is easy to see how this will in turn drive the knowledge transfer strategy of a firm, building on internalization theory (see, for example, Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). On the other hand, an MNE will have to take into consideration the possibility that, precisely on account of spillovers, the technology or know-​how that characterizes its ownership advantage may dissipate, thereby diluting or weakening its ownership advantage. As such, both local innovation that influences an MNE subsidiary’s demand for transfer of technology and know-​how from its parent MNE and technology transfer from the parent are more likely when the firm adopts either a transnational or localization strategy. As Driffield, Love, and Yang (2014) and Driffield, Mickiewicz, and Temouri (2016b) point out, this in turn drives the ownership structure of foreign affiliates and determines the development path of the affiliate (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) and its degree of autonomy from the parent MNE. In the context of EMEs, in particular, the ownership structures of foreign affiliates arise from the tension between two opposing forces. On the one hand, an MNE has the desire to insulate the local affiliate-​subsidiary (and by extension, the parent MNE) from a weak institutional environment. This desire is consistent with the adoption of a defensive approach, with lower levels of local engagement. At the same time, weak local institutions necessitate partnerships with local firms which may be more versed in working with local institutions (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009), and which may have to be incentivized through transfer of technology and know-​how. In other words, the extent of involvement of an MNE in a local affiliate by way of ownership and the extent of knowledge transfer may be inextricably linked. This proposition about the relationship between two strategic decisions of MNEs—​ decision about ownership stake in the local subsidiary, and decision about technology transfer—​finds support in recent literature on India. In a survey of MNE affiliates in India, where equity ownership of MNEs in local subsidiaries increased consistently since the country embarked on liberalization in 1991, Beena, Bhandari, Bhaumik, Gokarn, and Tandon (2004) found that as many as 28% of Indian subsidiaries of MNEs felt that they could always rely on transfer of technology from the parent MNEs, while only 6% of these firms felt that they would never be able to draw on their parents’ technological strengths. Along the same lines, Sasidaran and Kathuria (2011) find that majority ownership of local subsidiaries by MNEs and R&D activities of the latter are substitutes, implying that majority ownership may facilitate greater transfer of technology from the parent MNE, thereby discouraging R&D activities in the local subsidiaries. As Driffield et al. (2016b) point out, the fact that the ownership of local subsidiaries and knowledge transfer to these subsidiaries are influenced by local institutions implies that the desire for knowledge transfer may change over time. It is easy to see that the desire for these transfers would be influenced directly by changes to the strength of

410    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. property rights in the host country. However, institutional changes can also affect this desire indirectly, by influencing the development of capital markets. Driffield et  al. (2016b) show that ownership shares of foreign affiliates between foreign and local partners are in part driven by local capital markets. As local capital markets improve, a key ownership advantage from the perspective of an MNE in terms of access to (global) finance is eroded, increasing the likelihood of a joint venture with a local firm. At the same time, however, the greater the local stake in a venture, potentially the lower the incentive for the MNE to transfer knowledge from the parent.

Absorptive Capacity We have already introduced one other major cause of variation in technology transfer effects from inward investment, the absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Zahra & George, 2002) of local firms. Recapitulate, for example, that efficiency-​seeking FDI may actually lead to greater spillover effects, in part on account of the greater ability of EME local firms to absorb technology that is relatively old by the standards of the parent MNEs from developed countries. Empirically this is discussed in detail in Girma (2005), but it is also identified conceptually in the meta-​analysis of Meyer and Sinani (2009). As such, in order to capture spillover effects, local firms must have the capacity to adapt, assimilate, and, in some cases, commercialize the information.6 This is far more common within the vertical buyer-​supplier relationships, involving support from the inward investors, than in the more esoteric (and “purer”) horizontal “pure spillover” effects. Evidence from EMEs highlights the importance of absorptive capacity of local firms. Empirical evidence from China generally supports that for domestic firms to receive FDI spillovers, absorptive capacity is needed to absorb advanced knowledge brought by foreign investors (Liu & Buck, 2007; Yang & Lin, 2012; Zhang, Li, Li, & Zhou, 2010). Girma et al. (2008, 2009) observe that without absorptive capacity horizontal and vertical FDI crowd out domestic firms’ innovation. Evidence from the CEE countries also supports the idea that domestic-​owned firms need sufficient level of their own absorptive capacity in order to be able to benefit from knowledge spillovers of FDI. Absorptive capacity is often proxied by R&D, exporting behavior, and productivity or human capital. For example, Kinoshita (2000) finds that positive horizontal spillovers of FDI in the Czech Republic are limited to firms that invest in R&D. Kathuria (2002) draws a similar conclusion in the Indian context; spillover-​related benefits accrued only to firms that invested in R&D. The horizontal and vertical spillovers in CEE tend to be significantly lowered by the large technology gap (distance to the productivity frontier), as shown in Halpern and Muraközy (2007), Nicolini and Resmini (2010), Havránek and Iršová (2011), and Gorodnichenko et al. (2014). However, using only a firm-​level measure or a single indicator as a proxy of absorptive capacity (e.g., human capital at the firm) has strong limits in analysis of spillovers. For example, Narula and Jormanainen (2008) use the example of Russia to show that

Spillovers from FDI    411 the availability of a pool of qualified workers is not by itself a guarantee for efficient absorption of MNEs’ knowledge. In general, the effective absorption not only requires the efforts of the firm itself or its interactions with suppliers, clients, and competitors but also depends on the whole system of learning and innovation in the economy, thus depending also on economy-​wide institutions (Narula & Pineli, 2016). The importance of wider set of institutions is further shown in Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005) that endeavurs to explain the different patterns of FDI spillovers over from 1992 to 2000 in the Czech Republic and Russia. Their empirical results suggest that spillovers are likely to be more positive in environments that have competition, market-​oriented and enforceable institutional and legal framework, and openness to FDI and trade. Similarly, Franco, Ray, and Ray (2011) argue that legacy industrial and competition policies in countries such as India facilitate development of technological capabilities in some sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and steel while restricting the development of these capabilities in other industries such as those associated with consumer goods. To re-​emphasize, the absorptive capacity of local firms plays an important role in determining the extent of spillovers, and that absorptive capacity, in turn, depends on their internal knowledge development activities and their networks with other firms that are involved in similar activities. Internal knowledge development activities of local firms are likely to be influenced by competition, even though competition is more likely to stimulate such activities in firms (and industries) that are closer to the global frontier than in those that are laggards (Aghion et al., 2009). In some contexts such as India, it may also depend on the expectations of the local firms; these firms may be more willing to engage with knowledge development activities if they feel that economic reforms that usher in greater competition are irreversible (Kathuria, 2008). The ability to be part of knowledge networks and indeed have internal resources such as skilled labor that can assist with development and assimilation of knowledge may, on the other hand, depend on the location of local firms. In particular, local firms may have greater ability to develop and assimilate knowledge if they are part of clusters that can either develop on their own or be created using some form of industrial policy. Evidence in the literature suggests that spillovers may indeed be restricted to, or be more pronounced within, regions and clusters (Franco & Kozovska, 2008). Demonstration effects may be local if domestic firms can observe other firms more closely in the same region. Indigenous firms may be more likely to experience spillovers via labor turnovers in geographically close areas (Liu, Lu, J., Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 2010). Communication with local foreign firms along the value chain may be easier for domestic firms to minimize costs (Girma & Gong, 2008a). Wei and Liu (2006) observe strong intra-​and inter-​industry productivity spillovers from FDI to indigenous Chinese firms, but such benefits are confined within regions. However, the identification problem as to whether this is on account of greater willingness of MNEs to transfer technology or because of greater absorptive capacity of firms within these clusters has not been resolved satisfactorily.

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An Integrated Framework: The Importance of Institutions To reiterate, we have thus far demonstrated that there is evidence for spillovers, even though the evidence is clearer for vertical spillovers than for horizontal spillovers that are more consistent with the pure externality-​based view of spillovers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the incidence and extent of spillovers depend on the motivation of MNEs, the extent of ownership stake of MNEs in their local subsidiaries, and the absorptive capacity of the local firms. However, these are distinct and somewhat different strands of the literature, and each is more closely associated with a particular discipline than with others. The literature on estimates of spillovers, for example, is significantly embedded in the economics literature, while the motivation of MNEs is embedded largely in the international business (IB) and strategy literatures. Despite the importance of the spillovers, however, there is no integrated framework to discuss this phenomenon. In this chapter, we offer a conceptual framework for evaluating the likely magnitude of spillovers from FDI in the context of EMEs. This is developed from the somewhat fragmented empirical literature that cuts across a number of disciplines, but one that links the evidence to issues that are central to the IB literature, e.g., MNE motivation for FDI, their strategic decisions regarding ownership of and technology transfer to local affiliates, the institutional contexts in host countries, and the technological capacity of local firms. Figure 17.1 illustrates our framework.

FDI

MNE motivation

MNE local resource need Local institutional quality MNE ownership stake in local affiliate Absorptive capacity of local affiliate

New firm entry, factor mobility and cluster formation in FDI location

MNE technology transfer

Extent of spillover

Figure 17.1  Conceptual framework

Spillovers from FDI    413 To highlight the obvious, a pre-​condition for spillovers in any context is that the relevant country should be able to attract FDI. The (largely economics) literature on determinants of FDI flows suggests that FDI is influenced by factors such as size of the local market, local human capital, and labor costs, the so-​called gravity factors,7 and proximity of the home and host countries (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 2001). The IB literature, in turn, highlights the motivation of the MNEs that underpin these cross-​border investments; MNEs are attracted by local characteristics that can help them leverage their embedded ownership advantages. In the Chinese context, for example, Western investors may be attracted by the size and growth of the domestic market, while firms from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT) are primarily attracted by low production cost and supportive policies (Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002; Zheng, 2009). At the same time, the Chinese government has actively pursued policies such as the creation of special economic zones, flexible labor policies for MNE affiliates, and favorable taxation (and import duty) policies to attract FDI.8 By contrast, the government’s inability to develop physical infrastructure and business-​friendly regulatory structures is cited as a reason for (until recently) India’s inability to attract FDI to the same extent as China (Henley, 2004; Huang & Tang, 2011).9 A country’s ability to attract FDI also depends on its political economy which influences an EME government’s choice of corporate taxation regime (Arbatli, 2011), as well as its ability to liberalize capital account rules that govern foreign ownership of local assets, and enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements with home countries of MNEs (Athreye & Kapur, 2001; Banga, 2003). Political economy can also influence tariff regimes for international trade which can have a detrimental impact on inward FDI flows (Henley, 2004). In addition, evidence about FDI flows to India suggests that a country may benefit from cultural proximities to countries that are major exporters of capital (Zheng, 2009). Most important, however, it depends on strength of local institutions, in particular, property rights, corruption, political stability, and the rule of law (Asiedu, 2006; Du, Lu, & Tao, 2008; Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998; Pournarakis & Varsakelis, 2004; see also Contractor, this volume). As discussed earlier in this chapter, once MNEs enter a country by way of inward FDI, the incidence and extent of spillovers depends on the MNEs’ motivation—​ e.g., market-​seeking vs. efficiency-​seeking—​which, in turn, influences its needs for local resources, both tangible and intangible. As discussed by Meyer et al. (2009) and Driffield et  al. (2016b), this influences the MNEs’ choice of entry mode and their decisions about ownership stakes in the local subsidiaries, and therefore the parent MNEs’ motivation for technology transfer, conditional on host-​country institutional quality. In particular, a MNE’s willingness to transfer technology is adversely affected by weak IPR (Maskus, 1998). More generally, local institution quality not only determines MNE’s behavior such as location choice, organization structure, and choice of technology (Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008) but also influences appropriability conditions for innovation (Cohen, 1995). These factors in turn will determine technological opportunities and spillovers for domestic firms to bene­ fit from FDI. Qu, Qu, and Wu (2017) suggest that positive changes in regional

414    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. institutions help moderate FDI spillovers on process innovation production, as such institutional climate encourages MNEs to transfer technologies to host countries and increase the scope for FDI spillovers. In addition to the MNEs’ willingness to transfer technology to their local subsidiaries, the incidence and extent of spillovers will also depend on the absorptive capacity of the local firms. Absorptive capacity depends, in part on government policies that affect the incentives and ability of local firms to develop their absorptive capacity through in-​house knowledge development and networking with other firms, especially within clusters. In part, this depends on the ability of local firms to recruit from a pool of workers with appropriate skills (and motivation), and/​or their incentives such as tax benefits to train the workers internally (Blalock & Gertler, 2009; Blomstrom & Kokko, 2003; Minbaeva, Pedersen, Bjorkman, & Park, 2003). However, in large measure, this incentive to develop absorptive capacity can depend on factors such as competition, which is also influenced by development of market-​ promoting institutions (Bhaumik et  al., 2009; Estrin & Prevezer, 2010), as well as development of institutions that provide potential market entrants access to complementary resources such as finance (Cetorelli & Strahan, 2006). Further, institutions also influence the extent of inter-​firm labor mobility (Marsden, 1990), which is an important mechanism through which knowledge transfers take place between MNE subsidiaries and other local firms. Finally, institutions also impact absorptive capacity of local firms by affecting the appropriability of the capabilities that are associated with such capacity (Zahra & George, 2002). Finally, once there is technology transfer from MNEs to local firms through spillovers, there is an improvement in the absorptive capacity of the latter. Technology transfer also makes them better acquisition targets for future MNE investors. In principle, this paves the way for a virtuous circle whereby one round of spillovers from inward FDI paves the way for further spillovers in the future. This optimism may have to be tempered in light of evidence that suggests that if technological capability of local firms is significant, MNEs may use their local affiliates for R&D activities without necessarily transferring technology (Franco et al., 2011). This is consistent with the evidence that suggests that benefits of technology transfer increases with the technology gap between MNEs and local firms (Blalock and Gertler, 2009). However, if the key policy issue is development of technological capability, the mechanism through which this development takes in subsequent FDI rounds may be moot.

Conclusion With the evidence about the impact of FDI on employment generation inconclusive, the spillover effects of FDI in the form of technology transfer to local firms in the FDI recipient country have gained increasing importance. The importance is particularly

Spillovers from FDI    415 high for EMEs that lag developed economies in the technology sphere, such that technology transfer by foreign firms plays a significant role in closing the technology gap vis-​à-​vis the latter countries. There are a number of empirical studies estimating the extent of spillovers and the relevant literature suggests that while the evidence about pure or non-​market-​based horizontal spillovers is mixed, there is greater evidence about vertical spillovers that are driven by market-​based transactions, for example, between MNEs and local firms in their supply chains. The literature discusses factors such as motivations of MNEs and absorptive capacity of local firms in influencing the presence and extent of spillovers. However, the literature is fragmented, thereby lacking a holistic conceptual narrative that links all elements of the spillover phenomenon. We have sought, therefore, to develop a conceptual understanding of the drivers of FDI spillovers in an emerging market setting. We have not sought to critique the large (and growing!) literature on FDI spillovers in any detail, because these critiques will be well known to many readers. However, we have demonstrated that beyond the desire to answer a simple empirical question regarding the scale of technology or productivity spillovers in a given sector/​location setting, it is not sufficient within an EME setting to simply take a standard model and employ this to the case of inward investment into an EME. For example, building on Driffield et al. (2016b) one has to consider the ownership structure of a MNE affiliate not only as a determinant of the nature of technology transfer between parent and affiliate but also as a potential determinant of spillovers. However, one also must acknowledge that the potential for spillovers or local appropriation of technology may influence both technology transfer from the parent and ownership structure. For example, in settings of weak institutional quality, internalization theory suggests that firms are likely to adopt a defensive approach, and act in isolation from the local economy, which in turn will limit technology transfer and therefore spillovers. However, as Driffield et al. (2016b) illustrate, employing property rights theory, weak institutional quality may at the same time drive less defensive strategies, with the inward investor taking on a local partner. The extent of technology transfer from parent to affiliate in this case is then driven by the nature of the property rights between the two parties. A key finding from this is that as local engagement and local ownership increases, the property rights of an MNE declines. In such circumstances firms may be less inclined to transfer frontier technology, and so spillovers may be in more mundane activities. This in turn suggests two lines of enquiry. The first is to distinguish between genuine frontier technology and more mundane activities when evaluating technology transfer, both from parent to affiliate and from affiliate to the local economy. In China’s context of technology upgrading, for example, innovation novelty determines the domestic firms’ development trajectory. Radical innovation not only impacts firm performance but also has the potential to alter market structure and push the technological frontier. In contrast, incremental or mundane innovation will improve productivity only in the short term, though it may be extremely important for competitiveness. As FDI is an important international knowledge source in an emerging market context, linking FDI and

416    Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al. innovation novelty is critical to understand heterogeneous drivers of innovation, innovation process, channels, and conditions for host countries to utilize FDI knowledge. An equally important but rarely examined question is the relationship between inward FDI and innovation efficiency of domestic sectors, which directly links to industry technology upgrading. Innovation efficiency in China is typically examined from the perspective of national innovation system, with the role of inward FDI largely neglected. It suggests that China remains at a low level of innovation efficiency and much room is left for improvement. Lack of supportive system such as insufficient financial support, underdeveloped institutions, and lack of cooperation between enterprises and universities plays a role in this low innovation efficiency (Bai, 2013; Chen & Guan 2012; Hong, Feng, Wu, & Wang, 2016). As inward FDI is expected to bring international knowledge, it could shape the rate of conversion from knowledge input to output. Second, one needs to consider the mechanism of any apparent spillover effect. Low levels of absorptive capacity may still facilitate some spillovers through, for example, demonstration effects, or in the longer term through labor mobility, but these are likely to limit any productivity effects to moving a subset of local firms that have benefited from spillovers nearer to the local frontier (i.e., catching up with inward investors). This is not, however, suggestive of moving the local frontier out, nearer to global frontiers, through transfer of new technology. This requires a different set of processes, and relies on high levels of institutional quality, capital mobility, and clear delineation of property rights between inward investors and local partners. This in turn suggests a more complex modeling process for evaluating spillovers in EMEs than has been applied hitherto, and in turn places the emphasis on better firm-​ level data, linked to local sectoral-​and national-​level data, than have typically been available.

Notes 1. Inward FDI in actual use was $0.9 billion in 1983. It increased to $11 billion in 1992, and rose sharply thereafter to $135.6 billion by the end of 2015. Correspondingly, value added by foreign firms rose from 1011.6 billion yuan in 1992 to 22,799.1 billion yuan in 2015 (Statistics on FDI in China, 2016). In 2016, China was ranked the third largest FDI recipient in the world (UNCTAD, 2016). 2. It should be pointed out here that despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the work seeking to determine the nature of spillovers for FDI has been done on developed country data, particularly the UK, some of the most influential work in terms of shaping the literature was carried out on emerging economies. See, e.g., Aitken and Harrison (1999); Javorcik (2004); Kugler (2006). 3. We deliberately avoid the term “negative spillovers” in this context. While one occasionally sees this term erroneously used in the context of analysis of FDI spillovers, it should more correctly be characterized as a separate mechanism by which inward investment may cause a decline in average productivity of the domestic sector, such as crowding-​out effects (Aitken & Harrison, 1999).

Spillovers from FDI    417 4. This may reflect the role of economic development for benefiting from potential FDI spillovers (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). 5. Another early paper is by Schoors and van der Tol (2002) using data from Hungary. The focus of the empirical literature until 2000s on effects in the same sector of the subsidiary is somewhat surprising, given the important early contributions by Lall (1980) that suggest the significance of backward linkages to suppliers of foreign firms. 6. Alternatively, as argued by Bhaumik et  al. (2015, 2016), a firm needs some firm-​specific advantages or capabilities to be able to absorb new technology that can help develop its competitiveness. While Bhaumik et al. (2015, 2016) discuss the specific case of emerging market multinationals, the general argument holds true of all emerging market firms that seek to obtain technology from companies and contexts that are more technologically advanced. 7. The gravity model is a much-​used empirical specification that is used to explain bilateral trade flows between countries, and has since been adapted to explain bilateral FDI flows. The main “gravity” factors included in this empirical specification are sizes of the countries between which trade-​FDI flows takes place and distance between these two countries. For a detailed discussion of the gravity model, see Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985). 8. The first law that permits and legalizes foreign firms to operate in China was issued in 1979. In the 1980s, a strategy often known as “trading market success for technology” was formed aiming to attract inward FDI to import and learn advanced technologies by allowing foreign firms to take some market shares and earn profits (Xia & Zhao, 2012). At the same time, two provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, were granted favorable policies in order to attract inward FDI, followed by establishing another four special economic zones in coastal areas. Infrastructures such as transportation, communication, water, and electricity supplies were considerably improved to create a better environment for investment. Since 1984, more cities were open for inward FDI with more economic and technological development zones established afterward (Chen, 2011). Taxation is an important incentive to attract inward FDI. For instance, income tax rate is 15% and 24%, respectively, in special economic zones and coastal provinces, compared to the normal level of 33%. Foreign firms are exempt from or pay a small amount of income tax during the initial years of operation in China. The time period of income tax exemption is even longer for technological foreign firms. Foreign firms importing advanced equipment and technologies that are not available in China are exempt from import duties (Zheng, 2001). 9. India ranks 66th among 137 countries in terms of infrastructure quality, according to the 2017–​18 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum. According to S&P Global, “India’s power insfrastructure, traditionally a weakness, seems to be turning a corner, but transport infrastructure still faces overwhelming capacity constraints” (Dangra, 2016). At the same time, according to the 2016 Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank, India ranks at the 41st percentile in terms of regulatory quality, a marginal improvement from its 45th percentile rank in 2006. Net FDI inflow into India was modest until 2005 but rose sharply from US$7.2 billion in 2005 to US$43.4 billion in 2008. It declined thereafter, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, but subsequently recovered to US$44.4 billion in 2016 (World Development Indicators, The World Bank).

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Chapter 18

Risk M anage me nt for C om panies Ope rat i ng i n Em erging M a rk ets Donald Lessard

In the 50 years since the first international business (IB) writing on political/​country risk associated with investing in emerging markets (e.g., Root, 1968), a great deal has changed, but much has remained the same as well. Risk remains a dual concept, relating to both the “objective” hazards and volatilities associated with a particular economy but also the subjective perceptions of investors or managers regarding “foreign” activities (Kobrin, 1982; Miller, 1993) and the local attitudes and behaviors toward them—​the two sides of the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). Emerging markets have emerged. Together with developing countries1 they now count for more than 85% of the world’s population (and hence for demand for basic products that closely track population), and 60% of gross domestic product (GDP). However, many remain volatile, reflecting institutional and political dynamics. In gen­ eral, they have become much more connected with global economy, in terms of both flows of goods and services and finance—​“increasingly interdependent rather than interconnected”(Friedman, 2017). Perhaps most important, emerging economies have become key links in highly interdependent global value chains (see, e.g., Gereffi, Humphey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Grosse, 2015). The risks associated with emerging markets are of interest to many economic actors:  banks and other lenders, portfolio investors, foreign direct investors, and local investors. These increasingly include firms that are based in emerging markets (EMs). This chapter focuses on the risks associated with conducting business in emerging economies by foreign-​ based firms (through foreign direct investment or global value chain relationships) and local firms, which themselves may be multinationals (Lessard, 2014).

428   Donald Lessard This chapter is organized into four sections, each addressing a key question: • What are the (drivers of) risks facing firms in emerging economies? º how are they different in emerging markets, and how have they changed over time? º Are these risks diversifiable and how has this changed over time. • How does the incidence of these risks depend on the nature of the investment at risk: e.g., local firm operating locally, foreign firm operating though foreign direct investment (FDI), local supplier in global value chain (GVC), locally based multinational enterprise (MNE)? • How can/​are/​should these risks be managed? º Avoidance º Hedging º Integration into business model • Summary and generalization

Unpacking Emerging Markets Risks Emerging market risks can be characterized at multiple levels. The most common are aggregrate, country-​level measures and the specific risks of individual firms, which themselves are layered. We first address aggregate risk, then turn to firm-​level risk for multi-​domesiic firms and firms that form part of global value chains.

Aggregate Measures of EM Risk By almost any measure, EMs are riskier than developed markets (DMs). The most common measures of country risk are constructed indexes of financial, economic, and political risk such those published as the International Risk Guide (ICRG) (http://​epub.prsgroup.com/​products/​international-​country-​risk-​guide-​icrg). For institutional risks, a major source is the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home). While there are many such measures, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) find that most of them display a high rank order correlation. A direct quantitative measure of overall country risk is provided by sovereign bond spreads—​the difference in interest rates between bonds issued by the US Treasury and US dollar-​denominated bonds issued by other sovereigns. These typically are wider and more volatile for EMs than for advanced countries, as shown in Table 18.1. Longstaff, Jun Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) unpack them into default premium and a risk premium and find that most of the variation over time in sovereign spreads—​about two-​thirds—​reflects world markets’ changing aversion to risk rather than changing

Risk Management for Companies    429 Table 18.1 Sovereign credit spreads Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Median

Maximum

Japan

17.73

21.93

2.17

7.17

97.67

Slovakia

46.94

47.9

6.00

23.88

211.67

China

49.72

47.83

10.23

29.47

247.67

Qatar

53.85

66.9

10.90

32.50

308.44

Poland

57.13

63.49

8.13

40.00

367.67

Chile

63.40

58.37

13.17

45.84

265.80

Israel

69.02

60.18

17.75

36.75

275.00

Thailand

75.07

63.25

27.5

42.81

303.18

Korea

80.15

84.70

14.25

57.19

432.48

Malaysia

83.44

67.31

13.63

50.15

304.04

Hungary

91.36

125.22

11.00

35.00

564.1

S. Africa

142.53

89.99

25.25

140.58

458.62

Mexico

147.62

97.36

28.82

119.08

457.38

Croatia

150.36

128.82

15.50

101.42

529.04

Romania

177.28

163.89

17.75

140.5

726.43

Panama

186.35

87.94

63.53

160.08

462.57

Peru

203.40

110.50

63.14

165.00

570.89

Bulgaria

206.85

182.71

13.45

163.44

697.5

Colombia

281.46

170.09

79.00

206.91

805.00

Russia

305.60

271.74

38.83

216.67

1017.5

Philippines

324.35

143.00

102.19

331.11

617.50

Turkey

452.59

307.45

122.94

315.72

1281.25

Brazil

566.82

734.94

62.92

322.43

3790.00

Pakistan

600.76

726.76

157.50

264.17

3084.30

Ukraine

680.03

927.29

132.63

234.25

3857.61

Venezuela

737.79

664.11

119.22

550.50

3218.04

Source: Longstaff et al. (2011), resorted by mean spreads. Copyright American Economic Association; reproduced with permission of the American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.

fundamentals in specific EMs, thus demonstrating the extent to which emerging markets (and the valuation of emerging markets investment) are enmeshed in the global financial system. The volatility of equity market returns typically also are much larger for EMs than for advanced countries and remain less correlated across countries. As noted by Bekaert and Harvey: “There are at least four distinguishing features of emerging market returns:  higher sample average returns, low correlations with developed

430   Donald Lessard market returns, more predictable returns. and higher volatility (1997: 30–​31).” The overall higher levels of risk displayed by EMs reflects many factors including less diversified economic activity, more procyclical monetary and fiscal policies, more changeable or more fragile institutions and governance, less transparency, and so on. Recognizing these aggregate differences is useful for screening investments across countries, and perhaps for deciding how to generally adjust cash flows or discount rates, but it provides little guidance on whether to invest in EMs. The reason for this is that in the case of portfolio investment the decision depends on the extent that these risks are reflected in asset prices and the extent to which they are diversifiable; while for direct investors and GVC orchestrators the key questions are how to manage the associated risks, and whether the presence of these higher risks represents a competitive opportunity for a particular firm. As a result, it is necessary to go beyond aggregate levels of risk to address the issues of management and competitive advantage. Risk drivers are the underlying variables whose future values are not known with certainty, either because of a lack of information regarding the underlying process or because they are the result of social, economic, or political forces that cannot be fully predetermined. Risk events (outcomes) are specific realizations of these uncertainties, e.g., the imposition of exchange controls, a fire in a factory, or a trade dispute between the USA and China. Finally, risk consequences are the (potential) impact of specific realizations of these variables on the firm’s cash flows or reputation, which in turn will impact future cash flows. For simplicity, we collapse all three of these into “risks,” though we will unpack the three levels in addressing how firms should manage these risks. Further, in some cases, these risks are seen as outside “events that happen,” while in others they are seen as the outcome of strategic interactions between investors and host countries (Vernon, 1980).

Layers of Risk in Multidomestic Firms A foreign firm that owns a self-​contained local business in an emerging economy faces risks associated with is its local earnings and cash flows and its ability to repatriate and convert those earnings into its home currency. Figure 18.1 illustrates these risks in a layered model—​from “inside” to “outside”—​in six categories: operational risks, industry risks, institutional risks, country risks, world price risks and world systems risks. Operational risks are those related to the fundamental, recurring activities of the company. They have to do with what the company does and how it does it. For industrial firms, operational risks would include those associated with their productive processes, safety policies, or the occurrence of natural hazards that affect the smooth running of the company’s operations. While not generally labeled “emerging markets risks,” these are often the primary differences of operating in EMs compared to DMs and typically

Risk Management for Companies    431 World System Risks World Price Risks Country Risks

• Commodity Prices • Political stability • Exchange rates • Financial, • Interest rates economic • Risk premium Industry/Competitive • Regulatory stability, inflation stability or • Industry evolution intervention • Expropriation, Operational • Demand, growth • Contract taxation enforcement • County beta rates Risks • Operating • Supply conditions • Legal stability • Repatriation efficiency policies • Costs • Technical failure • Distribution • Terrorism, civil • Natural hazards • Prices unrest • Personal injury • Trust/reputation

Institutional/Regulatory

• Political conditions, war • Trade regimes • Global demand

Figure 18.1  Layers of risk Source: Lessard (1996) and Lessard and Lucea (2009).

require substantial localization. Examples include unreliable electrical supply or unpredictable transport costs and times due to urban congestion. Competitive risks are linked to the activities of direct competitors and other actors operating in one’s industry. Among the most common are the risks associated with competitors’ strategic moves. price wars, time to market, changes in demand, changes in the relative strength of suppliers, etc. With the increasingly global nature of competition (Porter, 1986), these forces may be local, regional, or global, and in most cases some complex mix of the three. Santos and Williamson (2015) show that local firms often present the greatest competitive challenges to MNCs operating in EMs. Country and Institutional risks are those that emanate from actions by nation states (or sub-​sovereign entities) and/​or involve unexpected changes to the legal, normative, or social rules of how a firm is allowed to operate (North, 1990). These risks are often classified into macro-​and micro-​components, where macro-​risks apply to all investments within a particular jurisdiction, while micro-​risks are specific to particular industries or even firms. Macro-​country risks reflect pervasive macroeconomic sources of uncertainty that are at work in a particular country. By their nature, they affect all firms operating in that country, not just specific subgroups of companies. Probably the most widely studied source of country-​wide risk is the degree of political stability enjoyed by a particular country. More generally, country risks at both levels are linked to the strength and predictability of its institutions.2 Micro-​ level country risks are those that affect only particular industries or companies. An example of this type of risk would be the forced renegotiation of oil-​ sharing agreements that a large number of private firms operating in Latin America have suffered in the early 2000s (Berríos, Marak, & Morgenstern, 2011). Further, micro-​risks

432   Donald Lessard may apply to all firms in a given industry or only to foreign-​owned firms or even firms of a particular nationality, or they may be the result of strategic interactions between a particular firm and the state or other relevant institutions.3 In our taxonomy we refer to macro-​level risks as country risks and to micro-​level risks as institutional risks. The final two categories in our taxonomy are at a supra-​national level of analysis. World market risks involve unexpected changes in global prices and worldwide availability of capital and basic commodities. The 2008 global financial crisis is a clear example of a realization of such risks, as is the subsequent drop in commodity prices. Similarly, geopolitics and supra-​national actors can also have a significant impact in shaping and changing the basic framework within which firms operate. Examples of world system risks (often referred to as global risks) include the current remaking of regional and global economic relations with Brexit (EU) or Trump’s shakeup of US trading relations, and the underlying forces that engendered each of these. While the precise layering is somewhat arbitrary, our taxonomy and others such as that of Miller (1992) bring order to an otherwise extremely complex phenomenon. Part of this complexity is due to the fact that the different sources of risk are not independent of one another.

Risk in Global Value Chains Figure 18.2 provides a similar view of the layers of risk for a stylized global apparel value chain (GVC)—​again from inside to outside by the scope of the system in which the risk is

Supply chain dynamics

National dynamics Firm-level dynamics • Capacity • Quality • Flexibility • Resilience

• Regulation • Labor • Safety • Health • Envir. • Taxes • Prices • Provision of • Education • Health • Infrastructure

• Delays • Disruptions • Natural • Terror • Other manmade • Bull-whip • Redundancy, resilience

Macro Competitive economic and global Dynamics market • Innovation • Product dynamics • Price • Consolidation

Customer (social) dynamics • Consumer Tastes • Fads • Consumer confidence

Geopolitical dynamics

• Perceived imbalances • Trade regime • Frictions • Disruption • Protectionism • Disposable • Security tensions income • Hostilities • Commodity • Environmental Prices Regulation, e.g. • Exchange GHG rates • Financial stress

Figure 18.2  Sources of risk from inside to outside for a global supply chain Source: Lessard (2013).

Risk Management for Companies    433 generated. Note that only some of the drivers emanate from emerging markets, as many reflect customer and competitive dynamics in advanced as well as emerging economies, and quite a few result from the interdependent cross-​border nature of the GVC. For firms with value chains that extend across multiple countries, operational risks also extend to disruptions to the smooth flow of goods including disruptions in single locations or in transport; risks dramatically heightened in the post 9/​11 world as described by Sheffi and Rice (2005). With globalization, determining whether a particular risk emanates from the national system, the industry, cross-​border interactions among national systems, or the global system is increasingly complex as these levels merge and overlap. Nevertheless, it remains useful to think of the overall system as a nested one, with global regimes and the global macroeconomy and global markets (e.g., commodities, interest rates, and risk premia) representing the highest levels; industry and consumer dynamics next; and supply chains next—​all operating above or at least across national systems. Supplier firms due to their physical locations are nested in national institutions, though some through multinationality are able to transcend or arbitrage some of these national forces. Changes in global trade regimes, for example, may affect all operations that cross borders, but their impact will differ on a regional or national basis, depending on whether the shifts are bilateral or multilateral.4 Similarly, fluctuations in real exchange rates will favor certain locations above other. As modeled by Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) and others, the flexibility of the multinational (extended) enterprise mitigates these impacts and may even allow profitable arbitrage, which represents valuable real options looking forward. While most of the literature on political and macroeconomic risk emphasizes the risk associated with operating in individual countries, several authors also address the risks of operating across countries. Stopford and Strange (1991) for example, analyze the transnational character of political risk, while Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1987) address the macroeconomic risk of running a multinational system as well as operating in specific countries. Similarly, while some risks can be addressed within specific countries, many can be mitigated (or even profited from) through diversification, flexibility, or pooling across national units, which thus represents an advantage of MNCs relative to single-​country firms (Kogut, 1985). While any business activity in an emerging economy can be said to face a common risk field, its exposures to/​consequences of these risks will depend on the specific nature of the business engagement. The risks associated with local cash flows for a fully integrated local business, i.e., the “multidomestic” subsidiary of a foreign MNC or a locally owned firm, would be similar. However, the two are likely to face different cross-​ border financial risks, e.g., transfer risk. In addition to these cross-​border financial risks, a GVC or a fully integrated MNC also faces risks associated with the transfer of goods and services. And finally, even financial (sources of) risks propagate into other elements of the system. An interesting example is provided by the experience of a major pharmaceutical MNC during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. With the onset of the crisis, its treasury

434   Donald Lessard unit sought to protect cash flows by quickly “upstreaming” profits and transferring local currency cash balances into major currencies, but upon deeper review found that its greatest risks were the result of the weakened financial condition of its national distributors, and the possible lapses in fulfillment or even ethical behavior that could ensue. It quickly found that it had to choose which of these distributors it would support through the crisis, and which it would “take out” of its system.5 In a global supply chain, each risk interacts with specific elements of the supply chain. Macroeconomic fluctuations and customer dynamics drive product demand; innovation both derives from the resulting customer dynamics and influences them. Capacity and relative cost dynamics, as well as costs of trade restrictions and transport, affect the competitiveness of different manufacturing sites. Natural and man-​made risks in the logistics system feed back into the timeliness of delivery, as well as to the competitiveness of different manufacturing sources. Some of these forces are individual drivers; others are the result of complex system interactions. A prime example of a system-​level risk in global supply chains is the bullwhip effect where, due to the multiple stages in the chain coupled with lags in responses, a small initial demand shock can trigger much larger variations in demand further back into the chain (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang 1997). Figure 18.3 illustrates this effect an electronics manufacturing chain. The dotted line traces changes in ultimate sales—​the channel sell through, the dashed line the shipments by the OEM to the sale channel, and the solid line the shipments by the supplier to the OEM. Note that the volatility of supplier shipment to the original equipment manufacturer (solid line) (OEM) is many times greater than the channel sell-​through (dotted line). 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000

30

28

24

26

22

20

16

18

14

12

8

10

6

4

2

W

ee

k

0

Channel Sell-Through

OEM Shipments to Channel

Supplier Shipments to OEM

Figure 18.3  Risk magnification via the bull whip Source: Kaipia, Korhonen, and Hartiala (2006) cited by Samel (2012).

Risk Management for Companies    435 Reputation risk is another system-​level risk. Not only is there the risk of an “event” in, say, a fire in a Bangladesh factory that kills workers because the building’s exits are blocked, but also of increases in the salience and perhaps even definition of what constitutes an abuse among global customers. The most interconnected are “systemic risks” where the supply chain system as a whole grinds to halt, perhaps due to the cascading effect of reductions in trade financing as with the 1997 Asian crisis, or to escalating national reactions to trade imbalances or perceived abuses that we are likely to see in the next few years. As the volume of gross flows increase relative to net flows, the consequences of such systemic failures also increase. A recent OECD supply chain study (OECD, 2013) prominently discusses systemic risks in the globalized supply chain, citing as examples the “great trade collapse” of 2008–​2009 and the aftermath of the 2011 Tsunami and the associated nuclear disaster in Japan. While much of the discussion is on how global supply chains transmit shocks from one economy to another, it must also be recognized that due to their own complexity and layering, and their dependence on fragile systems of international cooperation and finance, GVCs can be a source of system shocks as well. While systemic risk in the financial system has received most attention, it also looms large in the global supply chain and is probably even less well understood. Figure 18.4 shows the relative importance of these GVC risks as seen by managers, categorized by the type rather than the level of the generating system. This figure also shows the extent to which each risk is viewed as controllable or influenceable, which we address in section 2.

Uncontrollable Environmental Geopolitical

Economic

Technological

Influenceable

Natural disasters Extreme weather Pandemic Conflict and political unrest Export/import restrictions Terrorism Corruption Illicit trade and organised crime Maritime piracy Nuclear/biological/chemical weapons Sudden demand shocks Extreme volatility in commodity prices Border delays Currency fluctuations Global energy shortages Ownership/investment restrictions Shortage of labour Information and communications disruptions Transport infrastructure failures

Controllable

% 59 30 11 46 33 32 17 15 9 6 44 30 26 26 19 17 17 30 6

Figure 18.4  Drivers of global supply chain risks Source: World Economic Forum (2012), cited in OECD (2013).

436   Donald Lessard

Correlations and Implications for Diversification, Pooling, and Flexibility While mean volatility is higher for stock markets in EMs than in DMs, the correlations of returns across countries typically are lower for EMs, though they are rising with greater global integration of financial markets and EM economies in general in general. In the first study of the diversification potential across EM stock markets, Lessard (1973) found correlations of near zero across four Latin American countries, reflecting a time when most of these markets were not “investible” by foreigners, and when capital flows in general were limited. Errunza (1977) found similar low correlations and high diversification potential across a broader set of markets. Subsequently, these correlations have risen, especially with the financial opening of many of these economies in the late 80s and early 90s, and have continued to rise over time. While there are many nuances of measuring correlations across countries (see, e.g., Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs, & Jin, 2014), the key finding is that correlations of EMs with other markets have increased over time but still remain lower than the correlations among DMs as shown in Figure 18.5. The implications of these lower but rising correlations, again, depend on the nature of the investment. For a portfolio of essentially free-​standing local businesses, lower correlations imply greater gains from diversification, and hence a benefit for MNCs relative to single-​country firms, other things being equal (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Rugman, 1976). For firms that are more integrated at an operating level, these lower correlations

Rolling Correlation

16 Developed Markets, 1989–2008

16 Developed Markets, 1995–2012

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2

0

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

0

1992

Rolling Correlation

13 Emerging Markets, IFCG 0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2 1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2000

2004

2008

2012

16 Emerging Markets, IFCI

0.8

0

1996

2012

0

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

Figure 18.5  Correlations of DM and EM equity markets over time Source: Christoffersen et al. (2014), reprinted with permission from Elsevier.

Risk Management for Companies    437 can give rise to even greater benefits of “pooling” of capacity.6 Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) develop the concept of flexibility much more deeply, and show how it goes beyond simple diversification. Chang, Kogut, and Yang (2016) bring these two concepts together. Globalization, defined as the increasing interdependence of national societies and economies, has two counteracting impacts on risk. On the one hand, it enables greater diversification of some risks, particularly macro-​and product‑level variations in demand as well as the potential to benefit through flexibility/​pooling. On the other, it enhances the potential for propagation of shocks from one nation to another. Ghemawat (2011) provides two contrasting examples, food and finance, where he argues that the benefits of “openness” outweigh the costs in the case of food security, but not for short‐ term capital flows. The same is true for GVCs. A  primary risk benefit of a global supply chain that serves multiple demands (regions, products, or customers) is the potential to reduce fluctuations in demand risk through pooling. This is an economy of scope that complements the scale economies and comparative advantage that motivate the creation of such chains. This risk pooling benefit must be traded off against the risks resulting from the interconnection of geographically and institutionally distant activities which include, among other things, the risk of disruptions due to changes in trade policy, physical events, and man‑made (careless or malicious) events, as well as the system risks resulting from the loss of direct control and the added complexity. Global supply chains entail both physical and informational/​reputational risk propagation mechanisms. With globalization, firms with recognized brands live in a “goldfish bowl” and lapses in any location can easily reach other locations. Further, a firm can quickly get into a vicious circle of attention as with the case of Nike as documented by Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007). As Ghemawat (2011) notes, fear (or outrage) travels faster than fundamentals. With increased integration, gross flows increase much more rapidly than net flows (within a single supply chain, product category, industry, and for economy as a whole) as the benefits of scale, specialization, and pooling increasingly outweigh trade and transportation costs, Risks of disruptions apply to the gross rather than the net flows, though a shift toward protectionism and the associated changes with global regimes could reverse the grossing up observed over the last two decades. Since the two effects—​diversification and propagation—​are offsetting, it is not possible to state as a general matter that risk favors the lengthening or shortening of supply chains. All this is further complicated by cross-​border borrowing that often accompanies investment in EMs. A local investor that is internationally mobile faces similar risks, and thus differentiating the exposure to EM risk faced by outsiders versus locals is not so easy. A key question for IB is the extent to which these higher risks and this greater potential for diversification represent a major deterrence or source of advantage to cross-​border investment into EMs. It’s probably a draw. Risks are higher, but these risks by and large

438   Donald Lessard affect all investors and therefore should be “priced” onto the opportunity set. And the lower correlations across EMs allows for greater risk reduction through diversification. This finding applies to local investors as well as to foreign investors. In fact, more so, as local investors typically have a much higher proportion of total at risk in their home country. Therefore, a key drive toward internationalization by EM firms is to diversify from their own home base. This is perhaps best captured by the situation of CEMEX in 2008, when it acquired Rinker and for the first time more than 50% of assets and operating cash flows were in/​from DMs as opposed to EMs, just as markets tanked worldwide!

Managing EM Risks Risk management typically is framed as reducing or avoiding risk, with the implicit assumption that this is the objective of the exercise. Managing “in the face of risk in contrast is a broader concept that can seek to reduce risks, accept them, or even embrace them for competitive advantage. We begin by discussing objectives, and then turn to the management of each level of risk.

What Problem Are Firms Solving? The first question in risk management should consider what problem are we trying to solve—​minimize risk or maximize value in the face of risk? A novice firm confronting foreign risks is likely to choose the former as it gradually goes through the “three stages of risk acceptance”—​ignore/​deny, transfer, get your hands dirty. In contrast, the experienced and capable firm is much more likely to focus on incorporating risk management into its strategic choices and operational management. The way managers think about risk will determine whether the risk management practices they set up in their organizations are predominantly oriented toward minimizing losses or creating, capturing, and preserving value. One way to achieve the latter is to view risk management as risk-​ shaping and not just risk-​shedding. Further, it requires understanding competitive advantage and actively using risk allocation as a tool. This in turn implies that the organizational structure of the firm, its coordinating mechanisms, and its culture can become extremely powerful risk management tools. While in general firms are risk averse, it does not necessarily follow that they should seek to avoid risk or transfer it to others. A  form of comparative advantage exists whereby risks should be taken on by those actors with (1) the greatest knowledge about them, (2) the greatest ability to mitigate or shape them, (3) the greatest ability to transform them via poling or flexibility (real options), and (4) the greatest ability to withstand the residual impacts through diversification and resilience.7 Regardless of the type of risk driver or consequence, there are only a small number of fundamental types of possible responses, either before or after the fact. These

Risk Management for Companies    439 include responses that (1) have the potential to change the probability distribution of outcomes—​what we refer to as shaping risks; (2) those that have the potential to improve the consequences of the affected operations conditional on the realization of the risk outcome—​real options and real pooling; and (3) those that redistribute risk without affecting the stand‑alone distributions of outcomes and consequences—​financial diversification, hedging, and insurance. As a general matter, risk-​shaping is most applicable for the “inner circle” of risks (see Figures 18.1 and 18.2),—​those most directly under the control of the firm (or its EM partner in a GVC). The outer layers (global regimes, world prices, national macroeconomic or macroinstitutional risks), in contrast, typically are not subject to shaping by firms and therefore can only be addressed by hedging, where there are financial markets and instruments that match the dimensions of exposure or diversification. However, in some cases, it may be possible for a firm to transform particular risk, e.g., macro demand risk in various countries or foreign exchange (FX) risk, by pooling demand into one facility or creating flexible capacity that can be redeployed in response to shifts in demand or relative prices. The middle layers typically involve gaming between firms and governments, and thus may be partly shapeable. However, institutional risks such as trade regime changes typically are not insurable or otherwise transferable though financial transactions, so costly flexibility (creating the option to exit) or diversification remains the only viable avenue for risk reduction. Firms confronting possible changes in continent-​wide trading regimes such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), for example, may choose to preserve more US capacity than they would otherwise. For the firm that is seeking to maximize its (shareholders’ or stakeholders’) value in face of risk, the pecking order of the interventions is (a) interventions that have positive present value, (b) steps that have (close to) neutral value, and (c) measures that are costly. Flexibility may have value, but it typically is costly since it requires excess capacity, so the firm must calculate whether the benefit exceeds the cost. If not, it is better to reduce risk through near-​zero NPV (net present value) financial transactions, and only then to take more costly steps e.g. otherwise unrelated diversification. In the discussion that follows, we focus on two prototypical situations: managing the risks facing a firm with local businesses in EMs and managing the risks of a globally integrated firm or GVC with important operations in EMs. The example we use is a collection of local businesses, CEMEX, which is itself an EM-​based firm. The second is a stylized apparel GVC, where the risks could be seen from the perspective of the brand/​ buyer, a supplier, or a third-​party orchestrator such as Lee and Fung.

Managing Risk in Local EM Businesses CEMEX is an emerging market-​based multinational (EMNE) with roughly half of its operations in EMs. It is essentially a portfolio of local businesses, with global synergies in technology development and implementation, sharing best practices, and most

440   Donald Lessard important for purposes of this chapter, diversifying its revenue base, and hence its funding ability, across a large set of volatile markets. CEMEX faces risk at each layer, but due to their salience for CEMEX, we emphasize operational risks, industry risks, and institutional risks. Our discussion of risk management by CEMEX focuses on two episodes—​the period surrounding CEMEX’s successful acquisition of RMC in 2005 which capped a long-​period of international expansion and above market shareholder returns (Lessard, Lucea, & Vives, 2013) and the period following its disastrous acquisition of Rinker in 2008. Our detailed description of risk management practices is based on interviews conducted in 2005, originally published in Lessard and Lucea (2009), but we also note a number of changes in CEMEX’s risk exposures and responses in subsequent years. Although much has changed about CEMEX since then, the risk management practices we describe continue to be relevant for CEMEX and for practice in general.

Operational Risks As of 2005 CEMEX had (and still has) a formal approach for managing property and casualty risks. This multistep process involves the following:

• tracking and offering advice on risk at the plant-​or business-​unit-​level, • allocating sufficient “first loss” to assure the unit’s focus on risk management, • pooling the remaining risk through a captive insurance subsidiary, and • reinsuring the excess in international markets to calibrate prices and manage potential losses that might otherwise strain CEMEX’s capacity to respond.

This rigorous approach to reduce property and casualty losses comprises three main elements that share much in common with the firm’s overall approach to operations: a formal process mapped out in engineering detail, clear assignment of responsibilities, and measurement of outcomes, and it is one of the first measures deployed in newly acquired firms. The acquisition of RMC in March 2005 was a major challenge for two reasons—​the sheer size of the operation: $7.9B in revenue generated by 26,000 employees operating 51 cement factories, mills and terminals; over 400 quarries, and close to 1500 ready-​ mix plants distributed across more than 20 countries; and differences in management philosophies:  whereas RMC’s operations were managed in a decentralized manner, CEMEX is the poster child of standardization. The first phase of the integration process focused on immediate efficiency improvements and cost reductions. One of these initiatives was the turnaround of the Rugby cement plant in the United Kingdom. The largest of its kind in the country, this plant had a long history of labor conflict and underperformance. During 2004, the plant had operated at barely 70% of capacity, and materials, energy, and maintenance costs were much higher than for similar plants operated by CEMEX. Two months after the acquisition, the control systems had been streamlined to the point that instead of 3000 potentially plant-​stopping alarms each month there were only a handful; and plant

Risk Management for Companies    441 utilization increased to 94%. As part of the post-​merger integration (PMI) program, an energy-​efficiency and cost-​savings plan based on burning of tire chips as an alternative fuel was implemented. Plant personnel levels were also reduced as part of the efficiency program. Further, safety outcomes improved dramatically. These operational changes reduced operational risks, but they exacerbated institutional risks as CEMEX’s “social license to operate” was questioned with the announced reduction in the number of plant alarms and planned shift to burning tire chips. A number of encounters with community leaders and citizen groups forced CEMEX to release detailed information about the nature of proposed process changes and to invest in a state-​of-​the-​art filter system that would further minimize the particulate emissions over and above what was required by the planning process. Further, as CEMEX moved increasingly into developed markets, it found that product liability (Europe) and liabilities for worker safety (USA) were much larger than those they had encountered in emerging markets.

Industry/​Competitive  Risks The main industry/​competitive risk incurred by the cement business is the irreversible commitment of fixed assets (cement plants, terminals, and distribution facilities) with significant fixed operating costs and specific capital in the face of uncertain demand. This risk is exacerbated by the commodity nature of its products and services, which make prices fall to marginal cost levels during periods of oversupply. In the long run, these risks play out in the entry and expansion decisions of firms seeking to dominate particular markets through investments in production scale and scope. In the short run, attempts to dominate through preemptive investments in capacity increase the likelihood of a mismatch between supply and demand, resulting in excess productive capacity and forced price reductions. Such risk exposure is a common fact for any firm that produces durables with relatively inflexible and lumpy capacity. CEMEX’s main product, cement, and its focus on emerging markets made this risk particularly salient to CEMEX during its adolescence as a global firm. CEMEX addresses industry risk in various ways. For example, it dedicates a substantial amount of managerial attention and considerable resources to estimating the evolution of supply and demand in the various markets it serves. This allows CEMEX to manage the risk of demand fluctuations not only by strategically adjusting its product mix and carefully selecting where to locate its plants but also by operating in multiple countries and by brokering market unbalances through logistics and trading. As CEMEX director of trading explained, “[trading and logistics J play a key role in the corporate risk agenda because you have a mechanism for dealing with shifts in demand around the world and for balancing them in a way that is probably much more effective than the portfolio.” Indeed, diversifying sales across countries can reduce overall variation in cash flows, revenues, and profits. However. substantial variation in capacity utilization might still be experienced on a market-​by-​market basis. In order to arbitrage supply and demand misalignments CEMEX invested heavily in port terminals and vessels. and developed a sophisticated process to operate them. While trading decisions

442   Donald Lessard are made regionally, as close to markets as possible, shipping decisions are cleared and aggregated globally through CEMEX’s IT system. This combination of localization and global integration enables the company to respond quickly and coherently to specific mismatches in the market.

Institutional Risks Among the most important institutional risks CEMEX faces is the uncertainty regarding the application of environmental regulations and the uncertainty regarding acceptable behavior in limiting market access and in pricing across countries. As we have seen, competition in the cement industry is strongly determined by three elements: the fact that cement is, by and large, a commodity, its low value-​to-​weight ratio, which makes it expensive to move across long distances, and the high proportion of sunk and fixed costs in its production process. which pushes manufacturers to sell at marginal costs. All three factors make pricing strategies the main instrument through which competition among manufacturers is waged. It also means that most firms in this sector have flirted, at one point or another, with the specter of being accused of price dumping to drive competition out of the market. As a consequence. and because of the central role of the construction industry in most economies, regulatory authorities in most countries keep a very close watch on the pricing practices of cement companies. On the other hand, the impact, direct and indirect, that manufacturing activities have on the environment and on public health has raised, in the last decade, the level of scrutiny of social and governmental actors. CEMEX copes with these risks in a variety of ways. First, it invests considerable resources in regulatory compliance and legal oversight. Second, it responds to increasing social and government concerns through the adoption of global standards for safety and environmental practices in all of its operations. Further, EMs do not represent the greatest risks that a firm faces on many of these dimensions. It is interesting to note that the rapid expansion of sustainability initiatives at CEMEX coincides with its geographic expansion into more developed countries, where social actors are more influential in determining standards of acceptable corporate behavior. With the acquisition of RMC and its arrival “on stage” as a leading world firm, in particular, CEMEX found that it needed to become much more explicit and formal in its management of environmental risks, particularly given the increased public awareness of the role of cement production in global warming. In addition to the “within country” responses to mitigate institutional risk, CEMEX also makes use of international investment agreements (BITs, or bilateral investment treaties, and multilateral agreements) to mitigate expropriation risk. Along with Holcim and Lafarge, its assets in Venezuela were expropriated in Venezuela. It settled in 2011, using its Dutch subsidiaries as the key to ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) arbitration (https://​www.cdr-​news.com/​categories/​arbitration-​ and-​adr/​venezuela-​settles-​cemex-​expropriation-​claims-​for-​usd-​600-​million) as well as substantial direct pressure from the Mexican Foreign Ministry including the leverage

Risk Management for Companies    443 provided by the Mexico/​Venezuela/​Colombia trade agreements investment provisions (http://​investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/​Download/​TreatyFile/​2432).

Country/​National Macroeconomic Risk In addition to the strategic steps outlined above, the major way that CEMEX addresses national-​level market risk is through diversification. In 2004, for example, CEMEX calculated that with its current geographic distribution of sales ten years earlier, it would not have experienced a single quarter of negative growth since the 1990s. With its expansion into developed countries with the RMC and Rinker acquisitions, it successfully reduced its exposure to EMs but still remained exposed to global downturns such as 2008. In fact, it is also possible that its concern with ameliorating the risk of operating in emerging economies blinded it to the substantial risk associated with its increased exposure to OECD markets with the RMC and, particularly, Rinker acquisitions. In 2012, though, the power of international diversification became apparent with the cratering of Mexico’s market for cement, still a major source of CEMEX’s cash flows. Had CEMEX not been diversified, it could well have failed at this point.

Exchange Rate and Transfer Risk While global energy prices and national exchange rates both strong effect local cash flows and their translation into US dollars, which is CEMEX’s focal currency, the firm does relatively little to directly manage either. It actively addresses energy prices, but largely by trying to arbitrage through lower-​cost alternatives in each country, which to some extent separates it from the global market, and it addresses FX fluctuations as part of the overall country diversification strategy. The one place where the two come together is in determining the currency composition of its overall borrowing (and hedge) positions, which it largely keeps in US dollars. This may have been a mistake, as in fact cash flows in each country rise in response to increases in the real exchange rate, since it purchases a bundle of internationally traded (and priced) inputs (energy, CAPEX consumables, some aggregates) while selling a locally priced product. Ironically, the major transfer risk that CEMEX faced, particularly in its early phase of internationalization, was that associated with Mexico itself. When it embarked on internationalization in 1992 it faced a sovereign spread of roughly 600 basis points, which meant that it had a very high cost of capital compared to that of competitors such as Holcim or Lafarge. By acquiring assets (and cash flows) first in Spain and then in other lower-​financial-​risk countries, it was able to borrow against these flows and reduce its overall capital disadvantage. Since CEMEX is largely multidomestic, with limited cross-​border integration of operations or costs, FX risk management is largely subsumed into the determination of the borrowing mix for the firm as a whole. As a general matter, firms with highly concentrated cross-​border exposures are more likely to single out FX risk. Even in these cases, the best response to risk might be to hedge at the operating level or better yet, if possible, to transform risk through pooling/​flexibility We will return to FX risk in more complex, linked operations below.

444   Donald Lessard In contrast to this this period of successful international expansion bolstered by a thorough-​going process of risk management, CEMEX made another major acquisition in 2008—​Rinker—​and nearly bankrupted itself in the process. While it is impossible to fully unscramble bad timing from a poor strategic decision, the fact that CEMEX acquired Rinker at a substantial premium using short-​term dollar-​denominated bank borrowing—​a violation of its overall focus on limiting risk—​contributed to the debacle. While the acquisition further broadened its overall diversification, the leverage exacerbated the remaining risk. Further, 2008 witnessed a world-​wide crash, an outlier among the previously low correlations among its national markets. While it is possible that CEMEX’s confidence in risk management may have blinded it to the overall risk profile of the acquisition, it also appears that the strategic logic was not as strong as that for RMC (see (Lessard, Lucea, & Vives, 2013). It also demonstrates that the risks associated with macro-​volatility are not limited to EMs and can affect the entire world economy.

Managing Risks for EM-​Based Global Value Chains In a GVC, a brand or buyer such as H&M or Nike employs a widely distributed set of factories, often performing very specialized and hence interdependent steps, in different countries.8 The overall orchestration will involve the management of within-​ factory operational risks such as variations in productivity, violation of labor standards, and natural disasters, as well as the cross-​country risks of matching supply and demand, moving goods physically and across trade and fiscal barriers, and ensuring that the ensemble performs in sync. Lardner (1988) provides a vivid description of this division of labor and orchestrations, and Yew and Neo (2017) show how dynamic it is over time. A GVC is a large system linked through ownership, relational contracts, and transactional interactions, while the integrated MNE is defined by common ownership and an internal division of labor. With the growing emphasis on core competencies, along with the global dispersion of activities and ecosystems, the two forms may in fact be converging. Many multinationals employ a set of market-​oriented subsidiaries at the “front end” and boundary-​spanning GVCs on the “back end.” As shown in Figure 18.2, many risks in GVCs involve emerging markets, but few if any are contained within EMs. This seems ironic given that GVCs are characterized as fragmented (Gereffi, Humphey, & Sturgeon, 2005), but the reason is that while individual production activities are “salami-​sliced” across countries, they are tightly integrated into the global chain, often with few buffers or redundancy. Of course, the “inside risks” of the GVC—​ maintaining quality, avoiding disruptions—​must be managed country by country and plant by plant, shaped by a combination of systems, incentives, and expertise. However, the risks that arise from the interconnectedness of the supply chain itself—​the magnification of demand pulses, the fragility of the overall system in the face of individual disruptions, etc., must be managed at the system level, finding ways to relax/​diffuse demand shocks and build in some

Risk Management for Companies    445 degree of redundancy across specific sources or logistic links. Simchi-​Levi (2010) lists a series of steps for managing supply chain risk. Each of these has EM elements, but none is done exclusively within specific EMs. GVCs are both risk absorbers and risk propagators and managing the trade-​off between the two effects is the essence of risk management. They are absorbers by pooling demands for different products destined to different end markets within a shared production facility. They are propagators since the various elements are linked serially, and a break in any one can propagate, or even magnify, elsewhere. Mitigation of the propagation effect takes two forms: redundancy, which allows decoupling, and greater transparency and communication among the elements. In fact, one of the major advantages of GVC orchestrators such as Li and Fung relative to single brands or suppliers is that they maintain relationships in many locations, as well as being able to shift know-​how, and thus they are able to rapidly shift sourcing in response to changes across countries. This advantage, however, has decreased as brands that directly manage their own GVCs also have also gained the scale and capabilities to do so, though some, including Japan’s Fast Retailing (Indiglo brand), continue to use orchestrating firms such as Mitsubishi Corporation.

The Special Case of Reputational Risk Figure 18.6 shows the unique character of reputation risk associated with, say, “unacceptable” labor practices. A reputation hit is a consequence of various forces, and not itself an initial risk driver. The inner circle of reputation risk includes the various drivers that may lead to abusive overtime—​a socially irresponsible profit-​maximizing factory owner operating in a context with limited or no enforcement of working conditions—​ but also pressures for “impossible” delivery by the buyer, and so on. The outer layer

External risk drivers Internal risk drivers

“Unacceptable act”

Media coverage PR activities

Issue awareness

Reputation Financial outcomes

Sales impact

Access to opportunities

Figure 18.6  The reputational risk system Source: Henry Weil and Don Lessard, published in Lessard (2013).

446   Donald Lessard

includes the dynamics of reputation—​e.g., the salience of a particular set of issues, and their identification with a particular brand. A “downgrade” in reputation has further knock-​on effects, driving a downward spiral. As a result, reputational risk is the result of a complex set of system interactions that is best understood as a consequence rather than a source of risk. Breaking this cycle, either before or after the fact, is itself complex. At the plant level, two approaches are described by Distelhorst, Hainmueller, and Locke (2017)—​ compliance or capability-​building In the former, the GVC owner/​manager continuously monitors and periodically audits factory behavior in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of abusive overtime or other labor abuses. With capability-​building, the brand owner, or perhaps an NGO, helps front-​line operators to upgrade practices so that they will be less reliant on steps that lead to abuses. However, the GVC brands/​buyers/​orchestrators also must discipline themselves in terms of the requirements they place on the factory, since overly strong “pulses” of demand can only be met by abusive working conditions. Finally, GVC owners/​orchestrators can change overall incentives, by favoring suppliers that meet international codes of conduct. This also involves a public relations dimension, showing that the firm is actively engaged with improving labor conditions, etc. Some brands like Nike have invested a great deal in doing this proactively, while others like Apple have found themselves managing such exposures reactively. Of course, the brand owners are not the only active elements in a complex GVC. Foxconn’s 2017 move to establish a major plant in Wisconsin is clearly an attempt by a supplier to mitigate a reputational risk associated with “offshoring”(Lowrie, 2017). Risk management in GVCs involves two different aspects. The first is to mitigate risks at the component or system level; the second is to reallocate the remaining risks among and across the system. The two are complementary, since the allocation of risk across parties feeds back into the risk at each level and system wide. Samel (2012) notes that a key aspect of the “division of labor” within a GVC is the issue of who bears and deals with various uncertainties and risks inherent in meeting unpredictable macro and product demand through a distributed and fragmented supply chain. He identifies a set of electronics assemblers located in the Malaysian island of Penang that have succeeded in commanding both relatively high wages for their workers and relatively high margins for themselves by specializing in bearing volatility in product demand. They do so on the basis of accommodating labor regulations/​ institutions (including an ample pool of immigrant labor), a broad set of relationships with design and end‑product firms that allow them address extreme fluctuations in product demand, with surges in production requirements from 250% to 500% within a year and cutbacks of up to two‑thirds within the same time frame, through to the pooling of production and relatively simple technologies that can be reconfigured quickly, e.g., changing the number of assembly lines. The volatility of orders for each product/​relationship acts as a barrier to entry since it is costly for new entrants to match the scale and organizational and managerial capabilities required for pooling and flexibility. This risk is partly

Risk Management for Companies    447 transformed by pooling and partly transferred to workers through volatile hours and harsh working conditions. Hon Hai (Foxconn) also appears to gain much of its advantage from its ability to quickly scale production to meet demand. This is particularly important given the winner-​take-​all nature of the network effect on consumer electronic products which is exacerbated by the fact that product demand is “pulsed” to build a self‑reinforcing wave of sales. The inherent volatility of demand in supply chains at the macro and product level, in fact, appears to be one of the key barriers of entry to the supply chain and access to higher value added (Buckley, 2009). Supply chain stakeholders differ in their exposure to particular risks, in their capacity to absorb these impacts, and in their ability to mitigate or hedge those risks. The key concern from an extended view of the supply chain that includes labor and small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs) is the extent to which different supply chain actors have greater or lesser scope to manage a particular set of risks. A related issue is to determine which risks within specific supply chains can be relatively successfully managed by individual actors versus those that require concerted efforts by groups of suppliers, by policymakers, or by the two groups working together. A disruption in a particular source, whether due to a natural calamity, a man‑made error, or a malicious act at that source, or a disruption to another stage, will result in in the failure of the supply chain to deliver the promised products on a timely basis. It also may entail a significant loss of income for labor, and a loss in capacity utilization and income for the factory owner that will be exacerbated by any investment in raw materials or work in process that it has undertaken. The orchestrator typically will lose proportionally on its throughput, unless of course it has another source of supply. The brand owner may or may not lose depending on whether it (or its orchestrator) has an alternative source of supply, and if not, whether the ultimate product is a free-​standing product or a component of a more complex system, as well as whether or not it faces close substitutes in the marketplace. If the disruption is systemic to the supplier country or region, e.g., a natural disaster such as Fukushima, a transport shutdown, or a policy “embargo,” then the supplier country will suffer a similar proportional impact, or perhaps an even larger one due to the social capital/​infrastructure involved. As a general matter, the exposure or vulnerability of a particular stage in the supply chain to a given risk depends on its operating leverage, its competitive or contractual position that determines the extent to which it can pass on or must absorb the impact, and its flexibility in adjusting to the impact within the activity. Its ability to absorb the impact depends on its diversification, its financial strength, and its flexibility across activities. The exposure of labor will depend among other things on the employment terms which determine how these impacts are shared with the employer, with the greatest exposure corresponding to situations with piecework pay and no premium for or constraints on overtime versus one with a greater salary base and premiums for/​

448   Donald Lessard constraints on overtime. Examples of how firms can proactively mange thiese risks is provided by Foxconn and Apple’s recent voluntary steps to avoid excessive overtime (The Economist, 2012). Designing the GVC to distribute risk according to comparative advantage becomes the highest order of risk management.

Financial vs. Strategic/​Operational Responses to Country and Other EM Risks A common misconception in risk management is that financial risk should necessarily be managed with financial instruments (or that non-​financial risk should not!). By financial risks, we refer to those that have financial drivers, e.g., foreign exchange rates, interest rates, oil prices, transfer conditions, etc., as opposed to all risks that have financial outcomes (all risks facing a firm). Financial measures to reduce/​shift/​offset risk should be employed (1) when they are available and effective, and (2) when there are no positive NPV interventions that both add value and reduce risk. Managing this within the firm, though, is not simple as operational responses are the responsibility of operating units, financial responses are the responsibility of treasury, and shaping institutional risk (through lobbying or otherwise exerting influence) takes place through public affairs and senior leadership (Lessard & Zaheer, 1996). This is most easily seen in the FX sphere, a salient issue in EMs with a history of monetary and exchange rates instability. A firm with inputs determined in one currency and outputs determined in another faces an exposure to the risk, and can respond to these risks by employing financial instruments (local currency borrowing, FX contracts e.g., swaps, non-​deliverable futures, etc.) or operating measures. A firm may be able to add value in the face of varying relative prices across regions/​ countries by opportunistically shifting production and altering marketing mix/​pricing (Lessard & Lightstone, 1986). This requires coordination across production, sales, and financial functions within the firm and is organizationally difficult to pull off (Lessard & Nohria, 1987; Lessard & Zaheer, 1996). Some risks are amenable to only one type of management intervention, whereas different actors may be able to respond in multiple ways to others. “Things that break” correspond to operational failures such as delays or gaps in quality, or to disruptions due to man‑made or natural hazards. In most instances, these are “inside” risks at the supplier or supply chain level and are best addressed by building effective organizations with properly aligned incentives and/​or commitment of its employees, as well as an overlay of compliance and security. Diversification or pooling does not alter the expected losses associated with these errors, and insurance will be expensive (relative to the expected losses) due to information asymmetry and moral hazard. Multiple or flexible sourcing will mitigate the impacts of supply interruptions, but not of product quality.

Risk Management for Companies    449 “Things that vary” correspond to fluctuations in macro and product demand, e.g., the collapse of European demand with the euro crisis or the boom and bust of demand for specific smart phones or other consumer electronics, and to commodity prices and exchange rates. Strategic risks associated with irreversibly committing resources in the face of cost or demand uncertainties by firms, by workers, or by regions often can be addressed by creating options to allow greater range of responses in line with future outcomes. In the case of FX fluctuations, for example, the ideal would be to put all factories on ships, allowing them to quickly arbitrage changes in cost. In practice, these real options, though, are costly—​e.g., building two plants in different currency areas and initially loading each at only one and a half shifts—​so only some of them will add value.9 A variant of the real option is pooling, whereby a firm is able to employ a specific fixed capacity to serve a variety of different product or national market demands, thus enhancing the expected cash flows for this set of activities while reducing their volatility. This is different from, and more effective than, financial diversification that simply reduces portfolio variance by mixing different distributions without altering their expected values. On the other hand, pooling requires standardization and specialization, and it may limit the ability of firms to integrate forward or backward in the chain and is subject to diminishing returns as the number of “demands” that are pooled increases. This standardization and specialization, in turn, benefits from regional agglomeration that allows the co‐specialization of firms and provides a barrier to entry benefitting relatively few locations. When “things that vary” are traded in markets, such as exchange rates or commodity prices, it also is possible to shift these risks through hedging. “Regimes that change,” whether at the global level, such as the disputes between the USA and Europe over meat, the USA and Mexico over tomatoes, or the USA and China regarding clean trade or intellectual property, or the national or local level, are often ill‑defined and unpredictable as they depend on the decisions of governments or regulators, typically acting in response to pressures from affected parties. Transforming them through influence, though, is sometimes possible. Further, flexibility and diversification can ameliorate their impact on any given supply chain actor. A key difference among the three types of risk is how they alter the distribution of cash flows relative to most likely cash flow projections. Things that break have limited upsides, but long downsides, so the expected cash flows are invariably lower than the most likely case. Things that vary, in contrast, are more symmetrically distributed, and hence expected cash flows will be similar to most likely cases. Regimes that vary will be more complex, though it seems that breakdowns are more likely than “golden ages,” implying that these risks will on average tend to reduce cash flows as well. These differences, and the different exposure of various activities to them, suggest that simply adjusting discount rates for political, country, or institutional risks is likely to be misleading (Lessard, 1996). Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2016), however, show that it can be done consistently for political risk.

450   Donald Lessard

Summary and Generalization Emerging markets are no longer exotic as they represent a very large fraction of the total world economy. However, they continue to be riskier than developed economies, because of both local dynamics and a generally greater sensitivity to global changes. Managing risk in emerging markets requires a systematic identification of these risks, determining which of them can be managed to the advantage of a particular firm, and which simply have to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to invest in a given country. This chapter highlights four perspectives that we believe will be helpful in managing emerging markets risks: layers of risk, comparative advantage in risk bearing, the pecking order of risk management tools, and the integral nature of risk management and overall operational and strategic management. The layers-​of-​risk perspective summarized in the first part of the chapter provides guidance on how various risks should be managed and who in the organization should be responsible for them. As a general rule, “outside risks” are best dealt with through markets, and only through diversification when markets are not effective. This sounds simple, but it requires the both the relevant expertise and capabilities and a high degree of cross-​functional collaboration. “In-​between risks” such as corruption or changes in regulation within countries are more complex. Managing them requires a mix of shaping, hedging, and diversification, with “local insiders” typically excelling at the former and multinationals at the latter. If MNCs can integrate locally as well as benefit from their global scope, they can get the best of both worlds (Santos, 2017). As Santos and Williamson (2015) point out, EMNEs are likely to emerge as leaders in doing this. Comparative advantage in taking/​bearing risk builds directly on the layers approach. It recognizes that some firms have an advantage relative to others in sensing, influencing, pooling, or diversifying particular risks. This comparative advantage should be a key element of their competitive and international strategy. This is particularly the case in GVCs, since different actors—​brands/​buyers, orchestrators, multinational suppliers, and local suppliers—​have different advantages in risk taking, and good GVC design aligns with these advantages. This comparative advantage, in turn, leads to a pecking order of risk management that differs radically from risk avoidance. Firms first should seek to create value by embracing risks, shaping risks, and exploiting flexibility to deliver unique value propositions. They then should seek to capture value by using ability to bear, shape, and exploit risks as a barrier to entry. Finally, they should seek to preserve value by partnering, contracting, and financial risk management to limit or transfer those risks that do not offer competitive advantage. Ultimately, risk management cannot and should not be separated from operational or strategic management in general. Without a clear understanding of strategic advantage,

Risk Management for Companies    451 managing risk will not necessarily add value. On the other hand, even a very good strategy can be tripped up by weak risk management. Risk management for EMs does not appear to be fundamentally different than risk management in DMs. However, the salience of particular risks will vary as will the difficulty of managing them. EM risks should be seen as part of general fabric of global risks. In fact, even companies that do not invest abroad are affected by global forces, and increasingly these global forces include the impact of EMs.

Notes 1. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines emerging markets as “a group of about 30-​50 countries that are in a transition phase—​not too rich, not too poor, and not too closed to foreign capital, with regulatory and financial systems that have yet to fully mature.” (Lagarde, 2016). 2. See Parsley and Popper (2017) for the use of the instability of “managing the macro-​ trilemma” as a measure of country risk. 3. These aspects of country risk and their implications are discussed in Lessard (1989). 4. See Lardner (1988) for a vivid chronicle of how changing trade regimes have shaped the knitwear industry. 5. Author experience. 6. See Lessard and Lucea (2009) for further discussion of the benefits of diversifying across local operations vs. pooling capacity across locations. 7. Blitzer, Lessard, and Paddock (1984) develop this concept with application to risk allocation between producer countries and MNCs in extractive activities. Lessard in 1996 extends it to free-​standing investments in a EMs, and in 2013 to GVCs. 8. This section builds largely on Lessard (2013). 9. See Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994).

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Pa rt   I V

LOCAL FIRMS A N D E M E RG I N G MARKET MNES

Chapter 19

E ntrepreneu rsh i p i n Em erging M a rk ets Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright

Entrepreneurship is one of the fastest growing branches of management and business research, yet it originated with studies that took as given the institutional context; that of the developed countries. Consistent with this, the key early theorists of entrepreneurship, including Kirzner (2015[1973]), Schumpeter (2008[1934]), and von Mises (1966), paid no attention to national development status nor to the specific issues of emerging economies. That changed only in the late 20th century, when Baumol (1990) asked about the linkages between the institutional setup and the motivation to engage in alternative types of entrepreneurship. According to Baumol, it is not the availability of entrepreneurial talent that explains variation in entrepreneurial outcomes across nations but the form of the institutional arrangements; these create a variety of incentives system leading entrepreneurs to engage in either productive, non-​productive, or destructive forms of entrepreneurship. In this chapter we consider the factors influencing the supply of entrepreneurship including the impact of the social and institutional context on entrepreneurial activity. Once questions about institutions have been raised, we can no longer consider all economies to be uniform, and to conform to the behavior common in developed economies. This leads to us undertake research from a comparative perspective and to consider emerging market economies as distinctive. Yet it is also not appropriate to create a simple dichotomous comparative framework because emerging economies, while being similar in terms of development level, are not homogeneous in a number of important aspects, most notably in terms of their institutional contexts (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). Moreover, while in many countries, the pace of development has been rapid, in others it has been slower (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Thus previous decades

458    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright have witnessed dynamic development in some of the poorest countries, especially in Southeast Asia (O’Neil, 2011), starting with the smaller economies of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Recent years have been dominated by the spectacular development of China, with India now following a similar path. And much of this development was accompanied by the emergence of “billions of entrepreneurs” (Khanna, 2011). In this process, institutional change came hand in hand with the opening up of opportunities. Similarly, many transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe also offered new prospects for entrepreneurship (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011a). These developments have created heterogeneity in the institutional contexts of emerging economies (Carney, Estrin, Liang, & Shapiro, 2017), with significant implications for the nature and extent of entrepreneurship (Zahra & Wright, 2011). Institutions refer to the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991: 97). Within these, the key distinction is between formal institutions, namely, the “rules of the game” represented by the laws and formal structures that set out the economic incentives to guide individual choices, and informal institutions which are the social arrangements and norms that affect both the individual choices directly, and the actual operations of the formal institutions. Institutions therefore define the set of strategic choices, including the decision to create a new firm as well as the incentives of potential entrepreneurs (Baumol, 1990). Williamson (2000) integrates the theory on institutions, categorizing them at three levels distinguished by the pace at which they change, each placing constraints on the ones below, and jointly determining national and organizational resource allocation. Thus, what North (1991) terms “informal institutions,” including social capital, are the deepest-​rooted institutions and therefore placed at the top of Williamson’s hierarchy. They influence the effectiveness of rules and formal controls at the lower levels. At the second level are formal institutions; the codified “rules of the game” (North, 1991) that relate to the rule of law and property rights that are stable and effectively enforced and define the formal institutional environment. The third level, governance, represents the particular structures adopted by organizations and individuals to manage transactions. These three levels of institutions are closely inter-​related. But change at the higher levels is much slower than at the lower levels (see, however, Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011a). Emerging economy research highlights the importance of institutions for securing business performance (Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2013). Following that, we start with an empirical analysis describing the characteristics of entrepreneurship in emerging economies. In particular, we contrast the way that human capital is utilized by entrepreneurs in emerging market economies and in developed countries. Continuing with the theme of human capital, we then bring in theory and consider entrepreneurship in emerging economies at the individual level; we reflect on the importance of an entrepreneur’s social capital in the emerging economy context, while the following section is dedicated to the important role that the repatriating human and social capital from abroad plays in emerging economy entrepreneurship, especially that of an innovative character. We then go on to the macro level and provide

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    459 cross-​country comparisons of the effects of institutions on entrepreneurial activity. Finally, we offer conclusions and suggest avenues for future research.

Empirical Evidence on Institutions and Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets As we already hinted, the earlier stages of economic development are associated with greater entrepreneurial activity. Figure 19.1 provides empirical illustration of this proposition. The figure is constructed utilizing Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data which have been collected as representative national surveys of individuals since 1999 when it covered 10 countries (Reynolds et al., 2005); 106 countries appeared at least once in the survey between 2001 and 2015, with an increasing emphasis on emerging economies. The dataset is drawn from working-​age populations; it contains detailed information about the characteristics of entrepreneurs, employees, and individuals not currently employed, including age, gender, education, attitudes, and their entrepreneurial experience and networks. In Figure 19.1, each dot represents a country-​year point, where the years range from 2001 to 2015. Level of development is captured by gross domestic product (GDP) per person employed, based on purchasing power parity, in constant (2011) prices, expressed in US dollars. The entrepreneurship prevalence rate relates to the percentage of the working-​age population of each country being involved in starting a new firm (in “nascent entrepreneurship" or, another words, in “start-​ups”). The pattern is of a U-​curve: entrepreneurship rates are high in less developed countries, go down in middle-​income countries, and then seem to increase again in the most developed economies. This relationship is consistent with previous findings (Acs, Desai, & Hessels, 2008; Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik, & Reynolds, 2005). However, note that the fit of the right-​hand branch of the graph relies on a handful of outliers only. It is possible that what we actually see may represent an L-​shaped curve—​entrepreneurship rates going down at some stage of development, around $50k of GDP per employee and staying low thereafter. A possible U-​shape is largely driven by Qatar (third observation from the right; the first two from the right relate to Luxembourg). What is clear is that in the emerging economies there is far more dispersion in rates of entrepreneurship, which suggests heteroscedasticity: entrepreneurial outcomes differ much more in emerging markets. If we are inclined to believe in the U-​shaped pattern in Figure 19.1, it would conform to the stages of development identified by Porter (1990), with countries first being “factor driven” (i.e., reliant on labor and especially capital for growth) at low levels of GDP per capita; then “efficiency driven” (i.e., reliant on skills for growth) at middle-​income levels; and finally “innovation driven” (i.e., reliant on technical change for growth) when they are developed. Acs et al. (2008) offer the following explanation of the U-​shape. Countries in the factor-​driven

460    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright Level of development and nascent entrepreneurship rates

.4

.3

.2

.1

0 0

50000

100000

150000

200000

GDP per employee Nascent entrepreneurship rate

Fitted values

Figure 19.1  Level of development and nascent entrepreneurship rates Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2001–​2015) and World Bank

stage largely produce agricultural goods, commodities, or low value-​added products using basic technologies, and most firms in manufacturing and services are small. Barriers to entrepreneurial entry are relatively low and exit rates may also be high. In the efficiency-​driven stage, countries begin to manufacture and possibly export at scale, and firms are typically much larger, as are barriers to the entry of new firms. In consequence self-​employment rates are lower and there is less opportunity for entrepreneurship. Moreover, managers can earn more when employed by somebody else because the returns to wage work are higher in large firms relative to entrepreneurial activity. This may explain the observed decline in entrepreneurial activity as economies become more developed. However, when economies reach the technological frontier at which growth relies on innovation rather than the improved application of existing technologies (Acemoglu, Zilibotti, & Aghion, 2006), the role of the entrepreneur as innovator may once again become more central. Our alternative explanation of the nonlinear relationship, and consistent with the L-​ shaped interpretation, hinges on the fact that entrepreneurial entry is a heterogeneous phenomenon. Some entrepreneurial projects, especially in less developed countries, are undertaken out of necessity and their function is to provide basic income support when opportunities in sufficiently well-​paid employment are scarce. Indeed, this is what we observe when we extract the pure “necessity” motive among entrepreneurs. Figure 19.2 shows how the proportion of those who start their businesses because they do not have any better work alternatives changes with the level of development. The trend is clearly negative and the fit is good. This necessity entrepreneurship is closely associated with lower levels of entrepreneurial ambitions: ventures started out of necessity are likely to start small and to stay small. There is another reason why entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    461 Share of necessity entry in nascent entrepreneurship

.6

.4

.2

0 0

50000

100000

150000

200000

GDP per employee No better choices for work

Fitted values

Figure 19.2  Share of necessity entry in nascent entrepreneurship Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2001–​2015) and World Bank

does not bring economic dynamism in some emerging economies, as emphasized by De Soto (1989, 2000): institutional barriers to engage in formal sector projects are high and entrepreneurs tend to stay within the informal economy where the opportunities to grow are more constrained (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2012). To obtain more insights into these issues we ran regressions using all the available data, from GEM, 2001–​2015. While previous research has relied on models with country random effects, now with 15 years of data and a large number of countries, we can estimate our models including country and year fixed effects. These fixed effects are therefore added to the set of over 1.7 million individual observations with robust standard errors. In each estimated model below, we apply logit to estimate the likelihood of an individual in a country being engaged in a start-​up project (nascent entrepreneurship) among the working-​age population. Model 1 is a basic model where the key explanatory variable of interest is our proxy for the level of development (GDP per person in employment), consistent with the discussion above. In model 2 we add interactions of individual characteristics such as education and age with the level of development. Models 3 and 4 are similar, except in those two we add the individual attitude to risk proxied as the respondent’s self-​ declared fear of failure, and also the self-​declared entrepreneurial skills. This comes at a cost; the sample shrinks by about 300,000 observations. Table 19.1 reports the set of controls we use, along with descriptive statistics and variable labels. This list, which includes variables at the individual level like gender and age, and at the country level like inflation and growth, is consistent with norms in the literature (e.g. Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2016). Table 19.2 contains our results. As mentioned already, in model 1 the key explanatory variable of interest is GDP per person employed, representing the level of development. There is less entrepreneurship in

Table 19.1 Variables used in logit regression models Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Engaged in nascent business start-​up activity

1,953,076

0.05

0.22

0

1

Age

1,953,076

40.2

13.03

16

64

Female

1,952,856

0.52

0.5

0

1

Some secondary education

1,898,833

0.24

0.43

0

1

Secondary education

1,898,833

0.33

0.47

0

1

Tertiary education

1,898,833

0.36

0.48

0

1

Manages and owns a business older than 42 months

1,953,076

0.08

0.27

0

1

Past 12 months, sold, shut, discontinued, or quit a business

1,886,644

0.04

0.19

0

1

Business angel

1,946,253

0.04

0.2

0

1

Fear of failure would 1,664,128 prevent from starting a business

0.39

0.49

0

1

Knowledge and skills for starting a business

1,666,851

0.5

0.5

0

1

Mean age

1,953,076

42.06

4.47

25.39

62.12

Share of females

1,953,076

0.52

0.04

0

0.73

Share of those with some secondary education

1,939,268

0.25

0.17

0

0.9

Share of those with secondary education

1,939,268

0.33

0.14

0

0.77

Share of those with higher education

1,939,268

0.36

0.17

0

0.94

Share of established business owners

1,953,076

0.07

0.05

0

0.38

Share of those who discontinued business

1,901,130

0.04

0.04

0

0.3

Constraints on executive

1,907,126

6.4

1.27

1

7

GDP per person employed (constant 2011 PPP $)

1,940,826

64156.9

30103.99

1813.97

203704.5

GDP deflator

1,936,231

3.64

5.07

−15.71

56.5

GDP growth

1,936,231

2.54

3.37

−14.33

26.28

Sources: GEM, Polity IV project, World Bank

Table 19.2 Likelihood of being engaged in nascent business start-​up activities, logit estimations Explanatory variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Age

0.106*** (0.00187)

0.102*** (0.00359)

0.0812*** (0.00198)

0.0844*** (0.00377)

Age squared

−0.001*** (0.000)

−0.001*** (0.000)

−0.001*** (0.000)

−0.001*** (0.000)

Female

−0.450*** (0.00699)

−0.273*** (0.0132)

−0.276*** (0.00734)

−0.215*** (0.0138)

Some secondary education

0.120*** (0.0164)

0.127*** (0.0272)

0.0586*** (0.0171)

0.0952*** (0.0278)

Secondary education

0.274*** (0.0156)

0.186*** (0.0266)

0.146*** (0.0163)

0.115*** (0.0273)

Tertiary education

0.503*** (0.0157)

0.310*** (0.0272)

0.282*** (0.0165)

0.195*** (0.0280)

Manages and owns a business older than 42 months

−0.439*** (0.0142)

−0.773*** (0.0239)

−0.825*** (0.0142)

−0.929*** (0.0250)

Past 12 months, sold, shut, discontinued, or quit a business

0.734*** (0.0130)

0.471*** (0.0203)

0.451*** (0.0131)

0.334*** (0.0211)

Business angel

0.680*** (0.0125)

0.467*** (0.0204)

0.462*** (0.0126)

0.361*** (0.0212)

Fear of failure would prevent from starting a business

−0.385*** (0.00829)

−0.195*** (0.0162)

Has knowledge and skills for starting a business

1.604*** (0.0103)

1.151*** (0.0210)

Mean age

−0.183*** (0.0216)

−0.188*** (0.0215)

−0.182*** (0.0230)

−0.193*** (0.0229)

Mean age squared

0.00202*** (0.000240)

0.00208*** (0.000239)

0.00213*** (0.000257)

0.00226*** (0.000256)

Share of females

0.315* (0.132)

0.179 (0.132)

0.394** (0.141)

0.318* (0.141)

Share of those with some secondary education

−0.376*** (0.0725)

−0.407*** (0.0725)

−0.460*** (0.0757)

−0.443*** (0.0757)

Share of those with secondary education

−0.854*** (0.0758)

−0.890*** (0.0759)

−0.829*** (0.0789)

−0.829*** (0.0789)

Share of those with higher education

−1.007*** (0.0784)

−1.049*** (0.0785)

−1.057*** (0.0824)

−1.050*** (0.0823)

Share of established businesses owners

1.536*** (0.155)

1.558*** (0.154)

0.895*** (0.161)

1.012*** (0.160)

Share of those who discontinued business

4.187*** (0.195)

4.400*** (0.195)

3.385*** (0.206)

3.627*** (0.204)

Effective constraints on the executive branch of government

0.0736*** (0.0130)

0.0885*** (0.0172)

0.0791*** (0.0137)

0.0960*** (0.0180) (Continued )

Table 19.2 Continued Explanatory variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

GDP per person employed

−0.000* (0.000)

−0.000 (0.000)

−0.000 (0.000)

−0.000 (0.000)

Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)

−0.000332 (0.00102)

−0.00108 (0.00102)

−0.00321** (0.00108)

−0.00343** (0.00107)

GDP growth (annual %)

0.00583*** (0.00168)

0.00632*** (0.00170)

0.00176 (0.00179)

0.00268 (0.00181)

GDP per person employed x Age

0.000 (0.000)

−0.000+ (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Age squared

−0.000+ (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Female

−0.000*** (0.000)

−0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Some secondary education

0.000+ (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Secondary education

0.000*** (0.000)

0.000** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Higher education

0.000*** (0.000)

0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Established business owner

0.000*** (0.000)

0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Discontinued business

0.000*** (0.000)

0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Business angel

0.000*** (0.000)

0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Fear of failure

−0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Entrepreneurial skills

0.000*** (0.000)

GDP per person employed x Constraints of executive

−0.000 (0.000)

−0.000 (0.000)

Constant

−0.183 (0.521)

0.256 (0.522)

−1.031+ (0.554)

−0.505 (0.555)

Observations

1,776,214

1,776,214

1,472,067

1,472,067

Notes: Dependent variable: engagement in nascent entrepreneurship (start-​up activity) = 1, no engagement = 0; logit estimator; country and year dummies included but not reported. Source: GEM, 2001–​2015.

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    465 more developed countries, in line with the graphs.1 The coefficient of GDP per capita turns insignificant in model 2, but this is because we now also interacted it with the individual characteristics. These interactions are of particular interest as they directly test the differences in characteristics of entrepreneurs between emerging economies and developed countries. We find more serial entrepreneurship in developed countries compared with emerging economies. This is supported by the signs of the coefficients, both when evidence of engagement in entrepreneurship is captured by those who left businesses, and when it is captured by those who currently own another business. In the latter case, we have an overall negative effect, probably due to opportunity cost, but the effect is less negative for developed countries. These results may be interpreted in the context of our earlier remarks on necessity entrepreneurship. It is more likely that those with accumulated entrepreneurial experience engage in opportunity entrepreneurship rather than necessity entrepreneurship. We found a similar result with respect to self-​declared entrepreneurial skills. These are more likely to be transformed into entrepreneurial projects in developed countries. Likewise, there are stronger positive effects of education in more developed countries compared with less developed countries. Finally, business angels are more likely to start businesses in developed countries compared with developing countries. All these effects point to an interesting phenomenon: human capital based on experience and on education, as well as financial resources, are more likely to be utilized in entrepreneurial projects in developed countries compared to emerging economies. Yet, another way to summarize the results is to say that there are more people without entrepreneurial or other skills engaging in entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Presented this way, we come back to where we started: necessity entrepreneurship is more widespread in emerging economies and is likely to be less related to skills. We also register two interesting differences related to demographics. Females are relatively more likely to start a business in less developed countries. Consistent with higher prevalence rates of necessity entrepreneurship, this may simply suggest higher barriers to women becoming an employee rather than self-​employed. Finally, the age profile is flatter in emerging economies than in developed countries; young people are more likely to start businesses in emerging economies, but old people are also likely to do so. This again may be consistent with the prevalence of necessity entrepreneurship in emerging economies where the old have less access to welfare. We now turn to the extant literature that may shed light on some of these stylized facts.

Personal Characteristics, Traits, and Occupational Choice In this section, we review the literature on the sociodemographic and personality profile of those starting businesses in emerging economies, with a special focus on their human

466    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright capital. There is less evidence on these topics and their relevance for entrepreneurship in emerging economies than in developed countries. This is why we started with our own analysis above. Overall, there are both similarities and stark differences between entrepreneurs in emerging economies and in developed economies. We first discuss sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender), human capital (education), and then personality and occupational choice.

Age Research on age and entrepreneurship is a relatively new area overall, triggered in part by an interest in aging in light of demographic shifts in developed economies (Kautonen, Down, & Minniti, 2014). With the exception of China, emerging economies tend to be characterized by younger populations. While Lévesque and Minniti (2011) outline that populations skewed toward both the younger and the older can hamper entrepreneurial activity, our results above suggest that this does not apply to emerging economies: the propensity to engage in entrepreneurship is higher in both groups. At the individual level, start-​up activity shows an inverted U-​shaped relationship with age and is highest among middle-​aged people (Parker, 2009). Descriptively, successive reports by GEM testify to the highest start-​up rates among the 25–​34-​year-​olds and 35–​44-​year-​olds compared to both younger and older individuals (Kelley, Singer, & Herrington, 2015). These age differences probably reflect changing opportunity costs and life circumstances (Jayawarna, Rouse, & Kitching, 2013; Lévesque & Minniti, 2006), age-​related changes in preferences (Wach, Stephan, & Gorgievski, 2016), and declines in certain cognitive abilities in older age (Gielnik, Zacher, & Frese, 2012). Yet GEM data signal relatively higher start-​up activity among older people in many emerging economies relative to developed economies—​in particular for Sub-​Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean and the MENA region (Schott, Rogoff, Herrington, & Kew, 2017). As already hinted above, these findings, consistent with our regression results, may be explained by the greater necessity to engage in entrepreneurship due to the lack of welfare and pension systems. This resonates with a study across European countries, which found evidence for an age-​related decline for opportunity but not necessity entrepreneurship (Kautonen et al., 2014). Little research explores how entrepreneurs’ age relates to business success and growth in emerging economies. In developed economies, the exploration of entrepreneurial opportunities (and growth aspirations) declines with age, especially for those entrepreneurs plagued by health problems (Gielnik et al., 2012).

Gender On average, women are less likely to start businesses than men (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011b; Jennings & Brush, 2013; Kelley et  al., 2015a) for a complex variety of reasons.

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    467 Standard explanations include personal characteristics, human capital, and barriers related to prejudice concerning access to resources. For example, in terms of personal characteristics, women tend to exhibit lower entrepreneurial self-​efficacy and higher fear of failure, both closely associated with business creation (e.g., Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2013), though gender differences in general personality traits are much less pronounced (Obschonka, Schmitt-​Rodermund, & Terracciano, 2014). Women especially in emerging economies often have lower levels of human capital (education) and there are more constraints for them in accessing financial capital (Demirgüç-​Kunt, Klapper, & Singer, 2013). These differences not only hamper the development of entrepreneurial skills and confidence, they are also perpetuated by the fact that fewer (same-​sex) entrepreneurial role models are available to support women. Gendered institutions, especially restriction on the freedom of movement of women (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011b) and those relating to access to finance (Demirgüç-​Kunt et al., 2013), limit the growth ambitions of female entrepreneurs; and these constraints are more widespread in emerging economies. Finally, entrepreneurship is often depicted as a stereotypically male career. Such stereotypes can be overcome if entrepreneurship is deliberately presented as a gender-​neutral career choice (Gupta, Goktan, & Gunay, 2014; Gupta, Turban, & Bhawe, 2008) or when non-​pecuniary motives are emphasized, as is the case for social entrepreneurship (Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2013b). In summary, several factors are stacked against a greater participation of women in entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Yet as our own analyses show, the proportion of women starting a business is slightly higher in emerging economies compared to developed economies. Again, this may in part be due to a higher degree of necessity and the relative lack of paid employment options for women. One may also speculate whether micro-​finance programs have played a role in boosting female entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Such programs, which often target women, are widely available across emerging economies (Chliova, Brinckmann, & Rosenbusch, 2015; Khavul, 2010). However, there is also important variation among emerging economies. In a handful of emerging economies women start businesses at the same or even at a higher rate than men.2 These countries include economies in Africa such as Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana; in Latin America such as Brazil; and in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. At the same time, there are significant gender gaps in start-​up activity to the disadvantage of women in other emerging economies such as Turkey, India, and South Africa (Kelley et al., 2015a). Some of these differences can be explained by the varying characteristics of institutional frameworks, which may restrict women’s’ economic rights (Demirgüç-​Kunt et  al., 2013; Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011b). But it is likely that the cultural factors and traditions such as those of female market traders in Sub-​Saharan Africa also play a role. Interestingly, the estimations we provided suggest that for emerging economies the neccessity–​push motive dominates. A related topic concerns the performance of the new ventures in emerging economies. Here, the contrast between female and male entrepreneurs has received less attention to date. Even for developed economies, the evidence is conflicting (Jennings &

468    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright Brush, 2013). A study across emerging economies detects a pattern that reflects findings in developed countries; there are size differences (to the disadvantage of female-​led enterprises), but much smaller gender differences, in measures of firm efficiency and growth (Bardasi, Sabarwal, & Terrell, 2011).

Education Education develops individual skills and a knowledge base, thereby enhancing individuals’ ability to discover and exploit opportunities to start and grow businesses (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). At the same time, as individuals invest resources into education, their outside options improve and wage employment may offer more certain returns than entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2016). Once a business is created, higher education generally benefits firms’ performance (for a meta-​analysis, Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011). Research on how education impacts start-​ups, however, yields more mixed findings and the effects are contingent on the wider institutional framework (Estrin et al., 2016). In a meta-​analytic review of research across emerging economies, van der Sluis, van Praag, and Vijverberg (2005) found that more educated individuals typically chose wage employment over self-​employment. However, if they engage in entrepreneurship, then more educated individuals are likely to engage in non-​farm entrepreneurship. The effect of education on choosing wage over self-​employment is particularly pronounced for women (van der Sluis et al., 2005). The same study also documents a positive association of education with firm performance, and again the positive effect of education on performance is particularly pronounced for women (van der Sluis et al., 2005)—​which is similar to the effects found for education and gender in developed economies (van der Sluis, van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2008). We replicate the findings for education and entrepreneurial entry in our own analyses. As we report in Table 19.2, higher-​quality human capital feeds more often into entrepreneurship in developed than emerging economies; more highly educated individuals in emerging economies are more likely to seek wage employment over entrepreneurship, compared with those less educated.

Other Entrepreneurial Forms Start-​ups are not the only form of entrepreneurship. Many entrepreneurial firms have been created in emerging economies, especially in those transitioning from central planning, through the process of privatization, for example, via management and employee buyouts (Wright, Filatotchev, Buck, & Robbie, 1994; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2000). These may involve job protection efforts, as well as entrenchment and appropriation by incumbents where outside investors and management are absent

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    469 (Frydman, Pistor, & Rapaczynski, 1996; Sun, Wright, & Mellahi, 2010). They may also enable insiders to engage in entrepreneurial activities that they were constrained from pursuing under the previous ownership regime, especially if their firm was a smaller, peripheral part of a larger state-​owned enterprise (Buck, Filatotchev, & Wright, 1994; Filatotchev et al., 1999; Karsai & Wright, 1994). Yet studies suggest that start-​ups perform better than state-​owned firms privatized to domestic owners (for a review, see Estrin et al., 2009). Family firms have an important role to play in entrepreneurship in many emerging economies but may take different forms from those typically observed in developed economies. For example, to the extent that kinship and extended families are a feature of many emerging economies, family firms may oftentimes involve intergenerational teams among extended families (Cruz, Hamilton, & Jack, 2012). In former socialist economies where entrepreneurship has been enabled by institutional reforms (Estrin, Meyer, & Bytchkova, 2006), many new family firms are emerging. Indeed, since reforms began around 1990, many of these firms are beginning to face succession challenges, which, in some contexts, may be distinct. Thus, due to the one-​child policy in China, family firms with only one heir face more limited options to continue family management and reduced probability of adult children working in the family firm (Cao, Cumming, & Wang, 2015). Next-​generation family members, particularly if they have been educated abroad, may, for example, be more interested in starting their own ventures in information technology (IT) sectors rather than joining the family firm in a traditional sector. As in developed economies, there is scope in emerging economies for the creation of entrepreneurial firms through spin-​offs by university faculty (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2007). However, the challenges in establishing mechanisms to identify and support academic entrepreneurship in developed economies, which have been well-​discussed (e.g., Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, van de Elde, & Vohora, 2005; Shane, 2004), would appear to be even greater in emerging economies. Social entrepreneurship, the creation of ventures primarily to create societal in addition to economic value (Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009; Zahra & Wright, 2016), is a form of entrepreneurship that attracts increasing research attention. Social entrepreneurs are seen to provide solutions to societal challenges ranging from poverty, social exclusion, and poor health to environmental degradation. These challenges are arguably more widespread in emerging economies. However, evidence on how successful and efficient social enterprises are in addressing societal challenges is scarce. Case study research (e.g., Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012) as well as a recent systematic review (Stephan, Patterson, Kelly, & Mair, 2016) highlight just how complex and lengthy is the process of stimulating social change. This is likely to be even more so the case in emerging economies where weaker institutional frameworks mean even greater uncertainties (Estrin et al., 2013b). Indeed, there is some evidence that balancing social and economic activities, which lies at the heart of social enterprises (Battilana & Lee, 2014), is more difficult to achieve in emerging markets (Ault, 2016). New evidence further suggests that social enterprise leaders in China and Russia were younger and their social enterprises more focused

470    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright on revenue-​generating activities compared to their European Union counterparts. This may reflect the relative novelty of the concept of social entrepreneurship in these contexts. In post-​communist Central European transition economies, such as Hungary and Romania, social enterprises appear to rely to a greater extent on grants (Huysentruyt, Mair, Le Coq, Rimac, & Stephan, 2016).

Personality Traits After decades of conflicting findings as to whether and how personality matters for entrepreneurship, several meta-​analyses offer an evidence-​based answer (Frese & Gielnik, 2014; Rauch & Frese, 2007): specific traits such as self-​efficacy, achievement motivation, innovativeness, and to a lesser extent risk propensity show consistent positive relationships with entrepreneurial entry and performance, while proactive personality is positively related to performance. Research on the personality traits of entrepreneurs in emerging economies is sparse. Several studies document the beneficial effects of a proactive personality (Frese et al., 2007; Rooks, Sserwanga, & Frese, 2016), similar to the effects established in developed economies (Frese & Gielnik, 2014). Proactive entrepreneurs adopt a self-​starting opportunity-​focused and strategic approach; as part of the latter they also develop their personal and business relationships and accumulate social capital (Rooks et al., 2016). As a specific personality trait, proactive personality can be successfully trained; with positive effects on small business growth that outstrip those of traditional business training in emerging economies (Campos et al., 2017; also Glaub, Frese, Fischer, & Hoppe, 2014). Other traits studied are self-​efficacy and the need for achievement. The effects of self-​efficacy positively fuel intentions to become an entrepreneur and performance (Bullough, Renko, & Myatt, 2014; see also next section). Comparing the Czech Republic, an emerging economy (at time of the study), with Austria, an adjacent developed economy, Kessler (2007) suggests that the need for achievement may be more closely related to entrepreneurial success in emerging than in developed countries. The following section sheds new light on the role of traits for entrepreneurship. The GEM database includes proxy measures for two traits: entrepreneurial self-​efficacy (the confidence in own entrepreneurial skills) and fear of failure, a measure that reflects loss aversion (Higgins, 1997) which is related to low risk taking. Both traits are more closely associated with entrepreneurial entry in developed than in emerging economies. Again, our tentative explanation is the need to consider opportunity cost of entrepreneurship and the considerable role that the necessity entrepreneurship plays in emerging markets.

Occupational Choice A prominent occupational choice model for entrepreneurship is the theory of planned behavior (TPB; Schlaegel & Koenig, 2014). It predicts that entrepreneurial behavior will

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    471 be based on individual’s intentions, which are themselves determined by attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavior control/​self-​efficacy beliefs (Ajzen, 1991). In turn, sociodemographic characteristics (Iakovleva, Kolvereid, & Stephan, 2011), personality traits (Karimi, Biemans, Mahdei, Lans, Chizari, & Mulder, 2017) and personal preferences such as values (Gorgievski, Stephan, Laguna, & Moriano, 2017) impact entrepreneurial career choice indirectly through their influence on attitudes, social norms, and self-​efficacy. Research has shown that the TPB predicts future entrepreneurial behav­ior in longitudinal studies (albeit in developed economies, Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2006; van Gelderen, Kautonen, & Fink, 2015), and TPB is also supported by experimental evidence in other domains (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). TPB predicts entrepreneurial intentions equally well in both developed and emerging economies (see Schlaegel & Koenig, 2014, for a meta-​analysis). In a study comparing 13 countries of which 5 were emerging economies, Iakovleva et  al. (2011) find that respondents from emerging economies show stronger entrepreneurial inclinations across the board (higher entrepreneurial attitudes, social norms, self-​efficacy, and intention). However, most studies within this framework in emerging economies have drawn on student samples. Considering the often low rates of participation in higher education in emerging economies, these samples are not representative. However, since education is associated with more high-​growth and opportunity entrepreneurship (Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013a) as well as social entrepreneurship (see Estrin et al., 2016), student samples in emerging economies provide an important insight into high-​ impact entrepreneurship (Nabi & Liñán, 2011).

Social Capital Alongside human capital, social capital plays an important role for entrepreneurial behavior. Social capital refers to the resources embedded in and available through relationships (e.g., Gedajlovic et al., 2013, Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Entrepreneurs rely on social capital in emerging economies to a greater extent than in developed ones as a substitute for weak formal institutions, although culture also plays a role (for more details on institutions and culture see the section “Categorizing institutions relevant for entrepreneurship” below). In brief, in emerging economies, weak formal institutions mean that there is limited enforcement of rules and regulations that would ensure due process and punish expropriation. This leads entrepreneurs to rely on informal social structures to enable exchange based on mutual trust and enforceable social norms of cooperation (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010; Tan, Yang, & Veliyath, 2009). A range of studies shows that social capital is “good” for entrepreneurship. At the macro level, studies have shown that in countries with higher levels of social capital individuals are more likely to start businesses (e.g., Estrin et  al., 2013b; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010), individuals see more business opportunities (Kwon & Arenius, 2010), and angel investors are more likely to invest in starting-​businesses (Ding, Au, & Chiang, 2015).

472    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright Importantly, these relationships are even stronger in environments with weak formal institutions such as emerging economies (Danis, De Clercq, & Petricevic, 2011; De Clercq, Danis, & Dakhli, 2010; Kim & Li, 2014). Social capital has a positive effect on entrepreneurial firms’ performance in emerging economies (Batjargal, 2003). In particular, the weak-​ tie aspect of social capital, relationships with dissimilar others and those not in the immediate circle of family and friends, engenders access to novel information and opportunities and is linked to firm growth in emerging economies (Batjargal, Hitt, Tsui, Arregle, Webb, & Miller, 2013; Efendic, Mickiewicz, & Rebmann, 2015). However, social capital also brings drawbacks, particularly in emerging economies. For instance, close-​knit ties have been shown to facilitate corruption in emerging economies (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). Moreover, the financial and time burden associated with maintaining social capital such as in the form of community obligations can be considerable and impact the business negatively (Ugwu, Orjiakor, Enwereuzor, Onyedibe, & Ugwu, 2016). Research has also shown that emerging economy entrepreneurs may benefit from weak-​tie social capital by contributing to community in the form of philanthropy (Mickiewicz, Sauka, & Stephan, 2016) or through social entrepreneurial efforts (Estrin et al., 2013b). Such research in turn opens new perspectives on bottom-​up processes underlying culture or the building of informal institutions. Social capital in the specific sense of connections to the political class and elite are the subject of Chapter 14 in this Handbook.

Bringing Human and Social Capital Back Home: High-​impact Returnee Entrepreneurs An important feature of entrepreneurship in emerging economies is the return of entrepreneurs and in particular “high impact” entrepreneurs from emerging economies to their home countries. Such returnee entrepreneurs are often scientists and engineers who transfer back to start up a new venture in their native countries some years after obtaining business experience and/​or education in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) countries (Filatotchev et  al., 2011; Saxenian, 2006; Wright, Liu, Buck, & Filatotchev, 2008). Returnees represent an important and international dimension of entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Entrepreneurial ventures may seek to internationalize from emerging economies to developed economies (Yasuhiro, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). Some limited research has shown that the international expansion of new ventures from emerging economies is driven by their desire to enhance domestic reputation, to exploit their stocks of prior knowledge, and to explore benefits of incoming knowledge

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    473 flows (Yasuhiro, Khavul, Peng, & Deeds, 2013). Alternatively, entrepreneurs may migrate from many emerging economies across the globe to developed economies, establishing ventures in the host country (Aliaga-​Isla & Rialp, 2013). Such immigrant or diaspora entrepreneurs often utilize ethnic and cultural social capital to establish their ventures in particular locations characterized by population concentrations or enclaves with the same religion, culture, or language (Riddle, Hrivnak, & Nielsen, 2010; Vaaler, 2013). Returnee entrepreneurs are viewed as bringing the benefits of commercial, academic, scientific, and technical knowledge, as well as sometimes access to financial resources, from developed economies to (opportunity) entrepreneurship-​ deficient emerging economies. By being linked to host and home countries, returnees also have the cultural and language attributes that enable them to take opportunities and ideas from the former country and implement them in the latter.

Characteristics and Behavior Returnee entrepreneurs may begin with a venture in the host country in the West and return to their home emerging economy country to create another one. Alternatively, they may create a returnee venture in their home emerging economy before internationalizing through the establishment of a venture in their host developed country in the West, or a third-​party country. Returnee entrepreneurs may also have been employed by an overseas affiliate of a multinational company located in their home country prior to starting their venture (Liu, Lu, Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 2010a; Liu, Wright, Filatotchev, Dai, & Lu, 2010b). Further, rather than spending a short period in the host country, some returnees may be coming back to their homeland when the commercial and political environment becomes more favorable, after spending all their lives in foreign countries (Kuznetsov, 2006; Lin, 2010). The social capital of these returnees may be quite distinctive from that of returnees who have only spent short periods abroad. Returnees may also differ in terms of their entrepreneurship modes. For example, “transnational” entrepreneurs may be able to start their ventures abroad, grow their businesses, and then bring them back to the homeland (Drori, Honig, & Wright, 2009; Pruthi & Wright, 2017). Diaspora entrepreneurs having developed their ventures in the host country may seek to leverage their financial and human capital to establish new businesses in their emerging economy home countries (Vaaler, 2013). Others may have been involved in research and development projects in foreign universities and returned home to commercialize their ideas and know-​how. Tax advantages and other economic inducements by governments may be important catalysts of a rise in returnees. Such benefits may help to encourage scientists returning home after years spent in foreign research centers to become entrepreneurs. The differences in careers and experiences may lead to differences in entrepreneurial orientations and subsequent design of business ventures set up by the returnees.

474    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright Studies have examined characteristics of returnee entrepreneurs that are related to venture performance in comparison with non-​returnee firms (Dai & Liu, 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010a), notably showing that returnee-​owned ventures outperform non-​returnee firms regarding exporting, innovation, and employment growth. The experience of returnee entrepreneurs in the commercial context of the West may contribute to their learning behavior. Work experience abroad, preferably in leadership roles, appears to have a greater impact than educational experience in the host country (Cui, Li, Meyer, & Li, 2015; Tan & Meyer, 2010). Experiential and vicarious learning by returnees contributes to perceptual performance, while vicarious learning contributes to employment growth in returnee owned ventures (Liu, Lu, & Choi, 2014). However, the age of the firm appears to weaken the impact of experiential and vicarious learning, suggesting that while returnees may try to maintain their networks in the West, in order to update their technological knowledge and access to export markets, the learning benefits from experience in the West depreciate over time.

Location Choices Several papers have explored factors affecting location choices of returnee entrepreneurs and how location choices subsequently affect firm performance. There appears to be a tendency for returnee entrepreneurs with academic knowledge in the form of patents transferred from abroad to seek complementary assets by locating in non-​ university science parks, and for those with previous firm ownership abroad to choose university science parks (Wright et al., 2008). The firms of returnees with patents from abroad enjoyed stronger employment growth in non-​university science parks, and those with commercial experience abroad with MNCs performed better in university science parks.

Knowledge Spillovers Returnee entrepreneurs have contributed significantly to technological development, and in particular to the IT industry, in several emerging economies, including India, mainland China, South Korea, and Taiwan (Saxenian, 2002, 2006). However, Kenney, Breznitz, & Murphree (2013) note that, based on evidence from ICT (information and communications technologies) industries in Taiwan, China, and India, returnee entrepreneurs played a major role in the expansion phase after domestic entrepreneurs had created the early successful ICT firms. Nevertheless, they conclude that such countries should focus on supporting the development of indigenous entrepreneurship rather than courting returnee entrepreneurs. Notably, the knowledge acquired in the West by returnee entrepreneurs means that their firms have positive effects on the innovative activities of non-​returnee firms through knowledge spillovers that help to enhance the technological capabilities of local firms, especially if the technology gap is

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    475 large (Filatotchev et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2010a, 2010b). An important caveat, however, is that firms owned by local non-​returnees need to have the absorptive capacity to assimilate such knowledge.

Social Ties and Social Spillover Effects The decision to become a returnee entrepreneur has been seen as a discrete decision by an individual having identified an opportunity. However, this may be an oversimplistic view. Qin and Estrin (2015) add to understanding of the transmission mechanisms through which individuals become returnee entrepreneurs. Using quantitative data on overseas alumni of a top Indian university they find a strong impact of peer influence on the likelihood of returnee entrepreneurship as peers shape career aspirations and facilitate resource and information transfer. Pruthi (2014) also explores the role of social ties in venture creation by Indian returnee entrepreneurs. Using a qualitative approach to examine the structure of returnee entrepreneurs’ social ties, she suggests that local ties are crucial for venture creation by returnee entrepreneurs. Returnee entrepreneurs’ prior exposure to different institutional contexts shapes their new ventures’ formal–​informal orientation at an early stage, and returnee entrepreneurs emphasize formality more than informality compared with local entrepreneurs (Lin et al., 2015). However, over time, the formality and informality balance of both types of entrepreneurs converges in line with the institutional transition in China. Yet other scenarios exist. Where conditions are ripe, instead of adjusting to local norms, newcomers may generate a shift in these norms. Arora and Gambardella discuss an Indian case: the software industry, built to a considerable extent on linkages with Indian US diaspora, “was virtually the first instance where wealth was created honestly and legally, and more importantly, visibly so” (2006: 299). That led to some shift in public attitudes toward entrepreneurship and generated acceptance of more entrepreneurship friendly policies, creating a virtuous circle (see also Khanna, 2011). What we discuss here may be seen as spillover effects enhancing local “entrepreneurial capital” (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004).

Disadvantages Many studies have tended to focus on the advantages of returnees, while overlooking the disadvantages. While the assumption has often been that returnee entrepreneurs can transfer and leverage their commercial experience and advanced technological knowl­ edge in the host institutional environment, returnees may also face challenges arising from a lack of local ties and understanding of the local context (Li, Zhang, Li, Zhou, & Zhang, 2012; Wahba & Zenou, 2012). Having left the country for a period, returnees face the challenge of being outsiders in terms of the loss of home country network positions and hence in gaining access to local resources and opportunities (Wahba & Zenou,

476    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright 2012). There is some evidence that returnee entrepreneurs do not necessarily perform better than local counterparts due to their exits from local networks and lack of shared identities (Li et al., 2012). This raises the question of whether and how they might be able to regain their insidership. Research is beginning to emerge on how outsidership affects returnee entrepreneurs’ resource acquisition and hence firm performance, as well as the strategic actions through which they attempt to regain insidership and leverage their transnational competitive advantages. Although local ties may be dormant, it may be possible to resurrect them, especially if returnees are perceived to have local affiliations, accents, etc. (Qin & Estrin, 2015). Zheng et al. (2016) using Chinese data show that returnee entrepreneurs can overcome outsidership through strategic actions such as locating in cities with prior experience or collaborating with local top management team (TMT) members who serve as local brokers to facilitate resource acquisition. This study draws attention to the important point that while much returnee research has focused on individuals, in fact it is important also to consider the nature of the entrepreneurial team as this may provide insights into the role of social capital. Returnee entrepreneurs may experience a cultural shock when they go back to their home environment having left it some years before (Zhou & Hsu, 2011). As such, they may suffer problems in readjusting to the local market, especially if they lack local connections (Li et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2015; Obukhova et al., 2012). Returnees’ perceived difficulties in readjusting to the local norms and culture in their home countries can undermine the positive relationship between international knowledge transfer and returnees’ decisions to become entrepreneurs (Lin et al., 2016). Of particular importance in emerging economies that feature great uncertainties and fast changes in market opportunities is the time spent converting an idea into a business. The capability of returnees to make better use of advanced technological knowhow and foreign capital resources resulting from their experience abroad may help them to overcome the hurdles in establishing their ventures more speedily. However, exposure to commercial environments in developed economies may be insufficient to facilitate entry into returnees’ home markets. As they have been away from their home market, they may lack knowledge about home market institutions or social capital from not being able to develop local networks, which may slow their ability to establish their ventures. Hence, contextual influences on the different resources available to returnee entrepreneurs may have positive or negative influences on their entry speed. Qin et  al. (2017) find that returnees are slower in new venture entry in the home country, compared with homegrown entrepreneurs. Ventures with innovative technology and backed by foreign capital are slower to set up due to higher levels of liabilities of newness and foreignness. However, if these firms have a returnee founder who can leverage experience with foreign resources and technological knowhow, such negative effects are mitigated. This effect appears to be stronger than the influence exerted by the role of family and friends in the home country.

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    477

Institutional and Cultural Contexts At the beginning of this chapter, we emphasized commonalities as well as heterogeneity in emerging economies in terms of their institutions. We started by noting the seminal contribution of Baumol (1990) in highlighting that to understand differences in levels of entrepreneurship, it is critical to focus on variation in institutions, and therefore the incentives driving the choice of entrepreneurship rather than other occupations such as wage employment. Baumol distinguished institutions in terms of whether they encouraged entrepreneurship which was productive, in the sense of adding value; non-​productive, for example, in the choice to seek rents in bureaucratic environments; and destructive, exemplified by the choice to organize an extortion racket rather than to become a retail trader in lawless environments. The literature has gone on to classify emerging markets according to the character and the form of their institutions, focusing on the effects of institutions on the productive form of entrepreneurial activity. Considerable research has therefore concentrated on hypothesizing and testing the impact of institutional characteristics on (productive) entrepreneurship. The fundamental point in this section is that a well-​functioning business environment is likely to provide clear incentives to entrepreneurs (North, 1990; Bowen & De Clercq, 2008), while a weak institutional environment is an impediment to entrepreneurship (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008; McMillan & Woodruff, 2002).

Categorizing Institutions Relevant for Entrepreneurship We have seen that Williamson (2000) provides a helpful way to categorize institutions that has motivated subsequent empirical work, arguing that institutions can be represented in terms of a hierarchy, each placing constraints on the levels below. He places informal institutions, denoted as social embeddedness, at the top; these are the deepest rooted and the slowest changing. We consider the empirical work on impact of this level in section “Culture.” Formal institutions are located at Williamson’s second level. The literature has developed in two directions to capture this critical aspect of the institutional environment. The first is to consider the large variety of legal arrangements protecting private ownership. Entrepreneurs must raise capital, bear risks, and enter new markets over a long-​ time horizon and this is strengthened by property rights that are stable and effectively enforced. In terms of empirical measurement, this literature typically focuses on legal systems (Shleifer, Lopez-​de-​Silanes, & La Porta, 2008), and political systems conducive to security of property rights such as the rule of law and effectiveness of governance (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; Estrin et al., 2013a). There are a variety of measures of these institutional characteristics, and this analysis is often undertaken based on a statistical clustering of variables (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012). Specific variables used in the

478    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright literature include national legal systems by historical origin (Shleifer et al., 2008), corruption (Anokhin & Schulte, 2009); intellectual property rights (Autio & Acs, 2010); and rule of law (Estrin et al. 2013a; Estrin et al., 2013b, 2016). The latter emphasis is consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who highlight the danger of expropriation, which may be especially important for entrepreneurs who need to rely on the security of their residual claims to the returns from the organizations that they have created (Estrin et al., 2013a). This dimension is measured in Polity IV, especially by the “effective constraints on the executive” measure (Gurr, Marshall, & Jaggers, 2016) seen by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) as a distinctive proxy for the rule of law that we applied in Table 19.2. Williamson’s third level of institutions is governance, which aligns the governance structure with the types of transactions. While this includes government business regulatory rules, Williamson also places particular emphasis on private governance; for entrepreneurship, this refers to arrangements underlying, for example, the provision of finance, often seen as critical for entrepreneurs (Parker, 2009) and the development of supply and distribution networks in order to scale the business (Khanna & Palepu, 2010); we return to these issues below. Government regulatory institutions relate to the scale and the day-​to-​day effectiveness of the government apparatus; cumbersome regulations and burdensome rules can also have a strong negative influence on entrepreneurs, by raising the costs of running new business (Djankov et al., 2002).

Findings on Formal Institutions Estrin et al. (2013a; 2013b; 2016) show that entrepreneurial activity benefits from strong constitutional-​level institutions that act to protect property rights via the rule of law. These institutions support entrepreneurial activity by lowering uncertainties and the threat of expropriation of any returns that entrepreneurs may generate. This is true for different types of entrepreneurship, but especially for high-​growth entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2013a). Interestingly, social entrepreneurship is less affected (Estrin et al., 2013b, 2016). In general the empirical literature cited above confirms that all forms of entrepreneurship are more likely to thrive in contexts in which formal institutions are more effective, notably in which the rule of law is stronger, the limitations on the possibility of expropriation are stronger, and intellectual property rights are better protected. The quality of institutions becomes more important as the complexity and sophistication of the entrepreneurial activity increases. Thus, the rule of law, for example, matters more for more ambitious entrepreneurial ventures than it does for firms that are created to provide self-​employment only (Estrin et al., 2013a). The distinction between more and less ambitious entrepreneurship is also closely correlated with the opportunity-​ necessity axis discussed above. Emerging economies are often described as having underdeveloped formal institutions in terms of institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Mair & Marti, 2009; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). Different types of institutional voids can

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    479 be distinguished. First, institutional voids highlighted in the work by Khanna and Palepu (2010) are those that hinder market functioning, typically due to the lack of intermediaries and weakly developed capital, labor, and product markets. Such voids in turn offer opportunities for (highly skilled) entrepreneurs to create businesses, bridging these voids. Second, institutional voids hamper not just the functioning of markets but also their development in the first place (Mair & Marti, 2009). When constitutional-​ level institutions are not enforced, the rules of exchange are uncertain and market development stalls. Entrepreneurs in emerging economies deal with these two types of institutional voids by relying on informal institutions, especially social networks (Puffer et al., 2010). However, strong-​tie social networks can become tight-​knit “clubs” which may hamper entrepreneurship by gatekeeping access to resources for entrepreneurial talent from outside of these networks (Aidis et al., 2008); in Baumol’s (1990) terminology, some entrepreneurial talent cannot be used for productive entrepreneurship. A third type of institutional void refers to those that impede market participation (Mair & Marti, 2009; Mair et al., 2012). Because institutional arrangements are either absent or weak, they prevent individuals and firms from participating in market exchange in the first place. Examples range from the lack of physical infrastructure that does not allow individuals to travel to marketplaces, or informal institutions that exclude women from partaking in economic activity (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011b). Such voids are widespread in the least developed countries, but they also exist for rural entrepreneurs and for entire segments of society in thriving emerging market economies such as India. A fourth type of institutional void has been discussed in the social entrepreneurship literature with regard to the lack of social welfare provision, which in turn creates demand (social need) for social entrepreneurs (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010). The evidence suggests that these voids indeed encourage individuals to take steps to create social enterprises (Estrin et al., 2013a), but may hamper the creation of operating social enterprises especially in the absence of supportive informal institutions (Stephan, Uhlaner, & Stride, 2015).

Culture As indicated, we now return to Williamson’s highest institutional level—​embeddedness. Culture, or the shared values, norms, and practices of societies (House et al., 2004), are seen as drivers of entrepreneurship that complement formal institutions. Though the entrepreneurship literature tends to focus on the innovator-​entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 2008), recent research for a wide variety of countries finds little support for the notion that entrepreneurship thrives in individualistic cultures. Pinillos and Reyes (2009) suggest that, if anything, values of cultural collectivism support entrepreneurship, and particularly so in developing countries. Indeed, Stephan and Uhlaner (2010) find that it is a particular aspect of cultural collectivism norms, so-​called socially supportive cultures, which are rich in weak-​tie social capital that enable entrepreneurship. These cultures provide a context in which entrepreneurs can easily draw on informal support and capital to launch their business, where they are less afraid to take risk and feel more confident

480    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright that they can succeed (Hopp & Stephan, 2012). Here “socially supportive” may be a better label than “collectivism,” given ambiguities that the latter term invokes (Schwartz, 1990). Recent research points to the association between innovativeness (and high-​ impact entrepreneurship) and focus on the outside, including other-​regarding values. Such a perspective overcomes the limitation of the old individualism-​collectivism axis (Mickiewicz et al., 2016). Stephan and Uhlaner (2010) did not find any direct relationship between performance-​based cultures with entrepreneurship; however, performance-​based cultural norms appeared to shape more competitive and entrepreneurship-​supportive formal institutions. Indeed, Thai and Turkina (2014) found performance-​based cultural norms to be related to the level of formally registered as opposed to informal entrepreneurship. Similarly, performance-​based cultures have been shown to influence planning, while socially supportive culture is associated with an effectual logic (Laskovaia, Shirokova, & Morris, 2017). Emerging market economies are heterogeneous with regard to socially supportive culture and most show low performance-​based cultures (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). Thus, the literature suggests that culture may help to better understand the diversity in entrepreneurship among emerging markets.

Entrepreneurial Finance Weaknesses in the availability of external finance are viewed as one of the major constraints on the emergence and scaling up of entrepreneurial ventures in all economies (Parker, 2009), but the problems are particularly acute in emerging economies. This is because the deficiencies in the institutional environment have not only the direct effects on entrepreneurship we discussed above, but also indirect effects via weaknesses in capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), which impact the provision of entrepreneurial finance. For example, the development of venture capital in emerging economies has been hampered by a weak institutional environment that typically makes enforcement of contracts difficult and severe informational asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors (Wright, 2007; Karsai et al., 1998). Ahlstrom et al. (2007) discuss the problems of accounting information and due diligence in China. These problems may be especially severe for VC (venture capital) without local networks, and a major challenge for foreign VC entering such markets unless they can syndicate with local firms. In developed economies where there is an established rule of law, the VC contract can form a “backdrop” to the operation of relationships in these circumstances. However, in weak institutional environments characteristic of many emerging economies, and in which enforcing contracts may be problematic, securing majority ownership stakes, convertible securities, and covenants such as anti-​dilution provisions, board veto rights, and drag-​along clauses are important (Farag, Hommel, Witt, & Wright, 2004). Becoming more closely involved in portfolio companies (Pruthi, Wright, & Lockett, 2003) as well as the development of longer-​term relationships involving trust may be a substitute. The development of exit routes is important for the functioning of VC markets, and which may

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    481 be especially challenging in emerging economies because of illiquidity in capital markets. Indeed, the very notion of exit may be somewhat challenging in a context where VCs have built a relationship with an entrepreneur but then seek to end it through the traditional forms of realizing gains seen in Anglo-​American markets. Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) explore the determinants of VC in 118 countries, 78 of which they considered to be emerging markets. Using panel data from 2000 to 2013 they show that M&A activity, legal rights and investor protection, innovation, IP (intellectual property) protection, corruption, corporate taxes, and unemployment impact the development of VC markets. They show that the economic magnitude and direction of impact of these determinants differ between developed and emerging markets. As emerging economies evolve, such as those of central and eastern Europe that joined the European Union, restructuring and the introduction of hard budget constraints facilitate emergence of a private sector banking system, resulting in increased availability of debt finance for smaller entrepreneurial firms to complement VC investment (Wright et al., 2004). Given the difficulties in raising VC in many emerging economies, entrepreneurs may turn to other less formal sources of raising capital by, for example, drawing on their social capital to exploit personal ties and relationships, possibly within the informal sector (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2012). Harrison (2012) notes that in emerging markets there are challenges regarding the definition of the phenomenon. Further, while institutional voids may shape its development, cultural constraints may hinder efforts to legitimizing angel activity. Micro-​lending has been a common source of entrepreneurial funding at the so-​called base of the pyramid dimension of entrepreneurship. However, there is little evidence to support the effectiveness of micro-​lending in addressing poverty and seeding sustainable entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies (Duvendack et al., 2011; Tarozzi, Desai, & Johnson, 2014). Last but not least, parallel to the role of returning migrants, inflow of remittances by the diaspora of migrant workers or entrepreneurs from emerging economies (Vaaler, 2013) may also be important as a source of funds. Korosteleva and Mickiewicz (2011) provide evidence that inflow of remittances to a country is strongly and positively associated with the amount of total capital invested in a new start-​up (scaled by GDP per capita). Studying individuals who cross the Mexican-​US border, Bercovitz, Martens, and Savage (2013) find that the likelihood that remittances are used for entrepreneurial activities increases with the absolute level of remittances.

Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research The earliest ideas of entrepreneurship highlighted its potential role in the process of economic development; indeed, Schumpeter’s (1934) seminal book had “development” in

482    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright its title. While much of the more recent literature has identified emerging markets in terms of their institutional arrangements rather than their rates of economic growth, the founding work on entrepreneurship was silent on the relationship between the former and entrepreneurial activity. However, research in the past decade has significantly addressed that deficiency, and there is now a huge literature about entrepreneurship in emerging markets, which we have sought in this chapter to briefly summarize. We have organized the findings from the literature at three levels. In the first, we considered empirical evidence, using the most recent data from GEM to provide new findings as to the similarities and differences between entrepreneurs in emerging and developed economies. We started with the crucial finding that entrepreneurial activity is not the same in emerging and developed economies; in fact as the level of development increases the level of entrepreneurial activity initially falls, though it later stabilizes. There is also far greater heterogeneity in rates of entrepreneurship in emerging economies, probably because of heterogeneity in all Williamson’s layers of institutions including social capital and culture, as well as in specific attributes such as the extent of returnee entrepreneurship. The greater prevalence of necessity entrepreneurship is a factor critical in understanding the differences between emerging and developed economies. As a result, we find that human capital derived from education and experience, as well as financial capital, plays a greater role in entrepreneurship in developed than emerging economies. This is because these factors are less important if the motivation for becoming an entrepreneur is necessity and given the paucity of alternatives to earn a living. Human capital plays a more important role in contexts where the occupational choice between wage employment and entrepreneurship is based on an evaluation of the relative returns of the two. Interestingly, however, female entrepreneurship is relatively more common in emerging economies, perhaps driven again by necessity but also possibly by policies supporting female entrepreneurship. In terms of traits, the significant differences between emerging and developed economy entrepreneurs are also likely associated with the greater proportion of necessity entrepreneurship in the former. Thus, both entrepreneurial self-​efficacy and fear of failure are more closely associated with entrepreneurial entry in developed economies, perhaps because necessity entrepreneurship is less likely to be correlated with those. In terms of policy, the focus should therefore be on increasing the rates of opportunity entrepreneurship in emerging economies, so that factors such as human capital can play a greater role in driving high-​impact entrepreneurial activity. Second, the phenomenon of returnee entrepreneurs is a rather unique feature of emerging economies, and they play a significant role in the broader entrepreneurial activity and environment which has been closely studied. The central finding is that returnees outperform their domestic entrepreneurial rivals, and considerable attention has been devoted to considering why as well as how to harness the benefits more effectively. The reasons relate to the skills, technology, funding, and networks brought home by the returnees, and there are clear spillover benefits to the entrepreneurial community as well as the broader economy.

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    483 Key policy issues concern maintaining the returnees’ links to their former host economies while simultaneously integrating them more effectively into their home business environment. An example of India is a good illustration of this policy recommendation, as unlike China, it introduced policies to enhance linkages with its diaspora only at the beginning of 21st century, and benefited from opening up afterward (Khanna, 2011). It is also important to build absorptive capacity in domestic institutions and through human capital. Finally, as we have seen, institutions play a considerable role in the rate of entrepreneurship, in a manner not observed in developed economies that are more homogenous in this respect. In general, institutions protecting property rights, ensuring the rule of law, and limiting levels of corruption act to increase both the quantity and the sophistication of entrepreneurial ventures (Estrin et  al., 2013a). Since there is evidence that entrepreneurship is associated with innovation and growth (Acs et al., 2018), this finding is of considerable significance for policymakers and multilateral institutions. However, it is not straightforward to improve institutions to increase entrepreneurship. Formal institutions can perhaps be improved more rapidly than informal ones, but significant and sustained progress in both are important, as the change in the former may not be sustained without a change in the latter. Hence, as well as addressing the legal structures, policymakers need to think deeply about education and other factors affecting culture in order to stimulate entrepreneurship.

Further Research Our overview suggests several promising avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of emerging economy entrepreneurship while contributing to theory in a range of fields. Diversity of entrepreneurial forms across emerging economies is striking. Although there is similar heterogeneity among entrepreneurs in developed economies, it can be tempting to simply equate entrepreneurship in emerging economies with necessity entrepreneurship. Although necessity entrepreneurship dominates, we also find highly skilled, high-​ growth entrepreneurship in emerging economies, and many of our mostly “Western” theories of entrepreneurships may be particularly applicable to understanding this type of entrepreneurship. At the same time and considering the sheer volume of necessity entrepreneurship in emerging economies, understanding how to effectively support these entrepreneurs (beyond offering micro-​finance) and build their skills to develop them into growth-​oriented business seems a worthwhile avenue, which may go hand in hand with the development of more contextualized entrepreneurship theories (Zahra & Wright, 2011). Similarly, more work is needed to understand the potential role of social capital in substituting for absent institutions in emerging markets. A particular aspect of social capital that has been relatively unexplored in the literature, but which would seem to be

484    Saul Estrin, Tomasz Mickiewicz, Ute Stephan, and Mike Wright of particular importance in emerging economies, is its link with religion (see Neubert, Bradley, Ardianti, & Simiyu, 2017). In addition, we know very little about the micro-​foundations and psychological characteristics of those engaged in entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Is it indeed the case, as some of our findings suggest, that psychological characteristics (self-​efficacy and fear of failure) are less relevant for start-​ups in emerging economies? Or, might it be the case that our models of relevant psychological characteristics are not easily transferable to understand emerging economy (necessity) entrepreneurship? Much research on returnee entrepreneurs has focused on voluntary returnees creating formal businesses in China and, more recently, India. However, there is scope to widen this agenda as returnees also play a role elsewhere, including Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and other parts of Asia. These returnees may not necessarily have been in higher-​skills employment. For example, migrant workers may return home to poorer countries of Asia and Africa after several years of manual labor in the Middle East, some of whom may start businesses. Returnees may not necessarily have returned voluntarily. Political developments in some countries are leading to a tougher approach to the deportation of illegal or unregistered immigrants, as well as making many immigrants feel less welcome in their adopted countries. Accordingly, there is likely to be an increased flow of people back to their home countries, at least some of whom will become returnee entrepreneurs. Some of these individuals may also have been immigrant entrepreneurs in the host country. The nature, rationale, and networks involved in these ventures may be quite distinct from returnees studied so far. For example, to what extent are these ventures informal rather than formal? The immigrant entrepreneurship literature has tended to focus on migration from emerging economies to developed economies (Aliaga-​Isla & Rialp, 2013). As emerging economies begin to develop at differing rates (Hoskisson et al., 2013) migration may also involve the movement of entrepreneurs from laggard emerging economies to geographically and culturally adjacent more advanced emerging economies. As yet, we have little rigorous analysis of this dimension of emerging economy entrepreneurship (for an exception, see, for example, Wong & Primecz, 2011). Further research is needed to shed light on the distinctiveness of this type of migrant entrepreneurship. The heterogeneity and differences among emerging economies are striking. Our review of the literature suggests the importance of understanding and “unpacking” these differences in their influence on entrepreneurship, and institutional theory appears to be a useful tool to do so. While great strides have been made, the configuration and co-​ existence of institutions, both formal and informal, in their impact on entrepreneurship appear still under-​researched. The influence of institutional context on the heterogeneity of entrepreneurial ownership forms in a particular country has been recognized (Zahra & Wright, 2011) but further empirical research is needed to explore the drivers, evolution, and impact of this variety in different emerging economies. Also given the difficulties in reforming institutions at the higher levels of Williamson’s hierarchy, attention might focus on identifying mechanisms to change institutions at the lower levels that might be

Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets    485 implemented more rapidly and effectively. Further research is also needed that explores the heterogeneity within different ownership forms in different emerging economies. Academic spin-​offs vary according to the extent of IP involved and universities differ in terms of the support they provide (Clarysse et al., 2005). Paucity of world-​class research in many emerging economies may limit the extent of spin-​offs that depend on formal IP. However, many academics may seek to create spin-​offs in order to generate income to supplement poor university salaries. Further research is needed to explore the extent and impact of these different forms of entrepreneurial engagement. Turning to finance, we have seen that the institutional factors that may constrain entrepreneurship generally in emerging markets also limit the development of capital markets to the detriment of new venture funding. Hence access to finance (alongside access to insurance; see Banerjee & Duflo, 2011) remains a key barrier to the development of emerging markets entrepreneurship and high-​impact entrepreneurship in particular. Further research is therefore required on ways to relax these constraints, for example, through returning financial capital (Korosteleva & Mickiewicz, 2011) alongside migrant returnees as well as enabling access to developed capital markets abroad. Recent studies are beginning to highlight the importance of remittances for the establishment of entrepreneurial ventures, but at present we have little systematic analysis of the nature of these ventures and their impact. Furthermore, other innovative forms of finance call for special attention. Crowdfunding in particular may address some of the financing gaps relating to the provision of finance for entrepreneurial ventures from more traditional sources. Furthermore, as emerging economies evolve, the accumulation of individual wealth increases the scope for the development of a business angel market—​an area which once again is crying out for further research.

Notes 1. In a model with squared term added (not reported), we found the expected reversed J-​ shaped pattern, but only one term is significant, and therefore we report the linear specification as superior. This may indicate that the underlying pattern is in fact L-​shaped not U-​shaped as discussed above. 2. In the literature, this is measured through the total early stage entrepreneurial activity rate which combines nascent and young entrepreneurs (Reynolds et al., 2005).

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Chapter 20

Innovation a nd In ternational i z at i on of SM Es in Em ergi ng Ma rk ets John Child

Our ability to generalize about the innovation and internationalization of small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs) in emerging economies is limited.1 One reason for this is that SMEs do not comprise a uniform category but come in various shapes and sizes. Another is that they operate in environments which contrast even within the category of “emerging economy,” especially in terms of their factor market and institutional development (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). The diversity among emerging economies, highlighted in Chapter 1, is consequential because resource and institutional deficiencies can constrain the strategic choices of smaller firms which generally possess little power to influence external conditions (Child & Rodrigues, 2011). Drawing conclusions from comparisons between studies conducted in different emerging economies is complicated by the fact that there is no consistent definition of SMEs. Different jurisdictions apply contrasting size limits to them. The most common criterion is employment. Depending on the industry, China sets upper limits ranging from 50 to 300 employees. In South Africa the upper limit is 200 employees, and in India various definitions apply. Within these upper size limits, significant distinctions are often made between very small (micro) enterprises with less than 10 staff, small enterprises with less than 50 staff, and medium-​sized enterprises with less than 250 staff. SMEs also come in different shapes. They are normally understood to be independently owned firms, and this excludes the subsidiaries of larger companies. The nature of their ownership can vary. Some SMEs are wholly owned by an individual or a small group of persons, who are often their founding entrepreneurs, while others are family or collectively owned. Some may be partly owned by venture capital or by universities from which they have spun off. Another commonly made distinction is between SMEs that are new ventures and those that are longer established firms. The former may internationalize early on and rapidly, which has given rise to the categories of

496   John Child “international new venture” (INV) (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) and “born global” (BG) (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996). Some soon become “micro-​multinationals,” going beyond exporting by establishing foreign offices often with the aid of foreign business associates; examples are found among Indian software SMEs (Prashantham, 2011). These SMEs contrast with more traditional ones which usually internationalize more slowly on an incremental basis. Knowledge-​intensive industries like software development or knowledge-​based industries like biotechnology (Bell, McNaughton, Young, & Crick, 2003) produce a high proportion of BG/​INVs and epitomize the link between innovation and internationalization (Love & Roper, 2015). Accordingly, the international business models adopted by SMEs tend to vary according to their industry and this is therefore a further significant distinguishing factor among them (Child et  al., 2017). In short, the diversity among SMEs signifies that they undertake different levels and forms of innovation (Salavisa, Sousa, & Fontes, 2012), and that they follow contrasting internationalization pathways (Kuivalainen, Sundqvist, Saarenketo, & McNaughton, 2012). SME internationalization can be directed at different kinds of foreign market—​for instance, emerging versus developed economies (Yamakawa, Khavul, Peng, & Deeds, 2013), and it can also take place through different foreign market entry modes (Root, 1998). Nor can an understanding of emerging economy SME (EE SME) strategies and behaviors simply draw on analyses developed by international business scholars for large well-​resourced multinational enterprises (MNEs), most having their home base in developed economies. SMEs are different to MNEs, and emerging economy contexts contrast with those of developed economies. Regarding the first point, Knight and Liesch point out that “SMEs are structurally different and they behave differently” (2016: 95). Structurally, MNEs generally formulate their strategies through the collective contribution of specialists to high-​level decision-​making, whereas in SMEs this process is often in the hands of a single entrepreneur or a very small group. So, while MNEs are likely to pursue strategic models of innovation and internationalization, SMEs are more often associated with an entrepreneurial approach. Strategy implies the adoption of a measured bounded-​rational approach to opportunity search, decision-​making, and decision implementation, although research shows that intuition can also play a part (Elbanna & Child, 2007). By contrast, entrepreneurship implies the use of heuristics informed by personal experience, and the rapid seizing of opportunities including those presented through serendipity (Ireland, 2007). Consequently, for SMEs, insights from international business research need to be complemented by those from the field of international entrepreneurship, especially to incorporate the role of entrepreneurial cognition (Jones & Casulli, 2014). Xu and Meyer (2013) comment that the divergence of emerging market contexts from those typical of developed economies also implies that some assumptions underlying existing theories of strategy and international business are not wholly appropriate for the former. For example, information asymmetries and deficiencies in the formal institutions of emerging economies can constrain rational decision-​making and may lead decision-​makers in firms to rely more on tacit rules and informal networks.

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    497 Some of the liabilities that SMEs tend to experience compared to MNEs may also be more acute in emerging economies. These include (1) liabilities of smallness such as limited resources, influence, and reputation (Auster & Aldrich, 1986); (2) liabilities of outsidership with respect to having fewer network links to foreign markets (Schweizer, 2013); and (3) liabilities of foreignness, especially of origin in an emerging economy due to its institutional and educational deficiencies, and negative customer biases against a less-​developed economy (Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). Following a brief discussion of how SME innovation and internationalization contribute to emerging economies, the main part of this chapter is organized in terms of four major analytical perspectives which allow the specific circumstances of EE SMEs to be identified. These are (1) the contextual perspective (with particular reference to institutions); (2) the resource-​based view; (3) the network perspective; and (4) the entrepreneurial perspective. The first two perspectives are widely applied in international business studies, whereas the latter two are prominent in the study of international entrepreneurship. As summarized in Figure 20.1, the four perspectives between them identify many features of the environment, the firm, and its decision-​makers that are relevant to understanding innovation and internationalization among EE SMEs. While each perspective has its own distinct focus and rationale, in practice the factors they highlight are often connected. We shall conclude that future studies need to investigate RESOURCE-BASED VIEW SME liabilities Finance, market & technical information Compositional competencies

CONTEXTUAL/ INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE Role of government Institutional voids & costs Institutional supports Industry

INNOVATION Exploratory or exploitative? INTERNATIONALIZATION To emerging or developed economies? Breadth Channels

NETWORK PERSPECTIVE Network links and their functionality (resource provision) Social versus business ties Returnee entrepreneurs & foreign kinship links Use of internet

ENTREPRENEURIAL PERSPECTIVE Motivation/orientation Attitude to risk/opportunity recognition Experience Connections Family ownership & control

Figure  20.1  SMEs in emerging economies:  Innovation and internationalization. Summary framework of theoretical perspectives and key factors

498   John Child these connections further. The chapter focuses primarily on the three largest emerging economies—​Brazil, China, and India.2 China in particular has attracted the lion’s share of relevant research (Xu & Meyer, 2013).

SMEs in Emerging Economies This section considers how SME innovation and internationalization contribute to emerging economies.

Economic Contribution Overall, SMEs contribute importantly to the economic life of emerging economies. A World Bank study suggests there are between 365 and 445 million SMEs in emerging markets. Of these, 25–​30  million are formal SMEs; 55–​70  million are formal micro enterprises3; and 285–​345  million are shadow informal enterprises. The World Bank estimates that formal SMEs contribute up to 60% of total employment and up to 40% of national income (GDP) in emerging economies, while these numbers rise significantly when informal SMEs are included (World Bank, 2015). However, the economic contribution of SMEs varies considerably across emerging economies. They are estimated to contribute approximately 60% of GDP in China, 45% in India, 25% in Brazil, and 21% in Russia. The informal sector is disproportionately large in lower-​income countries, while the former Soviet countries have relatively small SME sectors due to historical political reasons (Edinburgh Group, 2013). More specifically, the importance of SMEs for the development of emerging economies is seen to derive from their low-​cost agility combined with a potential for innovation. They are enterprises that can adapt quickly, can provide employment through high labor intensity combined with a lower capital requirement, and therefore offer cheap production. This means that policies to develop SMEs should be an effective approach to poverty reduction (Maksimov, Wang, & Luo, Y., 2017). At the same time, SMEs contribute to economic growth through their innovation and entrepreneurship (Keskin, Sentürk, Sungur, & Kiris, 2010). For example, innovative SMEs in the Indian auto, electronics, and machine tool sectors were found to register higher growth relative to non-​innovative SMEs in terms not only of sales turnover but also of employment and investment (Subrahmanya, Mathirajan, & Krishnaswamy, 2010). In China, SMEs collectively have become significant drivers of that country’s science and technology development, with an impressive output of patented inventions (Child, 2016). The internationalization of EE SMEs, normally in the form of exporting, can also bring developmental benefits. For it is likely to encourage them to adopt new technology and upgrade product features to meet international standards (Williams, Colovic, & Zhu, 2016).

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    499

Innovation and Internationalization in SME Strategies Innovation and internationalization both play an important role in promoting the growth of an economy as well as of the individual firm. A  positive relationship between innovation and exporting among SMEs has been widely reported in developed economies (European Commission, 2010; Golovko & Valentini, 2011) and is expected for emerging economies as well (Newburry, McIntyre, & Xavier, 2016). BG/​INV knowledge-​based SMEs have demonstrated the potential to constructively combine both innovation and exporting to a wide range of markets (Cavusgil & Knight, 2015). Within the international entrepreneurship literature, offering innovative products or services and capitalizing on supporting network links have been prescriptions for international new ventures to overcome the liability of foreignness and achieve early internationalization (Coviello, 2006; Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). Although numerous empirical studies have examined the relationship between innovation and exporting among SMEs, often concluding that they can have joint positive effects on productivity (see the review by Love & Roper, 2015), this relationship is not always present and can also be nuanced. Learning from exporting does not necessarily feed into enhanced innovation, as Araújo and Salerno (2015) found in Brazil, and possessing an effective absorptive capacity may be a necessary condition for this to take place as Wu and Voss (2015) found in China. Moreover, in an emerging economy like Brazil where SME resources for investing in R&D are generally limited, factors like an SME’s international experience and knowledge may have a stronger positive impact on exporting performance than does innovation (Oura, Zilber, & Lopes, 2016). A further qualification to the innovation-​internationalization link is that the domestic markets of some emerging economies like China and India are so large and rapidly growing that they attract inward foreign domestic investment (FDI) by foreign firms which feeds into local SME innovation, while at the same time they make exporting to foreign markets a less attractive business proposition. Another consideration is that the aggregated data used in most economic studies fail to account for the fact that innovation and exporting are not homogeneous phenomena. March (1991) distinguished between “exploration” or radical innovation, involving the generation of new knowledge to produce new products or services, and the “exploitation” of already available knowledge for purposes of adapting or improving existing products or services. While different kinds of innovation are found in emerging economies such as India (Nair, Guldiken, Fainshmidt, & Pezeshkan, 2015), exploitation is more characteristic of EE SMEs. Kiss, Danis, and Cavusgil (2012) conclude from their review that SMEs from emerging economies tend to focus on less technological intensive business with lower product development costs. EE SMEs tend to adopt business models that are less innovation-​intensive than those of developed economy SMEs (Child et al. 2017). A study of Chinese and Indian new ventures suggests that, in the early stages of internationalization at least, they may seek an exploitation of their technology in other emerging economy markets because they are

500   John Child unsure of the competitive benefits of their technology in more sophisticated markets (Yamakawa et al., 2013). Exporting, let  alone internationalization more generally, can also take various forms:  exporting directly to customers, exporting through agents and host-​country partners, indirect exporting through supplying global value chains, “inward internationalization” in partnership with MNEs, and exporting technology and know-​ how through licensing (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; EU-​LAC, 2017; Root, 1998). The choice of foreign market entry modes has implications for the technology transfer and innovation-​related learning opportunities open to EE SMEs. Those seeking to enhance their capabilities to world-​standard marketing practices and technologies may achieve this through entering into supply-​chain partnerships with MNEs. For example, Zeng, Xie, and Tam (2010) found in a study of manufacturing SMEs in Shanghai that vertical and horizontal cooperation with customers, suppliers and other firms played a particularly important role in enhancing their level of new product innovation. Similarly, Kumar and Subrahmanya (2010) concluded that in the Indian context subcontracting relationships with a MNE can be an important source of technological innovations and enhanced economic performance for SMEs. Ribeiro, De Miranda Jr., Borini, and Bernardes (2014) found that integration into a global production chain accelerated the internationalization of small Brazilian technology-​based firms.

Theoretical Perspectives This section discusses the four theoretical perspectives that serve to identify many features of the environment, the firm, and its decision-​makers relevant to understanding innovation and internationalization among EE SMEs.

The Contextual Perspective, with Particular Reference to Institutions The clear implication of categorizing economies into developed and emerging is that they constitute contrasting contexts for the firms based in them. As already noted, emerging economies generally have distinctive institutional characteristics, and the institutional perspective provides the most frequently referenced theoretical basis for research on firms in those economies (Meyer & Peng, 2016). Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008) argue that institutions combined with industry and resource-​based considerations are the major influences on firm strategies in emerging economies. Smaller firms, unlike most large corporates, are typically confined to one clearly defined industry which, as an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), itself carries strong regulatory, normative, and cognitive institutional associations. Industry as an aspect of EE SME’s context

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    501 has been found to predict variations in the kinds of innovation, competitive strengths, and external network connections that SMEs use to foster their internationalization. The industry in which an EE SME operates is relevant to the role of innovation in its international business model, especially its intensity in terms of R&D (research and development) commitment and the importance of exploration as witnessed by new product development (Child et al., 2017). Deficiencies in governmental, legal, and other formal institutions, together with a high level of government involvement in the economy, are two salient features of most emerging economies. Institutions can affect SME innovation and internationalization both positively and negatively, a distinction that is reflected in two subperspectives: the institutional support perspective and the institutional void perspective (Stephan, Uhlader & Stride, 2015). The institutional support perspective assumes that governments and their agencies can effectively promote small business entrepreneurship through providing assistance such as finance, especially when these are made accessible under the terms of clear universalistic rules. There is also scope for governmental agencies in emerging economies to build research networks to mobilize national talent, exchange knowledge, and link SMEs with sources of advanced technology, including multinationals and international R&D networks (Gunawan, Jacob, & Duysters, 2016). The institutional void perspective by contrast highlights that not only can there be a lack of institutional support for entrepreneurship but also inadequate institutional rules and their weak enforcement, often going hand-​in-​hand with bureaucratic inefficiency and unhelpfulness, generating uncertainty, discouraging innovation, and inhibiting participation in foreign markets. Institutional voids are prevalent in emerging economies (Luo & Junkunc, 2008; Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010; World Bank, 2017). The generally underdeveloped institutional context of emerging economies may constrain firms’ in-​house development of innovation (Cuervo-​Cazurra, 2016) and undermine the benefits of their networking for innovation (Schøtt & Jensen, 2016). Compared to developed economies, the propensity and ability of SMEs to innovate tends to be compromised by a number of factors: difficulties in raising the necessary capital and credit, a scarcity of highly qualified personnel, a volatile regulatory environment, and inadequate protection of intellectual property. There is typically a limited availability of venture capital to fund innovation, partly due to inadequate financial and legal institutional supports, as Scheela, Isidro, Jittrapanun, and Trang (2015) document for the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. A  further significant institutional limitation on SME innovation in emerging economies lies in the relative paucity of fundamental research available from universities and research institutes, and inadequate links between the key parties. In China, for example, there has been poor coordination between the agencies relevant to innovation, a weak system of performance valuation, and political constraints on the free exchange of ideas (Cao, Li, Li, & Liu, 2013). Even in a relatively advanced emerging economy like China, limitations in the availability of financial support from agencies such as venture capitalists and of advanced technical knowledge from universities and research institutes tends to result in much SME innovation being

502   John Child imitative and incremental rather than fundamental (Child, 2016). The quality of domestically approved patents in China is very mixed, partly due to problems of incentive, monitoring, and intellectual property (IP) protection resulting from institutional deficiencies (Cheng & Huang, 2016). On the positive side, there are various ways in which institutional policies can facilitate innovation by EE SMEs. The World Bank China 2030 report mentions some of these when recommending that China “improve the institutional arrangements needed to encourage broad-​based innovation—​such as ease of firm entry and exit, increased competition, enforcement of laws protecting intellectual property rights, quality tertiary education, the availability of risk capital for small and medium enterprises, evaluation of government R&D expenditures, and standard setting in government procurement” (World Bank, 2013: 35). Similarly, Gupta and Barua (2016) identify government policies as among the most important enablers of SME technological development in India. However, the protection of intellectual property rights is generally less rigorous in emerging economies, with India and Indonesia having particularly weak protection regimes (Property Rights Alliance, 2016; US Chamber of Commerce, 2017). In China, there is evidence that limited IP protection has discouraged innovation by SMEs, especially in the case of product innovation which is open to re-​engineering (Child, 2016). Moreover, government authorities in some emerging economies like China tend to favor large state-​owned enterprises in areas such as procurement which is perceived by SMEs as unfair competition, so creating a negative climate for innovation and internationalization (Zhu, Wittmann, & Peng, 2012). Institutional voids also limit the capacity of EE SMEs to internationalize, more so than in the case of larger firms (LiPuma, Newbert, & Doh, 2013). For example, Narooz and Child (2017) found that in an emerging economy (Egypt), SMEs’ knowledge of opportunities to internationalize was limited by voids in the support from domestic export-​promoting institutions. The voids were manifest in two respects. The first is an institution’s technical inadequacies in providing export assistance services and carrying out its formal responsibilities. The second concerns ways in which institutional officials may impose informal conditions on their willingness to offer such services. Informal arrangements typically reflect a privileged relationship with officials, and in most countries it is larger firms rather than SMEs that are likely to enjoy such connections. In China SMEs can also be disadvantaged in securing institutional assistance by political ideology insofar as this continues to grant greater legitimacy to state-​owned enterprises than to private firms (Child, 2016). Also within the purview of this second factor are corrupt practices whereby officials are only willing to support firms if side payments or other favors are offered. A large-​scale survey of private enterprises, many of them SMEs, in 72 emerging economies found that inadequacies among government institutions meant that the senior executives concerned had to spend more time engaging with those agencies, especially in countries with high levels of government intervention and corruption and when the firms were new ventures (Luo & Junkunc, 2008). EE SMEs pursue a number of strategies to undertake internationalization in this unfavorable context. They tend to rely on external supports secured through various forms

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    503 of networking. One initiative is to exercise “institutional leverage” (Landau, Karna, Richter, & Uhlenbruck, 2016) through network connections to institutional officials, primarily of a social nature, in order to gain access to information, introductions, and financial support for exporting that institutional agencies are otherwise reluctant to provide to small firms (Narooz & Child, 2017). A counterpoint to the negative impact of domestic institutional factors on EE SME internationalization arises from the transaction costs that bureaucratic restrictions, lack of standardization, and underdeveloped infrastructure can create for domestic business. By contrast, the costs of transacting in and with foreign markets, especially in developed economies, can be lower due to their more effective institutional provisions such as the protection of property rights and simpler procedures. It has therefore been argued that in such cases EE SMEs have an incentive to internationalize to supply and/​or operate in foreign markets that impose lower transaction costs (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). Although referring to FDI by larger emerging economy firms, Witt and Lewin (2007) also argued in a similar vein that this could be undertaken as an “escape response” to home-​country institutional constraints. Institutions such as government trade promotion agencies, industry associations, research institutes, consultants, and commercial funders can also assist SME internationalization. They can provide information on foreign markets, access to relevant technical knowledge, and financial aid to support new market entry (e.g., funding participation in trade missions and exhibitions). These are among the most significant resources that SMEs require to support their foreign transactions (Brouthers, Nakos, Hadjimarcou, & Brouthers, 2009; EU-​LAC, 2017; Liesch & Knight, 1999). For example, Raju and Rajan (2015) note that the Indian government has adopted measures to improve bank credit to SMEs which their research identifies as a stimulus to better export performance. Nevertheless, SMEs frequently report a resource-​deficiency (Xie & Suh, 2014) which, partly due to institutional limitations, tends to be greater in less-​developed economy environments (Chrysostme & Molz, 2014). The generally lower availability in emerging economies of government assistance for exporting, of financial support from agencies such as venture capitalists, and of advanced technical knowledge from universities and research institutes, is likely to diminish the opportunity that their SMEs have for pursuing innovation-​based internationalization (Child et al., 2017). At the same time, their resource limitations can sometimes be self-​imposed insofar as SME entrepreneurs often prefer to rely on internally generated funds rather than enter into a dependency on external providers (e.g., Osei-​Bonsu, 2014).

The Resource-​based View The resource-​based view of the firm draws attention to the fact that its competitiveness hinges on its ability to secure and organize resources that allow it to maintain an advantage over other rival firms (Barney, 1991). EE SMEs may seek to innovate and choose to internationalize to exploit resource advantages in their domestic context. Access to

504   John Child low-​cost domestic resources, in the form of lower labor, production, R&D, product development, and marketing costs, is generally a source of distinctive competitive advantage for EE SMEs compared to those from developed economies (Kazlauskaitė, Autio, Gelbūda, & Šarapovas, 2015a). Foreign FDI into emerging economies, particularly if it involves technology transfer, enables these lower factor costs to be combined with improved standards of product design and quality. This combination potentially gives EE SMEs partnering with MNEs a growing competitive edge in international markets. New technologies have also facilitated EE SME innovation and internationalization. An example is the availability of open source software which in Turkey has promoted collaboration and contributions from different parties in software innovation and production (Yildirim & Ansal, 2011). EE SMEs may also choose to internationalize in order to access assets and resources abroad, to remedy a domestic resource shortfall. The resources they may seek to acquire can include a knowledge of advanced international marketing practices and advanced technology, and finance for capital investment. They may also seek to strengthen their domestic market position through enhancing their domestic reputation on the basis of being an international player (Yamakawa et al., 2013). The resource and factor market shortfalls that Hoskisson et al. (2013) identify in many emerging economies limit the capacity of EE SMEs to innovate and to internationalize. So the need for ambitious EE SMEs to reduce or compensate for them can be very significant. For example, although access to finance and credit is crucial to support both innovation and internationalization (World Bank, 2015), SMEs in emerging economies commonly experience obstacles to accessing finance, such as bank credit, where preference tends to be given to larger firms (Beck, Demirgüç-​Kunt, Pería, 2011; Child, 2016; Woldie & Thomas, 2017). Given that SMEs typically command fewer internal resources than do larger firms, it may be essential for their innovation and internationalization performance to secure technical and marketing knowledge from external partners in a way that complements their internal capabilities. Partnering with research institutes is typically strategic for knowledge-​based SMEs (Salavisa et al., 2012), while partnering with MNEs offers various possibilities in addition to technology transfer such as the facilitation of risk capital, and outlets for new product offerings (Buckley & Prashantham, 2016). Moreover, emerging economies typically face a shortage of trained and creative scientific staff. This lowers the absorptive capacity of SMEs and limits their ability to secure full benefit from externally purchased technology (Hou & Mohnen, 2013). In the case of China, it has become evident that SME innovation, especially of a more fundamental kind, is being constrained by several factors, including access to finance such as venture capital and angel investment, low financial incentives, limited human resources and training, and restrictions on intellectual freedom (Child, 2016; SPI, UNU-​Merit, & AIT, 2014). As articulated in the Western literature, the resource-​based view generally assumes that the resources enabling a firm to compete successfully need to be idiosyncratic and superior: scarce, valuable, and difficult to copy. In emerging economies, however, firms may be obliged to work with resources that are ordinary rather than superior.

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    505 Nevertheless, as Luo and Child (2015) illustrate, they often manage to compete without the benefit of resource advantages, proprietary technology, economies of scale, or market power. They generate extraordinary results through the effective combination of ordinary resources both within the firm and through networking with other firms, to achieve a flexible response to market opportunities. “The firms adopting this approach are particularly proficient in composing new, low-​cost designs (especially adding new product functions), and in creating prompt market responses, developing convenience of use, and strengthening customer-​oriented services” (Luo & Child, 2015: 381). Similarly, Batra, Sharma, Dixit, and Vohra et  al. concluded from a study of Indian manufacturing SMEs that their ability to manage their resources dynamically—​“to coordinate, integrate and reconfigure their resources” (2015: 28), rather than possessing unique resources—​predicted superior innovation performance. EE SME managers can exhibit highly productive organizing skills despite having generally received far less formal training than their developed economy counterparts. So, the innovation that EE SMEs undertake tends to be low cost, makes creative use of existing resources and technologies rather than exploring new technologies, and is flexible in its application. Because many developing economies have a large informal economy of poor citizens, their SME innovation is often aimed at poorer communities. In India, this approach to innovation and entrepreneurship is known by the Hindu term jugaad and is not confined to SMEs. Prabhu and Jain (2015) argue that approaches to innovation comparable to jugaad can be found in other emerging economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although it exploits the limited resources that are available in those contexts, its sensitivity to local market needs can still lend it a disruptive effect. Undertaking internationalization also requires resources. Insofar as it depends on offering products and services that are attractive to foreign markets, entry to those markets will benefit from the financial and other resources that underwrite innovation. Financial resources may also be required to offset the risks involved, such as taking out insurance against the risk of non-​payment. Intangible resources are, however, likely to be of more fundamental strategic importance. These include specialized knowledge of opportunities in specific international market segments and how to serve these, as well as superior technical knowledge. While such knowledge may be available to entrepreneurs when they first establish their new ventures, it may also be available through network links (Coviello & Cox, 2006). Various external sources can provide access to resources for SME internationalization, and these can therefore be regarded as social capital for the firm.4 Some studies have also concluded that human capital, particularly at the level of SME leadership, is an important resource requirement for internationalization. The international experience of EE SME entrepreneurs, their education and skills, and their ability to combine resources and activities effectively to support international business have been found to relate positively to internationalization performance (e.g., Alon, Yeheskel, Lerner, & Zhang, 2013; Javalgi & Todd, 2011; Osei-​Bonsu, 2014). It is often not possible, however, to separate out the resource from the motivational aspects of human capital because features such as the entrepreneur’s commitment to internationalization

506   John Child and proactivity can also play a positive role. For example, the findings of Boso, Story, Cadogan, Annan, Kadić-​Maglajlić, & Micevski (2016) suggest that while the relationship between radical product innovation and sales performance of internationalizing SMEs is generally non-​significant in a developing economy context, it becomes significant when entrepreneurial orientation is high.

The Network Perspective It is widely assumed that networks play an important role as antecedents and facilitators of SME innovation and internationalization, especially in the case of early-​ internationalizing high-​technology ventures (Coviello, 2006). Studies have tended to show that SMEs that forge a larger number of business alliances with a greater diversity of partners outperform others, especially among start-​up firms (Pangarkar & Wu, 2013). It is generally accepted that network connections can contribute in providing resources, coping with institutional voids, reducing transaction costs, and as the basis for building entrepreneurial social capital. Networking is therefore often included within the scope of other theoretical perspectives. The term can refer to links with individual external parties or, more commonly, to links with several external parties which themselves form part of a wider network, whereas internal networking refers to communications and relationships within the firm, which is often a condition for EE SMEs to achieve the effective combination of ordinary resources mentioned earlier. The value attached to external networking has been termed “bridging social capital,” while that associated with internal networking has been termed “bonding social capital” (Putnam, 2000). Innovation by SMEs benefits from their ties to external networks, especially in high-​tech fields (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; OECD, 2010). Such ties can facilitate innovation through providing capital, technology, market information, and connections to potential customers of new products. EE SMEs situated in higher-​ tech industries need regularly to enhance their technological levels. They need to access international networks in order to upgrade to higher-​value-​adding activities—​to shift from innovation focused on exploiting existing knowledge to undertaking more fundamental exploration (March, 1991). For example, in the biotechnology sector this upgrade could involve progressing from doing contract research to doing discovery research. For this reason, EE SMEs led by technically qualified CEOs and investing in R&D may prefer to internationalize into developed economy markets in order to acquire and exploit the more sophisticated market and technical knowledge available in those economies (Yamakawa et al., 2013). Studies conducted in China throw light on the contribution that external network links can make to EE SME innovation. Zeng et al. (2010) point out that the complexity of innovation processes has led to considerable growth in the use of external networks by SMEs. Network links, such as those belonging to innovation networks and having partnerships with potentially knowledge-​transferring MNCs, may also be significant

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    507 enablers through providing access to appropriate sources of new knowledge. Yu, Hao, Ahlstrom, Si, & Liang (2014) studied 134 relatively young Chinese firms in high-​tech industries. They found that those firms having a higher ability to manage their network of relationships competently had a superior new product development performance, the more so when they also possessed a high level of technological capability. Xu, Lin, & Lin (2008) found from their study of SMEs in Guangdong Province that the structural characteristics of SME networks themselves, namely, their density, reciprocity, and multiplicity, had a positive association with the innovation capabilities of individual member firms. They concluded that the “innovative capabilities of firms can be enhanced in a business network characterized by frequent and diversified interactions, as well as collaborative interdependencies among network members” (2008: 798). The forms of networking on which innovating SMEs rely vary according to their field of activity and the type of innovation undertaken. Distinct categories of network tie provide different contributions suited to the commercialization of contrasting forms of innovation (Partanen, Chetty, & Rajala, 2014). Even knowledge-​intensive sectors are not homogeneous with regard to their innovation processes and this variation influences the architecture of the innovation networks constructed by the firms (Salavisa et al., 2012). Thus highly knowledge-​based EE SMEs, such as biotech firms, rely heavily on access to scientific knowledge from universities and research institutes to undertake more advanced research, and the availability of this support tends to be more limited in emerging economies. Consequently in emerging economies, SMEs predominantly undertake incremental exploitative innovation, and much of their networking is informal in nature. For example, Nee and Opper found in two samples of approximately 700 firms each (c. 90% of them SMEs) located in China’s Yangzi Delta region that “the rise of innovative activities is deeply embedded in social network structures, which facilitate marginal innovations and diffusion of technology through informal collaboration” (2012: 225). These firms’ innovations were generally incremental in nature relying significantly on imitation and learning by doing. Customers were by far their main source of ideas for this form of innovation, followed by other firms in the same industry, their own employees or R&D units, technical or industry standards, and suppliers. Nee and Opper emphasize that the accumulation of informal network ties offers substantial learning and developmental opportunities. Network ties also contribute to SME internationalization in a number of ways. They can inform SMEs of potential opportunities in foreign markets and/​or introduce them to potential clients or partners (Chetty & Blankenburg-​Holm, 2000; Ellis, 2011). The process of networking is increasingly facilitated by advances in information and communication technology (ICT). These have opened up many new opportunities for SMEs to acquire resources for internationalization through online networking (Sigfusson & Chetty, 2013). ICT also helps EE SMEs to access new foreign markets. For example, it enables them to supply services such as software development online directly to customers, while it also helps EE SMEs to coordinate tightly with the operational requirements of global supply chains (Etemad, 2013a).

508   John Child Oparaocha (2015) differentiates between three different sets of SME network ties potentially relevant to their internationalization:  (1) social networks such as family, friends, or colleagues; (2) business networks such as suppliers, customers, or strategic partners; and (3) institutional networks such as the government, support agencies, research institutes, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Senik, Scott-​ Ladd, Entrekin, and Adham (2011), consulting experts’ and SME owners’ opinions in Malaysia, had previously suggested the relevance of these network categories as supports for SME internationalization particularly when they are used in tandem. Similarly, Han (2006) recommended a combination of many weak ties and a few strong ties as conducive to superior internationalization performance. Different network links perform different functions and, as is the case with innovation, their relative importance may depend on the SME’s industry and business model (Child et al., 2017). For example, interpersonal knowledge-​based network ties, sometimes established before the founding of the firm, were found to play an important role in promoting the early and rapid internationalization of software and biotech South African SMEs through facilitating organizational links with key MNEs (Masango & Marinova, 2014). A significant form of networking by EE SMEs is to build external social capital with players in foreign markets by building on ethnic ties with émigrés, including extended family members (Prashantham, 2011; Prashantham, Dhanaraj, & Kumar, 2015). Similarly, returnees from abroad can bring to new ventures not only technology transfer and knowledge of foreign markets but also connections with potential partners or agents in those markets (Filatotchev, Liu, Buck, & Wright, 2009). Shared ethnicity with potential foreign partners, and the international experience and contacts of returnee entrepreneurs, can provide important assistance for entry into foreign markets (Kiss & Danis, 2010; Musteen, Francis, & Datta, 2010). Partnering within business networks is a further EE SME networking strategy to foster internationalization − for example, cultivating ties with MNEs as contributors to their international supply chains. Such ties can not only create exporting opportunities but also provide a basis for improving innovation capabilities through technology transfer and also achieving reputational benefits in the international marketplace. For example, a survey of young Indian software SMEs found that those which built up relational capital with the local subsidiaries of MNEs developed a greater internationalization capability through knowledge transfer than did those SMEs that just linked with other Indian software firms (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015). Partnerships and network collaborations can reduce the risk of opportunism by more powerful MNEs (Lin & Lin, 2016). In addition, SMEs may have opportunities to enhance their bargaining power over foreign MNE partners through, for example, fostering ties with local government officials and business managers (Deghetto, Sutton, Holcomb, & Holmes, 2016). A third set of network links that can potentially benefit EE SME internationalization is with formal institutions such as relevant government departments, agencies, or support offices. However, we have noted that in emerging economies the operations of these ties is likely to be hampered by institutional voids (Narooz & Child, 2017). In the presence of institutional voids, especially weak rules and procedures, cultural norms

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    509 are likely to provide points of reference for coping behavior to fill the gaps, especially social networking (Chakrabarty, 2009). In emerging countries with immature formal institutions, SMEs need to rely on strong particularistic ties to facilitate their internationalization (Kiss & Danis, 2008). Many emerging economies are in fact characterized by collectivist and particularistic cultures in which strong cohesive relationships are valued and favored (Hofstede, 2001; Nardon & Steers, 2009). Overall, evidence on the role of networks in EE SME internationalization is mixed. Some studies point to an important and positive role, while others suggest that factors such as entrepreneurial international experience and proactivity make a more important contribution (Kazlauskaitė, Abramavicius, Šarapovas, Gelbūda, & Venciûte, 2015b). As an example of a positive role, equity and non-​equity alliances with US firms were found to facilitate the entry and survival of software firms (not all SMEs) from India, Ireland, and Israel into the USA (Giarratana & Torrisi, 2010). However, it has also been found that the contribution of inter-​firm network connections tends to reduce over time, playing a larger role in foreign market selection and entry than in the later development of market position (Manolova, Manev, & Gyoshev, 2010). While social networks, including family-​based ones, may assist initial internationalization, once the process is underway business networks tend to become important (Scholes, Mustafa, & Chen, 2016). For example, foreign market entry may be activated through a focused link to a customer, possibly faciliated through a third-​party personal contact, and then subsequently widened to take in more business-​like links to other customers in that market, perhaps through the mediation of agents and distributors (Etemad, 2013b). Indeed, reliance on existing social ties may come to play a negative role through insulating SMEs from information on more diverse internationalization opportunities that can be obtained from arm’s-​length business ties outside an entrepreneur’s closed social network (Musteen et al., 2010). These weaker business ties, often based on contracted services such as those provided by export-​promoting agencies, can provide non-​redundant information that is crucial for identifying opportunities for further development and growth in international markets (Evers & O’Gorman, 2011; Ibeh & Kasem, 2011). Social and business networks may play a different role in the internationalization of EE SMEs compared to those in developed economies (Kazlauskaite et al., 2015b). This is partly a concomitant of whether particularistic or universalistic norms and practices prevail in the home society (Narooz & Child, 2017). The form of networking that is most helpful is also likely to differ according to whether SMEs are attempting to enter developed economy markets or other emerging economy markets. If the former, networking and partnering with MNEs may offer an important learning experience, lend reputational credibility, and open up opportunities through a process of “inward internationalization” (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Many smaller firms from low-​cost emerging economies have achieved indirect exporting through supplying MNEs for their home and international markets (Etemad, 2013b). On the other hand, if SMEs are intending to enter other emerging economy markets in which governments are active players, networking with host-​government departments may make a more significant contribution especially if trade and investment agreements with the home government

510   John Child are in place (Child & Marinova, 2014). Many EE SMEs may have already accumulated skills in networking and managing relations with their domestic government officials that are transferable to other emerging markets. These skills include the ability to navigate informal, even corrupt, network processes.

The Entrepreneurial Perspective SMEs tend to be characterized by an individualized leadership (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). Coviello (2015) has argued, however, that a focus on the individuals or teams that establish and drive firms has been overwhelmed in both international business and international entrepreneurship research by firm-​level studies. This adds pertinence to the entrepreneurial perspective which focuses on the leading individual or team in EE SMEs and on their characteristics such as education, experience, proactivity, and the significance they attach to innovation and/​or internationalization. The important role played by individual decision-​makers in SMEs means that their personal characteristics, creativity, and mental outlooks are highly likely to affect their level of commitment to innovation and internationalization. Schumpeter (1942) asserted that entrepreneurs are the source of innovation, creating new possibilities and combinations of resources through an inherent compulsion or “entrepreneurial spirit.” Drucker (1985/​2011) saw innovation as the heart of entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurs also necessarily play a central role in initiating and building the networks that support innovation and internationalization. Nevertheless, despite widespread acceptance of the interdependence of entrepreneurship and innovation, there is relatively little direct evidence on which aspects of entrepreneurship encourage innovation by firms, or on the mechanisms whereby individual entrepreneurs encourage such innovation (Harms, Reschke, Kraus, & Fink 2010). One reason for this paucity of evidence probably lies in the assumption that the terms “entrepreneurial” and “innovative” are treated as being virtually synonymous. The concept of a firm’s “entrepreneurial orientation” includes dimensions such as innovativeness, risk-​taking, pro-​activeness, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). It expresses the entrepreneurial disposition of its decision-​makers that is likely to underpin a firm’s commitment to innovation. Studies have generally concluded that a strong entrepreneurial orientation is associated with greater innovation, as well as overall business success (e.g., Onkelinx, Manolova, & Edelman, 2015). Research among Chinese firms, for example, has found a positive relationship between entrepreneurship orientation and product innovation performance, especially when an entrepreneurial orientation is supported by internal practices such as strategic human resources management (Tang, Chen, & Jin, 2015). The entrepreneurial perspective envisages three sets of features enabling SME leaders to influence the proactiveness of their firms in regard to undertaking both innovation and internationalization. Sometimes these are grouped together under broad headings such as innovative capacity or international orientation. The first set is

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    511 individual, focusing on the cognition of the entrepreneur (Milanov & Maissenhälter, 2015). Research undertaken in Brazil has, for example, indicated that the meaning entrepreneurs attach to internationalization affects their commitment to it and the regularity with which they undertake foreign business. The researchers emphasized that entrepreneurs’ interpretations mediate between situational factors and internationalization behaviour (Seifert, Child, & Rodrigues, 2012). It is likely that individual characteristics such as high personal drive, willingness to take risks, orientation toward novelty, and cognitive ability manifest in an entrepreneur’s opportunity recognition and evaluation (Grégoire, Cornelissen, Dimov, & van Burg, 2015), and that in this way they predict both innovation and proactive internationalization by an SME. The second set of factors is more social in nature and includes the entrepreneur’s social capital developed through network connections, previously discussed. National or local cultures are another social factor category which may bear upon the incidence of innovation and internationalization through the ways that entrepreneurial actions are influenced by values concerning, for example, uncertainty avoidance as well by as the levels of interpersonal trust that facilitate innovation team working as well as network relations supporting internationalization. Also within the social category is the possibility (discussed below) that different forms of firm ownership (e.g., individual versus family) may either encourage or constrain entrepreneurship. The third set of factors draws attention to a range of potential behavioral influences, particularly on innovation, which include the entrepreneur’s managerial style and organization. Some entrepreneurial characteristics fall into more than one of these categories. For instance, the length and quality of an entrepreneur’s experience is likely to add to his or her cognitive appreciation of strategic possibilities based on innovation and internationalization, allow for a greater accumulation of social capital, and improve the capacity to organize resources for new initiatives. As previously noted, one source of experience that has been found to positively affect innovation and internationalization in EE SMEs is the presence of entrepreneurs returning from abroad, who provide a channel for spillovers of international knowledge (Liu, Lu, Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 2010) and connections into international markets (Filatotchev et al., 2009). Entrepreneurs’ experience has been found to predict various foundations for SME success including an ability to learn and assess the relevance of past events effectively (Wally & Baum, 1994) and an ability to identify and decide on relevant opportunities (Baldacchino, 2013). Studies such as the one by Chandra, Styles, and Wilkinson (2009) have shown that entrepreneurs with a greater level of prior international experience are more likely to have a greater awareness of potential and emerging international opportunities and tend to be more proactive in pursuing those opportunities. International experience is a multidimensional construct signifying that the quality of such experience is likely to be a function not just of its length but also of its scope, diversity, and intensity (Clarke, Tamaschke, & Liesch., 2013). A  cognitive learning perspective on internationalization decisions has the potential to advance our understanding of how SME entrepreneurs make sense of foreign environments and how their perceptions affect their internationalization strategies (Maitland & Sammartino,

512   John Child 2015). The entrepreneur’s perception of opportunities in foreign markets, which may include opportunities for innovation-​based market disruption, is also expected to significantly influence the process of SME internationalization (Mainela, Puhakka, & Servais, 2014). As suggested earlier, EE entrepreneurs may be encouraged to internationalize by comparing perceived opportunities in foreign markets against conditions in their domestic market. The entrepreneurial perspective also draws attention to two firm-​level factors that promote SME internationalization: innovation capability and network links. The ability to offer innovative products or services is regarded as key in helping small exporting firms to overcome their liabilities of newness and foreignness (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004), and in the case of EE SMEs their liability of country origin (Ciravegna, Lopez, & Kundu, 2014). In turn, their participation in international markets allows SMEs to acquire and absorb new knowledge not available in domestic markets. This can enhance their innovation capability and their competitive advantage, hence increasing the probability of international growth (Filipescu, Prashantham, Rialp, & Rialp, 2013; Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006). The contributions offered by “strong” social and “weak” business network links to EE SME internationalization were noted when discussing the network perspective. However, while an SME’s links to networks may facilitate internationalization in ways already identified, ultimately its success depends on the intrinsic qualities of the product or service being offered. The ownership and governance of EE SMEs closely relates to their leadership and in that respect is allied to the entrepreneurship perspective. Family-​owned firms are particularly significant in emerging economies and a great many are SMEs (Björnberg, Elstrodt, & Pandit, 2014). This raises a number of issues relevant to innovation and internationalization. One concerns the form of SME ownership that is more conducive to innovation and internationalization. For instance, what are the consequences of single ownership where there is dominant control by a single entrepreneur or family member versus multiple ownership where principal-​agent conflicts and principal-​principal conflicts are more likely to occur? Are family-​owned firms more likely to risk investing in innovation and internationalization or are they generally more conservative? Does a mix of family and non-​family members in leading positions combine the benefits from a continuity of core family-​held values with the energizing effects of importing new perspectives (D’Angelo, Majocchi, & Buck, 2016)? Does dispersed ownership provide an SME with a greater number of network links that are strategically useful for innovation and internationalization? Research conducted on Asian family enterprises, reviewed by Sharma and Chua (2013), as well as studies from developed economies, reviewed by Classen, Carree, Van Gils, and Peters (2014), provides very mixed answers to such questions. A factor contributing to this ambiguity is that the literature on the consequences of family control for innovation and internationalization is based on two opposed theoretical perspectives. The principal-​agency perspective suggests that controlling family members can attach higher priority to family self-​interest than to the longer-​term benefit of the firm. Similarly, the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective suggests

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    513 that family owners gain from the socioemotional aspects of their business (Gomez-​ Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011). This may lead them to choose strategies that are aimed at obtaining non-​economic benefits such as preserving family control and maintaining a family culture, rather than undertaking longer-​term and growth-​oriented but potentially risky strategies involving investment in innovation or internationalization. As a result, family control could result in less commitment to renewing the firm and developing its competencies through investment in innovation and foreign expansion. Stewardship theory by contrast emphasizes that controlling family members identify with the firm and, perceiving their role to be one of stewardship, will be inclined to invest in its future in these ways (Ashwin, Krishnan, & Geirge, 2015). Ashwin et al.’s own research on Indian pharmaceutical firms over a seven-​year period lent broad support to the stewardship theory. Another reason that Sharma and Chua identify for the variance in research findings is that insufficient attention has been paid to the impact of context in terms of how cultural norms, government policies, and their industry affect the behavior and performance of family firms and how this impact may be changing. For example, in emerging economies the traditionally high social significance of kinship groups, which can facilitate EE SME innovation in ways we have discussed under the network perspective, may today be weakening. Sharma and Chua note that research on entrepreneurship and innovation in family firms is becoming more nuanced, with scholars recognizing, for instance, that not only can family and non-​family leaders convey different benefits but that their significance may change over the course of a firm’s evolution. Moreover, some studies conclude that the effects of ownership are moderated by other factors such as the educational level of the CEO (e.g., Classen, Van Gils, Bammens, & Carree, 2012; Yeoh, 2014). Turning to more specific findings, evidence from China suggests that certain ownership and governance configurations of Chinese SMEs may inhibit their innovation, such as an absence of external board members (Shapiro, Tang, Wang, & Zhang, 2015), or having multiple and family owners rather than single-​owner entrepreneurs. Deng, Hofman, and Newman (2013) concluded from a large dataset of Chinese SMEs that single-​owner entrepreneurs are likely to have a stronger entrepreneurial orientation and to prioritize innovation more than family or dispersed ownership, although firms with multiple owners tend to be better at utilizing external sources of knowledge and human capital. Liu, Chen, and Wang (2017) found among Taiwanese high-​tech firms (not SMEs) that higher levels of family ownership have significantly lower internal innovation as assessed by R&D intensity, but that this applied only when firms have low organizational slack (low ratio of current assets to current liabilities). Evidence drawn largely from developed economies suggests that family-​owned SMEs tend to have lower innovation intensities in terms of R&D expenditure, and a lower diversity of cooperation partners used to acquire innovation-​related resources, but may be relatively successful in achieving innovation outcomes such as new products (Classen et al., 2012; 2014). In a rare study covering 47 developing economies, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-​Kunt, and Maksimovic (2011) also found that family firms (including SMEs) introduce more new products than do non-​family firms.

514   John Child Most research on the relevance of family and other ownership features on firm internationalization derives from developed economies. In addition, the studies that have been conducted of emerging economy firms have focused on larger companies rather than SMEs (Ivanova, Dentchev, & Todorov, 2015). Moreover, the evidence on whether and how the degree of family ownership and control affects EE SME internationalization is not conclusive. As with innovation, it would appear that future studies need to adopt a more fine-​grained and nuanced approach. For example, the impact of family ownership and control may vary according to the stage of internationalization. It was noted earlier that while family-​based networks may assist initial internationalization, reliance on them may constrain the subsequent diversification of international markets which requires a wider range of business links. This is consistent with Kontinen and Ojala (2010) finding from their review of empirical research that family-​owned ventures tend to internationalize gradually to countries that are close geographically and culturally. Evidence from Taiwanese SMEs suggests that a mix of institutional ownership with family ownership enhances their level of internationalization (Chen, Hsu, & Chang, 2014). To take another example of the need for a nuanced approach, Liang, Wang, and Cui (2014) demonstrate from a study of Chinese private firms (mainly SMEs) that a distinction needs to be made between family ownership and family involvement in management. They found that the two features affected the propensity to internationalize, via exporting and FDI, differently and in a non-​linear manner.

Conclusion It has become apparent that SMEs in emerging economies pursue innovation and internationalization strategies that can contrast with those typical of their developed economy counterparts. Although it is hazardous to generalize in view of the diversity among emerging economies and their SMEs, the following conclusions are suggested by the body of research informed by the four broad perspectives considered in this chapter: 1. Faced with resource constraints, EE SMEs often develop successful adaptive and compositional skills to support innovation with ordinary resources, leveraging networks both within their firms and with external partners. The innovation that EE SMEs undertake tends to be low cost, makes creative use of existing resources and technologies rather than exploring new technologies, and is flexible in its application. 2. In contrast to the born-​global model among developed economy SMEs, the limited resources of EE SMEs for investment in R&D may lead factors like entrepreneurs’ experience and knowledge of international markets to be stronger drivers than innovation for internationalization and to have a stronger positive impact on performance in international markets.

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    515 3. Institutional voids compromise the propensity and ability of EE SMEs to innovate due to factors such as difficulties in raising the requisite capital and credit, a scarcity of highly qualified personnel, a volatile regulatory environment, and inadequate protection of intellectual property. Significant domestic institutional voids may, however, provide an incentive for EE SMEs to enter foreign markets. 4. The industry in which an EE SME operates is relevant to the role of innovation in its international business model, especially its intensity in terms of R&D commitment and the importance of exploration as witnessed by new product development. 5. EE SMEs rely heavily on social networking to achieve their goals in the presence of institutional voids and resource limitations. Their reliance on networking is encouraged by cultural norms and extended family ties in economies where family business is predominant. 6. EE SMEs can acquire technical and market knowledge, and valuable connections, through returnee entrepreneurs from developed economies either as new venture founders or as recruits to senior positions. The inter-​personal knowledge-​ based network ties of entrepreneurs can play an important role in promoting the early and rapid internationalization of high-​tech EE SMEs through facilitating organizational links with key MNEs. 7. While networking has generally been seen to facilitate EE SME innovation, evidence on the role of networks in EE SME internationalization is mixed. The contribution of inter-​firm network connections tends to reduce over time, playing a larger role in foreign market selection and entry than in the later development of market position. While social networks, including family-​based ones, may assist initial internationalization, once the process is underway business networks tend to become important. 8. EE SME innovation tends to be incremental and directed at supporting entry to other emerging economy markets, at least in the earlier stages of internationalization. However, some EE SMEs do network with foreign MNEs in order to acquire more advanced knowledge and as a platform for entry into developed economy markets. 9. If EE SMEs are attempting to enter developed economy markets, networking and partnering with MNEs can be advantageous. If they are attempting to enter other emerging economy markets, networking with host government agencies may make a more significant contribution. 10. Individual characteristics such as high personal drive, willingness to take risks, orientation toward novelty, and cognitive ability favor an entrepreneur’s ability to recognize and evaluate opportunities, and hence they predict both innovation and proactive internationalization by EE SMEs in ways similar to those found for developed economy SMEs. 11. Research into the relevance of an EE SME’s ownership and control for its innovation and internationalization has focused on either individual entrepreneurs or family. Personal demographics, orientations, and skills emerge as predictors in

516   John Child much the same way as has been found for developed economy SMEs. However, there is little consensus about the effects of structural features such as individual versus collective leadership or family versus non-​family influence. 12. On the whole, studies on the impact of entrepreneurs’ characteristics reach similar conclusions for SMEs in both emerging and developed economies. However, the manifestation of those characteristics may depend on factors such as national culture and entrepreneurial migration that are specific to particular economies. One of the advantages of addressing the subject of this chapter through four theoretical lenses is that this draws attention to the need for a holistic approach to the analysis of EE SME strategies and behavior with respect to innovation and internationalization. Research on international entrepreneurship has recognized that its subject can be informed by taking account of a range of theoretical perspectives, including the resource and knowledge-​based views, and network theory (Peiris, Akoorie, & Sinha, 2012). This approach would build on the inter-​dependencies between macro and micro factors as well as between structural and behavioral features. The entrepreneurial and network perspectives serve to emphasize the microfoundations of EE SME strategies forged through the initiatives of key actors (Fellin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015). At the same time, a consideration of all four perspectives taken together clarifies how the nature of EE SME leaders’ actions is informed by contextual circumstances including prevailing institutions, resource constraints, and culturally embedded forms of social networking. Some other scholars have argued in a similar vein in recent years (e.g., Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008; Coviello, 2015). Interdependencies between our four selected theoretical perspectives point to fruitful areas for further investigation. The institutional perspective links to the resource-​based view insofar as formal and informal agencies control the provision to SMEs of resources for innovation and offer support for internationalization. State organizations tend to be particularly influential, but not always effective, players in emerging economies. In China, for example, while there are government schemes to provide risk capital for innovation, other state institutions such as banks have been criticized for inadequate provision of finance to SMEs, because they regard lending to larger state-​owned firms as a less risky proposition. The resource-​based view also interfaces with the network perspective insofar as links to external networks can provide EE SMEs with finance (e.g., via venture capitalists), technical knowledge (e.g., via collaboration with foreign firms and research institutes), access to new markets (e.g., via supplying to MNEs and enlisting returnee entrepreneurs), and encouragement of an orientation toward innovation and sharing of experience (e.g., through close relations with other SMEs situated in local clusters). The resource-​based view accounts for the value of social capital in terms of a firm resource that resides in its social network. Access to the Internet, which is dramatically expanding access to markets and to information for EE SMEs, provides another clear example of where the resource and network factors come together.

Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs    517 The entrepreneurial perspective links to the resource-​based view insofar as the availability of financial resources may encourage SME decision-​makers to perceive less personal risk attaching to innovation, and access to market-​relevant information may enhance their perception of the commercial opportunities that innovation could open up. The network perspective relates to each of the other perspectives because it identifies network links as external aids for SMEs to relate constructively with institutions, secure tangible and intangible resources, and supplement entrepreneurial knowledge and experience. The entrepreneurial perspective could be considered as the natural starting point for an understanding of EE SMEs, and future research needs to penetrate deeper into the psychology of the entrepreneur (Coviello, 2015). At the same time, it is becoming increasingly appreciated that entrepreneurial behavior has to be understood in relation to the contexts identified by the other perspectives considered in this chapter. Much work remains to be done to clarify how and to what extent emerging economy contexts have different impacts on SME innovation and internationalization compared with those of developed economies.

Acknowledgements I am grateful for comments received from Linda Hsieh, Klaus Meyer, and Rose Narooz.

Notes 1. Some parts of this chapter draw from Child (2016). 2. A fourth large emerging economy, Russia, follows closely behind India in GDP. However, the share of SMEs in Russia’s GDP has been lower than that of other emerging economies (European Investment Bank, 2013). Moreover, relatively little has been published on the innovation and internationalization of Russian SMEs. Given limitations of space, Russia is therefore not a chosen focus of this chapter. 3. Normally defined as having fewer than 10 employees. 4. Nahapiet and Ghoshal defined social capital as “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (1998: 243).

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Chapter 21

Fam ily Busi ne s s i n Em erging M a rk ets Rodrigo Basco

Family business is the most common form of organization in emerging economies. For instance, according to The Economist, “Around 85% of $1 billion-​plus businesses in South-​East Asia are family-​run, around 75% in Latin America, 67% in India and around 65% in the Middle East” (“Special report,” 2015). Family business’s social and economic representativeness is well-​informed by local, national, and international newspapers and economic and business magazines. For instance, the United Arab Emirates’ economic development miracle of the United Arab Emirates was founded by the link between a natural resources and entrepreneurial families (Stanley, 2017) or the importance of Samsung for South Korea’s economy, with Samsung’s revenue being equal to 17% of South Korea’s gross domestic product (Shen, 2015). Family business is not an old-​ fashioned economic and social phenomenon. Indeed, the share of family firms among large corporations is expected to increase from 15% to 40% over the next decade (The Economist, 2015)  because economic activities are embedded in family relationships (Basco, 2017b) in informal and formal markets (Webb, Pryor, & Kellermanns, 2015); in small, medium, and large firms (Basco & Bartkeviciute, 2016); and in local and multinational firms (Calabrò, Campopiano, Basco, & Pukall, 2017). Nevertheless, current research in family business is considerably biased toward American and European family firms (Sharma & Chua, 2013; Gupta & Levenburg, 2010). The study of family business in developing countries has received less attention and has basically focused on two main levels of analysis: on the one hand, the aggregate level links the family business phenomenon with institutions and cultural aspects; on the other hand, the firm level attempts to replicate investigations coming from developed countries in the context of emerging economies. However, these research streams have been context-​less, failing to integrate both levels of analysis and neglecting to explore the family’s role between context and business. To address this context-​less gap, this chapter attempts to contextualize the phenomenon of family business in emerging economies.

528   Rodrigo Basco In this chapter, I view context as “what is beyond the phenomenon itself, and it is composed of both a physical demarcation and a cognitive demarcation” (Basco, 2017a: 329). There are two important reasons for contextualizing family businesses. First, context may affect the formation, development, and exit of family businesses. Second, family businesses may affect the context (institutional quality, economic development, and economic mechanisms) in which they are embedded—​for instance, the diversified conglomerates that emerged, such as Easa Saleh Al Gurg Group in the United Arab Emirates (“Community champions,” 2015), together with government institutions, to face the unique social and economic development of emerging Arab countries. In this sense, emerging economies, which are characterized by inefficient markets, active government involvement, extensive business networking, and high uncertainty (Xu & Meyer, 2012), provide new conditions in which to better understand the phenomenon of family business and the theories that attempt to explain it. After presenting a brief literature review to report what we know so far, I propose a model that introduces three dimensions to understand family businesses in emerging economies: family, business, and context. The key characteristic of the model focuses on the importance of families’ role in emerging economies as a filter. That is, the role of families is to interpret the context and mobilize resources and capabilities into economic activities. The model serves as a research tool to investigate the phenomenon of family business in developing economies in order to dismantle cross-​firm and cross-​cultural differences, explain the extent to which family firms are affected by context (survival, behavior, growth, and performance), determine what role family businesses play in regional economics and social development, and determine the extent to which context is affected by family businesses. This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present a brief overview of the family business field to define the borders within which this chapter navigates the topic of family businesses in emerging economies. Specifically, I address two levels of analysis: firm familiness and regional familiness. Section 3 explores how the field has contextualized the phenomenon of family business in emerging economies. Section 4 presents a gen­ eral model of family business in emerging economies by introducing the filter role of the business family. In section 5, I highlight the future lines of research that emerge from the research gaps. Finally, this chapter ends with conclusions to summarize our knowledge on family businesses in emerging economies.

The Family Business Field The family business field has evolved from a practical perspective, and little by little it has penetrated the academic environment. When most of the teaching and research developed around businesses focused on big corporations (Berle & Means, 1932), because of the long-​lasting Anglo-​Saxon point of view emphasizing the rational perspective of economic actors and dispersed ownership in organizations, the phenomenon of the family

Family Business in Emerging Markets    529 business emerged as a perfect context to relax both assumptions to understand firm behavior (Astrachan, 2010), firm performance, and the firm’s effect on economic development (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003). At the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s, family business started to be considered a phenomenon of study, and the family was beginning to be seen as an important dimension affecting the way firms are owned, governed, and managed. Regardless of the attractiveness of family firms, the adolescence of the family business field has been built based on external legitimacy (Perez Rodriguez & Basco, 2011). That is, family business researchers have sought room for their ideas in mainstream fields through journals, conferences, and influence groups. External legitimacy is a necessary but insufficient condition for a field to reach maturity. Even with the knowledge development up to now, a theory of family business is far from being realized, and several questions remain open and unexplored. The theory-​building process has been characterized by three main research strategies (Perez Rodriguez & Basco, 2011). First, there is the borrow-​and-​replicate strategy, whereby mainstream theories, concepts, and relationships are applied to a family business sample (e.g., Bannò, 2016). Second, there is the borrow-​and-​extend strategy, which attempts to go beyond the previous strategy by adding and extending current knowl­ edge with family dimensions, family relationships, and family explanations (e.g., Boers, Ljungkvist, Brunninge, & Nordqvist, 2017). Finally, there is the inverse-​contribution strategy, which goes beyond prior research with new knowledge developed by challenging and transforming mainstream fields and related disciplines (e.g., Gómez-​Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-​Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-​Fuentes, 2007; Jaskiewicz, Combs, & Rau, 2015;). With these strategies, it is expected that the field of family business is going to be able to develop a theory to “explain and predict not only the interaction between family and business systems at the individual and family firm levels but also the interaction between family firms and the environment at the aggregate level” (Basco, 2015: 260). The aforementioned theoretical evolution has determined two main schools of thought in the field of family business: firm familiness and regional familiness. In the next two subsections, both schools of thought are explained in more detail. Afterward, these schools of thought are contextualized in emerging economies.

Firm Familiness in the Context of Emerging Economies Firm familiness is the school of thought that basically focuses on the firm-​level analysis, attempting to capture the family’s effect on firm structure (i.e., pyramidal ownership structure, business group, and independent firm), firm behavior (i.e., ownership, governance, and management arenas), and firm performance (i.e., economic and non-​ economic performance). To give a sense of these effects, the system theory of families has been the main theoretical framework applied to research the phenomenon of family business (Discua Cruz & Basco, forthcoming). That is, extending the assumption that the elements of a system are interrelated and in contact with the environment, researchers have assumed that family, business, and environment are linked, and based

530   Rodrigo Basco on these links, researchers have fertilized the field of family business and used it to re-​ interpret mainstream theories and approaches. Three main theories have been re-​interpreted for the family business field. First, researchers re-​interpreted the resource-​based view by considering that the family affects the way family firms create, develop, and generate resources and capabilities—​ for instance, in the case of the family embeddedness approach (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003) or the transgenerational entrepreneurship approach (Basco, Calabrò, & Campopiano forthcoming). The specific resources and capabilities that emerge from the family-​ business interaction are called familiness (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). There are four familiness dimensions: (1) financial capital (e.g., patient capital), (2) physical capital (i.e., keep resources integrated in the business idea or project), (3) social capital (i.e., network derived from nuclear and extended family members), and (4) human capital (i.e., knowledge and experience passed from one generation to another). Familiness is unique and difficult to imitate for competitors, creating a competitive advantage for family businesses. Second, the agency theory was also re-​interpreted in the context of family businesses. The classical view of agency theory proposed that family businesses benefit from the overlap between ownership and management (i.e., owners and managers are the same, or they belong to the same context—​family—​favoring goal alignment and expectations). Therefore, family businesses tend to have fewer agency problems and consequently fewer agency costs (e.g., monitoring), characteristics that give family businesses additional competitive advantages. Finally, stewardship theory has been a particularly popular theoretical framework for understanding family firm behavior through the behavior of its members. The destinies of the family and the firm overlap, creating a special sense of ownership (Pieper, 2010) in family members for whom the well-​being of the family is attached to the well-​being of the firm (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010). In this sense, family members are likely to develop high levels of identity, commitment, and reciprocal stewardship, which may contribute to firm performance, innovativeness, and strategic flexibility (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016). For each of these three theoretical frameworks, the family business was used as context to prove or test existing theories. However, the re-​ interpretation of the aforementioned theories and approaches has generated a recursive effect by extending ideas and challenging assumptions and premises. For instance, new interpretations show that alternative agency problems—​ known as family agency problems—​emerge in family firms due to nepotism, altruism (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005), executive entrenchment, and goal misalignment (Basco & Calabrò, 2016). These problems demonstrate that even when individuals belong to the same family, they have different economic and non-​economic goals. For instance, principal-​principal conflicts often arise in family firms due to principals’ heterogeneous interests—​that is, family members have different expectations and intentions (Calabrò, Campopiano, & Basco, 2017). On the other hand, pro-​organization behavior may reduce formal control mechanisms, thereby triggering opportunism in the board room (Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2011), and the governance and management

Family Business in Emerging Markets    531 arenas are fertile ground for clashes between the business and family logics (e.g., disputes). While the family logic is based on nurturing and protecting family members, the business logic is about competition and performance. Both logics may contradict. If the family logic prevails, the family may constrain resources and capabilities in a conservative and less proactive manner (Escribá-​Esteve, Sánchez-​Peinado, & Sánchez-​ Peinado, 2009); the firm may grow slowly (Casillas & Moreno, 2010), which may damage firm performance (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008), and resources may be locked in, thus affecting innovation and entrepreneurial spirit. If the business logic prevails, the family is no longer a source of resources and capabilities eroding the competitive advantage of being family firm. The main limitation for the firm-​familiness school of thought is that most research in this stream has failed to integrate the context (there are exceptions, such as Huang, 2015) in which the family and the firm dwell. The lack of research to contextualize the phenomenon of family firms has led the field to explore the interaction between the family firm and context—​regional familiness.

Regional Familiness Regional familiness is the school of thought that focuses on the meso-​and macro-​levels of analysis, aiming to understand the effect of context on family firms (and business families) and the other way around (Basco, 2015). In other words, regional familiness attempts to understand, explain, and predict the role the family firm plays in regional economics and social development (Stough, Welter, Block, Wennberg, & Basco, 2015). This school of thought is characterized by two main approaches. On the one hand, the institutional approach, including economic institutions (North, 1990) and cultural institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), is based on the assumption that a firm’s level of institutional maturity and cultural patterns will determine the extent to which the family is embedded in the firm through ownership, governance, and management. That is, it assumed that family involvement in the firm is a consequence the formal and informal context. The base-​of-​pyramid perspective (Webb et al., 2015), which combines the family embeddedness perspective (as a narrow lens of embeddedness theory (Granovetter, 1985)) and institutional theory, explains the emergence and importance of household economic activities. The reasoning behind this approach is that in the context of weak formal institutions (formal institutional voids characterized by blurred property rights, less developed infrastructures, weak capital markets), nuclear and extended families provide hard and soft resources and capabilities to carry out economic activities. That is, the family emerges as a substitute for lacking institutional support. For instance, in China, institutional weaker contract enforcement led to a higher degree of family control in businesses (Lu & Tao, 2009). This reasoning was also extended to explain the formation and development of family business groups in emerging economies, such as Asia (Tsui-​Auch & Lee, 2003), Latin America (Guillen, 2000), and India (Manikutty, 2000), or listed family businesses around the world

532   Rodrigo Basco (Chakrabarty, 2009) in response to weak institutional contexts. However, even more interesting is the possible variation of family ownership concentration within emerging countries (Zhou, Tam, & Lan, 2015). On the other hand, the proximity approach (based on Boschma, 2004) sustains that family firms are locally embedded due to families’ roots in their geographical space and that, as a consequence, families’ identification with their local environment creates particular historical, emotional, social, and economic relationships with their context (Basco & Bartkeviciute, 2016). The underlying assumption of this approach is that family firms alter the depth and quality of proximity dimensions—​geographical proximity, cognitive proximity, and social proximity (Basco, 2015)—​all of which increase family firms’ resilience. For instance, indigenous family business retailers in Chile were able to increase their consolidation and concentration, improve retail offers for consumers, and incorporate retail best practices (Bianchi & Mena, 2004: 502) to address foreign competition. The implicit assumption of this approach is that by altering proximity dimensions, family firms can affect economic processes (e.g., spillovers, information exchange, learning processes, social interactions, competition dynamics, and institutional dynamics) that can then impact regional economic development. Carney, Duran, van Essen, & Shapiro (2017) found evidence that country-​specific factors supportive of exports are strengthened with high levels of family firm prevalence, but that high levels of family firm prevalence are not associated with higher levels of outward foreign direct investment (FDI). A particular example of this approach can be seen in industrial districts or clusters (e.g., Beccattini, 1989; Gurrieri, 2008; Johannisson et al., 2007; Wei, Li, & Wang, 2007). The local family roots reinforce the local connection of the firm through corporate social responsibility or philanthropic effort such as the GMR Varalakshmi Foundation, an arm of the market-​leading GMR Group, which aims to “develop social infrastructure and enhance the quality of life of communities around the locations that have the Group’s presence.” The aforementioned approaches also open the door to the dark side of family business. While family firms are seen as a reaction to a weak institutional environment, which has consequences in the family firms themselves (their behavior, strategy, performance, and survival) (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003), the negative macro-​economic effect of managerial dynasties has consequences in aggregate total factor productivity (Caselli & Gennaioli, 2013). Excess proximity may also negatively impact economic and social development because it hinders social interactions, reduces economic coordination, and locks in resources in a few individuals or families, all of which may produce negative externalities by reducing innovation, destroying entrepreneurial spirit, and increasing political-​related firm profits. For instance, the recent scandal in South Korea where the “heir of the sprawling Samsung empire, had been accused of making large donations to foundations run by a close friend and confidante of the deposed South Korean president, Park Geun-​hye, in return for political favours” (McCurry, 2017). Basco (2015) characterized the family effect on regional development and its recursive impact as the Dr. Jekyll–​Mr. Hyde effect to highlight the dark side and bright side of family business for regional development. Even though there are several studies that have pointed to the

Family Business in Emerging Markets    533 negative relationship between family businesses and regional development (e.g., Fogel, 2006; Morck & Yeung, 2004; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-​Miller, 2009), most of the studies missed theoretical frameworks, had problems interpreting the level of ana­ lysis (firm, meso, macro), and lacked the methodology to establish a causal relationship. Even with these attempts to link the phenomenon of family business and the destiny of regions and countries, the phenomenon of family business still lacks contextualization.

Contextualizing Family Business in Emerging Economies To start addressing the context-​less gap in the field of family business, in this section, I present a brief literature review on the current state of this topic to clarify what we know about the way family business scholars have contextualized their research in emerging economies. Most of the knowledge developed so far comes from developed economies (Sharma & Chua, 2013), where the family firm was rediscovered as an important economic and social actor (Basco & Bartkeviciute, 2016). Even with the progress that has been made by expanding research on family businesses around the world, several literature reviews have revealed (e.g., Basco, 2013) that there is a lack of systematic studies on family businesses in emerging economies. The process of theorizing based on family businesses in emerging economies is in its infancy. Following the theory-​building process described by Pérez Rodríguez and Basco (2011), it is possible to distinguish three main paths in this process. The first path is characterized by studies attempting to replicate previous studies by applying traditional theories but in the context of emerging countries and using family firm samples (or samples distinguishing family and non-​family firms). At the firm level, the research tendency has been to use samples of family businesses in emerging economies to test mainstream theories/​approaches or traditional relationships, for instance, leader-​member exchange (e.g., Cai, Luo, & Wan, 2012; Wang, Chu, & Ni, 2010; Yopie & Itan 2016), family involvement and firm performance (e.g., San Martin-​Reyna & Duran-​Encalada 2012; Torres, Jara Bertín, & López-​Iturriaga 2017), professionalization (less family involvement) and firm complexity (scale and scope) (e.g., Liu, Ahlstrom, & Yeh, 2006), innovation as a mediating variable in family involvement (board structure and composition), and firm performance (van Essen, Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012; Cai et al., 2012), among other classical demographic relationships (Basco, 2013). At the aggregate level, there has been a link between institutional theories and the presence of family-​based economic activities. For instance, Chakrabarty found that “both national culture and institutional voids influence family ownership patterns around the world, and that institutional voids moderate the influence of national culture” (2009: 32). These findings help reconcile institutional economists and cultural sociologist perspectives

534   Rodrigo Basco but leave the door open to explore cross-​behavioral differences among firms’intra-​and inter-​cultures. An additional aspect that researchers have highlighted is the common family link to business groups in some emerging economies, such as Korean chaebols, which are characterized by private family ownership. That is, there is a high level of family participation in family-​based economic activities (Schmitt & Frese, 2011) in some emerging economies. The second path includes studies that extend existing theories by adding family dimensions (beyond the classical discrimination between family and nonfamily firms) and contextualizing the research in emerging economies. For instance, Gupta and Levenburg (2010) found that there are significant variations among family firms across contexts, specifically in the family interface, business interface, and family-​ business interface. Differences in these interfaces are assumed to occur because of institutional and cultural factors. The family embeddedness perspective in entrepreneurship also contributes to extending theories by contextualizing them in emerging economies. While the family is a source of financial capital and human capital for start-​ups (Schmitt & Frese, 2011) and entrepreneurial culture is transmitted via long intergenerational interactions and is continued via the involvement of junior generations in the identification and pursuit of opportunities (Discua Cruz, Hamilton, & Jack, 2012), family ties in entrepreneurs’ business advice networks are less effective in emerging economies than in developed economies (Arregle, Batjargal, Hitt, Webb, Miller, & Tsui, 2015). Other studies have investigated how family firms react to particular contexts. For instance, Bassetti, Dal Maso, and Lattanzi (2015) found that family firms are rather sensitive to corruption. At the regional level, even though the regional-​familiness approach (Basco, 2015) has introduced the theoretical basis to link the phenomon of family business to the economic, social, geographical, historical, and temporal contextual aspects associated with where firms and families dwell, there is no empirical research available in emerging economies to link family business and regional development. Finally, the third path includes studies that provide an inverse contribution—​that is, to what extent the study of family businesses in emerging economies contributes to family business research and other mainstream theories, such as international business, strategic management, organizational behavior, and regional science, among others. Even though this is the least developed path in the family business theory-​building process, there are several efforts challenging established theories and approaches, such as the institutional-​based view (Chung, 2001; Lien, Teng, & Li, 2016). For instance, considering the Taiwanese market, Lien et al. found “that institutional reforms reduce firm dependence on family governance and eliminate the negative effects on performance exerted by a controlling family’s pyramidal ownership structure” (2016: 174), thus testing the institutional-​based view of corporate governance. Another example is the base-​of-​ pyramid perspective (Webb et al., 2015), which explains the emergence and importance of household economic activities, which are mainly supported by family involvement, and their impact on poverty and child well-​being in developing and emerging economies.

Family Business in Emerging Markets    535 The aforementioned review of family business in the context of emerging economies shows the theory-​building patterns that family business scholars have been using to connect the family, business, and context dimensions. Following the current research tendency, in the next section, I propose a model to integrate these three dimensions, which may help describe, analyze, and explain family business in emerging economies.

A Model of Family Business in Emerging Economies In this section, I  propose a model to analyze and research local family businesses in emerging economies. The model proposes that family firms (the way family firms compete—​their strategic position, internationalization, and innovation, among other dimensions) and their subsequent effects on regional development are determined by

Family Structural, psychosocial, and transcational perspective

Family Businesses Regional development Context Regulative influence, social normative, and cultural cognitive

Business Ownership, governance, and management structure

Figure 21.1  Contextualizing family business in emerging economies

536   Rodrigo Basco the interaction of family, business, and context dimensions. Figure 21.1 presents the conceptual model. The first dimension in the model is the family itself. Family, as a basic institution in our society, interprets the context and produces a reaction to mobilize and allocate tangible and intangible resources for economic activities. In this sense, part of the business heterogeneity in emerging economies (inter and intra) is not only a consequence of the context itself but also a consequence of the mechanisms the family uses to navigate its contexts. These mechanisms come from the family. That is, the family acts as a filter (Stangej & Basco, 2017) to interpret and react to the context. There are three main aspects that influence family mechanisms. First, there is the structural aspect of the family, which accounts for the size of the family and the types of relationships that form the family itself (nuclear family or extended family). Second, there is the psychosocial task aspect, which focuses on certain tasks accomplished by family members (e.g., maintaining the household, educating children, and providing emotional and material support to each other). Finally, there are the transactional aspects, which involve the way members develop family identities by nurturing emotional ties, common experiences, and sharing the past as well as similar expectations about the future. Therefore, the model posits that cross-​firm differences emerge because the “family” connects context and business (formal or informal economic activities). As a result, families differ in their structural, psychosocial, and transactional aspects across emerging economies and between emerging and developed economies. For instance, how in-​laws are treated in different cultures will determine their participation in the family firms (see the case of in-​laws in the Philippines (Santiago, 2011)), and the role that females play, such as laoban liang (boss’s wife), in family business in Taiwanese family firms (Yu, 2009). The second dimension in the model is the context itself. The context in which families and businesses are embedded will affect the structural, psychological, and transactional aspects of families and the structural components of the business (independent firms, business group, etc.). Therefore, the family, through its members, interprets and re-​ interprets the context in order to create, organize, manage, and allocate resources. Due to cultural aspects (Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008), in collectivistic societies, the concept of the family is broader than in individualistic societies, which consequently affects its role for family-​based economic activities. For instance, in China, the most important source of start-​up capital is the family compared to Germany where the family does not have such importance (Schmitt & Frese, 2011). In China, the family acts as an institution to support entrepreneurial activities. Another example is the Arab World, which is characterized by a patriarchal, hierarchical, and gender-​organized society (Barakat, 1993), where the family plays an important role in interpreting the environment (Basco, 2017b) based on its own characteristics, such as size and types of relationships, tasks distributed among family members, and the way families developed their own identities. All of these factors determine the meaning of the family for the firm and the way the firm is interpreted for the family. The third dimension in the model is the business itself. It has been shown that context affects the way an organization is owned, governed, and managed. For instance,

Family Business in Emerging Markets    537 both national culture and institutional voids influence family ownership patterns around the world and . . . institutional voids moderate the influence of national culture. In other words, national culture has a strong influence when a country has institutional voids; however, the influence of national culture weakens when a country has effective institutional facilities, regulations, and norms that guarantee a good business environment. (Chakrabarty, 2009: 42)

Thus, family and context determine businesses’ internal structure based on the types of organizations within emerging economies: family subsistence economic activities (see Leinbach, 2003), family owned-​private firms, and family business groups. In this sense, it is important to distinguish among small, medium, and large family firms and how they relate to family and the context. On the one hand, the premise is that the family affects business by altering the reference point that owners and managers use to make decisions. The family introduces a mix of economic and non-​economic goals and family-​oriented and business-​ oriented goals (Basco, 2017c). The smaller the firm, the higher the impact of family members on the daily decision-​making. On the other hand, contexts create and develop incentives that that determine the best structure for a business to survive and to manage competitive advantages. In a large firm, the family social network acts as a bridge between business and the context to attract resources, explore opportunities, and exploit them. For example, the interaction between context, family, and business was captured in Thailand by measuring family firms’ stock prices when members of the controlling family got married with partners coming from prominent business-​p olitical families or ordinary citizens (Bunkanwanicha, Fan, & Wiwattanakantang, 2013). The model suggests that any attempt to approach the phenomenon of family business in emerging countries should consider the dimensions of family, business, and context. Considering the family, the business, and the particular context of emerging economies, we can interpret why family firms develop specific strategies to compete. The families behind firms play an important role in defining the family firm strategy and in operationalizing it. In emerging economies, where institutions are relatively weak and unstable, research cannot deprive them of the dimension of family because families act as a filter to interpret the context and define strategic decisions, including decisions regarding growth, innovation, internationalization, localization, and ultimately firm survival (stay or exit). In emerging economies, the presence of the family in the firm could be a critical factor for firm competition and survival. Family businesses can take advantage of their social and commercial networks, which are resources embedded in the family—​also known as family social capital (e.g., Basco et al., forthcoming). For instance, in transitional economies like Lithuania, it was shown that family businesses are more successful than non-​family businesses at leveraging social capital to acquire critical external resources (Dyer Jr. & Mortensen, 2005). Another example of family social capital is the role that family businesses play in natural resource-​–​based clusters in Latin America,

538   Rodrigo Basco such as Chile, in terms of exploiting backward linkages using a related open innovation search strategy (Basco & Calabrò, 2016). In Asian contexts, such as China, family businesses follow a mix of market and non-​market strategies to compete (Li, Chen, Chua, Kirkman, Rynes-​Weller, & Gomez-​Mejia, 2015), exploiting internal resources and capabilities as well as their social networks to position themselves. In the Indian context, Ashwin, Krishnan, and George justified their findings that family shareholding and family control over both CEO and chairperson positions have a positive and significant influence on firms R&D (research and development) investments by arguing “that the high technology opportunity environment in the Indian pharmaceutical industry facilitates stewardship behavior which in turn promotes innovation in these firms” (2015: 870). Family businesses’ internationalization process in emerging economies is boosted by social networks based on international industry and market-​specific knowledge and by human capital based on family entrepreneurs’ prior experience (Zaefarian, Eng, & Tasavori, 2016). Even more, it was shown that family ownership influences firm internationalization processes, such as in Taiwan, where family businesses opt for rapid pace, narrow scope, and irregular rhythm when it comes to internationalization (Lin, 2012). Kuo, Kao, Chang, and Chiu (2012) found that inexperienced family businesses, compared with inexperienced non-​family businesses, are more likely to use joint venture strategies over wholly owned subsidiaries. On the other hand, experienced family businesses are more likely to choose wholly owned subsidiaries compared with experienced non-​family businesses. These results are justified by combining transaction cost economics and the perspective that family businesses have economic, social, and emotional endowments that may alter their reference point for making decisions. For instance, how family businesses react to corruption may affect their internationalization. Bassetti et al. (2015) came up with three main reasons explaining why family businesses, in contrast to non-​family businesses, are rather sensitive to corruption in the context of Eastern European countries. The authors stated that informal payments may represent additional export risk insurance, may help family firms compensate for a lack of managerial capabilities to export, or may be a tool for family firms to protect their socioemotional wealth. Additionally, family management plays an important role in diversification decisions. For instance, Chung (2013) found that in Taiwan, the likelihood of diversification declines as a controlling family assigns more family members to an affiliate firm’s key leadership positions, justifying this result in the agency theory viewpoint because of resource constraints and family agency problems. On the other hand, the author found that the level of diversification increases with a pyramidal ownership structure in response to market imperfections and institutional voids. In India, Khanna and Palepu (2000) found that firm performance initially declines with group diversification but subsequently increases once group diversification exceeds a certain level. Therefore, the model posits that family businesses face a coordination problem that involves three dimensions: family, business, and context. The way the family businesses resolves this coordination problem determines the productivity of the whole system

Family Business in Emerging Markets    539 and, therefore, has consequences for regional and economic development. In this sense, family businesses are not good or bad because they are a dominant form of organization but because of the way they allocate resources for productive economic activities. This general model applied to emerging economies may help future researchers develop their studies to better understand how firms are owned, governed, and managed; why the family firm is a common form of organization in emerging economies; what type of family firms dominate in emerging economies; and what consequences this phenomenon has for regional and economic development.

Future Lines of Research Future research efforts on family business in emerging economies should be associated with three research streams. The first stream is about contextualizing the phenomenon of family business. Family business studies should recognize the multiple contexts in which family firms are embedded. The multiple embedded context model (Basco, 2017b) emphasizes the blurred boundaries among contexts, such as the family itself as a micro-​context, meso-​context, and macro-​context; the physical and cognitive level of contexts; and time as a path-​dependent perspective capturing the past, present, and future of family business in emerging countries. Contextualizing family business—​a descriptive and exploratory step in the theory-​building process—​is the first step to give sense to the phenomenon itself. This contextualization may help identify differences and similarities among family businesses (heterogeneity) across emerging economies since not all emerging economies are the same. This research stream could be expanded by considering not only emerging economies but also developing economies to unpack cross-​country differences and similarities based on comparison studies. Contextualizing family firms should focus on the firm-​familiness level and the regional-​ familiness level. Several questions remain open: How do family, business, and contextual institutions affect family firms’ structure, behavior, and performance? How do the effects of family, business, and contextual institutions on family firms’ structure, behavior, and performance vary across emerging economies? How do different types of family firms (e.g., informal and formal economic activities; small, medium, and large firms; and local and multinational firms) affect regional development? The second stream of research is about moving the contextualization of family businesses forward by contextualizing theories that have been used to analyze and interpret family businesses. Institutional theory, agency theory, and the resource-​based view need to be contextualized to test, challenge, and re-​interpret the assumptions of these theories in emerging economies. Several lines of research are still opened in this stream. In general, business research on emerging economies focuses on institutions as incentives and institutions as pressure (Meyer & Peng, 2016). However, this reasoning does not reflect real life and omits the family’s role among institutions and businesses. Therefore, future lines of research that attempt to integrate family business must

540   Rodrigo Basco consider the family’s mediating effect between institutions and businesses in emerging economies. The filter role of the family alters the traditional reaction of the firm as well as the pressure that the family itself exercises in the firm. In this sense, several research questions emerge: What role does the family play between context and business? How does the family exercise its filter role between context and business? What differences are there between the family’s role in context and business across countries and cultures in emerging economies? Additionally, agency theory and the resource-​based view—​the two most used theories to investigate businesses in emerging economies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000)—​should be adjusted to integrate family dimensions. There is room for exploring the dark and bright sides of the family in emerging economies. The challenge is how to contextualize theories in emerging countries by integrating family dimensions. The third stream of research involves theorizing context through the lenses of the family business and the business family. This is the most ambitious path because it conceives a recursive relationship among the three dimensions considered in the aforementioned model. That is, this stream considers the influence that the family business and the business family have on context by considering regulatory, normative, and cultural-​cognitive pillars. Again, several research questions emerge:  To what extent are family businesses and business families responsible for the evolution of formal and informal institutions? How do family businesses produce and reproduce particular behaviors in emerging economies, and what effect do those behaviors have for regional development?

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Chapter 22

T he Ec onom i c a nd So ciol o gical A pproac h e s to Research on Bu si ne s s Groups in Eme rg i ng Markets Chi-​N ien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo

Business groups are a set of legally independent firms that are bound together by formal and informal inter-​firm ties and function coherently as an entity. Many of them diversify across unrelated industries and operate in emerging economies, while there are also business groups in some mature markets such as Japan and Sweden (Granovetter, 1995; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Unlike multidivisional or multiproduct firms that operate under a single legal entity and administrative command, business group firms have multiple and separate governance structures. Nevertheless, group affiliates are bound together by common identity, social structure, and long history, dissimilar to the portfolio type of conglomerates that buy and sell member firms for profitability. The Indian business houses, the Korean chaebols, the Taiwanese Guanxiqiye, the Turkish family holdings, and the Mexican groups come to mind as examples of such an organizational form. Business groups often play a central role in the economies in which they operate by contributing high percentages of national GDP (gross domestic product) and hiring many employees (Colpan, Hikino, & Lincoln, 2010). Research also indicates that such an organizational form helps newly industrialized countries innovate, move up the value chain, and catch up with the advanced countries (Amsden, 2001). Given their economic significance in emerging economies and the importance of emerging economies to world economic growth (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011; Khanna & Palepu, 2010), research and publication on business groups have burgeoned in the past two decades (see

548    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen, & Oosterhout, 2011). While there are surveys of relevant literature on this topic, the more recent ones have already been published for more than 10 years (e.g., Granovetter, 1995; 2005; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). The first purpose of this chapter is to provide an updated review on the more recent studies. Second and more important, while previous literature reviews are normally organized around subjects such as ownership and control, diversification pattern, or business group-​state relationships or issues such as governance and tunneling, few reviews are organized according to disciplinary and/​or theoretical approaches (but see Yiu et al., 2007). What remains lacking is a review that compares and synopsizes different theoretical views on business groups. This chapter aims to organize the literature according to four theoretical perspectives rooted in economics and sociology: the internal market view, the resource bundle perspective, the network perspective, and the institutional logic perspective. While there are other approaches to studies of business groups such as the political economy and comparative politics (see Schneider, 2009; Zhang, Sjogren, & Kishida, 2016), these four perspectives are considered mainstream theoretical views that attract most of the attention from scholars and generate many publications. In addition, most of the reviews focus on internal attributes of business groups and have not paid sufficient attention to how business groups interact with their broader environment (except with market intermediaries), which is a key theme in the perspective of organizational sociology (Davis, 2005). In the past decades, there have been novel studies that investigated such phenomena. We hence added a section under the sociological perspective to cover studies that examine how business groups are embedded in emerging economy contexts such as market transition, political power, social hierarchies, and ethnic groups. In reviewing relevant literature in each of the theoretical perspectives, we first summarize the major constructs and reasoning, followed by a review of the key studies according to this perspective. We address important topics and questions, such as reasons for the existence of business groups; the impact of business group affiliation on resources, capabilities, strategies, and organization of affiliate firms; and the performance implications of group membership, according to each perspective. We then identify key strengths and weaknesses of each of the perspectives and point out direction for future studies. Table 22.1 lists the basic assumptions, key constructs, main findings, contributions, and limitations of the four theoretical perspectives.

Economic Perspectives on Business Groups There are two business group perspectives that are derived from the discipline of economics: the internal market view and the resource boudle perspective.

Table 22.1 Basic assumption, key construct, and main argument of four theoretical perspectives in business group research Internal market

Resource bundle

Inter-​firm network

Logic carrier

Basic assumption Hierarchies (internal market) and markets are alternative governance modes for exchanges and transactions of production factors

Business groups are bundles of tangible and intangible resources and capabilities

Market, hierarchy and network are all possible governance models in inter-​firm relationships

Societal institutions and their logics are key components in organizational environment

Key construct

Internal market for transfer of production factors such as components, labor and capital

Rare, valuable, inimitable, and resources and capabilities such as project execution capability

Network Institutional governance that logic; legitimacy features formal and informal inter-​ firm ties

Main argument

Business groups are organizational substitutes for inefficient or missing external markets in emerging economies

Business groups are bundles of resources that are not industry-​ specific, facilitating unrelated industry entries in emerging economies

Business groups are a network form of organization and network configurations within the group shape group and affiliate behavior and performance

Business groups behave according to the norms, values, and frameworks defined in institutional logics of family, community, and state

Contribution

Identify market and institutional conditions for formation and performance of business group member firms

Identify internal group attributes that enable repeated entries into unrelated industries

Demonstrate concrete mechanism for how affiliates within business groups coordinate

Identify how business groups can be shaped by non-​market forces

Limitation

Underspecify contextual, group-​ level, and member firm contingencies for performance impact of group affiliation

Underutilize unique organizational features of business groups in explaining industrial diversification

Boundaries of business group network are difficult to discern in some contexts, making it difficult to conduct systematic network analysis

Understate the agency of business groups for institutional change

550    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo

Business Group as Internal Market The most popular perspective in business group research is probably the internal market view which is originated from Leff ’s works (1976, 1978). Leff focused on the underdevelopment of external capital markets in developing countries and argued that business groups serve as internal capital markets and help mobilize and allocate financial resources efficiently among affiliated firms. In other words, business groups are organizational substitutes for inefficient or missing external markets. The transaction costs among firms or between firms and financial institutions tend to be high when capital markets are underdeveloped, and such costs can be substantially reduced in a coordinated organizational system such as a business group (Williamson, 1975). Finance and economics scholars have followed this line of reasoning and found positive effects of the group’s internal capital market on the firm’s profitability and market value (Almeida, Kim, & Kim, 2015; Buchuk, Larrain, & Munoz, 2014). The typical way of testing this argument is comparing the performance of group affiliates and their counterparts, stand-​alone firms. Due to the requirement of a comparable set of samples, studies following this approach usually adopt listed firms as the sample and compare the listed group affiliates with other listed firms. Scholars have identified different types of internal transfer of financial resources. For instance, intragroup loans have been shown to be an important means of transferring cash across group firms and are typically used to support financially weaker firms in Indian business groups. This practice not only improves the financial return of affiliates but also helps avoid default by a group firm to spill over to other members of the group (Gopalan, Nanda, & Seru. 2006). In Chinese business groups, intra-​group loans and loan guarantees are found to be used to support the controlling firm during credit crises (Jia, Shi, & Wang, 2013). Later on, Khanna and his colleagues expanded the concept of internal capital market to internal product market and labor market (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). The key idea is that similar to financial capital, other production factors such as raw materials and components or labor and managerial talent are scarce and difficult to locate in emerging economies which feature missing or underdeveloped market intermediaries such as retailers, training institutions, and headhunters. As a result, business groups serve as an organizational replacement for external market intermediaries and provide accessible production factors to firms affiliated with the group. Khanna and Palepu (1999, 2010) provide detailed lists of intermediaries in product, labor, and capital markets and tested the effects of such market intermediaries in moderating the group membership effects on financial performance of listed group firms in Chile and India (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 2000b). Many studies have followed this view and research design of comparing the financial performance of listed group affiliates and their stand-​alone counterparts and found positive effects of group affiliation. For example, evidence has been found in Korea (Chang & Hong, 2002) and India (Majumdar & Bhattacharjee, 2014). An interesting test in the

Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research    551 context of Mexico is that the more the firms affiliated with the same business group through interlocking directorate ties, the more similar their performance was (Rocha, 2012). This evidence demonstrates the harmonization effect of group membership on affiliates’ performance. In addition to financial return and market value, scholars have also investigated the group effects on firm innovation (Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010; Chang, Chung, & Mahmood, 2006; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004) as well as creation of new firms and entrepreneurship (Bena, Jan, & Hernan Ortiz-​Molina, 2013). The main idea is that internal markets not only facilitate transfers of financial, production, and human resources but also knowledge, ideas, technology, and other institutional necessities for innovation among group affiliates. Most of the studies found positive effects of group membership on firm innovation, especially when external market and infrastructure institutions for innovation are missing. If the business group as internal market thesis sustains, it follows that when external market intermediaries and related institutions gradually build up, the extent of affiliation of firms with business groups or the performance effect of such affiliation may decline. However, this proposition has generated mixed results in different institutional contexts and countries. For supporting evidence, scholars have studied firm-​level data of business group in 15 European countries and found that countries with less developed financial markets have a higher percentage of group affiliates and these affiliates are more likely to be in more capital-​intensive industries. Such a relationship is also more pronounced for young and small firms (Belenzon, Berkovitz, & Rios, 2013). Nevertheless, another comparative study on listed firms affiliated with business groups in 14 emerging economies demonstrated mixed findings (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Of the 14 economies studied, “group affiliates perform better than non-​affiliates in six countries and worse than non-​affiliates in three, with no difference in profitability levels in the remaining five countries” (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001: 46). Khanna and Rivkin conclude that “the cross-​country bivariate correlations provide no support for either of the most widely held views of groups as responses to capital market imperfections and as rent-​seeking devices” and suggest that “it may be that groups are really results of a wider range of cultural and sociological factors that have little to do with economic efficiency” (2001: 67). To reconcile such mixed findings, scholars have tried to identify contingencies that moderate the performance impact of group affiliation. Important contingencies of group characteristics have been identified, such as group diversification level, size, and age (Elango, Pattnaik, & Wieland, 2016), as well as the group’s organizational structure (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2015). Carney and his colleagues conducted a meta-​ analysis of 145 studies in 28 countries and found that business group membership in general is negatively correlated with firm financial performance, but it improves firm performance when market conditions are weak. In addition, the benefits from group affiliation are moderated by group-​level characteristics such as levels of diversification and internationalization (Carney et al., 2011).

552    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo Inconsistency within the internal market approach of business groups is also found in some more recent studies, which indicate that business group membership provides benefits even in contexts with strong market institutions. A study of 6500 firms in 20 Latin American countries found that group-​affiliated firms are more innovative in national economies with more efficient financial, legal, and labor market institutions (Castellacci, 2015). Similarly, Lamin (2013) noted that business groups provide benefits even when market infrastructure improves, because group affiliation allows member firms to tap into the knowledge and connections of other affiliates. This in turn enabled affiliated firms to attract clients from more industries and foreign markets than in the case of unaffiliated firms, producing higher international sales. These studies suggest that group affiliation may not serve as a substitute for external markets but provides network resources that can be synergistic with strong external markets. Overall, while the internal market thesis is straightforward to understand and test, the evidence that has accumulated in the past two decades remains inconclusive. Among the many possible contingencies, scholars have identified group-​level strategies and organizational form. Yet there are other potential possibilities, such as group resource profile and search behavior, which will be reviewed in the next section. Furthermore, firm-​level contingencies may also affect the extent to which firms can benefit from the group, such as the role and status of the firm in the overall group structure. In addition, non-​listed group affiliates are often overlooked in studies following this approach which requires a comparable set of samples of stand-​alone firms. This leads to the need to view business groups from other perspectives.

Business Group as Resource Bundle Rather than seeing business groups as internal markets, the other economic perspective treats business groups as a bundle of resources and capabilities. This line of work is rooted in the resource-​based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959) and aims to explain a core strategic feature of business groups (i.e., unrelated industry entries). As business groups enter new sectors, they build resources and capabilities that are rare, valuable, and inimitable which allow them to repeatedly enter into unrelated industries. Such skills as setting new plants, hiring and training employees, and establishing supply chains and distribution channels for businesses and products that are yet existent inside the group are labeled “project execution capability,” which facilitates business group growth and helps emerging economies catch up with mature countries (Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Hikino, 1994). Such capability is generic because it is not industry-​specific, and it is difficult to trade in the market because it is embodied in an organization’s owners, managers, and routines. Once the new plant has been set up and is running, the capability becomes idle. Such unique and non-​tradable features of the capability encourage business groups to diversify across industries rather than become specialists in one industry or product line (Guillen, 2000). As the resource bundle view of business groups is mainly inward

Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research    553 looking and strategy focused, Guillen (2000) tried to specify external political economy conditions in which such a capability can be developed. He argued that such a valuable, rare, and inimitable skill can only be maintained as long as asymmetric foreign trade and investment conditions prevail. Otherwise, foreign multinational firms can also own such a capability, enter various sectors, and compete with local business groups. Following such ideas, Kock and Guillen (2001) conceptualize political ties as one of the core capabilities that are inimitable and generic for business group diversification and accelerate group growth. Chung (2006) followed this framework and demonstrated a three-​stage evolution pattern of firm capabilities and the diversification of Taiwanese business groups. He showed the importance of political networks (contact capability) in unrelated industry entries in the early stage of group development. As the capabilities of organizational/​technical mass production develop, groups gradually diversify into related industries. Similar works that examine business group capabilities and diversification patterns are also conducted in India (Becker-​Ritterspach & Bruche, 2012), South Korea (Amsden, 1989), Spain, and Argentina (Carrera, Mesquita, Perkins, & Vassolo, 2003; Guillen, 2000). A recent case study on Samsung delineates how the group developed the capability to manage coopetition, simultaneous forces of competition and cooperation among enterprises and units within the group. Such capability enabled Samsung to move into the smartphone industry quickly and become the largest mobile phone maker in only three years (Song, Lee, & Khanna, 2016). Some studies show that the way affiliated firms develop their capabilities and responses can be influenced by their relationship with the group. Vissa, Greve, and Chen found that “compared with unaffiliated firms, business group–​affiliated (BG-​affiliated) firms are levels and more likely to respond to low performance in the market domain” (2010: 696). Group affiliation thus can affect the firm’s responsiveness to performance feedback. In addition, studies also show that the alignment or misalignment between the goal and resource of affiliates and the group as a whole may enable or constrain search behavior such as the internationalization of the affiliated firm (Gubbi, Aulakh, & Ray, 2015). Treating the business group as a bundle of resources and capabilities is useful given the pattern of unrelated diversification prevailing among business groups in emerging economies. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning attracts relatively less attention and subsequent studies as compared to the internal market view. There are theoretical and empirical reasons. Analyzing diversified business groups in emerging economies as bundles of resources is not much different from studying multiproduct firms in developed markets. This is because the focus of the resource bundle perspective is on industrial diversification rather than organizational form. As a result, it does not leverage the unique business group form such as multiple legally independent affiliates, the inter-​ firm links among these affiliates, and their collective identity and coherent coordination, and misses the opportunity to add new insight for understanding the business group as an organizational form. Empirically, it difficult to collect and construct group-​level performance data, but to measure concepts such as resources, capabilities, and routines of the business group as a whole is also a challenging task (but see Tan & Meyer, 2010).

554    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo Most of the studies reviewed are case studies (single or multiple), making it challenging to verify and replicate research results and accumulate knowledge.

Sociological Perspectives on Business Groups Sociology provides two distinct angles to study business groups. The first one treats business group as a network and the second one see business group as carrier of institutional logic.

Business Group as Network Distinct from the approaches rooted in economics, sociologists see the business group as a network form of organization, whose governance characteristics lie between market and hierarchy (Davis, 2005; Powell, 1990). Network governance involves a select set of autonomous firms that coordinate and safeguard exchanges through formal and informal inter-​firm ties in order to create products and services (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Business groups hence are not hierarchical authorities or market transactions. Rather, business groups are a set of affiliated firms and their multiple and persistent relationships. According to this perspective, the configuration of the network structure and exchange relationships embedded in the network, as well as the affiliated firm’s position in the network, shape business group operation and affiliates’ performance. One of the earliest works that adopts formal network analysis constructs and techniques such as blockmodeling to conceptualize and analyze business groups is Gerlach’s studies of the equity, director, and debt networks of Japanese keiretsu (1992). It provides a glimpse of the holistic network structure at the group level. Chang (1997) examined the cross-​shareholding networks within Korean chaebol and conducted a blockmodeling analysis which demonstrated a “nested hierarchy” network structure with the controlling family on top of the hierarchy. Chung (2004) used the automorphic equivalence and blockmodeling to identify six types of ownership network in Taiwanese business groups and their ultimate controlling owners. More recently, Mani and Moody (2014) identified hybrid types of network models in the ownership networks of Indian business groups and showed that firm age and industry shape the firm’s position in the network. Keister (2001) investigated the development of lending and trading dyadic networks of affiliates in Chinese business groups. Her results showed that even though there are cheaper external alternatives, group affiliates tend to lend, borrow, and trade with each other, especially when there are previous ties and other nontrade ties. She also found

Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research    555 that affiliates that are central in group networks and located in developed regions tend to be the lenders rather than borrowers. In another study, Keister (1998) examined the interlocking directorate networks of the largest 40 business groups and their 535 member firms in China and found that firm centrality in such networks improves affiliated firms’ financial performance and productivity. Her studies move further the literature that sees the business group as a network structure because she identified not only the performance implication of such networks but also the parameters of development of such ties such as length of relationship and network centrality. Researchers also analyze how the density of buyer-​supplier networks among group affiliates and central position in this network affect firm innovation due to the flows of ideas, knowl­ edge, and opportunities of recombination within the group (Mahmood, Chung, & Mitchell, 2013). An affiliate’s positions in the business group networks shape not only the firm’s profitability and innovation but also its strategic behavior. Using Indian firms from 1995 and 2010, Ayyagari, Dau, and Spencer (2015) show that business group affiliates are more responsive to market changes. They found that compared to stand-​alone firms, group affiliates are more sensitive to threats from multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) inward investment. Those group members that occupy central position in the director networks are even more likely to respond by announcing expansion plans. In addition to analyzing business groups as networks of formal ties such as interlocking directorate and buyer-​suppler connections, scholars have also examined informal social networks within the group. For instance, Luo and Chung (2005) examined three types of social ties—​family relationships, friendships, and same-​ hometown connections—​among top executives of group affiliates and found that only family relationships and friendships have an impact on group performance. In addition, family ties have an inverted-​U relationship with profitability so that some family relationships facilitate information-​ sharing and decision-​ making while too many such ties lead to redundant information and legitimacy discount in the eyes of foreign investors. Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, and Schoar (2008) moved one step further and distinguished involvements by different family members such as males and females and sons and daughters in Thai business groups. They found that more involvement by sons is associated with lower performance, especially when the founder passed away, whereas involvement by daughters has no significant effects. In addition to profitability, Lin (2014) further examined how social and kinship ties among group executives shape group strategy such as internationalization. While the network perspective provides a useful angle to examine how business groups coordinate and perform, it faces certain challenges. The boundaries of business groups are sometimes difficult to discern, which makes it difficult to conduct systematic network analysis such as blockmodeling. For instance, the group (network) boundaries can be drawn by multiple criteria such as ownership, kinship, religion, or region and sometimes firms are affiliated with multiple groups. Further, the inter-​group ties such as kinship relationships can be so dense that it is almost impossible to determine clear group boundaries (Khanna & Rivkin, 2006).

556    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo

Business Group as Carrier of Institutional Logics The fourth perspective of business group research views the group as a carrier of institutional logics prevailing in the institutional environment. The establishment, operation, and performance of group affiliates are not only shaped by market forces, group resources, or intra-​group networks but also the societal institutions in which the group is embedded, and the affiliates and the group pursue legitimacy in addition to efficiency. This line of research is inspired by the new institutionalism in organizational study (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2009; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), and the institutional logics perspective. According to this perspective, the foundational logics such as the state, community, family, market, and religion shape the assumptions, values, and ways of thinking held by individuals and organizations (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). The research on business groups based on this perspective suggests how business groups are influenced by the state, community, and family logics. For the formation of business groups, instead of treating business groups as organizational responses to market imperfection, institutional research has shown that business groups can be intentionally created by the government to promote economic development and increase employment. In other words, the group is the product of the developmental state and its ideology (Fields, 1995; Wade, 1990). While the internal market view places the market construct at the center, the institutional perspective highlights the role of government and political logic. For instance, Kim (1997) delineates how the Korean state under General Park Chung Hee supported and nurtured chaebols through favorable bank loans and industrial policies. These chaebols were also asked to participate in strategic industries designated by the government, which shaped the diversification profiles of these chaebols. Maman (2002) compared Israeli and South Korean institutional contexts in which business groups emerged and found the significance of developmental ideology of political elites in both countries despite different levels of state intervention. Costa, Bandeira-​de-​ Mello, and Marcon (2013) describe the similar development of the 95 largest business groups in Brazil. The Communist Party in China also promoted a dozen of powerful state-​owned business groups in order to symbolize the economic rise of China (Brødsgaard, 2012). For instance, China National Petroleum Group and Sinopec Group are ranked third and fourth on the Global Fortune 500 list. These Chinese state-​owned business groups also tried to maintain employment even in an economic downturn. Besides the logic of economic development and social stability, business group operation can also be affected by the communitarian logic which highlights social welfare and redistribution within the group rather than efficiency and profitability. Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian (1996) studied the profitability of 197 large Japanese manufacturing firms and found that affiliates of the six keiretsus have less performance variation compared to their stand-​alone counterparts, and this is because the stronger members within the group subsidize the weaker ones, creating a de facto social insurance scheme

Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research    557 within the group. Similar findings are also reported in the context of Russian business groups (Estrin, Poukliakova, & Shapiro, 2009). Should business groups function as a perfect internal market, which aims to maximize the efficiency of utilization of financial capital, we would not expect and observe such redistribution and insurance effects of group membership on affiliates’ financial returns. However, whether business groups follow the communitarian logic may also depend on the influence of such a logic in the broader society in which business groups are embedded. In a comparative study of 12 emerging economies including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) found no risk-​sharing effects except in Japan, Korea, and Thailand. This may indicate a weak influence of the communitarian logic in those societies or the existence of strong competing logics. In addition to carrying political ideology and redistribution belief, business groups are also demonstrated to be the embodiment of family values and norms. Hamilton and his colleagues (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Orru, Biggart, & Hamilton, 1991) compared the authority structure and inter-​firm relationships of business groups in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and found strong manifestation of family values rooted in Confucius tradition. The family authority is so strong that they label centralized structure in Korean chaebols as corporate patrimonialism while emphasizing the impact of family ties in the operation of Taiwanese business groups. In a similar vein, Chung and Luo (2008) find a significant impact of family logic in influencing strategic maneuvers of Taiwanese business groups. They found that compared to non-​family-​controlled groups, family-​ controlled ones are less likely to divest of unrelated businesses even if these businesses are not making profits, probably due to the concern of layoff and family name and reputation. More specifically, Gu, Lu, and Chung (2016) argue that the concern of family succession shapes new industry entries of business groups in Taiwan. The inheritance logic of giving a fair share of family assets to each of the descendants drives business group owners to enter new lines of business so that each offspring can head his or her own business within the group. While there have been theoretical statements on this family logic (Wong, 1985), Gu et al. (2016: 21) conducted the first study that empirically demonstrates the positive association between number of descendants and number of new business entries. They also found that such an association is even stronger for male descendants. Viewing business groups as carriers of institutional logics has enhanced our understanding about the impact of the institutional environment on business groups, and in particular how business groups are shaped by non-​market forces. However, two important questions remain. First, as business groups are exposed to multiple institutional logics in their environment, some of which potentially conflict with one another, this literature needs to go deeper and explain how business groups respond to multiple and even conflicting institutional logics. The recent development in the institutional logics perspective regarding institutional complexity can shed light on this issue. Second, rather than being shaped by existing institutions, business groups may exert significant influence over the evolution of social and regulatory institutions due to their sheer large

558    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo size and complex ties to the political power. Future studies may examine how business groups play a role in hindering as well as engendering institutional changes.

Embeddedness of Business Groups in Emerging Economy Contexts A fundamental view of the sociological perspective of the organization is that organizations operate in the environment and have constant exchange relationships with other components or organizations in the environment (Davis, 2005). However, due to their special organizational form, business groups exchange with the environment in ways distinct from other types of organizations such as multidivisional firms. In the following existing studies, we review how business groups interact with market forces, political institutions and regulations, social hierarchies, and ethnic groups. One key market trend in the organizational environment of emerging economies is deregulation and privatization, especially in those countries that transformed from central planning to market economies (Newman, 2000). Such market-​oriented institutional changes often involved deregulation of industries and privatization of state-​ owned enterprises (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Facing these market upheavals, business groups often restructure their industrial portfolios by entering new industries and establishing new affiliates (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). In Argentina, business groups generally expanded their corporate portfolios in periods of higher uncertainty by taking advantage of market deficiencies and leveraging local and foreign opportunities. In response to the Argentine market-​oriented reforms of the 1990s, many business groups also expanded internationally (Carrera et al., 2003). In terms of interaction with political institutions, business groups usually build formal interlocks and informal social ties with politicians in order to get access to tacit and timely information, scarce resources, and administrative privileges. In this regard, stand-​alone firms and business group affiliates share similar needs. However, the organizational arrangement of legally independent affiliates bound together by multilayered pyramids and chains of control makes business group member firms preferable partners for politicians as such organizational design allows the dealings between business groups and politicians, which are sometimes in the gray area, to be less visible to the public (Morck & Yeung, 2003). A case study of Columbian business groups during the term of President Ernesto Samper (1994–​1998) confirmed this observation and found that these economic groups sustain mutual dependence relationships with the state in the form of contracts, credit, and regulation. Similar findings are reported in research of business groups in the Philippines (de la Rama, 2012). The political ties established over time can further shape the diversification and alliance strategy of business groups. For instance, in Taiwan, well-​connected business groups are often the first to enter newly liberalized industries by leveraging the tacit information, financial resources, and administrative support channeled through political connections (Amsden & Chu,

Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research    559 2003: 119–​160). These business groups are also often deemed as preferred local alliance partners for multinational corporations (MNCs) thanks to their political connections. Cosy ties with the dominant political power, however, may turn from assets to liabilities should the political alley be replaced by its opposition party in general elections or military coups. Siegel (2007) demonstrates that sociopolitical networks to the power regime in Korea facilitate international strategic alliances for Korean business groups. Such alliance building, however, decreased after the political enemies of the previous regime took over the power. It seems that political enemies may “punish” “disloyal” business groups by constraining their access to resources needed for international alliance building. Similarly, Zhu and Chung (2014) examined political connections of Taiwanese business groups and found that groups with ties to both the dominant and the opposition party, hence forming a portfolio of political ties, are more able to move into new industries and continue growing amid institutional turmoil such as political regime change. Studying the largest ethnic Chinese business group, Salim Group, in Indonesia, Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) indicated that another way to cope with the potential adverse effects of political connections is compartmentalization of different group units in legal, physical, spatial, or symbolic manners. Such a “loosely coupled” structure helps avoid the group’s being misappropriated as a whole and stops spreading the damage to other group units when political ties turn into liabilities. Such special design and function are not usually seen in traditional multidivisional forms in developed countries. Research has also shown that the level of government to which business groups build ties also matters. Xavier, Bandeira-​de-​Mello, and Marcon (2014) examined the different levels of government (central vs. local) that business groups have political ties with in Brazil and demonstrated how different ties moderate the relationship between market and legal institutions and group performance differently. In addition to market forces and regulatory regimes, business groups also interact with social systems which normally feature a well-​defined hierarchy of status. Would large business groups strengthen or weaken such hierarchy? Researchers have engaged such an agenda from the angle of intermarriages among business group families. Anecdotal evidence and archival data often indicate that large business families often marry each other, sustaining the status hierarchy (Baltzell, 1958). More systematic studies confirm such observation. Khanna and Rivkin (2006) examine the kinship ties maintained by business group families in Chile. Their evidence shows that the kinship ties, in which intermarriage plays a key part, are so dense that it even becomes difficult to delineate clear boundaries among business groups. Their findings are consistent with those of Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988) that the business group families, political elites, and landlords in Chile form “kincon” groups, which constitute the dominant class in Chile. In Korea, such marriage ties also entail some sacrifice on the side of the bride family. Han, Shipilov, and Greve (2017) investigated the intermarriage ties among chaebol families and found that when two chaebol families knot the marriage tie, the bride’s family will withdraw from the industries in which the groom’s

560    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo family also participates, so that the two family groups do not become direct competitors in the market. Another key dimension of social embeddedness is ethnicity and race. This can be a pivotal issue when ethnicity-​based business groups operate in economies of other ethnic groups such as ethnic Chinese business groups in Southeast Asia. The ethnic Chinese often served as middlemen in the trading business during colonial period before the World War II. After the retreat of colonial regimes, Chinese entrepreneurs grasped the economic opportunities left over by the colonial government and built up large businesses. The ethnic population of Chinese comprised between 2.8% and 33% of national population in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand but controlled between 33% and 80% of large private firms in these countries (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002: 3). After World War II, nationalism centered on ethnicity emerged in Southeast Asia when countries established national states. Confronted with official decimation on economic policies and licenses and unofficial rent-​seeking, Chinese business groups develop a family-​focused management system as close family members are the only people they can trust. These groups also prefer dispersing family assets across different industrial sectors with multiple small-​scale enterprises to limit their visibility. As a result, a type of group coordination built upon holding structure prevailed (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002).

Directions for Future Studies As emerging markets maintained the strong momentum of economic growth in the past two decades, firms in these markets, especially those affiliated with business groups, also followed the path of multinational enterprises in developed countries and ventured into overseas markets. However, the entry mode, location choice, and resources and capabilities of these MNCs based in emerging economies are different from those in developed countries. Yet we are only starting to see studies that examine these important issues. Specifically, there is a lack of studies on how business group affiliation may facilitate or constrain such overseas expansion. Bhaumik and Driffield (2011) analyzed foreign direct investment made by pharmaceutical firms in India and showed that group-​affiliated family firms were more likely to enter developing markets but less likely to enter developed countries, probably due to their organizational routines and capabilities formed in the weak institutional contexts of their home countries. With regard to the phenomena examined, almost all studies, especially those that follow the internal market perspective, examine how the establishment and operation of business groups influence the performance of groups and their listed affiliates. Little research has been done to inspect the demise of such a group form. Would the dynamics of bankruptcy the same for business groups as other types of firms (Hannan & Freeman,

Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research    561 1989)? Organizational ecology provides some interesting clues for the direction of future studies. At a higher level of organizational field, would the form of business group disappear or be replaced by other organizational forms? Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley (1994) delineated the “deinstitutionalization” process of diversified conglomerates in the United States in the 1980s and ascribed the process to a combination of market for corporate control, government regulations, and business rhetoric. As a result, by the 1990s, large American manufacturing became much less diversified and saw the disappearance of the “firm-​as-​portfolio” model. It would be interesting to observe what factors could lead to the decline or deinstitutionalization of the group form amid the fast-​changing organizational environment of emerging economies. We identified four major theoretical perspectives used in research on business groups; future studies can juxtapose the different perspectives and see which has more explanatory power or how they can be combined to better understand business groups. Most prior studies have used one of the perspectives. While some studies identified inconsistent findings with one perspective and suggested the use of alternative theories, future studies can apply the multiple perspectives reviewed here and discover important contingencies.

Conclusion In this chapter, we reviewed the four major perspectives in business group research: business groups as internal markets, resource bundles, networks, and carriers of institutional logics. They are, respectively, rooted in economic and sociological theoretical traditions. The studies applying these perspectives have illuminated particular aspects of business groups as well but also have revealed some inconsistencies with the respective perspectives. More recent studies have shed further light on how business groups interacted with the market and social-​political forces in emerging markets. We call for future research that can combine these perspectives and examine the continued evolution (including decline) of business groups.

Postscript Despite the size and importance of the economy in mainland China, research about business groups there is scant. Nevertheless, business groups are an important economic player in this economy. For one thing, many state-​owned enterprises (SOEs) are organized as business groups (Keister, 1998). For another thing, private (non-​ state-​controlled) companies also tend to expand into business groups as they grow. There are several important features of business groups in mainland China that deserve closer attention and research. First, the control by the central government and

562    Chi-Nien Chung and Rose Xiaowei Luo its various agencies is a key characteristic of the state-​controlled business groups. With the reform of SOEs since the 1990s, only the large well-​performing SOEs (typically controlled by the central government) were allowed to remain while poorly performing SOEs were forced to declare bankruptcy. These remaining SOEs are typically structured as diversified business groups. Second, family relationships have become less important in private business groups. The one-​child policy which was enforced for more than three decades has significantly reduced the size of the family. The rising Internet and high-​tech sector has attracted many foreign-​educated entrepreneurs, who prefer institutional and strategic investors to family funds. As a result, these private firms still compete as business groups, but the relationships among affiliated firms is no longer primarily family ties. Third, some group affiliates went to initial public offerings (IPOs) but the holding company usually did not. Due to the lack of enforcement of corporate disclosure rules, the financial relationship between affiliates can potentially hurt investors’ interests. This also makes rigorous research on business groups in mainland China challenging.

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Chapter 23

State-​O w ne d M u ltinat i ona l s in Internat i ona l C om peti t i on Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini

An impressive body of scholarly work has studied the liabilities of state ownership over the last few decades. The usual conclusion is that state-​owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to be less efficient and profitable than privately owned firms due to several factors. Based on agency logic, scholars have pointed out that managers of SOEs are poorly monitored and lack the high-​p owered incentives normally found in private firms (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; La Porta & López-​ de-​Silanes, 1999). SOEs also tend to pursue objectives other than efficiency and profitability (Bai & Xu, 2005; Shirley & Nellis, 1991; Stan, Peng, & Bruton, 2014). For instance, governments may require SOEs to keep prices low or avoid layoffs even in moments of economic downturn. In addition, SOEs can be used as vehicles of patronage and corruption:  politicians and their allies may be tempted to divert resources from SOEs to support their pet projects or directly benefit their constituencies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). In fact, many scholars argued that this managerial control of the firm by politicians has a darker side, dubbed “the grabbing hand” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998), where the costs of state ownership largely outweigh the benefits. Consistent with these predictions, empirical studies of privatization have, in general, detected performance gains in the transition from state to private ownership (for a review, see Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Megginson, 2005).

570    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini Given these potential liabilities of state ownership, it is surprising that in more recent years we still see a pervasive presence of SOEs throughout the world and in a broad range of industries (Wooldridge, 2012). In 2013, among the top-​100 Fortune 500 companies, 25 were state-​owned multinational firms (SOMNCs), directly owned by the state or indirectly through several state-​related investment vehicles. Nine of the 15 largest IPOs (initial public offerings) in the world between 2005 and 2012 involved SOEs selling minority positions to private investors (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). And this phenomenon is not simply due to the rise of interventionist emerging economies such as China or Russia; there is vast evidence that SOMNCs remain important even in developed countries. A recent survey of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) countries, for instance, found that SOMNCs represented a total equity value of US$1.4 trillion in 2011, of which 61% involved firms with minority stakes—​t hat is, firms with private management and partial state ownership (Christiansen, 2011). In this new scenario, there is also evidence that investors have not shied away from SOMNCs. A report by Morgan Stanley in May 2012 claimed that several SOMNCs have outperformed their industry peers in emerging markets, despite the fact that they may be “targeting development objectives rather than shareholder returns” (Morgan Stanley, 2012: 1). The extant literature (e.g., Cuervo-​C azurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy 2014) has also documented the rise of SOEs from developing and developed markets which have recently started to expand outside their domestic borders, leading to the emergence of many important SOMNCs, which compete head to head with the largest global private firms. In fact, some of those SOMNCs—​e.g., EDF from France, Statoil from Norway, CITIC from China, Petrobras from Brazil, just to name a few—​are actual giant global players with assets of hundreds of billions of US dollars. These facts raise an important question: given their flagrant resilience as top global corporations and potential investment targets, is it possible that SOMNCs’ intrinsic sources of performance disadvantage have been attenuated or even disappeared? Are these firms better managed and governed today than the old SOEs of the past? Given the rise and preeminence of large SOMNCs as global players, in this chapter we suggest a more nuanced analysis of SOMNCs contrasting agency and institutional theories to explain the performance and internationalization patterns of the so-​called state-​private-​hybrid SOMNCs (in relation to private firms) (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). Our review of the literature suggests a much more balanced view of SOMNCs and shows that they have advantages (“state levers”) and disadvantages (“liabilities of stateness”) (Musacchio, Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015a). More important, once we consider both the costs and benefits of state ownership, we argue (and provide some empirical evidence) that SOMNCs and private firms do not have significantly different performance when they compete globally.

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    571

State Ownership: Background and Theory Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, state ownership was adopted on a wide scale.

The Evolution of State Ownership The initial thrust for the expansion of state ownership followed the desire of governments to spur investment in public services such as mail, water, sewage, electricity, telephone, and railways (Toninelli, 2000). With the disruptions caused by the Great Depression and World War I, governments also ended up venturing into a variety of new business industries beyond public services. The expansion of state ownership, however, also came with substantial cost. Many SOEs were poorly managed and had to cope with several social or political objectives, while trying to avoid losses or even generate profits (Shirley & Nellis, 1991). With subsequent global macroeconomic crises, notably the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the situation became unsustainable. Higher oil prices fueled inflation and led to a major credit rationing caused by escalating interest rates. At the same time, the progressive collapse of command and mixed economies exposed the limits of running various industries with the ubiquitous presence of state-​controlled firms. Facing increased debt and realizing the high opportunity cost of allocating state capital to unprofitable SOEs, many governments in the 1980s and 1990s eventually undertook large-​scale privatization programs and experimented with varied reforms in the public sector (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Megginson, 2005). Yet, governments had political reasons not to fully privatize SOEs and keep some assets under their control. A number of studies showed that governments all around the world kept equity stakes in large SOEs, even after the privatization waves (Bortolotti & Faccio, 2009; Christiansen, 2011). Guillén (2005), for instance, describes how Spanish SOEs were consolidated before 1996 and initially only partly privatized. In France, the government held an 18% stake in carmaker Renault and in 2014 acquired another stake in Peugeot, jointly with China’s Dongfeng (also an SOE). In reality, state ownership was not fully replaced by private capital but instead transformed in two important ways. SOEs with majority state control that survived the process of privatization remained relevant players in their sectors and in many cases were listed in stock exchanges, attracting private investors as minority shareholders (Gupta, 2005). In other cases, state ownership was morphed from majority to minority, through myriad investment vehicles such as state-​owned holding companies, development banks, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, life insurance companies, and many others (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). For instance, Temasek, Singapore’s state-​ owned fund, invests 32% of its portfolio in companies such as Singapore Technologies

572    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini Telemedia, Singapore Communications, Singapore Power, and Singapore Airlines (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008). In sum, today almost 40  years after the first privatization wave, state ownership is still prevalent, in both emerging and developed markets. In some countries, central governments still hold majority and minority ownership in tens, even hundreds, of firms, often in strategic sectors. For instance, Table 23.1 illustrates this point. Furthermore, this state of things is not a consequence of a monotonic decrease in state ownership. Wang, Guthrie, and Xiao (2011) in fact show an increase in state ownership over time in China. Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) also highlight that, for instance, in Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela the state has increased its ownership of enterprises over time. The variation in terms of ownership is not only across countries but also within countries. In many countries the ownership of SOEs is not only done by the central government but at the provincial level as well. In Canada, Brazil, and China the number of SOEs controlled at the provincial level is larger than the number controlled by the central government (Bernier, 2011; Chang & Jin, 2016; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014; Wang et al., 2011). Second, SOEs are prevalent at all levels of economic development among emerging markets (EM). In order to visualize this, in Table 23.1 we created a normalized index of state ownership of majority-​owned firms by dividing the raw number of majority-​ owned SOEs over population in millions. This is a rough index that tries to make large countries comparable to smaller countries. This measure of SOE penetration shows significant dispersion across emerging markets and no clear relation to their level of development. In fact, to illustrate the point that there is no clear pattern of state ownership as it relates to GDP per capita, we plot the number of SOEs per million people against the log of GDP per capita in Figure 23.1. From this figure, it is clear that SOEs are prevalent at all levels of development. It is not clear that as countries develop, the number of SOEs per capita declines. This is also a cautionary tale for private firms and multinationals from the developed world. Dealing with SOEs is inevitable in the developing world, no matter how developed or underdeveloped the host country is. In EMs, SOEs either provide key services or inputs, such as oil or electricity or telecommunications, or they compete directly with private firms in the provisions of services and even in the manufacturing of intermediate and final goods. It is also important to note not only the prevalence of SOEs in developing and developed countries but also how an important number of SOEs, notably from emerging markets, expanded internationally over the past couple of decades to become important SOMNCs. Cazurra et al. (2014: 925) provide an excellent illustration of the global reach of the largest SOMNCs, which have on average 46% of their revenues coming from foreign operations. Furthermore, among the 100 largest firms in the world, there are 23 SOMNCs which have return on assets (ROA) and operating margins of 3.44% and 14%, respectively, which is well beyond the performance of the largest private firms in the top-​100 list (Cazurra et al., 2014: 925).

Table 23.1 State-​owned enterprises per million people in emerging markets c. 2014 Firms with the central government as a majority shareholder

Firms with the central government as a minority investor

Listed SOEs as a % of total stock market capitalization

Federal SOEs per million people (majority)

Federal SOEs per million people (minority)

Czech Republic

1000

120

5%

95.0

0.0

Russia

7964

1418

40%

54.5

0.0

Vietnam

1805

1740

20.1

0.0

498

691

12.9

0.1

Poland China (all)

17,000

70%

12.4

Slovak Rep.

60

55

11.1

0.1

Austria

57

21

6.7

0.1

South Africa

270

5.0

Uruguay

15

4.4

Singapore

20

Bolivia

26

Chile

32

Malaysia

52

Ecuador

24

Paraguay

10

Costa Rica

6

31

28

74

67

Argentina

40

Thailand

60

Peru

27

Mexico

90

Egypt

57

59

36%

1.7

0.3

1.5

34%

1.2

2.6

1.0

0.9

0.9 21%

0.9 0.9

0%

142

21

Korea

26

4

Australia

12

0

Colombia

22 102

1.8

1.2

Turkey

217

0.4

1.5

397

China (SASAC)

0%

0.00

128

India

3.7 2.6

Brazil

Indonesia

20%

404

0.8 0.7

1.6

0.6

0.3

0.5

0.3

3%

0.5

0

15%

0.5

29%

0.2

30%

10.8

0.07

Source: Musacchio et al. (2015a) and some data from Musacchio, Pineda Ayerbe, and Garcia (2015b). China (all) data come from Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011).

574    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini 6

SOEs per million people

4

2

0

–2 7

8

9

10

11

12

Log(GDP per capita)

Figure 23.1  SOEs per million people vs. log of GDP per capita in USD (c. 2010) Source: Plotted using data on SOEs from Table 23.1 and population and GDP per capita data from the World Development Indicators, available at http://​databank.worldbank.org/​ accessed August 10, 2017

In light of this evidence and of the recent series of transformations in the way SOMNCs are owned and controlled, it is important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of state ownership and how that maps into strategic advantages or disadvantages vis-​à-​vis private firms. In the next sections we review the existing literature and contrast agency and institutional views on state ownership aiming at shedding light on the SOMNCs’ specific advantages and disadvantages in general. In the final sections of the article we present empirical evidence of these advantages/​disadvantages and discuss their implications.

An Agency Theory of State-​owned Multinationals The starting point is that SOMNCs have different objective functions than private enterprises and these myriad objectives can generate a variety of benefits and costs for SOMNCs. On the one hand, developmental objectives may produce rents that benefit private shareholders when they own shares in these SOMNCs (e.g., when SOMNCs get subsidies or monopoly rights). Additionally, given the nature of government ownership of publicly traded SOMNCs, these firms can benefit from having a long-​term patient

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    575 investor mentality. Beyond these benefits, SOMNCs face social, political, and diplomatic objectives that can generate a variety of agency costs. SOMNCs, however, can avoid or reduce many of those agency costs. In most SOMNCs governments share ownership with private investors, who have clear profit-​ seeking objectives. Furthermore, given the new governance arrangements in SOMNCs, in which boards of directors, analysts, institutional investors, credit rating agencies, and minority shareholders can monitor the actions of managers, we would expect fewer deviations from profit-​maximizing objectives (Pargendler, Musacchio, & Lazzarini, 2013). Still, since SOMNCs have an implicit (or explicit) soft-​budget constraint, there are perverse incentives that can induce executives to deviate from government and shareholder objectives to pursue their own empire-​building agendas, or to engage in acquisitions on the basis of hubris simply because they know the government will bail them out (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Song, Nahm, & Zhang, 2015). In publicly traded SOMNCs there is an additional type of agency problem, referred to in the literature as the principal-​principal problem (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Jiang & Peng, 2011; Shen, Zhou, & Lau, 2016; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). This problem has to do with the fact that governments, as controlling shareholders, or as influential shareholders, can sway the strategic decisions SOMNC managers make to benefit themselves at the expense of private shareholders. Governments can, for instance, extract financial resources from SOMNCs to benefit specific political groups, e.g., they can control prices, or ask SOMNCs to take on specific social investments or subsidies, and so on. Critical channels of performance disadvantage immediately follow from agency theory. Given that society essentially delegates the monitoring function to governmental representatives (Dixit, 2002), governments, as owners, tend to appoint politicians and political allies to run and influence SOEs. In China, for instance, SOE managers are direct agents of the Communist Party and their career paths inside the party are linked to their performance in SOEs (Brødsgaard, 2012; Li & Xia, 2007; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013). By controlling SOEs, governments can also misallocate resources to support projects that will yield political dividends, such as unprofitable investments in remote areas to benefit particular constituencies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Furthermore, managers of SOEs tend to have low-​powered incentives—​that is, salaries that are poorly responsive to performance (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; La Porta & López-​ de-​Silanes, 1999). In reality, the pursuit of multiple objectives beyond profitability complicates the creation of efficient incentive contracts in SOEs (Bai & Xu, 2005; Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006). SOE managers may not be fully incentivized to pursue profitability if they anticipate that governments will divert resources to support political objectives or veto certain actions that would otherwise cause political damage (e.g., layoffs during economic crises). Despite these costs, some authors do recognize potential benefits emanating from state ownership. For instance, governments can provide SOMNCs with more “patient” capital (Beuselinck, Cao, Deloof, & Xia, 2013; Borisova, Brockman, Salas, & Zagorchev, 2012)

576    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini and stimulate economy-​wide new investment in areas where the private entrepreneurship is lacking (Gerschenkron, 1962; Rodrik, 2004). Yet, at the firm level, these benefits may not outweigh the costs of state ownership especially in the case of firms where governments have direct control rights, which magnifies agency problems associated with diffuse monitoring, low-​powered incentives, and political meddling. In other words, majority SOEs may receive distinct support, but at the cost of reduced firm-​level profitability and efficiency. In firms with minority state ownership, in contrast, management will be in the control of private shareholders who will more likely follow profit-​maximization goals. This feature will not only facilitate the creation of managerial incentive contracts but also enhance the monitoring pressure on SOE managers. At the same time, partial state equity can help minority SOEs pursue profitable projects especially when faced with scarce availability of capital and other institutional constraints (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013; Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Thus, minority SOEs should have lower costs of state ownership and, at the same time, benefit from their superior access to governmental resources. We, however, cannot predict that minority SOEs will generally have superior performance when compared to private firms. SOEs may not be completely insulated from governmental interference: governments may collude with other shareholders and even use their distinct regulatory power to influence decisions (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). For instance, Renault, minority-​owned by the French government, decided to back off on its intentions to shift production overseas in 2010 after President Nicolas Sarkozy publicly objected to this decision. Therefore, we expect that majority SOEs will underperform minority SOEs, although the latter will not necessarily fare better than private firms (Majumdar, 1998; Wu, 2011).

An Institutional View of SOMNCs Another perspective on SOMNCs is offered by institutional theory. The main idea of this approach is that the strategic and internationalization choices firms make vary according to the institutional context in which they operate—​that is, the set of informal and formal rules that constrain and enable economic behavior (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2016; Li, Meyer, Ding, & Zhang, 2017; North, 1990). Thus “even firms with similar types of ownership may make different strategic choices when institutional contexts vary” (Estrin et al., 2016: 294). In some institutional contexts, the operation and/​or internationalization of SOMNCs is supported by the government and facilitated by the institutional system in which firms (SOEs) operate, while in others their operation is limited or hindered by the institutional environment. Which institutions are conducive to better SOE performance and/​or internationalization remains an open research question. Yet recent research provides a few answers. Some authors have built on institutional theory to suggest that state ownership provides a number of advantages to SOMNCs, to the extent that such firms, notably in emerging markets, benefit from their privileged relationship with the government to access financial capital (Estrin et al., 2016; Knutsen, Rygh, & Hveem, 2011; Musacchio

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    577 & Lazzarini, 2014), the diplomatic lobbying home governments can provide (Duanmu, 2014; Li et al., 2017), and other resources such as technical infrastructure and land. For Estrin et al. (2016), when institutions allow for more direct control of SOMNCs, they tend to behave more like private multinationals. In contrast, when government control over SOMNCs is weak, insiders or politicians may pursue their agendas and deviate from the behavior of private firms. In their view, institutions that allow SOMNCs to perform closely to private firms are those that enable tight control by the government. In terms of diplomatic ties, Li et al. (2017), Chen, Musacchio, and Li (2016), Duanmu (2014), and Knutsen et al. (2011) argue that having the diplomatic backing of the home government provides SOMNCs with advantages, because they can invest in riskier jurisdictions. Li et  al. (2017) link specific target jurisdictions with the diplomatic networks of the home government. Therefore, these home advantages provide internationalization benefits that can ultimately make SOMNCs perform as well as private firms or even better. In a recent paper, Zhou, Gao, and Zhao (2017: 4) also highlight that governments often intervene in firms’ activities and protect certain business actors through national strategic planning, antitrust policies, and financing. In a similar vein, Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) provided evidence that SOEs are not only granted special protection from the government (e.g., exclusive license to operate in strategic sectors like oil and gas) but also frequently receive subsidized credit from the government. In SOEs with 100% government ownership, Jara-​Bertin, Lazzarini, Musacchio, and Wagner (2016) show that investors price in the implicit government guarantee, which allows SOEs to issue bonds with lower yields than comparable private firms. Interestingly, though, this same institutional logic also offers a more negative perspective on SOMNCs if the institutional environment allows governments to intervene, or meddle, in the operation of firms to make them focus on social or political objectives rather than on long-​term performance or innovation (Lazzarini, Mesquita, Monteiro, & Musacchio, 2016). For instance, in a slightly different vein of work, Choudhury and Khanna (2014) argue that fearing government meddling in the affairs of the state-​owned firm, pharmaceutical labs in India internationalized in the 1990s by licensing their patents. This allowed them to obtain foreign exchange and to be more autonomous from the government (and to protect themselves from privatization). Political ties can also be relevant in the case of private firms with minority state capital given that the allocation of government credit and equity investments to these firms can be influenced by political connections (Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-​ de-​Mello, & Marcon, 2015). In Chapter 14, on corporate political ties in this Handbook, Pei Sun deepens the study of political ties as a valuable strategic resource and highlights how SOEs and SOMNCs use those connections to obtain advantages.

SOMNCs and Legitimacy Finally, the neo-​institutionalists make a compelling case for the liability of stateness when they argue that SOMNCs face disadvantages in the host country if the local

578    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini citizens or government feel hostility toward those firms (Cui & Jiang, 2009, 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). For instance, Meyer et al. (2014) argue that SOMNCs have advantages when they are aligned with their home-​country governments, yet they find that when SOMNCs invest in countries with stronger rule of law or that are more technologically advanced than their home countries, they have to choose entry forms that give them more legitimacy (e.g., by choosing greenfield investments rather than acquisitions or choosing lower ownership in acquisitions). In fact, in many developed countries there has been a backlash against SOMNCs that try to invest in sensitive industries (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). In Table 23.2 we summarize some of the literature that has studied SOMNCs from these different perspectives (agency, institutional, resource dependence, and Table 23.2 Some of the papers studying the advantages and disadvantages of SOMNCs Theoretical approach

Reference

Main question

Duanmu (2014). “State-​ owned MNCs and host country expropriation risk: the role of home state power and economic gunboat diplomacy”

Where do SOEs invest abroad?

Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen (2016). Home-​ country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: a cross-​ country analysis

What home-​country Institutions institutions facilitate or constrain the internationalization strategies of SOMNCs relative to private firms?

Agency

Argument SOMNCs are more likely to expand into riskier countries or countries with deeper diplomatic ties to the home-​ country government—​the main idea being that SOMNCs obtain advantages because they can get protected (diplomatically) by their home-​country government. They study this using a database of close to 900 greenfield investments by Chinese firms in a variety of countries (between 2003 and 2010). Home-​country institutions that allow for better control of SOMNCs make them behave more like similar private firms; when institutions make control weaker, SOMNCs suffer from a variety of disadvantages relative to private firms. This article using matching techniques looking at the internationalization of 150+ companies into 40 countries.

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    579 Table 23.2 Continued Reference

Main question

Theoretical approach

Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang (2014). “Overcoming distrust in host societies: How state-​ owned enterprises adapt their foreign entries to institutional pressures.”

How does state ownership shape entry mode?

Institutions/​ neo-​ institutional

They study if SOMNCs entry strategies are different than those of private firms looking at almost 300 cross-​border investments by Chinese firms in 2009; they find that SOMNCs investing in countries with stronger rule of law or more technologically developed have to choose entry forms that give them more legitimacy, such as greenfield investments rather than acquisitions, or choosing lower ownership stakes in acquisitions.

Knutsen et al. (2011). “Does state ownership matter?”

Do SOMNCs behave differently than private firms?

Institutions/​ OLI

SOMNCs tend to invest in riskier host countries (i.e., more corrupt or with weaker rule of law) because they have the backing of their governments. They study the internationalization patters of Norwegian firms between 1998 and 2006.

Cui and Jiang (2012). “State ownership effect on firms’ FDI ownership decisions under institutional pressure: A study of Chinese outward-​investing firms”

How does legitimacy issues affect the entry form that SOMNCs choose in host countries?

Neo-​ institutional approach

Liability of stateness because host-​country governments or citizens can discriminate against SOMNCs. Thus, the pressures on the SOMNC in the host country will determine the entry mode. With high ownership will come more pressure. They study these questions using a sample of 130+ cross-​border investments by Chinese firms (2000–​2006)

Bass and Chakrabarty (2014) “Resource security . . .”

Do SOMNCs pay more than private firms for the same cross-​border transaction?

Resource dependence

SOMNCs pay more for oil field exploration contracts than private firms thanks to the backing of the state and the need for strategic resources. They use a database of 400 + oil and gas exploration contracts (2005–​2012).

Argument

(Continued )

580    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini Table 23.2 Continued Reference

Main question

Theoretical approach

(Choudhury & Khanna, 2014). “Toward resource independence . . .”

Why do SOEs internationalize?

Resource dependence

When governments are predatory and intervene in SOEs, one solution to escape bad institutions is to internationalize. This article is a case study of 42 national laboratories in India (between 1993 and 2006) that internationalized by licensing their patents as a way to gain autonomy from government intervention.

Buckley et al. (2007). “The determinants of Chinese outward FDI . . .”

What determines outward foreign direct investment by Chinese firms?

Transaction cost economics/​ OLI framework

Chinese multinationals tend to invest in risky host countries that are culturally and geographically close, and that are rich in natural resources. State-​owned multinationals seek assets abroad according to the mandates of the Chinese government. They test this using pooled OLS estimates with a database of 400 + Chinese cross-​border transactions into 49 countries, between 1984 and 2001.

Argument

neo-​institutional views). The conclusion drawn from this table should be that the literature finds advantages and disadvantages from almost all perspectives and we do not have a conclusive view on whether SOMNCs use those advantages to outperform private firms or if SOMNCs end up being at a disadvantage given all the liabilities of stateness.

The Firm-​level Performance Implications of State Ownership To shed light on whether SOMNCs have advantages or disadvantages vis-​à-​vis private firms, below we examine firm-​ level performance differences between publicly traded SOEs, i.e., state-​private hybrid firms (Bruton et  al., 2015), and

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    581 private companies using a cross-​industry, cross-​country database of 477 large, listed SOMNCs observed between 1997 and 2012 in 66 developed and emerging countries. This database was first assessed in Lazzarini and Musacchio (Forthcoming). Those firms are all publicly traded SOMNCs that are owned not only by governments but also by private investors and funds. Of those firms, 280 have minority state ownership—​ a form of governmental participation that has been relatively understudied. For instance, in our database we have large, global SOMNCs such as Norway’s Telenor (majority), Russia’s Rosneft (majority), France’s Renault (minority), and Brazil’s Vale (minority). These SOMNCs are compared to a group of 431 listed private firms with no state ownership. We adopted matching techniques (Abadie, Drukker, Herr, & Imbens, 2004; Abadie & Imbens, 2011) to guarantee comparability between the observed SOEs and private firms based on key observable traits such as firm-​level “fundamentals” (e.g., size and capital intensity), industry-​ level characteristics, and country-​level conditions (chiefly, the extent of economic and institutional development). In order to facilitate comparisons with private firms, we also collected data on 431 private firms. We compiled this data by following a simple procedure. First, we collected data for a set of large, publicly listed SOMNCs included in the OECD survey of state-​owned enterprises (Christiansen, 2011). Using that initial set, we then searched for all SOMNCs in the Fortune Global 500 list. We then went to Bloomberg and looked at the peer companies of the SOMNCs on our list and collected those with similar asset size; sometimes the firms added were private firms, but sometimes they were additional SOMNCs. We made sure to collect the top 10 firms in each sector for which we had firms. Whenever available, we also collected data of additional firms in the same sector and country of each of the SOMNCs that we selected. Because most of the data was collected in 2012, we had ownership data going back only a couple of years. Thus, we had to collect detailed data on ownership to complete a panel going back to 1997. We did so by using Bureau Van Dyke—​Orbis (five years back), and complementing that we researched the history of each firm, using the World Bank Privatization database, the company’s web page, and pages describing privatizations by country, including Wikipedia in some instances. We were able to collect panel data for a good portion of our companies and we are confident we have ultimate ownership as we were able to track owners of controlling stakes up to five levels up when there were pyramids. Ideally, we would like to perform comparisons between SOMNCs and private firms in the same country and sector. Unfortunately, however, various SOMNCs do not have comparable listed private firms in the same country. Some SOMNCs represent monopolies or quasi-​monopolies in their own sectors; and, in some countries, the widespread presence of minority state equity makes it more difficult to find firms that are completely privately owned. Thus, in our database only 15.6% of majority SOMNCs have private firms in the same country and sector. For this reason, as we explain below, we compared SOMNCs to private firms in the same sector and then used country-​level traits to find private firms under similar conditions. By studying the performance gap of

582    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini SOMNCs with firms in their sector, with similar size, we are assuming that the gap tells us something about state intervention in the SOMNC host country.

Main Variables We adopted a host of measures capturing distinct elements of firm-​level performance. We use a simple accounting measure to compare performance (ROA). We avoided using return on equity because SOMNCs tend to operate with low levels of capitalization (or even when technically they are bankrupt) in many countries, making comparisons harder to make. Still, given their wide variation and likely presence of outliers, we winsorized all performance variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles.

Independent (ownership) Variables For each firm and year, we collected data on the extent of total state ownership and the nature of ownership, that is, whether states directly own firms or instead use indirect channels of ownership or “pyramids” (e.g., Inoue et al., 2013). For instance, it is very common for states to hold ownership stakes in certain firms that in turn have stakes in other firms, and so on. Whenever available, we tried to unveil those pyramids and identify state-​related owners including the federal government, state-​level governments, sovereign wealth funds, development banks, and all sorts of state-​related investment vehicles (such as pension and insurance funds). Our primary data sources were the databases Orbis and Capital IQ, besides Christiansen’s (2011) survey in the case of OECD countries. Yet, in various cases we had to search for additional information on multiple sources such as Nexis-​Lexis, company websites and the shareholder lists available in some of their annual reports. We then created two dummy variables coding the type of state ownership. We classified firms as Majority SOMNCs when a state-​related entity held more than 50% of the controlling shares throughout the whole pyramid. This can occur, for instance, when a state-​related owner holds more than 50% of the shares of a given firm, which then holds more than 50% of the shares of another firm, and so successively until the ultimate owner of the firm in the database is found. Minority SOMNCs are then coded as such when there is relevant state ownership (more than 1%) but less than the amount necessary to grant clear control rights. In our database, the median levels of state ownership are 71.2% and 18.1% in majority and minority SOMNCs, respectively.

Control (matching) Variables We used three sets of control variables to more effectively compare SOMNCs and private firms. The first set involved firm-​level traits. Ln(Assets) is the logarithm value of total assets and allows us to compare firms with similar size. Fixed capital is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets and is used to control for capital intensity. Leverage, a measure of total debt to total assets, is in turn adopted to account for differences in the use of debt across firms. The second set included fixed industry-​and year-​specific factors, operationalized

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    583 as industry and year dummy variables. The third set of variables, in turn, comprised country-​level indicators of economic and institutional development We adopted the following country-​level indicators. GDP per capita is used as a measure of economic development. Drawing from the Polity IV database (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2002), we also coded the nature of the country’s political regime, ranging from -​10 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). In addition, following previous research (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 2008; Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010), we employed a host of variables measuring the extent of institutional development based on capital, product, and labor markets. Market capitalization represents the total stock market value of companies in each country divided by the country’s GDP. We also added a group of measures coming from the World Competitiveness Yearbook, a survey published by IMD. Ease of credit, Competition legislation, and Skilled labor measure executive perceptions on the availability of credit, the extent of regulation avoiding unfair competition, and the supply of high-​quality workers, respectively. Finally, we created a composite measure with three indicators of the Yearbook found to be highly correlated: perceptions of protection of property rights, justice, and absence of corruption. The final measure, referred to as Rule of law, has a high reliability score (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.913).

Matching Techniques Simple comparisons between SOEs and private firms are plagued with endogeneity, mostly because governments do not choose SOEs or equity shares in firms at random. In order to avoid this problem as much as possible and to compare similar firms we relied on a host of matching techniques (see, e.g., Imbens, 2004), such that for each individual firm we created a performance gap between firms with state ownership (majority or minority) and similar private firms. Whether a firm is observed with state ownership is therefore our “treatment” and our dependent variable of interest is the average performance gap between the SOE and similar private firms using nearest-​neighbor matching; this is what the literature would call the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). Matching analysis essentially builds on two core assumptions (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The first assumption is called “selection on observables”: conditional on a set of observable traits, being an SOE or private firm is independent of the final outcome (firm-​level performance). The second assumption is that there is a group of comparable control (private) firms, similar to the set of treated (state-​owned) firms that can be used for matching purposes. In most of our analyses we adopt the nearest-​neighbor matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2011) and implemented by Abadie et al. (2004). For each SOE, majority or minority, we tried to find the closest private firm based on our set of observables. We adopted one match per treated firm, and implemented exact matching by industry (with replacement), imposing a variety of restrictions, such as making sure that SOEs and private firms are from countries in the same level of development category and making sure they are matched by year. In addition, we computed robust standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity.

584    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini

Findings As it turns out, although some of the extant literature has emphasized that SOMNCs should exhibit important performance gaps, our data reveal that those gaps are not universally present. That is, at least for our sample of large SOMNCs, these firms do not appear to systematically underperform comparable private firms Table 23.3 presents matching (ATT) estimates corresponding to the difference in performance between SOMNCs and matched private firms with similar traits. The findings are intriguing because we do not find any significant performance gap between SOMNCs and private firms, either when SOMNCs are majority owned or when the government has minority equity stakes. The average treatment effect is negative, but it is not significantly different from zero. That means that once we did the careful work of studying the performance of publicly traded SOMNCs with similar private firms there was no significant, systematic advantage or disadvantage for any of them. According to our previous theoretical discussion, several explanations are possible for this result. First, SOMNCs may enjoy rents that make them have financial results similar to those of private firms. For instance, it is not uncommon for SOMNCs to have privileged access to natural resources and government concessions, as well as valuable state resources such as subsidized credit and special tax regimes. Second, because the firms in our database are publicly traded, they may be subject to monitoring from external shareholders and investors, thus helping overcome

Table 23.3 Performance in majority and minority SOMNCs vs. similar private firms (nearest-​neighbor matching by industry) ROA Majority SOEs

ROA Minority SOEs

Matching estimate (ATT)

-​0.003

Matching estimate (ATT)

0.000

Standard error

[0.003]

Standard error

[0.002]

p-​value

0.311

p-​value

0.919

N

5,439

N

5,840

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ATT is computed using the bias-​ corrected nearest-​neighbor matching estimator proposed by Abadie & Imbens, (2004) and Abadie et al. (2011). We allow one matching observation per SOE, imposing exact matching by year, same level of country development (developing vs. OECD) and industry. Besides industry and year, other observable matching variables include Ln(Assets), Fixed capital, Leverage, GDP per capita, Polity IV, Rule of law, Ease of credit, Market capitalization, Competition legislation, and Skilled labor. All these matching variables are lagged (average, two previous years). More detailed results and analyses are presented in Lazzarini and Musacchio (Forthcoming).

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    585 some of the key agency problems that we thought hindered the performance of more traditional SOEs. Third, with this simple matching comparison, we were not directly examining heterogeneous institutional effects influencing the behavior and performance of SOMNCs. For instance, Lazzarini and Musacchio (Forthcoming) detect significant positive gaps of SOEs during economic crises (when the temptation of governments to intervene in those firms escalate) and when the local institutional environment is relatively less developed. Finally, SOMNCs may differ in terms of their specific governance traits. Pargendler, Musacchio, and Lazzarini (2013) compare three distinct national oil companies (Statoil, Pemex, and Petrobras) and find that they have marked differences in terms of their firm-​specific governance mechanisms, including criteria to appoint CEOs, incentive packages for executives, and board composition. Shen et al. (2016) also examine changes and variations in corporate governance patterns in China. Although difficult to observe in large databases and across countries, these factors can possibly help detect more nuanced differences between state-​owned and private firms.

Conclusion and Discussion Overall, our findings above imply that, unlike the common assumption that private firms typically outperform SOMNCs, more often than not the performance of both types of firms may not be generally different. Therefore, we need to overcome the biased, monolithic view of SOMNCs as inefficient firms and start taking them seriously as local and global competitors. In the case of China, where the government has made an explicit effort to have SOMNCs in most sectors, managers in private firms are more conscious of the prevalence and importance of SOMNCs as competitors. In fact, many national champions are the product of partnerships between the government and local or foreign private firms. In other countries, however, the importance and prevalence of SOMNCs across sectors is either ignored or minimized. Perhaps some wholly owned SOEs still show signs of fatigue and inefficiency, but as this article shows, publicly traded SOMNCs do not appear to be generally inferior to their private counterparts at least with respect to overall profitability. Furthermore, combining the evidence in this chapter with evidence of the prevalence of SOMNCs among the list of largest multinationals in the world, we need to start thinking differently about SOMNCs. The theoretical grounds on which we analyze SOMNCs need to move away from an almost exclusive focus on principal-​ agent problems and focus more on principal-​principal relations (PP relations). PP relations in SOEs are extremely complex because they imply that SOEs can extract rents and insurance from governments (i.e., the so-​called soft-​budget constraint), but governments can also impose political and social objectives on these firms, thus taking away performance advantages. Therefore, we need to develop new theories

586    Aldo Musacchio, Felipe Monteiro, and Sergio G. Lazzarini that zoom in into the PP relations (or conflicts) and make explicit predictions of under what conditions these PP relations are a handicap for the SOE and when they provide a performance advantage vis-​ à-​ vis private firms and/​ or foreign multinationals. As much as in this chapter we compared SOMNCs and private firms in terms of their ROA performance, we believe a promising avenue for future research is to examine how the state ownership affects “innovation performance.” In today’s world, one of the main advantages of MNCs are their global innovation capabilities, and state ownership may have an important impact on how SOMNCs compete globally, not only in terms of how much they innovate but also in which technological areas. As suggested by Lazzarini et al. (2016), SOMNCs are likely to outperform private firms in terms of their invention intensity (number of patents filed) as well as in the level of their invention pioneerism (i.e., the patents they file are more original). Interestingly, they also suggest that this advantage of SOMNCs is contingent on the institutional context of those SOMNCs’ home countries. More precisely, the authors find that in institutional contexts lacking political constraints (where political meddling enhances conflicts of interest and dilutes resources), SOMNCs’ innovation performance tends to deteriorate and private firms are likely to outperform the former. Once again, a more balanced view of SOMNCs where both the costs and benefits of state ownership are taken into consideration seems warranted. Finally, in this article we have simplified state ownership as a dichotomous variable (1 if there is majority or minority ownership, 0 otherwise), when in real life the relationship between national champions and the government is substantially more complex. That is, in the real world there is no dichotomous relation but a series of fluid relations that require new typologies and new studies of how those new typologies map onto performance and competitiveness. For instance, firms that are extremely close to the government, without explicit government ownership, may enjoy the same kind of benefits SOEs have without having to necessarily pursue all of the social and political objectives SOEs face. In particular, as Musacchio et al. (2015a) emphasized, we need to dig deeper into the micromechanisms of state ownership, such as coalitions of state actors to exercise control of firms. In their examples, they were concerned about governments partnering with pension funds of SOEs to exercise control of firms that appear on paper to have minimal state control. Furthermore, these coalitions can take on a variety of forms and we need new studies to look at coalitions of state principals rather than focusing exclusively on government equity stakes. Chen et al. (2016) study the differences in internationalization strategies (acquisition size and acquisition premium) between coalitions of state-​affiliated blockholders and private blockholders and study how the contests for control between these two groups reduces both acquisition size and acquisition premia. SOMNCs today are competing head to head with private firms all over the world, be it in developed or developing countries. This chapter suggests that instead of immediately equating them to laggards (or leaders), in many instances the modern SOMNC, when both state advantages and disadvantages are part of the equation, may perform

State-Owned Multinationals in International Competition    587 in a similar way as private firms. Instead of seeking a general answer to the question of whether SOMNCs are superior or inferior to their private counterparts, scholars and practitioners should try to examine in detail (and possibly in a very contextual fashion) all positive and negative factors influencing the performance of state ownership in the global arena.

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Chapter 24

L o cal Firm s W i t h i n Gl obal Value   C ha i ns From Local Assembler to Value Partner Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip

Companies have been globalizing their value chain for the past three decades, seeking a combination of effectiveness based on capabilities historically situated in advanced markets and efficiency through a lower-​cost base in emerging markets. The vertical disaggregation of the value chain activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their spatial dispersion have given rise to a great interest among international business (IB) researchers in global value chains (GVCs). A real-​world phenomenon that prompted much of the research that is today included under the GVC umbrella pertains to offshoring. The rise of offshoring of manufacturing to China and services to India highlighted the mobility of labor, not merely capital, which could be deployed and redeployed (Doh, 2005). Technological developments have permitted “fractionalization of the production process (breaking it up into finer stages) and international dispersion of stages (offshoring)” (Baldwin, 2016: 290). Yet, with the passage of time, some of these firms have grown in aspiration and capability, leading to a transformation of their strategic intent and activities. An intriguing development over time has been efforts by emerging markets to engage in a catch-​up process as they seek to enhance their effectiveness. One means to achieve this has been trade specialization with emerging market (EM) companies being then able to focus on relatively narrow niches, albeit ones with a large volume, a strategy that entails participating effectively in GVCs. The focus of this chapter is thus on local firms in emerging markets as participants in GVCs, and how some of them make the transition from local assembler to value chain. However, while the purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive review of the GVC literature (see Hernández & Pedersen, 2017, for an excellent such

592    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip Overview - Governance - Upgrading

Drivers of GVCs in emerging markets

The rise of emerging market firms within GVCs

- IB theory Implications - Future research challenges

Figure 24.1  Topics covered in this chapter

effort) we nevertheless begin by discussing key GVC concepts that are relevant to our focus. We begin with an overview of the GVC notion highlighting the issues of governance and upgrading. Next, we review key drivers of GVCs in emerging markets, before highlighting the rise of EM firms within GVCs. We close with implications for IB theory and future research (see Figure 24.1).

Global Value Chains: An Overview Consistent with the Porterian idea of value chain analysis, Gereffi and Fernandez-​Stark note: “The value chain describes the full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond. This includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the final consumer. The activities that comprise a value chain can be contained within a single firm or divided among different firms” (2016: 4).1 In their comprehensive review of the GVC literature, Hernández and Pedersen (2017) classify GVC activities as follows: (1) degree of involvement in the production in the production process: primary or secondary activities; (2) function in the value change: upstream, middle-​end (manufacturing/​logistics), or downstream activities; (3)  potential for competence creation:  exploration-​related or exploitation-​related activities; (4)  potential for being a source of competitive advantage: core, essential, or non-​core activities. According to UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) “GVCs are a global mode of production in which intermediate goods and services are traded in fragmented and internationally dispersed production processes” (2015: 60). The rapidity of the growth of GVCs in recent decades is captured well by Elms and Low: Trade and production networks are not new. Firms have been producing items with components sourced from around the globe for centuries. Businesses have continuously sought out new markets for their products. What have changed, however, are the speed, scale, depth and breadth of global interactions. Increasingly, new players have become active in what have come to be called global value chains. (2013: 1)

The GVC idea is inherent in Buckley’s notion of the global factory, which is “a structure through which multinational enterprises integrate their global strategies through a combination of innovation, distribution and production of both goods and services”

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    593 (2009: 131). As economists from Adam Smith’s time have recognized, the multistage production seen in supply chains typically results from the splitting of a complex production process into simpler tasks carried out repetitively by specialists who thus become complementary to each other and, in concert, more productive than non-​specialists. Fundamental to the notion of global factory-​like GVCs is Smithian division of labor. Global factory-​like GVCs combine finely sliced and spatially dispersed value chain activities combined within a single structure and orchestrated by a large MNE (Buckley, 2012). Firms and labor in different parts of the world have become interdependent and consequential for the other (Gereffi & Fernandez-​Stark, 2016). As we shall note later, this has played no small part in is the rise of anti-​globalization as a result of perceived inequity in the benefits of globalization around the world (Meyer, 2017). Clearly, there are multiple actors involved since GVCs are not confined to the boundaries of the orchestrating firm but will typically involve external actors to whom different parts of the value chain may be outsourced in a dynamic process entailing constant adjustment in response to market conditions and the performance of GVC actors. MNEs seek greater advantage by breaking up their GVCs and considering where to locate various upstream and downstream activities, and whether or not to undertake the activity by themselves. The GVC thus introduces a perspective that goes beyond a unitary firm-​centric one. Observing that early IB theorists recognized the division of labor in creating products and knowledge by MNEs, Casson and Wadeson observe that within GVCs “the strategies of individual firms are inter-​dependent” and “advantages are context-​ dependent” (2013: 165). Firms may compete for control of a certain part of a chain and co-​operate when they have complementary offerings at different parts of the chain. In the absence of clear power asymmetries, strategies may be negotiated rather than imposed. Two issues have generated prominence in GVC research: governance, from a top-​ down perspective and upgrading, from a bottom-​up perspective. We discuss both briefly below, then build on the second concept to highlight the rise of EM firms through participation in GVCs.

Governance Porter’s (1986) framework of global strategy highlighted the variance in the configuration and coordination of value chain activities. In terms of configuration, many studies consider location decisions and the geographic scope of value chains. Relatedly, MNEs must also decide on the extent of centralization of offshored value chain activities which entails disintegration, localization, and externalization (Kedia & Mukherjee, 2009). Of course, not all GVCs are configured to be truly “global” since industries vary in the extent of their “globalness” (Yip, 1992). Taking the MNE as the unit of analysis, Asmussen, Pedersen, and Petersen (2007) identified three types of GVC configuration: international, multidomestic, and global. More recently, scholars have argued for a system-​level

594    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip perspective, arguing that most GVCs are regional rather than global (Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016)—​although there is still a debate as to whether this is truly holistic or (over)emphasizes market-​facing activities (Mudambi & Puck, 2016). In terms of coordination, a GVC’s lead firm must consider how to work with various actors including strategic partners, specialized partners, and generic partners through practices such as interfirm coordination, intrafirm control, interfirm partnering, and extrafirm bargaining (Yeung & Coe, 2015). Crucial to how GVCs are coordinated is the issue of governance. Governance refers to “authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a [value] chain” (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994: 97). An important issue is the governance of relationships among exchange partners and related stakeholders (such as regulators), which affects how the GVC is controlled. In particular, this speaks to issues around the nature of these relationships (arm’s-​length versus integrated, for instance) and which actors exert how much power along the chain. The nature of GVC governance, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) suggest, is influenced by three key factors: transaction complexity, information codifiability, and supply-​base capabilities. These scholars identify five types of global value chain governance—​hierarchy, captive, relational, modular, and market—​on a continuum ranging from high to low levels of explicit coordination, which is correlated with power asymmetry. In reality, contemporary GVCs are neither pure vertically integrated hierarchies nor arm’s-​length markets. Thus the GVC literature has highlighted governance modes beyond a dichotomous choice between hierarchies and markets. Moreover, the literature recognizes the prospect of mixed modes in a given GVC; that is, multiple governance types may coexist. Relational governance, which “implies that coordination is organized by social relationships and shared norms” (Hernández & Pedersen, 2017: 140), comes into play when complex information and knowledge have to be shared; then, trust becomes important. The relational governance perspective accentuates the network characteristics of GVC in that it involves “a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms . . . engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-​ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges” (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997: 914). Building on Buckley’s (2012) notion of the global factory which highlights the significance of relational governance, Kano (forthcoming) identifies six social mechanisms through which the efficiency outcomes of the GVC can be enhanced by the orchestrating MNE: (1) selectivity, (2) inclusion of non-​business intermediaries, (3) joint strategizing, (4) relational capital, (5) multilateral feedback, and (6) rules for equitable value distribution. These mechanisms are argued to be most effective in facilitating coordination and fostering innovation when deployed in an integrative fashion. Kano’s (forthcoming) six social mechanisms of relational governance in GVCs support three economizing or value-​creating objectives: (1) enhancing knowledge flows and filling information gaps while reducing complexity—​ referred to as economizing on partners’ bounded rationality; (2) setting bounds on potential unreliable behaviors—​that is, economizing on partners’ bounded reliability; and (3) facilitating capability creation, which typically involves joint activity between partners. The last-​mentioned point could involve highly asymmetrical actors—​for instance, a

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    595 GVC’s hub-​MNE engaging with small entrepreneurial firms, a prospect that Buckley and Prashantham (2016) have referred to as “division of entrepreneurial labour.”

Upgrading While stakeholders such as policymakers often focus on spatial aspects of GVC upgrading such as cluster development and growth (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gereffi, 2008), from a strategy perspective, our focus is primarily on how firms can improve their lot within GVCs, in terms of the amount of value that they create and capture. The potential for this arises through market access, technology transfer, and the adoption of global standards by EM firms in GVCs. It is widely recognized that there is a “general expectation that firms coordinating the GVC—​the lead firms—​ produce a positive impact on suppliers by transferring to them valuable knowledge with which to compete in global end-​markets. Indeed, for small firms in developing countries, participation in GVCs is probably one of the few opportunities to both obtain information about the type and quality of products demanded by consumers in global markets and to actually gain access to those markets” (UNIDO, 2015: 159). Upgrading may take the form of process upgrading, product upgrading, functional upgrading, or inter-​sectoral upgrading (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002). Learning from interactions with other firms, especially the lead firm, is an important way through which EM firms are able to upgrade. Staritz observes: “Market entry and upgrading is achieved by assisting supplier firms and producers to access information and resources, develop linkages with other firms and producers, comply with lead firm requirements and standards, increase productivity, acquire new skills, competencies and capabilities, and take on new functions associated with higher value added activities” (2012: 11). Indeed, quality standards represent a core governance mechanism in GVCs (Gereffi & Lee, 2016) which forces many EM firms to raise their game. Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011) suggest that while collective learning outcomes may accrue for EM firms as a result of pressure to meet international standards imposed by a GVC’s lead firm, when the local and foreign actor’s competences are complementary then the learning may actually be bidirectional. Such mutual learning requires intense face-​to-​face interactions, they argue. However, accomplishing upgradation is nontrivial, involving a “set of enormous leaps” for firms to upgrade their activity set and position within a GVC (Buckley, 2012: 87). For EM-​ based manufacturing firms, upgrading may involve a shift from manufacturing to design and ultimately brand ownership. The starting point (as a contract manufacturer) is itself non-​trivial, as it calls for demonstrating high levels of quality and reliability in order to competitively bid for and secure business opportunities typically entailing complex activities. To move beyond mere execution to given specifications, and become a designer, Buckley avers, is “a profound step change” while the ultimate transition to becoming a brand owner is “even more difficult.” Upgrading requires new capabilities around developing a global mind-​set and vision and strategic and operational planning, as well as coordinating multiple skillsets to accomplish

596    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip high-​precision execution. The broad principles hold true even in the case of EM firms operating in offshore services activities within GVCs as they seek to transition from focusing on information technology outsourcing to business process outsourcing and ultimately knowledge process outsourcing (Gereffi & Fernandez-​Stark, 2016).

Drivers of GVCs in Emerging Markets The development of GVCs has unfolded in tandem with the rise of emerging markets whose “firms have managed to grasp the opportunities” that arose—​notably after the mid-​1980s in China, but also before that, initially in Japan and therefore the so-​called Asian tigers of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2016). And manufacturing apart, offshore services in GVCs have led to opportunities in EMs such as South Africa, the Philippines, and India. In 2009, global exports of intermediate products exceeded the combined exports of finished goods and capital goods for the first time (UNIDO, 2015). We believe there are four major drivers for global value chains to be located in emerging markets: level of economic development, maturity of institutions, science and technology level, and company management capabilities.

Level of Economic Development There is obviously a relationship between the level of economic development of an EM and its attractiveness as a location for GVCs, simply because of labor and factor costs. South Korea is now well beyond that stage and Taiwan is getting close to it. China is starting to reach the top of the in the inverse-​U curve, depending on the sector and the level of skills required—​GVC elements that require low-​cost labor migrate to even lower-​cost countries such as Vietnam, which is the latest entry as a serious player in GVCs. This pattern seemingly echoes a much older perspective put forward by the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s, and made known to English-​ speaking audiences in the 1960s, referred to as the “flying geese pattern of development” and discussed even later by Kojima (1960, 1966). This model explains intra-​industry, inter-​industry, and international aspects of the catch-​up process of industrialization by latecomer economies. This model is especially associated with Asian countries and is distinguished from both the vertical division of labor between colonies and their (usually Western) colonizers in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century as well as the more horizontal division of labor between countries of similar economic development levels and culture, as seen in Europe. The flying geese model describes how Japan has transitioned from low-​value activities and industries (e.g., garments) to high-​value ones (e.g., high definition TV), with corresponding and progressive shifts of the activities it exited to other Asian countries such that the latest comers have the greatest concentration of low-​value activities.

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    597

Maturity of Institutions A defining characteristic of EMs is that they have immature institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). The maturity of institutions in EMs should have a direct linear and positive inducement for locating GVCs. But the degree of inducement will vary by element of the value chain. For low-​value activities such as manufacturing, China’s infrastructure has proved adequate for MNEs operating in that market, and several institutional voids have been plugged. However, in relation to innovation activity that exists within GVCs the story may be different (Van Assche, 2017). For research and development (R&D), maturity of intellectual property rights and other legal institutions is highly important. Governments, including China and India, have made strong efforts to improve the intellectual property (IP) regime in a bid to attract and retain large MNEs (UNIDO, 2015). MNCs from developed markets (DMs) are also increasingly smart about how they protect IP are in EMs. Yip and McKern (2016: ch. 7) discuss how in China MNCs use a variety of protection strategies: set up a Chinese R&D center focused on a research domain in which the company does not currently have a large body of IP; patent in China intellectual property that may have been patented elsewhere if the company has any intention of using it in China; take more than usual care to employ well-​established (physical) practices of IP protection; and splitting R&D into modular tasks and allocating some core tasks to the headquarters group, with specific tasks allocated to the group in China. For manufacturing, the maturity of legal institutions has affected more the ownership strategy rather than the location strategy: lessor legal protection discourages direct ownership of fixed assets in EMs and encourages buying from local owners and operators of factories.

Science and Technology Level As we discussed in Chapter 17, in this Handbook, the level of science and technology capability is a major attraction for R&D activities. As EMs catch up in per capita income, there is a corresponding catch up in education (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2011). Furthermore, as many EMs have larger populations than most DMs, the absolute numbers of those educated in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects have been rising very quickly in countries such as China and India (Krishnan & Prashantham, 2018). In addition, a rising level of science and technology capability will also encourage the location of manufacturing of more technologically advanced products (Mudambi, 2008). Economies such as Singapore, which has progressed from EM to DM status, experienced the location of GVC activities in increasingly advanced products and components, and developed indigenous companies operating in high-​technology sectors such as semiconductors and advanced electronics. Examples of such companies include Singapore’s Aztech in electronic devices and components.

598    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip

Company Management Capabilities Finally, different elements of GVCs require different levels of management capabilities from local companies. Coordinating more elements requires more management capabilities. While the lead foreign MNC in a GVC is typically not enthusiastic about policy-​led pressure to work with local suppliers (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005), in the large EMs such as China (and to some extent, India) governmental influence is strong and MNCs tend to toe the line. But perhaps even more attractive is the perceived improvement in the capabilities of EM firms in being able to participate effectively in GVCs (Buckley, 2012; Yip & McKern, 2016). A  major reason for the rise of China’s Huawei, to become the world’s largest in telecommunications equipment, has been the development of management capabilities to work closely with DM MNC customers such as Vodafone. Chinese companies are even beginning to pioneer in management methods such as the appliance company Haier’s “self managing teams” (Khanna & Palepu, 2010).

The Rise of Emerging Market Firms Within Global Value Chains Local firms in emerging markets have steadily increased their role in the global value chains of developed market MNEs. In the first phase, EM firms were merely local assemblers of components produced in DMs. In a second phase, EM firms manufacture many of the components themselves but usually not the highest value-​added parts. In a third phase, EM firms are themselves innovating and adding value as true partners of DM MNEs. This evolution has happened in different EMs at different times—​South Korea being the first and Vietnam one of the latest. An illustration of the changing role of EM firms is provided by a new kind of player, the global original equipment manufacturer (OEM), which has joined the ranks of traditional multinational companies (Leung & Yip, 2003). These firms are OEMs in that they typically supply parts, components, or even complete products to other companies which resell them under their own names. They are global in that these firms have customers all over the world. Some of these firms are very large companies, such as those found in China, that even dwarf individual DM customers in size, and smaller entrepreneurial firms in many EMs all over the world.

Phase 1: Local Assemblers At the outset, many EM firms began their participation in GVCs as mere assemblers on the basis of low labor costs. In most cases, the components were sourced from elsewhere. The iPhone is widely referenced in the GVC and global factory literatures as illustrative of the opportunity that local EM firms to enter a GVC by merely assembling based

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    599 on a foreign MNE’s intellectual property. As Kaplinsky and Morris observe based on Xing and Detert’s (2010) analysis of Apple’s GVC, “The firm enters the GVC by merely assembling to the designs of the lead firm (for example, the iPhone 4 in China). . . . Each device retailed at just under $500 in the US. The phones were exported from China—​ made in China—​at a unit price of $179. But the value added in China was only $6.50” (2016: 10–​21). They go on to observe at this early stage, ambitions for upgrading are manifested in attempts at process improvement. EM local assemblers began with low cost and low sophistication. In the mid-​1970s one of us visited the final assembly factory for Italian automaker, FIAT, in Thailand. This factory was owned by a consortium of local and other Asian businessmen, including one of our fathers. The factory was the ultimate in low-​cost assembly in that there was no equipment on the shop floor. For example, to attach the door to the chassis, one worker held up the door while another screwed it in place.

Phase 2: Component Manufacturers As time passed, EM manufacturing firms developed the ability to act as producers. A case in point is Chinese firms participating in the GVC for the wooden toy industry in Zhejiang province’s Yunhe cluster (Zheng & Sheng, 2006). Lacking in design (and distribution capabilities), these firms focused solely only on production, a capability acquired through an essentially “copycat” process. Zheng and Sheng (2006) observe that while this cluster has grown, it remains disadvantaged by the lack of market-​ interfacing skills as a result of which Chinese traders continue to exert considerable influence as middlemen between the wooden toy producers and international markets. The auto components industry in India illustrates the scope for upgrading as well. In a country better known for participating in GVCs via services than in manufacturing, the auto components industry stands out owing to the almost tripling of the work force within a decade from the turn of the century and a 700% increase in output to $21 billion (UNIDO, 2015). While the main R&D came from the foreign MNEs involved, local SMEs began to engage in (incremental) technological innovation over time (Krishnaswamy, Mathirajan, & Subrahmanya, 2014). As EM firms became more important as component suppliers, they had to upgrade not just the quality but also this service, particularly in terms of just-​in-​time (JIT) delivery (Leung & Yip, 2003). As parts of MNCs’ global business systems or value chains, EM participants must meet exact, pre-​determined production schedules or else stall the entire production chain. For example, in fast moving consumer fashion, consumer electronic and computer markets, where product cycles are short, there is great pressure to get products out to the retail sector as soon as possible. To a large extent, this JIT capability also depends on the transportation infrastructure of the country where the OEM’s major production facilities are located. Hence, component manufacturing in EMs, has taken off first in those economies, such as Taiwan and China, with good

600    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip transportation infrastructure, while it has lagged in economies such as India and those in most of Africa. In relation to the information technology and communication (ICT) sector, China and India have traversed contrasting paths—​the former focuses primarily on hardware and the latter on software services. In both cases, strong efforts at upgrading are apparent. As already discussed (see also Chapter  17, in this Handbook), some Chinese manufacturing firms have followed the previous examples of firms in the so-​called Asian tigers (e.g., South Korea) to move toward design and brand ownership. In relation to software development, several Indian firms have moved beyond mere IT outsourcing of software development to engage in business process outsourcing and knowledge process outsourcing (Gereffi & Fernandez-​Stark, 2016). Somewhat related, there has been an effort for the India-​ based R&D centers of multinationals—​w hich include firms in the IT sector—​to go up the value chain by engaging in product development. One example is Cisco’s development of a new product to straddle 2G and 4G networks, which has subsequently been sold in other markets as well (Jha, Parulkar, Krishnan, & Dhanaraj, 2016). While much of the current literature focuses on Asia, and to a lesser extent Latin America, it will be interesting to see how GVCs develop and evolve in Africa.2 A United Nations study (UNIDO) acknowledges: “Export sophistication and product discovery (intended to capture the extent of upgrading within GVCs) are generally lower in Africa than in other developing regions” (2015: 73). It however goes on to note: “Still, Africa has made some progress in upgrading” (2015: 73) and offers the case of the Moroccan automotive industry as a case in point: The Moroccan government has followed consistent sectoral strategies to promote new industries, such as the manufacture of automobiles . . . Morocco benefits greatly from this value chain, because of Morocco’s geographical proximity to Europe, low labour costs, financial incentives, skilled labour, good infrastructure and political stability. Two special economic zones were created for the automotive industry. By 2012, Morocco was producing automobiles and spare parts through the Société Marocaine de Constructions Automobiles, which has the capacity to manufacture 90,000 vehicles a year, the majority for export. And Renault’s new €1 billion plant in Tangiers can assemble up to 400,000 vehicles a year, bringing 6,000 direct jobs and many more indirect jobs. (UNIDO, 2015: 73)

Phase 3: Value-​adding Innovators and Partners In a few cases, EM firms may be able to become value-​adding innovators and genuine partners to foreign MNEs—​and potentially, MNEs in their own right (Yip & McKern, 2016). Pananond refers to achieving this final level of upgrading as a transformation

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    601 “from servant to master” (2016: 292). She highlights in particular the role of cross-​border acquisitions as an important means for EM firms to engage in “power-​repositioning,” using the example of Thai Union “which rose from a local tuna cannery to become the world’s largest processor of shelf-​stable seafood through international acquisitions of companies with globally established brands” (2016: 293). A brand acquisition strategy, she argues, increases the EM firm’s power and control of both technological and market-​ share thereby leading to an enhanced ability to leverage global production decisions. Williamson and Raman (2013) discuss the “double handspring” by which a Chinese firm uses cross-​border mergers to obtain foreign capabilities that, in the first step, are integrated with existing domestic assets to increase domestic advantage. Then these enhanced combined advantages are deployed in international expansion. While Williamson and Raman do not directly address how cross-​border mergers enhance a Chinese firm’s ability to participate in GVCs, it seems clear that all such enhancements make cross-​border do contribute to GVC capabilities. Indeed, firms from all major EMs now make acquisitions to enhance their capabilities: Brazil (Cyrino & Barcellos, 2013), India (Ramamurti, 2013), and Russia (Kalotay & Panibratov, 2013).

Implications for IB Theory The GVC phenomenon is one that IB researchers have increasingly paid attention to through closely related concepts such as the global factory (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Kano, forthcoming) and holds implications for various research streams in the field, particularly in relation to our understanding of EMs. Below we selectively highlight a few.

Emerging Market Multinationals Upgradation within GVCs can lead to, in some cases, EM firms becoming MNEs in their own right. While not easy to achieve, this has been seen in cases such as Acer, the Taiwanese PC company that started off as a contract manufacturer. Some emerging market multinationals (EMNEs) have adopted an aggressive stance toward cross-​border acquisitions, allowing them to acquire brands and technology, thereby seeking to accelerate their internationalization process. It remains to be seen how successful these acquisitions will be, but currently there is much research interest on the topic of EMNEs. For example, a qualitative research study of China’s automotive components industry highlights how domestic companies participating in the GVC of major Western MNEs like Volkswagen and General Motors have ended up undertaking outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) (Hertenstein, Sutherland, & Anderson, 2017). One of the cases they describe, Fuyao, worked with Volkswagen in Shanghai, and eventually invested in Germany and Russia in order to expand its exchange relationship within that GVC. Similarly, its work with Ford and General Motors resulted in foreign investments in the

602    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip US markets. In a couple of cases, the Chinese automotive components company also invested in India and became a supplier to the hub firm of the GVC in that market. As Pananond (2016) points out, however, the GVC literature has not made as much of a connection with the EMNE literature as it might. Doing so represents a potentially interesting line of research for the future.

Regional Strategy and Clusters One interesting implication of adopting a GVC lens is that it leads to a more holistic understanding of just how geographically widespread an MNE’s organizational activities—​ direct or indirect—​might be. Mudambi and Puck argue that “when assessing a firm’s degree of globalization, its overall GVC needs to be considered. This includes both local/​regional activities that might be offshored as well as potentially global activities not captured by sales or asset-​based measures” (2016: 1084). Thus while Rugman and Verbeke (2004) point out, quite rightly, that there is often a regional bias in the international sales activities of MNEs, when the entire GVC that it orchestrates or participates in is taken into account, then its global footprint may be considerable. Additionally, at a subnational level, regional issues also become salient when viewed through a GVC lens. In emerging markets, as in more developed economies, specialized expertise tends to be spatially clustered. Thus, policymakers’ efforts to cultivate clusters for specific industries could enhance the chances of certain sets of emerging market firms entering, and ultimately upgrading their position within, GVCs. Governance dynamics within clusters and GVCs differ because they are often driven by public-​sector and private-​sector actors, respectively (Gereffi & Lee, 2016). Future research can usefully continue to explore the interplay between clusters and GVCs, including their ramifications for economic development.

The Role of SMEs Buckley and Prashantham (2016) note that while the GVC and MNE literatures tend to focus on the large orchestrating MNE, in reality there are multiple smaller entrepreneurial firms that participate in GVCs. Of course, scholars of GVC governance have noted the growing consolidation of GVCs whereby there is a preference for a smaller number of large (and capable) suppliers concentrated in fewer locations to yield a less wieldy network to manage (Cattaneo, Gereffi, & Staritz, 2010). That said, these large suppliers often must resort to themselves working with smaller specialists, often with a regional focus, thus providing hope for a wider range of firms to benefit from GVCs (Gereffi & Fernandez-​Stark, 2016) although some research suggests that the SMEs that do participate in GVCs tend to be larger than non-​participating SMEs (Elms & Low, 2013). Part of the challenge is overcoming trust deficits between MNEs and SMEs in GVCs (Buckley & Prashantham, 2016; Prashantham & Birkinshaw, 2008). Interestingly,

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    603 the literature on SME internationalization also tends not to take into account the influence of large MNE-​orchestrated GVCs. Relatively little is known, as a result, about the “division of entrepreneurial labor” between these disparate sets of organizations. Future IB research could fruitfully seek to integrate the perspectives of both the MNE and SME participants to yield a holistic picture of GVCs.

Sustainability Of growing important and research interest is the issue of sustainability within GVCs. Perez-​Aleman and Sandilands (2008) describe how Starbucks made the transition from being merely reactive to the concerns raised by Conservation International, an NGO, to subsequently proactively adopting social and environmental standards. There is a growing expectation of private regulation to adopt and maintain high standards of ethics and sustainability in GVCs (Wahl & Bull, 2014) in particular with respect to ecological (green) considerations (Marchi, Maria, & Micelli, 2013). Concerns about sustainability are noted by Fung: “Production and consumption is increasing in Asia and other parts of the world as living standards rise and populations become better off, which is certainly a good thing. However, it also places new demands on the environment and depletes natural resources. Clearly, traditional growth models and patterns of consuming natural resources may be unsuited for a changing world, particularly one which will have 9 billion people by 2050. These issues require attention from both business and government. We need to produce and consume more sustainably, and foster innovation” (2013: xxi).

Future Challenges: Anti-​ globalization and the Innovation Imperative Looking ahead, it seems clear that EM firms will not be able to focus solely on cost advantages; they must also innovate if they are to climb the value chain and create more sustainable business models (Yip & McKern, 2016). However, it would also appear that political populism and anti-​globalization sentiments could decelerate the progress and growth of GVCs (Prashantham, Eranova, & Couper, 2018). GVCs result in the offshoring (and often outsourcing) of activities from high-​cost DMs. This can result in job losses, although perhaps more unemployment is attributed to GVCs, as compared to other developments such as robotics and automation, than is warranted (Ghemawat, 2017). Nonetheless, GVCs constitute an important manifestation of globalization that has attracted strident criticism, with some populist politicians in the West calling for multinationals to retain jobs in DMs. Indian IT outsourcing firms have experienced

604    Shameen Prashantham and George S. Yip anxiety on account of the tightening of visa rules, which may limit their participation in certain aspects of the software services GVC. It has to be recognized, however, that the anti-​globalization backlash is largely indicative of the lack of equitable sharing of the benefits of globalization (Meyer, forthcoming). Thus concerns about globalization do reflect some legitimate concerns which, in a sense, relate to the point on sustainability above. An area of importance from both a theoretical and practical purpose will undoubtedly be the cultivation of sustainable GVCs with widespread gains for all participants. Fung’s observations are astute and pertinent: Sustainability has another important side—​that of social inclusion and distributional equity. This is essentially about fairness. In terms of global value chains, it is about ensuring that those who manufacture and assemble goods share equitably in the benefits. It is about creating an environment in which small and medium-​sized enterprises can participate in supply chains, without being shut out by costly regulation, poor administration or exclusionary behaviour. (2013: xxi)

Limitations of space preclude a detailed discussion of these topics—​but it can be safely concluded that more research on these topics is warranted (see also Buckley, Doh, & Benischke, 2017). These issues also point to the importance of gaining a deeper understanding of GVC dynamics. This is important because of “the complexity of a global value chain configuration that may be constantly evolving due to changes in countries, industries and firms” (Hernández & Pedersen, 2017:  138). Yet, most studies adopt a static perspective of GVCs (Yeung & Coe, 2015). Going forward, we anticipate (and encourage) greater research attention to be paid to emergent changes within GVCs and the development of new ones—​and emerging markets will remain an exciting and fertile context for such work.

Notes 1. Although some IB scholars were quick to reflect on the theoretical implications of phenomena such as offshoring (e.g., Doh, 2005), there was arguably a longer tradition of related work in other disciplines. In addition to the work of sociologist Gary Gereffi cited above, research in economic geography on global production networks—​organizational arrangements “comprising interconnected economic and noneconomic actors coordinated by a global lead firm and producing goods or services across multiple geographic locations for worldwide markets” (Yeung & Coe, 2015: 32) is highly relevant. 2. The great unknown is Africa. It certainly has low labor costs but other factor costs, especially transportation and energy, are higher than in DMs (UNIDO, 2015). In Sun (2017), a McKinsey consultant explains how Chinese investment is reshaping Africa so that it has potential to become the world’s next great manufacturing center. Drivers include having the largest pool of labor in the world, Africans gaining manufacturing experience by working for Chinese companies will eventually become bosses themselves, and Chinese investment is actually improving institutions in Africa. However, some may see this as naïve and

Local Firms Within Global Value Chains    605 overoptimistic due to the de-​industrialization of certain African sectors. It remains to be seen whether Sun’s (2017) predictions come true.

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Chapter 25

Emerging Ma rk et Multinationa l s i n Advanced Ec onomi e s Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh

The last three decades have seen rapid growth of emerging economy multinationals (EMNEs) which are the vehicles of an increasing amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) originating from countries traditionally positioned as the main recipients of FDI. Cross-​border FDI capital flow statistics show a steady trend of the EMNEs’ increasing significance in the world FDI. Figure 25.1 shows that FDI outflow from emerging economies has grown steadily for the period from 1990 to 2015, during which its average growth rate has exceeded that of outward FDI from developed economies. As a result, the global FDI landscape has changed from an undisputed dominance of the “North,” where over 90% of the world FDI originated from developed economies in the early 1990s, to the fast catch-​up of the “South,” where the proportion of world FDI contributed by emerging economies increased to nearly 30% after the global financial crises (i.e., 2010 and onward). Although the majority of emerging economies remain net recipients of FDI, the ratio of their outward to inward FDI flow increased steadily, especially since 2005. A few major emerging economies that have been the most popular destinations of FDI, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), are also becoming important sources of FDI from the South. Despite their relative inexperience with managing foreign operations, many EMNEs have targeted highly competitive foreign markets in advanced economies for their FDIs. Based on UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2017, in 2016, greenfield FDI from developing economies into developed economies totaled US$48,470 million, a 43.43% increase from the previous year, which accounted for 19.62% of the total value of greenfield FDI into developed economies. Also in 2016, the value of cross-​border M&As (mergers and acquisitions) by developing economy acquirers of developed economy targets was recorded at US$87,174 million, a 7.78% increase from the previous year, which accounted for 10.97% of the total value of cross-​border M&As that involved developed economy

610    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh Outward FDI of developed countries and emerging markets

Growth rate (%)

FDI US$ (millions) 2000000

200.00

1800000 150.00

1600000 1400000

100.00

1200000 1000000

50.00

800000 0.00

600000 400000

–50.00

200000 –100.00 1990

1995 Developed economies

2000

Year

Emerging markets

2005

2010

Growth rate of DE

0 2015

Growth rate of EM

Figure  25.1  Annual flow of outward FDI from developed economies and emerging markets during 1990–​2015 Source: Balance of payment data from UNCTAD

targets. Among developing economies, China stands out as the largest investor in terms of total FDI outflow (third largest in the world after the United States and Japan), and has emerged as a leading investor in developed economies, undertaking a number of cross-​border M&A megadeals (World Investment Report, 2016). More than just a snapshot, research based on empirical data over the past two decades suggests that a substantial proportion of emerging economy investors have targeted developed economy FDI destinations, even in the relatively early stages of their internationalization. For example, Yuan, Pangarkar, and Wu (2016) analyzed the location of Chinese outward FDI from 1992 to 2005 and found that 483 of the total 661 (73.1%) foreign subsidiaries of Chinese listed companies were located in developed countries. Similarly, analyzing cross-​border acquisitions made by Indian publicly traded companies from 2000 to 2007, Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor (2010) showed that 76% of the acquisitions were in advanced economies, with the United States (32.7%), the United Kingdom (14.4%), and Germany (4.9%) being the top three target countries. Collectively, empirical evidence indicates the persistent trend and increasing prominence of the phenomenon of FDI from the South (developing economies) to the North (advanced economies). The phenomenon of FDI from the South to the North is relatively recent, and is often contrasted with the more conventional type of foreign direct investment that flows out of advanced economies into less advanced foreign markets, hence often referred to as “unconventional” or “the other way around” (Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). International business research has started to reveal the unconventional characteristic of EMNEs at the

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    611 firm level. Given their home country conditions, global business landscape, and stage of development, EMNEs often pursue internationalization with resource bases and strategic objectives quite different from those of conventional MNEs from advanced economies (Cuervo-​Cazurra, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012). An important strategic feature of EMNEs is that many of them have strategic intent to break through their domestic institutional constraints on their growth and profitability potentials, by seeking opportunities in foreign strategic factor and product markets through conducting FDI, especially in advanced economies (Cui, Meyer, & Hu, 2014; Gubbi et al., 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). Their resource bases, which are shaped by their home-​country institutional and market conditions, potentially complement the strategic assets of advanced economies when the two are effectively combined and internalized in EMNEs (Hennart, 2012; Luo & Child, 2015). Accordingly, driven by the exploratory strategic orientation and potential resource complementarity, a large proportion of FDI projects originating from emerging markets is targeted toward advanced economies, hereinafter referred to as “South-​North investment,” a phenomenon often contrasted with the conventional pattern of FDI flowing from advanced to emerging economies. This phenomenon has drawn the attention of international business scholars in recent years as it presents a challenge of directly applying the dominant FDI theories that have been developed in the context of advanced EMNEs (Narula, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012). This chapter aims to take stock of existing research on EMNEs in advanced host economies. Both the extent of such investments and the stage in the firms’ internationalization life cycle in which these occur challenge some of the tenets of the traditional theories of multinational enterprises. We critically evaluate the literature on this phenomenon, and identify three research themes related to the strategic motivation behind the investments, institutional influences, and network-​based resources that explain EMNEs’ aggressive forays in advanced economies. Collectively, these theoretical and empirical studies contribute to a rethinking and refinement of current traditional understanding of the pace and paths of firm internationalization. We further suggest that the unique strategic asset-​seeking orientation behind EMNE investments in advanced markets and the institutional support facilitating such expansion create important strategic and organizational challenges for these firms in their globalization efforts. Accordingly, we identify some research possibilities around related themes of ambidexterity, comparative institutionalism, and legitimacy that may facilitate further theorization and a better understanding of both normative and policy implications of the increasing investments of EMNEs in more developed economic and institutional environments.

A Review of the Research Streams To take stock of the knowledge generated from academic research on South-​North investment, we conducted a comprehensive review of the related studies in the international business literature.

612    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh

Scope of Review We focused on peer-​reviewed journal articles. To ensure a comprehensive coverage of existing studies, we set our literature search to cover the Financial Times’ top 50 journals from 1990 to 2017, and other popular international business and emerging market-​ focused journals from 2012 to 2017. We checked the title, abstract, and keywords of all the papers within this coverage to identify if a study directly investigates, or has a research question closely related to, the phenomenon of South-​North investment. As a result, we obtained a collection of 317 articles. Sixty of these papers are published in the Financial Times’ top 50 journals, most noticeably the Journal of International Business Studies (36), Journal of Management Studies (8), and Strategic Management Journal (5). The remainder of the articles appear in a wide range of outlets, including those focusing on international business topics, such as the Journal of World Business (40), International Business Review (34), Journal of International Management (24), Management International Review (20), and Global Strategy Journal (12), and those outlets with a focus on emerging market contexts, such as Asia Pacific Journal of Management (21) and Management and Organization Review (13). The accumulation of this body of research accelerated over the years, with only 6 articles published in the 1990s, 81 articles published between 2000 and 2009, and the rest (230 articles) published from 2010 to 2017. These data show that the phenomenon of South-​North investment is becoming increasingly popular among business scholars, especially those working in the fields of international business and strategic management. To evaluate the cumulative knowledge generated from the research on South-​North investment, we categorized the existing studies into research themes based on the theoretical perspective adopted or developed in individual studies and the core arguments made in these studies. The most popular research themes are asset-​seeking strategic orientation (99 studies), institutional influence (129 studies), and network-​based approach to internationalization (49 studies). Other theoretical perspectives adopted in this literature include the resource-​based view, the international development path model, signaling theory, and corporate governance perspectives. Our categorization is not mutually exclusive, as some studies integrate multiple theoretical perspectives related to different research themes. In an attempt to critically evaluate the cumulative knowledge generated in this body of literature, we focused on the three main research themes to synthesize their key arguments and findings as well as potential knowledge gaps.

Theme 1: Asset-​seeking Strategic Orientation Asset-​seeking is among a set of FDI motivations applicable to multinational firms in general (Dunning & Lundan, 2008), and has been highlighted as a central feature of many EMNEs, dominating their FDI motivation and strategic decision-​making. A gen­ eral observation is that EMNEs, on average, lack firm-​specific competitive advantages in the traditional sense, such as technological and managerial know-​how, especially when compared to their counterparts in advanced economies (Hennart, 2009; Luo &

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    613 Tung, 2007; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). Therefore, they lack firm-​specific advantages for asset exploitation but are motivated to engage in asset exploration to catch up with more competitive global market players (Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2015; Cui et al., 2014), often by investing in advanced economies (Cui, Fan, Liu, & Li, 2017; Gubbi et al., 2010). While the notion of asset augmentation is an inherent component of the existing theoretical insights offered by the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 2006; Narula, 2012), its strong relevance for the phenomenon of South-​North investment has led researchers to articulate and contextualize its significance by introducing new theoretical perspectives. One prominent perspective is the springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2017). It argues that instead of exploiting existing ownership advantages, many EMNEs take international investment as a springboard to pursue their long-​term and learning-​ oriented strategic objectives. South-​North investment can potentially help EMNEs compensate for their competitive disadvantages by acquiring technology, brands, and other strategic assets through internationalization in order to redress their ownership disadvantages, overcome their latecomers’ deficit of international management experience by seeking information and managerial know-​how from advanced markets, and alleviate domestic factor market constraints. Overall, based on the springboard perspective, South-​North investment can serve as a long-​term oriented strategy to enhance EMNEs’ competitive positions. A related perspective is the LLL (linkage-​leverage-​learning) perspective (Mathews, 2006), which provides a similar explanation for the asset-​seeking strategic orientation of South-​North investment. This perspective is in line with a network-​based approach to internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), another major research theme discussed later in this chapter, but with strong emphasis on the learning potentials from forming international linkages with business partners and economic actors in more advanced foreign markets. The learning motive can drive EMNEs’ effort of global network building for asset-​seeking. Awate et al. (2015) show that EMNEs can respond to the growing geographic dispersion of knowledge sources by expanding their R&D (research and development) networks and FDI locations. The research on the motives of EMNEs investing in advanced economies presents a number of open questions that warrant future research efforts. First, the diversities across home countries and industries are underexplored. Many empirical studies draw on single host countries (typically China or India) or single industries (typically manufacturing) and thus face limitations to their generalizability. Although the conclusions may be indicative, it would be useful for future studies to use samples from a broader range of industries and emerging economies to verify this empirically. Research has also been uneven in terms of industrial sectors within South-​North investment, e.g., distinction between manufacturing and services sectors. Second, as EMNEs mature and the global competitive landscape evolves, the motives underlying South-​North investment may change over time. Thus, a dynamic approach to understanding EMNEs’ internationalization path is needed. Do new ventures in emerging economies initially internationalize into emerging economies before entering developed economies? And where are they going after investing in developed

614    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh economies? The migration of new ventures’ internationalization activities may be an interesting and a fruitful area for future research. Longitudinal analysis of EMNEs’ decision-​making can help map out the evolution of their motives and structures over time. While the existing research has established asset-​seeking as a strategic orientation that motivates many EMNEs to engage in FDI and influence their strategic choices such as FDI location choice (Cui et al., 2017; Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002) and mode of entry (Cui & Jiang, 2009), there is relatively less evidence regarding the performance outcomes of asset-​seeking FDI by EMNEs. Scholars have raised concerns over the feasibility and cost of asset-​seeking strategic orientation of EMNEs. For example, Luo and Tung (2007) point out learning challenges for EMNEs to utilize the springboard effectively. In particular, an important bottleneck for EMNEs to execute their asset-​seeking strategy is human resource management (Meyer & Xin, 2017; Tung, 2007), especially the lack of managerial capabilities of coordinating global operations and managing global talents. Empirically, the performance evidence, especially financial returns, regarding the foreign assets acquisition activities of EMNEs is also inconclusive (e.g., Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011; Tao, Liu, Gao, & Xia, 2017), with some evidence directly contradicting traditional theoretical prediction, and requires new explanations (McCarthy, Dolfsma, & Weitzel, 2016). Overall, it remains a knowledge gap as to whether and how EMNEs can realize their asset-​seeking objectives of competitive catch-​up. Studies in this research stream have pointed to two potential approaches to investigating the performance outcomes of asset-​seeking FDI by EMNEs. One approach is based on the theoretical perspective of strategic ambidexterity (Hsu, Lien, & Chen, 2013; Luo & Rui, 2009). Asset-​seeking can be financially costly and have uncertain return on investment. As such, EMNEs may need to balance their asset-​ seeking activities with asset exploitation efforts to diversify risks and create synergy to sustain and maximize the learning benefits from asset-​seeking (Li & Cui, 2018). The other approach is to extend the research of absorptive capacity to the context of EMNEs’ asset-​seeking FDIs. The path-​dependent nature of absorptive capacity has led researchers to investigate the relationship between EMNEs’ knowledge seeking from inward FDI and their outward FDI (Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012; Li, Yi, & Cui, 2017a), and the sequential entry strategy of EMNEs to accumulate learning capabilities for asset-​seeking (Elango & Pattnaik, 2011).

Theme 2: Institutional Influence The institution-​based view of strategy suggests that the institutional environment in which a firm operates can influence its strategic choices directly, for example, by regulatory constraints and incentives, or indirectly through shaping firm resource and capability development as well as organizational structures (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). This perspective is widely applied by scholars as a theoretical foundation to examine the phenomenon of EMNEs (Meyer & Peng, 2016), mainly because the home-​country institutional characteristics of EMNEs are significantly different

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    615 from those faced by conventional multinationals. Existing studies have highlighted institutional voids as a main characteristic of emerging economies that differentiates them from developed economies. The notion of “institutional voids” does not suggest the absence of institutions but rather the underdevelopment of formal market-​supporting institutions (e.g., prop­ erty rights and contract laws) commonly seen in advanced market economies. Such voids then give rise to various non-​market alternatives that coordinate economic activities, such as the economic planning mechanisms of the state (Kohli, 2004; Nee & Opper, 2007), the informal institutions supporting relationship-​based (as opposed to rule-​based) transactions (Peng, 2003), and business groups as an organizational form that internalizes transactions (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2011; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Home-​country institutional voids and the above-​mentioned non-​market alternatives can explain the motives and strategic choices of EMNEs investing in advanced host economies. There are at least two lines of argument for an institutional explanation of South-​ North investment. The first is institutional imprinting, which suggests that the home-​ country institutional conditions of EMNEs influence their resources and capabilities, as well as risk orientations that shape their internationalization strategies. For instance, Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, and Zheng (2007) observe that the capital market imperfections in China have led to a perverse reaction to risk and return by many Chinese MNEs, which tend to venture into unfamiliar and challenging advanced economies despite their lack of international management experience. Also, states’ coordination of economy can influence firms’ resource and capabilities to engage in South-​North investment. Some EMNEs are backed by their home-​country state, which provides policy, information, and financial support to develop national champions of internationalization (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Yamakawa et al., 2008). State logics are imprinted in these internationalizing firms and may drive them to invest in host countries that are of important strategic and economic interest to the home-​country state. Such institutional influence is particularly significant in state-​owned multinationals as their resources and governance are more closely tied to the home-​country government (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Musacchio, Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015). The imprinting of state logics can also influence the execution of South-​ North investment. For instance, the high bidding price of some EMNEs to acquire assets in developed countries reflects non-​commercial motives of the home-​country state, because these transactions display “national pride” and are seen as a landmark movement in elevating the status of the home country (Hope et al., 2011). The second line of argument in the institutional perspective emphasizes the agency of firms in responding to external institutional conditions. EMNEs may use outward FDI as a strategic response to home-​country institutional deficiencies. Institutional voids hinder the development of product and factor markets at home, motivating emerging economy firms to escape from such environments by entering developed economies. Madhok and Keyhani (2012) argue that EMNEs conduct acquisitions in advanced economies to overcome their liabilities of emergingness

616    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh which are imprinted onto them by their home-​country institutional contexts. The difference in the development of formal institutions between home and advanced host countries also motivates some EMNEs to engage in “institutional arbitrage” (Boisot & Meyer, 2008) as an effective strategy of overcoming home-​country institutional constraints. Outward FDI can also be carried out as a strategic response to the unfavorable power dependencies EMNEs face in their home institutional environments. Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu (2014) suggest that institutional transition at home reduces entry barriers of foreign competitors which results in higher interdependence through home market exchange between emerging economy firms and their foreign competitors. In this situation, outward FDI may be conducted as a strategic response to this heightened interdependence. However, the need for such a strategic response is weakened if emerging economy firms can form coalitions with home-​country state agencies to resolve the power imbalance with foreign competitors (Xia et al., 2014). Other research shows that outward FDI can be a strategic escape from home-​country state itself. An explanation for why state-​ owned entities in India might seek a global footprint and investment is that they are motivated by breaking free from power imbalance and establishing resource independence from other state actors (such as government ministries and government agencies) by becoming a multinational firm and/​or by generating global cash flows (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014). While they both highlight the strong influence of institutional forces on South-​ North investment, the imprinting and active agency arguments bring out some conflicting ideas. Essentially, the imprinting argument follows a top-​down view of institutional influence on organizations, whereas the active agency argument focuses on firms’ self-​interest and strategic responses. This divergence leads to some contrasting views in the research of South-​North investment. For instance, is the home-​country state a source of support and therefore an enabling factor for EMNEs (Luo et al., 2010; Yamakawa et al., 2008), or is it a source of institutional constraints and liability (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Huang, Xie, Li, & Reddy, 2017) that hinders firms’ autonomy to diversify their operations internationally? Also, while EMNEs may be motivated to escape their home institutional constraints (Xia et al., 2014), are they necessarily able to escape given their resource dependence on home institutional actors and the resultant institutional constraints (Huang et al., 2017)? We think there is unlikely to be a uniform answer to these questions, as the dynamics between EMNEs and their home institutions will vary substantially across countries, industries, and stages of intuitional transition in emerging economies. For example, while institutional escape may be feasible for firms in deregulated and globalized industries, it may not be feasible for firms in strategic industries that remain in the control of the state. Also, the varieties of capitalism systems across emerging economies (e.g., Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009; Witt & Redding, 2013) may help explain the relative salience of the imprinting and active agency effects of home institutional influence. Therefore, a key direction to further advance this research stream is to focus on institutional diversities across countries, industries, and time.

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    617

Theme 3: Network-​based Internationalization A network-​based approach has been widely adopted by scholars to study the internationalization process of EMNEs, especially their investment in economically and institutional distant and challenging locations (i.e., developed host countries) (Khavul, Perez-​Nordtvedt, & Wood, 2010; Li, Meyer, Zhang, & Ding, 2017b; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010). Firms operate in networks and networks can expand beyond national borders, which then serve as bridges for firms to expand their physical presence to foreign locations. This argument is in line with the network-​based internationalization process mode (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), which claims that networks serve as an important source of knowledge and relational resources that enable internationalizing firms to overcome liabilities of outsidership when entering foreign markets. This network-​based approach of internationalization is particularly relevant to EMNEs because, being “latecomers” to the international market, EMNEs tend to lack firm internal capabilities of managing foreign market expansion and therefore need to draw on external capabilities that exist in their networks. This is especially the case for EMNEs investing in advanced economies, where EMNEs’ internal advantages of navigating poor country governance conditions (see Cuervo-​Cazurra & Genc, 2008) do not apply. Networks provide access to resources and information that are critical for high-​risk investments, such as EMNE’s FDIs into economically and institutionally distant foreign markets in advanced economies, because of the high cost, and thus low feasibility, of the market alternatives to access such resources and information. Various levels of networks can help EMNEs expand internationally; these levels include personal networks of managers (e.g., managerial ties and social capitals), inter-​organizational networks at the corporate level, and networks at the country level. Personal-​level networks facilitate South-​North investment typically through the social capital of managers with other important business partners and political actors. Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) show that EMNEs are motivated by accruing and exploiting social capital for their internationalization. Similarly, Yiu, Lau, and Bruton, (2007) highlight the importance of personal networks of top management teams with home-​country business and political stakeholders for their firms’ international venturing. Manolova, Manev, and Gyoshev (2010) also show that domestic personal networks can facilitate the international venturing of EMNEs. Beyond facilitating the incidence of foreign market entry, personal networks can also influence strategic choices and performance of EMNEs. For instance, networks of compatriots in foreign locations can also influence strategic decisions of internationalizing firms such as entry modes and location choices (Jean, Tan, & Sinkowicz, 2011; Tan & Meyer, 2011). International network of CEOs can also influence the speed and performance of international venturing by EMNEs (Musteen, Francis, & Datta, 2010). At the corporate level, inter-​firm networks can take the forms of equity-​or non-​equity-​ based strategic alliances, upstream or downstream supply chain linkages, or other forms of inter-​firm interactions. In terms of more formal type of linkages, strategic alliance and

618    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh equity ties with advanced economy partners can motive EMNEs to leverage such linkages for learning. For instance, Lecraw (1993) studied outward FDI (OFDI) by Indonesian firms and suggested that strategic equity holding by foreign investors facilitates outward FDI, which motivates EMNEs’ FDI in advanced economies. Emphasizing the network learning effect, Li, Yi, and Cui (2017a) show that EMNEs’ inward international activities, such as joint venture with foreign firms, can provide learning benefits that facilitate their outward international activities. Similarly, Liu, Gao, Lu, and Lioliou (2016) find that domestic learning through collaboration with foreign firms at home not only directly contributes to foreign subsidiary performance but also enhances the benefit of host market learning through the synergy between domestic and foreign market learning. The effect of country-​level networks in facilitating EMNEs’ internationalization is relatively less researched. One exemption is that of Li et al. (2017b), who find that good diplomatic relations between countries induce firms to invest in friendly host countries. They further show that the effect of this country-​level network is contingent on organizational and personal network linkages between the focal firm and its home-​country government. As the diplomatic and political networks within which governments operate tend to manifest in formal institutions (e.g., bilateral or multilateral treaties for trade and investment), research on the country-​level network effect on South-​North investment may cross the theoretical boundary of network and institutional perspectives. Overall, the network perspective complements the assets-​seeking and institutional perspectives in explicating how some EMNEs can effectively manage learning and institutional distance in advanced economies. The research on the network-​based internationalization of EMNEs can benefit from a deeper understanding of the boundary conditions of the network effects. The value of social capital is contingent. Research has suggested that network facilitation of internationalization is more relevant when EMNEs are in early stage of development, that is, when they are small in size and internationally inexperienced. Elango and Pattnaik (2007) and Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) document how international networks helped small and young Indian firms to build capabilities in their internationalization process. The network effects will weaken as firms develop. Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) find that initial stocks of social capital and networks may depreciate, ceasing to yield new growth opportunities beyond their utility life cycle. Manolova et al. (2010) also find that the positive effect of inter-​firm networks on internationalization is negatively moderated by firm age. This line of research presents several gaps. First, we need a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between network-​building and internationalization. While the value of firms’ initial networks may diminish over time, firms can build new networks as they internationalize, and such new networks may facilitate further global expansion. These mutually reinforcing and iterative processes of network-​building and internationalization remain underexplored. Second, while the research has primarily focused on external networks, the role of EMNEs’ internal network, namely, the network of a portfolio of foreign operations, has not been sufficiently studied in relation to internationalization process. Third, what is the potential downside of networks and how do we mitigate it? Prior research has found that extensive reliance on networks may hinder international

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    619 performance of EMNEs (Musteen et al., 2010). There is little research on the potential network locked-​in effect in the context of South-​North investment.

Critical Perspectives The preceding review of the literature on emerging market multinationals in advanced economies highlights three key aspects which need critical evaluation and also offer opportunities for further research. First, there seems to be a general consensus that many investments by EMNEs in advanced economies are motivated by the need to acquire strategic assets, both tangible and intangible, in order to move up the value curve and have the ability to catch up with global competitors. Thus, such South-​North investment flows are often exploratory in nature where investing emerging market firms search for knowledge bases, product markets, and organizational practices from sources distinct and distant from those that existed in the past (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Second, seeking strategic assets in advanced economies (which may include brands, technology, and natural resources) is often risky because of a combination of resource requirements and liabilities of foreignness faced by EMNEs in early stages of internationalization. Such risk-​taking requires unique institutional support. Third, the exploratory nature of internationalization and the support of such internationalization by state or state-​associated institutions creates legitimacy issues for EMNEs in advanced country markets. These three inter-​related aspects create challenges for these firms to achieve their investment objectives. For instance, according to The Economist, “China Inc’s adventures abroad in the past 15 years have been a mixed bag. Thousands of small deals have taken place, some of which will succeed. But of the mergers and acquisitions that have been worth $1bn or more, it is a different story” (“Chinese companies have a weak record abroad,” 2017: 69). Similarly, commenting about Indian firms’ overseas acquisitions, The Economist stated that “the tide of foreign acquisitions by Indian companies will continue to rise, with more and bigger deals. How successful they will be is less certain” (“India’s acquisitve companies,” 2007: 71). In the following sections we evaluate the process and outcome of EMNEs’ investments in advanced economies along these three inter-​related issues. Each of these tackles a unique characteristic of EMNEs investing in advanced host economies, and often contains varied theoretical viewpoints which can be paradoxical and complementary at the same time. We analyze these perspectives and offer some research possibilities.

Exploratory Search Behavior and the Ambidextrous Emerging Market Multinational In the context of firms from emerging markets, the reviewed literature suggests that entering advanced country markets constitutes an exploratory aspect of search,

620    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh while entry into other developing country markets represents a more exploitation-​ oriented approach. This is in line with the observation that “South-​South” flows of goods and services are more common as developing country firms seek markets abroad, with the general argument being that such markets enjoy certain fundamental commonalities with respect to institutional voids and imperfect factor markets with each other. In parallel, the argument that emerging market firms also find it important to enter advanced country markets in order to gain technological and market know-​how that enables them to become more globally competitive notwithstanding the relatively alien, more competitive and sophisticated environments therein (what Luo & Tung, 2017, term “springboarding”). This supports the general idea that moving into Western markets for firms for developing economy firms constitutes “experimentation with new alternatives,” which March (1991: 85) argued to be the essence of exploration. In essence, EMNEs can use a combination of exploration and exploitation across geographical markets as dual vehicles to achieve firm growth and competitiveness. However, they face a fundamental dilemma in the balancing of exploration and exploitation due to implicit tensions between these strategies. Literature suggests that exploratory search behaviors, which are characterized by discovery, experimentation, and risk-​taking, are fundamentally different from exploitative behaviors, which are characterized by refinement and efficiency (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996). As a result, exploitation’s reliance on existing routines retards adjustment to novel situations and forecloses a firm’s ability to perceive new strategic options (Cyert & March, 1992). This self-​reinforcing bias in “retrofitting” existing routines purges variation and impairs the capacity for exploratory learning (Baum & Ingram, 1998). Further, “positive, proximate, and predictable” returns from exploitation compete for resources with exploratory investments that have “uncertain, distant and often negative” returns (March, 1991). Building on the idea that being able to reconcile these trade-​offs and accomplish conflicting objectives is a virtue (March & Simon, 1958), Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) proposed an ambidextrous organization as one that is able to simultaneously blend exploration and exploitation activities. The virtues of ambidexterity and its associated challenges have also been discussed in some recent studies on EMNEs. For instance, Luo and Rui (2009) propose a multidimensional concept of ambidexterity encompassing temporal, contextual, stakeholder, and organizational aspects. According to Luo and Tung (2018: 141), “[s]‌pringboard is a strategic means by which [EMNEs] capture values of ambidexterity—​acquiring global resources they need and augmenting global competitiveness at new heights.” While the literature on EMNEs’ investments in advanced economies has acknowledged the tensions inherent in balancing exploration and exploitation along multiple aspects, and alluded to the virtues of ambidexterity, how such ambidexterity is achieved by these EMNEs has not been adequately addressed. Organizational literature has provided some possibilities about how organizations balance conflicting demands. It has been suggested, for example, that firms can manage this duality through structural ambidexterity (separation of business units) (Duncan,

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    621 1976) that entails task partitioning, temporal detachment, and separation of the organization into disparate, unconnected business units as a way to resolve the tension. So, for example, Christensen (1997) points to spin-​offs and structural separation while the literature on multinationals proposes the idea of matrix structures as a possible solution to managing the dual needs of efficiency and adaptability (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), on the other hand, adopt an interpretation based on organizational climate to advance the notion of contextual ambidexterity. Focusing on the behavioral aspect of individuals throughout the organization, they suggest that organizations may be able to develop such a capacity within a single business unit by building processes and systems that empower employees to strike a balance in their internal day-​ to-​day activities. The possibility of structural or contextual ambidexterity as a way to balance the tension seems plausible for emerging market multinationals, but it needs to be assessed in terms of the ability for these firms, while still facing liabilities of foreignness, to implement complex organizational structures. The normative implications of the theory of the multinational have led to a predominantly structural solution in response to the need to balance supply-​side efficiency with demand-​side localization requirements. However, such suggestions of creating complex matrix structures that balance both product-​and geography-​based organizational structures may seem impractical when one considers EMNEs that are in their initial phases of international expansion, especially in advanced markets. Furthermore, as pointed out by Williamson (2014: 164), the learning-​and innovation-​based motivation behind the EMNEs’ investments in advanced markets require a rethinking about their organizational structures and processes, ones that would focus on “resource interactions” rather than “resource assembly.” For such firms, another possibility of balancing exploration activities in advanced economies while exploiting existing resources in the home and other developing country markets is through choices of organizational boundaries when investing in foreign markets. Our review of the literature as well as evidence of investment modes in advanced economies shows that firms use both collaborative modes (through alliances and joint ventures) and wholly owned subsidiaries (primarily through acquisitions) in order to gain a foothold in these markets. Furthermore, evidence also suggests that within the wholly owned subsidiaries approach of market entry, EMNEs can use a variety of organizational process to manage them, from totally autonomous local management, some of which is inherited during the acquisitions, to infusing the top-​management hierarchy with home market managers. The diversity in both organizational design and the management structures in these international investments creates different transaction cost and agency issues. This lends itself for further research endeavors to look into which combination of design structures allows emerging market multinationals to achieve their exploratory goals. In particular, issues related to tacit and explicit knowledge flows from advanced countries and their absorption within the emerging market multinationals can be examined through the choice of organizational design.

622    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh

Home-​country Institutional Variations The rapid proliferation of EMNEs and their distinct modes of internationalization in terms of moving very quickly into culturally and institutionally distant markets (i.e., advanced countries) as well through more involved and thus risky entry modes (FDI in general and acquisitions in particular) have challenged the two traditional theoretical paradigms in international business: the internationalization process model and the internalization theory and related OLI (ownership, location, and internalization advantages) paradigm (see Aulakh, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). In gen­ eral, both the speed and mode of internationalization of EMNEs connote greater risk-​ taking in terms of geographic scope and sunk costs. This naturally leads to the question as to how relatively resource-​poor and internationally experienced firms are able to undertake risky strategic actions. The existing literature points to two important factors influencing risk-​taking in organizations:  first, firms should have the propensity to undertake riskier strategic decisions such as FDI, and second, firms should have the resources (managerial, financial, strategic) to support such investments (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Hoskisson, Chirico, Zyung, & Gambeta, 2017). Some recent studies have started to examine risk-​taking EMNEs through the lenses of firm resources and managerial characteristics. For instance, Gaur, Kumar, and Singh (2014) examine how firm capabilities (reflected in R&D and marketing efforts) along with the ability to access business groups’ related resources allow Indian firms to rapidly internationalize. Chittoor, Aulakh, and Ray (2015) examine the role of managerial experience and ownership patterns in facilitating acquisitions of Indian multinationals. Similarly, Cui and Jiang (2012) highlight the role of the state in providing the resources and absorbing the investment risk for Chinese multinationals. These studies provide some initial evidence regarding the diversity of theoretical underpinnings (including agency, institutional, resource-​based, prospect theories) that can explain emerging market multinationals in advanced markets as well as point to the multi-​level interactions (manager, firm, industry, group, etc.) influencing their risk-​taking behavior. We believe this preliminary evidence opens up numerous research opportunities to further examine these firms’ internationalization behavior. In particular, while the role of the state (in the case of China) and business groups (in the case of India) in facilitating international expansion of these countries’ firms has found empirical support, we believe that more comparative studies would shed light on the various mechanisms in play and better explain firm risk-​taking. Both the state and business groups can be thought of as different types of institutions that share some characteristics in terms of resource support and payback expectations, but they also differ substantially in terms of agency costs, private gains versus losses, and so on. More broadly, McCarthy et al. (2016) call for more comparative research to better understand how various societal institutions (e.g., family logic), business systems, and cultural features may influence the performance of EMNEs. Further research can examine how the distinct characteristics of these overlapping institutions

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    623 influence different types and forms of risk-​taking. Understanding how different levels of institutions influence firm risk-​taking, understanding the respective roles of country-​level macro-​institutions (e.g., state) and organizational-​level quasi-​macro-​ institutions (e.g., business groups) in promoting FDI in advanced markets, and evaluating their complementary or substitutive nature are important research issues that need to be addressed.

Liability of Foreignness and Building Legitimacy in Advanced Markets There is a long and active research tradition in international business examining whether internationalization enhances firm performance (Contractor, 2012; Hennart, 2012), and empirical results have shown mixed findings. Part of the explanation for unequivocal performance benefits of internationalization (or multinationality) is the need to account for the costs of internationalization which sometimes outweigh the various purported benefits of international expansion. These costs can be classified into two categories: costs related to entering foreign markets or entry costs and those related to managing market and product exploration across countries, or coordination costs (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Lu & Beamish, 2004). EMNEs in general are also likely to face high liabilities of foreignness, especially in advanced markets with different institutional environments (Luo & Tung, 2007). Given that many of these firms expand abroad not just to exploit their ownership advantages but to acquire strategic assets to learn and catch up, a pertinent research question relates to an understanding of the means through which such firms overcome costs associated with liabilities of foreignness. It has been alluded to in the literature that ownership advantages of emerging market multinationals differ from the traditional conceptualization of advantages in terms of proprietary brands, technological know-​how, and organizational processes. Instead, these firms’ advantages are related to their access to low-​cost production, experience of working in environments with institutional voids, and also, importantly, having the resource backing and risk-​taking ability due to close associations with home-​country institutions such as the state and business groups. As discussed above, the risk-​taking behavior involved in investing in advanced markets is facilitated by the unique organizational structures involving state ownership or being part of diversified business groups. This institutional advantage as a way to overcome liabilities of foreignness creates an interesting conundrum for emerging market multinationals operating in advanced economies. On the one hand, the resource backing and risk-​taking ability allow them to leapfrog (or springboard) the traditional incremental approaches to internationalization and allow them to take a longer-​term view for returns from international investments. On the other hand, the sources of the resource backing (i.e., the state or business groups) create legitimacy concerns in the advanced markets.

624    Lin Cui and Preet S. Aulakh There is enough anecdotal evidence in advanced markets such as the EU, Canada, and the USA, where a number of investments by EMNEs (especially in the resource and technology sectors) have been seen with suspicion and some investments have been blocked due to “national interests” and similar concerns. According to a recent article in The Economist, “state-​controlled . . . firms are more likely to provoke opposition abroad from private rivals and from politicians who can argue that . . . the [foreign] government is meddling in their economy” (“Chinese companies have a weak record abroad,” 2017: 69). Similar arguments regarding the opaque ownership structures in business groups create political and economic backlash in advanced markets. This points to a need to examine EMNEs’ investments in advanced markets through a legitimacy perspective. A few recent studies point to the importance of legitimacy in understanding FDI by firms from developing economies. For instance, Marano, Tashman, and Kostova (2017) show how EMNEs overcome the liability of home-​ country institutional voids by signaling through active reporting of their corporate social responsibility initiatives. Similarly, Meyer et al. (2014) examine heterogeneity in entry mode and control choices among Chinese state-​owned and private companies when investing in order to overcome legitimacy considerations in host market institutional contexts. Since legitimacy issues encompass institutional concerns at multiple levels (such as customer acceptance, competitors, financial markets, local politics), future research that complements the political-​economy approach with the organizational aspects of legitimacy can be useful for additional theory development and policy implications in both home and host markets of emerging economy multinationals.

Conclusion Developing countries in general, and their subset, the emerging markets or BRICS in particular, are continuing to increase their weight in the global economy. With their high growth rates, exponentially increasing purchasing power of the rising middle class, and liberalized economies, these countries have become increasingly important as sites for production and consumption of products and services of the traditional multinationals. Concurrently, indigenous firms from these countries have seen huge growth opportunities in their domestic markets but also increased competition from well-​endowed foreign multinationals. As a consequence, firms from these developing economies are becoming more active internationally and use advanced countries markets as vehicles to access critical resources to catch up and compete with the established multinationals. This chapter has evaluated these firms, especially related to the asset-​seeking strategic motivation, institutional influences, and network-​based approach of their investment in advanced countries, and we offer some insights into how their paths of internationalization and related strategies have

Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies    625 challenged and augmented existing theoretical perspectives on multiple fronts. We have also identified some critical theoretical issues that could form the basis of future research. The phenomenon of EMNEs is likely to continue and, with new forms of multinationals proliferating (such as the “micro-​multinational,” see “Rise of the micro-​multinational,” 2017) with diverse motivations and internationalization paths, will continue to offer new opportunities for theory development and refinement in organization studies.

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Chapter 26

Investments by Emerging-​M a rket Multinational s i n Ot h e r Em erging M a rk ets Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro

According to UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) statistics, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows from emerging economies reached US$275.6 billion in 2016, and OFDI flows from emerging economies within total world OFDI flows increased from 1.8% in 2000 to 19% in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017) (see Chapter 1 in this Handbook for the definition of emerging economies). Similarly, OFDI stocks from emerging economies increased from 3.2% in 2000 to 12.8% in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017). A close examination of OFDI data from Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) shows that a significant amount of BRIC OFDI has been conducted in other emerging economies; on average 37% of Chinese OFDI flows went to emerging economies from 2003 to 2012, with the average for India being 47% from 2010 to 2012, for Brazil 51% from 2006 to 2010, and for Russia 21% from 2007 to 2012 (see Figure 26.1 for the OFDI flow information). Despite its apparent importance, research on FDI among emerging economies (E-​ E FDI) has been limited, particularly in comparison to the scholarly attention paid to OFDI from advanced to emerging economies or from emerging to advanced economies (see Chapter 25 in this Handbook for a review on OFDI from emerging to advanced economies). This chapter first reviews the literature on E-​E FDI with a specific focus on the motivations behind E-​E investments, home country-​specific advantages (CSAs) and firm-​specific advantages (FSAs) associated with emerging-​economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs), and the spillovers effects of E-​E FDI on host-​country economic and institutional development. The literature to date is sufficiently sparse that strong conclusions are difficult to draw. This chapter further identifies and proposes directions

632    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro 25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

2003

2004

2005

2006

China

2007 India

2008

2009 Brazil

2010

2011

2012

Russia

Figure 26.1  OFDI flows from BRIC to emerging economies (millions of US dollars) Source: Author calculations based on UNCTAD FDI statistics. Singapore, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan were excluded from the list of developing and transition economies in the UNCTAD FDI statistics (see Chapter 1 in this Handbook for the definition of emerging economies).

for future research necessary to understand EMNEs leveraging of home-​government resources and diplomatic connections advancing investments in other emerging economies; nonmarket strategies important to EMNEs; ownership and corporate governance affecting investment strategy and performance of EMNEs; and E-​E FDI contributions to sustainable development in host countries. Future studies might consider potential heterogeneity among EMNEs with respect to these factors by integrating insights from institutional theory, network theory, political science, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and sustainable-​development research.

Literature Review Table 26.1 summarizes the studies with a focus on E-​E FDI and their key points, dividing them into four categories: motivation for E-​E FDI, home CSAs as a determinant of E-​E FDI, FSAs as a determinant of E-​E FDI, and spillover effects of E-​E FDI in emerging markets—​with key insights discussed for each category.

Motivations for E-​E FDI The FDI literature has established that firms invest overseas for a variety of reasons, including seeking resources, markets, efficiency, and strategic assets (Dunning, 1998).

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    633 Table 26.1 Summary of key literature on FDI among emerging economies (E-​E  FDI) Research topics

Research articles

Key points

Motivations behind E-​E FDI

Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) Gubbi et al. (2010) Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) Makino et al. (2002) Sanfilippo (2010)

Natural-​resource seeking, market seeking, and efficiency seeking are all important motivators, with a particular emphasis on natural-​ resource seeking. Strategic asset-​ seeking is not yet an important motivator.

Home country-​specific advantages (CSAs) of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs)

Duanmu (2014) Li et al. (2017) Li et al. (2013) Lu et al. (2017) Lu et al. (2018) Shapiro et al. (2018)

Home government’s state loans, aid, and diplomatic networks are all important CSAs that contribute to EMNEs’ expansion to emerging markets.

Firm-​specific advantages (FSAs) of EMNEs

Azemar et al. (2012) Carney et al. Taussig (2016) Cuervo-​Cazurra  (2006) Cuervo-​Cazurra and Genc (2008) Del Sol and Kogan (2007) Demir and Hu (2016) Holburn and Zelner (2010) Kumar and Chadha (2009) Ramamurti (2012) Ramos and Ashby (2013) Rui et al. (2016)

EMNEs possess two broad types of FSAs that make them competitive in other emerging markets. First, their cost-​effective processes and income-​appropriate products, developed based on home CSAs in labor and demand, are appropriate for other emerging markets due to economic similarities. Second, their ability to deal with weak institutions at home provides an advantage in other emerging markets with similarly weak institutions.

Spillover effects of E-​E FDI

Amighini and Sanfilippo (2014) D’Amelio et al. (2016) Demir (2016) Kim et al. (2015) Kubny and Voss (2014) Lipsey and Sjöholm (2011) Rui et al. (2016) Santangelo (2018) Seyoum et al. (2015)

Empirical evidence has been mixed regarding whether EMNEs or MNEs from advanced economies generate greater spillover effects on local productivity. Studies on the impact of EMNEs on host-​country sustainable development have been limited.

A review of the E-​E FDI literature suggests that E-​E FDI is largely driven by natural resources, market potential, and low-​production cost-​seeking investments. In comparison, emerging market FDI in advanced economies has been driven relatively more by pursuing strategic assets such as technology and brands, and by looking for better institutional environments (or escaping from bad institutions at home) (Luo & Tung, 2007). Strong evidence suggests that EMNEs are particularly motivated to secure natural resources, even when such resources occur in countries with poor institutional

634    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro environments (Li, Newenham-​Kahindi, Shapiro, & Chen, 2013; Shapiro, Vecino, & Li, 2018). Using information from a broad range of countries, Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) compared the effects of institutional distance on FDI flows from the advanced and emerging economies. They found that EMNEs are deterred by a large institutional distance, similar to the behavior of firms from advanced economies. However, for EMNEs only, the deterring effect of “bad” institutions diminishes in destination countries endowed with abundant natural resources. Sanfilippo (2010) also found that much of Chinese OFDI in Africa comes from state-​ owned enterprises searching for unexplored reserves. Chinese FDI flows to Africa have surged since 2005, with 40.74% in the natural-​resource sector in 2006 (Renard, 2011). From 2003 to 2007, Chinese firms were involved in 81 projects in this sector in at least 25 sub-​Saharan African countries—​40% of them in oil, 55% in mining, and 5% in natural gas (Mlachila & Takebe, 2011). Governments in resource-​poor countries might experience strong political motivation to secure natural resources across the globe. It is also possible that EMNEs excel at navigating the weak institutional systems because of their experience and knowledge accumulated at home, which will be discussed in detail below. Besides natural resources, EMNEs investing in emerging markets also look for the presence of efficiency and market. Sanfilippo (2010), for example, found that Chinese firms in Africa are also interested in exploring the market and the potential for low-​ cost production in Africa, and in taking advantage of favorable trade agreements among African countries. There is evidence supporting the idea that EMNEs have a different motivation when investing in emerging markets than they do in advanced markets. Makino, Lau, and Yeh (2002), for example, studied FDI location choices by firms from a newly industrialized economy (Taiwan). They found that firms tend to invest in advanced countries when they aim to secure strategic assets and overseas markets, and in emerging countries when they focus on improving cost efficiency. Similarly, Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) found that Russian MNEs seek to control upstream natural resources when investing in emerging economies and to control downstream markets when investing in advanced economies. Furthermore, Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor (2010) investigated the extent to which international acquisitions by emerging market firms create shareholder value. They argued that international acquisitions facilitate internalization of critical resources that are both difficult to trade through market transactions and take time to develop internally, thus creating value for emerging market firms. Using data on Indian firms, they found that the magnitude of shareholder value for Indian acquirers is higher when the target firms are located in advanced economies, suggesting that emerging market firms tend to invest in advanced (and not emerging) markets to seek strategic assets. It is possible that the motivation for EMNE foreign investment evolves over time as the firm gains international experience. Elia and Santangelo (2017) suggested that the extent to which EMNEs engage in strategic asset-​seeking acquisitions in advanced countries has evolved over time with the strength of their home-​country national innovation

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    635 system, and with the strength of the national innovation system of the host countries they have targeted. Thus, EMNEs’ strategic asset-​seeking in emerging markets may become more prominent as the national innovation systems of the emerging markets become more developed.

Home CSAs of EMNEs The home countries of EMNEs are characterized by low per capita incomes and weak institutions (Cuervo-​Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2017). Nevertheless, recent studies have shown the importance of investigating the home conditions of EMNEs in understanding their OFDI behavior (Cuervo-​Cazurra, 2011; Hobdari, Gammeltoft, Li, & Meyer, 2017). Thus, we will discuss below the implication of home CSAs for the FSAs of EMNEs, but here we focus on home-​country policies that might encourage FDI by EMNEs. In particular, several studies have focused on the OFDI implications of aid and loans provided by a home government from an emerging market to another emerging market government, and others have focused on the impact of bilateral diplomatic relations on firms’ entry into foreign countries, particularly those with weak institutions. Thus, state loans, aid, and a government’s diplomatic networks are all important CSAs that EMNEs can draw on to facilitate their internationalization efforts. However, these studies have also suggested that home CSAs themselves are not sufficient for EMNEs to overcome the liability of foreignness and that firms differ in their capabilities to utilize these CSAs to their advantage.

Home-​government Loans and Aid Li et al. (2013), based on interviews related to Chinese investments in Africa, proposed a one-​tier bargaining model in which the Chinese government represents the collective interests of Chinese natural-​resource companies in negotiating with host governments in Africa. To secure deals in natural-​resource projects, the Chinese government provides loans from state development banks to fund multiple-​purpose projects in various sectors, with a special focus on infrastructure projects. Chinese firms are often seen as the implementers of deals reached at the governmental level. The approach of loan plus infrastructure development used by the Chinese government not only secures investment opportunities for Chinese natural-​resource firms but also effectively reduces the political risks they may face. However, Li et al. (2013) pointed out the possible boundary conditions of this model: it is limited to emerging economies and is not applicable to advanced economies where infrastructure is better developed, and it is limited to natural-​ resource sectors because of the strategic-​resource interests of the home government. Shapiro et al. (2018) examined whether the one-​tier model based on the African experience also applies to Chinese investments in Latin America. They found that the Chinese government also provides loans and infrastructure support to host countries in exchange for investment deals in the natural-​resource sectors. Such an approach effectively reduces the number of public legal disputes between Chinese companies and

636    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro governments in Latin America, which the authors used as an indicator of the reduced political risk facing Chinese firms. Moreover, they found that Chinese firms have a higher ratio of mining projects involving conflicts with local communities, suggesting that Chinese firms face higher social risks than other foreign investors in the mining sector in Latin America. Thus, Shapiro et al. (2018) concluded that China’s state-​led FDI model helps firms reduce political risks related to host governments but is not useful in curbing social risks related to nongovernment organizations and communities in the host country. This conclusion indicates that the type of nonmarket risks is another boundary condition that defines the limits of the one-​tier model, as well as the effectiveness of the Chinese government’s policies in support of OFDI by its firms. In addition to loans, a home government can also provide aid to a host country to increase bargaining power in relation to the host government. In this regard, the results are somewhat mixed. Lu, Li, Wu, and Huang (2018), for example, found that Chinese firms are inclined to form joint ventures (over wholly owned subsidiaries) in Africa when political hazards are high in the host country, but this relationship is weakened when Chinese government aid to the country increases. This provides indirect evidence that the presence of Chinese government aid lowers political risk. However, using aggregate FDI data for African countries that received Chinese FDI, Lu, Huang, and Muchiri (2017) found that Chinese aid has a negative (instead of an expected positive) moderating effect on the relationship between political risk and FDI in a country, and this moderating effect becomes positive only in those resource-​abundant countries. Thus, the role of government aid in helping to mitigate political risk in host countries is somewhat ambiguous.

Home-​government Diplomacy Recent studies have examined the impact of diplomatic relations between countries on firms’ OFDI behavior. Duanmu (2014) investigated the determinants of the size of FDI greenfield projects by Chinese firms and found that, although expropriation risk in the host country discourages MNE investment, amicable diplomatic relations between home and host countries alleviates this negative impact of expropriation risk on MNE investment. This effect is greater for SOEs than for private firms, implying that SOEs are better able to counterbalance the host government’s power by leveraging the political influence of their home government. Li, Meyer, Zhang, and Ding (2017) further proposed a network perspective to investigate the role of diplomatic relations in connecting politicians and businesses across borders. They suggested that not all firms can benefit from intergovernmental diplomatic networks; only those closely tied to home governments are able to access home governments’ international diplomatic networks. Using Chinese firms’ foreign location choice from 2003 to 2014, they found that state-​controlled firms are more inclined to enter host countries that are friendly to their home country than are private firms; among state-​controlled firms, those controlled by central governments have a greater tendency to enter friendly host countries than those controlled by local governments. Among firms with ties to home central governments, those with organizational ties to

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    637 home governments are more inclined to enter friendly host countries than those with personal ties to home governments. Thus, Li et al. (2017) found that whether home-​government ties are organizational or personal and whether those relationships are with central or local governments affect firms’ ability to access and utilize intergovernmental diplomatic networks. They also found that firms’ ability to utilize diplomatic ties is particularly important when host countries do not have foreign investment protections in place. Specifically, in countries where neutral treatment of foreign investors is absent, having connections with host governments via diplomatic relations becomes more valuable in terms of avoiding political hazards or receiving favorable treatment.

FSAs of EMNEs There is a considerable debate within the EMNE literature regarding whether EMNEs possess FSAs and, if so, whether they are unique or distinct (Cuervo-​Cazurra, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012). Unlike their advanced-​ market counterparts, EMNEs are not equipped with strong brand names or cutting-​edge technologies. Rugman and Li (2007), for example, argued that Chinese MNEs do not possess strong FSAs; instead, their advantages arise primarily from home CSAs such as low labor costs. However, other scholars have argued that EMNEs do possess certain types of FSAs (e.g., low-​cost production capabilities and the ability to deal with weak institutions), which are not the traditional FSAs possessed by MNEs from advanced economies (AMNEs) (Cuervo-​ Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014, 2017; Ramamurti, 2012). Here we focus on two types of FSAs relevant to EMNEs’ ability to compete in other emerging economies.

FSAs Based on Home-​country Advantages One set of potential FSAs that allows EMNEs to succeed in other emerging economies is the ability to understand the needs of relevant customers and to develop low-​ cost products relevant to local customers. For example, Kumar and Chadha (2009) suggested that Indian firms’ FSAs are found in cost-​effective processes and products, derived from their constant dealings with price-​conscious and demanding consumers in the home market. Indian firms also develop organizational and managerial expertise when dealing with cultural diversity at home that enables them to manage operations across different cultural environments. In general, relative economic similarities make the FSAs of EMNEs particularly relevant in other emerging economies. Rui, Zhang, and Shipman (2016) found that EMNEs’ competitive advantage is significantly enhanced by knowledge relevance rather than superiority. By examining Chinese firms’ investments in Africa, Rui, Zhang, and Shipman found that Chinese firms transfer relevant knowledge—​that is, “existing knowledge reconfigured so that recipients can apply it more effectively with less effort in the new context” (2016: 713). Using case studies of two Chinese MNEs, Jansson and Soderman (2013) also found that these two firms deploy the same resource and capability

638    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro configuration in Brazil as in China because their products are suitable to the Brazilian market and are in no need of adaptation.

FSAs Developed in Response to Home-​institutional Challenges EMNEs’ FSAs lie in their capability to not only respond to low-​income consumers but also to deal with weak institutions. Scholars have devoted significant attention to investigating this possible advantage of EMNEs. Using largely country-​level FDI data to infer firm capabilities, a number of studies have found evidence that EMNEs tend to invest in countries with weak institutions, such as those with high political risks or corruption levels. Cuervo-​Cazurra and Genc (2008) argued that although EMNEs in general tend to be less competitive than AMNEs, partly because they suffer the disadvantage of operating in home countries with underdeveloped institutions, this disadvantage can become an advantage when firms operate in countries with similarly “difficult” governance conditions because EMNEs are experienced in dealing with such conditions. They found empirical evidence that EMNEs are more prevalent among the largest MNEs in the least-​developed countries that have poor regulatory quality and lower control of corruption. Three other studies using country-​level data have found similar results. First, Azemar, Darby, Desbordes, and Wooton (2012) investigated how FDI is shaped by bilateral ties, experience of international expansion, and knowledge of how to deal with poor governance. They found that, in contrast to AMNEs, EMNEs are more attracted to physically and linguistically close countries, suggesting that as a group EMNEs have yet to acquire enough international experience to deal with the challenges of investing in more distant countries. However, they found that location decisions of EMNEs are less influenced than AMNEs by macroeconomic and governance conditions. Thus, the authors found evidence to support both the “evolution stage” hypothesis and the “resilience advantage” hypothesis of EMNEs; that is, EMNEs are still in the early stages of internationalization and thus prefer geographically close locations, but they have also accumulated experience in operating in poor governance conditions, which enables them to invest in countries with similar conditions. Second, using bilateral FDI flows of 134 countries from 1990 to 2009, Demir and Hu (2016) found that bilateral institutional distance works as an entry barrier for foreign investors. However, this effect is present only with respect to FDI from advanced to emerging economies and from emerging to advanced economies. Importantly, institutional distance does not work as an entry barrier for FDI among emerging economies. Similarly, Ramos and Ashby (2013) proposed that MNEs tend to have heterogeneous capabilities in assessing and coping with organized crime in host countries, and that their capabilities are shaped by home-​based experiences with organized crime. They proposed that firms’ capabilities to deal with organized crime can mitigate its negative impact on entry decisions. Using FDI data from over 100 countries investing in different Mexican states from 2001 to 2010, they found evidence to support their arguments; that is, firms seek to leverage home experience with high levels of organized crime as they expand abroad.

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    639 Along the same lines, three studies based on firm-​level data have developed the concept of political and institutional capabilities that EMNEs can leverage in countries with similar institutional conditions. First, Del Sol and Kogan (2007) used two case studies of Chilean multinationals to illustrate that one source of competitive advantage for Chilean firms is their “liberalization know-​how”; that is, their know-​how of business strategy in response to economic liberalization. Such an advantage makes foreign affiliates of Chilean companies more profitable than similar local firms in other Latin American countries that experienced economic liberalization after Chile. Second, Holburn and Zelner proposed the concept of political capabilities, defining them as “organizational capabilities for accessing policy risk and managing policy risk and the policy-​making process” (2010: 1291). This concept echoes the ability to manage institutional idiosyncrasies proposed by Henisz (2003). MNEs vary in their response to host-​country policy risk because of differences in political capabilities, which, in turn, are shaped by firms’ home-​country policymaking environments. Using location choices of MNEs in the electric power generation industry, they found that firms from home countries characterized by weak institutional constraints on policymakers will be less sensitive to host-​country policy risk in their international location choice. Moreover, these firms even invest in risker host countries to leverage their political capabilities. Third, Carney, Dieleman, and Taussig (2016) proposed the concept of “institutional capabilities” that capture heuristics, skills, and routines enabling a firm to navigate in a context of institutional voids. Institutional voids refers to the absence or paucity of institutional facilities, norms, and regulations that enable arm’s-​length transactions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). There is firm specificity of institutional capabilities as reflected by inter-​firm differences in heuristics, skills, and routines with respect to network penetration, relational contracting, and business model innovation. Using the international expansion of an Indonesian MNE, the authors showed that actions to achieve network penetration include accessing local bureaucrats through partnerships and legitimizing positioning in networks; actions to achieve relational contracting include acting upon and honoring personal commitment and convincing and negotiating with government players; and actions to achieve business model innovation include provision of missing institutions.

Spillover Effects of E-​E FDI Limited literature exists on the spillover effects of E-​E FDI on local firms’ productivity and knowledge acquisition, with even fewer studies on the impact of E-​E FDI on institutional and infrastructural development in the host country. On the one hand, EMNEs, with weaker FSAs than AMNEs, are likely to have weaker demonstration and knowl­ edge spillover effects on host-​country firms. On the other hand, smaller technology gaps may enable a transfer of appropriate knowledge that can be readily absorbed and applied locally, facilitated by shorter institutional and economic distances (Kubny & Voss, 2014). The latter is consistent with the “flying geese” model that explains the

640    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro gradual catching-​up process in latecomer economies, based on the experience of early Japanese investments in Southeast Asia whereby knowledge transferred by Japanese firms was more relevant to those economies, relative to US investments (Kojima, 2000). However, empirical evidence has been mixed on whether EMNEs or AMNEs generate greater spillover effects on local firms. Some studies have found positive spillover effects of EMNEs on the local economy. Amighini and Sanfilippo (2014), for example, analyzed the differential impacts of imports and FDI from advanced and emerging economies on the export performance of African countries from 2003 to 2010. They found that, in terms of impact on export diversity, neither imports nor FDI from advanced economies has an impact on host-​country firms. However, imports from emerging economies enhance export variety in low-​tech manufacturing sectors in other emerging markets. In terms of export quality, imports from both the advanced and emerging economies have positive impacts, with the impact of imports from the advanced economies being stronger. On the other hand, FDI from the emerging economies contributes to export quality, whereas FDI from the advanced economies does not. Overall, the results indicate that imports or FDI from the emerging markets can contribute to both export quality and variety. Other studies have found no evidence or mixed evidence that EMNEs generate greater spillover benefits than AMNEs in emerging economies. Kim, Lee, and Lee (2015) examined FDI spillover effects on the total factor productivity (TFP) of firms in an emerging economy. Using data on 122 countries from 1998 to 2008, they found support for spillover effects of FDI from advanced economies but provided no evidence of spillover effects of FDI from emerging economies. In another study, Kubny and Voss (2014) found that Chinese and other foreign investors transfer similar types and amount of knowledge to firms in Vietnam, despite the proximity of Chinese firms and the expectation that they should provide higher levels of knowledge spillovers. Santangelo (2018), in a study of FDI in land in developing countries, found that FDI from developed countries enhances food security, but FDI from other developing countries does not, in part because of limited spillover benefits. In their study of E-​E FDI within Asia, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2011) found that EMNEs are more likely to enter labor-​intensive industries, and that AMNEs are more inclined to enter capital-​intensive and technology-​intensive sectors. Plants established by AMNEs tend to have higher productivity than those established by EMNEs. However, the productivity difference is not significant in labor-​intensive sectors such as textiles and wood/​furniture, the industries in which plants by EMNEs are most prominent. They found mixed results on FDI spillovers to local firms. In general, they found positive spillovers from advanced economies and no spillovers from emerging economies, but the results are different in Indonesia, with more spillovers from emerging economies. Some studies have investigated the absorptive capacity of emerging economy firms and their participation in the knowledge transfer process to understand the conditions that allow FDI spillovers to occur. Seyoum, Wu, and Yang (2015), examining Chinese firms in Ethiopia, showed that domestic firms with higher productivity experience positive spillovers, whereas those with lower productivity experience negative spillovers. Rui, Zhang, and Shipman (2016) suggested that to ensure the transfer of relevant knowl­ edge from EMNEs, recipients in emerging markets need to exert ownership of the

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    641 knowledge transfer process, influencing what knowledge is transferred and how it is transferred. Thus, evidence suggests that the spillover benefits from EMNEs depend on the absorptive capacity of the host-​country firms. In addition to investigating the economic effects of FDI spillovers, some studies have also investigated FDI spillovers on institutional development in emerging markets. Because emerging market countries seldom impose conditionality on institutional and political changes in providing loans or aid, they are sometimes accused of undermining the efforts of developed countries to improve institutional development in emerging markets (Demir, 2016). Thus, Demir (2016) evaluated whether any difference between AMNEs and EMNEs exists in terms of their impacts on the dynamics of institutional convergence in host countries. Using bilateral FDI flows among 134 countries from 1990 to 2009, Demir (2016) found that the institutional development effects of bilateral FDI flows from the advanced to emerging markets, as well as those from the emerging to emerging markets, are not significant—​and neither are the effects different from each other. When aggregating all investments into a country, this study found that aggregate FDI flows from all other emerging economies to an emerging economy have a significant, negative effect on the host-​country institutions (and aggregate FDI flows from all advanced economies to an emerging economy have no effect). The negative effect of aggregate E-​E FDI flows is particularly salient in natural-​resource-​rich countries. Thus, the total volume of FDI flows from a particular group of countries (i.e., advanced or emerging) can play a more important role in stimulating institutional change than individual bilateral flows, and a negative effect is more likely for E-​E FDI in the case of countries rich in natural resources. Finally, existing studies have also investigated spillover effects of E-​E FDI on infrastructure development. D’Amelio, Garrone, and Piscitello (2016) examined the role that FDI plays in enhancing access to electricity for local communities in developing countries. They suggested that MNEs are incentivized to solve the lack of electricity infrastructure for two reasons: to guarantee their business activities and to gain legitimacy with their local stakeholders. MNEs from institutionally underdeveloped countries will be more prone to develop electricity infrastructures because they suffer from greater challenges to their legitimacy. Using information from 83 home countries in 15 host countries in sub-​Saharan Africa from 2005 to 2011, the authors found that FDI promotes access to electricity in emerging economies with weak institutions, and this is mainly true when the FDI comes from institutionally underdeveloped countries. As discussed above, another possible explanation for this result might be the infrastructure investments associated with state-​led investments by emerging market governments (Li et al., 2013; Shapiro et al., 2018).

The Road Ahead The literature on E-​E FDI is limited and leaves open several research questions. Table 26.2 summarizes future research directions, beginning with a more in-​depth understanding

642    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro of home CSAs of EMNEs relevant to operations in emerging markets, and in particular, a research focus on home-​government policy and diplomatic connections. Following this is a discussion on how future research can advance understanding of FSAs of EMNEs. Specifically discussed are the internationalization capabilities of EMNEs related to two broad areas: nonmarket strategies (political and social), and corporate governance and ownership. Finally, this chapter suggests a focus on E-​E FDI spillovers from the perspective of host-​country sustainable development.

Home-​Government Policy and Diplomatic Networks A salient feature of Chinese E-​E FDI is the heavy involvement of the home government, and this may be true of other emerging-​economy governments. Thus, E-​E FDI provides a rich opportunity to understand the dynamic interactions between firms and governments in the home market and their impact on firms’ international investment behavior and performance. First, to what extent can financial assistance from one government to another affect bilateral FDI flows between two countries? Most studies on EMNEs have to date focused on home-​government financial support to home MNEs (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). Recent studies have started to analyze home-​government loans and aid to host-​ developing countries that help to create investment opportunities and lower investment risks (Li et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2018; Shapiro et al., 2018). Although aid has been used by advanced countries to create a supportive investment environment in emerging markets and has been studied in the bargaining model proposed by Ramamurti (2001) and tested in Lu et al. (2018), loans and their relationship to FDI have yet to be systematically investigated. Shapiro et al. (2018) found that state loans to a country and FDI to that country are highly correlated but provide neither the direction of causality nor the dynamic properties of this correlation. It is possible that loans and FDI are jointly determined by a common factor such as resource endowment or market size. It is also possible that loans lead to the development of amicable diplomatic relations, which facilitates FDI flows between the countries (Li et al., 2013). Moreover, although Shapiro et al. (2018) showed that loans play a more prominent role than aid in predicting both where Chinese FDI will go to and the political risk level that Chinese firms would face in a host country, Lu et al. (2018) found some evidence that aid can also effectively mitigate political risk that firms would face when choosing their investment mode in a foreign country. Thus, aid and loans should be considered simultaneously and compared systematically to understand the home government’s influence in affecting firms’ international investment strategies. It is also important to understand whether this model of state support extends beyond China. Most studies so far have focused on Chinese firms’ OFDI. This raises the question of whether China represents a special case, notably with respect to the role of government in promoting FDI in resources (Li et al, 2013; Shapiro et al., 2018).

Table 26.2 Summary of research directions for the topic of FDI among emerging economies (E-​E FDI) Research topics

Potential research questions

Home country-​specific advantages (CSAs) of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs)

Home-​government policy and diplomatic networks 1. To what extent can financial assistance from one government to another affect FDI from one country to another? Do aid and loans play similar or different roles in affecting EMNEs’ FDI in emerging markets? 2. Does China represent a unique case in terms promoting OFDI through aid and loans to another country? 3. What are the roles of diplomats and diplomatic networks in bridging E-​E FDI?

Firm-​specific advantages (FSAs) of EMNEs

Nonmarket strategies and internationalization capabilities 1. What exactly explains why EMNEs are less deterred than advanced-​economy multinational enterprises from investing in countries with poor governance? Does the propensity of EMNEs to invest in emerging markets reflect home CSAs, FSAs, or strategic actions of EMNEs? 2. What determines cross-​border transferability of FSAs in political, social or institutional capabilities? 3. To what extent is managing multiple stakeholders important in the E-​E FDI context? How do EMNEs acquire these capabilities and how do they diffuse the capabilities to other emerging markets? 4. What is the nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in the E-​E FDI context? What is the relationship between such activities and performance? Corporate governance, ownership, and internationalization of EMNEs 1. Do state-​owned and private EMNEs exhibit similar or different patterns of investments in emerging markets? 2. What are the FDI strategies and performance of family-​owned EMNEs in emerging markets? Are they systematically different from EMNEs that are not family owned?

Spillover effects of E-​E FDI and host-​ 1. Does E-​E FDI generate spillover impacts on local country sustainable development productivity that are higher or lower than FDI from advanced economies to emerging economies? 2. To what extent does E-​E FDI contribute to sustainable economic development, and in what ways? 3. Should EMNEs align their actions with the new United Nations Sustainable Development Goals? How should they deal with complex environmental and developmental issues in emerging markets?

644    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro Second, future studies might usefully extend the network approach to gain a more complete understanding of the role of diplomats and diplomatic networks in bridging E-​E FDI. These studies would not only enrich the applications of network theory to international business studies but also contribute to the literature on EMNEs and the strategies they can adopt to overcome their liability of foreignness. Li et al. (2017) demonstrated the importance of a firm’s government ties at home that allow access to intergovernmental diplomatic networks and promote firms’ international investment activities, particularly in countries with weak rule of law. Stevens and Newenham-​ Kahindi (2017) showed that intergovernmental endorsement facilitates cross-​border legitimacy spillovers for Chinese firms in the East Africa Community (EAC); specifically, Tanzanian governments, which have seen significant economic benefits associated with Chinese investments in Tanzania, have helped China to build connections with other EAC governments and communities. The network literature has largely focused on firms and entrepreneurs and focused very little on the role of public actors (Rangan, Samii, & Van Wassenhove, 2006). Thus, future research might use insights from network theory (e.g., the concepts of structural holes and the principles of brokerage and closure) to delve more systematically into the role of public actors in government and nongovernment organizations in connecting firms with politicians and businesses overseas (Burt & Burzynska, 2017). The networks that connect firms with diplomatic networks may be particularly important for E-​E FDI because network ties at the diplomatic and intergovernmental levels can to some extent compensate for institutional voids in those countries. On the other hand, connecting to diplomatic networks with the advanced countries can also help firms overcome certain legitimacy barriers associated with institutional distance or latecomer status. Given that EMNEs face different types of challenges in advanced and emerging economies, it would be useful to investigate and compare the role of diplomatic networks in affecting EMNEs’ OFDI activities in both contexts.

Nonmarket Strategies and Internationalization Capabilities Recent literature has emphasized that nonmarket strategies can be an important determinant of internationalization capabilities (Attig, Boubakri, El Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2016; Jamali & Karam, 2018; Marano, Tashman, & Kostova, 2017). These studies have not specifically isolated E-​E FDI for consideration, and this remains a fertile area for future research in many respects.

Nonmarket Political Capabilities One example is the issue of whether and why EMNEs are less deterred by poor governance and weak institutions in host countries. For the most part, the literature supports the idea that EMNEs are more likely to choose locations with less developed and more

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    645 fragile institutions, but this itself requires more research. A prominent view put forward is that some EMNEs may develop nonmarket political capabilities in dealing with institutional complexity based on experiences accumulated at home, which enables them to leverage such capabilities in countries with similar institutional conditions (Cuervo-​Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Thus, such nonmarket capabilities reflect firms’ intrinsic ability to transform institutional disadvantages at home into advantages abroad. However, there are alternative explanations for why EMNEs are more inclined to invest in countries with weak institutions. First, some EMNEs, as a group, may possess home CSAs that mitigate host-​country political risks. For example, the home government may facilitate home MNEs’ entry and operation in the emerging markets by providing loans to the host countries, establishing friendly diplomatic relations, and thus improving the overall investment climate of the host countries (Li et al., 2013; Shapiro et al., 2018). If this were the case, we would observe that firms from specific countries with strong international power and influence tend to behave differently from firms that are from countries with weak power and influence. Second, some EMNEs will enter a host country regardless of its institutional environment because of abundant natural resources that this country possesses (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013). Many countries rich in natural resources have underdeveloped institutions, and EMNEs’ entry into these countries may well reflect host CSAs in natural resources. Home governments may also play a role here because they may assist state-​owned natural-​resource companies in securing resources overseas and provide financial and diplomatic support in helping them overcome the associated political risks. Third, some EMNEs may possess an FSA that allows them to leverage their connections with the home government in securing financial, policy, and diplomatic support, which makes them less sensitive to risk factors in host countries in their initial entries (Duanmu, 2014; Li et al., 2017; Pan, Teng, Supapol, Lu, Huang, & Wang, 2014). This perspective suggests that not all EMNEs from the same country would be able to access home CSAs in the same way, and that some MNEs are better able to internalize the benefits from home CSAs. Finally, it is also possible that EMNEs enter institutionally underdeveloped countries to avoid intense competition with AMNEs that typically dominate markets with well-​ developed institutions (Lu et al., 2018). Thus, E-​E FDI in this case represents EMNEs’ strategic actions in dealing with AMNEs. Given that multiple theoretic perspectives can be proposed to explain why EMNEs are less deterred from investing in countries with poor governance than AMNEs, more firm-​level systematic studies are first needed to discern the fundamental mechanisms that guide EMNEs’ entry decisions. To achieve this goal requires both large quantitative studies that include all indicators for these possible explanations and qualitative methods such as case studies and interviews that would allow a thorough understanding of the determinants of firms’ decisions to enter those regions. One of the factors that links these research possibilities is the recognition that intangible nonmarket skills are required to enter countries with weak institutions, and that

646    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro such skills can constitute an FSA (see Chapter 14 in this Handbook for reviews of political ties in emerging markets). The relationship between nonmarket strategies and the internationalization of emerging market firms is not new. As noted by Henisz, we must recognize: “the ability to manage institutional idiosyncrasies as a firm-​level capability akin to research or advertising that can drive internalization across national borders” (2003: 173), a point also emphasized and generalized by Doh, McGuire, and Ozaki (2015) and Henisz (2016). More generally, the process, if any, that links home-​country characteristics and FSAs in emerging markets remains understudied (Ramamurti, 2009, 2012). In particular, the development of FSAs in political capabilities and their cross-​border transferability are worth attention. Although emerging economies are commonly characterized by weak institutions, political institutions in some countries (e.g., China) are fundamentally different from those in other countries (e.g., India). It is unclear how institutional experience, knowledge, and capabilities accumulated in one country are useful in another country. Thus, more studies are required to open the black box regarding what types of institutional knowl­ edge, experience, and capabilities are location bound and what types are non-​location bound (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) as well as the conditions that would allow effective transfer and utilization of home institutional experience and knowledge. Insights from political science or varieties of institutional systems research may shed light on the variations among political infrastructures of the emerging economies (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018; Carney, Estrin, Liang, & Shapiro, 2018). These studies would contribute to the literature on institutional distance and cross-​border transfer of organizational practices and capabilities (Kostova, 1999).

Corporate Social Responsibility and Legitimacy The issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and legitimacy in the host market requires more attention. It is increasingly recognized that to successfully operate abroad, firms must gain some degree of local legitimacy, which, in turn, is related to their CSR activities in the host market. These activities often require the management of complex relationships between multinationals and home and host governments and other stakeholders (Stevens, Xie, & Peng, 2016). Future research could focus on the question of whether the capabilities to manage multiple stakeholders are important in the E-​E FDI context, how EMNEs acquire these capabilities, and how they diffuse them to other emerging market destinations. A related question concerns the role of the home government in helping to establish legitimacy. Li et al. (2013) found that the Chinese government helps coordinate the collective provision of activities in various sectors in Africa that in a Western model would be provided by individual firms as part of their CSR program. The question is whether the collective provision of these goods is effective in increasing the legitimacy of Chinese firms in the host country (Stevens & Newenham-​Kahindi, 2017). Another example is the question of CSR and performance. There is evidence of a positive relationship between CSR and financial performance. A recent meta-​analytic study (Wang, Dou, & Jia, 2016) found not only that the relationship is positive and significant

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    647 but that the causality likely runs from CSR to performance. However, the relationship is weaker for firms from emerging economies, again suggesting the importance of understanding the nature of CSR activities in an E-​E FDI context.

Corporate Governance, Ownership, and Internationalization of EMNEs Many emerging economies are also experiencing economic transitions resulting in a variety of business organizations with different governance practices, ownership structures, strategic orientations, and FSAs; consequently, their foreign investment strategies are likely to vary substantially (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014, 2017). Research focusing on heterogeneity among EMNEs is worth special attention. In particular, a significant feature of EMNEs is the presence among them of significant numbers of state-​and family-​ owned enterprises (SOEs, FOEs), with the latter often organized as business groups. The significant body of literature on the internationalization of both SOEs and FOEs comes to a somewhat common conclusion that each faces limitations in terms of internationalization potential (Arregle, Duran, Hitt, & van Essen, 2017; Carney, Duran, van Essen, & Shapiro, 2017a; Cuervo-​Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014). However, little attention has been paid to the specific case of EMNEs that internationalize primarily in the emerging markets.

State-​owned  EMNEs Despite the “liability of stateness” often associated with SOEs, they do internationalize. In 2017, close to 1500 state-​owned MNEs existed, with three-​fifths headquartered in emerging economies (18% in China, 5% in Malaysia, 4% in India, 4% in South Africa, and 3% in Russia) (UNCTAD, 2017). State-​owned MNEs are more heavily focused on financial services and natural resources than are other MNEs. Although state ownership may bring resources or incentives that permit an SOE to internationalize, state ownership may also represent a liability that hinders overseas investments. State-​ owned MNEs are more likely to be influenced by home-​government objectives and policies, are more likely to be embedded in home-​country institutions, and may rely heavily on the diplomatic relations between home and host countries (Duanmu, 2014; Li et al., 2017). Whether these factors provide state-​owned MNEs with advantages or disadvantages is contingent on whether government objectives are in line with firm objectives and whether incentives favor international as opposed to domestic activity, as well as whether diplomatic relations are supportive or hostile. State-​owned MNEs may also face significant legitimacy barriers in some host countries that are concerned about investment motivations and consequences of such investments for national security (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Li, Xia, & Lin, 2016; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). The question is whether state-​owned MNEs, particularly those from the emerging markets, are more likely to invest in the emerging markets, and, if so, what the impact

648    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro will be. More investments by state-​owned MNEs would be expected in the emerging markets than in the advanced markets, although this might be highly country specific. First, state-​owned MNEs might be instruments of government policy to secure natural resources, which are more likely found in the emerging markets. It is important to note that most global FDI by SOEs has gone into the extractive sectors (Stevens, Kooroshy, Lahn, & Lee, 2013), a sector often characterized by significant conflict. Second, they may be instruments of diplomacy, designed to deliver infrastructure and other services as part of a more general diplomatic strategy. Finally, they may face fewer legitimacy challenges in emerging economies where SOEs are perceived more positively, and where they may be associated with positive diplomacy by the home country. Whereas some evidence suggests that this may be the case for China, it remains to be determined whether SOEs from all emerging economies are similar in their approach to E-​E FDI. It is therefore important to study SOEs from countries other than China. At the same time, it is important to pay closer attention to the role of emerging market SOEs in the extractive sectors.

Family-​Owned  EMNEs Although Chinese SOEs tend to dominate the landscape and therefore the academic literature on SOEs, the same is not true for family firms. Family firms are prominent in virtually all emerging economies, though the degree of family firm prevalence does vary from country to country (Carney et al., 2017a). Like the SOE literature, the literature on family firm internationalization suggests that there are both incentives and impediments to internationalization. Recent literature (Arregle et al., 2017) showed that family firms can overcome potential liabilities, such as failure to accept professional management and inability to translate social capital advantages abroad. Nevertheless, the evidence appears to be quite context specific (see Carney et al., 2017a, for a recent discussion), suggesting an important role for studies that focus specifically on the E-​E FDI emanating from family-​owned firms, and in particular family-​owned firms that are part of larger business groups (Carney, van Essen, Estrin, & Shapiro, 2017b). A few studies have examined the internationalization of the Chinese family firm through the lens of Dunning’s (1981) eclectic paradigm (Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003). Although these studies looked at EMNEs (Chinese family firms), they did not explicitly focus on E-​E FDI, nor did they focus on escape explanations for such FDI; consequently, they remain promising avenues for future research (Carney, Fathallah, Gedajlovic, & Shapiro, 2015). Very few studies have looked empirically at the international expansion of family firms. Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, and Lien (2007), for example, examined FDI decisions in China by firms from a newly industrialized economy (NIE), based on the ownership of the investor. They found that share ownership by foreign financial institutions in NIE firms is associated with a high-​commitment FDI strategy, whereas high levels of share ownership by the

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    649 family and domestic institutional investors are associated with low levels of equity commitment. Thus, family firms choose different, but not unique, entry mode strategies. As is the case for SOEs, it is important to consider the internationalization of emerging market family firms into other emerging markets from a broader number of countries and from a broader number of perspectives (such as entry strategies).

E-​E FDI Spillovers and Host-​Country Sustainable Development Little is known about the spillover benefits (if any) of E-​E FDI, and the topic deserves greater attention. However, the very nature of E-​E interactions suggests that the host-​ country benefits of E-​E FDI may extend beyond standard spillovers and may extend to development projects related to infrastructure provision or other measures that support development outcomes. These studies would enrich and expand the FDI spillover literature, shifting the focus from productivity and technology to a broader range of development issues, including sustainable development. The traditional focus in the FDI spillover literature has been on the impact of FDI spillovers, mainly on host-​country productivity (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Meyer & Sinani, 2009), and this literature has carefully considered the conditions under which positive spillovers on productivity are likely to occur. Existing studies on E-​E FDI spillovers have been limited, and they have yet to find strong, consistent evidence that E-​E FDI generates positive productivity spillovers, particularly relative to the spillovers generated by advanced-​economy firms. This result is interesting given the likelihood that emerging market firms possess more compatible and appropriate technologies to transfer. Future research should examine more carefully the nature of spillover benefits by E-​E FDI, with a particular focus on the factors that might limit such spillovers and on the underlying mechanisms (e.g., the degree of linkages and interactions between foreign and local firms, Amendolagine, Boly, Coniglio, Prota, & Seric, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), under which knowledge spillovers occur from EMNEs to local firms. There is evidence that E-​E FDI, at least Chinese FDI, is linked to infrastructure projects. Infrastructure development might in turn affect other development outcomes (such as poverty reduction and social conflict) related to sustainable-​ development outcomes. This perspective would be particularly useful in evaluating the Chinese government’s approach to E-​E investments at least in natural resources. Chinese firms’ investments in the emerging markets are often accompanied by the Chinese government’s provisions of aid, loans, and infrastructure projects (Li et al., 2013). Infrastructure development can be critical to economic development and is an area that other governments have often neglected, and where emerging market governments might have an advantage. As pointed out by a Chinese government official, “We know the root causes of poverty in developing countries. Our first-​hand experience has put us in a comparative advantage to address issues here” (Li et al., 2013: 307). Thus,

650    Jing Li and Daniel Shapiro the governments of emerging economies provide not only much-​needed funding but also their expertise and knowledge in assisting host-​developing countries to develop infrastructure. Infrastructure development here includes both economic infrastructure, such as establishment of special economic zones, and physical infrastructures, such as roads and railways (Stevens & Newenham-​Kahindi, 2017). This new pattern of investments from the emerging markets (i.e., FDI accompanied by aid, loans, and infrastructure support) has been found among Chinese investments in Africa and Latin America (Li et al., 2013; Shapiro et al., 2018). There is a reason to believe that China will continue to use this approach to invest in other developing regions, in particular through the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative proposed by China in 2013. OBOR aims to improve trade and investment among China, Asia, Africa, and Europe through the construction of large infrastructure projects, often financed by loans from Chinese sources, including the China Development Bank. For example, China has focused on building infrastructure facilities and enhancing industrial capacities in Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa (UNCTAD, 2017). Whether these projects contribute to sustainable development and whether they are unique to China remain questions for future research. Anecdotal evidence at least suggests that the state-​owned Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES Bank) also made loans to foreign countries for development projects (de Bolle, 2015). Therefore, it would be important to investigate the impact of such loans from foreign state-​owned banks on a host country’s infrastructure and sustainable development and whether the impact is largely driven by Chinese state-​owned banks or by state-​owned banks from other emerging economies as well. Finally, a more interesting perspective would be to evaluate the impact of FDI from emerging markets (relative to FDI from advanced economies) on sustainable development in the emerging markets, and the specific role, if any, of EMNEs in contributing to sustainable economic development (Ghauri & Yamin, 2009; Kolk & van Tulder, 2010; Kolk, Kourula, & Pisani, 2017 and inclusive growth (Gerrard, McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012). Specifically, researchers might direct their attention to comparing the performance of EMNEs and AMNEs in terms of their contributions to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Kolk et al., 2017). The SDGs raise important questions regarding how firms should deal with complex issues including human rights, environmental concerns, poverty reduction, and community relations. In this regard, the suggestion by Santangelo (2018) that the understanding of spillover benefits and sustainable development should be extended to include conscious choices by investing firms should be pursued. Santangelo suggested that firms can deliberately set out to create spillover benefits consistent with goals of food security and poverty reduction. In general, research on these questions is limited, and research on them from the perspective of E-​E FDI to our knowledge does not exist. As the lack of quality data prevents research in this area, case studies and interviews appear to be the best way forward.

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals    651

Conclusion This chapter reviews studies on E-​E FDI and proposes directions for future research. E-​E FDI has unique characteristics in terms of motivations, FSAs and home CSAs of EMNEs, and impacts of EMNEs on host countries, all of which require further study. In addition, the active involvement of (some) home governments in facilitating E-​E FDI and the heterogeneity of ownership and governance structures of EMNEs are features of E-​E FDI that are not fully understood. These features also point to the importance of nonmarket FSAs, a subject that has not been widely addressed in the context of EMNEs. To fully understand E-​E FDI thus requires innovative research combining insights from institutional theory, network theory, political science, corporate governance, nonmarket strategies, FDI spillovers, and CSR and sustainable development.

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Chapter 27

Hum an Res ou rc e M anagem ent i n E me rg i ng Markets Dana Minbaeva

In their efforts to understand how human resource management (HRM) is practiced in emerging markets, researchers traditionally talk about the differences in the business environment between advanced and emerging markets, such as the type of capitalism, characteristics of the institutional environment, cultural values and traditions, and so onc. However, the business environments of emerging economies are “moving targets”—​ often characterized by underdeveloped but constantly changing formal institutions with fluid institutional environments (see Chapters by Meyer & Grosse and by Kostova & Marano in this Handbook). Further, there is no one “local model” of HRM in emerging context: some are more advanced and others are still stack in transition (see Horwitz & Budhwar, 2015). So any generalization about HRM across emerging markets doesn’t make any sense. However, there may be a generalizable approach in how to understand HRM in emerging markets. To do so, I argue, one needs to adapt the nested systems approach (Walloth, 2016) and accept that the landscape of HRM within that context is built on interactions among home-​country multinational corporations (MNCs), subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, and domestic companies. In other words, I suggest that the way human resources are managed in a company in an emerging economy depends on the interactions between the focal company and other companies present in that emerging market, all of which depend on and compete with one another (see also Geary & Aguzzoli, 2016). These companies form an ecosystem that is nested in the local and global business environment that shapes HRM practiced in that particular market by all players (i.e., domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries, and emerging-​market MNCs). Accordingly, to understand HRM in an emerging market, we need to know how it is practiced by actors within the ecosystem, how those actors interact, and how their interactions are affected by and affect the business environment.

658   Dana Minbaeva To illustrate these arguments, I  reviewed the extant studies on HRM in emerging markets. The goal of the review was to understand what we know about how HRM is practiced by domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries, and MNCs operating in emerging-​ market contexts. The search of the EBSCOhost database was done using the keywords “HRM” or “HR” together with “emerging” or “transitional.” Based on the results of this search, I identified 163 articles relevant for the subject. The list included articles published in the top-​tier HRM (e.g., Human Resource Management), general management (e.g., Academy of Management Journal) and international business (e.g., Journal of International Business Studies) journals, as well as region-​focused journals (e.g., Asia Pacific Journal of Management). I also included articles published in focused issues and special issues in such journals as International Journal of Human Resource Management, International Journal of Emerging Markets, and Management International Review. Then, for each firm type, I sought to identify issues that attracted most of researchers’ attention and to provide a systematic mapping of what we do know by now. I then discuss the generalizable mechanisms through which the interactions among different types of firms occur and how these interactions shape HRM in emerging markets. At the end of the chapter, I argue for the need to adopt a nested view in order to fully understand how HRM is practiced in emerging markets and point out at possible research questions that future investigations in this field could explore.

HRM in Domestic Firms Changes in economies are often complex, and not all organizations within a country experience fundamental changes in the economy or waves of progress toward change in the same way. Some positive indicators can mask negative consequences, contestations, and dissonance (Hollinshead & Maclean, 2007). In their analysis, Kiriazov, Sullivan, and Tu (2000) demonstrated that East European political reforms aimed at improving productivity had decreased output, reduced wage rates, and resulted in more downsizing and increased layoffs in many instances. When discussing the ways in which Russian organizations managed their labour, Dirani, Ardichvili, Cseh, and Zavyalova (2015) noted that the radical transformation of Russia’s socioeconomic and political systems inevitably influenced the character of labor relations, HRM strategies, and HRM practices. That influence was not necessarily positive. In such contexts, HRM—​as the business professionals in Western societies understand it—​has only just started to take hold in the management discourse and in practice (see further details in Morley, Minbaeva, & Michailova, 2018). Researchers studying this development often adopt “Western” theories of HRM, while only questioning the extent to which “Western” theories of HRM can be applied in emerging-​market contexts. The findings seldom provide evidence of a unique approach to HRM emerging in this region. Only few authors explicitly challenge the applicability of Western theories to the emerging-​market context (see also Budhwar & Debrah, 2009). In this regard, Table 27.1

Country context

Journal of Quantitative Single International Business Studies

Journal of Quantitative Bundle International Business Studies

Miller et al. (2009)

Buck et al. (2003)

Training, incentives, employee welfare, job security

Employer-​ employee relationship

Strategic role of HR

Journal of Quantitative Single International Business Studies

Ukraine

South Korea

China

UAE

EVLN India (organization-​ level and team-​level commitment)

Name/​HPWS

Law et al. (2003)

Quantitative Bundle

Single/​ bundle

Career exploration/​ perceived employability

Human Relations

Mellahi et al. (2010)

Method

Forstenlecher Human Quantitative Single et al. (2014) resource management

Source

Author

Table 27.1 HRM in domestic firms in emerging markets

(Continued )

It is found that insider ownership is positively associated with high-​ commitment HRM strategies and negatively with low-​commitment, cost-​ cutting HRM strategies. Cost-​cutting HRM strategies are in turn associated with weaker firm performance. These outcomes correspond broadly with theoretical expectations.

The findings are generally in line with the theoretical expectations: (1) Relationships community and connection will be more common in family businesses (FBs) than in non-​FBs. (2) These relationships will enhance performance in emerging-​market high-​technology sectors. (3) The performance of FBs will benefit more from these community and connection relationships than the performance of non-​FBs

The study confirms that while social institutions remain powerful in a transitional economy, effective HRM is important to firm performance.

As expected, the authors found that the social contract and resulting expectations toward state employment have strong implications for willingness to work in the private sector.

The findings on the use of voice are consistent with the past research in Western countries, but challenge the prevailing assumption about the use of voice in high-​power distance societies.

Findings

Journal of Quantitative Bundle International Business Studies

Human Quantitative Bundle Resource Management

Wei & Lau (2008)

Wei et al. (2008)

Stumpf et al. Human Quantitative Bundle (2010) Resource Management

Human Quantitative Bundle Resource Management

Single/​ bundle

Khavul et al. (2010)

Method

Source

Author

Table 27.1 Continued

China

China

India, China, South Africa

Country context

Performance India management, professional development, normalization of ratings

SHRM items

Recruitment and selection, and Indicies/​ scales of “SHRM”

Recruiting, hiring, training, developing, compensation, motivation

Name/​HPWS

Companies are creating strong human resource climates based on structured HR practices in performance management, professional development, and normalized performance ratings. The perceived effectiveness of these HR practices influences employees’ perceptions of career success and, to a lesser extent, organizationally rated performance and potential.

In line with previous studies, it was found that corporate culture has an impact on the adoption of SHRM, and that different types of culture affect the SHRM process differently. Specifically, group and developmental cultures have positive effects on the adoption of SHRM, but the effect of hierarchical culture is not significant. Developmental culture is also found to have a direct effect on firm performance.

This study examined three factors leading to a firm’s adoption of strategic human resource management (SHRM): market orientation, HRM importance and HRM competency. Empirical results showed that the three factors are significantly related to a firm’s adoption of SHRM.

Overall, the findings suggest that internationalization by entrepreneurial firms in emerging markets is associated with developing HRM practices

Findings

Human Resource Management    661 offers examples of representative empirical studies from different regions and highlights some tentative conclusions. Moreover, researchers studying HRM in domestic firms in emerging markets have found that investments in HRM potentially may contribute to performance. Using the sample of Chinese firms, Law, Tse, and Zhou concluded that “good HRM does matter to firm performance in a transitional economy” (2003: 263). Similar results have also been obtained from other regions, such as the countries of the former Soviet Union (e.g., Russia (Fey & Bjorkman, 2001) and the Ukraine (Buck, Filatotchev, Demina, & Wright, 2003)), Africa (e.g., Nigeria (Ogunyomi & Bruning, 2016), and Mozambique (Wood, Dibben, Stride, & Webster, 2010)), Asia (e.g., Pakistan (Ahmad & Allen, 2015) and Malaysia (Galang & Osman, 2016)), Latin and South America (e.g., Brazil (Wood, Dibben, & Meira, 2016) and Mexico (Bonache, Trullen, & Sanchez, 2012)). Interestingly, some studies looking at “best practices” or high-​performance work practices (HPWP) in domestic firms in emerging economies have found that HRM does not always contribute to financial and operational performance—​the two performance indicators that are most often used as outcome variables in Western theories of HRM (e.g., Huselid, 1995). For Algerian firms, Ramdani, Mellahi, Guermat, and Kechad found that although HPWP are “positively associated with positive work attitudes, this is not always translated into organizational-​level outcomes” (2014: 268). Similar results have also emerged for other regions (see Table 27.2 for selected examples). One potential explanation is that many other factors also affect the performance of firms in emerging economies. However, the extant studies have also suggested that the relationships between HRM and performance in emerging markets are contingent on the firm’s ownership and corporate governance. Buck et al. (2003) reported that HRM strategies conducive for firm performance are highly dependent on insider ownership. Law et al. (2003) found that Chinese firms’ abilities to implement efficient HRM practices and capitalize on their benefits largely depend on the ownership type. As Buck et al. concluded, “although completely understandable in the light of conventional Western theories of employee ownership, the possibility arises of the gradual emergence in the FSU [former Soviet Union] of transitional economies that are characterised by a special kind of capitalism, arguably suited to local contingencies” (2003: 543–​544). Another ownership-​related factor believed to be decisive in the adoption of HPWP is top management’s values. For example, Bae and Lawler (2000) found that when top management teams in Korean firms view human capital as a source of competitive advantage, they tend to invest in more progressive HRM strategies that contribute to organizational performance (see also Khavul, Benson, & Datta, 2010). In a move away from the traditional focus on the HRM-​performance link (i.e., the shareholder approach), researchers studying HRM in domestic companies in emerging markets have recently started adopting a broader, more society-​relevant approach—​ the stakeholder perspective (Srinivasan & Arora, 2015). Among the topics that have attracted attention in this regard are sustainability (e.g., Dögl & Holtbrügge, 2014), corporate social responsibility (e.g., Vlachos, Panagopoulos, & Rapp, 2014), responsible

Asia Pacific Quantitative HPWS (inducement, Journal of involvement, and investment Management systems)

Chow et al. (2013)

Absenteeism, quits, labour productivity

Performance type

Nigeria

Employee, operating and financial performance

Firm performance (5 financial and 4 non-​financial)

Singapore Perceived organizational and market performance

International Quantitative HPWP (employee training Algeria Journal and development, employee of Human empowerment, performance-​ Resource based compensation, Management competence-​based performance appraisal and merit-​based promotion)

Ogunyomi International Quantitative HPWS (employee resourcing, & Bruning Journal reward management, (2016) of Human human capital development, Resource employee performance Management management, occupational health and safety)

Ramdani et al. (2014)

Country

Quantitative HPWS (recruitment and Pakistan selection, training and development, employee involvement and voice mechanisms, performance appraisal and remuneration, career development, work-​life balance)

Employee Relations

HPWS practices

Ahmad & Allen (2015)

Method

Source

Author

Table 27.2 HPWS research in the context of emerging markets

The results of a firm-​level survey show that while HPWP are positively associated with employee work attitudes and motivations, this effect is not converted into organisational-​level outcomes.

Human capital development and occupational health and safety had a direct relationship only with non-​financial indicators of performance. HRM practices as a group accounted for 16% of the variance in non-​financial performance and 12% of the variance in financial performance.

The study found an indirect effect between Inducement and Investment HRM systems and firm performance, such that the relationship was mediated by strategic orientation. In particular, Singaporean firms which implemented product and market differentiation strategies would mediate the HRM systems–​performance relationship.

Empirical results from a sample of Chinese firms from various industries and regions reveal that SHRM mediates the relationship between market orientation and firm performance. It is also found that the effect of SHRM on firm performance is stronger for firms with a higher degree of autonomy in staffing, and weaker for private firms. Other types of ownership have no effect on this relationship.

Findings

Human Resource Management    663 management (e.g., Connell & Burgess, 2013) and community engagement (Jackson, 2014). The findings of these studies are similar to corresponding studies focused on developed economies. However, corporate social responsibility in many emerging markets is contingent upon history, culture, traditions, and economic and political organization (Luo, Wang, & Zhang, 2017). For example, the driving forces for the development of modern philanthropy in India are religious beliefs and sentiments associated with capital accumulation (Sundar, 2013). In countries with communist backgrounds, such as the countries of the former Soviet Union, there are examples of domestic firms using the established traditions of supporting war veterans to deal with the institutional void and achieve performance parity. Despite this progress, we still need to understand how HRM practices in domestic firms operating in these environments, especially small and medium enterprises, are shaped by informal interpersonal social networks (beyond blat and guanxi); how those networks adapt and change over time; and how they create, affect, constrain, or undermine management practices. For example, Minbaeva and Muratbekova-​Touron (2013) showed that local companies in Kazakhstan use clanism (i.e., informal networks of individuals linked by immediate and distant kin and fictive kin identities) to win the war for talent. Their respondents perceived the hiring of staff on the basis of connections as positive and even necessary for ensuring a strong organizational culture: About 15% of candidates are spontaneous applicants who apply through job sites. These candidates are interviewed and tested. However, 85% of our candidates are proposed by our managers or colleagues. This is believed to be a better method of recruitment. These candidates are also tested, but this testing is done to allow us to get to know the person, not to evaluate them for selection purposes. (Minbaeva & Muratbekova-​Touron, 2013: 127)

These researchers offer several illustrations in which managing with clanism (as opposed to managing against clanism) is, in fact, beneficial for local companies. For example, seemingly contradictory managerial practices, such as performance-​ based compensation and clan-​network recruitment, were found to be complementary and conducive to better performance. As Minbaeva and Muratbekova-​Touron (2013) explain, a drive toward transparency; efforts to selectively embrace, rather than reject and stigmatize, clan divisions; and communication and involvement are desirable and relevant for the local firm’s comparative advantage. Somewhat similar results were reported by Miller, Lee, Chang, and Le Breton-​ Miller (2009), who studied family and non-​family businesses in Korea. These authors concluded that “affective, collective community relationships with their employees, and intensive, ongoing connections with outside stakeholders” (i.e., the aspects of family firms that are criticized in the governance and management literature) allow the businesses to perform well in dynamic environment of an emerging market, and “led not to failure but to success” (2009: 813).

664   Dana Minbaeva

HRM in Foreign Subsidiaries A key issue in the extant research on HRM in foreign subsidiaries operating in emerging markets is whether foreign MNCs should be adaptive and responsive or standardized and productively efficient in managing their human resources in the focal countries. While adaptation across different subsidiaries helps MNCs achieve a better local fit, it creates “lack of standardization” issues related to MNC integration, control, and coordination. Such issues increase the marginal cost and complexity of managing employees across subsidiaries. On the other hand, adaptation is necessary given the often unstable and volatile business environment in emerging markets. Current research on global integration and the local responsiveness of HRM in foreign subsidiaries operating in emerging markets is inconclusive. This to a very large extent echoes findings from similar research in developed countries. One stream of studies found that HRM practices were converging across countries (in line with Pudelko & Harzing, 2007) and doing so in line with higher levels of standardization in MNCs. The other stream of studies shares a view that the extent to which HRM practices implemented across subsidiaries resemble the headquarters-​originated HRM practices varies significantly and is most strongly influenced by forces of local isomorphism, especially differences arising from constraint associated with local institutions (in line with Brewster & Wood, 2014). These streams of contradictory findings call for a nuanced approach to better understanding the determinants of integration and adaptation that enable us to understand whether, why, when, and where a MNC should globally standardize or locally adapt its HRM practices. I see two potential solutions offered in recent studies. One possible solution is to look at the individual practices rather than HRM bundles or systems. So far, a majority of studies on HRM in emerging markets have been leaning toward grouping HRM practices rather than studying them independently. In a recent study, Edwards, Sanchez-​Mangas, Jalette, Lavelle, and Minbaeva warned of the dangers of grouping practices together and encouraged research that addressed particular practices: “The evidence strongly points to the need for disaggregated analysis; the national effects took different forms for the different practices, so we should be wary of grouping practices together into categories” (2016: 1015). Another solution points at the need for greater contextualization of the global concepts dominating international HRM research (such as global talent management, global mobility, succession planning). Consider, for example, the concept of global talent management, implying that MNCs should invest heavily in their internal talent systems to enable talented employees to operate on a global, coordinated basis regardless of their locations. However, the definition of “talent” in emerging economies and developing countries may be very different from the corresponding definition in developed economies (Minbaeva, 2016). As one manager explained: I have this guy: he is 48 years old, barely speaks English, old school, but has great relationships with local authorities. Without him none of our projects would ever be

Human Resource Management    665 approved by local government. And then I have another guy: 32 years, western MBA, smart, fast, but has no idea of how to talk to our project partners. In fact, we joke that as long as we keep him inside of our office walls, he will not make any damage. But he can mobilize our project team and put together the best project proposal. Are they both TALENT? Yes, definitely. Can I compare them? No! At least not on the same standardized scales that I receive from the HQs. (Managing Director of a western MNC’s subsidiary in Kazakhstan) (Minbaeva, 2016: 101)

To succeed in emerging markets, MNCs should stop relying on standardized global systems for managing talent. Instead, they should understand what constitutes talent in a given context and work toward more localized approaches to talent management. Both solutions call for a clear need for “more direct contextualization of theoretical propositions as opposed to post hoc contextualizing” (May, Stewart, Puffer, McCarthy, & Ledgerwood, 2011: 719; see also Michailova, 2011). So far, in most of instances the country context is used as empirical limitation (Whetten, 2009) allowing little theoretical understanding of the context heterogeneity (Minbaeva, 2016) and its impact on the implementation of HRM practices in foreign subsidiaries.

HRM in EMMNCs Research on emerging-​market MNCs (EMMNCs) has increased significantly in recent years (see Chapters 27and 28 in this Handbook). While it is still too early to generalize, some trends are clearly evident. For example, EMMNCs rely extensively on global best practices. Mimetic pressures (Oliver, 1991) are fueled by the worldwide convergence of management practices and the emergence of global best practices in management, which have resulted in a “dominance effect.” Under conditions of uncertainty, EMMNCs tend to replicate the HRM models advanced by trend-​s etting organizations, such as consulting firms or business schools (Geary & Aguzzoli, 2016). In our study of MNCs based in Russia (see Andreeva, Festing, Minbaeva, & Muratbekova-​Touron, 2014), we spoke with a vice president of a Russian company, who explained the company’s reliance on global best practices as follows: We cannot afford to spend two years on the development [of HR practices]. We simply do not have time for this, as the market develops very dynamically. Furthermore, we do not want to be an equal player but a front-​r unner. That is why it is easier and cheaper for us to connect with a specialist from a well-​k nown company who is already experienced in this field and has already implemented such a project, and let him/​her do the same in our company. (Andreeva et al., 2014: 12)

666   Dana Minbaeva In all other interviews with executives from Russian EMMNCs, the superiority of Western practices appeared to be indisputable in the eyes of HR managers. Some interviewees spoke of the Western origins of HRM practices with respect and certain managers even expressed their admiration.1 A  recruitment director in Moscow explained, “[We] went to the US to learn the business.” Undoubtedly, the receptivity of local firms to Western HRM practices may vary by location—​it is higher in regions with high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI)—​and by company size. Another observable trend is associated with the facts that EMMNCs are more likely to invest in low-​wage economies and that they are not very concerned about the local skills gap (Wood, Mazouz, Yin, & Jet, 2014). In other words, they tend to invest less in training and development, and they generally do not focus on career development (Budhwar Varma, Singh, & Dhar, 2006). Based on the experience of EMMNCs in Africa, Wood et al. (2014) find this problematic, as a reliance on low wage rates is likely to deter the development of firm-​specific human capital and reduce the organizational commitment of local employees. On the other hand, any attempts to upgrade human capabilities are likely to be rejected by the EMMNCs’ management teams, as such efforts may result in demands for higher wages and make local employees more competitive on the external labor market (Wood et al., 2014). A significant country-​of-​origin effect is associated with the next group of observable trends. For HRM, this country-​of-​origin effect plays out in management’s mind-​set (Zhu, Zhu, & De-​Cieri, 2014) and in the company’s management style (Geary & Aguzzoli, 2016), which is often highly centralized, coercive, and forceful. However, there are sectoral differences (Thite, Wilkinson, & Shah, 2012). But, in some sectors, such as information technology (IT) services, the systems and, to some extent, the management mind-​set are becoming globally faster than in other sectors (e.g., manufacturing). Furthermore, EMMNCs in fast-​growing industries are often “born global.” In such companies, researchers observe significant involvement of the HR function in corporate decision-​ making and a growing strategic role of HRM. The rhetoric of these new companies is similar to the rhetoric of Western companies and, in such companies, Western best practices are more eagerly adopted. As Thite et al. explain, this is not surprising given that “right from their inception they have focused on Western markets and have, therefore, placed HR at the forefront of their business and international strategy” (2012: 937). Despite the obsession with global best practices and the presence of “born globals,” EMMNCs are often characterized by a lack of global processes. In fact, several researchers have highlighted the presence of different methods for organizing HRM within the same EMMNC. Andreeva et  al. (2014) found that Russian MNCs imposed headquarters’ HRM policies in CIS subsidiaries, and they did not allow these subsidiaries to implement local adaptations (except those required by law) or to diverge from the headquarters’ view. The same MNCs were much more open-​minded with respect to their subsidiaries in developed countries and gave them more freedom in deciding which types of HRM to practice, such that the HRM practices of non-​CIS subsidiaries encompassed a mix of global best practices and local HRM practices. These two distinct HRM approaches were applied simultaneously and run as if they were two

Human Resource Management    667 parallel HR organizations within the same company, without any cross-​pollination or lateral exchanges.

Interactions As explained at the beginning of this chapter, I argue that in order to understand how HRM is practiced in the context of emerging economies, we need to understand how three actors—​domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries, and EMMNCs—​interact in the HRM domain, and how these interactions are affected and affect the local and global business environment. The interactions among domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries and EMMNCs create a micro-​ecosystem for the formation of HRM in a given context. This micro-​system is nested in meso-​and macro-​systems, which represent the immediate and global business environments, respectively (see Figure 27.1). The micro-​, meso-​, and macro-​systems form an emergent and adaptive complex that encompasses inward (from enclosing to

1 Domestic firms

2

Global business environment

Immediate business environment

HRM

EMMNCs Foreign subs

Micro Meso Macro

Figure 27.1  HRM in emerging markets: Nested view

668   Dana Minbaeva Table 27.3 Examples of inward and outwards influences Arrows

Examples of outward influences Examples of inward influences (from (from enclosed to enclosing systems) enclosing to enclosed systems)

1

• Professionalization • Global trends in education • Higher-​skilled workers

• Law and state ownership • Collective bargaining • Informal institutions

2

• Growing availability of local human capital • New generation of talent

• Globalization pressures • Global convergence of management practices

enclosed systems in Walloth, 2016) and outward (from enclosed to enclosing systems in Walloth, 2016) influences (see Table 27.3 for examples). At the micro-​system level, interactions among domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries, and EMMNCs occur through two main mechanisms:  increased labor mobility between firms and knowledge leakage (both intentional unintentional). With regard to the former, emerging markets have experienced an increase in labor-​market dynamism, as evident in the rising trends of job hopping (especially in regions with a high concentration of FDI) and rapid changes in careers (especially among the younger generations). Qualified candidates move between firms with different ownership types, of different sizes, and from different industries. As they move, they develop an expectation that their new employers should support their training and development, and provide adequate opportunities for professional growth and career advancement. Hence, the increased labor-​market dynamism pushes both domestic firms and EMMNCs to adapt more advanced and progressive HRM practices, as all firms are competing for high-​quality, local human capital, which is often limited. Given the increased labor mobility, knowledge leakage is unavoidable (Inkpen, Minbaeva, & Tsang, forthcoming). As previous research shows, human-​capital mobility is a powerful driver of knowledge diffusion between firms and even among rivals (Almeida & Kogut, 1999). Increased knowledge leakage may have negative consequences, especially for foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, the literature warns foreign incumbents of the need to take specific steps to protect against knowledge leakage. However, non-​proprietary knowledge leakage may be beneficial for all firms operating in the same context. By allowing pieces of their proprietary knowledge to leak to firms operating in the same context, foreign subsidiaries may develop a reputation for cooperation that generates reciprocity, which can facilitate access to local sources of knowledge (Inkpen et al., forthcoming). Inward influences originate from the enclosing system and are directed toward the enclosed system. In our case, the HRM micro-​system, which is formed through the interactions of the three actors, is exposed to inward influences from the local and global business environments. Examples of inward influences from the local business environment include traditional institutional pressures, such as legal requirements and

Human Resource Management    669

the employment-​relations system. Given such inward influences, HRM in emerging markets is often highly segmented—​there are significant differences between “more extensively regulated large firms and state sectors on the one hand, and informal employers and SMEs on the other” (Wood & Horwitz, 2015: 37; see also Cooke, 2014; Cooke & Lin, 2012). Overall, researchers agree that many state-​owned and formerly state-​owned industrial enterprises continued to treat human resources as cost factors, while employee involvement in such companies remains low. In contrast, new HRM practices have emerged in the privatized and newly established companies. Future research on HRM in emerging markets should explore in greater detail the underlying reasons for high segmentation in a given country context and theoretically explain the presence of the large differences between how HRM practiced in domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries, and EMMNCs in their home operations. At the same time, all firms operating in emerging markets are exposed to the pressures of informal institutions, such as guanxi or blat. Previous research shows that the extent to which the firm is exposed to such pressures is related to its degree of embeddedness in the employment-​relations systems of the past. Even foreign-​owned subsidiaries established through mergers and acquisition experience inertia and significant pressure to adapt to local institutions. Within organizational settings, certain individuals are particularly exposed to such conflicting pressures, including decision-​makers who are visible to “significant others” (i.e., those assuming the right to affect the direction of an actor’s actions). These decision-​makers include managers responsible for recruitment, selection, or procurement decisions. Future research needs to go beyond blat and guanxi—​ such as jeitinho in Brazil (Tanure & Duarte, 2005), jaan-​pehchaan in India (McCarthy, Puffer, Dunlap, & Jaeger, 2012), wasta in the Middle East and North Africa (Hutchings & Weir, 2006), or yongo in Korea (Horak, 2018)—​and consider the effects of other informal networks (see Ledeneva, 2018, for examples) without getting outright normative and quickly labeling these informal practices as unethical (see Horak, 2018, for further discussion). Inward influences from the global macro environment are visible in the pressures for global convergence and for adoption of global best practices, especially by EMMNCs. Overall, studies on HRM in emerging economies provide evidence that Western-​ originated HRM practices can be effective in such environments. As a certain degree of adaptation is necessary, there is some evidence indicating a need for hybrid approaches. Furthermore, the underdeveloped state of local HRM at the meso-​level coupled with the need to satisfy individual physiological needs provides very “fertile” land for North American HRM practices. This is why the findings on HRM in emerging markets are generally in line with previous studies on North American HRM practices. Future research should focus on the actual implementation of the HRM practices in subsidiaries of EMMNCs, both in developed and developing countries. So far, much has been said about the potential strategic role of HRM in EMMNCs global expansion. Yet, demonstrations of concrete HRM activities that can enhance the effective execution of corporate strategy are lacking.

670   Dana Minbaeva At the same time, there are outward influences that manifest themselves in increasing formal regulation of employment practices at the meso level (e.g., new labor laws and amendments to national employment-​protection legislation). Emerging markets are also experiencing a professionalization of HR as professional communities emerge. These communities are beginning to set standards and norms for best practices, thereby gradually institutionalizing the HR profession. We still need more knowledge about how these professional communities emerge and what kind of effect they have on the way HRM is practiced in emerging markets. Another example of outward influences on the macro system—​influences that emerge from interactions among the actors within the micro system—​is the growing availability and quality of human capital (Meyer & Xin, 2017). Talent management and leadership development programs are in focus in all firms. Such programs go beyond training to include competency assessments, personal mentoring, special projects, and job rotations. Such programs, for example, in China attract a younger generation of employees, who represent a very unique group due to the evolving demographics of Chinese society. As Meyer and Xin explain, “recent university graduates tend to be, for example, more confident, more materially oriented, and less respecting of traditional hierarchies” (2017: 18). The emergence of this new generation of local leaders affect both meso-​and macro-​systems in which HRM in emerging markets is embedded.

Conclusion When talking about HRM in emerging markets, it is difficult to make any generalizations. Nor can we precisely predict the future of HRM in these contexts. HRM in emerging markets is still emerging, and it is characterized by uncertain and unplanned forms of hybridization (Chung, Sparrow, & Bozkurt, 2014; Minbaeva, Hutchings, & Thomson, 2007). As illustrated in this chapter, in each emerging market, HRM will depend on the types of actors present and the behavior of those actors (i.e., the interactions that form the micro-​system). The extent to which HRM in a given emerging market will exhibit global convergence will depend on the strength of its enclosing system (i.e., the meso-​system). However, in all emerging markets, the inward influences of the macro-​system will remain strong and decisive in shaping both the meso-​ and micro-​systems. For managers operating in emerging markets, the understanding of HRM as a nested, complex, and adaptive system highlights the need to effectively monitor and address complexity outside their firms. Firms that fail to reach such an understanding will eventually be marginalized and experience significant difficulties in attracting human capital of the quality needed to ensure a competitive advantage.

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Note 1. In fact, all local managers we interviewed in Russia and the other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries used English words in their discourse, such as “training,” “global meeting,” “compensation and benefits,” “expat[riate],” “coaching,” “talent management,” “grading,” “recruitment,” “mobility,” and “headhunting.” Even the term “HR” was used by Russian speakers as it is pronounced in English (aeich-​ar). This use of English HR-​ related terms illustrates that Western thinking dominates the profession and that there is a shared perception of Western HRM practices as more advanced than local practices.

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672   Dana Minbaeva Cooke, F. L. 2014. Chinese multinational firms in Asia and Africa:  Relationships with insitutional actors and patterns of HRM practices. Human Resource Management, 53(6): 887–​896. Dirani, K. M., Ardichvili, A., Cseh, M., & Zavyalova, E. 2015. Human resource management in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe. In F. Horwitz & P. Budhwar (Eds.), Handbook of human resource management in emerging markets:  357–​371. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Dögl, C., & Holtbrügge, D. 2014. Corporate environmental responsibility, employer reputation and employee commitment: An empirical study in developed and emerging economies. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 25(12): 1739–​1762. Edwards, T., Sanchez-​Mangas, R., Jalette, P., Lavelle, J., & Minbaeva, D. 2016. Global standardization or national differentiation of HRM practices in multinational companies?:  A comparison of multinationals in five countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 47(8): 997–​1021. Fey, C., & Björkman, I. 2001. The effect of human resource management practices on MNC subsidiary performance in Russia. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(1): 59–​7 5. Forstenlecher, I., Selim, H., Baruch, Y., & Madi, M. 2014. Career exploitation and perceived employability within an emerging economy context. Human Resource Management, 53(1): 45–​66. Galang, M. C., & Osman, I. 2016. HR managers in five countries: What do they do and why does it matter? The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 27(13): 1341–​1372. Geary, J., & Aguzzoli, R. 2016. Minors, politics and institutional caryatids: Accounting for the transfer of HRM practices in the Brazilian multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 47(8): 968–​996. Hollinshead, G., & Maclean, M. 2007. Transition and organizational dissonance in Serbia. Human Relations, 60(10): 1551–​1574. Horak, S. 2018. Join in or opt out? A normative-​ethical analysis of affective ties and networks in South Korea. Journal of Business Ethics. 149(1). 207–​220. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10551-​016 -​3125-​7. Accessed February 23, 2018. Horwitz, F., & Budhwar, P. 2015. (Eds.). Handbook of human resource management in emerging markets. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Huselid, M. 1995. The impact of human resource management practices on turnover, productivity, and corporate financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 38(3): 635–​672. Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. 2006. Understanding networking in China and the Arab world:  Lessons from international managers. Journal of European Industrial Training, 30(4): 272–​290. Inkpen, A., Minbaeva, D., & Tsang, E. forthcoming. Point-​counterpoint on knowledge leakage. Journal of International Business Studies Jackson, T. 2014. Employment in Chinese MNEs: Appraising the dragon’s gift to Sub-​Saharan Africa. Human Resource Management, 53(6): 897–​919. Khavul, S., Benson, G. S., & Datta, D. K. 2010. Is internationalization associated with investments in HRM? A  study of entrepreneurial firms in emerging markets. Human Resource Management, 49(4): 693–​7 13. Kiriazov, D., Sullivan, S., & Tu, H. 2000. Business success in Eastern Europe: Understanding and customizing HRM. Business Horizons, 41(1): 39–​43.

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674   Dana Minbaeva Sundar, P. 2013. Business & community: The story of corporate social responsibility in India. New Delhi: Sage. Stumpf, S. A., Doh, J. P. & Tymon, W. G. Jr. 2010. The strength of HR practices in India and their effects on employee career success, performance, and potential. Human Resource Management, 49(3): 353–​375. Tanure, B., & Duarte, R. G. 2005. Leveraging competitiveness upon national cultural traits: The management of people in Brazilian companies. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 16(12): 2201–​2217. Thite, M., Wilkinson, A., & Shah, D. 2012. Internationalization and HRM strategies across subsidiaries in multinational corporations from emerging economies—​ A conceptual framework. Journal of World Business, 47(1): 251–​258. Vlachos, P. A., Panagopoulos, N. G., & Rapp, A. A. 2014. Employee judgements of and behaviors toward corporate social responsibility: A multi-​study investigation of direct, cascading, and moderating effects. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 35(7): 990–​1017. Walloth, C. 2016. Emergent nested systems: A theory of understanding and influencing complex systems as well as case studies in urban systems. Brussels: Springer. Wei, L.-​Q. & Lau, C.-​M. 2008. The impact of market orientation and strategic HRM on firm performance:  the case of Chinese enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(6): 980–​995. Wei, L.-​Q, Liu, J., Zhang, Y. & Chiu, R. K. 2008. The role of corporate culture in the process of strategic human resource management:  Evidence from Chinese enterprises. Human Resource Management, 47(4): 777–​794. Whetten, D. 2009. An examination of the interface between context and theory applied to the study of Chinese organizations. Management Organization Review, 5(1): 29–​55. Wood, G., Dibben, P., & Meira, J. 2016. Knowledge transfer within strategic partnerships: The case of HRM in the Brazilian Motor industry supply chain. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 27(20): 2398–​2414. Wood, G., Dibben, P., Stride, C., & Webster, E. 2010. HRM in Mozambique: Homogenization, path dependence or segmented business system? Journal of World Business, 46(1): 31–​41. Wood, G., & Horwitz, F. 2015. Theories and institutional approaches to HRM and employment relations in selected emerging markets. In F. Horwitz & P. Budhwar (Eds.), Handbook of human resource management in emerging markets: 19–​41. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Wood, G., Mazouz, K., Yin, S., & Jet, C. 2014. Foreign direct investment from emerging markets to Africa: The HRM context. Human Resource Management, 53(1): 179–​201. Zhu, J. S., Zhu, C. G., & De-​Cieri, H. 2014. Chinese MNCs’ preparation for host-​country labor relations: An exploration of country-​of-​origin effect. Human Resource Management, 53(6): 947–​965.

Pa rt   V

C OU N T R I E S A N D R E G ION S

Chapter 28

M anaging M u lti nat i ona l s in Bra z i l Opportunities and Challenges Jorge Carneiro

Brazil and Brazilians have long-​lived traits from the past that still persist today and affect business practices. However, several important changes have recently taken place, which bear significant impact on the business landscape. Future prospects indicate quite a few challenges to be faced as well as expectations of important improvements in several aspects. As will become clear throughout this chapter, Brazil is a very complex and idiosyncratic society—​but with many promising opportunities. As allegedly said by bossa nova composer Tom Jobim (author of The Girl from Ipanema), “Brazil is not for beginners.” In the sections that follow, both public information and primary data (from the interviews) are intermingled as a way to provide evidence about the business environment in the country.

How Does History Impinge on the Ways of Doing Business in Brazil? “Brazil” (named after “Pau Brasil”—​reddish dyewood) was officially “discovered” by the Portuguese in 1500, soon after the signing of the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 (Figure 28.1), which partitioned, between Portugal and Spain, the to-​be-​discovered lands outside Europe. The temporary Spanish rule over the Portuguese crown (1580–​1640) expanded the frontiers of the Portuguese possessions in the Americas (as a Portuguese ruler returned to power in 1640) much farther than had been originally determined in the Treaty of Tordesillas.

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Figure 28.1  Colonial demarcation lines between Castille/​Spain and Portugal in the 15th and 16th centuries (Treaty of Tordesillas and Treaty of Saragossa) Source: By Lencer [CC-​BY-​SA-​3.0 (http://​creativecommons.org/​licenses/​by-​sa/​3.0/​)], from Wikimedia Commons, https://​commons.wikimedia.org/​wiki/​File:Spain_​and_​Portugal.png

Throughout its history, Brazil has been populated by a quite diverse set of people and cultures:  native “indians,” Portuguese (including adventurers, outlaws, and also noblemen), slaves from Africa, French and Dutch raiders (in the Northeast), “Bandeirantes” (soldiers of fortune) and their followers, Jews (escaping from religious persecution), Japanese farmers (mainly in the São Paulo region, now making São Paulo the home of the largest Japanese population outside Japan), and several other European immigrants (Spaniards and Italians in the Southeast and Germans and Polish in the South). Interestingly, these different cultures, accents, and habits have mingled well to create a sense of unified nation, although tinted by several hues, and a welcome feeling regarding diversity. After the Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil in 1808 (running away from a potential invasion by Napoleon’s troops) and established Rio de Janeiro as the capital of the Portuguese Empire, the country experienced great transformations, with (often, but not always) favorable implications for cultural development, work-​related habits, infrastructure development (railroads and gaslight in 1854), education, and economic development (Banco do Brasil in 1808). Brazil moved from a Portuguese colony to an independent country (1822), with Pedro I (son of John VI, king of Portugal) as the first emperor; his son, Pedro II, already born in Brazil, was a lover of arts and culture in general and also commanded important improvements in the country’s infrastructure. The Portuguese colonization of Brazil presents some striking differences from the Spanish colonization of other Latin American countries. While the Portuguese, much like the Spaniards, engaged in outright exploitation of natural resources, they, on the other hand, also promoted settlements and economic/​infrastructure development.

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    679 Besides, the Portuguese settlers fostered miscegenation (e.g., with native Indians and African slaves, building a unique society). Brazil’s independence from its colonizer was “smooth” and, in fact, run by the Portuguese king’s heir. On the other hand, the Spaniards had bloody battles with the native peoples in the other parts of the continent where the Spaniards ruled—​in part, because the peoples who lived there were quite more advanced (at least, in terms of a Western European perspective) than natives in Brazil and they did not accept external dominance. As a result, the Spaniards virtually annihilated the Aztec, Maya, and Inca civilizations. Given the heterogeneous populations, later independence from the Spaniards led to several independent countries, while Brazil remained a single country. Since Portugal had been highly indebted to Great Britain, Brazil also experienced great influence from the British (e.g., in economy and transportation infrastructure), culminating in the opening of ports to “friend” nations (in fact, Britain) in 1808. North American influence (in politics and commercial relations) came later, from the early twentieth century on. Particularly in big companies and large cities, business culture has been deeply affected by the influence of North American models and texts used in business schools. Portuguese colonizers imposed a hierarchical social structure, the notion of authority from public officials as well as a set of institutions and laws (many of which not understood by “Brazilians”), which has led to a “way of going around things”—​that is, pretending to comply while not actually doing so. Brazilians have learned “to expect, fear, admire and respect authority” (Caldas, 2006: 171 (emphasis in the original)) and have developed a sense of paternalism, that is, they have learned to expect shelter and protection from the “powerful.” Possibly as a way to deal with unfavorable situations against which they thought they could not fight, Brazilians have learned to make jokes about (serious) national problems, instead of struggling for solutions to the problems. A  gap between norms and social practice (Caldas, 2006) has developed a sense of dealing with ambiguity and has to led to laws that do not “stick” (i.e., are not followed in practice) and doing things just for “the Englishman to see” (i.e., pretend that one is doing, while one is not). In the words of AR, the Brazilian CEO of the subsidiary of an Italian MNE (multnational), “things [in Brazil] are not ipsis litteris.” The influence of Portuguese colonization over the relationships between sellers (producers) and buyers is still noted today in commercial relations, public services, and private services. Brazilian people, as buyers, were at a disadvantage in their relationship with sellers because Portuguese rulers (under the disguised influence of the British) did not allow the colony to manufacture; given the frequent shortage of products from Portugal, sellers (awarded that position by Portuguese authorities) would provide credit and access to scarce goods—​as a result, sellers were considered “superior” (rich, refined, sophisticated) and Brazilian buyers, “inferior” (crude, ignorant, unprepared) (Da Rocha, 2000). Consequently, pre-​and post-​sale services (as well as technical product specifications) are often not of high quality, which opens up a good opportunity to be exploited, both by domestic as well as by foreign firms. Poorer consumers, in particular, feel neglected and are often very humble and ashamed to

680   Jorge Carneiro complain or to demand their rights—​therefore, companies that treat them well and deliver on their promises may have a good chance to conquer the loyalty of such consumers (as long as companies do not charge a high price, since those consumers are price sensitive). Because of those hierarchical and paternalist expectations, Brazilians usually prefer someone who gives orders, who tells them what to do and provides them with details of what is expected. “Brazil is a hierarchical country,” as pointed out by GD (a Brazilian executive of a Norwegian multinational); similarly, LM (the French CEO of the Brazilian subsidiary of a French MNE) contends that “in France, your team will talk to you [the CEO] and challenge you; in Brazil, employees follow orders.” However, CEOs of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from advanced markets sometimes keep their home posture and apply a “high view” approach to business, leaving out the details to their employees. As emphasized by PH (a Brazilian executive with experience in North American MNEs), a lack of critical sense on the part of employees and the need for permanent supervision hinder speed and may lead to waste. Interestingly, while lower-​level employees tend to expect to be told what to do and do not show a proactive attitude, top executives like autonomy from the (foreign) headquarters (argues PH). As exemplified by PH, North Americans want to impose their way, but Brazilians resist. However, Brazilians find it difficult to say “no” directly; instead, they seem to comply, but they do otherwise, which leads to mistrust. Interestingly, PH’s experience at North American multinationals in Brazil indicates that because many Brazilian managers have been trained in “Americanized” business schools, they tend to accept “Americanized” solutions. AR agrees that communication in Brazil is not explicit and that Brazilians go around tough issues. As advised by PH, foreign executives should try to understand the “unsaid.” Much by the same token, LM argues that “in Brazil, it is necessary to read between the lines, to understand what is not spoken.” As a result, “Brazilians [may] change their position even after the decision has been taken,” complains LM. FC (a Brazilian board member and former CEO of the Brazilian subsidiary of a USA headhunter firm) agrees that Brazilian top executives do not like to “feel in a cast” or to be strategically subordinated to the foreign headquarters. However, as stated by FC, top Brazilian executives tend to prefer to work for foreign large firms rather than Brazilian firms because the former usually pay better.

Distinct Features of the Institutional Environment of Brazil Brazil is a unified nation, but there are huge heterogeneities (in terms of culture, infrastructure, business practices, patterns of consumption, and workforce skills) across regions of the country (Figure 28.2).

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    681

North region Northeast Region Central-West region Southeast region South region

Figure 28.2  Brazil’s geopolitical regions Source: By João Felipe C.S [CC-​BY-​SA-​3.0 (http://​creativecommons.org/​licenses/​by-​sa/​3.0/​)], from Wikimedia Commons, https://​en.wikipedia.org/​wiki/​File:Brazil_​Labelled_​Map.svg. Labels added by author.

Geography Specific geographies within the country have developed their own economic “vocations”:  agriculture, manufacture, real state, trade, services, or public administration. As a continental country (area of 8.5 million km2 (fifth largest in the world) and 23,000 km of borders), with many mountain ranges and few navigable rivers, Brazil imposes severe difficulties to the transportation of goods and people. Dependence on roads and highways instead of waterways or railways and poorly maintained harbors (also plagued by high costs imposed by labor unions) lead to high costs and losses. As noted by CS, the Brazilian CEO of German MNE, who had past experience in US and French firms in Brazil and was once expatriated to China, “the distance between Lisbon and Moscow is similar to the distance between Porto Alegre and Recife [two state capitals in Brazil].” Such distances, CS adds, increase logistic costs—​which are compounded by deficient transportation infrastructure—​and lead to distinct business cultures. As argued by

682   Jorge Carneiro ME, an entrepreneur who sells information technology (IT) services to MNEs in fast-​ moving consumer goods industries, “the logistical chain is very problematic”; LM is more direct: “Logistics [in Brazil] is expensive, slow and risky.” EF, a country manager of a Brazilian subsidiary of a US MNE, contends that since distributors may not be reliable, many large companies vertically integrate and build their own distribution systems. Some industries (e.g., agribusiness) demand scattered sales, that is, dispersed logistics (e.g., “a chainsaw may take 40 days from the manufacturing plant [e.g., in the Sao Paulo state] to the point of sale [e.g., in the Amazon region],” according to EF). On the other hand, some industries (e.g., beauty care) are much more concentrated—​in the richer states of the Southeast and South of Brazil. Brazil is somewhat geographically “isolated” from other countries because of natural barriers: the Amazon forest, the water lands (Pantanal), the Andes mountain range (in neighbor countries), and the Atlantic Ocean. This virtual isolation has affected international trade—​no wonder that the Mercosur trade bloc started with the three countries (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) that are neighbors to Brazil in the South and where those natural barriers are smaller. Brazil’s exuberant nature has created the illusion of the land of plenty and of limitless resources. In the words of Pêro Vaz de Caminha, who wrote the detailed official report of the 1500 discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese fleet, “Em se plantando, tudo dá,” that is, “If one sows, anything grows.” However, the crude reality indicates otherwise. There are great inequalities across the country’s geographies, with the Southern and Southeastern states (São Paulo in particular) concentrating a disproportionate share of the country’s GDP (gross domestic product), while other regions have suffered from poverty for decades. In fact, Brazil is endowed by natural resources: a tropical climate and lots of sunshine favor agriculture; there are also large oil, natural gas, and mineral reserves. The country boasts a great extension of land, but a large proportion was not arable (including some dry lands and water lands); this picture has changed, however, thanks to some irrigation projects and especially the efforts of EMBRAPA (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, Brazilian Agricultural and Livestock Research Center), which has developed seeds and plants that do well in once-​unfertile lands. As a result, the cerrado (the Brazilian savanna) in the midlands of the country has been “colonized” by Brazilians—​ migrants from the South and the Center-​West, who have employed modern production techniques and achieved high levels of productivity. EMBRAPA’s work, coupled with the fact that 17 Brazilian states have research centers on agriculture (e.g., ESALQ, in the interior of São Paulo state), has produced genetically modified organisms (GMOs), pest-​ resistant, disease-​resistant, and environmental-​adapted crops, besides hormones and built-​in vaccines in crops which add value to the consumer. High reliance on natural resources, though, has led to a re-​primarization of the economy, in particular concerning exports. However, EMBRAPA has been able to add much value to crops produced in the country, many of which now incorporate functional components with metabolic or physiological properties that are beneficial to health—​thus moving production away from mere commodities. Additionally,

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    683 the production of oil (still a commodity) has benefited from major developments at Petrobras (the national oil company), which has found oil in pre-​salt depths and has improved recovery rates (how much oil can be extracted from a reserve) considerably. Therefore, embedded (product or process) technology now characterizes much of the Brazilian natural resource exploitation economy.

Ecology and the Natural Environment As argued by EF, high humidity and temperature are an opportunity to sell more pesticides, given the higher occurrence of plagues. On the other hand, research by EMBRAPA has led to the development of plague-​resistant varieties, negatively affecting the demand for pesticides—​while, as a consequence, helping preserve the natural environment. EF contends that Brazil mixes advanced environmental laws and strict rules (e.g., for granting licenses) with somewhat negligent monitoring and control (of emissions). Hydropower has been well exploited. In fact, Brazil’s energy matrix boasts an outstanding 45.3% production from renewable sources, such as water, biomass, and ethanol (Portal Brasil, 2017). On the other hand, exploitation of wind-​generated and solar power is much below its potential.

Culture Besides the physical barriers that have kept Brazil geographically distant from the world, Brazil also suffers from cultural distance, even from its neighbors in South America. As the only country that speaks Portuguese in the region (while virtually all others speak Spanish) and being often regarded as the new “imperial” power in the region, Brazil faces some rejection in the continent—​as argued by PH, such perspective is similar to what many Brazilians think about advanced market multinationals. Thus, PH maintains that “Brazil is not an obvious way to Latin America.” The similarities, however, seem greater than the differences and Brazilians consider that other Latin American countries are, in general, (much) more psychically close than European, North American, or Asian countries, so that a springboarding approach (cf. Pla-​Barber & Camps, 2011) may be employed, in particular by Spanish companies, which might start their forays in Latin America via smaller, Spanish-​speaking countries, before they make their full entry into Brazil. Africa is regarded as somewhat similar, possibly because of the African slaves brought to Brazil—​but this apparent similarity has not been strongly exploited in commercial or political relationships. In terms of religion, Brazil is quite syncretic and officially there is a separation between religion and the state (although quite a few politicians have been elected on the grounds of their manifested religious creeds, such as the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, elected in 2016, who is a “bishop” of an evangelical church). The Portuguese inheritance

684   Jorge Carneiro resulted in a majority of Roman Catholics (albeit with many non-​practitioners), but protestant religions (e.g., Baptists, Evangelicals, Lutherans, Methodists, Pentacostalists, Presbyterians, and Adventists) have been growing. Jewish and Islamic influences, as well as Mormons, Jehovah’s witnesses, and spiritualists, are also noted, though to a lesser degree. Among the younger Brazilians, there seems to be a growing number of atheists. The rise in protestant religions has opened opportunities in several industries (e.g., publishing, media, food services, bars, and travel agencies) that exploit the particular preferences of this rising public—​such as traveling in larger groups and having religious activities included in the package or attending places (e.g., bars) that play gospel music. Brazil is a melting pot of subcultures across regions: São Paulo is perceived as “too much” business, Rio is too much Carnival (fun and easy-​going spirit), Bahia is too much African (casual relation with time issues), the Southern states as too much European (colder, less open to (non-​European) foreigners), and the Amazon states as too much “native.” Although Brazilians manifest a sense of national unity, these marked regional differences demand adaptations in products (to cater to different economic and educational levels, as well as peculiar preferences), service attitudes (Northeasterners are “warmer,” Southerners are “colder,” not just because of physical temperature), and business practices. Such subtleties are difficult to grasp by a foreigner; therefore, multinationals may benefit from hiring local executives as I discuss at the end of this chapter. As examples of adaptations implemented by MNEs in order to accommodate color preferences related to North and Northeast folklore, where the red bull “fights” the blue bull at June festivities (festas juninas), are Coca-​Cola and Nestlé cans painted either in red or in blue. When it turns to formal business negotiations, CS contends that Brazilians write long contracts with a lot of operational details and mutual duties, whereas in some countries (e.g., China), contracts are quite short and look more like letters of intentions. These differences reflect the low-​versus high-​context cultures (cf. Hall, 1976), where the former prefer explicit rules and responsibility assignment, which lead to shorter-​term (contract-​based) relationships, while the latter tend to lead to less explicit communication, less written/​formal information, longer-​term relationships, and decisions made via face-​to-​face agreements. In terms of temporal horizons, Brazilians show a shorter time perspective, especially when compared with Europeans (longer term) and North Americans (middle term)—​contends CS. Oddly, the same Brazilians who expect paternalistic behavior from their superiors also want to express their autonomy (an expression of self; “I will do it my way”; with Carnival and football as manifestations) rather than follow some collective behavior. Brazilians like improvisation and heroes (reflected in football stars), but this attitude is detrimental to long-​term planning and operational efficiency. The mess that preceded some recent large events (e.g., World Youth Day, 2013; FIFA World Cup, 2014; Olympic Games, 2016)  has nonetheless been overcome by hard last-​minute efforts (although, in many instances, at the expense of larger disbursements by the state, much of which is going to corrupted politicians and businesspersons), and a sincere dedication of the people, since Brazilians do like to welcome and to serve.

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    685 The jeitinho brasileiro (Brazilian way to get around obstacles, as practiced by Disney’s character Zé Carioca, who exemplifies the malandro character, the smart guy) is at the same time a manifestation of flexibility and a reaction to unexpected events/​outcomes—​ which may be good for business—​but the expression (not the attitude) often underlies a pejorative interpretation, even among Brazilians. Brazilians have deep connections with family members and friends (Da Matta, 1984), which often affect business decisions, such as job hiring, employee performance assessment, and feedback providing. A  popular saying has it that “to your friends, everything; to your enemies, the rigor of the law”). PH maintains that less objective communication modes as well as personal and political relationships often prevail over direct/​unequivocal messages and technical decisions. LY, the Chinese country manager of the Brazilian subsidiary of a Chinese MNE, complains that Brazilians are not straightforward but rather talkative and “effusive”—​“Brazilians should be quicker [to act], rather than talk too much,” he maintains. Given that most Brazilians do not speak good English (if any), with the exception of those in state capitals in the South and Southeastern regions, communication with foreign managers is even more difficult. The importance of close social relationships extends from the personal into the business sphere. Success depends on managing to be immersed in the social/​business tissue and building appropriate connections. Therefore, hiring local executives, who are part of a social/​business web, may provide better returns in the short and the long run, as expressed by LY and by FC. As stated by PH, Brazilians like foreigners and value the novel, different, diverse, and “funny.” Maybe this attitude is a trait of the liability of origin and the fact that Brazil was for decades a closed market—​consequently, there is a sense that foreign things are better. FC claims that while Brazilian firms are usually quite open to different cultures and to novelties, they are, however, quite “conservative” regarding gender and skin color equality, particularly in the top executive team and the board of directors. Brazilians like to party and to celebrate. Therefore, companies should understand that such expressions should not only be tolerated but encouraged. A Christmas party (or at least an official lunch or dinner sponsored by the company) is expected. Also, when the Brazilian team is playing at the FIFA World Cup, employees should be allowed to watch the match (with no quid pro quo expected in work time) even if the match takes place during regular working hours.

Sociodemography Brazil has a population of almost 208  million inhabitants (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2017), highly concentrated in the (more developed) Southeast region (Figure 28.3), with the state of São Paulo alone housing 44 million, the metropolitan area of São Paulo city (39 cities in conurbation), 21 million, and the city of São Paulo, 12 million.

686   Jorge Carneiro 7.6% 8.6%

Center-West North

41.9%

Northeast 27.6%

South Southeast

14.3%

Figure 28.3  Geographic distribution of the population in Brazil Source: Data from IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics]). Estimativas de população [Population estimates]. Retrieved from https://​www.ibge.gov.br/​estatisticas-​novoportal/​sociais /​populacao/​9103-​estimativas-​de-​populacao.html?=&t=resultados. Accessed April 18, 2018.

The shape of Brazil’s age pyramid is changing rapidly: from a majority of youngsters into a profile that will, by the 2060s, resemble that of today’s advanced markets. Such change will have huge implications for public retirement pensions and private pension funds, but it may bring good prospects for several industries, such as pharmaceuticals and private health care, in particular if the expected increase in formal employment turns into reality, which means more people will have a (corporate) health plan. Depending on whether people are going to contract private retirement plans, as a response to the (anticipated) changes in the rules for receiving public pensions (which are expected to become more stringent), this aging population may have an interesting discretionary budget to be exploited by several industries. Brazil’s average GDP per capita (in 2016, US$8,647 (nominal) and US$15,128 (PPP—​ purchase power parity), cf. World Bank, 2017a, 2017b) is very unequally distributed. In fact, Brazil stands as one of the worst in inequality in Latin America and in the world (but was getting better, at least until the recent recession), with the 1% richest earning as much as the 50% poorest and “the gap in income between the top and bottom deciles is still about five times that of advanced economies” (World Economic Forum, 2015: 2). For this reason, overall figures of population as indicators of market size should be regarded with care. In fact, companies may consider offering a portfolio of products/​ services, each more specifically adapted to the particular needs, patterns of consumption, and price sensitivity of distinct market segments—​for example, smaller packages and simpler products for the less well off and the functional illiterate (or the smaller firms for that matter) as well as more sophisticated products for other segments—​as indicated by EF and LM, whose firms sell to corporate buyers. EF advises that “emerging markets also buy ‘high-​end’; therefore, one needs a broad portfolio: entry level and high-​ end.” Managing such a diverse portfolio of offers may put stress on strategic positioning/​ brand image and operations. Moreover, in Brazil, just as in many emerging markets, the purchase unit is the (extended) family, not the individual (Cavusgil, Knight, Riesenberger, Rammal, & Rose,

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    687 2014); therefore, family income is a better indicator of purchasing power that per capita GDP. Although illiteracy rate (7.3%) is not very high (World Bank, 2017c), functional illiteracy is. Therefore, companies often need to design products and respective instructions that can be understood and used by consumers who virtually cannot read. Besides, a low educational level leads to low productivity. In fact, Brazil has quite a few good universities, but there is a shortage of well-​trained technical workers (such as, carpenters, mechanics, turners, and electricians), especially in the interior of the country—​with the São Paulo state as a laudable exception. Despite the efforts of the, so-​ called, S-​system (composed of public institutions related to technical training, such as SENAC, SENAI, and SESI, among others), this picture has not changed much. Besides, AR complains that the S-​system is “bureaucratic and insufficient.” AR adds that Brazilian workers have poor abstraction skills and poor formal knowledge, so that “Improvisation and practical experience abound,” but sound reasoning and common sense are lacking. Such deficiency, coupled with the expectation of permanent supervision on the part of lower-​level workers, increases costs and reduces productivity. On the other hand, AR accepts that managerial skills have been improving quite a lot—​the stability of the economy has helped, but so have lessons from former unstable times and the incorporation of management practices observed in MNEs, as well as the application of management techniques (e.g., TQM, or total quality management). However, AR contends that “planning is not in the ‘blood’ of Brazilian executives,” but things have been getting better as shown by some successful Brazilian multinationals such as AB InBev, BRF, Marcopolo, Metalfrio, and EMBRAER, among several others. In fact, although it has been argued that emerging market firms would undertake acquisitions abroad in order to gain access to strategic assets (Luo & Tung, 2007), such as technology and brands, several Brazilian firms—​and, in fact, many of their Latin American counterparts, cf. Cuervo-​Cazurra et  al. (forthcoming)—​have developed firm-​specific competitive advantages (in process and product technology as well as in marketing and distribution skills) in their home country, before they went abroad. High rates of urban violence (Murray, Cerqueira, & Kahn, 2013) affect tourism, foreign capital investment, and expatriation of executives into the country. The rising middle-​class phenomenon has changed Brazil in many ways. Several measures directed to reduce the economic difficulties of poor families (such as control of inflation and social assistance programs), initiated in the neo-​liberal government of President Cardoso (1994–​2002) and deeply reinforced in the Labor Party’s government of President Lula (2003–​2011) (I present more details in the section “Economy” below), have brought millions of poor consumers into the middle class. The larger middle class increased consumption, which helped move several middle-​class consumers into the upper middle class. Between 2003 and 2011, the number of people in the upper and middle classes raised 49  million (of which, 13  million between 2009 and 2011)  and the poor population decreased from 96 million to 64 million people; as of 2011, 55% of the population were in the middle class (Neri, 2011)—​they could decide any election! As of 2011, purchasing

688   Jorge Carneiro power was evenly distributed between upper classes (46.6%) and middle classes (45.6%), with lower classes accounting for just 7.8% (Neri, 2011). Unemployment declined from 12.6% (2002) to 4.8% (2014) (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2016). The rise of the middle class propelled the country’s GDP. However, the model was largely based on cheaper access to consumer credit and an increase in consumption by middle-​class customers—​which met a limit and left middle-​class families in a great deal of debt. Besides, Brazil’s government did not take measures to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks and improve productivity. As a result, that favorable picture of fewer poor people and growing GDP has deteriorated much since 2012, with a great rise in unemployment rates, reaching 13.7% in the first quarter of 2017. In fact, the country has experienced an economic recession since 2015.

Legal Issues Brazil has very intricate legal and regulatory systems, with the power to determine new taxes and tax brackets being distributed among the federal government, states, municipalities, and the federal district. Companies need expert advice not to (often inadvertently) break the law. The tax system is so complex that companies often end up paying penalties for not having complied with some tax rule that was unclear or unknown. Tax wars among states and cities have often ensued. As argued by interviewees EF and CS, such complexities demand larger organizational structures and head count and it is often difficult to have “the headquarters understand this [complexity], in particular in the early stages in the country, when the local subsidiary is not profitable yet” (EF). Worse still, CS complained about the differences across states of the federation. The tax burden is high. Business magazine Exame presents OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) data that indicates that Brazil has the highest tax burden (33.4% of GDP) in Latin America (Nakagawa, 2016). A  high tax burden promotes informality and disequilibrium: some pay much; some pay little (or nothing). The informal economy was estimated at 16.3% of GDP in 2016 (Reuters, 2016, citing a study by IBRE/​FGV). It is estimated that, if all due taxes (personal and corporate) were to be paid, taxation would represent about 60% of GDP. Electronic payments and more effective tax collection, though, have been reducing evasion. As a way to curb tax evasion, the government has chosen companies in given industries in order to establish a taxation substitution regime, whereby the largest company in the value system is responsible for paying the taxes related to all the links along the chain—​and gets compensated by the price mechanism, that is, by charging higher prices to companies downstream (e.g., distributors) or being charged lower prices from companies upstream (suppliers). Depending on the fiscal regime that a company has adhered to, taxes are not levied on value added but rather on revenues—​characterizing cumulative taxing. There are a few tax exemption zones, such as Zona Franca de Manaus (in the Amazon state) and ZPE—​ Zonas de Processamento de Exportação (Export Processing Zones).

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    689 The great number of laws may be a cultural trait. As Hofstede contended, “[a]‌t 76 Brazil scores high on UAI [uncertainty avoidance index]—​and so do the majority of Latin American countries. These societies show a strong need for rules and elaborate legal systems in order to structure life. The individual’s need to obey these laws, however, is weak. If rules however cannot be kept, additional rules are dictated” (2017). Although, the Brazilian legal framework is rather stable, “different judges interpret the laws differently” (AR). Bureaucracy and paperwork impose costs and reduce productivity. For instance, approximately 250 laws regulate the installation of new telecom antennas (but the antennas law, promulgated in 2015, has simplified the process), 120 documents are necessary to import a single container, and around 14 years are necessary to close down a legally established firm and 12 times as many employee hours are necessary to register a firm as compared to what occurs in OECD countries (World Bank, 2017d). Besides, there are several legal dysfunctions, such as payment of overtime to employees while in the company bus (which is a way to circumvent deficiencies in public transportation); fines to firms that distribute profits to employees, under the allegation that it is disguised salary; or controversies across different public institutions/​agencies or between judges in their interpretation of the law. Such complexities and inefficiencies often lead to a quest for “breaches” in the legislation (and the use of jeitinho brasileiro). The World Bank (2017d) report positions Brazil as 123rd, among 190 countries, in terms of “ease” of doing business. In regard to “paying taxes,” Brazil is placed as 181st, but the country has been improving regarding the enforcement of contracts (occupying the 37th position). AR provides examples such as difficulties to reach a common definition of ICMS (sales tax, Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços or Tax on the Circulation of Goods and Services, equivalent to a sales tax ) to rural clients; problematic interpretation of the recently passed outsourcing law; and the judicial decision that reintegrated employees that had been legally dismissed (because they had developed a disease (RPS—​repetitive strain injury) that prevented them from doing their job any longer). LM complains about the excessive red tape and the poorly prepared public officers. He contends that “although France is as bureaucratic as Brazil, at least public officers are better prepared [there] and rules and laws are clear.” LM protests that “the customs officer interprets [rules] the way he sees fit” and adds the example of the law about minimum national content, which is difficult to apply in practice, thus causing “delays and, sometimes, embargo.” LM also objects to the high import duties (60%–​65%) for the equipment his firm brings into Brazil. Labor charges (non-​salary labor costs) are complex and high on a formally employed workforce. Among others, the following charges add up to the salary that the company has to pay (some of which go to the employee, while some go to the federal government):  vacations (30 running days a year), vacations complement (one-​third of a monthly salary), 13th salary, additional remuneration (overtime, night time, unhealthy job, dangerous services), paid absence (for up to 15 days), in case of medical leave, work licenses, weekly paid rest, work contract termination, transportation vouchers, public pension fund, Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS, Time of

690   Jorge Carneiro Service Guarantee Fund, which is one salary per year), and contribution to the S System (Senar, Senac, Sesc, Sescoop, Senai, Sesi, Sest, Senat, Sebrae, DPC, Incra, and Fundo Aeroviário). There are some other charges, which are not compulsory, however: meal ticket, health care, profit sharing, and child-​care assistance. New laws passed in 2017 are expected to provide more flexibility in labor regulations and reduce costs for hiring companies. The union system is pervasive in most industries. According to the O Globo newspaper (2013), Brazil featured more than 15,000 unions and around 250 new ones had been formed every year between 2005 and 2013 (Almeida & Carneiro, 2013). IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) (2017) (a Brazilian public institute) indicates 16,491 unions as of January 2017. Not only do unions mean additional cost to companies and employees, but, as complained by FC, unions sometimes demand (off-​ the-​record) private benefits when negotiating with large companies. In the words of CS, “they [the unions] are incompetent and intransigent” and pose difficulties in negotiating agreements. However, a recently passed law that revoked the mandatory payment (by workers, whether or not they were unionized) to labor unions will represent a great setback in the unions’ power. Quite a few institutions help enforce consumer protection. For example, there are several regulatory agencies (ANATEL, ANEEL, ANP, ANA, ANVISA, ANS, ANCINE, ANTT, ANTAQ, ANAC) and a bureau similar to the North American Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—​the CADE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica or Administrative Council for Economic Defense) (responsible for promoting and defending (healthy) competition. Besides there is Procom (a bureau to enforce consumers’ rights) and the CONAR (a privately run institution for self-​regulation of advertising campaigns in order to guarantee ethics and consumer rights in advertisement activities). Court cases usually take a long time to be settled. Although arbitration is an alternative to the regular slow judiciary system, it has not been used often in practice.

Politics Brazil is a civil law (not common law) country and Brazil is a federal republic with a parliamentary regime. The president is elected for a mandate of four years, with the possible immediate reelection of another equal period. History has shown that the president’s party usually does not secure the majority of seats in the congress or the senate, leading to long “wrestling” negotiations with the houses for the approval of laws and (long-​ needed) reforms. The constitution indicates the use of proportional (not district) voting; votes go both to candidates and to their parties, such that a highly voted candidate can carry on other candidates of his or her party, who free-​ride on the former’s votes. Brazil is a civil law (not common law) country. Given the pre-​specified distribution of the financial resources of the Fundo Partidário (public funding to political parties)—​5% are posted for equal delivery to all parties that meet the constitutional requirements for

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    691 access to these resources and 95% are distributed in proportion to the votes obtained in the last election for the Chamber of Deputies—​larger parties will tend to retain a great share of votes, making it difficult to modify the party composition of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate. Despite the impeachment of two presidents (Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 and Dilma Rousseff in 2015), institutions in Brazil are stable. The impeachment processes themselves serve as evidence, since the procedures followed the constitution and the results were respected. Although there were extreme perspectives in place, the processes were legitimate, not coups d’état. While there is formal independence among the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, the president of the Republic often issues provisional measures and delegated laws. There is also a game of “compadres,” by which presidents are perceived as sometimes indicating for the Supreme Court (and the congressmen and senators approving) “friendly” judges. Corruption has been a very serious and pervasive issue in the country. “If it were possible to zero in on corruption, we believe that this could increase GDP by more than 2%,” according to Luís Fernando Figueiredo, former director of economic policy at the Central Bank (Bittencourt, 2017). Likewise, a study by the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) projects that up to 2.3% of Brazilian GDP is lost each year with corrupt practices (Ribeiro, 2016). AR argues that, particularly near elections, pressures go higher and companies have to make a decision: whether or not to enter the game. However, in response to corruption scandals, the electoral law was recently modified in order to forbid private funding to parties; the public resources of the Fundo Partidário have been greatly increased as a (much criticized though) way to compensate the political parties. Corrupt practices occur not only in arrangements between private companies and public officials but also between purely private concerns. For example, private health plans have been hurt by malicious doctors who prescribe unnecessary medical procedures or indicate the use of more expensive than necessary medical devices (such as stents or prostheses) in order to get disguised bribes from suppliers of such medical devices. A fierce fight, though, has been in place against corruption, whose emblematic evidence is the investigation about the mensalão (big monthly stipend)—​a regular “allowance” given out by some political parties in order to bribe congress persons and senators (the money was usually supplied by private companies, which expected favorable changes in the laws as reciprocity)—​and the lava jato (car wash) operation—​the corruption scheme involving Petrobras (the national oil company), most of the largest construction companies, and several other public institutions and private firms, quite similar to the mensalão, but of a much larger magnitude (Sousa, 2015). Several other investigations are under way. The Federal Police and the Ministério Público (the Office of the Public Prosecutor, which is a public institution for law enforcement and prosecution of crimes), have been instrumental in this fight.

692   Jorge Carneiro Several businesspersons (including the CEOs of major Brazilian construction firms, such as Odebrecht and OAS) have been imprisoned and a few politicians (e.g., former Presidente Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, former governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sergio Cabral, and former president of the Congress, Eduardo Cunha) are also in prison. Current President Michel Temer, and Aécio Neves (president of PSDB, the social democrat party), senator and defeated candidate in the 2014 presidential election, are among the many politicians under investigation.

Infrastructure Transportation in Brazil is based on roads and highways (most of which are poorly maintained, in particular in the North and Northeast regions) and also cabotage navigation (which represents only 9.6% of total transported goods as opposed to 37% in the EU, cf. Araújo, 2014), with few railroads (because of the hilly geography) and waterways (because of lack of navigable rivers) and harbors. Electrical energy supply has undergone risk of apagão (blackouts), a problem that also plagues other emerging markets. Telecom services are expensive and somewhat unreliable (as explicitly mentioned by LM), so that the government has prohibited telecom companies from selling new lines unless they invest to improve service. Public health used to follow a remediation, instead of an anticipation approach, but the picture is getting better. Social assistance programs that demand that the families receive regular visits by public doctors have helped. Brazilians want better services: hospitals, schools, public safety. The demonstrations on the streets as a protest against high disbursements to build or revamp stadiums for the 2014 FIFA World Cup is a sign of the rising consciousness that there is (public and private) money, but government priorities are distorted. The lack of good schools and hospitals means productivity losses. The deficient infrastructure, coupled with government deficits, can pave the way to PPPs (public–​private partnerships) and represent a potentially profitable opportunity to offer better services to the population with more efficient operations (and lower costs), without stretching the national, state, and municipal budgets. The so-​called custo Brasil (Brazil cost) is a result of:

• High taxation • High interest rates • Deficient infrastructure (telecom, transportation, energy) • Inefficiencies of the judiciary system and difficulty to understand/​interpret laws and regulations, which may turn into fiscal penalties • Bureaucracy and red tape • Confusing legal frameworks, some political “intromissions” (albeit diminishing) in the judiciary system and poorly technically prepared judges • Labor legislation “knot” • Poorly prepared technical workers

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    693 • Cargo thefts and related insurance costs • Less access to credit (more expensive, scarcer, and more bureaucratic)

Economy Brazil is the ninth largest economy in the world, with a GDP of US$1.8 trillion (World Bank, 2017e). Yearly GDP variation has been very volatile. Private services overall represent a bit more than one-​third of the economy and other relevant sectors are public administration, manufacture, trade, agriculture and cattle raising, and construction (although the size of the construction sector has diminished due to recent corruption scandals). After many years of very high inflation (average of 15%/​year between 1960 and 1994 with a peak of almost 2000% in 1989), Brazil reached relative economic stability with the Plano Real—​an economic plan launched by neo-​liberal President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, based on three pillars: fiscal responsibility and primary surplus of government accounts (governments, at every level, cannot spend more than they collect in taxes), floating exchange rate, and maximum inflation target—​currently defined at 4.5%, within an acceptable range between 2.5% and 6.5% a year (which, however, was violated in the last Labor Party government of President Dilma Rousseff, but has come back on track under President Michel Temer, albeit in part because of the economic recession). The World Bank (2017f) presents detailed information. Despite the huge privatization plan undertaken by former President Cardoso, the participation of the Brazilian State in the economy is still very large, through state-​ owned enterprises (although many of them have been privatized since 1997), BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), and public pension funds. In fact, Brazil is an example of “state capitalism” (cf. Lazzarini, 2011), whereby well-​connected insiders gain privileged access to contracts and resources. However, the change in the age pyramid—​with people living longer and fewer babies being born—​means a very high deficit for public pensions. Serious discussions are under way as to how to revert this gloomy picture. Brazil has experienced several (and often erratic) government interventions in the economy, for example, in terms of regulated prices (such as energy and fuels), subsidies to particular industries (e.g., automakers) or firms (such as some allegedly unduly favored by BNDES), changes in interest rates, and changes in foreign exchange rates. Such unexpected changes make long-​term planning more difficult; changes in exchange rates, in particular, harm foreign direct investment because “[foreign] investors expect their return in dollar terms,” as argued by FC. Volatility in economic growth, with cycles of ups and downs, also has troubled the country. During the 1980s, Brazil underwent 8 economic stabilization programs, 15 wage policies, 54 changes in the system of prices control, 18 changes in the exchange rate policy, 21 proposals for renegotiation of external debt, 11 distinct inflation indexes, 5 government policies to freeze up prices and salaries, and 18 government orders to drastically cut off public expenses. Since 1994, however, stability has been the norm.

694   Jorge Carneiro Brazil’s industrial policy has been inconsistent, to say the least. From a past imports substitution phase to the selection of a few industries to be (preferentially) developed, the government has also determined minimum national content (i.e., inputs supplied by firms producing in Brazil) in purchases by state companies as well as firms in some industries (e.g., automakers). In addition, incentives have been offered to some firms in a, not officially admitted, national champions program. Apparently, there is no strong coherent theme that ties those initiatives together; rather, it seems like quick “bust-​and-​run” efforts. Brazil’s exports represent around 11.0% of the country’s GDP and just 1.3% of world exports (while Brazil’s GDP is around 3.3% of the world’s). Trade flows represent just 21.8% of the country’s GDP, with Brazil virtually absent from free trade agreements (and Mercosur never delivered on its promises). However, Brazil has been a large recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). Capital markets are still underdeveloped. Fewer than 400 companies are listed on the stock exchange (although some Brazilian firms have ADRs—​American depositary receipts) and Brazil is not part of the MILA (Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano—​ Latin-​ American Integrated Market). However, venture capital activity has been increasing. BNDES used to be, by far, the largest source of (reasonably priced) funding, but the bank has diminished its activity while the investigation of allegedly favoring of a few companies is under way. The economic pyramid has changed a lot since the Labor Party took power in 2003. Among the government programs that promoted a better distribution of income stand Bolsa Família (Family Allowance Program), Bolsa Escola (School Allowance Program), Fome Zero (Zero Hunger), Brasil sem Miséria (Brazil without Poverty), and Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My Home, My Life), among a few others. Access to these social assistance programs was granted only to poor families that kept their children in school and received regular visits of health care personnel—​therefore, schooling and infant mortality indexes have improved. Quotas for minorities (black people, poor, disabled) have also been established as a way to “force” a change in historical social inequalities.

What Challenges Do Foreign Companies/​Investors Face in This Country and How Can They Overcome Them? Overall, Brazil is a market of contradictions: • Need for entry level and high-​end products (cf. EF) • Pollution vs. recycling • Stringent environmental laws (which make it difficult to start a business), but negligent enforcement

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    695 • Poorly skilled technical and lower-​ level workforces and well-​ trained middle managers and top executives There are several favorable aspects to investing in Brazil, though, as perceived by the businesspersons interviewed for this chapter: • Favorable natural environment • Political stability (despite the permanent turmoil), that is, very little risk of a coup d’état or a dramatic change in the political regime; but frequent changes in laws • Growth potential, although still unfulfilled; “big size; bigger potential” (in the words of entrepreneur ME) • “Virgin terrain out there to be built”; “one can shape the market”; since there are regulatory voids, one can help “set the [technical] standards” (as argued by CS) • Flexibility to accept what is new (CS); flexible culture (AR): • Openness to non-​conventional solutions, search for alternatives (including articulation with the government and with society representatives) • Opportunity for good profits, since competition is not intense in general (as argued by AR); but risks are higher • Cheap assets, which represent an opportunity for acquisitions As indicated by the executives interviewed and as became clear from the revision of the institutional environment of Brazil, multinationals should carefully address, and leverage on, cultural differences. After all, as stated by FC, Brazil mixes characteristics of advanced markets and of emerging markets. LM maintains that “while private companies are getting closer to global practices, institutions [legal issues, infrastructure] are still far behind”; “but the Government is genuinely trying to turn Brazil ‘pro-​ business’.” However, LM complains that the fact that the Brazilian government buys from whomever sells at the lowest price leads to equipment failure and consequent need for maintenance and spare parts. MNEs should consider hiring a CEO with knowledge of the Brazilian environment and of the MNE’s country-​of-​origin environment (e.g., a native from the MNE’s country of origin who has lived (lives) in Brazil or vice versa), who has a geocentric perspective to business, that is, fosters a balanced understanding of the differences (culture, legal issues, etc.), and does not fall into the trap of equating “different” with either “superior” or “inferior,” argues FC. A possible solution is to hire a local top executive, but with good knowledge of the home country of the headquarters (e.g., by having an MBA degree from there), as indicated by PH; or else, the “local” executive may be a foreigner as long as he or she has good knowledge of Brazil and speaks good Portuguese—​in order to gain trust, empathy, and commitment from employees, added PH. Complementarily, CS was more direct: “Hire local managers and executives; maybe the one who takes care of the money can be expatriated.” Companies should build a diverse pool of talents, both for the executive team and for the board of directors: Brazilians (local culture, local relations, local business practices) plus foreigners from the country of origin of the MNE (to provide company culture) plus other foreigners (as a sense of appreciation for diversity),

696   Jorge Carneiro as suggested by FC and EF. In the words of AR, “Build a mixture—​Brazil is a complex society.” Entrepreneur ME recognizes that many MNEs have already populated the second level with Brazilians, but they still choose home-​country executives for C-​positions; FC agrees: “many [foreign] multinationals do not hire Brazilians to top positions in Brazil.” FC strongly advises to “avoid segregation [between operations and staff],” that is, avoid a “foreign with foreign, Brazilian with Brazilian” approach. Interestingly, Chinese LY recommends that top executives of foreign MNEs in Brazil (be them Brazilian or not) should not just “listen” to their headquarters and obey blindly but rather “train” their headquarters’ peers and superiors, that is, teach them how complicated and different the Brazilian environment is. However, foreign headquarters are often blind and deaf to such differences (and corresponding challenges and opportunities) and rather prefer to impose their own way. However, they should motivate Brazilians according to Brazilian cultural traits and should leverage on the differences. Therefore, when operating in emerging markets, advanced market MNEs should not follow their usual practices blindly. Rather, they should mind the peculiar characteristics of the host market and “think locally, while leveraging globally their good practices—​ those that have proved successful in similar markets” (EF). Usually, R&D activities are run at the home market (or other advanced markets), but these efforts often assume that technological improvements will be valued by customers and fail to consider the particular needs and price sensitivity of the local customers and the specific characteristics of the local business environment, argues EF. He provided an example: “Who, in Roraima [a poor state in the region of the Amazon forest], would take his chainsaw to adopt electronic injection (a fuel control cell)?” As a response to this challenge, EF adds that some MNEs have R&D centers in Brazil (e.g., Basf, Syngenta, Monsanto). Foreign executives should definitely show a genuine effort and learn the local language (Portuguese, which, by the way, is not an easy language) and avoid a critical attitude regarding Brazilians or Brazil’s issues in general. FC has seen examples in which “the [country-​of-​origin] executive showed contempt for Brazil and never learned Portuguese.” By keeping such distance and by clearly not trying to understand the host country, those managers are likely to fall victims of the Brazilian “unsaid,” since Brazilians, especially at lower positions, need to be followed closely, given that “people do [tasks] differently from what they are told,” as contended by EF. MNEs should avoid too much centralization (as recommended by LY), given that Brazilian top executives like to give business a “local flavor.” In fact, MNEs should treat Brazilian top executives in equal terms, since they do not feel inferior to their US or Western European counterparts and, in fact, have been very well trained in a rather complex environment—​as argued by FC, who adds that MNEs should take advantage of the managerial and financial skills of top Brazilian executives. As for the importance of social relations, FC advises foreign executives to “get to know who is ‘the boss’ in the country; get to know people who know people,” since “in Brazil, one trusts whom one knows.” ME notes, however, that there is “frequent job rotation in MNEs,” which “makes it difficult to keep [business] relationships.”

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    697

Particularities of Business Models in Brazil EF indicates that “the product has to be of good quality and cost [price] and be robust and reliable because the user has low level of education” and often puts the product to a use for which it was not designed. He provides an interesting example: a company he worked for sold a hedge trimmer (a gardening tool, similar to a large scissor, used for cutting (trimming) hedges or solitary shrubs), but users often inadvertently used it to prune coffee plants—​a harder task that demands a more robust and resistant tool. In other words, firms need to take into consideration some deficiencies of the customers (who may not use the product properly, so technical specifications need to be more robust or else clear instructions/​training on how to use the product have to be provided); besides, there are deficiencies in infrastructure (e.g., failures in electrical power supply and bumpy roads) that demand more resistance from the products. On the other hand, the sale of spare parts may be a good business opportunity (as suggested by EF)—​exactly because the user (end consumer or organizational customer) inadvertently causes defects in the product due to incorrect use. Interestingly, LM—​who also acknowledges that poor preparation of the users, especially government, and the fact that the Brazilian government buys from whomever sells at the lowest price, lead to equipment failure and consequent need for maintenance and spare parts—​says that his company tries to educate buyers. But he complains that Brazilian buyers of public organizations are sometimes unsophisticated: “they do not plan in advance, they do not know what they want [to buy].” On the other hand, he states that private companies (both large and smaller) in Brazil are much like their North American and Western European counterparts, as far as procurement behavior is concerned; however, he maintains that, “while private companies are getting closer to global practices, institutions [legal issues, infrastructure] are still far behind”; “but the Government is genuinely trying to turn Brazil ‘pro-​business’.” As a rule, one needs to be open-​minded and flexible regarding negotiation terms and conditions. In EF’s words, “outside-​in [from the market to the company], rather than inside-​out.” He adds, “Small companies in particular are little structured and tend to need some adaptation in the ‘solutions’ that MNEs want to sell to them.” Companies may need to employ “unusual” commercial practices, such as bartering, to sell to agribusiness clients as a way to offset credit risk. In addition, this client likes to feel that the seller is closer; for example, by having the manufacturer also operate distribution or post-​sale services (even though these activities may actually be performed by third-​ parties, the manufacturer needs close control, so as to seem closer to the client). As one considers that logistics is a challenge and that many distributors fail, companies may contemplate forward integrating into distribution. EF argues that, in Brazil, there is not such a culture of “do-​it-​yourself ” and there are “no large dealers.” In complement, PH maintains that, in the insurance industry, there

698   Jorge Carneiro are virtually no direct sales (a sharp contrast with the USA, for example), but rather independent brokers and banks as intermediaries. CS indicates that domestic firms, particularly smaller ones, usually are more short-​term oriented, more flexible, more informal (including tax payment) and have lower quality standards. Interestingly, EF contends that it may be easier to sell to Brazilian customers than to multinationals in Brazil (since the latter have stricter purchasing rules); on the other hand, here lies an opportunity for foreign MNEs to sell to other foreign MNEs in Brazil. As another side of the same coin, ME states that “multinationals have too rigid procurement standards,” so that sometimes “they prefer [accept] to pay 10 times as much and buy from their world references,” while disregarding competent national suppliers. This blind practice prevents some MNEs from getting better deals in procurement of raw materials and technical services. Some executives, on the other hand, argue that “there are no differences in business models across countries” (CS); that is, overall, the same basic frameworks could be applied, at least in some (possibly, commoditized) industries. Overall, MNEs should consider the need for: • More robust technical specifications • Training/​support services • Spare parts as differentiation and additional revenue stream • Simpler products, since product innovations (usually at higher prices) are not always valued by local customers • Broad portfolio (high end plus low end (including the need to tropicalize, e.g., simplify on the one hand and make it more robust on the other hand)) • Integration along the value system

Conclusion A recurrent theme underlay the speeches of all interviewees:  foreign company executives should get to know Brazil and the main business actors in their industry and run some business analysis before they hastily invest in the country. In order to operate successfully in Brazil, foreign companies need to make some adaptations or, sometimes, thorough modifications to their products/​services and their business practices and operational processes. They should build a business model that gets the best of both worlds: leverage their company’s capabilities with local market resources. A point to bear in mind is that there are great heterogeneities across the country (differences in culture, legal issues, business practices, infrastructure, educational levels, etc.). The particularities of the country, the somewhat personalized approach to business (and the consequent importance of personal relations), the heterogeneity across regions and industries, all indicate that foreign multinationals would benefit if they build

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a mixed team of home-country and Brazilian top- and mid-level managers—as strongly recommended by several of the experienced executives interviewed. Brazil is a land of challenges and of opportunities. As argued by one of the executives interviewed, paraphrasing someone whose name he could not remember, “In Brazil, nothing is as wonderful as it seems at first sight, and nothing is as bad as it looks.”

Author Note The material for this chapter draws from the author’s previous 16-year professional experience in the Brazilian business environment (mainly in the oil and gas industry and at dotcom companies) and his 20-year teaching experience (of which, 15 years were at executive MBA programs). The author has taught courses abroad and given short lectures in Brazil to delegations of foreign students about “Doing Business in Brazil.” In addition, the author ran in-depth interviews with eight top executives who work for, or serve, multinational companies in Brazil (see details in Table 28.A1). Their insights help understand the nuanced views of the Brazilian institutional environment and provide guidance on how to deal with Brazilian peculiarities.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor Marina Heck, retired Associate Dean of FGV São Paulo School of Business Administration, for her help with some interviews with executives and her careful review and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

Note The Appendix is available online. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780190683948.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190683948-e-30

References Almeida C., & Carneiro, L. 2013. Com mais de 250 novos sindicatos por ano, Brasil já tem mais de 15 mil entidades [With more than 250 new unions per year, Brazil already has more than 15  thousand entities]. Retrieved from https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/com-mais-de -250-novos-sindicatos-por-ano-brasil-ja-tem-mais-de-15-mil-entidades-8237463. Accessed July 22, 2017. Araújo, J. 2014. Um retrato da navegação de cabotagem no Brasil [A picture of cabotage navigation in Brazil]. Tecnologistica Online. Retrieved from http://www.tecnologistica.com .br/portal/artigos/66018/um-retrato-da-navegacao-de-cabotagem-no-brasil/. Accessed October 20, 2017. Bittencourt, A. 2017. O alto custo da corrupção para o PIB [The high cost of corruption for GDP]. Valor Econômico, April 10, 2017. Retrieved from http://www.valor.com.br/brasil /4932664/o-alto-custo-da-corrupcao-para-o-pib. Accessed July 23, 2017.

700   Jorge Carneiro Caldas, M. P. 2006. Conceptualizing Brazilian multiple and fluid cultural profiles. Management Research:  The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management, 4(3): 169–​180. Cavusgil, S. T., Knight, G., Riesenberger, J. R., Rammal, H. G., & Rose, E. L. 2014. International business. Melbourne: Pearson Australia. Cuervo-​Cazurra, A., Carneiro, J., Finchelstein, D., Duran, P., Gonzalez-​Perez, M. A., Montoya, M., Borda, A., Fleury, M.T. & Newburry, W. (forthcoming). Uncommoditizing Strategies by Emerging Market Firms. Mulltinational Business Review. Da Matta, R. 1984. O que faz o brasil, Brasil? [What makes brazil, Brazil?]. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Rocco. Da Rocha, A. 2000. Empresas e clientes:  Um estudo sobre valores e relacionamentos no Brasil [Companies and clients:  A study of values and relationships in Brazil]. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Atlas. Hall, E. T. 1976. Beyond culture. New York: Dubleday Dell Publishing. Hofstede, G. 2017. Hofstede Insights, Brazil. Retrieved from https://​geert-​hofstede.com/​brazil .html. Accessed July 22, 2017. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics]. 2016. Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego [Monthly Survey of Employment]. Retrieved from https://​sidra.ibge.gov.br/​Tabela/​2176. Accessed July 23, 2017. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics], 2017. Projeção da população do Brasil e das Unidades da Federação [Projection of the population of Brazil and of the Federation Units]. Retrieved from http://​www.ibge.gov.br/​apps /​populacao/​projecao/​index.html. Accessed July 21, 2017. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada [Institute of Applied Economic Research]. 2017. Pesquisa do Ipea traça um panorama dos sindicatos [Research by IPEA outlines an overview of trade unions]. http://​www.ipea.gov.br/​portal/​index.php?option=com _​content&view=article&id=29256. Accessed July 22, 2017. Lazzarini, S. G. 2011. Capitalismo de laços: Os donos do Brasil e suas conexões [Capitalism of ties: The owners of Brazil and their connections]. São Paulo, Brazil: Elsevier. Luo, Y., & Tung, R. L. 2007. International expansion of emerging market enterprises: A springboard perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4), 481–​498. Murray, J., Cerqueira, D., & Kahn, T. 2013. Crime and violence in Brazil:  Systematic review of time trends, prevalence rates and risk factors. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 18(5): 471–​483. Nakagawa, F. 2016. Brasil tem maior carga tributária da América Latina [Brazil has the highest tax burden in Latin America]. Exame. Retrieved from http://​exame.abril.com.br/​economia /​brasil-​tem-​maior-​carga-​tributaria-​da-​america-​latina/​ Accessed July 20, 2017. Neri, M. 2011. A nova classe média:  O lado brilhante da pirámide social [The new middle class: The bright side of the social pyramid]. São Paulo, Brazil: Saraiva. Pla-​Barber, J., & Camps, J. 2011. Springboarding: A new geographical landscape for European foreign investment in Latin America. Journal of Economic Geography, 12(2): 519–​538. Portal Brasil. Matriz Energética [Energy Matrix]. Retrieved from http://​www.brasil.gov.br /​meio-​ambiente/​2010/​11/​matriz-​energetica. Accessed July 20, 2017. Reuters. 2016. Fatia da economia informal no PIB brasileiro cresce em 2016 [Slice of informal economy in Brazilian GDP grows in  2016]. Retrieved from http://​br.reuters.com/​article /​businessNews/​idBRKBN13U2LQ. Access: 22-​Jul-​2017.

Managing Multinationals in Brazil    701 Ribeiro, I. 2016. O custo Brasil da corrupção [The Brazil cost of corruption]. Estadão. Retrieved from http://​politica.estadao.com.br/​blogs/​fausto-​macedo/​o-​custo-​brasil-​da -​corrupcao/​. Accessed July 23, 2017. Sousa, B. 2015. Mensalão x Lava Jato: compare os casos que chocaram o Brasil [Mensalão x Lava Jato: Compare the cases that shocked Brazil]. Exame, March 4, 2015. Retrieved from https://​exame.abril.com.br/​brasil/​mensalao-​x-​lava-​jato-​compare-​os-​casos-​que-​chocaram -​o-​brasil/​. Accessed October 20, 2017. World Bank. 2017c. Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%). http://​data .worldbank.org/​indicator/​SE.ADT.LITR.ZS?locations=BR. Accessed July 21, 2017. World Bank. 2017d. Ease of doing business in Brazil. Retrieved from http://​www.doingbusiness .org/​data/​exploreeconomies/​brazil. Accessed July 22, 2017. World Bank. 2017e. GDP (current US$). Retrieved from http://​data.worldbank.org/​indicator /​NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BR. Accessed July 22, 2017. World Bank. 2017a. GDP per capita (current US$). Retrieved from http://​data.worldbank.org /​indicator/​NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=BR. Accessed July 21, 2017. World Bank. 2017b. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). Retrieved from http ://​data.worldbank.org/​indicator/​NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=BR. Accessed July 21, 2017. World Bank. 2017f. The World Bank in Brazil. Retrieved from http://​www.worldbank.org/​en /​country/​brazil/​overview. Accessed October 20, 2017. World Economic Forum. 2015. The inclusive growth and development report. Retrieved from http://​www3.weforum.org/​docs/​WEF_​Forum_​IncGrwth.pdf. Accessed July 21, 2017.

Chapter 29

M anaging Eme rg i ng Markets in  Ru s sia Sheila M. Puffer, Daniel J. M c Carthy, Ruth C. May, Galina V. Shirokova, and Andrei Yu. Panibratov

This chapter provides an overview of the business climate in Russia, which in turn depends upon the country’s political-​economic environment. That environment is generally considered relatively unsupportive of business, but with exceptions, particularly regarding state-​owned or partially state-​owned enterprises often designated as being in strategic industries. Additionally, the chapter focuses on the conditions for doing business by both domestic and foreign firms. The chapter consists of four sections. The first one introduces the institutional environment for doing business in Russia that focuses on the political-​economic conditions that have generally proven to be highly restrictive for starting and growing businesses. The second section discusses entrepreneurship in this relatively negative environment that has provided little support for fledgling domestic businesses, and also notes that government policies and related international economic sanctions have created harsh conditions for entrepreneurs and their firms. The next section describes the circumstances for Russian multinationals, noting progress made in internationalization and outward foreign direct investment. We emphasize differences between government-​owned MNEs and those privately owned, as well as the highly regulated nature of their environments including government policies. For instance, the government supports domestic MNEs in which it had meaningful ownership, particularly those in natural resources, while in contrast, providing little incentive for private companies like those concentrated in communications, information technology, and related areas. The concluding section focuses on implications for managers in both domestic and foreign firms dealing with managerial activities including knowledge transfer and

704    Sheila M. Puffer et al. management, leadership, innovation, and other important areas for managers. In summary, the chapter provides an overview for doing business in Russia that is challenging for both domestic and foreign firms due to the country’s negative institutional environment, except for those Russian multinationals favored by the government because of its ownership and/​or their strategic importance to the country.

The Institutional Environment for Doing Business in Russia It is widely accepted that foreign direct investment and imports can play an important role in the development of an emerging market. Yet Russia’s policies toward foreign businesses have been consistently inconsistent since the country began transitioning to a market economy in the 1990s. In early 2017, Russia’s Economic Development Minister called on foreign entities to invest more in the country’s economy (TASS, 2017a). Three months later President Vladimir Putin declared that the roots of Russia’s economic problems “lie in the 1990s when everything collapsed and uncontrolled huge quantities of imports came into the domestic market” (TASS, 2017b: 2). Contradictory messages from Russia’s top leaders have created a level of uncertainty that foreign firms found untenable. As their confidence eroded so did their investments. By mid-​2018, Russia had evolved into a high-​risk proposition for multinational enterprises (MNEs) (TASS, 2017c). Much of that risk stemmed from uncertainty created by the fundamental erosion in the country’s formal institutions, as well as Russia’s contentious relationships with Western governments that have led to the imposition of severe economic sanctions that have affected both imports and exports as well as inward and outward direct investment. According to North (1990), a country’s institutions, conceptualized as formal or informal, provide the framework for guiding human interactions. Formal institutions are comprised of the rules and enforcement mechanisms established by governments and informal institutions reflect the underlying cultural values and beliefs that guide behaviors and ways of thinking. Institutional instability, which often characterizes emerging markets, may erupt when a country’s formal institutions break down or begin to shift out of alignment with more enduring informal institutions (Peng, 2003). Russia’s relatively brief history as an emerging market is marked by two significant periods of institutional transition; one being the decade of the 1990s during which Boris Yeltsin served as Russia’s first democratically elected president, and the other being the years that followed after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency on the first day of the 21st century. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created unprecedented voids in Russia’s formal institutions, Russia’s fledgling market reforms and its nascent democratic freedoms signaled that the country had the potential to become a formidable power in the global economy. By the mid-​1990s, much of the inefficient state or government

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    705 sector had been privatized, albeit through two inherently flawed waves of privatization, and new business start-​ups were beginning to flourish. Still, corruption remained entrenched, and political influence accrued to a new class of exorbitantly wealthy men with close ties to the Kremlin. Puffer described a deeply engrained “instinct among Russians who, upon seeing someone who is better off, become preoccupied with bringing that person down to their level, instead of devising ways to become equally successful” (1993: 475). This instinct seeded a growing animosity between the wealthy elite and average citizens and gave rise to the term “oligarch capitalism” (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007), ultimately leading to the erosion of Boris Yeltsin’s political capital and Vladimir Putin’s ascendancy to the presidency. When President Putin took office on January 1, 2000, Russia’s public sector accounted for only 11% of its GDP (McCarthy, Puffer, & Naumov, 2000) and economic growth stood at 10%, recovering from a precipitous decline in the late 1990s. In his first address to the nation, Putin guaranteed that “freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, the right to private property—​all these basic principles of a civilized society” would be protected by his administration (Bohlen, 2000). During his first term as president, Russia instituted a flat income tax of 13%, lowered corporate taxes, gave citizens the right to own commercial and residential property, and established a Corporate Code of Conduct. Confidence in Putin grew at home and abroad, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia climbed to US$15.4 billion1 by 2004. By the end of his second term in 2008, oil revenues had soared, lifting Russia’s international currency reserves to a record $596 billion. From 2000 to 2008 wages rose by 400%, and the percentage of the population living below the poverty line fell from 30% to 14%. As incomes increased so did the size of the middle class. Consumer demand drove economic growth and attracted a record $74.7 billion of FDI in 2008. Yet beneath the surface of economic prosperity and Vladimir Putin’s high popularity, a disturbing trend was unfolding inside Russia’s formal institutions that foreign investors either could not see or did not want to see. And for the Russian public, the growing restrictions on individual freedoms, in the face of Putin’s soaring popularity, might well be explained by their view that these were the price to be paid for the better life they found in stability and relative prosperity. As Figure 29.1 illustrates, shortly after the start of Putin’s first term in 2000 “the state began to weaken, reverse, supplant, or ignore laws, regulations, and structural reforms that had been established to protect (1) the independence of the media, (2) the electoral process, (3) judicial independence and (4) the rights and freedoms imbued in civil society. Civil society includes freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the rights to privacy and to own property” (May, Rayter, & Ledgerwood, 2016: 194). In his first year in office, the government began its assault on Russia’s independent media through the intimidation of journalists and hostile takeovers of mass media companies, most notably NTV and Channel One. Both of these enterprises had been successfully privatized in the 1990s. Over the next eight years, Putin diminished the independence of the judiciary and expanded his executive authority over the constitutional, supreme, and arbitration courts. Regional elections of governors were eliminated by the Russian Duma and replaced with presidential appointments. Property

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rights were eroded as the government carried out a massive campaign of nationalizing private companies, effectively reversing much of the privatization that had occurred in the 1990s. In perhaps the most high-​profile case of corporate raiding, the state seized the oil giant, Yukos, after arresting its primary owner and outspoken critic of Putin, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, on charges of tax evasion. The Yukos scandal damaged Russia’s reputation and unnerved international investors, but it had little impact on MNEs’ appetite for profiting from Russia’s domestic market of 140 million people and its vast natural resources. As can be seen in Figure 29.1, by the time Putin left office in 2008, Russia’s public sector had already reverted back to 30% of its gross domestic product (GDP). During Medvedev’s one term as president from 2008 to 2012, he appointed civil law scholars to key positions in his administration and waged war against corruption. He also passed amendments to the Criminal Code of Procedure in an attempt to restrict pretrial detentions of individuals charged with economic crimes. This effort was meant to fulfill his campaign promise to address wide-​scale corporate raiding by the government which had severely undermined property rights and Russia’s struggling entrepreneurial class (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). Medvedev’s actions over the course of his presidency may explain why the trend line for civil society in Figure 29.1 sloped slightly upward before taking a precipitous downturn during Putin’s third term as president. Before Putin took office in 2012, mass demonstrations erupted across Russia over allegations of widespread fraud in the December 2011 parliamentary election. After his

Independent Media

Figure  29.1 Erosion of formal institutional components (by presidential term), from democratic/​ market-​ based to authoritarian/​ state-​ based with overlay of public sector as percentage of GDP Note: The four components are scored 1 to 7, where 1 equals freedom and democracy and 7 equals a consolidated authoritarian regime. Data from the Freedom House Nations in Transit Russia Report for 2017 and 2009, retrieved from https://​freedomhouse.org/​report/​nations-​transit/​2017/​russia and https://​freedomhouse.org/​report /​nations-​transit/​2009/​russia. Public sector as % of GDP from McCarthy et al. (2000), and US Department of State (2012, 2016). Adapted from May, Rayter, & Ledgerwood (2016).

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    707 inauguration in May, Putin responded to the protests by signing legislation making participation in unsanctioned demonstrations illegal and stepping up government pressure on social media websites used by political opposition leaders. In July 2012, the president signed the controversial Russian Internet Restriction Law which created a federal blacklist of websites containing “extreme” content. The law’s provisions extended to social media websites that might have inadvertently hosted forbidden content posted by users. In early 2013, Putin warned state security officials of “the dangers of unbridled free speech” (Winning, 2013) and amended the Code of Administrative Offenses to criminalize blasphemy. The cumulative effect of his actions on civil society can be seen in Figure 29.1 where the slope turns sharply downward in 2012. By 2016, Russia ranked lower on the protection of civil liberties than Myanmar and Pakistan. By contrast, when Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, Russia was ranked higher on civil rights than two of its BRIC (Brazil, Russia, China, India) counterparts, Brazil and China, and was near parity with India (Freedom House, 1999, 2017). Even as the suppression of civil society and the independent media was increasing in 2012, Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was lauded by the global community and investments by foreign firms continued to pour in. As shown in Figure 29.2, Russia received a record $69.2 billion in FDI in 2013, making it the third highest recipient country of FDI in that year behind China and the United States. Then everything changed in 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support of pro-​Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine enraged Western governments and led to the introduction of economic sanctions. FDI in Russia fell to $22 billion in 2014 and then to $6.4 billion in 2015, a

Net FDI Inflows USD (millions)

80,000

74,783

69,219

70,000 60,000

55,874

55,084

50,000

50,588

43,168 36,583

40,000

32,539

30,000

22,031

20,000

6,853

10,000

4,646

Year/Quarter

2017 Q1

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

0

Figure 29.2  Net FDI inflows into Russia in US$ (millions) for 2007 through Q1 2017 Source: Data from Central Bank of Russia, retrieved from http://​cbr.ru/​eng/​statistics/​?Prtid=svs Net FDI inflows into Russia in US$ (millions) for 2007 thru 2017 Quarter 1.

708    Sheila M. Puffer et al. stunning 91% drop in two years, but partially bounced back in 2016 to a notably high level, in fact the highest since 2008 with the exception of 2013. Still, it appeared that “The Kremlin had knowingly put Russia’s geopolitical interests above its economic ones and had deliberately driven the country into political self-​isolation” (Babinov, 2017: 2). The country’s economic situation was made worse by a near collapse in global oil prices, the devaluation of its currency, and soaring inflation. By the end of 2015, Russia’s public sector had ballooned to 71% of GDP (US State Department, 2016). In the first quarter of 2016, net flows of FDI went negative before making a partial recovery later in the year, but the first quarter of 2017 once again looked bleak. Taken together, Figures 29.1 and 29.2 demonstrate how the erosion of Russia’s formal institutions from 2000 through 2017 was inextricably linked to the dramatic slowdown of FDI that resulted not only from low world oil prices but also from economic sanctions imposed by Western and Asian governments. It was in this deteriorating political-​economic institutional environment that both domestic and foreign businesses faced extreme challenges, including Russia’s fledgling entrepreneurships and small businesses.

Entrepreneurship and SME Development in Russia Entrepreneurial intentions, nascent entrepreneurial activity, and SME (small and medium-​ sized enterprise) density in Russia are among the lowest in the world. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, only 2.1% of Russian adults surveyed have intentions to start a new business within three years, while 17.9% of respondents see good opportunities to do it in the area where they live (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016/​2017). There are presently only 17 SMEs per 1000 citizens in Russia, and these account for approximately 21% of GDP, compared with 50% of GDP in many developed countries (Yukhanaev, Fallon, Baranchenko, & Anisimova, 2015). The low contribution of entrepreneurial activity to national competitiveness and economic growth can be attributed to a large extent to the institutional context (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011; Welter & Smallbone, 2011). The formal institutional regime in Russia is characterized by poor property right protection, violations of the rights of minority shareholders, weak capital market institutions, corruption (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011), and corporate raids (Yakovlev, Sobolev, & Kazun, 2013); an increasing lack of free press that can hold culprits accountable (Rochlitz, 2014); and the sense that, under the current situation, Russian entrepreneurs fear bureaucrats more than criminals (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008). In the absence of well-​developed formal institutions designed to regulate economic relations and support equal opportunities in entrepreneurship, individuals will more likely choose not to create a new business, which has negative consequences for innovation, job creation, and economic growth. For instance, some entrepreneurships that do exist may take the forms of unproductive (rent-​seeking) and

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    709 destructive (criminal) entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Welter & Smallbone, 2011), although it is generally agreed that the power of criminal groups has been significantly reduced since the 1990s (Zhuplev & Shtykhno, 2009). Other entrepreneurs who run productive ventures have to deal with fulfilling everyday government requirements and searching for ways to avoid administrative pressure (Ivy, 2013). In the weak formal institutional environment, entrepreneurs still need to take actions for creating, running, and growing their businesses. Among those, developing networks, especially with the government (“administrative resource”), appears to be the most important activity (Yakovlev et al., 2013). Informal institutions such as social networks and trust substitute for formal institutions compensating for their deficiencies (Bruton, Su, & Filatotchev, 2016; Puffer et al., 2010; Welter & Smallbone, 2011). In order to survive, many Russian entrepreneurs rely on inter-​personal communications, informal networks, and relationships with governmental officials (Meyer & Peng, 2005). The use of personal ties (“sviazi”) for obtaining resources while circumventing formal procedures and “administrative resource” is crucial for reducing government intervention in commercial affairs, and for protecting businesses from extortion and expropriation (Yukhanaev et al., 2015). According to a study of 432 Russian SMEs (Wales, Shirokova, Sokolova, & Stein, 2016) in the Russian regulatory environment, the relationships with governmental officials facilitate the manifestation of entrepreneurial orientation in a firm, and are among the most important factors to be considered by SMEs operating in the hostile Russian business environment. Besides the formal institutional environment, prior studies also accounted for Russia’s cultural characteristics, predominantly utilizing Hofstede’s dimensions. Russia is characterized with high levels of power distance (93 of 100) and uncertainty avoidance (95), and low levels of individualism (39) and masculinity (20) (Hofstede, 2016; Naumov & Puffer, 2000). As argued by Puffer and McCarthy (2011) and Saidov (2014), these cultural peculiarities lead to a tendency to adopt an authoritarian leadership style, which is typically considered to be unfavorable for innovative behavior, participation, and teamwork. A greater tendency for Russians to be less comfortable in the uncertain context and less willing to behave entrepreneurially can also be related to national cultural characteristics. However, according to Seawright, Mitchell, and Smith (2008), who investigated entrepreneurial cognitions of Russian and American entrepreneurs, there are similarities with respect to arrangements, willingness, and ability scripts in two countries. Following this, it can be argued that, regardless of national culture and geography, entrepreneurs share a common experience during the conceptualization of entrepreneurial ideas and business growth, and, thus, experience similar ways when creating a new firm and promoting their entrepreneurial ideas and behaviors within an existing company. This perspective supports the argument that many Russian top managers are inclined to reject the traditional authoritarian approach to management and rather adopt a more flexible and entrepreneurial leadership style in spite of the many difficulties faced by Russian entrepreneurs (McCarthy, Puffer, Graham, & Satinsky, 2014). For instance, from 1995 to 2004, there can be observed a growth of the overall entrepreneurial contribution of employees in Russia, and positive tendencies in the creation of

710    Sheila M. Puffer et al. entrepreneurial initiatives expressed by top-​managers (Croucher & Rizov, 2011). Similar to their Western counterparts, Russian SMEs may experience benefits from adopting this approach, like attracting talented employees and encouraging corporate entrepreneurship (Kickul, Liao Gundry, & Iakovleva, 2010; Shirokova, Vega, & Sokolova, 2013). The need to build informal network relationships and the constant search for administrative resources increases the overall level of environmental hostility, poses obstacles for newly created businesses, and hampers innovativeness (Meyer & Peng, 2005). Russian educational establishments provide high-​ quality education, especially in the fields of natural science and engineering. Nevertheless, regardless of their high education level compared to non-​business owners (Djankov, Roland, Miguel, Zhuravskaya, & Qian, 2005), Russian entrepreneurs often focus on achieving high profitability and do business outside their expertise area (Kravchenko, Kuznetsova, Yusupova, Jithendranathan, Lundsten, & Shemyakin, 2015). As a result, many entrepreneurial ideas are not commercialized (McCarthy et al., 2014). Innovation development presumes a constant trial-​and-​error process with room for cheap and fast failures (Trimi & Berbegal-​Mirabent, 2012) which is not easy if the environment requires success from the very beginning. Even though many young people have positive attitudes toward entrepreneurship (AGER 2015, 2016)2 and perceive entrepreneurial careers as an opportunity to achieve independence, make their dreams come true, and do exciting work (Shirokova, Tsukanova, & Bogatyreva, 2014), many constraints hinder the development of a strong entrepreneurial culture in Russia. Another crucial factor in entrepreneurship and SMEs development in Russia is a spatial remoteness of some regions from an economic and political hub, especially Moscow. Prior studies suggest that remote areas are disadvantaged in attracting new venture creation and firm growth because of constraints on workforce availability, or infrastructure and transportation cost disadvantages due to remoteness (Stephens & Partridge, 2011). In Russia there are substantial differences in firm development from the regional point of view in terms of financial, social, and human capital. Also worth noting is the high degree of uneven geographical distribution of Russian SMEs. Specifically, 29.6% of all SMEs are located in the central region, with around two-​thirds being in Moscow, and 16.2% in Northwest region, mostly in St. Petersburg (Federal State Statistics Service, 2016). Cross-​regional differences are crucial if measured by gross regional product (GRP); however, they are less visible if measured by means of consumption per capita and other parameters based on household data. A European Bank for Reconstruction and Development study devoted to identifying the differences in socioeconomic development of the Russian regions revealed an outflow of population from remote regions (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012). Entrepreneurship and innovation depend on the supply of finance and other inputs like knowledge, as well as the market structure. A strong educational system capable of producing both innovative talent and an adequately trained supportive labor force is essential. Also, entrepreneurship and innovation ultimately rely on demand for the products or services generated. Thus, the ability of a region’s economy to capitalize on innovative trends is associated

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    711 with a critical mass of qualified personnel. However, a highly skilled labor force tends to migrate if proper working conditions in the region are lacking. In recent years, a substantial migration of skilled workers from remote regions of Russia to the central areas has been observed. Moreover, Russia’s population is unevenly distributed throughout its vast territory. The overwhelming majority of the Russian population (93%) resides in the so-​called main strip of settlement of about one-​third of the country’s territory. The remaining two-​thirds of the territory are inhabited by less than 10 million people (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012). This factor also negatively affects the level of entrepreneurship, particularly in innovative sectors due to inadequate markets in the remote regions of Russia. Thus, the ability of Russian SMEs to provide innovative products and services decreases as the distance increases from the Central Federal District, including Moscow. The recent economic crisis has aggravated an existing institutional hurdle which is especially problematic for SMEs as they generally lack necessary resources to deal with increasing uncertainty and frequent economic policy changes. Oil revenues comprise the largest source of income for the Russian state budget, and the country is strongly dependent on imports of finished goods and exports of raw materials. Thus, the Russian economy experienced a dramatic downturn when in 2014 oil prices dropped by more than 60%. In addition, trade with foreign partners deteriorated after the introduction of economic sanctions and countermeasures. In 2015, Russian GDP decreased by 3.7%, inflation and unemployment increased, and the ruble, the national currency, lost approximately 50% of its value. These events had a particularly strong negative influence on SMEs having provoked a large number of bankruptcies (Federal State Statistics Service, 2016). Russia’s economic crisis of 2014–​2016 significantly affected both the business environment and performance of SMEs. First, the loss in value of the national currency as well as the introduction of a food import embargo negatively impacted companies that rely on imported goods. The production of goods in a number of sectors of the Russian economy is critically dependent on imported components, the replacement of which in the short term can be technologically impossible (Ulyukaev & Mau, 2015). With the increase in prices for purchased materials, the costs of doing business rise and profits decrease, which can lead to a loss of competitive advantage in the market. At the same time, companies that are less dependent on imports of foreign products may be in a better position relative to competitors with a large share of imports in their purchases (Eberhardt & Menkiszak, 2015; pwc, 2015). Second, the increase in prices for goods and services and a decrease in the standard of living of the population have led to a reduction in consumer spending and changes in consumer preferences. The vast majority of the population has felt the impact of the crisis and shifted to a more economically based behavior: reduced the amount of purchases, bought cheaper products, and closely monitored sales and special offers (pwc, 2015). As a result of this decline in demand, company revenues decreased, and was most acute for retailers whose activities were related to non-​food products as the population cut down their spending on everyday goods and deferred large purchases until better times (pwc, 2015).

712    Sheila M. Puffer et al. Third, for companies having external debt obligations, debt servicing had become more expensive (Eberhardt & Menkiszak, 2015). In addition, the policy of increasing the interest rate by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation3 in order to strengthen the national currency resulted in the rising cost of domestic borrowing. As a result, access to domestic borrowings has been restricted and investment opportunities for companies have been reduced. Furthermore, the opportunities to refinance current debt were limited as well, which influenced many companies’ operations, as current cash flows had to be used to pay off existing debts (Ulyukaev & Mau, 2015). The characteristics of the external environment described above created difficulties for doing business, and negatively affected the performance of firms in general. For example, the share of profitable enterprises in the total number of small and medium-​sized ones decreased from 82.3% in 2013 to 79.7% in 2015, while the share of enterprises experiencing losses increased from 17.7% to 20.3% (Federal State Statistics Service, 2015). Thus, small and medium-​sized enterprises have rather weak positions in the structure of the Russian economy, which can be considered a serious factor restraining the country’s economic development and diversification from its dependence on the natural resource sector. At the same time, the development of SMEs is one of the elements of anti-​crisis program announced by the Government of the Russian Federation in 2015 (World Bank, 2015). One way to achieve this goal is to promote the benefits of an entrepreneurial career among young people, and create conditions that encourage young Russians to be involved in the creation and development of their own businesses (Shirokova et al., 2014). But although these and other such policies strengthening the attractiveness of entrepreneurship and operating small businesses could well strengthen the overall Russian economy and hasten its diversification away from dependence on the natural resource sector, the government’s policies thus far have yet to exhibit a penchant for such enlightened economic policies.

Russian Multinational Enterprises In contrast to the almost ubiquitous negative situation experienced by Russian entrepreneurships and other small businesses, Russian multinationals faced fewer challenges, particularly if they were government-​owned or involved in industries designated as being strategic to the country’s security. That dichotomy is explained in this section. Generally, Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs hereafter) have shown the ability and the ambition to play a role on the world scene and many now enjoy international recognition and ranking among others established global firms (Panibratov, 2012). Virtually all of these have a large scope of operations, employ large workforces around the globe, and earn high profits on worldwide markets. Some of them are relatively mature and can be compared with MNEs from developed economies; others are of a lesser size, younger, and have only recently started to internationalize. The

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    713 internationalization of Russian MNEs with significant scale and sizable outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) became possible as of 1991, with the emergence of private business in the country’s post-​communist period, “perestroika,” or transformation from a centrally planned to a free market economy. Hence, Russian MNEs are generally younger and less experienced than their Western counterparts. Prototypes of Russian MNEs go back to the time of Soviet Union and originally, these companies were government-​owned and mostly involved in restructuring and consolidation of assets inside Russia. Only after having reoriented themselves to a market-​led strategy and a new foreign policy were they ready to turn to international markets and began investing abroad. OFDI from Russia started to grow in the second half of the 20th century, but its progress was slow and its depth modest. At the end of the 1983, Soviet firms had about 320 affiliates in foreign countries (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007), a tiny figure, considering the large size of Russia’s economy. These affiliates were often registered as joint ventures and were mostly situated in neighboring Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries. There were about 115 affiliates in OECD countries and 30 in developing countries. In 1990, the value of Soviet OFDI abroad amounted to less than $1 billion. These first Russian MNEs were referred as “red multinationals” (Hamilton, 1986). The label should be understood to contain the hint that in most cases they were guided by state policy and confined themselves abroad to marketing and sales. A  few red multinationals eventually adopted the practices of Western MNEs (McMillan, 1987). The Soviet Union exercised strict control over its multinationals, and usually owned them (Vahtra, 2006). It had them engage in supporting Russian exports (raw-​resource marketing, infrastructure support, banking, and insurance). These first-​generation emerging market multinationals (EMNEs) conducted their activities very intensively, selling more than 50% of total Soviet exports. The crash of the Soviet Union brought about disruption in Russia’s economic activity, and recovery from this shock and adaptation to what followed took almost ten years. During this period, Russian companies mostly engaged in restructuring during privatization that primarily included consolidation of assets inside the country. Only after having done that, did they set forth to explore foreign markets. Russian companies cleaned up the shambles of the Soviet enterprises before considering foreign conquests (McCarthy, Puffer, & Vikhanski, 2009). It took until the eve of the 1990s for Russian FDI to pick up pace. To illustrate, until 2000, Gazprom and Lukoil accounted for around 90% of Russian assets abroad (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). When change did come and foreign investment activity of Russian firms skyrocketed in the mid-​2000s, it mainly took the form of cross-​border mergers and acquistions (M&As). Greenfield investments also played a role, but on a much smaller scale. This all reflected the practice of Russian investors to go for a quick return and their impatience with the type of enterprise based on solidly acquired experience. Oligarchic investing patterns followed by many Russian state-​associated EMNEs are similar to those followed in countries at a higher stage of development than those followed by other BRIC countries (Kalotay 2005). There are also stimuli for Russian capital to venture abroad, partly because of the

714    Sheila M. Puffer et al. government’s inhospitality toward domestic business, and the incentives it offers business to internationalize (Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009). The role of Russian institutions for MNEs is influential, and although having affiliates throughout the world, Russian MNEs concentrate their activities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, due to a common history, similar language, geographic proximity, and other cultural ties (Dikova, Panibratov, Veselova, & Ermolaeva, 2016). There is governmental pressure on companies like the privately owned Lukoil to invest more in Kazakhstan rather than in other countries. However, Russian OFDI to the West is a top priority for many such companies that resist strong political and state involvement. Hence, Russian foreign policy cannot be considered the sole determinant of choice for outbound investment. No one can claim, for example, that it is by government writ that the Virgin Islands are an FDI choice, since it is really Russian companies seeking tax havens as a way of escaping the system. Unlike incoming investments that attract large media attention, OFDI from Russia has not attracted attention in terms of the relationship between host country and Russian MNEs. The biggest portion of Russia’s OFDI are investments in natural resources, such as Lukoil’s ownership stakes in oilfields in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, plus refineries and gas stations around Europe and the USA (Hanson, 2013). OFDI is not only linked to system-​escape motives (to easily accessible tax havens) but is also substantially influenced by the opaque Russian business environment. Russian OFDI is often viewed with suspicion, and sometimes linked to organized crime and corruption, with the Russian government’s involvement. An example of this occurred in 2009, when Russian oil company Surgutneftegaz acquired 21.2% of the Hungarian energy company MOL (Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009). This investment was perceived as politically connected since it occurred when Gazprom and the Russian government tried to strengthen their dominance over a pipeline network in southeastern Europe via the South Stream gas pipeline, a competitor to Nabucco and a Western gas project. Other reasons to suspect the transparency of this deal were the very secretive character of Surgutneftegaz, knowing that the company had no previous OFDI, and that the stake in MOL was acquired at double its market value (Hanson, 2013). Subsequently, the role of state-​owned multinationals in Russian global expansion became larger than in developed countries. Political aspects are important in Russian OFDI, which is highly illustrated in investment and trade cooperation projects with strategically important countries such as China (Panibratov, 2017). Furthermore, the influence of state institutions in Russian OFDI can be seen through schemes like “investment-​for-​debts,” enabling some firms to keep high domestic debts because of their international projects. At the same time, this kind of cooperation carries political liabilities, since these companies are tied to Russia’s foreign policy and interests. All things considered, formal state support for Russian MNEs is quite weak due to the lack of developed policy instruments. For instance, the Russian export insurance agency that assists multinationals with export credits and OFDI was only established in 2011. Financial support for exports remains in its early stages, and many Russian financial institutions are not rushing in since they view this route as highly risky.

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    715 Generalizing about international results for Russian MNEs remains limited, although some firms in different industries have shown their own unique internationalization path (Panibratov, 2012). In oil and gas, which is highly diversified, the major players are state-​owned Gazprom and Rosneft, both highly driven by the political interests of the state. The third major, Lukoil, operates like a private, profit-​seeking company. Rosneft and Gazprom target two types of markets: the former CIS and CEE (Central and Eastern European) countries, and Western Europe, with exports being the main method of expanding abroad. Using joint ventures, cooperation agreements, and sometimes greenfield projects, Russian state-​owned oil companies exploit the already existing portfolio of international assignments of the state. In the case of Lukoil, its core activities, exploration, and production are not as internationalized as its less important ones, refining, distribution, and marketing, which can mean that internationalization is not, in the oil and gas industry, an absolute requirement for high profit margins. Nevertheless, Lukoil is active with acquisitions in Europe and the USA, which is a signal that private oil firms’ liability of foreignness is lower than that of state-​owned enterprises. In the electricity sector, where the role of the state is huge, the leading international firm is Inter RAO UES, the success of which could not have been possible without the alignment of its strategic goal with that of the Russian state. Having a monopolistic position at home, the company has enjoyed massive government backing, including inheritance of the Soviet era assets. This heritage endowed it with a competitive position such that other players able to construct and operate power plants or electricity grids cannot compete on price. In banking, the process of penetrating new markets has been sporadic and cautious. It usually begins with a representative office that evaluates the potential of a foreign market, and gauges the appropriate time for entry. Most such reconnaissance has been carried out by foreign subsidiaries of Russian banks. Only few big Russian banks (like Alfa Bank, VTB, or Sberbank) had the resources to go abroad. The motivation for internationalization was to service large Russian clients that were often other Russian MNEs, including those belonging to the state, and hence this strategy was similar to a “follow the client” approach. In metallurgy, both the rise and expansion of Russian MNEs occurred in the regions rich with raw materials. Russia is a huge country containing an abundance of raw materials, and domestic firms therefore have accumulated vast experience in metallurgy. With that in hand, it is natural for them to use their know-​how to expand abroad. The booming commodities markets have meant plenty of cash for investment, so Russian companies in this industry are multinationals by nature, and some of them took the risk of challenging developed market firms as their growth strategies. Relatively risky acquisitions in developed economies, the EU and the USA, in particular, were made by two MNEs, Evraz and Severstal, which allowed them a closer approach to customers as well as a way to overcome trade barriers, tariffs, and duties. Another major, Rusal, has concentrated mainly on acquisitions of emerging market companies, especially in locations where raw materials sufficient for large-​scale business

716    Sheila M. Puffer et al. are located. Additionally, in countries such as Montenegro or Guinea, Rusal was equally bargaining with the local governments, sometimes appearing even more powerful than the host states. Having a highly diversified product portfolio, Severstal has acquired mines and production facilities in developing countries, which allowed it to secure efficiency in production. Rusal followed the strategy of acquiring new deposits and developing existing ones, sufficient to cover the needs of its product lines. For Russian metallurgy, in general, one important way to lower costs is by securing a supply of inexpensive energy, which explains acquisitions and further development by Rusal, in particular, of power-​generating assets. In telecommunications, those firms that achieve success globally are able to exploit partnerships in order to become more innovative and, in turn, to exploit new knowl­ edge in the process of foreign acquisitions, thereby expanding their market, obtaining both new suppliers and customers. This process explains why Russian high-​tech MNEs use M&As in order to achieve or strengthen a market position abroad. One of the largest Russian telecom companies, MTS, expanded abroad by entering CIS countries, and then began exploring opportunities in the large Indian market. Seeking maximum control over their foreign operations, such companies first purchase a modest stake and then, to the extent that experience warrants, increase their participation in the foreign market. MTS followed an aggressive approach, having fewer joint ventures and more M&As, while other companies like VimpelCom were more flexible and open to partnerships. The MTS strategy was oriented to takeovers of leading telecom companies in order to attain a leadership position in a foreign market, while VimpelCom did make exceptions and also acquired companies of only average competitiveness. Both companies have paid significant attention to development of their brands abroad, which was another justification of their international strategies. For Russian MNEs, then, the state was alternatively aggressive in most resource-​ based industries, or lax toward companies of relatively small size in non-​resource based sectors. The above-​mentioned examples thus confirm two extremes of the strategies followed by Russian MNEs, one strategy relying on marketing and branding when the government has no interest in a domestic Russian firm’s expansion abroad and the other in which a firm is encouraged by the state to internationalize in the interest of foreign policy (Panibratov, 2016). The interest of the state in the internationalization of national firms focuses on two types of companies, one where the business itself requires very vigilant control, as in case of Rosenergoatom in the nuclear power sector, and in any other sector where foreign policy impinges, as in case of Rosoboronexport in military and defense. In the nuclear power sector, where massive capital investment is required, the business, at least in Russia, cannot develop without government subsidy. Supporting Rosenergoatom is obligatory lest Russia be denied its own nuclear power industry. Similar to nanotech, the internationalization occurs via the involvement of joint projects with foreign companies and organizations. The military industry, where government involvement serves the cause of national security, is heavily reliant on foreign sales to offset cost to the national budget, while the government leverages deals for the military industry abroad to help with the military industries’ budget. Coincidentally,

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    717 these deals dictate the formation of alliances and other requisites of foreign policy. In other words, to a company like Rosoboronexport, a strong government link is the path to follow. In both cases, improving the technical and financial performance of the firms under the control of the state is an obvious precondition to achieving what the government has ordained, namely, improvement of efficiency in state firms. Such new efficiency, it is hoped, will help diversify state firms away from their present rut in natural resources, and thus enrich the economy as a whole. Although involvement of the government in Russian MNEs has often been considered politically motivated and negative, the state role for emerging market firms is actually multifaceted, and thus new forms of IB theories need to be established to understand the complexity involved (Zubkovskaya & Michailova, 2014).

Implications for International and Domestic Russian Managers In this section, we focus on implications for managers in both foreign and domestic firms, emphasizing international managers. We do so in the context of the first three sections of this chapter by considering the macro-​environment, including institutions, and the effects on businesses of all types. The environment and related institutions are vital factors for managers to consider in any country, but they become even more critically important in an inconsistent and even hostile environment as found in Russia (EY, 2015). Managers doing business in Russia or with Russian companies will have to become familiar not only with the institutional environment but also with managerial practices and processes in that transitioning country. The erosion of legitimate institutions was discussed in detail early in this chapter, and various managerial practices and processes were also covered, but primarily as they pertain to Russian companies. Thus we focus on managerial functions including knowledge transfer and management, leadership, and innovation, as well as other critical areas of managerial interest and activities (McCarthy & Puffer, 2013), primarily as they pertain to foreign executives and managers who do or plan to operate in Russia, or do business there while not directly entering the country. In an age where information and knowledge have become vitally essential, transferring knowledge to Russians is still a complex undertaking even after more than two decades after the break-​up of the USSR. An early work noted the importance of knowledge in a successful transition to a market economy, and explained that Russia needed to develop a knowledge industry (Kuznetsov, 2004). Recognizing the difficulty of transferring knowledge to Russia, one work constructed a DNA model around the need for mutual cultural awareness, since the starting point for most foreign firms and managers was mainly disconnected from that of Russians to whom they hoped to transfer knowledge (May, Puffer, & McCarthy, 2005). In some contrast, a later article spoke of the need for foreign managers to listen more to their Russian counterparts to

718    Sheila M. Puffer et al. facilitate a more useful knowledge exchange (Michailova & Mustaffa, 2012). This caveat would be especially important when dealing with Russian technical professionals who often have exceptional backgrounds in science and engineering. The message in virtually all research articles to date has been the need for new and better approaches to knowledge transfer on the part of foreign firms and managers as well as the Russian participants. At the heart of this managerial process, as well as many other processes and practices discussed later, is the need for an understanding of Russian culture, including values, traditions, and ethics. Without that foundational knowledge, foreign managers would be hard pressed to succeed in working with Russian counterparts. And in an institutional context, culture is generally recognized as being an informal institution, vitally important particularly in emerging and transition economies usually lacking strong, legitimate formal institutions and plagued with institutional voids. As noted earlier in this chapter, Russians tend to be high on uncertainty avoidance and power distance, while being low on individualism and masculinity. Such cultural artifacts not only play against entrepreneurial orientation but also affect numerous other areas of managerial style and behaviors, as will be discussed below. As would be expected, such cultural factors were heavily influenced by the communist, centrally planned economy during the time of the USSR, and even after. In short, managers and workers typically tried to avoid responsibility and kept a low profile, while factory directors acted as the decision-​makers as well as paternal figures. Such values and relationships were part of the reason that Russia developed as a society based on particularized trust within personal networks, but with a low level of generalized trust. This situation often led to a mistrust of outsiders, including foreign managers, and hindered communications between them and Russians (Ayios, 2004). A 2008 article saw a need for Russia to develop a higher level of generalized trust to facilitate business (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2008). These cultural institutional traditions have led to an approach to ethical behavior that differentiated between in-​group network members and others, especially foreigners including business peers (McCarthy & Puffer, 2008). The importance of these in-​group networks has been widely researched and reported, including their relationship to a high dependence on the use of favors, blat and sviazi (Ledeneva, 1998; Puffer et  al., 2010). It is also clear from this analysis that cultural artifacts impede knowledge transfer on a number of dimensions, including trust, but also other managerial processes and practices. Foreign managers must, for instance, avoid being involved in activities that may be ethical for Russians but could be unethical and even illegal in their home country contexts. In essence, they must continue to exhibit their legitimate approach to business and management, including their leadership and managerial styles. Leadership and managerial styles have also been highly influenced by Soviet-​era practices and processes, with the result that foreign executives and managers would likely encounter difficulties in adapting to those roles in Russia and with Russians elsewhere. In general, Russians tend to be very direct in communication and interactions, whereas Westerners, particularly Americans, tend to prefer a more indirect approach

Managing Emerging Markets in Russia    719 that is often more subtle and more time-​consuming, and in their eyes, more personal. The Russian approach has led to an appreciation for strong leaders who provide assignments and expect results, generally seen as a transactional approach. This is in contrast to the more transformational style of Western, and even many Asian, executives and managers. A number of articles have concluded that the Soviet-​era style persists in Russia (e.g., Ardichvili, 2001; Gurkov & Maital, 2001; McCarthy, Puffer, May, Ledgerwood, & Stewart, 2008). Additionally, a major study posited that Russian leadership style still exhibited the traditional Russian command and control style that might well not be appropriate in an age where information, innovation, and involvement are critical (Kets de Vries, Shekshnia, Korotov, & Florent-​Treacy, 2004). So although that traditional style may persist, foreign managers will need to exhibit in their own styles the best of transformational leadership, while increasingly adapting some elements of directness and perceived strength in their styles when dealing with Russians in that country, or even abroad.

Conclusion As we consider the insights of our chapter, we believe that although much has changed in Russia and much progress has been made since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, much has remained essentially unchanged, partially due to a regression to a far more authoritarian state than seemed likely in 2000 and the subsequent early years of the Putin administration. This deterioration was illustrated earlier in this chapter as being due to the country’s political and economic institutional environment, resulting in severe challenges for most domestic and foreign businesses. Yet as we have seen in this chapter, in spite of these challenges, entrepreneurship, which was illegal under communism, has taken hold and is seen as far more socially acceptable in Russia than in the past. The chapter has also illustrated that the situation is similar for Russian MNEs that are privately owned and do not receive government support. In contrast, those MNEs with government ownership or that operate in industries strategic to the government’s plans, receive substantial support and face far fewer challenges. Thus the government’s frequently proclaimed support of entrepreneurship and private business has been more of a hollow promise than a serious attempt to move the economy away from its heavy reliance on oil, gas, and other natural resources that constitute the backbone of its multinational enterprise activity based on extensive government support. As a concluding observation, we note that the state continues to exert excessive influence on business, leading to a form of state-​managed capitalism as the country under President Putin has continued its retreat to statization (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007; McCarthy, Puffer, & Naumov, 2000). So foreign managers will likely face the same inconsistencies and institutional voids that have plagued their domestic counterparts, and the environment for business will likely not improve without substantial changes in

720    Sheila M. Puffer et al. the country’s institutional arrangements, essentially lessening the weight of the heavy hand of government. But as always, when the rewards appear to justify the risks, many will move forward seeing Russia through a longer-​term lens, and conclude that the risk is warranted by the potential rewards, always a key judgment and decision for international firms and their managers.

Notes 1. All currency figures are stated in US dollars. 2. On average, 73% of Russian respondents had a generally positive attitude toward entrepreneurship in 2016, which is essentially the same as in 2015 (71%) (AGER 2015, 2016). 3. In December 2014, the key interest rate rose from 9.5% to 17% per annum. In the subsequent period, the rate was gradually reduced to 10.5% per annum in June 2016 (Bank of Russia, 2014–​2016).

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Chapter 30

H ow Techn ol o g y-​ Based Firm s f rom I ndia De al with Leg i t i mac y Challeng e s i n International Ma rk ets S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan

Technology-​based emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) often suffer from the liabilities of origin and newness due to a small customer base, evolving organizational structure, ambiguous role definitions, and excessive dependence on founders (Stanislav & Aleksios, 2010; Stinchcombe, 1965; Suchman, 1995). As these emerging market firms aspire to achieve international growth, they seek to access resources and capabilities which might help them fulfill their business goals and aspirations. Hence, technology-​based EMNEs engage in the process of seeking and obtaining legitimacy in order to get access to resources needed for growth (Diez-​Martin, Prado-​Roman, & Blanco-​González, 2013; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Legitimacy has been viewed in the literature as a “perception that the actions of an entity are appropriate within a system of socially constructed norms and values” (Suchman, 1995:  p.  574). In this chapter, we address the following research question: “How do multinational technology firms from an emerging market such as India deal with these legitimacy challenges and what strategies do they adopt in overcoming these challenges”? One alternative that emerging market technology firms from a country like India often consider to gain legitimacy is to look at international markets and partner with global firms. The OLI (ownership, location, and internationalization) framework (Dunning, 1993) suggests that firms will expand internationally only if they possess advantages that overcome the liabilities of foreignness and origin. Firms in an emerging

726    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan market economy such as India face challenges of the institutional environment. Understanding the strategic choices these EMNE firms make requires understanding the institutional framework of the country of origin of the firm (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). From the perspective of institutional theorists such as DiMaggio and Powell, strategic activities are driven by the desire of organizational actors to legitimately account for their activities. The effectiveness of their actions is judged by a range of constituents such as shareholders, customers, public interest groups, and so on, who assess the appropriateness of their activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Firms gain social legitimacy from both institutional and strategic sources. Institutional sources include both cultural factors and responses to inputs that arise from outside the firm’s control. Strategic sources of legitimacy are those that firms can control, such as choosing the organizations they are associated with in order to raise their social profile (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007; Suchman, 1995). Organizations that share the same environment share similar strategies. This argument leads us to the logic that organizations that are embedded in their environment choose similar strategies to survive (Scott, 2001). It is widely understood that in technology-​intensive industries, standards play a critical role in shaping markets by enhancing and constraining competition. Once players choose a particular standard, it is hard to change track and choose an alternate technology due to threats of lock-​in or lock-​out. Technology firms from emerging markets such as India face many challenges during the process of emergence of standards. Technology firms respond to the twin uncertainty of changing customer needs and the future path of technology in different ways (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). New innovators enter the industry with innovations while firms that have been unsuccessful exit the industry. With time, a design or a new methodology is effective and one particular technology begins to attract a significant market and a dominant design emerges that compels other firms to switch over to this design. A dominant design is a specific path that establishes dominance among competing design paths in a company’s design hierarchy. The product architecture that has all the primary characteristics of later product designs is called the dominant design (Suarez & Utterback, 1995). Once a dominant design emerges, recognizing that fact and adopting the dominant design quickly is important, because the gap between the developers of the design and adopters of the design vanishes quickly. It becomes more profitable for other firms to focus on process innovation rather on inventing new designs. Competition among designs and technologies usually culminates in agreement around a single concept as the accepted way to do things and this is what results in a dominant design. The emergence of technology-​based enterprises from emerging markets such as India has become an interesting arena of research as it explores ways of addressing international opportunities both from a market and a resource perspective (Ramamurti, 2012). The ownership perspective in the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993) suggests that firms that operate in their own familiar environment and manage institutional voids are able to perform better than MNEs (multinational enterprises) from developed markets which are accustomed to a different institutional environment. The linkage-​leverage-​learning

Technology-Based Firms from India    727 (LLL) framework explains the emergence of the dragon multinationals (Mathews, 2006). International expansion, as understood today, has been undertaken not just to exploit existing resources but also to search for new resources and the advantages that can be externally acquired. Thus opportunities to expand are found in the global environment through the links established with partners in order to leverage the resources. This process of linkage and leverage leads to learning to perform such operations more effectively. Table 30.1 notes some of the key literature on emerging market multinationals. Some emerging market MNEs have adopted the route of acquiring strategic assets in developed countries. These include Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC business, Tata Steel’s acquisition of Corus, and Tata Motors’ acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover brands. According to the springboard perspective, emerging market firms acquire strategic assets to compete effectively in developed markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). Firms from emerging market economies need marketing skills that will enable them to capitalize on the home-​based advantages or their strong operational and technical skills. This chapter attempts to address this issue by looking at how technology-​based EMNEs from India gain legitimacy in international markets. Legitimacy enables a firm to get access to resources required for growth and survival (Diez-​Martin et al., 2013; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Legitimacy has been viewed in the literature as a “perception that the actions of an entity are appropriate within a system of socially constructed norms and values” (Suchman, 1995). In this chapter, we address the following research question: “How do technology-​based EMNE firms deal with these legitimacy challenges and what strategies do they adopt in overcoming these challenges”? An alternative that technology firms often consider to gain legitimacy is to look at international markets and partner with global firms. The OLI framework (Dunning, 1993) suggests that firms will expand internationally only if they possess advantages that overcome the liabilities of foreignness and origin. Firms in emerging market economies such as India face challenges of institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2010) and are cognizant of the importance of the institutional framework of the host country of the firm (Buckley et al., 2007; Peng et al., 2008). From the perspective of institutional theorists such as DiMaggio and Powell, strategic activities are driven by the desire of organizational actors to legitimately account for their activities. The effectiveness of their actions is judged by a range of constituents such as shareholders, customers, public interest groups, and so on, which assess the appropriateness of their activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Firms gain social legitimacy from both institutional and strategic sources. Institutional sources include both cultural factors and responses to inputs that arise from outside the firm’s control. Strategic sources of legitimacy are those that firms can control, such as choosing the organizations they are associated with in order to raise their social profile (Dacin et al., 2007; Suchman, 1995). Organizations that share the same environment share similar strategies. This argument leads us to the logic that organizations that are embedded in their environment choose similar strategies to survive (Scott, 2001).

728    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan Table 30.1 Literature on emerging market multinationals Authors

Perspective

Key Findings

Dunning, 1993

The Network perspective

Firm’s internationalization processes create new relationships in different industries. Capability enhancement is an outcome of being able to participate in the production network as niche suppliers

Buckley et al., 2007; Madhok & Keyani, 2012; Rugman, 2009

Comparative advantage perspective

Internationalization is the result of exploiting home-​country comparative advantages (e.g., Chinese firms’ access to cheap capital); Indian software industry’s access to cheap skilled engineering labor pool.

Hamel & Prahalad, 2005

Strategic intent perspective

Rise of Japanese MNEs. The MNE firm’s ambitious and compelling dream to win, although it may not yet have the resources and capabilities needed for global competition.

Khanna & Palepu (2010) Institutional perspective: Managing institutional voids

Firms have experience of managing “institutional voids” and this allows them to thrive better than Western MNEs in developing countries with weak market institutions and opaque regimes.

Luo & Tung, 2007; Matthews, 2006

Overcoming latecomer disadvantages; LLL framework & a springboard perspective

EMNEs use international expansion for resource acquisition and reduction of institutional and market constraints. To overcome latecomer disadvantage they undertake a series of aggressive, risk-​taking measures.

Ramamurti, 2012

Exploitation in home markets EMNEs go abroad to obtain (strategic asset-​seeking approach) technologies and brands for exploitation in their home markets.

Peng, 2012

The global strategy of emerging multinationals from China

Underappreciated role of home-​ country governments, challenge of going abroad in the absence of technological and managerial resources & rapid adoption of high-​ profile acquisitions as an entry mode.

In technology-​intensive industries, standards play a critical role in shaping markets by enhancing and constraining competition. Once players choose a particular standard, it is hard to change track and choose an alternate technology due to threats of lock-​ in or lock-​out. Emerging market firms focusing on emerging technologies face many

Technology-Based Firms from India    729 challenges during the process of emergence of standards. In this chapter, we look at some of these issues EMNE technology firms address in their cross-​border forays.

Research Methodology Our study has been based on data from technology-​based EMNEs from India providing products and services to OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) and highly R&D (research and development)-​intensive companies. This context is useful because many of these firms operate in niche areas, work with companies often developing leading-​ edge products, and are in a position to provide system integration services which give them a good perspective. Our goal is to build a theory of technology-​based emerging market multinational firms. Hence, the case method is appropriate for this purpose. We build a multiple case study that would allow for replication (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The case study method enables the understanding of why a certain sequence of events happened or how a series of decisions was taken in an organ­ization while facilitating a focus on contemporary events—​thus facilitating the understanding of dynamics within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2002). The multiple case study method supports a comparative approach and hence enables generalization through methods that facilitate replication. This is particularly useful in theory building and testing as they provide more compelling evidence and make the study more robust (Yin, 2002). We collect data from multiple sources, viz., secondary data from companies, interviews, data from press articles, and technical articles in order to triangulate the information received. We conducted interviews with managers of the firms in the case studies. The sources of data for the cases include the websites, sources of secondary data, press articles, names of managers interviewed and the organizations and the technology standard bodies that we researched are presented in Table 30.2.

Case Study 1: Wipro Wipro: Company Brief Azim Premji, the current chairman of Wipro took over the reins of the company in 1966. At that point it sold vegetable products, had 350 employees with revenues of $3 million, and was loss making. Wipro is an Indian information technology (IT) services corporation headquartered in Bengaluru, India. In 1979, restrictions imposed by the government of India forced IBM to leave the country. Sensing the market opportunity presented by this development, Azim Premji led the company’s move into the IT sector and started building India’s first mini-​computers. It had become a leading computer company moving toward the 1990s. In 1992, however, the government of India led by

730    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan Table 30.2 Sources of data for the case studies Organization/​Individual

Website/​Affiliation

Remarks

Sasken website

http://​www.sasken.com/​

Interview with Sasken managers

Interviews with CTO, SVP Marketing

June 2016

Wipro

www.wipro.com

Wipro website, analyst reports, investor reports

Tech Mahindra

www.techmahindra.com

Tech Mahindra website, media reports, investor reports

Acquisitions data

www.crunchbase.com

List of acquisitions done by Wipro and Tech Mahindra

SIP Forum

http://​www.sipforum.org/​

Dynamicsoft

www.cisco.com

Vovida

www.vovidasystems.com

H.323

www.h323plus.org

International telecommunications standardization sector

https://​www.itu.int/​en/​ITU-​T /​Pages/​default.aspx

ETSI (European Telecom Standards Institute)

http://​www.etsi.org

Acquired by Cisco

PV Narasimha Rao liberalized the economy. This led to new competition from multinational corporations (MNCs) such as HP, Compaq, and IBM. Wipro sensed that it could not compete with these giants and instead focused on providing engineering expertise and solutions to these companies. Wipro began by designing embedded applications for telecom equipment and then embarked upon hardware and chip design. Wipro’s offerings were targeted to meeting the requirements of OEMs and a range of peripherals. Wipro’s goal was to be among the top 10 service providers in India by providing innovative solutions and achieving operational excellence in delivery. Now in 2018, Wipro is a global IT services provider and is among the top five software exporters in India, after TCS and Infosys. Its main areas of business are R&D services for telecom and embedded systems and enterprise solutions like information systems (IS) outsourcing, package implementation, custom applications, and system integration. Wipro works with customers across the world with headquarters in Bangalore, India, and offices in the USA, the UK, Europe, Japan, and Latin America. In fiscal year 20117, Wipro clocked revenues of $7.7 billion with net profit margins of close to 20%. Revenues for the IT services business grew fourfold over the last decade from roughly$2 to approximately $8 .

Technology-Based Firms from India    731 Wipro’s global competitors were IBM, Accenture, TCS, and Infosys. The quest for operational excellence led it to pursue CMM level 5, PCMM, and Six Sigma processes. Wipro prided itself on its ability to deliver results and meet quality expectations. Throughout the past two decades, it tried to find growth opportunities and boost competitive advantage. The agility to adapt business processes to changing market scenarios, integrate business strategy, and adapt IT infrastructure has been a hallmark of Wipro’s strategy.

Company Strategy Over the past decade, Wipro has been using its pile of cash to make acquisitions in emerging technologies such as Cloud & SaaS, PaaS. It leverages experience in providing IT infrastructure management to provide these services in global markets in order to achieve the stated goal of being a leader in the digital era, In 2017, Wipro closed the acquisition of Appirio, a US-​based cloud services firm for $500 million. This deal helps it make the transition to SaaS-​based services, with access to crowd sourcing communities. Appirio works with customers such as Salesforce and Workday to implement cloud services for SaaS. Wipro can showcase this capability to its customers and offer integrated deals to them. In February 2016, Wipro acquired Healthplan services a BPaaS (Business Process as a service) provider in the US health insurance market. This deal helped buttress Wipro’s capability in this space and helps it to create a more sustainable growth engine Table 30.3 presents the list of acquisitions made by Wipro.

Table 30.3 Wipro acquisitions Year

Transaction

2005

Acquisition of New Logic Technologies, a semiconductor design services company

2005

Acquisition of mPower software services, a finance services company

2006

Saraware Oy, a wireless network infrastructure provider

2006

Quantech Global Services, a mechanical design and analysis company acquired

2007

Infocrossing, a data center service provider and provider of IT infrastructure, enterprise application, & BPO services acquired for $600 million to address gap in managed hosted services in infrastructure management.

2008

Citi technology services

2014

ATCO i-​tek IT Services company specializing in enterprise asset management solutions acquired

2016

HealthPlan services, a BPaas service provider was acquired

2016

Wipro acquired Appirio, a US-​based cloud services firm for $500 million to create a cloud transformation practice

2017

InfoServer, an IT services provider, providing custom application and software deployment services and having large Brazilian banks as its clients was acquired to strengthen its presence in the Latin American market

Source: Author’s construction from publicly available company information.

732    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan In R&D outsourcing, Wipro has worked in handling engineering for large-​product portfolios for customers, who transfer their engineering and working proactively with them to manage change. There is a big shift toward open source platforms particularly in end consumer segments that could lead to accelerate innovation and improve the user experience. Wipro took advantage of the shift in technology toward open systems and standards leading to offshoring of R&D services. Open source advancements eliminated licensing fees to drive down the overall cost and create rich software ecosystems for customized applications. For example, Wipro has been designing developing and testing multiple versions of mobile operating systems of a handset OEM. This may also require modifying underlying system software, board support packages, and so on, to run on a wide variety of platforms (different versions of Android, Windows Mobile, etc.) that exploited the unique capabilities of each device while maximizing software reuse and development/​test efficiency. The need for localization support and network interoperability requirements also presents its myriad challenges. Regulatory compliance support for medical and other industrial solutions created other opportunities for Wipro. Wipro has specialized in providing testing and validation services to many leading OEM customers. Limited storage and working memories in certain markets demand smart design and testing plans. Unpredictable network connection, limited coverage, and lower network bandwidth than a fixed connection must be considered as part of validation scenarios. Wipro realized that it had the ability to address these gaps in the marketplace that were not being adequately addressed.

Dealing with Technological Transitions In 2008, the network equipment manufacturer (NEM) segment was significantly affected by the financial crisis and the resulting downturn. The network equipment industry witnessed consolidation and some exits. Wipro had a big exposure to the telecom segment. One of Wipro’s customers in this segment Nortel (a network equipment manufacturer) exited from the telecom space by selling off its GSM and GSM-​R assets to Ericsson and Kapsch CarrierCom and its enterprise business to Avaya. Another big customer Nokia Siemens (NSN) hived off or closed down its R&D centers. Wipro’s original positioning as a “Lab-​on-​hire” helped it to co-​innovate with customers. The company used its existing skillsets in the creation of Intellectual Property (IP). The company adopted a risk-​ reward sharing model where it invested in the creation of IP for a share in the revenue stream of its customers through royalties. An innovation initiative, with an internal innovation council was set up that worked like internal venture capital. The “internal venture fund” also triggered innovation within the company. The attempt was to combine innovation in process and technology to deliver value to customers. Once customers were confident about its capabilities, legacy product lines were transitioned to Wipro for enhancement and maintenance. For example, Wipro had dedicated labs for Cisco, Alcatel Lucent, Nortel, and Nokia Siemens Networks among others. This allowed these big players to move their skilled resources to emerging technologies rather than locking them up in legacy product lines.

Technology-Based Firms from India    733

Case Study 2: Tech Mahindra Tech Mahindra started in 1986 with British Telecom as the principal customer and its partner. Later it added other marquee customers such as Vodafone and AT&T and now have 200 + customers. The company focuses on “digital solutions” that form more than a fifth of its revenue. In fiscal year 2017 it clocked revenues of close to $4.4 billion with Profit After Tax (PAT) PAT margins of close to 12%. Tech Mahindra has over the years emerged as an end-​to-​end services partner to operators looking to deploy, integrate, and manage their telecom infrastructure. Currently Tech Mahindra has more than 100,000 engineers spread across 20 delivery centers across the globe. Tech Mahindra competes with Accenture, IBM, Wipro, Infosys, TCS, and Mindtree across the globe.

Company Strategy Tech Mahindra initially focused on the telecom vertical, with the goal of being a transformation and consulting organization to telecom service providers and network equipment manufacturers and OEMs with the vision of being the global leader in outsourcing in the telecom industry. Its customer base included the top three leading operators across Europe, Asia Pacific, and the USA. The service strategy in the period in the first two decades of its existence was to build end to end capabilities across telecom software, hardware, and services. Slowly, the company extended its service portfolio across the entire telecom value chain, including systems integration and consultancy services. Later company management felt the need to diversify its customer base across the managed services in order to leverage its IT outsourcing and BP (business process) outsourcing capabilities. In 2012, Tech Mahindra merged with Satyam (the acquisition happened in 2008), a company that was in trouble due to fraudulent accounting practises. Satyam had a global clientele spread across various verticals such as banking, insurance, and so on, and a pool of trained engineers. Tech Mahindra focusses on the BSS (billing support systems) and OSS (operational support services). Going forward, technologies such as 5G are growth drivers as and when network equipment manufacturers and operators make investments. The company’s offerings in the telecom segment straddled the following segments which is described in Table 30.4.

Engaging with the Customer The leading customers would want Tech Mahindra support in existing deployments so that the experienced and the rather high-​skilled engineering resources in the customer’s organization could be directed toward newer customer projects. Tech Mahindra would be expected to take complete product ownership, including hardware and support development and level 3 customer support, for maintenance and technical publications. A team (typically 50 to 100 engineers) would be assembled with different skills in diverse areas such as hardware, system software, and support systems. Knowledge transfer from the customer to these engineers would happen in a short time. The Tech Mahindra team would be expected to ramp up on the knowledge and provide quick turnaround to

734    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan Table 30.4 Tech Mahindra offerings Target segment

Services

Operators

• OSS (operational system support) and BSS (billing system support) solutions

Semiconductor and mobile OEMs

• Release management—​Complete product life-​cycle support from requirement gathering to product reuse • Systems integration—​hardware and software integration • BSP, device driver, customization, and integration • Product testing—​field testing, functional testing, unit test regression testing, and protocol conformance testing • Product enhancements and value engineering—​ application enhancements, power consumption reduction, BOM cost reduction, component obsolence, and RoHS compliance • Customization of devices for the Indian market

Mobile platform companies

• Mobile platform development—​hardware, firmware, and reference application • Mobile platform benchmarking and testing services

Mobile OS vendors

• Maintenance and feature enhancement of OS product source code • Testing and test automation

Tool and test tool providers

• Test automation framework development • Conformance test suite development • Automation test bench development

Source: Author’s construction from interviews and publicly available company information.

the development and support needed. The role of the Tech Mahindra team would typically involve studying and understanding the product, architecture and functionality, test center setup, requirements analysis, project management, design, and testing.

Acquisitions Table 30.5 shows the list of acquisitions by Tech Mahindra. Tech Mahindra acquired Light Bridge Communication Services, the largest independent services firm to get access to telecom service providers in the North American region. There is need for regulatory compliance support for mobile medical and other industrial solutions (e.g., 21 CFR Part  11, factory-​quality assurance for remote medical diagnostics equipment). In industrial solutions, a range of challenging usage environments, including extremes in ambient lighting, noise, and temperature (the user may be wearing gloves or lose dexterity in cold conditions), all affect the user’s ability to interact with the device. These all influence the manner in which applications are being developed and tested.

Technology-Based Firms from India    735 Table 30.5 Tech Mahindra acquisitions Year

Acquisitions done by Tech Mahindra

2005

Axes technologies acquired; this company gave them competencies in VoIP

2006

Joint venture with Motorola called CanvasM

2008

Tech Mahindra successfully bids for Satyam’s global operations

2012

Hutchison Global Services division acquired for $87 million

2012

Acquires 51% stake in Comviva

2013

Type approval lab, part of Sony Mobile communication’s internal test function, based in Sweden acquired to become a test lab in Europe

2013

Merger with Satyam completed

2014

Tech Mahindra successfully acquired Lightbridge Communications, a large telecom services company

2015

Tech Mahindra acquires Sofgen holdings, a Swiss IT firm in financial services

2016

Target group, a fintech firm acquired to strengthen its business process offerings in the financial sector

2017

CJS Solutions, a US-​based health care IT consulting company acquired to boost its health care solutions

Source: Author’s construction from publicly available company information in annual reports and interviews with company executives.

Case Study 3: Sasken Sasken was established in 1989 to provide software solutions that enabled customers to reduce the time to market in an effective manner. They provided R&D software services and solutions to terminal device manufacturers, NEMs, and semiconductor companies, delivering end-​to-​end solutions that enabled richer content delivery on next-​generation networks. Sasken’s customers included companies such as Fujitsu, Hitachi, National Semiconductors, Philips, Sharp, Synopsys, Texas Instruments, and Toshiba. Sasken reported revenues of approximately $75 million in fiscal year 2017 with close to 3000 + engineers spread across development centers in Bangalore, India, and Finland with offices in Germany, Japan, UK, and USA. Sasken has been listed on the Indian stock exchange since 2005. Sasken’s competitors included firms such as TTPCom, Wipro, Mindtree, Aricent, TietoNator, and Tech Mahindra, among others.

Business Strategy Sasken started as a niche player providing products and components to major semiconductor OEMs like EDA, IC Design and DSP. Sasken then thought about the idea of providing both products and services. Quoting the CEO Rajiv Mody, “Though our products and services divisions operate in different market segments, they give substantial leverage to the organization because of their inter play. This gives us a strategic advantage

736    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan of the skill base to address a wider market. An important pre-​requisite for this model is a strong emphasis on R&D. In this direction the corporate R&D group was set up to ensure a clear technological edge for our business divisions and to create barriers for our competitions.” Sasken used a combination of products and services to create a strong R&D base serve different market segments and create differentiation in order to get competitive advantage.

Target Segments and Customer Offerings Since 2000, Sasken had been positioned as a provider of embedded software solutions offering a gamut of services across the product life cycle. The company’s offerings now straddle semiconductor, automotive, smart devices and wearables, transportation, satellite communication, and the retail segments.

Tracing the Development of Sasken The company had a deep relationship with most of the leading tier 1 OEMs and with its technical know-​how it had a preferred vendor status. Sasken started by building products and IP in the semiconductor and telecom domain. Sasken’s product offerings ranged from base modem software, multimedia applications to fully integrated offerings encompassing third-​party products. Table 30.6 shows the list of product offerings, target segment, and features. Sasken often used the M Series (protocol stack) product as an entry point with the semiconductor vendors. The protocol stack offering was focused on creating software components for the radio modem subsystem covering the GPRS, EDGE, GSM, and UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) technologies. Sasken worked with two of the leading semiconductor companies, Philips and Analog Devices, in this segment to create the component offering which served as a building block for call handling in mobile semiconductor chipset solutions. Sasken’s S Series offerings enabled handset manufacturers to incorporate multimedia functionalities. The codecs enabled compression and decompression of media. Multimedia applications (“S Series”) are targeted at high-​end smartphones priced upward of $500. Sasken’s strength in this area lies in software accelerators; earlier multimedia operations were enhanced using hardware accelerators, which consumed more power and reduced battery life. The deal closure time for Sasken’s product offerings could take anywhere between 9 and 12 months. The key milestones included: • Identification of a semiconductor player:



Identifying the right partner was critical for strong relationships with leading handset vendors and controlling market share in the handset space.

• Design-​in: Sasken’s software compatibility with silicon chipsets had been proved and the design of customer phone model initiated.

Technology-Based Firms from India    737 Table 30.6 Sasken product offerings Product model

Target segment

Product features

Offering details

Competitors

M Series

Basic phone model (< $50)

Has baseband which has the critical part and the base processor, which could handle basic applications

Mobile protocol stacks sold to semiconductor vendors

TTP Com, Tieto Nator, in-​house development team at Intel, Samsung, etc.

E Series

Feature phone ($50–​$200)

Has complex applications, operating system and application processor

Integrated offerings with application processing players such as Texas Instruments

Feature phone manufacturers, Chinese white label phone developers

S Series

Smartphones (> $200)

Color screen, MMS GPRS enabled, software bundled to reduct cost

Multimedia codecs and Engines with handset vendors such as Samsung, Motorola, LG, Panasonic

Wipro, Mindtree,



Source: Author’s construction from publicly available company information in annual reports and interviews with company executives.

• Design-​win: A stage where the phones were shipped and royalty payments were initiated.

Using the capabilities that Sasken had built in serving handset customers and network equipment providers, Sasken created a satellite phone for Inmarsat. Sasken was able to manage the technology transition from handsets to a different domain by utilizing the competencies that it had across various sites. It was able to use the components it had developed for the GSM/​GPRS protocol into a dual-​mode GSM and satellite phone. Sasken thus was able to successfully diversify into satellite communication technologies by modifying the GSM/​GPRS protocol stack for the GMR2+ satellite communication standard. A modular approach to product development enabled the company to extend the components it had built to the satellite communication domain. The Chief Technology Officer (CTO), G Venkatesh, made the following comments on the foray into satellite business: The short-​term challenges on the Networks business, notwithstanding, evolution of wireless networks to 3G/​4G and LTE/​WiMax continue to be attractive for potential business opportunities in the near to medium term, and we are making investments in these technologies to grow our Network offerings. A niche area that

738    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan we have recently started targeting with our network capabilities is the Satellite Radio Access Network segment, which is typically based on standard RAN equipment, but requires substantial customization and testing.

Though Sasken was primarily into product development in the early years of its formation, it gradually evolved into a “hybrid” firm with both product and service offerings. The teams that were constituted often had a range of engineers with varying backgrounds, level of experience, and degree of expertise. Since Sasken was into domains that experienced high levels of turbulence, the new technologies that came up created new set of requirements, interactions, and challenges. Sasken attempted to build its capabilities in full phone development through acquisitions: one of a Finland-​ based company, “Botnia Hitec,” and another of a Nokia development center in Bochum, Germany. These acquisitions again illustrate how third-​party external providers can provide effective substitution services by taking over the ownership of matured product lines. S40 was a matured software product line in the middle of the previous decade and Sasken’s acquisition enabled it to gain skills in product integration and also knowledge of full phone development process. Sasken had executed different stages of the program R&D for vendors with conceptualization, product development, and integration phases. Using the capabilities that it had built in serving handset customers and network equipment providers, in 2013, Sasken was able to develop a completed satellite phone for Inmarsat, a leading satellite phone operator. It was able to manage the technology transition from handsets to a different domain by utilizing the competencies that it had developed by working for different customers and that it had built through acquisitions (e.g., acquisition of Botnia Hitech, a Finland-​based company) and the acquisition of Nokia’s R&D center in Bochum, Germany. Sasken used the components developed for the GSM/​GPRS protocol into a dual-​mode GSM and satellite phone and was able to successfully diversify into satellite communication technologies by modifying the protocol stack it had developed for GSM/​GPRS protocols for the GMR2+ satellite communication standard. The experience gained in concept analysis, electromechanical engineering, acceptance, and interoperability testing in this segment helped them in the development. The value addition that Sasken offered was low footprint modem, long battery life, and low cost stable design.

Findings from the Cases The case studies studied above show how emerging market technology firms from India that worked with larger international partners were able to overcome their liabilities of origin and newness. Our findings from these studies show that these firms gained international legitimacy by participating in the creation of new standards and leveraging the connect with the major actors involved in the creation of such standards.

Technology-Based Firms from India    739 Social legitimacy is the ability of the firm to conform to expectations from the community. While firms can gain social legitimacy either through institutions or through strategic moves, all the three cases, Wipro, Sasken, and Tech Mahindra, gained social legitimacy through its participation in the standards forums such as ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) and IETF (Internet Enginering Task Force). All of them had the top telecom OEMs such as Nokia, Nokia Siemens, Alcatel Lucent, Avaya, and Cisco as their customers. Tech Mahindra was an important partner to British Telecom. The social process of joining and contributing to a standard setting body follows the steps of “mutual engagement,” “joint enterprise,” and “shared repertoire” (Wenger, 1998: 72–​73). Members of the community often build relationships, establish norms, and build relationships for collaboration in a process labeled mutual engagement. Then a shared understanding of their common interests leads them to create a joint enterprise, the terms of which are negotiated and renegotiated by members. Then the community produces a set of tools and resources that is used in the pursuit of the enterprise. Standards creation is an incremental process with contributions from interrelated events rather than through the emergence of a few discrete events with three major components that include resource endowments, incentives for proprietary functions, and institutional arrangements. (Van de Ven, 1993).

Engagement with the Community In the process of evolution of new technologies, creation and participation in technology forums imply a commitment to the domain and, therefore, a shared competence that helps give a unique identity. The members of this forum engage in joint activities and discussions, building relationships that help them learn from each other. The interactions on the newsgroups and the participation in interoperability events were essential in creating a feeling of community. This, in turn, helped them develop a shared repertoire of experiences, stories, and ways of addressing recurring problems.

Shared Repertoire Wipro, Sasken and Tech Mahindra participated in these events, developing complementary products, tools to test and check the interoperability of products, and often tools to bridge products that used the competing standards. When UMTS emerged as the dominant design, the existing regimes of GSM and CDMA were under pressure. Sasken and Wipro were able to exploit the opportunities provided by this transition. They took over the ownership of the GSM/​GPRS products of Nortel, Alcatel Lucent enabling them to focus on UMTS technologies. Figure 30.1 shows the relationship between the actors in the ecosystem and the role of the emerging market multinational enterprises. The successful introduction of new technologies requires more than just technological innovation or being a first-​mover in a market. Participation in standardization processes, however, remains an integral part of product development and marketing strategies. The competitive strategies of emerging market multinational

740    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan Standard Bodies & Regulatory framework Mimetic pressures/ Threats of lock-in and lock-out

Exogenous shocks

New Technology based EMNEs

Market place: Network operators, customers, service providers

Rules of engagement

Resources, tools, ideas & incremental innovation Standardization strategies

Innovation System • OEMS • Semiconductor & Device manufacturers • Middleware providers

Figure 30.1  Relationship within the ecosystem

firms must provide a broader network of complementary products which increases installed base and reinforces switching costs. Thus, emerging market multinational firms with complementary capabilities gain legitimacy once a dominant design emerges. Table 30.7 offers an example of this complementary capability and. A common theme that we note from the three case studies is the nature of solutions provided by the three companies. For the target segment below all the three companies had testing and validation offerings that were clearly a sought after service in the OEMs. Tech Mahindra, Wipro, and Sasken, by virtue of their experience and expertise gained by working in different markets and geographies with a range of customers, were well positioned to provide this service. The study has implications for technology-​based EMNEs. One implication of our study is that the evolution of technology and standards happens when interests of different actors are aligned. Enrollment of actors in the network is essential for social construction. Aligning the interest of different actors in the network presents a significant opportunity for emerging market multinationals to make a contribution. Another opportunity for emerging market firms is to provide services that enable new solutions or new uses for products designed by OEMs around existing standards. This type of serv­ ice known as “adapting” service facilitates the integration of the core product built with an earlier standard to newer standards (Cusumano, Kahl, & Suarez, 2015). The patterns

Technology-Based Firms from India    741 Table 30.7 Test and validation offerings Target segment

Offerings for the target segment

Semiconductor companies

• Release management: complete product life-​cycle support from requirement gathering to product reuse • Systems integration: board support package, device drivers, hardware and software integration • Product testing: field testing, functional testing, regression testing, and protocol conformance testing • Product enhancement and value engineering: application enhancement, power consumption reduction, BoM cost reduction • Customization of devices for the Indian market

Mobile platform companies

• Mobile platform development: hardware, firmware, and reference applications • Mobile platform benchmarking and testing services • Maintenance and feature enhancement

Test & measurement

• Test automation framework development • Conformance test suite development • Automation test bench development

of adoption are affected by regulatory issues, availability of features, technology availability, and ease of use. Firms have to work at creating new routines for developing new practices as this is a key step in obtaining social legitimacy. For emerging market firms, participating in standard committees is an important step in their evolution. Cooperating with developed market multinational firms enables them to access development activities and substitute their research and development efforts. For example, Sasken supported the ETSI standards-​making body by developing test scripts in the evolution of the UMTS standard. For Sasken signaling its legitimacy through its participation in the standard bodies was important even though this process consumed a lot of resources and money as well. This process of gaining “social legitimacy” among the broader technology community was seen to be important for long-​term success. Having gained social legitimacy during the phase of the technology standards development, the next step for the firms in the case was to gain “relational legitimacy” by convincing the bigger players that they would make a good partner. In the technology industry, firms require partners not only to share risks but also to help with product development and selling by bringing in complementary skillsets. Thus creation of relational legitimacy is a key step in the development of emerging market firms. The firms that we studied worked to increase the perception of expertise in their area of Bluetooth technologies and UMTS, by providing skills and through show of operational efficiency.

742    S Raghunath and Jaykumar Padmanabhan Technology transitions often disturb the existing equilibrium and result in a change in both the structure of the industry and the interorganizational interactions. Often the boundaries of organizational communities change as well and this results in contests between the actors involved. Firms take actions to address uncertainty brought about by technological change. Often the technology leaders compete fiercely in the post-​ dominant design phase in terms of the complexity of competitive actions. The cases also illustrate how the standards development process often leads to technological separation of systems and components. The different actors in the sociotechnical system act upon reality that is based on the prevailing institutional logic. This process enables emerging market firms to solve the problem of “institutional failure” by helping them to organize around new standards and plug the gaps that arise when formal standardization processes do not yield a timely solution. Our brief exploratory work indicated that the sequence of legitimacy-​seeking choices should be social → relational → market. Firms directly seeking market legitimacy without having an understanding of how the signaling practices are perceived by important stakeholders in a standards-​driven industry are taking huge risks.

Discussion and Conclusion EMNEs expand abroad precisely to obtain firm-​specific assets that are unavailable in their home countries (Luo & Tung, 2007). EMNEs indeed do possess certain advantages, only that they are of a different kind than the intangibles (e.g., brands or technologies) typically associated with MNEs. These different advantages include project-​execution capabilities, political know-​how, and networking skills, among others (for a review, Guillén & García-​Canal, 2009; Ramamurti, 2012). As we saw in the case study of Sasken, the exposure and experience of EMNEs in working with multiple customers make them good at developing solutions that interwork with products and are interoperable. The processes detailed in this chapter show that technology transitions affect the competitive dynamics and results in the evolution of technology-​based emerging market firms. The changes included technological disruptions that sow the seeds for contest of interests. The evolution of technology and standards happen when interests of different actors are aligned and that the enrollment of actors in the network is essential for social construction. The challenge in the technology domain is about having a good knowl­ edge of the market, domain, and standards setting. Also there is a need to be engaged closely with the customer in terms of architecture and high-​level designs. Aligning the interest of different actors in the network presents a significant opportunity for emerging market companies to make a contribution. Another opportunity for emerging market companies is to provide services that enable new solutions or new uses for products designed by OEMs around existing standards. This type of service known as “adapting” service facilitates the integration of the core product built with an earlier standard to newer standards (Cusumano, Kahl, & Suarez, 2015). In our case studies,

Technology-Based Firms from India    743 Sasken built adapters that enabled customers to develop products and solutions that enabled interoperability between standards. Tech Mahindra and Wipro, through their customer engagements, co-​developed solutions that enabled interoperability between standards. The patterns of adoption of technology are affected by regulatory issues, availability of features, technology availability, and ease of use. Hence it makes sense that EMNEs should identify building social legitimacy as a strategic objective fairly early in the game. Social legitimacy then leads to relational and market legitimacy subsequently leading to the growth of the firm. Existing international business (IB) theories suggest that MNEs rely on certain firm specific advantages like brands, products, and technologies for internationalizing their business. These relate to the O advantages as explained by Dunning (1993), the intangible assets in Hymer (1960) and Buckley and Casson (1976), or product-​based life cycle theory of Vernon (1966). Economic transactions in emerging markets are characterized by high levels of transaction uncertainty (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). This implies that there is less confidence among the big OEMs in developed markets regarding adherence to schedules and the overall quality of output of the technology-​ based EMNEs. Technology-​based EMNEs such as Wipro, Sasken, and Tech Mahindra address these issues by relying on different types of advantages. They do not possess strong brands or great products and technologies. However, they rely on other factors like agility and flexibility gained by working with different technologies and their vendors. This lends a unique advantage which they are able to use to create impact. Creating interoperability between technologies and products and being able to plug these gaps is a distinct set of capabilities that enables them to support foreign expansion.

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Chapter 31

How Real are t h e Opp ortunit i e s for M ultinationals i n  C h i na ? Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan

In the decades after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in late 1970s many multinationals came to see China as a land of limitless opportunities. According to the Chinese State Administration for Industry & Commerce, a total of 481,200 foreign-​funded firms had been established in China by the end of 2015, with the cumulative investment stock reaching US$4.54 trillion (Xinhua, 2016).1 By 2014 had China overtaken the USA as the top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) for the first time: foreign firms invested US$128 billion in China, compared to US$86 billion in the USA (BBC, 2015). In 2016, the number of newly established foreign firms with investment of over US$100 million exceeded 840, with businesses covering many emerging and high-​tech industries (China Daily, 2017). FDI to China has also long been studied by scholars in the field of international business (Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2004; Child & Tse, 2001; Fetscherin, Voss, & Gugler, 2010; Luo, 1998; Ma, Delios, & Lau, 2013; Park & Luo, 2001; Pollitte, Miller, & Yaprak, 2015; Shenkar, 2006).2 Plenty of multinationals are doing well in China. One of the great success stories has been that of Volkswagen AG, which is the largest and earliest international partner in China’s automotive industry. It entered China as early as in 1978, and has since retained the leading position in the Chinese automotive market for many years in the past three decades. China is Volkswagen’s largest market and played a key role in helping the company to avoid a crash in global sales following its emissions scandal in 2015. In 2016 Volkswagen dethroned Toyota to become the world’s best-​selling automaker for the first time, propelled by surging demand in China when deliveries stood at 3.98 million units (38% of Volkswagen’s global market share), representing a year-​on-​year growth of 12.2%.

746    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan But some multinationals are loss-​making in China. Consider Yum Brands, which was the first big foreign fast-​food firm to enter the country. Its thousands of KFC restaurants became hugely popular with local families. In 2011 Yum’s China division was providing more than half of its global operating profits. However, the days of good performance now seem to be over because of its food-​safety scares in 2012 and 2014—​investigative reporters found that one supplier had sent out-​of-​date meat to KFC outlets in China. Because of weak performance in recent years, Yum spun off the China division into a separate company in 2016. Some multinationals have even exited China. Prominent examples include Revlon, an American cosmetics firm; Best Buy, an American electronics retailer; and Media Markt, a German electronic retailer. Increasingly, multinationals are finding that their growth in China is being hampered by ever-​stronger competition from local companies (Santos & Williamson, 2015). Consider this evidence: In China’s ice cream market, Unilever and Nestlé S.A. had won market shares of only 7% and 5%, respectively, by 2013—​despite decades of investment. The market is dominated by two companies that most people outside China have probably never heard of: China Mengniu Dairy Co. Ltd., with a 14% market share, and Inner Mongolia Yili industrial Group Co. Ltd., with 19%. Meanwhile, in the Chinese market for laundry detergent, Procter & Gamble was the leading foreign brand, with an 11% share in 2013, but it was overshadowed by two China-​based companies: Nice Group Co. Ltd., with more than 16% of the market, and Guangzhou Liby Enterprise Group Co. Ltd., with 15%. The home appliance market is similarly structured. Chinese companies dominate the market, with Haier Group at 29%, followed by Midea Group (12%) and Guangdong Galanz Group Co., Ltd. (4%). The two top multinational competitors, Germany’s Robert Bosch GmbH and Japan’s Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd., have only niche positions (each with less than 4%). According to one survey (Chin & Michael, 2014), 73% of executives in large multinationals considered that “local companies are more effective competitors than other multinationals” in emerging markets such as China. This means that to assess the real potential of China for multinationals it is insufficient to focus simply on demand; it is also essential to understand the strategies of the local competition and develop effective ways to respond if multinationals are to win a significant share of the ongoing growth in China. We suggest that multinationals need to learn new capabilities (such as cost innovation and accelerated innovation) from Chinese companies. Multinationals also need to move from “local adaptation” to “local integration,” which will enable them to access the local country-​specific advantages (CSAs) in China much more effectively. Finally, multinationals could try to form a new type of partnership with a Chinese company. Instead of the Chinese partner just doing local things like distribution and government relations, this would need to be a full and equal partnership where both parties were fully involved in everything from strategy to product development as well as operations and marketing. In exploring these issues, this chapter is structured as follows. We begin by examining the changing strategies of local Chinese competitors. In the following section we analyze the evolution of multinationals’ strategies in China. We then compare relative strengths and weaknesses of local Chinese companies versus multinationals. The chapter

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    747 concludes by examining how multinationals have responded to increased competition from local players in China and the options open to multinationals as they seek to secure future opportunities in China in the face of a rapidly changing market environment.

The Changing Strategies of Local Chinese Competitors Companies compete by a combination of CSAs and firm-​specific advantages (FSAs) (Dunning, 1988, 2003; Rugman & Collinson, 2009; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 2011). In terms of FSAs, local Chinese companies have been racing down the learning curve to develop non-​traditional competitive advantages such as cost innovation and accelerated innovation capabilities. They have also been filling capability gaps with multinationals through partnerships and overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&A). As a result, many Chinese firms have been moving up to higher value-​added activities in global value chains. Meanwhile, local Chinese companies are exploiting new ways to take advantage of local CSAs in the Chinese market.

Racing Down the Learning Curve In the early days of China’s economic reforms back in late 1970s and through 1980s, Chinese firms earned rents simply by low-​cost labor in assembly and mainly low-​value industries as their labor cost relative to productivity was much lower than that of most other countries. In 1978, for example, China’s wage was only 3% of the average US wage at that time, and it was also significant lower than the wages in neighboring Asian countries such as the Philippines and Thailand (Li, Li, Wu, & Xiong, 2012). As China’s wage growth started to pick up steam in the 1990s, Chinese firms learned to compete through cost innovation: “the strategy of using Chinese cost advantage in radically new ways to offer customers around the world dramatically more for less” (Zeng & Williamson, 2007:1. The first of these cost innovation strategies adopted by Chinese firms was to offer customers high technology at low cost. Chinese computer maker Dawning Information Industry Co., Ltd. (branded “Sugon”), for example, put supercomputer technology into the low-​cost servers that are everyday workhorses of the world’s information technology (IT) networks. This novel strategy overturned the conventional wisdom that high technology should be restricted to high-​end products and segments, and interrupted the conventional game in which established global competitors maximize their profits along the product life cycle by only slowly migrating new technology from high-​priced segments toward the mass market. Its customers now include a wide range of Chinese companies, such as Sina Corporation (which operates Weibo, China’s version of Twitter), and leading overseas IT infrastructure providers such as Dell EMC.

748    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan Second, Chinese competitors began to offer customers variety and customization at low cost, proffering an unmatched choice of products into what used be considered standardized, mass-​market segments. The harbor machinery maker Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery Company (ZPMC), for example, hired 800 design engineers—​ between 20 and 40 times the number of design staff employed by their German and Italian competitors. This massive engineering resource allowed ZPMC to offer a far wider product range than its European rivals, and the capacity to customize its equipment to the particular requirements of any port operator’s site and cargo mix—​all at a similar price to standardized machinery. Again, this challenged the accepted wisdom that customers who want variety and customization have to pay a hefty price premium. Chinese companies are able to pursue this strategy because their enormous domestic market allows them to spread the costs of manufacturing a large number of product variants, helped by the availability of a large supply of low-​cost engineers with the basic training sufficient to customize products. Third, the emerging Chinese competitors began to reposition niche products into the mass market, challenging the conventional wisdom of niche-​focused strategies. Using their low costs to reduce the break-​even point for setting up and launching a new product, they offered specialty products at dramatically lower prices, attempting to unlock latent demand and turn former niche markets into volume businesses. Where they succeeded, the bases of competition shifted toward volume and cost—​a game multinationals were often ill-​equipped to play. The consumer appliance maker Haier, for example, transformed the market for wine-​storage refrigerators from the preserve of a few wine connoisseurs into a mainstream category sold through America’s Sam’s Club (a subsidiary of Wal-​Mart) at less than half the previously prevailing price. As a result, Haier has grabbed a 60% market share by value, leaving yesterday’s niche players floundering. Competition from this new business model challenged the notion that specialty products must forever remain low-​volume and high-​priced. Building on this base, accelerated innovation and disruptive strategies have begun to emerge among leading Chinese companies in recent years (Wan, Williamson, & Yin, 2015; Williamson & Yin, 2014). Chinese companies opened up a new front in global competition by re-​engineering research and development (R&D) and innovation processes to make new product development dramatically faster and less costly. This new emphasis is unlikely to generate stunning technological breakthroughs, but it allows Chinese competitors to reduce the time it takes to bring innovative products and services to mainstream markets. It also represents a different way of deploying Chinese cost and volume advantages in global competition. Silicon Valley and other technology hotbeds may be able to match the speed of Chinese innovation in particular sectors such as electronics and Internet-​based services. However, what’s distinctive about the strongest Chinese competitors is their capability to combine accelerated innovation with rapid scale-​up to high volume at low cost, and to apply these techniques across a wide variety of traditional industries. Accelerated innovation has been deployed in Chinese industries ranging from pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and information technology to medical and industrial equipment,

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    749 consumer electronics, and e-​business. Although it may not impact companies that are consistently able to deliver breakthrough innovations, it presents real threats and opportunities to many mainstream competitors. The first way accelerated innovation is achieved is by industrializing the innovation process. This involves adopting an “assembly-​line” approach analogous to that used in manufacturing. WuXi AppTec, a pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, and medical-​ device outsourcing company with operations in both China and the United States, is a good example of a firm that has embraced this industrialized approach to new product development. Rather than relying on a small team working in the laboratory with a few machines, the company began by dividing the R&D process into a series of eight steps, with dozens of people assigned to each step. This highly industrialized approach has enabled WuXi AppTec to complete projects two to five times faster than comparable projects using conventional approaches that the company benchmarked in the United States. The second way Chinese firms have accelerated innovation involves pushing the boundaries of simultaneous engineering by borrowing not from the concept of assembly lines used in manufacturing but from the idea of “parallel processing” commonly used in supercomputers. Consider Lenovo Group Ltd., which acquired IBM’s personal computer business in 2005 and is headquartered in Beijing and Morrisville, North Carolina. In 2005, its new product development cycle was 12 to 18 months. Since then, Lenovo has managed to cut the cycle in half by applying simultaneous engineering across the entire innovation process, beginning in R&D and continuing through design, manufacturing engineering, quality control, procurement, marketing, and service. For every project, team members work on different elements in parallel, under the supervision of one leader (Wan et al., 2015). The third route adopted by Chinese firms to accelerate innovation is by modularizing product development. In mobile handsets, starting as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or a distribution channel for leading brands, Chinese companies such as Tianyu Longtong and Jinli Group, among others, have captured a high share of the mid-​ and lower-​tier markets by breaking down the design process into separable modules, so that the re-​design focuses on only one attribute at a time. By limiting the re-​design to small increments in one aspect of the functionality, rather than waiting until they have a model that is more completely new, successive upgrades and new models of cheaper me-​ too phones with added features can be released into the market every few weeks. The final way of accelerating innovation is by adopting structures that enable pragmatic, rapid decision-​making throughout the innovation process. The traditional decision-​making processes that have become embedded in many global corporations understandably reflect the demands of the mature markets for which they were developed. In these markets legacy customers are often cautious, while regulatory constraints and risk aversion all militate against the launch of new products or business models until these have been thoroughly researched and tested. In many Chinese firms, however, a single, senior individual often oversees the entire innovation process and his or her word was proverbial “law.” Such dependence on

750    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan the judgment of a single executive increases the risk that innovation efforts end up moving in a completely unproductive direction. But this hierarchical structure and decision-​making do speed up the process of initiating, developing, and launching innovations. Chinese firms have also combined this with extreme horizontal flexibility between functions in the organization and resource fluidity so that a multifunctional team can be assembled at short notice to get a mandated innovation project up and running quickly. While cost innovation and accelerated innovation are unlikely to generate radical technological breakthroughs, today Chinese firms have started to invest heavily in cutting-​edge technologies and increasing value-​added products. BoyaLife, for example, has operations spanning stem cell techniques, regenerative medicine, genetic testing, health care management, and diagnostic sensing. It has the largest and the most automated stem cell bank in the world and a cloning facility capable of producing 100,000 cattle embryos a year, with plans to increase this to 1  million animals per annum (Financial Times, 2015). Chinese firms are also getting serious about the robot revolution (sometimes termed “manufacturing 4.0”) in response to the country’s shrinking working-​age population and rising labor costs. Japanese robot makers still have the lion’s share of the market, with about 60%, but Chinese suppliers are growing fast, with about a quarter of the market (Reuters, 2017). Leading Chinese robot makers include JD.com (an e-​commerce firm that also designs robots for automated warehouses and autonomous deliveries), E-​Deoar, and Midea.

Filling Capability Gaps Through Partnerships and Overseas M&A Chinese firms are filling capability gaps through partnerships and joint ventures with established multinationals. The Chinese government has utilized inward foreign investment as a key tool for promoting domestic technological capability. An important mechanism has been to encourage partnerships and joint ventures with multinationals as a way to transfer competencies and knowledge to domestic firms (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Collinson & Narula, 2014). Galanz, which is now the world’s largest manufacturer of microwave ovens, illustrates the successful application of this strategy. Originally Galanz wanted to build its own brand in the international market but failed to do so. The company then established partnerships with many different international brands (as many as 250) to produce microwaves for them. As it grew into a dominant manufacturer with its increasing bargaining power, it was able to print the label “made by Galanz” on all the microwaves it produces. Clearly, this strategy has enabled the company to fill capability gaps and built up its own strong international brand. Many partnerships and joint ventures also involve the licensing of foreign technology, which has enabled Chinese firms to acquire knowledge of considerable competitive value. In fact, the hand of government policy can be seen here in that a willingness to

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    751 provide Chinese firms with access to technology has often been a condition of permitting foreign firms to establish in China. A high-​profile example is Huawei, which provides an example of how the joint venture approach strengthened a Chinese company’s international competitive capabilities. Established in 1987, Huawei is now the world’s largest telecom equipment maker with headquarter in Shenzhen, China. The company has entered into a number of joint ventures. For example, in March 2003, Huawei and 3Com Corporation formed a joint venture company, 3Com-​Huawei (H3C), which focused on the R&D, production, and sales of data networking products. In 2005, Huawei began a joint venture with Siemens, called TD Tech, for developing mobile communication technology products. In 2006, Huawei established a joint R&D center with Motorola to develop UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service) technologies. The formation of a partnership or joint venture with a foreign partner ties a Chinese firm more closely to the internal network of that partner, and offers a more effective channel for the transfer of tacit knowledge to the Chinese partner. Another way to fill capability gaps has been through overseas M&A. In 2000, shortly before acceding to the World Trade Organization, the Chinese government announced a “Go Global” policy that encouraged local companies to make acquisitions abroad. The number and value of international acquisitions by Chinese firms has grown markedly since then reaching $229 billion in 2016 (pwc, 2017). Lenovo provides an early example of foreign acquisition aimed at capturing proprietary technology, know-​how, and a brand. In December 2004, Levono announced to acquire IBM’s PC division for US$1.75 billion, allowing it to use the IBM brand for five years and also enabling it to acquire IBM’s laptop production lines, product developers, and distribution networks. The president of Lenovo, Chuanzhi Liu, clearly stated that this move was intended to make it possible for his company to challenge Dell and HP not only in the Chinese market but also in global markets. An increasing number of Chinese firms are making overseas acquisitions to gain access to technology, to secure research and development skills, and to acquire international brands. Zhejiang Geely Holding Group, for example, acquired Volvo Cars from Ford Motor Company for $1.8 billion in 2010. Volvo sold over 500,000 cars in 2016, up from 350,000 at the time of the acquisition, and moved from losses to make profits of $1.24 billion. In June 2017 ChemChina completed the $43 billion acquisition of Syngenta, the Swiss company that is a world leader in agricultural chemicals and patented seed technologies.

Moving Up to Higher Value-​added in Global Value Chains In the initial development of most global value chains (GVCs), “lead” firms monopolize high rent activities such as design, distribution, and marketing while outsourcing low value-​added, low-​return functions such as assembly and basic manufacturing to firms from developing countries (Azmeh & Nadvi, 2014; Gereffi, 1999; Kaplinsky, 2005). As Chinese firms have moved rapidly down the learning curve, propelled by cost innovation and accelerated innovation, as well as filling capability gaps through partnerships

752    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan and overseas M&A, they have been able to extend their value-​adding activities far beyond basic volume manufacturing. As a result, many Chinese firms, which were initially integrated as minor subcontractors in GVC coordinated by “Western” lead firms, have now migrated to controlling higher-​value-​added activities. In some cases, they are now taking on significant chain coordination functions in their own right, becoming “co-​ leads” in the GVC (Azmeh & Nadvi, 2014; Su, 2013). Beijing Orient Electronic Technology (BOE), which is a Chinese state-​ owned manufacturing company formed in 1993, is now a leading firm in the TFT (thin film transistor)-​LCD (liquid crystal displays) industry. In the mid-​1990s, BOE was a supplier of CRT (cathode ray tube) displays to leading firms in Japan and Taiwan, leveraging their cost advantage. Since 1998, the company has embarked on a strategy of moving up the value chain by investing in next-​generation technology, TFT-​LCD, which was dominated by Japanese and Korean firms such as Sony and Samsung. The breakthrough only came when BOE acquired a Korean firm, HYNIX, which was on the edge of bankruptcy because of the Korean financial crisis in 1997. In January 2003, BOE completed the acquisition of HYNIX, including its design and R&D teams, as well as the global distribution network at a cost of US$350 million. After absorbing the technology from HYNIX and investing heavily in R&D, BOE established the fifth generation of TFT-​LCD production line in 2005, which was the first in China. According to the Global Innovation Index in 2016 by WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization), BOE ranked number 8 in the TFT-​LCD industry with 1673 patents. As a result, it is has now become a key supplier of this high-​value component in the global value chains for appliances, including appliances and television sets, computer monitors, mobile phones, navigation systems, and projectors. Some other Chinese companies have taken overall control of their global value chains through acquisitions. Examples include Haier’s purchase of General Electric’s global appliances business for $5.4 billion in 2016 and ChemChina’s US$43 billion takeover of the Swiss agri-​tech company Syngenta in 2017.

Exploiting Local Advantages in New Ways It has long been recognized in the field of international business that country-​specific advantages (CSAs) play a role underpinning the competitive advantages of individual firms (Dunning, 1988; Rugman & Collinson, 2009). Potential CSAs include not only Ricardian type endowments—​such as land, labor, capital—​but also aspects of the legal and commercial environment in which the firm is based, such as market structure, government legislation, and policies (Dunning, 1980). Researchers have, however, recognized that some CSAs are not freely and fully available to all firms operating in the same location (Crilly, Ni, & Jiang, 2016; Hennart, 2009, 2012; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Porter, 1990; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & Nachum, 2011; Zhou & Guillen, 2014). The profits from innovations may accrue to the firms which have access to certain strategic CSAs (such as distribution network) rather than to the innovators (Hennart, 2009).

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    753 Local Chinese firms may have better access to some CSAs than multinationals at home for three reasons. First, some domestic firms will enjoy better access to CSAs at home because they have greater stocks of experiential and context-​dependent, complementary local knowledge. Second, some domestic firms will be more capable of accessing CSAs at home because of a closer relationship with the related and supporting industries and the local government. Third, some domestic firms will be more capable than multinationals from advanced economies in accessing CSAs at home because of their home-​focused strategies, while multinationals from advanced economies tend to pursue HQ-​imposed strategies that ignore or reduce their ability to access local CSAs. This is a negative side effect of their understandable need to exploit ownership advantages transferred from overseas. Consider Yonyou, a Chinese management software supplier that has surpassed SAP and Oracle to become the leading company in the management software industry in China. In terms of technology, SAP and Oracle are still better than Yonyou as they dominate the global market. The reason Yonyou became the number 1 company in Chinese market is mainly because of its better access to local CSAs. First, Yonyou has established a much wider distribution network than SAP and Oracle in China, enabling it to better tap into the Chinese demand conditions. Multinationals often have less ability to create a distribution network that is effective in unlocking demand. In some cases this is because multinationals are prohibited from establishing a local distribution network (Hennart, 2009). Even when their involvement in distribution is permitted, building an effective network can be a difficult and lengthy process, especially where local customers have already formed strong bonds with existing local distributers. Second, Yonyou has optimized its management software to meet the specific needs of Chinese customers (a demand condition). Because of the integrated nature of management software, optimizing for local customers can be a difficult and resource-​intensive task for multinationals. Last but not the least, as an “insider” Yonyou has been able to build close relationships with related and supporting industries and local government that have helped support the expansion of business. When local Chinese companies such as Yonyou are better able to access and exploit the potential CSAs available in China because of regulation or complementary capabilities, they are better able to compensate for the otherwise superior technology or brands enjoyed by multinationals and hence become stronger competitors.

The Evolution of Multinationals’ Strategies in China Arguably the most influential framework for characterizing and shaping the strategies of multinationals has been the “integration-​responsiveness” model (Bartlett & Ghoshal,

754    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). This work emphasizes the trade-​off between global integration and local adaptation. On one hand, multinationals seek to take advantage of economies of scale and scope by standardizing products and processes. This moves them toward a centrally driven, common “global strategy.” On the other hand, multinationals are under pressure from local customers and competitors to become more locally relevant by adapting to local conditions, pursuing a “multi-​domestic strategy.” Ideally, multinationals can move toward a “transnational strategy” that takes advantage of both economies of scale and local adaptation possibilities (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). This provides a useful framework to understand the evolution of multinationals’ strategies in China.

Establishing a Beachhead in the Premium Segment Multinationals generally adopted a global strategy in the early stage of doing business in China, and entered the market through the high-​end segment, seeking to leverage superior technology and international brands. This allowed multinationals to maximize global economies of scale by bringing the products designed for advanced markets into the Chinese market (Brandt & Thun, 2010). However, this strategy has several limitations. First, it has the unintended side effect of locking a firm into a high-​end segment of a market because the firm is seeking to limit the extent of adaptation. The product may be more sophisticated and of higher quality than the “good enough” market in a developing economy such as China demands. Second, it often forces multinationals to use components from global suppliers because only these components will meet the exacting specifications required by the designs, limiting the potential for cost-​effective local sourcing. Third, the location and global orientation of R&D and design activities at headquarters reinforces the bias against fully adapting to the specific needs and preferences of Chinese customers. As a result, it is often very difficult for multinationals pursuing a global strategy to match the cost-​performance standards offered by local competitors in the mass market. This leaves them constrained to competing at the top of the market, but in many cases this premium segment has proved too small to support the high fixed costs of operating as a foreign company in China. Taking the example of the wheel loader market in the construction equipment sector, there are five segments of the market:  (1) world-​class; (2)  premium; (3)  heavy construction/​ mining; (4) general construction; and (5) low-​end. Multinationals dominate the world-​ class segment, but that segment is small with units in the hundreds. In the premium segment, multinationals compete aggressively with the most capable of the Chinese manufacturers (such as Liugong, Longgong, Xiagong, and Lingong) and the volumes are still relatively low—​in the thousands of units. Chinese manufacturers, however, dominate the two mid-​market segments—​heavy construction/​mining and general construction—​and the low-​end segment, where the combined sales are more than 100,000 units (Brandt & Thun, 2010).

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    755

Competing for the Massive Mid-​market Facing the problem of being constrained to the subscale, premium segment, many multinationals have had to try to find ways to match the common price points in the Chinese mass market. The first solution is to use local suppliers to lower costs through outsourcing. Take the example of the manufacture of braking systems. As is quite common in a global value chain, the Tier 1 global suppliers became tutors to the Tier 2 Chinese suppliers, often providing them with designs, tooling, and skilled engineers to oversee the production process (Brandt & Thun, 2010). The extent to which Tier 1 global suppliers outsourced the components for a particular product depended on the balance of low cost and quality demanded by the multinationals, as well as their desire to preserve its technical advantage. Although multinationals have been able to lower their cost to some extent by using local suppliers, it is still difficult for them to compete with Chinese firms in the massive mid-​market because their products are over-​engineered relative to the demands of the local market. The second solution that multinationals have adopted is to re-​engineer products and create “Chinese versions” of their brands, both to lower the cost and to better appeal to local customers. To achieve this, increasing numbers of multinationals have established R&D centers in China—​there were more than 1500 foreign R&D centers in China in 2015, and each year more are being set up there than in any other country in the world (Yip & McKern, 2016). Philips provides a good example of such an approach. Seeing a need for a portable light source for use in China’s small, crowded homes and college dormitories, its China R&D center developed an LED lighting device that can distribute light all over a plastic panel the size of the page of a book. Light is shed nowhere else and hence doesn’t disturb other family members or roommates. In addition, being rechargeable, this portable light is useful in the many rural areas with irregular electricity supply. A third solution adopted by multinationals is to acquire (or invest in) a Chinese company. The Chinese companies are highly skilled at designing products that are easy to produce, easy to maintain, and easy to repair (Brandt & Thun, 2010). Acquiring a Chinese firm can also provide access to products that are designed for the domestic market, a lower cost structure, and a well-​developed network of domestic suppliers. It is often easier for multinationals to enhance the capabilities of a low-​cost domestic manufacturing operation they acquire than it is to dramatically pare back a high-​cost foreign operation. This is because dramatic improvements in the cost-​competitiveness of an existing operation are impeded by the difficulties of changing legacy processes and attitudes and the fact that products often need to be completely re-​designed. When they acquire a Chinese company, the initial emphasis of most multinationals is to improve the quality of products and processes within the acquired assembly plant by introducing lean manufacturing techniques and new process controls and providing engineering support to make product improvements without significantly increasing costs. Multinationals also try to upgrade the capabilities of suppliers to the acquired Chinese plant. For example, a leading multinational acquired a Chinese wheel loader

756    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan firm which has a supplier in Zhejiang. The defect rate of goods returned under warranty of the Zhejiang supplier amounted to 3.6% of the total value of purchases in 2005. By 2008 this number was reduced to 1.6% with the help of the leading multinational (Brandt & Thun, 2010). Managing a local Chinese supplier, however, is not always an easy task. As we mentioned above, in 2014 investigative reporters found that a supplier had sent out-​ of-​date meat to KFC outlets in China which severely damaged the brand of KFC in China. Yum, like other foreign restaurant groups, had hitherto benefited from Chinese consumers’ assumption that its quality controls were higher than those of local rivals, an advantage it seems to have squandered. Some other solutions multinationals have used to improve their competitiveness in China include hiring more local staff to progressively replace expatriates; expanding their distribution to reach a broader geography; and developing “flanking brands” to help reach lower-​end customer segments without compromising the standing of their main brand (Park Ungson, & Cosgrove, 2015). In summary, as multinationals have sought to develop their businesses in China they have increasingly moved from global strategies toward local adaptation including localizing product development and design, marketing, staff, and their supply chains, and by acquisitions of domestic companies in a quest to grow by winning share against Chinese competitors in the massive mid-​market. In some industries regarded as “strategic” by the Chinese government, such as the manufacture of automobiles, foreign players have been required to participate in 50:50 joint ventures with Chinese companies as a pre-​condition to entering the market. In practice, this has meant sharing technology with their local partners. As a result in the car market, Chinese companies, many of which operate wholly owned subsidiaries producing local brands while simultaneously participating in a joint venture with a foreign player, captured 41% market share in 2016 (Demandt, 2017). Volkswagen (VW Group), however, remained the number one brand in 2016, largely through its joint ventures with First Auto Works (FAW) and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). VW Group made 49% of its worldwide pre-​tax profits in China in 2016, while the Chinese market contributed 24% of the global pre-​tax profits of General Motors (Clover, 2017). The constraint to form joint ventures, therefore, has not necessarily prevented foreign companies from earning good returns on their investments in China. In other industries that the government regards as strategic, such as banking, policy restrictions have largely prevented foreign companies from accessing the mainstream market in China. As of 2017 foreign banks held just 1.5% of total bank credit outstanding in China. Slowly, however, this may be changing. In November 2017, for example, China announced that it would ease some of the restrictions, eliminating the current restriction of 25% on foreign ownership in banks and raising the limit on foreign ownership in insurance companies, securities firms, fund managers, and futures companies to 51% (Bradsher, 2017).

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    757

Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of Local Chinese Companies Versus Multinationals It is clear from the foregoing discussion that local Chinese companies and multinationals have different strengths and weaknesses in the Chinese market. Local Chinese companies have developed non-​traditional FSAs such as cost innovation and accelerated innovation, and even have started to invest in developing value-​added products. They have also tried to fill capability gaps through partnerships and M&A. Local competitors are often more capable in accessing strategic CSAs (such as dispersed local demand through an extensive distribution network or the potential of a large and deep local supply base) than multinationals because they have greater stocks of complementary local knowledge, a closer relationship with the related and supporting industries and the local government, and home-​focused strategies. Multinationals from richer countries have an advantage in brands, proprietary technologies, and cutting-​edge innovation. As multinationals are linked with two dynamic ties—​the one internal to the multinational and the one operating within the local environment (Nachum & Keeble, 2003), they also can benefit from the opportunity to learn from other markets and access to international R&D. Multinationals therefore have established a beachhead in many premium segments. In recent years they have also tried to compete in the massive mid-​market by local outsourcing, re-​engineering their products, and acquiring local Chinese companies. Chinese companies also face significant weaknesses:  obviously, most are still behind on cutting-​edge technology and in some industries their brands are still weaker than foreign ones, although in some industries local consumers prefer Chinese brands (Hofer & Ebel, 2007: 16). The literature on quality ladders suggests that multinationals from richer countries produce the highest quality and enjoy the highest profits, while local firms from poorer countries manufacture lower-​quality, less expensive versions of the same products (Brandt & Thun, 2016). It is possible for local Chinese firms to move up the ladder if the rungs are complete from the very low, middle, to premium. However, the Chinese companies often have difficulty moving upmarket where the segments are polarized between very low end and premium, with a gap in between (because that means they need to “jump,” which is difficult). For multinationals, their weaknesses stem mainly from the fact that they still can’t access local CSAs (such as distribution networks and government relationships) as fully as local Chinese companies because of less local knowledge and outsidership, nor are they as willing to adapt their strategies sufficiently to access these advantages for fear of losing their advantages. That means it is still hard to compete in the mass market in China for many of these companies.

758    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan China is more open to multinationals than ever before—​Chinese authorities are considering revising guidance for entry to the market, cutting the number of restricted industries further from 93 to 62 (ChinaDaily, 2017). In general multinationals no longer need enter into a joint venture if they don’t want to do so. However, multinationals are losing ground to local companies in industries as diverse as Internet retailing, “bricks and mortar” retail, consumer appliances, and packaged food (Santos & Williamson, 2015). More generally, it is increasingly difficult for multinationals to compete with local Chinese firms only by adapting the formula they perfected at home because globalization now enables local champions to fill gaps in their knowledge and capabilities by accessing technology and expertise from abroad (Santos & Williamson, 2015).

How Can Multinationals Grasp the Real Opportunities in China? Given the increasingly powerful competition from local Chinese players, there are three things multinationals need to do to grasp the opportunities in China. First, they need to learn new capabilities from China such as cost innovation and accelerated innovation. One way to do this might be to acquire a Chinese company, but then the buyer has to be willing to learn from it rather than to try to change and dominate it. This has proven to be extremely difficult for most acquirers from advanced economies which seem intent on applying cutting-​edge technologies, superior brands, and global processes which can undermine the competitiveness of the acquired company, particularly in China’s mass market. Second is the need to move beyond “local adaptation” to “local integration.” This means repositioning their products, marketing, and distribution to become an integral part of the life of local communities; integrating with local supplier networks through co-​investment and open innovation; and engaging with governments and regulators to shape the institutional environment. This will open up the opportunity to better access the local CSAs. But it also requires new capabilities (complementary capabilities to access the CSAs) which can only be developed through years of doing business in the local environment. It will also require the headquarters of multinationals to adapt. Without going back to a multi-​domestic world where powerful country managers have virtual autonomy that’s bounded only by financial controls, the depth of capabilities in the Chinese subsidiaries of multinationals and the caliber and autonomy of country head will need to increase. Exceptions will need to be made to formerly company-​wide processes. Instead of pushing from the center, multinationals will need to allow local management to pull the technologies, processes, capabilities, and brands they need from their global networks if they are to succeed in China (Santos & Williamson, 2015). They may be willing to make these necessary changes to become fully locally integrated, given the huge size of the Chinese market.

Opportunities for Multinationals in China    759 Third, they could try to form a new type of partnership with a Chinese company. Instead of the Chinese partner just doing local things like distribution and government relations, this would need to be an equal partnership where both parties were fully involved in everything from strategy to product development as well as operations and marketing to achieve the right symbiosis between the different strengths of the Chinese and multinational partners. Does this mean China requires a new approach to international business? The answer is, at least in some ways, “yes.” China is unusual among emerging markets and those like Japan and Korea that developed globally competitive companies in the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike most emerging economies, China attracted massive foreign investment at a relatively early stage in its development cycle. Effectively prohibited before 1978, FDI grew during the 1980s and then soared starting in the early 1990s. By 1994 FDI inflows were equivalent to nearly 75% of the amount flowing into the USA, the world’s largest destination for FDI (McGrattan, 2016). This resulted in a huge flow technology and know-​how into the country to which Chinese firms were exposed by acting as suppliers to multinationals, hiring staff trained by foreign firms, and through direct observation. This knowledge spillover was reinforced by the formation of GVCs in which many Chinese firms were active participants. GVCs provided opportunities for Chinese companies to learn from more advanced players in the chain who often had strong incentives to help improve the capabilities of Chinese suppliers in order to gain quality inputs at low cost. Moreover, China was developing at a time when the world economy was already quite globalized, so that the knowledge embodied in equipment, and available through hiring global talent and purchasing global services, was much more accessible to Chinese companies compared with their counterparts from countries such as Japan and Korea that had developed in earlier decades. Together these factors meant that the technological and knowledge gaps between Chinese and advanced multinationals had been reduced, and in many cases eliminated, much more rapidly than has been the case for most other emerging economies. At the same time, as we have already discussed, the Chinese market and economic environment provided potentially powerful CSAs that Chinese companies were able to access. As we have seen, this has enabled Chinese companies to develop their own, distinctive competitive advantages. These distinctive characteristics of China and its economic emergence mean that the usual assumption in international business that multinationals continue to be uniquely favored as the mechanism for transferring superior technology and know-​how into the country no longer necessarily holds. Truly proprietary technologies and competitive advantages will, of course, continue to offer multinationals the potential to succeed. But in China, multinationals cannot assume that their existing technologies, products, and processes will offer superior value to Chinese consumers compared with alternatives offered by local players, contrary to what might be the case in many other emerging economies. In sum, there are real opportunities for multinationals in China, but they will not be grasped simply by an attempt to access the huge potential of Chinese demand using existing products, processes, and strategies. Today market share in China must be wrested

760    Peter J. Williamson and Feng Wan from increasingly powerful Chinese competitors with home-​team advantages and access to global technologies, knowledge, and resources. To succeed multinationals will need to make the long-​term investments and changes in their strategies and operating procedures necessary to become fully integrated into what soon will become the largest economy on earth.

Notes 1. It is generally agreed that some of these “foreign” firms are actually Chinese companies whose investment is funded by so-​called round-​tripping of funds transferred out of China through Hong Kong or various tax havens and invested back into China, classified as foreign direct investment (FDI). The magnitude of this round-​tripping is difficult to estimate, but the total stock of such disguised investment has been put at around US$160 billion by 2015 (Garcia-​Herrero, Xia, & Casanova, 2015). Such investments, however, are concentrated in relatively few large firms, so most of the nearly 500,000 foreign firms in China have bona fide overseas parents. 2. See Fetscherin et al. (2010) for an extended literature review on FDI to China.

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Chapter 32

Managing in E me rg i ng M ark ets in Ce nt ra l a nd Eastern Eu rope Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass

In the early 21st century, the questions of what the CEE region can offer for foreign investors in terms of locational advantages and how its MNEs construct their competitiveness strategies continue to be of utmost importance for experts and business practitioners following the constant evolution of the world economy and changes in the international division of labor. However, this unchanged importance is reflected less in the volume of literature devoted to the region. While it attracted considerable attention of researchers in the 1990s when transition to the market economy started and unfolded, this interest has faded away gradually, especially when the majority of these countries became members of the European Union (EU). Since then they are considered, rightly or wrongly, developed economies, having successfully completed their transition, although, as we will refer to it, the capitalism embraced by these countries carries on the effects of the centrally planned economy. This in turn has major implications for the strategies that business enterprises locating their activities in the region have to follow in order to maximize the benefits of those activities. CEE is not a subset of the Western European market but a different market with its own characteristics. Another factor shifting the focus of attention away from the region from a research point of view is the emergence of a group of much larger countries, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), and especially China, which attracts significantly more global strategic interest from MNEs than CEE. We should not forget the enormous size difference between BRICS and CEE. In 2015, the former accounted for 42% of world population, while the latter for only 1.7% (according to official data in the UNCTAD database). In terms of GDP, the difference was smaller but still sizable: BRICS accounted for more than 22% of the world total, while CEE countries only for 1.8%. From these

764    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass numbers it can be deducted that, on average, CEE countries have almost twice as high income per capita as BRICS (their share in world population is almost the same as their share in world GDP (gross domestic product), while in the BRICS, the share in world population is almost twice as high as in world GDP). In this comparison, CEE countries are thus double handicapped: they are not only much smaller but also more expensive locations; therefore they cannot produce goods and services on a scale and at a cost level similar to East Asia, and thus, need to move their specialization to at least middle value-​added products in which smaller scales and slightly higher costs are accepted and counterbalanced by stable quality, or offer other benefits such as geographical proximity and nearshoring, coupled by logistical advantages (see also below), should they wish to succeed in international competition.

Multinationals and Economies in Transition: Overall Considerations This chapter analyzes the situation of two types of “transition” economies in CEE: those 11 countries that have become members of the EU and the 7 Western Balkan economies that are at different stages of EU accession. It does not deal with the former Soviet Union, which shows quite different characteristics in terms of MNE strategies and inward and outward FDI. In particular, Russia is more appropriately seen as part of a different category, the above-​mentioned BRICS group encompassing the largest of emerging economies. The countries and economies of the CEE defined in this chapter show many common characteristics, including the relatively small size of economies (with the exception of Poland), and their openness, related to their geography in the crossroads of various key routes on the European continent. These two factors make them naturally open to international transactions, including trade and investment. It also makes natural that global firms can use this small region for specific segments of their value chains, and very rarely for core activities. In other words, it is misleading to compare CEE with large regions that have a more complete offer of resources endowments and market size. In turn, it is a very appropriate place for “nearshoring” activities, when production sites have to be kept close to European headquarters but at locations with some cost and efficiency advantages. This specialization at the same time restricts the scope of activities that these countries can attract, as “nearshoring” applies mostly to middle or higher value-​added products and services, but rarely low value-​added ones with limited strategic value for the parent firm. In the latter category, the size and the cost advantage of other locations, especially in Asia, remains overwhelming. In other words, these locations are in a delicate position within a game that can be called “flying geese” applied to Europe (cf. Kalotay, 2004), in which they are sandwiched between the high value added of Western Europe and the low value added of global competition, from which they can move upward if the geese are flying to the right direction but can also fall back to a position in which competition is almost impossible to match.

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    765 Despite this natural inclination to openness, the historical path of these economies included episodes of strict “closedness,” especially during the decades of centrally planned economy. The heritage of that period still looms large over society, and on the business sector (through phenomena like underdeveloped business culture, problems of customer orientation, reliance on government, corruption). Once communism fell, these economies became interesting “laboratories” (Meyer & Peng, 2005, 2016) for transition to market economies. It has to be stressed here that it is very misleading to think of CEE as a single bloc, despite its small size. In reality, it is a fragmented region, in which different countries engaged in different paths to a market economy (Farkas, 2017). However, a relatively common feature was their reliance on inward FDI (perhaps with the exception of Slovenia) and a relatively late start and small size of outward FDI. This was naturally related to the historical heritage of these countries: they needed inward FDI to fill the gap created with the lack of entrepreneurship in the centrally planned period, while local firms proved to be relatively weak in engaging in international expansion; and if they invested abroad, it tended to focus on a relatively small number of neighboring countries. EU integration has been another important characteristic of these countries, resulting in a degree of regulatory harmonization between countries. In particular, countries that have acceded to the EU, have adopted the acquis communautaire—​the accumulated body of all kinds of legislation, legal acts, and court decisions constituting the law of the EU—​and are part of the customs union, showing some convergence of policies and locational advantages. The analysis of the transition process and later developments in CEE countries contributed in many ways to contemporary business and economics research, in the form of a strand of international business studies focusing on the region’s specificities (such as, e.g., Artisien, Rojec, & Svetličič, 1993; Lankes & Venables, 1996; ; Meyer & Estrin, 2007; Peng, 2000; Peng & Meyer, 2005) and major studies on the “economics of transition” (such as, e.g., Åslund, 2007; Bartlett, 2008; Blanchard, 1997; Csaba, 2005; Kornai, 1990, 2006; Lavigne, 1995, 2000; Roland, 2000, 2012). As already mentioned, the CEE provided a “laboratory” for analyzing business and economic theories in the era and location of radical societal and economic change. It provided a ground for testing the validity of contemporary theories and enriching them with more details. The contribution of CEE analysis was especially important in the area of the influence of institutions on economic transition, economic growth and development, and international business (see Berkowitz & Roland, 2007; Gelbuda, Meyer, & Delios, 2008; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). As Gelbuda et al. noted:  “The economy-​wide institutional changes in CEE countries created challenges for business on multiple levels” (2008: 2). When the transition process started, formal institutions in the CEE countries were deeply reformed, restructured, and changed, and it took considerable time to get the new institutions going, the mandates, structures, and legal background of which were based on developed country examples. The relatively fast “build-​up” of the new formal institutions, their relationship with other formal and informal institutions, their efficiency of functioning, the different speed of changing formal and informal institutions, and

766    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass their impact on business and on the economy provided ample ground for research, including in the area of foreign direct investment. In management, this offered opportunities to analyze the impact of institutional changes on management and decision-​making processes in the companies. It is to be noted that the Great Recession of 2008–​2009 and recent technological changes have forced firms to re-​consider their previous locational strategies in the CEE region. They have resulted in increasing competition with the rest of the world and between CEE countries for gaining or maintaining productive capacities. It also changed the group of winners and losers in the region. It is usually FDI, both inward and outward, as the first proxy used to measure the internationalization of economies. The two phenomena are linked with each other intrinsically, mostly through a mechanism called the investment development path (Dunning & Narula, 2003). According to that theory, both inward and outward FDI are major channels of gaining competitiveness, but their timing differs. Usually lower-​income countries start attracting inward FDI, and then gain expertise in outward FDI. Outward FDI by “own” MNCs can be particularly important because those firms are at the top of the value chain and control the technology. A cautionary note should, however, say that FDI is a very imperfect proxy of the real activities and real impact of multinationals (cf. Antalóczy & Sass, 2015; Lipsey, 2001). There are various reasons why they underestimate the real impact, including the existence of various forms of non-​equity modes of control over the value chain (contract manufacturing, business process outsourcing, licensing, franchising etc.; see UNCTAD, 2011) and various activities of MNEs that at best are registered in other parts of the balance of payments (such as profit repatriation). At the same time, with the financialization of FDI, statistics include a variety of transactions such as transhipment, round-​tripping, corporate inversions, and FDI in offshore financial centers and FDI in special-​purpose vehicles that are not leading to the creation of productive capacities (although there is an attempt to exclude the latter from FDI data and show only the net numbers, with varying success). All these factors have to be taken into consideration when reading the FDI numbers of transition economies. This chapter provides an overview of questions related to inward FDI first, followed by an analysis of the nascent outward FDI of the region, examination of the relationship between these two phenomena, competitiveness and corporate decision-​making, and conclusions.

Inward FDI and Affiliates of Foreign-​ owned Multinationals FDI inflows have played a major role in the transition of CEE countries to market economies, especially against the background of a late developing and weak local

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    767 business sector and a lack of business culture, especially in the early stages of transformation. No wonder that FDI, once having passed the stage of early take-​off and testing new markets, started growing rapidly in CEE. However, it was far from being a linear process, with inward FDI fluctuating at various times and, in general, losing importance in recent times. This latter development will require special attention and explanation. As mentioned above, the inflows in transition economies have undergone various cycles since the beginning of transition. Consistent data series are available for 1992–​ 2016, allowing for conclusions about specific periods in FDI attraction. The first 12 years (1992–​2003) were characterized by a gradual take-​off of inflows. The volumes attracted were small in the initial stage, not exceeding $30 billion per annum, or 5% of world inflows, reflecting the caution of investors, despite obvious first-​mover advantages (Figure 32.1, and see Annex Table 32.1 for country-​by-​country details). However, in terms of the economic role of FDI, there was a steady rise, as evidenced by the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). First of all, since 1992, in every single year up to 2016, that ratio of the CEE countries was higher than the world average (see Annex Table 32.2). The regional average was just 5% in 1992, exceeding 20% in 2002, and 30% in 2005, the first year after the first wave of EU accession. In some countries such as Bulgaria and Estonia, high ratios were registered for quite a long period of time. In terms of major recipient countries, Hungary was an early bird, but its share was declining while that of the Czech Republic, and especially Poland, exceeded that of

35

90 80

30

70

25

60 50

20

40

15

30

10

20

5

10

0

19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15 20 16

0

Inflows of the Western Balkans (left scale)

Inflows of new EU members (left scale)

FDI per GFCF (%, right scale)

Share of transition in world (%, right scale)

Figure 32.1  Selected indicators of FDI inflows of transition economies, 1992–​2016 (billions of dollars and percent) Source: The authors, based on numbers from UNCTAQ, FDI/​MNE database (www.unctad.org/​fdistatistics)

768    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass Table 32.1 Selected cases of R&D centers of MNEs in Central and Eastern Europe, 2017 Investing company

Industry of investing company

Home country

Target location

Target country

Tubis AG

Chemicals and plastic

Germany

Sofia

Bulgaria

Johnson Controls

Auto spare parts

United States–​Ireland

Sofia

Bulgaria

Xellia Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceuticals

Denmark

Zagreb

Croatia

RedHat

Software

United States

Brno

Czech Rep.

Honeywell

Engineering and software

United States

Brno, Prague

Czech Rep.

Roper Technologies

Engineering

United States

Ostrava

Czech Rep.

Matsushita Panasonic

Consumer electronics

Japan

Plzeň

Czech Rep.

STMicroelectronics

Electronics and semiconductors

France–​Italy–​ Switzerland

Prague

Czech Rep.

Ricardo

Engineering

United Kingdom

Prague

Czech Rep.

General Electric Aviation Aircraft

United States

Prague

Czech Rep.

Rockwell Automation

Automation solutions

United States

Prague

Czech Rep.

Audi

Carmaker

Germany

Győr

Hungary

Servier

Pharmaceuticals

France

Budapest

Hungary

Robert Bosch

Electronics including auto parts

Germany

Budapest

Hungary

Knorr Bremse

Braking systems for vehicles

Germany

Budapest

Hungary

AVL

Automotive research and development

Austria

Budapest

Hungary

Ericsson

Telecom networks

Sweden

Budapest

Hungary

General Electric

Electronics conglomerate

United States

Budapest

Hungary

ABB

Power machines and automation

Sweden–​ Switzerland

Cracow

Poland

Siemens

Electronics including auto parts

Germany

Łódź

Poland

Bosch

Electronics including auto parts

Germany

Łódź

Poland

Unilever

Chemicals

Netherlands

Poznań

Poland

General Electric

Electronics conglomerate

United States

Warsaw

Poland

Whirlpool

Home appliances

United States

Wroclaw

Poland

Rohde & Schwarz

Electronics

Germany

Bucharest

Romania

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    769 Table 32.1 Continued Investing company

Industry of investing company

Home country

Target location

Target country

Bosch

Electronics including auto parts

Germany

Cluj-​Napoca

Romania

Nokia Networksa

Telecom networks

Finland

Bratislava

Slovakia

Mühlbauer Group

Machinery

Germany

Nitra

Slovakia

Johnson Controls

Auto spare parts

United States–​Ireland

Trenčín

Slovakia

Siemens

Electronics and automation

Germany

Žilina

Slovakia

a 

Up to 2016 this center belonged to French Alcatel-​Lucent.

Source: The authors’ collection, based on firm and press reports

Hungary (Figure 32.2). Moreover, the share of the big three was declining as more and more countries entered the game of FDI attraction. A period of fast expansion of FDI started with the EU accession of eight CEE countries in 2004 (followed by three more later on), which lasted until 2008. With the onset of the crisis, inflows became more hectic and fluctuated at lower levels. The share of the region in world flows fell from around 5% to 3% and below. The last two years (2015 and 2016) were characterized by very low inflows, dragged down, in particular, by negative inflows in Hungary, a former front runner. The turning point was also visible in the FDI to GFCF ratio, which started to decline after 2006, first slowly and then increasingly. Naturally this decline was only partly due to the relative sluggishness of inward FDI; another part was due to a rise in local capital formation. Overall, FDI inflows substantially declined during the crisis and post-​crisis years, and this now seems to be a lasting phenomenon (Hunya, 2015; Kalotay, 2017; and Bartlett and Prica, 2011, focusing South East Europe). Studies on the countries of origin and sectoral composition of FDI usually find that the bulk of inflows of transition economies come from EU member countries, although their share may be overestimated as MNEs from third countries also use their affiliates in the EU to invest in CEE (Kalotay, 2010). Practically all leading developed country multinationals are now present in the region. Over time, the interest of new investors such as Russia (Kalotay, Éltető, Sass, & Weiner, 2016) and China (Éltető & Szunomár, 2016) has increased, although it still remains limited. It also seems that the bulk of inward FDI targeted services, and within manufacturing FDI, there was a major difference between the Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) that attracted sizable projects in the automotive and electronics sectors, and the rest, in which manufacturing in general remained weak. There are, however, recent developments such as the efforts of Serbia to attract assembly (Kragujevac) and supplier activities in the automotive industry, and that of the former Yugoslav Republic

107

7

82

91

106

Montenegro

Serbia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Memorandum item Germany 5

61

7

109

93

62

96

72

58

84

47

64

37

76

68

46

53

31

5

102

96

49

88

77

52

79

60

67

45

71

70

39

47

36

6

100

95

60

78

76

48

79

69

77

57

74

64

41

44

38

33

6

88

95

72

89

81

60

80

71

78

56

62

55

41

45

39

34

4

87

101

67

95

75

63

73

78

76

62

57

52

42

48

46

32

5

 . . . 

94

67

97

77

60

63

75

59

70

54

42

43

41

37

29

4

111

94

70

93

77

63

60

67

53

59

54

44

41

36

31

30

5

107

90

82

80

74

69

68

65

62

56

50

49

36

35

31

30

2011–​2012 2012–​2013 2013–​2014 2014–​2015 2015–​2016 2016–​2017

Source: The authors’ calculations based on data from the World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset, 2007–​2016

85

65

108

57

109

Albania

62

89

46

68

42

76

54

53

44

Croatia

47

74

Romania

Hungary

39

Slovenia

41

79

Bulgaria

94

45

Latvia

The FYR of Macedonia

51

Poland

Slovakia

38

Lithuania

33

33

33

Czech Republic

35

27

Estonia

32

2007–​2008 2008–​2009 2009–​2010 2010–​2011

Economy

Edition of the Global Competitiveness Report

Table 32.2 Global Competitiveness Index ranking of Central and Eastern European economies, 2007–​2017

-​

-​1

1

-​

29

-​17

-​22

26

-​24

12

-​17

29

-​4

15

3

2

-​3

Change in ranking, 2016–​ 2017/​ 2007–​2008

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    771 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

16

15

20

14

20

13

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

08

Hungary

20

07

20

06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

Czech Republic

20

01

20

00

20

99

20

98

19

97

19

96

19

95

19

94

19

93

19

19

19

92

0

Poland

Figure 32.2  Share of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the FDI inflows of transition economies, 1992–​2016 (percent) Source: The authors, based on numbers from UNCTAQ, FDI/​MNE database (www.unctad.org/​fdistatistics)

of Macedonia to attract suppliers in the same industry, that can change that industrial structure in the medium turn. The question of why inward FDI declined and became more volatile after the Great Recession of 2008–​2009 is under-​researched. There are some studies (Filippov & Kalotay, 2011; Schuh, 2012) that attempt to link the apparently decreasing attractiveness of the region to changing strategies by MNEs in response to the global crisis and their attempt toward cost optimization as a response to heightened global competition. Schuh (2012) has also hypothesized that it was a reaction to disappointment about the efficiency of the EU umbrella in terms of safeguarding these economies from the global crisis. The most probable answer to that question is that the crisis coincided with important technological changes in the world economy, usually described in shorthand as the digital economy and Industry 4.0, leading to a general re-​evaluation of global production strategies and global production networks; and in that exercise, CEE was not found as particularly attractive. On the one hand, it was not modern enough to spearhead big technological change; on the other hand, it was not found “cheap” and efficient enough (see the middle-​income trap) to be the production base for remaining labor-​intensive activities. Some studies also argue that policy changes becoming less favorable toward FDI had also played a role. In this respect, it is possible to cite a policy turnaround in Hungary in 2010 and then in Poland in 2015 (see Szanyi, 2016, for Hungary; Zimny, 2015, for Poland; and Drahokoupil and Galgóczi, 2015, and Sass, 2017, for both countries). It has

772    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass been shown how in political rhetoric the distinction between “good” and “bad” FDI has appeared. Here “bad” market-​seeking, horizontal FDI aims at replacing domestic producers or service providers and repatriating profits and thus “not beneficial” for the host economy. At the same time, “good” vertical FDI has resulted in many new jobs and exports and allowed domestic companies to benefit from becoming part of global or European value chains. There is probably a gist of truth in the statement that policy change is not unrelated to negative inward FDI in Hungary in 2015 and 2016, especially based on episodes of the government buying back assets from foreign-​owned infrastructure companies. However, it seems on the one hand that Poland so far has been more exempt from such radical change. Moreover, inward FDI was suffering in countries that remained open and favorable to inbound FDI, such as the Baltic States (Hunya, 2017) and various indices indicate that there have been no significant unfavorable changes in FDI policies and the FDI environment, which are still much more liberalized (with the possible exception of Poland in certain areas) than the OECD average. However, in certain industries, the number of unfavorable and discriminative measures has undoubtedly grown in Hungary (Mihályi, 2015; Sass, 2017; Szanyi, 2016), while vertical, export-​oriented manufacturing FDI still enjoys generous incentives (Sass, 2017). At the level of overall national policies and attitudes toward foreign investors, development strategies have started to diverge between the Visegrád countries, with Hungary and Poland moving toward more tightening of rules on the one hand and the Czech Republic and Slovakia continuing liberalization on the other hand. It is naturally too early to provide a full-​fledged explanation for the emergence of such a difference. Some of the roots of divergence may be found in the long-​term political cultures of these countries (more “rebel” reactions to political developments in Hungary and Poland, and more relaxed, wait-​and-​see approaches in the Czech Republic and Slovakia). However, it is also too premature to forecast if the divergence is going to be temporary or lasting, and even more difficult to tell if eventual future convergence will lead to a return to liberalization in Hungary and Poland, or the “conversion” of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to a more restrictive policy stance. To test the hypothesis of change in the perceived place in global networks, we have to ask first why CEE used to be so attractive in the late 1990s and around EU accession, whether countries have lost these advantages or not, and/​or whether those factors have lost importance or not. These countries are not particularly rich in natural resources, and their existence or lack has played only a minor role in determining inflows. (Perhaps they played some role in say Poland and Serbia, where some measurable resources exist.) The unique opportunity to invest in newly created market economies surely played a role, and as these countries have advanced on the road to a market economy, that sort of frontier feeling may have dissipated by the time the crisis was striking. As for human resources, they have played an important role in attracting efficiency-​seeking projects, which were important for these relatively small economies with relatively low income. However, perceptions have evolved over time: on the one hand, as countries were growing, and wages rose, the original perception of very cheap locations dissipated while investors started to discover the skills base of the region. However, it remains an

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    773 open question, if those skills, looking good on paper, are sufficiently good to attract higher and higher value-​added activities. It may well be that CEE countries indeed started falling into the middle-​income trap—​when countries have exhausted their development potential based on cheap half-​ skilled labor, while the foundations of a knowledge-​based society, needed to move to the next step, are not very solid (Burger, Jindra, Kostevc, Marek, & Rojec, 2015; Kalotay, 2017; Wilinski, 2012)—​especially as they failed to attract high value-​added projects, such as research and development (R&D) on a large scale. Nevertheless, cases exist such as R&D centers set up by multinationals in CEE (Table 32.1). As expected, most of the laboratories are located in relatively developed environments. Of the 30 cases found, 8 were targeting the Czech Republic, the region’s most developed economy in terms of engineering skills (of which 5 were located in the capital city of Prague), followed by 6 cases in Poland (with more dispersion among traditional academic centers such as Cracow and engineering powerhouses such as Łódź and Poznań, and not forgetting the capital city of Warsaw, which occupies both functions). In turn, it is equally notable that almost all Hungarian cases were registered in Budapest. It is also to be added that for the size of the region, the number of R&D centers is very limited. The relatively slow spreading of higher value added activities is somewhat puzzling, as CEE economies undoubtedly enjoy the advantages of a favorable location, close to the large and high-​income Western European market, accessible by ever improving transportation and logistical infrastructure. The relevance of the above list of factors is supported by various empirical studies:  unit labor costs, market size, human capital, proximity, and the quality of institutions were found by empirical analysis to be the major factors for attracting FDI in CEE (see, among others, Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Gauselmann, Knell, & Stephan, 2011; Lankes & Venables, 1996). Estrin and Uvalic (2014) delineate certain differences for the Balkan countries. We have to assume that those factors did not fade away during the crisis. Moreover, EU accession further facilitated the free access to Western markets, and also contributed in many cases to better regulations through the adoption of the EU acquis. That factor also stands unchanged, or even improved. Therefore, when we investigate the reasons of the lull in inward FDI, we have to assume that inflows slowed down despite evident competitive advantages. As for the regulatory environment, the evaluations of most of the countries of CEE are witnessing some improvements, in many countries moving away from the long overhang of bureaucratic regulations. For example, if we look at the evolution of their “Doing Business” performance between 2010 and 2017, for which a consistent dataset is available, all economies reduced their distance from the “frontier,” but at different speeds (Figure 32.3). In general, the Baltic States are coming close to global best practices, followed by Poland and the Czech Republic. A very unusual outlier in this evaluation is the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is showing not only the biggest improvements between 2010 and 2017 but also the highest score in 2017, ahead of Estonia and Latvia. This is related to various limitations of the Doing Business dataset in measuring the real conditions for investing for foreign investors. The most important reason is that despite all efforts, the rankings measure more the formal, declared requirements

774    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass The f.Y.R. of Macedonia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Slovakia Romania Bulgaria Hungary Croatia Serbia Montenegro Albania Kosovo Bosnia and Herzegovina

50

55

60

65 2017

70

75

80

85

2010

Figure 32.3  Distance to frontier scores of Doing Business in CEE economies, 2010 and 2017 (percent of score of “frontier,” best performing economies) Source: The authors, based on World Bank, Doing Business data, various years

than the reality in the field (how local administration applies rules and regulations), and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, that gap is quite important (UNCTAD, 2012). Therefore, there are quite many “stars” of the Doing Business rankings that fail to convince foreign investors. Other reasons for the discrepancy include the fact that Doing Business measures the conditions of an average (mostly local) firm in the capital (or business capital) of the country, and not the conditions for foreign investors located in any part of the country. It is also obvious that companies look at a much broader set of locational determinants, including production factor endowments and costs and local quality of life, than the Doing Business factors. The rest of the dataset on improvements is less surprising, with three EU members—​Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia—​ and one candidate country—​Serbia—​figuring among the top reformers. To that we have to add that in the initial stage, countries were ready to attract projects aggressively, created investment promotion institutions, and provided generous incentives (Antalóczy, Sass, & Szanyi, 2011; Meyer & Jensen, 2004; Rugraff, 2008), sometimes engaging in “incentive wars” (race to the bottom) (Sedmihradsky & Klazar, 2002), especially in certain industries (for example, in the automotive industry; see Jakubiak, Kolesar, Izvorski, & Kurekova, 2008). It is an open question to what degree those strategies were sustainable and to what extent they were efficient. For the latter, empirical evidence is mixed: for example, Beyer (2002) could not find any impact of the incentives on FDI inflows, Jensen and Mallya (2003) found a marginal role in attracting

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    775 FDI projects to the Czech Republic. Sedmihradsky and Klazar (2002) found a negative correlation in that respect, while Jindra (2010) found support for the impact of incentives in the case of East Germany. Bellak, Leibrecht, and Damijan (2009) found an impact of effective tax rates (and infrastructure) on FDI. Another strand of studies analyzed various elements of the regulatory and institutional environment from the point of view of their impact on FDI flows. The evidence here is more straightforward:  institutions undoubtedly matter for attracting FDI—​ though the importance of the various institutions may be different from that point of view. Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004) found that FDI is positively related to the quality of formal institutions, and private ownership of business, banking sector reform, foreign exchange and trade liberalization, and legal development, while other institutional elements are not. Javorcik (2004) found that weak intellectual property rights hinder FDI in high-​technology sectors. Grosse and Trevino (2005) underlined the positive link between the inflow of FDI and institutional variables related to the reduction of uncertainty and costs for investors. According to Doytch and Eren (2012), manufacturing FDI in CEE is promoted by better institutional quality. EU accession added some rules curtailing such incentives competition; however, it was counterbalanced by more regular access to external funding, and most important, access to the large EU market. It is yet another question to what degree the EU has succeeded in providing an umbrella against undesirable developments, both in macroeconomic balances and in policy stability and predictability. It seems that the Great Recession has reduced the excessive optimism of the years following EU enlargement. FDI is of outstanding importance for the CEE countries. FDI has played an important role in their transition process (see among others Lankes & Venables, 1996; Holland, Sass, Benáček, & Gronicki, 2000; Meyer & Peng, 2005; and Kalotay, 2010), as it not only transferred capital to CEE, but facilitated the restructuring and transformation of centrally planned economies into market economies through various channels (accelerating privatization, bringing in management know-​how, etc.). Even in the case of takeovers of existing companies, significant capital has been invested with the aim of improving the competitive position of the companies in question (Antalóczy & Sass, 2001; Estrin & Meyer, 2001). Besides the establishment of completely new capacities and restructuring the existing ones, there were numerous relocations (both offshoring and offshore outsourcing) of capacities from mainly the Western part of Europe with the aim of benefiting from lower wage costs in CEE (Hunya & Sass, 2014). Because of the significant inflow of FDI, by the end of the 1990s, foreign ownership had become dominant in the key manufacturing and service industries of the economies in transition, and among them the Visegrád countries (Bonin, Mizsei, Székely & Wachtel, 1998; Buch, Kokta, & Piazolo, 2003). While FDI undoubtedly played a catalyst role in the transition process, other expectations concerning their positive impact on domestic companies, and thus enhanced competitiveness, growth, and convergence with more developed countries, were realized only in part. Numerous factors play a role in this, such as, for example, overly high expectations, economic policy mistakes, the inability of domestic firms to become partners of local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, and the generally low

776    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass inclination of the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals to team up with local firms (Sass, 2017). Other global economic developments, especially the appearance of mainly Asian competitor countries also played a role (see, e.g., Bohle & Greskovits, 2007; Galgóczi, 2009; Narula & Bellak, 2009). The broader impact of MNEs on CEEs can usually be approached from the point of view of global value chains (GVCs), which go beyond the activities of parent companies and affiliates, and include all business partners (formally independent from MNEs) that participate in the production of final goods or services. For CEEs, which are a relatively small region in global comparison and do not possess overwhelming cost advantages (and if they have possessed some, those tended to erode), this is an essential question. On the one hand, among CEE, EU member countries particularly are highly involved especially in automotive (Pavlínek, Domański, & Guzik, 2009), electronics (Plank & Staritz, 2013), and clothing (Smith, Pickles, Bucek, Pástor, & Begg, 2014) GVCs. On the other hand, as the region is not a key player in any large GVC, it has to find its own niches. Moreover, it has to consider the fact that the benefits of GVCs usually depend on the capacity of host countries to move up the value ladder, and that moving up is far from being guaranteed. On the contrary, business as usual leads to downgrading, as rapid technological changes can make extant productive capacities obsolete very quickly. The experience of CEE in this respect is mixed. Empirical results point to diverse results concerning the upgrading in CEE subsidiaries. Majcen, Radosevic, and Rojec (2009) analyzed first empirically in CEE the relationship between the portfolio of business functions to multinational subsidiaries’ productivity. Their results point to a link between specialization into a narrowly defined production-​oriented mandate and higher productivity levels of subsidiaries operating in CEE. Domański, Guzik, Gwosdz, and Dej (2013) found that there is a continuous functional upgrading process in the automotive subsidiaries in Poland, which has slowed down during the years of the financial crisis. Sass and Szalavetz (2013) analyzed functional upgrading, and they provide case study evidence about upgrading in subsidiaries in the Hungarian automotive and electronics sectors. However, this rarely implied MNE-​wide responsibilities. Thus, it did not have any influence on the subsidiaries’ ability to appropriate increases in local value added. Demeter and Szász (2016) found that together with a prevalence of less competent plants based on low-​cost factors, gradually and in increasing number, highly competent plants have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe. In a more recent study, Burger, Jindra, Marek, and Rojec (2018) found that functional upgrading in upstream and downstream activities does not occur often in CEEs. On the other hand, they show that functional upgrading induces an upward shift of subsidiaries’ value capture and affect positively productivity and employment. The development impact of MNEs normally hinges on the capacity of host countries to forge beneficial linkages with MNEs and to extract spillover effects from them. This is a policy issue because governments and public agencies have to play a major role in fomenting and facilitating a development-​friendly outcome, in cooperation with other stakeholders, especially local and foreign business, their associations, academia,

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    777 and civil society. In other words, an intervention in market forces is required, but in a manner that is beneficial for all stakeholders. The outcome then hinges on various factors, including the policy of the parent MNE, the autonomy and local strategy of the affiliate, the capacities and entrepreneurship of local firms, the economic structure of the host country, and its skills base and educational system, to mention the most salient ones. As far as the local factors are concerned, CEE is a mixed bag, with undoubted advantages of certain skills but not typically strong on entrepreneurship and SME (small medium enterprise) capacities (Szerb, Ács, & Autio, 2013). In contrast to the high expectations concerning the growth impact of FDI, empirical evidence is inconclusive concerning local linkages and spillovers of CEE subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies. Industry studies point to a limited reliance on local supplier firms in the automotive (Pavlínek & Zizalova, 2014) or electronics (Radosevic, 2002) industries. Econometric studies tried to explain the overall limited impact at the macro level. For example, Majcen, Radosevic, and Rojec (2003) found that positive and negative impacts usually simultaneously affect host economies. The interference of these two impacts may eliminate measurable positive effects. Campos and Kinoshita (2002) found that FDI affected economic growth positively and significantly in the period between 1990 and 1998 in transition economies. They explain their results with reference to technology transferred through foreign direct investments. At the same time, Mencinger (2003) found negative correlation between FDI and growth. He explains that privatization incomes were spent on consumption rather than on debt reduction. Iwasaki and Tokunaga (2014) prepared a meta-​analysis of studies analyzing the macroeconomic impacts of FDI in transition economies and found that the effect size and statistical significance of the estimates depend on study conditions (e.g., estimation period, data type, estimator, and type of FDI). Rojec and Knell (2017) showed that recent methodological improvements brought more optimistic results in detecting knowledge spillovers. Jindra and Rojec (2014), in a policy paper, explain that significant misalignment between domestic and foreign technological accumulation impedes broader knowledge diffusion and growth effects from FDI. Using company-​level data, Javorcik (2003), Halpern and Muraközy (2007), and Damijan, Rojec, Majcen, and Knell. (2013) distinguish horizontal and vertical spillovers and found the latter significant. An analysis based on firm-​level data, presented by Gorodnichenko, Švejnar, and Terrell (2014), found that the various channels of FDI spillovers differ in their significance, and that sectors, FDI source and characteristics of the business environment, education of workers, etc., affect the impact of FDI on the host economy. While their local impact in terms of spillovers remained below the expectations, the expansion of foreign multinational companies in CEE impacted upon the business environment to a significant extent. As a result, both local and foreign firms modified and fine-​tuned continuously their strategies (Schuh, 2007). Differences compared to the “Western” business environment still prevail, causing differences in strategy development processes and management trends as well (Köles & Kondath, 2014). The impact of FDI on local management culture and practices is a highly debated question. In this area, foreign MNEs have a vested interest in having a local impact, as

778    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass firm performance and profits hinge on them. In this area, some studies have shown that in CEE, too, there is a tangible impact of foreign affiliates on business culture. FDI, together with the increased level of openness and increasingly intense flows of goods, capital and people has influenced the behaviour and knowledge of managers and management techniques in the countries for which information is available (Morley, Poór, Heraty, Alas, & Pocztowski, 2016a). Based on the opinions in six countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), an empirical study found differences in the region but overall an improving trend and comparable local management to Western managers. Among others, it shows that bureaucracy and corruption seriously hinder good business performance in the CEE region (TARGET, 2015). Management culture, however, still differs considerably from Western European practices (Reynaud, Egri, Ralston, Danis, & Wallace, 2007, Allen & Aldred, 2011; or Karoliny, Farkas, & Poór, 2009 and Kazlauskaitė et al., 2013, specifically for human resource management) and reveals a high heterogeneity and diversity in the region. This is partly connected to cultural diversities (see https://​www.hofstede-​insights.com /​country-​comparison/​; Hofstede, 2001; Skinner, Kubacki, Moss, & Chelly, 2008; Wdowiak, Schwarz, Breitenecker, & Wright, 2012). For example, empirical evidence showed that in the case of South-​East European countries, especially the relationship between information interpretation and behavioral and cognitive changes was influenced by four elements of Hofstede’s dimensions:  positively by power distance, and negatively by individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance (Škerlavaj, Su, & Huang, 2013). Another factor causing differences is of demographic nature (Perlitz, Schulze, & Wilke, 2010). Furthermore, there are clear differences in the management practices of internationalized companies and those that focus their activities exclusively on the domestic market: internationalized companies usually differ from their domestic counterparts in various aspects of management (Czakó, Juhász, & Reszegi., 2016; Morley, Slavic, Poór, & Berber, 2016b). “Hidden champions” also differ, especially in ownership (in the majority of cases family-​ownership), organizational culture and governance (Walravens & Filipovic, 2014). Studies are quite rare for the SEE (Southeast Europe) region. It may be indicative, that in a summary of empirical studies, Berisha Qehaja, Kutllovci, and Shiroka Pula, (2017) found that the fewest strategic management tools are used in SEE transition economies, in contrast to developed and developing countries. These findings point at a separate business culture in CEE. Successful companies take into consideration the specificities mentioned above. For example, many well-​known local brands were kept “alive” or revived in the CEE region by foreign multinational companies (e.g., the Czech Škoda, the Polish Syrena or the Romanian Dacia in the automotive industry, the Czech Bata in footwear; the Hungarian Túró Rudi, Sportszelet in the food industry, or other brands in cosmetics, such as the Hungarian Gabi and Baba) (see, e.g., “Communist-​era brands make comeback,” 2003). Local firms revived local brands mainly in the food-​beverages industry, such as the Czech Kofola, Hungarian Traubi-​Soda, or the Polish Frugo and Polo Cockta (about the success of the two Polish brands, see Zalesna, 2013).

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    779 In turn, corporate social responsibility is a relative underdevelopment in CEE (UNIDO, 2006 for Bosnia-​Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia; Jablonkai, 2014, for CEE in general), though the gap between Western Europe and CEE has been closing (Steurer & Konrad, 2009). Certain multinational companies also play an active role in sponsoring local culture or sport.1

Outward FDI and Emerging Multinationals from CEE In principle, FDI outflows can act as an important source of competitiveness as FDI inflows. However, as highlighted above on the specificities of transition, outflows started to take off in the CEE much later than inflows, lagging behind and remaining limited in value. Indeed, until as late as 2005, the outflows of the region were negligible (Figure 32.4). The share of transition economies in global FDI outflows exceeded 1% only in 2006 and 2012. A rather erratic and limited “take-​off ” in these outflows can be observed from 2006 on. However, the ratio of outflows to inflows never exceeded 40%. Moreover, as firms from Hungary registered large negative intra-​company loans, the outflows of the whole group turned negative in 2015 and 2016. Overall, three countries (Poland, the

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Figure 32.4  Selected indicators of FDI outflows of transition economies, 1992–​2016 (billions of dollars and percent) Source: The authors, based on numbers from UNCTAQ, FDI/​MNE database (www.unctad.org/​fdistatistics)

780    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass Czech Republic, and Hungary, in that order) accounted for two-​thirds of the outflows of the group over the period of observation, with Hungary taking a relatively early lead in 2006, the Czech Republic starting to register major outflows in 2008, and Poland around 2010 (Table 32.3). It is to be noted that these numbers included both outward FDI by locally owned MNEs and by affiliates of foreign firms investing in third countries (indirect FDI). Thus, OFDI data contain investments carried out not only by indigenous, locally owned or controlled firms, but also by foreign-​owned resident companies, i.e., subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations operating in the country in question. This latter is called indirect OFDI, which thus means the utilization of affiliates abroad as intermediaries for investment in third countries. The distinction between direct and indirect OFDI has been investigated by a small number of studies (see among others Altzinger & Bellak, 1999; Altzinger, & Bellak, Jaklič, Rojec, 2003; Kalotay 2012; UNCTAD, 1998). Indirect OFDI can still be significant in overall OFDI of the analyzed countries, but certain countries are more affected than others. For example, Rugraff (2010) called attention to the different composition of the OFDI of the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) in terms of direct and indirect OFDI. Slovene affiliates were “used” as intermediaries to serve the Balkan markets (Jaklič, 2011). Estonia acted as a gateway to other Baltic countries for Scandinavian investors in banking (Roolaht & Varblane, 2009). In Poland, between one-​third and one-​half of the OFDI stock could be “genuine” FDI, i.e., carried out by Polish (owned or controlled) firms in 2008 (Zimny, 2011). In the electronics industry, the share of domestically owned companies in total OFDI was around one-​third in Hungary and Poland—​thus the majority of OFDI was realized by local subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies, such as the Korean company Samsung, the Taiwanese Foxconn, or the US General Electric in the case of Hungary (Sass, 2016). A  detailed case study on Hungarian paper producer Dunapack (Antalóczy & Sass, 2008) has highlighted the main reasons and strategies of a foreign investor in a concrete case. Dunapack was acquired by the Austrian, family-​owned Prinzhorn Group (another paper firm) in 1995. Management of recycling and containerboard production within the consolidated group was refocused in Austria, while the Hungarian subsidiary was made responsible for the packaging division. Moreover, after the restructuring and modernization of the Hungarian subsidiary was complete, the Austrian firm decided to manage and realize its expansion of packaging in CEE from Dunapack. The main reasons for that were industry specificities (high specific transport costs), the advantageous (close to new markets) geographic position of Dunapack, its specialization in packaging, and its familiarity with paper capacities in the CEE region. At present the packaging division consists of 15 factories in 10 countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine) (see http://​www.prinzhorn-​holding.com/​unternehmen _​en.html; https://​dunapack.hu/​hu/​cegcsoport). Another interesting “indirect” case is that of the Czech Škoda, which was sold to the German Volkswagen Group in the nineties. It has affiliates in China, India, Russia and Slovakia (http://​www.skoda-​auto

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    781 .com/​en/​company/​production-​plants). Škoda Auto India was established in 2000, with a market-​seeking aim and keeping in mind that in the Volkswagen Group, Škoda cars are the types in size, technology, and price that can be marketed the most successfully in India (Zemplinerová, 2012). The reasons for indirect FDI in the region may be manifold (Kalotay, 2012):  the most important is, as in the Dunapack case, corporate strategy delegating decisions to subsidiaries on investment in third countries, especially if the subsidiary is geographically and/​or culturally close to the third country. This is obviously also the case for the Korean Samsung, where the Hungarian subsidiary is the “parent” of a Slovakian and a Czech subsidiary, and of one Romanian branch. The Hungarian GE Holding is similarly a minority owner (33%) in seven CEE affiliates of GE. The case of HonHai (Foxconn) is less straightforward and more puzzling: Hungarian subsidiaries are parents to HonHai firms in Brazil and Denmark (Sass, 2016). In this latter case, differences in the regulatory background between Hungary and the host countries (taxes and customs duties) can be assumed to explain the organization of the multinational company. Equally important may be tax optimization considerations through transhipment over financial centers or countries with low effective corporate tax rates. In Hungary and Poland, one can find a number of multinational firms, in which foreigners as a whole own the majority of shares but no single foreigner owns more than 10%. These are usually formerly state-​owned companies that were privatized through techniques that led to highly dispersed ownership structures. Usually their shares were introduced on and sold through the Budapest or Warsaw stock exchange. During these sales and afterward, during the setting up of corporate ownership rules, it was assured that no single shareholder should exceed the 10% threshold, and if it nevertheless happened, its voting rights should be restricted to 10%. These rules on (foreign) ownership basically excluded the possibility of a foreign takeover. Moreover, in these companies, the (Hungarian or Polish) management is taking all strategic decisions. Therefore, foreign ownership loses its power over effective decision-​making, making its impact more “virtual” than real. From a purely formal point of view, the foreign expansion of these firms could be called indirect; however, because of the ineffectiveness of foreign ownership and exclusive decision-​making rights of local management, they can only be called “virtual indirect” investors (Sass, Antalóczy, & Éltető, 2012), with characteristics much closer to usual direct OFDI. For instance, their home country is Hungary or Poland, as the nationality of foreigner shareholders is dispersed among many countries. The Hungarian top foreign investor companies belong to this category: the oil company MOL, OTP bank, and the pharmaceutical company Richter Gedeon (Sass & Kalotay, 2010). Overall, relatively large-​sized CEE multinationals are quite rare. They remain quite small compared to their respective economies and compared to their developed country (and BRICS) counterparts. Exceptions can be the Polish and Hungarian oil companies, PKN Orlen and MOL, which would figure among the top emerging multinationals based on their foreign and total assets (based on Annex Table 25, UNCTAD, 2017; and the foreign assets of MOL and PKN Orlen (see Sass & Kovács, 2015; Kaliszuk & Wancio,

782    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass 2013)). As we already mentioned, separate data on indigenous multinational companies is hardly available. There is anecdotal evidence of a high level of concentration in CEE OFDI in terms of the number of investor companies (see, e.g., Zemplinerová, 2012, for Czech; Sass et al., 2012, for Hungarian; Radło, 2012, for Polish; and Rugraff, 2010 for Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Slovakian outward FDI, and Box 32.1). In terms of motivations for investing abroad, CEE multinationals go abroad the most often in search of new markets (see, e.g., Svetličič, Jaklič, & Burger, 2007, for SMEs; and the overview of the literature in Trąpczyński, 2016). There are a few company cases of efficiency-​seeking FDI (see, e.g., Zemplinerová, 2012, for the Czech Republic; Sass et al.,

Box 32.1 Leading multinationals in CEE Although outward FDI from CEE started relatively late and has been increasing only slowly, as of today, the region has gradually become home to an important number of firms investing abroad successfully. Some of them are already comparable to their mid-​sized developed country peers in terms of size and scope of international expansion. Based on foreign assets, two oil and gas firms, the Hungarian MOL and the Polish PKN Orlen, stand out among the CEE multinationals. They have a substantial footprint abroad. They have developed extensive control over their value chains, in both downstream and upstream activities. MOL is present in 25 countries with 64 affiliates, while PKN Orlen has invested in 9 countries with 34 affiliates. In the cases of both companies, the leading foreign subsidiary is located in another CEE country: for MOL in Croatia, and for PKN Orlen in Lithuania. Equally in the energy sector, the Czech CEZ is a majority state-​owned regional multinational. It is present with foreign affiliates in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey. In financial services, the Hungarian OTP Bank is the only significant regional bank. It has subsidiaries in many countries in CEE and in Southeastern Europe. OTP started its “shopping spree” in the region after its privatization had been finished in 2001, by acquiring IRB in Slovakia. At that time OTP Bank could base its foreign market penetration on its experience with post-​privatization restructuring. At present it has foreign operations in Bulgaria (where its subsidiary, DSK Bank, has become market leader), Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Although most of the largest pharmaceutical companies of the region have over time become affiliates of foreign companies (Croatian Pliva belongs to Teva, Slovenian Lek belongs to Novartis, Czech Zentiva belongs to Sanofi), some of them like Krka in Slovenia and Richter Gedeon in Hungary continue to operate as independent companies. The latter has been particularly successful with foreign expansion, spreading its assets not only into the CEE countries but also to China and India. Most recently, it has entered mature markets by acquiring shares in German and Swiss pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. Potentially, certain service industry firm could emerge as important CEE multinationals, too. For example, the Polish Asseco Group is now on the list of the leading European information technology and software companies, and owns affiliates in most major European countries. Source: Compiled by the authors.

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    783 2012, for Hungary; Gorynia, Nowak, Tarka, & Wolniak, 2015; and Trąpczyński, 2015, for Poland; Ferenčíková & Ferenčíková, 2012, for Slovakia). More recently, OFDI emerged with the aim of acquiring hitherto lacking ownership advantages, such as knowledge (Jindra, Hassan, Günther, & Cantner, 2015). However, the market-​seeking motivation clearly dominates. New data on ultimate destination countries indicate that many CEE multinationals go abroad with the aim of “optimizing” taxes; that is, they invest in tax havens (Sass, 2017). Empirical analyses are lacking on the impact of these CEE multinationals on their home countries (Gorynia et al., 2015); however, given the relatively high presence of the tax optimization motive, overall OFDI may possibly lead to the erosion of the tax base in the analyzed countries. Small multinationals, among them born globals or international new ventures, exist in all Visegrád countries. They differ from the large multinationals in terms of their target countries, as their host countries are often developed economies. They are usually active in high-​tech activities and industries, though there are a few documented exceptions (see, e.g., Czakó & Könczöl, 2014; Danik, Kowalik, & Král, 2016; Jarosinski, 2014; Kiss, Danis, & Cavusgil, 2012; Lamotte & Colovic, 2015; Nowinski & Rialp, 2013; Sass, 2012; Szalavetz, 2015; Vissak, 2007). Nowinski and Rialp (2013) list a few “region-​ specific” characteristics of CEE international new ventures—​besides limited financial resources (Kiss et al., 2012, present a similar finding), they cite relatively weak human and social capital. The former may result in resource saving strategies and operations, a behavioral pattern inherited from the shortage economy. This may be part of a competitive advantage specific to the CEE region’s firms. Additionally, they identify certain region-​specific drivers of early internationalization, such as domestic market entry barriers and highly solvent markets compared to these firms’ home countries, in developed economies. Furthermore, the role of networks may be of special importance for CEE international new ventures:  first, CEE entrepreneurs rely on their domestic networks, but with international expansion they develop their international networks as well. For the success of outward FDI from new source countries, the assistance of the home country could prove to be crucial, especially due to the fact that new players have to compete immediately with incumbent firms, and experience in competing in foreign markets can be quite limited, especially in a region attempting to get rid of the legacy of centrally planned autarky. However, ensuring that support is not always straightforward. Counterintuitively, home countries have to “export” scarce national resources to ensure medium-​and long-​term gains at home, gains that are much else visible than the subsidies or other favors provided. Outward investment promotion lacks support even in some developed countries, not to talk about emerging economies. However, in some highly successful countries—​small ones such as Singapore, and large ones such as China—​outward investment promotion is part of the national competitiveness strategy. Reflecting partly the typically mercantilist economic policy stances of the CEE governments—​especially after the financial crisis—​and partly the relative smallness of OFDI, OFDI policies are not well developed in the economies of the region. Usually we can find OFDI promotion among the tasks of the investment promotion agencies,

784    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass if anywhere. However, support for capital export has been pushed in the background compared to goods and services export and incoming FDI. According to a mini-​survey, done for Hungary, an interviewee emphasized that “in other, mainly developed countries, the support is much more substantial and more flexible” (Éltető et al., 2015).

Relationship of Inbound and Outbound FDI Competitiveness In general, it is undecided whether competitiveness leads to more FDI or vice versa. Probably the relationship is two-​way and circular. Undoubtedly, the competitiveness of host and home countries does influence inflows and outflows, but also these flows are shaping the competitive advantages of countries. A further complication arises from the fact that the relationship between competitiveness and FDI is not linear. It can be observed that countries with a highly competitive domestic enterprise sector (such as Germany, Italy, or Japan) attract relatively limited inward FDI, except for cases of the restructuring of industries at a large scale. This is not fully surprising as newcomers have to overcome not just the liability of foreignness but also the strong competition of incumbents. It has also been observed in the case of emerging MNEs, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, that the relative weakness of competitive advantages may act as a stimulus of foreign expansion, as the missing advantages can be accessed only abroad. In this study, as the focus is not the competition-​FDI link per se but the overview of competitive strategies, we acknowledge this complex system of relations, allowing us to draw some general conclusions, before turning to the “real” conclusions of the chapter. The most concise way to gauge the competitiveness of CEE economies is to proxy it with the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, given the fact that this composite index takes into account most of the factors of FDI attractiveness. Keeping in mind the shortcomings of such composite indices, and the problems of using opinion surveys across countries, important trends can nevertheless be detected in the period around and after the global crisis (Table 32.2). While there is a major dispersion of rankings, and the distance from highly competitive economies such as Germany are important even for the region’s frontrunners (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland, in that order), there have been major movements upward and downward in the rankings for various individual economies. Four economies (Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia, in that order) have experienced major losses of competitiveness after the crisis. The timing of losses, however, diverged. In Slovakia, the index deteriorated rapidly between 2007 and 2014, the years of crisis and its aftermath, and recovered slightly afterward. In Hungary, the index fluctuated, and even improved during the crisis years of 2008–​2012, to fall later on in the post-​crisis period. In Slovenia, the best year for the ranking was 2009–​2010, followed by a sharp decline during the

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    785 post-​crisis period. Therefore, it is impossible to blame the crisis uniformly for the deterioration of competitiveness; it is more the post-​crisis developments that are problematic from the point of view of attractiveness. It is to be added that some economies improved their competitiveness over the period examined. The most striking is the rise of Poland to the top echelons of the region. Bulgaria and to a lesser degree Romania were also winners, moving to the middle range of the group. Finally, there were economies (Montenegro, Albania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or FYR) that improved their ranking, but from a relatively low level. However, even those changes upset the conventional view of FDI attractiveness, with the ranking of the FYR of Macedonia surpassing that of Hungary. All these changes indicate that the main changes of competitiveness are related to the capacities of countries to adapt their skills base and regulatory environment to accelerating technological change, and not (only) their capacity to resolve the macroeconomic problems caused by the crisis.

Conclusion In sum, the experience of CEE countries provides valuable insights into various areas of economics, business, and management. Once the initial stage of transition to market economy was in general completed, and especially EU accession achieved for various countries, the exceptional status of this region and the enthusiasm created by major events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall has withered, and what was left for this group of countries was the nurturing of their competitive capacities and advantages. This search was complicated by a twin challenge: these countries had to find or redefine their place in the international division of labor under the circumstances of fast technological change, and against the odds of ever growing global competition. This chapter has shown that in individual investment projects, solutions have been found to this challenge; however, these societies are far from finding their ways of success in a systematic manner. This chapter has not in general dealt with the international social and political dynamics surrounding this change, with the exception of political changes and their consequences in Hungary and Poland. In these two countries, political developments have evolved toward a more hostile stance to at least some inward investors, which can have an impact on inward FDI (it is already measurable in Hungary in 2015 and 2016; it remains to be seen how it will affect flows to Poland in the future). It is to be noted, however, that despite this partial U-​turn, the regulatory environment of CEE as a whole remains highly liberalized in international comparison. It is yet another question to what degree protectionist developments will affect not only inward FDI but also the outward FDI of Hungarian and Polish MNEs. The developments in these countries have to be seen in a broader context, at least for two reasons. One is that the social phenomena observed in these two countries are present in various other countries of the region, although their impact is not yet so

786    Kálmán Kalotay and Magdolna Sass apparent. However, it cannot be excluded that the Hungarian and Polish patterns will be replicated in other countries, too. Another consideration is that the stakes of these countries are not whether any formal FDI indicator becomes more or less favorable. The main issue is that inward and outward FDI are intimately linked with competitiveness, which is the basis for the future success of societies. In this respect, it should not be forgotten that despite the liability of foreignness, MNEs have a rather clear and realistic picture of the competitiveness advantages and disadvantages of the region, and base their strategies on rational calculations, detached from any emotion of the local political debate. In principle, the region has many ingredients of success and upgrading, on conditions that government policies are geared toward helping to exploit them, and not to hinder them. The future of inward and outward FDI in CEE will surely be characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, related to the fact that we do not yet fully grasp the meaning of technological and social changes that are taking place on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, including the European Union’s advanced countries, on which CEE remains to be largely dependent. Even more characteristically we do not fully know what the future of emerging economies (such as the BRICS mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) and its implications for CEE countries. It is only sure that social, political, and economic processes in those countries will be even less linear; therefore, expecting the unexpected may be the only stance that CEE countries may have. The challenges are particularly high for decision-​makers in CEE companies. On the one hand, they have to keep up with the accelerating pace of “global” competition, or at least with competition within the EU, which is the largest bloc in the world economy. It means that they have to maintain expertise in all aspects of international management instantly. They also have to adjust their management and business culture. They have to discover that this culture does not fit fully the management culture of the West (therefore they have to adopt new strategies in the EU) or the management culture of the “East (they are different from Chinese and Indian firms, but also to some extent from Russian and Turkish firms, which are somewhat geographically closer). The only way to keep up with competition is to leverage their relatively limited home-​base resources. They also have to face fast technological changes in the world, to which they must adapt, and a more complex international policy scenario. Moreover, despite an increase in the number of competitive firms in the region, the threshold over which they could exert a considerable impact on their home economies does not seem to have been reached yet.

Acknowledgements Magdolna Sass’s research was financially supported by the Hungarian Research Fund NKFI. The authors are grateful to Robert Grosse and an anonymous referee for their comments on a first version of this article. The views are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of their institutions.

Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe    787

Note 1. Visiting the websites of the leading sports clubs is a good indicator of this activity. Multinational companies from the most active sport sponsor industries worldwide (soft drinks, automotive, telecommunications, financial services) (Jeanrenaud, 2006) are present and active in the CEE countries.

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Chapter 33

Ope rating Acro s s L ev e l s in the Gl obal E c onomi c Hierarc h y Insights from South Africa’s Setting in Wider Africa and the World Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-​B enson

Most international business scholars make an essentially binary distinction between what has been termed “advanced and emerging markets” or “developed and developing countries,” and at the level of the firm, “advanced multinational corporations” (AMNCs) and “emerging multinational corporations” (EMNCs). However, various supranational organizations have long acknowledged that the world can be divided into an economic hierarchy of at least three levels: developed, developing, and least developed (as per the United Nations) or high, middle-​high, middle-​low, and low-​income (as per the World Bank). We argue that the simplification of the global economic landscape into just two categories does not adequately serve either practitioners or scholars of emerging markets. We employ Peng and Meyer’s (2016) global economic pyramid classification which divides economies on the basis of their GDP (gross domestic product) per capita: high-​income economies have a GDP per capita greater than 15,000 Euros, middle-​income economies range from 1500 to 15,000 and low-​income economies are below 1500 Euros. Although a few scholars (e.g., Cuervo-​Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013) have examined the implications of “middleness,” we argue that more attention needs to be given to what middleness means for both AMNCs and EMNCs. First, almost all EMNCs originate from middle-​income countries like Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia, and South Africa. The evidence of both the better-​known EMNCs like Cemex, Embraer, Arçelik, Petronas, and Sasol and also the bulk of EMNCs that can be

798    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson found in databases like OSIRIS suggests that being situated in the middle of the global economic hierarchy is virtually definitional to being an EMNC. South Africa occupies a middle position in the global economic hierarchy. On metrics like its GDP per capita and human capital, its performance is comparable to that of countries like Brazil, Thailand, Iran, and other middle-​income countries. Yet its economic development dwarfs that of most other African countries. Its neighbors, Namibia and Botswana, both have a similar GDP per capita to South Africa, but each has a population of only about 4% of the South African population. Although some North African countries like Egypt and Tunisia are comparable to South Africa in terms of level of development, they are often deemed as a part of the Middle East and not a part of Africa. South Africa is not only the largest holder of FDI stock in Africa (about 24% of FDI in sub-​Saharan Africa, or 16% if North Africa is included), but also the fifth largest source of FDI on the continent after the USA, UK, France, and China (UNCTAD, 2016). In terms of its formal economy, 13 of the 21 African firms on the Forbes Global 2000 list are from South Africa, and that excludes “migrating multinationals” (Barnard, 2014) with deep South African roots, e.g., Anglo-​American and BHP Billiton. South Africa, due to its colonial past, shares an affinity with the English-​speaking world: the UK, Australia, Canada, and even the USA—​all advanced economies with well-​developed technological infrastructure, competitive economies, and high-​income consumers. But it also shares geographic proximity and a colonized history with other African countries. Most of those countries have a much lower per capita income than South Africa, and are often described as “least developed” by the World Bank, although they offer substantial opportunities for economic expansion. South Africa’s position in these two distinct types of contexts makes it a useful setting for exploring the implications of operating across levels in a global economic hierarchy. Because South Africa has so few neighbors at a comparable level of development, it can seldom follow the incremental internationalization process described by Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 2006). Most countries with a similar income level (e.g., from Latin America, Central Europe, or Asia) are not viable options for internationalization, being both geographically distant and culturally quite different. Internationalizing South African firms therefore quite soon need to decide where they want to position themselves in the global economic hierarchy—​whether they want to expand to wealthy countries with which they have long-​established but typically colonial ties or to geographically proximate countries at a lower level of economic development. South African MNCs therefore provide a useful lens for understanding implications of the global economic hierarchy. The ability of firms to prosper is heavily dependent on their place and participation in the global economy. Regional value chains (Gereffi & Lee, 2016) developed in low-​ income sub-​Saharan African markets may be lucrative but not competitive globally and carry a risk of stagnation. In high-​income markets, these firms have the benefits of operating in a developed context, with the potential for upgrading as they seek to meet the requirements of more sophisticated lead firms (Gereffi & Lee, 2016). However, the value created may not accrue to the developing country (Mudambi, 2008).

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    799 As far as AMNCs are concerned, managers readily acknowledge that there is a big difference in operating between, for example, Tanzania and Tunisia—​two countries with virtually the same GDP, even though Tanzania is five times more populous than Tunisia, implying a lower GDP per capita, and thus a different place in the global economic pyramid. Institutions tend to be relatively better developed in middle-​income countries, and markets somewhat larger (Hoskisson et al., 2013). For example, relative to other sub-​Saharan African countries, South Africa has a better developed infrastructure and globally recognized financial, legal, and other professional services. Indeed, it is often seen as a gateway into wider Africa, although this status is challenged by both policymakers (Cropley, 2013) and academics (Alden & Schoeman, 2015). For example, in 2011, General Electric established the headquarters for “GE Africa” in Kenya rather than in South Africa where it had long had a presence (Ireland, n.d.) However, the GE experience also suggests that AMNCs go into less developed African countries only after they have gained significant experience in South Africa. AMNCs use caution when they enter into low-​income markets. This chapter examines the implications of “middleness” for both EMNCs and AMNCs. We examine six strategies that firms use to navigate the global economic hierarchy. We discuss two strategies used by AMNCs and four strategies used by EMNCs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in all but one of the options, high-​income countries are important as potential markets and/​or sources of technology. Figure 33.1 presents the different options. Our first two categories relate to AMNCs, and are “pecking order exploiters” and “lead firms.” For the former we draw on Vernon’s (1979) revised product cycle model.

Global consolidator

High income countries Lead firm

Niche provider

Middle income countries Pecking order Broker exploiter Local optimizer Low income countries

Figure 33.1  Six strategies to navigate the global economic hierarchy Source: Authors’ conceptualization

800    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson While globalization has complicated many of the predictions of the product cycle model (e.g., Cantwell, 1995), we argue that Vernon’s notion of a “pecking order” remains important, albeit in a marketing rather than production context. In particular, many AMNCs do not expand directly into low-​income countries but rather move the bulk of their internationalization (after entering high-​income markets) into middle-​income countries. Evidence of the s-​shaped relationship between internationalization and profitability (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004) suggests that expansion into low-​income countries may not even be profitable. We add the category “pecking order exploiters” to examine AMNCs entering low-​income countries through their operations in middle-​income countries. A number of scholars have examined global value chains and the interplay between AMNCs with their advanced technologies and EMNCs with their less expensive but also less sophisticated home environment (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Kaplinsky, 2000; Linden, Dedrick, & Kraemer, 2011). Some global value chains retain activities in-​house: automotive companies tend to locate assembly in middle-​income countries like Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, etc., but typically under the control of the parent (Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gereffi, 2008). However, global value chains often involve external partners, for example, “electronics contract manufacturing” (Lüthje, 2002) where the assembly of computing equipment, albeit under the control of a lead firm such as Apple (Mudambi, 2008), is typically done by EMNCs like Inventec and Hon Hai. Ramamurti and Singh (2009) term such EMNCs “low-​cost partners,” but we instead describe them as “brokers,” highlighting the dimension of arbitrage that Ramamurti and Singh argue is an important raison d’être for the existence of firms that produce in low-​income but sell in high-​income countries. We argue that broker firms tend to “interpret” low-​income countries for their AMNC partners from advanced economies, and that brokerage need not involve only production. For example, broker firms in middle-​ income countries can also distribute and service the products of AMNC lead firms in low-​income countries. Next we discuss “local optimizers,” EMNCs that compete in local low-​income markets. The rise of lower-​income countries as key players in the world economic recovery has led to the development of a subset of global value chains, namely, regional value chains. For example, South African clothing manufacturers developed a regional retailer-​driven value chain with low-​income countries like Lesotho and Swaziland, while providing an opportunity for process, product, and functional upgrading in these countries (Morris & Staritz, 2017). Regional value chains in the supermarket industry, with South African stores like Woolworths and Shoprite capturing the low-​income markets of sub-​Saharan Africa, are another example. The category of what Ramamurti and Singh (2009) term “global consolidators” is next. They use this term to describe the competitive implication of industries being at different stages in different countries. This category of firms builds on the fact that industries at a mature stage in advanced economies may be at a growth stage in emerging countries. This allows EMNCs to consolidate the industry globally by beginning with

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    801 their home market, horizontally acquiring in similar emerging markets and then engaging in bold acquisitions of companies from advanced economies. Finally, we discuss what Ramamurti and Singh (2009) term “global first movers.” The evidence for global first movers generally comes from China and India, very large countries where the absolute availability of capabilities helps overcome challenges related to their relative scarcity. However, this is not the case for most middle-​income countries. We instead argue that they should be seen as “specialist niche providers.” Although EMNCs do develop and exploit world-​leading technologies, they often lack the capabilities to be much more than niche providers. These specialist niche providers typically limit their international activities to the more lucrative high-​income countries, and are often acquired by AMNCs, at which point they become integrated in global value chains. The next section discusses each of the six types in greater detail.

Pecking Order Exploiters According to Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 2006), firms will internationalize in an incremental way to countries that are in some way proximate (e.g., geographically or culturally). We argue that proximity in terms of market potential is another consideration driving internationalization. In particular, we argue that ceteris paribus, AMNCs will expand first to other high-​income countries, then to middle-​income countries, and only then to low-​income countries. Moreover, they may well decide to not settle directly in those countries and instead rely on regional headquarters in middle-​income countries to drive growth. In this way (albeit in marketing terms, and not production, and with labor costs playing a less important role than income) they follow what Vernon terms “a predictable pecking order, based largely on income levels and labor costs” (1979: 261). The “regionalization” of MNCs is increasingly recognized (Nell, Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2011; Verbeke & Kano, 2016). Enright (2005) defines regional headquarters as offices with control over the operations of one or more other offices and subsidiaries in other countries of the region. In various discussions, the role of an economic hierarchy is often implied but seldom stated, e.g., Amann, Jaussaud and Schaaper’s (2014) finding that potential market size is the most important determinant of the location of regional headquarters. We argue that when AMNCs expand into lower-​income countries in an internalized way, the global economic hierarchy helps explain regionalization and the regional management of AMNCs. As scholars attempt to account for the nuances found between different subsidiaries (e.g., Cantwell & Mudambi’s, 2005, work on competence-​creating subsidiaries) and dedicated regional headquarters versus regional management mandates (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017), it is perhaps useful to look at an example of a large AMNC operating across the African continent as a “pecking order exploiter” (see Figure 33.2).

802    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson

High income countries

Pecking order exploiter

Middle income countries

Low income countries

Figure 33.2  Pecking order exploiter

Microsoft first opened its South African office in 1992, and by 2014, South Africa was responsible for 60% of its African revenues (CFO South Africa, 2014). During this period, there were only two full-​fledged “stand-​alone” Microsoft subsidiaries on the continent: South Africa and Egypt. In 2014, after 14 years, Nigeria was also elevated to stand-​alone subsidiary status—​although not on the basis of a proven track record but on the expectation of future growth (Van Zyl, 2014). Apart from the three subsidiaries, there are seven Microsoft “offices” on the African continent. Each of these offices in turn supports a number of other, smaller countries where the firm has a very small physical base. Thus the Kenyan office also supports Uganda and Tanzania, while the Ivory Coast office also supports Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-​Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, St. Helena, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (Microsoft website, n.d.). The president of the Microsoft Middle East and Africa region is based in Dubai, with Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa all reporting to Dubai. However, a role like that of the general manager for the West, East, Central Africa, and Indian Ocean Islands (WECA) region is based in South Africa. The reporting patterns reflect a hierarchy: the African subsidiaries rank below the Dubai hub, but as subsidiaries they have greater autonomy than the local country offices. And although the country offices are not full-​fledged subsidiaries, they in turn support smaller and less developed proximate markets. For an AMNC managing efficiencies, such a “pecking order” arrangement offers the benefit of easier coordination. As local countries grow in importance, they can “graduate” to a higher status: Thus in 2013 Kenya was split out from the larger Southern and Eastern Africa group as a stand-​alone “office” (Capital FM, 2013), while Nigeria in 2014 graduated from “office” to subsidiary status. But clearly, although the AMNC seeks to maximize its sales in the poorer areas, it also seeks to limit its exposure to very small

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    803 and/​ or institutionally underdeveloped contexts. This suggests the importance of differentiating between low-​and middle-​income countries in theorizing how AMNCs arrange operations in a continent like Africa.

Lead Firms Lead firms represent another mechanism by which AMNCs expand lower down the economic hierarchy, but this time by externalizing operations in lower-​income locations. Lead firms directly and indirectly control global production, logistics, and marketing, as well as the most profitable resources, usually new technologies (Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky, & Sturgeon, 2001; Gereffi & Lee, 2016). Their expansion into low-​and middle-​income countries in recent years has been mainly to increase their local market share, given the limited demand from advanced economies (Kaplinsky & Farooki, 2011). However, it is important to note that emerging economies offer, almost per definition, limited markets, and also often institutional instability (Hoskisson et  al., 2013; Luiz, 2009). We argue that lead firms manage this relative low-​return/​high-​risk situation by entering these economies with external parties. One such a lead firm AMNC is Caterpillar. Caterpillar Tractor Company was formed from the merger between Holt Manufacturing Company and C.L. Best Tractor Company in 1925, establishing itself as the world’s leading manufacturer of mining and construction equipment, industrial gas turbines, diesel and natural gas engines, and diesel-​electric locomotives. In order to meet its client needs in over 180 countries, Caterpillar drives technology development and digital solution through its 20 diverse brands. For example, it recently introduced its ACERT technology to address challenges of climate change and pollution. In Africa, Caterpillar’s operations are premised on projections of growth in the construction, mining, agriculture, power, and energy sectors. It is currently investing in projects to meet the skills shortage. An example of one such project is “Technicians in Africa” which seeks to develop innovative technologies applicable to the specific environment, using e-​learning platforms that allow African workers with an Internet connection to access relevant heavy-​equipment training resources (Caterpillar website, 2016). However, the investment is made by Caterpillar Foundation, not by the main company, which means that it is protected from investors’ expectations about returns on investment. Caterpillar is still trying to limit its exposure to the risk of the African continent.

Brokers Lead firms control the value chain but do not internalize all the various activities of the value chain. Instead, they often work through external parties. The most common

804    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson example is that of the use of “low-​cost partners” (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009) for manufacturing. Ramamurti and Singh (2009) argue that the strategy of some EMNCs is to arbitrage the wage differential of higher-​and lower-​income countries in production activities, but they also point out that the strategy of becoming a low-​cost producer most accurately describes China and India, the two largest emerging markets (see Figure 33.3). We argue that the category can gain in both applicability and precision if three conditions are met: if we explicitly differentiate between low-​, middle-​, and high-​income countries, if the central strategy of the EMNC is broadened to refer to brokering rather than only production, and if such brokering is seen as more broadly than just the arbitrage of wage differentials. It also implies that brokering can go beyond manufacturing. To the extent that brokerage occurs when there is a breakdown in the flow of information (Stovel & Shaw, 2012), any activities that involve the sharing of information across boundaries in the global economic hierarchy fits into this category, including quite different actions like sharing investment opportunities or finding new markets. Mahnke, Ambos, Nell, and Hobdari (2012) find that when regional headquarters play an entrepreneurial rather than administrative role, regional headquarters have limited influence over the parent. If the focus is on finding new business opportunities in the region, it seems that some intra-​organizational coordination is sacrificed. Against this backdrop, some AMNCs may well feel comfortable assigning the role that would otherwise be performed by entrepreneurial regional headquarters to an outside firm. Indeed, AMNCs may gain from having local partners who are embedded in the local context, especially in underdeveloped contexts with limited infrastructure and the weak enforcement of rights. In the case of Caterpillar, dealer networks handle much of the sales. In Africa, the main dealer network, Barloworld, is a substantial EMNC in its own

High income countries Lead firm Middle income countries Broker

Low income countries

Figure 33.3  Lead firms working with brokers

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    805 right. Its role is as a broker, where it interprets conditions and opportunities in Africa for Caterpillar. Barloworld is an industrial conglomerate that distributes and provides in-​field support to industrial brands such as Caterpillar across Africa. Barloworld was founded in 1902 in Natal in South Africa by a British immigrant, and first listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1947. It has about 20,000 employees and operates across 15 countries, mainly in southern Africa Barloworld website, n.d.). It is a distributor of leading international brands such as Caterpillar, Hyster, Massey Ferguson, a range of vehicles (Ford, General Motors, Toyota, Volkswagen, etc.), and specialist equipment for industries such as mining and power generation. Barloworld provides integrated rental, fleet management, product support, and logistics solutions for those brands. Its understanding of the infrastructurally underdeveloped African context is a valuable resource. In 1927, only two years after the founding of Caterpillar in the USA, Barloworld negotiated the rights to sell Caterpillar farming, mining, and earthmoving machinery in two of South Africa’s provinces, Natal (site of the sugar plantations) and the then-​ Transvaal, location of Johannesburg (and mining industry). Barloworld has since become synonymous with Caterpillar in Southern Africa and more recently Africa. For long, Barloworld focused only on South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana, but with the post-​apartheid reintegration of South Africa to the global economy, in 1993 it gained rights to distribute Caterpillar to Spain and Portugal. In 1994 it obtained the rights to distribute Caterpillar to Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola, and in 1998 expanded to South-​West Siberia. That contract has since been expanded to include Eastern Siberia, Yakutia, and the Russian Far East. In 2006 a joint venture with the French Caterpillar dealer Tractafric was concluded to supply Katanga province in the DRC with Caterpillar mining equipment (Barloworld-​equipment website, n.d.). Barloworld has a close relationship with Caterpillar, e.g., as one of 15 dealers on a dealer advisory board on a multi-​billion-​dollar initiative to improve alignment between Caterpillar and dealers (Caterpillar website, n.d.). In terms of the available capability base and institutional network of a middle-​income country, it is unlikely that an EMNC will be able to do much more than this type of effective logistics management and localization. At the same time, it is unlikely that Caterpillar would be able to directly sell as effectively as Barloworld into underdeveloped contexts. Moreover, because Barloworld represents multiple brands, it is able to leverage its understanding of and contacts in different, often quite challenging territories for multiple manufacturers. For example, in addition to its long-​standing relationship with Caterpillar in Zambia, Barloworld has entered into a joint venture with the German firm BayWa to distribute agricultural equipment such as Massey Ferguson and Challenger on behalf of their US-​based manufacturer AGCO (Phiri, 2015) in that country. In a world where there is increasing recognition that economic activity is organized across networks, brokerage between high-​and low-​income countries is a potentially lucrative way for EMNCs to engage with AMNCs. Entrepreneurs from middle-​income countries can avoid head-​to-​head competition with the well-​resourced and technologically advanced firms from high-​income countries if EMNCs choose to play a brokering

806    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson role, and draw on the combined strengths of the high-​quality offerings of AMNCs and their own superior ability to operate in less developed countries in the region (Cuervo-​ Cazurra & Genc, 2008). By customizing and supporting the offerings of the AMNC, EMNCs can, to the benefit of both themselves and their partners, exploit opportunities in contexts that AMNCs may be hesitant to enter. It is perhaps useful to point out that firms playing such a brokerage role can also be quite small. Barnard and Rosen (2016) document the case of IHS (see Box 34.1). What characterizes broker firms is that they recognize a dimension of the high-​income country context and a complementary role that they can play with their access to and understanding of a low-​income country context.

Local Optimizers Arguably the most typical case of internationalization in developing countries is local optimizers, which occurs when EMNCs go to countries at a lower level of development than they are (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Conceptually, an EMNC that goes from a middle-​to a low-​income country (e.g., Shoprite entering wider Africa from South Africa) is not that different to an AMNC that goes from a high-​to a middle-​income country, e.g., Walmart entering South Africa from the USA, which it did through its purchase of Massmart in 2011. The fundamental logic for MNCs from middle-​income countries going to lower-​ income countries is that they will have developed the capacity to operate at a certain level of sophistication, a level that exceeds what firms in the home country can achieve. Because those economies are less developed, suppliers may not be as well-​developed and customers are likely to respond positively to a quality offering that exceeds what their domestic context offers them. And although it may require effort to train the local employees to operate at a given level of sophistication, firms are typically able to achieve

Box 34.1 International housing solution in Africa The South African firm International Housing Solutions (IHS) is a company with 35 employees that over the course of seven years delivered in excess of 27,000 local housing units. The company accesses pension funds from high-​income countries where managers are seeking to invest in socially responsible but profitable projects through organizations like OPIC (the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). IHS brings together these funders with local prop­ erty developers who know how to engage with municipalities and communities in the construction of low-​income housing. Having fine-​tuned this model in South Africa, IHS is now expanding to Ghana, Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius (http://​www.biznisafrica.co.za /​private-​investors-​boost-​funding-​for-​housing-​across-​africa/​).

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    807 a superior level of organizing. This type of expansion reflects principles that were first articulated by Dunning in his 1958 book (reissued in 1998) and reiterated and refined in later works (1983, 1994, 1999). When this engagement takes place in a geographical region, contemporary scholars conceptualize this economic arrangement as a regional value chain (Gereffi & Lee, 2016). Given these mechanisms, an EMNC entering into a lower-​income country is well placed to achieve competitive success. After an initial concern about the stability and profitability of wider Africa, there is now enthusiasm among South African MNCs for expanding into the rest of the continent (Holmes, 2013). A useful South African example is Shoprite, which has over the years consolidated its position as a leading retailer in wider Africa (see Figure 33.4). Shoprite, founded in 1979, first expanded internationally (into Namibia) in 1990, the year that Nelson Mandela was released from prison. Over the next 25 years it has expanded its international footprint to 1751 corporate and 360 franchise outlets in 15 countries across Africa and the Indian Ocean Islands (see Table 33.1 for details.) About 18,000 of its 133,000 employees are employed outside South Africa (Shoprite website, n.d.-​a). Early experiments with Egypt and India have been abandoned, and Shoprite is focusing on sub-​Saharan Africa, including such fairly risky investments as the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is holding steady with a single store in Zimbabwe (see Box 34.2), given the geographic proximity but also current instability of the country. The Deloitte Global Powers of Retailing survey has reported it as by far the leading retailer in Africa, with around the 100th position globally. Shoprite plays a fairly typical upgrading role in the local context, and states on its website:

High income countries

Middle income countries

Local optimizer Low income countries

Figure 33.4  Local optimizers

808    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson Table 33.1 History of international presence of Shoprite Year

International presence

1990

Namibia

1995

Zambia

1997

Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique

1998

Botswana

2000

Zimbabwe and Uganda

2001

Malawi and Egypt

2002

Madagascar, Mauritius, and Tanzania; list on Namibian Stock Exchange

2003

Ghana and Angola; list on Lusaka Stock Exchange (Zambia)

2004

India

2005

Nigeria

2006

Exit Egypt

2010

Exit India

2010

Democratic Republic of Congo

The Group actively empowers small local suppliers in virtually all the countries in which it does business in Africa for the delivery of a range of items, mainly fresh produce and perishable products. Most of these suppliers initially need assistance to meet the Group’s requirements in terms of volumes and product specifications. To bring them to the required standard, the Group operates extensive support and development programmes aimed at assisting them to achieve the required standards and produce to our needs. (Shoprite website, n.d.-​b)

It has long regarded investment in information and communication technology (ICT), for example, in procurement and logistics systems, as essential to manage the challenges of moving perishable goods along an underdeveloped road and rail network and through slow ports and customs operations. Indeed, given the inefficient infrastructure on which Shoprite relies to bring merchandise to its stores, it is in its interest to develop local capacity. Local optimizers may not be competitive relative to AMNCs in high-​or even middle-​ income countries, but in low-​income countries the situation is different. They benefit both from relatively higher capabilities that allow them to outperform local competitors, and form a better understanding of underdeveloped contexts that allow them to do better than AMNCs (Cuervo-​Cazurra & Genc, 2008), for example, South African mining company operations in high-​risk Africa (Luiz & Ruplal, 2013). In the process they may or may not develop capabilities that can be of use in high-​income markets and decide to become global consolidators. However, the large, untapped markets in

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    809

Box 34.2 Shoprite in Zambia An NGO (http://​w ww.bench-​marks.org.za/​research/​BMF_​Shoprite_​Research.pdf ) examining Shoprite’s operations in 2009 found that about 60% of goods in the Zambian Shoprite stores were purchased from South Africa, while about 40% originated from Zambia. Table 33.2 provides an overview of the goods examined. Although the report is highly critical of Shoprite, the evidence nonetheless suggests that it is developing a regional value chain through local procurement.

Table 33.2 Bench Marks Foundation report on Shoprite, 2009 Commodity Breakfast cereals

Quantity surveyed

Number and source of product South Africa

19

14

Insect killer

9

Body lotions

22

Baby foods

Zambia

Other

5

-​

9

-​

-​

3

19

-​

13

10

2

1

1

-​

-​

1

Biscuits

29

20

7

2

Tea

10

5

3

2

Rice

9

5

3

1

Pasta

3

3

-​

-​

Sugar

Toiletries

10

6

4

-​

Soups

9

9

-​

-​

Mealie meal (corn meal, local staple)

4

-​

4

-​

Bath products

4

1

3

-​

9

5

4

-​

11

6

5

-​

Soaps Detergents Total

162 (100%)

96 (59.3%)

59 (36.4%)

7 (4.3%)

underdeveloped countries suggest that being an emerging market expert is a viable strategic option of its own.

Global Consolidators Much scholarly attention has been directed at “global consolidators,” EMNCs going into lower-​income countries but using the experience in those less competitive markets

810    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson

Global consolidator

High income countries

Middle income countries

Low income countries

Figure 33.5  Global consolidators

to develop capabilities to allow them to compete in the wider world (see Figure 33.5). Ramamurti and Singh describe them as firms from emerging economies that first expand horizontally through acquisitions to similar developing economies before moving to an advanced economy, typically in mature industries. These EMNCs leverage on their home-​country middleness as a competitive advantage that allows them to function effectively in both advanced and emerging economies, by “expanding, modernizing and gaining technical and financial muscle” (2009: 142) in low-​and middle-​income countries and then internationalizing into similar mature (and stagnated) industries in high-​income countries. South African Breweries, until recently known as SABMiller, is perhaps the best such South African example; other examples include the firm that acquired SABMiller in 2015, ABInBev (originally from Brazil) and Cemex from Mexico. SABMiller was founded in 1895 as Castle Breweries and initially listed in London but moved its listing to the Johannesburg Stock Market when the stock exchange was founded in 1897. It relocated its headquarters from London to Johannesburg in 1950, but could not become legally incorporated in South Africa until 1970. During that time, it oversaw operations in South Africa as well as Zambia and Zimbabwe, then North and South Rhodesia (Pederson, 1998). It consolidated its position in South Africa in 1955, when it acquired the two local competitors and rebranded as South African Breweries (SAB). SAB acquired licenses to manufacture Guinness (from Ireland), Amstel (the Netherlands), and Carling Black Label (the USA) during the 1960s. In 1973, it established its first breweries outside South Africa and the two Rhodesias, in Botswana and Angola (then still under Portuguese control). This successful trend continued, as it established more breweries in Swaziland in 1976 and Lesotho in 1981. During the 1980s, a period of severe anti-​apartheid resistance, SAB largely unsuccessfully experimented with entering high-​income markets (the USA and UK) due to the closing of market

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    811 opportunities in Africa (SABMiller website, n.d.). Finding itself struggling in those markets, it instead turned to domestic diversification. The strategy of domestic diversification in the 1980s changed with the end of apartheid. As soon as it was able to operate internationally, SAB went on the offensive, acquiring stakes in developing countries that had been ignored by more established developed companies in the global industry (Klein & Wocke, 2009). It reentered African markets, starting with Tanzania in 1994. In the same year, it entered China through a joint venture, and Eastern Europe (Hungary in 1993, the Czech Republic in 1994, and Poland in 1995), through the acquisitions of established brands, a strategy in character of global consolidators (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). In 1999, SAB shifted its primary stock exchange and a substantial part (although not all) of its headquarters back to London. It started entering Latin American markets in 2001 (Honduras), with Colombia and Argentina over the next few years. It also continued to strengthen its position in the East, entering India in 2000, strengthening its exposure to the Chinese market through a series of acquisitions over that decade and initiating a greenfield investment in Vietnam in 2006 (Oliver & Colicchio, 2011). By 2010 it was also pursuing interests in Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. In 2008, the brewer acquired US-​based Miller and rebranded as SABMiller, turning from “a company with a number of great businesses in doubtful neighborhoods to one with a doubtful business in a good neighborhood” (Klein & Wocke, 2009: 348). Following this move, there was initial concern in the market about whether the knowl­ edge that was applicable in the low-​income markets where South African Breweries had demonstrated its mastery would be of use in the high-​income US market (Barnard, 2014). For example, many of the skills needed to succeed in very poor countries are logistical, like making sure that the water with which beer is manufactured is pure, that the electricity supply is not interrupted so that the production process can continue, and that the beer could be transported over often rugged roads. These skills are less useful when expanding into an industrialized country, while sophisticated marketing skills become very important. Evidence suggests that internationalization experience in less developed countries is indeed a useful predictor for successful internationalization into more developed countries (Rabbiosi, Elia, & Bertoni, 2012). Some evidence exists on “reverse innovation” (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011), but much more work is needed on how the specific capabilities developed by EMNCs in low-​income countries apply or not in high-​ income countries. The success of global consolidators may be due to the fact that they have learned to deal with the difficulties of internationalization itself, e.g., operating within different legal frameworks, with currency fluctuations, and with employees with very different world views. It could also be that they had developed the capacity to deal with uncertainty and be responsive in rapidly changing environments—​in other words, meta-​skills. Our inability to answer the question of how experience in a poor context translates to a wealthier context is partly because there is a dearth of understanding about the practices and capacities that enable success for an MNC in a profoundly underdeveloped

812    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson context. This speaks to the question of whether management is fundamentally the same in all locations or not. For example, in Africa, management styles are argued to be primarily communalistic (Bagire & Namada, 2015). This question remains well debated in the international business literature in the context of theories of internationalization (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Mathews 2006a, 2006b; Narula, 2006; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). However, not just the internationalization decision but also the micro-​level of operational decisions inside the firm must be studied to really understand how MNCs—​whether AMNCs or EMNCs—​achieve success in those markets.

Specialist Niche Provider Specialist niche providers are technological leaders, often in information and communication technologies, that typically target consumers from high-​income countries with their offering. It is rare for low-​income countries to have the capabilities to support the emergence of such firms, and though such firms are often found in high-​income countries, they rarely target buyers from lower on the economic hierarchy. Thus when specialist niche providers take advantage of the tension between higher-​and lower-​income countries, they tend to originate in middle-​income countries. However, the lack of skills in those countries shapes how these firms evolve. In their 2009 book, Ramamurti and Singh give examples of firms like Embraer, Huawei, and Dr. Reddy under their category “global first mover.” But although those firms operate in high research-​intensive industries, they are seldom true first movers. In the case of South Africa, the global first movers hardly appear in MNC databases. They are typically very small, and few of them would qualify as traditional MNCs in the sense of having subsidiaries across multiple countries. However, they are undoubtedly not simply national firms. These firms offer a specialized niche service for a focused market in the high-​income countries. Middle-​income countries are arguably not simply “average” across all dimensions. In fact, they often demonstrate high levels of within-​country inequality (Sala-​i-​Martin, 2006) with a concomitant high level of intra-​country variability in skills. This variability is exploited by firms that find small, targeted niche markets in high-​income countries. Specialist niche providers tend to have a narrowly focused area of specialization. This is in keeping with wider trends: it is known that as countries develop economically, their patent profiles diversify, and recent patentors from countries like China and India operate in much narrower technological areas than patentors from the economically leading countries (Athreye & Cantwell, 2007; Cantwell & Vertova, 2004). Specialist niche providers operating under skills constraints are likely to find it more lucrative to deepen a fairly narrow set of capabilities rather than develop a diverse internal capability base. Because the skills shortages in middle-​income countries often make it difficult for these firms to take on multiple markets, they tend to focus on high-​income countries

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    813 where they can find the most lucrative markets. Because firms like these earn most of their income in the foreign currencies of high-​income countries, they are able to pay superior wages which helps them to attract the right kind of employees. But although specialist niche providers can use their insider knowledge about the best local schools and universities to identify the most skilled potential employees and offer them desirable workplaces, the skills shortages in middle-​income countries make it hard for them to achieve scale. This is less the case in countries like India and China where the large populations enable these firms to achieve a somewhat greater scale, even though the technological focus of these firms still tends to be quite narrow. Specialist niche providers from smaller middle-​income countries are so small that they are generally not captured in databases of EMNCs. They often operate largely under the radar of scholars and in some cases even local policymakers. Where they do attract attention, they often become targets for acquisition by MNCs from high-​income countries (see Figure 33.6). Derivco, a South African specialist niche provider, is a privately owned developer of software for the international online gaming industry (Derivco website, n.d.-​a). It was founded in 1996 in the South African coastal city Durban, has about 1000 employees, and is well-​known in technology circles for its Google-​style campus, benefits, and good salaries. It plays a lead role in the development of coding skills in Durban, for example, by hosting get-​togethers for developers, (Derivco website, n.d.-​b), and indeed for its work more widely in South Africa, for example, in co-​sponsoring the training initiative WeThinkCode (MyBroadband, 2015). It otherwise has a low profile, partly because Derivco is not customer-​facing. It files patents in high-​income countries where patent protections are greater, and the Wikipedia entry for Microgaming, a privately owned firm in the Isle of Man, suggests that Dervico is one of its important suppliers.

High income countries Niche provider Middle income countries

Low income countries

Figure 33.6  Specialist niche providers

814    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson Interestingly, Microgaming is referred to as a “South African company” in an industry publication (O’Donnell, 2013). A South African firm can access international markets because its offering is digital and the sales of its products are not tied to presence in a specific location. Only a small subsector of companies has offerings that are purely digital; most require some geographic footprint. However, even when the product is sold in a specific territory, and even for smaller firms than Derivco, specialist niche providers offer profitable opportunities for middle-​income country firms. Another Durban-​based specialist niche provider came about when its founder, Gavin Hough, realized the applicability of his research on auroral dynamics in Antarctica to the early detection of fire in commercial plantations. His system, ForestWatch, uses high-​resolution cameras to scan the surrounding environment and integrate the data with existing landscape information (SA Forestry Mag, 2010). Hough in 2002 founded the firm Envirovision to market the ForestWatch system across the world. In 2004 the Forest Engineering Research Institute of Canada accepted the bid of Envirovision Solutions over competitor bids from NASA and a German aerospace company to safeguard the Canadian forests (Security SA, 2004). Envirovision Solutions has sales on every continent but mainly works through agents. The bulk of its fewer than 100 employees are located in Durban, while a second office with about six employees is located in Oregon in the USA. Research and development (R&D) takes place both in Durban and, to a lesser extent, in Oregon, where the team is working on off-​the-​shelf solutions for the USA. Most of the R&D could be termed “exploitation” rather than “exploration,” using March’s (1991) classic distinction. Thus most of the effort of the company goes to refining the existing technology and finding new uses for the technology, e.g., observing the movement of ships in harbors. As in the case of small-​sized brokerage firms, these specialist niche providers are often not MNCs in the traditional sense of the word. There is no doubt that they are international; the overwhelming bulk of their income is from abroad and their relevant technological and economic communities (with which they are well connected) are international rather than local. But when they do have offices abroad, they are less often full-​fledged subsidiaries and more often “listening posts” (Cho & Lee, 2003; Miotti & Sachwald, 2001). Indeed, the examples from South Africa are similar to the examples that Aharoni (2009) gives of the highly internationalized Israeli high-​tech firms, e.g., Orbotech (automated optical inspection systems), Netafim (drip irrigation technologies), Medinol (flexible closed-​cell stent design), Mobileye (control systems for vehicles), and the likes. Those firms operate within a niche area, develop and refine cutting-​ edge technology, and sell their products or services mainly to the more lucrative high-​income markets. In both South Africa and Israel, limitations of the home market force these firms to act as niche providers. If they were to seek scale, acquisition by an AMNC is often the best option. Indeed, Aharoni (2009) points out that many Israeli companies that have started as such specialist providers have been acquired by Western MNCs.

Operating Across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy    815

Discussion The decision whether to expand to a more or a less developed country is consequential: it influences the types of products and services customers will most likely want, as well as the type of competition that MNCs can expect to face. Different host locations and specifically whether they are in high-​, middle-​, or low-​income contexts, present systematically different types of challenges and opportunities to both EMNCs and AMNCs. We want to highlight two implications of our discussion of business in Africa and specifically the role of South Africa—​one related to EMNCs and the other to AMNCs. EMNCs almost always occupy a middle position in the global economic hierarchy, and therefore they present a particularly useful lens for understanding that hierarchy. The evidence on EMNCs, especially from the specialist niche provider category, suggests that there is a need to rethink the size of firms involved in business across borders. EMNCs can take the form of traditional MNCs but also of firms with a substantial global presence but without what UNCTAD regards as the standard characteristics of MNCs, e.g., foreign affiliates and an equity stake (or its equivalent for private firms) of about 10% in such affiliates (UNCTAD, n.d.). This raises the question of the definition and characteristics of cross-​border economic interaction in a globalized world. The economic historian Wilkins (1988) has previously highlighted that the ability to exercise control across borders is manifested not only through MNCs but was historically also found in “free-​standing companies.” Moreover, Rangan and Sengul (2009) have found that MNCs are externalizing an increasing proportion of their activities. With increasing advances in information technology, it may be that new forms of cross-​border contact are emerging. It is unlikely that such forms, should they come to exist to a meaningful extent, will be the domain only of firms from middle-​income countries. However, it may be easier to identify and theorize those forms in the sparser economic landscape of middle-​income countries. Similarly, understanding the role of middle-​income countries in the development of subgroups of global value chains as they seek to maximize their environmental advantages and disadvantages will enhance both the literature and practice of global value chains as it pertains to regional value chains (Gereffi & Lee, 2016) and the “middleness” of emerging economies. In terms of AMNCs, this chapter suggests that AMNCs use two options to enter low-​ income markets: a pecking order approach in which the AMNC incrementally increases its exposure to lower-​income countries, and entering into complementary brokerage-​ type partnerships with EMNCs. Both options allow AMNCs to benefit from the growth often associated with these contexts but to avoid the institutional instability that is also often endemic (Luiz, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2013). Both strategies suggest that many AMNCs may have a pervasive albeit low involvement presence in low-​income countries, but that the ways in which they have been accessing those markets have limited their direct exposure. Indeed, those strategies may have even limited scholarly and practitioner awareness of the extent of their

816    Helena Barnard and Theresa Onaji-Benson involvement in those countries. If the question shifts to not whether or not AMNCs are engaged with low-​income markets but how, very different considerations come into play. For example, Schotter and Beamish (2013) have highlighted what they term “hassle” factors in international business such as onerous visa requirements or poor airline connections. In low-​income countries, these “hassles” are particularly severe. Understanding how executives assess the relative importance of matters like reliable airline connections, decent hotels, and good private schools versus economic potential and/​or a stable sociopolitical context is important for future research. If one takes seriously the implications of an economic hierarchy, theory development about, for example, such behavioral considerations can usefully help enrich international business scholarship.

Conclusion There is no doubt that Africa is an underdeveloped continent. Even the economic leaders on the continent, e.g., South Africa and Egypt, cannot be considered highly developed. Yet it is nonetheless possible to discern an economic hierarchy between African countries. This chapter highlights six firm strategies across a three-​tiered economic hierarchy and discusses firms operating in and from South Africa to explain each of the strategies. We argue that international business theories can benefit from a nuanced discussion of the global economic hierarchy, and how the interplays between advanced and emerging multinationals influence the development and operations of value chains in Africa and similar developing regions.

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Chapter 34

M anagem e nt i n Sou theast   Asia A Business Systems Perspective Michael A. Witt

This chapter contains an overview of business and management in Southeast Asian markets. Drawing on the business systems literature, it lays out the institutional features of business in the region, which broadly fall into two clusters: Singapore as an exponent of advanced city economies and the remainder of the region as emerging Southeast Asian markets. The chapter identifies key historical themes and material forces that have led to the emergence of these ways of organizing economies in the region and discusses their key characteristics, including the importance of family and state ownership as well as, for much of the region, rentier business models and attendant high levels of corruption. The chapter then discusses typical strategies by foreign direct investors coming into the region, including the use of Singapore as a hub and a preference for partnerships to handle the political environment. While most major multinational enterprises are probably present in the region, few multinationals have emerged from the region, and their strategic range seems limited.

Scope and Definitions Geographically, this chapter focuses on Southeast Asia. By common usage, the region comprises 11 countries:  Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.1 For the purposes of this chapter, I will exclude the five smallest economies—​Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Laos, and Myanmar—​from the discussion. The reason for this is that—​with the exception of Laos, which is structurally similar to Vietnam (Andriesse, 2014; Witt and Redding, 2013)—​little systematic research has gone into business in these

822   Michael A. Witt countries. Lack of economic heft has been one underlying issue for Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, and Laos. Cambodia, the largest of the four, had a 2015 GDP (gross domestic product) at purchasing power parity of US$54.3 billion, which is equivalent to 0.3% the GDP of the United States (World Bank, 2017a). Myanmar, by contrast, has escaped systematic exploration because of the unsettled nature of its economy in the aftermath of the decision in 2011 to engage in reforms. The construct of “institutions” is central to this chapter. Institutions are defined as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). Institutions of interest in this chapter include formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, as well as informal institutions, such as unwritten norms, values, and practices (North, 1990). Since institutions are by definition only institutions if they shape human interaction, the chapter will focus on institutions as expressed in actual behavior. To the extent actual behavior deviates from formal institutions, the former is taken to reflect informal institutions that supersede their formal counterparts. The chapter will also make reference to “culture.” Following Berger and Luckmann (1966), culture is defined as the “social construction of reality.” Underlying this definition is the notion that objectively identical realities, such as a type of behavior, can be interpreted in different ways, and that such differences in interpretation and the attendant values shaping such interpretation are societally contingent.

Business Systems Analysis To draw a systematic picture of how business and management work in the six economies at the heart of this chapter, I will draw on the literature on national business systems. In line with precedent (Witt, Kabbach de Castro, Amaeshi, Mahroum, Bohle, & Saez, 2018; Witt & Redding, 2013), I subsume under this label both the business systems literature building on Whitley (1992, 1999) and Redding (2005) and the varieties of capitalism literature based on Hall and Soskice (2001). The central thrust of this literature is that institutional differences across countries have given rise to distinct patterns of doing business and structuring the economic context of the firm, with concomitant implications for management. Recent research suggests the presence of at least nine distinct such patterns in the world economy (Witt et al., 2018). Drawing on major works in the national business systems literature, Witt et  al. (2018) identified eight key dimensions in comparing institutional structures relevant to business across societies: education and skills formation, employment relations, the financial system, inter-​firm networks, internal dynamics of the firm, ownership and corporate governance, social capital (trust), and the role of the state in the economy. Each of these dimensions in turn has a number of subdimensions, which jointly define key institutional aspects of the respective economy. Before putting the framework to use for the Southeast Asian economies, I will briefly lay out what each of these dimensions means.

Management in Southeast Asia    823 Education and skills formation as well as employment relations both speak to the availability and quality of human capital. The core question for the former is, what kinds of systems are in place to facilitate the formation of skills that firms require? In the context of emerging markets in particular, this implies a concern with general education and literacy. More specific to management is the question, who trains? There are generally three possible answers: firms, the state, or nobody (i.e., it is up to the individual to acquire skills). Of interest is further the quality of the training provided, though beyond general schooling, this is extremely difficult to compare across countries. Employment relations speaks to the relationship between firms and their employees. One aspect pertains to the typical length of employment with a given firm, which may range from several months, as in Indian call centers, to lifetime employment, as in Japan and parts of Continental Northern Europe. Relevant is also the extent to which employees are organized in unions and the quality of the relationship between firms and unions, which can range from partnership (Japan) to high levels of adversity (France, South Korea). The financial dimension speaks to the rules governing access to finance from outside the firm. Countries vary in the main sources of outside funding, with banks, markets, and the state as the dominant choices. Allocation in some countries happens on the basis of creditworthiness, in others, on the basis of relationships or of state guidance. The time horizon of finance availability ranges from short term, such as quarterly results in the United States, to long term, to the extent that bank loans may be treated like capital. The key question for inter-​firm networks is, to what extent do firms collaborate with each other across firm boundaries? This can be, but does not need to be, collusive. Examples of networks include supply chain networks and other forms of alliances, but also interlocking directorates at the board level. Internal dynamics relate to the structure of management. Are decisions top-​down, as in China or in Anglo-​Saxon firms, or are they participatory and consensual, as in Japan? To what extent do managers delegate, or centralize, tasks? And what does it take to be promoted—​performance, seniority, or relationship? Ownership and governance relate to the connection between the firm and its owners. Countries vary in the dominant mode of ownership, with the most common types being family or state ownership. Widely held ownership as in the United States is a third but rare option. Countries also vary in terms of who has actual control over the firm: families, the state, or dispersed shareholders. Variance is further evident in the extent to which minority investors are protected against the whims of controlling shareholders. Social capital in this literature refers to trust. The key question is whether a given economy can draw on institutionalized trust (Li & Redding, 2014) or needs to transact on the basis of interpersonal trust. Institutionalized trust usually implies that there is the rule of law. The role of the state, finally, recognizes that the state is a key actor in generating and enforcing institutions. States come broadly in four different types (Carney & Witt, 2014): predatory states, in which the people in power use the state to enrich themselves;

824   Michael A. Witt developmental states, which actively work to develop the economy; welfare states, which seek to produce relatively equal economic outcomes for citizens; and regulatory states, which try to use regulatory frameworks to establish a level playing field. State decision-​ making involves various degrees of voice and accountability and comes in three varieties (Witt & Lewin, 2007):  top-​down, in which a small group of people, elected or not, make decisions; participatory, in which government and key stakeholders represented by associations form a consensus; and bottom-​up, in which autonomous decisions by individuals and firms over time converge on common practices. Finally, states vary considerably in their output, be it regulatory quality or the effectiveness of implementation.

Southeast Asian Business Systems The business systems of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam span two of the nine international varieties of capitalism identified by Witt et al. (2018). Singapore represents an advanced city economy, a category it shares with Hong Kong. The other five countries represent emerging markets, a broad category that spans 21 countries. Prior research specific to Asia (Witt & Redding, 2013) suggests subcategories for Asia, with Vietnam representing a (post-​)socialist economy and with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand described as emerging Southeast Asian economies. To provide a sense of how similar, or dissimilar, these business systems are relative to one another as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) economies and major exponents of other types of business systems, Table 34.1 shows pairwise institutional distances as calculated by Witt et al. (2018). As the table indicates, there is a high level of institutional similarity among the cluster of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; medium levels of similarity between this cluster and Singapore and Vietnam; and considerable dissimilarity between Singapore and Vietnam. All of these economies, Singapore included, are quite different from the advanced industrialized economies. France, representing European peripheral economies, is least dissimilar, while Germany, Japan, and the United States (representing coordinated market economies, highly coordinated economies, and liberal market economies) exhibit greater institutional distances. So, while Singapore has attained high levels of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity, it has not converged on the institutional model of the advanced industrialized economies. Relative to the BRICS economies and advanced Northeast Asian economies represented by South Korea and Taiwan, similarities seem greatest on average relative to China and India, with all economies save Vietnam resembling India a bit more than China. This may partially be a consequence of more democratic governance, which in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand also produces similar challenges in terms of government efficiency and efficacy as in India.

Germany

Hong Kong 0.27

India

Indonesia

Japan

Korea

Malaysia

Philippines 0.22

Russia

Singapore

South Africa

Taiwan

Thailand

United States

Vietnam

DE

HK

IN

ID

JP

KR

MY

PH

RU

SG

ZA

TW

TH

US

VN

Source: Witt et al., 2018

0.26

0.45

0.16

0.25

0.26

0.26

0.26

0.21

0.26

0.45

0.21

0.18

0.42

0.27

France

FR

0.25

China

CN

BR

0.06

0.55

0.23

0.34

0.30

0.30

0.31

0.22

0.18

0.38

0.56

0.23

0.15

0.37

0.57

0.43

CN

0.38

0.44

0.33

0.27

0.41

0.39

0.38

0.35

0.38

0.28

0.29

0.34

0.35

0.27

0.16

FR

0.53

0.53

0.48

0.42

0.51

0.50

0.48

0.49

0.55

0.38

0.20

0.49

0.51

0.43

DE

0.32

0.31

0.23

0.27

0.28

0.29

0.29

0.24

0.28

0.32

0.51

0.23

0.34

HK

0.15

0.53

0.22

0.36

0.25

0.26

0.27

0.21

0.21

0.40

0.58

0.21

IN

0.19

0.56

0.48

0.42

0.35

0.17 0.46

0.45

0.14

0.06

0.50

0.53

0.17 0.16

0.48

0.48

0.28

JP

0.02

0.11

0.26

0.47

ID

0.38

0.40

0.25

0.11

0.25

0.32

0.39

0.25

0.25

KR

0.18

0.47

0.10

0.18

0.29

0.22

0.20

0.11

MY

0.18

0.43

0.07

0.17

0.27

0.28

0.21

PH

0.18

0.45

0.25

0.34

0.38

0.39

RU

0.41

0.36

0.22

0.26

0.25

SG

0.40

0.37

0.21

0.19

ZA

0.35

0.45

0.16

TW

0.24

0.46

TH

0.51

US

Table 34.1 Pairwise institutional distances (Gower dissimilarity matrix), higher = less similar. Distances involving Southeast Asian economies are in bold.

826   Michael A. Witt

Common Themes and Salient Differences Within Southeast Asia Similarities across Southeast Asian economies are evident not only in the aggregate institutional distances but also in most of the eight dimensions defining business systems mentioned earlier. Below, I will highlight the major areas of common trends among all six countries as well as salient differences that differentiate the Southeast Asian emerging economies from the (post-​)socialist economy of Vietnam and the advanced city economy of Singapore. Unless otherwise indicated, all data stem from the respective chapters on these countries in the Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems (Carney, 2014; Carney & Andriesse, 2014; Kondo, 2014; Rosser, 2014; Suehiro & Wailerdsak Yabushita, 2014; Truong & Rowley, 2014) and the summary work by Witt and Redding (2013) building on them. Table 34.2 provides a high-​level

Table 34.2 High-​level summary of institutional differences and similarities Category

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand

Singapore

Vietnam

Education and • Weak education skills formation • Weak skills formation

• Excellent education • Weak skills formation

• Medium education • Weak skills formation

Employment relations

• Employment tenures short • Weak unions

• Employment tenures short • Weak unions, incorporated in government

• Employment tenures short • High union membership but union a branch of the Communist Party

Finance

• Bank-​led • Allocation by relationships and state guidance

• Bank-​led • Allocation by relationships and state guidance

• Bank-​led • Allocation by relationships and state guidance

Inter-​firm networks

• Conglomerates • Personal  ties • Government

• Conglomerates • Personal  ties • Government

• Conglomerates • Personal  ties • Communist Party

Internal dynamics

• Top-​down decision-​making • Little delegation

• Top-​down decision-​making • Some delegation

• Top-​down decision-​making • Little delegation

Ownership and governance

Family and state

Family and state

Family and state

Social capital

Interpersonal (some institutionalized in Malaysia)

Interpersonal and institutionalized

Interpersonal

State role

Predatory

Developmental and regulatory

Developmental and predatory

Management in Southeast Asia    827 summary with the categories arranged in alphabetical order, while the below discussion orders the same categories for optimum flow of the narrative.

Ownership and Corporate Governance The two major types of owners in Southeast Asian business systems are families and governments. While family ownership is common for small businesses everywhere, in the region it is also not unusual for fairly large enterprises. Even when listed on stock exchanges, the founding family usually retains a controlling stake in the firm and is intricately involved in its management. In the countries considered here except Vietnam, families in 2010 controlled between 39.0% (Malaysia) and 83.2% (Philippines) of total market capitalization (Credit Suisse, 2011). Among the largest 200 firms in the same countries, families in 2008 controlled between 37.8% (Thailand) and 78.5% (Philippines) of these firms, with only Thailand falling below 50% (Carney & Child, 2013). Successful families often build business groups of firms spanning a number of not necessarily related industries, with the top positions held by family members. Managerially speaking, this implies that promotion to the very top is out of reach for most employees and success in the firm in general is a function of finding favor with the founding family. It also creates a challenge of intergenerational succession, with most enterprises in the region currently in transition to the third generation—​which, so local folklore has it, is usually the one that runs the business into the ground. In terms of corporate governance, this shareholding structure paired with weak legal systems in most of the region, as explained below, creates the potential for controlling shareholders to abuse minority investors. For instance, a practice known as tunneling involves using transfer pricing within the business group so most of the profits accrue where the founding family has retained the largest cash flow rights. In all six economies in this chapter, the ethnic Chinese business community plays a prominent role in business ownership. Ethnic Chinese have been settling throughout the region for centuries. Previously known as “Overseas Chinese,” the community currently prefers the label “Regional Ethnic Chinese” to clarify that its members are not Chinese citizens. The Regional Ethnic Chinese are a minority in Southeast Asian countries except Singapore. Up-​to-​date and reliable data on their wealth are notoriously difficult to obtain. The business success of the Regional Ethnic Chinese is a politically highly sensitive matter that has at times led to communal violence, last in Indonesia in the context of the 1997/​ 1998 Asian financial crisis. As a result, there is a strong tendency for ethnic Chinese businesses to try to keep their holdings compartmentalized and their true extent hidden (cf. Redding, 1990). For Thailand, which has a well-​integrated ethnic Chinese business community, Millet summarized that about 50 ethnic Chinese families control “80% to 90% of the overall market capitalization of the country, 90% of its manufacturing section, 50% of the banking and financial services sectors (including the four largest private banks) and about 80% of the companies listed in the Thai stock market . . . five top billionaires in Thailand have Chinese blood as well as 17 former prime ministers and at least one prior king” (2015: 101). Other evidence (Lasserre & Schütte, 2005) suggests that in the early 2000s, ethnic Chinese accounting for 1% of Filipinos received about 40% of its gross national income, with the corresponding figures for Indonesia being

828   Michael A. Witt 4% and 50%. Many successful ethnic Chinese families from countries with a history of friction—​mainly Indonesia and Malaysia—​park considerable wealth in Singaporean bank accounts and property as an insurance. The causes of prominence are manifold (cf. Redding, 1990). Much money has been made in trading. The so-​called bamboo network of reciprocal business relations connecting regional ethnic Chinese communities in different parts of the region historially provided considerable support of this strategy but has since lost significance at least for the larger enterprises. In terms of trading strategies, Redding (1990) showed that ethnic Chinese businesses outperformed their local competitors by offering lower prices while achieving much higher turnover, lower stock, and shorter collection periods. Privileged access, not always cleanly gained, to natural resources, such as forests and mines, has likewise helped generate fortunes. And at least historically, especially in countries with strong and long-​standing leaders, some ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs became wealthy through political strategies that involved a generous cut of their proceeds to whoever was in power. Former Indonesian dictator Suharto, for instance, was estimated to have embezzeled up to US$35 billion (Transparency International, 2004). Much of this occurred apparently with the help of local tycoons, with most of the large ones being ethnic Chinese. Rather than a sign of openness, this focus on ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs was an insurance policy for Suharto: as members of an ethnic minority disliked by the majority, even very wealthy ethnic Chinese business people could never challenge him politically. In the literature, the Regional Ethnic Chinese have at times been treated as a transnational business system in its own right (Redding & Witt, 2007; Whitley, 1999). There is some justice to this, even though there is variance in the way ethnic Chinese businesses are run in different parts of the region and local circumstances, such as weak institutions, have shaped them. Works in this vein have generally found that the Regional Ethnic Chinese way of doing business resembles that of private business in the People’s Republic of China. This is not surprising given that the Regional Ethnic Chinese brought the traditional Chinese way of doing business with themselves when they emigrated to Southeast Asia (Redding, 1990). In addition, after the opening of China to foreign investors in the 1980s, the Regional Ethnic Chinese committed massive investments to China, thus contributing to the revival of private business after the Mao era (Ralston, Pounder, Lo, Wong, Egri, & Stauffer, 2006; Redding, 1990; Redding & Witt, 2007). The second largest ownership category is state-​controlled firms. Carney and Child (2013) found that in five of the six countries studied here, the state controlled between 5.2% (Philippines) and 39.7% (Malaysia) of the respective 200 largest publicly listed firms. This is in addition to various unlisted state-​owned enterprises in areas such as utilities and transportation. While similar statistics are not available for Vietnam, state ownership remains pervasive, and the state usually retains a controlling stake even if “privatizing” a state-​owned enterprise by listing it on the stock exchange (Taussig, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2015).

Management in Southeast Asia    829 State-​owned firms are often large players deemed too important, or lucrative, to transfer to private ownership. For instance, Singapore’s “government-​linked companies” (GLCs) span sectors judged too essential to leave to the whims of foreign multinational players. They are economically highly significant, accounting for 37% of stock market capitalization between 2008 and 2013 (Sim, Thomsen, & Yeong, 2014). Unlike in the rest of the region, Singapore’s GLCs are held at arm’s length and managed essentially like private enterprises. In state-​controlled firms in the other countries, management tends to be more politicized. For instance, state-​owned enterprises in Malaysia are at least in part also vehicles for government policy favoring ethnic Malays over other ethnicities, especially ethnic Chinese. In Vietnam, top management appointments are still decided by the Communist Party.

Financial System All countries in this chapter feature bank-​based financial systems. This is true even for Singapore, which has a high stock market capitalization relative to GDP and thus at first glance looks like a market-​based system. However, a substantial part of that capitalization derives from foreign firms, especially Chinese, listing in Singapore. Bank-​led finance is a factor that permits founding families to remain in control as their firms grow, as expansion can be financed using debt rather than equity. This suggests an important role for debt management. Capital allocation in all six countries is based on a mix of relationships and state guidance. Vietnam is heaviest on state guidance, probably followed by Malaysia. Management thus has an incentive to cultivate ties with their banks or with the government. This can, but does not need to, imply corruption or cronyism: other countries, such as Germany and Japan, feature relationship-​based bank-​led systems that are not usually seen as corrupt. Rather, the relationship element here is the result of close, long-​ term business ties with a given bank. This pattern is most likely in Singapore, which features low levels of corruption in general and has the best developed financial system in the region.

Employment Relations Employment relations are fragmented, in the sense that unions as independent representatives of collective employee interests are very weak throughout the region. Membership is around 5% of the workforce in Indonesia, around 10% in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 17% in Singapore, though about 67% in Vietnam. At the same time, membership strength does not mean power. In Vietnam, the unions are a branch of the Communist Party, as is typical of communist political systems. In Singapore, the unions are likewise in effect a branch of the government. In terms of effective rights of unions, the region fares poorly. Even the best-​rated country in the region, Singapore, is reported to commit “regular violation of rights” of workers in the ITUC Global Rights Index (International Trade Union Confederation, 2016: 16). Employment tenures in the region are usually short term, which means that talent management and skills formation (see below) represent managerial challenges.

830   Michael A. Witt

Education and Skills Formation Basic education continues to be a challenge in most of the region, except Singapore. The mean years of schooling completed for the population aged 25 or above in 2010 (the last year for which comparable data are available) was 7.3 for Indonesia and Thailand, 7.5 for Vietnam, 8.2 for the Philippines, 9.8 for Malaysia, and 10.6 for Singapore (World Bank, 2017a). The region thus lags behind standards of advanced industrialized countries. With Germany, Japan, and the United States registering 12.7, 11.5, and 13.4 years, respectively (World Bank, 2017a). Attainment by current students likewise suggests a mixed picture. In the 2015 international comparison by the Program for International Student Assessment (OECD, 2016), Singapore ranked first among 72 countries across all three categories: mathematics, science, and reading. Vietnam on average across the three categories ranked 21st, Malaysia, 46th, Thailand, 57th, and Indonesia, 65th. The Philippines have not participated in the study, but it seems unlikely that it would attain a top rank. Usable skills at the level of firms are relatively scarce in all of these economies, including Singapore. Public vocational training is weak throughout. One reason for this phenomenon is a cultural predisposition against manual labor. Attending vocational training or going to a polytechnic is seen as a concession of academic failure. At the same time, given short employment tenures, which implies that employees switch companies fairly often, managers are reluctant to invest heavily in their employees’ skills. The acquisition of skills is thus left effectively to individual efforts, and talent management is more oriented toward sourcing appropriate skills from outside the firm rather than toward internal training. Strategies requiring high levels of skills inside the firm are difficult to execute in these contexts.

Social Capital In business systems analysis, social capital is construed as the trust that is necessary for people and capital to work together to produce value (Li & Redding, 2014). Southeast Asian business systems overwhelmingly rely on interpersonal trust, that is, confidence in the trustworthiness of a specific other person that is grounded in past experience. This limits the circle of available business partners, though it may be extended to previously unknown persons through referrals by trusted third parties. Only Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia have managed to build up the main alternative form, institutionalized trust. This form of trust enables business connections by putting in place a system that prevents opportunism, such as a functioning legal system. The extent of institutionalized trust is inversely correlated with the degree of corruption in society. In the region, corruption is generally high except in Singapore (Transparency International, 2017), which moved early in its existence to stamp out corruption, in part to enable its economic strategy of becoming a hub for foreign multinational firms. The corruption ratings for Malaysia (Transparency International, 2017) probably underestimate the magnitude of the problem. For instance, in the 2015 scandal around 1Malaysia Development Berhad

Management in Southeast Asia    831 (1MDB), the FBI estimated that more than US$3.5 billion was siphoned off and laundered for private use (Jenkins, 2016). At the managerial level, this creates challenges with respect to staffing and delegation. Since contracts require institutionalized trust to work, hiring into key positions is often done on the basis of kinship or friendship. Supervisory control of untrusted employees is usually high, as there is constant concern that the person in question may behave opportunistically. For the same reason, the willingness to delegate beyond the circle of trusted employees is low. One implication is that firms in these environments will usually find it difficult to create very complex products, as these require high levels of cooperation and delegation.

The Role of the State An analysis of the role of the state for the six countries explored here produces three clusters: Singapore, Vietnam, and everyone else. Singapore stands out as generally well governed. Its state model has been described as a mix of developmental and regulatory state (cf. Carney & Witt, 2014). Developmental states use government policies to drive economic development, often with fairly heavy state intervention to ensure that developmental goals are attained. In Singapore, the government-​linked sector can be argued to represent this aspect of governance. By contrast, regulatory states put into place regulatory frameworks to establish a level playing field for firms to compete. In Singapore, this aspect is most clearly visible in the rules and regulations governing private economic activity, especially that of foreign multinational players. The emergence of this mix in Singapore is linked to two forces. First, Singapore cannot be a predatory state because it has no natural resources. Second, Singapore came into being in 1965 under hostile conditions, with both Malaysia and Indonesia vying to absorb it. Creating a strong economy to finance national defense was a necessity. The recipe chosen combined the build-​up of local players in vital industries with the opening of the economy to foreign investors. Singaporean government decision-​making is top-​down, which increases the possible speed of decision-​making but also the risk of faulty decisions (cf. Witt & Lewin, 2007). The long-​standing ruling party of Singapore seeks to reduce the risk of the latter through consultation with community leaders through its “grassroots” movement. Government effectiveness and regulatory quality are high. Vietnam mixes developmental elements with predatory components, similar to China. The abuse of public office for private gain is typical of predatory states, as signified by high levels of corruption. Predatory states often suffer from the natural-​resource curse, in which the easy availability of natural resources reduces government motivation to build up a modern economy. Vietnam does have some elements of this, though predation is also enabled by the possibility of using state resources for private gain (a pattern also seen in China). Decision-​making is top-​down by the Communist Party and generally opaque, and government effectiveness and regulatory quality are the weakest among the six countries, which limits the scope for successful developmental state intervention.

832   Michael A. Witt The remaining four states are usually seen as predominantly predatory in nature. All of them suffer from the natural resource curse. Malaysia for a while seemed to make a successful transition to a developmental state model, but this is generally considered to have stalled or failed (Carney & Andriesse, 2014). Government effectiveness and regulatory quality are generally poor, though decent in Malaysia (World Bank, 2017b). All six states discussed here are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The argument has been made that ASEAN may be a source of a “region-​specific advantage” (Beleska-​Spasova, Loykulnanta, & Nguyen, 2016), and that recent attempts to build an “ASEAN Economic Community” may provide a major push toward tighter regional integration (Park, Ungson, & Francisco, 2016). In reality, however, the impact of this transnational arrangement on individual member states and their ways of doing business is probably minimal beyond facilitating trade and the attendant distributional consequences (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, & Rogowski, 1996; Webber, 2013). ASEAN is best understood as a structure that provides for nearly tariff-​free trade in goods and increasingly also services among its member states, though non-​tariff barriers have apparently grown in recent years (Jones, 2016). There is little evidence of a clear ability or ambition to become much more than that. In terms of ability, a common market under the ASEAN Economic Community remains work in progress (Jones, 2016). There is no institutionalized dispute settlement mechanism if member states fail to live up to their commitments. And non-​ economic agreements of the type common in the European Union are sparse and generally do not work. For instance, Indonesia took 12 years to ratify the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Both during and after these years, dense smog (“haze”) from slash-​and-​burn agriculture in Indonesia reached neighboring countries. In terms of ambition, tighter integration along the lines of the European Union is in effect impossible because achieving this would require the relinquishing of some levels of sovereignty. A  common misunderstanding of the European Union is to think of it as basically a glorified free trade zone, when in fact it constitutes a mechanism intended to prevent war in Europe through the pooling of sovereignty (Archick, 2017). The fact that ASEAN nations are unwilling to consider such pooling is evident in the ASEAN decision-​making rules, the so-​called ASEAN Way, which emphasizes self-​ determination and sovereignty (Jones, 2016). The managerial implications growing out of these configurations are diverse. In Singapore, compliance is a main concern in terms of interfacing with government, unless one manages a government-​linked company. In the other countries, corruption and regulatory uncertainty are likely to impinge on managerial decision-​making and actions. The developmental element of Vietnam, finally, implies a potentially precarious position for foreign firms competing in the same space as local firms. The objective of developmental states is to grow a domestic industrial infrastructure, not to provide for fair competition for foreign entrants.

Management in Southeast Asia    833

Inter-​firm  Ties Common across the region is a tendency to build conglomerates and the maintenance and use of personal ties, often along ethnic lines (see the above discussion of the Regional Ethnic Chinese) for business purposes. With the exception of Singapore, the latter type of networking may involve elements of corruption. Networking among firms may also occur in the context of state ownership, as discussed earlier. In Vietnam, Communist Party penetration of much of the economy provides a further substratum for inter-​firm networks.

Internal Dynamics of the Firm Management in Southeast Asian firms tends to be top-​down, with major decisions centralized at the senior executive level. Family-​owned firms, even if listed and large, are usually run by the family, for the family. For state-​owned firms, the state represents an important stakeholder that needs taking into account, and the career prospects of top managers in these firms are often tied to their ability to manage government relations. Consultation with lower-​level employees in the firm tends to be rare, with the implication that employees rarely feel empowered or particularly committed to the firm. Commitment also suffers from factors already mentioned. Delegation tends to be circumscribed as a result of limited trust, and supervisory control tends to be high. Promotions at least to the very top are limited to controlling family members or the politically connected to the respective state agencies in charge of a state-​owned enterprise, so performance will take employees only to a certain point. And given the emphasis on control and enforcement, there is a strong tendency to manage vertically, at the expense of lateral coordination across departments. These issues are least pronounced but still present in Singapore.

Strategies in the Region Strategies in the region differ between firms originating in the region and multinational enterprises (MNEs) entering from outside the region. For the former group, the above discussion of the business system has already shed light on salient features of corporate and business strategies visible in the region. Strategic orientations mentioned include trading and politically based (“non-​market”) strategies by Regional Ethnic Chinese businesses; a tendency toward conglomerate building, often involving unrelated diversification (Lim, Das, & Das, 2009); growth using leverage rather equity; and so on. MNEs coming into the region likewise display a number of strategic tendencies. Some 80% of firms use Singapore as a hub and regional headquarters (Wood, 2014). This is, of course, precisely what Singapore government policy has been working to accomplish. The continued motivation by firms to locate in Singapore, as opposed to elsewhere in the region, is contingent on Singapore remaining a cleaner, better regulated, and

834   Michael A. Witt more efficient business environment for MNEs than the neighbors—​in other words, a hub strategy is, at least to some extent, invariably built on the incompetence of the neighbors. Fortunately for Singapore, the rest of the region is not showing any clear signs of catching up. Most MNEs have likewise abandoned attempts to run all of Asia out of China, which usually resulted in too much attention on China and too little attention on the rest of the region. While Singapore makes for a good hub for the region, MNEs there face a series of challenges. Some of these are purely economic. For instance, Singapore has ranked as the world’s most expensive city (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017), with concomitant cost implications for regional headquarters. Others are strategic. For instance, how much power should the regional headquarters have relative to the countries and global headquarters? Others again are managerial. For instance, many MNEs use their regional headquarters in Singapore as a means of rounding out international staff for higher management roles. At the same time, the small size of Singapore and a relatively weak skills formation system, as discussed earlier in this chapter, mean that the supply of internationally top local talent is limited. As a result, foreign talent occupiers many of the top positions in regional headquarters, leading Singaporeans to suspect that top echelons in foreign MNEs are beyond reach. This, in turn, is at least partially to blame for some of the human resource challenges such as high turnover already mentioned. Continued diversity and limited integration across Southeast Asian economies means that MNEs seeking market access usually rely on multiple presences across the region (Wood, 2014). Especially in the less advanced economies in the region, this often involves joint ventures (JVs). This is partially in response to legal requirements. For instance, Indonesia maintains a “negative investment list” regulating sectors foreign MNEs may enter and prescribing partnerships and foreign ownership limits for various industries. In part, however, foreign MNEs also rely on their local partners to provide local know-​how they themselves do not possess, such as a sense of maneuvering the political context and dealing with corruption. Partnerships may thus help solve certain managerial challenges. At the same time, they usually create new ones, including strategic questions around with whom to partner and how to manage a partnership in contexts that are institutionally very different from the home countries of most MNEs and, in particular, lack institutionalized trust and thus the rule of law necessary to enforce partnership contracts. For many Western firms, Southeast Asian emerging markets have also played an important role in their international supply chains, especially in the context of offshoring manufacturing to China. Many of the components used in Chinese export processing manufacturing, such as the final assembly of IT equipment, have been sourced from Southeast Asia (Ravenhill, 2006). Increasing sophistication of the supplier base in China obviously reduces the need for pan-​Asian sourcing. At the same time, the region has benefited from widespread implementation of so-​called China + 1 strategies—​the notion that manufacturing should not be overly concentrated in China so as to reduce dependency on a single source of supply.

Management in Southeast Asia    835

Multinational Enterprises Emerging from Southeast Asia In the context of the bamboo network of the Regional Ethnic Chinese already noted, the region has a long history of internationally active firms. Modern MNEs from the region, on the other hand, are a more recent phenomenon, and their numbers remain small, though of growing research interest (Pananond & Giroud, 2016; Park et al., 2016). The 2017 Fortune Global 500 list contained only six firms from the region (Table 34.3), half of them from Singapore. The non-​Singaporean firms are all in the same industry—​ petroleum—​and are all state-​owned. The Singaporean firms are privately held, but two of them are “Singaporean” mostly by virtue of having their headquarters located there. Wilmar International is a holding company, presumably taking advantage of Singapore’s rule of law and benign tax regime, with virtually all of its production occurring elsewhere, especially Indonesia. Flex was founded in the United States and moved its headquarters to Singapore in 1990. While the region is thus still sparsely endowed with large MNEs, a growing number of candidates for future growth are waiting in the wings. Boston Consulting Group (BCG), a consultancy, in 2016 identified 15 firms from the region as rising stars (Table 34.4)2 (Azevedo et  al., 2016). Arguably a number of Singaporean firms should be added to the list—​BCG apparently meant to exclude Singapore, classifying the Golden Agri-​Resources and Wilmar International by the main geography of their activities (Indonesia) rather than their headquarters (Singapore), which Table 34.4 corrects. Prominent Singaporean candidates for inclusion are, for instance, the three major banks (DBS, OCBC, UOB) and Singapore Airlines—​all of them, incidentally, government-​ linked companies. One might also add Grab, an unlisted Uber clone with a valuation exceeding US$1 billion. Founded in Malaysia, Grab is headquartered in Singapore and active throughout most of Southeast Asia. A number of patterns are visible in Table 34.4. First, 8 of the 15 firms, marked in bold, are led by ethnic Chinese businesspeople, consistent with the role of the ethnic Chinese in the region already discussed. Second, most of these firms are active in relatively low-​ tech industries, with food occupying a prominent position. And third, the Philippines and Thailand provide particularly good examples of the conglomerate structure common in emerging markets, with Ayala Corporation perhaps as the clearest case. Intriguingly, the firms in Tables 34.3 and 34.4, but also all Singaporean firms mentioned two paragraphs, earlier except perhaps Singapore airlines, are virtually unknown internationally to a non-​specialist audience. This points to one of the major managerial challenges these firms will need to overcome to be truly successful internationally: brand-​building. So far, this has proved an uphill battle—​similar to MNEs emerging out of China (Redding & Witt, 2007). The key question for MNEs from the region is: given a management system that is top-​down, highly centralized, little delegated, and organized in vertical silos, how can firms handle something as complex as building

836   Michael A. Witt Table 34.3 Major MNEs from Southeast Asia Rank

Company

Country

Industry

Revenues, Billion USD

Employees

54

Trafigura

Singapore

Trading

98.1

4107

184

Petronas

Malaysia

Petroleum refining

49.5

51,034

192

PTT

Thailand

Petroleum refining

48.7

24,934

239

Wilmar Int’l

Singapore

Food production

41.4

90,000

289

Pertamina

Indonesia

Petroleum refining

36.5

27,227

455

Flex

Singapore

Semiconductors and other electronic components

23.9

200,000

Source: Fortune Global 500, 2017

and maintaining a brand, which requires extensive lateral collaboration across different areas of the firm? Part of the challenge of building brands is connected to the relative lack of institutionalized trust, which limits the willingness of owners and managers to delegate. This is likely to hamper the emergence of MNEs from the region beyond limiting their ability to create and manage global brands. Internationalization usually involves the dispersion of managerial decision-​making and control across different geographies. Such dispersion, however, requires delegation. There are probably workarounds that will take Southeast Asian firms international up to a point. For instance, foreign dependencies could still be run out of the global headquarters—​a strategy that is most suitable for simple or globalized products and services as this structure would limit responsiveness to local market conditions. Or local branches could be led by trusted family members, which would place a premium on family size. For successful brand-​building, Southeast Asian MNEs will further need to transition out of their current roles of contract manufacturing for established multinational players and capture more of the value chain of their products. This may require non-​traditional approaches other than the upgrading of internal capabilities usually envisioned in the literature (Pananond, 2016). For instance, the Thai Union Group used international acquisitions of firms with established brands to transform itself from a local tuna cannery to the leading canned seafood processor in the world (Pananond, 2016). Jollibee, on the other hand, seems to be leveraging brand recognition among the Filipino diaspora for international expansion (cf. Kumar & Steenkamp, 2013). Looming over the region is further the question whether the strategies of large firms in Southeast Asia may not effectively lock them into the specific institutional contexts of their home markets. Noting the low levels of outward investment by Indonesian firms, for instance, Carney and Dieleman (2011) suggest that internationalization of these groups may be circumscribed by contextual factors. Family ownership, common in

Management in Southeast Asia    837 Table 34.4 Rising MNEs from Southeast Asia. Ethnic Chinese businesses in bold face, numbers as of September 30, 2017 Country

Company

Industry

Revenue (million US$)

Employees

Indonesia

Indofood

Food production

5186

84,350

Malaysia

AirAsia

Air travel

2039

7710

Axiata Group Berhad

Telecommunications

5645

25,000

Petronas

Petroleum refining

52,937

40,827

Ayala Corp.

Real estate, financial services, manufacturing, telecommunications, infrastructure

5391

114 (holding company)

DMCI Holdings

Real estate, mining, infrastructure

1505

1292 (holding company)

Jollibee Foods Corp.

Restaurants

2495

11,957

Universal Robina Corp.

Food and beverage

2207

13,001

Golden Agri-​Resources

Food production

7722

46,300

Wilmar International

Food production

44,246

90,000

Charoen Pokphand Food production, Foods telecommunications, retail, manufacturing

15,132

n/​a

Indorama Ventures

Petrochemicals

8617

n/​a

PTT

Petroleum refining

59,419

10,630

Thai Beverage

Beverages

5817

n/​a

Thai Union Group

Food production

4138

25,973

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

Sources: Azevedo et al., 2016, S&P Capital IQ.

Indonesia and the region, seems to be linked to a preference for domestic diversification. In addition, firms have built their success on capabilities that are highly specific to Indonesia, such as maneuvering the regulatory and political landscape. This can be highly profitable at home, not least also by enticing or forcing (with the help of political connections) foreign players into JVs. Whether it is a good basis for international expansion is less obvious. To the extent Southeast Asian firms do go international, they are more likely to do well in other emerging markets than in advanced industrialized economies. As already discussed

838   Michael A. Witt in the context of Table 34.1, Southeast Asian economies are institutionally more similar to other emerging markets, such as the BRICS, than to OECD countries. This means that their liability of foreignness for operating in the former is likely to be smaller than in the latter, and their approach to management is more likely to be transferable to the former (Carney, Dieleman, & Taussig, 2016). A likely pattern for the future thus seems to be a path similar to that trodden by many other EMNEs: in terms of serving foreign markets, expansion to other emerging markets is a likely first step (see Chapter 19 in this Handbook). Where expansion involves advanced industrialized countries, we may see acquisitions involving strategic resources such as technology to upgrade internal competences and possibly to accelerate the internationalization process (Luo & Tung, 2007), but rarely involving full integration into the activities of the acquirer. At this point, however, these are merely conjectures. Clearly the study of MNEs from the region has a long future ahead.

Acknowledgements I thank Klaus Meyer and Rob Grosse for their editorial guidance and Jorge Carneiro, Marleen Dieleman, Pavida Pananond, and Andrew Staples for giving feedback on this chapter. I am further grateful to Gordon Redding and the participants of the authors’ conference for this Handbook in August 2017 for their helpful input.

Notes 1. Papua New Guinea is usually considered part of Oceania. 2. The employment numbers for Petronas and PTT in Table 34.4 are markedly different from those in Table 34.3. Assuming no errors in either database, this may be because of differences in reporting dates—​the Fortune numbers are older. At the same time, the changes seem too large for organic developments. Possible explanations are spin-​offs for PTT and partial sales of operating subsidiaries for Petronas.

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Index

absorptive capacity, and foreign direct investment (FDI), 410–​411, 640–​641 acquisitions and competing for mid-​market, 757–​758 filling capability gaps through, 752–​753 as source of legitimacy for technology-​ based companies in India, 733, 736, 737t activist investors, and corporate governance and monitoring, 165 advanced multinational corporations (AMNCs) definition of, 799 global economic hierarchy and methods of internationalization, 800–​801, 802, 817–​818 implications of middleness in global economic hierarchy, 801 affordability, implications for management in emerging markets, 230–​231 Africa drive toward manufacturing in, 390, 604n2 foreign direct investment in, 634 international business strategies during Great Reversal, 64 management practices in, 30 See also individual countries See also South Africa, setting in wider Africa and the world agency theory, and state-​owned multinationals, 574–​576 Aguilera, Ruth V. “Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets,” 185–​218 Akamatsu, Kaname, 12, 596 Amazon global supply chain, 48, 48f ambidexterity, of multinational emerging market enterprises, 619–​621 Amrutham Nutrimix, 256

Anderson, Ray, 255 Anglo-​Iranian Oil Company, nationalization of, 63 Apple outsourcing of production to China, 70 Arbenz, Jacobo, 63 arbitrage, and behavioral biases in management, 169, 170, 179–​180, 180n3 artificial intelligence (AI), implications for human rights in business, 390 Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (Asian NIEs)  10-​11 “Asian Tigers” definition of, 10, 12 assembly capability, and local firms in global value chains, 598–​599 asset seeking strategies, and multinational emerging market enterprises, 612–​614, 632–​635 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 834 Aulakh, Preet S. “Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies,” 609–​630 auto components industry in China, 601–​602 in India, 599 automobile industry in Brazil during Great Reversal of globalization, 65 in China, 758 in Morocco, 600 Avon, and beauty industry in Latin America, 68 banking sector in China, 758 in Russia, 717

844   Index banking systems, in emerging nations, 232 bankruptcy laws, as institutional variable, 283–​284 Barber, Benjamin, tribalization, 71 bargaining, and managing fixed price structure, 232 Barloworld, as broker, 807 Barnard, Helena “Operating across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy: Insights from South Africa’s Setting in Wider Africa and the World,” 799–​822 Basco, Rodrigo “Family Business in Emerging Markets,” 527–​545 base-​of-​the-​pyramid (BoP) approach, and importance of household economic activities in family business, 531, 534 base-​of-​the-​pyramid (BoP) communities archetypal BoP ventures, and mutual value, 252t archetypes of BoP ventures, 251f BoP approaches, history of, 243–​244 business opportunities in, 25 and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 221–​222 definition of initiatives in, 262n1 focal agents in, 250–​251 frugal engineering and marketing to, 72 and markets served, 251 purchasing behavior of, 225, 226t base-​of-​the-​pyramid (BoP) communities, mutual value CARD approach to ventures in, 241–​265 appropriation of value, 248 archetypes of BoP ventures, 251f basics of, 241–​242 BoP approaches, history of, 243–​244 BoP as consumer, 253–​254, 259 BoP as producer, 257–​258, 260 broadening perspective of, 260 creation of value, 247–​248 defining mutual value CARD, 247–​250 destruction of value, 249–​250 directions for future research, 259–​260 focal agents, 250–​251 inclusive supply chains, 254–​255, 259–​260

markets served, 251 mutual value and shared value, 246–​247 mutual value as lens to view success, 245–​247 mutual value CARD and archetypal BoP ventures, 252t retention of value, 248–​249 self-​reliant BoP, 255–​257 success in various contexts, 250–​258 Baumol, W. J., 457, 477 beauty industry markets for in second global economy, 71 behavioral biases and corporate governance and objectives, 173–​177 in emerging economies, 162–​163 and financial management, 169–​173, 181n7 in firms, 174, 175f, 176, 178 and implications for financial markets, 178–​179 managerial biases and financial markets, 176–​177 of managers, 171–​173, 180n4, 180n5, 181n6 sources and implications of, 177–​179 Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar “Spillovers from FDI in Emerging Market Economies,” 399–​425 biases, behavioral and corporate governance and objectives, 173–​177 in emerging economies, 162–​163 and financial management, 169–​173, 181n7 in firms, 174, 175f, 176, 178 and implications for financial markets, 178–​179 managerial biases and financial markets, 176–​177 of managers, 171–​173, 180n4, 180n5, 181n6 sources and implications of, 177–​179 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 128 efforts to terminate, 142 protections afforded investors, 135b boards of directors in BRIC countries, 205–​206 and corporate governance and monitoring, 165, 191

Index   845 two-​tier board system, 206 Bolivia, nationalization of tin industry, 69 borders, ease of trading across as institutional variable, 282–​283 borrowing, ease of as institutional variable, 281–​282 bottom-​of-​the-​pyramid communities See base-​of-​the-​pyramid (BoP) communities brands and consumer preferences in China, 229 implications for managers in emerging markets, 231–​232 Brazil automobile industry during Great Reversal of globalization, 65 board and managerial supervision in, 205 challenges for foreign companies and investors, 694–​696, 698–​699 corporate governance, dimensions of, 195t corporate governance in, 189t, 192–​193 corporate social responsibility in, 206–​207 cultural and ethnic diversity of, 678 culture of, 683–​685 distinctive approaches to innovation in, 364–​365 ecology and natural environment, 683 examples of innovation in, 353 geography of, 681–​683 geopolitical regions, 681f history of, 677–​680, 678f, 693 income inequality in, 686 information disclosure and reporting in, 204 infrastructure in, 692–​693 legal framework in, 201–​202 management practices in, 29 ownership and corporate governance in, 190 ownership and shareholder rights in, 203 religion in, 683–​684 rise of middle class in, 687–​688 sociodemography of, 685–​688, 686f stakeholder rights in, 206–​207 See also BRIC countries Brazil, managing multinationals in, 677–​704 bureaucracy, 689

challenges for foreign companies and investors, 694–​696, 698–​699 corporate leadership style, 680 corruption in politics and business, 691–​692 culture, and human resource practices, 695–​696 culture, and institutional environment, 683–​685 custo Brasil (Brazil cost), 692–​693 distance and transportation issues, 682 ecology, and institutional environment, 683 economy, and institutional environment, 693–​694 formal business negotiations, 684 geography, and institutional environment, 681–​683 historical influences, 677–​680, 678f, 693 and income inequality, 686 infrastructure, and institutional environment, 692–​693 interviews and interviewee details, 699, 700t, 702–​703 labor costs and union system, 689–​690 legal issues, and institutional environment, 688–​690 natural resources, 682–​683 and particularities of business models, 697–​698 politics, and institutional environment, 690–​692 and rise of middle-​class, 687–​688 social relationships and, 685 sociodemography, and institutional environment, 685–​688, 686f tax burden, 688 BREXIT, and economic nationalism, 345 BRIC countries corporate governance in, 189t, 192–​193 definition of, 12 distinctive approaches to innovation in, 362–​365 examples of innovation in, 352–​353 international tourism data, 19t outward foreign direct investment from, 631, 632f ownership and ownership rights in, 209

846   Index BRIC countries, corporate governance in, 193–207 board and managerial supervision, 205–​206 corporate social responsibility, 206–​207 dimensions of, 195t frameworks, 194, 200–​201 future challenges and opportunities, 207–​210 information disclosure and reporting, 204–​205 and legal frameworks, 201–​203 ownership and ownership rights, 209 ownership and shareholder rights, 203–​204 stakeholder rights, 206–​207 brokers, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 805–​808,  806f Buckley, P. J., theory of internalization, 40–​41,  49n1 business, ease of exiting, 283–​284 business, ease of starting as institutional variable, 281 Business and Human Rights, United Nations Guiding Principles on, 129, 133, 374, 380–​381 business and human rights in emerging markets, 27 business environment, evolution of in comparative institutionalism, 114–​116 in institutional economics, 101–​106 in organizational institutionalism, 110–​111 business groups in emerging markets, 28 characteristics of, 547–​548 directions for future research, 560–​561 economic perspectives on, 548, 550–​554 embeddedness in emerging economy contexts, 558–​560 ethnic and racial dimension, 560 and family businesses, 557 and family business groups, 559–​560 and institutional logics, 556–​558 internal market, business group as, 550–​552 literature studying, 548, 549t and market-​oriented institutional changes, 558 networks, business groups as, 554–​555 resource bundle, business group as, 552–​554 sociological perspectives on, 554–​560

sociopolitical networks and changes in government, 559 theoretical perspectives in research, 561, 594t business models, particularities in Brazil, 697–​698 business systems and analysis of management in Southeast Asia, 824–​826 in Southeast Asia, 826–​835, 828t capability gaps, filling through partnerships, mergers, and acquisitions, 752–​753 Carneiro, Jorge “Managing Multinationals in Brazil,” 677–​704 Casson, M. C., theory of internalization, 40–​41,  49n1 Castaño, Raquel “Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets,” 219–​240 catch-​up trends, of emerging markets in twenty-​first century, 13–​16, 14t Caterpillar Tractor Company, operations in Africa, 805, 806–​807 cement industry, competition and risk management in, 442 CEMEX, risk-​management practices, 439–​444 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) management practices in, 30 central and eastern Europe (CEE), managing emerging markets in, 765–​797 centers of R&D for multinational firms, 770t “Doing Business,” evolution of performance in, 775–​776, 776f foreign-​owned multinationals and inward FDI, 768–​769, 769f, 771, 773–​781, 773f Global Competitiveness Index ranking of CEE countries, 2007–​2017, 772t global value chains and, 778 inbound and outbound FDI competitiveness, 786–​787 indirect outward FDI, 782–​783 inward and outward FDI, 767, 768 leading multinationals in CEE, 784b management and business culture, 780–​781

Index   847 outward FDI and emerging multinationals, 781–​786,  781f regulatory and institutional environment, 777 scale and cost of offerings, 765–​768 transition economies, overall considerations, 766–​768 Central Europe management practices in, 30 Chakrabarty, S., 537 chief executive officers (CEOs) dual leadership as chairman, 206 optimism of U.S. based vs. non-​U.S. based,  175f and overconfidence bias, 171–​172, 180n4 Child, John “Innovation and Internationalization of SMEs in Emerging Markets,” 495–​526 China automotive components industry in, 601–​602 board and managerial supervision in, 206 corporate governance, dimensions of, 195t corporate governance framework, 201 corporate governance in, 189t, 192–​193 corporate political ties in, 300, 301 corporate social responsibility in, 207 decreased poverty in, 31n4 direct investment in Africa, 634 distinctive approaches to innovation in, 362–​363 economic contributions of SMEs, 498 education and innovation in, 353–​354 emerging middle-​class segments in, 228–​229 enablers of innovation in, 355–​356 ethnic Chinese business ownership in Southeast Asia, 829–​830, 839t ethnicity-​based business groups, 560 examples of innovation in, 352 as expanding market for goods and services,  16–​17 expansion of middle class in, 228 external networks and SME innovation, 506–​507 firm-​specific advantages in other emerging markets, 637–​638

foreign direct investment in, 417n8 global innovation networks in, 368 information disclosure and reporting in, 205 information technology sector, 600 innovation by foreign MNCs in, 366–​367 internationalization of companies, 208–​209 investment law and policy, 145–​146, 153n24, 154n27 legal framework in, 202 management practices in, 30 markets for beauty products in, 71–​72 national innovation system in, 359–​360 and outsourcing of multinational production, 70 outward direct foreign investment and infrastructure projects, 649–​650 ownership and corporate governance in, 190 ownership and ownership rights in, 209 ownership and shareholder rights in, 204 promotion of state-​owned business groups, 556 protection of intellectual property rights in, 356 research and development in, 357, 358 stakeholder rights in, 207 state-​owned enterprises and other business groups, 561–​562 state-​owned multinationals in, 585 and technology-​based global supply chains, 354 Top 20 Chinese companies, 21t wooden toy industry in, 599 See also BRIC countries China, opportunities for multinational firms, 747–​764 accelerated innovation of local competitors, 750–​751 capability gaps, filling, 752–​753 changing strategies of local competitors, 749–​755 competing for mid-​market, 757–​758 and competition from local companies, 748 entering market through high-​end segment, 756

848   Index China, opportunities for multinational firms (cont.) evolution of multinationals’ strategies, 755–​758 exploiting local advantages, 754–​755 foreign investment since economic reforms, 747 global value chains, moving up in, 753–​754 and relative strengths and weaknesses, 759–​760 seizing opportunities, 760–​762 success of Volkswagen AG, 747 Chung, Chi-​nien “The Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research on Business Groups in Emerging Markets,” 547–​567 cigarette industry, marketing practices in developing countries, 67 CIVETS countries, definition of, 12 clanism, and human resource management practices, 663 classification of countries, 6–​9, 7t comparative institutionalism, 114–​117 business environment, evolution of, 114–​116 firm/​context interface, 116–​117 firm strategies and organization, 117 competition emerging in global economy, 20–​23, 21t, 22t for mid-​market, 757–​758 competitive advantages of local firms in China, 749–​750 competitive risks in local emerging-​market businesses, 441–​442 in multidomestic firms, 430–​431, 431f compliance costs, as institutional variable, 282 component manufacturing, capability of local firms in global value chains, 599–​600 conceptual perspectives on emerging markets, 24–​25,  35–​53 considering new theories for, 36–​37, 49 Dunning’s OLI paradigm, 38–​40, 39t, 49n1 emerging-​market MNEs, theorizing on, 44–​46,  49 global value chains, 46–​49, 47f, 48f internalization, theory of, 40–​41 internationalization process theory, 41–​42

need for a new theory, 42–​44, 49 using traditional theories for, 37, 38–​40, 49 Vernon’s international product cycle, 42, 43f conservatism bias, 172 consolidators, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 802, 811–​814, 812f consumer behavior in emerging markets, 25, 219–​240 attitudes and purchasing patterns, 226–​227 consumer segments in China, 228–​229 contextual influence on buying decisions, 220, 220f, 234 digital connectivity and, 233 directions for future research, 233–​235 evaluation criteria and strategies, 222–​223 and global middle-​class expansion, 227–​228 implications for international managers, 230–​233,  234 income inequality and, 221–​222, 226t maladaptive behavior, research on, 235 middle-​class consumption potential in India, 229–​230 product affordability and availability, 230–​231 purchasing decisions, time to reach 225 and rise of middle class, 225–​230 selection criteria, 223–​225 sources of product and brand information, 222 time spent shopping, 228 understanding middle-​class consumers, 219 consumer markets, during Great Reversal of globalization, 67 consumer protection, and Brazilian institutional environment, 690 context definition of, 528 contract enforceability, as institutional variable, 283 Contractor, Farok J. “Regulatory Institutions and Multinational Companies in Emerging Markets,” 267–​289 corporate control, market for, 165–​166 corporate governance, and Southeast Asian business systems, 829–​831

Index   849 corporate governance frameworks, in BRIC countries, 194, 200–​201 corporate governance in BRIC countries, 193–​207 board and managerial supervision, 205–​206 corporate social responsibility, 206–​207 dimensions of, 195t framework of, 194, 200–​201 future challenges and opportunities, 207–​210 information disclosure and reporting, 204–​205 and legal frameworks, 201–​203 ownership and shareholder rights, 203–​204 and socioeconomic development, 194 stakeholder rights, 206–​207 corporate governance in developed markets, types of, 185–​186 corporate governance in emerging markets, 25 boards of directors and, 191 characteristics of, 185–​187, 190–​193 and characteristics of firms, 167 differences across countries, 166–​167 and economics of financial management, 164 and goals of financial management, 168–​169 literature regarding, 187, 190–​193 and managerial behavioral biases, 173–​177,  175f and market for corporate control, 165–​166 monitoring practices, 164–​165 and ownership, 188–​191 and ownership concentration, 166 top management team and, 191–​192 corporate leadership style, among Brazilian executives, 680 corporate political ties in emerging markets, 291–​308 in business-​government exchanges, 292–​294,  293f future research regarding, 302–​304 and market-​based capabilities or strategies, 297–​298,  303 rent creation or capture, 295–​297, 302–​303 and sociopolitical institutions, 299–​301 and strategic corporate social responsibility, 298–​299,  303

theoretical perspectives on, 294–​295 corporate social responsibility (CSR) in BRIC countries, 206–​207 and corporate political ties, 298–​299, 303 in firm strategies and organization, 113 as opposed to business and human rights, 377–​381 and outward foreign direct investment, 646–​647 corruption, and political environment of Brazil, 691–​692 cosmetics marketing of in Latin America, 67–​68 costs of doing business in variety of regions, 80t country-​of-​origin, influence on consumers, 223–​225 country risks financial vs. operational responses to, 448–​449 in local emerging-​market businesses, 443 in multidomestic firms, 431–​432, 432f credit systems, in emerging nations, 232 Cuervo-​Cazurra, A., emerging-​market MNEs, 40 Cui, Lin “Emerging Market Multinationals in Advanced Economies,” 609–​630 cultural context and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 221 and entrepreneurship, 477–​481, 711 and entrepreneurship in Russia, 711 of first global economy, 62 human resource management and adaptation to, 669 and human resource practices in Brazil, 695–​696 implications for domestic and international managers in Russia, 720 and institutional environment in Brazil, 683–​685 customization, as strategy of local firms in China, 750 decision-​making concentrated vs. democratic, 168, 174, 176 role in accelerating innovation, 751–​752

850   Index definition of emerging markets, 4–​12 classification of countries, 6–​9, 7t dynamics of emergence, 9–​10 indicators of emergence, 9t regional scope, 4–​5 taxonomies of emerging markets, 10–​12, 11t deinstitutionalization, and evolution of business environment, 111 demand enablers, and innovation in emerging markets, 355–​356 Dembek, Krzysztof “Examining BOP Venture Success through the Mutual Value CARD Approach,” 241–​265 Derivco, operations in South Africa, 815–​816 Deutsch, K. W., politics of transitions and traps, 83 developed economies vs. emerging markets, 3–​4 developing economies, use of term, 5 development, and global production networks, 344–​345 developmental state, definition of, 116 digital connectivity, and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 233 diplomacy, as home country-​specific advantage, 636–​637, 642, 644 disclosure and reporting, in BRIC countries, 204–​205 disposition effect, 172–​173, 176 diversification of family businesses, 538 and risk management in emerging markets, 436–​438 double-​taxation treaties, 152n3 “dragon multinationals” internationalization of, 45 Driffield, Nigel “Spillovers from FDI in Emerging Market Economies,” 399–​425 Dunning’s OLI paradigm, 38–​40, 39t, 49n1 dynamics of emergence, 9–​10 “Ease of Doing Business,” World Bank index, 274–​275, 276f, 284–​285, 274f Eastern Europe management practices in, 30

economic and political outcomes, relationship between, 83–​85,  91–​92 economic development, and locations of global value chains, 596 economic environment of emerging markets, 24,  77–​97 costs of doing business, 80t gross national incomes and other characteristics, 78–​79, 80t potential for growth, 77 economic growth, and technology-​based global supply chains, 354 economic nationalism, and global production networks, 345–​346 economic perspectives, on business groups in emerging markets, 548, 550–​554 economy, and Brazilian institutional environment, 693–​694 education and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 468, 712–​7 13 and skills formation, business systems perspective on, 825, 828t, 832 and sociodemography of Brazil, 687 electricity sector, in Russia, 717 electronics industry, global production networks and, 338–​339 Elms, D. K., 592 Embraer, 365 emerging economies, use of term, 5 emerging markets characteristics of firms in, 167 classification of countries, 6–​9, 7t conceptual perspectives on, 24–​25, 35–​53 country and region perspectives, 29–​30 defining, 5–​12, 31n1 dynamics of emergence, 9–​10 foreign MNEs in, 26–​27 indicators of emergence, 9t local firms in and from, 27–​29 markets and governance in, 25–​26 multinational investment in, 56t taxonomies of, 10–​12, 11t transient nature of defining, 36 vs. developed economies, 3–​4 emerging markets, future economic prospects and challenges, 79–​94

Index   851 emerging markets, in the twenty-​first century,  13–​23 catch-​up trends of, 13–​16, 14t emerging competition in global economy, 20–​23, 21t, 22t inbound and outbound tourism, 19t investment opportunities, 19–​20 manufacturing exporters by sector, 18t markets for goods and services, 16–​17 markets for services, 18–​19 natural resource production by commodity, 17t raw materials and manufacturing, sources for,  17–​18 as share of global economy, 13f Top 20 Chinese companies, 21t emerging multinational corporations (EMNCs) definition of, 799 global economic hierarchy and methods of internationalization, 817 implications of middleness in global economic hierarchy, 801 empire building, and financial management practices, 164 employment relations, business systems perspective on, 825, 828t, 831 energy sector and competition from emerging markets, 20 international business strategies during Great Reversal, 66–​67 entrepreneurial perspective, on innovation in small and medium-​sized enterprises, 510–​514 entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 457–​494 age and, 466 cultural context, 479–​480 education and, 468 empirical evidence regarding institutions and, 459–​461, 462t, 463t, 465 entrepreneurial finance, 480–​481 formal institutions, findings on, 478–​479 forms of, 468–​470 future research, 483–​484 gender and, 466–​468

institutional and cultural contexts, 477–​481 institutional characteristics and, 457–​459,  483 levels of economic development and, 459–​461, 460f, 461f, 465 occupational choice, and personality, 468–​472 occupational choice, and sociodemographic characteristics, 466–​468 and personal characteristics and traits, 465–​472 personality traits and, 470 relevant institutions, categorizing, 477–​478 Russian attitudes toward, 722n2 small and medium-​sized enterprises in Russia, 710–​7 14 social capital and, 470–​471, 472–​476 and sociodemographic characteristics, 466–​468,  482 entrepreneurship in emerging markets, returnee entrepreneurs, 472–​476 characteristics and behavior, 473–​474, 482–​483 disadvantages encountered, 475–​476 and entrepreneurial finance, 481 knowledge spillovers, 474–​475 location choices, 474 social ties and social spillover effects, 475 environmental factors in opportunity and risk,  59–​62 environmental flexibility, moderating effect of, 318 Envirovision, as specialist niche provider, 816 Estrin, Saul “Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets,” 457–​494 ethnicity and building external social capital, 508 and business groups, 560 and corporate governance in Southeast Asia, 829–​830, 839t European Union investor-​state dispute settlements, 142 Evraz, 717 exchange rate, and risk management in local EM businesses, 443–​444

852   Index executive compensation and corporate governance and monitoring, 165 export strategies for multinational enterprises, 26 for small and medium-​sized enterprises, 499–​500 familiarity bias, 172 family businesses in emerging markets, 28, 527–​545 business dimension, 536–​537 business groups and, 557 contextual dimension, 536, 537 contextualizing, 533–​535, 535f, 539–​540 coordination issues, 538–​539 dimensions of, 528 and economics of financial management, 166 and entrepreneurial perspective on SMEs, 512–​514 and entrepreneurship, 469 and family business groups, 559–​560 family dimension, 536, 537–​538 as field of study, 528–​533 firm familiness, dimensions of, 530 firm familiness, theory of, 529–​531 future lines of research, 539–​540 and goals of financial management, 168–​169 internationalization of, 538, 648–​649 managerial dynasties, negative effect of, 532–​533 a model of, 535–​539, 535f, 540 regional familiness, theory of, 531–​533 vs. in United States, 180n2 family business groups (FBGs) in firm/​context interface, 116–​117 Felipe, J. middle-​income traps, 88 finance, entrepreneurial, 480–​481 financial management and behavioral biases, 169–​173, 181n7 financial management, economics of, 161–​163, 163–​169 characteristics of firms in emerging markets, 167 and corporate governance, 164 differences across countries, 166–​167

and goals of financial management, 168–​169 and market for corporate control, 165–​166 monitoring practices, 164–​165 ownership concentration, 166 financial markets, and managerial biases, 176–​177 financial responses, to emerging market risks, 448–​449 financial sector and competition from emerging markets, 20 financial systems, business systems perspective on, 825, 828t, 831 firm/​context interface in comparative institutionalism, 116–​117 in institutional economics, 101–​106 in organizational institutionalism, 111–​113 firms, focal and corporate political ties, 293 firm-​specific advantages (FSAs) ways of exploiting, 754–​755 firm-​specific advantages (FSAs), of emerging-​economy multinational enterprises, 637–​639, 645–​646 firm strategies and organization in comparative institutionalism, 117 in institutional economics, 108–​109 in organizational institutionalism, 113–​114 flexibility, and risk management in emerging markets, 436–​438 Flores, David “Consumer Behavior in Emerging Markets,” 219–​240 “flying geese” pattern of economic development in central and eastern Europe, 766 defined, 12, 596 investment by emerging market economies in other emerging markets, 639–​640 focal firms, and corporate political ties, 293 foreign direct investment (FDI) in central and eastern Europe, 767, 768 effect of policy changes and political rhetoric on, 773–​775 in emerging markets 1914-​2007, 56t, 57 gravity model of, 417n7

Index   853 impact on local management culture, 779–​780 inbound and outbound FDI competitiveness, 786–​787 indirect outward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 782–​783 and institutional climate, 279, 280t and international investment agreements, 134, 137 inward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 768–​769, 769f, 771, 773–​781, 773f and liberalization of regulatory environment, 272–​273, 273f and measures for institutional quality, 280–​284 and multinational emerging market enterprises, 609–​611, 610f, 612–​619 outward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 781–​786,  781f outward from emerging markets, 143, 144f, 145 potential for investor-​state disputes, 140–​141 protections afford investors, 135b and quality of regulatory institutions, 275, 278 rates of, 416n1 from and to regional emerging markets, 79 and regulatory and institutional environment, 777 regulatory changes, 137, 138t resources devoted to attracting, 399–​400 round-​tripping and, 762n1 and transition to market economy in Russia, 709–​7 10, 709f treaty-​based disputes, 141t, 152n12 See also outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) foreign direct investment (FDI), spillovers from, 399–​425 absorptive capacity, 410–​411, 640–​641 conceptual framework, 412f conceptualizing spillovers, 402–​403, 412f contributing factors and conditions, 414–​416 determinants of scale, 407–​411 horizontal spillovers, 403–​405

importance of institutions in, 412–​414 integrated framework for, 412–​414, 412f and job creation or protection, 401 multinational enterprise motivation, 407–​408 “negative spillovers,” 416n3 ownership and technology transfer, 408–​410,  417n6 and productivity growth of host-​country firms, 401 and technology transfer, 399, 400, 408–​410 vertical spillovers, 405–​407 Foxcomm, Apple outsourcing to, 70 Friedman, Milton, 169 frugal engineering, and competition from local firms, 72 Fukuyama, F., politics of transitions and traps,  83–​84 Fung, V. K., 604 Galanz, 752 “gamekeeper state” vs. “gardener state,” 344–​345 “gardener state” vs. “gamekeeper state,” 344–​345 Gazprom, 20–​21, 717 gender, and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 466–​468 Giddens, A., 341 global commodity chains See global value chains Global Competitiveness Index of World Economic Forum, and competitiveness of CEE economies, 9, 786–​787 global economic hierarchy, operating across levels in, 799–​822 brokers, 801f, 805–​808, 806f consolidators, 811–​814 812f defining levels of hierarchy, 799 lead firms, 805 local optimizers, 808–​811, 809f methods of internationalization, 800 pecking order exploiters, 801f, 802, 803–​805,  804f specialist niche providers, 814–​816, 815f strategies to navigate, 801f, 802–​803

854   Index global economy competition from emerging markets, 20–​23 emerging markets as share of, 13f international business strategies during Great Reversal, 62–​70 international business strategies during second global economy, 70–​73 international business strategies in the first global economy, 58–​62, 59t global investment and trade, from 1870 to 2015, 271f globalization anti-​globalization and global value chains, 603–​604 ebb and flow, from 1800 to 2015, 270–​271 of emerging market companies, 208–​209 historical evolution of, 55–​58 impacts on risk management, 437 of innovation by multinational companies in emerging markets, 368–​369 and managerial biases in emerging markets, 179 processes involved in, 335 and reassertion of local cultures, 71 and risk in global value chains, 433 See also global production networks globalization, three eras of international business strategies during Great Reversal, 62–​70 international business strategies during second global economy, 70–​73 international business strategies in first era,  58–​62 multinational strategies in emerging markets, 59t global production networks, 333–​350 characteristics of, 337–​339 definition of, 333 and development, 344–​345 and disaggregation of the value chain, 335–​337 and economic nationalism, 345–​346 and globalization of technology, 334 governance of, 346–​347 management and policy challenges, 26 and the meaning of “place,” 339–​341 and national control of production, 341–​343

and nationalization of production, 343–​344 and political authority, 333–​335 and sovereign territoriality, 334 and territoriality, 333–​335, 339–​341 global supply chains, technology-​based, 354 global value chains (GVCs), 592–​596 characteristics of, 592–​593, 604n1 drivers of in emerging markets, 596–​598 external partnerships, 802 framework, 46–​49, 47f, 48f governance of, 593–​595 impacts on risk management, 437 implications for international business, 93 managing risks for EM-​based chains, 444–​448 and multinational investment in CEE, 778 risk in, 432–​435, 432f, 435f sustainability issues, 603 upgrading of, 595–​596 and upgrading of local firms, 28, 753–​754 global value chains (GVCs), local firms within, 591–​607,  592f as assemblers, 598–​599 challenges and imperatives for, 603–​604 and company management capability, 598 as component manufacturers, 599–​600 as emerging market multinationals, 601–​602 and EM level of economic development, 596 and EM level of technological capability, 597 global value chains, characteristics of, 592–​593,  604n1 global value chains, drivers of in emerging markets, 596–​598 global value chains, governance of, 593–​595 global value chains, upgrading of, 595–​596 as innovators and partners, 600–​601 international business theory, implications for, 601–​603 and maturity of EM institutions, 597 participation of SMEs, 602–​603 phases of development, 598–​601 regional strategy and clusters, 602 goods and services, markets for in twenty-​first century,  16–​17 governance business groups and changes in, 559

Index   855 business systems perspective on, 825, 828t in emerging markets, 25–​26 of global production networks, 346–​347 and high-​performance work practices, 661 and internationalization of EMNEs, 647–​648 and Southeast Asian business systems, 829–​831 government roles, types of, 115–​116 Grameen Danone, 253–​254 gravity model, and bilateral FDI flows, 417n7 Great Britain, influence in Brazil, 679 Great Depression and foreign direct investment in emerging markets, 56, 57 Great Recession of 2008-​2009, and decreased FDI in central and eastern Europe, 773 Great Reversal, of globalization, 56, 57 international business strategies during,  62–​70 political context during, 63–​66 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for various countries 1700-​2010,  85f percentage growth in for selected countries, 86f of South Africa, and Latin American and Asian countries relative to USA, 87f Grosse, Robert “Conceptual Approaches to Managing in Emerging Markets,” 35–​53 Grosse’s Value-​added Chain, 47f “Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets,”  3–​34 gross national incomes, and economics of emerging markets, 78–​79 group affiliation See business groups in emerging markets growth, potential for in emerging economies, 77 Haier, 368 Hart, S. L., 241, 243 Hausmann, R., network theory, 88 Haxhi, Ilir “Comparative Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets,” 185–​218

herding bias, 180n5 Hidalgo, C. A., network theory, 88 high-​income countries (HICs) economic environment of, 78–​79 strategies for navigating global economic hierarchy, 801f, 802–​803 high-​performance work practices (HPWP) in EM domestic firms, 661 research in emerging markets, 662t historical perspective on emerging markets, 24,  55–​76 evolution of international business, 55–​58 home bias, 172, 181n6 home country-​specific advantages (CSAs) ways of exploiting, 754–​755 of emerging-​economy multinational enterprises, 635–​637, 642, 644 Hrnjic, Emir “Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance in Emerging Markets,” 161–​184 Huawei, 753 human capital as resource requirement for SMEs, 505 and returnee entrepreneurs, 472–​476, 508 Human Development Index (HDI), 9 human resource management in emerging market firms, 29, 657–​674 clanism and, 663 domestic firms, 658, 659t, 661–​663 emerging-​market multinational companies, 665–​667 foreign subsidiaries, 664–​665 and global best practices, 665–​666, 669, 671n1 interactions among domestic, foreign, and multinational firms, 667–​670, 668t labor mobility and knowledge leakage, 668 nested systems approach to understanding, 657, 667–​670, 667f and professional communities, 670 standardized vs. localized approaches to, 664–​665,  671n1 human rights in emerging markets, 27, 373–​398 future research needs, 386–​389 global-​level implications, 390

856   Index human rights in emerging markets (cont.) global-​level themes and concerns, 387–​388 human rights due diligence (HRDD), 380–​381 implications of, 389–​393 institutional landscape, 381–​383 legal approaches to, 375–​376, 380 legislative implementations, 384–​385 litigation and adjudication regarding, 385–​386 moral approaches, 376–​377 national action plans (NAPs) on business and human rights, 379–​380 operational-​level implications, 392–​393 operational-​level themes and concerns, 389 as opposed to corporate social responsibility, 377–​381 policy implementations, 384 political approaches, 377 rationale for corporate human rights responsibility, 374–​375 state-​level implications, 390–​391 state-​level themes and concerns, 388–​389 and United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 374, 383–​386 Hume, David, 375 Huntington, S. P., politics of transitions and traps, 83, 84, 91–​92 Husk Power Systems, 256–​257 Hymer, S., 340 income inequality and Brazilian sociodemography, 686 and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 221–​222 implications for international managers, 230–​231 India auto components industry in, 599 bankruptcy laws in, 284 board and managerial supervision in, 206 corporate governance, dimensions of, 195t corporate governance framework, 200–​201 corporate governance in, 189t, 192–​193 corporate social responsibility in, 207 distinctive approaches to innovation in, 363–​364

economic contributions of SMEs, 498 education and innovation in, 354 enablers of innovation in, 355, 356 examples of innovation in, 352 as expanding market for goods and services,  16–​17 expansion of middle class in, 228 foreign direct investment in, 417n9 global innovation networks in, 368–​369 information disclosure and reporting in, 205 information technology sector, 600 innovation by foreign MNCs in, 367–​368 intellectual property rights protection in, 502 legal framework in, 202 management practices in, 29–​30 marketing of beauty products in, 68 middle-​class consumption potential, 229–​230 national innovation system in, 360 organizational capability of local information technology firms, 69 ownership and shareholder rights in, 204 poverty indices used in, 245, 262n3 protection of intellectual property rights in, 357 research and development in, 357, 358 stakeholder rights in, 207 World Bank and IMF bailout, 270 See also BRIC countries India, sources of legitimacy for technology-​ based firms in, 727–​746 case studies, findings from, 740–​745 case studies examining, 731–​740, 732t complementary capabilities, 743t engagement with customers, 735–​736 engagement with technology community, 741–​744,  742f liabilities and strategic solutions, 727–​731 Sasken, case study of, 737–​740, 739t social legitimacy and standards creation, 741–​744,  742f Tech Mahindra, case study of, 735–​736, 736t, 737t technological transitions, dealing with, 734, 744

Index   857 test and validation offerings, 743t Wipro, case study of, 731–​734, 733t indicators of emergence, 9t Indonesia, corporate political ties and regime change in, 300 industrialized economies, use of term, 5 industry risks, in local emerging-​market businesses, 441–​442 informal substitution, and evolution of business environment, 110 information disclosure and reporting, in BRIC countries, 204–​205 information technology offshoring of services, 71 organizational capability of Indian firms, 69 Wipro, case study of company, 731–​734 infrastructure and Brazilian institutional environment, 692–​693 communication and business strategies, 61 and outward foreign direct investment, 649–​650 innovation acceleration of in China, 750–​752 advantages in emerging markets, 355–​356 capability of local firms in global value chains, 600–​601 catch-​up factors for, 353–​354 competition from emerging markets in, 20, 23 constraints in middle-​income economies, 87–​91,  89t cost innovation and local firms in China, 749, 752 definition of, 351 and diffusion and learning, 354 disadvantages in emerging markets, 356–​357 distinctive approaches to in emerging markets, 362–​366 and education, 353–​354 examples of in BRIC countries, 352–​353 by foreign multinational companies in emerging markets, 366–​369 globalization of, 368–​369 input activities for, 352 landscape in emerging markets, 26–​27, 351–​352,  369

and local firms within GVCs, 603–​604 national innovation systems, creation of, 359–​362 non-​customer innovation, 369n1 research and development by local firms, 357 research and development by multinational companies, 357–​359 reverse innovation 358-​359 rise of in emerging markets, 353–​362 as source of legitimacy for technology-​ based companies in India, 734 strategies for small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs), 27–​28 types of, 351–​352 innovation, of small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs), 495–​526, 497f contextual perspective on, 500–​503 developed market vs. emerging market contexts, 496 entrepreneurial perspective, 510–​514, 517 exporting to foreign markets, 499–​500 institutions, significance of, 500–​503, 502–​503,  516 and intellectual property rights protection, 502 liabilities encountered, 497 and networking, 502–​503 network perspective, 506–​510 resource-​based view, 503–​506, 516 strategies for, 499–​500, 514–​517 and ties with formal institutions, 508–​509 transaction costs and, 503 insolvency, ease of resolving, 283–​284 institutional development indices,  9–​10 institutional economics, 101–​109 business environment, evolution of, 101–​106 firm/​context interface, 106–​107 firm strategies and organization, 108–​109 institutional environment and entrepreneurship, 477–​481 and inward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 777 and managing emerging markets in Russia, 706–​7 10

858   Index institutional influence, and multinational emerging market enterprises, 612–​614 institutionalism, organizational, 109–​114 institutional logics, and business groups in emerging markets, 556–​558 institutional quality, measures for, 280–​284 institutional risks in local emerging-​market businesses, 441–​442 in multidomestic firms, 431–​432, 432f institutional theory perspectives, on emerging markets,  99–​125 areas for future research, 118–​119 comparative institutionalism, 114–​117 and corporate political ties, 294–​295 institutional economics, 101–​109 organizational institutionalism, 109–​114 and state-​owned multinationals, 576–​577 summary of applications, 102t institutional ties, and innovation in SMEs, 508–​509 institutional variations, and multinational emerging market enterprises, 622–​623 institutional voids definition, 9 and firm/​context interface, 111–​113 and firm strategies and organization, 117 and multinational emerging market enterprises, 615 institutions global value chains and maturity of, 597 local institutions and human resource management, 669 regional familiness as substitute for, 531–​532 integration-​responsiveness model, and strategies of multinationals, 755–​756 intellectual property rights and innovation in small and medium-​sized businesses, 502 poor quality in emerging markets, 356–​357 intellectual traditions, and management of emerging markets, 24 Interface, commercial carpet manufacturer, 255 internalization, theory of, 40–​41 internal market, business group as, 550–​552

international business impact of global value chains, 93 implications of middle-​income traps for,  92–​94 international business, and human rights, 373–​398 future research needs, 386–​389 global-​level implications, 390 global-​level themes and concerns, 387–​388 human rights due diligence (HRDD), 380–​381 implications of, 389–​393 institutional landscape, 381–​383 legal approaches to, 375–​376, 380 legislative implementations, 384–​385 litigation and adjudication regarding, 385–​386 moral approaches, 376–​377 national action plans (NAPs) on business and human rights, 379–​380 operational-​level implications, 392–​393 operational-​level themes and concerns, 389 as opposed to corporate social responsibility, 377–​381 policy implementations, 384 political approaches, 377 rationale for corporate human rights responsibility, 374–​375 state-​level implications, 390–​391 state-​level themes and concerns, 388–​389 and United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 374, 383–​386 international business, historical perspective on,  55–​76 evolution of international business, 55–​58 strategies in the first global economy, 58–​62 strategies in the second global economy,  70–​73 international business theory, implications of GVC phenomenon for, 601–​603 International Housing Solutions, 808b international investment agreements, 128–​134, 128f, 152n11, 152n14 convergence of interests in, 150–​151 defensive interests, assertion of, 139–​143 double-​taxation treaties, 152n3 offensive interests, assertion of, 143–​149

Index   859 protections afforded investors, 135b responsibilities of investors, 149–​150 terminology used, 151n2 and treaty-​based disputes, 146–​149, 152n12 “treaty shopping” and “round-​tripping,” 149 internationalization and corporate governance and ownership, 647–​649 of “dragon multinationals,” 45 of emerging market companies, 208–​209 of family businesses, 538 family businesses and, 648–​649 firm strategies and organization, 108 network-​based, 617–​619 nonmarket strategies and, 644–​647 proximity and, 803 of Russian national firms, 718 South Africa’s setting and, 800 strategies for small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs), 27–​28 See also global economic hierarchy, operating across levels in internationalization, of small and medium-​ sized enterprises (SMEs), 495–​526, 497f contextual perspective on, 500–​503 developed market vs. emerging market contexts, 496 entrepreneurial perspective, 510–​514, 517 exporting to foreign markets, 499–​500 institutions, significance of, 500–​503, 502–​503,  516 and intellectual property rights protection, 502 liabilities encountered, 497 and networking, 502–​503 network perspective, 506–​510 resource-​based view, 503–​506, 516 strategies for, 499–​500, 514–​517 and ties with formal institutions, 508–​509 transaction costs and, 503 internationalization process theory, 41–​42 international joint ventures and protection for minority investors, 282 International Labor Organization, declaration on multinational enterprises, 133 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and classification of countries, 6–​9

international product cycle, 42, 43f international production determinants of, 39t motivation for, 336 investment in emerging markets spillovers from MNEs and benefits to local firms, 27 investment law and policy, 24–​25, 127–​158, 152n11, 152n14 advisory center on, 143, 153n22 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 128, 153n24 changes over time, 139–​150 convergence of interests in, 150–​151 defensive interests, assertion of, 139–​143, 153n19, 153n20 double-​taxation treaties, 152n3 international investment agreements, 128–​134,  128f investor-​state dispute settlements, 136, 140–​143, 140f, 152n12 offensive interests, assertion of, 143–​149 and outward FDI from emerging markets, 143, 144f, 145 protections afforded investors, 134, 135b responsibilities of investors, 149–​150 substantive and procedural coverage of rules, 134, 136–​137, 139, 153n16 treaty-​based disputes, 141t, 146–​149, 147f “treaty shopping” and “round-​tripping,” 149 investment opportunities characteristic opportunities and challenges,  19–​20 investors activist investors, 165 investor-​state dispute settlements, 136, 140–​143, 140f, 152n12 Iran nationalization of Anglo-​Iranian Oil Company, 63 Japan, and “flying geese” pattern of economic development, 596, 639–​640 job protection or creation, and foreign direct investment (FDI), 401 Johanson, J., internationalization process theory,  41–​42

860   Index joint ventures, international and protection for minority investors, 282 Jones, Geoffrey “International Business and Emerging Markets in Historical Perspective,” 55–​76 “jugaad,” and innovation in India, 363 Kahneman, Daniel, 169, 181n7 Kalotay, Kálmán “Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe,” 765–​797 Kaplinsky, R., 599 Keister, L. A., 554–​555 Keynes, John Maynard, 333 knowledge leakage, and human resource management, 668 knowledge spillover, and returnee entrepreneurs, 474–​475 knowledge transfer in Russia, 719–​720 Kobrin, Stephen J. “Global Production Networks, Territoriality, and Political Authority,” 333–​350 Kostova, Tatiana “Institutional Theory Perspectives on Emerging Markets,” 99–​125 Kubitschek, Juscelino, 65 Kudumbashree, Indian quasi-​governmental organization, 245, 256, 257, 261–​262,  262n3 labor costs, and Brazilian institutional environment, 689 labor force, and population distribution in Russia, 713 labor-​intensive manufacturing, sources for,  17–​18 exporters by sector, 18t labor mobility, and human resource management, 668 labor practices, and risk management for EM-​ based global value chains, 445–​448 Latin America marketing of cosmetics in, 67–​68 Lazzarini, Sergio G. “State-​Owned Multinationals in International Competition,” 569–​590

leadership style, among Brazilian executives, 680 lead firms, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 805 legal frameworks, in BRIC countries, 201–​203, 688–​690 legitimacy building in advanced markets, 623–​624 and corporate social responsibility, 646–​647 legitimacy, sources of for technology-​based firms in India, 727–​746 case studies, findings from, 740–​745 case studies examining, 731–​740, 732t complementary capabilities, 743t engaging with customers, 735–​736 liabilities and strategic solutions, 727–​731 Sasken, case study of, 737–​740, 739t social legitimacy and standards creation, 741–​744,  742f Tech Mahindra, case study of, 735–​736, 736t, 737t technological transitions, dealing with, 734 test and validation offerings, 743t Wipro, case study of, 731–​734, 733t Lenovo Group, Ltd., 751, 753 Lessard, Donald “Risk Management for Companies Operating in Emerging Markets,” 427–​454 Li, J. T. “Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy in Responding to the Rise of Local Competitors in an Emerging Market,” 311–​332 Li, Jing “Investments by Emerging-​Market Multinationals in Other Emerging Markets,” 631–​655 Libya, multinational corporate responsibility in, 299 linkage-​leverage-​learning framework, of internationalization, 45 literacy, and sociodemography of Brazil, 687 loans, ease of obtaining as institutional variable, 282 loans and aid, as home country-​specific advantages, 635–​636, 642, 644

Index   861 local cultures globalization and reassertion of, 71 human resource management and adaptation to, 669 local firms absorptive capacity of, 410–​411, 640–​641 changing strategies in China, 749–​755 and competition for multinationals in China, 748 competition from in first global economy,  60–​61 and competition in second global economy,  71–​73 in and from emerging markets, 27–​29 expanding capability during Great Reversal,  69–​70 FDI and increased productivity, 401 investment spillovers benefitting, 27 MNEs and rise of local exporters, 315–​316 relative strengths and weaknesses in China, 759–​760 research and development by, 357 strategies in responding to MNEs, 311–​313 local firms, within global value chains, 591–​607,  592f as assemblers, 598–​599 challenges and imperatives for, 603–​604 and company management capability, 598 as component manufacturers, 599–​600 as emerging market multinationals, 601–​602 and EM level of economic development, 596 and EM level of technological capability, 597 global value chains, characteristics of, 592–​593,  604n1 global value chains, drivers of in EM, 596–​598 global value chains, governance of, 593–​595 global value chains, upgrading of, 595–​596 as innovators and partners, 600–​601 international business theory, implications for, 601–​603 and maturity of EM institutions, 597 participation of SMEs, 602–​603 phases of development, 598–​601 regional strategy and clusters, 602 sustainability issues, 603

localization of management during Great Reversal of globalization,  64–​65 local management culture, impact of FDI on, 779–​780 local market, re-​engineering products for, 757 local optimizers, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 802, 808–​811, 809f local suppliers, use of by multinational firms, 757, 758 London, T., 249, 260 Long-​Term Capital Management, and behavioral biases, 169–​170, 170f, 179–​180 Low, P., 592 low-​income countries (LICs) economic environment of, 78–​79 strategies for navigating global economic hierarchy, 801f, 802–​803 Luiz, John M. “Economics, Transitions, and Traps in Emerging Markets,” 77–​97 Lukoil, 20, 717 Luo, Rose Xiaowei “The Economic and Sociological Approaches to Research on Business Groups in Emerging Markets,” 547–​567 Luo, Y. D., “springboard strategy” of MNEs, 45 macroeconomic risks, 431, 433, 443 management and behavioral biases, 169–​173, 181n7 and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 230–​233, 234 and corporate political ties, 292–​294 global value chains and capability of, 598 internal dynamics of, 825, 828t, 835 values and high-​performance work practices, 661 management, economics of, 161–​163, 163–​169 characteristics of firms in emerging markets, 167 and corporate governance, 164 differences across countries, 166–​167 and goals of financial management, 168–​169 and market for corporate control, 165–​166 monitoring practices, 164–​165 ownership concentration, 166

862   Index management, in emerging markets in central and eastern Europe, 765–​797 centers of R&D for multinational firms, 770t “Doing Business,” evolution of performance in, 775–​776, 776f foreign-​owned multinationals and inward FDI, 768–​769, 769f, 771, 773–​781, 773f Global Competitiveness Index ranking of CEE countries, 2007–​2017, 772t global value chains and, 778 inbound and outbound FDI competitiveness, 786–​787 indirect outward FDI, 782–​783 inward and outward FDI, 767, 768 leading multinationals in CEE, 784b management and business culture, 780–​781 outward FDI and emerging multinationals, 781–​786,  781f regulatory and institutional environment, 777 scale and cost of offerings, 765–​768 transition economies, overall considerations, 766–​768 managerial myopia, 173 managerial supervision, in BRIC countries, 205–​206 manufacturing capability of local firms in global value chains, 599–​600 exporters by sector, 18t sources for, 17–​18 Marano, Valentina “Institutional Theory Perspectives on Emerging Markets,” 99–​125 market-​based capabilities and strategies, and corporate political ties, 297–​298, 303 market reforms and firm strategies and organization, 108–​109 markets implications of behavioral biases in, 178–​179 implications of managerial biases in, 176–​177 markets and governance, in emerging markets,  25–​26

consumer markets during Great Reversal, 67 implications of managerial biases, 178–​179 markets for goods and services in emerging markets in the twenty-​first century,  16–​17 market strategies, of multinational enterprises in response to local competition, 311–​332 dynamic market strategies, 313–​315 environmental flexibility, moderating effect of, 318 factors influencing, 315f organizational flexibility, moderating effect of, 316–​317 and rise of local exporters, 315–​316 study examining, discussion and conclusion, 325–​326 study examining, method, 318–​321 study examining, results, 321, 322t, 323t, 325 mass market, repositioning niche products into, 750 Matthews, J., “dragon multinationals,” 45 May, Ruth C. “Managing Emerging Markets in Russia,” 705–​726 McCarthy, Daniel J. “Managing Emerging Markets in Russia,” 705–​726 Medvedev, Dmitry, and institutional environment in Russia, 708 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and competing for mid-​market, 757–​758 filling capability gaps through, 752–​753 metallurgy, rise and expansion in Russia, 717 Mexico expansion of middle class in, 227–​228 transfer of assembly facilities to, 70 Meyer, Klaus E. “Conceptual Approaches to Managing in Emerging Markets,” 35–​53 “Introduction to Managing in Emerging Markets,”  3–​34 Mickiewicz, Tomasz “Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets,” 457–​494 microeconomic risks, 431

Index   863 microlending, and entrepreneurial finance, 481 Microsoft, operations in Africa, 804 middle-​class consumers in emerging countries analysis and examination of, 225–​230 attitudes and purchasing patterns, 226–​227 consumer segments in China, 228–​229 consumption potential in India, 229–​230 and global middle class expansion, 227–​228 income distribution and purchasing power of, 222 purchasing behavior of, 225, 226t understanding behavior of, 219 middle-​income countries (MICs), 20, 21 advanced and emerging multinationals in, 801 strategies for navigating global economic hierarchy, 801f, 802–​803 middle-​income countries (MICs), economic environment of, 78–​79 comparison of countries, 85–​87 constraints on innovation, 87–​91, 89t example of South Africa’s political economy,  91–​92 middle-​income traps, inevitability of,  81–​92 per capita GDP for South Africa, and Latin American and Asian countries relative to USA, 87f per capita GDP for various countries 1700-​2010,  85f percentage growth in GDP for selected countries, 86f total factor productivity (TFP) levels, 90–​91,  90f middle-​income  traps impact of global value chains, 93 implications for international business,  92–​94 middle-​income traps, inevitability of, 81–​92 comparison of middle-​income countries,  85–​87 explanations for middle-​income traps,  81–​82 middle-​income trap defined, 81

per capita GDP for South Africa, and Latin American and Asian countries relative to USA, 87f percentage growth in GDP for selected countries, 86f politics of transitions and traps, 82–​85,  94–​95 and South Africa’s political economy, 91–​92 structural changes in middle-​income economies, 87–​91, 89t and total factor productivity (TFP) levels, 90–​91,  90f mid-​market, competition for, 757–​758 Minbaeva, Dana “Human Resource Management in Emerging Markets,” 657–​674 minority investors, protection for as institutional variable, 282 MINT countries definition of, 12 international tourism data, 19t Monteiro, Felipe “State-​Owned Multinationals in International Competition,” 569–​590 Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 6 financial markets as classified by, 6, 8, 8t Morocco, automotive industry in, 600 Morris, M., 599 MSCI index, 6, 8 MTS, Russian telecommunications company, 718 multidomestic firms, layers of risk in, 430–​438,  431f multinational companies (MNCs) emerging multinational corporations (EMNCs), definition of, 799 evolution of strategies in China, 755–​758 filling capability gaps through partnerships with, 752–​753 human resource management practices, 665–​667 innovation in emerging markets, 366–​369 and political benefit of corporate social responsibility, 299 regionalization of, 803

864   Index multinational companies (MNCs) (cont.) relative strengths and weaknesses in China, 759–​760 research and development in emerging markets, 357–​359 seizing opportunities in China, 760–​762 talent management in Brazil, 695–​696 talent management in foreign subsidiaries, 664–​665 territoriality and, 339–​341 multinational companies (MNCs), relationship with regulatory institutions, 267–​289 FDI and institutional climate, 279, 280t, 286 FDI and quality of regulatory institutions, 275, 278 global investment and trade, from 1870 to 2015, 271f and globalization, from 1800 to 2015, 270–​271 height of government control, from 1920 to 1980, 269 historical ties to 1890, 267–​268 institutional quality, measures for, 280–​284 institutional quality, policy implications, 284–​285 renewed liberalization, and FDI inflows, 272–​273,  273f renewed liberalization, from 1980 to present, 269–​270 renewed liberalization, implementation of, 271–​273, 285–​286 skepticism and scrutiny, from 1890 to 1920, 268–​269 World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” index, 274–​275, 274f, 276f multinational emerging market enterprises, direct investment in other emerging markets, 631–​655 BRIC countries and, 631, 632f and corporate social responsibility, 646–​647 and firm-​specific advantages, 637–​639 and home country-​specific advantages, 635–​637, 642, 644 infrastructure and sustainable development, 649–​650

motivations for, 632–​635 and nonmarket political capabilities, 644–​646 research directions for, 643t spillover effects of, 639–​641 studies examining, 633t multinational emerging market enterprises, in advanced economies, 609–​630 asset seeking and, 612–​614, 632–​635 cross-​border foreign direct investment, 609–​611,  610f exploratory search behavior, 619–​621 home-​country institutional variations, 622–​623 institutional influence, 614–​616 legitimacy in advanced markets, 623–​624 network-​based internationalization, 617–​619 scope of research on, 612–​619 multinational enterprises (MNEs) business strategies in first global economy, 58–​62,  73 business strategies in Great Reversal, 62–​70,  73 business strategies in second global economy,  70–​73 centers for R&D in central and eastern Europe, 770t, 775 and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 219, 230–​233 emerging from local firms in GVCs, 601–​602 emerging from Southeast Asia, 837–​840, 838t, 839t emerging-​market MNEs, 40, 41–​42 emerging-​market MNEs, “springboard strategy,” 45 emerging-​market MNEs, theorizing on,  44–​46 foreign MNEs in emerging markets, 26–​27 investment in emerging markets, 56t inward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 768–​769, 769f, 771, 773–​781, 773f key literature examining, 730t leading MNEs in central and eastern Europe, 784b market strategies of subsidiaries, 315f

Index   865 Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) guidelines for, 129, 130b, 133 organization flexibility of subsidiaries, 316–​317 outsourcing of production, 70–​7 1 and outward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 781–​786, 781f ownership advantages of, 400, 417 ownership and technology transfer, 408–​410 and political benefit of corporate social responsibility, 299 relationships with governments, 26 risk management in, 27 in Russia, 714–​7 19 South-​South investments, 29 strategies and operations in advanced economies, 28 value creation and retention in BoP communities, 25 multinational enterprises (MNEs), response to rise of local competitors, 311–​332 and dynamic market strategy, 313–​315 environmental flexibility, moderating effect of, 318 factors influencing, 315f organizational flexibility, moderating effect of, 316–​317 and rise of local exporters, 315–​316 study examining, discussion and conclusion, 325–​326 study examining, method, 318–​321 study examining, results, 321, 322t, 323t, 325 Musacchio, Aldo “State-​Owned Multinationals in International Competition,” 569–​590 mutual value appropriation of value, 248 creation of value, 247–​248 destruction of value, 249–​250 retention of value, 248–​249 success through lens of, 247–​250 vs. shared value, 246–​247 myopia, managerial, 173 national action plans (NAPs) on business and human rights, 379–​380, 384

national innovation systems, creation of, 359–​362 nationalism, and global production networks, 345–​346 nationalization of production Anglo-​Iranian Oil Company, 63 and global production networks, 343–​344 tin industry in Bolivia, 69 natural resources and dynamics of emergence, 10 production by commodity, 17t natural resource sector international business strategies during Great Reversal, 65–​66 “nearshoring” activities, and markets in central and eastern Europe, 766 nested systems approach, and human resource management in EMs, 657, 667–​670, 667f Nestlé, marketing practices in developing countries, 67 Netherlands, treaty-​based investment dispute, 148 networking and HRM practices in domestic firms, 663 and internationalization of EMNEs, 617–​619 and internationalization of SMEs, 502–​503 and outward foreign direct investment, 642, 644 networks business groups as, 554–​555 inter-​firm networks, 825, 828t, 835 Neubauer, D. E., politics of transitions and traps, 83 niche products, repositioning into mass market, 750 niche providers, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 803, 814–​816, 815f Nigeria government reforms and prosperity, 95n1 international business in, 94 noise-​trader risk model, 180n3 non-​customer innovation, 369n1 North America, influence in Brazil, 679 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and consumer behavior in Mexico, 221 and economic nationalism, 346

866   Index occupational choice, and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 470–​471 offshoring and global value chains, 591 oil industry international business strategies during Great Reversal, 66–​67 in Russia, 717 Olson, M., politics of transitions and traps, 83 Onaji-​Benson, Theresa “Operating across Levels in the Global Economic Hierarchy: Insights from South Africa’s Setting in Wider Africa and the World,” 799–​822 operational responses, to emerging market risks, 448–​449 operational risks, in multidomestic firms, 430–​431, 431f, 440–​441 opium trade, and first global economy, 61 opportunity and risk, environmental factors in,  59–​62 Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) and corporate governance in BRIC countries, 193 definition of innovation, 351 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 129, 130b, 133, 193 membership,  6–​7 multinational enterprises and human rights responsibility, 381 study of risk in global supply chains, 435 organizational flexibility, moderating effect of, 316–​317 organizational institutionalism, 109–​114 business environment, evolution of, 110–​111 firm/​context interface, 111–​113 firm strategies and organization, 113–​114 organizational structures in developed vs. emerging economies, 161–​163 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), formation of, 66 original equipment manufacturing (OEM) and organizational flexibility, 317 Ostrom, Elinor, 280

outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from Russia, 715–​7 16 outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), in other emerging markets, 631–​655 BRIC countries and, 631, 632f and corporate social responsibility, 646–​647 firm-​specific advantages and, 637–​639 home country-​specific advantages and, 635–​637, 642, 644 infrastructure and sustainable development, 649–​650 motivations for, 632–​635 nonmarket political capabilities and, 644–​646 research directions for, 643t spillover effects of, 639–​641 studies examining, 633t overconfidence bias, 171–​172, 180n4 ownership business systems perspective on, 825, 828t and corporate governance, 188–​191 and corporate political ties, 292 and ownership rights in BRIC countries, 209 and shareholder rights in BRIC countries, 203–​204 and Southeast Asian business systems, 829–​831 Ownership, Location, and Internalization paradigm (Dunning), 38–​40, 39t, 49n1 ownership, location, and internationalization (OLI) framework and technology-​based firms in India, 727–​731 ownership concentration, and economics of financial management, 166 Padmanabhan, Jaykumar “How Technology-​Based Firms from India Deal with Legitimacy Challenges in International Markets,” 727–​746 Pananond, P., 600–​601 Panibratov, Andrei Yu. “Managing Emerging Markets in Russia,” 705–​726 pecking order exploiters, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 802, 803–​805, 804f

Index   867 perks, and financial management practices, 164 personality traits, and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 470 petroleum industry international business strategies during Great Reversal, 66–​67 political and economic outcomes, relationship between, 83–​85,  91–​92 political capabilities, and foreign direct investment, 644–​646 political context and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 221 of first global economy, 59–​60 of Great Reversal, 63–​66 political ideology, and business groups, 556–​557 political structure, and Brazilian institutional environment, 690–​692 political ties, corporate, 291–​308 in business-​government exchanges, 292–​294,  293f future research regarding, 302–​304 and market-​based capabilities or strategies, 297–​298,  303 and rent creation or capture, 295–​297, 302–​303 and sociopolitical institutions, 299–​301 and strategic corporate social responsibility, 298–​299,  303 theoretical perspectives on, 294–​295 political ties and capabilities in emerging markets, 26 pooling, and risk management in emerging markets, 436–​438 Portugal colonial demarcation lines, 678f colonization of Brazil, 677–​679 poverty alleviation of in base-​of-​the-​pyramid communities, 245, 246 Prahalad, C. K., 241, 243 Prashantham, Shameen “Innovation in Emerging Markets,” 351–​372 “Local Firms within Global Value Chains,” 591–​607

predatory state, definition of, 116 Premji, Azim, 731 production modularizing of product development, 751 national control of in global production networks, 341–​343 nationalization of in global production networks, 343–​344 professional communities, and human resource management, 670 property, registration of as institutional variable, 281 property and casualty risks, management of, 440–​441 proximity, and internationalization, 803 Puffer, Sheila M. “Managing Emerging Markets in Russia,” 705–​726 purchasing power parity (PPP) theory, definition of 286n1 Putin, Vladimir, and institutional environment in Russia, 706–​7 10 radionovela, and marketing in Latin America, 68 Raghunath, S. “How Technology-​Based Firms from India Deal with Legitimacy Challenges in International Markets,” 727–​746 Raman, A. P., 601 rationality, and behavioral biases in management, 169 raw materials, sources for, 17–​18, 17t redistribution beliefs, and business groups, 556–​557 Reeb, David M. “Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance in Emerging Markets,” 161–​184 regional clusters and entrepreneurship in Russia, 712–​7 13 in global value chains, 602 regionalization, of multinational enterprises, 803 regional scope of emerging markets, 4–​5 regional value chains, in Africa, 802

868   Index registration of property, as institutional variable, 281 regulatory environment and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 221 and inward FDI in central and eastern Europe, 777 regulatory environment, and economics of emerging markets, 79 regulatory institutions, relationship with multinational companies, 267–​289 FDI and institutional climate, 279, 280t, 286 FDI and quality of regulatory institutions, 275, 278 global investment and trade, from 1870 to 2015, 271f and globalization, from 1800 to 2015, 270–​271 height of government control, from 1920 to 1980, 269 historical ties to 1890, 267–​268 institutional quality, measures for, 280–​284 institutional quality, policy implications, 284–​285 renewed liberalization, and FDI inflows, 272–​273,  273f renewed liberalization, from 1980 to present, 269–​270 renewed liberalization, implementation of, 271–​273, 285–​286 skepticism and scrutiny, from 1890 to 1920, 268–​269 World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” index, 274–​275, 274f, 276f regulatory state, definition of, 116 rent creation or capture, in politically connected firms, 295–​297, 302–​303 reputation risk in multidomestic firms, 435 reputational risk system, 445f and risk management for EM-​based global value chains, 445–​448 research and development acceleration of in China, 750–​752 centers of MNEs in central and eastern Europe, 770t, 775 competition from emerging markets, 20, 23

by local firms in emerging markets, 357 modularizing of product development, 751 by multinational companies in emerging markets, 357–​359 re-​engineering products for local market, 757 as source of legitimacy for technology-​ based companies in India, 734 resource-​based view (RBV), and corporate political ties, 294 resource bundle, business group as, 552–​554 resource dependence theory (RDT), and corporate political ties, 294 resource sector international business strategies during Great Reversal, 65–​66 reverse innovation 358-​359 risk management in emerging markets, 27, 427–​454 aggregate measures of risk, 428–​430, 429t characteristics of, 428–​430, 450–​451 concepts of, 427 correlations of domestic and emerging equity markets, 436f diversification, correlations and implications for, 436–​438 for emerging market-​based global value chains, 444–​448 financial vs. operational responses to risk, 448–​449 flexibility, correlations and implications for, 436–​438 and home-​country institutional variations, 622–​623 identifying and defining risks, 438–​439 implications of managerial biases, 179, 180n3 layers of risk in multidomestic firms, 430–​438,  431f managing risk in local emerging-​market businesses, 439–​444 pooling, correlations and implications for, 436–​438 risk in global value chains, 432–​435, 432f, 435f sovereign credit spreads, 429t

Index   869 risk taking, and financial management practices, 164, 180n3 Rosenau, J. N., 346 Rosneft, 20, 22, 717 round-​tripping, and foreign direct investment, 762n1 “round-​tripping,” and emerging-​market firms, 149 Royal Dutch/​Shell, example of arbitrage and, 170f, 179–​180 Ruggie, John business and human rights, 375, 378 territoriality, 343 UN representative for business and human rights, 377, 382–​383 Rusal, 717–​7 18 Russia board and managerial supervision in, 205–​206 corporate governance, dimensions of, 195t corporate governance framework, 200 corporate governance in, 189t, 192–​193 corporate social responsibility in, 207 cultural characteristics and entrepreneurship in, 711 distinctive approaches to innovation in, 364 education and innovation in, 354 examples of innovation in, 353 human resource management terminology and practices, 671n1 information disclosure and reporting in, 204–​205 legal framework in, 202 management practices in, 29 national innovation system in, 360–​362 ownership and shareholder rights in, 203 population distribution in, 713 small and medium-​sized enterprises in, 517n2 stakeholder rights in, 207 transition to market economy in, 361, 706–​710, 708f, 714–​716 See also BRIC countries Russia, managing emerging markets in, 705–​726 culture, implications for domestic and international managers, 720

economic crisis of 2014 to 2016, effects of, 713–​7 14 entrepreneurship and small to medium-​ sized enterprises, 710–​7 14, 722n2 implications for international and domestic managers, 719–​721 institutional environment for, 706–​7 10, 708f internationalization of national firms, 718 knowledge transfer, 719–​720 multinational enterprises, 714–​7 19 net FDI inflows 2007 to 2017, 709f population distribution and labor force, 713 sectors and industries, 717–​7 18 Soviet-​era practices and processes, 720–​721 Samsung, entry into smartphone industry, 553 Sasken, technology-​based company in India, 737–​740,  739t Sass, Magdolna “Managing in Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe,” 765–​797 Sauvant, Karl P. “Emerging Markets and the International Investment Law and Policy Regime,” 127–​158 science, and locations of global value chains, 597 search behavior, by multinational emerging market enterprises, 619–​621 self-​dealing, in financial management, 164 services markets for in twenty-​first century, 18–​19 Severstal, 717–​7 18 Shapiro, Daniel “Investments by Emerging-​Market Multinationals in Other Emerging Markets,” 631–​655 shared value vs. mutual value, 246–​247 shareholder-​oriented corporate governance, 185–​186 shareholder rights, in BRIC countries, 206–​207 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 268 shirking, and financial management practices, 164 Shirokova, Galina V. “Managing Emerging Markets in Russia,” 705–​726

870   Index shopping and emerging consumer segments in China, 228–​229 time spent by middle-​class consumers, 228 Shoprite, operations in Africa, 809–​810, 810t, 811b, 811t Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad cooperative, 258 simultaneous engineering, and acceleration of research and innovation, 751 Singapore, government-​linked companies in, 831, 833 Singer Sewing Machine Company, in first global economy, 61 Sivasubramaniam, Nagaraj “Examining BOP Venture Success through the Mutual Value CARD Approach,” 241–​265 small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs), 497f challenges in emerging markets, 27 defining, 495 developed market vs. emerging market contexts, 496 diversity among, 496 economic contributions of, 498 and entrepreneurship in Russia, 710–​7 14 liabilities encountered, 497 participation in global value chains, 602–​603 small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs), innovation and internationalization of, 495–​526,  497f contextual perspective on, 500–​503 developed market vs. emerging market contexts, 496 entrepreneurial perspective, 510–​514, 517 exporting to foreign markets, 499–​500 institutions, significance of, 500–​503, 502–​503,  516 and intellectual property rights protection, 502 liabilities encountered, 497 and networking, 502–​503 network perspective, 506–​510 resource-​based view, 503–​506, 516 strategies for, 499–​500

social capital business systems perspective on, 825, 828t, 832–​833 definition of, 517n4 and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 470–​471 and networking by SMEs, 508 and returnee entrepreneurs, 472–​476 social embeddedness perspective, and corporate political ties, 294 social entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 469–​470 social legitimacy, and technology-​based firms in India, 741–​744, 742f socialpolitical institutions, and corporate political ties, 299–​301 social ties and social spillover, and returnee entrepreneurs, 475 socioeconomic context, and consumer behavior in emerging markets, 220 Song, Meng “Spillovers from FDI in Emerging Market Economies,” 399–​425 South Africa innovation in, 366 and the political economy of middle-​ income traps, 91–​92 South Africa, operating across levels of global economic hierarchy, 799–​822 Barloworld, as broker, 807 brokers, 801f, 805–​808, 806f Caterpillar Tractor Company, operations in Africa, 805, 806–​807 consolidators, 811–​814 812f defining levels of hierarchy, 799 Derivco, operations in South Africa, 815–​816 Envirovision, as specialist niche provider, 816 International Housing Solutions, 808b lead firms, 805 local optimizers, 808–​811, 809f methods of internationalization, 800 Microsoft, operations in Africa, 804 pecking order exploiters, 801f, 802, 803–​805,  804f position in global economic hierarchy, 800

Index   871 Shoprite, operations in Africa, 809–​810, 810t, 811b, 811t South African Breweries, as global consolidator, 812–​813 specialist niche providers, 814–​816, 815f strategies to navigate, 801f, 802–​803 South African Breweries, as global consolidator, 812–​813 Southeast Asia management challenges in, 30 multinational enterprises emerging from, 837–​840, 838t, 839t transfer of assembly facilities to, 70 Southeast Asia, management in, 823–​843 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 834 brand-​building,  838 business systems analysis, 824–​826 business systems in Southeast Asia, 826–​835,  828t education and skills formation, 832 employment relations, 831 financial systems, 831 inter-​firm networks, 835 internal dynamics of management, 835 ownership and corporate governance 829-​831 role of the state, 833–​834 social capital, 832–​833 strategies in the region, 835–​836 South Korea, advantage of corporate political ties in, 300 South-​South investments definition of, 29 Spain colonial demarcation lines, 678f treaty-​based investment dispute, 147 specialist niche providers, and global economic hierarchy, 801f, 803, 814–​816, 815f spillovers benefits to local firms, 27 effects of emerging-​economy FDI, 639–​641, 649–​650 knowledge spillover and returnee entrepreneurs, 474–​475 social spillover and returnee entrepreneurs, 475

spin-​offs, and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 469 “springboard strategy,” and emerging-​market MNEs, 45 stakeholder-​oriented corporate governance, 185–​186 standards creation, as source of legitimacy for technology-​based firms in India, 741–​744,  742f state-​owned enterprises in emerging markets, 28, 573t, 574f and economics of financial management, 166 and goals of financial management, 168–​169 internationalization of, 647–​648 liabilities of, 569 pervasive presence of, 570 in Southeast Asia, 830–​831 state-​owned multinationals, in international competition, 569–​590 advantages and disadvantages of SOMNCs, 578t agency theory of SOMNCs, 574–​576 evolution of state ownership, 571–​572, 573t, 574 examining assumptions regarding, 585–​587 firm-​level performance, 580–​585 firm-​level performance, main variables of, 582–​583 firm-​level performance, research findings, 584–​585,  584t institutional theory perspective on SOMNCs, 576–​577 and legitimacy of SOMNCs, 577–​578, 580 liabilities of SOEs, 569 pervasive presence of SOEs, 570 state ownership background and theory of, 571–​580 evolution of, 571–​572, 573t, 574 firm-​level performance implications of, 580–​585 states, business systems perspective on types of, 825–​826, 828t, 833–​834 status quo bias, 172 Stephan, Ute “Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets,” 457–​494

872   Index stewardship theory, and family businesses, 530 Stiglitz, Joseph, 375 Strange, Susan, 333–​334 strategic responses, to emerging market risks, 448–​449 structural changes, and constraints on innovation, 87–​91, 89t, 90f Sula Vineyards, 254 Sun, Pei “Corporate Political Ties in Emerging Markets,” 291–​308 supervision, in BRIC countries, 205–​206 supply enablers, and innovation in emerging markets, 355 sustainability issues and global human rights concerns, 387–​388 and local firms within global value chains, 603 and outward foreign direct investment, 649–​650 sustainability issues, and behavior of middle-​ class consumers, 227 Sustainable Development Goals, 387–​388 talent management in MNC foreign subsidiaries, 664–​665 and multinational companies in Brazil, 695–​696 taxation levels, as institutional variable, 282, 688 taxonomies of emerging markets, 10–​12, 11t Tech Mahindra, technology-​based company in India, 735–​736, 736t, 737t technology competition from emerging markets in, 20, 23 and locations of global value chains, 597 readiness of various countries, 2013, 89t technology transfer, and foreign direct investment (FDI), 399, 400, 408–​410 Teece, D. J., foundations of enterprise performance, 92 telecommunications sector in Russia, 718 Tech Mahindra, case study of, 735–​736 telenovela, and marketing in Latin America, 68

territoriality and global production networks, 334, 339–​341 and national control of production, 341–​343 Tilly, Charles, politics of transitions and traps, 84 top management team (TMT), and corporate governance, 191–​192 total factor productivity (TFP) levels of various countries, 90–​91, 90f tourism international inbound and outbound, 19t toy industry, in China, 599 trade trading across borders, ease of, 282–​283 transaction costs, and internationalization of small to medium-​sized businesses, 503 transfer rate, and risk management in local EM businesses, 443–​444 transition economies, use of term, 12 transitions and traps, politics of, 82–​85, 94–​95 transport infrastructure and business strategies in first global economy, 61 “treaty shopping,” and emerging-​market firms, 149 Triad Countries definition and use of term, 12 international tourism data, 19t tribalization, and reassertion of local cultures, 71 Trump, Donald, global production networks and sovereign territoriality, 334, 345 Tung, R.,”springboard strategy” of MNEs, 45 Turkey, innovation in, 365–​366 Tversky, Amos, 169 Unilever, 253 challenge from local Indian firm, 69–​70 international business strategies during Great Reversal, 64–​65 marketing practices in developing countries, 67, 68–​69 union system, and Brazilian institutional environment, 690 United Fruit Company, 63

Index   873 United Nations Draft Code, on conduct of multinationals, 381 United Nations Global Compact, on responsible business practices, 382 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 129, 133, 374, 380–​381 foundation and implementation of, 383–​386 Unnathi Society, 257 Urry, J., 344–​345 Vahlne, J.-​E., internationalization process theory,  41–​42 Vahter, Priit “Spillovers from FDI in Emerging Market Economies,” 399–​425 value chain, disaggregation of the, 355–​337 van Agtmael, Antoine, 5 Venezuela treaty-​based investment disputes, 147–​148,  154n32 Venkatesh, G., 739–​740 venture capital, and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 480–​481 Vernon, Raymond, international product cycle, 42, 43f Volkswagen AG, success in China, 747 Wan, Feng “How Real Are the Opportunities for Multinationals in China?”, 747–​764 Washington Consensus, points of, 270 welfare state, definition of, 116 Wettstein, Florian “Human Rights, Emerging Markets, and International Business,” 373–​398 Williamson, O. E., 477–​478

Williamson, Peter J., 601 “How Real Are the Opportunities for Multinationals in China?”, 747–​764 Wipro, technology-​based company in India, 731–​734,  733t Witt, Michael A. “Management in Southeast Asia: A Business Systems Perspective,” 823–​843 wooden toy industry, in China, 599 World Bank, ease of doing business index, 274–​275, 274f, 276f, 284–​285 world market risks, in multidomestic firms, 431f, 432 world system risks, in multidomestic firms, 431f, 432, 434, 434f, 435 Wright, Mike “Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets,” 457–​494​ WuXi App Tech, 751 Xie, Zhenzhen “Adjustment of MNE Geographic Market Strategy in Responding to the Rise of Local Competitors in an Emerging Market,” 311–​332 Yeltsin, Boris, and institutional environment in Russia, 706, 707 Yeung, Bernard “Financial Decisions, Behavioral Biases, and Governance in Emerging Markets,” 161–​184 Yip, George S. “Innovation in Emerging Markets,” 351–​372 “Local Firms within Global Value Chains,” 591–​607 Yonyou, 755 Yum Brands, Chinese division of, 748