The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood 9780198797203, 0198797206

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T h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

G OV E R NA N C E AND LIMITED STAT E HO OD

The Oxford Handbook of

GOVERNANCE AND LIMITED STATEHOOD Edited by

THOMAS RISSE TANJA A. BÖRZEL and

ANKE DRAUDE

1

3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2018 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2018 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948693 ISBN 978–​0–​19–​879720–​3 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, cr0 4yy Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Preface

Putting together this handbook took several years and we have to thank many people who helped us along the way. The handbook covers more than a decade of interdisciplinary research on governance in areas of limited statehood. It tries to represent the state of the art and to move the research agenda away from ill-​conceived notions of ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states, and from the Western bias of developed and consolidated statehood that still informs a lot of research on the global South. At the same time, this handbook can only be an interim step in a broader research agenda; we, as well as our authors, identify important research gaps to be tackled in the future (see Chapter 1 Börzel et al., this volume). Much of the research reported in this handbook began in the framework of the Collaborative Research Centre (Sonderforschungsbereich/​SFB) 700 ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood’, which has been generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG—​Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) between 2006 and 2​ 017. Many of this handbook’s authors have been working at the research centre, started their work in Berlin and then moved on, or have been affiliated with our centre for several years. Other authors we just invited to contribute to this handbook, given their expertise in areas important to us. Inspirations for this handbook came from two other Oxford handbooks. The first is the Oxford Handbook of the Transformations of the State (Leibfried et al. 2015), which originated from the Bremen-​based Collaborative Research Centre ‘Transformations of the State’ and which Stephan Leibfried co-​edited. Our own endeavour owes a lot to Stephan. The second inspiration came from the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (Börzel and Risse 2016), which we—​that is, Börzel and Risse—​co-​edited. Without the encouragement of Dominic Byatt, our editor at Oxford University Press, we might not have taken on yet another publication of this magnitude. This new handbook came together during two conferences also funded by the DFG, which took place in Berlin on 22–​23 April 2016, and 17–​18 February 2017. The two meetings proved to be a tremendous learning exercise, helping us as editors and our authors to produce what we hope is a coherent volume. We are extremely grateful to all authors and the participants to the workshops for their insights, their spirited criticisms, as well as their openness when engaging with our conceptual framework. Moreover, these conferences would not have been possible without the top organizational skills of the SFB’s one and only ‘Team Z’, particularly Max Westbrock, Jan Harrs, and Markus Sattler. ‘Team Z’ has been led by the SFB’s management team, namely Eric Stollenwerk, our terrific managing director (see also Chapter 6 Stollenwerk, this volume), and Anne

vi   Preface Hehn, our equally excellent chief administrator. Eric also provided a new data set on governance and limited statehood, which some of our authors used in their chapters (Stollenwerk and Opper 2017). In addition, our heartfelt ‘thank you’ goes to the student assistants Sarah Barasa, Tanja Friesen, Sophie Frossard, Darya Kulinka, Lukas Müller-​Wünsch, Helena Rietmann, Markus Sattler, and Onno Steenweg, for checking references, formatting chapters, proof-reading, and the like. Last but not least, this handbook would not have been possible without the continuous support of the superb professional team at Oxford University Press. As mentioned above, we are especially grateful to Dominic Byatt for his encouragement and continuous support. Special thanks also go to Olivia Wells who guided us and the handbook throughout the editing process. Finally, we are grateful to Anya Hastwell for excellent copy-​editing, Eilidh McGregor for accurate proof-reading, Cathryn Pritchard for doing the index, as well as Kiruthika at Newgen for the entire production and publication management. Thomas Risse—​Tanja A. Börzel—​Anke Draude Berlin, Germany, June 2017

References Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse, eds. 2016. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leibfried, Stephan, Evelyn Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D. Levy, Frank Nullmeier, and John D. Stevens, eds. 2015. The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stollenwerk, Eric, and Jan Opper. 2017. The Governance and Limited Statehood Dataset, version March 2017. SFB 700. Freie Universität Berlin. URL: http://​www.sfb-​governance.de/​en/​ publikationen/​daten/​index.html.

Contents

List of Figures  List of Tables  List of Contributors 

xi xiii xv

I N T RODU C T ION 1. Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Conceptual Clarifications and Major Contributions of the Handbook  Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse, and Anke Draude

3

PA RT I   T H E ORY A N D M E T HOD OL O G Y 2. Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood  Stephen D. Krasner

29

3. A Historical-​Sociological Perspective on Statehood  Klaus Schlichte

48

4. Anthropological Perspectives on the Limits of the State  Andrew Brandel and Shalini Randeria

68

5. Critical Approaches  Laura Sjoberg and J. Samuel Barkin

89

6. Measuring Governance and Limited Statehood  Eric Stollenwerk

106

PA RT I I   T I M E A N D SPAC E 7. Histories of Governance  Stefan Esders, Lasse Hölck, and Stefan Rinke

131

8. A Global History of Governance  Madeleine Herren

148

viii   Contents

9. Geographies of Limited Statehood  Benedikt Korf, Timothy Raeymaekers, Conrad Schetter, and Michael J. Watts

167

PA RT I I I   G OV E R N OR S 10. External State Actors  Markus Lederer

191

11. INGOs and Multi-​Stakeholder Partnerships  Marianne Beisheim, Anne Ellersiek, and Jasmin Lorch

211

12. ‘Traditional’ Authorities  Till Förster and Lucy Koechlin

231

13. Business  Tanja A. Börzel and Nicole Deitelhoff

250

14. Violent and Criminal Non-​State Actors  Benedetta Berti

272

PA RT I V   M ODE S OF G OV E R NA N C E 15. Coercion and Trusteeship  David A. Lake

293

16. Hierarchical and Non-​Hierarchical Coordination  Thomas Risse

312

17. Brokerage, Intermediation, Translation  Jana Hönke and Markus-​Michael Müller

333

18. Social Trust  Anke Draude, Lasse Hölck, and Dietlind Stolle

353

PA RT V   I S SU E A R E A S 19. Security  Ursula Schroeder

375

20. Foreign Aid  Axel Dreher, Valentin Lang, and Sebastian Ziaja

394

Contents   ix

21. Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy  Tobias Berger and Milli Lake

416

22. Health  Anna Holzscheiter

438

23. Food Security  Andrea Liese

459

24. Education  Anne Ellersiek

479

25. Environmental and Natural Resources  Ralph Hamann, Jana Hönke, and Tim O’Riordan

498

26. Migration  Sandra Lavenex

520

PA RT V I   I M P L IC AT ION S 27. International Legal Order  Heike Krieger

543

28. Normative Political Theory  Daniel Jacob, Bernd Ladwig, and Cord Schmelzle

564

29. Policy  Lars Brozus, Christian Jetzlsperger, and Gregor Walter-​Drop

584

Name Index Subject Index

605 611

List of Figures

1.1 Degrees of statehood, 2015

7

1.2 Effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood 

15

6.1 Global degree of limited statehood 

113

6.2 Statehood by federal state in Nigeria, 2008 

115

6.3 Public health provision by federal state in Nigeria, 2008 

117

6.4 Perceptions of public health provision by federal state in Nigeria, 2008 

118

6.5 Number of foreign aid projects by federal state in Nigeria, 2008 

120

15.1 The governance problem 

297

18.1 The relationship between trust and governance 

367

20.1 States affected by ALS, 2006–2015

400

20.2 Income and inflation 

401

20.3 Military expenditure and battle deaths 

402

20.4 Democracy and the rule of law 

403

20.5 United Nations General Assembly voting and the number of donors 

404

20.6 Multilateral and Northern donors

405

20.7 Aid amounts and security aid 

407

20.8 Aid channels 

407

23.1 Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) by region, 1991–​2015 

467

23.2 Bivariate linear regression of Global Hunger Index, 2016, on statehood, 2015

469

25.1 Relationship between environmental performance and statehood, per country, 2014 

503

25.2 Hybrid governance forms between state, market, and community 

509

25.3 Incentives of governments and non-​state actors to cooperate, depending on levels of statehood 

510

List of Tables

2.1 Per capita income and polity scores 

41

2.2 Groups of countries according to per capita income and polity scores 

42

6.1 Data sources for measuring statehood and governance 

108

6.2 Criteria for developing measurements of statehood and governance 

122

9.1 The spatial grammar of authority and regulation in areas of limited statehood 

172

28.1 Types of non-​state governance in areas of limited statehood 

569

List of Contributors

J. Samuel Barkin is professor of global governance in the McCormack Graduate School at the University of Massachusetts Boston, MA, USA. Marianne Beisheim is senior researcher at the SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany. Tobias Berger is assistant professor of politics and international relations at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Benedetta Berti is a Robert A. Fox Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Philadelphia, PA, Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, Israel, and at the Modern War Institute at West Point, New York, NY, USA. Tanja A. Börzel is professor of political science and European integration at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Andrew Brandel is lecturer in the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. Lars Brozus is senior researcher at the SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany. Nicole Deitelhoff is professor of international relations at Goethe-​University Frankfurt and Director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany. Anke Draude is a postdoctoral research associate at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Axel Dreher is professor of international and development politics at Heidelberg University, Germany. Anne Ellersiek is a postdoctoral research associate at the SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany. Stefan Esders is professor of the history of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages at the Friedrich Meinecke Institute, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Till Förster is professor and chair of anthropology at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Ralph Hamann is professor at the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business, South Africa.

xvi   List of Contributors Madeleine Herren is a professor of modern history and director of the Institute for European Global Studies at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Lasse Hölck is a postdoctoral research associate at the Institute for Latin American Studies, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Anna Holzscheiter is assistant professor of political science and international relations at Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Jana Hönke is associate professor and Rosalind Franklin Fellow in international relations at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Daniel Jacob is a postdoctoral research associate at the SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany. Christian Jetzlsperger is a German diplomat and deputy head of the Political Department of the German Embassy in Washington DC, USA. Lucy Koechlin is senior lecturer at the chair of anthropology, University of Basel, Switzerland. Benedikt Korf is professor of political geography at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. Stephen D. Krasner is Graham H.  Stuart Professor of International Relations and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, CA, USA. Heike Krieger is professor for international and public law at the Department of Law, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Bernd Ladwig is associate professor of political theory and philosophy at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. David A. Lake is the Gerri-​Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and distinguished professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, CA, USA. Milli Lake is assistant professor of international security in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics, UK. Valentin Lang is a PhD candidate at the Alfred-​Weber Institute for Economics at Heidelberg University, Germany. Sandra Lavenex is professor of European and international politics at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, and visiting professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium. Markus Lederer is professor of international relations at the Technical University Darmstadt, Germany.

List of Contributors    xvii Andrea Liese is professor of international organizations and policies at the University of Potsdam, Germany. Jasmin Lorch is a postdoctoral research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies (IMES), Hamburg/​Berlin, and lecturer at the Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Germany. Markus-​Michael Müller is assistant professor of Latin American politics at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Tim O’Riordan is emeritus professor of environmental sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Timothy Raeymaekers is a postdoctoral lecturer in political geography at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. Shalini Randeria is rector of the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, Austria, and professor of anthropology and sociology at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. Stefan Rinke is professor of history at the Institute of Latin American Studies and the Friedrich Meinecke Institute, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Thomas Risse is professor of international politics at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, and has been coordinator of the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 700 ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood’. Conrad Schetter is professor for peace and conflict studies at the University of Bonn, and director for research at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Germany. Klaus Schlichte is professor for international relations and world society at the Department for Political Science, University of Bremen, Germany. Cord Schmelzle is a postdoctoral research associate at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Ursula Schroeder is professor of political science and scientific director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Laura Sjoberg is associate professor of political science at the University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA. Dietlind Stolle is professor of political science at McGill University, and director of the Inter-​University Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship (SCDC), Montreal, Canada. Eric Stollenwerk is a research associate at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.

xviii   List of Contributors Gregor Walter-​Drop is scientific coordinator of the Center for Area Studies, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Michael J. Watts is Class of 63 and Chancellors Professor of Geography and Development Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA. Sebastian Ziaja is a postdoctoral researcher at the Research Center for Distributional Conflict and Globalization at Heidelberg University, Germany.

I N T RODU C T ION

Chapter 1

Governance i n A re as of Limited Stat e h o od Conceptual Clarifications and Major Contributions of the Handbook Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse, and Anke Draude

For the past 20 years and beyond, Somalia has topped the list of ‘failed states’ in almost every available data set. The country is usually portrayed as being in permanent turmoil, where civil war prevails, and rebel as well as terrorist groups freely roam. In other words, Somalia seems to represent the quintessential Hobbesian state of nature, where ‘life is nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 1987 (1652)). A closer look at the country reveals a very different picture, however. While fighting and violence prevail in the province of Central Somalia and particularly the capital of Mogadishu, the rest of the country has remained remarkably quiet over the years. The province of Somaliland has developed into a quite successful quasi-​state run by tribal groups and their chiefs (Bakonyi and Stuvoy 2005; Bryden 2004; Richards 2014). International organizations, foreign aid agencies, and international non-​governmental organizations (INGOs) even managed to successfully set up and implement public health services combating HIV/​ AIDS (Schäferhoff 2014). At the same time, nobody would probably portray Germany as a ‘failed state’, and rightly so. Yet, in the autumn of 2016, the city of Berlin gave up on policing Görlitzer Park in the Kreuzberg district, one of the city’s major drug distribution places.1 The same holds true for many inner city districts in the wealthiest countries of the world. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005, it took days before US authorities were able to restore law and order. Ten years afterwards, parts of the city—​particularly African American neighbourhoods—​are still not rebuilt.2 These two contrasting examples serve to illustrate the central message which this handbook wants to convey: first, what we call ‘areas of limited statehood’ can be found

4   Börzel/Risse/Draude everywhere and are not confined to what the literature erroneously calls ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states (e.g. Rotberg 2003, 2004). Even though this handbook concentrates on the global South, we do not suggest at all that areas of limited statehood are confined to developing countries (see Chapters 4 Brandel/​Randeria, 5 Sjoberg/​Barkin, 6 Stollenwerk, and 9 Korf et al., this volume, on this point). Second, however, areas of limited statehood where central state authorities lack the capacity to uphold the monopoly over the means of violence and/​or to enforce the law, are neither ungovernable, nor ungoverned. There is no linear correlation between degrees of statehood, on the one hand, and the provision of public goods and services, on the other (Lee et al. 2014). Instead, we find an enormous variation that includes badly governed places but also ‘good governance’ in areas of limited statehood, sometimes separated only by a few blocks (Krasner and Risse 2014). Effective and legitimate governance is not confined to the consolidated states of the global North. This handbook explores the relationship between statehood and governance from a variety of disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological perspectives. While the majority of our authors are political scientists, we have assembled contributions by social anthropologists (Chapters 4 Brandel/​Randeria, 9 Korf et al., and 12 Förster/​Koechlin, this volume), historians (Chapters 7 Esders et al. and 8 Herren, this volume), geographers (Chapter 9 Korf et al.), economists (Chapter 20 Dreher et al., this volume), and legal scholars (Chapter 27 Krieger, this volume). The theoretical perspectives with which our authors approach the themes of this handbook also vary (see, for example, the various contributions in part I ‘Theory and Methodology’). The same holds true for the methodological approaches of our authors—​from large-​n statistical analyses (particularly Chapters 6 Stollenwerk and 20 Dreher et al., this volume) to ethnography (Chapters 4 Brandel/​Randeria, 9 Korf et al., and 12 Förster/​Koechlin, this volume), historical methods (Chapters 7 Esders et al. and 8 Herren, this volume) and other qualitatively derived data. This chapter serves to introduce the central concepts of the handbook, to briefly delineate its contributions to the state of the art, and to lay out the rationale behind its various sections. We begin by discussing the two central concepts of the handbook, ‘areas of limited statehood’ and ‘governance’. We then discuss some central messages of the handbook and avenues for future research. The chapter concludes with an overview of the handbook and the underlying logic of the various parts.

Conceptual Clarifications Areas of Limited Statehood Our concept of ‘limited statehood’ requires clarification (the following builds upon Risse 2011; for a more comprehensive argument, see Börzel and Risse, forthcoming, ch. 2). First, we elucidate what we mean by statehood and ‘the state’—​as opposed to other forms of

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    5 political order. Second, we clarify our understanding of ‘limited statehood’ and distinguish it from other concepts such as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, or ‘failed’ states. Most scholars would probably agree that the state constitutes a particular type of political order, a political system, or a polity. A tribe forms a political order, but it is not a state. Global governance with its many international institutions also constitutes a political order, but there is no world state. So, how do we know a state when we see it? One can distinguish two conceptualizations of statehood (for the following, see also Eriksen 2011). The first is based on the functions states are supposed to perform. The following quote is typical for this approach to statehood: We define weak states as countries that lack the essential capacity and/​or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population. (Rice and Patrick 2008: 3)

From this point of view, functioning states are essentially service providers; from security to health, education, and a clean environment. Most of the scholarly literature on ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states, the various data sets measuring degrees of statehood, as well as the state-​building programmes of development agencies and international organizations are based on such functional understandings of statehood (e.g. Carment 2003; Carment et al. 2015; Messner et al. 2015; Rotberg 2003, 2004). As a result, this literature often engages in tautological reasoning. States are fragile, because they do not meet basic human needs or do not control their territory. Because they are fragile, they fail to satisfy human needs or to maintain a monopoly over the means of violence. Such conceptualizations are not only analytically useless, but tautological reasoning also leads to bad policy advice (see Chapter 6 Stollenwerk, this volume, on the various measurement problems). Such functional conceptualizations also tend to confuse definitional issues and research questions. If we define the state through the functions it performs, a poorly performing state is no longer a ‘state’ at all, strictly speaking. It also conflates regime type (democracy, autocracy, and so on) and statehood. Such conceptualizations prevent us from asking the questions we are most interested in: Under which conditions do states or other types of polities perform well by providing rule structures and delivering goods and services? How much statehood is necessary for effective governance? Last but not least, most functional typologies in the literature and data sets on fragile states, ‘states at risk’, and so on reveal a normative orientation towards highly developed and democratic statehood and, thus, towards the Western and European models. The benchmark is usually the democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law (Leibfried and Zürn 2005; see also Chapters 2 Krasner and 29 Brozus et al., this volume). This is normatively questionable, because it reveals Eurocentrism and a bias

6   Börzel/Risse/Draude towards Western concepts, as if statehood equals Western liberal statehood and market economy. A second understanding of state and statehood is institutional and conceptualizes the state as a particular type of organizational structure. Max Weber has provided the quintessential definition: A compulsory political organization with continuous operation (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. (Weber 1978: 54)

Note that in Weber’s view, all it takes for the state is to claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, not to actually exercise the monopoly. Accordingly, the state constitutes an authoritative rule structure, a Herrschaftsverband with the capacity to rule hierarchically in the sense of expecting obedience to its commands (see also Chapter 3 Schlichte, this volume). This is an institutional understanding of the state and of statehood as a hierarchical rule structure. States command what Stephen Krasner calls ‘domestic sovereignty’, that is, ‘the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity’ (Krasner 1999: 4). It does not imply that states rule hierarchically via command and control all the time, only that statehood implies the ability to do so (for such understandings see Fukuyama 2004, 2012; Holsti 2004; Jackson 1990; Krasner 1999; see also Chapter 2, Krasner, this volume). This understanding allows us to strictly distinguish between statehood as an institutional structure of authority, on the one hand, and the kind of governance it provides, on the other. The latter is an empirical, not a definitional question. For example, control over the means of violence is part of the definition. Whether this monopoly over the use of force actually provides security for the citizens as a public good and irrespective of one’s race, gender, or kinship, becomes an empirical question. The claimed capacity to govern hierarchically is part of the definition, but whether this ability exists and is used to provide collective goods and services, forms part of the research question. Last but not least, statehood in this understanding has nothing to do with regime type (democracy, autocracy). We can now define more precisely what ‘limited statehood’ means. While areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognized states (even the failed state Somalia still commands international sovereignty), it is their domestic sovereignty which is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood then constitute those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/​or in which they do not command a legitimate monopoly over the means of violence. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be restricted along various dimensions: (i) territorial (i.e. parts of a country’s territorial spaces); (ii) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; (iii) social (i.e. with regard to specific

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    7 parts of the population); and (iv) temporal (see also Chapter 9 Korf et al., this volume). The opposite of ‘limited statehood’ is not ‘unlimited’ but ‘consolidated’ statehood (i.e. those areas of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability to make and enforce central decisions most of the time). Figure 1.1 uses various indicators to map state capacity and state monopoly over the means of violence. It shows that consolidated states, which command more or less sufficient domestic sovereignty over most of the territory, in most policy areas most of the time, are the exception to the rule in the contemporary international system covering mostly the ‘global North’ of highly industrialized and democratic states. This is not to argue that areas of limited statehood are confined to the ‘global South’ of the developing world, as just discussed here. At the other end of the spectrum, we find ‘failed states’, that is, countries where areas of limited statehood cover the entire territory and most of the population, as well as encompass most policy areas most of the time. Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan constitute prominent examples of ‘failed states’ in the current international system. Figure 1.1 shows that the vast majority of contemporary states exhibit areas of limited statehood with regard to parts of the territory, particular policy areas, parts of the population, or combinations thereof. At this point, however, the map is misleading because of methodological nationalism, as a result of which data are aggregated on the national level, rather than with regard to substate or even local entities and policy areas (Chapters 6 Stollenwerk and 9 Korf et al., this volume, on these measurement problems and on

Degrees of statehood 2015 Consolidated Limited Extremely limited Failed No data

fig. 1.1  Degrees of statehood, 2015. Source: Stollenwerk and Opper 2017; see also Chapter 6 Stollenwerk, this volume.

8   Börzel/Risse/Draude suggestions for remedies). Take Brazil, for example, a prominent member of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The Brazilian state can certainly not be regarded as failed or fragile, but state authorities do not command the capacity to enforce the law in many favelas of Rio de Janeiro, or in vast areas of the Amazon. With regard to policy areas, the People’s Republic of China—​the emerging power of the century—​has rather strict environmental laws, but still contains some of the most polluted areas of the world, indicating a lack of law enforcement (Man 2013). The government of South Africa—​the ‘S’ in the BRICS—​for years has not dealt with the country’s HIV/​AIDS pandemic (Börzel and Thauer 2013). If we conceptualize limited statehood in a configurative way, areas of limited statehood are an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in the contemporary international system, but also in historical comparison (Chapters 7 Esders et al. and 8 Herren, this volume; see also Conrad and Stange 2011). After all, the state monopoly over the means of violence has only been around since the nineteenth century (see e.g. Osiander 2001; Reinhard 2007; Thomson 1994, 1995). For centuries, states have fought against mercenaries and pirates in order to reap the means of violence from the various contenders. As Charles Tilly argued, state-​making was war-​making, and war made the state (Tilly 1985, 1995). As Stephen Krasner put it, sovereignty amounted to not much more historically than ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner 1999). In sum, rather than the Weberian consolidated state with a strong and independent bureaucracy, areas of limited statehood are the default condition in the current global system and historically. The ubiquity of areas of limited statehood stands in sharp contrast to the fiction upheld by international law and the sovereignty discourse prevailing in the international community that the world is populated by fully sovereign Weberian states enjoying consolidated statehood (Chapter 27 Krieger, this volume). If areas of limited statehood are the default and not the exception, what does this tell us about the contemporary international order? First, the familiar distinction in International Relations theories (Waltz 1979; see also Lake 2009) between domestic orders where hierarchy prevails, and the international realm of ‘anarchy’ falls by the wayside. (Domestic) Areas of limited statehood share, by definition, characteristics of the international system, namely that there is no central rule enforcer. Second, the binary distinction between state and non-​state actors becomes problematic. This distinction usually rests on the assumption that state actors enjoy international and domestic sovereignty, while non-​state actors do not. However, the ability to rule hierarchically is not confined to states, but many non-​state actors do so, too—​from warlords to local chiefs (Chapters 12 Förster/​Koechlin, 14 Berti, and 16 Risse, this volume). As the various contributions to this handbook demonstrate, both state and non-​state actors govern in areas of limited statehood and it is often less than clear who the ‘governors’ are in particular places (on this term, see Avant et al. 2010b). Third, areas of limited statehood are mostly not anarchic in the Hobbesian sense where life is ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 1987 (1652): ch. 13). They are neither ungovernable nor ungoverned. Again, this is what areas of limited statehood have in common with the ‘anarchic’ environment of the international system (Chapter 15 Lake,

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    9 this volume). There is no supreme authority governing these spaces, but the international system as well as areas of limited statehood are full of rules, regulations, and institutions, both formal and informal (Chapter 9 Korf et al., this volume). As we will show in this handbook, some areas of limited statehood are reasonably well governed, while others are not, and the provision of basic collective goods and services is lacking. Just because the Brazilian police cannot enforce the law in many favelas of Rio de Janeiro does not mean that all Brazilian favelas are crime-​infested places. Some are reasonably well governed, while others are not. At this point, we need to clarify our understanding of ‘governance’.

Governance ‘Governance’ has become almost a fashionable term in the social sciences since the 1990s and the 2000s. Several handbooks of governance, including global and transnational governance, have been published in the meantime (Bevir 2011; Hale and Held 2011; Levi-​Faur 2012b; Schuppert and Zürn 2008; see also Bevir 2009; Mayntz 2009; Pierre and Peters 2000; Schuppert 2005; Zürn 2013). So, has governance become an ‘empty signifier’ (Offe 2009; see also Grande 2012)? We do not think so, but the confusion surrounding the concept requires clarification (see Draude 2012 and Risse 2011 for the following). In its most general version, governance refers to all modes of coordinating social action in human society. Williamson, for example, distinguished between governance by markets and governance by hierarchy (i.e. the state); later scholars added governance by networks to this list (see e.g. Kooiman 1993, Rhodes 1997, and Williamson 1975; for overviews see Levi-​Faur 2012a). However, such a broad understanding that identifies governance with any kind of social ordering does not appear to be useful for our purposes. After all, we do not want to enquire how markets allocate values and resources. Rather, we want to know how collective goods and services can be provided in the absence of a well-​functioning state. In other words, we are interested in politics as the regulation of public affairs for a society. We want to know, ‘who gets what, when, how?’, to quote Harold Laswell (Laswell 1936) and how the ‘(authoritative) allocation of values for a society’ works, to use David Easton’s definition of politics (Easton 1953: 131).3 As a result, this handbook employs a somewhat narrower concept. By governance, we mean the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, and/​or to provide collective goods. This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is widespread within the social sciences (see e.g. Benz 2004; Kohler-​Koch 1998; Mayntz 2004, 2009; Schuppert 2005; Schuppert and Zürn 2008). Accordingly, governance consists of both structural (‘institutionalized’) and process dimensions (‘modes of social coordination’). Governance covers ruling by the state (‘governance by government’), governance via cooperative networks of public and private actors (‘governance with government’), as well as rule-​making by non-​state actors or self-​regulation by civil society (‘governance

10   Börzel/Risse/Draude without government’; cf. Benz 2004; Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Grande and Pauly 2005; Zürn 1998). Moreover, clarifying the concept of governance requires answering three traditional political science questions (see Dahl 1961): Who governs? How is governance taking place? What results from governance?

Who: The Governors The ‘Who’ question concerns the actors of governance which we call the ‘governors’ in this handbook (following Avant et al. 2010a; see part III of this volume). We find various combinations of state and non-​state actors governing areas of limited statehood. State actors include the national or local governments (irrespective of their limited capability to enforce decisions in areas of limited statehood), international (intergovernmental) organizations, and foreign governments including their multiple agencies (Chapter 10 Lederer, this volume). Non-​state actors encompass (international) non-​governmental organizations (INGOs) and multi-​stakeholder partnerships (Chapter 11 Beisheim et al., this volume), business actors (Chapter 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume), but also local chiefs, so-​called ‘traditional’ authorities (Chapter 12 Förster/​Koechlin, this volume), and even violent non-​state actors, such as rebel groups and warlords (Chapter 14 Berti, this volume).

How: Modes of Governance The ‘How’ question refers to the modes of governance (see part IV of this volume). Consolidated states have the ability to rule hierarchically, that is, to authoritatively enforce the law, ultimately through policing and ‘top-​down’ command and control. Hierarchical rule can take place through coercion, but it can also invoke voluntary compliance, the more the political order as well as the governors are considered legitimate in the sense of social acceptance by the governed (Hurd 1999). Moreover, consolidated states also have the capacity to cast a ‘shadow of hierarchy’, that is, to incentivize other actors to provide governance in order to avoid hierarchical coordination by the state (Börzel and Risse 2010; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). It is precisely this ability to enforce decisions which is lacking in areas of limited statehood. However, as several contributions in this handbook show, hierarchical rule is not absent in areas of limited statehood (e.g. Chapters 9 Korf et al., 14 Berti, 15 Lake, and 16 Risse, this volume). External intervenors establishing trusteeships, violent non-​ state actors including warlords, rebel groups, or terrorist groups, as well as ‘traditional’ authorities and local chiefs often rule hierarchically in areas of limited statehood. Much more common, however, are non-​hierarchical modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. The contemporary social science literature has discussed these as ‘new’ modes of governance or the privatization of authority (see e.g. Cutler et al.

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    11 1999; Grande and Pauly 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002). However, these ‘new’ modes of governance are by no means specific to the contemporary international system (Chapter 7 Esders et al., this volume). The colonial state, for example, constituted an area of limited statehood as we understand it in this volume, as a result of which governance took place through colonial rulers (‘states’), transnational ‘public–​private’ companies (cf. the Hudson Bay Company in North America or the East India Company in Asia), and local ‘private’ actors, such as settlers (Chapter 8 Herren, this volume; see also Conrad and Stange 2011). Non-​hierarchical modes of governance can be distinguished according to the underlying logic of action (including a mix thereof, see March and Olsen 1998; see also Chapter 16 Risse, this volume). The logic of consequentialism assumes utility-​maximizing actors with given preferences, whose cost-​benefit calculations can be affected through modes of governance. Accordingly, this mode of governance involves creating and manipulating incentives and ‘benchmarking’. Positive incentives, but also sanctions are meant to affect the cost-​benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the desired behaviour. Non-​hierarchical governance also includes the give and take of bargaining processes. While power asymmetries are common in negotiations, for example, between external actors and governments in areas of limited statehood (see Chapters 10 Lederer, 22 Holzscheiter, 23 Liese, and 26 Lavenex, this volume), they should not be confused with hierarchy. Non-​hierarchical modes of governance also encompass interactions following the logics of appropriateness and of communicative action (March and Olsen 1998; Risse 2000; see also Chapters 16 Risse and 17 Hönke/​Müller, this volume) including non-​ manipulative communication, persuasion, and learning. These modes of governance aim at challenging fixed interest and preferences so that actors are induced in a socialization process to internalize new rules and norms (see e.g. Chapter 21 Berger/​Lake, this volume). As Risse argues in Chapter 16 (this volume), many non-​state justice institutions in areas of limited statehood contain strong elements of deliberative processes.

What: Collectively Binding Rules and Collective Goods Governance is supposed to provide collectively binding rules as well as collective goods (see part V, this volume). Simply curbing negative externalities of private goods’ production does not qualify as governance in our understanding (while setting up rules to avoid negative externalities does, see the following list). We can then distinguish three types of governance contributions (see also Chapter 10 Lederer, this volume): • The direct delivery of collective goods and services (first-​order governance), such as security, public health, education, clean environment, and the like. We follow the usual definition of collective goods as characterized by non-​exclusive access and/​or non-​rivalry in consumption. At least one of these conditions has to be present for a good to qualify as collective or common;

12   Börzel/Risse/Draude • The formulation and implementation of collectively binding rules for regulating social life (e.g. human rights) as well as the delivery of collective goods and services (second-​order governance); • The establishment of institutions regulating the rule-​making itself and coordinating the governance contributions of others (meta-​governance).

Central Contributions of the Handbook Explaining Effective and Legitimate Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood The various contributions to this handbook focus on one particular research question: How and under what conditions is governance in areas of limited statehood effective and legitimate? ‘Effectiveness’ means in this context that binding rules and collective goods are actually delivered in areas of limited statehood—​for as many people as possible (Schmelzle 2011). We understand ‘legitimacy’ as the ‘licence to govern’, or the ‘right to rule’ (Schmelzle 2015). Most authors of this handbook focus on ‘empirical’ legitimacy in this context, that is, the social acceptance of the governors and/​or the governance institutions by those being governed or ruled. Empirical legitimacy has to be strictly distinguished from ‘normative legitimacy’, that is, the rightfulness of an order according to particular normative criteria (see Chapter 28 Jacob et al., this volume). The greater the empirical legitimacy of governors or of governance institutions, the more we can expect voluntary compliance with (costly) rules by those being governed (Hurd 1999; Scharpf 1997). So what are the major findings of this handbook? To begin with, as argued above, areas of limited statehood are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. Part III of this handbook discusses the various governors stepping in when state authorities are too weak to implement and enforce decisions, or even lack the monopoly over the means of violence. These governors often create what Krasner calls ‘islands of excellence’ in areas of limited statehood (Chapter 2 Krasner, this volume). The key challenge for governance in areas of limited statehood is not so much how to induce non-​state and external state actors to engage in governance, but how to sustain and upscale these islands of better governance and to insure that the governors help create and manage their relationship so that they do not compete with each other (Chapter 15 Lake, this volume).

Legitimacy Empirical legitimacy or social acceptance matters hugely for the effectiveness of governance in areas of limited statehood (Krasner and Risse 2014; see also Chapter 16 Risse, this

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    13 volume). In fact, as Berti argues in her chapter (Chapter 14, this volume), particularly violent non-​state actors often provide governance in the areas which they rule in order to gain legitimacy (see also Jo 2015), both by the local population and by the international community. The same holds true for business actors as governors (Chapter 13 Börzel/​ Deitelhoff, this volume) and for brokers (Chapter 17 Hönke/​Müller, this volume). Several authors of part V of this handbook also point to the crucial importance of social acceptance and legitimacy (see Chapters 19 Schroeder, 21 Berger/​Lake, and 25 Hamann et al., this volume). At the same time, lack of legitimacy—​both domestic and international—​ also explains why massive military state-​building interventions mostly fail (Chapter 15 Lake, this volume). Legitimacy constitutes a decisive scope condition for the effectiveness of governance in areas of limited statehood. Moreover, the causal arrows between empirical legitimacy and the effectiveness of governance in areas of limited statehood point in both directions. On the one hand, legitimacy bestowed upon the governors or the governance institutions leads to voluntary compliance with costly rules (second-​order governance; see list above), which is particularly relevant in areas of limited statehood where the enforcement capacities of the state are notoriously weak. Even first-​order governance—​ the direct delivery of collective goods and services by the various governors—​requires at least some degree of legitimacy in order to be effective (see the contributions in part V of this volume). On the other hand, effective governance tends to increase the legitimacy of the governors and the governance institutions. Thus, we find that output legitimacy matters in areas of limited statehood (Scharpf 1999; see also Schmelzle 2015). In sum, legitimacy and effectiveness form some degree of a virtuous cycle in a similar way as Levy and Sachs have argued for consolidated states (Levi and Sacks 2009; for a thorough treatment, see Schmelzle and Stollenwerk, forthcoming).

Social Trust Social trust—​understood here as risk-​taking by engaging in cooperative actions with others in the absence of complete information about their motives and interests (Börzel and Risse 2016; Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume)—​serves as another powerful driver for the effectiveness of governance under conditions of limited statehood. As particularly Ostrom has shown, social trust among local community members helps them overcoming collective action problems within and between social groups (Ostrom 1990, 2000) and, thus, enables effective governance (see also Chapters 12 Förster/​Koechlin, 15 Lake, 16 Risse, 17 Hönke/​Müller, and 18 Draude et al., this volume). Thus, social trust can solve the governance problem making ‘cooperation under anarchy’ possible (Chapter 15 Lake), which is particularly relevant for areas of limited statehood. The main challenge here is to upscale social trust from personalized relations within local communities to generalized trust among larger entities (Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume). Social trust not only contributes to more effective governance in areas of limited statehood, but it also appears to enhance the legitimacy of the governors, particularly those

14   Börzel/Risse/Draude embedded in the various communities. Finally, non-​exclusive forms of social trust help prevent the outbreak of violence in areas of limited statehood as a precondition for effective service delivery with regard to health, education, and food security (Chapters  22 Holzscheiter, 23 Liese, and 24 Ellersiek, this volume).

Design of Governance Institutions The design of governance institutions also matters for the effectiveness of governance in areas of limited statehood. To begin with, institutions must be ‘fit for purpose’, that is, functionally capable of performing the task that they are built to accomplish (see the rational design of institutions argument, Koremenos et al. 2001). Most chapters in part V of this volume point to the relevance of adequate institutional designs for service delivery in areas of limited statehood. Moreover, the make-​up of institutions for governance in areas of limited statehood must be flexible enough to adapt to local conditions, and this includes in-​built learning capacities (Beisheim and Liese 2014; Beisheim et al. 2014; see Chapter 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). Institutions also facilitate non-​hierarchical modes of governance, which complement and substitute for hierarchical coordination based on statehood (Chapters 11 Beisheim et al., 16 Risse, and 25 Hamann et al., this volume). In particular, socially inclusive governance institutions serve as discourse arenas in areas of limited statehood enabling deliberative modes of governance and preventing the arbitrary exercise of power (Chapters 2 Krasner, 15 Lake, 16 Risse, 17 Hönke/​Müller, and 25 Hamann et al., this volume). Inclusive governance institutions not only contribute to the effectiveness of governance under conditions of limited statehood, but they also foster both legitimacy and social trust (Chapters 16 Risse and 18 Draude et al., this volume). The experience of fair, impartial, and inclusive governance institutions is particularly relevant for building generalized trust in the absence of well-​functioning states (Börzel and Risse 2016). In sum, empirical legitimacy, social trust, and institutional design appear to be major scope conditions for the effectiveness of governance (both rule-​making and service delivery) in areas of limited statehood. In addition, the three factors reinforce each other in a triangular relationship (Fig. 1.2).

But What About the State? Most contributions to this handbook confirm that there is no linear relationship between degrees of statehood and effective governance (Lee et al. 2014). The data show that effective governance in terms of both service delivery and rule-​making (first-​and second-​order governance; see above) is possible in areas of limited statehood where state institutions are too weak to implement and enforce decisions.

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    15

Legitimacy

Effectiveness

Institutions

Social Trust

fig. 1.2  Effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood.

At the same time, we cannot simply follow Scott’s ‘two cheers for anarchy’ (Scott 2012). Several chapters find that statehood still matters for building islands of governance, particularly when it comes to broadening access to collective goods and services (Chapters 10 Lederer, 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, 20 Dreher et al., 22 Holzscheiter, 23 Liese, and 25 Hamann et al., this volume). Basic security and administrative infrastructure are essential preconditions for effective governance by non-​state and external governors (Chapters 11 Beisheim et al., 22 Holzscheiter, 23 Liese, and 24 Ellersiek, this volume). NGOs, multi-​stakeholder partnerships (MSP), and companies are unable or reluctant to provide such basic services. External state governors, but also warlords, rebel groups, and other violent non-​state actors may engage in peace-​keeping and peace-​making (Chapters 10 Lederer, 14 Berti, 19 Schroeder, and 29 Brozus et al., this volume). They contribute to state-​building in the sense that international as well as violent non-​state actors uphold a monopoly over the means of violence in the areas they control. They also set up basic administrations to coordinate external and domestic resources necessary for service delivery. While statehood does not have to reside with state actors, non-​ state actors with the capacity to control the monopoly over the use of force as well as set and enforce collectively binding rules have to accept the public responsibility to use their statehood to serve the public interest rather than seek rents (Chapter 28 Jacob et al., this volume). The incentives to do so often come from external consolidated statehood (Chapters 2 Krasner, 10 Lederer, and 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume) and from international law that is still rather state-​centric (Chapter 27 Krieger, this volume). Home-​ country regulations keep multinational companies and international NGOs compliant. International law entails governance obligations for non-​state actors if they want to acquire (international) legitimacy (Chapters 16 Risse and 27 Krieger, this volume). Statehood, both internal and external, is not an end of governance building, but it may remain an important means.

16   Börzel/Risse/Draude At the same time, the success of state-​building efforts has been limited at best (Chapters 10 Lederer, 15 Lake, 19 Schroeder, and 29 Brozus et al., this volume). Domestic elites have little incentive to invest in state institutions dedicated to the provision of collective goods and services. Service delivery can facilitate resource extraction, enhance control over territory, and generate legitimacy (Chapters 14 Berti and 16 Risse, this volume). Yet, governors are more than ‘stationary bandits’ (Olson 1993). Eventually, state-​ building cuts into rent-​seeking opportunities and undermines political power (Chapter 2 Krasner, this volume). External actors, in turn, often lack sufficient financial and military resources, as well as domestic political support to solve the ‘governance problem’ (Chapter 15 Lake, this volume) and build sustainable and liberal state institutions (Chapters 10 Lederer, 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, 15 Lake, 21 Berger/​Lake, and 29 Brozus et al., this volume). So, where does this leave us if some degree of statehood is required for sustainable governance in many issue areas (and particularly with regard to highly complex tasks that require the coordination of multiple actors and multiple interventions, i.e. meta-​governance), yet (external) state-​building efforts have largely failed? To begin with, statehood is not a dichotomous variable, but there are degrees of statehood. For example, there are a lot of variations in statehood between Denmark, on the one hand, and Central Somalia, on the other. Even if the state has completely failed, ‘islands of excellence’ (Chapter  2 Krasner, this volume) are still possible in local communities. Social trust can almost completely substitute for the absence of statehood under these circumstances (Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume). Two problems remain, however. First, upscaling governance from small communities to larger entities appears to be difficult, if not impossible, without at least some degree of statehood possessed by state rather than non-​state or external actors. This is not to suggest that we need a functioning nation-​state for upscaling, as international law seems to suggest (Chapter 27 Krieger, this volume). It may be possible that the province level or some equivalents are sufficient for these purposes (see Chapter 6 Stollenwork, this volume, for data on Nigeria). Second, what about meta-​governance (i.e. the coordination of actors and the setting up of rules about rule-​making)? Again, some degree of statehood—​whether provided by state or non-​state actors—​appears to be necessary here. Yet, this still does not mean that well-​performing Western states like Denmark or Norway should be the endpoint of history. There are many examples of meta-​governance that work with consolidated statehood of external actors. Governance delegation agreements by which weak state governments delegate governance functions to external actors that have statehood are a case in point (Matanock 2014; see also Chapter 16 Risse, this volume). Such agreement are also in line with recent tendencies in international law to uphold the necessity that external interventions should be based on the consent of the home governments (Chapter 27 Krieger, this volume). Last but not least, we should not forget that states with enough capacity to enforce decisions are sometimes part of the problem, rather than the solution. Consolidated statehood that is unconstrained by the rule of law including the protection of human

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    17 rights simply amounts to autocratic rule (Chapter 2 Krasner, this volume). Moreover, even weak state governments often act as spoilers trying to prevent other governors from stepping in with regard to rule-​making and service delivery (e.g. in order to generate rents; see Börzel and Thauer 2013). Finally, legitimacy as the ‘right to rule’ has to be earned by state governors, too, as a precondition for effective governance; it does not come automatically (Chapter 28 Jacob et al., this volume). In sum, this handbook promotes a nuanced view of statehood as a precondition for scaled-​up and sustainable governance. As a result, policy conclusions tend to be rather modest. Wholesale state-​building has largely failed, but it is not necessarily required for sustainable governance beyond local communities (see Chapter 29 Brozus et al., this volume).

Avenues for Future Research Non-​Western Governors External actors play a crucial role for governance in areas of limited statehood, particu­ larly in building islands of excellence (Chapters 2 Krasner, 10 Lederer, 11 Beisheim et al., 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, 22 Holzscheiter, 23 Liese, 24 Ellersiek, and 25 Hamann et al., this volume). External governors are predominantly located in the ‘West’. Western states either interfere directly or through international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, or the Food and Agriculture Organization. Transnational non-​governmental organizations, multi-​ stakeholder partnerships, foundations, charity organizations, and companies usually headquarter in OECD countries. However, various contributions to this handbook find that China, Brazil, and, to a lesser extent, the other three BRICS have become involved in areas of limited statehood. Thus, while most of the scholarship still focuses on ‘Western’ external actors, we need more studies that investigate to what extent emerging markets and rising powers act as governors, whether actors and modes differ from Western governors, and how effective and legitimate their governance contributions are (Chapter 10 Lederer, this volume).

Areas of Limited Statehood in the Global North Unfortunately, none of this volume’s chapters cover areas of limited statehood in the developed OECD world. This does not imply, however, that we reduce the concept of limited statehood to the post-​colonial world. Chapters 7 by Esders et al. and 8 by Herren (this volume) show that areas of limited statehood have existed across history, and Chapter 6 by Stollenwerk (this volume) demonstrates that they are a global phenomenon in our present time. Several chapters criticize the binaries of the ‘underdeveloped’ global South and the ‘developed’ and ‘modern’ global North (Chapters 3 Schlichte, 4 Brandel/​

18   Börzel/Risse/Draude Randeria, 5 Sjorberg/​Barkin, 8 Herren, and 9 Korf et al., this volume). Most chapters in part V of this volume compare governance in the global South with the global North and explore their entanglements. What is still missing, though, are systematic comparisons of areas of limited statehood across the North–​South divide that investigate similarities as well as differences, and explore varieties of limited statehood. Western states may deliberately limit their statehood by outsourcing the provision of collective goods and services to non-​state actors (Chapters 4 Brandel/​Randeria, 22 Holzscheiter, 24 Ellersiek, and 26 Lavenex, this volume). How is the ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange 1996) through privatization, marketization, and externalization different from ‘discharging’ (Chapters 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff and 25 Hamann et al., this volume) and the ‘cunning state’ (Chapter 4 Brandel/​Randeria; see also Randeria 2003) in sub-​Saharan Africa or India? Does the ‘globalized state’ (Chapter 8 Herren, this volume) in Europe differ from the ‘internationalized state’ (Chapter 3 Schlichte, this volume) because supranational organizations, such as the European Union, interfere with the Westphalian sovereignty of Western states rather than international donors? To what extent is multilayered network governance in the twenty-​first century different from the colonial power settings of nineteenth-​and early twentieth-​century imperialism (Chapter 8 Herren, this volume), or from modes of governance in the Middle Ages and early modern empires (Chapter 7 Esders et al., this volume)? How important is statehood for the role of (state) actors as governance managers (Chapter 16 Risse, this volume)?

The Nation-​State as Reference Point? The need for upscaling islands of excellence arises from their limited scope in terms of social inclusion and accessibility. The reference point for defining whether actors provide truly public or only club goods is often the nation-​state (Chapter 28 Jacob et al., this volume). Yet, boundaries of belonging are not necessarily defined by national imagined communities, particularly not in areas of limited statehood with rather fluid borders (Chapters 4 Brandel/​Randeria and 9 Korf et al., this volume). This may explain why citizens’ perception of governance effectiveness diverges from its provision measured by ‘objective’ governance indicators (Chapter 6 Stollenwerk, this volume). Decentring the state also requires us to think about boundaries that are not defined by state borders and about ‘imagined communities’ other than the nation for constructing overarching group identities as the basis of generalized trust (Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume).

The Structure of the Handbook This handbook covers more than a decade of interdisciplinary research on governance and limited statehood. Each chapter carves out the actors and modes of governance as well as their areas of engagement, and reflects on the implications of its findings.

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    19 Moreover, the authors pay particular attention to the spatiotemporal conditions of the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance in areas of limited statehood. In the following, we explain the structure of the handbook and how the various chapters fit in. Part I revisits social science theories and methodology, appraising their capacities to describe, explain, and assess the realities of governance in areas of limited statehood (Chapters 2–​6). Krasner starts with a concise overview of modernization theory and institutionalist approaches. By enquiring about statements on new modes of non-​hierarchical and non-​state governance in particular, Krasner reconsiders this literature as theories of governance and limited statehood (Chapter 2 Krasner, this volume). Schlichte criticizes prevailing deficit descriptions of states in the global South. He sheds light on complex constellations of domination that are often measured against an idealized image of consolidated statehood (Chapter 3 Schlichte, this volume). While Schlichte introduces the reader to alternative approaches from political sociology, Brandel and Randeria take stock of social anthropology’s theorizing of the state and non-​state governance in the post-​colony, which challenges pervasive binaries such as ‘the West and the Rest’, or public and private, based on everyday experiences (Chapter 4 Brandel/​Randeria, this volume). Likewise, Sjoberg and Barkin argue that critical theories are particularly able to reveal biases in the knowledge production on governance and limited statehood, by self-​reflecting on the scholarly community itself and thus revealing dominant and excluded languages, locations, perceptions, and interests (Chapter 5 Sjoberg/​Barkin, this volume). Finally, Stollenwerk criticizes the state​centrism of existing data and quantitative approaches, indicating a lack of subnational data and differentiated indicators for a more adequate analysis of governance and limited statehood (Chapter 6 Stollenwerk, this volume). Part II of the handbook is meant to sensitize readers to historical continuities and spatial varieties of governance and limited statehood (Chapters 7–​9). The chapters in this part provide evidence that, throughout time and space, areas of limited statehood are neither ungovernable nor ungoverned spaces, but rather spaces of contested governance. Esders, Hölck, and Rinke work out the varieties of non-​hierarchical governance by state and non-​state actors in the transitional periods of medieval Europe and colonial history (Chapter 7 Esders et al., this volume). Herren challenges the Eurocentric success story of the modern nation-​state by unveiling colonial power settings as a source for the development of multilayered networked governance on a global scale (Chapter 8 Herren, this volume). Last but not least, Korf, Raeymaekers, Schetter, and Watts revisit the concept of limited statehood from a geographer’s perspective. Drawing from insights of the so-​called ‘spatial turn’, the authors understand areas of limited statehood as shifting patterns of establishing control over people, infrastructure, and resources, which are not restricted to the global South (Chapter 9 Korf et al., this volume). The following three parts of the handbook follow the ‘who’, ‘how’, and ‘what’ of governance in areas of limited statehood as outlined above. Accordingly, part III focuses on various actors as ‘governors’ (Chapters 10–​14). Actors involved in governance in areas of limited statehood range from external state actors (Chapter 10 Lederer, this volume),

20   Börzel/Risse/Draude external non-​state actors (Chapter 11 Beisheim et al., this volume), and ‘traditional’ authorities (Chapter 12 Förster/​Koechlin, this volume), to more ambivalent ‘governors’ such as business actors (Chapter 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume) and violent and criminal non-​state actors (Chapter 14 Berti, this volume). These chapters draw the readers’ attention particularly to the factors that motivate different actors to engage in governance and to provide collective goods and collectively binding rules. The chapters also examine the effectiveness and legitimacy of these governance contributions, thereby formulating scope conditions. Part IV focuses on how governance is provided in areas of limited statehood, thereby distinguishing various modes of governance identified above (Chapters 15–​18). Even though they co-​occur in reality, different modes of governance follow specific underlying rationalities or logics of action. To begin with, Lake examines the fundamental problem of governance and explores coercion and trusteeship as two particular solutions (Chapter 15 Lake, this volume). He concludes that the scope conditions for coercive governance and trusteeships imposed by external actors are so demanding that effective and legitimate governance is rather unlikely under these circumstances. In contrast, Risse is more optimistic with regard to non-​hierarchical methods, including deliberative modes of governance in areas of limited statehood (see Chapter 16 Risse, this volume). He argues that the empirical legitimacy of the governors and the governance institutions, together with the design of the latter, go a long way towards explaining effective governance in areas of limited statehood. Hönke and Müller open up an integrative perspective on brokerage, intermediation, and translation as a common mode of governance in areas of limited statehood and beyond (Chapter 17 Hönke/​Müller, this volume). They argue that, far from being a phenomenon exclusively located in areas of limited statehood, brokerage shapes the global policies directed at areas of limited statehood, and the international organizations and institutions that produce them. Last but not least, Draude, Hölck, and Stolle show that social trust facilitates governance by enabling collective action; governance, in turn, can broaden the scope of trust by promoting universalistic values (Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume). Part V is dedicated to the ‘what’ of governance and, thus, particular issue areas (Chapters 19–​26). Our authors cover major policy fields, from security (Chapter 19 Schroeder, this volume) and foreign aid (Chapter 20 Dreher et al., this volume) to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (Chapter 21 Berger/​Lake, this volume); they deal with health (Chapter 22 Holzscheiter, this volume), food (Chapter 23 Liese, this volume), and education (Chapter 24 Ellersiek, this volume), as well as environment and natural resources (Chapter 25 Hamann et al., this volume), and migration (Chapter 26 Lavenex, this volume). Each chapter maps the specific actors dominating the issue area, and investigates the modes of coordination as well as conditions for effectiveness and legitimacy of the identified governance arrangements. In addition, research gaps for future scholarship as well as policy implications for governance practitioners are discussed. Most authors in this part of the handbook concur on pointing out ambivalences of non-​ state and external governance. They emphasize that we should not give up on governance by the state prematurely, particularly when it comes to ensuring the sustainability

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood    21 of governance and the provision of meta-​governance, that is, coordination of actors as well as rules about rule-​making. The final part VI of the handbook reflects on the implications of the findings (Chapters 27–​29). Krieger conducts a legal analysis of how international law has dealt with areas of limited statehood over the past decades (Chapter  27 Krieger, this volume). While the period after 1990 was characterized by approaches which relativized the sovereignty of fragile states as ‘unwilling and unable’ to provide governance, more recent developments point to a re-​emphasis of state consent, particularly with regard to intrusions into their domestic sovereignty. Jacob, Ladwig, and Schmelzle discuss the normative implications of non-​state governance in areas of limited statehood, arguing against purely instrumental justifications of non-​state governance and instead favouring a more critical focus on the public character of governance institutions, be they state or non-​state (Chapter 28 Jacob et al., this volume). Brozus, Jetzlsperger, and Walter-​ Drop, finally, change the perspective from theory to practice. They assess the results of decade-​long international state-​building, with modest results and partly disastrous consequences, which ultimately leads them to recommend ‘governance building’ as an alternative concept to guide policy vis-​a-​vis areas of limited statehood (Chapter 29 Brozus et al., this volume).

Notes 1. See http://​www.bz-​berlin.de/​berlin/​friedrichshain-​kreuzberg/​berliner-​polizei-​gibt-​am-​ goerlitzer-​park-​auf (accessed 12 December 2016). 2. See http://​w ww.zeit.de/​politik/​ausland/​2015-​08/​hurricane-​katrina-​new-​orleans-​zehn-​ jahre-​danach/​seite-​3 (accessed 18 May 2017). 3. We put ‘authoritative’ in parenthesis here, since it should not be conflated with hierarchical. For a discussion see Czempiel 1981.

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Pa rt  I

T H E ORY A N D M E T HOD OL O G Y

Chapter 2

Theories of Dev e l op me nt and Areas of L i mi t e d Stateh o od Stephen D. Krasner

Over the last several decades, the most important attempts by scholars to understand how and why development takes place have been informed by three different analytic approaches:  modernization theory, institutional capacity, and rational choice institutionalism. Each of these approaches has different implications for areas of limited statehood and how governance might be provided in areas of limited statehood. For modernization theory, the expectation would be that areas of limited statehood would become smaller and smaller over time. The state would become a more effective governor over all geographic and functional areas. The problem of limited statehood would solve itself over time. For institutional capacity approaches, areas of limited statehood might become smaller over time, but only if the capacity of the state increases, which might or might not happen. If areas of limited statehood do persist, governance might be provided by actors other than the state. Rational choice institutionalism suggests that areas of limited statehood would be normal for most polities. Political elites would only attempt to exercise effective control over areas and functional activities that would help them to stay in power. Areas of limited statehood would be the norm not the exception. Governance might be provided in areas of limited statehood by actors other than the national state, but only if such service provision does not threaten the rulers’ position. If islands of excellence are created by actors other than the national state in areas of limited statehood, they will remain isolated islands that will not diffuse to other parts of the polity where they might be a threat to rulers. Only in consolidated or full democracies would political elites have an interest in minimizing areas of limited statehood. In exclusive or closed access polities, political elites would have few incentives to eliminate areas of limited statehood, and would tolerate alternative governance arrangements only if they do not threaten their own position.

30   Krasner Each of these three approaches suffers from some major lacunae. Modernization theory cannot explain why development, including the elimination of areas of limited statehood over time, occurs in the first place. Institutional capacity fails to explain why greater capacity would lead to growth and development, and the elimination of areas of limited statehood, rather than extortion—​if not pillage—​by a political elite. Rational choice institutionalism makes very clear analytic distinctions between open and closed orders, but does not adequately explain the performance or existence of polities that are in-​between closed and open access orders. Polities do not change instantly from one to the other. Islands of excellence, where governance is effective and legitimate, may be established in closed access or exclusive polities but these islands might wither, remain isolated islands, or spread. Diffusion is much more likely in intermediate polities where there are a number of actors that would support rational legal structures that would be effective, but also constrain the arbitrary power of the state. This chapter begins with an explication of the three major approaches to development and their implication for governance in areas of limited statehood. It then looks at gaps in each of these theories. An elaborated version of rational choice institutionalism, one that explicitly takes account of countries that have neither fully open nor fully closed access orders, provides the most convincing approach to understanding development and governance in areas of limited statehood. The chapter concludes by pointing out that in closed access orders, perhaps 130 countries in the world, areas of limited statehood will persist. Islands of excellence with some governance might be created in such areas, but they will remain isolated or will wither and die if external support is withdrawn.

Modernization Theory Of the three approaches, modernization theory is the most widely recognized, thoroughly examined, and fully elaborated. Modernization theory contends that political transformation and democratization result from social transformations and economic growth, which are the products of technological change and higher factor inputs especially population growth and capital. Urbanization, higher levels of literacy, and industrialization lead to social mobilization and a larger middle class, which supports democracy. The middle class is prepared to defend both rule of law, because middle class individuals want to protect their property rights, and accountability, because they do not want public policy to be dictated exclusively by the rich and powerful, which can too easily act in its own interest (Fukuyama 2014: chs. 27–​28 and Lipset 1959). In a more complex social and political environment, inhabited by a better-​educated population, cross-​cutting cleavages become more important. Class conflict is mitigated (Inglehart and Welzel 2009).

Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood    31 Although the classic theorists of modernization such as those of Lipset (1959) and Lerner (1959) did not try to explain economic growth, they were at least implicitly confident that it would take place. Growth theory in the 1950s and 1960s saw rising income as a likely, if not inevitable process. Although domestic savings in developing countries might not support the level of investment needed to sustain high growth rates, this gap could be closed by foreign assistance. For modernization theory, areas of limited statehood might exist at the beginning of the modernization process, but over time such areas would be eliminated. A larger middle class would demand a more effective government and support democracy. Areas of limited statehood would disappear over time. One obvious criticism of modernization theory is that the underlying conditions that might account for a kind of automaticity in growth, such as population growth and technological change, have been present in many different polities over the last several hundred years, but sustained economic growth only really begins in Europe during the Renaissance and dramatic economic growth only begins in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the nineteenth century. There is nothing automatic about economic growth, and the larger middle class and attitudinal change that follow along with growth. Rather, both growth and democracy may depend on the existence of appropriate institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson put the case against modernization theory with particular vigour and clarity: Modernization theory is both incorrect and unhelpful for thinking about how to confront the major problems of extractive institutions in failing nations. The strongest piece of evidence in favor of modernization theory is that rich nations are the ones that have democratic regimes, respect civil and human rights, and enjoy functioning markets and generally inclusive economic institutions. Yet interpreting this association as supporting modernization theory ignores the major effect of inclusive economic political institutions on economic growth. . . . (I)t is the societies with inclusive institutions that have grown over the past three hundred years and have become relative rich today. (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 454)

The Madisonian sweet spot in which the state is both strong enough to provide order and constrained enough to limit the arbitrary exercise of power is a rare occurrence in human history. There have been approximations of open access inclusive polities in the past that were associated with sustained economic growth, such as in some of the city-​states of classic Greece and the northern Italian city-​states in the Renaissance. All of these historical episodes, however, ultimately failed either because they were crushed by autocratic external powers, or because the domestic political elite accumulated enough power to prevent further changes that could threaten their position (Ober 2015). If modernization theory was an accurate empirical description, then the expectation would be that areas of limited statehood would be gradually eliminated over time.

32   Krasner

Institutional Capacity Approaches Modernization theory dominated academic and policy discourse in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, if only because it provided an alternative to communism. It has continued to be the single most influential approach, but its intellectual hegemony was challenged in the mid 1960s by Samuel Huntington (1968). Where modernization theorists saw institutional development, especially the institutions of liberal democracy, as the natural outgrowth of economic and social change, Huntington argued that political order was contingent on institutional capacity. For Huntington, political mobilization without political institutionalization would lead to political decay. The now famous first sentence of Huntington’s 1968 book reads: ‘The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government’ (Huntington 1968: 1). For Huntington, and others focusing on institutional capacity, areas of limited statehood would be eliminated by a fully developed state, but not all polities have such states and where the ‘degree of government’ is limited, there will be areas of limited statehood. A clear implication of an institutional capacity perspective would be that governance might be provided in areas of limited statehood, but not by the state itself. In areas or functions that the state cannot control, the extent of governance would depend on the incentives for external actors. There has also been another challenge to governance aside from the lack of capacity that has exacerbated the problems of areas of limited statehood: the tasks that public authorities are expected to perform are now generated by a global template, rather than by indigenous demands (see also Chapter 15 Lake, this volume). In the contemporary world, states are expected to be engaged in a wide range of activities. The 1997 World Development Report from the World Bank includes the following list of ‘functions of the state’: Minimal functions: defence, law, and order, property rights, economic management, public health, anti-​poverty programmes. Intermediate functions: basic education, environmental protection, utility regulation antitrust policy, insurance (health, life, pensions), financial regulation, consumer protection, redistributive pensions, family allowances, unemployment insurance. Activist functions: fostering markets, cluster initiatives, asset redistribution. (World Bank 1997: 27) This is a daunting list and not all of the most advanced countries perform all of them. When the state is presumed to be responsible for education, health, and social security, and to effectively control geographic areas under its control, areas of limited statehood are more likely to arise. For many states in the developing world,

Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood    33 there is a decoupling of the logic of appropriateness (what the state is expected to do), and the logic of consequences (what political leaders actually have an incentive to do based on their resources, interests, and the capacity of public intuitions) (Meyer et al. 1997). For adherents of the view that state capacity is the key to development and modernity, the fundamental analytic question is: how can state capacity be increased? With higher state capacity, areas of limited statehood would be eliminated. Without greater capacity, areas of limited statehood will persist. Governance might be provided in areas of limited statehood, depending on the incentives of other actors, but islands of excellence would usually remain isolated. The only mechanism through which islands of excellence might diffuse to the state more generally would be situations in which indigenous actors would demand greater service provision. The most straightforward argument in the institutional capacity literature is one in which greater state capacity results from demands made by a larger middle class for the more effective provision of state services. Islands of excellence first created in response to a larger middle class might diffuse to the polity as a whole. This argument for state capacity obviously also draws on modernization theory: the middle class grows because the economy expands. Other arguments for greater state capacity carry no implication for the elimination of areas of limited statehood. The most prominent explanation for the growth of state capacity is external threat. War makes the state and the state makes war, as Tilly (1985) famously argued. This argument has been applied to China in the warring states period (Fukuyama 2011: 115–​122), as well as to Europe following the Renaissance. Other arguments that explain greater state capacity include colonial legacies (Kohli 1994) and religious convictions (Gorski 2003). What unites all authors who understand institutional capacity as the key to state development is the assumption that it is possible to engage in what Hui (2005) has called state-​strengthening; that is, to construct a central state apparatus that can concentrate and effectively deploy power for collective objectives. State institutions must be able to set and enforce the rules of the game. They must be able to establish order, assure rule of law or at least rule by law, and provide some collective goods. The state is not just a stationary bandit. If state-​strengthening is successful, then areas of limited statehood will be eliminated. The leviathan would, indeed, reign over all of its subjects and all of its territory. There are no empty spaces in the body of the famous frontispiece for Hobbes’s masterwork. State capacity has, however, not always increased even in response to external threats: Prussia/​Germany became stronger, but Poland disappeared as an independent political entity from 1795 until 1918. If state capacity does not expand, then areas of limited statehood will persist and if external actors provide some services normally associated with the state, any islands of excellence that they create will just remain as islands. Only if there are domestic demands for a more effective state are islands of excellence likely to diffuse to other areas or functional arenas.

34   Krasner

Rational Choice Institutionalism Rational choice offers a third perspective on the trajectory of political and economic development and on the implications for governance in areas of limited statehood. Where modernization theory emphasizes social and economic change leading to political transformation, institutional capacity theory focuses on the development of central state institutions that can effectively control violence, extract resources, provide some collective goods, and perhaps educate and socialize subjects. Rational choice sees development principally as the result of self-​interested decisions taken by elites, especially the elites that control the instruments of violence. Getting to Denmark or Norway, where areas of limited statehood are eliminated, is only possible if elites are willing to create institutions that constrain their own freedom of action. Full development can only occur if institutions are both effective and inclusive, rather than extractive (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The great mystery is why elites would ever create such institutions, and why those who control the means of violence within a polity would ever agree to constrain their own freedom of action—​to relinquish their own possibilities for self-​help? In human history, present day Somalia is much closer to the modal state than Norway. Only if institutions prevent the arbitrary exercise of power is it possible for a polity to achieve full development. At the same time, the government must be able to govern effectively, and eliminate areas of limited statehood. In Federalist 51, James Madison captured this problem perfectly: If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. (Madison 1788)

Unconstrained elites will never allow changes, economic or political, that would threaten their power. They will not allow dynamic economic growth. They will not allow islands of excellence in areas of limited statehood to diffuse to other parts of the polity where they might threaten their rent-​seeking opportunities. History is filled with examples of situations in which violence-​wielding elites have crushed technological, political, or economic changes that might have threatened their own power. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Chinese had the most formidable sea-​going fleet in the world, ships that were much larger than anything in Europe, and many more of them. But the Chinese treasure fleet, which had reached down the east coast of Africa and had originally been supported by the imperial court, was ordered to be destroyed by the emperor who saw commerce as a threat to his rule (Levathes 1994: 20–​22). From a rational choice perspective, elites are always self-​interested and calculating. Elites will seek out rent-​seeking opportunities that enhance their own well-​being, but limit the utility of the society as a whole. The state, or at least states in which political leaders are not held accountable to most of the citizens, is best understood not as a

Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood    35 provider of collective goods but as a stationary bandit, willing to allow some development but not the kind of development that would upset the political order (Olson 2000). For rational choice institutionalism, the world is essentially bifurcated between open and closed access, or inclusive and exclusive, orders. Cox, North, and Weingast (2015) note that ‘violence is surprisingly common throughout the developing world, including the richest developing countries’. The median number of years between violent regime changes in the poorest half of the world’s countries is seven years; at twelve and a half years, it is not much higher in the richest developing countries. In contrast, the median number of years between violent regime change in the richest decile of countries is 60 years (Cox et al. 2015: 2). With regard to levels of violence, the richest developing countries are closer to the poorest developing countries than they are to the OECD world. The move from a limited access order to an open access order has been accomplished only by a relatively small percentage of states in the contemporary world. In limited access or closed access orders, violence is commonplace; in open access orders, it is exceptional. Cox, North, and Weingast (2015) argue that moving from a limited access to an open access order requires simultaneous change in many different issue areas, including economic activity, military structures, the application and determination of laws, and the choice of political leaders. Such change across many different activities is difficult to achieve. Limited access or exclusive orders are the norm for most polities. There will be areas of limited statehood. External actors might create islands of excellence in areas of limited statehood in exclusive polities, but political elites will prevent these islands from diffusing to the polity in general. While analysts relying on rational choice approaches share the same basic ontology (political actors must be understood as self-​interested and strategic), and the same analytic framework (open access institutions in common interest states are mechanisms that allow elites, especially violence-​wielding elites, to tie their own hands by making credible commitments possible), they do not pretend to offer a systematic explanation for how polities make the jump to consolidated democracy and a fully open market. Rather, they offer path dependence as a framework, which has two essential aspects: luck and lock-​in. First, some random conditions, possibly combined with extant structural features of a polity, precipitate change; second, this change is then locked in. The lock-​in might or might not be optimal in the long run. For rational choice institutionalism, the jump to open access is positive: it leads to a virtuous circle in which openness in political system supports openness in the economic system, which in turn reinforces political openness, leaving the society as a whole—​and potentially everyone in it—​ better off. Many different specific answers, however, have been offered for the random conditions and possibly underlying structural prerequisites that can transform social orders. Perhaps the most extensive and systematic argument is offered by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009). They argue that for the jump from open to closed access to occur, polities must reach what they term the doorstep conditions: rule of law for elites; some organizations that are perpetual rather than strictly tied to particular rulers; and central control of the military. If these doorstep conditions exist, then elites might or might not

36   Krasner find it to be in their interests to extend impersonal rights, including the rule of law to a broader segment of the society. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009: 78) emphasize, however, that there is no necessary progress. Mature closed access orders have more often collapsed back into basic or fragile closed access orders, in which the only organization that exists is the state, rather than transforming into open access societies. In Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006), Acemoglu and Robinson offer a different analysis of the conditions that might lead from more closed to more open polities. They argue that elites may relinquish control when they face a credible threat of being overthrown. In this situation, elites may accept more democratic institutions because this is the only way that they can make a credible commitment that allows them to avoid the even worse outcome of a successful rebellion (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: xii–​xiii, 18–​28) Like North, Wallis, and Weingast, Acemoglu and Robinson do not see any teleological movement towards democracy. They begin their 2006 study by pointing to cases where democracy has been consolidated (Britain), resisted for a long period (South Africa), failed to consolidate (Argentina for most of its history), or never existed (Singapore) (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: 4–​14). Economic crises can lead to democratization, but also precipitate coups that end democratic regimes. High levels of development, Singapore being the exemplary case, do not necessarily lead to democracy. For rational choice approaches, the transition to inclusivity or open access requires simultaneous transformations across political and economic domains. Many good things must happen at once, and such transformations are rare. Social violence is the norm, while areas of limited statehood are to be expected. For most people, for most of human history, life has been nasty, brutish, and short. Violence has been endemic. There were few effective constraints on warriors. Political elites pillaged, taxed, and conscripted. Life expectancy was below 30 years. For almost all of human history in almost all parts of the world, human beings have lived in closed access or natural orders. Areas of limited statehood were the norm. Political elites have prevented the diffusion of islands of excellence, perhaps created by external actors, in areas of limited statehood.

Theoretical Gaps and Failures Modernization theory, approaches that focus on institutional capacity, and rational choice institutionalism are impressive efforts to explain how the exceptionally privileged OECD world came into existence, a world in which areas of limited statehood have been more or less eliminated, after thousands of years during which the well-​being of human beings hardly changed at all. Each of these approaches has been supported by substantial empirical evidence and motivated by plausible analytic arguments. Each has different implications for our expectations about areas of limited statehood: modernization

Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood    37 theory would expect such areas to be gradually eliminated over time. Both institutional capacity approaches and rational choice institutionalist approaches would expect areas of limited statehood in many polities. For institutional capacity theory, there is some possibility that islands of excellence created in areas of limited statehood might diffuse to other parts of the polity, but only if these islands of excellence were supported by domestic actors that wanted a more effective state. For rational choice institutionalism, there is no chance that islands of excellence created in areas of limited statehood would diffuse more broadly. In closed access order, islands of excellence would threaten the rent-​seeking opportunities of political elites. None of the three approaches, however, is completely satisfactory. Modernization theory cannot explain why development, with both higher levels of output and ultimately consolidated or full democracy, began where and when it did. Institutional capacity approaches do not have a satisfactory account of why leaders who can direct more effective institutions, military but also civilian, will not use this capacity to further their own well-​being at the expense of the society as a whole. Rational choice institutionalism, aside from having no ability to predict when a polity will make the leap to an open access or inclusive order, cannot account, or at least not account very well, for intermediate polities, those that have elements of both limited and open access. The flaws in modernization theory are fatal even though one fundamental finding of modernization theory—​the positive relationship between per capita income and democracy—​is a very useful guide for policymakers and for addressing the problems associated with areas of limited statehood. With higher levels of income, there will be a larger middle class and a larger middle class may demand a more effective government for the polity as a whole and the elimination of areas of limited statehood. Economic development, however, is not automatic. The inability of institutional capacity approaches to explain why political leaders would be expected to act in the best interests of their societies as opposed to their own best interests is also a fatal flaw. Institutional capacity approaches do, however, suggest arenas where the interests of external and internal political elites might be complementary. The most obvious is security. Rational choice institutionalism provides better guidance for understanding development in general, but completely fails to account for polities that might be in transition. No political system instantaneously moves from closed to open access. In closed access polities, where political and economic elites are entirely dependent on rent-​seeking to keep themselves rich and in power, areas of limited statehood are to be expected. If better governance is achieved in areas of limited statehood, such islands of excellence (or even just islands of better governance) would remain isolated or will wither and die over time. Such islands will not diffuse to other arenas. Areas of limited statehood will not be excised; fundamental political reform is not possible. In intermediate polities, where some members of the elite might have some interest in broadening access to the rule of law and the right to form organizations, the opportunities to build on islands of excellence are greater. Such islands might diffuse to other parts of the polity. Intermediate polities might become open access orders; areas of limited statehood might be eliminated or contained over time.

38   Krasner

Gaps in Modernization Theory The fundamental challenge for modernization theory is to explain how economic development got started in the first place. For tens of thousands of years, homo sapiens survived in small bands as hunter-​gatherers. About ten thousand years ago, this changed with the development of settled agricultural communities on the Eurasian steppes. Large states and empires waxed and waned, but the condition of most humans did not change. Impressive technological, intellectual, and artistic achievements such as Hellenistic bronze sculptures, Roman aqueducts, or Platonic philosophy were realized and then lost. The dramatic disparities in economic growth and democratization that characterize the contemporary world present a huge challenge for modernization theory, one that this approach cannot satisfactorily address. Only a small number of polities have moved along the path described by modernization theory (around 30). And this movement has only taken place over the last two centuries. For the last 10,000 years of human history following the development of settled agriculture minus the last 200, the human condition has been more or less stagnant. As Josiah Ober has written: ‘The conjunction of democratic politics and a strong economy is, in practice, available only to affluent citizens of highly developed countries . . . These conditions were not normal, or even imaginable, for most people through most of human history’ (Ober 2015: xiii). The evidence that on average higher levels of per capita income are associated with democracy is compelling, but explanations for how this growth got started in the first place remain, for modernization theory, elusive. The failure to explain how growth gets going in the first place is a fatal flaw for modernization theory. The empirical evidence does not support modernization theory’s implication that areas of limited statehood will be eliminated as part of the natural process of development.

The Gap in Theories of Institutional Capacity Theories that link development with institutional capacity have a robust set of explanations for why institutional capacity develops in some places but not others, most notably as a result of external threat. They do not, however, provide a systematic understanding for the conditions under which the political elites directing a more powerful state apparatus would adopt policies that would benefit the society as a whole, or even a large part of it, rather than their own narrow self-​interests. Even where states have accumulated very formidable capacity (China for most of its more than two thousand year history, for instance), change has usually been limited to areas that strengthened the state. At most times in most places, political elites have acted to protect their own narrow material self-​interest. Most especially, they want to stay in power, and in a rent-​ seeking regime staying in power does not mean improving the situation of most of

Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood    39 the population. Areas of limited statehood may be perfectly consistent with targeted state-​strengthening. Charles Tilly (1990) referred to the state as a protection racket. James Scott (2009), the anti-​Hobbes, who is profoundly distrustful of states (even to some extent democratic ones), argues in The Art of Not Being Governed that oppression, slavery, hierarchy, arbitrary power, disease, war—​all those things that go towards making life nasty, brutish, and short—​are the result of the activities of state. In all of the classic states—​Athens, Rome, the padi states of Asia —​power depended on population; population depended on slaves; slaves were secured through warfare (Scott 2009: 85). Thus, while analysts focusing on the institutional capacity of the state have suggested a number of different ways in which state power can be established, they have failed to explain why this power, controlled by elites, might lead to sustained economic growth, democratization, and the excision of areas of limited statehood.

Rational Choice Institutionalism and the Empty Middle For rational choice institutionalists, the Madisonian sweet spot, institutions that are both strong enough to govern effectively and that are not at the same time repressive, is hard to achieve. Luck and happen-​stance play important roles. Small differences in initial conditions can have large subsequent consequences. Rational choice institutionalism makes no claim to being able to predict ex ante what the conditions might be that would allow a polity to be transformed into an open access or inclusive order. Only after the fact can institutions that are both effective and constrained be explained. Given the complexity of the political, economic, and social environment and the multiplicity of incentives confronting elites, it is hardly a fatal flaw that rational choice institutionalism does not provide ex ante predictions about whether or not a polity will find the Madisonian sweet spot. The more damaging lacunae for rational choice institutionalism is that it provides limited insight on polities that might be in the middle. Instantaneous transitions from exclusive to inclusive polities are impossible. The middle could mean a number of different things: polities in which some aspects of state policy are effectively constrained and others are not; polities in which the percentage of the population with access to the rule of law and with the right to form organizations was substantial but not fully inclusive; polities in which the members of the political and social elite were divided with regard to their preferences for open access or closed access institutions; polities where areas of limited statehood were becoming smaller over time; polities where islands of excellence might diffuse, rather than stagnate or wither. Even in the country that was the trailblazer in extending the rule of law and the right to form organizations, the extension of rights was gradual. The United Kingdom was not suddenly transformed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 from a country that was subject to the arbitrary power of the crown to one in which the sovereign was constrained. The constraints on borrowing that the Glorious Revolution placed on the

40   Krasner British monarch benefitted the holders of capital, but not the population as a whole. In the eighteenth century, the constraints on the sovereign and the rule of law budget applied only to the military. Only in the nineteenth century was the rule of law budget extended to civilian affairs, largely because of pressure from the merchants who had initially benefitted from the rule of law budget for the army and the navy, their allies in the parliament, and lessons taken from the eighteenth century military budget (Cox 2016). The military budget was a large island of excellence and some of its lessons were applied to the civilian budget, such as contracting, parliamentary inspections, and state servants selected on the basis of merit rather than birth. Three factors explain why what had at first been an island of excellence (the military budget) or, perhaps more appropriately, a continent of excellence given the relative importance of the military budget in Britain in the eighteenth century and through the Napoleonic Wars, spread to the civilian aspects of the state during the nineteenth century: the threat from the major continental powers, especially France; the experience of the commercial class with a rule of law budget for the military; and the organizational innovations made by parliament for this budget. Classic institutional capacity arguments (war makes the state and the state makes war) and analysis suggested by modernization theory (the rising importance of the commercial class) do help to explain changing elite incentives in Britain accounting for how Britain reached the Madisonian sweet spot. Areas of limited statehood in the United Kingdom, where the sovereign exercised little or no power, were gradually eliminated over time. Britain was a polity that could be transformed, a polity where an island of excellence could diffuse rather than remain isolated or wither away, because it was an intermediate polity, somewhere between open and closed access. Identifying polities where there is some opportunity to facilitate the jump from closed to open access is essential for national efforts to address areas of limited statehood. In purely closed access, orders areas of limited statehood will persist, and islands of excellence will remain islands or wither away.

Empirical Measurements for Closed, Intermediate, and Open Access Orders There are no empirical measures or analytic factors that can unambiguously provide a boundary between closed access or exclusive orders, polities that have the potential for transitioning to open access or inclusive polities, and open access or inclusive polities. Some empirical measures provide at least a rough starting point for making these distinctions among these three groups of countries: closed access, intermediate, and open access. The two most obvious measures relate to per capita income,

Theories of Development and Areas of Limited Statehood    41 where the positive empirical relationship between wealth and democratization has been clearly established, and the current state of institutional development in a particular polity. The following table (Table 2.1) shows the percentage of countries in each income category that received a score of 10, the highest democracy score given by Polity IV, and a score of 6–​10, which Polity IV classifies as a democracy. A 10 indicates a country that could be understood as a consolidated or liberal (not electoral) democracy. Scores of 6–​9 can mask a variety of sins but scores in this range suggest, but do not guarantee, that a country can reach the Madisonian sweet spot. These data are completely consistent with modernization theory; democracy is correlated with income level. It does not, however, solve the causality problem: Are richer countries democratic, or are both high income levels and democracy a function of inclusive or open access institutions? The data do suggest that there is a discontinuity, especially if a score of 10 is used to indicate a consolidated liberal democracy or a fully open access order. If a score of 10 is the right value to focus on from the Polity IV data set, then the distribution of countries is neither dichotomous nor continuous. There are a small number of countries in the middle. Table 2.1 suggests that countries with per capita incomes between $10,000 and $19,999 are the ones that could most easily be placed in the middle. Half of these countries received a polity score of 10. Excluding countries with populations under 500,000 there are, according to the World Bank, 26 countries with per capita incomes between $5,000 and $10,000. The last table (Table 2.2) does suggest that there is a discontinuity between poorer and richer countries. Consolidated democracies or fully open access orders are associated with higher levels of income. There is a significant break at $12,750 for perfect democracy scores of 10 (this income level is chosen so as to maximize the contrast between richer countries receiving a score of 10 and less rich countries). There are 44 countries with per capita incomes above $12,750 in 2015 that also received a score from Polity IV. Table 2.1 Per capita income and polity scores Per capita gross national income (GNI), Atlas method

Percentage of countries receiving a score of 10 from Polity IV

Percentage of countries classified as democracies (scores of 6–​10)

Income >$20,000

81%

96%

$10,000–​19,999

50%

87.5%

$5,000–​9,999

3%

70%

$2,500–​4,999

8%

60%

Income $12,750 (44 countries total; 7 of which are oil exporting states)

72% or 32 countries with scores of 10 All 7 high income oil exporting states had scores below 10

$5,000–​12,749 (30 countries total)

6% or 4 countries with scores of 10; 17 with scores of 6–​9; 9 countries with scores below 6

$2,500–​4,999

8% with scores of 10

Income 0)

Density

Military expenditure (% GDP)

0

2

4 6 Means differ by 0.40 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 783).

8

ALS states; 16 countries; mean = 2.21 non-ALS states; 91 countries; mean = 1.81

fig. 20.3  Military expenditure and battle deaths.

0

500 1,000 1,500 Means differ by 2,640 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 182).

2,000

ALS states; 11 countries; mean = 3,215 non-ALS states; 22 countries; mean = 574

Foreign Aid   403

Density

Rule of law

Density

Democracy (Polity IV)

–10

–5 0 5 Means differ by –3.23 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 883).

10

ALS states; 21 countries; mean = –0.07 non-ALS states; 95 countries; mean = 3.15

–2

–1 0 1 Means differ by –1.13 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 1,018). ALS states; 22 countries; mean = –1.46 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = –0.33

fig. 20.4  Democracy and the rule of law.

closer to those stable poles of the spectrum. Citizens in non-​ALS states can also trust more in their government adhering to the rule of law, as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (right panel; Kaufman and Kraay 2015). Note that zero constitutes the global average in the indicator: none of the ALS states reach this benchmark. A very similar pattern emerges when looking at other governance indicators such as control of corruption (for more information on democracy and the rule of law in ALS, see Chapter 21 Berger/Lake, this volume). In summary, ALS states are mostly very poor countries with slightly higher inflation rates and anocratic governments that perform badly in governance indicators. ALS states spend more on the military and suffer substantially more battle deaths when in conflict. While being poor could make ALS states a prime target for poverty alleviation, a precarious security situation, bad governance, and weak institutions feature among the prime suspects that are detrimental to aid effectiveness. Proponents of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) ‘good policy’ model would argue that the ‘policy distortions’ in ALS states create disincentives to invest aid and thereby make it less effective in promoting economic growth compared to non-​ALS states. Democracy—​ a potential driver of economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2016)—​ is unlikely to be strengthened by aid flows, as it is not sufficiently developed in most ALS states (Dutta et al. 2013). On the contrary, aid given to autocratic ALS states may increase the political survival of the countries’ autocratic leaders and hinder democratic reforms (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Furthermore, as in non-​democracies, aid-​receiving governments are less accountable to their citizens, so that it is easier for them to channel aid to sectors that do not promote development (‘fungibility’). For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) as well as Langlotz and Potrafke (2016) find that

404   Dreher/Lang/Ziaja ODA, which excludes military usage by definition, increases military expenditure in recipient countries. Kono and Montinola (2012) find this effect to hold only in autocratic countries. In sum, we expect the lack of democracy in most ALS states to undermine aid effectiveness there. In addition, a well-​established literature has looked at the effects of aid in violent environments in more detail. Hirshleifer (1989) and Grossman (1992), for instance, argue that foreign aid may lead to conflicts by raising the value of capturing the state. Others hold that aid increases public goods provision and military capabilities of the state and thereby reduces the incentives to participate in violent activities against the state (Azam 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). In the recent empirical literature, Nunn and Qian (2014) provide evidence for the hypothesis that US food aid increases the probability of conflict as rebels can capture it and use it as a financing mechanism. In a similar vein, Bluhm et al. (2016) show that giving aid to countries with low-​intensity conflicts increases the likelihood of an escalation of violence. The literature is thus sceptical towards the ability of aid to help ending violent conflicts in ALS states.

Donor Characteristics and Motives What characterizes the relationship between ALS states and foreign aid donors? Do ALS states receive aid from different types of donors compared to other recipients? Figure 20.5 (left panel) depicts whether ALS states tend to align politically with a major

Density

Numbers of donors

Density

UNGA voting with USA

0.0

0.1

0.2 0.3 0.4 Means differ by –0.03 (clustered t-test; p = 0.02; n = 790).

0.5

ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 0.12 non-ALS states; 110 countries; mean = 0.16

0

10

20 30 40 Means differ by 5.48 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 904). ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 34 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = 28

fig. 20.5  United Nations General Assembly voting and the number of donors.

Foreign Aid   405 donor—​the United States—​and whether they play a role in international decision-​ making. Developing countries in general rarely vote in line with the United States in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): on average, their votes coincide in only 16% of decisions (calculations based on Bailey et al. 2017). ALS states agree even less with the United States (on average 12%). There are no ALS states among the countries that have a very high affinity with the United States. Despite their uncertain internal conditions, fragile states are sometimes elected to the UN Security Council (calculations based on Dreher et al. 2009a; not shown). Between 2006 and 2015, both the Republic of Congo and Chad served one term. But non-​ALS states had a much higher likelihood of appearing several times on the council, serving on average half a year in the decade under observation, whereas ALS states, on average, served less than two months. Are donors confronted with more competition in the aid business in ALS states? ALS states attract, on average, five donors more than non-​ALS states (right panel of Fig. 20.5). There is no ALS country with fewer than 20 donors present. This donor fragmentation may lead to inefficiencies and increased transaction costs in the delivery process. Knack and Rahman (2007) show that donor fragmentation bears particularly heavily on ALS. Weak administrations have little means to hold strong against a plethora of donor requests and contain battles between donors (Faust et al. 2015). Neither can citizens in ALS states hope to benefit from more effective multilateral aid.16 The data show that only 7% of the aid that ALS states receive comes from multilateral donors. This is not statistically different from the share in non-​ALS states (left panel of Fig. 20.6). Northern donors17 however provide on average a higher share of aid in ALS states (10% vs. 6%, see right panel of Fig. 20.6).

Density

Aid from Northern donors (%)

Density

Aid from multilateral donors (%)

0

10

20

30

Means do not differ significantly (clustered t-test; p = 0.21; n = 902). ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 7.43 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = 10

fig. 20.6  Multilateral and Northern donors.

0

10

20

30

Means differ by 3.23 (clustered t-test; p = 0.02; n = 902). ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 10 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = 6.35

406   Dreher/Lang/Ziaja In sum, the donor characteristics in ALS states differ in some aspects from those of non-​ALS states. In ALS states, the potentially harmful effects of more fragmentation could be partially balanced by the beneficial effects of more Northern donors and less pronounced geopolitical motivations for aid (as proxied by UN Security Council membership). This occurs despite the fact that ALS countries are poor, which arguably makes their votes in the UNSC and the UNGA cheaper to buy with aid. Due to the one-​ country-​one-​vote rule in these bodies, rich countries will ceteris paribus be more likely to target these countries to secure their votes (for a game theoretic model of vote buying in international organizations see Vreeland and Dreher 2014). One must consider, however, that the security situation in ALS states makes them geopolitically important for donor states eager to prevent the spread of instability (see Chapters 10 Lederer and 29 Brozus et al., this volume). A large amount of aid is given to countries in which Western donor governments fight against terrorist groups, such as Iraq and Afghanistan (Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Fleck and Kilby 2010). Rather than being directly aimed at promoting social and economic development, in these settings, aid, more often than not, is intended to win or end violent conflicts (Goodhand and Sedra 2010). Given the recent empirical evidence on the negative effect of political motivation on aid’s effectiveness, this is likely to reduce the effectiveness of development aid in ALS states.

Aid Characteristics Do the aid flows to ALS states have characteristics that allow a judgement on their expected effectiveness? In terms of aid’s share of gross national income (GNI), ALS states outbid non-​ALS states by a factor of three, with 15% versus 5% (left panel of Fig. 20.7; data from World Bank 2016). This is in part due to ALS states having lower GNIs, but it shows that aid plays a larger role in countries affected by ALS than in those that are not. We exclude debt relief, emergency aid, and expenses in the donor country from our definition of foreign aid, as these types of aid are not intended to promote social and economic development. In light of this discussion, an aid sector that we expect to be of particular importance in states affected by ALS is security. The right panel in Figure 20.7 shows that this is indeed the case: 4.2% of all aid flows to ALS states goes to this sector. Variance, however, is large. What is more, we find differences in the channels of delivery (Fig. 20.8). Less aid is channelled through governments in ALS states: they are involved in about one-​third less of the overall aid transactions than governments of non-​ALS states (11% vs. 18%).18 In particular, governments of ALS states are much more likely to handle less than 20% of the aid that flows into the country. This supports the idea that donors mistrust governments of ALS states. Donors often hesitate to cede full control over development projects to recipient governments as aid may help cement political structures that prevent developmental progress (Gisselquist 2015). Donors in ALS states do not, however, rely

Foreign Aid   407

Density

Security aid (% of total aid)

Density

Aid (% of GNI)

0

10

20

30

40

50

0.0

Means differ by 11 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 950).

2.5

5.0

7.5

10.0

Means differ by 2.65 (clustered t-test; p < 0.00; n = 902).

ALS states; 20 countries; mean = 15 non-ALS states; 109 countries; mean = 4.58

ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 4.19 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = 1.54

fig. 20.7  Aid amounts and security aid.

Density

Aid to NGOs (%)

Density

Aid to government (%)

0.1

1

10

100

Means differ by −6.57 (clustered t-test; p = 0.02; n = 902). ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 11 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = 18

0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Means do not differ significantly (clustered t-test; p = 0.11; n = 902). ALS states; 19 countries; mean = 0.81 non-ALS states; 113 countries; mean = 1.41

fig. 20.8  Aid channels.

more strongly on NGOs.19 The shares of the aid budgets that are channelled through NGOs do not differ significantly from non-​ALS states. In summary, foreign aid commitments to ALS states are larger than to non-​ALS states, both in absolute terms and as a share of GNI. At the same time, average aid per capita in fragile states is only half of that going to non-​fragile states. If we apply the ‘medicine

408   Dreher/Lang/Ziaja model’ and expect decreasing returns of aid if it is given in abundance, we find that ALS states are more likely to receive ‘too much’ aid. Following Clemens et al. (2012) in setting the ‘turning point’ to an aid-​to-​GNI-​ratio of 15%, our data show that in several ALS states aid shares exceed this threshold. However, promoting growth in ALS may also require additional investments in security, as the larger shares of security aid compared to non-​ALS states show. When considering not only the amount but also the type of aid that is given, we find that in ALS states, less aid goes directly to governments. The use of aid delivery channels other than the governments of ALS states may risk undermining domestic state-​ building efforts by creating parallel structures (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010). Such delivery tactics also run counter to the recommendations of the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011), which support the ‘use of country systems’ to avoid inefficiencies and to strengthen local institutions. Donors are likely to avoid these ‘country systems’ because they mistrust the local political authorities—​often for good reasons. Bypassing the state may work in certain times and places, but donors will then have to rely increasingly on brokers that pursue their own agendas (see Chapter 17 Hönke/Müller, this volume). In terms of aid effectiveness, withdrawing permanently from the idea of strengthening state structures to support human development finds little support in both academia and politics. The channels donors have to choose as substitutes (e.g. project aid) are not the ones that make aid more effective for development. The inconvenience of having a weak partner that is at risk of being overburdened while at the same time not being able to disburse per capita amounts close to what non-​ ALS states receive is the core problem of aid effectiveness in ALS states. Both ways out of this impasse—​a complete disengagement or externally led state-​building—​are politically difficult to sell in most donor countries.

Conclusions The existing evidence on aid effectiveness does not allow drawing definitive conclusions concerning the expected effect of aid on social and economic development in ALS. Nevertheless, the evidence we have at our disposal suggests that ALS constitute a challenging environment for aid to be effective. The fact that the average ALS state has weak and undemocratic institutions, lacks ‘good policies’, and does not receive the most effective types of aid makes us expect aid in areas of limited statehood, on average, to be less effective than elsewhere. This does not, however, prompt the recommendation to discontinue giving aid to the group of ALS states. Rather, the evidence on conditional aid effectiveness suggests that the specifics matter. We do not find ALS states to constitute a homogenous group in terms of recipient, donor, and aid characteristics. Their performance across indicators varies widely, as the spread of their distributions indicates. This is why we

Foreign Aid   409 must differentiate with regard to the type of fragility that a state suffers from (Grävingholt et al. 2015). Some states may be capable of benefitting from specific types of aid despite the bleak general picture. Carefully designed, well-​targeted aid projects that also take into account the many factors that undermine aid effectiveness may still help to promote social and economic development in ALS. Even if positive effects from aid on development in ALS are often too much to ask for, aid can still alleviate humanitarian crises and disasters. Marginally improving the lives of the poorest in such situations is desirable even if developmental impacts that are visible on the macro-​level are beyond the reach of aid.

Notes 1. We thank Tanja Börzel, Anke Draude, Thomas Risse, and other participants at the author’s workshops for the Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood at FU Berlin (2016 and 2017) for helpful comments and Jamie Parsons for proofreading. 2. OECD DAC glossary, available at http://​www.oecd.org/​dac/​dac-​glossary.htm. 3. A couple of recent papers suggest more plausible instruments (Dreher and Langlotz 2017; Dreher and Lohmann 2015; Dreher et al. 2016, 2017; Galiani et al. 2017; Nunn and Qian 2014; Werker et al. 2009). See Dreher and Langlotz (2017) for a discussion. 4. See Werker (2012) and Doucouliagos (2016) for recent reviews. 5. For a discussion of these measures, see Lang and Lingnau (2015). 6. More recently the literature started paying attention to donor–​recipient-​specific characteristics. For example, Dreher et al. (2015) show that aid is more effective when donors and recipients of aid are more closely aligned in terms of their political ideology. Minasyan (2016) obtains similar results for donors and recipients who share a similar cultural understanding. 7. Dreher et al. (2013) find similar evidence regarding the quality of World Bank projects. This result fits the evidence reported by Kilby (2013), who focuses on World Bank loans and finds shorter preparation periods for aid projects in countries that are geopolitically important for the Bank’s major shareholders. In a follow-​up study, he finds that longer preparation time increases the likelihood that development will have favourable outcomes (Kilby 2015). 8. Others however disagree (e.g. Rajan and Subramanian 2008). Dreher and Lohmann (2015) find no effect of World Bank aid on development at the subnational level. See Biscaye et al. (2015) for a detailed review. 9. Koeberle et al. (2006) provide a detailed review. 10. Gehring et al. (2017) however point to the frailty of these findings. 11. Boone (1996) however finds large amounts of aid to be more rather than less effective, which he attributes to limited fungibility there. 12. See Grävingholt et al. (2015) for suggestions of how to better identify ‘fragile states’. 13. The BTI scores are largely based on data gathered in the preceding year, so we consider the 2016 edition as reflecting the status in 2015, and so on. We interpolate the biannual missing observations with data from the previous year. 14. A score of 4 is described by the BTI codebook (BTI 2014: 16) for the monopoly of violence as such: ‘The state’s monopoly on the use of force is established only in key parts of the country. Large areas of the country are controlled by guerrillas, paramilitaries or clans’;

410   Dreher/Lang/Ziaja for basic administration, ‘The administrative structures of the state are extending beyond maintaining law and order, but their territorial scope and effectivity are limited’. 15. If not otherwise noted, all data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016). 16. Multilateral aid is identified by the CRS bi-​multi code 4. 17. Defined as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden by Minoiu and Reddy (2010). 18. CRS purpose codes 12000 to 12999. 19. CRS purpose codes 23000 to 29999.

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Chapter 21

Human Rights , t h e Ru l e of L aw, and De mo c rac y Tobias Berger and Milli Lake

The examination of human rights, rule of law, and democracy promotion by external actors in areas of limited statehood (ALS) is an examination of the articulation and implementation of collectively binding rules. In this way, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law differ from other issue areas discussed in this volume, such as health (Chapter 22 Holzscheiter, this volume), food (Chapter 23 Liese, this volume), or security (Chapter 19 Schroeder, this volume), which are concerned with public goods provision. Although competing and at times contradictory definitions of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law coexist in the literature, all have common statements about the ways in which collectively binding rules are articulated (democracy), systematically applied and enforced (the rule of law), and limited through normative standards that ought to be adhered to (human rights). This chapter examines human rights, rule of law, and democracy as they are defined and promoted by external actors in ALS. While we do not take a ‘top down’ process of diffusion—​from the global North to the global South—​for granted, we are primarily concerned with understanding the influence of external actors in shaping outcomes in each of these three issue areas in ALS (see also Chapters 10 Lederer, and 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). The chapter begins with a definition of key terms. After a brief historical overview of good governance in the twentieth century, we proceed with a discussion of the cross-​cutting issues that pertain to each of the three policy areas, including, importantly, the actors involved in their diffusion and dissemination, and the principle mechanisms through which their promotion occurs. Finally, we discuss questions of effectiveness and legitimacy, particularly concerning subnational variation and reception by local actors that pertain to each of the three issue areas individually. We conclude with a set of policy considerations for stakeholders engaged in governance interventions.

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    417

Terminology Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are inherently contested concepts (Gallie 1955). Their meanings depend on the philosophical traditions in which they are embedded as well as the contexts in which they are deployed. Schematically speaking, different conceptualizations of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights exist on a spectrum that ranges from minimalist to more expansive understandings. At its core, minimalist notions of human rights encompass physical integrity of the individual as well as a narrow portfolio of civil and political rights such as the right to free speech and assembly. More comprehensive approaches add social, economic, and cultural as well as group rights (Cohen 2004). Whether these rights (either in their minimalist or maximalist version) are an integral part of ‘the rule of law’ is a subject for ongoing debate. Whereas thin definitions are primarily procedural, and highlight the capacity of the law to hold state and other powerful actors accountable (Raz 2009), thick conceptualizations of the rule of law include substantive provisions such as human rights and principles of redistributive justice (Tamanaha 2004). The concept of distributive politics is a similarly crucial component of substantive definitions of democracy, in which participation and processes of collective will-​formation are central components of democratic governance. In contrast, minimalist accounts of democracy emphasize the peaceful transition of power; and fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes among eligible members of the adult population (Huntington 1993: 7). In this chapter, we take minimalist conceptualizations as a baseline and focus primarily on the meaning that democracy, the rule of law, and human rights have acquired among multilateral donor agencies within the international system. Human rights are typically understood as the civil and political rights enshrined within the United Nations system and international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). At the same time, democracy is largely defined and measured in terms of free and fair elections while the rule of law is commonly understood as the promotion of an independent and impartial judiciary (Carothers 1998, 2003). Collectively, we refer to these three policy areas as governance interventions. External actors are, simply put, those that derive their authority and mandate from outside the state in question. These may include foreign governmental or non-​governmental organizations, donors, international organizations, or transnational religious entities.

Good Governance in the Twentieth Century The promotion of norms of governance in ALS through external actors is not a new phenomenon. European conceptualizations of normatively desirable forms of democractic

418   Berger/Lake governance and the rule of law have served as the cornerstone of European colonial domination (Benton 2002; Den Otter 2007). Human rights for women and minorities were similarly used by European powers in their efforts to justify and legitimate colonial expansion and demonstrate cultural superiority (Abu-​Lughod 2002; see also next section, ‘Actors’). Good governance promotion thus unfolds in much larger historical trajectories, which are characterized by a tension between the promotion of normatively desirable political order and external domination (for the historical discourse on colonial governance, see Chapter 8 Herren, this volume). Following independence, Western governments and development agencies continued to offer assistance in the areas of democracy and rule of law promotion, but throughout the Cold War this assistance became deeply politicized. In the 1960s and 1970s, the US government incorporated far-​reaching interventions across Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the name of ‘law and development’ (Krever 2011; Trubek and Galanter 1974), treating legal institutions as a panacea for problems of economic growth and political order. However, these efforts were overshadowed by parallel efforts to shore up the support of Western allies and undermine those with Soviet sympathies. Thus, beneath a guise of democracy promotion, the United States and the United Kingdom, among other European nations, propped up abusive human rights regimes, while aggressively promoting economic liberalism. In many cases, rule of law and economic liberalism came at the expense of democracy and human rights, as government agencies in the United States and Europe supported military regimes and facilitated coups in countries from Democratic Republic (DR) of the Congo to Chile. Since the end of the Cold War, Western governments and development agencies have continued and even accelerated the promotion of effective governance, particularly in ALS. We consider the key actors involved in these efforts in turn.

Actors Our focus on governance interventions by external actors includes both governmental and non-​governmental stakeholders (see also Chapters 10 Lederer, and 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). Major players include multilateral donors (e.g. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, IMF) as well as various UN agencies like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, and UNWomen. In addition to regular contributions to international institutions, governments of industrialized countries also disperse political aid directly to governments of poorer nations via bilateral agreements (for a discussion of economic aid, see Chapter 20 Dreher et al., this volume). Aid is most often channelled through implementing agencies like the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID), the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    419 Non-​state actors, including non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), individual practitioners, technocrats, experts, and advocacy organizations, also assume crucial roles in the promotion of good governance. Despite divergent substantive focus, non-​ governmental actors share strategies, tactics and approaches, and may work on multiple issue areas consecutively. Activities may include election monitoring, fact-​finding, training, and outreach workshops disseminating ideas about human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. And NGOs may work directly with host governments to roll out programmes such as the timely payment of government employees or distributing national budgets. NGOs may be transnational organizations with regional or country offices responsible for direct programme implementation in their various field sites. Their partnerships may be concentrated in environments that appear to be most visibly in need of governance interventions:  those exhibiting high degrees of limited statehood. Other organizations do not support programme implementation, but conduct research and collaborate with local partners (e.g. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). Foreign businesses (Chapter 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume) and religious organizations (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006; Seay 2013; Titeca and Herdt 2011) may also be involved in aspects of governance and service provision. Finally, small-​scale NGOs or ad-​hoc organizations, that are not part of larger transnational networks, may have physical premises or programmes on the ground in specific contexts.

Modes of Engagement This cast of external actors pursues myriad strategies, which can be analytically distinguished according to the specific logics of social action that they follow. The literature on the diffusion of norms and ideas distinguishes three such logics: the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness, and the logic of arguing (Börzel and Risse 2009; March and Olsen 2009; Risse 2000; see Chapter 16 Risse, this volume). The logic of consequences operates through the manipulation of actor’s utility calculations by creating two kinds of incentives. On the one hand, external actors impose negative incentives on recipient governments by making access to international loans or other forms of bi-​and multilateral aid dependent on the adherence to specific conditions. Such conditionalities have been a cornerstone of the governance agendas of the World Bank and the IMF (see also Chapters 10 Lederer and 20 Dreher et al., this volume). While the logic of consequences operates through the manipulation of actors’ utility calculations, the logics of appropriateness and of arguing rely on the legitimacy of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as aspirational norms of good governance. Research on the diffusion of human rights has shown how coalitions of liberal states, transnational advocates, and domestic activists can pressure authoritarian governments ‘from above and below’, thereby contributing to the socialization of human rights norms as accepted standards of appropriate behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). While early accounts

420   Berger/Lake of socialization have been criticized for their underlying paternalism (Chandler 2013; Epstein 2012, 2013, 2014), the logic of arguing remains an important mode of interaction influencing interactions and outcomes of governance interventions in ALS, where normative dialogue is used as a form of persuasion to inspire changes in behaviour. These three modes of interaction constitute ideal types. Although they empirically hardly ever exist in isolation, they allow for analytical distinction between the different modes employed by external actors (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2011). The particular mode of engagement chosen by an external actor, in turn, affects their empirical legitimacy (Chapter 28 Jacob et al., this volume). The imposition of external norms through conditionalities, for example, is generally perceived to lack local legitimacy. This continues to be the case even though key donors like the World Bank and the IMF have gradually moved away from the imposition of uniform policy templates and towards more participatory approaches. However, persistent disparities of power between donors and recipients have largely undermined efforts at enhancing local ownership and thus failed to meaningfully increase the legitimacy of external actors promoting norms of governance through strict conditionalities (Cooke and Kothari 2007). More legitimate are approaches that emphasize normative dialogue and persuasion. Instead of reducing participatory approaches to a bureaucratic imperative that needs to be adhered to, dialogic approaches can enhance the legitimacy of both external state and non-​state actors (Kapoor 2002, 2007; Parfitt 2004). The emphasis on enhanced legitimacy through dialogic approaches points to the importance of local actors as mediators, brokers, and translators of external governance agendas (Acharya 2004, 2009; see also Chapter 17 Hönke/​Müller, this volume). In processes of translation, the meaning of human rights (Levitt and Merry 2009; Zwingel 2016), democracy (Schaffer 2000), and the rule of law (Berger 2017a; Zimmermann 2017) is changed in ways that render them congruent with pre-​existing institutions, practices, and normative frameworks in ALS, without necessarily reducing their emancipatory potential. At the same time; however, processes of translation and domestication might leave interventions vulnerable to distortion. Local actors might resist, reconfigure, or instrumentalize the agendas of external actors. We will return to the importance of local actors as both translators and resistors of external interventions in the subsequent sections.

Critical Perspectives Much of the literature on liberal norm diffusion assumes that internationally promoted democracy, human rights, and rule of law principles are normatively desirable and globally shared. Critics, however, point to the imbrication of liberal principles with colonial expansion (Tully 2008a, 2008b), and the detrimental and depoliticizing effects on local forms of resistance (Ferguson 1990). Stephen Hopgood (2013) thus argues that we are currently witnessing ‘the endtimes of human rights’. Adding to historiographic

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    421 scholarship on the development of the human rights movements (Moyn 2012, 2014; Hoffmann 2016), Hopgood locates the emergence of the current human rights movement in mid-​nineteenth-​century Geneva. Since the late 1970s, when the international human rights movement shifted its centre of gravity from Europe to the United States, Hopgood points to the marketization of human rights as moral products for consumption in the global North (Hopgood 2013: 103; see also Bob 2010). Makau wa Mutua (2001) similarly argues that the promotion of human rights in ALS needs to be critically analysed against the backdrop of racialized global hierarchies, in which human rights promotors comprise primarily United Nations agencies, Western states, Western academics, and transnational advocacy networks dominated by members from the global North. These hierarchies reinforce a narrative that pits the global North as dispenser, and the global South as passive recipient, of rights. Other scholars contest the relevance, applicability, or universality of democracy and the rule of law as they are imported to non-​Western contexts. Abdullahi An-​Na’im (1995) and others have called attention to modes of dispute resolution that are embedded with local meaning and thus retain legitimacy among the communities they are intended to serve. Adam Branch (2007), Phil Clark (2008), Allison Corey and Sandra Joireman, (2004), and Timothy Longman (2006) have emphasized traditional or customary rule of law mechanisms and their effectiveness in resolving local disputes and responding to intercommunal violence and division. In rural Malawi, Harri Englund (2006: 12) shows how the internationally induced translation of people’s grievances into individual rights violations through human rights and rule of law institutions in fact served to undermine the potential for collective gains and camouflage underlying structural problems such as exploitative labour relations. In a similar vein, Elizabeth Hurd (2015) is critical of the potentially detrimental effects of transnational human rights promotion. Focusing on the right to religious freedom, Hurd argues that international efforts to strengthen these rights simultaneously ‘mold religions into discrete faith communities, with clean boundaries, clearly defined orthodoxies, and senior leaders who speak on their behalf ’, thus privileging a modern liberal understanding of faith (Hurd 2015: 16–​17). There is a similarly large literature critiquing the reification of the Weberian state in understanding democratic governance outside of Western Europe (Menkhaus 2007; Vogel 2013). Scholars have used such critiques to push back on tokenistic democracy promotion as an appropriate, effective or ‘exportable’ model of governance in ALS.

Issue Areas Advocates and critics alike paint rather monolithic pictures of the respective successes and failures of human rights, democracy, and rule of law promotion in ALS. In order to do justice to the factual complexity of good-​governance

422   Berger/Lake promotion, we highlight the multiplicity of outcomes that result from external interventions, whose impacts prove highly unevenly and spatially dispersed. Further, we emphasize the crucial influence of local actors and pre-​existing institutions in shaping the outcomes of any governance intervention. Finally, we note that external actors have tended to rely on state-​centric conceptualizations of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In most conceptualizations, authoritarian regimes are indeed the primary perpetrators of human rights violations. The rule of law is primarily conceptualized in state-​ centric terms as the uniform enforcement of legally binding rules within a clearly demarcated territory; and democracy is conceptualized as a system of governance that has pacifying effects on social conflicts as it allows powerful groups within a society to (a) peacefully negotiate compromises and (b) hold individuals accountable through state institutions. As we show in the following three sections, these underlying assumptions do not necessarily hold in ALS. Human rights are not only violated by states but also by a variety of non-​state actors; and although states might be willing to respect the human rights of their citizens, they might lack the capacities to do so. Similarly, the rule of law can operate through a multiplicity of non-​state justice institutions that display significant degrees of subnational variation. And the narrow definition of democracy as free and fair elections can accelerate rather than diminish violent conflict. While external actors often discard such outcomes as pathological deviations from established global models that will be overcome over time, we argue for more focused attention to local specificities when explaining the outcomes of external governance promotion in ALS.

Human Rights As principled ideas about the ways in which every individual ought to be treated simply by virtue of being human, human rights have historically centred around the relationship between the state and its citizens (Schmitz and Sikkink 2013: 827). Consequently, much scholarship on the diffusion of human rights has focused on the conditions under which states, firstly, sign on to international human rights treaties and, secondly, start to adjust their behaviour accordingly. Whereas early International Relations (IR) scholarship on the global diffusion of human rights treated states primarily as obstacles to the realization of human rights, recent scholarship has complicated this picture. On the one hand, scholars have highlighted how states might be willing to protect the human rights of their citizens but lack the capacity to do so effectively (Börzel and Risse 2013). The literature further highlights the plurality of possible human rights violators, including non-​state actors such as multinational companies (Baumann-​Pauly and Justine 2016), armed groups (Wood 2010; Wood and Gibney 2010), or transnational religious networks. These recent trends notwithstanding, questions about how we get from nominal commitment (human rights treaty ratification or the passage of new human rights laws)

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    423 to compliance (the implementation of those laws to result in the realization of their protections for civilians) has dominated the literature on human rights over the past two decades. Insights from Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s Persistent Power of Human Rights push these conversations further, examining how the international community can move beyond mere window-​dressing compliance towards the habituation and internalization of emerging human rights principles (Hafner-​Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Hafner-​ Burton et al. 2008; Hafner-​Burton and Ron 2009; Risse et al. 2013; Simmons 2009). Key in the movement from commitment to compliance is the mobilization of local actors that pressure government to adhere to the international commitments that they have signed (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Many scholars thus propose that a proliferation of NGOs—​or local advocates—​is needed in order to translate human rights norms to local practice (Merry 2006; Murdie 2014; Murdie and Peksen 2015; Neumayer 2005). However, arguments about NGOs as a driving force that helps to socialize states into compliance with international human rights norms still tend to work through the apparatus of the central state (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et  al. 1999, 2013). With some exceptions, this literature overlooks alternative or non-​state-​based approaches to strong human rights practice. It similarly overlooks the ways in which NGOs, international organizations and other non-​state actors can (and have) bypassed the state when it exhibits weakness. Stephen Krasner refers to such forms of direct intervention as ‘trusteeship’ statehood, in which external actors explicitly set the agenda for human rights practice in specific locales or exert direct influence over local human rights institutions (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Keohane 2002; Krasner 1999, 2004; Lake 2014; Lake and Fariss 2014). An important deficiency in the existing literature on human rights diffusion, therefore, which proves especially pertinent in ALS, is the heavy emphasis on the state as the primary—​or the only—​mechanism through which diffusion and compliance can occur. Thus, in addition to continued violations of human rights in contexts with effective state apparatus and strong compliance overall (such as the United States), we can also observe small pockets of effective human rights governance in contexts that the literature would leave us to believe to be immune to the influence of international human rights principles. This can result from strong local institutions that protect and uphold the rights of groups or individuals without the support of the international system (Baldwin 2015; Joireman 2001; Tripp 2013), or it can result from the work of international agencies and NGOs operating in the peripheries and without extensive buy in from central governments (Lake 2014). We do not suggest that the state does not play an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights. Evidence suggests that it does. Rather, in strong and weak states alike, external actors are likely to face both normative and institutional plurality. State capacity may, therefore, be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the protection of human rights or the diffusion of international human rights norms in the ways that existing scholarship assumes. Pockets of compliance may be visible in ALS, in the same way that actors or locales in strong states may be deeply hostile to specific human rights norms. The extent to which human rights may

424   Berger/Lake be protected by non-​state justice institutions, for example, is discussed more fully in the subsequent section. Scholars should remain attentive to the specificities and variation within ALS, and what each can tell us about processes of diffusion and compliance more broadly.

Rule of Law The rule of law is an essentially contested concept that has been circulating through the international system for the past two centuries. Since the latest ‘Rule of Law Revival’ (Carothers 1998) in the 1980s, rule of law interventions by external actors have primarily focused on reforming the state’s legal system in those areas where statehood is limited. The portfolio of activities embraced by external actors has thus regularly comprised investment in judicial infrastructure (e.g. repairing courthouses or purchasing furniture and computers), drafting new legislation, training judges, lawyers, and other legal personnel, building up bar associations, and facilitating international exchanges for judges, lawyers, and administrative staff (Golub 2003: 9). In recent years, this ‘rule of law orthodoxy’ (Dezalay and Garth 2002)  has been increasingly criticized. The driving force behind this critique is a growing consensus among scholars and policymakers that ‘rule of law promotion has produced less than stellar results’ (Zürn et al. 2012a: 314; see also Tamanaha 2011). Thomas Carothers has criticized international donors’ attachment to checklists as well as their proclivity to fetishize particular institutional forms. This has resulted in an ‘  . . .  overattachment to forms and underattachment to principles’ (Carothers 2004: 154; see also Carothers 2006). Similarly, Michael Zürn, André Nollkaemper, and Randall Peerenboom (2012b) have argued that contemporary rule of law promotion is too legalistic, underestimates the sociolegal complexities of receiving contexts, and consequently fails to adequately adjust interventions to varying realities on the ground. In more fundamental terms, Stephen Golub has argued that ‘[t]‌he international aid field of law and development focuses too much on law, lawyers, and state institutions, and too little on development, the poor, and civil society’ (Golub 2003: 3). Golub (2009, 2010) thus calls for a fundamental shift away from the established rule of law orthodoxy and towards the support of legal empowerment. Common to these different critical analyses of the rule of law orthodoxy is the diagnosis that the reliance on uniform templates and the exclusive focus on state institutions are inadequate to address the complex challenges of legal reform in ALS. One of the defining features of ALS is the persistence of legal pluralism in the absence of a collision regime. Legal pluralism refers to a situation in which a multiplicity of normative and legal orders overlap and coincide within a given sociopolitical space (Benda-​Beckmann 2002). Whereas legal pluralism exists virtually anywhere in the world, in ALS it exists in the absence of a singular authority that would be able to impose a unitary order on the plurality of different legal and normative systems within the territory of the state. As an empirical phenomenon, legal pluralism has been largely neglected by the rather

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    425 state-​centric jurisprudential literature, though notable exceptions do exist (Chiba 2002; Kötter et al. 2015; Menski 2006). Instead, legal pluralism has been mainly discussed in the anthropological literature (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Merry 1988; Nader 2002), which has placed a great emphasis on non-​state justice institutions (NSJIs). Importantly, NSJIs exist in myriad forms; they vary greatly in size and composition, have different jurisdictions, and draw on multiple normative sources, including for example customary principles, religious precepts, or indigenous cosmologies. Embedded in local relationships of power, NSJIs evolve to reflect broader trends of social transformation within particular contexts (Connolly 2005; Forsyth 2007; Kötter 2015). These relationships might range from proactive attempts by the state to resist non-​state justice, to the complete integration of non-​state institutions into state judiciaries (Forsyth 2007). In-​between these two extremes exists a wide range of formal and informal linkages between state and non-​state institutions. One of the most common configurations in ALS is the informal cooperation between state agencies and non-​state courts even if the latter are not formally recognized. Marlies Bouman shows in the case of Botswana how ‘chiefly courts are in fact tolerated, or even supported, by the official police forces, although their adjudication activities are in violation of various national laws’ (Bouman 1987: 291). Yet even if NSJIs are formally recognized by the state, as for example in the case of constitutional recognition of indigenous legal systems in many Latin American countries (van Cott 2000), the state’s effective control over the legal dynamics in NSJIs remains rather limited. As a consequence, NSJIs display a great deal of subnational variation; in the absence of an overarching authority, it is local factors rather than national legal frameworks, that define the ways in which NSJIs operate in ALS (see also Chapter 16 Risse, this volume). The analysis of legal pluralism is not limited to seemingly ‘local’ systems of non-​state law but includes the scrutiny of transnational legal influences. As Shalini Randeria has shown, legal pluralism operates across national boundaries. It consists of (i) a multiplicity of (at times contradictory) transnational norms, (ii) state law, (iii) non-​ state law, for example in the form of customary principles or religious precepts, and (iv) the kind of soft ‘project law’ constituted by the conditionalities of international donor agencies (Randeria 2003, 2007). Recently, international donor agencies have re-​discovered NSJIs as potential institutional sites for the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, more broadly (Tamanaha 2015). The growing fatigue with the results of orthodox rule of law initiatives has led to what Deval Desai and Michael Woolcock (2015) from the World Bank’s ‘Justice for the Poor’ (J4P) Programme have aptly called ‘experimental justice reform’. Central to this ‘heterodox approach to justice reform’ is an emphasis on taking context and the rules of the game seriously (Sage et al. 2009). This entails an experimental approach to ‘finding and fitting’ solutions that respond to locally nominated and prioritized problems. Such an approach is juxtaposed and legitimated against orthodox approaches in which universal best-​practice solutions (i.e. the legal texts, procedures, and institutional structures that prevail in developed countries) are imported in response to problems determined by external experts (Desai and Woolcock 2015: 162).

426   Berger/Lake There are two strands to this new context-​sensitive approach that aims at replacing the established canon of rule of law reform. The first draws on much broader understandings of ‘law in society’ to move beyond the narrow confines of the state’s legal institutions. Justice for the Poor is thus ‘an approach to justice reform which sees justice from the perspective of the poor and marginalized, is grounded in social and cultural contexts, recognizes the importance of demand in building equitable justice systems, and understands justice as a cross-​sectoral issue’ (Allen et al. 2013). This includes, for example, the support of paralegals to enhance accountability within Sierra Leone’s healthcare system, substantial action research on the possibilities for a more equitable land governance in Vanuatu, and community empowerment programmes in Indonesia as key projects supported within the J4P framework. A second stream in the ‘new experimentalism’ has aimed to directly engage NSJIs as sites for the promotion of the rule of law in ALS. Although programming with NSJIs only reentered the international rule of law mainstream with the publication of a comprehensive report by UNDP, UNICEF, and UNWomen on ‘Informal Justice Mechanisms—​Charting a way for Human Rights-​based Engagement’ (UNDP, UNICEF, and UN Women 2013), informal institutions in the global South have a long history of transnational influences. In their attempts to eradicate ‘repugnant’ local practices, on the one hand, and maintain at least some degree of local legitimacy, on the other, international actors have frequently targeted NSJIs. As Laura Benton argues, this ‘ . . . often required the creation of “traditional” authority and the reification of legal practices and sources of law that had existed formerly only as fluid elements of a flexible legal process’ (Benton 2002: 128). The kind of NSJIs international donor agencies have recently started to engage are therefore not manifestations of ‘authentic’ or ‘untouched’ legal institutions. Instead, precisely because they are not, or only in a very limited way, regulated by the state, NSJIs tend to be in a constant state of evolution and change, frequently reflecting larger processes of social transformation. In their attempts to engage these institutions, international actors aiming at the promotion of the rule of law are now torn between two impulses: On the one hand, NSJIs are considered to be fast, efficient, and quite often enjoy higher degrees of legitimacy than state-​backed court. On the other hand, NSJIs have been frequently criticized for their patriarchal biases and the overall perpetuation of unequal power relations in violation of basic human rights and rule of law standards. International donors are thus confronted with the question of how to maximize the perceived advantages of non-​state courts without perpetuating their perceived short-​comings (Berger 2017b). In most cases, international donor agencies address these challenges by insisting on some, albeit minimal, degree of oversight through state institutions that ought to ensure adherence to basic international normative standards. This might include the imposition of procedural requirement, the circumscription of jurisdiction, or the judicial supervision of non-​state institutions through state agencies (Kötter 2015). This, in turn, also involves the bureaucratization of NSJIs as only specific practices of documentation allow for the kind of oversight international agencies envision (Berger 2017b). For these agencies, it therefore almost seems inconceivable to engage non-​state

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    427 institutions without at least nominal references to the state’s judiciary and some of its constitutive practices. These necessary links with state judiciaries notwithstanding, programming with NSJIs in ALS generally aims for a high degree of context-​sensitivity and eschews ‘one-​size-​fits-​all’ approaches. The greater appreciation of context-​specific knowledge has facilitated enhanced dialogues between practitioners and scholars of various disciplines (Golub 2010; Kötter et al. 2015; Tamanaha et al. 2012). It has also informed programming. In his analysis of one of the most comprehensive donor-​sponsored projects with NSJIs as they exist today, Tobias Berger (2017a) has shown that projects with village courts in Bangladesh can empower poor and marginalized people in processes of conflict resolution. Yet, they do so only if they are implemented by local NGOs that translate donor-​understandings of the rule of law in ways that resonate with the experiences of people in rural Bangladesh. Instead of integrating the village courts into the state’s judiciary, as anticipated by international donors, the grassroots level staff of local NGOs introduce the village courts as yet a further informal institution in the complex legal landscape of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh. Rather than using the official documents provided by the European Union and UNDP to orderly keep village courts records, NGO fieldworkers use these documents as symbolic capital that allows poor and marginalized people to access local authorities they could not have otherwise accessed. And instead of promoting the rule of law in the secular vocabulary of international agencies, the fieldworkers translate this into specific interpretation of Islamic law and community harmony. In sum, the grassroots level employees of the local NGOs tasked with the activation of village courts significantly improve the standing of poor and marginalized people in rural Bangladesh precisely because they do not promote the rule of law in the ways in which international actors understand it. Processes of translation unfold not only in the context of donor-​sponsored programmes with NSJIs. In the field of orthodox rule of law programmes with state institutions, the translation perspective offers novel insights into recursive interactions between global norms and specific local contexts. As Lisbeth Zimmermann (2017) has shown in her analysis of the promotion of children’s rights, access to public information, and an international commission against impunity in Guatemala, international rule-​of-​ law programmes trigger domestic contestation, thereby changing the approach taken by external actors, and ultimately fuelling a process in which global templates are locally translated (see also Chapter 17 Hönke/​Müller, this volume). Any examination of rule of law architecture in ALS thus demonstrates that a great deal of subnational diversity and disaggregation exists. Yet pre-​existing dispute resolution mechanisms are rarely (or never) evenly distributed. Indeed, across parts of rural sub-​Saharan Africa, vastly different customary institutions can be found under the same juridical state (Baldwin 2015). It is important to acknowledge that what is understood as customary law by activists in the global North is often, itself, a curious hybrid of colonial-​era adaptation (Spear 2003). Yet, local actors nevertheless wield a considerable degree of power and influence in shaping local dispute resolution in ALS, and therefore in determining the reception and integration of externally promoted programmes.

428   Berger/Lake As with human rights, scholars should also be wary of assuming greater resistance or barriers to implementation in the absence of consolidated statehood. Indeed, in her work in eastern DR Congo, Milli Lake (2014) found that precisely because the state was weak, rule of law practitioners have been able to exert disproportionate influence over legal processes in ways that may not have been possible were the state stronger. On this point, we have seen considerable opposition to aspects of international rule of law programming in countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, and to an even greater extent in strong autocracies such as China, North Korea, or Singapore, where state strength means that international actors have very few entry points to exert influence or engage in rule of law promotion at all. The role that local actors and the state play in shaping or contesting rule of law diffusion is therefore deeply contingent. As in any context, local actors may appropriate global templates to give the appearance of compliance and implementation while entrenching pre-​existing hierarchies of power (Lake 2017). They may instrumentalize international programmes to pursue overlapping personal, political, or social agendas. Or they may utilize global templates to confront or challenge hegemonic power structures. Whatever their motives, local actors demonstrate substantial agency in shaping the outcomes of international rule of law promotion in ALS, as elsewhere. The agency and influence of local actors is not necessarily determined by state strength.

Democracy Having come to a standstill throughout much of the Cold War, US democracy promotion accelerated in the 1980s when the Reagan administration included the promotion of democracy as a key pillar of US foreign policy. Key stakeholders in these efforts include the US National Endowment for Democracy, the Latin American Bureau of the USAID, and the International Foundation for Election Systems (Babayan and Huber 2012: 6; Carothers 2015: 78). After the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration elevated democracy promotion to one of three major foreign policy priorities. Clinton also enhanced funding, institutionalizing democracy promotion in US foreign assistance programmes (Babayan and Huber 2012: 6). Besides USAID and other government agencies, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Brother’s Fund, and the George Soros Foundation became key actors in the field of international democracy promotion, especially in ALS (Encarnación 2011: 471). On the other side of the Atlantic, European actors have also channelled billions of dollars into external democracy promotion via the European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE), development assistance programmes of EU member states, national foundations, and NGOs. European and American stakeholders do not differ significantly in their tactics and approaches to the promotion of democracy in ALS (Magen et al. 2009). Whereas international rule of law promotion has tended to focus primarily on state institutions, the promotion of democracy through bi-​and multilateral donor agencies

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    429 historically emphasized the support of civil society. Inspired by de Tocqueville’s account of voluntary associations as the bedrock of American democracy, scholars emphasized the importance of civil society for the flourishing of democratic life. Focusing on one area of limited statehood par excellence, Robert Putnam’s (1993) study of civic traditions in modern Italy quickly became the foundational text for scholars highlighting the transformative potential of civil society (Encarnación 2011; see also Chapter 18 Draude et al., this volume). Among policymakers, support for civil society quickly turned into the preferred strategy for promoting democracy. Complemented by election monitoring and the building of institutional capacity in national judiciaries and parliaments, civil society organizations thus assumed a key role within the three-​tiered framework through which international donor agencies approached the promotion of democracy in ALS (Carothers 2015: 70–​80). In liberal accounts, civil society is the space where relationships between the state and its citizenry are mediated so that the former is held accountable to the latter (Williams and Young 1994). Civil society is thus understood as ‘the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-​ generating, (largely) self-​ supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules’ (Diamond 1994: 5). Yet in their attempts to promote democracy in ALS, international donor agencies have operated with a severely impoverished account of civil society. Neglecting the multiplicity of actors that comprise civil societies in ALS, existing scholarship has too frequently focused almost exclusively on NGOs. Yet in highly aid-​dependent countries, the exclusive focus on NGOs reverses lines of accountability, away from domestic audiences and towards international donor agencies (see also Chapter 17 Hönke/Müller, this volume). In her case study of the booming NGO sector in Bangladesh in the 1990s, Sarah White (1996, 1999) has shown how increasing dependence on foreign funding has undermined the capacity of non-​governmental originations to articulate political vision in line with grassroots demands (see also Karim 2011; Lewis 2004). Similarly, the essays collected in John and Jean Comaroff ’s 1999 volume have analysed the contradictory effects that donor-​sponsored attempts to ‘build’ civil society had in different contexts across sub-​ Saharan Africa. Following the rather perfunctory model of democracy promotion in the 1990s, most recent developments have indicated a greater attentiveness to local contexts. As Thomas Carothers argues: At least some civil society development work has evolved beyond the romanticism and superficiality that marked much of this kind of aid in the 1990s. Back then, elite advocacy groups tended to attract the most donor support, even when they lacked sufficient rootedness, local legitimacy, and sustainability. Today, some aid organizations do things differently. They are emphasizing the need for local civil society to focus on constituency building, striving to reach groups beyond the narrow range of Westernized donor favorites, giving local groups means and incentives to find their own local sources of support, and working to ensure that outside aid spurs cooperation rather than infighting within the local civil society scene. (Carothers 2015: 81).

430   Berger/Lake The extent to which recent attempts by external actors to ground democracy promotion in local political processes will succeed to move beyond the narrow confines of elite civil society remains an open yet important question. Especially in post-​conflict contexts, the ill-​conceived promotion of unsuitable institutional templates may not only fail to deliver the desired results but actually have negative repercussions. A burgeoning new body of scholarship has thus called some of the underlying assumptions of democracy promotion into question by showing how countries emerging from civil war or autocracy are heavily incentivized to embrace and adopt a host of new democratic institutions. Elections held in such settings are expected to aid in the transition from contexts of repression or relative anarchy, to environments of predictable, rule-​governed behaviour, in which political disagreement can be mediated through the ballot box and through formal institutional channels, rather than through violence. Yet Thomas Flores and Irfan Noorudin have cast doubt on these assertions, suggesting instead that rapid transitions to democracy are fraught with danger (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 2016). Highlighting the rapid proliferation of what have been termed ‘nominal’ democracies—​or, the phenomenon in which elections are held, but representation, democratic integrity, and a lack of political interference remain elusive—​the authors posit that, rather than hindering a return to conflict, a rapid-​fire transition to elections in the immediate aftermath of a peace accord can, in fact, exacerbate political tension and hasten a return to violence. Flores and Nooruddin note that the inability of post-​conflict politicians to credibly commit to respecting new electoral institutions suggests that their implementation could exacerbate the security dilemma by heightening mistrust in an already volatile political environment. Unless institutions can be built slowly and carefully over time, and include the buy-​in, confidence, and genuine investment by warring factions, they will do little to stave off a return to arms in the face of uncertainty. Finally, even in contexts that do not face the risk of imminent resurgent violence, questions prevail concerning the extent to which fragile democratic institutions in ALS are able to deliver on their promises to ordinary citizens. Even when ostensibly democratic elections are able to stave off a return to arms, there are a growing number of nominal democracies around the world that exist in a state of uncertainty; are unwilling to commit to promises of free or regular elections; and are unwilling to uphold the fundamental rights of their citizens. In such contexts, freedom of speech may be curtailed, a free press may be muzzled, political opposition suppressed, and scheduled elections delayed. In ALS, it seems premature to label the nominal existence of elections as a success of ‘democracy promotion’ interventions.

Conclusions Given that consolidated statehood is, historically speaking, the exception rather than the rule, international donor agencies need to critically scrutinize at least some of the

Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Democracy    431 state-​centric assumptions underpinning human rights, rule of law, and democracy interventions. This reorientation involves the acknowledgement that local scripts, which shape and determine the fluid realities of governance in ALS and elsewhere, require serious consideration. Indeed, the expectation that low state capacity necessarily leads to poor outcomes in the arenas of human rights, rule of law, and democracy promotion derives from a troubling absence of high-​quality subnational data, in addition to a disturbing lack of nuance concerning the realities of local governance. More careful analysis reveals that well-​resourced international organizations can utilize gaps created by the absence of functional state infrastructure in order to assume direct responsibility over tasks normally under the jurisdiction of the central government, shaping human rights, rule of law, and democracy interventions in previously underexplored ways. Moreover, fine-​grained data show that local actors shape and transform the global governance scripts of external actors, wielding considerable influence over their local implementation. It is thus necessary to recognize that local stakeholders, and local context, shape the realities of governance interventions by external actors in both strong and weak state environments alike. The different ways in which local actors mediate the influence of external governance programmes in ALS should be a subject for further inquiry. However, it should not be assumed that the mere absence of consolidated statehood determines outcomes uniformly.

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Chapter 22

Healt h Anna Holzscheiter

Health is existential to human life and well-​being—​without safe birth, basic immunization, and essential medicines, such as oral dehydration therapy against diarrhoea, many children around the world would not grow into healthy adults or would not even see adulthood. The past 25 years have seen remarkable progress in fighting communicable diseases, such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and polio, in rising life expectancy of populations around the globe and widespread access to drugs and health services. New HIV infections have been reduced by 35% since 2000 (UNAIDS 2015: 32), while only two countries remain endemic to polio with 74 cases of polio in 2015 in contrast to 125 countries and 350,000 cases in 1988 (WHO et al. 2016: 11); there has been a global increase of five years in life expectancy at birth since 2000 (WHO 2016: 7); and more people have access to essential health services today than at any point in history (WHO and World Bank Group 2015: 19). The increasing collaboration between state and non-​state actors and the resources offered by non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), private foundations, businesses, and many other actors beyond governments have undoubtedly accelerated these improvements in the health area. These remarkable achievements notwithstanding, millions of people around the world still lack the most basic healthcare. In 2015, 303 women died every day because of complications during pregnancy and delivery (WHO 2016: 44) and 5.9 million children (UNICEF et al. 2015: 8) died of preventable early childhood diseases. These numbers highlight the widespread incapacities of states and the failure of markets in providing basic health services and life-​saving medication worldwide. They also testify to the ubiquity of areas of limited statehood (ALS). The Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014 and 2015 has been a dramatic case to show how quickly fragile health systems crumble in the face of a severe health crisis. Health governance comprises all ‘institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules or to provide collective goods’ related to the well-​being of societies (see Chapter 1 Börzel et al., this volume, for a conceptualization of governance). More specifically, it is understood to comprise the structures, principles, and processes of policy formulation, regulation, accountability,

Health   439 and control built around the core aim of preventing diseases and ensuring the well-​ being of human beings (Barbazza and Tello 2014). Governance has emerged as a prominent concept to capture the interplay between public and private actors, and their collaborative structures and processes in the health sector. Widespread and deep collaboration between the public and the private sector characterizes health policymaking and implementation around the world, in developing and developed countries alike (Hunter et al. 2011; Kirigia and Barry 2008; Kumar 2003; Lenaway et al. 2006; Paim et al. 2011; Saltman 2003; Tuohy et al. 2004; see Chapter 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). Contemporary discussions on governance of health in ALS evidence, though, that these areas are mostly associated with low-​and middle-​income countries (Schäferhoff 2013). This focus on developing countries is owed, before all, to the prominence of health on today’s development agenda.1 Health has become the focal point of policies aiming to improve governance of the social sector in low-​and middle-​income countries, starting with the acceptance of ‘human development’ as an international paradigm in the late 1960s/​early 1970s, accelerating after 1990, and culminating in the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.2 Bilateral and multilateral development assistance for the health sector has skyrocketed since 1990, but particularly since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. The last 20 years have witnessed an almost fivefold increase in official development assistance from US$ 5.6 billion in 1990 (Lagomarsino et al. 2009) to US$ 26.8 billion in 2010 (IHME 2010: 9) and 35.9 billion in 2014 (Dieleman et al. 2015). This exponential growth in resources to address health issues has also been reflected in the steep rise of health on domestic foreign policy agendas, as well as on the agenda of the G7/​G8/​G20. Improvements in health governance are seen by many as the litmus test for effective international development cooperation; and considering the successes described earlier, it has to be assumed that the massive international efforts in the health area have reaped significant benefits.3 This chapter has two aims: first, it will introduce health as a policy field and specify what exactly is meant by ‘health governance’. The second aim of the chapter is to carve out the implications of limited statehood for health governance. It will show broader trends in the literature on health governance in ALS and introduce major controversies revolving around the notions of effectiveness, legitimacy, and sustainability. The chapter starts by discussing different definitions of health governance and will capture the lively debate on what constitutes public health, on the one hand, and what is considered a collective good for health, on the other. I will argue that, in many regards, the differentiation between domestic and global health governance makes little sense in the face of contemporary developments. I will also engage with the question of which actors are involved in health governance, their motivations, resources, and core areas of activity. The chapter goes on to discuss the implications of limited statehood for health governance as they have been identified in the literature. Polio eradication efforts—​nationally and globally—​will serve as an empirical example to illustrate contemporary trends in the scholarly debate. The last part will introduce the reader to issues of effectiveness and legitimacy of health governance with a particular focus on contemporary debates

440   Holzscheiter about the legitimacy of non-​state actors in global health, most notably those with exceptional power, such as the Gates Foundation.

Health Governance: Definition, Actors, and Modes of Governance There are three characteristics of health governance which make this area of public policy special: first, the virtual dissolution of boundaries between national, international, and global health governance; second, the ubiquitous involvement of diverse non-​state actors in health governance, with often considerable influence on agendas and policy decisions; and third, the weak legalization of health governance at the global level, which is also reflected in weak rules regarding the interplay between public and private, international and domestic actors involved in health governance. All three of these characteristics are relevant to the analysis of health governance in ALS (Lee et al. 2002: xix).

Defining Health Governance Drawing the boundaries of the policy field of health is as difficult as in the areas of food security (Chapter 23 Liese, this volume) or education (Chapter 24 Ellersiek, this volume). Two lines of contention mark discussions on the scope of health governance: first, how far the notion of health should go beyond a focus on preventing and curing diseases; second, what should be included in the notion of public health or, to put it differently, what to consider as public goods for health. Most broadly, it is possible to differentiate between narrow and broad definitions of health. Narrow definitions focus on health as the opposite of largely physical disease, disability, and death: health governance then comprises the prevention of death and disability and the curing of diseases, mainly by providing the necessary medical substances and interventions. Broad definitions, such as the official definition included in the WHO Constitution of 1948 include ‘mental and social well-​being’4 as constitutive of health and go well beyond biomedical approaches towards population health. These discussions on the scope of the policy field have immediate repercussions with regard to the question of what constitutes health governance. In fact, a widely used textbook on Making Health Policy from 2005 does not even make reference to the notion of governance, despite its heavy emphasis on the contribution of private actors to health policymaking. Rather, it frames changes in public health policy as ‘modern cooperation in global health’ (Buse et al. 2005: 145) or the ‘globalization of the policy process’ (Buse et al. 2005: 153). It is not too surprising, then, that several authors claim the governance of health systems to be the ‘least well understood aspect of health systems’ (Siddiqi et al. 2009: 13; see also Barbazza and Tello 2014; Frenk and Moon 2013: 936).

Health   441 Mitchell and Shortell state the need to devise a systematic way of thinking about dimensions of governance contributing to effective community health partnerships (Mitchell and Shortell 2000: 243). De Leeuw et al. note that a conceptualization of determinants of global health is absent and that no ‘definition is explicit on how particular governance perspectives would enable a more transparent operation of the global health system’ (de Leeuw et al. 2013: 108). They further stress the need to establish new sets of theoretical tools to analyse global health governance (de Leeuw et al. 2013). Even though the study of health politics and policymaking in the contemporary world is no longer conceivable without using the term governance, the fuzziness of the concept allows a broad array of phenomena to be accommodated under the notion of health governance. In fact, much research on health governance focuses on public administration and its authority in policy m ​ aking and operational capacity in policy implementation with a focus on the six functions identified by Carlson et al., ‘policy development; resource stewardship; continuous improvement; partner engagement; legal authority; and oversight of a health department’ (Carlson et al. 2015: 159). However, there are also broader conceptualizations of health governance which include accountability and different models of shared authority between public and private entities. The next section will discuss how the notion of collective goods in the area of health has been considerably stretched in the late twentieth century and how that has necessitated new modes of social coordination with private actors.

Stretching the Boundaries of Health Governance The study of health governance is, first and foremost, a study of the very definition of what constitutes health, what defines the substance of health politics, and the scope of governance, including its relevant actors. In this regard, it is undeniable that, over time, the scope of issues and problems that are perceived to belong to the field of ‘health governance’ has grown immensely. Today, the territory of health is no longer seen as exclusively colonized by (bio-​)medicine. The traditional focus of the public health sector on infectious diseases has been considerably expanded: towards traditional or alternative medicine, the migration of health personal, or the implications of the data revolution for the health sector. A growing interdisciplinarity in the study of health has led to the recognition of disciplines, such as social medicine, epidemiology, and population health that study the health of populations primarily as an outcome of social, economic, political, and cultural determinants rather than individual risk factors and predispositions. This shift in perspective has not only considerably broadened the tasks of domestic and international health agencies (most notably health ministries and the WHO), but it has also brought with it a propensity to embrace a host of non-​state actors in the governance of health (see Chapters 11 Beisheim et al. and 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume). Discussions on the boundaries of health governance have underlined the necessity to reflect on what constitutes ‘public goods’ in this area, both with regard to how broad the relevant public is (‘global public good’) and in terms of which health

442   Holzscheiter issues should be seen as pertaining to public regulation and provision. The history of health governance is also the history of the continuous stretching of the boundaries of public goods for health and the health services accessible to large parts of the population. In human history, doctors were only visited when people were severely sick as they were paid out-​of-​pocket; in fact, for a considerable part of today’s world population, this is still the norm (Leive and Xu 2008). Advanced public health systems, though, today offer health prevention services or reproductive assistance alongside often very progressive public insurance schemes. The Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs includes a Minister of Health Care, Public Health, and Sport who is assigned the ‘promotion of health and disease prevention’, also through such means as the promotion of physical activity and healthy eating, as well as the elimination of avoidable health inequalities.5 Similar fields of activity are pursued by health ministries in other OECD countries. Central to the work of health ministries across OECD countries is their stewardship and oversight over private actors, most notably insurance companies and the pharmaceutical and biomedical sectors. The German Ministry of Health sees its main task in ensuring universal health coverage/​universal access to health insurance through legislation that regulates the insurance sector; the effective protection of the public against health threats; and the regulation of the pharmaceutical and biomedical sector, particularly with regard to drug licensing.6 Not only the boundaries of public health systems but also those of global public health have been significantly stretched in the past 25 years. Those observing the field of global health, like Messac and Prabhu, conclude that the discovery of HIV and the massive international effort to contain the virus and its deadly effects marked the advent of a ‘golden era of global health’ (even if this may seem a cynical term in the light of the millions of people that have died of AIDS). Before 2000, they argue, expectations in the area of health were rather low, considering the scarcity of resources routinely attributed to this sector. Policy priorities focused on the ‘low-​ hanging fruits’ to be reaped by targeting infectious diseases and cheap health interventions in developing countries (anti-​malaria bed nets, condoms, vaccines, oral rehydration therapy; see Messac and Prabhu 2013: 115). International cooperation in health—​and, as a consequence also international assistance in health governance in ALS—​underwent a seismic shift with HIV, which many see as the first truly global health issue. The HIV crisis coincided with the end of the Cold War, the acceleration of global interdependencies, and an unprecedented growth in civil society activism and philanthropic engagement. The HIV and AIDS epidemic and the international and domestic strategies developed to confront this human tragedy of massive scale epitomize the broadening notion of health just discussed and, as a consequence, also in policy instruments and governance structures designed to address acute health issues around the world. As a consequence of these developments, domestic health governance has become so broad and globally interdependent that it is virtually impossible to analyse domestic health systems without taking into account their global political, economic, and cultural determinants.7

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Actors and Modes of Health Governance Health constitutes an exceptional field of public policy inasmuch as its domestic governance faces a multitude of challenges arising from globalization and global interdependencies. These are exemplified by the conventional wisdom that ‘viruses know no borders’ (Piot 2015: 74), by global competitive markets for the prices of pharmaceutical products or health insurance policies, or a globalized labour market for medical professionals. As trivial as this acknowledgement of the global dimensions of domestic health governance may be, it has had a self-​reinforcing effect on the field. It contributed to the breakneck speed with which actors and agencies in global health governance and domestic health systems have diversified and multiplied and it has also served to justify the massive increase in resources available for addressing health issues in developing countries. In fact, the very recognition that health crises in ALS have immediate effects well beyond the confines of domestic societies constitutes a major driving force behind an ever-​increasing attention to health on foreign policy agendas and the growing influence of actors such as militaries and philanthropies. Following the previous discussion, contemporary analysis of health governance broadly shares the consensus that ‘health is a property of many complex systems and dynamic networks has demanded new and formal interactions with varied actors, found often beyond the domain of health itself ’ (Barbazza and Tello 2014: 2). Despite this recognition of health governance as an exceptionally complex affair, the literature on health governance presents national governments and their health ministries as the major reference point of health governance, both domestically and globally (Frenk and Moon 2013: 937; Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012). As member states of multilateral organizations, national governments are the ‘shapers’ of international rules and the major decision-​ makers. The standard against which their statehood is measured is one of ‘responsive regulation’, understood as having clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity and the possibility to impose sanctions (Abbott and Snidal 2013). Likewise, at the national level, they are the central governance actors when it comes to setting and implementing rules, steering national health systems, and regulating private actors’ contribution to and impact on domestic health systems. At the same time, there is great variance in the degree of central governmental authority in the health sector (Saltman 2003). In fact, historical accounts of health systems around the world, in the global North and South alike, suggest that in many countries the health sector (as a subsector of social policy) has always been a sector with ‘limited statehood’, given the extensive involvement of non-​state actors (Steffen 2010). The evolution of health systems in industrialized countries, following a far-​reaching policy change towards privatization and de-​regulation, is a process of decreasing, rather than increasing statehood in the area of health. The claim that the ‘role of government in (health) governance . . . is expanding in many areas of modern life’ (Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012: viii) is sustained by a wealth of empirical knowledge on the increasing capacities, budgets, and mandates of health ministries, particularly in low-​and middle-​income countries (Lu et al. 2010). In other words, health governance is often characterized by a concomitance of incremental processes of both

444   Holzscheiter privatization and enlargement/​strengthening of hierarchical coordination through health ministries. This applies to advanced health systems as well as to developing countries since development cooperation for health in low-​and middle-​income countries in many cases seeks to strengthen the capacity of national health ministries to steer and coordinate public–​private health services. Generally, the literature on health governance covers a broad range of public and private actors, organizations, and networks, both in their roles of contributors to and targets of health governance (Hein et al. 2007; Huckel 2005; Keefe and Zacher 2008; McInnes and Roemer-Mahler 2014; Youde 2012). In a narrow perspective, public actors governing the health system are ministries of health and/​or social affairs; health insurance agencies; and authorities responsible for public pharmaceutical procurement, licensing, and distribution. A broader understanding of public health governance includes parliamentary health committees, regulatory bodies, other ministries (finance, development, defence) or the judicial system. The role of public authorities in health systems marked by the existence of diverse private ‘players’ is most often referred to as that of a ‘steward’ (Saltman and Ferroussier-​Davis 2000). Unsurprisingly, the notion of ‘stewardship’ is a highly contested one with fuzzy boundaries, despite its accepted use in the area of health governance. On a most basic level, though, it introduces a vertical element into the debate on health governance as it implies asymmetries in authority between different actors where some actors orchestrate others (i.e. governments adopt patent legislation; regulate insurance markets; have an oversight over drug certification, and so on). Stewardship is typically defined as ‘setting and enforcing the rules and incentives that define the environment and guide the behaviors of health-​system players’ (Lagomarsino et al. 2009). Following the differentiation between hierarchical and non-​hierarchical modes of coordination, stewardship clearly pertains to the former category. In a narrow perspective, the ‘health-​system players’ steered by public authorities are typically those contributing to health system financing and healthcare provision: in a broad perspective, they include an extensive range of actors such as philanthropic organizations, NGOs and civil society, professional associations, think tanks, organizations representing patients/​clients/​consumers, academic institutions, multilateral banks, and regional and international organizations such as the European Union and the WHO (Frenk and Moon 2013: 938). Looking at health governance in ALS, though, it appears that international agencies and private actors occupy a much more prominent and consequential role than is usually associated with the classical notion of stewardship. Health governance in ALS is thus emblematic for a general trend towards non-​hierarchical modes of governance in these areas (Risse 2012; see Chapter  16 Risse, this volume). In the past, it was particularly bilateral global health programmes, for example, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) initiated by George W. Bush or the Obama Global Health initiative, which have attracted widespread interest. The contribution of bilateral development cooperation agencies, such as USAID, DFID, GIZ, NORAD, or the Swedish International Development Cooperation

Health   445 Agency (SIDA) as well as the involvement of old (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation) and new (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Clinton Foundation) large philanthropies, have also figured in the analysis of health governance in ALS (Mwisongo and Nabyonga-​Orem 2016). International public and private actors have become ever more important partners in domestic health governance with the origins and effects of domestic health challenges increasingly being perceived as global in nature (see also Chapters 10 Lederer and 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). While national governments orchestrate their contribution to health governance in many cases, they also operate through modes of governance in which they themselves occupy the role of stewards, most notably in the context of global public–​private partnerships. While private actors indeed most extensively engage in the provision of health services and medicines, they have also become part of rule-​setting and meta-​governance activities (i.e. institutional structures and processes aiming towards greater coherence and harmonization between different public and private entities operating at the domestic level). In fact, in 2010, Balabanova and colleagues identified over 75 global health partnerships and initiatives engaging in meta-​governance activities, in an attempt to improve coordination among donors or between donors and recipient countries (Balabanova et al. 2010). Among these are, for example, the International Health Partnership (and related initiatives) established in 2007 which aims to coordinate through multiple country compacts between donors and recipient countries, mostly in sub-​Saharan Africa; the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health; or the African Medicines Regulatory Harmonisation Programme.

The Implications of Limited Statehood for Health Governance Most health systems around the world build on a complicated mix of public and private contributions to financing and health service delivery. Health reforms in low-​and middle-​income countries have been driven by processes of decentralization and privatization, particularly since the 1980s and 1990s (Mills 2014). Much of the literature on health governance in resource-​constrained settings or ‘ALS’ thus revolves around the interactions between public and private actors and the contribution of public–​private arrangements to curing deficiencies of domestic sovereignty as regards the safeguarding of the well-​being of national populations.8 As these studies evidence, in many low-​and middle-​income countries, external public and private actors or international public–​ private partnerships contribute to a significant extent to the financing, management, and oversight of health systems. Despite these trends, the logical starting-​point for assessing health governance in developing countries continues to be the government, more precisely ministries of

446   Holzscheiter health as the central administrative institutions governing domestic health systems. Research on the role of governments in domestic health governance concludes that these ministries often operate under constrained conditions with a limited mandate and meagre resources, particularly when it comes to broader health reforms (Berman and Bosselt 2000). In the face of these public management deficits, external actors are in many cases able to compensate for domestic governance deficits in the provision of public goods, for example in mitigating market failure in the field of neglected tropical diseases (Moran 2005). Yet, empirical research in the area of health governance shows very clearly that—​where external actors are heavily involved in national health governance—​results are mixed in terms of the benefits, challenges, and sustainability of external governance input (Cruz and McPake 2011; Harmer 2013 et al.). As Rechel and Khodjamurodov have shown in their research on Central Asia and particularly Tajikistan, the involvement of international actors in health governance has both strengthened and undermined national health governance (Rechel and Khodjamurodov 2010). Generally, there are only very few studies that look at health governance and limited statehood in comparative perspective, analysing how modes of governance involving external actors affect domestic health systems. Those few studies mainly ask about the scope conditions for an effective interplay between international and domestic public and private actors. As a consequence, questions of coordination and harmonization between multiple donors occupy centre stage in these analyses. Conclusions about the effects of better coordination are mixed at best—​a finding that begs the question to what extent donor coordination really has a positive impact on health outcomes. In fact, there is empirical evidence that ‘hypercollective action’—​as the concerted efforts of multiple donors—​may lead to governance failure and excessive transaction costs for domestic actors (Severino and Ray 2010). What is more, studies on external agencies’ involvement in domestic health governance have noted a mock governance transfer as external actors often employ mostly individuals of their host state or buy products from their country of origin. The flow of expertise and resources, thus, remains to a large part inside the donor community (Bornemisza et al. 2010). In a cross-​country study on global health initiatives (GHIs), Biesma et al. also come to the conclusion that GHIs can as much support and complement domestic governance capacities as they can undermine them (Biesma et al. 2009; see also WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group 2009). Generally, there is growing evidence from comparative policy analysis that networked modes of governance in healthcare delivery in low-​and middle-​income countries constitute only the ‘second best governance’ and result in a multiplicity of market and government failures (Ramesh et al. 2015). Taking these findings into account, the more interesting question to ask is to what extent healthcare delivery or larger health systems can be sustained, even where the capacities of governments are weak or non-​existent. Research on the effectiveness and legitimacy of public–​private/​domestic-​external modes of governance in the health

Health   447 sector in ALS zooms in on the ability of governmental actors to steer, coordinate, and harmonize the input of a broad variety of non-​state actors into domestic health governance (Biesma et al. 2009; Sundewall 2009; Sundewall et al. 2009) and align them with national health priorities and domestic health systems. In the following, I will further illustrate the relationship between limited statehood and health governance by looking at the specific example of polio eradication.

Health Governance in ALS: The Case of Polio Eradication Polio is an excellent case to discuss the implications of limited statehood for effective and legitimate health governance—​at the same time, it shows how quickly a seemingly simple health issue with remarkable successes can turn into a ‘wicked’ governance problem, locally and globally. The eradication of poliomyelitis (polio)—​one of the most well-​known childhood diseases and one that has almost vanished from the planet—​highlights the history, remarkable achievements, and contemporary challenges of health governance under conditions of limited statehood. Poliomyelitis is an acute communicable disease that is caused by any one of three types of the poliovirus (types 1, 2, or 3) and can lead to paralysis or even death, affecting mostly children under the age of five years (WHO 2014: 73). Many people are infected without symptoms but still spread the virus through their excrement, which means that the polio virus thrives in settings with poor sanitation. Vaccination against polio today is part and parcel of every country’s national vaccination strategy and it is considered to be a fundamental contribution to child survival and healthy development around the world. In most countries, polio is given as part of the pentavalent routine vaccination that is administered for the first time shortly after birth. A lifelong immunization against polio requires multiple doses of the vaccine. A dose of inactivated polio vaccine today costs approximately 0.75 USD, the oral polio vaccine is even cheaper at 0.14 USD. Generally, vaccines and immunizations against childhood diseases that are potentially life-​threatening or can lead to severe disabilities are considered to be the most cost-​effective health interventions and constitute the backbone of primary healthcare systems everywhere (i.e. healthcare offered to communities, usually by family doctors, nurses, midwives, and other community health professionals). The number of children immunized against polio in a country is therefore an excellent indicator for the strength of that country’s governance capacities in the health sector. Indeed, immunization against polio figures very prominently as an indicator for economic growth, prosperity, and development in low-​and middle-​income countries. The history of polio exhibits the interdependence between limited statehood and (global) health governance. It demonstrates how limited statehood affects not only the polio incidence rate in very few regions of the world but the ‘health of nations’ overall, endangering decades of efforts to eradicate a disease.9 In the 1950s and 1960s, effective vaccines were introduced. From the late 1980s onwards, complete eradication seemed to

448   Holzscheiter be within reach for the entire planet. In 1988, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative was established aiming at complete eradication by the year 2000. Polio infections declined dramatically. In 1988, there were 350,000 polio cases in 125 polio-​endemic countries. By the year 2000, three of the six WHO regions were declared polio-​free. By 2003, the number of remaining infections was down to below 1%.10 While cases were approaching zero, financial resources spent on the ‘endgame strategy’ skyrocketed at a breathtaking speed with the international community eagerly trying to completely eradicate the polio virus. In 2009, USAID and the US Centers for Disease Control together had spent 134 million USD on polio eradication. In 2016, their funding had reached 226 million USD.11 At the same time, for the whole year 2016 the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) registered 42 polio cases worldwide.12 The history of polio eradication is an extraordinary example for health in ALS for at least two reasons: first, it exhibits how decreasing statehood negatively affects hard-​won public health accomplishments. Second, it shows how the transformation of polio into a ‘wicked problem’ (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009) has been driving a growing complexity of the polio governance landscape, with ever more actors involved in addressing issues of state and market failure. Polio remains problematic only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the statehood of these countries is extremely limited. Insecurity and violence in these countries pose a major threat to the eradication endgame, explaining in part the steep rise of the costs of polio eradication (Gostin 2014). In addition to the challenging task of preventing and detecting new cases in these two countries, the polio virus continues to resurface also in other parts of the world. In fact, in the past 10 years, polio has spread from endemic areas to over 20 formerly polio-​free countries. At the same time, polio eradication has had to confront an increasing market failure, ever since scientific evidence confirmed that oral polio vaccination itself can, in very few cases, lead to new infections, transmitted through faeces. What followed from this was a growing concern about continued use of the oral polio vaccine (OPV) causing cases or outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis (WHO 2014: fn. 13 and 14) and the necessity to address the comparatively excessive prices for inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) on the global market. As a consequence of these developments, new collaborators had to be found by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, contributing funds, personnel, and other resources, most notably GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Gates Foundation (Holzscheiter 2017). The example of polio showcases the benefits of new, horizontal modes of governance between public and private actors, epitomized by the huge success that the Global Partnership for the Eradication of Polio (GPEI) has been able to achieve. It illustrates the virtual impossibility to differentiate between domestic and global health governance, which necessitated a concerted effort between GHIs such as GPEI and GAVI and domestic governments. But polio is also emblematic for the far-​ reaching implications of limited statehood in even very small territories. When governments and external actors fail to effectively contain polio, this endangers human beings everywhere and undermines massive efforts to eradicate the disease from the planet.

Health   449

Health Governance and Limited Statehood: Contemporary Discussions on Effectiveness, Legitimacy, and Sustainability Undoubtedly, the contemporary discussion on health governance in ALS is heavily marked by questions of efficiency and effectiveness, with a predominant interest in (if not outright euphoria for) the potential benefits of involving private actors in horizontal governance constellations. As a consequence of this functionalist, solution-​driven bias, health governance has been largely presented as an a-​political, technical policy field with congruent goals between public and private actors and ample opportunities for synergistic action in the name of public interests. The disciplines of political science, sociology, health policy, and epidemiology have been strongly focusing on the contribution of single international health organizations or groups and networks of actors to the safeguarding of human well-​being. Multidisciplinary scientific engagement with (public) health governance has mostly addressed the question of how national health systems can guarantee universal health coverage and equitable access to health services and medicines. International Relations literature on the subject of health governance has been mainly driven by a traditional international relations (IR) agenda, focusing on health diplomacy and security/​securitization issues (Elbe 2010; McInnes and Lee 2006). What is largely missing from this scientific engagement with health governance is a normative adjustment of the discussion reaching out to a more critical perspective on the forms and instruments of political and societal organization related to human well-​ being and health matters. Rather than asking which strategies, policies, and governance structures yield the greatest benefits and maximum efficiency in terms of an investment of available resources, a broader debate on what constitutes health governance, on which priorities are set on domestic and global health agendas, and on what institutions and regulations are considered desirable and appropriate in the light of broader goals appears warranted. The developments sketched in this chapter, where a number of middle-​income countries have made remarkable progress towards universal health coverage while other middle-​ and high income countries have curtailed their social welfare systems require a vigorous discussion of how a global system of norms, rules, and institutions can be created that is fit to guarantee the best possible standard of health to every human being. Critical voices in contemporary scholarship on health governance have sought to reanimate the debate of the late 1970s on ‘Health for All’ and an alternative (economic) world order. ‘Health equity’ has emerged as the focal point in the current debate on health and social justice with a particular emphasis on health inequities within countries, rather than between countries and regions (WHO 2015a). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are seen by many as supporting a perspective that considers health to be indicator, result, and

450   Holzscheiter precondition for development (WHO 2015b). Once more, the SDG negotiations have reinvigorated a discourse on ‘health for all’ by placing greater emphasis on the political, social, and economic determinants of health and touching upon the critical question of global social justice. Recent health crises, such as the Ebola epidemic in 2014/​2015, have helped to raise awareness of cultural, community-​based determinants of health, such as ‘community resilience’, that had escaped medical specialists at first. The ‘lessons learned’ from the Ebola outbreaks in West Africa have also underscored the importance of interdisciplinary research on public health issues and multidisciplinary task teams in the responses to health emergencies. Social, political, and cultural sciences have a vital role to play in the broadening of our horizons on what shapes the health and well-​being of individuals, seeking to transcend dominant, yet narrow-​minded frames that privilege technical, (bio-​)medical explanations and interventions. Empirical studies on health governance under conditions of limited statehood document the successes facilitated by the close collaboration between public and private actors and by the generous financial and in-​kind contributions of corporations and philanthropies. A LSE/​Wellcome Trust study of 2005, for example, underscores the potential of public–​private partnerships in the area of research and development for neglected tropical diseases (Moran et al. 2005). Achievements in the areas of infectious diseases including HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria suggest that global health challenges can be effectively addressed through gigantic global public–​private partnerships such as the Global Fund (see also Chapter 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). The relevance of health on the development agenda is symbolized by its prominence in the context of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) or the OECD Development Assistance Committee. It is justified by reference to its ‘short causal chains’, its solution-​ driven nature, and the availability of goods and services to remedy illnesses and prevent diseases. Health has emerged as the perfect candidate in order to reap quick and observable benefits in the social sector, grounding the legitimacy of actors involved in public health programmes and interventions primarily in their provision of public goods in the health sector. At the heart of this powerful development approach lies a clear bias towards such programmes and interventions that encapsulate a short causal chain (i.e. ‘one vaccination = one human life saved’) and are easily quantifiable (i.e. 1,000 malaria nets distributed = successful malaria prevention) and therefore allow for easy recognition of effectiveness and ‘success’. On a more general level, it is associated with a dominant neoliberal agenda prevalent in domestic health systems and in global policies, which has led to a growing dissociation of disease-​oriented policies, on the one hand, and the broader socio-economic context, on the other (Thomas and Weber 2004). The study of health governance in ALS has been marked by a focus on health economics and rational choice approaches emphasizing mutual gains for public and private actors, incentive structures, and opportunities and challenges for cooperation and coordination among those involved in domestic health governance in developing countries (Holzscheiter 2017). Nevertheless, scholarship on health governance has undergone different waves of engagement with questions of legitimacy of values, actors, and goals in this policy field.

Health   451 The first wave of research into the normative underpinnings of health governance—​ domestically and in international health cooperation—​followed in the wake of the Alma Ata Declaration of the World Health Assembly in 1978 (‘Health for All’; Brown 1976; Levine 1977; Pannenborg 1979; Taylor 1979). The Alma Ata Declaration sparked off an intense debate on equity in health systems and ensuing controversies over universal health coverage. The promotion of universal health coverage and a more human rights-​ oriented framework to health through the WHO fuelled a discussion on the WHO’s legitimacy and its overly politicized role in international health cooperation. Ever since, the WHO’s role in global health governance has remained an issue of contention. While its central role in international norm-​setting has gone largely unchallenged, its mandate in other fields (emergency response, operations, funding, or coordination) continues to be a matter of ongoing debate, with numerous proposals for institutional reform. These reform proposals have also, over time, crystallized around the WHO’s interaction with private actors, particularly since the end of the 1990s when its then Director General Gro Harlem Brundlandt steered the organization towards an unprecedented opening up towards non-​state actors (Richter 2004). At present, the WHO is spearheading a new effort of multilateral institutions to define more clearly the organization’s rules of engagement with private actors. The contestation revolving around the Framework of Engagement with Non-​State Actors (FENSA) evidences contemporary struggles for legitimacy between different groups of actors that also entail a discussion on their legitimate resources and means to shape international health governance. Not surprisingly, the strongest controversies have revolved around the role of the Gates Foundation as well as collaboration of the WHO with ‘unhealthy’ industries such as the food and beverage industry.13 On a broader level, the ongoing battles over, particularly, corporate influence on international organizations in the field of health suggest an increasing unease with regard to the privileging of notions of good governance that build on effectiveness and ‘value for money’. It is to be expected that—​following an unleashed enthusiasm for public–​private partnerships in the early 2000s—​there will be growing attention to procedural standards of good governance, such as transparency, accountability, and fair representation in the years to come (Doyle and Patel 2008). The discourse on and adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals has also been a catalyst for renewed attention on issues of accountability of NGOs and public–​private initiatives, particularly with regard to the relationship between the UN and non-​state actors and structures of meta-​governance between them. Non-​state actors’ legitimate contributions to these global goals are increasingly dependent on their compliance with standards of good governance, such as transparency, regular reporting, and accountability.

Conclusions The study of health governance in ALS is displaying several broader trends. First, there is an (undue) focus on low-​and middle-​income countries. This overemphasis

452   Holzscheiter on resource-​poor settings explains a prevalent focus on the contributions of international agencies and global initiatives and programmes in analyses of health governance in developing countries. The heavy bias towards developing countries is coupled with an overemphasis on infectious diseases that originate in developing countries and present a threat to the rest of the world. These may not be the diseases and health issues of greatest concern to developing countries, though. The marginal attention to maternal and reproductive health or non-​communicable diseases in developing countries is a case in point for how research agendas originating in the global North have shaped the study of health governance in ALS (Mwisongo and Nabyonga-​Orem 2016). Second, health governance is mostly studied through the lens of rather technical, solution-​driven, policy-​analytical approaches focusing on questions of efficiency and effectiveness. The observable dominance of issues of effectiveness and coordination deflects from potentially conflicting agendas, value pluralism, and the possibility that there may be a ‘healthy’ contestation around health policies and governance among domestic and international actors alike (for exceptions, see Sundewall 2009; Sundewall et al. 2009). Third, there is a striking lack in discussions of the broader ethical and normative issues related to contemporary goals and forms of health governance, domestically and globally. In contemporary political science/​international relations research on health governance, this latter trend stands out as particularly remarkable. What is largely missing is a more critical engagement with the motivations, legitimacy, and power politics of private actors in this policy sector. The fact that, recently, a number of studies have ventured to direct questions of legitimacy towards highly influential private actors, above all the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Harman 2016), is promising. More scholars should pay attention to the power politics of private actors’ engagement in global health governance. Future analyses of health governance and limited statehood also may want to pay greater tribute to ‘rich’ countries and the uneven distribution of health gains that characterizes their health systems. In fact, there are a number of middle-​income countries which have made remarkable progress in strengthening statehood and governance capacities, establishing universal health coverage14 and implementing significant reforms of the health sector (Lagomarsino et al. 2012). By contrast, we are seeing reverse changes in a number of countries which already had advanced social policies and systems. In Greece and Portugal, for example, the state has been gradually retreating from the health sector in the past decade (Karanikolos et al. 2013). There is thus much ground to cover for scholars interested in applying the notion of limited statehood to seemingly developed countries.

Notes 1. Compared to aid sectors such as agriculture or rural development, this shift in international priorities is particularly apparent. See OECD, Trends in aid to agriculture and rural development between 1971 and 2009, available at www.oecd.org/​dac/​aidstatistics/​ 49154108.pdf and OECD Trends in aid to health between 1971 and 2009, available at www. oecd.org/​dac/​aidstatistics/​49907438.pdf, accessed 10 May 2017.

Health   453 2. Seminal contributions to development theory and economics such as Banerjee/​Duflo (2012) or Easterly (2007) are heavily focused on health. 3. Health, for example, has been used as a so-​called tracer sector for evaluating the impact of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness whose implementation is overseen by the OECD. 4. WHO Constitution, signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Off. Rec. Wld Hlth Org., 2, 100), and entered into force on 7 April 1948. 5. Government Office of Sweden, ‘This is the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health’, Stockholm, http://​www.government.se/​4a0638/​contentassets/​196adce4e5b241b89bc77e22ab72ddc9/​rk_​21605_​socialdep_​broschyr_​20160715_​eng_​tillg.pdf, last access 21 December 2016. 6. See:  http://​www.bmg.bund.de/​ministerium/​aufgaben-​und-​organisation/​aufgaben.html, last access 9 April 2016. 7. A literature search for ‘domestic health governance, public, private’ excluding ‘global’ produces close to no results. 8. See Balabanova et  al. 2010a; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Biesma et  al. 2009b; Grundy 2010; Hanefeld 2008; Hönke and Thauer 2014; Lele et al. 2005; Schäferhoff 2014; Spicer et al. 2010. 9. See GPEI ‘History of Polio’, available at:  http://​w ww.polioeradication.org/​ Polioandprevention/​Historyofpolio.aspx#sthash.8RCdz1Qm.dpuf, last access 4 April 2016. 10. Ibid. 11. Kaiser Family Foundation, ‘The U.S. Government and Global Polio Efforts’, available at http://​kff.org/​global-​health-​policy/​fact-​sheet/​the-​u-​s-​government-​and-​global-​polio-​ efforts/​,  last access 10 May 2017. 12. GPEI, ‘Polio now’, available at http://​polioeradication.org/​polio-​today/​polio-​now/​, last access 10 May 2017. 13. http://​www.huffingtonpost.com/​kavitha-​kolappa-​md-​mph/​fensa_​b_​7381712.html, last access 9 May 2017. 14. For universal healthcare reform movement see reference list here: http://​www.sciencedirect.com/​science/​article/​pii/​S0140673612613403, last access 30 May 2017.

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Chapter 23

Fo od Sec u ri t y Andrea Liese

Governance efforts on achieving food security and eliminating undernourishment have been quite effective.1 Over the past 25 years, the absolute number of undernourished people—​people not able to acquire enough food to meet the daily minimum dietary energy requirements—​dropped by 383 million worldwide, while the child stunting prevalence, indicating chronic undernutrition, declined from 39.8% in 1990 to 23.8% in 2014. For more than half a century, famines causing more than a million deaths have been eliminated altogether, while famines with more than 100,000 deaths have been the rare exception. Yet, according to estimates, still one in nine people, in total about 795 million, were undernourished worldwide in 2014–​16. Nearly all of them (780 million) live in developing regions. Food insecurity remains a problem in the so-​called global South, and this is reflected in the literature, which frames food security in terms of a ‘Third World’ problem (e.g. Leathers and Foster 2009). Indeed, low-​income and lower-​middle-​income countries now account for 90% of the 159 million stunted children worldwide (i.e. children with low height for age). In 2015, according to the Global Hunger Index, ‘serious’ or ‘alarming’ levels of hunger still prevailed in 52 countries. In its Global Risk Map on Food Security for April to June 2017, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) detected signs for a famine in South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and the Northeast of Nigeria. The United Nations’ (UN) eventual declaration of a famine in South Sudan was the first after the declared famine in Somalia in 2011. As these illustrations show, the governance of food security remains an acute global governance challenge. This chapter2 examines the governance of food security from the perspectives of governance in areas of limited statehood (ALS) (see Chapter 1 Börzel et al., this volume): Is the provision of food security affected by limited capacity of states to set and enforce rules and the lack of the monopoly over the means of violence? Which other factors influence food insecurity? Which governance modes do external governance actors employ? Can they compensate for limited statehood and provide for or contribute to food security themselves? If so, how, and under which conditions?

460   Liese The chapter argues that limited statehood undermines the effectiveness of governance of food security. Food security-​related frameworks assign states the primary responsibility in achieving food security. Hence, it matters if their capacity (e.g. to set and implement food security-​related rules and policies) is limited. In addition, external governance actors who strive to provide food security are confronted with contexts of limited statehood, which affect their prospect of success and increase the costs of their operations. The literature has largely overlooked such a (potential) nexus of limited statehood and food security governance. Only a small percentage of the studies on food security governance considers limited statehood, and then typically focuses on war or violent conflict and the extreme case(s) of state failure (e.g. Kerr 2015; Seal and Bailey 2013). This research gap is surprising. A quick look at the FAOs Global Risk Map (FAO 2017b) reveals that all countries at risk of famine and high risk to food security (namely Yemen, (Northeast) Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda) as well as nearly all countries ‘on watch’ (among them the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, and Iraq), are characterized by severe limitations of statehood. What is meant by these terms? Food security, a term for which many definitions exist in research and policy usage, respectively, is understood here as a multidimensional concept that is constituted by the ‘dimensions’ or ‘pillars’ of food availability, food access, food utilization, and the stability of these three dimensions over time. This definition follows the most recent refinement of the widely accepted definition by the World Food Summit in 1996 (for a critique, see Shepherd 2012): ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets the dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO et al. 2015: 53; see also WFS 1996). Accordingly, food insecurity exists when these conditions are missing, either chronically or transitory. One may distinguish different scales of food insecurity, with famine at the one extreme and general food security at the other. In between, there are various forms of acute and chronic food insecurity. Food insecurity is not the same as hunger and it is also not equivalent to malnutrition (see FAO 2008). Given that the causes and patterns of food security and malnutrition differ, this chapter does not address the latter, including the more recent problem of obesity. Nor does it speak to the wider governance of food, which next to food security would include other issues, such as the governance of food and agricultural trade (see e.g. Curran et al. 2009), of plant genetic resources and intellectual property rights, of food safety, of food systems (see the contributions in Herring 2015), and of agrifood governance (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). The chapter builds on secondary literature, evaluations, and some of the available data for food security indicators. It also relies on case studies (e.g. on Somalia) to illustrate causal assumptions. It begins with a definition of the policy field of food security, including a short description of its history. I then describe the most relevant actors and their modes of governance. The third part investigates data on the effectiveness of food security governance and on the prevalence of food insecurity, before I discuss causes and conditions of food security governance effectiveness and ineffectiveness.

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The Policy Field of Food Security Governance While food security governance has attracted renewed attention from scholars of various disciplines in recent years (for a literature review, see Candel 2014), a common understanding of food security governance is missing. The majority of the literature, including this chapter, treats governance as a solution to food insecurity. Global food security governance is rather new, although food insecurity has been a recurring problem in history. The first reported famine occurred in ancient Rome, 441 BC. Europe experienced recurring famines (e.g. in 1618–​1648). Famines and episodes of forcible mass starvation have killed more than 100 million people since 1870. Yet their eradication only emerged as an objective of international cooperation in the twentieth century. A first international conference, held in Rome in 1906, led to the creation of the International Institute of Agriculture. Another important conference, held in Hotsprings, Virginia, in 1943 initiated the creation of a permanent organization for food and agriculture, namely the FAO. The functions of the International Agricultural Institute were transferred to the FAO in 1948. The establishment of the FAO is widely regarded as the origin of global food security governance (Shaw 2009). The foundation of the FAO notwithstanding, famines that occurred after World War II (including the famine in the course of ‘the Great Leap forward’ propagated by Mao Zedong in the 1960s which killed 30 million people), were still by and large viewed as national problems and did not trigger an international response (Leathers and Foster 2009: 12–​14). From the 1960s onwards, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign (1960–​79), the 1963 World Food Congress, and the 1974 UN World Food Conference provided for the first attempts towards greater intergovernmental and transnational cooperation. The end of the Cold War has further raised the concerns of the international community in eliminating famines. The North Korean famine in the 1990s received a substantial transnational response, with shipments of over one million metric tonnes of food per year between 1995 and 1998 (Leathers and Foster 2009: 15). Another turning point was reached in 2008 in the course of the food price crisis, renewing public attention to the field and paving the way to move from the reduction of hunger to its complete eradication (SDG, goal 2).

The Changing and Multifaceted Concept of Food Security Food security is a changing and expanding concept (see CFS 2014; FAO 2006; Shaw 2007). The evolution of the concept clearly reflects changes in policy thinking and in empirical observations. The term originated in the mid-​1970s, when the World Food Conference defined food security in terms of the availability of adequate world food supplies at stable

462   Liese price levels at the national and international level (FAO 2006: 1). This reflected the concern of lacking grain reserves and rising fertilizer and food prices at the beginning of the 1970s. In the 1980s, when grain reserves were filled but the numbers of the hungry remained high, Amartya Sen (1981) challenged the common view that lacking access to food is a consequence of lacking food supplies. Instead, he showed that famines are the result of relative not absolute supply deficits and he emphasized the influence of personal entitlements on food access. In 1986, the influential World Bank Report (1986) on Poverty and Hunger introduced the distinction between chronic food security, associated with structural poverty, and transitional food insecurity, associated with times of pressure due to natural disasters or conflict. The 1996 World Food Summit reflected this distinction when emphasizing that food security is defined by access of everyone at all times (see definition cited on p. 460). It also reaffirmed a rights-​based approach to food security. Already in 1966 had states recognized ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’ and committed themselves to taking ‘appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right’ individually and through international cooperation, when adopting the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966. The Covenant has been ratified by 164 states to date. Countless conferences have specified global commitments and changed, both, the concept of food security and the governance of food security (for a detailed history see Shaw 2007; for a shorter mapping, see e.g. Clapp 2013). Currently then, food security is defined in terms of food availability, food access, food utilization, and their stability over time (FAO 2006; FAO et al. 2015). Food availability is accomplished when sufficient quantities of food are consistently available to all individuals within a country. This can be achieved through domestic production, imports, or food assistance. Food access is ensured when households have adequate production or financial resources to obtain appropriate food for a nutritious diet and when food is accessible by all individuals within the household (i.e. irrespective of age and gender). Food utilization refers to a state of nutritional well-​being (i.e. requires a diet providing sufficient energy and essential nutrients, potable water, and adequate sanitation). It depends on knowledge within the household (e.g. with regard to food storage and basic principles of nutrition). Food stability refers to the stability of the three former pillars over time. It requires that neither cyclical events, such as seasonal unemployment, nor sudden shocks, such as rising food prices, hinder availability, access, and utilization. Hence, food security is a complex, multidimensional, and dynamic concept and issue, which requires multifaceted responses at the domestic and international level (Rayfuse and Weisfelt 2012: 4; UNGA 2015).

Actors and Modes of Governance Actors The current structure of the global governance of food security has often been conceptualized as a decentralized set of actors, norms, and policy actions oriented towards

Food Security   463 achieving food security (see also Margulis 2017: 506f.). We find states, various international organizations (IOs) (Margulis 2017; Shaw 2009), a variety of non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as social movements and philanthropic organizations (McKeon 2014), private sector organizations (Clapp and Fuchs 2009), and public– ​private partnerships (Bitzer 2012; Kaan and Liese 2011; see also Chapters 10 Lederer and 11 Beisheim et al., this volume). Part of the often described complexity of (the governance of) food security stems from the multitude of actors having a direct or indirect impact on food security. International human rights standards regard states as the primarily responsible governance actors. In 2011, the constitutions in 56 states protected the right to food and in at least 51 countries is this right directly applicable as international treaty law (Knuth and​ Vidar 2011: 32). Many countries have adopted policies to address issues of agricultural development and agricultural productivity, food price stabilization, social protection, and other food security-​related measures. Several of these national efforts were initiated in an attempt to meet the Millenium Development Goal (MDG) of halving hunger between 1990 and 2015. Others are part of national poverty reduction strategies. Next to targeted programmes aimed at food security, the economic development of emerging powers, particularly that of China, has resulted in notable achievements with regard to food security (Gandhi and Zhou 2014). IOs have been involved in food security governance since the middle of the twentieth century. Following the creation of the FAO, about a dozen other IOs or formal institutional arrangements were created to address food security governance (see Shaw 2007, 2009). These IOs have launched numerous initiatives, which range from promoting and facilitating, to funding and implementing policies on numerous aspects of food security. The most well-​known IOs are: FAO, the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). FAO serves as a platform to negotiate agreements and set standards, advocates and facilitates national and regional programmes on food security, provides technical assistance and knowledge on agricultural production and food security. The WFP is mostly known for its provision of food assistance and logistic support in emergencies, where it is often the ‘provider of last resort’. In non-​emergency settings, WFP also supports food security projects through vouchers or cash transfers, school meal programmes, and technical assistance to governments. The World Bank Group, mainly its International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its International Development Association (IDA), turned poverty reduction to a dominant paradigm in the 1970s. In the course of these efforts, it had a strong focus on agriculture and rural development, which is today supplemented with knowledge provision. IFAD is devoted to the long-​term goal of eradicating rural poverty in developing countries. It mainly provides loans and grants to governments to support the development and financing of country-​specific solutions for the rural poor. In addition, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), an intergovernmental body, serves as an advisory forum for food security policies. Its highly inclusive structure provides a platform for a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society organizations and private sector associations.

464   Liese Next to these important IOs, a number of regional organizations have developed policies and programmes to strengthen food security in the region of membership. For instance, in Asia (FAO 2015; Islam and De Jesus 2012: 268, 270), ASEAN has actively promoted the cooperation of its members on agricultural and food policies since 1993. It implemented various initiatives on food security, such as an information system, a plan of action, and an Integrated Food Security Framework (AIFS) in order to scale-​up community-​based food security initiatives and to build national capacities (Islam and De Jesus 2012: 268). In 2013, Asia-​Pacific countries launched a Regional Zero Hunger Challenge for ending hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition by 2025. Private actors have become key actors in the field of food security governance. This group is rather heterogeneous, comprising retail food corporations which directly govern the production, trade, and marketing of food and governance (what Fuchs et al. call ‘agrifood governance’; Clapp and Fuchs 2009; see also Fuchs et al. 2012: 276), and associations and private corporations which engage in development partnerships (Beisheim and Liese 2014), or humanitarian assistance (see Chapter  13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume). Transnational humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—​which bases its work on the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols—Christian Action Research & Education (CARE), Oxfam, and Médicins sans Frontières (MSF), ​also play a crucial role in the delivery of food assistance and the implementation of food aid programmes. Together with national NGOs, they are often implementing partners, notably where public authorities lack the respective capacities. Civil society organizations (CSOs) can bridge the local and the transnational level, provide valuable information, and increase public support. They have formed broad national alliances to campaign for food security-​related efforts, for example in Peru. Their involvement is often considered crucial for an effective and legitimate governance of food security.

Modes of Food Security Governance The global governance of food security is dominated by non-​hierarchical modes of governance (Schettler et al. 2018; see also Chapter 16 Risse, this volume). This holds for global and regional coordination mechanisms with regard to transnational or intergovernmental norms, regimes, or programmes, as well as for the modes of external governance actors in ALS. Hierarchical modes, such as coercion and adjudication, are largely absent. States set the rules which they comply with voluntarily. Shaming and blaming are available as mechanisms of social sanctioning, for example under the periodic human rights review. The governance of external actors in ALS usually respects the sovereignty principle. In carrying out capacity building measures, designing, and implementing development projects as well as when advising governments, ministries, or other national or local stakeholders, external governance actors use non-​hierarchical modes of social

Food Security   465 coordination, which create incentives, provide technical advice, and initiate learning processes. A special case with regard to modes of governance is food assistance through in-​ kind distribution or cash-​based assistance, where external governance actors make available the public good of food, usually with the consent of the recipient state. Food assistance is either directly provided by IOs, the ICRC, and transnational NGOs, such as CARE, Oxfam, MSF, regional organizations, or it is delivered by local subcontractors. The WFP channels almost half of all the global food aid, while NGOs and governments each account for about a quarter of food aid. They collaborate in funding and providing this assistance: governments are the main donors to the WFP, while the WFP works with governments and NGOs in distributing food aid in the respective field. In delivering aid, external governance actors need the collaboration of national and local authorities, be it to receive the permit to be present, to gain access to food insecure areas and people, or not to threaten the life of the humanitarian personnel. External aid agencies usually achieve this by means of trust and persuasion with reference to appropriate humanitarian norms. Or external aid agencies bargain access in exchange for the provision of collective goods. After all, local authorities, even violent non-​state actors, typically have an interest in servicing the areas under their control (see Chapters 12 Förster/​Koechlin and 14 Berti, this volume). However, aid delivery sometimes also depends on an implicit bargain with dubious incentive mechanisms (e.g. rent-​seeking) for local governance actors. Aid agencies are charged, before their deliveries are let pass, and they are charged for security provision. Hence, in these instances of limited statehood, their operations become additionally costly. Somalia has a history of over 20 years of such ‘revenue raising’ by violent non-​state actors and local authorities (Menkhaus 2010: 323). Here, the capture of ships by seaborne pirates has not only disrupted WFP’s supply in Somalia but for the entire region (see also Kerr 2015). The bargaining situation is oftentimes not in favour of external governance actors, whose only potential sanction against local and national spoilers of humanitarian aid is to withdraw. When food assistance is delivered during military interventions, external armed forces at times escort aid convoys and protect aid workers. Depending on the mandate of the intervention, coercive means may be used (see Chapter 15 Lake, this volume). However, while this indirect protection of food assistance with the help of a hierarchical mode of governance may increase the security of the humanitarian personnel, minimize food aid theft, and facilitate access, it may negatively affect the possibility to rely on non-​hierarchical governance modes, which are based on bargaining and persuasion, because it becomes difficult for aid agencies to continue to appear as neutral. This is why humanitarian organizations sometimes prefer to use the UN security system to accompany aid convoys on their missions, but do not always let security forces accompany their staff to the final destination. While the humanitarian and political dilemmas associated with some of these governance modes are well documented (Barnett 2011; Menkhaus 2010), the varying effects of these modes on the effectiveness of food assistance are still underresearched.

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Prevalence of Food Insecurity and Effectiveness of Global Food Security Governance Overall, transnational efforts by a multitude of actors have minimized the burden of food insecurity and helped to achieve global targets. MDG 1 to halve the number of hungry or undernourished people by 2015 has been nearly reached at the global level, and also within 72 of the 129 countries monitored for progress (FAO et al. 2015: 5). To study the patterns with regard to the prevalence of food insecurity, it is common to analyse quantitative data. Well-​accepted indicators for two of the three pillars or dimensions that determine food security (see definitions cited on page 462), namely food access and food utilization are included in the Global Hunger Index (GHI) (see von Grebmer et al. 2015). The 2015 Index covers 117 countries where measuring hunger is considered most relevant. This excludes higher-​income countries where the prevalence of food insecurity is very low. As shown next, the pillars of food access and of food utilization have improved over time. However, depending on the indicator, improvements come at different rates. Furthermore, there are large regional differences, differences among income groups, and differences between countries that experience war and conflict and those that do not. One of the most common indicators for food access is the prevalence of undernourishment. It is typically used as a lead indicator for internationally agreed targets (see von Grebmer et al. 2015) and is one of the composite indicators of the GHI. It measures the share of the population with insufficient calorie intake. The data on undernourishment at an aggregate level reveal that the proportion of undernourished people has fallen globally and within most regions since 1991 (Fig. 23.1). Yet, there is quite some regional variation: the decline is rather steady in sub-​Saharan Africa, in East Asia and the Pacific, and in Latin America. In contrast, while the overall prevalence of undernourishment in South Asia has decreased, this development has not been continuous, as there has been an increase after the year 2000. The prevalence of undernourishment in the Middle East and North Africa has slightly increased as compared to the 1991 value. In absolute numbers (FAO 2015: 9–​11), the region of Asia and the Pacific is most affected: two-​thirds of the world’s undernourished, namely 490 million people, live in this region. The best available indicators for food utilization are the prevalence of stunting (low height for age) and the prevalence of wasting (low weight for height) in children from the age of 0–​5 years. The GHI covers data on stunting and wasting in up to 130 developing countries worldwide (IFPRI et al. 2016). Again, data for high-​income countries are missing. Wasting is taken as an indicator for acute undernutrition, while stunting measures chronic undernutrition. These are also the suggested nutrition indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). By focusing on children, the indicators reflect the fact that they are particularly vulnerable to nutritional deficiencies. Furthermore, the choice of this age group takes note of the most critical periods of growth and development

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Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)

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East Asia & Pacific Latin America & Caribbean

Middle East & North Africa South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa World

fig. 23.1  Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) by region, 1991–​2015. Source: Time-​series data and regional aggregates (following the World Bank’s classification) are obtained from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2017).

in early life. The data on stunting and wasting show a slight improvement: The worldwide prevalence of wasting decreased from 27.4% in 1990 to 16.6% in 2013. The decrease per region and subregion ranges during this period between 19.2% in Southern Asia and 0.2% in Southern Africa. No progress was made in Oceania, where the prevalence of wasting increased slightly from 18.5 to 18.9% (FAO et al. 2015: 19–​20). While Asia has reduced stunting from 47.6 to 25.1%, progress in Africa has been slower (decrease from 42.3 to 32.0%). In addition, the absolute number of stunted children is on the rise in Africa. Sub-​ Saharan Africa and South Asia still have the highest GHI scores, which indicate serious levels of hunger. Similar to wasting, stunting has slightly risen in Oceania as well. A case of concern is that low-​income countries have made the least progress towards stunting reductions, while upper-​middle income countries have made the strongest progress (UNICEF et al. 2015). Still, the data indicate overall global improvement. Since different types of actors engage in food security, it is impossible to link the data on the impact dimension to particular initiatives. While evaluations often study quite impressive outputs (e.g. FAO 2011 on Cambodia), little is known as to the longer-​term effectiveness of specific programmes of FAO or WFP, and analyses of smaller initiatives, such as the ones by Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), are entirely lacking (Islam and De Jesus 2012: 270). Hence, it is usually not discernible in how far these specific outputs provided an impact.

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Causes of Food Insecurity and of Ineffective Food Security Governance A discussion of the effectiveness of food security governance needs to consider, both, the causes of food (in)security and the causes for the (still suboptimal) effectiveness of food security governance. The following section starts by introducing the assumption that limited statehood affects both food insecurity and the effectiveness of food security governance. It finds a correlation, but also an indication for additional causes and scope conditions. Therefore, the chapter continues by focusing on the most frequently discussed food security risks, namely conflict, natural disasters, rising food prices, and poverty (Saad 2013). Secondly, it summarizes the main concerns raised in the academic debate with regard to food security governance in effectiveness, notably governance failure, and issue-​linkage. Third, it discusses the potential link of limited statehood and food insecurity, and it addresses some of the conditions of effective food security provision by external actors in ALS. Statehood is negatively correlated with the GHI, which reflects inadequate food access and utilization (r = -​0.49). The bivariate linear regression of the GHI, which is composed of four indicators (undernourishment, child wasting (low weight for height from 0 to 5 years), child stunting (low height for age), and child mortality), with data on statehood reveals that all states with low values for statehood (0.5 and under) score above 20 on the GHI scale, which indicates ‘serious’ if not ‘alarming’ conditions (Fig. 23.2). In contrast and with only one exception, the GHI scores for states with high values for statehood (0.8 and above) are below 20 points, indicating only ‘moderate’ or ‘low’ levels of hunger. Given that the GHI does not rank high-​income countries, which generally fare better with regard to food security, one may assume that the true relationship between the variables is even stronger. The wide variation for states with medium levels of statehood can be taken as an indication that factors other than statehood strongly affect the GHI values for states with somewhat limited statehood. The relationship between statehood and the isolated indicator of undernourishment shows a quite similar pattern.

Food Insecurity Risks In general, food insecurity is highly affected by structural causes, mainly by poverty, and by socio-​economic developments, such as changing consumption patterns, urbanization, marginalization of vulnerable groups, and insufficient investments in agriculture (CFS 2014; Rayfuse and Weisfelt 2012: 5, 8). While poverty is widely regarded as ‘the root cause of hunger and malnutrition’ (Shaw 2007: 387), extreme cases of food insecurity, such as the famine in Somalia, are caused or triggered by multiple factors, of which three stand out: conflict, increase in food prices, and drought. While none seems to constitute a necessary or a sufficient condition for a severe food crisis, they partly

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Global Hunger Index

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fig. 23.2  Bivariate linear regression of Global Hunger Index, 2016, on statehood, 2015. Source: The relationship is statistically significant at the 99.9% level of confidence (β = -​44.1). Shadings indicate 95% confidence bounds. GHI values less than 5 are coded as 5. The GHI for 2016 reflects the most recent available country-​level data and projections available between 2011 and 2016 and is provided by IFPRI et al. 2016; statehood data are taken from Stollenwerk and Opper (2017).

cause and strongly reinforce each other with devastating effects. Actors in food security-​ related governance may hardly affect these risks, but either engage in risk assessment and strengthening policies, which mitigate the food security-​specific effects of these risks and increase coping capacity, or provide humanitarian relief when a food crisis has evolved. Violent conflicts are widely regarded as a core cause of food security crises. Of the 39 countries in need of external food assistance in 2016, 21 face civil conflicts and their consequences, such as refugees (FAO 2016). Still, studies tend to be careful not to generalize. For example, when discussing the relative progress of Angola, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, the countries with the highest hunger scores in 2000, the authors of the GHI observe that all three share a recovery from war and at the same time accomplished a substantial decrease of food insecurity. They argue that ‘it is not possible to directly attribute their hunger levels to the previous conflicts’, although the conflicts ‘undoubtedly contributed to the challenges these countries face’ (von Grebmer et al. 2015: 16). More recent findings also show that violent conflict and political instability are not necessary conditions for food insecurity. Of the three countries with the highest GHI scores in 2015, namely the Central African Republic, Chad, and Zambia, only the first two share instability and conflicts, while Zambia is rather peaceful (von Grebmer et al. 2015: 17). Considering

470   Liese potentially alarmingly high GHI scores for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, for which no GHI data are (currently) available, the likelihood that a food security crisis is overall strongly linked to war and conflict seem even higher. The causal links are well known: when widespread insecurity hampers access to land, farming supplies and markets, farmers lose the ability to cope with rising prices and scarce seeds. The war in Syria decreased wheat production by 55% and led to a loss of 16 billion USD in terms of production. Nine million people require food assistance (FAO 2017a). Similar mechanisms of displacement, theft of livestock, and the closing of food markets are at work in other countries struggling with insurgencies, for example Nigeria and northern Cameroon due to the conflict with Boko Haram (Searcey 2016) and Somalia due to the conflict with al-​Shabaab (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick 2012). Increasing and volatile food prices trigger food insecurity in many countries. In the course of mounting food prices in 2008, food access suddenly dropped (Brinkman et al. 2010). Price instability hits conflict-​ridden countries, where agricultural productivity is usually low, especially hard. The same holds for drought-​affected countries. When rural incomes decrease due to the loss of agricultural productivity, increasing food prices further aggravate food insecurity. Thus, it seems that the effect of rising food prices partly depends on other factors, such as agricultural productivity and conflict. Vice versa, food prices may themselves aggravate conflicts, but only under certain conditions: in a working paper for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) based on panel data for over 120 countries from 1970 to 2007, Arezki and Brückner (2011) show that rising food prices lead to a significant increase in riots and civil conflict, however, only in low-​income, and not in high-​income countries. Natalini et al. (2015) find that the effect mainly hinges on political stability. Droughts and other environmental disasters certainly minimize food supply. In 2010, Somalia saw the lowest rainfalls in 50 years: decreased crop production and increased livestock mortality were the result. Food supply is highly affected by a series of natural and socio-​economic phenomena, such as land degradation and land grabbing, climate change, and other environmental pressures, bio-​energy production, or plant diseases. For example in 2016–​17, a fall armyworm outbreak damaged cereal crops in many countries in sub-​Saharan Africa (FAO 2017b). Conflict-​related abandonment of food production is also triggered by unfavourable weather conditions in parts of Syria (FAO and WFP 2016).

Concerns Governance Failure at the National and at the Transnational Level Despite increased national efforts and efforts for global coordination of development policies and humanitarian assistance (Barrett et al. 2012), food insecurity is definitely to a large extent still the result of governance failures. Issues of unequal distribution and lacking access are not adequately addressed, commitments are not met, cooperation and assistance are fragmented and lack scale (CFS 2014: 8). At the national level one

Food Security   471 finds ‘misguided policies and their inconsistent implementation’, as Babu and Sanyal (2007: 1) conclude for the case of Malawi. Likewise, the authors of a case study of five African countries, namely Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, argue that food policy failure in southern Africa over the last decades is the result of neo-​patrimonialism (Bird et al. 2003). The ruling elites’ interests’ conflict with the principle of maximizing the welfare of citizens and agricultural policies are formulated to bolster political support, not stabilize food security. In addition to inadequate policies, many scholars and practitioners have long warned that food security-​related policies are underfinanced (FAO 2009). At the transnational level, national governance failures often motivate NGOs and other external governance actors to fill the gap of public goods (Uvin 1999). Yet, the increase in NGOs’ (and other external governance actors’) governance services and goods provision also reifies the weakness of state institutions. If poorly targeted, the direct provision of food aid can distort local production and markets and thereby threaten long-​term food security. Another reason for concern is that food crises are often not prevented, although early warning schemes function well. Several factors cause non-​ timely reactions: lack of pressure and public attention below the scale of a severe hunger crisis; lack of political will; security considerations that lead to the withdrawal of aid agencies; and the motivation not to support violent non-​state actors. According to many observers, the 2011 famine in Somalia could have been prevented had actors responded in a more timely and effectively manner to predictive warnings. The lack of adequate funding is well documented. This affects both humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. For instance, the WFP had to halve the intended value of vouchers to vulnerable Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, because of funding gaps in 2015 (FAO and WFP 2016). Lack of funding has several causes:  besides donor fatigue, shifting domestic priorities, and ‘power of the purse games’ towards IOs, the withholding of funds can be politically motivated and is also influenced by the fight against terrorism. In order to prevent the use of aid by alleged terrorists, in 2009 the United States cut its entire food assistance to the area under the control of al-​Shabaab in southern Somalia. Ironically, the declaration of a famine often increases public and private funding pledges immediately. A high portion of the literature is also highly critical of the current institutional architecture. Despite various efforts of coordination, scholars and practitioners argue that the increasing density of over 30 IOs and various formal institutional arrangements is not effectively coordinated and leads to interorganizational rivalries and policy incoherence. On the one hand, leading IOs in the field, such as FAO, WFP, IFAD, and World Bank, compete for scarce resources. On the other hand, institutional fragmentation has led to conflicts among some IOs with different mandates and conflicting paradigms. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN Human Rights bodies battle over appropriate roles for states and markets. Consequently, they compete for the best strategies for food security-​related policies (Margulis 2012, 2017). A second major challenge to the effectiveness of food security governance is a lack of IO authority. Although food security is deeply related to global economic issues (see ‘Issue Linkage’,

472   Liese next), the main food security-​related IOs have not been empowered to address those issues (Clapp 2013: 649).

Issue Linkage The policy field of food security has rather loose boundaries. It is highly affected by and interrelated with other policy issues and governance challenges such as agriculture (food prices, investments in agriculture, agricultural productivity), demographic and social issues (population growth, rural-​urban migration), economic relations (trade, investment), property rights (‘land grabbing’ and private investments in land use), environment (e.g. climate change, degradation, natural disaster such as earthquakes), health (e.g. malnutrition, obesity, maternal and child mortality), and security (conflicts and conflict-​related migration). The governance of food security has huge effects on other public goods and public policies, and vice versa. Food policy has therefore been characterized as a wicked problem, emphasizing both the multidimensionality of the underlying problems and conflicts and unforeseen consequences in solving them (Peters and Pierre 2014; Pritchard et al. 2016). The following summary of often-​discussed linkages does not claim to be comprehensive, but rather serves to illustrate some of them. While poverty is often regarded as a major driver of food insecurity, the latter also influences the former (Shaw 2007: 387–​412). The literature has discussed the devastating effects of FDI and retail corporations on rural development (Fuchs et al. 2012: 279–​280). It is also argued that GMOs and health policies (see Chapter 22 Holzscheiter, this volume) affect food security. Climate change and natural disasters feature prominently as limiting agricultural productivity. FAO (2017b) warnings with regard to an El Niño are based on the assumption of negative impacts on crop production and on marine eco-​systems and fisheries. In addition, plant and animal diseases, which affect agricultural productivity, plague many countries. At the same time, agricultural production and the misuse of land influence environmental policies, as they may lead to short water supply and land degradation. Many parts of the global food system, for example large-​scale farming that depends on fossil-​ fuel-​inputs, are unsustainable. And while conflict is often seen as a cause of food insecurity, studies have also considered that food insecurity triggers conflict. Yet, the relation between a food crisis and popular unrest or violent conflict (sometimes called a food riot) ‘is not straightforward’ (Ó Gráda 2009: 56).

Limited Statehood Many governments in developing countries certainly lack the capacity to provide essential public goods and effective governance structures to ensure agricultural productivity and guarantee access to adequate amounts of quality food. Evidence suggests that a government’s limited capacity to adopt and enforce rules—​one dimension of statehood—​provides serious obstacles to effective food governance. In countries, where the state has only limited administrative capacity and authority is contested,

Food Security   473 food markets are too unregulated and subject to elite capture (Christoplos and Pain 2015: 13). In Haiti, for instance, the lack of resources to employ qualified civil servants on the subnational level has been a major obstacle for the decentral implementation of food policies of different kinds. Food inspection and quarantines necessary to control the invasion of the ‘Mediterranean Fruit Fly’ failed when quarantine posts along the Haitian border did not become operational due to a lack of capacity (Schettler et al. 2018). Moreover, countries struggle to manage the involvement of all stakeholders in the design and implementation of food security projects and to provide social protection systems. However, the potential correlation of a lacking capacity to set and enforce rules with regard to food security governance and the achievement of food security is definitely underresearched. Obviously, institutional and capacity deficiencies cannot be fixed by food security governance actors (alone) and during rather short-​term capacity development projects (FAO 2014: 87). Quite well researched is the correlation between a lacking or limited monopoly over the means of violence—​the other dimension of statehood (see Chapter 1 Börzel et  al., this volume)—​and agricultural productivity and its scope condition. Somalia, for instance, had not seen an effective central government since 1991 and therefore counts as, both, ‘the longest-​running instance of complete state collapse’ and ‘one of the longest-​running humanitarian crises in the world’ (Menkhaus 2010: 320). The drought-​ and conflict-​related food security crisis turned into a famine in southern Somalia, an area mostly under the control of al-​Shabaab since 2007. Limited statehood, notably the lack of a monopoly over the means of violence also directly affects the effectiveness of external actors’ governance activities in conflict-​ridden and war-​torn countries. The effectiveness of food security governance depends crucially on access, on adequate funding—​which can be limited under the circumstances of limited statehood—​and on the (legal) protection for humanitarian action (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick 2012; Seal and Bailey 2013). Lack of access and deteriorating security situations reduce or close the humanitarian space in which aid agencies work. In areas where the monopoly over the means of violence is missing and violent non-​state actors are present, traditionally the latter used to grant access to humanitarian actors. In today’s zones of conflict, this is often no longer the case. Lack of access severely hampers the delivery and effectiveness of food aid. Access depends on the security situation, on the willingness of local authorities to grant access to their controlled territory, and on infrastructure. An extreme case of how insecurity and the lack of willingness hinder access of aid workers, is Somalia. By 2010, the country had become the ‘most dangerous place in the world for humanitarian aid workers’, predominantly external ones (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick 2012: 9; Menkhaus 2010: 320). In extreme cases, the security of humanitarian personnel is severely threatened. In the past, instances such as the kidnapping and killing of aid workers has led to the withdrawal of aid agencies, including CARE and MSF in Somalia before and during the last famine. Security threats also affect the choice of local offices, that is, oftentimes operations are managed from the distance of the capital or even neighbouring countries. ‘Given the security situation, humanitarian support could reach only a small fraction of the population and the most affected groups were unable

474   Liese to pay for them’ (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick 2012:  8). Conflict and limited statehood regarding the territory often interact, with harsh consequences for aid organizations. In late 2011, the Islamist insurgent group and de-​facto governing authority al-​Shabaab denied 16 agencies, among them several UN Agencies, such as WFP, and several international NGOs access to South Central Somalia on grounds of ‘illicit activities’ (Seal and Bailey 2013: 3). Currently, the FAO (2017b) warns that urgently needed humanitarian access in Northeast Nigeria ‘will be limited due to access restrictions’ in several areas. According to Seal and Bailey (2013: 3) the United States’ anti-​terror legislation hampered an adequate humanitarian response in Somalia. Aid workers apparently feared prosecution under US law after al-​Shabaab had been added to the list of ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ under US regulations in early 2008, implying that it must not benefit from any given or stolen aid. External governance actors can partly adapt to limited statehood by employing non-​hierarchical modes of governance that are based on trust, arguing, and incentives (Schettler et al. 2018; see also Chapters 16 Risse and 18 Draude et al., this volume). However, securing access is costly. When non-​hierarchical modes do not suffice to secure humanitarian personnel, external security governance is required (Kerr 2015).

Conclusions I have argued in this chapter that food insecurity and limited statehood should be regarded as partly related. Given that food security-​related frameworks assign states the primary responsibility in achieving food security, it strongly matters if their capacity to set and implement food security-​related rules and policies is limited. In addition, external governance actors who strive to provide food security are confronted with contexts of limited statehood, which affect their prospect of success. In extreme cases, notably a lacking monopoly over the means of violence, external governance actors face access restrictions, security threats, aid theft, and other forms of costly ‘revenue raising’ by violent non-​state actors. Non-​hierarchical modes of governance, which are typically employed in food security governance in ALS, can partly compensate for a lack of statehood. When food assistance is indirectly provided with the help of a hierarchical mode of governance, this may increase the security of the humanitarian personnel, minimize food aid theft, and facilitate access. However, it may also negatively affect the possibility of external governance actors to rely on non-​hierarchical governance modes, which are based on bargaining and persuasion, because it becomes difficult for aid agencies to continue to appear as neutral. In addition, I have sketched other causes of food insecurity, such as violent conflict, increasing and volatile food prices, droughts, and other environmental disasters. I have also addressed reasons for the ineffectiveness of global food security governance, notably governance failure and complex issue linkage. A cause of concern is that food security governance is currently inadequately structured and underfinanced.

Food Security   475 Demonstrable success in achieving food security notwithstanding, the governance of food security remains challenging. While many problems are already well researched, some of those pertaining to limited statehood are not. The causal links between domestic and transnational food security governance and limited statehood need further exploration.

Notes 1. Compare with the data in UNICEF et al. 2015: 56; FAO 2017b; FAO et al. 2015: 5; von Grebmer et al. 2015: 13–​20, 23. 2. I thank Inga Christina Müller, Sofie Sharifi, and Nadine Grimm-​Pampe for valuable research assistance, and Sascha Riaz for crucial support in the illustration and analysis of the quantitative data on food security. The chapter benefitted from discussions at the two authors workshops in Berlin and the jour fixe at the Collaborative Research Center ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood.’ Special thanks to the editors and to Angela Heucher, Anna Holzscheiter, Ann-​Kathrin Rothermel, and Leon Schettler for their detailed comments and thorough questions. The support by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft; DFG), under Grant SFB 700/3, D08 is greatly appreciated.

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Chapter 24

Edu cati on Anne Ellersiek

For a long time, the importance of education as a (global) public good has been widely acknowledged (Kaul et al. 1999) and regarded as essential for economic and human development (Jamison et al. 2008).1 Education has a profound impact on the distribution of income, the nature of growth (Jamison et al. 2008), and on several other societal factors, such as health and resilience to external shocks and disasters (Barakat and Bengtsson 2016; Nicolai and Hine 2015), and stability in conflict-​prone areas (Justino 2014). Studies on the relationship between education and development show significant effects at both the individual and societal level. At the individual level, research has demonstrated that education is associated with higher individual earnings. Consequently, education features high on most (global) development agendas (Cremin and Nakabugo 2012) and countries worldwide are seeking to strengthen their education sectors to provide equal opportunities and ensure stability (Smith and Vaux 2003) and to compete for jobs and investment globally. Many countries have caught up on expanding educational coverage, in particular regarding basic primary education (Mwabu and Ackerman 2013). However, several countries have not met the (global) goal of universal primary school completion (UPE, Alam et al. 2010) and many countries struggle to ensure education quality (Majgaard and Mingat 2012), which is argued to be equally important for the benefits reaped from education (Mwabu and Ackerman 2013). Countries differ in a myriad of ways in which their education systems are designed, regulated, financed, in the ways through which education is provided, and in the impacts on individual and country-​level development outcomes. Not surprisingly, the governance of education is one of the key issues in the education sector today, both nationally and globally. The concept of governance has been gaining ground as an analytical perspective in the study of education to capture the interplay between the state and non-​ state actors and a growing shift to multilevel political processes that characterize also other policy areas (Chapters 19 Schroeder, 22 Holzscheiter, 23 Liese, and 25 Hamann et al., this volume).

480   Ellersiek These and other characteristics of education governance are particularly relevant to its study in areas of limited statehood (ALS; see Chapter 1 Börzel et al., this volume). As Hanushek and Wößmann (2007) argue based on cross-​country analysis of strategies to achieve universal schooling: ‘  . . .  countries that do not function well in general might not be more able to mount effective education programmes than they are to pursue other societal goals’ (Hanushek and Wößmann 2007: 1). A differentiated view on the provision of education in these contexts seems required. Because of the traditionally prominent role of the state in governing and providing education, the condition of (limited) statehood (Muedini 2015) bears important consequences for education in ALS. Non-​state actors may fill considerable gaps left by the state in the provision of education in ALS. At the same time, they may also undermine the role of the state as a provider of public goods, for example, when the educational objectives and agendas of faith-​ based organizations (FBOs) (Mantell et al. 2011; Sow 2014) conflict with secular education curricula provided by the state. If non-​state actors have broader reach and enjoy higher levels of trust, they may severely threaten the legitimacy of the state. Beyond challenging the legitimacy of the state as a provider of public goods, conflicting agendas may even become a severe security risk. An extreme example is Boko Haram, which started out as a provider of education drawing its members from among disaffected youths and unemployed graduates, and with the ideological mission to overthrow the Nigerian state (Onuoha 2010: 57). Looking at education from the perspective of (limited) statehood means to study how education effectiveness depends on statehood as well as how and under which conditions it is provided in ALS. If statehood matters, can external governance actors compensate for limited statehood and provide the public good of education? If so, how and under which conditions? How does the provision of education by state and non-​state actors affect (limited) statehood in ALS? To address these questions, this chapter is structured as follows: First, the issue area of education governance, and education as a public good are defined. Second, I describe the array of relevant actors in the education sector and their modes of governance. The third part provides an overview of the available data on the effectiveness of education. Fourth, I discuss causes of education effectiveness and ineffectiveness. The final section discusses normative implications of the presented findings for (limited) statehood and policy recommendations for effective education governance.

Education Governance Governance is currently one of the key issues in the study of education (Mok 2005). International agreements and national constitutions still regard education primarily as a state responsibility. Nevertheless, non-​state provision of education has proliferated in many countries, in particular in ALS, and many countries look back at a long history of education provision through non-​state actors. In fact, oftentimes, non-​state actor

Education   481 provision can be seen as the origin of the (formal) education sector. Much of the literature on education governance describes a shift from government to governance (Ball 2008; Rhodes 1997), from an often free-​of-​charge and nation-​wide provision of education by the state (Kadzamiraa and Roseb 2003) towards an increased marketization of the education sector and provision of education by non-​state actors. This shift involves a greater use of private finance (Downes and Schoeman 1998), a greater focus on consumer choice (Ranson 2003; Reay et al. 2001), and changes in the (new-​public) management of schools and universities (Ferlie et al. 2008), for example by introduction of monitoring and reporting procedures, such as student evaluations, along measurable performance targets and quality standards (Brignall 2000; Salter and Tapper 2000). Another global trend is the rise of the knowledge economy (Olssen and Peters 2005) and a shift in focus from employability towards entrepreneurship education (Moreland 2004; Pittaway and Cope 2007; Sewell and Pool 2010). The trend towards market-​oriented policy reforms affects education governance in ALS. However, (limited) statehood may mitigate the effects of these trends. They have different implications for the endeavours of countries to move from the particularism that resulted from non-​state actors’ provision, towards nationwide coverage, and related objectives to strike a balance between education coverage, quality, and choice. For example, in ALS, governments often lack the capacities to raise educational budgets domestically. Combined with severe cuts in official development assistance (ODA), great attention is currently being paid to the role of non-​state actors in supporting countries and filling these gaps (Rose 2009). However, non-​state actors in ALS are often foreign. Balancing ‘external’ development agendas with national needs and priorities frequently plays out at the disadvantage of the latter, since dependency by governments on external actors is strong, whereas the capacity and/​or the will to appropriately coordinate external and national interests and development priorities is weak (Klees 2010; Moss et al. 2006). ALS equally feel the potentially challenging consequences of a marketization of the education sector. Whereas many countries have established regulative regimes and quality insurance (e.g. higher education in Kenya and South Africa; see Varghese 2004), other countries lack such provisions. Next to the marketization of education, other and often parallel developments with an impact on the education sectors of many countries include population growth as well as calls for decentralization and democratization. Several democratically elected governments (in particular in sub-​Saharan Africa in the 1990s) dispensed with fees for primary enrolment. Deininger (2003) and Stasavage (2005) describe how the Ugandan government upon its election in 1996, introduced with great success UPE programmes. However, population growth, decentralization and fiscal crises put at risk accomplishments and many governments were unable ‘to cope with the pressures of expansion and “massification” of education’ (Teferra and Altbachl 2004: 26). The created demand left considerable gaps in education provision and governance to be filled by (external) non-​state providers. The general risk for mismanagement, corruption, and fraud also inhibits education effectiveness. Ngome (2003: 31) describes how the impact of the fiscal crisis on Kenyan public universities got worse with the misappropriation of (scarce)

482   Ellersiek resources: ‘As students continue living and studying under deplorable conditions, the top administrators in the universities are regularly accused by the national auditor general’s office of mismanaging funds and having misplaced priorities.’ Another trend affecting the education sector globally is the internationalization of education. Characterized by, inter alia, efforts towards harmonization of curricula and degree structures, for example through student and teacher assessments and (external) quality assurance mechanisms, internationalization results in a convergence and integration of education systems (Callan 2010). Although the literature traces these developments often back to the Bologna Process and a ‘juxtaposition of internationalization with Europeanization and globalization’ (Callan 2010: 15), Southern African countries, such as Tanzania, felt the implications of the internationalization of their education sector already in the 1980s, manifested, among others in the Arusha convention (1981) and several initiatives initiated, for example by regional institutions such as the African Union (Oyewole 2013: 1; Shabani 2013). However, ‘practices in higher education have developed without much concern for quality assurance’ (Damme 2001: 415); limited capacities of the state in ALS exacerbate these effects, for example, the lack of public quality assurance agencies to accredit programmes and ensure that education provision meets regional and international standards (Shabani 2013). In sum, general trends in the education sector frequently carry particular consequences on the governance of education in ALS. The current situation of the education sectors of many countries is characterized by complex systems of governance, in which the rules, roles, and the responsibilities of the different actors are constantly evolving. Thus, Kristof Titeca and Tom de Herdt (2011) find for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that education continues to be provided, even without overall regulatory authority in place due to the limited capacities of the Congolese state. The authors frame the state’s role as to provide an ‘administrative framework’ (Titeca and De Herdt 2011: 213), in which the coordination, regulation, and the provision of education results from negotiations between the state and non-​state actors. These negotiation processes are defined by the particular ‘power configurations in particular localities at particular times’ (Titeca and De Herdt 2011: 213).

Universal Primary Education as a Public Good Despite its alleged strong link to development, education is a governance objective and outcome in itself. The objective to provide education builds on the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). ‘[For these reasons], the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free

Education   483 exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives’ (UNESCO 1945). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights established in its Article 26 the right to education: ‘Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory . . . ’, as does the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1998), and the Education for all declaration (Haddad et al. 1990). The Millennium Development Goal 2, ‘Achieve universal primary education’ and the Dakar Framework for Action adopted in 2000 stipulate the goal to reach UPE globally, by 2015 (UNESCO 2000). Despite some progress, MDG 2 was not met, and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 was set to ‘Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’ (UN 2016) by 2030. In addition to the initial goal of ensuring universal access, the Dakar Framework for Action (UNESCO 2000) and SDG 4 explicitly refer to the quality dimension of education. Further concerns raised in the light of the current debate on education outcomes and UPE as the most prominent (global) concept of effectiveness, refer to the need to balance efforts towards a holistic approach to education by increasing the access to and the quality of primary, secondary, and tertiary education, and vocational education and trainings (VET; see Atchoarena and Delluc 2002). The literature discusses innovative ways of increasing coverage and inclusion in formal education, in particular of marginalized groups and in rural areas. At the same time, it focuses on the need to extend further understandings of the linkages between learning achievements and broader life and entrepreneurial skills. It also addresses the question of formal and informal education as well as on how to balance employability and entrepreneurship in order to tighten the current gap between the educational offer and the demand of the (labour) market, and to adjust the education sector to the economic realities of countries, in terms of the viability of their formal and informal economies. The third part of the chapter will further elaborate on these issues providing an overview of the available data on the effectiveness of education governance.

Actors and Modes of Education Governance (External) non-​state actors often fill the gaps left by the public sector, in particular regarding financing, the provision of education, and enrolment. In fact, in some countries ‘it is the government that is the minority provider’ (Batley and Rose 2011: 230). Sub-​Saharan Africa (SSA) is the largest recipient of total ODA (OECD 2014). With regard to education budgets, the ‘Financing Education in Sub-​Saharan Africa’ report (UNESCO 2011: 21) by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics finds that ‘among the countries

484   Ellersiek with available data, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda and Zambia seem to have financed more than 50% of their education budgets from external sources (in 2008)’. Looking at the provision of education, the considerable role ascribed to non-​state actors in the literature is seen by some authors as overrated and ‘at odds with administrative data’ (Tsimpo and Wodon 2014: 5), for example, collected from the Ministries of Education by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS)’ (UNESCO 2011). These data suggest an average share of external state and non-​state actors across African countries for primary education in the 12–​14% range and for secondary education at about 20%, respectively. DeStefano and Schuh Moore (2010: 512) refer to a report by the Aga Khan foundation which reveals that ‘the non-​state provision of primary education is increasing’, since one-​third of the increase in access to primary education (1991–​2004 and across 136 developing countries) was in non-​state schools. Data on enrolment ratios show different trends: A recent report by the Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institution (Steer et al. 2015: 7) finds that ‘non-​ state enrolment remains a relatively small percentage of total enrolment but has increased rapidly in low-​and middle-​income countries over the past two decades, with the share of non-​state enrolments in primary education rising by almost five percentage points (between 1990 and 2012), now standing at 16 percent in lower income countries and 12 percent in lower middle-​income countries’. The development of the share of non-​state education in SSA, however, has stagnated in most countries or even declined over the past two decades. The exceptions are about 15 countries that have shown strong growth, some of over 15 percentage points. Whereas these data provide an overall modest picture compared to the impression conveyed by the literature, they are likely to underestimate the role of non-​state actors in education (Steer et al. 2015) and have to be interpreted with caution.2 Data on non-​ state providers are often missing, incomplete, and insufficient in terms of specification, making it more difficult to classify and analyse. Moreover, non-​state actors are often not registered in official data bases (Harbom and Sundberg 2009). Another reason for the lack of quality data on the role of non-​state actors in education lies in the very definition of ‘non-​state actor’. Some define non-​state provision of services as ‘including all providers existing outside the public sector, whether they operate for profit or for philanthropic purposes’ (Moran and Batley 2004: 5). The Agha Khan Foundation defines as non-​state ‘any educational institute that is controlled and managed by a non-​government organization (e.g. religious group, association, enterprise) or if its governing body consists mainly of members not selected by a public agency’ (AKFT 2007: 1–​2). It assumes that countries use this definition when they send data on ‘private education’ to UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics. The lack of clarity regarding the very definition of non-​state actors in education reporting may explain why assessments about role and effect of non-​state engagement in education differ. Generally, the education sector may cover a myriad of diverse actors, such as (external) funders, providers, and governance actors, including philanthropies, investors, and private and social impact funds, government and multilateral donors, providers of formal and non-​formal education and training, faith-​based and secular organizations, a

Education   485 wide range of educational institutions that may be publicly or privately funded, operated, and governed by public or private boards, community owned, run by national or sub-​national institutions, and linked to or being subsidiaries of foreign educational institutions. The next section will analyse non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) and businesses and the modes of governance by which they primarily engage in the provision of education (see Chapters 11 Beisheim et al. and 13 Börzel/​Deitelhoff, this volume).

NGOs NGOs, often funded externally, help extend the reach of education to remote areas and marginalized groups that are underserved by government provision (Nishimuko 2009; Rose 2009a) and of little (commercial) interest to business (Hamann and Acutt 2003). They also increase the ‘social accountability’ (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg 2016) of development projects and are seen as being more flexible and responsive to community needs (Rose 2009b). Batley and Rose (2006) identify three phases of engagement of NGOs in the provision of basic services (in the post-​colonial era): First, they argue that states ‘asserted their role as universal provider of services leading sometimes to incorporation, control, or even suppression of voluntary and charitable service provision’. Second, they see a rise in non-​state provision as a response ‘to the failure to achieve universal provision of publicly provided services, in the 1980s’. Weak public services and the decline of support for state-​led development, they argue then resulted in a promotion of non-​state as an alternative to state provision. Third, they define the mid-​1990s as the beginning of the promotion of partnerships. Often as a funding requirement, ‘across service sectors, government policy came to employ the discourse of partnership with NGO and private actors’ (Batley and Rose 2006: 231–​232). To date, partnership is seen as the primary form of engagement of NGOs in the education sector (Haque 2004; King 2001; Miller-​Grandvaux et al. 2002; Robertson et al. 2012). They are prone to enter into partnerships with other actors (Batley and Rose 2011: 231), because of their comparably strong need for resources and because of their dependency on government appraisal to be able to operate (in the local context). The current debate about NGO engagement in education highlights two broader themes:  Regarding their involvement in partnerships, some raise the concern that these collaborations put at risk the autonomy and capacity for independent action of NGOs, thus jeopardizing their unique comparative advantage to strengthen ‘social accountability’(Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg 2016: 273). In many countries, NGOs do not register to avoid increasingly strict regulation and repression by governments (Batley and Rose 2011: 232). These general risks are further increased in ALS, since partnerships require adequate institutional frameworks and governance provisions to moderate power imbalances (Ellersiek 2012)  and prevent co-​optation (Baur and Schmitz 2012).

486   Ellersiek Another issue is whether NGOs strengthen or weaken the role of the state. In her analysis of the role of non-​profits/​NGOs in providing access to primary school aged children, Rose (2009a) shows, for instance, that, if these actors fail to perform they may jeopardize the legitimacy of the state, if they operate as subcontractors or enjoy other forms of government appraisal.

Business One of the main reasons for the proliferation of non-​state actors in education is seen as ‘the inability of public finances to keep pace with the growing demand’ for education (Fielden and LaRocque 2008: 3). Other reasons include an increasing demand for quality education and choice and the need for more labour-​market relevant education. Today, business plays a major role in the provision of, in particular tertiary education in both, developing and developed countries (Fielden and LaRocque 2008: 2). The engagement of businesses in primary and secondary education is comparably lower, because of the dominance of public provision in many countries and because of lower expected returns. Although expansion in tertiary education enrolment is lacking behind primary and secondary education in many African countries, the share of private universities is rapidly growing in some. For Tanzania, Fielden and Norman LaRocque (2008: 3) report an increase in the number of private universities and enrolments by 143% and 500%, respectively, between 2002/​03 and 2006/​07. Two primary ways of engagement in education by business actors are identified: On the one hand, they individually provide their services, for example in the form of education institutions, such as private schools and universities. On the other hand, business often enters into partnership with other actors. Public–​private partnerships (PPPs) with governments (Robertson et al. 2012) traditionally are the predominant means of engagement (e.g. in the provision of education infrastructure). The global internet technology (IT) company Cisco Systems, for instance, collaborates through partnerships with governments, community-​based organizations, technical institutions, high schools, colleges and universities in several countries with the stated goal to bridge the digital divide in education through teaching students and teachers internet technology skills. The Cisco System’s Networking Academy Programme (with two specific programmes targeting developing countries) has established over 11,000 non-​profit academies as direct providers of education in over 63 countries (Bhanji 2008). Two main points define the debate about business-​actors’ engagement in education, be it individually or through partnership with other actors: First, concerns are that the increase in quality and choice in education fostered by for-​profit providers comes at the expense of inclusive and free education. Second, for-​profit provision of education may undermine the role of the state, for example by increasing public perceptions of inequality and by exposing regulatory gaps and the weakness of the state in case such provision do not meet expectations (see next section, ‘The Effectiveness of Education Governance’).

Education   487

The Effectiveness of Education Governance This section presents the data on the effectiveness of education with a focus on sub-​ Saharan Africa (SSA). SSA is chosen as the empirical grounds for this assessment of education effectiveness in ALS for the region’s dire state of economic and social development and a high concentration of countries with limited statehood due to long periods of war, civil unrest, and political instability. Education levels on the African continent are low by international standards, including comparisons with other developing regions. The presentation of available data on the effectiveness of education in SSA will primarily build on those education outcomes that have been introduced in part 1 of this chapter. In terms of achieving UPE, UNESCO’s regional overview on education data (UNESCO 2008) portrays the state of education in SSA: The number of new entrants in primary education rose by 40% (between 1999 and 2005). However, demographic pressure through the projected growth of the primary school age population is likely to result in an increased demand for schooling in the future. More than 60% of the countries show primary net enrolment ratios (NER) below 80% still, and more than one-​ third below 70%. Nearly 33 million children of primary school age are not enrolled in school, making SSA home to 45% of the world’s out-​of-​school children in 2005 (of which 54% were girls). More than half of the out-​of-​school children in the region had never been in school and ‘may never enrol without additional incentives’ (UNESCO 2008: 3). Therefore, despite progress, the objective of reaching UPE as formulated by global and national development agendas has not been reached in SSA yet. Notably, the data show that (lack of) achievement is not uniform. In global comparison, SSA is the region with the lowest rates of school participation but half of all the out-​of-​school children come from just a few (primarily West and Central African) countries, many of them characterized by not only poverty but also conflict and instability (UNESCO and UIS 2015: 13). In addition, the data reveal disparities in progress within countries: ‘Primary NER increases led to reduced geographic disparities in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, and the United Republic of Tanzania, but to greater disparities in Benin, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Kenya and Zambia’ (UNESCO and UIS 2015: 13). Regarding the conditions for effective education in the different areas within countries, rural households tend to have less access: ‘[f]‌or every 100 urban children enrolled, only 33 rural children are enrolled in Burkina Faso, 43 in Ethiopia and 54 in Chad’ (UNESCO 2008:  3). Yet, the ‘urban ‘advantage’’ is reduced by poverty in slum urban areas. Furthermore, unequal access to education within SSA countries for disabled children varies: ‘In Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the chances of disabled children not attending school are reported to be two to three times greater than for non-​disabled children’ (UNESCO 2008: 3).

488   Ellersiek The main line of reasoning to support a shift from a focus on coverage towards equal consideration of the quality dimension of education derives from strong disparities between and within countries regarding, inter alia, grade-​levels, completion rates, and learning achievements. Lewin (2009: 151) finds that across SSA, ‘only two-​thirds of children reach the last grade of primary, and many of those enrolled are over age, repeating years, and failing to complete a full cycle of basic education, especially where this includes lower secondary grades’. Again, differences between and within countries exist. Mwabu and Ackerman (2013) draw on data from the Africa Learning Barometer (Watkins et al. 2012) to illustrate these disparities: ‘  . . .  in Malawi, 52 percent of girls are not learning basic competencies at the end of primary school compared to 44 percent of boys; between urban and rural communities in Tanzania, 10 percent of rural children are not learning compared to only 4 percent of urban children; and between the wealthy and the poor, which is noted as the most divisive of the disparities—​in Botswana, 7 percent of the wealthy are not learning compared to 30 percent of the poor.’ Regarding the need for an equal balance of all levels of education, UNESCO’s regional overview on education data (UNESCO 2008: 4) shows that: ‘By 2005, enrolment in secondary education has increased by 55% (since 1999). The average gross enrolment ratio (GER) rose from 24% to 32% during this period.’ Growth in secondary education enrolment thus lacked far behind growth in primary education enrolment. Overall participation levels in secondary education (in 2005) remain low (