The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq 9780804774154

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The Other Iraq

The Other Iraq PLURALISM AND CULTURE IN HASHEMITE IRAQ Orit Bashkin

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data Orit, 1974The other Iraq: pluralism and culture in Hashemite Iraq I Or it Bash kin. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-o-8047-5992-2 (paperback: alk. paper) 1. Iraq-History- Hashemite Kingdom, 1921-1958. 2. Pluralism (Social scicnces)Iraq-History-zoth century. 3. Iraq-Ethnic relations. 4. Intellectuals-IraqHistory-2oth century. 5· Iraq-I ntcllectuallife-2oth century. 6. Nationalism-IraqHistory-2oth century. I. Title. DS79.65.B37 2008 956.704'2-dc22 2008020016 Typeset by Bruce Lundquist in 10!14 Minion

To Rachel and Yossi Bashkin

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Introduction: Hybrid Iraq

1x 1

ASPECTS OF PLURALISM IN THE IRAQI PUBLIC SPHERE

17

1 Modest Hopes: Iraqi Intellectuals in the Early 1920s

19

2 Protecting Pluralism, 1931-1945

52

3 Renaissance and Revolution, 1945-1958

87

PART 1

PART 2

NATIONAL NARRATIVES

125

4 Narratives of Iraqi and Arab Nationalism(s)

127

5 Strangers in Our Midst: Iraq's Others

157

6 The Rural Nation: Intellectuals, Tribesmen, and Peasants

194

7 Educating the Nation: Modes and Theories of Discipline

229

Conclusion

265

Notes

277

Bibliography

325

Index

349

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK FRIE!\'DS AND COLLEAGUES whose

advice was instrumental to this work. Robert Tignor's immense knowledge and thoughtful supervision guided me during my graduate studies at Princeton University. Samah Selim's insightful mentoring shaped the ways in which I use Arabic literary sources in my work. I am indebted to Sasson Somekh, who helped in solving many dilemmas concerning Iraq's cultural history, and to Israel Gershoni for his enthusiasm and persistent interest in this project. Peter Wien's conceptualizations ofi raqi-Arab nationalism were an important source of inspiration for this book. M. ~iikri.i Hanioglu, Negin Nabavi, and John E. Woods provided indispensable guidance and help. Fred Donner and Wadad Kadi offered precious words of advice and support. Finally, this book would not have been published without the professionalism and care of Kate Wahl and the two readers from Stanford University Press. A special word of appreciation is due to Amy Motlagh for her perceptive commentary on my dissertation. I am appreciative of the support of my colleagues and friends at the University of Chicago: McGuire Gibson, A. Holly Shissler, Cornell Fleischer, Persis Berlekamp, Tahera Qutbuddin, Rusty Rook, Farouk Mustafa, Noha Forster, and Basima Bazargian. I am also grateful to Carolyn Brown, Ami Ayalon, Sandy Bloom, John Dechant, Azar Ashraf, Laura Strikwerda, Mitra Sharafi, Alex Schubert, Camilla Adang, Ovadia Ezra, Youval Rotman, and Anders Hamori for their help. My family plays an important part in my life. It is a source of deep regret that my grandparents Mina and Ze'ev Bashkin and my cousin Shahar Dolev

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x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

could not see this work. I dedicate this book to my parents, Yossi and Rachel (Rochaleh) Bashkin, and thank them for their love and support. They have patiently accompanied me through various stages of my career, identifying with me at every stage of the way. This book would never have been written without their help.

The Other Iraq

INTRODUCTION Hybrid Iraq

ISAIAH BERLIN once cautioned historians not to minimize the achievements of the Russian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that their ideals were not materialized after the October Revolution. We should consider, wrote Berlin, their contribution to literature, culture, philosophy, and social criticism. 1 The same remarks are equally relevant to the achievements of the Iraqi intelligentsia. Whether collaborating with or persecuted by colonizers or local political elites, Iraqi intellectuals were deemed, at best, impotent in the face of political oppression and, at worse, responsible for many of their country's miseries. 2 Nevertheless, the story of Hashemite Iraq is that of nation building. Regardless of its success or failure, a national project cannot occur without intellectuals fostering new notions of both time and space. Intellectuals were the historians who wrote, rewrote, and reinvented their nation's past, the teachers who educated its youth, and the novelists who depicted their social, cultural, and political milieu. Iraqi intellectuals, however, were also the harshest critics of the national project and the group most active in exposing the transgressions of modern colonialism. Furthermore, Iraqi critics theorized about such modern phenomena as colonialism, nationalism, and print capitalism, and their views provide us with indispensable insights into not only the history of the Iraqi state but also, and more important, the ways that public spheres, state apparatuses, and civil societies are created and cultivated within colonial and postcolonial contexts. In this study, therefore, I investigate how Iraqi intellectuals defined their relationship to their national community by focusing on their activities in the print media.

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INTRODUCTION

In this book I take a functional rather than an ethical approach to the meaning of the term intellectual. An intellectual is seen as a person who expresses opinions concerning the nature of society, whether to generate change or to preserve the existing political order. The intellectual's authority can be based on professional expertise or ethical commitments. However, the intellectual must also be a person with some means of propagating ideas through journalism, literary activity, or affiliation with an institution. The intellectual's ideas must have an effect on society, whether in a cultural or a political realm. Thus an intellectual could be a marginalized communist, a bureaucrat working in the Ministry of Education, or a religious scholar attempting either to advocate reform or to protect religious practices from Westernized elites. The representations of intellectuals and their social functions changed in Iraq over time. In 1921-1923, when the state had not fully consolidated its power, there was more room for the simultaneous existence of various views in the public domain. Intellectuals saw themselves as agents of nationalism and democracy who envisioned ideal forms of governance. Ji.irgen Habermas's theory underscoring the links between political participation and democracy is applicable to this milieu. Habermas described a European bourgeois public sphere whose functions were to negotiate the interests of the individuals with the demands of pablic life and to foster public debate through the activity of clubs, salons, cafes, and the press. Habermas's parameters of the public sphere, namely, tolerance, debate, and consensus, were shared by Iraqi writers. 3 The desire for democracy and the will to be free from colonial rule was instrumental in shaping public discourses and found advocates from the early 1920s on in the newly established press. Beginning in 1924, the state started to strengthen its grip on Iraqi society. In 1924-1958 bureaucratic networks took form, and the educated middle classes (the effendia) underwent urbanization and growth. Many intellectuals worked for the state and evaluated the capacities of its subaltern classes to absorb new ideas. These intellectuals often thought that many elements of the Iraqi population were ignorant and irrational and thus ill prepared to be a part of a democratic regime. This antidemocratic frame of thinking was most evident in the 1930s, although it typified the 1940s and 1950s as well. Nevertheless, during the 1940s and 1950s, socialist and communist thinkers challenged the state's political leadership and its intellectuals. Groups such as the Ahali social-democratic group and the Iraqi Communist Party were established in the 1930s, but they reached larger audiences in the 1940s

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3

and 1950s. Their intellectuals argued that the Iraqi state and the British had failed in their plans to reform Iraqis and offered alternative models instead. They championed the representation of intellectuals as individuals deeply entrenched in their society and committed to its change. The means of altering society were accordingly revolutionized and included not only activities in the public sphere but also more radical and violent solutions. Frantz Fanon observed that, although colonized intellectuals endeavor to either charm or denounce their colonizers, nationally conscious writers produce a committed literature that aims at liberation and democracy. In the postcolonial stage, however, Fanon criticized the intelligentsia that articulated its national aspirations in undemocratic, chauvinistic, and racial fashions. The alternative, to him, was a native class of intellectuals (civil servants, technicians, and revolutionary elites) who would radicalize and politicize the people and give them a place in history. 4 Interestingly, Iraqi intellectuals in the 1950s made similar claims. They tried to assess the influence of the anti-British struggle on culture, denounced the undemocratic features of their state, and were encouraged to create literary and artistic works that would speak directly to and on behalf of the people. Moreover, Iraqi Marxist and socialist writers argued that their transparent representations of the lives of rural inhabitants and the poor accurately mirrored the experience of the Iraqi people. 5 IRAQI HYBRIDITY

Homi Bhabha's formulation of colonial hybridity is extremely constructive for understanding Iraqi culture and the location ofthe intellectual in it. To Bhabha, the categories of"East" and "West" or "the colonized" and "the colonizer" are not inseparable monoliths. Rather, both the colonized and the colonizers are changed and transformed during the colonial interaction. Moreover, this hybridity signifies a process in which the nature of colonial domination itself is challenged. The constant fusion and mutual synthesis between the cultures of the colonizer and the colonized creates an ambivalent space in which a symmetric differentiation between the colonizer and the colonized and their representation as "self" and "other" become impossible to maintain. Translation, bilingualism, bilingual education, and migration to and from the metropolis further dissipate such categories. These hybrid relationships thus contest the assumption of the colonizers to identify a recognizable colonized subject who is in need of civilizing and guidance. 6 In Iraq, such hybrid cultural models signified not only the meeting of the

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INTRODUCTION

British/colonial and the Iraqi/national but also the processes that rendered unfeasible the conceptualization of the Sunna and the Shi'a as inseparable monoliths. Migration from the countryside to Baghdad, the emergence ofiraqi education, and the rise of a shared Arab print market read by both Sunnis and Shi'is contributed to the hybrid nature of Iraqi culture. In fact, three hybrid cultural models existed in Hashemite Iraq: colonial and national, national and transregional, and hybridity between various sects. Colonial and National

In this book I cover intellectual activity during the mandate period and during the period oflraqi "independence" (1931-1958). My aim in this study, however, is not to present a coherent chronological sequence of events in which the beginning and the end of British rule are clearly marked but rather to draw attention to the blurry boundaries between the colonial and postcolonial eras. Although Iraq has been considered an independent entity since October 1932, Britain maintained its geostrategic interests in Iraq until1958. Most significant, however, is the fact that British rule shaped categories and concepts that survived well after the official termination of the mandate. 7 Iraqi national elites were profoundly immersed in Western culture. From 1921 onward, and particularly during the 1950s, Iraqi bureaucrats, policymakers, and intellectuals were educated in American and European universities. Moreover, Iraqis, especially Jews and Christians, studied in schools constructed by European institutions. In the 1920s, Iraqi educators, administrators, and politicians worked with and under the supervision of British advisers and colonial bureaucrats. With the writings of national historiographies in the 1930s and 1940s, Iraqis familiarized themselves with accounts written by British colonial administrators. Similarly, Iraqis cooperated with British and American experts in projects concerning the status oflraqi education and the reform of the nation's tribes. Moreover, Iraqi intellectuals wrote in English and French and translated works from European languages into Arabic. In the 1950s, Iraqi exiles found themselves living in Russia, Western and Eastern Europe, or the United States because of political pressures at home. These processes meant that Iraqi intellectuals constructed narratives reflecting the interests of Arab nationalism in the language of the Western metropolis. Moreover, urbanized national Iraqi elites and British colonial officials shared many common themes with respect to subaltern groups, such as Iraqi peasants and tribesmen. For example, Sunni urban elites often defined Shi'i and the Kurdish tribalism as "problems" that jeopardized national order and

INTRODUCTION

5

needed to be placated. Certain sets of qualities, such as violence, unmanageability, and ignorance, were attributed to these groups by both Iraqi elites and British colonizers. The print culture of Hashemite Iraq was thus produced by intellectuals who were well grounded in the various metropolitan traditions and who used their works to communicate ideas shaped in a metropolitan context. Their delimitation of the history of Iraq, their ethnographies of diverse Iraqi populations, and the modes they proposed to reform Iraqi society could certainly pass as texts produced in Western academia or in a European print market. On the other hand, a careful reading of such texts equally mirrors other voices, traditions, and oral histories that were unique to the Iraqi and Arab setting. The hybrid nature of such studies, therefore, reflects the inability to separate between an "authentic" Iraqi culture and a British one and the diverse ways that Iraqi culture changed because of its interaction with Britain. Iraqi and Transregional

Dina Rizk Khoury defined Mosuli-Ottoman intellectuals as a class at the crossroads of several cultural traditions-Syrian, Iranian, Central Asian, Arabian, and Indian-and privy to debates on reform current among the scholars oflstanbul, Iran, India, and other parts of the Middle East. 8 Khoury's observations are applicable to Hashemite Iraq, given the links that Iraqi culture maintained with many intellectual traditions. Iraq in the interwar period was dependent on publications imported from Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, and many of its leading writers were educated in Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Furthermore, the strong bonds between Istanbul and Iraq before World War I, described at length by William Cleveland and Reeva Simon, lasted well into the 1920s and 1930s.9 Albert Hourani observed that in the interwar years "new media of expression were creating a universe of discourse." Products of Egyptian or Lebanese publishing houses-newspapers, textbooks, poetry collections, novels, and works of popular science and history-were read by educated Arab elites outside Egypt and Lebanon. 10 Iraqi intellectuals were a part of this universe; they highly respected the works by and sought the approval of fellow Arab writers. They shared similar cultural concerns about such topics as structural and thematic changes in Arabic literature and social and political dilemmas relating to social reform and the anticolonial struggle. Moreover, when pressures of Iraqi censorship increased at home, many Iraqi intellectuals published articles, poems, and short stories in Lebanese and Egyptian magazines. The diverse and hybrid intellectual sources generated a pluralistic synthesis of ideas and traditions. Thus the examination of Iraqi intellectual production reveals

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INTRODUCTION

the movement of ideas in the Middle East from the cultural centers (Istanbul, Cairo, Beirut) to the cultural periphery (Iraq) and the transformation of these ideas, once relocated into the periphery. The movement of ideas, journals, and peoples from and to Iraq advanced the popularity of Pan-Arabism, an intellectual and political movement that champions the unique cultural and historical heritage of Arabic-speaking peoples. Pan-Arabism in the Hashemite period was challenged by the map created by the British and the French in which separate Arab nation-states were carved out under the mandate system. Iraqi Pan-Arabism was important for a number of reasons. It served as a legitimizing narrative for the Hashemite monarchy, which emphasized its role in the anti-Ottoman Arab Revolt during World War I. In the interwar period, Pan-Arabism was adopted by the radicalized Iraqi middle classes as an anticolonial, national mode. In the 1940s and 1950s, Iraqi Pan-Arabists localized the theories ofNasserism and Ba'thism in the Iraqi milieu. Various forms ofPan-Arabism were consequently used by both the ruling elites and the opposition. In addition, Shi'i, Christian, Jewish, and Sunni intellectuals all attempted to present their own images of Arab culture and history. In other words, familiarity with the rich Arabic literary and cultural tradition was not a mere obligation forced on non-Sunnis by a Sunni state. Rather, many members of all religious communities sought to use Arab culture as their entry ticket to the realm of the state. The nature of this Pan-Arab culture should also be seen in a social context. Iraqi Sherifian officers (officers who participated in the Arab Revolt) maintained links with other Arab officers who tied their lot with other Arab nation-states. The dynamics of Pan-Arab discourses were invigorated by the constant flow of intellectuals from the Arab world into Iraq. 11 Seen from this perspective, Pan-Arabism was an ideology located within shared social and intellectual networks. However, in the Iraqi context, it was often difficult to clearly define what "Arab culture" entailed, because the boundaries between Iraqi, Arab, and Ottoman cultures were often difficult to define. Hybridized Sectarian Discourse

The modern Iraqi print market transcended religious and ethnic boundaries. Shi'i and Sunni reformers of the early 1920s read works of Muslim religious reformers as well as works by Lebanese Christian intellectuals propagating the theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. In the 1940s and the 1950s, Sunnis and Shi'is alike were grappling with the works of Marx, Lenin, and Sartre. The reading of the same texts by Sunni, Shi'i, Christian, and Jewish

INTRODUCTION

7

intellectuals provoked local discussions on such issues as progress and civilization. Moreover, Iraqi thinkers were preoccupied with the question of sect in relation to other themes, such as knowledge, commitment, and class. This is not to say that sectarian politics were unimportant in Iraq. Yet, in the intellectual realm, many writers strove to create a shared universe of discourse. For example, a discourse on constitutionalism was prevalent among both Sunnis and Shi'is in the early 1920s. Although Sunni writers were mostly inspired by debates in the Ottoman-Arab press following the 1908 revolution, the Shi'is were also inspired by reflections on the Iranian constitutional revolution. Nevertheless, both communities used a modern language that spoke of ending tyranny through the power of rationality and law. Ussama Makdisi has shown that in the Lebanese context, sectarianism was an act of interpretation whose articulators manipulate the historical past to justify their social and political claims. Sectarianism was thus a form of hybridized modernist knowledge echoing European hegemony, Ottoman concepts of reform, and nationalist desiresP Makdisi's analysis is applicable to Iraq, in whose national discourse the battle against sectarianism (ta'ifiyya) was often used to reduce acts of resistance against the state's power (revolts, refusal to be conscripted or to pay taxes) to irrational sectarian deeds inspired by dissatisfied Kurdish and Shi'i sheikhs. Hanna Batatu, Samira Haj, and, more recently, Faleh Abdul Jabar have done much to problematize the validity of sectarianism as the only relevant category for interpreting Iraqi social and cultural realities during the Hashemite period.' 3 Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett have convincingly shown that the fundamental division in Iraqi society was between the rural members of the Shi 'i community on the one hand and residents of the urban centers on the other. 14 Furthermore, as Sami Zubaida has argued, tribal and ethnic identities were both consolidated by the state (British mandatory and Hashemite "independent") and conceived by it. 15 The concept of sect itself was thus produced, hybridized, and changed over time. SOME HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OBSERVATIONS Sources

British officialdom left memoirs and monographs written by colonial officials that illuminate various aspects of Iraqi intellectual life. British archives contain personality files consisting of biographical details about intellectuals, documents describing their activities, and documents transcribing certain conversations that British representatives held with intellectuals. However,

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INTRODUCTION

one cannot base a study of intellectual history primarily on British sources, because such reliance silences voices not recorded in the British archives. Ranajit Guha's exploration of the vocabulary attached to tribal revolts in the British colonial archive demonstrates how certain words were defined in the context of hypothesizing about the nature of the rebels. 16 The Israeli novelist David Grossman has shown a similar process. Grossman argues that when occupiers described the actions, intentions, and even termination of the occupied, whether in their media or in official accounts, a certain "word-laundry" comes into play. He noticed, for example, that when the Israeli press refers to Palestinian intellectuals, the word intellectual in itself is rarely used and is often replaced by other synonyms such as educated or learned menY In Iraq, the British tended to refer to writers as extremists or dissenters rather than as intellectuals. Moreover, British sources often reflect colonial fears, predominantly because of their concerns about the penetration of Kemalist ideas during the 1920s and pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi propaganda during the 1930s. Nevertheless, during the 1930s the voices of liberal Jewish writers who were active in intellectual life or influential anti-Fascist Egyptian intellectuals who taught in Iraq were mostly absent from official colonial records. Similarly, during the 1950s Iraqi governments brutally suppressed communist activities and communist writers. British reports often depicted communists as saboteurs and scalawags. Clearly, if we rely solely on such accounts, we perpetuate either British representations or the silencing of many Iraqi intellectuals by the state. To examine intellectual life in Iraq according to publications in Arabic, we must scrutinize numerous and varied sources: textbooks, review essays, novels, short stories, and memoirs as well as the Iraqi, Lebanese, and Egyptian press. Other representations of the intellectual as a bureaucratic professional are ample in blueprints and programs designed by Iraqi officials. Such blueprints, however, were often ineffective in changing social realities. For example, some of the tribal education plans produced in the Ministry of Education were never implemented in the rural areas. Nevertheless, these blueprints reflect how state officials (teachers, bureaucrats, and experts) viewed the public whom they were to discipline and the means they offered to generate change. The Iraqi press in this period is important. Benedict Anderson has scrutinized the role of the press in the formation of an imagined national community to suggest that the simultaneous reading of contemporary texts by numerous readers facilitates the belief that all readers belong to the same lin-

INTRODUCTION

9

guistic, cultural, and political unit. 18 The Iraqi press of the Hashemite period clearly played such a role, because a significant number of newspapers discussed various aspects of Iraqi nationalism, reported on the anticolonial struggle, and addressed, in Arabic, a growing number of middle-class readers. Moreover, the ways that journalists framed their answers to readers seeking advice, the manner with which writers of narrative prose popularized their works in the press, and the reviews of literary and cultural works that readers and journalists published in various journals provide interesting insights into the print market, the intellectuals who worked in it, and their interactions with their middle-class readership. Furthermore, the fact that several newspapers were highly critical ofiraqi governments or alternatively escaped censorship because they were labeled cultural or literary allows us to hear the voices of intellectuals who operated outside official state sponsorship and to delve into issues that engaged intellectuals and their readers yet were not recorded by politicians and diplomats. Novels, short stories, and drama fashioned images of intellectuals and popularized them. Edward Said, for instance, referred to Turgenev's Fathers and Sons and Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man as texts portraying and representing intellectuals. 19 In a context of nation building, Anderson observed that novels formed similar notions of time and space within their readers. 2° Fredrick Jameson characterized third-world texts as "national allegories, even if their forms developed from predominantly western machineries of representation." 21 Third-world texts "necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national allegory. The story of the private individual density is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public in third world culture and society." 22 Iraqi narrative prose was read within a defined political and historical context. Novels, short stories, and plays examined specific political parties and organizations, addressed conventions and norms by either challenging them or reinforcing them, and introduced themes from Arab geography and history. Their writers tackled questions of "class, gender, ... religious community, trade union, political party, village, prison." 23 Moreover, the plots of many Iraqi novels and short stories were populated with intellectuals: writers, journalists, and poets. These texts were later discussed in review articles published in the press. Iraqi social-realist fiction from the 1950s can similarly be used to study the representations of the rural and urban poor in circles of middle-class intellectuals. The reading of such novels, however, is not meant to reduce their significance to an

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INTRODUCTION

anthropological remark on the nature of society; rather, the idea is to use methodologies that emphasize the link between narrative prose and issues of class, race, and gender in order to understand the imagery connected with the intellectual. Another variety of indispensable sources is the memoirs of scholars, poets, and journalists. They reveal the links between intellectuals and politicians, their interactions with the British, their education, and their activities in various cultural centers. Texts published in Ba'thi Iraq were subjected to limitations of censorship. Nevertheless, precisely because their writers were aware of the prevalent ideas of their censors regarding the nature of the Hashemite period, the memoirs reflect a complex dialogue between the Ba'thi and monarchic representations of the past. Exiled Iraqi intellectuals have likewise published an impressive body of memoirs. The exilic location liberated writers from censorship and allowed them to critique various aspects of Iraqi political culture, although some of the writers developed a sense of nostalgia for the Hashemite period. Moreover, many memoirs contain poems, articles, and stories that the writers had either read or composed during their stay in Iraq, giving us a glimpse into cultural life in Iraq and telling a story of their own relevant to Hashemite rather than Ba'thi Iraq. 24 Another underappreciated source is the writings of Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian intellectuals on Iraqi culture. Arab intellectuals were certainly familiar with Iraq's history and geography even before their arrival in Iraq because of Iraq's prominent role in Islamic history and culture. The study of Arab-Islamic culture, moreover, was reinvigorated in this period, as a conscious effort to reappropriate the knowledge of "Islamic civilization" from the West. The Egyptians, Syrians, and Palestinians who resided in Iraq left many accounts of cultural life in Baghdad in which they often compare Iraq's present with its glorious past. Because Iraqi intellectuals valued the contributions of other Arab writers to their cultural milieu and because the accounts written by non-Iraqis often produced scandals and intense debates inside Iraq, such sources illuminate the intellectual scene and dynamics of Pan-Arab culture. Modern Arab Intellectual History

Arab intellectual history, especially the Egyptian case study, produced significant monographs devoted to the achievements of individual intellectuals. 25 The earliest works studying Arab intellectual history were deeply rooted in

INTRODUCTION

11

the Orientalist tradition. Nevertheless, as Edward Said himself noted, some scholars have also viewed Muslim men of letters as articulating a certain

esprit humaine a travers l'espace et le temps, as manifested, for example, in Louis Massignon's exploration of al-Hallaj. Scholars such as Hamilton Gibb, however, were tempted to study modern Arab subjects after they studied medieval Islam. For this reason, many were interested in notions of revival or the reform of "classical Islam." 26 The fact that such scholars were not divided into medievalists and modernists (as accepted in the field of Middle Eastern studies today) also allowed them to examine the impact of streams of thought from the medieval to the modern eraY An important focus of modern Arab intellectual history was Arab nationalism, which assumed importance in the mid-1950s. The functions of intellectuals were thus evaluated with respect to their contributions to the national project. One of the earliest works in the field was George Antonius's landmark The Arab Awakening, which tended to classify intellectuals as the precursors, pioneers, and followers of Arab nationalism. Ernest Dawn, William Cleveland, and Albert Hourani, however, critiqued Antonius's idealization of the Arab national movement, especially his overstatement of the impact of national thought before World War I, his stress on the activity of Christian intellectuals, and his turning a blind eye to the Ottomanized nature of notable politics. 28 Commenting on the metahistory of Arab nationalism that followed Antonius, Israel Gershoni identified a narrative in Western historiography that emphasized the utopian and romantic characteristics of Arab nationalism without reference to issues of class, social mobility, or gender. 29 Evoking Quentin Skinner's critique of genealogies of ideas devoid of a social and linguistic context, 30 Gershoni identified the anachronistic attempts to find a unified message in the diverse works of intellectuals, which produced an ahistorical reading of Arab nationalism. 31 Rashid Khalidi pointedly observed that when certain scholars did address the question of context, they tended to "reduce ideology to the pettiest of personal motivations, on the part of its formulators." Consequently, works of leading Arab intellectuals were often understood as promoting trivial and self-centered causes, such as desires for political influence or financial benefits. 32 Perhaps the boldest effort to appreciate the vigor of ideas in the Arab Middle East is Albert Hourani's masterwork, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, which gives an overall view of the philosophical and theological currents of thought in the Arab world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 33

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INTRODUCTION

Highly respectful of Arab culture and its modern projects of interpretation and translation, Hourani's monograph supplied later scholars of Arab intellectual history with intellectuals who became the subjects of many studies. Nonetheless, the text concentrated on the founders of grand theories and did not probe into issues of their dissemination and reception. 34 In the 1980s and 1990s the theories of Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson generated a new view of Arab nationalists whose articulators responded to the modern processes of urbanization and industrialization. 35 Furthermore, following their readings of Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Darnton, Lynne Hunt, and Jtirgen Habermas, scholars explored questions related to dissemination of knowledge, canonization, and reception, not always related to the national project. These works examined publishers, editors, booksellers, and newspapers and underscored the ways that writers, entrepreneurs, and intellectuals utilize literary and cultural products to modify public opinion. 36 The idealized notion of the intellectual as an agent ofWestern secular modernity, liberalism, and nationalism was revisited following a critical appreciation of the activity of national elites with respect to peasants and workers that cast doubt on the emancipatory functions of Arab intellectuals. 37 Historians consequently devoted attention to intellectuals whose participation in national discourses had been marginalized. An important contribution was made in the field of gender studies, where works explored the culture of women writers. 38 Furthermore, methods of discourse analysis were used to critique Arab elites themselves. Texts produced by Arab intellectuals were viewed as mirroring the attempts of a modernizing project whose aims, as Timothy Mitchell argued, were to introduce order into an orderless and hence meaningless Middle East. The construction of new disciplinary institutions and their methods of visibility facilitated the creation of a modern bureaucratic state and assigned new roles to intellectuals. Arab intellectuals were indeed agents of modernity; yet it was their modernity that allowed them to bring the Middle East under the regime of European representation and to introduce newer mechanisms of regulation in the service of a global capitalist machinery. 39 In recent years, postcolonial theory has emphasized the links between the premodern and the modern, the colonized and the colonizer, and has deconstructed national narratives and historiographies. 40 Studies of Arab nationalism, for instance, have expanded the national experience to the domain of the popular, in which discourses produced by elite intellectuals were translated,

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distorted, and subverted by nonelites. Scholars likewise have explored the construction of differences based on sect, race, and gender in the intellectual field. This criticism of nationalism likewise has generated an interest in transregionalism, exile, and exilic production. 41 Within the field of Arab intellectual history, modern Iraq received relatively little attention. This was often explained as the outcome of the lack of academic and political freedom in which "original and innovative scholarship could flourish."42 Another factor that limited the interest in Iraqi intellectual history, especially during the interwar period, was the self-image of Iraqi intellectuals. Repeatedly, Iraqi intellectuals complained that their cultural production did not match the creative activities of their Egyptian and Lebanese peers. Last, as Hayden White reminds us, historians choose to impose a structure and story type on historical events to endow them with meaningY Iraqi history was often narrated as a story of a failed Enlightenment and liberalism. The end of the story, Ba'thi authoritarianism under Saddam Hussein, thus determined its beginning and the way it was narrated. An example is Republic of Fear, by Kanan Makiya, which subjugated Iraqi intellectual history to a narrative in which many intellectuals are depicted as perpetuating dictatorship and oppression already in the Hashemite period. 44 Iraqi intellectual history, however, parallels, in many ways, Arab intellectual history. Early scholars of Arab nationalism focused on Iraqi national educators, ideologues, and bureaucrats. 45 The shift from the history of ideas to social and cultural history was apparent in the important works of Phebe Marr, Michael Eppel, and Reeva Simon, which focused on urban intellectuals and accentuated the role ofPan-Arabism as an option that was popular among both Sherifian elites and the educated urban middle classes. 46 'Abd al-Salaam Yousif was one of the first scholars to explore the works of novelists, poets, and journalists as reflecting a battle for cultural hegemony among various political groups under the monarchy and QasimY Hanna Batatu's magnum opus, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, although not dealing directly with intellectual history, delineated the ideological developments of various political groups, especially the communists. Nevertheless, Batatu occasionally communicated his notions about the "correct" ways in which Iraqi intellectuals ought to have interpreted Marxism and socialismY In doing so, he missed the opportunity to explore how the translations and adaptations of such theories in the Iraqi context produced new and interesting cultural models.

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INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s and in the present decade, a revisionist approach to Iraqi history began taking shape. Scholars increasingly are emphasizing the Iraqi nature of the public sphere, its pluralistic dimensions, and the variety of actors who participate in the print market. 49 For example, Eric Davis insightfully examines the roles played by intellectuals in negotiating a variety of competing memories of the nation's past. 5° Muhsin Musawi's inspiring Reading Iraq illustrates the richness of the Iraqi intellectual field and its unique national features. 51 Finally, Peter Wien's thoughtful assessment of Iraqi nationalism investigates the ways that national discourses shape aesthetic values, spatial projects, and perceptions of the body. 52 A response to Moshe Behar's recent suggestions for "a relaxation of the explanatory role assigned to the ideational realm in shaping the region's macro sociopolitics" might serve as a concluding comment. To Behar, economic transactions by indigenous clients of Bank Misr or military operations by Hamas and Tanzim have a greater impact on national movements than editorials in the Egyptian press (given the high rates of illiteracy in Egypt at the time) or a year's worth of writings by Edward Said and "other intellectuals of his caliber." 53 Although, admittedly, ideas cannot solely explicate the behavior of particular agents in the public domain, intellectual activity remains highly important. First, Arab intellectuals were political activists leading opposition movements, bureaucrats devising state policies, ministers, and parliament members. Intellectuals were important witnesses, theoreticians, and activists who reflected on the modern world. The ways in which middleclass intellectuals experienced colonialism and nationalism are mirrored in their writings. Ghasan Kanafani's texts might not have directly inspired the actions of his peers, but they certainly echo what it means to be a Palestinian in a particular historical moment. Second, as we seek the theoretical advice of an intellectual such as Frantz Fanon, we could turn to the texts of highly original Iraqi intellectuals, such as 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim or 'Ali al-Wardi, as brave and perceptive critics. Finally, we should consider the contribution of the works of'Abd al-Malik Nuri or 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati to our human culture, esthetics, and language; their long-term influence on generations of readers and critics; and the opportunity to read and reread these texts critically and hence politically. In conclusion, the availability of unexplored sources in Arabic-a broad spectrum of novels, short stories, newspapers, and memoirs-and the relationships between the undemocratic state (colonial and postcolonial) and

INTRODUCTION

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intellectual activity turn Iraq into an intriguing case study for the cultural historian. In 1929, Jewish Iraqi intellectual Anwar Sha'ul published an open letter to the British high commissioner, titled "I Wish to Speak, But ..." in which he complained that "my mouth is shut and my hands are tied." In this study I examine the ways that the hands of Iraqi intellectuals were tied and the strategies they adopted to untie these bonds. 54

1

MODEST HOPES Iraqi Intellectuals in the Early 1920s

THE PERIOD 1920-1924 began with modest hopes for an independent Iraqi state, in the form of either a constitutional monarchy or a republic, and ended with the realization that such hopes would not materialize. The organizations that sprung up during and shortly before World War I remained alive during the period of the nation-state. An important, albeit modest, platform for articulating ideas was the Iraqi press. Al-Zawra', an eight-page publication in Ottoman and Arabic (1869-1911), was published as part of the important reforms of the Ottoman governor (wali) Midhat Pasha (1869-1872). A significant increase in publishing occurred after the Young Turks Revolution, in 1908-1911, when forty-four publications appeared in Baghdad.' Press activity came to a relative halt in 1911 and was renewed in 1920. Not only newspapers but also clubs, groups, and associations increased in numbers after 1908. Small clubs, such as the Reform Club in Basra or the Scientific Club in Baghdad, assumed some importance. In the religious domain, the salafi writings of the Sunni scholars of the Alusi family of Baghdad inspired much debate. 2 After World War I, intellectuals cautiously followed the San Remo Conference (April1920) in which Britain was granted a mandate over Iraq, or the "sacred trust of civilization," to help it advance to readiness for full independence.3In June of the same year an armed revolt against British rule broke out and quickly spread through the mid-Euphrates regions. During the revolt, diverse social and political groups collaborated: the Shi'i religious leadership of the mujtahids, the Sherifians, and members of tribal populations. This was

19

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also a moment in which intellectuals-poets, writers, and journalists-collaborated and were duly punished. 4 The revolt starkly revealed the problems intrinsic to maintaining order in Iraq. The solution for such problems was articulated at the Cairo Conference (March 1921), which determined that Iraq would become a monarchy under the leadership of Emir Faysal (b. 1883), a son of the Hashemite Sherif Husayn and one of the leaders of the Arab Revolt, who was forced to flee Syria after its occupation by the French. Faysal had some claims to legitimacy as the ruler of the short-lived Arab government in Syria and as a man associated with Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, he was a newcomer when installed as king in August 1921. Within this context, the chances of constructing a pluralistic domain capable of fostering intellectual creativity appeared gloomy. The Shi'i population, especially the spiritual leadership of the rnujtahids, had suffered considerably during the 1920 revolt. The situation in both Palestine and Syria indicated that the lot of their neighbors was hardly better. Yet it was precisely these conditions that created room for debate. In 1920-1924 an intriguing debate about the nature of the new state was reflected in the arguments between pro-Sherifians, supporters of other candidates for the state's leadership (e.g., Sayyid Talib ibn Rajah, the Naqib of Basra), 5 and pro-Kemalist forces. Furthermore, between 1921 and 1924 intellectuals unrealistically expressed their faith that the monarchy would somehow fulfill their hopes for independence, grant freedom of speech, and allow democratic elections. These debates were not new. The Ottoman elections of 1912 and 1914 and debates on electoral laws had stirred much excitement among Arab intellectuals and had been discussed in both the Arab and Ottoman press. 6 Furthermore, discourses about autocracy and the need to limit the ruler's power had characterized the Arabic print media since the mid-nineteenth century. 7 Iraqis read the Arab press and were subsequently aware of the changes occurring in political theory and political life. Some were students in Istanbul and thus directly affected by debates about constitutionalism, democracy, and the powers of political leaders. 8 Iraqi-Shi 'i readers of the Lebanese magazine AI- 'Irfan were exposed to discussions about constitutionalism and reform because of the constitutional revolution in Iran. Denizens of Najaf took active part in the discussions that accompanied the revolution.' Important to our concern, however, is that all these deliberations were rooted in the Iraqi press. Iraqi journalists saw these concepts as relevant to their new nation and wished to have a constitution, a parliament, and a court in Iraq.

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THE VIRTUES OF DEMOCRACY

The Iraqi print culture was mostly, although not exclusively, the venture of the Sherifians who worked as editors and publishers in the newly established dailies. The players in the cultural realm were mostly Arab Baghdadi men. The new Iraqi dailies that appeared in 1921 were all preoccupied with the nature of the future Iraqi regime and were divided into prorepublican and promonarchic journals. In September 1920, 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri (b. 1890), a Sherifian, established the daily Al-Istiqlal ("Independence"), which advocated a Hashemite monarchy. Many of the Sherifians contributed pieces to the journal, although most did not sign their names. Two other publications that generally expressed the desire for a democratic monarchy were 'Abd al-Latif al-Fallahi's Al-Fallah, which first appeared in June 1921, and Sami Khunda's (b. 1900) Al-Rafidan, the first issue of which was published in September 1921. On the other hand, articles calling for a republican Iraq were published in Al-Dijla, established in June 1921 and edited by Hasan al-Ghasiba (b. 1889), Da'ud al-Sa'di (b. 1887), and Rashid al-Hashimi (b. 1896). Hailing the French Revolution, Al-Dijla's journalists suggested that Arabs emulate the example of the revolutionaries, thus subtly criticizing the Hashemite option. 10 Following the accession of Faysal to the throne of Iraq, Al-Dijla demanded a republican system based on free elections. In October 1922, it published an editorial accusing the king of being a British puppet and was subsequently bannedY Nevertheless, all the new publications persistently asserted that democracy was essential to Iraq, and they continued to do so after the monarchy was established. Democracy was esteemed as the most suited regime for the Iraqi nationstate. AI- 'Iraq's editorial argued that a democratic spirit would surmount sectarian differences between Iraq's Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities. Therefore Iraq did not need aristocrats but rather the participation of the peasant, the worker, the clerk, and the mother, because all members were responsible for the nationY Al-Rafidan suggested that democracy was the best remedy for social pressures. When governments did not grant citizens the right of assembly, people formed secret societies in response.U This editorial indirectly referenced Iraqi Ottoman subjects, especially officers, who joined anti-Ottoman secret societies before the war. More radically, the editorial warned the new regime unfolding in Iraq not to follow in the antidemocratic footsteps of the Ottomans, lest they face similar results. According to the journal Al-Mawsil, democracy should govern all aspects oflife. It was not only

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the election of central governments but also the election of officials to schools and to local offices that ensured the appointment of the best possible personnel, capable of establishing more schools, building hospitals, and supervising public morality. 14 Iraqi writers contended that individuals were no longer motivated by concepts of divine punishment and reward but rather by rational law and public consensus. In the modern age, the fear of hell and the desire for heaven ceased to serve as motivation for human behavior. AI-Fallah, for example, celebrated the contribution of Montesquieu to democracy as the articulator of the theory that laws represented the will of the nation. 15 In the modern age, concluded Al-Mawsil, democracy was the latest and most developed form of political governance. 16 On the other hand, writers tended to depict democracy in terminology borrowed from Islamic theology and law. Democracy allowed every rational individual to "command Right and forbid Wrong" (amr bi'l ma'ruf wa nahi 'an al-munkar), implying that leadership had transferred from the hands of advisers to the hands of the people, whose will was manifested in constitutional government, an active parliament, and a free pressY Writers evoked the notion of ijtihad, a term in Islamic law that signifies the use of individual reasoning, to explicate the meaning of democracy. Muhyi al-Din al-Nasiri noted that in the medieval Muslim world, the king consulted his viziers, generals, and 'ulama'. At present, however, every individual possessed the powers of reason. 18 Similarly, 'Abd a!-Latif al- Fallahi used the term ijtihad to verify that every person possessed the power of ijtihad in matters pertinent to his life and was consequently able to participate in the democratic process. 19 The press's self-image was that of an organ promoting democracy and openness. Muhammad ai-Hashimi (b. 1898) wrote that different people had different thoughts and opinions, which should all be represented in journals. 20 Muhammad Makki added that the press serves the nation in the same way that an army serves the government as the "speaking, defending tongue" (al-lisan al-natiq al-dafi') of the people. 2l "AI-'Asimi" defined the press as the mirror of the thoughts of the people. Journals advocated different methods for achieving progress and differed from each other according to various principles and parties. They represented the feelings of the people, inspected the order (nizam) of society, and discussed controversial issues, unbound by the influence of politicians and their interests. 22 Al-Rafidan clarified that the press usually complained about the government, which, in response, attempted to banish the men of the

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press and prevent them from publishing the truthY AI-Fallah equated the press with a political leader who propagates opinions, leads society, and contributes to culture and literature. 24 Al-Dijla equated the press with cinematic footage because both transmitted reality transparently and candidly. 25 A concern for all writers was freedom of speech. AI-Fallah asserted that freedom was a right/ 6 and Al-Mawsil similarly argued that freedom was the most beautiful grace God had bestowed upon humankindP In the article "The Freedom of the Press," a writer tor Al-Istiqlal, reporting on British pressures on Egyptian journalists, explained that "a writer composes an item with a clean conscience, assuming he is defending a national or political idea." For such a writer, "no difference exists between the ruling class [hay'a hakima] and the ruled classes [hay'a mahkuma ]." 28 Articles called repeatedly for a more liberal press law, for further amendments to the existing laws, 29 and for modifying the penalties exercised on journalists and writers. 30 The concepts adopted by the newspapers indicate a response not only to the new Middle Eastern realities but also to global, Wilsonian ideals that spoke of sovereignty and self-rule. Therefore the Iraqi constitution (accepted in July 1924), which strengthened the power of the king, used the same democratic language employed by the press. The constitution declared that all Iraqi citizens should enjoy equality before the law, freedom of expression, and liberty of publication and association as well as religious freedoms, freedom of conscience, and equality of taxation. However, the system created in Iraq did not allow such freedoms. In fact, the very prose of the constitution was negated by laws and regulations concerning land tenure, conscription to the army, and voting. 31 Yet the choice of words used in the constitution does indicate that a new language had emerged and that lip service to this language, which underscored rights and democracy, was important to both the British drafters of the constitution and to the Iraqis themselves. Hailing elections was also a pro-British and pro-Hashemite stance. The Shi 'i mujtahids voiced their objections to the electoral process, especially during 1922-1923. In November 1922 they issued fatwas condemning participation in the electoral process. Fearful that the British and the king would pressure Shi'i voters to minimize their powers and conscious of the fact that the political system was created to perpetuate the political hegemony of the Sunni elites, the mujtahids threatened to excommunicate those Shi'is who participated in the elections. Their campaign, however, ended with the weakening of the mujtahids' positions and the deportation of leading mujtahids. Objections

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to the elections were also voiced by Sunni nationalists, who feared that the elections would lead to signing a treaty with Britain that would favor British colonial interests. 32 Nevertheless, the discourse on democracy was critical. The Shi'i mujtahids or Sunni nationalists did not critique the electoral process itself but rather the fact that it was improperly implemented by the Hashemites and the British and ill-suited for their needs. It is important to note that some Sunni and Sherifian writers evoked the notion of a republic. In the early 1920s, talking about a republic meant taking a pro-Kemalist stance, a position deemed hazardous to both the Hashemites and the British. Moreover, given that the British themselves abolished such institutions as the Ottoman elected municipal councils and directly appointed officers during the period that followed the occupation, the emphasis on the significance of such Ottoman institutions as municipal councils might be seen as an indirect critique of British direct rule. As noted, democracy, constitutionalism, and elections were not new concepts for Iraqi intellectuals. Yet these writers seemed to suggest that democracy was important to modern states and therefore that their new country was entitled to this form of governance. THE BUDDING PUBLIC SPHERE

Intellectuals linked their perceptions of democracy to a broader intellectual milieu because they thought that the schools, libraries, clubs, and reading societies could educate the public, increase the level of literacy, and consequently enable Iraqis to participate in public debate. Baghdad was the center of this public sphere. Many came to reside in the city: politicians seeking power, individuals in need of state patronage, absentee landowners, tribal sheikhs, parliament representatives, and students, writers, and poets. Shi'i poets such as Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri (b. 1900) from Najaf, Christian journalists such as Rafa'il Butti (b. 1900) from Mosul, and young Jewish writers such as Anwar Sha'ul (b. 1904) from Hilla all headed to Baghdad. A significant venue for intellectual activity was the Scientific Institute (alMa' had al-'ilmi), which provided night classes and lectures. Many of Iraq's intellectuals lectured at the institute. Thabit 'Abd al-Nur (b. 1890) spoke about art and progress; educator Sati' al-Husri (b. 1862) delivered talks on progress and science; neoclassical poet Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi (b. 1863) examined the education of the illiterate; Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir (b. 1885) tackled issues in Iraqi history; Yusuf Ghunima (b. 1885) addressed Iraq's economic history;

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and Ahmad 'Izzat al-A'zami (b. 188o) detailed the rise of Arab nationalism. By 1930 the Scientific Institute developed into a full-fledged academic institution, offering classes to 6,ooo illiterate Iraqis, who attended evening classes in thirty-one schools throughout the country. 33 The Reform Club (Nadi al-islah), established in Baghdad in 1920, was led by Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi (b. 1891) and Muhammad Sadiq Chalabi alBassam. It advocated reform in social life, propagation of the sciences alongside Islamic principles, and the upholding of classical Arabic (fusha) in the face of colloquialism. The Reform Club published the newspaper Al-Islah and provided lectures and classes for the general public. Although the club was considered apolitical, it objected to the proposed treaty with Britain and organized demonstrations against it. Another cultural club, "the Society of the Brethren of Culture" (lam' iyyat ikhwan al-adab), was dedicated to the promulgation of contemporary literature and new literary genres and to the promotion of Iraqi independence. A Baghdadi organization, its members included some of the city's literary celebrities, including Sati' al-Husri, the poets Ma'ruf al-Rusafi (b. 1875) and Zahawi, and the historians Sulayman Faydi (b. 1885) and Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir. 34 The only club for women's activities was Asma' al-Zahawi's Women's Revival (al-Nahda al-nisa'iyya), which included mostly upper- and middle-class women who protested seclusion and advocated women's education in order to facilitate the running of modern households. A journal that addressed similar issues was Layla (1923-1925), edited by the Palestinian writer Pauline Hassun. 35 Another important association was a group headed by Husayn al-Rahhal (b. 1900). A son of an Ottoman bureaucrat stationed in Berlin, Rahhal saw himself as a pioneer of Iraqi socialism. In 1924, while a Baghdadi law student, Rahhal formed a group intended to promote progressive ideas. The group included novelist Mahmud Ahmad Al-Sayyid (b. 1904) and teacher and journalist Bakr Sidqi 'Awni. The group published the journal Al-Sahifa ("The Paper"), in which they underscored the need to liberate Iraqi women and peasants and called for legal reform. 36 Najaf continued to be a center of great learning and poetry, as it had been all throughout the Ottoman period. The Najafi Society of Islamic Revival (Jam'iyyat al-nahda al-islamiyya) was a meeting place for notables, clerics, and tribal sheikhs. 37 This city, however, also contained a few radical associations. Mujtahid Muhammad Taqi al-Din al-Shirazi published a fatwa declaring the Bolsheviks to be friends of Islam. 38 His son, Mirza Muhammad, called

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for cooperation between Bolsheviks and Arabs and founded a society for the promotion of Iraqi collaboration with Mustafa Kemal and the Bolsheviks. A pro-Bolshevik society, called the Society for the Liberation of the Muslim East (Jam'iyyat takhlis al-sharq al-islami), founded in 1919, had sympathizers in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, and Karbala. The Shirazis were likewise involved in al-Jam'iyya al-'iraqiyya al-'arabiyya (the Iraqi Arab Society), which called for Iraqi collaboration with Mustafa Kemal and the Bolsheviks. 39 Although these organizations reflected the political uncertainty of 1919-1921, their activities indicate that in order to defy British control, Shi'i public figures were willing to cooperate with nonsectarian elements. Writers realized that journals and clubs could not survive unless people read more. Therefore they advocated the proliferation of libraries and publishing houses as institutions that inspired democratic change. Shi'i intellectual and poet Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi (b. 1889) penned an article, "The Role of Books in the East," in which he claimed that the importance of books, "the treasures of Eastern literature," was globally recognized. Shabibi hailed the efforts of libraries in Istanbul, Cairo, Damascus, and Medina to collect texts and manuscripts. Nonetheless, as most of the Eastern manuscripts were still unknown to Muslims (because countries such as India, Bahrain, and Iraq did not devote enough effort to amass texts in proper libraries), Shabibi hoped that these Muslim countries would erect more libraries and emulate the Egyptian, Syrian, and Turkish models. He cited titles of manuscripts found in Najaf that he believed should be preserved and kept. Shabibi's article emphasized the role that intellectuals played in the public sphere as custodians of knowledge in libraries and as guardians of the cultural heritage of Islam. Yet, as a denizen of Najaf, Shabibi was aware of the cultural richness found in his own city, and he used his articles to inform readers about it. 40 Mahzun ("the sad one") from Najaf wrote that publishing houses were responsible for progress, for "there is no civilization without knowledge, there is no knowledge without books and there are no books without publishing houses." He suggested several ways to popularize reading, such as reducing the prices of books and adding illustrations to texts. 41 AI- 'Iraq advised the government to encourage publishing while taking into account freedom of conscience as a guiding principleY In the past, wrote AlDijla, only students of religion possessed books. Nowadays, Iraqis should read more books, through the activities of libraries. 41 Libraries, to Zahawi, were "the pulse in the human body," "the barometer that points out the weather

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outside," and "the treasures of knowledge." 44 Rafa'il Butti, the editor of Al'Iraq, considered creating an Iraqi version of the Pulitzer Prize to increase public interest in the print culture and to encourage young writers to publish their works. 45 The Jewish intellectual Ezra Haddad maintained that, although Iraq was experiencing a scientific and national revival, this marvelous revival was bound to fail without libraries and scientific and literary associations. 46 The rise of a new literary market was best articulated in the Lebanese paper AI-'Irfan. Despite its Shi 'i readership and the fact that it was published outside Iraq, the paper commented on most of the new publications in the Iraqi market. The newspaper Al-'Iraq was "an advanced daily" whose issues included the works of the finest writers and poets. 47 Rafa'il Butti's Contemporary Literature in Iraq (al-Adab al-'asri fi'l 'Iraq) was described as "a historical, literary, critical publication," and the writers of AI-'Irfan advised libraries to adorn their collections with this indispensable book. 48 Following the publication of his diwan, Zahawi was depicted as one of the leaders of culture (shaykh min shuyukh al-adab) together with the Iraqi poets Shabibi and Rusafi. 49 The cohesiveness of the intellectual community, which transcended religious divisions, was most evident in the obituary ofMuhmud Shukri al-Alusi, in which the Sunni religious scholar was described as "the great 'alim of Baghdad" who "possessed precious knowledge and high qualities." Not only Iraq but the entire Arab nation grieved for the great scholar. 50 These processes, however, engendered anxieties about the nature of reading and readership. A reader from Najaf, for example, criticized the proliferation of books whose sole purpose was "to spread the spirit of heresy" and strongly disapproved of the marketing of these books and especially of their use in schools. His suggested that parents more closely supervise the reading practices of their children. 51 An article in the cultural magazine Al-Yaqin warned readers that the Shari'a did not allow the purchasing of books written by nonbelievers (kuffar)Y Another article in Al-Yaqin, "A New Mentality and an Old Mentality" ('Aql jadid wa 'aql 'atiq), criticized a teacher who, shockingly, preferred reading novels rather than tafsir collections, saying that Qur'anic exegesis was reflective of the old mentality. 53 These articles, then, considered the reading of novels or heretical books a challenge to tradition and patriarchal authority. Despite the absence of data regarding newspaper circulation or the number of members in clubs, it is clear that the scope of this new cultural activity was limited. The same names-Rusafi, Zahawi, Basir, Faydi-reappear in most

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articles dealing with intellectual activity in societies and clubs. Nevertheless, the importance of these novel institutions is demonstrated by visits of the king to the Baghdadi clubs and by the fact that members managed to market newspapers identified with their clubs. Moreover, journalists and writers realized that literacy and proliferation of publishing houses and libraries would allow their works to be sold and their opinions to be heard. They thus invested much effort in creating a reading audience by organizing night classes and lectures and by encouraging debate. Representing themselves as both democratic and patriotic, journalists hoped that newspapers would give voice to popular grievances. The concept of public opinion (ra'y 'amm) was thus central in the newspapers' editorials. Public opinion, that which "unites the thought of all or most of the individuals in the nation," was formed in cultural and political clubs. 54 Intellectuals held that public opinion was the pillar of the nation, its spirit, and the source of its happiness. 55 The concept of "public opinion," however, was somewhat amorphous because articles rarely specified the nature of the ideas that united the public. Similarly, they signified a desire for unity that would obliterate inner divisions. Al-Fallah asserted that the press strove for unity of thought among all readers instead of the proliferation of ideas. 56 Freedom of the press should be exercised within reasonable limits, wrote Al-Istiqla/. 57 The boundaries between the "reasonable" and the "unreasonable, however," remained indistinct and blurred. The self-image of journalists as national speakers of popular anti-British sentiment was prevalent throughout the 1920s. Already during the 1920 revolt poets encouraged, confronted, and guided the rebels (a phenomenon quite familiar from premodern culture), 58 and writers and journalists similarly endeavored to address public concerns and interpret current events. One of the journals established during this period was Al-Istiqlal. Muhammad 'Abd alMuhsin (b. 1899) founded the paper with the help of Shi'i 'ulama'. The paper strove to condemn the "barbaric acts" of the British and to bear witness to the suffering of its contributors, writing during war and siege. 59 Al-Furat, established by Baqir al-Shabibi around the same time, also articulated the aspirations of intellectuals to become speakers for the public. The front page of Al-Furat's first issue was addressed to the British, a nation lacking any understanding of the concept of mercy. For the British, mercy meant the banishment of innocent 'ulama' and poor children, torment, exile, and imprisonment. The religious freedom they offered Iraqis was nothing but a lie. Shabibi wrote:

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"Why have you made the mosques' court a target for your air strikes? ... Is it a feature of religious tolerance to bomb the mosques of Muslims, to besiege their meetings and to thwart their holidays and ceremonies? ... If this is tolerance, what is intolerance? We congratulate Gladstone and applaud the Crusaders!" As for the argument that the people ofiraq welcomed Britain because it liberated them from the Ottomans, Shabibi asked rhetorically, "When did they welcome your country? And when were they happy with the presence of your army?" 60 The editorial, echoing both religious and national causes, refers to military actions taken by the British to suppress the revolt (bombardment, siege of cities, and attacks by air). It encourages the Shi'i readers of the newspaper by explicating that their revolt is aimed at protecting sacred religious values. Significantly, to function as a national and popular newspaper, Shabibi constructs a clear dichotomy between "we," a collective whose signification shifts from the denizens of Najaf to the entire Muslim community, and "you," the violent and merciless British. Shabibi, the intellectual, was the writer able to expose the lies disseminated by the British and to articulate the grievances of the Muslims. Subsequently, he focused on aspects of everyday life that were interrupted as a result of occupation, such as public prayers. Al-Furat published only five issues, yet the idea of a newspaper voicing popular grievances while exposing colonial oppression continued in the 1920s. 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri's Al-Istiqlal expressed similar opinions. One of its editorials commented that when the colonizers attempted to loosely translate the term "mandate" into Arabic and connote its meaning, they used Arabic words that signified guardianship, assistance, and supervision ( wasiyya, musa'ada, ishraf). Nevertheless, such translations were intended to deceive weak nations, because "mandate" was not synonymous with any of these positive terms. This manipulation of language was reflective of British policies, which talked of liberating humanity and helping the weak yet did nothing to realize these noble aims. 61 In December 1921, Al-Istiqlal published a poem by Jawahiri in which the poet lamented the death of the martyrs of the 1920 revolt. The land, the poem declared, bore witness to the crimes of the West. 62 As a voice of the public, 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri often associated his paper with nonjournalistic, national, and popular activities, thus demonstrating the paper's constant involvement in the affairs of the community. Al-Istiqlal, for example, invited people to the mosque of the Haydarkhana to express their opposition to the mandate. 63

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Intellectuals nonetheless articulated communal opposition to not only the British but also the Hashemites and their supporters. In 1922-1924 the press addressed many of the pressing problems faced by Iraqis. For example, the prohibitive cost of rents in Baghdad was an issue taken up by journalists as migration increased from the provinces to the capital city. In Al-Dijla, Muhammad al-Hashimi protested the high rents that were out of reach to migrants and to owners of small businesses. 64 AI- 'Iraq argued that poor migrants were forced to endure appalling housing conditions in the metropolis because they could not afford the unreasonably high rents; therefore the newspaper called for legislation to solve the problem. 65 Al-Rafidan focused on the issue of land ownership and demanded the distribution of lands to peasants according to their technical and economic capacities. The paper also called for improving the educational system in the villages and for the establishment of charitable organizations that would provide for the poor. 66 Al-Mawsil not only preached in favor of assisting the poor but also asked for donations from Muslims, Christians, and Jews for the building of a hospital in the city. 67 A noted intellectual in the public sphere was Sulayman Faydi of the Islamic Charitable Society (al-Jam'iyya al-khayriyya al-islamiyya). 68 As early as 1908, Faydi established a school and in 1909 published the newspaper Al-Iqaz ("The Awakening"). His views about reform were known to Iraqi readership from a text in rhymed prose, Al-Riwaya al-iqaziyya ("The Story of Awakening"), which was considered an important statement in praise of social change and progress. 69 During 1921-1923 Faydi and his peers used the press to launch a campaign for the establishment of an orphanage and a school. 7°Consequently, the king showed his support for the project, and the orphanage's opening ceremony was attended by officials of all religions as well as by poets and writers.71 The campaign proved that intellectuals possessed the ability to pressure the state into honoring its commitment to the weakest elements in societypoor children and orphans. An intellectual who saw himself as the defender of the people against injustices perpetrated by Iraq's political leadership was Ibrahim Salih Shukr (b. 1893). His journals Al-Nashi'a ("Writing") and Al-Nashi'a al-jadida ("New Writing") often criticized and ridiculed Iraq's political leadership. Shukr was most blunt in his criticism of politicians, poets, and fellow journalists. He published, for example, a series of satirical articles dealing with "the true biographies" oflraqi politicians, parodying the language that flattered such officials. Sabih Bey Nasha'at was thus described as a man with an enormous

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physique but minuscule professional achievements and was faulted for safeguarding Iraqi oil only when his own car needed gas. 72 The paper cheered the resignation of the minister of education and published a sarcastic essay in which Shukr presented himself as the best candidate for this position despite his total inexperience, given the inept track records of the personalities who previously worked in the ministry. 73 Shukr criticized the Scientific Institute for inviting only a small group of people to its lectures. He also criticized intellectuals who participated in official ceremonies sponsored by the government. 74 Shukr's articles reflected the idea that writers should always keep their eyes on the behavior of politicians and fellow intellectuals in order to unmask the true intentions of the corrupt Iraqi leadership. Despite the fact that intellectuals and politicians "say they are doctors," capable of curing society's illness, wrote Shukr, "if one inspects their affairs carefully, one discovers that they are virtually illiterate." His paper, then, sought to extract the real truth behind such official statements as "I am a journalist, I am one of the leaders of public opinion!" and to present the realities behind them. 75 Shukr's ideas, it should be noted, were not happily received, as is evident from the two assassination attempts in the 1920s. 76 These attempts, however, also attested to the importance attributed to his articles and to his activity as a public intellectual. The press, then, began as a popular national vehicle to express public concerns, mostly anti-British. It was positioned between the state and the colonial authorities. When it functioned as a nationalist press, it accentuated the unity of the Muslim and Arab community vis-a-vis the British and, at times, collaborated with the Hashemite court. Yet national commitments were not always enough to restrain criticism of the state. The press therefore developed into a tool that occupied a domain different from that of the state. Intellectuals such as Faydi and Shukr fully exploited the potential of clubs and journals to influence political processes. The press thus served to create a domain in which individuals discussed their problems and expressed concerns about their national leadership while supporting their struggle against Britain. PLURALISM: THE ROLE OF RELIGION

The public sphere was able to tolerate diverse concepts regarding the role of religion in society. Although certain issues were still taboo (such as parodying the Qur'an), 77 intellectuals were able to express their criticism oflraqi 'ulama'. Iraqi writers were also familiar with debates on secularism, positivism, Darwinism,

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and social Darwinism. The leading neoclassical poets in general and Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi in particular composed verses hailing the virtues of science, evolution, social Darwinism, and scientific progress. Zahawi had visited Egypt in 1896 and had met Ya'qub Sarruf, Faris Nimr, Shibli Shumayl, and Jurji Zaydan, intellectuals interested in scientific innovations and positivism. Zahawi gained most of his knowledge from articles published by the Egyptian journals Al-Hilal and Al-Muqtataf and from studies published in the Ottoman press. Rahhal's group used to collectively read the works of Shumayl, Salama Musa, and Nikola Haddad, three thinkers associated with propagating Darwinism in the Arab intellectual milieu. 78 This, however, does not mean that the press was simply a secularizing tool. On the contrary, some intellectuals used the press as a pluralistic institution to denigrate certain aspects of nationalism and materialist currents prevalent in the print culture. The print market responded to the needs of Muslim believers. The monthly Al-'Irfan regularly published titles and reviews of new editions of texts that were pertinent to the lives of Shi 'i believers. 'Abd al-Karim al-Hilli's Al-Ahkam al-Ja'fariyya ji'l ahwal al-shakhsiyya ("Shi'i Rulings Regarding Personal Affairs") "provided information in matters of marriage and divorce, inheritance and custody according to the Ja'fari law" and consequently "made life much easier for Shi'i judges and for the students of the law school in Baghdad." 79 The new edition of Mawahib al-wahib fi fada'il Abi Talib ("The Best Bounty Considering the Virtues of Abu Talib"), written by Ja'far al-Naqdi (b. 1885), the qadi (judge) of 'Imara, represented the author's endeavor to "serve religion and faith." 80 Hala Fattah noted the importance of an Iraqi salafi reform movement, dominated by the writings of the Sunni sheikh Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (b. 1857). The theological and intellectual struggle against the Wahhabi movement and the need to confront Wahhabi raids colored Iraqi religious debate on the nature of reform. Nonetheless, essays written in the press in the 1920s illustrate that the Iraqi religious press addressed a plethora of issues and responded to Egyptian and Syrian publications as well. 81 The Najafi mujtahidHibat al-Din al-Shahrastani (b. 1883) wrote frequently on ethical, social, and theological themes and used the press both to express and respond to public concerns. His hybrid and pluralistic framework included the works of medieval Arab thinkers (both Sunni and Shi'i), theories of modern Western thinkers, and the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers. Furthermore, he used these theorists even when he attacked what seemed to

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him the perilous streams of materialism and positivism. In his essay on the senses, for example, he referenced poems written by Ma'arri and Mutanabbi, the works of both Shi'i and Sunni 'ularna', and the theories of Hippocrates and David Hume. 82 Already in the 1910s, he referenced essays published in Egyptian, Syrian, Ottoman, Iraqi, and Indian journals. 83 Shahrastani went out of his way to explain that a pious Muslim could be a devout believer while accepting the premises of scientific knowledge. In 1909, he tried to harmonize Qur'anic verses, prophetic traditions, and the findings of modern astronomy and physics. 84 In the early 1920s, he used the same principles when replying to questions addressed to him by Shi'i readers that were published in the journal Al-Murshid. The questions referred to Shahrastani reflected problems faced by readers of the Qur'an, fiqh manuals, and hadith collections. Topics were wide-ranging, and questions varied from requests for information about sects such as the Druze to problems concerning rituals, dietary laws, and veiling. Queries also dealt with the virtues of materialist and spiritual philosophies, free will and determinism, and the need to refute the claims of secularists and particularly the Bolsheviks that religion had either ceased to exist or would cease to exist in the near future. 83 Shahrastani's interpretations relied on both Shi'i law and theology and a more modern knowledge of history and geography. For example, when a reader inquired whether the prophetic tradition, "the earth is established upon the horns of a bull," represented a contradiction between reason and religious knowledge, Shahrastani replied that ancient societies believed that the land stands on horns of bulls and on elephants and that these traditions might have influenced this incorrect perception of the earth. Even so, other Islamic traditions proved that the earth exists without any means of support. Hence two techniques emerged for interpreting these traditions. One was to find fault with their transmitters, given that these traditions were attributed to the isra'iliyyat genre. 86 However, Shahrastani preferred to investigate these traditions allegorically, as symbols of the primitive agriculture of humans in premodern times, which was dependent on animals such as bulls. We could also understand these traditions metaphorically, namely, as saying that the earth was round like the horns of the bull. 87 Another important hybrid religious model was suggested by the Sunni Muhammad al-Hashimi through his journal Al-Yaqin. Hashimi's thinking represented a critique of the modern secular nation-state on the one hand and a rigorous denunciation of the Iraqi religious establishment on the other.

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Hashimi was a strong opponent of ethnic nationalism, reminding his readers that the term "Muslim" included even those who could not read the Qur'an in Arabic. Looking at nationalism as the sole principle that organizes human existence may thus lead to the un-Islamic concept of racism. 88 Hashimi, moreover, critiqued the theories of materialism (madiyya) and Darwinism, arguing that in European context, the Church's oppression gave birth to theories that denied religion its role in life. Because Islam encouraged freedom of inquiry, Muslims had no reason to question the essence of their faith. Hashimi further made the point that philosophers and scientists from both the East and the West had all emphasized the necessity of spiritualism and the significance of the existence of a power beyond reason. Hashimi 's explanation about the virtues of religion, however, was framed in nonreligious terms; he enlisted historical case studies and theories produced in the West to validate the point that the religious experience was a vital component in the life of every human being. 89 Hashimi, however, also criticized Iraqi 'ulama', both Sunni and Shi'i, as a group unable to comprehend the spiritual meanings of the holy texts. They failed to realize that Islam not only signified performance of rituals and adherence to law but also represented ethics and culture (adab). Similarly, the Awqaf Ministry focused on building numerous lavish mosques yet ignored the importance of religious guidance. Hashimi thus advocated a return to the model of the Prophet and the surma by removing the layer oflegends that had been grafted onto Islamic holy texts and reforming the religious establishment according to the models suggested by the Egyptian reformer Muhammad 'Abduh (b. 1849).~ 0 Like Shahrastani, Hashimi referenced a variety of thinkers, for example, Muhammad Shukri al-Alusi and medieval Islamic philosophers. 91 Moreover, Hashimi's journal published essays by the socialists Hussayn al-Rahhal and Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid, the Christian Yusuf Ghanima, and the Shi'is Shahrastani and Mahmud Mahdi al-Basir.92 Al-Yaqin illustrates how in the pluralistic Iraqi public a critique of both secular national axioms and the religious establishment was possible. His condemnation of the AwqafMinistry likewise disclosed a distrust of the state's religious institutions, which he held accountable for Iraq's cultural and religious adversities. More broadly, Shahrastani and Hashimi's activities were part of a world in which writing about religion was inspired by Muhammad 'Abduh, the contemporary Arab print market, and the works on Qur'anic exegesis and prophetic traditions. The similarity between the views of the Shi'i Shahrastani and the Sunni Hashimi was a result of the Iraqi publishing market, in which

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intellectuals read each other's works. The Iraqi and Arab press consequently offered a platform for Shi'i and Sunni intellectuals to articulate a variety of views on religion that was read by both sects. THE LIMITS OF THE SPHERE

National and colonial limitations restricted the possibility of writing freely and openly in the press. The British were especially wary of the daily press because it dealt with current politics and the particularities of the Anglo- Iraqi relationship. Thus editors of dailies were subjected to a variety of punishments and constraints. In Iraq, then, writing about democracy and pluralism was often a way of implicitly demanding a change in the undemocratic nature of the mandate. The state was quite active in silencing intellectuals. Faysal often cooperated with the British and capitulated to pressures from the high commissioner's office to stop certain publications. One of the most influential pro-British politicians in Hashemite Iraq who would head many of its governments, Nuri al-Sa'id (b. 1888), thought it crucial that all journalistic activities be supervised and suggested the creation of a special office for public safety that would prevent journalists from disseminating "negligent information" that could lead the public astray. In an interview to AI- 'Iraq, he confessed that he was concerned about "bizarre ideas" spread by foreign elements (dukhala'). Sa'id maintained that it was "the duty of every local patriot to let me know about the practices of individuals who create or try to spread damaging rumors." 93 King Faysal co-opted intellectuals into the new state. As Charles Tripp notes, one of the important strengths of the Hashemite state was its use of networks of patronage that served to ensure the support of the regime by such diverse groups as tribal sheikhs, the Sherifians, and Sunni notables. 94 The regime invested much effort in enticing intellectuals to join the patronage system by inviting them to official ceremonies and offering them employment in the court and in the new institutions of the state. Such official positions were an effective means of influencing the activities of intellectuals and of supplying the needs of the state for trained personnel.95 The king knew that when he came to Iraq, he was not accepted by publics who resented his pro-British politics, and consequently he attempted to expand his circles of support. The public manifestation of his support could thus be a speech by a poet or a leading intellectual in a ceremony. Moreover, Faysal made sure to attend openings of clubs and societies and invited intellectuals to attend school functions and

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events in his honor. Gertrude Bell provides a colorful depiction of one such event, held in a local school. It lasted the usual 3 hours. We sat in rows and listened to speeches, songs and poems and I really believe the audience liked it .... There were parts of it which were quite remarkably boring, long speeches (no speech lasted less than 15 minutes) about the light of education being the sole ray that illumines the world; but I must confess that there were also interesting moments. One was an ode by our half paralyzed old poet, Jamil Zahawi-there were 35 moments of it .... He began by tumbling off the estrade and having to be poked and pushed back onto it while everyone murmured "Allah!" ... He began very quietly with great throbbing lines which pulsed on to a growing volume of sound. The whole audience took fire; they lent forward with their faces illuminated and time after time the falling couplet was revived with a "Repeat! repeat!" ... Zahawi was followed by another and rival poet, a man called Maruf [a!-Rusafi ].90 One of the first attempts to organize a state festival was at the initiative of the Scientific Institute in Baghdad to revive the medieval market, Suq 'Ukaz, in which poets used to recite their works. The local press lauded the new 'Ukaz as a market of poetry, oratory, and fine arts. Such cultural markets had in the past produced the treasured jahili poetry, and writers were sure that the new 'Ukaz would produce similar works of art. The king granted his support for the event and attended its sessions. 97 Shukr, on the other hand, was generally suspicious of ceremonies organized by the state and castigated the intellectuals who participated in 'Gkaz. 98 In subsequent years intellectuals were invited to speak and write on holidays, most notably 'id al-nahda that commemorated the Arab Revolt. In the 1920s, events such as the arrival of an important dignitary or the death of a leading personality served as pretexts for the gathering of intellectuals under the auspices of the state. For example, when Prime Minister 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun committed suicide in 1928, his funeral included a list of eminent intellectuals who eulogized him and read poems glorifying his achievements. 99 The establishment of a patronage network for journalists was easier because many journalists either were Sherifians or were on good terms with Iraqi politicians. Some studied with politicians in schools or colleges, and others participated in the same secret societies, mainly al-'Ahd, during the Ottoman period. Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir, the historian, and Muhammad

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Baqir al-Shabibi, the editor of Al-Furat, were members of Haras al-istiqlal. AlIstiqlal's editor, 'Abd al-Ghafur a!-Badri, was a member of al-'Alam al-akhdar. AI-Fallah's editor, 'Abd al-Latif a I- Fallahi, was a student of the military academy in Istanbul. Al-Dijla's Hasan al-Ghasiba was an officer in the Arab Revolt's army, and Mahmud al-Hashimi served in Faysal's Syrian government. Although such social networks meant that politicians used their personal clout with editors to curtail criticism of the Hashemites, journalists did criticize the regime and were able to express their disapproval of many aspects of its pro-British policies. Censorship and banning of newspapers were used as far as intellectual activity was concerned. The Ottoman laws regulating the print culture (as amended in 1910 and 1911) were reapproved in May 1921, with a few amendments, and remained virtually unchanged until1931. 100 Every publisher had to submit a memorandum to the Ministry oflnterior stating the title of the newspaper or periodical, the place of issue, and the subjects under discussion; the name, age, residence, and nationality of its publisher and editor; and the language in which the paper would be published. Publishers had to send two copies of each newspaper, daily, or periodical to the Ministry ofinterior. Sellers of newspapers, books, pamphlets, pictures, or other printed matter needed permits from the state. Defamatory publications against religious communities and publications calling on citizens to resist military service were outlawed. Public morality also played an important role in legislation. It was illegal for books, pamphlets, articles, pictures, or titles of newspapers to breach public morality or decency. It was likewise illicit to print material that endangered the safety of the state. The defamation laws set penalties of imprisonment for three months to three years for defamation offenses against state officials; and for fifteen days to six months for defamation offenses against the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the courts. Demonstrations and public meetings needed to be approved by state officials. The state also had a right to send a representative to these meetings. 101 These laws gave power to the state to interfere in the public sphere. Such laws were imposed throughout the history of Hashemite Iraq when publications appeared too critical or ran out of favor with the government. This meant that intellectuals and writers were careful to self-censor their publications and articles. Sami Khunda, the editor of Al-Rafidan, reported that he and Ibrahim Hilmi al-'Umar (b. 1890), the editor of Al-Mufid, accompanied Faysal on his visit to N asiriyya. The leader of the As ad tribes addressed Faysal

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and proclaimed that Iraq was far from a democracy. These people, confessed Khunda, believed that their king was a British governor "dressed in Arab clothes." 'Umar said that he would not publish such news in order to avoid the punishments of "the hand of imperialism," whereas Khunda did publish the story. Consequently, his paper was suspended for a month. 102 The British also attempted to control the Iraqi press, manipulate local newspapers, and foster their own publications. Gertrude Bell initiated the establishment of the Baghdadi Peace Library (Maktabat al-Salam) in September 1919. During the occupation and its aftermath, the British sponsored newspapers in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulimaniya. In 1914, they published Iraq During the War, a weekly that circulated pro-British items. In 1915 the British installed Sulayman al-Zuhir, a notable from Basra, to publish Al-Awqat al-Basriyya (Basra Times), a four-page journal in English, Arabic, Turkish, and Persian; the paper was transformed in 1916 into the English publication The Times of Mesopotamia. Its printing press then moved to Baghdad in 1918, where it was renamed Baghdad Times. 103 Another newspaper sponsored by the British was AI-'Arab, whose staff included the Christian linguist Anastas alKarmili (b. 1866) as subeditor, Razuq Ghanim (b. 1882) as editor, and Gertrude Bell as general manager. The paper first appeared in July 1917, and in June 1920 it resurfaced as Al-'Iraq, under Ghanim's management. Poet Ma'ruf al-Rusafi accused Ghanim of receiving financial support from Britain by alluding to the mysterious circumstances under which Ghanim was able to accumulate much wealth following the occupation and to become "the sheikh of the Arab press," although "he could not put two words in Arabic together." 104 British-sponsored publications, however, were not the main concern of intellectuals. For writers and journalists, the question of free speech was a pressing concern because British censorship endangered their livelihood. High Commissioner Percy Cox linked the impossibility of democracy in Iraq to the fact that Iraqis had yet to achieve "the stage of social development" that would permit a republic to be "a safe solution." 105 Armed with stereotyped notions of Oriental backwardness and a will to establish an elite sympathetic to British interests, both the high commissioner and Gertrude Bell pressured the Provisional Council and later Faysal and the Iraqi government to pay heed to real and imaginary threats to British rule expressed in the print market. Much information about intellectual activity during the mandate period is found in British intelligence reports, especially under sections titled "public opinion" and in personality files, which consist of biographical details on

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many of Iraq's intellectuals. Such accounts assessed each intellectual according to his pro- or anti-British tendencies and the danger he posed to Faysal's monarchy. 106 Al-Dijla's editor, Da'ud al-Sa'di, was initially "a moderate and sensible Baghdadi." Nevertheless, his later activity categorized him as a "prominent extremist" who was "usually connected with all nationalist agitations and intrigues." 107 Shi'i intellectual Fahmi al-Mudarris (b. 1873) was said to be "in close touch with the extreme nationalists." 108 Thabit 'Abd al-Nur was deemed "prominent in extreme Nationalistic politics." 109 Ibrahim Hilmi al'Umar was a "thoroughly worthless and contemptible character, who will do anything (or anybody) for money or drink." 110 Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi was reprehended for "his reactionary views." 111 The British commented on the ethnic affiliations of the intellectuals and their relatives, because they assumed that the ethnic and religious background of intellectuals would dictate their writing. Furthermore, clubs and societies seemed to constitute a danger to the underdeveloped Iraqi mentality. "In the opinion of his Excellency, it is for very careful consideration firstly whether at the present juncture," the government ought to allow "the formation of societies, the existence of which must result in [the] tendency to disintegrate the people of Iraq into political factions." 112 The influx of what the British regarded as Bolshevik and Kemalist "propaganda" occupied many reports. "The bogey of pro-Turkish sentiments," "fostered by the extremists" might, according to one report, have disastrous effects on undeveloped Iraqis.U' Al-Dijla was often under scrutiny because of its pro-Kemalist tendencies. Gertrude Bell's letter from 14 August 1921, relates the following: The Dijlah is edited by a young ass who is agin everybody.... And the idiot public of the coffee shops ... reads his rag eagerly in the hope that they will find him in opposition to us. He is by way of being the pure, high-minded Arab patriot and he demonstrates this by publishing all the news of Turkish successes which happened six weeks ago without dreaming of giving a date. Finally the clouds and the fact that on one and the same day he announced that the Greeks were escaping in ships from Ismir while the Reuters in another Arab paper related that the Turks were evacuating Angora, were more than I could bear. You understand the public here hates the Greek successes and applauds anyone who talks of Turkish victories; moreover they buy his paper. In principle I feel the same. I don't the least want to see the Greeks in Asia

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Minor; ... But my business now is to set up an Arab state in Mesopotamia and the only visible enemy is the Kamalists allied with the Bolshevists.... Ja'far [al-Askari] sent in to say that while the Dijlah was publishing telegrams announcing Turkish victories he could get no recruits for the Arab army. People's minds were disturbed and they began to talk of the possibility of the Turks coming back! That's what they are like in the East-don't I know it. Bell read the paper's statements "in a passion which words fail me to describe." When she happened to meet "the luckless editor of the Dijlah," she informed him that unless he reformed his ways of reporting, "he would find himself in gaol."ll4 To Bell, the editor of Al-Dijla published inaccurate information, adequate for the public coffeehouses. His news lacked accuracy and stood in contradiction to the truthful Reuters accounts. Of importance is the fact that Bell herself supported the Turks rather than the Greeks, yet she believed that the Iraqi public had not reached the degree that allowed it to accept such news. Furthermore, news about the Turks might endanger the formation of an Arab army. Ironically, Bell was as moved by Al-Dijla's words as was the Iraqi public. According to her own words, the article emotionally influenced her, and her narration, which featured the words "ass" and "idiot," indicates the profound importance she addressed to the newspaper's articles. The suppression of AlDijla also demonstrates the shared interests of the Hashemites and the British in silencing criticism of the regime and voices of republicanism. The idea that the Iraqi public was incapable of understanding the news they read, expressed in Bell's assessment, was exemplified in other intelligence reports. The debates about the Awqaf budget that appeared in AI-Fallah, Al'Iraq, and Al-Dijla in August 1921 were "tiresome and foolish," noted an intelligence report. The comment, "This idiotic article is written under a complete misconception," accompanied a translation of the news about the stance of the Jewish minister of finance Sassun Effendi toward reform in the Awqaf Ministry. 115 When the British organized a visit by Faysal to Mosul, the welcoming atmosphere in the city was seen as an appropriate response to claims pronounced in the press, which alluded to Faysal's unpopularity. The success of the visit, in the words of the office of the high commissioner, implied that "the tongues of all prophets of evil have been effectively silenced." 116 The colonial officer was thus not only a recorder of events but also a commentator on the quality of the language that described them and its truthfulness.

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The British were also vigilant in averting criticism of France or of British colonial policies in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world. The high commissioner did not like the tendency in the local Arab press to publish news on the policy of the French government in Syria. To Cox, "neither the British nor the Arab government can regard with indifference expression of hostility to a power allied to Great Britain ... at a time when all its energies are directed towards the establishment of an independent Arab state in Iraq." 117 For this reason, the 3 August 1921 issue of Lisan al-'Arab was suppressed because "two days previously the editor had promised some comments on the British and the French policies in the Middle East." Two French consuls complained, and the editor, despite being "privately warned to abstain," published the article. The high commissioner judged that its publication would be "ill advised" and banned the issue.U 8 Objections to the proposed Anglo-Iraqi treaty were dangerous in British and Hashemite eyes. When Al-Mufid expressed the view that "if weak nations are forced by terrorism to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility," the high commissioner gave orders to exile its editor. Ibrahim Hilmi al-'Umar, the paper's publisher, escaped to Iran and returned in May 1924, when he revived the paper. 119 In September 1922, the intellectuals Fahmi al-Mudarris, Sami Khunda, and Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir took part in a large demonstration in front of the palace to mark Faysal's rise to the throne and to protest the continuation of the mandate. Cox and Bell witnessed the demonstration and heard the calls to terminate the mandate. In response, at the high commissioner's request, Mudarris was dismissed from his position in the court. AlMufid and Al-Rafidan were closed, and Sami Khunda and Basir were arrested and exiled to the island ofHenjam. 120 High Commissioner Henry Dobbs and Faysal allowed them to return in March 1923. 121 The British reports convey an interesting contradiction. On the one hand, newspapers were considered a manifestation of popular sentiments, as expressed in the title "public opinion" in the intelligence reports and in the translation of editorials from Iraqi newspapers into English. In this, the British accepted the Iraqi editors' arguments that their products represented public opinion. Furthermore, newspapers seem to have had, in British eyes, a profound impact on Iraqis, because they could easily stir their emotional readership. In fact, the power attributed to the journalists seems astonishing considering the high illiteracy rates in Iraq and the limited size of the public

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sphere. It suggests that the imagery concerning the powers of the journalist so prevalent in the Iraqi newspapers, read and translated by British officials, reemerged in colonial reports. Cox and Bell accordingly concluded that newspapers, clubs, and meetings were dangerous because of their overwhelming impact on the public. On the other hand, these reports did not regard journalists and writers highly. Writers were "idiots," "agitators," pro-Kemalists, or pro-Bolsheviks whose essays were part of some propaganda machinery and provided an ignorant audience with partial and inaccurate data. Furthermore, these debates marked the limits of the public sphere and the inability to carve a completely free zone of conversation in the colonial setting of the mandate. Torn between two sets of censorship, the Hashemite and the British, it was difficult for writers to articulate their opinions. The discussion about democracy and free speech was therefore a response to constant and repressive interference in the print culture. Writing about democracy came to articulate not only the importance of democracy in a future Iraqi state but also the urgent necessity of changing present realities. Having acknowledged the limits of the public sphere, however, we should not underrate the efforts of writers to have their opinions heard and published. Despite being constantly monitored and viewed as subversive elements, journalists and writers managed to create a sphere that mediated public concerns and encouraged debates on a variety of opinions. This tendency was even more apparent in cultural and religious magazines, which mostly escaped the eyes of the censors. These debates introduced a new political vocabulary, assimilated ideas prevalent in the Ottoman and Arab press into the Iraqi context, and popularized them among the reading public. THE PUBLIC SPHERE, 1924-1931

After 1924, the process of national institutionalization was accelerated: Iraq adopted a constitution, approved a flag, appointed a senate, and held elections. A special royal decree in 1924 introduced the Tribal Criminal and Civil Dispute Regulation. Iraqi thinkers, however, were uncertain about the possibility of realizing democracy in their country. It was clear to many that Iraq would be neither democratic nor free from Britain's domination. As Peter Sluglett puts it, "The Iraqi government realized that there was no escape and that the only amelioration lay in tinkering with the details of the Anglo-Iraqi relationship." Iraqi politicians, moreover, were quick to realize the rewards of cooperation

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"which would accrue from their remaining in office." 122 Journalist Rafa'il Butti summarized the intellectual melancholy of 1924. His generation, he wrote, wanted to smash old gods, struggle against oppression, and revolt against the existing order. Yet in Iraq, freedom was extremely limited and writers were unable to express themselves freely. Oppression seemed to have surrounded him, and he found the situation unbearable. He thought of suicide. 123 Despite this new context, a few institutions played a major role in articulating public opinion. One of them was the majlis, a literary-cultural salon in which state officials and leading intellectuals invited poets, writers, and bureaucrats to discuss cultural matters. A Syrian writer who spent several years in Mosul, described the local majalis as intellectual clubs where various issues such as politics, economy, and agriculture were discussed. Saydawi confessed that he enjoyed going to these meetings and listening to the various opinions being negotiated between the participants. 124 The majalis had served a vital function already in the Ottoman period. Many of the established Sunni and Shi'i families, for example, the Kaylanis, Suwaydis, Babans, and Chadirchis, entertained poets and writers who attended their majalis. Iraqi notables, mujtahids, and holders of the Naqib position held such affairs in their homes. In the 1920s, the majalis continued to play a dominant role and were used by politicians to establish networks of local patronage. Some hosted them on a formal reception day called Yawrn al-Qubul in which homes were opened to visitors. Poets and writers such as Fahmi al-Mudarris or Ma'ruf al-Rusafi were well-known for the majalisthat met in their houses. Another important institution closely related to the majalis was the coffeehouse. Readers met in coffeehouses to read new journals and newspapers, and poets used them to hold meetings and converse with their followers. Zahawi, for instance, was so identified with the coffeehouse he frequented that it was named after him. 125 Clubs operating outside official state sponsorship continued to exist. Rahhal's small circle expanded. In 1926 socialist writer Husayn al-Rahhal founded the Solidarity Club (Nadi al-tadarnmun), which was attended by reform-minded young men, who, in the next decade, would be identified with either the social democrats or the communists. In this context it should be noted that toward 1929 we find small leftist organizations in the public sphere. The Artisans' Society (Jam'iyyat ashab al-sina'a), a trade union under the leadership of Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz, developed contacts with several political parties. A variety of local groups identified with socialist causes appeared

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in Baghdad, Nasiriyya, and Basra in 1929. These were to assume immense importance in the generation to come. 126 The press became more closely identified with political parties, each having its own "mouthpiece."127 Nida' al-Sha'b (1926-1927) spoke for the Sha'b Party, Al-Nahda al-'Iraqiyya represented the Nahda Party, Al-Taqaddum (1928) belonged to the Taq addum Party, Sad a al-'Ahd (1930) served the interests of the 'Ahd Party (1930 ), and Al-Akha' al-Watani (1931) articulated the views of a political party called Al-Akha' al-Watani. Occasionally, an individual politician was in charge of a journal. For example, Finance Minister Yusuf Ghanima published Al-Siyasa for six months. These phenomena led to the depiction of the press as a "press for hire" (sahafa rna' jura), that is, a press serving the interests of a party or a powerful individual. 128 Thematically, the press was mostly concerned with the nature of the proposed treaties with Britain, yet it dealt with different issues as well. Pressures from the state-in particular, in the form of censorship-curtailed the power of the free press, and many journals were banned or canceled. For example, AlZaman, edited by Ibrahim Salih Shukr, was canceled for its attacks on the government. Nonetheless, from 1924 to 1931 the number of journals increased. The daily Al-'Alam a!-'Arabi appeared in 1924 and continued to be published until 1947. Al-Bilad, established by Rufa'il Butti, the first daily that had six pages, was published after 1958. Some intellectuals founded newspapers to promote particular causes. For example, poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri used his newspaper, Al-Furat, to debate the policies of the Ministry of Education. 129 The press, however, continued to foster pluralism. Journals specific to the needs of particular communities, such as the Jewish journal Al-Misbah (19241929) or Kurdish journals, appeared in the public sphere. The Local Languages Law (1926) allowed for Kurdish cultural autonomy, although it did not appease Kurdish doubts about the state. Al-Misbah expressed the hopes of the Jewish community that state institutions would foster actual democracy. The opening of the Iraqi parliament, the ratification of the constitution, and the acceptance of Jews to the new state institutions such as the Supreme Court were all depicted as constructive steps leading to equality and justice. 130 The journal of the popular Shi'i poet Mulla 'Abbud al-Karkhi (b. 1896), Al-Karkh, exemplifies the openness of the public sphere. Karkhi's poetry in colloquial Iraqi became extremely popular in the 1920s, and as a result he was invited to speak on public occasions. Thematically, his poems addressed every possible feature in Iraqi public life: from unveiling to elegies for the Prophet

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45

Muhammad's family and the Shi'i imams. In fact, Karkhi compared himself to none other than Dante because of his talent for creating complex poetry in the vernacular, which, he believed, was understood and loved by a wide range of social groups. 131 Karkhi used his journal to critique many political and social aspects of the Iraqi state. Despite the fact that he tried to run for parliament and was an owner of vast tracts ofland, Karkhi still used his newspaper to protest the low status of the Iraqi peasantry, to mock parliament members, and to denounce laws limiting the freedom of the press. During the debates about an Iraqi oil treaty to be signed in 1925, Karkhi wrote a poem on behalf ofiraqi oil, in which he complained that Iraqi oil was being undersold for the next seventy years for the cheapest of prices and criticized the politicians selling the country's treasures to the British. 132 Karkhi vilified the actions of parliament members, confessing that his heart bemoaned their excessive corruption. 133 In one of his poems, he lampooned a parliament member who attained his position despite his extremely young age. Karkhi concluded his poem wondering what kind of value system prefers the young and inexperienced over the old and wise. 134 A poem written in 1930 depicted the excessive ideological relativism of a certain representative in the majalis. One day the representative is a member of the 'Ahd Party, another day he joins the Akha' al-Watani Party, and then becomes a martyrnot for the sake of the nation but rather for the sake of a particular minister. Other poems dealt with the activities of British advisers in the ministries, indicating that they were the ones who were in charge of the ministries. 135 Karkhi's journals cannot be considered "modern" because they were written in rhymed prose and were meant to be read aloud and in public to serve the personal interests of their publisher. The authorial prose of the press, with aims of objectivity or daily coverage of events, was not the main consideration of Karkhi, and his newspapers recorded living speech in the vernacular. Karkhi, however, managed to articulate many of the grievances that other newspapers pointed to: the corruption of the political system, the personal nature of politics, and the pro-British stance of the Hashemite state. Karkhi's career highlights another current of the 1920s (as well as the 1930s), namely, the significance of poetry in public life. As Salma Jayyusi points out, many poets of the era (e.g., Muhammad Rid a al-Shabibi and Jamil Sidqi alZahawi) filled official positionsY 6 Thus, as noted before, poets composed poems in honor of Faysal and leading politicians and spoke at official events.

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Nevertheless, neoclassical poetry was used as a critical political tool. Zahawi, for instance, used his poetry to remark on a variety of issues: secularism, science, women's rights, and political changes in the world, such as the rise of Bolshevism and Fascism. 137 Most important was Ma'ruf al-Rusafi, whose political poetry covered every aspect of Iraqi life: women's rights (unveiling, ending seclusion), social justice, and the counterfeit nature of Iraqi independence. His national poetry gave voice to what the press called "the peculiar situation" (al-wad' al-shadh), that is, the fact that Iraq appeared to be independent yet in reality was controlled by British interests. The poem "The Mandate Government" (hukumat al-intidab) is a good example ofRusafi's critique of the Iraqi state. The speaker in the poem represents himself as a man knowledgeable in matters pertinent to governance and politics: I speak my mind about the government, and do not fear those who argue that I am an extremist. 138 The government, the speaker reveals, has two faces. On the surface, it appears to be independent, yet its hidden nature is that of a governing body enslaved to British interests: The flag and the parliament are meaningless symbols; the constitution is based on the text of the mandate; the parliament is not established according to the will of the electorate; and the ministries are utterly subordinated to foreign advisers. The speaker continues to delineate the specific vices of the government: The inflated number of its ministries do little on behalf of the citizens (muwatin), and local taxes paid by Iraqis are not spent for Iraqi well-being but for services provided by foreigners (dukhala'). The people, however, will not tolerate this situation for long and will revolt against the present order. The poem hence offers a political solution: Iraqis should not adopt Fascism but rather turn leftward: The British have interests in your nation which will never come to an end, unless you become Bolsheviks. 139 The poem is constructed as a series of contradictions: between privileged foreigners and underprivileged Iraqi citizens and between an outside veneer of Iraqi independence and the state's subordination to British control. These binaries serve to underscore the role of the speaker, the "extremist poet," as unmasking the undemocratic apparatus of the government and the true character of the state. As we have seen, the word "extremist" was common in the

IRAQI INTELLECTUALS IN THE EARLY 19205 47

British colonial language to depict Iraqi intellectuals. Here Rusafi makes an ironic use of this expression. Although the poem focuses on many aspects of the Iraq state, it mostly disparages of the misdeeds of government; thirteen of its verses deal with the government, and the words "government" (hukuma) and "ministers" as well as words derived from the verb "to govern" (h-k-m) appear numerous times. Rusafi was not the only critical poet in the public sphere. Many of Iraq's poets, mostly Shi'is such as 'Ali al-Sharqi (b. 1890), Muhammad Salih Bahr al-'Ulum (b. 1908), Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, and Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir, produced political neoclassical poetry. Najaf was the leading center of poetry, and although Baghdad became a magnet for many an Iraqi poet, the poetry of the south remained significant in the 1920s. 140 The south's most famous poet, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, drew on the events of 1920 to make a name for himself as a national poet. From 1920 to 1923, Jawahiri published poems in the major newspapers. National themes, in particular the 1920 revolt, occupied the works of the young bard, who began to be recognized in this early stage for his mastery of the neoclassical genre. Some of his poems about national themes were published only a year or two after their public recitation. In some cases, Jawahiri published only a censored version of his poems and omitted the more scathing verses he had recited. 141 Another courageous commentator on the Iraqi state was the Shi'i poet Ahmad Safi al-Najafi (b. 1895), who lived in Syria from 1930. Najafi persisted in boldly condemning the less optimistic features of the mandate. His 1927 "Where Is the Guard?" depicted Iraq as a land safeguarded by blind watchmen who ignored the thugs who attacked their land, robbed their people, and acquiesced to every demand imposed by the foreigners. The bell of revival [nahda] rang and yet we were not awakened when it rang, The greedy stole our brightest glory and continued attacking, yet where was the guard? 142 The guard had pocketed mammon in the name of this nation, whose treasures they readily sold. They never denied the requests of the greedy and enslaved the majalis to foreign interests. 143 In the poem, the ruling elite is compared to a guard, supposedly vigilant, but in reality, paralyzed and blind. The notion of a national awakening, which was a prevalent theme in the writings of many Iraqi intellectuals, turned in this poem into perpetual sleep. The elite, in other words, had a vested interest

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in keeping the people unaware rather than in galvanizing them into action. The use of the word "guard" might refer to the secret society Haras al-Istiqlal ("Guards of Independence"), which included Iraqi Sherifians. In the poem, then, two highly important symbols in the Hashemite national narrative, "guard" and "awakening," are used to connote the failure of the political leadership of the Hashemite state whose parliament was nothing but a veneer serving the interests of a foreign government. In the field of prose, local publishing houses (such as the Dangur publishing house in Baghdad or the Najah publishing house in Najaf) produced texts of an increasingly local Iraqi nature. The 1920s witnessed the publishing and republishing of works on history and geography by such officials as Yusuf Ghanima. Texts relevant to the Iraqi milieu included Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir's historical study that critically evaluated the 1920 revolt and the reasons that led to the formation of the new Iraqi state, the works of Kazim al-Dujayli (b. 1884), and studies on Iraqi literature and culture by Rusafi (1921) and Butti (1923). 144 Another phenomenon current in the public sphere was the political use of demonstrations. Demonstrations against the mandate, often organized by politicians, started as early as 1921. The two best-known cases of public protest were the Nusuli affair and the Mond protest. In 1927 Anis al-Nusuli, a Syrian teacher, published a book on the history of the Umayyads, which appeared in Baghdad. The pro-Umayyad account angered many readers. Nusuli was asked to remove some controversial sections from his book, but he refused. Iraqi intellectuals, mostly Shi'is, launched a successful campaign for Nusuli's dismissal; the affair played out over the pages of Al-'Irfan and in the Ministry of Education. In January, three teachers from the secondary school and the Higher Teachers Training College sent a protest to the Ministry of Education against Nusuli's dismissal, and they too were dismissed as a result. Then, 6oo students of the secondary schools, including members of the Solidarity Club, protested in the streets in defense of Nusuli. The protesters were both Shi'is and Sunnis. Furthermore, the protesters elected Shi'is to negotiate with government officials in order not to portray this battle as sectarian. Politicians such as Sati' al-Husri intervened in favor of Nusuli and his colleagues. 145 It would be a mistake to assume that this was only a sectarian debate about 'Ali, Husayn, or Mu'awiyya. All sides used the language of rights when talking about the affair. The intellectuals who protected Nusuli evoked the notion of

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freedom of speech in his defense. The anti-Nusuli stance, however, claimed that citizens had the right to intervene in matters concerning the activities of their government and the Ministry of Education and to demand that their children not be taught a book contradictory to their belief system. Socially minded youth as well as politicians and state officials took sides in the debate, many in favor ofNusuli. Of significance, however, is that the attempts to mold public opinion occurred not only among politicians but also in the streets, in demonstrations taken up by students, and in the press. A second wave of demonstrations that swept Baghdad occurred in February 1928 in protest of the arrival of the British pro-Zionist politician Alfred Mond. Batatu estimates the number of protesters as 2o,ooo. 146 The demonstrations were not spontaneous reflections of the will of the people, because key politicians (and possibly the king himself) were involved in the campaign. Yet the sheer number of participants and the fact that the demonstrations included individuals who were critical of the government's policies, such as members of al-Rahhal group, suggest that the demonstrations drew a large number of students, who used it as a means to protest both Zionism and British colonial politics in the Middle East. The intertwining of involvement of politicians on the one hand and a popular campaign in the press and in the streets on the other was evident in this case, as it was in Nusuli's. In conclusion, the years 1924-1931 set in motion certain patterns. On the one hand, the state began consolidating its powers and established key institutions (parliament, courts, senate). The ambiguity of the early 1920s had vanished and with it came a more assured political elite. Despite these changes, however, elements within the public sphere continued to be critical. The fact that the Iraqi state was subjected to British interests did not escape the critical eye of writers, who expressed their resentment in their verses and in their magazines. These texts, in other words, were not simply an articulation of opinions for or against the proposed treaty with Britain but rather a more comprehensive analysis of the nature of the new ruling elites. Likewise, the Iraqi nature of the public sphere, with its majalis, newspapers, and works of poetry and prose, shaped modes of thinking and artistic production. The audiences for the new works were not the denizens of Cairo or Istanbul but the young people who populated the local coffeehouses and attended the literary salons. Cairo and Istanbul were still the cultural centers, but the local Iraqi periphery had begun to articulate its own unique voice.

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CONCLUSIONS

The formation of the new state gave birth to reawakened hopes on the part of intellectuals. Some members of the intellectual community published newspapers, hoping that the new regime would ensure the continued freedom of the press. Their expectations were soon dashed. Constant surveillance curtailed the democratic potential of the press and restricted the creation of a truly independent public sphere. The activity in the small public sphere was the result of the efforts of a small group of intellectuals in Baghdad. This activity succeeded in fostering the Iraqi press, promoting the Iraqi book market, and creating the perception that Iraq was changing. Moreover, intellectuals in the 1930s would attempt to assume control over the institutions that were created by the intellectuals of the 1920s. The discussion about democracy and pluralism was a response to the undemocratic realities of the mandate. Intellectuals who championed democracy most vocally in the early 1920s did so as a way of appealing to a better future. In contrast, during the mid- and late 1920s intellectuals were not trying to offer new models for a future state but critiquing present patterns of colonial control that surfaced in Iraq. After 1924, with the initial institutionalization of the state, networks of patronage made it easier for the state to establish its control. The king, ministers, and bureaucrats could tempt intellectuals to support them by offering positions or invitations to official ceremonies. Nevertheless, some features of the pluralistic public sphere did not disappear, for popular and neoclassical poetry as well as cultural and literary magazines sharply criticized the features of the Hashemite state. The Iraqi public sphere was certainly smaller than the public sphere of Egypt of the mid-nineteenth century or the spheres in Lebanon and Egypt during the 1920s. Yet it was influential because it stimulated conversations about concepts, ideas, and political theories. It was mainly a Baghdadi sphere, but other voices were heard in it as well: Najafi poets who immigrated to Baghdad, Arab writers whose journals were read in Baghdad, and the intellectuals who acquired their academic and professional training in Istanbul, Cairo, and Damascus. Intellectuals fostered discussion on the future of the state and produced interesting cultural hybrids. Considering the low literacy rates, the written word was not read by subaltern populations, although writers definitely sought to represent them. The public sphere was not a domain of uncoerced conversation at all; instead,

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intellectuals had to deal with not one but two states: the colonial and the Iraqi. Both had vested interests in silencing some intellectuals and manipulating others. The intellectuals, for their part, were manipulated by, and manipulated, the fragmented nature of the state, in which the public debate was colored by politics of leading personalities, British power, and maneuvers by Fays a!. Its mediatory function was thus limited because many politicians were not interested in the intellectuals' voices. Intellectuals might have had a lot to say, but outside the print market, many refused to listen.

2

PROTECTING PLURALISM,

1931-1945

A REVERSAL OF DISCOURSES

The years 1931-1945 were important years for Iraqi intellectuals. On the surface, Iraqi national elites had nothing to rejoice about. Although in October 1932 the League of Nations agreed to accept Iraq to the institution's assembly, thus acknowledging the termination of the mandate period, the long-anticipated independence was limited. The treaty with Britain, signed in 1930, had preserved much of Britain's power in Iraq and stipulated that Britain would maintain the right to use its air bases in Iraq and move British troops into the country if necessary. 1 The treaty, as could be imagined, was greeted by a wave of angry demonstrations and a flood offuming neoclassical poems denouncing its humiliating conditions. 2 In May 1941, following Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani's (b. 1892) military coup, British forces reoccupied Iraq. Intellectuals appeared powerless in the political realm as power continued to shift to generals, bureaucrats, and tribal sheikhs. 3 In the 1930s, the army became a significant vehicle for social and political mobility and intervened frequently in politics. These trends increased after the adoption of a universal conscription law in 1935. Two military coups, by Bakr Sidqi (b. 1890) and Hikmat Sulayman (b. 1889) in 1936 and by Kaylani, pointed to the power of the Iraqi army in politics. 4 The 1930s were typified by national, nationalist, and ultranationalist discourses. Constant references to the sanctity of the nation, the need to rebuild its army, and the need to foster loyal soldiers and obedient mothers through education and rigorous training became prevalent in the press and in state officials' speeches. The endeavor to cultivate national solidarity and notions of 52

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propriety came with attacks on "immoral elements" in society. Thus members of the Iraqi political elite, the army, and the Iraqi Royal Court critiqued the intellectuals' irresponsibility and their lack of patriotism. The first victim of such attacks was the press. King Faysal I called to "put a limit to the press's unreasonable critique of government activities." 5 The national director of publications and broadcasting thought that "the Iraqi press became one of the problems of the state" because it was led by individuals who lacked real abilities in journalism, politics, and culture and who "dared to ridicule honorable men."" Iraqi journalists, for their part, also expressed the suspicion that their medium was being manipulated to spread harmful propaganda. Al-Istiqlal published many editorials on this theme, as readers were warned that mercenary elements were spreading antinational propaganda in the press. These reports increased after 1938, when Al-Istiqlal declared World War II to be a "war ofbroadcasting and propaganda" in which various governments manipulated local intellectuals to transmit sympathetic propaganda to their causes. 7 These accusations reflected the notion that in an ideal setting, the press should be independent and objective. On the other hand, journalists undermined the importance of their profession by associating good journalism with patriotic writing and by accusing fellow journalists of stooping to accept foreign aid. The number of newspapers, however, increased in the 1930s. New dailies came to play a major role, as did the important cultural magazines Al-Hatif, edited by the Najafi intellectual Jaf'ar al-Khalili, and Al-Hasid, edited by the Jewish intellectual Anwar Sha'ul. Nevertheless, some newspapers were closed in 1935 because of their critique of the state. In 1938 the Iraqi government passed a bill that tightened control over the activities of intellectuals. According to the new version of the press law, any individual who expressed "approval of or disseminates by any means of publication ... any of the doctrines of communism, anarchy or the like" would be punished with penal servitude or with imprisonment not exceeding seven years in jail. 8 Even though allegations about the press's lack of objectivity had already appeared in the 1920s, such accusations acquired new political meanings when World War II broke out. When Britain declared war on Germany, a state of emergency was declared and strict censorship was imposed on all publications. During the 1930s, the processes of institutionalization and the establishment of networks of patronage accelerated, and the involvement of intellectuals

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in the state's mechanism increased accordingly. The steady, although limited, increase in the number of high school graduates and the educational missions abroad allowed the state to recruit intellectuals into its apparatus. The Hashemites, the Sherifians, and the landed elites welcomed the creation of a class of professionals and the expansion of the effendia. 9 As in the 1920s, politicians needed writers to produce narratives in accordance with their view of the recent Iraqi past. 10 Faysal's successors were King Ghazi, who came to power in 1933 and ruled until his death in 1939, and Ghazi's 4-year-old son, Faysal II, who ruled under the regency of his uncle, 'Abd al-Ilah. The supporters of Ghazi and the regent used intellectuals to glorify Faysal I as a way of legitimizing their own leadership. Moreover, if Britain was to remain the dominant power in Iraq's foreign policy according to the treaty, the state could at least produce texts to enhance national sentiments and use the education system to instill a national feeling among the members of the nation.U The Middle East had experienced a wave of radicalization during the 1930s, especially among the effendia. Iraq was no different in that respect. The tensions with Britain and the economic crisis that hit the region after the Depression (1929) turned Iraqi youth into a radical power. These young individuals turned to anti-British politicians or supported anti-British parties. Important, however, is the fact that these middle-class youths were the clients and the organizers of many of the clubs, salons, and youth movements on the one hand and the participants in demonstrations on the other. The 1930s saw the proliferation of clubs and societies, and the involvement of politicians in such venues intensified. The important clubs of the 1930s enjoyed the support of leading politicians. The Society of Arab Culture (Jam'iyyat al-thaqafa al-'arabiyya) was a joint venture of educator Sati' alHusri and Egyptian intellectuals. The Iraqi Pen Club (Nadi al-qalam al-'iraqi) was opened in October 1934, thanks to the efforts of the Shi'i educator and bureaucrat Fadhil al-Jam ali (b. 1902); this club brought together journalists, poets, and writers. The Iraqi Pen Club had more than thirty members, and they gathered in private houses of such intellectuals as Jamali and Baqir alShabibi to discuss literary and social affairs. All the individuals involved in the formation of these clubs, especially Husri and Jamali, worked for the state and used these institutions to ensure the collaboration of intellectuals with their schemes. 12 The Pan-Arab club Nadi al-Muthanna, founded in 1935, exemplifies most lucidly the involvement of politicians in intellectual activity. The club was

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55

intimately connected to the Ministry of Education and was secretly supported by army officers, who legally were not allowed to be members. Officially Nadi al-Muthanna also enjoyed the support of leading politicians and occasionally King Ghazi. It also was involved in the activities of two important movements: the Futuwwa youth movement and the Committee for the Defense of Palestine (Lajnat al-Difa' 'an Filastin, established in 1933). A wide array of writers and bureaucrats took part in the club's endeavors, including poets, journalists, educators such as Sami Shawkat (b. 1893), Husri, and Jamali, and Palestinian writers such as Darwish Miqdadi and Akram Zu'aytar. Many contributed articles to the club's journal. The dual goals of supporting Pan-Arab nationalism and espousing a modern agenda, which included the cultivating of healthy masculinity and women's education, appealed to many intellectuals of the time. The club's women's committee, for instance, aspired to cultivate a cultural and national consciousness among its female members.IJ Even clubs that were less involved in politics often invited politicians and Ministry of Education personnel to attend their meetings. In Karkh, the more conservative Club of the Muslim Youth invited Egyptian scholars who taught in Iraq, such as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, to deliver talks to its members. The club published a journal, AI- 'A lam al-Islami. Another active Muslim club was the Club for Islamic Guidance (Nadi al-hidaya al-Islamiyya), which also published a journal. Two important clubs that were active in Najaf in the 1930s and far less reliant on state support were the Scientific Association (Al-Rabita al-'ilmiyya), which published the works of various poets, and the Writing Club (Mutanda al-nashr). 14 Similarly, the field of art witnessed the involvement of the state. In 1931, for example, the state-sponsored Industrial and Agricultural Fair in Baghdad presented innovative works of sculpture and paintings. 15 The visibility of the middle classes in the urban sphere became an important feature in public life. The disciplined marches of students as well as of youth movements were part of the Baghdadi urban scenery in the 1930s. On the other hand, Baghdad witnessed demonstrations for a variety of causes: against the British and Iraqi governments and for Arab and Iraqi nationalism. As Peter Wien notes, the end of this period was marked by a complete breakdown of order, with urban rioting in June 1941, in the aftermath ofKaylani's coup. 16 The demonstrations in favor of the Palestinian cause illustrate the dynamic yet problematic nature of the public domain. Palestine, as noted by Michael Eppel, was a subject of constant concern for many intellectuals

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and public figures. Pro-Palestinian activity reached its peak in the years of the Palestinian National Revolt (1936-1939). The dailies Al-'Iraq, Al-Istiqlal, Al-Bilad, and Al-'Alam al-'Arabi denounced British policies in Palestine, and the Committee for the Defense of Palestine worked with Shi'i 'ulama', who published fatwas on the matter of Palestine, and sent protests and petitions to the League of Nations, the Iraqi government, and leaders of Arab countries. Nadi al-Muthanna issued anti-Zionist position papers and used public prayers to express sympathy with the Palestinians. However, whereas in 1936 leading politicians were involved in pro-Palestinian activities, in 1938 the state gradually lost control over the demonstrations and constantly changed the rules regarding what pro-Palestinian activities were permissibleY Another act of collective public action, directed against the British and the Iraqi politicians benefiting from British support, was the boycott of the British-owned Baghdad Electric Light and Power Company. The strike broke out in December 1933 and ended in January 1934. Although it ended with the liquidation of the trade unions, the strike facilitated the cooperation of socialists, communists, and nationalists. Newspapers published complaints about the electric company's high rates and called on Iraqis to use oil lamps and candles and to boycott the company. Private homes, houses, shops, cafes, and cinemas all boycotted its service. 18 The involvement of intellectuals in clubs supported by the state and in the organizations of marches and festivities did not erase fears of unsupervised intellectual activity. On the contrary, Iraqi intellectuals expressed growing suspicions about the ways that Iraqis spent their free time and the materials they read. Cafes, nightclubs, cinemas, and theaters were negatively depicted as institutions encouraging idleness. The cinema, for example, was seen as a center of immoral activities. Iraqi governments banned certain films that were perceived as having a harmful effect on the impressionable Iraqi audiences.19 Intellectuals working in the Ministry of Education expressed their mistrust of the public sphere most bluntly. The views of two of them, Fadhil al-Jamali and Sati' al-Husri, illustrate the general suspicion of independent thinking and misgivings about a public sphere that functioned independently of the state. Jamali was distrustful of many institutions in the public sphere. He held the press liable for many of Iraq's cultural problems, arguing that journalists might glean their information from unreliable sources, thus creating fiction and not true reporting. Jamali claimed that Iraqi artists neglected their

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57

national functions: Poets produced too gloomy poetry; musicians composed meaningless cacophonies; and no original work was to be found in painting or architecture. He went on to assert that writers produced unsavory cartoons and novels that destroyed domestic relationships and generated a national crisis in marriage. Jamali also critiqued intellectuals who tried to achieve popularity by using colloquial Arabic in their writings, because he thought that the use of dialect imperiled the position of classical Arabic (fusha) as a unifying language of all Arabs. 20 Sati' al-Husri viewed the public sphere quite differently. He argued that clubs and societies devoted to charity, commerce, sports, literature, and politics were far more prevalent in Western societies than in Iraq, playing a more vital role in the lives of citizens and enjoying a far larger number of members. In contrast, the number of such clubs and societies in Iraq was insignificant, although the need for their presence was great. Husri explained that many Iraqis remained indifferent to the activities of such organizations as a result of being unaccustomed to a social life and to communal projects. The Iraqis' compassion and sense of solidarity thus remained individualized, limited to their own families and local settings. Easterners, he wrote, help the beggars or the poor, provided that they see them in their own eyes. Thus they help a poor man or a child yet cannot comprehend the meaning of "the poor" or "the children" as abstract social categories. 21 Husri identified the significance of the public sphere as responsible for the creation of social cohesion and national solidarity. In the East, regrettably, the public was unable to envisage the theoretical and nonfigurative concept of a "community." Iraqis, in other words, were still enslaved by their particular notions of visibility and had not become modern in the sense that they could not overcome anonymity through a sense of belonging to a larger unit, such as a city and a nation. Husri's essay "Concerning the French Defeat" further exemplifies his perception of intellectual activity and its relation to the state. The main reason for France's downfall was, according to Husri, that the country provided sanctuary for numerous German refugees, and they, in turn, manipulated public opinion. This fifth column took advantage of the "confusion of opinions" prevalent in France and of the numerous political parties that engendered political corruption and anarchy. Although France attacked the new political order in Germany and in Italy, it ignored its own public domain, in which excessive freedom of thought and expression permitted intellectuals

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to overemphasize individual freedom, pacifism, and antimilitarismY These reflections on France disclosed the belief that a democratic system could bring about disorder and anarchy. It should be noted, however, that Husri's statements here contradict other tolerant elements in his writingsY Nevertheless, the passages do reveal an unmistakable suspicion of intellectual activity and might also reflect Husri's anxieties about schisms within the Iraqi nation. Pressures on the Iraqi public sphere came not only from Iraqi governments or state officials but also from British officials. Starting in the mid-1930s, the British pressured Iraqi governments to exercise censorship against pro-Nazi activity in Iraq. They feared the dissemination of German propaganda by four subcurrents-pro-Nazi, Pan-Arab, anti-British, and anti-Jewish-and worried that Arab intellectuals would use the press to propagate pro-German and anti-British views. They noted that the German representatives had direct contacts with the newspapers Al-'Alam a/-'Arabi, Al-Kifah, and Al-Istiqlal and that Al-Bilad and Al-Istiqlal subscribed to a German news agency. 24 British officials found the Iraqi press so alarming that the British representative in Syria lamented that the "anti-British outpouring of Iraqi journalists and Iraqi newspapers are commonplace to us." 25 Evidence of that can be seen in their use ofBBC Radio broadcasts in Arabic to challenge voices coming from Radio Berlin and the Italian Radio Bari. British fears concerning the advancement of pro-Nazi propaganda were not unfounded, even though they were exaggerated. The ideas coming from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had certainly found their share of supporters in the Iraqi public sphere among nationalist intellectuals and parts of the effendia. Kaylani's pro-German coup, the activities of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who resided in Iraq, or the speeches delivered to Nadi al-Muthanna had done much to stir pro-German sentiments. These sentiments jeopardized Iraqi intellectual activity in two ways. First, British intervention and censorship of newspapers and publications endangered the entire print media. Second, prodemocratic intellectuals were faced with new models of Fascism, totalitarianism, and Nazism that assumed some popularity in the Ministry of Education and in certain clubs. The extent and influence of authoritarian, Nazi, Fascist, and totalitarian voices have been critically addressed in the important works of Simon, Marr, and Wien. 26 Less attention, however, has been placed on opposition circles or on the fact that despite massive efforts by the state, the independent, critical public sphere did not disappear. Certainly, the small socialist, leftist, and lib-

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eral groups were much less influential than the nationalist groups, yet they established patterns and modes that became immensely important when World War II ended. Furthermore, the pluralistic features of the public sphere of the 1920s, although under attack, remained steadfast. Various groups that supported national causes denounced pro-Nazi policies adopted by state officials. Jewish intellectuals, who defined themselves as Arab Jews, attacked Germany intensely and fiercely, both in articles and on the BBC Radio in Arabic. After the occupation of Ethiopia, AI-Hasid's Jewish editor, Anwar Sha'ul, composed a poem dedicated to an Ethiopian female warrior leading Ethiopian maidens in battle against the Fascist invaders. 27 AIHasid printed the works ofJewish writer Ezra Haddad (b.1904), who published a series of articles condemning Fascism. In his essay "The Flood of Fascism Overflows Europe," Haddad bemoaned the loss of freedom and democracy in Europe. He noticed that subjects in European dictatorships were bound to comply with the orders of the superior leader. In such regimes, there was no free press that was able to express grievances against the state, no articles of opposition, and no public opinion able to articulate the feelings of the people. The liberals (ahrar) feared jailing and punishment and thus found themselves in exile. 2R Although most of the contributors and writers of Al-Hasid were Jewish, the journal was accepted in the public sphere by Iraqi Muslim intellectuals and politicians, who willingly contributed stories and poems to it. 29 Other groups of Sunni and Shi'i intellectuals also objected to Fascism. Dhu Nun Ayyub (b. 1908), a young communist novelist, viewed Mussolini as a dangerous thug whose ambition was to recapture Italy's past glory as a global empire and to reconstitute violence, slavery, and barbarism. Fascist regimes, he explained, tended to replicate themselves once they assumed power over the state's institutions, because the violence of the leader trickled down to each of the government's ministries and other cultural institutions. In other words, once a state adopted Fascist patterns, each ministry was ruled by a small-scale Hitler or Mussolini who terrorized his employees. In Germany and Italy, Ayyub stated, dictatorship had completely ruined humanism and humanistic literature. 30 Expressing an anti-Fascist, religious stance, mujtahid Hibat al-Din alShahrastani noted that Islam is a religion of brotherhood of all men. The Koran states clearly that Muhammed revealed divine truth, not to the Arabs or to this or that race

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alone, but to the whole of humanity. Obviously he made no distinction between the different races or nations. Altogether the theory of the supremacy of one particular race is completely alien to the Arab spirit. It is equally alien to this spirit to exalt the State to the disadvantage of the individual. The dignity and the importance of the individual are among the leading factors of our national and social life. We abhor the idea of deifying the State. Since racial and social differences are unknown to us, we can claim that our religion provides a foundation for complete democracy on the one hand, and for strong individualism, on the other. 11 Pan-Arab Egyptian intellectuals who taught at the Baghdadi teachers training colleges challenged pro-Nazi discourses. Ahmad Hassan al-Zayyat, the influential publisher of the Egyptian literary magazine Al-Risala (which was widely read in Iraq), viewed Italy as an imperialistic force "thirsting for wars ... worse and more dangerous than the old imperialism of France and England." 32 Zayyat, for this reason, opposed the introduction of militarism into the Iraqi school system and in particular the introduction of uniforms into classrooms. 33 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, an Egyptian legal theorist who taught law in Baghdad, alleged that Nazi anti-Semitism was not only antiJewish but also anti-Arab and emphasized that for the Nazis the Arabs were an inferior race as well. 34 'Abd al-Mun'am Khallaf denounced the notion of "death for the nation's sake" and argued that Islam did not value ethnicity ('asabiyya), racism (jinsiyya), blood (damawiyya), or patriotism (wataniyya) but rather underscored mercy and compassion. 35 Thus, although the British condemned Pan-Arabism as an agent of German propaganda, the arrival of the Egyptian Pan-Arabists did much to foster democratic currents. The origins of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and the social-democratic group al-Ahali can be traced to the 1930s. After the failure of the Kaylani coup in 1941 and the reoccupation of the country, the British installed pro-British politicians in key positions. The British and Nuri al-Sa'id unleashed a campaign against the Kaylani movement and its supporters. Because Kaylani had received the support of many intellectuals, the new government was adamant to purge public officialdom of his supporters. One hundred twenty supporters of the revolt were deported, 700 were arrested, and the leaders of the coup were executed. Many Palestinian teachers were exiled, some educational books were banned, and the educational system became less Pan-Arab in its nature. 36 The void created by the nationalist defeat, however, created room for

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other voices, associated with the Left, that managed to gather support in the public sphere. In what follows, an exploration of opposition voices will clarify their important role in Iraq. The argument proposed here is that significant theoretical proposals had been made already in the 1930s concerning democracy, civil rights, and the nature of civil society. These activities established the democratic camp of Arab nationalism and the communist opposition, which would become immensely important after the war. ADVANCING DEMOCRACY: THE AHALI GROUP, 1932-1937

The Ahali group (Jama'at al-Ahali) represented an endeavor to form a socialdemocratic movement in Iraq. Composed of individuals of varying ideological persuasions, the Ahali group nonetheless offered the Iraqi public a new political vocabulary. 37 Because most of the members of the Ahali group were born in the 1900s, their historical frame of reference was different from that of the generation born in the 188os, for whom the Young Turks Revolution and the Arab Revolt were formative experiences. Ahali's intellectuals, on the other hand, were more critical of the institution of the monarchy and even of the public image of Faysal. The roots of the Ahali movement can be traced to two centers: Beirut and Baghdad. In Beirut, a group of Iraqi students at the American University formed a society designed to discuss the questions of imperialism, socialism, and nationalism. The Beirut circle was headed by two individuals: 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim and Muhammad Hadid (both born in 1905). 38 Other supporters of the Ahali group came from Baghdad's law faculty. The two leading figures in the Baghdad core were 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il (b. 1907) and Husayn Jamil (b. 1906). A third person significant to the Ahali group was Kamil al-Chadirchi (sometimes spelled Jadirji or Chadirji) (b. 1897), who joined the group in 1933. Chadirchi was older than most of the members and also had a political career before joining the society, yet he was the intellectual most identified with the movement and the one who emerged as its leader after World War II. 39 Another key public figure affiliated with the group was the Shi'i politician Ja'far Abu Tim man, who was one of participants in the 1920 revolt and who enjoyed the support of certain tribes during the 1930s. 40 The intellectual background of the members varied. Ibrahim studied history at Columbia University under the instruction of Parker Thomas Moon, whose critical approach to the role played by imperialism in world politics

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greatly influenced lbrahimY In the United States Ibrahim also read socialist and communist literature, in particular, the English translation of Das Kapital. Hadid, whose Ph.D. from the London School of Economics was written under the supervision of Harold Laski (1893-1950 ), turned into a supporter of Fabianism, which emphasized advancing socialism through public discussion, education, and research. Isma'il's perceptions were informed by his reading of Salama Musa, Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid (who was his cousin), Husayn alRahhal, and the translations of Lenin into Arabic. Jamil read works by Musa and Rahhal and essays that appeared in the progressive journal Al-Sahifa. 42 Chadirchi, although less radical than other members, held the Fabian belief that "parties, societies and associations, whether political or apolitical" were the best means to achieve the individual's goals. 43 Like other members of his generation, he received most of his information about socialism from the Arab press. 44 In Baghdad, the group established a newspaper called Al-Ahali (The People); the title was chosen to symbolize its democratic agenda. The newspaper's logo declared that it was "published by a group of youths" and that Husayn Jamil was its owner and publisherY The paper survived, albeit under various titles, until1937 and was revived in the early 1940s. It was composed of news sections, columns, and editorials, which mostly appeared unsigned because their authors were often civil servants who were prohibited by law from engaging in political activity. 46 The editorial was published on the front page and was illustrated with a small picture of a hand carrying a torch-a pictorial representation of Al-Ahali's aspiration to enlighten its readership. The division oflabor at the paper was such that 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il edited the paper and supervised the publishing, 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim wrote on social, historical, and political themes, Hadid wrote on economics, and Jamil and later Chadirchi took part in the editorial board. The paper, despite its critique of some communist politics, accepted contributions from future members of the ICP. Other contributors were academics, poets such as Muhammad Mahdi alJawahiri, and even nationalists. 47 The paper's diversified ideological mixture caused much tension. Isma'illeaned more toward Marxism, whereas Jamil wanted to adopt a less combative, more marketable line. In addition, Chadirchi objected to Ibrahim's radicalism. Ibrahim, on his part, was suspicious of Chadirchi's upper-class affiliations. 48 In any case, most of the group did have a common agenda that recurred in the paper's editorials, which emphasized the obligations to alter the inherent social injustice in Iraqi society, to democ-

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ratize its fraudulent public sphere, and to grant Iraq real independence from British colonial intervention. A key period of Ahali activities was 1932-1933, during which Ibrahim and Isma'il were most influential. In this period the group did not seek the support of leading politicians and was thus more radical. The Ahali group was the platform that encouraged democratic thinking, a pluralistic milieu, and analysis of functions of the public sphere. In fact, until 1958 it was the most important source for discussion of democratic theory. DEMOCRACY AND ITS MEANINGS

Democracy was the concept that appeared most frequently in Al-Ahali's editorials. Members of the group thought that the mere existence of a constitution and a parliament was not sufficient to ensure a democratic regime. Consequently, a regime that suppressed the press or supported social injustice could not be considered democratic. The group's focal objectives were thus to widen the electoral base, promote economic equality, lessen the socioeconomic gaps in society, and assign a more vital role to political parties and their representatives. The fifth issue of Al-Ahali promised to publish a weekly article on democracy and constitutional regimes as well as an assessment of their possible implementation in various states. It announced that its exploration of democracy would center on the following themes: 1

2

3 4 5 6

Familiarizing [readers with] democracy and its modern history The theoretical principles [as as nazariyya] of free democracy and equality Democracy and education Democracy and the press Democracy and political parties Democracy and the people 49

Loyal to its initial promise, the newspaper published articles on these themes. The editorial "How Human Rights [huquq al-insan] Were Established in Neighboring Countries" outlined the evolution of the concept of "human rights" and the contributions of such intellectuals as Voltaire and Rousseau to the theory of rights. The essay clarified the role that such thinkers played in liberating modern thought from clerical impact and, subsequently, in secularizing the concept of equal rights. 5° The essay "The Theoretical Aspects of

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Democracy" delineated the various liberties that an individual was entitled to, such as religious liberty and civil liberty (hurriyya madaniyya), that is, the freedom of an individual to act as an independent agent in matters related to life and property, so long as such liberties did not endanger the rights of others. 51 Another article elucidated the importance of the separation of the legislative and executive powers, maintaining that the government (the executive agent) should be subordinate to the parliament (the legislative agent). 52 A few years after the Kaylani coup, Chadirchi penned an essay, "The Spread of Fascism in Iraq," in which he restated that democracy was an order founded on basic freedoms (huriyyat asasiyya) linked to human rights, such as the freedom of opinion, thought ( 'aqida), association, and publication, achieved through peaceful, nonviolent means and through the participation of political parties in free elections. 53 Democracy was understood in its broadest sense, as a concept with both political and social implications. 54 Social rights (education, free health care, minimum wages) were often considered human rights. Free education, for instance, was regarded as the right of every citizen, because education gives individuals the acumen and judgment necessary for appreciating the platforms of political parties. 55 Jamil clarified that the group believed that democracy meant liberation from foreigners and from the Iraqi landed classes. 56 Ibrahim further differentiated between a populist democracy (dimukratiyya sha'biyya) and capitalist democracy, such as the American one, which benefited only the affluent. 57 An article about the communists in Britain suggested that the measured and gradual evolution of democracy in Britain prevented violent revolutions. The article elucidated that even Marxists who believe that revolution is a historical necessity could still be loyal members of a democratic regime. 58 The middle-class members of the Ahali group objected (at least in the early 1930s) to a violent revolution inspired by the Soviet model, asserting that open activity in the public sphere could achieve equality and justice. 59 Partly because of their Fabian beliefs and partly because of their persecution under various Iraqi governments, writers believed that freedom of speech was a precondition to the establishment of a truly democratic regime. Freedom of thought, publication, and association within the limits of law were regarded as the rights of every individual. 60 The press was recognized as a relatively new invention, about 150 years old, which achieved great importance thanks to mass education, democracy, and industrialization. 61 The paper pro-

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tested the banning of newspapers by the state, arguing that the banning of newspapers should be the prerogative of courts of law, not of government's ministers. 62 The editorial "The Government and the Press" warned readers that limiting free speech endangered the value of truth itself. Journalists who were fearful that their newspapers might be closed down by the government did not dare publish truthful information. Therefore the people had no access to valid data that would enable them to participate in a democratic procedure.63 The article "Ideological Newspapers" illustrated that intellectuals should not use the press as a means of livelihood but rather as a channel for communicating ideas. The commercial press, on the other hand, grew to be an industry, related to the interests of capitalists such as bankers, politicians, businessmen, industrialists, and colonialists. 64 The paper thus praised those journalists who resisted the influence of political institutions or capital. Loyal to the Ahali group's democratic outlook, Al-Ahali adopted an antiNazi stance. In the early 1930s, Mussolini appeared to be a reformist whose reorganization of the Italian economy was hailed in several articles. Yet by early 1933, Al-Ahali journalists were already condemning all forms of Fascism in both Germany and Italy. 65 Chadirchi thought that the ruling elite used Fascism as a means to eliminate the progressive and democratic elements in Iraqi society. For this reason, the genuine sympathy felt by Iraqis for the Palestinians was manipulated by the pro-Fascists to support an anti-Jewish, Nazi stance. 66 The most lucid expression of the Ahali group's democratic theory is found in Ibrahim's Introduction to Sociology (Muqaddima fi'l ijtima'), which is one of the most sophisticated works produced in this period. Ibrahim's book, first published in 1939, was reprinted in two editions by the publishing house of the Ahali group. The text covers theories on the subject of democracy and political theory. It references the Greek political theory of Aristotle and Plato, critiques works on Fascism and antidemocratic political theory, quoting Brady and Croce, analyzes such works of literature as Faust, and reflects on Marxist and nationalist texts. The text is interdisciplinary, as it references sociological works by Ginsburg, philosophical texts by Hume, Huxley, Kant, Mill, and Smith, anthropological material by Malinowski and Taylor, and historical works by Myers, Toynbee, and Zeller. 67 Although printed two years after Al-Ahali was banned, Ibrahim's book expresses the same ideas as those he propagated in Al-Ahali: that pluralism is a positive element in society, that democracy is essential to the development of human societies, and that notions of race and language are not enough to form bonds of communal relationship.

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Instead, it is the political participation of citizens in political parties that cause them to be a real part of a nation. Following his readings of Mill, Ibrahim repeatedly states that disagreement and multiplicity of opinions enhance society. Ibrahim emphasizes that democratic nations successfully manage, despite racial or ethnic differences, to mold a civic consciousness through the activities of political parties. He alleges that the constant emphasis on state security actually facilitates the rise of authoritarianism. 68 Historically, Ibrahim places great importance on the periods of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, when print and communication expanded the scope of the individual's participation in civic decision making. 69 Although other thinkers emphasized the gradual acquisition of knowledge through pedagogy and education that would prepare Iraqis to participate in the democratic game, Ibrahim envisioned an immediate and universal democratic regime. This position was also articulated in an anecdote narrated by the Jewish intellectual Nissim Rejwan, recalling a conversation he held with Ibrahim about democracy. I recall one occasion on which I debated with him the whole subject of democracy and whether it was "practicable" in Iraq under the circumstances .... My "stance" was that although I wholeheartedly agreed with his views about the desirability of both democracy and socialism, I was not sure Iraq and the Iraqi people were "mature" enough for democracy. Endlessly he reasoned with me on the point, explaining with exemplary patience that there was no such thing as people unfit for a democratic system of government. 70 Ibrahim's Muqaddima outlines a number of reasons for rejecting Fascism and Nazism. It deplores the Fascist and Nazi concept of totalitarian leadership, which placed the leader above the law and viewed him as irreproachable. Following his readings of Carl Schmitt, Ibrahim further emphasizes how Fascist regimes manipulated the basest of human tendencies toward war and violence. 71 Ibrahim's interesting conceptualizations on nationalism will be discussed later, but it is important to note the book's originality. Ibrahim refers to a different set of political thinkers from the ones who were invoked by his contemporary intellectuals. Whereas other thinkers, most notably Husri, hailed the link between the individual and the nation-state and constructed it on ethnicity, language, and common history, Ibrahim offered another vision based on political participation. Ibrahim even differed from the intellectuals revered by

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his own party. He was influenced by Egyptian thinker Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, whose work on liberal democracy was significant to him, yet Ibrahim's commitment to socialism radically differed from al-Sayyid's liberalism. Salama Musa addressed Fabian thinkers, but his understanding of Italy under Fascism differed from Ibrahim's. Al-Ahali's intellectuals not only theorized about the meaning of democracy but also functioned as an opposition force to Iraqi governments, targeting specific elements in Iraqi political culture. Articles on democracy, in other words, criticized the policies of Iraqi ministers, administrators, and bureaucrats. An editorial from February 1934 maintained that the parliament had no hand in the fall of governments. The forces behind the rise and fall of governments were neither elections, the results of which were inconsequential, nor the parliament, which functioned as a mere rubber stamp of the government. In other words, elections and parliaments in Iraq did not benefit the people or represent their will. 72 Mocking the almost automatic voting of the members of parliament, an editorial from April1933 sardonically reported that most of the hands in parliament were raised swiftly, as though they were machines positioned on living bodies, activated upon hearing the request to approve the government's policies. Sadly, the entire deliberation in parliament lasted no longer than ten minutes. 73 The Ahali group's suggestions as to the desired regime of the Iraqi state were expressed in the theory of the sha'biyya (literally, populism or "people-ism"). Ibrahim was the living spirit behind sha'biyya, popularized in the collection Inspections in the Sha'biyya (Mutala'at fi'l sha'biyya) and in the editorials of Al-Ahali. Ibrahim was assisted in publicizing the sha'biyya platform by 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, 'Ali Haydar Sulayman, and Muhammad Hadid. 74 Chadirchi, on the other hand, objected to what he considered rashness in publishing this platform and to Ibrahim's critique of nationalism, which he thought would turn many educated Iraqis against the group. 73 The sha'biyya platform aspired to create a social-democratic state that would grant freedoms to its citizens and strive to reduce social and economic disparities between classes. 76 According to the sha'biyya doctrine, the rights of the individual were the rights to life, freedom, equality, and employment. The state must have complete sovereignty over both internal and external affairs and control all major industries and public services. It should distribute lands to the peasants, encourage the establishment of corporate villages, provide free medical care, and establish educational institutions, such as preschools and kindergartens, public libraries, cinemas, theaters, and music halls. The

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association between individuals and the state should be constitutional and democratic. The state's laws should be consistent with the needs of modern society, thus reforming family laws and emancipating women, yet such laws should also take into consideration the family structure (nizam 'a' ili) common in Iraq. The sha'biyya, however, rejected the class struggle principle and dictatorship of the proletariat as its ultimate goal. 77 The communist intellectual Qasim Hasan contended that sha'biyya, in its misunderstanding of the class struggle, was the creation of the middle classes, which sorely lacked important economic principles and, as such, was doomed to fail. The communists objected to what they deemed the lack of commitment to women's liberation, asserting that the preservation of the present structure of the Iraqi family, including polygamy, in effect undermined all chances for women's emancipation. 78 Ibrahim tried to implement the ideas of sha'biyya in Iraq. He established a society known as Sha'biyya with two branches-one secret, one open-whose aims were to promote the ideas he outlined. At the end of 1933 Ibrahim worked to help form the Baghdad Club (Nadi Baghdad), whose mandate was to discuss social and political problems, provide education to the poor, and circulate the ideas of sha'biyya. According to Majid Khadduri, elder politicians pressured the government to close down the Baghdad Club because they thought that it was serving communist interests and destabilizing national and Muslim traditions. The police chief of Baghdad broke into the club with the excuse that morally questionable activities were conducted there; he ordered its closure, which eventually transpired in April1937. 7 " A more successful attempt was the Society for Combating Illiteracy (Jam'iyyat mukafahat al-ummiyya). It intended to duplicate similar attempts conducted in Turkey and Russia in which intellectuals cooperated with the state to provide free education, especially in the rural regions. 80 The Ministry of Interior granted a stipend to finance the new society, although the society had to fight to obtain funds. 81 As Batatu noted, the society enabled members of the Ahali group, who were civil servants and thus forbidden to engage in politics by law, to enlist political support for their projects under a cultural guise. 82 The society had about fifty members, among whom were Abu Timman, Ahali members, communists, prominent nationalists, politicians and generals, and famous intellectuals, journalists, actors, and writers. Nevertheless, after five years of irregular activity, the society, lacking permanent governmental support, was forced to close its doors. 83

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The activities of the Society for Combating Illiteracy and the Baghdad Club exposed some of the weaknesses and successes of the Ahali group. The language of reform, in particular the use of education to reform the mentality of the subaltern classes, appealed to larger audiences encompassing both the Left and the nationalists. Moreover, although the writings of Isma'il, Hadid, and Ibrahim censured the policies of Iraqi governments, the group was dependent on the patronage of the exact same groups it criticized. The Ahali group, in other words, needed capital and licensing permits from the state, which meant that they were dependent on the state, or at least on reformminded politicians such as Abu Tim man. The Ahali group paid a heavy price because of its ongoing attacks on Iraqi governments. As a result, their newspaper was banned a number of times. 84 Other newspapers identified with Al-Ahali, such as Ja'far Abu Timman's AlMabda' (The Principle), were likewise censured and banned. 85 Another tactic used by Iraqi governments to discredit Al-Aha/i was to associate it with communism, because communism was outlawed for most of the period. In the early years, the paper had indeed printed articles about Lenin, Stalin, and reform in the Soviet Union and implied that some USSR policies would be advisable on the Iraqi front as well. 86 lt should be mentioned, however, that throughout the entire period, Chadirchi maintained a salon in his home and continued to host intellectuals and politicians without government interference. The first meeting of the Ahali group with Chadirchi in 1933 was held in his house, and the space functioned as a gathering place in the years to comeY THE 1936 SETBACK

Considering the Ahali group's belief in democracy, the motivation of certain members to cooperate with the Bakr Sidqi coup (October 1936) and to support the Kaylani coup (1941) seems unclear. General Sidqi, a commander of an army division, orchestrated a coup after which his co-conspirator, Hikmat Sulayman, was appointed prime minister. Sidqi was inspired by the reforms of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran and hoped to act in Iraq along similar lines. Nevertheless, neither Sidqi nor Sulayman supported the democratic principles so cherished by the Ahali group or shared their ideas concerning the promotion of democracy in nonviolent ways. An exploration of the group's behavior during 1936 illuminates the dilemmas entailed in carrying out their principles and the sacrifices they made when they chose to take part in Sidqi's regime.

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Before the coup, Hikmat Sulayman, who previously served as a minister of interior, joined the group and fostered links to the army. Ultimately, he convinced the Ahali group to join the new regime. The fact that Ahali members were considered partners indicates that their activities before 1935 left a mark on Iraqi politics. Ibrahim objected to the idea of a coup, whereas Chadirchi and Abu Timman agreed that the group needed to work closely with individuals who possessed resources and political clout. After the coup, the Ahali group became a political player in the new regime, although this lasted only a short while. In November 1936 Ahali's Society for Popular Reform (Jam'iyyat al-islah al-sha'bi), which had been established earlier, was legalized, a step that enabled it to run for election as a political party. Hadid, Chadirchi, and Jamil assumed ministerial positions in the new regime. Ibrahim was offered positions by Abu Tim man, but he refused, left the political arena, and worked as a teacher instead. 88 The platform of the Society for Popular Reform reveals the concessions that the Ahali group made because of its connection with Sulayman. Although it still endorsed workers' rights, constitutionalism, and democracy, the platform drew attention to the need to strengthen the army and foster patriotism among the soldiers. 89 Ahali members had to justify their support of an undemocratic, violent coup. They explained that Iraq had reached a state of tyranny that allowed no other option but violence. Abu Tim man admitted that the coup was an inevitable result of the policy of an oppressive government that had crossed all legal and constitutional boundaries, shed innocent blood, and oppressed freedoms, most notably the freedom of speech. In view of the urgent need for reforms, the progressive powers (islahiyya) were obligated to take action. 90 The justification for the coup was therefore the desire to provide social justice to members of the nation and to create a government willing to work on their behalf, guard their property, safeguard their liberties, respect their religious beliefs, and rise above religious sectarianism. 91 In retrospect, Chadirchi further explicated that when the country was under "absolute tyranny," which denied the freedoms of speech and association, and when an oppressive dictatorship suffocated "the soul of democracy," the democrats had the right to "adopt the road of revolution." 92 The leaders of the coup themselves used the language of the Ahali group to justify their claims to power. Sulayman explained that in an environment where the freedom of speech was suppressed, democratic rights were disregarded, a network of spies governed public spaces, and the government aimed its guns at its own people, the army had no alternative but to intervene. He

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argued that the army represented the people and that the officers themselves suffered from oppression and abuse of their liberties. The military movement thus presented itself as reflecting the sentiments of people longing to be freed from a "nightmarish regime." 93 Sulayman's words illustrate the extent to which the language promoted by the Ahali group had penetrated national discourse. Democracy and freedom of speech recurred in Sulayman's statement as he attempted to present the army as equal to the people, feeling their oppression, and loyal to democratic principles. Initially, the new regime seemed open to free press activity. In November 1936, Sulayman announced in a press conference that he wanted to promote freedom of the press.In 1936, the press was divided over the question of the new government, with the Pan-Arab Al-Istiqlal, Al-'Iraq, and Al-Tariq critiquing the regime's lack of commitment to Arab nationalism, and Al-Ahali, Al-Haris, Al-Anba', and Habazbuz supporting it. In November Al-Istiqlal, Al-Tariq, and Al-'Iraq were banned. 94 The suspension of newspapers revealed the undemocratic tendencies of both Sidqi and Sulayman. The two were also highly mistrustful of the communists and Ahali members leaning toward communism, even though the communists initially supported the coup. The new parliament was split between conservative elements and those who supported Ahali policies and raised issues regarding the rights of peasants, the creation of collective farms, and land distribution. Such propositions seemed to have generated fears in various landowning circles and instigated charges of communism. Consequently, Sulayman and Sidqi unleashed a brutal attack against the communists and their alleged supporters. 95 Disgusted by and fearful of the regime's violence and disillusioned by the government's polices, Abu Timman, Chadirchi, and other Ahali members left the government in June 1937. In his letter of resignation, Chadirchi admitted that the Society for Popular Reform had aimed to reform the country in democratic ways and to achieve these reforms in collaboration with the army. However, the government's actions did not further the realization of these objectives. In response, Ahali's newspapers were outlawed. The radical members of the Ahali group suffered most severely from this move. Lacking the support of ministers, 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il fled to Syria and then to France. In his absence, the Iraqi interior minister revoked his citizenship. 96 Even after the coup's leadership was defeated, it was impossible for the group to renew its activity. Ahali's condemnation of Iraq's political leadership presented a problem. Its intellectuals needed capital and patronage to propagate their views and

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finance their projects. They needed, in other words, the cooperation of the same sociopolitical groups that they critiqued. Ahali's initial collaboration with the army turned ineffective and eventually destructive, as Sidqi and Sulayman manipulated the political vocabulary popularized in the group's newspaper to justify their seizure of power without accomplishing the democratic goals that the Ahali group aspired to achieve. The collaboration with the militaristic sector of the national elite, then, illuminated the in-between position of Ahali thinkers as critics of the national elite to whom they partly belonged and whose patronage they often needed. It is indeed difficult to view al-Ahali as a unified group or laud its success in the 1930s. Some intellectuals affiliated with the Ahali group (e.g., Chadirchi, Jamil) shared many of the national assumptions held by the leadership of the Iraqi community. The Ahali group also supported the army in the Assyrian massacre, casting all the blame on the British.97 A Marxist analysis of the activity of the group tended to emphasize their position as a group of middle-class intellectuals who heeded the pleas of Iraq's subaltern classes to strengthen their positions against their social enemies, namely, the landowners and the tribal leaders of Iraq. 98 Furthermore, with the failure of the 1936 coup, the Ahali group was excluded from the political sphere, and in the coming years (1937-1941) the state became more militaristic and nationalistic. Nonetheless, the group's bourgeois background and apparent failures should not diminish its importance. First, the group was a cluster of intellectuals who published daily criticisms of the undemocratic nature of the regime. As Samira Haj suggests, the group's intellectuals "expressed the idealism of a new generation of Western-educated intellectuals who identified with European liberal humanism, but rejected its antihumanist and exploitative practices." 99 Ahali intellectuals presented other parameters by which the commitment of the national leadership should be judged, such as free elections, human rights, and democratic freedoms. In that, they articulated an alternative language to that of intellectuals affiliated with the state. Second, the group was important enough to draw the attention of more established politicians. Although such politicians restrained the more radical aspects of the group, they rightly recognized its ability to both attract and express the desires of the new generation of educated young Iraqis. Third, the group resumed its activity, and its members, in particular, Chadirchi and Jamil, became important politicians in the postwar period. In 1946, the Ahali group, without its radical elements, reappeared in the public sphere, under Chadirchi's leadership, and gained

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support from the lower and middle classes. Its language accentuating social justice now colored many groups associated with the Left. 100 GETTING REDDER: THE COMMUNISTS, 1936-1945

The Russian Revolution had attracted Iraqi intellectuals already in the 1920s. Soldiers returning from the Turkish-Russian front knew something about the revolution: that it stopped the war and that it had something to do with equality and justice. The Indian workers and soldiers who came with the British forces likewise talked about this revolution. As noted, political groups such as the 'Ahd Party and the mujtahid Muhammad Taqi al-Din al-Shirazi and his son, Mirza Muhammad Rida, called for cooperation between Bolsheviks and Arabs. Intellectuals took an interest in the revolution as well. Arabic renditions of Lenin's State and Revolution (al-Dawla wa'l thawra), published in Egypt in 1922, were read in Baghdad. The British, unwisely, encouraged debates about the Russian Revolution by sponsoring articles that presented the Bolsheviks as the enemies of Islam. Thus, despite the negative portrayal of communism and socialism in such articles, they kept the issue alive in the press. 101 The combination of a few factors made the Russian Revolution interesting to Iraqis. Like the French Revolution, it offered a grand narrative, which permitted intellectuals to position themselves within a global movement. As noted by 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, stories about the Russian Revolution made the young generation realize that both Russians and Iraqis were suffering from the same problems, because the Russian milieu was also characterized by a peasantry exploited by corrupt landed elites. The fact that the revolution was recent and that it occurred in a nonindustrial society therefore made it more attractive to Iraqi readers. 1112 The ICP emerged from a variety of local groups identified with communist and socialist causes that had been active in Baghdad, Nasiriyya, and Basra since 1929. Baghdad had three communist groups: the first was led by 'Asim Falih (b. 1905), Qasim Hasan (b. 1910), and Madhi Hashim (b. 1910); the second by Nuri Rafa'il and Jamil Tuma (b. 1905); and the third by Zaki Khayri (b. 1911). Connections were formed between the various socialist and communist groups when they participated together in demonstrations and strikes, especially the strike against the Baghdad Electric Light and Power Company. 1113 The groups finally united in March 1935 into a society called the Committee for Combating Colonialism (Lajnat did al-isti'mar), from

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which the ICP emerged. Beginning in July 1935, the party published an illegal paper, Kifah al-Sha'b (The Struggle of the People), described as the representative of the workers and the peasants and speaking on behalf of the central committee of the ICP. The communists initially supported Sidqi's coup and organized demonstrations in favor of the army. 104 However, Sidqi attacked the communists later, and this limited the scope of their activities. During Sidqi's regime the communists took part in large strikes at such industrial centers as the National Cigarette Company, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, Baghdad Rail, and Najaf's weaving factories. After the failure of the coup, many were jailed or exiled. 105 The communists supported Kaylani's coup, although they cautioned Kaylani not to side with Germany and not to harm the Jewish citizens oflraq. 106 During 1941-1945, communist activists manipulated the relaxation in censorship to recuperate from previous waves of arrests. As World War II progressed, many communists were released from prison because of the party's support of the war against Germany. Amended labor laws allowed a number of trade unions (e.g., oil workers, cigarette makers, and dock workers in Basra) to be set up. By 1942, workers who suffered under wartime inflation were attracted to the ICP. 107 The ICP skillfully manipulated its illegal press. Members published essays in the legal press under pseudonyms and fictitious names to avoid disclosing their identity. Kifah al-Sha'b included the logo "Workers of the world unite! Workers oflraq unite!" It reported on events in Russia as well as on local Iraqi problems, such as the role of religion in Iraqi society and the modes to revolutionize peasants and workers. 108 In the 1940s, the main newspapers of the ICP were Al-Sharara (from 1940) and Al-Qa'ida (from 1943). Both were illegal, and both reached the Kurdish-speaking areas. 109 The Iraqi communist press of the war years dealt with the October Revolution and the Soviet Union and critiqued the regime's social and economic policies. The communists also read socialist and left-leaning journals that reached Iraq, such as the Lebanese Sawt al-Sha'b and Al-Tariq, the Egyptian Al-Majalla al-Jadida, and publications of the Indian and British communist parties. Interest in such publications increased after the Stalingrad campaign, when the Iraqi public read a great deal about the Soviet resistance to German aggression. The growth in the number of publications affiliated with communism was also due to internal splits and fragmentation within the party in the early 1940s. Wahdat al-Nidal, under 'AbdAllah Qarini and Dhu Nun Ayyub, ran a printing house and a newspaper.

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Another splinter group possessed a printing machine in 1944 and published a journal called Al-'A mal that discussed the ideas of Marxism, Leninism, and the meaning of revolution and revolutionary struggle (nidal thawri) against the feudal law in the country.ll 0 The illegal publishing house of the ICP was Dar al-Hikma (established in 1944), which printed newspapers and other publications. An important source was literature in English brought from the Soviet Union, which was then translated into Arabic. Dar al-Hikma produced translations of The Origin of the Family (Engels), The Mother (Gorky), and essays on historical materialism and dialectical materialism by Stalin. Some members were fluent in foreign languages (Tuma, Fahd, Falih, and Rafa'il and former students of missionary schools) and could translate English, Russian, German, and French publications. Activists affiliated with bookstores in Baghdad and 'Amara made sure that they sold Dar al-Hikma's publications. Rail workers transmitted communist newspapers, and party members freely distributed Al-Qa'ida and Al-Sharara. The ICP also published small notebooks (kara'is) that addressed minority rights and the duties of members.m Because the ICP targeted not only the working classes and the peasantry but also the effendia, it was important to address this public in the means best known to them, namely, the press and the written word. In addition, for many communists the market for Arabic books prompted their first interest in communism. Intellectuals who did not study abroad were impressed by the books of such Arab socialists as Salama Musa, Shibli Shumayil, and Nikola Haddad and the translations of Lenin into Arabic, which gave them general ideas concerning the nature of socialism and communism. Moreover, many owed their further communist education to debates in clubs, cafes, and societies affiliated with leftist intellectuals.m During the 1940s, the ICP spread geographically and enjoyed some success in the south, especially in Basra, as well as in Iraqi factories. It gradually assumed a hierarchic status that included a congress that met biannually and conferences that were organized when matters needed approval. Branches were set up for minorities, and in many cases where the ICP's leadership thought that the local members were not properly knowledgeable, it sent an ideologue (muthaqaf) to disseminate information. Of the local committees in cities, Baghdad was the largest. Usually members met in cells two or three times a week to discuss party decisions, read its newspapers, and learn about Bolshevism, Marxism, and Leninism in Russia.

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In the next section I focus on two communist intellectuals: Yusuf Salman Yusuf, known as Fahd (1901-1949), the leader of the party; and Dhu Nun Ayyub, a communist teacher and writer. Although Fahd was the uncontested leader of the party and Ayyub was a politically marginalized novelist, both theorized about public participation, pluralism, and intellectual activity in Iraq, and their views shed important light on the nature of the opposition to the Hashemite state and its nationalist elites in the 1930s and early 1940s. FAHD, DEMOCRACY, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The man who became the chief ideologue of the ICP and its leader was Yusuf Salman Yusuf, known as Fahd. Fahd was born in Baghdad to a Chaldean family, but from the age of 7 he grew up in Basra, where he attended the American Missionary School (1914-1916). He organized societies dedicated to socialist causes that played an important role in strikes that broke out in the south following the introduction of a new municipal tax (1931). In 1929-1930, Fahd traveled in the Middle East and serialized his reflections about Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine in Al-Bilad. In 1932, he wrote a pamphlet adorned with the title "Workers of the World Unite!" which called for the unity of peasants and workers in Arab lands. In the early 1930s, he continued to be active in communist circles in both the south and Baghdad. Fahd spent the next few years (1935-1937) in the Soviet School for the Toilers of the East (KUTV).m After a short voyage to Spain and France, he returned to Iraq in 1938 to lead the ICP.n 4 Historians of the ICP concur that it was Fahd who rebuilt the party's organizations, first in the south and then in Baghdad, and enabled it to emerge as an influential organization after 1941.115 Fahd's publications from the early 1940s reflect many of the problems Iraqi communists encountered during the 1930s, such as the pro-Nazi campaign of certain nationalist groups. Fahd's leadership of the ICP was definitely not democratic. He ousted from the party those who challenged his leadership, such as Dhu Nun Ayyub, Jacob Cohen, and AbdAllah Mas'ud. Furthermore, Fahd was identified as a Stalinist, and one of the founding texts of the party he wrote was "A Communist Party-Not a Social Democracy." Yet an examination of his writings illustrates a great concentration on the freedom of speech and association, free elections, and the significant political role of the public sphere. Democracy, in Fahd's opinion, necessitated the formation of a public dis-

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course through a print culture protected by freedom of speech. A state should have clubs and societies, as well as political parties that participate in elections. Iraqis, in contrast, were ruled undemocratically and did not enjoy democratic or constitutional rights. 116 The ICP, however, also emphasized social equality; whereas political democracies granted only the ruling classes the rights to benefit from the constitution, social democracies granted equality to each individual according to his or her capacities. Fahd realized that for a successful dissemination of communist and Marxist views, the party needed access to the publishing industry, and he therefore encouraged Iraqi communists to submit articles to the press. He highlighted the usefulness of the revolutionary literature and the press as an outlet for the proletarian party and condemned the absence of the freedom of publication and association in Iraq. Fahd argued that in its battle for the transparency of political processes, editors of journals such as Kamil al-Chadirchi strove to publish protocols of both the parliament and cabinet, thus enabling a close watch on the state's activities.m Not only the press but also books and works of art were important. Fahd called every comrade to "be progressive in your outlook towards science, art, literature and culture, and defend them, thinking they are our people's property and property of forward-thinking humanity. Respect scientists, artists, and writers, without looking into their nationality or ethnicity."m The Iraqi public sphere, however, was critiqued as a means of creating false consciousness. The market for books and journals, in other words, was viewed as an ideological vehicle of both colonizers and the national ruling classes to maintain their control over Iraq's mental and physical resources. The print culture, Fahd maintained, substantiated myths concerning Britain's preeminence and its natural right to control Iraq. The most popular myth was that Britain was a civilized and democratic nation. The might of its army, navy, weapons industry, and capital somehow made the British occupation of Iraq, as well as their occupation of other parts of the world, seem natural and self-understood. Fahd maintained that British propaganda portrayed Iraqis as primitive and in need of a civilized country, like Britain, to enlighten them. Iraq's agriculture, trade, and industry correspondingly necessitated its aid. The British were also proud of their democracy at home and let Iraqis believe in their ability to democratize Iraq.ll9 Iraqis, however, should not be duped into believing in these myths, stated Fahd, because Britain and the Iraqi comprador governments assisted each

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other in upholding an undemocratic regime to secure their economic interests, as exemplified by their "terrorist campaign" against the communists and the liberals (ahrar). To impose these myths on Iraqi society, Britain flooded the Iraqi and Arab markets with books, journals, pamphlets, and newspapers and financed publishing houses, news agencies, and radio stations. These ideological structures were also sustained by foreign teachers and cultural institutions and by British publications in Arabic that were supported by reactionary Arab governments. The role of the communist thinker was consequently to declare that Britain had no right to interfere in Iraqi affairs and to validate that it had, in effect, perpetuated ignorance and poverty and that it supported those Iraqis who objected to democracyY 0 During World War II, the communists, much like the nationalists, emphasized that foreign elements were corrupting the Iraqi public domain. To Fahd, the Iraqi national leadership was subservient to the interests of either Britain or Germany and hampered the emergence of a truly progressive print culture by preventing the importation of newspapers from other Arab countries into Iraq and by using censorship to avoid discussion on any topic that might encourage disagreement. Fahd, however, argued that the modes of silencing criticism were not necessarily violent. Iraqi journalists themselves were forgetful of the fact that their role was more than merely publishing telegrams and printing foreign news stories, and they capitulated to political pressures. 121 The interest in print culture, its link to colonialism, and the ways the party attempted to propagate its own message indicate the weight that Fahd attributed to cultural hegemony. Fahd believed that whoever controlled Iraq's print market would also gain control over the political structure of Iraq. The written word was therefore the weapon of both the revolutionary intellectuals and their reactionary rivals. He examined civil society, Iraqi communications, and the national education system to argue that these ideological apparatuses not only legitimized control by Iraq's own ruling classes but also legitimized British cultural hegemony in the country. The communist intellectual, accordingly, was to challenge a two-part consensus: the acceptance of the yoke of the Iraqi ruling elites and the British colonizers as normative. In his investigation, Fahd recognized the significance of bodies in civil society that, after being manipulated by colonial powers, ultimately enabled the nonviolent subordination of Iraqis to their rule. Nevertheless, the same exact institutions, particularly the press, were the crucial means to critique the present regime and would eventually lead to its demise.

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We can better understand Fahd's conception of the public sphere by examining his analysis of the Nazi regime in Germany. He attempted to explicate, like many other socialists and communists of the time, how Hitler rose to power in a state with a developed proletariat movement. The Nazis, he contended, manipulated unemployment, the economic difficulties of the educated youth, and national antipathy to the Treaty ofVersailles. They fostered distrust in the democratic process among the people and eventually stripped Germany of its humanity. The regime's absolute and brutal termination of all democratic rights was manifested in its treatment of intellectuals. Fahd explained that the Nazis jailed, tortured, and killed many scientists, writers, and intellectuals because they feared the powers that such groups possessed. This explanation is hardly original, yet Fahd's attention to the rights the Nazis denied, such as personal liberties and parliamentary elections, and his stress on the roles of intellectual activity in a free society indicate the importance he attributed to them. 122 Initially the communists regarded World War II as a battle for imperial spheres of influence, in which the Arab world should remain neutral. 123 Nevertheless, after June 1941, the war against Nazism was transformed into a war of liberation. Fahd stressed that Iraqi communists must battle Nazism "as a philosophical, social, reactionary theory, extreme in its colonial aims" and disrespectful of the rights of other nations to live in freedom. The war against Nazism thus signified a national battle against a movement that opposed Iraqi independence. Contesting Nazism, however, signified not only the party's commitment to the anticolonial struggle but also its opposition to the Iraqi supporters of Nazism, and it connoted the uprooting of the social conditions that allowed the agents of the Axis to "poison the minds" of many Iraqis. 124 Fahd thought that the Germans identified in Iraq abhorrence for Britain and for Zionism and an undemocratic community typified by poverty and ignorance, and they manipulated these sentiments to construct a fifth column of pro-German Iraqis. These local groups were highly dangerous to Iraqi democracy and independence. 125 Fahd, like many communists in the colonized world, proposed that the battle against Fascism and Nazism was an all-inclusive struggle that was universal and local at the same time. Identifying local Fascists, who mask their true intentions under the banner of nationalism, and using this battle as a platform for fighting for democracy and social change within Iraq seemed to him the course that the party must adopt. After 1941 this course turned out to be extremely appealing to many Iraqi intellectuals.

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AYYUB, DOCTOR IBRAHIM, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Dhu Nun Ayyub was born in Mosul (1908), where he received his elementary and secondary school education. A graduate of the Higher Teachers Training College in Baghdad, Ayyub worked as a math teacher in various districts of Iraq. He was a communist but left the ICP in 1942 because of disagreements with Fahd. In the late 1930s, Ayyub published a few collections of short stories126 and a novel, Doctor Ibrahim (Duktur Ibrahim, 1939 ). 127 Doctor Ibrahim narrates the fictional biography of a man called Ibrahim and his rise from a humble provincial background to positions of power. Ibrahim obtains a doctorate in agriculture from London University, which enables him to become an influential official and an important public figure in Baghdad. The novel, whose chapters were first serialized in the press, created much noise at the time of its publication, because contemporary readers and critics believed that Ibrahim's character was modeled after Fadhil al-Jamali. 128 Moreover, because the novel parodied familiar intellectuals, journalists, public figures, and leading politicians, its plot turned into a highly important commentary on contemporary events. The novel's journalistic style and Ayyub's declaration in its introduction that he wrote a realistic text whose aims were to mirror present realties generated the notion that the satire's contents were anything but fictional. The novel contains many elements pertinent to the communist criticism of Iraqi civil society. In the novel, Dr. Ibrahim affiliates himself with diverse political, religious, and cultural societies and participates in public events. He joins the Society of the Muslim Brethren (because he is a Muslim), the Society of Christian Youth (because of his Christian wife), the Freemasons (because of his "lofty ethics"), and Nadi ai-Muthanna (because of his "passionate nationalism").129 Dr. Ibrahim's intellectual brilliance and subsequent political power are thus based on his capacity to analyze the various conversations produced in such clubs, replicate them, and convince their members that he is part of their ideological group. For example, when accused of agnosticism, Dr. Ibrahim immediately delivers a talk to a Muslim society on the virtues of the Islamic faith, in which he quotes the high repute with which Islam is held in the West in general and in the eyes of his British father-in-law in particular. He assures listeners that universal Islamic humanism both supersedes and precedes the ideas of communism. Advocating a struggle against the growing influence of missionaries and foreign schools, Dr. Ibrahim, who is married to a British woman, assumes the name of a modern Muslim reformerY 0 Similarly,

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Dr. Ibrahim manages to convince the members ofNadi al-Muthanna and the ultranationalists at the Ministry of Education that he firmly believes in the superiority of the Arab race and that he wishes to follow the political course outlined by Mussolini and Hitler in order to revive the Arab nation.m In Dr. Ibrahim's opinion (and in Ayyub's), the dissemination of Nazi propaganda in Iraq was successful predominantly because Germany duped Iraqis with its hatred of the British and of the Jews. Dr. Ibrahim, however, is astonished to find a large number of Nazi supporters in the army, the political arena, and the Ministry of Education and even among students, vendors, and porters. 132 Although Baghdad's coffeehouses were a creative milieu for intellectuals, to Dr. Ibrahim the cafes and entire public sphere were a space where he could solicit the collaboration of politicians and gather information about his rivals through a network of spies. Cafes, clubs, and societies became highly important in Iraq, because, as Dr. Ibrahim suggests, many Iraqis found comfort in such institutions after despairing of finding a political party that they could belong to or a newspaper where they could express their opinions. An ironic portrayal of "Iraqi democracy" is reflected in Dr. Ibrahim's endeavor to form a political party, whose eight founding members are corrupt journalists, officials, sons of affluent Baghdadi families, and members of parliament, all eager to materialize their personal interests. 133 This political adventure suggests that in Iraq the markers of a democracy, like the creation of political parties, mask, in effect, the self-interests of individuals seeking to maintain the status quo. Another agency by which the Iraqi elite promulgated its agendas was the press. Upon Dr. Ibrahim's return to Iraq with a Ph.D. from London University, the public that populates his lectures and reads his articles comes to consider him one of the sons of the motherland who has returned from the West "bearing the fruits of science and culture."134 Moreover, Dr. Ibrahim is asked to publish items about social, scientific, and political life in the West as well as comment on Iraq's agriculture and the state of its peasants. Such articles not only contribute to his image as a facilitator of progress but also permit him to spread incorrect information about his political rivals. Dr. Ibrahim's manipulation of the press has a corrupting effect on his employees, who, seeking their patron's favor, publish sympathetic articles about his innovative approaches, supported by numerous fabricated statistics. Dr. Ibrahim elects to congratulate these ad hoc journalists for their writing expertise, even though he has no idea if their statistics are valid.

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To Dr. Ibrahim, the failure of Iraq's print media signifies the worthlessness of ideas and the language that expresses them. He comments that during the 1936 coup, ministers and writers depicted their goals with such positive nouns as "revolution," "freedom," "the ending of tyranny," and "the defense of democracy." 135 Yet these same people supported authoritarianism and militarism, which made a mockery of their speech. Dr. Ibrahim thus comes to believe that language itself is meaningless. He thinks that, despite the fact that various Iraqis identified themselves as "Fascists," "Pro-British," "Nazis," "Communists" and so on, a careful examination of Iraqi newspapers, journals, and even scientific magazines reveals that such words simply became "powerful weapons in the hands of authoritative figures." 136 The deceitful use of language in the public sphere is fully revealed in the campaign against the communists led by hypocritical journalists and politicians. Dr. Ibrahim notes that talented students, gifted authors, and successful short story writers are all accused of communism, by mediocre individuals who could not accomplish similar achievements.m The constant attacks against the communists created a new and popular signification of the word communist (shuyu'i) that had little to do with the ideas of Marx or Lenin. To a local policeman, communism was a belief system that allowed him to sleep with other women and allowed his wife to sleep with other men. Others identify it with the Shi'i sect and with unorthodox Islamic religious movements.138 The Ministry of Communications interpreted words such as [allah, worker, poverty, justice, and equality in printed materials as testimony of communism and subsequently banned these printed materials. 139 Thus those most fearful of communism had a vague and often incorrect understanding of the concept, and their accusations were frequently voiced to achieve personal and political aims. Ayyub's novel suggests that the public sphere, especially newspapers and political parties, lost its function as a mediator between the Iraqi people and the state. For Ayyub, as for Fahd, the public sphere appeared to be too ethically contaminated to carry out such goals. Ayyub's analysis discloses important yet contradictory views regarding the potential of pluralism in Iraq. On the one hand, Ayyub reveals much contempt for the Iraqi intellectual arena that is populated by impotent, corrupt people-journalists who collaborate with dishonest politicians, club members who are easily duped by the likes of Dr. Ibrahim, and officials who write trivial articles in newspapers. If Jamali labeled the press, the cafes, and the clubs as spaces encouraging idleness,

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Doctor Ibrahim proposes that the clubs and journals were precisely the institutions that permitted Iraqi politicians to widen their base of support. At the same time, however, Ayyub consistently called for freedom of speech, motivated by the belief that, so long as a few intellectuals were allowed to speak freely, there would be a future for a pluralistic Iraq. 140 In this sense, the press is not the tool of corrupt politicians but rather the instrument that will bring about their demise. More generally, Doctor Ibrahim reflects the concerns of political groups associated with the Left. These groups recognized the educated middle classes as their target audiences and needed to have open access to publishing houses and cultural magazines to communicate with them. In other words, they needed to function in the same public sphere that they deemed corrupt and ineffective. In Doctor Ibrahim, language functions as a means of control. Ayyub bore a strong similarity to other interwar intellectuals who used journalism as well as prose fiction to explore the roles played by both the state and the print media in corrupting language and propagating tyranny. 141 In his novel, journalists, politicians, and generals use such expressions as freedom, progress, and justice while perpetuating oppression, backwardness, and injustice. Doctor Ibrahim, although critiquing censorship and state brutality, suggests that Iraqi intellectuals were not violently forced to yield to the state's language but rather willingly took part in this undemocratic process, motivated by a variety of self-interests: the desire to be published in major newspapers, to acquire jobs in state institutions, and to merit the patronage of influential politicians. The novel, then, shows how an authoritarian political culture can create compliance with the aid of numerous Iraqi "big brothers" (sheikhs, politicians, generals), as opposed to a single Orwellian big brother. In conclusion, exploring the actions and writings of Iraqi communists illustrates how an important, albeit small and persecuted, group of Iraqis operated in the public domain. The sheer amount of energy and force devoted by Iraqi governments to the eradication of local communism before 1941 attests to the communists' perceived importance in official circles. Like the social democrats of the Ahali group, Iraqi communists offered daily criticisms of the antidemocratic nature of the state and criticized sharply the conduct of Nazi Germany and those Iraqis who misguidedly supported it. Moreover, such communist writers as Fahd and Ayyub were preoccupied with questions of cultural hegemony and perceptively identified many of

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the weaknesses endemic to the Iraqi public sphere of the 1930s. Many more intellectuals joined the ICP during and after World War II. The defeat of the ultranationalists affiliated with the Kaylani movement and the British reoccupation in 1941 singled out the communists as a serious intellectual opposition to nationalist intellectuals and bureaucrats. The origins of their success, however, should be traced to the late 1930s. CONCLUSIONS

Despite the rise of nationalist and authoritarian voices, democracy and pluralism were important themes throughout the 1930-1945 period, as a minority group of Iraqi intellectuals introduced new concepts to the democratic discourse. Although newspapers in both the 1920s and the 1930s dealt with democracy and its virtues, the writings of the 1930s were different. In the early 1920s tyranny was associated with the Ottoman past, whereas in the 1930s the lack of democracy and independence was associated with the Hashemites and their supporters. Even though the British were also judged as an obstacle in the path of reform, the liability for the failure of the state was cast mainly on the Iraqi elites themselves, whose cooperation with Britain was symbolized by the 1930 treaty. Furthermore, whereas the debates concerning democracy in the 1920s were inspired by the Wilsonian doctrine and discussions in the Ottoman and Arabic press, the debates in the 1930s were instigated by a variety of intellectual sources, such as the publications of the Fabians in England and new theories articulated by Russian, American, and British socialists. Unlike the religious discourse of the 1920s, which positioned democratic principles within Islamic law and theology, the new supporters of democracy focused mainly on the language of secular and universal values. The social democrats and the communists were challenged by the overwhelmingly nationalist bodies that received at times increasing state support. In addition, internal fragmentation endangered the dissident groups themselves. Although the communists and Ahali members collaborated at times, they often disagreed over questions relating to gender and class. Some within the Ahali group believed that to realize their goals, they needed to collaborate with militaristic elements, a decision that proved destructive to their democratic agenda, whereas others denounced participation in violent coups. Within the communist party, internal divisions also paralyzed the ICP's effectiveness. Differing in their ideologies, tactics, and strategies, the opposition groups lacked cohesion and subsequently could pose no serious threat to the status quo.

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However, their significance does emerge in several spheres. First, an investigation of Hashemite Iraq in the years to follow reveals that the individuals who were actively involved in the social-democratic and communist circles in the 1930s emerged as the leading figures of the opposition. Kamil al-Chadirchi, Muhammad Hadid, and Husayn Jamil turned into influential politicians after World War II. The activists surrounding Fahd, for example, Zaki Khayri and Husayn Muhammad al-Shabibi, became the important leaders of the illegal ICP. Second, it is important to note that both the Ahali group and the communists were highly critical of British colonial policies and Iraq's leadership. Their supporters came from the same ranks of the effendia that were frustrated with the present leadership of the state. Yet their objection to Britain did not necessarily entail the adoption of antidemocratic or pro-German politics. Third, despite the nationalist hegemony until1941, there were elements of diversity within the Iraqi cultural environment. Newspapers and journals

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fJ11 p;,f •~ 240. 242, 250. 320n51 Hila/, Al- (journal), 32 Hilali, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-, 128, 242, 24748; Theories Concerning the Reform of the Countryside, 211 Hilla, 248 Hilli, 'Abd al-Karim al-: Al-Ahkam alJa'fariyya fi'l ahwal al-shakhsiyya, 32 Hilli, 'Ali a!-, 122,140, 165 History, 24, I75, I76; British records, 19-20; intellectual, 10-11, IJ; Iraqi, 128-31

History of Iraq Between Two Occupations, The ('Azzawi), I29, I}O History of Iraqi Governments, The (Hasani), 129,130

History of Iraqi Problem, The (Basir), 144 Hope party, 183 Hourani, Albert: Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 11-12 Human rights, 64, 103, 133; jails and, 97-98 Hunger strikes: political prisoners, 97-98, 113-14 Husayn, Sherif, 20, 141, I79 Husayn, Taha, 176 Husayni, Hajj Aminal-, 58 Husri, Khaldun, 251-52 Husri, Sati' a!-, 24, 25, 48, 54, 55, 56,130, 139, 161, 178, 199, 236, 3081133> 3221179; on colonial cultural policies, 162-63; "Concerning the French Defeat," 57-58; education system, 231, 233, 249-54, 320n51; Shi'i discrimination, 170-71 Hussein, Saddam, 13, 272 Hut, Mahmud a!-, 153 Ibrahim, 'Abd al-Fattah, 14, 68, 94, 102, 106, 121, 128, 130, 155, 159, 168, 240, 243, 289n65, 320n39, 3211!70; Ahali group, 61-62, 63, 70, 290n76; Introduction to Sociology, 65-66, 132-33; on nahda, 146-47; On the Road to India, 160-61; on political participation, 66-67 Ibrahim, Hafiz, 150 ICP. See Iraqi Communist Party Ibn Hawqal, 207 Ibn Khaldun, 89, 202, 220, 221, 228 Identity, 140, 157; culture and, 132-33; Iraqi, 125-26, 128, 131; Jewish, 2596o; Shi'i, 173-74, 177 Idris, Suhil, 151-52 Idris, Yusuf, 150 Ilah, 'Abd al-, 54, 129, 141 Ilitzam (commitment), 89-90 Imperialism, 138-39; British, 159-61; opposition to, 98-99 Impressionists, 91 Independence Party, 94-96, no, 111, 112, 113, 117, 136, 212, 244

INDEX

Industrial and Agricultural Fair, 55 "Informer, The" (Sayyab), 105 Inspections in the Sha'biyya, 67 Institute of Fine Arts, 92 Intellectuals, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 20, 93, 121-23; activism of, 30-31; arrests of, 107-8; British monitoring and control of, 38-42; colonialism and, 3, 158-69, 270-71; criticism of public sphere, 56-57; execution of, 109-10; Faysal and, 35-36; global literacy, 90-91; government roles of, 53-54; as historians, 10-11; Iraqi, 13, 191-92, 269-70; Jewish, 59, 185-86; role ot; 265-66; suppression of, no-n Intifada, 88, 109, 116-18, n9, 167, 241, 272 Introduction to Sociology (Ibrahim), 6s-66, 132-33 'Jqab, AI- (journal), 154 Iqaz, AI- (newspaper), 30 Iran, 5, 20, 160, 164-65, 170, 184 Iranian Communist Party. See Tudeh 'Iraq, AI- (newspaper), 21, 26, 27, 30, 35, 40, 56, 71, 143 Iraq During the War (weekly), 38 Iraqi Academy, 92,104 Iraqi Arab Society, 26 Iraqi Artists Society, 91 Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), 2, 6o, 62, 8o, 84, 114, 109, n9, 136, 189, 218, 227, 241,266,267,268,295n29,321n7o; activities of, 100-104; emergence of, 73-74; and Fahd, 76-79; illegal press of, 74-75; Kurds in, 94,183-84, 311n121, 122; on nahda, 147-48 Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party, 184 Iraqi Pen Club, 54 Iraqi Petroleum Company, 74, 97, 102 Iraqi Royal Court, 53 Iraq Times (newspaper), 117 'Irfan, AI- (newspaper), 20, 27, 48,155 Irrigation engineers, 200 'Isa, Razuq, 143 Islah, AI- (newspaper), 25 Islam, 11, 33, 209; as anti- Fascist, 59-60; Jewish use of, 186-87 Islamic Charitable Society, 30

355

Isma'il, 'Abd al-Qadir, 71, 73> 121,136, 214, 291n96; Ahali group, 61, 62, 63, 154 Isma'il, Fa'iz, 95 Isma'il, Muhyi al-Din, 122,151,175 Istiqlal. See Independence Party Istiqlal, Al- (Independence) (newspaper), 21, 23, 28, 29, 53, 56, 58, 71, 138, 154 Italy, 6o; Fascist, 58, 59, 232 Ttjihad, 22 'Izza tribe, 215 )abbar, Ahmad Fawzi 'Abd a!-, 112 jab! 'Ami!, 155 Jabr, Salih, 106, 114,115,116,119,171 Jabra, Jabra Ibrahim, 149,153, 154-55 Jacob, Morris, 106 Ja'fari Law, 32 jahiz, al-, 208 Jails: political prisoners in, 97-98, 108, 113-14 Jalal, Ibrahim, 92 Jalal Khalid (al-Sayyid), 162 fama'at Ahl-Ahali (Ahali group): and democracy, 61-63 Jamali, Fadhil al-, 54, 55, 92,103,123, 128,154,171,200,222,228,233,240, 293-94n128; on Bedouins, 208-9; criticism by, 56-57; The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education, 199, 245; on rural administration, 204, 206; on tribes, 201-2, 246 Jami'at al al-bayt, 231 Jamil, Husayn, 61, 62, 72, 85, 108, 111, n2, 113, 121, 134, 207, 314n2o )ami!, Makki, 199, 204, 205, 210, 2n Jarallah, Zuhdi, 153 Jazeera, AI-, 272, 273 Jawad, Kazim, 122, 131, 140, 151, 164, 165, 294n7 Jawad, Mustafa, 207 Jawahiri, Ja,far al-, 116 Jawahiri, Muhammad Mahdi al-, 24, 29, 44, 47, 62,109,112, us, 119,121,213, 240, 273; "Lullaby for the Hungry," 147-48; "My Brother Ja'far," n6; Shi'i affiliation, 170-71, 172 Jawdat, 'Ali, 178

356

INDEX

Jayyusi, Salma, 45 jews, 4, 6, 8, 15, 24, 44, 95, 102; Arab, 59, 185-90; Arabization of, 259-60; Biblical studies, 260-61; at Shammash School, 206, 254-59 Jibran, Jibran Khalil, 150, 186 Jihad (newspaper), 99 Jordan, 195, 211, 243 Journalists, journalism, 9, 18, 20, 23, 25, 28, 53, 265, 291n94; British criticism of, 41-42; patronage network, 36-37 journey in Iraq, A (Hasani), 129 Joyce, James: Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 9 Judea-Arabic, 186

Kadihun, Al- (Ayyub), 223 Kanafani, Ghasan, 14 Karbala, 117, 170, 172-73, 175, 197 Karkh,55 Karkh, AI- (journal), 44-45,131 Karkhi, 'Abbud a!-, 125, 179, 213; poetry of, 44-45> 229 Karmili, Anastas al-, 38 Kaylani, Rashid 'Ali al-, 52, 95; coup, 58, 69, 74. 188, 236 Kaylani family, 43 Kazimayn, 117 Kazimiyya, 175 KDP. See Kurdish Democratic Party Kemalists, Kemalism, 8, 20, 39, 179, 232 Kerkuk (journal), 177 Khadduri, Majid, 68, 128, 130, 240, 277n2, 292n100, 320n51 Khalidi, Rashid, 11 Khalili, Jaf'ar a!-, 53,150,152,172,173.174, 201

Khalis, Safa' al-, 122, 243 Khallaf, 'Abd al-Mun'am, 60,149 Khayri, Zaki, 73o 85, 121 Khayyat, Ja'far, 204, 247; on tribes, 199, 200,202-3,205,22 2 Khouri, Ilias, 273 Khulusi, Sa fa', 123; Abu Nuwas in America, !67-68 Khunda, Sami, 37-38, 21, 41 Khusbak, Shakir, 92

Kifah, Al- (newspaper), 58 Kifah al-Sha'b (newspaper), 74,216 Kilani, Kamil, 150 King Faysal College, 248 Kirkuk, 38,102,177-78, 183 Kubba, Ibrahim, 93, 122, 218, 227; Lights on the Algerian Problem, 165-66; on United States, 166-67 Kubba, Muhammad Mahdi, 94, 122 Kurdish, 183, 184-85 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 94,184 Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, 184 Kurds, 7, 44, 94,215, 268; 'Azzawi on, 21011; communist, 100-101; education, 231, 235; sectarianism, 169, 1il2-85; tribalism, 4-5, 196, 198 Kut, 117 Kut Jail, 115 KUTV. See School for the Toilers of the East Land ownership, 30, 195, 205, 214-15, 313n8; and rural-urban migrations, 202-3 Land reform, 30; communist calls for, 217-18 Language, 4, 8, 132, 185; and identity, 177, 182-83; used by Jews, 254, 255, 258-59. 324nl23 La' or, Yitzhak, 273-74 Laski, Harold, 62 Law College (Baghdad), 92,114 Lawrence, T. E., 147,160 League for Combating Zionism, 94, 101-2,136 League for the Defense of Women's Rights, 94 League of Nations, 52, 56,169,187,232 Lebanese, 10, 191-92 Lebanon, 7, 27, 150,155, 302n45; Arab nationalism, 143, 149; publications from,;, 8, 20, 27, 129 Leftists, 58, 61, 85-86, 91, 110, 130, 121-22, 137, 266; and Algeria, 165-66; Iraqi identity, 131-32; Jews in, 189, 190; Kurdish, 183, 184; rural, 212-28 Legal system: reform of, 25, 205; tribal, 209-10,216

INDEX

Lenin, V.I., 6, 62, 75, 155; State and Revolution, 73 Liberalism, liberals, 12, 58-59 Liberal Party, 94 Libraries: in Baghdad, 38, 91; promotion of, 26-27 Lights on the Algerian Problem (Kubba), 165-66 Lisan al- 'Arab (newspaper), 41 Literature, 27,131, 271-72; global view of, 90-91; Kurdish, 184-85; 1950s, 88-89; resistance, 136-37; rural theme in, 222-27 Liwa' al-Istiqlal (newspaper), 96, 99,106, 112, 114, 152 Local Languages Law, 44, 182-83 "Lullaby for the Hungry" (Jawahiri), 147-48 Lutfi, 'Abd a!-Majid, 228; Qalb Umm, 179, 223

Mabda', Al- (newspaper), 69, 214 235 Mack, Ambassador, 243 Mackenzie's Bookstore, 91 Madi, Iliya Abu, 186 Maghreb, 165 Mahfuz, Najib, 91, 150, 273 Mahmud, 'Abd al-Majid, 203 Mahmud, 'Abd al-Wahhab, 109 Mahmud, Nur al-Din, 117 "Malja' al- 'ishrun, AI" (Bayati), 137 Majalla al-Tad ida, AI- (journal), 74 Majallat al-Mu'allum ai-Jadid (newspaper), 92,197,246

Majlis, 43 Makdisi, Ussama, 7 Makiya, Kanan: Republic of Fear, 13 Makki, Muhammad, 22 Mala'ika, Nazik a!-, 88, 89, 122, 151, 152, 271; "We Have Wiped Out the Disgrace," 136 "Mandate Government, The" (Rusafi), 46-47 Martial law, 108, 117, 196 Marxism, 13, 62, 93, 120 Massacres: Assyrian, 169 Matthews, Roderic C., 238

357

Mawahib al-wahib fi fada'il Abi Talib (Naqdi), 32

Mawsil, Al- (journal), 21, 22, 23, 30 Me'ir, Yoseph: "My Present State and My Dream State;' 256 Menasheh, Sha'ul, 188-89 Messengers of Culture, The (Ayyub ), 234, 29311126 Middle class, 2, 6, 9, 125-26, 186, 269; mobility of, 220-21; public life of, ss-s6 Migration: rural-urban, 4, 30,197, 202-3 Ministry of Education, 8, 44, 48, 49, 55, s6,92,11o,128,130,153,197,238,239, 240,242,245,248,249,26}-64,266, 322n93; national education system, 231-32,233 Ministry of Interior, 37, 100 Miqdadi, Darwish, 55, 149, 153, 235; Our History in a Narrative Form, 231-32 Misbah, AI- (journal), 44, 186, 187 Modern Theater (AI-Masrah ai-Hadith), 92 Monarchy, 6, 20, 21, 88, 96, 127 Mond, Alfred: protest against, 48, 49 Mongols: in Baghdad, 129 Monroe, Paul: education inspection, 244-45 Monroe Commission, 244-45, 248, 322n79 Moon, Parker Thomas, 61-62 Mossadeq (Mohammed), 164-65 Mosul, 38, 40, 93, 119, 129, 183 "Mother of a Prisoner in Nuqrat alSalman, K (Sayyab ), 98 Mubarak, Zaki, 176, 192, 238 Mudarris, Fahmi a!-, 39, 41, 144-45, 179, 231 Mufid, AI- (newspaper), 41 Muhsin, Muhammad 'Abd a!-, 28 "Mujahidun, Af' (ai-Sayyid), 217 Mukmal, Salih, 258-59 Munit~ ~bd al-Rhaman, 151 Muqtataf, Al- (journal), 32 Murad, Sultan, 258 Murshid, Al- (journal), 33 Muruwa, Husayn, 141, 172

358

INDEX

Musa, Salama, 62, 150, 151 Musawi, Muhasin, 221; Reading Iraq, 14 Mussolini, Benito, 59, 65 Muthanna, AI- (journal), 232 Mutjahids, 19, 20; on electoral process, 23-24; in Najaf, 25-26 Muzaffar, Muhammad Rida a!-, 207 "My Brother Ja'far" (Jawahiri), 116 Nadi al-Muthanna, 54-55, 56, 58, 138, 153, 154, 179> 232 Nahda, 140-41, 173; development of, 142-43; narratives of, 143-49 Nahda al- 'Iraqiyya, AI- (newspaper), 44 Nahda of Husayn, The (Shahrastani), 145 Nahda Party, 44 Najaf, 55, 95, 74,117,119,170,176, 197, 244; intellectual activities in, 20, 25-26, ss; poetry in, 47, 174-75,191,192 Najafi, Ahmad Safi al-, 155, 173; poetry of, 138, 172, 175, 212, 242; "\'Vhere Is the Guard?" 47-48 Najah publishing house, 48 Naji, Hila! a!-, 115,122 Najib, General, 99, 100 Naqdi, Ja'far al-: Mawahib al-wahib fi fada'ilAbi Talib, 32 Naqdi, Muhammad al-, 165 Nashi'a, AI- (journal), 30 Nashi'a al-jadida, AI- (journal), 30 Nasir, Muhammad, 237 Nasiri, Muhyi al-Din, al-, 22 Nasiriyya, 37-38, 44, 73, 95, 217 Nasser, 'Gamal Abd al-, 100, 119 Nasserism, 6, 164, 243 National Cigarette Company, 74 National Democratic Party (NDP), 94, 95-96,97,102,106,110,111, 117, 134> 187,244, 245; on Egyptian coup, 99, 100; on hunger strikes, 113-14; on land ownership, 214-15; on tribes, 197,227 National Front, 110 Nationalism, 2, 7, 34,155-56,158,165,168, 203, 230, 263, 259, 268, 272; Arab, 4, 11, 12-1}, 25, 142, 143, 161, 192-93, 194; Ba'thists and, 148-49; Bedouins and,

207-8; in education, 231-34; Iraqi, 9, 14, 52,128, 131, 269-70; Pan-Arab, 55, 126, 137-40; political participation and, 66-67; Shi'i and, 172-73, 175; Sunni, 24, 170 Nationalists, 122-23, 136 National Liberation Party, 101, 102 Nation-state: and Arab unity, 139-40; Shi'i and, 170-77 NAT0,166 Nawwab, Muzaffar a!-, 131, 299 m21 Nazi Germany, 58, 59, 79, 189, 232 Nazism, 8, 58, 65, 79, 132 NDP. See National Democratic Party New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education, The (Jamali), 199, 245 Newspapers, 22-23, 28, 44, 53, 56, 58, 71, 92, 96,106,197, 28om; British control of, 41-42; censorship of, 37-38; communists, 100-101 Nida' ai-Sha'b, 44 Nidal, Wahdat a!-, 74 Nomads, 196, 201, 247. See also Bedouins; Tribes North, J. 231 Novels, 9-10,27,223 Nuqrat al-Salman prison, 97-98, 108, 109, 113-14 Nur, Thabit 'Abd al-, 24, 39 Nuri, 'Abd al-Malik, 14, 88, 93,122, 151, 152, 154, 228; The Anthem of the Earth, 224-25 Nuri, Baha' a!-Din, 107,109,114, 184, 31Inl21 Nusuli, Anis a!-, 48-49, 149, 175, 176, 185 "Odes to Jaffa" (Bayati), 136-37 Oil industry, 45, 97, 102, 113, 204-5, 206 "Old Clerk, The" (Basri), 181-82 Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, The (Batatu), 13, 279n48 Orphanages, orphans, 30, 93 Ottoman Empire, 5, 19, 20, 142, 160, 17879,198,20},222,258,308 n33;Arab elites and, 181-82; education 232, 234; Iraqi culture during, 220-21;

INDEX

language of, 180-81; sheikhs and, 195-96 Ouda, Shinwar, 102

Our History in a Narrative Form (Miqdadi), 231-32 Paintings, 57, 222-23 Palestine, 20,102,153,190, 262, 303n68; Arab unity, 134-35; demonstrations for, 172-73; partition of, 136, 189; support for, 55-56, 188; and Zionism, 133-34 Palestinian National Revolt, 56 Palestinians, 127; artists, 154-55; in Iraq, 6o, 191; support for, s6, 136-37; writers, 10, 153-54 Pan-Arabism, 6, 13, 96,111,126,127, 129, 130, 131, 133, 155, 211, 241, 268, 269; Ba'thists and, 148-49; British opposition to, 60-61; clubs, 54-55; historical narratives of, 137-40; and Independence Party, 94-95; radical, 89, 242; Shi'i critique of, 171-72 Parliament, 45, 112-13 Pasha, Da'ud, 143 Pasha, Jamal, 141 Pasha, Midhat, 19, 143 Patriotism, 126, 171 Patronage system, 35-36, 53-54 Peace Library (Baghdad), 38 Peasants, 195, 198, 211, 313n8; civil rights of, 212-14; and communists, 103, 215-18; land distribution among, 30, 214-15; rural-urban migration of, 202-3, 221; and urban sector, 223-28 People's Party, 94 Peretz, Ya'qov: "An Orphan on a Rainy Night;' 255-56

Personality of the Iraqi Individual (Wardi), 219-21 Phinehas, Ya'qov: "Freedom:' 256 Pioneers Group (Jam'iyyat al-ruwwad), 91, 131 Pluralism, 17, 44, 65, 84; of public sphere, s8-s9; religious, 32-35 Poetry, 9, 18, 90, 57, 131, 138, 140, 150, 164,201,222,256,271-72,310n98;

359

colloquial, 44, 179, 213; Iraqi, 191-92; Karkhi's, 44-45; Kurdish, 184, 185; neoclassical 46, 47, 50, 52, 150, 152, 192, 213, 271; about Palestine, 136-37; on peasants, 212-13; political themes of, 45-48, so; rural theme in, 225-26; Turkoman, 177-78, 179 Police: abuse by, 97, 103, 107, 108 Political parties, 94-95, 108, 109, 215, 285ni27 Political Prisoner, The (Salim), 98 Politics, 11, 44, 52, 54, 70, 85; anti-foreign, 164-65, 191; British mandate, 42-43; participation in, 66-67; poetry and, 45-46; violent suppression of, 266-67 Popular Front, 117 Populism, See sha'biyya

Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Joyce), 9 Portsmouth Treaty, 113, 114 Positivism, 32, 33 Poverty: rural sector, 214-15, 216 Press, 8-9, 44, so, 53, 71, 113; Britain and, 42-43, 87-88; communist, 74-75, 77; critique of state, 96-100; freedom of speech and, 64-65; government control of, 106-7; on religious issues, 32-35 Press law (1954), 107 Primary Teachers College, 238, 248 Print market, 4, 6, 18, 20, 38, so, 106, 253, 187, 265, 272-74; on religious issues, 32-35 Prisoners: executions of, 109-10; political, 97-98, 107-8, 113-14 Propaganda, 53, 58, 100, 134 Provisional Council, 38 Publications, publishing, s, 8, 19, so, 53, 75, 129, 240, 284moo; self-censorship of, 37-38 Public Education Law, 232 Public sphere, 2, 50-51, 77, 89; Ayyub on, 82-83; critique of, 56-58; Fahd on, 78-79; middle class in, S5-s6; pluralism of, s8-s9; poetry in, 45-46; religion's role and, 31-35

360

INDEX

Publishing, 19, 21, 150; government and, 22-23 Publishing houses,;, 48, 187 Qa'ida, AI- (newspaper), 74, 75, 102, 292n109 Qalb Umm (Lutfi), 179, 223 Qarini, 'AbdAllah, 74 Qasim, 'Abd al-Karim, 265,267,268 Qazzaz, Muhammad Salih al-, 43 Qishtayni, Khalid, 151 Queen Aliya College, 239 Rabita bookshop, 93 Racial theory, 132 Radi, al-Sharif al-, 175, 176 Radicalism, 54, 62, 104; education, 24244; in Najaf, 25-26; Pan-Arab, 89,95 Radio Bari, ;8 Radio Berlin, ;8 Radio Moscow, 101 Rafidan, AI- (journal), 21,22-23,37,41, 158; on nahda, 142-43 Rahhal, Husayn al-, 25, 32, 34, 43, 49, 62 Rahhal, Khalid al-, 122 Rahman al-Na'if, 'Abd al-, 122,164 Raids, 201; Wahhabi, 32, 196 Railways: strikes, 102 Rashid, Harun a!-, 142 Rashid, Muhammad: From the Depths of Prisons in Iraq, 98 Rashid street, a!-, 91 Ra'uf, 'Adnan, 93 Rawi, 'Abd a-Jabbar a!-, 199, 200, 201 Rawi, 'Adnan a!-, 98, 99, no, 112, 122, 164, 208 Ra'y al- 'Amm, AI- (newspaper), 187 Reading Iraq (Musawi), 14 Realist Stories from the Arab World, 151 Rebellion in Hell (Zahawi), 179,192 Red Crescent, 93 Reform Club, 25 Refugees: Palestinian, 136-37 Rejwan, Nissim, 66, 90-91, 107 Religion, 22, 176; role of, 31-35, 272 Renaissance: European, 146-47; literary and cultural, 88-89

Rents: in Baghdad, 30 Republic of Fear (Makiya), 13 Resistance: literature of, 136-37; to state power, 111-12 Revival, 173; Arab, 140-49. See also Nahda Revolt of the Zanj (Samir), 218-19 Revolts, 219, 291n97, 300-301114; 1920, 19-20, 28, 29, 128, 175, 199, 201; sectarian, 169-70; tribal, 8, 196, 214, 215, 317n113. See also Arab Revolt Revolution: 1958, 104 Revolutionary Prisoner, The (ICP), 114 Rida, Mirza Muhammad, 73 Rida, Rashid, 133 Rif, 228; academic studies of, 218-22; artistic portrayals of, 222-27; elites and, 195, 196; leftist attitudes toward, 212-18; policies toward, 198-99 Rihani, Amin a!-, 130, 171, 191-92 Rikabi, Fu'ad a!-, 95, 122,148 Rimawi, Fahd al-, 153 Riots, 55, 114, 119 Risala, Al- (magazine), 6o, 150,151,152,273 Risalat al- 'lim, 174 Riwaya al-iqaziyya, AI- (Faydi), 30 Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation), 94 Road to India, On the (Ibrahim), 160-61 "Role of Books in the East, The" (Shabibi), 26 Rafa'il, Nuri, 73, 243, 288n38 Ruralism, 195, 196 Rural sector. See Rif Rusafi, Ma'ruf a!-, 25, 27, 38, 43, 48,179, 191-92, 229, 28om, 286m44; "The Mandate Government;' 46-47 Russian Revolution, 73 Rustamiyya College, 248 Sabri, 'Ata, 223 Sabri, Mahmud, 122 Sada al-Ahali (newspaper), 96, 97,134, 165 Sa'di, Da'ud al-, 21,39 Sa'id, Nuri a!-, 171, 178 Sadiq, Judah, 109,189 Sadr, Muhammad al-, 116,175 Sa'dun, 'Abd al-Muhsin a!-, 36

INDEX

Sahifa, AI- (journal), 25, 62 Said, Edward, 9, 11 Sa'id, Nuri al-, 35, 6o, 88, 94, 95, 98, 99, 103,108, 110,115,130,196,215, 243; on Arab unity, 134, 142 Salafi reform movement, 32 Salim, Jawad, 122; The Political Prisoner, 98 Salim, Lorna, 131 Salim, Nizar, 93 Samara'i, Fa'iq a!-, 99, 108, 109, no, 112, 122,140 Samara'i, Ibrahim al-, 122 Samir, Faysal al-, 93, 122, 227, 3171m3; Revolt of the Zanj, 218-19 Sanhuri, 'Abd al-Razzaq a!-, 6o, 149 San Remo Conference, 19 Sarraf, Mahmud Hamid a!-, 255 Sartawi, 'Ali Muhammad a!- 211 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 89-90, 91,152,166 Sa'ud, Ibn, 160 Sawt ai-Ahali (newspaper), 96, 99,114, 134> 187 Sawt ai-Sha'b (journal), 74 Sayyab, Badr Shakir al-, 88, 89, 90, 93, 122, 1}6, 140, 151, 152, 165, 171, 226, 240, 271, 294n7; "The Informer;' 105; "A Mother of a Prisoner in Nuqrat alSalman," 98 Sayyid, Mahmud Ahmad Al-, 25, 34, 62, 146, 151, 161, 173, 179, 217; "The Exiled Student;' 233-34; Jalal Khalid, 162; "Talib Effendi;' 194 Sayyid, Ahmad Lutfi al-, 67 Sayyif, Malik, 242 School for the Toilers of the East (KUTV), 76, 292-93m13 Schools, 4, 30, 229-30, 238, 248, 318n4, 320n51, 323n114; curriculum, 236-37, 320n44; Husri's policies, 250-51; Jewish, 254-59; peripatetic, 245-46 Science, 31, 32, 33 Scientific Association, 55 Scientific Institute, 24-25, 31 "Scrupulous Clerk, The" (Fadhil), 180-81 Secret societies, 21, 36-37, 142 Sectarianism (ta'ifiyya), 7, 158,169, 268, 272; of Arab Jews, 185-90; education,

361

233, 243; Kirkuk and, 177-78; Kurds and, 182-85; non-Iraqi Arabs, 19093; Shi'i, 170-77 Self-censorship: of publications, 37-38 Self-rule, 23, 159 Sha'b, AI- (newspaper), 187 Shabibi, Husayn Muhammad al-, 101, 102, 112, 121, 171, 321n70; execution of, 109-10 Shabibi, Muhammad Baqir a!-, 25, 27, 28, 29,36-37,54 Shabibi, Muhammad Rida a!-, 39, 8;, 173, 174; poetry and politics of, 45, 172, 175, 191; "The Role of Books in the East;' 26 Sha'biyya, 67-68 Sha'biyya, 68 Sha 'b Party, 44 Shahrastani, Hibat al-Din a!-, 34,145, 174,231, 283nn86, 89; as anti-Fascist, 59-60; The Nahda of Husayn, 145; pluralism of, 32-33 Shammar tribe, 200 Shammash, Benjamin Solomon, 254 Shammash (newspaper): articles in, 255-59 Shammash School, 206, 262-63; educational program at, 254-59, 260 Shar'a, 27 Sharara, Muhammad, 173, 259-60 Sharara, AI- (newspaper), 74, 75,189 Sharif, 'Aziz, 94, 101, 102, 106, 121, 297n78; trial of, 111-12 Sharqi, 'Ali al-, 47, 138,175, 208 Shatrah, 248 Sha'ul, Anwar, 15, 24, 53, 59, 152, 186, 240, 2981l102 Shawkat, Naji, 198 Shawkat, Sa'ib, 179 Shawkat, Sami, 55, 139, 154, 155, 208, 232, 233; on rural education, 246-47 Shawqi, Ahmad, 150 Shawwaf, Khalid al-, no, 122, 140, 165 Sheikhs, 7, 194, 218, 227, 316n90; colonial use of, 195-96; power holding of, 175-76, 221-22; and rural-urban migration, 202-3

362

INDEX

Sherifians, 6, 19, 20, 21, 54, 131, 142, 178, 196, 232, 267 Shiblak, Abbas, 95 Shi'r, AI- (journal), 150

Shi'is, 7, 28, 32, 48,119,155,157,179,196, 242, 243, 268, 281n19; 1920 revolt, 19, 29; opposition to elections, 23-24; sectarianism, 170-77; tribalism, 4-5, 197.198 Shina, Salman, 186 Shirazi, Mirza Muhammad al-Din a!-, 25-26

Shirazi, Muhammad Taqi al-Din a!-, 25, 73

Shu'ubiyya, 170-71 Shukr, Ibrahim Salih, 30-31, 36, 44, 144 Sidqi, Bakr, 52, 69, 71, 72, 74 Sitti, Yehezkel: "On the Banks of the Euphrates," 256 Siyasa, Al- (newspaper), 44,106,187 Social class, 220-21, 289n59 Socialism, socialists, 2, 13, 25, 43-44, ;8, 120, 290n76

Society for Combating Illiteracy, 68, 69 Society for Popular Reform, 70, 71 Society for the Liberation of the Muslim East, 26 Society of Arab Culture, 54 Society of Islamic Revival, 25 Society of Lost Time, 93 Society of Rapprochement Between the Islamic Madhahib, 174 Society of the Brethren of Culture, 25 Solidarity Club, 43, 48 Somekh, Sasson, 116, 259-60, 263 Some People (Darwish), 187 Soviet Union, 74, 100, 109, 184, 189, 320n39; influence of, 91, 292-93n113 Spencer, Herbert, 6 "Spread of Fascism in Iraq, The" (Chadirchi), 64 State and Revolution (Lenin), 73 "Statue of Liberty, The" (Hamudi), 106,112 Stereotypes: of rural populations, 196, 201-3,206

Stonehewer-Bird, H., 100 Strikes, n6; against Baghdad Electric

Light and Power Company, 56, 73; communist participation in, 74, 102; by political prisoners, 97-98; Wathba, 114-15 Students, 231, 235, 328n4; 1952 Intifada, 116-17; political activism of, 241-42; radicalism of, 242-43; study abroad, 239-40; Wathba protests, 115-16 Sudan, 243 Suez crisis, 119 Suffrage, 94 Sufism, 210 Sulayman, Hikrnat, 52, 69, 70-71, 72 Sulimaniya, 38, 119, 183 Sunnis, 4, 6, 7, 157, 197, 170, 243, 268, 2811119; elections, 23, 24; and Shi'i intellectuals, 174-75 Surveillance, 105-6, no Susa, Ahmad Nissim, 128, 222, 240, 254 Suwaydi family, 43 Suwaydi, Tawfiq, 94, 112 Swiss Cafe, 91, 93 Syria, 5, 10, 20, 26, 41, 88, 95, 148, 150, 243, 291n96; Arab nationalism, 143, 149, 194; Arab unity, 134, 135: tribes and, 195, 203, 211

Syrians, 127, 190-91, 269 Tahir, 'Ali Jawad a\-, 122 Takarli, Fu'ad al-, 88, 89,122,151,152 Takarli, Nahad a!-, 90, 93,122,137 Talabani, Rida al-, 210 Tali'a, Al- (journal), 150 "Talib Effendi" (al-Sayyid), 194 Talib ibn Rajab, Sayyid (Naqib of Basra), 20, 160

Tammuzi movement, 140 Taqaddum, Al- (newspaper), 44 Taqaddum Party, 44 Ta'rikh al- 'Iraq al-Siyasi al-Hadith (Hasani), 130 Tariq, AI- (newspaper), 71,74 Taxation: sheikhs and, 195, 218 Teachers, 229, 235, 236, 240-41, 242; rural, 245, 248; training of, 238-39 Teachers Club, 154 Tevik, Riza, 179

INDEX

Thabit, Nuri, 179-80, 311n112 Thaqafa al-Jadida, AI- (journal), 93, 151, 243 Theater, 91-92

Theories Concerning the Reform of the Countryside (Hilali), 211 Tikrit, 110

Times of Mesopotamia, The (newspaper), 38 Timman, Ja'far Abu, 61, 68, 69, 70, 71, 175-76, 214, 235 Trade unions, 43, 56, 74 Treaty of Versailles, 79 Trials: political, 111-12 Tribal Criminal and Civil Dispute Regulation, 42 Tribes, 4-5, 7, 8, 19, 201,215, 218, 227-28; administration of, 204-5; colonial use of, 195-96; control and reform of, 196-97; education of, 245-49; government attitudes toward, 199-200; as national symbols, 207-10; policies toward, 198-99; as problems, 197-98; stereotypes of, 202-3, 205-6; in urban setting, 223-24 Tribes of Iraq, The ('Azzawi), 129,199-200, 210 "Trip on Saturday,/\' (Basri), 256 Troutbeck, J., 87-88, 181, 242, 243 Tudeh,184 Tuma, Jamil, 73, 243, 288n38 Turkey, 5, 26, 16o Turkish: use of, 177, 178-81 Turko mans, 39, 183, 210; Iraqi, 177-78 'Ubayd tribe, 215 'Ukaz, Suq (market), 36 'Ulum, Muhammad Salih, Bahr al-, 47, 109, 115, 119, 121, 242 'Umar, Ibrahim Hilmi al-, 37, 38, 39,41 'Umari, Arshad a!-, 94, 106, 181 United Nations, 94, 136 United States, 4, 166-67, 271 U.S. Information Center, 117, 118 Universities, 238; political activism in, 241-42

363

Uprisings: Kurdish, 183-84, 196 'Usba, AI- (journal), 101 Urbanization, 2, 5, 202 Urban sector: peasants and, 223-27

Vered Tzela (La'or), 273-74 Villages, 30, 196, 198, 204, 205-6 Vocational schools, 237, 238 Wahhabi movement, 32, 196 Wa'iz, Ibrahim al-, 123 Wardi, 'Ali a!-, 14, 89, 128, 176, 227, 240;

Personality of the Iraqi Individual, 219-21; on tribal system, 221-22 Wasiti, a!-, 131 Watan, AI- (newspaper), 106 Watani, Ittihad a!-, 94 Wataniyya School, al-, 260 Wathba, 88,108,109, 111, 114-15,117,189, 241; sectarian elements of, 118-19 "We Have Wiped Out the Disgrace" (Mala'Lika), 136 Welfare rights, 94 "Where Is the Guard?" (Najafi), 47-48 Women's League Against Fascism, 94 Women's Revival (al-Nahda al-Nisa'iyya), 25 Women's Union, 93-94 World War I, 38, 160 World War II, 53, 74, 79, 12o Writers, 8, 9, 18, 54, 162, 273; arrests of, 107-8; execution of, 109-10; suppression of, 110-11 Writing Club, 55, 207 Writings, 12; languages used in, 4, 178-79

Yad al-Ard wa'l Ma', Al- (Ayyub), 223 Yaqin, Al- (journal), 27, 33-34, 143 Yaqza, Al- (newspaper), 95,114 Yasin, Muhammad Husayn AI, 237 Yawm al-Qubul, 43 Yazidi tribes, 196, 198, 210 Young Turks Revolution, 19, 142 Yousif, 'Abdul ('Abd a!-) Salaam, 13, 91-92 Youth, 54, 55,232. See also Students Yusuf, Sa'di, 273 Yusuf, Yusuf Salman. See Fahd

364

INDEX

Zaghlul, Sa'd, 143 Zahawi, Asma' a!-, 25, 138 Zahawi, Jamil Sidqi a!-, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 43, 305nn6; poetry and politics of, 45, 191; Rebellion in Hell, 179,192 Zahir, 'Abd ai-Razzaq a!-, 241; Feudalism

and [Government] Ministries in Iraq, 218

Zaman, Al- (newspaper), 44 Zanj, 219

Zawra; Al- (journal), 19, 179 Zayyat, Ahmad Hasan a!-, 55, 6o, 149, 1)0, 152 Zionism, 49, 101, 136; Iraqi Jews and, 18788, 190; and Palestine, 133-34, 153 Zirkili, Khayr al-Din a!-, 133 Zu,aytar, Akram, 55, 149, 153-54, 170, 176, 235, 236 Zuhir, Sulayman a!-, 38 Zurayq, Jalal, 149