The Origins of Democratization in Poland. Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976–1980 9780231896009

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The Origins of Democratization in Poland Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980

The Origins of Democratization in Poland Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980 Michael H. Bernhard

Columbia University Press New York

Columbia University Press New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 1993 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bernhard, Michael H. The origins of democratization in Poland: workers, intellectuals, and oppositional politics, 1976-1980 / Michael H. Bernhard. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-231-08092-1.—ISBN 0-231-08093-X (pbk.) 1. Poland—Politics and government—1945-1980. 2. Opposition (Political science)—Poland. 3. Civil society—Poland. I. Title. JN6752.B371993 943.805'5—dc20 93-2983 CIP

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Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Paula

Contents

Acknowledgments Acronyms Used in Text and Notes 1.

Civil Society and Democratization in the East Central European Context Defining "Civil Society" Civil Society in a Comparative European Perspective From Dissidence to Opposition Democratization and the Reconstitution of Civil Society in East Central Europe Self-Liberation of Civil Society—The Polish Case Comparing Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia to Poland

2.

Why Poland? The Fatal Link Between Legitimation and Stability Polish Stalinism The Gomulka Regime The Gierek Regime

3.

Workers I: The Events of June 1976 The Price Reform The Strikes Ursus Tractor Factory Radom The Tri-City Area (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot)

xi xiii

1 2 4 7 9 10 13

24 31 36 41 46 48 50 50 52 59

viii

Contents Plock Other Strikes Poststrike Repression The Mass Meeting and Press Campaign Repression in Ursus Repression in Radom Repression in Other Cities

4.

Enter the Intellectuals: KOR (The Workers' Defense Committee) The Birth of KOR Foundation Membership and Organization Theorizing Opposition: New Evolutionism as a Strategy for Transforming the Polish Political System Appendix: KOR Members During the Amnesty Struggle, 1976-1977

5.

60 62 64 64 66 69 70

76 76 77 84 88 98

KOR's Waging of the Workers'Amnesty Struggle

100

Public Articulation of the Committee's Aims • Publicity Efforts on the Behalf of the Repressed Efforts to Bring Public Pressure to Bear Upon the Party-State

101 102

Direct Appeals to Public Assistance Organizations Workers' Protests The Call for a Special Sejm Commission

108 108 108 109

Clemency The Death of Stanislaw Pyjas The Failure of Renewed Oppression

111 113 117

The Roundup Actions Taken in Defense of KOR Amnesty

117 118 121

Transformation of the Committee KOR's Relief Efforts

121 124

Contents 6.

The Extension of the Public Space KSS-KOR After Its Transformation The Polish Catholic Church and Politics in the 1970s The Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights and Its Factionalization Student Movements Peasant Movements The Society of Academic Courses Independent Publishing

7.

Workers II: Oppositional Politics The Growth of Feelings of Injustice Among Polish Workers Robotnik The Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions Katowice (KZ-WZZ-K) Western Pomerania (KZ-WZZ-PZ) Gdansk and the Baltic Seacoast (KZ-WZZ-W)

8.

KOR and Solidarity The Problem of KOR in Polish Politics Workers and Intellectuals KOR's Significance for Solidarity

ix 131 131 135 140 143 146 147 148 151 151 159 170 171 173 180 193 194 197 199

Notes

209

Bibliography

257

Index

285

Acknowledgments

This book began as my dissertation at Columbia University. I owe a large debt of gratitude, first and foremost, to my sponsor, Joseph Rothschild, as well as to my committee chair, Seweryn Bialer. Both of them provided exceptionally valuable advice and consistent encouragement. I was also helped enormously by the three other members of my dissertation committee—Charles Gati, Deborah Milenkovitch, and Dwight van Horn. I have profited from discussions and conversations with many friends and colleagues over the years, including Glen Adler, Ian Armour, Stanislaw Baranczak, Gyorgy Bence, Nancy Bernhard, Simone Chambers, Jane Curry, Emil Freund, Harvey Goldman, Barbara Hicks, Dick Howard, Jan Kubik, Joseph McCahery, Gerd Meyer, John Micgiel, Michael Pollak, Bob Scott, Larry Spence, Rudi Tokes, Louisa Vinton, and Kurt von Mettenheim. Several of my colleagues at Penn State— James Eisenstein, John Martz, Nancy Love, Jim Curtis, and Jens Drews—read and commented upon earlier drafts of individual chapters. I am also indebted to two anonymous reviewers for Columbia University Press who commented on the manuscript as a whole. I wish to thank a number of Polish friends and colleagues who were of help in more ways than I can acknowledge. They include Ireniusz Bialecki, Elwira Grossman, Urszula Grzelonska, Bogdan Grzelonski, Jadwiga Koralewicz, Ireniusz Krzeminski, Wojciech Lamentowicz, Helena Luczywo, Stanislaw Prazmowski, Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, and, especially, Krzysztof Jasiewicz. I also wish to thank the members and staff of the General Sociology Section of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at Warsaw University, directed by Aleksandra JasinskaKania, for hosting me for several months of research in Poland.

xii

Acknowledgments

Several institutions generously funded this project at various stages. The Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council provided support for the writing of my dissertation and several weeks of language training in Poland. Its programs, which have been ably administered by Jason Parker, have been instrumental in promoting East European studies in this country and in assuring that a new generation of scholars has had the support to complete their research and graduate training. I also wish to thank the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense at Harvard University, and in particular Gene Sharp and Chris Kruegler, for funding and a supportive environment to finish my research and write my dissertation. The Graduate School of Arts and Science at Columbia University awarded me a travel fellowship to conduct research in Warsaw, Munich, and London. I also received grants from the Office of the Associate Dean for Research and Graduate Studies at Penn State University, the Kosciuszko Foundation, and both the Political Science Department and the Slavic-Soviet Area and Language Center at Penn State. Several archivists and librarians facilitated my access to underground Polish publications. They include Dr. Jagodzinski of the Polish Library in London, Ellen Scaruffi of the Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University, Maciej Siekierski of the Russian and East European Collection at the Hoover Institution, and Ewa Wolynska of the Solidarity Bibliographic Center at Harvard University. I also want to thank Roman Stefanowski, the Director of Polish Research at Radio Free Europe in Munich for providing me with working space and access to his section's collection of Polish underground publications for a six-week period. I would also like to thank my editor at Columbia University Press, Kate Wittenberg, for suggestions on improving the manuscript and for her help in shepherding me through the review and revision process. My two research assistants, Steven Lauser and Paul Clark, made valuable contributions as well. This book would never have been completed without the support and encouragement of my friends and family. In particular, I thank my parents, Ruthe and Harry, for raising me with an open mind. And most of all, I want to thank Paula Golombek, my wife, for our many long discussions on the manuscript, her willingness to read and criticize countless drafts, her helpful suggestions and unflagging support.

Acronyms Used in Text and Notes

CRZZ

Central Council of Trade Unions (Centralna Rada Zwipzköw Zawodowych)

KIK

Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej)

KOR

Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotniköw)

KPN

Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej)

KPSN

Committee for National Self-Determination (Komitet Porozumienia na rzecz Samostanowienia Narodu)

KSS-"KOR"

Social Self-Defense Committee "KOR" (Komitet Samoobrony Spolecznej "KOR")

KSS-W

Social Self-Defense Club in Wroclaw (Klub Samoobrony Spolecznej we Wroclawiu)

KSS-WK

Social Self-Defense Club of the WielkopolskoKujawski Region (Klub Samoobrony Spolecznej Regionu Wielkopolsko-Kujawskiego)

KZ-WZZ-K

Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions in Katowice (Komitet Zalozycielski Wolnych Zwi^zkow Zawodowych w Katowicach)

KZ-WZZ-PZ

Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of Western Pomerania (Komitet Zalozycielski Wolnych Zwijizkow Zawodowych Pomorza Zachodniego)

KZ-WZZ-W

Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of the

xiv

Acronyms Used in Text and Notes Coast (Komitet Zalozycielski Wolnych Zwigzkow Zawodowych Wybrzeza)

MKS

Interfactory Strike Committee (Migdzyzakladowy Komitet Strajkowy)

MO

Citizens' Militia (Milicja Obywatelska)

NOW-a

Independent Publishing House (Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza)

PPR

Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza)

PPS

Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)

PSL

Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)

PZPR

Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)

RMP

Young Poland Movement (Ruch Mtodej Polski)

ROPCiO

Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela)

SB

Security Service (Sluzba Bezpieczeristwa)

SKS

Student Solidarity Committee (Studencki Komitet Solidarnosci)

SZSP

Socialist Union of Polish Students (Socjalistyczne Zrzeszenie Studentöw Polskich)

TKN

Society of Academic Courses (Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych), also known as "the flying university" (uniwersytet latajgcy)

TKNZZR

Provisional Committee for Independent and Free Trade Unions of Farmers (Tymczasowy Komitet Niezaleznego Zwigzku Zawadowego Rolnikow)

TKSChzG

Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Grojec Area (Tymczasowy Komitet Samoobrony Chlopskiej ziemi Grojeckiej)

TKSChzL

Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Lublin Area (Tymczasowy Komitet Samoobrony Chlopskiej ziemi Lubelskiej)

Acronyms Used in Text and Notes TKSChzRz

Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Rzeszöw Area (Tymczasowy Komitet Samoobrony Chlopskiej ziemi Rzeszowskiej)

ZOMO

Motorized Units of the Citizens' Militia (Zmotoryzowane Oddzialy Milicji Obywatelskiej)

ZSL

United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe)

xv

The Origins of Democratization in Poland Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980

1

Civil Society and Democratization in the East Central European Context

What is Freedom? ask the philosophers. I, too, wonder; at one time I maintain that it means guaranteed liberty in the face of the power of the State, or else I emphasize that it is the strength of convictions, the sovereignty of spirit and the loyalty to one's own vocation. But even when I am at a loss to define the essence of freedom 1 know full well the meaning of captivity.1 —Adam Zagajewski

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc has unleashed a new era of economic and political, maybe even democratic, reform in the eastern half of Europe. The term "civil society" often figures in discussions of democratization. Thus my first task will be to clarify the meaning of "civil society"; the second, to define the relationship between civil society and democratization in the East Central European context—and on a more general theoretical level. Ultimately, I will present a vocabulary and framework that will explain the origins of democratization in Poland during the crucial years 1976 to 1980, and distinguish Poland's unique civil society-led democratization from that of the other East Central European countries. Although radical reforms are underway in most of the former Soviet bloc, democratic reforms emerged earlier and are presently more advanced in East Central Europe (the former German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) than in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, for example. The modern forms of mass democracy these reforms are intended to create (as well as the limited forms of representative government that preceded democracy) have existed only in conjunction with a civil society. Civil society constitutes the sphere of

2

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

autonomy from which political forces representing constellations of interests in society have contested state power. Civil society is a necessary condition for the existence of representative forms of government, including democracy. However, it is clearly not a sufficient condition, for as the following exposition will demonstrate, civil societies have existed in tandem with milder forms of authoritarianism. In certain cases the emergence, activization, extension, and/or reconstitution of civil society can initiate democratization. 2 In the East Central European cases considered here, only Poland closely corresponds to this pattern. In Poland, the reconstitution of civil society was the first step in curtailing the autonomy of the party-state regime from society and in creating representative forms of authority dependent on societal consent. Other cases will show that the reconstitution of civil society need not necessarily be the first step in the process of democratization, but rather that it can take place at different junctures in the process. First, however, it is necessary to turn to a more general discussion of civil society.

Defining "Civil Society" The meaning of the term "civil society" has changed over time. According to John Keane, before the eighteenth century, the terms "civil society" and "state" were nearly synonymous. 3 Civil society began to be defined in opposition to the state in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries, both in Scottish Enlightenment thinking and in German Idealism. Civil society is used in this way in Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the History of Civil Society, as well as Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Marx's critique of Hegel and his followers (particularly in On the Jewish Question).4 Civil society as a historical phenomenon first began to take shape in late medieval, early modern Europe. The concept described aspects of the emancipation of the Third Estate from restrictions placed upon it by feudal and absolutist systems. Historically these elements developed in emerging modern commercial centers. Certain urban elements, notably the forerunners of the bourgeoisie such as merchants and guildsmen, were granted representation as an estate, as well as privileges of local rule and economic autonomy within the feudal system. After many of these political rights and privileges were nullified by absolutism, these social groups began to reassert themselves as a critical con-

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

3

stituency of the increasingly public rule of the monarchy. By the late eighteenth century certain political forces within civil society became strong enough to challenge the power of monarchies. 5 In this process of emancipation, a sphere of autonomy, which I will call the "public space," was created between the official public life of the monarchy, the state, and the nobility, and that of private and/or communal life. In time, a range of associations and organizations (voluntary, professional, cultural, social, trade union), political parties, social movements, and communications media (the press and publishing) came to populate it. These forces were able to organize themselves outside the official political sphere and compel the state, through political struggles, to recognize and respect their existence. In time they were able to use this autonomy to institutionalize influence over official political structures and, thereby, radically alter the political system as a whole. A critical juncture in the development of civil society was the establishment of legal boundaries that protected the existence of an independent public space from the exercise of state power. In the West, the most important historical agent of these changes was the bourgeoisie. In Eastern and Central Europe, the most important role was played by an autonomous intelligentsia. Eventually, the Third Estate, as well as components of society thoroughly excluded from political life, were able to assert themselves and to extend citizenship throughout society. In particular the proletariat, organized in Labor and Social Democratic parties, and the women's suffrage movement were able,6 in some states, to win inclusion through struggles for enfranchisement. The preceding capsule account may strike some readers as too general. However, its purpose is to condense important themes in the rise of modern Europe. Clearly, individual national patterns diverged from this sketch in important respects. Yet when we talk about civil society, we all have some concept of it in this schematic sense. It provides us with a basis to define civil society based on certain structures and social agents. This exposition has yielded a notion of a public space located between official public and private life, which is populated by a range of different autonomous organizations. In other words, civil society has concrete boundaries and is composed of a diverse set of agents. However, civil society requires more than this. In order for these concretely

4

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

located agents to constitute a civil society, they need the sanction of the state. That is, the public space must be guaranteed as a realm of freedom from the state by the state itself. Thus civil society (as well as the private sphere) must be legally separated from the state by law, and the actors within it must be guaranteed specific personal and group liberties, so that they may pursue their real and ideal interests. 7 Barring this a liberated public space would be little more than an anarchy of competing interests.

Civil Society in a Comparative European Perspective Throughout Europe, civil society's autonomy from the state and, in turn, how much influence it was able to exert upon the state, varied considerably. The work of Hungarian historian Jeno Szucs provides a convenient starting point for discussion. He traces the emergence of three distinct developmental patterns in Europe (Western, East Central, and Eastern) to different responses to the "First Crisis" of feudalism (1300-1450). The Western response was "the emergence of 'absolutism' and its threefold solution: preserving whatever was preservable from feudalism, preparing for capitalism, and forming the framework of the nation-state system." 8 The Russian (Eastern) response was to bind the society in a much tighter relationship with the monarchy (e.g., second serfdom, service requirements for the nobility, etc.) (p. 312). Although these were both absolutist solutions, Szucs demonstrates that they had very different results. In the West society was subordinated to the state but was able to preserve certain autonomies and later to reassert itself. In the East society was "nationalized" (p. 318). While the Western response prepared the way for capitalism, the Eastern variant consolidated feudalism in a new and stronger form. Szucs also argues that there was no uniform pattern of response to the crisis in the intermediate region, East Central Europe. Instead, individual states reacted in unique ways, combining elements of the Eastern and Western solutions to the crisis with varying results (e.g., Prussia and Austria were clearly more effective in their responses than the Polish Commonwealth or the Kingdom of Bohemia) (pp. 322-29). These three responses to the crisis had important ramifications for the historical emergence of civil society and representative government. Even though Szucs does not take his analysis past the age of absolutism, and although the boundaries of these historic regions have

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

5

fluctuated over time, it can still be argued that three distinct historical regions exist. Within Western Europe the process of political development culminated, as early as the late nineteenth century, in the creation of full blown parliamentary democracy as the institutional form through which competing forces in civil society contested state power. Political parties representing constellations of interests within civil society became the mechanism through which state power was contested. East Central Europe included the lands under the sovereignty of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies. Thus, it encompassed present-day Germany, Austria, Hungary, much of Poland, the northern parts of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Transylvania. In this region, the process fell short of the fuller development of civil society achieved in Western Europe. In these areas civil society was able to carve out certain spheres of autonomy from the ruling dynastic states. However, at the same time the monarchies managed to maintain a great deal of autonomy from civil society in governing. Most importantly, parliaments were constrained with respect to the monarchy and governments were not fully responsible to a parliament. The press was subjected to greater censorship than in the West. Certain national, religious, and social groups faced official discrimination, i.e., they were legally denied the rights and protections that others in society enjoyed. The pattern of political development in this region can be summed up under the rubric of Rechtsstaat—a state of law.9 Boundaries between the state and civil society were regulated by law. Exercise of political power was codified into a well-defined system of law, but at the same time, it fell short of fully developed parliamentary democracy. With the collapse of the four East European empires at the end of World War I, numerous successor states were created. For a time during the ensuing interwar period civil society achieved its most elaborate development in the region, at least until the present era. This was a period wherein, at first, the modern press, political parties, and other organizations enjoyed greater freedom relative to both the earlier and more recent history of the region. At the beginning of this period, many of the successor states experimented with parliamentary rule. Czechoslovakia, however, was the only country that maintained democratic parliamentary rule for an appreciable length of time. In most of the other states parliamentary experiments collapsed into dictatorship. Yet in many of the states, the

6

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

structures of civil society were not subjected to the leveling (Gleichschaltung) that was so frightfully practiced by Stalin and Hitler. Even in the petty dictatorships of Pilsudski (Poland) and Horthy (Hungary), civil society was able to maintain and defend some of its autonomy. Both countries enjoyed a fairly lively press, albeit subjected to censorship, but nevertheless not an official press in the Soviet and Nazi sense. In both cases, parliaments and political parties continued to have a recognized presence in the system, though subject to limitations on their ability to freely organize, in their power over the government, and not wholly elected by fair franchise. 10 These were dictatorships, but not dictatorships capable of inspiring the term "totalitarian" like in Germany or the Soviet Union. In the period that followed World War II (except for a short period of coalition government from 1945-48), civil society in those parts of East Central Europe that came under Soviet control was suppressed. Szucs confines his discussion of Eastern Europe to the Russian empire. In the Romanov dominions the pattern of feudal society and absolute monarchy survived well into the modern era. In Russia proper, there were some indications of an emerging civil society. These included the zemstvo movement, the creation of a duma with fairly broad power (for a short period of time after the revolution of 1905), the birth of modern political parties and a modern press, and the development of autonomous forms of organization during the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Such stirrings were ruthlessly squashed by Stalin's revolution from above in the 1920s and 1930s. It can be argued that the areas of southeastern Europe remaining under Ottoman domination until into the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries also experienced a pattern of development that severely retarded the development of civil society. The Ottoman empire in the Balkans was geared toward collecting taxes from the largely peasant society of the region, and thus perpetuated the region's political and economic backwardness. 11 Ottoman political culture was radically different from that of even feudal Europe. For instance according to Dogan Kuban, a Turkish historian: The idea of citizenship did not exist in Ottoman times, as it did in contemporary Paris or Florence. Under the law, the people were slaves of the sultan and thought of themselves as tenants in his city. It

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

7

was not part of their habit of thought to organize themselves to achieve common goals—the concept of private organizations is still unfamiliar in Islamic societies.12 Certainly, under such conditions the ideas of public space and societal autonomy would have made little sense. Furthermore, the social actors that played important roles in the process of creating public space and civil society in other parts of Europe did not develop as extensively. The regional bourgeoisie were small in number and included a large number of minority nationals. Thus, it was limited to a marginal role in politics.13 Furthermore, the gentry, the feudal class that contributed so strongly to the emergence of the intelligentsia in Poland and Hungary, was severely weakened, if not destroyed, by the Ottoman conquest. 14 The obvious alternative to this, a middle-class-based intelligentsia (such as that which led the Czech national revival in the first half of nineteenth century and the creation of the Czechoslovakian state in 1918) did not develop as extensively.15 When countries such as Serbia and Bulgaria achieved independence, they were largely undifferentiated peasant societies. In a number of areas, the most important actor in national revivals was the Orthodox Christian clergy.16 Early experiments with democratic constitutions after liberation from the Ottomans did not produce real parliamentary government. 17 Stokes persuasively argues that such disappointments occurred because of the introduction of unsuitable political blueprints into this vacuum of powerful social actors. The Balkans copied readymade Western state forms which easily dominated societies "almost totally unprepared for it." Thus, the state and the social elements controlling it held Balkan societies in check.18 Whatever autonomous social organization that did develop in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was likewise destroyed (except in Greece) when the region fell within Stalin's sphere of influence.

From Dissidence to Opposition It was not until the 1970s that civil society reappeared as an important concept in political discourse in or about East Central Europe. During that decade opponents of the Communist system changed their resistance strategy from dissidence to what I will term "opposition." It is the

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Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

difference between these two strategies and their practical achievements that made the reconstruction of civil society under Communist rule possible. This shift of strategy was most marked in Poland in the late 1970s. The first group to be effective in translating this new strategy into a practical politics was the Workers' Defense Committee [Komitet Obrony Robotnikow] (KOR). Leszek Kolakowski, a prominent Polish philosopher living in exile, laid important theoretical groundwork for this new strategy in two political essays written in the early 1970s. Several themes in his work were picked up and expanded by members of the growing Polish opposition of the late 1970s. (See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of their work.) Though others came to similar conclusions, they were unable to achieve as much practical success as KOR did. In Hungary important theoretical ground was broken by the philosophers Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis, writing under the pseudonym of Marc Rakovski,19 and in Czechoslovakia by Vaclav Havel and others associated with Charter 77.20 Once this strategy began to be effective in Poland, it was only then that certain academic observers in the West began to conceive of the struggle between the opposition and the party-state in Poland in terms of the reconstruction of a civil society.21 By the 1980s activists in other areas of East Central Europe began to explicitly demand the restoration of civil society.22 The shift from dissidence to opposition involved a sharp change of focus. Dissidence was a response to the conservative policies of the Brezhnev era, which destroyed the last hope for any sort of "Socialism with a Human Face." 23In essence, dissidence was a form of moral suasion; it addressed grievances to the party-state, demanding that it behave better. 24 After revisionism failed to reform the party-state from within, some critical Marxists continued to struggle for a more humane socialism. However, in the post-1968 climate in the bloc such dissident Marxists were marginalized within ruling parties or forced to leave them. At this juncture Marxist-inspired reform began to lose its appeal, and would later become largely irrelevant with the shift to oppositional resistance strategies. Other dissidents made their appeals from outside the framework of the party and Marxism, most often on the basis of liberal or traditional values. The success of dissidence as a strategy was predicated on a hope that the ruling party would heed the suggestions of dissidents. In retro-

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

9

spect, considering the ultraconservative nature of the rule in the region at this time, the prospects were unlikely. Ultimately, dissidence came to represent nothing more than the articulation of an agenda of change without any concrete program to implement it except the hope that those in power would listen. 25 The new oppositional strategy emerging in the mid-1970s in East Central Europe broke with this pattern. It ceased to be preoccupied with telling the party state authorities how to act and, instead, concentrated its efforts on society. This critical change of focus marked the intellectual shift from dissidence to opposition. This shift was even quite evident in the personal development of individuals. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, in their "Open Letter to the Party," called for selfmanaging socialism in which workers and peasants, and not the party, would exercise the key role in political and economic decision-making. Yet Kurori and Modzelewski published this program in an "Open Letter to the Party" and not to workers and peasants themselves. 26 Later, in the essay "Reflections on a Programme of Action," Kuron would speak of social movements exerting pressure from below as the best way to affect change, 27 and would become a key activist in the oppositional politics of the Workers' Defense Committee. Another Workers' Defense Committee activist, Adam Michnik, came to similar conclusions by analyzing the failure of earlier resistance strategies. He realized that both revisionism and more traditional resistance movements could not be effective for geopolitical reasons. He then distinguished a third society-focused option—"new evolutionism." 28 (For a detailed account of both Michnik's and Kuron's work, see chapter 4.) In Poland the emergence of a range of social movements in the late 1970s, which resisted the party-state's policies by means of pressure from below, marked the advent of the first opposition of this sort in the Soviet bloc. Those efforts would later culminate in the birth of Solidarity and the reconstruction of civil society in Poland.

Democratization and the Reconstitution of Civil Society in East Central Europe As a result of the radical reforms and revolutions of 1989-1990, new elites throughout the region have committed themselves to democratizing political life in their countries. Clearly the reconstitution of civil

10

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

society in order to create forms of authority dependent on societal consent is a necessary condition for the establishment of democratic forms of government. However, as the earlier discussion of the interwar pattern of political development in the region made abundantly clear, the existence of a civil society in itself is not a sufficient condition for the creation of a democratic regime. Forces within civil society must establish mechanisms by which the exercise of state power becomes dependent upon their consent. This understanding of civil society as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for institutionalizing democratic government does not, however, tell us much about what role a reconstituted civil society would play in democratization. The recent history of eastern and central Europe does not permit us to make any universal conclusion about what role the reconstitution of civil society plays in democratization or that this reconstitution is a definite stage in some sort of sequence leading to democratization. It only reinforces the point that the successful democratization of regimes will include the reconstitution of civil society both as a means to curtail state autonomy and as a basis for a new system of interest representation. To substantiate this claim I will comparatively analyze the differing roles that the reconstitution of civil society played in the breakdown of Communist regimes in East Central Europe. The case of Poland is a particularly striking one. Here the reconstitution of civil society preceded similar development in other countries in the region by ten years and Poland remains the only case to date of the self-liberation of civil society within the context of a nation-state. 29

Self-Liberation of Civil Society—The Polish Case The first step in the self-liberation of civil society in Poland was the successful implementation of an oppositional, rather than a dissident, resistance strategy in response to the crushing of the strike movement of 1976 (for details, see chapter 3). The most important social actor in the creation of this opposition was the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR). It was founded specifically to help those repressed by the partystate's pacification campaign (for details, see chapter 4). KOR began the work of carving out public space in Poland by maintaining itself outside the official structure of party-state political life. In waging an amnesty campaign for the repressed, KOR also played the definitive role in creating an underground "samizdat" press with a regular circulation. 30

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

11

KOR's foundation and practice inspired others in Poland to form organizations and to contest state policy. Some of these organizations belonged to the larger milieu of the KOR movement and benefited from direct support by the committee, while others with different political or ideological orientations competed with KOR. Opposition grew throughout the late 1970s, such that even prior to the strike wave of July-August 1980, the struggle between the party-state and the opposition became the dominant axis of Polish political life. This broader resistance movement became highly differentiated in terms of the functions played by different organizations, their political orientations, and their social composition. By the end of the 1970s, as a result of the proliferation of various organizations and movements, their geographic dispersion, the growing participation of society in their activities, and the broad dissemination of the underground press, the public space in Poland had been liberated and the actors arrayed therein were positioned as the potential basis for a reconstituted civil society. (Chapter 6 talks about these developments in detail.) Furthermore this array of social movements, organizations, and initiatives had developed a self-defense capability that forced the partystate to tolerate their existence. This was critical in establishing the boundaries of the public space and enforcing the state-society separation essential to the reconstitution of civil society. Independent actors also developed the capability to apply pressure upon the party-state to compel it to alter policies. This development marked the beginning of the process of curtailing state autonomy from interests in society. While these developments were important landmarks in the selfliberation of civil society in Poland, they fell short of a full reconstitution of civil society. This was because the Polish party-state had still made no de jure recognition of the opposition, neither of its right to exist, nor of the boundaries of the public space it had carved out. The fact that the existence of these movements was based on their ability to defend themselves and the public space in the face of a hostile state makes these developments something less than the reconstitution of civil society. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the late 1970s, this was a novel and unprecedented development. The Polish opposition liberated the public space that civil society came to occupy. This remains the only unambiguous case to date in Eastern and East Central Europe where an opposition, not assisted by regime-sponsored liberalization, created an extensive public space on a national level on the basis of its own

12

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

power and successfully maintained its boundaries vis-â-vis the state through practices of social self-defense. This is the space into which Solidarity and other independent movements of the 1980s would emerge. However, it is only as a result of the strikes of the summer of 1980 that we can talk about the reconstitution of civil society in Poland. The massive working-class strike waves accomplished something that the opposition movements of the 1970s did not. By acceding to the twenty-one demands of the Interfactory Strike Committee in Gdansk (as well as the agreements negotiated with representatives of other striking workers in Szczecin and Jastrzebie Zdrôj), the Polish partystate recognized the boundaries of the public space and the autonomy of the organizations situated within it. The accords of the summer of 1980 and the subsequent struggles over their implementation marked the reconstitution of civil society in Poland, albeit only for a short time. The declaration of martial law in 1981 temporarily disrupted the reconstitution of civil society by withdrawing legal recognition of the actors in the public space, and by attempting both to liquidate almost all independent organization and to collapse the public space. It was ultimately unsuccessful because the social forces of the de-institutionalized civil society were able to protect themselves and the public space by organizing a broad underground self-defense movement. 31 Polish politics throughout most of the 1980s lapsed into a stalemate. The party-state was unable to successfully reform a stagnant economy or to fully isolate the opposition from its sources of social support. The opposition, while successfully defending the public space and its organizational existence, was unable to re-secure legal recognition or to compel the regime to make much needed structural reforms of the economy or the political system. This deadlock was finally broken in late 1988 when two small strike waves rekindled the party's fear of intractable working-class unrest. Making use of the expanded room for maneuver afforded by Gorbachev's leadership in the Soviet Union, the party-state regime entered into Roundtable Negotiations on reform with Solidarity as the only seemingly palatable alternative.32 The party-state negotiators made concessions and compromises beyond Solidarity's expectations. It legally recognized Solidarity and other independent movements and allowed them to contest partially-free elections. This development re-institutionalized civil society after an

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

13

eight year hiatus. Furthermore by unexpectedly allowing the forces within civil society to contest a number of seats in parliament, the party-state established institutional mechanisms through which civil society could articulate its interests, as well as influence, and even contest, state power. Solidarity by triumphing decisively in those elections and forming a Solidarity-led coalition government, took reform beyond the reconstitution of civil society and began the process of reestablishing parliamentary democracy. Thus in Poland we see a unique relationship between the reconstitution of civil society and democratization. Here the civil society's selfliberation, growing out of the opposition movement of the 1970s, Solidarity's period of legal existence in 1980-81, and the Solidarity underground of the 1980s was the driving force behind the democratization of Polish politics. Not only was the Polish opposition able to carve out public space, but it also secured the legal guarantees necessary for a civil society. Civil society, in turn, was able to affect a radical diminution in state autonomy through a program of democratization that has made the exercise of state power directly dependent on the support of social forces within the civil society.

Comparing Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia to Poland What were the differing roles that the reconstitution of civil society played in the democratic transitions in East Central Europe? Should general conclusions be drawn from the Polish case alone, a case where civil society liberated itself in a struggle for democracy, we might be tempted to maintain that civil society was the driving force behind democratization in the region as a whole. In the following sections, I will examine the secondary literature on the democratic transitions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to determine whether such comprehensive claims about civil society are warranted. To do this, I will comparatively analyze the role that the reconstitution of civil society played in the democratic breakthrough in the other three cases. The Polish pattern will serve as the standard of comparison. By treating martial law as a temporary interruption, the Polish democratic transition can be understood in fairly linear terms. The selfliberation of civil society in Poland began with the formation of opposition movements. These movements were then able to effectively

14

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

liberate and defend a public space from the party-state. Later, they managed to compel the party-state to legally recognize their existence and the boundaries of the public space, thereby reconstituting civil society. This civil society was able to coexist for a time with a moribund authoritarian regime. Social forces within the reconstituted civil society then negotiated a compromise with the regime, thus allowing them to contest state power through parliamentary elections. They continued the process of democratization, expanding it to encompass the state itself, after triumphing at the polls. In my comparison of Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia to Poland, I will pay close attention to the extent to which opposition developed. I will also seek to determine whether it was able to liberate the public space and acquire the legal sanctions necessary for the reconstitution of civil society, and whether this played a role in the democratic breakthrough in each country. I will then conclude with generalizations about the relationship between civil society and democratic transition. The State as an Agent in the Creation of Civil Society:

Hungary

On the surface, there seem to be a number of similarities between the Polish and Hungarian cases. Within the region Hungary's opposition was second only to Poland's in terms of development. After the revisionist Budapest School was decapitated by the exile of some of its most prominent members in 1973, an opposition began to emerge in Hungary in the late 1970s. The opposition forged a number of modestly successful initiatives and averted full-scale repression. One of its more impressive successes was in the field of underground publishing, in which the Hungarians brought out a number of books and several periodicals on a regular basis. 33 Some activists also established a Foundation for the Support of the Poor (SZETA). Over time such initiatives were joined by a variety of additional programs, including uncensored lectures patterned on the Polish flying university (for more information, see chapter 6), independent ecological movements such as Duna Kor (The Danube Circle), and peace movements like Dialogus (Dialogue). Dialogue was able to stage a number of peaceful demonstrations in Budapest, 34 and to engage western peace movements in discussion on peace and human rights. 35 The Hungarian ecologists were also sue-

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

15

cessful in organizing a series of protests. 36 The most impressive of these, because it included coordinated international protest, was centered on the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project. 37 In the mid- to late-1980s, the scope of public involvement began to grow modestly. The number of public demonstrations rose, and they routinely included organized agendas. Demonstrations tended to draw larger crowds when they commemorated important events in Hungarian history (e.g., the revolutions of 1848 and 1956) or protested the maltreatment of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Transylvania. 38 Even though the Hungarian opposition managed to achieve modest success, it did not grow as extensively or become as differentiated as its Polish counterpart. Although it did manage to carve out some public space, the Hungarian opposition was initially limited largely to the capital city, Budapest, and was confined to a small milieu of liberal and social democratic intellectuals. One major way that the Hungarian breakthrough differed from the Polish is that reform Communists played a critical role in creating the bases for the reconstitution of civil society. Unlike in Poland, where the Communists were forced to comply with the demands of wellorganized movements in an already extensively liberated public space, the Hungarian reform Communists intervened to prevent such a development. The impetus behind this action was the exhaustion of the Kadarist path of reform. Reformers such as Imre Pozsgay, Reszo Nyers, and Miklos Nemeth clearly understood that the economic reforms had come to a political dead end due to the inability of Kadar and the party's conservative wing to move beyond limited marketization, despite the stagnation and deterioration of Hungary's economy and its standard of living. Even within the party, political reform was seen as the first step in solving the country's economic difficulties.39 At a Party Conference held in May 1988 (the first held since 1957), Kadar and a number of supporters were ousted from the Politburo and Central Committee. 40 He was replaced as General Secretary by the pragmatic, but hardly liberal, Karoly Grosz. He, in turn, was later replaced in response to greater pressure for a radical transformation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP). Considering the deterioration of the economy and the stirrings of opposition, the situation in Hungary was beginning to look "pre-

16

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

Polish." The Budapest critical intelligentsia consolidated their activity in a new organization called the Network of Independent initiatives in fall 1987. They were joined in the late 1980s by new intellectual organizations such as the League of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), an independent student movement, some small independent unions, 41 and a broader environmental movement. 42 Another important development was the foundation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum in September 1987, which extended opposition outside the urban liberal and socialdemocratic Budapest milieu to other parts of the country, encompassing those with populist and nationalist views. 43 The Forum espoused a "third way" between Western capitalism and Soviet Communism. Its early ideal was a "garden Hungary" of autonomous communities with a multiparty system and a mixed market economy, stressing cooperatives, individual farms, workers' councils, local self-government, etc.44 At this juncture, reformers in the party also made use of Gorbachev's window of opportunity, to push forward a program of liberalization that would eventually lead to the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy. Because the Hungarian opposition was still very limited in scope, reformers began to encourage its development so that it would have a credible partner in the reform process. The party literally had to act as a catalyst in the creation of civil society during this liberalization phase. 45 It did not do so for altruistic reasons. The reformers, some of whom, like Pozsgay, were genuinely popular, felt that a renovated Communist party could continue to play a role after elections because of both its history of reform and relative tolerance, and its success in promoting stability and relative prosperity after 1956. In late 1987 the regime began informal discussions with official groups, the opposition, fledgling initiatives, and the like on the shape of reform. 46 Soon thereafter independent groups were officially allowed to form parties and other associations, formally becoming the state's partner in the liberalization process. In the fall of 1988, important parties from the brief postwar period of competitive party politics, such as the Smallholders and the Social Democrats, were reconstituted by their surviving leaders. 47 This sequence of events initiated a process whereby the party tactically retreated from its controlling positions without obstructing the development of political competitors. The réévaluation of the Revolution of 1956 played an important part in Hungary's democratic breakthrough. It was a key point of contestation in the struggle for power within the party.48 It also played an im-

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

17

portant role in mobilizing Hungarian society. The re-interment of the corpse of Imre Nagy, the executed leader of the revolution, from an unmarked grave to a place of honor in June 1989 was a watershed. For Hungarian society it represented a long overdue vindication of their actions in 1956, as well as a repudiation of both the Soviet invasion and Kadar's harsh repression in the initial period of his rule (1956-61). The reburial also had a catalytic effect within the ruling party. Grosz was effectively demoted at the next Central Committee Plenum, from First Secretary to the only traditional party loyalist in a new four-man executive body, the Presidium (with Nyers, Pozsgay, and Nemeth). When the HSWP later transformed itself into the Hungarian Socialist Party, Grosz departed. After Roundtable Negotiations, 49 which also took place in June 1989, free elections followed in the spring of 1990. A coalition of parties representing more traditional forces led by the Democratic Forum was able to defeat the Alliance of Free Democrats (organized by the Budapestbased urban opposition), the Young Democrats, as well as the Socialist Party (the reform Communists) and others. 50 Spontaneous Revolt Followed by Incorporation into the Framework of an Already Existing Parliamentary System: East Germany Prior to the revolution of 1989, there was only scattered resistance in the German Democratic Republic. These limited protests focused on peace and ecological issues. 51 In comparison to the other countries of East Central Europe, opposition on human rights grounds and regular underground publishing got a late start in the DDR. 52 Sometimes such initiatives received covert support from the Lutheran Church. 53 Opposition however remained fairly isolated from society at large because of the efficiency of the East German security apparatus, and because the regime had at its disposal a highly effective and low-cost repressive option—deportation to West Germany. 54 This made it very easy for the security service to deprive reform initiatives of leadership before they could gain political momentum. Deportation ceased to be an effective option in the summer of 1989 when large numbers of East Germans began to use Hungary's newly opened border with Austria as means of flight to the Federal Republic. This exodus, combined with Gorbachev's refusal to sanction mass repression of demonstrators demanding change on the fortieth anniver-

18

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

sary of the founding of the DDR in October 1989, shook the Honecker leadership. The inability of the Honecker regime to bring an end to the demonstrations either by repression or promises of reform, led to its downfall. A group in the party leadership, including Egon Krenz, Gunter Schabowski, and Hans Modrow, more open to dialogue with society, replaced Honecker and those who continued to support him. Krenz, as party leader, decided drastic action was necessary to stop the exodus of East German citizens. Symbolically, this flight was a ringing denouncement of forty years of Socialist Unity Party (SED) rule. Moreover, the disappearance of large numbers of skilled laborers threatened to paralyze the East German economy. On the evening of November 9, Schabowski, the newly appointed party spokesman, announced that restrictions on travel to West Germany would be abolished. Throngs of East Germans then stormed the crossing points to West Berlin, and thus, the whole dynamic of East German events was radically transformed. The struggle to democratize the DDR became fused with the reunification of Germany. 55 A new government under Modrow as prime minister began to negotiate on reform and free elections with independent political groups. The most noteworthy of these groups was the New Forum, an umbrella group composed of different oppositional activists who began to channel the demands of demonstrators to the regime. 56 Although this newly emerging opposition was able to compel the new SED leadership to enter into Roundtable Negotiations on free elections, both partners steadily lost political initiative and influence to demonstrators, new political parties and their West German counterparts. Reports on the life-style of Honecker and his supporters, corruption, and the activities of State Security (Staatsicherheit or Stasi), as well as an inability to adapt to the growing radicalism of the demonstrators, led to the rapid evaporation of any credibility that the SED still enjoyed. Attempts to regroup as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) under the leadership of Gregor Gysi, did little to stem their irrelevance. The New Forum also failed to respond to the radicalization of the demonstrators. The Forum's activists still, for the most part, were partisans of a "third way," an alternative path of development that would avoid the social inequalities of capitalism and the repressiveness of Soviet-type systems. They felt that certain aspects of the social system

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

19

of the DDR could be salvaged and combined with a more democratic political system. They had been quite effective in galvanizing discontent when demonstrators had been chanting "Wir sind das Volk" (We are the people) to emphasize their demand for democratization. However, when demonstrators began to chant "Wir sind ein Volk" (We are one people), 57 which expressed their desire both for reunification of the two Germanies and to partake of the Federal Republic's consumer culture, the New Forum failed to adequately respond. When the demonstrators pushed the subject of reunification to the top of the political agenda, West German political parties began to assist local forces in the campaign for the upcoming election. Rapidly, the East German party structure came to roughly mirror that of the Federal Republic. In short, political parties from West Germany intervened in the DDR and, in concert with local forces, began to organize civil society along the West German pattern. Due to the postwar division of Germany, there was a markedly different relationship between the reconstitution of civil society and democratization in East Germany in comparison to the indigenous Hungarian and Polish patterns. The very existence of the Federal Republic as an alternative vision of how German society might be organized had a decisive influence on how the Honecker regime fell. While the nascent opposition groups like New Forum were able to negotiate with the Krenz regime for the liberation of the public space and free elections, this new opposition did not come to dominate the newly liberated public space. Before East German civil society had a chance to reconstitute itself in a unique and indigenous fashion, the radical demands of the demonstrators for reunification permitted West German political parties to take a decisive role in shaping the political contours of the public space. Thus East German civil society has come to resemble an extension of that of the Federal Republic. This has become even more marked now that the two Germanies have merged. Spontaneous Revolt Followed by Indigenous Democratization: Czechoslovakia The Czechoslovakian case bears certain similarities to East Germany. Opposition movements were weak and isolated from society by effective repression. Furthermore, it was mass demonstrations rather than

20

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

the pressures exerted by an opposition or regime sponsored liberalization that led to the reconstitution of Czechoslovakian civil society and the democratization of the political system. The genesis of the Czechoslovakian opposition movement, as well as its weakness, was the product of the twenty years of repressive rule by the Husak regime following the Prague Spring of 1968. Efforts to organize resistance to the party-state were made by Charter 77 and VONS (Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted).58 Charter's activities in some sense lay on the border of dissidence and opposition.59 Much of its activity was geared toward demanding that the party-state authorities observe the human rights standards of Basket III of the Helsinki Accords. Charter also circulated a number of critical manifestos, analyses, and reports, and worked to create a modest underground publishing sector.60 It also conducted a dialogue with Western peace movements on questions of human rights and peace,61 which later found an echo in Czechoslovak society.62 Charter did not aspire to become a mass movement. 63 It was also subject to exceptionally strong repression, which effectively isolated it from the population at large. Thus, the development of an unofficial public space and alternative institutions in Czechoslovakia lagged behind that of Hungary, not to mention Poland. 64 VONS was specifically organized to defend Chartists arrested and harassed by the security apparatus. Czechoslovakia also possessed a small but imaginative aesthetic counterculture. While this sphere was highly dynamic, its efforts were aimed at securing private space independent of state interference. 65 In the late 1980s the climate of fear and the effectiveness of repression in Czechoslovakia began to decline. The retirement of party chief Gustav Husak, feared because of his ruthless normalization policies that followed Soviet intervention in 1968, with the hapless and stolid Milos Jakes, was important in breaking down this paralysis. The general tenor of reform in the Soviet Union and the other countries of the bloc was also important in this respect. 66 Public demonstrations occurred with greater frequency and encompassed larger numbers of participants. 67 This new public activism seems also to have been related to the coming of age of a new generational age cohort for whom the Prague Spring and the most repressive early years of normalization were just a vague memory. An officially sanctioned student demon-

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

21

stration in Prague (to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the murder of a student by the Nazis) sparked the Velvet Revolution. After demonstrating students were roughed up by the police on November 17, the population of Prague and other cities began to demonstrate en masse against the regime. 68 In this climate, an ideologically diverse group of oppositionists in both the Czechlands and Slovakia organized themselves in the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, respectively. Early talks with Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec did not yield concessions acceptable to the Forum and Public Against Violence. Then in rapid succession the opposition toppled Jakes, compelled Adamec to resign by rejecting his proposed concessions, and then chased Husak from the largely ceremonial office of president. This last feat was accomplished by a one-hour general warning strike that left no doubt where the sentiments of the working class lay. The opposition was able to convince Adamec's more reform-minded successor, Marian Calfa, to incorporate opposition politicians, including Vaclav Havel as president and Aleksander Dubcek as Speaker of Parliament, into an interim government. This prepared the way for free elections. As in East Germany, the relative weakness of the Czechoslovak opposition and the limited public space that it was able to carve out, meant that democratic change was finally affected only when the opposition was able to channel spontaneous, unorganized, mass demonstrations to force far-reaching concessions from the party-state authorities. As in East Germany, the public space and state recognition of its boundaries was secured before there was extensive autonomous development of movements, organizations, and initiatives. Thus, civil society in Czechoslovakia was reconstituted only after the public space had been carved out by a spontaneous popular insurgence that the opposition was able to mobilize against the party-state. The four countries that served as examples above now find themselves confronting the exceptionally difficult task of institutionalizing new political and economic systems, combining parliamentary rule and market economy In this task, the reconstitution of civil society is an absolute necessity. Yet, at the same time, the role and timing of the reconstitution of civil society in the historical processes that led to these attempted transformations from Soviet-type to more democratic regimes were quite different.

22

Civil Society and Democratization—Eastern Europe

In Poland, the process originated in the late-1970s with the development of an opposition-liberated public space. In turn, the Solidarity movement was able to force the party-state regime to recognize the principle of autonomous organization and the boundaries of the public space. Civil society coexisted for a time with an authoritarian regime that tried to violently stifle it, but ultimately failed and had to accept democratization of the political system. In Hungary, the opposition never developed to the extent that it did in Poland and remained incapable of formally institutionalizing the principal of autonomous organization or the boundaries of the more modest public space it had managed to carve out. The reconstitution of Hungarian civil society only proceeded once the party-state authorities undertook a preventative liberalization in order to avoid the sort of events that had occurred in Poland. The party-state in Hungary did not collapse as civil society liberated itself, but only after the state had intervened to create a framework for the reconstitution of civil society as a means to politically overcome the intensifying economic and political crisis. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia effective political repression severely constrained opposition movements. The examples of Poland, Hungary, and perestroika in the Soviet Union created aspirations for far-reaching political change in these countries, as well. When the Soviet Union demonstrated little or no desire to support stagnant antireformist regimes, the fear that had immobilized society in Czechoslovakia and East Germany began to disintegrate. These regimes were toppled quickly in nonviolent revolutions by mass protest actions from below. In both cases, it was insurgency from below that significantly expanded the modest public space that the oppositions had begun to create. Furthermore, the emergence of a political framework for democratic elections coincided with the legal recognition of the public space and preceded the proliferation of autonomous organization in society. Yet, these two cases differ significantly in what transpired after this point. In the case of Czechoslovakia the society set off on its own indigenous path of the organizational development critical for the reconstitution of civil society. In East Germany, these forms were in large measure imported from West Germany as part of the framework for reunification of the nation. In each one of these cases civil society was reconstituted in a unique fashion. Clearly each national pattern will have definite effects on the

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23

ongoing process of democratization. This study will concentrate on understanding the Polish democratic breakthrough as a self-liberation of civil society. It focuses on the earliest stages of the breakthrough and in particular, on the creation of an opposition and how it managed to liberate the public space before the reconstitution of civil society. In seeking to shine light on how this unfolded, I will pinpoint the social actors who took a decisive role in the breakthrough and how they went about affecting such changes. But first, the critical question is: how was it possible for Polish society to traverse this unique historical path that foreshadowed and helped to make possible today's movement toward democracy in East Central and Eastern Europe.

2

Why Poland? The Fatal Link Between Legitimation and Stability Repeated honeymoon trips will not save a bad marriage by improving what is wrong with it, but may lead to its continuing without purpose and in growing discomfort. —Bruno Bettelheim1

Democratization in Poland was facilitated by a special set of circumstances. Powerful independent social movements were able to carve out public space in the late 1970s and reconstitute civil society in the early 1980s because of the weakness of the Polish party-state. Despite the fact that this state was highly centralized, hierarchical, and repressive, it lurched from crisis to crisis throughout the postwar period. Unlike the party-state authorities in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which were able to survive and restore order after major crises in 1956 and 1968, successive Polish regimes failed to restore stable rule for any appreciable length of time after weathering crises. The Polish party-state system was a modified version of Soviet economic, political, and social institutions. This institutional pattern was created by Stalin's revolution from above. It was the product of currents in Russian political culture. Until the late 1980s it had a strong measure of acceptance in Russian society, producing domestic political stability in the Soviet Union. 2 The Polish version of this system did not produce similar results. Stalinist institutions were imposed upon Poland during the period 1944 to 1949 and were clearly alien to its dominant political culture. Had Poland been afforded an opportunity for self-determination after World War II, it would have, no doubt, opted for a parliamentary political system in which the parties of the London government-in-exile would have competed for power and for a mixed economy. Many Poles viewed the new system as alien long before the Soviets "discovered" problems with their own.

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

25

Thus, it is tempting to conclude that the reason for difference in performance between the Soviet and Polish systems was purely a question of sovereignty. After all, in the Stalinist era Poland was practically ruled from Moscow and, after that, even under more "normal" conditions, the Polish state was semi-sovereign at best. Yet, this did not seem to pose an insurmountable barrier to establishing effective rule in other Soviet bloc states. Poland's history of antipathy toward Russia and Bolshevism was by no means unique in the region. Furthermore, other members of the bloc had similar institutions and the same sort of constraints on sovereignty, but were not beset by the kinds of problems that marked Poland as particularly rebellious. Nowhere else in East Central Europe did any other Communist regime have to contend with so many popular challenges to power sustained over so many years. In Poland, four party general secretaries were prematurely retired in the midst of popular unrest (Ochab, 1956; Gomutka, 1970; Gierek, 1980; Kania, 1981). Student protest in 1968 and another round of strikes in 1976 weakened the Gomulka and Gierek regimes before they finally collapsed. In 1988, two strike waves helped compel First Secretary Jaruzelski to negotiate directly with the outlawed trade union Solidarity a year later. Thus, the existence of welldeveloped oppositional movements, from the strikes of 1976 until the disintegration of the party-state, mark this last period of Communist rule as one of profound instability. Poland thus, in this regard, was a unique case in Communist-ruled Europe. The question of instability directly addresses the ability of a country's leaders to rule effectively. Thus stability is a question of whether rulers are able to maintain their domination (Max Weber's Herrschaft or some concept derivative of it). 3 For the purposes of this study I will use Mueller's notion of domination: "the control of a limited number of individuals over the material resources of society and over the access to positions of political power." 4 1 shall refer to these powerful individuals as the "elite" and those over whom they rule, "subordinates." Thus, systems of domination imply concrete political and economic structures in which elites command the obedience of subordinates and control the uses of socially produced resources. When such arrangements are profoundly challenged, as they were in Poland, there is instability. A further distinction about instability is warranted in order to fully understand the predicament of the Polish elite. Instability in one form can be merely a challenge to domination by a specific ruling elite. This

26

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

can be described as "regime instability." This was commonplace in Poland as challenges to the ruling party faction of the moment. However, when such challenges are sustained and persistent, as they were in Poland, we can talk of a problem of a different order—"system instability." In contrast to Poland, the stability in the Soviet Union was attributable to the fact that it had established bases for its legitimacy.5 The record of instability in Poland suggests that successive regimes were not successful in legitimating their domination. Before turning to Poland per se, however, a discussion of legitimacy is in order. Legitimate domination is a subset of the forms of domination. There are also other forms of domination. The most common of these is nonlegitimate. In this case, subordinate members of society are obedient for reasons of feared or actual coercion and/or material gain. Weber talks about such a situation in his essay, "The City" (subtitled "Nonlegitimate Domination"), in which the logic of the market rules. 6 Such a logic of obedience can also be illustrated by the ethos of the mercenary. Obedience in such military formations is based on monetary gain and fear of punishment for failing to obey orders, not commitment to a cause or fealty to a commander. Legitimate domination implies some greater commitment than the two reasons discussed above. It requires that obedience be internalized as a binding norm of routine action by the subordinates. Legitimate domination is based on voluntary obedience—obedience viewed in some sense by those dominated as the way in which they ought to act. That is to say the dominated understand obedience as morally justified—e.g., as "good," "right," or "natural," and so on. Lipsethas summarized this most succinctly: "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society" (my emphasis). 7 This kind of domination by definition will always be stable. It is also possible to discuss something called "illegitimate domination," but it is important to stress that, in such cases, domination itself is only tenuous or partial. This condition describes a system of domination under severe duress, e.g., where it faces a challenge that calls the very fact of its existence into question or where it has already begun to crumble. Under such circumstances competing political forces often vie over who has the right to exercise power. By definition this is a condition of acute instability such as in the case of dual power, anarchic interregum, revolt, or civil war.

W h y Poland? Legitimation and Stability

27

The logical relationship between these three forms of domination and stability is summarized in figure 2.1. While legitimate and illegitimate domination logically dictate whether there will be stability or instability, the case of nonlegitimate domination is more complex. Both stable and unstable forms are logically possible. This is because obedience is based on material benefit or coercive sanction and thus is contingent upon an elite's ability to make good on its promises or threats. Stability or instability is a question of the elite's performance in "delivering the goods" and/or invoking fear of coercion or actually applying it. In the past, when existing systems of legitimate domination closely corresponded to the Weberian ideal type of traditional legitimate domination, it was common to conceive of "legitimacy," once conferred on a form of rule, as something immutable. As tradition has waned, it has become necessary to maintain legitimate domination by a process of ongoing legitimation. Thus, in modern mass polities, legitimate domination should not be conceptualized as a static condition. Strictly speaking, it is more accurate to speak of domination undergoing a process of legitimation. Thus, legitimate domination has become something that must be continually reproduced. It is impossible to say whether legitimate domination is more "moral" than nonlegitimate or illegitimate forms of domination without reference to a particular set of ethics. Nevertheless, subordinates prefer legitimate domination to other forms of domination precisely because it coincides with their notions of how social and political life is properly structured. This means that legitimate domination should be a more FIGURE

2.1.

The Logical Relationship Between Stability and Legitimation Form of Domination Illegitimate Stable

I

Nonlegitimate

Unstable

II Necessary by definition

V

III

Impossible by definition

Legitimate

Logically possible IV

Necessary by definition VI

Logically possible

Impossible by definition

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Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

effective form of domination, because subordinates have internalized obedience as a norm, thus making it effectively automatic. Hence elites who have legitimated their domination should not need to commit as extensive a quantity of resources to monitoring and enforcing obedience as they would under different conditions. In the long run we would expect legitimate domination to be more stable and thus preferred by the dominant elite. The nature of the problem studied here makes it impractical to utilize the ideal-typical forms that Weber developed for the study of legitimacy. Ideal types are well suited to study why a particular system is legitimate. It is a matter of comparing ideal types to a given reality to try to understand what particular mechanisms come into play in the legitimation of a particular system. In the case of postwar Poland, the analytical problem is different. Here I will try to understand why the elite failed to legitimate its domination. To do this, I need to understand why Polish society was so adamant in its rejection of party-state domination. For this reason, I will introduce a concept that does not figure in Weber's legitimacy scheme—"ideology." For the purposes of this study, the arguments that elites make to justify obedience to their rule will be termed as "ideologies." When subordinates accept the normative validity of these arguments as binding, domination is legitimated. The utilization of "ideology" for this purpose is also quite useful in capturing an essential element of Soviet-type systems like Poland's: the proclaimed revolutionary nature of the regime led it to violently reject tradition and legal-rational procedures as a suitable basis for rule. Thus it sought social compliance in a way that was more transparently ideological than other systems. 8 "Ideology" used in this sense is distinct from its use in ranking parties, belief systems, elites, or other political phenomena along a pragmatic-ideological continuum. Similarly, its use here is distinct from Marx's use of the term. 9 Marx's notion of ideology—class interest disguised as universal interest—is too narrow for the reason that class domination is not the only form of domination and that presentation of class interest as general interest is only one conceivable form that ideology could take. Ideologies can originate as novel arguments or rationales posed by elites to justify their domination, can come from existing elements in political culture, or can combine both of these. 10 In cases where a revolutionary elite seizes power, as the Polish Communists did, ideology

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

29

plays a special role, for it must justify both the seizure of power and policies to transform society. In such cases, the new elite usually tries to inculcate new beliefs throughout society in support of revolutionary change. However, since revolutionary elites are more prone than established ones to use violence to achieve their aims, mass acceptance of their rule and, hence, internalization of revolutionary ideology by the subordinates on a mass scale is not crucial in the short run. For a time, mass obedience can be secured by coercion and terror, i.e., in a nonlegitimate fashion. However, support from certain sectors of society is necessary in order to recruit new members into the echelons of the elite and sub-elite. Moreover, in the case of the sub-elites who are called upon to play crucial roles in the process of rapidly transforming the existing order, an exceptionally high degree of belief in the ideology is required to motivate them to obey commands that will undoubtedly involve a host of unpleasant coercive acts. As Kolakowski has pointed out, upon the successful establishment and the consolidation of the new regime, the elite often seeks to incorporate socially resonant elements of prerevolutionary political culture into its ideological appeals for obedience. 11 This has important ramifications with respect to the legitimation strategies of such regimes. In this regard, Markus speaks of the distinction between "overt" and "covert modes of legitimation." 12 In Poland, the ideology employed in the overt mode of legitimation was Marxism-Leninism in its official canonical form. As we shall see in the following sections, in the immediate postwar period, when the present system of domination was first established, it served as the primary ideology that the regime employed. Later, the role of Marxism-Leninism in legitimation would change. It would play less of a role with respect to society and would come to serve an almost ritualized function in the elite's self-legitimation. With de-Stalinization a covert mode began to supplement official Marxism-Leninism in the way that the regime attempted to legitimate itself to society at large. This covert mode came to assume an ever greater importance for the regime in Poland. Markus describes the general change in ideology that results from this switch to the covert mode: Its role is not merely an auxiliary one, for it is believed to be more effective, appealing as it usually does to more popular, sometimes traditional, sometimes "external," so-called "petty bourgeois" values. Thus internationalist references in overt legitimation are re-

30

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability placed by nationalist ones; the principle of collectivism is replaced by a competitive individualism, by the ideology and practice of "bettering one's own lot" and emphasis on familial values; the aim of humanization of social relations is replaced by an orientation towards "modernization," primarily in the sense of economic growth. Generally speaking, the system of covert legitimation is far from being, or even attempting to be coherent. In this sense it "adapts" itself to "commonsense" which is never a systematic worldview.13

In the sections which follow, this shift from the use of an almost pure overt mode of legitimation under Stalinism to increasing reliance on covert modes, starting with Gomulka, will be evident in the discussion of the ideologies that post-Stalinist regimes in Poland used in their legitimation strategies. Finally, as Markus indicates, while Marxism-Leninism was a codified system of thought, the shift to covert modes of legitimation has meant that ideology in the particular sense discussed here ceased to be as unified or as coherent as it previously had been. With this change, the regime tried to inculcate different norms of obedience in diverse social groups, strata, or classes, using rationales specifically developed for the target audience. One could say that the elite had begun to try to secure the obedience of different groups (e.g., sub-elites versus mass constituencies) on the basis of sub-ideologies. 14 The historical record of instability in postwar Poland indicates that the party-state there was far from successful in legitimating its domination. To understand why, among all the Communist regimes in East Central Europe, the Polish regime was the least successful in establishing stable bases for its domination, it is first essential to explain how the Polish elite tried to inculcate norms of obedience in the society over which it ruled for over forty years and why it failed. Second, having explained this, it is also necessary to specify why obedience could not be maintained by other (i.e., nonlegitimate) means. My analysis will end with a discussion of the Gierek regime of the 1970s, the period in which civil society in Poland began to liberate itself. When Gierek assumed leadership of the party in 1970, he, like his predecessors, presented a novel vision of the sort of society he hoped to create in order to secure the support of the Polish people. Like the Stalinists and Gomulka, whom he replaced as a result of working-class unrest on the Baltic coast, Gierek was ultimately unsuccessful in this

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

31

attempt and was removed from power as a result of the crisis of 1980. To understand the disintegration of party-state power under Gierek and how this facilitated the reconstitution of civil society in Poland, we must also understand the failure of his predecessors to establish legitimate bases on which the system of domination in Poland could rest. In the following sections I will examine how the party-state elite in Poland sought to justify its domination, and evaluate the reasons why Polish society failed to internalize this ideology. All three regimes that ruled Poland before the birth of Solidarity—those of the Polish Stalinists, Gomulka, and Gierek—were literally chased from power by the wrath of their subjects. It stands as a record unparalleled in the history of Communist regimes, in which leadership turnover in response to mass discontent had generally been rare prior to 1989.

Polish Stalinism After World War II, the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) managed to seize power in Poland with Soviet support. Those who came to hold leadership positions within the party were enthusiastic supporters of Stalin. Generally, these figures spent much of the interwar period and the war in the Soviet Union and thus have been dubbed "Muscovites." Polish Communist circles in the USSR began to make plans for taking power as early as 1943.15 They had other competitors for power in the immediate postwar period, however. In London, there was a Polish government-in-exile, composed of parties that had opposed the dictatorship established by Pilsudski in 1926. The London government organized Polish divisions which fought on the Western front, and claimed the allegiance of the vast underground partisan Home Army and the structures of the Polish underground state. There were also right-wing and phalangist political organizations that maintained partisans in the field in Poland. Finally, there were divisions among the Communists. In the immediate postwar period, the PPR was originally led by Wtadyslaw Gomulka, who had spent the latter stages of the war as the leader of the Communist underground in Poland. Such "home Communists" were not fully trusted by Stalin. By 1948, the Muscovite faction of the Polish Workers' Party had managed to consolidate its hold on power. Soviet power and diplomatic activity had prevented the London government from fully participating in the government of postwar Poland. The Home Army and the Polish

32

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

underground state had been dismantled by a combination of wartime attrition, 16 demobilization, and the activities of the Soviet army and secret police. The partisan bands that had continued to operate after the Red Army took control in Poland were effectively destroyed by 1948. The other political parties, most notably the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), were both neutralized by repression, then forceably incorporated into organizations under the control of the Communists or their supporters. The PSL leader, Mikolajczyk, fled the country and his party's organizations were forced into submission by their incorporation into the new Communist-controlled United Peasant Party (ZSL). In 1948, the PPS was likewise compelled to merge with the PPR to form the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Leaders and cadres who deviated from the Communist line were removed from political life. The PZPR itself came under the control of the Muscovite faction. The victory was symbolized by the replacement of Gomulka, who had shown a modicum of independence from Moscow in his tenure as party leader, with Boleslaw Bierut and by the subsequent imprisonment of Gomulka and his followers. With the consolidation of its power the PZPR began to transform the state and society along the lines of the Stalinist model. These policies were justified on the basis of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Stalinist ideology was a peculiar mix of elements. It contained elements drawn from both science and religion, yet the structure of belief it engendered differed substantially from either science or religion. Whereas religious belief is based on the experience of faith in a divine authority that requires no empirical verification, Marxism-Leninism in its Stalinist form demanded belief in things empirically unverified as empirical truth. In this way, Stalinist ideology discounted the conventional rules of scientific evidence as well. Because of this strange combination of elements, one observer noted that believers had an "inability to distinguish truth in the usual sense from political expediency."17 The Stalinist mode of legitimation and its ideology were strongly tied to a leadership cult. In certain ways, this cult approached Weber's ideal type of charismatic legitimacy, in so far as followers of the party leadership believed that Stalin and his inner circle possessed extraordinary qualities that demanded obedience. This, in itself, explains the intense fervor of Stalin's Polish followers and the radical steps they were willing to take in pursuit of the movement's aims. Obedience was tied to the leader as the ultimate source of Marxism-Leninism, a role which

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

33

would allow him to lead his followers "from the misery of exploitation into the socialist millennium." 18 In the case of Poland and the other People's Democracies the leadership cult was based on the local Communist leader's claim to be Stalin's leading disciple in the country. The Stalinist mode of legitimation also combined modern and premodern elements. In premodern traditionally legitimated systems of domination, the ruler is seen as the repository of authority, independent of the will of the ruled. The compliance of subordinates to the ruler's commands is based on a "teachable knowledge of an ordered world" specific to the culture of that particular society. Modern societies, on the other hand, have come to incorporate elements of the "reflective consent" of the ruled in their legitimation strategies. Institutionalized Marxism-Leninism functioned as a comprehensive world view that justified obedience to the hierarchical commands of the party leadership. Under Stalinism, the use of Marxism-Leninism in this fashion resembled traditional premodern modes of legitimation. However, at the same time these premodern elements were justified "in the name of real popular sovereignty," which was claimed to be a form of democracy superior to mere "formal" systems for producing reflective consent, such as "bourgeois" democracy.19 Large segments of Polish society obeyed the Polish party-state and its directives during the Stalinist period of social transformation. The regime did not hesitate to use terror to achieve its aims, and thus many complied out of fear. This is not the whole picture, however. Some complied because the regime's policies created rapid and extensive upward social mobility. Others followed the party obediently out of a fanatical sense of commitment. 20 A number of intellectuals enthusiastically threw their support behind the new regime. There were several common rationalizations for this. The interwar Polish regime had been strongly discredited by its failure both to solve nagging social problems and to defend the country at the beginning of World War II. The need for social reform was something upon which almost all significant Polish political actors agreed, 21 and the Communists were able to recruit a number of intellectuals by playing on these sentiments. Others were strongly attracted by the Soviet Union's role played in defeating Nazi Germany and saw the USSR and its system as a guarantee against the resurgence of fascism. Others were impressed with the practical emphasis of Marxism-Leninism, as opposed to abstract intellectualizing, and put their knowledge at the

34

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

service of the regime. Still others, dissatisfied with the limitations of intellectual life, felt a need to establish contact with the real lives of the peasant and worker masses. Polish peasants and workers also supported the regime. Many benefited from the upward mobility created by the regime's policies of social transformation. Peasants were encouraged to leave the countryside and settle in the cities, where they were given jobs in industry and first experienced modern urban life. Workers with skill and initiative were co-opted into positions of responsibility in the party and in the factories. Some truly believed that the regime was dedicated to bettering the lot of the masses or to a notion of social justice, 22 and some threw their support behind the regime in the hope of returning to a normal life and rebuilding the war-torn country. While the Stalinist regime in Poland commanded sufficient obedience to maintain itself in power and to carry out its policies of social transformation, it did not manage to convince the masses of the true efficacy of Marxism-Leninism. By and large, obedience out of belief in the ideology did not take root. One reason, of course, is that many merely complied out of fear of retribution. Others obeyed in order to improve their standard of living or social status. Others saw their original enthusiasm for the stated aims of the regime betrayed by its failure to live up to its promises and by the means by which it pursued those aims. When terror was relaxed in the period following Stalin's death (1953-56), sectors of the elite and the population began to speak out against the system and to discuss ways of changing it. Working class disappointment with a low standard of living, disgust for the terror, and disillusionment over the failure of the regime to live up to the ethical aims of socialism manifested themselves most dramatically in the demonstrations and street battles in Poznari in June 1956. In October 1956 the peasants decisively rejected the regime's agricultural program by spontaneously disbanding the collective farms. The number of collectives fell from 10,150 on September 30, 1956, to 1,534 on December 31. 23 Many Polish intellectuals also came to reject Stalinism. Some who subserviently propounded and perpetuated the myths of the regime came to feel responsible for the wrongs the regime had committed. It was as if the intelligentsia had awoken from a terrible dream and found itself "with a hand in a chamber pot." 2 4 Many enthusiastically joined

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

35

the growing reform movement. The party elite itself split into competing factions, allowing Gomutka and his followers to stage a political comeback and for Gomulka to become party leader once again in October 1956. Polish Stalinism had, in large measure, been forcibly established against society's will. The events in Poland from Stalin's death until Gomulka's return to power in 1956 showed just how much Polish Stalinism had relied on the coercion of many, the self-delusion of some, and the support of those who gained materially from the new regime. Mass obedience was contingent on the perpetuation of coercion and the continued ability of the regime to provide material gain. Only a very small proportion of the support upon which the Polish Stalinist regime relied was based on the belief that the system was the most appropriate one for the society. The six-year plan (1950-55) failed to live up to its goals in the areas of gross national product, real wages, and agricultural production. More significantly, in the period from 1950 to 1953 real wages fell at a rate of 3.7 percent per annum. 25 The protesting workers of Poznari carried signs with slogans such as "We want bread for our children," "We demand the lowering of prices; we want to live," and "We want to eat," alongside calls for "Freedom. " 26 Thus, it is not surprising that in the period 1955-56, when terror was sharply curtailed and revelations about the conduct of both the Polish and Soviet regimes became public, Polish Stalinism collapsed. In summation, obedience had been based largely on coercion and economic benefit. When the regime stopped using terror and failed to deliver economically, Poles stopped obeying. This was because Marxism-Leninism had not been internalized as an ideology. Domination had not been legitimated; support had been of a contingent nature, i.e., secured on a nonlegitimate basis. The absence of any more compelling reason to obey the elite explains why the Polish Stalinist system, which had once seemed so unassailably powerful, collapsed so rapidly. Both Polish society and significant groups within the party elite rejected Stalinism and hoped for its replacement by a model of socialism that would be more Polish in character. When Gomulka came to power, he had significant elite and widespread popular support. In a face-toface showdown with Khrushchev he had, unlike the unfortunate Imre Nagy in Hungary, less than a month later, averted a Soviet invasion.

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Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

Because Gomulka was popularly perceived as a victim of Stalinism, he came to symbolize the hopes of the vast majority of Poles for a new Polish model of socialism. 27

The Gomulka Regime No first secretary in the history of the Polish Communist movement enjoyed as much genuine popularity as Wladysiaw Gomulka upon his return to power in 1956.28 He had clear mandates from both the party and society. However, the nature of the mandate from the party and the one from society were different. The party expected Gomulka to restore order and carry out reforms both to mitigate the excesses of Stalinism and to restore the power and privileges of the elite. From society, Gomulka had something of a more far-reaching mandate—the expectation that he would replace Stalinism with a truly Polish form of socialism that would be more democratic, more independent from the Soviet Union in foreign policy, more attentive to consumer needs, and willing to replace Soviet-inspired institutions with Polish ones. At no point in Polish postwar history was the opportunity to establish legitimate domination as favorable as when Gomulka came to power in 1956. He managed to rule for over fourteen years, the longest reign of any of the Communist leaders of Poland. However, Gomulka did not live u p to his great promise. When he was removed from power in 1970, virtually nothing remained of his once broad support. The man who had inspired so much hope in 1956 left office feeling wrathful and isolated. The reason for this radical change was that Gomulka's actions in power had fallen quite short of society's expectations. In fact, his policies more closely followed the course implied by his mandate from the party: he restored order and carried out a series of limited reforms of the Stalinist institutions he had inherited. Those who supported him out of a commitment to nationalism or democracy were profoundly disappointed, and those who expected him to increase the national standard of living found that what he was prepared to provide did not live up to their expectations. There was a brief honeymoon period. 29 Gomulka accepted the decollectivization of agriculture and allowed the workers' councils that had been formed in 1956 to continue to operate. He eliminated some of the more degrading aspects of Soviet-Polish relations, such as unfair

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

37

terms of trade 30 and the staffing of the Polish Army with Red Army officers.31 Other popular measures included the adoption of more tolerant attitude toward small craftsmen and retailers and a more liberal passport and entry-visa policy.32 A Polish delegation led by Gomulka visited the Soviet Union on November 14,1956, and returned with a Soviet pledge to respect Polish internal sovereignty and with financial compensation for past economic exploitation (1400 metric tons of grain on credit and 700 million rubles in long-term credits). Upon his return, Gomulka stressed that only a Polish Communist government was capable of coming to such agreements with the Soviets.33 Gomulka also began in Poland the process of post-Stalinist institutional adjustment that occurred in most of the countries of the Soviet bloc. Important changes in the manner in which the party ruled were introduced. The party first secretary ceased to be a dictator in the classical Stalinist sense. While Gomulka's power was comparable to Bierut's, it was not based as exclusively on the power of the secret police or Moscow's anointment. Rather, it was a product of his original popularity as well as his ability to fill the ranks of the party elite with loyal followers. Gomulka also curtailed the autonomy and power of the secret police and subjected them to party control, thus eliminating terror as the central instrument of rule. This reestablished the leading role of the party and guaranteed the elite's security. Important bureaucracies and elite formations began to receive quasi-formal representation inside the highest decision-making bodies, and the decision-making process itself became subject to bargaining and compromise between such groups. Experts also came to play an important advisory role in the policy-making process. Finally, the role of the regional elites expanded, and they were granted a greater degree of autonomy from the center.34 Certain changes were also introduced in the economy. Collectivization of agriculture became a goal that was to be realized at some indefinite point in the future. Increased operational and administrative independence was granted to factory management by reducing the number of centrally allocated goods. 35 More attention was paid to consumer satisfaction. Finally, in the cultural sphere, a less doctrinally rigid policy was instituted. Artists were allowed to experiment with forms other than socialist realism. Intellectual life became less subject to ideological canon, although the degree of relaxation was higher in the natural sciences than in the social sciences or humanities. Another critical change was the cessation of blatant attempts to crush the Catholic Church and

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Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

the beginnings of efforts to arrive at a modus vivendi acceptable to church and state. It is important to note however, that these reforms did not fundamentally change the institutional structure of the party-state in Poland. In fact, they consolidated it, routinized its operation to a greater degree than under Stalinism, and probably improved its overall operation. There were only two areas where there were lasting and important institutional differences between the Polish system and that of the other bloc countries. As mentioned earlier, the Gomulka regime postponed the task of re-collectivizing agriculture. This meant that the Polish agricultural sector was dominated by a small-holding peasantry. 36 The other area in which the Polish system was exceptional was the degree of autonomy granted to the Catholic Church. While harassment and interference by the state did not completely end in 1956, churchstate relations were normalized to the extent that the Church could pursue its spiritual mission and the moral education of parishioners without much trouble. The upshot of this was that Polish Catholicism escaped the fate of other religious denominations in the Soviet bloc, that of outright collaboration and control by the party-state. In Poland, the Catholic Church was not only able to escape the institutional control of the party-state, but later was able to play a number of other roles—including moral witness, mediator in time of crisis, and supporter of independent culture. Though the Church was never able to completely free itself from constraints put upon it by the party-state and often had to be conciliatory toward power or seek permission or cooperation from the authorities on certain matters, it did so in pursuit of its own interests, as an autonomous actor. (The role of the Church in politics is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.) Once Gomulka managed to reassert firm control over the party, his policies began to diverge from the popular spirit of the Polish October. Rather than expanding democracy, he began cracking down on independent social initiatives, and as a result, his popularity began to wane. The first signs of a change came when Gomulka fired the entire editorial committee of the party daily Trybuna Ludu (People's Tribune) early in 1957 for being too outspoken. Then, at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR in October 1957, he declared the revisionists (those who wanted to expand upon the democratic gains of October 1956) a greater threat to the party than dogmatists. That same month, the reform-oriented newspaper Po Prostu (Simply Speaking)

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

39

was closed, and a campaign to verify party membership, which ultimately resulted in the dismissal of 200,000 members and decimated the ranks of the revisionists, was unleashed. 37 In 1958, legislation passed which stripped the workers' councils of any real power. 38 Gomulka's offensive against the revisionists continued at the Third Congress of the PZPR in March 1959, where he again stressed that revisionism was the "greatest threat" to the party.39 During 1959, hardliners who had "retired" in 1956 were brought back into the government and the Central Committee. Simultaneously, more liberal members of the government and Politburo were shuffled out of the centers of power. 40 The "Club of the Crooked Circle," a critical discussion society of the Warsaw intelligentsia, managed to last until 1962,41 but other independent discussion societies, with the exception of the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), were not so lucky. Gomulka's record on foreign affairs followed the same pattern. In the economic sphere, Gomulka was only marginally successful. Although he had been imprisoned by the Stalinists, he proved very cautious about changing any of the institutions they had created, including those of the planned economy. While there was an initial improvement in real wage levels immediately after he came to power, the rate of growth in real wages slowed considerably after 1958.42 Gomulka's personal limitations no doubt played a role in the growth of economic dissatisfaction. Abstemious by nature, he (unlike successor Gierek and his coterie) led a spartan life and seemed incapable of grasping the fact that many Poles wanted a higher standard of living than the system was providing. His frame of reference was simply outdated. While it is true that the Poland over which he presided was prosperous in comparison to the poverty it had known in his youth, a whole generation of Poles, for whom the prewar period and even the World War II had not been formative experiences, had grown up. 43 The younger generation had been shaped by life in an industrializing, urban Poland, and thus their expectations about the standard of living were much higher than Gomulka's. Late in Gomulka's tenure (1969-70) the economy entered into a new period of stagnation marked by a decline in the rates of growth of national income, wages, and productivity of labor, despite an increase in the rate of growth of the capital stock.44 His earlier economic successes were undone as a prolonged period of slow growth was succeeded by an economic crisis that left many Poles deeply dissatisfied.

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Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

After some initial steps to alleviate a few of the more distasteful aspects of the Soviet-Polish relationship and taking a somewhat independent stand on the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary, 45 Gomulka settled into the role of faithful ally to Khrushchev and then Brezhnev. 46 This disappointed many who had hoped for greater independence from the Soviet Union. The factor that has most strongly shaped Polish nationalism has been the country's unfortunate geographic location between Germany and Russia. German and Russian states have not only wiped Poland off the map of Europe more than once, but have even aggressively tried to Germanify or Russify the population. Gomulka was constrained in just how far he could use the antiRussian side of Polish nationalism. Leaders of Soviet bloc countries were quite aware they ruled, in the final analysis, at the behest of the USSR. The Soviet army served as the final guarantor of their power. The extent to which local popular support was achievable by. independent national policies was limited by the extent of Soviet tolerance of diversity within the bloc at any given moment. Leaders of bloc countries needed to be very aware of this fact, or they risked finding themselves very popular ex-leaders as a result of Soviet intervention. Hence, using Polish resentment toward the Soviet Union was not a viable option for Gomulka. Gomulka did try to make use of the side of Polish nationalism antipathetic toward Germany, justifying his foreign policy positions on the basis of the threat of German revanchism. Polish Communists often argued that the Soviet alliance afforded Poland protection from potential German attempts to recover lands lost to Poland after the war. 47 The dubious threat posed by a divided Germany, compared to the very real fact of party-state hegemony, undermined the credibility of such pronouncements. Gomulka himself further discredited such claims by his own diplomatic activity: his response to Brandt's Ostpolitik resulted in the signing of a treaty of mutual recognition with the Federal Republic in 1970. 48 Gomulka's flagging popularity meant that his last years were embattled. After a few early reforms, he had retrenched somewhat, and then settled into a very conservative defense of his past actions. He steadily lost the support and respect of the Polish intelligentsia. Those who had seen their hopes for a more democratic form of socialism wither began to oppose him openly. They advocated a more humane and efficient socialism, similar to the revisionism of the Prague Spring. 49 Very soon,

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

41

these tensions broke into open conflict. The arrest and punishment of some of the more outspoken revisionist intellectuals such as Kolakowski, Kurori, and Modzelewski, failed to bring an end to the movement. The banning of a production of Mickiewicz's Dziady (Forefathers' Eve) in March 1968 sparked student demonstrations at Warsaw University, which then spread to most other university towns. The regime finally resorted to an orchestrated campaign of anti-Semitism and police brutality to suppress the students and imprison their leaders. The revisionists were effectively isolated within the party, and many of their leading intellectual spokespeople joined in the flight of a large proportion of Poland's remaining Jewish population. 50 As stated earlier, Gomulka's policies brought an economic slump during the last years of his rule. The slow growth of consumption led many to grumble, but the possibility of real economic loss made them angry. By the late 1960s, the system of subsidized prices had become outmoded. In 1970, the regime made the mistake of introducing sharp price increases just before the Christmas holiday, sparking major strikes on the Baltic coast. The attempts of the authorities to restore order escalated into street battles with the police and army in which workers were killed and wounded. At this point, the Politburo removed Gomulka, who was convinced that the counterrevolution had arrived and was considering a call for Soviet military assistance. Gomulka had failed to live up to the hopes of the Polish October. When he came to power in 1956 many Poles saw him as a savior. By the time he was swept out of power in 1970, he was more despised then loved. He had failed to transform the popular reform aspirations of 1956 into any sort of "Polish model" of socialism for which he could have claimed the support of Polish society. Instead, he had increasingly isolated himself from the concerns of society. Parts of the intelligentsia had grown openly rebellious and had to be subdued by force. They were soon followed by the workers of the Baltic coast, and the party hierarchy reasoned that Gomulka was not the man to restore order. In his stead, they chose a regional party secretary from Silesia, Edward Gierek.

The Gierek Regime When the Politburo chose Edward Gierek to replace Gomulka, Gierek did something unprecedented. He traveled to Gdansk and Szczecin and held talks with the elected representatives of factory crews in Janu-

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Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

ary 1971. In face-to-face discussions with real workers, he exacted a pledge of their help for his efforts to improve the situation. However, it was not until a new round of strikes broke out in the textile mills of Lodz in February 1971, that the new regime finally repealed the price increases introduced by its predecessor. Gierek moved quickly to distinguish himself from Gomulka by presenting a much bolder vision of what he wanted to accomplish in Poland. To restore labor peace, he built his appeal around society's craving for higher levels of consumption. Thus Gierek and his new ruling team planned to rapidly accelerate economic growth through an ambitious plan to modernize industry. This new strategy was accompanied by the announcement of a "technocratic" approach to economic growth intended to satisfy the rising expectations of Polish consumers. 51 Gierek's team decided upon an "import-led" growth strategy based on an influx of Western capital stock financed by credit. This massive investment was to be accompanied by institutional and price reforms. However, these reforms were never implemented, and foreign credits were erroneously considered a panacea for an economy in severe need of structural reform. 52 Still, the new team was confident it could create a Communist version of consumer society. It hoped that in this way the support of society, particularly the recently rebellious working class, could be secured. 53 There was a second component to Gierek's new approach. After the success of his discussions with the workers in Gdansk and Szczecin, he promised that the leaders of Poland would routinely hold consultations with representatives of important social groups. 5 4 by doing so, he believed that past errors attributed to the party's temporary isolation from the people could be avoided in the future. 5 5 This uninstitutionalized practice became fairly common in Poland in the early 1970s. Major party figures traveled to factories to hold "consultations with the working class." 56 It has been said that Gierek himself held some 187 grass-roots level meetings in 1971.57 This practice signified a promise, in effect, that the party would now listen to the concerns and desires of the people. Taken together, Gierek's plan for economic growth and modernization and his scheme for "consultations with society" comprised the legitimation strategy of the new regime. It was a hybrid of party paternalism toward society wed to a technocratic approach to the economy. In reality, the consultation plank of the strategy soon collapsed. The

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

43

most damaging blow to its credibility was delivered in June 1976, when the Gierek regime attempted to introduce a wage and price reform without preparing society for its introduction. Workers promptly staged strikes and demonstrations in several cities. The party-state authorities responded by brutally repressing the larger demonstrations and by quickly repealing the wage and price reform. (For more on these events, see chapter 3.) Gierek's pledge to hold consultations was thus exposed as hollow. Later, he would admit that there had been no real consultations in 1976, and one of his prime ministers, Edward Babiuch, would also admit that "consultation" had ceased to be a serious policy in the late 1970s.58 The consultations held in the latter part of the 1970s were rather ritualized in nature, little more than lavish self-congratulatory events that brought prominent national politicians together with members of the local apparatus. 59 The retreat of the authorities from the policy of consultation in the late 1970s had the effect of undermining the Gierek regime's legitimation strategy. Consultations might have provided a "shock absorber" for economic dislocation, enabling the authorities to argue that they were still trying to take society's needs into account despite economic setbacks. However, without this, the nature of the support the Gierek regime could hope to attract was at best contingent. Only the economic component of Gierek's vision for Poland remained, and support could thus be maintained only by "delivering the goods." Political support became tied to the vagaries of economic policy outcomes. The regime had placed itself in a position where the best it could hope for was some sort of nonlegitimate domination accepted by the populace on instrumental, economic grounds. When in the late 1970s Poland's economy entered into a sharp recession,60 Gierek's power began to crumble. With the formation of the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) in 1976, his regime faced rapidly expanding and diversified opposition movements. When another set of price increases was announced in the summer of 1980, the most extensive strike movement in Polish history erupted and culminated in the formation of the trade union Solidarity. Gierek was replaced by Stanislaw Kania. None of the three regimes that ruled Poland prior to the creation of Solidarity managed to legitimate party-state domination. It is impor-

44

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

tant to understand what this exactly means with respect to political stability, and in the context of this study, what this meant for the emergent Polish opposition of the 1970s. It should be emphasized that domination which has not been legitimated does not necessarily "equal" political instability. Nonlegitimate domination can also be quite stable, but obedience to the commands of the elite will be based on a calculus of material gain or on fear of coercion. The records of greater stability in Communist Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany prior to the late 1980s serve as counterexamples to the Polish case. All three regimes survived periods of extreme fragility. The Hungarian Communist regime barely survived the revolution of 1956. The Czechoslovak regime faced a similar challenge during the Prague Spring, and the viability of the German Democratic Republic was continually called into question by the existence of the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, all three of these regimes were able to avoid the kind of chronic instability that wracked Communist Poland. The events of 1989 indicate that this was not due to the legitimation of party-state rule in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany but, rather, that the regimes there were able to achieve much higher levels of obedience on the basis of providing higher standards of living and the more effective application of coercion. Had these systems been legitimate they would not have collapsed so rapidly. The Polish pattern of development presents a different picture. Periods of nonlegitimate domination were followed by crises that threatened the very existence of the system, leading, in turn, to adjustments that restored a state of nonlegitimate domination. Polish Stalinism collapsed when it could no longer command the obedience of society by terror and economic incentives. The party-state elite responded to this crisis by choosing Gomulka as first secretary. His reputation as a victim of Stalinism and the initial reforms he made secured the new regime broad societal support. However, Gomulka's unwillingness to make further reforms in the "spirit of October" prevented him from building broad voluntary obedience on the basis of a genuine Polish model of socialism. His innate conservatism and the slow nature of economic growth during his tenure led to the alienation of key social groups. In 1968, his regime found itself at war with segments of the intelligentsia and, in 1970, rebellious workers forced the party to replace him. Gomulka was followed by Gierek, who managed to temporarily secure the support of the striking workers and presented a bold new plan

Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

45

to rebuild the Polish system. He promised a much more dynamic economy with greater consumer welfare and a system of consultations to keep the party-state elite in touch with society. Gierek's economic plans, however, were far too ambitious, poorly worked out, and badly implemented. By the mid-1970s, disequilibrium in the economy demanded attention, and the party-state elite again tried to correct the situation with the wage and price reform of 1976. This struck a rather sensitive nerve with the working class, as it contradicted Gierek's promises to avoid the mistakes of the past. With this one measure, the Gierek regime destroyed its strategy of consultation. At this juncture, it could not hope to secure legitimate domination, but only contingent obedience based on economic satisfaction, i.e., nonlegitimate domination. Because the economic situation was rapidly deteriorating, this was courting disaster. The Gierek regime successfully regained control of the situation after the strikes of June 1976 by dropping price increases and crushing the strikes. In response, a group of Polish intellectuals organized KOR, the Workers' Defense Committee, and began to struggle against the party-state's repression of the protesting workers. It should be emphasized that legitimation problems like those experienced by the Polish party-state do not necessarily lead to a generalized societal challenge to domination such as the one that ensued in Poland in 1980. However, such problems present favorable conditions for the organization of opposition to systems of domination because under nonlegitimate domination, obedience has not been internalized as a norm of routine action. Under such favorable conditions, where domination rests on far less sturdy social foundations, counter-elites will find it easier to mobilize the public against domination. This is particularly true when deteriorating economic conditions create the rather potent motivating force of injustice. It was under receptive conditions of this type, that KOR's initial effort to mobilize public opinion against party-state repression of the workers achieved success. Later, KOR and other groups radically broadened the size of the opposition. With time and greater economic dislocation, obedience to the commands of the party-state elite diminished and support for the opposition increased. In 1980 the party-state found itself confronted by a well-organized movement demanding radical change of the existing system. Thus, at this juncture, it is necessary to review the events of June 1976 and those that followed.

3

Workers I: The Events of June 1976

June and October '56, March '68, December '70, June '76—these already are symbolic dates in the postwar history of Poland. For one person they might mark the turning point of successive cycles in the process of alienation from the authorities. For another they might be the most intense examples of protest caused by life under intolerable conditions or protest attesting to the inauthenticity of authority. And that lily-livered authority found only one answer—coercion . . . But it is possible to look at these dates in a different fashion.. .as movements of experience, which in aggregate comprised the collective consciousness of Poles in 1980. . . They created an image of struggle, the most beautiful of all—for Freedom . . . Then the value of the suffering of all those wronged, of each lonely and individual sufferer, became clear. And with such thoughts I place into Your hands this humble publication. If you have suffered, it is acknowledgement that it had sense. If you have caused suffering, you should understand that you also acted against yourself. And this should attest to truth. —Jerzy St^pien in the introduction to a "Solidarity" pamphlet on Radom '761

On June 25, 1976, Polish workers responded to proposed increases in the price of food by striking. In doing so, they provoked the most profound crisis that the Gierek regime had faced since it had quelled the strikes of 1970-1971. Gierek was able to survive this latest challenge, but would not be as fortunate in four years' time. It is estimated that strikes took place in 130 or more factories across the country. According to data later collected by KOR, this number in-

Workers I: Events of June 1976

47

eluded approximately 75 percent of the largest factories in Poland. 2 For the most part, these actions were peaceful. However, in some localities, events became violent. As is usually the case, violent protest attracts greater attention and, thus, considerably more information is available about them. This has led to the inaccurate naming of the events under consideration as the "Radom-Ursus" strikes, in reference to the two places where the "June events" were most violent. This obscures the fact that the strikes were widespread and generally peaceful in character. The Polish party-state moved quickly to crush the strike movement of June 25, 1976. It also withdrew the proposed price rises that very day, ensuring that no new strikes broke out. In the aftermath of the strikes, participants as well as a number of innocent bystanders were subjected to a number of forms of repression. On June 25, demonstrators, dispersing strikers, and passersby were arrested, detained and, in many cases, beaten either on the street or while under arrest by the police (milicja), the Security Service (SB), or the ZOMO. 3 Many were tried, either summarily by misdemeanor tribunals or in courts of law. Penalties ranged from fines to lengthy terms of imprisonment. Finally, an even larger group of workers were dismissed from their jobs. Despite this repression, June 1976 was a landmark political event for the two major social groups that would play important roles in the opposition of the 1970s—the working class and the critical intelligentsia. For the working class, June 1976 was another demonstration of its ability to veto party-state policies it found unacceptable. The June events played an important role in fomenting worker hostility toward the party-state. Furthermore, it was the second time in the 1970s that authority on the shopfloor had broken down. Thus, it was another opportunity to undertake collective political action free of the party-state, and as such, it was an important event in the political education of the Polish working class, which in four years' time would rock the political system in Poland. For parts of the Polish critical intelligentsia the subsequent repressions were a clarion call to political action, something that—with the exception of the small Ruch (Movement) group in Lodz 4 and a campaign against constitutional changes in 1975 (for details of this campaign see chapter 4)—had been conspicuously absent since the crushing of revisionist Marxism in 1968. This new commitment seems to have mitigated the ambivalence of many workers toward the intel-

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Workers I: Events of June 1976

ligentsia, misgivings that had been reinforced by the public silence of the intelligentsia in the face of the killings of workers on the Baltic coast during the 1970 strikes. The participation of the critical intelligentsia changed the dynamics of the Polish political system. Led by KOR, members of the critical intelligentsia demanded amnesty for workers persecuted in the aftermath of the June events and took actions to mitigate the workers' plight. This struggle inaugurated the "ruch oporu" (opposition movement) period (1976-1980), the period during which the present process of democratization in Poland began. During this period numerous social movements with diverse political orientations and social constituencies were born and became politically active. This marked the reappearance of socially diverse resistance in Poland, something which had been absent since 1956 (manifestations of discontent had encompassed only one social group at a time, e.g., the intelligentsia in 1968 and workers in 1970-71).

The Price Reform Although, the introduction of price reform was a political disaster, the decision to reform the price system in Poland was in some ways justified. By the mid-1970s it had become obvious that things were beginning to go wrong with the Gierek team's economic policies. Work on price reforms had begun as early as 1973, but these early plans, involving less drastic increases, had never been introduced. Prime Minister Jaroszewicz was assigned the responsibility of overseeing this latest attempt. He worked with a Politburo committee that included Edward Babiuch, a Central Committee secretary with responsibilities in the area of internal party affairs; Mieczyslaw Jagielski, a deputy prime minister with long experience in centralized planning; and Jan Szydlak, Central Committee secretary for industry.5 Work on the reform proposal lasted several months. It would seem that Jagielski and the State Planning Commission drew up the proposal that was introduced. Jagielski would later deny this, trying to shift responsibility for the structure of the actual reform onto Deputy Prime Minister Tadeusz Pyka, who was then also first deputy chairman of the Planning Commission (pp. 67,108-9, 278-79, 324-27). Prior to the adoption of the proposal, the Council of Ministers consulted with a number of important officials. Zdzislaw Grudzien, the provincial governor of Katowice, later reported that he, as well as De-

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fense Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, Jerzy tukaszewicz (Central Committee secretary in charge of propaganda), Deputy Prime Minister Alojzy Karkoszka, and Deputy Prime Minister Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk (also chairman of the Planning Commission), felt that the price rises were too steep. Jagielski, as well, later claimed that he also thought they were too high (pp. 223, 333). Stanislaw Kowalczyk, the minister of Internal Affairs, also subsequently stated that the Security Service had expressed concern to Jaroszewicz that the planned price rises were so steep that they might provoke protests. According to Kowalczyk, security forces were prepared for such a contingency, but also added a prior decision was taken not to use firearms in case of working-class protest. While after the fact testimony makes it seem that there was significant resistance to the reform proposal in the highest ruling circles, when the matter was brought before the full Politburo for approval, not one member expressed any reservations in the discussion, and it was approved in an unanimous roll call vote (pp. 108-9, 223). On June 24,1976 the prime minister presented the price reform legislation to the Sejm (parliament) and also outlined its specifics on national television. The reform package included rises in wages and transfer payments, agricultural procurement prices, the cost of inputs to private agriculture and, most significantly, the retail prices of certain foodstuffs. 6 The government also pledged to hold consultations with representatives of factories and social groups on June 25, before seeking the Sejm's ratification on the 26th.7 The proposed rise in the prices of foodstuffs was quite steep: 69 percent on meat and fish, 100 percent on sugar, 60 percent on butter and quality cheese, and 30 percent on poultry and vegetables. It was calculated that the average family would have spent approximately 39 percent more on food and 16 percent more in general to maintain its consumption level.8 Agricultural procurement prices were to be raised (12-50 percent), as were the prices of intermediate goods and services for private farmers (20-45 percent). The reform also included wage and pension increases ranging from 240 to 600 zloty (US$7-$18 at the official exchange rate) per month (at most, a 23 percent raise) and increased support for children, mothers on maternity and child-care leave, and students. 9 The proposed adjustments in wages were structured to favor the lower paid. 10

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Workers I: Events of June 1976

The party-state also made other preparations prior to the implementation of the proposed reform. Security measures were taken to deter protest actions. In Gdansk, one of the centers of extensive protest in 1970-71, military and security units patrolled the streets in a show of strength on June 24. 1 1 Significantly, both before the announcement of the price reform proposal and in the days following its withdrawal there was also a flurry of military conscription. "Half-reserve companies" were formed and those drafted included some who the partystate thought were politically dangerous. There is evidence that three categories of suspects were called up for reserve duty—"unofficial workers' leaders," "the negatively politically active," and "criminals." Many were called up despite advanced age or poor health. Past strike leaders and certain intellectuals, such as Jacek Kurori (the co-author of the famous "Open Letter to the Party" in 1965 and later a leading KOR activist), the poets Witold Sulkowski and Adam Zagajewski, and the art historian Wojciechowski were among those conscripted. 12

The Strikes The strikes of June 25,1976, lasted only one day because, that very evening, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz appeared again on national television to announce the withdrawal of the price reform from consideration by the Sejm. 1 3 Upon hearing this, the workers ended their strikes. This response seems to have been universal; at any rate, none of the available sources contradict it.

Ursus Tractor Factory Ursus is a largely working-class suburb on the outskirts of Warsaw. Much of its population is employed at the Ursus Tractor Factory, where wages had been traditionally high. Its crew had gone on strike in February 1971 in response to the last round of price increases. 14 The proposed changes would have reduced the standard of living of skilled workers like those in Ursus. 15 Nearly the whole work force at the tractor factory went on strike. At first, workers gathered together in small groups and heatedly discussed the situation. Managers and party functionaries threatened and—when this failed—begged them unsuccessfully to return to work. A crowd gathered under the main work dispatcher's station and

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demanded a meeting with representatives of management and the factory PZPR committee. Some workers were heard to say, "If the party rules, it shouldn't hide its head in the sand." The chairman of the factory council of the Metalworkers' Union, Zbigniew Antonow, came to talk with the crowd. They treated him with contempt and told him what they thought of the unions—"What sort of unions are these which defend interests other than our own?". . . "We don't need such unions." 16 At 9:00 A.M. the strikers made their way to the enterprise's administrative offices outside of the factory proper and demanded to talk with "high party authorities." The "pensioner" (such factory guards were often retired security service and police officials) who kept watch on the building's entrance tried to barricade the door when he saw the workers coming. The manager rejected the demand, and he and the factory party secretary, Stanislaw Mackowski, tried unsuccessfully to calm the strikers. The workers surrounded them, and a young female worker slapped them both. Police agents circulated among the crowd, marking outspoken workers and those who seemed to be leaders with a special phosphorescent paint that could be detected under ultraviolet light. The workers occupied the nearby Kutno-Warsaw (east-west) and Warsaw-Skierniewice (southwest-northeast) rail lines, and people from town joined the crowd. The nonviolent character of the strike began to change as strikers, using welding equipment brought from town, ripped up railroad track, stopped trains—including the ParisWarsaw express, which they refused to release until the price reform was dropped—and rolled a locomotive into a breach in the tracks. Workers also distributed eggs, bread, and sugar from one of the stopped trains among themselves and to passersby. At this stage, the police did not obstruct the strikers. They did, however, divert traffic away from the site of the disturbances, and observed what was happening by helicopter.17 Sometime after 8:00 p. M ., news of the withdrawal of the price reform reached the strikers, and they began to demobilize. As they dispersed, the police attacked groups of workers near the factory, at the railroad station, and in the town with tear gas, concussion grenades, and truncheons. They also used a type of grenade that dispersed a special powder detectable under ultraviolet light. Both these grenades and the spray described earlier were designed to allow the police to identify

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Workers I: Events of June 1976

strikers after they had been arrested. The attacking force included police officers and a group described as "boys from Gol^dzinow" (presumably ZOMO). The attackers also attempted to enter the factory but were repelled by the workers there. Many people, including innocent passersby, were beaten unconscious on the streets. The dining car of one of the trains caught on fire. The police riot lasted until dawn. 18 The sources provide many examples of excessive police brutality, including the detention by force of a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy, the beating of people who had already lost consciousness, and the use of car keys and belt buckles in attacks. 19 Upon their arrival at police headquarters in Warsaw, located in the Mostowski Palace, arrested workers and bystanders were forced to pass between rows of police officers swinging truncheons (an ordeal known as the "hotel under the oaks" [hotel pod dgbami] or the "health path" [sciezka zdrowia]. Some were submitted to this more than once. Some were put in isolation cells, beaten with truncheons, and kicked. Several sustained broken ribs. Those either too weak to move or unconscious were dragged by their legs. Behind the police station prisoners were again run through "health paths." KOR later asked any of the two hundred to three hundred arrested that night to come forward if they had not been beaten. None of the detainees denied that they had been beaten. Those arrested or detained were checked under ultraviolet light to see if they had been hit by phosphorescent powder or paint. The arrested were held in other facilities in Warsaw as well, including Rakowiecka prison and the police station on Walicow Street. There were also beatings at these locations. 20 There were reports of other strikes in the Warsaw area that day. While detailed accounts do not seem to be available, there were orderly sit-in strikes and work stoppages reported at the Zerari Auto Plant (Polski Fiat), Zelmot, the Polish Optics Enterprises (PZO), "Nowotko," the Kasprzak Radio Factory, the Warynski Crane Plant, and the General Swierczewski precision instruments plant. 21

Radom Radom, a medium-sized city southeast of Warsaw, was the site of the most extensive protests in 1976. Striking workers eventually gained control of most of the city and sacked the building of the Regional Committee of the PZPR. A counterattack by members of the security forces

Workers I: Events of June 1976

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led to pitched street battles in which the authorities regained control over the city. The crew of the Walter Metal Factory seem to have played a key role in bringing workers out of factories and onto the streets. Among the products turned out at Walter are small caliber arms and ammunition. 22 The first work stoppage began sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 in the morning in department P-6. Management sent a representative to investigate, and he was bombarded with questions about the increases in the price of food. As he left, the workers followed him out into the yard. Other workers soon began to join them in the courtyard of the factory. Their number eventually grew to 1000. At 8 A.M., factory director Skrzypek tried, to no avail, to justify the government's price policy to the crew. Some workers tried to arm themselves, but failed because Skrzypek had transferred all ammunition in the factory magazine to a local air base. Around 8:30 A.M., Walter workers began to leave the factory in order to make contact with workers in other factories. 23 At Radoskór, a leather factory nearby, motorized carts from Walter and Blaszanka, a tin can factory, arrived soon after 8:30 A.M. Unobstructed by the factory guards, the workers on the carts went from department to department and agitated among the Radoskór workers. At 8:40 several hundred strikers from Walter came to a heating equipment factory (ZSG) and called for a work stoppage there in order to facilitate a march to the Regional PZPR Committee building (KW PZPR). At 9:00, a group of workers from both ZSG and Walter arrived at Radoskór and joined in the ongoing discussions there. After a brief period, it was finally resolved to move on the KW PZPR. 24 At 9:20, the first shift from Radoskór joined the Walter strikers in marching down May First Street to the Party Committee building. They were joined by workers from the Telephone Factory (RWT), the Tobacco Factories, the Rolling Stock Repair Shop (ZNTK), and smaller factories, as well as students, housewives, and other passersby. Some of the workers paraded in formation with Red Flags and sang the Polish national anthem (Jeszcze Polska nie Zgin§la) and the Internationale. The majority of the workers were young and they exhibited strong discipline. They chanted such phrases as, "We want to eat. We want to drink," and "The young will not be able to live." In a number of enterprises (e.g., the Fireproof Products Factory), workers roughed up factory directors and PZPR secretaries. By 9:40 A.M. approximately 6000 workers were standing in front of the KW PZPR on May First Street.

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Workers I: Events of June 1976

They demanded to talk with Regional First Secretary Janusz Prokopiak about rescinding the price rises. 25 Instead of Prokopiak, Deputy PZPR Regional Secretary Adamczyk came out of the building. When the crowd called for discussion, he said that he could not have a discussion with "rabble." A woman with a child stepped out of the crowd and addressed him. She said that she was a widow with three children and that she made only 2,200 zloty (US$66) per month. She complained that before the price rises she had been able to afford both bread and sugar for her children, but now she would be able to afford only bread. She asked Adamczyk how much money he made. He told her that if she were so concerned about her children, she would have left them at home rather than take them to a demonstration. In response, the woman took off her shoe and began to strike Adamczyk on the head with it. 26 After freeing himself from the wrathful mother, Adamczyk told the crowd to pick a delegation with whom he could talk. One woman cried out, "So, a delegation, so you know who to arrest." The crowd seemed to respond in agreement with her by directing taunts and insults at the deputy secretary. Adamczyk repeated that he would not conduct a discussion with a mob. A worker from the Walter factory then stepped out of the crowd to address Adamczyk. He pointed to his soiled work clothing and explained that he could afford only one set per year, while four were necessary. When he confronted Adamczyk about the cost of his clothing, the crowd cried out "strip him, strip him." Several young workers grabbed Adamczyk and did exactly that. The deputy regional party secretary then fled in his underwear into the party building, chased by stones and rubble hurled by the crowd. While this was going on, other workers began constructing barricades on May First, Struga, Zeromski, and Slowacki streets. This continued throughout the morning and afternoon. One group of demonstrators, led by a young woman, succeeded in convincing a bus driver to use his bus to fill a gap in the barricade. On Slowacki Street, gasoline was spread on the asphalt and then ignited. More was stored in case of an attack by the police or the army. 27 At 10:15 A.M., more workers began to arrive at the KW PZPR. These included parts of the crews from RWT, ZREMB, the Meat Factories, and the Spare Parts Shop (WCZ). Those assembled began to speak more disparagingly about the party. The crowd built a bonfire, into which

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many people threw their party cards. There were chants of "Down with the traitors' party" and "Down with price rises." At 11:00, some workers went into the KW PZPR to find out whether Prokopiak would meet with them. They returned with a rumor that the first party secretary had escaped in an ambulance, dressed as a hospital worker. Workers returned to the building to verify the report. According to a worker who reached the scene around 11:30, the red flag on the building was taken down and trampled, and the Polish national flag was hoisted in its place. The demonstrators forwarded petitions calling for an end to the price rises and for improved working conditions. Sometime after noon, the crowd used a tractor to break down the gate of the KW PZPR building. 28 At 12:30 P.M., the rumor about Prokopiak's flight proved to be incorrect. He had a conversation with some workers who entered the building and promised that he would contact the Central Committee in Warsaw by telephone and provide an answer about the cancellation of the price rises by 2:30. Some of the workers who entered the party building reported that very few functionaries were still inside, mostly plainclothes police officers and low-level party officials. 29 The Central Committee in Warsaw seems to have been well informed by telex about the events in Radom. Prokopiak also spoke by phone with Szydlak, the Central Committee secretary for industry. Szydlak then informed other members of the party leadership about what was transpiring. The party elite also assembled a special staff to coordinate repressive action to restore control in Radom. Prime Minister Jaroszewicz learned of what was happening around 11:00 A. M. General Stanislaw Kowalczyk, the minister of internal affairs, and Stanislaw Kania, then the Central Committee secretary in charge of the armed forces, security, and church relations, called Gierek and informed him of the need to use force to quell the disturbances in Radom. Both counseled against the use of firearms and advocated instead the use of a plan drawn up in advance that did not involve their use. Gierek agreed to the ban on firearms and told them to proceed. 30 The confused and uncertain atmosphere inside the Regional PZPR Committee building belied the readiness of the forces at the disposal of the party-state. At noon an airlift of police, Security Service (SB) officers, and cadets from the Noncommissioned Officer School in Pila began. Approximately thirty fighting squads of police as well as sophisticated crowd control equipment were landed by Polish military

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Workers I: Events of June 1976

transports. Throughout the day, columns of police vehicles assembled from a number of cities (including Tarnobrzeg, Lublin, and Rzeszow) sped from the air base toward Radom at 100 km/hr. Some vehicles came from Golgdzinow, where there was a large ZOMO base. The airlifted forces included armored cars equipped with grenade launchers, as well as hand-held grenade launchers, jeeps, radio equipment, mechanized water cannons, and detention vans. The attacking forces operated in units that were estimated in some instances at 1000 men. Many were equipped with riot gear, such as visored helmets, armored shields, and 85 centimeter-long truncheons. 31 At the KW PZPR, several people entered the cafeteria and discovered substantial supplies of meat and cold cuts. When this was displayed to the crowd assembled outside, they became enraged. Around 1:00 P.M., those inside the building began to systematically destroy its entire contents. Furniture, televisions, rugs, and party records were thrown out of windows. As 2:30 approached, the time by which Prokopiak had promised to provide a definitive answer on the questions of price increases, the anger of those assembled intensified. 32 At 2:00 P.M., ZOMO units drove up to the KW PZPR and tried to force their way through the demonstrators to the building. They attacked using water cannons and grenade launchers. Workers inside the building started fires, and by 2:30 the Regional Party Headquarters was burning out of control. The remaining functionaries, including the First Secretary, fled at this time. As the building burned, the workers erected more barricades to block the arrival of fire trucks. On May First Street, the workers stopped four fire trucks, and at least one of these was set on fire. At 2:40 P.M., a portion of the crowd of 40,000 people that had been assembled in front of the KW PZPR building retreated to the vicinity of the Regional Government building (Urzjjd Wojewodzki) and the Regional Police Headquarters (KWMO). These buildings were surrounded by police officers, who attacked the demonstrators using tear gas, truncheons, and mechanized water cannons. The workers threw up barricades and in the course of this struggle, two people were killed. Although the workers lit the barricades on fire, a mechanized water cannon managed to create a breach. 33 By 3:00 P.M., the crowd in the area of the Regional Government and Regional Police Headquarters buildings managed to regroup and resume the attack. They hurled stones and even Molotov cocktails at the

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government building, causing it to burn. Throughout the city, demonstrators painted "Away with the corrupt PZPR" on buildings. However, the protesters were unable to take Police Headquarters. The police officers barricaded themselves in the building, took pictures of the crowd, and hurled tear gas down on those assembled. A helicopter hovered overhead and filmed those below. 34 By 4:00 P.M., the city began to resemble a battlefield. The KW PZPR, the Regional Government Building, and a police station that served as the Passport Bureau were in flames. Official vehicles and police cars were burning. Around 5:00, people fleeing down Zeromski Street (the city's major shopping thoroughfare) began looting stores. In fact, there are also reports that earlier in the afternoon, when attention was focused on the events at the party building, several men with sticks systematically smashed shop windows along Zeromski. Other shop windows had been destroyed by spray from water cannons, and in various parts of the city men broke into liquor stores and urged people in a provocative fashion to take vodka. Many in Radom suspect this was a police provocation to justify the use of excessive force. Later, many workers were charged with theft in connection with these events. Exactly who initiated the looting cannot be firmly established, but it is clear that some completely innocent people were framed. 35 Around 5:00 P.M., a column of ZOMO reached the area around the Regional Government and Police Headquarters buildings. They moved quickly to attack any civilian in the area. They arrested a number of workers who happened to be passing through on their way home from work. They justified the arrests with remarks such as, "Dirty hands are evidence of having taken part in the demonstration." 36 The fighting was incredibly violent and destructive. A group of workers broke into the Radom Meat Factory and distributed ham that was marked for export to Western Europe and the USSR. The police were singled out as targets of revenge by the crowds. There was rumor that a police car had been destroyed by stoning, and another that a police officer was subsequently killed by the crowd when he and his comrades were dragged out of the car. There were also reports of protesters turning truncheons on their former owners. At various times during the day, workers took up positions on roofs and hurled stones at the security forces. They were joined on one occasion by a housewife who threw cutlery and flowerpots from her apartment. 37

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As the security forces began to turn the tide of battle, the conflict degenerated even further, becoming a outright police riot. Illumination flares and tear gas grenades were fired directly into crowds to drive them back. On at least one occasion, the police advanced on a crowd in hedgehog (jez) formation, similar to the phalanx of ancient warfare. The most vicious units were the ZOMO from Gol^dzinow. It was rumored that these units were made up of hard-core criminals recruited by the police (a common rumor about ZOMO in Poland). The security forces attacked with such frenzy that some suspected that they were drunk. It was reported that they even beat up women and children. Many people were severely injured by the beatings administered by the security forces. Several police officers often ganged up on one protester with their truncheons. Other protesters were hurt by the explosion of grenades or were burned by illumination flares. 38 At 6:00 P.M., firemen began to put out the blaze at the KW PZPR building and extinguished it by 7:30. At 6:30, the demonstrators made one final attempt to take the Regional Police Headquarters in order to free prisoners held there. The security forces repelled this last attack and pursued the retreating crowd, arresting demonstrators and bystanders indiscriminately. A retreating crowd on Zeromski and Struga streets displayed the corpses of two young workers with split skulls on a factory electric cart bedecked with black flags. By 8:00 P.M., the center of the city was firmly in the hands of the security forces. 39 By 9:00 P.M., as helicopters hovered above, the police riot had spread into outlying districts of the city. At 10:00, ZOMO units began to block the streets, and by 11:00, the suppression of the rebellion was complete. Once the security forces regained control of the city, people were assembled to clean up the damage. They included forced conscripts from Warsaw, Kielce, and Kozienice, as well as three Ochotnicze Hufce Pracy units (OHP—an organization that recruited teenagers and provided them with vocational and paramilitary training). 40 The disturbances in Radom caused extensive losses. Twenty-four vehicles destroyed, numerous shops were looted, damage was inflicted upon numerous public buildings, seventy-five police officers were wounded (eight critically), and an unknown number of protesters were killed and many more were wounded. Losses from looting were estimated at several tens of millions of zloty.41 Large numbers of participants and bystanders were detained or arrested by the police in Radom. Estimates put the number of arrests or

Workers I: Events of June 1976

59

detentions on June 25 and the following days at 2000. It seems that those arrested in Radom fared no better than those in Ursus. They were subjected to the same "health paths" and individual beatings. In one case, a man was beaten five times in the course of a night, twice until he lost consciousness. Some were charged under article 127 of the penal code, which carried a sentence ranging from three years in prison to capital punishment. 42

The Tri-City Area (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot) Three cities on Poland's Baltic coast—Gdansk, Gdynia, and Sopot— constitute an important maritime and industrial area. This Tri-City area became the most important center of militant working-class action in the 1970s and 1980s. It was the site of large-scale disturbances in December and January of 1970-1971, and in the late 1970s, it was a hotbed of free trade union agitation. The events of 1980 at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk, which became a focus for that strike movement, are well known. On the morning of June 25, 1976, the army and police patrols that had been in evidence on the previous day disappeared. Lines began to form in front of stores early in the morning. By afternoon, there was no sugar to be found. 43 In Gdynia, there was a sit-in strike at the shipyards. 44 A group of workers from Gdynia blocked the entrance of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. As the shifts changed, the Gdansk workers also refused to work. At 9:00 A.M., they went to the administration building, where the director was expecting them. However, he was not prepared to negotiate immediately, claiming that it was first necessary to erect loudspeakers. While this was going on, he called the Regional PZPR Committee for assistance. The committee sent Regional First Secretary Tadeusz Fiszbach, a Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ) official by the name of Borosniewicz, and others. Borosniewicz told the workers that the price rises were economically unavoidable and could not be repealed. Fiszbach began his speech with the invocation, "Comrades!" This was met with immediate hostility. The workers shouted back things like, "We are not comrades; we are citizens; comrades— that is you, the bureaucracy, the dictatorship's people." 4 5 The shipyard director asked the workers to go back to their work stations, where discussions would take place on a departmental level. The workers insisted on having discussions then and there. The party dele-

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gation tried to convince workers that the price rises were designed to get more money from foreign tourists. The workers responded that in that case they should get a raise of 100 percent. They then demanded a meeting with either First Party Secretary Gierek or Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz by 7:00 the next morning. The party delegation said that it could not assure this, but that they certainly could get someone from the Central Committee to come. The director reminded the workers that they had received a raise at the time of the last reorganization of the shipyard. A worker countered that this had not been enough and asked the director how much he made per day. He told them that he earned 1500 zloty (US$45) per day, but that he worked until 7:00 P.M. The worker answered, "By the heat of your fireplace." A young worker mentioned that he made only seven zloty per hour, while in the United States workers made seven dollars per hour. A third worker added that in order to feed their families, they had to work overtime, which routinely kept them at the shipyard 300 hours per month. He also lamented the fact that they had to work twelve-hour days, while their fathers had fought for an eighthour day. One worker tore his shirt, and in direct reference to the 1970 massacre said, "It's all the same to me, let them shoot." Another worker complained that he had left his village where there was a shortage of "forces of production" in order to work at the shipyard, where he thought he could get a good apartment and high pay. He added that now he was starving. A trade union representative approached the microphone and said he was a shipyard worker. The crowd began to whistle, and the atmosphere seemed to grow more tense. The workers demanded to know why a helicopter had appeared overhead and maintained that they would not leave the shipyard. At 1:00 P.M., the discussion ended, and the assembled workers spontaneously and almost unanimously called for a general strike to begin the next day at 9:00 A.M. However, since the price reform was withdrawn that evening, nothing came of it. Other factories in the Tri-City area went on strike on June 25. The names of three are mentioned in the literature—Zremb (construction materials), Budimer (construction industry), and the Dairy Equipment Factories.46

Plock At 6:00 A.M., workers at the Mazowiecki Refinery and Petrochemical works went on strike. Individual departments chose representatives

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61

for a mass meeting at 10:00 A.M. At the meeting's conclusion some of the workers from Mazowiecki went out onto the street and then made their way to the building of the Regional Party Committee (KW PZPR) sometime in the late morning or early afternoon. They were joined by workers from the other large factory in town, an agricultural machinery plant, as well as workers from other plants. The marchers sang "We from razed villages, we from starving cities" (My ze spalonych wsi, my ze gfodujftcych miast), the Internationale, and patriotic songs. The crowd that formed outside the Regional Party Committee building also included many women with their children. During these early stages, the demonstration was very peaceful, except for the smashing of a few of the building's windows. 47 It was also reported that, during the course of the day, workers bid members of the armed forces to join the protest. 48 According to another report from Plock, workers at an unidentified factory, upon hearing about the price rises, gathered in front of the building that housed the director's office. They brought a red flag they had taken from the City PZPR Committee (MK PZPR) building. This group, consisting of older and skilled workers, tried to get information from the local party secretary and to make their opinion known to him. They decided to stop work until they received word from the Central Committee in Warsaw that the price rises were suspended. 49 At 8:00 P.M. at the demonstration outside the KW PZPR building, an announcement that the price rises had been revoked was made from a car with a loudspeaker mounted on it. The workers did not believe the announcement, and thus they refused to disperse. The demonstrators were surrounded by police units, not all of which were local. Some had apparently come from Zgierz, a suburb of Lodz approximately seventy kilometers away from Plock (under a different regional administration). Workers called for order in their ranks, fearing that a provocation might lead to violence. This, however, was not fully successful. There were reports that some of those present overturned a car and threw rocks at the KW PZPR building, and that one part of the crowd tried to force its way into the building. Eventually, some people from the city arrived and confirmed that they had seen Jaroszewicz's announcement of the withdrawal of the price rises on television. 50 Sometime after 8:00 P.M., as the demonstrators dispersed, the police moved in and arrested a number of people, including passersby coming home from the movies. By 9:00, the city was firmly under police control. 51 Later in the evening, about 200 teenagers began breaking store win-

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dows and stealing goods. As in the case of the similar incident in Radom, many people in Ptock were convinced that this was a provocation by the security forces. The police subsequently poured into town and arrested people who they claimed were responsible for the looting.52

Other Strikes In Grudzijidz, there were several strikes and work-stoppages. There was a day-long strike at Plant No. 1 of the Pomeranian Casting and Enameling Factory (POiE), and a POiE plant in the town of Mniszek near Grudzijtdz also went out for a few hours. A department in the Stomil Factory (rubber and tires) did the same for a few hours, and there were reports of scattered stoppages across the town. 53 Some details are available about what happened at POiE. In Mniszek, management successfully convinced the workers to resume production before Jaroszewicz's announcement on television. At Plant No. 1 in Grudzijidz the reasons for the strike were not only connected with the rise in food prices but also with a new piece rate structure. The action started around 7:00 A.M., when both the night and morning shifts were there. The workers said that they would accept the price rise in exchange for a restoration of the old pay scales. They declared a sit-in strike and waited for a reply from management. When the afternoon shift arrived, they also joined the strike. The action was welldisciplined and peaceful. The workers destroyed no property and even turned off the electricity when they stopped working. The occupation of the factory ended at 8:00 P.M. with the announcement of the withdrawal of the reform on television. The night shift resumed work around 10:00.54 In Lódz, a center of textile and clothing production and a strike center in January-February 1971, there were reports of work-stoppages in at least sixteen factories, and several workers were later dismissed. Patterns of strike activity differed from factory to factory. There was one common element, however: in no case did the strikes in Lódz move out of the factories and into the streets. In some enterprises management met with the whole crew and in others just with representatives of the crews. In other factories, lists of demands and grievances were drawn up, and in others, including the Fornalska Factory, a strike committee was elected.55 Details are also available about a strike in the Transformer and Trac-

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63

tion Apparatus Factory in Lódz. The workers halted production, and when no one in authority came to speak with them, they went to management. This resulted in a mass meeting with management in which representatives elected by the workers spoke. A transcript of the speech by Zdzislaw Bednarek, a representative of the assembly department, was later published in 1978. Bednarek spoke of how promised consultations with the working class had not been held, and he said that although workers had given their pledge to help the new ruling team in 1971, the situation had deteriorated. He recalled the events of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1971 and emphasized that workers wanted no repetition of the blood bath of 1970. He also maintained that workers wanted no return to capitalism, but instead wanted parliamentary democracy and free trade unions. Bednarek also demanded the bringing to account of those responsible for the present economic situation, and he appealed for rises in wages and payments to the lowest paid groups in society.56 In Szczecin, only the Gryfia repair shipyard went on strike, according to interviews conducted with the members of the city's Interfactory Strike Committee of 1980. 57 In Gryfino, a town to the south of Szczecin with a population of about 18,000, there was a strike on June 25 at the Dolna Odra Electric Power station. Almost the whole crew refused to work, and by 10:00 A.M., most of them had congregated in the machine hall of the mechanical department. The station manager first tried to convince them to return to work. When this failed, he attempted, also unsuccessfully, to get them to disperse to their departments. He told the workers that the situation in the country was peaceful, and that they were making a big mistake. At Dolna Odra, the workers chose a strike committee, but at the end of the shift at 3:00 P.M., many left the plant in obvious relief. At 3:30, the strike committee declared an occupation strike, and patrols were set up to maintain order. The head of the strike committee, Nowak, gave a speech to the crew, which was well received. 58 The authorities took steps to isolate Dolna Odra; most notably, it was taken off the communication network. During the strike, the workers continued to generate and transmit electrical power. Lacking information on the situation in the country, the strike committee sent representatives to shipyards in the area and listened to the radio. Eventually, they received news about the strikes in Radom and Ursus and learned that Prime Minister Jaroszewicz had revoked the price rises. They end-

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ed the strike at 8:10 P.M., singing the Internationale. As they returned home, they were greeted with great enthusiasm by the inhabitants of the town (ibid.). In Poznari, a four-hour work stoppage was reported at a roller bearings plant. 59 Strikes were also reported in Katowice, Pruszcz Gdariski, Elblfig, Opole, Olsztyn, Wroclaw, Radomsko, a truck factory in Starachowice (FSC), and two factories in Nowy Targ.60

Poststrike Repression The scope of the poststrike repression in 1976 was extensive. The party-state responded on several different levels. It staged a press and mass meeting campaign with the obvious intent of discrediting the strikers and painting a picture of solid popular support for the regime. There was continued repression of working-class communities that participated in the strikes. Punishments were meted out on three different levels—court trials, summary sentences handed out by misdemeanor tribunals, and dismissals from work. Lipski estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 workers were eventually dismissed in the aftermath of June 25. He also estimates that of the approximately 2,500 people detained on June 25 and the following days, 373 were sentenced by misdemeanor tribunals and approximately 500 faced criminal court proceedings. 61 However, official figures published in August 1976 reported only fifty-three sentences in connection with the June events. 62 Estimates made by the European Trade Union Confederation in Brussels put the total number arrested at 6,000, and the total number dismissed from work at 20,000. Other sources have estimated the number of people sentenced by misdemeanor tribunals at as high as 5,000. 63 Those dismissed from work were commonly denied new employment or offered only inferior jobs. Not surprisingly, such direct repression was most intensive in Radom and Ursus.

The Mass Meeting and Press Campaign Shortly after the immediate repression of the strike centers, Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member Edward Babiuch ordered the organization of mass meetings in support of the policies of the Gierek team in all provinces. 64 Meetings of this kind were held as early as June 27, 1976. 65 Large rallies and public demonstrations in support of

Workers I: Events of June 1976

65

the party-state were held in several cities, including Szczecin, Poznan, Kielce, Krakow, Warsaw, and Radom. 6 6 The harsh criticism of the strikers and the lavish praise of the party leaders that typified these meetings is illustrated below in excerpts from a speech made by Tadeusz Karwicki, the president of Radom: Comrades and Citizens! How Poland has reverberated far and wide for the last six days with support for the policies of the party and government, as well as for the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Comrade Edward Gierek, and for the prime minister, Comrade Piotr Jaroszewicz. As an inhabitant of this city, as its president, I must declare with sorrow and shame that these are words of bitterness and indignation, which unfortunately we deserve. Because each of us, as inhabitants of Radom, is morally responsible for the recent events and their causes. They began it, those for whom the dignity of Poland and the dignity of workers are empty phrases . . . The true face of those groups was revealed expressively before the building of the Regional Party Committee. Shame and disgrace to those inhabitants of Radom who actively supported [the demonstrations—MB], who warned them [the demonstrators—MB] of approaching police units as well as to those who threw stones from the balconies of houses at police functionaries restoring order and harmony. They will meet just punishment for that. . . In response to these acts,. . . the forces of order, who did not fear for their own lives, acted with uncommon restraint to restore peace and order in the city sometime around 11:00 P . M . 6 7 This speech was delivered at a rally in Radom on June 30, which was attended by people transported there from other cities. The rally in Warsaw was held on June 29 in the Ten Year Anniversary Stadium and was attended by bureaucrats and PZPR activists. 68 More detailed independent accounts are available of the official demonstrations held in Gdansk and Szczecin on June 28,1976. The report from Gdansk stressed that those chosen to participate were handpicked by the party, police, and state bureaucracy. The demonstrators consisted primarily of office workers, party members, and managers. Some of them had been bused in from out of town. The demonstrators marched down Dluga Street, which was crawling with police officers.

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When they reached the city's main square (Dlugi Targ) they were met by the laughter of bystanders and passersby. 69 The participants of the rally held that same day in Pogoni Stadium in Szczecin had been bused in from all over the province. In one case, railroad workers stalled a train carrying 1,000 people to the meeting from Starograd Szczeciñski. One hundred workers from the Dolna Odra power plant were forced to attend. 70 A campaign of letters and telegrams of support sent to Gierek and Jaroszewicz was also staged by the authorities. Telegrams of condemnation were sent to factories that had gone on strike. There is evidence that in some cases the management or party committees of factories which participated in this campaign did not even inform their workers that letters or telegrams were being sent. When the crew of a leather factory in Nowy Targ found out that such a letter had been sent on their behalf by the factory party committee, they staged a protest strike. The mass meetings, letter campaigns, and various antistrike pronouncements concocted by people in authority were covered extensively in the press. The actions of the striking workers were painted as the crazed deeds of drunkards, hooligans, brawlers, incorrigible troublemakers, malcontents, criminals, malingerers, etc. Later, during the trials, state prosecutors tried to characterize defendants in the same way. 71

Repression in Ursus For the first few weeks after the events in Ursus, arrests continued. Party members at the factory level helped the police to identify workers from photographs taken on June 25. On June 27, the police demanded picture identification cards from many tractor factory workers, and those they were able to identify were arrested. The police also visited private homes and asked the occupants to make identifications from photos of crowds. People who went to police stations in search of friends or relatives sometimes found themselves inexplicably incarcerated. In some cases people who had absolutely no involvement with the strike were arrested. 72 At the Ursus Tractor Factory, an announcement from the Factory PZPR Committee, management, the Factory Council and the Factory Office of the Socialist Union of Polish Youth was posted on June 28. It called on the crew to fulfill the production plan as "evidence that Ursus

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67

is an integral part of the Polish working class." On that same day, the Factory PZPR Committee's first secretary, Stanislaw Mackowski, gave a speech in which he blamed the trouble at the factory on "anarchists, brawlers, enemies of true working people, old malcontents, troublemakers, drunkards, provocateurs, and hooligans," who had misled the crew. He also claimed that the crew had approved the price hikes during consultations. 73 Ursus was one of the cities in which strikers were tried publicly in the courts. Reliable information is available on four trials with multiple defendants. Generally, however, the record on poststrike repression is fragmentary. The official press did not cover it comprehensively, and KOR was constrained by its small size at this time. Thus, the information presented below on Ursus and other cities should not be read as a comprehensive record. In mid-July 1976, seven workers were sentenced in the Warsaw Provincial Courts to terms of three to five years for damaging railroad equipment. Five of these were employees of the tractor factory. They ranged in age from 21 to 42 and had no previous convictions. They were permitted the counsel of only a state-appointed defense attorney. On September 27, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of their case and commuted their punishments to suspended sentences. 74 In August, another two groups of people, twelve in total, were tried in courts in Pruszkow (Warsaw province) for distribution of eggs and sugar in Ursus on June 25. They were given 1.5- to 5-year sentences (suspended) and at least five were given fines ranging from five to ten thousand zloty. One of these defendants was later able to win a reduction in sentence by appeal. Four others were unsuccessful in their appeal attempts. Three more Ursus workers were tried on December 29, 1976, for damaging railroad lines. Two were sentenced to 3-year prison terms, while one received only one year (suspended for three years).75 Two other Ursus workers were also tried and sentenced: Marek Majewski, nine years for obstructing railroad tracks, and Adam Zukowski, three years for illegal use of an electrical cart. The original date of their trial is unclear. On March 29,1977, they unsuccessfully appealed a lower court decision to the Supreme Court. The higher court refused to take into account the defendants' declaration that their confessions had been obtained by beatings. 76 According to data collected by KOR, of the estimated 500 people detained in Ursus, at least 112 received sentences of one sort or another. 77

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On the basis of the record of repression available, it seems that the vast majority of those punished were not tried by courts. Instead, their cases were heard by misdemeanor tribunals. On Sunday June 27, 1976, misdemeanor tribunals (kolegia orzekajjice) began trying workers arrested in Ursus on charges of "attacking policemen, disobeying orders to disperse, and destroying shops, railroad cars, and so on." Many were brought up on false charges based on bogus evidence. Police officers—not necessarily the arresting officers—randomly gave evidence. The defendants were denied counsel, and only police officers were admitted as witnesses. The conviction rate was one hundred percent. Punishments included fines of 1,500 to 5,000 ztoty (a month's pay or more for most workers), unpaid community-service work, and suspended prison sentences. Within 48 hours after the trials began, most of those arrested were released. 78 From July 4 to 6, workers previously convicted were summoned to appear at Police Headquarters in Ursus. From there they were transported to Warsaw for retrial because their sentences were deemed to be too lenient. Data collected by KOR on the numbers of workers from Ursus in prison in August 1976 suggest that approximately one hundred people were retried in this fashion. Almost all of them then received three-month sentences. Those who had been fined in earlier trials did not receive refunds. Thus, they were punished twice for the same alleged crime. The retrials did not conform to the procedures specified in the criminal code. Some workers were convicted of attacking police officers on the basis of written depositions, despite their denials. Others were convicted on the basis of unsigned entries in arrest logs. Testimony from "witnesses" who were not present at the arrest was also used to implicate the defendants. After sentencing, the defendants were imprisoned in Bialotgka prison. All legal appeals, including declarations that defendants had been beaten while in police custody, were ignored. After one month of imprisonment, approximately 40 workers were released on suspended sentences. 79 During the week following the strikes, the labor contracts of other arrested workers were unilaterally terminated by the Ursus Tractor Factory without the notice required by Article 51, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code. This statute gave management the right to fire workers if they were absent from work without permission, and it functioned in effect as an antistrike law. Others were fired on the basis of depositions written by police officers, managers, and informers or on the basis of

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69

identification from police photographs. Workers were dismissed because they were not at work for justified reasons (e.g., medical excuses or vacations), or because they had personal differences with their managers or supervisors. It was reported that eight hundred workers were fired on July 2 alone. Estimates of the total number of workers discharged run as high as 1750. 80

Repression in Radom Radom, the site of the most extensive disturbances, was also the site of the most severe campaign of repression. The city was not fully cleaned up until two days after the upheaval. Local rumors put the number of dead in the city at seventeen. Those who perished were buried secretly by the authorities on the night of June 26-27. The official death count was two, and both fatalities were attributed to crowd violence. 81 People continued to be arrested in Radom for three weeks after the strike. In this roundup, the police often arrested people with previous criminal records and charged them with crimes committed on June 25. 8 2 This served the regime's aim of painting the strikers as criminals. After June 29, the police began to arrest people on charges of looting. Often, the only evidence cited was the presence of some new possession in their homes. 8 3 While no mention was made of it in the official press, KOR investigations raised suspicions that the police committed at least three murders in Radom in the immediate poststrike period. At least one worker died of injuries sustained during a beating at the hands of the police. Another probable victim of police murder was Roman Kotlarz, a priest, who was seen giving unction to the dying on June 25 and was subsequently arrested on charges of blessing a demonstration. After his release, his cleaning lady found him beaten and unconscious in his ransacked room. He died on the way to the hospital. 84 On the night of June 29, Jan Brozyna was beaten to death on the streets in Radom. His wife produced witnesses who saw police officers brutally beat a man at the site where her fatally wounded husband was later found. 85 As in Ursus, there were both individual and multiple defendant court trials, as well as misdemeanor tribunal trials. KOR estimated that at least 261 sentences were handed down in Radom. 86 As in Ursus, many of these trials failed to observe civil procedure, rules of evidence, and judicial fairness. The regional court in Radom held more trials than

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the total number of defendants in its possession. Thus, it seems that some people were tried more than once for the same crime. 87 Many of the court-appointed defense lawyers were incompetent. At some proceedings, no defense counsel whatsoever was present because lawyers were not informed by the court of trial times. 88 Indictments and convictions were levied on the basis of the demonstrators' "collective responsibility" for harassing public officials, injuring police officers, or damaging public property. Miroslaw Chojecki, who observed several trials, reported that in such cases all that was needed for a conviction was proof that defendants were present at the demonstrations. Defendants claimed that much of the evidence presented at their trials was false or forged. 89 Police officers planted stolen property on suspects whom they had detained in order to charge them with robbery or looting. In separate trials, police officers gave evidence that would have put them in two places at the same time. 90 There were at least five trials with multiple defendants held in Radom during July and August. Sentences ran from two to ten years for the twenty six defendants tried in this fashion. Most were charged with collective responsibility for property damage or injuring police officers on June 25. In subsequent appeals a number of defendants received reductions or suspensions. 91 There were also at least 100 individual trials in Radom. These usually involved defendants accused of looting and yielded lighter sentences of a few months to a few years and/or fines ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 zloty.92 As in Ursus some of those tried in Radom were later retried. Some defendants, originally sentenced to short terms of imprisonment (two or three months), received higher sentences (as high as four years) when retried. 93 In Radom, misdemeanor tribunals tried a host of alleged lesser crimes. Beginning June 28, five tribunals sat in judgment, each hearing around seven hundred cases per day. By July 4, some 5,000 people had been tried. The most common penalties were three-month jail terms and fines between 2,000 and 5,000 zloty.94 There were reputed to be a large number of firings in Radom, as well. There were rumors that particular factories even received firing quotas. The workforce at Walter was among the hardest hit. 95

Repression in Other Cities At the Mazowiecki Factory in Plock, some fifty-five workers were detained. Between ten and twenty of them were sentenced by misde-

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71

meanor tribunals. At least two and perhaps as many as five were sentenced to three years' imprisonment. On June 26, management declared a twelve-hour work day to make up for time lost during the strike. While KOR was later able to locate twenty-three workers in Plock who had been dismissed for strike activity, it estimated the total number dismissed from Mazowiecki alone at "several tens." 96 As a result of the protest strike in Nowy Targ over the antistrike letter sent by the factory party committee, between 100 and 300 workers were dismissed. 97 In Gdansk, there were reports of dismissals at the Lenin Shipyard, Budimer, the Dairy Equipment Factories, and Zremb. 9 8 The number dismissed at the Lenin Shipyard was estimated between 200 and 400. Two shipyard workers, Stefan Krajcarz and Jan Mroczka, were tried on charges of disrupting production. They were sentenced to 1.5- and 1-year imprisonment respectively, but their sentences were eventually suspended. Dismissals were also reported in nearby Pruszcz Gdañski. 99 In Warsaw, dismissals were reported in four factories. Some 200 were fired from the General Swierczewski Precision Instruments Factory. At Zelmot, 30 workers who refused to work overtime to make up for time lost on June 25 were also dismissed. There were dismissals at Polish Optical and Kasprzak as well. 100 Reports on fourteen plants in Lódz put the total number of workers fired at approximately 300.101 There was an unspecified number of dismissals in Szczecin, and at the Dolna Odra Power Plant in Gryfino, at least 24 workers, including the leader of the strike committee, were dismissed. Several of the railroad workers who stalled a train from Starograd Szczeciñski on June 28 also lost their jobs. 102 At the Pomeranian Casting and Enameling Factory in Grudzifidz, 43 workers were dismissed. In Poznañ, 8 firings were reported at the ball bearing factory that had gone on strike. At the FSC Truck Plant in Starachowice, between 199 and 300 workers were dismissed. Finally, an unspecified number of workers were reported to have lost their jobs in Wroclaw and Bialystok. 103 Many of the strikes started in large factories among highly paid, skilled workers (e.g., Walter, Ursus Tractor, Pomeranian Casting and Enameling, the shipyards in Szczecin, Gdansk and Gdynia, Mazowiecki Petrochemical, etc.). One possible explanation is that the reform package was perceived as strongly prejudicial to the economic interests of these workers. After all, the wage compensation compo-

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nent of the reform gave greater raises in percentage terms to lower-paid groups. However, there is little evidence to suggest that lower-paid groups favored the price reform or abstained from taking action. The evidence, particularly from Radom, suggests in fact that all strata of workers violently rejected the price reform package. Rather, this seems to be another case where skilled workers concentrated in large factories proved to be the fragment of the working class most capable of pressing grievances by strike action. Labor history abounds with such examples—the Putilov Works in Russia, Skoda workers in Bohemia, the Berlin metal workers in 1918, or the production line workers organized by the CIO in the United States, to name a few. Large factory shops are much more conducive to stopping production and publicizing it. Furthermore, workers there, by dint of their sheer mass, seem more conscious of their power and more easily put together the critical mass needed to take strikes out onto the street. The strikes of June 1976 also shed light on the political development of the Polish working class. The mobilization of workers on June 25, 1976, was directed toward the immediate issue of preventing the price rises. References to "dictatorship" in Gdansk, slogans painted on the KW PZPR building in Radom, the burning of party cards in Radom, and distribution of meat marked for export to the USSR and Western Europe implicitly linked economic grievances to questions of political power. However, despite the integration of political content into strike actions, immediate demobilization in response to the announcement that the price increases had been withdrawn indicates that workers were not prepared to confront the political causes of their discontent. They also avoided articulating demands for political change that would have addressed these issues. The lone exception to this, Bednarek's speech in Lodz, seems to be an isolated example. In this sense, the strikes of 1976 were dominated by immediate economic concerns. This contrasts with the events of both 1970-71 104 and 1980, when economic grievances precipitated protests with much broader, programmatic political and social content. Thus, 1976 was a step backward for workers in terms of their readiness to express political demands. However, the situation changed in the period between 1976 and 1980, when workers gained substantial experience in defending their interests, in publishing their own newspapers and leaflets, and in creating their own organizational networks in Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions and in connection with

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the underground newspaper Robotnik (The Worker). This experience will be explored in greater detail in chapter 7. Unlike the strikes of 1970-71, which were largely confined to the areas of the Baltic coast and Lodz, this strike wave had a truly national character. While not as geographically extensive or as numerous as the actions of 1980, the strike centers were spread across the country. This indicates that between 1970 and 1976, the idea that unilaterally imposed price increases were unjust became more widespread among Polish workers. There is also evidence of a greater awareness of working-class history and past experience among the workers and that this shaped the fashion in which they acted. For example, in certain cases there was an evident reluctance to elect strike committees for fear that their members would be victimized. This concern was explicitly voiced in Radom in exchanges between Adamczyk and the demonstrators. It was also implicit in the refusal of the Gdansk workers to negotiate in their departments, where they could be more easily identified. There were exceptions, however—at the Mazowiecki Petrochemical Works, at Dolna Odra, and among the strikers in Lodz. Nevertheless, the particular case of Lodz, is explainable by reference to its unique experience in February 1971. While the Baltic coast workers' strikes and meetings with party authorities had failed to secure a reversal of the December 1970 price rises, the actions of the Lodz workers had led to a meeting with Prime Minister Jaroszewicz and other high-ranking officials that brought about the rescission of the price hikes. We cannot be certain in all cases where strike committees were not elected that this stemmed from consciousness of the Baltic experiences of 1970-71 rather than "heat of the moment" militancy or inexperience. However, in some cases, the effect of historical lessons is evident in the decision to avoid electing representatives. The symbolic forms of action utilized by workers in 1976 also provide evidence of an absence of a unified sense of worker identity. Radom presents the most striking examples of the juxtaposition of the seemingly contradictory symbols of Polish nationalism and communism. Workers sang both the Internationale and the Polish national anthem while marching. Some marched under the red flag, while others tore it down, trampled it, and ran up the national flag. Such evidence leads to the conclusion that in 1976 there was still no consensus within working-class political culture with regard to the appropriate symbols

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to utilize in calls for mobilization and the expression of grievances. It also indicates confusion in class-wide attribution of meaning to these symbols. There is no clear evidence as to whether this reflected a fractured identity (i.e., worker or Pole?), or whether it was produced by structural factors, such as the lack of opportunity for local workingclass communities and strike centers to communicate. Here too, between 1976 and 1980 a major change was to take place. Polish workers would firmly identify themselves as both "worker" and "Pole" in the Solidarity period. Finally, in consideration of the party-state's response to the strikes, the ban on the use of firearms, for one, was a very intelligent decision. Obviously, Gierek's team had learned something from the experience of 1970. Although those killed on the coast would later become martyrs for the members of the Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions and for Solidarity, their symbolic importance is attested to by the monument at Gate 2 of the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk—the repression of the June events did not produce a symbol of such emotional importance. Keeping the army out of the suppression of disturbances was also a wise move. First of all, the army had performed poorly on the coast in 1970. There is evidence to suggest that substantial units disintegrated as effective fighting forces. 105 Thus in the case of 1976, the army was spared another potentially damaging test. Second, its employment could have undermined the favorable reputation the army enjoyed despite its participation in the massacres on the Baltic coast in 1970. It is interesting to note that workers in Plock felt that they could ask army units to come over to their side, and that the army was positively perceived by Poles in the Solidarity period. The security forces were efficient in dealing with the disturbances. They were able to mobilize quickly and were outfitted with effective and modern equipment. The tactics used in Radom (e.g., the hedgehog) and Ursus (e.g., the use of the phosphorizing agents to mark worker leaders and militant strikers) indicate that at least some of the forces were well-trained and capable of using highly sophisticated methods. The ZOMO, who do not seem to have played a significant role in 1970-71, 106 stood out as a highly specialized force, trained to deal specifically with such situations. Their introduction in 1976 was the first test of their utility as a force of domestic repression on a mass scale.

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Despite their effectiveness, the security forces particularly in Radom, Ursus, and Plock, showed unfortunate tendencies to use excessive and unnecessary violence, particularly in the handling of the arrested and by indiscriminately arresting people. In Radom, the security forces may actually have escalated the process of disorder and destruction. The ZOMO attack on the crowd outside the KW PZPR building may well have spurred workers to set the building on fire, and the smashing of shop windows, possibly by security agents, increased the amount of damage done to the city. With regard to long-term political stability, the brutal treatment of those arrested and their subsequent treatment by the courts not only alienated the victims but created sympathizers who were outraged by these practices. In the chapters that follow, I will discuss the effects of these actions on Polish politics in the ensuing years.

4

Enter the Intellectuals: KOR (Workers' Defense Committee)

Socialism may not be decreed. It is and may only be born of the free action of free people. Hope is awakened by the fact that after thirty years of the political practices I have endeavored to describe here, there are still people who have the courage to think and act. I am deeply convinced that the movement of revival shall gain in strength, and that the recently intensifying repression will not contain it much longer, even though this repression is very dangerous to society and the cause of socialism. —Edward Lipinski, in a letter to Edward Gierek.

The Birth of KOR In September 1976, fourteen Polish intellectuals, most of them living in Warsaw, publicly announced the foundation of the Committee for the Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow, or KOR), an organization devoted to assisting those repressed by the party-state in June 1976. At the time, it would have seemed foolish to expect that in just four years KOR would become a full-fledged national opposition movement. It also would have been difficult to foresee that the committee would soon be joined by a number of other independent organizations, some of whom competed with KOR. By the time of Solidarity's formation in 1980, more than twenty different oppositional committees or associations had come into existence in Poland. Their activity was accompanied by the rise of an underground (bibula) press and publishing movement that produced oppositional newspapers and magazines, independent journals, and banned books. These accomplishments are all the more remarkable in light of the constant harassment of the opposition by the police and security apparatus. 1

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Foundation The repression that followed the strikes and disturbances of June 1976 provoked a strong reaction on the part of the Polish intelligentsia and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. As early as July, the primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyriski, expressed his disapproval of the state's treatment of the workers in a letter to the government: " T h e workers who partook in the protests should have their rights and their social and professional positions restored; the injuries they suffered should be compensated; and those w h o have been sentenced should be amnestied." In this same letter the cardinal also called on the government to respect the rights of all Poles and to open a dialogue with society. 2 Party-state repression of workers also met with a strong response from Polish intellectuals, motivated by feelings of moral outrage. Stanistaw Barariczak, for example, described how the injustices perpetrated by the authorities compelled intellectuals like himself to take action to defend the workers. 3 The recollections of Miroslaw Chojecki and Adam Michnik also confirm that this spontaneous moral impulse to help the repressed was the impetus behind the formation of the committee. 4 This shared sense of moral outrage brought together various preexisting circles of intellectuals. Each of these circles were based on shared experience, but were by no means exclusive. Their memberships often overlapped across political, generational, professional, and personal lines. Lipski mentions several of these subgroups including participants in reformist institutions of the mid-1950s (e.g., the Club of the Crooked Circle and Po Prostu), former revisionist writers and scholars, members of the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) and the independent Catholic press, student activists from 1968, Scout activists, Catholic social activists from universities in Lublin and Gdansk, former members of the Ruch group, members of the so-called "Tatarnicy" (a group of young people w h o smuggled Polish emigre publications into Czechoslovakia and then across the Tatra mountains in the early 1970s), and student activists w h o had opposed the merger of the noncommunist Association of Polish Students with the Union of Young Socialists in the early 1970s. 5 An important subgroup, which Lipski does not mention, is that a large number of the committee's older members had been activists in the prewar Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and/or soldiers in the underground H o m e Army (AK). A notable example was

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Antoni Pajdak, who had been a socialist member of the Home Council of Ministers of Poland's wartime underground parliament, the Council of National Unity.6 Somehow these subgroups, through a series of mutual acquaintances, friendships, and joint concerns managed to come together to form KOR. Some of these contacts were established when the authorities proposed revisions to the Polish constitution in late 1975. Three proposals in particular caused consternation within intellectual circles. Two of these new statutes would have constitutionally enshrined the SovietPolish alliance and the leading role of the PZPR. Another proposed revision would have linked civil rights to the fulfillment of duties to the state. Subsequently, a series of open letters on constitutional questions appeared, e.g., Letter of the 59, Letter of the Fourteen, Memorandum of the 101, a demand from twenty citizens from Lodz for a referendum on the changes, a letter from 92 students to the speaker of the Sejm, and a number of memoranda and letters from lay Catholic circles. A majority of the signers would later participate in the KOR movement or in independent publishing or educational institutions linked to KOR.7 The Church also made its position on the amendments clear. An important statement on this issue was made by Cardinal Wyszyriski in a sermon at Warsaw's Holy Cross Church. He argued that all human beings, irrespective of their contribution to society, merit full human and civil rights. The episcopate also issued a statement in March 1976, in which it called on the government to cease its harassment of those who had expressed their views on the constitution. 8 The combination of the open letter campaign and the public airing of the Church's views resulted in a qualified success. The three controversial statutes were toned down. The rhetoric of an "inviolable fraternal bond" with the USSR was replaced by vaguer talk of strengthening "friendship and cooperation" with the Soviet Union and socialist bloc. The party was mentioned in the constitution merely as "the guiding force in the construction of socialism," and while citizens were encouraged to fulfill their duties, this was no longer coupled to their civil rights. In this revised form, the changes were ratified by the Sejm on February 10,1976, with only one independent Catholic deputy abstaining-9 The idea of institutionalizing the intelligentsia's support for the workers has been attributed by Lipski to Jacek Kuron and Antoni Macierewicz, both of whom were founding members of KOR. Preparatory

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work was done sometime in early July 1976 at a meeting held in Laski (a village west-northwest of Warsaw), at a house where Adam Michnik was working on his book Kosciol, lewica, dialog (The Church, the Left, a Dialogue). Although the formal declaration of KOR's foundation did not occur until the following September, by the time of the first trial of Ursus workers in Leszno courthouse on July 17, 1976, a consensus to form a committee had been reached and work was already underway. 10 The activists involved at this early stage concentrated on two actions. The first was the provision of medical, financial, and legal assistance to the victimized workers and their families. The second was to publicize workers' situation through a series of open letters and manifestos. KOR's public activity began at that first trial of Ursus workers. Among those in attendance were Kurori, Macierewicz, and Lipski, who had brought along money from lay Catholic sources. The police kept a close eye on them, making contact with the families of the workers difficult. However, contact between the activists and workers' families was established when Malgorzata Lukaszewiczowna expressed sympathy for their plight. This led to a discussion of how to get competent legal assistance at a price that would not be a financial burden. That day, Jan Olszewski, a lawyer with a history of assisting dissidents, took over the defense of one of the workers. The money brought by Lipski was given to the families of the workers on trial and Piotr Naimski arranged for boy scouts in his troop to take care of workers' children during the trials. 11 The assistance work in Ursus was carried out chiefly by scouts and their leaders and by Warsaw KIK affiliates, led by Henryk Wujec. They collected information, distributed financial assistance, and contacted doctors and lawyers (doctors were necessary because those fired had lost their access to free medical care). 12 By August 25, 1976, KOR had helped or planned to help some fifty-four people from Ursus. Of these, forty-eight had been fired from their jobs and six of them still had not found new work. Thirteen of them had been sentenced, and eleven were still under arrest and in detention. 13 Similar work in Radom did not begin until early September. The Radom team included Zofia and Zbigniew Romaszewski, Krystyna and Stefan Starczewski, and Mirostaw Chojecki, who acted as its director. The Romaszewskis replaced Chojecki when he began to devote his time to creating an underground publishing house. 14 In August 1976, a

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group of young lay Catholic activists from Gdansk began raising money for the workers of Radom. In the middle of September, one of them, Bogdan Borusewicz, encountered the Warsaw activists by chance in Radom. Because of this meeting and others, he would later become a member of KOR. This was the beginning of links between Gdansk and Warsaw.15 Money to assist the workers was first collected in dissident and intellectual circles in Warsaw, but the work quickly spread to the rest of the country. Eventually two overseas committees began collecting money for the assistance efforts. One (the Raczyriski Committee) concentrated on collecting money from Polish emigres, and another committee, led by Leszek Kolakowski, concentrated on raising money from Western intellectuals. Important contributions were also made by Western trade unions. Later, the emigre journal Kultura, published in Paris, played an important role in funneling Western support to KOR and the opposition in general. 16 Another important source of KOR's funding was individual parish priests, who collected money and turned it over to individual KOR members, sometimes without the knowledge of their Church superiors. 17 The initial attempts of the intellectuals to provide publicity for the plight of the workers was conducted via an open letter campaign, similar to the one waged against the proposed changes in the constitution. This remained the primary method of providing publicity, until a underground press was launched after the foundation of KOR. The first of these open letters, issued directly after the June events, "The Declaration of the 14 in Solidarity with the Workers," was sent to the Sejm. The Declaration of the 14 called for several steps to solve Poland's social problems, including dialogue between the party and the people, as well as the expansion of civil liberties, including freedom of association and the press. It characterized the situation as dangerous and urgently called for the "establishment of real representation of the workers," since the official trade union council (CRZZ) had shown itself incapable of fulfilling this role during the June events. 18 All fourteen signers of the declaration had signed the Letter of the 59 on the constitution and later became involved with KOR on different levels. 19 The Declaration of the 14 was followed by two declarations from younger Warsaw activists. The first, "The Declaration of 15 in Solidarity with the Workers," was made by young members of the Warsaw

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intelligentsia. Its signers included future KOR members, such as Blumsztajn, Celinski, Lityriski, and Macierewicz, as well other younger intellectuals who were participating in the relief efforts or would later become involved in the KOR movement. The second, "The Declaration of Warsaw Students and Graduates," was signed by twenty-one people, many of whom were already involved in helping the workers and would later play important roles in the extended KOR milieu, including founding an independent student organization in Warsaw.20 Sometime in early to mid-July (sources vary as to the date of its writing), Jacek Kurori, who had been performing army reserve service (see chapter 3), wrote a letter to the leader of the Italian Communist party, Enrico Berlinguer, in the hope that the PCI could obtain an amnesty for the persecuted Polish workers. On July 20, 1976, Unita, the PCI newspaper, reported that its Central Committee had sent a letter to the Central Committee of PZPR calling for it to exercise "restraint" in the matter. 21 Another personal appeal was written by a future founding member of KOR, the novelist Jerzy Andrzejewski. Entitled "To the Persecuted Participants of the Workers' Protest," it contained the following: There are people in Poland who are immune to deception and hypocrisy and have preserved their ability to discern truth from falsehood and who see in you, the persecuted workers, not only spokesmen for an immediate and specific cause, but, above all, fighters for true socialist democracy and for social liberty, without which all freedom perishes and deceitful cliches reign over public life, the nation is in danger, [and] the life of individuals is stifled.22 On the same day as Andrzejewski's open letter, thirteen intellectuals issued an appeal in protest of the sentencing of seven workers to as much as five years' imprisonment by a court in Ursus. The "Appeal of the 13" asserted that the trial had violated standards of civil procedure, and it condemned the trials in Radom, as well. The appeal reminded the authorities that it was not "hooliganism" to contest "unjust" policies and protested both police brutality and punitive firings. As with the other letters above, the signatories included future KOR members (Barariczak, Lipski, Michnik, Mikolajska, Lipinski, and Zieja) and a number of important writers and academics who would later become directly associated with KOR or with independent initiatives

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close to it. The Appeal was published in Liberation in Paris and specifically appealed to Western intellectuals to lend their support to the Polish workers. 23 By early September 1976, the assistance movement began to pick up steam. Relief operations began in Radom, and the movement was attracting new participants. Talk of formalizing a committee had been going on since July. Kuron, who was still doing army reserve service at the time, was strongly in favor of the idea and encouraged Lipski to take the necessary steps. 24 A preliminary meeting was held on September 4 in Edward Lipiriski's apartment. Of the approximately twenty people who participated, most were from the older generation of KOR activists, with the exception of Macierewicz, Naimski, and Chojecki who represented the younger generation. The meeting yielded no concrete results. Those in attendance favored prudence and did nothing further than to name a preliminary commission to study the formation of a committee, consisting of Aniela Steinsbergowa, Jozef Rybicki, Ludwik Cohn and possibly some others. (Ibid.) At this time however, the police attacks in response to the relief effort in Radom changed the situation. On September 16, relief workers were detained after attending a trial. The worst treatment was received by Ludwik Dorn, who was verbally abused for being Jewish and beaten about the mouth until he lost consciousness. The young people involved in the relief efforts, many of whom were highly encouraged by the September 10 statement of the episcopate (see note 3), demanded the formalization of a committee and threatened to form their own if their elders hesitated. This seems to have convinced the older activists that the formation should proceed quickly, so that a formal committee could shield the younger activists from police persecution. (Ibid.) On September 23, 1976, another meeting was held, and fourteen of those present (for details on the original fourteen see the appendix to this chapter) signed the draft of the "Appeal to Society and the Authorities of the Polish People's Republic." The name, Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Workers' Defense Committee), was suggested, most probably by Macierewicz, and thus KOR was born. KOR decided to choose mostly older people with social standing for official membership, so that the authorities would exercise restraint in dealing with the committee and its unknown younger activists. 25 According to Lipski, KOR's foundation involved several important "understandings."

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First, the committee's activity was to be based on moral and ethical rather than political grounds. However, it was understood that going public would be viewed by the authorities as a political act. Second, the committee and its membership were to be publicly known. This was considered important if the inertia of fear in Polish society was to be overcome. Third, the committee's activities were to be legal. Fourth, as an organization, KOR was to have one formal characteristic—membership. It would have no statutes, officers, or dues. 2 6 The "Appeal to Society and the Authorities of the Polish People's Republic" was sent to the Speaker of the Sejm, along with a cover letter from KOR member, Jerzy Andrzejewski. The letter informed the Speaker of KOR's desire to inform the ruling authorities of its formation and to encourage the Sejm to consider an appeal for amnesty for the workers. 27 This appeal supported the workers' protest of the price reform as "expressing . . . the attitude of virtually the whole population . . ." and decried the physical brutality and legal irregularities by which the workers had been repressed. The signatories explained their reasons for forming the committee: The victims of the current bout of repressions cannot hope to obtain aid and protection from the institutions formed to provide them . . . In this situation the task must be taken over by the community at large, in whose interests the victimized workers came out, since our society has no means of defending itself against unlawfulness other than by solidarity and mutual help. It is for this reason that the undersigned have formed a Workers' Defense Committee with the purpose of initiating all forms of defense and help. Financial, medical, and legal aid is essential. Full information concerning the victimization is no less important. It is our conviction that only the public exposure of the conduct of the authorities can provide an effective means of defense. For this reason we ask, among other things, that all who have been subjected to victimization or know of such cases, pass on the relevant information to members of the committee. 28 It should be noted that, even at this early stage, KOR began to employ the tactic of connecting aid with publicity in order to create more effective forms of social self-defense. The appeal continued with a call for society to organize itself and provide assistance to victims of repression. The committee couched its

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call for amnesty and reemployment of dismissed workers as a statement of support for the Resolution of the Conference of the Episcopate. It ended with a general appeal for people to support these demands. 2 9 The official response to the committee was not encouraging. O n September 25, Andrzejewski received a letter from the director of the Office of Proceedings of the Sejm, which read: " O n the recommendation of the Speaker of the Sejm, I return to you the letter directed to His hand as well as the attached text of the so-called Appeal. The text is not suitable for examination either from a formal legal point of view or on the basis of its content." 3 0 It would seem that in the earliest stages of the committee's existence, the authorities decided to publicly ignore it, while interfering in the work of the activists engaged in assistance. Despite this rebuff, KOR continued to press on with its efforts and, as we shall see, grew and achieved a considerable measure of success.

Membership and Organization The members of KOR openly identified themselves in the bibula publication Komunikat (Communique). They also listed their addresses and phone n u m b e r s to facilitate contact. O n e m o n t h after the committee's formation, its membership expanded from fourteen to eighteen. Between November 1976 a n d June 1977 the committee's membership reached its largest during the workers' amnesty struggle—twentyfive. 31 By this time, eight n e w members had been listed on Komunikat. However, Wojciech Ziembiriski resigned because he had become a member of the Movement for the Defense of H u m a n and Civil Rights (ROPCiO). 32 Later, with the transformation of KOR into the Social SelfDefense Committee "KOR," two other members, Emil Morgiewicz and Stefan Kaczorski, resigned f r o m the committee because of differences with the n e w and broader programmatic statement that accompanied this change. 3 3 In terms of its composition, all of KOR's members were intellectuals. Nevertheless, their backgrounds were diverse. The committee included seven social scientists and historians, four writers or poets, three educators of one sort or another, three lawyers, two physical scientists, two priests, two journalists, a performing artist, an academic in the humanities, a n d an agronomist. The diverse backgrounds a n d occupations of its members allowed

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KOR to draw upon a broad selection of skills, and this undoubtedly contributed to the group's success. The underground organizational experience of the Home Army veterans was adapted to fit the situation of Poland in the late 1970s.34 The lawyers were able to provide legal expertise on the technical aspects of the prosecution of the workers and on state actions taken against the committee. The journalists, as well as Zawadzki (once head of a publishing collective), had important skills that allowed the group to assemble underground journals "from scratch." In fact, in examining these publications, the great talent and diversity of the group becomes obvious. In the same journal, for example, it is possible to read very technical explications of the legal code and political appeals that verge on the poetic. KOR's members were concentrated in Warsaw; twenty-one of them lived there. However, the group's activities extended beyond the Warsaw area as well. This meant that members or activists often had to travel and to rely upon a network of local supporters in order to operate. KOR had members in three other major cities—Barariczak in Poznan, Borusewicz in the Tri-City area (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot), and Sreniowski in Lodz. Two other members, Rybicki and Father Kaminski, lived in the town of Milanowek near Warsaw. KOR spanned at least two political generations—those who had come to political maturity in the interwar period and those who did so under the communist regime. The first group constituted the majority of the committee. It included Andrzejewski, Cohn, Lipski, Lipinski, Pajdak, Rybicki, Steinsbergowa, Szczypiorski, Zieja, Ziembinski, Kaczorski, Kielanowski, and Kaminski. This group was of an age that, with exceptions, precluded movement-style political activism. Thus, younger members of the committee had to rely on the support of a network of activists who were not committee members. Of the members of the older generation, nine had participated in the noncommunist resistance to the Nazi occupation, five had been active in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in the interwar period, and four had been political prisoners at one time or another in their lives. Since many of these members were well past the age of activism, their membership on the committee served two other purposes. First, as individuals of stature and great respect in Poland, they lent the committee an immediate moral legitimacy. Second, this stature provided a defensive shield, making the destruction of the committee (something well within the power of the party-state) a politically costly proposition. To im-

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prison people of such renown would have caused a political scandal with possible international repercussions. In the event of a round-up of the younger members, these people would have remained free to organize an amnesty campaign with the assistance of the network of activists. The second generation included the committee's leading activists and theorists (e.g., Borusewicz, Chojecki, Macierewicz, Michnik, Naimski, Onyszkiewicz, Sreniowski). Six of them were participants in the student movement of the 1960s, at least three of whom were imprisoned when it was smashed in 1968-69. Kuron, several years older than the rest, was one of the movement's mentors (his first imprisonment preceded that of the others; however, he was again imprisoned with them in 1968). Michnik had been one of the student movement's most visible leaders. At least five of the members of this generation were active in the Polish scouts, which have a unique history for a group of this sort. During the Nazi occupation, the scouts carried out several skillful assassinations of collaborators and German officials. Many of the activists of the student movement in the 1960s seem to have learned useful organizing skills as a result of their participation in it. Jacek Kuron, moreover, had been Adam Michnik's scoutmaster in the 1950s.35 The first political contacts between these two generations occurred in the 1960s, during the collaboration between the student movement and revisionist intellectuals. In 1964, Lipiriski had been one of the organizers of the famous Letter of the 34 attacking censorship. 36 Many KOR members had previously been participants in or had contact with the Club of the Crooked Circle, an unofficial discussion group of which Lipski was president and through which Michnik first entered the Polish intellectual scene. Kuron had been a major target of the authorities' attacks on the dissident intelligentsia. For the second political generation in KOR, the crushing of revisionism had been a first opportunity to become acquainted with the Polish prison system. Having established that KOR's formal membership was small and composed primarily of people beyond the age of political activism necessary for a social movement, a discussion of its network of supporters is in order. This network can be divided into two types of participants: activists and sympathizers. The activists carried out a broad range of activities—organizing open letters, leading public protests, collecting money and information, writing for and distributing the underground

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press, conducting actions in cities other than Warsaw, and attending the trials of workers. Additionally, there were doctors and lawyers who put their careers on the line by providing legal and medical aid to the workers. After the first year of the committee's existence, one observer, Oliver MacDonald, put the number of activists in the hundreds. 3 7 During the same period, Radio Free Europe estimated their number at about one thousand. 3 8 Some activists named in KOR reports on state repression later joined the committee (e.g., Lityñski, Blumsztajn, Wujec). This group consisted of many young people, especially university students. The involvement of sympathizers was obviously less intensive that that of the activists. Sympathizers read bibula, supplied money and information, and went to public protests. MacDonald put the number of these people in the thousands. 3 9 As the opposition grew, many of these people became activists. Following an intense campaign of state repression in late April 1977 (see chapter 5 for more details) and the death of KOR activist Stanislaw Pyjas while in police custody in May 1977, the committee decided to increase the scope of its assistance to victims to encompass general violations of human rights. To do this, it created a permanent structure, the "Intervention Bureau," to handle the large number of cases that had come to its attention. 40 KOR described its functions in this fashion: "It will collect data on the violation of human and civil rights in order to inform public opinion. If it is possible, it will also seek to give aid to those wronged by factory policy, trade unions, the state apparatus, the police, the security service, and the courts. Where it is possible, legal help will be given, where it is necessary—medical help, and where it is absolutely indispensable—financial." 41 The Intervention Bureau was directed throughout its existence by Zbigniew and Zofia Romaszewski, veterans of the Radom relief action. 42 Also in the spring of 1977, a Fund for Self-Defense was established to manage and distribute the funds that KOR had at its disposal. It was supervised by several members of the committee, including Kielanowski, Lipiñski, Lipski, Rybicki, Mikolajska, Zawadzki, and Zieja. 43 KOR also created an editorial board to oversee the publication of official KOR statements in the periods between committee meetings. According to Lipski, it was initially composed of himself, Cohn, Lipiñski, Macierewicz, Michnik, Naimski, Rybicki, Steinsbergowa, and Szczypiorski.

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All KOR members had a right to participate in its meetings. The existence of the editorial board and its membership was not publicly disclosed during the 1970s.44 During the period of the amnesty struggle, KOR not only forged the organizational tools that help to account for its success, but also developed an innovative strategy to guide it in its struggles with the partystate. This strategy, "New Evolutionism," is the subject of the following section.

Theorizing Opposition: New Evolutionism as a Strategy for Transforming the Polish Political System In his insider account of KOR, Jan Jozef Lipski downplays any common political stance within the committee other than "a desire for democracy and sovereignty in Poland." He also disassociates the political writings of members such as Kuron, Michnik, and Macierewicz from the committee's activity. While the documents used to discuss KOR's strategy in this section are largely authored by Michnik and Kuron, they reflect directly on the committee's activity. Despite Lipski's claim, they represent the fullest programmatic statement of what he calls, "the long-term goal of KOR" —i.e., "to assist the emergence of new centers of activity which would be independent of KOR." 45 A comparison of the programmatic writings of Michnik and Kuron with the "Declaration of the Democratic Movement" demonstrates just how influential these writings were in the KOR milieu.46 As noted earlier, the intellectual origins and earlier sympathies of many KOR members had been with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and with the humanist, revisionist Marxists of the 1960s.47 The political and social programs discussed below, while still marked by some continuities with these traditions (e.g., Ed ward Abramowski's thought on cooperatives), were no longer confined to a Marxian conceptual framework. They incorporated liberal and syndicalist concepts such as rights or self-management, and downplayed eschatological visions. Instead, they concentrated on framing a realistic program of action intended to slowly and partially transform the communist system in Poland. Indeed, for Kuron, the promulgation of a program of action was a necessity. Poland was beset by a grave economic, political, and social crisis. Food and energy shortages proved that the economic system was in serious need of reform. After the strikes of 1976, Kuron specu-

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lated that the security forces were no longer firmly under party control.48 The government had ignored the situation for too long. Not only did it bar discussion of the crisis, but it did not even acknowledge its existence. Instead, the press reported that all was well, that policy was successful, and that people were fully behind the party. In Kurori's estimation, this failure to squarely face Poland's problems meant that the situation was becoming quite dangerous. After all, an angry people had brought the government to a state of paralysis. Such a situation compelled the opposition to take responsibility for improving the situation. A program of fundamental economic, political, and social reforms was necessary to prevent an even graver crisis. The problems would not go away, for they were inherent to the system of government itself.49 KOR paid close attention to the failure of two liberalization strategies that had failed in the aftermath of de-Stalinization: revisionism and neo-positivism. Michnik described revisionism's attempt to reform the system as unfaithful to the "church" (the USSR), but true to the "scripture" (Marxism). Its success hinged on "liberals" coming to power within the Polish United Workers' Party and enacting a program of "enlightened socialist absolutism." 50 Michnik acknowledged that revisionism had two very positive effects. First, it had mobilized the intelligentsia in an attempt to change the political orientation of the party. Second, revisionist works of literature, art, and scholarship were of lasting importance for "propagating persecuted ideas and defending truth and humanistic values." However, in Michnik's assessment, the revisionist struggle within the party had ended in complete political failure, due to the weakness of the liberal wing of the party. The few outspoken revisionists were easily isolated within a hostile party and handily defeated. By 1968, any and all bonds between the party apparatus and the revisionist intelligentsia had been severed (pp. 268-69). Michnik also criticized the strategy of neo-positivism, which was an attempt to alter the system through the participation of Znak (Sign), a lay Catholic group, in the Polish Sejm. Znak saw itself as an oppositional core that could lead Poland to independence under favorable conditions, such as the internal disintegration of the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc as a whole. Until that became possible, Znak sought to cooperate with the authorities on pragmatic policies that held out the prospect for either greater Polish independence from the USSR or the

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extension of civil liberties. It also acted as a liaison between the church and the state. Neo-positivism, unlike revisionism, had been loyal to the Soviet "church" but had disdained the Marxist "scripture" (pp. 267-68) Michnik believed that neo-positivism had also had positive effects. First, by obtaining concessions from the state, it had been able to lay the groundwork for a public opinion independent of the state. This was typified by the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), as well as the Catholic press and publishing houses. Second, neo-positivism was an example of limited political pluralism, the first to be seen by an entire generation of young Poles. Third, it had been able to work with the party for limited improvements in civil rights and increased national sovereignty. Fourth, its action as a mediator between the church and the state helped normalize relations between the two. Nevertheless, in other respects, neo-positivism was a political failure because a policy of collaboration would only have been successful if both partners had taken it seriously. "Entente" without balancing political strength or restraint had led to failure. The regime consistently interfered with Znak's parliamentary membership, so that in 1975 only Stanislaw Stomma did not vote for the constitutional amendments. This failure to publicly affirm its values discredited neo-positivism in the eyes of the public (pp. 270-71). Michnik attributed the failure of both revisionism and neopositivism to a common factor. Both hoped for change from above, by means of the party or state apparatus. They had not attempted to link change with pressure from below (p. 268). Change from above had been effective during the relatively liberal period that followed deStalinization (1957-64), when the party sought to expand civil liberties and improve the standard of living. However, according to Michnik, problems began with the political disturbances of the late 1960s and 1970s. Confronted with crackdowns by the party-state, neither the revisionists nor the neo-positivists had "influence on power." They had no choice but to be either victims of, or disenfranchised spectators to, state repression (p. 272). Kurori and Michnik approached resistance from a new perspective. They argued that pressure from below could limit state power and make it more responsive to society. The action programs they formulated were strongly influenced by the post-Marxist writings of Leszek Kolakowski. Formerly Poland's leading revisionist philosopher, he had

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gone into exile in 1968. In official KOR publications, Kolakowski was listed as a member who was "temporarily overseas" because of his activism on the committee's behalf in the West. In two essays written in the early 1970s, he argued that Soviet-type political systems had deprived their societies of the means to defend themselves from the state. 51 Kolakowski traced this problem to the Marxian notion that true human emancipation can be achieved only through the identity of political and civil society.52 Kolakowski examined Marx's notion of the capitalist state, a tool of particular class interest disguised as universal interest, and concluded that this led Marx to argue that true human emancipation was not constituted by political emancipation per se (p. 20). Marx dismissed abstract political rights as illusory, because they did not abolish concrete religious and class differences within civil society. For Marx, the true nature of society—i.e., its class character—was obscured by equality before the law and personal freedom. This resulted in political alienation as a product of the duality of "real but self-centered life in civil society," as opposed to the "communal but abstract existence as state members" (p. 24). In this light, Kolakowski understood Marx's notion of communism as an attempt to abolish this alienation by reuniting the personal and the collective as an organic identity and as distinct from: 1) primitive communism, which subsumes the personal under the collective, or 2) philosophical anarchism, which subsumes the collective under the personal (p. 25). Although, Kolakowski appreciated the noble intention behind such an ideal, he categorically rejected any notion that this organic identity had been realized under existing Communist regimes: The dream of perfect unity may come true only in the form of a caricature that denies its original intention: as an artificial unity imposed by coercion from above, in that the political body prevents real conflicts from expressing themselves. The body is almost mechanically compelled to crush all spontaneous forms of economic, political, and cultural life, and thus deepens the rift between civil and political society, instead of bringing them closer to each other, (p. 34) Thus, in Kolakowski's analysis, Communist systems subsumed the personal under the collective, as an artificial unity held together by the coercive power of the modern totalitarian party-state. 53 Given the coercive power of the modern state and the dilemma

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posed by its geopolitical situation, the prospect for meaningful political change in Poland seemed almost hopeless. Nevertheless, Kolakowski addressed this problem in an essay called "Hope and Hopelessness." He saw hope for meaningful political reform because "bureaucratic despotic socialism is entangled in contradictory internal tendencies, which are incapable of resolving into any kind of synthesis, and which inevitably weaken its cohesion—a development that is becoming more acute rather than diminishing in intensity. " 54 Furthermore, since the existing system was able to maintain itself only by denying society the ability to resist state action, Kolakowski believed that the way to reform the system was through societal resistance. This could lead to a "more viable" socialist system, providing a more satisfactory life for those who were living under it. The contradictions within the system were critical in Kolakowski's view because they made the system reformable. (Ibid.) Kolakowski discussed four of these contradictions at length: those between 1) elite unity, necessary for the smooth operation of the system, and the elite's desire for security; 2) Marxism-Leninism and national sovereignty as a legitimation device; 3) Marxism-Leninism and technocratic modes of production as a legitimation device and a source of stability; and 4) the elite's dependence on the USSR and its desire for its own autonomy.55 Kolakowski thought that, by exploiting these contradictions, societal resistance could give rise to a "reformist orientation in the sense of a belief in the possibility of effective, gradual, and partial pressures, exercised in a long-term perspective of social and national liberation" (p. 49). Building upon this idea, Kuroñ and Michnik developed the notion of evolutionary strategy. Kuroñ argued that the thirty-year history of People's Poland demonstrated that pressure from below was the only effective way to resist the party-state. To document this assertion, he pointed to four examples of successful national resistance movements: 1) peasant disbanding of collective farms (1956); 2) worker defense of their standard of living (1956-57,1970-71,1976); 3) defense of the church by believers (not as a political movement to install theocracy, but as an attempt to defend the right of individual conscience); and 4) the struggle of intellectuals for independent research, thought and culture. In Kuroñ's opinion, these movements had been successful because they had operated in a coordinated fashion, relying on broad social pressure. He pointed to

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the revisionists as a counterexample. They had operated in a social vacuum and thus had been an easy target of repression. 56 Kuron contended that the same sort of national resistance movements that had preserved elements of Polish independence in the past could be deliberately created in the present. Social movements would have to organize open protests synchronized in a number of centers. They would consist of large numbers of small groups united by a common purpose and willing to band together for joint actions. The mode of organization was inconsequential as long the initiative remained in the hands of small groups. 5 7 Kuron hoped that a "third Poland" of social movements could be created. 58 Michnik's writings also made the aim of evolution explicit: "In my opinion, the only policy for dissidents in Eastern Europe is an unceasing struggle for reforms, in favor of evolution that will extend civil liberties and guarantee a respect for human rights . . . it looks for progressive and partial changes rather than for violent overthrow of the existing regime." 59 However, the very factors that made revolution impossible also circumscribed the range of possible reforms. Michnik emphasized that the evolution must proceed realistically, especially with respect to the "Brezhnev Doctrine"—i.e., that it must not challenge control of the state by the PZPR or seek to take Poland out of the Eastern bloc. Such attempts had led to disaster in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). In both cases, tampering with the party, the state, or its foreign policy orientation had resulted in Soviet intervention. Barred from these paths of action, Michnik distinguished a third option, "new evolutionism:" Such a programme of evolution should be addressed to independent public opinion and not just to the totalitarian authorities. Instead of acting as a prompter to the government, telling it how to improve itself, this programme should tell society how to act. As far as the government is concerned, it can have no clearer counsel than that provided by social pressure from below, (p. 274) Michnik even hoped that authentic compromise leading to reform would produce a Poland more stable than any imposed order and that the Soviets might see a distinct advantage in this. 60 New evolutionism thus envisioned the creation of a social movement pluralism, through

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which the demands of various constituencies would be conveyed to the state by organized political groups below the state level, cognizant of the limits that the political situation placed upon them. Kurori was also aware of the constraints the geopolitical situation placed on efforts to achieve national independence and parliamentary democracy. But he reasoned that the prospect of intervention would be distasteful to the Soviets, given Poland's past responses to foreign occupation. Thus, the Soviets might permit reforms in Poland in order to avoid the prohibitive costs and international ramifications of intervention. 61 With revolution precluded and the party-state unwilling to carry out the reforms necessary to stem the crisis on its own, Kuron reasoned that KOR must help "to create social movements that would oblige the authorities to carry out the reforms." 62 Thus, this reform from below strategy envisioned a society that organized itself independently of the state in order "to force great concessions from the state." However, in the Polish case, these concessions had to be consciously limited by the opposition. Kuron speculated on the kind of system Poles could hope for under these constraints. The state might become more responsive to social interests. Judging the prospects for the restoration of parliamentary rule to be almost nil in the present circumstances, Kuron posed the alternative of a direct, selfmanaging form of democracy.63 A political prognosis of this kind implied the coexistence of a pluralist society with a monolithic state. Kuron envisioned societal pluralism organized on the level of "corporations, cooperatives, consumer associations, economic self-managements; different self-managements; different cultural associations, sponsorships, etc.; an organized farmers' movement, a movement of citizen's initiatives, of discussion clubs designed to work out certain concepts, centers whose task it would be to integrate individual programs. And, of course, also unions." 64 He emphasized that the ability of such a plurality to be politically effective was possible only through the exercise of social self-defense, reinforced by solidarity: "At this stage solidarity is more important than demands. If the authorities were to concede the demands and then, soon afterwards dismissed the workers' leaders from their jobs, they could easily go back on their promises as they have done in the past." 65 Social solidarity, like that practiced by KOR in defending workers after the repression in Radom and Ursus, seemed to Kuron to be a potential way to ensure that demands were implemented. He then proposed

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that intellectuals undertake the special responsibility of supporting the initiatives of other social groups and classes.66 The mere creation of these self-managing and solidaristic social movements was not sufficient in the long run. As Kuron stressed, their existence had to be integrated into the political system: "Institutional forms have to be created to enable these pluralist movements to organize and cooperate. A system for society must be worked out." This, of course, implied the creation of a legal framework sanctioned by the party-state. It had to become responsive to the autonomously determined interests of society and play a role in implementing them. In the long run, Kuron believed, this would lead to the dismantling of the totalitarian system. 67 Geopolitics dictated that the PZPR retain control of the police (although this power had to be exercised strictly within legal norms), the military, and foreign policy. It would also retain responsibility for the central administration of domestic policy.68 Michnik felt that the party-state could be convinced to abide by such a development. He reasoned that KOR, by virtue of its desire to avoid a repetition of uncontrollable violent outbreaks, as well as the fact that it did not aspire to replace the party leadership, was "one of the few guarantees that change in Poland can be carried out in a step-by-step fashion that assures the continuity and security of the existence of the Polish state." Like the independent structures of the Church, the opposition exercised a certain moral authority, which afforded the party-state an opportunity to reach significant compromises with society. Thus, the opposition could offer the party-state the possibility of avoiding future sporadic and violent confrontations. 69 Michnik stressed that compromise was not the same as entering into an alliance for reform in which the opposition could expect assistance from the authorities. He believed that Marxism in Poland was already an empty shell since the demise of revisionism. Thus, the party in itself was not a force for reform. However, it was important that certain party factions had maintained a pragmatic outlook. They would favor scientific development, technical improvement, and more extensive contacts with the West. However, the opposition should not expect pragmatists to share their ultimate goals. They would not be in favor of democracy, increased pluralism, or self-management. Yet, pragmatic elements might well see the road of compromise as preferable to repression. The pragmatists could at best be a partner in the process of political compromise, but in no way a political ally.70

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Andrew Arato has attempted to summarize the major principles of this strategy: 1. The limit of reform from below is constituted by the given state institutions, i.e., the single party state cannot be overthrown (1956) or democratized from within (1968); 2. The means of pressure from below are organized as open and public, unconspiratorial and non-avant-garde social movements—each representing a constellation of interests; 3. Pressure from below can force the existing system to adhere to its own legality as well as a de facto toleration of the plurality constituted by social movements; 4. The organization of plurality, in particular, of an alternative, critical social sphere, can bypass the state altogether by setting up parallel institutions; 5. Legality, plurality and publicity, though important means of putting pressure on the state, are seen, above all, as ends in themselves. 71 Arato has done a fine job of this, but I would make two small corrections and two additions. The first correction concerns the open nature of the movement's organization. This only went so far. For instance, as noted above, KOR's open membership was a very select group. Also, in the key area of underground publishing and distribution, KOR and other opposition groups were extremely secretive. KOR was also quite secretive in protecting the names of individuals receiving assistance who did not want the details of their cases made public. Second, the state cannot be bypassed altogether. In fact, it must be drawn into the process of reform by the pressure that social movements would generate. It had to respond to the concerns of the plurality of social movements, manage relations with the Soviet Union, and play a crucial role in policy implementation. While the theme of Arato's article is the reemergence of a civil society in Poland, the role of the state in this process, as noted in the first chapter, cannot be underplayed. Without keeping this important consideration in mind, KOR's resistance strategy would resemble philosophical anarchism. The first additional point that should be added to Arato's summary is: party-state repression of any independent initiative or and attempt

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to reverse reforms or concessions must be met with social self-defense through solidarity. Victimization of any current of societal plurality must be resisted by all elements of the opposition, irrespective of their political differences. This is because to permit the party-state to curtail plurality by selective repression would weaken that plurality and constitute a threat to all elements within it. Finally, a second point also needs to be added, one that is never overtly stated but is evident in KOR's and in the general opposition's practice: resistance was to be nonviolent. KOR did not want to see a return to the sporadic outbursts of violence that had marked the events of 1970-71 and 1976. The extent to which the committee ought to go to prevent violence in fact became a topic of hot debate after Kurori proposed in 1979 that pressure articulated through official political channels by people not involved with the opposition might help to avoid a spontaneous outbreak of violence.72 However, irrespective of such differences, the committee itself was strongly committed to nonviolent struggle, as distinct from ethical pacifism.73 The development of new evolutionism as a strategy to transform the Polish political system had serious ramifications. The strategy's concentration on organizing social movements from below to force concessions from the party-state was crucial in transforming resistance in Poland from dissidence to opposition in the sense that I outlined in chapter 1. As the opposition became politically effective, grew in size, and proved capable of resisting attempts to suppress it, it began to liberate the public space necessary for a pattern of democratization through the self-liberation of civil society. In the period just after the strikes of 1976, KOR had begun to lay an organizational basis for itself as a movement and had a theoretical notion of how to wage opposition. These small achievements would be tested as KOR would attempt to translate the moral impulse that led to its creation into a durable and effective politics. The committee proved successful at this by waging an amnesty campaign for the victims of June 1976. This struggle is the subject of the next chapter.

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APPENDIX

KOR Members During the Workers' Amnesty Struggle, September 1976- October 1977™ Name, City/Profession, (Date Joined)—Biographical Data Original Fourteen 1. Jerzy Andrzejewski, Warsaw/writer, (9/23/76)—Winner of State Prize for Literature, author of the internationally acclaimed novel Ashes and Diamonds. 2. Stanisíaw Baranczak, Poznañ/poetand critic, (9/23/76)—Instructor in Polish Literature at the Adam Mickiewicz University. 3. Ludwik Cohn, Warsaw/lawyer, (9/23/76)—Prewar activist in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), soldier in the defense of Warsaw in 1920 and 1939, prisoner of war, political prisoner during Stalinist era. 4. Jacek Kuroñ, Warsaw/educator, (9/23/76)—Political prisoner 196571, co-author of the famous open letter to the Polish United Workers' Party in the mid-1960s (with K. Modzelewski). 5. Edward Lipiñski, Warsaw/economist, (9/23/76)—PPS activist, Member of the Polish Academy of Sciences, winner of the State Prize, ViceChairperson of the Economic Council (1956-62) and President of the Economists' Association (1946-65). 6. Jan Józef Lipski, Warsaw/literary historian and critic, (9/23/76)— soldier in the Home Army ( AK), participant in the Warsaw Uprising, President of the Club of the Crooked Circle. 7. Antoni Macierewicz, Warsaw/historian, (9/23/76)—member of the student movement (1968), scout activist. 8. Piotr Naimski, Warsaw/biochemist, (9/23/76)—scoutmaster. 9. Antoni Pajdak, Warsaw/lawyer, (9/23/76)—PPS activist, soldier during the Nazi occupation, defendant in the trial of 16 Home Army Leaders in Moscow, imprisoned in the USSR 1945-56. 10. Józef Rybicki, Milanówek/high school principal (9/23/76)—Temperance activist, commander of the 'Kedyw' (diversion and sabotage) unit of the AK, participant in the Warsaw Uprising, recipient of the Knight's Cross of Military Virtue, political prisoner under Stalinism. 11. Aniela Steinsbergowa, Warsaw/lawyer (9/23/76)—prewar political defender (e.g.,in the case of the striking "Semperit" factory workers of Kraków), PPS member, political defender after the war (e.g.,in the rehabilitation trials of AK members and the trial of Kuroñ and Modzelewski in 1966).

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12. Adam Szczypiorski, Warsaw/historian, (9/23/76)—PPS activist. 13. Jan Zieja, Warsaw/priest, (9/23/76)—military chaplain in the 1920 campaign against the USSR, recipient of the Knight's Cross of Military Virtue, regimental Chaplain in the AK, participant in the Warsaw Uprising, organizer of the Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals (KIK). 14. Wojciech Ziembiriski, Warsaw/editor and painter, (9/23/76)—soldier in the Polish Armed Forces in the West and German POW during WWII. Other

Members

15. Halina Mikoiajska, Warsaw/actress, (10/10/76)—twice awarded the State Prize. 16. Miroslaw Chojecki, Warsaw/chemist, (10/30/76)—participant in the student movement (1968), scout activist. 17. Emil Morgiewicz, Warsaw/lawyer, (10/30/76)—political prisoner (1970-74), member of Amnesty International. 18. Waclaw Zawadzki, Warsaw/writer, (10/30/76)—PPS activist, president of the Wiedza publishing collective. 19. Bogdan Borusewicz, Sopot/historian, (11/22/76)—imprisoned as a high school activist in 1968. 20. Jozef Sreniowski, Lodz/ethnographer and sociologist, (11/22/76)— activist in the Student movement (1968), political prisoner. 21. Stefan Kaczorski, Warsaw/publicist, (03/22/77)—former Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, participant in the Warsaw uprising. 22. Anka Kowalska, Warsaw/writer (03/22/77)—PAX (pro-regime Catholic organization) activist until 1968. 23. Wojciech Onyszkiewicz, Warsaw/historian, (03/22/77)—student activist (1968). 24. Adam Michnik, Warsaw/historian (04/29/77)—student leader in 1968 in Warsaw, political prisoner (1968-69), private secretary to Antoni Slonimski, author of Kosciot, Lewica, Dialog (The Church, The Left, A Dialogue), astounded the Club of the Crooked Circle, when as a teenager, he delivered a brilliant proposal on educational reform. Returned to Poland in the spring of 1977 from an eight-month stay in the West, where he had acted as a spokesperson for KOR. 25. Jan Kielanowski, Warsaw/agronomist, (07/24/77)—member of both the Polish and German Academies of Science, soldier in the AK. 26. Zbigniew Kamiriski, Milanowek/priest, (07/24/77)—AK chaplain, former professor.

5

KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle Improvising

the Practice of an Effective Oppositional

Politics

We appeal to every single individual to act at all times to oppose any act of terror and persecution, whether it be directed against his fellow citizens, colleagues or against himself, and whether it takes place at work, in his professional or social environment, or in his union. Solidarity is now an absolute necessity and self-defense by the community as a whole is indispensable. Every violation of human rights and our rights as citizens, which goes uncensured, which passes without opposition, and without being brought before the public eye will eventually severely injure every one of us, though it may not, at the moment, be aimed directly at us. Every infringement that passes without comment becomes an antecedent to another transgression. We become accomplices to every violation that we let pass in silence. —KOR, Declaration on the Violation of the Law by the Authorities, May 10, 1977,1

In the first year of its existence, the Workers' Defense Committee was preoccupied with waging "the workers' amnesty struggle." It focused its efforts on exonerating the victims of the June events and bringing to account public officials who had exceeded their authority or broken the law. These attempts were accompanied, throughout, by the medical, legal, and financial help that the committee had provided in the period prior to its official foundation. The amnesty struggle was waged by publicly articulating a series of demands to the party-state and then trying to mobilize public support for them. While KOR's efforts secured the release of those imprisoned and the reemployment of most of those dismissed, they failed to win any concessions on the issue of public accountability for the excesses associated with the repression of the strike

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movement. As we shall see, the party-state's intransigence on this issue would have profound ramifications for the future of opposition in Poland.

Public Articulation of the Committee's Aims In its earliest public declarations, KOR articulated a series of six demands. These were: (1) an end to reprisals against the strikers, (2) provision of assistance to affected workers by the appropriate social welfare institutions, (3) amnesty for those imprisoned, (4) rehabilitation and reinstatement of those fired to their former positions (or appointment to equivalent positions without loss of seniority), (5) a public accounting of the scale of the post-June repression, and (6) the bringing to justice of officials responsible for the abuse of the law and the use of torture. 2 As some of these demands were fulfilled and others became irrelevant due to changing circumstances, KOR made several minor modifications. 3 Nevertheless, throughout the period of the workers' amnesty struggle, these issues remained the basis for the committee's campaign. In its early statements the committee stressed that its role had been forced upon it by the authorities. The failure of official institutions to take action on behalf of the workers had compelled them to create a volunteer organization to assume these responsibilities. KOR emphasized that it had undertaken this action openly and that if its demands were met, "The committee would consider that it had no further role to play." 4 As noted earlier, after the Sejm's rebuff of KOR's original appeal, the authorities continued to officially ignore the committee while trying to disrupt its efforts. Activists assisting workers were constantly harassed (see below) and attempts were made to sow confusion about the committee's public statements. In October, two fabricated issues of KOR's official organ, Komunikat (Communique) appeared (see below for more information on this publication). They contained false information on Radom and Ursus and an announcement that KOR had discontinued its activity. Perhaps the most original falsification of this type was a letter forged in Jerzy Andrzejewski's name. Sent to a number of people and institutions, it contained a personal plea for "greater sexual freedom and a relaxation of moral standards." KOR found this activity troubling enough to issue a public condemnation. 5

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On October 29, 1976, Prosecutor General Lucjan Czubinski gave a speech to the Sejm in which he explicitly addressed some of the committee's concerns. He claimed that seventy-eight people remained in prison for crimes committed during the June events, but that none of them had been convicted for striking or for acts committed at their place of work. He also maintained that the police had acted properly in restoring order and that this had been confirmed by the Council of State at its September meeting. He also reiterated the recommendation of the Council of State that first offenders be treated with leniency.6 Thus, Czubinski, while making a public disclosure on one aspect of the scope of repression and holding out the prospect of leniency, sought to rebut KOR's charges about the unlawful character of the restoration of order.

Publicity Efforts on Behalf of the Repressed KOR's pressed its demands upon the party state, reported on the repression of workers, and provided information about its own activities and other independent initiatives in Poland through two journals, Komunikat and Biuletyn Informacyjny (Information Bulletin). These periodicals resembled the samizdat publications produced by the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. The commonly used Polish term for such materials is "bibula" (tissue paper) because of the low quality of the paper on which it was published. Prior to KOR's foundation, uncensored manuscripts were often circulated illicitly, but only among small groups. It was fairly common for academicians or writers to circulate works that had almost no chance of passing censorship among small groups of friends and interested colleagues. 7 However, with the foundation of KOR, a real underground press developed. Komunikat was KOR's official organ. As such it was the only publication, which expressed the opinions of the committee as a whole. Its original editors were Antoni Macierewicz and Anka Kowalska, 8 and its first issue was dated September 29, 1976. 9 During the period of the workers' amnesty struggle, each issue was prefaced with the following statement: All information given below concerns nothing but confirmed events. Since public statistics on the post-June repression have never come to light, it is difficult to know something on the subject of their extent.

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In the event of information about which we are not sure, we will confirm its source or the premises that led us to those particular suppositions. (p. 181) Komunikat dealt explicitly with the June events and their aftermath (e.g., repression, relief, trials, appeals, lists of security officials involved in repression), published official KOR documents and pronouncements, and discussed internal committee matters which KOR wanted to make public. During the period of the workers' amnesty struggle, Komunikat devoted much of its space to publicity on behalf of the victims and to a description of KOR's efforts on their behalf. Biuletyn Informacyjny, on the other hand, was not an official KOR journal. Rather, it was an independent journal edited by KOR members and activists. It did not speak authoritatively for KOR as an organization. Nonetheless, because of its coverage of events in Poland and the publicity it provided for both the victimized workers and KOR's initiatives, it became an important tool in the waging of the workers' amnesty struggle. Its first issue was also dated September 1976. 1 0 Each issue of Biuletyn Informacyjny was prefaced by the following statement: The bulletin has as its goal the breaking of the state information monopoly which is secured by the existence of censorship in our country. The information included serves as evidence of public life and is assembled as a chronicle of repression directed against citizens as well as national culture. Wider distribution of the bulletin is an active step forward in the defense of citizen's rights and is an exercise of those rights. Read it, copy it, and give it to someone else to read. Report attacks on the rights of citizens. Remember! Destroying the bulletin seals your own mouth and those of others. 11 The purpose of Biuletyn Informacyjny was to report on the development of the new oppositional politics emerging in Poland and on party-state attempts to repress them. For this reason, it was subtitled "Current Events of Public Life" (Aktualnosci zycia publicznego). It chronicled the activities of KOR and other groups, provided legal information, reported on censorship, and generally reported on matters of public interest excluded from the official press. During the early period of its existence, Biuletyn Informacyjcny concentrated on reporting on KOR's activities and publishing data on repression that the committee had

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collected. On one occasion, a complete issue was devoted to a special report on the Radom strikes and their aftermath. 12 One of the pathbreaking features of Biuletyn Informacyjny was its effort to make people aware of how to fight for their legal rights. Beginning with its first issue, it printed articles on legal rights that citizens could use to defend themselves, especially against members of the police or the security forces. 13 Biuletyn Informacyjny was named after the main periodical of the wartime Home Army. The prime mover behind the foundation of the journal and its editor-in-chief was Seweryn Blumsztajn. He and his colleagues were motivated by a desire to publish the information that they had gathered on the June strikes and on the repression which followed. In the initial phases of publication, Blumsztajn's co-editors were Joanna Szczgsna and Jan Litynski. Szczgsna stayed with the journal throughout its existence, while Litynski later devoted his efforts to Robotnik (The Worker), a bimonthy for workers. Other members of the editorial board included Anka Kowalska, Eugeniusz Kloc, Jan Wale, and Janusz Przewtocki. 14 In the late 1970s, Biuletyn Informacyjny's size and scope were greatly expanded. While it continued to serve as an information bulletin, it became something more of a monthly political review, containing regular features on conditions in Poland and international affairs, book reviews, essays, cultural criticism, and political debates. The printing techniques used by the committee at the beginning of the workers' amnesty struggle were quite primitive. Regular readers of committee publications were expected to retype the issue using carbon paper, and then to pass on the duplicates. 15 This placed strong constraints on the ability of the committee to reach a large number of people. It is my suspicion that, in the early days of the committee's existence, many more people were made aware of its activity through broadcasts of information by Western radio services. While such broadcast services continued to be an important source of information for many in Poland, the development of more advanced duplication techniques in the 1970s, permitting an expansion of the number of examples of an individual issue that could be printed and a proliferation of underground periodicals in circulation, created a truly indigenous alternative information network in Poland. 16 Perhaps the most important figure in the rise of a technically sophisticated underground press in Poland was KOR member Miroslaw Cho-

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jecki. He originally led relief efforts in Radom and became interested in publishing the information collected there. Chojecki had some previous publishing experience. While studying at Warsaw University in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he and his friends had published a shortlived (three to four months) underground newspaper, The Subversive. Chojecki helped KOR develop primitive mimeograph technology and, as a result of this, the committee was able to publish a number of pamphlets. 1 7 The first of these, published in May 1977, was The June Events and the Activities of the Workers' Defense Committee, which summarized the information KOR had collected on the June strikes and their repression and reported on the committee's early activity. 18 This was followed by a two-part pamphlet on the trials in Radom and Ursus, . . . in the Name of the Polish People's Republic.19 Chojecki and a group of other activists interested in printing contacted an already existing underground publishing group in Lublin, Nieocenzurowana Oficyna Wydawnicza (The Uncensored Publishing House), which had printed the first two editions of Zapis (The Register), an underground literature and arts review produced by a group of writers associated with or close to KOR. This Lublin group would eventually found and publish the influential, independent lay Catholic youth magazine—Spotkania (Encounters). The Warsaw group around Chojecki was invited to join the Lublin initiative. The name of the publishing house was changed to the Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza (Independent Publishing House), but was most commonly referred to by its acronym—NOW-a. Eventually, the publishing house was transferred from Lublin to Warsaw, where conditions for publishing were better. 2 0 During the start-up phase of the publishing house, Chojecki was in jail with several other KOR activists (see below). However, his effective stewardship was one of the important factors which made NOW-a something of a phenomenon. NOW-a employed printers, typesetters, bookbinders, and distributors. In this early period, the activities of the publishing house involved between one hundred and one hundred-fifty people. These people not only saw to the technical side of publishing but made important contributions in deciding what NOW-a would publish. Other activists who made important contributions to NOW-a in its initial phases were Ryszard Knauf and Ewa Milewicz. Chojecki and these two were members of NOW-a's editorial board, which had the final say in determining the publishing house's list. Others on the board included Grzegorz

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Boguta, Adam Michnik, and Konrad Bielinski. Decisions taken by this body were made democratically. Michnik was able to play an important role in ensuring a steady flow of high quality manuscripts because of his extensive contacts in literary and intellectual circles. He helped bring many of the writers w h o published in Zapis in contact with NOWa. 2 1 Bogdan Grzesiak, a printer by profession, also played an important role in NOW-a. 2 2 The first title in NOW-a's series was The Origins of the System. It was a chapter from Marek Tarniewski's book Evolution or Revolution (Ewolucja czy rewolucja), which had been published previously by an emigre publishing house in Paris. W h e n NOW-a published it in Poland in August 1977, they printed a statement on the cover that their aim was to break the state's information monopoly. The statement also appealed to the public for help in distributing books, securing printing supplies, and collecting money. It ended with the admonition, " T h e fate of free speech in Poland depends on u s . " 2 3 Although KOR also maintained its own publishing facilities for its journals, it had access to NOW-a's technological expertise. KOR put up the original capital for NOW-a's printing facilities and NOW-a often borrowed money from KOR to finance projects. KOR in turn was guaranteed the printing of leaflets and pamphlets promptly and at cost. Despite these arrangements and the fact that NOW-a's personnel was overwhelmingly made up of KOR members, supporters, and sympathizers, NOW-a was editorially independent from KOR. Unlike most of the activities which surrounded KOR, openness was not extended to printing activities. 2 4 KOR's initiatives in the field of underground publishing led to efforts by others. The first alternative publication with no link to KOR was U Progu (At the Threshold), which made its debut in October 1976. U Progu included coverage of current Polish events and the opposition, general articles on historical subjects, articles on culture and education, and some analysis of international problems. 2 5 In many ways, it bore a strong resemblance to Biuletyn Informacyjny. According to Lipski, it had a small circulation and was published by a group of people who would later help to create the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO). 2 6 W h e n ROPCiO was formed, it produced its own official organ as well, Opinia (Opinion), which also served as a forum for broader discussion of cultural, political, and historical subjects of interest to its

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readers and contributors. The first issue of Opinia was dated April 30, 1977. It was published in Warsaw under the editorship of Kazimierz Janusz, Leszek Moczulski, and Wojciech Ziembiriski.27 Zapis, another alternative publication referred to previously, appeared during the first year of the committee's operation. It was established specifically to publish literary works rejected by the censorship system. 28 It was thus able to choose from a wide variety of works by leading Polish authors and poets. Lastly, the independent quarterly Postgp (Progress) also made its debut in this period (July 1977). It seems to have been largely the work of one man, Henryk Bjjk, an engineer who would later sign the Charter of Workers' Rights, a milestone in the creation of the independent trade union movement (see chapter 7 for greater detail). Postgp's intent was to provide a forum in which "working people" could carry on "public discussion." At first, it devoted much of its attention to debate on and discussion of independent trade unions for farmers and workers, as well as workers' self-management. Later, with the creation of initiatives of this sort, it spent most of its time covering their development. 29 Considering the enthusiasm the subjects it covered would later receive, and the fact the journal was not well known in Poland, I am led to believe that Post^p had a very small circulation. The creation of an underground press was an essential development in the self-liberation of civil society in Poland. KOR played a pioneering role in its creation. In order to articulate its demands, publicize the plight of the workers, and inform the public of its activities, the committee developed methods of public communication outside the controlled mass media. These channels of alternative publicity rapidly developed from open letters and petitions, used in the constitutional campaign of 1975, to crudely assembled and primitively reproduced publications. Within months, the committee was able to improvise technology to mass produce its publications and help other organizations to create an alternative underground press. The existence of this press was, in itself, a critical step in liberating the public space in Poland. It provided a forum for the necessary development of critical discussion among emerging organizations and movements within this public space, and it offered them a means to reach society. This was not only important in exposing society to the opposition and recruiting new participants to the movement, but it was also critical to self-defense. Without the ability to mobilize public

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opinion by means of the alternative publicity provided by the underground press, the opposition could not have brought pressure to bear on the party-state, and thus would have been incapable of pursuing its aims and defending itself or others.

Efforts to Bring Public Pressure to Bear Upon the Party-State Along with publicizing the plight of the victims of the June events, KOR attempted to bring direct public pressure to bear on the partystate as a means of realizing its demands. It tried to do so in three different ways: 1) by direct appeals to public assistance organizations, 2) by complaints filed by workers themselves, and 3) by calls for a special Sejm commission.

Direct Appeals to Public Assistance Organizations In early October 1976, KOR member Lipiriski wrote a series of five letters to public assistance organizations on the committee's behalf. On October 3, he wrote to the chairman of the Polish Red Cross, to the secretary-general of the Polish Committee for Social Assistance, and to the chairman of the Polish Society for the Friends of Children. He appealed to them to render assistance to the repressed workers and their families. These were followed by two more letters on October 8. The first, to Marian Sliwiriski, minister of Health and Social Service, asked for provision of medical care for the workers. The second, to Tadeusz Rudolf, minister of Work, Wages, and Social Issues, asked for a reinstatement of the contracts of dismissed workers. 30 These letters do not seem to have brought about any response on the part of the authorities.

Workers' Protests It is important to note that workers from factories affected by the June events and the repressed themselves took part in the protest against their treatment. The earliest and most spectacular action of this sort was a letter from 889 Ursus workers to Edward Gierek, dated November 4,1976. They demanded the reinstatement of their fired colleagues with back pay and no loss of seniority.31 An additional 232 workers later added their names to the letter. 32 KOR's Wojciech Onyszkiewicz

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helped to coordinate this action, but the overwhelming share of the effort in bringing the letter to fruition was that of the Ursus workers. 33 By December 1976, many of those dismissed in Ursus were offered new work, but often at a level inferior to the jobs they had lost. 34 In the midst of the campaign to summon a special Sejm commission (see below), while the government was denying accusations of mistreating arrested workers, sixty-seven workers who had been tortured in police custody sent a letter to Prosecutor General Lucjan Czubiriski on November 30, 1976. They disputed his public statements attesting to the fairness of the Radom trials, brought to his attention their beating and torture while in police custody, and called for an investigation into abuses of the law.35 This was followed, on December 1, by a letter of a similar nature from relatives of seventeen imprisoned workers. These collective efforts were accompanied by the filing of over one hundred individual complaints with the prosecutor's office. 36 After the last of the imprisoned workers were released in July 1977 (see below), workers continued to press the government about the reinstatement of lost jobs. In August 1977, three of the forty-three workers dismissed from POiE in Grudzi^dz wrote to Gierek on the group's behalf, demanding reinstatement and compensation for lost wages. 37 Around the same time, several workers dismissed from the Lenin Shipyard and Zremb in Gdansk sent a complaint to the Sejm demanding the reversal of their firings. 38

The Call for a Special Sejm Commission Because of the intransigence of the party-state, KOR took steps in November to increase the pressure on the authorities. On November 16, 1976, Antoni Pajdak sent a KOR petition, "Appeal to the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," to its Speaker. It called for the establishment of a "commission of inquiry into the strikes and mass demonstration of June 1976." KOR specifically mentioned two matters warranting special attention: 1. Torture and other forms of infringement of the law by the police and the security services. 2. The scale and extent of the reprisals, the total figures of those arrested, imprisoned, sentenced by the courts and by special tribunals, and dismissed from work.

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Appended to the appeal was a lengthy recitation of "facts" that KOR had collected about the brutality and scope of repression. 39 This move brought about a sudden reversal in the party-state policy of publicly ignoring the committee's existence. On November 19, a government spokesperson declared KOR an illegal organization. Curiously this charge was made under the provisions of an obscure statute dating from 1932. Four days later, the police raided a KOR meeting in Warsaw and detained fourteen members for a short period of time. The Church then made a new appeal on November 19 that was seen as supportive of the committee. The episcopate renewed its call for the release of imprisoned workers and announced that it, too, would begin to collect funds to help fired workers and their families.40 KOR responded to the government's action with "Appeal to the Nation," dated November 29, 1976. In this document the committee argued that its call to the Sejm was insufficient and urged Poles to send "letters, petitions, and resolutions" in support of its appeal. 41 The response of the party-state was hardly encouraging. In a speech on December I, 1976, Gierek stated: "Only a small group of persons of old bourgeois political orientation and incorrigible revisionists are responsible for the attempts to create disorder in Poland. They poison national debates with their demagoguery, and try to attack the basis of our sociopolitical system and international policy. These people are in fact raising their hands against the fatherland." 42 Events would soon disprove Gierek's claims about the isolation and social composition of the opposition. KOR's calls for a campaign of public pressure brought a response from society. The "Complaint of the 65 Radom Workers" of November 30,1976 (see above) called for the summoning of a commission. On December 21,1976, prominent Polish academicians directed the "Appeal of the 34 Professors" to the Sejm in support of KOR's call.43 KOR's demand was also supported by eight other individual or small collective letters.44 While the Church did not directly endorse the call for a commission, Wyszyriski's sermons left little doubt as to where his sympathies lay. On December 6, 1976, he accused the police of using brutal methods against the striking workers, basing his claim on interviews conducted by the Church. He also called on Catholics to forgo luxuries in order to provide material assistance to people who found themselves in difficult straits as a result of the June events. 45 In a sermon given later that

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month (December 25), he decried the use of violence against ordinary citizens.46 The government's official response to this renewed pressure came in the form of testimony given by Prosecutor General Czubiriski before the Sejm Committee on Internal Affairs on January 5, 1977. In his speech he refuted the charges leveled against the police and the security services, making a special reference to the retraction of several complaints filed by workers. Though these retractions were made under police pressure, he charged that the workers' complaints had been falsified or filed for money. 47 On the following day, the official press devoted much attention to Czubiriski's testimony, lavishing praise upon him. 48 Czubinski's refutation of the charges and, hence, of the need to summon a special commission only evoked further support for KOR's appeal. One of the first rebuttals was "An Eyewitness Report on the Proceedings of the Trials," addressed to Sejm Speaker Gucwa. It was submitted by a group of 31 KOR activists and relatives of workers who had been tried. 49 This, however, was only the first response. A flood of collective complaints and open letters calling for the summoning of a special commission poured into the Sejm. While the vast majority of these letters came from intellectuals and students, there were also calls issued by clergymen, workers, and members of the technical intelligentsia. The appeals came from all over Poland (Warsaw, Wroclaw, Przemysl, Gdansk, Krakow, Lodz, and Lublin). Many were also received from smaller groups and individuals. According to KOR's calculations, by the end of April 1977, the Sejm had received calls to convene a special commission from at least three thousand citizens.50

Clemency Under this mounting public pressure, the authorities moved to counteract KOR's actions. Attempts to mobilize the public for this purpose yielded little success. For instance, on January 16,1977, KOR reported that factory party organizations in Radom and Zielona Gora had circulated petitions calling for the expulsion of KOR members from Poland, but that only 160 of the 5000 workers approached were persuaded to sign.51 Incapable of countermobilizing public sentiment against KOR, the

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party-state then moved to undercut the grievances that had enabled KOR to mobilize people so successfully. On January 22, 1977, Gierek met with the president of the Writers' Union, Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz, and told him that an amnesty for the jailed workers was under consideration, contingent upon an end to protest against the authorities.52 Gierek followed this up during a speech at the Ursus Tractor Factory on February 3, 1977, in which he announced that he had encouraged the Council of State to consider an act of clemency "to apply to prisoners sentenced in connection with the June events who have shown repentance and are unlikely to revert to crime." 53 While Gierek's speech was somewhat conciliatory, clemency, implying forgiveness of guilt, fell short of the committee's demand for amnesty, i.e., absolution from guilt. Furthermore, Gierek's speech ignored the petition of nearly 1100 Ursus workers calling for the reinstatement of their dismissed colleagues. Gierek also went out of his way to stigmatize KOR in a veiled reference to "opponents of Poland and socialism."54 KOR offered a measured response to Gierek's speech. Two days later, it released "Statement on the Conditional Pardon for the June Protests." The committee welcomed the offer of clemency "as a first move in the direction of atoning for the wrongs inflicted upon participants in the workers' demonstration" but found it insufficient for several reasons. To begin with, KOR disagreed with the conditional nature of the proposal. It felt that a show of repentance would be humiliating for the workers and confused the facts about who the real guilty party was. Second, the committee disagreed with the implicit assumption that the original sentences had been just. Third, KOR noted that the proposal did not address the question of dismissals. The committee ended its statement with the insistence that its demands for rehiring, amnesty, disclosure, and punishment be fulfilled. It stressed once again that it would become "redundant" once these demands were met and renewed its call for the creation of a special Sejm commission to conduct an impartial investigation. 55 In the ensuing period open letters on the summoning of a commission continued to pour into the offices of the party-state authorities.56 Imprisoned workers began to be released. A KOR statement of February 17, 1977, reported the release of twelve from Radom, who were subsequently promised new jobs. The committee still reckoned that some forty people from Radom and Ursus remained in prison. In a March 10,1977, statement, the committee put the total number remain-

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ing in prison at twenty, three of them from Ursus and seventeen from Radom. 5 7 By early May, only five (three from Radom and two from Ursus) were still in jail. 58 It appeared that the crisis provoked by the June events might be coming to an end. However, this was not to be. A new wave of repression triggered an intensified period of struggle between the committee and the party-state.

The Death of Stanislaw Pyjas For approximately one month after the disclosure that the Council of State was considering a pardon, harassment of KOR declined markedly. 59 However, conditions soon worsened and the committee felt obliged to issue a statement on March 10, 1977, reporting a tightening of political control in the cities in the form of a police campaign against workers. 60 The latter was followed by a campaign of detentions, interrogations and apartment searches directed against KOR, beginning on April 15.61 On April 27, an indictment was issued accusing Michnik, Kuron, and Lipski of working with foreign organizations to the detriment of the interests of the Polish People's Republic. 62 The signal for the unleashing of the campaign was provided by Gierek's speech at the Central Committee Plenum of April 14, 1977, in which he asserted: "We cannot accept infringement of the law and misuse of socialist democracy and civil liberties for activity stemming from alien class positions and directed against the socialist state. Such activity must be unmasked and will be opposed by all necessary means." Gierek continued this line in a speech to a conference of regional and local party secretaries on April 25, where he attacked "forces hostile to socialism." 63 Just as this campaign of repression seemed to have reached its peak, 64 an event occurred that went well beyond the scope of repression to which KOR had heretofore been subjected, and this in turn sparked public protest on a scale not seen since June 25,1976. Early in the morning of May 7, 1977, the corpse of Stanistaw Pyjas, a student and KOR activist in Krakow, was discovered lying in a pool of blood. 65 Pyjas had been a target of police harassment prior to his death. Because of their activity in organizing an open letter from Krakow student circles on the question of a special Sejm commission, Pyjas and five coorganizers (Leslaw Maleszka, Bronislaw Wildstein, Mieczyslaw God-

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yri. Andrzej IMlcerek, and Boguslaw Bek) had received anonymous threatening letters. These letters attacked Pyjas' moral standards and accused him of being a police informer. One letter, in particular, threatened Pyjas with death and elliptically threatened the other organizers of the open letter as well. 66 On April 26, Pyjas and the five other students petitioned the prosecutor's office in Krakow to investigate these letters. 67 At the time of his demise, Pyjas was involved with other local KOR activists in compiling a report for a complaint against police brutality in Krakow. When he was last seen on May 6, he had been collecting signatures for the complaint. 68 Pyjas' death was followed by an unusual investigation. Within ten hours of the death, the Krakow police were relieved from the investigation by the Security Service (SB). On May 8, the official version of events was published. According to the report of the coroner, Pyjas had fallen down a flight of stairs while drunk and drowned in his own blood. The conclusion did follow logically from facts uncovered by an investigation of the site and the circumstances of death conducted by young KOR activists in Krakow. Predictably, the coroner who conducted the autopsy had been used earlier in the investigation of one of the murders in Radom, where the police were under suspicion. Another peculiar aspect of the investigation involved the last witness to have seen Pyjas alive. A few months after giving evidence to the Pyjas family's attorney about a man who had seemed to be escorting Pyjas on the night of May 6, the witness was found dead under mysterious circumstances.69 In another coincidence, the anonymous letters that Pyjas' friends had received disappeared during burglaries that took place while all five were being interrogated at police headquarters. 70 On May 12, 1977, the day after Pyjas burial, his colleagues from the Polish Philology Department at Jagellonian University, other Krakow students involved with KOR and KIK, and the university chaplain decided to make May 15 a day to mourn and protest his death. KOR was informed and dispatched a group of young Warsaw activists who had been trained in primitive poligraphy and demonstration control.71 Overt preparation for public protest in Krakow began on the night of May 14, during the celebration of the annual Juvenalia (Youth Festival). Students with black armbands distributed obituaries containing information about a memorial mass to be held the next day and a KOR state-

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ment protesting Pyjas' death. The students also called for a boycott of Juvenalia. At the house where the body had been found, black bunting, votive candles, and flowers were arrayed around a death notice. During this initial phase, SZSP (Socialist Union of Polish Students) activists acting as monitors for Juvenalia attempted to disrupt the action. However, crowds of onlookers joined together and chased them away. 72 On May 15, at 9:00 A.M., the memorial mass was held at the Dominican church. Prior to its commencement a group of students carrying a black flag were arrested. Most sources agree that a crowd of about 5,000 (including workers from Nowa Huta) attended the mass. In his eulogy, the academic chaplain stressed Pyjas' struggle "for justice, for right, for truth, for freedom." 73 After the mass, a contingent of mourners carrying black flags marched to the house where the corpse had been found. The KOR statements on the death of Pyjas and on the detention of committee activists on their way to Krakow from Lublin and Warsaw were read, and a minute of silence was observed. The crowd dispersed after calls were made to return to the site for a 9:00 P.M. march to Wawel castle. During the day, Juvenalia was poorly attended, and black flags replaced Juvenalia banners in the student quarter. 74 At 9:00 P.M., several thousand people (estimates run as high as ten thousand) with black flags and candles gathered and marched silently to Wawel. The march was extremely well organized and restrained. An attempt to disrupt the march by men dressed in civilian clothes was bypassed without confrontation. When the procession reached the castle a declaration announcing the formation of a Student Solidarity Committee (Studencki Komitet Solidarnosci or SKS) was read, and a minute of silence was again observed. The national anthem was sung, and the crowd dispersed peacefully.75 The founding declaration of SKS expressed the outrage of the national academic community at the death of Pyjas. The efforts of the SZSP to disrupt the memorial, the writers asserted, had compromised the group's integrity and, thus, it had lost its "moral right to represent the academic community." For this reason, the declaration continued, SKS was formed to provide "authentic and independent" student representation. SKS demanded that the death be investigated and that the murderers be brought to justice regardless of their position. They also

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requested information about attempts to disrupt the mourning and promised to begin to organize self-defense. The declaration closed with the statement that "The Student Solidarity Committee allies itself with the Workers' Defense Committee," and it was signed on behalf of SKS by ten young Krakow KOR activists. 76 Mourning and protest took place in a number of other cities as well. In Warsaw, the large number of arrests and detentions (see below) and the fact that a number of local activists assisted in the preparations in Krakow limited the scale of the memorial. Nevertheless, despite threats conveyed at factory and school meetings, one thousand people participated in a mass and a minute of silence at St. Martin's Church. The building was surrounded by police and security service officers throughout the event and three activists were arrested on the scene. 77 In Lublin, a memorial mass was held on May 17, during which the declaration of the Krakow SKS was read in an expression of solidarity. 78 In Wroclaw, a memorial mass in the cathedral on May 25 was attended by 5,000 people. Afterward, 1,000 to 1,500 people marched to the monument to Pope John XXIII and read the Krakow declaration aloud. 79 In Gdansk, a memorial mass was held on May 24, and obituary notices were posted in student dormitories. 80 In Poznari, student and KOR activist Lech Dymarski made an appeal on May 19 for students to commemorate the death. A memorial mass attended by 800 people was later held. In addition, 133 students and three priests from the city signed an open letter in support of SKS.81 In Lodz, obituary notices appeared on walls on May 10 and 11, despite police attempts to tear them down. Lodz students sent a telegram of condolence to Pyjas' colleagues, and a one-minute silent vigil was held on May 12 in the university's Polish Philology Department. On May 15, approximately 500 people attended a memorial mass at St. Teresa's Church. Afterward, the aforementioned KOR statement and the SKS declaration were read. Piotr Amsterdamski, a KOR activist and student, then read an open letter signed by 150 local residents and expressing their horror at the death, their approval of the actions of the demonstrators in Krakow, and their decision to form a local branch of SKS.82 In protesting and commemorating the death of Stanislaw Pyjas, the growing opposition movement demonstrated that it was more than just a few intellectuals with the crazy idea of delivering humanitarian

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aid to a few abused strikers. It had proven itself capable of mobilizing the organized public protest of thousands of people in most of Poland's major cities. The Pyjas memorials were an important watershed in the history of postwar resistance to the Polish party-state. However, they were not without cost. Soon after the death of Pyjas the committee was subjected to the most severe campaign of repression that it had yet faced. The ensuing months would prove to be a test of strength that would threaten the very existence of KOR and perhaps of the opposition as a whole.

The Failure of Renewed Repression The Roundup In Warsaw, a massive campaign of repression directed at KOR was unleashed on May 14,1977, on the eve of the events in Krakow. It included detentions, arrests, beatings, and apartment searches. In the month of May, 118 detentions and 20 apartment searches were recorded. This amounted to nearly one-half of the detentions and one-third of the apartment searches documented by the opposition during its first thirteen months of existence. 83 The first group to be arrested consisted of Jacek Kuron, Antoni Macierewicz, Adam Michnik, Piotr Naimski, and Wojciech Ostrowski. They were soon joined by Wojciech Arkuszewski, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Mirostaw Chojecki, Jan Jozef Lipski, Jan Litynski, Hanna Ostrowska, and Marian Pilka. All were placed under prosecutorial sanction, which made allowance for a three-month investigative arrest. 84 Those arrested were for the most part KOR members. Both editors of Biuletyn Informacyjny (Blumsztajn, Litynski) and one editor of Komunikat (Macierewicz) were among them. Four of them were not KOR members. Ostrowski and Arkuszewski were important activists in the KOR movement. Both had been involved with the committee's earliest relief efforts. Hanna Ostrowska was an activist from Radom. Marian Pilka, a ROPCiO affiliate, was released on May 23. Because of health problems, both Lipski and Hanna Ostrowska were also released before the others (in early June and early July respectively). 85 Most of the charges levied against the arrested were connected with the ongoing investigation of Kuron, Michnik, and Lipski (see above) or with charges of "dissemination of false information . . . harmful to the interests of the Polish

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People's Republic." The arrests were accompanied by an anti-KOR press campaign. 86

Actions Taken in Defense of KOR After the arrests of the week of May 14-21, a national and international campaign was mounted in KOR's defense. This campaign included actions taken by the committee itself, by the Church, and various other groups inside and outside of Poland. KOR's Self-Defense Actions As early as May 17, 1977, while the campaign of repression was still underway, KOR published its first "Statement" on the arrests. The committee appealed for support in securing the release of those already held. 87 During the period in which the thirteen activists were under arrest, KOR maintained the ability to generate a great deal of publicity on its own behalf. Until their release in July, the committee managed to publish three issues of Komunikat, and Biuletyn Informacyjny continued to come out under the temporary editorship of Barbara Toruriczyk, Joanna Szczgsna, and Stanislaw Barariczak. Important roles during this period were assumed by Anka Kowalska, Grazyna Kurori, and Halina Mikolajska. They acted as a bridge between the younger activists and older members of the committee, and maintained an information bank that allowed the committee to coordinate its activities.88 KOR also organized a number of special actions aimed at securing the release of those arrested. On May 16, 20, and 23, the KOR members still at large made group visits to the prosecutor general's office in Warsaw and demanded—unsuccessfully—to see him. Finally, on the 23d, Lipinski wrote to the prosecutor general on KOR's behalf: "As members of KOR we consider ourselves to be as fully responsible for the entire activity of KOR as our arrested colleagues. . . . We demand their release, because we are convinced that they have committed no crime and that their activity was not contrary to law, but served the interests of society. " 8 9 KOR also publicized the plight of its arrested colleagues by contacting prominent international figures such as Willy Brandt and Kurt Waldheim (the latter of whom visited Warsaw in July 1977 to receive an

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119

honorary doctorate in the days before he was stricken with "historical amnesia"), and by asking the French, Spanish, and Italian Communist parties to intercede with the PZPR on behalf of those arrested. 90 KOR also held press conferences and invited the international news media. 91 The most striking and innovative protest action was a week-long collective fast held in St. Martin's Church in Warsaw. This was not strictly a KOR undertaking, but rather a collective effort by several different groups of people. It was begun by eight fasters and joined by six others during the course of the week. The largest group participating was from KOR. It included member Barariczak and several other activists, some of whom later became members—Boguslawa Blajfer, Jerzy Geresz, Barbara Toruriczyk, Henryk Wujec, Eugeniusz Kloc, and Joanna Szczgsna. The fasters also included relatives of those in prison, among them Michnik's father and the wife and sister of imprisoned Radom worker Czestaw Chomicki. In addition, two prominent Catholic figures joined the fast—a priest, Aleksander Hauke-Ligowski of Poznari (who later became a bishop) and Bogdan Cywinski, editor of the independent Catholic monthly Znak (The Sign). Finally, the group included two worker activists—Zenon Palka, a technician from Wroclaw, and Kazimierz Switori, a radio technician from Katowice. 92 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, editor of the independent Catholic monthly Wzgz (The Link), acted as the fasters' spokesperson. He informed the government, the episcopate, and the public of the reasons for the fast and kept them apprised of its progress. Despite the fact that the church was surrounded by police, citizens of Warsaw came and laid flowers around the church as a symbol of support. 93 The official press denounced the fast as an attempt to exploit the Church and world public opinion. After it ended, a Warsaw daily (Zycie Warszawy) even carried an article characterizing the participants as "terrorists." 94 Church Actions During this period both Primate Wyszyriski and the Archbishop Karol Wojtyla of Krakow (soon to be Pope John Paul II) gave sermons that indirectly addressed the question of the arrested KOR activists. Wyszynski severely criticized repression of defenders of human rights, and Wojtyla decried the inaccurate portrayals drawn in the national mass media and called for greater respect for human, civil, and individ-

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KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle

ual rights. While the KOR activists were under arrest, the Church also made unpublicized interventions with the authorities on their behalf. 95 National and International

Pressure

Drawing on its experience since the foundation of KOR, certain sectors of Polish society reacted quickly to the detention of the committee activists. Even before the campaign of arrests had ended, seventeen prominent writers, cultural figures, and intellectuals fired off a declaration to Prosecutor General Czubiriski, condemning the first five arrests and called on others to join their protest. 96 The personnel of a number of official institutions with which the arrested were affiliated attempted to intervene on their behalf. Such actions were undertaken by the Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics of the Polish Academy of Sciences for Naimski, by KIK for Ostrowski and Arkuszewski, and by the Polish PEN Club, the Institute of Literary Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and the Union of Polish Writers for Lipski. 97 Both ROPCiO and SKS also spoke out on KOR's behalf. ROPCiO issued a statement on May 18, even before the arrest campaign had ended, which called for the activists' release, stressed the groundlessness of the arrests, and argued that the authorities' actions would only cause further unrest. 98 In late May 1977, SKS in Krakow sent a petition signed by 629 people to the Sejm, the episcopate, and Krakow Sejm deputy Tadeusz Holuj, requesting them to intervene on behalf of the workers still in prison and the arrested KOR affiliates. 99 More than 1,000 people signed open letters and petitions calling for the release of the arrested KOR activists. They included 43 scientists from Lodz, 99 students from Lodz, 97 miners from Gliwice, 349 peasants from the Grojec Region, 420 citizens of Warsaw, 18 Warsaw intellectuals (along with 140 others, whose signatures were lost during the detention of one of the initiative's organizers), and four professors of the Catholic University of Lublin. 100 In addition, Lipski mentions one small but remarkable letter signed by a group of intellectuals, all of whom were later to become important Solidarity leaders, advisers, or activists—Maria Dziewicka, Bronislaw Geremek, Helena Hagemejer, Tadeusz Kowalik, Karol Modzelewski, and Jan Strzelecki. 101 Extensive efforts were also made from abroad on behalf of the arrested KOR activists. In this case, KOR's publicity efforts, as well as the

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121

international contacts and reputations of individual members paid off. Protests came from Italy, Sweden, Belgium, West Germany, the United States, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. They came from diverse sources—political parties, trade unions, Amnesty International, and prominent intellectuals. Demonstrations were held in Stockholm, Paris, and London, and the office of the Polish National Airline in Geneva was occupied by protestors. 102

Amnesty Under this barrage of national and international pressure, the partystate relented. An amnesty for the arrested KOR activists and the five workers remaining in prison was prepared for the upcoming anniversary of the Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (July 22). Despite indications at the last minute that new charges were being drawn up against the KOR detainees, they and the five workers were released on July 23,1977. 1 0 3 The amnesty was a personal victory for the arrested and imprisoned, as well as an important test of KOR's self-defense capacity. It demonstrated that the committee had grown sufficiently strong to prevent the party-state from either destroying it outright or severely repressing and isolating it (as had been done, for example, with Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia) without paying very high costs nationally and internationally. Through the amnesty campaign, new parts of society gained experience in the practice of social self-defense. These new participants had thus become aware of their ability to resist the party-state, and the efficacy of their actions served as an example to others.

Transformation of the Committee Prior to the dramatic events of May 1977, a consensus emerged within KOR that the committee needed to modify its practices and structure in order to adapt to a changed set of circumstances, one that demanded the creation of a general committee for social self-defense. In order to do this, the committee had to accomplish four tasks. First, it had to make a financial accounting of its past work. Second, it had to establish a committee to oversee financial matters, a step accomplished with the appointment of the Council of the Social Self-Defense Fund in May 1977. Third, KOR had to work out a consensus on the new form the

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committee would take, and fourth, it had to prepare the necessary documents for the transformation. Preparations for these measures had been disrupted by the May events. 104 After the July amnesty, the committee, not without some disagreement, decided not to disband. The majority reasoned that the demands for the punishment of public officials guilty of excesses and for a public disclosure of the scope of events of 1976 had not yet been met. Additionally, dismissed workers in certain cities had been reemployed at significantly lower pay, had been denied work despite the findings of labor courts, or had been forced to work in private businesses. Another reason KOR chose not to disband was its concern about what would happen to diffuse groups of activists without the effective selfdefense shield that the committee had developed. Furthermore, many citizens continued to approach the committee with complaints of violations of their rights. 105 Prior to its transformation into a broader-based social self-defense committee, KOR appointed a three-man citizens' committee to review the committee's activities and financial status. Three highly respected public figures were chosen for the task—writer Andrzej Kijowski, Wtadyslaw Bierikowski, and Catholic journalist, Stefan Kisielewski. They found KOR's finances to be in order, and in their report, published on September 29, 1977, they concluded that the committee had acted in accordance with its stated principles and goals and, without violating the law, had created "new forms of collective action, societal self-help, and collection and dissemination of information." They recommended that the remaining funds be transferred to the Social SelfDefense Fund. 106 With an eye to accomplishing the third and fourth tasks—reaching a consensus on the transformation and preparing the necessary documents—a meeting was held on September 29, 1977, at the apartment of Edward Lipinski. Opposition to the transformation was expressed by Stefan Kaczorski and Wojciech Ziembinski (the latter of whom reasserted his membership despite his prior resignation), both of whom were now active in ROPCiO, and by Emil Morgiewicz, who was not a ROPCiO member. The three argued that KOR had achieved its stated goals and thus, should disband and transfer its funds to ROPCiO, which could then see to general social self-defense. Ziembinski further argued that KOR should adopt a liberum veto (i.e., that any dissenting vote would block action) in any vote on the future of the com-

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123

mittee. Despite its history of working for consensus in the past, the committee rejected both ideas. The name that the committee chose for its new incarnation was Komitet Samoobrony Spolecznej (Social SelfDefense Committee). The old acronym was attached in quotation marks thus making the new acronym KSS-"KOR," despite the opposition of the three dissenters. A motion on the transformation of the committee carried. The majority then voted for a recess, to be followed by a meeting of KSS-"KOR." Ziembiriski, Kaczorski, and Morgiewicz did not participate. 107 The first meeting of KSS-"KOR" produced a "Resolution" (Uchwala), informing the public of the committee's reasons for continuing its work and also describing its new status. Its new goals, printed in the text, henceforth appeared in each copy of Komunikat: The goals of the Social Self-Defense Committee "KOR" are: 1) To struggle with repression for reasons of politics, world view, religion or race, and to aid those persecuted for these reasons. 2) To struggle against violations of the rule of law, and to help those who have been wronged. 3) To fight for institutional protection of civil rights and freedoms. 4) To support and defend all social initiatives aimed at realizing Human and Civil Rights. 108 These were to remain the committee's goals until its dissolution. At the time of the transformation many of the activists involved with KOR also felt the need to articulate a positive program of political change and did so in the four-part "Declaration of the Democratic Movement." In the declaration, the authors stated their belief that the flawed relationship between the authorities and society was the fundamental cause of the crisis in Poland, and they sought to change this relationship. The first part of the declaration posited that the expansion of basic freedoms in four areas was necessary to rectify this problem. These were freedom of conviction, freedom of speech and information, freedom of union, association, and assembly, and finally, freedom to work. In its second part the signatories argued that the authorities could help implement the necessary changes by observing the international human rights pacts they had ratified. In the third section, the democratic movement asserted its co-

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responsibility for the future development of Poland, regardless of whether or not the authorities recognized that claim. It made this assertion on the basis of the fact that it had existed since the constitutional protests of 1975. Last, the movement called on citizens to take the initiative in democratizing the country and defending human rights. It mentioned several specific areas in this regard—educational reform, independent workers' representation in factories, cooperatives for peasants and artisans, economic reform (including the abolition of hard currency shops), support of the underground press, and social self-defense in the face of the state's violation of the law. 109 The declaration called for the population to cooperate with KSS"KOR" to achieve the committee's aims. It was signed by 110 people who had been involved with KOR. 1 1 0 The movement also created an underground journal to serve as its mouthpiece, Gios (The Voice), which first appeared in October 1977. Antoni Macierewicz served as its editor-in-chief. 111

KOR's Relief Efforts KOR's relief activities continued and expanded after its formal foundation. It is important to remember that the committee's publicity efforts and the amnesty campaign were built upon this work. Only by its persistent efforts to contact the repressed was KOR able to collect sufficiently reliable information with which to confront the party-state. This is not to say that KOR's relief work was based on ulterior motives. Rather, the original humanitarian impetus for the committee's foundation complemented the publicity campaign necessary for securing the amnesty. KOR distributed three distinct kinds of relief—financial, medical, and legal. Based on their financial situation, those who had been dismissed from work and the families of those imprisoned were given money to take care of their basic material needs. 1 1 2 KOR also found sympathetic lawyers 113 to replace less enthusiastic public defenders and paid court costs and fines. 114 The committee also encouraged workers to contest dismissals in the labor courts and through appeals commissions (Terenowe Komisje Odwolawcze) and paid lawyers for this purpose as well. 115 Medical assistance was not only provided for those who had suffered beatings or torture; the committee also helped

KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle

125

dismissed workers pay for routine and emergency medical bills, since the unemployed in Poland are not provided with free medical care.116 According to Lipski, KOR never demanded that the workers they helped become activists in return for assistance. Nevertheless, in Radom, Ursus, Grudzigdz, and Lodz, however, some who received assistance did become KOR activists. Only one request was made of aid recipients—that they point out others who were in similar straits. Lipski reports that compliance with this demand was universal. 117 KOR was never able to establish a completely comprehensive picture of the extent of repression. Its data was limited to what could be provided by those with whom the committee was in contact. Thus, the committee was never able to definitively establish the total number of workers tried, arrested, imprisoned, dismissed, released, reemployed, or otherwise affected by the June events and their aftermath. The data that KOR collected on repression was of an "at least" character.118 Nevertheless, the information that it collected provides the most extensive picture of the repression that exists, i.e., far more comprehensive than anything published by the official media. Because of the committee's work, the relative plight of various working-class and factory communities, the details of the trials, and the procedural irregularities involved in the arrests and trials were brought to light.119 During the first year of its operation, KOR managed to collect substantial donations, both inside and outside of Poland, to support its relief action (3,251,000 ztoty: US$47,422).120 An important role in the collection of overseas support for the opposition as a whole was played by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who spent time in France and Belgium in 1976.121 The monies collected outside of Poland were not utilized directly in the early stages of the amnesty struggle. However, thanks to a Polish government service that permitted emigres to buy foodstuffs for their families in Poland, the workers of Radom and Ursus were supplied with food parcels.122 Another important source of funds was a group of Western authors who donated the royalties from the sales of their works published in Poland. 123 The existing data indicate that the vast majority of the assistance that KOR provided to the workers was delivered in the last quarter of 1976 and the first quarter of 1977. In fact, 86 percent was distributed during the first seven months of the committee's existence.124 This is apparently due to the fact that most of the workers' legal costs were incurred during the first six months of the KOR's operation. 125

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KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle

KOR carried on relief efforts in six cities—Ursus, Radom, Gdansk, Lodz, Plock, and Grudzi§idz. The available data on the total effort are summarized in table 5.1. By late September 1977, the relief campaign on behalf of the victims of the June events was virtually completed. 126 As table 5.1 indicates, the majority (58 percent) of KOR relief was distributed in Radom, yet only 49 percent of the cases identified and 45 percent of the total number of recipients lived in Radom. This is reflective of the fact that Radom was the site of the most extensive juridical repression and hence of the highest legal costs. In Radom, KOR provided assistance in 53 percent of the cases it identified. As mentioned earlier, the co-organizers of the Radom relief effort (after Miroslaw Chojecki turned to publishing work) were Zbigniew and Zofia Romaszewski. The group of activists who worked in Radom spent a great deal of time attending the numerous trials held there. A fairly extensive report on these trials was prepared by Jan Litynski and published in a special issue of Biuletyn Informacyjny.127 It was a rare occasion when the activists in Radom were not harassed by the security forces. It was not until October 7,1976, that KOR members and coworkers were able to attend a trial without experiencing harassment in some form. 128 Police interference included identification checks, detentions, denials of entry into court rooms, interrogations, confiscations of notes, beatings of activists, and threats of arrest and imprisonment. 129 The police also tried to mount a disinformation campaign. In "conversations" with relief recipients and KOR activists, the committee was accused of being agents or an unwitting tool of "Israel," "Radio Free Europe," "West German revanchists," and "Jews." The police also tried to use bribery and threats to dissuade workers or their families from making appeals and formal complaints. 130 There were also reports at this time that the slogan "KOR=Zydy" (KOR=Jewboys) was painted in numerous public places in Radom. Such tactics did not provoke the sort of anti-Semitic response for which the sloganeers, no doubt, hoped. In fact, in some cases it provoked the opposite. One inhabitant of Radom remembered thinking that if KOR's relief efforts were the work of Jews, there were far too few Jews in Poland. 131 Immediately following KOR's foundation, the sheer quantity of trials and appeals in Radom put a strain on the committee's financial resources. Legal bills, fines, and trial costs went unpaid, and KOR was not able to meet the basic needs of the workers satisfactorily.132 It also had a difficult time providing a sufficient number of qualified legal defenders. 133

KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle TABLE

KOR's Relief

127

5.1.

Efforts

City

(A)

(B)°

(C)

(D)«

(E)

(F)

(G)»

Ursus Radom Gdansk Lódz Ptock Grudzijidz

266b

25 49 9 7 4 4

169 274 34 68 32 25

28 45 6 11 5 4

63 53 36 100 73 58

730,470 1,825,760 113,010 227,550 40,000 189,000

23 58 4 7 1 6

Total

511 93 68 44 43

1,025

602

3,126,590

SOURCES: For case information, Lipski, p. 124. For financial information, KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 14, p. 1. NOTE:

(A) Cases registered.

(B) Percentage of total cases registered. (C) Families receiving assistance. (D) Percentage of total families receiving assistance. (E) Percentage of registered cases receiving assistance. (F) Monies paid out (zloty). (G) Percentage of total zloty paid.

"Percentages may not equal 1 0 0 due to rounding. ' ' T h i s figure includes 64 cases of persons residing in Ursus but w o r k i n g in Warsaw.

In Radom, as in the other cities to which KOR delivered aid, the work of activists extended beyond the monitoring of trials. They checked on whether fired workers had been rehired at their previous wage and skill levels. If not, this sometimes necessitated the continuation of outside financial assistance, especially for larger families. 134 Other important tasks included keeping track of who was in prison and who had been released, documenting police brutality, and determining whether factories obeyed the verdicts of labor courts. 135 One activity unique to Radom was the investigation of suspicious deaths that occurred around June 25. KOR was able to confirm the circumstances of four deaths but was unable to untangle rumors about another seven. 1 3 6 The most troubling case was the death of Jan Brozyna. When his family managed to produce witnesses who had seen policemen delivering a severe beating to someone at the place where the corpse was later found, the witnesses themselves were accused and convicted of the murder. KOR spent a great deal of effort in trying to exonerate the witnesses and in publicizing their case. 137 Except for Radom, Ursus was the area most strongly affected by repression. In Ursus, KOR assisted in 63 percent of the cases it identified (see table 5.1). These relief efforts were directed by Andrzej Celiriski and Henryk Wujec. 138 The outline of KOR's work in Ursus parallel that

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KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle

in Radom. For instance, the committee provided medical services to those who were deprived of them, acting with the occasional help of the Church. 139 KOR likewise paid legal costs and tried to secure competent defense lawyers. As in Radom, there was a shortage of lawyers willing to oblige. Moreover, court-appointed lawyers in Ursus sometimes charged exorbitant fees. 140 KOR activists tried to attend the trials of Ursus workers and met with harassment similar to that experienced in Radom. In at least one case, KOR activists were physically abused and pelted with eggs by twenty "unknown assailants." 141 Like in Radom, police agents attempted to discredit the committee by linking it to Radio Free Europe, and they accused relief workers of squandering funds earmarked for workers. The most pressing problems in Ursus were the vast numbers of those dismissed and the immense financial burden being out of work placed on families. For this reason, KOR's assistance effort there included a number of appeals to the labor courts. 142 KOR's efforts in the other four cities were much smaller in scope than in Radom or Ursus, due to the fact that repression in these centers was less severe. The relief effort in Gdansk was perhaps the weakest. Assistance was received in only slightly over one-third of the cases identified there (see table 5.1). It seems fairly certain that Bogdan Borusewicz, who had made contact with KOR in Radom and then joined the committee, and Andrzej Gwiazda and Joanna Duda-Gwiazda, later KOR intervention bureau workers in Gdañsk, played a role in these efforts. 143 The situation in Lódz was a curious one; assistance was received in all sixty-eight of the cases identified there (see table 5.1). The leading role seems to have been played by KOR member Sreniowski and his associates. In Lódz, the only form of repression was dismissals. The workers attempted unsuccessfully to use the official trade unions channels (CRZZ) to appeal labor court decisions.144 As in the aforementioned cities, KOR helped workers in Lódz appeal successfully for reinstatement in the labor courts, only to have the overturned verdicts ignored by factory management. 145 It seems that most of the dismissed workers in Lódz eventually found new jobs, albeit below their levels of skill and often in factories where there had been no strikes in June 1976.146 There is little information available about relief work in Plock, other than that which is summarized in table 5.1. Nevertheless, it is known that assistance was rendered to dismissed workers from the

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129

Mazowiecki Plant and that appeals in the labor courts were sometimes successful. 147 Grudzigdz, too, presents a unique case. The forty-three workers dismissed from the Pomorska factory (POiE) created their own mutual aid society and contested their dismissals in the courts. It was only after they contacted KOR in Warsaw that the committee began assisting them financially.148 Later, this group would work closely with the newspaper Robotnik (see chapter 7). The period of the workers' amnesty struggle was the crucial test of whether an oppositional politics was feasible under the party-state regime in Poland. Although KOR had not achieved all of its stated aims, it had secured the release of those imprisoned and thus blunted the worst of the post-June repression. It had emerged from the struggle organizationally in tact and with a larger base of activists and supporters. In the process it had gained a larger sense of future purpose as evidenced by the stated aims of KSS-"KOR" and the "Declaration of the Democratic Movement." KOR had also pioneered a number of different tools and techniques that permitted the committee to practice oppositional politics effectively. Clearly the creation of an underground press as an alternative means of publicity, as well as the ability of the committee to finance itself and other initiatives, were significant developments. The organization of a movement with a small open membership and a larger, less public activist base proved effective in maintaining a profile in society while complicating repression by the party-state. The social work of the relief teams in Radom, Ursus, and other cities, later institutionalized in the work of the Intervention Bureau, allowed the committee to mitigate economic and legal coercion by the party-state and the fear caused by such repression. KOR also reinvented, refined, or lent a higher degree of purposeful organization to a number of forms of collective action, which were effective in putting pressure on the partystate. These included larger and more-concerted open letter campaigns, organized public protests and demonstrations, and hunger strikes. Later, these techniques would be successfully employed and incorporated into shopfloor protest by workers who played key roles in the foundation of Solidarity in 1980 (see chapter 7). More importantly, the way in which this array of tactics was employed had allowed the committee to successfully defend itself against the party.

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KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty Struggle

The committee's response to the death of Stanislaw Pyjas and the intensified protest that followed it was a watershed in the development of self-defense. The party-state authorities learned that repression aimed at destroying the committee would not be an effective solution to the problems posed by its existence. In fact, such repression proved to be counterproductive. The killing of Pyjas and the subsequent round-up of KOR members provoked countermobilizations involving thousands of people across the country. It also elicited disquiet and unfavorable publicity in the West, with which the Gierek regime enjoyed extensive economic links and improved relations. Thus the period of the workers' amnesty struggle was not only the time when the opposition began to carve out public space in Poland, but it was also the juncture at which social self-defense developed as a means to establish the boundaries of that space vis-à-vis the state. Though the party-state would continue to harass the opposition, it now concentrated its efforts on containing and reducing the effectiveness of the opposition's actions, rather than on its outright eradication. 149 In effect KOR had begun the process of securing the de facto toleration for the public space that would precede the reconstitution of civil society in Poland. The process of expanding the liberated public space and firmly establishing its boundaries continued throughout the 1970s. KSS-"KOR" would expand its actions and organizational base and would be joined by an array of politically, socially, and functionally diverse movements and organizations throughout Poland. I will next review some of the more important developments in this arena.

6

The Extension of the Public Space

We consider that expropriation of society from its right to organize itself and the resulting social atomization and destruction of social ties are the fundamental characteristics of a totalitarian system. Therefore the essential element of all actions for democracy must be social selforganization, i.e., the creation of self-governing bodies independent of the state, which will gather the majority or at least a good part of our society. —Jacek Kurori.1

KOR's success inspired others in Poland to form new oppositional movements and institutions. The organized opposition grew to a size and diversity that was unprecedented in the Soviet bloc. It encompassed social groups and political activists outside the original KOR milieu, thus extending the liberated public space. The growth of opposition made it increasingly difficult for the party-state to repress the organizations within the developing public space, and thus further strengthened the boundaries KOR had established between the public space and the state. The most important development of this period, the creation of independent groups of worker activists, deserves special attention, a task for which I have devoted the next chapter in its entirety. These worker activists would become the most important force in securing the de jure recognition of the public space and the actors within it that marked the reconstitution of Polish civil society. In this chapter, I will describe and delineate the broader oppositional environment within which these worker activists functioned.

KSS-"KOR" After Its Transformation KSS-"KOR'"s membership and activities continued to expand until the creation of Solidarity in the late summer of 1980. The committee existed until the Solidarity Congress in the autumn of 1981, at which time it

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The Extension of the Public Space

formally dissolved itself. However, with the rise of Solidarity, the committee ceased to be a critical actor, not only because Solidarity made much of its activity irrelevant, but also because many of K S S - " K O R " ' s most important activists devoted themselves to the union's work. 2 In the period preceding the foundation of Solidarity, K S S - " K O R " developed into a national movement. It was always strongest in Warsaw, the h o m e of Poland's largest intellectual community. However, prior to the strike wave of 1980, K S S - " K O R " in Warsaw began to establish extensive contacts with workers in Ursus (who later led Solidarity's influential Mazowsze Branch). There were also other large K S S - " K O R " operations in Krakow, Szczecin, Gdansk, and Lodz. In Lodz, the movement put out its own journal, Kronika Lodzka (Lodz Chronicle), after successfully publishing a trial Lodz edition of Biuletyn Informacyjny. It also organized an "Independent Discussion Club" (Niezalezny Klub Dyskusyjny). The Lodz K S S - " K O R " environment included a number of young poets and writers who were responsible for the publication of Poland's second underground literary magazine, Puis (Pulse). 3 In the Krakow area, the movement was especially strong in SKS student circles and in the Lenin steelworks (see chapter 7). The Szczecin and Gdansk milieus will be discussed in detail in chapter?. In Poznari and Wroclaw local K S S - " K O R " activists formed Clubs for Social Self-Defense (Kluby Samoobrony Spolecznej). The Social SelfDefense Club in Wroclaw (KSS-W) issued a declaration announcing its foundation on May 3 , 1 9 7 9 . 4 It published its own monthly, Biuletyn Dolnoslpski (Lower Silesian Bulletin), starting in May 1979. In one years' time, the Club managed to generate eleven issues, including two double numbers. Biuletyn Dolnoslgski was printed by a local underground publishing house, the "Liberation" Publishing Cooperative (Kooperatywa Wydawnicza "Wyzwolenie"). 5 KSS-W carried on a number of other activities, including the creation of a local Intervention Bureau and the making of periodic appeals and statements on the questions of the day and in protest of the harassment of oppositionists. It also maintained a network for the distribution of bibula, including Robotnik (The Worker—see chapter 7) to factories. 6 Perhaps the most important public protest that KSS-W organized was a march on the ninth anniversary of the December 1970 massacre

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of Gdansk workers. Despite detentions and house searches by the police and the distribution of inflammatory leaflets by agents provocateurs calling for armed struggle, the march, cosponsored by the local chapter of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights, ended peaceably in a memorial mass attended by 3,000 people in Wroclaw Cathedral. 7 The Social Self-Defense Club centered in Poznan (Klub Samoobrony Spolecznej Regionu Wielkopolsko-Kujawskiego or KSS-WK) was less developed than its counterpart in Wroclaw. The KOR milieu in Poznan centered around member Baranczak and was largely confined to the writer-intellectual environment around Adam Mickiewicz University, the student population organized in SKS (see below), and avant garde theater circles. Baranczak attributed this to the fact that Poznan had been politically cautious since the uprising there in 1956. This was especially true of its working-class community, which was very well-paid by Polish standards. Nonetheless, a relative degree of success was achieved in distributing Robotnik within factories, including those of the highly sensitive armaments industry.8 KSS-WK included affiliates of both KSS-"KOR" and ROPCiO in Poznan, Kalisz, and Bydgoszcz. 9 A number of members of KSS-WK and KSS-W played important roles in the foundation and operation of local Solidarity branches. In Poznan, because of the caution of the local working class, the formation of a Solidarity branch there began as an intellectual initiative in which workers later took part. Important Solidarity activists emerged from the milieu in Poznan included KSS-"KOR" member Jerzy Nowacki, Jacek Kubiak (who established a local information center for Solidarity in September 1980), and the poet Lech Dymarski (who was one of the founders of Poznan Solidarity, as well as its press spokesperson, and a member of the union's National Coordinating Commission). Two KSSWK members also became the head and deputy head of Kalisz Solidarity (Bogustaw Sliwa and ROPCiO affiliate Antoni Pietkiewicz, respectively). KSS in Wroclaw likewise contributed a number of important activists to Solidarity. Mariusz Wilk helped to organize poligraphy at the Lenin Shipyard in the summer of 1980 and co-edited the Gdansk Interfactory Strike Committee's bulletin, Solidarnosc (Solidarity). Others included Zenon Palka; Krzysztof Turkowski, who served as deputy head of the Wroclaw branch; Jan Waszkiewicz, who was a member of Solidarity's

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National Coordinating Commission after the Union Congress in 1981; and Jaroslaw Broda, w h o edited the local Solidarity bulletin, Solidarnosc Dolnoslgska (Lower Silesian Solidarity). KSS-"KOR" also had smaller centers of activity in Gizycko, Gorzow Wielkopolski, Grudzi^dz, Kalisz, Lublin, Myszkow, Poznan, Radom, the Katowice area, Tarnow, Toruri, and Walbrzych, as well as representatives in Legnica, N o w y S$cz, Stalowa Wola, Zbrosza Duza, Shipsk, and Rzeszow. Some activists from these cities later played important roles in Solidarity regional branches, e.g., Ewa Sobol of Radom; Wieslaw Cichori, w h o edited the Solidarity bulletin in Toruri, Wolne Stowo (The Free Word); and Jerzy Jacek Pilichowski, w h o was secretary of the Solidarity branch in Walbrzych for a time and a major figure in the disputes over Solidarity in the Katowice area. 1 0 In the period after KOR's transformation, political divisions began to emerge within the movement. Certain members refused to sign the "Declaration of the Democratic M o v e m e n t " because they did not agree with its larger aims, e.g., Andrzejewski, Mikolajska, Zieja. 1 1 Mikol ajska and Zieja expressed further reservations, as did Jan Kielanowski, Maria Wosiek, and the group around the independent monthly G/os (The Voice) w h e n the committee entertained a proposal to accept observer status with the Socialist International. 1 2 The most troubling factional problems pitted the G/os group (including Macierewicz, Naimski, and several others) against activists of a social-democratic orientation such as Michnik, Kurori, Blumsztajn, and Lityriski. Problems manifested themselves on both personal and political levels. The G/os group evolved politically in a nationalist direction and, as time went on, this led to several acrimonious disputes with the Social-Democrats. 1 3 KSS-"KOR" continued to support a range of other independent initiatives through publicity, social self-defense, and financial assistance. Although nearly half the budget of the Social Self-Defense Fund seems to have been devoted to the Intervention Bureau and other committee expenses, the fund was generous in its support of other initiatives. Its budgets from September 1977 to September 1979 included support for underground journals such as Biuletyn Informacyjny, Robotnik, G/os, Puis, Biuletyn Informacyjny—Przeglpd Prasy Zagranicznej (Information Bulletin—Review of the Overseas Press), Krytyka (Critique), Indeks (Index), Placowka (The Outpost), and Spotkania (Encounters); loans to in-

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dependent publishing houses; support for underground pedagogy (the Society of Academic Courses, the Peasant University, and various underground libraries); as well as grants to independent student, worker, and peasant organizations. 14 Finally, during the pre-Solidarity period KSS-"KOR" created a Polish Helsinki Commission (Komisja Helsiriska w Polsce) to draw up a report for the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to maintain contacts with similar human rights groups in other countries. Its members were Ludwik Cohn, Edward Lipinski, Zbigniew Romaszewski, and Aniela Steinsbergowa. 15 Prior to the birth of Solidarity, KSS-"KOR" organized an even greater number of tactically sophisticated protest, self-defense, and support actions than it had in the past. Those directly linked to worker initiatives are described in the next chapter. A full description of KSS-"KOR" activity in this period, however, is beyond the scope of this book. 16

The Polish Catholic Church and Politics in the 1970s The role played by the Catholic Church in Polish politics is a complex one. It cannot be explained with a few simple generalizations. Its role has varied across historical periods, at different levels of Church organization, and in different regions of Poland. For example, during the partition and the postwar eras the Church served in many cases as a bulwark against the power of state, while during the interwar era, the Church was, on balance, very supportive of the period's traditional authoritarianism. Since the collapse of the Communist regime, the Church has attempted to turn its social agenda into law, and cautiously supported like-minded political parties (e.g., the Christian-National Union). Periodically, there are disagreements within the Church on its proper political role. 17 Similarly, the Church's role and influence varies according to the approach of the local clergy, the size of non-Catholic populations in the area, or the location of the parish (i.e., whether it is rural or urban). While observers may differ in their assessments of the Church's role, almost no one would dismiss it as inconsequential. 18 Because of the adjustments to Poland's postwar boundaries and the virtual annihilation of Polish Jewry at the hands of the Nazis, the country's population is over 90 percent Catholic. The Church as an institution com-

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mands respect, and attendance at mass is high by European standards. In public opinion research it repeatedly receives high confidence and approval ratings. The intensity of Polish devotion to the Church is not a manifestation of exceptional faith. Polish society does not exhibit exceptional levels of religious knowledge or obedience to Church teachings on a range of social issues (e.g., abortion, sobriety, premarital sex, etc.). It is no country of saints. Devotion to the Church is a question of national identity. This stems back to the partition period, when the Polish nation was subjected to campaigns of forced religious and national conversion, or when Poles faced formal legal discrimination on the basis of their nationality and religion. The most notorious examples of this were Bismarck's Kulturkampf and the forced Russification campaigns of the tsars. During this period the Church was often the only institution that had a Polish character. Thus Polish national consciousness came to be strongly tied to a Catholic religious identity. At its best this experience has led to a universal rejection of religious and ethnic discrimination and an appreciation for the benefits of toleration. At its worst it has lead to an exclusionary notion of citizenship and a xenophobic, aggressive nationalism. 19 As mentioned in chapter 2, after failing to bring the Church under its direct control and deciding not to destroy it, the party-state attempted to come to a modus vivendi with the Church. This did not mean that relations between the two became normal or friendly; the state continued periodically to harass the Church and lay Catholic organizations. The Church in turn cooperated with the party-state on a limited basis to secure the resources and leeway it needed to perform its spiritual mission. Thus, the Polish Church was able to maintain its moral and organizational independence after 1956 and escaped the collaborative role into which other national Churches in the region were forced. 20 The Polish Catholic Church did not behave like a conventional political actor. As the only substantial independent organization tolerated by the party-state, its very existence was political. While the Church had to be sensitive to political developments, it tried to avoid direct involvement in politics. Its public stances were taken on moral grounds. The persecution of the Church and its followers during the Stalinist era, as well as the continued discrimination against Catholics in public life, led the Church to stress the universal moral principles of Christian ethics. In stark contrast to its public stance in the interwar era, the post-

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war Church came to espouse fundamental human rights, such as social justice, toleration, and freedom of conscience and expression. Through the propagation of these principles, the Church provided a readily accessible alternative system of values that stood in stark contrast to the reality of political life in Poland. Judeo-Christian ethics, whether religiously inspired or not, 21 are the foundation upon which the social and moral expectations of most Poles are based. This is important on a pre-political level because popular resistance to the partystate in large measure sprang from this moral foundation. Thus, while the Church was not a political opposition, it publicly espoused many of the values for which the opposition struggled. During the 1970s, the Church's new attitude promoted a rapprochement between different segments of the Polish intelligentsia. Formerly anticlerical intellectuals, who had already started to reevaluate the relevance of Christian ethics, began to see the Church as an institution in a more favorable light.22 This allowed for cooperation within the opposition between lay Catholics and nonbelievers, 23 as well as for both to agree on the fundamental importance of human rights. Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, the Church took a number of public stands against party-state policies that it saw as immoral. Despite this convergence of views, it would not be wholly accurate to describe the Church and the opposition of the 1970s as political allies. At times, they cooperated on concrete cases, but the Church was constrained in just how far it could or wanted to go in its support of the opposition. In contrast to the Solidarity period, when the Church hierarchy attempted to mediate between the union and the party-state, or the 1980s, when the Church provided space and shelter for independent cultural initiatives, Church political involvement in the 1970s was less direct because it posed greater risks. In discussing the role of the Church in politics in the 1970s, it is essential to remember that the Church is a complex hierarchical organization. Its politics are not identical at all levels of the hierarchy (primate, episcopate, within bishoprics and parishes, and the laity), and vary according to the individual beliefs of individual clergy and lay people. Lay Catholics participated in the opposition in large numbers according to their own conscience and made many important contributions to different movements as activists and leaders. Individual priests differed in their orientation toward the opposition. Two priests, Jan Zieja and Zbigniew Kamiriski, were members of

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KOR. However, other priests were also supportive of the opposition. For example, Fathers Stanislaw Malkowski, Leon Kantorski, and Bronistaw Dembowski either participated in oppositional protest fasts or hosted them in their churches. Other notable examples include Reverend Bronislaw Sroka, who spoke at a public commemoration of the massacre of workers on the Baltic Coast (see chapter 7), and Reverend Czeslaw Sadlowski, who had close contact with peasant activists in the Zbrosza Duza area. Many other priests gave the opposition short-term access to their parish facilities or collected money, food, and clothing in support of relief efforts and other oppositional activities. Nevertheless, there were other individual clergy, some of whom were very highly placed, who were hostile to the opposition or currents within it.24 Before his death in 1981, the Church was led by Stefan Cardinal Wyszyriski, a leader of great skill and perseverance. The independence of the Polish Catholic Church was in large part attributable to the primate's stewardship. In the late 1970s, the primate, the episcopate, and individual bishops made official pronouncements on public issues and events that were often intended to be and were seen as supportive of the opposition. However, these statements were always made in the language of respect for ethical principles and never incited the public against the party-state or directly called for support of the opposition. They never condemned the party-state in a blanket fashion, but only decried individual acts. On other occasions, the Church also worked behind the scenes to persuade the party-state to release political prisoners or to be less repressive. 25 The Church always ventured very cautiously into political matters to protect itself from repression. This was a question of the Church's own priorities and agenda; the hierarchy's primary goal was the preservation and expansion of its ability to perform its spiritual mission. It had to maintain a reasonable relationship with the party-state in order to build new churches, train its personnel, and keep the security forces from disrupting Church activity. The episcopate was unwilling to sacrifice that ability to any political cause. In particular, during episodes of large-scale unrest the Church reacted with caution. During the events of 1956, 1970-71, 1976, and 1981, while the Church criticized partystate actions that violated norms of moral conduct, it also called for compromise and the restoration public order. 26 While such calls were genuinely motivated by a desire to avoid bloodshed and promote real compromise, they were sometimes exploited by the party-state author-

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ities, 27 and led to party-state concessions to the Church on a number of issues. 28 Another event of religious significance, which also had important ramifications for Polish politics, was the election of Karol Wojtyla, the bishop of Krakow, to the throne of Saint Peter in October 1978. His election was met with jubilation and the new pope's pilgrimage to Poland had an important psychological effect on Polish society. One observer has described the pilgrimage's effect in this fashion: The Pope expressed in public what had been hidden for decades, the people's private hopes and sorrows, their longing for uncensored truth, for dignity and courage in defense of their human and civil rights. A whole generation experienced for the first time a feeling of collective power and exaltation of which they had never dreamt. It gave them a sense of confidence, unity and strength to take up their causes even more decisively.29 One fact that well illustrates the effect of the pope's visit is that, although there had been a conspicuous absence of religious symbols during the protests of 1976, they appeared as a ubiquitous sign of workers' identity as Poles both at the strike at the Gdansk shipyard and throughout the Solidarity period. Some observers fear that this symbolism was indicative of religious fanaticism or a threat of encroaching theocracy in Poland. However, both sociological30 and historical evidence do not support this conclusion. During the 1970s, ultramontane groups did not play a large role in the Polish opposition. 31 There were, however, a number of small oppositional groups who were active on the boundary between politics and religion. They were primarily concerned with the free exercise of worship; their activism grew out of long-standing struggles to build churches or to defend illegal chapels. The first of these, founded in Opole Stare in November 1978, was the Believers' Self-Defense Committee in Podlasie (Podlaski Komitet Samoobrony Ludzi Wierz^cych). The second, the Christian Community of Working People (Chrzescijariska Wspolnota Ludzi Pracy or ChWLP), was founded in Nowa Huta in April 1979. It published its own paper, Krzyz Nowohucki (Cross of Nowa Huta), and organized a demonstration on the tenth anniversary (April 27, 1980) of the erection of a cross in Nowa Huta, in which approximately 1,500 people participated. One of the driving forces behind ChWLP was Franciszek Grabczyk, an editor of Robotnik. Two oth-

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er Believers' Self-Defense Committees were also founded in the Cisôw (December 1979) and Przemysl (August 1979) areas. 32

The Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights and Its Factionalization In early 1977, when KOR was no longer overwhelmed with cases related to the June events, it began to talk with other independent activists, including the group responsible for publishing the independent monthly U Progu (At the Threshold), about a general human rights initiative that would have been called the Committee for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (Komitet Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela). A joint declaration was drawn up, and its signing as well as a public announcement of the formation of the new committee were scheduled for March 29, 1977. However, the initiative was preempted on March 26, when two of the activists who had been negotiating with KOR, Andrzej Czuma and Leszek Moczulski, announced the creation of a new organization, the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela), also known by the acronym—ROPCiO. In what appeared to be an effort to split the committee, ROPCiO's founders tried to convince individual KOR members to sign its declaration, while excluding others. Of the eighteen signatories of the ROPCiO founding declaration, two of them, KOR members Pajdak and Zieja, immediately withdrew. They were soon followed by Reverend Ludwik Wisniewski. However, KOR members Kaczorski and Ziembiriski stood by ROPCiO. 33 ROPCiO's raison d'être was to compel the party-state to fulfill its commitments as a signatory of international human rights pacts, including United Nations covenants and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act. Like KSS"KOR," it was ultimately interested in the restoration of democracy and national sovereignty. It seems to have been a conglomeration of people with liberal and nationalist views. The acrimony accompanying ROPCiO's formation was unfortunate in the sense that it represented the loss of any opportunity to forge a more broadly based, unified opposition movement. This initial conflict also boded poorly for ROPCiO's future: the movement was continually plagued by factionalism and splintering, thus diminishing its effectiveness. Nonetheless, ROPCiO was successful in a number of fields. It set up information and consultation points 34 as well as discussion groups

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in a number of cities and towns. 35 According to Lipski, one area in which ROPCiO was weak was "social work" such as that done by KOR's Intervention Bureau. 36 ROPCiO had members in a number of Polish cities. The largest concentrations seem to have been in Warsaw, Lodz, Gdansk, Poznari, and Lublin, with smaller followings in Krakow, Wroclaw, the Katowice area, Bydgoszcz, Kalisz, Przemysl, and Radom. ROPCiO was prolific in the publishing field but its bibula was not as widely distributed as that of KSS-"KOR. " 3 7 Its most important publication was Opinia (Opinion), a monthly review of uncensored news and political opinion. The movement also had its own journal directed toward peasants, Gospodarz (Farmer).38 It also published a journal for young people called Bratniak (a reference to a prewar student fraternal assistance organization) and several local journals, such as Aspekt (Aspect) in Lodz, Kronika Lubelska (Lublin Chronicle), and Wolne Sfowo (The Free Word) in Kalisz, Wroclaw, and Zdunska Wola. 39 ROPCiO and its splinter groups were also very prolific in organizing patriotic demonstrations on the anniversaries of important Polish historical events. Memorial masses followed by marches were staged on patriotic occasions in various cities in the late 1970s. Table 6.1 summarizes these events. Although KSS-"KOR" did not help to officially organize these demonstrations, often its members, activists and supporters participated in them. This was particularly true in Gdansk, where collaboration between the two milieus was strong. 40 Despite these successes, ROPCiO was hampered by factional rivalries, which often turned into organizational splits. Sharp divisions developed between factions around Czuma and Moczulski at the Third All-Poland ROPCiO meeting in June 1978. Thereafter, Moczulski's faction began to publish its own paper, Droga (The Way). In September 1978, it seems that two separate Fourth All-Poland meetings were held, one by a faction around Moczulski and Karol Glogowski and another by the rest of the movement. Both groups laid claim to the organization, and the movement split amidst a hail of polemics. 41 The name ROPCiO was kept by the Czuma faction. Many of its student members formed their own organization, the Young Poland Movement (Ruch Mlodej Polski or RMP) and took the journal Bratniak with them. Other splits followed quickly. The Movement of Free Democrats (Ruch Wolnych Demokratow), for example was formed by Karol Glogowski, the editors of Aspekt—Andrzej Mazur and Andrzej Ostoja-

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6 . 1 .

Patriotic Demonstrations, 1978-1980 Event Commemorated Polish independence, 1918

Constitution of 1791

Thirty-fifth anniversary of Warsaw uprising

Fortieth anniversary of World War II Fortieth anniversary of Soviet invasion of Poland Memorial masses for Katyn massacre

Date

Nov. Nov. Nov. Nov.

11, 11, 11, 11,

City

Gdansk Warsaw Warsaw Krakow

800-1,000 thousands 2,000 800-1000

May 3, 1979 May 3, 1980

Gdansk Gdansk

1,000 7,000-15,000 (mass) 7,000-7,500 (march)

July 31, 1979

Warsaw

several thous. (mass) 1,000 (march)

Sept. 1, 1979

Warsaw

1,000

Sept. 17, 1979

Warsaw

???

April April April April April April April April April

Katowice Krakow Lodz Poznari Szczecin Toruri Warsaw Tamow (1) Tarnow (2)

small small small small small small small 500 7,000

11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 20, 27,

1978 1978 1979 1979

Attendance (est.)

1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980

numbers numbers numbers numbers numbers numbers numbers

Lipski, pp. 277 and 345-53; Biuletyn Informacyjny 37, pp. 6-8; Biuletyn Informacyjny 31-2 (July-August 1979), p. 33; Biuletyn Informacyjny 34 (November-December 1979), pp. 6-7; Biuletyn Informacyjny 25 (September-October 1978), p. 14; KZ WZZ-W, Robotnik Wybrze.a 3 (March 1979), p. 8; Biuletyn Informacyjny 29, (April 1979), p. 19; Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne 5 (May 1980), p. 8; Lech B§idkowski, "Man of What?" in The Book of Lech Walesa, p. 108; and Robotnik 50 (May 30, 1980), p. 1. SOURCES:

Owsiany—and others. 42 Another group, the Committee for National Self-Determination (Komitet Porozumienia na rzecz Samostanowienia Narodu, or KPSN) was formed in February 1979 and published its own journal, Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth), edited by Ryszard Perzyriski, Marian Piika, and Wojciech Ziembiriski.43

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Moczulski became the leading figure in the Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, or KPN), founded on August 31,1979. He described the movement's primary aims as follows: "The opportunity should not be wasted of creating a new, independent third Polish Republic. The only road which leads to this goal is to end Soviet domination by liquidating the power of the Polish United Workers' Party." 44 KPN was a confederation of the Moczulski ROPCiO faction and a number of obscure groups with no traceable history. Considering KPN's stated intentions toward the PZPR, it was not surprising that the organization attracted much attention from the police. KPN also published a paper called Gazeta Polska (Polish Gazette). 45

Student Movements The protests that followed the death of Stanistaw Pyjas led to the creation of the Student Solidarity Committee (SKS) in Krakow. However, prior to this, in the winter of 1977, student activists from Warsaw and Krakow had begun to lay the groundwork for the SKS movement at training sessions held in Gorce. In the summer before the 1977-78 academic year, the Krakow SKS organized a discussion camp on "the theme of the forms of action of the independent student movement," which attracted students from a number of cities. During that academic year, five new Student Solidarity Committees were created—Warsaw (October 20, 1977), Gdansk (November 5, 1977), Poznari (November 15,1977), Wroclaw (December 14,1977) and Szczecin (May 10,1978). 46 Although in most cities KOR student activists formed these committees and played a dominant role within them, they were not composed solely of KOR affiliates. ROPCiO activists were participants, but only in the Gdansk and Szczecin committees did they have a strong presence. Although SKS was formally independent of other organizations, its work sometimes overlapped with KOR's since many of its members had dual affiliations. The committees were not linked by any national structure. 47 The activities of the Student Solidarity Committees included the defense of students' rights and interests, the pursuit of issues of local academic interest (such as the defense of oppositional activists in the academic community), 48 the protest against limited circulation of library books (or the establishment of underground libraries as an alterna-

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tive), 49 the operation of information and consultation points, 50 and the demand for greater academic autonomy and consultation within universities. 51 SKS also supported national oppositional initiatives, and played a key role in bringing the uncensored lectures of the Society of Academic Courses (see below) to local audiences, 52 as well as in locally distributing underground publications. 53 SKS was also very active in the area of publishing. Beginning in October 1977, SKS established a national journal for its members, called Indeks, which involved a collaborative effort by activists in Krakôw, Warsaw, and Lodz. 5 4 SKS in Warsaw began publishing its own Biuletyn in late 1977, 55 and this was followed in 1978 by similar publications, such as Sygnal (Signal) in Krakow 56 and Podaj Dalej (Give a Bit More) in Wroclaw.57 Podaj Dalej was accompanied by a more far-ranging magazine along the lines of Biuletyn Informacyjny, called Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne (Academic Information Magazine). 58 SKS in Wroclaw published another magazine called Tematy (Themes), which was intended to be a forum for the discussion of contemporary Polish problems, including political freedom, human rights, cultural and academic life, and the economic crisis. 59 SKS also published brochures and books on a small scale. One such initiative was the Notebooks of SKS Poznan (Zeszyty SKS Poznan) which published a number of texts, including a collection of Michnik's writings. 60 SKS in Wroclaw published fiction by Diirenmatt and Orwell, as well as at least three brochures on contemporary Polish topics as supplements to Podaj Dalej.61 In the late 1970s, SKS' coherence as a movement began to weaken. While SKS in Krakow and Poznan remained independently active, the committees in Warsaw and Wroclaw became increasingly involved in the KSS-"KOR" milieus in their respective cities, to the detriment of student issues. 62 SKS in Szczecin was the least successful of the committees. Constant police interference in their attempts to organize kept their practical activity to a minimum. 63 SKS in Gdansk disintegrated. In turn, those sympathetic with KOR joined with the circle around member Borusewicz and the Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions of the Coast (see chapter 7). As I mentioned earlier, the student ROPCiO circle in Gdansk went on to form the Young Poland Movement (RMP). The movement continued to publish Bratniak, which was originally edited by Aleksander Hall of Gdansk and Marian Pilka of Lublin. Its first issue had appeared in October 1977. 64

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RMP was formed during a meeting in the Gdansk area of activists associated with Bratniak. They described the movement in this fashion: It is an independent ideological movement whose participants agree on the necessity of action on behalf of the independence of the Polish state, the strengthening of the bonds of the Polish nation, respect for human rights, the observance of Christian norms in public life and the preservation of the identity of national culture.65 Its orientation was described as "Neo-endecja," i.e., drawing inspiration from Roman Dmowski's National Democrats but discarding the chauvinistic aspects of that historical current. This new toleration was expressed in its stated willingness to cooperate with "all people of good will" in realizing its aims. 66 In addition to its strength in GdariskGdynia-Sopot, RMP had scattered support in Lodz, Warsaw, Poznan, Szczecin, Toruri, and Lublin. The student movements of the 1970s contributed a large number of key Solidarity members. Several of those mentioned above began their oppositional activity or honed their skills in this arena (e.g., Mariusz Wilk of Wroclaw, Jacek Kubiak and Jerzy Nowacki of Poznan, and Ludwik Dorn and Urszula Doroszewska of Warsaw). In Krakow in particular, former SKS members played an important role in Solidarity's Malopolska branch. Robert Kaczmarek was a member of the Regional Presidium and co-editor of its bulletin, Goniec Maiopolski (The Malopolska Messenger). Ewa Kulik assisted Jacek Kurori in maintaining the strike information bank in the summer of 1980 and for a while even ran it. Boguslaw Sonik was head of the Malopolska Region delegation to the Solidarity Congress. Wojciech Sikora served as the branch's chairman after the Congress. Anna Szwed was an expert at the Solidarity Center for Labor and Social Studies in Krakow. Younger activists, such as Jacek Rakowiecki, continued their activity as students. Rakowiecki served as the press spokesperson for the Solidarity-Era Independent Student Union and sat on its national presidium. The student milieu in Gdansk also produced its fair share of Solidarity luminaries. Danuta Kgdzierska of SKS worked in Gdansk at the Solidarity Center for Labor and Social Studies. Andrzej Jarmakowski of RMP became a Solidarity activist and was placed in charge of all the technical arrangements for the Solidarity Congress. Arkadiusz Rybicki

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of RMP headed the Solidarity Information Office in Gdansk, and his sister Bozena served as Walesa's private secretary.

Peasant Movements During the late 1970s, four regional peasant committees were founded to address dissatisfaction over new peasant retirement legislation and a series of local issues. The first of these committees, the Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Lublin Area (Tymczasowy Komi tet Samoobrony Chlopskiej ziemi Lubelskiej, or TKSChzL) was founded in July 1978. 67 This was followed by the formation of another Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Grojec Area (TKSChzG) on September 9, 1978, founded by 188 peasants from fifteen villages. One of these villages, Zbrosza Duza, had written a collective letter in KOR's defense in June 1977. 68 Another peasant committee, founded in the village of Lisow in Radom province on September 10, 1978, called itself the Provisional Committee for Independent and Free Trade Unions of Farmers (Tymczasowy Komitet Niezaleznego Zwi^zku Zawodowego Rolnikow, or TKNZZR). 69 Finally, a fourth Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee was founded in the village of towisko in Rzeszow Province on November 12, 1978 (TKSChzRz). 70 Three underground newspapers for peasants circulated during this period. The first of these was Gospodarz, edited by ROPCiO's Piotr Typiak and Bogumil Studzinski. Its initial issue came out in December 1977. 71 An independent paper for peasants, entitled Niezalezny Ruch Chtopski (Independent Peasant Movement), also appeared in Zbrosza Duza in 1978. 72 In addition, KSS-"KOR" activists launched Placowka (The Outpost) in early 1979. It was edited by a group of committee affiliates interested in peasant questions, notably member Wieslaw Piotr Kgcik, and activists from TKSChzG and TKNZZR. 73 A Peasant University (Uniwersytet Ludowy), modeled on the Society for Academic Courses (see below), was formed in February 1979 in Zbrosza Duza by the four peasant committees and the Believers' SelfDefense Committee in Podlasie. It brought intellectuals into villages to lecture on subjects of interest to peasants. 74 There was also an attempt to create a "think tank" on the rural question, called the Center for People's Thought (Osrodek Mysli Ludowej). Its purpose was to bring together peasant activists and surviving politicians from the interwar

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populist movement. It does not seem to have yielded much in the way of action or programmatic materials. Both the Peasant University and the Center for People's Thought included peasant activists and both KSS-"KOR" and ROPCiO peasant specialists. 75 The independent peasant movement provided several leaders of Rural Solidarity. This included a number of its founders, such as Janusz Rozek (TKSChzL), Miroslaw Macierzyñski (TKSChzG), Zdzislaw Ostatek (TKSChzG), and Maria Szczygielska (a co-editor of Placówka, as well as Józef Baran (TKSChzRz), who edited Wies Rzeszowska (Rzeszow Countryside) during Solidarity, and Jan Koztowski (TKNZZR).

The Society of Academic Courses The activities that led to the formation of the Society for Academic Courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych, or TKN), also known by the nickname "flying university" (uniwersytet lataj^cy) began in the autumn of 1977, when informal lectures and courses that did not heed official restraints on curricula were organized in private apartments. 76 It was not until January 22,1978, however, that the creation of the society was officially announced. 77 Although TKN was not a part of KSS"KOR" or any other oppositional group, it was dominated by KSS"KOR" members, activists and sympathizers. The person most responsible for its organization and success was KSS-"KOR" member Andrzej Celiñski. 78 During its first semester of operation, the society organized six lecture series, and in its second semester, thirteen. From October 1977 to May 1978, TKN also arranged a total of 120 individual lectures in Warsaw, Kraków, Poznañ, Wroclaw, and Lódz. Regular lecture cycles were held primarily in Warsaw. The lecturers were usually eminent scholars and they covered a wide range of topics in the areas of history, political theory, economics, pedagogy, philosophy, sociology, literature, and art. History lectures tended to draw the greatest number of listeners. 79 Individual lectures and cycles continued to be organized by TKN in academic years 1978-79 and 1979-80, but due to attacks by the police and "bully boys" from the Socialist Union of Polish Students (SZSP) on large open lectures in 1979, smaller seminars became the norm. 80 TKN also maintained a library and published the proceedings of symposia on important topics in the series TKN Notebooks (Zeszyty TKN-u). 81 In addition, TKN created a Fund for Scientific Assistance (Kasa Pomocy

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Naukowej) that provided research stipends to students who, for political reasons, were not permitted to continue their doctoral studies. KSS"KOR" 's Social Self-Defense Fund raised money on TKN's behalf. 82 The amount of intellectual support that Solidarity drew from TKN was astounding. In 1980, five of the advisers to the Interfactory Strike Committee in Gdansk were TKN members (Bohdan Cywiriski, Bronislaw Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Tadeusz Kowalik, and Jan Strzelecki). The editor and one of the assistant editors of Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Solidarity Weekly) came from this group (Mazowiecki and Cywinski respectively), and one of the paper's most talented writers, Jan Wale, was also a TKN member. Many important Solidarity advisers (Stefan Amsterdamski, Geremek, Jacek Kurori, Stefan Kurowski, Adam Michnik, Piotr Naimski, Strzelecki, and Zdistaw Szpakowski) lectured for TKN. "Rector" Celiriski sat on Solidarity's National Coordinating Commission and headed its Center for Social and Scientific Studies in Gdansk.

Independent Publishing In the discussion above, I have cited a number of underground publications related to specific movements. However, there were also many independent ones. In October 1977, two new journals, Spotkania (Encounters) and Puis, made their appearance. The purpose of Spotkania was to present the perspective of young Catholics. The journal sought to engage other political viewpoints in the interest of reaching a mutual understanding on the important issues of the day. 83 Puis was Poland's second underground literary journal. Its editorial board was composed of young KOR activists from Lodz. 8 4 Another journal linked to the KOR milieu was Krytyka, which first appeared in the summer of 1978. It was explicitly conceived of as a political quarterly of high scholarly and theoretical standards. Its editorial board included several KOR members as well as corresponding editors from the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian oppositions. 85 Additionally, there were two journals devoted to the publication of translations from the international press. The first of these, Biuletyn Informacyjny—Przeglpd Prasy Zagranicznej (—Review of the Overseas Press) appeared in 1977 and was published by KOR circles. The second, Przeglgd (Review), appeared in early 1979 and was printed by a publishing house with strong ROPCiO connections. 86 Intellectual jour-

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nals with a conservative perspective also began to emerge in the period 1979-80. Prominent among these were Alternatywy (Alternatives) and Res Publica.87 There were also a host of other small journals (for further titles consult the bibliography). NOW-a continued to pursue its publishing activities throughout the 1970s and still publishes books today. Its work was supplemented by another publishing house close to KSS "KOR," called Circle (Kr§g). In the period from 1976 to 1980, NOW-a managed to publish over onehundred books on a variety of political, economic, historical, and literary topics, including works of fiction and translations of foreign books. It also published Zapis, Puis, and Krytyka (another thirty volumes). 88 In addition, Puis, Gios, and Spotkania each issued their own "library" (biblioteka) series of books. 89 There were two major editorial concerns close to ROPCiO, the "May Third Constitution" and "Polish" publishing houses. The former seems to have published primarily books, as well as the journal Przeglgd, while the latter published ROPCiO's official organs. 90 There were also a host of smaller publishers. 91 According to Lipski, by early 1979 the total number of volumes of underground periodicals, books, and brochures printed each month reached approximately 100,000. 92 This meant that in the year before the foundation of Solidarity, underground printers had bombarded Polish society with over one million pieces of bibula. According to Walery Pisarek, director of the Center for Journalism Research in Krakow, one out of every four Poles had read an underground publication before 1980. This means that, at one point or another, between eight and nine million Poles had contact with the underground press. Pisarek was more circumspect, however, with regard to regular readers, estimating their number at 200,000. 93 Keeping in mind that the figures above were provided by an official source— which, if anything, would be more inclined to underestimate the figures in this instance—it is obvious that circulation of the underground publications was a major success for the opposition. In the period after the waging of the workers' amnesty struggle, movements and other organizations within the public space in Poland continued to multiply. They encompassed a growing part of the population and became even more differentiated in terms of their social base, political orientation, and functional specializations. In my discussion of the growth of the underground press and publishing, the

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newspaper Robotnik (The Worker), a publication created by a group of younger KOR activists, was not mentioned. Neither were other papers published by workers or the growth of independent worker initiatives discussed. These will be the subject of chapter 7. These worker initiatives proved to be the most important actor in the reconstitution of civil society in Poland. It was their activity in the summer of 1980 that forced the party-state to grant legal recognition to independent organizations, thus securing the legal boundaries that would separate the state and the range of independent associations, organizations, movements, and other actors that would populate a reconstituted civil society in Poland.

7

Workers II: Oppositional Politics

The Communist system contains protest in its ideological nature. It cannot get away with propagating egalitarian slogans while promoting a network of shops for the elite; it cannot get away with proclaiming ideas about worker power while using police to mercilessly suppress workers' strikes; it cannot get away with calling itself the heir of liberty while stamping out by force every sign of freedom. —Adam Michnik1

The Polish opposition of the 1970s and 1980s was unique because, unlike its counterparts in the rest of East Central Europe, it included a large number of industrial workers. Their participation would prove to be critical to the reconstruction of civil society in Poland. Although the opposition of the 1970s had secured de facto toleration of an alternative public space and the organizations therein, and had improvised ways to pressure the party-state, it had not yet obtained de jure recognition from the party-state of its right to exist or its organizational autonomy. It was not until the strikes of the summer of 1980, when the partystate authorities agreed to the wide-ranging political demands of the interfactory strike committees, that the opposition was able to secure the legal recognition of the boundaries of the public space and organizational autonomy for the actors within it. Although the popular perception of the strikes of 1980 is that they ran a spontaneous course, an essential role was played by workers who were involved in oppositional politics. These workers were able to steer the negotiations with the party-state so that they secured the legal recognition necessary for the reconstitution of civil society in Poland. This chapter will detail the development of these working class oppositional circles.

The Growth of Feelings of Injustice Among Polish Workers Barrington Moore has argued that even extreme deprivation does not automatically lead to unrest. Revolts occur only when deprivation is

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transformed from a material condition into a motivation for action. Moore calls this motivating force "injustice": Evidently social rules and their violation are crucial components in moral anger and a sense of injustice. Essentially it is anger at the injury one feels when another person violates a social rule. There are two distinct possibilities here. One can be angry because one feels that the existing rule is itself wrong and that a different rule ought to apply. In real life such situations frequently take the form of disagreements about what the rule actually is. 2 During the period in which workers' opposition emerged the effects of the economic crisis in Poland produced such a sense of injustice. In the Polish case injustice arose in both ways suggested by Moore. First, the rules under the existing system of domination, institutionalized in relations of authority, codified legally, and backed by the coercive apparatus of the state, were often at odds with the norms and values of Polish society. Thus, authority itself was seen as unjust. Additionally, since the law was intentionally vague in order to allow the authorities maximal room for maneuver, and because the authorities often ignored the formal provisions of the law in pursuit of their goals, they were seen to be in violation of their own rules. Thus in Poland in the late 1970s, not only was domination at odds with generally held social norms, but the authorities were seen to be in violation of their own laws. Public opinion surveys conducted in the 1970s confirm that feelings of injustice were growing in the aftermath of the June events. At that time, the Central Committee of the PZPR commissioned a study on workers' political attitudes, based on a sample of 2,800 workers from large factories throughout Poland. The study found that workers favored illegal methods for resolving conflicts with the authorities: 40 percent favored strikes; 20 percent, absenteeism; 11 percent, slowdowns; and 9 to 10 percent, industrial sabotage. Only a tiny minority felt that the trade unions were an effective means to solve such conflicts. Both the party factory committees and the trade unions were viewed overwhelmingly as an apparatus for mobilizing workers to achieve the party's aims. Just under 50 percent felt exploited by their employers. When asked about the kinds of changes they wanted, workers ranked freedom of speech and equal access to schooling highest. The results of the poll also showed a correlation of critical views with high skill and pay levels, and party membership. 3

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The results of this survey are indicative of the growing sense of injustice Polish workers were experiencing. The data on exploitation are significant particularly since "exploitation" is an institutionalized relationship of economic injustice. Similarly, the willingness of the workers surveyed to consider illegal methods of resolving conflicts is an indication of their lack of belief in the justness of the system. Other surveys compiled during the late 1970s, although they do not directly confirm the growth of feelings of injustice, are at least consistent with it. This research, conducted over a multi-year period, documented a strong deterioration in the public mood prior to the strikes of 1980 (see table 7.1). These results suggest a growing potential for discontent in Polish society.4 The injustice experienced by Polish workers was not merely a product of the economic crisis of the late 1970s, but also of the way in which the party-state structured the impact of the decline in production. In centrally administered economic systems the elite has strong control over the social distribution of product. This is not only true of economic gains but also of austerity in times of crisis. While this might seem like an additional and useful policy tool, it is politically troublesome. Whereas in market systems the effects of economic decline can be passed off as the random outcomes of an impersonal market, in centrally administered economies they are inescapably seen as policy decisions taken by the authorities. The policy decisions of the Gierek regime, as well as the structure of the economic system, produced a social distribution of austerity that diminished workers' standards of living and general sense of wellbeing and also caused a deterioration in working conditions. On the production side, the regime attempted to manage the crisis by reducing costs and raising productivity. At least five distinct mechanisms of this sort were discernible in the late 1970s. First, the regime manipulated wage policy so that losses from chronic disruptions in production caused by the crisis were offset by reduced wages. Most Polish workers were remunerated according to piecerates, and thus production stoppages meant that workers were only minimally compensated for down-time on the line. During the late 1970s, production lines often sat idle due to shortages of energy and other inputs, particularly imported ones. As a result, stoppages at one factory turned into production bottlenecks at others whenever deliveries promised by one did not appear at the other. Often management's response was to force crews to work overtime to make up for

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7.1.

in the Public Mood, (percentage)

1974-1980

Previous Year Was Good? Bad? Year

Good

Neither

Bad

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

60 81 23 43 46 32 8

14 9 23 33 33 39 11

18 2 37 15 13 21 78

s o u r c e : David Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1992, p. 56.

lost output and wages. On occasion this provoked strikes, which further disrupted production. 5 Second, new piece-rate quotas, which compelled workers to spend over eight hours a day on the job to make a decent wage, were introduced in a range of industries in 1978.6 Under the new system, many workers found that over half their wages came from overtime, including work on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. 7 In the shipyards of Szczecin and Gdañsk, it was not uncommon for workers to spend twelve, and sometimes even fourteen, hours a day and as many as 350 hours per month at work. 8 This increase in overtime damaged people's health, and the fatigue it produced contributed to a rise in job-related accidents. It also made normal family life difficult.9 Changes in piece rates tied to factory reorganization were also used as an excuse to reduce wage budgets. For instance, in October 1978, workers went on strike at the Pabianice Dressing Materials Factory (PASO) when management changed packaging sizes to tighten piece rates, thereby reducing wages by several hundred ztoty per month. 10 Third, managers manipulated the production quota and reporting system in ways that reduced costs or fulfilled the plan (thus safeguarding managerial bonuses) at the expense of workers' welfare. For example, a strike broke out at a concrete-mixing factory in Myszków in December 1978 when wages were not delivered on payday so that a wageplan period quota could be met. Some managers falsified reports on production in order to reduce the bonuses paid to workers. For instance, at POLFA, a Pabianice pharmaceutical firm, workers went on

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strike because management did not report certain deliveries, and then did not pay the workers their plan fulfillment bonuses. In another case the management of a technical textiles factory in Pabianice classified inferior grades of yarn as "quality" in order to deny the workers their bonus for fulfilling the inferior yarn quota. This also led to a brief strike. 11 A fourth practice that reduced production costs at workers' expense was a neglect of occupational health and safety standards. According to a report in Robotnik in 1978, 2.8 million Poles worked in unhealthy conditions. 12 For example, 50 percent of the women working in spinning factories in Lódz suffered hearing problems due to noise levels above the legal limit. The existence of a three-shift system in textile factories also caused health problems among female workers who had to combine night work with family chores during the day. 13 This neglect of occupational health and safety had dire results. In the shipbuilding industry, for instance, there was a shortage of adequate tools and neglect of occupational health and safety rules was particularly severe. In one case, eight workers died during the building of a ship. 14 Finally, the authorities also held down costs by scrimping on health benefits. Between 1973 and 1977, official Polish sources reveal that the level of expenditure from the National Fund for Health Protection (Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Zdrowia) was only 15 percent of the level of contributions. 15 This caused such a deterioration of the hospital system and such a chronic shortage of medicine that KSS-"KOR" felt obligated to issue a special report on the state of Polish health care. 16 Additionally, reports from a number of factories in 1979 indicated that workers were not paid bonus wages during medical leaves of absence, as had been common practice, including hospital stays and convalescence periods. 17 The combined effects of these kinds of measures had disastrous effects on whole industries and caused grievous deterioration in the quality of workers' lives. The situation in the mining industry is indicative of the kinds of conditions that fed workers' sense of injustice in the late 1970s. Deterioration in wages, working conditions, and safety in mining was caused by an innovation introduced in January 1978 to boost productivity, called the four-brigade system. Theoretically, it should have increased production while reducing working hours; however, this was predicated on an 11 percent expansion of the work force. Since the actual number of miners increased by only 2 percent, the anticipated improvements did not materialize. 18

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The four-brigade system was designed to allow for 24-hour exploitation of mines. The crew was broken up into four brigades to cover three shifts. Each brigade worked six days on one of the three shifts and then got two days' rest. Thus, each day three brigades were supposed to work an eight-hour shift while one brigade rested. Management had the right to ask workers to give up one free day per month, but could do so only seven times per year. Nine days were designated as official holidays when the mine was to be closed. 19 Numerous problems soon developed with the four-brigade system. Workers found themselves obliged to work three-quarters of all Sundays and, due to the labor shortage, on holidays as well. 20 By the end of July 1978, KSS-"KOR" had received complaints from miners in Zagl§bie Górnoslgskie, Walbrzych, and the Rybnicki district. They reported an increased number of additional "plan Sundays" on which they were obligated to work. According to official party sources, coal miners worked forty-two Sundays in both 1978 and 1979. The twelve scheduled free Saturdays per year disappeared altogether. Those who resisted working on these extra days were harassed by management. On Saturdays and Sundays, shifts sometimes lasted u p to eleven hours. 21 In December 1978, violent protest erupted at Division 5 of the Gliwice mine when management attempted to force miners to work a twelvehour shift over the Christmas holiday. 22 Some miners ended up working as many as thirty-five shifts per month. 2 3 The large number of shifts scheduled at different times of the day and night made normal family life nearly impossible. The system also extended time spent underground, because a working shift had to wait for the next one to arrive before going up. Additionally, wages fell as a result of the introduction of the new system. Overtime became all but mandatory because piece rates were structured so that failure to work extra hours put workers below quota levels, resulting in a drastic loss of bonus pay. Because of this, some workers felt compelled to work even when ill. Moreover, the factory health service was reluctant to excuse ill workers. Even a death in one's family was not accepted in all cases as a legitimate excuse for missing work. 24 The necessity of working long shifts for days at a time, even when sick, was one contributing factor to a rash of mining accidents in the late 1970s. In 1978 alone, KSS-"KOR" estimated that at least 180 miners died in accidents. 25 Later, KSS-"KOR" sources reported a number of fatal mining accidents that had not been reported in the official press.

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In October 1979, at least sixty-six miners died in four accidents at three mines. 26 In April 1980 there were at least another eight fatal mining accidents. 27 In addition to exhaustion, KSS-"KOR" cited several other reasons for safety problems in mining. First, the 24-hour day schedule of the four-brigade system did not allow enough time to check and repair machinery. Second, safety equipment, such as methane indicators and alarm systems, did not work or were not installed comprehensively. Third, methods of seam exploitation sometimes undermined the structural stability of mines. Finally, in an effort to expand the work force, management sent miners who had not yet been properly trained down the shafts. 28 The Gierek regime tried to manage the economic crisis not only with cost-cutting measures on the production side, but also with polices designed to reduce consumption. Although the regime had rescinded the increase package of 1976, prices were raised in a number of surreptitious ways in the late 1970s. By packaging products in a different way, altering their contents slightly, or marketing them under a separate trademark, managers were allowed to claim that these were new products and, exploiting loopholes in the law, raise prices. The most outrageous example of this was the marketing of neckties under the name of "zwis mgski" (male hang). 29 The party-state authorities also began to sell meat in a newly created network of "commercial shops" at prices 40 to 80 percent above normal retail. Research done in 1978 in the Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot area found that nearly 30 percent of the meat stores in the Tri-City area had been converted to commercial shops. While these shops were well stocked, normal meat shops had, for the most part, only a paltry selection of low-quality prepared meat products. In commercial shops one kilogram of kielbasa cost as much as the average daily wage of a worker. 30 The combined effects of these policies led to an 8 percent increase in the cost of living in 1978 and meant that approximately 50 percent of families experienced a drop in real wages. 31 The difficulties this created were exacerbated by the declining availability of many everyday goods in the late 1970s.32 Another factor that intensified resentment among workers over decreasing living standards was the greater visibility of the difference between elite and mass standards of living since Gierek had replaced Gomulka. 33 Meanwhile, as the standard of living and conditions in industry de-

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teriorated, the Gierek regime seemed increasingly helpless in the face of the economic crisis. It was unwilling or unable to undertake decisive measures to respond to the crisis. At the Eighth Congress of the PZPR in 1979, all the party could muster was a call for a campaign of "Austerity and Unity," which amounted to little more than patriotic appeals to accept a reduction in the standard of living.34 Considering that earlier in the decade two price reforms had been perceived as unjustly lowering workers' standard of living and had met with violent protest, this approach was an obvious indication that the Gierek regime had reached a state of incapability that threatened political disaster. The situation for the regime on the shopfloor was hardly more encouraging. The trade unions were also ineffective in stemming worker discontent. Under Gierek, unions had been so fully integrated into the factory production structure that " . . . the great majority of workers saw unions as not just subordinate to, but often as part of the factory management." The unions concentrated on production planning, health care, recreation, and distribution of scarce consumer durables (as rewards for political loyalty and good work), while ignoring worker representation and the articulation of worker interests. Regulations in this sphere had been so watered down that union power and autonomy were negligible. Management was not even obliged to respond to objections raised by the unions about unfair and illegal dismissals.35 This left Polish workers convinced that there was no way to address their feelings of injustice through the existing system. Ultimately, the feelings of injustice that Polish workers experienced fit into a much larger political context. By the time of the strikes of 1980, this sense of outrage was not merely experienced as a form of class injustice, but was translated in the political dimension into democratic and national grievances as well. Workers had come to understand that they were subject to class-based injustice because the system barred them from any meaningful participation in the decisions that affected them, economic or otherwise. This disenfranchisement was a product of the authoritarian nature of the system, which, in turn, was attributable to the semi-sovereign status of the Polish state, i.e., power was ultimately guaranteed by the Soviet authorities, and this constrained the Polish elite in just how responsive it could be to the concerns of Polish society. The inability of the system to compartmentalize errors in individual spheres of its authority proved to be exceptionally desta-

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bilizing, as it transformed feelings of class injustice into global issues of political democracy and national self-determination. 36

Robotnik Working-class opposition in Poland, in the sense used in this study, grew out of a KOR initiative. When the committee became KSS-"KOR" it sought new ways to approach workers. Having largely accomplished its aims with regard to the June 1976 protesters, it began to focus on the larger issues affecting the Polish working class. The first step in this direction was made in the spring of 1977, when some activists tried to organize discussion groups for workers "which would provide a framework for job-related and political agitation." This initial attempt failed because the intellectuals involved wanted the workers to take the initiative, whereas the workers expected "ready-made plans and precise instructions." Furthermore, many of the workers with whom KOR was in contact had been the victims of the post-strike repression and thus were reluctant to become politically active. 37 The vehicle that finally translated this new approach into practice was a newspaper—Robotnik (The Worker). The first issue came out around the time of the committee's transformation (September 1977). It was supposed to be a bimonthly, but there were times when it appeared less frequently. The title was taken from the most famous underground paper of the Polish Socialist Party at the turn of the century. 38 Plans for the publication of Robotnik were made in August 1977. At a gathering in the apartment of Andrzej Celinski, several younger KOR activists discussed new directions for activism. Among those present were Wojciech Onyszkiewicz, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Henryk and Ludwika Wujec, Helena and Witold tuczywo, and Joanna Szcz^sna. At the meeting, Onyszkiewicz reportedly suggested the idea of publishing a paper for workers. 39 Litynski, on the other hand, recalled that Henryk Wujec had suggested publishing a paper for workers after the failure of the discussion group initiative. Through such a publication, they reasoned that workers could begin political activity without any sort of national organization. 40 Not all those present at Celinski's apartment actually took part in the publication of Robotnik, and others later joined those who did. 41

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Although Robotnik was published by activists affiliated with KSS "KOR," its editorial committee was not controlled by the committee. The paper was intended to inform and educate workers and to serve as a tool for organizing workers' cells. Robotnik reflected "the strategy and tactics of KOR," and there was little controversy in the committee about it, because its editors were the most influential activists on workers' issues associated with the committee. 42 In the first issue of Robotnik, the group made its purpose and goals explicit. Robotnik was created so that workers could "publish their independent opinions, exchange experiences, and make contacts with workers at other factories." Its stated goals were: "1) solidaristic defense of workers' interests; 2) the expansion of workers' participation on the questions of pay, working and living conditions; and 3) support of independent worker representatives who must replace the dead institution of trade unions." 4 3 Robotnik's founders explained that they had participated in the KOR assistance efforts of the past year. They expressed a desire to publish the truth, which the official press distorted or omitted. They believed that the fate of Poland was, in great measure, dependent on the workers. In the past, workers had exerted their influence through demonstrations and had been met with repression. Instead, Robotnik posited that "It is necessary to create a situation in which workers can defend their interests and have daily influence on the decisions of the authorities." In pursuit of this goal they called for discussion "on the means to create workers' representation, its role, its scope of power and obligations." 44 Robotnik also stressed two conclusions its creators had drawn from recent events. For one, they recalled that the efforts of the movement around KOR, public pressure, the statements of the episcopate, and Western public opinion had forced the authorities to release imprisoned workers and the KOR members who had been arrested in the spring of 1977. They also pointed out that this success had been possible only because of the "solidaristic action of society," whereas unsuccessful past resistance had lacked this. In 1968, the workers had not supported the intelligentsia, and in 1970-71, the intelligentsia had not supported the workers. The aftermath of June 1976 had brought this mutual isolation to an end. The founders of Robotnik sought to establish worker-intellectual cooperation in order to create "a just and independent Poland." 45

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The first issue of Robotnik was only four pages long and was produced on primitive duplicators in a small edition of only 400 copies. By issue No. 9, this number had been expanded to 3,000. One year later, however, Witold Luczywo developed a technique for photographic reduction of text in conjunction with screen printing. This permitted the condensation of six typescript pages onto one printed sheet and the expansion of the print run to between 10,000 and 20,000 copies. According to Jan Lityriski, each copy was read on average by three people; however, Bogdan Borusewicz put the number of readers of each copy as high as five. Thus, each issue of Robotnik published after September 1978 reached between 30,000 and 100,000 people. This was the highest circulation of any underground publication in Poland in the preSolidarity period. KSS-"KOR" was able to boost the print run to over 40,000 copies for each of the four issues assembled in the crucial months of July and August 1980. A record run of approximately 70,000 was set by Robotnik No. 60, which appeared at the end of August 1980. 46 Distribution of Robotnik began with local contacts in most major industrial centers. These contacts devised various methods of distribution. 47 In certain cases, KSS-"KOR" activists or sympathizers simply handed out copies on the street. This could be dangerous and was sometimes greeted distrustfully. Nevertheless, in June and July 1978 a concerted effort to distribute Robotnik in this fashion was made in front of factories and churches in Lodz, Wroclaw, Gdansk, Gdynia, and Nowa Huta. 48 On occasion the Security Service (SB) unwittingly promoted Robotnik. When the SB would find out that Robotnik was being smuggled into a factory they would dispatch informers to infiltrate the factory to arrest those responsible for distribution. As a result of the informers' less-than-subtle methods, the whole crew would find out about the journal, and this would spark greater interest and demand for it. 49 An important role in distributing and expanding the range of Robotnik's contacts was played by a group of its editors, who signed each copy "For the editorial committee" (Za komitet redakcyjny). Robotnik No. 1 was signed by three KOR members, all intellectuals—Jan Litynski and Wojciech Onyszkiewicz from Warsaw, and Jozef Sreniowski from Lodz. In time, the signatories came to include a number of workers and additional intellectuals from throughout the country. The intellectuals included Bogdan Borusewicz of the Gdarisk-Gdynia-Sopot

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area, Jozef Ruszar of Krakow, and Henryk Wujec of Warsaw. Robotnik! s worker-editors included Wladyslaw Sulecki from Gliwice and, replacing him after he was forced to emigrate, Andrzej Spyra; as well as Franciszek Grabczyk, an engineer from Nowa Huta (who replaced Ruszar in the Krakow-Nowa Huta area when the latter was called up for military service); Stefan Kozlowski from Szczecin, Jerzy Jacek Pilichowski from Walbrzych, Jan Witkowski from Gryfino, and Leopold Gierek from Radom. Each of these editors served as a contact point for Robotnik. Their addresses and telephone numbers were printed in each copy of the paper. They also contributed articles to the paper, distributed it, recruited new coworkers, collected money, and conveyed news from their communities back to Warsaw, where the actual editing, layout, and production of the paper was done. Much of the editorial work was done by Helena t u c z y w o and Ludwika Wujec. 50 Another important link in the distribution chain was KSS-"KOR"'s Intervention Bureau. The nature of the Bureau's work took its members all over Poland to investigate complaints and deliver aid. Members also functioned as couriers of uncensored publications, including Robotnik. All KSS-"KOR" members, coworkers, and even some sympathizers who had reason to travel often served in this latter capacity.51 The Intervention Bureau also played an important role in defending workers persecuted for their oppositional activities. In October 1977, it announced that it was prepared, in conjunction with the editorial staff of Robotnik, to assist workers in appealing unfavorable legal decisions. 52 The Intervention Bureau produced a number of important Solidarity activists. Andrzej Gwiazda, the first vice-chairman of the presidium of the union's National Coordinating Committee, was the Bureau's representative in the Gdansk area. Boguslaw Sliwa, the chairman of the presidium of Kalisz Region Solidarity and a member of the National Coordinating Committee, resigned his position as a state prosecutor and began to work with the bureau when a policeman accused of murder was acquitted despite overwhelming evidence against him. Robotnik's distribution system was very successful. Once print runs were boosted to high levels, fifty separate distribution points were organized throughout Poland and received regular deliveries. The largest shipments went to Gdansk (15-25%) and Warsaw (10%).53 The "Charter of Workers' Rights" (details on its contents follow below), which was published in Robotnik No. 35 and went through at least three

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separate printings between August and December 1979, lists groups oi Robotnik activists operating in Bielsko-Biala, the Gdansk area (including Gdynia, Sopot, Elbl^g, Stupsk, and Pruszcz Gdariski), Gizycko, Grudzigdz, the Silesian industrial basin around Katowice (including Lazy, Gliwice, Myszkow, Ruda Sl^ska, Wodzislaw Sl^ski, and Zabrze), the Krakow area (including Nowa Huta and Skawina), Lublin, Lodz (including Pabianice), Nowa Ruda, Poznari, Przemysl, Radom, Szczecin (including Gryfino), Tarnow, Torun, Walbrzych, Warsaw (including Ursus and Pruszkow), and Wroclaw.54 Beginning with Robotnik No. 9, the paper carried a contributors' list ("Wplacili do kasy robotniczej"). 55 Contributions came from all the centers named above, with the exceptions of Przemysl, Tarnow, and Torun. 56 The opposition in Torun was closely associated with that of Gdansk. 57 For this reason, it is likely that money collected there went to a more local paper, Robotnik Wybrzeza (Worker of the Coast—see below). Tarnow had its own newspaper, Wiadomosci Tarnowskie (Tarnow News), edited by two signatories of the Charter of Workers' Rights, Waclaw Mojek and Zbigniew Staruch. Contributions to Robotnik also came from Kotobrzeg, Olkusz, Bialystok, the copper mining region around Lubin, Jelenia Gora, and a few villages, but were most consistent from the Warsaw, Gdansk, Katowice, Lodz, Szczecin, Krakow, and Grudzi§dz areas. Gdansk, Katowice, and Szczecin played host to Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions (see below). Lodz is a city with a history of labor unrest in 1971 and 1976. Krakow's activity seems to have been concentrated in the Lenin Steel Works in Nowa Huta, which went on to become the most important factory in the Malopolska region of Solidarity. The region's future Chairperson, Mieczyslaw Gil, became involved in distributing underground publications as early as 1977.58

In Grudzijidz, a group of workers dismissed from the Pomeranian Casting and Enameling Factory in 1976 organized their own selfdefense under the leadership of Edmund Zadrozyriski.59 This group then linked up with KOR and extensively broadened the scope of its activity by organizing numerous open letters to the authorities.60 Warsaw was Robotnik's city of origin. Despite this, concrete initiatives beyond distribution activities were relatively late in coming. The strongest support came from the Ursus, due to the efforts of Emil Broniarek, Zbigniew Bujak, and Zbigniew Janas. At first, they worked more closely with ROPCiO. Andrzej Czuma provided them with bibula,

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and they in turn collected m o n e y for ROPCiO. In 1979 in Zakopane they met Janusz Lojek, aRobotnik distributor from Wroclaw, and hearranged for them to receive large shipments of KOR bibula, including Robotnik. For a time, this trio also attempted to work through official institutions. Janas, in particular, devoted much of his energy to this kind of public action, especially speaking out at official meetings, which earned him a great deal of popularity. He was even elected to an official union position. Bujak concentrated his efforts on the distribution network. In May 1980, Bujak and Janas went to a K S S - " K O R " fast in the parish of Podkowa Lesna and made contact there with Kurori, Litynski, and Wujec. Afterward, with K S S - " K O R " 's help, a workers' self-education circle in Ursus was established. They also began to organize to "defend their rights and interests around such issues as pay supplements to compensate for price rises, or the independent representation of workers." They also tried to establish "a workers' commission intended to lay the basis for independent trade u n i o n s . " They did not succeed in accomplishing the latter until July 1980, during the summer strike wave. Bujak and Janas went on to play major roles in Solidarity—Bujak as chairman of the Mazowsze Regional presidium and vice-chairman of the National Coordinating Commission, and Janas as chairman of the Solidarity Factory Commission in Ursus and a member of the Solidarity National Coordinating Commission. 6 1 Clearly, this analysis of the signatories of the Charter of Workers' Rights and of contributions to Robotnik indicates that Robotnik possessed a distribution network which extended to the country's many major industrial areas. Very telling in this respect is the fact that in Gdansk Robotnik was read openly on commuter trains as early as 1979, and that when the paper did not appear for various reasons, its readers made inquiries to the distributors. 6 2 The Charter of Workers' Rights is undoubtedly the most important document that Robotnik produced. It can be read as an early draft of the demands of August 1980. The Charter was signed by over 100 activists, most of w h o m were connected with K S S - " K O R " (a minority were ROPCiO affiliates). Their occupational profile is shown in table 7.2. In reading table 7.2, one is immediately struck by the diverse occupational composition of this group. It includes both intellectuals and workers, as well as engineers and technicians. With the exception of peasants and party-state bureaucrats, almost all occupational categories were represented. Among the workers, the skill levels were quite

Workers II: Oppositional Politics TABLE

Occupations

of the Signers

165

7.2.

of the Charter

Occupation Intellectual Creative or performing artist, artisan Engineer Other professional or white collar worker Technician Skilled worker "Worker" Clerical "Lenin steel mill" worker (unspecified) Student Workers at cooperatives for the physically impaired No occupation given

of Workers'

Rights

Number of Signers 11 3 9 2 7 31 2 2 17 3 8 12

SOURCES: Based on analysis of the signatures from Lipski, pp. 496500, and modifications based on biographical data in the possession of the author.

high: steel workers, skilled workers, and technicians comprised a majority of signers. The Charter was written by KSS-"KOR" members and "friends from the coast," 6 3 evidently members of the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions there (see below). The Charter was printed a number of times, and a total of over 100,000 copies were distributed in almost all large factory centers. The document had an important organizational impact because it brought many worker activists into contact with each other, led to the creation of workers' commissions in some factories, and expanded the number of organized workers' groups. 64 While over one hundred people signed the Charter, this number represented even greater numerical strength, because a number of the signatories "had a group of colleagues, supporters at his workplace, who could not afford such an act of courage [i.e., signing] but were certainly under the influence of our [the Charters'] ideas." 6 5 The Charter's publication also had the effect of attracting a significant number of new coworkers who were "well-grounded" and had authority in working-class circles. 66 The Charter of Workers' Rights began with a series of grievances. First, citizens were deprived of participation in decision making in areas that concerned them. Second, the rights of working people were

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not respected, particularly with regard to "safe and sensible work" and "adequate wages and rest." Third, social injustice and inequality were growing. Fourth, there were no institutions to defend the interests of working people, because the official trade unions did not fulfill this function. Fifth, workers were deprived of basic rights of self-defense, particularly the right to strike. Sixth, the cost of errors made by the authorities were shouldered by society. Because of the failure of the system in these areas, the signers sought to build a system of social selfdefense for working people, "above all . . . independent trade unions." 67 After stating these grievances, the Charter specified a series of partial measures that might help to mitigate the problems of economic hardship and inequality faced by workers: 1) the linking of wages to the cost of living; 2) the establishment of a minimum wage level; 3) the elimination of "glaring and unjustified wage differentials"; 4) the establishment of a uniform wage scale for equivalent work throughout industry; and 5) the protection of wage levels in the event of the interruptions in production or the introduction of new piece-rate schedules. On the question of working time, the Charter called for an end to forced overtime, Sundays and holidays off for miners, a uniform number of free Saturdays for all workers, and the eventual introduction of a forty-hour week with no reduction in pay. With respect to work safety, the Charter proposed strict adherence to regulations with the possibility of appeal to special enforcement bodies with broad review powers, appointment of workplace doctors independent of management, compensation for those who had lost their health as a result of workrelated injury or illness, elimination of night work and hard physical labor for women, and a review of the list of occupational illnesses. On the question of privilege, the Charter called for an end to special treatment of workers based on their party affiliation, politics, or worldview; public disclosure of the regulations governing the distribution of bonuses, apartments, and vacations as well as disclosure of their recipients; and the abolition of privileges for the party and police apparatus, particularly special distribution of apartments, land, building materials, cars, medical care, vacation homes, and pensions. The Charter also called for cessation of practices that forced people to act contrary to their own principles. In regard to the latter, it specifically mentioned compelling people to act immorally, to inform on and denounce others,

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to produce shoddy goods, to work in hazardous conditions, or to falsify results. The last of the problems the Charter discussed was the Labor Code. It maintained that the version promulgated in 1975 was in need of revision, because its absence-from-work provisions were used as an antistrike law. The Charter also suggested a number of other changes in this area. It argued that the right to strike should be guaranteed, and that dismissals should be accompanied by an explanation in writing. The Charter also maintained that the dismissed should have the right to legal counsel and to continue working until all legal procedures are exhausted. Last on this issue, it believed that union representatives chosen by factory crews should be protected from dismissal during their tenure and for a period following their time in office. The Charter's signers stressed that the solution to these problems depended on the actions of the workers themselves. Concessions, they pointed out, had been won in the past, but without the self-defense of activists, the situation would worsen. For this reason, they made a number of tactical suggestions. • First, strikes could only be effective in the long run if representatives of the crew were chosen to oversee the implementation of concessions. These representatives had to be defended in solidaristic fashion by the crew. • Second, dissemination of information was important. Activists were to speak out against abuses, discuss issues with colleagues, raise questions at public meetings, compel management to take a clear position, and inform the independent press and independent social institutions about significant developments. • Third, the official trade unions could be revivified to some extent by demanding that they defend workers' interests, by turning their meetings into discussion forums, and by electing to factory councils only those who would support worker demands. • Fourth, the creation and operation of workers' groups was an essential part of effective action. Such groups could formulate programs, organize actions, affect public opinion, and even go public as "workers' commissions." • Fifth, once workers' groups were strong enough to defend their

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representatives, they should form Free Trade Union Committees. Independent trade unions were seen as the means at the workers' disposal to resist the authorities successfully and to negotiate with them on an equal basis. 68 • Sixth, the signers stressed their commitment to implementing the points of the charter. They also announced the creation of a relief fund to defend anyone dismissed from work for free trade union activism. • Finally, the signers asserted that their activity was legal, because the Polish People's Republic had ratified Convention 87 of the International Labor Organization, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, both of which guaranteed the right of employees to unionize and the right to strike. 69 Throughout its history, Robotnik also ran articles which underlined the importance of creating authentic workers' representation protected through social self-defense. These articles discussed tactics with which workers could defend their interests while avoiding pitfalls that had allowed the authorities to deprive them of gains in the past. In the first article of this series, "Price Rises," Jan Litynski proposed a strategy for avoiding the catastrophic results of the protests of 1970 and 1976. He argued that in case of new price hikes, workers should elect their own representatives to compel the authorities to enter into negotiations. This was necessary because the official unions and councils (Konferencje Samorz§dow Robotniczych) did not defend workers' interests. Litynski stressed that in negotiations one of the most important demands must be "a guarantee of the future existence of workers' representatives and security for such representatives." 70 Similar points were made byJozef Sreniowski in an article on how to conduct safe and effective strikes. He began by analyzing recent strikes in Poland that had not been effective. Conventional strikes were rare. Usually, when management ignored workers' grievances, tools were downed for short periods of time in order to compel management to consider demands. Workers did not call these actions "strikes" because they were aware that "it is not permitted to strike here" (nie wolno u nas strajkowac). Instead they labeled them "work-stoppages" (przerwy w pracy). Typically, management sent a representative, who made

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a few vague promises or asked for a few days to consider the workers' demands. Often management asked the workers to pick representatives. Workers would then select official ombudsmen, master craftsmen, or party members in the hope of avoiding reprisals against strike leaders. Despite this tactic, management often penalized representatives or workers w h o played organizational roles in the strike. Workers often failed to make headway on important issues because grievances were settled in accord with management's needs (e.g., pay raises rather than alleviation of poor working conditions). To break out of this pathological pattern, Sreniowski suggested that workers pick articulate representatives, trusted by the crew, w h o had the courage to stand firmly by the d e m a n d s of their workmates. The most essential demand in any strike, he argued, was the immunity of participants from reprisals. Sreniowski also recommended that strikers make arrangements to financially support representatives and coworkers in case of dismissals. 71 After an unsuccessful strike at the Northern Shipyard in Gdansk in October 1979, Robotnik published five guidelines for conducting a successful strike. First, precisely formulated and realistic demands should be sent to management. Second, before any meetings with management, a plan of action should be worked out. Third, the crew should not return to work without a concrete agreement on the means and time frame for the implementation of demands. Fourth, other units and factories should be informed as fully as possible of the reasons for and the goals of the strike. Finally, after strikes, it was important to maintain work discipline, to defend colleagues against repression, and to avoid using the opportunities afforded by such situations for personal gain or to settle personal scores. 72 Last, in early 1980, after an intensification of repression against the opposition as a whole including Robotnik, Dariusz Kupiecki wrote an article outlining social self-defense tactics. He argued that the ability of the opposition to mobilize society in the event of large-scale repression was the opposition's best defense. Kupiecki stressed the importance of the wide dissemination of information about repression as the first step in defense, and noted that Robotnik had an important role to play in maintaining links between the active opposition and its sympathizers. Kupiecki made several suggestions for assuring ongoing access to Robotnik and urged people to use the underground press, foreign radio

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stations, and personal contacts to stay informed of the situation in the country in case of repression. He advocated pamphleteering as the most expeditious form of short-term action and presented a number of tips on how to organize it effectively and safely. He also mentioned grafitti, open letters, and strikes as methods for defending the persecuted. Kupiecki advocated strikes only in the case of failure of other methods to secure coworkers' release. He emphasized the importance of selecting representatives to present demands and of defending them and other participants from reprisals. He also argued that the goals of any strike, irrespective of economic considerations, should include the cessation of politically motivated repression. 73 In the following section, the most advanced form of worker representation in the pre-Solidarity period, the Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions, will be discussed. Their efforts and those of Robotnik resulted in the expansion of the opposition to include a substantial number of workers. Opposition politics, when combined with the power of strikes, proved to be a potent means to exact concessions from the party-state. The organizing experience and skill of some of these activists was a critical factor when workers' feelings of injustice exploded in the summer of 1980.

The Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions In the Gdansk area, the Szczecin area, and Silesia, Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions, respectively Komitet Zalozycielski Wolnych Zwigzkow Zawodowych Wybrzeza (KZ-WZZ-W), . . . Pomorza Zachodniego (KZ-WZZ-PZ), and . . .w Katowicach (KZ-WZZ-K), emerged in the late 1970s. There is also some evidence of an abortive attempt in the early part of 1980 to set up another committee (Wolne Zwifizki Zawodowe Podbeskidzia) in the area around Bielsko Biala, by Zdzislaw Mnich, a member of KZ-WZZ-K. 74 At first glance, the existence of the three committees seems quite significant, for in the summer of 1980, agreements between the Interfactory Strike Committees and the government were signed in Gdansk, Szczecin, and Silesia. However, as we shall see, this is not the case. These three committees represented the pinnacle of autonomous working-class organization in the period prior to Solidarity. All three were formed from preexisting, loosely organized groups of worker activists in their areas. The first to publicly declare its existence was the Silesian Committee.

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Katowice (KZ-WZZ-K) On February 23, 1978, the first Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions was founded in Katowice, the most important of the industrial cities clustered in Silesia ("the Polish Ruhr"). 75 Its founding declaration criticized the power of the party and the dependent status of the official trade unions. It appealed for workers to unite "to resist the exploitation of the workers by the state and party apparatus" and to help create free trade unions as a mechanism through which to struggle for the improvement of their lives. 76 The founding members of the committee were Boleslaw Cygan, Roman Ksciuczek, Kazimierz Switon, Tadeusz Kicki, and Wladyslaw Sulecki. The committee was composed of both ROPCiO and KSS-"KOR" activists—Switon and Ksciuczek from the former and Sulecki and Cygan from the latter. Sulecki was one of the activists whose name and address was listed in Robotnik. Cygan had tried to expose corruption at his factory and was then persecuted for it. His case was taken up by the KSS-"KOR" Intervention Bureau. The founders were later joined, among others, by Jan Bal, Zdzistaw Mnich, Andrzej Spyra, and Jan Switon. 77 The Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions in Katowice was created to serve as an organizational framework "to be filled out with a spontaneous will to action." 78 This notion was controversial. Soon after the committee was formed, Switon and Ksciuczek went to Warsaw and discussed their plans with KSS-"KOR" member Jacek Kuron. Their discussions ended acrimoniously. Kuron told other KSS-"KOR" activists that public declaration of the committee's existence was a mistake, because KZ-WZZ-K had not yet established itself with a record of activism, and because this bold step would provoke close police scrutiny that would disrupt its attempts to organize. 79 As it turned out, Kurori's fears were well-founded. KZ-WZZ-K met with harsh and unceasing repression that rendered it ineffective. Tadeusz Kicki, one of the founding members, was compelled to resign from the committee because of police threats. On the very day of the signing of the founding declaration, Ksciuczek was detained by the police, held for two days, handled roughly in jail, and threatened with imprisonment. 80 This was just a taste of things to come. Kazimierz Switon, undoubtedly one of the most active members of the committee, also became its

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most persecuted. In the period from January to October 1978, he was detained on twelve different occasions without cause. 8 1 He and his family were tried, detained, harassed, slandered, and beaten by the police on countless occasions. The opposition as a whole fought continually to protect Switon from repression. 8 2 KSS-"KOR" even published The White Book of Kazimierz Switon, which chronicled the police repression to which he was subjected. 8 3 Wladyslaw Sulecki, who was also a member of Robotnik's editorial committee, was another target of constant police surveillance and harassment. Sulecki became involved with KOR as early as January 1977, when he sent a letter to the Polish parliament in response to the committee's call for a special parliamentary commission. His troubles with the police began soon thereafter. Through constant harassment, the police persuaded Sulecki's wife and daughter to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany. Sulecki saw no other course than to join them, which he did in March 1979. 8 4 The single concrete organizational success that KZ-WZZ-K enjoyed was in the publishing field. In July 1978 it proposed to the Founding Committee in Gdansk (KZ-WZZ-W) the publication of a joint trade union organ of a theoretical nature. KZ-WZZ-W saw a number of problems with such an undertaking, and therefore declined the offer. 8 5 Nonetheless, a journal was produced—Ruch Zwigzkowy (Union Movement). Its first issue came out in August 1978. Although, it seemed to claim to speak for the whole independent workers' movement, its editors were exclusively ROPCiO activists. Ruch Zwigzkowy was successful in recruiting worker editors from ROPCiO circles in both Lodz and Gdansk, and it apparently brought out ten issues. 8 6 The impression that one gets from Ruch Zwigzkowy is that the committee never quite amounted to anything more than the strenuous efforts of a few individuals. In a typical article, the editors proposed drawing up a statute for the new independent workers' movement in Poland. 8 7 Once again, KZ-WZZ-K seemed to be returning to its original idea of creating frameworks that would later be filled in with a "spontaneous will to action." This combination of outspokenness, without any effective organization to back it up, goes far in explaining KZ-WZZ-K's paucity of successes. Litynski noted that KZ-WZZ-K was fairly unsuccessful in carrying out concrete actions. 8 8 Considering the fierce repression it faced, it is remarkable that the committee in Katowice survived. Its lack of success should also be understood in light of drastic police repression in Silesia and the overall

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weakness of the Silesian opposition compared to that of other major industrial regions. 89 The impression that one gets from reading the underground press is that the news from Silesia almost always concerned the repression of worker activists and protests on their behalf. It is clear from what befell Sulecki and Switori that the committee was incapable of defending its most prominent members. The history of KZ-WZZ-K is one of extreme personal courage and commitment. It was not, however, one of organizational success. Switon's efforts, nevertheless, were later acknowledged. During the summer of 1980, workers from the Katowice Steel Mill demanded and secured his release from house arrest and made him secretary of their strike committee. 90

Western Pomerania (KZ-WZZ-PZ) Before turning to the Founding Committee in the Gdansk area, the second and most successful of the three, I will discuss the third committee to be founded, the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of Western Pomerania. Western Pomerania (Pomorze Zachodnie) is the northwesternmost area of Poland and a major maritime, port, and shipbuilding area due to its location on the Baltic coast and the natural harbor afforded by the Bay of Szczecin (Zalew Szczeciriski) and the Oder (Odra) River. The committee was active primarily in the cities of Szczecin and Gryfino (just south of Szczecin, where the Eastern Oder River turns into the Regalica). Szczecin was the site of major disturbances in 1970-71. Unlike the committee in Gdansk, which included important leaders from the 1970-71 strikes such as Lech Walesa and Anna Walentynowicz, KZ-WZZ-PZ did not include any leading figures from 1970-71 in its core membership. 91 As it turned out later, this would be significant in the case of the committee in Szczecin. KZ-WZZ-PZ was founded by a group of activists associated with Robotnik. They had learned about the formation of KOR and ROPCiO by listening to the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe. Eventually, underground publications began to reach Szczecin, notably ROPCiO's Opinio. From Opinia they learned of a ROPCiO Information and Consultation Point (Punkt Informacyjno-Konsultacyjny) in Szczecin. However, it was not until May 1978, when a Student Solidarity Committee (SKS) was founded, and a group of workers began to distribute Robotnik (see below), that oppositional activity in Szczecin began in earnest. 92 When the group that would later work with Robotnik found out

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about Komunikat, Biuletyn Informacyjny, and the independent publisher NOW-a (again by radio), they went to Warsaw to establish contacts. In Warsaw, they met a number of activists from KSS-"KOR" and ROPCiO in late 1977. They also had discussions there with KSS-"KOR" members Jacek Kuron, Henryk Wujec, and Jan Lityriski. The group decided to form an independent workers' circle in Western Pomerania and to cooperate with KSS-"KOR." Soon thereafter, they made contact with Jan Witkowski, who would not only become a leading figure in the committee, but who had also participated in the strike at the Dolna Odra Power Plant in Gryfino in June 1976 and who, with Aleksander Chmielewski, had organized a protest against Soviet nuclear weapons and SS-20s during an official demonstration against the neutron bomb in April 1978. 93 The first action that the Robotnik group in Western Pomerania undertook was distribution of the underground press. Evidence indicates that this initiative got underway in the spring of 1978. At this time, KSS-"KOR" activist Jerzy Geresz was detained on his way to Szczecin while carrying underground materials, including Robotnik. Subsequent searches at the Dolna Odra Power Plant resulted in the confiscation of a number of issues of Robotnik.94 Among the factories into which the Western Pomeranian Robotnik group smuggled underground publications were the Warski Shipyard, the Repair Shipyard, Dolna Odra, Selfa, Police, the Gryfia Shipyard, and FMS Polmo. At the Warski Shipyard, copies of Robotnik were smuggled in by inserting several hundred copies between the pages of the normal shipyard news bulletin. A number of workers at Warski commented that they liked the insert. 95 One of the activists from Szczecin, Stefan Koztowski, described the effect of underground publications on the members of the Robotnik group as follows: "With each paper and book we read, we better understood the progressive sovietization of the country. We became aware of the fictional character of the trade unions and of an even larger number of cases of violations of workers' rights. We felt impoverished internally, and we felt the need to speak the truth." 9 6 Despite its initial success in the distribution of underground materials, the group wanted to do more. One such initiative was the organization of a memorial mass on the eighth anniversary of the massacre of workers on the coast in 1970. This was followed by the placing of posters marking the anniversary on public notice boards. 97 However, pub-

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lie commemoration of 1970 never became the mass oppositional event in Szczecin that it did in Gdansk (see below). In January 1979, the group also created the Szczecin Fund (Fundusz Szczeciriski) to help those repressed for their oppositional activity. The work of the fund served additionally as a forum for the exchange of views and experiences and for the discussion of strategy and tactics. The group also began to set up an underground library. In addition, the Western Pomeranian activists expanded the scope of their cooperation with Robotnik beyond distribution. They began to send Robotnik information and articles about Szczecin and its workers. Both Jan Witkowski (in October 1978) and Stefan Kozlowski (in February 1979) began to sign Robotnik and thus served as contact points for the paper in Gryfino and Szczecin, respectively. As a result of this expanded cooperation, Robotnik was able to issue a one-time Szczecin edition (Wydanie Szczecinskie) in March 1979. Its primary subject was past workingclass activism in Szczecin. More than half of it was written by Stefan Kozlowski, Jan Witkowski, and Witkowski's brother Mirosiaw.98 On October 11,1979, the Robotnik group in Szczecin, Trzebusz (a village northeast of Szczecin), and Gryfino—including Kazimierz Dobosz, Danuta Grajek, Andrzej Kamrowski, Tadeusz Kocielowicz, Stefan Kozlowski, Bronislaw Modrzejewski, Jan Paprocki, Stanistaw Podoloski, Jan Witkowski, and Mirosiaw Witkowski—announced the formation of the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of Western Pomerania (Komitet Zatozycielski Wolnych Zwi§zkow Zawodowych Pomorza Zachodniego). 99 On that same day, they also issued a declaration that began by citing several problems, many of which, they noted, had already been raised in the Charter of Workers' Rights. First, changes in piece rates hurt workers' welfare. Second, work stoppages for which workers were not responsible were nevertheless resulting in losses of pay. Third, the distribution of bonuses and premiums was unjust. Fourth, work time was being prolonged. Fifth, occupational health and safety conditions were substandard. 100 The declaration then stated that it had been necessary to form the Founding Committee because of the unwillingness of the official trade unions to address such problems. The declaration concluded by stating that the committee intended to operate throughout Western Pomerania and that they counted on the help and participation of those who shared their concerns. The names and addresses of the founders

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were provided so that those who were interested could make contact with the committee. 101 The Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of Western Pomerania continued the work it began with the Szczecin edition of Robotnik. They published their own paper, Robotnik Szczecinski (Szczecin Worker), with financial and technical support from KSS-"KOR." Andrzej Kamrowski played an important role in its editing. The publication of the first issue, scheduled for November 1979, was disrupted by the Security Service, and thus did not appear at this time. Misfortune struck a second time in February 1980 when police and security service agents raided an apartment in Gryfino where members of KZ-WZZ-PZ were printing another issue of the paper. The whole print run, a typewriter, several reams of paper, and duplicating equipment were confiscated. Only after Founding Committee members went to Warsaw to obtain replacement supplies from KSS-"KOR" did the first issue appear in late March 1980. It was followed by a second in October 1980, after the summer strike wave. 102 The first issue of Robotnik Szczecinski contained, among other articles, the committee's declaration from October 11, 1979 (discussed above), a discussion of the difficulties the police caused during the earlier attempts to publish Robotnik Szczecinski, and a statement (Oswiadczenie) on police actions against KZ-WZZ-PZ members and their self-defense activity. In one article, "In Defense of Our Rights," Jan Witkowski discussed some of the underpinnings of the Founding Committee's actions and goals. He stated that Polish workers had waited patiently for thirty years for the government to bring about desired changes, but that the time for passive waiting was over. He called on workers to organize in order to have "input on the conditions of their lives and the development of the country." Common goals, he continued, should unite workers in solidarity, and he argued that history showed that workers acting in this fashion could defend their rights. 103 Witkowski thought that the starting point for such work could be the Charter of Workers' Rights, which had called for the creation of Free Trade Union Committees. He emphasized that KZ-WZZ-PZ wished to address all matters of concern to workers in Western Pomerania, understand the causes of those problems, and work for their solution. Among the specific demands that Witkowski made were the raising of compensation to workers, improvements in the supply of consumer

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goods (especially food) and the stabilization of prices. He also stressed that KZ-WZZ-PZ would continue its press initiatives, saying, "We will write on events about which the official mass media are silent." He closed the article by asserting the Founding Committee's belief that its actions would help to move Poland closer to democracy and sovereignty, as well as shape the country in the spirit of the desires of working people. Like other opposition groups in Poland, KZ-WZZ-PZ was subjected to intense harassment and disruption by the police. For instance, in the period immediately before and after its foundation (late September to mid-November 1979), members of the committee and their coworkers were subjected to sixteen detentions, four apartment searches, one tear gassing, one beating, and one attempted beating. In one case, the police interrogated a member's wife and daughter. 104 Similar bursts of police activity were aimed at the Founding Committee in late February 1980, in an attempt to disrupt the publication of Robotnik Szczecinski, and also in late April-early May 1980. In the latter case, Jan Witkowski's apartment was searched three times in one week, while Stefan Kozlowski was detained three times in one week. 1 0 5 The Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions in Western Pomerania was not the most important participant in the events that led up to signing of the agreement between the government and the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), located in the Warski Shipyard. The strike there began on August 18, 1980 and was waged as a solidarity strike with the MKS in Gdansk. In the early stages of the strikes, the KZ-WZZ-PZ and activists associated with it tried to affect the course of events. The first strike on August 18 occurred at the Parnica Repair Yard. Its crew elected Andrzej Krystosiak as the chairman of their strike committee. Krystosiak had been receiving underground publications since late 1977. He also regularly attended oppositional discussion meetings, which were organized by a young man who worked with the editorial board of Robotnik and, in turn, Krystosiak began to organize similar meetings with workers in Parnica. He estimated that out of 1,000 workers in Parnica, 300 read the underground press. Parnica also collected fairly substantial sums of money for Robotnik on a regular basis. Krystosiak even spent time making copies of Biuletyn Informacyjny, which he particularly enjoyed reading. 106 Since the opposition in Szczecin was relatively weak, and due to a

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massive round up of its activists which began on August 19 and continued until the signing of the Gdansk agreement on August 31, KZWZZ-PZ was at a disadvantage. 107 The dominant enterprise in the strike movement in Szczecin was the Warski Shipyard. Prior to the election of the strike committee at Warski, Andrzej Kamrowski of Robotnik Szczecinski was one of several people to address the crowd of assembled workers. He proposed that they pick three representatives from each department to form a strike committee. It is unclear how the crew reacted to this. However, by 2:00 P.M. they had chosen 48-yearold Marian Jurczyk, a veteran of the strike committee in 1970-71, as the chairman of their committee. Jurczyk later assumed leadership of Interfactory Strike Committee as well. 108 If there was any element that linked the strikers in Szczecin and their leaders, it was the legacy of the strikes of 1970-71. One worker explained the selection of Marian Jurczyk in this way: "We knew that Marian Jurczyk had been a member of the strike committee in 1970, that he had not changed his ideas since then, and that he would give his life for the workers and the workers' struggle. What mattered for us was to have completely trustworthy leaders. Trust and confidence were much more important than ability. " 1 0 9 Jurczyk was not the only Interfactory Strike Committee leader who had participated in some fashion as a worker representative in 197071. His two deputies, Stanistaw Wgdotowski and Kazimierz Fischbein, as well as MKS members Andrzej Krystosiak and Jan Nowak had also been active in the 1970-71 strikes. 110 Unlike the strike in Gdansk, which has been described by an observer as a "happening," 1 1 1 the Szczecin strike was more of a closed working-class event. There was little of the excitement that was generated by the presence of the world press corps and representatives of the Polish intelligentsia at the Gdansk strike. The Szczecin workers admitted only a few Polish journalists and three outside intellectual advisers. Even so, this was done at a late stage in the strike (August 28), and only one of the latter had any visible oppositional experience— Andrzej Kijowski. Jurczyk and several other leaders of the Interfactory Strike Committee were clearly biased against KZ-WZZ-PZ and anything that smacked of KOR in general. On the first day of the strike, two young people, described as "looking like students," arrived at the Warski Shipyard with packages of leaflets. They identified themselves as be-

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ing affiliated with Robotnik and were received coolly by the workers. They were told that they could present their program, and that if the delegates accepted it, they could join the struggle. What happened subsequently has been described as follows: One of the young people spoke about the struggle for workers' rights, joint concerns, and about the desire to help. He was very nervous and the workers didn't like it. The result was that free trade union activists, distributors of the paper which for two years had published the postulates agreed to by the Szczecin workers that very day, were shown to the gate. 112 There were further setbacks for KZ-WZZ-PZ and KSS-"KOR" in Szczecin. Andrzej Zielinski, a member of the MKS presidium and its legal adviser, had a positive opinion of KOR's work. He wanted to draw up a small paper on KOR and its work to distribute to the strikers. This was vetoed by Jurczyk and other members of the Presidium. Stefan Kozlowski, a member of KZ-WZZ-PZ and of Robotnik's editorial board, was allowed inside the Warski Shipyard, but only as an unofficial observer. He was not informed of calls from KSS-"KOR" in Warsaw requesting information on the Szczecin strike, and when supplies of KSS-"KOR" publications were delivered in his name to the Warski shipyard, they were immediately impounded by the MKS without his knowledge. 113 Although KZ-WZZ-PZ's participation in the Szczecin events was circumscribed by a strong faction in the presidium of the MKS, a part of that very body had been strongly influenced by the underground press that KZ-WZZ-PZ had brought to Szczecin. Not only Krystosiak, but also Nowak had been involved in its distribution and had even been detained by the police for it. A small group in his factory (WKPM) had even considered how to found a free trade union there. Zielinski, as stated earlier, read the underground press in the 1970s but did not get further involved because he did not know how to contact those responsible for its distribution in Szczecin. Some of the members of the presidium believed that the underground press played an important role, while another maintained that it only confirmed what people already thought, and thus strengthened their beliefs. 114 If only through the effect the underground press had on some members of the MKS, the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of Western Pomerania had a degree of influence on the strikes of 1980 in

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Szczecin. However, KZ-WZZ-PZ's key activists did not go on to play important roles in the strike or in Solidarity. It is fair to say that the experience of 1970-71 was more important to workers in Szczecin than the opposition of the late 1970s, and thus they threw their support behind activists from this time. Although, Robotnik had appeared in the Warski Shipyard, the most significant factory in the Szczecin MKS, its effect was not so great as to lead the workers to choose the members of KZ-WZZ-PZ as its leaders in the crucial days of August 1980.

Gdansk and the Baltic Seacoast (KZ-WZZ-W) The most successful of the Committees for the Free Trade Unions was located in Gdansk and surrounding cities on the eastern part of Poland's Baltic seacoast. KOR had an effective group functioning in the Gdañsk area very soon after its foundation. Bogdan Borusewicz, a young historian from Sopot, had linked up with KOR activists from Warsaw during the relief action in Radom and soon joined the committee. KOR began providing assistance in Gdansk during the earliest part of its existence. The apartment of Andrzej Gwiazda and Joanna DudaGwiazda functioned as the office of the Intervention Bureau in the Gdansk area. They both began working with KOR in its earliest stages. 115 Intervention Bureau work continued to be a significant activity after the foundation of KZ-WZZ-W. On a number of occasions, activists who had been penalized for their union activity were able to successfully appeal their punishments in the labor courts. Another important activity of the Intervention Bureau in Gdañsk was the distribution of money from KSS-"KOR" to worker activists who had been fired for their activities. For example, both Lech Walgsa and Sylwester Niezgoda were helped in this fashion after the strike at Elektromontaz in 1980 (see below). 116 Unlike in Katowice or Western Pomerania, the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of the Coast was centered in a strong oppositional milieu. Cooperation between oppositional groups was welldeveloped in the Gdañsk area. 117 The strong spirit of cooperation between the activists (who would later work with Robotnik and form KZWZZ-W) centered around Borusewicz and the Gwiazdas as well as the students who would later form RMP has already been mentioned. Borusewicz became one of the first editors of Robotnik. His name and address were first printed in the second issue (October 1977). 118 Before

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the foundation of KZ-WZZ-W, a well-developed circle of Robotnik activists existed. They were involved in distributing the underground press (especially Robotnik), cooperating with the Gwiazdas on matters of concern to the Intervention Bureau, gathering information on the Gdansk area for KSS-"KOR," and organizing self-education circles. 119 As early as February 22, 1978, a self-education meeting of eleven people was broken up by policemen who fired tear gas into Borusewicz's apartment. 1 2 0 Around the same time, oppositional circles in Gdansk began collecting signatures on a petition protesting the brutality and indignity of police methods used against the opposition, violation of the rights of free assembly and expression, discrimination on the basis of belief, and violation of the Polish constitution and international human rights agreements ratified by the Sejm. 1 2 1 Even before the foundation of KZ-WZZ-W, this group of activists was already taking strong measures to defend itself from police coercion. The massacre of workers in Gdansk near the Lenin Shipyard in 1970 was a highly emotional issue in worker and opposition circles on the coast. The matter had been officially ignored by the authorities since the early 1970s. Among the most spectacular and significant actions organized by the Gdansk area opposition were the annual commemorations of the events of December 1970. The earliest event of this type preceded the formation of KZ-WZZ-W by almost a year. This action, organized by Gdansk-area students, took place on Sunday, May 1, 1977. A wreath with the inscription "To the Shipyard Workers Killed in December—Students" was laid at Gate 2 of the Lenin Shipyard, where workers had been shot down in 1970. Since it was a Sunday, only a few people attended, and the wreath was removed a mere five minutes after the participants dispersed. 122 The next commemoration of the massacre of 1970 took place on its seventh anniversary, on December 16,1977. In subsequent years, regular ceremonies took place each December, culminating in the unveiling of a monument in front of the shipyard in December 1980. The December 1977 commemoration was much better prepared than the previous one. It was the joint work of KSS-"KOR" (including the Robotnik group in the Gdansk area), ROPCiO, and SKS. Announcements stating that there would be a wreath laid at Gate 2 of the shipyard at 2:00 P.M. on December 16,1977, in memory of the workers shot in December 1970 were posted and scattered throughout Gdansk and the Lenin Shipyard on December 14 and 15. After the announcements

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were posted, the management of the Lenin Shipyard informed the crew that such activity would disrupt the year-end production drive and warned workers that there would be a large number of policemen at the demonstration. 123 The tactic of intimidation did not work. Most accounts of the 1977 commemoration put the number of participants at around 1,000 (approximately 900 workers and 100 students). Since Gate 2 was blocked by buses, flowers were laid at the Shipyard wall. The ten- to twentyminute ceremony was simple—flowers and votive candles were laid, a minute of silence was observed, and the national anthem was sung. The crowd then dispersed. The security forces made their presence quite evident. They attempted to block the wall at which votive candles and flowers were laid. The parking of buses in front of the gate was certainly no coincidence. Plainclothesmen circulated among the crowd and filmed those present. The police also made a point of confiscating cameras and detained KSS-"KOR" activists traveling from out of town. Both KSS-"KOR" member Borusewicz and SKS-Gdañsk spokesperson Blazej Wyszkowski were attacked by unknown assailants as the ceremonies ended. 1 2 4 The formation of the committee on the coast followed the foundation of KZ-WZZ-K by a little more than two months (April 29, 1978). The founding declaration discussed the thirty-year absence of authentic trade unions since the destruction of the Polish Socialist party (PPS) and Polish Peasant party (PSL). It condemned the official trade unions for serving the party-state employers and not defending workers' interests. Society, the declaration continued, had been deprived of the means of self-defense and thus had been compelled to defend itself in spontaneous ways. It claimed that such spontaneous forms could only have uncertain results. The declaration saw the solution to the growing economic and political crisis in extensive democratization. 125 In addition, the declaration argued that only authentic representatives of society could help synchronize the real interests of citizens with the interests and powers of the state and produce real cooperation and compromise. The existence of organizations such as KSS-"KOR," ROPCiO, SKS, and TKN was pointed to as a step in this direction. KZWZZ-W's goal was defined as "the organization of the defense of the economic, legal, and human interests of workers." The committee expressed its intention to defend all workers regardless of their convictions or qualifications. It openly identified itself with Robotnik and

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pledged to keep the public informed of its activities via Robotnik and its own publications. Finally, the committee called upon all workers, technicians, and engineers to help create independent representation and emphasized the need for "solidarity in the struggle for a better future." 1 2 6 Although there are some minor discrepancies between sources, the signers of the original founding declaration were probably Andrzej Gwiazda, Edwin Myszk, Antoni Sokolowski, and Krzysztof Wyszkowski. Gwiazda was already quite active in the Gdansk area KSS-"KOR" milieu. Krzysztof Wyszkowski, like his brother Blazej, was also an activist. The stories of Myszk and Sokolowski are regrettable. Myszk worked as a Security Service agent within KZ-WZZ-W. Sokolowski, unjustly denied a pension for a work-related disability, was compelled to withdraw from KZ-WZZ-W through a combination of bribes and threats of imprisonment, which resulted in a rather messy affair over a letter condemning KZ-WZZ-W that he allegedly wrote to the editors of Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw Life) and that he tried to have retracted. 127 Many other activists eventually joined KZ-WZZ-W. Borusewicz remained an important contact point, because his name and address were given in Robotnik and Komunikat. Andrzej and Joanna Gwiazda continued to play a significant role, as did the Wyszkowski brothers. Other important activists included Anna Walentynowicz; Lech Walesa, who made contact with Borusewicz in May 1978 and was known as an indefatigable distributor of bibuta; Alina Pienkowska, who became involved through reading Borusewicz's name in Komunikat and contacting him; police spy Myszk, who remained "active" until sometime in the fall of 1979; Andrzej Bulc; and Jan Zapolnik, a ROPCiO activist and coeditor of Ruch Zwigzkowy. They were later joined by Bogdan Lis, Andrzej Kolodziej, and Maryla Ploriska, a leader in a struggle for tenants' rights in her building complex. 128 KZ-WZZ-W continued to attract more and more adherents. It is estimated that the committee distributed Robotnik and later Robotnik Wybrzeza (Worker of the Coast) to several thousand people in the Tri-City area. It had a strong following in a number of factories. These included the Lenin Shipyard, Techmet, Elektromontaz, Ceto, and Elmor. At Elmor, KZ-WZZ-W was even able to elect Bogdan Lis and a number of "genuine" workers to the factory council. Strength in Gdynia was limited, involving only sporadic contacts. 129 One of KZ-WZZ-W's first actions was to organize a meeting with the

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editors of Robotnik. The meeting, scheduled for May 28,1978, was broken up by the Security Service and the police. This was the most conspicuous example of the sort of repression that KZ-WZZ-W encountered in its early phases. Nine people were detained, and Blazej Wyszkowski was sentenced to two-months imprisonment by a misdemeanor tribunal. The defense of Wyszkowski became a significant test of strength for KZ-WZZ-W. Wyszkowski, from the minute of his arrest, began a 33-day hunger strike, and four others joined him in an 8- to 9-day solidarity fast. SKS and KZ-WZZ-W printed 15,000 copies of two joint statements of protest, which were distributed extensively at churches. Similar protest statements were circulated in Lodz and Warsaw. Prayers for Wyszkowski's release were offered daily for seven consecutive weeks in the Church of St. Mary in Gdansk. An open letter signed by 274 people from the Gdansk area was sent by writer Lech Bjidkowski and actress Helena Winiarska to the State Council (Rada Paristwa). In late June and early July, some 700 copies of Robotnik were handed out in front of the Lenin Shipyard as part of a Wyszkowski solidarity action. Protest leaflets were scattered across the Gdansk area several times and over 100,000 were distributed throughout Poland, during the course of Wyszkowski's imprisonment. All in all, approximately 100 people from the Gdansk area directly participated in the Wyszkowski defense campaign. 130 The response of KZ-WZZ-W to the arrest and imprisonment of Wyszkowski was a milestone in its development. The committee demonstrated it could mount a strong local response with minimal outside help and mobilize public support against repression. According to an interview conducted with KZ-WZZ-W activists in December 1978, the committee believed it needed to concentrate on raising consciousness so that workers could act independently, organize themselves, become conscious of their power, and become convinced of the value of independent action. For this reason, the committee paid great attention to the distribution of underground literature and the organization of self-education circles. 131 KZ-WZZ-W set up the first of its worker self-education groups in September 1978. They were assisted in this effort by Lech Kaczynski, an expert on labor law. In a joint endeavor with Robotnik, KZ-WZZ-W produced its own materials for these education circles. By March 1979, they had begun to produce pamphlets of texts too lengthy to publish in Robotnik. These included the conventions of the International Labor

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Organization (ILO) and Boleslaw Sulik's "Workers," an account of the 1970-71 events in Szczecin. These were followed by the sociologist Jan Malanowski's "Remarks About Young Workers" and emigre scholar Krzysztof Pomian's "Workers and Party Secretaries." By August 1980, between 100 and 200 activists had completed a fairly comprehensive study course, which included training on what rights citizens had "in case of problems with the police" and how to successfully conduct strikes. 1 3 2 KZ-WZZ-W also published it own newspaper, Robotnik Wybrzeza (Worker of the Coast). Its original editors were Andrzej Bule, Bogdan Borusewicz, Joanna Duda-Gwiazda, Andrzej Gwiazda, and Edwin Myszk. Later, Alina Pieñkowska, Anna Walentynowicz, Lech Walgsa, and Maryla Ptoñska also joined the editorial board. The first issue came out on August 1,1978, and contained an editorial titled "Why We Have Founded Free Trade Unions." 1 3 3 The editorial began with the assertion that the official trade unions had failed to do their job and that in relation to management, workers remained "powerless and isolated." It offered two explanations for this. First, the existing unions were not controlled by the workers, but by the party and the administrative apparatus. Second, in a "state economy," employers were more powerful than in capitalist economies, where the interests of the state and those of employers were not identical. The editorial also stated that trade union independence from employers was KZ-WZZ-W's fundamental principle. Even though all independent activity was considered to be political by the authorities KZ-WZZ-W was not a political organization. KZ-WZZ-W pursued nonpolitical, union goals, did not seek to take power, and was not based on a shared worldview. 1 3 4 The editorial did, however, specify the sorts of goals, issues, and activities that KZ-WZZ-W would pursue. These included the defense of workers dismissed for protests or strikes, the publication and distribution of their own newspaper, as well as issues such as working conditions, the right to work, overtime, night work, pay, the cost of living, goods availability, disproportional wages, changes in piece rates, and the autonomy of factory administration. The editorial concluded by arguing that KZ-WZZ-W's activity was legal and that "Each person has a natural right to defense, to justice, and to a dignified life." These rights were guaranteed, it stressed, by the Polish constitution and ILO convention 87, ratified by Poland in 1956. 1 3 5 The overall quality of Robotnik Wybrzeza was excellent. Most of the

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articles were contributed by KZ-WZZ-W members, and its focus was more local than Robotnik's. The contents of most editions of Robotnik Wybrzeza were dominated by investigative pieces on social and working conditions in the Gdansk area. Despite the success of KZ-WZZ-W's independent publishing venture, the committee remained dependent on Robotnik as an organizing tool. There is evidence that Robotnik Wybrzeza's print run was limited to 300 copies per issue. For this reason, Robotnik had great currency in the Gdansk area. During a strike in 1978 at "Malmor," workers read Robotnik aloud. The members of KZ-WZZW continued to play a key role in Robotnik. As mentioned earlier, the committee's members were jointly responsible for the drawing up of the Charter of Workers' Rights, and fourteen activists from the Gdansk area signed the Charter. This group included most of the important activists listed above. 136 After its formation, KZ-WZZ-W became the main organizer of the commemorations of the 1970 events. However, KSS "KOR," ROPCiO, SKS, and later RMP members always participated as well. In 1978, the commemoration (scheduled for December 18 because December 16 was a day off) drew much police attention. Beginning on December 9 or 10, 3,500 publicity leaflets were pasted up and handed out in the Gdansk area, including within the shipyard itself. From December 17 to 20, twenty-eight oppositionists were detained, and twenty-five apartments were searched. Nevertheless, numerous people walked with flowers toward gate 2 of the Lenin Shipyard on December 18. Among them was Walesa, who was fined 5,000 zloty for disturbing the peace while carrying a wreath from KZ-WZZ-W. The management of the Lenin Shipyard tried to persuade workers to work overtime and directed them to exit from gates other than number 2. Despite this, approximately 4,000 people attended the ceremonies. Borusewicz managed to get through with a wreath from KSS-"KOR;" he seems to be the only one to have reached the site with flowers. One group arrived with a Polish flag emblazoned with the year "1970" in black. 137 Dariusz Kobzdej of ROPCiO, later an important RMP activist, read a letter from Kazimierz Switoñ, who was incarcerated at the time. This elicited cries from the crowd to free him. Kobzdej also informed the crowd of the existence of KZ-WZZ-K and its recent repression. Borusewicz and Kazimierz Szoloch, a member of the 1970 strike committee and ROPCiO affiliate, both spoke. Szoloch spoke about the rising cost of living and drew attention to the issue of commercial meat

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shops. Borusewicz discussed why the commemoration of 1970 was forbidden by the authorities and why workers should organize, and he reported on the foundation of KZ-WZZ-W. During the ceremony, buses parked nearby raced their engines to disrupt the proceedings. After the speeches, the demonstrators then sang patriotic songs and the Internationale. A minute of silence was observed before the crowd dispersed. 138 The last commemoration of the Gdansk events of 1970 before the erection of the monument at Gate 2 in 1980, was held on December 16, 1979, the ninth anniversary of the massacre. On this occasion, the security forces took stronger measures. During the days before the event, over 200 people were detained, including fifteen KSS-"KOR" and ROPCiO activists arrested on charges of belonging to an association "that planned to commit a crime." As in previous years, the commemoration was well publicized beforehand by KZ-WZZ-W and RMP pamphleteering. The Lenin Shipyard was closed that day "to save energy." The police managed to detain some people on their way to Gate 2, but after that, they engaged in no further interference. It is estimated that between 5,000 and 7,000 thousand people attended. Hundreds of flowers, wreaths, and votive candles were placed at the site. A banner reading "The Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions" was unfurled. The ceremonies began with the singing of patriotic songs. Speeches were given by Dariusz Kobzdej of RMP, by the Rev. Bronislaw Sroka, and by KZ-WZZ-W members Maryla Plonska and Lech Walesa. Walesa had gone into hiding for twenty-four hours in order to be able to attend. 139 Kobzdej spoke about the traditions of Polish independence and about December 1970 on the coast. Father Sroka talked about the historical and patriotic traditions of Poland and led a prayer for those killed in 1970. Walesa called for society to organize itself and swore that if a monument to the fallen was not erected by next year, they should return in 1980 with bricks and build one themselves. One report noted that Walesa's words were greeted with particular enthusiasm. Plonska, speaking on behalf of the KZ-WZZ-W, discussed the long tradition of societal resistance in postwar Poland and its lessons. She spoke of the importance of mutual solidarity for self-defense and for the defense of workers' representatives in order to achieve gains more lasting than those of 1970. She concluded her speech with a call for the observance of a minute of silence for the victims of 1970. Memorial masses were

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held in other cities as well, including Kalisz, Kraków (attended by approximately 1,000 people), Legnica, Poznañ, Warsaw (attended by approximately 5,000 people), and Wroclaw (attended by approximately 2,000 people). In Szczecin, flowers were laid on the graves of workers killed in 1970."° Following an intense and closely coordinated joint KSS-"KOR"ROPCiO protest campaign, the fifteen activists, arrested prior to the commemoration, were released on December 19, 1979.141 The success of this campaign was based on the rapid and extensive engagement of a large number of people in oppositional activity. Poles began to discuss the means at their disposal to free the fifteen and what they should do. Walls were covered with graffiti protesting the arrests, and informational leaflets were circulated widely. Confronted by this show of social solidarity, the authorities backed down. 1 4 2 The events of December 1979 were something of a breakthrough for the opposition in Poland. Commemorations of 1970 had been coordinated in many cities, and the opposition was able to defend itself in the face of police repression. Following the events of December 1979, the authorities moved to curtail KZ-WZZ-W's strength in factories by firing or transferring key activists. KZ-WZZ-W, with the support of factory crews, contested these actions in a variety of ways, including strikes and the formation of workers' commissions. In the pre-Solidarity period, direct defense of shopfloor activists on a widespread and consistent basis by workers was unique to Gdansk and was directly attributable to the organizing efforts of KZ-WZZ-W. As Joanna Duda-Gwiazda later recounted: The general principle which we observed and which we wanted to instill into the people was that until they had learned to defend their leaders against repression there would always be very few such people, and they would not be able to organize, that the repression would make them powerless and make any defense impossible. Talking about leaders I meant those who will be brave enough to openly, officially oppose the foreman, the management on a definite issue. 143 KZ-WZZ-W's ability to mobilize workers in defense of activists, whether successful or not, is direct evidence of the strength of the Founding Committee and the success of its attempts to get across its message. As early as December 16, 1979, the day of the commemoration,

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workers in departments W-2 and W-4 of the Lenin Shipyards held short warning strikes over the detention of their colleagues Maciej Mietkowski and Henryk Lenarczuk. In W-4 a leaflet was circulated calling for another strike if Lenarczuk was not released by December 18. At the Elmor factory in Gdañsk, several tens of leaflets were pasted up on December 19, which demanded the release of Andrzej Gwiazda, who had been detained at work on December 16. The leaflet appealed to the crew to protest the breaking of the law (i.e., Gwiazda's detention), as well as to demand that management respect the right to work and that neither the police nor the security services be permitted on the grounds of the factory without obvious cause. 144 On December 31,1979, eighty of the hundred or so workers in W-2 held another warning strike over plans to isolate KZ-WZZ-W's Anna Walentynowicz from the crew by transferring her to another department. On the morning of January 31, 1980, after Walentynowicz had been transferred, W-2 went on strike for three hours. The workers also threatened to strike the next day unless the firing of KZ-WZZ-W activist Andrzej Kolodziej was retracted. 145 On February 1, 1980, party activists from all over the shipyard assembled in W-2's locker room before work. As the workers arrived, each was escorted to his or her work station, threatened with dismissal if Anna Walentynowicz was contacted, and individually supervised by two overseers to prevent talking. Similar precautions were taken in Kolodziej's department (W-3), despite a lack of strike preparations. Two workers who contacted Walentynowicz, Tadeusz Gapa and Maciej Mietkowski, were indeed dismissed. Despite the breaking of the February 1 strike, the action was partially successful because Walentynowicz was reassigned to a part of the shipyard that was not as isolated from the crew as the site of her original reassignment. The firing in January of another KZ-WZZ-W activist, Jan Karandziej, a welder from department K-2 in the Northern Shipyard in Gdañsk, elicited a protest letter from twenty-eight of his colleagues to management. Management's subsequent attempts to intimidate the workers were of no avail. Workers continued to stand up for Karandziej at a hearing of the Territorial Appeals Commission (TKO), which reinstated him three months later.146 The most extensive of the defense actions took place in the Elektromontaz factory. On January 21, 1980, management decided to dismiss twenty to twenty-five "redundant" workers. The crew interpreted this

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as an attempt to punish those who had participated in the gate 2 demonstration in December. On January 23,1980, members of the crew organized a five-man workers' commission to fight the dismissals. Walesa headed the commission. Its other members were Sylwester Niezgoda, Teofil Koszalka, Zbigniew Dgbrowski, and Edward Slapa. Not surprisingly, all five were among those to be dismissed. The statement announcing its formation was signed by 168 of the 500 or so members of the crew. 147 On January 31,1980, management tried to disrupt the commission's work by forcing the workers to hold two smaller meetings rather than one large one. Nevertheless, the commission managed to formulate four demands: 1) withdrawal of all terminations of contracts; 2) submission of the redundancy elimination plans to a special commission of elected workers' representatives (including workers' commission members, if they were elected) for approval; 3) an end to dismissals of redundant workers until comparable work could be found for them; and 4) protection from inflation by quarterly indexing of wages. At this point, management promised not to fire Walesa, to find new jobs for those dismissed, and to end the firings. Nonetheless, management prevented a meeting scheduled for later in the day. The crew decided to meet after work near the factory on February 1. On that day, large numbers of police officers and security service agents were present when the crew arrived. At 10:00 A.M., groups of several workers were summoned by management, threatened about political action, and escorted out of the factory until it was emptied. In this way, the activity in Elektromontaz was terminated, and later, management did not honor its promises concerning the firing of certain workers, including Walesa and Niezgoda. 148 On April 16, 1980, management at Elmor informed Alina Pieñkowska that she had been transferred from the clinic there. In response, 311 workers at Elmor signed a petition refuting charges of poor work discipline and negligence that had been levied against her. Another sixtyfour workers wrote statements in her defense in the clinic's suggestion book, and the factory council also defended her. In addition to Pieñkowska's, there were reports of other dismissals of workers connected with KZ-WZZ-W in the Gdansk area in the spring of 1980. 149 I have been unable to determine exactly how these events unfolded because of the shift in underground press coverage in response to the eruption of strikes in the summer of 1980.

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What the numerous examples above attest to, however, is the great strength of KZ-WZZ-W in many Gdansk-area factories and the willingness of workers in those factories to use a variety of means, including strikes, to defend their colleagues in KZ-WZZ-W from party-state repression. When workers at the Lenin Shipyard heard reports of strikes from other parts of the country in July and August of 1980, they began to turn to KZ-WZZ-W activists and ask them when their own strike would begin. After careful planning and preparation the strike began at 6:00 A.M. on August 14. 1 5 0 At first, demands were minimal—a pay increase and the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz, who had been abducted by plainclothesmen. The demands proved to be well chosen: the price rises had, after all, diminished workers' standards of living, and the crew of the Lenin Shipyard had already demonstrated that they were willing to strike to defend Walentynowicz. At the earliest stages of the strike Waif sa electrified the crowds with his now famous face-to-face confrontation with the shipyard manager, announcing the beginning of an occupation strike. The shipyard strike committee halted the strike in exchange for monetary concessions on August 16. When the settlement aroused disappointment among some outspoken workers, KZ-WZZ-W decided to try to continue the strike. This was made possible by the work of the shipyard strike guard, who managed to keep enough workers in the shipyard to prevent the strike from ending. Andrzej Gwiazda and Bogdan Lis were dissatisfied with the strike settlement and traveled from enterprise to enterprise in Gdansk persuading representatives of other striking factories to meet at Elmor. When they received word that the strike at the shipyard was in fact not yet over, the representatives of the enterprises assembled at Elmor returned to the shipyard and that same night created the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), which formulated the twenty-one demands and negotiated the settlement with the authorities. The number of factories in the Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot area that joined the MKS grew larger with each passing day. As an ultimate measure of the influence of KZ-WZZ-W on the course of the signing of the agreement permitting the formation of independent trade unions, let us examine the composition of the presidium of the Interfactory Strike Committee. The presidium consisted of eighteen members. The three-person executive of the presidium was made up entirely of KZ-WZZ-W members. Walesa was the chairman, and Bogdan Lis and Andrzej Kolodziej were its deputy chairmen. Iron-

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ically, Koiodziej, who had been fired from the Lenin Shipyard, had found work at Paris Commune Shipyard in Gdynia just days before the strike there. When the Paris Commune Shipyard went on strike on August 15, Koiodziej was elected chairman of that strike committee and led the yard into the MKS. Of the remaining fifteen members of the MKS presidium, four were KZ-WZZ-W activists—Andrzej Gwiazda, Alina Pienkowska, Anna Walentynowicz, and Florian Wisniewski (a KZ-WZZ-W activist from Elektromontaz). Another member, Lech Bgdkowski, was not a KZ-WZZ-W activist but had strong links to the committee. He had been one of the organizers of the letter to the National Council in defense of Wyszkowski in 1978. In 1980, when Bjidkowski and Helena Winarska delivered a letter of support to the shipyard from members of the Gdansk intelligentsia, he was drafted into the presidium of the MKS. Thus, even without B^dkowski, KZWZZ-W members constituted nearly 40 percent of the presidium. There was, moreover, no other coherent organized presence on the presidium. Clearly, the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of the Coast was the most successful of the committees of its type. In the period before the summer strike wave of 1980, KZ-WZZ-W was able to carry out a much greater range of successful actions than either of the other groups in Silesia or Western Pomerania. The committee was responsible for organizing the original strike at the Lenin Shipyard that summer, and the Interfactory Strike Committee was brought together by the efforts of KZ-WZZ-W's members. KZ-WZZ-W members were chosen by the workers of the Tri-City area to lead their strike, which resulted in the signing of the Gdansk agreement, the most significant of the three signed that summer. The MKS became the most important actor in the foundation and organization of Solidarity, and its leaders continued to be important figures in the union. As a result of this, Gdansk Solidarity became the single most important branch of the union.

8

KOR and Solidarity To speak a language in which the word "security " Awakens a shiver of terror, the word "truth " is The Name of a newspaper, and the words "freedom " and "Democracy " come under the authority of a police general; How did it happen that we began To play these word games, puns, Slips of the tongue, inversions of sense, In this linguistic poetry? —Stanislaw Barariczak, stanza from the poem "N.N. Begins to Ask Himself a Question."'

In this study, I have sought to understand the origins of the driving force behind democratization in Poland, the self-liberation of civil society. It has documented the emergence of opposition in the aftermath of the June 1976 strikes. That opposition was able to effectively liberate a public space and to successfully defend it against the party-state. With the strikes of 1980, the Interfactory Strike Committee in Gdansk was able to negotiate a settlement that recognized the legality of existing self-governing trade unions and opened the door for recognition of the legality of other forms of autonomous social organization. This recognition marked the reconstruction of civil society in Poland. Despite the attempts of the party-state to destroy civil society, including the declaration of martial law and the banning of opposition groups, Solidarity reemerged triumphant at the end of the 1980s and has tried to transform Poland into a parliamentary democracy. In my depiction of how this unique process began, I drew attention to the opposition movement around KOR, not only on the formal committee structure in Warsaw, but also on its publishing initiative for workers—Robotnik, and the most significant group of activists associated with that initiative—the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of the Coast in Gdansk. Although there are a number of books and articles devoted in total or in part to KOR, it is my hope that this

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focus has not only provided a more detailed account of workers' opposition in the 1970s, but also allowed me to make an interpretive contribution. The most comprehensive work on KOR's Warsaw-based activity is Jan Jozef Lipski's history of the committee. Although no apology is necessary, Lipski points out a limitation of his approach: "Although this book is based mainly on documents it is not a scholarly work. Rather . . . it is too much of a chronicle and does not sufficiently attempt a synthesis that would order the sequences of facts within a theoretical framework that . . . no work with scholarly ambitions can do without." 2 It is clear that Lipski did not intend his book to be the final word on KOR, but a starting point for the historical interpretation of the Solidarity and pre-Solidarity periods in Poland. He even expresses the hope that others will take up the challenge of interpreting this period in Polish history (ibid., pp. 1-2). In writing this book, I have endeavored to provide such a "theoretical framework" in order to understand the significance of the late 1970s in Poland in the context of the democratization now underway there. Unlike Lipski, I have had the good fortune to view the events of the period with several years additional hindsight. From today's perspective, KOR's actions are significant as the initial step in a civil society-led process of democratization, the consolidation of which we may very well be witnessing today. Here I will specify just how KOR's actions helped to initiate this process. My interpretation will undoubtedly be controversial; however, this is true of nearly everything written or spoken about KOR. I will begin my analysis by outlining the long controversy that has surrounded the committee. 3

The Problem of KOR in Polish Politics Although KOR disbanded over ten years ago, many of its former members and activists are still important political figures. They can be found throughout the political spectrum in Poland. For instance, Antoni Macierewicz and Piotr Naimski were leaders of the Christian-National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrzescijarisko-Narodowe), a conservative nationalist party. Others, like Jan Olszewski and Lech Kaczynski, were prominent politicians in the Center Alliance (Porozumenie Centrum), a party created to support Lech Walesa's presidential bid. With the fall

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of the Olszewski government in the summer of 1992, Olszewski and Macierewicz have left these parties but are still politically active. Jacek Kurori, Adam Michnik (now an eminent newspaper editor), and several others are prominent members of the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna), which grew out of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's unsuccessful presidential campaign. The late Jan Jozef Lipski also remained politically active, attempting to resurrect the old Second International Socialist party, the Polish Socialist party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna). Despite the many contributions of its former members, KOR has been one of the most contentious subjects in Polish politics. The nowdefunct Communist regime seemed to target the committee for extremely sharp criticism. When numerous KOR activists began to play key roles in Solidarity in 1980-81, official sources claimed that the union had been infiltrated by anti-socialist elements. 4 After the declaration of martial law, many members of the committee were arrested and interned. Four KOR members were later again placed under arrest for allegedly preparing the overthrow of the state, but were freed under the amnesty of July 1984. The regime also sponsored "poison pen" literature in an attempt to distort the committee's record. 5 KOR was not an object of universal acclaim within the opposition either. Periodic disagreements between KOR and such groups as the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) and the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) led to a great deal of controversy and animosity.6 Finally, as this study has made clear, there were sometimes even strong disagreements within KOR itself about the work of the committee. KOR activists played key roles in the events of the summer of 1980, and once Solidarity was created, many KOR activists assumed positions as advisers, journalists, researchers, activists, and even leaders within the union. During the Solidarity period, the committee ceased to function as it had in the past, and suppressed political and personal differences began to surface. Thus, while KOR activists made important individual contributions to Solidarity, and former colleagues sometimes found themselves allied in union politics, KOR did not constitute an organized presence within Solidarity. Often enough, committee members found themselves on opposing sides of the same question. KOR continued to be a source of controversy within the opposition even after the legalization of free trade unions. In many cases, attitudes

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toward the committee seem to have been based on whether KOR members were political allies or competitors. A sharp division of opinion in regard to the committee emerged in a rather unseemly fashion at the Solidarity Congress in the autumn of 1981. After KOR member Lipiñski formally announced the dissolution of the committee, a group of activists proposed passing a resolution thanking KOR for its special contribution to the movement. Others then responded by proposing a draft that omitted KOR by name, but thanked the "democratic opposition" of the 1970s. This, in turn, provoked another resolution that was even stronger in its praise of the committee. While the Congress did eventually pass the resolution thanking KOR by name, the incident was fraught with extreme tension and caused a great deal of commotion on the Congress floor.7 Moreover, the rancor that this issue raised made the gratitude expressed toward KOR seem less than fully genuine. Although it is indisputable that the committee made a vital contribution to Solidarity, it is also obvious that the committee was not alone in this regard. As noted above, the values preached by the Catholic Church constituted a moral alternative embraced by many in Solidarity, regardless of whether or not they were believers. Furthermore, the significance of the election of Pope John Paul II and his first trip to Poland, which broke down barriers of fear in society and made it aware of its own strength and potential, should not be underestimated. The influence of ROPCiO, RMP, and other opposition groups in shaping contemporary Polish nationalism, although surely present at some level, still awaits systematic scholarly study. Without a doubt, Solidarity, and the success of the opposition in the 1970s for that matter, would have been impossible had the Gierek regime not awakened a profound sense of injustice among workers and other social groups in Poland. Finally, of course, the workers' past political experience itself was important. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence presented in chapter 7, it would be preposterous to argue that KOR was an insignificant factor in the creation of Solidarity. To a large degree, I believe that the controversy surrounding KOR, both in Poland and among Western observers, stems from a misunderstanding of the committee as an organization. By the summer of 1980, KOR had become much more than the thirty-two primarily Warsawbased intellectuals who were then signing its Komunikat.8 This account has presented a different picture of KOR; that is, one of a nationwide, highly differentiated social movement that included more than just a

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handful of intellectuals. The movement also included, for instance, many workers who participated in the Robotnik initiative and/or the Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions.

Workers and Intellectuals Social scientists use categorical terms like "the working class," "the intelligentsia," "the peasantry," and "the bourgeoisie" in at least two different ways. Sometimes they are used merely to denote different components of society. However, they are also used to describe agents of large-scale collective action and social change. In the case at hand, while KOR drew its activists and supporters from the ranks of the Polish working class and intelligentsia, it would be premature, from the perspective of the late 1970s, to understand and define these categories as social forces. It is only in the context of the strikes in the summer of 1980 and after that it makes sense to transform our use of these categories from terms of social stratification into terms describing larger social forces of sweeping change. From the perspective of the 1970s, the intellectuals and workers who participated in the KOR movement were exceptional. The founders of the committee broke with the political passivity that had characterized the Polish intelligentsia in the early Gierek period. The Polish intelligentsia had been all but silent when the state suppressed strikes and victimized the participants in 1970-71. KOR's actions represented a return to contestory political action by the intelligentsia. 9 With the exception of the small, ill-fated movement (Ruch) in Lodz in the early 1970s, this sort of activism had been conspicuously absent in Poland from the defeat of revisionism in 1968 until the petition and open letter campaign that protested the proposed constitutional changes of 1975. Christopher Lasch has provided a useful typology of three different roles that intellectuals play in politics: the mandarin, who uses his or her knowledge in the service of power; the revolutionary, who puts his or her knowledge at the disposal of a dispossessed social group in the name of taking power; and the "rebel, alien, or renegade," who, unlike the first two, has no power ambitions. Intellectuals of this third type find themselves in sympathy with the dispossessed and provide what Warner Berthoff calls "a posture of accusatory public testimony." 10 KOR intellectuals, by comparison, do not easily fit any of these types. The traditional Polish intelligentsia of the partition period, who

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tried to organize and lead society, can be seen as revolutionary intellectuals in their advocacy of the Polish cause. Thus, I do not view KOR's politics as a return to the traditional role of the Polish intelligentsia, which led the successful struggle for national independence in 1918. During the interwar period, many of these intellectuals worked to create the power structures of the new state, while others contested the dictatorship that developed after 1926. Depending on their relationship to political power over time, partition era and interwar intellectuals usually played the role of either mandarin or revolutionary. With the establishment of communist power in Poland many intellectuals acted as mandarins for the new regime. Others were either silenced, imprisoned, killed, or forced to emigrate. KOR, however, pioneered a new role for Polish intellectuals. If the KOR intellectuals are close to any one of Lasch's types, it is the third— "alien, rebel, renegade." Although KOR certainly sympathized with the dispossessed (its foundation was an expression of moral outrage at the treatment of workers after the strikes of 1976), it did not indulge in a pathos of victimization. KOR did provide "accusatory public testimony" by chronicling oppression, but this effort entailed more than simply "bearing witness." The committee also took concrete practical action to alleviate the injustice it encountered. This aspect of KOR's work was expressed most concretely in the prominence of its Intervention Bureau. Other oppositionists, Lipski tells us, spoke deprecatingly of KOR as "social workers." 11 Adam Michnik's discussion of the uniqueness of this practical aspect of KOR's activity is telling in its formulation—"Help for prisoners was rather the domain of Polish women." 1 2 It was this very activity that permitted KOR to overcome barriers between social classes and groups in Poland. Its conception of its proper role led KOR to eschew any claim to a special right to speak in the name of those it defended. It made no attempt to hierarchically subordinate the dispossessed to the committee. Instead KOR concentrated on assisting them in becoming self-reliant in pursuit of their own interests. In this way, the committee decisively broke with the past traditions of the Polish intelligentsia and with those of the Leninist avant garde. The workers who became involved in KOR were of a special nature, as well. The evidence presented on the occupational profile of the signers of the Charter of Workers' Rights makes this evident. They con-

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sisted primarily of workers with high-skill jobs in large factories. They were clearly drawn, on balance, from the upper socioeconomic strata of the working class. Lipski described their unique cultural outlook as follows: More and more often one came across workers who read, who educated themselves and tried to understand everything—and themselves tried to propagate literature . . . those workers who were active in KOR either represented a high intellectual and cultural level, or at least understood that these were important values for the life of the nation, values worth preserving even if they did not feel drawn to them personally.13 It is not necessarily the case that oppositional activity created such workers. Workers with a thirst for education and self-improvement are present in all societies, and in the case of Poland in the late 1970s, they were drawn to the opposition. This activity gave them the opportunity to pursue these interests, as well as to utilize their intelligence and knowledge in ways that went well beyond self-education. Thus, the workers and intellectuals who participated in the KOR movement were not representative of their social classes. Their engagement presages the mass politicization of Polish workers and intellectuals that occurred in 1980. At that juncture, they established themselves as a counterelite that led an alliance of workers and intellectuals in Solidarity. The movement in the 1970s encompassed people of all classes, but not until the strikes that gave birth to Solidarity does it make sense to speak in terms of large-scale political change effected by social forces.

KOR's Significance for Solidarity The questions raised at the Solidarity Congress by the conflicting resolutions concerning KOR's contribution were posed for political purposes. 14 Clearly, KOR was a significant political actor whose efforts helped pave the way for Solidarity. However, to understand this significance, a different set of questions must be posed. In this section, I will address the question, "how did KOR affect the struggle of Polish workers to create free trade unions?" In doing so, KOR's importance to Solidarity will become clear, as will KOR's contribution to the long-term

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process of democratization in Poland. One way to begin to answer this question is to pose another: "Could Solidarity have come into existence without KOR and the Founding Committees?" It is obvious that KOR did not summon the strike wave of the summer of 1980, which set the stage for the negotiation of the agreements between the Polish government and the strike committees. The utter incompetence and social isolation of the Gierek regime, combined with the feelings of injustice it provoked, provided the necessary tinder and spark. It is highly probable that there would have been disturbances of some sort in the summer of 1980 regardless of any other factors. One important feature that distinguished these events from previous expressions of worker discontent was the fact that in 1980 the workers remained organized, in Solidarity, after the strikes had ended, to ensure the implementation of the concessions that were wrested from the party-state. The first statement of the MKS in Gdansk stressed this distinction at its outset—"Without independent trade unions all the other demands can be ruled out in the future, as it has happened several times in the short history of the Polish People's Republic." 15 Earlier worker unrest had not achieved lasting political gains. In 1956 and 1970, the workers threw their support and hopes behind new party leaderships, who, once the moment of truth had passed, went back on their promises. The interfactory strike committees in Szczecin and Gdynia in 1970-71 were short-lived. In 1976, no extensive forms of worker organization emerged. Strike committees were elected in a few exceptional cases, but this was certainly not the dominant pattern. Thus the crucial issue is whether striking workers could have and would have perpetuated some sort of organization or structure to oversee the enactment of their demands irrespective of the work of the democratic opposition in the period from 1976 to 1980. Although no definitive answer to this question is attainable, there is some evidence which can be examined. The Lublin General Strike of July 1980 did not produce an agreement permitting the formation of free trade unions. The Gdansk strike in August was the work of KZWZZ-W, and both Szczecin and Katowice responded to Gdansk's lead. The Katowice agreement was based on implementation of the Gdansk accord in the Katowice area. Szczecin went on strike in solidarity with Gdansk, and when the two strike committees made contact, they agreed to press free trade unions as a demand on which they would not compromise.

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Assuming, therefore, that demands for free trade unions could have spontaneously emerged in 1980 as they did in 1970, 16 the question remains whether spontaneous strikes—in and of themselves, without the efforts of KOR and the Founding Committees—actually would have yielded an organizational framework like Solidarity to pursue workers' demands and see to the implementation of concessions. From a historical point of view, however, this question is falsely posed. The fact is that, in the four years prior to 1980, an organizational network of oppositional social movements, inspired and nurtured by KOR, had already emerged, and the workers who participated in it had become quite proficient at the sort of political activity that enabled them to follow up their demands. In Gdansk, a worker counterelite arose from the KOR milieu and played a decisive role in creating the Interfactory Strike Committee and negotiating the Gdansk accord. Thus, to understand how 1980 differed from previous strike waves in Poland, it is necessary to examine the particular ways in which workers articulated and pursued demands similar to those they had made earlier. It should be recalled, as chapter 7 demonstrated, a process of social learning and organizational development had taken place in the intervening years. The problem of KOR's influence on Solidarity can thus be resolved by specifying the ways in which the committee contributed to the effectiveness of these new forms of worker organization and the worker counterelite that practiced them. For one, worker activists adapted the oppositional mode of politics which KOR had created and developed. KOR, through the worker counterelite that emerged in 1980, shaped the political organization of the Gdansk strike and the form which Solidarity took. It was the KOR movement that had initiated and most effectively practiced the oppositional politics which the Founding Committee on the coast successfully adapted on the shopfloor level prior to and during the strikes of 1980. Although the content of the strikes of 1980 was explicitly workers' feelings of injustice, KOR, through the actions of the workers affiliated with it, strongly affected the forms in which the Polish working class expressed those feelings. This new oppositional politics was practiced through consciously organized, continually operating independent social movements that strove to change the behavior of the party-state through pressure from below. It was pioneered by KOR in its defense of the workers prosecuted after the strikes of June 1976, and the committee continued to practice it until 1980. KOR activists were the earliest to advocate the

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shift from a state- to a society-centered emphasis in resistance, which led to the emergence of oppositional politics. KOR nurtured this fledgling politics by publicizing oppositional initiatives of other groups, training many activists in its practice, offering financial and moral support to its practitioners, and disseminating knowledge about how to practice it. In this regard, Robotnik served as an important organizational and pedagogical tool for worker activists. This new form of oppositional politics became the dominant mode of resistance to the Polish party-state. It was adopted by the vast majority of organized oppositional groups and was carried on in a legalized form by Solidarity and other groups in the subsequent period. Leading union activists emphasized KOR's effect on the way in which workers organized themselves. An interview with the Gdansk leadership of Solidarity in December 1980 contained the following: WALESA: The whole affair is based on the fact that KOR taught us this job. Now the pupils have surpassed the teachers. . . . [. . .] W A L E N T Y N O W I C Z : They didn't only defend the workers, they also taught them how to defend themselves against any reprisals. W h e n tension began to grow groups had already been organised so as to be in a position to influence the course of events. And it was owing to these groups that the strikes took a peaceful course, that no one went out into the streets. GWIAZDA: KOR taught the people that there are other methods of arguing with the authorities other than molotov cocktails. 1 7 These remarks were later echoed by Zbigniew Bujak as follows: " K O R represented a model and a method of society's self-organisation, it led to organised workers' activity, it helped to articulate their demands, KOR also, so to speak, imposed through its own example peaceful methods of struggle." 1 8 Besides attesting to KOR's organizational influence, another important point which surfaces in these remarks is the fact that selforganization was key in avoiding the mistakes of the past, in particular the outbreaks of violence, which the party-state had used to discredit protest. KOR's contribution to the effectiveness of worker's opposition was also reflected in the fact that Polish workers expressed themselves through oppositional political language. The official mass media in Po-

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land in the 1970s was largely a monopoly of the party-state authorities, and all publications were subjected to extensive and rigid rules of preventative political censorship. 19 This had two important effects. First, there was a strong awareness of censorship among the populace and of the areas and ways in which censorship obstructed the discussion of Polish history and contemporary issues. As a result the official media were viewed with extreme skepticism, if not total disbelief. One observer succinctly summarized, as follows, the cumulative effect of years of such propaganda on Soviet society: "Over the years, Soviet propaganda has completely exhausted its credit among its consumers. The tireless lies and unscrupulousness have produced a stunning effect: Soviet people are deeply interested in whatever it is the propaganda repudiates, and no less deeply disgusted by everything it extols." 20 The passage could just as well have described Poland or many other nations with Soviet-type systems. The Polish mass media of the late 1970s were accused by many of fabricating "a propaganda of success." This meant that while the economy deteriorated and political opposition grew, the press continued to maintain that the regime's policies were having their desired results and that society fully supported the party.21 In addition, investigations conducted in the pre-Solidarity period by the group "Experience and the Future" also strongly criticized the Polish press for its inaccurate reporting and warned of the danger this posed for society, polity, and economy. 22 The publication of a censor's manual and other items by the underground press increased public knowledge of the unreliability of the official press. 23 Second, political dialogue was severely constrained, not only because of censorship, but because the party-state had appropriated certain key terms from the political lexicon to provide rationales for its actions. This cooptation stripped these terms of their original content, and also stigmatized them by virtue of their association with a system of domination that was perceived as unjust. These terms therefore ceased to be a means through which society could express itself politically." The debasement of political language became so widespread that Orwell's term, "newspeak" (nowa mowa), was used to describe it. Biuletyn Informacyjny, in an article entitled "New Initiatives of Youth Organizations," cited the following from an official publication of the Party Committee of Warsaw University:

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Evaluating the "educational sessions" held by TKN and agreeing with the expressed opinions of our youth activists, the Warsaw Council of the Federation of Polish Socialist Youth Unions resolved to dispatch groups of members from youth organizations to the lectures of TKN. Their task was to make evident, through substantive discussion, the baselessness of the anti-socialist theses presented by TKN's lecturers, and to disorganize the sessions as espionage activity directed by KOR and foreign centers. 25 This same event was described to a well-known Polish writer by a student w h o attended it: A bearded young man told me of the latest methods for thwarting the activities of the "Flying University." Last week Adam Michnik was to give a lecture in a housing development in Ursyn [sic—Ursynow, an area of new development on the south of Warsaw]. A group, actually a squad of twenty-year-old roughnecks, was blocking the entrance to the building. Inside, another group kept watch on the stairs. . . . The only way the students could penetrate the blockade was by force, which would have meant a clash. . . . When Michnik arrived to deliver his lecture, the cordon let him pass, but he was attacked on the stairs. They dragged him upstairs to an apartment, pushed him against the glass doors in the foyer, breaking the glass and then roughed him up, throwing him to the floor, picking him up, then throwing him down again. . . . Saying goodbye to me, the young man added, "You know, they were students too. From the federation of youth groups. They shouted at us, 'You traitors, how much is the CIA paying you?' " 2 6 The notion of "substantive discussion" in the official account is certainly cast in a n e w light by contrasting it with the second. Adam Michnik, in a speech given u n d e r the auspices of the Society for Academic Courses at Warsaw University on November 14, 1980, traced the historical roots of the debasement of political language in Poland to the very origins of the system: The perspective imposed on us is false. Because all of the ideological currents in Poland recognized the need for social reforms and for a critical look at the period between the wars. The answer given to these questions in 1944 was too simplistic. The social reforms instituted were but a caricature of those proposed. The communists who arrived at the end of the war succeeded in imposing false solutions

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because they succeeded in imposing their language. [ . . . ] During the course of those years, most of our society lost its language. 27 What Michnik is discussing is not, of course, the loss of language per se. What he is describing is the systematic definition of the terms of political debate so as to prejudice, if not preordain, political outcomes. This practice allowed the regime to discredit alternatives and to declare its own programs to be the pinnacle of human emancipation, irrespective of the outcomes they produced. A good example is the fate of the trade union movement in Poland before Solidarity. In the immediate postwar period, there was a pluralistic union movement. With Stalinization, unions were turned into transmission belts of party-state policy. In official discourse, these unions were described as workercontrolled and democratic, even though they were centrally administered by party bureaucrats on the basis of directives from above. In this way, notions of trade unionism, democracy, and worker control were deprived of the meanings which workers had previously attributed to them. Jadwiga Staniszkis discusses the effects of the debasement of political language on the political expression of Polish workers. She noted: "Workers avoid using numerous symbols from the official language (like 'democracy' or 'self-government'). This is an example of the situation where numerous ideas traditionally associated with the so-called liberal ethos have been excluded from social circulation." 28 She attributed this to the fact that "symbols had lost their value and were regarded less as instruments of communication than as signs of identification with the establishment." 29 This left a linguistic void for the expression of workers' grievances: It is very difficult to formulate your own claims when you do not have an autonomous political language and, at the same time, do not believe it is possible to express yourself in the official facade language. 30 While Staniszkis' work is quite rich and suggestive, I do not agree with all her observations or conclusions. In this specific context, I have some differences of opinion with her. First, the terms that were discredited as a result of identification with the regime were drawn not only from the liberal ethos, but also from other political traditions such as syndicalism, social democracy, Polish nationalism, and conservatism. Staniszkis also puts the beginning of

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this process of reclaiming key political terms in August 1980. She fails to recognize that the worker counterelite in Gdansk which led the strikes in August 1980 had already begun to use political language in a way to which Polish workers readily responded. KOR-associated workers began to redefine these key terms so that they again were politically meaningful by employing them in the underground press and in oppositional politics. As Watçsa noted in his autobiography, "KOR could employ their (i.e., the party's) meaningless words to advocate real participation in public affairs." 31 These workers' understanding and command of political language can be seen in Robotnik's merciless lampooning of the official celebration of the seventieth anniversary of Poland's independence in 1918: They [the authorities] clamor about freedom though there isn't any, and about equality though there isn't any, and about socialism though there isn't any, and even about sausage though there isn't any because the government bought the pigs, but makes sausage from soy beans, water, and paper. Yet it is nothing strange that with so many lies, they also lie about independence.32 The process of purging key political terms of the stigma of unjust authority, which the example above illustrates, occurred in the context of support for and participation in oppositional politics. This participation included activities that demanded reading, writing, and speaking politically. Not only did workers read underground periodicals, but they also wrote for Robotnik, put out their own local underground papers, and delivered political speeches. Oppositional political language came to define certain means of combatting injustice and certain ends that could constitute a more just society. Large components of the militant worker counterelite that would later lead the strikes of August 1980, most significantly KZWZZ-W, adopted and employed these political terms in the context of the oppositional subculture and the political mobilizations of the opposition. The activists of KZ-WZZ-W acknowledged KOR as a teacher in these matters, even in the heat of the strikes of August 1980. 33 This worker counterelite learned to act collectively, to mobilize other workers, and to articulate demands in a new fashion, one that addressed workers' concerns and in which terms with powerful semantic importance were purged of their taint of unjust authority and could once again be used in redressing feelings of injustice through political action.

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That the members of KZ-WZZ-W and other workers who cooperated with KOR were able to play such an important role is underscored by their capability for self-expression. When a delegate from the Fazos factory in Tarnowskie Gory arrived with a resolution of support for the MKS in Gdansk, he said: "I don't know how to make a speech. I was sent here as a factory delegate from Tarnowskie Gory, bringing a resolution of solidarity with the strikers of the coast. So I will read it out. " 34 Such reticence stands in marked contrast to the verbal confidence of the MKS negotiators with the government delegation in Gdansk. During a rather pointed exchange in the negotiations on censorship, Krzysztof Wyszkowski even took Vice-Primier Jagielski to task over the fact that the Polish emigre writer Gombrowicz had never been officially published in Poland. 35 The importance of KOR's influence on the way in which workers expressed their feelings of injustice should not be underestimated. C. Wright Mills once made the following observation about the formation of social movements, which sheds light on why the activity of KZWZZ-W was so important for Solidarity: "With deprivation must come the rejection of the symbols and myths that justify the authorities and the acceptance of counter-symbols that will focus the deprivation politically."36 The work of KZ-WZZ-W in Gdansk, which resulted in the agreement between the MKS and the government commission, utilized an alternative political language that was developed in the oppositional milieu and to which workers responded. This is not to say that KOR or the opposition was the only source of Solidarity's symbols or political language. For example, workers also strongly identified with, and spontaneously employed, Catholic symbols as markers of Polish national identity. The existence of a worker counterelite that could readily articulate demands and respond to party-state negotiators facilitated the creation of a cohesive workers' movement. Had this not been the case, it might have turned out, as in 1970-71 and 1976, that workers' spontaneous and violent protest would have led only to temporary gains, because they would not have produced politically cohesive structures to ensure the implementation of a precisely formulated agreement. It is also possible that the workers might have settled for vague promises as they had in the past. Whether or not another spontaneous working-class outburst would have yielded effective organization and binding agreements, we can never know.

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However, had workers failed to do this, the strike movement of 1980 would have been similar to that of 1970-71 and 1976—intense and sporadic protests punctuating periods of apathetic withdrawal. Adam Michnik attributed these sort of responses to a "psychology of captivity." He compared such outbreaks to slave rebellions: The rebellious slave does not free himself for a moment; but his main desire is for revenge, which is rarely constructive. The rebellious slave will at best look for a better Tsar, but he is incapable of discovering his own subjectivity, for he has been deprived of his community, his ideals, his language. He is left alone with his hate, which spells helplessness. 37 In the late 1970s many sectors of Polish society liberated public space in which they reappropriated their own communities, ideals, and language. It should not surprise us that those workers who participated in that process went on to lead a movement in their country that went well beyond the "psychology of captivity" Michnik decried, and advanced the process of democratization in Poland by securing the legal prerequisites for the reconstruction of civil society. The discipline, cohesiveness, and nonviolent character of the strike movement of 1980 speak eloquently of this democratic spirit. The sporadic outbursts of the past were transcended, because the strikes of 1980 came under the control of a worker counterelite that channeled discontent into the institutionalization of new structures like Solidarity, which later were able to advance democratization even further.

Notes

1. Civil Society and Democratization in the East Central European Context 1. Zagajewski, " F r e e d o m / ' in Czeslaw Milosz, ed., Postwar Polish Poetry, p. 190. 2. D e p e n d i n g on the form of the regime, a civil society-led democratization might be characterized in different ways. In societies emerging from traditional forms of autocracy, it is often more accurate to speak of the emergence of civil society. This is also the case for societies that have passed from traditional autocracy directly to m o d e r n forms of authoritarianism without the development of a civil society. With the democratization of forms of limited representative government, e.g., competitive oligarchies in Robert Dahl's terms (see Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, p. 7), the process can probably be best characterized as an extension of civil society by provision of citizenship and suffrage to formerly excluded social groups. In the case of modern authoritarianism, regime subtype is critical. Certain forms of authoritarianism coexist with a civil society, e.g., Alfred Stepan's example of inclusive state corporatist regimes (see his The State and Society; Peru in Comparative Perspective, pp. 52 a n d 73-74). In the democratization of such regimes, it is p e r h a p s best to speak of activization of civil society or of its extension in the case of newly created social groups or classes. Other m o d e r n forms of authoritarianism destroy the structures of existing civil societies. This occurred in East Central Europe during the Stalinization of the region in the first decade or so of the postwar period. This explains w h y Juan Linz characterizes t h e m as their o w n unique sub-type— posttotalitarian authoritarian regimes (see "Totalitarian a n d Authoritarian Regimes," 5:336-50). Thus, in their case, it is best to speak of the reconstruction of civil society. 3. John Keane, "Despotism a n d Democracy: The Origins a n d Development of the Distinction Between Civil Society a n d the State 1750-1850," in John Keane, ed. Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, pp. 35-36. 4. Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Keane stresses that

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Ferguson saw a danger that the civil society of his time was preparing the ground for despotism, and advocated a new type of civil society to avoid this. His normative prescription for public-spiritedness and civic association prefigures a modern liberal notion of what civil society should be. Keane, pp. 42-44. T. M. Knox, translator and annotator, Hegel's Philosophy of Right; Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, pp. 39-62. 5. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, chs. 3 and 4, especially pp. 77-85. George Schopflin also makes the excellent point that the development of autonomy within universities in the late medieval and early modern periods was essential in freeing learning from the constraints of ecclesiastic teachings on the world. As such, "It eventually provided cognitive instruments for challenging all claims, all privilege, all power flows," and thus was a critical step in the formation of a critical public. See George Schopflin, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe," p. 59. 6. Agnes Heller makes this neglected point in "On Formal Democracy," in Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State, p. 31. For a forcefully argued and welldocumented study on the gender bias of liberal civil society, see Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), esp. pp. 10-13 and 108-110. 7. Hegel was among the first to understand this but at the same time was much too optimistic about what sort of role a strong state should play. He wrote: (B) Civil Society—an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system—the means to security of person and property—and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests. This external state (C) is brought back to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and public life devoted thereto. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 110 Notwithstanding the trappings of his metaphysics, he makes the observation that civil society only exists by its recognition and regulation by the state. Yet Hegel has little faith in civil society itself and puts his trust in the ability of bureaucracy and civil law to produce a universal and ethical state to regulate particular and divisive interests within civil society. Thus, he does not consider the problem of state interest and the pitfalls this poses with respect to despotism. Similarly, in the East Central European context, Jacek Kuron when talking about the emergence of social movements in Poland in the early 1980s noted the necessity of working out some sort of system for the regulation of society once it was able to wrest far reaching concessions from the state. See "Not to Lure the Wolves Out of the Woods: An Interview with Jacek Kuron," Telos (Spring 1981), 47:05-96. 8. Jeno Szucs, "Three Historical Regions of Europe," in Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State, p. 311. Hereafter cited in text.

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9. Otto Kirchheimer, Politics, Law, and Social Change, pp. 430-32. 10. For instance, the governments of Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen (1921— 31) in Hungary relied on open balloting in 199 rural constituencies to secure its parliamentary majorities. See Andrew C. Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe," p. 343. In Poland, after Pilsudski's coup d'état in 1926, successive elections were increasingly manipulated. However, it was not until 1935 that the regime largely freed itself of parliamentary constraints and then not without unexpected and negative ramifications. In the elections of 1928, which were designed to secure national approval of the coup, Pilsudski's camp emerged as the largest electoral bloc, but failed to secure a majority in the legislature. These elections involved only "modest chicanery" on the part of the government. In the election of 1930, the Pilsudski camp was able to use harsh measures such as the imprisonment of key opposition leaders and police pressure on the electorate to secure a majority in the legislature. Nevertheless, opposition parties still sat in both houses of parliament. After 1935, when a new constitution was introduced by "an extended series of parliamentary tricks and casuistries," strong constraints on opposition parties and enhanced presidential powers, including the right to appoint up to one-third of the upper house, reduced parliament's powers significantly. Despite these measures, the last years of the interwar republic (1935-39) were characterized by weak governments after the death of Pilsudski, the intensification of extra-parliamentary opposition, and political polarization. See Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, pp. 63-64 and 69-72. 11. For details on Ottoman economic organization in the Balkans, see Robert Brenner, "Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe in Light of Developments in the West," and Fikret Adanir, "Tradition and Rural Change in Southeastern Europe During Ottoman Rule," in Daniel Chirot, ed., The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe, pp. 45-47 and 135-54 respectively. 12. Quoted in Milton Viorst, "A Reporter at Large (Turkey)," The New Yorker (June 5,1989) p. 44. 13. In particular, Jewish, German, Armenian, and Greek communities played this role to different extents in different countries. See Schopflin, p. 83, and Gail Stokes, "The Social Origins of Eastern European Politics," in Chirot, p. 229. 14. Ivo Banac, "Political Change and National Diversity," p. 144. 15. Stokes sees Romania as a partial exception to this pattern. There, the National Liberal Party, which was based on the small Romanian national middle class, was an effective political force in alliance with the monarchy. For this reason, Stokes sees "a recognizable, if weak, tendency toward democracy." See Stokes, pp. 231-33. 16. Stokes, p. 235 and Banac, p. 144. 17. Both the Bulgarian (1879) and the Serbian (1889) constitutions granted

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extensive power to parliaments elected on the basis of universal suffrage. However, extra-constitutional means rendered much of this irrelevant. For instance, the Liberal Party machine under Stambulov in Bulgaria managed to keep actual voter turnout at five percent while reporting much higher turnouts. See Janos, pp. 337 and 343-44. 18. Stokes, p. 245. 19. Marc Rakovski, Towards an East European Marxism. In particular, the chapter "The Intellectuals" (pp. 39-72), on the possibility of a samizdat "counter-public sphere" created by critical intellectuals was an important contribution. 20. The Czechs and Slovaks developed the idea of a "parallel polis" alongside the existing system. The term was coined by Vaclav Benda in an article written in 1978 and adopted by others such as Havel in his essay "The Power of the Powerless." See Steven Lukes, "Introduction," and Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Vaclav Havel et al. The Power of the Powerless, pp. 11-12 and 7 8 - 8 1 . 21. Maria Markus, "Crisis of Legitimation and the Workers' Movement: Understanding Poland," p. 3; Jan Tomasz Gross, "Poland: Society and the State" ; Andrew Arato, "Civil Society versus the State: Poland, 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 " ; and Jacques Rupnik, "Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: The End of Revisionism and the Rebirth of Civil Society," in Rudolf Tokes, ed., Opposition in Eastern Europe. 22. For example, within the East German peace movement some activists began to direct their activity explicitly toward reviving civil society as an essential means to achieve their aims. Similar concerns were also expressed by Petr Uhl in Czechoslovakia. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic," pp. 101-2. 23. In the USSR, the varieties of dissidence were typified by three outstanding figures: Aleksander Solzhenitsyn (traditional, religious, and nationalist in orientation), Andrei Sakharov (liberal and civil libertarian in orientation), and Roy Medvedev (in-party and appealing for a return to a "true" Leninist orientation). In a number of countries, there were important dissident revisionists. In Hungary, the Budapest School of Humanist Marxism was quite influential, until several of its important thinkers emigrated and younger activists switched to an oppositional mode of politics. In Yugoslavia, the Praxis Group continued in this vein as did Rudolf Bahro and Robert Havemann in East Germany. In Bulgaria and Romania, local conditions did not allow for very visible or effective dissidence. Due to the exceptionally repressive nature of the Ceausescu regime most dissidents there had to flee. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, dissenters remained on the defensive in the wake of post-1968 repression until the emergence of opposition revivified resistance in both countries. 24. Kis and Bence observed that, "Even those people who have criticised the policies of the apparatus in the name of the working class have in fact addressed themselves to the apparatus and not to the working class itself." Rakovski, p. 105.

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25. It is not my intention to mock the courage of the dissidents or to belittle the importance of their concerns. Later when the nature of leadership changed in the Soviet Union, important dissidents such as Sakharov and Medvedev were able to play important public roles in the new era of reform. 26. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, List otwarty dopartii, (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1966), pp. 76-89. 27. Jacek Kuron, "Reflections on a Programme of Action," p. 3. 28. Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," p. 274. 29. There is evidence that similar self-liberations have occurred under a rather different set of circumstances in the Slovenian and Croatian republics of multinational Yugoslavia. For details see Paul Shoup, "Crisis and Reform in Yugoslavia," pp. 141-43, and Tomaz Mastnak, "Civil Society in Slovenia: From Opposition to Power," Studies in Comparative Communism (1990), 23(3/4):30514. I am grateful to Paul Shoup for alerting me to the significance of these events. The possibility that recent events in a number of the former Soviet republics can be seen in a similar light cannot be discounted. 30. Samizdat is actually a Russian contraction meaning self-publishing. In Poland, traditions of unofficial underground publishing have a long history dating back to the age of partition and the occupation of the country during World War II. Poles more commonly refer to such materials by their traditional Polish name bibuta (tissue paper). For greater detail on the underground press see chapters 5 and 6. 31. For details on the underground see Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, Konspira, Solidarity Underground, and Michael T. Kaufman, Mad Dreams, Saving Graces—Poland: A Nation in Conspiracy. 32.1 address developments in the 1980s in more detail in "Legitimation and Instability: The Fatal Link," Program on Central and Eastern Europe, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Working Paper Series 2 (1990), pp. 4 2 - 5 2 . 33. Underground books began to appear in Hungary in 1977 and were joined by a number of journals beginning in 1979. The first independent publishing house (AB) began to function in 1981. 34. Andras Bozoki, "Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary," p. 381. 35. The most important of these discussions occurred in Budapest when END leader Edward P. Thompson visited the city in September 1982. See Bill Lomax, "The Hungarian Peace Movement," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe (1983), 6(l/2):35-36. 36. Andras Korosenyi, "The Emergency [sic] of Plurality Trends and Movements in Hungary's Society in the Mid-1980s," p. 646; H. Gordon Skilling, Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 184; and Gabor Revesz, Perestroika in Eastern Europe, Hungary's Economic Transformation, p. 128. 37. In response to an appeal from the Danube Circle, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia protested the dam's construction and published one the Circle's re-

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ports on the environmental damage that the project would cause. The Circle also took the bold step of taking out an advertisement in a major Vienna daily to convince Austrian banks and construction firms to break commitments to help finance and build the dam. This evoked a sympathetic hearing from a number of Austrian politicians and environmentalists and led to joint AustroHungarian protest demonstrations. See Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition and Social Activism, pp. 212 and 214, and Jacques Rupnik, "Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?" p. 264. 38. For details that emerged in the official Hungarian Press after the Party Conference of May 1988, see Revesz, pp. 128. Also see Skilling, Samizdat, p. 186, and Timothy G. Ash, The Uses of Adversity, pp. 226-27. 39. Speaking to Parliament in November 1988, Imre Pozsgay expressed these sentiments in a way that may have given his future political competitors pause: Granting that the economy has a crucial part in a country's life, I surmise that the reform is not primarily economic in its nature for the causes of the economic problems and antagonisms also lie in the social sphere. Departing from this statement, the first task of the reform is to take the necessary steps in order to humanize the political system. Even if the order was not such during history, now we have first to discard obstacles in politics in order to secure the economic bases of national well-being, for Stalinist state socialism, the prime mover of central will, was also installed in the first instance politically, i.e., from above. Cited in Revesz, p. 142. 40. For a detailed assessments of these changes in the party see Revesz, pp. 125-27, and Charles Gati, "Reforming Communist Systems: Lessons from the Hungarian Experience," pp. 235-36. 41. In 1987, academic workers formed their own independent union. They were soon joined by independent unions of teachers and film industry workers. These three later joined together to form a League of Independent Unions. See Laszlo Urban, "Hungary in Transition, the Emergence of Opposition Parties," p. 114. 42. In March 1988, thirteen small environmental and ecological groups, including the Danube Circle, formed an Alternative and Environmental Groups' Information Network and began to publish their own underground newsletter. See Bugajski and Pollack, p. 215. 43. Bozoki, "Critical Movements," pp. 383-84. 44. Andras Bozoki, "Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary," p. 223. 45. This aspect of the Hungarian pattern of democratization became manifest in a conversation I had with Laszlo Schiffer, the head of the independent union of film industry workers. Schiffer spoke about how he, the head of a tiny union, found himself thrust into the role of a full partner in discussions on the

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future of trade unions in Hungary. Reform Communist Imre Pozsgay, who became a prominent force in politics as General Secretary of the People's Patriotic Front (a broad based transmission belt to society), seems to have played a strong role in promoting greater societal activism in support of reform. He, for instance, attended some of the early meetings of the Hungarian Democratic Forum as an observer. Also his supervision of the press in the late 1980s allowed the official Hungarian press to become an important independent and critical voice for reform. See Urban, pp. 114 and 116. 46. Elemer Hankiss, "In Search of a Paradigm," p. 205. 47. Urban, p. 116. 48. Pozsgay used this issue effectively in his challenge to the leadership of Grosz, and his securing of a more balanced evaluation of 1956 (formerly it had been viewed as counterrevolution) in February 1988 was an important milestone in the changes in Hungary. 49. The Hungarian Round table did not lead to a full consensus on the terms of the transition. The Free Democrats, Young Democrats, and independent trade union delegation did not agree with the popular election of the new president prior to parliamentary elections, because this was seen to favor Imre Pozsgay. Thus they used a constitutional provision to call for a referendum on the issue. Their position, that the new parliament should select the president, was ratified by the electorate. 50. For a summary of the political tendencies in Hungary see Bozoki, "PostCommunist Transition," pp. 228-29. 51. Some of the more important works chronicling and analyzing these movements include: Roger Woods, Opposition in theGDR Under Honecker, 197185: An Introduction and Documentation; Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic"; Bruce Allen, Germany East, Dissent and Opposition; Werner Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views During the Last Decade" ; and Michael J. Sodaro, "Limits to Dissent in the DDR: Fragmentation, Co-optation, and Repression." 52. Sodaro speaks of many of the problems faced by resistance movements in the GDR ("Limits to Dissent in the DDR"). Explicit human rights activism was pursued by the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights which became active in late 1985-early 1986 (Allen, pp. 133-36). In June 1986, it also began to publish a regular bulletin, Grenzfall (Borderline Case), which was often disrupted by police harassment (Tismaneanu, pp. 104 and 110, and Allen, pp. 168-69). Publications also appeared under the auspices of the Lutheran Church, but these were subject to very restrictive official limits on print runs. 53. The attitude of the Church was not one of unequivocal support. At times it attempted to curtail radical manifestations of criticism and protest. For instance, it was decidedly lukewarm toward the "Berlin Appeal" for a debate on peace in 1982. Also, in 1987, when on the 750th anniversary of the foundation of Berlin, the Church was permitted to hold a Church Festival (Kirchentag), the ecclesiastical authorities did not permit activists to stage a peace workshop in

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conjunction with the festival. Thus, the activists created their own "Church Festival from Below," Such experiences led some peace activists to call for "Glasnost in the Church." See Tismaneanu, pp. 9 7 - 9 8 and 105; Allen, p. 103; and Woods, pp. 3 8 - 4 0 . 54. There were a number of well-publicized cases of the expulsion or emigration of well-known critical writers, artists, and intellectuals; such as Rudolf Bahro, Wolf Biermann, Jurek Becker, and Rainer Kunze. A massive police crackdown in the late 1980s on the expanded activism of new groups such as the Church from Below and the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, included the expulsion or forced emigration of a number of prominent activists, including Stefan Krawczyk, Freya Klier, and Vera Wallenberger. See Tismaneanu, p. 108; Woods, pp. 2 3 6 - 3 9 ; and Jurek Becker, Sleepless Days (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), back cover. 55. For an excellent summary of the events of November 9, see Elizabeth Pond, "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the G D R , " pp. 48-49. 56. For a selection of documents on new opposition groups formed in late 1989, see Charles Schuddekopf, ed. "Wir sind das Volk!" Flugschriften, Aufrufe, und Texte einer deutschen Revolution. 57. Timothy G. Ash noted this shift in emphasis in demonstrations in Leipzig in November 1989. See The Magic Lantern, p. 72. 58. H. Gordon Skilling has done a masterful job of chronicling and analyzing the fortunes of Charter 77 and VONS in two studies—Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe and Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia. 59. Within Charter, some participants were more concerned with conveying information to the "appropriate authorities" rather than reaching the broader public. Skilling, Samizdat, p. 27. Later, other Chartists participated in the formation of a new organization with a more oppositional outlook, the Movement for Civil Liberties. In October 1988, this group's founding declaration called for "liberal democracy, rule of law, and a mixed economy." See Ash, The Uses of Adversity, p. 237. 60. While there was large variety of different publications in Czechoslovakia, they were not, for the most part, produced in large editions. Most materials were duplicated on typewriters in multiple copies with the use of carbon paper. Skilling, Samizdat, p. 27. 61. See Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, eds. Voices from Prague: Czechoslovakia, Human Rights, and the Peace Movement. 62. Though repression made an independent peace movement in Czechoslovakia impossible, petitions against the stationing of SS-20s in the country were circulated in Prague and Brno, and approximately two thousand signatures were collected. See Ash, The Uses of Adversity, p. 69. 63. Skilling, Samizdat, p. 45. 64. There is some scattered controversy in the literature over whether the

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alternative public space was stronger in Hungary or in Czechoslovakia. Skilling's position is ambiguous. Although he states that Charter 77 was unable "to serve as a catalyst of a broader wave of dissent," something "even the Hungarian opposition could do to a limited degree" ("Czechoslovakia Between East and West," p. 257), he also states that "In comparison with the Polish, or even the Czechoslovak independent communication movement, the Hungarian was small and weak" (Samizdat, p. 35). Others such as Radoslav Selucky ("The Irrelevance of Perestroika in Czechoslovakia," p. 153) state that the Hungarian movement was the stronger. It is my overall impression that the Hungarian was stronger, especially in the late 1980s. To some extent this was attributed to the fact that the Hungarians "enjoyed" a less repressive government, while the Czechs and Slovaks suffered at the hands of their government. The Hungarian opposition was clearly more visible in their society, but was not significantly more successful in establishing links, like the Poles, with workers and peasants. It could be argued that a strategy of "repressive toleration" in Hungary in the late 1970s and early 1980s for a time functioned just as effectively as Husak's overt repression. 65. Nevertheless, there were important links between these two spheres. It is instructive to remember that the origins of Charter are linked to the repression of The Plastic People of the Universe, an underground rock band. See Skilling, Charter 77, ch. 1. Charter also defended the editors of the newsletter of the Jazz Section of the official Union of Musicians when they were persecuted for publishing information on art, culture, and music that was not available elsewhere in Czechoslovakia. See Skilling, "Czechoslovakia Between East and West," p. 256. 66. It should be added that Gorbachev's rise to power in the USSR did have some effect on parts of the ruling elite as well. A group of politicians surrounding Prime Minister Strougal used this opportunity to press for renewed economic reform. These efforts were blunted when Strougal was removed from power in 1988. See Michal Reiman," Prague Spring and Perestroika," pp. 159, 161-62, and Skilling, "Czechoslovakia Between East and West," p. 259. One indication of the decline in fear was that a petition for religious freedom in 1988 collected over 500,000 signatures. Ash, The Magic Lantern p. 99. 67. One exceptionally ironic and uniquely Czech example of this was the reception that Mikhail Gorbachev was given by the population of Prague in March 1987. The spontaneous enthusiasm that the crowds expressed in the hope that Gorbachev would reevaluate the Soviet role in the crushing of the Prague Spring (on this occasion he would disappoint them) functioned as a stinging indictment of their own party leadership. Ash reports that in March 1988, the police broke up a peaceful demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava and in October 1988 one in Prague commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the interwar republic. See Ash, The Uses of Adversity, pp. 219 and 237-38. Prior to demonstrations of late 1989, another notable example was a week of demonstrations that developed around attempts to

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commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the death of Jan Palach, a young mathematician w h o immolated himself to protest the Soviet invasion. In January 1989, attempts by political nonconformists to place flowers on the site of the suicide were obstructed by the police. Crowds of passersby began to protest the behavior of the police. T h e incident led to five days of orderly and peaceful demonstrations and the charging of fifty-four people, including Vaclav Havel, with crimes against public order. For details on the "Palach w e e k " see Jeri Laber, "Fighting Back in P r a g u e , " p. 39, and Vaclav Havel, " A Statement to the C o u r t , " p. 41. 68. For a far more detailed account of the events of November see Ash, The Magic Lantern, pp. 7 8 - 1 3 0 . Reports from Prague periodically suggest that this incident was staged by the security forces as part of an intra-party power struggle.

2. Why Poland? The Fatal Link Between Legitimation and Stability 1. Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart, pp. 4 7 - 4 8 . 2. Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors, pp. 1 8 4 - 8 5 , and Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State, pp. vii-viii. 3. Weber's notion of Herrschaft has also b e e n commonly translated into English as "authority" or even as "imperative coordination." For Weber's original formulation of the concept, see Max Weber, Economy and Society, especially part 1, ch. 3 and part 2, ch. 10. 4. Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication, p. 129. 5. See Bialer, especially ch. 9, "Soviet Political Stability and the Question of Legitimacy," pp. 1 8 3 - 2 0 6 . 6. Weber, pp. 1 2 1 2 - 1 3 7 2 . 7. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, p. 77. 8. By this I do not mean to imply that legitimation based on other means is free of ideology, but only that legality and tradition anchor such claims in institutionalized legal or traditional practices which have historically acquired a powerful force of normative validity. 9. Marx, " T h e G e r m a n Ideology," pp. 4 3 8 - 4 1 . 10. T. H. Rigby, "Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber, and Communist Monoorganisational S y s t e m s , " in Rigby and Ferenc Feher, eds., Political Legitimation in Communist States, p. 17. 11. Leszek Kolakowski, "Ideology in Eastern E u r o p e , " p. 50. 12. Maria Markus, " O v e r t a n d Covert M o d e s of Legitimation in East European Societies," in T. H. Rigby a n d Ferenc Feher, eds., Legitimation in Communist States. 13. Markus, pp. 8 8 - 8 9 . 14. For example, one could imagine that an elite which presented itself to the population as technocratic might stress different components of a technocratic approach to workers and technical specialists. To workers it might pre-

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sent the idea that greater efficiency and productivity would bring more and better paying jobs, whereas to technical specialists they might stress greater efficiency and productivity as values in themselves, as well as the opportunity for a more important role in economic processes. 15. Krystyna Kersten, Narodziny Systemu Wtadzy, Polska 1943-1948, p. 19. 16. In particular, the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 took a very heavy toll, and not only in terms of casualties among the underground's supporters. The physical destruction of Warsaw totally disrupted the work of the underground state's administrative apparatus and communication network. Kersten, p. 95. 17. Leszek Kolakowski, "Ideology in Eastern Europe," p. 48. 18. Graeme Gill, "Personal Dominance and the Collective Principle: Individual Legitimacy in Marxist-Leninist Systems," in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, eds., Political Legitimation in Communist States, pp. 100-101. 19. Maria Markus, "Overt and Covert Modes of Legitimation in East European Societies," in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, eds., Political Legitimation in Communist States, pp. 82-84. 20. For a series of interviews with some of the leading Polish Stalinists, see Teresa Toranska, Oni. 21. The declaration of Poland's underground parliament, the Council of National Unity (RJN) on March 15, 1944, entitled "O co walczy narod polski," called for thoroughgoing industrial and agricultural reform, local selfgovernment, and parliamentary democracy. It was considerably more radical than the proposals which the Polish Communists were making at that time. See Kersten, pp. 49-50. 22. For instance, Anna Walentynowicz, an important working-class oppositionist during the 1970s opposition and the Solidarity period, wrote that in the early 1950s she was taken in by the regime's rhetoric of "justice" and "equality" for the working class. See Anna Walentynowicz, "Zyciorys," p. 8. 23. Jan Tomasz Gross, "Poland: Society and the State," p. 305. 24. Stanislaw Baranczak, "The Polish Intellectual," pp. 224-25. 25. Jakub Karpinski, Countdown, p. 75; Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "The Strategy of Development and Gierek's Economic Manoeuvre," in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, eds., Gierek's Poland, p. 57. 26. See the photographs in Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., Poznanski Czerwiec 1956. 27. Gomulka had disagreed with Stalin over collectivization of agriculture, the formation of the Cominform, and the expulsion of Tito from it. See Paul Lewis, "Legitimacy and the Polish Communist State," p. 441. In one of the sweet ironies of history, the security official who arrested Gomulka in 1951, Jozef Swiatto, made the greatest contribution to Gomulka's reputation as a victim of Stalinism. After defecting in 1953, Swiatlo broadcast radio reports to Poland about his work in the Security Office (UB). Zbigniew A. Pelczynski, "The Downfall of Gomulka," in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, eds., Gierek's Poland, p. 22.

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2. W h y P o l a n d ? L e g i t i m a t i o n a n d Stability

28. Gomutka's unauthorized biographer, Nicholas Bethell, argues that the sort of popularity enjoyed by Gomulka occurs rarely, usually when a nation unites behind a figure as a symbol in a time of acute crisis. Along with Gomulka, he would list only Churchill (England 1940), Nagy (Hungary 1956), and Dubcek (Czechoslovakia 1968) as having this level of popularity in the twentieth century. See Nicholas Bethell, Gomulka, p. 229. 29. The elections of January 1957 demonstrate just how popular Gomulka's early policies were. Poles voted overwhelmingly in favor of the official slate for the Sejm. Gomulka's personal appeal just before the election is credited with stopping a campaign to cross Communist candidates off the ballots. There were supposedly even cases where Catholic priests led their congregations to the polling stations. Bethell, pp. 232-33; Pelczynski, p. 9. 30. After World War II the Soviets treated the German territory incorporated into Poland (including areas which the Nazi Reich annexed in 1939) as part of the zone from which it was entitled to collect reparations. It is estimated that some 25 to 30 percent of the industry in these areas was appropriated by the USSR. Particularly hard hit were the textile factories of Lodz and Bialystok. Additionally, the exploitation of Polish coal resources by the Soviets was extensive. Large amounts of coal were delivered at prices roughly equal to transport costs. After the Polish October of 1956, the amount of coal Poland delivered to the Soviet Union dropped by half and prices were put on a more equitable basis. See Nicholas Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, pp. 17678; Chris Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe, pp. 50-52. 31. The Soviet military officers were dismissed in November 1956 after being thanked and decorated. The ranking Soviet officer in the Polish Army, Marshal Konstantin Rokosovsky, had served as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, minister of defense, and was a member of the Politburo of the PZPR. Bethell, p. 230; Karpinski, p. 73. 32. Bethell, pp. 233 and 236. 33. Bethell, pp 230-31; Karpinski, p. 73. 34. The decision to delegate more authority to the regional elite was taken at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1956, where Gomulka came to power. See Ray Taras, Ideology in a Socialist State, Poland 1956-1983, p. 48. 35. The number of centrally allocated goods steadily declined throughout party-state rule. In the early 1950s, the heyday of Stalinism, some 2,000 goods were centrally allocated. By the late 1970s the number had been reduced to about 200. See John P. Farrell, "Growth, Reform and Inflation," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland, p. 314. 36. Despite having title to their plots, Polish peasants were never able to fully break free of the economic hold of the party-state. Crucial agricultural inputs were controlled by the authorities, who only provided them for fixed deliveries of produce at state-set procurement prices. Experts sometimes referred

2. Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

221

to this system as "socialist dwarf agriculture," only half-jokingly. For greater detail on these arrangements, see Balint Magyar, "Peasantry and Agrarian Policy in Poland (1944-1982)" ; Magyar and Pal Juhasz, "Some Remarks on the Position of Polish and Hungarian Agricultural Small-Scale Producers in the Seventies." 37. Bethell, pp. 240-41. The speech at the Tenth Plenum became known for its "influenza-tuberculosis" metaphor—"Influenza, even in its most serious form, cannot be cured by contracting tuberculosis. Dogmatism cannot be cured by revisionism. Revisionist tuberculosis can only strengthen the dogmatist influenza. . . .The revisionist wing must be cut out of the party. . . .We shall destroy with equal firmness all organized or individual forms of anti-party activity launched from a position of dogmatism." 38. On the fate of the councils, see January Kostrewski, "Na smierc rad robotniczych," Biuletyn Informacyjny 26 (1978), pp. 16-20. 39. Taras, p. 53. 40. Gomulka's minister of culture and early supporter, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, was transferred to the Parks and Forests portfolio because he supported further democratization, and Jerzy Morawski was removed from the Politburo and made ambassador to England. Bethell, p. 242. 41. Karpinski, p. 106. 42. The average growth of real wages per annum in the socialist sector in the period 1956-58 was 7.7 percent. In 1959-67, it fell to 1.9 percent, and in 196870 to 1.62 percent. See Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970s," in East European Economies Post-Helsinki: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, p. 819. 43. In 1970, a majority of the Polish population was under 30 years old. See Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, "December 1970: The Turning Point," in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, eds., Gierek's Poland, p. 28. 44. Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "The Strategy of Development and Gierek's Economic Manoeuvre," in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, eds., Gierek's Poland, pp. 54-57. 45. On November 21, 1956, the Polish delegation to the United Nations abstained on a motion to admit UN observers into Hungary. Bethell, p. 231 46. Perhaps the best example of this is Gomulka's wholehearted support of the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. For a man who had spared his country a similar fate in 1956, this seems to be a peculiar turnaround. The potential for trouble in Soviet-Polish relations appeared in 1964, when Khrushchev informed Gomulka in January that he was going to seek to establish relations with Bonn. This led to a quarrel between the two men, but the danger of greater conflict passed when the Soviet Politburo removed Khrushchev later that year. Bethell, pp. 244-46. The Soviets obviously recognized Gomulka's worth, for on his sixty-fifth birthday in 1970, they awarded him the Order of Lenin "for outstanding services to the development of fraternal friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and

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2. Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

the Polish People's Republic, for the strengthening of peace and socialism, and for many years of active participation in the world Communist movement." Pelczyrtski, p. 23. 47. This seems to have been an important rationale for Polish Communists since the Stalinist period. The most extreme example of this argument I have read is the interview that Teresa Toranska conducted with Jakub Berman (Toranska, pp. 225-358). Another fine example of this sort of thinking was provided by Wojciech Jaruzelski, then minister of defense, when he was part of a government delegation that met with striking workers in Szczecin in January 1971. While explaining the role of the army in the massacre of striking workers, he added: "At this very moment, while we're talking here, West German vessels are patrolling beyond that horizon. Espionage and reconnaissance vessels—we even know them by name. Over the Baltic, the aircraft of the Bundeswehr are flying day and night. . . it's only our strength that they fear . . . thanks to Socialism." From "Polish Workers and Party Leaders—A Confrontation," New Left Review, 72 (1972), p. 50. 48. Such arguments were further discredited under Gierek when expanded economic cooperation between Poland and the Federal Republic began in the early 1970s. From 1969 to 1974 Polish imports from the Federal Republic rose from $157 million to $1,402 million. The corresponding figures for exports were $137 million and $555 million. Roger E. Kanet "East-West Trade and the Limits of Western Influence," in Charles Gati, ed., The International Politics of Eastern Europe, p. 196. 49. In 1968, demonstrating Polish students chanted the rhyme, "Poland is waiting for her Dubcek" (Polska czeka na swego Dubczeka)." Bethell, p. 262. 50. It is not fair to blame Gomulka for initiating the outburst of antiSemitism in 1967-68. The "Partisan" faction in the party, led by Mieczyslaw Moczar, actually used anti-Semitism as part of a power play against Gomulka, who had a Jewish wife. However, as he fought for his political life, Gomulka stood still while anti-Semitism was used against the revisionists because it served his political goals. In the final analysis, however, his politically expedient lip service makes him also responsible for the exodus of Polish Jews that followed. 51. The notion of "technocracy" here refers to practical "goal oriented" economic management, rather than strict adherence to ideological principles. To a certain extent, Gierek's reputation as technocrat was based on his performance as party leader in Silesia, the most industrialized part of Poland, which enjoyed a reputation for efficient management and high wages. The Gierek regime projected this image through a series of slogans which stressed greater autonomy for those who were economically qualified, such as "the party directs and the government governs," "people of good work," and "the right person for the right job." Perhaps the most famous slogan in this regard was "We are building a second Poland." The "second Poland" referred to the introduction of the latest advanced technologies into the Polish econ-

2. Why Poland? Legitimation and Stability

223

omy, which had become antiquated as the result of an investment policy under Gomulka that had neglected plant modernization. Gierek's team also put added stress on the role that science was to play in economic development and social policy. Under Gierek the notions of "social policy" and "social planning" first entered the lexicon of the Polish party-state. Finally, an examination of Gierek's personnel policy seems to bear out the notion that he took this commitment to "technocracy" seriously. Under his rule, the composition of the central committee was changed to include more economic officials. See Jack Bielasiak, "Recruitment Policy, Elite Integration, and Political Stability in People's Poland," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland, pp. 116-17; Taras, p. 109, 114,130, and 140; Lewis, p. 443; Michael D. Kennedy and Konrad Sadkowski, "Constraints on Professional Power in Soviet-Type Society: Insights from the Solidarity Period in Poland" (University of Michigan, CSST Working Paper 113, November 1988), p. 9; Vincent C. Chrypinski, "Political Change under Gierek," in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, eds., Gierek's Poland, p. 38. 52. It seemed at first that Gierek and his team were committed to reforming the economy. In 1971, measures were drawn up to provide for the greater autonomy of economic units from planners. Groups of firms were to be consolidated into a kind of larger enterprise dubbed "WOG" (Wielka Organizacja Gospodarcza, i.e., Large Economic Organization). The WOG was to be freed from the system of centralized planning, and controlled instead by indirect instruments such as interest, depreciation, and taxation rates. It was also to have increased autonomy in generating its own small-scale investments and in price setting. Compensation to employees would have no longer been based on plan quotas, but tied to value-added for workers and profit for managers. However, the WOG reform was never fully implemented, and when the Polish economy began to ail in 1975, even the partial measures were canceled. See Waldemar Kuczyrtski, "Upadek Reformy Gospodarczej," Biuletyn Informacyjny 33 (September-October 1979), pp. 30-36; Farrell, pp. 308-9. 53. Examples of this sort of thinking were common soon after Gierek's rise to power. For a selection translated into English, see Adam Bromke's "New Political Style," p. 8. 54. In the early part of his reign, Gierek seemed to have been committed to a formalized system of consultation with the workers through renovation of trade unions. He made promises to this effect at the Central Committee Plenum in February of 1971. However, shortly thereafter, the regime postponed a trade union congress, scheduled for the middle of 1971, until November 1972. Free elections were held for trade union representatives, but while some of the strike leaders of 1970-71 were elected to positions, they did not command a dominant position within the trade unions and were effectively neutralized by the power of management in the factory structure. The large rises in wages in the early Gierek period seemed to have cut support out from under radical shopfloor activists. See Alex Pravda, "Poland in the 1970s: Dual Functioning

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Unionism under Pressure," in Pravda and Blair A. Ruble, eds., Trade Unions in Communist States, p. 127; Chrypinski, p. 44; and Martin Myant, Poland: A Crisis for Socialism, p. 83. 55. In his radio and television speech of December 20, 1970, Gierek said: "The iron rule of our economic policy and our policy in general must always be respect for reality, broad consultation with the working class and the intelligentsia, and the observance of principles of collegiality and democracy in the life of the Party and the functioning of the supreme authorities. "The most recent events reminded us painfully of the fundamental truth that the Party must always maintain a close bond with the working class and the whole nation, and that it must not lose a common language with the working people." From Pelczyriski, pp. 3-4. 56. Bromke, "New Political Style," p. 9. 57. M. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland, p. 318. 58. Grazyna Pomian, ed., Protokoiy tzw. Komisji Grabskiego, pp. 79 and 138. 59. For an account of such a meeting (Gierek's visit to the Gdansk Shipyard in August 1979), see "Szczera dyskusja nad antrykotem," Robotnik 38-39 (October 5, 1979), p. 4. 60. For details on the economic crisis, see Renate Damus, "The Polish Strike and the Strike Cycles of the 1970s"; Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "Poland's Economic Crisis" ; Andrzej Korbonski, "Victim of Villain: Polish Agriculture since 1970," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Background to Crisis: Polish and Politics in Gierek's Poland; J. Michael Montias, "Poland: Roots of the Economic Crisis"; Laura D. Andrea Tyson, "Aggregate Economic Difficulties and Workers' Welfare," in JanTriska and Charles Gati, eds., Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe; David Kemme, "The Polish Crisis: An Economic Overview," in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice Simon, eds., Polish Politics, Edge of the Abyss. 3. Workers I: The Events of June

1976

An earlier version of this chapter appeared as, "The Strikes of June 1976 in Poland," East European Politics and Societies 1:3 (1987), pp. 363-92. 1. Jerzy Stgpieri, Introduction to MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc" -" Ziema Radomska," Radomski Czerwiec '76, p. 1. 2. George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland, p. 258; Jan Jozef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981, p. 39. 3. The police in Communist Poland were called the Milicja Obywatelska (Citizens' Militia). The SB combined the functions of political police and espionage service. The ZOMO (Motorized Units of the People's Militia) were a special branch of the police. They received special training in the control of riots, demonstrations, and strikes. They were frequently photographed in riot gear by Western correspondents covering the repression of resistance actions to the declaration of martial law.

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4. For the most comprehensive account of this group see Ewa Ostrolçka, "Ruch" przeciw totalitarzmowi. 5. G r a z y n a P o m i a n , e d . , Protokoiy tzw. Komisji Grabskiego, pp. 277 a n d 281.

Following page references given in text. 6. Radio Free Europe Research (henceforth RFER), Situation Report, Poland/21 (1976), pp. 2 and 5; A. Ostoja-Ostaszewski etal., eds., Dissent in Poland, 1976-1977, p. 50. 7. Blazynski, pp. 257-58; Stefan Kawalec, Demokratyczna opozycja w Polsce, p. 6; Lipski, p. 33; and Marek Tarniewski, Ptonie komitet, p. 173. 8. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 50. 9. Blazynski, pp. 257-58. 10. The rises in wages, disability, and retirement pensions were to be structured as shown in table 3A. 11. "Relacja robotniköw gdanskich," Aneks 12 (1976), p. 31. 12. KOR, Komunikat 2 (1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), pp. 129-30; Biuletyn Informacyjny, Wydanie lôdzkie (April 1977), pp. 1-2; Lipski, p. 248. 13. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 51; Blazynski, p. 265. 14. Romuald Spasowski, The Liberation of One, p. 476. 15. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/21 (1976), p. 4. 16. K O R , Wypadki czerwcowe i dziatalnosc Komitetu Obrony Robotniköw, p. 1; Z F

TABLE Wage/Pension Level (zloty) 1201-1300 1301-1400 1401-1500 1501-1800 1801-2000 2001-2300 2301-2500 2501-2800 2801-3000 3001-3500 3501-4000 4001-5000 5001-6000 6001-7000 7001-8000 8001 +

3A

Wage Increment (ztoty)

Increase

(%)

Pension Increment (ztoty)

Increase

240 260 280 300 330 350 380 400 420 440 460 480 500 530 560 600

18-20 19-20 19-20 17-20 17-18 15-17 15-17 14-16 14-15 13-15 12-13 10-12 8-10 8-9 7-8 8

280 300 320 340 370 390 420 430 440 460 480 500 520 540 560 600

22-23 21-23 21-23 19-23 19-21 17-19 17-18 15-18 15-16 13-15 12-14 10-12 9-10 8-9 7-8 8

(%)

S O U R C E : Zycie Radomskie, June 25, 1976, cited in MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc"—"Ziema Radomska," p. 6.

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3. Workers I: Events of J u n e 1976

NSZZ "Solidarnosc" w ZM Ursus, Biuletyn Informacyjny 10, Wydanie specjalne— Ursus Czerwiec 1976 (June 25,1981), p. 1. 17. Ibid.; Blazynski, pp. 258-59; "Opis akcji represyjnej podjgty wobecpracownikow Z.M. Ursus i innych zakladöw," Kultura 11:350 (1976), p. 163; ZF NSZZ "Solidarnosc" w ZM Ursus, p. 1; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/21 (1976), p. 3. 18. "Opis," p. 163; KOR, Wypadki, p. 1. My assumption about the deployment of ZOMO units is based on the fact that there was a ZOMO base in Gol^dzinow. For Poles, Golgdzinow was a code word that indicated ZOMO. 19. "Opis," pp. 163-64; KOR, Wypadki, p. 1. 20. "Opis," pp. 163-64; ZF NSZZ "Solidarnosc" w ZM Ursus, pp. 20-25. 21. Robotnik 2 (October 1977), p. 3; Blazynski, pp. 260-61; KOR, Wypadki, p. 2; Kawalec, pp. 8 - 9 ; Lipski, p. 40. There were reports in later KOR materials about dismissals at some of these plants, e.g.. KOR Komunikat 4 (November 22, 1976) in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 88-98. 22. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/23 (1976), p. 12. 23. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 59; "Relacja dwöch swiadköw o zajsciach w Radomiu," Kultura 11:350 (1976), pp. 169-70; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 2. 24. "Relacja pracownika Radosköru," Kultura 11:350 (1976), p. 175; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 2. 25. Ibid.; Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 59-60; Blazynski, pp. 259; Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1957, pp. 232-33; "Relacja dwöch," pp. 170 and 172; Kawalec, pp. 7 - 8 . 26. This and following incidents are from "Relacja dwöch," pp. 170-71; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 2. 27. "Relacja dwöch," p. 171; Miroslaw Chojecki, "Radom, June 1976," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 60; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 2. 28. "Relacja dwöch," p. 170-71; Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 60; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," pp. 2-3. 29. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 60; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 3. 30. Pomian, pp. 67, 99-100, 110, 263, and 300. 31. "Relacja dwöch," pp. 171-72. 32. Ibid., pp. 170-91; Chojecki, p. 60; Blazynski, pp. 259-60; "Relacja pracownika," p. 175; Lipski, p. 33; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 3; Kawalec, pp. 7 8.

33. MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 3; "Relacja pracownika," p. 175. 34. "Relacja dwöch," p. 171; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 3. 35. "Relacja dwöch," p. 171-72; Lipski, pp. 34; Kawalec, p. 8; Biuletyn Informacyjny 8 (February 1977), in Raina, pp. 524-25; Komitet Organizacyjny Obchodöw V-Rocznicy Radomskiego Protestu Robotniczego z 25 Czerwca 1976 r., Radomski Czerwiec '76, pp. 10-11; MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 3. 36. MKZ NSZZ "Solidarnosc," p. 4; "Relacja pracownika," p. 176. 37. "Relacja dwöch," pp. 171-72; "Relacja pracownika," p. 176. 38. "Relacja dwöch," pp. 172-74.

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227

39. M K Z N S Z Z " S o l i d a r n o s c , " p.4; Biuletyn Dolnoslgski 6/13 ( J u n e 1980), p. 18; "Relacja p r a c o w n i k a / ' p. 176. 40. M K Z N S Z Z " S o l i d a r n o s c , " p.4; "Relacja d w ö c h , " p 173. 41. KOR, Komunikat 7 (1976); excerpts in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 ; Biuletyn Dolnoslpski 6/13, p. 18; Relacja d w ö c h , " p. 173; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/23 (1976), p. 12. 42. M K Z N S Z Z " S o l i d a r n o s c , " pp. 7 - 1 0 ; Komitet Organizacyjny, pp. 8 - 1 3 ; KOR, Wypadki, p. 5 - 6 ; Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 6 0 - 6 1 ; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/23 (1976), p. 13. 43. "Relacja robotniköw," p. 31. 44. Blazynski, pp. 2 6 0 - 6 1 . 45. The following account is drawn from "Relacja robotniköw," pp. 3 1 - 3 3 . 46. Lipski, pp. 40; KOR, Wypadki, p. 3. The latter mentions dismissals at the Dairy Equipment Factory in the immediate post-June period. I take this as an indication of workers' unrest there. 47. Lipski, p. 39; KOR, Komunikat 5 (December 2 1 , 1 9 7 6 ) , in Raina, pp. 3 1 9 20; Biuletyn Informacyjny 3 (November 1976), p. 1; Kawalec, p. 8. 48. Joseph Kay, " T h e Polish O p p o s i t i o n , " p. 8; KOR, Wypadki, p. 2. 49. "Uzupelnienie relacji z k r a j u , " Aneks 12 (1976), p. 34. 50. Ibid.; Kawalec, p. 8; Biuletyn Informacyjny 3, p. 1; Lipski, p. 39. 51. Lipski, p. 39; K O R Komunikat 5, pp. 3 1 9 - 2 0 ; Kawalec, p. 8; Biuletyn Informaa/jny 3, p. 1. 52. " U z u p e l n i e n i e , " p. 34. 53. KOR, Komunikat 7, excerpts in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 9 8 - 9 ; KOR, Wypadki, p. 2; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/22 (1977), p. 11. 54. KOR, Komunikat 7, pp. 9 8 - 9 ; KOR, Wypadki, p. 2; K S S " K O R , " Komunikat 20 (1978), p. 7. 55. KOR, Komunikat 5, pp. 3 2 0 - 2 1 ; Kawalec, pp. 8 - 9 ; KOR, Wypadki, pp. 2 3; Biuletyn Informacyjny, Wydanie iodzkie (April 1977), p. 3; Lipski, pp. 3 9 - 4 0 . T h e factories mentioned by these sources were the Defenders of Peace Cotton Factory, Dywilan, Elseter, ZTK, Teofilöw, the Fornalska Clothing Factory, the Femina Knitting Factory, P O L M O , Elta, the Walter Cotton Factory, the Olimpia Knitting Factory, the Elasticana Knitting Factory, the Hydraulic Mechanisms Factory, the Eskimo Knitting Factory, the Polanil Worsted Fabric Mill, a n d Anilana Artificial Fiber Factory in Lödz-Widzew. 56. Robotnik 18 ( J u n e 25, 1978), p. 1. 57. Malgorzata Szejnert and Tomasz Zalewski, Szczecin, Grudzien-SierpienGrudzien, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 . 58. Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie (March 1979), p. 1. 59. KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 98. 60. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 51; Kawalec, p. 9; Lipski, pp. 41; Blazynski, p. 260-61. 61. Lipski, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . 62. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/26 (1976), p. 1.

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3. Workers I: Events of June 1976

63. Cited in Blazynski, pp. 2 6 6 - 6 7 , 2 6 2 - 6 3 . 64. Pomian, p. 151. 65. Blazynski, pp. 2 6 2 - 6 3 . 66. ZF N S Z Z "Solidarnosc" w Z M Ursus, pp. 8 - 9 ; Karpinski, p. 195. 67. Tadeusz Karwicki, " R a d o m musi odzyskac dobre i m i § , " Zycie Radomskie (July 1, 1976); excerpts in M K Z N S Z Z " S o l i d a r n o s c , " p. 7. 68. Kawalec, p. 10; Lipski, pp. 3 7 - 3 8 . 69. Antoni Karwowski, "Dzieri 28 C z e r w c a , " Aneks 12 (1976), p. 33. 70. Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie, pp. 1 - 2 . 71. Kawalec, p. 10; Lipski, pp. 3 7 - 3 8 ; Karpinski, pp. 1 9 4 - 9 5 ; Lipski, p. 41; ZF N S Z Z "Solidarnosc" w Z M Ursus, pp. 8 - 1 8 ; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/27 (1976), pp. 7 - 8 ; M K Z N S Z Z "Solidarnosc," p. 11; Komitet Organizacyjny, pp. 3 - 4 . 72. ZF N S Z Z "Solidarnosc" w Z M Ursus, pp. 2 0 - 2 5 ; KOR, Komunikat 3 (October 30, 1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), p. 143; " O p i s , " p. 168. 73. ZF N S Z Z "Solidarnosc" w Z M Ursus, pp. 4 - 7 . 74. Blazynski, pp. 2 6 7 - 6 8 ; " O p i s , " pp., 1 6 6 - 6 7 ; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/1 (1977), p. 16. 75. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 5 7 - 5 8 ; KOR, Wypadki, p. 4. 76. KOR, Komunikat 9 (April 2 9 , 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. 1 and 3. 77. KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 88. 78. " O p i s , " pp. 1 6 4 - 6 5 ; ZF N S Z Z "Solidarnosc" w ZM Ursus, p. 1. 79. " O p i s , " pp. 1 6 5 - 6 6 , 1 6 8 . 80. Ibid. 81. "Relacja d w ö c h , " p. 173. 82. Lipski, pp. 8 9 - 9 0 . 83. "Dalsze relacje," Kultura 11:351 (1976), p. 178. 84. Ibid., p. 179. 85. Lipski, p. 95. 86. KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 88. 87. Chojecki, p. 63. 88. "Dalsze relacje," p. 179. 89. Chojecki, pp. 6 2 - 6 3 . 90. Lipski, pp. 8 9 - 9 1 . 91. Komitet Organizacyjny, pp. 8 - 9 ; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/1 (1977), p. 16; KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 88; "Dalsze relacje," p. 178; Lipski, p. 93; KOR, Wypadki, pp. 4 - 5 . 92. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/1 (1977), p. 16; "Dalsze relacje," p. 178. 93. "Dalsze relacje," pp. 1 7 8 - 7 9 . 94. "Relacja d w ö c h , " p. 174; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/5 (1977), p. 8. 95. Jan Litynski, " R a d o m on Trial," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 66. 96. KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 95; KOR, Komunikat 5, p. 323; KOR, Wypadki, p. 3. 97. Kawalec, p. 10; Lipski, p. 41; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40 (1976), p. 7.

4. Enter the Intellectuals: KOR

229

98. Lipski, pp. 40-41; Biuletyn Informacyjny 3, pp. 1 - 2 ; Biuletyn Informacyjny 13-14 (July-August 1977), p. 16; Robotnik 1 (September 1977), p. 3. 99. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40 (1976), p. 7; KOR, Wypadki, p. 3. 100. Lipski, pp. 40-41; Robotnik!, p. 3; KOR, Komunikat5, p. 321; " O p i s , " pp. 167-68; KOR, Wypadki, p. 3. 101. KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 97; Lipski, pp. 40-41; KOR, Wypadki, p. 3. 102. " O p i s , " pp. 167-68; Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie, pp. 1 - 2 . The information from Dolna Odra is based on collection of data from only a limited number of work sections. 103. Robotnik 9 (January 15-31, 1978), p. 2; KOR, Komunikat 5, p. 321; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40 (1976), pp. 7; Lipski, pp. 4 0 - 4 1 ; " O p i s , " pp. 16768. 104. See Roman Laba, "Worker Roots of Solidarity," passim. 105. This was strongly documented, using primary materials, in a lecture by Roman Laba at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions of the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University on October 8, 1986, entitled, "The Polish People's Army and the Workers' Strikes of December 1970." This is also suggested in less reliable sources such as Leopold Jerzewski, ed., Spojrzenie z drugiej strony, relacja z Gdanska 1970, pp. 2 2 - 2 7 , 30-31; Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Przesilenie grudniowe, pp. 41, 45. 106. This was also brought out in Laba's paper at Harvard.

4. Enter the Intellectuals: KOR (Workers Defense

Committee)

1. Within the Ministry of Internal Affairs there were special units formed in the 1970s to disrupt the work of the opposition and the Catholic Church. See Jerzy Jachowicz, "Akcja ' D ' , " Gazeta Wyborcza (December 8 - 9 , 1990), p. 1. These units subjected opposition members to numerous forms of harassment and repression. A few oppositionists were actually killed (e.g., Stanistaw Pyjas and Tadeusz Szczepariski). Others were beaten, taken on "joyrides" of several hundred kilometers (e.g., Jerzy Geresz), threatened with death or beating, arrested and imprisoned on false charges (as in the cases of Kazimierz Switori, Edmund Zadrozynski, and Miroslaw Chojecki), or subjected to the destruction of personal property. Sanctions were taken against people's livelihoods or careers through firings, demotions, or expulsions from school. Oppositionists were also falsely accused of crimes, had their houses or apartments periodically searched, and were very often detained for up to fortyeight hours without cause, as was then permitted by Polish law. It was common for the police to use a combination of threats against family members and promises of monetary compensation to try to induce oppositionists to work as informants. There were also a host of minor harassments: bugging of apartments, surveillance and tailing, and threatening or obscene letters and telephone calls. In the case of Halina Mikolajska, the police tried to drive her into a nervous breakdown by these methods. Finally, a number of tactics were used

230

4. Enter the Intellectuals: KOR

to try to destroy people's reputations, such as planting bogus, characterdamaging leaflets at one's place of residence, sending forged letters, and printing fake bibuia. For the period from September 1976 through September 1977, Bogdan Borusewicz has calculated that there were at least 64 apartment searches and 254 detentions of oppositionists. Bogdan Borusewicz, "Metody walki z opozycj$i w Polsce," Spotkania 1 (October 1977, version reprinted in Great Britain), p. 63. Beginning with Komunikat 24 (November 25, 1978), KSS " K O R " attempted to compile and publish a record of the harassment and repression about which it had reliable reports. In the twenty-month period that ended in June 1980, I have calculated, from the incidents reported to KOR, that each month approximately 60 oppositionists were detained or interrogated by the security forces, that the apartments or houses of another 30 oppositionists were searched, and that two oppositionists were beaten. These figures are on the low side, since not all oppositionists reported their troubles to KOR, and because these figures do not take into account two large roundups of oppositionists. I have no complete figures for April 1979, when a statue of Lenin in Nowa Huta was bombed. (During the three days after that incident alone the Security Service carried out 130 searches, detentions, or investigations of opposition members.) These figures also do not include the 250 searches and detentions carried out in connection with the attempt of security forces to foil the opposition's December 1979 commemoration of the 1970 massacre of workers. This information has been compiled from K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat, numbers 24 to 41. It is noteworthy that the number of incidents per month is significantly higher than that indicated by Borusewicz's calculations for the early months of the committee's operations. 2. Radio Free Europe Research (henceforth RFER), Situation Report, Poland/25 (1977), p. 8. Later, the statement of the Episcopate Plenum in Czgstochowa (September 10, 1976), while reiterating the call for amnesty and dialogue, also called for Poles to work hard and make sacrifices for the common good and social peace. It should be noted that the official press emphasized the latter point without printing the former. See Stefan Kawalec, Demokratyczna Opozycja w Polsce, pp. 2 0 - 2 1 . 3. Remarks made by Baranczak at the symposium, "KOR: Intellectuals in Democratic Movements: The Polish Experience," Center for European Studies, Harvard University, February 1985. 4. " A n Interview with Miroslaw Chojecki," Marek Nowak, trans., Studium Papers 10:3 (1986), pp. 75-76; Adam Michnik, "Letter from Gdansk Prison, 1985," in Letters from Prison and Other Essays, p. 78. 5. Jan Jozef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981, pp. 9 - 2 3 . 6. Adam Ciolkosz, "Poland," p. 37. 7. Lipski, pp. 25-29; Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 11-24.

4. Enter the Intellectuals: KOR

31.

231

8. Ibid. 9. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 11,19. 10. Lipski, p. 43. 11. Lipski, pp. 46-47; Biuletyn Informacyjny 35 (Janaury-February 1980), p.

12. Lipski, pp. 48-49; Jakub Karpinski, "More than Dissidents," p. 15. 13. "Opis akcji represyjnej podjçtej wobec pracowniköw ZM Ursus i innych zakladow," Kultura 11:350 (1976), p. 169. 14. Lipski, p. 79. 15. Kawalec, p. 23. 16. Biuletyn Informacyjny 35, pp. 31-32; Lipski, pp. 48-49. 17. Such priests often came into conflict with members of the church hierarchy who were against supporting KOR. From an interview conducted with Stanislaw Baranczak, Cambridge, Mass., November 1986. 18. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/25 (1976), p. 3; "A Declaration of Solidarity with the Workers by the 14," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 70-72; and George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland, pp. 263-64. 19. The signatories of the declaration were Ludwik Cohn, Jakub Karpinski, Stefan Kisielewski, Jacek Kuron, Edward Lipinski, Rev. Stanislaw Malkowski, Adam Michnik, Jan Olszewski, Jözef Rybicki, Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, Aniela Steinsbergowa, Adam Szczypiorski, Waclaw Zawadzki, and Rev. Jan Zieja. Almost all of them became members of KOR with a few exceptions. Olszewski and Sila-Nowicki were two of the more prominent lawyers connected with KOR. Karpinski was a KOR coworker (wspölpracownik) and one of the movements most prominent theorists and publicists. Kisielewski was an esteemed Catholic journalist who, while independent of KOR, served on its citizens' audit commission during the committee's later transformation in 1977. Reverend Malkowski later participated in the KOR solidarity fast with Charter 77 at the Holy Cross Church in Warsaw. List of signatories from Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 72. In some sources the declaration is mistakenly referred to as the "Letter of the 11." 20. Biuletyn Informacyjny 2 (October 1977), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), pp. 12728. 21. Blazynski, p. 269; Kawalec pp. 19-20; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/25 (1976), pp. 2-3. 22. "Open Letter from J. Andrzejewski: To the Persecuted Participants of the Workers' Protest," (Warsaw, July 28,1976), in Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977, p. 289. 23. "The Appeal of the 13," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 76-78. 24. Lipski, pp. 50-51; KOR, Komunikat 1 (September 29, 1976), in Kultura 11:350 (1976), p. 182. 25. Lipski, pp. 50, 51-52. 26. Ibid., p. 45.

232

4. Enter the Intellectuals: KOR

27. Jerzy Andrzejewski, "Letter to the President of the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," (Warsaw, September 23,1976), in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 80-81.

28. KOR, " An Appeal to the People and the Government of Poland," (Warsaw, September 1976), in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 81-82. The translated title of the appeal in the Ostoja-Ostaszewski volume is slightly different from the translation used in this text. The original Polish was "Apel do spoleczeristwa i wladz PRL." 29.Ibid. 30. Biuletyn Informacyjny 2, p. 126 31. Short biographical sketches of the KOR members discussed in this section appear in an appendix to this chapter. Much of the information used in the ensuing analysis comes from that table. Other information is specifically cited. 32. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 85. ROPCiO, the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights, was a competing underground civil rights movement. After discussions to merge ROPCiO and KOR failed, relations between the two fluctuated from strong hostility to respectful coexistence to temporary alliance, depending on the issue or the moment. With a few exceptions, ROPCiO's members tended to be more outspokenly nationalistic and more socially conservative than KOR's. ROPCiO was also less concerned with the sort of humanitarian assistance that preoccupied KOR. I discuss ROPCiO in greater detail in chapter 6. 33. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/25 (1977), p. 9. 34. Lipski, pp. 66-67. 35. "Abridged Translation of the Speech Made by Adam Michnik in the Warsaw Voivodship Court on January 22 and 23, 1969," in Raina, pp. 178-79. 36. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 25. 37. Oliver MacDonald, "Party, Workers, and Opposition," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1:2 (1977), p. 4. 38. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/25, p. 3. 39. MacDonald, "Party, Workers, and Opposition," p. 4. 40. Lipski, pp. 171-72. 41. Biuletyn Informacyjny 11 (May 1977), p. 2. 42. Lipski, p. 172. 43. Lipski, pp. 171-72; Biuletyn Informacyjny 11, p. 3. 44. Lipski, pp. 172,174-75. 45. Lipski, pp. 62, 64. 46. The Declaration of the Democratic Movement (October 1977) was signed by many KOR members and activists. Its aims went beyond KSS "KOR" 's focus on the defense of human and civil rights. It reflected the desire of many activists for the elaboration of a program for democratic political change. For further details on the Declaration see chapter 5. 47. Lipski claims that more than 50 percent of KOR members had social-

4. Enter the Intellectuals: KOR

233

democratic leanings. KOR as a whole could not be described as a socialdemocratic organization, however. See Lipski, p. 360. 48. Kuron claims this on the basis of hints in the state media that the security forces had grossly exceeded their authority in repressing the riots. Jacek Kuron, "Reflections on a Program of Action," pp. 51-52. 49. Kuron, pp. 51-52. 50. Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," pp. 267-68. Hereafter cited in text. 51. Leszek Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," p. 37. 52. Leszek Kolakowski, "The Myth of Human Self-Identity," p. 18. Hereafter cited in text. 53. Unlike most Western specialists, Kolakowski, and many other political writers from the region (including Kuron and Michnik), continued to use the word "totalitarian" to describe the party-state system. Whereas most Western social scientists saw de-Stalinization as a break from the conditions specified in totalitarian models, dissident and opposition writers used the term to capture the seeming impossibility of reforming the system in a democratic direction during the post-1968 normalization of the region. These issues are discussed in depth by Jacques Rupnik in "Totalitarianism Revisited," in John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives. One Western approach that attempts to bridge this divide is Jeffrey Goldfarb's notion of a "totalitarian culture" in which "violence defines truth." See his Beyond Glasnost, p. 29. 54. Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," pp. 42. 55. Kolakowski elaborates the contradictions and how they can be exploited as follows: 1. Between the need for elite unity for the system's operation and the elite's craving for security: The party-state can maintain its rule only by maintaining unity in the face of a disenfranchised but by no means compliant society. Yet, the elite's desire to provide for its own security led to the dismantling of one-man dictatorship and the institutionalization of an oligarchic system. This represents a break from this unity. As such, it can lead to splits within the state apparatus and permits successful actions by resistance movements, which can exploit the contradictions of a divided elite. 2 and 3. Between the state ideology and the concrete limits it places on state legitimation: Lacking real elections, the state attempts to legitimate itself on the ideological level. As the legend of embodiment of the interests of the working class and all people has lost credence, the state has used a subtler sub-ideology of nationalism and technocratic rationality. Yet, saddled with the baggage of Marxism-Leninism, such legitimation by ideology founders. The notion of national sovereignty is contradicted by the relationship to the USSR. Technocratic criteria for production remain unrealized. The political power of the Leninist party obstructs the

234

4. Enter the Intellectuals: K O R

reform of the economy along rational lines of production. The contradictions present the opportunity for resistance actions along lines of national sovereignty and economic dislocation, especially where the latter is a strong cause of chronic instability. 4. Between the local elite's dependence on the USSR for its power position and its desire for its own autonomy: Pushing for increased national sovereignty, a prerequisite for greater liberty by resistance movements, can create exploitable tensions within the apparat. This is elaborated in Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," pp. 43-48. 56. According to Kuron, this resulted in Polish arts and sciences being the least dogmatic in the bloc. Kuron, "Reflections," pp. 61-63. 57. Kuron, "Reflections," p. 60. 58. This is a reference to Edward Gierek's call for a "second Poland," one with a modern industrial sector. Ibid., p. 67. 59. Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," p. 273. 60. Adam Michnik, "Polskie Perspektywy," p. 8. 61. Jacek Kuron, "Niepodleglosc i demokracja, a interwencja radziecka," p. 2.

62. "Interview with Kuron," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 174. 63. Kuron, "Reflections," pp. 48-49. 64. "Not to Lure the Wolves out of the Woods: An Interview with Jacek Kuron," p. 95. 65. Kuron, "Reflections," p. 67. 66. Ibid., p. 67. 67. "Not to Lure the Wolves," pp. 95-96. Kuron defined totalitarianism in the following fashion: "We consider that expropriation of society from its right to organize itself and the resulting atomization and destruction of social ties are the fundamental characteristics of a totalitarian system." See Jacek Kuron, "The Perspective," p. 134. 68. "Not to Lure the Wolves," p. 97. 69. Michnik, "Polskie perspektywy," pp. 4 - 6 . 70. Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," pp. 275-76. 71. Andrew Arato, "Civil Society Against the State: Poland 1980-1981," p. 32. 72. Kuron published his thoughts on this in an article published in Biuletyn Informacyjny in 1979. See Jacek Kuron, "The Situation in the Country and the Programme of the Opposition: Some Notes." A more nationalist faction in KOR, centered around Macierewicz, then roundly condemned Kuron and argued "for the continuation of KOR's existing program of creating independent parallel structures" (Lipski, p. 327). Michnik and Lipski attempted to smooth over the differences, noting that Kuron had not called for the abandonment of parallel structures. See Adam Michnik and Jan Jozef Lipski, "Some Remarks on the Opposition and the General Situation in Poland," in Michnik, Letters from

5. KOR's Handling of the Workers' Amnesty

235

Prison and Other Essays. These disputes had as much to do with personal as with political differences that developed between Macierewicz and Kurori, who represented, on some level, the left and right political factions that had developed within KOR. 73. Lipski, pp. 70-71. 74. Information compiled from: KOR, Komunikat 2 (October 10, 1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), p. 137; KOR, Komunikat 3 (October 30, 1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), pp. 144-46; KOR, Komunikat 4 (November 22,1976), in A. OstojaOstaszewski et al., eds., Dissent in Poland, 1976-77, p. 95; KOR, Komunikat 5 (December 21,1976), p. 7; KOR, Komunikat 8 (March 22,1977); KOR, Komunikat 9 (April 29,1977), p. 7; KOR, Komunikat 12 (July 24,1977), pp. 9 - 1 0 ; KOR, "Appeal to the People and Authorities of the Polish People's Republic," in Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1:1 (1977), pp. 10-11; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/20 (1977), p. 7; Peter Green, "The Course of Events, " Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1:3 (1977), p. 3; and Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 25, 8 4 - 8 5 , 1 9 2 . Miscellaneous information provided by the author.

5. KOR's Waging of the Workers' Amnesty

Struggle

1. Reprinted in Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland, pp. 376-77. 2. KOR, Komunikat 3 (October 30, 1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), p. 142; KOR, Komunikat 4 (November 22, 1976), in A. Ostoja-Ostaszewski et al., Dissent in Poland, 1976-77, p. 95. 3. KOR, Komunikat 9 (April 29, 1977), p. 1; KOR, "Statement," (February 5, 1977), in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 140. 4. KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 142; KOR, Komunikat 4, p. 95. 5. Radio Free Europe Research (henceforth RFER), Situation Report, Poland/36 (1976), p. 10; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 140; KOR, "Oswiadczenie," (November 4, 1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976) pp. 146-47. 6. George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland, p. 281. 7. I was lucky enough to come across such a manuscript in the Solidarity Bibliographic Center at Harvard. It was a rather thick tome by Kazimierz Janusz, later an important ROPCiO activist, on different conceptions of "Eastern" and "Western" civilization and the confrontation between them. See Kazimierz Janusz, Konfrontacje, part 1 (Warsaw: Samizdat, 1975). The name of the publisher, Samizdat (the Russian word for self-published materials), the obvious production of the volume by typewriter, and the fact that I never again encountered another publication from "Samizdat," lead me to discount the possibility that the manuscript serves as evidence of the existence of a publishing house as early as 1975. Jan Wale, in a lecture at the Haus der Begegnung in Munich on April 8, 1986, mentioned that the poetry of Stanislaw Baranczak and Adam Zagajewski circulated in this fashion, as well. 8. Jan Józef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981, pp. 110-11 and 361.

236

87.

5. KOR's Handling of the Workers' Amnesty

9. KOR, Komunikat 1 (September 29,1976), in Kultura 11:350 (1976), pp. 180-

10. Biuletyn ¡nformacyjny 1 (September 1976). 11. Biuletyn ¡nformacyjny 2 (October 1977), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), p. 125. 12. Biuletyn Informacyjny 8 (February 1977), in Raina, pp. 502-30. 13. Biuletyn Informacyjny 1, pp. 5-7. Such information continued to be published as a regular feature under the title "Artykul 114 k.p. k" (Article 114 of the Penal Code). 14. Lipski, pp. 111-12; Marek Nowak, trans., "An Interview with Miroslaw Chojecki," p. 76. 15. Lipski, p. 110. 16. For a remarkable account of complexities of underground printing, see Jan Wale, "My Wolna Watkowa," Biuletyn Informacyjny 38 (June 1980), pp. 1-11. 17. "An Interview with Miroslaw Chojecki," pp. 75-76. 18. KOR, Wypadki czerwcowe i dziaialnosc Komitetu Obrony Robotniköw. This is a Western reprint of a May 1977 pamphlet published by KOR in Warsaw. 19. See . . . w imieniu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Parts 1 and 2. 20. "An Interview with Miroslaw Chojecki," pp. 76-77. 21. Ibid., pp. 76-77. 22. Lipski, pp. 178-79. 23. Biuletyn Informacyjny 13-14 (July-August 1977), p. 19. 24. Lipski, pp. 178-79, 64. 25. See UProgu issues 1 (October 1976), 6 (March 1977), 11 (October 1977), 12 (November 1977). 26. Lipski, pp. 111-12. 27. Opinia, pismo Ruchu Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela, numery 1-4 (London: Wydawnictwo Polonia Books, no date). 28. Stanislaw Barariczak, "Dlaczego Zapis," Zapis 1 (January 1977). Version published in Britain by Index on Censorship, p. 11. 29. See Postqp issues 1 (July 1977), 2 (October 1977), 7 (January 1979), 10 (October 1979). 30. KOR, Komunikat 2 (October 10, 1976), in Kultura 12:351 (1976), p. 136. 31. Biuletyn Informacyjny 3 (November 1976), p. 3; "Letter of the 889 Workers of Ursus," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 112-13; Robotnik 1 (September 1977), p. 2.

32. KOR, Komunikat 5 (December 21,1976), in Raina, p. 322. 33. Lipski, p. 100. 34. Robotnik 1, p. 2. 35. "Letter of the 67 Tortured Workers of Radom," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 113-14. 36. Lipski, p. 102. For examples of individual complaints, see Raina, pp. 290-93 and Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 114-22. 37. Robotnik 1, p. 3; Biuletyn Informacyjny 13-14, pp. 15-6; Lipski, p. 188. 38. Biuletyn Informacyjny 13-14, p. 16.

5. KOR's Handling of the Workers' Amnesty

237

39. KOR, "To the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," (November 15, 1977), in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 124-27. 40. Blazynski, pp. 282-83. 41. KOR, "Appeal to the Nation," (November 29, 1976), in OstojaOstaszewski, pp. 127-29. 42. Blazynski, pp. 284-85. 43. "Appeal of the 34 Professors," in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 129-32. 44. KOR, Komunikat 5, pp. 327-28. 45. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/42 (1976), p. 11; Blazynski, pp. 285-86. 46. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/1 (1977), pp. 20-21. 47. Lipski, p. 103; Raina, p. 269. 48. Raina, p. 269. 49. "An Eyewitness Report on the Proceedings of the Trials," in Raina, pp. 307-9. 50. KOR, Komunikat 9, pp. 6-7; Lipski, 104-6; Bogdan Szajkowski, Next to God . . . Poland, p. 46. For texts of several of the important letters in the campaign see Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 132-37. 51. Blazynski, pp. 288-89. 52. Ibid. 53. KOR, "Oswiadczenie," (February 5, 1977), in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 137. 54. Blazynski, p. 289. 55. KOR, "Statement on the Conditional Pardon for the June Protests," (February 5,1977), in Raina, pp. 332-35. 56. "The Open Letter of 730 Students of Warsaw University to the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," in Raina, pp. 313; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/13 (1977), p. 7 and Poland/8 (1977), p. 4. 57. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/5 (1977), p. 8 and Poland/8 (1977), pp. 3 4. 58. Lipski, p. 161. 59. Bogdan Borusewicz, "Metody walki z opozycj^ w Polsce," Spotkania 1 (October 1977, version reprinted in Great Britain), pp. 63 and 70-71. 60. Raina, p. 272 n. 40. This source mentions specifics in Radom only. There were reports of similar police behavior in Grudzijjdz as well. See KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 3. 61. KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 4; Peter Green, "The Course of Events," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1:3 (1977), p. 2; Lipski, p. 109; Borusewicz, pp. 63 and 7172. 62. KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 4; Green, "The Course of Events," pp. 2-3; Lipski, pp. 108-9. 63. Green, "The Course of Events," pp. 2-3. 64. Borusewicz, pp. 71-72. 65. Lipski, pp. 142-43; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3. 66. Lipski, p. 144; Biuletyn Informacyjny 11, pp. 1-2; Raina, pp. 274-75.

238

5. KOR's Handling of the Workers' Amnesty

67. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11 (May 1977), pp. 1 - 2 ; Raina, pp. 274-75; Lipski, p. 144. 68. Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/13 (1977), p. 4. 69. Lipski, pp. 142-47. 70. Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3. 71. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 3; Lipski, pp. 150-52. 72. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 3; "Pogrzeb Stanistawa Pyjasa," Kultura 6:356 (1977), pp. 139-40. 73. "Pogrzeb Stanislawa Pyjasa," pp. 139-40; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3; Lipski, p. 152; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 3. 74. Lipski, p. 152; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 3; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3. 75. "Pogrzeb Stanistawa Pyjasa," pp. 139-40; Lipski, pp. 152-53; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, pp. 3 - 4 . 76. SKS, "Oswiadczenie, " (May 15,1977) in Kultura 6:357 (1977), pp. 140-41; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 4. 77. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, pp. 6 - 8 ; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3; Lipski, pp. 153-54. 78. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 6. 79. Ibid.; Lipski, pp. 153-54. 80. Lipski, pp. 153-54. 81. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 6; Lipski, pp. 153-54. 82. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 5; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 3. 83. Borusewicz, pp. 63 and 72-74; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, pp. 6 - 8 . 84. Borusewicz, pp. 72-74; Lipski, p. 154; Raina, p. 277. 85. Lipski, pp. 154,169. 86. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/13 (1977), p. 8; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 1; Lipski, pp. 154-55. 87. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 5. 88. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 1; Lipski, p. 167. 89. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 8; Lipski, pp. 166-67. 90. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 13-14, pp. 4 - 5 ; Lipski, p. 167; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 4. 91. Lipski, p. 169. 92. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, pp. 8 - 9 ; Lipski, p. 161. 93. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, pp. 8 - 9 ; Lipski, p. 164. 94. Green, "The Course of Events," p. 4. 95. Lipski, p. 158. 96. Jacek Bochenski et al. "Deklaracja," (May 19, 1977), in Kultura 6:357 (1977), pp. 142-43; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 11, p. 9. 97. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 13-14, p. 4; Lipski, p. 157; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/16 (1977), p. 3. 98. ROPCiO, "Statement in Respect of the Temporary Detention in Custody

5. KOR's Handling of the Workers' Amnesty

239

of Members and Sympathisers of the Workers' Defence Committee," in Raina, pp. 495-96. 99. RFER, "Review of Uncensored Polish Publications, SeptemberNovember 1977," Background Report/255, (1977), p. 3; Lipski, pp. 156-57. 100. Lipski, pp. 156-57; Green, "The Course of Events," p. 4; Raina, pp. 500-1. 101. Lipski, p. 156 and 519. n. 7. 102. Ibid., pp. 159-61. 103. Ibid., pp. 169-70. 104. Ibid., p. 197. 105. Ibid. pp. 194-95; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 14 (September 30, 1977), pp. 2-3. 106. "Oswiadczenie tröjki obywatelskiej w sprawie rocznej dzialalnosci KOR-u," (September 29,1987), in K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 14, pp. 6 - 8 . 107. Lipski, pp. 198-200. 108. Ibid., p. 200.1 have made some small changes in the translation of goal one after comparison with the original Polish text. KOR, "Uchwala," (September 29,1977), in K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 14, pp. 9 - 1 0 . 109. "Declaration of the Democratic Movement" (October 1977), in Raina, pp. 452-57. 110. Ibid., pp. 457-58. 111. Lipski, p. 201. This status was not long-lived. When a certain amount of factionalism developed within K S S - " K O R , " Glos began to serve as the mouthpiece of the faction around Macierewicz. 112. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 105-6. 113. Among these lawyers were Andrzej Grabinski, Witold Lis-Olszewski, Jan Olszewski, Stanislaw Szczuka, and Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki. Later, Jacek Taylor worked with the opposition in Gdansk. KOR also hired lawyers in Radom, including Ewa Milewska and several others mentioned only by their surnames in the literature: Szczerpiriski, Marczewski, Kolodziejski, and Iwaszczukiewicz. Not surprisingly, a number of the lawyers who worked throughout the late 1970s for KOR became advisers to Interfactory Strike Committees, regional Solidarity branches, Solidarity's National Coordinating Commission, and Rural Solidarity. KOR published a two-part brochure on the cases argued by these lawyers on behalf of the workers. See . . . w imieniu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Parts 1 and 2. 114. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 105-6. 115. Lipski, p. 83; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40 (1976), p. 7. 116. Lipski, p. 83. 117. Ibid., pp. 99 and 186-87. 118. KOR, Komunikat 3, pp. 138-39. 119. The most important document of this type was Biuletyn Informacyjny 8 (see Raina, pp. 502-30). In general, the first year of both Communique and Information Bulletin are packed full of details of this nature.

240

5. KOR's Handling of the Workers' A m n e s t y

120. Andrzej Drawicz, "Experience of Democratic O p p o s i t i o n / ' Survey 24:4 (1979), p. 36. 121. A. Dorniak et al., Solidarnosc, leksykon zwigzkowy—who's who, what's what. 122. KOR, Komunikat 5, in Raina, pp. 3 2 4 - 3 5 . 123. Biuletyn Informacyjny 9 (March 1977), p. 4. 124. Table 5 A gives a picture of KOR's delivery of relief during its first year of operation: 125. KOR, Komunikat 5, p. 324; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 139. 126. KOR, "Declaration" (September 29, 1977), in Lipski, p. 469. 127. Jan Litynski, " R a d o m on Trial," Biuletyn Informacyjny 8, in Raina, pp. 502-10. 128. KOR, Komunikat 2, p. 35. 129. Biuletyn Informacyjny 3, p. 4; KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 41; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 142; "Z Biuletynu Informacyjnego nr. 1 , " in Kultura 11:350 (1976), pp. 1 8 6 - 8 7 ; KOR, Komunikat 2, pp. 1 3 4 - 3 5 . 130. "Z Biuletynu Informacyjnego nr. 1 , " pp. 1 8 6 - 8 7 ; KOR, Komunikat 2 , 1 3 4 35; KOR, Komunikat 5, pp. 3 2 2 - 2 3 . 131. Personal communication. 132. KOR, Komunikat 3, 1 3 8 - 3 9 ; KOR, Komunikat 2, p. 133 and 1, p. 182. 133. KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 140. 134. KOR, Komunikat 9, pp. 3 - 4 ; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 139; KOR, Komunikat 2, p. 133; Lipski, p. 187. 135. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/1 (1977), p. 16; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 139; KOR, Komunikat 2, p. 133; Lipski, p. 187; "Interview with Kuron, " in Ostoja-Ostaszewski, p. 170; KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 1. 136. Ostoja-Ostaszewski, pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 ; KOR, Komunikat 1, p. 181; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 139. 137. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 15 (October 31, 1977), p. 1; Lipski, pp. 9 5 - 9 8 .

TABLE 5. A

Date N o v e m b e r 21, 1976 D e c e m b e r 15, 1976 April 22, 1977 M a y 7, 1977 September 25, 1977

Total Amount of Aid Delivered (zloty)

As a Percentage of the September 25, 1977 Total

658,000 1,066,660 2,662,320 2,863,190 3,126,590

21 34 86 92 100

s o u r c e s : KOR, Komunikat 9 (April 29, 1977), pp. 3 - 4 ; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40 (1976), p. 7; KOR, Komunikat 5, pp. 3 2 4 - 5 ; KSS "KOR," Komunikat 14 (September 30, 1977), p. 1; and Lipski, p. 124. Komunikat 14 contains a misprint (the 130,470 distributed in Ursus should be 730,470), as does Lipski (the 400,000 in Plock should be 40,000).

6. The Extension of the Public Space

241

138. KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 15, p. 8. 139. "Opis akcji represyjnej podj^tej wobec pracowniköw ZM Ursus i innych zakladow," Kultura 11:350 (1976), p. 169. 140. "Opis akcji represyjnej," p. 169; KOR, Komunikat 1, pp. 180-1. 141. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/1 (1977), pp. 15 and 19; KOR, Komunikat 6 (January 15, 1977), in Raina, pp. 329-30; Blazynski, pp. 267-68; "Opis akcji represyjnej," pp. 166-67; KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 3; KOR, Komunikat 3, p. 128. 142. KOR, Komunikat 2, pp. 133-34; KOR, Komunikat 3, pp. 138-41; "Opis akcji represyjnej," p. 169; KOR, Komunikat 5, p. 322. 143. A. Dorniak et al., Solidarnosc, leksykon zwipzkowy—who's who, what's what. 144. KOR, Komunikat 9, p. 3. 145. Lipski, p. 187. 146. KOR, Komunikat 5, pp. 320-21 and 323. 147. KOR, Komunikat 5, pp. 319-20. 148. Lipski, pp. 41-42. 149. A number of different factors might explain this. As mentioned, the Gierek regime had good reason to be concerned about Western reactions. Other factors such as the greater effectiveness of the opposition or simple moral restraint on the part of the regime (after all, Gierek's ascension to power was framed in terms of avoiding a repeat of 1970) also might explain it. Since these three factors are not mutually exclusive, it is also possible that all of them worked in a mutually reinforcing fashion. Although it is clear that the regime had extensive coercive resources at its command (witness the events of 1981), it had decided that bloodshed and massive repression were unacceptable responses to the opposition.

6. The Extension of the Public Space 1. Jacek Kuron, "The Perspective," p. 134. 2. To take the Warsaw KSS-"KOR" milieu as an example: Konrad Bielinski and Mirostaw Chojecki set up the poligraphy facilities in the Gdansk shipyard during the strike of August 1980. Ewa Milewicz was also present and organized the communication between the shipyard and the rest of the country. Waldemar Kuczynski and Tadeusz Kowalik were advisers to the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS) in Gdansk during the negotiations with the government in August 1980. A number of activists worked for the Solidarity press. /IS had numerous KOR affiliates among its editors (Malgorzata Pawlicka, Andrzej Zozula, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Joanna Szczgsna, and Helena Luczywo). Both Jan Wale and Kuczynski worked for Tygodnik Solidarnosc. Konrad Bielinski took part in the founding of Tygodnik Solidarnosc and then became the director of the Commission on Information and Mass Media of Solidarity Mazowsze, as well as editor-in-chief of Mazowsze (Masuria), one of its publications. The Romaszewskis continued their intervention work under the auspices of

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Mazowsze Solidarity. Both Henryk Wujec and Wojciech Onyszkiewicz sat on the presidium of Mazowsze Solidarity. Numerous other KOR affiliates from Warsaw also served as experts for Solidarity. Jacek Kuron, who organized a strike information bank in the summer of 1980, was an adviser to the National Coordinating Commission of the Union. Jan Olszewski, Jan Lityriski, Adam Michnik, and Antoni Macierewicz served as advisers to regional union branches. Olszewski and Andrzej Grabinski served as legal advisers to the National Coordinating Committee. A number of KOR activists worked in Solidarity research centers or served as delegates in Solidarity teams negotiating with the government (Piotr Naimski, Ludwik Dorn, Urszula Doroszewska, Jan Jözef Lipski, Antol Lawina, Antoni Macierewicz, Irena Wöycicka, Krzysztof Hagemejer, and Stefan Starczewski). Andrzej Celinski was head of the Center for Social and Scientific Research at Gdansk, a member of Solidarity's National Coordinating Commission, and served as its secretary for a period. Others rose to prominence in the Independent Student Union (Jacek Czaputowicz and Teodor Klincewicz) or assisted in the birth of Rural Solidarity (Wieslaw Piotr K§cik and Stanislaw Szczuka). 3. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 17 (December 1977-January 1978), p. 42; KSS"KOR," Komunikat 17 (January 23,1978) [Western retype], p. 10. 4. Studencki Komitet Solidarnosci we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn lnformacyjny "Podaj Dalej" 9 (May 1979), p. 3. 5. KSS w Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Dolnoslgski 11 (April 1980), p. 28. 6. Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne Wroclaw) 3 (January 1980), p. 2; Biuletyn Dolnoslgski 11, p. 28; SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn lnformacyjny "Podaj Dalej" : 13 (May 1980), p. 2; KSS i SKS Wroclawiu, "Apel do mieszkancöw Wroclawia, Komunikat o obchodach dziewijitej rocznicy wydarzen grudniowych," in SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn lnformacyjny "Podaj Dalej" 11 (January 1980), pp. 3 - 4 . 7. "Apel do mieszkancöw Wroclawia," pp. 3 - 4 . 8. Interview with Stanislaw Baranczak, Cambridge, Mass., November 1986. 9. KOR-"KOR," Komunikat 3 1 - 3 2 (September 1979), p. 20. 10. For details on the disputes that crippled Solidarity in the Katowice area, see David McQuaid, "Solidarity Union Organization in Upper Silesia: A Historical Sketch." 11. Radio Free Europe Research (henceforth RFER), Situation Report, Poland/26 (1977), p. 14. 12. Jan Jözef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981, p. 360. 13. Ibid., pp. 201-3, 359-63. 14. Ibid., pp. 416-17; KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 23 (October 16, 1978), pp. 1 2 13. 15. KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 36 (January 31, 1980), p. 14. The commission's first report was published for the Madrid Conference: Komisja Helsinska w Polsce, Dokument Nr. 1, O przestrzeganiu praw cziowieka i obywatela w PRL; published in English as Prologue to Gdansk. The commission relied heavily on re-

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243

ports compiled by Intervention Bureau workers. It continued to work independently of KOR and Solidarity in the martial law period. See Polish Helsinki Watch Committee Commission, Poland Under Martial Law (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1983). 16. For those interested in this topic, Lipski's KOR: A History is the best individual source. 17. For instance, during the martial law era, Primate Jozef Glemp attempted to reign in a number of local parish priests, including Jerzy Popieluszko, who were strongly criticized by the Communists and harassed by the police because of the unrelenting pro-Solidarity stance of their ministries. For greater detail on a number of these disputes, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 164-65. 18. To contrast a more positive view from a more guarded one from two observers who share much in common politically, see Leszek Kolakowski and Jan Gross, "Church and Democracy in Poland: Two Views," pp. 316-22. Another observer, Zbigniew Pelczynski, argues that the Church made the most important contribution to the reconstruction of civil society in Poland. See "Solidarity and the 'Rebirth of Civil Society' in Poland, 1976-1981," in John Keane, ed„ Civil Society and the State, pp. 361-80. 19. These themes are elaborated in Jan Jozef Lipski's influential essay "Two Fatherlands; Two Patriotisms" (Dwie Ojczyzny, Dwa Patriotyzmy). It has been translated into English in Robert Kostrzewa, ed., Between East and West; Writings from "Kultura," pp. 52-71. 20. Lay Catholic organizations were not always so adept in preserving their moral independence. Michnik's discussion of what happened to Znak during the constitutional debate of 1975 is illustrative of this. 21. Both Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik stressed this point in their writings of the 1970s. Kuron addressed the importance of Christian morality independent of faith in an essay called "Christians Without God," published in 1975 under the pseudonym of Maciej Gajka. See "Chrzescijanie bez Boga," in Kuron, Polityka i odpowiedzialnosc, pp. 17-33. Michnik's most succinct discussion of the importance of Christian morality is an essay written for Biuletyn Informacyjny during the pope's visit in 1979 (English translation: "A Lesson in Dignity," in Letters from Prison and Other Essays, pp. 160-68). 22. The most important work of this kind was Adam Michnik's Kosciof, Lewica, Dialog. Parts of it have been published in English as Michnik, "The Church, The Left: A Dialogue," in Francisek Silnitsky, Larisa Silnitsky, and Karl Reyman, eds. Communism and Eastern Europe, pp. 51-98. 23. One influential book that made this point explicitly was Bohdan Cywinski's Rodowody niepokornych (Lineages of the Unsubmissive), which documented how intellectuals of different world views and religious orientations cooperated in Poland's struggle for national independence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 24. For instance, conflicts developed between Bishop Bronislaw Dgbrowski,

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the secretary of the episcopate, and fasters at the Church of the Holy Cross in October 1979. However, Primate Wyszynski smoothed over the conflict soon thereafter. Later in 1981, Reverend Alojzy Orszulik, the head of the episcopate press office, strongly criticized K O R — a n d Jacek Kurori in particular—during a meeting with journalists. The Church and the Vatican went out of its way to stress that the Reverend's comments were his own, and not the official Church position. For greater detail on these two incidents see Lipski, pp. 3 9 0 - 9 2 and 444. 25. See chapters 4 and 5 for examples of Church statements or interventions in the period 1975-77. 26. Christopher Cviic, " T h e Church," in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Poland, Genesis of Revolution, pp. 96-97; Jakub Karpinski, Countdown, pp. 81 and 1 7 1 72; Andrzej Micewski, Cardinal Wyszynski, pp. 318-19, 3 7 2 - 7 3 , 4 3 1 - 3 2 . 27. The most famous example of this was when the authorities broadcast only a part of Cardinal Wyszynski's sermon of August 26,1980, in order to give the impression that he was appealing to the strikers on the Baltic coast to return to work. See Cviic, p. 104, and Micewski, pp. 431-32. 28. Although the Church did not take stands on public issues in order to cynically gain concessions, there were a number of occasions where the state used such concessions to bolster its own popularity. See Cviic, p. 101; Karpinski, pp. 8 1 - 8 2 . 29. Bogdan Szajkowski, Next to God . . . Poland, pp. 72-73. 30. Poles seem to be modern in their attitude toward religion. They tend to respect the views of the Church more consistently when these view apply to the spiritual realm, but show much greater disagreement with Church views in more temporal areas of life. For instance, according to a recent survey, 87 percent of Poles said that the Church should decide on the building and location of churches and 50 percent said that it should play a role both in the instruction of religion in schools and in drawing up anti-alcohol legislation. However, only 15 percent said that the Church should have influence over what is shown on TV, and only 14 percent said that it should have influence over the programs of theaters and movie houses. Polityka (November 18,1989), p. 2. 31. Lipski, however, mentions a few examples of activists and groups of this orientation (pp. 19-20). 32. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 3 1 - 3 2 , p. 20; Biuletyn Informacyjny 34, p. 13; Lipski, p. 353; Gios, Special English Edition (May 1979), pp. 15-17; Robotnik 33 (June 1,1979), p. 1. 33. Lipski, pp. 117-20; Biuletyn Informacyjny 26 (December 1978), pp. 50-51; RFER, Situation Report, Poland/25 (1977), p. 10. 34. Gospodarz 1 (December 1977), p. 9. 35. Opinio 7 (November 1977), reported on the existence of several such groups that discussed rural and nationalist issues and drew from 30 to 200 participants. See Opinio, pismo Ruchu Obrony Prow Cziowieka i Obywatela, numery 58 (London: Wydawnictwo Polonia Books), p. 113-14. 36. Lipski, p. 122.

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37. Ibid. 38. Gospodarz 1, p. 1. 39. Aspekt 2 - 3 (1979); Biuletyn Informacyjny 37 (May 1980), p. 32. 40. Bjidkowski, pp. 106-8; Lipski, pp. 2 0 4 - 4 ; Lech Walesa, A Way of Hope, p. 92. 41. Biuletyn Informacyjny 26, pp. 50-51; Droga 1 (June-July 1978). 42. Lipski, pp. 123 and 304. 43. Biuletyn Informacyjny 28 (February-March 1979), p. 50; KPSN, Rzeczpospolita 1 (February 14,1979). Curiously enough, some members of KPSN continued to participate in ROPCiO, and Ziembinski continued to co-edit Opinia. See KPSN, Rzeczpospolita 2 (May 3,1979, English version), p. 8; ROPCiO, Opima 3 5 66 (March-April 1980), p. 32. 44. " N e w Party Formed," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 3:4 (1979), pp. I I IS. 45. Gazeta Polska 1 (January 1979) came out prior to KPN's foundation. Gazeta Polska 2 (September 10,1979) appeared after its foundation, but with a new editorial board and including information on KPN. 46. Lipski, pp. 142 and 204; Biuletyn Informacyjny 13-14 (July-August 1977), p. 14. 47. Lipski, pp. 176-77. 48. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 17, pp. 6 and 10; Biuletyn Informacyjny 17, pp. 1 5 17; SKS we Krakowie, Sygnal 2 (1978), p. 10; RFER, "Review of Uncensored Polish Publications, October 1977-January 1978," Background Report/51 (1978), p. 9; Biuletyn Informacyjny 37, p. 19; Biuletyn Informacyjny 16 (November 1977), p. 3; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 16 (December 1977), p. 16; SKS we Wroclawiu, "Oswiadczenie," (March 19,1978), in Postgp 4 (1978), p. 19; SKS w Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej" : 11 (1980), p. 2; ibid, 9, p . l . 49. Tematy (No number, 1979), pp. 3 - 4 ; SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej" 13, p. 3; 340, p. 2; Biuletyn Informacyjny 16, p. 2; Biuletyn Informacyjny 17, pp. 15-16; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 17, pp. 5 - 6 ; SKS w Krakowie, Sygnal 2, pp. 9 - 1 0 ; SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej" 1 (1978), p. 4; Lipski, p. 204; Karpinski, "More than Dissidents," Index on Censorship 8:6 (1979), pp. 17-18; and K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 16, p. 9. 50. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 17, p. 10; Biuletyn Informacyjny 17, p. 17; SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej" : 5 (1978), p. 3; ibid., 1, p. 4; ibid., 11, p. 4; SKS w Krakowie, Sygnal 7 (1979), p. 31. 51. Biuletyn Informacyjny 16, pp. 2 - 3 ; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 16, p. 15; SKS w Warszawie, Biuletyn 1 (November 12, 1977), pp. 1 - 2 ; SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej" 5, p. 1; Tematy (no number, 1979), pp. 3 - 4 . 52. SKS we Wroclawiu, "Oswiadczenie," (May 8[?], 1978), in Post^p 4 (1978), pp. 18-19; SKS w Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej": 11, p. 4; ibid., 6 (1979), pp. 1 - 2 ; ibid., 8 (1979), p. 2; ibid., 9, p. 2; Henryk Bjik, "Samoksztalcenie i represje wobec studentów," Postgp 4 (1978), p. 14; SKS w Krakowie, Sygnal 2, pp. 9 - 1 0 . 53. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 24 (November 25,1978), p. 11; Biuletyn Informacy-

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jny 17, p. 17; SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej": 1, p. 4; ibid., 8, p. 2; ibid., 9, p. 1. 54. Lipski, p. 203; Karpinski, pp. 17-18; RFER, "Review of Uncensored Polish Publications, October 1977-January 1978," Background Report/51 (1978), pp. 8 - 9 . 55. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 16, p. 15; Biuletyn Informacyjny 16 (December 1977), p. 3; SKS w Warszawie, Biuletyn 1, p. 1. 56. SKS w Krakowie, Sygnal 2, p. 1. 57. SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej" 1, p. 1. 58. See Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne, 3 (January 1980) and 5 (May 1980). 59. Aspekt 2 - 3 (1979), p. 1. 60. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 33 (October 1979), p. 7; Biuletyn Informacyjny 38 (June 1980), pp. 4 3 - 4 4 . 61. SKS we Wroclawiu, Biuletyn Informacyjny "Podaj Dalej": 9, p. 2; 13, p. 2. 62. Lipski, p. 399. 63. Dariusz Cecuda, Leksykon Opozycji Politycznej, 1976-1989, pp. 112-13. 64. RFER, "Review of Uncensored Polish Publications, SeptemberNovember 1977," Background Report/255 (1977), pp. 2 - 4 . 65. Ruch Mlodej Polski, Komunikat 1 (July 29,1979), p. 1. 66. Ibid. 67. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat: 21 (July 31,1978), p. 9; 22 (September 11,1978), p. 2; Biuletyn Informacyjny 23 (August-September 1978), pp. 12-14; Robotnik 2 1 22 (September 25, 1977), pp. 1 - 2 . 68. Biuletyn Informacyjny 23, pp. 14-15; Peter Green, "The Course of Events," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1:3 (1977), p. 4; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 22 (September 11,1978), pp. 3 - 4 . 69. Biuletyn Informacyjny 24 (September-October 1978), p. 17. 70. Biuletyn Informacyjny 25, p. 31; Robotnik 25 (November 25, 1978), p. 1. 71. Gospodarz 1 (December 1977); K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 17, p. 10. 72. Lipski, p. 264; Niezalezny Ruch Chlopski (no number, July 30, 1978). 73. Biuletyn Informacyjny 28, p. 50; Lipski, p. 264. 74. Lipski, pp. 260-61; Peter Raina, Independent Social Movements in Poland, p. 163. 75. Raina, Independent Social Movements in Poland, pp. 169-80; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 30 ( M a y - J u n e 1979), pp. 9 - 1 5 ; Lipski, p. 264. Strangely, Raina lists the founding document of the Osrodek Mysli Ludowej under the name of the Center for Peasant Knowledge as a distinct organization. 76. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/5 (1978), p. 12; Biuletyn Informacyjny 2 1 22 (June-July 1978), p. 8. 77. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/5 (1978), p. 12. 78. Lipski, pp. 208-11. 79. Biuletyn Informacyjny 2 1 - 2 2 , pp. 8 and 10; SKS w Warszawie, Biuletyn 1, p. 3; Biuletyn Informacyjny 16, p. 4; Robotnik 8 (January 1 - 1 5 , 1978), p. 1. 80. Biuletyn Informacyjny: 34, p. 22; 30 (May-June 1979), p. 47; 33 (September-October 1979), p. 29; 24, p. 29.

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81. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/5 (1978), p. 12; Biuletyn Informacyjny 30, p. 47. The first of these symposia was on the subject of the language of propaganda. See TKN, Jgzyk propagandy (Warsaw: Zeszyty TKN-u, NOW-a, 1979). 82. Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne 3 (January 1980), p. 3; KOR, Komunikat 11 (May 1977), p. 407. 83. Biuletyn Informacyjny 16 (November 1977), p. 10; L. Dym, "Spotkania," Zapis 5 (January 1978), pp. 247-49. 84. Lipski, pp. 226-27; A. B. (pseud.), "Pierwszy Numer Pulsu," Zapis 5 (January 1978), pp. 243-46. 85. Lipski, pp. 302-3; Biuletyn Informacyjny 23, p. 34. 86. Biuletyn Informacyjny 28, p. 51; Biuletyn Informacyjny 1 3 - 1 4 (July-August 1977), p. 19. 87. Biuletyn Informacyjny 29, p. 56; Biuletyn Informacyjny 36 (March-April 1980), pp. 4 6 - 4 7 . 88. Lipski, pp. 179-81. 89. Biuletyn Informacyjny 38, pp. 35 and 4 3 - 4 4 ; Biuletyn Informacyjny 3 1 - 3 2 , pp. 66-67. 90. Biuletyn Informacyjny 33, pp. 58-59; " A n Interview with Mirostaw Chojecki," Studium Papers 10:3 (1986), p. 77; Biuletyn Informacyjny 27 (January 1979), p. 52; "Wydawnictwo niezalezne," Posigp 4 (1978), p. 28. 91. "An Interview with Mirostaw Chojecki," p. 77; Lipski, pp. 180-81. 92. Lipski, pp. 3 0 4 - 5 . 93. Cited in Madelene Korbel Albright, The Role of the Press in Political Change, pp. 18-19.

7. Workers II: Oppositional Politics 1. Adam Michnik, " O n Resistance: A Letter from Bialol^ka," Letters from Prison and Other Essays, pp. 4 6 - 4 7 . 2. Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, p. 5. 3. Oliver MacDonald, "Party, Workers, and Opposition," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1:1 (1977), p. 3. 4. Although a decline in public mood is not tantamount to an increase in feelings of injustice, these results are at least consistent with a growing sense of injustice. If the results in 1979 and 1980 had shown improvement in the public mood rather than its deterioration, such claims would be difficult to substantiate. 5. Robotnik 19 (July 30,1978), p. 1; Robotnik 32 (April 30,1979), p. 1. 6. Robotnik 16 (May 31,1978), p. 1. 7. "Robotnicy nabrali odwagi," in Raport o stanie narodu i PRL, pp. 212-13. 8. "Robotnicy nabrali odwagi," pp. 212-3; Robotnik 26 (December 15,1978), p. 2; Robotnik—Wydanie szczecinskie (March 1979), p. 1; and Biuletyn Informacyjny 26 (September 1978), pp. 3 0 - 3 1 . 9. "Robotnicy nabrali odwagi," pp. 2 1 2 - 3 .

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10. "The Strike Movement/' Labour Focus on East Central Europe 3:2 (1978), p. 10. 11. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 12. Robotnik 10 (February 22, 1977), pp. 3-4. 13. Ruch Zwigzkowy 2 (September 1978), pp. 6-7. 14. Biuletyn Infbrmacyjny 26, pp. 30-31. 15. Robotnik 29 (February 21, 1979), p. 2. 16. The complete KOR report was published in English as KOR, "The State of the Hospital System," Critique 15 (1981), pp. 57-67. 17. Robotnik 36-37 (September 15, 1979), p. 3. 18. "Protest Over Mining Disasters," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 3:6 (1980), p. 15. 19. Robotnik 40 (November 1,1979), p. 1. 20. Ibid. 21. Grazyna Pomian, ed. Protokoty tzw. Kotnisji Grabskiego, p. 304; KSS "KOR," Komunikat 22 (September 11, 1978), pp. 1-2. 22. "The Strike Movement," pp. 10-11. 23. Robotnik 40, p. 1. 24. KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 22 (September 11, 1978), pp. 1-2; Robotnik 40, p.l. 25. Robotnik 41 (November 10, 1979), p. 1. 26. KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 34 (November 30,1979), pp. 58-60; Robotnik 4748 (April 16, 1980), p. 1. 27. Robotnik 49 (May 15,1980), p. 2; Robotnik 53-54 (June 30, 1978), p. 3. 28. Robotnik 41, p. 1; KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 34, pp. 58-60. 29. Robotnik 18 (June 25, 1978), p. 1; Jan Jözef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981, p. 30. 30. Bogdan Borusewicz, "Podwyzki nie bçdzie," Robotnik Wybrzeza 1 (August 1,1978), p. 2; KSS-"KOR," "Appeal to Society," in Lipski, KOR: A History, p. 474-75; and also see Jan B. de Weydenthal's annotation of Radio Free Europe Research's translation of KSS-'KOR," "Appeal to Society," Background Report/236 (1978), p. 3, n. 1. 31. Robotnik 26, p. 2. 32. KSS-"KOR," "Appeal to Society," in Lipski, pp. 474-75, and numerous personal communications. 33. Jack Bielasiak, "The Evolution of Crises in Poland," in Bielasiak and Simon, eds., Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss, p. 14. 34. Bielasiak, pp. 12-13. 35. Alex Pravda, "Poland in the 1970s: Dual Functioning Trade Unions under Pressure," in Pravda and Ruble, eds., Trade Unions in Communist States, pp. 127-28,135. 36. To my knowledge, this point received its first systematic exposition in Alain Touraine et al., Solidarity, the Analysis of a Social Movement: Poland 19801981, ch. 2.

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37. "Robotnik Editor on Unofficial Workers' Movement," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 3:5 (1979-80), p. 11. 38. The original Robotnik was first published in 1894. Jozef Pilsudski, then a member of the PPS, edited, printed, and contributed to it until 1900, when he was arrested by the Russian police. 39. Interview with Helena Luczywo, Cambridge, Mass., November 1986. 40. "Robotnik Editor," p. 11. 41. The editors of Robotnik as far as I could determine were Bogdan Borusewicz, Leopold Gierek, FranciszekGrabczyk, Stefan Kozlowski, Mieczyslaw Ksijjzczak, Dariusz Kupiecki, Jan Litynski, Helena Luczywo, Witold Luczywo, Wojciech Onyszkiewicz, Malgorzata Pawlicka, Jerzy Jacek Pilichowski, Jozef Ruszar, Andrzej Spyra, Wladyslaw Sulecki, Jozef Sreniowski, Jan Witkowski, Irena Woycicka, Henryk Wujec, Ludwika Wujec, and Edmund Zadrozynski. 42. Lipski, KOR: A History, p. 227. 43. Robotnik 1 (September 1977), p. 1. 44. Ibid., pp. 1 - 2 . 45. Ibid. 46. Lipski, pp. 229-30, 426; "Robotnik Editor," pp. 11-12; interview with Jan Wale, Cambridge, Mass., November 1986; "Robotnicy nabrali odwagi," pp. 214-15; Robert Eringer, Strike for Freedom, p. 36; Robotnik 60 (August 30,1980), p. 1; "Robotnik," Tygodnik Solidarnosc (April 10,1981), p. 14. Lipski puts the number of pages that were reduced at 12; Helena Luczywo informed me that the number was actually 6. 47. "Robotnik Editor," p. 12; Lipski, pp. 229-30. 48. "Robotnik Editor," p. 12; Lipski, pp. 229-30; Biuletyn Informacyjny 2 1 - 2 2 (June-July 1978), p. 13; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 21 (July 31, 1978), pp. 14-15; Robotnik 18, p. 1. 49. Robotnik 23 (October 15, 1978), p. 1. 50. "Robotnik Editor," p. 12; Lipski, 228-29; interview with Luczywo. 51. Interview with Wale. 52. Robotnik 3 (October 1977), p. 4. 53. "Robotnik," p. 14. 54. The text of Robotnik 35, the "Charter of Workers' Rights," is printed in English, complete with signatures, in Lipski, pp. 492-500. Lipski dates it December 1979. The first printing of Robotnik 35 was in August. The third printing of this issue was in December 1979. 55. Robotnik 9 (January 15-31, 1978), p. 3. The list gave the contributor's town, but never anyone's name. Occasionally the town was supplemented by a cryptic reference. 56. All information on contributors to Robotnik is compiled from a number of issues of the paper (nos. 9 , 1 4 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 32, 33, 3 6 - 3 7 , 3 8 - 3 9 , 40, 41, 4 3 - 4 4 , 45, 4 7 - 4 8 , 50, 51-52) covering the period from January 1978 to June 1980. 57. In Toruri province, activists tended to cooperate with the oppositional

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groups in Gdansk. This certainly is the case of Boleslaw Niklaszewski and Waldemar S^dzikowski, who were both coworkers of the Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions of the Coast. Stanislaw Smigiel, a KSS-"KOR" activist from Toruri, attended self-education meetings as early as February 1978 at the apartment of Bogdan Borusewicz in Sopot and was arrested with him on more than one occasion. See KSS-"KOR/' Komunikat 31-32 (September 1979), p. 17; Lipski, p. 373; and KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 18 (March 1978) [Western retype), p. 4. 58. Interview with Maciej Kozlowski, Cambridge, Mass., January 1987; Hanna Malarecka-Simbierowicz et al., Nasi w sejmie i w senacie, p. 50. 59. KSS-"KOR" and Redakcja Robotnika, "Oswiadczenie" (July 9, 1979), in KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 31-32 (September 1979), p. 10. 60. For information on these letters, see ibid.; Lipski, pp. 246-47; KSS"KOR," Komunikat 20 (May 30,1979), p. 7; Robotnik 18, p. 1; Robotnik 28 (January 24,1979), p. 2; and Robotnik 30 (March 18,1979), p. 2. 61. Interview with Luczywo; A. Dorniak et al., Solidarnosc, leksykon zwigzkowy, who's who, what's what; "Interview with Zbigniew Janas," East European Reporter 1:3 (1985), p. 48. 62. "Robotnicy nabrali," pp. 214-15. 63. "Czego bronimy," Robotnik 47-48, p. 2. 64. Lipski, pp. 339-40. 65. "Voices from Poland," Social Text 5 (Spring 1982), p. 6. 66. "Robotnik," p. 14. 67. "Charter of Workers' Rights," in Lipski, p. 492. The summary that follows is drawn from the Charter, Lipski, pp. 492-95. 68. Ibid., p. 495. Some members of KSS-"KOR" were very interested in the example of the workers' commissions in Spain in the late Franco period. Litynski stressed that KSS-"KOR" was not interested in directly copying the Spanish experience, but in creating a "decentralized, nonclandestine organization, acting within the workplace in response to precise problems and leaving behind the official trade unions" ("Robotnik Editor," p. 12). Almost one-half of the copy in Robotnik 8 (January 1-15,1978) was devoted to information on the Spanish commissions. 69. "Charter of Workers' Rights," Lipski, pp. 495-96. 70. Jan Litynski, "Podwyzka cen," Robotnik 5 (November 1977), pp. 2-3. 71. Jözef Sreniowski, "Strajki w PRL, bezpieczenstwo, skutecznosc, reprezentacja," Robotnik 17 (June 17,1978), p. 2. 72. "Strajk w Stoczni Polnocnej," Robotnik 41 (November 10,1979), pp. 1 - 2 . 73. Dariusz Kupiecki, "Jak si? obronic," Robotnik 50 (May 30,1980), pp. 1-2. 74. KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 46 (April 15,1980), p. 24. 75. There is some confusion over the committee's actual name at the time of its foundation, and whether it was founded in February or March of 1978. Robotnikll (March 14,1978), p. 1, first listed its name as "Workers' Committee for Free Trade Unions" (Komitet Pracowniczy Wolnych Zwi§zkow Zawodowych). Lipski (p. 240) puts the foundation date in March 1978, but this seems to come from Biuletyn lnformacyjny 20 (May 1978), p. 11. An English translation of the

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founding declaration is dated February 23,1978. See "Founding Declaration of the Committee for Free Trade Unions in Katowice," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 2:3 (1978), p. 21. This source lists the name of the group as "Committee for Free Trade Unions in Katowice." 76. Robotnik 11, p. 1, and Radio Free Europe Research (henceforth RFER), Situation Report, Poland/6 (1978), pp. 8 - 9 . 77. The various sources available sometimes omit founding members of the committee. Lipski, for instance, omits Kicki (p. 240), probably because he soon withdrew. Robotnik 11, p. 1, omits Cygan. All information is taken from these two sources, as well as "Founding Declaration," p. 21; Ruch Zwigzkowy 1 (August 1978), p. 2; Lipski, p. 225; and RFER, Situation Report, Poland/6 (1978), pp. 8-9. 78. "Robotnik Editor," pp. 11-12. 79. Lipski, pp. 240-41. 80. RFER, Situation Report, Poland/6 (1978), pp. 8 - 9 ; "Robotnik Editor," pp. 11-12; and Lipski, pp. 240-41. 81. K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 24 (November 25,1978), p. 5. 82. Lipski, pp. 240-41. 83. K S S - " K O R , " Biata Ksiçga Kazimierza Switonia (Warsaw: 1980). 84. Biuletyn Informacyjny 11 (May 1977), p. 2; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 28 (March 1979), p. 12. 85. KZ-WZZ-W, Robotnik Wybrzeza 3 (March 1979), p. 7. 86. Ruch Zwigzkowy 1, p. 1 . 1 am not absolutely certain about just how many issues of Ruch Zwigzkowy were published. I have seen issues 1, 2, 5, and 10, which span the period from August 1978 to September 1980. The scarcity of archival copies suggests that its publication was intermittent or that its print run size was small. In contrast, complete sets of Robotnik or Robotnik Wybrzeza are available. Robotnik Szczecinski, as we shall see below, had problems in bringing its issues to print. The Robotnik group in Radom also put out a publication in this period; however, I have never encountered a copy of their news sheet Radomska Komorka Robotnika. 87. Ruch Zwigzkoivy 2, pp. 1 - 2 . 88. "Robotnik Editor," pp. 11-12. 89. Robotnik 28, p. 1. 90. Lipski, pp. 240-41. 91. "Robotnik Editor," pp. 11-12. 92. Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie, p. 2. 93. Ibid.; KZ-WZZ-PZ, Robotnik Szczecinski 1 111 (May 1980), p. 4. 94. Komunikat 20, pp. 8 - 9 ; Komunikat 21, p. 4. 95. Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie, p. 2; Robotnik 26, p. 1; Robotnik 23, p. 1. 96. Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie, p. 2. 97. Ibid., pp. 1 - 2 ; Robotnik27 (January 4,1979), p. 1. 98. Robotnik—Wydanie Szczecinskie, pp. 1 - 2 ; Robotnik 29, p. 2; and Robotnik 23, p. 2. 99. Robotnik Szczecinski 1/2/, p. 3; KZ-WZZ-PZ, "Deklaracja Komitetu

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Zatozycielskiego Wolnych Zwigzków Zawodowych Pomorza Zachodniego/' Postqp 10 (October 1979), pp. 8-9; and Lipski, pp. 340-41. Lipski and the version published in Postqp leave out Dobosz and Kamrowski. I take the version published in Robotnik Szczeciriski to be definitive because it was published by those concerned. The issue numbers of Robotnik Szczeciñski are confusing. This issue is called no. 2 because issue no. 1 was confiscated by the police. It is the first number in 1980. 100. Robotnik Szczeciñski 1 111, p. 3; KZ-WZZ-PZ, "Deklaracja," pp. 8-9. 101. Ibid. 102. KZ-WZZ-PZ, Robotnik Szczeciñski, 1131 (October 29,1980), p. 1; Robotnik Szczeciñski 1 111, p. 4; KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 37 (February 29, 1980), p. 11; Robotnik 51-51 (June 11,1980), p. 4; Lipski, pp. 340-41. Lipski puts the date of the first printing of Robotnik Szczeciñski in May 1980. This is contradicted by Robotnik 51-51. 103. Jan Witkowski, "W obrong naszych praw," Robotnik Szczeciñski 1 111, p. 4. 104. KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 34, p. 70. 105. Komunikat 37, p. 11; KSS-"KOR," Komunikat 40 (May 31, 1980), p. 73. 106. Malgorzata Szejnert and Tomasz Zalewski, Szczecin, Grudzieñ-SierpieñGrudzieñ, pp. 109-10; Robotnik Szczeciñski 1131, p. 2. 107. Jerzy Holzer, "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981, p. 97; Robotnik Szczeciñski 1131, p. 8. 108. Robotnik Szczeciñski 1131, p. 2; Neal Ascherson, The Polish August, pp. 168-69. 109. "Szczecin," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 4:4-6 (1981), p. 17. 110. Szejnert and Zalewski, p. 342; Oliver MacDonald, "Building Solidarity in Szczecin," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 4:4-6 (1981), p. 21. 111. Ewa Milewicz, "Ja, happening, stocznia," Biuletyn lnformacyjny 40 (August-September 1980), pp. 42-56. 112. Szejnert and Zalewski, p. 122. 113. Ibid., pp. 178-79. 114. Szejnert and Zalewski, pp. 106-10. 115. Dorniak et al., no pp.; Lipski, p. 172. 116. "Voices from Poland," pp. 7, 9, 20. 117. Lipski, p. 246. 118. Robotnik 2 (October 1977), p. 4. 119. Lipski, pp. 241-42. 120. Lipski, pp. 211-12. 121. Robotnik 11, p. 1. 122. KZ WZZ W, Robotnik Wybrzeza 1 (January 1979), pp. 1-2, and "Robotnicy nabrali," pp. 215-16. The commemoration of May 1, 1977, is also mentioned in Lech Walesa's autobiography, A Way of Hope, p. 80. However, this account claims that RMP was responsible. This is hardly possible because the foundation of RMP had not yet taken place. Considering that it is rumored that

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large portions of the book were ghostwritten by former RMP activists, this and other inaccuracies such as the impression that Bogdan Borusewicz was an RMP member (p. 97) and that ROPCiO was formed in 1976 (p. 98) should be kept in mind. 123. Lipski, pp. 231-32; Robotnik Wybrzeza 2, pp. 1 - 2 ; K S S - " K O R , " Komunikat 17 (January 23,1978), p. 5 [Western retype], 124. Komunikat 17, p. 5; Biuletyn Informacyjny 17 (December 1977-January 1978), p. 52; Lipski, pp. 231-32; Robotnik 27, p. 1; Robotnik Wybrzeza 2, pp. 1 - 2 ; "Robotnicy nabrali," pp. 215-16. 125. Robotnik 15 (May 16,1978), pp. 3 - 4 ; Robotnik Wybrzeza 1, p. 1. 126. Robotnik Wybrzeza 1, p. 1; Robotnik 15, pp. 3 - 4 . 127. "Voices from Poland," p. 18; Robotnik Wybrzeza 1, p. 1; Lipski, p. 242; Robotnik 17, p. 1; Biuletyn Informacyjny 20, pp. 11-12; Robotnik 15, pp. 3 - 4 . 128. Eringer, p. 35; KZ-WZZ-W, Dodatek do Nr. 4 Robotnika Wybrzeza (September 9,1979); Lipski, pp. 241-42; KZ-WZZ-W, Robotnik Wybrzeza 5 (September 1979), p. 8. 129. "Voices from Poland," pp. 11 and 15. 130. Ibid., p. 18; Robotnik Wybrzeza 1, p. 2; Biuletyn Informacyjny 26, pp. 2 7 28; "Robotnik," p. 15; Robotnik 19, p. 2. 131. Biuletyn Informacyjny 26, pp. 27-28. 132. "Voices from Poland," pp. 9 and 15; Lipski, p. 424; Bolestaw Sulik, Robotnicy; Krzysztof Pomian, Robotnicy i Sekretarze; A. Kemp-Welch, "Introduction," in The Birth of Solidarity, p. 14; Robotnik Wybrzeza 3, p. 7. 133. Robotnik Wybrzeza 1, pp. 1 - 2 , and Robotnik Wybrzeza 5, p. 8. 134. Robotnik Wybrzeza 1, p. 1. 135. Ibid. 136. "Charter of Workers' Rights," in Lipski, p. 496; Biuletyn Informacyjny 26, pp. 29-30; Robotnik Wybrzeza 5, p. 7. 137. Robotnik Wybrzeza 2, pp. 2 - 4 ; "Robotnicy nabrali," pp. 215-16; Ruch Zwigzkowy 5 (January-February 1979), pp. 5 - 6 ; Biuletyn Informacyjny 26, p. 16; Robotnik 27, pp. 1 - 2 ; Lipski, pp. 245-46. 138. Ibid. 139. Lipski, pp. 354-56; Robotnik 42 (Numer Specjalny, December 20,1979), pp. 1 - 2 ; Mary Craig, The Crystal Spirit, pp. 157-58; Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne 5 (May 1980), p. 5; and Krzysztof Wyszkowski, "Czlowiek rodzi si? i zyje," Tygodnik Solidarnosc (August 14,1981), p. 1. 140. Lipski, pp. 354-56; Robotnik 42, pp. 1 - 2 ; Craig, pp. 157-58; Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne 5, p. 5; "Tekst przemowienia Maryli Plonskiej przedstawicielki Komitetu Zalozycielskiego Wolnych Zwipzkow Zawodowych Wybrzeza na uroczystosci skladania wiencow w Gdansku 18.12.79 w rocznic? Grudnia" (typescript, no date); Biuletyn Informacyjny 34 (November-December 1979), pp. 3 and 6. 141. Lipski, pp. 354-55; Robotnik 42, p. 1. 142. Robotnik 42, p. 1.

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143. "Voices from Poland," p. 17. 144. Biuletyn lnformacyjny 35 (January-February 1980), pp. 12-13, and Lipski, p. 343. 145. Lipski, p. 343; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 35, p. 12; Robotnik 47-48, p. 4. 146. Lipski, pp. 343-44; Robotnik50 (May 30,1980), p. 2; Biuletyn lnformacyjny 35, p. 12; and Robotnik 47-48, p. 4. 147. Lipski, pp. 340-41; Oliver MacDonald, "The Struggle for Independent Workers' Organization in Gdansk," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 3:6 (1980), p. 14; KZ WZZ W Robotnik Wybrzeza 6 (March 1980), pp. 3-4; Robotnik 47-48, p. 4. 148. Lipski, pp. 340-41; "Voices from Poland," pp. 19-20; Walesa, pp. 103; MacDonald, "The Struggle for Independent Workers' Organization in Gdansk," p. 14; Robotnik Wybrzeza 6, pp. 4-5; Robotnik 47-8, p. 4. 149. Robotnik Wybrzeza 6, pp. 7-8; KZ WZZ W, Robotnik Wybrzeza 7 (May 1980), pp. 7-8; and Robotnik 50, p. 1. 150. Wyszkowski, p. 9. 8. KOR and

Solidarity

1. The poem was published under this title in Robotnik 32 (April 30,1979), p. 2. It is actually part of the larger poem "Artificial Respiration" (Sztuczne oddychanie). I wish to thank Stanislaw Barariczak for his help in rendering the verse into English. The reference to "truth" is the well-known Soviet newspaper Pravda. "Freedom" and "democracy" are references to the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (Zwigzek Bojownikow Wolnosci i Demokracji or ZBoWiD), a veterans' organization that had a hardline political orientation. The "police general" is Mieczyslaw Moczar, the leader of ZBoWiD who became minister of Internal Affairs in 1964. 2. Jan Jozef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-81, p. 1. 3. After I finished writing this book, two books were published that argued against the importance of KOR. See Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity, and Lawrence Goodwyn, Breaking the Barrier. Rather than repeat arguments I have made elsewhere, I direct readers who are interested in my criticism of these books to read my "Reinterpreting Solidarity," pp. 313-30. 4. "Statement of the Presidium of the NSZZ Solidarity, Mazowsze Region, Warsaw, November 21,1981." This statement contains the state document "On the Present Methods of the Prosecution of Illegal Anti-Socialist Activity." An English translation of the text can be found in Leszek Szymanski, Candle for Poland, pp. 79-87 5. Books of this type include: Edward Modzelewski, Import Kontrrewolucji: Teoria i Praktyka KSS-KOR, and Leslaw Wojtasik, Podziemie Polityczne. The latter for instance, claimed (p. 276) that the committee was one of the primary organizers of underground Solidarity during martial law, despite the fact that the vast majority of KOR's membership was interned at that time. 6. Lipski, pp. 116-24.

8. K O R a n d Solidarity

255

7. Lipski, p. 454-56, and George Sanford, ed. and trans. The Solidarity Congress, 1981, pp. 157-58 and 246. The English edition of Lipski, which I have used for citation, contains a small translation error that produces a misunderstanding. It gives the impression that the majority group of the Mazowsze Solidarity regional board and its chairman, Zbigniew Bujak, were anti-KOR. In fact, it was a minority group within the regional board with whom they had been in conflict who proposed the anti-KOR version of the resolution. This is clearly the sense of the Polish original. See Lipski, KOR, pp. 389-90. 8. KSS " K O R , " Komunikat 43 (September 1,1980), pp. 16-17. 9. In Polish, the semantic field of "intelligentsia" is richer than in English. The word intellectual can be translated in Polish as either "inteligent" or as "intelektualista." Both are members of the intelligentsia (inteligencja). An "inteligent" is someone who does mental as opposed to physical labor. It corresponds roughly to the English term "white collar worker." "Intelektualista" refers to a much narrower stratum. It encompasses scholars, writers, and artists, i.e., those who are familiar with a particular body of "high" culture and thought. Thus all "intelektualisci" are "inteligenci" but not vice versa. "Inteletualista," unlike "intellectual" in English, is also a term that carries a highly positive "subjective valuation of his or her merit or potential" within the hierarchy of values of Polish society. This derives from a national myth from the time of the partitions (1795-1918), when it was considered an intelektualista's duty to serve the cause of partitioned Poland and Polish nationality. The membership of KOR was composed primarily of "intelektualisci." In English this perhaps most closely corresponds to our notion of "critical intellectuals." See Stanistaw Barariczak, "The Polish Intellectual," pp. 217-20. 10. Christopher Lasch, " A Typology of Intellectuals," pp. 27-30. 11. Lipski, KOR: A History, pp. 62-63. 12. Adam Michnik, Takie czasy . . . rzecz o kompromisie, p. 11. 13. Lipski, p. 180. 14. Alain Touraine's research team has interpreted this episode in the context of sharpening conflict between democratic and nationalist currents within the union. See Solidarity, Poland 1980-1981, pp. 144-45. 15. Interfactory Strike Committee in Gdansk, "Statement No. 1," (August 20,1980), in Oliver MacDonald, ed., The Polish August, p. 27. 16. See Ewa Wacowska, ed., Rewolta szczecinska i jej znaczenie, and Roman Laba, "Worker Roots of Solidarity," Problems of Communism, p. 4. 17. "Solidarity and KOR: An Interview with Gdansk Leaders," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 4 : 4 - 6 (1981), p. 14. 18. Cited in Robert Zuzowski, "KOR and the Transformation of Polish Politics in the 1970s," p. 86. 19. The weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, the monthlies Znak and W/gz, and the publishing house Znak were under the control of lay Catholic intellectuals of an independent character. Although they strenuously tried to defend their editorial independence, they were not exempt from censorship. 20. Vladimir Voinovich, The Anti-Soviet Soviet Union, pp. 4 2 - 4 3 .

256

8. KOR and Solidarity

21. Andrew Swidlicki, "The Struggle for the Media in Poland," p. 113. 22. Experience and the Future, Poland Today, pp. 2 3 - 2 5 and 160. 23. Large sections of the censor's manual were published in Biuletyn Informacyjny, and a large number of copies were put on deposit with a number of prominent Poles. The complete manual was published by NOW-a and translated into English in Jane Curry, ed., The Black Book of Polish Censorship. Among the other items in the underground press addressing these issues were Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych, J(zyk Propagandy. There were other interesting incidents from the Solidarity period and beyond that testify to the prolongation of these feelings from the 1970s. For instance, the graffito "Telewizja Klamie!" (Television lies) was painted or scrawled on numerous walls in Poland, as well as in approximately two-meter-high letters on the ground outside the Solidarity Congress in Gdansk in Autumn 1981. See the picture on p. 12 of Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 5 : 1 - 2 (1982). Another interesting incident that testifies to this phenomenon is the fact that Poles after the declaration of martial law in December 1981 turned their television sets to face out of windows toward the street when the evening news came on. 24. A very thoughtful work testifying to how meaning was debased in the employment of language by the Polish party-state is Jakub Karpinski, Mowa do Ludu: Szkice o jfzyku polityki. Chapter 1, which describes the way that the official press covered certain key events or actors in the student protests of 1968, is particularly fascinating. 25. Cited in Biuletyn Informacyjny 29 (April 1979), p. 37. 26. Kazimierz Brandys, A Warsaw Diary, pp. 5 6 - 5 7 . 27. Adam Michnik, "What We Want to Do and What We Can D o , " p. 67. 28. Jadwiga Staniszkis, " O n Some Contradictions of Socialist Society: The Case of Poland," p. 179. 29. Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland's Self-limiting Revolution, p. 119. 30. Staniszkis, " O n Some Contradictions," p. 179. 31. Lech Walesa, A Way of Hope, p. 95. 32. "PRL obchodzi niepodleglosc," Robotnik 25 (November 25, 1978), p. 1. 33. "Solidarity and KOR: An Interview with Gdansk Leaders," Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 4 : 4 - 6 (1981), p. 14; Andrzej Drzycimski, "Growing," The Book of Lech Walesa, pp. 71-72; and "Voices from Poland," p. 14. 34. A. Kemp-Welch, trans., The Birth of Solidarity, p. 181. 35. Lipski, KOR: A History, pp. 244. 36. Cited in Jim Miller, "C. Wright Mills Reconsidered," p. 273. With respect to this quote from Mills, it is important to keep in mind that deprivation in itself is less important in such situations than the conversion of deprivation into feelings of injustice. 37. Adam Michnik, " O n Resistance: A Letter from Bialol?ka," in Letters from Prison and Other Essays, pp. 5 0 - 5 1 .

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Akademickie Pismo Informacyjne Aspekt Biuletyn (Student Solidarity Committee, Warsaw) Biuletyn Dolnoslgski Biuletyn Informacyjny Biuletyn Informacyny "Podaj Dalej" Biuletyn Informacyny—Przeglgd Prasy Zagranicznej Bratniak Droga Gazeta Polska Gios Gospodarz Indeks Komunikat (Workers' Defense Committee) Komunikat (Center for People's Thought) Komunikat (Committee of Believers, Przemysl) Komunikat (Young Poland Movement) Komunikat (Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee, Grojec) Krytyka Kronika TKN Krzy Nowohucki Merkuriusz Krakowski i Swiatowy Niezalezny Ruch Chlopski Opinia Placowka Po Prostu Bis (Niezalezne Pismo Studenckie)

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Others Aneks Background Reports, Radio Free Europe Research, Munich East European Reporter Gazeta Wyborcza Kultura, Paris Labour Focus on Eastern Europe Poland Watch Polityka Situation Report, Radio Free Europe Research, Munich

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Miscellaneous Typescripts (in Polish) " D o stoczniowcow, tekst ulotki rozpowszechnianej na terenie Stoczni Gdanskiej napisanej przez Komitet Zalozycielski Wolnych Zwigzkow Zawodowych Wybrzeza i Redakcjg Robotnika Wybrzeza." no date. Komisja Robotnicza w Elektromontazu. " D o zalogi 'Elektromontazu.' " Gdansk-Gdynia, January 21,1980. Komisja Robotnicza w Elektromontazu. "Przebieg wydarzeri w 'Elektromontazu.' " Gdansk-Gdynia, February [?] 1980. KZ WZZ Pomorza Zachodniego i Szczecinskie Srodowisko ROPCiO. "Oswiadczenie." November 1,1979. KZ WZZ W i Redakcja Robotnika Wybrzeza. "Ulotka masowo kolportowana na Wybrzezu." no date. "Tekst przemowienia Maryli Plonskiej przedstawicielki Komitetu Zalozycielskiego Wolnych Zwi^zkow Zawodowych Wybrzeza na uroczystosci skladania wiericow w Gdansku 18.12.77 w rocznic? Grudnia."

Index

Abramowski, Edward, 88 Absolutism, emergence of, 2 - 3 , 4 Adamczyk, deputy PZPR regional secretary in Radom, 54, 73 Adamec, Ladislav, 21 Akademickie Pismo lnformacyjne (Academic Information Magazine), 144 Albania, 1 Alliance of Free Democrats, 17 Alternative and Environmental Groups' Information Network, 214«42 Alternatywy (Alternatives), 149 Amnesty International, 121 Amsterdamski, Piotr, 116 Amsterdamski, Stefan, 148 Andrzejewski, Jerzy: and factionalism of KSS-"KOR," 134; forged letter allegedly from, 101; and KOR, 81, 83, 84, 85, 98 Antonow, Zbigniew, 51 "Appeal of the 13," 81-82 "Appeal of the 34 Professors," 110 "Appeal to Society and the Authorities of the Polish People's Republic," 82, 83, 84 "Appeal to the Nation," 110 "Appeal to the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," 109-10 Arato, Andrew, 96 Arkuszewski, Wojciech, 117,120 Aspekt (Aspect), 141 Association of Polish Students, 77 Austria, 4, 5

Authoritarianism, 2 Authority: stability of, 25; as unjust, 152 Babiuch, Edward, 43, 48, 64 Bjdkowski, Lech, 184,192 Bahro, Rudolf, 212«23, 216n54 B§ik, Henryk, 107 Bal, Jan, 171 Balcerek, Andrzej, 114 Balkans, see names of individual countries Baran, Jozef, 147 Baranczak, Stanislaw, 77, 81, 85, 98, 118, 119,133 Becker, Jurek, 216n54 Bednarek, Zdzislaw, 63, 72 Bek, Boguslaw, 114 Belgium, 121 Believers' Self-Defense Committee: in Cisow, 140; in Podlasie, 139,146; in Przemysl, 140 Bence, Gyorgy, 8 Benda, Vaclav, 212n20 Berlinguer, Enrico, 81 Berlin metal workers' strike, 72 Berthoff, Warner, 197 Bethlen, Istvan, 211«10 Biafystok, 71 Bibula (tissue paper), see Underground press, Polish Bielinski, Konrad, 105, 241-42n2 Bielsko Biata, 170 Bienkowski, Wfadystaw, 122, 221n40 Biermann, Wolf, 216»54

286

Index

Bierut, Boleslaw, 32, 37 Bismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold von, 136 Biuletyn Dolnoslgski (Lower Silesian Bulletin), 132 Biuletyn Informacyjny (Information Bulletin), 1 0 2 , 1 0 3 - 4 , 1 0 6 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 8 , 126, 134,174,177, 203; published in Lodz, 132 Biuletyn Informacyjny—Przeglgd Prasy Zagranicznej (Information BulletinReview of the Overseas Press), 134, 148 Blajfer, Boguslawa, 119 Blaszanka tin can factory, Radom, 53 Blumsztajn, Seweryn, 81, 8 7 , 1 0 4 , 1 1 7 , 134, 159, 241-42n2 Boguta, Grzegorz, 105-6 Bohemia, Kingdom of, 4 Borosniewicz (CRZZ official), 59 Borusewicz, Bogdan, 80, 85, 86, 99, 128, 144,161,180-81,182,183,185,18687, 249n41 Bourgeoisie, 2, 3, 7 Boy Scouts, Polish, 77, 79, 86 Brandt, Willy, 4 0 , 1 1 8 Bratniak, 141,144-45 Brezhnev, Leonid, 8, 40 "Brezhnev Doctrine," 93 Broda, Jaroslaw, 134 Broniarek, Emil, 163 Brozyna, Jan, 69, 127 Budapest School of Humanist Marxism, 14,212n23 Budimer construction industry factory, 60, 71 Bujak, Zbigniew, 163-64, 202, 255n7 Buk, Andrzej, 183,185 Bulgaria, 7, 212«23 Bydgoszcz, 141 Calfa, Marian, 21 Capitalism, emergence of, 4 Catholic Church: and human rights issues, 137, 196; and the intelligentsia, 137; in Poland, 37-38, 77, 7 8 , 1 3 5 - 4 0 , 229-30nl; and Polish nationalism, 136, 207; press associated with, 77, 90,139,

148; and Solidarity, 196; support for KORin, 8 0 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 9 - 2 0 Celiriski, Andrzej, 8 1 , 1 2 7 , 1 4 7 , 1 4 8 , 1 5 9 , 241-42n2 Center Alliance (Porozumenie Centrum), 194 Center for People's Thought (Osrodek Mysli Ludowej), 146-47 Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ), 59, 80, 128 Ceto, 183 Charter 77, 8, 20,121, 213-14n37 "Charter of Workers' Rights," 1 0 7 , 1 6 2 63,164-68,175,176,186,198 Chmielewski, Aleksander, 174 Chojecki, Miroslaw: arrest of, 117; and KOR, 70, 77, 79, 82, 86, 99, 229-30nl; and Solidarity, 241-42n2; and underground publishing, 1 0 4 - 5 , 1 2 6 Chomicki, Czeslaw, 119 Christian Community of Working People (ChWLP), 139 Christian-National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrzescijarisko-Narodowe), 135,194 Church from Below, 216H54 Cichon, Wieslaw, 134 Circle (Krjig), 149 Citizens' Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, MO), 47 Civic Forum, 21 Civil society: definition of, 1 - 4 ; European variations of, 4 - 7 , 9 - 2 3 Club of the Crooked Circle, 39, 77, 86 Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), 39, 77, 79, 90,120 Coalition governments, 6 Cohn, Ludwik, 82, 85, 87, 98, 135, 231«19 Committee for National SelfDetermination (Komitet Porozumienia na rzecz Samostanowienia Narodu, KPSN), 142 Committee for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (Komitet Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela), 140 Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), 20 Communism, opposition to, 7 - 9

Index "Complaint of the 65 Radom Workers," 109,110 Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, KPN), 143,195 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 135,140 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 73 Council of National Unity (RJN), 78, 219n21 Council of the Social Self-Defense Fund, 121

CRZZ (Central Council of Trade Unions), 59, 80,128 Cygan, Boleslaw, 171 Cywinski, Bogdan, 119,148 Czaputowicz, Jacek, 241-42n2 Czechoslovakia: democratization in, 1, 20; dissidence in, 212n23; emergence of civil society in, 5, 20, 21, 22; emergence of opposition in, 8 , 1 9 - 2 1 , 22; intelligentsia in, 7; parliamentary democracy in, 5; peace movements in, 20; Soviet invasion of, 93, 221-22«46; stability of party-state in, 44; Velvet Revolution in, 21 Czubinski, Lucjan, 102,109, 111, 120 Czuma, Andrzej, 140,141,163 Djibrowski, Zbigniew, 190 Dairy equipment factories, 60, 71 Danube Circle, The (Düna Kor), 14, 21314«37, 214n42 "Declaration of 15 in Solidarity with the Workers, The," 80-81 "Declaration of the Democratic Movement," 8 8 , 1 2 3 - 2 4 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 4 "Declaration of the 14 in Solidarity with the Workers, The," 80 "Declaration of Warsaw Students and Graduates, The," 81 Dembowski, Fr. Bronislaw, 138 Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna), 195 Democratization, role of civil society in, 1, 2 , 1 0 , 1 3 , 21-23

287

Dialogus (Dialogue), 14 Dictatorships, 5 - 6 Discrimination, in East Central Europe, 5 Dissidence, vs. opposition, 7 - 9 Dmowski, Roman, 145 Dobosz, Kazimierz, 175 Dogmatism, 38 Dolna Odra Electric Power station, Gryfino, 63, 66, 71, 73,174 Domination: and charismatic leadership, 32-33; definition of, 25; and ideology, 28-30; legitimacy of, 26-28; stability of, 25-31 Dorn, Ludwik, 82,145, 241-42n2 Doroszewska, Urszula, 145, 241-42n2 Droga (The Way), 141 Dubcek, Aleksander, 21 Duda-Gwiazda, Joanna, 128,180,181, 183,185,188 Duma, creation of, 6 Dymarski, Lech, 116,133 Dziady (Forefathers' Eve) (Mickiewicz), 41 Dziewicka, Maria, 120 East Germany (former), see German Democratic Republic (former) Elbljig, 64 Elekromontaz, 180, 183,189-90 Elmor factory, Gdansk, 183,189,190,191 European Trade Union Confederation, 64 Evolution or Revolution (Tarniewski), 106 "Experience and the Future," 203 Exploitation, 153 "Eyewitness Report on the Proceedings of the Trials, An," 111 Fazos factory, Tarnowskie Gory, 207 Ferguson, Adam, 2 Feudalism, 2, 4 Fireproof Products Factory, Radom, 53 Fischbein, Kazimierz, 178 Fiszbach, Tadeusz, 59 Flying University, 14, 147-48, 204 Fornalska Factory, Lôdz, 62 Foundation for the Support of the Poor (SZETA), 14

288

Index

Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions, 72, 74, 144,163,165, 170-92, 197 France, 121 French Communist Party, 119 Fund for Scientific Research (Kasa Pomocy Naukowej), 147-48 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project, 15 Gapa, Tadeusz, 189 Gazeta Polska (Polish Gazette), 143 Gdansk: Grudzigdz, 126, 128; and KOR, 80, 201; KZ-WZZ-W in, 170, 172, 18092, 193, 200, 206-7; labor practices in, 154; party-state support in, 65-66; poststrike repression in, 71; reaction to Pyjas' death in, 116; ROPCiO in, 141, 144; strikes of 1976 in, 50, 59-60, 73; strikes of 1980 in, 12, 200; student activists in, 143, 144, 145-46,181; support for KSS-"KOR" in, 132,181 Gdansk Solidarity, 192 Gdynia, 59-60, 183 General Swierczewski precision instruments plant, Warsaw, 52, 71 Gentry, 7 Geremek, Bronislaw, 120,148 Geresz, Jerzy, 119,174, 229-30nl German Democratic Republic (former); democratization in, 1, 17-19; dissidence in, 212n23; ecological movements in, 17; emergence of civil society in, 22; emergence of opposition in, 17-19, 22; exodus to West Germany from, 17-18; peace movements in, 17; Roundtable Negotiations in, 18; stability of party-state in, 44; State Security (iStaatsicherheit or Stasi) in, 18 Germany: dictatorship in, 6; emergence of civil society in, 5; lands absorbed by Poland, 40; reunification of, 18,19 Gierek, Edward: and economic crisis, 153, 157-58, 200; personality of, 39; political reforms attempted by, 41-43, 44-45; rise to power of, 41, 44; strikes of 1976 triggered by, 43, 45, 46,196; treatment of strikers by, 55,110, 112,113

Gierek, Leopold, 162, 249«41 Gil, Mieczyslaw, 163 Gizycko, 134 Glemp, Jozef, 243rcl7 Glogowski, Karol, 141 G/os (The Voice), 124,134,149 Godyri, Mieczyslaw, 113-14 Gombrowicz, Witold, 207 Gomulka, Wtadyslaw: failure of, 36, 41; and foreign affairs, 39, 40; imprisonment of, 32, 39; as leader of PPR, 31, 32; personality of, 39; political comeback of, 35-36; political reforms attempted by, 36-41; support for, 35, 36, 38-39, 40, 41, 44 Goniec Maiopolski (The Malopolska Messenger), 145 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 12,16,17, 217-18n67 Gorzow Wielkopolski, 134 Gospodarz (Farmer), 141,146 Grabczyk, Franciszek, 139,162, 249n41 Grabinski, Andrzej, 239wll3, 241-42«2 Grajek, Danuta, 175 Great Britain, 121 Greece, 7 Grosz, Karoly, 15,17 Grudzijdz: KOR relief efforts in, 125,126, 129; KSS-"KOR" in, 134; poststrike repression in, 71; strikes of 1976 in, 62 Grudzien, Zdzisiaw, 48 Gryfino, 63, 71, 173 Grzesiak, Bogdan, 106 Gucwa, Stanislaw, 111 Gwiazda, Andrzej, 128, 162, 180, 181, 183,185,189,191,192, 202 Gysi, Gregor, 18 Habsburg monarchy, 4 Hagemejer, Helena, 120 Hagemejer, Krzysztof, 241-42>z2 Hall, Aleksander, 144 Hauke-Ligowski, Aleksander, 119 Havel, Vaclav, 8, 21, 217-28n67 Havemann, Robert, 212n23 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 2, 210«7 Helsinki Accords, 20,140 Herrschaft, 25 Hitler, Adolf, 6

Index Hohenzollern monarchy, 4 Hoiuj, Tadeusz, 120 Home Army (AK), 31, 77, 85, 104 Honecker, Erich, 18,19 "Hope and Hopelessness" (Kotakowski), 92 Horthy, Miklös, 6 Hungarian Democratic Forum, 16,17 Hungarian Social Democrats, 16 Hungarian Socialist Party, 17 Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), 15,17 Hungary: Communist party in, 15,16; democratization in, 1; dictatorship in, 6; dissidence in, 212«23; ecological movements in, 14-15; emergence of civil society in, 5, 22; emergence of opposition in, 8 , 1 4 - 1 7 , 22, 216-17n64; gentry in, 7; independent unions in, 16; intelligentsia in, 15,16; parliamentary democracy in, 16; peace movements in, 14; revolution in 1956 in, 16-17, 44, 93; Roundtable Negotiations in, 17; Soviet invasion of, 40; stability of party- state in, 44; student movement in, 16 Husak, Gustav, 20, 21 Indeks (Index), 134,144 Independent Discussion Club, Lodz, 132 Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, 215n52,216n54 Injustice, 152-53,158-59,170,196 Intelligentsia: and Catholic Church, 137; from gentry class, 7; in Ottoman empire, 7; vs. state power, 3; typology of, 197; and workers, 160,197-99 Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS): Gdansk, 12, 133, 148, 170, 177, 19192,193, 200, 201, 207; Silesia, 170, 200; Szczecin, 170,177,178,179, 200 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 168 International Labor Organization (ILO), 168,184-85 . . . in the Name of the Polish People's Republic, 105 Italian Communist Party, 119

289

Italy, 121 Iwaszkiewicz, Jaroslaw, 112 Jagielski, Mieczyslaw, 48, 49, 207 Jakes, Milos, 20, 21 Janas, Zbigniew, 163-64 Janusz, Kazimierz, 107 Jarmakowski, Andrzej, 145 Jaroszewicz, Piotr, 48, 49, 50, 55, 61, 63, 73 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 25, 49, 222n47 Jastrzgbie Zdröj, 12 John Paul II (pope), 119,139,196 June Events and the Activities of the Workers' Defense Committee, The, 105 Jurczyk, Marian, 178 Kacmarek, Robert, 145 Kaczorski, Stefan, 84, 85, 9 9 , 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 1 4 0 Kaczynski, Lech, 184,194 Kadar, James, 15,17 Kalisz, 134,141 Kaminski, Fr. Zbigniew, 85, 99, 137 Kamrowski, Andrzej, 175, 176, 178 Kania, Stanislaw, 43, 55 Kantorski, Fr. Leon, 138 Karandziej, Jan, 189 Karkoszka, Alojzy, 49 Karpinski, Jakub, 231nl9 Karwicki, Tadeusz, 65 Kasprzak Radio Factory, 52, 71 Katowice: KSS-"KOR" in, 134; KZ-WZZK in, 170, 171-73; ROPCiO in, 141; strikes of 1976 in, 64; strikes of 1980 in, 200 Katowice Steel Mill, 173 Keane, John, 2 Kfcik, Wieslaw Piotr, 146,241-42«2 Kf dzierska, Danuta, 145 Khrushchev, Nikita, 35, 40 Kicki, Tadeusz, 171 Kielanowski, Jan, 85, 87, 99,134 Kielce, 65 Kijowski, Andrzej, 122,178 KIK (Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia), 39, 77, 79, 90,120 Kis, Janos, 8 Kisielewski, Stefan, 122, 231nl9

290

Index

Klier, Freya, 216n54 Klincewicz, Teodor, 241-42n2 KIoc, Eugeniusz, 104,119 Knauf, Ryszard, 105 Kobzdej, Dariusz, 186,187 Kocietowicz, Tadeusz, 175 Kolakowski, Leszek, 8, 29, 41, 80, 90-92 Kolodziej, Andrzej, 183,189,191-92 Komitet Obrony Robotników, see Workers' Defense Committee Komunikat (Communique), 8 4 , 1 0 1 , 1 0 2 - 3 , 117,118,123,174,196 Konferencje Samorzjdów Robotniczych, 168 KOR, see Workers' Defense Committee Koszatka, Teofil, 190 Kotlarz, Roman, 69 Kowalczyk, Stanislaw, 49, 55 Kowalik, Tadeusz, 120,148, 241-42n2 Kowalska, Anka, 99,102,104,118 Koztowski, Jan, 147 Kozlowski, Stefan, 162, 174, 175, 177,179, 249n41 KPN, see Confederation for an Independent Poland KPSN, see Committee for National SelfDetermination Krajcarz, Stefan, 71 Kraków: harassment of opposition in, 113-14; party-state support in, 65; reaction to Pyjas' death in, 114-16; ROPCiO in, 141; student activists in, 143,144; support for KSS-"KOR" in, 132 Krawczyk, Stefan, 216n54 Krenz, Egon, 18,19 Kronika Lódzka (Lodz Chronicle), 132 Kronika Lubelska (Lublin Chronicle), 141 Krystosiak, Andrzej, 177,178,179 Krytyka (Critique), 134,148,149 Krzyz Nowohucki (Cross of Nowa Huta), 139 Ksciuczek, Roman, 171 Ksigzczak, Mieczysiaw, 249«41 KSS-"KOR," see Social Self-Defense Committee "KOR" (KSS-"KOR") KSS-W, see Social Self-Defense Club in Wroclaw (KSS-W)

KSS-WK, see Social Self-Defense Club of the Wielkopolsko-Kujawski Region (KSS-WK) Kuban, Dogan, 6 Kubiak, Jacek, 133,145 Kuczynski, Waldemar, 241-42«2 Kulik, Ewa, 145 Kultura, 80 Kulturkampf, 136 Kunze, Rainer, 216n54 Kupiecki, Dariusz, 169-70, 249«41 Kuron, Grazyna, 118 Kuron, Jacek: arrest of, 117; in Democratic Union, 195; and factionalism of KSS"KOR," 134; and Founding Committee for Free Trade Unions, 171,174; indictment against, 113; and KOR, 9, 41, 50, 78-79, 81, 82, 86, 88-89, 90, 9 2 93, 94-95, 97, 98, 231«19; and Solidarity, 148, 241-42n2; and strike information bank, 145 Kurowski, Stefan, 148 KZ-WZZ-K, see Katowice, KZ-WZZ-K in KZ-WZZ-PZ, see Szczecin, KZ-WZZ-PZ in KZ-WZZ-W, see Gdansk, KZ-WZZ-W in Labor parties, proletariat organized in, 3 Lasch, Christopher, 197,198 Law: and injustice, 152; and separation of public from private space, 4, 5 Lawina, Antol, 241-42n2 League of Independent Unions, 214«41 League of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), 16,17 Legnica, 134 Lenarczuk, Henryk, 189 Lenin Shipyards, Gdansk, 59-60, 71, 74, 109,181-82,183,186-87,189,191 Liberation, 82 "Liberation" Publishing Cooperative (Kooperatywa Wydawnicza "Wyzwolenie"), 132 Lipinski, Edward: appeals for public assistance by, 108; and KOR, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87,98,196, 231«19; and Polish Helsinki Commission, 135

Index Lipski, Jan Józef: arrest of, 117,120; indictment against, 113; and KOR, 64, 77, 78-79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 98, 194, 198,199; and PPS, 195; and relief to protesters, 125; and Solidarity, 2 4 1 42w2 Lis, Bogdan, 183,191 Lis-Olszewski, Witold, 239M113 Lisów, 146 Lityñski, Jan, 81, 8 7 , 1 0 4 , 1 1 7 , 126,134, 159,161, 168,174, 241-42n 2, 249n41 Lodz: KOR relief efforts in, 125,126,128; poststrike repression in, 71; reaction to Pyjas' death in, 116; ROPCiO in, 141; strikes of 1970-71 in, 73; strikes of 1976 in, 62-63; support for KSS"KOR" in, 132 Lojek, Janusz, 164 Lublin, 134,141, 200 Luczywo, Helena, 159, 162, 241-42«2, 249n41 Luczywo, Witold, 159, 161, 249n41 Lukaszewicz, Jerzy, 49 Lukaszewiczówna, Matgorzata, 79 Lutheran Church, 17, 215«52 MacDonald, Oliver, 87 Macierewicz, Antoni: arrest of, 117; and Christian-National Union, 194-95; as editor, 102,124; and KOR, 78-79, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 98, 234-35«72; and Solidarity, 241-42n2 Macierzyñski, MirosJaw, 147 Maékowski, Stanislaw, 51, 67 Majewski, Marek, 67 Malanowski, Jan, 185 Maleszka, Lestaw, 113 Matkowski, Fr. Stanislaw, 138, 231rcl9 Malopolska Solidarity, 145 Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, 121 Markus, Maria, 2 9 - 3 0 Marx, Karl, 2, 28, 91 "May Third Constitution," 149 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 1 1 9 , 1 2 5 , 1 4 8 , 1 9 5 Mazowiecki Refinery and Petrochemical works, Plock, 60-61, 70-71, 73 Mazowsze Solidarity, 132,164, 255nl

291

Mazur, Andrzej, 141 Meat Factories, Radom, 54, 57 Media: censorship of, 5, 6, 203; official, 202-3; see also Press; Underground press Medieval Europe, 2 Medvedev, Roy, 212n23, 213n25 Michnik, Adam: arrest of, 117,119; in Democratic Union, 195; and factionalism of KSS-"KOR," 134; indictment against, 113; and KOR, 9, 77, 79, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89-90, 92, 93, 95, 99, 198, 231nl9; and psychology of captivity, 208; and Solidarity, 148, 241-42«2; in TKN, 204-5; and underground publishing, 106 Mickiewicz, Adam, 41 Mietkowski, Maciej, 189 Mikofajczyk, Stanislaw, 32 Mikolajska, Halina, 81, 87, 99, 118, 134, 229-30«1 Milewicz, Ewa, 105 Milewska, Ewa, 239nll3, 241-42«2 Mills, C. Wright, 207 MKS, see Interfactory Strike Committee: Gdansk; Silesia; Szczecin Mnich, Zdzislaw, 170,171 Mniszek, 62 MO (Milicja Obywatelska, MO), Citizen's Militia, 47 Moczar, Mieczysfaw, 222«50 Moczulski, Leszek, 1 0 7 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 3 Modrow, Hans, 18 Modrzejewski, Bronislaw, 175 Modzelewski, Karol, 9, 41,120 Mojek, Wadaw, 163 Monarchy: vs. civil society, 3; in East Central Europe, 5; Eastern European/Russian, 4, 6 , 1 3 6 Moore, Barrington, 151-52 Morawski, Jerzy, 221n40 Morgiewicz, Emil, 84, 9 9 , 1 2 2 - 2 3 Motorized Units of the People's Militia (Zmotoryzowane Oddzialy Milicji Obywatelskiej, ZOMO): and strikes of 1976, 47, 52, 56, 57-58, 74, 75 Movement for Civil Liberties, 216«59

292

Index

Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO), 84, 106, 120, 122,133,140-43,148,149,163-64, 195,196 Movement of Free Democrats (Ruch Wolnych Demokratów), 141 Mroczka, Jan, 71 Mueller, Claus, 25 Myszk, Edwin, 183,185 Myszków, 134,154 Nagy, Imre, 17, 35 Naimski, Piotr: arrest of, 117,120; and Christian-National Union, 194; and factionalism of KSS-"KOR," 134; and KOR, 79, 82, 86, 87, 98; and Solidarity, 148,241-42«2 National Fund for Health Protection (Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Zdrowia), 155 Nationalization of civil society, 4 Nation-state system, emergence of, 4 Nemeth, Miklos, 15,17 Neo-positivism, 89-90 Netherlands, 121 Network of Independent Initiatives, 16 New evolutionism, 9, 88-97 New Forum, 18-19 Nieocenzurowana Oficyna Wydawnicza (The Uncensored Publishing House), 105 Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza (Independent Publishing House, NOW-a), 105-6,149,174 Niezalezny Ruch Chlopski (Independent Peasant Movement), 146 Niezgoda, Sylwester, 180,190 Niklaszewski, Boleslaw, 249-50n57 Northern Shipyard, Gdansk, 169,189 Notebooks of SKS Poznan (Zeszyty SKS Poznan), 144 NOW-a (Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza) (Independent Publishing House),, 105-6,149,174. Nowacki, Jerzy, 133,145 Nowa Huta, 115,139 Nowak (head of Dolna Odra strike committee), 63

Nowak, Jan, 178,179 "Nowotko," 52 Nowy S^cz, 134 Nowy Targ, 64, 66, 71 Nyers, Reszo, 15,17 Ochotnicze Hufce Pracy (OHP), 58 Official press, 67, 69, 202-3 Olszewski, Jan, 79,194-95, 231nl9, 239nll3, 241-42«2 Olsztyn, 64 Onyszkiewicz, Wojciech, 86, 99, 108-9, 159,161, 241-42n2, 249« 41 Opinio (Opinion), 106-7,141,173 Opole, 64 Opole Stare, 139 Opposition: vs. dissidence, 7-9; emergence of, 7 - 9 Origins of the System, The (Tarniewski), 106 Orwell, George, 203 Ostatek, Zdzislaw, 147 Ostoja-Owsiany, Andrzej, 141-42 Ostrowska, Hanna, 117 Ostrowski, Wojciech, 117,120 Ottoman empire, 6 - 7 Pabianice Dressing Materials Factory (PASO), 154 Pacifism, ethical, 97 Pajdak, Antoni, 78, 85, 98,109,140 Palach, Jan, 217-18n67 Palka, Zenon, 119,133 Paprocki, Jan, 175 Parallel polis, 212«20 Paris Commune Shipyard, Gdynia, 192 Parliamentary democracy: emergence of, 5; in Poland, 13, 24,193 Parnica Repair Yard, 177 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), 18 Pawlicka, Malgorzata, 241-42ii2, 249n41 Peasant University (Uniwersytet Ludowy), 135,146-47 Perzynski, Ryszard, 142 Pienkowska, Alina, 183,185, 190,192 Pietkiewicz, Antoni, 133 Pilichowski, Jerzy Jacek, 134, 162, 249n41 Pilka, Marian, 117,142,144 Pilsudski, Jozef Klemens, 6, 31

Index Pisarek, Walery, 149 Placówka (The Outpost), 134,146 Plastic People of the Universe, The, 217n65 Plock: Grudzi^dz, 126,128-29; poststrike repression in, 70-71; strikes of 1976 in, 60-62, 75 Plonska, Maryla, 183, 185,187 Podaj Dalej (Give a Bit More), 144 Podoloski, Stanislaw, 175 Poland: advancement of democratization in, 1, 24, 123-24, 208; anti-Semitism in, 41,126; artistic freedom in, 37; collective farms in, 34, 36, 37, 38; Communist party in, 15, 28, 30, 33, 36, 78; constitutional revisions in 1975 in, 78; consumerism in, 37, 41, 42; dictatorships in, 6, 31, 37; dissidence in, 212n23; emergence of civil society in, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10-13, 22, 31, 150, 193; emergence of opposition in, 8, 9, 10, 13-14, 25, 43, 48, 9 7 , 1 3 0 , 1 3 1 ; gentry in, 7; geography of, 40; Gierek regime in, 25, 30-31; Gomutka regime in, 25, 30; and government-in-exile in London, 31; harassment of the opposition in, 7 6 , 1 0 1 , 1 1 3 - 1 4 , 1 2 6 , 128, 177; instability in, 24-45 passim; intelligentsia in, 33-34, 39, 40-41, 44, 47-48, 77, 9 5 , 1 9 7 - 9 9 ; labor practices in, 153-55, 165-68; martial law in, 12, 13, 195, 256n23; MarxismLeninism in, 29-30, 32-35, 92; mining industry in, 155-57; occupational safety in, 155,156-57; parliamentary democracy in, 13, 24, 193; peasants in, 34, 38, 146-47; poststrike repression in 1976 in, 64-71; press in, 38-39; price reforms by Gierek regime in, 43, 46, 48-50, 71-72; response to feudalism in, 4; Stalinism in, 24-25, 30, 31-36, 44; strikes in 1976 in, 43, 45, 4 6 - 7 5 passim; strikes in 1980 in, 12, 4 3 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 8 , 200, 208; strikes in 1988 in, 12; student movements in, 41, 77, 8 6 , 1 4 3 - 4 6 ; workers in, 34, 39, 4 1 - 4 2 , 44, 47-48, 7 2 - 7 4 , 1 5 1 - 9 2 passim

293

POLFA pharmaceutical firm, 154 Polish Academy of Sciences: Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics, 120; Institute of Literary Studies, 120 Polish Army, 37, 74 Polish Committee for Social Assistance, 108 Polish Helsinki Commission, 135 Polish Labor Code, 167 Polish Optics Enterprises (PZO), 52, 71 Polish Peasant Party (PSL), 32,182 Polish PEN Club, 120 "Polish" publishing house, 149 Polish Red Cross, 108 Polish Socialist Party (PPS), 32, 77, 85, 88, 159,182,195 Polish Society for the Friends of Children, 108 Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), 32, 38, 39, 89, 95, 119,143,152,158; Plock regional committee of, 61; Radom regional committee of, 52, 53, 54-58, 75 Polish Workers' Party (PPR), 31 Pomeranian Casting and Enameling Factory (POiE), Grudzi^dz, 62, 71,109, 129,163 Pomian, Krzysztof, 185 Popieluszko, Jerzy, 243M 17 Po Prostu (Simply Speaking), 38-39, 77 Post(p (Progress), 107 Poznari: KSS-"KOR" in, 134; party-state support in, 65; poststrike repression in, 71; reaction to Pyjas' death in, 116; ROPCiO in, 141; Solidarity branch in, 133; strikes of 1976 in, 64; student activists in, 143,144; support for KSS"KOR" in, 132, 133 Pozsgay, Imre, 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 214«39, 2 1 4 15«45, 215«48 PPR (Polish Workers' Party). 31 PPS (Polish Socialist Party), 32, 77, 85, 88, 159,182,195 Praxis Group, 212n23 Press: censorship of, 5, 6, 203; see also Official press; Underground press Prokopiak, Janusz, 54, 55 Proletariat, vs. state power, 3

294

Index

Provisional Committee for an Independent and Free Trade Union of Farmers (Tymczasowy Komitet Niezaleznego Zwijizku Zawodowego Rolniköw, TKNZZR), 146 Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Grojec Area (TKSChzG), 146 Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Lublin Area (Tymczasowy Komitet Samoobrony Chlopskiej ziemi Lubelskiej, TKSChzL), 146 Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee in the Rzeszöw area (TKSChzRz), 146 Prussia, 4 Pruszcz Gdariski, 64, 71 Przeglgd (Review), 148,149 Przemysl, 141 Przewlocki, Janusz, 104 PSL, see Polish Peasant Party Public Against Violence, 21 Public space: components of, 3; vs. state power, 3 - 4 , 7 Puis (Pulse), 132,134,148,149 Putilov Works, Russia, 72 Pyjas, Stanislaw, 87, 113-17,130, 22930nl Pyka, Tadeusz, 48 PZPR, see Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) Raczyriski Committee, 80 Radio Free Europe, 87, 128,173 Radom: Biuletyn Informacyjny issue on, 104; clemency for strikers in, 112-13; KOR relief efforts in, 125-27, 129; KSS-"KOR" in, 134; party-state support in, 65, 111; poststrike repression in, 69-70; ROPCiO in, 141; strikes of 1976 in, 47, 52-59, 72, 73, 74, 75 Radomsko, 64 Radoskor leather factory, Radom, 53 Rakowiecki, Jacek, 145 Rechtsstaat (state of law), 5

Representative government; civil society as necessary condition for, 2,10; as precursor to democratization, 1 Resistance movements, 9 Res Publica, 149 Revisionism, 8, 9,14; in Poland, 38-39, 41, 47, 86, 88, 89, 95 RMP, see Young Poland Movement (Ruch Mlodej Polski, RMP) Robotnik (The Worker), 73, 104,129,132, 133, 134,150,155,159-70,173-75, 180-81,184,193, 197, 202, 206 Robotnik Szczeciñski (Szczecin Worker), 176,177 Robotnik Wybrzeza (Worker of the Coast), 163,183,185-86 Rokosovsky, Konstantin, 220n31 Rolling Stock Repair Shop (ZNTK), Radom, 53 Romania, 1, 211nl5, 212n23 Romanov monarchy, 6 Romaszewski, Zbigniew, 79, 87, 126, 135, 241-42m2 Romaszewski, Zofia, 79, 87, 126, 24142h2 ROPCiO, see Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights ROPCiO Information and Consultation Point (Punkt InformacyjnoKonsultacyjny), 173 Rozek, Janusz, 147 Ruch (Movement) group, 47, 77,197 Ruch Zwigzkowy (Union Movement), 172 Rudolf, Tadeusz, 108 Rural Solidarity, 147 Russia: emergence of civil society in, 6; monarchy in, 4, 6; revolutions in, 6 Russian empire, 6 Ruszar, Józef, 162, 249n41 Rybicka, Bozena, 146 Rybicki, Arkadiusz, 145 Rybicki, Józef, 82, 85, 87, 98, 231nl9 Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth), 142 Rzeszów, 134 Sadlowski, Czesfaw, 138 Sakharov, Andrei, 212«23, 213«25

Index Samizdat, 10,102 SB, see Security Service Schabowski, Gunter, 18 Schiffer, Laszlo, 214-15«45 Security Service (SB), 47, 49, 55, 58, 7 4 7 5 , 1 1 4 , 1 6 1 , 1 7 6 , 184 Sfdzikowski, Waldemar, 249-50M57 Serbia, 7 Sikora, Wojciech, 145 Sila-Nowicki, Wtadystaw, 231«19, 239h113 Silesia, see Katowice Skoda workers, Bohemia, 72 Skrzypek, factory director in Radom, 53 SKS, see Student Solidarity Committee (Studencki Komitet Solidarnosci) Slapa, Edward, 190 Sliwa, Boguslaw, 133,162 Sliwinski, Marian, 108 Slovakia, 15 Slupsk, 134 Smallholders, 16 Smigiel, Stanislaw, 249-50n57 Sobol, Ewa, 134 Social Democratic parties, 3 Socialist realism, 37 Socialist Union of Polish Students (SZSP), 115.147 Socialist Unity Party (SED), 18 Social justice, 34 Social Self-Defense Club: in Wroclaw (KSS-W), 132-33; of the WielkopolskoKujawski Region (KSS-WK), 133 Social Self-Defense Committee "KOR" (KSS-"KOR"): citizen cooperation with, 124; disbanding of, 131-32; expansion of, 130, 131-35; formation of, 84,122-24; health care report by, 155; and mining industry, 156-57; purpose of, 123,129,159; and underground press, 159,160,161; and workers, 159 Social Self-Defense Fund, 8 7 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 2 , 134.148 Society for Academic Courses (TKN), 14, 1 3 5 , 1 4 4 , 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 204 Sokolowski, Antoni, 183

295

Solidarity; and Catholic Church, 137; and emergence of civil society, 22,193; formation of, 43, 131-32; identity of workers in, 74; impact of KOR on, 199-208; legal advisers to, 239nll3; martyrs of, 74; members from student movements, 145; members in early opposition movement, 120, 129, 195; and opposition strategy, 9 , 1 2 ; Polish party's Roundtable Negotiations with, 12-13, 25; role in reestablishing parliamentary democracy, 13, 193; TKN support for, 148; see also Gdansk Solidarity; Mazowsze Solidarity; Rural Solidarity Solidarity Factory Commission, Ursus, 164 Solidarnosc (Solidarity), 133 Solidarnosc Dolnoslpska (Lower Silesian Solidarity), .134 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 212«23 Sonik, Boguslaw, 145 Sopot, 59-60 Soviet bloc: Catholic Church in, 38; collapse of, 1; opposition strategy in, 9; Soviet control of individual leaders in, 40; suppression of civil society in, 6 Soviet Union: collapse of, 1; dictatorship in, 6; dissidence in, 212w23; legitimate domination in, 26; perestroika in, 22; Polish dependence on, 24-25, 92; and respect for Polish sovereignty, 37, 78, 93,94 Spanish Communist Party, 119, 250n68 Spare Parts Shop (WCZ), Radom, 54 Spotkania (Encounters), 1 0 5 , 1 3 4 , 1 4 8 , 1 4 9 Spyra, Andrzej, 162,171, 249«41 Sreniowski, Jôzef, 85, 86, 99,128, 161, 168-69, 249)141 Sroka, Rev. Bronislaw, 138,187 Stalin, Joseph, 6, 7, 32, 34 Stalinism, in Poland, 2 4 - 2 5 , 3 0 , 31-36, 44 Stalowa Wola, 134 Staniszkis, Jadwiga, 2 0 5 - 6 Starachowice, 64, 71 Starczewska, Krystyna, 79 Starczewski, Stefan, 79, 241-42n2

296

Index

Staruch, Zbigniew, 163 State, and civil society, 2 "Statement on the Conditional Pardon for the June Protests," 112 State Planning Commission, Polish, 48 Steinsbergowa, Aniela, 82, 85, 87, 98, 135, 231nl9 Stgpieñ, Jerzy, 46 Stokes, Gail, 7 Stomil Factory, Grudzijidz, 62 Stomma, Stanislaw, 90 Strzelecki, Jan, 120,148 Student Solidarity Committee (Studencki Komitet Solidarnosci, SKS), 115-16, 120,132,133,143-44,173 Studziñski, Bogumil, 146 Subversive, The, 105 Sulecki, Wladyslaw, 162,171,172, 173, 249«41 Sulik, Boleslaw, 185 Sulkowski, Witold, 50 Sweden, 121 Switoñ, Jan, 171 Switoñ, Kazimierz, 119, 171-72, 173, 186, 229-30wl Switzerland, 121 Sygnai (Signal), 144 Szczecin: KZ-WZZ-PZ in, 170,173-80; labor practices in, 154; party-state support in, 65, 66; poststrike repression in, 71; strikes of 1970-71 in, 178-79, 180; strikes of 1976 in, 63; strikes of 1980 in, 12,177-78, 200; student activists in, 143,144, 173; support for KSS-"KOR" in, 132, 174, 179 Szczecin Fund (Fundusz Szczeciñski), 175 Szczepañski, Tadeusz, 229-30nl Szczgsna, Joanna, 104,118, 119,159, 24142n2 Szczuka, Stanislaw, 239rcll3, 241-42n2 Szczygielska, Maria, 147 Szczypiorski, Adam, 85, 87, 98, 231nl9 Szoloch, Kazimierz, 186 Szpakowski, Zdislaw, 148 SZSP (Socialist Union of Polish Students), 115,147 Szucs, Jeno, 4, 6

Szwed, Anna, 145 Szydlak, Jan, 48, 55 Tarniewski, Marek, 106 Tarnow, 134 Tatarnicy, 77 Taylor, Jacek, 239nll3 Techmet, 183 Telephone Factory (RWT), Radom, 53, 54 "Telewizja Klamie!" (Television lies!), 256n23 Tematy (Themes), 144 Territorial Appeals Commission (Terenowe Komisje Odwolawcze, TKO), 124,189 Third Estate, 2 , 3 Thompson, Edward P., 213«35 TKN (Society for Academic Courses), 14, 135,144,147-48, 204 TKN Notebooks (Zeszyty TKN-u), 147 TKNZZR, see Provisional Committee for an Independent and Free Trade Union of Farmers TKSChzG, see Provisional Peasant SelfDefense Committee in the Grojec Area TKSChzL, see Provisional Peasant SelfDefense Committee in the Lublin Area TKSChzRz, see Provisional Peasant SelfDefense Committee in Rzeszow area Tobacco Factories, Radom, 53 Torun, 134 Toruriczyk, Barbara, 118,119 Totalitarianism, 6 Transformer and Traction Apparatus Factory, Lodz, 62-63 Transylvania, 5 , 1 5 Trybuna Ludu (People's Tribune), 38 Turkowski, Kryzysztof, 133 Tygodnik Powszechny, 255«19 Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Solidarity Weekly), 148 Typiak, Piotr, 146 Underground press: Czechoslovak, 20; East German, 17; Hungarian, 14, 21415n45; for peasants, 141,146; Polish, 10,11, 72-73, 76, 79, 80, 96,102-8, 124,134-35,141, 148-49; and student

Index movements, 144-45; and workers movement, 150,172; see also names of individual papers, magazines, and publishers Union of Polish Writers, 120 Union of Young Socialists, 77 Unita, 81 United Nations, 140 United Peasant Party (ZSL), 32 United States, 121 UProgu (At the Threshold), 106,140 Ursus: clemency for strikers in, 112-13; KOR relief efforts in, 125-28,129; poststrike repression in, 66-69; strikes of 1976 in, 47, 50-52, 74, 75; support for KSS-"KOR" in, 132; workers' protest in, 108-9 Ursus Tractor Factory, 50-52, 66-67, 6 8 69,112 USSR. See Soviet Union VONS (Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted), 20 Wjidotowski, Stanislaw, 178 Wafbrzych, 134 Wale, Jan, 104, 148, 241-42 n. 2 Waldheim, Kurt, 118 Walentynowicz, Anna, 173,183, 185,189, 191,192, 202, 219n22 Walesa, Lech, 173, 180, 183, 185, 186, 187, 190,191,194, 202, 206 Wallenberger, Vera, 216«54 Walter Metal Factory, Radom, 53-54, 70 Warsaw: concentration of KOR in, 85,132; KSS- "KOR" in, 144; party-state support in, 65; poststrike repression in, 71; reaction to Pyjas' death in, 116; repression of KOR attempted in, 117; ROPCiO in, 141; student activists in, 143,144; support for workers in, 80 Warski Shipyard, 177,178,179,180 Waryñski Crane Plant, 52 Waszkiewicz, Jan, 133 Weber, Max, 25, 26, 28, 32 Western Pomerania, see Szczecin West Germany: deportation of East Germans to, 17; as model for East

297

German civil society, 19, 22; recognition of Poland by, 40; support for KOR in, 121 White Book of Kazimierz Switoit, The, 172 Wiadomosci Tarnowskie (Tarnów News), 163 Wies Rzeszowska (Rzeszow Countryside), 147 Wi(i (The Link), 119, 255«19 Wildstein, Bronislaw, 113 Wilk, Mariusz, 133,145 Winiarska, Helena, 184,192 Wisniewski, Florian, 192 Wisniewski, Rev. Ludwik, 140 Witkowski, Jan, 162, 174, 175,176-77, 249n41 Witkowski, Miroslaw, 175 WOG (Wielka Organizacja Gospodarcza; i.e., Large Economic Organization), 223«52 Wojciechowski, art historian, 50 Wojtyla, Archbishop Karol, 119,139,196 Wolne Slowo (The Free Word), 134,141 Women's suffrage movement, 3 Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR): arrest of activists in, 117-21; controversy surrounding, 194-97; declared illegal, 110; editorial board of, 87-88; founding of, 1 0 - 1 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 76-84; international support for, 120-21; Intervention Bureau of, 87,129,134, 141,162,180,198; investigation of 1976 strikes by, 52, 67, 68, 69, 71, 79; membership in, 84-88, 96, 97-99; and nonviolent resistance, 97; and opposition strategy, 8, 9 , 1 0 - 1 1 , 76, 88-97,159,193-94; organization of, 84-88; purpose of, 76, 159; success of, 8, 76,131; supporters of, 86-87; Western financial support for, 80, 82, (125 —and workers' amnesty struggle: and clemency for workers, 111-13; impact of death of Pyjas on, 113-17,130; and interaction with party-state, 108-11, 129; publicity about, 102-8, 129; purpose of, 97,101-2; relief efforts

298

Index

Workers' Defense Committee and workers' amnesty struggle (Continued) during, 124-29; success of, 117-21, 129-30; transformation of committee after, 121-24; underground press developed by, 1 0 2 - 8 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 4 - 3 5 World War I, 5 World War II, 6 Wosiek, Maria, 134 Wóycicka, Irena, 241-42n2, 249«41 Writers' Union, 112 Wroclaw: poststrike repression in, 71; reaction to Pyjas' death in, 116; ROPCiO in, 141; strikes of 1976 in, 64; student activists in, 143, 144; support for KSS-"KOR" in, 132-34,144 Wrzaszczyk, Tadeusz, 49 Wujec, Henryk, 79, 87, 119, 127,159,162, 174, 241-42n2, 249n41 Wujec, Ludwika, 159,162, 249«41 Wyszkowski, Blazej, 182, 183,184, 192 Wyszkowski, Krzysztof, 183, 207 Wyszyñski, Stefan Cardinal, 77, 78, 11011,119,138 Young Poland Movement (Ruch Mlodej Polski, RMP), 141,144-45,180,196 Yugoslavia, 1, 5, 212n23 Zadrozyñski, Edmund, 163, 229-30rcl, 249n41

Zagajewski, Adam, 50 Zapis (The Register), 105,106,107,149 Zapolnik, Jan, 183 Zawadzki, Waclaw, 85, 87, 99, 231«19 Zbrosza Duza, 134,146 ZELMOT, Warsaw, 52, 71 Zemstvo movement, 6 Zerari Auto Plant (Polski Fiat), 52 Zgierz, 61 Zieja, Rev. Jan, 81, 85, 87, 98-99,134,137, 140, 231«19 Zieliriski, Andrzej, 179 Zielona Gora, 111 Ziembinski, Wojciech, 84, 85, 99, 107, 122-23,140,142 Znak (Sign) (lay Catholic group), 8 9 90 Znak (The Sign), 119, 255nl9 ZOMO, see Motorized Units of the People's Militia (Zmotoryzowane Oddzialy Milicji Obywatelskiej, ZOMO) Zozula, Andrzej, 241-42n2 ZREMB, Radom, 54, 60, 71, 109 ZSG heating equipment factory, Radom, 53 ZSL (United Peasant Party), 32 Zukowski, Adam, 67 Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw Life), 119, 183