The Origin of Language and Consciousness: How Social Orders and Communicative Concerns Gave Rise to Speech and Cognitive Abilities (World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures) 3031306295, 9783031306297

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World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures

Nikolai S. Rozov

The Origin of Language and Consciousness How Social Orders and Communicative Concerns Gave Rise to Speech and Cognitive Abilities

World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures Series Editors Christopher Chase-Dunn, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA Barry K. Gills, Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland Leonid E. Grinin Moscow, Russia

, National Research University Higher School of Economics,

Andrey V. Korotayev , National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

This series seeks to promote understanding of large-scale and long-term processes of social change, in particular the many facets and implications of globalization. It critically explores the factors that affect the historical formation and current evolution of social systems, on both the regional and global level. Processes and factors that are examined include economies, technologies, geopolitics, institutions, conflicts, demographic trends, climate change, global culture, social movements, global inequalities, etc. Building on world-systems analysis, the series addresses topics such as globalization from historical and comparative perspectives, trends in global inequalities, core-periphery relations and the rise and fall of hegemonic core states, transnational institutions, and the long-term energy transition. This ambitious interdisciplinary and international series presents cutting-edge research by social scientists who study whole human systems and is relevant for all readers interested in systems approaches to the emerging world society, especially historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, geographers and anthropologists. This book series is indexed in Scopus. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed.

Nikolai S. Rozov

The Origin of Language and Consciousness How Social Orders and Communicative Concerns Gave Rise to Speech and Cognitive Abilities

Nikolai S. Rozov Institute of Philosophy and Law Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences Novosibirsk, Russia

ISSN 2522-0985 ISSN 2522-0993 (electronic) World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures ISBN 978-3-031-30629-7 ISBN 978-3-031-30630-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

I express special gratitude to my mother, Antonina Viktorovna Rozova, an essential specialist in biostratigraphy and paleontology. She regularly demanded that I explain to her in “human words” the ideas about the steps and mechanisms of linguistic complexity. How convincingly and intelligibly I managed to present these thoughts in the book is for the reader to judge. Still, it was due to the preliminary elucidation that I managed to do so to some extent. My mother rejoiced over the release of the original Russian version of this book, but, alas, she did not live to see the English translation published. The book could not have appeared without the moral support, sincere warmth, and love of my wife, Lenochka. Our cat Masya, whom my wife called “the muse,” also contributed since Masya often sits on my lap when I am working. She wandered willfully in front of the monitor and even on the keyboard, obviously alluding to evolutionary roots of our relations, to the limits of human language and consciousness, and to their essential connection with concerns, emotions, and social interactions, which, generally speaking, is the main topic of the book.

Foreword

Rozov’s book is the most advanced work yet written on the evolution of human language and its effects on distinctively human consciousness. Rozov takes a topic full of controversies and goes a long way toward resolving them. Along with his original theorizing, it is a work of wide-ranging synthesis of research in the many relevant fields: from paleo-linguistics to the schools of linguistics based on modern languages; the psychology of child development of language and thought (starting with the pioneering work of the Russian psychologist L.S. Vygotsky); archeology and paleontology of the great apes and early hominids; ethnography and experiments with present-day apes and other animals; and sociological theories and reconstructions of the evolutionary pathways from animal groups to fire-tending, tool-inventing, and symbol-centered human societies as they created networks growing from dozens to millions. I offer this preface out of my own experience of reading the text, as an effort to provide a simplified skeleton of the argument. Rozov’s text is quite complex, is heavily documented, and takes up many threads of argument from rival positions. It is also full of lively passages that bring the central argument to life: once humans started cooking with fire, what did they talk about while they ate? What did they do when situations arose where they couldn’t understand each other? I have not attempted to repeat the references to important researches on which Rozov builds his argument, although I have added a few references to some further sociologists and anthropologists who have illuminated key aspects of the preliterate past. I have attempted to explain some of the technical terms which Rozov has taken from other researchers (holophones, protophrases, pidgin-sentences, etc.). This preface is certainly no substitute for reading the full weight of the book. Since I am a historical sociologist who takes the approach that macro-structures are made by linking together micro-interactions, my summary tends to focus on the aspects that I understand best: the micro-sociology of face-to-face interaction; the growth of social networks; and geopolitics (literally, how human politics spread across the geology of the world, which is what happened from the time the earliest human ancestors started migrating). Rozov covers these and a great deal more, including the philosophers and methodologists who have long been discussing the vii

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nature of consciousness and of history. I can only say here: Rozov stands on firmer ground than any of them. Rozov’s analysis of the evolution of human language necessarily starts out from animals communicating among themselves. There is considerable debate about what animals compared to humans can or cannot do. Before getting into these issues, it is best to explain interaction ritual theory: based on micro-sociological research on how humans today interact with each other, both verbally and non-verbally. This is a crucial mechanism which Rozov uses to explain what the earliest proto-humans got out of communicating with each other, in a series of refinements that became the early history of languages. Successful interaction rituals create social solidarity, and this is an evolutionary advantage for reproductive selection of the physiology of the vocal organs, and for the things human can do when they have more intense coordination. Rozov’s theory traces the reciprocal evolution of biology and the forms of social interaction.

Interaction Rituals: A Flexible Mechanism for Building Social Networks Research on interaction ritual (IR) started with Emile Durkheim’s study of what people are doing when they do religion and from Erving Goffman’s microobservations of face-to-face behavior in everyday life. Fine-grained details have been learned by audio and video recordings of conversations, quarrels, fights, lovers, protest demonstrations, sports fans, and political speeches. The ingredients of an IR are summarized in my book Interaction Ritual Chains (2004): If people are in bodily presence with each other and 1. Establish a shared mutual focus of attention (they are all looking or listening to the same thing, and know each other is aware of it). 2. Share the same emotion or mood. 3. Their voices and bodies get into a shared rhythm, feeding back to intensify their attention and emotion. If these ingredients build up (bearing in mind they could also fail, such as when people don’t pay attention) the results are: 4. They have a feeling of solidarity or membership, with boundaries to people who aren’t part of the shared rhythm. 5. Participants are pumped up by emotional energy, feeling stronger, more confident, more proactive (in contrast to when the interaction doesn’t take off, leaving them alienated or depressed). 6. A further result of successful rituals is to create symbols charged with meaning; emblems remind people of their membership even when they are apart. 7. Attunement in rituals gives them moral feelings of right or wrong—right is showing respect for the symbol; wrong is disrespecting it and the group it represents.

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Durkheim first pointed out these processes for religious rituals and symbols (crucifix, Bible, Qur’an, or tribal totem) and their similarity to modern political rituals around flags and public appearances of popular leaders. “The totem is the flag of the clan,” and vice versa. Rozov applies IRs to speech (or any kind of face-to-face communication, such as gestures, or dancing in rhythm). Successful talk requires 1. Focusing on the same thing (the sounds and gestures) 2. Feeling the same emotion (we’re both angry about the same thing; or happy, or sad, etc.) 3. Getting into the same micro-rhythms in speaking This is the “accent” in which someone speaks, going smoothly when speakers have the same rhythm and pitch and conveying inferiority if the micro-rhythms don’t match. Solidarity is the outcome of a successful conversation, even if it is just “chatting” about trivialities, talking for the sake of keeping up the conversation; it is alienating if you can’t get into the flow of talk. There is always an unconscious “underground” in talking—it isn’t only whatever you are talking about but the relationship you feel (or lack of relationship) with the people present. Talking in all its forms, from animal-like noises to the most refined pronunciation and complicated grammar, is itself a symbol of solidarity and membership. People who can talk successfully together (shared rhythm, mutual attunement, etc.) come to feel an emotional tie to each other, and this gives them the energy and discipline to accomplish things together. For Rozov, the evolution of language is a history of face-to-face interactions over a million years or more, during which speakers create new features of language to negotiate new kinds of social relationships. IRs are a flexible mechanism: people can try out IRs with strangers and persons who aren’t their kin; if they can make a successful IR, they can expand their network. The whole history of human institutions is a process of expanding networks—from little campsites to villages, from hunting together to war parties to armies, and from sharing food to trading gifts to economic markets. The scale of organization grows far beyond what previous animals could do; humans escape from genetics and innate behaviors, because they can forge new relationships if they can get people to focus on new IRs. The difference between successful and failed IRs steer our individual behavior today; we seek out people who we feel energized with and try to avoid those who bring you down. IRs are the steering mechanism for how we find friendships and make careers. Rozov stresses the importance of failed IRs during the process of developing language: failed verbal rituals within an already existing group result in efforts at correction. This is how small children learn to speak; parents repeat the sounds their little kids make and say it over again correctly, trying to get everybody imitating the right sounds, and this correction process is itself a ritual focusing attention our talk. We evolved to become speakers who care about how we talk. It must have been like this, thousands of generations ago, when early hominids spoke to each other in repetitious rituals trying to get them to understand each other. Those who could speak well became group leaders; those who couldn’t became

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lower status. Skipping ahead many centuries, to a time when tribes were politically organized as alliances and enemies, it became important to iron out ambiguities and misunderstandings about who said what and who promised to do what. The more complex forms of language, with grammar and tenses for past and future, questions and oaths, and ifs and maybes, grew out of efforts to make IRs succeed by overcoming these misunderstandings. Rozov gives us a pragmatic theory of the development of language. He adds an important difference to theories that consider language as emerging in order to carry out utilitarian tasks: the familiar argument that homo sapiens were evolutionarily selected for bigger brain size, because it enabled them to find food, avoid dangers, make tools and shelters, and the most intelligent branch of the great apes first learned to speak about utilitarian things. Instead, Rozov argues the big evolutionary advantage of IRs was to increase solidarity and normativeness, making some groups more energetic and self-disciplined; they not only could make tools but developed rules about who they belonged to—rules of property; rules about sharing food with group members; and rules about watching their fire so that it would not go out. Groups with more solidarity reproduced themselves better; they could recruit more members and win fights over resources instead of being driven away. IR builds solidarity, discipline, and organization, and these social advantages make tools and other inventions more useful, not the other way around. Rozov echoes Durkheim’s classical theory: solidarity must exist before there can be utilitarian contracts. And solidarity expanded into new forms of social organization, above all through the IRs that focused on improving communications via speech. The long-term result was to create interior attitudes in their members’ minds, orienting them to rules and institutions that expanded into social structures and cultural forms.

Animal Communication: What Does Human Evolution Add? Many animal species communicate among themselves. They lack the human voice box but make distinctive noises and gestures. Bird calls have been carefully observed and recorded: particular species make alarm sounds; some songs are interpreted as territorial claims to keep rivals away (especially when nesting); very sociable birds like crows call loudly to get other birds to join them. (Jonathan Elphick, 2018: Handbook of Bird Families.) Monkeys in the wild make distinctive noises to alert others to dangers above them in the air, on the ground, and recognizing dominant monkeys in their group. Such signals are mostly innate, since bird calls are standard across all members of a species. A few species of birds are good at imitating sounds, including noises of humans, other birds, even cars, and machinery. Animals who interact regularly with humans can develop special utterances (words?) and can anticipate what humans expect them to do. This has led some theorists to argue that animals can do all the mental operations involved in speech; what they lack is the articulation of the tongue, lips, and larynx.

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Animal “speech” is embedded in the immediate, here-and-now situation. A domestic cat can miaow when it wants food (while leading the way to the kitchen), or when it wants to be let in or out a door (while sitting in front of it), making purrrrrr-noises when it approaches and wants to be petted. Dogs, horses, and other animals have been trained to do particular actions but not to carry on a conversation about something. Chimps and bonobos, raised by humans, have been taught to use substitutes for talking, such as by choosing pictures on a screen and stringing them into “sentences.” But these referred almost entirely to actions, such as “want-bananafood-banana-want.” Apes have sometimes learned to use sticks as tools, but they rarely pass the skill to their fellows, nor have image-using bonobos taught signs to others. What is lacking is the normative sense that Rozov refers to, when adult speakers make a point of correcting a child’s speech, or insiders make fun of an outsider’s way of talking. Discussions of animal communication tend to degenerate into contests of showing who is as good as whom, but that isn’t the point: Early human ancestors were similar to animals that we observe and experiment with today. What we are learning about is the baseline from which early hominids started, thus allowing us to reconstruct the steps by which human speech emerged. Early hominid speech must have been this kind of voice-plus-gesture language of drawing attention to something in the immediately visible situation and getting others to do something about it. Experiments on animals interacting with humans don’t help us here, because there were no humans in those days. Bigger brains, per se, do not solve the mystery. Whales and dolphins (which are sea mammals) have very large brains, some species with numbers of neurons rivalling humans, and a quarter of their body size devoted to producing and receiving sounds. (Tom Mustil, 2022. How to Speak Whale.) Thousands of whale “songs” have been recorded, although no evidence has yet been found of bi-directional communication—i.e., message sent and acknowledged. Neanderthals (who had fire and tools) had bigger brain size than homo sapiens, but the former went extinct, while the latter progressed to more complex social forms and language. Rozov finds the crucial evolution in interaction rituals. Some of the ingredients for IRs exist among animals: contagious emotions spread among animals of the same species when they are close together, and they can get into shared rhythmic behavior. Nearby animals can become aware of the same object. What seems to be missing are two things: (a) A reciprocal sense of mutual attention—recognizing not just that we see the same object but that we know that the other is paying attention just as we are. (b) A symbol which carries the memory of this feeling of emotional intersubjectivity. Children around 10 months old can look where an adult is pointing; a cat looks at your finger. (Some dogs can be trained to point at hunted game, but they do this only in the presence of humans, not alone with other dogs.) Rozov summarizes psychological research on joint attention, since it is the key to full-fledged IRs: the sense that what we have both concentrated on together in mutual awareness has a meaning for

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ourselves as a speech community. This pointing-together experience, carried out first by gestures and then by vocal speech, focused atttention not just on an object but also on a signifier, the beginning of semiotics. We are on tricky grounds here, because IRs of some kind exist among animals; Rozov posits that full-scale IRs existed among early humans (Australopithecus, a fur-covered, 4-feet tall upright African ape) as they began to compile a repertoire of new sound symbols, something that their animal ancestors did not do. Here we get into the process of gene-culture interaction, with this emphasis: whatever got selected through differential reproduction must have gone into strengthening the missing ingredients for full-scale IRs. One more argument against the growth of human cognition through language needs to be disposed of. Sociologists and developmental psychologists in the tradition of G.H. Mead and L.S. Vygotsky observe that children learn to speak with others, then to speak to themselves, and then to internalize speech as thought. Against this, some philosophers have argued that thought is not inner language, because it is possible to have a thought before you put it into words. This is experienced when you struggle to find the right words to express your idea—“it’s on the tip of my tongue.” It follows that language is something added on, after the cognition takes place. This argument has been adopted by animal experimenters (such as teaching a bonobo to pick images on a screen to make sentences): the inference is that animals can think all the things humans can; they just lack the vocal apparatus to say it. But having a pre-verbal idea before putting it into words can be explained by the brain’s organization into neural nets. Sensory experience—including the experience of moving one’s body, such as forming words with one’s vocal apparatus—creates connections among neurons, and the more often such actions are carried out, the more pronounced or habituated are these particular pathways. Talking establishes neural nets and further talking reinforces them. Since words can be used in different combinations, many of these neural nets overlap. When you are having an idea but haven’t yet articulated it in words, relevant neural nets are flickering with arousal (visual image memories can be involved too); eventually you settle on the particular pathways you are going to use, and it becomes verbal speech. Internal speech is more cryptic, less fully grammatical than spoken (and formal speech more elaborated than casual speech); more complicated neural pathways correspond to each of these degrees of elaboration. Speech shapes the brain circuits of human individuals since early childhood. Struggles to put ideas into words do not come from no where (i.e., from pure a-social cognition); they come from previous habits of speech laid down in the brain. Note: Neural nets help us answer the question: how do animals think? The common mistake is anthropomorphizing animals, assuming they think like we do; on the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that they can solve various tasks. One thing is certain: they do not think in human words and sentences, because they don’t speak our language. If they can internalize their own language, dogs could growl or bark to themselves subvocally in their brain; cats could miaow and purr and hiss silently to themselves. What appears to be lacking in the intermediate step, as human

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children talk to themselves out loud before talking silently to themselves; this intermediate stage has not (to my knowledge) been observed in animals when they are alone. Still, cats or dogs must be deepening their neural pathways each time they miaow or bark; some kind of “thinking” activity may go on in their own animal language, activating the brain networks like humans who have a thought before putting it into words.

Evolution of the Human Voice Though Physiological-Plus-Social Feedback Animals on the whole cannot pronounce consonants, only vowels. Consonants are “unvoiced” as they are a manipulation of lips and tongue to shape the breath as it is expelled; vowels are evolutionarily earlier than the consonants added to them. Although we spell animal sounds like “woof,” these are pseudo-consonants; “woof” is actually “aarrr!” cut off abruptly at the end, “rrr” being a rumbling sound. The cat’s “purrr” is humming and has no initial consonant; “miaow” is a sequence of vowels. The capacity to make syllables (ra, ri, ro, etc.) had to emerge by evolution of the vocal cords and shape of the larynx (a hollow muscular organ in the air passage from the lungs), together with more precisely tuned audition in the inner ear to discriminate the sounds being made. Along with this came the evolution of speech areas in the brain. The mechanism for selection of these physiological changes is Darwinian reproductive success, while adding a social component: hominids who could articlulate better were more likely to find mutually attracted sexual partners: males and females who had more successful interaction rituals were more likely to reproduce their genes. The central process was erotic. It must have accompanied other changes that make human sexual activity different from most animals: already among the great apes, the estrous period was replaced by year-round receptivity for mating. For humans, smell was de-selected as an attractor, replaced by visual signals like enlarged female breasts (compared to the teats of animals). This went along with the distinctively human loss of body-covering fur, so that humans are largely hairless except for attention-attracting head-top hair; eye-brows drawing attention to emotions and eye-contact; bare skin made the face more capable of expressing nuances of emotion. Pubic hair became a sexual marker visible at a distance for creatures standing upright. The mature male beard and chest-hair distinguishes human males from females: ape males and females look much more similar, except for differences in size, whereas size disparity narrowed as humans evolved for flexible solidarity and sexual attractiveness rather than strength. Humans became more eroticized, and thereby more likely to be pair-bonded; this increased not only their birth rate but survival of the young, as parental pairs became motivated to stay together sharing sustenance; eroticism co-evolved as the period of infant and childhood dependence lengthened.

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Physical and social changes operated in parallel and in feedback with each other. Not just random changes in the genome were selected as their carriers mated and raised offspring more successfully; social interaction was also evolving, improving the ingredients of successful IRs. One could say social behavior was randomly varied (by whatever was happening in the environment), but the practices that made for more solidarity were passed along by parents who could teach them to their children. Active teaching became an evolutionary substitute for genetic reproduction. Language is not genetic, but the physical apparatus is, which makes it easier to produce interactionally successful speech. Humans were not the only species to become more eroticized. Chimpanzees mate freely without an estrous period, but lack male–female bonds between parents. Bonobos are omni-sexual, performing simulated intercourse with anyone irrespective of sex, age, or even parent/child relationship. Although this seems an extreme violation of the incest taboo universal among known human societies, it appears to be a socially evolved behavior. Bonobos are very peace-loving, and when a conflict breaks out, the fighters are smothered by other bonobos distracting them with pseudo-sexual intercourse (no real arousal or penetration). Here we see an effect of environmental conditions on selection; bonobos live in a very benign environment, with plenty of food, and no dangerous predators. They contrast strongly with baboons, who live in dangerous, food-scarce savannahs, and evolved a militaristic social organization led by the most aggressive, intimidating males. Early humans did act to some extent in this way, competing with neighboring peoples over territories and food, and becoming increasingly dangerous to each other. If baboons had won out as the path of evolution, primates would have taken the pathway to wolves and hyenas. But erotic selection went in the opposite direction; humans would later become dangerous killers, not because of biology but as the result of solidarity-based social organization, manufacture of weapons, and coordinated war operations. We should keep in mind the length of time it took to evolve these social and physical features. It was at least 4 million years (possibly much longer) before the present (BP) that hominids began to diverge from other apes; if it takes about 20 years for a generation to reproduce itself, which would be 200,000 iterations of rolling the genetic dice: 200,000 lifetimes of improving the focus of attention in IRs, through bodily erotics as well as vocal apparatus. The chain of social-and-genetic selection is illustrated in the domestication of fire by homo erectus about 200–300,000 years ago (10,000 or more reproductive generations). Fires required social discipline to keep from causing unwanted damage; someone had to be delegated to watch the fire and keep it supplied with fuel. Living with fire demanded foresight and instruction. Johann Goudsblom (1992, Fire and Civilization) calls the domestication of fire the first stage of the “civilizing process” of internalized self-discipline. It must have gone along with a certain level of language complexity (which we will consider below). It enabled humans to move into otherwise too dangerous environments, as fire could be used to hold off predatory animals and to herd animals in large-scale hunts. Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, concluded that tribal myths of human origins point to cooking one’s food as the break in kinship between humans and animals.

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Evolution of Human Emotions Jonathan Turner has presented a theory of human divergence from the other great apes that also gives an important place to interaction rituals. Chimpanzees in the wild can engage in rituals that appear much like those described by ethnographers of central Australia aborigines, and which Durkheim used for his model of religious rituals. Chimpanzees can create a great deal of collective excitement when gathered together, loudly calling out to each other, screaming rhythmically, virtually in a collective dance. These emotional rituals are older than the human species, and according to Turner, become the building blocks on which shared cognition and language were built. From paleontological sequencing of skeletal remains, Turner argues that the crucial step to humans was not the increase in brain size per se. Around 4 mya, the brain of the common ancestor of today’s chimps and today’s humans was about 400 ccs, around 2 mya, the early hominids brains had grown only moderately to 550 ccs. The big difference was a 100% growth in the size of the subcortical centers for emotional arousal. Physiological evidence also shows that human emotional centers are connected in much more complex ways, pervading the higher brain functions. Humans became hard-wired to have much more complicated emotions, combinations arising from the blending of basal arousal and cognition: not just fear but guilt, shame, worry; not just anger but righteousness and pride. Such emotions made it possible for humans to develop rituals for many different purposes: religious worship, funerals, happy dances, solemn declarations, and public punishments. Rituals became a flexible social technology that could recruit new members outside of primary kin groups, and thus eventually build the networks of human societies. All this is compatible with Rozov’s analysis of the steps by which human language was formed. The gap between the two theories is that Turner posits a jump from chimpanzee rituals of collective effervescence to a mental language consisting of gestures, since it took another million years or so to evolve the vocal physiology for articulate speech. Turner notes that social rituals took place among pre-humans, evidenced by rhythmic entrainment, contagious emotional excitement, and solidarity. More precisely, we can say these are almost interaction rituals in the Durkheimian sense, but missing one of its results: the creation of symbols. Symbols are created as emblems that are the focus of attention during a ritual. And symbols become a reminder of one’s identity as member of the group, a reminder that individuals can carry with them in the times when they are not performing the ritual. Symbols can be visual emblems, and thus the existence of art is taken as archeological evidence for humans having arrived at a culture of symbolism that can be transmitted across the generations. Certain kinds of gestures can be symbols as well (making the sign of the cross, for instance; or culturally specific hand signals for insults, etc.). But the most important kind of symbols became the systems of sounds distinctively recognized by a particular set of people, which is to say the vocal symbols of language. Developing language cultures simultaneously spread both externally and internally; enabling humans to communicate about an unseen

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world over the horizon and including past histories and future possibilities; and an inner world of the mind as humans come to talk to themselves in thought, mirroring and amplifying the external world references in talk. The evolution of the human brain to connect primal emotions with cognitive nuance and the evolution of the vocal and auditory organs to communicate with refined nuance of sounds are both key steps in the coevolution of genes and culture, indeed, probably co-evolving with each other.

Sequence of Language Development Parallels Human Social Organization Two kinds of developments took place more or less simultaneously. One is the sounds hominids made, distinguishing more and more clearly between similar sounds and eventually putting them together in different combinations as recognizable syllables, phonemes, and words. The other development is stringing phrases and words together into sentences, so that more complex matters can be talked about. Discriminating the nuances of sounds came first, in tandem with evolution of the vocal and hearing organs—via incremental mating advantage from better articulation, taking perhaps 50,000 generations or so. Once the physiology was in place, the multiplication of words, word connections, and word sequence could happen somewhat more “rapidly,” in about 5000 generations. It was during this period (300– 200,000 years ago) that hominids mastered more complex activities (fire, making tools, creating art and other symbols). Although highly evolved vocal organs made it possible to distinguish phonemes, language could not have built up by starting from the smallest pieces (phonemes), and combining them into words. Early ape/human language was animal language— situational sounds and gestures that communicated immediate concerns: “alarm!” “food!” “let’s fuck” “snarl.” Paleo-linguists refer to these as holophrases: aspects that modern speakers could distinguish by words and grammar are packed into one sound, probably shouted excitedly by every hominid present. Modern people can still use holophrases when they are excited or in a hurry: “Hey!” has different meanings depending on the situation and accompanying body gestures—it could be an alarm, a greeting, a call for help or attention, a protest against something someone else has just done, etc. But we pronounce our “Hey!” more carefully than our remote ancestors, and can spell out its meaning if we need to. Early hominids (lacking a refined vocal apparatus) made do with whatever sounds they could loudly articulate. Becoming more sensitized to nuances of sounds we make resulted in more erotic and family attachments; mutual attunement in successful interaction rituals promoted reproductive success and vocal physiology. As evolutionary advantage in social relationships built up, more sounds could be recognized and put to use for more precise communications. Rozov describes this process as outside-in; holistic,

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pragmatic expressions developed first, eventually promoting more attention to the smaller sound segments. The long-time development of speech went like this: holophrases became more varied and used for different situations as protosyllables began to be recognized and then syllables ( fa, ma, ka, etc.—units of pronunciation consisting of a vowel with or without surrounding consonants). Then phonemes because recognized—distinct sound units distinguishing one word meaning from another: (we call these letters when we spell them in writing), d, t, p, b, enabling us to distinguish pad, pat, bad, bat, and to put together a large number of combinations—to create new words. A full-fledged word is arbitrary—some human group has made it out of phonemes they collectively learned to articulate, and thus, different groups can have different words and languages. (There is no reason to suppose that all hominids had the same language, only that they followed the same general pathway.) And a word is part of a system of language, a set of sounds/usages connected with each other. This is Saussure’s point that words are contrasted with other words—bed/red—or derived from or modify each other—have/had; him/his. They have systemic sense as well as pointing-to reference. Rozov calls the intermediate stages of development protosyllables (gradually becoming a little more clearly articulated and heard), protophrases, and protowords. Protowords differ from animal signs (e.g., a sound that means “predator approaching out there!”) by being normative, approved and corrected via human speech rituals. Protophrases are situational; they have no word order. The next step toward complex language came when speech acts were created to refer to something that was not visible in the situation. I would call this “elsewhere talk.” Rozov uses the term “leading-away phrases.” This was a momentous step because it gave rise to regarding things and actions as references—a step beyond pointing at something here in the situation, or at its horizon—thereby fixing the word with a transportable meaning. It is the beginning of a mental/cognitive world, a talked-about world. It expands to over-the-horizon people and things, real or imaginary, natural and supernatural, into a past and a future. Elsewhere talk (or leading-away protophrases) gives rise to word order, the attempt to state who does what to who. Pidgin-sentences (simple word efforts by tourists and other outsiders, “me buy this,” “toilet where is?”) distinguish subject/ noun, verb, and predicate by word order. Pidgin would have been used by early proto-sapiens (around the fire-using stage). Simple syntax and grammar (130– 50,000 years ago) and full-fledged languages (more recently) have socially enforced customs of arranging words and phrases into “correct” sentences, eventually by combining word order with variants on individual words to express tense, number, mood (declaring a fact, command, question, wish, iffy-ness), and other specifications. Rozov explains such language innovations by looking at the archeological record and reconstructing what human organization would have been associated with it. The key is what kinds of speech situations and speech rituals existed at the time. Once fire was domesticated, people ate meals together; what did they talk about when they ate? “Give me” could have been said in holophrase. “That’s mine,”

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“He’s got more than me,” “This is a gift for you” require more complex language and social rules.1 Talking about events of the day leads attention away from the immediate present and into a larger world in time and space. Since having fire requires social discipline and planning for the future, and the existence of joint meals (eating the collectively produced and cooked food) creates a regularly occurring social ritual, fire-using hominids were embarked on the path to social etiquette. At some point there emerged deliberate turn-taking (one person “has the floor,” speaking while others listen and respond). If some persons speak more than others, having greater verbal facility, this creates leadership, social ranking, and eventually management, politics, and diplomacy. And these in turn create a demand for language capable of dealing with issues arising in new social relationships. Speaking rules creates social organization, and vice versa, in an ongoing chain. The main problem with pidgin-sentences (and even more so with a collection of protophrases and protowords) is that anything complicated is ambiguous. “Girl man give fire” leaves it unclear who gives what to who. If everything talked about is visible in the immediate situation, the ambiguity can be resolved by pointing (although it might also take the invention of an expression for “what do you mean?”). But if what is talked about happens elsewhere or at a different time, there needs to be language structure, i.e., grammar. Evolutionary selection continues, but it is no longer biological. A group who over time accumulates a more grammatical language can adjudicate conflicts inside their group. They can discuss and plan how to deal with external groups, allies, or enemies; they can exchange things with them and create market networks. Negotiating with allies and making threats or truces with enemies call for even more verbal skill. Misunderstandings, mistakes, and lies happen, and these call for yet further grammatical terms. Rozov points out that miscommunications motivate people to meet and discuss what went wrong—it creates new speaking rituals. Of course, it is likely that much of the time, and over hundreds of generations, little hominid groups did not resolve their misunderstandings and went on distrusting, fighting, quitting, and moving away. But those who did evolve more grammar became the coalition leader, the law giver or judge. The eventual result was to be able to say things like: “You said X, but you didn’t do it.” “No, I didn’t.” “You are a liar.” “I swear it’s true.” These kinds of expressions take us far into the realm of tenses, conjunctions, speech acts, and reflexive talk about talk itself. It becomes a conceptual vocabulary and speech forms out of which abstract rules can be stated. Perhaps, the most important of such early rules were terms for kinship relations (as Levi-Strauss displayed in the massive comparisons in The Elementary Structures of Kinship), expressed in abstract terms such as “mother’s sister’s son or daughter goes away to marry father’s brother’s son or

1

The biblical story of Jakob and Esau, attributed to the most ancient times, is about two brothers, one returning from hunting, the other who offers him a bowl of lentils in exchange for his birthright inheritance. This could not have been said in the era of pidgin-sentences.

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daughter” or many other kinship rules found among stateless people. Levi-Strauss noted that anthropologists sometimes found the tribal elders gathered to discuss how the rules applied to the current situation, and even to negotiate exceptions or making new kinship/marriage rules. The rules were a practical achievement of oral language, and certainly not “set in stone” (since writing was not yet invented). Their reality as rules was affirmed in speaking rituals, by individuals who were the diplomats and politicians of kinship-alliance politics. And not just group leaders performed this kind of talk. All members of a group of Homo sapiens at their campsite must have learned to talk (as small children do among themselves today), about “who hurt who, who helped or didn’t help who... who observed the rules and who violated them” (Rozov). The grammar of past events and abstract rules becomes the everyday conversational ritual, spreading complex language to everyone. Conversational ritual during the centuries of developing complex language was intensely Durkheimian: ritual discussions of what is right and wrong, praise and punishment, inclusion or exclusion, rewarded by collective effervescence and the pride of moral egotism.2 Once again, Rozov parts company with the paleontologists who see evolution almost entirely in terms of brain capacity and behavior focused on utilitarian concern with tools and food. For complex language, at least, the driving concerns—the topics of discussion—were social relationships themselves. The growing strength of language-bound groups continued for thousands of generations, tens of thousands of years. By the time nineteenth- and twentiethcentury missionaries, colonists, and anthropologists wrote down the customs of surviving Paleolithic hunter-gatherers, there were none without a complex language. None of them remained in the pidgin stage. All “were capable of negotiation, alliances, and exchanges, and maintained complex kinship ties... all possess complete languages, with a very complex lexicon, grammar, and syntax.”

What Caused the Varieties of Historically Existing Languages? Writing was invented perhaps 4500 years ago. Historical linguistics (once called philology) became a research field in the 1700s and 1800s. The aim was to reconstruct the history of languages, starting with present-day written languages and working backward. The chief method was to compare words across languages, looking for similarities that could be taken as evidence of descent from a common root. Later researchers extended this effort to include non-written languages. The

2

The Hebrew Old Testament illustrates the atmosphere of collective moralizing in tribal coalitions, enforcing discipline through religious language invoking unseen Powers, and cursing and destroying ritual outsiders.

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method is almost entirely internal to language, the opposite of the social interactional approach taken by Rozov and others reviewed in this book. Rozov is skeptical that all languages can be traced back to some hypothetical root-language, Indo-European or an even more inclusive ancestral people. A better question to ask is: why are there so many different languages? More precisely, how did the number of languages vary over the entire history of humans? And what caused the number of languages to decline or grow? It is important to bear in mind that for most of the past 5000 or more generations, hominids lived in small bands of a few dozen at most, and they migrated over extremely large territories of the earth, often widely separated from each other. What Rozov refers to as “crossing the language Rubicon” probably happened more than once; as holophrases turned into words, the syllables and phonemes that different groups focused upon were different in different places, and so were the grammars they evolved. Surely that is the more straightforward explanation of why the basic sound units and their forms of combination in Japanese, Chinese, Greek, Gaelic, Finnish, Kalahari Desert click-tones language, and the Nahuatl language of the Aztecs are so different. Turning the usual question around, how can we explain how the 7–8000 known (today) languages winnowed down to the 200 language families posited in current linguistics? The starting number of hominid languages may have been very much larger, but these languages disappeared because the group died out, or was absorbed or conquered by another group. The widespread languages of the world (about 10 to 20 of which made their own transition to writing) were those of the biggest social formations: organized by states and armies, priests and missionaries, or merchant enterprises. Hence the languages of major ethnic groups and nations are the result of top-down processes: a cosmopolitan, distance-spanning elite promoting the ascendency of their high-prestige language, and below them, little language-group pockets of heterogeneous origin who eventually were coerced or enticed into speaking the big-state language. Rozov’s analysis stops here. He does not attempt to explain what made syntax inflected or analytical, agglutinative or isolating, conveying grammar through auxiliary verbs and adverbs, instead of by suffixes and prefixes. Or why the French picked out the nuances of e, é, or è, to hang semantic differences upon, while English speakers struggle to even hear them. From a sociological point of view, speaking is first of all a ritual of microinteractional attunement; language is a set of Durkheimian symbols that result. All social organization, small and local or large and distant, is put together out of language rituals; the complexity of the language mirrors the organization it was evolved to talk about, and thereby to enact it. The history of the forms of interaction drove the history of languages, and vice versa. Rozov calls this the spiral of coevolution: between practical concerns of human-animals with their immediate problems, and the structures they create, both in the networks and institutions of

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social organization and in the cultural structures that become the languages of the world. Philadelphia, PA November 2022

Randall Collins

Preface

This book was born from a section of another work designed to provide the prehistorical foundations for the philosophy and theory of history series of monographs. It was impossible to get around the long-standing and equally mysterious topic of the origin of language and consciousness. I had to dive into the literature, and it caught on. The section grew into a chapter and then four chapters. The prospect of writing a big theoretical book on anthropogenesis was receding into a vague distance. All right, I decided to quickly finish a little book on glottogenesis. It did not work quickly because the difficulty of the theme turned out to be fascinating. The accumulated hypotheses and results of others, especially those of recent decades, combined with my models and concepts already tested in philosophy and macrosociology suddenly began to produce unexpected and inspiring fruit. These ideas opened new theoretical possibilities for further advancement on the subject. And there was no stopping. The result was 11 chapters with new concepts, schemes, models, explanations, untested hypotheses, and versions, as well as phase and factor models, time charts, and tables. With all this, you, dear Reader, will have to face, if you have not yet thought seriously to plunge into the book, frankly speaking, in some places difficult, possibly tedious, indeed not easy, and not entertaining. The title of the book refers to “language” and “consciousness.” The focus will explain the stages of glottogenesis, with some musings on the simultaneous development of the faculties of consciousness and remarks on other cognitive and mental functions: attention, perception, memory, thinking, and emotions. It seems evident that all these abilities of the psyche of our distant ancestors developed in the closest conjunction with the development of speech and language. Since the stages of glottogenesis themselves remain hypothetical, it would be too vague a fantasy to build some more meta-hypotheses on top of them. Even without such speculations, the ideas and versions presented in the book have an acute shortage (and often a complete lack) of empirical foundations, for which the author will receive a fair amount of well-deserved criticism. Chapter 1 “Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results” is devoted to putting at least an approximate order in a huge space of xxiii

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ideas, approaches, concepts of glottogenesis, and empirical studies related to this problematic. A single typology was insufficient. I distinguished five aspects and accordingly received five typologies. It turned out that certain types of concepts from distinct aspects gravitate toward each other, which allowed me to identify three conflicting contemporary paradigms (vast research programs). According to the ideas of Imre Lakatos and Randall Collins such conflictual structuring of the research field is necessary for creative development because it forms a unified space of intellectual attention and promotes productive argumentation. One of three paradigms fully corresponds to my view on mechanisms and patterns of evolution, so I focused on it. It is within this paradigm, ecosocial, multistage, functionalist, and nomological that I have identified and articulated in ten points the most plausible ideas and valuable results already achieved by other researchers. I do not argue with them but take this as a starting point for further theoretical advancement. Chapter 2 “Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution” has a paradigmatic and methodological character. It begins with the “black-box” scheme of anthropogenesis and the challenge of transforming it into a “transparent box.” The main phenomena for the evolutionary explanation include the linguistic universals taken in Charles Hockett’s classic version and major features of consciousness. The “difficult problem” of consciousness will be left out of the brackets. Consciousness is defined according to “cognitive pluralism” as a special integration of accumulated mental abilities, including those providing subjective experience, the structure of “self,” and volition. The a priori rules of language structure emergence are formulated as the initial axiomatics and the framework of further reasoning. The concepts “gene-culture coevolution” and “cultural drive” serve as the biological evolutionary basis of the research. “Evolutionary zones of proximal development” and the functional model as a dynamic interaction of factors play an important role in its systemic foundation. The core concepts of the model are defined within this construction: concerns, support (or providing) structures, and magic wands. Evolutionary principles are formulated as the basis for subsequent reasoning about patterns of sapientation and glottogenesis. Chapter 3 “Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals” outlines in more detail the conceptual tools: the dynamic relationship between techno-natural niches and social orders, challenges-threats, and challengesopportunities. They connect with concerns, attempts, and fixation mechanisms on multiple levels of selection, as well as with communicative concerns, practices, and sign structures. The concepts of interiorization and interactive ritual appear to be intrinsically close. The concepts of operant conditioning and mental attitudes complement the explanatory device. The main difficulty in the research of glottogenesis is the complete absence of direct data on the development of speech and language. The multiple indirect data obtained in archaeology, paleoanthropology, and paleogenetics are insufficient. To overcome this difficulty, I suggest an extended version of the Hempelian nomological explanation that allows systematic use of both these data and up-to-date observations, comparisons, experiments for testing theoretical (“universal”) hypotheses.

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Chapter 4 “Self-domestication and Normativity: Conditions for the Breakthrough to Speech” is devoted to an analysis of similarities and differences between known traits of living in groups of great apes or anthropoids (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos) and putative characteristics of the earliest hominins.3 Significant phenomena of the psyche, behavior, and development of humans and human communities, such as consciousness, interactive rituals, interiorization, attitude formation, translation of cultural patterns, social relations, and orders, have germinal analogs in anthropoids. These traits, as well as the phenomena of preconsciousness, prerituals, preattitudes, and differentiated sound signals, must also have belonged to hominins. They played the role of ingredients for the formation of sapient traits (approaching human ones). The transition of dominance from alpha males to egalitarian coalitions, the subsequent self-domestication, joint intentionality, and normativity (D. Belyaev, R. Wrangham, P. Bingham, M. Tomasello, and B. Hare) formed a complex driver for the next breakthrough to speech, language, and consciousness. Chapter 5 “Crossing the Language Rubicon: From Signal Multiplication to Distinguishing Protowords” explored multiple explanations for this breakthrough. Classical and modern thinkers suggested a variety of origins of speech communication: grooming, singing, gesture, “mirror neurons,” neural overlaps, instrumental activity (“labor”), recruiting as calls to capture and carve large carcasses of fallen animals, conspiring and “cold” aggression, instructing children, regulating sexual relations, and erotic flirtations. In each explanation, the fundamental role of normativity, rituals, and behavioral responses to fundamental concerns and challenges of renewed social orders is shown. Some of them are plausible because they have these essential components at their core. The first linguistic structures include protosyllables, protowords, holophrases, phonemes, and syllables. The recruitment competition seems to be an initial mechanism for the multiplication of protosyllables and their development of articulation. Chapter 6 “The Childhood of Language: Rituals of Rephrasing and Reactive Protophrases” continues the development of articulate and meaningful speech, but with an emphasis on the level of direct communication, the significance of misunderstanding in hominin groups, and the corresponding permanent concern for recognizing what lies behind the sounds produced by tribe members. The initial stages of speech development should be considered a by-product of the rituals of rephrasing and guessing. Levels of selection include selecting sign forms in behavior and selecting inherited predispositions among individuals, groups, and populations. Special attention is paid to the problem actively discussed in the modern literature: Could Neanderthals speak or not? Within the framework of the concept of multistage glottogenesis, it is correct to ask: What level of communicative abilities did they probably possess? There are arguments in favor of a definite interval achieved by Neanderthals on the ladder of linguistic complexity.

The general term “hominins” in this book refers to humans and all their ancestors and related species, from Ardipithecus and Australopithecus to Neanderthals, Denisovans, and Protosapienses.

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Chapter 7 “Managing Imagination” of Interlocutors and the Phases of Protolanguage Development” discusses the essential stage of speech development and joint intentionality (focused joint attention) beyond the limits of the present situation. The leading-away protophrases appear when the speaker “leads away” the listeners’ attention and “directs their imagination” (Merlin Donald), trying to inform about what happened in another place and another time. I insist on the role of joint meals in establishing the order of remarks (which is by no means “natural” or instinctive) in the practices of discussing the events that have happened, the proceedings. Concerns probably stimulated a progressive increase in the precision of the remarks. Naturally, after the stage of leading-away protophrases came pidgin-sentences with an order of protowords but still without syntax and grammar (“proto-language” according to D. Bickerton). At the same time, there is a transformation of protowords into fullfledged words and epochal separation of consciousness from attention, which opens ways for further development of consciousness abilities as the lexico-semantic fundament of psyche and culture. Chapter 8 “The Need for Syntax and Illusion of the Consciousness Totality” is devoted to an equally crucial step: the transformation of a protolanguage into a fullfledged language with a set of syntactic constructions and grammatical rules for the coordination of word forms. This new progression toward greater precision of utterance requires a particular explanation. The new social orders and communicative preoccupations caused the insufficiency of pidgin sentences. A hypothesis has been advanced about the nature of the changes associated with the mysterious “sapientation cauldron” in southern and eastern Africa when Heidelbergians became Protosapienses and those became Early sapienses. The latter were already ready to take the technological and cultural take-off of the Upper Paleolithic. The syntax could appear from the completion of sentences in dialogue, just according to the principle of interiorization by Vygotsky. It was also the time for the appearance of so-called mental maps, that is, skeletons of consciousness, thinking abilities, and basic logical structures. The consciousness “totality” (Kant’s “unity of apperception”) gets its rationale from the point of view of psychology and neuroscience. This “totality” did not appear “suddenly” but has its history of development connected with the complication of language, especially in terms of semantics and cognitive schemes. Chapter 9 “Bridging the Pre-Language Gap” critically examines the foundations of two major research programs aimed at filling the gap between the completion of glottogenesis and the known ancient languages: macro-comparativists in historical linguistics and the unification of genetic approaches with linguistic approaches (again of macro-comparativist tendency) in the series of studies led by Luca Cavalli-Sforza. The super-objective “to reconstruct a single proto-European language” (whether “proto-indo-European” or “Nostratic”) seems to be dubious. In my alternative approach, I suggest a series of macrosocial laws of linguistic evolution based mainly on common sense and historical intuition. The Toba volcano eruption circa 74 thousand years ago (hereafter—kya) led to the “volcanic winter” catastrophe and significant depopulation. The macroprocesses of language evolution accompanied the settlement of sapienses on continents and islands, ethnogenesis,

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and the stages of political evolution according to Robert Carneiro, and world-system evolution according to Immanuel Wallerstein. The number of primary language families (with the apparent close kinship of languages) seems constant, but the number of languages has changed dramatically. Chapter 10 “Linguistic Complexity and Simplicity: Socio-Evolutionary Roots” deals with the reasons languages steadily increase in complexity and the grounds keeping some languages remarkably simple and unchanging. Here we return to the Upper Paleolithic era, where the primary driver of complexity was the emergence of the “economy of deferred reciprocity” (Kim Sterelny) and the development of intergroup relations and kinship systems. It is possible to explain the peculiarities (“simplicity”) of the Piraha language as a natural consequence of the unique culturalmental strategy adopted by the tribe. The concluding Chap. 11 “The Nature of Modern Languages Affinity” explains the evolutionary causes of linguistic universals (according to Hockett), considering the analysis conducted in the book. The most difficult problem is the one of linguistic kinship. Since the strategy of reconstruction of common protolanguages goes back to the “obvious” origin of Romance languages from Latin, we had to deal as much as possible with this question, which turned out to be extremely dark. At the same time, the proposed answers to it are questionable. Therefore, based on macrosocial principles of linguistic evolution, an alternative view of the origin of Romance languages has been presented, opening new heuristic possibilities for linguistic reconstructions. The Conclusion presents a summary of scientific results in conditional time schemes. It outlines the strategy of prehistory research based on comparing various “linguistic traces” with the data of paleosciences using the known macrosocial regularities. Finally, as a philosophical reflection of the obtained results, statements are formulated that connect them to the topical political and philosophical problems and the idea of the humanistic meaning of history. The Index of Subjects was initially conceived as a technical auxiliary device, but unexpectedly grew out of this role. It turned out to be a rather thorough thesaurus of the entire field of glottogenesis studies. So, “don’t pass it by.” While working on the index, the author discovered quite a few surprises in his book, so I dare to hope that the thoughtful reader will find something to ponder here. Novosibirsk, Russia

Nikolai S. Rozov

Acknowledgments

Compiling the acknowledgment section in the English edition of the book was not easy for me. Usually, authors list dozens of colleagues’ names on an entire page. Colleagues help the authors, discussed various problems and topics in the book, offered advice, and criticized. To my great regret, I lack such a circle of communication in the problems of language origin. We talked about it in a meaningful way only with Oleg Donskikh, professor of philosophy and philologist by primary education. In 1984, he wrote a book about the classical theories of language origin, starting from Antiquity, and in great detail about the concepts of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. The naivety of these theories makes it possible to feel how significant the intellectual breakthrough of the last three decades is. Using Donskikh’s book as a guide in classical literature, I honestly tried to build my “retrospective canon” as a chain of notable authors whose ideas I developed in this book. Unfortunately, this endeavor was a complete failure. For me, the only finding was the not particularly famous book “Of the origin and progress of language” (1774) by J. B. Monboddo, albeit also naive in many ways, but striking with a few bold insights. On the subject of my book, I talked personally, but more often on the Web, with several Russian anthropologists, linguists, archaeologists, neurophysiologists, psychologists, and historians. I express my gratitude and appreciation to all of them. I have tried to take many of the comments into account in the book. However, unfortunately, almost none of them specifically dealt with glottogenesis problems. Biologist Alexander Markov showed the importance of gene-culture coevolution and cultural drive and then supported my work in e-mail correspondence and suggested some essential details. Linguist Svetlana Burlak, who has authored a book with a sensible retelling of modern theories on glottogenesis, made valuable critical comments on my article (one chapter from the book) and mentioned helpful literature. I am also grateful for the support and valuable comments of archaeologist Leonid Vishnyatsky, whose systematic comparisons and summaries of Middle and Upper Paleolithic achievements I consider profound and exemplary. xxix

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I express my deep gratitude to Eugene Anderson for his valuable criticisms, comments, and legitimate demands to define new concepts more clearly. I have tried my best to respond to his notes with additions and corrections. In my theoretical study of the origin of language and consciousness, I rely mainly on the ideas and results of contemporary Western authors with whom, to my great regret, I do not know personally, but I am very grateful to all of them. The ranks of this gratitude partly correlate with the frequency of references in the book’s pages, so I turn the Reader to the Index of names and will not bore with an additional listing. I make an exception for one single name: Randall Collins. I will briefly tell the story of our acquaintance since it is directly related to the idea of this book and the essence of the theoretical approach undertaken. I first learned of this name in 1995, when it turned out that Collins was the only social thinker who not only predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union (before him, Leo Trotsky, Helene d’Encausse, and Andrew Amalrik did so) but relied on a general theory, in full accordance with the nomological approach of Carl Hempel. This approach was familiar to me since I was engaged in theoretical history, better known today as “historical macrosociology” or “macrohistory.” Collins’ ideas, concepts, and approach made such a profound impression on me that I set aside my projects and translated two of his books (“The Sociology of Philosophies” and “Macrohistory”—1280 pp. and 500 pp. in Russian editions). I attach particular importance to the theory of interactive rituals of Collins. It turned out that we have a common ideological source, the psychology of Vygotsky. In the 1960s, Vygotsky’s works were well known at Harvard, where young Collins studied psychology. At Moscow University in the Department of Psychology, where I studied in the 1970s–1980s, Vygotsky is considered the founder of the scientific school and generally has an aura of intellectual genius. In my university lectures, articles, and books, I expound and try to develop Collins’s ideas, which I can barely distinguish from my own since they are so close to me. I was lucky enough to communicate with Collins several times in Washington DC and Chicago at meetings of the Macrohistorical Dynamics network I organized in the late 1990s as part of the Social Science History Association (SSHA) conferences. We also talked a lot in Novosibirsk, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, where Collins came in 2002 to present his book, “The Sociology of Philosophies.” As I embarked on the new topic of the origins of language, reading many Englishlanguage books and articles, I found myself, to my surprise, in an intellectual context I knew well. The evolutionary, cultural-historical conception of the human psyche, the social conditioning of language development in phylogeny and ontogeny, the theory of interiorization, and the importance of emotional interactions for the formation of the mental structures—these and similar ideas, which have become popular in the problems of glottogenesis in the last 10–15 years—were for me selfevident. A sense of solid theoretical foundation allowed me to focus on combining the concepts I knew with the results of recent studies of glottogenesis. Randall Collins was the first English-speaking scientist to read this book, approved my approach, and supported it. Every scientist who has shown his

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magnificent work to his teacher and received his approval will understand my feelings of joy and gratitude. Perhaps one will say something like this about the volume: “It is the book of a strange guy from distant Siberia who took Randall Collins’ ideas, combined them with the approaches of Leo Vygotsky and Carl Hempel, and decided that this is the way to reconstruct and explain the origin of language and consciousness.” Well, let it be.

Contents

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2

Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 From Differentiation to Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Typologies of Conceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Structure of Evolution and the Problem of the Language Rubicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Direction of Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Ontological Levels of “Springboards to Speech” and Main Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4 Empirical, Inductive, and Idiographic Approaches . . . . 1.2.5 Modeling, Experimental, and Deductive Approaches . . 1.2.6 The Synthesis of Inductive and Deductive Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Three Approximate Paradigms of Glottogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Main Achievements in the Study of Glottogenesis: Plausible Ideas and Research Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The “Black Box” of Anthropogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Explained Phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Linguistic Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 From the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness to Cognitive Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Consciousness as Accumulated Layers of Mental Abilities . . . . 2.6 Self-Structure and Volition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Aromorphoses and Glotto-Aromorphoses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 The A Priori Temporal Structure of Language Origin and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 8 12 13 19 19 20 22 22 24 25 26 27 xxxiii

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Contents

2.9

Glotto-Aromorphoses as Rises in the Linguistic Complexity Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10 The Rules of the Emergence of Linguistic Structures . . . . . . . . 2.11 The Gene-Culture Coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.12 The Cultural Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.13 Sapientation and Language as By-Products of Survival Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.14 Evolutionary Zones of Proximal Development . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.15 The Functionalist Approach to Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.16 Concerns, Needs, and Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.17 Support Structures, Exaptations, and Magic Wands . . . . . . . . . 2.18 Principles of Evolution Applied to Sapientation and Glottogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals . . . 3.1 Renewal of Techno-Natural Niches and Social Orders . . . . . . . 3.2 Coevolution of Niches, Orders, and Communications . . . . . . . 3.3 Disclosure of Transformation Mechanisms: Phase and Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Communicative Concerns, Speech Abilities, and Sign Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Are Functionalist Explanations of Language Constructions Justified? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 The Spiral Coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 The Linguistic Concerns Are Internal Stimuli for Language Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Abilities and Attitudes as the Main Phenomena to Explain . . . . 3.9 The Interiorization Mechanism Is a Key to the Origin of Mental Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10 Interactive Ritual and Interiorization: A Synthesis of the Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11 Positive Reinforcements, Emotional Energy, and Normativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12 Attempts and Fixation Mechanisms at Distinct Levels of Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13 Approaches to the Study of Cognitive Abilities and the Crucial Role of Rituals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14 The Constructive Notion of Consciousness Is a Key to Its Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15 The Phylogeny of Consciousness Is the Accumulation of Cognitive Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16 Extension of Hempel’s Nomological Explanatory Model . . . . . 3.17 Glottogenesis as a Discontinuous Development with Multiple Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 30 31 35 37 38 40 41 42 43 45 49 49 51 53 55 57 58 59 61 61 62 63 65 65 67 68 69 72

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The Relationship Between Anthropogenesis and Glottogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4

Self-Domestication and Normativity: Conditions for the Breakthrough to Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Fundamental Needs and Derivative Concerns in Social Animal Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Similarities and Differences in the Orders of Animal and Human Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Animal Pre-Consciousness and Peculiarities of Anthropoids’ Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Pre-Rituals in the Animal World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 “Animal Language” as a Part of the “Episodic Mind” . . . . . . . 4.6 The Learning Ability of Anthropoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Social Orders of Early Hominins as Structures that Ensured Their Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 The Traits of Early Hominins as Ingredients for Future Support Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 Differences of Orders in Groups of Social Animals and Hunter-Gatherers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 Is Human Normativity Unique? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11 The Level of Ultramicro: From Self-Training to Normative Rituals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.12 Hominins and Humans Are Close to Bonobos..., but Too Similar to Baboons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.13 The First Group Norms and Their Evolutionary Advantage . . . 4.14 Philosophical Interlude: The Sociosphere as an Ontology of “Institutional Facts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.15 The Shift of the Regulative Instance from Another Person to a Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.16 Why Has the Concern for Communicating/Understanding Rules Become So Acute? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.17 The Dominance of Egalitarian Coalitions and Self-Domestication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.18 Internal Logic of the Normativity Emergence: Nomological Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.19 The Rationale for the Theoretical Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.20 The Empirical Hypothesis: Why and When Normativity Emerged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.21 Were the Early Homo the First to Establish Rules of Behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.22 A Simultaneous Breakthrough in the Three Spheres of Sapiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74 75 79 79 81 82 83 84 86 88 89 91 93 95 96 98 99 101 102 104 106 109 111 115 118 119

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6

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Crossing the Language Rubicon: From Signal Multiplication to Distinguishing Protowords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Grooming and Joint Vocalization as Rituals of Solidarity . . . . . 5.2 Did Gesticulation, “Mirror Neurons,” and Neural Overlap Breakthrough to Speech? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Tools, Speech, and Stages of Their Mutual Conditioning . . . . . 5.4 What Is Primary: Scavenger Recruitings or Normative Requirements? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Did Language Appear for Conspiracy and Proactive Aggression? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 The Teaching of Children and Social Control of the Speech “Correctness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Sexuality in Hominin Groups: The Cauldron of Passion and the Concerns of Ordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Animal Signals and Hominins’ Protowords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 The Cultural Drive of the Breakthrough to Speech: From Concerns to Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.10 “Need for Something that Does Not Exist”: The Paradox and Its Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.11 Linguistic Interlude I: Formation of Phonetic Systems . . . . . . . 5.12 Competition of Recruitings and Multiplication of Protowords . . 5.13 The Conflicts of Belonging Led to New Communicative Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.14 Genetic Mutations, Brain Growth, or Multiplication of Protowords: Which Process Was a Primary Driver? . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Childhood of Language: Rephrasing Rituals and Reactive Protophrases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 From the Variability of Ecological Niches to Social Tensions and New Communicative Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Linguistic Interlude II: Structures in Pre-Speech and the Fold/Unfold Ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Significance of Misunderstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 The Closest Analogies: A Comparison of Children’s and Anthropoids’ Speech Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 How Did New Protowords Emerge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 Speech Development as a By-Product of Rephrasing and Guessing Rituals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 The Subject-Predicate Structure: The Problem of Genesis . . . . 6.8 Multiplication of Protowords at the Ultramicro-Level . . . . . . . 6.9 From Single Protowords to Reactive Protophrases . . . . . . . . . . 6.10 Three Levels of Selection in Hominin Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.11 The Severity of Group Selection and the Role of Speech in the Evolutionary Triumph of Sapienses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123 123 126 129 131 133 134 135 138 139 140 141 143 147 148 151 155 155 156 160 161 163 164 166 168 170 172 173

Contents

6.12 6.13 6.14

Heidelbergians and Their Cognitive Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . Did Neanderthals Talk? What Could They Say? . . . . . . . . . . . How and Why Were Neanderthals Different from African Protosapienses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.15 Probable Level of Neanderthals’ Speech Development . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

8

“Managing Imagination” of Interlocutors and the Phases of Protolanguage Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 At What Stage in the Language Evolution Were the Early Sapienses? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Theoretical Necessity of Recognizing Protolanguage . . . . . 7.3 A Protolanguage Began with Protosemantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Leading-Away Protophrases and Separation of Consciousness from Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Why Was It Necessary to Verbally “Lead Away” the Listeners? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 The Group Meals Ritual and the Order of Remarks Sequence . . 7.7 What Did Our Forebearers Talk About at Shared Meals? . . . . . 7.8 Levels of Protolanguage and the Concern for Refinement . . . . . 7.9 Who Is a Hero, Who Is a Coward, and Who Is an Intruder? . . . 7.10 The Transition to Pidgin-Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.11 The Riddle of the Words’ Birth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.12 The Transformation Signal→Protoword→Word as the “Semiotic Triangle” Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.13 Transition to Protolanguage: The Nomological Explanation . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Need for Syntax and Illusion of the Consciousness Totality . . . 8.1 Learnability and Full-Fledged Language as the Main Evolutionary Advantage of Sapienses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Protolanguage and Language: Criteria for Distinction . . . . . . . 8.3 Bickerton’s Greedy Brawlers, Dessalles’s Honest Girl, and the Importance of “Social Calculus” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 The Precision Concern Leads to Predicates of Qualities and a Syntax Complication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 The “Paleoclimatic Pump” and the African Cauldron of Sapientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Circumscription, Migration, and Clashes of Protosapienses . . . 8.7 Intergroup Alliances and Negotiations as Factors for Clarification of Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 The Communicative Challenges of the Most Ancient Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 Factors of Language Refinement in Intergroup Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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175 176 178 180 184 187 187 188 188 190 191 192 194 195 197 199 204 205 206 211 213 213 214 215 217 219 220 222 224 226

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The First Complex Sentences as the Product of Contracting Utterances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.11 Mental Maps, Patterns of Consciousness, and Thinking . . . . . 8.12 The Logical Origin of Syntax Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.13 Thinking and Cognition Gain Autonomy from Language . . . . 8.14 Switching Contexts and Language Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . 8.15 Contexts in Terms of Psychology and Neuroscience . . . . . . . 8.16 The Transition from Protolanguage to Simple Syntax: The Nomological Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contents

8.10

9

10

. . . . . .

228 229 230 231 232 232

. 234 . 238

Bridging the Pre-language Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 The “White and Blind Spot”: How to Fill It? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Approaches and Problems of Reconstructing Pre-languages . . . 9.3 The Correspondence of Languages and Ethnic Groups: A Ready-Made Solution or a Starting Point for Research? . . . . 9.4 The Size of Communities and the Vertical Structure of Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 Macrosocial Regularities of Languages Evolution . . . . . . . . . . 9.6 World-Systemic Languages and the Transition to Writing . . . . 9.7 Factors of Language Development Within Societies . . . . . . . . 9.8 The Original Linguistic Oikumene: Unity or Dissection? . . . . . 9.9 The “Volcanic Winter” Catastrophe: And Progenitors of All Known Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.10 Stages of Glottogenesis and Linguistic Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.11 The Exit to the Eurasiatic Expanses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.12 Language Development in the Upper Paleolithic . . . . . . . . . . . 9.13 Resource Depletion, Transition to Neolithic, and Political Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Linguistic Complexity and Simplicity: The Socio-evolutionary Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Evolutionary Divergence of Languages Under a Single Functional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 The Drivers of Language Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 The Economics of Reciprocity and Deferred Commitments . . . 10.4 Speech Self-presentation and Linguistic “Redundancy” . . . . . . 10.5 The Complication of Language: Principal Trends and the Nomological Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 Leaders of Linguistic Simplicity: Piraha and Riau . . . . . . . . . . 10.7 Spatial Orientation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.8 The Identity Strategy of “Straight-Headed” People . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

241 241 242 245 248 249 252 253 254 254 257 259 261 263 266 269 269 270 272 277 279 281 284 285 291

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11

12

The Nature of the Affinity of Modern Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Morphological Types of Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 The Structural Unity of Protolanguages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 The Explanation of Language Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 Diversity and Exotics of Known Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5 Types of Linguistic Kinship and Proximity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6 Problems of Explaining Language Types and Affinity . . . . . . 11.7 The “Natural” and “Artificial” Processes in Language Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8 The Irreducible Multilingualism of Great Empires . . . . . . . . . 11.9 Uniform Writing and Different Pronunciation . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.10 The Origin of Romance Languages: Was There an Empire-Wide “Folk Latin”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.11 The Effects of the Latinized Regional Languages Codification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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293 293 294 296 301 302 303

. 304 . 306 . 306 . 307 . 311 . 314

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Scientific Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Scientific Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 The Philosophical Epilogue: Lessons of Acquiring Language by Humans and the Humanistic Challenge . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

317 317 319 322 326

Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

About the Author

Nikolai S. Rozov Doctor of Philosophy, Professor Areas of research: macrosociology, the philosophy of history, early human evolution, the methodology of social cognition, and value theory. Candidate thesis (Tomsk State University, 1989) and Dr. Sc. thesis (Moscow State University, 1993) in social philosophy. He is Chief Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Since 1987, he has been working in Novosibirsk State University, at present as the Head of the Department of social philosophy. In 1997, he organized the network “Macrohistorical Dynamics” at the Social Science and History Association (SSHA), and for several years formed sections for the annual meetings (Washington, DC, Chicago, St. Louis, etc.). He is the author of more than 380 scientific works, including the ten monographs (in Russian). He is the compiler and scientific editor of the almanac “The World Time” and the series of collective monographs “Theoretical History and Macrosociology.” Articles by Nikolai S. Rozov (in English, public domain) related to the theme of the book: • The Language Origin Paradigms: Conceptual Typologies, Results Accumulation, and Theoretical Perspectives • The Strangeness and Origins of Human Sexuality • Acceleration of History: The Conceptual Frame work for Causal Analysis xli

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About the Author

• The Circumscription Theory by Robert Carneiro in the Socio-Ontological and Macrosociological Context • The Meaning of History as a Trial for Humanity: Philosophical Foundations for a Global Multilevel Legal and Judicial System • The Historical Macrosociology: Formation, Funda mental Areas of Research, and Types of Methods • The Apologia for Theoretical History

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3

Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5

Fig. 2.6

Cognitive evolution and glottogenesis as a “black box.” The white arrows mean the transitions between phases. Black arrows mean impacts on the “black-box” processes from conditions and factors of different nature. Gray arrows indicate the use of general principles and regularities to “open the black box,” i.e., to reconstruct and explain its internal processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Diagram of glottogenesis with preceding and following epochs. Solid lines indicate languages known to linguists from direct data. Dotted lines denote reconstructions of pre-languages based on indirect data, usually based on phonetic or lexical diachronic regularities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The model of gene-culture coevolution where blocks indicate conditional phases and arrows mean transitions between them. The shaded blocks and arrows denote processes mainly related to heredity and selection, while the white blocks designate aspects of behavior, psyche, and culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The evolutionary mechanism of cultural drive .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . Levels of changes in glottogenesis and causal links between them. The shaded arrows denote causal influences “from the top-down” and “from the outside-in.” White arrows mean the reverse causality vector—costs, constraints, and opportunities “supplied” by structures. The levels in bold are the focus of this study. The blocks within the oval designate “the life circle” as a driver of technological progress and social evolution. The lower blocks can be treated as “the side effects” of this circle that, in turn, produce morphological and cognitive sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Stinchcombe’s model of functional causality. From now on, solid arrows mean positive (strengthening, increasing) connection, and dashed arrows mean negative (weakening, decreasing) relationship . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

28

34 36

38

40

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Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5

Fig. 3.6

Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5

List of Figures

The model of structure and community selection (groups, alliances, populations). It is a mechanism of emergence and preservation of new successful (sapient) features of different nature while discarding features and groups that proved to be inadequate. Here, blocks denote conditional phases of processes, and arrows indicate transitions between phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Presumptive dynamic interconnection of factors (drivers), conditioning the emergence and development of a new support structure (anatomical, physiological, behavioral, mental, social) in anthropogenesis. Gray arrows denote the dependence of costgenerating practices on fundamental needs and concerns . . . . . .. . . . The cycle of communicative concerns and linguistic structures development as part of the spiral coevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Approaches to explaining consciousness (and more broadly: human cognitive abilities) (Revonsuo, 2009, p. 285) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The extended nomological explanation of cognitive evolution and glottogenesis phenomena. The largest shaded arrow means the influence of causal phenomena on consequences in the reality under study (lower right area). The white arrows denote the logical justifications of judgments in theoretical thinking (upper left area) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The scheme of justification of the theoretical hypothesis in the extended nomological approach. Here, the blocks denote judgments and arguments. The arrows indicate logical reinforcement: increasing the validity, plausibility of judgments, and confidence in them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indirect justification of a target empirical hypothesis in the extended nomological explanation scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The schematic nomological explanation of an evolutionary stage as a step-by-step formation of a new structure S to provide a new concern H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interrelation of factors influencing the strength of communicative concerns in early hominin groups. Shaded blocks denote the intensity of processes directly related to sound communication, that is, (pre)speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The formation of social conditions for human cognitive evolution and the mechanism of group selection. The blocks denote the conditional phases of the processes and the arrows indicate the transitions between them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergence of normativity in early hominins: the extended nomological explanation . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . Justification of the theoretical hypothesis explaining normativity formation . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . Justification of the empirical hypothesis on normativity emergence . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .

54

55 59 66

70

70 71

72

98

107 108 109 112

List of Figures

Fig. 4.6

Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

Fig. 5.6

Fig. 5.7 Fig. 5.8

Fig. 5.9

Fig. 6.1

Conditional scheme of the first stages of social and cognitive evolution in anthropogenesis. Bold segments denote glottoaromorphoses, or formative, innovative periods. Thin segments indicate cumulative periods in which the acquired support structures expanded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The shift in favor of sound communication as the primary social control technique due to the loss of fur (according to (Wildgen, 2012, p. 363)). Here and in Figs. 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, the solid arrows denote the generation of some phenomena by others (in the evolutionary sense), and the dashed arrows indicate the weakening or dying out of this connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The shift in favor of sound communication as a consequence of normativity emergence . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . New use of “mirror neurons” by hominins in Wildgen's version (Wildgen, 2012, p. 366) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Explaining the emergence of culture (intergenerational translation of patterns based on symbolization) with the help of “mirror neurons” . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . The dynamic relationship of factors related to fundamental concerns (security/status, sustenance), and their impact on the emergence and development of speech. All arrows denote positive, reinforcing relationships. The shaded blocks indicate factors directly related to the emergence and development of articulate speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dynamic relationship between the parameters of speech ability, gender relations, and parenthood. All arrows mean positive (strengthening) connections. The shaded blocks represent the factors directly connected with the emergence and development of articulate speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The group selection mechanism drives the coevolution of normative social order, language, larynx, memory, and brain . . . . . Extended nomological explanation of how the first holophrasesprotosyllables (poorly articulated) transformed into protowords (articulated through syllables and phonemes) . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Overcoming the language Rubicon as a step-by-step process with alternating rapid formative periods (the emergence of new magic wands in speech experimentation) and long cumulative periods (the spread of these structures to new language areas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Rosetta Stone. The texts are written in ancient Egyptian, Demotic, and Ancient Greek. No spaces between words, no punctuation, no paragraphs, no other service marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xlv

118

124 124 128

129

133

137 141

146

151

157

xlvi

Fig. 6.2

Fig. 6.3

Fig. 6.4

Fig. 6.5

Fig. 6.6

Fig. 6.7

Fig. 6.8 Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3

Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5

Fig. 7.6 Fig. 7.7 Fig. 8.1

List of Figures

Interrelation of factors that explain the progressive development of speech and language. Solid arrows denote strengthening connections; dashed arrows indicate weakening and depressing ones. The shaded blocks here and later in this chapter refer to the realm of speech and language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interrelation of factors explaining the appearance of new protowords, the ability to combine them, and compose protophrases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The transition from the holophrases to the initial phase of the subject-predicate construction according to W. Wildgen (2012, p. 376) .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . Two possible paths of transition from holophrases to protolanguage. The upper path is the Wildgen’s version. The lower path is discussed below and in the next chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . The loop of speech patterns selection (an effect of imitation on communicative leaders) is an additional contour to the spiral model. See versions of the model in Figs. 2.4 and 3.3. Here, the shaded blocks indicate new factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The sexual selection contour as an addition to the spiral model of speech ability development. See versions of the model in Figs. 2.4 and 3.3. Shaded blocks indicate new factors . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . The positive feedback contours in the group selection dynamics as the most vital driver of speech ability development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Causal links between niches, concerns, and cognitive structures underlying the emergence of leading-away protophrases. The bold names on the left side indicate the corresponding ontological levels. Shaded arrows stand for causal influence, and white arrows for transitions (transformations) . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The dynamic relationship of the factors leads to the emergence and development of pidgin-sentences and early protolanguage . . . Causal links underlying the transition from protowords to fullfledged words and from leading-away protophrases to the mature protolanguage (pidgin-sentences with different order schemes, sprouts of syntax) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stages of protoword accumulation and transition to a protolanguage . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . The extended nomological explanation of the transition to leading-away protophrases and protolanguage with pidginsentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Substantiating the theoretical hypothesis about the emergence of ability to generate pidgin-sentences . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . The conditions of protolanguage formation: the empirical hypothesis justification in an extended nomological approach . . . . Bickerton’s three-stage theory of language development (Calvin & Bickerton, 2000; Botha, 2003, p. 78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

165

166

167

168

172

173 174

200 201

202 207

207 209 210 215

List of Figures

Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 8.6

Fig. 8.7

Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2

Fig. 9.3

Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5 Fig. 9.6 Fig. 10.1

Fig. 10.2

The steps of language complexity and accuracy growth: the modified scheme . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . . Waves of sapienses’ distribution (Eswaran, 2002, p. 752) . . . . . . . . The dynamic relationship of factors leading to the emergence of language with syntax due to intergroup negotiation practices . . . . . Protolanguages transform into languages: a conditional scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The conditions of transition from a protolanguage (with pidginsentences) to a language with syntax and grammar: substantiation of the theoretical hypothesis .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . The transition conditions from a protolanguage with pidginsentences to a language with simple syntax: justification of the empirical hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Location of the pre-language gap within main stages of origin and evolution of languages: the conditional scheme. The dotted lines indicate reconstructions of the stages of glottogenesis. Dashed lines are reconstructions of “pre-languages” (“ProtoIndo-European,” “Nostratic,” etc.) and the past states of the languages studied. Solid bold lines represent languages known from written texts or scholarly records of oral speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of the tree of populations based on genome relatedness (left) and the tree of language families derived from reconstructed “primordial languages,” or “pre-languages” (right). (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1988, p. 6003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The schematic genealogical tree from Erectuses to sapienses and the “volcanic winter” following the Toba super-eruption (Rampino & Ambrose, 2000, p. 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothetical connections between the stages of glottogenesis and the structural levels of known languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The most significant changes in the number of protolanguages and the first languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothetical historical dynamics of language numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . Measurement of linguistic complexity: inverse correlations: (a) The relationship between the number of segments in the phonological inventory and the mean length of words, for ten languages of diverse families. (b) The relationship between the number of word forms that occur in a translation of the New Testament and the number of word tokens in that translation, for six languages (Nettle, 2012 p. 1831) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The complication and rhetorical enrichment of particular languages in the Upper Paleolithic .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .

xlvii

217 223 227 234

235

236

242

246

255 258 261 265

270 271

xlviii

Fig. 10.3

Fig. 10.4

Fig. 10.5 Fig. 10.6

Fig. 10.7

Fig. 10.8

Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2

List of Figures

Social factors and communicative concerns lead to the complexity of language constructions (in the broad sense). The shaded blocks relate directly to language and speech, and the white blocks relate to social interactions and mentality (cf. Fig. 10.8 explaining the language simplification) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The dynamic relationship of the factors leads to the growth of linguistic complexity in communities of Middle and Late sapienses. All arrows denote a direct reinforcing relationship between the factors . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . Sequence of the late stages of glottogenesis with a continuation of Bickerton’s conditional example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conditions of simple language enrichment with complex syntax, grammar, polysemy, and rhetorical embellishments: substantiation of the theoretical hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The conditions of simple languages enrichment in the epoch started from the Upper Paleolithic: justification of the empirical hypothesis .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . Relationship of factors that explain the simplicity of the Piraha language. The shaded blocks denote the factors of the Pirahas’ cultural-mental strategy that repress the causes of linguistic complexity (c.f. Fig. 10.3 with general dynamics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The main stages of glottogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Changing numbers of languages and linguistic families in prehistory: hypothetical dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

275

276 279

280

281

290 318 319

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 8.1 Table 10.1

Niches, orders, concerns, and structures: from Ardipithecus to Habilises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Steps to overcome the language Rubicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The main factors of early speech development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of the speech development levels between Protosapienses and Neanderthals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Factors of the cognitive evolution of Neoanthropes . . . . . . . . . . . . . The emergence of complex syntax, grammar, and rhetorical decorations . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. .

117 150 183 203 237 282

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Chapter 1

Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

1.1

From Differentiation to Integration

The absence of direct empirical data on the birth of speech and language (“blind spot”) remains a fundamental difficulty, and at one time was the basis of two strict prohibitions. In 1866, the Linguistic Society of Paris banned reports on the origin of language. The Philological Society of London established the same ban in 1873. Any speculation on the subject was declared unscientific fantasies that should not divert scientists’ energies and time, much like empty and hopeless attempts to invent the perpetual motion machine. In violation of these bans, versions of the language origin continued to multiply, and since the 1980s, there has been a flood of articles, monographs, collections, and conferences. In addition, there are special education and research programs, laboratories, centers, societies, and journal rubrics. There are even journals and whole book series devoted to the origin and evolution of language. The reason is simple: In the “blind spot” are the origins of language and the primary features and virtues of the human species inextricably linked to language, such as consciousness, culture, thinking, cognition, and social institutions. The explosive growth of scientific interest in the origin of language during the last three–four decades has led to an abundance of concepts (ideas, versions, hypotheses, and approaches) of varying degrees of plausibility and validity. Many works give informative reviews; particularly, see Pinker (1994), Bickerton (2009), Fitch (2010), Bouchard (2013), Bernabeu and Vogt (2015). If we apply Herbert Spencer’s well-known principle to the evolution of glottogenesis research itself, then differentiation must necessarily lead to integration, designed to reconnect a multitude of separated elements. In this regard, along with the emergence of new synthesis reviews, the formation and development of the project Causal Hypotheses in Evolutionary Linguistics Database (CHIELD, https:// chield.excd.org/) seems natural, claimed, and promising. The project

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_1

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Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

. . .allows users to apply computational search and visualization methods, in order to express, explore, and evaluate hypotheses (Roberts et al., 2020, p. 3).

CHIELD aims to collect and process information about thousands of variables and many thousands of relationships between them, to test many hundreds (thousands in perspective?) of hypotheses and theories. Such a bold project deserves all the support it can get. However, does its current version integrate the efforts of very heterogeneous research groups and centers? In his Sociology of Philosophies, Randall Collins convincingly demonstrated the need for a focused field of intellectual attention and competition of opposing positions to scientific and philosophical creativity (Collins, 1998). According to the “law of small numbers,” there should not be many such positions (no more than 5–6), only then the attention of many researchers remains focused, and the probability of successful advances in epochal thought turns and discoveries increases. These positions are potential “research programs” (Lakatos, 1978), which can be represented as “conceptual paradigm + methodological approach” pairs. The first component includes basic ontological notions expressed in initial principles, concepts, categories, and schemes. The second component includes ways of judgment justification, rules of correct, reliable research methods, and truth criteria. It is hardly possible by the early 2020s to speak of holistic, structured research programs in the field of language origins, which different scholars and groups perceive as distinct positions opposing each other. For such a structure of the intellectual attention field to emerge, it is necessary to identify the main aspects and lines of separation. First, consider the fundamental ontological aspects. If it is possible to compile aspects and typologies covering the most significant glottogenesis conceptions, then definite combinations of types from different typologies form the initial versions of alternative paradigms. The reasoning becomes too abstract, so let us give the main typologies of evolutionary concepts of glottogenesis (may I hope the reader will forgive the complete neglect of non-evolutionary, i.e., creationist ideas). The names of wellknown authors and their publications indicate the conceptions corresponding to the individual types of concepts.1

1 Almost all conceptions are multi-component and do not have to fit seamlessly into one type, so the same authors appear in different typologies and types. Consequently, there is no claim to an exhaustive listing of the literature: authors’ names and references only play the role of illustrative examples.

1.2

Typologies of Conceptions

1.2 1.2.1

3

Typologies of Conceptions Structure of Evolution and the Problem of the Language Rubicon

• Continualist conceptions: multiple features of sound communication, already present in animals, naturally developed, combined in human ancestors, and as a result turned into articulate speech (Darwin, 1872/2004; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Turner & Maryanski, 2008; Fitch, 2010; Turner & Machalek, 2018). Adherents of these concepts either do not mention the language Rubicon2 or explicitly reject its existence. • Saltationist conceptions: A single mutation or a crucial cognitive invention led to the emergence of language with syntax, recursion (Bickerton, 1981; Chomsky, 1986; Berwick & Chomsky, 2016). In one term or another, the authors insist on the cardinal importance of the language Rubicon, on its insurmountability through evolutionary development as a gradual adaptive change. – Variant: the faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB) developed gradually from animal communicative abilities, and the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN) with recursion emerged through rapid mutation processes and computations outside of the domain of communication (Hauser et al., 2002). In other words, FLB developed without any essential barriers (continualism), but FLN appeared just in a disposable and dramatic crossing the language Rubicon (saltationism). • Multistage conceptions: there are some steps of preparation for speech, speech breakthrough, and increasing complexity of language (Donald, 1998, 2001, 2017; Jackendoff, 2002; Bickerton, 2009; Wildgen, 2012; Dediu & Levinson, 2013, 2018; Sterelny, 2016; Fitch, 2017; Gabora & Smith, 2018). The language Rubicon is real and substantial, but our ancestors overcame it evolutionarily through multiple stages and over an exceedingly long time.

1.2.2

Direction of Causality

• The causality is “bottom-up” and “inside-out”: from parts, elements to an entire system, from quantity to quality, from a mechanism to a process. Change of a structure → selection. This type includes explanations based on ideas of neo-Darwinism (random mutations + natural selection), “natural” anatomical, and physiological changes. The continualist and saltationist conceptions are usually inclined to such an internalism. The “language Rubicon” means the qualitative boundary between the communicative systems of animals and human language.

2

4

1

Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

• The causality “top-down” and “outside-in” means from a whole to a part, from a system to an element, from a process to a mechanism, from a function to a structure. Such schemes as function → adaptation (a support structure in a wide sense) and challenge → response also belong to this type. A tension (a need, disturbance of homeostasis) leads to mass behavior activity, subsequent changes in abilities, and organic prerequisites. Such external explanations usually presuppose climatic and/or geographical determinism. • Cyclic causality and spiral development emphasize feedback loops, interactions between the environment and populations, functions, activity, and structures, and the impact between the “outside-in” and “inside-out.” Multistage concepts that focus on the interconnection of environmental, technological, social, and communicative drivers tend to elaborate ideas of coevolution and spiraling development (Donald, 1998, 2001, 2017; Bickerton, 2009; Dor, 2015; Sterelny, 2016; Laland, 2017).

1.2.3

Ontological Levels of “Springboards to Speech” and Main Drivers

• Biology: anatomy, physiology, neurosciences, genetics: – Brain growth, enlarged Broca’s area, the action of “mirror neurons,” overlapping neurons (Deacon, 1997; Kay et al., 1998; Dunbar, 2003; Givón, 2009; Arbib, 2005, 2017; Gabora & Smith, 2018); – A consequence of laryngeal transformation, increased thoracic vertebrae size that enhanced breathing control (Maclarnon & Hewitt, 2004; Fitch, 2010); – The emergence of FOXP2 (Enard et al., 2002). • Ecology, environment, climate, demography (Alexander, 1990; Lovejoy, 2009; Bingham, 2010; Bickerton, 2009; Powell et al., 2009; Richerson et al., 2009; Laland, 2017; Page & French, 2020). • Material technology, cultural innovations, symbolism: – “Labor theory” is based on the ideas of L. Geiger and L. Noiret: action planning and imagining the future product (Engels, 1884/2010; Iriki, 2005; Stout, 2002, 2005); – Need to teach mastery (Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017); – Cultural innovations (Richerson et al., 2009); – Symbolic activity (Donald, 1998; Henshilwood & Dubreuil, 2011). • Linguistics: the genesis of syllable and sound distinctions, protosyllables, their chains, the identification of relics in modern languages, analogs in pidgins and creole languages, in deaf languages, in various speech disorders in patients, in babbling, the first speech of children mastering a language (Jackendoff, 2002; Dessalles, 2007).

1.2

Typologies of Conceptions

5

• Psychology: cognition, memory, attention, emotions (Luria, 1981; Byrne, 1996; Breyl, 2021). • Social relations and processes, interactions within and between groups: – Gesturing, facial lip movements (Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2010; Heyes, 2012). – Grooming (Dunbar, 1996, 2003; Wildgen, 2012); – Singing, recitatives, rituals, games, and other “useless” practices (Darwin, 1872/2004; Burling, 2005; Power, 2014). – Parenthood, learning (Hrdy, 1999; Lovejoy, 2009; Power, 2014; Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017). – Changes in gender relations have led to the need for flirting and seduction (Lovejoy, 2009; Deacon, 1997; Miller, 2000; Burling, 2005; Power, 2014). – Collaborative activities include mobilization in the battle for prey, recruiting, group hunting, keeping the fire going, and cooking (Bickerton, 2009; Wrangham, 2010). – Violence, dominance, leadership, “Machiavellian reason,” conspiracy (Byrne, 1996; Wrangham, 2019). – The result of coalition dominance over singles, self-domestication (Belyaev, 1979; Bingham, 2010; Hare et al., 2012; Dor & Jablonka, 2014; Hare, 2017; Wrangham, 2019). – Joint intentionality, normativity, interactive rituals, rephrasing, and guessing (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Knight, 2006; Tomasello, 2008; Zlatev, 2014). – New economy with deferred liabilities, exchange, gossips (Sterelny, 2016). For obvious reasons, specialists in their fields focus on analyzing, describing, and searching for the drivers of glottogenesis in their respective types of processes. However, there is no doubt that processes at all ontological levels played a role in the origin and evolution of speech and language. Let us now consider the main methodological approaches.

1.2.4

Empirical, Inductive, and Idiographic Approaches

• Reconstructions and path-tracking of the emergence of speech and language development without any attempt at explanation, but with only a description of successive phenomena: “how it probably happened.” Most springboard conceptions use this type of narrative. • Particularist ad hoc explanations pretend to justify judgments about consequences by judgments about concrete local causes; there are no general hypotheses or laws on which these conclusions are at least implicitly based; the approximate formula of such explanations is: “Certain conditions arose at that time and place, and so the old structure developed (transformed) into a new one.” • The use of analogies includes observations of the development of speech abilities of young children, studies of patients with aphasia, languages of the deaf, the development of pidgins and Creole languages, and animal communication.

6

1

1.2.5

Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

Modeling, Experimental, and Deductive Approaches

• Experiments with analog models; the reasoning includes phenomena similar in some features to language emergence and evolution: mastering speech by children, adult subjects’ mastery of making tools, using abstract symbols, teaching, e.g., chimpanzees or bonobos using sign labels (Steels, 1997; Morgan et al., 2015; Tamariz & Kirby, 2016; Kirby, 2017; Lloyd, 2004; Rumbaugh, 2013, 2015; Fitch, 2017). • Experiments with robots that can interact and communicate (Nolfi & Mirolli, 2010). • Abstract computer simulations (Markov & Markov, 2020).

1.2.6

The Synthesis of Inductive and Deductive Approaches

• Systematic comparisons using general principles (Turner & Maryanski, 2008; Cavalli-Sforza, 1997; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Irvine et al., 2013; Dediu & Levinson, 2013; Dor & Jablonka, 2014; Donald, 2001, 2017; Roberts et al., 2020).

1.3

Three Approximate Paradigms of Glottogenesis

As discussed above, no self-conscious and opposing research programs have emerged. A massive portion of the concepts form the following potential paradigms: • The continualist-biological paradigm: – Neglecting or rejecting the language Rubicon. – Focusing on anatomy, physiology, brain, tools. – Causality is mainly “bottom-up,” “inside-out” (genetics), and “outside-in” (selection). – Reconstructions, path-tracking, and particularist explanations. • The saltationist-cognitivist paradigm: – Emphasis on the language Rubicon as a barrier that could not be overcome evolutionarily. – Focusing on language and cognitive structures. – Causality is mainly “top-down” (from a mind to a brain, speech behavior) and “outside-in” (from functions in the environment to a mind); – Modeling, experimental, and deductive approaches.

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Three Approximate Paradigms of Glottogenesis

7

• The multistage-ecosocial paradigm: – The language Rubicon is real, but it was overcome through several evolutionary stages. – Focusing on interaction and coevolution of all ontological levels and structures (niches, social orders, behavior, mentality, language, brain, neuron ensembles, anatomy, physiology, genetics). – Causality is multilevel, based on feedback loops, coevolution, and spiral dynamics. – The synthesis of inductive and deductive approaches, systematic comparisons, and testing hypotheses. The third paradigm seems to be the most reasonable and promising, and I will discuss it further in more detail. If the provisions of the first two paradigms ever are systematized, their adherents will do it best. Let me cite a critique of my conception from both sides to argue for their existence. The anonymous American reviewer writes explicitly from the position of biologically oriented continualism: All Great Apes—Chimps, Gorillas, and Orangutans—have the neurological capacity for language. They can understand English or any language if raised in an English-speaking environment from infancy. Moreover, they can "speak" through sign language of the death or type their speech on a computer with dedicated icons denoting meanings (. . .) So, I suspect that this is an author who has read a lot, but who also does not know a key part of the literature on the origins of speech and cognitions. He apparently does not understand that speech evolved out of a pre-adaptation among great apes (with whom humans share a common ancestor), and so language was not the problem, but rather articulated speech because great apes do not have the capacity (. . .) And even in the proposal there is some obvious ignorance. For example, whether Neanderthals had speech is ridiculous; they had a 1600 cm3 brain, much larger than humans, and you bet that they could talk.

The well-known biologist Evgenii Panov in Russia, who authored many books about anthropology and cognitive evolution, criticizes my conception from the opposite position: Is it possible to believe that the transition period from the early precursor to the late precursor took about a million years? In my opinion, it is admissible to suppose that the jump-like emergence of linguistic abilities occurred for the first time as a result of an epiphany of some prehuman Einstein, who realized that a sound signal is a sign-symbol of something existing in its environment (for example, a rock or a tree), something that we call a signal referent. If such a step were taken in understanding the underlying meaning of a single protophrase, the transition to the formulation of protophrases must hardly have stretched over a million years.

Here I am not going to argue with my critics. The quotations are just illustrations of the actual existence of the first two paradigms. The third one is in the crossfire of both. It is a particular topic to discuss how paradigms connect with different research activities and how it is possible to relate each paradigm to some extensive, long-run scientific research program (Lakatos, 1978). The research possibilities of the first two paradigms seem somewhat limited. The continualists usually focus on various species’ communicative and cognitive abilities (with evident preference to apes). The saltationists focus on human language, mental and cognitive structures, emphasizing their absolute specifics.

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Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

The Main Achievements in the Study of Glottogenesis: Plausible Ideas and Research Results

Only the multistage-ecosocial paradigm is sufficiently wide to embrace many research tasks and approaches. There is now no definite self-conscious scientific research program for this paradigm. However, most of the accumulated ideas and results are mutually compatible. Structuring them opens up a wide space of prospective research directions. Arguments are given in the cited works. 1. Speech and language appeared as an adaptation (a support structure) during biological, social, and cultural evolution. The studies and results (Alexander, 1990; Pinker, 1994, 2010; Jackendoff, 2002; Bouchard, 2013; Dediu & Levinson, 2013) include the following interrelated trends and principles. • An increase in the number of putative stages (phases, steps) of language evolution; addition of initial stages up to the epochs of Heidelbergians, Habilises, or even Australopithecus (0.5, 1.6, or 4–6 mya3). • Attention to constructing new techno-natural and social niches (Bickerton, 2009; Laland, 2017). • Importance of social relations and orders, greater attention to intragroup and intergroup interaction and communication under multilevel selection mechanisms (Dor et al., 2014; Henrich, 2015; Sterelny, 2016). • The close connection of language with other cognitive abilities and spheres (consciousness, memory, culture, thinking, searching, and constructive activity).4 2. Speech and language at each stage of evolution belong not to an individual, brain, or organism but to members of the community (group, union, population, society)5 members who use the sign and semantic system for communication, remembering, and transmission of experience. Language is in some sense a “social technology,”6 but it does not mean that hominins and sapienses (before From now on, “mya” means million years ago, and “kya” indicates thousand years ago. “The problem with many efforts to understand the evolution of language is that the lenses used are often focused too narrowly. By placing language within the context of our species’ overall repertoire of communicative abilities and then seating this within culture-gene coevolution, we can begin to see the synergistic relationships between tools, practices, norms, communication, and language. Languages are a subset of culture that are composed of communicative tools (words) with rules (grammar) for using those tools” (Henrich, 2015, p. 232). 5 “Not all human minds have language, but all societies do (. . .) All human societies use different variations of the same technology, locally designed by cultural evolution for the universal function of the instruction of imagination. This is an absolute universal” (Dor, 2015, p. 150). 6 “The question of the evolution of language is no longer a cognitive question: it has to do with the evolutionary history of the technology—its invention, development, propagation, and diversification, the social contexts within which it emerged in ancient human communities, the ways it changed society once it was established, and so on. It is a question about the social-technological development of humanity. The question of the evolution of human minds (in the plural) and their 3 4

1.4

The Main Achievements in the Study of Glottogenesis: Plausible Ideas. . .

9

the invention of writing) ever focused attention on it as something separate from their interaction. 3. As in other aspects of sapientation, functional changes preceded structural changes and behavioral innovations preceded genetic changes. The function → adaptation scheme usually accompanies the “top-down” and “outsidein” causality principle. Challenges to the living system come from outside, or from needs of “higher” processes to “lower” mechanisms, from needs, concerns, stresses related to survival in a given niche to support structures: behavioral, mental, physiological, anatomical, genetical (Givón, 2009; Bickerton, 2009; Dor, 2015; Laland, 2017). 4. “Bottom-up” and “inside-out” causality is also significant since the supporting elements, connections, and structures are not entirely plastic. All of them have some degree of rigidity, limits of variability. They are more able to change in some directions and less able to change in others. Therefore, the “underlying” mechanisms set the framework of variability (a “channel,” a “track”) for the “overlying” processes but can also provide the latter with new “beneficial” opportunities (in terms of delivering functions, needs). Support structures of different nature (from genetic to anatomical and psychophysiological) appeared through mechanisms of gene-culture coevolution and cultural drive due to attempts, i.e., definite mass behavior of multiple generations to respond to various challenges and difficulties (Wilson & Lumsden, 1983; Dediu & Levinson, 2013; Laland, 2017). 5. At the initial stages, speech abilities have already developed through positive feedbacks with morphological changes in the larynx, brain enlargement, especially frontal (volitional) and temporal (speech) areas, neural and muscular mechanisms of breathing control. Modern dating of hominin anatomical changes related to speech ability is based on archaeological data (Deacon, 1997; Martínez et al., 2004; Wood & Bauernfeind, 2012; de Boer et al., 2011, 2020; de Boer, 2017). Consider the following summary with all concessions concerning approximation and differences in the dating: • From 1.6 mya to 100 kya, the vertebral column (the thoracic vertebrae) developed steadily, allowing control over breathing; • Between 400 and 300 kya, the skull changed, indicating the lowering of the larynx; this shift is considered a prerequisite for the ability to articulate speech. • About 300 kya, the sublingual nerve canal increased and approached the size characteristic of modern humans, indicating the possibility of controlling fine motor skills (Donald, 2001, 2017). • Specific sapient changes in the “speech gene” FOXP2 appeared ca. 300–200 kya (Enard et al., 2002).

relations with the emergent technology is thus secondary: it has to do with the involvement of individual human minds in a technologically-driven process” (Dor, 2015, p. 190).

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Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

• The structure of the hyoid bones (nerve channels) in the remains of protosapienses or Early sapienses,7 dating from ca. 100 kya, became identical to humans. 6. The formation of joint intentionality and basic moral rules and norms, especially those related to solidarity, communication of meaningful information, kinship relations, and regular collective actions. This mutual assistance became a necessary condition for speech development (Tomasello, 2008, 2019; Stringer, 2012; Zlatev, 2014; Dor, 2015). 7. Regular suppression, prevention of in-group aggression, and violence evolutionarily led hominins to self-domestication (Belyaev, 1979; Hrdy, 1999; Lovejoy, 2009; Bingham, 2010; Hare et al., 2012; Power, 2014; White et al., 2015; Wrangham, 2019). These structures included: • • • •

The practice of cooperative threats and collective violence against abusers. Egalitarian (including female) coalitions. Ostracism of rapists and brawlers. Norms for sharing the spoils.

8. Speech abilities and, hence, linguistic structures (distinctions, units, constructions) appeared separately over an exceedingly long time (hundreds of thousands of years); alternation of breakthrough and long cumulative periods in language development is supposed by analogy with the development of stone technologies (Bybee, 2002; Burling, 2005; Bickerton, 2009; Bouchard, 2013, pp. 211–215; Donald, 1998, 2001, 2017; Dessalles, 2007; Hurford, 2007, 2011; Fitch, 2017; Gabora & Smith, 2018): • Hominins consistently and concomitantly reached certain stages in the development of language and consciousness. • There was coevolution in aspects of articulation, meaning understanding, verbal memory, and the ability to describe distant events, to identify relationships, and to switch contexts; • The likely stages of increasing linguistic complexity were protowords, pidgin sentences (without word order), sentences with syntax and grammar, logical models including recursion, rhetorical constructions, adornments of speech, and professional terminology. • Along with the multiplication of elements came various convolutions, which enabled complex content to be conveyed and understood by simple means, using subconscious structures and skills. 9. The step-by-step development of speech abilities (and relevant language structures) took place through positive feedback to several fundamental processes of social and mental sapientation:

7 Hereafter, the term “Early sapienses” roughly corresponds to the term “anatomically modern humans.”

1.4

The Main Achievements in the Study of Glottogenesis: Plausible Ideas. . .

11

• In the establishment and expansion of social norms in sexual and parental relationships (Hrdy, 1999; Lovejoy, 2009; Heyes, 2012; Power, 2014; White et al., 2015); • In planning, coordinating group actions, including protection from predators, finding and cutting up carrion of animals, hunting, finding new types and sources of food, gathering, maintaining fire and cooking, organizing stays, dwellings (Gärdenfors & Osvath, 2010, p.104–114; Bickerton, 2009; Wrangham, 2010). • In the exact copying of complex actions, including tool making (Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017, pp. 188–207). • In establishing relations of prestige and leadership in the group (Zlatev, 2014; Laland, 2017, pp. 267; Tomasello, 2019). • In providing relations of exchange, kinship within and between groups, in discussing and resolving conflict situations (Stringer, 2012; Sterelny, 2016). • In gossip, wit, and courtship (Miller, 2000; Dunbar, 2003; Power, 2014). • In a variety of types of symbolic behavior, including early art forms, burials with inventory, magical and religious rituals (Dor et al., 2014, pp. 208–248). • In the accumulation of a wide variety of cultural patterns or memes, in the learning, socialization, and enculturation of younger generations, respectively, in the generational reproduction of culture and social experience, with language development reducing the costs of growing memory and the difficulty of transmitting experience (Falk, 2004, 2016; Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017, pp. 184, 266; Boyd, 2018; Markov & Markov, 2020). 10. In “here and now” micro-situations, processes of emotionally intense interaction, like rituals, usually accompanied the use of speech (Deacon, 1997; Collins, 2004; Laland, 2017; Tomasello, 2019); probably, the development of speech and language was profoundly connected: • With the emotional intensity of initial speech communication, with difficulties of understanding, with repetition, with the use of facial expressions and gestures. • With systematic correction of each other’s mistakes, the joint concentration of attention, synchronization of rhythms, emotions, and simultaneous actions. Appearance and evolution of language as a “technologically driven process” (Dor, 2015, p. 190) had primary causes and drivers in changing ecological (techno-natural) niches and changing social orders (see Chap. 2).

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Structuring the Conceptual Field: Typologies, Paradigms, and Results

Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives

Despite solid research findings and the level of agreement on the principal points reached, the emerging paradigm is far from complete. Instead, it represents a kind of springboard for another advance in knowledge. New research goals are related to the main difficulties and shortcomings of the paradigm: the absence of a generalizable conceptual framework, the extreme heterogeneity of methods and research directions, and no correlation or weak connection between interpretative aspects. These difficulties and the conducted typology of concepts allow us to formulate the following requirements for the further development of the multistage ecosocial paradigm: • Articulated principles of evolution. • A basic conceptual construct (scheme, set of models) capable of encompassing all stages of glottogenesis. • The sequential transition from stage to stage according to general hypotheses or laws correlating with evolutionary principles. • Inclusion of processes of all levels of movement (from genes to intergroup interaction) into conceptual “cells” with causal, functional, structural, or other links. • The possibility of including versions of “springboard” concepts from various spheres of our ancestors’ life during the anthropogenesis epoch (interaction with the natural environment, instrumental activity, relations in groups and between groups, spheres of sustenance, security, sexuality, parenthood). • A methodological approach encompassing multiple methods of obtaining, interpreting indirect data on glottogenesis, and turning them into a kind of megamachine for hypothesis making and testing is needed. It is necessary to present the regular connections between the phenomena in a pair of theoretical and empirical hypotheses for each stage. Let us return to the broad questions raised at the beginning. Structuring studies of the origin of language as a single field with focused intellectual attention seems necessary and promising.8 It is not necessarily that the three paradigms presented above, with such names, will be the prominent opposing positions in this field. Let them be other paradigms, but there should not be more than five, preferably less. As an adherent of the multistage-ecosocial paradigm, I hope for its victory and domination. In this case, according to the laws of intellectual dynamics (Collins, 1998), it will split into several positions. For example, one can expect that there will be an opposition of advocates of the long evolution of language (starting from

Causal Hypotheses in Evolutionary Linguistics Database (CHIELD, pronounced like “shield,” https://chield.excd.org/) is an ambitious project with a database of hypotheses expressed as causal graphs. It allows users to apply computational search and visualization methods, in order to express, explore, and evaluate hypotheses (Roberts et al., 2020). 8

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Australopithecus or even earlier), the medium duration (from Homo habilis, Homo heidelbergensis), or the short duration (the Early sapienses or even Cro-Magnons). Other lines of division are also possible. What positive changes might occur if this or that version of structuration became widely known and the currently unfocused intellectual attention became focused? At the level of language origin theorizing, we should expect a new explosion of creativity, a vigorous competition between explanatory concepts. Theorists will try to get into the center of intellectual attention, and to do this, they will express their ideas using concepts familiar to the representatives of competing concepts. The ideas and models contributing to the “Big Game” of colliding paradigms will naturally enjoy the most significant interest. At the level of specific empirical research and development of new methods, processes similar to the orientation of chaotic particles of iron powder when approaching a magnet will occur. Scholars and grantors will direct their interest to such research programs and results, which will shift the scales in favor of one paradigm or another. Therefore, we should expect a flourishing of empirical research in the logic of critical experimentation. Interpretations and reinterpretations of their results will become the focus of attention in the same “Big Game.” Significant and promising transformations may occur in the design and strategies of such field-spanning systems as CHIELD. Already the microscale of accounting for connections between single variables gets sense and becomes intriguing in the mesoscale of competition between competing conceptions, say, between “gossip” by Dunbar and “ritual” by Knight, Power, and Watts (Roberts et al., 2020, pp. 10–11). A continuation of the same logic in projects of this kind would be a macroscale focusing on the competition between a few major paradigms and related research programs.

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Tomasello, M. (2008). The origins of human communication. MIT Press. Tomasello, M. (2019). Becoming human a theory of ontogeny. Harvard University Press. Turner, J. H., & Machalek, R. (2018). The new evolutionary sociology: Recent and revitalized theoretical and methodological approaches. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Turner, J. H., & Maryanski, A. (2008). On the origin of societies by natural selection. Paradigm Publishers. Wildgen, W. (2012). Language evolution as a cascade of behavioral bifurcations. Estudios de. Linguistica Universidad de Alicante, 26, 359–382. Wilson, E., & Lumsden, C. J. (1983). Promethean fire. Reflections on the origin of the mind. Harvard University Press. White, T. D., Lovejoy, C. O., Asfaw, B., Carlson, J. P., & Suwa, G. (2015). Neither chimpanzee nor human, Ardipithecus reveals the surprising ancestry of both. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 112(16), 4877–4884. Wood, B., & Bauernfeind, A. (2012). The fossil record: Evidence for speech in early hominins. In M. Tallerman & K. Gibson (Eds.), Language Evolution (pp. 258–272). Oxford University Press. Wrangham, R. (2010). Catching fire. How cooking made us human. Profile Books. Wrangham, R. (2019). The goodness paradox: The strange relationship between virtue and violence in human evolution. Pantheon. Zlatev, J. (2014). The coevolution of human intersubjectivity, morality, and language. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 249–266). Oxford University Press.

Chapter 2

Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

2.1

The “Black Box” of Anthropogenesis

Let us start from a standard system model with inputs, outputs, and a “black box” in the center (Fig. 2.1). Two features of the anthropogenesis processes are essential: 1. The impressive flowering of only one species (ours) and the complete disappearance of all other hominin species that competed with it. 2. We obtain unique achievements (culture, technologies, institutions) based on language and consciousness as unique features of our nature. The simple “black-box” scheme itself does not explain anything. Its purpose is to direct attention to the main structural points. (a) The successive acquisition by human ancestors of the most important traits and abilities (b) Complete displacement and final death of competitive species (albeit with partial miscegenation with them) (c) Importance of the initial state and traits of prehominins, the accompanying conditions of geography, climate, and natural environment, three blocks of principles, and regularities for explaining points a–b The transition to the “transparent box” will be accomplished in several stages. In this chapter, I present my understanding of the phenomena to explain, formulate the most general evolutionary mechanisms and principles, and extend the nomological approach as a main intellectual tool for further theorization.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_2

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Related conditions Geography, changing climate (ice ages and interglacials), fauna, flora, inorganic raw materials. Correspondingly changing niches, needs, and concerns requiring provision

Input

Groups of ancient African hominins moved to a terrestrial life. No possession of fire, no articulate speech, no specially made and stored tools, no burials and drawings. Differential vocal and gestural signals, mental abilities similar to those of apes

"Black box" cognitive evolution in the line of sapientation, including glottogenesis. Coexistence and development of multiple hominins’ forms

Principles of social and cognitive evolution

Foundations:

Output

Neoanthropes (Early and then Middle and Late sapiens) populated continents and islands. Ubiquitous skillful possession of open fire for various tasks. Advanced tool technology, clothing, dwellings, burials with implements, pictorial activities, probable ritual practices. All have articulate speech, developed languages, and consciousness

Complete disappearance of all side branches Possibilities and limitations of mental and language transformation

General patterns and mechanisms of evolution

Fig. 2.1 Cognitive evolution and glottogenesis as a “black box.” The white arrows mean the transitions between phases. Black arrows mean impacts on the “black-box” processes from conditions and factors of different nature. Gray arrows indicate the use of general principles and regularities to “open the black box,” i.e., to reconstruct and explain its internal processes

2.2

Explained Phenomena

Speech, verbal activity, directly perceived processes of another’s and one’s own speaking. Language is interpreted as the interconnection of linguistic (phonetic, lexical, grammatical, syntactical, semantic) elements and constructions. Speech and language are distinguished quite traditionally, according to F. de Saussure (1986). They had an essential peculiarity before the appearance of writing. Speech used only the components of language at any stage of its development, including the most ancient ones. Language manifested itself externally only in speech and was transmitted from generation to generation exclusively through speech. All new linguistic structures were born in speech, reproduced in it, and served as “springboards” (ingredients) for the formation of linguistic innovations, which were made again in the speech processes. The same attitude occurred at all stages of glottogenesis. That is why speech as a behavioral process of speaking/ recognition and language as a coherent set of sign and semantic constructions were only two aspects (procedural and systemic) of one holistic phenomenon. Individual consciousness appears as a “subjective reality” in which some “I” perceives “inner experience.” It is believed that the “I” is capable of making decisions, of performing internal conscious and voluntary acts of thinking,

2.2

Explained Phenomena

21

imagination, and recollection. “Inner experience” is commonly ascribed properties of unity, continuity, controllability, and potential limitlessness.1 Language, speech, and consciousness exist and develop on several ontological levels: • • • •

Social (interactions, communication) Mental, or psychological (abilities and attitudes acquired during ontogeny) Cultural (intergenerational transmission of cultural patterns) Cerebral and genetic (innate ability of every healthy infant to learn any language and become conscious)

The phenomena of language, speech, and consciousness with the structure of the “I” and the will at the psychological level are treated as complex sets of multiple interrelated abilities and attitudes (compare with J. Fodor’s modularity of mind, C. Fillmore’s and W. Croft’s grammar of constructions, and S. Horst’s “cognitive pluralism” (Fodor, 1983; Croft, 2001; Horst, 2016)). Abilities, including speech and higher cognitive and volitional abilities, are instrumental properties that allow individuals to express themselves, perceive what is happening, and act in a certain way. Attitudes are mental regulatory structures formed during ontogeny that control processes, acts of consciousness, and behavior including verbal one, i.e., speech. This model considers attitudes of various types as internal causes of motives, interests, desires, beliefs, accepted principles and rules of behavior, sanctuaries, and values.

Hereinafter the term “consciousness” is used in a sense that may seem unfamiliar to the English language and therefore requires clarification. In this book, “consciousness” means much more than just a state of awareness (wakefulness, the ability to perceive and respond appropriately to what is going on around us). This is how individual consciousness is usually presented to itself: as a field of perception or as a field of attention. However, what happens in consciousness is much more expansive and profound. In English this is referred to rather as “complex cognition,” or “higherlevel understanding.” To use John Locke’s terminology, consciousness is not an “empty cabinet”; it is closer to human “understanding” (or “mind”) as a complex activity of the soul through the union of perception, reflection, and active memory (Locke, 1997). Full human consciousness is understood here as a very complex set of cognitive abilities allowing, in particular, us to focus attention arbitrarily on any perceived objects as well as objects absent in the field of perception, retrieved from memory, imagined, or generally abstracted. Added to this are the abilities to compare any objects with one another, to include them in various mental schemes and contexts, to reflect on one’s cognitive actions, etc. (see also Chaps. 7–8). Hominin consciousness initially differed little from the cognitive abilities of primates (their perception of present situations, attention, use of memory). In the process of sapientation, hominin consciousness evolved, acquiring new abilities, and in the closest connection with the stages of language development. 1

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Linguistic Universals

Classical linguistic universals, for example, in Ch. Hockett’s version (Hockett, 1963) need an explanation within the concept of the evolutionary steps: • Traditional transmission—intergenerational transfer of language through culture and social learning, rather than through biological mechanisms of heredity. • Alternation—adult members of a language community are alternately transmitters and receivers of language signals. • Displacement—messages can refer to denotations distant in time or space from the situation of the news, from the perceptual field of communication participants. • Productivity/openness—the ease of creating and understanding new messages. • Semantics and discreteness of signs. • The arbitrariness of language elements (first, words, lexemes) means the usual absence of an explicit external connection, any similarity between the signifier and the signified. • Duality of patterning means that semantic superstructures rise above the nonsemantic phonetic substrate; thus, combinations of phonemes form words (or morphemes) that have values; combinations of words form sentences with their meaning, and sentences form vast even larger semantic units; due to duality, a huge number of words are expressed in combinations of a relatively small number of minimal, meaningless, but usually clearly pronounceable and distinguishable phonemes. • Prevarication as the ability to lie and make meaningless statements. • Reflexiveness as the possibility to talk about language. These universals emerged evolutionarily in social interaction and communication (see results in the Chap. 1). What definite abilities and attitudes appeared on each stage of evolution and what were the drivers of this emergence—this is the main problemata of the Chaps. 5–8. General features in the wide variety of languages available need explanation as well. For example, there are different degrees of relatedness between them and a considerable variation in simplicity/complexity (Chap. 10).

2.4

From the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness to Cognitive Pluralism

Perhaps, the central mystery in the philosophical and psychological understanding of the phenomenon of human consciousness is the “unity of apperception” (according to Kant) or “totality” of consciousness,2 which seems to be “equal” to the world, the 2 Here we do not consider the ideas of “transcendence,” “a priori,” “purity” of apperception, “identity of the self” developed by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, the working concept

2.4

From the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness to Cognitive Pluralism

23

universe. It is as if we can think anything. It appears to us: nothing escapes the light of our mind; everything is open to us.3 Moreover, consciousness seems to be independent of language. Suppose the interlocutors have a shared context, known word meanings. In that case, language allows us to convey a thought that is easily understood, comprehended, even though there is no explicit connection between the sentences and the words. D. Bickerton gives this example: The price of copper fell 17 percent overnight. A sudden drop had been predicted by many analysts. The recent cease-fire in Central Africa has already resulted to an increased supply." The exact same conditions apply: the sentences are merely strung together, and, apart from “the,” no word appears in more than one of the sentences, so there are no lexical links. On the other hand, for anyone familiar with politics and economics, the paragraph makes perfect sense (Bickerton, 2009, p. 189).

This is just one example of the extraordinary abilities so familiar to people of modern mind. This book focuses not on the mystical depths and totality of consciousness but on its boundaries and the evolution of its most essential faculties (see details in Chap. 8). The question is how and why the mental abilities evolved and consequently the boundaries of consciousness expanded. Philosophically, my position on the nature of consciousness is quite close to Stephen Horst’s “cognitive pluralism.” Cognitive pluralism is the thesis that our ways of understanding the world are all partial, idealized, and cast in individual representational systems and perhaps cannot be reconstructed into a single representational system that is comprehensive and consistent at the same time. These different representational systems are attuned to particular phenomena in the world and weakly optimized for pragmatic goals in interacting with them. Some of these representational systems are weakly nativistic and take species-typical forms. Others are acquired through trial and error, social learning, and special processes involved in learning technical theories, such as those found in mathematics and the sciences. The models acquired may vary widely between individuals and over the course of a lifetime in a single individual. Through them, we 'triangulate' a common reality without the construction of a comprehensive and consistent worldview (Horst, 2016, p. 83).

Horst’s “comprehensive and consistent worldview” is exactly what I mean by the (false) “totality of consciousness.” It is also necessary to add that all “mental models” (including “qualia” and “ideas” in the traditional philosophical sense) are products of both long cognitive evolution and appropriation of human culture through language in ontogeny. The famous “hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers, 1996) seems to be hard only if one limits a view of the individual brain and subjective experience of the

of consciousness used here is closer to Kant’s understanding of “empirical” and “subjective” unity of apperception. One can explain stability, facility, and relative “objectivity” of consciousness of a mentally healthy person by reliance on sense experience, practice, communication, and intersubjectivity. 3 I do not consider any phenomena of mystical, religious, dreamlike, hallucinatory, delusional, and any other similar experiences here.

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individual. All this hardness dissolves when we add long cognitive evolution, culture with language, and various mental abilities, and appropriation of them in ontogeny by each sane human individual. The crucial ability in this aspect is to talk about someone’s subjective experience as “he sees, hears, feels, imagines, or thinks something” (Theory of Mind, ToM). Naturally, this ability transfers to the self: “I see, hear, imagine or think something.” The problem of qualia is not hard but not because “qualia do not exist” as D. Dennett argued (Dennett, 1991). Instead, all living beings able to accept signals from the environment have their subjective qualia even if they are extremely primitive, like light/darkness, food/no food, danger/no danger. A proponent of the “hard problem of consciousness” will exclaim, “But we cannot know anything about them! If such ‘subjective experience’ even exists in ants, plants, or bacteria, it is not consciousness!” I totally agree. Qualia alone do not mean existence of consciousness (as it is understood here). Only normal sane humans (and maybe apes trained by humans in gesture or grapheme language but not wordless babies) can intentionally convey to us their subjective experience. And this is the best argument that consciousness is an evolutionarily, socially, and culturally acquired body of abilities to use a variety of mental models, usually through linguistic symbolization.

2.5

Consciousness as Accumulated Layers of Mental Abilities

Considering the meaningful insights in the works (Donald, 1998; Stringer, 2012; Heyes, 2012; Revonsuo, 2009; Zlatev, 2014; Gabora & Smith, 2018; Sterelny, 2016), it is possible to outline the sequence of consciousness abilities acquired by hominins (at later stages, already by sapienses). • In each situation, the ability to jointly focus attention on emotionally significant actions of fellow tribe members, either disapproved or approved by the group. • The ability to distinguish the general rules of (un)approval that are marked in some way and recognize others’ and one’s actions that fall under them. • The ability to designate, distinguish, and recognize belonging of things (e.g., valuable tools) to tribe members, corresponding rules of access to them; subsequent transfer of rules of belonging to relations between individuals; recognition of related limiting rules of sexual access. • The ability to focus attention on objects of the situation at hand, designate and recognize actions and objects by assigned signs, distinguish between active subjects of motion and their things, and include them in different practical activity or discussion contexts. Establishing the inescapable limitedness of consciousness does not yet clarify the nature of its apparent “totality.” The notion of consciousness as a coherent set of

2.6

Self-Structure and Volition

25

mental capacities for attention, memory, and thinking, supported by sensory perception and the linguistic ability to produce and recognize speech, comes to the rescue. One can reasonably compare the capacity for attention with a light beam that can move from object to object. Human consciousness surpasses this ability in the following main points: • The field of consciousness seems to encompass all the potential objects to which one can direct their attention. • The individual’s field of consciousness potentially includes their memories, including those hidden from others. • An individual’s field of consciousness may include objects which another individual verbally indicates. • One can use consciousness to discuss or reflect alone on the things which are in focus. • Thanks to consciousness, it is possible to change easily and quickly the focus of attention between situations, between objects, their parts, attributes, relations, to connect using various acquired associative, object, logical, magical, or other schemes. • Through consciousness and thinking, it is possible to apply schemes of causality, expediency, object relations, belonging, exchange to the situations at hand and then to any other cases. • During and as a result of discussions, personal reflections, recollections, imagination, one can easily change the focus of attention, moving from context to context (as areas of objects and relations), which gives individuals a subjective sense of the potential boundlessness, i.e., “totality” of their consciousness. Perhaps, someone will point out additional faculties, but for our purpose, the presented list suffices,4 and as we shall see, emergence of consciousness abilities was closely related to the stages of glottogenesis. Namely, thanks to language “anchors” that we became capable of moving and controlling our attention. The interconnected stages of consciousness and language development also occur in ontogeny, i.e., in the cognitive development of each child.

2.6

Self-Structure and Volition

Who obtains and uses all these abilities? Here we meet the problem of “I” that needs a special conceptualization.

4

Creativity as the ability to create new objects and relations with the help of consciousness (and not only) is a specific subject and requires a separate analysis. I will only note that it uses the abilities mentioned above of consciousness. People create new objects (things, images, texts in the broad sense) that are always parts of contexts available to the author, the results of their combination and intersection.

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Let us treat “I” as a self-structure, a special complex of attitudes and abilities. The basic cognitive scheme (frame) of this complex includes a “subject” (a perceiving, decisive, acting instance) and “experience” in the broadest sense, which includes the environment perceived by the senses as well as the contents of “inner life” (imagined, thought, remembered). This frame itself is formed in each individual in early childhood (2–3 years) through interiorization of ideas about other people who also see, hear, and feel something (Theory of Mind, ToM). Besides usage of main cognitive abilities (see above) the self-structure can also manifest will (volitional processes) and experience feelings, emotions (see Chap. 3). Volitional processes are acts of self-restraint, when the controlling role is given to one set of normative attitudes (values, goals, principles of obligation, “super-ego”) while suppressing another set of attitudes (usually related to basic organic and social needs: getting pleasure, achieving comfort, prestige, pursuing material interests, etc.). The willpower is formed in interactive rituals (Collins, 2004; Rozov, 2010), when the corresponding symbols and attitudes accumulate emotional energy (see further conceptualization in Chap. 3). The will is strengthened in subsequent practices of self-coercion, which also have a ritual-emotional nature, usually being a preparation for successful performance in future real-life interactions. Volitional processes are significant in paleopsychology because they exercise normativity, a crucial property of human social orders (Chap. 4). Summarizing these ideas, we get the following working definition. Consciousness (in its full development) is an integral field of sensory and semantic representations with the self-structure, volitional processes, and the following basic cognitive abilities: to move the focus of attention from object to object, to consider what is happening in other places and times, to navigate in this space, to move in semantic contexts, to use previously accumulated representations to recognize and think through what is happening, making decisions, and appropriate behavior.

2.7

Aromorphoses and Glotto-Aromorphoses

In evolutionary biology, many terms are close in meaning: “aromorphosis,” “arogenesis,” “genetic revolution,” “macromutation,” “quantum speciation,” and “systemic mutation.” Below, we will use Alexei Severtsov’s (Severtsov, 1990) term “aromorphosis,” but in the broader understanding of Ivan Schmalhausen (see: Rispoli & D’Abramo, 2019). Aromorphosis is understood in this tradition as the raising of the organization as a whole to a higher level, giving the organism an opportunity to use new materials and factors of the external environment. Such an organism receives in the struggle for existence advantages of a general nature not restricted to any strictly defined environment. Therefore, it gets an opportunity to go beyond the environment in which its ancestors lived and to capture new, partly very different areas for its habitat. So, aromorphosis is a process which frees organisms from their too-close

2.8

The A Priori Temporal Structure of Language Origin and Evolution

27

connections with the environment as if lifting them above many private conditions of existence. The organism becomes more active and increasingly masters the vital means of the environment. The entire anthropogenesis can be considered as a single aromorphosis, but such a representation makes analysis difficult. The other extreme to consider as aromorphosis the development of only one structure (skillful hand, brain with neocortex, larynx, normativity, ritual, institution) is also unproductive because of the multistage development and close interconnection between the structures. We are interested in the main sapient shifts in the cognitive and communicative aspects. Since the development of the abilities of consciousness (the cognitive aspect) was closely connected with the development of speech and language (the communicative aspect), we will call the “glotto-aromorphosis” each major, distinguishable rise in the steps of sapiency in both aspects. We retain the general idea of Severtsov–Schmalhausen’s concept of “aromorphosis,” but with an important clarification. Progressive shifts in social orders (systems of intragroup and intergroup relations) are especially significant in the cognitive and communicative aspects of sapientation. The natural environment itself increasingly took the form of techno-natural niches: from the niches of inferior scavengers to those of skillful hunters and fishermen with a confident mastery of fire, dwellings, clothing, and a wide arsenal of implements. Thus, we obtain the following definition of one of the basic concepts of this book. Glotto-aromorphosis is such a shift in the upward evolution of verbal, cognitive structures and potential of hominins (sapienses in the later stages) that their abilities for mutual understanding, coordination of actions, remembering, and intergenerational transmission of knowledge and experience significantly expanded; also new abilities allowed better mastering factors of the techno-natural environment, orientation in social orders, their regulation and updating thanks to symbolization, ever more precise messages, and corresponding mental operation.

2.8

The A Priori Temporal Structure of Language Origin and Evolution

Let us return to the original “input-process-output” scheme and present the aspect of glottogenesis in the form of a timeline (Fig. 2.2). The “output” includes 7000–8000 languages known in linguistics. The end of glottogenesis, that is, the last rung of the supposed ladder, is separated from the “exit” by a large gap. This mysterious period—the pre-language gap—which rarely attracts the attention of researchers requires a special analysis. Therefore, the a priori structure should include four major epochs divided by three conventional boundaries.

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Fig. 2.2 Diagram of glottogenesis with preceding and following epochs. Solid lines indicate languages known to linguists from direct data. Dotted lines denote reconstructions of pre-languages based on indirect data, usually based on phonetic or lexical diachronic regularities

• The “input” means communicative system of animals, say, of the most ancient prehominins as common ancestors of chimps, bonobo, and Ardipithecus; presumable formation of initial ecological and social conditions for further development (see Chap. 4). – The language Rubicon, as a breakthrough in articulation and meaningfulness of early speech practices (Chaps. 5–6). • The main “process” of glottogenesis which represents the successive advancement from step to step of language complexity (Chaps. 6–8). – The end of principal glottogenesis; probable formation of the first archetypical languages with division of main structural linguistic types (Chap. 9). • The pre-language gap (presumably beginning in the Upper Paleolithic era) as the earliest evolutionary epoch of fully developed languages with their supposed division and fusion, separation by levels of complexity (Chaps. 9–11).

2.9

2.9

Glotto-Aromorphoses as Rises in the Linguistic Complexity Stages

29

Glotto-Aromorphoses as Rises in the Linguistic Complexity Stages

In, ordinary research, scientists observe, record the phenomena, and then look for explanations for them, identifying relevant essences, causes, and regularities. Theorists hypothesize precisely about these regularities. The specificity of the study of glottogenesis consists of the unobservability of intermediate evolutionary links, i.e., about the stages of the process of increasing linguistic complexity. The real observed phenomena are the languages known to linguists. These languages are the “output” or the end point of the long processes of glottogenesis and subsequent linguistic evolution. To attempt at once to explain the origin of these languages is to stand on the saltationist paradigm, which has been rejected (Chap. 1). Within the multistage paradigm there is a wide range of versions about the number and nomenclature of intermediate steps. Which version should be a subject for further explanation? Among the researchers of glottogenesis, the dominant concept is that of folding more complex constructions (protophrases, phrases, sentences) out of already existing elements (protowords, words). Such a view has been called “synthetic.” An alternative is the “holistic” version, according to which holophrases, i.e., fused combinations of sounds that expressed complex statements, requests, commands, such as “give that to her,” originally appeared in (Tallerman, 2007). The latter assumption about holophrases is quite plausible, but it does not contradict the further synthetic emergence of protophrases. The protowords appeared due to the distinction of holophrases via differentiation of protosyllables, then syllables, and phonemes. The holistic conception does not allow us to imagine successive stages of the appearance of pre-speech, protolanguage, with a later complication of linguistic constructions. To do so, one would have to assume the initial emergence of sufficiently long and well-articulated holophrases capable of division. However, this hypothesis contradicts the initial view of a holophrase as a single vocalization with vague pronunciation and meaning. It is not by chance that adherents of the holistic approach later began to recognize both ways of language development (Wray, 2002). Therefore, we will further adhere to the synthetic conception, but not without a complete denial of individual possibilities of productive division of integral elements (protowords, words) into components. The singularity of the subject dictates the singularity of the methodology. Hypotheses usually refer to the latent regularities and internal reasons of the phenomena. We will return to such hypotheses later. But now we should start with hypotheses about the phenomena themselves. Indeed, this approach is partly reminiscent of Baron Munchausen’s trick of pulling himself out of a swamp by his own hair. To make the hypothesis of the stages of glottogenesis different from Munchausen’s braggadocio, let us point to two types of fulcrums: general evolutionary principles, ideas, and results presented in Chap. 1 (points 1–10) especially the most constructive and plausible concepts of glottogenesis researchers:

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• “Nothing comes from nothing”; in other words, every new structure is formed from some ingredients. • Complex structures are composed of simpler elements, usually preceded by similar ingredients; therefore, a subsequent step of language complexity cannot occur in the absence of the previous one. • More abstract meanings are usually built on top of the situational, concrete ones, appearing after them and using them as ingredients. • “Protosyllables,” “holophrases,” “protowords,” “protophrases,” “protophrases,” “protosemantics,” “protolanguage,” “pidgin-like language,” “full-fledged words,” “instructing of imagination” (Vygotsky, 1930/1997; Donald, 1998; Dessalles, 2007; Bickerton, 2009; Dor, 2015; Gabora & Smith, 2018).

2.10

The Rules of the Emergence of Linguistic Structures

Thus, our hypothesis about main glotto-aromorphoses as phenomena for further explanations includes the following statements (rules of glottogenesis step progression): • Constructions of complex syntax (with recursion, polysemy, rhetoric decorations) can appear on the basis of simple syntax and grammar. • Encompassing structures of simple syntax and grammar that govern combinations (chains) of words can emerge when such combinations with simple order and coherent values are already present in speech. • Word combinations with simple order and coherent values (i.e., pidgin sentences5) and full-fledged words themselves can appear when leading-away protophrases already exist. • Full-fledged words (used arbitrarily, clearly articulated and identifiable, with constant semantically interconnected values independent of a situational context) can appear and multiply only on the basis of previous protowords (used reactively, not clearly articulated with syncretic, vague values recognizable only in a shared context). • Leading-away (transcending-here-and-now) protophrases that describe situations in another place and time could emerge when reactive and situative protophrases are already in use. • Reactive and situative protophrases as chains of protowords arranged in no order, but with a general syncretic meaning conveying what is happening “here and now” can appear from uttering or repeating individual protowords. • Individual protowords (holophrases), being gluings of syllables or phonemes aimed at conveying integral situational meaning, can emerge from differenced signals as protosyllables.

5

J. Hurford also uses the term “protosentence” (Hurford, 2011, p. 607).

2.11

The Gene-Culture Coevolution

31

• Protosyllables as vocal sounds roughly recognizable by a few phonological attributes can appear from differenced signals of the type that group animals get by social learning. The language origin stages presumed by these a priori rules should correspond to the steps of anthropogenesis. The dating and accuracy of the correspondence relations can be only approximate. For now, they are not so important; one can always specify them when reliable data become available. Much more essential is the very logic of causation in language origin and evolution. Each stage of anthropogenesis begins with the emergence of new features in technology, in way of life and nutrition, and in anatomical changes. These changes are always associated with shifts in material and communicative practices and cognitive abilities. Practices and abilities in turn are connected with social interaction, intragroup and intergroup orders, natural and techno-natural niches (see the general model in Chap. 3). Speech and cognitive abilities develop in humans only in the presence of innate potential. The evolution of genetic bases, the corresponding cerebral, anatomical, and psychophysiological predispositions, requires a special explanation. Let us consider the mechanisms of the gene-culture coevolution and the cultural drive that acted throughout glottogenesis and noogenesis.

2.11

The Gene-Culture Coevolution

What is the biological basis of sapientation processes? Significant anatomical and psychophysiological changes accompanied the emergence and development of the ability to speak. During evolution, there appeared: 1. The organs of articulation that produce speech (control of breathing through innervation of pectoral muscles, specific vocal cords, the shape of larynx, forms of mouth, lips, and teeth). 2. A precisely tuned auditory system (mainly the inner ear). 3. Specialized brain areas (in the cortex, but also the brain stem) with their specific abilities of perception, recognition, categorization, memory, and self-control; Broca and Wernicke’s speech centers (Wildgen, 2012, p. 361). The concept of gene-culture coevolution was born to combine neo-Darwinism with the ideas of the Baldwin effect and Waddington epigenesis, so the priority of gene mutations sounds like a name. Researchers emphasize the evolutionary success of behavior acquired during ontogeny but also conditioned by innate assignments. There are definite similarities with Lamarck’s doctrine of organ inheritance (Richards, 1987, p. 399). Some authors also mention the importance of a changing external environment. Baldwin gave a behavioral interpretation of Darwin’s view of evolutionary phenomena, even as simple as the giraffe growing a long neck to eat the leaves at the tops of bushes and

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trees. He suggested that behavioral flexibility and learning could amplify and bias the course of natural selection. Once new, invented, or learned habits had changed the context or habitat of a particular group of animals, natural selection could favor genetically determined behavioral and physical characteristics that best exploited that new environment. Known as 'coevolution' or 'genetic assimilation', this simple argument avoided the fallacy of Lamarck’s discredited theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics, while retaining one of the forgotten but more prescient ideas (Oppenheimer, 2012, Prologue).

There is a clear departure in modern genetics from the former strict corpuscular (in fact, Mendelian) ideas about unidirectional causality “from the bottom-up,” i.e., from the genotype to the phenotype. Instead, flexible epigenetic processes are increasingly recognized.6 In other words, the ideas and positions of neo-Lamarckism are strengthened (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983; Severtsov, 1990; Koonin, 2011; Popov, 2018). The authors of gene-culture coevolution theory adhere to the same idea of a dynamic relationship between genotype-determined assignments, brain, and psyche formation during ontogeny and behavior. The latter becomes successful in terms of adaptation and sexual selection in a changing environment. Here, “epigenetic rules” are the key concept, and “cultural alternatives” become a significant property of the changing environment (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, pp. 70–71). The authors describe the main links of the relevant cycle as follows: • • • • •

The genes prescribe the rules of development (the epigenetic rules) by which the individual mind is assembled. The mind grows by absorbing parts of the culture already in existence. Culture is created anew in each generation by the summation of decisions and innovations of all members of society. Some individuals possess epigenetic rules that allow them to survive and reproduce better in contemporary culture than other individuals. The more successful epigenetic rules spread through the population, along with the genes that encode them; in other words, the population evolves genetically (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, pp. 117–118).

An important direction in the development of these ideas is to consider the inheritance and distribution due to the Baldwin effect of not so much individual assignments to specific forms of behavior, but more general and broader mental potential to learning, experience borrowing, thinking, and constructive abilities. When confronted with new challenges, some individuals, due to their innate predispositions, respond successfully. Thus, individual learning occurs—the choice of the best of alternatives. If no one imitates such a pioneer, the effect dies with him. However, if the most successful tribe members are imitated (“biased transmission”7), the innovation is preserved. Then, social learning can take place, acquiring abilities in interaction with elders and imitating them. This knowledge is effective in a stable

Hereinafter, epigenetics means processes that “complement” the traditional genetic basis of inheritance. Epigenetics includes changes that affect the regulation of gene expression. 7 “Biased transmission”—individuals in groups usually imitate successful tribesmen, choosing among several known behavioral alternatives the best one (Richerson & Boyd, 1992. p. 65). 6

2.11

The Gene-Culture Coevolution

33

environment. However, when the environment changes and creates challenges8 (especially with migrations and encounters with outsiders), more of those who learn individually must emerge for the group to succeed (Richerson & Boyd, 1992, pp. 70–71). Individuals who have gained advantages through innate epigenetic rules propagate their genes primarily in their group. Successful practices spread through imitation. This group becomes more successful in the following generations than other groups due to its “advanced” members. In intergroup encounters of mixing, mutual contributions of genes occur as an essential mechanism of population reproduction and integrity. As a result, benefits derived from combinations of genes, rules, and culturally translated practices spread throughout the population. The extinction of those groups left without this evolutionary advantage only accelerates the process of extending the latter. The success of individual learning has its regularities associated with the Skinnerian mechanisms of reinforcement (Richerson & Boyd, 1992, p. 64). Successful forms of behavior acquired are closely related to innate predispositions. The scheme in Fig. 2.3 presents the complex mechanism of joint action of gene mutations, heredity, development of neural brain structures, sexual and intergroup selection, translation, updating cultural patterns, and social practices. The scheme includes two clearly expressed contours: the lower one presents processes on genes, heredity, and selection, and the upper one presents processes in behavior, imitation, interaction with the environment, social transfer of experience, and the transmission of various kinds of cultural patterns. Read the scheme according to the ordinal numbers of blocks. The numbers with letters (1, 1a, 4a-b-c, 5-5a) mean parallel or conjugate phenomena (separable only analytically), phenomena in the circuit of causal relationships. Divergent mutations (block 1) are eventually replaced by mutations “in a narrower spectrum” (1a) with preservation of the epigenetic rules supported by selection (4a-b-c). Trial and error in block three can only partially be considered as behavioral analogs of gene mutations. The successful answers found (individual or group actions, practices, strategies) are not accidental: 1. Not all group members come to them, but the carriers of the most pronounced innate epigenetic rules. 2. Successful responses are not created “out of nothing”; they are always a transfer of an idea, structure, or technique from another sphere. 3. They can be a new combination of such patterns with some modifications and adjustment of elements to each other.

The concept of “challenge” here correlates with the more accepted idea of “stress” in biology. Numerous experiments have shown that stress causes directed mutations—the so-called stressinduced mutagenesis as a quasi-Lamarckian mechanism of evolution. Moreover, as environmental pressures mount, the Darwinian model weakens and gives way to the Lamarckian mode. See more details: (Koonin, 2011, pp. 263–273). 8

2

Fig. 2.3 The model of gene-culture coevolution where blocks indicate conditional phases and arrows mean transitions between them. The shaded blocks and arrows denote processes mainly related to heredity and selection, while the white blocks designate aspects of behavior, psyche, and culture

34 Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

2.12

The Cultural Drive

35

In other words, successful behavioral responses are generally “indebted” to predispositions, i.e., the inherited genome and cultural patterns transmitted through generations. Both parts of the potential allow for various recombinations. The death of individuals and groups that have not received a practical behavioral innovation (block 4a) enhances the reproductive success of those who have received it (4b) and contributes to selection for the ability to acquire such innovations (4c). Block 5a expresses the incorporation of the Baldwin effect into the model: hominin groups not only adapt to their environment but also adapt their niches and orders (the material, social, and cultural elements) to their needs. These changes lead to an even greater success of behavior according to acquired epigenetic rules in subsequent generations. Here, we are talking about the arrangement of stays and hearths, trail-building, establishing contacts with other groups (cross-marriages, exchanges, joint warfare), and later already about storage technologies, construction of dwellings, and domestication of animals and plants.

2.12

The Cultural Drive

The models of gene-culture coevolution (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983) and cultural drive (Laland, 2017, p. 124; Henrich et al., 2022) are closely related and sometimes difficult to distinguish. However, the treatment of the vector of causality changes in recent years reversed. Not from genes to culture and back but from adaptive behavior and culture to genes. Like this approach and alternative to (neo)Darwinism, Russian evolutionists develop the ideas of orthogenesis, nomogenesis, and the importance of the interaction of entire populations (not just individuals) with the environment: ...mutations and genetic variability, in general, are not the cause of evolution, but its result. They do not pave new development paths but only consolidate the achieved result so that each subsequent generation does not have to start over again. Rearrangement of physiology (as well as in rearrangement of behavior and mental attitudes governing it, in development of cognitive abilities, I should add,—N.R.) covers the real source of evolutionary changes. Therefore, the description of evolution should not at all start from genetics (Nazarov, 2005, p. 436).

In a similar vein, D. Dor and E. Jablonka, staking on the factor of specific hominin sociality, propose to speak “from gene-culture coevolution to culturally driven coevolution.” In doing so, they rely on the ideas of James Baldwin, Conrad Waddington, and Ivan Schmalhausen. As the growing literature within the framework of Evolutionary-Developmental Biology (evo-devo) makes clear, genuinely new behavioral patterns emerge from exploratory processes made possible by brain plasticity. They are gradually shaped by experience to approximate their functions, become objects of learning, mold capacities in their shape, and eventually, if the selection pressure remains, drive a process of genetic accommodation. Adaptation thus begins at the level of phenotype: capacity emerges from behavior, not the other way around. Genes are followers in evolution (Dor & Jablonka, 2014, p. 17).

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7.The readiness of new generations to perceive behavioral attitudes, cultural patterns, social relations, and orders (primarily as uses and modifications of magic wands) is growing

1. In response to challenge-threats and challenge-opportunities, individuals and groups make behavioral attempts, the successful ones spreading through imitation, anchored in behavior (according to Skinner), corresponding neural connections, and epigenetic effects

5. Gene, morphological, and neural predispositions to the realization of the broadest and most flexible response and support structures (magic wands) systematically and predominantly develop

Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

6. Groups with a fixed type of behavior change their techno-natural niches (according to Laland et al.) and social orders. in which this type of behavior becomes even more successful and strongly reinforced, and selection pressure in favor of appropriate assignments of such behavior increases (inverse pressure of niches and orders) 2. Individual and sexual selection processes in generational change through the Baldwin effect produce the gene drift toward innate assignments of such neural connections that increase the potential for abilities to this type of behavior (according to Lumsden and Wilson)

3. Groups with the most efficient abilities, patterns, and orders In collisions in common niches dominate, grow, displace, and assimilate competing groups (group selection)

4. The presence of genotypes of these dominant groups along with their inborn assignments, abilities, and genetically related traits, including markers of success (f.e. morphological ones like small jaws and bare skin), is systematically expanded in the population

Fig. 2.4 The evolutionary mechanism of cultural drive

However, these sensible ideas quite rhyme with the well-known concept of the “whip” when a behavioral adaptation forced due to changes in climate, landscapes, and available means of sustenance then “pulls” multiple morphological, psychophysiological shifts, fixed already in the genome (Vishnyatsky, 2008, 2014; Givón, 2009). J. Turner and A. Maryanski (2008) conceptualize these “whips” as “Spencerian selection pressures.” A. Markov describes the contour of the positive relationship between the variables in the concept of “cultural drive” as follows: Evolution of social learning and cognitive abilities → behavioral innovations are more often enshrined as cultural traditions; culture becomes richer → more different skills can be learned from kin; social learning abilities become more useful; more complex and flexible behavior presents individuals with new cognitive tasks and “challenges” → selection for even more effective social learning and cognitive abilities → even richer culture (Markov, 2020).

A general scheme of the cultural drive as a complex evolutionary mechanism is present in Fig. 2.4. This mechanism, which emphasizes response to challenge and cultural drive, differs significantly from the more traditional model of coevolution of genes and culture (Fig. 2.3), which views mutations as the main driver of evolution. The scheme should be read by ordinal numbers of blocks, paying attention to two large circuits (1-2-3-4-5-1), (1-2-3-6-7-1) and three small ones (1-2-7-1), (1-2-5-1), (2-3-6-2). The top chain (3-6-7-1) describes an aspect of social and cultural evolution that is quite “Lamarckian” in nature. This mechanism, due to the flexibility of behavior, learning, and accumulation of cultural patterns, turns out to be faster and more efficient than the lower mechanism of evolution through gene drift and mutations, morphology, predispositions, and instincts (3-4-5-1).

2.13

Sapientation and Language as By-Products of Survival Efforts

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This advantage grows with the diversity of cultural patterns and the amount of information that individuals become capable of transmitting to their offspring through learning, in later stages through articulate speech. Therefore, the upper sociocultural circuit increasingly supersedes genetic and morphological transformations.

2.13

Sapientation and Language as By-Products of Survival Efforts

Therefore, repeated changes in hominin mass behavior led to progressive sapientation: morphological and cognitive (Fig. 2.5). Attention should be paid to the block “Responses: changes in mass behavior” (with question marks). It is central to the diagram since it is the source of causal connections to the rest of the blocks. According to the multistage paradigm (Chap. 1), the central problem of glottogenesis is as follows: What shifts in hominin mass behavior led to the progressive development of language and consciousness, and what were the driving forces behind these changes at each evolutionary stage? The further theoretical analysis will focus on the “upper” levels, including interaction with the natural environment, intragroup and intergroup social orders, mental processes, attitudes, and abilities. The approach does not focus on the brain, individual minds, or concrete linguistic structures. There is no doubt that the “lower levels,” i.e., anatomical, psychophysiological, gene structures, and mechanisms, are integral to evolution. They are assumed, but are not included in the subject matter of this study. Consider the social and functionalist program by Daniel Dor. The question of the evolution of language is no longer a cognitive question: it has to do with the evolutionary history of technology: its invention, development, propagation and diversification, the social contexts within which it emerged in ancient human communities, the ways it changed society once it was established, and so on. It is a question about the socialtechnological development of humanity. The question of the evolution of human minds (in the plural) and their relations with the emergent technology is thus secondary: it has to do with the participation of individual human minds in a technologically driven process (Dor, 2015, p. 190).

I agree with the “social-technological” essence of language. However, my research concentrates not on the “technologically driven process,” but on changing ecological (techno-natural) niches and changing social orders as primary drivers of the entire evolution in prehistory. The block “Changes in mass behavior” with question marks occupies the central position in diagram 2.5 because it is the source of causality links to the rest of the blocks. The central riddle of glottogenesis, noogenesis, and the problem of this study sounds as follows. What shifts in the hominin’s mass behavior led to the progressive development of language and consciousness, and why did these changes occur?

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NATURAL CHALLENGES

Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

Changes in techno-natural niches with aspects of migraons, tool technology, and fire development

Intergroup selecon pressure Social challenges Aempts and behavioral selecon

Changes in social orders: within and between groups Challenges and new communicave concerns: to forbid, approve, mobilize, communicate, understand, persuade, negoate, blame, brag, seduce

Social learning

Responses: changes in mass behavior (???)

Transformaons in mentality, semancs, sign media (images, meanings, concepts, contexts) Mastering language in ontogeny

Individual and gender selecon

The Baldwin Effect

Cognive abilies intenonality, percepon, memory, recognion, volion, consciousness

Neural, anatomical structures, psychophysiological mechanisms of abilies and skills (including speech)

The genec basis as a potenal for these structures and abilies

Fig. 2.5 Levels of changes in glottogenesis and causal links between them. The shaded arrows denote causal influences “from the top-down” and “from the outside-in.” White arrows mean the reverse causality vector—costs, constraints, and opportunities “supplied” by structures. The levels in bold are the focus of this study. The blocks within the oval designate “the life circle” as a driver of technological progress and social evolution. The lower blocks can be treated as “the side effects” of this circle that, in turn, produce morphological and cognitive sensitivity

2.14 Evolutionary Zones of Proximal Development The “zone of the proximal development” (ZPD) is an essential concept in Vygotsky’s psychology, which means a discrepancy between the level of a child’s actual development and their possible development level. A child can achieve the last one when solving tasks with an adult or peers (Vygotsky, 1930/1997). Thus, a child successfully masters each zone of the proximal development through interiorization. Evolutionary developing species ascend to each new step only when it has mastered the previous one. Therefore, the concept of Evolutionary Zones of Proximal Development (EZPD) as an analogy to Vygotsky’s notion is essential for our analysis. In the aspect of glottogenesis, each actual stage included already used linguistic distinctions and structures, individuals’ speech tasks and abilities, features

2.14

Evolutionary Zones of Proximal Development

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of social interactions, and communicative practices, which were potential ingredients9 for the emergence of new structures, new tasks, skills, and communicative practices. The field of possibilities to modify and combine these potential ingredients was constituted for each EZPD in this sphere. In terms of the parametric space of potential attractors, the achievement of each EZPD makes a new set of attractors available.10 However, a living system, that is, a group or population of hominins with a particular cognitive and speech abilities level, needs to be “pushed” toward new ones. Challenges and concerns played a role as the “pushes” (drivers) that led to new tryouts. In anthropogenesis, it was a “main way” between attractors: an ascending ladder of steps of glottogenesis and cognitive evolution to a full-fledged language with Hockett’s universals. Exceptionally flexible and potentially rich support structures (magic wands) had set this path. A child learns a native language in just a few years, advancing in the mastery of ZPD. Constant communication with native speakers is the backbone of this acquisition. In cognitive evolution as a phylogeny of language and consciousness, there were no “adults” who could transmit already prepared cultural patterns. Nobody could transmit linguistic structures in a ready-made form. That is why naturally hominins moved to speech and language very slowly, with constant strenuous attempts to break through to mutual understanding in new spheres of discussion and at new levels of precision. The progression through EZPD as stages of linguistic complexity, glotto-aromorphosis, took many hundreds of thousands and even millions of years, albeit with increasing acceleration (Dediu & Levinson, 2018; Gabora & Smith, 2018). For each stage of sapientation, one should reconstruct the new techno-natural niches that emerged, and the new social orders usually associated with them. The corresponding communicative concerns can be understood (somewhat simplistically) as objectively given needs to transmit and perceive messages meaningful in the context of a particular social order and techno-natural niche. The concept of “concerns” is one of the key concepts here, which requires justification and clarification. The basic construct for this notion is the functional model.

9

Compare with the concepts of cognitive potential and linguistic strategy (Coupé & Hombert, 2005, pp. 38–40). A cognitive potential opens an access to a EZND, and a linguistic strategy is a mode of how a definite magic wand fills this EZND by definite types of language structures. 10 “The capacity for invention, and for the learning process that follows, is never completely openended. The further an innovation is from the envelope of the already-adapted behaviors of the individual, the more difficult it would be for the individual to invent and stabilize it. Because of that, individuals of later generations, who have by now adapted themselves, at least partially, to the behavior invented by their ancestors, would now be able—if required by necessity—to invent and stabilize behaviors that were outside the capacity of their ancestors” (Dor, 2015, p. 196).

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C — the costs (damages, threats, deficits, discomfort) to which the activity of structure S leads

Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

H — homeostatic variable (parameter vital to the system, subject of concern)

S — the intensity of the supporting structure (institution, practice)

T — tension depressing H (any harm to the subject of concern)

Fig. 2.6 The Stinchcombe’s model of functional causality. From now on, solid arrows mean positive (strengthening, increasing) connection, and dashed arrows mean negative (weakening, decreasing) relationship

2.15

The Functionalist Approach to Evolution

The scheme of Stinchcombe has wide systemic application. It is also a helpful tool for analyzing evolutionary processes (Fig. 2.6). The activity of the support structure S (social institution, practice, technology, ritual, or tradition) maintains the homeostatic variable H (subject of constant concern) at an acceptable level. The lower the homeostatic variable H, the more intensive the activity of structure S (negative connection). This activity restores and strengthens H (positive connection), thus neutralizing the oppressive effect of the tension T. It is the classical cybernetic principle of feedback providing stable equilibrium. Stinchcombe enriches the classical canon. The activity of the structure S increases the costs C (positive relation). Cost growth naturally depresses this intensity of S (the negative link). (Stinchcombe, 1987, p. 136). Moreover, costs C can also directly increase tension T. As applied to cognitive evolution and glottogenesis, the values of variables and the dynamic relationships between them receive the following interpretation: • The homeostatic variable is the level of acceptability of the state of concern (e.g., peace, harmony, mutual understanding in a group); when values of homeostatic variables are high, the group (as well as group alliance, population) is more likely to survive, expand, and prevail in encounters with other groups (unions, populations). • Activity of a support structure is the intensity of a restorative effect on the subject of concern usually by means of collective actions, practices supported by coordination and communication. • The costs mean any difficulties, troubles, risks, alerts produced by these actions and practices; e.g., the suppression of aggressive loners led to the effectiveness decline of deterrence by direct violence and intimidation as the former primary ways of disciplining tribe members (see Chap. 4).

2.16

Concerns, Needs, and Functions

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• Challenges as the effects of tension T can come from outside (e.g., lack of food, raw materials for necessary products, threats from predators or rival groups, other forms of “whips”—Spencerian selection pressures); increased costs C can also cause stresses damaging the objects of concern (e.g., effective weapons against outsiders become dangerous to group members; becoming attractive to a desirable partner increases the risk of becoming a potential victim of rapists). J. Turner and R. Machalek (2018) have articulated rather serious methodological accusations against functionalism. One problem is that explanations of this sort can be seen as illegitimate teleology in which an end state (meeting the functional need or requisite) somehow causes the sociocultural formation meeting this end state to miraculously arise and evolve. Without specifying how outcomes cause the very things that bring about these outcomes, explanation becomes an illegitimate teleology. Another logical problem in functional explanations is that they easily become tautological, trapped in circular reasoning. For example, functionalists often get caught in arguments that "a social system is surviving; how do we know the function of a particular sociocultural formation in this social system is meeting a functional need; answer: because the system is surviving." To avoid such tautologies, it is necessary to specify the mechanisms and processes by which a particular sociocultural formation operates and the means by which it does so, to increase or decrease the fitness of a superorganism to survive in its environment. Most functional explanations, however, short-cut this necessary step in an evolutionary explanation (Turner & Machalek, 2018, p. 19).

This and the next chapter present conceptual constructions about the mechanisms and processes of the formation of new structures. These models and their unfolding in the next chapters serve as a response to this methodological challenge.

2.16

Concerns, Needs, and Functions

Let us call a concern a stable complex of variables significant for the existence of a living system (an individual, group, or community) in its niches, which manifests itself in the increasing variability and renewed activity of the live system aimed at getting into a definite (“comfortable”) zone of values of these variables. The concept of “concern” is close to “function” and “need,” but essentially differs from them. In evolutionary biology, “function” generally refers to the purpose of an organ or system of organs11: . . .function is the purpose of a given morphological structure (functional system), which provides the connection of structures within the organism or their interaction with the environment, and thereby the adaptability of the whole organism (Severtsov, 1990, p. 91).

11

Here one cannot help but think of J. Haldane’s witty comparison: teleology for the evolutionist biologist is like a beloved, without whom he cannot live, but he tries not to show his face in public with her.

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Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

A concern, unlike a function, is not attached to an organ or system of organs. The concern is not a characteristic of an organism but the whole complex, i.e., a living system (including an animal, an individual, a group, a community), and in a particular niche of this system’s existence. A need is a renewable state of readiness of an organism or a subject (an individual, a group) to fill some deficiency in air, food, water, sex, social support, play, physical or mental abilities manifestation. The “concern” as a word of everyday speech is a subjective (somehow perceived) need. The scientific concept of “concern” (in the systemic, broad sense) manifests itself as a regular activity aimed at achieving acceptable, preferred values of certain variables (see above). Whereas a need belongs to the individual organism, regardless of any environment, a concern is the driving force of activity shaped by the whole structure which includes the living system (individual or group) and its more or less permanent circumstances. Basic concerns draw energy from fundamental needs (see Chap. 3) and themselves generate derived concerns, including communicative ones.

2.17

Support Structures, Exaptations, and Magic Wands

As a result of challenges, attempts, and fixation mechanisms, a support structure of any type emerges. This structure restores the concern, i.e., returns, with one or another success, the variable (or complex of variables) to the required zone of values. Support structures (adaptations in the broad sense and related elements, constraints, connections, processes) can be vastly different: an organ, a property of an organ, an innate skill, and its gene mechanisms, a type of behavior, a social practice, a social institution, a cognitive ability, finally, a language element, rule, or construction. The origin of a structure can also be quite different. A new structure can emerge through compromise with other structures, by means of their integration, following given rules (i.e., previously established structures), by conscious responses to challenges, i.e., decisions and their implementation. The structures that make up the “building material” for the new structure are called its ingredients. A particular case of the sufficiency of only one ingredient is pre-adaptation, i.e., a structure that previously provided other concerns. Exaptation means using a structure or function for a purpose other than that for which it initially evolved. In other words, exaptation is the process by which forms that evolved during evolution to provide one concern began providing the new concern that emerged. In addition, distinctive features of structures have different plasticity; some change beyond recognition or disappear altogether, while others remain almost unchanged. Among the support structures, there are special ones that I call metaphorically magic wands because they have a fantastic property of high plasticity and

2.18

Principles of Evolution Applied to Sapientation and Glottogenesis

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multifunctionality, and a vast potential for development, for which sometimes there are no limits. In other words, a magic wand is a source of multiple future exaptations. In the human organism, the brain became such a structure. In prehistory and history, major magic wands emerged: normativity, rituals, language and speech, cultural transmission, technology, consciousness, thinking, visual activity, and later philosophical and scientific cognition. In languages, magic wands are diverse ways of phonological distinction, word formation, sentence composition, and semantic values.

2.18

Principles of Evolution Applied to Sapientation and Glottogenesis

The principles formulated below with the status of initial postulates outside have their empirical and theoretical grounds. These principles are partly directly borrowed, partly obtained by generalization, conceptual stylization from works on the general theory of evolution, anthropogenesis, developmental psychology, social psychology, and sociology (Spencer, 1901/2021; Vygotsky, 1930/1997; Alexander, 1987; Collins, 2004; Vishnyatsky, 2014; Boehm, 2015; Turner & Machalek, 2018). These postulates are often assumed and implicitly used in many works on language origin and evolution (Jackendoff, 2002; Bybee, 2002; Dessalles, 2007; Tomasello, 2008; Turner & Maryanski, 2008; Bickerton, 2009; Wildgen, 2012; Dor et al., 2014; Sterelny, 2016; Laland, 2017; Gabora & Smith, 2018). The principle of provision, or “whip”: when a new acute concern emerges, if there are sufficient ingredients, abilities for attempts, fixation mechanisms, there is bound to appear a structure that provides this concern to some extent; in particular, social practices, individual attitudes, and cognitive and speech abilities are such structures. The advantage of breadth of available ingredients: A living system tries to respond to the challenge and forms a new structure, always using the available arsenal of ingredients, that is, structures and elements that provide some other concerns. The wider this arsenal (the Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development, EZPD), the wider the possibilities of various combinations, the higher the probability of forming a successful structure and winning against competitors at this or that level of selection. The advantage of colliding diversities: the more encountering populations and their cultural traditions with different structures available for modification and use in new combinations, the wider the arsenal of ingredients, the more likely new effective structures will appear to provide the emergent concerns. The principle of magic wand expansion: if some found or established structure (e.g., linguistic construction or cognitive ability) proves highly effective in providing current concern, new attempts to use and modify it for various other concerns will undoubtedly occur; in such cases, the mechanism of positive reinforcement in

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Basic Concepts and Principles of Cognitive Evolution

ontogeny and positive selection in phylogenesis begins to operate; if the structure again leads to success, then the intensity of subsequent attempts to use and modify it increases in response to new challenges. The principle of adaptation to previously created structures is the following: if a new structure comes into conflict with already existing structures that function successfully, then the new structure (say, a neologism) is likely to be adapted for ease of use. Thus, new words change phonetically and grammatically accordingly to similar words, the standard forms of a given language, while retaining distinctive features. The principle of costs as drivers of renewal: the activity of many structures leads to costs, subsequent tensions, challenges, and concerns that require responsive attempts, resulting in new support structures with new costs. The principle of cultural drive: successful behavioral practices and abilities are fixed not only in social learning, cultural transmission, but also through the formation of hereditary prerequisites for such behavior due to the operation of diverse levels of selection. The principle of no complete evolutionary gaps: it is legitimate to extrapolate known similar features of the initial and final periods of some evolutionary epoch to an unknown middle period; if at the early stages or similar levels of evolution, members of a species had some distinct trait, and a similar trait is present in much more evolutionarily advanced species as the presumed descendants, then it is reasonable to assume that this trait existed in the unknown intermediate stages. The principle of the rhythm of formative (breakthrough) and cumulative stages: in each formative stage, new structures with immense potential for functionality, modifications, and deployment (magic wands) appear; in a subsequent cumulative stage, these new structures realize their deployment potential within the Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development (EZPD) by modifying and articulating with other forms, which leads to accumulation of changes (costs, tensions), accumulation of potential ingredients for the next breakthrough stage. Spencer’s principle, or the combination of differentiation and integration: if a structure initially used is syncretic (e.g., inarticulate sound, octosyllable, protoword), and a live system accomplishes various actions for successful responses to different challenges, then this structure diverges forming clearly distinct structures, but if these structures while remaining separate from one another are frequently and successfully used in the same responses, practices, then an integrative form, or convolution, encompassing them emerges. The principle of convolution: a stable and repeatedly successfully used complex of structures tends to turn into a single form which becomes either a syncretic indissoluble whole (gluing, merging) when its inner elements are no longer separately used or an integral but internally dissociated module (convolution), elements of which are used individually or in connections with other structures. Vygotsky’s principle, or interiorization mechanism: if behavioral acts in social interaction (especially in communication) lead to successful responses to repeated challenges, then participants’ mental structures (attitudes, predispositions, abilities)

References

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are likened to these actions; thanks to these structures, participants become inclined and capable of quickly, automatically responding to subsequent similar challenges. Skinner’s principle of reinforcement: attitudes and abilities are formed and strengthened in the psyche thanks to positive reinforcement (or negative one for rejected structures); in humans, from early childhood and in higher mammals (dogs, horses, apes) the explicit (un)approval from significant others serves as sufficient reinforcement. The shift from Darwinian to Lamarckian mechanisms in human evolution. The more the life of individuals depends on social practices, relationships, structures (rather than directly on the natural environment), the more they seek to enhance or maintain their position in the communities that provide them, the more their behavior depends on social control and the competition dynamics in those communities (fitness rewards go to those with good social reputations (Alexander, 1987)). The systematic effect of this trend in generational change through the Baldwin effect (changes in genes, brain structures) and through the translation of cultural patterns (changes in mentality) sets the vector of directed evolution.12 The principle of stopping the search when success is achieved: If the structure found as a response to a challenge-threat effectively protects against risk and harm, or if the new structure as a response to a challenge-opportunity leads to attractive goals and no new challenges or concerns appear, then the support structure is retained and used further without new challenges or concerns.

References Alexander, R. D. (1987). The biology of moral systems. Aldine de Gruyter. Bickerton, D. (2009). Adam’s tongue: How humans made language, how language made humans. Hill and Wang. Boehm, C. (2015). The evolution of social control. In J. H. Turner, R. Machalek, & A. Maryanski (Eds.), Handbook on evolution and society. Toward an evolutionary social science (pp. 424–440). Paradigm Publishers. Bybee, J. (2002). Sequentiality as the basis of constituent structure. In T. Givón & B. F. Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford University Press. Collins, R. (2004). Interaction ritual chains. Princeton University Press. Coupé, C., & Hombert, J.-M. (2005). Polygenesis of linguistic strategies: A scenario for the emergence of languages. In J. W. Minett & W. S.-Y. Wang (Eds.), Language acquisition, change and emergence: Essays in evolutionary linguistics (pp. 1–49). City University of Hong Kong Press. Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective. Oxford University Press. Dediu, D., & Levinson, S. C. (2018). Neanderthal language revisited: Not only us. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 21, 49–55. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. The Penguin Press.

12 This thesis results from the joint action of the “whip,” cultural drive, Vygotsky’s, and Skinner’s principles.

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Dessalles, J.-L. (2007). Why we talk. The evolutionary origins of language. Oxford University Press. Donald, M. (1998). Hominid enculturation and cognitive evolution. In C. Scarre (Ed.), Cognition and material culture: The archaeology of symbolic storage (pp. 7–17). McDonald Institute. Dor, D. (2015). The instruction of imagination: Language as a social communication technology. Oxford University Press. Dor, D., Knight, C. J., & Lewis, J. (Eds.). (2014). The social origins of language. Oxford University Press. Dor, D., & Jablonka, E. (2014). Why we need to move from gene-culture coevolution to culturally driven coevolution. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 15–30). Oxford University Press. Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press. Gabora, L., & Smith, C. M. (2018). Two cognitive transitions underlying the capacity for cultural evolution. Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 96, 1–26. Givón, T. (2009). The genesis of syntactic complexity: Diachrony, ontogeny, neuro-cognition, evolution. Benjamins. Henrich, J., Blasi, D. E., Curtin, C. M., Davis, H., Hong, Z., Kelly, D., & Kroupin, I. (2022). A cultural species and its cognitive phenotypes: Implications for philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2022, 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00612-y Heyes, C. M. (2012). What can imitation do for cooperation? In B. Calcott, R. Joyce, & K. Sterelny (Eds.), Signalling, commitment & cooperation (pp. 313–331). MIT Press. Hockett, C. F. (1963). The problem of universals in language. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (pp. 1–22). MIT Press. Horst, S. (2016). Cognitive pluralism. MIT Press. Hurford, J. R. (2011). The origins of grammar. Language in the light of evolution (Vol. II). Oxford University Press. Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of language: Brain, meaning, grammar, evolution. Oxford University Press. Koonin, E. V. (2011). The logic of chance. On the nature and origin of biological evolution. FT Press. Laland, K. N. (2017). Darwin’s unfinished symphony. How culture made the human mind. Princeton University Press. Lumsden, C. J., & Wilson, E. J. (1983). Promethean fire. Reflections on the origin of the mind. Harvard University Press. Markov, A. В. (2020). Koevolyuciya mozga i kulturi veroyatniy mehanizm stanovleniya chelovecheskogo razuma. Coevolution of brain and culture—a probable mechanism of human mind formation/elements, 25.05.2020; https://elementy.ru/novosti_nauki/433657/ Koevolyutsiya_mozga_i_kultury_veroyatnyy_mekhanizm_stanovleniya_chelovecheskogo_ razuma. In Russian. Nazarov, V. I. (2005). Evolyuciya ne po Darvinu: Smena evolyucionnoy modeli. [Evolution not according to Darwin: Change of evolutionary model]. ComBook, Publ. In Russian. Oppenheimer, S. (2012). Out of Eden: The peopling of the world. Robinson. Popov, I. (2018). Orthogenesis versus Darwinism. Springer Nature. Revonsuo, A. (2009). Consciousness: The science of subjectivity. Psychology Press. Richards, R. J. (1987). Darwin and the emergence of evolutionary theories of mind and behavior. University of Chicago Press. Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (1992). Cultural inheritance and evolutionary ecology. In E. A. Smith & B. Winterhalder (Eds.), Evolutionary ecology and human behavior (pp. 61–92). Aldine de Gruyter. Rispoli, G., & D’Abramo, F. (2019). Ivan I. Schmalhausen (1884–1963). In L. Nuno de la Rosa & G. Müller (Eds.), Evolutionary developmental biology (pp. 1–13). Springer.

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Rozov, N. S. (2010). Rituali, instituti i resursi: Socialnie osnovi transformacii mentaliteta [rituals, institutions, and resources: Social bases of mentality transformation]. Tsennosti i smysly [Values and Meanings], 5(8), 50–67. In Russian. https://nrozov.nsu.ru/publ/Rozov_rituals-2010.pdf Saussure, F. D. (1986). The linguistic sign. In R. E. Innis (Ed.), Semiotics. An introductory anthology (pp. 28–46). Hutchinson. Severtsov, A. S. (1990). Napravlennost’ evolyucii [the directionality of evolution]. Moscow State University Press. In Russian. Spencer, H. (1901/2021). Essays: Scientific, political, and speculative. Routledge. Sterelny, K. (2016). Cumulative cultural evolution and the origins of language. Biological Theory, 11(3), 173–186. Stinchcombe, A. (1987). Constructing social theories. Univ. of Chicago Press. Stringer, C. (2012). Lone survivors: How we came to be the only humans on earth. Times Books. Tallerman, M. (2007). Did our ancestors speak a holistic protolanguage? Lingua, 117(3), 579–604. Tomasello, M. (2008). The origins of human communication. MIT Press. Turner, J. H., & Machalek, R. (2018). The new evolutionary sociology: Recent and revitalized theoretical and methodological approaches. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Turner, J. H., & Maryanski, A. (2008). On the origin of societies by natural selection. Paradigm Publishers. Vishnyatsky, L. B. (2008). Kulturnaya dinamika v seredine pozdnego pleystocena i prichini verhnepaleoliticheskoy revolyucii [cultural dynamics in the middle late Pleistocene and causes of the upper paleolithic revolution]. Sankt-Petersburgh State University Press. In Russian. Vishnyatsky, L. B. (2014). Vooruzhennoe nasilie v paleolite [armed violence in the Paleolithic]. Stratum Plus, 1, 311–332. In Russian. Vygotsky, L. S. (1930/1997). The history of the development of higher mental functions. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. Wray, A. (2002). The Transition to Language. Oxford University Press. Wildgen, W. (2012). Language evolution as a cascade of behavioral bifurcations. Estudios de. Linguistica Universidad de Alicante, 26, 359–382. Zlatev, J. (2014). The coevolution of human intersubjectivity, morality, and language. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 249–266). Oxford University Press.

Chapter 3

Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals

3.1

Renewal of Techno-Natural Niches and Social Orders

The idea of niche updating as the most crucial driver of cognitive evolution is already widely accepted (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Bickerton, 2009; Laland, 2017). In evolutionary biology, “niches” represent areas of interaction between species and their environment, primarily in foraging, breeding, and providing security and comfortable living conditions. Some species’ niches are delimited from or overlap with the niches of others, which is usually associated with stiff competition, adaptations, and selection. The niches of hominins, especially those beginning with early Homo (c. 2.7 mya), had crucial features. First, hominins updated and expanded their interactions with the natural environment faster, more successfully, and on a larger scale through the discovery of new sources of food. Then, Archanthropes from about 1.7 to 1.3 mya dispersed already outside Africa, encountering new, highly diverse landscapes. Second, the development of instrumental technologies transformed natural niches into techno-natural ones, as their capture, construction, renewal, and the transformation of new niches became increasingly dependent on the progress of Stone Age technologies. Third, there was an equally rapid and large-scale transformation of social relations systems: the structures of interactions initially adapted to survival of communities in their natural niches. As time passed, social relationships acquired their dynamics and evolution. Everyone occupies a particular position in the relations system, that is, an internal social niche for social animals within a group. At the same time, the group outside must interact with groups of the same species: as a rule, competing for territory, feuding, or entering friendly and mating relationships. Such internal and external social niches are significant for lion pride. Social interactions and relations occupy almost the main forces, energy and attention in groups of baboons, chimpanzees, and bonobos (our closest relatives). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_3

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Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals

Due to hominins’ initial cohesion and subsequent successful expansion, their intragroup and intergroup interactions have become even more critical. As a result, social niches with behavioral adaptations appear as social orders: systems of typical relations and practices with behavioral patterns of individuals and groups. These patterns are set by positions with corresponding possibilities of mutual influence, of access to each other, to benefits and resources. In the long run, these relations and positions began to be supplemented by systems of rules, that is, social institutions. Initially, individuals and groups react to natural niches and social orders as sources of challenges-threats and challenges-opportunities. Variability and activity represent attempts in the broadest sense: behavioral trials and probing actions, new social practices and rules, variants of the phenotypes and genomes, and cultural innovations patterns, including cognitive and speech abilities. If successful, attempts are fixed thanks to special fixation mechanisms that include multilevel selection, genetic heredity, and intergenerational cultural transmission. Prospective responses become behavioral strategies, practices. It is a process of support structures formation (see Chap. 2). Typical already known challenges provided by responsive practices become regular (including everyday) concerns. This conceptualization broadens and explicates the Spencerian evolutionary ideas of J. Turner and R. Machalek. Societies are fit if individuals and corporate units can respond to these pressures through their capacities for agency; and these responses do not come from some underlying genome and the shuffling of genes into new variants on which selection occurs but, instead, by goaldirected actions and/or luck of individual actors or collective/corporate actors seeking solutions to these selection pressures (Turner & Machalek, 2018 p. 31).

Of course, here we are referring primarily to objective concerns. They have a subjective representation as needs among animals. Humans can perceive concerns in the ordinary sense as desires, aspirations, passions, interests, and motives. The areas of fundamental needs include: • Security, control of violence, and the ability to use it • Life support (primarily the provision of food and water) • Comfortable and acceptable external conditions (protection from cold, heat, wind, precipitation) • Sexuality • Position among their kind, level of group membership, status, dominance, prestige, leadership, influence, dignity • Parenthood as protection, sustenance, and upbringing of children • Preferential or exclusive access to territory, to bodies of potential sexual partners; also possession of things, raw materials, and anything considered good (in humans and hominins, probably starting with Erectuses) Fundamental concerns play a vital role in the entire evolution of the human species (prehistory and history) and thus in cognitive evolution, including glottogenesis. In the most general sense, they play the role of drivers in the renewal

3.2

Coevolution of Niches, Orders, and Communications

51

of techno-natural niches and social orders. Already in these niches and orders, new derived concerns emerge.

3.2

Coevolution of Niches, Orders, and Communications

Consider the causal influences between techno-natural niches, social orders, communicative concerns, and practical, verbal behavior (see Fig. 2.5). There is no direct causal determination here. The role of techno-natural niches is to supply challengesthreats (“sticks”) and challenges-opportunities (“carrots”) primarily in the areas of life support (hunger or the desire for new, tasty, and nutritious food), security/ violence (fearful predators, dangerous enemies, or opportunities to defend against them, defeat them), and living conditions (heat, cold, harsh weather, or pleasant comfort). Hominins in their main response strategies, creativity, use of external means, and coordination of complex group behavior, evidently used intragroup imitation and communication. What needs to be conveyed, persuaded, learned, or understood: all this no longer depends directly on natural challenges (“carrots and sticks”). It now depends on an established social order in a group (later, in an alliance of groups, in complex configurations of relationships). At this point, the sociological approach becomes particularly important. Moreover, the life of hominins, so distant and alien to us, was permeated by social universals that have not lost their relevance to this day: violence and control over violence, power, status (in perspective—prestige, and influence), and material goods (in perspective—wealth, property). Thus, the natural “sticks and carrots” are refracted in various social orders. We can represent the daily challenges and concerns of social interaction in the form of the following questions: • Who protects us from outside dangers? Who do I need to protect and why? • Who will help me escape the heat, the wind and rain, the cold? • How do you know what to do today? Where to go? Who to hunt? What should we gather? • Who gets the food? Who cuts it up and cooks it to perfection? Who decides who gets what food? Who should share food with whom and not with whom? • What are the opportunities and obstacles to participating in these processes for the benefit of ourselves and our loved ones? In addition to concerns related to external challenges, there have always been internal spheres of derivative social challenges and concerns in each group. They are usually associated with fundamental concerns and the same universals (Dunbar, 1996; Hrdy, 1999; Richerson & Henrich, 2012; Dor, 2015). There are even more questions here, and the answers are highly varied, so let us note only the central themes. • Who and how one decides who does what, when, and where to leave this stay? Who needs to obey and who does not?

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• Who can and who cannot hit me, hurt me, or take something away from me? Who can I hit and what can I take away from whom? Who can I complain to if I am hurt? What happens to the person found guilty? • How is it determined who can have sex with whom? What can I do to achieve intimacy with my desired partner? How are tensions and conflicts in this area resolved? • Who and how one takes care of the children? Who feeds and teaches them? What can and cannot one do with their own children or another? It can be argued that such issues are of concern to any higher mammals living in groups, though they do quite well without articulate speech. Indeed, the basic social needs of individuals are similar, say, in groups of lions, elephants, primates, hominins, and humans (see above). However, the corresponding concerns in human groups are essentially specific: they are immersed in a normative context with general rules (see below on normativity). In early hominin groups, the system of rules was just beginning to form, and started probably with Erectuses (c. 1.6 mya); it became the main framework of social orders in groups and alliances. Of course, in the absence of articulate speech, no one could ask or ponder such questions. However, the relevant social challenges and concerns alarmed the hominins, and they responded with their behavior successfully or not to the challenges. New behavioral patterns are forced into existence by necessity; they are gradually carved by experience to approximate their specific functional goals; they become objects of learning, and eventually mold capacities in their shape. It is thus not the case that behavior is based on already existing capacity: capacity actually emerges from behavior. We are never already capable before we begin. We gradually become capable as we try. Skill emerges from practice, not the other way around. Quite obviously, new capacities are never totally unrelated to their past: pre-adaptations play an important role in the story. New capacities, however, emerge from the interaction—made possible by plasticity—between old capacities and new necessities, and because of that, they are never just reflections of their past. (Dor, 2015, pp. 196–197).

Typical regular responses became practices. Among them, we are interested in those related not to physical actions (to objects of nature, implements) but to communication, when some group members influence others by sounds, mimicry, gestures, and pantomime. In primitive social orders, where the dominant position and winning fights resolve all tensions (usually related to competition for food, territory, and females), communication plays a modest role. It is much more critical for the leader to maintain strength and formidable appearance, and for challengers to save and build strength for future fights (Boehm, 2000). In the chimpanzee and bonobo groups, communication is much more critical. It is not by chance that these apes have moving facial expressions. The complexity of social behavior in such orders includes not only the tasks of getting into a strong coalition, asserting one’s place in it, and fighting competitors, but also the

3.3

Disclosure of Transformation Mechanisms: Phase and Factor Models

53

establishment and maintenance of quite individualized relationships (Goodall, 1986; Rumbaugh, 2013; White et al., 2015; de Waal, 1995). Hominin social orders steadily became increasingly complex (we shall further explore for what reasons) and quite human as the achievement of social goals became dependent on influencing fellow tribe members through articulate and meaningful communication. Thus, a particular communicative niche within the social niche grew. It became a strict filter, which is still in effect today. Group members can achieve social goals only by uttering sounds whose meanings are understood by others, i.e., through speech and conversations. The expanding niche of communication manifested itself through challengesthreats (“they will not understand me,” “they will not agree,” “they will judge me,” “they will kick me out”) and challenges-opportunities (“they will understand me,” “they will agree,” “they will give what I want,” “they will accept me in their circle”). Routine interactive challenges became communicative concerns.1 Our distant ancestors’ constant attempts and efforts had been providing new sign means and cognitive abilities for new communicative concerns. Changing group behavior transformed social orders and techno-natural niches, which gave rise to new communicative challenges and concerns, and the spiral coevolution continued for thousands of generations. This is an initial heuristic to explain the origin of language and consciousness.

3.3

Disclosure of Transformation Mechanisms: Phase and Factor Models

In order to reveal the “black box” of anthropogenesis (see Fig. 2.1), it is necessary to present the mechanism and driving forces of transformation. Two types of graphical models are useful tools for this task. Phase models represent transitions between stages, and factor models (trend-structures) express the dynamic relationship between factors (acting variables) with increasing and weakening influence. Figure 3.1 presents a phase model of the main aromorphoses in anthropogenesis in general terms, including cognitive evolution. The model also helps identify the individual phases of glottogenesis. Here, the directional movement toward providing concerns through responses to challenges involves many circles of “trial and error.” The selection of structures is closely related to the selection of groups, since linguistic structures are inherently social. Provision of communication challenges has been an important factor in the survival of communities and in winning encounters with competitors.

“We know that necessity, not just capacity, is the mother of all invention: the absolute need to solve a problem inspires an exploratory process that eventually stumbles upon a good-enough solution, which is often identified as such only in retrospect (and because of that, inventions always require a considerable amount of luck)” (Dor, 2015, p. 190).

1

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Challengesthreats and challengesopportunities common to groups. Concerns without provision

Lack of new attempts, reliance on old structures in the group (population) B

3

New challenges and concerns of the group (population) A

Responsive attempts in the group (population) A: changes in behavior, interaction with the environment, and phenotype

The effects of unsecured care. Rising tensions

Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals

A new type of behavior that responds to challenges

Updating the social order, and the techno-natural niche

Mechanisms of fixation: Skinner’s reinforcement, Baldwin effect in genes, sexual selection, group selection

Support structures including magic wands

Dominanation, displacement or assimilation Reduced vitality, losing B in competition with rivals

Side effects: accumulation of costs, imbalances, tensions

Group success: increased viability, more diverse and flexible structures for subsequent trials, winning of A in clashes and competition; growing group size

Migration (especially of girls and women) to a more attractive group

Displacement B to worse conditions, assimilation, or death

Fig. 3.1 The model of structure and community selection (groups, alliances, populations). It is a mechanism of emergence and preservation of new successful (sapient) features of different nature while discarding features and groups that proved to be inadequate. Here, blocks denote conditional phases of processes, and arrows indicate transitions between phases

Let us also consider an example of an abstract factor model explaining the emergence of structure S to provide a derivative concern H generated by practices P needed to provide some fundamental need and correspondent basic concerns (Fig. 3.2). Such schemes usually center on a variable to be explained (explanandum). This variable expresses the level of development of a new sapient trait S that includes some cognitive ability (e.g., attention, memory, consciousness functions) and a new type of language structures (cf. Fig. 2.6). While preserving the fundamental needs common to animals, hominins, and humans (see above), new derivative concerns H related to social interaction emerge at certain stages of anthropogenesis leading to behavior and abilities S. Needs of status evolve into more complex differentiated concerns of raising/preserving prestige, authority, influence, power, erotic appeal. In the basic concerns of parenthood, an increasing role is to educate the rising generations, which manifests itself in socialization and enculturation. Basic concerns as social forms of universal fundamental needs are labeled at the edges of these schemes, since derivative concerns (say, communicative) and structures (say, linguistic) usually emerge in connection with the provision of these basic concerns and needs. So, from where do the new communication concerns (H in the schema) come?

3.4

Communicative Concerns, Speech Abilities, and Sign Structures

Concerns of strength and security (preservation or growth of them)

Concerns of prestige and social position Access to the ingredients’ variety

Provision of similar concerns Readiness and variability of ingredients Sharpness of the concern H

Expression of side sapient traits

Intensity of attempts caused by the concern H

The pressure of sex and group selection in favor of structure S

55

Concerns of parenthood and training Fixation in genes and traits

The level of development (expression, effectiveness) of the structure S providing the derivative concern H

The effectiveness of fixing successful attempts in favor of structure S

Provision of the The activity of practices P increasing costs C and tensions T which generate the derivative concern H

Concerns of food

Significance of practices P for fundamental concerns in these niche and order

Concerns of household and acquisitions

concern H

Sexual Concerns

Fig. 3.2 Presumptive dynamic interconnection of factors (drivers), conditioning the emergence and development of a new support structure (anatomical, physiological, behavioral, mental, social) in anthropogenesis. Gray arrows denote the dependence of cost-generating practices on fundamental needs and concerns

3.4

Communicative Concerns, Speech Abilities, and Sign Structures

Speech and language emerged as support structures for communicative concerns that had been changing throughout anthropogenesis because of permanent renewal of techno-natural niches and social orders. Niches and orders have their source in structures that once emerged to provide basic concerns in primary areas of life: sustenance, security, prestige, and influence, acquiring and maintaining goods, sexuality, and parenthood. Each complication and layering of structures and practices in the natural environment and social interaction naturally led to the development of communication (S

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Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals

in Fig. 3.2). All these means are once-formed structures designed to provide specific communicative concerns H. These concerns require transmitting messages, emotions, and moods. Recall that concern in the theoretical sense does not refer to an individual or a group but to a living system in its environment and includes a set of variables with acceptable, tolerable, “comfort” zones of values (see Chap. 2). The immediate environment for communicative concerns is the social situation – one or more potential listeners or interlocutors.2 The multitude of significant variables in communication is an open set, but below, we will consider only the most important in terms of the origin and development of language. • Comprehension—the level of listeners’ recognition of the general meaning of the utterance; sufficient accuracy of meaning transmission in typical situations • Intelligibility—the quality of pronunciation, articulation of sounds, statements; ability to such articulation • Ease of utterance and phonetic recognition—efficiency of differentiation, identification of meaningful sounds (phonemes, syllables, tones, words); the ability to do this • Semantic recognition—the effectiveness of distinguishing and identifying the meanings of individual elements of utterances; the corresponding ability • Persuasiveness—the level of the speaker’s success in achieving the listeners’ consent, acceptance of their point of view, position, statement; ability to accomplish this result with their statements • Agreement—the level of unity achieved by the interlocutors in understanding the general sense of the conversation, in its interpretation, evaluation, and decisions concerning subsequent actions • Correctness of speech—compliance with the accepted standards, rules of a given type of sign system (including protolanguage, language); ability to meet these standards • Eloquence—is a scale of “beauty of speech,” that is, the quality of the impression made on listeners of speech as smooth, pleasant, persuasive, rich, mesmerizing, delightful This series of communicative concerns has an internal hierarchy, albeit not a perfectly strict one. Thus, the one who seeks the agreement of interlocutors always takes care of his speech persuasiveness. Speech is not persuasive when it is not understood or is obtuse. To accurately understand the meaning of speech, it is necessary to recognize the meaning of the spoken words. Thus, eloquence implies correct pronunciation and construction of phrases, sentences. 2

In human history, especially with the invention of writing, printing, and other communicative media up to the television and the Internet, the concept of “social situation” must be substantially expanded to include supposed readers, future generations. In the topic of glottogenesis it suffices to understand the “social situation” as including the presence of hominins and then sapienses in the same place and time capable of hearing the sounds they produce.

3.5

3.5

Are Functionalist Explanations of Language Constructions Justified?

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Are Functionalist Explanations of Language Constructions Justified?

The presented concepts correspond well to the functionalism of modern linguistic theories such as Fillmore’s grammar of constructions (Croft, 2001) and the functionalist cultural determination of languages (Everett, 2017, 2008). At the same time, functionalism in evolutionary linguistics is often criticized, including on empirical grounds. In the Oxford collection of articles on language evolution, Comrie and Kuteva (2003) rejected functionalist explanations of the origins of syntax and grammar. They draw on the results of their large-scale comparative study of adjective forms in a representative sample of 157 languages. The authors found a wide variety of constructions, from the simplest to the most complex. All these constructions convey the meanings for which ordinary adjectival sentences are sufficient in English. The essence of the argument is that one cannot explain this variety by functional need. As an alternative explanation, Comrie and Kuteva suggest “historicity” and “contingency.” According to the approach taken in this book, social and linguistic constructions emerge as support structures for objective concerns (an abstract and extended counterpart to “functions” and “needs”). Thus, the argument of Comrie and Kuteva is sound but leads not to a rejection of functionalist explanations but to their refinement. New challenges and concerns lead to changes in language, such as the formation of new syntactic constructions and grammatical devices. These and others always correlate with the specific state of the language, its speakers’ speech abilities, and dispositions. Therefore, different structures under different initial conditions not only respond to an actual specific challenge but also provide (support, restore) some universal concerns, like ease of utterance, semantic recognition, and eloquence (see above). The vague appeals to “historicity” and “contingency” are not so difficult to clarify. Here we should consider the ingredients available in the current state of language, from which alone a new linguistic construction can be constructed as a new support structure (an answer to a new challenge). It is possible to uncover the origin of the syntactic constructions cited by Comrie and Kuteva. It will also be possible to explain the specificity of each by the available ingredients in the respective language. Such an approach is constructive and opens great research possibilities. It is true that the linguistic structure itself and earlier its ingredients were once formed “historically” and that “chance” played some role in this, as always. However, it does not reject the functional approach in evolutionary studies.

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3.6

Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals

The Spiral Coevolution

Communicative concerns emerge from tensions and challenges in new niches and orders; i.e., they are the effects of the costs of the new support structures, above all individual and collective practices P (see also the cycle closure at the top of Fig. 3.1). In other words, social and cultural evolution and progress in material technology generate new tensions and concerns, including the need to communicate with new content, better precision, more power of persuasion, and richer impressiveness. . . .The cognitive challenges of language, throughout its evolution, grew and developed along with it. The use of the first prototype in its original form required certain sets of capacities; the more advanced versions of the prototype gradually required more of these capacities; the first revolutionary advance in the system brought with it new challenges that required new capacities, which were then gradually stretched as the new generation of the technology entered the phase of gradual growth, and so on and so forth. The cognitive challenges of the first language speakers of language were not our challenges. The challenges themselves evolved (Dor, 2015, p. 192).

The responses to these challenges are the trials and fixations of successful attempts: new speech practices, language structures, and mental capacities of attention, comprehension, memory, consciousness, and thinking. These internal mental gains and external communicative skills immediately begin to be used in various collective and individual practices (the principle of magic wand expansion, Chap. 2). They contribute to further advancement in social and cultural evolution and technological progress, which generates new tensions and challenges. Thus, the circle closes, forming a spiraling evolutionary dynamic. Note also that the cycle and ascent to a new cycle, the evolutionary spiral (Fig. 3.3), reflect the same “backbone path” from “entry” to “exit” in the “black box” scheme (Fig. 2.1) as the ascending ladder of steps of glottogenesis in the sapientation processes. The emergence of fundamentally new linguistic structures and their subsequent extension to other sign units of the same language appear as a transition from the previous attractor to a new one (Wildgen, 2012). The “backbone path” to universal properties of full-fledged human languages, e.g., according to Ch. Hockett (1963), appears as a unidirectional evolutionary “river,” where many languages “flow” along the same vector and pass similar milestones, i.e., stages of glottogenesis. This picture does not cancel the multiplicity of diverging (and sometimes converging) languages as “streams of changes.” The original language-specific structures. Subsequent “turns” at each stage of glottogenesis and further evolution set unique “channels” of languages and their families (see details in Chaps. 9–11).

The Linguistic Concerns Are Internal Stimuli for Language Development

3.7

FACTORS OF EVOLUTION external to the language community: climate, demography, resources, competition

Tensions, challenges of new techno-natural niches and social orders

Collective and individual practices that provide fundamental needs in new settings; costs, tensions, and new derivative concerns

Renewal of techno-natural niches and social orders: changes in technology, sustenance, social control, power, exchange, parenting, sexuality

Use of new speech, cognitive abilities, language structures in more effective social and material practices providing basic and other concerns. Victory over competitors

Displacement, assimilation, or elimination of competitive groups, populations, and species without such efficient communication and practices

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Closing the chain and a new round of the evolutionary spiral

New concerns require solidarity, agreement, understanding, support, participation, trust

New communicative concerns appear including crucial topics, essential new types of objects, achieving accuracy of labeling and messaging, persuasiveness of speech in new contexts

Formation of new speech abilities and related cognitive ones. Emergence of the language structures as "by-products"

Fig. 3.3 The cycle of communicative concerns and linguistic structures development as part of the spiral coevolution

3.7

The Linguistic Concerns Are Internal Stimuli for Language Development

Within social orders, their structures (practices, attitudes, rules, customs, and institutions) always provide interactions that implement relations of solidarity, power, violence, exchange, and kinship. The functioning of these social structures always involves communication, and thus communicative concerns of transmitting and understanding utterances in the broadest sense. Therefore, utterances (from emotional shrieks, interjections to extended speeches, later written texts) and series of statements by different subjects (dialogues, general conversations) are interpreted here as structures providing communicative concerns. At the “lower” level of this hierarchy of concerns and structures are linguistic concerns, i.e., emerging objective needs of a linguistic community to change (enrich, complicate, simplify, transform) their sign means so that they are more effective for the generation and use of verbal messages. Effectiveness criteria include the adequacy of content transmission, ease of pronunciation, intelligibility, and recognizability. Linguistic concerns include: • Phonological and phonetic concerns (how to achieve adequate distinction and recognition of phonemes in new or borrowed words with an already established phonetic structure) • Lexical and semantic concerns (how to name new realities conveniently and understandably, what new meanings are necessary given the already existing vocabulary, given ways of word formation)

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• Syntactic and grammatical concerns (how to construct word combinations conveniently and understandably to express ordinary meanings with new logical or conceptual structures). Thanks to the Young Grammarians, we know about the “phonetic rules,” the regularities of updating the lexical composition of languages.3 These rules should not be understood scholastically as “written in Heaven” eternal ideal laws. Any changes in pronunciation and dictionary updates have always resulted in providing communicative concerns: pragmatic and instrumental. However, the sign structures of this provision emerge in every language under the already existing phonetic system, the lexical arsenal, and the corpus of syntactic-grammatical constructions. These rigid coercive ties (constraints) are condition-specific “channels” of linguistic change. Thus, the pragmatic concerns of native speakers get “technical” concretization in linguistic concerns. Linguistic structures provide them at the phonetic, lexical, and syntactic-grammatical levels. Linguistic concerns refer to the content level (semantic units, related to understanding meanings) and the expression level (instrumental units, related to ease of pronunciation and aural recognition capabilities). Semantic concerns arise when there are not enough words or word combinations (lexical structures) to express new objects, meanings, and thoughts. As a result, already established languages develop primarily in terms of enrichment and renewal of lexical composition. Examples of alternative lexical structures are direct inclusions from another language as immutable, adapting them to the grammatical structure of their language (according to previously established structures), giving a new meaning to a word already present in the language, inventing a novel word with the help of native roots. The constructions of syntax and grammar rules are also structures once formed to provide semantic concerns, but already at a higher level: concerns of conveying more precise, holistic, situational, logical, abstract, artistic, or any other meanings. Instrumental concerns related to the pronunciation, distinguishability, recognizability of sounds, and their combinations emerged in the earliest stages of language formation. The ways of distinguishing between phonemes (the phonological system) and the composition of phonemes (the phonetic complex) are sets of established structures that provide these concerns. In the further development of each language, the phonetic concerns re-emerge during periods of massive borrowing of vocabulary from other languages. The structures providing them emerge naturally within the framework of the already existing phonetic system and its means; this explains “phonetic rules” as a favorite subject of historical linguistics (see Chaps. 9 and 11).

3 Macro-comparativists stubbornly try to reconstruct the “Pra-Indo-European language” and all kinds of “Nostratic languages” on the basis of these rules (see Chap. 11).

3.9

The Interiorization Mechanism Is a Key to the Origin of Mental Structures

3.8

Abilities and Attitudes as the Main Phenomena to Explain

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The most constructive, flexible, convenient concepts for mental structures that provide behavioral (including verbal) practices are “attitudes” and “abilities.” The traditional distinction between “mental dispositions” (L. Lange, D. Uznadze, M. Rokeach) and “social attitudes” (W. Thomas, F. Znaniecky, G. Allport) is not absolute because of “cultural-historical” genesis of both. Attitudes can be conscious or completely subconscious, stable, or situational. They can be typologized in quite a variety of ways. Attitudes provide mental and behavioral reactions of an individual, usually associated with moral obligation, solidarity with other group members,4 loyalty to leaders, and commitment to symbols (sanctuaries, values), which are explicit or implicitly actualized during social interactions. Practices of social control and tendencies to internalize external structures (above all moral rules, solidarity relations) are fixed across generations (Gintis, 2004; Boehm, 2015). Abilities (including coagulated, automated skills) appear as operational “technological” additions and means of the attitudes mentioned above (Donald, 2001, 2017). Abilities emerge through repetition, practice, and training. We will be mainly interested in the formation of speech abilities during anthropogenesis. Still, we will also understand the development of consciousness as a layering of specific skills to focus attention and operate with various mental representations. If abilities emerge as individuals practice, they already have attitudes of repetition and training. From where do the attitudes themselves come?

3.9

The Interiorization Mechanism Is a Key to the Origin of Mental Structures

Some researchers reasonably turn to the rich intellectual legacy of Leo Vygotsky and Aleksandr Luria (Dor & Jablonka, 2014; Tomasello, 2008, 2019). The authors of the cultural-historical approach paid attention not only to the general problems of mental development but also to the cognitive abilities of great apes, their similarities and differences from those of child and adult humans (Vygotsky & Luria, 1930/1993). The essence of the approach was expounded with crystal clarity by A. R. Luria: In order to explain the highly complex forms of human consciousness, one must go beyond the human organism. One must seek the origins of conscious activity and 'categorical' behavior not in the recesses of the human brain or in the depths of the spirit, but in the

4

C. Boehm considers the connections between moral rules, reputation, conscience (as internalized rules), social control, sexual selection, and evolutionary effects in his analysis of hunter-gatherers’ social orders (Boehm, 2015).

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external conditions of life. Above all, this means that one must seek these origins in the external processes of social life, in the social and historical forms of human existence (Luria, 1981, p. 25).

It is necessary to pave the way from the initial conceptual ideas (the Vygotsky– Luria approach) to reconstruct and explain the genesis of language and consciousness in anthropogenesis. The milestones on this way are the following questions. • If some initial elements of articulate and meaningful hominin speech emerged from interiorization, what type of social interactions led to it? • How and why did a strict standardization of signs and meanings come about? • What motivated our distant ancestors to the unaccustomed and challenging labor of uttering, recognizing, remembering the multiplied signs, meanings, language constructions, moreover, of inventing new ones? • What are the essential conceptual connections between speech behavior, manifestations of consciousness abilities at the ultramicro-level (in “here and now” situations), and the scale of multigenerational cognitive evolution? The theoretical core of the approach is the concept of “interiorization,” because each mental function first manifests itself as social interaction and then as an internal ability (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, pp. 187–188). There is also a broader generalization: For us to call a process “external” means to call it ‘social.’ Every higher mental function was external because it was social before it became an internal, strictly mental function; it was formerly a social relation of two people. The means of acting on oneself is initially a means of acting on others or a means of action of others on the individual (Vygotsky, 1930/1997, p. 105).

It is not coincidence that these processes are structurally consistent with the impact of interactive rituals on the behavior and psyche of participants.

3.10

Interactive Ritual and Interiorization: A Synthesis of the Concepts

Interactive ritual (in the tradition of E. Durkheim, E. Goffman, and R. Collins) refers to the interaction of two or more individuals in a “here and now” situation with a common focus of attention, automatic reactions of each to others’ behavior, synchronized actions, psychophysiological rhythms, and common emotional arousal of one or another modality. Full-fledged, successful rituals lead to the formation and strengthening of social relations, feelings, and beliefs about sacred symbols (sanctities, values, ideas) (Collins, 2004; Rozov, 2010). Hereafter, for simplicity, we will understand “ritual” in this broad sociopsychological (and micro-sociological) sense. Interiorization is the mechanism of transforming parts or aspects of social interactions into internal mental structures. More precisely, some structures of an individual’s psyche (as ingredients) are transformed and likened to the social interactions in which this individual has participated.

3.11

Positive Reinforcements, Emotional Energy, and Normativity

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According to R. Collins (2004), each person’s psyche is nothing but a layering of the lived chains results of the most impressive, effective rituals. These include reading and discussing essential books, conversations with parents, significant teachers, and other authorities, rituals of involvement in family, friendship, professional and other networks of solidarity, participation in conflicts, collective action, and much more. It means that the main psychic structures of each individual once emerged in some emotionally impressive rituals through interiorization. Let us also link Collins’ model of ritual to broad notions of attitudes and abilities (see above). Successful interactive rituals play the role of microsocial anchoring mechanisms in the formation of long-term internal attitudes, enriching, over time, the verbal abilities of communication participants. The latter then pass on their abilities through innate gifts and social learning (i.e., also through rituals!) to the next generation. Ritual with interiorization appears as the core of the critical mechanisms of socialization and enculturation. In the following chapters, we will see that the microsocial basis of cognitive evolution (including glottogenesis and the formation of consciousness abilities) are also specific rituals. For example, possessing a particular language includes a person’s attitude (disposition, inclination, readiness) to speak it, understand it, and the corresponding complex speech abilities. While even one inspiring ritual (“now I will learn Chinese!”) may be sufficient for the attitude, the capacity is acquired only through a multitude of learning activities and interactions, episodes of conversational practice, which are also rituals, however small and truncated, but which promote interiorization and internal accumulation of language structures.

3.11

Positive Reinforcements, Emotional Energy, and Normativity

Factors in the success of learning external structures, particularly in learning, are a well-studied topic in the concept of operant conditioning, starting with the works of E. Thorndike (Skinner, 1938; Cooper et al., 2020). Here, the interaction of participants and complex cognitive and emotional processes in rituals play the role of operant attempts. In Collins’ concept, successful rituals produce emotional energy that fills participants and gives them a sense of victorious rightness or “moral power,” according to E. Durkheim. Such a powerful volitional resource is available for the subsequent overcoming of obstacles for hard or tedious work, for example, in teaching a foreign language. A child in the early years quickly learns a native language due to the great readiness of neural structures at this age. This remarkable progress is possible because of benevolent corrections, smiles, parental approval of each correctly said word, every perfectly constructed sentence. All these interactions are micro-rituals with positive emotional reinforcement of the abilities acquired by the child.

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J. Turner and R. Machalek correctly point out the special importance of emotions in cognitive and brain evolution. One observation, often made, but not always fully drawn out, is that intelligent animals are always emotional animals. Why would this be so? The answer is that storing, remembering, retrieving, and deliberating over cognitions cannot occur without these cognitions being tagged with valenced emotions (Turner & Machalek, 2018, p. 350).

The role of emotions in memory of certain semantic units is not in doubt. The richness and diversity of emotions and “emotional language” developed in the course of evolution not by themselves, as Turner and Machalek tend to claim, but as parts of the evolution of impressive ritual practices. Consider on the same grounds the dominance of standardization in any language that we feel when we hear speech with a strong accent or “illiterate.” It is necessary to recognize our rather strange, hypertrophied normativity developed in speech practices (not to mention written language) and our so rigorous attitudes to speaking “correctly.” The social success and adoration of eloquent speakers, ridicule of those who “distort the language,” and the almost universal reluctance to be branded as “tongue-tied” all point to powerful ritual mechanisms for maintaining social normativity in general and linguistic normativity in particular. Normativity, being one of the key concepts of this theory, needs an explicit definition. Further, we will understand normativity as a characteristic of a community (a group, an alliance, a broader social integrity with systematic internal contacts) whose members in one way or another conform their behavior to the rules established in this community: they comply with them, seek to conceal violation of rules, express indignation at another’s violation, and are ready to punish collectively for violations. Each social order as a set of typical interactions, relations, and institutions includes its own specific normativity as a system of valid rules to which members of the community who find themselves in certain positions and/or typical situations must subordinate their behavior. At the individual level, rules are effective insofar as they are interiorized as attitudes (see above). The normativity of hominins and humans should be distinguished from the typical social behavior of animals that live in groups. This behavior is either completely programmed by innate instincts (as in ants and bees, as in birds and mammals feeding their offspring) or regulated by relations of domination, patronage, partnership, mutual assistance, and rivalry (as in lions, elephants, primates). A crucial difference of quasi-normative behavior in animal groups is the absence of clear patterns of joint attention to violations and obligatory collective sanctions for them (see Chap. 4 in more detail).

3.13

3.12

Approaches to the Study of Cognitive Abilities and the Crucial Role of Rituals

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Attempts and Fixation Mechanisms at Distinct Levels of Selection

Two crucial components form support structures for new communicative challenges and concerns: attempts and fixation mechanisms, both in the broadest sense. Attempts can take the form of deliberate collective actions and concrete pronunciation of a sound, a word, or a set of words. People usually perform speech attempts among significant listeners in emotionally rich activities: peculiar interactive rituals (E. Goffman, R. Collins). According to Vygotsky’s interiorization principle, these rituals produce the transfer of external actions (including vocal) into internal structures (including new speech abilities). At diverse selection levels, fixation mechanisms lead to survival of some structures (with their subsequent propagation) and death of others. Macro-level fixation results from multiple products of attempts (trials, efforts) at lower levels up to the level of ultramicro: the “here and now” situations. Thus, a linguistic innovation, such as an invented or borrowed word, a way of pronunciation, a phrase, and a turn of speech, is either approved by others and becomes a new language element, or the community ignores, rejects this innovation and then forgets it. Convenient language constructions and typical formulas positively reinforced (according to B. Skinner) by the general joy of mutual understanding led to clarification of what was said and to the achievement of agreement in every sphere of joint activity. Hominins formed these constructions through numerous attempts of reinterpretation and recombination of sounds, syllables, words, their modifications, and repetition in unison of found verbal solutions (see details in Chap. 6). In this case, for each new type of construction, previously applied methods of connection between elements were used by analogy. In this way, linguistic magic wands appeared underlying the glotto-aromorphoses. Since some linguistic structures (elements and constructions) provide communicative concerns more effectively (more convenient, more accessible to pronounce and understand, and better conveying the desired meanings and moods) than others, they are also subject to selection and evolution. In this respect, each language is a particular superstructural system (“a symbiont”) “living” on its carrier—a linguistic community (Hurford, 1999, p. 187).

3.13

Approaches to the Study of Cognitive Abilities and the Crucial Role of Rituals

Revonsuo presented a simple and witty scheme of the correlation of different approaches to explaining consciousness (Fig. 3.4). The same strategies are helpful in the study of language and culture. Let us show how the ritual concept of stepped cognitive evolution fits into this context.

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Fig. 3.4 Approaches to explaining consciousness (and more broadly: human cognitive abilities) (Revonsuo, 2009, p. 285)

In the “upward-looking explanation,” it is through interactive rituals that the structures governing their acts of consciousness and behavior emerge in the psyche of individuals. The “downward-looking explanation” of consciousness through brain processes and neural connections (and further, the genetic level) has developed quite separately from the theory of rituals and attitudes. However, it can also connect with it through a chain of mediations. For example, it is known that emotional states in intensive ritual actions are closely related to various psychophysiological rhythms, hormonal bursts (Collins, 2004), and thus brain processes, with innate assignments and mechanisms of heredity. In individual development (the ontogeny), the human psyche evolves through the accumulation and structuring of attitudes. The last ones result from an individual’s participation in many chains of rituals throughout their maturation all subsequent life (see above). Finally, a “backward-looking explanation” of cognitive abilities through phylogeny is just possible based on the theory of cognitive evolution. Unicellular organisms and fish can scarcely help us to understand the genesis of consciousness, as

3.14

The Constructive Notion of Consciousness Is a Key to Its Genesis

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A. Revonsuo shows boldly in the scheme. The framework of anthropogenesis is a more modest and promising area of research. Here we study the conditions and causes of the emergence of consciousness itself. Different stages and levels of its development appear as successive acquisitions of attitudes and cognitive abilities. In each generation, attitudes emerge socially (according to Vygotsky), ritually (according to Collins), and operatically (according to Skinner). This development uses the potential skills obtained in the genome (and thus in the brain structure). According to the Boulding effect, the principle of gene-culture coevolution, and the cultural drive principle (see Chap. 2), the potential for speech and consciousness abilities has slowly but consistently grown over many thousands of generations. The reason is that the individuals and groups that showed the best cognitive skills (primarily in the sphere of speech and consciousness) steadily won the competition (Figs. 3.1 and 3.3).

3.14

The Constructive Notion of Consciousness Is a Key to Its Genesis

J. Searle’s definition is as follows: Consciousness consists of inner, qualitative, subjective states and processes of sentience or awareness (Searle, 2000, p. 559).

Searle phenomenologically indicates the elements of the field of consciousness and the processes associated with them. Revonsuo interprets Searle’s understanding of consciousness in roughly the same way: Consciousness is unified or holistic in the sense that every content of consciousness is embedded into a holistic field where each separate content, say, the feeling of pain in the foot, the sight of red colour in the traffic lights, the smell of smoke, the sound of a church bell, is related to each other to form one momentarily unified experience (Revonsuo, 2009, p. 184).

Searle suggests that the elements of this field are equivalent. Still, the elements of consciousness seem to be comparable precisely because of our ability to move and focus our attention arbitrarily on any one of them. This ability to control focused attention based on internal speech and thought attitudes constitutes a cardinal feature of human consciousness. This trait distinguishes our consciousness from the attention field of animals and their “practical thinking.” The function of consciousness is to summarize the current state of the world in a compact representation that is consequently used for the planning and execution of voluntary behaviour (Revonsuo, 2009, p. 210).

This notion already takes consciousness beyond the phenomenological field and points to our ability to relate one’s behavior in space and time. Consciousness appears to be deeper than the “holistic field” due to user experience, memory, and

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accumulated meanings. The neural basis of these abilities seems to be the following description: ... the brain learns by constructing a growing network of concepts. When a new entity is experienced, say a song, a fruit, or a mathematical technique, it is processed by a spreading search through the network in an attempt to find links with previously established nodes (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, p. 82).

Consciousness as a part and ability of the psyche belongs to the individual, i.e., each person has his or her own personal, somehow developed consciousness with its own specifics. The terms from the series “group consciousness,” “social consciousness,” “national consciousness,” “religious consciousness,” and “bourgeois consciousness” will be considered as metaphors indicating the general features, invariants of individual consciousness, including beliefs, and typical interpretations of what is happening. At the same time, the cardinal role of social interactions and verbal communication for the development of individual consciousness of each person in ontogeny is no longer in doubt (just thanks to the works of L. Vygotsky). In the same way, in phylogeny, consciousness could not appear and develop in hominins, Protosapienses, and sapienses outside sign (and then verbal) communication. We should abandon the customary notion that consciousness is always the same, that it “either exists or does not exist,” and that in its ancient origins it is like ours, i.e., the consciousness of a modern adult.

3.15

The Phylogeny of Consciousness Is the Accumulation of Cognitive Abilities

The difficulties of reconstructing the consciousness origin and development are due not only to the extreme complexity of this phenomenon (or rather, to the vast area of phenomena). There is not even a hint of a scientific and philosophical consensus on the nature of consciousness (Revonsuo, 2009). Just as it is convenient and constructive to reason about mental regulation of behavior in terms of multiple attitudes (see above), consciousness should be represented as a layering of specific cognitive abilities. Evolutionarily more recent ones using previous ones as their ingredients apply the concept of the Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development (EZPD, see Chap. 2). According to the principle of interiorization, each time, the general group ability acquired in direct communication precedes the individual capacity. In the same way, the reactive ability induced by the situation or group behavior precedes the arbitrary ability in the communication situation. The most recent to emerge are the skills of individuals to arbitrarily produce actions in their consciousness, i.e., to purposefully reflect in solitude: the third-order rituals according to R. Collins (2004). In the Vygotsky–Luria approach, potentially rich is the idea that humans use signs as unique tools to change other people’s behavior and control their behavior.

3.16

Extension of Hempel’s Nomological Explanatory Model

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The notion of doubling of experience in consciousness is also helpful. The concept appears to mean an arbitrarily direction of attention, abstraction of properties, and their synthesis into meaning. This ability becomes a tool of the arbitrary control of its own psychological operations in imagination as a doubling experience (Vygotsky, 1930/1997).

3.16

Extension of Hempel’s Nomological Explanatory Model

W. T. Fitch reasonably writes in his review of empirical approaches to testing hypotheses of language origin and evolution: . . .we have quite a full roster of explanations and predictions concerning incoming data. Many of these models can be falsified by new data, especially when their predictions contrast with those from other hypotheses. And, as I will document in detail below, there is plenty of relevant data, and more coming in every day. The main problem for this approach is not with data or hypotheses, but sociological: There is no well-developed tradition of scholars in language evolution taking each other’s models seriously. Instead, the tradition has been one where others’ models are ridiculed or (worse) ignored (Fitch, 2017, p. 4).

A methodological approach is needed that encompasses multiple methods of obtaining, interpreting indirect data on glottogenesis, and turning them into a kind of megamachine for hypothesis making and testing. It is necessary to present the regular connections between the phenomena as a pair of theoretical and empirical hypotheses for each breakthrough to a new stage of linguistic complexity. Carl Hempel’s nomological scheme (Hempel, 1942) with a deductive derivation of judgments about phenomena-sequences from judgments about initial conditionscauses and from “universal hypotheses” seems to be a promising core of such an approach. Figure 3.5 presents a diagram of this explanatory logic. The target empirical hypothesis of each transition to a new stage of language development has the following form: “There and then under such circumstances, the linguistic structures of such a class must have formed.” A general theoretical hypothesis (“universal” in Hempel’s terms) with the structure “if..., then...” is a logical basis for a target empirical hypothesis. The theoretical hypothesis itself must be justified, which is why the Hempelian scheme needs extension. One should formulate it so abstractly that it allows testing its consequences by observations or experiments in the present tense. Let us name the auxiliary hypotheses of the correspondent judgments. If the latter are successfully confirmed, then the abstract theoretical hypothesis becomes justified (the opposing arrows in Fig. 3.5), and it makes our target empirical hypothesis more plausible (Stinchcombe, 1987, pp. 18–28). Fig. 3.6 presents the general logic of the theoretical justification of the hypothesis. Examples among experiments already conducted include varying the nature of oral instruction in the practical construction of Olduvai and Acheulian stone

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Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals deductive inference

The level of cognitive evolution and language development

A form of theoretical hypothesis: everywhere and always under such-and-such initial conditions, there will necessarily occur a phenomenon of such-and-such class Confirmation that such phenomena have occurred

THINKING deductive connections

Auxiliary hypotheses — verifiable up-to-date consequences of the theoretical Reinforcing the hypothesis hypothesis if its consequences are confirmed

The effect: a phenomenon happens that falls within the prediction (given class criteria) if both hypotheses, empirical judgments, and logical connectives are true

Judgments about consequence

A form of a target empirical hypothesis: there and then conditions that meet the criteria of the theoretical hypothesis have developed, so phenomena of such-and-such class must necessarily occur

REALITY

Judgments about initial conditions

Confirmation of initial conditions with indirect data

causal linkages Causes are specific phenomena, judgments about whose attributes constitute the first part of the empirical hypothesis

Direction of time

Fig. 3.5 The extended nomological explanation of cognitive evolution and glottogenesis phenomena. The largest shaded arrow means the influence of causal phenomena on consequences in the reality under study (lower right area). The white arrows denote the logical justifications of judgments in theoretical thinking (upper left area) Main types of auxiliary hypotheses Comparative observations in order to find out: under what conditions phenomena of this class or close to them occur

General arguments that the ingredients of the initial conditions are sufficient to turn them into the phenomenon under study

Experiments with analog models: we create conditions structurally similar to target ones, then select, or instruct subjects, find out at what parameters phenomena of this class occur or are close to them

The form of a theoretical hypothesis: everywhere and always under such initial conditions, there will necessarily occur a phenomenon of definite class

Computer experiments-based f. e. on the game theory: "players," "statuses," "wins," "losses," "interaction strategies." Parameters widely vary in order to find out: under what combinations of conditions the model phenomena of such class or close to them occur

General arguments that attempts and fixation mechanisms can transform and combine ingredients into phenomena of this class

A target empirical hypothesis

Fig. 3.6 The scheme of justification of the theoretical hypothesis in the extended nomological approach. Here, the blocks denote judgments and arguments. The arrows indicate logical reinforcement: increasing the validity, plausibility of judgments, and confidence in them

implements (Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017, pp. 189–207), teaching tabular or gestural “language” to chimpanzees (Lloyd, 2004), learning experiments and observations of language-learning children (Tomasello, 2008, 2019), computer simulations (Steels, 1997; Tamariz & Kirby, 2016; Kirby, 2017; Markov & Markov, 2020), and even experiments with communicating robots (Nolfi & Mirolli, 2010). If such auxiliary testing supports the theoretical hypothesis, it also confirms the target empirical hypothesis about a definite phase of language origin. If the theoretical hypothesis is not supported, then we should seek another meaningful

3.16

Extension of Hempel’s Nomological Explanatory Model

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The theoretical hypothesis The target empirical hypothesis The rationale of provision lack for the definite concerns: the juxtaposition of information about natural conditions, likely social interactions, and relationships involving communicative concerns for which there were not yet cognitive and vocal support structures

Justification of the presence of the required ingredients: by traces in the remains, artifacts, or by inference from similar analysis of previous cognitive evolution stages

Judgments about initial conditions: new concerns, available ingredients, attempts

Rationale for the reality of attempts and fixation mechanisms based on general information about the nature of behavior, selection in communities of this type and development level

Judgments about the explained phenomenon: on the emergence of the new linguistic and/or cognitive structure

Rationale for the communicative concern provision based on data indicating the success of relevant social practices

Rationale for the appearance of the language structure itself: after all, it subsequently became an ingredient of subsequent known constructions

Rationale of the emergence of new costs and concerns caused by the activity of the structure

Fig. 3.7 Indirect justification of a target empirical hypothesis in the extended nomological explanation scheme

explanation and repeat all further logical procedures. Note that in the present tense there are many opportunities to vary the experimental conditions. The theoretical hypotheses explaining the rise to a new phase of linguistic complexity get their sources in the cognitive evolution principles (Chap. 2) and take the following form. With such new type of communicative concerns emerging in such social orders, with such already used sign means (including linguistic structures), added by such new practices of attempts and fixation mechanisms, definite type of linguistic structures will emerge using these means as ingredients and providing the concerns mentioned above. Target hypotheses as assumed judgments about conditions and results of conditions’ formation in each place and epoch have a separate logic of empirical testing. Here, indirect data of paleosciences and the archaeology of sites and implements used in studies of anthropogenesis get the main role. These data allow us to judge the way of life and social interactions of hominins. The substantiation of the empirical hypothesis, in this case, looks as follows (Fig. 3.7). Now it is possible to refine the extended scheme of the nomological explanation by adding the notions of concerns, attempts, fixation mechanisms, and support structures to the forms of hypotheses (Fig. 3.8). At the micro-level (individual development), the fixation of speech abilities occurs through social learning. At the meso-levels (groups, alliances of groups), the role of fixation mechanisms is already played by the sexual and intergroup selection, where the most successful individuals win, not least at the expense of rhetorical leadership and speech coordination of collective actions (see Chaps. 6–7, and 10).

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Sapientation proximity to human qualities

Explanatory Fundamentals: From Niches to Interactive Rituals

The provision principle as a form of theoretical hypothesis: when a new acute concern emerges, with sufficient ingredients, attempts abilities, and fixing mechanisms, a structure will necessarily emerge that provides this concern to some degree

Auxiliary tests — verifiable up-to-date consequences of the theoretical hypothesis

Confirmation that such phenomena have occurred

A form of a target empirical hypothesis: there and then in such-and-such groups appeared a definite acute concern H without sufficient provision. These groups already obtained such-and-such (theoretically sufficient) ingredients, abilities for

The effect: the new support structure S has emerged

Judgements of consequence

attempts, fixation mechanisms. So, a structure S of the definite class must emerge from these Judgments ingredients to provide this concern H. about initial conditions

Confirmation that the initial conditions meet the requirements of the theoretical hypothesis

The causes: a new concern H without provision. Also, ingredients, abilities for attempts, fixation mechanisms

Direction of time

Fig. 3.8 The schematic nomological explanation of an evolutionary stage as a step-by-step formation of a new structure S to provide a new concern H

At the macro-levels (linguistic communities, future ethnic groups), there are mechanisms of “horizontal” cultural diffusion, “vertical” intergenerational translation, as well as the gene-culture coevolution and the cultural drive (see Chap. 2).

3.17

Glottogenesis as a Discontinuous Development with Multiple Branches

Before proceeding with a coherent presentation, it is necessary to present a general preliminary image of the evolution of language and consciousness as an encompassing framework and an initial heuristic. Anthropogenesis is not the evolution of a single species but of several dozen species and varieties of hominins. Each of these branches evolved along its own trajectory, which intersected in complex ways with the trajectories of the branches that were in contact with it. This is especially true for Archanthropes, Prepaleoanthropes (Heidelbergians and others), and Paleoanthropes (Neanderthals, Denisovans) whose cognitive and, probably, communicative abilities were sufficient for distant migrations and survival in a variety of landscapes and climatic conditions. Only our species—Homo sapiens—survived on the planet as a result of complex processes of competition, exchange, and partial mestization between these branches. All races and smaller ethnic groups of our species have full-fledged languages and roughly the same cognitive, verbal assignments and abilities.

3.17

Glottogenesis as a Discontinuous Development with Multiple Branches

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Knowing this result of cognitive and communicative evolution, it is natural and justified to reconstruct a kind of “pivotal line” with steps, or stages, of upward development. In this logic we will construct further narrative. It may give the false impression that the author adheres to the concept of progressive evolution of only one selected species (in the spirit of random mutations, neo-Darwinism), ignoring the parallel cognitive and verbal development of many “lateral lines” of hominids. This is not the case. The silence about alternative evolutionary lineages is due to the scarcity, or more often the complete absence, of relevant data. Undoubtedly, the hominins of each lateral lineage reached some level of their own on the intended ascending ladder of glottogenesis. However, there is no argument for particular exotic deviations from this backbone path. Even if some species instead of verbal communication developed cardinally different ones (e.g., sign language, whistling, hissing, growling, facial expressions, or pantomime), the basic structure of the glottogenesis steps did not change from this. Still, they could communicate either in holophrases, or combine “words” (in any external form) into phrases, were able or not able to report events in another place and time, etc. The death of all lateral branches and the expansion of sapiens to almost all continents and habitable islands mean a quite trivial thesis: the general cognitive development, social orders of sapienses, their level of cohesion, coordination of actions, ability to quickly adopt and preserve in generations useful technological, military, and other innovations were much higher than the corresponding characteristics of competing species. There can be no doubt that all these qualities were directly related to the level of development of speech, language, and consciousness. Consequently, the hominids of the lateral lineages, although they developed their own exotic communicative abilities, essentially lost to the sapiens in this aspect as well (or even above all). The only exception was made in this book for Neanderthals, since there has long been a heated debate about whether they were speech-language speakers. Accordingly, a solid body of data and arguments has been accumulated in this area. At the end of Chap. 6, the question is posed differently: What stage of glottogenesis were the Neanderthals most likely to have reached? Or in another way: What could they tell each other? So, the outwardly linear scheme of the following reasoning and the simple ascending ladders in the drawings should be perceived not as an expression of the really outdated views of the nineteenth and first half of the 20th centuries on evolution, but as a forced simplification. The ladder of steps of glottogenesis is unified for all evolved and competing hominin species, each of which stopped (or died out) at some point of the ladder. The thesis of principal glottogenesis unity is valid until substantial data and arguments emerge that contradict it. The following meditations and graphic illustrations can also be incorrectly taken as accepting the slow, step-by-step, continuous, and reliable accumulation model. First, ascending evolution is not accidentally depicted as staggered, meaning rhythms with slow accumulations and relatively fast breakthroughs to a new stage.

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The ideas of the punctuated equilibrium model are used here (Gould & Eldridge, 1977). The concept of evolutionary zones of immediate development is precisely constructed to explain this dynamic. Second, glottogenesis, even in the pivotal lines of sapientation, was quite probably full of failures and loss of achievements followed by resumption of development. The scarce data available do not allow us to reconstruct all the twists and turns of this history. The simplicity of the ascending ladder of glottogenesis in the drawings does not mean that there was no such history or that the author is unaware of its complexity and drama. The only thing that can be asserted with certainty is the natural reduction in the number and scale of evolutionary losses as we move to each successive stage in the development of language and consciousness. Long epochs of stagnant, extremely slow development of instrumental technology in the Lower Paleolithic period are known, followed by a moderate acceleration in the Middle Paleolithic and an impressive multilateral “Upper Paleolithic Revolution.” The first cause of this acceleration dynamics is the saltatory improvement of the intergenerational translation of cultural experience through speech. The second type of causes is related to demographic growth, denser contacts, exchanges between groups, and the formation of alliances, which was again related to the development of speech communication of Protosapienses and Neoanthropes (see Chaps. 7 and 8).

3.18

The Relationship Between Anthropogenesis and Glottogenesis

To conclude the three theoretical chapters, we should make one more general observation. Anthropogenesis (biological and biosocial evolution that led to our species) and glottogenesis (evolution of speech, language, and closely related abilities of consciousness) are not separate processes between which some “correlations” need to be made. The evolutionary development of language and consciousness is an integral organic part of anthropogenesis, which should be understood more broadly than is customary in archaeology and paleoanthropology. Moreover, according to the principles of cultural drive and neo-Lamarckism (see Chap. 2), cognitive and linguistic evolution driven by the challenges of interaction with the external natural and social environment (within each group and between groups) plays a major driving role not only in brain development and growth but also in some other morphological changes usually attributed only to the biological mechanisms of genetic mutations. Of course, random mutations did occur, but even taking into account selection, they could in no way be the causes of the accelerating sapientation with definite quality of orthogenesis (Popov, 2018; Rispoli & D’Abramo, 2019). Cognitive, communicative, social, morphological, genetic processes, and factors of sapientation were linked in positive feedback circles, limiting each other in some respects but for

References

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the most part stimulating and enhancing mutual development. Therefore, the enlarged brain and skull, changes in the larynx, and chest breathing muscles initially caused by intense cognitive processes and communication began to provide them with new opportunities for development (Deacon, 1997; Martínez et al., 2004; Wood & Bauernfeind, 2012; de Boer, 2011; de Boer, 2017; de Boer et al., 2020). Some morphological changes were caused by shifting techno-natural niches. For example, according to the most plausible version, bodies began to lose their fur as intense perspiration allowed for heat dissipation in the hot African savannas (DavidBarrett & Dunbar, 2016). Other changes are better explained by shifts in in-group interactions. Complicated processes in spheres of competition, access, and jealousy led to specific features of human sexuality (Rozov, 2022). The estrus in females became latent, the readiness for sex became year-round, and the secondary sex characteristics of males and females increased, gaining a more pronounced function of erotic attraction, especially with naked bodies and their particular sensitivity to touching (Diamond, 1997). All these changes were becoming serious challenges to peaceful group life. Responses to these challenges were stricter norms of interaction, for example, prohibiting forced sex. This led to the need to attract desired partners through coquetry and persuasion, which in turn stimulated the development of verbal communication (Miller, 2000; Wildgen, 2012). Again, there is insufficient data to reliably describe complex relationships of this kind between the morphological and cognitive-communicative aspects of anthropogenesis. So, in the future we will refer to them only sporadically, focusing only on language and consciousness development. At the same time, the immersion of these processes in the complex network of mutual influences of purely biological (genetic, anatomical, physiological, neural), social, techno-natural factors and changes is considered to be self-evident here, and therefore there is no need to emphasize it constantly.

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Comrie, B., & Kuteva, T. (2003). The evolution of grammatical structures and ‘functional need’ explanations. In M. Tallerman (Ed.), Language origins: Perspectives on evolution (pp. 185–207). Oxford University Press. Cooper, J. O., Heron, T. E., & Heward, W. L. (2020). Applied behavior analysis. Pearson. Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective. Oxford University Press. David-Barrett, T., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2016). Bipedality and hair loss in human evolution revisited: The impact of altitude and activity scheduling. Journal of Human Evolution, 94, 72–82. Deacon, T. W. (1997). The symbolic species: The coevolution of language and the brain. Norton. Diamond, J. (1997). Why is sex fun? The evolution of human sexuality. Basic Books. Donald, M. (2001). A mind so rare: The evolution of human consciousness. Norton. Donald, M. (2017). Key cognitive preconditions for the evolution of language. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 204–208. Dor, D. (2015). The instruction of imagination: Language as a social communication technology. Oxford University Press. Dor, D., & Jablonka, E. (2014). Why we need to move from gene-culture coevolution to culturally driven coevolution. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 15–30). Oxford University Press. Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. Harvard University Press. Everett, D. (2008). Don’t sleep, there are snakes. Life and language in the Amazonian jungle. Vintage Books. Everett, D. (2017). How language began: The story of humanity's greatest invention. Liveright. Fitch, W. T. (2017). Empirical approaches to the study of language evolution. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(1), 1–31. Gintis, H. (2004). The genetic side of gene-culture coevolution: Internalization of norms and prosocial emotions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53, 57–67. Goodall, J. (1986). The chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of behavior. Harvard University Press. Gould, S. J., & Eldridge, N. (1977). Punctuated equilibria: The tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered. Paleobiology, 3, 115–151. Hempel, C. (1942). The function of general laws in history. The Journal of Philosophy, 39, 35–48. Hockett, C. F. (1963). The problem of universals in language. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (pp. 1–22). MIT Press. Hrdy, S. B. (1999). Mother nature: A history of mothers, infants, and natural selection. Pantheon Books. Hurford, J. R. (1999). The evolution of language and of languages. In R. Dunbar, C. Knight, & C. Power (Eds.), The evolution of culture (pp. 173–193). Edinburgh University Press. Kirby, S. (2017). Culture and biology in the origins of linguistic structure. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 118–137. Laland, K. N. (2017). Darwin’s unfinished symphony. How culture made the human mind. Princeton University Press. Lloyd, E. A. (2004). Kanzi, evolution, and language. Biology and Philosophy, 19, 577–588. Lumsden, C. J., & Wilson, E. (1983). Promethean fire. Reflections on the origin of the mind. Harvard University Press. Luria, A. R. (1981). Language and cognition. Wiley. Markov, A. V., & Markov, M. A. (2020). Runaway brain-culture coevolution as a reason for larger brains: Exploring the “cultural drive” hypothesis by computer modeling. Ecology and Evolution, 10(12), 1–19. Martínez, I., Rosa, M., Arsuaga, J.-L., Jarabo, P., Quam, R., Lorenzo, C., Gracia, A., Carretero, J.-M., Bermudez de Castro, J.-M., & Carbonell, E. (2004). Auditory capacities in middle Pleistocene humans from the Sierra de Atapuerca in Spain. Proceedings National Academy of Science (PNAS), 101(27), 9976–9981. Miller, G. F. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Doubleday.

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Morgan, T. J. H., Uomini, N. T., Rendell, L. E., Chouinard-Thuly, L., Street, S. E., Lewis, H. M., Cross, C. P., Evans, C., Kearney, R., de la Torre, I., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. N. (2015). Experimental evidence for the coevolution of hominin tool-making, teaching and language. Nature Communications, 6(6029), 1–8. Nolfi, S., & Mirolli, M. (Eds.). (2010). Evolution of communication and language in embodied agents. Springer. Odling-Smee, F. J., Laland, K. N., & Feldman, M. W. (2003). Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution. Princeton University Press. Popov, I. (2018). Orthogenesis versus Darwinism. Springer Nature. Revonsuo, A. (2009). Consciousness: The science of subjectivity. Psychology Press. Richerson, P. J., & Henrich, J. (2012). Tribal social instincts and the cultural evolution of institutions to solve collective action problems. Cliodynamics: The Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History, 3(1), 38–80. Rispoli, G., & D’Abramo, F. (2019). Ivan I. Schmalhausen (1884–1963). In L. Nuno de la Rosa & G. Müller (Eds.), Evolutionary developmental biology (pp. 1–13). Springer. Rozov, N. S. (2010). Rituali, instituti i resursi: Socialnie osnovi transformacii mentaliteta [rituals, institutions, and resources: Social bases of mentality transformation]. Tsennosti i smysly [Values and Meanings], 5(8), 50–67. (In Russian) https://nrozov.nsu.ru/publ/Rozov_rituals-2010.pdf Rozov, N. S. (2022). The strangeness and origins of human sexuality. In D. S. Sheriff (Ed.), Human sexuality. IntechOpen. https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/80771 Rumbaugh, M. D. (2013). With apes in mind: Emergents, communication & competence. CreateSpace. Searle, J. R. (2000). Consciousness. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, 557–578. Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. Appleton-Century. Steels, L. (1997). The synthetic modeling of language origins. Evolution of Communication, 1(1), 1–34. Stinchcombe, A. (1987). Constructing social theories. University of Chicago Press. Tamariz, M., & Kirby, S. (2016). The cultural evolution of language. Current Opinion in Psychology, 8, 37–43. Tomasello, M. (2008). The origins of human communication. MIT Press. Tomasello, M. (2019). Becoming human a theory of ontogeny. Harvard University Press. Turner, J. H., & Machalek, R. (2018). The new evolutionary sociology: Recent and revitalized theoretical and methodological approaches. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1930/1993). Studies on the history of behaviour: Ape, primitive, and child. Lawrence Erlbaum. Vygotsky, L. S. (1930/1997). The history of the development of higher mental functions. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. Vygotsky, L. S. (1934/1987). Thinking and speech. In R. W. Rieber & A. S. Carton (Eds.), The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky (pp. 39–285). Springer US. de Waal, F. (1995). Bonobo sex and society. The behavior of a close relative challenges assumptions about male supremacy in human evolution. Scientific American, 272(3), 58–64. White, T. D., Lovejoy, C. O., Asfaw, B., Carlson, J. P., & Suwa, G. (2015). Neither chimpanzee nor human, Ardipithecus reveals the surprising ancestry of both. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 112(16), 4877–4884. Wildgen, W. (2012). Language evolution as a cascade of behavioral bifurcations. Estudios de. Linguistica Universidad de Alicante, 26, 359–382. Wood, B., & Bauernfeind, A. (2012). The fossil record: Evidence for speech in early hominins. In M. Tallerman & K. Gibson (Eds.), Language evolution (pp. 258–272). Oxford University Press.

Chapter 4

Self-Domestication and Normativity: Conditions for the Breakthrough to Speech

4.1

Fundamental Needs and Derivative Concerns in Social Animal Groups

Let us consider the ecological conditions, social causes, and mechanisms of the transition from the communicative system of animals to articulate speech in hominins. • What were the ingredients for future cognitive development in social animal groups, our common ancestors with chimpanzees and bonobos? • What were the main challenges and concerns of early hominins in the natural environment and social interactions? • What were their typical responses practices? • What attitudes, behavioral, and cognitive structures emerged as a result? • What costs, tensions, new challenges, and concerns did they lead to? • Why was the evolutionary response to these challenges the development of speech? Duane Rumbaugh contrasts his salience theory with concepts of stimulusresponse type: conditioned reflexes (I. Pavlov) and operant conditioning (B. Skinner). Pavlov’s famous dogs learned the salivation response when an essentially neutral stimulus, such as a bell, was presented slightly before the delivery of food to the dog’s mouth. Skinner’s rat learned the bar-press response when bar pressing was accompanied by a food pellet reward. But we hold that trying to explain behavior solely in terms of the events (receiving meat powder or pellets) acting on responses is to take too narrow a view of what is occurring. Rather than limiting emphasis to events acting on responses, salience theory treats organisms as foraging beings that are constantly surveying their perceptual worlds to determine what it offers for sustaining life and providing comfort. As foragers, they are generally assessing and pursuing adaptation to the most salient stimulus events around them (Rumbaugh, 2015, p. 516).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_4

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However, extending behaviorist models with notions of “challenge-opportunity,” “challenge-threat,” variety of “concerns,” “ingredients,” “attempts,” “fixation mechanisms,” and “support structures” softens or even eliminates this contrast. Indeed, organisms-foragers within Rumbaugh’s salience theory survey their perceptual worlds constantly in terms of their concerns. They perceive incoming stimuli from the world around them as challenges-opportunities (attractive) or challenges-threats (dangerous to defend against) precisely when they relate them to their concerns. Pursuing adaptation to the most salient stimulus events around them is nothing less than trying to respond to challenges from a position of their fundamental needs and correspondent derivative concerns. These responses include trying (making various attempts), combining attainable ingredients, fixing successful decisions, and thus forming new support structures, i.e., adaptations in the broadest sense. No one is obliged to use behaviorist ideas and concepts only in a strictly narrow sense that denies mentality. Rumbaugh suggests replacing the (positive) “reinforcement” with the word “reward.” There is nothing wrong or “antiscientific” with this. One could also replace “negative reinforcement” with “failure,” “disappointment,” “frustration,” or “annoyance.” A fair criticism of extreme pedantic behaviorism should not become “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” and prevent using sensible ideas about feedback and fixation mechanisms. We will see further that these phenomena, as well as the “imprinting” of attitudes in the psyche of participants’ ritual actions, operate at all stages of evolution including the highest superstructural levels of the psyche and the behavior of hominins, sapienses, and modern humans. Let us take a closer look at concerns of the higher mammals living in groups: There is almost no other way to know about the first hominins. As with humans, fundamental needs rule here: “hunger” (concerns about getting food), “fear” (concerns about safety, avoiding natural and social threats), and “love” (concerns related to sexual relations, birth, and upbringing of offspring). The orders of behavior in groups (including harem-type groups of lions and gorillas) are the structures that provide all these primary concerns.1 However, the life of each group is already a particular niche with its own—derivative—concerns: • Individual aspirations to maintain/increase status (place in the hierarchy, dominance, inclusion in the clique) • Maintenance of peaceful order necessary for joint defense against external threats, for getting food, for mutual help in difficult and dangerous situations • Coordination of individual behavior allowing the whole group to survive in its specific natural niche and in social relations with other groups For all the diversity of social orders, a common feature of the structures that provide for these group concerns in wolf packs, lion prides, gorilla harems,

1

Darwin rightly considered life in a group as an effective individual adaptation (Darwin, 1859). When a group has already formed, it becomes an independent unit (living system) with its concerns and structures, which largely determine the formation and behavior of each group member.

4.2

Similarities and Differences in the Orders of Animal and Human Groups

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communities of chimpanzees, and bonobo is the combination of violence (the threat of violence) and solidarity. It is crucial to decide who dominates, i.e., who can use violence or threaten violence convincingly to discipline congeners and tribe members. Alpha males (white-backed gorillas in their harems, solitary lions, or allied brothers in their pride) usually play this role. Older females (among wolves and hyenas), volatile and aggressive male gangs (among chimpanzees), and stable and peaceful coalitions of females with supporting adult males (among bonobos) also dominate (Goodall, 1986; de Waal, 2019). Hominins and humans, judging by certain anatomical features,2 are in sexuality between gorillas and chimpanzees with bonobos but closer to the latter two species.

4.2

Similarities and Differences in the Orders of Animal and Human Groups

There are fundamental similarities in support structures of intragroup concerns among various animal species: establishing an order of interaction through hierarchical relations and control (including force) over behavior with punishments for violators by a group head or a dominant clique. Except for clashes between competing males during the rutting period (e.g., for capturing a lion’s pride or a gorilla family with a weakening host) a relatively peaceful order is maintained in animal communities. One can only envy the coordination of top predators’ actions in group hunting. Dynamic social relations in groups characterize chimpanzees and bonobos. Advanced facial expressions, gestures, and intonation facilitate their high sensitivity to each other’s moods. Ape have only objects that are situationally turned into tools and then thrown away: a stone to break nuts or shells of mollusks, a stem to stick into an anthill and lick it. They have no intricately crafted implements for long-term use and, thus, there is no individual or group concern to protect them. Groups of male chimpanzees often prey on miniature monkeys. They move to other habitats, possibly using previous stays. However, their behavior does not go beyond the situational. It is enough for them to follow the leaders or learn the standard distribution of roles in the group hunt. This fact also applies to the movements common to many species of animals to new feeding places, in the order of seasonal migrations, when patrolling the territory. Among ape, other groups of the same species are usually perceived as competing, attractive to individuals (females may run over to a new group, males may attack the

2 It is common in evolutionary biology to point out the comparative size of testicles. In gorillas they are relatively small (no reproductive competition), in chimpanzees and bonobos they are very large (intense competition), in humans they are medium-sized (it is possible that they decreased during the transition to mating orders) (Diamond, 1992).

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leader to take his place), or openly hostile. Intergroup fights or even longer “wars” were observed between groups of chimps. Usually, social animals zealously defend their territories from outsiders (Goodall, 1986). From time to time, group divisions occur. Strangers (usually females) can be accepted. The food exchanges between semiwild chimpanzee groups and humans, or the known cases of urban apes cooperating with criminal groups,3 are always perceptions of human practices, primarily based on human initiative or benefit. Researchers never observed long-term, dense, mutually beneficial contacts and exchanges between groups of anthropoids in their natural habitat. Long-term intergroup cooperation between humans is structurally similar to symbiotic relationships. However, symbiosis among animals exists between representatives of individual species, for example, between flowers and the insects that pollinate them, between all kinds of “cleaners” of skins, teeth, and their formidable owners (crocodiles, hippos). Within each animal species, long-term cooperative relationships and exchanges occur only in couples, between parents and cubs, but very rarely between adults, even those who are closely related. Only bonobos share food with their tribe members, usually in return for services (grooming), to demonstrate friendliness, or openly in exchange for sex.

4.3

Animal Pre-Consciousness and Peculiarities of Anthropoids’ Behavior

There is no doubt that animals with sharp eyes, sensitive ears, and noses fairly adequately perceive the surrounding world and behave concerning different objects according to their “meanings.” The field of sensory attention of animals can be rightly considered an evolutionary stage of pre-consciousness4 or the zero stage of development of consciousness. The most evolved animals can retain the “meanings” of objects that have disappeared from the field of vision. The results of the following experiments are illustrative. In a simple case, an experimenter hides an object (something attractive) behind a screen. Domestic chickens do not cope with such a test, but dogs and cats look for and find the thing. In a more difficult test, the experimenter first puts the object in a box, hides it behind the screen, and then shows the empty box. Those who keep looking for the thing behind the screen pass the test. 3 For example, in India, monkeys living near tourist sites or on the roofs of temple complexes rob tourists, take their cameras and other valuable objects, and then exchange them with local crooks for food. 4 “Pre-consciousness” refers to a set of cognitive abilities richer than the ordinary abilities for animals of immediate sensory perception and attention, but still lacking the basic abilities characteristic of full-fledged consciousness, such as the mental placement of self and present situation in time (with extended past and future) and in space (with many distant unseen places).

4.4

Pre-Rituals in the Animal World

83

Squirrel monkeys pass the simple test, but the tough test is not manageable. Parrots and dogs hold an idea of the object, but not more than 4 min. Chimpanzees remember the object (keep looking for it) the next day (Hurford, 2011, p. 490). Children from infancy learn to pay attention only to the structural logic of the simple test. Thus, in the game “Coo-coo!” an adult hides and then shows a smiling face simultaneously with simple but already speech sounds. From the age of three, children pass the difficult test. A child can remember the object, especially the named one, significantly longer than chimpanzees. There are essential features of the psyche and behavior of anthropoids, especially chimpanzees and bonobos, which are probably like those features of the most ancient hominins that became the ingredients of future sapient (ordinary for humans) structures. Along with the complex system of sign communication, emotional pre-rituals, which will be discussed further in more detail, we should point out the propensity and high ability to imitate actions, good trainability and teachability, including in mastering new actions and signs, developed practical thinking (Vygotsky & Luria, 1930/1993; Vygotsky, 1930/1997; Lloyd, 2004; Fitch, 2010).

4.4

Pre-Rituals in the Animal World5

Could it be that rituals as generators of attitudes appeared only in Homo sapiens and that Protosapienses, Heidelbergians, Erectuses, early Homo, and Australopithecines did not have them? There is no trace of ritual behavior until burials with inventory in the late stages of anthropogenesis. Here is precisely the case where the thesis of practices that left no traces can be asserted with complete certainty based on the principle of no complete evolutionary gaps (see Chap. 2). The empirical basis is the presence in anthropoids, if not rituals, then their obvious similarity, the behavioral pattern capable of transforming into interactive rituals characteristic of humans. The most vivid analogs of ritual actions (pre-rituals) in higher mammals living in groups are male fights, demonstrative or bloody, including those observed among anthropoids. The result of such fights is “imprinting” of opposing (pre)attitudes into the psyche of the winner and the loser. These psychic structures will determine their behavior until a new fight between rivals. It is a mental aspect of domination relations in the group with priority access to females and food. When a weakened head of a harem—a lion or a gorilla—loses a fight to a strengthened rival, both develop specific mental structures regulating their future behavior. Such attitudes can be expressed in human words approximately as: “now I am defeated, everything There is a whole literature on “ritualization” in animals (how ordinary behavior became courtship stereotype actions, etc.). However, hereafter ritual (according to the R. Collins’s concept) means a full-fledged interaction with a definite symbol connected with the focus of joint attention, emotions, and behavior of the participants. Animal stereotype behavior lacks this set of ingredients, but in some aspects is really like full-fledged human rituals. 5

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here is no longer mine, and I will have to leave” or “now I am the boss, all this territory and all females are mine, I will not let anyone here.” Other examples of pre-rituals are the establishment and maintenance of relations of acceptance, friendship (“solidarity”), sexual partnership, and parenthood. Grooming, touching, and exchange of certain sounds are typical means for such relations’ arrangement (de Waal, 2019, p. 98). Mating games, courtship among mammals and birds during pair formation, and further partner and parental interaction play the same role (albeit with an instinctive basis). Among many herbivores, momentary access to a female is a sufficient positive reinforcement to win a fight with a rival in the rutting period. Among anthropoids, positive reinforcement is not limited to rewards or treats that are necessary for trained animals. Important motivators for chimpanzees and bonobos and very significant for us are feelings, emotions, usually related to the level of social, group membership, and attitude from significant others. J. Turner and R. Machalek discuss various pre-adaptations of human behavior, refer to Collins’ conceptualization of rituals, and reasonably link it to the phenomenon of mirror neurons. One propensity is, at noted above, mimesis. Another is what Randall Collins (2004) has labeled the “rhythmic synchronization” of vocalization and bodies. Chimpanzees will, when co-present and aroused, engage in collective acts of animated behaviors and screeching that fall in the collective rhythmic flow of bodies and vocalizations. Some have seen this kind of behavior as “musilanguage” or a proto-language revolving about singing and rhythm (. . .) that early humans used to generate solidarity through the mirror neuron system (as this activates the brain systems generating neurotransmitters and neuroactive peptides in the brain). Another is a form of dance, involving a kind of collective jumping around in unison, which intensifies the action of mirror neurons (as these neurons activate brain systems generating positive emotions leading to attachment behaviors). Some see these mimetic behaviors as the basis for all rituals, large and small, that humans use to initiate and animate interactions (Turner & Machalek, 2018, p. 237).

The “gratitude” and “vindictiveness” of chimpanzees that transcend current situations are, in fact, personalized attitudes toward friendly or hostile actions toward certain tribe members (or people, for example, experimenters, service staff) and directly dependent on the nature of previous interaction (de Waal, 2019, p. 100).

4.5

“Animal Language” as a Part of the “Episodic Mind”

Consider D. Bickerton’s formulation of the “continuity paradox”: Language must have evolved out of some prior system, and yet there does not seem to be any such system out of which it could have evolved (Bickerton, 2009, p. 35).

Many social animals, including anthropoids, communicate with each other quite effectively using distinguishable sound signals, the so-called “animal language” or “animal communication system” (Fitch, 2010). Consider the “language” of those

4.5 “Animal Language” as a Part of the “Episodic Mind”

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monkeys and apes for whose life different group behavior is essential, adequate to various external threats or different situations within their groups. Situational meanings of signals (appearance of a dangerous predator, a threat, agreement to obey, an invitation to play, be friends, become a sexual partner) are conveyed not by articulate but different and recognizable sounds (Hurford, 2011). This “language” corresponds to the “episodic mind,” according to M. Donald (2001). The use of differentiated sounds with different meanings has received solid empirical grounding thanks to the tape-recording of different sounds and subsequent video recording of monkeys’ behavior. The vervets of Amboseli have at least ten putative “words” for ‘leopard,’ ‘eagle,’ ‘snake,’ ‘baboon,’ ‘other predatory mammal,’ ‘unfamiliar human,’ ‘dominant monkey,’ ‘subordinate monkey,’ "watch other monkey,’ and "see rival troop’ (Diamond, 1992, Chap. 8).

This observation of the ability of monkeys to use differentiated signals is one of the most frequently cited. It is necessary to note the inaccuracy of the interpretation, which can be misleading. Monkeys do not designate specific individual objects (referents, denotations) but respond to holistic situations. Of course, they distinguish between these situations. However, the situations themselves are perceived and transmitted as a syncretic whole. Therefore, it is correct to denote the semantics of signals not as “leopard,” “eagle,” “snake,” but as “alarm! big dangerous predator in a tree,” “alarm! danger from above,” “alarm! dangerous crawling creature underfoot,” and others. Apes usually do not invent new signs that other apes understand. If something like this occasionally happens and passes down through generations, there is no noticeable buildup of the sign stock. Leo Vygotsky while discussing W. Koehler’s experiments and observations noted a close connection of vocal reactions of chimpanzees (which he used to call “speech”) with emotions, perceptively pointing out the significance of this connection in glottogenesis: . . .this link between speech and expressive emotional movements (which become particularly marked at times of strong affective arousal) is not unique to higher apes. This phenomenon is common to many animals with a vocal apparatus and probably underlies the origin and development of human speech (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 108).

Moreover, Vygotsky noted the social and communicative role of apes’ vocal reactions, which also points to the “genetic root” of human speech: . . . it is the case with other animals, the chimpanzee's speech is not limited to this emotional function. Chimpanzee speech constitutes not only an expressive-emotional species. There is, of course, a genetic link between this function of animal speech and the corresponding functions of human speech (. . .) There is no similarity between this reaction and intentional, meaningful communication. It is an instinctive reaction, or something very similar to it (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 108–9).

Our common ancestors with anthropoids had approximately the same level of sign system development. Otherwise, it would be necessary to consider methods of

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communication of chimpanzees and bonobos as degraded, for which there is no reason.

4.6

The Learning Ability of Anthropoids

The anthropoid laryngeal anatomy imposes substantial limitations on producing different, recognizable sounds and fused combinations of sounds (words). However, chimpanzees and bonobos successfully learn to use graphemes. They press the keys after which the tablets with meanings of objects and actions appear on the screen (Lloyd, 2004; Rumbaugh, 2013, 2015). Kanzi, as the most talented bonobo, learned several hundred such tablets. He made full use of combinations of these “words” (i.e., protophrases), displaying in no order the signs he had learned by pressing keys. They usually denoted something tasty, “give me,” and “want to eat.” He also demonstrated an imposing ability to understand tasks. For example, he fulfilled the bizarre request “Put the keys in the fridge.” J.-L. Dessalles (2007) doubts Kanzi’s full understanding of the meaning of such requests. The keys may be taken, placed somewhere, or given to the experimenter. Somebody usually opened the refrigerator if something was lying there, but sometimes he or she put something into it (e.g., fruits). Kanzi perceived the combination of the words “keys” and “fridge” in the context of the cash situation with the usual operations for both, so the message was sufficient for the correct execution of the task (Dessalles, 2007, p. 182). If this correctness was reinforced with approval, a treat, then this “language genius” could probably be taught to put anything in the fridge. Donald rightly observed that such successes are the result not only and not so much of the innate biological abilities of apes themselves,6 as of the culture of symbolic

6

Based on later observations and experiments, M.D. Rumbaugh claimed that chimpanzees raised in a human environment, trained to use pictograms on computers, could understand speech and compose sentences in response to human verbalization (Rumbaugh, 2013, 2015). Some experts even think that all great apes have the neurological capacity for language. As if they can understand English (or any language) and “speak” through special signs if raised in a human speech environment from infancy. However, claims of this kind are still the subject of heated academic criticism and debate. As for me, I support R. Collins’s stance when he wrote: “I am reminded of discussions with experts on animal communication who I have heard in recent years, good empiricists who seem mainly concerned to surprise the audience with how many things animals can do what humans do. (For example, that prairie gophers chatter out signals to alert the others when a dog approaches, or another signal for an owl). I asked the lecturer if they could talk about something that isn’t present, like a typical human conversation “did you see what happened in the football game last night?” (personal communication). There is a certain “Rubicon” between the speech abilities of animals and humans. This strict boundary (or high barrier) is not phonetic but mental and cognitive. The numerous ecological and social conditions by which hominins overcame this barrier in long evolutionary processes and aromorphosis will be discussed in Chaps. 5–7.

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The Learning Ability of Anthropoids

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representations and human communication practices brought in from outside by experimenters (Donald, 2000, p. 29). Chimps and bonobos due to special communication with humans can produce chains of signals by gesticulation or graphemes. This ability is amazing, but these chains are not equal to the protophrases that young children can produce (and presumably could have pronounced by Helderbergians or Protosapienses; see Chaps. 6–7). There is an important difference between the chimpanzee’s hide, stick, hide, stick, stick, stick, hide, kiwi, kiwi and the human You me downtown movie fun (Hurford, 2011, p. 608).

In fact, in Kanzi’s case, we are talking about animal training, albeit at a remarkably elevated level. Therefore, one should not take the word “training” as pejorative. In the following, we will see that hominins acquired language and became humans primarily due to their extraordinary abilities in training and self-training. Vygotsky attached significant importance to W. Koehler’s observation about the gap between the sign communication of chimpanzees and their ability to think practically. He noted the same gap in the early stage of development of children with subsequent connection. Vygotsky fixed this similarity in his significant theoretical conclusions: 1. Thinking and speech have different genetic roots. 2. The development of thinking and speech moves along different channels, independently of one another. 3. The relationship between thinking and speech is not constant over the course of phylogenetic development. 4. Anthropoids manifest an intellect similar to that of humans in their use of rudimentary tools. Their speech is also similar to human speech, but here the similarity is linked to different aspects of psychological function. It is related to the phonetics of speech, the emotional function of speech, and the existence of the rudiments of social speech. 5. Anthropoids do not manifest the close link between thinking and speech that is characteristic of man. In the chimpanzee, the two are not connected in anyway. 6. In the phylogenesis of thinking and speech, we can almost certainly identify a pre-speech7 phase in the development of intellect and a pre-intellectual phase in the development of speech (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 109).

On the one hand, the observations and conclusions presented indicate that the potential ingredients for the formation of speech communication were already present in the predecessors of hominins (in the era of separation from anthropoids). Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney (2017) made a review of the literature on anthropoids’ communication, systematic observations of social relations, the nature, and the role of signals in baboon groups. The authors came to the following conclusion. 7

From now on, the pre-speech refers to the stage of language evolution between babbling and articulated protowords with simplest situative meanings but without any word order. Early pre-speech includes holophrases with rudimentary differentiation of protosyllables. Late pre-speech uses protowords with more or less stable syllables and phonemes. Protowords could be composed into protophrases but still without meaningful order.

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Non-human primates live in complex social groups in which an individual’s reproductive success depends on the ability to form strong social bonds and represent the relationships of others. In response, animals have evolved systems of communication and cognition that are discrete, combinatorial, rule-governed, and open-ended. As a result, when language first evolved from the communication of nonhuman primates, many of its distinctive cognitive features were already in place (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2017, p. 83).

However, on the other hand, there was an exceedingly high barrier (the language Rubicon) which hominins overcame for several million years.

4.7

Social Orders of Early Hominins as Structures that Ensured Their Survival

The stated task of explaining glottogenesis from renewed social orders and communicative concerns (see Chaps. 2–3) implies fulfilling a specific methodological requirement. It is necessary to show the specificity of the hominin orders and their uniqueness compared to the group orders of other social animals. . . .where special social arrangements or humans are invoked as the crucial significant factor, one has to be able to argue that these social arrangements did apply to humans (or rather in our distant ancestors, N. R.) at the relevant time, and not to other species. And in general, more realistically and more eclectically, for any set of circumstances proposed as individually necessary and collectively sufficient to explain the emergence of Language, one has to show that this combination of circumstances applies (or applied) to humans and to no other species (Hurford, 1999, p. 178).

The peculiarities of the early hominin orders were not so much due to advantages (initially, relatively modest) as to disadvantages, weaknesses, and probably even to the initial plight of their existence. Suffice it to note that once down from the trees, hominins were significantly inferior in speed of movement, muscle strength and jaw size to their main niche competitors (hyenas, jackals, geldings) and formidable predators (big saber-toothed cats) (Bingham, 2010; White et al., 2015). Let us consider the differences in the lifestyle of hominins in savannas and of anthropoids who live usually in dense jungles. First, the hominins did not move entirely to new feeding grounds. Instead, they made stays or found caves to protect themselves from nocturnal predators, for mothers to nurse and protect their children during a day when the men went hunting for prey. Second, the hominins began to consume bone marrow, which they extracted with stone tools, in addition to plant food. Thus, they entered the niche of inferior scavengers: they consumed the remains of the feasts of those competitors (jackals, hyenas, vultures) that ate the meat of dead animals (Lovejoy, 2009; Bickerton, 2009). One of the initial forms of eating the meat of large animals should be considered the use of the remains of prey, eating the carcasses of fallen animals. The Bushmen used this method of obtaining food until the last decades: the camp's foreman sent the boys in the morning to see

4.8

The Traits of Early Hominins as Ingredients for Future Support Structures

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if birds of prey feeding on carrion were circling nearby. In a positive case, all went to a place of a dead animal and extracted edible remains of a carcass (Bunak, 1966, p. 536).

Given the weaker ability of the earliest hominins (Ardipithecus, Australopithecus) to chase and defeat the game than the numerous competitors, the thesis of this method of sustenance is difficult to reject. While men searched for carrion and later hunted, women, who could leave their children on others’ concerns, looked for places to gather fruits, roots, larvae, and mollusks. One group would find and get one thing and another would get another, while hungry tribesmen and young children waited “at home.” This order could not maintain the group’s life without sharing the food obtained daily. Here, sharing is a social practice as a structure that provides the common group concern of sustenance. Suppose mothers fed their children through their instincts and some grateful men brought food to their girlfriends, but why did the rest have to share? The piles of broken bones at the hominin sites show that they brought them in, meaning that everyone could eat bone marrow, that is, there was a sharing, replacing the old squabbles over access to food. This phenomenon is by no means “natural” and should get its explanation. The hominins, deprived of fast legs, muscle power, the size of their jaws, fangs, and claws, could only survive through group cohesion. The leader’s dictates or a few of the most robust males could provide cohesion and order in the group through total domination. In this way, evolution would have gone in the direction of an increase in males’ power and bodily armament, primarily in their fangs, jaws, and claws. Among primates, baboons have chosen such a direction. However, many other primate species failed to live in savannahs and disappeared. The lack of stable group cohesion was the primary cause of this negative selection effect or at least one of the main factors. . . .There are no permanent groupings among humans’ closest primate cousins. This lack of strong ties and permanent groups caused the extinction of most great apes that were forced to the edges of the forests and to the open-county African savanna, beginning about 10 million years ago. Without strong bonds and groups to defend against predators and to organize food collection, great apes were doomed to extinction (Turner & Machalek, 2018, p. 414).

The evolutionary strategy of the hominins that survived differed radically from both the savannah baboons and the rainforest apes.

4.8

The Traits of Early Hominins as Ingredients for Future Support Structures

Our ancestors went their way; they had to find their niches and survival methods because other paths were blocked and fast, aggressive, and fanged competitors dominated their niche. We can judge the behavior of the first hominins to come down to earth by analogy with the social anthropoids: chimpanzees and bonobos. Hugging as an expression of

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kinship and friendship, flexible gesture and sound communication, lively facial expressions, tendency to imitation or to copying actions, high capacity for social learning, sexual partnerships, coalitions, conflict and fluid status hierarchies, intragroup solidarity with wariness to outsiders—all these are our common features with chimpanzees and bonobos. It is safe to assume similar traits in the first hominins that emerged from the jungle to the savannahs. According to the principle of no complete evolutionary gaps (Chap. 2) all intermediate species of hominins from the earliest to the sapienses also had these traits. Turner and Machalek presented the list of “behavioral propensities of the last common ancestor to humans and great apes”: 1. High individualism and mobility around home range 2. Transfer of males and females at puberty from their natal community to another community, never to return (except chimpanzee males) 3. High levels of reading eyes and faces of conspecifics for meanings and dispositions to act 4. At birth, high rates of imitation of facial gestures signaling emotions 5. Rhythmic synchronization of bodies and voice, mimicry, and ritual when conspecifics assemble in larger numbers, mostly among chimpanzees 6. High levels of emotional effervescence during assemblies of conspecifics 7. Attention to reciprocity of others who have received resources 8. Calculations as to fairness and justice in exchanges of resources 9. Capacity of individuals to see themselves as objects in their environment, especially vis-а-vis others and the responses of others to self (Turner & Machalek, 2018, p. 353).

One can find the justification of these propensities in the work of these authors. No serious objections are heard and I focus on other topics using somewhat different conceptualizations. In addition, we will see why and how the anatomical, interactive, cognitive, and emotional ingredients developed into the most significant structures of the social orders and communicative means of hominins (then sapienses). As noted above, the new natural niche, full of dangers and difficulties in obtaining food, shaped the concern for cohesion and mutual support within each group. Two other potential ingredients of future hominin abilities and orders are well known: free skillful hands and a relatively large brain. Traditionally, these acquisitions have been associated with the notorious idea of “labor made man,” that is, the ability to constantly use, make, and carry implements. No one would deny the importance of stone technology for the development of the skilled hand and brain (see details in Chap. 5). However, long before the confident use of cutting (c. 2.7 mya), free hands were used to bring the extracted food to those who remained (Lovejoy, 2009). The compulsory division of food, the corresponding prohibitions on eating all prey and taking away food by the right of the strongest, and orders of solidarity and cohesion are comparable in importance with stone technology for the further evolution of hominins. Monkeys and apes, living in the jungle full of trees with tasty fruits and leaves, generally do not experience an acute food shortage. Instead, they are much more concerned about safety, so in this sphere they developed a significant differentiation of signals.

4.9

Differences of Orders in Groups of Social Animals and Hunter-Gatherers

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In contrast, hominins had to search for a variety of food away from the camps, so in the earliest stages of vocal communication, we should assume the growth of differentiated signals (long before the appearance of syllables and distinct phonemes) for diverse types of extracted food. At first, these sounds probably were expressions of feelings at finding and then began to serve as signals for calling relatives, recruiting (Bickerton, 2009; see the analysis of this mechanism in Chap. 6). Another area of differentiated signals, mimicking, gestural, and sound ones, in anthropoids, especially chimpanzees and bonobos, is purely social. Such signs express moods, feelings, and desires addressed to each other. Given the vital need for group cohesion, one should recognize that this sphere of reactions and signals was no less rich and diverse in the communities of the earliest hominins. Therefore, this vast pool of affective responses and calls should be considered as potential ingredients for the later development of sound communication with the prospect of a breakthrough in speech (see Chap. 5). However, the main specificity of hominins was the joint production of sound signals. Rather selfish chimps and gorillas are not capable of this. Only bonobos can demonstrate common emotions with outwardly similar signals. Another difference relies on the meaning of such standard signals: they have come to express approval, disapproval, appeals, requests, and demands. Undoubtedly, fundamental needs and derivative concerns (in the areas of security, food security, group position, sexuality, and parenthood) played an important role in the production of these social reactions. We can safely assume a direct dependence of hominins’ survival, growth, and expansion on their cohesion and level of inner peace. This is why the new order, which limits or eliminates violence, replaced the constant struggle for a place in the intragroup hierarchy. Who but an alpha male or a single prominent, aggressive leader could have established such an order? Bonobos and the well-known huntergatherer groups (before their enlargement into hierarchical chiefdoms) provide a clue: both types of community are dominated by relatively egalitarian coalitions.

4.9

Differences of Orders in Groups of Social Animals and Hunter-Gatherers

With all the known objections and reservations, a comparison based on the generalizations of anthropologists and ethologists is valid. All hunter-gatherers known in anthropology are the surviving descendants of the most ancient hominins engaged in hunting and gathering. Consequently, the general patterns of social orders (abstracting from many behavioral differences) should resemble the most ancient structures. 1. Humans and anthropoids are similar in dynamic social relationships in groups. Advanced facial expressions, gestures, and intonation facilitate their high

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4.

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Self-Domestication and Normativity: Conditions for the Breakthrough to Speech

sensitivity to each other’s moods. Both tend to have intragroup hierarchies. There may be leaders, “alpha males,” but anthropologists note high egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer groups among adult men and among married women (before chiefdoms) (Hrdy, 1999; Power, 2014; Johnson & Earle, 2000). In animal groups, leaders assert their prominent position by dominance (violence, threat of violence), and in hunter-gatherer groups by leadership, prestige, authority (prowess, generosity, superiority in everyday affairs, discussions, rituals, entertainment) (Richerson & Henrich, 2012, p. 63–64). Aggression, conflicts, and violent fights between rivals occur in animals and humans. Among animals, it is part of the dynamics of the social order when a challenger has felt or is forced to admit that his strength and power dried up. Brutal violence, violent fights, and beatings occur within hunter-gatherer groups, but as scandalous order violations. The tribespeople usually try to calm down the fighters. They can severely punish irrepressible brawlers. Among animals, the alpha male (usually the most robust and formidable) as the head of the harem or pride usually occupies the highest position in the hierarchy and punishes impudent. Punishment consists of a threat (grin, grunt) or direct violence (Goodall, 1986). In human groups of hunter-gatherers, a coalition of adults usually controls individual behavior. It means sanctions and punishment rather than the dominance of a loner leader. The most typical punishment, or rather, asserting some norm of behavior in hunter-gatherer groups, is mockery, causing general laughter, which means some downgrading of the offender’s position in the group. Everyone does not like when others ridicule them, so this subtle emotional “tuning” allows humans to maintain order and norms without threats and violence, which are used only in extreme cases. The threat of expulsion is also highly effective, but there are known cases of collective (!) murder of violators of peace and tranquility (Johnson & Earle, 2000). Coordination exists in all groups, and it is most cunning and effective in predators and hunters (in fact, also predators). As a rule, in animal groups, coordination of actions is provided by the leader. Such a leader may be an alpha male, head of pride or harem, or the eldest female of wolves and hyenas. Among hunters, it may be the leader who coordinates actions, but discussion of the hunting plan and distribution of roles is also common. For decisions concerning the life of the whole group, the consent of adult males, and often of females as well, remains necessary even if there is an influential and authoritative leader. All social animals and humans have developed a specific order of sexual relations, primarily peaceful, without excluding conflicts or brutal violence. The male who defeats his rivals gets unhindered access to all females ready for mating in animal groups. Among hunter-gatherers, polygamy or monogamy (or much rarer polyandry) is common, and there are also practices or special ritual periods with legalized sex outside the mating relationship (Ryan & Jethá, 2010). However, the principle of voluntariness and mutual consent usually exists in this sphere. Rape, coercion to sex by force, or threat is practiced only against women of hostile or

4.10

Is Human Normativity Unique?

93

strangers’ groups. Sexual violence within the group is forbidden, and if it occurs, it is subject to severe condemnation and punishment. 8. The animals in their groups rarely share food. The main exception is the feeding of offspring by parents. In addition, males of some bird species bring food to the incubating female. Predators and scavengers, when full, give their large family members access to their prey. Nevertheless, there are often loud fights over food. Anthropoids, especially bonobos, can share food with relatives and sexual partners. Many of these behaviors are present in human communities. However, in solidary groups of hunter-gatherers and all friendly families of all eras and cultures there is a special ritual of daily meals: mutual acceptance of pre-brought and prepared food as an independent action with joint attention not only to the food but also to each other, to the community, to the communication situation, and usually with positive emotions shared by the participants (see Chap. 7). As we can see, at all points, there remains an invariant pattern specific to the hunter-gatherer social order found in many other human solidarity groups: the dominant role of a coalition of roughly equal adult members and the rules of behavior that the coalition upholds and asserts. The main clues are already here. It is only necessary to understand and explain what conditions, causes, and mechanisms have enabled hominins to acquire the sapient trait of cardinal importance, normativity.

4.10

Is Human Normativity Unique?

Ethologists often write about social norms in animals, hiding violations, and fearing exposure. F. de Waal cites the following situation as an example: As a student working with long-tailed macaques, I followed the activities in an outdoor section of their group cage that connected the indoor section by a tunnel. Often, the alpha male would sit in the tunnel so he could keep an eye on both sides. However, as soon as he moved indoors, other males would approach the females outdoors. Normally, they would be in great trouble for doing so, but now they could mate undisturbed. However, fear of punishment did not completely disappear. They had regularly run to the tunnel entrance to take a peek inside to check on the alpha, worried about his sudden return. If they encountered him shortly after a sneaky copulation, the low-ranking males would have wide toothy grins on their faces, betraying nervousness, even though the alpha could not possibly know what had happened. When this kind of situation was tested systematically in an experiment, the same reactions were observed, which led the investigators to dryly conclude that “animals can incorporate behavioral rules that are associated with their social role and can respond in a manner that acknowledges a perceived violation of the social code” (de Waal, 2019).

The keywords here are “low-ranking,” “nervousness,” and “fear of punishment.” “Behavioral rules” are not real social norms in this case. They are part of the syncretic attitude characteristic of the subordinate position in the hierarchy: behavior toward the dominant male (fear, desire to hide from him) and the learned prohibition

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to mate with his females. There is no separate “rule,” autonomous from actual personal interrelations. Social hierarchy rather than normativity remains the principle regulating individual behavior. Violent fights in chimpanzee groups are rare, but clashes for dominance between individuals and situational small “gangs” occur almost daily. Bonobo groups are closest to normative behavior, but this is due to their evident self-domestication.8 Usually, egalitarian coalitions of females in alliance with the strongest males gain dominance in each group. Basic norms common to humans (e.g., prohibition of incest) do not exist in bonobos either (de Waal, 1995, 2019). At the same time, chimpanzee “small gangs” and female bonobo coalitions already show rudimentary capacities (behavioral ingredients) for the emergence of a new structure: stable, relatively egalitarian coalitions amicably expressing aversion to recurrences of intragroup aggression and violence. Let us also consider the difference between the new moral feelings, namely human shame, pride, and seemingly analogous animal emotions. According to their visible signs (a downcast look, the lowered head, and shoulders hunched over), shame is related to a more ancient sentiment of subordination and humiliation. However, human shame is a more complex, superstructural feeling since it recognizes not one’s failure and weakness but moral guilt of a particular rule violation. Thus, it is not the fear of punishment that becomes the main thing but the experience of the wrongness of one’s behavior.9 Dominance as power and might is similarly expressed by humans and anthropoids: straight posture, raised head, squared shoulders, straight look, burning eyes (Darwin, 1872/2004). Probably the alpha males in the first hominins had the same image.10 However, humans also can feel pride, which means not only victory in a

“Self-domestication” does not imply any deliberate, controlled change in the internal nature, phenotype, or behavior of tribesmen. Self-domestication as a trend of multigenerational evolution is a by-product of multilevel natural selection. The result of these processes is the spread in the population of more solidary and cooperative individuals who achieve their goals not so much by violence and threats as by friendly behavior and partnership, who have an attractive rather than intimidating appearance (Belyaev, 1979; Bingham, 2010; Hare et al., 2012; Dor & Jablonka, 2014; Hare, 2017; Wrangham, 2019). 9 It is possible to say that these are different feelings: shame is the result of group condemnation, and guilt is the result of self-judgment. However, according to Vygotsky’s principle of interiorization, guilt and self-judgment can arise only as a result of previous social interaction, when the violation of the norm became the subject of joint attention and moral condemnation by a significant person or group. 10 Further reasoning is based on the premise that the groups of our early ancestors that descended into savannahs were dominated by alpha males. In fact, the exact social structure of these groups is not known. A wide variety of such structures was most likely, all the more so given the plethora of lateral branches in anthropogenesis. Probably, this diversity was limited on two sides by such limits. On the one hand, there was not so pronounced dominance of one alpha male as in the harems of gorillas. The fact is that this structure is associated with pronounced sexual dimorphism (males are much larger than females), but most early hominins were devoid of this trait. On the other hand, it is highly doubtful that groups of Ardipithecus or Australopithecus that descended to earth immediately behaved as relatively egalitarian and good-natured bonobos. Such communities would not 8

4.11

The Level of Ultramicro: From Self-Training to Normative Rituals

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fight and power advantage but also the “moral power” according to E. Durkheim. This feeling is the sense of the correctness of one’s behavior, of one’s justified high social position in a group. Here is self-respect and prestige (Fessler, 2007, p. 176). The traits of norms specific to hominins (including sapienses, modern humans) and different from the behavior limitations of social animals are as follows: • Norms apply to the behavior of any member of the group or anyone occupying a certain status in the group (probably, with gender-age specifics). • Norms are autonomous, not merged with specific situations of interaction or relations between individuals (although they are far from being “blindfolded”). • Not just individual leaders or alpha males but a dominant coalition or even the entire group establishes norms, controls over their observance, and performs punishment for their violation. • Unique signs known in a group (facial expressions, gestures, sounds) approve norms with the help of enforcement signals which express general dissatisfaction at violation. • Norms first established by external control often become internal normative attitudes of an individual through the mechanism of interiorization, which leads to compliance with the norms without external supervision and control. • Norms can be refined, modified, and transformed into new norms.

4.11

The Level of Ultramicro: From Self-Training to Normative Rituals

M. Tomasello revealed a curious peculiarity: apes never point at anything, including meaningful things (e.g., a treat or a toy) to each other. Instead, their behavior usually attracts attention to themselves, sometimes showing with their movements what they are going to do (Tomasello, 2019, p. 129). Wild animals do not point separately from practical actions or emotional arousal. Nor do they concentrate or fix their attention in response to the pointing. Specially trained chimpanzees can indicate to an experimenter in order to get a treat, but there is no evidence that they do anything like that in a natural setting. The smartest well-trained dogs respond correctly, finding hidden objects if their owner points in the right direction with his hand. Dogs can muzzle or bark to indicate to people where something is (e.g., a padded duck).

have needed to invent norms, fixate on them, and strictly monitor the correctness of each other’s behavior. Compared to bonobos, humans are much more jealous, prone to achieving power and prestige, and aggressive toward outsiders. We are more similar to chimpanzees. Given the constant threats from fearsome predators and competing groups, the social structure in our ancestral groups probably also included variable dominance by gangs of adult males rallying around one or two or three ringleaders. It is this complex configuration that should be kept in mind, although further we will use a conditional and simplified scheme with only one alpha male.

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Dogs follow the direction of a human gaze or point to locate hidden food or toys. If a human points to one of two locations, dogs are more likely to search where a human has indicated. Dogs can even spontaneously use novel and arbitrary gestures to help direct their search for objects or food. Several controls rule out the possibility that these searches in response to human gestures are reflexive or based on olfactory cues (. . .) Dogs seem to understand the cooperative-communicative intent of human signals in ways resembling those of the youngest human infants (Hare, 2017, 24.6).

This ability is probably due to the long evolution of dogs in the human cultural space. However, dogs cannot point at an object to other dogs and keep their joint attention on it for a long time. Children, even before they have mastered speech, at 12–14 months of age, are already quite confident in responding to directions and can point to objects arbitrarily on their own. Thus, one of the specific features of our species is the ability of people to point, understand, and react to instructions, retain attention for a long time, and transfer it from object to object. It seems to be a minor detail. However, the basis of full-fledged human interactive rituals is precisely our ability to focus on the same object jointly, so this “detail” turns out to be significant. Due to the absence of precise indicative gestures, animals do not have full-fledged joint intentionality when attention is focused not on themselves, not about their interaction, not on the practical goal (as in hunting), but the object of common interest and mutual communication. Accordingly, in animal pre-rituals, there are no separate symbols with the autonomy of meaning from a particular emotional situation, no ability to keep the joint focus of attention on an object for a long time, and thus no shared, shareable subjective reality (at least, one cannot judge it).

4.12

Hominins and Humans Are Close to Bonobos..., but Too Similar to Baboons

In terms of egalitarianism and group control over the “rightness” of behavior, bonobos are the closest to humans and probably to early hominins. A close-knit coalition of females supported by strong males effectively pacifies potential brawlers and aggressors in each group. Such cases are few because males have long been “domesticated” by some artificial selection: females did not mate with brawlers, thus depriving their offspring and the spread of their genes (de Waal, 1995; Wrangham, 2019). It is a mechanism of how peace-loving bonobos evolved, preferring group solidarity, peace, and goodwill to fighting. Group “norms of peacefulness” in bonobos exist at the level of innate instincts. Why did they not move on to the development of sonic communication, language, and consciousness? This question requires special consideration, but here I will present only the simplest version. It may seem anecdotal, even scandalous, but it is serious.

4.12

Hominins and Humans Are Close to Bonobos..., but Too Similar to Baboons

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In their external circumstances (abundance of food and absence of formidable predators) and in their internal features (low level of aggressiveness), bonobos have found an extremely comfortable and pleasant way to resolve inner tensions. They solve any social problems, difficulties, and conflicts with momentary real or imitative coitus, without distinction of sex, age, and strict restrictions on close kinship. They also engage in friendly exchanges of tasty food and practice grooming (de Waal, 1995). Atrophy of readiness for aggression and violence in bonobos was possible only in a safe environment without large predators and attacking rivals. Apart from the earliest hominins (Ardipithecus and Australopithecus) the inhabitants of savannahs and highlands were (and still are) baboons, hamadryas, and others. They quickly run on their four limbs, have intimidating fangs, and are overly aggressive, and males tend to assert their dominant positions by direct and brutal violence. Baboons show high cohesion when faced with predators (primarily leopards). These formidable primates took the evolutionary path partly close to wolves and hyenas, and this path has proved quite successful. Our distant ancestors lived in a much harsher environment than bonobos in terms of threats from toothy predators. The environment was closer to the niche of life of the baboons. Hominins had to get defense means, and evolutionarily chose not anatomical but external weapons (by the way, the human progress in arms is not even going to stop up to date). Our distant ancestors had to wage a fierce struggle against numerous competitors in this food niche (hyenas, jackals) as scavengers. In the initial stages of hominin evolution, intergroup relations were competitive and hostile, rather than peaceful. Humans still cannot boast of peace, especially with outsiders. The latest neurobiological evidence and evolutionary models suggest that intragroup prosociality can explain our paradoxical kindness and cruelty toward others. Selection for in-group prosociality drove late human self-domestication and, as a correlated by-product, is responsible for extreme forms of out-group aggression (Hare, 2017, 24.16).

We are ambitious and highly jealous in the sexual domain. Although not all are determined to dominate, we certainly do not tolerate humiliation, suppression, or violence. In contrast, we are ready to defend ourselves and our loved ones quite aggressively. In other words, we are more similar in many aspects, not to benevolent and sexually unbridled bonobo cuties, but to menacing gorillas, jealous harem masters, to chimpanzees prone to join aggressive gangs, to unyielding, dominant, and always ready to fight baboons. As early hominins lived in a hungry and dangerous environment, one can hardly attribute them a gentler character. Under these internal traits and external circumstances, the comfortable bonobos’ path of evolution was firmly closed to hominins. They had to develop communication, speech, memory, consciousness, thinking, and civilization... Permanent natural tensions and stresses for hominins, primarily due to climate and landscape changes during migrations (danger, food deficit, heat, cold), as well as intragroup competition and struggles in the areas of status, violence, food, and sexuality, led to high conflicts and to the growth of objective group concern for

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Natural tensions and strains: food shortages, dangers, heat, cold, traumas et cetera

Levels of conflict, violence, and group concern for appeasement

Intra-group competition and struggles in the areas of status, violence, sustenance, and sexuality

The orderliness of the group, the coordination of collective action

Urgence of communicative concerns as the striving to influence tribesmen: to coerce, demand, call, approve. Interaction Intensity, oral attempts

Level of understanding and agreement within the group

Fig. 4.1 Interrelation of factors influencing the strength of communicative concerns in early hominin groups. Shaded blocks denote the intensity of processes directly related to sound communication, that is, (pre)speech

suppressing intragroup violence, for establishing solidarity and mutual assistance (Fig. 4.1).

4.13

The First Group Norms and Their Evolutionary Advantage

The earliest norms (or rather sets of prohibitions and injunctions) were, to varying degrees, related to violence, food, sexuality, and kinship: 1. The prohibition of ferocious intragroup violence, with a focus on injury and murder; only joint violence by the dominant coalition against the transgressors was allowed. 2. Compulsory sharing of the spoils with the tribesmen.11 3. Prohibition of rape within the group, of coercion to sex by individuals.

11

For some reason, the emergence of the social norm of food sharing is not given proper attention in paleoanthropology and paleopsychology. The usual sociobiological explanation of it as a rational calculation (“if my kin survive, our genes will survive and spread”) does not seem plausible.

4.14

Philosophical Interlude: The Sociosphere as an Ontology of “Institutional. . .

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4. Prohibition of incest, first of all, sexual relations of parents with their children; those who violated this prohibition (which became almost the strictest) monopolized the access to their children, confronted themselves to others, turned into outcasts, were banished, which inevitably led to their death; general aversion to such behavior became the basis of the norm, though not innate, but deeply rooted in all human cultures; adults extend this prohibition to sexual relations between siblings; thus, children from a certain age had to remain open to sexual partnership with other group members or outside the group (in intergroup alliances, in transitions from group to group). 5. A separate, rigorous prohibition on killing other people’s children, injuring them, and damaging them. 6. Prohibition to take food by force; prohibition to take other people’s things without consent. All six points seem strange, not to say wild and scandalous. However, were they necessary at all? Isn’t it “natural” to behave within these frameworks? All these norms are being violated by social animals, including anthropoids and modern people. The severe punishments, also our “holy terror,” “righteous anger,” and “deep contempt” for violating these norms, especially points 3–5, testify to their universality and deepest antiquity.12 Norms 1–6 are valid and strictly observed in all known hunter-gatherer groups. When and how they evolved in hominins is discussed below. Many hominin populations and species have disappeared. Most likely, they lost competition for territory and resources due to weaker coordination and less internal solidarity. This means the absence or weak maintenance of the above norms (see Figs. 3.1 and 3.3 from this point of view).

4.14

Philosophical Interlude: The Sociosphere as an Ontology of “Institutional Facts”

Christopher Knight, in an article with the all-important title “Language Coevolved with the Rule of Law,” referring to F. de Saussure, L. Wittgenstein, and J. Searle, writes: A speech act, like a move in a game of ‘let’s pretend’, is internal to reality of this kind. A move need not produce no physical or biological impact, only a shift in perspective. Each such change of state occurs within a quite peculiar domain, neither objective nor subjective in the ordinary sense. Things are ‘seen’ or ‘judged’ differently, and to that extent reality (the world as jointly constructed) has changed (Knight, 2006, p. 172).

12 Killing and raping members of alien, hostile communities and condemning them to starvation are quite common practices in human history, alas, not disappearing today.

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The emergence of normativity in hominins marks the most crucial stage, the appearance of “institutional facts” (J. Searle’s notion). When human life became subject to the rule of law, participation in this kind of reality became possible for the first time. Because signals internal to this novel domain were no longer evolving in a Darwinian world, the familiar laws of signal evolution (. . .) no longer applied (Knight, 2006, p. 173).

“Institutional facts” exist because people believe that these phenomena are natural. Examples are usually money, marriage, the results of soccer matches, stock market quotes.13 These kinds of phenomenon and social relations, structures, organizations, states, and institutions themselves form a particular ontological sphere of being, the “sociality,” or sociosphere.14 The sociosphere always relies on the realities of other ontological spheres: the material world (including the bodies of animals, hominins, humans), the psychosphere (with the objective psychological and internal subjective reality of processes carried out by the neural mechanisms of the brain), and the culturosphere (as a set of patterns transmitted in generations extracorporeally—beyond genetic heredity) (Rozov, 2016, p. 6–29). The last three ontological spheres correspond directly to K. Popper’s first, second, and third “worlds,” but a separate sociosphere he “did not see” with his philosophical thinking. Long before Searle and his concept of “Institutional facts” (Searle, 1995) Durkheim, Husserl, and Alfred Schütz wrote about the sociosphere in their terms (“social fact,” “life-world,” “social world”). Perhaps the honor of singling out the sociality as a separate ontological domain (a sphere of being) belongs to Hegel, who actually placed in his “objective spirit” social institutions: a family, a civil society, and a state. It is not true that animals, particularly anthropoids, do not have their culturosphere and sociosphere at all. Many behavioral patterns transmit through social learning (from nightingale singing to wolf hunting techniques): these are elementary analogs of the human cultural patterns as the main constituents of the culturosphere. The reality of dense interactions and relationships in animal groups (hierarchies, sexual partnerships, parenthood, friendship, hostility) is not reducible to the material world, to an individual psyche, or to instincts or patterns transmitted through generations. The stability of such relationships represents the sprouts of the sociosphere in animals.

Yuval Harari, speaking of “legends” and “fictions,” such as the Peugeot Company, the limited liability company, money, shares, law, etc., actually means “institutional facts,” or more precisely, social entities as parts of a special ontology. Harari rightly points to the powerful integrating role of such “imaginary constructs” (Harari, 2015). It is only unclear why these ideas, long known in the social sciences and social philosophy, have been taken by many readers and reviewers as some kind of revelation. 14 Consider the Thomas’s theorem: “If people define situations as real, then they are real in their consequences.” In fact, this means that the components of the sociosphere are by no means mere “fictions,” but are powerful parts of reality that can alter its other parts (including the material ones) through human action. 13

4.15

The Shift of the Regulative Instance from Another Person to a Sign

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In animals, the actions of some individuals may be liked or disliked by others. However, no clear meaning of (un)correctness is associated with a joint agreement on the rule. Animals do not have the joint intentionality necessary for the normative regulation of individual behavior. During anthropogenesis, the hominin sociosphere progressively proliferated. Why? The sociosphere (“the social world”) is usually interpreted as “something jointly constructed” or as “the collective imaginary.” It was no coincidence that J. Searle defined the same reality through “institutional facts,” since collectively accepted norms form the foundation of all social institutions and, in fact, of all sociality. It is normativity that has become the magic wand, that is, the support structure with the broadest range of potential applications. The unfolding of this crucial structure led to an impressive diversity of human relations, institutions, and organizations, which continues to expand in our time. An internal norm is a pattern of behavior that is intrinsically desired as a personal goal, rather than simply being used to achieve some other goal. Agents conform to an internal norm because so doing is an end to itself, and not merely because of the external social sanctions, such as material rewards that follow from norm compliance or punishments that follow from norm violation. For instance, an individual who has internalized the value of “speaking truthfully” will do so even in cases where the net payoff to speaking truthfully would otherwise be negative (Gintis, 2004, p. 61).

First, normativity as a general social condition became necessary for the emergence of language and consciousness because it transformed the social orders that gave rise to new and urgent communicative problems (see Chaps. 5–7). Second, more specifically, normativity made articulate speech itself possible, becoming the regulatory basis for all its linguistic “correctness”: the standard articulation, the effective use of words, and the composition of sentences allowed in each given language.

4.15

The Shift of the Regulative Instance from Another Person to a Sign

It is essential that over time, the standard sound cues that accompanied disapproval or approval gained regulatory power over individual behavior through interiorization. The mechanism of interiorization itself is already present in animal pre-rituals: after a fight, the loser forms an attitude of subordination and the winner an attitude of dominance (see Chap. 3). At the same time, the entire emotional situation with fear of the victor or triumph over the defeated opponent is “imprinted” in the animal’s psyche. Here, the general result of interaction became a social pre-attitude through interiorization. Now let us look at what happens in the training process. A well-trained dog “understands” the commands “Lie Down!,” “Sit!,” “Voice!,” “Ugh!,” and “Near!” and obeys them even if someone else utters these words with an authoritative

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intonation. There is no interiorization here because social interaction is still necessary for “correct” behavior. The notion of “self-training” is significant here because every hominin, as an object of “training,” was to some extent also its subject. Thus, it could recognize and utter the same sound signals that signified group approval or disapproval of someone’s actions or of what was happening in general. Let us present three stages of hominin self-training in almost exact accordance with the stages of formation of mental structures according to L. Vygotsky: 1. Repetitive situations with a collective expression of group approval or disapproval of someone’s action, which took the form of a specific, well-recognized sound signal. 2. A participant who is alone and wants to do something disapproved of (e.g., to eat the extracted food instead of taking it to the parking lot and sharing it) loudly utters words of disapproval himself, imagining displeasure of his tribesmen, and refuses to violate, or on the contrary, he does not want to do something approved (to follow the prey to a dangerous place, cross a river, share the extracted food), but loudly utters encouraging signals and overpowers himself. 3. A hominin pronounces the sounds “in mind,” i.e., the attitude emerged through interiorization and fastened to the sign as an internal referent of the sound signal. The widespread ability of social animals to form pre-attitudes through interiorization is transforming here into the ability to interiorize a norm and to obey it through self-command in mind. Adherents to psychoanalysis can see the birth of the “super-ego.” Within the theory of interactive rituals, it is reasonable to call point (1) a normative ritual. The mental instance formed and manifested in items 2–3 is a normative attitude. This complex of social interactions, cognitive processes, and corresponding behavior is called normativity.

4.16

Why Has the Concern for Communicating/Understanding Rules Become So Acute?

We have seen that the human practice of “sharing with loved ones” is not unique. Importantly, instincts program this behavior in animals purely on an individual level. For example, who knows of cases of birds exerting group pressure on a greedy father who does not bring food to his egg-sitting female? Lions in their pride, gorillas in their harem, chimpanzees, and bonobos in their packs generally refrain from violence, making do with threatening signs. These are the practices of group pressure on transgressors through expressions of disapproval and threats. Probably, these emotional reactions are the forerunners of normative group control in hominin groups.

4.16

Why Has the Concern for Communicating/Understanding Rules Become So Acute?

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Modern humans do not even have a semblance of the instinct to share. There are no instinctive prohibitions on taking others’ things and no prohibitions on using violence. Every child must be taught these simple rules, often with difficulty and with a fair amount of resistance. Not everyone behaves properly, not always can be taught. So primitive greed, disregard for other people’s property, murder, and rape still occur, including within small communities, neighborhoods, and even families. In other words, instincts do not help, and human rules are not innate. Only social learning, social control, and social attitudes (morality, customs, legal consciousness) “imprinted” in the psyche of individuals are sufficient mechanisms for their acceptance. Social norms appeared among our distant ancestors and already with known qualities: they did not become innate instincts and implied group pressure, protection of these norms via the threat of punishment of violators (Gärdenfors & Osvath, 2010, p. 110). There is nothing “natural” about our ancestors suddenly refusing the temptation to take possession of something or someone, which is nearby and attractive, which another member of the group considers their own, be it a weapon, a tool, a prey, or a female. In the absence of rules of belonging (group protection of “property”), either everyone shares with everything (as in bonobo groups), or one dominant leader suppresses any self-will (as in gorilla harems), or there are constant conflicts, struggle for dominance, and clashes (as in chimpanzees). When an ape has left a tool (e.g., a stone to break nuts), another ape can immediately take it. Naturally, conflicts and even fights occur, but a group never stands up for the original “owner” of the tool because of the “violation.” The transition to normativity was long and arduous, as group rules clashed with the ordinary instincts of individuals, predominantly selfish ones. In addition, ambitious individuals and their cliques sought to consolidate demands that were advantageous to them. The struggle for dominance through violence and threats transformed into a battle for prestige and leadership, promoting their claims as new rules. Prestige was won by those whose demands and proposals for new rules received general approval. But they were usually rules that were useful to the whole group as normative structures that ensured the common concerns of the tribesmen. Such demands received repeated positive reinforcements, emotional approval and agreement on the part of the whole group or the dominant coalition. That is why these requirements were preserved and transformed into reproducible norms over generations. The impressive diversity of prohibitions and injunctions in the known groups of hunter-gatherers (especially the rules connected with the kinship systems) results from the long-term processes of “natural selection” of norms. No wonder that the basic norms—prohibitions on intragroup murder, incest, sexual violence, and sharing prey (see points 1–6 above)—remain universal. Instincts did not help, and there was still no language in the early hominins. How could the rules for survival in a new and challenging environment arise and then be reproduced in the generations? The required support structure is simple: to collectively and convincingly forbid undesirable individual behavior.

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Cultural evolution will often favor social norms that suppress aggression toward fellow group members and inhibit theft, rape, and other harms. Over evolutionary time, these processes would have also often assembled norms that supported food sharing, mutual aid, communal defense, and cooperative hunting. Norm violators would have initially been sanctioned in various ways, perhaps by losing skilled hunting partners, attractive mates, and valuable allies. When such sanctions fall short, modern hunter-gatherers readily escalate to ostracism, beatings, and even executions. Dominant individuals, or others unable to suppress aggressive reactions, would have been particularly likely to be executed in acts of coordinated punishment (Wrangham, 2019).

J. Henrich and M. Muthukrishna in their review (Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021) aptly articulated the close connection between the need for peaceful order and food sharing in the group, normativity, multilevel selection, and self-domestication through genetic shift. Such normative sanctions would have created genetic selection pressures favoring reduced reactive aggression, stronger self-control, and greater docility. These norms, by selecting for less reactive aggression, longer developmental windows for learning and greater selfcontrol, may have favored a set of corresponding morphological changes including more juvenile faces and reduced brow ridges (Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021).

Therefore, the main structure that provides pacification within groups was egalitarian coalitions against aggressive alpha males, joint intentionality, normative rituals, normative attitudes, and sound designations. During the development of these structures, there was a process of self-domestication (Belyaev, 1979; Bingham, 2010; Hare et al., 2012; Tomasello, 2019; Wrangham, 2019). Let us consider in order the mechanisms of formation of these components.

4.17

The Dominance of Egalitarian Coalitions and Self-Domestication

In theoretical terms, for normativity to emerge, it seems necessary for dominance to shift from a lone male leader (alpha male) to a relatively egalitarian coalition since only a coalition is capable of making constant demands on group members expressing displeasure, threatening, punishing when disobedient, encouraging compliance. Norms can be reliably reproduced across generations (through social learning, incorporation, initiation rites) only if a solidary coalition supports them. Indeed, suppose that only the lone leader expresses requirements. In that case, they stay variable, depending on specific relations, are not accepted by the rest of the members, are not fulfilled in the absence of the leader’s control, and disappear when he is weakened or dead. Changeable hierarchies of chimpanzee groups and gorilla harems cut off the possibility of normativity. The presence of egalitarian coalitions in bonobos presents a more complicated problem. To explain specifics of hominins we need additional factors: joint defense against enemies, active use of effective group weapons, the deficit of food resources,

4.17

The Dominance of Egalitarian Coalitions and Self-Domestication

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and scarce sexual access (males fight for access to females and vice versa). In contrast, bonobos in the natural environment, even more so in nurseries, live in relative safety, enjoy an abundance of food, are not armed with any chops, and do not deny each other sex. Moreover, females like to have sex with males of other groups (de Waal, 2019). In other words, bonobos’ concerns for appeasement are far not as acute as they were in early hominins. There are several explanations for egalitarianism that do not contradict but complement each other. • Remote group violence (stoning). • The emergence of lethal weapons (choppers). • Coalitions of mothers against aggressors to protect children and themselves from violence, appropriate negative sexual selection of aggressive alpha males. • Groups with coalitions and rules grew faster in numbers due to their attractiveness to potential mothers. Hominins drove away competitive scavengers from their prey with stones (Bickerton, 2009). It was also necessary to drive predators away from the camp to protect small children so that females could throw stones as well as males. They were also the least tolerant of intragroup skirmishes and fights, as the winning males became a threat to the children of the defeated ones, and females were in fear of sexual violence (Hrdy, 1999; Diamond, 1992; Power, 2014). The version of group stoning of the most aggressive and robust opponents (Bingham, 2010) is supplemented here by a plausible alliance between mothers and a group of relatively weak males, who together confronted large, fanged, toothy bullies and rapists. By joining together, six or seven adult males can defeat and traumatize an antisocial individual with minimal risk to themselves. Wrangham calls this aggression “coalitional proactive aggression” (Wrangham, 2019). The rudimentary choppers used to cut carcasses were new weapons that could severely injure and kill. Since among the higher mammals, the impressive clash (who will be afraid of whom) occurs more often instead of fights, the single aggressors were more often inferior to the coalition of weaker males, more so supported by females. Since attitudes as control structures of the psyche do not require consciousness and calculation, this representation is more plausible than the cost-benefit correlation in the spirit of rational choice theory (Bingham, 2010). A collective adverse reaction, punishment in case of disobedience, just played the role of rituals, forming participants’ attitudes. In this way, a particular support structure emerged: a normative ritual. It is certainly possible that morality and political egalitarianism developed very gradually, through gene-culture evolution, but it is not easy to imagine what the earlier stages of moral behavior might have been. It seems at least equally possible that morally-based egalitarianism was invented rather quickly, with language and the invention of effective hunting weapons as pre-adaptations that made sudden, planned, and decisive political rebellions mutinies (against dominant chiefs, or alpha males,—N.R.) relatively safe for the subordinates. If morally-based egalitarianism did arrive as an abrupt (and therefore culturally-based)

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change in political format, it is easy to suggest how this new way of doing things socially and politically could have spread through intentional cultural selection (Boehm, 2006, p. 86).

Females who entered a broad alliance against aggressive males avoided mating with the latter. This factor of negative sexual selection was probably the most effective for hominin self-domestication both in body morphology (gracilization) and in behavioral traits (focus on group membership and solidarity rather than on personal dominance through violence and intimidation). It is hypothesized that group punishment acted as a force of natural selection that was social, rather than environmental, and that social selection could have shaped human gene pools (Boehm, 2015, p. 424).

Young females moving to a new group more often chose a safer, emotionally comfortable, friendly, and nourishing group, i.e., a group with rules. However, due to the greater influx of potential mothers, these groups grew, divided, and displaced groups without rules. By the same logic, groups with internal alienation, aggression, violence, and unwillingness to share food suffered from a shortage of potential mothers, became smaller, and lost competition. They were forced out into unfavorable and resource-poor lands. Such groups probably disintegrated. and their surviving members were assimilated by more successful groups. Thus, groups with stable coalition dominance and normativity replaced groups with the former order of alphamale power. The progressive growth of multilateral advantage of egalitarian coalitions in groups of hominins evolutionary led to their morphological, social, and cognitive self-domestication (Fig. 4.2). In the progressive lineage of hominids and hominins from Australopithecus to Heidelbergians and sapienses, along with the growth of the body and brain, large jaws disappeared, cranial ridges and shafts decreased, sexual dimorphism (size and strength differences between males and females) decreased, intragroup cohesion increased, normativity emerged and developed (Belyaev, 1979; Bingham, 2010; Bickerton, 2009; Diamond, 1992; Stringer, 2012; Wrangham, 2019). The transition to normativity was the most prominent manifestation of the evolutionary shift from Darwinian biological mechanisms to Lamarckian social mechanisms (see Chap. 2). It is hardly necessary to explain the significance of normativity, social control, and the emergence of internal moral attitudes for subsequent human history and prehistory.

4.18

Internal Logic of the Normativity Emergence: Nomological Explanation

The task is as follows: to formulate a general proposition that meets the following requirements:

Reduced vitality, losing out in compeon with rivals

Support structures: normave rituals, peaceful conflict resoluon, sharing of meals

Provision of concerns: suppressing intragroup violence, increasing vitality, winning compeon using solidarity growth

Aempts to establish new norms, conflicts over them, but already with violence prohibion

Chaoc behavior without the former discipline that was ensured by hierarchy and inmidaon.

Displacement to worse condions, subjugaon, assimilaon, or death

A new niche: tendency to the intragroup peace and equality but without established order

Mechanisms of fixaon: rituals of punishment, formaon of the peaceful and cohesion atudes (within a group)

The effects of unprovided concerns: intragroup violence, alienaon, malnutrion

Responsive aempts: joint expression of rejecon, opposion to aggressors, coercion to share spoils

New concerns: the difficules of understanding and reaching agreement

Fig. 4.2 The formation of social conditions for human cognitive evolution and the mechanism of group selection. The blocks denote the conditional phases of the processes and the arrows indicate the transitions between them

In other groups, coalions do not form, or they cannot establish norms, or cannot transmit them across generaons

Challenges-threats and challengesopportunies, acute concerns without provision: risks of injury, conflict killings, the vulnerability of women and children, malnutrion

4.18 Internal Logic of the Normativity Emergence: Nomological Explanation 107

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1. To serve as a theoretical (“universal”) hypothesis, i.e., a basis for the conclusion of an empirical hypothesis about the formation of normativity, which includes rules forbidding or limiting violence, prescribing the sharing of the prey. 2. To be expressed at such a level of abstractness that it is possible to deduce and verify various kinds of corollary from the hypothesis (through up-to-date comparisons, observations, analog, or computer experiments). 3. To explain why normativity has not arisen in apes living in groups, including anthropoids. The substantive basis of the theoretical hypothesis is the evolutionary principle of provisioning: The combination of acute unprovided concern, changeable ingredients, various attempts, and functioning fixation mechanisms generates a structure that provides this concern to some extent (see Chaps. 2–3). The theoretical hypothesis: under acute concerns of maintaining group cohesion to repel external aggressors, under scarcity and difficulties of food extraction, under obtaining weapons that give reliable advantage to the group over the individual, and under the high ability of individuals to imitate actions, necessarily coalitions emerge that begin to dominate, and establish effective rules: prohibition of intragroup violence and injunction to share prey. This abstract hypothesis can be a logical premise for deducing statements accessible for testing nowadays. It also leads deductively to the empirical hypothesis concerning early hominins. Figure 4.3 schematically shows the above reasoning. Sapientaon as proximity to human qualies

Theorecal hypothesis: concerns to repel aggressors, individual access to lethal weapons, obtaining distant weapons by a group, scarcity of boons lead to dominance of coalions banning intragroup violence, prescribing sharing spoils

Judgments about consequences

Empirical hypothesis: Condions of early hominin groups

Confirmaon that the norms have been established

Verifiable up-to-date consequences of the theorecal hypothesis

The effect: coalions have been winning bales against alpha males and, through normave rituals began to form atudes for intragroup peace and ssolidarity

Judgments about inial condions Confirmaon of inial condions with indirect data

The causes: external threats for groups, stone choppers as lethal weapons, stoning pracces, meal deficiency, allseason aracveness of females

Direcon of me

Fig. 4.3 Emergence of normativity in early hominins: the extended nomological explanation

4.19

4.19

The Rationale for the Theoretical Hypothesis

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The Rationale for the Theoretical Hypothesis

Arguments for the sufficiency of attempts and fixation mechanisms: joint signals of discontent cause conflicts that play the role of trials and rituals as sources of attitudes. Because the coalition dominates, it can force or threaten to enforce a requirement, which negatively reinforces the violation and forms in each participant in the interaction (not just the transgressor) an attitude of unacceptability to violate the rules. The attitude, supported by a series of such rituals, operates already without external control (Fig. 4.4). Relevant up-to-date analogies include military, policemen, and bandits. These groups use violence and must unite to defend themselves against external enemies. Indeed, they have strict prohibitions on intragroup violence and “ratting” (stealing from each other). Also, consider the following scheme of an analog experiment. Groups of subjects (children or adults) play a table game. Players receive cards that indicate various “weapons” and “boons.” They can use “weapons” to take “boons” from one another. Players also use “weapons” to protect themselves from external forces that sometimes take “boons” from everybody. Everyone’s ability to “survive” and win depends on having “weapons” and “boons” and on coordination of the group’s defensive actions. The goals and permissible strategies of individuals and groups include allowing for the taking away of “boons” from other group members with the help of “weapons.” Communication within each group is possible with only two signals (“I approve this action” or “I do not like this action”). Players can demonstrate these signals within a given group after each player moves. Thus, it is possible to vary all the parameters of the game. If the hypothesis is correct, then with greater Jusficaon of the theorecal hypothesis Up-to-date analogies: strong prohibions on interior violence in armed groups confronng external threats

Raonale: The egalitarian coalion more readily accepts requirements, can systemacally reinforce, and transmit them across generaons through social learning

Experiments with analog models: members of a group fight for "boons" with "weapons" and must jointly defend against external "threats." If the hypothesis is correct, then in definite condions the rules of nonaggression against each other, and sharing of both boons and weapons will be formed more quickly and firmly

Computer experiments based on the game theory: "statuses," "wins," "losses," "social interacon strategies, "self-limitaons" are set. Parameters vary widely in order to find out: under what combinaons of condions analogs of common rules and sustained self-limitaons appear

The theorecal hypothesis: armed, able to imitate each other parcipants in a cooperave defense against external enemies, in condions of boons scarcity, usually develop norms that prohibit intragroup violence and prescribe boons sharing

The empirical hypothesis

Aempts and fixaon mechanisms: joint signals of discontent negavely reinforce violaons and form normave atudes

Fig. 4.4 Justification of the theoretical hypothesis explaining normativity formation

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efficiency (danger) of “weapons,” the greater scarcity of “boons,” the more significant external threat, the longer joint “defense”—the intragroup rules of non-aggression against each other and of obligatory sharing “boons” will be formed more quickly and firmly. The theoretical hypothesis concerning the formation of normativity depending on resource circumstances includes two propositions: 1. When resources are abundant, there is no need to communicate about them, and the corresponding means of communication do not develop. 2. If a group or an individual needs a specific set of resources, which can be obtained only with the cooperation of participants who have access to different resources, and if there are channels of communication, participants will establish rules for sharing, rules for collecting into a common pot (for the group), or the order of exchange (for the benefit of each). Analog experiments can take the form of a board game. The participants see each other but cannot hear each other and can communicate by placing cards on the table. Some cards indicate “boons” or the means of obtaining them, i.e., the ingredients of the “boons.” Other cards have meaningless syllables on them. Each participant has separate reusable cards: “Good” (I propose to oblige everyone), “Bad” (I suggest forbidding everyone), “Agree,” “Disagree,” and pictures meaning: to give to someone, to take away, to put out for everyone. Participants at each step randomly gain access to some “boon” and can communicate with each other only with these cards. The following are variants of the game tasks. Option 1. Each group must accumulate a particular set of “boons” as quickly as possible. Option 2. Each participant must collect a distinct set of “boons.” That group wins in which everyone gathered their collection of “boons” and was faster than the other groups. The theoretical hypothesis will be supported if the following empirical hypotheses are confirmed. 1. If “boons” are abundant and fully accessible, then everyone will take what he needs, not paying attention to the sign cards (an analog of a bonobo comfortable life). 2. If a group needs to accumulate a set of “boons” to win, the group whose participants will set the rules of collecting “boons” into the common pot will win faster and more efficiently. 3. If the group needs each participant to collect his own set of “boons” to win, the group will win whose participants set the rules for the exchange of “boons” faster and more efficiently. A computer experiment with the logic of game theory is possible. It includes a set of parameters with varying values (e.g., as in the version above). A series of computer simulations allows testing and refining of many theoretical hypotheses.

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The Empirical Hypothesis: Why and When Normativity Emerged

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The Empirical Hypothesis: Why and When Normativity Emerged

The nomological explanation can work for each stage of the long processes of normativity formation. However, as the required data are insufficient, methodological procedures must be compressed. Therefore, the empirical hypothesis has a threestep structure: (a) In Africa from 8–7 to 2.7–2.5 mya under threats from predators, remoteness of places of food extraction, and scarce sexual access, there was a transition of dominance to egalitarian coalitions in hominin groups (Ardipithecus, or Australopithecus, or Early Homo) that used stoning against aggressive alpha males; joint threats of such stoning, ostracism against aggressors, and refusal of females to mate with them led to the evolutionary effect of self-domestication; at the end of this period, the emergence and spread of lethal weapons (choppers) made group selection particularly severe, and the acquisition of the ability to aim stone-throwing gave a confident advantage to coalitions over aggressive singles; so only the most cohesive and coordinated groups dominated by coalitions survived. (b) From about 2.7–2.5 mya onward, hominins (Habilises and further forms) with practices of joint threats and rewards, i.e., normative rituals, became increasingly influential in suppressing violence, establishing rules of sexual access, imposing other rules of behavior, and forming appropriate internal attitudes of peacefulness and mutual assistance—structures that ensured group cohesion and viability; such groups expanded; their populations and species won competition and survived. (c) From about 1.6 mya, the social orders of some groups became predominantly normative; this allowed hominins (Erectuses and later forms) to create rather sophisticated tools (Acheul), which could no longer be taken away from a master; the need for consensus within each egalitarian coalition increased the number of rules and behaviors, including sign communication; probably from this time the progressive differentiation of verbal signs led to the transformation of former protosyllables into syllables as recognizable sound signals, the first protowords (holophrases). Arguments for the justification of the empirical hypothesis are presented in Fig. 4.5. Concerns for cohesion, intragroup peace, and coordination of collective actions were not adequately provided and required new structures. Climate and landscape changes in Africa associated with alternating glacial periods and interglacials led to the transformation of natural niches, which required significant behavioral changes in hominins. For example, judging from ancient finds from Tabarin, Kenya, around 5–4.5 mya there was a global cooling with a massive change of fauna species. New ecological conditions and seasonality in the distribution of food resources led to

Fig. 4.5 Justification of the empirical hypothesis on normativity emergence

Aempts and fixaon mechanisms: negave reinforcement of aggressive acons of loners; girls (potenal mothers) move rather to safe and friendly groups with high solidarity and rules of behavior

Inial condions: An egalitarian coalion dominates, lethal weapons (stone choppers) appear, dangerous predators and scavenger competors around, constant food shortages, all-season aracveness of females The concern got a support structure: early migraons of Archanthropes from Africa and their successful selement

Consequences: Prohibions appear against intra-group violence, taking away food, taking away implements, rape

The empirical hypothesis

New concerns: when single alpha males lost their monopoly on power, there was a need to negoate everyday acons, to enforce order by introducing new rules

The raonale for the emergence of normavity: technological progress (was possible only if nobody could take a tool away), mastery of fire (thanks to rules of fire maintenance)

4

Required Ingredients: skills to fight against predators and rival scavengers; pracces of targeted stoning

Concerns were not provided: the choppers increased the risk of killing tribesmen; during ice ages, Africa suffered droughts; compeon with other scavengers, and threats from predators increased

The theorecal hypothesis

112 Self-Domestication and Normativity: Conditions for the Breakthrough to Speech

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The Empirical Hypothesis: Why and When Normativity Emerged

113

changes in the diet of early hominin populations. Depending on the season, the ratio of fruits, fat fruits and nuts, roots and cereals, small vertebrates, and insects changed. There are no more remains of Australopithecus dated 1.5 mya. Some of their populations transformed into early Homo (Homo rudolfensis, Homo habilis, etc.) and the rest died. All of the above ecological factors took place. The transition to meat-fed food explains the survival of a branch of hominins with significantly reduced teeth, and jaws, but why did the other branches die out? An additional explanation is required. It is reasonable to link the epochal transition from Australopithecus to Early Homo with significant changes in social order. Note that orders in animal groups (as in humans) depend on dominance structures. Since the landfall (8–7 mya), hominins had to flee together from formidable predators. However, within hominin groups, as in other anthropoids, conflicts over hierarchical positions continued. Thus, during the first four to five million years of existence of ancient hominins in the niche of gatherers and inferior scavengers, there was a complex process of coalition formation in their struggle for dominance with aggressive, individualized violence and intimidation alpha males. Judging from the bone remains, it is only 2.7–1.6 mya that the structure of the joints began to allow for purposeful stoning (Bingham, 2010, p. 220). Undoubtedly, long before that, hominins used this safe practice of remote group weaponry to scare away swarms of small predators or rival scavengers. It is likely that joint intentionality (Tomasello, 2008, 2019) began to develop precisely in situations of this kind. In some hominin groups, aggressive bullies who tried to achieve dominance by direct violence caused general resentment, anxiety, and stimulated coordinated actions. The Bingham version about the use of the same technique of stoning by hominins for the group punishment or intimidation of such bullies is quite plausible. Especially since the practices of such collective punishment are well known to anthropologists in many cultures. Along with other anatomical changes toward sapientation, there was significant thinning or even complete shedding of hair on bodies. In addition, females, thanks to hidden estrus, enlarged breasts, and thighs, became every day attractive and ready for coitus, which meant a particularly acute concern for ordering sexual relations in this always tense and fraught with conflict sphere (Hrdy, 1999; Miller, 2000; Diamond, 1992). Archaeologists date the emergence of already continuous stone technology (manufacture of pointed choppers) to approximately 2.7–2.5 mya and link it with the emergence of Early Homo (Michlich, 2018). Choppers were designed mainly to cut thick hides and carcasses of large mammals. But the same weapon could be used to mutilate or kill a tribesman. The concern to calm intragroup life increased. The group selection also became more severe. In groups whose members failed to get rid of the temptation to use choppers in intragroup conflicts, mutual alienation grew and young females left for

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more friendly groups15; therefore, groups that could not cope with regular mortal fights for a place in the hierarchy steadily decreased in number, were pushed out to the worst lands, and died out. The groups that asserted internal peace and cohesion survived, grew, divided, and took over the vacated lands (Fig. 3.1). Ethnographic analysis also supports the idea that humans show a change in social structure consistent with self-domestication and the coevolution of parochialism. Hunter-gatherer intragroup interactions are best described as a reverse dominance hierarchy. Group members work together to defend each other against any individual trying to monopolize power in the group. This suggests that the most aggressive members of the group would be at a selective disadvantage. Aggression occurs, but ostracism and lethal aggression are levied against those who do not conform to the more egalitarian social system (Boehm et al., 1993). These bonded egalitarian groups would have been more successful in outcompeting other hominin species or human outgroups. Humans became kinder and crueler as a result of selection for intragroup prosociality (Hare, 2017, 24.18).

The best explanation for this evolutionary divergence is the beginning of a shared intolerance to intragroup violence and the encouragement of mutual support. Each collective expression of rejection of individual violence and aggression with threats of punishment was a memorable affair with negative reinforcement of aggressive actions, formation of installations of submission to the requirements of the coalition. When the demands were constant, they became rules. Such was the mechanism of behavioral fixation. Rulebreakers lost in the sphere of sexual selection (see above). The rule-abiding gained prestige and won in it; moreover, they became role models, so the ability to adapt and assimilate the rules spread with the change of generations. It was the mechanism of reproductive fixation. The rationale for the emergence of normativity. Subsequent technological progress, growth of quality, and uniformity of the Acheul tools point to the internal attitudes of masters to follow some uniform canons and the establishment of prohibition: one should not take away other people’s tools. Maintaining fire requires regular standard actions implying internal and external normative control (Wrangham, 2010; Dor & Jablonka, 2014). Finally, articulate speech began to develop later, but its “correctness” is primarily the standardization of articulation (Tomasello, 2008; Bickerton, 2009; Martínez et al., 2004; Wood & Bauernfeind, 2012). The growth of the intelligibility of pronounced protowords, then words, phrases, and sentences, is closely related to the progressive development of verbal motor skills and the structure of the larynx (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983). It does not seem possible to establish and maintain rules and standards of behavior, including speech (!) without normativity as a new basis of social order in groups.

15 The transition of young females to other groups is usual among anthropoids (e.g., gorillas) and was detected by genetic methods in Neanderthals. Moreover, in many hunter-gatherer communities, girls married men from other groups (exogamy, patrilocality). The same pattern of intergroup mixing is reasonable to assume in hominins.

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Were the Early Homo the First to Establish Rules of Behavior?

115

Suddenly appearing by themselves strict speech norms without normativity as essential characteristic of social orders would require some sophisticated ad hoc explanation. However, a general explanation through normativity with rituals of control, correction practices, the interiorization of attitudes, and self-control skill development is far preferable to any ad hoc explanation by criteria of simplicity, plausibility, and methodological correctness. Consider the rationale for the provision of intragroup appeasement concern. Unfortunately, there are no reliable data on the level and dynamics of armed violence for this epoch, primarily due to the lack of penetration implements and the difficulty in determining the nature of injuries found in the skulls and skeletal bones (Vishnyatsky, 2014, p. 320). The supporting argument is the widespread settlement of African Erectuses in 1.5–0.8 mya. These migrations represented for each group a most dangerous expedition to unknown lands that required high cohesion and mutual support. These traits are difficult to imagine without ensuring a peaceful life within the group.

4.21

Were the Early Homo the First to Establish Rules of Behavior?

Let us compare the following data. (a) During the period of 2.7–1.6 mya, there was no considerable progress in lower Paleolithic (Olduvai) technology; the brain then remained small (552 cm3 in Habilises) and grew slowly. (b) With the emergence of Pre-Archanthropes (c. 1.7–1.6 mya), significant evolutionary shifts began to take place: • Substantial advances in technology from early Acheul to late one began, with increasingly accurate machining of both sides of sharpened implements, which meant more labor-intensive manufacturing, practical value, and thus temptations to grab. • Hominins began to master fire; perhaps, the first attempts were made to heat food (e.g., bones were heated, so that bone marrow flowed out). • Rapid growth of the brain began, followed by overcoming the “brain Rubicon”—750 cm3. • There was a significant increase in body weight. Early Erectuses (Pre-Paleoanthropes) already achieved the niche of higher, aggressive scavengers: they did not pick up the bones but drove competitors away from fresh carcasses or even took them away from predators.16

16

Later forms (Heidelbergians?) began to hunt themselves.

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What invisible accumulation occurred during about 2.7 to 1.6 mya that prepared this breakthrough? Given the theoretical hypothesis formulated above, the answer is that egalitarian coalitions established a reliable normative order. Hominins established and transmitted in generations rules of behavior as the basis of this order by special normative rituals as a significant kind of interactive rituals. There is a vast spectrum from solemn public ceremonies to encouraging smiles and censuring sneers in personal communication, e.g., in parenting, teaching a child to pronounce words correctly. All joint emotionally impressive actions producing and supporting attitudes and correspondent abilities of participants have the status of normative rituals. At the initial stages of these practices, there was no articulate language or consciousness, only joint expressions of rejection of “wrong” unacceptable actions and expressions of support, approval of the “right” ones. Of course, these reactions also included sounds, but usually with vivid facial expressions and gestures. They expressed anger, threat, contempt in some cases, and support, acceptance, and sympathy in others. It is reasonable to call these reactions normative signals. In terms of their exterior performance, they practically did not differ from the rejection and acceptance signals in other primates. However, there were substantial differences: 1. Joint expression of shared emotions 2. The collective ability and readiness to either punish or welcome a tribe member for his/her actions in a joint manner 3. Efficiency of such external coordinated influence on psyche and behavior of each participant with the formation of corresponding attitudes of “rightness” of some actions and “wrongness” of others 4. Ability to transfer such requirements to other social actions, manipulations with their designation by standard signals (sounds, gestures, pantomime) People rarely speak norms themselves openly. Rules are mainly “taken for granted” (as ethnomethodologists have demonstrated). However, norms have created a new niche for the socially acceptable and unacceptable. In this environment, to achieve something and not become an outcast, it was necessary to talk with others and understand them. Table 4.1 is a record of our reasoning results in a compact and illustrative form. Let us turn to the popular thesis about the redundancy, the biological paradox of the very existence of language. Why would selection favor a more specific system of reference than currently exists in animals? What advantage can a communicator gain from the ability to briefly describe events in the world to somebody who also experiences them? If significant situations have potential biological value, why do people spend most of their time telling their genetic competitors about them? (Dessalles, 2007, p. 337). The first answer is given here concerning the most ancient hominins: along with normativity and norms comes the concern to express one’s attitude to the behavior of one’s fellow tribesmen as conforming to or violating the rules. Many other typical challenges and concerns, requiring utterances of varying character and precision statements, will be discussed further. However, the normative significance of

Time, prominent representatives, technology, brain volume 7–2.5 mya. Australopithecius. Low-level scavengers and gatherers. First, implements ca. 3.3 mya, then absence up to 2.7 mya. Brain to 460– 515 cm3

New material practices, techno-natural niches, and social orders Joint defense against predators and the fight against rival scavengers. Stands of mothers with children and daily expeditions of adults in search of food. The delivery of prey to the camps and sharing. Stoning niche rivals and external enemies

New regulatory and communicative concerns Preventing intragroup violence. Formation of coalitions to deal with aggressive loners (alpha males). Protecting women from sexual violence. Feeding those left behind in the parking lot. Demands to share the prey. Expressions of general anger, threat, or general approval of actions or situations. Attempts to communicate where food has been found Practices of (pre)rituals and communication Joint expression by gestures, postures, facial expressions, sounds of disapprovalthreatening, and approvalencouragement of the actions of group members. The beginning of the transformation of pre-rituals in dyadic interaction into normative rituals, through which the coalition expresses standard requirements and situationally controls the behavior of everyone. Calls, mobilization of tribe members for food, fighting off rivals (recruiting) Types of signs Syncretic signals. Growth of differentiation of sound form of common emotional reaction to different actions of tribe members, to situations or objects, causing approval, disapprovalprohibition, threat, interest. Probable differentiation of signals expressing the detection of distinct types of prey, diverse ways of its extraction, associated dangers

New structures and abilities

Table 4.1 Niches, orders, concerns, and structures: from Ardipithecus to Habilises Cognitive capabilities and regulatory attitudes The emergence of joint intentionality, retention of collective attention on emotionally significant situations. The beginnings of normative attitudes as internal regulators of behavior: What tribe members should do and what should not do in various circumstances, considering the (un)approval of others

4.21 Were the Early Homo the First to Establish Rules of Behavior? 117

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situations and actions as their direct or at least indirect connection to the rules accepted in the community remains immutable; it remains fundamental throughout the entire prehistory and history of humans.

4.22

A Simultaneous Breakthrough in the Three Spheres of Sapiency

Emotionally intense rituals of approval and censure with joint intentionality and collective synchronous sound signals became the communicative and cognitive “germ” of developing the most crucial magic wands: normativity, speech (with a growing language behind it), and the capacity for consciousness. Actually, in the rituals of expressing general disapproval of someone’s actions (say, aggressive ones), hominins formed individual abilities to focus long attention on an object together with others and to attract the attention of others, including indications of the thing and the sounds that became associated with it. This was the first step from reactive awareness, which animals have, to consciousness, which only humans obtain. Simultaneously, the ability to distinguish general rules of (un)approval, to recognize others’ and one’s actions falling under them, was developing. Differentiated sound signals and later the first articulated protowords supported this ability. The coalition members repeated the sound pattern many times in unison during the normative rituals, which contributed to memorizing the protowords (see Chap. 6 for more on these rituals). This was the first, extremely significant breakthrough to sapiency, which included a whole complex of newly acquired structures (Fig. 4.6): From Early Homo to the Erectuses

Sapientation in aspects of social and cognitive evolution From Australopithecus to Early Homo

Reinforcing normativity, i.e., rituals of group control, the transmission of norms to new generations

The Erectuses The niche of hunters

The niche of gatherers and higher scavengers. Initial hunting practices The formation of egalitarian coalitions and their struggle for dominance. Concerns to ensure cohesion. Joint emotional syncretic signals of dissatisfaction with aggressive behavior. Coalitions' attempts to discourage intragroup violence and coerce the sharing of the spoils The niche of gatherers and inferior scavengers

The beginning of overcoming the language Rubicon (see Chaps. 5-6)

Lethal implements. Targeted throwing, stoning. The transition of dominance to egalitarian coalitions. Syncretic signals as collective demands and threats were sprouts of the first protowords

Coming down to earth, bipedalism, developing a new niche 8–7 mya

Direction of time 2,7–2,5 mya

1,6 mya

Fig. 4.6 Conditional scheme of the first stages of social and cognitive evolution in anthropogenesis. Bold segments denote glotto-aromorphoses, or formative, innovative periods. Thin segments indicate cumulative periods in which the acquired support structures expanded

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• Normative rituals and normative attitudes in social relations and orders (in the nascent institutions), the ability to mark, distinguish, and recognize belonging of things (e.g., valuable implements) to tribe members, appropriate rules of access to them; the transfer of rules of belonging to relations between individuals and the recognition of proper limiting rules of sexual access • Joint intentionality, arbitrary direction, and retention of attention (in the developing consciousness) • Protowords with the potential of their multiplication and distinction (in nascent articulate speech and language) The importance of anatomical and psychophysiological changes is not in doubt, but they are not the driving force behind cognitive evolution. Moreover, none of the traditional versions of the springboard (see Chap. 1) seem sufficient. At the same time, the relevant phenomena have participated in different ways in the breakthrough to speech and therefore deserve serious discussion.

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Chapter 5

Crossing the Language Rubicon: From Signal Multiplication to Distinguishing Protowords

5.1

Grooming and Joint Vocalization as Rituals of Solidarity

A common version belongs to Robin Dunbar (1996), who linked the hypothetical transition from grooming to speech to the growth of the number of individuals with whom hominins could establish relationships and the corresponding growth of the brain. This version is rather primitive and inconclusive, but it has a rational basis. Grooming is indeed similar to “chitchat,” “small talk about nothing” as a ritual that strengthens bonds of friendliness and solidarity. Wolfgang Wildgen (2012) attributes the transition of early hominins from predominantly tactile communication (primarily grooming) to predominantly sonic communication not to the group increase (as in Dunbar) but to the loss of fur. The latter morphological change was probably an adaptation to long movements under the African sun: searching for food and later chasing game while hunting. A naked body with sweating became evolutionarily “more advantageous” than a thick coat. Thus, according to Wildgen, grooming lost its importance and sound communication became dominant in solidarity and controlling behavior (Fig. 5.1). Note that grooming is mainly a means of establishing and maintaining relationships of solidarity. It is no coincidence that Wildgen himself, in the explanation of his scheme, writes about “social control.” In other words, he implies regulation and normativity, for which vocal signals such as growl, shout, squeal, and whoosh can express rejection, threat, and demand to stop the action. These signals do not fit into solidarity relations in any way. Therefore, we should supplement the normativity factor to the Wildgen scheme (Fig. 5.2). The reader can evaluate from reading this and the following chapters which factor had a more substantial influence on the emergence of speech and language: the loss of our ancestors’ fur or the emergence of normativity. The progenitor of the speech-origin version from more ancient singing is none other than Charles Darwin himself in his so-called “Caruso” theory: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_5

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Body contact (e.g., grooming)

Sound (social) communication (including vocal imitation and learning)

Audio contact (shouts, screams)

Fig. 5.1 The shift in favor of sound communication as the primary social control technique due to the loss of fur (according to (Wildgen, 2012, p. 363)). Here and in Figs. 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, the solid arrows denote the generation of some phenomena by others (in the evolutionary sense), and the dashed arrows indicate the weakening or dying out of this connection

Body contact (e.g., grooming)

Collective signals of approval/disturbance

Situations of collective acceptance/disagreement

Sound (social) communication (including vocal imitation and learning)

Normativity

Concerns of pacification in the group and the obligation of sharing the spoils Fig. 5.2 The shift in favor of sound communication as a consequence of normativity emergence

All these facts with respect to music and impassioned speech become intelligible to a certain extent, if we may assume that musical tones and rhythm were used by our half-human ancestors, during the season of courtship, when animals of all kinds are excited not only by love, but by the strong passions of jealousy, rivalry, and triumph. From the deeply-laid principle of inherited associations, musical notes in this case would be likely to call up vaguely and indefinitely the strong emotions of a long-past age. As we have every reason to suppose that articulate speech is one of the latest, as it certainly is the highest, of the arts acquired by man, and as the instinctive power of producing musical notes and rhythms is developed low down in the animal series, it would be altogether opposed to the principle of evolution, if we were to admit that man’s musical capacity has been developed from the tones used in impassioned speech. We must suppose that the rhythms and cadences or oratory are derived from previously developed musical powers. We can thus understand how it is that music, dancing, song, and poetry are such very ancient arts. We must go even further than this, and, as remarked in a former chapter, believe that musical sounds afforded one of the bases for the development of language (Darwin, 1872/2004, p. 638).

For a long time, the idea of the origin of language from singing (“tra-la-la-la”) was the subject of ridicule along with many other concepts such as “woof-woof”

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(from imitation of animal sounds), “puh-puh” (from emotional interjections), and “hey-uh” (as a means of coordination of labor activities). However, in recent decades Darwin’s idea has been developed in many works on glottogenesis. Thus, R. Burling (2005) quite reasonably connects the development of the ability to sing beautifully and participate “correctly” in common recitative and similar actions with the transformation of the larynx due to an extended sexual selection. This process probably began long before the first full-fledged words, clear speech, and was in complete agreement with the principle of cultural drive serving as the anatomical and psychophysiological foundation for the abilities to articulate clearly. It is entirely plausible that at successful prey, our distant ancestors' contentment and general joy from delicious food, satiation, an influx of good mood, and friendliness poured out into rhythmic swaying with embraces, into a certain kind of public dancing. At the same time, young boys and girls expressed their feelings in movement, drawing erotic attention to themselves. Such practices, desires, and concerns were undoubtedly more ancient than any language. Joint festivities have gone nowhere throughout known human history and remain with us today as various rituals for establishing and maintaining solidarity. Let us pay attention to Darwin’s insightful point on the importance of strong common emotions and unifying rhythmicity. These are the principal factors of successful interactive rituals of solidarity (Collins, 2004). Rhythmic joint singing of habitual melodies and collective cries of different characters could express conciliation, general contentment, and the united male readiness to defend the group, corral and kill the game, and fight with strangers. The undoubted emotional significance of such rituals was associated with strengthening group solidarity and sexual selection. Those who sang more beautifully and “properly” occupied the center of the group’s attention and won in the erotic marketplace and correspondent reproductive sphere. These processes led to the growth of shared habits of collective vocalization and the spread of genes from the most vocally talented individuals. Darwin himself, speaking of the significance of singing for language development, was not referring to shared meals but to courtship and seduction. There is, of course, no contradiction here. In contrast, practices that enhance social position in the public are carried over quite naturally into the sphere of erotic communication. Individuals who achieve public success through self-presentation will then use these skills to attract partners on the seduction front. However, the main feature of speech is the transmission of meaningful messages. Therefore, we need to explain this very point, for which versions of grooming, singing, or facial expressions are not suitable.

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Did Gesticulation, “Mirror Neurons,” and Neural Overlap Breakthrough to Speech?

A modern version of the origin of speech from gesticulation has an essential reason: It is easier for apes to transmit messages by gestures. This is because their larynx cannot articulate recognized phonemes (M. Corballis, M. Tomasello, M. Arbib, et al.). The gesticulation version attracted more attention after discovering the “mirror neurons” effect. Brain excitation patterns between the chimpanzee that grabs something with its hand and the chimp that sees this grab are completely similar. M. Arbib (2005) distinguishes the following stages of speech development: 1. Grasping objects with the hands 2. Mirror system for grasping, inherent in the common ancestors of humans and apes, i.e., when one sees the other grasping, the same state of neurons appears in the brain of the former as in his grasping 3. Imitation of actions in the common ancestors of humans and chimpanzees 4. A complex system of imitations of different actions and gestures 5. Protosigns as a system of communication using gestures with an open vocabulary 6. Proto-recognition, in which this mechanism operates 7. Coevolution of cognitive and linguistic complexes through action-object frames to verb structures, to sentences with syntax and semantics The last four stages already distinguish the hominin lineage from the great apes. There is no doubt that initially all means, including gestures, body movements, facial expressions, and sounds, were used to communicate something. However, neither data nor convincing theoretical arguments favor the version of the blossoming and withering of the hominin gestural language. Adam Kendon presented a cogent critique of the “gesture-first” theory (Kendon, 2017). For me, the following argument is sufficient to reject this theory. The larynx of our common ancestors with the anthropoids did not fit the articulation of human speech. The approximation of the Heidelbergians’ larynx to the human one around 400 kya indicates its long previous(!) evolution, which could only have occurred through the systematic attempts of multiple generations of ancestors to articulate. The principles of cultural drive, gene-culture coevolution, and the Baldwin effect (see Chap. 2) here point to a very long history of articulation, without which Heidelbergians could not have obtained a nearly human larynx. Since our common ancestors with the anthropoids always used vocal cues along with gestures, there is nothing to suggest that the hominins of subsequent generations suddenly have abandoned this channel of communication. Gestures were in hominins and still are in humans an additional means of expression, but no more than that. However, it can be possible that gestures dominated for some time in the syncretic communication system of our common ancestors with chimpanzee. However, in the initial stages of glottogenesis, hominins

5.2

Did Gesticulation, “Mirror Neurons,” and Neural Overlap Breakthrough. . .

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began to develop vocalization as a dominant medium that provided communicative concerns in many aspects better than other channels. We have already spoken above about the reasons for the predominant development of vocal communication. W. Wildgen (2012) also gives a sensible explanation for the shift from pointing gestures (with the hands or direction of gaze) to sound indications, which in his version occurred 2 mya. ... The rich system of gestural signals was, therefore, functionally parallel to a poorer system of calls. If we take the gestures of the hand, it is clear that as soon as hands are fully occupied with other functions like carrying tools and objects, or if communication takes place in the dark or at a distance (with obstacles between), the gestural “language” is ineffective. As such circumstances probably prevailed in the ecology of the australopithecines that lived in the savannah and as the ear had to increase its capacity of discrimination due to the permanent danger of carnivores in the environment, the bimodality between reference by gesture and reference by phonic articulation shifted towards the latter (Wildgen, 2012, p. 364).

The discovery of “mirror neurons” retains its significance. Although the patterns of neuronal excitations during the pronunciation of a word or phrase in the speaker and the understander are much more challenging to identify, one can hardly doubt their structural similarity. . . .Lesions of Broca’s area in deaf signers induce a form of aphasia akin to the effect on spoken language of those with normal hearing, then led to the hypothesis that mirror neurons might be at the heart of language parity (that the hearer can often get the meaning of the speaker via a system that has a mirror mechanism for gestures at its core), and that manual gestures may have led vocal gestures in the evolution of the language-ready brain (Arbib, 2017 p. 143).

L. Gabora and C. Smith (2018) explain that the cognitive breakthrough of hominins in comparison to animals refers to the mechanism of overlapping of memorized qualities in the corresponding neural ensembles, which according to their version becomes possible due to an increase in brain volume. In these terms, they interpret the adaptive interaction of hominins with the natural environment, citing the following version of the invention of spear and arrowheads: . . .the experience of being accidentally punctured by a thorn could potentially play a role in the invention of an arrowhead is that both the thorn wound and hunting experiences involve overlap in the set of relevant attributes (i.e., ‘pointed’, ‘flesh’, ‘tear’), and thus overlap of activated cell assemblies (Gabora & Smith, 2018, p. 5).

Consider that similar “overlapping” and imitation actions are also available to chimpanzees, albeit at a lower stage of development. It remains a mystery why this ability led only hominins to the emergence of speech and consciousness. Did brain growth lead to a cognitive breakthrough? Or did social interaction concerns become provided by cognitive structures (primarily related to behavioral attitudes, communicative abilities, and memory), which conditioned brain growth with new neural overlap capabilities? According to modern views, brain growth as a phenotypic manifestation of gene changes occurred not as a result of the selection of random mutations. According to the cultural drive mechanism, new behavior structures led to the development of the correspondent innate assignments during the change of generations (see Chap. 2).

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Imitating behavior by trial and error (strategy of "hard work") Imitation and learning (stealing strategy)

Creating cultures through the accumulation of learned behavior

Fig. 5.3 New use of “mirror neurons” by hominins in Wildgen's version (Wildgen, 2012, p. 366)

New abilities that gave prestige and attractiveness to individuals in their social, erotic competition and groups in their interaction with the natural environment, with competing groups, emerged and strengthened (Chaps. 3 and 4). The trend toward the development of these assignments, especially memory in the initial stages, led evolutionarily to an increase in the number of neurons, correspondingly an increase in brain volume. As a result, the possibilities of neuronal overlap also grew. Wildgen (2012) rightly attributes the appearance of “mirror neurons” to the epoch of common ancestors of hominins and chimpanzees. He describes the later bifurcation as follows. Anthropoids can imitate the actions of their congeners (e.g., crack nuts with a “hammer” stone and an “anvil” stone), but only when they immediately receive positive reinforcement of their new skill.1 Humans, on the other hand, are embracing a more general strategy of imitation and learning, which allows the acquisition of know-how and even symbolic knowledge from others without any immediate pragmatic support (Wildgen, 2012, p. 365).

Wildgen wittily likens the anthropoid strategy to “toil” and the human strategy to “theft” in computer modeling. In his version, the transition to this stage of cognitive evolution looks as follows (Fig. 5.3). The transition to the new strategy, according to Wildgen, is entirely plausible. The only thing missing is an explanation: Why did it occur in hominins but not in anthropoids? When we add such phenomena as joint intentionality, interiorization, normative ritual (Chaps. 3 and 4), and the ritual of rephrasing and guessing (Chap. 6) the scheme becomes as follows (Fig. 5.4). Bart de Boer (2017) formulated a version of multiple processes coevolution that seems to be much more plausible than any specific springboard hypothesis. I also do not think the evidence indicates transitions from radically different precursors, such as musical or gestural systems. Rather, the evidence reviewed here indicates a much more gradual process of coevolution between cognition and anatomy; between vocalizations, gestures, and communicative abilities; and between culture and biology, linked through

1

The Kanzi bonobo has learned to split stone with a stone quite well, obtaining a "chopper" with a sharp edge. However, it is significant that (1) Kanzi did this because of his long association with humans, the reward for him being verbal encouragement from the experimenter; (2) Kanzi did not make a “tool” himself for his purposes, he did not keep it successfully, and he did not teach this skill to other apes; (3) Kanzi is an exceptional phenomenon among anthropoids.

5.3

Tools, Speech, and Stages of Their Mutual Conditioning

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"Mirror Neurons"

Anthropoids: imitating behavior by trial and error (hard work strategy) People: ability to create and intergenerational transmission of cultural patterns based on symbolization

Hominins: imitation and learning = individuals' mastery of patterns fixed by sound signs and their meanings

The mechanism of interiorization

Normative rituals including collective repetition of successful sound formulas

Sound designation: symbolization, reinterpretation

Communicative concerns

Fundamental concerns in new niches and social orders

Group concerns for social behavioral control

Fig. 5.4 Explaining the emergence of culture (intergenerational translation of patterns based on symbolization) with the help of “mirror neurons” self-organization. It is true that this coevolutionary account does not propose a clear causal factor that may potentially tell us when language emerged precisely, but the complexity of multiple coevolving systems is something that the field of language evolution has been coming to terms with over the last few decades (de Boer, 2017, p. 161).

In any case, neither gestures nor neuronal processes can help to explain the origin of language as a system of phonetic, lexical, syntactic, and semantic structures.

5.3

Tools, Speech, and Stages of Their Mutual Conditioning

Of course, instrumental activity's steady, albeit uneven, progress is closely related to linguistic development and, more broadly, to cognitive evolution. However, the connection here is not direct, one-step, as if the plan for a future tool necessarily implied a symbolic capacity, a favorite idea of archaeologists. In the “labor” version (L. Noiret, L. Geiger, F. Engels, et al.), the production and complication of implements gave rise to the need to realize, signify, and imagine them; that is why speech appeared, which then became increasingly complex, articulate. Here, overcoming the language Rubicon coincides with the epochal connection of consciousness, signifying sounds, and practical activity. Then the mind, guided by the unity of labor and language, grew quite naturally and without obstacles. There are significant objections to accepting this simple version, however familiar it may be. Consider that apes diligently teach their offspring to use tools (to crack nuts, shells of mollusks with a stone and “anvil,” to poke an anthill with a straw to

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lick the juice), the reliable army method of “do as I do” is sufficient. This method could be suitable for learning to split rocks to obtain primitive choppers. . . . Our data support the hypothesis that a gene-culture coevolutionary dynamic between tool use and social transmission was on-going in human evolution, starting at least 2.5 mya and potentially continuing to the present. The simplicity and stasis of Oldowan technology are indicative of a limited form of social transmission, such as observational learning, that only allowed the transmission of the broadest concepts of stone knapping technology. Whatever its nature, this was sufficient to support limited transmission among individuals with prolonged contact, but insufficient to propagate innovations more rapidly than they were lost and would have contributed to stasis in the Oldowan technocomplex (Morgan et al., 2015, p. 6).

Apes use sounds, gestures, postures, and facial expressions in the social sphere to establish, maintain, and clarify relationships. However, it remains unclear why suddenly this channel of communication in early hominins began to be applied in training for making tools, immediately having started to develop toward articulation and meaningfulness. There are several arguments to the effect that toolmaking and verbal communication appeared, developed simultaneously, and are in close relationship. Both abilities could evolve only under certain social conditions and with a strong overlap of neural mechanisms that provided sensorimotor processes of skillful handwork and articulation (Iriki, 2005; Stout, 2005). . . .It may be acquisition of the necessary sensorimotor capabilities, rather than executive capacities for strategic planning, that represents the critical bottleneck in the initial development of complex tool use and tool making abilities. Because the acquisition of such sensorimotor capabilities clearly depends upon a combination of neural preconditions with motivated and effortful practice (Iriki, 2005), this conclusion raises questions about the social context necessary to support prolonged perceptual-motor skill acquisition in early hominin toolmakers (Stout, 2005) and provides some support for hypotheses emphasizing the cultural foundations of human technological capabilities (Stout & Chaminade, 2007, p. 1098).

Making more complex tools, beginning with Acheulian ones, requires verbal explanations, which researchers demonstrated by experiments (Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017, pp. 201–207). Besides, sound learning assumes the presence of specific innate potential and abilities connected to giving voice commands, their understanding and submission to them, with necessary and by no means the apparent connection of actions, qualities, attributes of used raw materials with the issued sounds. This connection requires long joint retention of attention on sounds and actions. What seems natural and straightforward to us, and what children grasp and absorb with impressive readiness, was by no means so at the dawn of human history. Many professional abilities, skills, and operations were required to make every Acheulian tool. Not every pebble can become a valuable tool (e.g., a sharp, durable spearhead), which means that a preliminary search for the material supplements labor. All this significantly increases the “use value” of the tool. According to the classical concept of technological springboard, the primary human cognitive abilities, including speech itself, emerged through “labor.” The

5.4

What Is Primary: Scavenger Recruitings or Normative Requirements?

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naive notion of a sole “Robinson Crusoe” who started out making tools and then, for planning more complex tools, developed his thinking and his language, is obsolete and not worthy of discussion. In each group of hominins, the temptation to take away a good thing was inevitable, and hence the potential for conflict grew. One could work long and hard on a valuable tool only when the master was sure that nobody had taken away the fruit of his labor. In other words, it was only possible when there were group norms, rules of belonging (archaic property, if you will), and social control over their observance. It was necessary to replenish the supply of raw materials, as the stone tools deteriorated and needed replacement. In other words, tool technology was initially not an individual affair, but a group practice with a sufficiently elevated level of solidarity, mutual understanding, and the ability to plan and coordinate joint actions. All this suggests a level of sign communication that already surpassed the syncretic signals of animals. The more complicated alternative version includes at least three mutual conditioning stages for instrumental activity and speech. In the first stage, primitive implements (choppers) became dangerous and lethal weapons in internecine conflicts, which intensified concerns about intragroup pacification. Over time, this gave significant evolutionary advantages to those groups of Early Homo that acquired normativity (see Chap. 4). In the second stage, hominins established rules of belonging through normative rituals with collective sound cues, including prohibitions against taking away others' tools by the right of force. Under these conditions, progress became possible in the stone technologies of Archanthropes, early Erectuses, of increasingly sophisticated and valuable implements, beginning with the Acheulian (Chap. 6). Only in the third stage did the concern of learning this skill, the transfer of knowledge about the necessary qualities, and the location of raw materials (along with other communicative concerns!) contribute to the complication of speech and language during the evolution of Erectuses to Heidelbergians, Protosapienses, and Neoanthropes (Chaps. 7 and 8).

5.4

What Is Primary: Scavenger Recruitings or Normative Requirements?

One of the most authoritative experts on the origin of language, D. Bickerton, offers the following version. As tools, fighting ability, and coordination evolved, hominins evolved from lower scavengers into higher, aggressive scavengers. If only our ancestors could come up with sufficient numbers, they could hold off the competitions by screaming and flinging stones while they butchered and consumed the carcass (Bickerton, 2009, p. 127).

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D. Bickerton (2009, pp. 175–185) believes that the first learned signals were the mobilizing calls of aggressive scavengers, alerts of their kin that an animal carcass lies in the distance and help is necessary to drive away competitors. Bickerton considers this recruitment to be the most functional because, in his opinion, there is nothing more important than the feeling of hunger. He proceeds from the “rational man” paradigm while correlating possible gains and losses. Bickerton copes with objections about possible lies and distrust since the veracity of the appeal is soon tested. Bickerton next argues for the particular importance of recruiting for the extraction of food, not only for the group but for the recruiter himself. One of the big problems facing any exchange of information is, why exchange any information at all? Why tell everyone something that might give them an advantage over you? Why not keep any useful information only for yourself, and exploit it for your own benefit? Exchanging information about the scavenging of megafauna is one case that overcomes this problem. If I don't tell others about the dead dinotherium, there’s no benefit. I can't exploit it for myself alone. I get the benefit only if I can persuade others to help me, and I can only get others to help me by giving them information. If we cooperate, we all gain; if not, we all lose (Bickerton, 2009, p. 166).

The importance of vocalization and its advantage over gestures in recruiting and scaring off competitors is obvious, so we should recognize the contribution of “low” scavenger practices to the “high” sphere of language origin. The comments to this version are as follows. Firstly, recruiting is by no means a prerogative of hominins and humans. Many social animals, including scavengers and predators, call their relatives to their prey by loud sounds. Thus, there is no specificity here. Bickerton does not explain why hominins began to develop language, and not their rivals. Second, in all his reconstructions of the social behavior of hominin scavengers, Bickerton implicitly assumes their solidarity, the order of peaceful interaction, and mutual support. The call not for food but for help and support is adequate to the extent that normative attitudes are strong with respect to joint food extraction. Bickerton’s version tacitly assumes that hominins did not fight among themselves for food after getting it. Somehow each of them did not try to carry it away to a secluded place to eat it themselves or give it to their cubs, as many predators, including chimpanzees, do after a successful hunt. Thus, Bickerton’s explanation already contains the premise of solidarity and normativity, which he does not explain. Recruiting was hardly just a dry functional signal followed by a self-serving group mobilization. Instead, it was a unique interactive ritual in hominins, or the beginning of a more extensive ritual combined with a productive practice: getting to food, taking it away from competitors, bringing it to the stay, sharing, and enjoying a shared meal. It is not easy to imagine the oldest recruiting without arousing a common emotion, focusing attention on the message and the goal, and without feelings of solidarity. Thus, the significance of recruiting is reinforced no longer by Bickerton's rational benefit-calculation explanation but by a ritualistic and normative explanation based on the emotions of solidarity, on the importance of already established coalitions and

5.5

Did Language Appear for Conspiracy and Proactive Aggression?

SECURITY AND STATUS CONCERNS

The dominance of an egalitarian coalition, not aggressive alpha males

The level of self-domestication

SUSTENANCE CONCERNS

Trying to achieve understanding with sounds: speech and language development

Normativity, prohibition of violence, compulsory sharing of food

The need to mobilize, to coordinate, to beat back carcasses from competitors, to hunt

Progress of tools for carcass cutting and hunting, level of proficiency in fire

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Order of access to food

Cooking and eating together

Laryngeal modification and speech motor training

Joint ritual vocalizations, practice of imitating sounds

Searching for food, hunting in the open space

Fig. 5.5 The dynamic relationship of factors related to fundamental concerns (security/status, sustenance), and their impact on the emergence and development of speech. All arrows denote positive, reinforcing relationships. The shaded blocks indicate factors directly related to the emergence and development of articulate speech

rules of group behavior (see Chap. 4). Thus, the very ancient mobilizing signals became differentiated in terms of articulation and recognition only when the level of solidarity and normativity was sufficient. Figure 5.5 shows the complex dynamic relationship of factors in the spheres of violence dominance and feeding.

5.5

Did Language Appear for Conspiracy and Proactive Aggression?

R. Wrangham (2019) offers a very exotic version of the origin of language, combining ideas of egalitarian coalition struggles with alpha males, concepts of recruiting, and “Machiavellian reason.” The objective need of the groups (in our terms, their permanent challenge, or concern) was to reduce the level of “hot” reactive aggression, which was precisely the sin of strong, ambitious males striving to the top of the hierarchy. According to Wrangham, weaker males united and plotted something like a conspiracy for this purpose. In their practices of already “cold” proactive aggression, they planned to win the battle against such antisocial robust males. However, the latter may have had allies in the group willing to fight on their side. The language was necessary, above all, for the conspirators to weave intrigues, to test the

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intentions of others, to persuade them to take their side, and, ideally, to facilitate consensus before launching an intended attack. There can hardly be any doubt that throughout human (pre)history, language has been used many times for this kind of purpose. But much later. Initially, egalitarian coalitions did not need language to achieve victory and total domination, as evidenced precisely by the social order in bonobo groups to which Wrangham himself constantly refers. Sophisticated cognitive abilities must already have been developed to conspire, think, and plan for a future attack. These abilities became possible only after passing through several stages of glottogenesis (see Chaps. 7 and 8). Coalitions of peaceful males and females could fight alpha males through “hot” reactive aggression, say, by remote collective stoning. They also used joint intensity, shared emotions, expressions of rejection, threats, and denial of sexual access (Chap. 4). Such initial versions of normative ritual did not need dick-speech. The acute need for speech came later, with the victory of the coalitions and the establishment of the normative order (Chap. 6).

5.6

The Teaching of Children and Social Control of the Speech “Correctness”

Thanks to the work of L. Vygotsky, it has become clear what a significant role interaction with adults plays in a child’s cognitive development. Thus, even though the feminist emphasis on the origin of language from communication between child and mother, women’s joint education of children (Hrdy, 1999) seems one-sided; the importance of social learning is undoubtful. The transmission of patterns from adults to children was and remains the basis of cultural transmission. Patterns here gradually lose the optional behavioral “additives” peculiar to a particular generation. Through the intergenerational transmission of stable patterns of sound signals, the latter became autonomous from facial expressions and gestures. The traits of reliable cultural reproducibility and autonomy from extraverbal components gave sound signals the status of protowords. Let us note the presence of all components of interactive ritual in each interaction between an adult and a child mastering speech: a common focus of attention (on what the child does and pronounces), emotions of solidarity, explicit expressions of support from elders, approval at correct pronunciation, instant corrections at a mistake, attempts of the child to correct articulation, and again positive reinforcement at success. The bonds of solidarity and joy of inclusion in rituals of the general success of mutual understanding were and remain a powerful motive for mastering a sign system new to the child, and with it the complete set of behavioral norms. The transition of hominins to articulate speech and its maintenance across generations was possible only thanks to social control of the “correctness” of pronunciation, the use of protowords, and subsequent more complex constructions.

Sexuality in Hominin Groups: The Cauldron of Passion and the Concerns. . .

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It was the same normative ritual, only now aimed at the standardization of speech actions, while the sanctions (negative reinforcement) were mockery as offensive signs of lowering the speaker’s status. On the other hand, smiles, non-verbal expressions of acceptance, approval, and friendliness were positive reinforcement. At the transition stage to articulate speech, this control with everyday normative micro-rituals was especially significant, as it provided so acute hominins’ concern of mutual understanding. Along with children’s social learning, K. Laland (2017, pp. 264–282) emphasizes the need for speech explanations when effectively copying complex operations. Each such lesson in making sharp, durable, comfortable tools has a ritual structure. The same is true for explaining where potential food exists, how and when to get it, cook it, and how to light and keep the fire. The shared emotional basis for it is solidarity, joint concentration on the situation, the correctness of actions, the corresponding sound cues, the desire to understand them, the indispensable joy of the teacher and the student when the task is finally understood, and well done.

5.7

Sexuality in Hominin Groups: The Cauldron of Passion and the Concerns of Ordering

Terence Deacon (1997) rightly pointed out the inherent contradictory and fragile social order of hunter-gatherers. Indeed, let us relate the following points: group life, sexual division of labor in which only adult males harvest the most valuable prey, the need to share food (the only instinct in this area: mothers feed their children), the forced long-term care of children, some kind of restrictions in sexual access, always fraught with tension. Males hunting in the savanna cannot be sure that other males are not mating with someone else’s spouses at the same time. Mothers cannot reliably protect their babies from infanticide by extraneous males. They may also suspect that their feeders are not bringing meat because they have already given it to their mates or girlfriends. When a group lives together, hunting, foraging, sex ties, competition in the area, and caring for children constantly create a risk of acute conflict. Jordan Zlatev (2014) articulates the unusual features of the living conditions of our distant ancestors: (a) social groups with multiple males and females (for protection and group hunting), (b) immature infants with slow-maturing brains (partly because of bipedalism) requiring, (c) essential (for survival) maternal care and paternal provision. Together these conditions constituted the "evolutionary bottleneck" in which only the groups that entered into some kind of "sexual contract"—a contract requiring symbolic designation of social rights and obligations of sexual partners survived (Zlatev, 2014, pp. 255–256).

According to T. Deacon, the fragility of this structure and the difficulty of choosing a reliable partner and of maintaining stable relations of “mutual altruism” both in the family and in the group led to the need for a special system of

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communication, speech. This logic is plausible, but Deacon, Lovejoy, and others attach too much importance to the assertion of monogamy, while its universality in that era and later is highly questionable (Ryan & Jethá, 2010). The group concern of sexual access ordering has always been quite acute, but monogamy is only one support structure among a considerable variety of other normative and permissible relations. J. Turner and R. Machalek (2018) point out a remarkable feature of the human brain in comparison to the brains of large apes: the area responsible for sexual pleasure in humans is much larger. The authors explain this with the rejection of the harem pattern and the emergence of new diverse and meaningful emotions of affection, attraction, and love between sexual partners. . . . the subcortical area of the mammalian brain dedicated to the pleasurable sexual feelings in mammals—the septum and septal area—is over twice as big, controlling for body size, among humans compared to highly sexed and promiscuous chimpanzees. Why would this bilateral organ need to be twice as big? It cannot be to enhance sexual pleasure since chimpanzees clearly derive that from their smaller septum. The answer may be that with increased selection on the tail favoring larger size of the normal distribution of the septum across a population, new emotions associated with sex were activated in those with a larger septum—emotions such as attachment, even love, or other emotions that would increase the bonds between sexual partners. Otherwise, it is hard to see how selection could overcome the obstacle presented by promiscuity, which is still an obstacle in sustaining stable nuclear families among humans today (Turner & Machalek, 2018, p. 316).

The explanation through the abandonment of the harem pattern and the emergence of new emotions can hardly be considered sufficient for the argument about ancient monogamy. Let us leave aside the unclear questions of the existence of the harem pattern in hominins and the prevalence and dating of this phenomenon. In any case, the main problem is the mysterious driving force, i.e., the evolutionary mechanism of selection that led both the sexual, erotic emotions and the corresponding parts of our ancestors’ brains to such an impressive feature. Let us consider the physiological and morphological changes that took place at the initial stages (most likely, even before the appearance of Early Homo): the loss of fur, concealment of ovulation, year-round readiness of females for sex, their external charms not covered by any clothes and causing quite instinctive desires of suitors. After the transition from dominance to egalitarian coalitions, only the establishment of nonviolent norms of sexual access has mitigated conflicts and overcome the fragility of group relations. Through rather strict rules, dominant group coalitions protected girls and women from sexual violence. This new social order greatly strengthened individual concerns: attracting a partner and gaining sexual access to him/her. According to the new group norms, such access was only possible if the desired partner was also willing to copulate. Knowing the behavior of apes, we can assume that hominin courtship practices from ancient times included facial expressions, intonations, smiles, laughter, rhythmic movements, gentle bodily touches, hugs, or attempts to embrace (all this behavioral arsenal is still relevant today). It would be strange if hominins, having

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Sexuality in Hominin Groups: The Cauldron of Passion and the Concerns. . .

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GENDER RELATIONS

VIOLENCE/SECURITY Voluntariness of sex Regulatory prohibition of intra-group violence and coerced sex

Prestige in the group - the level of social membership

Personal level of ability to speak clearly, persuasively, to sing

Erotic competition and the difficulty of establishing relationships

The erotic appeal of having a clear, beautiful speech, ability to sing

Speech ability. Level of language development

Trying coquetry, seduction with a beautiful speech or singing

Striving to have relationships with attractive suitors, to have children by them. Attempts to attract and retain fathers

PARENTHOOD

Fig. 5.6 Dynamic relationship between the parameters of speech ability, gender relations, and parenthood. All arrows mean positive (strengthening) connections. The shaded blocks represent the factors directly connected with the emergence and development of articulate speech

reached the first stages of articulate speech (proto-speech and protophrase), did not try to apply them in courtship practices as erotic rituals of seduction. As a result of numerous behavioral attempts and multilevel selection (see Chap. 2), specific structures emerged to provide these new acute individual concerns. Various courtship and seduction practices emerged and evolved, but no single strategy guaranteed reliable success. The inevitable anxieties, ups and downs, hopes and disappointments multiplied the intensity of feelings, the emotional value of relationships, and the motivation for sexual access in hominins. An “outside-in” causal link has been triggered, from external social practices to internal mental structures. In addition, we see here the powerful role of normativity and interactive rituals, which eventually gave rise to new concerns, practices, attitudes, and abilities as specific features of human sexuality: sensual attraction, coquetry, seduction, erotic feelings and affections, love (Rozov, 2022). Humans acquired this unique characteristic that distinguishes us (along with “higher” traits of intelligence) from all other animal species, including great apes. Consequently, the hypertrophy of the part of our brain responsible for erotic and sexual feelings should come as no surprise. Thanks to the norm of sharing, females could demand from their partners food and protection for themselves and their children. In addition, the cavaliers could appeal to the group to protect their girlfriends and daughters from unwanted encroachments, to punish the abusers. The contours of positive feedback began to form (Fig. 5.6).

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Animal Signals and Hominins’ Protowords

Is it possible to draw a clear boundary between a differentiated sound signal and a protoword, and at what period was this boundary crossed? Questions of this kind are difficult, which is characteristic of considering any evolutionary change. The epochal breakthrough from signals to protowords was a long, complicated, and multistage evolutionary process. The general principles of the development of structures providing for the multiplication of concerns allow us to present the general logic of this evolution. Animals learn signals due to their innate inclinations. For example, a baby monkey recognizes the “dangerous snake on the ground” signal through training, imitation, “experience transfer,” not through genes and instincts. However, some signals (e.g., threatening or inviting, beckoning) are quite instinctive and work like a biological “key and lock.” Of course, ancient hominins had similar differentiated signals of both types, both learned and innate. The best candidates for the status of ingredients (“pre-adaptations”) for protowords as support structures are the learned in-group signals. Thus, Burling (2005, p.132) suggests that protowords emerged from local group signals that early hominins learned, changed, and expanded in their meanings. This reasonable argument supports the version about the birth of protowords and further stages of language development from normative group rituals with repeated trials and repetitions of sounds, positive emotional reinforcements when reaching mutual understanding and agreement. How could it happen? For a long time, sounds still were syncretic signals, outwardly similar to animal signals with rather clear meaning (“dangerous predator in the sky,” “dangerous predator in a tree,” “dangerous snake on the ground”), causing different and quite adequate reactions (see Chap. 4). However, due to joint intentionality, hominins uttered them collectively. The simultaneous joint focusing on a subject and correspondent sound allowed to correct each other, make new vocal attempts, agree with “proper” sound, “proper” designation, and finally repeat joyfully the common resulting sound. Presume that the hypothesis about the close connection of joint intentionality, normativity, and the ability to create new signs is correct. In this case, further development, namely the multiplication of sound signs, is related to jointly disapproved (trauma, pain, loss of prey, dangerous beast, inedible fruit, crying child) and approved (tasty food, rich prey, satisfied child) situations. The disapproval, the threat from the coalition at undesirable behavior of the tribesman, was expressed by a common syncretic reaction with the meaning “bad-improper-dangerous-stop!” Again, it was natural to express one’s approval with the usual response with the purpose “good-pleasant-right-friendly!” to the intention of sharing food, peacefully resolving a conflict, protecting the weak. The multiplication of concerns to denote new objects or actions (see Chap. 6) began to be provided by the magic wand of making new syllables from already known ones by changing phonemes, and gluing syllables into new protowords (see

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The Cultural Drive of the Breakthrough to Speech: From Concerns to Structures

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below the linguistic aspects). The protowords continued to multiply as structures denoting something important for mutual understanding, and the hominins transmitted them effectively from generation to generation.

5.9

The Cultural Drive of the Breakthrough to Speech: From Concerns to Structures

The emergence of articulate speech should be explained through several stages of the emergence of diverse structures in response to the naturally emerging new concerns (see Chap. 4): • Concerns of survival in a dangerous environment—collective practices of defense against predators, rallying. • Concerns of sustenance in distant places of food extraction—practices of expeditions and sharing of prey. • Group concerns to pacify intragroup interactions—egalitarian coalitions and practices (pre-rituals) of collective violence and intimidation against aggressive loners; at the same time, joint intentionality and ability to synchronous behavior through imitation were formed, which as a result of multilevel selection led to self-domestication. • Concerns of establishing and maintaining order in the group, tasks of signaling general dissatisfaction with individual behavior or approval—uniform sound signals uttered in unison; appropriate training and self-training, folding of normative rituals (common focus of attention plus recognizable sounds signifying approval or disapproval of someone's action, behavior). • Individual concerns to be included in a group, to conform to its orders—interiorization of typical, regular requirements (appearing rules, norms) through reinforcements (signals from others) as internal regulatory settings. Due to the consideration of the concepts discussed above, we can add additional links to this conceptual framework: • Group concerns of regulating the behavior of younger generations, learning rituals (pronunciation of sounds with gesture explanations, requirements to pronounce these sounds correctly, corrections of pronunciation) • Group concerns for creation of general mood for collective actions, rituals of mobilization for hunting, defense, war, expedition to gather food, make stay, make weapons, procure raw material for them, keep fire • Concerns of involvement in recreational activities, rituals of solidarity communication (attunement to a joint meal, game, fun, erotic, and sexual touch) • Group concerns of understanding (demands, appeals, prohibitions, messages, complaints)—rituals of rephrasing and guessing (see Chap. 6 for details)

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“Need for Something that Does Not Exist”: The Paradox and Its Resolution

Having discussed Marxist ideas about the origin of language, Oleg A. Donskikh (1984) formulated the following theoretical paradox: In phylogenetic terms, there is a contradiction: language arises from the need, while the need for language emerges in the process of life of people who do not possess language. However, one cannot feel a need for something that never existed (Donskikh, 1984, p. 111).

Of course, hominins needed to communicate (many mammals and birds living in groups and families have the same need), but they did not need articulate speech and language, which did not yet exist and about which there could be no idea. The concept of conjugate and spiral development of concerns and structures resolves this difficulty. In the beginning, hominins had basic needs common to other social animals in the areas of security, sustenance, sexuality, parenthood, and group status (Chap. 3). According to the specifics of intragroup life, hominins developed much more differentiated social interactions, relations, correspondent derivative concerns, and support structures. Thus, for safety (from each other in the group) and for nutrition (when it is necessary to stick together and food is far away and in various places), they consistently began to develop specific relations and practices: the dominance of egalitarian coalitions, joint intentionality, normativity (Chap. 4). Furthermore, new communicative concerns emerged in this new social order: the need to convey increasingly differentiated messages, demands, appeals, and complaints. The “Rubicon” was crossed precisely in connection with the increasing process of hominins’ identification of the utterances’ meanings through the distinction of sounds. At the same time, attempts to articulate, recognize, and memorize them for the next rounds of communication continued, since the content of these meanings was of the utmost importance for hominins’ lives, social security, and comfort. As a component of the complex ritual structure (normative, mobilizing, solidarizing), sound signals proved to be highly flexible ingredients with potentially limitless possibilities of modifying and producing meanings. By distinguishing and combining signals, protosyllables, syllables, protowords, and later composing them into more complex language structures, hominins gradually provided communicative concerns that emerged in conjunction with the development of social relations and orders. At the ultramicro-level, the hard-won intragroup peaceful and relatively egalitarian order led to challenges, permanent difficulties, and failures of mutual understanding. This new “biocultural niche” (Dor et al., 2014) gave rise to a new communicative and status environment that became not less essential and tense for hominins than their everyday clashes with nature. Severe group selection took place. Cohesive, coordinated groups quickly learned new skills, preserved and effectively transmitted them to younger generations, survived, displaced opponents, and multiplied. These were the groups whose members learned to pronounce words more clearly and better understand each other. Therefore, other things being equal, such groups gained an evolutionary advantage (Fig. 5.7). They prevailed in conflicts with competitive groups because of their

5.11

Linguistic Interlude I: Formation of Phonetic Systems

Challenges: to report what we see, to urge, to persuade, to reach agreement in an egalitarian coalition

Prospective responses: joint attempts at mutual understanding: repetition and modification of sound signals. Positive reinforcement by understanding and agreement

Tensions and challenges-threats: failures of understanding

Unsuccessful responses: reproduction of dominance stereotypes through threats and violence; sexual selection through physical strength and aggressiveness; communication only through a limited set of sounds, gestures, facial expressions; therefore, no progress development of the neocortex, larynx, and speech prerequisites in the genome

Magic wands: the ability to focus group attention on faces, actions, situations; changing signals and obtaining new ones: protosyllables; distinguishing protosyllables, then syllables through more or less stable set of phonemes; laryngeal articulatory apparatus, temporal lobes of the neocortex

Causes for losing to other groups: mutual alienation and constant conflict in the group cause weakness or lack of coordination; inability to plan joint actions, to collectively use individual findings

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New costs, deficits, obstacles: the limitations of the larynx and temporal lobes of the brain do not allow clear pronunciation and recognition of new vocal signals. Brain volume is insufficient for the need to memorize many new sounds and their meanings New achievements and opportunities: new rules of behavior, new protowords for distinguishing objects, commands, reactions; better coordination in obtaining food, in clashes with competitors

Displacement of such groups (populations) to worse conditions. Decay, assimilation or death

Fig. 5.7 The group selection mechanism drives the coevolution of normative social order, language, larynx, memory, and brain

ability to plan operations and coordinate collective actions. That is why, of the numerous hominin species, only the sapienses survived, who all, without exception, mastered articulate speech.

5.11 Linguistic Interlude I: Formation of Phonetic Systems Let us consider the stages of speech development in the phonetic and semantic aspects. The story of sound communication began with the signals of animals: whooshing, hooting, shouting, and growling. Ray Jackendoff's assumption (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 243) about the “primacy” of syllables in the formation of speech, based on the observation of the ease with which children recognize syllables (faster and better than individual phonemes), is quite reasonable. He considers syllables to be specific “articulatory gestures.” In everyday speech, there remain exclamations, interjections, sound signals that do not denote something outside themselves, but express an emotion or a simple appeal, for example, “Wow!” when surprised, “Uh-oh” when frightened or hurt, “Sh-sh-sh!” to silence others, to behave quietly. R. Jackendoff (2002, p. 240) called such “words” “language fossils.” R. Burling (2005) writes about protowords, rightly distinguishing them both from signals of “animal language” and from full-fledged words. The first word-like signals were probably as limited as the calls of green monkeys (vervet) in certain situations. Without syntactic support from neighboring words, these signals could only be interpreted through a non-verbal context. However, given how limited the first words were in their sound and meaning, they still differed from all earlier forms of primate communication because they were both learned and conventional. Almost certainly, there was some special intonation and tone of voice in the utterance of the earliest protowords. The

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pitch, rhythm, tempo, and volume of the spoken signs or the force, size, and speed of the gestural signs could tell a lot about the emotions and intentions of those who were making them. What was lacking was the ability to use each word in a wide range of situations. Still, even if the earliest conditional protowords were used with narrow meanings and in limited situations, observers and listeners could always benefit from interpretations that went beyond the intentions of the speaker (Burling, 2005, p. 130).

New communicative concerns through attempts and fixations led to new types of statements with new intentions: to forbid, to scold, to praise, to urge, to propose, to persuade, to deny. The specificity of the first protowords was not “material,” but functional: Their use became a regular practice of focusing attention (at first only in a group) on something of interest or threatening in the visible environment. These signals were still not well articulated but recognizable sounds tied to concrete visual situations. These sound signs served as a means of indication and concentration of attention and then, turning out to be magic wands, they became capable of modification and complication. The number of subjects to communicate about had been increasing, and so new challenges-opportunities to denote these subjects emerged. The already known and used sound signals had to be distinguished from each other. This semantic concern began to be provided by the accumulation of differentiating characteristics. We should presume an intermediate stage between animal signals and syllables. The protosyllables were more differentiated than the previous signals, but they still lacked clear phonemes. Their primary characteristics were simple pronunciation (at the attained level of development of the larynx, speech motor skills) and easy recognizability (at the achieved level of speech hearing). Thus, protosyllables were simultaneously the first protowords, i.e., the most straightforward single utterances, or holophrases.2 Why did the protosyllables become differentiated through phonemes (including tones)? The most plausible explanation is the multiplication of protowords: the existing protosyllables simply became insufficient to distinguish new sign units. Full-fledged syllables with the distinguishing of all phonemes (hard and voiced, hard and soft consonants, close sounding “m” and “n,” etc.) could not appear at once. Thus, for many thousands of years, they had been isolated from a few protosyllables, distinguished by a few bright and easily recognizable features (e.g., “mama,” “ugu,” “sh-sh-sh,” and “ra-ra-ra” are distinguished now). W. Zuidema and B. de Boer (2009) constructed a sophisticated model of the phonetic development mechanism using the concept of “perceptual distinctiveness.” D. Dor describes the idea of this model as follows: The instructive function, however, demands that all speakers mutually identify the same gestures and vocalizations for the same mutually identified experiences—transcending individual differences. Under such a demand, then, every minute change in the arsenal of

2

R. Jackendoff (2002, pp. 238–240) writes about pronunciation of one sound as a separate sign and considers it as an early stage of glottogenesis J.-L. Dessalles (2007, p. 180) calls this stage “prelanguage,” distinguishing it from “protolanguage” (pidgin-type) according to D. Bickerton.

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Competition of Recruitings and Multiplication of Protowords

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vocalization and gestures would be selected for if it provided higher levels of perceptual distinctiveness—and thus minimized the probability of confusion. As Zuidema and de Boer (2009) show, the accumulation of such changes would eventually produce a categorical and combinatorial phonetic system. Zuidema and de Boer stress the fact that the process requires a significant level of noise: without it, the probability of confusion is too low. This is important, because the entire process was indeed embedded from the very beginning within the very noisy world of experiential mimetic communication. The challenge was not the construction of a sound and gesture system out of nothing: it was the isolation of a distinct sound and gesture system from the analogue continuum of experiential communication. What this means, in simple words, is that instructive interactions gradually began to sound differently. This was the beginning of phonetics (Dor, 2015, pp. 205–206).

Each signal with a holophrase function was a kind of “prosodic contour” that was divided by such isolation processes into protosyllables. Then the protosyllables along the same logic began to distinguish among themselves. The way of their gluing with acquisition of new meanings became a magic wand for the formation of many new such glues. The continued differentiation of protosyllables led to relatively stable phonemes in each language community (a group and an alliance of friendly groups). Combining them gave full-fledged syllables, easily pronounced and recognizable. The syllable glues were also protowords (functionally), but they already differed from the animal’s signals socially (via joint intentionality, normativity, mutual control), and “materially” (by clear phoneme differentiation). New protowords could only be uttered and recognized by being transformed from already mastered syllables. Thus, the acquired ability to spell, distinguish, and combine phonetically discernible syllables became the ability to generate new and new protowords.

5.12

Competition of Recruitings and Multiplication of Protowords

What did the first protowords mean? Scientists have been trying to answer this classic question since the earliest speculations and scientific hypotheses about the origins of language. It is unlikely that there will ever be a definitive answer to this question. One can only formulate sensible criteria and then reason which spheres or types of objects (in the broadest sense) best meet these criteria and thus are the preferred candidates for the role of denotations of the first hundreds protowords. This quantitative aspect is crucial because it was a factor in the phonetic distinction of syllables: the beginning of speech articulation (see above). Hominins somehow produced new protowords (probably by repeated rephrasing and guessing; see Chap. 6), memorized them, and tried to pronounce them so correctly that they could be recognized. It was a lot of hard work, since speech, hearing, and neural structures were not yet developed sufficiently. Hominins could only make such daily and persistent attempts in response to strong and regular challenges and concerns.

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These concerns were such that the newly invented protowords and their meanings had to be memorized and passed on to the younger generations. Thus, each new protoword, still with a vague pronunciation and a vague sense, had to be fixed, i.e., to become a shared property. So, every time, there had to be events that gave quick positive reinforcement of the correctness of the use, pronunciation of this protoword in a specific situation, or when encountering a particular object. These criteria essentially narrow the search space and allow us to find the sought social mechanism of the rapid growth of the protowords number. This mechanism was not the only one but the most productive one in the first stages of glottogenesis. Let us take a closer look at the sphere of sustenance concerns. Except for rare periods of happy abundance, hunger haunted every group and individual daily. Groups moved from stay to stay, and at each place, one had to remember where edible food could be found. So why do many animals deprived of speech seek and find a variety of food by tearing the ground, stripping bark, climbing into tree hollows, finding places with fruits, berries, nuts? Appropriate instincts and a keen sense of smell are their evolutionary advantages. The hominin ancestors, who lived in jungles rich in fruits of all kinds, did not need these abilities. Apes and especially humans lose their sense of smell in almost all terrestrial mammals. It is unlikely that hominins had a much better ability to find food by smell. At the level of instinct, they tasted edible food, just as we do. However, in order to taste potential food, it must first be found. Try to survive in the woods without any cultural information about herbs, mushrooms, roots, and the ways and means of hunting and fishing. Humans are endowed with rather poor innate food-seeking abilities. Hominins probably had better instincts, but not radically. Therefore, in large areas, hominins had to memorize, learn from their elders, and teach their young where to get what. During seasonal or extensive migrations, any change in the landscape led to the need to look for local foods and come up with names for them. An acute constant concern was to master these (proto)words. Social interaction concerns were related to the need to coordinate behavior in the group. If there is one leader, many problems do not arise: people repeat his actions, follow him. However, in the new social order, coordinated behavior presupposes the agreement of group members, at least the understanding of the dominant coalition.3 Thus, here the “whip” of the difficulties of the natural environment (the concerns generated by techno-ecological niches) is not discarded at all. In contrast, it was crucial to operate through an intermediate link: the social order with the necessity to reach an agreement in the coalition. New communicative concerns arose in all spheres, but the most pressing were those associated with the daily search for sustenance: to persuade, to urge, to reject

3

The high egalitarianism of known hunter-gatherer groups suggests that coalitions always remain influential and can only submit to leaders to the extent that they recognize their leadership, and this involves discussions and assessments of what is going on (Johnson & Earle, 2000).

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others’ proposals, to convey concern, expected threat, or hope. A new “whip” of constant difficulties in mutual understanding was in effect (Dessalles, 2007, pp. 349–355). The need to coordinate collective action meant a new concern: making joint, binding decisions for all (Bickerton, 2002, pp. 213–214; Gärdenfors & Osvath, 2010, pp. 108–109). Bickerton's idea of the significance of recruiting is quite valid but insufficient. Bickerton described only the solitary call for the group to repel the detected carcass from competing scavengers and cut it up. Of course, there was such a thing (the practice of searching for large dead animals continues to persist in African tribes), but a few calls without special articulation are sufficient for such recruitment. Even a single audible signal supported by gestures is enough. Therefore, let us connect the idea of recruitment with egalitarianism and competitive calls. For example, individuals wandering in search of food would stumble upon a cluster of potential food, and then when encountering tribe members, they would have to inform them about it. The necessity of understanding different messages and appeals to decide where to go and for what benefits shaped the competition of recruitings (mobilizing calls). In the next chapter, we will examine the internal structure of this mechanism. The menu of famous hunters and gatherers in the jungle and savannah has 200–300 or more foodstuffs suitable for eating. These are all kinds of roots, various berries, other fruits, grains, bird eggs, mollusks, larvae, and insects. It is necessary to know when they are usually found, accumulate, and ripen. One had to know how to obtain them, carry them, and process them for final consumption. Each product also has associated qualities (quantity, size, taste, color), associated dangers, operations, and search secrets. The hunters and gatherers know all this. They pass on this knowledge to the children. Much, of course, is shown visually, but much is also named (Johnson & Earle, 2000). Robert Boyd (2018) convincingly attributes the extraordinary success of our species not to “smartness” and brain size of individuals but to unique ability of human communities to accumulate the cultural experiences of multiple previous generations. We are able to learn all the things we need to know in each of the many different environments in which we live only because we acquire information from others. We are much better at learning from others than other species are, and equally important, we are motivated to learn from others even when we do not understand why our models are doing what they are doing (. . .) For the Yandruwandha, Cooper’s Creek was a land of plenty because they had a rich trove of culturally transmitted knowledge about how to make a living there. A Yandruwandha “Natural History Handbook” would have run to hundreds of pages with sections on the habits of game, efficient hunting techniques, how to find water, how to process toxic ferns, yams, and cycads, and so on. Australian Aborigines are famous among archaeologists for the simplicity of their technology. Nonetheless, an “Instruction Manual for Technology” would have had to cover the manufacture and proper use of nets, baskets, houses, boomerangs, fire drills, spears and spear- throwers, poisons, adhesives, shields, bark boats, ground stone tools, and much more (Boyd, 2018, pp. 16–18).

Probably, hominins did not yet reach such heights of erudition as the known modern hunter-gatherers. However, our distant ancestors survived, so they

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The theorecal hypothesis: if solidarity is high, the communicave ability is limited, there are joint intenonality and imitaon, everyone benefits from a group benefit and security, then individuals will modify signs to name new benefits and dangers, they will beer remember and transmit new naming signs

Groups of middle hominins (Erectuses?) had: coalion solidarity, first protosyllabic holophrases, daily search for sustenance, variety of its distant sources involving dangers; therefore they modified sounds to report what they saw, tried to disnguish mobilizing calls and messages by syllables and phonemes. name objects by differenated vocal signals, i.e., protowords

Erectuses

Fig. 5.8 Extended nomological explanation of how the first holophrases-protosyllables (poorly articulated) transformed into protowords (articulated through syllables and phonemes)

approached this variety of knowledge to some extent. Hominins could only transmit such cultural baggage by inventing hundreds of protowords. In parallel, they used names of objects in other spheres and names of tribespeople. Figure 5.8. presents the nomological explanation of these phenomena. The growth of linguistic complexity and the emergence of full-fledged words beyond situate interactions probably belong to later stages of cognitive evolution and glottogenesis (see Chaps. 7, 8, and 10). Structures of up-to-date experiments with children or adult subjects are not difficult to draw up on the basis of the theoretical hypothesis and the models presented in Chap. 4. In a simple variant, at each step, each player informs the other players of the “realities” encountered (“boons,” “dangers,” “places”) with cards. It is possible to use a computer program for a convenient fixation of processes and results. In the beginning, only simple syllables are given (e.g., including 2–3 letters), but the players can complicate them by adding new letters to the syllables, thus designating different “realities.” If the theoretical hypothesis is correct, the regularity takes the form of the following correlation. The higher the solidarity of the players and the more letters they have at their disposal to distinguish syllables and the faster and more reliable the feedback (the group frequently encounters “reality” named by a new syllable), the better the players create new syllables, remember them, and more reliably use. The grounds for the empirical hypothesis are the data of paleoanthropology (see below). The transition to the subsequent stages of glottogenesis (Chaps. 6–8) is an indirect justification. According to the principle of Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development (EZPD; see Chap. 2) this transition was possible only when the articulate protowords had emerged.

5.13

5.13

The Conflicts of Belonging Led to New Communicative Concerns

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The Conflicts of Belonging Led to New Communicative Concerns

The prohibition of violence by cohesive coalitions led not to stable tranquility but to growing uncertainty and created the ground for everyday anxieties and conflicts. Now it was possible to turn to others for support, but it was not a simple task considering speech deficiency. How to complain? How to prove your own rightness? How to explain to the tribesmen that the one who had taken someone else’s tool must give it back? How to ask them for help to protect a girlfriend from other men’s intrusions? Let us assume that those around us understand and are ready to support the fair demands. However, they must somehow make the offender understand that his actions are unacceptable. Probably, they did it by making sounds, making eloquent gestures with the meanings of belonging, and some analogs of our words “mine,” “yours,” “not yours, but someone else’s,” and “you cannot take someone else’s.” As already mentioned, the norm of belonging began to extend to other forms of “property,” above all to a special order of sexual access. The last concern was based on a fundamental need not less important than sustenance and security. Moreover, norms of sexual access had to extend to the future, to situations beyond the visible field. They required an indication of “what is whose,” that is, who has access relative to whom and for whom access is not permitted. Here, it was no longer enough to get by with gestural designations of persons and objects. Instead, in order to understand the rule, it was necessary to designate the members of the group, their relations (“social calculus”), their respective prescribed and forbidden actions. Therefore, possessive pronouns are probable contenders for the role of a second row protowords (after joint reactive denotations of different food and threats, approved and disapproved actions). Probably, they merged with negation and remained syncretic, not separated from the expression of norm, threat, or action, which changed belonging. So, for example, “Mine!” could have the meaning “It is not yours! Don't take it!” By the same logic, “Yours!” could have the intention of “I give it to you! You can take it and use it!” The sustained norm of belonging as exclusive sexual access underlies polygamy or couples’ relationships as the precursor to monogamous marriage. The ordering of the sphere of sexual and familial relations determines much in other spheres of group life: who should feed whom, who should take care of whom, who should protect whom, who should be subordinated, who should be considered equal or unequal to somebody else. The symbolic fixation of sexual and parental relations has, to a large extent, opened up a very significant sphere for new social relations and their corresponding protowords.

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Crossing the Language Rubicon: From Signal Multiplication. . .

Genetic Mutations, Brain Growth, or Multiplication of Protowords: Which Process Was a Primary Driver?

We should hardly attribute the emergence of speech abilities to hominins of a particular stage or lateral branches of anthropogenesis, e.g., Heidelbergians, Neanderthals, Neoanthropes, only based on definite anatomical changes in their bone remains. To do so is to reduce the long multistage process of overcoming the language Rubicon to some mysterious (mutational?) one-time shift (cf. Bickerton, 1981; Hauser et al., 2002). Arbib presented a quite plausible model of how mirror neurons acquire new cognitive functions: from recognizing and imitating others’ practical actions to understanding protowords and the ability to articulate them. Likely, Heidelbergians did indeed acquire the ability to articulate and distinguish syllables and to pronounce several protowords in a row (see details on the cognitive skills of Neanderthals in Chap. 6). However, this breakthrough was only one glottoaromorphosis along with previous (Chap. 4) and subsequent (Chaps. 6–8, and 10). According to the principles of cultural drive and the Baldwin effect, changes in mass behavior due to the emergence and layering of new communicative concerns led to neural, psychophysiological, and anatomical shifts, and they had been anchoring in genes through the mechanisms of multilevel selection (see Chap. 2). Thus, the concerns of message transmission, comprehensible articulation, and recognition, which required distinguishing new protowords, are the original evolutionary driver of anatomical and cognitive sapientation. It is no coincidence that from 1.6 mya the hominin brain began to grow at an accelerated rate. Although the brain volume of Australopithecus was 457 cm3 and that of Habilises (Early Homo) increased to 552 cm3, the brain volume of archanthropes reached 854 cm3 and that of late Erectuses 1016 cm3 (Corballis, 2010, p. 116). Furthermore, the lower jaw and cranial ridges needed to hold the powerful musculature decreased. Respectively, the walls of the skull became thinner, which gave additional space for accelerated brain growth. In addition, the shapes of the skulls indicate a rapid increase in the Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, where the speech centers are located (Bingham, 2010, p. 220). The growth of brain volume did not stop up to Neanderthals and sapienses. Crossing of the “brain Rubicon” (750 cm3) was a “genetic response” to an evolutionary challenge, the unreadiness of neural structures to fix new volumes of signs and meanings that required memorization. The connection from the growing needs of lexical memory, initial speech abilities, to the growth of brain volume (Laland, 2017; Markov & Markov, 2020) seems to be the strongest driver of this coevolution, though not the only one.

5.14

Genetic Mutations, Brain Growth, or Multiplication of Protowords:. . .

149

There was a directed multilevel selection that strengthened the predispositions to create numerous neuronal ensembles. The last ones had to fix both learned in ontogeny protowords and sets of mental images associated with them. The articulation, semantic, and figurative components of speech required an increasingly “fine-grained” memory, and for it, a more sizable number of neurons, a larger brain. Group and sexual selection acted in this direction according to the principle of cultural drive (Deacon, 1997; Corballis, 2010; Tattersall, 2010, 2017; Laland, 2017). Attributing the breakthrough to speech only to identify anatomical changes in the larynx, hyoid nerve canal, spine, pectoral muscles, and others has the status of proximal explanation (Diamond, 1992) and seems inadequate. It is not correct to ignore the evolutionary causes of these organic changes themselves. All relevant anatomical and neural shifts were the development of the support structures. These structures emerged stepwise only because new cognitive challenges, communicative concerns, mass vocal, and articulate practices appeared and evolved over hundreds of thousands (or millions?) years. The language Rubicon was not a clear boundary for a one-step crossing or a “leap,” but a large interval filled with a multitude of interconnected multilevel processes. Table 5.1 presents this sequence of stages correlated with the generally accepted structure of anthropogenesis. The initial stage (top line of Table 5.1) is preparatory (see Chap. 4). The two subsequent stages constitute a step-by-step overcoming of the language Rubicon. The dates in the left column indicate that it took about 2.3 million years in total. Figure 5.9 outlines the same milestones on a conventional diagram of alternate formative and cumulative periods. With their different alarm signals, anthropoids can evoke an image of an object to a recipient, but no more than that. At the same time, in their practical thinking, anthropoids can connect their subjective images into structures and act adequately in the corresponding dynamic situations (see Chap. 4 on the initial separation of speech and practical thinking). Here, another boundary of the language Rubicon that distinguishes human speech from the communicative systems of animals is passed along, along with the syllabic and phonemic structure of protosyllables. Hominins developed the ability to create new protowords and transmit them across generations.

Heating bones to extract bone marrow. The structure of the joints allowed the throw of stones with precision. Choppers as a lethal weapon. Increase in brain volume up to 730 cm3. The basics of thermal processing of food. The steady development of the vertebral column (particularly the thoracic vertebrae) allowed one to control breathing. Rapid growth of brain volume up to 1250 cm3

2.7–1.6 mya. Early Homo: From Habilises to Pre-Archanthopes. Aggressive scavengers. Beginnings of hunting. The beginning of a continuous history of tool technology. Olduvai

New communicative concerns New mining and cooking technologies required coordination and naming (see Chap. 6)

Ritual and communication practices Situational behavior control. Development of the recruiting competition mechanism. Rituals of rephrasing and guessing (see Chap. 6)

Social and communicative concerns, practices Struggles for dominance. Concerns to establish peace and cohesion within the group. Emerging egalitarian coalitions began to collectively express discontent, protest, and threaten solitary aggressors, alpha males. Restriction of violence and rules of prey sharing: The emergence of normative rituals Hominins began to inform with different signals about new food resources (recruiting) Situational control of rules related to violence, sharing of prey. Development and expansion of normative rituals as the primary regulators of order in each group. Beginning of the recruiting competition mechanism: the attempts of different group members to report where to go for what food. Achieving understanding and agreement through articulation and recognition of new sound cues

New concerns and structures

The first protosyllabic utterances (holophrases) were confidently recognizable sound designations of different foods, the places of their extraction. Due to the growth of the number of meanings that needed new calls, hominins made attempts to distinguish protosyllables through the first differentiated phonemes. The appearance of syllables and protowords was the beginning of overcoming the language Rubicon. Joint intentionality became common due to the ability to attract attention, fixation through pronunciation, and perception of protowords. Integration of practical thinking and vocalization. Rule-marking rituals formed normative attitudes Types of linguistic Cognitive abilities constructions Ability to distinguish, Distinction of syllables. Breath control allowed discriminate, denote the pronunciation of relationships of belongprotophrases, that is, ing, orient in time and some protowords in a space with the help of row, but still without an protowords order

Sound signs, cognitive abilities, and regulatory attitudes Syncretic signals (including sound ones) with differentiated meanings of holistic situations, actions. The number of such calls increased to several dozens. The emergence of joint intentionality, i.e., holding collective attention on the object and situation, attracting someone else’s attention, and fixing one’s own. The first common normative attitudes emerged: what tribe members approve and what disapprove

5

1.6-0.4 mya. From PreArchanthropes to Heidelbergians. Hunters. Acheul

Archaeological data on the sapientation milestones Morphological selfdomestication: significant reduction in the size of jaws, teeth, mandibles, cranial rollers, thinner skull walls. Growth of brain volume to 460– 515 cm3

Time, prominent representatives. New niches and technologies 7–2.5 mya. Australopithecines. Gatherers and inferior scavengers. First implements c.3.3 mya, then absence up to 2.7 mya

Table 5.1 Steps to overcome the language Rubicon 150 Crossing the Language Rubicon: From Signal Multiplication. . .

References

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Stages of linguistic complexity

Overcoming the language Rubicon Distinguishing syllables, first phonemes

Early Homo: from Habiliseses to Pre-Archanthropes

The late pre-speech: accumulation of articulate protowords, appearance of protophrases

The early pre-speech: the first protosyllablesholophrases

Differentiated signals of Australopithecus

8-7 mya

Heidelbergers

From Pre-Archanthropes to Erectuses

Distinguishing protosyllables

From Australopithecus to Early Homo. The development of joint intentionality and normativity

Phonetic structure, arsenal of syllables

2,7–2,5 mya

1,6 mya

Direction of time 500–400 kya

Fig. 5.9 Overcoming the language Rubicon as a step-by-step process with alternating rapid formative periods (the emergence of new magic wands in speech experimentation) and long cumulative periods (the spread of these structures to new language areas)

References Arbib, M. A. (2005). From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(2), 105–124. Arbib, M. A. (2017). Toward the language-ready brain: Biological evolution and primate comparisons. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 24, 142–150. Bickerton, D. (1981). Roots of language. Language Science Press. Bickerton, D. (2002). Foraging versus social intelligence in the evolution of protolanguage. In A. Wray (Ed.), The transition to language (pp. 207–225). Oxford University Press. Bickerton, D. (2009). Adam's tongue: How humans made language, how language made humans. Hill and Wang. Bingham, P. (2010). On the evolution of language: Implications of a new and general theory of human origins, properties, and history. In R. K. Larson, V. Déprez, & H. Yamakido (Eds.), The evolution of human language: Biolinguistic perspectives (pp. 211–224). Cambridge University Press. de Boer, B. (2017). Evolution of speech and evolution of language. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 158–162.

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Boyd, R. (2018). A different kind of animal: How culture transformed our species. Princeton University Press. Burling, R. (2005). The talking ape. How language evolved. Oxford University Press. Collins, R. (2004). Interaction ritual chains. Princeton University Press. Corballis, M. C. (2010). Did language evolve before speech? In R. K. Larson, V. Déprez, & H. Yamakido (Eds.), The evolution of human language: Biolinguistic perspectives (pp. 115–123). Cambridge University Press. Darwin, C. (1872/2004). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. Penguin. Deacon, T. W. (1997). The symbolic species: The coevolution of language and the brain. Norton. Dessalles, J.-L. (2007). Why we talk. The evolutionary origins of language. Oxford University Press. Diamond, J. (1992). The third chimpanzee: The evolution and future of the human animal. Harper Collins Publ. Donskikh, O. А. (1984). K istokam yazyka [to the origins of language]. Nauka, Publ. (In Russian). Dor, D. (2015). The instruction of imagination: Language as a social communication technology. Oxford University Press. Dor, D., Knight, C. J., & Lewis, J. (Eds.). (2014). The social origins of language. Oxford University Press. Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. Harvard University Press. Gabora, L., & Smith, C. M. (2018). Two cognitive transitions underlying the capacity for cultural evolution. Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 96, 1–26. Gärdenfors, P., & Osvath, M. (2010). Prospection as a cognitive precursor to symbolic communication. In R. K. Larson, V. Déprez, & H. Yamakido (Eds.), The evolution of human language: Biolinguistic perspectives (pp. 103–114). Cambridge University Press. Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science, 22(298, issue 5598), 1569–1579. Hrdy, S. B. (1999). Mother nature: A history of mothers, infants, and natural selection. Pantheon Books. Iriki, A. (2005). A prototype of Homo faber: A silent precursor of human intelligence in the toolusing monkey brain. In S. Dehaene, J.-R. Duhamel, M. D. Hauser, & G. Rizzolatti (Eds.), From monkey brain to human brain: A Fyssen Foundation Symposium (pp. 253–271). MIT Press. Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of language: Brain, meaning, grammar, evolution. Oxford University Press. Johnson, A., & Earle, T. (2000). The evolution of human societies. From foraging group to agrarian state. Stanford University Press. Kendon, A. (2017). Reflections on the “gesture-first” hypothesis of language origins. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 163–170. Laland, K. N. (2017). Darwin’s unfinished symphony. How culture made the human mind. Princeton University Press. Markov, A. V., & Markov, M. A. (2020). Runaway brain-culture coevolution as a reason for larger brains: Exploring the “cultural drive” hypothesis by computer modeling. Ecology and Evolution, 10(12), 1–19. Morgan, T. J. H., Uomini, N. T., Rendell, L. E., Chouinard-Thuly, L., Street, S. E., Lewis, H. M., Cross, C. P., Evans, C., Kearney, R., de la Torre, I., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. N. (2015). Experimental evidence for the coevolution of hominin tool-making, teaching and language. Nature Communications, 6(6029), 1–8. Rozov, N. S. (2022). The strangeness and origins of human sexuality. In D. S. Sheriff (Ed.), Human sexuality. IntechOpen. https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/80771 Ryan, C., & Jethá, C. (2010). Sex at dawn: The prehistoric origins of modern sexuality. HarperCollins. Stout, D. (2005). The social and cultural context of stone-knapping skill acquisition. In V. Roux & B. Bril (Eds.), Stone knapping: The necessary conditions for a uniquely hominin behaviour (pp. 331–340). McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research.

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Stout, D., & Chaminade, T. (2007). The evolutionary neuroscience of tool making. Neuropsychologia, 45, 1091–1100. Tattersall, I. (2010). A putative role for language in the origin of human consciousness. In R. K. Larson, V. Déprez, & H. Yamakido (Eds.), The evolution of human language: Biolinguistic perspectives (pp. 193–198). Cambridge University Press. Tattersall, I. (2017). How can we detect when language emerged? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 64–67. Turner, J. H., & Machalek, R. (2018). The new evolutionary sociology: Recent and revitalized theoretical and methodological approaches. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Wildgen, W. (2012). Language evolution as a cascade of behavioral bifurcations. Estudios de. Linguistica Universidad de Alicante, 26, 359–382. Wrangham, R. (2019). The goodness paradox: The strange relationship between virtue and violence in human evolution. Pantheon. Zlatev, J. (2014). The coevolution of human intersubjectivity, morality, and language. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 249–266). Oxford University Press. Zuidema, W., & de Boer, B. (2009). The evolution of combinatorial phonology. Journal of Phonetics, 37(2), 125–144.

Chapter 6

The Childhood of Language: Rephrasing Rituals and Reactive Protophrases

6.1

From the Variability of Ecological Niches to Social Tensions and New Communicative Concerns

It is challenging to connect changes in climate and landscapes with stages of cognitive evolution over the vast span of one million and a half years. Researchers know much less about speech development than about the timing of glaciations and interglacials. We note that the climatic and, therefore, ecological conditions of the life of the Erectuses are strongly related to significant changes in food supply (Walter et al., 2000; Rohling et al., 2013). African savannas were displaced either by deserts or, in contrast, by jungle. The Erectuses as already skilled hunters moved following the game migrations along shifting landscapes. Erectuses became the first members of the Homo genus, which left Africa (about 1.7–1.3 mya). They penetrated various subtropical and tropical areas from Spain to China, Indochina, and even the remote islands of present-day Indonesia. The unprecedented abilities appeared in long-distance migrations that crossed water and other barriers. Such achievements imply an elevated level of coordination, the ability to navigate new types of hazards, and foraging opportunities in new landscapes. Settlement itself means adaptive success and increased density of Erectuses in Africa. The difference between Erectuses and other predators was that their behavioral adaptation became much faster and more flexible due to the mastering and intergenerational transmission of new practices. There are similar mechanisms in other higher predators (different “hunting cultures” in wolves and lions). However, they are almost unchanged, do not develop, and innate instincts play the primary role. Erectuses, thanks to speech communication, steadily replaced instincts with coordinated collective practices. These support structures can develop much faster. The speech communication itself and the corresponding language structures evolved in conjunction with cognitive and linguistic brain potential, which was genetically inherited like instincts (see Chap. 2). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_6

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The Erectuses did not care about the multiplication of the signs used and the development of the language. They could not even suspect what it was. However, there was undoubtedly the concern to achieve understanding in communication. In this chapter, let us examine how and why articulate speech developed in the early intermediate stage.

6.2

Linguistic Interlude II: Structures in Pre-Speech and the Fold/Unfold Ability

Initial holophrases, which coincided with the first protosyllables and protowords, began to turn into protophrases. It means that hominins (say, Erectuses) began to consistently utter different protowords, each of which added its semantic content to the general meaning of the utterance, and this meaning was already more or less reliably understood by listeners. The early pre-speech structurally similar to differentiated animal signals was replaced by the late pre-speech. The analogues of the latter in animals can be considered only clutter protophrases produced by bonobos and chimpanzees specially trained in sign language or use of graphemes, and only in an artificial experimental environment (see Chap. 4). In further considerations, I will be forced to use designations of units of speech similar to the usual linguistic terminology. The following reservations must be made. Our conceptions of living speech are significantly distorted by our cultural habits of structuring any utterance according to the canons of developed and grammatically ordered writing. It is as if hominins and humans in the prewritten era separated sounds, parts of words, words, turns, simple sentences, and compound sentences from each other. Let us call this variant of appropriation of the past, which scientists often sin in the historical sciences, the “reverse normalization effect.” In the real everyday speech of modern people, the canons of written texts do not work, although all literate people are well aware that the words in writing are separated from each other by spaces. There was nothing like this in prewritten speech. It is in this sense that hominin pre-speech should be considered as prenormalized: it had some elements repeated from utterance to utterance; in our understanding these could be particles, words, compound words, stable word combinations, variable turns, stable formulas, etc. However, for the speakers and listeners themselves it was a single stream with a transmitted and understood meaning, which they recognized by connecting the semantic contents of the components of this stream. An image of such a stream can be given by utterances in polysynthetic languages, for example, in Iñupiak-inuktitut (the language of the Eskimo-Aleut family in North America) Tusaatsiarunnanngittualuujunga means “I can’t hear very well.” It is absolutely not by chance that the most ancient monuments of writing do not have gaps between words, no punctuation marks which would separate sentences and parts of sentences from each other, no paragraphs, no explanatory, or other signs

6.2

Linguistic Interlude II: Structures in Pre-Speech and the Fold/Unfold Ability

157

Fig. 6.1 The Rosetta Stone. The texts are written in ancient Egyptian, Demotic, and Ancient Greek. No spaces between words, no punctuation, no paragraphs, no other service marks

or service particles. This is what the writing on the famous Rosetta Stone looks like (Fig. 6.1). At the dawn of writing, people were not aware of the presence of structures in their speech and language, accordingly, they did not distinguish them in any way. This does not mean, however, that these structures themselves did not exist. All linguistic structures appeared together with the birth and development of the languages themselves, i.e., during glottogenesis. Of course, they essentially differed from the formalization of the rules as the results of the later reflexive activity of grammarians. However, it was the accumulation of new structures of changes and combinations of (proto)words in the subsequent stages of glottogenesis that transformed pre-speech into full-fledged speech and language. Since further we will have to talk about syntax it is necessary to outline our position regarding the influential concepts of “Universal Grammar” (UG), “faculty of language in the broad sense” (FLB), “faculty of language in the narrow sense”

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(FLN), and “Merge” (Chomsky, 1986; Hauser et al., 2002; Berwick & Chomsky, 2016). Chomsky rightly criticizes gradualism, which is close to classical Darwinism. However, the “biolinguistic” concept of a rapid leap from animal communication (already possessing FLB) to full language (with UG, FLN and Merge) through one amazing mutation or series of such mutations is completely erroneous in several respects. The main flaw in the concept is the neglect of the development of communication and, more broadly, the importance of social relations. That is, social concerns required an increasingly complex and precise mutual understanding. Ignoring the ideas of cultural drive, gene-culture coevolution, the construction of techno-natural niches, and social orders as sources of new challenges and concerns prevents Chomsky and co-authors from providing any convincing explanation as to why some series of mutations suddenly led to UG, FLN, and Merge. Berwick and Chomsky ask the right question about the original ingredients of the emergence of language and answer it by appealing to miracle appearance of the “Merge” and sensorimotor and conceptual “interfaces” (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016, p. 39–40). The question about the ingredients is valid, but it should be asked at each stage of glottogenesis. Structures of early pre-speech (holophrases pronounced by protosyllables) needed ingredients already present in animal communication. These ingredients were differentiated signals especially mastered in ontogeny. The ascent to each successive stage occurred through the use of already achieved linguistic structures as ingredients for the formation of the next structures. The following chapters will explain these evolutionary breakthroughs (glottoaromorphoses) on the basis of the ideas of cultural drive and the need to provide new emergent communicative concerns. How to interpret Chomsky’s ideas from this viewpoint? The main feature of “faculty of language in the narrow sense” (FLN) was at first considered to be recursion as the ability to produce sentences with any complex layering of syntactically correct constructions. Later, the complexity of recursion has been reduced to the Merge operation,1 which really needs to be dealt with. The essence of the operation is that several speech elements are somehow combined with each other and used as a whole. The authors give a witty example to demonstrate exactly the structural nature of this kind of phenomenon: . . .the contrast between birds that fly instinctively swim and instinctively birds that fly swim. The first example sentence is ambiguous. The adverb instinctively can modify either fly or swim—birds either fly instinctively, or else they swim instinctively. Now let’s look at the second sentence. Placing instinctively at the front is a game-changer. With instinctively birds that fly swim, now instinctively can only modify swim. It cannot modify fly. This seems

“In its simplest terms, the Merge operation is just set formation. Given a syntactic object X (either a word-like atom or something that is itself a product of Merge) and another syntactic object Y, Merge forms a new, hierarchically structured object as the set {X, Y}; the new syntactic object is also assigned a label by some algorithm that satisfies the condition of minimal computation” (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016, p. 10). 1

6.2

Linguistic Interlude II: Structures in Pre-Speech and the Fold/Unfold Ability

159

mysterious (. . .) Apparently, it is not linear distance that matters in human syntax, only structural distance (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016, pp. 8–9).

Is the operation of combining elements into a whole and then treating this whole as a separate element something unique and exclusive, characteristic only of speech activity? Not at all. Handfuls of berries, shellfish, and nuts, piled up on the ground, are quite admissible for operating with each bunch as a whole. For example, they can be divided among the tribesmen. Let this example be too simple, because berries or other fruits in piles are homogeneous. However, it is also possible to combine different objects (shells, tools, jewelry) for an exchange, for a gift, to make amends for an offense or damage, etc. Note that in these operations there is no complete fusion, dissolution, loss by objects of their separateness, their features. By performing such operations on the whole, the subjects do not lose their perception of the specificity of separate elements. The same processes take place in operations, which Chomsky describes as Merge. The disadvantage of this term is the connotation of complete fusion, mutual dissolution. It is more adequate to call this structure, indeed a basic one, a “fold/unfold ability.” Really, by uttering a simple phrase, we combine words into a kind of coherent bunch (fold, or collect them), but they remain distinguishable (ready to unfold). Listeners, in this flow of speech, recognize individual words (unfold them). They immediately combine them into a meaningful phrase (fold them); that is, they understand what is said. When phrases are combined into sentences, and sentences are recursively layered one after another, the same fold/unfold ability applies, where the elements are already the lower levels of the hierarchy. The fold/unfold ability, while fundamentally similar in structure to Merge, differs from it in the following essential aspects: • The fold/unfold ability is not a single operation or ability, but rather a magic wand; that is, it is an extremely flexible basic structure with a wide range of modification possibilities; the great variety of syntactic structures in the various languages of the world reflects just this breadth and polyfunctionality. • The fold/unfold ability is a product of evolutionary development of languages, but also the basis that determines both possibilities and limitations of further evolution; in particular, such “channels of evolution” are the main morphological types of languages (analytic, synthetic, agglutinative, etc.); they differ namely in grammatical and syntactic ways of folding different elements with their semantics into constructions of certain kinds. • The fold/unfold ability is meaningfully compatible with the concepts of interiorization, interactive ritual, the zone of nearest (evolutionary) development, etc. (see Chaps. 2 and 3). It can be shown that during ontogenesis the child, ascending the stages of acquisition of the native language, develops this ability only in speech interaction with native speakers, which assumes a long series of both interiorization and interactive ritual acts. Thus, complication of the ability in the mastery of simple phrases, participle, and derivative turns, in construction of complex sentences by recursion, occurs in succession. This means that previous achievements become ingredients for subsequent advancements. It is safe to

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assume a similar evolutionary development, the conditioned arsenal of fold/ unfold ability in phylogeny. Here vast opportunities open up for the formulation of theoretical hypotheses to be tested by means of the extended Hempelian approach (see Chap. 3).

6.3

The Significance of Misunderstanding

Listener-understandable speech is a characteristic of successful language development. However, at the beginning of glottogenesis, “talk” was full of flaws, defects, and communicative failures. Sounds (the first protowords), especially new sounds with which hominins tried to denote something essential, were pronounced indistinctly and identified with difficulty. Therefore, a typical situation should be considered as listeners’ failure to understand what their tribe members are trying to convey by these sounds. Modern researchers, of course, write about the difficulties of hominins in interacting with the natural environment. Evolutionary researchers accept that language evolved as our ancestors adapted to it to perform more complex tasks (Pinker, 2010; Laland, 2017). However, there are only few mentions of the enormous role of misunderstanding in the works on language origins. Virtually all scientific discourse on glottogenesis fits into the positive scheme of “onward and upward”: as if the mind, memory, language, learning, technology, skills, and abilities had been developing smoothly and progressively. Jeffrey Miller (2000) saw a logical gap in this scheme but went much further down the steps of glottogenesis. In his book, he considers the motive of winning hearts (a specific individual concern) to be the main stimulus for the emergence and development of speech with its redundant embellishments. In an alternative, the complementary concept of the “Machiavellian mind,” cognitive abilities, including the richness of language, grew out of the perennial competition of individuals for status, position, and power, which requires both cunning and the rhetorical power of persuasion (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Byrne, 1996; Wrangham, 2019). Both concepts are partly true, but the reality behind them belongs to the later stages of language development. A solid cognitive foundation was needed to build all these rhetorical contrivances for individual gain on the prestige, political, or erotic fronts (see Chap. 10). Let us consider the initial stages of speech and language development that prepared this basis.

6.4

6.4

The Closest Analogies: A Comparison of Children’s and Anthropoids’. . .

161

The Closest Analogies: A Comparison of Children’s and Anthropoids’ Speech Abilities

Many researchers have noted Haeckel’s law in the sphere of language: children mastering their native language pass through stages that resemble the supposed glottogenesis stages. Of course, one should not trust this analogy too much, but it is still helpful to consider the main stages of children’s speech development (Vygotsky, 1930/1997, 1934/1987; Hurford, 2011, pp. 590–604). In early childhood, speech acquisition begins with “humming” (up to 3–6 months). Children at this age still lag in cognitive development far behind adult anthropoids who produce differentiated sound signals with more or less fixed meanings (see Chap. 4). At 6–10 months of age, the child begins to understand the meaning of words, pointing out their denotations. In other words, already at this stage, joint intentionality is formed (Tomasello, 2008). An analog of the emergence of protowords is in the babbling of infants up to 1 year of age. After adults, they repeat syllables “ma-ma-ma,” “ba-ba-ba,” then learn to pronounce separately “ma,” “ba,” or words like “mama,” “papa.” Gradually, thanks to corrections, they already pronounce them when they see the corresponding person. Single protosyllables pronounced as a response to a visible occurrence (“Mama!,” “Bi-bee!,” “Woof-woof!”) are holophrases. At this stage of pre-speech, children already grow up to anthropoids in developing the cognitive side of sound communication, since the latter in the natural environment usually use two to three dozen distinguishable signals (Fitch, 2010). At this holophrastic stage (about 12 months), children tend to consider several words as a whole: whasat (what’s that), gimme (give me), etc. Then, from 1.5 to 2.5 years, the protophrase stage follows: folding protowords into phrases without coordination, particular order, and vague meaning. Protophrases develop in the direction of adding stable combinations of protowords. The child reacts to what is happening and uses together the known protowords actualized by the seen (“Car bi-bee!,” “Man big!,” “Doggie woof-woof!”). Note that specially trained anthropoids can also create meaningful combinations of signs. For example, Jane Goodall cites multiple accounts of the ability of chimpanzees trained in American Sign Language (ASL) to compose new protowords and protophrases through combinations of gestures. Thus, a female chimp Lucy designated a nut as a stone-berry, celery as a food-pipe, watermelon as a drink-candy or a fruit-drink, radish as a food-ay-sickly (the first radish Lucy tasted turned out to be very bitter). Lana, another female chimp, labeled a cucumber banana-green and an orange apple-orange. A third chimp Moja called a fizzy drink to listen (or sound, noise)drink, and she designated a lighter as metal-fire (Goodall, 1986).2

2

See about discussion on observations and experiments by M. D. Rumbaugh et al. in Chap. 4.

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On the one hand, such success (as well as the ability of Kanzi to use tabletsgraphemes) was made possible by including anthropoids in a symbolic environment already developed by humans (Donald, 2000; Lloyd, 2004). On the other hand, evidence of this kind points to an exceedingly early timeline of hominin cognitive and speech evolution. Suppose that chimpanzees and bonobos can produce meaningful combinations of signs (albeit through learned gestures or graphemes). It is unlikely that Australopithecines and early hominins were inferior to them in the level of cognitive development. It would be very strange to deny such an ability to Habilises, Erectuses, and Heidelbergians. Neanderthals probably used rather developed sound communication, say articulated protowords and protophrases (see in detail at the end of this chapter). At the protophrase stage, the child’s understanding of adult speech and consciousness abilities develop rapidly. One can ask him or her to bring a specific thing from another room; (s)he understands the request and gets what is needed. Adults say quite reasonably when the child does well, “One cannot send a cat!” However, a trained dog can also fetch the right thing because it has formed pre-attitudes due to training (see Chap. 4). What are the differences? Verbal commands to well-trained animals are somewhat like protowords. Practical training always includes a common focus, emotions, positive and negative reinforcements. It is essentially a chain of pre-rituals organized by a trainer. Perhaps, we can admit that the “linguistic genius” bonobo Kanzi made an impressive breakthrough to the level of protowords and protophrases when he learned 200 tablets with lexigrams, because often he connected them adequately and used them in communication with experimenters (see Chap. 4). Still, his attention and “speech” behavior were limited to a specific visual situation. Actually, Kanzi was losing children aged 3.5–4 years and, even more so, older ones in his ability to combine protowords, quickly master new ones, and overcome syncretism of meanings. Other bonobos and chimpanzees, to mention animals of other species, never approached the linguistic heights of Kanzi. Due to designations (though not yet full-fledged words), a child can consider the situation elsewhere. Then, to perform actions adequately, (s)he can clarify what is in the other room and remember it tomorrow. Mastering protophrases as complex reactions to what is happening around opens possibilities of their use to name just what happened nearby and then yesterday’s events, what happened in distant places. If the speaker manages to focus joint attention on such external, invisible the-moment events, a prominent progressive shift in the development of consciousness occurs. During the next 4–6 years, children, advancing through the stages of their zones of proximal development (ZPD), master the basic vocabulary of their native language. At the same time, the adult acts as a carrier of ready cultural patterns (as in teaching arithmetic rules and solving various kinds of problems), sufficient for forming the child’s required abilities in the current ZPD.

6.5

How Did New Protowords Emerge?

6.5

163

How Did New Protowords Emerge?

Let us return to hominins and make a mental leap from millions and hundreds of thousands of years to hours and minutes. Novel words, language, and consciousness emerged and evolved not in heaven or in a high abstraction. Instead, speech development took place in many everyday episodes on the ultramicro-level. These interactions are comparable to the regular simple episodes of a child’s language mastering. Presumably, the pre-speech of a child and the pre-speech of hominins (Erectuses? Heidelbergians?) are structurally similar. Deacon believes that gestures and exaggerated intonation went with an early hominin speech in a kind of ritual action about the way adults talk to small children. He rightly points out that modern talk also includes ritualized signs of attention and approval, alternate sequencing of remarks, demonstrations of agreement or disagreement, and pointing to objects. Such conversational rituals were probably more pronounced in the early stages of brain and language coevolution (Deacon, 1997). The general focus of attention, repetitions, corrections, and available joyful emotions when pronounced correctly with proper pointing to a recognized person or object are typical interactive rituals during the child’s acquisition of the native language. They serve as a model for the much more difficult birth of protowords in anthropogenesis when “there was no one to prompt.” So how did new protowords appear? There were no “adults” in human evolution, but Evolutionary Zones of Proximal Development (EZPD). Something new could already develop, and something could not. What was the analog, the substitute of the missing “adults” with their ready language patterns? D. Dor (2015) suggests the following solution to the problem. . . .Where did those individuals who did manage to meet the challenges of language, at the different stages of its evolution, find the capacities to do it? The traditional, cognitively oriented answer would be that the relevant capacities must have already been there before: behavior is made possible by pre-existing capacity, and because of that, the explanation for the capacity should be sought somewhere else, away from language and its challenges—in the structures of the brain (or the mind) and the structures of our genes. Recent advances in evolutionary theory, however, allow for a very different answer: the capacities evolved together with language, for language. First, we invented language collectively, then language changed us individually (Dor, 2015, p. 393).

But what did this “invention of language” look like? Language transformations took place through tireless and daily attempts to overcome misunderstandings and solid mental tension. Motivation to achieve understanding was exceedingly high, as fundamental needs related to survival and derivative social concerns drove it (see Chap. 5). These searches, trying to convey something important to fellow tribe members, were fraught with disappointments, mutual irritation, because of imperfect, inarticulate speech. However, happy discoveries in achieving understanding and agreement also happened. Hominins repeated these speech innovations, therefore fixing new linguistic structures.

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The fundamental needs related to the search for food (and the attendant dangers) were so strong and vital that their energy was transferred to communicative concerns: to report what they saw, persuade, and reach mutual understanding and agreement for collective solutions. To do this, one had to search for and go through expressive means from the available arsenal: sounds, facial expressions, gestures. Hominins primarily used the most productive magic wand of modifying sounds and tried to differ sound signs from each other, to be understood unambiguously.

6.6

Speech Development as a By-Product of Rephrasing and Guessing Rituals

The speech abilities of hominins on the mainline of evolution to sapienses evolved albeit long (hundreds of thousands and then tens of thousands of years), but steadily, and hence based on solid regularities. Such processes always have deep interconnection of factors, which, as a rule, include circuits of positive feedbacks. According to the cultural drive principle (Laland, 2017), changes in speech patterns and speech abilities resulted from regular, mass, and uniform behavior (here I try to uncover the question marks in Fig. 2.5). Therefore, according to the Skinner’s principle, only regular, very motivated, and strenuous practices with indispensable positive reinforcement could raise the appearance of “proper” abilities for standard clear articulation and correct recognition. To denote such practices by “naming” is to mislead: as if a deity or a cultural hero appears, who, seeing a new object, at once gives it an explicit name. The real processes in hominins were interactive, challenging, long, and emotionally intense. Our pre-linguistic ancestors managed to achieve what they did because they spent enormous amounts of collective effort in the struggle for mutual understanding, mapping the differences and similarities between their experiential worldviews, learning from each other, and teaching each other. They gradually spent more and more of their time doing things together, solving problems together, sharing, and comparing experiences. This was the first revolution that made us who we are (Dor, 2015, p. 201).

It is more correct to label the new collective practices as rituals of rephrasing and guessing, reminiscent of games with pantomime. The one who tries to deliver a message changes its sound form in every conceivable way, supplementing attempts with gestures, facial expressions, and poses. These attempts may be multiple and repeated for a long time; success is achieved only due to a long series of such “sessions.” The achieved result, e.g., a distinctly pronounced sound with a definite meaning now clear to all participants, leads to general satisfaction. Hominins repeated the found formula many times, fixing its meaning in their interior semantics connected with the speech-motor and auditory patterns. Thus, the interlocutors got the ability to later articulate and recognize the new protoword or protophrase.

6.6

Speech Development as a By-Product of Rephrasing and Guessing Rituals

165

External tensions and interior conflicts. Inability to provide for basic needs and social concerns

Effectiveness of normative rituals, reaching agreement

The orderliness of the group, the coordination of collective action

Level of mutual understanding

Vital daily processes in every generation

Clarity of articulation, the success of recognition of new signals, i.e., protowords

Clarity of new protowords meanings and their recognition capabilities

The level of the sound communication development (in live hominins, their groups of each generation)

The by-products in genetic and cultural levels of cognitive evolution

Sharpness of communicative concerns: aspirations to call for collective action, to persuade, to demand compliance with rules, to reach agreement

Activity of efforts and attempts of modifying, rephrasing, articulation, conjecture, and correction by others

Advantage and win in selection between hominins' groups

The level of the articulate speech and language structures development (in the population, species, generational change)

Fig. 6.2 Interrelation of factors that explain the progressive development of speech and language. Solid arrows denote strengthening connections; dashed arrows indicate weakening and depressing ones. The shaded blocks here and later in this chapter refer to the realm of speech and language

Such systematic rituals increased clarity of meaning, pronunciation, and increased mutual understanding which eased the establishment of group interaction orders (Fig. 6.2). Thus, language development turns out to be a by-product of these processes and a springboard (advancement into the EZPD) for further communicative progress. As niches and orders changed and new communicative concerns appeared, situations of misunderstanding again arose, and hominins had to resort again to collective trials: rephrasing and guessing, which led to protoword multiplication (Fig. 6.3). The new protowords could not at once acquire precise meanings and clear pronunciation. Hominins had to make repeated and tense speech attempts that inevitably led to a significant by-product: they transformed the neural structures of the participants.

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External tensions and interior conflicts. Inability to provide for basic concerns

Vital daily processes in every generation

Clarity of articulation, clarity of meaning, and success in recognizing new protowords

The by-products of these processes in language evolution

Number of situations, rules, conflicts available for discussion and requiring agreement

Sharpness of new communicative concerns

Activity of efforts and attempts of modifying, rephrasing, articulation, conjecture, and correction by others The number of protowords, the ability to combine them into protophrases

The lexical richness of speech and the length of utterances

Fig. 6.3 Interrelation of factors explaining the appearance of new protowords, the ability to combine them, and compose protophrases

When the interlocutors successfully achieved understanding and agreement, these tensions resolved in shared joy. A jointly experienced positive emotion is a vital sign of the interactive ritual of solidarity (see Chap. 3). It is reasonable to assume that group members and especially individuals with leadership qualities wished to experience the euphoria of shared joyous feelings again in this prestige arena. Having long been “social animals,” Erectuses were eager to engage in these acts of shared experience. Such everyday practices altered the neural, psychophysiological structures, and with multiple generations and multilevel selection, the corresponding gene, anatomical bases of speech skills and abilities (see Fig. 2.5).

6.7

The Subject-Predicate Structure: The Problem of Genesis

W. Wildgen offers the following version of the transition from the holophrases (utterances from a single protoword) to the subject-predicate structure as an initial stage of protolanguage (Fig. 6.4). The separation of holophrases leads to two consequences. On the one hand, the dynamic tension between the two separated parts remains active and drives the dynamics of sentence formation/understanding; on the other hand, new levels of complexity replace the holophrases integrity (the holophrastic gestalt); such are the turns in conversation, islands of monologue in the dynamics of conversation: stories, descriptions, or sequences of arguments (Wildgen, 2012, p. 376).

Wildgen’s conception suggests a leap from the very first stage, when hominins were capable of uttering only holophrases, to a protolanguage with primary syntax.

6.7

The Subject-Predicate Structure: The Problem of Genesis

167

First constituent: some protosubject or configuration of semantic roles

Holophrase (Holophrastic unit)

Dynamic field connecting the dividing poles: "connexion"/valence

Second constituent: a certain protopredicate

Fig. 6.4 The transition from the holophrases to the initial phase of the subject-predicate construction according to W. Wildgen (2012, p. 376)

However, such a grand leap in the development of speech is doubtful if we consider the general evolutionary principles (see Chap. 2). It is not clear what prevented hominins from uttering two or more protowords in succession in any order without assigning syntactic roles between them. This possibility is supported by several analogues, such as pre-speech of a child (Vygotsky, 1930/1997; Tomasello, 2008), combinations of signs in chimpanzee gestural language (Goodall, 1986), disorderly sets of graphemes in Kanzi’s communication (Lloyd, 2004). Wildgen did not hypothesize the reasons for the transition. However, within the framework of the concept developed here, it is necessary to point out the new communicative concerns for which a new structure, the subject-predicate construction, began to emerge. If indeed this were the most ancient transition from holophrases to syntax, then the universal order of words in the subject-predicate (S–P) sentence would have been preserved. Such an order does exist in many languages, but not in all (see about linguistic diversity in Chap. 11). Let us accept as a compromise the following version: certain groups of hominins (the progenitors of future language communities) switched from single protosyllables (holophrases) to sentences with word order (Fig. 6.5). Some of them emphasized the main topic, the main object of attention, and put it first in the utterance (the upper line of the great leap according to Wildgen). Other groups remained for a long time at the stage of uttering protophrases as a chaotic set of protowords with unclear syncretic meaning (the lower line). We will consider the second course of development more convenient for analysis, as it traces the evolution of protophrases: reactive, situational, leading-away, and arbitrary. It is likely that the late Heidelbergians or Protosapienses mastered and developed only reactive and situative protophrases (see below). Both lines converged as all our ancestors (Neoanthropes) eventually mastered syntax and grammar (Chap. 8). However, the key features of the original diversity remained (Chaps. 9 and 10). As a result, languages and their morphological types

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«The great leap - Wildgen's version Holophrase (a phrase of a single protoword)

Protosubject Dynamic field ("connexion"/valence) Protopredicate

Protophrases (chaotic chains of protowords): reactive, situational ones

Protophrases: leading-away, arbitrary (Chap. 7)

Pidgin-sentences as elements of the protolanguage (Chap. 7)

The version of the stepped transition

Diversity of syntax and grammar in different types of known languages (Chaps. 9–11)

Syntax and grammar emergence (Chap. 8)

Fig. 6.5 Two possible paths of transition from holophrases to protolanguage. The upper path is the Wildgen’s version. The lower path is discussed below and in the next chapters

differ greatly in word order, syntactic constructions, grammatical rules, and level of complexity (Chap. 11).

6.8

Multiplication of Protowords at the Ultramicro-Level

What was going on in the constantly occurring situations of misunderstanding? Let us look in more detail at the competition of recruitings (of mobilizing calls) as a social mechanism (Chap. 5). Two or more group members are trying to communicate something important to others. They did not achieve understanding, but the vital concern to find food does not allow stopping the attempts. How to explain to fellow tribe members that it is necessary to go there for so-andso food and not go in the other direction (which is senseless, dangerous)? One is trying to say that earlier (yesterday) there was an under-eaten carcass, and the other wants to convey that those toothy barkers have already eaten this carcass. So, he pulls to another place, wanting to encourage his fellow tribesmen to pick there the already ripe fruits. However, neither of these things can be understood. Furthermore, until understanding is achieved, how can they move anywhere? Suppose that the listeners do not recognize the sounds or understand their meaning, but it is vital to get the message across, and the speaker will not stop talking. The excited tribe members do not keep silent. Their “mirror neurons” (see Chap. 5) join the process, and they “ask back”: reproduce sounds but only the sounds that are familiar, clear, and habitual for them. Now the speaker adjusts and at last pronounces the familiar protoword or changes it, helping with facial expressions, gestures, and pantomime. If they achieve understanding, everyone is happy. Was the protoword used correctly? Were their agreement and collective decision justified? In a recruiting situation, participants go where the speaker calls them, and there they discover if the given name is adequate to the actual state of affairs: a type

6.8

Multiplication of Protowords at the Ultramicro-Level

169

of berry, fruit, root, other food, a source of clean water or stones suitable for making tools. Hominins renewed statements, denying the mistaken ones according to the seen situation. They recalled or rephrased protowords, and maybe picked up new ones. In any case, there was some reinforcement: negative for false names and positive for those certified by direct experience and joint agreement. Difficulties and failures in communication can have varied reasons: for lack of understanding of the meaning, values, or non-recognition of a sign (the pronounced sounds). In the first case, listeners recognize the protoword (or a combination of two–three protowords because there can be no more at this stage), but what the speaker is trying to communicate is still ununderstood. There is no correlation of the indistinct sound with the situation, someone’s interests, or what should or should not be done. The general tension of misunderstandings persists. Then, all available means are employed: gesture, facial expressions, bodily pantomime, and any other protowords as expressions of different versions of intended meaning. Hardly such action was cut short without result, fading away without understanding. When, finally, they reached an agreement, they fixed positively the successful chains of sounds. Now this speech element became apparent to all participants and was approved by them. How not to repeat it now amicably and joyfully? “Imprinted” thanks to such rituals protowords, which meant particular objects, then became reliably actualized when colliding with all similar things. Let us consider an alternative course of events. From the context of the situation, the apparent mood of the speaker, the meaning of his message is clear to everyone: what he is calling for, what he wants or demands, whose behavior is outraged about, what threat he means. However, he expressed it in a sound form very poorly, inarticulately, erroneously. Will it be enough just to understand the meaning and respond correctly in practice? Not at all. The listeners will inevitably correct the speaker by repeatedly pronouncing the “correct” protoword. In so doing, the speaker is “cross-examined” because everyone wants to understand correctly. What does the speaker do when he feels understood correctly? Of course, he adapts, and now “correctly” pronounces the protoword he did not manage at first. Here, moments of joy of understanding, repetition, and positive emotional reinforcement become the basis for “imprinting” the sound that is already unambiguously understood by everyone. Thus, because of such successful rituals, each protoword itself became an internal attitude that governed speech behavior: “That is the way I have to say it to be understood.” The magic wand of generating new names became even more “magical,” as it began to turn into passion and the ability to “name everything around.” Of course, “everything” initially included what was vital for groups and families: everything related to food, ways, and tools for its extraction and preparation, natural threats and protection against them, relations within the group, and with representatives of other groups. Protowords designated everything that fell into the focus of joint attention

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acts, persons, objects, their belonging, qualities: good/bad, big/small, ripe/unripe, tasty/unpalatable, etc. By the way, we still use many words as protowords. For example, when we do not know the exact names of technical details, we call them “thingy” or “that thing.” When talking about something strange, not very understandable to us, especially unpleasant and condemned, rude and destructive actions, threats of disasters, we usually do not use words with precise meanings. Instead, we use vague but very emotionally loaded protowords (here, obscene Russian language comes to my mind at once, but I let the readers recall their expressions in such situations).

6.9

From Single Protowords to Reactive Protophrases

Children aged 10–12 months utter the first solitary protowords (holophrases) in response to a visible event or a bright, impressing object that has come into the focus of attention. The same level of speech development occurred in hominins. If not Australopithecines, then Habilises and early Erectuses mastered late pre-speech, i.e., used holophrases recognized thanks to first distinctions of syllables and phonemes (see Chap. 5). The ability to pronounce and recognize chains of protowords, that is, protophrases, is difficult to separate from the stage of individual protowords. Where one is pronounced, two and three can be pronounced at once. When did protophrases become predominant? According to paleoanthropology, from 1.6 mya to 100 kya, there was a steady development of the vertebral column, especially the thoracic vertebrae. This feature allowed hominins to control breathing and, consequently, to utter long sequences of meaningful sounds (Wood & Bauernfeind, 2012). The protophrase stage differed from the simple repetition (muttering) of known sounds such as “talking” parrots. The distinction has a semantic character. A protophrase, albeit without a particular word order, was designed to convey some composite meaning that connected the values of its protowords. The principle of compositionality is that The meaning of an expression is a function of the meanings of its constituent parts and the way they are put together. In the purely pragmatic mode, with no grammatical rules or conventions for putting words together (beyond mere concatenation), there is already a simple systematic relationship between the meaning of a whole string and the meanings of its constituent words (Hurford, 2011, p. 611).

D. Dor formulates the same idea as a directed activation of experience existing in memory. ...the emergence of concatenation was actually revolutionary—in two complementary ways. To begin with, it presented listeners with a radically new challenge: they were no longer required to bring up from their memories clusters of experiences that were associated with mutually identified signs. They were asked to imagine the experiences associated with the sounds and then calculate the intersection between them: concentrate on

6.9

From Single Protowords to Reactive Protophrases

171

chasing-experiences and on rabbit-experiences, and then calculate the experience of rabbitchasing (Dor, 2015, p. 206).

Protophrases were originally a speech response to something meaningful and happening, usually in the visual field: “here and now.” Let us call such protophrases reactive ones. Why did they appear? Theoretically, the answer can be deduced from Spencer’s general evolutionary principle (see Chap. 2). Here, I will formulate the principle as follows: when there are general and particular concerns, and when the structures providing for particular concerns continue to differentiate, there will be inevitable attempts to integrate these structures to provide for general concerns. Indeed, the explosive growth of protowords responding to new particular concerns by reporting on essential parts or aspects of worrisome situations was that very differentiation of structures. So, the involuntary reaction to the whole situation and the desire to share one’s impression and understanding (a general communicative concern) led to natural attempts to combine different protowords in one statement (integration of structures). As mentioned above, the line between differentiated sound signals (to which anthropoids are also capable) and the very first protosyllables-holophrases of hominins’ early pre-speech are vague. The growth of the quantity of protowords led hominins to differ in sound signs by syllabic and phonemic structure, i.e., to rise to the late pre-speech (Chap. 5). Only articulatory distinct protowords can be composed into recognizable meaningful protophrases. The most talented anthropoids like bonobo Kanzi are capable of using protophrases via gesture signs or by manipulating images. Kanzi connected graphemes into chains due to human training. He most often produced chains like “wantbanana-food-banana-want” and stopped at this cognitive apex. Kanzi did not pass this ability on to other apes. Animals in the natural environment (!) cannot combine signals with different meanings into chains with a composite sense. A child starts to pronounce “Car be-be go,” “Dog woof-woof run.” Then the verbal ability develops rapidly due to genes, brainpower, and the constant influx of words and other language patterns from adults. Probably, late Erectuses or Heidelbergians became capable of transmitting in protophrases (chains of two, three, or more protowords) static or dynamic scenes and of recognizing such messages, even if at first only in “here and now” or just-beforeoccurring situations. Initially, such an ability appeared only for typical and repeated cases. The best explanation for this anchoring is the daily repeated rituals describing what was happening, both in public and private communication (see Chap. 7).

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The Childhood of Language: Rephrasing Rituals and Reactive Protophrases

Three Levels of Selection in Hominin Groups

Evolution involves not only variability (not necessarily random) but also selection. The first level is the selection of speech patterns. They must be elaborated in some way for further behavioral selection. The invention became necessary because the growing dependency on experiential mutualidentification locked humanity in a vicious circle—an extremely beneficial circle but a vicious one nevertheless: the ever-growing dependency of the community members on mutual-identification required a constant rise in the amount and quality of the information that could be shared and compared among the group; the rise in information sharing, however, only contributed to the deepening of the dependency (Dor, 2015, p. 202).

Undoubtedly, daily speech communication of adults encouraged all children, adolescents, and young people to participate. They took their example from communicative leaders who spoke most clearly, distinctly, and persuasively. Figure 6.6 presents the new contour of the model that explains the development of speech. Behavior selection was an imitation of the best in clarity and persuasiveness of speech. In the competition for status (the level of group membership), the main parameter became communicative leadership, i.e., the ability to pronounce sounds (protowords, then protophrases, sentences) clearly and understandable to others. Successful individuals in this new prestige niche evoked a positive reaction from others, found themselves in the center of attention, received positive reinforcement, and received flows of emotional energy: inspiration, enthusiasm, a sense of rightness, pride (Collins, 2004). Accordingly, the new successful speech patterns received a prestige marker and were mastered by the tribesmen. There has been the sexual selection of females and their cavaliers in phylogeny capable of articulating and recognizing speech over many generations. In the sphere of the erotic market, clear-speaking (later—eloquent) cavaliers became attractive for Level of mutual understanding

Effectiveness of rituals, teaching, leadership

Common desire to imitate verbal behavior of leaders Clarity of new meanings by new language structures

Subjectively significant social and communicative processes By-products of these processes

Activity of efforts and verbal success of some “communicative stars”

Importance of verbal communication for individuals and the desire to engage in it

New challenges and concerns of techno-natural niches and social orders

Striving of individuals to convey new meanings

The level of speech development in the group

Fig. 6.6 The loop of speech patterns selection (an effect of imitation on communicative leaders) is an additional contour to the spiral model. See versions of the model in Figs. 2.4 and 3.3. Here, the shaded blocks indicate new factors

The Severity of Group Selection and the Role of Speech in the. . .

6.11

Level of understanding

Clear articulation and clarity of meaning

Activity and effectiveness of rituals

The activity of verbal efforts and attempts in erotic communication

Hereditary speech abilities: brain structures of articulation, recognition of sounds, larynx, respiratory motor skills, verbal motility

173

Orderliness in the group

The importance of verbal communication for individuals and the desire to engage in it

Intensity of sexual selection on the criterion of speech proficiency

Subjectively significant social and communicative processes

The evolutionary byproducts of these processes

Level of speech development in a population

Fig. 6.7 The sexual selection contour as an addition to the spiral model of speech ability development. See versions of the model in Figs. 2.4 and 3.3. Shaded blocks indicate new factors

females as sexual partners and husbands, they received the best chances to spread their genes including verbal potential (Fig. 6.7).

6.11

The Severity of Group Selection and the Role of Speech in the Evolutionary Triumph of Sapienses

It appears that group selection played a significant role in the verbal evolution of hominins. As a mental experiment, let us imagine that only sexual selection acted. In addition to speech ability, there are many criteria for choosing mates for sex or family formation: height, build, beauty or special facial features, eye and hair color, tone of voice, body odor, character of movement, manner of behavior, skills in singing, dancing, hunting, cooking. There is great diversity for all these traits, albeit with different variability boundaries in known ethnic groups. In the case of purely sexual selection, the range of variability of speech ability would be, if not enormous (as with height, body weight, facial type, musical, and dancing abilities), but quite significant. However, healthy infants from all over the world have excellent assignments to master any language. In evolutionary terms, this fact indicates a highly severe or even ruthless selection in anthropogenesis of those groups (and covering populations) that mastered speech and achieved the maximum progress in this aspect. At the same time, all groups and&spi2;populations without speech or with some kind of primitive under-speech

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Activity and effectiveness of rituals, leadership, teaching. The orderliness, solidarity, trust within a group

Level of mutual understanding

Clear articulation and clarity of meaning

The group ability to plan, to incorporate experience, and to coordinate collective action

Intensity of intergroup selection for adaptability to environment, coordination, military success, attractiveness to transition of potential mothers from other groups

Hereditary speech abilities: brain structures of articulation, recognition of sounds, larynx, respiratory motor skills, verbal motility

The success of the most solidary, coordinated groups in the natural environment and intergroup competition

Population growth, division of large successful groups, assimilation of losers or their displacement

Level of speech development in the surviving and growing groups

Fig. 6.8 The positive feedback contours in the group selection dynamics as the most vital driver of speech ability development

and under-language (without many words with precise meanings, without clear phonemes, without syntax, without the ease to generate new phrases and sentences) perished. They left only their tools, and bone remains significantly different from the sapient ones to archaeologists. Group selection was carried out in three principal areas: (a) Survival in the natural environment (b) In conflict, including violent military clashes, in the struggle for control of territory (hunting grounds) (c) In the attractiveness of groups for potential mothers passing from their group to a foreign one (patrilocality) In the first two spheres, the main factors of success were the coordination of collective actions, the ability to plan, the consideration of previous experience, including that accumulated in the generations. Learnability, that is, the ability to acquire various skills played an extraordinary role. The higher was the level of speech development in a group, the greater was its success and advantage over competitive groups (Fig. 6.8). In the third sphere, as already mentioned in Chap. 4, young girls, who often left their groups, probably chose the most socially successful and friendly groups, where they would be fed, supported, and not offended. It is reasonable to assume that such friendliness was connected with intragroup solidarity and the level of development of verbal communication, and young girls knew how to recognize this level.3 The 3

Let us note here the features of the female psyche that have survived to this day: special attention to the emotional side of speech, aversion to rudeness and aggression, subtlety in distinguishing

6.12

Heidelbergians and Their Cognitive Abilities

175

“Market” of groups chosen by potential mothers is of immense importance in the systematic demographic gain of more attractive groups. Unfortunately, this factor, so significant for glottogenesis and, more broadly, sapientation throughout anthropogenesis, has not yet received worthy research attention. Speech ability, norms, and other structures of social order necessary for the survival of groups had spread through intergroup communication. Ethnographic observations suggest that people have a strong tendency to imitate those who are successful (Boyd & Richerson, 2006, p. 466).

6.12

Heidelbergians and Their Cognitive Abilities

The presumptive date for the early pre-speech development (a few dozen holophrases) is 2.7–2.5 mya: this is the epoch of Habilises and other Early Homo. Later, 1.7–1.5 mya, Pre-Archanthropes mastered pre-speech with syllable distinction, phonemes, and protophrases (Chap. 5). Acceleration of tool technologies since ca. 1.6 mya also indicates progress in verbal communication that is crucial for effective teaching. Hominin reliance on stone technology would have generated selection for increasingly complex communication that allowed the more effective spread of stone-tools. Under this continued selection, teaching, symbolic communication and eventually verbal language may have been favoured, allowing the ready transmission of abstract flaking concepts, such as the role of the exterior platform angle in choosing where to strike, which our findings shown are effectively transmitted by language. Given the increased complexity of the later Acheulean and Mousterian lithic technologies, with their reliance on ‘long sequences of hierarchically organized actions’ and other abstract concepts, our results imply that hominins possessed a capacity for teaching—and potentially simple proto-language—as early as 1.7 mya (Morgan et al., 2015, p. 6).

The time of confident mastering of articulate speech: already with hundreds of protowords and the phonetic system formation falling in the period 800–300 kya. With Heidelbergians, who lived about 500–400 kya, researchers associate the sapient development of the larynx, the hyoid nerve canal, and the respiratory muscles (Wood & Bauernfeind, 2012). J. Zlatev (2014, p. 263), conducting a systematic analysis of four socially oriented theories of glottogenesis (R. Dunbar, T. Deacon, M. Tomasello, and S. Hrdy), concludes that Heidelberg man already possessed “multimodal language,” or “hand-mouth communication.” These were protophrases of two to three or more protowords accompanied by gestures. So, what consciousness abilities corresponded to the mastery of articulate speech at this level?

intonation, responsiveness to loving, supportive words. These developed abilities allowed girls to fit into new groups (where everyday communication between women became essential) and “diagnose” more attractive groups for transition.

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Archeologists believe that the Heidelbergians began confidently to master fire (ca 350 kya), began to maintain it, and set up fires, which implied collective cooking. Then, they started building sheds, some semblances of dwellings (Tattersall, 2010, p. 196). To preserve the fire that was “yesterday early” and should remain “tomorrow later,” to prepare fuel in advance, all this is impossible without expanding consciousness and the ability to orient in time. Orientation in space and time is the most crucial step in developing consciousness.4 The group care for fire and the construction and maintenance of dwellings with necessity required cooperation, mutual understanding on a sufficiently complex level, and thus the use of protowords and protophrases with complex meanings. Heidelbergians probably had access to: • The ability to distinguish relations of belonging, to follow appropriate rules of access both to boons and resources (tasty food, tools, places) and to tribe members (especially in the sexual sphere) • The ability to distinguish more complex and diverse rules, to recognize others’ and one’s actions falling under them; to feel shame, pride, anger, and respect when comparing actions with normative attitudes • The ability to fix attention on “tomorrow” and “yesterday” and then to keep watch on the changing days, to mentally navigate in them (probably due to the need to maintain fire, to make fuel)

6.13

Did Neanderthals Talk? What Could They Say?

There remains a legitimate question as to why the African descendants of Heidelbergians followed the path of complication of language constructions. On the other hand, the speech abilities of the Neanderthals (the descendants of the same Heidelbergians) who have moved earlier to Eurasia remain disputable. There is a well-known mishap with the “brain championship” of Neanderthals, whose brain volume grew up to 1740 cm3. The average brain volume of sapienses is modest: 1355–1500 cm3 (Corballis, 2010, p. 116). The Neanderthals made impressive progress in tool technology (Moustier, Levallois) and material arrangement (e.g., they built dwellings from mammoth bones). In a recent review purporting to “triangulate” all the essential data on the cognitive abilities of Neanderthals, M. Breyl lists their achievements as follows: • • •

Long-distance transport of materials and establishment of local workshops Free use of fire for cooking and technology, for example, production of hafting materials Long-term and hierarchical planning in tool production and resource management

The ability to orient oneself in space and time outside the perceived visual field constitutes the primary function of consciousness. Therefore, psychiatrists treat consciousness simply and sensibly: their first questions when consciousness is suspected are: “What is the date, month, year?” “Where do you live? “Where are we?” “How did you get here?”

4

6.13 • • • • • • •

Did Neanderthals Talk? What Could They Say?

177

Production of tools classically seen as modern, like blade technology and ranged weapons in the form of throwing spears Early use of pigments and production of ornaments from seashells, beads, geodes, feathers, and talons Production of cave paintings and possibly construction of ritual sites Burial behavior, though possibly not fully compatible with modern funerary behavior Roughly modern, seasonal sustenance strategies including plants, mushrooms, nuts, small and big game, birds, sea food including fish and marine mammals Social (health) care toward oneself as well as the group, including natural remedies as well as mouth hygiene via toothpicks Seemingly crossing of open water (Breyl, 2021, p. 10)

For all that, the Neanderthals tragically lost the interspecies competition. Researchers have long argued about the linguistic abilities of Neanderthals.5 For a long time, the prevailing view was their inability to articulate (Bickerton, 1981, 2002). However, based on new data, authoritative scientists are writing increasingly confidently about the prominent level of cognitive and speech abilities of Neanderthals. Thus, the fairly sapient characteristics of the sublingual nerve canal indicate the absence of severe anatomical obstacles for Neanderthals to articulate. There are also arguments about their speech gene FOXP2. They repeated crossbreeding with sapienses (Fitch, 2009; Dediu & Levinson, 2013, 2018; Ferretti et al., 2018). At the same time, the cerebellum in Neanderthals was significantly smaller than in sapienses, especially the right part responsible for speech and communication (Kochiyama et al., 2018). The “bottleneck” detected by paleogenetics ca. 75–70 kya (Amos & Hoffman, 2010) suggests that subsequent migrants to Eurasia, the Early sapienses, may have had only a small number of languages (see details in Chap. 9). The authoritative adherents of the high intellectual and linguistic abilities of paleoanthropes D. Dediu and S. Levinson believe that the known modern diversity of languages (7000–8000) could not have appeared without the contribution of the languages of Neanderthals and Denisovans (Dediu & Levinson, 2013, p. 11). This argument does not stand up to criticism because the languages of Africans, whose ancestors never mixed and communicated with these paleoanthropes, are characterized by awe-inspiring diversity.6 In favor of the Neanderthal speech ability, researchers emphasize their technological advancement and their ability to survive in a wide variety of climatic conditions. . . .We think it is overwhelmingly likely that neanderthals were as much articulate beings as we ourselves are, that is, with large vocabularies and combinatorial structures that allowed propositional content and illocutionary force to be conveyed. Only such an advanced communication system could have carried the advanced cultural adaptations that neanderthals exhibited. (...) If one considers all of the cultural skills needed to survive in ecologies

5

For an overview of the discussion, see Dediu and Levinson (2013, 2018) and Ferretti et al. (2018, pp. 221–222). 6 The Niger-Congolese language phylum has 1542 languages, according to the handbook, Ethnologue https://www.ethnologue.com/browse/families.

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from the Arctic to game-poor Mediterranean littorals, it is difficult to argue that neanderthals lacked complex linguistic codes, capable of communicating about spatial locations, hunting and gathering, fauna and flora, social relations, technologies, and so on. This would imply a large lexicon and propositional encoding. Granting neanderthals advanced language capacities seems to us inevitable (Dediu & Levinson, 2018, pp. 52–53).

All adaptations to the harsh natural environment are included in “here and now” situations. These adaptations do not require new steps in the development of consciousness, imagination, memory, articulate speech, much less complex language structures. As for the universal adaptability of Neanderthals to various natural conditions, in this respect all hominins, including Homo sapiens, can only envy wolves, jackals, hares, mice, rats, crows, and sparrows. Such adaptations do not need speech at all. I will not question the ability of Neanderthals to articulate and use many protowords. If possession of speech were a binary scale (is or is not, 1 or 0), we could agree with D. Dediu and Levinson. However, if we admit that there were many rungs in the scale of linguistic complexity, which was available to the Neanderthals? Recognizing their ability to articulate and generate new protowords, we must also accept their ability to utter reactive protophrases, perhaps also chains of protophrases with intentions of invocation, message, demand, complaint, threat, and gratitude. If the Kanzi were capable of protophrases, then it is wrong to deny this ability to our “cousins” with whom our distant ancestors repeatedly mated, i.e., found some “common language” with them (Pääbo, 2014). Were messages about distant situations in space and time accessible to Neanderthals? Were sentences with a clear order of elements available to them? Did they arbitrarily use full-fledged words with meanings other than momentary situations, words with strong semantic links between themselves? Did they have a command of syntax and grammar? In further reflections, I rely only on circumstantial evidence and theoretical considerations.

6.14

How and Why Were Neanderthals Different from African Protosapienses

The fate of most Erectuses who moved to Eurasia and beyond before the main migration wave (55–40 kya) was unenviable (Shea, 2007, pp. 474–475; Armitage et al., 2011; Fernandes et al., 2012; Rohling et al., 2013, p. 196). Only part of the Heidelbergians, who mastered hunting large herbivores in western Europe, became Neanderthals and survived until 30–25 kya (in Crimea and lands of modern Spain). A small number of South Siberian Denisovans and Indonesian “hobbits” died much earlier. The contrast with the sapienses, who conquered the entire planet, is striking. Both populations hunted large mammals whose herds grazed in the African savannahs (which appeared during the retreat of jungles and deserts) and in the steppes of Eurasia (during the retreat of glaciers).

6.14

How and Why Were Neanderthals Different from African Protosapienses

179

The technologies of the Middle and Early Upper Paleolithic were similar; composite tools, scrapers, ropes, and the first bone products appeared. African products were by no means superior in complexity and finish to European and Asian products (McBrearty & Brooks, 2000; Vishnyatsky, 2008; Breyl, 2021). In Africa and Europe, there were intergroup interactions and relations, both conflicting and friendly, including marriages. Thus, paleogenetic studies have shown that people from El Cidron (northwest of modern Spain) maintained a patrilocal order: young men stayed in the group, and girls moved from their group to another. Again, the brain grew in the Paleoanthropes of both Africa and Eurasia. Morphological changes in the skull and skeleton continued toward sapientation (albeit at different rates). Why then did the Neanderthals stop their development, ultimately losing the competition, while their “cousins,” the African Paleoanthropes, transformed into Neoanthropes and took over all the inhabitable lands with time? What specific factors in Africa (primarily southern and eastern Africa) over several hundred thousand years led the Paleoanthropes there to near-final sapientation? The low rate (or even halting) of paleoanthropic evolution in Eurasia has primary causes explained by their small number, the dispersion of small groups over vast territories. The onslaught of glaciers aggravated the situation, which resulted in many groups dying out. Very plausible is the “bottleneck” effect due to the eruption of the Toba volcano around 74 kya. The further “volcanic winter,” which cooled the whole planet, produced a real pestilence of the already rare paleoanthropic groups in the rough middle latitudes of Eurasia of that time; see more details in Chap. 9). The too large fetal head as an anatomical nuisance negatively affected Neanderthal survival. It caused frequent birth traumas, resulted in the death of infants or parturients, kept the population at low levels of numbers, and served as a loss factor in competition. Furthermore, the small number of Neanderthals coupled with a vast dispersion meant low social and cognitive development rates. Under such conditions, the ability to withstand the cold was a crucial selection factor in the Neanderthal population. Their small and dispersed groups (families?) did not need to negotiate and conclude intergroup alliances (see Chap. 8). Instead, they achieved noteworthy progress in clothes making and began building dwellings (the Neoanthropes who came to these lands later adopted these abilities very quickly and developed them). The number of African groups of (proto)sapienses was much more significant due to the more favorable climatic and resource conditions in Africa than in Eurasia. After the Toba eruption, the “volcanic winter” was more sparing to the fauna and population of consistently warmer Africa than Europe. The already small number of Neanderthals fell even more severely. With a considerable and steadily growing population in Africa (before the Toba catastrophe, but with the subsequent resumption of growth), intergroup clashes, conflicts, alliances, and forced migrations with new clashes contributed to competition. As always in history, competition and exchange led to social and cultural progress and cognitive evolution. The greater frequency of contacts and transitions

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from group to group of African Paleoanthropes (Protosapienses) and subsequent Neoanthropes (Early sapienses) enhanced exchanges and cultural diffusion and thus promoted the spread of progressive practices (see principles of evolution in Chap. 2). In more numerous groups, joint meals turned into regular communication rituals and arenas of competition for prestige. The assumption of Neoanthropes’ ability to form large alliances, in contrast to Neanderthals’ life only in small groups, serves as an additional explanation of such a radical displacement of the latter. Early sapienses from Africa were unlikely to go to distant, unknown, threatening lands only in small groups. They were more likely combat-ready alliances, bound together by kinship ties and with speech abilities for coordination (Chap. 7). Could the Neanderthals or the Denisovans, having found themselves in more favorable conditions, having multiplied, and having undergone the same rigorous selection, also have acquired full-fledged language and consciousness on their own within a few hundred thousand years? There are no arguments to rule out such a hypothetical possibility. However, this branch of evolution turned out to be cut off, and not without our ancestors’ participation.

6.15

Probable Level of Neanderthals’ Speech Development

Note that anthropologists explain much in the technology of late Neanderthals (40–25 kya) by borrowing from sapienses, and there is no reason to argue with this judgment. It turns out that Neanderthals were able, with their champion brain, to rise to the technological (and hence cognitive in the sphere of material practice) level through imitation and learning (Breyl, 2021). So why didn’t it work for them? They were probably losing significantly in the other cognitive spheres, not by one (surmountable) but by two or more steps. According to the a priori rules of glottogenesis (Chap. 2), reactive protophrases gave rise to leading-away ones. Then pidgin-sentences and simple syntax with grammar emerged. Later, complications, rhetorical embellishments, and professional terminology developed. The next chapter will argue that the Early sapienses who migrated to the expanses of Eurasia possessed, at the very least, pidgin-sentences (with meaningful wordorder schemes), full-fledged words, perhaps the rudiments of syntax. Out of reverence for arguments of advanced Neanderthal speech (Dediu & Levinson, 2013, 2018; Breyl, 2021), let us recognize that Neanderthals used late pre-speech (with phoneme articulation) and could utter reactive protophrases. Could it be that Neanderthals, like Early sapienses, reached the level of pidgin sentences with a clear word order? This version seems highly doubtful because the order of words already implies a primary distinction of their types (parts of speech and their analogs). This is a direct way to form at least the simplest syntactic constructions. Moreover, if reaching the level of pidgin-sentences with full-fledged words was associated with negotiating and creating intergroup alliances (see the

6.15

Probable Level of Neanderthals’ Speech Development

181

argument in Chap. 7), then such practices and concerns could not have existed in disparate and small groups of Neanderthals. Did the Neanderthals master leading-away protophrases? As a concession to all the noble defenders of Neanderthal virtues, it is possible to admit only attempts and the very beginning of their mastering, but no more than that. Developed and confidently mastered leading-away protophrases testify to a radical leap in the development of consciousness, because thanks to them, interlocutors can “fly away in thought” to situations and events far away from what is happening here and now (Donald, 2001; Gabora & Smith, 2018). With such a mind, with the correspondent ability to verbalize, remember, and transmit experience in generations, Neanderthals could survive somehow even with the onset of sapienses challenge. But the Neanderthals failed. The leading-away protophrases refer to the invisible, which one cannot immediately point at with a finger. In the absence of such a straightforward way of referencing, there are bound to be challenges of misunderstanding and increased worries about achieving understanding, i.e., concerns about delivering and recognizing more accurate and unambiguous messages. Therefore, the leading-away protophrases are naturally and relatively quickly transformed into pidgin-sentences. If we agree that Neanderthals did not have the latter, then we must admit that they did not manage to master the leading-away protophrases either truly. In their absence, protowords could not become full-fledged words because reactive protophrases are situational, and thus their constituent elements have no reason to overcome this situationality. Neanderthals lived in families and small clans, probably of the harem and patriarchal type. Although they used fire, they did not need a strict order of access to food. Thus, they could not develop the crucial norm of statement order, sequenced replicas exchange (Chap. 7). Furthermore, Neanderthals were not motivated to assert their status through stories of their recent exploits; there was no group concern to control behavior outside of “here and now” situations. Consequently, there were no strong motives to learn about past situations. Thus, Neanderthals did not need and could not develop public discussions of conflict situations, investigations, prestigious verbal self-presentation, intergroup negotiations (Chap. 8). The mere reference to the small number of Neanderthals is not sufficient, since it was primarily a consequence of worse adaptation to the environment and the fragility, instability of larger groups (probably due to mutual alienation, inability to agree on the order of communal life). The deficient proportion of Neanderthal admixtures (1.6–2.7%) in modern non-African genomes (Pääbo, 2014) indicates a substantial difference in the potential for dominance and adaptability between sapienses (inexperienced newcomers in unfamiliar cold lands) and Neanderthals (experienced old-timers who had been mastering these lands for tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of years). Thus, even considering the more significant numbers of sapienses coming from Africa, the demographic and genomic results of their close encounters with Neanderthals would have been quite different at cognitive parity.

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If the gap in the level of development of speech and other cognitive abilities had been only one or two steps, then, considering crossbreeding and direct interchange of technologies with the coming sapienses, the Neanderthals should have been able to develop their speech and other cognitive abilities. However, they could not do this. So, it was a more significant gap (see Table 7.1 in the next chapter). The reason for the unprecedentedly large brain of the Neanderthals becomes clear. In the absence of syntactic constructions, they still accumulated experience, clearly evolved cognitively, as evidenced by advanced tool technology, dwellings, the rudiments of pictorial activity, the first burials (see the Breill’s list above). Of course, all these achievements presupposed coordination, but the mechanical accumulation of protowords provided the main communicative concerns. As far as new challenges and concerns emerged, the memory, the corresponding brain, and skull volume of the Neanderthals grew extensively. At the same time, our ancestors found a unique way to develop language, memory, culture, and even vocabulary thanks to all kinds of flexible structures and convolutions—syntax, grammar, conceptual relations, and complex semantics. Moreover, such structures otherwise utilized substantially transformed neural mechanisms, which no longer required extensive brain enlargement. The effect of the evolutionary channel “with a smaller brain but more convolutions and potential meanings” also significantly reduced birth trauma risks from a too sizeable fetal skull, again contributing to population growth, contact density, and the multifaceted progress of sapienses. Joseph Henrich (2015) offered a similar explanation. Neanderthals needed “individually large brains” to compensate for their “small collective brains.” Henrich’s book focuses on the driving role of culture, the trans-generational transmission of acquired skills, abilities, rules, rituals. All these ideas and considerations are indisputable. So, let us only ask a question: Why did the “collective brains” of our ancestors, with the same or even smaller volume of skulls, and hence the amount of gray matter, master cultural experience, which, in perspective, was significantly greater than that of Neanderthals? The answer is unambiguous: because (proto)sapienses transmitted their growing experience to new generations through much more developed language. The colossal volume of culture could be stored in the memory of living people and transferred to new generations thanks to language constructions and complex semantic links between words. Relevant was also the ability to generate, understand, memorize, and modify various meanings thanks to syntax and grammar. Therefore, the linguistic explanation of sapienses’ victory over Neanderthals is not an alternative to the reason through sapienses’ “social and cultural brains.” Instead, their essential language advantage is a significant aspect and a specification of this evolutionary gap. Table 6.1 presents the factors of speech development from Pre-Archanthropes to Protosapienses and Neanderthals. The emergence of the leading-away protophrases and the transition to pidgin sentences constituted another glotto-aromorphosis of enormous significance for the development of language, consciousness, and the entire human psyche. The next chapter is devoted to the explanation of this breakthrough.

Time, prominent representatives, technology, brain volume 1.6–0.3 mya. From Pre-Archanthropes to Heidelbergians. Hunters. Acheul. Brain up to 1250 cm3 Neanderthals at the same stage of speech and cognitive development 300–25 kya, brain up to 1740 cm3

New material practices, techno-natural niches, and social orders The basics of thermal processing of food. Labor-intensive production of efficient implements. The complete dominance of coalitions and the assertion of normativity. Everyday communicative environment within groups. Established rules of tool ownership and regulations of sexual access

New regulatory and communicative concerns Different foods require different processing. The actions of cooking also needed signs to convey and remember. Tools required different raw materials and processing procedures, which also needed labels. The number of meanings for new actions, objects, and their qualities grew. It was necessary to be able to articulate and distinguish new designations: protowords

Table 6.1 The main factors of early speech development New structures and abilities Ritual and Types of Linguistic communication practices Constructions Growth of abilities and Situational control of skills to distinguish sylthe implementation of the expanding range of lables (and protowords rules. Development of composed of them) by phonemes (also tones the mechanism of and clicks in some lancompetition recruiting guages). with making joint The beginning of a decisions, memorization of new protowords rapid growth in the number of protowords. with positive reinBreath control allowed forcement. pronouncing Rituals of rephrasing protophrases, that is, and guessing to oversome protowords in a come misunderstandrow. Even more so, they ing. Naming new had to be articulated objects more clearly as reactive and situational protophrases. The discreteness, duality, and semantics of the language developed. Hominins reached the stage of articulate speech, although still primitive

Cognitive abilities Abilities to distinguish relations of belonging, designate actions, objects, and their most essential qualities for life Naming situations, actions, objects, places, people as a found magic wand It was necessary to memorize information about the location and qualities of different prey. Establishing and remembering new rules of behavior with the help of new protowords

6.15 Probable Level of Neanderthals’ Speech Development 183

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Chapter 7

“Managing Imagination” of Interlocutors and the Phases of Protolanguage Development

7.1

At What Stage in the Language Evolution Were the Early Sapienses?

L. Progovac, considering the scenario “from Africa,” believes that the sapienses who came to Eurasia possessed only the simplest “two-slot paratactic grammar” of the subject-predicate type as the most ancient structure preceding the latest linguistic hierarchies and diversity of forms. Given this widely-adopted uniregional scenario for the origins of humans, it is likely that H. sapiens exhibited only the two-slot paratactic grammar before the dispersion to different geographical locations, which would in turn mean that their ancestors, such as H. erectus and H. heidelbergensis, could not have had more than that either (. . .) suggesting that human languages reconstruct back to a flat paratactic two-slot stage, which they share, rather than to any common hierarchical stage. The paratactic two-slot platform, (. . .) is a deep, conservative property of language that could have been in place in the common ancestor(s) of humans. On the other hand, the profound variation in the expression of hierarchical phenomena suggests that these diverging hierarchical solutions are a later add-on, which did not emerge only once (in Africa), but instead multiple times, and independently, either within Africa, or after the dispersion from Africa (Progovac, 2019, p. 80).

This thesis about only two-slot syntax in Early sapienses has not been proven in any way. Probably, its ulterior motivation is the premise of some linguistic uniformity of the people coming out of Africa. Most likely, this premise is false, because there could not have been any factors for such a unity (no close contacts between everybody and everybody, no unifying social structures like states or schools, etc.). The alliances of several groups probably migrated as linguistic communities. They were in a variety of relationships with each other, including rivalry and enmity. In Chap. 9, it will be shown that even during the period of extreme depopulation (ca. 70–74 kya) the number of such communities ranged from about 150–300. It means that the roots of the subsequent linguistic diversity had already emerged then. Thus, Progovac’s version of the two-slot protogrammar should rather be attributed to earlier stages of sapientation, such as the Heidelbergians. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_7

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The Theoretical Necessity of Recognizing Protolanguage

We have focused on the ability of hominins, presumably late Heidelbergians and Protosapienses, to invent new protowords and connect them into chains, i.e., protophrases, without any particular order of elements yet. Protophrases initially were reactive: several protowords were pronounced “automatically” in response to events around, actions of other persons, the occurrence of significant objects (predators, a stream, potential food). The mastered pronunciation practices (and, probably, joint repetition) of such protophrases led to the ability to pronounce them arbitrarily. Hominins used protophrases in normative rituals for censure-barring and approval-encouragement, for calls to collective actions (recruiting), complaints, flirting, and expression of sympathy. In all these cases, protophrases remained situational because the “umbilical cord” connecting the protoword with concrete situations “here and now” was preserved. Much later, sapienses would have a full-fledged language with syntax and grammar. The gap between this level of complexity and situational protophrases is too great. However, significant cognitive processes were taking place in this interval, which constitute some particular evolutionary periods. An almost generally accepted category for the corresponding stage of glottogenesis has become the notion of “protolanguage,” which D. Bickerton actively applied, which we will use similarly. Bickerton likens the protolanguage to pidgin, a language that spontaneously emerges between native speakers of languages far apart from each other (e.g., in colonies or frontier markets) (Bickerton, 1981, 2002, 2009). Usually, pidgins do not use syntax and grammar, but when the context is familiar to the interlocutors, the clear word order makes communication quite effective. A typical ordering scheme is subject-action-object. Schemes of this kind resemble syntax but are different because they lack parts of speech (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and conjunctions) and distinct word forms. I accept this view of protolanguage as an intermediate stage from situational protophrases to full-fledged language, but with the following additions. First, we should consider and explain the formation of another intermediate stage: the leading-away protophrases. Second, it is necessary to explain how and why protowords had transformed into full-fledged words.

7.3

A Protolanguage Began with Protosemantics

According to the basic principle of the provision adopted in this study (Chap. 2), structures emerge in response to concerns, and language structures are elaborated in response to communicative concerns. Thus, signifying structures (vocabulary,

7.3

A Protolanguage Began with Protosemantics

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phonetics, word forms) respond to pragmatic and semantic concerns to communicate or express something and to instrumental concerns of more convenient pronounceability and recognizability.1 Bickerton gives the following example: The words “cat, mat” spoken together immediately evoke the familiar image of “a cat sitting (or lying) on the mat.” So, he believes that there was no semantics in protolanguage, only this kind of static imagery. J.-L. Dessalles (2007) argues differently: a special protosemantics corresponded to protolanguage, which included, along with images of static states, also pictures of actions and dynamic scenes: compositions of several steps, changes in situations. The problem facing us (how are we to define protosemantics in relation to protolanguage?) is relatively constrained in four parameters, as follows: (1) protosemantics must be a functional field of meanings; (2) it must be locally optimal for a given biological function; (3) it must subsist in modern humans, either as a fossilized competence or as a functional subset of our semantic competence; (4) protolanguage, as we understand it from the study of pidgin, must be locally optimal for the expression of this protosemantics (Dessalles, 2007, p. 173–174).

Indeed, protophrases are sufficient to denote images and static scenes: “catcarpet,” and everything is already evident. On the other hand, pidgin-sentences of the protolanguage served a more complex semantics. Let us assume that Dessalles is correct: understanding and communicating dynamic scenes were important to hominins. However, if the movement takes place only in the “here and now” situation, what is the reason to complicate the sign structure? “Run-cat,” “cat-run,” “fast-cat,” “cat-fast”—any such protophrases quite adequately convey the message of what is happening when it is seen. It is not the case when reporting something that took place (or is expected, planned) in another time and space. Communicating such events requires, at the very least, pidgin-sentences. However, it is necessary to understand why all of a sudden late Heidelbergians or Protosapienses started to talk about something distant, not sporadically, seldom, privately, but systematically, frequently, publicly. The sufficient permanent concern and practices mean that late hominins had significant attention to the content and to the proper understanding of it. Only daily attempts at communication of this kind could lead to an epochal transformation of the statement structure. It was then that the notorious displacement (Hockett, 1963), one of the essential language universals, appeared. Again, according to the principle of provision, first, there was a concern to report the “distant, now invisible,” and only then were the sign constructions adequate to this concern formed. This reasoning serves as the basis for introducing leading-away

1

As noted in Chap. 3, the articulatory practices and phonetic structures that provide instrumental concerns result in their difficulties and costs, which generate linguistic concerns not realized by native speakers. They are related to the limitations of the speech apparatus, the ease of pronunciation, and the efficiency of recognition. These concerns are specific for each definite language, leading to the formation and development (probably divergent) of different phonetic structures in different languages. These processes constitute the subject of evolutionary linguistics and are beyond the scope of this study.

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protophrases as an intermediate stage between situational (including reactive) protophrases and pidgin-sentences of protolanguage.

7.4

Leading-Away Protophrases and Separation of Consciousness from Attention

I call utterances with extrasituative semantics leading-away protophrases because the speaker intends to lead the listener mentally away from the “here and now” situation to another, distant one as if to “escape” there with unified, jointly focused attention. It is the beginning of “elsewhere talks.”2 The corresponding ability of the mind to focus attention on situations in another place or time, to consider what has happened or is happening there in one’s behavior, is conceptualized by Daniel Dor as “instruction of imagination” (of listeners): Language is the only system that goes beyond the sharing of experience. It allows speakers to intentionally and systematically instruct their interlocutors in the process of imagining the intended experience—instead of directly experiencing it. The speaker provides the receiver with a code, a plan, a skeletal list of the basic co-ordinates of the experience—which the receiver is then expected to use as a scaffold for experiential imagination. Following the code, the interlocutor raises past experiences from memory, and then reconstructs and recombines them to produce novel, imagined experiences (Dor, 2015, p. 2).

The ability (at first jointly, according to Vygotsky’s principle; see Chap. 3) to switch attention to events outside of the visual field, outside of a situation “here and now” having appeared. Why did it become necessary to communicate something about distant situations? Under what social conditions did this become possible, regular, and typical? What was the mechanism for this crucial evolutionary breakthrough? Donald (1991) interpreted it as a transition from the “episodic mind” to the “mimetic mind.” The latter allowed late hominins to arbitrarily retrieve stored traces regardless of current cues from the environment. Thus, they used “keys to themselves” (autocue). Donald called this type of mind “mimetic” because of its ability to reproduce past events or events that may occur in the future. Liane Gabora and Cameron Smith (2018) turned to Donald’s concept of the “selftriggered recall and rehearsal loop” (STR) to identify the neural mechanisms of these processes. They also, like Donald, attribute the transition to progress in brain capacity due to an increase in brain volume. This growth allowed not only more memories with more details to be stored but also to switch from one memory to another due to the overlap of remembered qualities as fixed in the corresponding neural ensembles: ... The smaller the number of neurons a brain has to work with, the fewer attributes of any given item it can encode, and the less able it is to forge associations on the basis of shared

2

I am grateful to Randall Collins for his help with the English terminology.

Why Was It Necessary to Verbally “Lead Away” the Listeners?

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attributes. Conversely, the evolution of a more fine-grained memory meant that representations could be encoded in more detail, i. e., distributed across larger sets of cell assemblies containing more neurons. Since the memory organization was content addressable, that meant more ways in which distributed representations could meaningfully overlap. Greater overlap enabled more routes by which one memory could evoke another. This in turn made possible the onset of STR, and paved the way for the capacity to engage in recursive recall and streams of abstract thought, and a limited kind of insight (Gabora & Smith, 2018, p. 5).

The main thrust of M. Donald’s work is to argue for the extra somatic (in a sense anti-Darwinist) nature of cognitive evolution (Donald, 1991, 2000, 2001). He quite rightly sees the driver of evolution in culture. Before invention of writing, culture was not “located” in a single organism or brain but a community of individuals. Donald emphasizes oral speech and the capacity for “representational redescription.” He associates the ability to clarify thoughts and ideas. An individual capable of such a redescription would “escape” temporarily from the current situation and communicate his “escape” to his listeners through facial expressions, gestures, pantomime, and meaningful correspondent sounds. Mechanisms appeared that produced the ability to connect protophrases with a joint “leading-away” meaning. At the same time, a verbal neural ensemble began to correspond to each such protophrase, and the neural ensembles of denotations activated in speakers and listeners upon its activation. Thanks to this, the very joint mental “escape” of the speaker and the listeners from the present situation “here and now” to some distant and then abstract objects took place (as it still happens with us). Such a shift in (proto)semantics meant a cardinal advance on the scale of the entire cognitive evolution, first of all in consciousness. In general, the development of consciousness appears as a sequential and multistage acquisition by hominins of the ability to focus attention on distant, now invisible situations and objects, then to move this attention in the course of communication, then to do it arbitrarily (although still jointly), then individually, but by speaking, then without external speech, and finally even without conscious internal speech.

7.5

Why Was It Necessary to Verbally “Lead Away” the Listeners?

Now let us ask ourselves: why, instead of still living and interacting “episodically,” i.e., in “here and now” situations? Why did the late hominins (Protosapienses?) suddenly begin to mentally “escape” from the present situation and try to communicate something to their fellow tribe members about situations distant in space or in time? The standard explanation of this mental “escape” is logistical: Food resources, raw materials for stone tools, water sources, and dangers were far away, and therefore, it was necessary to report them. Generally speaking, many social animals roam large territories either in search of prey, protecting the territory, or combining

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these tasks. Some animal communities sometimes divide into smaller groups; for example, sentinel and hunting commands of chimpanzees usually include only adult males. However, they all do pretty well without speech. Recruitment and even competition of recruitments (see Chap. 6) are not sufficient explanations. The call for tribe members to go after some prey mentally links the visible environment with a distant resource into one coherent situation. Of course, there was also an advance in consciousness abilities here, but not enough to explain the “self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop.” What mighty factor made Protosapienses actively engage in “representational redescription”? Under what conditions did the use of leading-away protophrases become exactly a mass practice, i.e., occurred in all groups moving in this direction of language complication and consciousness expansion? It is essential to keep in mind that a protophrase alone could not be enough to “manage imagination” of the listeners. A speech in a somewhat performance was needed, which presupposes group attention and silence. Communication with recounting events and describing distant situations needs something like “sessions” or “sittings” already with a prolonged overall focus of attention. However, why were the others suddenly silent? Why was there no noise and tumult? The order of monologue stories and smoothly flowing conversation, with one person taking the floor and another waiting his turn, seems to us “a matter of course,” which is not valid. There is no innate instinct for such behavior. All children have to be taught this order, often with incredible difficulty. However, it is impossible to say that adults always observe the rules of the sequence of replicas and speeches, especially with the emotional excitement and low solidarity of the participants. Once upon a time, this order of remarks developed as a particular support structure. Therefore, there existed a somewhat concern provided by this structure. Also, there was an initial structure (a prototype, a pre-adaptation, an ingredient), based on which this remarks sequence order and listeners’ discipline emerged. Consider the following version.

7.6

The Group Meals Ritual and the Order of Remarks Sequence

Hominin communication in everyday gatherings is referred to in the contemporary literature as “communicative inquiry,” “social negotiation,” “collective innovation,” “co-creation”; see, e.g., Dor and Jablonka (2014, p. 24). All these designations are correct but focus only on the cognitive side of things. Once appeared the practice of talking about the past and the distant. A speaker was at the center of the public attention, or on the “front stage,” in E. Goffman terms (1967). Of course, some special interactive rituals took place here. Approximately 350 kya late Heidelbergians (and parallel species) confidently mastered fire coupled with collective cooking. This achievement led to the rituals of

7.6

The Group Meals Ritual and the Order of Remarks Sequence

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joint meals, which are still universal in all known cultures, which testify to their antiquity and cultural importance. The joint meal of hunter-gatherers and, probably, Protosapienses with reception of the food extracted during the day and cooked on the fire is a particular action with a common focus, solidary, coordinated actions, practices, common emotion, and specific order, discipline. Such a meal has always been a ritual and a specific support structure for the critical concerns: (a) To assert authority, the dominance of tribe members in the highest positions (the coalition, its head or leaders, their immediate minions) (b) To keep everyone fed and satisfied (c) To strengthen the common solidarity, the shared vision of what was going on A vital ritual aspect of every joint meal was the order in which each participant had access to food. Either someone gave it out one by one or each individual, in turn, got access to food (tearing off a piece or scooping). We will never precisely know the order of typical meals at this time. Probably, it corresponded to the social hierarchy established in each group. The only important thing here is that the participants observed a particular discipline. Without the access order to food, there would have been daily quarrels and fights, which does not fit the assumption of a dominant coalition that established the prohibition of intragroup violence (see Chap. 4). On the other hand, the order of access to food at a joint meal is a direct continuation of the compulsory sharing of booty, so establishing such an order cannot be questioned. Acceptance of this thesis has significant psychological and behavioral consequences. For example, what was the hunger feeling and how do they behave when they see someone already taking food and enjoying it? After all, one wants to rush to the delicious-smelling tasty meal. But you cannot. All eyes are on the food, which focuses on shared attention. Therefore, it was necessary to strictly acquaint the younger generation with the order of precedence. At first, angry shouting or blows were required to block anybody’s instinctive urge. Adults were no longer disruptive because they had developed an internal normative “I must wait until it is my turn.” It is the ritual of the access order at a joint meal that reliably established quiet waiting for one’s turn that appears to be the social basis for the vital communication ritual: one person makes a speech while others keep quiet, concentrate on this speech, and wait their turn, though they might already want to say, object, or add something. The very act of the meal, usually accompanied by verbal communication, received emotional reinforcement from the feelings of communion, consent, and mutual support. Of course, such communication separated later from the meal itself. However, it should be noted that virtually all the most important ancient rituals were associated with sacrifice and food. So, the transition from the order of access to food during everyday meals (in Heidelbergians?) to the order of giving the word (in Protosapienses?) allows us to explain one of the essential linguistic universals, alternativity: adult members of the

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linguistic collective are alternately transmitters and receivers of verbal signals (Hockett, 1963). Of course, in its “pure form,” this communication pattern could only form in the course of a long evolution. The rule of speaking order is sporadically violated (like all other human rules), but in most peaceful conversations, people fulfill it, which contributes to both solidarity and productive communication. In evolutionary terms, all rituals, which are structures that produce and reinforce attitudes of social behavior, were, by definition, magic wands (see Chaps. 2 and 3). So, whenever there was a severe challenge-threat to fundamental concerns, the rituals of the general assemblies adapted to produce the necessary support structures: decisions, collective actions, rules, individual attitudes.

7.7

What Did Our Forebearers Talk About at Shared Meals?

The participants in the shared meal and subsequent communication certainly wanted to communicate something important and meaningful to them. Therefore, the most likely topic of discussion was what had happened during the day. The focus was not on some abstract relationship but specific situations involving good fortune, danger or misfortune, and conflict, violating accepted routines. Moreover, all of them took place outside of the actual visual field of the discussion participants. The good events included the rich prey, prowess, and skill of extractors; the bad ones consisted of unsuccessful hunting, wounds, and someone’s improper behavior. The relationships and interactions related to violence/security, dominance, prestige, following and breaking the rules, sexuality, and parenthood were always significant. In other words, normativity was again the key factor here. However, even if an event involved misfortune, threats, or trauma, the rules of solidarity always implied the help of others. Participants had to inform somehow their fellow tribe members of their version of what had happened. The listeners had to understand them; all participants mentally “escaped” with the storytellers into the described situation. The protophrases used in this case could no longer be reactive and situational. Instead, they turned into leading-away protophrases. D. Dor (2015) addresses the same problem of overcoming situationality and proposes to solve it with the concepts of “instruction of imagination” and “epistemic dependency.” The challenge of epistemic dependency required a radical change of attitude: the failure would turn into success if B managed to interpret A’s communicative act not as an invitation to experience—but as an invitation to imagine. B would have to understand (without words): “A is intentionally attempting to turn my attention to something by pointing. His or her vocalization indicates that it is of the type x. As for myself, I cannot see anything there. I will, however, choose to go against my own experiential judgment, believe A’s experiential judgment, imagine there is something there of the type x, and act upon my imagination.”

7.8

Levels of Protolanguage and the Concern for Refinement

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For me, this was the essence of the linguistic revolution: the emergence of the will and capacity to imagine what you cannot see with your own eyes, simply because you believe somebody else (Dor, 2015, p. 203).

Undoubtedly, over time, leading-away protophrases have come to be used for planning of collaborative action, for messages about the imagined future. However, this more cognitively complex ability could only emerge with the mastery of leading-away protophrases referring to familiar past experiences, such as those about extraordinary events of the past day. For example, the hero of a past event (defense against a predatory beast’s attack, successful or unsuccessful hunting, a fight between tribe members, an attack on another’s girlfriend) tries to present his version. Still, he has only protowords and their chaotic combinations, protophrases, in his arsenal of verbal means. To make his speech clearer, he resorts to rephrasing and helps by gesticulation. Everyday practice of composing and recognizing protophrases allowed for a reduction of gestural and pantomimic explanations, but the structures of the leading-away protophrases themselves inevitably evolved toward greater accuracy, efficiency for conveying, and understanding messages. . . . (calculation of the experience by a chain of signs) allowed for communication about the intersected cluster of experiences (the cluster of rabbit-chasing) without the prior mutualidentification of the cluster itself. Speakers could now communicate not only about the experiences they had mutually identified but also about different combinations of these experiences. This meant, among other things, that they could begin to invent imagined entities and talk about them. The cultural consequences were enormous. All this must have implied a great leap forward in the expressive power of the technology: the function from the number of signs to the number of messages, which was up to now a linear one, would turn into an exponential function (Dor, 2015, p. 206).

Thus, it was the start of the appearance of displacement as a linguistic universal. This crucial stage was a principal broadening of consciousness but did not immediately lead to a full-fledged language. It was one of several glotto-aromorphoses. We must trace the transitions to the following most essential milestones and identify their driving causes.

7.8

Levels of Protolanguage and the Concern for Refinement

Leading-away protophrases, as long as their elements are not ordered, can be inaccurate and ambiguous. “Hit Ug Ig,” “Ug hit Ig,” “Ig hit Ug,” here it is clear that one has hit the other, but without word order, it is impossible to understand who hit whom. It is unlikely that the stage of the leading-away protophrases could be stable and long-lasting. What is immediately evident to those present in the actual local situation ceases to be clear concerning the distant situation. An acute concern for clarification emerged, and hominins (Protosapienses?) tried several ways of refining.

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To show the differences between protophrases and pidgin-sentences, I will use an example borrowed from J.-L. Dessalles’s book (2007). The speaker knows the situation that has occurred: “The girl whose money has been stolen left.” How to convey this message if there is no syntax and no established word order yet? A protophrase with the intention of “taking” listeners back in time sounds something like “money-girl-steal-go” or in any other order. One cannot say that such a “statement” is meaningless. It is clear what it is about, but what happened is unclear. In a situation of the general visual field, when it is possible to specify with a finger something in gestures or pantomime when there is a possibility of “asking again” by similar protophrases and gestures, then the necessary information can be transferred, though not without difficulty. About a distant and unfamiliar situation, one can only report a theft, a girl, money, leaving, but there is no way to clarify with protophrases what happened. The speaker sought to highlight the main subject of the event and its main attribute (action, quality) through emphasis and/or placement at the beginning of the utterance (see Chap. 6). In this way, the sprouts of word order appeared, transforming protophrases into pidgin-sentences. Pidgin-sentences with a set order of words, such as “subject-action-object,” are much more effective in conveying meaning. Already without the aid of gesture and pantomime, it is quite possible to communicate what happened in a distant, unseen situation to interlocutors, especially when they are familiar with the context, such as who usually steals money from whom and who runs away. The pidgin-sentence in our example would look like this: “girl-steal-money-go.” Yes, here it is misleading (cf. with the original meaning), which shows its lack of precision. However, this accuracy is enough for typical situations known to the interlocutors (as in trading on the market). Now let us roughly divide situations, phenomena, and events about which it is necessary to inform into those related to the natural environment (about attractive sources of food, water, and raw materials or, on the contrary, about threats and troubles) and those related to social interactions (who did what to whom, how that person responded, what then happened with each of them). To understand the essence of situations of the first type, protophrases (or even single protowords, holophrases) are sufficient. Still, through protophrases, there is no way to understand what happened between people. The leading-away protophrases hardly constituted a long-lasting independent stage in glottogenesis. If accounts of what happened with people became routinely practiced, then leadingaway protophrases inevitably transformed into more precise and effective pidgin sentences. As we see with the example of girl, stealing, money, and leaving, it is quite possible to make a mistake by means of a pidgin-sentence. But thanks to new verbal means, hominins could contest judgments, continue rephrasing, and move forward to further levels of accuracy. How to reconstruct such processes and put them into the covering conceptual framework?

7.9

7.9

Who Is a Hero, Who Is a Coward, and Who Is an Intruder?

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Who Is a Hero, Who Is a Coward, and Who Is an Intruder?

Based on the above reasoning and principles, we need to find out what concern (likely to have become meaningful and permanent) systematically drove the accuracy progress of utterances. Let us combine the following points: • Status as a level of group membership remained the primary social motivation for each individual. • While fundamental concerns for safety and sustenance remained, status in a longestablished normativity niche depended directly on demonstrated courage in protecting tribe members, on skill and success in hunting and other activities, and on compliance with group rules (which included, in particular, the prohibition of intragroup violence). • Thanks to the practices of communicating in protophrases that allowed mental “escape” into distant situations, group attention became increasingly focused on them. The juxtaposition of these components makes quite evident the growing importance of accounts of past events elsewhere for the changing status of the participants in these events. How were the event participants inclined to present what happened to them? Let us take a moment to recall familiar times. Every politician, willingly or unwillingly, presents past events in his memoirs in a favorable light for him. When talking about ourselves and our actions in everyday communication, we also tend to embellish our virtues, role, significance, and successes (though we do not like to admit this vaunt even to ourselves). It would be strange and offensive to deny such a natural desire to our distant ancestors. A communicative conflict arises if the other participants in the described situation disagree and present different versions of what happened. A long, undoubtedly tense, emotionally rich investigation and the trial process begins. Due to language deficiency, this process simultaneously had traits of the ritual of rephrasing and guessing (see Chap. 6). However, the content of this public happening is already much more complex: It is not simply a question of where to find something tasty, but what exactly happened in the crucial social area: who hurt whom, who helped or did not help whom, why such an unpleasant thing happened (an injury, loss of prey), what contributed to the success, who observed the established rules, and who violated them. The order of the elements in the statement appeared in response to growing concerns about accuracy, but these concerns usually arise when there are alternatives and uncertainties to overcome. The best candidate for supplying options and uncertainty is disagreement about what happened, that is, a conflict of versions. Let us also note that the significance of situations directly corresponds to the correlation of human actions with norms (prescriptions and prohibitions) or normative ideas in a broad sense: virtues, principles, sanctuaries, values. This attribution to

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norms sets a reaction, conclusions, sometimes subsequent decisions, and collective actions including various sanctions. Accuracy is also necessary to establish standards and demands to follow the rules. The need for accuracy significantly increases when explaining a rule or a practice to someone outside one’s environment is necessary. The communicative concern to clarify statements (say, protophrases or pidgin sentences) comes from the pragmatic concern of “social calculus,” when versions of what happened earlier diverge. In such situations, one needs to find out precisely the actions of different persons concerning the accepted norms. Such proceedings are, of course, special interactive rituals designed to resolve conflicts by communicative means. There is bickering and clarification of circumstances in proceedings and the desire of some authoritative instances to clarify the merits of the case (Boehm, 2006, 2015). It is an “arbitration court” structure, and the role of the authority was played by the dominant coalition, perhaps with some “first among equals”: an elder, big man, chief. The very possibility of such proceedings required definite social and cognitive conditions: the tradition of public assemblies with sequencing order of remarks and the group’s cognitive abilities to “mentally fly away” to distant situations. It seems that there is no better alternative to providing these conditions than a group meal ritual. The proceedings ended when the most authoritative coalition members reached agreement and rendered a verdict. Some people gained support and others deserved to be charged or punished. A judgment always got a verbal formula, which had to be understood quite unambiguously. The focus of attention was, first of all, on the persons who committed some actions, so it is no coincidence that in most languages, the subject still takes first place in the sequence of the elements of the utterance. All discussion participants probably repeated the final formula to understand it better, fix the consent, and express the common emotion induced by the leaders. At the same time, as a side result, they mastered the statements more exactly than they had been available before: the former leading-away protophrases transformed into pidgin sentences, and then pidgin-sentences themselves began to be supplemented by elements of syntax and grammar. As opportunities to learn from the stories of other tribe members elsewhere developed and evolved, distant normative control practices developed and evolved. Any transgression could now become known to the group, with sanctions to follow. Moreover, distance control became a significant concern, for the provision of which it was necessary to clarify statements, which led to the increase and complication of the linguistic means of accuracy. Over hundreds and thousands of generations, the linguistic means of expressing meaningful messages became increasingly refined. The content of the renewed concerns that gave rise to these support structures is now clearer:

7.10

The Transition to Pidgin-Sentences

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• To report distant situations • To report situations whose context is probably not familiar to the listener, which happens when a “stranger” is not one of those with whom one finds oneself in the same situations • To report, above all, on social interactions • To refer these interactions (who did what to whom) to norms; that is why it was important not to confuse who broke the rules and thus was wrong, who got hurt, who did a proper thing and was right, etc. • To discuss the rules themselves, cases of their violation, attitudes toward them, and subsequent actions Participants in these verbal rituals formed new speech attitudes required for these practices. As by-products, the underlying support structures evolved: linguistic constructions, mental attitudes, cognitive, speech-motor and hearing abilities, neural, anatomical, psychophysiological, and gene mechanisms (Fig. 7.1).

7.10

The Transition to Pidgin-Sentences

Public discussion of what has happened as an arena of prestige, explicit or implicit boasting, exchange of opinions and news, accusations and justifications, gossip,3 and stories is still practiced today. It is an essential part of our life. These practices will surely accompany the human race in the future. Consider the dynamic relationship between the factors leading to the emergence and development of the protolanguage (Fig. 7.2). Most of the connections here are reinforcing ones. Such contours of positive feedback underlie the progressive development of speech and language from protowords and protophrases to pidgin sentences. Let us pay attention to the negative, weakening connections indicated by dashed arrows. A low level of understanding (i.e., misunderstanding) naturally leads to an increase in discussion activity—this is the standard negative relationship in Stinchcombe’s scheme (see Fig. 2.6, (Stinchcombe, 1987, p. 136)). However, the progress achieved in the speech abilities and language means (the shaded block) leads to the growth of understanding. Then the already mentioned negative connection must suppress the discussion activity. Indeed, is it necessary to rephrase further if situations have become more apparent thanks to more precise statements?

“The least speculative statement that can be made about prehistoric gossiping is that in all probability it was fully in effect by the time people became culturally modern, and that, because language was likely to have evolved gradually along with brain size (see Lieberman, 2006), some earlier types of gossiping, reputational selection, and judgmental group sanctioning would have existed before 150,000 BP” (Boehm, 2015, p. 425).

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interlocutors’

Fig. 7.1 Causal links between niches, concerns, and cognitive structures underlying the emergence of leading-away protophrases. The bold names on the left side indicate the corresponding ontological levels. Shaded arrows stand for causal influence, and white arrows for transitions (transformations)

Here, two other negative connections come into play: from the concern to raise the individual prestige of the participants to the level of agreement reached, and from the level of agreement to the activity of discussion. Personal ambitions do not allow a participant to agree with another version of the past event that undervalued his role in

7.10

The Transition to Pidgin-Sentences

Access to a variety of verbal tools in public meetings

Intensity and effectiveness of protophrases modification

Individual prestige enhancement concerns

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Fixation of speech ability tasks in neural structures and genes

Selection of clear and recognizable modifications

Ability to manage word order. i.e., to obtain pidginsentences

Level of agreement on the rightness or guilt of participants in past events

The activity of discussionarguments at communal meals about events that had previously occurred (“proceedings”)

The concern to clarify descriptions and reach agreement about events and assessments

Level of past events understanding

Group concerns of remote normative control: distant imposing of rules

Fig. 7.2 The dynamic relationship of the factors leads to the emergence and development of pidgin-sentences and early protolanguage

success (e.g., in successful hunting). In other cases, someone emphasized the role of a tribe member in failure or was accused of violation of some essential prohibition (hit, offended, stole, took away, did not share). The offended person presents his version, again infringing on the interests and ambitions of his opponent. The accuracy of the speeches was growing and understanding increased by discussing and resolving these kinds of conflict. Sometimes a group achieves agreement, sometimes not, but the discussions certainly do not finish. On the contrary, this arena of prestige, of claims to better adherence to group rules and traditions, once emerged, always remains relevant. Figure 7.3 shows the transformations in the different layers of the protolanguage formation processes. African Heidelbergians underwent intense cognitive evolution and associated morphological and genetic sapientation. As a result, the groups and populations that won the species competition evolved into Protosapienses and Early sapienses. The other descendants of the Heidelbergians, the Neanderthals of Eurasia, also reached considerable heights in technology, but lagged far behind in speech development (see Chap. 6). Table 7.1 presents this gap.

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New concerns of social interaction

New in the psyche (attention, memory, attitudes)

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“Proceedings”: to figure out

Primary ability for the “social calculus”

Fig. 7.3 Causal links underlying the transition from protowords to full-fledged words and from leading-away protophrases to the mature protolanguage (pidgin-sentences with different order schemes, sprouts of syntax)

300–25 kya. Neanderthals. Brain up to 1740 cm3

Time, the prominent representatives, brain volume 500–100 kya. Paleoanthropes: from Heidelbergians to Protosapienses. Brain 1200– 1400 cm3

General achievements, technology Effective hunting of small and large game. Technologies: Moustier, Levallois. Composite implements. Cutting plates. Confident proficiency, maintenance of fire, and the ability to fix attention on “tomorrow” and “yesterday.” Burials. Decorations. Exchanges. Medical aid

Dwellings. Making clothes. The disunity of small groups (families). Fewer clashes and material, cultural exchanges

Material practices, techno-natural niches, and social orders Collective cooking. The dense communicative environment within groups. Joint meals, the establishment of the order of access to food. Frequency of intergroup clashes

To protect from cold. To avoid dangerous encounters, look for novel places

New regulatory and communicative concerns To tell the group what happened during the day. Respect the rules that may be said about the violation. To prove your case, gain support and prestige. Find out who is correct in conflicts. Make decisions about how to relate to other groups

New structures and abilities Ritual and Types of linguistic communicative construction practices From reactive and Establishing an order of “speeches” situational in discussions at the protophrases to leading-away beginning of a protophrases and joint meal. pidgin-sentences An exchange of impressions, reports with elements of syntax. Linguistic of what happened “displacement.” during a day. Rituals of ‘proceed- Establishing semantic links between the ings’ and distant values of control over other (proto)words people’s actions outside of the ‘here and now’ situations Multiplication of Only situational protowords within communication within small groups the same phonetic structure. If there were protophrases, then only reactive and situational ones, since the context was always clear to the participants

Table 7.1 Comparison of the speech development levels between Protosapienses and Neanderthals

The increase in the number of memorized items required more memory and brain growth. Only the “episodic mind”

Cognitive abilities and the brain The phonetic system and integration of protowords into meaningful protophrases allowed to avoid excessive brain growth. “Mimetic intelligence,” managing imagination of listeners, collaborative “mental escape,” “social calculus”

7.10 The Transition to Pidgin-Sentences 203

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The Riddle of the Words’ Birth

According to Vygotsky, the initial stage of word development in ontogeny is as follows. The meaning of a word is an unformed syncretic cluster of separate objects. A child somehow connects them in the perception of one cohesive image (Vygotsky, 1930/1997). It is hardly necessary to mechanically transfer the stages of development of meanings according to Vygotsky (“syncretism,” “complex,” “pseudo-concept,” “concept”) to the stages of development of words and their meanings in glottogenesis. Instead, it is much more important to note the general vector of transformation: (a) Protowords as reactive used haphazardly in protophrases tied to “here and now” situations, syncretic, having vague meanings, not separable from feelings turned into (b) Full-fledged words used arbitrarily in sentences with word order or already with syntax, autonomous from concrete situations, having more abstract and more precise values semantically connected with plenty of other words’ meanings This direction of evolution seems plausible, but the theoretical task is to identify the causal conditions and drivers of this transformation. The significance of the latter not only for language but also for consciousness, thinking, and the entire human culture hardly needs explaining. The combination of semantic connectivity of word meanings, the arbitrariness of their use, and their autonomy from the present situation provides a clue. Protowords become words in close conjunction with the development of leading-away protophrases, pidgin-sentences, and syntax. All three of these development stages provided concerns for increasingly precise and unambiguous descriptions of distant events. Anthropologists and linguists have long known the significance of encompassing structures for the evolutionary development of their elements (the same “outward-inward” causality; see Chap. 1). We still do not need special syntax to explain something in an existing situation with a common visual field or in the presence of a shared context that is clear to the interlocutors. As mentioned above, we often do not make do with words at all, but with the most real protowords like “that thing” (“bullshit,” or even more crudely). Let us clarify the step-by-step process of word evolution with the help of classical concepts of philosophical logic and structural linguistics.

7.12

7.12

The Transformation Signal→Protoword→Word as the “Semiotic Triangle”. . .

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The Transformation Signal→Protoword→Word as the “Semiotic Triangle” Evolution

If to use Peirce’s classical distinction of sign-index, sign-icon, and sign-symbol (Peirce, 1986), the first protowords were both signs-indexes and signs-icons (through sound imitation added by gestures, facial expressions, and pantomime). However, full-fledged words are closer to signs-symbols. They are not similar to the signified object and have an autonomous meaning connected with other meanings (Gärdenfors & Osvath, 2010, p. 112). Frege’s “semiotic triangle” (with later clarification by Ogden and Richards) is well-known: symbol/thought/referent, word/concept/thing, or sign/meaning/object (Frege, 1892/1984). This concept is the result of further scientific reflection. Let us use the most convenient scheme variant: sign/meaning/object. Generally speaking, the “triangle” already exists in differentiated signals of monkeys and apes. These are precisely recognizable: (1) a sound sign, (2) an object, e.g., the source of danger, and (3) a rigid meaning bound to both the sign and the object. Of course, such a “triangle” existed at the stage of protowords. What is the difference between syncretic signals of anthropoids, protowords of Paleoanthropes (including probably Neanderthals), and full-fledged words of sapienses? • In syncretic signals, the sign and the meaning are inseparably merged. The sound sign appears as a conditional reflex in response to a stimulus: occurrence of the object (usually in the visual field). Thus, signals are typically reactive; they can also react to an internal state. For example, they can express comfort, satiety, or hormonal status. Therefore, animals give signals of invitation to play, friendly communication (e.g., grooming), or mating. • In the multiplying protowords, the sound signs became articulate (see Chaps. 5 and 6). The meanings and objects (typical situations, actions, and things) became complex. Besides, while remaining situational, protowords were no longer so tightly bound to what was happening in the visual field and were not always reactive. For example, in the competition of recruitings, different individuals could report different food in separate places without seeing it but remembering it. Let hunger and the corresponding hormonal background also play a role here. Still, these appeals could no longer be considered purely reactive, and the boundaries of the actual situation extended far beyond the visual field. Establishing internal semantic links between these meanings began in situational protophrases with an integral but still vague sense composed of the meanings of the protowords. • The mastery of “representational redescription” (according to M. Donald) through leading-away protophrases marks an intermediate, transitional stage from protowords to full-fledged words. Here, the verbal signs of what happened in another place and time were already confidently separated from the immediate “here and now” situation. The speaker’s intention to talk about this occurrence actualized both signs and their meanings. This ability was not yet a complete

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breakthrough to the arbitrariness of speech. However, it was the halfway point in this “distance.” Connections between meanings were inevitably strengthened and clarified in leading-away protophrases. It was necessary to select (proto)words not reactively in response to a visible situation but “by sense” to convey a distant, now invisible event. The short duration of this stage was related to its instability. The more stringent requirements to precision required consolidation of word order. This shift also changed the nature of their meanings. • Words were already semantically connected by their meanings at the stage of pidgin-sentences. The word order schemes formed structures of proto-syntax, such as subject-action-object or subject-predicate. The signs themselves (sound forms of words) have not yet changed. There still were no word forms, suffixes, prefixes, or endings, which will appear, especially in synthetic languages, only at the next stage of full-fledged syntax and grammar (see Chap. 8). Words become full-fledged when they begin to be used arbitrarily and cooperatively in communicative tasks, not necessarily related to the present situations. Clear articulation and extra-situational meaning make the “props” of pantomime superfluous, while facial expressions, gesture, and intonation retain an additional expressive function. Together with a firm anchoring in the psyche and reliable intergenerational transmission, these features are also characteristic of full-fledged words. Of course, protowords did not suddenly and simultaneously turn into words. In contrast, many protowords remained with syncretic and situational meanings. Exact words appeared through repetition in those communications in which clarity of meaning proved pragmatically significant. Therefore, it is pretty natural that articulation and semantics developed along in the same processes. Figure 7.4 schematically represents the evolutionary steps considered, the glotto-aromorphoses.

7.13

Transition to Protolanguage: The Nomological Explanation

To explain the presented changes, we should formulate a theoretical hypothesis, so general (“universal” by K. Hempel) that one could test it in up-to-date experience (Fig. 7.5). Theoretical hypothesis: members of relatively egalitarian and solidarity groups with normativity, possessing the means to describe immediate situations, experiencing everyday dangers and fortunes, will try to convey information about recent events to one another during regular meetings; over time, they will form new sign means with recognizable “leading-away” meanings and increasing precision of descriptions. Why are these conditions necessary and sufficient? The hypothesis summarizes the initial conditions as follows:

7.13

Transition to Protolanguage: The Nomological Explanation

207

Stages of language complexity Late Heidelbergians and Protosapienses, 350-100 kya

The language Rubicon

Word Order Leading-away protophrases

A protolanguage with pidgin-sentences and transformation of protowords into fullfledged words

Mental escape

From Archanthropes to Heidelbergians, 1.6-0.3 mya Pre-speech of Neanderthals

Early Homo Late pre-speech: the beginning of phoneme distinction, the accumulation of protowords, reactive, situational protophrases

Direction of time

Fig. 7.4 Stages of protoword accumulation and transition to a protolanguage Sapientation

Theoretical hypothesis: members of relatively egalitarian and solidarity groups with normativity, possessing the means to describe immediate situations, experiencing everyday dangers and fortunes, will try to convey information about recent events to one another during regular meetings; over time they will form new sign means with recognizable "leading away" meanings and increasing precision of descriptions

The empirical hypothesis: Since the late African hominins (Protosapienses?) who possessed situational protophrases, lived in large groups, mastered fire, collective cooking, and shared meals, they must have developed the ability to convey past events in leading-away protophrases, and then use pidgin-sentences with word order

Judgements about effect

The effect: the practices of "managing imagination," joint "mental escape," and the ability to put words in a sequence for clarifying statements

Judgments about initial conditions

Grounds for judgments about initial conditions that meet the requirements of the theoretical hypothesis

Causes: clashing versions of past events outlined in protophrases by different tribe members, common attempts to rephrase, reinterpret and clarify them in the ‘proceedings’

Direction of time

Fig. 7.5 The extended nomological explanation of the transition to leading-away protophrases and protolanguage with pidgin-sentences

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(a) The strong motivation of communication participants to receive and understand messages about distant situations. (b) The absence of a common full-fledged language, but the presence of a set of common signs (words, names, symbols), correlated with elements of these situations. (c) Sufficiently elevated level of normativity and solidarity, common interest, disposition to reach mutual understanding, sufficient time for this, the order of the exchange of messages accepted by the parties. (d) The participants’ capacity to vary messages and give feedback according to the evaluation of their adequacy. (e) Participants who are more familiar with the situation can complement their messages with extraverbal means (facial expressions, nods, gestures, and pantomime). One can expect that in the presence of conditions (a–e), attempts will happen to combine the sign means known to the parties. This will inevitably lead to a common acceptance of the achieved convenient description modes. It occurs when participants who are familiar with the situation can no longer suggest a more adequate message modification and agree with the proposed variant. The added quality to the combination of signs can be quite different. Thus, in daily oral communication, people use various intonations, the emphasis of separate words by accentuation, the addition of service words (“this,” “that”), symbols-pointers invented on the fly. They first put the word that means the central figure of the message. With sufficient motivation and capabilities, new attempts at combining signs known to the parties will undoubtedly appear. With corrective feedback, the order of the signs will get closer to the optimal transfer of meaning. What participants will invent in each episode of communication of this kind is unknown; it depends on their particular experience and cognitive resources. Now let us imagine that not just one episode takes place, but a whole series of such episodes with different situations to be described using various signs. The ability to reach an understanding must grow, but at the expense of what? Intonation, the supply of words with accents, facial expressions, or gestures are ad hoc means, and it is difficult to transfer them to descriptions of new situations. However, the order of signs, functional words, and particles (the means of construction of new phrases and sentences) is easily transferable. The main content of the process is the growth of the ability to order connections between protowords: the semantic relationships between their meanings and the corresponding order of their pronunciation. In the course of the same process, (proto)words were freed from situationality, the ways of their association with other (proto)words multiplied, and their use began to be driven more by communicative tasks rather than by reactions to perception. The pronunciation of words and sentences became arbitrary.4 4

The rudiments of the ability to use function words and particles (future prepositions, conjunctions, prefixes, suffixes, endings) are already the way to syntax, which quite probably began with the

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Transition to Protolanguage: The Nomological Explanation

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Up-to-date analogs:

Computer experiments.

If the theoretical hypothesis is correct, newcomers in the egalitarian groups experiencing everyday luck or danger, will learn pidgin faster than in hierarchical groups with low solidarity and stable, safe life

The communicator sends the recipient a picture. The recipient recognizes the picture and composes a response message from the set of words. The communicator responds "warmer" or "cooler." Varying the conditions allows for refinement of the learning factors

Experiments with analog models: Groups children transmit information of dynamic situations displaying cards with pictures of faces, objects, and actions. If the hypothesis is correct, after a few iterations the children will learn to put the cards in a stricter order

Sufficiency of conditions: if participants combine signs known to the parties and remember features of past successes, then corrective feedback will necessarily bring the order of signs closer to the optimal transfer of meaning

The theoretical hypothesis:

The attempts and fixation mechanisms: interlocutors are rephrasing their utterances until they achieve understanding; they fix in their skills found successful word order, which becomes through many iterations the new norm

The empirical hypothesis

Fig. 7.6 Substantiating the theoretical hypothesis about the emergence of ability to generate pidgin-sentences

Up-to-date analogies. Bickerton was the first to apply his observations on the development of pidgin and creole languages (in Hawaii) to reflect on the mechanisms of glottogenesis (Bickerton, 1981). Since pidgins appear in many places where speakers of different languages collide, there are opportunities for systematic observations and experiments to test and refine the theoretical hypothesis. In mastering their native language, children typically experience a stage of individual protowords attached to immediate perceptions, a stage of reactive protophrases, a stage of attempts to communicate about a distant event or object, i.e., leading-away protophrases, and a stage of pidgin-sentences. The last two stages are brief and almost imperceptible, since children master syntax with surprising ease and speed. Before children master full-fledged syntax and grammar, their native language acquisition processes represent some “analog models” of the processes of protolanguage evolution (Fig. 7.6). The empirical hypothesis (Fig. 7.7): between 400 and 100 kya in relatively large groups of African Protosapienses with egalitarian coalitions, normativity,

development of pidgin-sentences. However, analytically it is better to separate the acquisition of such ability into a separate stage of language evolution (see Chap. 8).

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New individual concerns: to report past events to blame others and justify oneself. New group concerns: distant control of rules

Ingredients: normativity and competition for status, arranged hearths and everyday meals; order of access to food and the order of giving the word. Motivation for clarifying stories about recent events. Protowords and protophrases

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Initial conditions: in hominin groups with egalitarian coalitions, normativity, joint meals, competition for status, protophrases, and the ability to modify them…

Attempts and fixation mechanisms: at a previous stage, hominins they could change protophrases and fix their structures capable of conveying more precise meaning

Effect: … necessarily evolved practices for reporting past crucial events and ways of ordering words in these statements

Why provision of the concern actually took place: concerns for understanding and accuracy of retelling has not faded, but have only been fueled, as further transition to syntax demonstrates

The rationale for the structure's emergence: impossible to jump from individual protowordsholophrases to syntax. So, there were stages of leadingaway protophrases and pidgin-sentences

New challenges and concerns: continuing inaccuracy of pidgin-sentences about past distant events when it was not possible to ascertain the situation by direct experience

Fig. 7.7 The conditions of protolanguage formation: the empirical hypothesis justification in an extended nomological approach

protowords, confident mastery of fire, collective cooking, shared meals competition for status, and the ability to rephrase utterances (initial conditions) should have developed practices of reporting recent significant events with competing versions, attempts at clarification, increasing ordering of elements in utterances, and increasing semantic connectedness of words and the ability to use them arbitrarily (effect). According to the extended nomological explanatory scheme (Chap. 3), both the initial conditions and the consequences of the empirical hypothesis require justification, with only indirect data available. Before the period 500–400 kya, the bone remains of Ergasters indicate an inability to control the breathing necessary to utter more or less long phrases and sentences. It seems improbable that the communication of Homo ergaster or Homo erectus would have been as complex as the protolanguage proposed by the linguist Bickerton. This protolanguage would involve reasonably long multiword sequences, even though, like modern pidgins, it would lack complexity of syntax and the use of tenses. If Homo ergaster, Homo erectus, or their descendants put the preadaptive changes in their upper respiratory tract to use, they could, at most, have produced short sequences of phonemes or morphemes. These would have provided sufficient sound combinations, for example, for an increased lexicon or vocabulary using the memory power of the enlarged brain, but communication would have remained limited, as can also be the case for modern humans with reduced

References

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breathing control as a result of severe spinal cord damage (Maclarnon & Hewitt, 2004, p. 191).

The initial boundary of the transition to protolanguage corresponds to the time of confidence in regular use of fire (hearth arrangement), which indicates the practices of collective cooking with heat treatment and joint meals. In the previous cumulative period (approximately 1.2–0.4 mya), the brain of Paleoanthropes grew intensively, reaching 1016 cm3 for Heidelbergians (Corballis, 2010, p. 116). Therefore, the position of the larynx in Heidelbergians approached the larynx parameters of modern humans (Relethford, 2007; de Boer, 2011, 2017). Convergent evidence for adaptations to complex vocalizations in neanderthals and Homo heidelbergensis indicates that adaptations to producing complex vocalizations were already present 400,000 years ago. In combination with what we know about the prelinguistic abilities of other apes (and thus, of our latest common ancestor), it seems likely that some form of language must have been present as well (de Boer, 2017, p. 161).

The transition to basic language structures probably began only 200–150 kya (Sterelny, 2016). Many researchers agree that according to many morphological features and various symbolic activities, late African Paleoanthropes, i.e., Protosapienses, possessed some primitive speech (see, e.g., Sinha, 2014, p. 46). A complex solution to the problem of the acceleration of sapientation and transition to protolanguage includes factors of climate, demography, and the nature of natural selection. At that time, the African climate was much milder than in Eurasia, and much of it was under glaciers that even reached the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The upper limit of 150–100 kya for the transition to pidgin-sentences follows from the fact that at the next stage, the Early sapienses, by all indications, were already mastering syntax and grammar. In the next chapter, we will discuss these steps of glottogenesis and the new corresponding abilities of consciousness.

References Bickerton, D. (1981). Roots of language. Language Science Press. Bickerton, D. (2002). Foraging versus social intelligence in the evolution of protolanguage. In A. Wray (Ed.), The transition to language (pp. 207–225). Oxford Univ. Press. Bickerton, D. (2009). Adam's tongue: How humans made language, how language made humans. Hill and Wang. Boehm, C. (2006). Interactions of culture and natural selection. In S. Levinson & P. Jaisson (Eds.), Evolution and culture. A Fyssen foundation symposium (pp. 79–104). MIT Press. Boehm, C. (2015). The evolution of social control. In J. H. Turner, R. Machalek, & A. Maryanski (Eds.), Handbook on evolution and society. Toward an evolutionary social science (pp. 424–440). Paradigm Publishers. Corballis, M. C. (2010). Did language evolve before speech? In R. K. Larson, V. Déprez, & H. Yamakido (Eds.), The evolution of human language: Biolinguistic perspectives (pp. 115–123). Cambridge Univ. Press. de Boer, B. (2011). Loss of air sacs improved hominin speech abilities. Journal of Human Evolution, 62(1), 1–6.

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de Boer, B. (2017). Evolution of speech and evolution of language. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 158–162. Dessalles, J.-L. (2007). Why we talk. The evolutionary origins of language. Oxford Univ. Press. Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind. Harvard Univ. Press. Donald, M. (2000). The central role of culture in cognitive evolution: A reflection on the myth of the ‘isolated mind’. In L. Nucci, G. Saxe, & E. Turiel (Eds.), Culture, thought, and development (pp. 19–38). Psychology Press. Donald, M. (2001). A mind so rare: The evolution of human consciousness. Norton. Dor, D. (2015). The instruction of imagination: Language as a social communication technology. Oxford Univ. Press. Dor, D., & Jablonka, E. (2014). Why we need to move from gene-culture coevolution to culturally driven coevolution. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 15–30). Oxford Univ. Press. Frege, G. (1892/1984). On sense and meaning. In G. Frege (Ed.), Collected papers on mathematics, logic, and philosophy (pp. 157–177). Basil Blackwell. Gabora, L., & Smith, C. M. (2018). Two cognitive transitions underlying the capacity for cultural evolution. Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 96, 1–26. Gärdenfors, P., & Osvath, M. (2010). Prospection as a cognitive precursor to symbolic communication. In R. K. Larson, V. Déprez, & H. Yamakido (Eds.), The evolution of human language: Biolinguistic perspectives (pp. 103–114). Cambridge Univ. Press. Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Doubleday. Hockett, C. F. (1963). The problem of universals in language. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (pp. 1–22). MIT Press. Lieberman, P. (2006). Toward an evolutionary biology of language. Harvard Univ. Press. Maclarnon, A., & Hewitt, G. (2004). Increased breathing control: Another factor in the evolution of human language. Evolutionary Anthropology, 13, 181–197. Peirce, C. S. (1986). Logic as semiotic: The theory of signs. In R. E. Innis (Ed.), Semiotics. An introductory anthology (pp. 1–23). Hutchinson. Progovac, L. (2019). A critical introduction to language evolution: Current controversies and future prospects. Springer International Publ. Relethford, J. H. (2007). The human species: An introduction to biological anthropology. McGrawHill. Sinha, C. (2014). Niche construction and semiosis: Biocultural and social dynamics. In D. Dor, C. J. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of language (pp. 31–46). Oxford Univ. Press. Sterelny, K. (2016). Cumulative cultural evolution and the origins of language. Biological Theory, 11(3), 173–186. Stinchcombe, A. (1987). Constructing social theories. Univ. of Chicago Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1930/1997). The history of the development of higher mental functions. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. Springer.

Chapter 8

The Need for Syntax and Illusion of the Consciousness Totality

8.1

Learnability and Full-Fledged Language as the Main Evolutionary Advantage of Sapienses

The “anatomically modern humans” known by bone remains or the Early sapienses (approximately 100–40 kya) can hardly be separated from Protosapienses (about 200–75 kya). Then appeared the Middle sapienses, including the Cro-Magnons of Europe, who carried out the technological and cultural revolution of the Upper Paleolithic (about 50–20 kya). Finally, the Late sapienses moved on to the Mesolithic (25–8 kya) and Neolithic (10–5 kya), except for the most marginal and backward groups, which remained in the Stone Age until the arrival of European colonizers. The overlap of periods should not be confusing, because the entire population of (proto)sapienses did not transform simultaneously. “Laggards” either perished in the next climatic cataclysm or left in the minority, assimilated with the arrival of more “advanced” and therefore more numerous ones into their territory. Scientists agree that sapienses surpassed Neanderthals in one but crucial ability: to learn and adopt others’ achievements (Bickerton, 2002; Vishnyatsky, 2008; Laland, 2017). So, what is the ability to learn new things at the meso-, micro-, and ultramicro-levels? It could not be that an entire population only by simple imitation quickly mastered the progressive technologies of the old-timers (e.g., in making clothing and shelter, dwellings in the cold regions of Eurasia). Instead, the mastery and widespread dissemination of new skills and abilities occurred through speech. It became possible to teach new valuable practices verbally. It is safe to say that the very “ability to learn, to master new things” is in direct dependence on the development and flexibility of the communication means. Situational protophrases with vague meanings are poorly suited here. Pidgin-sentences with simple word order and full-fledged words (at least some of them) convey more reliably. However, this is still the stage of protolanguage. It is natural to associate the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_8

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mastery of a full-fledged language with “reasonableness,” hence, with Homo sapiens. What are the specifics of such language and why was it initially needed?

8.2

Protolanguage and Language: Criteria for Distinction

Pidgin-sentences with full-fledged words, including predicates, have a simple but straightforward order, usually enabling us to recognize more or less adequately structures of the type of subject-predicate (“man good”), subject-action-object (“man walk forest”). Thus, it is not so “far” from protolanguage to syntax acquisition (Bickerton, 2002). Generally speaking, the word order in every pidgin-sentence is already the simplest syntactic structure. When the corresponding speech ability appears, opportunities for further accumulation of syntactic structures open up. Let us use the analogy between child language acquisition and glottogenesis again. The protolanguage stage occurs when the child can retell a simple situation and describe meaningfully what is happening in the picture or in a row of pictures. This ability appears just by mastering pidgin-sentences with an order of words, albeit with errors in grammatical forms and their coordination. At some point (just “from 2 to 5”—the “age of speech genius” children begin to “catch on the fly” speech patterns of adults and master the basics of their native language with impressive speed (Chukovsky, 1963). Then the child’s speech ability usually develops quickly and successfully from protolanguage to language. Mastering the linguistic means common in everyday talks and then in the received education forms the ability to use them adequately by meaning and grammatically “correctly.” There were no ready-made patterns in the epoch of anthropogenesis and cognitive evolution. The formation of syntax and grammar went slowly but steadily. No one remained in the “pure” pidgin stage, that is, a protolanguage. The following distinctive features characterize the language in comparison with the protolanguage: 1. Presence of multiple schemes of word combinations (constructions) of different degrees of rigidity and flexibility, concreteness, and abstractness (from almost unchangeable turns of speech, phrases, proverbs to syntactic forms with nearly infinite possibilities of filling their cells and recursive layering) 2. Obligatory of the internal structure of these constructions, if they are chosen (availability of language-specific rules in each language) 3. Functional sufficiency of the composition of words and these constructions for solving typical communicative concerns (tasks, needs, habits, motives) of a language community What kind of constructions appeared and developed and how have the linguistic composition and rules of the available languages been changed (points 1–2)? These are the questions that outline the subject field of comparative evolutionary linguistics. The research interest in the approach adopted here is in studying general

8.3 Bickerton’s Greedy Brawlers, Dessalles’s Honest Girl, and the. . .

215

Protolanguage

rudimentary language

true language

social calculus "Ig take" "Og meat" "hit Og" (words and phrases)

"Ig take meat" "Ig hit Og"

"Ig hits Og took and takes the meat"

(simple syntax: sentences)

(complex syntax: morphology)

Fig. 8.1 Bickerton’s three-stage theory of language development (Calvin & Bickerton, 2000; Botha, 2003, p. 78)

correspondences between new layers of linguistic complexity and changing technonatural niches, social orders of language communities (point 3). This problemata is closer to cultural evolution studies and historical sociolinguistics.

8.3

Bickerton’s Greedy Brawlers, Dessalles’s Honest Girl, and the Importance of “Social Calculus”

Bickerton’s conception assumes a colossal leap from combinations of protowords to a complete language with complex syntax and grammar, which Bickerton denotes as the emergence of morphology: a change in word forms coordinated with syntax (Fig. 8.1). In the last (right) phase, Bickerton did not present any “complex syntax” but suggested a dubious grammar leap. By removing the previous stage (with word-form concordance), we get two pidgin-sentences joined to each other, except with the elimination of the second designation of a subject (“Ig”). In other words, Bickerton has only a slight complication of the previous middle stage. This scheme needs an essential conceptual and terminological correction. Linguistic complexity grew in response to the need for greater precision. Why were concerns about accuracy in communication increasing? J.-L. Dessalles considers the emergence of predicativity as an intermediate stage before the formation of syntax: Protosemantics is solely referential, whereas semantics is predicative (Dessalles, 2007, p. 212). The fact that syntax constitutes a functional whole derives entirely from the preexistence of a predicate-based semantics. Details of syntactic organization may be described in isolation from a structural point of view; but their functional role, as we have seen, can only be understood via a demonstration of their ability to express links between semantic predicates (Ibid p. 231).

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We need to find out why Protosapienses (or Early sapienses) suddenly needed not just to point objects (referentiality), but also to communicate their properties, states (predicativity). In the formation of protolanguage, the main concern was to achieve mutual understanding. In a sense, the dominant coalition or leaders played the role of “adults,” with whose formulas and verdicts the rest of the group members in the part of “children” agreed. Eventually, all members of a particular group mastered constructing and understanding pidgin-sentences. It means that each individual became capable of composing the most concise description of an event, both nearsighted and distant. However, the proliferation of such abilities led to an obvious cost: the constant divergence of interpretations. “Children” turned into “adolescents,” who tended to state their opinions and their disagreements, and were ready to argue. The disagreement could concern the actual state of affairs (where food is, danger), but this is easily verifiable (see Chap. 6). It is much more challenging to overcome disagreements when there are conflicts, rules violations, and established order. Along with public proceedings (see Chap. 7), local disputes in private communication have emerged. To argue, one must persuade, find arguments. Let us consider predicates in “proceedings” and distant control situations. Here, overcoming confusion is paramount, as it is of cardinal importance who did what. Let us deviate from the remote progenitors and turn to the example of the departing girl and the money. Dessalles shows the usefulness of pidgin propositions and their possible ambiguity with the risk of severe distortion. If all the semantically weak parts of a statement are omitted, like the grammatical words or the inflections of nouns and verbs, this can often prevent the meaning from being plain. Such omissions from the sentence The girl whose money was stolen has gone would result in Girl money steal go, which might make it appear that it was the girl who stole the money. In protolanguage, the words money and girl would be juxtaposed and the statement would probably be made in two sentences: Steal money girl. Girl go. There is still an ambiguity; but the wrong meaning is not so unavoidable. Protolanguage is not the result of a rough simplification of language; it is a tool for communicating meanings that has its own organization (Ibid p. 171).

What makes the precision of messages about social situations and interactions so important? The example of the girl and the theft of money gives an answer. When everyone agreed with the “girl-steal-money-go” version, laying the blame on her, a witness may appear and be willing to tell that the situation was quite different: she did not steal, but somebody has stolen her money. However, how to report using the same means of pidgin-sentences: without prepositions, function words, grammar? Let us note the particular importance of finding out exactly what happened. Not only “the opinion” may depend on it, but also the attitude toward the person, the punishment, or reward. The case, in general, may end in banishment or execution. The addition of the service pronoun “Someone stole money girl” already significantly clarifies the situation, and the simple grammatical agreement of word forms and the preposition removes any ambiguity “Someone stole the girl’s money.” Here, we can already clearly see the direct causal connection from the pragmatic concern

The Precision Concern Leads to Predicates of Qualities and a. . .

8.4

Connecting protowords Instruction of imagination

217

“Proceedings,” verbal conflicts as a source of permanent communicative concerns

Protolanguage

A language with simple syntax

Social calculus

"Ig take" "Og meat" "hit Og" (leading-away protophrases reporting a past situation)

"Ig take meat" "Ig beat Og" (separate pidginsentences)

"Ig take meat and Ig hit Og" (pidgin-sentences conjunction)

Fig. 8.2 The steps of language complexity and accuracy growth: the modified scheme

of “social calculus” to the communicative concern of clarifying the belonging of predicates, which has become ensured by syntax and grammar. Let us return to Bickerton’s schema (Fig. 8.1). The path of its correction has become more apparent. In the initial stage (left part of the diagram), we add “Connecting protowords” because the disordered protophrases were the essential ingredient for the new structure: the pidgin-sentences. We retain the “social calculus.” Moreover, we applaud Bickerton for his insight: indeed, discerning which person to match which action seems to be a crucial pragmatic, and thus communicative, concern. Presented in the first (left) step, protophrases refer to some distant past situation. They are leading-away protophrases, which form an essential intermediate step (see Chap. 7), omitted by Bickerton. Therefore, we add D. Dor’s “instruction of imagination” as this structure’s most crucial cognitive component. After the correction, the scheme takes the following form (Fig. 8.2).

8.4

The Precision Concern Leads to Predicates of Qualities and a Syntax Complication

The most straightforward and most meaningful for ancient people (and not only for them) were the following types of properties, traits, and characteristics: 1. Qualities of usefulness of things, inanimate or animate objects: dangerous/nondangerous, good/bad, ripe/unripe, tasty/unpalatable, big/small, sharp/dull, strong/ weak, hard/soft, etc.

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2. Qualities of people: good/bad, strong/weak, evil/good, beautiful/ugly, small/ young/old Suppose a group meets a discrepancy in the situation assessment, which we will express with the pidgin-sentence “Ug hit Ig.” Is this action right or wrong? To support or resent? Here, all circumstances and also qualities of persons and objects prove to be significant. Suffice it to compare the accusation and the justification that follows it: Accusation: “Big Ug hits little Ig stick. Ig hurts. Hit bad. Ug bad.” Justification: “Little Ig throwed stone big Ug. Ug hurts. Ug blood. Ug angry. Ug punish Ig. Ug good.” When the first qualities of faces and things began to differ, then the magic wand of predication began to extend to all messages where these differences are practically meaningful: Red fruits are good. Pick them. Green fruits are bad. Do not pick.

Such specifications immediately affected the coordination of actions, which was a powerful positive reinforcement to develop appropriate verbal skills. The number of definitions grew. Two, three, or more appeared in one sentence. What objects did they refer to? Confusion became the new costs (by-products) of the multiplicity of predications. There was a corresponding concern for clarification, which needed new linguistic structures to provide it. Increasingly strict schemes of word order or their glues were overcoming the confusion. In almost all languages, grammatical distinctions appeared between parts of speech and particles, word forms, other means of control, and concordance, which enabled the establishment and recognition of the collaboration of some words with others. Thus, the sapienses were able to form sentences like these: Gather large ripe fruits in a small basket. Then, gather the small fruits in the large basket. Stand behind that big tree and wait for the little beast to run out.

Attempts to give such commands using protophrases or pidgin-sentences would lead to inevitable confusion. Let us consider that at first the Early sapienses from Africa were not too superior to local Eurasian Paleoanthropes in technologies; moreover, they were behind in the sphere of specific local practices (protection from the cold, hunting of local animals, including giant mammoths and woolly rhinoceroses). However, in terms of language development and, more broadly, cognitive evolution, learning ability, and intergenerational translation, sapienses were superior to Neanderthals and, even more so, to Denisovans (see Chaps. 6 and 7). The achievement of high precision of utterance through mastering “social calculus,” predicativity, and syntax with grammar seems to be almost the main factor of this significant advantage.

The “Paleoclimatic Pump” and the African Cauldron of Sapientation

8.5

8.5

219

The “Paleoclimatic Pump” and the African Cauldron of Sapientation

Paleogenetic studies of mitochondrial DNA have pointed to a “genetic split” between the South African Khoisan peoples (with autochthonous, isolated, but fully developed languages) and other Africans at a time earlier than 90 kya (Barazesh, 2009). All non-African peoples (including the most isolated islanders), being the descendants of the migrants from Africa to Eurasia, have quite developed, complete languages, albeit with various levels of complexity (see Chap. 10). With the low linguistic development of newcomers from Africa, at least a few languages of the pre-speech and protophrases level of local old-timers (paleoanthropes) should have survived, but there are no such primitive languages. Scientists believe there are two or more waves of newcomers to Asia, Oceania, Australia (Eswaran, 2002; Oppenheimer, 2012). However, the later waves of sapienses were also numerous. They assimilated the handfuls of old-timers and spread their own, already quite full-fledged languages. Estimates based on the phonemic diversity regularities roughly confirm such a dating. Our analysis suggests that language appears early in the history of our species. It does not support the idea that language is a recent adaptation that could have sparked the colonization of the globe by our species about 50 kya (1), (91). our result is consistent with the archaeological evidence suggesting that human behavior became increasingly complex during the Middle Stone Age (MSA) in Africa, sometime between 350–150 kya (. . .). However, we cannot rule out the possibility that other linguistic adaptations, that are independent of phonemic evolution, arose later and triggered the out-of-Africa expansion” (Perreault & Mathew, 2012). An origin of modern languages predating the African exodus 50,000 to 70,000 years ago puts complex language alongside the earliest archaeological evidence of symbolic culture in Africa 80,000 to 160,000 years ago (Atkinson, 2011, p. 348).

It means that Africa was the main site of basic glottogenesis and cognitive evolution. Syntax probably began to take shape in the Early sapienses before leaving Africa. To elucidate the reasons for this breakthrough, we should turn to the extremely important in terms of cognitive evolution but mysterious African stage of the anthropogenesis in the interval of ca. 200–80 kya. The glacial period included cooling waves (glaciers) and warming (interglacials). Another cooling occurred about 120 kya, but it was not stable. Being very severe for the middle latitudes of Eurasia, the cold spared Africa, but affected its climate differently. The rising glaciers of Eurasia took water from the ocean and seas, which reduced evaporation and made the African climate drier, while the interglacials increased humidity. The alternation of these periods in Africa led to the transformation of jungles into savannas, savannas into steppes, steppes into deserts, or vice versa, deserts and steppes became savannas, and as the humidity increased, jungles overtook them (Walter et al., 2000; Wells, 2002). This “paleoclimatic pump” did not allow “once and for all” adaptation to the familiar niche of sustenance and security. Hominins since long ago began to respond

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to any challenge with new behavioral practices, which in these conditions led to accelerated evolutionary development, successful adaptation, and demographic growth. Francesco d’Errico and Chris B. Stringer refer to (Powell et al., 2009) and summarize conclusions of this research: . . .the number and size of subpopulations and the degree of interaction between them are key factors in the emergence, maintenance, spread and loss of innovations. They speculate that population size in Africa could have reached a critical threshold about 100 000 years ago, when population density and enhanced contact between groups could have allowed the rate of accumulation of innovations to significantly overtake their loss. Thus, cultural change in the Middle Stone Age greatly accelerated and the increased store of learning was beneficial to the survival of individuals and their groups. In turn this would have started a feedback mechanism, leading to a further increase in population density and contacts and so on (d’Errico & Stringer, 2011, p. 1066–67).

The population and density of late Paleoanthropes and Protosapienses in southern and eastern Africa were far superior to descendants of Archanthropes and Erectuses that had previously migrated to Eurasia and Austronesia. Climate changes in Africa constantly forced migrations, dense contacts, and rigid intergroup selection, that is, the main factors explaining the vanguard role of Africa in technological progress, morphological and cognitive sapientation. Researchers point out that the main aromorphosis processes in this era, which had the character of progressive sapientation, took place in the spheres of inter- and intragroup interactions, practices, and means of communication, accompanied by the development of cognitive abilities and assignments (Richerson & Henrich, 2012; Fitch, 2010; Laland, 2017). What were the reasons for this evolutionary shift of cardinal importance?

8.6

Circumscription, Migration, and Clashes of Protosapienses

The increased skill of African Protosapienses to hunt for large game and the enormous herds of cloven-hoofed mammals in the savannahs led to a substantial demographic increase, which turned into population pressure as the exits to Eurasia were still closed. Thus, before their triumphal settlement of Eurasia (and later of Austronesia and the Americas) with the known take-off of technology and Upper Paleolithic cultures, the sapienses were locked in Africa, especially in the East, for quite a long time. Thus, the factor of circumscription became active1 (Carneiro, 1970). 1

Generally speaking, the losing, weaker groups usually leave the disputed land. Thus, the settlement by sapienses of the farthest edges and islands of the planet is primarily due to demographic pressure and subsequent geopolitical displacement, not to a romantic passion for changing places: no one ever voluntarily leaves secure and nourishing lands.

8.6

Circumscription, Migration, and Clashes of Protosapienses

221

One should pay attention to the intensive morphological evolution of African late hominins 400–100 kya: the progressive sapient changes of skull and skeleton recorded from bone remains. This fact means large numbers, diversity of competing populations, and very severe selection between them. As demographic growth progressed, there were more frequent contacts and intensive mixing because only such factors could give African Paleoanthropes a powerful sapient shift to Protosapienses and then Neoanthropes (the Early sapienses). The further history of sapienses testifies to significant cognitive changes in the African period, despite the absence of direct traces of it. In terms of technology level, Africa of the Middle Paleolithic and Early Upper Paleolithic was not superior to the other world regions (Vishnyatsky, 2008, p. 76–80). How can we explain this enigma? In cramped conditions, aggravated by forced migrations due to the “paleoclimatic pump,” clashes and conflicts between groups of African (proto)sapienses became more frequent. A necessary consequence of such processes was the conclusion of intergroup alliances (Ambrose, 2002, p. 22). Thus, it is pretty natural that solitary groups hostile to all their neighbors and at war with them were losing. At the same time, those able to create alliances through marriage policy, exchange (the giftgiving mechanism), collective rituals, and joint meals lived in more reliable safety. They won in conflicts thanks to solidarity networks and numerical advantage. The cultural diffusion and hence the increased clashes and exchanges of African Early sapienses are evidenced by the archaeological data. The innovative technologies and social practices recorded at archaeological sites during the period 77–59 kya in the western Cape are only one part of a behavioral montage that also spread across other regions in Africa at this time. Rapid advances in human cognition after ca. 200 kya were manifested in material-culture practices not previously observed in the MSA. After ca. 100 ka, symbolically mediated behavior seems strongly allied to material culture (Henshilwood & Dubreuil, 2011, p. 379).

Early sapienses ca. 80–50 kya exchanged not only products but also valuable raw materials for stone tools. Current evidence indicates that obsidian—a common object of exchange throughout prehistory—was sometimes moved as far as several hundred kilometers between the source and eventual point of discard (Kuhn, 2012, p. 78).

Creativity, innovation, the fixation mechanisms, and the reliability of cultural translation between generations depend directly on the size of the populations and the density of contacts between groups. The more individuals are in a group and the stronger the ties between the groups, the greater the likelihood that an innovation will take hold. If this achievement gives a visible advantage to the group, members of other groups will tend to borrow the innovation, and then it has an excellent chance to spread widely and reliably translate across generations (Richerson et al., 2009; Kuhn, 2012). V. Eswaran proposed a mathematical model convincingly explaining many genetic characteristics of our species. The model develops Suell Wright’s balance

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shift theory. This concept assumes the following aspects of a population experiencing rapid adaptive progress with demographic growth and subsequent expansion. . . .In populations subdivided into small semiisolated demes, evolution can occur in the following three phases: (1) Genetic drift propels different demes along different trajectories, facilitating an exploration of the adaptive landscape available to the species. (2) Intrademe selection allows some demes to reach a new and higher adaptive peak. (3) Interdeme selection propagates the gene combinations that correspond to these adaptive advances and shifts the entire species to the new peak. For all this to occur, the demes are required to be (a) small enough to allow significant genetic drift and (b) semi-isolated, to facilitate the formation of complex coadapted gene combinations that would otherwise be broken up by admixture (Eswaran, 2002, p. 750).

In other words, it means a dual group/alliance structure. Owing to the combination of climatic and geographical conditions—a combination of the growth of vast herds of large herbivores in southeastern Africa and the development by (proto)sapienses there of efficient ways of collective hunting, probably with the use of throwing implements, a genetic and cognitive “cauldron” was formed here. It led to population growth and began to supply waves of migratory expansion to Eurasia through the Levant and Arabia (Fig. 8.3).

8.7

Intergroup Alliances and Negotiations as Factors for Clarification of Statements

The migration of Early sapienses from Africa to Eurasia took place in two, three, or more waves of 130–100 and 70–40 kya, with the most significant wave dating back to circa. 54–50 kya (see Chap. 9 for details). The descendants of all branches of sapienses have equally full-fledged languages, though they are vastly different in the phonetics and morphological types. Indigenous languages have specificities in the vast linguistic diversity. However, the peoples displaced to the distant periphery possess no less linguistic ability than the descendants of the dominant aliens. This fact demonstrates that the Early sapienses who initially migrated to other continents in Africa underwent a rigorous selection with mixing and cultural exchange among themselves. The selection was ultimately based on the criterion of cognitive and thus also linguistic development. The acceleration of biological and social evolution processes depended directly on increasing population density combined with the establishment of complex social relations and rigorous multilevel selection: sexual between individuals, intergroup selection between alliances (linguistic communities), and selection between populations. In addition, clashes became more frequent under conditions of high density and climate-driven migrations. Consequently, the selection was based on the criterion of internal solidarity and the level of coordinated action (Chap. 7).

8.7

Intergroup Alliances and Negotiations as Factors for Clarification. . .

223

Fig. 8.3 Waves of sapienses’ distribution (Eswaran, 2002, p. 752)

Active mixing in African Protosapienses and Early sapienses in the period 200–75 kya means that the groups not only clashed and fought each other over hunting grounds, but could also get along, cementing relationships by kinship, thus forming alliances for defense against outsiders or for capturing neighboring territories (Stringer, 2012). However, intermarriage, clan and alliance formation, and the division of territories all require mutual understanding between groups that had not previously encountered each other and thus had their arsenals of linguistic means. The intense intersection of cultural traditions led to creativity and development throughout subsequent human history. Here the general principles of evolution were systematically at work: the advantage of the breadth of available ingredients and colliding diversities (Chap. 2). However, conflicts and wars between groups and their alliances did not cease. These processes led to the extinction of those groups that could not agree and coordinate their actions, that is, those who lagged in the evolution of language and consciousness.

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The marriage policy within alliances (the oldest form of diplomacy) points to a no less rigid sexual selection already at the level of individuals. According to the general principle of “outward-inward” social dynamics, the principles and criteria of intergroup interaction inevitably penetrated to the level of interaction between families and between individuals. If in the former relatively isolated life of the group the advantage in mating, matrimony, and gene propagation belonged, for example, to successful hunters, with intensive intergroup interaction, there was a shift of criteria toward leadership and prestige usually connected with speech. It is unlikely that the politically significant act of twinning between families and clans was entrusted only to young brides and grooms; more likely, the elders (alliance chiefs, clan heads, parents) implemented marriage policy, that is, those who could negotiate. Accordingly, verbal and mental abilities, the flexibility of thinking, and learning other people’s words and practices developed. All these qualities inherent in alliance leaders became competitive advantages in intergroup and sexual selection.

8.8

The Communicative Challenges of the Most Ancient Diplomacy

The apparent difficulty was the need to negotiate the terms of the alliance. Here there were communicative challenges and concerns of a fundamentally new nature. Intergroup communication already required full-fledged, in fact, diplomatic negotiations. What did representatives of separate groups discuss in their meetings? To what characteristics of language did these topics attest? The specific themes seem to be obligatory: • About peace among themselves and their willingness to defend their territory together • About kinship already existing or planned, about the binding of the alliance by marriage, about the rules themselves in this sphere, perhaps differing, disputed, and about their application (cf. Barnard, 2009) • About the rules of territorial delimitation, the rules of access to valuable resources (clean water, raw materials for tools, fruitful plants, hunting grounds), who of what clan has access to what • About non-violence between members of their groups, rules for punishing violators or making amends • About violations of rules, conflicts that have occurred, and how to resolve them now • About gifts, offerings, valuables, and exchanges in the context of kinship, family, clan relations • About the following meetings, joint meals, rituals

8.8

The Communicative Challenges of the Most Ancient Diplomacy

225

Imagine that there were no negotiations or agreements on these topics. There were no alliances between the groups. Each group was only in a relationship of alienation, conflict, and war with all neighboring groups. Under such conditions, accelerated evolution would have been observed only in weapons and coordination of military actions. Although the last line of development seems plausible, this version contradicts the apparent advantages of Neoanthropes coming from Africa and encountering Eurasiatic Paleoanthropes. The ability of the former to suppress by numerical advantage and learn everything new from the old-timers points to the sapienses’ possession of a developed system of communication, to their ability to form alliances, and to quickly borrow practical innovations in intergroup contact. Abandoning the dead-end Hobbesian version of “everybody fought against everybody,” we accept the version of alliances, and hence the plausibility of the negotiating themes listed above. The latter had essential characteristics: (a) Many of their topics and objects during negotiations are absent in the visual field, and one cannot point the finger at them. (b) Content of negotiations must be explained quite precisely, since they are about vital subjects connected with resources, war and peace, violence and blood feuds, the rules of further coexistence, and necessarily in the context of kinship relations. (c) The parts of messages are connected logically as “marriage—union,” “belonging to such a family or clan—obligation to follow such rules,” “rule—violation— compensation for damage,” “decision—action,” “action—consequence,” etc. For this level of communication in intergroup negotiations, it was not enough to use leading-away protophrases (with no word order). At the very least, pidgin sentences had to be used, but rather elements of syntax and grammar, since these provided the high precision of utterances necessary in negotiation. Are not too advanced linguistic and intellectual abilities attributed to the most ancient hunter-gatherers? The answer to this legitimate objection includes the following points. • Presumably, groups of Heidelbergians (400–250 kya) or Protosapienses (250–100 kya) already possessed protowords and leading-away protophrases (see Chap. 7). During this period, up to 55–40 kya, intensive morphological sapientation (the formation of “human modern anatomical type”) took place. It would be strange if it did not also accompany an accelerated cognitive evolution with a rise in the steps of language development.2 • Of course, there was a permanent mutual misunderstanding with irritation, alienation, rupture of relations, and outbreaks of violence in the initial stages of

“The biological event that gave rise to Homo sapiens as a hugely distinctive anatomical entity, in Africa some 200 thousand years ago, had cascading effects throughout the bony skeleton; and there is no obvious reason why those effects should not have extended to soft-tissue systems, including the brain” (Tattersall, 2017, p 66).

2

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peaceful intergroup interaction. Only extreme external pressure, namely geopolitical pressure, could overcome the reluctance to deal with dangerous outsiders. This pressure meant that stronger and more aggressive enemies would attack, displace from their lands, kill men, and capture women without arranging an alliance. Therefore, the difficulties of communication had to be overcome willynilly. • We know about the life of hunter-gatherers at the Paleolithic level thanks to descriptions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century missionaries and anthropologists. These groups were capable of negotiation, alliances, and exchanges; they maintained complex kinship ties. They all possess complete languages, mainly with a very complex lexicon, grammar, and syntax. Suppose the known huntergatherers acquired these impressive abilities only in the last 30–40 thousand years (see Chap. 10). Then it is reasonable to assume that in the previous epoch (5–10 times longer), they, together with the rest of the African ancestors of modern humans, could have reached the previous stage both in social interactions and in linguistic complexity.

8.9

Factors of Language Refinement in Intergroup Communication

Why is such an emphasis on intergroup interactions and communications? Couldn’t the refinement of linguistic means, the acquisition of syntactic and grammatical constructions, go on within groups? Of course, it could to some extent. Linguistic innovations also took place at this level: in the processes of searching for mutual understanding, reinterpreting utterances at joint meals and everyday gatherings (Chaps. 6 and 7). However, the most plausible impetus for creating syntax seems to have been forced communication between members of separate groups. The arguments are as follows. • Within one group, all of its members are immersed in the same context, for the most part, related to “here and now” situations or to simple past cases, the communication of which could use a developed pidgin-like protolanguage. Otherwise, there are no apparent concerns that more complex syntactic constructions would provide. • This argument seems valid because of simpler syntax in the languages of groups and tribes with a strategy of cultural self-isolation, of which the Piraha people are a typical example (see Chap. 10). • Rules of behavior do not need to be pronounced within a group, as they are established and reinforced by immediate reactions to violations. • Friction and conflicts are inevitable in any dense interaction of autonomous communities. Communities do not fight and decide to co-exist peacefully and unite in an alliance to defend against enemies or attack them. Then the stipulation of rules is already necessary, which involves logical links between norms,

8.9

Factors of Language Refinement in Intergroup Communication

227

Sexual concerns Access to a variety of language ingredients through cross-ferlizaon

Eroc and matrimonial aracveness of sapient traits as a marker of success. Reproducve advantage of such traits possessors

Expression of sapient traits (appearance, speech ability) of successful groups representaves Probability of disintegraon or death of groups without alliances

The intensity of aempts to clarify statements

The fixaon of speech skills in genes; the fixaon of linguisc structures in cultural transmission

Acute concern for conveying accurate messages and understanding in the absence of a shared context

Demographic growth, ghtness, frequency of group clashes, intergroup selecon pressure

Concerns (preservaon/growth) of strength and security

The movaon to negoate and arrange alliances for security, presge, and sustenance

Concerns of sustenance, farming, and acquision

The level of language development in the populaon whose groups make alliances

Success of negoaons Concerns of presge and social membership

Fig. 8.4 The dynamic relationship of factors leading to the emergence of language with syntax due to intergroup negotiation practices

specific actions, and situations, and thus requires more complex clarifying language constructions. Figure 8.4 shows a close connection of intergroup relations, the correspondent processes of cognitive evolution, and glottogenesis with fundamental needs and concerns. Later on, intensive intergroup communications and alliances existed among the Middle sapienses of Eurasia (already at the level of the Upper Paleolithic). There is evidence of distant exchange relations in this period: exchange of raw materials for stone products, artifacts, shells, and ceramic figurines. These processes began already in African Early sapienses and Protosapienses. Let us bring together the arguments in favor of the hypothesis.

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• Early sapienses who moved to Eurasia survived similar sapient traits, social, and cognitive development levels. Most likely, not isolation but communication, ability to arrange alliances, and correspondent diffusion of skills allowed to achieve this level. • If sapienses formed alliances and conducted peaceful exchanges in the vast expanse of Eurasia, they probably already possessed this ability at significantly higher densities in East Africa.3

8.10

The First Complex Sentences as the Product of Contracting Utterances

At this point, we should formulate the microsociological hypothesis of the ritual origin of compound sentences. Briefly, it sounds like this: the first constructions uniting simple sentences appeared in dialogues, first of all, in situations of negotiations, when the interlocutor repeated or modified someone else’s phrase, adding his own to it. Then, after many attempts to reach agreement, both repeated the coordinated compound phrase as a sacral formula. Later, its pattern became a model (a magic wand) to generate similar sentences. In a more expanded form, the explanation of the complex syntax genesis looks like this. Language constructions uniting phrases or sentences with the logical following, subordination, originally appeared in intergroup negotiations, aimed at reaching agreement in discussions of the rules of interaction. To overcome difficulties in understanding and to reach an agreement, one interlocutor repeated or reinterpreted in his way the phrase just uttered by the other, adding to it his version. The other interlocutor agreed with this composite construction or offered his version, connecting the two sentences. Finally, after several such trials, the parties adopted an agreed formula, of which the parts were ably linked. Let us imagine the following dialogue between the representatives of groups (alliances, tribes) A and B. A. Our people (A) were hunting. Your people (B) attacked them. B. Your people hunted incorrectly. This side of the river is our land. А. However, your people used to hunt on our side of the river. That’s our land there. B. Okay. It’s wrong to cross the river. . . A. . . . Because across the river there is a foreign land. B. Good. It’s wrong to cross the river. . .because it’s someone else’s land across the river.

3

The general slowdown in the development of Early Upper Paleolithic technology in Africa (compared to the impressive leap after migration to Eurasia) is a particularly challenging problem. The probable explanation includes the growth of epidemics in Africa, further spatial separation of survived groups. Their populations unified within each locus met each other much rarely. The absence of diverse traditions clashes led to relative stagnation.

8.11

Mental Maps, Patterns of Consciousness, and Thinking

229

Reaching agreement was accompanied by emotional satisfaction, that is, positive reinforcement; the formula found (above italicized) was repeatedly recited, gained sacral significance, and became a model for expressing other compound thoughts. Generally speaking, constructions with adventitious or complex sentences could be composed approximately the same way with a somewhat abstract formulation of the rules. Thus, for example, the final part of the negotiation could have a structure of this type: A: On this side of the river, it is our land, the land of the A-people. . . B: . . .On the other side of the river, it is our land, the land of B-people. A: Okay. On this side of the river is A-people’s land, and on the other side of the river is the land of B-people. A: On this side of the river, only A-people hunt. B: You say that only A-people hunt on this side of the river. However, the B people have always hunted here. A: Let B-people come with gifts and ask permission. . . B. . . . And then they can hunt this side of the river. A: Okay. Let B-people come with gifts, ask permission, and then hunt this side of the river. ... A, B, and all the rest repeat several times: When people come with gifts and ask for permission, they can hunt on someone else’s land. Speech abilities achieved consistently penetrated intragroup communication, especially public speeches.4 Without accepting the thesis of overcoming the difficulties of intergroup contact, it is not truly clear why Neoanthropes could not have remained at the level of pidgin and simple sentences, compensating all ambiguities with gestures and references to everyday familiar experiences. People today effectively use modern pidgins in a well-known context, say in tourist or border markets.

8.11

Mental Maps, Patterns of Consciousness, and Thinking

It is hardly necessary to ask what came first as a primary driver: new semantic (say, mental maps of terrain, relations, temporal extent) or syntactic, grammatical constructions. Both sides give each other new possibilities. It increases the ability to move quickly from context to context and combine them into the required more

4 Note that in today’s world we use and encounter compound sentences mostly in written texts and public speeches: religious sermons, political and scientific reports, university lectures. In everyday conversations in our own circles, we do fine without long compound sentences, especially those with recursion.

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complex context. Dessalles (2007) calls processes of this kind “thematic segmentation”: . . . conceptualization of a statement generally involves several operations of thematic segmentation. In Last year he was smaller than his father the situation has to be thematically segmented both in terms of time and the scale of heights (. . .) Conceptualization of situations requires systematic use of a small number of means, which include mental maps, whether spatial, temporal, or abstract. Behind this system of maps there is no doubt a single positioning mechanism. This means that conceptualizing the idea that Bill is nicer than Josephine but not as nice as Dorothy is no different from understanding a statement like Bonfire Night is after Hallowe’en but before Christmas. In each case we position a theme and two reference points on two successive very simplified maps (Dessalles, 2007, p. 244).

The thinking and language structures needed each other. They formed the conditions and challenges for each other’s development. However, the structures of both types provided communicative concerns of clarifying various challenges. At first, the thinking concerns of understanding and explaining what was happening have been merging with the communicative ones, but then the intellectual and linguistic structures gained increased autonomy. They together provided challenges and concerns of techno-natural niches and social orders. Both types of structures transmit through cultural channels. This process is still the case to this day.

8.12

The Logical Origin of Syntax Means

Various syntactic constructions, grammatical forms and rules, and rhetorical devices have appeared in different languages, responding to the challenges of new communicative tasks at various times and in varying degrees of dependence on each other. All this complexity can be studied by methods of evolutionary linguistics or at later stages: on the material of written languages through diachronic comparative analysis of texts or on the model examples of pidgins and Creole languages (Bickerton, 1981; Mcwhorter, 2003). J.-L. Dessalles (2007, p. 299–301). calls cognitive conflict a source of logical operations. It was a conflict between representations (mental images), mainly in situations requiring action. The direction of these actions directly depended on the acceptance of one picture or another of what is happening. In the spirit of Vygotsky (although without reference to his work) Dessalles speaks of the source of logic as the initial unfolding of cognitive conflict between individuals who see the situation differently and suggest different actions. Indeed, thinking could emerge only in social or rather communicative verbal interaction, and only then could it pass into individual consciousness by the usual route of interiorization. Vygotsky argued that the child’s mastery of grammatical structures and forms comes ahead of the mastery of logical structures and operations corresponding to these forms. The child masters the adjective sentence, forms of speech such as “because,” “since,” “if,” “when,” “opposite,” or “but” long before it masters causal, temporal, conditional relations, oppositions (Vygotsky, 1930/1997). Suppose that a child really masters speech syntax before it masters the logic of thought. How can this thesis be combined with our main model: first communicative

8.13

Thinking and Cognition Gain Autonomy from Language

231

clash and thought concern, and only then emergence of logical and syntactical constructions as support structures? Where did the syntactic forms denoting logical structures come from? Certainly, for our distant ancestors there were no “adults” with already readymade, culturally transmitted linguistic patterns. Syntax adapted to logical operations was born with difficulty, probably in strenuous communication with attempts to convey an image of what was happening and to recognize another’s, with objections and attempts to argue, with interrogating and rephrasing. People could do all this challenging work only with solid joint motivation to provide significant shared concern. The latter consisted precisely of understanding the correlation of events, persons, things, causal, subject, and other connections. In fact, there were no ready-made logical and conceptual structures before the verbal embodiment. Instead, these structures appeared due to the formation of syntactic constructions of language in intense communication with attempts at argumentation. Thus, the concerns of thought immersed in social interactions with the verbalization of cognitive conflict drove the evolution of syntax. When the linguistic structures of logic appeared, children began to master them early and quickly, along with other elements of language. For this, the new generations did not need to understand all the logical meanings of the constructions at once. This is, in fact, what Vygotsky himself argued.

8.13

Thinking and Cognition Gain Autonomy from Language

It is possible that in the period of the Upper Paleolithic or later times, when interest in discerning the reasons for phenomena and the ability to think about them began to develop, some new challenges in the interaction with the natural environment or in the social sphere emerged. However, one can assume that even in the absence of principally new challenges, the very change in social orders toward diversification, stratification, and increased competition for prestige and leadership led sapienses to talk and argue about things that earlier used to be customary and self-evident. For a fire to ignite, it is necessary to blow hard or, in contrast, it makes the resulting fire go out. This kind of argument is quite conceivable, given the importance of creating and keeping a fire in all societies without exception since its development and the relatively reasonable experiential grounds for each position. Is it better to cook food over an open fire or charcoal? Should meat be wrapped in leaves or not? Is it better to kill an encountered stranger immediately so that his tribe members will be frightened and go away, or is it better to accept him as a guest so that later his tribesmen will not attack us? Every decision requires agreement, persuasion, and reasoning about how things usually work and what leads to what. The concern of persuading tribe members is the impetus to elaborate mental structures of argumentation and make verbal attempts to express them. Through attempts to prove a statement based on previously accepted

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judgments, direct experience, or recollection, sapienses formed new logical schemes of causality and adequate syntactic and grammatical means of expressing them. When logical relations (cause-effect, part-whole, object-quality, increasesdecreases) appeared at the level of meaning of sentences, coherent speech from several sentences, an autonomous sphere of thinking with its contexts emerged.

8.14

Switching Contexts and Language Enrichment

The transition from a simple syntax to a complex one naturally presupposes the ability to quickly shift one situation (and its context) to another, hold them simultaneously, take them into account, and build logical connections between events from different situations subject from other contexts. Thinking and cognition create particular concerns of fixing observations, knowledge, and assumptions. Together with the communicative concerns of discussion, these formulation concerns serve as potent stimuli for language development. It is a field of research in evolutionary sociolinguistics that is beyond the scope of our analysis. The rudiments of switching contexts probably appeared at earlier stages: on the level of protolanguage (of pidgin-type) or language with simple syntax. Thus, for example, a chain of simple sentences could indicate the connection between sequence or causality (a clear distinction of the latter is a late intellectual achievement). To draw attention to the connection between the semantic moments, it is natural to resort to some verbal or extraverbal means: intonation, accentuation, gesticulation. During the rephrasing rituals aimed at statements clarification, sooner or later appear service words with meanings such as “therefore,” “consequently,” “that,” “this,” “which,” “there,” and “were.” When the magic wand of combining simple sentences appeared (see above), the same means began to take part in complex syntactic constructions. Let us consider that there was no written language yet, so the transition from only simple sentences to complex ones was implicit, not occurring in all spheres under discussion, and even not in all languages (see Chap. 10 about the Piraha and Riau languages). A particularly intensive complication of language, its rhetorical enrichment, took place where there was a need to connect subjects, situations, including those from different contexts, in one thought, tirade, public speech. Such concerns arose in complex social orders with deferred obligations, linking them to the rules of exchange, contributions of different persons, compensation for damages, and the tasks of persuasion, accusing some and praising others for past deeds (see in more detail in Chap. 10).

8.15

Contexts in Terms of Psychology and Neuroscience

The ability of consciousness to switch quickly, to link objects from different situations and contexts, is conceptualized in an article by L. Gabora and C. Smith (2018) as the second fundamental breakthrough in cognitive evolution, which is achieved “by changing the specificity of the activated memory domain:

8.15

Contexts in Terms of Psychology and Neuroscience

233

The ability to shift between different modes is referred to as contextual focus (CF) because it requires the capacity to focus or defocus attention in response to contextual factors (. . .) such as the audience, or level of danger, or goals, which may shift minute by minute if goals are broken into subgoals (Gabora & Smith, 2018, p. 7).

The authors point out that focused attention promotes analytical thinking, whereas unfocused attention when combining two or more contexts has advantages. In analytic thought, the activation of memory is constrained enough to hone in and mentally operate on only the relevant aspects of the contents of thought. In contrast, by diffusely activating a wide region of memory, defocused attention is conducive to associative thought; it enables more obscure (but potentially relevant) aspects of the situation to come into play. This greatly enhances the potential for insight, i. e., the forging of obscure but useful or relevant connections (Ibid).

The ability of consciousness to switch focuses and integrate them concerns relations of sequence, a causality of events, and levels in the dimensions of abstract/specific, general/private, whole/part. Once the products of one mode of thought could become ‘ingredients’ for the other, they could reflect on the contents of their mind not just from different perspectives but at different levels of granularity, from basic level concepts (e. g., deer) up to abstract concepts (e. g., animal) and down to more detailed levels (e. g., legs), as well as conceive of their interrelationships (Ibid. p. 7–8).

Explaining the “totality” of the individual’s consciousness (see Chap. 2) through the acquired ability to switch, focus, and defocus attention in the various contexts available to him also implies the capacity for language. This language must be as rich in vocabulary and potential constructions, so that parts of all these contexts are (or can be) labeled and expressed. Everything in our sensory experience, sensations, emotions, and insights that we cannot in any way express in language exists subjectively but cannot be considered conscious. Full awareness presupposes linguistic expression and articulation. Everything vaguely described is either dimly realized or remains only a claim to attention, a vague sensation, a “blind swallow,” and a “fruitless thought” “upon clipped wings with shadows to play” in the “palace dour.”5 As noted in the previous chapters, the consciousness of hominins at every stage of cognitive evolution evolved in close conjunction with language. Usually, new communicative concerns lead to new semantic concerns of consciousness and then to instrumental, linguistic concerns of expressing these meanings. In this case, the new semantic possibilities of the emergent linguistic means open up space for further advancement in cognition and thinking, respectively, in expanding consciousness.

5 Russian poet Osip Mandelshtam wrote in his poem “The Swallow”: I have forgot the word that I had meant to say // To palace of the shades flies a blind swallow // Upon clipped wings with shadows to play. //Night’s song is in oblivion sung below (. . .) The mortal’s power is to love and seek, // For him the sound into the palms will pour // But I forgot the word that I had meant to speak // And fruitless thought returns to palace dour (translated by Ilya Shambat). For some more translations, see here: https://ruverses.com/osip-mandelshtam/the-swallow/

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Each of the stages of glottogenesis discussed previously had its level of development of consciousness abilities. Figuratively speaking, neither sapienses, nor Erectuses, nor Habilises, let alone Australopithecines, regretted the “limitedness” of their consciousness, nor complained about the narrowness of its framework and insufficiency of its abilities. On the contrary, they were pretty satisfied with the “totality” of their consciousness, just as we are confident in the perfection and uniqueness of our “total” consciousness, often even claiming its “boundlessness.” My cat Masya, now sitting in front of the monitor, is also satisfied with “totality” of her consciousness-attention. She does not bother with the limits of the contexts and abilities available to her. So, I can only acknowledge (not without difficulty) my limitation and express that thought here, which is, perhaps, the fundamental difference between us. . . Okay, jokes aside, some creatures enjoy endless leisure time, while others have to pore over methodology and justifications again.

8.16

The Transition from Protolanguage to Simple Syntax: The Nomological Explanation

Figure 8.5 shows the stages of language complication considered. Let us first formulate the theoretical hypothesis about the conditions of transition from a protolanguage (of the pidgin-type) to a language with simple syntax. If communities with normativity, practices of daily meetings, remote control, proceedings, common linguistic means (like pidgin-sentences) enter into long-term relations with similar communities without common experiences and contexts, and these relations, rules of interaction are necessary for essential concerns of each

Stages of language complexity Protosapienses 350–100 kya

Parts of speech and predicativity, logical relations

Order of words Mental escape

The language Rubicon

Protolanguages with pidginsentences

Early sapienses 130-40 kya. Languages with simple syntax and grammar

Pre-speech of Neanderthals

Direction of time

Fig. 8.5 Protolanguages transform into languages: a conditional scheme

8.16

The Transition from Protolanguage to Simple Syntax: The. . .

235

community, then new communicative concerns of more accurate understanding appear, and more adequate verbal structures will be developed to provide them. This formulation does not mean that constructions of a particular type appear. A protolanguage with pidgin-sentences is a fork (bifurcation) for substantially various subsequent complications. Standard notions about sentences (including the distinction between simple and compound ones), parts of speech, predicates, grammatical agreement, etc., are not relevant here (see the discussion of current linguistic diversity in Chap. 10). Therefore, one should only talk here about moving toward greater precision. Also, note that the very first structures of syntax and grammar became magic wands, which later multiplied and spread into the language of the community without any connection to negotiation, but with great usefulness in proceedings, planning, and discussions. Figure 8.6 presents the justification ideas for the theoretical hypothesis.

Modern analogies. Suppose, groups able to communicate with each other only in pidgin, have to discuss the rules of interaction. In that case, they will acquire and jointly use additional syntactic means drawn from any languages they know

Sufficiency of conditions: The task of establishing general rules requires not only the description of imaginary situations (fulfillment and violation of rules) but also the designation of actions consequences, which implies logical connections

The experiment with word cards and colored chips. In each pair of players, one must tell the other some "new rules" of traffic or a well-known game (such as soccer or chess). Players can only communicate by making combinations of cards with immutable words. There is also a set of multicolored chips, to which players are free to give any meaning, agree about it. Presumably, all other things being equal: the fuller a team designates syntactic and grammar categories by chips, the better the players will achieve mutual understanding and the faster, more adequately explain the "new rules" to each other

Theoretical hypothesis: communities with pidgin-sentences in the negotiation of interaction rules are bound to acquire, through trial and error, more precise and abstract language constructions, more adapted to "social calculus," to denote various logical and substantive connections

Attempts and fixation mechanisms. Pidginsentences are subject to correction only when versions collide in proceedings or negotiations. Attempts will inevitably connect unaccounted for elements of semantics with sign forms, which, when fixed, leads to more precise structures, i.e., constructions of syntax and grammar

Fig. 8.6 The conditions of transition from a protolanguage (with pidgin-sentences) to a language with syntax and grammar: substantiation of the theoretical hypothesis

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The causes: Proto- and Early sapienses had to negotiate rules for further interactions in their alliances

Attempts and fixation mechanisms: in discussion of rules of hunting, access to resources, marriages, exchanges, conflicts, pidgin-sentences were not enough. When negotiators refined them and reached an agreement, they fixed the obtained formulas by repetition as sacral ones

The effects: through negotiation groups and alliances have mastered the initial structures of syntax and grammar

The rationale for the appearance of the structure: a) all hunter-gatherer languages have at least simple syntactic structures; b) without simple syntax, there would be no complex syntax; c) if this transition occurred later, there would be isolated communities with protolanguages like pidgins, but there are none

The confirmation that at the concern obtained provision: because there were intergroup peace exchanges and alliances, it means there were successful negotiations. It means the Early sapienses have elaborated verbal structures to provide relevant communicative tasks

New challenges and concerns: with attention to the accuracy, the vagueness of connections between speech units became apparent. New clarification concerns later were provided by new means of grammar and complex syntax

Fig. 8.7 The transition conditions from a protolanguage with pidgin-sentences to a language with simple syntax: justification of the empirical hypothesis

The problems of justifying the empirical hypothesis are more challenging (Fig. 8.7). Table 8.1 summarizes the main factors in the increasing complexity of language and the development of the “totality” of consciousness. It should be clear to the reader from the end of the previous section why I do not describe all this material in detail in the main text. In the next chapter, we turn to the darkest and most unexplored topic of the pre-language gap. This adventurous attempt can be seen as an exercise in expanding historical and macrosociological consciousness.

Time, prominent representatives, technology, brain volume 130–40 kya. Protosapienses and Early sapienses, Skilled hunters. Gathering of shellfish, beginning of fishing. Moustier, Levallois. Compound implements. Spears, darts. Brain 1355– 1500 cm3.

New material practices, technonatural niches, and social orders Frequent intergroup contacts; opportunities for peaceful and hostile interactions. Probably alliances for defense and exchange purposes. Rudiments of complex kinship relationships

New regulatory and communicative concerns To build relationships with neighboring groups, to negotiate; to communicate one’s position and understand the situation of others; to persuade; to inform tribespeople about the new order of interaction; to prevent violations

Table 8.1 Factors of the cognitive evolution of Neoanthropes New structures and abilities: Ritual and communication Types of linguistic practices construction Negotiations with rep- The formation of fullfledged languages. First, resentatives of other simple constructions of groups; establishment syntax and grammar. of standard rules on Protowords become fullnonaggression, peacefledged words: with extraful relations, borders; situationality, semantic Making alliances, interconnectedness, the binding them by mararbitrariness of use riage and joint rituals, conflict resolution

Cognitive abilities Ability to reason about general rules. Rudiments of logical conclusions: from general to the, from cause to effect, and others. Switching, focusing, and defocusing attention considering different events, situations

8.16 The Transition from Protolanguage to Simple Syntax: The. . . 237

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References Ambrose, S. H. (2002). Small things remembered: Origins of early microlithic industries in sub-Saharan Africa. In R. Elston & S. Kuhn (Eds.), Thinking small: Global perspectives on microlithic technologies (pp. 9–29) Archaeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association, 12. Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346–349. Barazesh, S. (2009, April, 30). Expansive genetic diversity in Africa revealed. Science news. https:// www.sciencenews.org/article/expansive-genetic-diversity-africa-revealed Barnard, A. (2009). Social origins: sharing, exchange, kinship. In R. Botha & C. Knight (Eds.), The cradle of language (pp. 219–235). Oxford Univ. Press. Bickerton, D. (1981). Roots of language. Language Science Press. Bickerton, D. (2002). Foraging versus social intelligence in the evolution of protolanguage. In A. Wray (Ed.), The transition to language (pp. 207–225). Oxford Univ. Press. Botha, R. (2003). Unravelling the evolution of language. Elsevier. Calvin, W. H., & Bickerton, D. (2000). Lingua ex machina: Reconciling Darwin and Chomsky with the human brain. MIT Press. Carneiro, R. L. (1970). A theory of the origin of the state. Science. New Series, 169(3947), 733–738. Chukovsky, K. I. (1963). From two to five. Univ. of California Press. d’Errico, F., & Stringer, C. (2011). Evolution, revolution or saltation scenario for the emergence of modern cultures? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B: Biological Sciences, 366, 1060–1069. Dessalles, J.-L. (2007). Why we talk. The evolutionary origins of language. Oxford Univ. Press. Eswaran, V. (2002). A diffusion wave out of Africa. The mechanism of the modern human revolution? Current Anthropology, 43(5), 749–774. Fitch, W. T. (2010). The evolution of language. Cambridge Univ. Press. Gabora, L., & Smith, C. M. (2018). Two cognitive transitions underlying the capacity for cultural evolution. Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 96, 1–26. Henshilwood, C. S., & Dubreuil, B. (2011). The Still Bay and Howiesons Poort, 77–59 ka symbolic material culture and the evolution of the mind during the African middle stone age. Current Anthropology, 52(3), 361–400. Kuhn, S. L. (2012). Emergent patterns of creativity and innovation in early technologies. Developments in Quaternary Science, 16, 69–87. Elsevier. Laland, K. N. (2017). Darwin’s unfinished symphony. How culture made the human mind. Princeton Univ. Press. Mcwhorter, J. (2003). The tower of babel: A natural history of language. Harper Perennial. Oppenheimer, S. (2012). Out of Eden: The peopling of the world. Robinson. Perreault, C., & Mathew, M. (2012, April 27). Dating the origin of language using phonemic diversity. PLoS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035289 Powell, A., Shennan, S., & Thomas, M. (2009). Late Pleistocene demography and appearance of modern human behavior. Science, 324, 1298–1301. Richerson, P. J., & Henrich, J. (2012). Tribal social instincts and the cultural evolution of institutions to solve collective action problems. Cliodynamics: The Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History, 3(1), 38–80. Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Bettinger, R. (2009). Cultural innovations and demographic change. Human Biology, 81, 211–235. Stringer, C. (2012). Lone survivors: How we came to be the only humans on earth. Times Books. Tattersall, I. (2017). How can we detect when language emerged? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 64–67.

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Vishnyatsky, L. B. (2008). Kulturnaya dinamika v seredine pozdnego pleystocena i prichini verhnepaleoliticheskoy revolyucii [Cultural dynamics in the middle late Pleistocene and causes of the upper paleolithic revolution]. Sankt-Petersburgh State Univ. Press. (In Russian). Vygotsky, L. S. (1930/1997). The history of the development of higher mental functions. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. Springer. Walter, et al. (2000). Early human occupation of the Red Sea coast of Eritrea during the last interglacial. Nature, 405, 65–69. Wells, S. (2002). The journey of man: A genetic odyssey. Princeton Univ. Press.

Chapter 9

Bridging the Pre-language Gap

9.1

The “White and Blind Spot”: How to Fill It?

Reliable judgments of historical linguistics are limited to the dates of the oldest surviving texts and inscriptions. The boldest approaches, such as “glottochronology” and “lexicostatistics” with attempts to reconstruct “Nostratic” or “Boreal” pre-languages,1 usually do not go further than 6–4 kya. Researchers of the stages of glottogenesis, of course, do not write about specific phonemes or words. Instead, they argue about the nature, timing, and patterns of structural shifts in linguistic evolution. The temporal scale here is much larger: Heidelbergians (600–300 kya), Protosapienses and Early sapienses (350–70 kya), and Middle sapienses with Upper Paleolithic (50–15 kya). The vast gap in time, the Pre-Language Gap in our knowledge, is a “white spot” because even the most audacious macro-comparativist reconstructors know nothing about the languages of these epochs. Unfortunately, the “white spot” is also a “blind spot” because there is almost no research on this topic. Some scholars write about the earlier glottogenesis; others write about the much later precursors of the languages known by written records. . . .many scholars do not deny the evolution of our system of communication (e. g., protolanguage), but do not apply this evolutionary way of thinking to the history of modern languages. This is of course partly due to the fact that people working on the origin of “language” often do not tackle the prehistory of modern languages to this end, and vice-versa (Coupé & Hombert, 2005, p. 12).

1 As the term “protolanguage” means in this book a particular stage of glottogenesis (according to D. Bickerton), I will indicate all reconstructed languages as “pre-languages.” Researchers try to reconstruct pre-languages (say, Proto-Indo-European, Proto-Germanic, Pre-Old Japanese, or Nostratic) by linguistic comparisons in order to reveal a unique course of language evolution. This way seems to be dead-ended. I will suggest an outline of an alternative research strategy in the Conclusion.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_9

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Bridging the Pre-language Gap The invention Families of of writing

Stages of language complexity

modern languages Completion of glottogenesis

The pre-language gap THE STAGES OF GLOTTOGENESIS the development of articulate speech and the complication of languages

The language Rubicon

Hypothetical reconstructions of "Pre-languages"

Pre-speech of Neanderthals

Syncretic, audible signals of the earliest hominins

Direction of time

Fig. 9.1 Location of the pre-language gap within main stages of origin and evolution of languages: the conditional scheme. The dotted lines indicate reconstructions of the stages of glottogenesis. Dashed lines are reconstructions of “pre-languages” (“Proto-Indo-European,” “Nostratic,” etc.) and the past states of the languages studied. Solid bold lines represent languages known from written texts or scholarly records of oral speech

The pre-language gap (Fig. 9.1) is naturally linked to the conceptual, methodological, and disciplinary gap. Some works outline the connections between the ancient evolution of languages, archaeological data, modern population genetics, paleogenetics, and the folklore of different peoples (Renfrew, 1987; Korotayev et al., 2017). However, only a few research programs have systematically studied this field. I would mention three research directions: integration of genetics and linguistic studies by groups of Luca Cavalli-Sforza and further research (Pakendorf, 2014; Progovac, 2019), macro-comparativist analysis (Swadesh, 1952; Ruhlen, 1994; Starostin, 2007; Starostin et al., 2016), and statistical research of phonemic diversity (Atkinson, 2011; Perreault & Mathew, 2012). Within these research lines, no one demonstrated serious interest in the theory of glottogenesis. Thus, the pre-language gap has remained almost untouched.

9.2

Approaches and Problems of Reconstructing Pre-languages

Beliefs about some single “Nostratic language,” from which all or almost all other languages originated (H. Pedersen, M. Ruhlen, V. M. Illich-Svitych), seem, to put it mildly, improbable. One of the founders of macro-comparative liguistics, August Schleicher, understood this well. He argued the impossibility of establishing one primordial language for all languages because, most likely, there were many

9.2

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primordial languages. Since languages are disappearing increasingly and new ones are not arising, Schleicher assumed that there were initially more languages than today. At present, almost no one tries to reconstruct a single “ Nostratic language” anymore, although sometimes they speak of such “ideal-maximalist goal.” Instead, proponents of kinship between different language families now more often write about a plurality of “Nostratic languages.” It is generally accepted that close languages of the same family with the unity of the basic vocabulary, phonetic, syntactic, and grammatical structures have a common origin. They seem to go back to some ancient language communities that had one language. Some began to proliferate in the subsequent era and were divided into ethnic groups, so language clusters grew. However, one cannot prove the existence of a common ancestor of languages similar in some characteristics based on linguistic data alone. Nikolai Trubetzkoy, an outstanding linguist, creator of phonology, and one of the founders of structuralism, expressed legitimate doubts about the accepted canons of linguistic reconstructions: The concept of “language family” does not imply a common origin of some languages from the same pre-language. “Language family” means a group of languages which, except for some common features of the linguistic structure, are also several common “material coincidences.” It is a group of languages where a significant part of the grammatical and lexical elements are natural sound correspondences. However, to explain the correspondence’s regularity, one should not resort to the assumption of the common origin of the languages, because such a regularity also exists with the massive borrowing of one unrelated language from another (Trubetzkoy, 1987, p. 44).

Generally speaking, proof of the origin of several languages from one language is possible, especially if there is evidence of the migrations that divided a previously unified linguistic community. However, only a coherent set of linguistic, genetic, ethnographic, and archaeological data can serve as a sufficient argument for this proof. Unfortunately, in the vast majority of the “pre-language” reconstructions, such attempts at justification are not even made. Modern paleoanthropology practically rejected multiregionalism (many origins of humans on the globe). The “Out of Afrika” concept has won and now become mainstream. From eastern and southern Africa, the sapienses, apparently already possessing sufficiently developed languages (see Chaps. 8 and 10), began to settle Eurasia with other continents and islands of Oceania. However, does this mean that they all spoke the same language? The negative answer follows at least from the cardinal differences in the morphological types of languages (analytic, flexional, agglutinative; see Chap. 10). Furthermore, the extensive heterogeneity of African genotypes and languages also reflects the original ethnocultural and linguistic diversity (Cavalli-Sforza, 1997; Atkinson, 2011). There is no need to argue with the possibility of reconstructing a native language for those families that include several languages that are remarkably close in basic vocabularies, such as Korean (2 languages), Baltic (2), East Slavic (3), AbkhazAdygean (5), Chukchi and Kamchatka (5), or Japanese (12).

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The linguistic similarity within a phylum (a macrofamily) of hundreds of languages could result from a lengthy period of close contact (infiltration affinity; see Chap. 11). However, macro-comparativists do not consider such a possibility. Usually, they believe in the “correct,” i.e., only divergent genealogical trees (or even of a single tree). For large families also with close languages, probably there was some “pre-lingual state,” but it does not follow from anywhere that it was one language. Why would not this “pre-lingual state” include some linguistic alliance—a group of dialects belonging to neighboring groups and communities (wandering huntergatherers, later sedentary farmers)? In a more complex version, a community with a big man or chiefdom could have been bilingual with group dialects, local substrate languages, and a language of intergroup communication (see Chaps. 10 and 11). Mainstream modern linguistics recognizes the unity of origin for the languages of each family (phyla, cluster). Thus, the presence of significant lexical, phonetic, and even some syntactic invariants and similarities in the Indo-European languages inspires several generations of macro-comparativists to reconstruct a single “ProtoIndo-European language” which became the undisputed idol of comparative linguistics. Trubetzkoy was bold enough to doubt its existence: Be that as it may, the Indo-European language family does not present a particularly close connection between its branches. In this respect, each Indo-European family branch has many lexical and grammatical elements that have no exact correspondences in the other Indo-European languages. The Indo-European family differs significantly from such language families as the Turkic, Semitic, or Bantu language families. In such circumstances, the assumption that the Indo-European family formed due to the convergent development of initially unrelated languages (the ancestors of the later “branches” of the Indo-European family) is not less plausible than the converse assumption that all Indo-European languages evolved from a single Indo-European pre-language by pure divergent evolution (Trubetzkoy, 1987, p. 48).

Even such a “truth” as an origin of Romance languages from Latin, which seems to most linguists quite prominent, is not absolute and allows for another, more complex, and exciting explanation (see Chap. 11). However, it is precisely this very doubtful paternity of Latin that served as a model for the titanic efforts of macro-comparativists to reconstruct all kinds of “pre-languages.2” Despite recognizing the closest common parent language for the minor language families, going back to the depth of centuries and millennia, the history of the “primordial languages” remains very obscure.

2 Even modern formal adherents of the “origin of Romance languages from Latin” reject the macrocomparativist dogma of the genealogical ascent of the languages of one large family to a single pre-language. “While it is not our aim here to question the validity and utility of the comparative method, one major problem that it poses is its inescapable assumption that the many forms under comparison must all be traced back to a single original form. This view, however, is a dangerous fiction which is bound to mislead: the period of the formation of the Romance languages was undoubtedly characterized by enormous diatopic and diphasic variation, far from displaying a unitary system across the whole area of the future Romània” (Varvaro, 2013, p. 28).

9.3

The Correspondence of Languages and Ethnic Groups: A Ready-Made. . .

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The main weakness of the macro-comparativist approach (especially “glottochronology”) remains its “disciplinary purity”: almost complete closure in the linguistic framework. Connected to this weakness is an almost mystical faith in “phonetic laws (rules).” Macro-comparativists uncritically interpret them as a “deduction” of one language from another. This “mysticism” consists of the fact that there are no attempts to understand the internal socio-historical, cultural, and psychological reasons for the identified (and indeed undeniable) regularities. The macro-comparativist approach to the search for common “Nostratic” roots for the most different language families is based on the dogma of “normality” of language fragmentation and the impossibility of their integration, on the premise of “accidentality” (abnormality?) of foreign language loanwords. Often this leads to the discrimination of language elements (especially words, lexemes) into “legitimate” having their predecessors in the mother “pre-language” and “illegitimate” coming from other languages as a result of contacts and borrowings. Proximity to other languages, even rather evident, is not considered “kinship,” but rather an unfortunate external interference, “hybridization,” and almost “spoiling” of the pure lineage. We will proceed from the assumption that all regular linguistic changes, especially those stemming from contacts between different language communities, are equally legitimate, standard, and worthy of study. Moreover, the study should include the indispensable consideration of historical realities, and, in scarcity, absence of data based on the known regularities of social, cultural, and political evolution.

9.3

The Correspondence of Languages and Ethnic Groups: A Ready-Made Solution or a Starting Point for Research?

Another major research program, implicitly concerned with the pre-language divide, has been developing under the geneticist Luca Cavalli-Sforza (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1988, 1990; Cavalli-Sforza, 1997; Stone et al., 2007). Here, modern languages are directly compared with current ethnic groups. Then genealogical trees are constructed: for languages, based on the Nostratic concepts of J. Greenberg and M. Ruhlen (highly doubtful), and for groups, based on genetic affinities (Fig. 9.2). The correspondence of almost all language families (also called “phyla” or “genus”) to low-level genetic clusters or individual populations indicates the relatively late origin of these families (and hence of the languages identified within them). The acknowledged successive replacements of languages were insufficient to blur the overall picture (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1990). The critical thesis of the relatively late origin of the languages known to us, which seems to have gone unnoticed by the macro-comparativists, echoes the hypothesis of the linguisticformative character of writing appearance (see Chap. 11).

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Fig. 9.2 Comparison of the tree of populations based on genome relatedness (left) and the tree of language families derived from reconstructed “primordial languages,” or “pre-languages” (right). (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1988, p. 6003)

The approach of Cavalli-Sforza’s research program has received solid criticism (see, e.g., Bateman et al., 1990). Nevertheless, the first tiers of ethnic groups (in the middle of the diagram in Fig. 9.2, the rightmost branches of Populations) appear reasonably reliable. The genetic distance is reasonably well defined and indicates ancestral commonalities. However, as this distance increases (moving “to the left” in the diagram), the clarity becomes blurred. The unity of the “root” of the population tree is justified only by the African origin of sapienses, but here we cannot speak of any “united people.” The favorite metaphors of paleo-geneticists about “Adam” and “Eve,” designed for journalists and popular science “hype,” mislead some scientists. Multiple groups of early sapienses that emerged from Africa differed significantly in genetics and somatotype, as evidenced by the well-known craniological polymorphism identified as early as Victor V. Bunak (1938) based on archaeological data of the Upper Paleolithic. It is pretty natural that this polymorphism also corresponded to linguistic diversity. The connection between languages and genes is undoubtedly present, but the picture of the “gene-linguistic coevolution” turns out to be much more complex and contradictory than the first enthusiasts assumed. Increasingly sophisticated research

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The Correspondence of Languages and Ethnic Groups: A Ready-Made. . .

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continues in different regions of the world (see reviews in Pakendorf, 2014; Progovac, 2019). Without delving into the complex disputes about the studies of Cavalli-Sforza and colleagues, laden with linguistic and genetic-population concreteness, we should note, first of all, the shakiness of the “Nostratic” concept taken as a basis by them. Yes, the distance between languages can also be fixed numerically, for example, by the statistical method of J. Greenberg or by the operationalization of the more refined Trubetzkoy’s criteria, or by calculating the share of frequently used words in the base lists of M. Swadesh (Trubetzkoy, 1987; Swadesh, 1952). However, even the identified proximity of the languages does not necessarily imply the presence of a single “pre-language” (see Chap. 11). A more promising approach seems to be a systematic study of the connection between the development of languages (reconstructed from linguistic traces) and prewritten societies’ social and political evolution, considering their past migrations (see Conclusion). It is also necessary to identify the structural links between the stages of glottogenesis and the types, levels, and features of the available languages, positive knowledge of which is available from texts, inscriptions, or anthropologists’ linguistic records. The scarcity of data forces us to pay special attention to general principles and patterns. The drivers of language evolution presumably have the exact internal mechanisms at the ultramicro-, micro-, and meso- levels of that operated in glottogenesis, including changing social niches and orders of interactions, communicative concerns, and the language structures formed to provide them (Chaps. 3–8). However, due to political evolution (Carneiro, 1970; Johnson & Earle, 2000) and the steady enlargement of communities (from chiefdoms to states and empires3), a macrolevel has also emerged, with corresponding principles and mechanisms of linguistic change, primarily geopolitical, demographic, geocultural, religious, educational, stratification, state-coercive, and activist-mobilization in nature. Language division, convergence, fusion, and transformation are the natural consequences of the corresponding processes or, at least, the dynamics and evolution of languages that connect closely with them. The first complication associated with the enlargement of communities and political evolution consists in the emergence of one or more layers of encompassing languages of interethnic communication, which manifests itself as the phenomenon of bilingualism (diglossia).

3

The pattern of evolution from primitive groups to chiefdoms and states has been repeatedly questioned, most recently in Graeber and Wengrow (2021). Indeed, the whole picture appears to be much more complex. For example, some communities seasonally migrate, becoming part of larger social formations of different political types. Nomadic groups may unite into large state formations and then disintegrate again into clans and even families. Nevertheless, these and other deviations do not allow us to reject the principal sequence of the typical political evolution of “traditional” (pre-modern) societies.

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Bridging the Pre-language Gap

The Size of Communities and the Vertical Structure of Languages

Let us turn to the concepts, data, and generalizations of modern anthropology to clarify the phenomenon of diglossia, which appears to be much more prevalent in prehistory than is usually assumed. A. Johnson and T. Earle (2000, p. 135). distinguish three main types of community at a similar stage of social development: camp, hamlet (both 25–30 people), and local group (100–300 people). All three types correspond to the notion of a “group” in the previous chapters, but a “local group” most likely appeared as a result of the full integration of the intergroup alliance (Chap. 8). The significance of this point for our topic is that communities of all types had only one language. In sporadic interaction with neighbors, some elements of alien languages may have been acquired and used, but there is no reason to assume complete proficiency in any second language. Along with communities, Johnson and Earle distinguish another level of social organization: polities. Camps, hamlets, and local groups were also polities, that is, they were ready to defend their land with armed resistance. Subsequently, the situation became more complicated. A Big Man Collectivity may number 500–1800 people, coinciding with the polity. Most likely, there was some common language here, although it is quite probable that there was also an internal diversity of the type of accents or close dialects. These military-political alliances could include small communities such as villages of 25–250 people. This type is an intermediate alliance. Here, the rudiments of bilingualism, or diglossia, should be assumed: the lower-level dialects and the common language at the level of the whole polity. A chiefdom (1000–16,000 people) as the next type of polity has two distinct levels of social order. A chiefdom usually includes communities of 200–500 people. Since there is no standard educational system, no officialdom at this level of social evolution, we can safely assume a multitude of dialects at the lower level with a single common language for the whole polity. This type is most pronounced in mountains, jungles, vast steppes, and deserts. When contact is problematic, dialects are estranged from each other and transform into local languages. If the alliance retains through regular gatherings, feasts, exchanges, and military mobilization, some analog of the koine must necessarily be formed. Such common languages of medium level, which unite neighboring multilingual communities but are still not national or imperial, will be called regional languages. Often, they are mixed; that is, they combine the vocabulary, phonetic features, and constructions of lower dialects and local languages. Under circumscription conditions, the political evolution continued. Chiefdoms became complex chiefdoms, protostates, and then states (kingdoms, princedoms) (Carneiro, 1970). The regional languages of the victorious chiefdoms (heartland conquering people) became state languages.

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Macrosocial Regularities of Languages Evolution

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Empires as expanded conquering states reached several million (e.g., 14 million people of the Incas). So, here we can already assume a more considerable number of linguistic levels: • The imperial language, which usually belonged to the dominant conquering ethnic group, so spoken in the capital and the Heartland; authorities usually tried to impose this language in the provinces, but with quite different success. • State languages of the principalities and kingdoms that were part of a loose world empire similar to confederation; they also became provincial languages when a rigid and cohesive empire subdued the provinces by military force. • Remaining regional languages of communities that included several ethnic groups, whose representatives (e. g., merchants) used such languages in interethnic communication; whether there were one, two, or more layers of regional languages in large empires is not known, since they left no written traces; nobody ever formalized and described them; the very distinction between the layers of regional and provincial languages, if there were any, remained shaky, mobile, and changing from place to place. • Local languages of several connected places where everyone had no difficulty understanding everyone within the linguistic community. It is also possible to mention dialects and accents within local languages that survived at the level of individual settlements. Still, they are relevant for our topic only when they diverged and became independent languages. Of course, this list does not mean that every subject of such an empire spoke three or more languages. However, representatives of every social stratum, whose circle of communication extended beyond the home, possessed at least two communicative systems: for the inner, family, neighborhood circle, and for communication with officials, merchants, all others from wider circles. The coexistence of languages used by the same people always leads to linguistic inter-influence. The lexicon of the upper languages (“superstrate”) penetrated the lower levels, but the upper languages also acquired regional specificity under the influence of local languages and dialects (“substrate”). Such processes took place before and after the advent of writing.

9.5

Macrosocial Regularities of Languages Evolution

Suppose a linguistic community grows and demographic pressure occurs. In that case, some parts migrate, seek safe, resource-rich, and otherwise attractive places to live, and enter into conflict or peaceful relations with native communities. The differentiation of a language into dialects, as the study of the languages of modern primitive peoples shows, is most intricately connected with the division of expanded tribes into groups and their subsequent migrations.

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These processes lead to the divergence of dialects and languages and their interpenetration with neighboring languages through new contacts of migrant language communities. Under conditions of prolonged isolation of migrants from their parent community and other migrants, a previously common language breaks up into dialects or even into independent languages (Labov, 2010). However, they remain in the same family and are in “real” linguogenetic kinship with each other. With long close interaction, political, economic, and cultural (in particular, religious) integration of communities with different dialects, especially with free and frequent cross-marriages, the dialects merge into a common language. Sometimes, the dialect of the dominant group wins. Kindred languages may drift apart and become estranged from each other due to religious, political, and especially war-encumbered alienation between the peoples who speak these languages. Geopolitical processes include shifts in military and political control structures over territories: conquest, colonization, disintegration, creation of multi-stage political systems (like feudalism), their transformations. Perhaps these factors of linguistic change are the most powerful, since they cause significant shifts in all other spheres (from migrations to social revolutions) and form relations of solidarity, prestige, hostility, alienation.4 Consider only the most typical language effects of conquests. The spreading of the conquerors’ language is a typical pattern of world history. The conquerors imposed their language on the execution of their coercive practices, but they could not eliminate the linguistic diversity until later. A significant and lasting linguistic expansion is successful only if the new government achieves legitimacy (usually through proselytizing religion) and establishes a uniform educational system that also proves to be stable and practical. Otherwise, hostility to the imposed hegemonic language grows, and the languages of the conquered fringes become the mobilizing banners of smoldering, at times inflaming national liberation (separatist) movements, or irredenta at the possibility of an ethnic province joining a neighboring power with the same or a nearby language. There was also a variant, probably typical in an era when conquests were led not so much by states with armies, officials, and priests as by mobile hordes predominantly composed of men. Having seized power in a country, they inevitably left mixed offspring. If they did not pursue a strict segregationist policy to preserve their ethnic identity (as the Manchus in China), they dissolved into the local population in plans of language and appearance.5

Cf. the principle “ideologies follow geopolitics” (Collins, 1999). It is from this point of view that one should take a closer look at all kinds of barbaric conquests and conquerors (the Hyksos, Phoenicians, Cimmerians, Parthians, Scythians, Sarmatians, Nogaians, Pechenegs, Seljuks, Arians, Vandals, Alans, Goths, Huns, Vikings, Varangians, Khazars, Polovtsians, Kipchaks, Mongols, Chzhurchens). The strange thing they have in common is that 4 5

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Macrosocial Regularities of Languages Evolution

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In one way or another, the conquerors’ descendants constituted the local elite’s backbone: warlord rulers, nobility landowners, and the high priesthood. Their language could disappear without institutional support, but considerable lexical infiltration probably took over vast areas. Geocultural processes are associated primarily with the spread of religions and ideologies, with the dynamics of the prestige of societies, states, and peoples, respectively, with shifts in promoting cultural patterns. The spread of various cults can be considered a legitimizing part of military-political processes. With the emergence of writing and specialized priestly organizations, monastic schools, centers capable of transcribing old and producing new texts and training missionaries, geoculture acquired an autonomous dynamic. However, it was strongly associated with geopolitics (it is not accidental that priests usually accompanied the military). Geopolitical and geocultural processes underlie the mass motives of (non)borrowing from a foreign language, (non)studying it, or (non)switching to it. Communities and states implement their language strategies through the control of education and parents through the language instruction of their children in families, forcing them to speak their “right” language, not to speak a foreign and alien language of “enemies,” “oppressors,” or “savages.” Geo-economic processes are commercial contacts (in the broadest sense) that cross political boundaries, and thus almost always linguistic boundaries. As a consequence of these contacts, pidgins appeared. One language, usually belonging to the world-systemic society leader as the richer, more progressive, more prestigious one, is infiltrated into the languages of poorer countries, backward, peripheral societies. Before acquiring writing, regional languages depended directly on the nature of interactions between language communities. Therefore, they were likely to be fragile, unstable, subject to geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural perturbations such as conquests, state unifications and disintegrations, trade breakdowns and establishments, and changes of faith. Local languages and dialects seem much more resilient and capable of surviving macrosocial upheavals than regional ones. The states did not really “get to them” until the nineteenth century. Large effective states with extensive bureaucracies and universal primary education systems were able to “normalize” and “legalize” regional and local languages, turning them into written and taught languages (see Chap. 11). However, they could also marginalize, suppress, prohibit, and even destroy them.

they “disappeared somewhere,” literally dissolved into the lands they conquered so formidably and gloriously.

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Bridging the Pre-language Gap

World-Systemic Languages and the Transition to Writing

Since ancient times, societies, states, and polities have united through conquest, exchange, and cultural diffusion (predominantly religious messianism) into world systems of three respective types: • Unconsolidated, unstable world empires and more centralized, robust empires with politico-military coercive control • World economies with commodity exchange, usually asymmetrical • Cultural-religious oikumenes (Wallerstein, 2004; Collins, 1999) Civilizations as multicultural communities initially based on world systems of one or another type, over time, were supplemented by links of other types due to always continuing geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural dynamics. The world systems formed languages covering many societies, polities with their regional languages and minor local languages, dialects, accents. These world-systemic languages included: • The imperial languages that spread from the conquering Heartland • The various lingua franca in the network of trade hubs (along with the language of the Mediterranean network which gave that name) • The sacred languages of the founding books of proselytizing religions The world-systemic languages of interethnic and transnational communication can change their character and combine the distinctive features of these types. Such are ancient Egyptian, Sumerian, Akkadian, koine, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Turkic and Turkish, Sanskrit, Avastin, old Persian, old Chinese, old Russian, ancient Scandinavian, ancient Germanic, Nahuatl, the language of Aztecs, Quechua, the language of Incas, and others. The transition to writing played an enormous, perhaps underestimated, role in developing languages in historical linguistics. It is no coincidence that namely, world-systemic languages were the first to be written. The content of the earliest inscriptions on temple walls, memorials, stela has a religious-mythological, genealogical, imperial-administrative, and legal character (the boundaries between these aspects were very shaky, if present at all). Thus, the earliest languages known to us, represented in recorded texts (rather than theoretically reconstructed), are the languages of empires and imperial religions. Writing played the role of a structure that provided the administrative, fiscal, and legitimation concerns of empires, the economic concerns of fixing trade documents and accounting records, and the religious concerns of disseminating sacred texts for unifying flocks. Later transitions to the writing of regional and local languages always followed national and ethnic politics: to the emergence and legitimization concerns of new states, to the cultural policy of empires toward “barbarian” provinces, and to the rise of ethnic consciousness.

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Factors of Language Development Within Societies

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The process of acquiring writing was never a mechanical recording of a pre-existing “ready-made” language. Instead, it was always a creative process in which heterogeneous elements of the linguistic environment entered the language chosen as a base, under the enormous influence of geopolitical and geocultural (confessional, ideological) factors.

9.7

Factors of Language Development Within Societies

Sociolinguistics and ethnolinguistics (linguistic anthropology) have accumulated many empirical observations, including theoretical generalizations (Meillet, 1921; Labov, 1963, 2010; LePage, 1968). Thus, Meillet considered social change as the main variable to which one should turn to account for linguistic change. We must determine which social structure corresponds to a given linguistic structure, and how, in a general manner, changes in social structure are translated into changes in linguistic structure (Meillet, 1921, p. 16–17).

Therefore, a broad cultural-evolutionary approach seems promising. Therefore, J. Henrich argues that vocabulary, phonetic inventory, and grammatical tools depend on factors such as population size and interconnectedness, as well as features of social networks, technology such as writing, and institutions such as formal schools (Henrich, 2015). Changes in property, class, and ethnicity inevitably affect the linguistic configuration of society but through complex mechanisms that need further analysis. The following principles seem to be the most essential. The formation of a “main language” that dominates a society (and sometimes language family) is a natural consequence of the political, economic, cultural, and hence linguistic dominance of one group, such as the upper and middle classes of the capital or the Heartland (Collins, 1999). Language is always a marker of status and belonging to a stratum or community. Those “on the inside” usually seek to assert their position, and thus preserve their linguistic features. Those seeking to enter a more prestigious circle imitate its language (Labov, 1963). Those excluded and alienated from such a circle tend to alienate their dialect or switch to another language altogether (e.g., the language of potential allied power or an encompassing power for irredenta). The more marriages between members of two language communities, the more the correspondent languages will integrate. The number of such marriages depends directly on the closeness of the languages of these communities. The linguistic barrier in this sphere is almost the most important, along with confessional and socio-stratification ones. If marriages between parts of a linguistic community cease (e.g., because of political disintegration, religious schism, a series of wars), then the languages will diverge, including the formation of dialects. Therefore, the contour of positive links can produce both merging of communities with languages

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convergence and alienation of communities with languages separation, estrangement from each other. The reduction of contacts (trade, cultural exchanges) for whatever reason leads to the isolation of dialects and transformation into languages. When there is relative social stability, the above regularities work together and lead to complex configurations of linguistic diversity within and between each society. In periods of social upheaval, languages also undergo rapid and significant perturbations. For example, a language or dialect (characteristic of a particular professional, ethnic, or confessional group) can become a marker of “their own” in revolts and revolutions. In the case of the insurgents’ political victory, this language variant will have the best chance of spreading. Now let us go back to the distant past again and consider the number of languages, as their number surprisingly has changed.

9.8

The Original Linguistic Oikumene: Unity or Dissection?

The earliest hominins, then Protosapienses, and Early sapienses lived in small groups, at most alliances of groups (see Chaps. 5–7). It means that the original diversity of group communicative practices was very great. African late Heidelbergians and Protosapienses, after confident knowledge of fire and progress in hunting skills (ca. 350–200 kya), due to demographic growth, relatively rapid changes in climate, landscapes, and increasing geographic constraints, increasingly migrated, clashed, conflicted, fought, and formed alliances supported by cross-marriage (see Chap. 8). At the same time, the number of the first protolanguages naturally decreased as intergroup selection and the inclusion of the surviving groups in alliances progressed. Both extremes remain dubious: the complete initial isolation of languages and a single linguistic space without internal borders. The known linguistic universals contradict the first version (e.g., according to Ch. Hockett, see Chap. 2): they could hardly develop due to evolutionary convergence alone. The boundaries between language communities have always been permeable to varying degrees through contacts, migrations, and marriage policies with bride exchanges. The existence of meaningful boundaries that separated the linguistic oikumene is evidenced by the sharply different language types, especially the morphological and phonological ones.

9.9

The “Volcanic Winter” Catastrophe: And Progenitors of All Known Languages

Climatic disasters produced the harshest selection among groups, their alliances, and hence language communities. There may have been several such “bottlenecks” for the most ancient populations. Researchers attribute the narrowest “bottleneck” to the

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The “Volcanic Winter” Catastrophe: And Progenitors of All Known Languages

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Fig. 9.3 The schematic genealogical tree from Erectuses to sapienses and the “volcanic winter” following the Toba super-eruption (Rampino & Ambrose, 2000, p. 79)

“volcanic winter” that occurred after the Indonesian volcano Toba eruption, circa. 74–71 kya (Fig. 9.3). There was a dramatic drop in many animal populations, and hence the top predators at the top of the food chain, the African sapienses. The diagram actually presents the genealogical tree of Erectuses and sapienses. For the most part, the first perished due to the “volcanic winter” (dead-end branches). However, the latter survived and multiplied in Africa. As a result, several waves of migrations from Africa displaced, partly assimilated, and replaced the archaic populations in Eurasia and Austronesia. The Toba eruption (ca. 73,500 B.P., Indonesia) was the largest explosive eruption of the last few hundred thousand years. Several lines of evidence suggest that Toba produced an estimated 1015–1016 g of stratospheric dust and H2SO4 aerosols, and ice-core data and atmospheric modeling indicate a ca. 6-yr residence time for the dense global aerosol cloud. Such a stratospheric aerosol loading is predicted to have caused a “volcanic winter” with possible abrupt regional coolings of up to 15° C (similar to nuclear winter scenarios), and global cooling of 3–5° C (and possibly greater) for several years. Ice-core data suggest that Toba may have contributed to the initial severe cooling of a millennium-long cold event, suggesting involvement of climate feedback responses such as ocean cooling, and increased sea ice and snow cover (Rampino & Ambrose, 2000, p. 71).

The “volcanic winter” sharply reduced the population of Early sapienses: according to different estimates, to 30–50 thousand, 10–15 thousand, or even 3 thousand people (Rampino & Ambrose, 2000; Ambrose, 2002; Mellars, 2006; Williams et al., 2009). Global climate models predict that the Toba atmospheric perturbation would have caused severe drought in the tropical rainforest belt and in monsoonal regions. These results constitute a global ecological disaster, with expected reductions in standing crops of plants

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and animals especially in the tropics. Evidence for these abrupt environmental changes may be detectable in high-resolution palynological records, coral reefs, and ice cores. Genetic studies indicate that sometime prior to ca. 60,000 kya humans suffered a severe population bottleneck (possibly only 3,000–10,000 individuals) (Ibid).

This concept has caused much debate, and many critics have repeatedly tried to refute it. However, recent studies have been conducted in various places on the planet to assess the effect of the eruption. The recent results of a team of paleoclimatologists from the Max Planck Institute, who found a significant decrease in the ozone layer just after the Toba eruption, generally confirm the original version of Rampino, Ambrose et al. In more densely populated and less affected Africa, there was also depopulation due to droughts and harsh ultraviolet light. We conclude that limited cooling and drying plus severe biological UV (ultraviolet) damage in the tropics, combined with harsh volcanic winter conditions in the extratropics, could have provided the prerequisites for a population bottleneck (Osipov et al., 2021, p. 5).

Those who adapted better survived, also due to the practices of intergroup support and mutual assistance. This “filter” is related to the level of development of speech communication. The survivors and alliances of Early sapienses began to multiply rapidly when the characteristics of the climate and food base returned to previous values. They occupied all the previously habitable lands of Africa, and many began to penetrate Eurasia as far as possible. Together with the dead alliances, many protolanguages died, about which we will never know anything. Moreover, the “volcanic winter” wiped out groups living in the most unfavorable conditions, such as southern and southeastern Asia lands relatively close to Sumatra and northern regions of Eurasia.6 Linguistic communities with high chances of survival, and thus language preservation, were individual hunter-gatherer groups (30–40 people) or their alliances (hardly more than 150 people for ecological reasons) (Bickerton, 2009; Sterelny, 2016; Johnson & Earle, 2000). Let us conventionally take as the average number of community members with a distinct language 50–100 people. Then it turns out that in the period of the minimum number of sapienses on the whole planet (15 thousand people according to the average estimate), there were 150–300 language communities and the same number of ancient languages in Africa.7

European Neanderthals probably owed their relatively large numbers and subsequent “flourishing” (e.g., compared to the handfuls of Denisovans and Floresian “hobbits” who lived in Asia) to their remoteness from the same volcanic catastrophe. 7 Let us not entirely rule out the presence of speech rudiments in the Neanderthals, the Denisovans, and other Erectuses who had previously moved into Eurasia (see Chap. 7). However, the subsequent waves of sapienses’ expansion from Africa, having displaced, exterminated, and partially assimilated these handfuls of old-timers, apparently overwhelmed these linguistic rudiments. Thus, whether something from the indigenous protolanguages of Erectuses penetrated sapienses’ languages (like the multiple technological borrowings from Neanderthals) is unknown, and it is unlikely that this question will ever be clarified. 6

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The “ founder effect “ was the most crucial evolutionary pattern in the era of steady demographic growth and settlement following the catastrophe. This factor usually explains the processes of ethnogenesis, but it is fairly reasonable to apply this principle to linguistic evolution. The communities that survived the “bottleneck” became the progenitors of humanity, so their languages became the progenitors of all subsequent languages. Of course, there were multiple processes of division, death of new languages, mutual influence, absorption, and merger. However, the most ancient languages formed the nuclei of many families of languages that survive today. Therefore, it is natural to correlate the number of language communities and their languages that survived the “volcanic winter” with the number of known primary language families (clusters). The handbook Ethnologue presents data on 7117 languages8 distributed among 156 language families.9 The Niger-Congolese (1542 languages) and the Austronesian (1258 languages) families are outstanding in the number of languages. The Indo-European family is also huge (450 languages). Often, they are called “macro families,” which means that they cover 20–30 or more basic families. Therefore, considering the vast linguistic diversity of sub-Saharan Africa and Austronesia, it would be correct to estimate the number of modern language families as 200–250, which corresponds to the number of the most ancient language communities at the time of the narrowest bottleneck.10

9.10

Stages of Glottogenesis and Linguistic Layers

The stages of origin and development of languages undoubtedly have a profound connection with their levels: phonology (types of syllable and phoneme distinctions), phonetic structure, vocabulary, types of word formation, syntax, and grammar. This connection is a complex problem that one can solve only by combining the most plausible and reasonable versions of the stages of linguistic complexity growth with the most constructive theories of evolutionary linguistics.

Another database “Glottologue” (https://glottolog.org/glottolog/family) counts 8494 languages. The criteria distinguishing a language from a dialect are rather ambiguous. It is useful to recall Max Weinreich’s witty thesis: “A language is a dialect with an army and a navy.” 9 https://www.ethnologue.com/browse/families. In this large-scale reference book, most families include three to five languages, less often dozens of languages. Philas which include hundreds of languages should be divided into families. 10 Lord James Burnett Monboddo first formulated the idea of the correspondence between the most ancient languages and the modern language families. In his breakthrough for his time but the unappreciated book On the Origin and Progress of Language, Monboddo was the first to apply evolutionary theory to the problem, pointing out the role of “common cause” and the need for the cohesion of ancient people. He analyzed not only modern European and classical dead languages but also “barbarian” ones (Monboddo, 1774). 8

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Bridging the Pre-language Gap

Stages of language complexity

The Prelanguage Gap

The language Rubicon Distinguishing protosyllables The first sole protowords, i.e., holophrases Normative rituals, joint intentionality

Distinguishing syllables, first phonemes

Accumulation of protowords, reactive and situative protophrases

Basic Syntax Constructions

Simple syntax and grammar

Phoneme recognition

Linguistic levels of known languages:

Morphological types of sentences and word forms

Leading-away protophrases, pidgin-sentences, full-fledged words

Basic vocabulary and semantic connections of words

Word roots in basic dictionaries

Sound signals are uttered together in unison

phonetic ssystem Types of syllables, phonological distinctions

Normativity of behavior, including the prerequisites for master ing "correct", i.e., standardized speech

Direction of time

Fig. 9.4 Hypothetical connections between the stages of glottogenesis and the structural levels of known languages

Figure 9.4 presents the general hypothesis of the connection between successive stages of glottogenesis and the structural levels of languages. It is no coincidence that phonetic levels, having been learned in early childhood when learning a native language, manifest themselves as the most stable and rigid ones. The radical differences between the types of modern languages (flexional, isolating, synthetic, agglutinative, incorporation-polysynthetic types) can by no means be accidental. On the contrary, perhaps they point to several linguistic oikumenes (before the main migrations?) within which language communities borrowed from each other ways of generating words and sentences. The greater the distance, the more significant and prolonged the isolation. The more substantial was the influence of the languages of adjacent communities, the stronger the initial related languages diverged (Atkinson, 2011). This leaves only the possibility of investigating analogies, which implies the adoption of additional principles. The last ones allow us to compare observed phenomena in language and speech to glottogenesis processes as corollaries from the same abstract hypotheses. The first of these additional principles is a concretization of the Haeckel law presumed by Vygotsky and Luria in their research (Vygotsky, 1930/1997). The sequence of a child’s acquisition of speech (ontogeny) mirrors the stages of the origin of speech and language (phylogeny). Indeed, the acquisition of speech begins with protosyllables, which already have the functional meaning of holophrases. Then, as the child masters the arsenal of native language phonemes, it has the ability to distinguish and pronounce protowords (still quite situational) with simple syllables. That is why it can master many new protowords, folding reactive protophrases of them. It further masters arbitrary situational protophrases, leading-away protophrases, pidgin-sentences, simple syntax, and grammar, even though they are

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The Exit to the Eurasiatic Expanses

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called different terms in different traditions (Vygotsky, 1930/1997; Tomasello, 2008, 2019). Refinery experiments aimed at testing the principle of Zones of Proximal Development (ZPD) in the same area of the child’s acquisition of language levels are possible. Children 1–7 years old are divided into groups of those who mastered and those who did not master the components of a layer N. Then the experimenters try to teach them the components of layer N + 1 by equal procedures. Presumably, the first group will be much more successful than the second. If we agree with the similarity of ZPD (in the ontogeny of the child’s native language acquisition) and EZPD (in the phylogeny of language origin) according to Haeckel’s law, then the model presented in Fig. 9.4 is confirmed. About the same logic can be used to study the possibilities and limitations of adult acquisition of foreign language components belonging to diverse levels. As a rule, adults have the greatest difficulty in mastering foreign phonetics. This is evidenced by the residual accent. Without systematic learning, the adult, who finds himself in a completely new language environment, moves from mastering individual words to protophrases and pidgin-sentences. Even if he fully masters the syntax and grammar of a foreign language, it is only with great difficulty, purposefully developing his speech ability from simple to more complicated constructions. Additional information can be obtained from systematic studies of distinct types of aphasia and the process of speech recovery after aphasia (e.g., as a result of trauma to various parts of the brain). As a rule, researchers aim their primary attention at identifying the location of the departments responsible for each aspect of speech ability. For judgments on the correlation between the antiquity of the appearance of the correspondent levels in glottogenesis, the analysis of the belonging of these departments (or more subtle neural structures) to the older and newer parts of the brain is of particular importance. Thus, it is known that when a sore loses almost all his speech abilities, for the longest time he can say only obscene words. However, they are connected with emotions and, probably, it is not by chance that neuropsychologists refer the brain structures responsible for them to relatively ancient parts of the brain associated with the emotions of anger, fear, and the humoral sphere.

9.11

The Exit to the Eurasiatic Expanses

There are many different versions of the time, duration, number of exoduses (waves), and number of Early sapienses from Africa. Scientists are actively conducting research, primarily based on paleoclimatology and paleogeography data.11 New and reinterpreted old archaeological data regarding Africa itself and the adjacent regions of Eurasia are obtained, compared with the results of

11 About the structure and the size of past populations see, e.g., Coupé and Hombert (2005, p. 13–16).

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paleogenetics and data on modern hunter-gatherers, and mathematical models are constructed and tested (Renfrew, 1987; Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1988; Bateman et al., 1990; Ambrose, 2002; Eswaran, 2002; Shea, 2007; Amos & Hoffman, 2010; Rohling et al., 2013; Langgut et al., 2018; Page & French, 2020). Through sophisticated paleobotanical studies of pollen residues, researchers have identified a “climatic window” of 56–44 kya. During this period, Sinai and the Levant, which were usually lifeless deserts, were filled with streams, vegetation, and game, making them suitable for the life and migration of sapienses (Langgut et al., 2018, p. 13). Around the same time, the southern route to Arabia reopened. As a result, the demographic oversupply of the African “cauldron” of the Early sapienses (see Chap. 8), already quite socially and cognitively “advanced,” began to splash out in waves into Eurasia. In Eurasia itself, predominantly on the western edge of the continent, at that time, there lived in small, scattered groups of skilled hunters of large mammals, the Neanderthals. Judging by the small number of finds, the remnants of the other early settlers (Denisovans and others) were insignificant. Given the triumphal settlement of the sapienses with their Upper Paleolithic and Mesolithic cultures in all habitable corners of Eurasia, Austronesia, Oceania, and both Americas, it is safe to speak of continued demographic growth together with cultural and technological flourishing. Herds of herbivores, from mammoths to wild horses and sheep, formed the basis of abundance from about 50 to 15 kya. Being skilled hunters themselves, the sapienses quickly adopted all the valuable achievements of the Neanderthals. As a result, sapienses steadily displaced them, partially mixing with them and with Denisovans in southeastern Eurasia or already in Austronesia, as evidenced by the admixtures of the latter in the Papuan genomes (Pääbo, 2014). The dynamics of demographic growth and settlement leading to ethnic, racial, and linguistic divergence in the vast open spaces dominated the Upper Paleolithic and Mesolithic eras. In conflicts, weaker groups escaped, since there were still plenty of resource-rich and uninhabited lands. According to the division and dispersal of the communities, the original 200 languages (see above) gradually divided into dialects and dialects, and then became hundreds and thousands of independent languages. This process deserves the name of the Great Linguistic Divergence. Along with the processes of settlement, ethnogenesis, and language division, communities’ unification processes into polities always required some common language. The conquerors’ language or some regional language could initially play this role. However, such encompassing languages are inevitably changed by the elements of local dialects (“substratum”) and languages. After the “volcanic winter” and the settlement of sapienses outside Africa, i.e., during the Great Linguistic Divergence, the number of regional languages also increased, but always less than the number of local languages (Fig. 9.5).

9.12

Language Development in the Upper Paleolithic

Number of languages and dialects

Local languages and dialects The "volcanic winter" ca.74 kya

Protolanguages of separate groups

261

The Great Linguistic Divergence Regional languages of chiefdoms and larger polities

The integration of groups into alliances 300-75 kya. The correspondent integration of (proto)languages

Upper Paleolithic, population explosion Settlement across continents and islands Ca. 200 basic language families

Completion of the basic glottogenesis Depopulation - up to 10,000– 15,000 people and ca. 150-300 language communities, hence languages

Direction of time Fig. 9.5 The most significant changes in the number of protolanguages and the first languages

9.12

Language Development in the Upper Paleolithic

Let us consider on a model level the linguistic evolution in a settlement by huntergatherers and later by farmers and cattle breeders of some large oikumene devoid of internal geographical barriers (deserts, mountain ranges, seas). Let us put aside for the moment the processes of conquest, imposition, displacement, and mixing of languages. Communities with dialects or languages close to each other can be neighbors. In any case, contacts between neighboring communities inevitably develop. According to the classical concept of “linguistic continuity” by Adolphe Pictet, those living on the fringes of adjacent communities understand each other, and as language communities become distant, their ability to understand each further decreases in steps. Nikolai Miklukho-Maklay observed such a pattern in New Guinea in the 1870s and 1880s. Researchers have found a similar linguistic situation in the oikumenes of Australia, Africa, and Oceania. This model also corresponds to dialectal continuums, a relatively frequent phenomenon in Western Europe, the Balkans, and not only. . . .When we examine the linguistic geography of a purely hunter-gatherer continent— aboriginal Australia is the only example we have—we find a multitude of small languages,

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not traceable to any particular dominant root, but showing evidence of considerable local fission and fusion over many centuries (Nettle & Romaine, 2000, p. 103).

The life of the North American Indians of the Great Plains, not yet deformed by the European invasion, presented a more complex picture. This case is noteworthy because of its structural similarity to the earlier settlement of the sapienses in the vast expanses of Eurasia. People who originally came from Asia via Chukotka and Alaska (much later called “Indians”) went to the American lands, where there were no competing hominins. However, there were still mammoths and mastodons (already doomed to extinction). Furthermore, America was teeming with enormous herds of bison, red deer, elk, tapirs, reindeer, wild horses, pigs, and others. The Indians continued to hunt, fish, and gather, but later some tribes developed agriculture. Europeans caught up in North America with about 600 Indian tribes with 396 languages. Many tribes, especially in the Great Plains, united in militarypolitical alliances (leagues or confederations). There were also other social forms linking the tribes: various alliances, open and closed ones, and even secret societies such as fraternities and clubs (White, 1979). Communities met for negotiations, feasts, and arranging new alliances. Sporadic conflicts happened. It was a dynamic political and cultural world with many languages and myths, sophisticated marriage politics, and complex kinship systems. Such a vast and ramified social structure was because many Indians spoke not one but two or even more languages. To this day, there are remnants of this phenomenon. The few Pueblo Indians living in New Mexico today speak three different languages: Tanoan, Keresan, and Zuni. The Tanoan language, in its turn, is divided into three more languages. Tiwa, Tewa, and Towa, and the Keresan language is divided into Western Keresan and Eastern Keresan” (White, 1979). The primary linguistic situation in New Guinea demonstrates similar structural features. There was thus a constant flow of interaction between local groups. This interlinkage is best illustrated by the fact that most people spoke several languages. As well as the vernacular of their local group, many people, especially men, would know the languages of one or two neighboring groups, or perhaps a language that had come to have wider currency around their valley or coastline. The extent of this multilingualism varied. Where language groups were large, as in the highlands, only those in the border areas tended to be multilingual. Where groups were small, everyone was effectively in a border area and knowledge of multiple languages was universal (Nettle & Romaine, 2000, p. 86).

The linguistic situation of the Middle sapienses (including Cro-Magnons) in the Upper Paleolithic epoch resulted from the established structure of social interactions between the communities. Thus, both models, the linguistic continuity of contacting local communities and the complex dynamic system with hierarchies of languages, do not contradict each other but are mutually complementary. In resource-rich central regions, high population densities, frequent contacts, and complex alliance structures should be expected. Here people, especially chiefs and members of transverse communities linking tribes, including remote ones, spoke one, two, or more neighboring languages or regional intertribal languages, in

9.13

Resource Depletion, Transition to Neolithic, and Political Evolution

263

addition to the local native language. On the other hand, local settlements were more isolated in the resource-poor outskirts. Only neighbor communities proceeded to contacts, so one should expect proximity to the model of “linguistic continuity.” Returning to the peoples of Eurasia, let us note that in neither case can we even speak of a single “Nostratic” or even “Proto-Indo-European” language. Instead, there was a dialectal continuum in the vast and sparse spaces of the periphery. At the same time, representatives of different social segments in the centers of the oikumenes spoke two (local and regional) or more languages following the established military-political alliances, hierarchies, and configurations of economic and cultural exchanges that grew within this framework. Archaeologists note the particular activity of contacts and interconnectedness of Upper Paleolithic populations in Eurasia, traces of long-distance exchanges, including objects of fine art (in particular, the famous “Venus” figurines). The same extended social networks contributed to the rapid spread of technological innovations; see data review Churchill (2014, p. 359). Anthropologists and linguists in the USA studied the languages of North American Indians well. Thus, reconstructing the linguistic situation, especially the relations between minor local languages and regional intertribal languages, can serve as a model for reconstructing the early Eurasian language picture in regions with the highest population density.

9.13

Resource Depletion, Transition to Neolithic, and Political Evolution

Around the 20–15 kya, the abundance of game in Eurasia began to decline substantially. The demographic growth of sapienses and efficient hunting led to the extermination of large herbivores. Some species were completely wiped out (mammoths). Others shrank their range sharply (the reindeer that inhabited Europe disappeared there). This explains the exceptional attention of Upper Paleolithic people to creating animal images. The ancients gave them a magical character and assumed that they helped the recovery of endangered herds. However, as intensive hunting continued, the overall process of extermination of large herbivores accelerated, and its last phase proceeded particularly quickly, which put the hunting tribes in a demanding situation, as they did not have enough time to switch to other ways of gradually obtaining food. In this connection, we may think that the transition to the Mesolithic was painful for the primitive population. This conclusion is consistent with the results of many archaeological studies (Budyko, 1984, p. 366).

Indeed, the level of intra-species violence of sapienses increases significantly by the period 15 kya: The number of finds of human bones with weapon fragments embedded in them (29 bones of 27 individuals from 17 monuments) almost comparable with the number of similar finds of animal bones. However, all finds of this kind older than 15 thousand years are animal bones (10 bones of 10 individuals from 9 monuments) (Vishnyatsky, 2014, p. 311).

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The growth of violence, alienation, and the formation of military alliances, on the one hand, inevitably began to influence the linguistic sphere: the languages of enemies became increasingly distant from each other; the languages of allies became closer together. The ancient sanctuary of Gobekli Tepe (12–10 kya) in southeastern Anatolia, judging by the multiple depictions of various animals (totems?), was a place of regular gatherings of numerous groups and alliances (Mann, 2011). Such a largescale construction was possible only if food supplies were available, which meant the beginning of agriculture and the development of cattle breeding. Cattle breeding and farming practices developed most intensively in the Nile valley, the “fertile triangle” (Middle East), and in other ecologically favorable valleys (Indus, Huang He). Then Neolithic practices began to spread to all eligible territories. Finally, with the transition to the Neolithic and sedentarization, the previously embryonic processes of ethnogenesis gained real strength. The transition from hunting and gathering to a productive economy included technological, economic, ecological, and demographic aspects. The unstoppable expansion of larger and stronger Neolithic societies, the assimilation and displacement of “savages,” of course, led to the expansion of some languages at the expense of others. The systematic consequence was a reduction in the number of languages, which D. Nettle and S. Romaine call the “first wave.” This is a wave that began modestly around ten thousand years ago and continues today. We have argued that language loss began on a massive scale in the last thousand years; it therefore seems odd to trace it to a cause that began nine thousand years earlier. Agriculture, however, not only caused persistent waves of language disruption as farmer communities overcame hunters and gatherers but set off the development of economic differences between human communities on a scale which had not existed before (Nettle & Romaine, 2000, p. 98).

The enlargement of communities was not a one-time event, but a step-by-step event for the understanding of which R. Carneiro’s theory (1970) seems to be the most adequate. According to Carneiro, the political evolution occurred first in the regions with the most significant geographical constraints, i.e., circumscription (Nile and Indus valleys, Mesopotamia, coast of present-day Peru), and social constraints, resource gradient (the largest valleys of present-day Mexico and China). Then, due to wars and alliances, chiefdoms became complex chiefdoms, then appeared protostates, states, and finally empires. Languages and dialects, being in a sense a “symbiont” of linguistic communities of different scales, evolved closely in conjunction with geopolitical and other macrosocial processes (see above). Researchers describe three types of language loss: population loss, forced shift, and voluntary shift (Nettle & Romaine, 2000, p. 90–97). The enlargement of polities from chiefdoms to states and empires must have led to a stepwise reduction of the number of regional languages. Indeed, some polities lost wars and disintegrated. Their ruling ethnic groups lost their legitimacy and collapsed, leading to discrediting and suppressing of their languages. Other polities submitted to the new hegemon incorporated themselves into the imperial structure.

9.13

Resource Depletion, Transition to Neolithic, and Political Evolution The Invention of Writing

Number of languages Local languages and dialects thousands

Regional languages

265

The merging of dialects, the disappearance of some languages

POLITICAL EVOLUTION: consolidation of polities, formation of states, imperial conquests

hundreds The regional languages of the conquerors become state languages

Languages of major ethnic groups and nations (hundreds)

Languages of principalities and kingdoms

The minimum number of Sapienses due to the "Volcanic Winter" is ca. 74 kya dozens

All known languages (7–8 thousand)

The world-systemic languages: imperial, sacred, lingua franca

Basic language families (ca. 200) The first written languages (10–15)

Direction of time Fig. 9.6 Hypothetical historical dynamics of language numbers

Their elites sought either to fully adopt the language of the victors, which was becoming a world-systemic one, or adapt their speech to it. D. Nettle attributes the second wave of decline in the number of languages to the expansion of modern states and empires (Nettle, 1999), which is already fully consistent with the final stages of political evolution according to R. Carneiro (Fig. 9.6). The levels of commonality of the world, state, and regional languages could not be the same in different oikumenes, countries, or localities. Languages converged under more centralized governance, better communications, developed bureaucracies, and trade. When geographically disjointed (e.g., by mountains), low centralization, weak rudimentary bureaucracy, and lack of interregional trade, regional languages differed more from each other and the dominant language of the capital. The invention and dissemination of writing changed the course of language evolution radically. The pre-language gap ended when texts (petroglyphs and papyri), which have survived until modern times and constitute the most ancient empirical basis of historical linguistics, appeared.

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The reasoning carried out remains mainly speculative. It has a heuristic nature for discovering the conceptual possibilities of further interdisciplinary research into the prehistory of humanity. First of all, the known languages differ by the characteristics of complexity/ simplicity in various aspects. In the next chapter, we will consider the socioevolutionary factors of this divergence.

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Korotayev, A., Berezkin, Y., Borinskaya, S., Davletshin, A., Khaltourina, D., et al. (2017). Genes and myths: Which genes and myths did the different waves of the peopling of Americas bring to the New World? History of Mathematics, 6, 9–77. Labov, W. (1963). The social motivation of a sound change. Word, 19, 273–309. Labov, W. (2010). Principles of linguistic change, 3: Cognitive and cultural factors. Wiley. Langgut, D., Almogi-Labin, A., Bar-Matthews, M., Pickarski, N., & Weinstein-Evron, M. (2018). Evidence for a humid interval at ~56–44 ka in the levant and its potential link to modern humans’ dispersal out of Africa. Journal of Human Evolution, 124, 75–90. LePage, R. B. (1968). Problems of description in multilingual communities. Transactions of the Philological Society, 6, 189–212. Mann, C. C. (2011). Göbekli Tepe. National Geographic, 219(6), 34–59. Meillet, A. (1921). Linguistique historique et linguistique générale. La société linguistique de Paris. Mellars, P. (2006). Why did modern human populations disperse from Africa ca. 60,000 years ago? A new model. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 103(25), 9381–9386. Nettle, D. (1999). Linguistic Diversity. Oxford University Press. Monboddo, J. B. (1774). Of the origin and progress of language. Edinburgh: J. Balfour; London: T. Cadell. https://archive.org/details/originandprogre01conggoog/page/n9/mode/2up Nettle, D., & Romaine, S. (2000). Vanishing voices: The extinction of the world’s languages. Oxford Univ. Press. Osipov, S., Stenchikov, G., Tsigaridis, K., LeGrande, A. N., Bauer, S. E., Fnai, M., & Lelieveld, J. (2021). The Toba supervolcano eruption caused severe tropical stratospheric ozone depletion. Communications Earth and Environment, 2(71) https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-02100141-7 Pääbo, S. (2014). Neanderthal man: In search of lost genomes. Basic Books. Page, A. E., & French, J. C. (2020). Reconstructing prehistoric demography: What role for extant hunter-gatherers? Evolutionary Anthropology, 29(6), 332–345. Pakendorf, B. (2014). Coevolution of languages and genes. Current Opinion in Genetics and Development, 29, 39–44. Perreault, C., & Mathew, M. (2012, April 27). Dating the origin of language using phonemic diversity. PLoS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035289 Progovac, L. (2019). A critical introduction to language evolution: Current controversies and future prospects. Springer. Rampino, M. R., & Ambrose, S. H. (2000). Volcanic winter in the garden of Eden: The Toba supereruption and the late Pleistocene human population crash. In F. W. McCoy & G. Heiken (Eds.), Volcanic hazards and disasters in human antiquity (pp. 71–83). Geological Society of America. Special paper, 345. Renfrew, C. (1987). Archeology and language. Cambridge Univ. Press. Rohling, E. J., Grant, K. M., Roberts, A. P., & Larrasoana, J.-C. (2013). Paleoclimate variability in the Mediterranean and Red Sea regions during the last 500,000 years implications for hominin migrations. Current Anthropology, 54(Supplement 8), S183–S201. Ruhlen, M. (1994). The origin of language: Tracing the evolution of the mother tongue. Wiley. Shea, J. J. (2007). Behavioral differences between middle and upper paleolithic Homo sapiens in the East Mediterranean Levant. The roles of intraspecific competition and dispersal from Africa. Journal of Anthropological Research, 63(4), 449–488. Starostin, S. А. (2007). Trudi po yazykoznaniyu [Proceedings of linguistics]. Yazyki slavyanskih kultur. [Languages of Slavic Cultures], Publ. (In Russian). Starostin, G. S., et al. (2016). K istokam yazykovogo raznoobraziya. Desyat besed o sravnitelnoistoricheskom yazykoznanii s E. Ya. Satanovskim [To the origins of linguistic diversity. Ten conversations on the comparative-historical linguistics with E. Ya. Satanovsky]. Delo, Publ. (In Russian). Sterelny, K. (2016). Cumulative cultural evolution and the origins of language. Biological Theory, 11(3), 173–186.

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Stone, L., Lurquin, P. F., & Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (2007). Genes, culture, and human evolution: A synthesis. Wiley. Swadesh, M. (1952). Lexico-statistic dating of prehistoric ethnic contacts. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 96, 452–463. Tomasello, M. (2008). The origins of human communication. MIT Press. Tomasello, M. (2019). Becoming human a theory of ontogeny. Harvard Univ. Press. Trubetzkoy, N. S. (1987). Izbrannie trudi po filologii [Selected works in philology]. Progress, Publ. (In Russian). Varvaro, A. (2013). Latin and the making of the romance languages. In M. Maiden, J. Smith, & A. Ledgeway (Eds.), The Cambridge history of the romance languages, vol. I. Contexts (pp. 6–56). Cambridge Univ. Press. Vishnyatsky, L. B. (2014). Vooruzhennoe nasilie v paleolite [Armed violence in the Paleolithic]. Stratum Plus, 1, 311–332. (In Russian). Vygotsky, L. S. (1930/1997). The history of the development of higher mental functions. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. Springer. Wallerstein, I. (2004). World-systems analysis: An introduction. Duke Univ. Press. White, J. M. (1979). Everyday life of the North American Indians. Book Club Edition. Williams, M. A. J., Ambrose, S. H., van der Kaars, S., Ruehlemann, C., Chattopadhyaya, U., Pal, J., & Chauhan, R. (2009). Environmental impact of the 73ka Toba super-eruption in South Asia. Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology, 284(3–4), 295–314.

Chapter 10

Linguistic Complexity and Simplicity: The Socio-evolutionary Roots

10.1

Evolutionary Divergence of Languages Under a Single Functional Logic

Language complexity breaks down into many indicators, and each language may occupy various places on different scales. Esten Dahl considers systemic complexity as the complexity of prescriptions, which determines proper ways to express some content (Dahl, 2004). Roughly speaking, the greater the systemic complexity of a language, the greater the number of distinct types of construction, different units of expression, content units (semantic meanings), and implicit prescriptions for using all these means to produce “correct” statements. In general, a language with greater systemic complexity can more accurately express more complex semantic content and convey it to a recipient unfamiliar with the context. A systemically simple language is well suited for communication between interlocutors in a shared context. However, suppose that the recipient is unfamiliar with the topic, situation, and circumstances. In that case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to convey the exact meaning of the message in a simple language. Within each language, all complications once responded to the communicative concerns of the linguistic community, caught up in specific and legitimate social conditions, and with the limitations and possibilities of the initial state of the language (see evolutionary principles and concepts in Chaps. 2 and 3). The initial simplicity of structures in one aspect of the processes of linguistic evolution is necessarily compensated for by complexity in other aspects. This pattern is most clearly presented in D. Nettle’s graphs on the basis of P. Juola’s data (Fig. 10.1). Roughly speaking, initially simple phonology leads to lengthened words (e.g., in Georgian and Italian). Here, the instrumental concern of distinguishing words has been systematically operated. In the! Kung language, with its rich phonological arsenal, the average length of words is noticeably short (the left in Fig. 10.1). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_10

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Fig. 10.1 Measurement of linguistic complexity: inverse correlations: (a) The relationship between the number of segments in the phonological inventory and the mean length of words, for ten languages of diverse families. (b) The relationship between the number of word forms that occur in a translation of the New Testament and the number of word tokens in that translation, for six languages (Nettle, 2012 p. 1831)

Evolution can go in different directions but with the same functional logic. The discovery of a potentially rich magic wand that allows generation of new word forms expressing a wide range of meanings (as in Russian and Finnish) makes the multiplication of individual word roots superfluous. On the contrary, in English, and most strikingly in Maori, the modest ways of producing word forms have led during evolution to an impressive increase in the number of individual word roots (the right graph in Fig. 10.1). . . .languages which are morphologically complex tend to have a wide variety of distinct linguistic forms that appear in large samples, while languages which are morphologically simple have more words. This finding is intuitively plausible; the linguistic constructs which in a language like Russian or Latin are expressed in terms of morphological variation are expressed in other languages through function words—which almost by definition are few types but many tokens. Instrumental relationships, for instance, are usually expressed in English using prepositions (“opening a door with a key”), but in Russian with a morpheme attached to the instrument (Juola, 1998, p. 2012).

10.2 The Drivers of Language Complexity A language with simple syntax and grammar (see Chap. 8) solves the accuracy problem. However, the solution may seem clumsy: one needs a few chopped sentences to express the meaning of a complex message. A language with well-developed syntax and grammar, but without synonyms, verbal means of conveying semantic nuances, and rhetorical embellishments, quite adequately describes the main content, much like clerical documentation or technical instructions. Finally, with the help of a language with a vast arsenal of constructions of various levels, it is possible to express a complex thought precisely, elegantly, or eloquently.

10.2

The Drivers of Language Complexity

Level of language complexity

Glottogenesis

Features of complex languages:

The Pre-Language Gap

"Volcanic Winter" ca. 74 kya. Depopulation

The stages of linguistic evolution: the glottoaromorphoses

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Complex societies with kinship systems, public rituals, and prestigious hierarchies

recursion, embeddings, logical bundles, special terminology, polysemy, rhetorical embellishments, the variety of styles

Upper Paleolithic, technological and cultural progress settlement

???

The demise of groups and populations with primitive protolanguages?

Traits of simple languages

Direction of time

Fig. 10.2 The complication and rhetorical enrichment of particular languages in the Upper Paleolithic

How to explain the additional complication of initial languages? What new social interactions and communicative concerns served as drivers of this development? If the assumption is correct, the Early sapienses had mastered at least simple syntax and grammar (Chap. 8), then the further impressive complication of languages of the many known hunter-gatherer communities, including stone technology, should be attributed to the Upper Paleolithic (Fig. 10.2). This epoch lasted for some people (the Australian Aboriginal people, the African Pygmies, Bushmen) until the Europeans’ arrival. Language complexity depends on social conditions that support, preserve, or suppress complex linguistic innovations and shift language toward simpler forms. In recent years, sociolinguistic specialists have successfully identified relevant structural factors of language communities, in particular linking their size to the nature of relationships and communication (Trudgill, 2009, 2011; Spike, 2018). Perhaps in the future there will be opportunities to apply this knowledge to different stages of glottogenesis, but for now it is too early to tell. In what follows, I will follow the same basic functionalist model (Chaps. 2 and 3): any new more complex or simpler language forms emerge, survive, or perish as support structures for some communicative concern. In fact, this approach agrees well with modern sociolinguistic concepts, such as the efficiency theory of linguistic complexity (Hawkins, 2009).

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The Economics of Reciprocity and Deferred Commitments

Rapid, impressive, and unstoppable progress in technology begins with the migration of Early sapienses to Eurasia, especially after 50–40 kya. Of course, no miraculous mutation could produce language, as some eminent researchers thought. Nevertheless, this period with an apparent evolutionary breakthrough is undoubtedly significant and requires discussion.1 Archaeologists and paleoanthropologists are inclined to link linguistic development directly with progress in instrumental technology. It would be absurd to deny such links. The expansion of the vocabulary naturally followed the growth of the variety of technologies and materials (bones, horns, tusks, later pottery) and the development of the resource base of sustenance. However, first of all, we must speak not of a direct connection between the manufacture of tools and language but of a socially mediated one (see also Chap. 5). The Upper Paleolithic development of the material culture included a variety of jewelry, burials with implements, bone products, ceramic figurines, and wall paintings. Undoubtedly, this development was an expression and consequence of a new level of consciousness, thinking, and culture. Moreover, such development was an expression and effect of the complication of social orders, which, according to the concept developed here, always lead to new communicative concerns and hence the formation of the linguistic structures that provide them. Consider these processes in more detail. The very complication of social orders was connected with the development of instrumental technologies, correspondingly with the progress of hunting and all other practices of sustenance, provision of other fundamental concerns. Innovative technologies invented or borrowed (from the same Neanderthals) led to greater efficiency of food extraction. As a result, not all adult men together, but small groups of 3–5 people, or even lonely hunters, could engage in catching. In the late Pleistocene, an economic revolution took place: the transition from an economy based on collective extraction and indispensable collective consumption to an economy of diverse exchanges: everyone expects that their contribution eventually returns in a different form (Sterelny, 2016). Such reciprocal cooperation may well be mutually beneficial and stable, which is well supported by ethnographic observations. During the transition to the Upper Paleolithic, there was a radical change in social interactions related to exchanges, commitments, and prestige. This occurred in a normative, institutional, and communicative environment that inevitably transformed. As a result, new concerns emerged to comprehend, denote, and retain

One should note an ever-significant factor of demography: “Genetic estimates of regional population size over time show that densities in early Upper Paleolithic Europe were similar to those in sub-Saharan Africa when modern behavior first appeared” (Powell et al., 2009, p. 1298). 1

10.3

The Economics of Reciprocity and Deferred Commitments

273

in memory past interactions, corresponding relationships around “gifts” once made by someone, and subsequent due “return gifts.” Кim Sterelny describes the new demands on interaction participants’ cognitive and communicative abilities in this way. Perhaps more fundamentally, in a world of direct and indirect reciprocation, agents need to be able to track and describe their own contributions and those of others, and locate those contributions in time and space. Agents needed to avoid being taken to be free riders, and they had to guard against free riding. (...) these agents needed the linguistic resources to unambiguously express claims about past contributions and future expectations. Moreover, accurate reputation plays a very important role in stabilizing cooperative practices based on indirect reciprocation, so agents need to be able to specify to third parties the actions of other agents and the contexts of those actions (Sterelny, 2016).

As we can see, the theme of distant normative control is developed here (Chap. 7). The group, the dominant coalition, the clique, or even the individual family tracks not only the rules prohibiting intragroup violence, theft, or robbery but also new norms of reciprocity that have become crucial. The division of labor, previously associated with gender and age, also began to deepen. Stone technology reached such a level in the Upper Paleolithic that true professionals made sharp, light, solid tips, and composite implements. These masters purposefully selected apprentices and trained their replacements for many years. This statement is justified by recent observations of the production of stone tools,2 which are not inferior in processing skill to the samples extracted by archaeologists. Upper Paleolithic craftsmen were no longer obliged to obtain their daily food by hunting, fishing, or gathering. Instead, they contributed to complex relations of sharing and exchange. Of course, professional learning required its own additional lexical means (Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017). The same period of relations diversification within and between groups is an epoch of kinship system complication.3 In orders of this kind, all spheres of social interaction (including the economics of extraction, distribution, exchange,

2

Anthropologist Dietrich Stout in a village on a remote plateau in Iran in 1999 described such production in detail. At that time “there were seven men living on the plateau who were actively involved in adze (axe like a hoe—N.R.). making. These included three acknowledged experts, three apprentices, and one older man who was recognized as an established craftsman but whose skill was of a lower level” (Stout, 2002, p. 696). Boys, usually the sons or nephews of masters, begin learning the mastery from 12 to 13. 3 There is a vast anthropological literature on the diversity and exotic richness of this sphere, but the theoretical explanation of the growing complexity of kinship relations is relatively weak. The potential of classical functionalism (B. Malinowski et al.) is underutilized. Most promising is the representation of heterogeneous and complex notions, connections, kinship rules, corresponding rituals and myths as support structures once formed in response to new concerns. Such concerns could be something like identification of own clan, lineage, family, individual. Probably among friendly groups and alliances these concerns derived from new social conditions of providing fundamental needs and concerns: prestige-influence, power-security, food, sexuality, well-being (see Chaps. 2 and 3).

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commitment) are closely related to prestige—status, reputation, level of group membership, nascent stratification. In the same epoch of the Upper Paleolithic, it began almost mass production of “Venus” minifigures, and this is already a technology of high skill. Moreover, irrespective of their destination, the “Venus” themselves exactly participated in exchange processes, in relation of giving-returning that again added complexity in intragroup and intergroup interaction, requiring means of mutual understanding at the verbal level. Researchers pay too much attention to the Theory of Mind (ToM) as a means of attribution of mental states to others.4 They give it particular importance in the evolution of language and consciousness. This cultural achievement is a late (and, alas, not universal) acquisition, the timing of which is vague. However, we can assert with certainty that the “theory of (another’s) mind” could emerge only based on direct speech practice with the basic scheme of the statement “This person said (told, asserted) so-and-so.” The significance of such statements is quite natural in the sphere of distant control: in collisions, conflicts, proceedings concerning fulfillment, and violation of rules in different situations, when it is necessary to find out what story is true and what story is not. As long as language and thus the faculties of consciousness were at the level of pidgin-sentences (Chap. 7), such complex constructions were hardly possible. However, with the acquisition of syntax and the development of the “new economy,” gossip naturally became widespread. In this verbal arena of struggle for prestige, the so-called Machiavellian mind was already in full use (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Byrne, 1996; Gavrilets & Vose, 2006). Of course, accounts of successes, exploits, and others’ failures and dishonest deeds were not always truthful. In verbal communication, a new niche emerged with the possibility of false and mistaken statements, and thus with new concerns of comparison, verification. It was precisely this kind of communicative concern that began to be provided by utterances about other people’s utterances,5 and it was only after the confident, practical knowledge of such schemes that mental schemes of the “theory of (another’s) mind” could emerge. Thus, a new economy with indirect and deferred exchanges produced essential novelties in social orders: obligations, extended intergroup relations, the formation of kinship systems, and multiple arenas of competition for prestige and influence. All they gave rise to new communicative concerns, a strong motivation of speech

4 Ethologists, fascinated by the search for human abilities in animals, often attribute to them the possession of ToM. Such a judgment is a characteristic example of an error of anthropomorphism. Even such sensitive and intelligent pets as dogs, cats, and horses can sense only the emotional mood of their owners, sometimes even anticipating their intentions (such as going for a walk or hunting). However, a meaningful ToM consists not in empathy or reaction to another’s mood but in the structured mental reproduction (potentially discursive reporting) of another’s thoughts. No animal behavior allows us to claim the existence of such an ability. 5 Such linguistic universals (Hockett, 1963) as prevarication (the ability to lie) and reflexiveness (the ability to talk about language) probably have their origin in this epoch.

10.3

The Economics of Reciprocity and Deferred Commitments

Advances in technology and diversification of hunting, fishing, and other practices: the "new economy," a deeper division of labor

Movable social stratification in "arenas of prestige"

Motivating for prestige through eloquence

The richness of rhetorical embellishments

275

The remoteness of significant events in time and space, indirect and delayed exchanges, and the complication of kinship relations

The activity of gossip as reports of events, relationships. Intensity of public discussions

Attempts to reach understanding, support, admiration

Awareness of what is going on in the group, alliance; protection of the interests of clans, families, and individuals Sufficiency of message accuracy

Rephrasing statements, trying to use new words and constructions

Accuracy and suprasituativeness of word meanings, polysemy

Level of syntax and grammar development

The complexity of language Fig. 10.3 Social factors and communicative concerns lead to the complexity of language constructions (in the broad sense). The shaded blocks relate directly to language and speech, and the white blocks relate to social interactions and mentality (cf. Fig. 10.8 explaining the language simplification)

attempts, and thus the development of new verbal practices, correspondent linguistic constructions. Therefore, it seems pretty plausible and natural the conjugate appearance and development of the following traits of the Middle sapienses of the Upper Paleolithic: • The rapid development of “social calculus” abilities • The rise of pictorial activity (from jewelry to funerary implements) • The increasing importance of eloquence in public rhetoric, political negotiations, exchanges, and erotic communication (see below for more details) • The emergence of complex constructions of syntax and grammar with the subject and logical schemes, recursion, rhetorical embellishments, polysemy, particular terminology Figure 10.3 shows the dynamic interconnection of social factors leading to languages of this level of complexity.

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Sexual Concerns

Concerns of parenthood The consolidation of language structures in children's learning, i.e., in the intergenerational transmission

The pressure of sexual selection: those who receive group support win, including through the persuasiveness of their speeches in economic conflicts

Access to a variety of ingredients syntactic constructions for "social calculus" (who owes what to whom)

The sharpness of concern for mastering the accuracy of speech to formulate requirements, rules

The tasks of reporting, marking, and remembering when who got what, who (didn't) share what with whom, what is owed to whom…

Intensity of discussion of economic obligations, kinship rules, and their violations

The significance of indirect exchange practices and deferred economic obligations, related group rules of reciprocity in the context of kinship relationships

The concerns of sustenance and economies

The fixation of speech prerequisites in the genes

The level of development of complex syntax and grammar in the language community

The level of mutual understanding in negotiations, proceedings

Concerns of prestige and social membershipj

Fig. 10.4 The dynamic relationship of the factors leads to the growth of linguistic complexity in communities of Middle and Late sapienses. All arrows denote a direct reinforcing relationship between the factors

Of course, all subsequent shifts in social evolution, i.e., the transition to Neolithic and barbarian chiefdoms, to statehood, empires, and modernity, also contributed to the complication of social orders. Consequently, new communicative concerns were born, leading to further complications of languages. Figure 10.4 presents the communicative and linguistic factors associated with the pragmatics of the “new economy” and the complexity of linguistic constructions.

10.4

10.4

Speech Self-presentation and Linguistic “Redundancy”

277

Speech Self-presentation and Linguistic “Redundancy”

The critical difference between polysemy, grammatical structures, and rhetorical embellishments (beginnings, comparisons, metaphors, hyperboles, and other tropes) and syntax is that the latter is necessary for the logical linking of meanings. In contrast, one could do without the decorations if the task was to transmit essential information dryly. Thus, “telegraphic style” or cipher messages do not use polysemy as a rule. According to the same principle, strict artificial languages (mathematical formalisms, programming languages) do not use grammatical forms and polysemy is illegal. However, the rules of syntax (order of characters, placement of brackets, and other service signs) are very stringent. In a sense, polysemy and grammar as rules of word-form concordance are “ornaments,” markers of speech beauty, richness, and correctness. The comparison with material decorations is not accidental. It suggests the idea of a deep common cause that led not only to the ornamentation of faces, bodies, and household things but also to the ornamentation of speech. The concern of individuals for their self-presentation goes back to the deepest antiquity, to the time when traditions of joint meals, everyday gatherings, rituals, and festivals appeared (see Chap. 7). Here, we are talking about competition for social status, prestige, the level of group membership among one’s kind. Individuals tried to achieve markers of belonging or closeness to a privileged group. The concern to gain personal erotic attraction for the other sex became vital when violence and brutal coercion ceased to provide sexual access (Chap. 4). So why did the apparent rise of ornamentation in material culture (and in the development of language) precisely occur in the mature Upper Paleolithic era? The following reasons seem the most plausible. • In the African high-density situation, due to the formation of intergroup alliances, the corresponding expansion of the range of social interactions, the former egalitarianism began to erode. Leaders, successful negotiators, military heroes, elders, and healers began to stand out. The groups that had seized territories rich in valuable resources started to dominate with alliances. The owners of rare, exotic items (through gifts or exchanges) were proud of them as markers of participation in significant relationships with other groups. Potential brides and grooms from these strata and families became attractive, and thus the incentives to compete through self-presentation and mark their special status with different symbols increased. • In Africa itself, these motifs did not receive bright material expression (which could be judged on the basis of archaeological data) because the concerns of protecting territories, war, making, and maintaining alliances prevailed. Additionally, the difficulty of obtaining food due to the high density of the population (considering the lifestyle of hunter-gatherers) did not leave time and energy for decoration.

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• The rudiments of social hierarchy, the competition in the marriage market between families and individuals, and the corresponding concerns for selfpresentation persisted when migrating from Africa to Eurasia. • Up to 20–15 kya the Eurasia steppes were likely abundant with herds of large herbivores; time and strength were enough to meet concerns of self-presentation. • Handcrafting as a unique magic wand appeared to apply not only to implements necessary in practical life, but also to objects of ritual, entertainment, games, and decoration. • The circle of professionals expanded (from tool makers to ornament makers, herbalists, shamans); technologies and handicrafts progressed rapidly due to the combination of new concerns, borrowed practices from the old-timers, their own accumulated potential of abilities. • Speech, as a unique cognitive, communicative, and presentational magic wand, also became more actively involved in concerns of leisure and raising one’s prestige; accordingly, rituals of all kinds, entertainment, games, courtship and erotic negotiations, Machiavellian intrigue, and rhetoric with pretensions to leadership widely developed. Indeed, polysemy and grammatical concordances, though not pragmatically essential for informing (like syntax), are by no means useless when the range of concerns expands. The subtlety of semantic nuances in word choice, brightness, and juiciness of vocabulary, smoothness, and “correctness” of speech became significant. All these rhetorical virtues are structures that provide a wide range of selfpresentation concerns. “Correctness” can emerge and manifest itself only when the rules of speech appear. Syntax as a set of structures that ensure the transmission of logical connections between meanings acquires controlling functions: words that fall into specific cells of these structures must “adapt” and modify themselves when the linguistic rules reach the status of coercive cultural patterns transmitted across generations. The rules themselves, in all likelihood, were formed as subconscious by-products of “exemplary” speeches, i.e., remarkably successful and impressive rhetoric that one sought to emulate. Thus, deviation from these models, violation of the corresponding rules, was eventually perceived as clumsy, inept speech, a failure regarding the speaker’s aspirations to raise or maintain his prestige as a group membership level. Not all languages were obliged to acquire decorations as “excesses.” On the contrary, in small communities, in the absence of practices of public speaking, argument, evidence, when the context of communication situations was always clear to the participants, then there was no incentive to complicate constructions and rhetorically enrich language (see further on the Piraha and Riau languages). To visualize the resulting version of the sequence of stages in language development, I use D. Bickerton’s example, but with the addition of more complex constructions at later stages (Fig. 10.5).

The Complication of Language: Principal Trends and the Nomological Explanation

10.5

Late protolanguage combining pidginsentences

- Og-take-meatgood. - Ig-beat-Og. - Beat-bad. - Ig-take-meat-eatmeat. - Ig-bad.

Simple language: sentences with simple syntax and sprouts of grammar

- Og took meat. - Meat delicious. - Ig beat Og. - Punch bad. - Ig take meat ate meat. - Not right.

The language with complex pragmatic syntax and lax grammar

Og hunts and carries the delicious meat home, but Ig beats Og with a stick and takes the meat away. Ig does not share the meat that Og got with anyone. Ig does wrong. Now Ig's relatives owe Og. They must bring the meat to Og and his family.

279

Language with rich rhetoric: strict rules of grammar, recursion, polysemy, metaphors, comparisons, other decorations

You won't believe it! Our Og was hunting, killing a roe, and carrying the carcass to feed his family and all his friends. And Ig sneaked up on him, swooped down on him like a vicious kite, stunned Og with his club, and took the meat. And then, just think, Ig didn't share it with anyone! Is that how we do things around here? You have to pay for that. Now let Ig's relatives bring the loot from the hunt to Og and his family. That will be fair.

Fig. 10.5 Sequence of the late stages of glottogenesis with a continuation of Bickerton’s conditional example

10.5

The Complication of Language: Principal Trends and the Nomological Explanation

The frequent use of constructions of the same type led to all kinds of convolution, including grammaticalization, i.e., the transformation of words with semantics into purely service words (conjunctions, prepositions, prefixes, suffixes, particles). These coagulation processes, folding of typical habitual constructions, reduced the load on memory, as the processes of utterance and recognition became “automatic” and took place at the level of skills. At the same time, the language rules themselves exist in stable syntactic and grammatical constructions, which facilitate our ability to “speak correctly” in our native language without thinking about it at all. Logical bundles in syntax appeared together with logical mental operations. Identifying diverse types of links and operations in distinct cultures is a separate task of comparative psycholinguistics. Evolutionary linguistics, historical anthropology, and paleopsychology should investigate their origin. Here we will only present a general hypothesis about the origin of causal explanations in thinking and the corresponding syntactic means in language. Theoretical hypothesis: If individuals, groups, and alliances with a relatively simple language in common, with different access to boons and resources, engage in complex relations of stratification, deferred exchanges, commitments, public speaking, and debate, then necessarily new speech abilities and linguistic devices, based on previous or imported language constructions, are emerging, evolving to provide the following

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Linguistic Complexity and Simplicity: The Socio-evolutionary Roots

Changes in classmates’ speech with initially the same rhetoric levels, but then fell into more or less diversified and competitive spheres. If the first pnes have more complex and rhetorically rich speech, then the hypothesis is supported

The theoretical hypothesis: the more differentiated are the relations and the more the position of the participants depends on public presentations, the more complex will be the language

—

Fig. 10.6 Conditions of simple language enrichment with complex syntax, grammar, polysemy, and rhetorical embellishments: substantiation of the theoretical hypothesis

tasks: (1) accurately conveying messages about social events (adequacy), (2) rationally connecting meanings (persuasiveness), and (3) speaking correctly, smoothly, and beautifully (impressiveness). The hypothesis also can take the form of correlation: the more differentiated and movable are the relations (of prestige, economy, power, kinship) and the more the position of the participants depends on communication and public presentations, the more elements in complex syntax, grammar, logical connections, recursiveness, synonymy, and rhetorical decorations will be in the language. Figure 10.6 presents the essential elements of an expanded nomological explanation of language complication and ideas for testing the theoretical hypothesis in up-to-date observations and experiments As usual, it is much more challenging to justify empirical hypothesis judgments because of the scarcity of indirect data and the complete absence of direct data (Fig. 10.7). Table 10.1 presents the correspondence of new features of social orders from the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic with language and cognitive abilities structures.

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Leaders of Linguistic Simplicity: Piraha and Riau

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structure’s The empirical hypothesis

Ingredients: Every ancient simple language had its specific syntactic, grammatical, lexical, and phonetic means. i.e., potential elements of new constructions

The confirmation that the concern obtained provision: hunter-gatherer tribes with complex kinship relations, exchange, stratification have survived

Fig. 10.7 The conditions of simple languages enrichment in the epoch started from the Upper Paleolithic: justification of the empirical hypothesis

10.6 Leaders of Linguistic Simplicity: Piraha and Riau When explaining linguistic complexity, it is necessary to consider the existence of the simplest natural languages. There are real champions of simplicity among them, some of whom have become famous. For example, such is the language of the Piraha, a South American Indian tribe, which Daniel Everett (2008) described to refute Chomsky’s postulates. Let us list the most striking features of this language:6 • There is a surprisingly small number of “ordinary” phonemes in the phonetics of Piraha, although there are distinctive functions in tones and durations. • There are additional “channels of discourse”: whistling, mooing, singing, shouting; Everett himself asserts that Piraha people can convey any information through these channels. • There are no special color designations in the vocabulary; instead, Piraha people use descriptive expressions (“like blood” for red, “unripe” for green). 6

The accuracy of Everett’s judgment on each point repeatedly got doubts and criticisms. Indeed, much of the simplicity of the Piraha language is due to the absence of writing and to Everett’s recording of spoken language, which he structured as he saw fit. Moreover, the completeness of information transmission through “channels of discourse” (apart from speech) is highly questionable; indeed, a typical specialized sign system is used here for special conditions, like the winking of card cheats or the signal language of drums.

Time, prominent representatives, technology, brain volume Since 50 kya. Neoanthropes: Early, Middle, and Late sapienses. Microliths, plates and compound implements. Items of bone, pottery. Bows and arrows. Dwellings, clothing. Wall paintings. The brain, like modern humans, averages 1400–1600 cm3

New material practices, techno-natural niches, and social orders Tools allow hunting in small groups. Mastering fishing. Fractionality within groups and alliances. Complex kinship systems within intergroup unions. Hierarchies of prestige within groups and alliances

New regulatory and communicative concerns Keep track of heterogeneous obligations to find out and report who got what, who shared it with whom, who owed what to whom. Control justice in sharing and exchange. To achieve support, prestige, erotic appeal through persuasiveness, smoothness, beauty, and correctness of speech

New structures and abilities Ritual and Types of language communication practices constructions Complex syntax with Arrangements for logical conjunctions, deferred obligations recursive embeddings; concerning expected clarifying grammatical contributions, exchanges, and repara- devices; words for kinship, numbers, sizes, tions. qualities. Grammatical Public discussions. concordances, polyGossip, proceedings semy, rhetorical decoconcerning economic rations. The emergence and political relations. and growth of profesSelf-representations in sional vocabulary public speaking and erotic interactions

Table 10.1 The emergence of complex syntax, grammar, and rhetorical decorations

Cognitive abilities Ability to make complex “social calculus.” Proficiency in part/ whole, abstract/concrete schemes. Causal explanations and the use of logical schemes. Ease of switching between contexts. Ability to make colorful digressions, comparisons, metaphors, hyperboles, and other tropes

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• No numerals (there are relative terms in order of increasing h’oi, ho’i, and ba’agiso, Piraha chose the assignments according to the situation; one subject is always ho’i, but the same word can denote other quantities). • No grammatical markers to distinguish between singular and plural. • There are no comparative degrees of features: one cannot say “this thing is bigger than that thing.” • No particular words for a time of day (night, day, morning, evening, noon). • No words for quantifiers, inferior kinship terms, no notions of right and left (all orientation is by the river). • Straightforward syntax, especially compared to Chomsky’s constructions; the narrative is in chopped simple sentences; accordingly, there are no prepositions “and,” “or”; no disjunctive relations, no recursion. • Piraha phrases are questions, statements, or orders; there are no unique formulas of politeness; there are not even the words “thank you,” “sorry.” (Everett, 2008). After discussing the Piraha tribe, its language, and culture, many researchers pointed out the non-uniqueness of the Piraha and similar traits in many other (however, also quite exotic) languages (Borodai, 2020). Let us also give an example of the Indonesian Riau language according to David Gil: • Every word coincides with a morpheme, a word root; in other words, there are no prefixes, suffixes, endings. • No grammatical means of expressing the categories we are accustomed to: number, time, gender, type of action in time. • No stable word order. • One multifunctional word sama fulfills the role of all the function words. • Participants of conversation overcome uncertainty by the shared context. Unfortunately, in his work (Gil, 2004, 2009) Gil does not report the peculiarities of the way of life and social interaction of the Riau language speakers. Note that the Piraha and Riau languages are the exceptions rather than the rule, even among the known hunter-gatherer languages. Most of the languages studied belonging to Paleolithic and Mesolithic societies have considerable complexity. It is related to the sophistication of kinship systems, corresponding intergroup relations, marriage rules, exchanges, and ritual practices with a rich mythology. Many examples show that the simplicity of a language does not mean any “underdevelopment”; it is pretty functional. The constructions of each simple language usually fully provide for the communicative concerns of its speakers in their habitual social orders and life activities. An illustrative example from the Khmer language is: baan, took; ruəc, viə thom catch small escape it big The meaning of the sentence can be as follows: a. ‘When you catch it, it is small; when it escapes, it is big.’

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b. ‘If you catch it, it is small; if it escapes, it is big.’ c. ‘The one you catch is (always) small; the one that escapes is (always) big (Comrie & Kuteva, 2003, p. 192).

As we can see, each variant of expanded translation using different syntactic, grammatical, and lexical means has its facets, shades of sense, but the core meaning remains. It is enough for native Khmer speakers to discuss situations, the context of which is evident to all conversation participants.

10.7

Spatial Orientation Systems

The functionality of the simple and exotic languages of the “savages” connects with their specific cognitive abilities, always closely related to speech and language structures. The striking differences between the absolute spatial orientation systems fixed in languages (e.g., in the language of the Australian Guugu-Yimitir tribe) and the relative systems characteristic of Europeans (e.g., the English and Dutch) are impressive. Numerous experiments have shown that the locals of the Guugu-Yimitir, who always calculate their position and the location of any other objects relative to the cardinal points, demonstrate much better abilities to orientate and navigate at long distances, but have difficulties in recounting pictures where it is necessary to indicate the position of an object relative to a house or a tree. In addition, a native speaker of Guugu-Yimitir experiences great difficulty when setting a round table, putting forks on one side of the plates and knives on the other. On the contrary, the British and Dutch as test subjects practically lost their orientation when they walked a few kilometers or drove several dozen kilometers but excelled at retelling the same pictures. Of course, the task of placing the instruments to the right or left of the plates could not cause any difficulties for Europeans (Borodai, 2020, p. 233–241). Therefore, in languages of extreme degrees of complexity and simplicity, cognitive abilities remain fully functional in providing communicative and life concerns for their speakers. The increasing complexity of relations and orders at the tribal level, even more so with the subsequent social evolution, seems to be the main driver of the growth of linguistic complexity, as it generates new communicative concerns. There is a wide variation in the complexity of the available languages. Scholars understand that the determinants of the levels of simplicity/complexity are in areas such as the number of speakers, the isolation of groups, the density of their contacts, the presence/absence of writing, and formal education (Trudgill, 2009). However, research on this topic area is still in an early stage. The increasing complexity of language due to the growing complexity of social orders, including public discourse, writing, education, literature, science, and philosophy, seems to be a natural evolutionary trend. It is more difficult to explain the

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extreme degrees of sustained “conserved” simplicity of a language like Piraha. Let us consider the probable social causes of this phenomenon.

10.8

The Identity Strategy of “Straight-Headed” People

Everett himself explains the peculiarities of the Piraha language by “the principle of the perception immediacy”: the tribe lives “one day.” The people of Piraha do not stock up on food and do not build substantial houses. They are not interested in either the past or the future or what is happening outside of their everyday life. They trust only that is directly seen, in extreme cases, the stories of eyewitnesses. Thus, all the concerns of tribal members are “short,” tied to situations “here and now,” which determines the simplicity of communicative tasks and correspondent linguistic means. The Piracha Indians do not sleep at night but are awake throughout the day and night with short naps at all times. Therefore, they do not need to separate day from night. Numbers and colors are by no means universal. If there is no need to accurately count something by piece, then numbers are unnecessary. Unless there are chemical dyes, distinguishing colors in the jungle is useful only in specific situations, such as determining the ripeness of fruit. Consequently, a word meaning “unripe” is sufficient for green. There is no complex kinship terminology because there is no complex kinship system. What may make the Piraha tribe indeed unique, at least in the Amazon, is its ability to preserve its native way of life, its culture, and its language for a long time. In this respect, one should explain this peculiarity compared to most other Indians, who have steadily made their way into Brazilian society with schooling, adoption of the Portuguese language, mastery of standard dress, life in houses, and commoditymoney relations. Thus, the Mura language closest to Piraha disappeared due to the complete linguistic and cultural assimilation of the tribe. Everett’s critics pointed out that the Piraha women planned their activities for the day in the morning and thus were quite capable of going beyond the “here and now” situation. The Indians asked Everett (though in his visit, not in public), “Hey, Dan, do Americans die?” Thus, the “principle of the perception immediacy” is not absolute but represents a group norm and accepted individual attitudes of consciousness and behavior. At the same time, Everett’s observations about the persistent attitude of Pirahas’ “spontaneity of perception” are valid since many Pirahas’ habits, cases, and episodes support his conclusion. The question remains: how and why did the highly unusual traits and rules of Pirahas’ life come about? I will use the conceptual constructions of niches-challenges-attempts and orders-concerns-structures (see Chaps. 2 and 3). Every hunter-gatherer tribe finds itself in a niche with enormous external pressures after encountering colonizers and then finding itself within an industrially developed state. This pressure is not only geopolitical (a danger of territorial displacement), political (newcomers begin to command, coerce, forbid), and

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economic (exchanges with them are usually asymmetrical, unfavorable, or even humiliating) but also cultural (aliens impose their language, their religion, their education and upbringing, their rules of life). These stark challenges, coupled with a fundamental concern for survival, lead to different response strategies whose choice reasons need further analysis. However, we can assume that the following factors have a prominent role: successes or losses in the resistance history, the experience of neighboring tribes, the level of internal consolidation, commitment to own customs, and identity. There is almost no information about the history of the Pirahas because of their former isolation in the Amazon depths. For about 300 years, they were frozen in their condition, while neighboring tribes assimilated to a greater or lesser extent and became part of Brazilian society. Perhaps the Piraha had experienced disappointment from previous attempts at violent resistance. In addition, they were discouraged by information about the fate of neighboring tribes that had taken the path of assimilation. For these or other reasons, the Piraha acquired an exceptionally high degree of internal cohesion. It is bold to speak of their ethnocentrism: The Piraha call themselves “straight heads,” distinguishing themselves from all other people as “crooked heads.” For all these reasons, the Piraha adopted a particular strategy of responding to the challenges of colonization and assimilation threats. Let us call this strategy “cultural-mental selfisolation.7 This strategy, of course, was not a holistic and conscious plan. Instead, Piraha formed it through many attempts, trials, and fixation mechanisms. However, a complete resulting set of structures developed and provided quite a specific concern: to preserve themselves, their “straight head” identity, without entering into a direct violent clash with superior external forces, maintaining relations with them by convenient and acceptable ways. Everything that has so surprised Everett and continues to surprise readers of his descriptions turns out to be elements of several behavior structures of the Piraha people: • To speak only their language, not to switch to the dominant Portuguese around, preferably not to learn it at all; to resist, as gently as possible, instructing their children anything alien; not even to master numbers, although they needed in trade with the Brazilians.8 “The Pirahas’ isolation is due to their very strong sense of superiority to and disdain for other cultures. Far from thinking of themselves as inferior because they lack anything found in other languages and cultures, they consider their way of life the best possible way of life. They’re not interested in assimilating other values. So we see little seepage from other cultures or languages into Piraha” (Everett, 2008, p. 242). 8 “. . .many other groups around the world have had very impoverished numeral systems, but they have had counting and have borrowed numerals from surrounding languages as socioeconomic pressure builds to be able to use numbers in trade. The Warlpiri of Australia are an example. And the Pirahas have been engaged in trade with Brazilians for more than two centuries. Yet they have not borrowed any numerals to facilitate their trade” (Ibid. p. 220). 7

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• To regard as unimportant (uninteresting, unworthy of attention) anything that does not serve the daily needs of the tribe, that belongs to other places and times, that direct witness experience did not authenticate.9 • To maintain the solidarity of the tribe: – by a strict prohibition not only of intragroup violence but also of prolonged quarrels, of anger at one another.10 – By compulsory mutual assistance (sharing caught fish, prey, giving each other boats, helping to rebuild destroyed huts). – By free attitude to marriage, adultery, divorce, and sex; everyone has experience of sexual relations with almost every fellow tribesman of the opposite sex during his life, making the Piraha one friendly family.11 The functionality of such customs and practices to ensure the preservation of cultural and mental identity is quite apparent and does not require explanation. The other exotic features noted by Everett may be incidental and deterministic to jungle life, but it is likely that they also contribute to the adopted identity strategy. • The free attitude toward sex is not only about internal relations between tribe members, but the Piraha men are perfectly comfortable with their women paying merchants with sex for goods from the outside world, then getting pregnant by outsiders, and bearing children of decidedly non-native appearance. The contrast with the usual aggressive reaction of self-isolating tribes to any external intrusion in this sphere is particularly striking. However, goods are helpful for all. There is no need to fight with anyone, expose oneself to danger, or spoil relations with aliens. Children from alien biological fathers grow as Piraha and become real Piraha. • Objectively, such practice saved the tribe from degeneration, though Indians hardly thought about it. • Of course, intermittent sleeping during the day can be an effect of the abundance of snakes and the need for night fishing, but other tribes living in similar conditions do not practice such a sleeping and waking regime. It seems that in this way the Piraha assert their “straight-headedness.” The specific regime has an

“...missionaries have been trying to convert them (to Christianity) for over two hundred years. From the very first record of contact with the Pirahas and the Muras, a closely related people, in the eighteenth century, they had developed a reputation for “recalcitrance”: not Pirahas are known to have “converted” at any period of their history” (Ibid. p. 269). 10 “The giggling, smirking and laughter are all necessary components of the process, since anger is the cardinal sin among the Pirahas. Female infidelity is also fairly common. When this happens the man looks for his wife. He may say something mean or threatening to the male who cuckolded him. But violence against anyone, children or adults, is unacceptable to the Pirahas” (Ibid. p. 104). 11 “Given the lack of stigma attached to the relative frequency of divorce, promiscuousness associated with dancing and singing, and post- and prepubescent sexual experimentation, it isn’t far off the mark to conjecture that many Pirahas have had sex with a high percentage of other Pirahas. This alone means that their relationships will be on an intimacy unfamiliar to larger societies” (Ibid. p. 88). 9

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intrinsic linkage with the “here and now” (without long overnight breaks) and the remarkable moods of vigor, contentment, and even happiness. Everett and others observed these traits.12 Note that Piraha lives in extreme poverty while having to feed themselves daily in dangerous jungle. • The resistance to hunger and the value of “hardiness” is, of course, a support structure primarily to compensate for the instability of sustenance, but the especially encouraged resilience, together with the refusal to make any stores13 and to fall into any subordination to outsiders, has not only an environmental but also a socio-cultural significance. Such norms and attitudes express a specific profound principle of Piraha identity, somewhat like this formula: “living one endless day and remaining free from worries, long-term concerns, and external compulsion.” • The Piraha begin to communicate with the stranger wishing to live among them; they even begin to see him, only when they give him a familiar name. The same name usually belongs to the tribe member most similar to the stranger’s age and appearance. Thus, Piraha, in some sense, mentally “appropriate” the stranger through their language and their names. That the stranger, though “crookedheaded,” can neither speak nor fish nor hunt now is already understandable. He is not culturally dangerous to Piraha. He can live among Piraha. They can teach him the language, especially when he has many medicines, preserves, and other things useful for the tribe. • The Piraha themselves change their names several times when they become adults or old. It is not about taking respectful forms (as in Russia, we add patronymic and other people add such endings as -ogly, -san, etc.), but about taking a new name from the same traditional pool of names and correlates with the age reached. This strange custom has a connection with the principle of “endless joyful day” (see above). One can also associate this custom with the sad brevity of Piraha life, who, due to the dangers and diseases in the jungle, rarely live to 45–50 years. Funerals in this tribe are modest, they are almost devoid of rituality, and after them, life goes on as usual. The dead person’s name is a live legacy: soon, another “old man” will accept it. Everything goes on as if no one had ever died. Let us call this linguistic strategy, out of deference to Eduard Sapir (the author of the linguistic relativity idea), “the Sapirian stop of the world.” The closed set of personal names, indifferent to births, deaths, changes, and history in general, makes the inner social world of the tribe (the only important reality for “I have never heard from a Piraha say that he or she is worried. In fact, so far as I can tell, the Pirahas have no word for worry in their language. One group of visitors to the Pirahas, psychologists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Brain and Cognitive Science Department, commented that the Pirahas appeared to be the happiest people they had ever seen” (Ibid. p. 278). 13 “Pirahas have the knowledge to preserve meat—when they are about to embark to a place where they expect to encounter Brazilians, they salt meat (if they have salt) or smoke it, to preserve it. But among themselves they never preserve meat. I haven’t seen another Amazonian group that doesn’t salt or smoke meat routinely. The Pirahas consume everything without as soon as it is hunted or gathered. They preserve nothing for themselves (leftovers are eaten until they are gone, even if the meat begins to turn rancid). Baskets and food are short-term projects” (Everett, 2008, p. 76). 12

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each of its members) as if frozen, and therefore especially solid, protected from external disturbances. • In the villages of the Piraha, there is no common ground for assemblies and rituals; the Indians constantly gather in groups of different compositions, love to chat with each other, joke, laugh. They do not accomplish any special ceremonies, sermons, admonitions, or special collective discussions with decision-making. However, it does not mean that they lack normativity. Such means as mockery are pretty sufficient to impose and control the rules of behavior. In extreme cases, they stop sharing food with the offender, do not give him a boat for fishing or evict him altogether, and ostracize him, which happens very rarely. Here again, the pattern of a large friendly family is in operation, whose life has nothing to do with formal meetings. They need no political speeches, moral notation, judicial proceedings, or official verdicts. It is possible that the Piraha once abandoned these kinds of practice, just as they abandoned internecine violence and jealous revenge. Either way, the incentive to develop the rhetoric of persuasive speeches in the Piraha was either initially absent or had faded away. Figure 10.8 shows the interrelationship of the factors responsible for the simplicity of the Piraha language. The factors of the cultural strategy of the Piraha tribe (the upper shaded blocks) repress the causes of the increasing complexity of linguistic constructions, rhetorical enrichment. They are the same factors and connections that make up the general pattern of language complexity (see Fig. 10.3). The linguistic simplicity of Piraha has one notable exception: the complexity of verbs. They use markers of evidentiality. With these markers, the speaker assesses his knowledge of the conversation’s subject: whether he has seen it himself, passed on someone else’s words, or inferred it by inference. Each verb can contain 16 consecutive suffixes (Everett, 2008, p. 196). We look for a corresponding complexity in practices and immediately find it. The daily foraging in the jungle requires a lot of experience, careful observation, subtlety, and skill. It is necessary to tell the tribe members about all unusual cases. After all, experience is valuable per se. Also, it is always good to boast about special personal skills and surprise tribe members with a story about something specific, dangerous, or attractive. It is also essential to convince them of the credibility of the story. Therefore, the simplicity of the Piraha language is mainly due to the longstanding cultural and mental strategy adopted by the tribe to preserve its identity. The strategy allowed the Piraha people for centuries to maintain peaceful, bartering relations with the social environment, but without assimilation. An essential part of the strategy is the “principle of immediate perception”: almost exclusive attention to situations “here and now” which directly concern today’s concerns. Accordingly, Pirahas block any interest, curiosity, trust in anything external, distant in both space and time. This communicative specificity has also conditioned the peculiarities of language with the simple syntax but with markers of evidentiality as a complex system of clarification of the nature of actions by forms of verbs. Such a language is quite adequate to the needs of Piraha and does not require additional constructions.

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Fig. 10.8 Relationship of factors that explain the simplicity of the Piraha language. The shaded blocks denote the factors of the Pirahas’ cultural-mental strategy that repress the causes of linguistic complexity (c.f. Fig. 10.3 with general dynamics)

References

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*** In the following concluding chapter, let us turn to the most complex, debatable, and actively discussed problems of historical and comparative linguistics: the genesis of universal features and an extensive diversity of languages, the nature of their proximity and kinship, and the justification of their origin from common “prelanguages.”

References Borodai, S. Y. (2020). Yazyk i poznanie: Vvedenie v postrelyativizm [Language and cognition: Introduction to the postrelativism]. Yazyki slavyanskih kultur – Languages of Slavic Cultures, Publ. (In Russian). Byrne, R. W. (1996). Machiavellian intelligence. Evolutionary Anthropology, 5(5), 172–180. Byrne, R. W., & Whiten, A. (Eds.). (1988). Machiavellian intelligence: Social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans. Clarendon Press. Comrie, B., & Kuteva, T. (2003). The evolution of grammatical structures and ‘functional need’ explanations. In M. Tallerman (Ed.), Language origins: Perspectives on evolution (pp. 185–207). Oxford Univ. Press. Dahl, Ö. (2004). The growth and maintenance of linguistic complexity. Benjamins. Everett, D. (2008). Don't sleep, there are snakes. Life and language in the Amazonian jungle. Vintage Books. Gavrilets, S., & Vose, A. (2006). The dynamics of Machiavellian intelligence. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA (PNAS), 103, 16823–16828. https://vikent.ru/enc/6537/ Gil, D. (2004). Riau Indonesian Sama: Explorations in macrofunctionality. In M. Haspelmath (Ed.), Coordinating constructions (pp. 371–424). Benjamins. Gil, D. (2009). How much grammar does it take to sail a boat? In G. Sampson, D. Gil, & P. Trudgill (Eds.), Language complexity as an evolving variable (pp. 19–33). Oxford Univ. Press. Hawkins, J. A. (2009). An efficiency theory of complexity and related phenomena. In G. Sampson, D. Gil, & P. Trudgill (Eds.), Language complexity as an evolving variable (pp. 252–269). Oxford Univ. Press. Hockett, C. F. (1963). The problem of universals in language. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (pp. 1–22). MIT Press. Juola, P. (1998). Measuring linguistic complexity: The morphological tier. Journal of Quantitative. Linguistics, 5, 206–213. Laland, K. N. (2017). Darwin’s unfinished symphony. How culture made the human mind. Princeton Univ. Press. Morgan, T. J. H., Uomini, N. T., Rendell, L. E., Chouinard-Thuly, L., Street, S. E., Lewis, H. M., Cross, C. P., Evans, C., Kearney, R., de la Torre, I., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. N. (2015). Experimental evidence for the coevolution of hominin tool-making, teaching and language. Nature Communications, 6(6029), 1–8. Nettle, D. (2012). Social scale and structural complexity in human languages. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B: Biological Sciences, 367(1597), 1829–1836. Powell, A., Shennan, S., & Thomas, M. (2009). Late Pleistocene demography and appearance of modern human behavior. Science, 324, 1298–1301. Spike, M. (2018). Language complexity as an interaction between social structure, innovation, and simplicity. In Proceedings of the 12th international conference on the evolution of language (EVOLANG-12). NCU Press.

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Sterelny, K. (2016). Cumulative cultural evolution and the origins of language. Biological Theory, 11(3), 173–186. Stout, D. (2002). Skill and cognition in stone tool production: An ethnographic case study from Irian Jaya. Current Anthropology, 43(5), 693–722. Trudgill, P. (2009). Sociolinguistic typology and complexification. In G. Sampson, D. Gil, & P. Trudgill (Eds.), Language complexity as an evolving variable (pp. 98–109). Oxford Univ. Press. Trudgill, P. (2011). Sociolinguistic typology: Social determinants of linguistic complexity. Oxford Univ. Press.

Chapter 11

The Nature of the Affinity of Modern Languages

11.1

Morphological Types of Languages

Languages differ from each other according to a wide variety of parameters. There is also a considerable variation in the criteria in solid reference systems (Ethnologue, Glottolog, The World Atlas of Language Structures, and others). More or less standard and crucial from the language evolution viewpoint is the division into morphological types: • Analytic languages, where grammar is conveyed mainly through syntax with auxiliary words and auxiliary verbs, rather than through endings, suffixes, and prefixes; such are the English, Dutch, and Bulgarian languages. • Isolating (extremely analytic) languages, where most words have one root, such as Vietnamese and Maori. • Synthetic languages, where flections, grammatical particles, join the roots of words: – Fusional (inflected) languages, where flections have several meanings (e.g., case, number, gender); such are Russian and Latin. – Agglutinative languages, where each suffix or prefix attached to a word has only one meaning; such are Turkish and Japanese; • Polysynthetic languages, where all the members of a sentence, devoid of formal indicators, are combined into a single whole; such are the Chukchi, Eskimo, and Aleutian languages.1 Of course, there are intermediate types. Some languages even pass from type to type (say, English has become analytic from synthetic). Still, the type of affiliation is relatively stable, and languages of the same family (but not a phylum) usually belong to the same type. 1

For example, in the Chukchi language “tymeiӈylevtpygtyrkyn” means “I have a severe headache.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_11

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The origin of the types, the time, the reasons, and the conditions of formation of these patterns are not known and practically not discussed (I could not find any sensible hypotheses2). Where and when this took place, what were the correspondent lines of language evolution, whether they intersected, and how they influenced each other: all this is still in the obscurity darkness. It is reasonable to assume that the main divergence occurred as the protolanguage was transformed into a language (see Fig. 9.4). Indeed, such distinctions into morphological types could not yet exist in the pidgin-sentences themselves, whose structuring rules were limited to the order of immutable (proto)words consisting of only roots (Chap. 7). Thus, the divergence occurred in the formation of syntactic structures, and the grammatical rules of word form change closely related to them (Chap. 8). A priori, it is clear that the following factors influenced the main channels of linguistic development: • The initially found magic wands of forming new constructions (e.g., through multi-valued flections or the addition of single-valued suffixes) • The languages of neighboring, revered, or dominant communities as sources of borrowing such formation ways • The communicative concerns that prevailed in the formative period, which conditioned special attention to the precision, coherence of the elements of utterances in quite certain aspects, with the possibility of neglecting other aspects • The initial lexical and phonetic “substratum” of the supposed protolanguage as the ingredients of the future syntactic and grammatical constructions How exactly this happened in each language (a family of closely related languages) is already an area of research tasks of historical sociolinguistics, which requires new methods of analysis (for details, see the Conclusion).

11.2

The Structural Unity of Protolanguages

For all their differences, modern languages in the distant past derived from their predecessors, the protolanguages, whose main feature is ordering the sign elements (protowords or already full-fledged words) in utterances called pidgin-sentences (see Chap. 7). Given the linguistic diversity, we will understand elements ordering in pidgin-sentences broadly: not only as word order, but also as highlighting the main element by accentuation, a particular tone, or in any other way, as well as separate ways of relating the central protoword of the utterance to the others. As a result, it has

2

R. Dixon (1997) proposed the hypothesis that languages develop in a cycle from fusional languages to analytic, agglutinative languages, and then back to fusional languages. The theoretical foundations of this version are weak; moreover, it seems to be empirically incorrect.

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become possible to convey a more precise meaning of the (proto)words combination through their ordering. The structural similarity of protolanguages consists of universal features of all known natural languages, despite their variety and exoticism. Thus, the most familiar is the division of speech into words, the existence of word orders (in a broad sense and far from always strict), and the division of ordinary spoken speech into sentences, even if not “correct” and complete.3 The specificity of languages emerged as a superstructure on these foundations. Otherwise, there is no way to explain language universals. Consider the hypothesis about ascending stages of glottogenesis (Chap. 2): • Syncretic signals → first protowords-holophrases (initially spoken by speakers together, in unison), distinguishing protowords through protosyllables → • Multiplication of protowords through phonetic syllable distinguishing and their gluing → • Reactive protophrases → • Arbitrary situational protophrases → • Leading-away protophrases with the beginning of the transformation of protowords into full-fledged words → • Pidgin-sentences with word order schemes → • Simple syntax with elements of grammar → • Complex syntax and grammar → • Addition of recursion, polysemy, rhetorical embellishment, and professional vocabulary. I have attempted to explain these transitions on the basis of evolutionary principles, proxy evidence of changing technonatural niches, social orders, and communicative concerns (Chaps. 4–9). At the initial stages of glottogenesis, the mechanisms of generating language structures seem to be more or less similar since all groups with new communicative challenges and concerns needed one or another syllable distinction, invention, and recognition of new protowords, ways to refine protophrases, etc. With the further divergence of ecological niches, social orders, and communicative concerns, with the established diversity of protolanguages (provided by initial phonetic and lexical structures), dialects and languages of individual communities, moreover of different morphological types (see above), were quite naturally distanced from each other.

Molly Bloom’s famous monologue in “Ulysses,” presented as an uninterrupted stream of consciousness, is impressive precisely for its extraordinariness.

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The Explanation of Language Universals

Daniel Dor (2015) correctly insists on the social functionality of all human languages and presents the following list of linguistic universals: Essential universals are definitional in the most concrete sense of the word: we identify a certain communication technology as a language if and only if it manifests the entire set of constitutive properties. All languages are socially constructed communication technologies, designed through the collective, iterative process of experiential mutual identification for the specific function of the instruction of imagination. All languages comprise a large symbolic landscape with triple-natured signs and a protocol with prescribed procedures (strong or weak, stable, or flexible) for the production and interpretation of utterances. All languages translate experiential intentions into formal messages and translate messages into experiential interpretations, thus mediating between the private and the social. All languages require their speakers to have experience to instruct, and all are entangled in a bidirectional spiral of influence with their speakers’ private experiences. In all languages, utterances reflect (not necessarily syntactically) the hierarchical nature of the complete message. In all languages, grammatical patterns are determined by a series of prescriptive conventions. All languages require a long process of acquisition and practice (Dor, 2015, p. 150–151).

These general traits directly fit social functionality because languages evolved as complex structures designed to provide communicative and coordination concerns (see Chap. 3). Specific linguistic universals require a more complicated explanation. The list of design features of natural languages and their use in a speech presented by Ch. Hockett (1963) has already become a linguistic classic and has not lost its importance, despite multiple attempts of criticism and suggestions for revision. Therefore, it is high time to present an evolutionary explanation of Hockett’s universals. Traditionality (intergenerational transmission of language through culture and social learning rather than through biological mechanisms of heredity) is explained in Chaps. 4 and 5 as a natural extension of the pre-human ability to train cubs to pronounce and recognize differentiated signals. Further gene-culture coevolution in the speech domain consisted of a steady increase in the proportion of experience transmitted through language. Consequently, the innate neuropsychological prerequisites for language acquisition also evolved. The general explanation for this crosscutting trend in the cognitive evolution of the human species is that the linguistic fixation of new experience in the broad sense (knowledge, practices, rules, orders, sacred things, ideas) was systematically positively reinforced. These processes, in turn, have contributed to subsequent attempts to label and verbally communicate cognitive, practical, value-normative, and all other innovations. Alternativity means that adult members of the linguistic collective are alternately transmitters and receivers of linguistic signals. Chapter 6 shows the probable origin of this discipline and self-discipline from the ritual order of access to food at communal meals, especially when the confident mastery of fire allowed the daily practice of collective cooking with heat treatment. Displacement means that messages can refer to denotata distant in time or space from the communication situation, from the perceptual field of communication

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participants. In Chap. 7, the displacement is explained through the natural development of leading-away protophrases and then pidgin-sentences as structures involving “mirror neural ensembles.” These fundamentally new cognitive and linguistic structures provided “the instruction of imagination” as a new communicative concern. Leading-away protophrases and pidgin-sentences appeared in ritual reporting notable of events in another place and time (“mental escape” of interlocutors). These descriptions led to a collective discussion of these events through attempts at speech interpretations, shared understanding, and experiencing what had happened. Productivity/openness means ease of creating and understanding new messages. The origin of individual protowords, situational and diverting protophrases, pidginsentences, and coherent speech is explained in Chaps. 5–8. At the ultramicro-level, the primary mechanism seems to be the ritual of rephrasing and guessing. Structurally and genetically similar are the mini-rituals of correction and approval by parents of children’s attempts to speak, as well as adult discussion of complex topics, which, if successful and agreed upon, ends with a final, generally accepted speech formula, the “dry residue.” General approval of a successfully found formula (whether it is a protoword, a protophrase in hominins, or a successfully found wording in a modern discussion) is always a strong positive reinforcement, which contributes to fixing the result in the participants’ memory, appropriate to their inclinations and abilities of their subsequent speech production. The explanation of productivity from the innate structures of “Universal Grammar” (UG) or “The Narrow Faculty of Language” (FLN) lacks not only empirical but also theoretical foundations. The very ability of humans to generate an almost infinite number of new sentences must be explained as a structure that has emerged to provide meaningful communicative concerns (Chap. 3). Presumably, there is some analogue of UG and FLN in human brains, but these neural structures cannot explain productivity as a characteristic of speech behavior since they are themselves a by-product of this behavior according to the principle of cultural drive (Chap. 2). A theoretically sound and plausible explanation involves the appearance of syntactic constructions in different languages as particularly flexible structures that emerged to provide many effective messages needed in everyday communication. The main explanatory concept here is not “Merge” (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016) but fold/unfold ability (see Chap. 6). It was necessary to select the right words from a vocabulary that had become huge, but also to combine them into a meaningful whole, while meeting the increased criteria of precision (Chaps. 7 and 8). Simple syntax emerged as a relatively modest arsenal of constructions with empty slots for filling with words from potentially infinite dictionary. Complex syntax allows us to fill slots of one construction by other constructions. The length of such sentences is limited only by the volume of attention and the operative memory of the interlocutors. Later invention of writing essentially enlarged these limits (remember sentences as grandiose textual aggregates in Leo Tolstoy’s novels). It is remarkable that researchers of a quite different tradition and style of thinking S. Piantadosi and E. Fedorenko (2017) came to similar conclusions on the basis of a very abstract formal analysis.

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. . .our approach shows that productivity may result from virtually any algorithmically sophisticated processing mechanism that produces enough signals–itself, a communicative pressure. Other components of language usually attributed to Universal Grammar might be derivable from even more basic computational assumptions, rather than so far hypothetical cognitive representations and processes. Compositionality might, for instance, be derivable by constraining languages to be large but programs small and efficient. Hierarchical structure, incrementality in processing, or the arbitrariness of sign could be derivable from communicative pressures (. . .) combined with algorithmic considerations as well (. . .) So long as evolution makes a computationally-sophisticated species process with many signals, we can expect that the communication of that species will be an infinite formal language. The rich productivity and generativity of human language and thought is not mysterious or unexpected if communicative pressures have increased the number of signals we process and all else has been left to chance (Piantadosi & Fedorenko, 2017, p. 145–6).

The semantics and discreteness of signs receive a partial explanation through ritual practices of rephrasing and guessing (Chap. 6). The original discreteness comes from signals with differentiated meanings in the animal language. Normative signs (Chap. 4), names of different food sources, and their locations (Chaps. 5 and 6) are also discrete. Units of the expression layer (holophrases, protowords) originally had discrete meanings. The sporadic loss of discreteness led to vague and incomprehensible utterances, which did not provide the concern for transmission and understanding. Such utterances elicited rejection, that is, negative reinforcement in behavioral selection. Accordingly, attempts at paraphrasing continued, leading finally to production and understanding of the first still rather primitive discrete units. All phonemes, syllables, and words are magic wands because they can participate in different combinations for an almost infinite variety of utterances. The constant concern to make utterances recognizable and comprehensible has led to the development of structures that provide correct steps use and articulation of these speech units. Discreteness did not disappear with the appearance of protophrases, pidgin sentences, and syntax (Chaps. 7 and 8). Units’ fusion to indistinguishability also took place. Still, such processes did not reject discreteness because a separate unit was born each time, for example, a novel word or a service particle (with grammaticalization). The arbitrariness of language elements, primarily words (lexemes), means the usual absence of an explicit external connection, absence of any similarity between the signifier and the signified. The few reversed cases such as primitive imitations of animal and bird sounds (“coo-coo,” “meow-meow,” “woof-woof”) or first recognizable sounds of children (like “mama,” “baba”) need no particular explanation. For all cases of “arbitrariness,” the absence of any motivation or even possibility of “likeness” is a sufficient explanation. The first protowords and then words were produced when it was possible to point directly to the denoted object, show the action, and indicate a property (see Chaps. 4–6). When the interlocutors reached an understanding, this connection consolidated. Later, the meanings of novel words, including abstract ones without

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The Explanation of Language Universals

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visible denotations, were clarified and supported through explanations by other already known words (Chaps. 7–9). The duality of patterning indicates that combinations of phonemes form words with values, and words form sentences with encompassing meanings. The explanation of this universal is multistage. The presented mechanisms of overcoming the language Rubicon as a breakthrough to articulation (Chap. 5) and the natural process of protoword multiplication (Chap. 6) explain the first articulatory level of the duality. Attempts to convey new meanings consisted of persistent, articulate modifications of protosyllables, then syllables, and phonemes. Successful changes and rephrasing resulted in new protowords. Then followed the ability to pronounce protophrases as meaningful combinations of protowords. These abilities developed as structures that provided new communicative concerns related to the competition of recruitings, descriptions of what had happened in the day, arguments and proceedings, intergroup negotiations, and public speeches (Chaps. 6–8). Finally, as social orders became complicated, the ability to generate deployed oral texts with internal logic, recursion, and rhetorical embellishment developed as a third-level superstructure over sentences (Chaps. 9 and 10). Prevarication means secrecy, demagogy, the ability to lie, to make meaningless statements. The corresponding skills could not have appeared before displacement. One cannot lie and speak about nonexisting subjects when all speech refers only to things given to the interlocutors in their common perceptual field. Only when the ability to talk about the actual state of affairs in a distant place and time emerged (Chap. 7) did it become possible to distort what happened in one’s statements. Why did people begin to do this? The ability to lie appeared initially as a structure that provides the fundamental concern of preserving (raising) one’s prestige, but already in the new conditions of distant normative control (Chaps. 7 and 8). Lying allows overcoming the challengethreat of this control when the liar believes that there were no witnesses to what happened, that nobody will catch him/her in the lie. Demagogy and the ability to rant about non-existent things are features of later stages of cognitive evolution. At least two steps should be distinguished here: talking about invisible things and persons (totems, spirits, demons, gods) and talking about abstractions. The former talks appeared as structures providing new concerns of explaining things. When schemes of causality appeared, people began to transfer them from the evident phenomena to the new and incomprehensible ones. Quite naturally, the first ingredients of explanations were ideas of people (for spirits, gods) and animals (for totems). Much later, the discussion of abstractions also provided explanatory concerns. Still, the ingredients here are abstracted qualities of things and phenomena (power, dignity, goodness, evil, beauty, ugliness, intelligence, truthfulness, justice). The

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standard operation is reification (giving substance, “thingness” to what is not a thing).4 Reflexivity (the ability to talk about language) emerged through the practices of deliberation and distant control (Chap. 7). Only when two or more conversation participants present different versions of what happened in a different place and time does the ability to direct the focus of joint attention to the utterances and speeches emerge. This ability was primarily a structure that provided a significant concern for revealing what happened through criticism and exposing lies (see above about prevarication). This kind of concern and ability developed further in the “new economy” of the Upper Paleolithic. With the increasing complexity of exchange relations, deferred obligations (Chap. 8), intergroup ties, and kinship systems (Chap. 10), the role of gossip, litigation, and public speech grew steadily. A Pandora’s Box opened for cheating as responses to challenges-threats and challenges-opportunities concerning each individual’s prestige, status, and group position. To recognize and discredit cheating it became necessary to pay joint attention on speech and statements. People started talking about talks. To this, of course, should be added the ancient concerns that arise when confronted with strangers speaking an unfamiliar language. The geopolitical concerns of establishing alliances through negotiation (Chap. 8) led to attempts at mutual understanding and translation. Such meetings involved focusing on the words, their meanings, the speakers of the different languages, and the languages themselves. Thus, an evolutionary layering of superstructure cognitive abilities constitutes the intrinsic nature of reflexivity over language. Therefore, Hockett’s linguistic universals emerged during the stages of glottogenesis; they have every right to be considered the most ancient achievements. Let us conduct a mental experiment and abandon the main first universals. The result presents such a picture: • • • • • •

Most of the sounds made are innate. There is no alternate order between speakers’ lines in communication. No new messages appear. All the content of utterances is reduced to the “here and now.” There is no division of expressions into units. Utterances have no meanings, and they are sound imitations.

We can imagine dogs barking, wolves howling, and sparrows chirping in full correspondence to these points. Chimpanzees and bonobos are already breaking out of this framework, though only partially. Versions of a late or one-time simultaneous origin of universals seem utterly fantastic. Moreover, there is no single intelligible description of such interpretations,

4

Philosophy itself emerged in its time because of people’s ability to reify abstractions. Therefore, philosophy still tries with varying success to justify itself and disassociate itself from verbal cheating and sophisticated prevarication.

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Diversity and Exotics of Known Languages

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let alone an explanation. The multistage strategy of explanation of glottogenesis adopted in this study starting from the earliest steps seems reasonably justified. The general contours of social interactions and the evolution of communicative practices that served as explanations for the stages of glottogenesis in the previous chapters are uniform. Many social concerns whose verbal attempts at communicative provision led to the complication of language have remained with us: in all known human history. Indeed, only populations that did what we still use to do survived, multiplied triumphantly, and spread across the continents. They extracted food in numerous ways and prepared it together by cutting, mixing, and heating. They held joint meals, taught children to speak, and controlled the “proper” speech by correcting mistakes. They narrated events that occurred, condemned violations of rules, resolved conflicts in some way, and argued their position. If necessary, they exchanged, negotiated, participated in the erotic and marriage market or marriage politics, maintained their prestige in communication practices, flirted with each other, chatted, and gossiped. Even exotic tribes such as the Piraha fit into this image quite well. While living as a large friendly family, they neglect only official public speeches, sophisticated intrigue, discussion of distant events, and abstract topics (Chap. 10). Of course, the languages of such communities are much more straightforward, which is quite natural, but among the languages studied, there are no “under-languages” or “protolanguages” that have not passed the essential stages of glottogenesis and lack Hockett’s universals. This fundamental linguistic commonality is particularly impressive when considering the immense diversity and specificity of the world’s languages.

11.4

Diversity and Exotics of Known Languages

The presence of universals indicates the fundamental unity of glottogenesis processes. At the same time, the vastness of linguistic diversity means the primordial heterogeneity of language communities as founders of future primary language families. The cardinal differences of morphological types indicate the separation of the initial oikumenes within which communities mutually borrowed word and sentence construction principles. Linguistic diversity results from long autonomous lines of multiple languages’ evolution complicated by mutual influence (Chap. 9). The multiple pretenders to universality, more specific than Hockett’s, had not stood the test when linguists had met with exotic previously unknown languages. • • • • • •

Phonetics: The possibility of sounds in a language is virtually infinite, as far as we know. Phonology: Pattern CV→V→VC is not universal. Morphology: Isolating languages are not less functional than polysynthetic ones. Lexicon: The Big Four (nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) are not all universal. Syntax: Subject and object categories are not universal; nor is recursion. Semantics: Space, quantity, colour, etc. are not universally articulated as in English.

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Discursive: Conditionals are not always expressed via isolated morphemes (Bernabeu & Vogt, 2015, p. 9).

Classical notions of “Central European language standards” are confidently overcome. On the contrary, exotics are literally detected in all parameters.5 There are no grammatical categories necessary in all the languages of the world. Different languages may undergo the grammaticalization of different semantic domains. The variations that exist at the grammatical level are staggering. Languages may have ten absolute tenses (considering temporal distance) or none at all. Languages may have multiple verb aspects or no aspect encoding at all. Languages may have a branched system of evidential markers or not encode evidentiality at all. Languages can have a dozen and a half noun classes or no noun classes at all. Languages may have several dozen cases or none at all. Some languages may even lack such notions as “if” (guugu yimitir), “or” (celtal), “yes” (jaravara), “know” (dyirbal) (Borodai, 2020, p. 643).

Explaining linguistic diversity means explaining specific features of particular languages. Historical and comparative linguistics traditionally makes research of this kind. However, an intellectual breakthrough can only occur when these approaches are combined with sociolinguistics, macrosociology, cultural evolution studies, historical demography, anthropology, and ethnology (see the Conclusion). The following meditations include the paradigmatic and methodological aspects of this research program.

11.5

Types of Linguistic Kinship and Proximity

Darwin’s theory of species origin greatly influenced the study of language evolution.6 Until now, historical linguistics has not freed itself from this influence. The very principle of evolutionary changes, their regularity, the assessment of the proximity/distance of languages from each other by various parameters, the tracing of trends and patterns—all this does not lose its significance. However, it is more challenging to deal with “kinship” and especially with the construction of “correct” genealogical trees with one ancestor language at the root (see Chap. 9). Often the very notion of “language family” already by default assumes that all the languages of this “family” descended from a single language. There are attempts to overcome this dogma, e.g., Trubetzkoy (1987), but they are not widely recognized. Let us consider the main types and causes of language affinity: • Linguogenetic kinship, that is, the natural origin of languages from a single language. When a language community divides into parts which migrate and find themselves geographically separated, the related dialects and accents

See also the critique of the “myth of linguistic universals” with many examples of linguistic exotics in Evans and Levinson (2009). 6 It is especially evident in the works of one of the founders of comparative linguistics—A. Schleicher. 5

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Problems of Explaining Language Types and Affinity

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diverge. They are influenced by the languages of neighboring communities and turn into separate languages. However, such languages retain a great affinity with their sister languages in many aspects. • Infiltration affinity occurs when a part of one language community (through invasions, conquests, colonization, migrations, missionary, cultural regency, dense commercial contacts) settles in the territory occupied by another community, introducing its lexical and other structures into its language. The closeness of such a kinship depends on the permeability of social barriers between language communities, particularly on the acceptability and frequency of cross-marriages. Influences are not only “horizontal” (between neighboring local or regional languages) but also “vertical”: occurring “bottom-up” from the dialect to the local, regional, national, world-systemic language, and “top-down” in the opposite direction. • A language alliance occurs between languages of diverse types, levels, and degrees of kinship, when some barriers between communities remain (class, ethnic, confessional, territorial divisions), but permeability remains. • A language union (according to N. Trubetzkoy) emerges between initially distant languages when communities have become neighbors, but political boundaries remain. The degree of rapprochement depends on the height of barriers, on the corresponding density, and on the nature of contacts. Symmetric or asymmetric loanwords, “littering of language with foreign words,” the appearance of pidgins, and the formation of Creole languages in areas of constant contact are particular manifestations.

11.6

Problems of Explaining Language Types and Affinity

Dialects and languages of any nature of kinship, but with a high degree of proximity, are commonly included in a language family. Families of several languages with high multidimensional affinity and obvious linguogenetic kinship resulted from the expansion, separation, and dispersal of the original language communities. It is likely that this history of ancestral language communities dates back to the groups and alliances of the surviving Early sapienses as early as the “bottle-neck” period after the Toba volcanic eruption of ca. 74 kya (see Chap. 9). When doubting the linguogenetic kinship, reinforcements from other subject areas and spheres of knowledge should help, such as archaeology (the discovered continuity of material cultural objects between the putative mother and daughter societies) and the close similarity or coincidence of elements of folk culture (mythological and fairy tale motifs, songs, cooking recipes, clothing, home furnishings, utensils). Finally, it is now possible to prove population kinship using modern genetics (these methods work only for settlements and areas with minimal migration). Unity of origin (linguogenetic affinity) of the largest linguistic phylums (NigerCongolese, Austronesian, Austro-Asiatic, Sino-Tibetan, Turkic, Indo-European), as

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already noted in Chap. 9, can by no means be considered justified. The known commonality of vocabulary, phonetic structure, and constructions could well have appeared as a result of conquests, alliances in wars, migrations, long neighboring proximity, cultural exchange, and rapprochement on religious grounds (infiltration affinity). Intriguing and understudied is the fall of obviously distant languages (by phonetic structure, basic vocabulary) into one morphological type. For example, why are English and Bulgarian analytic, while Turkish and Japanese are agglutinative? Suppose that this is explained traditionally through “common roots” (English and Bulgarian from the Indo-European phylum, Turkish and Japanese from the UralsAltaic one). In that case, it remains unclear why the other languages of these phylums are much further apart in morphological parameters. It is possible to explain the effects of morphological proximity by evolutionary convergence when heterogeneous structures converge, such as the body shape of sharks (fish) and killer whales (mammals), in similar circumstances. However, even in this case, “similar circumstances” remain a great mystery: Why were they so similar for some pairs of languages and so different for other languages of the same phylum? At certain stages of glottogenesis, communities chose separate ways of combining language units (word roots and all kinds of particles) into complex words, phrases, and sentences (see Chaps. 7–9). Therefore, the explanation of the genesis of the correspondent morphological types should include the specification of the conditions of these choices. Only by this clarification can we know by what tracks protolanguages have evolved and transformed into full-fledged languages with syntax and grammar.

11.7

The “Natural” and “Artificial” Processes in Language Evolution

Linguists tend to consider language changes purely or predominantly “natural” and spontaneous. This is mainly true since every language used in communication is a “living,” “natural” object rather than an “artificial” object. However, we know that plants and animals lend themselves quite effectively to purposeful artificial selection. Known cases of effective language policies of states often aim to unify, narrow, or even destroy the available diversity of languages and dialects in the territory under their control. Such interventions are usually considered external, destructive, and irrelevant to linguistic evolution. This understandable view needs to be expanded, since it is not only states that have language policies in education, reforming writing, producing and distributing model texts, and controlling the “correctness” and “purity” of language. Culturally concerned religious, ethnic, intellectual, and other communities are also involved in

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language policies. Suffice it to mention the humanists of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries who fought for “correct Latin,” the struggle of Russian intellectuals of the eighteenth century against the compulsory use of Church Slavonic in literature, in social and political texts, and the European Romanticism movement for the development of national languages from the early nineteenth century. The consequences of such strategies can be unification, the destruction of languages, and new vectors of their development. Can anyone claim with certainty that in the Middle Ages or in more ancient times, linguistic changes remained “pure” in their “living natural spontaneity” and were not subject to deliberate transformations by ruling and intellectual elites, conquerors, and priests? Note that adding “artificial” strategies to “natural” language evolution does not destroy the basic explanatory model. Some sociopsychological universals (concern to speak in such a way as to raise, at least not to lower, one’s position, prestige, reputation, level of group membership, life prospects) seem immutable. The emergence of macro-level states and empires indeed brings its specificity. However, the same model is still valid: changing social orders creates new communicative concerns, and new language structures provide them (see Chaps. 2 and 3). States and communities have, with varying degrees of success, constructed social niches and orders of interaction, such as censors of career advancement or marriage opportunities, depending on specific linguistic competencies. Emerging new communicative concerns, as the main explanatory principle of linguistic change from a functional perspective, are not necessarily “natural,” “spontaneous,” “organic,” and “informal.” The administrative, fiscal, and mobilization strategies and programs of linguistic and educational reforms by rulers and officials give rise to new communicative concerns of people. Governments and elites need an understanding of the national language by ethnic minorities, residents of provinces, or colonies for subjects and citizens to understand their taxes, duties, and demanded burdens, what new laws they should obey, and for recruits to understand the commands of their officers. Individuals and families included in the encompassing institutions, above all state institutions, are forced to adapt to demands, including linguistic ones. Thus, speech control and self-control descend to the lowest levels. Therefore, for example, when parents send their child to a school with national language instruction, all those around are ready to correct pronunciation or demand that the child “speak properly.” Along with the ultra-micro-, micro-, meso- (simple control of the “correctness” of speech in families, schools, local communities), and macro-levels (linguistic processes in ethnic groups, nations, and states), it is always necessary to consider the higher international level. Especially geopolitics largely determines the hostile, friendly, and prestigious relations between linguistic communities. The rapprochement of peoples or the interpenetration of their languages and the alienation of peoples or the growing tendency to “speak differently than they do” depend most of all on geopolitical events, the configuration of relations in wars (opponents or allies, who defended or saved whom). Historical works solidly represent this layer of possibilities. Therefore, explaining linguistic changes seems promising through a correspondent methodological approach and adequate theoretical basis.

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The Irreducible Multilingualism of Great Empires

The spread of world-systemic languages over large spaces in epigraphy (domestic, grave, act) should not be misleading. One cannot accept the general implicit assumption that all subjects in different ancient empires spoke the same language (e.g., Ancient Egyptian, Sumerian, Akkadian, Greek koine, Latin, Sanskrit, Ancient Persian, Ancient Chinese). The upper strata of officials, priests, and nobility spoke the imperial language, and later some merchants and artisans also mastered it. The rest of the population, mainly illiterate, said in their regional or local languages.7 In the cases of large conquering empires, these were not dialects of the same language (e.g., suppose in the “substrate” theory of G. Schuchardt and K. Sittl; see below), but rather large oikumenes with great linguistic distances between them. Until the emergence of effective primary education systems and a critical mass of bureaucracy capable of implementing a centralized linguistic policy of the state, no unity of language within large states, much less within empires, could emerge. In every oikumene with dense internal contacts, the world-systemic language that had acquired a written language significantly increased its influence on the yet unwritten regional and local languages, although it did not abolish them. Small communities such as villages may have their own local characteristics. By contrast I have alluded to an emerging concept during the Empire that large provinces such as Africa and Gaul had separate linguistic identities. There are also extensive linguistic regions that do not overlap neatly with political or geographical entities (Adams, 2007, p. 705).

11.9

Uniform Writing and Different Pronunciation

When writing and the first attempts to disseminate it appeared, there were very few literate people, especially in the vast imperial peripheries. In each province, they read scripts written in the world-systemic language (e.g., ancient Chinese or archaic Latin). They pronounced them in their way, usually according to their (regional?) language structure. Coming from outside, priests, officials, and merchants had to adjust to the local pronunciation to understand and be understood. The cardinal event for every national language was the creation of a written language (the first texts in it, translations). The thesis can be formulated even more harshly: the codification of the more or less chaotic oral speech practices into writing was, in many cases, the actual creation of the language itself. In other words, for each of the modern languages (e.g., European ones) known from the first recorded texts (say, glosses as inserts into Latin texts), there was not some ready-made oral language. Instead, it was a complex linguistic environment: 7

Michael Banniard (2013) analyzes the problem of the origin of Romance languages from the perspective of historical sociolinguistics and emphasizes the importance of social divisions in the use of different languages in diglossia and speaking, writing different versions (“high” and “low”) of the same language.

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The Origin of Romance Languages: Was There an Empire-Wide “Folk Latin”?

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many accents, dialects, one or more inter-ethnic languages (regional, “sacred,” administrative), already recorded languages of neighboring communities, available competing alphabets. Consequently, creating writing for each new language has always been a complex creative process. It was necessary to fix the “correct” spelling of each word variant and the “correct” grammatical constructions in the presence of many dialectal versions. One or another variant was chosen partly because of the existing political, cultural configuration: one wanted to be more similar to whom and from whom to distance oneself. Random and subjective factors always influenced: namely who, with what education and with what geocultural and political preferences, undertook the creation of the written language of a given people. Some compromise of available options was the most likely to be achieved. The new national script consolidated previously accepted local variants of the pronunciation of words written in the earlier world-systemic language: imperial or sacred. The variant thus fixed became the official national language, whereas the other variants (previously equal to it) remained in the status of dialects and accents.

11.10

The Origin of Romance Languages: Was There an Empire-Wide “Folk Latin”?

In historical and comparative linguistics, the origin of Romance languages from Latin is an indisputable, even non-negotiable, dogma. At first, classical Latin seemed to be the ancestral language, which then “became corrupted” (A. Schlegel, Young Grammarians). Then the dominant version (H. Schuchardt et al.) was that the source of the Romance languages was some “folk” (“vulgar,” or “popular”) Latin, in which, however, “no one ever consciously wrote” (J. Mohl). Some modern adherents of the “origin of Romance languages from Latin” tend to reject both versions. The earliest explanation, which goes back at least to the humanist period, sees the ‘corruption’ and ‘barbarization’ of Latin as a result of the Germanic incursions. Today, nobody believes in such a theory, not least because we now have a much better understanding of the not always dramatic conditions under which the Germanic populations settled, over a long period of time, across the Empire (Varvaro, 2013, p. 36). Yet Schuchardt’s (1866–68) insightful study, while perfectly illustrating the early variation present within the language, had the undesirable consequence of popularizing, probably well beyond the author’s own original intentions, the concept of ‘Vulgar Latin’, which, in my opinion, has greatly harmed the development of research in this area ever since. His Vokalismus, like all of his later works on vulgar Latin, is given over entirely to reporting deviations from the classical norm, irrespective of period of attestation (from Plautus to the later authors), region or text type. This assorted mass of evidence has been portrayed in terms of a misleading synchrony, syntopy and symphasy to create a non-existent system, certainly distinct from that of the literary norm but above all viewed as an alternative system existing within a sort of diglossic situation (Ibid p. 24). The Manichaean opposition between ‘Literary Latin’ and ‘Vulgar Latin’ which was elevated to the status of scientific principle in the nineteenth century is merely the pseudo-scientific

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projection on to language of cultural and aesthetic differences. It invents a linguistic dualism which would make Latin a unique exception amongst languages (Banniard, 2013, p. 89–90).

With a wide range of views on the subject, almost all specialists consider “folk Latin” a late language derived from some mysterious “archaic Latin” or classical literary Latin. Only a few (G. Schuchardt and K. Sittl) have recognized the “original dialectality of vernacular Latin,” which arose from the interaction of Latin with the languages of the provinces conquered by the Romans. On the other hand, some scholars (W. von Wartburg, G. Rolfs, and G. Lausberg) believe that “folk Latin” dialects are the basis of modern Romance languages. This version goes back to the “ethnological theory” or “substrate theory” (G. Schuchardt, G. I. Ascoli, and J. Vandries). However, linguists in the old way often compare variants of the same word in different Romance languages with a word from classical Latin and explain the mechanisms of origin of Romance languages again directly from Latin, without even mentioning the “folk Latin.” The hypothetical example given by the current head of the Moscow macrocomparativist approach, Georgi Starostin, is quite revealing: Let us say there is a small Celtic village at the turn of the era, and all its inhabitants speak one of the Celtic languages (for example, Gallic). Then the Romans came and the village, together with all its surroundings, became part of the Roman province. For reasons of prestige, the inhabitants gradually begin to learn Latin (first, of course, the most respected and wealthy, then the rest gradually follow). When they are learning it, they all make approximately the same “Celtic-type” mistakes. In everyday life, they partly continue to use their native Gaul but try to replace it whenever possible with “spoiled” Latin; a situation that develops in sociolinguistics is called bilingualism, a variant of which the original language tends to die out. These Celts teach their children to speak a new language from birth. The paradox of the situation is that children learn this “spoiled Latin” in a sense even better than their parents because the language acquisition mechanism at childhood is fundamentally different from learning a foreign language “over” their native one. However, parents are still the primary role models. A Celtic child, uprooted from home as an infant and handed over to a Roman family for upbringing, would most likely have learned Latin “correctly”. Nevertheless, this is an exceptional situation, and he usually learned Latin from his Celtic parents, who unconsciously twisted it in their Celtic way. As a result, a language initially considered “incorrectly learned” transformed children's speech into the linguistic norm. This language became the result of the historical development of Latin in a particular territory (Starostin et al., 2016, p. 96–97).

Much is plausible in this assumption: the tendency to switch to a more prestigious world-systemic language, its systematic “spoilage,” i.e., adaptation to the usual phonetic structure, the adoption of this version of the language by children and descendants as the language norm. At the same time, the obsolete idea of “spoiled classical Latin” is reproduced here. In addition, the example refers to the Gaul language, which has written monuments considered old because they use different alphabets and glosses of texts in other languages. This fact means that Gaul could by no means be a strictly local language, a dialect, i.e., a “substrate.” On the contrary, it was a widespread regional language and was already quite close to Latin.

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As they write in the reference books and textbooks, the speakers of Gaul (already with the monuments of their writing!) for some reason switched to “folk Latin,” in which, however, “no one ever consciously wrote.” Or did they go straight to (classical) Latin? Either way, there remain many oddities here, downright suspicious. Juan Corominas gave in 1965 a much more plausible version about contacts between Latin and the pre-Roman languages: The problem is that the process of Romanization is viewed too simplistically; we seem to believe that everybody began speaking Latin or Romance overnight, giving up the pre-Roman language for good: the first generation would normally have spoken Basque whereas their children’s generation would have abruptly switched to Latin. In reality, however, the facts must have followed a similar course to that which can be observed in the recent history of the Basque-Navarrese country. Both languages existed side by side for centuries with many generations of bilingual speakers (!—N.R.) (...) In these areas (Upper Aragon and Pallars), the languages are constrained, not by geographical, but by social boundaries: noblemen, the clergy and Latin and the making of the Romance languages the upper classes spoke Romance since early times, whereas peasants, tenant farmers and herdsmen remained faithful to Basque for generations. Cit. by (Varvaro, 2013, p. 19–20).

The “substrate theory,” which considers the “dialects of folk Latin,” looks more plausible than the “spoilage of classical Latin” but dogmatically supports the existence of a single “folk” or “pan-Italic” language (albeit with different “dialects”) over vast areas, the territories of modern Romance languages distribution. Recognition by some specialists of the multitude of local autochthonous languages is a significant concession. However, it does not save the traditional model (the origin of Romance languages from Latin) because the role of these languages is only to “divide” the folk Latin by adding their “substrate.” The cited evidence of the widespread use of the “folk Latin” does not stand up to criticism. The beginning of Latin writing is judged mainly by the extensive epigraphy (a multivolume continuing edition, “Code of Latin inscriptions,” begun as early as T. Mommsen). K. Sittl and J. Mohl believed that these inscriptions recorded a certain “common Italic language in popular use” (Corlateanu, 1974, p. 90). The inscriptions are spread in vast imperial lands, roughly corresponding to the territories of later developed Romance languages. It indicates the status of the inscription language as an official imperial language, which in no way cancels the existence of the lower layer of local languages and dialects in the same epoch. In addition, even classical Romanticism recognized it: in Mommsen’s “Code,” there is a clear emergence of a lower layer of local languages and dialects. Mommsen clearly shows “dialectal features” (Gurycheva, 1959, p. 22). Linguists consider some inscriptions more archaic than classical Latin, which is quite reasonable because they use a variety of local alphabets. At that time, the uniform Latin alphabet to which we are accustomed did not yet exist, because the first inscriptions used borrowed and modified letters from Greek and Egyptian writing. Linguists treat other inscriptions as late, belonging to the period of “decomposition” and “deterioration” of Latin. This evaluation is already highly doubtful,

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especially since many inscriptions made, as a rule, in the standard classical alphabet turned out to be forgeries (Nadpisi, 1897). In general, epigraphy (tomb, household, record inscriptions, and other textual monuments) does not reflect the spoken language and can even less testify to its unity. In all these cases, the official, state, imperial language was used, albeit to the extent of its local understanding and literacy. In a rather traditional Cambridge book on “making Romance languages from Latin,” one can read the following statement: Latinization in the West was not the result of any deliberate linguistic policy. Quite the contrary. Permission to use Latin was initially granted to noncitizens of Rome only as an exceptional, much sought-after privilege. Rather, it was the prestige of the city and the superiority of its culture that led non-Romans, beginning with the upper classes, to adopt Latin (Varvaro, 2013, p. 7).

The premise of the existence of “folk Latin” as a single language in the vast imperial spaces is false because there were no institutions and practices capable of imposing it on speakers of local and regional languages: there was no state policy, no sufficient bureaucracy, and no school system for this. The only thing that could be taught and imposed was metropolitan Latin, and only for the relatively narrow educated class. The elements of “folk Latin” in the comedies (e.g., Petronius) reflect only the view of the metropolitan literati of the “rustic dialect.” They cannot represent the linguistic reality of the vast population of the Empire. The novelists’ attempt to rely on Cicero’s authority is unsuccessful since, in the cited quotation, the classic indicates not a fantastic picture of “the process of differentiation of Latin” but an entirely different, quite plausible, and expected linguistic situation: As there is a certain mode of speech, peculiar to the Romans and the townspeople, in which nothing can offend the ear, dislike or cause censure, in which nothing resembles foreigners, let us follow it and learn to avoid rustic rudeness and unusual foreign pronunciation. Cicero. De orat. 3, 12. 44. Cited from (Gurycheva, 1959, p. 8).

In this statement, there is not even a hint at the origin of the “rustic rudeness” and “unusual foreign pronunciation” (read: “folk Latin” and pronunciation of Latin words by strangers—“barbarians”) from “a mode of speech... in which nothing can offend the ear” (read: classical literary Latin). Cicero only indicated their difference. In this case, it is quite understandable that different variants of “foreign pronunciation” were taken. In other words, Cicero testified quite clearly that along with his noble metropolitan Latin there was a wide variety of oral Latin variants in the articulation of “foreigners.” The latter were probably the speakers of their regional or provincial (“barbarian”) languages used outside the imperial Heartland. For all this, the proximity of the Romance languages to Latin as a world-systemic language—imperial, metropolitan, sacred, literary—is not in doubt. How can we explain this apparent kinship while rejecting the initial naïve idea of “spoiling Classical Latin” and admitting that there never was a single “folk Latin”?

11.11

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The Effects of the Latinized Regional Languages Codification

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The Effects of the Latinized Regional Languages Codification

Initially, Latin acquired writing in its “archaic” state (in no way a refined “classical” Latin with a slender verified grammar as a fruit of scholarly formalization). Between this world-systemic language and the lower stratum of local languages, at least one middle stratum of regional colloquial languages existed.8 These languages united communities in large parts of the empire and the barbarian fringes under its cultural influence. Linguists usually designate these languages as different “branches of Latin”: . . .three different branches: Iberian Latin, which formed the basis of Spanish, Portuguese, and Catalan; Gallic Latin, which gave rise to French and Provençal; and Italo-Balkan Latin, which gave rise to Italian and East-Romanic languages (Corlateanu, 1974, p. 86).

There could be two or more layers of such regional languages; for example, ItaloBalkan included Italian and East Romanic. As colloquial languages, they had no clear boundaries between them, both “horizontally” (territorially) and “vertically” (in the commonality/locality dimension). These regional languages of the middle level most likely combined elements of the “upper” imperial language (archaic Latin) and elements of the “lower” local autochthonous languages (cf. surzhyk in the western outskirts of Russia and eastern Ukraine). As a language of power and religion, Latin was prestigious, so its vocabulary and basic syntax penetrated the thickness of the middle regional languages and even lower local ones. Undoubtedly, there was also a reverse process of regional language influence on early imperial Latin, especially in the lexical aspect.9 The recorded Latin words were pronounced differently in each locality as the writing spread (Wright, 2003). The phonetic structure acquired by mastering the native language with the corresponding abilities of speakers to pronounce and recognize phonemes and their combinations is extremely rigid (see Chap. 9). The first records in (future) national languages are found in Latin sources as interpretations in the margins (glosses in biblical and legal texts) and testimonies (such are the records of Italian speech in the “Capua Litigation”). Notarial deeds (Sardinian), treaties of alliance, oaths, royal wills, and hagiographies of saints (Catalan, French, Provençal, Portuguese) are also known.

“Here is not the place to list the western pre-Roman languages that would later be replaced by Latin and Romance. In many cases we know little more than their names and, perhaps, a few words that have come down to us through Latin sources” (Varvaro, 2013, p. 22). 9 “. . .this implies the rather banal, though often forgotten, fact that most Latin-speaking families had at some point in their history changed language, with all the consequent implications this had for speakers. Neither should it be forgotten that multilingualism in the Empire ensured that everyone was aware of the heterogeneity of language and the differing expressive possibilities offered by each language” (Varvaro, 2013, p. 24). 8

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As regional elites strengthened and national consciousness grew, the existence of a national language became a significant factor in the legitimacy of political claims and geopolitical and geocultural prestige. The stabilization of an orthography for the individual languages was a process that lasted centuries and which required the intervention of genuine legislators, grammarians, and even typographers. As still happens today, the desire to distinguish oneself from one’s neighbours also played an important role in this process (for example, if the Castilians write ñ, then the Portuguese opt for nh and the Catalans for ny). But for centuries there was much experimentation, which gave rise to relatively long-lasting and competing traditions (Varvaro, 2013, p. 51).

Thus, in this rather late era, national Romance languages began to be genuinely created, through translations of sacred books, legal codes, the recording of popular local tales, the compilation of historical chronicles, and the writing of grandiose literary works such as The Divine Comedy and The Song of Roland. The creation of the national language included, first of all, recording in Latin letters the linguistic composition accepted in a given region:10 the specific pronunciation of Latin words and the words of the average regional language, which had already previously experienced “superstrate” Latin influence, with the filling of semantic lacunas by the “substrate” vocabulary of local languages (Gallic, Iberian, Celtic ones), the Greek koine honored by humanists, and the languages of the vast region’s neighboring oikumene (Gothic, Germanic, Persian, Slavic). Who, for what purpose and on what basis, created the written language? Generally speaking, creating written languages is a fundamentally different process from forming the original oral languages. With rare exceptions (usually late), the writing creators are anonymous. As for the Romance languages, even without delving into specific histories (legendary to varying degrees), the following general assumptions can be made: 1. The creators were proficient in Latin at some stage of its development. 2. They were humanistic scholars, educated in schools, monasteries, and universities under the direct patronage of the church, and later under the influence of the humanistic tradition which extolled and disseminated classical Latin. 3. They were interested in increasing the prestige and legitimacy of the state, country, and people for whom they undertook such responsible and challenging work. 4. The creators sought to give the created written (actually new) language solidity and respectability, on the one hand, using the vocabulary and structures of Latin as a highly prestigious (sacred, imperial) language and, on the other hand, emphasizing the specificity, distinctive feature of the new national language, thereby claiming for the sovereignty of the relevant polity (principality, kingdom, usually a former imperial province);

“The Romance languages in the modern sense came into being not as a result of a sudden historical event, but when some regional varieties were codified in writing and particularly when certain of them acquired the status of standard languages” (Adams, 2007, p. 684). 10

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5. From the practical point of view, the created written language had to remain in the broad cultural circle of Latin speakers (Romanesque world), but at the same time, it had to be understood and perceived as “own” by local inhabitants, at least by military and political elites; 6. In the “high” spheres of politics, law, administration, scholarship, religion, international trade, regional variants of the reading of common Latin words were used. 7. In the “lower” spheres of everyday life and daily life, the written language included the words of a regional language or even of local languages and dialects. Here the dependence on Latin was significantly reduced or even absent at all. Provisions 1–5 can be verified for each Romance language individually if sufficient historical data are available. Similarly, points 5–7 can be tested by analyzing the oldest Romance texts using comparative linguistic methods. Of course, statements 1–7 need clarification, but they are unlikely to be disproved entirely since solid and repeatedly supported macrosocial principles (see Chap. 9) help them. If we accept the theses as a whole, the dogma “Romance languages came from Latin” looks dubious, to say the least, even considering the cunning proviso “from the folk Latin under the influence of local dialectal substrata.” The picture is quite different. The apparent affinity of the Romance languages to each other and their general proximity to Latin are explained by a complex multistep process: • The initial pre-writing stage of “linguistic continuity” of local languages, dialects, and accents. • Several oral, colloquial regional languages of interethnic communication emerged and developed over local languages and dialects. • Trade, cultural contacts, and conquests led to the spread of world-systemic languages that already had a script (Greek koine, archaic Latin with unstable spelling of letters and words); there were significant regional features of these languages in writing and especially in pronunciation.11 • The mobile, “responsive” regional languages during rather extended periods of bilingualism12 absorbed, especially in the “high spheres,” large masses of Latin

11 “We should get away from the idea that Latin was monolithic until a very late date, when some catastrophic event caused it to ‘split up’, or that it only showed regional diversification from the Empire onwards. Regional variety, albeit difficult to identify because of the paucity of the evidence, is there from the time of almost the earliest records, though its patterning changed because of historical events” (Adams, 2007, p. 725). 12 “Latin found itself alongside numerous languages of many diverse linguistic affiliations, necessarily giving rise to extensive bilingualism (. . .) We would be entirely mistaken to imagine that the Roman provinces underwent a process of rapid monolingualization. In actual fact, they were never monolingual and the dominant picture of Latin as a unitary language spoken over a homogeneous area proves entirely inaccurate for all periods. The reality was, rather, quite different” (Varvaro, 2013, p. 21).

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vocabulary and syntax constructions, but modified them, each according to its phonetic and other linguistic structures. • These regional languages later became the basis of the romance languages, which were created as written ones by recording their particular lexical and phonetic structure in Latin letters according to provisions 1–7. The recognition of language middle levels explains the closeness of some Romance languages and the distance from others. Consider that the postulate of the “origin of Romance languages from Latin” still is an indisputable archetype, a historical and comparative linguistics model. The destruction of this dogma is significant not only and not so much to discredit the ongoing attempts to reconstruct all kinds of unified “pre-languages” (the “ProtoIndo-European language,” or “Nostratic” ones). There is also a constructive and forward-looking justification for infringing on the main “sacred cow” of historical linguistics. The Conclusion presents a preliminary sketch of the prospective scientific program.

*** The last chapter has deliberately provocative traits. Its content contradicts the historical, linguistic canons, quite sacred, and therefore should cause a fierce rejection of their adherents. To look closely, the rest of the book is not less provocative. Many will dismiss the reasoning and arguments as just another fantasy. One can only hope that curious and courageous researchers will check the stated hypotheses, concepts. Probably they reasonably refute some of them, modify, and clarify other ones. It will open the door to further discoveries. To facilitate this enterprise, let us summarize.

References Adams, J. (2007). The regional diversification of Latin, 200 BC – AD 600. Cambridge Univ. Press. Banniard, M. (2013). The transition from Latin to the Romance languages. In M. Maiden, J. C. Smith, & A. Ledgeway (Eds.), The Cambridge history of the Romance languages. I. Contexts (pp. 57–106). Cambridge Univ. Press. Bernabeu, P., & Vogt P. (2015). Language evolution: Current status and future directions. 10th LangUE conference (pp. 1–27). Essex, UK. Berwick, R., & Chomsky, N. (2016). Why only us: Language and evolution. MIT Press. Borodai, S. Y. (2020). Yazyk i poznanie: Vvedenie v postrelyativizm [Language and cognition: Introduction to the postrelativism]. Yazyki slavyanskih kultur – Languages of Slavic Cultures, Publ. (In Russian). Corlateanu, N. G. (1974). Issledovanie narodnoy latini i ee otnosheniya s romanskimi yazykami [A study of folk Latin and its relations with the Romance languages]. Nauka, Publ. (In Russian). Dixon, R. M. W. (1997). The rise and fall of languages. Cambridge Univ. Press. Dor, D. (2015). The instruction of imagination: Language as a social communication technology. Oxford Univ. Press. Evans, N., & Levinson, S. C. (2009). The myth of language universals: language diversity and its importance for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(5), 429–448.

References

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Gurycheva, M. S. (1959). Narodnaya latyn’ [Folk Latin]. Inostrannaya literatura – Literature in foreign languages, Publ. (In Russian). Hockett, C. F. (1963). The problem of universals in language. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (pp. 1–22). MIT Press. Nadpisi. (1897). Nadpisi [Inscriptions]. In Enciklopedicheskiy slovar’ Brokgauza i Efrona [Brockhaus and Efron encyclopedic dictionary, vol. 20]. Moscow Univ. Press, In Russian. Piantadosi, S. T., & Fedorenko, E. (2017). Infinitely productive language can arise from chance under communicative pressure. Journal of Language Evolution, 2(2), 141–147. Starostin, G. S., et al. (2016). K istokam yazykovogo raznoobraziya. Desyat besed o sravnitelnoistoricheskom yazykoznanii s E. Ya. Satanovskim [To the origins of linguistic diversity. Ten conversations on the comparative-historical linguistics with E. Ya. Satanovsky]. Delo, Publ. (In Russian). Trubetzkoy, N. S. (1987). Izbrannie trudi po filologii [Selected works in philology]. Progress, Publ. (In Russian). Varvaro, A. (2013). Latin and the making of the romance languages. In M. Maiden, J. Smith, & A. Ledgeway (Eds.), The Cambridge history of the romance languages, vol. I. Contexts (pp. 6–56). Cambridge Univ. Press. Wright, R. (2003). A sociophilological study of late Latin. Brepols.

Chapter 12

Conclusion

12.1

Scientific Results

The book is large and is not easy to understand. Mainly it consists of attempts to formulate new explanatory ideas and justify hypotheses in the acute shortage or even absence of data. Following these lengthy arguments probably tired the reader who heroically made it to this page. Therefore, it is not necessary to repeat the results from the 11 chapters. Figure 12.1 presents the essential milestones of language origin correlated with the known stages of anthropogenesis. There are not many ideas in which the author has no doubts at the end of the study. The following statements summarize them. • Methodologically correct integration of multiple conceptual approaches to glottogenesis research is possible and displays heuristic prospects of the multistage, socioevolutionary paradigm (Chap. 1). • General evolutionary principles are consistent with gene-culture coevolution and cultural drive mechanisms. Perhaps, the rules of linguistic evolution should be formulated differently, but the concept of Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development (EZPD), that is, using already mastered structures as ingredients for new structures of the next glottogenesis stage, is justified and promising. The functionalist conceptual model (concerns, support structures, cost, tensionschallenges) is productive for explanation evolutionary processes (Chap. 2). • The dynamic interconnection and spiral coevolution of techno-natural niches, social orders, communicative concerns, and linguistic structures is a necessary and sufficient explanatory framework of glottogenesis. Interiorization and the formation of regulatory attitudes and cognitive and speech abilities in emotionally impressive interactions with a common focus of attention, i.e., in interactive rituals, have been central mechanisms at each stage of human evolution. The extension of the nomological explanatory approach opens new space for research possibilities (Chap. 3). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3_12

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"The Childhood of Language"

Stages of language complexity

The language Rubicon Early pre-speech with holophrases

Distinguishing protosyllables

Joint intentionality and normativity

Distinguishing syllables and first phonemes

From Habilises to Pre-archanthropes 2.7 1.5 mya

Proto language

Parts of speech, predicativity

Late pre-speech with protophrases

Word Order Leading-away protophrases

Arsenal of syllables and phonetic structure

Languages with simple syntax and grammar

Pidginsentences

Protowords Accumulation and Situational Protophrases

Conclusion Full-fledged languages

Logical connect ions

Middle sapienses. Cultural and cognitive progress of the Upper Paleolithic. Since 50 kya

Simplesentences Early sapienses 130 40 kya

Protosapienses 350- 100 kya

From Archanthropes to Heidelbergians 1.6-0.3 mya

From Australopithecus to Early Homo 7 2.6 mya

Pre-speech of Neanderthals

Paleoanthropes Early pre-speech of the demised species of Early Homo

Direction of time

Differentiated signals of Australopithecines

Chap. 4

Chap. 5

Chap. 6

Chap. 7

Chap. 8–9

Chap. 10

Fig. 12.1 The main stages of glottogenesis

• The transition of group dominance to egalitarian coalitions, self-domestication, development of joint intentionality, and normative rituals played the paramount role as necessary initial conditions of anthropogenesis and cognitive evolution (Chap. 4); • Hominins had overcome the language Rubicon thanks to their daily attempts to reach an understanding and agreement in groups by rephrasing aural messages and guessing their meaning; constant concerns of nutrition in new niches and competition of calls (recruiting) led to the invention of new protowords for various and multiple food sources. The growing multiplicity of protowords required means for their recognition; therefore, protosyllables and then syllables with more or less fixed phonemes were elaborated. Thus, the early pre-speech evolved into the late pre-speech (Chaps. 5 and 6). • Collective cooking, joint meals with access discipline, alternate sequence of remarks, attempts at describing events, “managing imagination” of interlocutors, and joint “mental escape” were prominent drivers of the following stages of glottogenesis with leading-away protophrases, pidgin-sentences, and full-fledged words. Thus, groups of hominins achieved in their specific verbal communication modes the stage of protolanguages (Chap. 7). • Group proceedings (public trials), social calculus, distant control, intergroup contacts, negotiations, “new economics,” evolving kinship systems became niches and orders for the formation of the syntactic and grammatical constructions. It means the rise to the stage of full-fledged languages (Chap. 8). • Macrosocial principles, broad analogies, and data from various paleosciences, especially concerning demography and migrations, allow cognitive bridging of the pre-language gap by hypotheses about genetic lines and changing number of languages during prehistory (Chap. 9).

12.2

Scientific Perspectives Completion of basic glottogenesis

Number of languages thousands

319

Groups unite into alliances with integration of languages, 300-100 kya

The Pre-Language Gap The Great Linguistic Divergence

The invention of writing The merging of dialects, the disappearance of some local languages

THE ETHNOGENESIS

The settlement of sapienses across continents and islands, starting at 55 kya

hundreds Recovery and DEMOGRAPHIC EXPLOSION after depopulation

"Volcanic winter" 74 kya and depopulation: minimum number of language communities and languages (ca. 200?)

The formation of regional languages due to contacts

POLITICAL EVOLUTION consolidation of polities

Languages of major ethnic groups and nations (hundreds)

The regional languages of the conquerors become the state languages and displace the competitors

Basic language families (ca. 200)

Creation of world-empires, spread of world religions, formation of worldeconomies and civilizations World-systemic languages: imperial, sacred, lingua franca

dozens

All known languages (7–8 thousand)

The first written languages (1-2 tens)

Direction of time

Fig. 12.2 Changing numbers of languages and linguistic families in prehistory: hypothetical dynamics

• The linguistic universals, unity and diversity, complexity and simplicity of languages, the genesis of their types, and families need social-evolutionary explanation. The complexity and rhetorical richness of language directly depend on the complexity of the social order and the importance of public communication for the dynamics of social statuses (Chap. 10). • The universality and great diversity of the world’s languages, the singularity of their morphological types with unclear roots, and the dubiousness of classical linguistic dogmas (such as the origin of Romance languages from Latin and the existence of a proto-Indo-European pre-language) require new strategies for studying language evolution (Chap. 11). Figure 12.2 shows the probable dynamics of language number in the context of prehistorical macrosocial processes.

12.2

Scientific Perspectives

When states, empires, civilizations, and writing emerged, new niches, social orders, challenges, and concerns appeared. All contacts, further political, economic, cultural relations between people and language communities, led to new communicative concerns. The main language changes occurred due to these challenges. New linguistic constructions emerged as structures providing the correspondent communicative concerns. That is why the general conceptual framework used for the explanation of glottogenesis remains helpful for analysis of language evolution in all pre-written and written history.

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Conclusion

The ideas outlined in the final chapters of the book indicate the need for historical sociolinguistics to use the principles of social dynamics at the macro- (nations, societies, states, unions, their geopolitics, and geoculture), meso- (ethnic groups, institutions, organizations, families), micro- (individual psyche and behavior), and ultramicro-levels (interaction in “here and now” situations). The presented sketch of overcoming the pre-language gap and further evolution of language calls for a synthesis of comparative and historical linguistics with a whole complex of disciplines, from paleoclimatology and paleogeography to (paleo)genetics and folkloristics. The attempted attack on the origin of Romance languages from Latin (a sacred dogma of macro-comparativism) is a sin that orthodox historians and linguists will never forgive. One could dare such an audacity only for a high goal: to point to a more promising direction than the fruitless attempts to reconstruct all kinds of “common pre-languages.” The alternate idea is to identify the causes and course of the past social, cultural, and linguistic transformations based on a systematic comparison of the various “traces” they left in different languages. Without getting bogged down in macro-comparativist linguistics (with “phonetic laws” and glottochronology as statistics of lexical updates), one should reconstruct the course of language evolution in connection with the study of (geo)political, (geo)economic, and (geo)cultural processes and changing social orders in the history of the respective language communities. Indeed, the 7–8 thousand known languages, which have always been “symbionts” of communities, reflect a purely linguistic history (with phonemes, lexemes, syntax) and, indirectly, a history of people with migrations, exchanges, alliances, and feuds. Thus, the studies of the linguistic evolution considering diglossia and the “vertical dimension” from local to world-systemic languages seem promising with an analysis of their dependence on changing techno-natural niches (say, various historical ways of urbanization), social orders (from chiefdoms to empires and nation-states), and correspondent communicative concerns (also connected with writing, printing, and other types of media). Each transfer to writing depended heavily on encompassing geopolitical and geocultural processes. Therefore, revealing the systematic transformation of languages during the creation of national scripts will uncover many linguistic mysteries. The history of peoples, including linguistic communities, is imprinted in the genes of living people, in the remains accessible to paleogenetic analysis, and myths, tales, songs, epics. Therefore, comparing folklore, primarily mythological motifs, helps to recognize long-standing waves of settlement and migration (Berezkin, 2007). The scientific prospects of evolutionary and historical sociolinguistics depend largely on the ability to cooperate with social and cultural paleoanthropology, with the analysis of genetic, folklore-mythological markers, and various archaeological data (Korotayev et al., 2017). The formulated evolutionary and macrosocial principles, the versions of linguistic and cognitive development mechanisms, can play the role of initial heuristics.

12.2

Scientific Perspectives

321

According to the approach presented, linguistic constructions have a triple determination. 1. Functional causes derived from concerns about social interaction and corresponding communicative tasks during the formative period of each language 2. The structural constraints with reliance on available ingredients in linguospecific means and speech abilities 3. The procedural possibilities and limitations through specific practices of multiple trials, rephrasing, and fixation mechanisms in the respective linguistic community Generally speaking, traces of all three sources should remain in the structures of each known language. Thus, the primary causal model takes the following form: encompassing natural and social niches → orders of interaction → group and individual concerns of language community members → communicative concerns (+ pre-existing language structures + available means from other languages + established practices of language attempts and diffusion of language innovations) → language changes. The way to a theoretical understanding of linguistic diversity is to explain the last link in the chain: the processes of concrete linguistic change as an explanandum. The proximal explanans are parts of the previous chain links: • Structures already present in the language (phonetic, lexical, and syntactic ones in a broad sense), giving both new possibilities for modifications, additions, reductions, and limitations, often quite severe; in historical linguistics, previous states of language are either recorded from extant texts (happy cases of languages with a long-written tradition) or reconstructed according to identified regularities (with varying degrees of reliability). • Lexical and other means of other languages, available through external contacts, which is possible to know thanks to available historical information. • Established practices of language attempts such as rituals of rephrasing, repetition of successful variants, the nature of linguistic innovations spread; sociolinguistics can identify such traditional practices by their remnants. • Past communicative concerns as reconstructions based on general regularities (e.g., the tendency under different conditions to simplify speech or, conversely, to saturate it with turns, word forms, complicated constructions, terminology, neologisms), considering historical information on the orders of the interaction, social and natural niches encompassing a given linguistic community. Time will tell whether ideas of this kind will occur in future studies of linguistic evolution.1 1 In the most advanced recent studies of linguistic evolution, the authors use corpus databases for dozens of modern languages together with phylogenetic models and information about previous versions of these languages. For example, Michael Hahn Yaung Xu found correlations between word order types (subject-verb-object, SVO, and subject-object-verb, SOV) and the frequency of combinations of subjects and objects with verbs (Hahn & Xu, 2022). The overall theoretical conclusion of this impressive work is that word order variation reflects the different ways in

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In the study of glottogenesis, one can only hope that more reliable evolutionary principles, more constructive concepts, more plausible data interpretations and hypotheses about the nature of glotto-aromorphoses, more precise dating, wittier, and more revealing patterns of observations and experiments to test these hypotheses will appear in further research.

12.3

The Philosophical Epilogue: Lessons of Acquiring Language by Humans and the Humanistic Challenge

The book is almost entirely scientific, even with a share of scientific pathos, although it is difficult to assign it to any particular discipline. Most likely, it would fall under the rubric of “philosophy.” A brief philosophical reflection on the results is appropriate. It cannot be limited to either anthropogenesis or the prehistory of Homo sapiens: philosophical interest in these epochs always presupposes their connection with the entire subsequent history of mankind, the present and the global future. Such a sweep requires not a separate chapter or article but a whole book. Therefore, here I formulate only brief theses without justification. The first five refer to themes already discussed in the book; the rest link its content to topical issues. 1. The conditions of the earliest hominins’ transition to humanity, the breakthrough to articulate speech, and the first consciousness abilities were the change of intragroup orders from the dictates of the strongest to the dominance of egalitarian, internally solidary coalitions, and later the normativity established by them.2

which languages deal with these evolutionary problems, with syntactic structure and word usage adapting across languages to maintain effective communication in the face of limited cognitive resources. In fact, what is at stake here is how different language communities respond to communicative concerns of informativity and message clarity by leaning toward different linguistic support structures (in this case, SVO or SOV), depending on the ingredients already in place: the frequency of different patterns of noun and verb combination (Chaps. 2 and 3). 2 Yuval Harari (2015) is wrong when, following Rousseau, he likens our distant ancestors to weak peaceful sheep that too quickly became formidable predators, found themselves at the top of the food pyramid, and therefore began to wage destructive wars, and now threaten to destroy the entire ecosystem. But Steven Pinker (2012) is just as wrong in asserting a general primordial belligerence of our ancestors, which as if systematically decreased in connection with the development of morality and peacefulness. More plausible, consistent with evolutionary principles and circumstantial evidence, is a much more complex picture: the emergence of norms of nonviolence first only within groups, the further extension of these norms to “their own” in friendly alliances and broader societies during the following stages of political and social evolution. At the same time, alienation and readiness to violence toward all kinds of “outsiders,” aggressiveness, vindictiveness, “just anger” toward the violators of expectations and rules among “ours” always took place in the past and persist to this day (Chap. 4). See also Malešević (2017).

12.3

The Philosophical Epilogue: Lessons of Acquiring Language by Humans. . .

323

2. The main processes of subsequent cognitive evolution were language complication and refinement, concomitant expansion of consciousness, and accumulation of cultural patterns for intergenerational transmission. The evolution of social orders proceeded in close mutual conditioning with these processes. 3. The principal mechanisms of evolutionary processes and their links were challenge-threats, challenge-opportunities, concerns related to them, disagreements, diverse types of attempts, structure formation, and multilevel selection. 4. Human language, consciousness, and thinking are always limited by the arsenal of accumulated means, insufficient understanding of what is happening, ignorance of the distant consequences of actions, weakness, or lack of grounds for justification of strategical choices. 5. Due to language, consciousness, and accumulated patterns, the ability to change rules and orders, to discuss them, to negotiate grew, respectively: (a) Zones of solidarity expanded, intergroup alliances, and larger communities formed. (b) Strategies and means of violence, wars, formation of power hierarchies, social stratification, formation of states, and empires developed simultaneously. (c) The weakest and the losers fled to the extent possible, developing new lands. 6. Under conditions of solidarity and continuing communication, inevitable disagreements, conflicts, competition, and corresponding concerns led to the invention of new rules, the complication of orders, the related development of language, and consciousness in the social and cultural sphere (cf. 5a). 7. When communication was hostile or blocked, people solved internal and external political conflicts by coercion, violence, and wars with the imposition on the defeat of the victors’ order (cf. 5b); here, no substantial renewal of rules and orders took place. 8. After the invention of writing (respectively, the transition from prehistory to history), cognitive evolution continued in further developing language and consciousness and in thinking, philosophical and scientific cognition, which became autonomous spheres of human life activity. These spheres have steadily evolved through a combination of intellectual solidarity and institutionalized criticism, which always supply new intellectual challenges and concerns, contributing to an awareness and overcoming of language, thinking, and achieved knowledge limitations (see 6). 9. The most rapid and considerable progress has been made in military technology, the subjugation of people, and the exploitation of natural resources. However, these processes did not require the dominant groups to be aware of the limitations of their language, consciousness, and thinking (see 7). 10. Only in the last 2–3 centuries have the social orders of some societies begun to change in the direction of increasing egalitarianism and civic solidarity (democracy, the rule of law); the same societies have achieved the greatest successes in science, technology, education, medicine, and other social spheres and have become the richest and safest.

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11. The renewed international and social conflicts of our time, mainly due to scarce resources and the parties’ claims to preferential access, are structurally similar to the intergroup territorial conflicts of prehistory. However, there are no more places for the weaker and the loser to leave (cf. 5c). 12. For all the evident differences, there remain three types of conflict resolution strategies determined by the established worldview: (a) Through communication, negotiation to ally with the new rules of social life (cf. 1–2, 5a). (b) To defeat the opponent through direct aggression, violence, or covert subversive actions (5b, 7, 9). (c) To isolate themselves (as an analog of the previous escape strategy, cf. 5c). 13. One of the main foundations of every worldview (religious, ideological, valuebased), the corresponding strategies of behavior in conflicts and crises, is the meaning given to world history. 14. From the position of humanism, the meaning of history3 appears as an endless self-trial (self-testing) of the human race for the ability to create such social orders that ensure full-fledged, that is, protected, dignified, meaningful life, for each person in each generation while considering the inescapable scarcity of resources and conflicting interests (Rozov, 2016, p. 235–252). 15. This view corresponds to the negotiation strategy for peaceful alliances (see 12a). Still, many political and religious movements, political entities, including powerful states, with strategies of hostility and aggression hinder its implementation (12b).

3

One of the most authoritative theorists and philosophers of history of recent decades, Reinhard Koselleck (2018) seems to reject the meaning of history, insisting on the inherent absurdity, the multiple meanings of multiple histories, which can only be interpreted retrospectively and always subjectively. “The costs with which “History” burdens us with its impositions of meaning are too high for us today if we intend to act. Let us therefore dispatch them back to their origins: to the realm of—difficult to bear—absurdity. Instead, we should modestly attempt to do what we ourselves can make possible in a sensible, meaningful manner. And if the results that emerge from conflicting agents and parties do not correspond to what the one or the other intended or expected, these results should not be burdened with the meaning of a self-realizing history. To do so would be to deceive humans about their responsibility to themselves and to others, a responsibility that they cannot, in any case, evade” (Koselleck, 2018, p. 195–6). But in the cited passage to his essay On the Meaning and Absurdity of History, Koselleck not only protests against the “meaning of self-realizing history.” He speaks loftily of the “responsibility (of humans) to themselves and to others.” Obviously, this is a moral responsibility, probably related to concerns about life, freedom, dignity in relation to oneself and loved ones. It is true that the humanistic meaning of history is not a teleology; it does not imply any guarantees. It merely extends (in the manner of Kant’s categorical imperative) the same values of concern for oneself and loved ones to the possibility and moral justification of the same concern for each person. Rightly writes Kozelleck, “History is neither a tribunal nor an alibi.” History is an ongoing test of the capacity of different societies and successive generations to recognize, accept, and realize the same moral responsibility, but on an expanding, now global scale.

12.3

The Philosophical Epilogue: Lessons of Acquiring Language by Humans. . .

325

16. An internal obstacle is the lack of awareness by the political actors and elites of their language, thinking, and knowledge limitations4 because of their low solidarity, poor communications, insufficient accumulation, and cultural transmission of the attained knowledge (cf. 4, 8–9). 17. Despite the validity of the criticism of social Darwinism as an ideology that justifies the suppression of the weakest, the processes and regularities of multilevel selection continue to operate. Good hopes that humane orders (adopted in open free legal democratic societies) will necessarily win the historical competition with authoritarian and repressive regimes are laudable and well-meaning, but not more than that (see the destiny of "end of history” and “democratic transit” ideas). 18. As in the most ancient times of intergroup confrontation, modern strategies of violence, war, suppression, and subjugation of losers do not require innovations and discoveries in language, concepts, knowledge of the world, invention, and justification of rules (see 7, 9, 16). For violent domination, advantages in resources, armaments, experience and art of force operations, organizational effectiveness, and the resolve to kill and die instilled in fighters suffice. Therefore, when developing peaceful strategies, one should not lose the ability to resist the aggressors forcefully. Unfortunately, modern “alpha males” still claim diktat and dominance. 19. Strategies for engaging in alliances and coalitions of peaceful living together, recognizing universal humanistic values (inalienable human rights and freedoms, the unacceptability of non-legal violence5), are much more demanding on In fact, here we are talking about “the strategic communication for peacebuilding” or “the rule of law in geopolitics” (Rozov, 2023). This line of political ideas and practices is gaining popularity as quickly as it is demonstrating, at least as of 2022, miserable effectiveness. Let us assume correctness of the critical role of our consciousness (and language) limits, all the more so of our political leaders and diplomats, not only authoritarian non-Westerners but also democratic Westerners. The prospects for this international verbal practices, diplomacy in wide sense, then, are as follows. Strategic communication with potential aggressors (conquerors or terrorists) aimed at their long-term appeasement should not consist of imposing peaceful, humanistic, liberal, or democratic beliefs alien to them (consider the corresponding failures in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, post-communist Russia), but in a much more complex and creative activity. It is necessary to study and master the worldview of the opponents in order to invent for them such challenges-opportunities, concerns, and strategies of behavior as support structures (see Chaps. 2 and 3) that, on the one hand, would fully correspond to their image of the world, sanctuaries, typical interests, mental attitudes; they would be expressed in their language, in concepts, symbols, and metaphors that are close to them. On the other hand, these new attractive strategies must block and prevent militant aggressive plans and actions. The difficulty of such a task points precisely to the limits of our consciousness and language that need to be overcome. 5 By humanism I do not mean the cultural movement that emerged in Northern Italy in the fifteenth century, nor the Harari’s caricature of humanism as a merge of flat scientism, consumerism, and egocentrism (Harari, 2017). The core of modern humanism is anthroprostasia as the principle of human protection. In other words, the full, free, dignified, and meaningful life of every individual (and thus of families, ethnic groups, and other free human communities) must be protected. Actually, Harari himself, in all of his popular, acutely polemical books, defends precisely free reason, the moral dignity of man, a sober understanding of reality, and the possibility of making 4

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the abilities of consciousness, thinking, political, legal, moral, and cultural creativity, and thus on the renewal of language. 20. Consciousness and language, generated by the “natural” renewal of social orders and the communicative concerns of hominins in anthropogenesis, are now called upon to become the evolving means for the “artificial”— purposeful—improvement and global spread of humane orders through peaceful communication, inclusion, and the rule of law on a global scale (Rozov, 2023). However, we must not forget their limits for all our pride in acquiring language, consciousness, and thinking. We must not be lazy or afraid to expand these limits. 21. Whereof one cannot speak, one should try to think about and then make rephrasing attempts to express in words. Erectuses and Protosapienses already knew how to do it. It may seem that the final philosophical-historical and philosophical-political chord is out of step with the paleoanthropological and paleolinguistic issues discussed in the book. Nevertheless, if one looks closely and thinks about it, it becomes clear that the content of the theses formulated only emphasizes the relevance and significance of the prehistorical problem. Novosibirsk Akademgorodok, RUSSIA February 2023.

References Berezkin, Y. (2007). Dwarfs and cranes. Baltic-Finnish mythologies in Eurasian and American perspective (70 years after Yrjö Toivonen). Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore, 36, 67–88. Hahn, M., & Xu, Y. (2022). Crosslinguistic word order variation reflects evolutionary pressures of dependency and information locality. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA (PNAS), 119(24) https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2122604119 Harari, Y. (2015). Sapiens: A brief history of humankind. Harper. Harari, Y. (2017). Homo Deus: A brief history of tomorrow. Harper. Korotayev, A., Berezkin, Y., Borinskaya, S., Davletshin, A., & Khaltourina, D. (2017). Genes and myths: Which genes and myths did the different waves of the peopling of Americas bring to the New World? History of Mathematics, 6, 9–77. Koselleck, R. (2018). Sediments of time. On possible histories. Stanford Univ. Press. Malešević, S. (2017). The rise of organised brutality. A historical sociology of violence. Cambridge Univ. Press. Pinker, S. (2012). The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. Penguin Books.

sense of it. In other words, I consider him an ally in our commitment to humanism as anthroprostasia.

References

327

Rozov, N. S. (2016). Idei i intellektuali v potoke istorii: Makrosociologiya filosofii, nauki i obrazovaniya [Ideas and intellectuals in the flow of history: The macrosociology of philosophy, science, and education]. Manuscript, Publ. (In Russian). https://www.academia.edu/29184396 Rozov, N. S. (2023). Vozmojno li verkhovenstvo prava v geopolitike? [Is the rule of law possible in geopolitics?]. Polis. Political Studies, 1, 159–172. (In Russian) https://nrozov.nsu.ru/publ/ Rozov_Rule-of-Law-in-Geopolitics.pdf

Name Index

A Adams, J., 306, 312, 313 Alexander, R.D., 4, 8, 43, 45 Allport, G., 61 Ambrose, S.H., 221, 255, 256, 260 Amos, W., 177, 260 Arbib, M.A., 4, 5, 126, 127, 148 Armitage, S.J., 178 Ascoli, G.I., 308 Atkinson, Q.D., 219, 242, 243, 258

Botha, R., 215 Bouchard, D., 1, 8, 10 Boyd, R., 6, 11, 32, 33, 145, 175 Breyl, M., 5, 176, 177, 179, 180 Brooks, A.S., 179 Budyko, M.I., 263 Bunak, V.V., 89, 246 Burling, R., 5, 10, 125, 138, 141, 142 Bybee, J., 10, 43 Byrne, R.W., 5, 160, 274

B Baldwin, J.M., 31, 32, 35, 45, 126, 148 Balow, M., 4 Banniard, M., 306, 308 Barazesh, S., 219 Barnard, A., 224 Bateman, R., 246, 260 Bauernfeind, A., 9, 75, 114, 170, 175 Belyaev, D.K., xxv, 5, 10, 94, 104, 106 Bernabeu, P., 1, 302 Berwick, R., 3, 158, 159, 297 Bettinger, R., 4, 221 Bickerton, D., xxvi, 1, 3–5, 8–11, 23, 30, 43, 49, 84, 88, 91, 105, 106, 114, 131, 132, 142, 145, 148, 177, 188, 189, 209, 210, 213–217, 230, 241, 256, 278, 279, 330 Bingham, P., xxv, 4, 5, 10, 88, 94, 104–106, 113, 148 Boehm, C., 43, 52, 61, 106, 114, 198, 199 Boer, B. de, 9, 75, 128, 129, 142, 143, 211 Borodai, S.Yu., 283, 284, 302

C Calvin, W.H., 215 Carneiro, R., xxvii, 220, 247, 248, 264, 265 Cartmill, M., 4 Cavalli-Sforza, L., xxvi, 6, 242–247, 260 Chalmers, D., 23 Chaminade, Th., 130 Cheney, D.L., 87, 88 Chomsky, N., 3, 158, 159, 281, 283, 297 Christiansen, M., 3, 5 Chukovsky, K.I., 214 Churchill, S.E., 263 Collins, R., xxiv, 2, 11, 12, 26, 43, 62, 63, 65–68, 83, 84, 86, 125, 172, 190, 250, 252, 253 Comrie, B., 57, 284 Cooper, J.O., 63 Corballis, M., 5, 126, 148, 149, 176, 211 Corlateanu, N.G., 309, 311 Corominas, J., 309 Coupé C., 39, 241, 259 Croft, W., 21, 57

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3

329

330 D Dahl, Ö., 269 Darwin, Ch., 3, 5, 31, 80, 94, 123–125, 302 Deacon, T., 4, 5, 9, 11, 75, 135, 136, 149, 163, 175 Dediu, D., 3, 6, 8, 9, 39, 177, 178, 180 Dennett, D., 24 d’Errico, Fr., 220 Dessalles, J.-L., 4, 10, 30, 43, 86, 116, 142, 145, 189, 196, 215–217, 230, 331 Diamond, J., 75, 81, 85, 105, 106, 113, 149 Donald, M., xxvi, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 24, 30, 61, 85– 87, 162, 181, 190, 191, 205 Donskikh, O.A., 140 Dor, D., 4–6, 8–11, 30, 35, 37, 39, 43, 51–53, 58, 61, 94, 114, 140, 142, 143, 163, 164, 170–172, 190, 192, 194, 195, 217, 296 Dubreuil, B., 4, 221 Dunbar, R., 4, 5, 11, 13, 51, 75, 123, 175 Durkheim, E., 62, 63, 95, 100

E Earle, T., 92, 144, 145, 247, 248, 256 Eldridge, N., 74 Enard, W., 4, 9 Engels, Fr., 4, 129 Eswaran, V., 219, 221–223, 260 Everett, D., 57, 281, 283, 285–289

F Falk, D., 11 Fedorenko, E., 297, 298 Fernandes, V., 178 Ferretti, Fr., 177 Fessler, D.M.T., 95 Fillmore, Ch., 21, 57 Fitch, W.T., 1, 3, 4, 6, 10, 69, 83, 84, 161, 177, 220 Fodor, J.A., 21 Frege, G., 205 French, J.C., 4, 260

G Gabora, L., 3, 4, 10, 24, 30, 39, 43, 127, 181, 190, 191, 232, 233 Gärdenfors, P., 10, 103, 145, 205 Geiger, L., 4, 129 Gil, D., 283 Gintis, H., 61, 101 Givón, T., 4, 9, 36 Goffman, E., 62, 65, 192 Goodall, J., 53, 81, 82, 92, 161, 167 Gould, S.J., 74

Name Index Graeber, D., 247 Greenberg, J., 245, 247 Gurycheva, M.S., 309, 310

H Haeckel, E., 161, 258, 259 Hahn, M., 321 Haldane, J.B.S., 41 Harari, Yu., 100, 322, 325 Hare, B., xxv, 5, 10, 94, 96, 97, 104, 114 Hauser, M.D., 3, 148, 158 Hawkins, J.A., 271 Hegel, G.W.F., 100 Hempel, C., 69–72 Henrich, J., 8, 35, 51, 92, 104, 182, 220, 253 Henshilwood, C., 4, 221 Hewitt, G., 4, 211 Heyes, C.M., 5, 11, 24 Hockett, Ch.F., xxiv, xxvii, 22, 39, 58, 189, 194, 254, 274, 296, 300, 301 Hoffman, J.I., 177, 260 Hombert, J.-M., 39, 241, 259 Horst, S., 21, 23 Hrdy, S.B., 5, 10, 11, 51, 92, 105, 113, 134, 175 Hurford, J.R., 10, 30, 65, 83, 85, 87, 88, 161, 170 Husserl, E., 100

I Illich-Svitych, V.M., 242 Iriki, A., 4, 130

J Jablonka, E., 5, 6, 35, 61, 94, 114, 192 Jackendoff, R., 3, 4, 8, 43, 141, 142 Jethá, C., 92, 136 Johnson, A., 92, 144, 145, 247, 248, 256 Juola, P., 269, 270

K Kant, I., xxvi, 22, 23, 324 Kay, R., 4 Kendon, A., 126 Kirby, S., 3, 5, 6, 70 Knight, C., 5, 13, 99, 100 Kochiyama, T., 177 Koehler, W., 85, 87 Koonin, E.V., 32, 33 Korotayev, A.V., 242, 320 Koselleck, R., 324 Kuhn, S.L., 221 Kuteva, T., 57, 284

Name Index L Labov, W., 250, 253 Lakatos, I., xxiv, 2, 7 Laland, K., 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 35, 36, 43, 49, 70, 130, 135, 148, 149, 160, 164, 213, 220, 273 Lamarck, J.-B., 31, 32 Lange, L., 61 Langgut, D., 260 LePage, R.B., 253 Levinson, S., 3, 6, 8, 177, 178, 180 Lieberman, P., 199 Lloyd, E.A., 6, 70, 83, 86, 162, 167 Locke, J., 21 Lovejoy, C.O., 4, 5, 10, 11, 88, 90, 136 Lumsden, C.J., 9, 32, 35, 68, 114 Luria, A.R., 5, 61, 62, 83, 258

M Machalek, R., 3, 41, 43, 50, 64, 84, 89, 90, 136 Maclarnon, A., 4, 211 Malešević, S., 322 Malinowski, B., 273 Mandelshtam, O.E., 233 Mann, Ch.C., 264 Markov, A.B., 36 Markov, M.A., 6, 11, 70, 148 Maryanski, A., 3, 6, 36, 43 Mathew, M., 219, 242 McBrearty, S., 179 Mcwhorter, J., 230 Meillet, A., 253 Mellars, P., 255 Mirolli, M., 6 Mohl, J., 307, 309 Mommsen, Th., 309 Monboddo, J., 257 Muthukrishna, M., 104

N Nettle, D., 262, 264, 265, 269, 270 Noiré, L., 4, 129 Nolfi, S., 6, 70

O Odling-Smee, F.J., 49 Ogden, K., 205 Osipov, S., 256 Osvath, M., 11, 103, 145, 205

P Pääbo, S., 178, 181, 260

331 Page, A.E., 4, 260 Panov, E.N., 7 Pedersen, H., 242 Peirce, Ch., 205 Perreault, C., 219, 242 Piantadosi, S.T., 297, 298 Pictet, A., 261 Pinker, S., 1, 8, 160, 322 Popper, K., 100 Powell, A., 4, 220, 272 Power, C., 5, 10, 11, 13, 92, 105 Progovac, L., 187, 242, 247

R Rampino, M.R., 255, 256 Relethford, J.H., 211 Renfrew, C., 242, 260 Revonsuo, A., 24, 65–68 Richards, I.A., 205 Richards, R., 31 Richerson, P., 4, 175 Rohling, E., 155, 178, 260 Rokeach, M., 61 Romaine, S., 262, 264 Rozov, N.S., xxvii, 26, 62, 75, 100, 137, 324–326 Ruhlen, M., 242, 245 Rumbaugh, M.D., 6, 53, 79, 80, 86, 161 Ryan, C., 92, 136

S Sapir, E., 288 Saussure, F. de, 20, 99 Schleicher, A., 242, 243, 302 Schmalhausen, I.I., 26, 35 Schuchardt, H., 307 Schütz, A., 100 Searle, J., 67, 99–101 Severtsov, A.S., 26, 27, 32, 41 Seyfarth, R.M., 87, 88 Shea, J.J., 178, 260 Shennan, S., 4, 220, 272 Sinha, C., 211 Sittl, K., 306, 308 Skinner, B.F., 63 Smith, C., 127, 233 Spencer, H., 1, 43, 44, 171 Spike, M., 271 Starostin, G.S., 242, 308 Starostin, S.A., 242 Steels, L., 6, 70 Sterelny, K., xxvii, 3–5, 8, 11, 24, 43, 211, 272, 273 Stinchcombe, A., 40, 69, 199

332 Stone, L., 245 Stout, D., 4, 130, 273 Stringer, C., 10, 11, 24, 106, 220, 223 Swadesh, M., 242, 247

T Tallerman, M., 29 Tamariz, M., 6, 70 Tattersall, I., 149, 176, 225 Thomas, M., 4 Thomas, W., 61 Thorndike, E., 63 Tomasello, M., xxv, 5, 10, 11, 43, 61, 70, 95, 104, 113, 114, 126, 161, 167, 175, 259 Trubetzkoy, N.S., 243, 244, 247, 302, 303 Turner, J.H., 3, 6, 36, 41, 43, 50, 64, 84, 89, 90, 136

Name Index W Waal, F. de, 53, 81, 84, 93, 94, 96, 97, 105 Wallerstein, I., xxvii, 252 Wartburg, W. von, 308 Weinreich, M., 257 Wells, S., 219 Wengrow, D., 247 White, T.D., 10, 11, 53, 88 Whiten, A., 160, 274 Wildgen, W., 3, 5, 31, 43, 58, 75, 123, 124, 127, 128, 166–168 Williams, M., 255 Wilson, E.O., 9, 32, 35, 68, 114 Wittgenstein, L., 99 Wood, B., 9, 75, 114, 170, 175 Wrangham, R., xxv, 5, 10, 11, 94, 96, 104–106, 114, 133, 134, 160 Wray, A., 29 Wright, R., 311 Wright, S., 221

U Uznadze, Dm., 61 X Xu, Y., 321 V Varvaro, A., 244, 307, 309–313 Vogt, P., 1, 302 Vygotsky, L.S., 30, 38, 43–45, 61, 62, 65, 67–69, 83, 85, 87, 94, 102, 134, 161, 167, 204, 230, 231, 258, 259

Z Zlatev, J., 5, 10, 11, 24, 135, 175 Znaniecky, Fl., 61 Zuidema, W., 142, 143

Subject Index

A Aborigine, 145 Affinity (of languages), xxvii, 293–314, 332 See also Alliance (linguistic); Linguogenetic; Union (linguistic) Aggression aggressive behavior, 112 aggressiveness, 97, 322 decline in self-domestication, 10 direct aggression with violence, 324 high in baboons, 97 “hot” reactive and “cold” proactive, 133 its limitation and suppression, 10, 40 low in bonobos, 96, 97 between males, 104, 105, 113 rivals, 92, 97 Aggressive alpha males in hominin groups, 94 hominins as aggressive scavengers, 131 outsiders in intergroup clashes, 179, 203, 223 reactions of self-isolating tribes, 287 rival scavengers, 113, 117 See also Military; Rivalry; Violence; War; Weapon Alienation, 106, 113, 181, 225, 250, 254, 264, 305, 322 Alliance (linguistic), 244 See also Affinity; Linguogenetic; Union (linguistic) Alliance (of groups), 51 See also Coalition; Diplomacy; Union (social)

Alpha male in hominin groups, 94 losing to egalitarian coalitions, 104, 133, 150 in social animal groups, 81, 92 See also Aggression; Hierarchy; Leaders; Violence Alternativity (of utterances, replicas), 193, 296 See also Conversation; Meal; Normativity; Universals (linguistic) Altruism reciprocal in the family, 135 standard explanations, 135 See also Cohesion; Normativity; Rational; Selfish America, North, South, 262 American Sign Language (ASL), 161 See also Gesture Animal language, 84–86, 141, 298, 329 See also Gesture; Vocalization Anthropology, 7, 91, 248, 253, 302 Aphasia, 5, 127, 259 See also Brain; Neural Approval (social) in hominin normative rituals, 111 micro-ritual in teaching a child language, 63 as positive reinforcement, 103, 135 role in the mechanism of gene-culture coevolution, 31–35 See also Feedback; Reinforcement A priori model of the glottogenesis ontological levels, 27, 28, 180

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. S. Rozov, The Origin of Language and Consciousness, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30630-3

333

334 A priori (cont.) See also Principles; Rules of glottogenesis steps progression Arabia, 222, 260 See also Strait (Bab-el-Mandeb) Arbitrariness (of signs, words) of actions, speech (ability to perform actions, including speech, consciously, purposefully), 22, 204, 206, 237, 298 “vertical” (no obligatory resemblance between sign and signified), 303 See also Consciousness; Full-fledged word Archaeology, xxiv, 71, 74, 303 Archanthropes, 49, 72, 112, 131, 148, 220 See also Erectuses; Pre-archanthropes Ardipithecus the beginning of sapientation, 89, 97 niche place, 117 the transition of dominance to coalitions, 111 See also Australopithecines Art early forms, 11 extensive exchange networks in Middle sapienses, 263 power operations, 325 See also Decoration (material); Pictorial activity Articulation adaptation of larynx, 31 clarity, 166, 173, 174 connection with linguistic concerns, 59 connection with sexual selection in hominins, 172 “correctness”, 101 development in child’s mastery of speech, 175, 230 drivers of development, 4–5 in gene-culture coevolution, 126 intelligibility, 56 of Latin by foreigners, 310 level in Neanderthals, 177, 178, 180–183 standardization, 114 See also Distinction; Hearing; Phonetics; Pronunciation; Prosody; Protosyllable; Syllable Attempt in breakthrough to speech, 65 in different levels of selection, 56 in erotic communication, 173 in nomological explanation of sapientation, 71 in overcoming misunderstanding, 163 in the principles of evolution, 295

Subject Index transition to protolanguage, 206–211 See also Ingredient; Mechanism of fixation; Support structure Attention, see Focus of attention Attitude behavioral, 127, 137 consequences of interactive rituals and positive reinforcements, 45 to “directness of perception” in Piraha, 285 of dogs in training, 162 to dominance, 101 to friendly/hostile action, 84 members of the Piraha tribe, 283 normative, 26, 102, 104, 116, 117, 132, 150, 176 personalized, 84 reaction to attitude of tribesmen in apes and hominins, 116, 287 regulatory, 21, 150, 317 social, 61, 103 speech, 199 as support structures, 105 syncretic in anthropoids, 93 See also Intentionality; Interiorization; Psychosphere; Predisposition; Ritual Attractor, 39, 58 See also Divergence; Evolutionary zones of proximal development Australia, 219, 261, 286 Australopithecines the beginning of speech development, 170 brain volume, 148 the transition of dominance in groups, 111 See also Ardipithecus; Early Homo Austronesian language phylum (macrofamily), 303 Awareness, 12, 67, 118, 233, 323, 325 See also Consciousness; Theory of Mind (ToM)

B Baldwin effect, 31, 32, 35, 45, 126, 148 See also Cultural drive; Evolutionary strategy; Epigenetic; Gene-culture coevolution; Neo-Lamarckism Belonging as membership in a community, 8, 244, 253 name, 288 sexual, 119, 147 of things, 24, 119 See also Implement; Property; Sexuality Biased transmission, 32 See also Imitation; Innovation; Mastering

Subject Index Big men, 248 See also Chiefdom; Polity Bilingualism diglossia, 247, 248 See also Languages (types of) Bipedalism, 135 See also Early hominins; Techno-natural niche Birth (injuries, risks), 1, 80, 90, 102, 138, 157, 163, 179, 182, 204, 288, 308, 330 See also Parenthood; Skull; Trauma “Black box” of anthropogenesis, xxiv, 19–20, 53, 328 See also Cultural drive; Driver; Geneculture coevolution; Glottoaromorphosis; Initial condition; Phylogeny; Regulatory Bone marrow, 88, 89, 115, 150 See also Fire; Meal; Sustenance Bone remains, 113, 174, 210, 213, 221 Bonobo, xxv, 6, 28, 49, 52, 81–84, 86, 87, 89–91, 93–98, 102–105, 110, 128, 134, 156, 162, 171, 300 Borrowing (linguistic), 32, 60, 180, 243, 245, 251, 256, 294 See also Inclusion (linguistic) Bottleneck, 130, 135, 177, 179, 254, 256, 257 See also Depopulation; Toba Brain assignments, 66 became slow to mature in infants, 135 brain structures, 33, 45, 67, 259 extra-somatic development, 191 “mirror neurons” in brain visionary, 4, 84 processes, 66 role in the mechanism of gene-culture coevolution, 31, 32 Brain volume in Neanderthals, 148, 176 in sapienses, 148, 176 See also Morphology (anatomical); Neural; Neocortex Breathing (control of breathing, respiratory muscles), 4, 9, 31, 75, 150, 170, 210 See also Articulation; Larynx; Sapientation Burials with inventory as a sign of social hierarchization, 281 in Neanderthals, 182 as a sign of sapientation, 83 See also Hierarchy; Ritual; Stratification Bushmen, 88, 271 See also Hunter-gatherer

335 By-product anatomical structures as by-product of attempts, 37 costs as negative by-product of activity structures, 218 language rules as by-product of “exemplary” speech, 278 speech and language as by-product of rituals, xxv, 37–38, 164–166 transformation of neural, 165 See also Attempt; Cost; Mechanism of fixation

C Causality directionality, 3–4 functional according to A. Stinchcombe, 40 in glottogenesis, 9, 38 mastery in consciousness, 25, 230 in modern genetics, 6 Causation, 31 See also Hempelian approach; Nomological; Ontology Cause, 35, 41, 74, 89, 109, 232, 237, 250, 257, 264, 277, 284, 310, 314 Cavaliers, 137, 172 See also Alpha males; Juveniles; Males Ceremony, see Ritual Challenge-opportunity as emergence of new concerns, 80 as part of evolutionary mechanisms, 323 as part of niche communication, 140 termination of trials when response is successful, 58 See also Concern; Response; Tension Challenge-threat, xxiv, 45, 50, 80, 194, 300, 323 Check, 314 Chiefdom complex were bilingual, 244 hierarchical, 91 as a stage of political evolution, 248 See also Big men; Political Evolution; Polity Chimpanzee, xxv, 6, 49, 52, 70, 79, 81–87, 89–91, 94, 95, 97, 102–104, 126–128, 132, 136, 152, 156, 161, 162, 167, 192, 300 Chopper absence in bonobos in the natural environment, 105 dating confident use, 111 features of Kanzi skills, 128

336 Chopper (cont.) as lethal weapons, 105, 111, 131, 150 See also Implement; Instrumental activity; Olduvai; Violence; Weapon Civilization (as a stage of social evolution in the emergence of statehood, cities, and writing), 97, 319 See also Empire; Geo-culture; Oikumene; World-Empire; Writing Civilization (as multicultural communities) formed based on world-systems, 252 See also Empire; Geo-culture Climate, 4, 19, 36, 97, 111, 155, 211, 219, 220, 222, 254–256 Clothing as a concern of manufacture, 179, 203, 213 in Neanderthals, 179 as part of popular culture, 303 in sapienses, 27 See also Decoration; Dwelling; Sustenance Coalition (in a group) in bonobos and chimpanzees, 81, 94 cohesive, 147 dominant, 5, 93, 95, 98, 104–106, 136, 144, 183, 193, 198, 216, 273 egalitarian, xxv, 91, 94, 104–106, 111, 133, 134, 136, 139, 140, 150, 209, 318 establishing norms of behavior, 133 female, 10, 81, 94, 96 role in speech development, 174 See also Normativity; Self-domestication Code coding, 93, 178, 190, 312 See also Symbolization; Writing Coercion by colonizers, 285 to fulfill norms in hominin groups, 111 as a mode of conflict resolution, 323 to “proper language”, 250 to sex, 92, 98, 277 Coercive ties of linguistic change, 247 See also Arbitrariness; Hierarchy; Power; Violence Cohesion baboons, 97 bonobo coalitions, 91 early hominins, 50, 89, 91 general factors of, 89 of the Piraha people, 286 rituals strengthen, 107 winning intergroup selection, 71 See also Recruitment; Ritual (solidarizing)

Subject Index Coitus, see Sexuality Comfort, 26, 51, 56, 79, 140, 205 Comfortable emotionally comfortable group, 106 a way of evolution (bonobos), 97 way of resolving conflicts, 138 See also Satisfaction; Sustenance Command complex, 29 requiring syntax and grammar, 178 understanding by recruits of, 305 verbal in training, 162 vocal, 130 See also Authority; Control; Regulative; Training Commitment (deferred), 61, 272–276, 279, 286, 326 See also Morality; Normativity; Reciprocity; “Social Calculus” Communicative concern abilities, 56, 155 approaches to study, 188 boundaries, 3, 149 context-switching mechanisms, 232 of early hominins, 98 field of, 296 flow, 58 limitation, 269 magic wand, 58, 118, 164, 278 Middle and Late sapienses, 276 Protosapienses and Early sapienses, 221 stages and processes of development, 221, 223, 228 “totality”, 233 Conscious attitudes, xxv, 21, 61, 66–68, 103, 105, 285 plans, 190, 286 responses to challenges, 42 Conspiracy, 5, 133–134 See also Aggression; Intrigue; “Machiavellian Mind” Construct, 12, 39, 60, 73, 100, 270 Convergence (linguistic), 247, 254, 304 See also Affinity; Kinship (linguistic); Union Conversation concern for agreement as to the general meaning of, 56 markers of knowledge of R. subject matter, 289 order, dynamics of, 166 role in language complexity, 289 role in separating holophrases, 166

Subject Index sequencing of lines, 166 See also Dialogue; Discourse; Interlocutors Convolution, 10, 44, 182, 279 See also Glue; Grammaticalization Cooperation in animal groups, 82 of apes with criminal groups, 82 inter-scientific, 320 reciprocal, 272 See also Alliance; Coalition; Coordination; Kinship; Union Coordination (of behavior) in an experiment, 109 in higher predators, 92 in hominins, 27, 51, 99, 111 in hunter-gatherers, 91, 99 See also Alliance (of groups); Cohesion; Negotiation Copying and bonobos, 90 chimpanzees, 90 complex operations with speech explanations, 11, 90, 135 tendency to behavior copying is a common trait of humans, 90 See also Imitation; Ritual Correction (of speech errors) of articulation, 134 in language acquisition by children, 163 pronunciation, 56, 134, 139 See also Rephrasing; Ritual; Standardization Correctness (of behavior) of bonobo behavior, 95 representation of the situation, 135 of task performance in training, 135 See also Normativity Cost of cognitive and speech abilities, 216 of increased memory, 11 support structures activity, 44, 58 See also By-product; Challenge; Functionalist approach; Tension Creole, 4, 5, 209, 230, 303 See also Pidgin Cro-Magnons, 13, 213, 262 Culinary recipes, 303 techniques, 231, 296 See also Fire; Meal; Sustenance Cultural drive brain growth and development, 127 breakthrough to speech, 139

337 mechanism, 9, 31, 36, 72, 127, 317 model, 35 principle, 44, 67, 74, 125, 126, 148, 149, 164, 297 See also Baldwin Effect; Drivers; Evolutionary Strategy; Gene-culture coevolution; Neo-Lamarckism Cultural-mental strategy, 290 See also Piraha Cultural pattern absence of ready-made cultural pattern in glottogenesis, 39 as constituents of culture-sphere, 323 “correctness” of speech and language as, 134 in mastering speech by a child, 134 participation in mechanism of gene-culture coevolution, 36 role in geo-cultural processes, 320 role in rituals, xxv role of their accumulation in glottogenesis, 11 translation through sound marks, 45 See also Inculturation; Intergenerational translation; Memes Culturosphere, 100 See also Ontology; Psychosphere; Sociosphere Cumulative period, 10, 118, 149, 151, 211 See also Formative period; Rhythm

D Darwinism social, 325 See also Neo-Darwinism; Neo-Lamarckism; Orthogenesis; Selection Dating, 9, 10, 31, 136, 219, 222, 322 Death of competitive species, 19 of groups, 225 of infants/mothers in childbirth, 179 of new languages, 257 perishing, 255 of support structures in selection, 35 See also Bottleneck; Depopulation; Selection Decision common, 198 as conscious responses to challenges and concerns, 42 in discussions, 289

338 Decision (cont.) group, 92 joint, 146, 183 See also Attempt; Providing; Response Decoration (linguistic), 278 See also Eloquence; Embellishment; Rhetoric Decoration (material), 277 See also Art; Pictorial activity Deduction, Deductive (inference), 70 See also Hempelian; Justification; Logic; Nomological; Principle; Proof; Rational; Substantiation Deficiency (scarcity, insufficiency) of data, 245, 247 of food, 41, 104 of resources, 104, 263–266 of sexual access, 105 See also Challenge; Concern Demographic excess, 260 explosion, 319 factor, 264 gain, 175 growth, 74, 220–222, 227, 254, 257, 260, 263, 319 pressure, 220, 249 result, 181 See also Geopolitics Denisovans, xxv, 72, 177, 178, 180, 218, 256, 260 See also Neanderthals Denotations child indicates denotation of words, 161 in displacement, 22, 296 neural ensembles of, 191 in protowords, 143 in “semiotic triangle”, 205–206 in syncretic signals, 138, 205 See also Indications; Reference Depopulation, xxvi, 187, 256 See also Bottleneck; Death; Selection; Toba Dialogue, xxvi, 59, 228 See also Conversation; Discourse Differentiation of languages, 143, 249 of protosyllables, 29, 87, 143 of sounds, 56, 111, 118 in Spencer’s principle, 1, 44 of support structures, 171 See also Divergence; Integration Diffusion, 72, 180, 221, 228, 252, 321 See also Geoculture; Imitation

Subject Index Diglossia, see Bilingualism Dimorphism (sexual), 94, 106 See also Morphology (anatomical); Sexuality Diplomacy, diplomat, diplomatic, 224–226, 325 See also Alliance (of groups); Negotiation; Union (social) Disagreement concerning the real state of affairs, 216 as a conflict of versions of what happened, 197 See also Dispute; Proceeding Discreteness (of signs), 22, 298 See also Universals (linguistic) Dispersal original language communities, 303 See also Demographic; Strait (Bab el Mandeb); Suez Displacement (linguistic) definition, 22 explanation, 22, 296 See also Consciousness; Conversation; Instruction of imagination; Leadingaway protophrase; Managing imagination; Pidgin-sentence; Universals (linguistic) Dispute, 216, 247 See also Disagreement; Proceeding Distant control, 203, 216, 274, 300, 318 See also Displacement; Normativity Distinction loss of distinction when units merge, 298 of phonemes, 59, 175 of protowords, 29, 119, 171 of sign means, 205 of sounds, 4, 140, 205 See also Articulation; Pronunciation; Protosyllables; Syllables Divergence concerns, 295 of languages, 250, 269–270 of morphological types of languages, 243, 293–294 of niches, 295 orders, 295 See also Convergence; Differentiation Domestication (of animals and plants), 35 See also Neolithic Domination, 12, 64, 83, 89, 134, 325 See also Hierarchy; Power; Rivalry; Social order; Stratification Doubling experience, 69

Subject Index See also Imagination; Symbolization Driver of the brain volume growth, 127, 128, 148, 150, 190 cognitive evolution, 49 of evolution, 36, 191 of glottogenesis, 5 of language complication, 192 of niches and orders renewal, 11, 44, 49, 50, 247 of sapientation, 148 of transformation of protowords into words, 202 See also Cultural drive Duality of patterning, 22, 299 See also Universals (linguistic) Dwelling, 11, 27, 35, 176, 179, 182, 203, 282 See also Clothing; Comfort; Sustenance; Technologies

E Early Homo brain volume, 148, 150 concerns, 112, 116, 131, 210 features of niches, 49 first protowords, 111, 118 first rules of behavior, 115–118, 329 the juxtaposition of morphological and cognitive evolution, 201, 221 mastery of tool technology, 40, 43 morphology and sexuality, 106 normativity, 43, 64, 108, 116, 131, 151, 206, 318, 329 practices, 40, 83, 111, 155 rituals, 40, 43, 65, 329 signals, 111, 116, 151, 318 See also Erectuses; Ergasters; Habilises; Pre-archanthropes Education policies of, 304 special, 1, 31 women’s joint education, 134 Educational reforms, 305 systems, 248 See also Inculturation; Intergenerational transmission; Nurture; School; Socialization Effectiveness communication, 322 direct violence, 40

339 discerning, 217 fixation of successful trials, 43, 58, 65, 109 getting food, 132 hunting, 92, 105, 203 magic wands, 43 meanings, 56 normative rituals, 105, 165 organizational, 325 reaching an agreement, 56, 165 recognizing signs, 59 of structures, 55, 59 twisting utterances, 56 weapons, 41, 104, 105, 108 See also Attempt; Concern; Reinforcement; Support structure Efficiency, 56, 110, 116, 189, 195, 271, 272 Elite local, 251 politico-military, 252 regional, 312 ruling and intellectual, 305 See also Coercion; Domination; Hierarchy; Power; Stratification Eloquence, 56, 57, 275, 290 See also Decoration (linguistic); Embellishment; Rhetoric; Wit Embellishment, 160, 180, 270, 271, 275, 277, 280, 295, 299 See also Decoration (linguistic); Eloquence; Rhetoric Empire, 247, 249, 252, 264, 265, 276, 305–311, 313, 319, 320, 323, 332 See also Conquest; Geopolitics; War; World Empire Empirical hypothesis on conditions of appearance of simple syntax, 236, 258, 295 on conditions of early protolanguage formation, 210 on conditions of language complexity, 236, 258 on conditions of transformation of the first protolanguages, 207, 209, 211, 234–237 in nomological extended approach, 70, 210 on social conditions of breakthrough to speech, 28, 86 See also Hempelian; Nomological; Theoretical hypothesis Encounter, 33, 40, 146, 203, 229, 288 Epigenetic processes, 32

340 Epigenetic (cont.) rules, 32, 33, 35 See also Cultural drive; Gene-culture coevolution Epigraphy, 306, 309, 310 See also Gloss; Inscription; Writing Erectuses early Erectuses, 115, 131, 170 late Erectuses, 148, 171 middle Erectuses, 146 See also Archanthropes; Heidelbergians; Neanderthals; Paleoanthropes; Pre-archanthropes; Protosapienses Ergasters, 210 See also Erectuses; Habilises; Pre-archanthropes Erotic attention, 125 attraction, 75, 277 communication, 125, 173, 275 competition, 137 front, 125 interactions, 282 market, 172 negotiations, 278 rituals of seduction, 137 See also Seduction; Selection (sexual); Sexuality Ethology, 91, 93 See also Alpha males; “Animal language”; Coalition; Harem; Hierarchy; Selfish behavior Evidential evidential markers, 289, 302 See also Displacement; Distant control Evidentiality definition, 289 Evolutionary linguistics, 57, 189, 230, 257, 279 See also Historical linguistics Evolutionary strategy, 89 See also Baldwin effect; Cultural drive; Gene-culture coevolution; Neo-Lamarckism Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development (EZPD), 38, 39, 43, 44, 68, 146, 163, 259, 317 See also Magic wand; Punctuated equilibrium Exaptation, 42–43, 328 See also Magic wand; Pre-adaptation Exogamy, 114 See also Kinship; Patrilocality; Sexuality

Subject Index F Factors of glottogenesis, see Drivers Feedback (loop, contour with) positive feedback in the dynamics of intergroup selection, 174 in experiments in the generation of new words, 253 in the formation of protolanguage, 199 and mental, 10 morphological change, 9 social sapientation, 10 between speech ability, 9, 10, 174 See also Approval; Correction; Reinforcement Female in anthropoids, 113 estrus latency, 75 food sharing in birds, 93 may refuse to mate, 111 participated in coalitions, 96, 134 role in wolves and hyenas, 81, 92 sexual access to, 105 young female move to other groups, 106 See also Girl; Lady; Parenthood; Sexuality; Women Field attention, 2, 12, 21, 67, 82 of consciousness, 25, 67 of representations, 26 of sensory perception, 21 of vision, 82 See also Attention; Consciousness; Intentionality Fire beginning to be mastered by hominins, 115 as a group concern and subject of dispute, 139 mastered by Neanderthals, 181 ritualistic and normative treatment of fire, 296 the role of mastering fire in development of speech, 27, 210, 296 significance for expanding consciousness, 176 See also Culinary; Meal; Sustenance Focus of attention ability to switch, 300 common in adult and child’s mastering language, 134 common in interactive ritual, 134 part of a normative ritual, 139 role in consciousness, 25

Subject Index See also Consciousness; Field; Ritual Folding/unfolding, 29, 41, 101, 139, 156–160, 230, 258, 279 Formative period, 151, 294, 321 See also Cumulative period; Glottoaromorphosis; Rhythm FOXP2, see Speech (gene) Friendship in social animal groups, 100 See also Cohesion; Grooming; Ritual Full-fledged word definition, 204 distinct from protowords, 141 in Early sapienses, 187, 205 in pidgin-sentences, 30, 180, 213, 214, 294 stage of glottogenesis, 146, 157 transformation from protowords, 188, 202, 205, 304 See also Protosemantics Functionalist approach justifiability of explanations of language constructions, 57 the Stinchcombe’s model, 40 See also Concern; Cost; Support structure; Tension Fundamental needs and concern (similar in animals, hominins, and humans), 54, 79–81, 227, 273

G Gene abilities of monkeys and apes to give and recognize signals through and beyond gene, 90, 138, 205 as the basis of assignments, 32 changes, 45, 127 comparison of gene and languages, 246 in explanations of altruism, 135 genomes, 35, 36, 50, 67, 181, 246, 260 mechanisms, 42, 199 mutations, 31, 33 role in the mechanism of gene-culture coevolution, 9 the speech gene FOXP2: gene structures, 4, 9, 177 which individuals propagate their, 222 Gene-culture coevolution relation to the development of morality and egalitarianism, 105 See also Baldwin effect; Cultural drive; Evolutionary strategy; Neo-Lamarckism

341 Genetic drift, 222 See also Heredity; Mutation; Selection Geo-cultural factors, 253 perturbations, 251 phenomena, 251 preferences, 307 prestige through the acquisition of national language, 251, 312 processes, 251, 320 See also Civilization; Diffusion Geo-culture has acquired an autonomous dynamic but remains connected to geopolitics, 251 Geopolitical displacement factors as the cause of settlement, 285 of evolution, 320 factors of languages, 253, 312 perturbations, 251 processes, 250, 251, 264, 320 sources of motives to create alliances, 300 See also Conquest; Empire; Military; War; World-Empire Geopolitics the close relationship of geopolitics to geo-culture, 247, 251–253, 312, 320 “ideologies follow geopolitics”, 250 Gesticulation, 87, 126–129, 195, 232 See also ASL; Indication; Mirror neurons Gesture in anthropoids, 91, 126, 171 as auxiliary to communication, xxv, 11, 52, 126–128, 143 becomes redundant, 290 for indications, 96, 127 as part of normative ritual, 96 sign language, 7, 73, 156, 161 as a “springboard” to speech, 5 Girl an example of Dessalles with a girl and money, 215–217 place in a group, 175, 179 usually left their groups, 174 See also Female; Lady; Women Gloss, 306, 308, 311 See also Inscription; Writing Glotto-aromorphosis as “black boxes”, 20 linguistic complexity, 29, 146 as a progression through the steps of EZPD, 317

342 Glotto-aromorphosis (cont.) realize magic wands, 65 transitions to languages with simple syntax, 30 See also Evolutionary zones of proximal development (EZPD) Glue (linguistic), 143 See also Grammaticalization; Syllable Göbekli Tepe, 264 See also Mesolithic; Neolithic; Sapienses Gossip, 5, 11, 13, 199, 274, 282, 300, 301 See also Intrigue; “Machiavellian Intelligence”; Rivalry Grammaticalization, 279, 298, 302 See also Convolution; Glue Grooming in bonobos, 82 as a ritual of solidarity, 84, 123–125 as a “springboard” to speech, 4–5 See also Friendship; Ritual Group concern of building dwellings, 179 of distant control, 203 of establishing an order of access to a meal, 139 establishing order, 136 of establishing relations with other groups, 81 hominins, 98, 135–137 of intragroup pacification, 81, 139 of maintaining fire, 89, 139 of sustenance, 139

H Habilises brain volume, 148 breakthrough to speech, 175 concerns, 117 did not regret the “limitedness” of their minds, 234 first holophrases and protophrases, 170 practices, 111 See also Early Homo Haeckel’s law, 161, 258, 259 See also Analogy; Mastery of speech; Ontogeny Harem group type in lions and gorillas, 80 in Neanderthals, 181 refraining from violence within harem, 102 suppresses deviance in harem, 103 in what humans are similar to gorillas, 136

Subject Index who punishes, 92 See also Alpha males; Polygamy; Sexuality Hearing, 56, 127, 142, 143 See also Articulation; Distinction; Phonetics Heidelbergians articulated and distinguished phonemes, 148 established order of everyday meals, 193 laryngeal position similar to human, 126, 175, 211 level of speech development, 175 their probable cognitive abilities, 148 underwent rapid morphological and cognitive sapientation, 201 used protowords and protophrases, 148, 171, 176, 188 See also Archanthropes; Erectuses; Neanderthals; Protosapienses Hempelian (approach, model, scheme), 69, 160 See also Nomological Heredity assignments, 66 biological mechanisms, 22, 296 extracorporeal, 100 heredity and selection, 33, 34 inheritance, 31, 33 speech ability, 173 See also Gene; Gene-culture coevolution Hierarchical planning, 176 See also Power; Stratification Hierarchy of communicative concerns, 56 in hominin groups, 113 of languages, 262 social hierarchy in animal groups, 100 Historical linguistics, 60, 241, 252, 265, 302, 314, 320, 321 See also Evolutionary linguistics; Sociolinguistics “Hobbits” (Floresian paleoanthropes), 256 See also Austronesian; Paleoanthropes Holophrases in children in mastering speech, 134 definition, 30, 161 inability to leap to syntax, 167 to subject-predicate structure, 166–168 transition to protophrases, 196 See also Distinction; Protosyllable Homeostatic variable, 40 See also Concern; Functionalist approach Hominin concern role in glottogenesis, 37 Homo ergaster, see Ergasters

Subject Index Homo habilis, see Habilises Homo heidelbergensis, see Heidelbergians Homo sapiens, see Sapienses Hostility, 100, 250, 324 Humanist tradition, 312 Humanistic challenge, 322–326 humane orders, 325, 326 values, 325 See also Morality; Normativity; Social order Hunter-gatherer groups arrival of colonizers as challenge and pressure, 285 basic group norms, 92 comparisons of modern with ancient, 104, 260 complexity and simplicity of languages in known hunter-gatherer groups communities, 283 diversity of norms, 92 the dominance of egalitarian coalitions, 144 inclusion in linguistic alliances, 256 intellectual ability, 225 language, 256, 283 shared meals, 193 similarities and differences with social animal orders, 61 their orders, 61, 91–93 See also Big men; Chiefdom; Exogamy; Piraha Hunting as faunal extermination factor, 263 in sapienses, 222, 263 as stress factor in hominin groups, 97 See also Cohesion; Sustenance; Weapon

I Imagination control of, 69 as a “springboard” to speech, 4 word as a tool for controlling operations in, 69 See also Attention; Consciousness; Intentionality Imitation of animal sounds, 125, 298 in anthropoids, 128 in apes, 90 in Early and Middle sapienses, 213 as a feature of most ancient hominins, 83 in neanderthals, 180

343 role in the dominance of egalitarian coalitions, 139 to speech behavior, 172 as a stage in the speech development, 126 to successful tribesmen as a factor in the accumulation of innovations, 32 See also Copying; Diffusion; Imitation; Intentionality Implement in anthropoids, 81 in the economy of reciprocity, 273 “ownership” of, 183 as a ritual, special practice, 59 role of, 71 rules of belonging, 59, 119, 130 tool, 81 See also Chopper; Innovation; Instrumental activity; Skill Inclusion (linguistic), 12, 80, 134, 254, 326 See also Borrowing (linguistic) Inculturation, 11, 54, 63 See also Cultural patterns; Education; Intergenerational transmission; Socialization Indication chains of simple sentences as, 232 by Cicero on the distinction between “vernacular” and classical Latin, 308 gestures, 96, 127, 128 processes of becoming linguistic universals, 301 protowords as, 298 on the relation of phenomena, 124 transition to sound, 127 See also Denotation; Intentionality; Referent Individual abilities, 118 adaptation, 80 aspirations, 80 attitudes, 43, 194, 285 behavior, 80, 92, 94, 101, 103, 139 concerns, 136, 139, 160, 321 consciousness, 20, 21, 68, 230 development, 66, 71 findings, 141 gain in an experiment, 160 learning, 32, 33 mind, 32, 37 prestige, 200 psyche, 100, 320 violence, 114

344 Individual (cont.) See also Attitudes; Consciousness; Interiorization Individual concerns of attracting a partner for sex, 136 couple relationships, 147 of maintaining position in a group, 45 of social groups and states in history, 321 See also Communicative Concerns; Function; Need Infiltration language into other languages, 251 lexical, 251 Infiltrative kinship of languages, 303 See also Kinship (linguistic); Linguogenetic Ingredient in chimpanzees and bonobos for egalitarian coalitions, 94 for cognitive development, 79 definition, 42 in evolutionary principles of glottogenesis, 43 for “goodness” in experiments, 299 for hominin self-domestication and normativity, 80, 83, 87, 89–91, 94 for language complexity, 140 for leading-away protophrases and pidginsentences, 217 linguistic, 20, 57, 71, 158 with possibilities of modifications constitute EZPD, 39, 317 for protowords, 138, 217 sapientation, 43 for speech communication and language structures, 87, 91 See also Attempt; Fixation mechanism Inhibitions, 104 Initial condition in anthropogenesis, 318 in glottogenesis, 126, 295 in nomological extended approach to explaining the origin of language, 210 processes of anthropogenesis, 318 providing concerns, 57 See also Causality; Hempelian; Nomological Innovation collective, 192 linguistic, 20, 65, 163, 226, 271, 321

Subject Index preservation in imitation of successful tribesmen, 32 role in recreating culture, 4, 36 role in the selection of individuals and groups, 35 in strategies of violence and war, 325 successful in behavior and psyche, 35 technological, 73, 221, 263, 272 their designation and transmission, 32 useful, 73 See also Instrumental activity; Invention; Technologies Input, 19, 27, 28 Inscription, 241, 247, 252, 309, 310 See also Epigraphy; Gloss Instinct, instinctive, 36, 64, 89, 96, 100, 102, 103, 135, 138, 144, 155, 192 ability, 144 basis, 84 desire, 136 prohibition, 103 reaction, 85 resistance, 103 signal, 138 See also Gene; Heredity Institution, 1, 19, 27, 40, 42, 50, 64, 100, 101, 119, 253, 305, 310, 320 Instruction of imagination conversation, 192, 194 displacement, 189, 195 distant control, 203, 216 interlocutor, 187–211 managing imagination, 187–211 See also Consciousness Instrumental activity generate new tensions and concerns, 233 labor, xxv in Middle sapienses in Upper Paleolithic, 74 role in changing niches, 49 social orders, 272 as “springboard” to speech, 12 technology, 49, 74, 272 See also Chopper; Implement; Invention; Olduvai Integration of attention focuses, 233 of communities, 250, 253 concepts, 1 ideas, 1 of languages, 1, 245, 250, 253 of scientific approaches, 1

Subject Index of structures, xxiv, 42, 44, 171 of thinking and vocalization, 150 See also Convergence; Differentiation Intellect (mind) of anthropoids, 87 Intellectual abilities of paleoanthropes, 177 achievements, 232 breakthroughs, 302 challenges and concerns, 323 communities, 304 elites, 305 See also Consciousness; Logic; Thinking Intensity of attempts, 44 in communication, 11 of communicative concerns, 98 of discussions, 275, 276 of intergroup selection, 174 of rephrasing, 201 of sexual selection, 173 of a structure’s activity, 40 See also Attempts; Cost Intentionality absent in animals, 96, 101 as a basis of interactive rituals, 116 condition of protowords emergence, 143, 178 consciousness ability, 116 factor in cohesion and victory of egalitarian coalitions, xxv interactive ritual, see Ritual normativity, 101 present in “smartest” dogs, 274 (joint): as a “springboard” to speech, xxv, 5, 10, 96, 101, 104, 113, 117–119, 128, 138, 140, 143, 150, 161, 318 translation of patterns, 296 See also Focus of attention; Imitation; Indications; Ritual Intergenerational transmission based on symbolization, 129 cognitive abilities, 27 mechanisms, 22, 50 new practices, 155 patterns of sound signals, 134 speech patterns, 74 See also Cultural pattern; Education; Experience; Inculturation; Meme Interiorization of attitudes, 64, 95, 101, 102, 114, 317 as fixation mechanism, 44, 61–62, 129 the key to the origin of language structures, 61–63

345 of signals, 102 in the synthesis of concepts, xxiv, 62–63, 159 in Vygotsky’s principle, xxvi, 44, 65, 94 in a zone of proximal development (ZPD), 38 See also Attitude; Ritual Interlocutors concern for agreement, 56, 166 create complex syntax through joining simple sentences in dialogue, 228 form a situational niche of communicative concern, 56 make effective use of the most straightforward language with visibility or mastery of shared context, 204 reinforce their speech skills in the success of mutual understanding, 209 See also Conversation; Dialogue; Discourse Interrelationship, 233, 289 Intonation in anthropoids, 91 in normative rituals of early hominins, 163 in pronunciation of protowords, 141 in transition to full-fledged words, 206 See also Pronunciation; Prosody Intrigue, 133, 278, 301 See also Aggression; Gossip; “Machiavellian intelligence” Invention of language structures, 3, 8, 37, 163, 265 and rules of conduct, 323 of words, 60, 270, 318 and writing, 9, 56, 191, 265, 297, 323 See also Innovations; Technologies Inventory burials with, 11, 83, 281 phonetic, 253 See also Art; Burials; Decoration (material); Implement; Pictorial activity; Ritual Irredenta, 250, 253 See also Geopolitics

J Joint meal, see Meal See also Deduction; Logic; Nomological; Proof; Substantiation Juvenile, 104 See also Alpha males; Cavaliers; Males

346 K Killing collective, 99, 125 killing of prey when hunting, 279 permissibility and encouragement of killing of strangers, 114 prohibition of killing within a group, 98, 108, 193 risks of women as challenges-threats, 107 See also Aggression; Murder; Violence; Wars; Weapons Kinship (in humans) complication in Protosapienses and Early sapienses, 223, 225, 227, 241, 254 as a context of negotiations, 181 not preventing sex in bonobos; connection with norms, 97 role in creating and strengthening intergroup alliances, 180 as a social condition for the emergence of language, 101, 130, 273 Kinship (linguistic) infiltration, 303 linguistic alliance as a form of self respect, 51, 71, 180, 222 linguogenetic, 250, 302–303 problems of explanation, 41 research programs, 245, 302 between Romance languages, xxvii, 332 See also Affinity; Convergence (linguistic); Divergence (of languages); Linguogenetic Kinship relations basis of diversity of norms in huntergatherers, 91–93 complexity in Middle sapienses (in Upper Paleolithic), 213, 262, 275, 318 complexity in North American Indian tribes, 262 the complexity of terms in languages of most hunter-gatherer communities, 281 kinship relations systems, xxvii, 49, 103, 262, 271, 273, 274, 282, 283, 285, 300, 318 simplicity of kinship relations and poverty of terms in Piraha, 287 See also Cohesion; Commitment; Normativity; Reciprocity; “Social Calculus”

Subject Index L Labor, see Instrumental Activity Lady all-season attraction, readiness for sex, 113 demand food, 137 prefer eloquent, 172 See also Female, Girl, Sexuality, Women Landscape with climate change, 220 in the “whip” concept, variety, change with migration, 36 See also Techno-natural niche Language family (cluster, phyla), 243–246, 253, 257, 265, 302, 303, 319 See also Kinship (linguistic) Language Rubicon, 3, 6, 28, 123–151, 299, 318, 329 Languages (individual) Abkhazian, 243 Adygean, 243 Aleut, 293 Bulgarian, 293, 304 Celtic, 308, 312 Chinese, 252, 306 Chukchi, 243, 293 Dutch, 284, 293 English, 7, 21, 57, 86, 270, 284, 293, 304 Eskimo, 156, 293 French, 311 German, 252, 312 Japanese, xx, 241, 243, 293, 304 Koine, 248, 252, 306, 312, 313 Korean, 243 Latin, xxvii, 244, 252, 270, 293, 305–314, 319, 320 Nahuatl, 252 Piraha, xxvii, 226, 232, 278, 281, 283, 285–290, 301, 331 Quechua, 252 Riau, 232, 278, 281, 283, 331 Russian, 170, 252 Sardinian, 311 Sumerian, 252 Surzhyk, 311 Turkish, 252, 304, 391 Vietnamese, 293 Languages (types of) complex, 140, 219, 271 Creole, 4, 5, 209, 230, 303 gestural, 70, 126, 127, 167 imperial, 249, 252, 306, 309–312 Indian, 262, 263 Indo-European, 244, 257, 303, 304, 314

Subject Index lingua franca, 254 local, 248, 249, 251, 252, 260, 261, 263, 265, 306, 308–313, 319 modern, 4, 219, 241, 242, 245, 258, 293–314, 321, 332 “Nostratic”, xxvi, 60, 243, 245, 247, 263, 314 pidgins, xxvi, 4, 5, 10, 30, 142, 167, 180–182, 188–190, 196, 198–204, 206, 207, 209–211, 213–218, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 234–236, 251, 258, 259, 274, 279, 294, 295, 297, 298, 303, 318, 330 regional, 248, 249, 251, 252, 260, 261, 264, 265, 306–308, 310–314, 319, 332 Romance, xxvii, 244, 306–314, 319, 320, 332 sacred, 252, 307, 310, 312, 320 simple, 269, 271, 279–281, 283, 284 world-systemic, 252–253, 265, 303, 306–308, 310, 311, 313, 320 See also Morphology (linguistic); Typology; Universals (linguistic) Larynx, 9, 27, 31, 75, 114, 125, 126, 141, 142, 149, 175, 211 Lateral branches (of hominins), 73, 94, 148 See also Archanthropes; Ardipithecines; Australopithecines; Erectuses; Habilises; Heidelbergians; “Hobbits”; Neanderthals; Pre-archanthropes; Rivalry; Selection Leader at the head of dominant coalitions in proceedings, 95 in hunter-gatherers, 92 lost monopoly when self-domesticated, 112 new concerns in the absence of leader dictate, 89 possessed regional languages of intertribal communication, 262, 263 in social animal groups, 92 See also Alpha males; Big men; Hierarchy Leadership communicative, 172 rhetorical, 71 See also Eloquence; Hierarchy; Power; Rhetoric Leading-away protophrase, 30, 168, 180–182, 188–192, 194–196, 198, 200, 202–207, 209, 217, 223, 258, 295, 297, 318, 330 See also Displacement; Instruction of imagination; Management of imagination; Reactive protophrase; Situative protophrase Legitimacy

347 legitimate, 44, 176, 225, 243, 245, 367 legitimation, 252 legitimizing, 251 See also Hierarchy; Power Levant, 222, 260 Lexical aspect, 311 composition, structure, stock, richness, 60, 166, 295 connection, 20, 244, 320 infiltration, update, 251, 303 invariant, 244 memory, 148 substrate, 244 See also Full-fledged Word; Word form Lexicon essential, 23 substrate, 249 Lingua franca, 252, 265, 319 See also World-economy Linguistics, see Evolutionary linguistics; Historical linguistics; Sociolinguistics Linguogenetic (kinship), 250, 302, 303 See also Alliance (of languages); Kinship (linguistic); Union (of languages) Local communities, 262, 305 groups, 138, 248, 262 settlements, 263 See also Chiefdom Logic of explanation, 106–108, 329 of glottogenesis processes, 69, 73, 160 internal logic of speech, 83 of justification of hypotheses, 69, 70 philosophical, 204 of tests, 83 Logical bundles, 271, 279 causation, 31 conclusions, 108 connections, 232, 235, 280 meanings, 231 means of syntax, 230–231 operations, 231 schemes of consequence, 69, 210 structures, xxvi, 230 See also Mental; Methodological; Proof; Thinking

348 M “Machiavellian mind”, 160, 274 See also Gossip; Hierarchy; Intrigue Macromacrosocial patterns of linguistic evolution, xxvii Macro-comparativism, 320 See also Pre-language; Pre-language gap Macro-level language communities, ethnicities, 72 states and empires, 305 See also Empires; Meso-; WorldEconomies; World-Empires Magic wand definition and examples, 194 emergence in formative and deployment in cumulative stages, 44, 151 grammar as, 235 handcrafting as, 278 as innovations in language, 118 interactive rituals as, 43, 116 major cognitive, 42 normativity as, 43, 101, 118 predication as, 218 principle of magic wand expansion, 43, 58 protowords and naming as, 138 ways of producing word forms, 43, 270 See also Evolutionary zones of proximal development (EZPD); Innovations; Inventions; Support structure Male in apes, 90 fighting, 83 in intergroup relations, 97 rivalry, 92 role in coalitions, xxv, 104 in sexuality, 105 in sexual selection, 105 in war and conquest, 125 See also Alpha male; Cavalier; Female; Juvenile; Sexuality Managing imagination, xxvi, 187–211, 318 See also Consciousness; Conversation; Displacement; Distant control; Instruction of imagination; Intentionality; Interlocutor; Mental; Ritual Mastery of speech in experiments, 6 importance of communication with adults, 172 levels of actual and potential development, 38

Subject Index as a model for glottogenesis, 27 place in cultural drive mechanism, 317 positive reinforcements, 135 role of micro-rituals, 135 speech normativity and the compulsion to “correct” speech, 258 stages, 204 word development, 204 See also Education; Haeckel’s law; Ontogeny; Skill; Zone of proximal development Mating the readiness of females, 92 the refusal of females, 111 shift of advantage criteria, 224 signals of invitation, 205 See also Erotic; Female; Male; Seduction; Sexuality Meal (joint, group, common) as an arena of competition for prestige, 180 as an interactive solidarizing ritual, 93 arena for proceedings, xxvi, 201 formation of syntax, 226 in nomological explanation of the derivative protophrases, 194 role in intergroup and interspecies selection, 2 role in intergroup interaction, 224 what was talked about during, 194–195 See also Conversation; Culinary; Discourse; Ritual Meat the consequence of the transition to, 113 as scavenger prey, 88 See also Culinary; Fire; Hunting; Meal; Sustenance Mechanism of fixation diverse, 65 fixing successful attempts, xxiv, 42, 43, 50, 58 new experience in language, 296 role in generating structure, 108 Skinnerian, behavioural, 54 social, 43 in speech innovation, 221 their reality, sufficiency, 71 their role in the reproductive domain, 114 See also Attempt; Ingredient; Support structure Meme, 11 See also Cultural patterns; Intergenerational transmission; Memory

Subject Index Memory brain basis, 31, 127, 149, 210 connection with consciousness, xxiii, 21, 25, 67 connection with reinforcement, 183 costs of growing, 11 “fine-grained”, 149, 191 role in glottogenesis, xxiii, 160 switching between, 190 verbal, lexical, linguistic, 10, 148 See also Brain (volume) Mental abilities, xxiv, 21, 23–25, 37, 42, 44, 224 argumentation structures, 231 assignments, 32 escape, 191, 197, 297, 318 images, 149, 230 maps, xxvi, 229–230 operations, 27, 279 patterns, 229–230 representations, 61 states, 274 transformations, 20 See also Attitude; Consciousness; Potential; Psychosphere; Thinking Mesomesolevels, 71, 247 mesolithic, 213, 260, 263, 283 See also Macro-; MicroMethodological approach, 2, 5, 12, 69, 305 procedures, 111 requirements, 88 See also Causation; Nomological; Paradigm Microfoundations of cognitive evolution, 63 micro-ritual, 63, 135 micro-social: mechanisms, 63 See also Interiorization; Macro-; Meso-; Ritual; UltramicroMilitary actions, 225 alliances, 264 clashes, 174 heroes, 277 mobilization, 248 the power of empire, 252 technology, 323 Military-political alliances, 248, 262, 263 confederations, 262 control of territories, 250 leagues, 262

349 processes, 251 See also Aggression; Geopolitics; Violence; War; Weapon Mind, see Intellect Mirror neurons, xxv, 4, 84, 126–129, 148, 168 See also Brain; Gesture; Neural Missionaries, 226, 251, 287, 303 See also Diffusion; Religion Misunderstanding attempts to overcome, 163 significance for multiplication of protophrases, 168 significance for the leading-away protophrases emergence, 168 See also Ritual of rephrasing and guessing Monogamy, 92, 136 See also Polygamy; Sexuality Morality, 103, 105, 322 Moral attitudes, 106 and cultural creativity, 326 feelings of shame, 94 norms, 10 notations, 289 pride, 94 rules, 10, 61 See also Commitment (deferred); Normativity; Values Morphological types of languages, 159, 293–294 Morphological changes in anthropogenesis as a whole, 74, 75 in early hominins during self-domestication, 106 in heidelbergians, 201 paleoanthropes, 211 in Protosapienses and Early sapienses, 211 See also Sapientation Morphology (anatomical), 225 Morphology (linguistic), 270 Motility (verbal), 173, 174 See also Mastery of speech; Ontogeny; Skill Motivation in (un)borrowing elements of another’s language, 251 clarify, 210 to learn about distant situations, 208 to learn the essence of what is happening, 145 toward understanding, 134 See also Concern Motive for asserting status, 181

350 Motive (cont.) in mastering speech, 134 prestige, 275, 290 Multilevel selection, see Selection Murder, 92, 98, 103 See also Aggression; Death; Killing; Violence; War Mutation in cultural drive, 148 directed, 33 in gene-culture coevolution, 31 one-time, 148 rapid, 3 role in the selection, 33, 127 See also Gene; Variability

N Naming, 146, 150, 164, 183 See also Denotation; Indication; Word form Neanderthals brain volume, 148, 176 causes and effects of smallness, 179 causes of survival under “volcanic winter”, 179 how they differed from Protosapienses, 178–180 influence on sapienses languages, 256 level of speech development, 180–183, 203 level of technological and cognitive development, 162, 179, 183 mixing with sapienses, 260 skull size, 182 speech gene in them, 177 the transition of females to other groups, 114 See also Denisovans Needs as an explanation of the transformation of protowords into words, 205–207 in articulate speech, 52, 79, 140, 163, 178 in comparison with the concept of concern, 41 counting by pieces in Piraha, 285 daily needs of the tribe, 287 in everyday communication, 290, 297 mutual needs of mental and linguistic structures, 158, 163 there is no needs to discuss them, 75, 110, 243, 285 when resources are abundant, 110 See also Concern; Function Negative connection (weakening, depressing)

Subject Index less agreement more discussion, 200 in the Stinchcombe’s functional scheme, 40, 199 See also Reinforcement Negotiation erotic, 275 as a factor in clarifying utterances, 225 in Indian communities, 262 intergroup negotiation as a sphere of appearance of syntax, 225, 227 as a mode of conflict resolution, 237 as a sphere of development of eloquence, 275 See also Alliance (of groups); Diplomacy; Ritual; Understanding, Union (social) Neoanthropes contacts, 74, 179, 221, 229 demography and factors of sapientation, 221 exchanges, 74, 180, 221 reasons for differences from Neanderthals, 179, 180 See also Sapienses Neocortex (cerebral cortex) frontal lobes, 141 temporal, 141 See also Brain; Neural Neo-Darwinism (synthetic theory of evolution), 3, 31, 73 See also Darwinism; Mutations; Orthogenesis Neo-Lamarckism, 32, 74 See also Baldwin effect; Cultural drive; Evolutionary strategy; Gene-culture coevolution Neolithic transition to, 263–266, 276 See also Sapienses Neural as a basis of consciousness abilities, 68 connections, 36, 66, 148 ensembles, 190, 191, 297 mechanisms, 9, 33, 38, 100, 127, 130, 148 mirror ensembles, 297 networks, 68, 75 overlaps, 126–130, 190 processes, 33, 66, 100, 130 shifts, 127, 148, 149 structures, 33, 38, 63, 127, 143, 148, 149, 165, 166, 182, 201, 259, 297 See also Brain; Mirror neurons; Neocortex Nomological (approach, explanatory scheme) in explanation of language complexity, 280

Subject Index in explanation of multiplication of protowords, 146 in explanation of normativity, 106–108 in explanation of the appearance of simple syntax, 234–237 in explanation of the transition to protolanguage, 206–211, 234–237 extension of Nomological Scheme, 69–72 See also Deduction; Empirical hypothesis; Hempelian; Principle; Theoretical hypothesis Normativity in Early Homo, 111, 131 lethal weapon factor for the emergence of, 111, 112 as a magic wand, 43, 101, 118 nomological explanation of the appearance of, 106–108 reasons for appearance in hominins, 64, 100, 108, 111, 116, 131, 188 relationship to interactive rituals, xxv, 5, 26, 64, 102, 137 role in recruitment, xxv significance in discussions, 106, 117 whether animals have, 64 whether in Piraha tribe, 289 See also Morals; Obligations; Regulatory; Values

O Observation actual, 290 of animal behavior, 82, 285, 289 of child behavior and development, 5 comparative, 70, 280 ethnographic, 175, 272 of Piraha behavioral, 285 Oceania, 219, 243, 260, 261 See also Settlement Offspring, 37, 64, 80, 93, 96, 129, 250 See also Nurture; Parenthood; Reproductive success; Selection Oikumene contact and separation, 254, 301 cultural-religious, 252 multilingual, 254, 258 as a world-systemic language range, 306 See also Civilization; Empire; Geo-culture; World-empire Olduvai, 69, 115, 150 See also Chopper; Implement; Weapon Ontogeny

351 formation of brain and psyche in ontogeny, 32 ontogeny in gene-culture coevolution, 32 positive reinforcement and accumulation of attitudes in ontogeny, 21, 43 stages of language acquisition in ontogeny, 159, 258, 259 See also Intergenerational Transmission; Mastering speech; Nurture Ontological spheres of being, 99–101 See also Causality; Culturosphere; Principle; Psychosphere; Sociosphere Ontology, 99–101 Operant conditioning mastery of external structures through operant conditioning, 63 See also Reinforcement Oral languages (unwritten) regional oral languages as the basis of Romance, 312 the role of codification, 306 variants of oral Latin, 310 See also Articulation; Conversation; Pronunciation Oral speech “representational redescription” by M. Donald, 205 Order of access to food, 133, 193, 203, 210, 296 remarks, speeches, xxvi, 192–194, 198 See also Conversation; Meal; Ritual; Social order Orientation in space, 176 in time, 176 See also Awareness; Consciousness Orthogenesis, 35, 74 See also Cultural Drive; Gene-culture coevolution; Neo-Lamarckism Ostracism by egalitarian hominin coalitions, 111 See also Aggression; Cohesion; Normativity; Punishment Output, 19, 27, 29

P Paleoanthropes, 72, 115, 177, 179, 180, 203, 205, 211, 215, 218–221 See also Erectuses; Heidelbergians; Protosapienses

352 “Paleoclimatic pump”, 219–220, 331 See also Demographic; Landscape; Protosapienses; Selection Paleolithic Early Upper, 179, 221, 228, 272 language development in Upper, 261–263 Lower, 74 Middle, 74, 221 modern communities with Paleolithic technology, 228 Upper, xxvi, xxvii, 28, 228, 231, 241, 260–263, 271–275, 277, 280, 281, 300 See also Instrumental activity Paradigm of linguistic relatedness in macrocomparativism, 320 multistage, 7, 8, 12, 29, 37 of “rational man”, 132 Paradigmatic foundations (ontological and methodological), 302 See also Methodological; Ontology; Principle Parenting one of the universal basic concerns, 54 source of group requirements and norms in hominins, 11 source of learning concerns, 5 See also Education; Intergenerational transmission; Mastering speech; Nurture Patrilocality, 114, 174 See also Exogamy; Girl; Kinship (in humans); Mating Pavians baboons, 49, 85, 87, 89, 96–98 other direction of evolution, 89 the significance of group relations, 49, 87 strong hominin competitors, 96–98 See also Aggression; Alpha male Perception, xxiii, 21–23, 31, 82, 150, 159, 204, 208, 209, 285, 289 Phase, xxiii, 53–55, 58, 70, 71, 87, 167, 215, 263, 328 Phenotype, 32, 35, 54, 94 See also Brain; Epigenetic; Morphology (anatomical) Phylogeny different roots of thought and speech, 172, 258 explanation of consciousness through, 39, 68

Subject Index growth of lexical stock, 258 no “adults” in phylogeny of language and consciousness, 39 the paradox of need for language, 140 positive and sexual selection in, 44, 172 See also Cultural drive; Gene-culture coevolution; Sapientation Pictorial activity, 182, 275 See also Burial; Decoration Pidgin in an experiment, 235 appearance in history, 303 definition, 30 developed, 167, 226 study, 5, 189 sufficiency of pidgin in a common context, 235 transition to pidgin as protolanguage in glottogenesis, 168, 206–211, 234–237 up-to-date use, 209 Pidgin-sentence concept, 196, 214 definition, 214 in explaining language universals, 296–301 in intergroup negotiation, 225 lack of precision of, 217–218 in mastering a foreign language by adults, 259 nomological explanation, 234–237 role in the transformation of protophrases into words, 196, 207 and role in the transition to syntax, 236, 237 semantics, 189 as a starting point for the divergence of morphological types of languages, 293–294 transformation from leading-away protophrases, xxvi, 182, 198, 203, 209, 297 See also Creole; Protolanguage; Protophrase; Word order Piraha (language) simple, xxvii, 281, 289, 290 vivid features, 281, 285, 289 See also Cohesion; Simplification Piraha (tribe) identity strategy, 289 as a relatively isolated community, 285 Planning for action, behavior role in consciousness, 67 role in the instrumental activity, 131 See also Attempt; Consciousness; Thinking

Subject Index Political evolution, xxvii, 247, 248, 263–266 See also Chiefdom; Empire; Macro; War Polity, 248, 252, 260, 264, 312 See also Alliance (of humans); Big Man; Chiefdom Polygamy, 92, 147 See also Harem; Monogamy; Sexuality Potential (innate traits, talents) of animal communication abilities, 5 behavioral, 106 cognitive, 39 directed changes and role in evolution, 155 mental, 32 of speech in hominins, 27, 31, 67, 87, 90, 91, 130 See also Gene; Heredity; Sapientation Power adornment and eloquence as markers of power, 56 competition for power and “Machiavellian mind”, 274 hordes of conquerors seized power in a country, 250 Latin as the language of power and religion, 311 as a social universal, 51 Powerful hierarchy, 92 the presence of powerful leaders does not negate the need for agreement, 92, 193, 216 See also Coercion; Empire; Hierarchy; Legitimacy Pre-adaptation as an ingredient for folding protowords, 138 definition, 42 as a source of order of cue order, 192 See also Exaptation; Ingredient; Magic wand; Support structure Pre-archanthropes, 150, 175, 182, 183 See also Archanthropes; Early Homo; Erectuses Precision, xxvi, 39, 58, 116, 150, 196, 206, 215–218, 225, 235, 294, 297, 331 Preconsciousness, xxv See also Consciousness Predicate, see Subject-predicate Predisposition, xxv, 31, 32, 36, 44, 149 See also Attitude; Potential Prehominins, 19, 28 See also Ardipithecines; Australopithecines “Pre-language”

353 ideas and attempts at reconstruction, 28, 242, 243 See also Kinship (linguistic); Linguogenetic; Macrocomparativism Pre-language gap attempts to reconstruct pre-languages, 241 definition, 241 studies of language Cavalli-Sforza group, 242, 246 as the “white” and “blind” spot of science, 241 See also Historical linguistics; Macrocomparativism Pre-ritual, see Ritual Preservation, 33, 54, 287 Pride connection with emotional energy, 172 connection with normativity, 176 of obtaining mind, 326 with one’s speech, language, 172 See also Leadership; Morality; Normativity; Status Priesthood, priests, 250, 251, 305, 306 See also Religion Principle of adaptation to previously created structures, 44 of advantage of breadth of available ingredients, 43 of advantage of colliding diversities, 43 of convolution, 44 of costs as drivers of renewal, 44 of cultural drive, 44, 67, 74, 125, 126, 148, 149, 164, 297 of magic wand expansion, 43, 58 of no complete evolutionary gaps, 44, 83, 90 of provision, or “whip”, 43 of the rhythm of formative (breakthrough) and cumulative stages, 44 Skinner’s principle of reinforcement, 45, 54, 164 Spencer’s principle, or the combination of differentiation and integration, 44 of stopping the search when success is achieved, 45 (principle of) the shift from Darwinian to Lamarckian mechanisms in human evolution, 45 Vygotsky’s Principle, or interiorization mechanism, 44

354 Proceeding, xxvi, 72, 198, 203, 216, 217, 233–235, 274, 276, 282, 289, 290, 299, 318 See also Disagreement; Displacement; Dispute; Distant control; Normativity; Punishment; Ritual; Sanction Productivity of communication, 298 of speech according to Ch. Hockett, 22 See also Universals (linguistic) Pronunciation different pronunciation of written letters and words, 307, 313 training, corrections of, 134, 139 See also Articulation; Correction; Larynx; Motility; Phonetics; Prosody; Understanding Property, 21, 26, 32, 42, 51, 58, 103, 131, 144, 147, 185, 216, 217, 253, 298 See also Belonging; Normativity Proposal, 7, 103, 145 Prosody prosodic contours, 143 See also Articulation; Intonation; Phonetics Protolanguage, xxvi, xxvii, 29, 30, 56, 142, 166, 168, 187–211, 213–216, 234–237, 241, 254, 256, 261, 294–295, 304, 318 See also Pidgin-sentence; Protosemantics Protosapienses alliances, 221 causes of rapid evolution in Africa, xxvi, 178–180, 209, 220, 223, 227 clashes, 179, 220–222 complication of semantics, 176 differences with Neanderthals, 178–180 effects of shared meals, 193 mastery of diverting protophrases and pidgin-sentences, 168 mental maps, xxvi, 230 and negotiations, 224, 237 progress in tool technology and speech, 175, 176 their rituals and attitudes, 83 their traits in morphology, 211 See also Heidelbergians; Neanderthals; Paleoanthropes; Sapienses Protosemantics, 30, 188–190, 215, 330 See also Pidgin-sentences; Protolanguage; Semantics Protosyllable characteristic of early pre-speech, 87

Subject Index definition, 30 functional properties, 258 as means of distinguishing protosyllables, 141, 142, 151, 258, 318 transformation into syllables, 111 See also Articulation; Distinction; Holophrase; Phonetics Psyche, xxii, xxv, xxvi, 32, 34, 45, 62, 63, 66, 68, 80, 83, 100, 101, 103, 105, 116, 174, 182, 206, 320 Psychosphere, 100 See also Attitude; Consciousness; Culturosphere; Mental; Ontology; Sociosphere Punctuated equilibrium, 74 See also Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development Punishment in animal groups, 92 because of proceedings, 198 discussion of punishment in negotiation, 224 in experimentation, 93 in hominin groups, 114 in hunter-gatherer groups, 92, 99 for incest, 99 including, 81, 92 in the Piraha tribe for adultery, 287 to punish, 64, 137 for sexual assault, 93, 103 for violence, 92 See also Morality; Normativity; Ostracism; Reinforcement; Social order

R Rational benefit calculus, 105, 132 choice, 105 the concept of concern, 62 empirical hypotheses, 111–115 human paradigm, 132 international relations, 27, 71 results of glottogenesis, 8 theoretical hypotheses about stages of glottogenesis, 109–110 See also Calculus; Deduction; Justification; Hempelian; Logic; Nomological; Principle; Proof; Substantiation; Thinking Reaction aggressive reaction of self-isolating tribes, 287

Subject Index automatic to the behavior of others, 62 behavioral, 61 emotional reaction of anthropoids, 85, 171 emotional reaction of hominins, 102 protophrases as complex, 162 release of words from situational, 205 vocal, 85 See also Response Reactive protophrase, 155–183, 258, 295 See also Situative protophrase; Leadingaway protophrase Reciprocity in kinship relations, 273, 275, 276, 281 See also Neoanthropes; Normativity; Commitment; Sapienses; “Social calculus” Recitative, 5, 125 See also Articulation; Ritual; Singing Recognition, 20, 24, 31, 42, 56, 57, 59, 60, 119, 126, 133, 141, 148, 150, 164, 189, 218, 279, 295, 314, 318 Reconstruction, xxvii, 5, 6, 28, 132, 242, 243, 321 Recursion absence in simple languages, 271, 279 appearance in negotiation, 275, 299 as complex language structures, 271 role in rhetoric, 271, 275, 279 See also Complex syntax; Eloquence; Rhetoric Referent (subject of reference, indication), 85, 102, 205 Referentiality, 216 See also Denotation; Indication Regulatory attitudes, 101, 117, 150, 317 basics of correct speech, 21, 101, 139, 183, 203, 282, 317 concerns and attitudes, 117, 150, 317 early hominins, 150 instances (from person to sign), 101–102 Neanderthals, 183, 203 neoanthropes, 237, 282 See also Attitude; Command; Distant control; Hierarchy; Normativity; Power Reinforcement (of action, experience) according to Skinner’s conception, 45, 54, 63–65, 164 in accumulation of cultural experience, 74, 145, 182

355 in emergence and development of protophrases, 162, 172, 183, 297 experience of forceful resistance to assimilation in Piraha, 388 features in anthropoids, 84, 128 forming attitudes, 26, 45, 80, 84, 109, 194 inarticulate utterances, 228–229, 298 logical, 70 mechanism of fixation, 54, 65, 70, 80, 108, 109, 114, 146, 328 in the mechanism of gene-culture coevolution, 31–35 negative, 80, 109, 114, 135, 290, 298 negative: aggressive actions, 112, 114 in ontogeny, 23, 24 positive: as micro-ritual in child’s learning of language, 63, 135 as ritual, 63–65, 80, 84, 109, 134, 135, 138, 193, 194, 328 role in the emergence of protowords, 135, 138, 144, 162, 169, 172, 183, 297 role in the intergroup competition, 174 See also Feedback; Correction; Operant conditioning Religion imperial, 252, 311, 319 as a linguistic sphere, 253, 313 proselytizing, 250, 252 worldly, 250–253, 319 Religious beliefs, 68 causes of language change, 304 motives for finding a “common pre-language”, 320 rapprochement, 304 relations of alienation, 250 rituals, 11, 281 sermons, experiences, 23, 229 strategies of messianism, 252 worldviews, 324 See also Magic; Priesthood; Ritual Rephrasing absence of rephrasing in Piraha, 281–284 in communicative conflict, 197 in the formation of protolanguage, 199, 210 in nomological approach, 210 as a response to concerns of understanding, 143 role in evolutionary differentiation, 158, 182 role in linguistic innovation, 321 role in the emergence of syntax, 166, 168, 182, 210, 231, 275

356 Rephrasing (cont.) See also Correction; Misunderstanding; Ritual Reproductive fixation, 114 sphere, 125 success, 35 See also Erotic; Mating; Selection; Sexuality Response attempts of, 36, 44, 58, 80, 141, 143 behavioral, xxv, 35 conscious, 42 evolutionary, 79 regular response became practices, 52 strategy, 51, 286 successful, 33, 44 unsuccessful, 141 See also Challenge; Concern; Reaction Revolution cultural, 213 economic according to K. Sterelny, 272 social, 250 Upper Paleolithic Revolution, 74 See also Innovation, Invention, Social order, Violence Rhetoric different in up-to-date observations, 280 embellishments, 180, 270, 271, 275, 280, 295, 299 factor of leadership, 71, 278 genesis, 319 mechanisms of development, 320 modesty in Piraha, 290 presence/absence in different languages, 230 stimulus to complication and enrichment of speech, 271, 289 See also Eloquence; Decoration (linguistic); Wit Rhythm actions, 11, 62 behavior, 62 in body, 84, 90 in body movements, 84, 90 synchronization of psychophysiological Rhythm in ritual, 62, 66 in vocalization, 84 See also Cumulative period; Formative period; Recitative; Ritual; Singing Riau (language), 232, 278, 281–284, 331 See also Simplification Rite, see Ritual (interactive) Rite, pre-ritual, ceremony, 83–84, 96, 101, 104, 117, 139, 162, 329

Subject Index See also Attitude; Correction; Intentionality; Misunderstanding; Rephrasing; Ultramicro Ritual (interactive) about a child’s mastery of speech, 230 in communicative conflict, 56, 58–60, 197 role in the genesis of Hockett’s universals, xxvii, 22, 58 singing as, 84 solidarizing, 140 stories of past and distant as, 198 as a structure (practice) providing concerns of understanding, 230 of twisting and guessing role in the creation and translation of new patterns of speech, 74 Rivalry in baboons, 97 between groups, 82, 83, 273 within groups, 273 between languages, 247 role in maintaining group order, 109 in sexual behavior, 84 See also Aggression; Alpha males Juvenile; “Machiavellian Intelligence”; Male; Selection; Sexuality; Violence Rules of glottogenesis steps progression, 30 See also Evolutionary Zone of Proximal Development; Glotto-aromorphosis; Principle

S Sacred books, 312 dogmas, 319 languages, 252 linguistic canons, 314 texts, 252, 307 See also Morality; Normativity; Religion; Ritual; Values Safety, 80, 90, 105, 140, 197, 221 Sanction negative reinforcement, 135 as punishment, 92, 101, 104 on violence, 92 See also Distant control; Normativity; Ostracism; Proceeding; Punishment Sapienses Early, xxvi, xxvii, 13, 177, 180, 187, 201, 211, 213, 216, 218, 219, 221–223, 227, 234, 236, 237, 241, 246, 254–256, 259, 260, 271, 272, 303, 318

Subject Index Late, 20, 213, 276, 282 Middle, 213, 227, 241, 262, 275, 318 See also Protosapienses Sapient bone remains, 174, 221 changes, 9, 221 characteristics, 277 shifts, 27, 221 structures, xxiv–xxvi, 9, 10, 27, 37, 43–45, 54, 58, 72, 83 traits, 54, 55, 93, 227, 228 Satisfaction, 164, 229 See also Comfort; Reinforcement Savanna abundance of cloven-footed, 220 boundary shifts with jungles and deserts, 178 as environment of first hominins, 97, 127 environment with variety of food, 89 factor in transition from gestural to aural signals, 127 See also Landscape; “Paleoclimatic pump”; Techno-natural niche Scavenger (including early hominins) competition fighting, 97, 111, 131 inferior, 27, 88, 113, 118, 150 or aggressive, 97, 105, 111, 113, 115, 117, 118, 131, 132, 150 order of access to prey, 93 recruitment, 117, 131–133, 145, 150 the significance of normativity, 93–95 superior, 115, 118, 131 See also Sustenance; Techno-natural niche Schema, 54, 217 School formal, 253 monastic, 251 state, 187, 251, 305 See also Education; Nurture; Standardization Seduction, 5, 125, 137 See also Erotic; Mating; Sexuality Selection intergroup, 71, 174, 220, 254 levels of selection in glottogenesis, xxiv, xxv, 43 multilevel, 8, 50, 104, 137, 139, 148, 149, 166, 222, 323, 325 natural, 3, 32, 94, 103, 106, 211 negative, 89 sexual, 32, 36, 54, 61, 105, 106, 114, 125, 141, 149, 172, 173, 224, 276 See also Death; Heredity; Reproduction

357 Self-consciousness ethnic, 252 national, 252 See also Awareness; Consciousness; Logic; Mental; Theory of Mind (ToM); Thinking Selfish (behavior) suppressed in hominin groups, 103 See also Altruism; Alpha male; Ostracism Self-training in bonobo groups, 84, 96–98, 156, 162 factor in cognitive evolution, 237 morphological, 104, 106, 150 relationship to normativity, 95–96, 102 the role of egalitarian coalitions and selection, 104–106 as “springboard” to speech, 4–5 See also Alpha males; Coalition; Geneculture coevolution; Morphology (anatomical) Semantics of protolanguage, 188–190 of protophrases, 156, 164, 170, 189, 190, 203–205, 258, 298 of signals, 22, 85, 141, 142, 298 See also Protosemantics; Understanding Sex in bonobos, 81, 82, 93, 97, 105 legalized outside of marriage, 92 in Piraha, 287 voluntary, 92, 137 Sexual access, 24, 105, 119, 134–137, 147, 183, 277 attitude, 105, 111, 119, 137, 287, 290 behavior, 32, 80, 99, 107, 111, 136, 173 coitus, 97, 113 communication, 55, 75, 135 contract, 135 encroachment, 137 experiment, 173, 287 partner, 50, 84, 85, 90, 93, 99, 100, 135, 136, 173, 290 rules, 24, 32, 61, 80, 103, 105, 111, 112, 118, 136, 183 violence, 93, 103, 105, 117, 136 See also Erotica; Females; Males; Normativity Sexuality features in hominins, 75, 90, 136, 137, 173 one sphere of universal basic concern, 103 Shame, 94, 176 See also Morality; Normativity

358 Simplification (of signification, of language), 216, 275 See also Piraha (language); Riau (language) Singing for erotic attraction, xxv, 125, 137 nightingale, 100 as a “springboard” to speech, 123, 137 Situative protophrase, 30, 258 See also Leading-away protophrase; Reactive protophrase Skill automated, 61, 279 behavioral, 36, 61 communicative, 58 cultural, 177 technical, 20, 27, 61, 90 verbal, 218 See also Motility; Potential Skull changes in morphological evolution, 179, 221 growth of the fetus as the risk of birth trauma, 179 walls, 148, 150 See also Birth; Brain; Neocortex “Social calculus” complication in transition to “new economy”, 275, 276 connection with “mental escape”, 203 role in the transition to protolanguage, 215, 217 the stimulus of refinement, 198 See also Commitment; Distant control; Kinship (of humans); Naming; Normativity; Proceeding; Reciprocity; Theory of Mind (ToM) Socialization education, 54 parenthood, 54 school, 253 Social order definition, 64 See also Belonging; Coalition; Compulsion; Hierarchy; Leadership; Kinship (of humans); Morality; Normativity; Parenthood; Patrilocality; Power; Property; Reciprocity; Sexuality; Stratification Sociolinguistics historical, 215, 294, 306, 320 See also Historical linguistics; Evolutionary linguistics Sociosphere, 99–101

Subject Index See also Culturosphere; Normativity; Ontology; Psychosphere Song as an experience for processing by consciousness, 69 imprinting of language in, 320 origin according to Darwin, 124 “Song of Roland”, 312 See also Articulation; Recitative; Ritual Stage (of development, evolution, complexity), 8, 22, 29–30, 87, 127, 204 Standardization (of speech and language), 64, 114, 135 See also Articulation; Correction; Normativity; School Stimuli, 59–60, 80, 232 Stratification almost absent in Piraha, 290 as a barrier to intermarriage, 253, 281 born in the complication of orders in Upper Paleolithic, 231, 274, 275, 281 a trend of social evolution, 279 See also Hierarchy; Power; Rivalry; Social order Subject-predicate (structure, construction), 166–168, 187, 206, 214 See also Pidgin-sentence; Word order Sublingual (nerve canal as a sign of the level of speech ability), 9, 177 See also Larynx; Morphology (anatomical); Motility; Sapientation Substantiation, 71, 235, 280 See also Justification; Logic; Nomological; Proof; Rational Support structure in breakthrough to speech, 80, 107, 149 in the complication of languages, 55, 198, 271 in development of protophrases and protolanguage, 155, 199 of different nature, 9 in early hominins, 50, 80, 89–91, 113, 138 in evolutionary principles, 317, 322 in the intergroup selection, 8 in sapientation and glottogenesis, 8–11, 40, 50, 58, 72, 118, 317 in social animal groups, 140 in social patterns of linguistic evolution, 50, 231 See also Concern; Functionalist approach; Innovation; Invention; Magic wand Sustenance, see Clothing; Comfort; Concern; Dwelling; Needs

Subject Index Switching attention between contexts, 10, 232, 282 in Protosapienses and Early sapienses, 237 in terms of psychology and neuroscience, 232–234 See also Consciousness; Focus of attention; Mental Syllable, xxv, 4, 29, 30, 56, 65, 87, 91, 110, 111, 138, 140–143, 146, 148, 150, 161, 170, 175, 183, 257, 295, 298, 299, 318 “Symbiont” (language as), 65, 264 See also Sociolinguistics Symbolization, 24, 129 See also Code; Naming; Referent Syncretic meanings of protophrases, 30, 167 signals, 117, 118, 138, 150, 205, 295 See also Protophrase; Protosemantics Syncretism, 162, 204 Synthetic theory of evolution, see Neo-Darwinism

T Techno-natural niche from Ardipithecus to Habilises, 117 concerns, 39, 51, 53, 55, 117, 158, 183, 230, 282, 317, 320 construction, 49, 158, 203 of neoanthropes, 282 of Protosapienses and Neanderthals, 203 renewal, 49–51, 55 social and linguistic structures, 158, 317, 320 See also Landscape; Savannah Tendency argue, 216 assert a position, 97 to embellish, 197 imitate, 175 to simplify speech, 321 to state, 216 See also Attitude; Disposition; Skill Tension cause communicative concerns, 58, 155–156, 317 concerning misunderstanding one another, 169 in the functional scheme, 4 from natural adversity, 97 See also Challenge; Concern; Cost; Functionalist approach

359 Theoretical hypothesis (universal hypothesis) a concept in nomological extended explanatory scheme, 69–72 explaining the emergence of diverting protophrases and pidgin-sentences, 209, 236 explaining the emergence of normativity, 109, 110, 206, 207, 209 explaining the emergence of simple syntax, 234–237 explaining the increasing complexity of syntax and grammar, 235–237, 281 rhetorical enrichment, 280, 281 See also Empirical hypothesis; Hempelian; Nomological Theory of Mind (ToM), 24, 26, 274 Thinking analytic, 233 associative, 25, 233 autonomy from language, 231–232 in the context of consciousness, xxiii, xxvi, 20, 25, 67, 230, 234, 323, 326 development of thinking in connection with the development of language, 232 figurative, 234 flexibility, 224 limitations of, 323, 325 as magic wand, 43, 58 mental maps in, xxvi, 230 practical in animals, 67 practical in hominins, 83 requirements for, 230, 323 role of heredity, 100 theoretical, 70, 204 See also Consciousness; Logic; Mental Toba (volcano), xxvi, 179, 255, 303 See also Bottle-neck; Depopulation Totality of consciousness, see Consciousness Totem, 264, 299 See also Magic; Religion; Sacred Traditionality (of language), 296 See also Cultural patterns; Intergenerational transmission; Universals (linguistic) Training, 61, 87, 95–96, 101, 102, 130, 138, 139, 162, 171, 251, 298 Trauma as a result of violence in hominin groups, 105 See also Birth; Violence Tribesman, 113, 138, 287 Typology glottogenesis concepts, 2 indicators of language complexity, 3 See also Languages (types of); Paradigm

360 U Ultramicro-(occurring in the actual, present situation “here and now”) ability to learn new things, 213 action of language evolution drivers, 247, 320 fixation, 65 hominin speech updating vs. child language learning techniques, 163 multiplication of protowords, 168–170 the relationship of W. level to the cognitive evolution, need for consideration, 62 and selection, 65, 140 from self-talk to normative rituals, 95–96 See also Awareness; Focus of attention; Intentionality; Micro-; Ritual Understanding (mutual) and alliances, 40, 223, 237, 300 building dwellings, 27 drivers of understanding growth, 199 exchanges, 208, 274 in maintaining a fire, 11 marriages, 223 in negotiations, 228, 237, 300 reinforcement of speech skills in reaching, 166 role in micro-rituals in child language acquisition, 135 the transfer of linguistic structures from situation to situation facilitates, 39, 164, 230 the “whip” of understanding difficulties, 144, 145 See also Articulation; Conversation; Distinction; Disagreement; Displacement; Misunderstanding; Ritual Union (linguistic), 225 See also Affinity; Alliance (linguistic); Kinship (linguistic); Linguogenetic Union (social), 320 See also Alliance (of groups); Coalition; Cooperation Unison, 65, 84, 118, 139, 295 See also Intentionality; Recitative; Ritual; Singing Universals communicative, 39, 296, 297, 305 psychological, 305 social, 8, 22, 39, 51, 54, 64, 296, 305, 319 Universals (linguistic), xxiv, xxvii, 22, 193, 195, 254, 274, 296, 300, 302, 319 See also Alternativity; Arbitrariness (of signs); Discreteness; Displacement; Duality of patterning; Productivity; Traditionality

Subject Index Up-to-date analogies, 109, 209 experiments, 108, 146, 280 in explaining protowords genesis, 146 in explaining the complexity of syntax and the development of rhetoric, 280 in explaining the genesis of leading-away protophrases and protolanguage, 209 in explaining the genesis of normativity, 106, 108 in explaining the genesis of syntax, 280 in explaining the stages of sapientation, 72, 108, 146 in nomological extended approach, 280 observations, xxiv, 108, 209, 280 in studies of glottogenesis, xxiv, 209 See also Justification; Logic; Nomological; Proof; Substantiation

V Value (as sacred symbol, normative concept) biological value of situations, 116 as foundations of worldview, 324 of “hardening” in Piraha, 288 of labor-intensive implements, 115 See also Attitude; Mental; Morality; Normativity; Ritual; Sacred Violence “alpha males”, 95, 105, 113, 117, 325 armed, 115 atrophy in bonobos, 97 in baboons, 97 collective violence and intimidation, 139 control of violence, 50 imitations of, 51 intergroup, 323 internecine, 289 intimidation by leaders, 40 intolerance of, 114 intragroup, 94, 97, 98, 103, 108, 110, 114, 117, 193, 197, 273, 287 intraspecific in sapienses, 263 rejection of, 114 the relationship of factors in, 133 remote (stoning), 105 rules, 109, 116, 194, 197, 216, 224, 225, 274, 301 sexual, 93, 103, 105, 117, 136 as “springboard” to speech, 4–5 standards of nonviolence, 322 strategies and means, 323 suppression of, 10, 40, 97, 325 threats, 81, 92, 94, 102, 103, 114

Subject Index violent, 92, 94, 174, 286, 325 See also Aggression; Coercion; Normativity; Rivalry Vocalization apparatus of, 85 integration with practical thinking, 150 joint vocalization as a ritual of solidarity, 123–125 See also Articulation; Phonetics; Pronunciation; Recitative; Ritual; Singing Volition, xxiv, 25–26 See also Consciousness; Mental Voluntariness, 92 See also Compulsion; Domination; Power

W War alliances of Protosapienses, 221 between groups, 223 between groups of chimpanzees, 82 as part of political evolution, 264 as solution of conflicts, 223 as stimulus for negotiation, 225 See also Aggression; Conquest; Empire; Geopolitics; Military; Violence; Weapon; World-empire Weapon dangerous, 110, 112, 131 effective, 41, 104, 105, 110 group, 103, 104 lethal, 105, 111, 112, 131, 150 a number of weapon fragments in remains as an indicator of violence, 263 remote group (stoning), 105, 113 See also Aggression; Chopper; Military; Violence

361 Women coalitions, 94, 134 communication, 134, 175 concealed ovulation, 136 in the Piraha tribe, 285, 287 See also Female; Girl; Lady; Parenthood; Sexuality Word form, xxvi, 59, 188, 189, 206, 215, 216, 257, 270, 277, 294, 321 See also Full-fledged word Word order makes communication effective, 188 in pidgins, 180, 196, 206, 213, 214, 234, 295 as simplest syntactic structure, 214 See also Pidgin-sentence; Protolanguage World-economy, Lingua franca, 25 World-empire, 252 See also Conquest; Empire; Geopolitics; War Writing changes in languages before, 57 distribution of writing and different pronunciation, 306–307 earliest P. monuments, 156 language-forming role of, 312 the role of writing in culture and geo-culture, 320 who created and reformed, 312 See also Code; Languages (types of)

Z Zone of proximal development (ZPD, in ontogeny), 259 See also Inculturation; Mastery of speech; Nurture