The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style 9781463222161

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T h e Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style

A n a l e c t a Gorgiana

383 Series Editor George Anton Kiraz

Analecta Gorgiana is a collection of long essays and

short

monographs which are consistently cited by modern scholars but previously difficult to find because of their original appearance in obscure publications. Carefully selected by a team of scholars based on their relevance to modern scholarship, these essays can now be fully utili2ed by scholars and proudly owned by libraries.

The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style

George Hendrickson

gorgia* press 2009

Gorgias Press LLC, 180 Centennial Ave., Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2009 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. 2009

1

ISBN 978-1-60724-632-9

ISSN 1935-6854

Extract from The ^American Journal of Philology 26 (1905)

Printed in the LTnited States of America

AMERICAN

JOURNAL VOL. X X V I , 3. I.—THE

OF

PHILOLOGY WHOLE NO. 103.

ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE CHARACTERS OF STYLE.

ANCIENT

Cicero, in the third book de Oratore, pleading for an ideal union of philosophy statesmanship and eloquence in the person of the orator—a union such as he finds exemplified in the sophists of fifth century Greece—describes with much picturesqueness the divorce of the arts of thought and speech, which before had been one under the common name of philosophy. 1 A s such a unit Gorgias Thrasymachus and Isocrates had conceived of their field and instructed their pupils. But Socrates, though himself a product of this comprehensive conception and a type o f the versatile skill which it produced, had brought in division and usurped for the science of thought that designation which thinkers orators, and statesmen had before enjoyed in common. Hence arose a division almost as of soul and body, so that the teaching of thought and expression was no longer one and the same. T h e sharp outlines of the antithesis as described by Cicero d o not in the widest sense correspond to the historical development as it can be traced; 2 they do, however, agree essentially with such pictures as the Gorgias and the Phaedrus present, in which, in concrete and almost plastic form, we have set over • D e O r . ILL 5 6 : hanc cogitandi pronuntiandique rationem vimque d i c e n d i v e t e r e s G r a e c i sapientiam nominabant. I b . 60: cum nomine appellarentur uno, q u o d o m n i s rerum optimarum c o g n i t i o atque in eis exercitatio philosophia nominaretur. See also 60 and 61 for the text f o l l o w i n g . 2

See von A r n i m , D i o v o n Prusa (Berlin, 1898), ch. 1. 17

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against each other t h e t w o rival arts, dialectic ( p h i l o s o p h y ) and rhetoric, and the b e g i n n i n g s o f that hostility w h i c h in o n e form or a n o t h e r — a n d in spite of m a n y efforts at reconciliation, such as C i c e r o ' s — c o n t i n u e d d o w n to late antiquity. 1 T h e rhetoricians, l o o k i n g u p o n t h e m s e l v e s as the heirs of the early sophists, still claimed ' philosophy ' as the p r o p e r designation of their a c t i v i t y , and on the other h a n d the p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e fond of indicating the nature a n d s c o p e of a true or ideal rhetoric. O f s u c h attempts the earliest, and in its w i d e - r e a c h i n g influence the most important, is that contained in the latter part of the P h a e d r u s . It is of course no m o r e than an outline, d r a w n with conscious antithesis to the rhetorical treatises of the contemporary s o p h i s t s — T h e o d o r u s Gorgias Thrasymachus and others. 2 First of all, the foundations of the art will consist of the s a m e c a p a c i t y for exact l o g i c a l analysis and synthesis, based u p o n a true k n o w l e d g e of things, as is d e m a n d e d of the dialectician (266 A B , 260 D , 262 A ) . B u t oratory is the art of enchanting the soul (xjfvxayayia), and therefore to the dialectical attainments b e f o r e e n u m e r a t e d , must be a d d e d a g e n u i n e k n o w l e d g e of h u m a n souls, their varieties, differences, susceptibilities, etc. (271 D ) . T h u s the true rhetorician will strive to d o b y reasoned m e t h o d that which the sophistical rhetoric h a d s o u g h t to teach b y mechanical rules or b y the m e r e e x a m p l e o f p a s s a g e s to b e learned. B u t in this s k e t c h of a ' true rhetoric ' no mention is m a d e of a special doctrine of s t y l e — n o r need we w o n d e r . For in spite of the fact that a m o n g the resources for the attainment o f the ifrvxayvyta, at w h i c h all aimed, p u r e l y stylistic m e a n s — t h e G o r g i a n i c figures, r h y t h m , e t c . — p l a y e d a most important róle, y e t it d o e s not a p p e a r that a special doctrine of s t y l e apart from invention and a r r a n g e m e n t had y e t been formulated. 3 F o r the s e p a r a t i o n of matter or t h o u g h t (irpay/xaTa) from the forms o f e x p r e s s i o n is not an easy abstraction. In the pre-Aristotelian rhetoric the d i v i s i o n of the subject was concrete, based u p o n the oration i t s e l f — p r o o e m i u m , narrative, a r g u m e n t , e p i l o g u e , and u n d e r each of these heads all the necessary instruction w a s 1

D e O r . I l l 72 : p o s t e a d i s s o c i a t i , u t e x p o s u i , a S o c r a t e d i s e r t i a d o c t i s . . .

philosophi eloquentiam despexerunt, oratores sapientiam. "On

t h e n a t u r e of t h e r é x v v pnTopiKi] of t h e s o p h i s t s s e e t h e

d i s c u s s i o n of G e r c k e i n H e r m e s 32 (1897), p p . 3 4 1 - 3 5 9 3

C f . G e r c k e 1. c. p . 355-

suggestive

ORIGIN

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OF CHARACTERS

OF STYLE.

2$ I

contained, belonging more or less indistinguishably in part to invention and in part to style. T h e outlines which Plato affords we find carried out in detailed treatment by Aristotle. 1 T h e Platonic points of view (apart from s o m e rather essential differences of conception as to the relation o f dialectic and rhetoric to philosophy as a whole) are absolved in the first two books of the Rhetoric as it has come down to us.2 In book I Aristotle aims to establish a new foundation for rhetoric, which shall m a k e of it as exact an instrument of proof as the practical uses of the art admit of. A r g u m e n t is to be conducted b y enthymeme and example, which are merely forms of the syllogism and induction of dialectic. Rhetoric is therefore essentially a form of dialectic, 3 adapted to the conditions which are imposed upon it by the nature of the audience to which it appeals. T h e proofs are the essential thing and enthymemes are the v e r y heart of proof (craipa rtjs mareai). T h e most efficient orator accordingly will be the one most skilled in enthymemes (1355 a, 3-14). T h e technicians therefore w h o pay no attention to the treatment of the proofs nor to the resources by which one m a y become skilled in enthymemes (1354 b, 21), and who devote themselves to other things, such as the nature o f prooemiums, narratives, etc., have devoted themselves to things which are apart from the actual issue (ra to0 npdyi.iaros). Spengel, Uber die Rhetorik des Aristoteles. Abhlg. d. Munch. Akad. 1851. Book I deals essentially with the peculiarly Aristotelian adaptation of dialectic to the purposes of rhetoric, the construction in short of a rhetorical dialectic, while book I I discusses the psychological basis of the appeal outside of the facts (ra ¡¡¡A TOV IRPA-YPATOE)—the IPVXAYUYIA of the Phaedrus. That the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric does not contemplate a doctrine of style was noted by Quintilian (II 15, 13 nihil nisi inventionem complectitur). It has further been observed that in the first two books there are no anticipatory references to book I I I and that this book is not included in the distribution of matter made at either the beginning of book I or I I , while on the other hand in the portion of book I I I rrepl Atjewf (1-12) there are no references to the two preceding books except at the beginning. For the whole matter see Marx, Aristoteles' Rhetorik, Berichte d. sachs. Akad. phil. hist. kl. vol. 52 (1900) p. 241 ff. I f we add that the catalogue of Diogenes Laert. names the Rhetoric as consisting of only two books, it will seem very probable that books I and I I presented what was meant to be a complete theory of rhetoric, without giving any place to a doctrine of style whatsoever. 1

2

3 T h e various terms by which Aristotle designates this relation are: awiorpofoi {rij SiaTienTinJ)) ' corresponding' or ' parallel,' 1 1 init.; apa^vi( 'offshoot,'

I 2, 1356 a, 25 ; iiooiov rt xai 6/uoca (oiwtutia) 1356 a, 31.

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T h e i r aim is to put the j u d g e (or a u d i e n c e ) in a certain frame o f mind favorable to their cause, irrespective of proof. T h a t this is a matter of importance for the orator A r i s t o t l e d o e s not d e n y ; " f o r w e g i v e v e r y different j u d g m e n t s under the influence of pain or pleasure, l o v e or h a t e " (1356 a, 1 5 ) : his criticism is that the technicians l o o k to this a n d this o n l y in their treatises ( 1 6 ) . T h a t it is a legitimate part of rhetoric he c o n c e d e s , a n d p r o m i s e s to t a k e it up in detail w h e n he c o m e s to s p e a k nepl rS>v nadav. T h i s s h a r p contrast in point of v i e w b e t w e e n A r i s t o t l e a n d his p r e d e c e s s o r s is s u m m a r i z e d briefly near the b e g i n n i n g o f the treatise ( 1 3 5 4 a, 13) : the proofs are the o n l y artistic (evrexvov) aspects of r h e t o r i c ; all else is surplusage. 1 T h e t w o points of v i e w m a y be s u m m e d u p in the w o r d s with which the —the e x t r a n e o u s matter to the treatment of w h i c h the earlier technicians h a d d e v o t e d t h e m s e l v e s — a r e characterized (1354 a, 17) : (1) ov TTCpl TOV Ttpdyparos fVriv, ( 2 ) aXXa npos TOV diKaarrjv.

T o both of these considerations A r i s t o t l e aims to contribute s o m e t h i n g n e w : to the first (wepl TOV npdypaTas) b y outlining a m e t h o d of dialectical proof, w h i c h earlier theorists h a d w h o l l y n e g l e c t e d ; to the second (wpos TOV SIKAATTJV) b y b a s i n g the appeal to t h e a u d i e n c e u p o n an accurate analysis o f the c h a r a c t e r s o f men a n d their emotions, in place of the empirical p r e c e p t s (or e x a m p l e s ) w h i c h the rhetoricians had indicated for e a c h part o f the oration. If the R h e t o r i c w e r e a w o r k of perfect s y m m e t r y and co-ordination of parts (' aus einem G u s s , ' as B r a n d i s s a i d ) w e m i g h t h a v e e x p e c t e d that the portion o f the third b o o k w h i c h deals with s t y l e s h o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to the main outlines of the t w o p r e c e d i n g b o o k s . In s u c h case it would h a v e been c o n c e i v a b l e , or even natural, that a differentiation of s t y l e s h o u l d h a v e been m a d e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the t w o divisions of the a r g u m e n t w h i c h w e h a v e o b s e r v e d , v i z . : a stylistic form suited to p r o o f or d e m o n stration, and a s e c o n d h a v i n g r e g a r d to that w h i c h lies outside 1 T h a t Aristotle has w i t h some inconsistency over-emphasized the significance of e n t h y m e m e for rhetorical proof M a r x (1. c. p. 289) points out, s h o w ing that, if he here be taken strictly at his word, the doctrine of ij$r) and •XA&JI is excluded from the TTLOTELI; SVREXVOI. M a r x uses this inconsistency as e v i d e n c e for his theory of the Rhetoric as an VTrofiVTjfia a x o h n i v .

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OF STYLE.

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the actual proof, and looking to an ' e t h i c a l ' or emotional effect upon the listener or j u d g e . Aristotle recognizes that both declamation and style as employed in practical rhetoric in his time are significant chiefly because of the debased character of the audience (Sia t^v tov anpoarov lioxdnp'"") and are therefore instruments for the perversion of justice. Strict justice ($Uaiov) demands that the question at issue should be settled on the merits of the case itself (ovToir ro'ii irpayfiatri); for everything apart from the strict proof is really superfluous. This applies most to declamation, but in a less degree to style a l s o ; for differences in the mode of expression have some effect on the actual communication of the thought (npos to SrjXSxrat), but not so much as is commonly believed, and in fact the devices of style are a mere display and look to an effect upon the listener (dXX' amavra (¡¡avracrla Tavr' e'ori xai jrpof tov ¿KpoaTTjv) I no one has ever thought of teaching geometry in such a fashion. S t y l e (as also d e l i v e r y ) should in strict justice aim at nothing more than neither to give pain nor pleasure (to SIkmov /Jtr/Sev jrXei'w CrjTtiv rrept tov \oyov rj ¿>s prjTe \v7tuv pfiT eipaivetv 1404 a, 4). 1 S u c h a style, a fitting instrument for the (v8vfir)p.aTiKAs of book one, had Aristotle chosen to outline it, would have looked solely to the argument, and would have been the stylistic counterpart of the ttuttfl? ¿v aira rpia$u apm) aaij)^ elvai (atj/idov yap on o 2,¿yog ¿ig lav fllj 6}]AOt OV TTOLTjCEL TO ¿CtVTOV EpyOV) Kal flf/TE TaTELVJ/V ILT/TE i'TTep to a^tufia, a'/.'/.a •Kperrovaav. 2

R h e t . I l l 7, 1408 a, 19 ff. (Oxford Translation).

T h e late rhetoricians are fond of reducing passages of the orators m a r k e d by great f e e l i n g to their bare intellectual content for the sake of illustrating the orator's power. See for example the treatment of the famous oath in the D e Corona in the treatise on the Sublime, ch. 16. Cicero, in Brutus 115, says of the defense of Rutilius R u f u s by Q . Mucius S c a e v o l a , that he spoke enucleate et polite ut solebat, nequaquam autem ea vi atque copia quam g e n u s illud iudicii et m a g n i t u d o causae postulabat. 3

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OF STYLE.

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o f s t y l e : ( 1 ) l a n g u a g e as an o b j e c t i v e colorless m e d i u m for the s t a t e m e n t of fact or the e x p r e s s i o n of t h o u g h t (npdypara), and (2) l a n g u a g e as a means of c o n v e y i n g (in addition to or as a part of the abstract t h o u g h t ) the color of the s p e a k e r ' s emotion or artistic feeling to his audience ( N P O S TOP AKPOARRFV). T h e attitude of A r i s t o t l e t o w a r d l a n g u a g e of the latter t y p e is not one o f hostility to it as s u c h — r a t h e r it is one of s y m p a t h e t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n ; it is o n l y that, realizing its power, he d e p r e c a t e s the use of it as an instrument for the adjudication of questions of fact or right. S u c h hints o f a fundamental analysis of style, or p e r h a p s m o r e specific utterances of A r i s t o t l e elsewhere, w e r e the source of a division of l a n g u a g e with reference to its end or p u r p o s e w h i c h T h e o p h r a s t u s m a d e . T h e f r a g m e n t is cited b y A m m o n i u s 1 and is as follows : &ITTR/s yap OCO-TJS TTJS TOV Aoyov (r^eVea)?, KtlOu biatpio-cv o p 77eurai TrpoTiOfTai TOVS uKpoaipcpovs, 77(j)\ pep Trjp (T)(eTaTov èrxTt Kal KaTçtTK€va(rp.fvov paXiara €ip.éi>biv

1

ôè fiâWov

Kai 7roiTjTiKov ¿771-

avvrjpTTjrai, odev aïff

aptCTTii 7TCÙÇ èihtip/lOTTfL. T h e description h il S seemed worth quoting because, while it represents the developed doctrine of the three styles, it yet agrees so thoroughly with the Theophrastean division from which we started. For it is one of the few Greek descriptions in which the function of the xaPaKTVP lax"6s is explicitly defined,—sc. roîr voepoïr, ' quae ratione intelleguntur'. These statements, therefore, of Cicero, Quintilian, Dionysius and Proclus are in exact agreement with our investigation to this point, which has derived the plain style from the ¿niirav

TOLS

VQtpOLÇ

2

Aoyof npos ra IT pay para.

T h e earliest occurrence of the threefold division is in the Auctor ad Herennium ( I V 8, n f f . ) . And first, concerning the middle style, it will require no other investigation concerning its origin than to point out the inevitable rise of a iertium quid between the plain and the grand styles. A s such the middle style is conceived of by this author, 3 by Cicero in the three passages of the de Oratore where he touches on this division, and also in the Orator 2 1 . T h e identification of the yévos âvôtipô» with the middle style 4 is another matter and requires its own explanation. 5 But to return to the Auctor ad Herennium. T h e theoretical relationship of the different styles to the parts of the oration is not expressly stated, but it is contained in numerous implications. In the first place, all three styles will be found present in all good oratory. 6 T h e example of the grand style 1

A term which plays a large rôle in divisions of style from the point of view of delivery and tone. Its antithesis is ovvrovoç. Cf. the anonymous scholia in Aphthonium, Walz I I p. 3, 3, where the rpôrmi priropiKÙv àvayvùawv are analyzed. T h e y correspond in some measure to the usual divisions of the styles—the rpÔKoç CVVTOVOÇ to the grand style, the Tpônoç âvei/iévoç to the plain style. T h e latter (àvsc/iêvoç) is described as ôiaTiEKTiKÔç re koX StêaanaXiicoç Kai cvfiÇiov'XevTiK.ôç. Cf. the analysis of voice in Auct. ad Herenn. I l l 1 3 , 23 into sermo and contentio, terms which have a large place in the literary criticism of Cicero. In de Officiis I 1 3 3 and I I 48 they are the Latin names for the Stoic division of speech into iiaMyeadai and àyaviÇeaSai. 2 T h e correction of W. Schmid for yospolç, R h . Mus. 4g, p. 134, I . * I V 8, 1 1 : mediocris est quae constat ex humiliore neque tamen ex infuma et pervulgatissima verborum dignitate. Cicero de Or. I l l 1 7 7 , 1 9 9 , 2 1 2 . •Quintilian X I I 10, 59 ; Cicero, Orator, 91 ff. 5 Proclus 1. c. TO ôè ¡ikaov nai rovvo/ia /¿èv ôt/2.oï mi uéaov écrriv àfiipoïv. av&qpov âè mr' iSiav OVK èan TrXâafia, àXkà ovveKijiêpeTai Kaï av/ipépinTac TOÏÇ e'ipTj/jévoiç. 6 I V 8, 1 1 : sunt igitur tria genera . . . in quibus omnis oratio non vitiosa consumitur, and cf. 16 extr.

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given is a peroration; it is highly figurative (rhetorical questions, exclamations), of elaborate stylistic finish, and almost wholly ran Trpaynaraiv. T h e specimen of the middle style is a somewhat impassioned specimen of argumentation. It would seem to belong to the stage of the argument which the author in II 18, 28 calls the rationis confirmation The example of the plain style is not, as we might have expected, a piece of objective and colorless argumentation, but a narratio. It is marked by an unconstrained conversational tone, corresponding to the characterization of this form as demissa . . . usque ad usitatissimam puri consuetudinem sermonis. But while not argumentative it is still pragmatic and free from elaboration or emotional appeal; and it will be recalled that the narratio (p. above) is reckoned to the ¡jiepos irpayimTMov. It should be kept in mind, further, that the two aspects of the plain style which may naturally be differentiated, a familiar conversational quality and argumentative cogency, are both contained in the Greek 8ia\ey«r8ai and its derivatives, and are both embraced in the Stoic principles of style which we have examined (o-w^eia). Thus ¡SiaXtuniai is not only for Plato, but even for the later Stoics the art of conversation.' Similarly, under the heading of delivery, in III 13, 23, sermo is divided into dignitas demonstratio, narratio and iocatio. It was therefore open to the writer to choose as a specimen of the figura attenuata either a narratio or a specimen of strict logical argument. 8 T h e object of this brief discussion of the three styles as they appear in the Auctor ad Herennium has been to show that they are thought of as corresponding to the parts of the oration and ' A c o m p l e t e and perfect argument is d i v i d e d into five p a r t s : propositio, ratio, rationis confirmatio, exornatio and complexio. T h e analysis is illustrated b y examples. T h e ratio est quae causam demonstrat verum esse id quod i n t e n d i m u s b r e v i subiectione ; that is the strict logical proof of the speaker's contention. T h e elaboration and amplification of this proof is the rationis confirmatio, of w h i c h the example of the figura mediocris seems to be m e a n t as a specimen. T h i s , then, is f o l l o w e d by the exornatio qua utimur rei honestandae et c o n l o c u p l e t a n d a e causa confirmata argumentatione. The e x a m p l e of the exornatio is a highly elaborated p i e c e of rhetoric comparable to the illustration of the figura gravis. 2 C f . C i c . de Off. I 133 and I I 48 on the distinction b e t w e e n sermo and contentio. T h e former is dialectic, the latter is rhetoric. T h e discussion is drawn from Panaetius. 3 On the examples of this style adduced b e l o w , pp. 274, 277, 279.

by C i c e r o and A u g u s t i n e see

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its several functions: the figura gravis to the exornatio of the argument after it has already received logical demonstration (that is, ra é£a> TS¡V npayudrav), the figura mediocris to the elaboration of the simple demonstration, the figura attenuata to the narrative and the simple demonstration itself (avro to vpa-ypu). B y whom the intermediate stage of a middle style was defined it is of course impossible to say. W e can only s a y that its origin as a natural intermediate step between the two characteristic forms is manifest, and that all three styles had been fixed and recognized for a considerable time anterior to this treatise. F r o m the subsequent history of the three styles I select a few aspects such as seem to me significant for the history and original meaning of the classification. But first of all I must j u s t i f y myself for naming the A u c t o r ad Herennium as the first writer to present the doctrine of the three styles. F o r a curious and interesting e x a m p l e of the division, which might be reckoned as the earliest occurrence of it, is preserved for us b y Gellius, who in turn draws from V a r r o . T h e account (Gellius V I 14) after presenting the conventional form of the doctrine, with the G r e e k and Latin terminology and with Latin examples, instances as illustrations the members of the embassy of G r e e k philosophers oí the y e a r 1 5 5 ; animad versa eadem tripertita varietas est in tribus philosophis, quos Athenienses R o m a m ad senatum l e g a verant. In the senate they s p o k e through the medium of an interpreter, but before this ipsi seorsum quisque ostentandi [frrt5eí|íc»í] gratia magno conventu hominum dissertaverunt. Turn admirationi fuisse aiunt Rutilius et Polybius philosophorum trium sui cuiusque generis facundiam: ' V i o l e n t a ' inquiunt ' e t rapida Carneades dicebat, scita et teretia Critolaus, modesta Diogenes et s o b r i a ' . T h e matter is referred, it will be seen, to Rutilius and Polybius as sources, whose names, I think, must be understood in this w a y : that Rutilius in his memoirs, criticising (as elsewhere *) rhetorical ideals of public speaking from the standpoint of Stoicism and plain speech, illustrated the matter by an account of this famous embassy derived from a report of Polybius (whether written or oral), whose point of view would have been substantially the same as his own. A s was to have been expected from the severe Stoicism which he represented, he condemns the style of Carneades as violenta et rapida (emotional and vehement), of Critolaus as clever and elaborated (scita et teretia), reserving praise only 1

Cic. de Or. I 2 2 7 ff. Brutus 79 ff.

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for D i o g e n e s , the representative of Stoic sobriety and moderation of speech (modesta et sobria). A s the names are arranged in Gellius (Carneades, Critolaus, Diogenes, corresponding, it would seem, to &bp&v ia^mv ¡ i t W ) Carneades stands as the representative o f the g e n u s grande, Critolaus and D i o g e n e s as the representatives of the genus subtile and medium respectively. But in Cicero de Or. I I 157 ff., w h e r e the same embassy is described and the styles of the philosophers characterized, it must be inferred that D i o g e n e s (as would naturally b e expected) stands for the g e n u s subtile and Critolaus for the g e n u s medium. 1 T h e divergence of the two accounts indicates, as might be inferred from Gellius alone, that Rutilius did not have in mind the threefold analysis of style w h i c h w e are considering, but merely contrasted the sober direct utterance of D i o g e n e s with the rhetorical-emotional styles of Critolaus and Carneades. It was probably Varro who endeavored to adapt Rutilius' description to the current threefold scheme of stylistic theory. 2 In point of time the three styles are found next in the d e Oratore III 177, 199, 212. But in all three passages they are alluded to so briefly as to cast no light upon the author's conception of them or their history. It may be said, however, that the middle style is thought of merely as an intermediate stage between the other two. It is not until we come to the Orator that we find the characteristics of the three styles fully discussed, and here let us pause to note briefly the circumstances which condition Cicero's treatment of them. T h e Orator, as has l o n g been recognized, is not an abstract picture of the oratorical ideal, the crown o f the edifice begun in the d e Oratore and continued in the Brutus. F o r though C i c e r o apparently would have these treatises conceived of as a series, yet, in fact, it m a y confidently be affirmed that the Orator is a product of partisan debate, reaffirming with some few essential changes in point of view the general position of the de Oratore. 8 ' C f . I I 159 et genus sermonis adfert (Diogenes) non liquidum, non fusum ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum atque minutum. 160 Critolaum . . . puto plus huic nostro studio prodesse potuisse. 161 Carneadi vero vis incredibilis ilia dicendi et varietas perquam esset optanda nobis. 5 T h e possibility that Gellius in excerpting Varro's account has confused the positions of Critolaus and Diogenes may be suggested. 3 T h e title Orator is, in fact, merely a variation of the earlier title de Oratore. In both the professed object is to delineate the ideal picture of the orator. Cf. de Or. I II8 sed quia de oratore quaerimus, fingendus est nobis oratione nostra

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T h e germs of the conflict with opposing oratorical ideals, ideals which were entertained by most of the other eminent orators of Rome—Calvus, Brutus,Caesar, Asinius,ServiusSulpicius,Messala, Caelius and others—are discernible in many places of the de Oratore, but especially in III 38-53. Whether all these named are to be called Atticists or not it is certain that they stood for a more restrained and pragmatic type of oratory than that represented by Cicero and Hortensius. T h e theoretical and practical antitheses between exuberant and restrained rhetoric had been present in Rome for fully a century. Apart from the element which Roman character itself gave to these tendencies, they may be said to be derived mainly from the rhetoric of Asia Minor on the one hand, and from Stoical literary and grammatical theory on the other. Both schools are of nearly equal antiquity in Rome, but the influence of Stoicism can be traced more accurately and concretely. Crates, the Pergamene master and Stoic (168 B. C.), Diogenes of Babylon (155) and Panaetius (ca. 145) suffice to outline the chronology of this influence. Its theoretical position may be inferred from the general Stoic doctrine of style which we have cited above (and which seems to go back to Diogenes), and from the discussion of two types of utterance, sermo and contentio, which Cicero has drawn from Panaetius in de Officiis I 133 and II 48. It is, of course, what we should expect: advocacy of plain conversational speech as against the vehemence and emotional utterance of conventional rhetoric. This doctrine, received into the highest political and social circle of Rome, the younger Scipio, Laelius and their friends, became the starting point of a stylistic and oratorical ideal which we can trace through Lucilius, the Scaevolae, Rutilius Rufus, Q. Lutatius Catulus, Cotta, L. Macer (the father of Calvus) down to the Atticists and other contemporary opponents of Cicero. 1 But I anticipate a matter which to carry conviction demands a much detractis omnibus vitiis orator atque omni laude cumulatus. See also I 202, and 264. N o t e also Or. 237 habes meum de oratore iudicium. T h e current conception, w h i c h Piderit especially has urged, that the three works represent an orderly sequence from the (1) theoretical foundations through the (2) historical exemplification to the (3) ideal picture, is purely fanciful. JThe sequence of the opposing school of emotional rhetoric is g i v e n by C i c e r o h i m s e l f in his summary of R o m a n eloquence at the end of the Brutus (333): G a l b a , L e p i d u s , C a r b o , G r a c c h i , A n t o n i u s , Crassus, [ C o t t a ] , Sulpicius, Hortensius, and the u n n a m e d crown of it a l l — C i c e r o .

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fuller treatment than can be h e r e a c c o r d e d to it. L e t it suffice t o h a v e indicated in brief outline that the o p p o n e n t s w h o m C i c e r o c o m b a t s are the b e a r e r s of a stylistic tradition which g o e s b a c k to the S t o i c influences ( g r a m m a t i c a l a n d philosophical) r e c e i v e d b y the S c i p i o n i c circle. N o w C i c e r o , d e f e n d i n g himself against the suspicion of A s i a n ism, is at pains in the Brutus to s h o w that he h a d early seen the d a n g e r s a n d tastelessness of that m a n n e r a n d h a d deliberately a b a n d o n e d it ( 3 1 3 - 1 6 ) . S i m i l a r l y in the O r a t o r , w h i l e not aband o n i n g his preference for the g r a n d style, h e is especially bent on s h o w i n g that he has a definite and correct conception of the g e n u s subtile, a n d in c o n s e q u e n c e he d e v o t e s to its description m u c h m o r e s p a c e than to either o f the o t h e r styles. F r o m his c h a r a c terization s o m e o f the most essential elements m a y be noted. In s o u n d n e s s and penetration of a r g u m e n t it is s u p r e m e (acutae c r e b r a e q u e sententiae ponentur et nescio unde e x abdito erutae, a t q u e in h o c o r a t o r e d o m i n a b u n t u r 79) ; it d o e s not aim at charm a n d lavishness o f ornament ( a b e r i t . . . ornatum illud s u a v e et adfluens 7 9 ) ; in c o m p o s i t i o n it admits of n e g l i g e n c e , as of one m o r e concerned for the t h o u g h t than the word ( d e re 1 hominis m a g i s q u a m d e verbis laborantis 7 7 ) ; its tone is conversational ( s u m m i s s u s est et humilis, c o n s u e t u d i n e m imitans 76). Cicero's characterization is careful and full. H e is entirely in s y m p a t h y with the qualities w h i c h he describes, but not as e m b r a c i n g the w h o l e equipment of the orator ( q u e m [sc. s u b t i l e m ] nisi q u o d s o l u m c e t e r o q u i recte q u i d a m vocant A t t i c u m . 83). T h e y fulfil b u t one of the functions of the orator and t h e y fall short of that w h i c h is his h i g h e s t a n d most characteristic trait, the p o w e r to s w a y a n d m o v e — i n q u o u n o vis omnis oratoris (69). T h e orator of the plain s t y l e a c c o m p l i s h e s the end of instruction ( d o c e r e ) a n d reveals the qualities of the p h i l o s o p h e r (ille summissus, q u o d a c u t e et veteratorie dicit, sapiens iam 99), but the g r e a t e r rew a r d s are not his. S a n d y s r e m a r k s on this p a s s a g e that C i c e r o o b v i o u s l y has in m i n d L y s i a s as the t y p e o f the orator summissus. T h e s u g g e s tion doubtless rests on the fact that D i o n y s i u s names L y s i a s as the canon of this style. T h e matter admits neither o f d e m o n stration nor of certain refutation. B u t it m a y be questioned w h e t h e r C i c e r o ' s characterization contemplates chiefly the ' C f . the T h e o p h r a s t e a n npbs ra ixpayfiara and the Stoic doctrine presented b e l o w p. 282.

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— t h e simple lucidity and transparency of the Lysian or Xenophontean type. A t any rate the example with which Cicero illustrates the style looks to pragmatic objectivity rather than to simplicity as its characteristic feature. Tola mihi causa pro Caecina de verbis interdicti fuit; res involutas definiendo explicavimus, ius civile laudavimus, verba ambigua distinximus (102). The qualities here described are chiefly dialectical, and in fact no one who reads the speech will call the style simple. Objective it is and pragmatic, but intricate and hard. T h e distinction is of some importance and it is not too much to say that Cicero's choice of illustration with his comment upon it, casts more light upon his understanding of the genus subtile than does his characterization. It is this quality of exact argumentation which is implied in the designation sapiens iam (cited above), since dialectic is the peculiar instrument of the philosopher, and it appears again in the technical dialectical words of description at the end of 99: qui enim nihil potest tranquille, nihil leniter, nihil partite definite distincte facete dicere, etc. But the plain style, however admirable for its own ends, is in itself impotent to effect that yf/vxayayia which is the true goal of oratorical effort. This can only be accomplished by the grand style which is in fact oratory itself. It was only this style which had won for eloquence place and historical significance in public life: hie est enim cuius ornatum dicendi et copiam admiratae gentes eloquentiam in civitatibus plurimum valere passae sunt (98). Because of this power it must, in any relative ranking of the styles, be placed first (at vero hie noster quem principem ponimus 99), a point of view to which Quintilian also bears evidence ( X I I 10, 63): quare si ex tribus his generibus necessario sit eligendum unum quis dubitet hoc praeferre omnibus: for it alone represents true oratorical power—haec est vere dicendi facultas (ib. 65). Its emotional power raises it above the necessity of objective argument—hoc dicente iudex . . . per omnes adfectus tractus hue atque illuc sequetur nec doceri desiderabit. 1 It was this distinction between objective persuasion (fides) and the emotional effect which rises above persuasion and renders it 1

C f . Trepl inpovi; 1 , 4 ov yap etc TiEt&ti tov$ anpoupevovc

vTrepva /ievi]

(sublimitas); and especially 15, g

fiEVTOi

¿ovhovrac,

Tali Kpay/iaTimic

also 15, 10

smxeipr/osaiv

apa yap

TOV TOV 7TEl&ELV opov VTt'p^tSr/KtV

rw

akW

ov Ksidsi

tov

tzpay uar lku eTrixeipelv

TG) Ij/ZluaTL.

tlr zKoraciv

rj pr/TopiKj) 1pavraaia. . . .

ayei

ra

naraiapva-

atipoaTTjv /idvov, aMa

0 prjrup TztpavTanTai,

nal dto

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superfluous ( m o t u s ) 1 which was the basis of Theophrastus' definition of the two types of Aoyor: the one upas ra ltpaynara, virep ¡¡v 6

Afycop rrufrat

irporWeTai

tuvf

axpoapipovi

and

t h e Other

npot

tov:

aKpowjievovs, which with all the resources of literary art seeks rjo-al re TOV aKpoarrjv Kin exirX^nt xal irpbs n)v irtiBa> ^eipa>0eera «^«c.3 T h e wide difference between these two styles Theophrastus indicates b y putting the latter in the same category with poetry. Indeed the conception of true eloquence as a kind of poetry in prose was the v e r y origin of the rhetorical style as Aristotle says, 3 and never ceased to be the accepted conception in circles uninfluenced b y the rationalistic protest of some philosophical school. A b u n d ant evidence on this point is available and has been put together b y Norden. 4 It was from this point of view that Theophrastus (whom Quintilian quotes X 1 , 27) said: plurimum oratori conferre lectionem poetarum, and the rhetorician adds t r u l y : multique eius Judicium sequuntur. Cicero too bears evidence to his realization of the wide difference between this style and the others: sed multum interest inter hoc dicendi genus et superiora (Or. 98). F r o m such considerations of the total difference between the pragmatic and the emotional styles there arose a doctrine of their irreconcilability, which has a curious antiquarian interest of its own, but which need here only be mentioned in illustration of the general principle of their fundamental divergence. 5 1 The terminology is drawn from Cic. Part. Oratoriae. passages cited in the preceding note.

Cf. Trei&eiv in the

2 Compare the phrase with the passage of ntpi inpovf cited in note above. OV rrei-9ei TOV aKpoari/v fidvov aXXa KC.1 SovAoirau Note also the similar contrast expressed in each by npay/iara, npayfiariKof. For the whole text of the fragment of Theophrastus, see above p. 255. 3

Rhet. I l l , I extr. A n t i k e Kunstprosa I pp. 3 0 + 7 5 f f . s T h e principal passages are these: Dionys. de Dem. 2 (of Thucydides and Lysias as the representatives of the two extremes of style) lead' 6 Si loot aKkf/kav i]aav drsTielc. T h e point of view of Dionysius may be illustrated by comparison with de Isaeo 1 9 and 20 where the representatives of the two styles are grouped under the headings jtotifnuoi and aKpifieZc. More explicit is Demetrius (de Eloc. 36) who in defining four unmixed styles and their possible combiT nations says: fi6vos ds 0 ¡isyabmptK-rft (xaPaKTw) V 'wXvV /¿iyvvrat, alV uanep air&eaTctTov nai avr'iKeio&ov ivavTiurdru. For this reason therefore some had held that these are the only two fundamental styles, and that the rest are merely intervals between them. T h e point of view is refuted at some length by Hermogenes I I 3 1 6 (Spengel) and perhaps also by Cicero de Or. I l l 175-1774

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But although the conception of the plain style has its origin in the antithesis of pragmatic objective utterance to the language of emotional effect, yet it is by no means always true that the descriptions of the plain style reveal this conception. In fact some of the fullest do not, as for instance that of Demetrius de Eloc., who still bears evidence to the fundamental twofold division. 1 Instead of a plain style the xa9aKThp Ivx"0'* becomes a style of simple elegance—a natural development enough when once the Atticists had begun to cast about for early examples of this style and found them in L y s i a s , Xenophon, Ctesias and others. Thenceforward in most of our sources the dominant characteristics recognized in it were formal and essentially rhetorical— ae\eia, x"Pls> e t c - — r a t h e r than argumentative and dialectical. T h i s can be seen most objectively perhaps in the rhetoric of Aristeides, the sophist of the second century, who defines two characters of style, the \oyas wOXITIKOS of which Demosthenes is the supreme type, and the Aoyos dqbeXiJf which is illustrated chiefly from the Memorabilia of Xenophon. 2 Without pausing to examine the evidence of numerous earlier writers which may be adduced for our purpose, 3 I would turn now to St. Augustine in whose works the conception of the plain style as the literary form of dialectical argument or proof appears with especial clearness ; it is accompanied also by a theoretical doctrine of the distinction between this style and the language of emotional or sensuous appeal, which will be of service to us in understanding the development of the theory of the styles. I shall call attention first to some passages of Augustine which distinguish in a stylistic w a y between dialectic and rhetoric. In the controversial treatise Contra Cresconium Donatistam (vol. I X . Migne coll. 4 4 5 - 6 ) we learn that Cresconius had warned his readers against the charm of Augustine's style and his rhetorical skill. Augustine replies with the Stoic conception of eloquence : facultas dicendi est, congruenter explicans quae sentimus; qua 1 !

S e e p a s s a g e cited in note 5 p. 2 7 5 . T h e m a t t e r d e m a n d s h o w e v e r f u l l e r investigation.

3 B u t note T a c i t u s D i a l . 3 1 : s u n t a p u d quos adstrictum et collectum s i n g u l a statim a r g u m e n t a c o n c l u d e n s d i c e n d i g e n u s plus fidei m e r e t u r : apud hos dedisse operam d i a l e c t i c a e proficiet. S e e also the interesting p o l e m i c a l utterances of Q u i n t i l i a n in V 1 4 , 2 7 - 3 3 , directed against a school w h i c h in the treatment of the argument was d i a l e c t i c a l (27 and 32), a n d affected the m a n n e r of the a n c i e n t s ; in style plain a n d direct (33).

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tunc u t e n d u m est c u m recta sentimus. It is g o o d or b a d a c c o r d i n g to the nature o f its utterances, not in itself ( i , 2). C r e s c o n i u s himself has s h o w n b y his o w n e l o q u e n c e in assailing e l o q u e n c e that his a t t a c k on this point is contentious rather than s i n c e r e (2, 3). S i m i l a r l y in r e g a r d to dialectic C r e s c o n i u s has s o u g h t t o p r e j u d i c e his followers b y w a r n i n g them to b e w a r e of A u g u s t i n e ' s skill, as if it w e r e sorrje p a g a n trick i n c o n g r u o u s with the Christian character (13, 16). B u t in fact what is dialectic e x c e p t skilful a r g u m e n t a t i o n (peritia d i s p u t a n d i ) ; and indeed just s u c h art as C r e s c o n i u s himself is u s i n g against A u g u s t i n e : inspicio s e r m o n e m tuum, istum ipsum q u e m ad m e scripsisti; v i d e o te q u a e d a m c o p i o s e ornateque explicare, hoc est e l o q u e n t e r : q u a e d a m v e r o subtiliter a r g u t e q u e d i s s e r e r e h o c est dialectice. C r e s c o n i u s has s o u g h t to i m p o s e on the i g n o r a n c e of his a u d i e n c e b y i n v e i g h i n g a g a i n s t rhetoric and dialectic, both of w h i c h he thus e m p l o y s in a false a n d sophistical w a y ( 1 4 , 17 extr.). T h e true dialectician uses the art for the necessary p u r p o s e of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the true a n d the false ( 1 5 , 19), a n d of this art, as of true e l o q u e n c e , t h e H o l y Scriptures afford abundant e x a m p l e s ( 1 4 , 18). 1 H o c ille v e r u s disputator si late d i f f u s e q u e faciat, e l o q u e n t e r facit, a l i o q u e tunc censetur a u g e t u r q u e v o c a b u l o , ut dictor potius q u a m disputator v o c e t u r ; sicut ilium l o c u m A p o s t o l u s c o p i o s e dilatat a t q u e diffundit ( 1 6 , 20): ' i n o m n i b u s ' inquit ( I I C o r . 6, 4 - 1 0 ) ' c o m m e n d a n t e s n o s m e t i p s o s ut D e i ministros, in m u l t a patientia, in tribulationibus, in angustiis, in p l a g i s , in carceribus,' e t c . — a p a s s a g e o f s u c h resonant a n d t r i u m p h a n t rhetoric in the L a t i n version which A u g u s t i n e uses that it is h a r d to refrain from citing it in full. U p o n this h e c o m m e n t s : q u i d enim h o c stilo a p o s t o l i c o uberius et ornatius, id e s t eloquentius, facile invenis ? T u r n i n g then to e x a m p l e s of dialectic he c o n t i n u e s : si a u t e m presse atque constricte, m a g i s e u m d i s p u t a t o r e m q u a m d i c t o r e m a p p e l l a r e c o n s u e v e r u n t : qualiter agit idem A p o s t o l u s d e c i r c u m cisione et p r a e p u t i o patris A b r a h a m , v e l distinctione legis et gratiae. M y p u r p o s e in setting forth this discussion has b e e n to s h o w as nearly as possible b y c o n c r e t e e x a m p l e s A u g u s t i n e ' s conc e p t i o n of the practical distinction b e t w e e n dialectic a n d rhetoric. 1 Augustine demonstrates the presence of dialectic in the Scriptures b y c i t i n g passages in w h i c h the w o r d disputare o c c u r s ; the argument is captious, but interesting as r e v e a l i n g the technical character of the word.

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Some passages of the treatise of Cresconius were rhetoric (eloquentia), others were dialectic. Examples from Cresconius he does not give (and we can well enough spare them), but the superb specimen of St. Paul's eloquence, contrasted with the close objective argumentation of the other passages of Scripture which are designated as dialectic, makes it clear that from a linguistic point of view the distinction between the two forms of presentation is a distinction between two types of literary style. T h e theoretical principle of differentiation as explained by Augustine himself we shall examine presently. The treatise De Doctrina Christiana deals with the method of interpretation and exposition of Christian doctrine. 1 It is a work of much interest for the personality of Augustine as well as for the history of Christian rhetoric, and deserves more thorough and historical interpretation than it has received. 2 T h e fourth book, which deals with the question of presentation or style, is perhaps of most general interest. A portion of it I shall here take up in which the doctrine of the three styles is applied to Christian eloquence. In book II 41 (I cite by the smaller divisions of Migne) Augustine has reviewed briefly the value of the various disciplines for the Christian teacher. After a rather full discussion of dialectic (48-53), he turns briefly to rhetoric in 54: sunt etiam quaedam praecepta uberioris disputationis, quae iam eloquentia nominatur. T o these two arts the duty of the Christian orator corresponds (IV 6). If his auditors require instruction, by narrative or argument the necessary facts and conclusions are to be placed before them ; but if they require that the knowledge which they already have shall be transmuted into action (moveri), then there is need of eloquence (maioribus dicendi viribus opus est 3 .) T h e underlying distinction here is, it will be seen, the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, and in the paragraphs which follow (7 and 8) the adverbs sapienter and eloquenter continue the same antithesis. ' I 1 : duae sunt res quibus nititur omnis tractatio S c r i p t u r a r u m : modus i n v e n i e n d i quae intelligenda sunt ( = b o o k s I—III) et modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt ( = book IV). 2 T h e treatises of Ferd. C o l i n c a m p , L a Methode Oratoire dans St. A u g u s t i n e (Diss. Paris 1848), and of A . L e z a t , D e Oratore Christiano apud St. A u g . (ib. 1871), are serviceable for a g e n e r a l introduction to the subject. 3 I b i d . extr. I b i observationes et increpationes, concitationes et coercitiones et quaecumque alia v a l e n t ad commovendos animos sunt necessaria.

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Without following further the intervening argument, I pass now to 27, which introduces the three Ciceronian officia oratoris. Dixit e r g o quidam eloquens et verum dixit ita dicere debere eloquentem ut doceat ut delectet ut flectat. T h e relationship of these three functions is defined with reference to the distinction drawn in II 55 between dialectic and rhetoric: horum trium quod primo loco positum est, hoc est docendi necessitas, in rebus est constituía quas dicimus; reliqua duo, in modo quo dicimus. 1 T h a t is, of the three functions of the orator, docere falls in the province of the dialectician, delectare and movere of the rhetorician. T h e first per se may wholly disregard form if only the speaker conveys his thought to the mind of another (si vero intellectus est, quocumque modo dixerit, dixit). But the auditor is not always patient to listen, nor, though he knows the truth, is he always moved to carry it into effect: sicut est autem ut teneatur ad audiendum delectandus auditor, ita flectendus ut moveatur ad agendum (27 extr.). T o these three functions correspond the three styles, the relation of which to the officia oratoris is described in words adapted from Cicero (34 extr.): is erit eloquens qui ut doceat poterit parva submisse, ut delectet módica temperate, ut flectat magna granditer dicere. In explanation of the words parva submisse Augustine digresses (35) to point out that the Christian preacher has always to do with great subject-matter, lest the words of Cicero should mislead; but though his theme is always great, yet it must not always be treated in the grand style: for where there is need of instruction, even in great matters, the style should be plain and subdued (38 init.). For example, the explanation of the unity of the Trinity requires careful discussion (disputatione) in order that a difficult subject may be apprehended as clearly as possible: here is no place for the ornaments of style, but only for explanation and demonstration (38). In 39 Augustine passes over to a more detailed characterization of the three styles on the basis of examples chosen from H o l y Scripture. T h e dictio submissa is first illustrated with passages drawn from the third and fourth chapters of Paul to the Galatians. T h e y are typical specimens of the close logical manner of St. Paul, exactly similar to the kind of discussions which Augustine said in his reply to Cresconius show the presence of dialectic in 1

See the formulation of this distinction in the de D i a l é c t i c a , p. 283 b e l o w .

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t h e sacred writings (see a b o v e p. 277). T h e characteristics o f t h e e x a m p l e s c h o s e n are e x p l a i n e d b y intercalated o b s e r v a t i o n s . T h e first is m o r e narrative and d i d a c t i c , the s e c o n d a r g u m e n t a t i v e , and as it p r o c e e d s it clears the g r o u n d b y the anticipation of objections or difficulties w h i c h m i g h t o c c u r to the reader. The strict dialectical character o f the s t y l e is c o m m e n t e d o n as f o l l o w s : pertinet e r g o a d d o c e n d i curam non solum aperire clausa et n o d o s s o l v e r e q u a e s t i o n u m , sed etiam d u m h o c agitur, aliis quaestionibus, q u a e fortassis inciderint, ne id q u o d dicimus i m p r o betur per illas aut refellatur, occurrere. It will be seen from the e x a m p l e s cited a n d from the c h a r a c terizing w o r d s o f A u g u s t i n e that the dictio submissa is s c a r c e l y what w e s h o u l d call a s i m p l e s t y l e (Xo'yoy dc\rjs), nor w o u l d it, I think, o c c u r t o the m o d e r n r e a d e r to instance p a s s a g e s o f close r e a s o n i n g in Paul's E p i s t l e s as e x a m p l e s of s u c h a style. One m i g h t h a v e l o o k e d m o r e naturally for s o m e simple narrative f r o m the G o s p e l s . B u t in fact not o n l y here, but also in t h e s p e c i m e n s g i v e n from C y p r i a n and A m b r o s i u s the characteristic traits a r e a r g u m e n t a t i v e and are d e s i g n a t e d as such. 1 Indeed this style is c o n c e i v e d o f b y A u g u s t i n e as the instrument for the most i n v o l v e d a n d intricate discussion (39 e x t r . ) : fit autem ut c u m incidentes quaestioni aliae quaestiones, et aliae rursus incidentibus incidentes pertractantur a t q u e solvuntur, in earn l o n g i t u d i n e m ratiocinationis e x t e n d a t u r intentio, ut nisi m e m o r i a p l u r i m u m valeat a t q u e v i g e a t , a d caput u n d e a g e b a t u r d i s p u t a t o r redire non possit. It is in short, as the e x a m p l e s and the w o r d s o f characterization s h o w (quaestio, ratiocinatio, disputator), dialectic itself l o o k e d at from the linguistic s i d e or, in other w o r d s , conc e i v e d o f as s t y l e . T h e description of A u g u s t i n e contains not a few allusions to or reminiscences of C i c e r o ' s treatment of the s a m e s t y l e in t h e O r a t o r . In g e n e r a l h o w e v e r t h e dialectical c h a r a c t e r o f the style, w h i c h w e found implied in s o m e of C i c e r o ' s t e r m s and especially in his c h o i c e o f an e x a m p l e (his oration p r o C a e c i n a ) , is m o r e s t r o n g l y emphasized. 2 1 Cf. 45 (On a passage from C y p r i a n ) : iam solvere incipiens propositam quaestionera. 44 (Ambrosius de Spiritu Sancto): res suscepta . . . rerum d o c u m e n t a desiderat. 2 T h i s m a y be seen very w e l l by comparison of the f o l l o w i n g passages, Orator 7 9 : acutae crebraeque sententiae ponentur et nescio u n d e ex abdito e r u t a e ; and A u g u s t i n e 56: plerumque autem dictio ipsa submissa, dum solvit difficillimas quaestiones et inopinata manifestatione demonstrat, dum sententious acutissimas de nescio quibus quasi cavernis, unde non sperabatur, emit et ostendit.

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In contrast to the genus summissum stand the other two styles, the genus medium and the genus grande, corresponding to the contrasted functions of the orator: ( i ) docere and (2) delectare and movere. T h e first of these has to do with the matter of eloquence, the other two with the manner (above p. 279). A s the plain style is thought of as the stylistic aspect of dialectic, so the other two styles are in reality but two aspects or phases of rhetoric looked at from the standpoint of style. For rhetoric is fundamentally conceived of as the art of effecting an emotional transport (yjrvxa-yayia) ' which shall take the place of intellectual persuasion. Its ends may be accomplished roughly speaking in either of two w a y s : (1) by language relying for effect chiefly upon the vivid and emotional conception of the thought ( f f ^ a r a •rijs biavoias), or (2) by the more subtle and sensuous elements of sound and rhythm ax^ara riji- Xtgear.2 In a rough way Demosthenes may be instanced as an example of the former type, Isocrates of the latter. With the first of these methods the grand style is identified (movere), with the second the middle (delectare). L i k e Cicero, Augustine attaches most importance to the grand style, which together with the plain style affords the Christian orator his essential instruments. These two styles and recognition of their aim (quod efficere intendunt) are especially necessary for those qui sapienter et eloquenter volunt dicere. Examples of the grand style, well chosen and effective, from the Epistles of Paul are presented in 42, of which the first (II Cor. 6 , 2 - 1 1 ) is the same as was adduced in the polemic against Cresconius to show the presence of rhetoric in the sacred writings. A s in the treatise D e Dialectica, to which we shall presently turn, the demand is made that the dialectician shall lend color and grace to disputation by rhetorical means, and that on the other hand the rhetorician shall use the bones and sinews of dialectic for the framework of his utterances, so in each of the three styles Augustine demands that some qualities of the other two shall be 1

Plato Phaedrus 271 D : ineiöij Mjov ¿vva/uc Tvy%dvet 1jivxayayia ovaa. Cf.

t h e interesting paper of H i r z e l , Ü b e r das Rhetorische und seine B e d e u t u n g b e i Plato, L e i p z i g , 1871. • T h e relation of these two methods to each other is w e l l defined in 4 2 : g r a n d e autem d i c e n d i g e n u s hoc m a x i m e distat ab isto genere temperato, quod n o n tarn verborum ornatibus comptum est, quam v i o l e n t u m animi affectibus. N a m capit etiam ilia ornamenta p a e n e o m n i a ; sed ea si non habuerit, non requirit. 19

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present. T h e genus submissum for instance shall not only be listened to with understanding (intelligenter), but also with pleasure (libenter), and with persuasion which shall lead to action (oboedienter); nolumus enim fastidiri etiam quod submisse dicimus; ac per hoc volumus non solum intelligenter, verum etiam libenter audiri (56). Enough has been presented to show that Augustine conceives of the genus submissum as the stylistic aspect of dialectic, the genus medium and the genus grande as two stylistic aspects of rhetoric. But before leaving Augustine I would call attention to a portion of the treatise D e Dialectica, in which is contained an explicit theory of the stylistic differences between dialectic and rhetoric, essentially identical with the relation which we have found to exist between the genus submissum and the two other styles as presented by Augustine. It harks back to the distinction between the \oyos irpbs TA rrpdyfiara and the \oyos npos TOVS aKpoa/jLevovs of Theophrastus from which we started, and is, in fact, I believe, merely a Stoic development and systematization of that doctrine. T h e ultimate differences are derived from the fundamental vis verborum (ch. V I I ) : 1 vis verbi est qua cognoscitur quantum valeat. valet autem tantum quantum movere audientem potest. Porro movet audientem aut secundum se aut secundum id quod significat aut ex utroque communiter.

I. T h e first division touches the sensuous or non-intelleclual aspects of the word : sed cum secundum se movet aut ad solum sensum pertinet aut ad artem aut ad utrumque.

O f these three divisions the first again receives a twofold subdivision: (1) sensus aut nalura movetur aut ccnsuetudine. (a) Natura—as when the ear is offended by the harshness of sound in ' A r t a x e r x e s o r is soothed (mulcetur) by the liquid softness of 1 T h e treatise w a s relegated to the spuria b y the B e n e d i c t i n e s , w h o m M i g n e follows, p l a c i n g it in the a p p e n d i x to vol. I and rendering it often quite uni n t e l l i g i b l e by careless printing. It is c a r e f u l l y edited and elucidated w i t h v a l u a b l e parallels by W . C r e c e l i u s , E l b e r f e l d , i 8 5 7 (Program of the Gymnasium). It is perhaps best preserved in the famous codex Bernensis no. 363 and is therefore now accessible in the splendid L e y d e n series of photographic facsimiles.

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' Euryalus (b) Consuetudine—as when the ear is offended or pleased by words which habit or convention has rendered disagreeable or pleasing. (2) T h e division ad artem is not perfectly clear, but it seems to cover the recognition of the grammatical form of the word, its rhythmical (metrical) value, or whatever else concerning words is taught in arte: it does not include the meaning or intellectual content of the word. II. The second main division, secundum id quod significat looks purely to the meaning of words, without reference to the sensuous, associative, or emotional effect which they may derive from any of the preceding considerations: iam vero non secundum se sed secundum id quod significat verbum movet quando per aurem accepto signo animus nihil aliud quam rem ipsam intuetur, cuius illud signum est quod accepit: ut cum Augustino nominato nihil aliud quam ego ipse cogitor ab eo cui notus sum, vel qui alium novit qui Augustinus vocetur. III. Both effects may be produced at once (ex utroque communiter) : tunc et ipsa enuntiatio ( = secundum se) et id quod ab ea enuntiatur ( = secundum id quod significat) simul advertitur. From this twofold nature of words are derived two aspects of language as a whole, the one looking purely to the expression of thought or meaning (enuntiatum), the other to an extra-intellectual effect of sensuous, associative, or emotional character dependent upon the form of expression itself {enuntiatio). The two points of view are designated as the characteristic (not exclusive) aspects of dialectic and rhetoric respectively : cum igitur tantam vim tamque multiplicem appareat esse verborum, quam breviter pro tempore summatimque attigimus, duplex hinc considerado [sensus] nascitur: partim propter explicandam veritatem, partim propter conservandum decorem; quorum primum ad dialecticum, secundum ad oratorem máxime pertinet. T h e features of language thus defined are unfortunately too often separated : quamvis enim nec disputationem deceat ineptam nec eloquentiam oporteat esse mendacem, tamen et in ilia [sc. dialéctica] saepe atque adeo paene semper audiendi delicias discendi cupido contemnit, et in hac [sc. eloquentia] imperitior multitudo quod ornate dicitur etiam vere dici arbitratur. T h e ideal is for each to borrow something from the characteristic (proprium) domain of the other: the two should be inseparably associated as are the bones and muscles (dialectic) in relation to the external beauty (rhetoric) of the human form : ergo cum appareat quid sit

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nniuscuiusque proprium, manifestum est et disputatorem, si qua ei delectandi cura est rhetorico colore aspergendum et oratorem, si veritatem persuadere vult, dialecticis quasi nervis atque ossibus esse roborandum, quae ipsa natura in corporibus nostris nec firmitati virium subtrahere potuit nec oculorum offensioni patere permisit. 1 T h e interest and importance of this chapter of Augustine for our inquiry is not slight; for whatever may be thought to-day of its ultimate worth, it affords us a more sharply defined and exp'icit theory of the distinction of styles than is elsewhere to my knowledge preserved. It is the theory upon which his presentation of the three styles in the D e Doctrina Christiana is based. For there the styles correspond to the officia oratoris; and of these the first—docere, in rebus est constitutum quas dicimus : the other two in modo quo dicimus ( I V 27), a distinction identical with that drawn between the content of language (enuntialum) and the form in which this is contained {ipsa enuntiatio). It need scarcely be said that this analysis is not original with Augustine, but goes back to the source from which the whole treatise is drawn. That this source is Stoic and, at latest, contemporary with Varro, is certain.2 But this Stoic source does not represent the actual origin of the ideas here advanced, but drew in turn from earlier Peripatetic speculations concerning the relation of language to thought and the consequent fundamental divisions of style. For the distinction here made between the vis verbi secundum se 3 and secundum id quod significat is essentially no more than an abstract and scholastic version (looking to more universal applicability) of the Theophrastean doctrine of 1 C f . Q u i n t i l i a n , Prooem. 24 (referring to d i a l e c t i c — r a t i o d o c e n d i ) : nam plerumque nudae illae artes nimiae subtilitatis a d f e c t a t i o n e frangunt atque concidunt quidquid est in oratione generosius et o m n e m sucum ingenii bibunt et ossa d e t e g u n t : quae ut esse adstringi nervis suis debent, sic corpore operie n d a sunt. 2 V a r r o is recognized as the p r o b a b l e source of the treatise b y W i l m a n n s , de V a r r o n i s lib. gram. pp. 16-19. R e i t z e n s t e i n , M . T e r . Varro ( L e i p z . , 1901) p. 75, seeks to show that the treatise is an excerpt from D e L i n g u a L a t i n a I . C f . also R . S c h m i d t , G r a m . Stoicorum p. 26 ff., and Sandys, H i s t , of CI. Scholarship, p. 224, note 1. F o r some earlier allusions to the g e n e r a l doctrine see note, p. 285. 3 It need scarcely be said the doctrine is not confined to the single word, b u t e x t e n d s to the w h o l e artistic structure of l a n g u a g e — f i g u r e s , rhythm, periodicity, etc.

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the Xóyoi 7Tpòs rovi ¿Kpotùfiévovs and the \oyos npos rà TrptiyfxaTn, from

which we started. W e have seen that in Augustine's account the value of the word or form of speech secundum se is something independent of or superinduced upon the meaning or intellectual content itself; something which from its sensuous (natura) or associative (consuetudine) significance we may call in a general way its emotional power. It is from the same point of view that T h e o phrastus defines the nature of the \6Yor npòs TOVS àxpomfiévovs. For in the same way it takes into account only as one of two considerations the actual meaning conveyed to the listeners, oh Ka\ OTJFIAITXI TI. Its primary function and characteristic is to select words which shall be more impressive and beautiful (o-i/ivÓTf pa) than the proper or common («oifa «al 8e&rip.fvpe'va) ones with which the thought itself might be most accurately expressed; 1 to weave these into such harmonious combinations («ai raura ìvapfiovlws o-vfijrXtKnv) as to delight and sway the listener (§a-m «ai tWAi/gai), who is thus overmastered and does not demand intellectual persuasion (jrpòs rìjv nei dà xeipadévra [ròi> ¿KpoaTiji'] e^eiy).2 T h e Xóyor jrpòs rà npayfiara on the other hand corresponds exactly to the doctrine set forth under the caption secundum id quod significai. Both points of view contemplate a use of language merely as a medium for the communication of thought (npayiiara, res) : secundum id quod significai verbum movet quando per aurem accepto signo animus nihil aliud quam rem ipsam (avrò tò npayfia) intuetur, cuius illud signum est quod accepit. 3 A s in Augustine this function of language is employed 1

C f . A r i s t . P o e t i c s , 22 i n i t . c i t e d p. 254.

2

C f . A u g u s t i n e ' s s i m i l a r c o m m e n t , w i t h t h e S t o i c r e p r o b a t i o n of such e f f e c t

(1. c. 8 extr.i : i m p e r i t i o r m u l t i t u d o q u o d o r n a t e d i c i t u r e t i a m v e r e d i c i a r b i tratur.

T h e T h e o p h r a s t e a n d e s i g n a t i o n irpòf rovf ÓKpou/iévovs is s u g g e s t e d b y

A u g u s t i n e ' s w o r d s audiendi

delicias

r e f e r r i n g to the l a n g u a g e of r h e t o r i c , a n d

b y t h e c o n s t a n t a p p e a l to t h e ear in the d i v i s i o n secuttdum 3

se.

T h e s a m e p o i n t o f v i e w is c o n t a i n e d in Q u i n t i l i a n V I I I 2, 6 : p r o p r i e t a s

n o n a d n o m e n s e d a d v i m s i g n i f i c a n d i r e f e r t u r , nec auditu

sed intellectu

p e n d e n d a est, w i t h w h i c h c o m p a r e e s p e c i a l l y C i c . d e O r . I l l 80 : p r o b a t u r in p r o p r i i s u s i t a t i s q u e v e r b i s m a x i m e explanat.

quod

aut optime

150.

per-

Cf. Orat.

sonat aut rem

T h e r e are m a n y p a s s a g e s of this k i n d w h i c h c a l l f o r m o r e

careful collection and comparison.

C f . P a r t . O r a t . 1 7 , and Q u i n t . V I I I 3 , 1 6 ff.

I t is a g a i n s t s u c h a b a c k g r o u n d of m o r e or less e l a b o r a t e t h e o r y t h a t the res of p h i l o s o p h y are c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the verba of

r h e t o r i c (and g r a m m a r ) . C i c .

O r a t . 51 : q u o d si in p h i l o s o p h i a t a n t u m i n t e r e s t q u e m ad m o d u m d i c a s , u b i res spectator, n o n verba penduntur,

etc.

C f . A r i s t e i d e s ( S p g . I I 500, 27): "orav

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propter explicandam, veritatem and is therefore the peculiar instrument of the dialectician, so in Theophrastus the division 7rpor to Trpdyiiara will be the special concern of the philosopher (o (f>t\o