The Northern Railroads in the Civil War 1861–1865 9780231895859

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T H E NORTHERN RAILROADS IN T H E CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865

THE NORTHERN RAILROADS IN THE CIVIL W A R 1861-1865

by Thomas Weber

King's Crown Press COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK

Copyright

1952 by Thoma»

Fir.it printing Second printing

KI Nil's

CROWN

Weber

1952 1953

1'RFS.S

Is an i m p r i n t established by Col u m b i a I ' n i v e r s i t y ^ l ' r e s s f o r the p u r p o s e of m a k i n g c e r t a i n schola r l y m a t e r i a l available a t minim u m cost. T o w a r d t h a t e n d , the p u b l i s h e r s h a v e used s t a n d a r d ized f o r m a t s i n c o r p o r a t i n g e\ ery r e a s o n a b l e economy t h a t does not i n t e r f e r e with legibility. T h e a u t h o r has a s s u m e d c o m p l e t e responsibility f o r e d i t o r i a l style and for proofreading.

PUBLISHED

IN

GREAT

BY G E O F F R E Y

BRITAIN,

CANADA,

CUMBERI.EGE,

UI.NDON, TORONTO,

MANUFACTURED

IN

THE

INDIA,

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OX KOMI) V N IVKRiilTY

BOMBAY, A N D

UNITED

l'\KI3TAN I'BFSS,

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AMFRICA

T h e H i g h w a y s of a people a r e one of the surest indices of their condition and character. Without them there can be neither commerce nor w e a l t h ; neither intelligence nor social order. H e n r y V. Poor, Railroad Manual of the United States

FOREWORD THE

MANY

G E N E R A L RAILROAD HISTORIES d o n o t t o u c h t p

any

great extent on the Civil W a r ; and only a few histories dealing with individual lines treat this period. This work is not, however, an attempt to write a general history of railroad transportation during this time of national crisis. Several events important for railroad historians, such as the founding in 1863 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, have been omitted. Rather this book tries to establish a relationship between the railroads and the war, to note how the war affected railroad activities, and how in turn railroad experience affected the events of the war. I t is therefore one phase of railroad history. Since the primary interest is railroads, not the Civil W a r itself, battles fought over railroad lines and junction points have also been omitted, except as they affected the function of the railroad in providing supplies and transportation of troops and other personnel in the various theaters of war. In general, it will be found that the period from 1861 to 1865 was an important one for the railroads, not because of any great expansion, but rather because of the general consolidation of gains made in the fifties, the experimenting with new and better methods of operation, the finding of new methods of economizing, and the growth in technical ability which enabled the railroads to handle the heavy wartime traffic. These factors once and for all established the railroads as an integral part of the American economy. On the other side, it will be found that the railroads, in their function of furnishing supplies and troops to the various theaters of war, materially affected the character of the war itself, and provided for the North a necessary element of victory.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I O W E A DEBT OF GRATITUDE to Professor Allan Nevins, of Columbia University, whose helpful and stimulating criticism at various stages of this work has been a great encouragement in its completion. Miss Elizabeth 0. Cullen kindly assisted in making available the library facilities of the Bureau of Railway Economics, Association of American Railroads, Washington, D. C. I would like to thank the Society of American Military Engineers for permission to quote from The Military Engineer the story on page 204, and other material on pages 135 and 156. T . W.

CONTENTS I. T H E NORTHERN RAILROADS AT T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR II. RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING T H E WAR

3 15

I I I . EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

25

IV. E F F E C T OF T H E WAR UPON RAILROAD BUSINESS: T H E NORTHEAST

42

V. E F F E C T OF T H E WAR UPON RAILROAD BUSINESS: T H E EAST-WEST TRUNK L I N E S

59

VI. EFFECT OF T H E WAR UPON RAILROAD BUSINESS: T H E CHICAGO RAILROADS

83

VII. T H E MOVEMENT FOR REGULATORY LEGISLATION

94

VIII. T H E NEW YORK-WASHINGTON BONE OF CONTENTION

ARTERY:

IX. GOVERNMENT ACHIEVEMENTS IN REGULATION X. T H E U N I T E D ROADS: T H E GETTYSBURG

107 127

STATES MILITARY RAILE A S T E R N T H E A T E R , TO 134

XI. T H E U N I T E D STATES MILITARY RAILROADS: T H E EASTERN THEATER, 1864-1805

169

XII. THE U N I T E D STATES MILITARY RAILROADS: T H E WESTERN THEATER, TO 1864

177

xii

CONTENTS—continued

XIII. T H E UNITED STATES MILITARY RAILROADS: S H E R M A N IN G E O R G I A A N D T H E CAROLINAS

199

XIV. T H E WAR A N D T H E RAILROADS

220

NOTES

2.™

BIBLIOGRAPHY

29.1

INDEX

30.'l

THE NORTHERN RAILROADS I N T H E C I V I L W A R , 1861-1865

Chapter I

THE NORTHERN RAILROADS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL W A R So far as breaking up the Union by force of arms was concerned, the attempt came fully a decade too late. It is not impossible that it might have succeeded in 1850, when over 40% of the nation's inhabitants formed a truly "solid South" and the opposition 60% was scattered from Skowhegan, Maine, to the Mississippi, with no completed means of transportation at either end. By 1860 the gaps in the north were bridged with steel. Slason Thompson, Short H'utory of American Railways C O M M E R C E as we know it was really a creation of the 1850s. Previous to 1850 the only rail connection between the E a s t e r n seaboard and the Great L a k e s was the series of five short lines, not physically connected, which l a t e r were organized into the New York Central R a i l r o a d , and the only important railroad in the trans-Allegheny region was a line from S a n d u s k y to Cincinnati. 1 T h e lines through New York state had to meet the competition of the E r i e Canal, not an easy thing to do at first.

RAILROAD

During the 1850s railroad construction underwent a tremendous advance. Lines were completed from Boston to Ogdensburg on L a k e Ontario by way of Rouses P o i n t ; the New York and Erie touched L a k e Erie a t Dunkirk in 1 8 5 1 ; the Pennsylvania R a i l r o a d was opened to P i t t s b u r g h ; and the Baltimore and Ohio to Wheeling. The Michigan Central and the Michigan Southern fought for entry into Chicago, and the P i t t s b u r g h , F t . W a y n e , and Chicago provided an important route which was later to become p a r t of the Pennsylvania R a i l r o a d . A similar

4

A T T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

b u t slower development took place in the S o u t h , as rails connected G e o r g i a with the Tennessee River, and the Mississippi was touched at Memphis. B y 1 8 6 0 railroads r a d i a t i n g f r o m L a k e E r i e and L a k e Michigan t a p p e d the Mississippi at ten p o i n t s a n d the Ohio at eight. 2 T h e chief N o r t h - S o u t h routes were the Illinois Central f r o m Dunlcith und Chicago to Cairo, the Louisville, New Albany, a n d Chicago (now the M o n o n ) in I n d i a n a , the Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati, and the Cleveland and P i t t s b u r g h in Ohio. I n the E a s t it was possible, t h o u g h with m a n y changes and stopovers, to travel bv rail f r o m B o s t o n to W a s h i n g t o n . 3 T h e Chicago and Rock I s l a n d R a i l r o a d h a d bridged the F a t h e r of W a t e r s and connected with the Mississippi and Missouri R a i l r o a d to Des Moines. 4 T h e Chicago, B u r l i n g t o n , und Quincy connected a t B u r l i n g t o n with the Burlington and M i s s o u r i t o O t t u m w a , Iowa, a n d a t Quincy with the H a n n i b a l and S t . Joseph.® T h e Ohio and Mississippi R a i l r o a d did business with the Pacific R a i l r o a d of Missouri, which looked f o r w a r d t o a connection with the K a n s a s b r a n c h of the Union Pacific. 6 Of the a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30,000 miles of r a i l r o a d in the Upited S t a t e s in 1860, a b o u t 2 2 , 0 0 0 h a d been built in the last decade; of t h a t 2 2 , 0 0 0 almost 15,000 was c o n s t r u c t e d in the N o r t h with Ohio, I n d i a n a , and Illinois leading all o t h e r states. 7 T h o u g h numerous r a i l r o a d connections existed between the G r e a t Lakes and the s e a b o a r d , there was no connection between N o r t h - S o u t h railr o a d s except by s t e a m b o a t on the Ohio or f e r r y across the Potomac to Alexandria.8 By 1860, r a i l r o a d s were beginning to s u p p l a n t canals, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the c a r r i a g e of t h r o u g h f r e i g h t from Chicago and the W e s t to tidewater p o r t s along the Atlantic. I n 1861, New Y o r k s t a t e r a i l r o a d s c a r r i e d 3 , 3 9 0 , 8 5 0 tons, canals 2,980,144 t o n s ; in Pennsylvania, r a i l r o a d s c a r r i e d 6,921,354 tons, canals

AT T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

5

9

5,349,513 tons. From Cairo, 111., it cost less to send goods via the Ohio River and the Pennsylvania Railroad to Philadelphia than to use the old route via the Great Lakes from Chicago to Buffalo—and Philadelphia was at tide water. 10 Likewise, the route directly east was cheaper and quicker than the route viu the Mississippi to New Orleans. Cotton, shipped from Memphis to Cincinnati by water, thence by rail through Buffalo to Boston, cost $4.50 per bale for the entire journey. This was not only a great deal cheaper than the New Orleans route, but about thirty days quicker. 11 In 1860 the railroads began to participate on a large scale in the carriage of Western grain to tidewater ports, where it was loaded on ships bound for Europe. 1 2 Besides participating in the Western grain trade, the railroads were developing an important trade in coal and in oil. T h e Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western, and the Lehigh Valley together shipped 3,000,000 tons of coal in 1861. 13 Oil was soon to become a m a j o r business for the Atlantic and Great Western Railway and the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad. By 1860 the Northern railroads represented an investment of about $895,000,000. 14 Roads earning a gross income of $1,000,000 or more (the present definition of a Class I railroad) at the beginning of the war included such important lines as the Western Railroad of Massachusetts; the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore R a i l r o a d ; the Northern Central; the New Jersey Railroad; the Central Railroad of New J e r s e y ; the Philadelphia and Reading; the Pennsylvania Railroad; the New York and E r i e ; the New York Central; the Baltimore and Ohio; the Illinois Central; the Little Miami and Columbus and Xenia Railroad; the Louisville, New Albany, and Chicago Railroad ; the Cleveland and Toledo Railroad; the Cleveland, Painesville, and Ashtabula R a i l r o a d ; the Cleveland and Pittsburgh

6

AT T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

R a i l r o a d ; the Michigan Southern and Northen Indiana Railr o a d ; the Michigan Central Railroad; the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago Railroad; the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway; the Chicago and Rock Island R a i l r o a d ; and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad. During the course of the war years this roll call was expanded to include the Boston and Maine Railroad, the Boston and Worcester, the Atlantic and Great Western, the Lehigh Valley, and the Chicago and North Western. 1 8 A good p a r t of railroad capital was invested in track and roadbed. Railroads were almost universally of single track. By 1861, the original s t r a p rail, or U-rail as it was called, had been discarded by most Class I roads for T-rail, varying somewhat in weight on different roads. The Boston and Worcester Railroad in 1861 had 59, 60, 63, and 66-pound r a i l ; during the course of the war some of this was taken up and 80-pound rail was substituted. 1 8 The Pennsylvania Railroad used 67pound rail, substituting some 83-pound rail during the war. 17 An 1862 law in New York state required at least 50-pound rail for reasons of safety. 1 8 The ties were usually unseasoned, therefore necessitating frequent changes because of rapid disintegration from exposure to the weather. 19 A few progressive railroads were trying to find means of lengthening the life of ties, and hence cut down on maintenance cost. T h e Michigan Central found that with a cyanizing treatment the life of the tie could be prolonged to eight years. 2 0 The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad used a process known as "burnetizing," or injecting forcibly into ties zinc chloride diluted with water, which was supposed to double the life of a tie. 21 Generally speaking, the kind of rails, ties, and ballast in use varied widely from one railroad to another. Rail iron was of poor grade, ties were unseasoned, and ballast was poorly laid. 22 T h e rail-

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR

7

roads could hardly be said to be fit for the task they were about to a t t e m p t in time of war. N o r was all track the s t a n d a r d width of 4 feet, 8 % inches. T h o u g h this was the most commonly used, the gauge varied enough to present difficulty in accommodating the growing amount of through freight and passenger traffic. New E n g l a n d roads generally used the 4-foot, 8 ^ - i n c h gauge. 2 3 Of the f o u r routes between the trans-Allegheny region and the Atlantic seaboard, the Baltimore and Ohio and the Pennsylvania Railroads used 4 feet, 8*4 inches, though the l a t t e r ' s P i t t s b u r g h connection to Chicago was of 4 feet, 10 inches, hence necessit a t i n g a change of cars a t Pittsburgh. 2 4 D u r i n g the war the New York Central shifted to the 4-foot, 8 ^ - i n c h g a u g e ; the E r i e stuck to its broad 6-foot gauge throughout. 2 5 T h e much used route between New York and Washington came in for a g r e a t deal of criticism from Congress and from newspapers during the war years, and the route was handicapped from the beginning in t h a t the New Jersey portion was 4 feet, 10 inches wide while t h a t south of Philadelphia was 4 feet, 8 i n c h e s . 2 8 Other important E a s t e r n roads such as the Philadelphia and Reading, Central Railroad of New Jersey, Lehigh Valley, and N o r t h e r n Central were of the common v a r i e t y . " I n the W e s t , the main lines centering in Chicago, such as the Chicago, B u r lington, and Quincy, Chicago and N o r t h Western, Chicago and Rock Island, Illinois Central, Michigan Central, and Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana were all 4 feet, 8 y 2 inches, 28 but beyond t h a t there was a great deal of variation. Ohio railroads seemed to favor 4 feet, 10 inches, while 5 feet, 6 inches was used in Canuda and by the Pacific Railroad of Missouri. 2 8 In the South 5 feet was favored, a f a c t which was t o hamper somewhat the operations of the United States Military Railroads. 8 0

8

AT T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

T o some extent the differences in gauge were overcome by using adjustable axles which enabled cars to run on roads of slightly different gauge. Such "compromise c a r s " ran between Buffalo and Chicago. 31 These expedients were of course dangerous, and accounted for many accidents. T o accommodate wide differences in gauge, a third rail was sometimes laid. The 4-foot, 10-inch Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton Railroad laid a third rail in order to do interchange business with the Atlantic and Great Western and to form its link with the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. A third expedient was to make wheel treads extra broad. 32 Cars equipped with these wheels were organized into " f a s t freight lines" to handle interchange freight traffic. 33 The gradual movement toward the establishment of a standard gauge, the only really effective remedy for the proper accommodation of through traffic, had been opposed by cities which saw advantages to their own business if passengers and freight had to change cars and stations; but the war period, with its high percentage of through traffic, was to accelerate the change toward standardization. 8 4 As an additional handicap to through traffic, few railroads had adequate terminal facilities to handle an expanding business. Most large cities lacked a union station. In Baltimore, for instance, each of the three railroads serving the city—the Northern Central, the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, and the Baltimore and Ohio—had its own separate depot, and there was no rail connection between depots. 35 Philadelphia had four main depots—those of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia and Reading, Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, and Philadelphia and Trenton—and three minor ones. 36 One of the few union stations in operation in 1861 was that a t Toledo, used by six railroads. 3 7 The Jersey City ferry depot, operated by the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company,

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR

9

accommodated 112 trains daily, belonging to six different railroads. 38 Loading facilities and interchange yards varied considerably in size and capacity. The American Railroad Journal of September 7, 1861, praised the large and efficient grain storage facilities of the Toledo and Wabash Railroad at Toledo, but the mounting pressure of eastward grain movements quickly swamped all available storage space. At one time 1,400 cars waiting to be unloaded at Toledo were simply used as warehouses to supplement normal capacity. 3 9 In the West, the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway had no capacity to handle peak grain shipments and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, with an 800,000-bushel grain elevator in 1861, found it necessary to purchase additional land in 1862 along the south branch of the Chicago River for a freight house and transfer shed. At eastern tidewater the Pennsylvania Railroad was obliged to build a 475,000-bushel grain elevator in connection with its railroad extension to the Delaware River for foreign shipments. 40 The New York Central had facilities at Buffalo which could load and dispatch 250 to 300 cars daily, amounting to 25,000 to 30,000 barrels of flour.41 Likewise, there was considerable variation in necessary buildings such as machine shops and engine houses. The Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad was generally considered to be well equipped in this respect. 42 On the other hand, roads bearing the brunt of the Civil W a r traffic very soon found their facilities inadequate. In 1862 the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore was already citing the need for a new freight house at Philadelphia and a new machine shop at Wilmington. 43 Similarly, the Northern Central pointed to the need for new and larger shops and engine houses. 44 Variations among the railroads were not limited to track

10

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL W A R

gauge and terminal facilities. Rolling stock and motive power, depending on track gauge for its size, was not standardized at all. The most commonly used type of engine was that with two leading wheels and two drivers on each side. This 4-4-0 wheel arrangement was called the American type. Other distinguishing marks were a tall stack, more often a balloon type than a straight one, a large cowcatcher, an oversize decorative headlight, a square cab, and a proportionally small boiler. 48 Some locomotives had three leading wheels and only one driver. 4 * The first of the Mogul type of 2-6-0 wheel arrangement was built in 1863 for the New Jersey Railroad. 47 Weights and dimensions of locomotives varied considerably, even on one railroad. A typical locomotive weighed between 20 and 30 tons, the diameter of the driving wheels usually ranging from 4 ^ to 51/2 feet. 48 The fuel most commonly used to fire the engines was wood, though a number of railroads, such as the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, the Pennsylvania, the Central of New Jersey, and the Illinois Central, were experimenting with the use of coal, a development which the Civil W a r was greatly to accelerate.4® Many locomotives could use either fuel interchangeably. Generally speaking, a ton of coal and a cord of wood were about equivalent in the distance they would drive a locomotive.50 Whatever they burned usually produced a great deal of smoke, most of which descended on the passengers. A traveler on the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad reported that between Havre de Grace and Philadelphia, "passengers were almost suffocated by smoke." 81 Passenger cars and freight cars used similar four-wheel trucks (some of the lighter cars two-wheel trucks), except that those for passenger cars were equipped with springs. 82 Passenger cars, usually made of wood, were characterized by open vestibules at either end, making it impossible to go from one car to another except at the risk of one's life. They usually

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR

11

seated from 50 to 60 passengers on seats which were straightbacked, austere, and lacking in any ornamentation. 5 3 Raised roofs, improved fan ventilation, and g a s illumination replacing greasy and smoky oil lamps were innovations being introduced by the more progressive railroads. 8 4 The Cleveland and Toledo and the Cleveland and Erie were enclosing the ends of their cars to reduce dust. 55 The Chicago and North Western heated cars by small stoves at either end, with hot air being passed under the car and through registers into the interior. 58 This system was usually more effective than placing the stove in the center of the c a r , which resulted in an uneven distribution of heat. 5 7 New passenger cars on the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroud were 52 feet long, 10 feet wide, and 10 feet high, two feet higher than usual. Ventilators were placed in alternation with stained glass windows. 58 Link and pin couplers were used everywhere, and since the air brake was unknown, the locomotive hud to c a r r y the entire burden of braking a train and bringing it to a halt. 5 9 Experiments were being made on iron passenger cars. One constructed for the Hackensnck and New York Railroad had walls and roof of sheet iron, and was lined with felt. 80 Another such car, three tons lighter than a wooden coach, was running on the Chicago and St. Louis Railroad in 1865. 61 Dining cars were unknown, but a few railroads had sleeping cars. In 1862, the Michigan Central had nine, of which six were first class. 62 During the war, sleeping accommodations were built into ordinary day coaches to meet the demand. 63 Sleeping cars operated from New York to Boston, New York and Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, Cleveland to Chicago, and from Chicago to Madison, Prairie du Chien, and St. Paul. 6 4 These curs were not exactly models of luxury. Dirty bed clothing, ill-smelling mattresses, and bad ventilation seem to have been characteristic. 8 5 Most railroads had a great many more freight cars than

12

AT T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

passenger cars, and cach railroad classified them differently so that detailed comparisons are difficult. Box cars, stock cars, coal cars, merchandise cars, flat cars, gravel cars, and gondolas were listed in the annual reports. Confusion in terminology sometimes resulted in embarrassment when the government requisitioned cars from the companies. 86 Most of these cars were wooden, though the New York Central was constructing iron freight cars at its West Albany shops. 8 ' Coal trains, then as now, were the heaviest trains the railroads hauled, those on the Philadelphia and Reading weighing an average of 754 tons. 88 On the other hand, freight trains in New York state, where not much coal was carried, averaged only 83 tons in 1861. 69 More usual, an average New York and New Haven freight train of 17 cars weighed 225 tons. 70 The average tonnage per car usually ranged between 5 and 10 tons. 71 Freight trains, usually less than 20 cars in length, ran at an average speed of 11 to 20 miles per hour. Passenger trains of 5 to 10 cars averaged about 30 to 33 miles per hour for express, 25 miles per hour for locals. 72 I t would be difficult to determine the maximum capacity of the railroads in handling either troops or general freight. Capacity would be determined not by rolling stock alone, but also by availability of rolling stock (much of it was constantly in repair shops), condition of track, ruling grades, and capacity of terminal facilities. The New Jersey Railroad claimed it could handle a maximum of 10,000 men daily, or up to 50,000 daily in cooperation with other roads. 73 Samuel Felton said the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad had a "cap a c i t y " of 2,000 cars, but the road's total rolling stock was 32 locomotives and 674 cars. 74 The three main East-West trunk lines (not including the Baltimore and Ohio which was out of operation during much of the time) had a combined rolling stock in 1861 of over 650 locomotives, over 400 passenger cars, and

AT THE OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

13

about 8,700 freight cars of various types. 7,1 According to the American Railway Review, February 14, 1861, this rolling stock plus the Erie Canal would have been almost enough to haul the entire cotton crop to the Eastern seaboard. The long distance traveler, then as now, had at his disposal a choice of routes. From New York to Chicago, one could go by way of the Hudson River Railroad to Albany, the New York Central to Suspension Bridge (Niagara Falls), the Great Western of Canada to Detroit, and the Michigan Central to Chicago. Two trains daily ran over this route, taking between 37 and 39 hours. 78 A second route ran via the Central Railroad of New Jersey to Harrisburg, the Pennsylvania Railroad to Pittsburgh, and the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago beyond. Third, travelers could go via the Erie Railroad to Buffalo, the Lake Shore Railroad to Toledo, and the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad to Chicago. These routes both required about 36 hours. 77 One reached St. Louis from the East via the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad from Cincinnati, a 340-mile line which one railroad man called "one of the pleasantest Roads in the Western country." 7 8 Other routes to St. Louis were the Bellefontaine Railroad via Indianapolis and Terrc Haute, a combination of lines via Pittsburgh, Galion, and Indianapolis, and the long way around via Chicago. 70 Other typical routes and times were: Chicago to St. Louis via the Chicago and St. Louis Railroad, 13 hours; Chicago to Cincinnati via Logansport, 12 hours; and New York to Washington, 11 to 12 hours. 80 In general, long distance travel was a minor business for the railroads. Most roads were primarily local in character, acting as feeders to cities rather than as connecting links between them. 81 Keen rivalry existed between cities for commercial supremacy. Building more railroads was a good way for one

14

AT T H E OUTBREAK OF T H E CIVIL WAR

city to assert its superiority over its neighbors. 82 The increasing urban population of the Middle West dramatized this commercial rivalry. In the sixties, Cleveland, Toledo, and Indianapolis each more than doubled its population, and Chicago almost tripled in size. 83 One result of these conditions was little interchange of traffic and wide diversity in construction of roadbed and equipment. 84 T h e local character of the railroads was emphasized by the fact that each railroad scheduled its trains according to the clock in its principal depot, a practice valid for short hauls, but chaotic with the growth of through traffic. 85 By 1861, the railroads were playing an important economic role in local areas serving large cities. T h e long distance routes of travel created in the 1850s between the Middle West and the E a s t were only j u s t beginning to be developed. I t was significant t h a t such physical connections existed. They had first been used on a large scale in 1860 in the transportation of Western grain to the Eastern seaboard. T h e war, with its unprecedented demands on the railroads for transportation of personnel and equipment over long distances, was to emphasize this still largely potential aspect of railroading, rather than its already developed local activities. By so doing, the war was to accelerate the transformation of railroads into enterprises national in scope, and j u s t at the very time when the railroad itself was helping to bind together the interests of the E a s t and Middle West.

Chapter

II

RAILROAD E X P A N S I O N DURING THE WAR The Pacific railroad . . . is an overwhelming military necessity. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, April 19, 1862 (Representative Sargent of California) shull d e m o n s t r a t e , b r o u g h t m a n y changes in railroading. C o n t r a r y to p r a c t i c e in the preceding decade, energies were now t u r n e d less to expansion, t h a n t o b e t t e r methods of o p e r a t i n g existing facilities. B u t the sixties did not witness a complete cessation of building. I n 1 8 6 0 N o r t h e r n r a i l r o a d s had a mileage of 2 1 , 2 7 6 ; x in 1865, the figure was 25,372, over 4,000 miles more. 2 P e r h a p s the most umbitious p r i v a t e p r o j e c t u n d e r t a k e n d u r ing the war y e a r s was the building of the 6 - f o o t g a u g e A t l a n t i c and G r e a t W e s t e r n R a i l w a y , to form a connecting link between the Ohio and Mississippi R a i l r o a d and t h e E r i e R a i l r o a d , a n d , unforeseen by the founders, destined t o do a tremendous business in coal, oil, and iron. 8 T h r e e s e p a r a t e companies had been formed before the w a r , the A t l a n t i c and G r e a t W e s t e r n in Ohio in 1851, another c o m p a n y in Pennsylvania in 1857, and one in New Y o r k in 1859. 4 W o r k begun in the e a r l y fifties was suspended d u r i n g the p r e - w a r depression. W h e n H e n r y Doolittle, the first backer of the p r o ject, died, ho was succeeded in M u r c h , 1861 by J a m e s M c I I e n r y , a wealthy Pennsylvania!) living in L o n d o n / ' who managed the financial p a r t of the enterprise, and T . W . K e n n a r d , who served as engineer-in-chief. C o n s t r u c t i o n was begun in earnest in M a y , 1860. S t a r t i n g f r o m S a l a m a n c a ,

T H E

WAR

PERIOD,

US

WC

1C

R A I L R O A D E X P A N S I O N D U R I N G T H E WAR

N . V., where a connection with the New Y o r k and E r i e could be made, J a m e s t o w n was reached in September, and by M a v , 1861, t h e r o a d was open 60 miles to C o r r v , P a . 6 T h e u n c e r t a i n t y of a c q u i r i n g labor and m a t e r i a l s u n d e r w a r conditions forced suspension of c o n s t r u c t i o n on M a y 27, 1861. 7 In September, K e n n a r d , H e n r y A. K e n t , and William Reynolds went t o E u r o p e t o seek c a p i t a l with which t o resume c o n s t r u c t i o n . 8 M c H e n r y entered into correspondence with M. de S a l a m a n c a , a M a d r i d c a p i t a l i s t , who responded f a v o r a b l y and b r o u g h t a l o n g with him the D u k e de R i a n z a r e s , h u s b a n d of the D o w a g e r Queen of S p a i n . 9 E n g l i s h b a c k e r s included Sir Samuel M o r t o n P e t o , c h a i r m a n of the London B o a r d of Control of the A t l a n t i c and G r e a t W e s t e r n , E d w a r d B e t t s , a n d H a y w a r d , K e n n a r d s & Co. of London. 1 0 H a v i n g t a p p e d these new sources of c a p i t a l , M c H e n r y proceeded to send 5 , 0 0 0 laborers from E n g l a n d t o work on the r a i l r o a d u n d e r K e n n a r d . 1 1 T h o u g h the opinion was expressed t h a t the p r o j e c t e d line would get no f a r t h e r t h a n A k r o n , 1 2 M c H e n r y and K e n n a r d expected to complete cons t r u c t i o n t h r o u g h to D a y t o n , Ohio, a n d a connection t h e r e with t h e Ohio River valley. R e s u m i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n in the s p r i n g of 1 8 6 2 , t h e r a i l r o a d reached Meadville, P a . , on November 10, and W a r r e n , Ohio, on J a n u a r y 1, 1863. 1 3 A t C o r r v , the line connected with the Oil Creek R a i l r o a d t o Titusville, t a p p i n g the rich oil region of P e n n s y l v a n i a . Between the termini of the two r a i l r o a d s , iron pipe was laid t o c a r r y petroleum f r o m one r o a d t o the other. 1 4 A k r o n was reached J a n u a r y 12, 1863, nine m o n t h s and 140 miles f r o m C o r r y . 1 5 T h e y e a r 1 8 6 3 was t o be a memorable one in A t l a n t i c and G r e a t W e s t e r n h i s t o r y . T h e r o a d was a l r e a d y doing a heavy local business even before its t h r o u g h connections were established. 1 6 In its first full y e a r of o p e r a t i o n , it was a l r e a d y a Class I road, c a r r y i n g 2 1 6 , 0 0 0 p a s s e n g e r s , a n d h a u l i n g 4 6 9 , 0 0 0 t o n s of freight. 1 7 T h i s f r e i g h t

RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING THE WAR

17

haulage included 533,487 barrels of petroleum, most of it eastbound, and the line was already complaining t h a t its E a s t e r n connection could not handle all the business which the new line offered. 18 The connection to Cleveland, leased in October, 1863, and joining the main line a t Leavittsburg, brought more interchange business from t h a t prosperous lake port. 1 9 T h e line to Cleveland from Youngstown was known as the Mahoning Division, and it ran through an excellent coal region. T h e 1863 report of the railroad said t h a t with adequate rolling stock the railroad could supply 1,700 tons of coal a day. T h e value and extent of this traffic was limited only by the means of t r a n s p o r tation, but a profitable and increasing traffic was certain for generations. 2 0 McHenry himself advanced $300,000 for improving and equipping this division. 21 Gradually the line kept building westward, crossing the P i t t s burg, F t . Wayne, and Chicago a t Mansfield, and on the last day of the year reaching Galion on the Bellefontaine Railroad. 2 2 Originally, the railroad expected to reach Dayton before the winter of 1863-64 set in. 23 But progress was delayed by the uncertainties of importing iron rail from England, bad weather, and a strike. In April, 1864, only one and a half miles of track were being laid daily. 2 4 Finally, on J u n e 21, 1864, D a y t o n was reached. Kennard was present to drive the last spike connecting the Atlantic and Great Western with the Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton Railroad, which had meanwhile laid an extra rail outside its normal 4-foot, 10-inch gauge to accommodate the 6-foot cars of the Atlantic and Great Western. 2 5 T h e first through train from New York to St. Louis via the Erie, Atlantic and Great Western, the Cincinnati, Hamilton, and D a y t o n , and the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad arrived at St. Louis August 26, 1864, with a trainload of officials who had left New York 44 hours earlier. 26

18

RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING THE WAR

The completed road was almost too prosperous. The oil trade alone accounted for all its rolling stock, and left begging a potential trade in coal and livestock.27 This intensive trade, with heavy trains and high speeds, prompted the United States Railroad and Mining Register to forecast an early depreciation of the light 56-pound rail and insubstantial ballast with which the road was constructed.28 Laying the track was only part of the work of building this railroad. Permanent stations were erected at Salamanca, Meadville, and Mill Village, and railroad shops were set up in Meadville and Franklin Mills.29 In 1863 the line had a rolling stock of 74 locomotives, 19 passenger cars, 14 baggage and mail cars, and 1,370 freight cars. The wartime difficulty in contracting for engines and cars forced the railroad to lease the Jersey City Locomotive Works to build 100 engines by the close of 1864.80 Also, the Railway Car Works of Ramapo were leased and it was hoped that four freight cars plus some passenger cars could be turned out daily.81 Outside contracts were let for 800 more freight cars. The Western connection proved to be something of an anticlimax. It did no good to expect business from Cincinnati or Indianapolis if the rolling stock was all engaged in carrying oil and coal on the Eastern districts of the line. The second annual report showed that the gross earnings for the first six months of 1864 were $50,000 more than the earnings of the entire year 1863. Even so, "a large amount of business has been rejected for want of sufficient equipment to do it." 32 Even with the leases of the locomotive and car works, the line found in July, 1864, that there was more rolling stock under contract than actually on the road.83 In view of this record, it was hardly any wonder that the backers of the Atlantic and Great Western were so optimistic

RAILROAD EXPANSION D U R I N G T H E WAR

19

about their line. But others pointed out possible difficulties, especially in the West. Several rival E a s t - W e s t routes were already well established. T h e broad gauge connection at D a y t o n was not so advantageous as it might have been, because through passengers from the Ohio and Mississippi had to change cars a t Cincinnati. 8 4 Interchange traffic in Ohio seemed to be something f o r the f u t u r e to decide. Cleveland was a t this time not so active a lake p o r t as Toledo or Buffalo; the hostile P i t t s burgh, F t . W a y n e , and Chicago offered no interchange at Mansfield; and at D a y t o n , the Cincinnati, Hamilton, and D a y ton already had an outlet via the Cincinnati, D a y t o n , and Toledo, the Lake Shore Railroad, and the New York Central. 3 5 T h e 388-mile Atlantic and Great Western Railway was a monument to the energy of Kennard and the faith of M c H c n r y in pouring more and more money into the enterprise. Certainly, as the directors conceived it, the whole p r o j e c t m'pht easily have been a colossal failure, because the g r e a t business and large profits of the Atlantic and Great Western came from the oil fields of Pennsylvania and the coal fields of Ohio, neither of which had been envisioned in the original plans. T h i s oil and coal region was tapped by another railroad during the Civil W a r period, the Philadelphia and Erie. T h i s line began a t Sunbury where it joined the Northern Central Railroad, and continued in a westerly direction toward Erie, P a . In 1860 and 1861 the road was already doing a heavy oil business, c a r r y i n g in the latter year 134,927 barrels of oil, a 600 per cent increase over its 1860 business. 36 T h i s business, on a still uncompleted road, prompted the American Railroad Journal to predict an annual t r a d e of 400,000 barrels when the road was completed, plus 100,000 tons of bituminous and anthracite coal. 37 T h e war brought a large passenger t r a d e to the Philadelphia

20

RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING T H E WAR

and Erie. In 1861 the line had a heavy interchange traffic in troops with the Northern Central, and in 1862 the Philadelphia and Erie delivered 15,829 troops to the Northern Central at Sunbury, more than any other railroad. 3 8 Heavy trade was not, however, confined to passenger traffic. T h e two railroads entered into an agreement in 1862 to furnish jointly 200 house cars, 200 gondolas, and 200 stock cars to take care of this interchange freight traffic. 39 The Philadelphia and Erie was leased by the Pennsylvania Railroad February 1, 1862, 40 and since there was a close tie between the Northern Central and the Pennsylvania, a through route was created from the new road to Philadelphia via Sunbury, Williamsport, and Harrisburg. By early 1863, only 47 miles were completed, but the line boasted a rolling stock of 30 locomotives and 549 freight cars, and was carrying 378,000 tons of freight, and 362,500 passengers. 41 I t was first expected t h a t the line would be finished to Erie by November 1, 1863, then by J a n u a r y 1, 1864, but scarcity of labor postponed completion until J u l y 2, 1864. 42 T h e first through train ran from Williamsport to Erie on August 13, 1864, and regular service began October 17 from Philadelphia. 48 When the Pennsylvania Railroad leased the road it transferred 50 cars to the line, and in 1864 p u t over $1,000,000 in earnings into the road, transferring 19 locomotives, and 400 new cars. 4 4 But even though the line grossed over $1,000,000 in 1864, it experienced a net loss, chiefly because of inadequate equipment and the lack of a through connection until late in the year. 4 5 In the last year of the war, the earnings almost doubled, but the expenses went u p even more, the road showing a net loss of over $270,000, in spite of the fact that business was nearly twice the original estimate. 48 Thus in traffic the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad had an experience somewhat similar to that of the Atlantic and Great

RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING THE WAR

21

Western. Financially, the continued losses of the former line could easily be absorbed by the Pennsylvania Railroad, thus overcoming the chief d i s a d v a n t a g e of this road. The city of Philadelphia, however, was to find its rail connections with Columbus, Cincinnati, and Chicago more profitable than the line to Erie. 4 7 New construction was not confined to the eastern p a r t of the country. In the spring of 1864 the Chicago Great Eastern R a i l r o a d was rapidly building to L a Crosse, Ind., and a connection with the Cincinnati and Chicago Air Line, the latter running to Richmond, Ind., where the L i t t l e Miami R a i l r o a d afforded a connection to Columbus. At the latter city, one route led via the Central Ohio R a i l r o a d to Bellaire and the Baltimore and Ohio, and another via the Pittsburgh and Steubenville R a i l r o a d to the Pennsylvania. 4 8 T h u s another route would be opened between the Northwest with its a g r i cultural produce and the A t l a n t i c cities with their access to l a r g e markets. W i t h the g r a i n t r a d e booming as it was, it would have been strange if there had been no new construction in this area. The expected opening of the railroad in the fall of 1864 was delayed until M a r c h , 1865. T h e Chicago Great E a s t e r n then combined with the Cincinnati and Chicago Air Line, opening a new direct route from Chicago to Richmond, Ind. 4 9 Likewise in the W e s t , the war y e a r s found the Chicago and North Western R a i l w a y building westward to Fulton on the Mississippi, and in the L a k e Superior Region organizing the Peninsula Railroad from E s c a n a b a to M a r q u e t t e , Mich., giving the road ¡icccss to valuable iron ore deposits. 5 0 In the E a s t , the R a r i t a n and Delaware B a y R a i l r o a d was offering competition to the Camden und Ainboy monopoly. 5 1 Plans were also made to complete a railroad link which would connect several of the

22

RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING T H E WAR

East-West lines in Connecticut and Massachusetts to the Erie Railroad on the Hudson. Under the name of the Boston, H a r t ford, and Erie Railway, organized in 1863, this proposed line found the obstacles of high prices and scarce labor too great to overcome. 52 Finally, the Civil W a r gave impetus to the project of a railroad between the Missouri River and the Pacific Ocean. Though very little construction of the Union Pacific Railroad actually took place before 1865, nevertheless the war, by stressing the necesity of binding the state of California to the Union, added the argument of military defense in favor of the project. The argument, however, was not new in the sixties. In 1851, the year a f t e r California became a state, Matthew Maury of the Navy Department had recommended the construction of a Pacific Railroad as a defense measure for California. 6 3 The reopening of the question of slavery in territories by Stephen Douglas and the resulting Kansas-Nebruska Act of 1854 were partially motivated by the possibility of rail communication with the F a r West. 5 4 Both political platforms of 1856 favored a Pacific Railroad and in 1857 President Buchanan supported the idea as a method of holding the Pacific coast to the Union. 55 The arguments for Union were strong in the 36th Congress, and, under the leadership of Samuel R. Curtis of Iowa, the House of Representatives passed a Pacific Railroad bill in December, 1860, but though Lincoln favored it, the bill never passed the Senate. 58 In the second session of the 36th Congress many references were made to the military importance of the proposed railroad. Representative Polk of Missouri thought that one of the great objects of the bill was to facilitate the transportation of troops, supplies, and munitions of war. 57 Representative Foot of Vermont said that a rail connection between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts was demanded "by the interests of commerce,

RAILROAD

EXPANSION

DURING THE

WAR

23

by the necessitites of our postal intercommunication, and by the necessities of our nationul defense." 5 8 Representative L a t h a m of California stressed national defense, pointing out that in case of a foreign war, the railroad would be the only reliable means of communication and reinforcement. 5 9 In the debates on the 1862 bill, Representative Phelps of California suid that

the

railroad was necessary f o r defense aguinst a foreign war, that otherwise California was an isolated and tempting prize: " W e must have a railroad across the continent by which troops and munitions of war can be rapidly transported to that c o a s t . " 6 0 T h i s view was supported by Representative Kelly, who quoted the report of Jefferson D a v i s as Secretary of W a r

showing

the inadequacy of existing means of transportation. Representative Campbell remarked that if a rebellion had broken out on the W e s t coast, the railroad would have helped to crush it. 6 1 T h e argument was well summed up by Representative Sargent of California: The Pacific railroad . . . is an overwhelming military necessity, necessary for the integrity of the country, the preservation of its honor, and called for by considerations of patriotism and safety. . . . That it is a work of this character . . . has been shown by the events of this war, where railroads have been used to an extent never before seen in the history of the world in precipitating armies into the field. . . . In case of a foreign war you cannot hold this continent together without rapid communication across it.62 Under pressure of these arguments, and with the elimination of the consideration of Southern routes because of the withdrawal of Southern Congressmen, 63 the House passed the bill in M a y , 1862. In the Senate, the leadership of Senator James H a r l a n of I o w a carried the legislation through on June 20, and the bill became law with the President's signature on J u l y 2, 1862. 64

24

RAILROAD EXPANSION DURING T H E WAR

In spite of all the urgent arguments about national defense, very little in the way of actual construction was accomplished until a f t e r the war. The company was organized in September, 1862, with Henry B. Ogden as president (later replaced by John A. D i x ) , but it was not until the spring of 1863 that Lincoln had decided on a definite eastern terminus at Council Bluffs, Iowa, and a standard gauge of 4 feet, 8 % inches. 88 Ground was finally broken at Omaha, Neb., on December 1, 1863, and when the original act was modified in 1864 about $500,000 was spent in surveying and grading the line. T h e first rail was finally laid in J u l y , 1865, and by the end of t h a t year, the road was completed 40 miles to Fremont. 8 8 T h e Kansas branch west from Kansas City fared better as to actual construction. I t was complete to Lawrence by the end of 1864, and in the spring of 1865 was ready to run trains to Independence, Kansas. 8 7 By comparison with the explosive decade of the fifties the Civil W a r period was not one characterized by railroad expansion. Yet neither did the war suddenly bring a halt to all construction. Railroading was a dynamic business, and it was n a t u r a l that the prosperity engendered by the war years should once again give rise to plans for building new lines and tapping undeveloped regions after the temporary blight of 1858-60. As the events of the war demonstrated the importance of railroads, the argument of military necessity provided added impetus for expansion. But this new enthusiasm and this new optimism were to be tempered by high prices of materials, scarcity of labor, and by the necessity of carrying on the tremendous job of transportation that the war demanded.

Chapter

III

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861 The construction of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into the war. General McClellan, Aug. 4, 1861, quoted in Carl R. Fish, The American Civil War. "Mr. Quincy, I haven't met a man on your road that's worth a damn but your Superintendent of Construction, and he's a damned rebel." General Landers to Baltimore and Ohio Railroad agent, quoted in Book of the Royal Blue. A M I L I T A R Y S E N S E , railroads are important as lines of communication and lines of supply. They distribute troops, arms and ammunition, food and equipment to areas where they are needed; they return wounded and furloughed soldiers, prisoners of war, surplus and worn out equipment to rear areas. I n addition, like rivers, they may be avenues of invasion into hostile country. In serving these functions, railroads, particularly a t junction points, become legitimate military objectives—to establish a supply depot and to secure a particular line of communication, to prevent a similar use of the railroad by hostile forces, or to advance a step f u r t h e r into enemy territory. Hence the possession of Manassas, Va., Bowling Green, Ky., and Corinth, Miss., was important for the Union armies. T h e American Civil W a r was the first important war in which railroads played a leading role, a role which was somewhat foreshadowed by the restricted use of railroads in the I t a l i a n campaign against Austria in 1859. 1 Before 1861, the possible military use of railroads in war had been foretold by only a few men. This f a c t should not be surIN

26

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

prising. Railroads were comparatively new, having grown from nothing within the memory of most living men. Americans, not being a militaristic people, were not prone to think first of the military aspect of a new development. Finally, the forties and fifties were decades of expansion and manifest destiny, when men thought only reluctantly of the possibility of sectional conflict over slavery. Thus before 1861 there were but few suggestions as to the military importance that railroads might assume in wartime. In 1839, Major General Gaines had reported to Congress that railroads should be thought of merely as an uid to coast defense.2 In 1851, Matthew Maury, noted for his pioneering work in oceanography, was almost alone in forecasting the use of railroads in quick transportation to facilitate the concentration of large masses of troops at desired points. 3 By the time hostilities broke out in 1861, leaders on both sides had begun to cite the importance of railroads in the military scene. General George B. McClellan thought they would prove important in the concentration of troops and in creating lines of operation. 4 In 1861, he asked Edwin M. Stanton if any plans existed relative to a rail-water movement of troops to Kentucky: "My mind is turning more and more in that direction." 5 In 1862, Lincoln himself objected to the use of steamboats for McClellan's Peninsular campaign. He wanted the troops transported via railroad to a point southwest of Manassas. 6 Perhaps an intimation of the importance railroads were to have in the coming conflict could be discerned in the secret journey made by Lincoln from Harrisburg to Philadelphia and Washington on February 22 and 23, 1861, to begin his presidential administration. Rumors of a conspiracy against Lincoln's life had spread rapidly among officials of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad. A mysterious man appeared to the

E M E R G E N C Y P R O B L E M S IN 1861

27

bridgekeeper at Back River Bridge, five miles east of Baltimore, and said conspirators would attack Lincoln's train or any troop train and burn the bridge. 7 Railroad president Samuel Felton's fears were scoffed at by Marshall Kane of the Baltimore police, but Felton proceeded to arm 2 0 0 men and assign them as bridge guards. 8 These men then coated the bridge with a whitewash saturated with salt and alum to make it fireproof.9 When Felton heurd that the conspiracy had been transferred to the Northern Central Railway, he arranged Lincoln's secret journey via Philadelphia and Baltimore. 1 0 On the President-elect's special train east from Harrisburg rode the Division Superintendent, Mr. Franciscus, and the General Superintendent, Enoch Lewis.11 At Philadelphia, the general superintendent of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore took over, and two officials of the road stood constant guard during the night. At 3 : 3 0 A.M. the car was drawn through the silent streets of Baltimore to Camden station, and at six in the morning the President arrived safely at the capital. 1 2 I t was not long before the national government was to learn even more dramatically how dependent it was for its very security on the railroad connection it had with the North. The city of Washington found itself almost isolated in April, 1861. Confronted with a hostile Virginia and a threatening Maryland, Lincoln had to tread warily lest a misstep bring disaster at the very outset. Washington was connected with Baltimore only by the 40-mile Washington Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Near Baltimore, the Baltimore and Ohio turned westward through Harper's Ferry and Cumberland to its connection with the Ohio River near Wheeling. Two other lines ran north from Baltimore: the Northern Central to Harrisburg, where it met the Pennsylvania Railroad; and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, connecting with the Penn-

28

EMERGENCY P R O B L E M S IN 18G1

sylvania at Philadelphia. It was mainly over these lines that troops mustered under Lincoln's call for volunteers would have access to Washington and eventually to Virginia. The Washington Branch was a particularly heavy carrier of troops und munitions. An historian of Baltimore city pointed out that "the earnings of the 30 miles of track between the Relay House ( 9 miles from Baltimore) and Washington exceeded anything ever known in the history of railroads." 1 3 Presiding over this booming trade was John W . Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Born and reared in Baltimore, Garrett worked as an apprentice in his father's commission house.14 He became adept at figures, and once prepared a financial report for a subcommittee of the Board of Directors of the Baltimore and Ohio. Garrett maintained so well the contact thus made, that in 1858, on the motion of Johns Hopkins, the largest individual stockholder, he became president of the road. He was then only 38 years old. Garrett immediately instituted measures of economy which gave the Baltimore and Ohio a net income during the depression years of 1859 and 1860. In spite of the fact that Garrett had referred to his railroad as a "Southern line," 1 5 he realized that his main source of revenue was in Western merchandise. Early in 1861, the B & O was losing its Western business, because Westerners, particularly Ohioans, feared that Maryland would secede. Garrett undertook to guarantee safety for their freight on his line, and trade partially revived until April. 18 Garrett's views were constantly governed by whatever would bring the most income to his road. In his Civil W a r career John Garrett proved himself loyal to two things. One was his railroad. The Baltimore and Ohio suffered extensive damage in the war from both Union and Confederate troops. Always the first j o b after any destruction wus inflicted was to restore the line. T o accomplish this as

E M E R G E N C Y PROBLEMS IN 1861

29

quickly as possible, G a r r e t t sometimes even went o u t to work with the reconstruction g a n g s himself. His second loyalty stemmed from his first. Since the B & O connected W a s h i n g t o n with the West and with the N o r t h , loyalty to the railroad made him of necessity loyal to the Union. Leading Confederates in M a r y l a n d held G a r r e t t responsible for their inability to seize the city of Washington. T h u s G a r r e t t ' s loyalty t o the Union was the result of business interests r a t h e r than personal conviction. This was also t r u e of J a m e s Guthrie, the elderly president of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. I n neither case, however, was the loyalty less effective than it might have been if based on other than economic considerations. G a r r e t t ' s energy and enthusiasm for doing everything possible t o p r o t e c t and develop his railroad gradually won him the admiration and s u p p o r t of some of the leading figures in Congress and in the Cabinet, and undoubtedly helped him a g r e a t deal in the fight to save his road from government seizure. A less able man could not have hoped to deal successfully with the tremendous problems faced by the B & 0 d u r i n g the war period. When Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers on April 15, 1861, G a r r e t t first arranged with Governor William Dennison of Ohio to t r a n s p o r t 800 volunteers from P a r k e r s b u r g and Wheeling to Washington. 1 7 G a r r e t t was then notified of 2,500 troops coming from the North to Baltimore and Washington, so he withdrew his arrangement with Dennison because he would need all available rolling stock to move Northern troops. Governor Dennison, however, misconstrued G a r r e t t ' s action as one of a Southern sympathizer. H e wired Secretary of W a r Cameron on April 18: We had made arrangements with Baltimore and Ohio Road to transport troops, and Mr. Garrett was anxious to take them until late last night, when he declined on the alleged ground that the

30

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

Washington Branch will employ all his empty cars in transportation of troops. We hope Harpers Ferry is safe. 1 8 H a r p e r ' s F e r r y was f a r from being safe, however. Even as Dennison telegraphed his message, Confederate t r o o p s occupied the arsenal and railroad bridge, and from then on Baltimore and Ohio t r a i n s operated westward only with the sufferance of the Confederate commanders. T h e news of the destruction of the H a r p e r ' s F e r r y arsenal created an intense excitement among the people of Baltimore. S y m p a t h e t i c with the South, t h o u g h h a r d l y secessionist, the m a j o r i t y of Baltimoreans were determined to show their opposition to the p a s s a g e of Federal t r o o p s t h r o u g h the city for the p u r p o s e of invading the South. P r o c l a mations were issued by the m a y o r and the governor t h a t no t r o o p s would be furnished by M a r y l a n d except f o r the p u r p o s e of defending Washington. 1 9 Six h u n d r e d r e g u l a r s of the Pennsylvania militia had passed t h r o u g h the city April 18, with an excited but not violent crowd watching them. B u t the news of H a r p e r ' s F e r r y , coupled with the arrival on the nineteenth of volunteers from M a s s a c h u s e t t s , inflamed the mob t o the point of violence. 20 T h a t M a s s a c h u s e t t s t r o o p s were the first to arrive on t h a t f a t e f u l morning of April 19 was due t o the foresight and energy of J o h n M u r r a y Forbes, a railroad builder and financier. Forbes had been involved in completing the Michigan Central Railroad to Chicago, and in building several railroads west of Chicago which were later to combine into the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R a i l r o a d . D u r i n g the Civil W a r , F o r b e s aided Governor J o h n A. Andrew of M a s s a c h u s e t t s in p u t t i n g the s t a t e on a war footing as quickly as possible. 21 A t 11 A.M., 35 c a r s with 2,000 t r o o p s of the 6 t h M a s s a chusetts, 1st and 4th Pennsylvania, and the W a s h i n g t o n Brigade of Philadelphia arrived a t the President Street S t a t i o n of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad. 2 2 I t

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

31

was necessary to go about a mile crosstown to the Camden station of the B & 0 in order to continue the trip to Washington. On regular trains this was done by hauling the cars themselves individually by horsepower on tracks along P r a t t Street. At Camden station travelers would change cars. The Massachusetts regiment, under the command of Colonel Edward F. Jones, had left Boston on the 17th and arrived at Philadelphia on the 18th. There Colonel Jones, warned t h a t his reception in Baltimore would be quite different from t h a t in Philadelphia and New York, distributed live ammunition to his troops, and gave orders t h a t the regiment was to march between the stations without paying attention to anyone and without firing unless attacked or fired on. 23 In spite of t h a t order, however, when the troops arrived at Baltimore, the cars were detached and started crosstown individually in the regular manner before the troops were able to unload. A strong police force under Marshall Kane was stationed at the Camden Street terminal, though apparently the police had not known of the coming of the troops until within an hour of their arrival. 2 4 Nine cars, containing seven companies of Massachusetts troops, were drawn by horses along P r a t t Street to the accompaniment of a yelling, ever-growing, but still not violent, crowd. The last car, because of defective brakes, broke down. Almost immediately the crowd began piling obstructions on the track in front of the c a r : rocks, a load of sand, even a ship's anchor. Attempts were made to pull up the rails. Confronted with these obstacles, the driver finally managed to return his car to the original station, and the crowd immediately gathered to prevent the troops from marching crosstown. Led by the police, four companies of troops were able to organize and make their way along P r a t t Street to the accompaniment of a shower of stones and bricks. At the P r a t t Street bridge, where a pile of timber formed a temporary

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EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

blockade, Mayor Brown joined the troops, and for a time marched at their head in an effort to keep order. Rioters rushed the soldiers, and on two occasions grabbed muskets from their hands. At Commerce Street the troops fired into a dense crowd blocking the way and in the resulting confusion several civilians and soldiers were killed. Undoubtedly some of those civiliuns killed were innocent bystanders, because the chief rioters were in the rear following the troops, and hence difficult to shoot at. Who fired first, civilians or soldiers, is a question which cannot accurately be answered. Marching double quick now, the troops, aided by Kane and about 50 police who lined the route, finally arrived at Camden Street station, where the crowd "pressed up to the car windows, presenting knives and revolvers, and cursed up into the faces of the soldiers." 45 Quickly joining their buddies on the train, the troops, loaded in a 13-car train with the blinds drawn, left for Washington at 12:45 P.M. The death toll was 4 soldiers and 12 civilians, with 36 soldiers and several civilians injured. 28 That the civil authorities of Baltimore did everything in their power to secure safe passage to the troops and to prevent bloodshed, was borne out by Captain Dike, one of the subordinate officers of the 6th Massachusetts, who wrote to the Boston Courier: "The mayor and the city authorities should be exonerated from blame or censure, as they did all in their power to quell the riot." 27 Colonel Jones himself thanked Marshall Kane in these words: "Many, many thpnks for the Christian conduct of the authorities of Baltimore in this truly unfortunate affair." 28 Mayor Brown immediately sent word to President Lincoln describing conditions in the city and saying that it was impossible to send any more troops through Baltimore, a sentiment in which Governor Hicks concurred. 29 J. Edgar Thomson and Samuel Felton, presidents respectively of the Pennsylvania

E M E R G E N C Y P R O B L E M S IN 1861

33

Railroad and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, with headquarters a t Philadelphia, wired Secretary of W a r Cameron t h a t they could not t r a n s f e r troops to the Baltimore and Ohio at Baltimore. The A d j u t a n t General replied immediately to send the troops anyway, p r e p a r e d to fight their way through if necessary. 3 0 President G a r r e t t was thus placed on the horns of a dilemma. W i t h his railroad menaced by a Baltimore mob, he himself was threatened with treason by Cameron if the B & O carried Southern troops, and threatened with confiscation of his railroad by Governor Letcher of Virginia if he t r a n s p o r t e d Federal troops. 8 1 On the evening of April 19, Governor Hicks, M a y o r Brown, Marshall Kane, and ex-Governor Lowe met in consultation. Determined to protect the city from mob violence and unwarranted p r o p e r t y destruction, they decided to burn the railroad bridges of the N o r t h e r n Central Railway, and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore in the vicinity of Baltimore, thus isolating the city from rail communication with the North. 3 2 At 2:30 A.M. on the 20th, the orders were carried out, under direction of Lieutenant Colonel Johnson and F i r s t Lieutenant Hubbell of the Purnell Legion of Maryland, 3 3 each of two parties destroying three bridges on each railroad, along with the telegraph lines. 34 Baltimore was thus cut off from communication with Philadelphia, H a r r i s b u r g , and New York. T h e danger in which this "official" action placed the city of Washington was f a r too great to j u s t i f y the action taken. When Marshall Kane and the Board of Police were later arrested by General Nathaniel P. Banks in J u n e , 1861, the extent of their action was made clearer. T h e Police Board inspected all communications via telegraph between Baltimore and Washington. On April 22, the Board refused permission to the N o r t h e r n Central Railway to rebuild the destroyed bridges, and on April

34

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

26 refused a similar request from the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore. T h e position of the Police Board was t h a t the railroad should not be used to t r a n s p o r t troops for the use of the government. 3 5 T h e railroad, on the other hand, claimed it could not prevent the destruction, and asked the legisl a t u r e to reimburse the companies for damages amounting to $117,609.63. Said the Northern Central: The protection to property and reparation for its injury, are eminently due where the wrong had been perpetrated by officials of the highest position. Rights hardly merit the name where there is neither security for their preservation nor compensation for their destruction. 89 T h e Northern Central Railway was closed from Hanover J u n c t i o n to Baltimore, 46 miles, until May 21, and this was the most productive p a r t of the line f o r passenger and freight revenue. 37 T h e Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore was disabled for 40 miles, and not reopened to Baltimore until M a y 14. 38 Meanwhile, faced with the necessity of getting troops to Washington, Cameron was forced to take immediate action. T h e 7th New York regiment arrived a t Philadelphia on the twentieth and was ordered by Cameron to proceed to H a v r e de Grace by rail, thence by f e r r y to Annapolis. 3 9 T r o o p s were also converging on Baltimore from the West. News t h a t 5,000 Northern troops were marching toward Baltimore from Cockeysville on the Northern Central had the electric effect of arousing the populace of Baltimore to arms, as a result of which the troops were temporarily ordered back to Harrisburg. 4 0 Both General Winfield Scott and Secretary Cameron favored using the Northen Central with the troops fighting their way t h r o u g h Baltimore if necessary (though Scott would have preferred t h a t they march around the city, not through i t ) , but M a j o r -

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86

General Patterson, commanding the Department of Pennsylvania, influenced by Thomson and Felton, convinced his superiors that the rail-water route by way of Annapolis was best. 41 These two railroad men urged the government to take possession of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad, and t h a t p a r t of the Baltimore and Ohio from Annapolis Junction to Washington. They offered their services to Cameron to supervise the transportation of troops and to furnish locomotives, cars, and men from their own roads. 42 Brown, Hicks, and G a r r e t t interceded with Lincoln to get a reversal of the order to send troops through Baltimore. 48 Cameron, favoring the Northern Central route to the last, finally yielded to the views of the m a j o r i t y , and on April 27, 1861, appointed Thomas A. Scott, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, to be in charge of the railways and telegraph between Washington and Annapolis. His chief assistant was 26-year-old Andrew Carnegie. 44 Scott, a Pennsylvanian by birth, had his first job with the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1850 at the age of 27. H e rose rapidly to third assistant superintendent of the Pittsburgh Division, then general superintendent, and finally vice-president in March, I860. 4 5 At the outbreak of war, Scott was summoned to Governor Curtin's office to assist in the transportation of Pennsylvania troops, and there, "with a relay magnet and key placed on a window sill," 46 opened the first military telegraph office in the country. Scott called in four expert railroad telegraphers and sent them to Washington to become the first operators employed in what was soon to become the Military Telegraph Corps. Scott, with the aid of John Tucker, 4 7 organized the route by way of Perryville, where the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore reached the Susquehanna River, thence by the steamer " M a r y l a n d " to Annapolis, then the Annapolis and Elk Ridge

36

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

to the B & O and on to Washington. Locomotives and cars were ordered from other railroads to supplement what B & 0 rolling stock the government had been able to appropriate. 4 8 Under Carnegie's direction, the railroad was repaired in three days, and by April 29 the route was open between Washington and Annapolis. 49 Carnegie had the able assistance of General Benjamin F. Butler, who had stationed guards along the Annapolis road and then advanced up the B & O to seize the important junction at Relay House, where the Washington Branch joined the main line from the west. Bv the middle of May, 1861, Baltimore was occupied by General Butler, 50 among whose troops were some of the same 6th Massachusetts regiment which had been attacked the previous month on their passage through the city. W i t h the occupation of the city and the repair of the railroad bridge, direct communication between Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia was again possible. Carnegie himself rode in the cab of the first train into Washington. 51 Andrew Carnegie and Tom Scott had already experienced many years of close association before the outbreak of war. As an alert and talented operator in the Pittsburgh teleg r a p h office, the 16-year-old lad from Scotland had a t t r a c t e d Scott's attention, and soon became the railroad executive's private secretary and telegrapher. 5 2 Carnegie remained with the Pennsylvania Railroad until 1865, eventually becoming superintendent of the Pittsburgh Division. In Washington, he was Scott's right hand man. I t was Carnegie who recruited the four telegraphers from Pittsburgh, Greensburg, Altoonu, and Mifflin to s t a r t the Military Telegraph Corps. In the summer of 1861, Carnegie personally supervised the transportation of the defeated Federal troops after Bull R u n ; in November he moved to Pittsburgh to help see the Pennsylvania Railroad through the war. 5 3

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87

Scott was commissioned a Colonel of District of Columbia Volunteers in May, 1861, and t h a t same month his jurisdiction was extended to all railways and telegraphs a p p r o p r i a t e d for government use. 54 His powers were merely advisory," however, and very little in the way of coordination was accomplished. There was some conflict of authority. J o h n Tucker, under the Quartermaster General, made contracts for rail t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , but his office had no title and he received no compensation. 0 5 In August, Scott became Assistant Secretary of W a r to supervise government railways and transportation, 5 8 and his former position was filled in September by R. N. Morley, captain in the Quartermaster Corps. Scott accepted his position on the understanding t h a t he could retire October 1 and return to his j o b with the Pennsylvania Railroad, but the war emergency kept him in office until J u n e 1, 1862. 5 7 Of Scott's accomplishments as assistant secretary, Cameron, twenty years later, said t h a t soon a f t e r Scott came to the W a r Department, he had his office placed in telegraphic communication with all the army stations that could be reached, with every telegraph station in every loyal state of the north. . . . He built a line of railway through the streets of Washington to the Long Bridge, so as to make a direct connection with the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. . . . In less than a month . . . he could tell the capacity for transportation toward every division of the army, 68 I t was unfortunate t h a t the first year of the war should bring Scott into conflict with G a r r e t t . Both were young ( G a r r e t t 41 in 1861, Scott 38) ; both were energetic; both had ability. Their mutual hostility had developed out of a pre-war competition between the Baltimore and Ohio and the Pennsylvania f o r control of the Northern Central Railway. 5 9 T h e Pennsylvania, with both J . E d g a r Thomson and Scott, was the stronger road, and had the advantage in this battle. When Lincoln became President, Scott found an ally in the Cabinet

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E M E R G E N C Y P R O B L E M S I N 1861

in S e c r e t a r y of W a r Cameron, one of the d i r e c t o r s of the N o r t h e r n Central. In the differences of opinion t h a t arose between Cameron and Scott on the one h a n d , and G a r r e t t on the other, the tensions of war almost inevitably introduced the question of disloyalty, and it was G a r r e t t who suffered most from the charge. T h e replacement of Cameron by S t a n t o n not only deprived Scott of u voice in high places, but also b r o u g h t in a man more sympathetic to G a r r e t t ; a f a s t friendship soon developed between the new s e c r e t a r y and the B & O president. T h e growing realization t h a t all railroads had a cooperative j o b to do in the war and could ill afford to q u a r r e l was another f a c t o r which helped to dispel the earlier hostility. B y 1863, S c o t t and G a r r e t t were c o o p e r a t i n g enthusiastically in a r r a n g ing the t r a n s f e r of Hooker's c o r p s from Virginia to Tennessee. D u r i n g 1861 the government expanded its t r a n s p o r t a t i o n facilities in Virginia. Morley's r e p o r t of November, 1861, showed t h a t the a r m y in Virginia was o p e r a t i n g nine miles of the O r a n g e and Alexandria R a i l r o a d , and eleven miles of the H a m p s h i r e and Loudoun R a i l r o a d , both roads o r i g i n a t i n g a t Alexandria, and supplying t r o o p s stationed along their routes. A machine shop was in operation in Alexandria to r e p a i r rolling stock and to f a b r i c a t e ironwork f o r bridge construction. T h e small amount of rolling stock not destroyed or carried off by the enemy was supplemented by three engines borrowed from the Philadelphia and Reading, and twelve passenger c a r s and one b a g g a g e c a r from the Pennsylvania. Sidings were built both in Alexandria and in W a s h i n g t o n to connect with wharves and to f a c i l i t a t e operations a r o u n d warehouses. 8 0 These facilities provided the groundwork on which the United S t a t e s M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s l a t e r built an elaborate organization. Morley, whose official title was General M a n a g e r of United S t a t e s M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s , was replaced in F e b r u a r y , 1862, by Daniel C. M c Callum. 6 1

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

39

T h i s r a t h e r h a p h a z a r d development of an organization responsible f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n in Virginia was duplicated t o some extent in the West. T h e r e , too, the United S t a t e s M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s had small beginnings, and these were for the most p a r t simply expedient solutions to whatever t r a n s p o r t a t i o n problems happened to arise a t the p a r t i c u l a r time. I t was not until November, 1861, t h a t C a p t a i n Lewis B. P a r s o n s , a f o r m e r director and t r e a s u r e r of the Ohio and Mississippi R a i l r o a d , was assigned to take charge of rail and river t r a n s p o r t a t i o n at St. Louis, working on the Q u a r t e r m a s t e r staff under M a j o r R o b e r t Allen. T h e next month his jurisdiction was extended by Allen to include the whole D e p a r t m e n t of the Mississippi. 8 2 Lewis Baldwin P a r s o n s was a Yale g r a d u a t e of 1840, and took his LL. B. degree at H a r v a r d in 1844, a f t e r which he p r a c t i c e d law in Alton, 111., and in St. Louis. In the decade before the war, P a r s o n s had been an a t t o r n e y f o r the Ohio and Mississippi R a i l r o a d , and d u r i n g his service with t h a t line he formed a firm friendship with its vice-president, George B. McClellan. In the fall of 1861 P a r s o n s joined McClellan's staff as c a p t a i n , and soon a f t e r was t r a n s f e r r e d to his western position, where he distinguished himself t h r o u g h o u t the war. 6 3 P a r s o n s found t h a t General F r e m o n t had instituted a system of c h a r t e r i n g river b o a t s over a long period of time, with payment given on a per diem basis. Finding the system e x t r a v a g a n t and unnecess a r y , especially because the river was controlled by the Union only to Cairo, Parsons abolished the c h a r t e r system in f a v o r of t e m p o r a r y c o n t r a c t s for specific work by the river b o a t s , a method which gave better service a t less cost to the government. 6 4 T u r n i n g to rail t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , P a r s o n s found a good deal of confusion. Railroad passes were being issued by almost a n y government officer, and many unauthorized persons were traveling at government expense. Railroads, not knowing which t r a n s -

40

EMERGENCY PROBLEMS IN 1861

portation orders were good and which were not, honored all of them and in so doing lost a g r e a t deal of money. A f t e r Parsons' chief, Fremont, was replaced by General Halleck, Parsons established rules regulating the procedure of issuing passes, and provided for periodic reports. T h e railroads cooperated enthusiastically, and almost immediately order appeared where there had previously been only confusion. 6 5 Another p r a c t i c e frequently abused, resulting in unnecessary cost to the government, concerned the procurement of railroad tickets. Tickets might be bought for 40 men, and only 30 would a c t u a l l y make the trip, the other tickets being unused or given a w a y . Sometimes the route was changed, or the troops traveled only p a r t of the distance, yet the government paid the r a i l r o a d s for the entire number the entire distance. Parsons corrected this abuse by requiring separate passes on each railroad, and certification by the railroad for only the a c t u a l number of men carried. 8 8 T h u s by regulating the issuance of travel orders, P a r s o n s provided the railroads with a more certain source of income from the government, and by correcting other abuses saved the government much wasteful expense. The capital city of Washington was located in a very s t r a t e g i c geographical position. Though the nerve center of the Union, it was situated almost as a f o r w a r d outpost, uncomfortubly close to enemy lines. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and communication were therefore of primary concern to the government. It took the B a l t i more riot and the subsequent severing of rail communication with the North to demonstrate the vital necessity of a secure line of railroad between the c a p i t a l and the industrial a r e a s of the North. In a similar way, this beachhead into the Confederacy e a r l y had to develop some semblance of organization looking to the use of its location as a base for an a t t a c k upon the heart of the Confederacy which of necessity had to be made by rail. T h e

E M E R G E N C Y PROBLEMS IN 1861

41

solutions to the problems created by the events of 1861 emphasized the tremendous importance of railway transportation in maintaining communication between the loyal states, and resulted in the passage of a comprehensive law to bring the railroads into the war economy, only nine months after the war started. 6 7 The Confederate government, meanwhile, was not regarding the development of its railroad system as desirable from u military point of view, though railroad transportation of troops had been used to its advantage in the first Battle of Bull Run. Southern railroads were poorly equipped, and the constitutional emphasis on state authority prevented any comprehensive development over the Confederacy as a whole.88 Before the miracles of railway transportation of 1863 and 1864 could be accomplished, other obstacles had to be overcome, but none was to be so severe as those of 1861. 8 9 B y the end of that year, the immediate problems had been met. Washington felt secure in its supply lines to the North; Scott was doing herculean work for which he had no precedents to guide him; and Parsons was bringing order out of chaos in the West. Foundations were thus being laid for the dramatic accomplishments of the railroads in war. Before relating them, however, it is necessary to consider first what effect the war was having on the ordinary business of the railroads.

Chapter IV

EFFECT OF T H E WAR UPON RAILROAD BUSINESS: T H E NORTHEAST Keeping the B & O in repair in war time was a task for Hercules. W. E. Porter, superintendent of construction, in Book of the Royal Blue The past year has been . . . the most prosperous ever known to the American Railways. American Railroad Journal, Jan. 2, 1864 IN MAY, 1861, the Railroad Record predicted that most Northern railroads would be unaffected by the war. Railroads in Maryland would be injured because of proximity to military operations, and North-South railroads such as the Mobile and Ohio and the Louisville and Nashville would be benefited as Southern commerce, deprived of its normal seaboard outlet because of the blockade, sought new channels to its markets. But the Record thought the war would leave other railroads unaffected. 1 I t was a bad guess. The war was to have a profound influence on all the Northern railroads, and those effects were not slow in revealing themselves. The immediate impact was one of pessimism, tempered by that native optimistic outlook so characteristic of the decade of the fifties. Some railroads, such as the Illinois Central, complained that government business brought on by the war was ruining their ordinary traffic and they were fearful that the war would bring a permanent dislocation of the economy on which they had been based. This pessimism was reflected by the decline in advertisements in the American Railroad Journal during the sum-

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43

mer of 1861, and by the American Railway Review't change from a weekly to a semi-monthly in July. 2 This gloomy reaction to the impact of civil war was only temporary. I t was soon lost in the j u m p in earnings and in the increasing business which came to the railroads. F o r the Civil W a r brought them prosperity. Increasing business, whether directly in the form of transporting troops and supplies, or indirectly from private manufacturers with government contracts, or for other reasons, was something all the railroads pointed to with pride. 3 No longer were the railroads overexpanded or suffering from the ill effects of depression. 4 Each year gross income increased and profits went up almost as fast. The American Railroad. Journal, J a n u a r y 2, 1864, called 1863 "the most prosperous ever known to the American Railways." Railroads which had suffered a decline in freight and passenger revenues in the three years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, soon found themselves swamped with business, and vied with each other in placing orders for more locomotives and more cars. As we shall see, the business of some roads increased so much that p a r t of it had to be turned away for lack of rolling stock. 5 Increased profits were p a r t l y passed on to the stockholders as higher dividends. The Erie Railroad, which paid nothing until 1863, paid 8 per cent beginning in that year. From 1860 to 1864, New York Central dividends rose from 6 per cent to 9 per cent; Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton from 7 per cent to 19 per cent; Cleveland, Painesville, and Ashtabula 15 per cent to 26 per cent; and Cleveland and Toledo from zero to 10 per cent. 6 But the picture had a dark side, too. As the war progressed, the railroads found themselves faced with a shortage of labor and with increasing prices of materials. T h e Civil W a r , as do all wars, drained away skilled manpower and led to attempts on

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T H E NORTHEAST

the p a r t of the railroads to have their skilled workers exempted from the d r a f t . Failure to do so meant t h a t the price of labor went higher as its skill deteriorated. Rising prices in materials was the most important factor pointed to as limiting the possible profits from increasing business. Fuel and iron were the chief culprits here. The rising price of wood as locomotive fuel hastened change-overs to coal, though of course the latter, too, rose in price during the war. Likewise the price of iron went so high as to be nearly prohibitive, and was an important factor in leading several railroads to experiment with steel rails as a substitute. Finally, one other common characteristic resulted directly from the others. As the war dragged on, the railroad plant began to deteriorate. T h e railroads had so much business they could not shop their rolling stock for any but the most essential repairs, and maintenance of track and of motive power was likewise neglected. Rising prices of materials and labor led many railroads to postpone m a j o r repairs until better times. One result of this situation was an increase in the number of railroad accidents. In 1861, 63 accidents killed 101 and injured 4 5 9 ; by 1864 there were 140 accidents, killing 404, i n j u r i n g 1,846. T The railroads of New England, f a r removed from the seat of war, less expansive, and less concerned with through business than other railroads, nevertheless experienced the same effects that other roads did in these critical years. The war years were prosperous years, though sometimes this increase in income did not show up until the war was half over, and was usually preceded by a definite recession. The Boston and Maine Railroad, for instance, suffered a sharp decline its its gross revenue from $930,000 in 1861 to $732,000 in 1862. 8 The railroad attributed this setback to the decline in local business because of the uncertainty among businessmen, and pointed out t h a t the war was

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45

proving unfavorable for New England railroads, but favorable to railroads to Washington. 9 Officers and employees of the line took a 10 per cent cut in wages and salaries. 1 0 The next year, however, the effects of the war began to be felt. Gross receipts hit $945,000, net $450,000 both figures the largest in the company's history. 1 1 T r o o p transportation and military business were the chief f a c t o r s in the increased earnings; even its subsidiary, the Portland, Saco, and Portsmouth, profited. 1 2 This trend continued in 1864 and 1865 with gross receipts topping $1,000,000 in each case. 13 But the net of 1864 ($482,000) proved to be the high water mark of the war period. By t h a t time, expenses were cutting severely into receipts. In the fiscal year ending May 31, 1862, the road spent $16,500 for coal; in 1863, $27,000; in 1864, $53,000; in 1865, $65,000, all without great changes in motive power or conversion from wood to coal. 14 T a x e s almost tripled in 1864 over 1863, due p a r t l y to the government t a x on gross passenger receipts. 18 Because of the increasing expenses, the line raised its rates, but not enough to prevent a s h a r p drop in net revenue in 1865. W i t h record gross receipts of $1,200,000, the expenses had risen to $928, 000, and the net of $367,000 was the lowest of the war period except 1862. 16 High prices, said the railroad, were responsible. New iron rails, costing $57.50 a ton as of November 30, 1860, rose to $120 a ton by November 30, 1865. 17 H a r d wood went up from $4.25 a cord to $6.75. S o f t coal, costing $5.50 in 1860, sold for $14 a ton in 1865. Spikes had jumped 200 per cent from 31/0 cents to 9J/t> cents per pound, and coach varnish went up from $2.75 to $7 a gallon. N o t only materials, but labor costs were up, too. Enginemen's wages had risen from $2.50 to $ 3 a day, machinists from $1.59 to $2.25, and others comparably. T h u s though the Boston and Maine was enjoying record business, hauling 2,600,000 passengers, and carrying

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THE NORTHEAST

275,000 tons of freight in 1865, 18 net revenue showed a sharp drop in the closing years of the war. One of the important New England routes was that from Boston to Albany. During the Civil W a r , the route consisted of two railroads, the Boston and Worcester between those points, and the Western Railroad from Worcester to Albany. The experiences of these railroads proved to be no exception to the general war trends, except that, as with the Boston and Maine, the effccts were felt somewhat later. The receipts of the Boston and Worcester for the year ending November 30, 1861, were less than those of the preceding year. As a result, the labor force was reduced, and the working d a y cut down from ten hours to nine hours. 19 The next year brought a moderate increase in gross receipts from $929,000 to $1,000,000, and in net from $408,500 to $490,OOO.20 In that year the line carried about 1,500,000 passengers, and about 382,000 tons of freight. 2 1 Bv 1864 it was c a r r y i n g more than 2,000,000 passengers, and more than 450,000 tons of freight. Although its track, rolling stock, and storage facilities were being used to capacity, its net revenue suffered a slight decline in both 1863 and 1864. 22 The answer to this paradox was increasing expenses, which almost exactly doubled from $515,000 in 1862 to $1,100,000 in 1865. 23 Prices of labor, fuel, and materials all contributed to this increase in expenses. In 1863-64 the cost of fuel per mile increased from 14.23 cents to 20.96 cents; the cost of transportation rose from 1.564 cents to 1.705 cents. 24 Additions to rolling stock and laying new rail in the main line added to these costs. 25 As a result of these expenses, the Boston and Worcester did not experience a substantial rise in net revenue until 1865, when its gross was $1,700,000 ($1,000,000 from passengers alone) and its net $537,OOO.26 The 117-mile Western Railroad from Worcester to Albany

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47

profited in 1861 from an increased western trade in flour. I t s gross receipts of $1,900,000 were higher than any y e a r since 1857, but so were its expenses of $1,000,000. 2 7 This line had more motive power than the Boston and Worcester, more freight cars, and generally did a greater business. 28 Receipts and expenses both continued to mount through 1862 and 1863, but the railroud pointed with pride to the fact that it was the income which was going up faster. 2 9 In 1863 its net for the first time exceeded $1,000,000, and included a small profit from the Pittsfield and North Adams Railroad. 3 0 High prices and scarcity of labor forced abandonment of a double track on the main line with only 40 miles to finish, but the road did not suffer so much from these factors as the Boston and Worcester because its passenger traffic was becoming better distributed both as to direction and kind, and it had a large amount of supplies on hand which had been purchased at the beginning of the y e a r while prices were still reasonable. 31 From 1863 till the end of the war, net receipts remained fairly constant, though both gross income and expenses increased considerably. 32 The New York and New Haven Railroad, like so many other New England lines, was primarily a passenger carrier. Travelers between New York and Boston rode to New Haven whence they took the New Haven, H a r t f o r d and Springfield, and the Boston and Worcester. This interior route, now the long way to Boston, was the chief rail route between Boston and New York. 3 3 The war experience of the New York and New Haven was typical in t h a t the first year of the war brought a decline in business. Gross receipts of $808,000 were the lowest since 1853. 3 4 The decline had begun noticeably in June, 1861, and the road blamed the absence of its normally high summer tourist business, of which a great part was southern, and was now cut off by the war. 3 5 To meet declining revenue, the railroad cut the number

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T H E NORTHEAST

of its employees 20 per cent and reduced the pay of others by one third. 8 6 But the war shortly began to have its cumulative effect. An improvement in business began in early 1862, and picked up especially a f t e r J u l y 1. F o r the rest of the year the company did the largest business in its history, carrying 1,100,000 passengers and grossing $1,000,000. 37 T h e j u m p in one year from the lowest receipts in nine years to the highest in its history was dramatic evidence of the economic effect of the war. But costs were rising too. T h e rise in fuel prices, plus heavier trains, brought the fuel cost per mile from 12.53 cents in 1861 to 14.43 cents in 1862. T h e line warned its patrons t h a t with increasing costs in labor and materials and increasing taxes, higher rates were in the offing. 38 T h e next year an even greater business was experienced. An increase of 300,000 passengers brought gross receipts to $1,400,000, net $720,000. 8 8 In M a y , 1863, an additional regularly scheduled passenger train was p u t on the line. Heavy traffic, however, was beginning to wear out the locomotives j u s t at a time when it was difficult to get new ones. The average passenger train was now six cars long instead of five, and the additional weight meant wear on both motive power and track.'*0 In November, 1863, the road had contracted for three locomotives from D a n f o r t h , Cook and Co. of P a t e r son, N. J . , but in March, 1864, the government found it necessary to requisition these engines for use on the military railroads in the West. 4 1 Similar difficulty was experienced in getting new cars, and new iron for r a i l ; fuel cost rose to 20.5 cents per mile.42 In 1864, expenses went f a r beyond any previous experience, rising from $704,000 to $1,200,000. Hence the record gross receipts of $1,800,000 produced a net of only $622,500, less than that of the previous year. 4 3 The costs incurred were unavoidable. Four new locomotives added to the line were essential to carry on its business. Another large expenditure was

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49

in the line's share of six new passenger cars, three railway post office c a r s , and three smoking and b a g g a g e c a r s p u r c h a s e d f o r the New York-Boston run. 4 4 I n addition, fuel cost had risen to 27.3 cents per mile, and the l a r g e number of heavy trains made necessary a higher expenditure t h a n usual on t r a c k repair. T h e New Y o r k and New H a v e n R a i l r o a d thus showed with p a r t i c u l a r c l a r i t y the characteristics trends of the period. A j u m p in one y e a r , 1861-1862, f r o m the lowest receipts in nine y e a r s t o the highest in the r o a d ' s history b r o u g h t a new prosp e r i t y a f t e r the u n c e r t a i n t y of the opening y e a r s of the war. W h e n expenses soared in 1864 t o well over $1,000,000, they showed t h a t the high wartime profits were limited by the highest expenses in the line's experience. On the whole, therefore, the New E n g l a n d r a i l r o a d s encountered record profits and record expenses, though not always in the same p r o p o r t i o n which lines elsewhere experienced. P r o s p e r i t y came late, 1862 or 1863, b u t it did come. H e a v y expenses were noted early in the war because of the generally local c h a r a c t e r of much of the r o a d s ' business. Because railroads in the eastern region south of New E n g l a n d were closer to the t h e a t e r of war, their location placed upon them a g r e a t e r burden in meeting the emergency demands of this time of national crisis. T h e experiences of the N o r t h e r n Central Railway proved t y p i c a l of lines in this region. Connecting S u n b u r y and H a r r i s b u r g with Baltimore via York, 4 5 the N o r t h e r n Central provided an i m p o r t a n t link t h r o u g h the Pennsylvania R a i l r o a d and the Philadelphia and E r i e R a i l r o a d with other p a r t s of the E a s t . T h e railroad found its traffic suddenly increasing in the summer of 1861 to a new high which was to remain fairly stable t h r o u g h o u t the war. I t s gross earnings increased 441/2 P e r c e n t over 1860, reaching a total of $1,417,977.06, of which $360,874.83 was the income from c a r r y i n g t r o o p s and munitions. 4 6 F o r t y - o n e engines, 3 0 passenger cars,

£0

T H E NORTHEAST

and 1,400 freight cars (including 744 for coal) handled this business. T h e line had contracted with the Baldwin Locomotive Company for seven more locomotives, and the 186*2 report listed 51 engines. 47 By 1862 the Northern Central was receiving a great deal of trade from the Philadelphia and Erie, much of it in oil, and in order to take care of this trade, 100 house cars, 100 gondolas, and 100 stock cars were ordered. 48 Of necessity, the business of the government was almost entirely one way, south. In the year 1861, 67,094 troops were carried from Harrisburg to Baltimore, and 14,053 from Sunbury to Baltimore—a total of 81,147 troops southbound. Those carried north totaled only 27,205. 49 I t w.as the same with freight; here too most of the business was through freight south, transported in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Railroad from Pittsburgh and the West. T h e 1861 report pointed out that its local freight had decreased during the year, not because of less business, but because all the rolling stock of the company was required to handle the business of the government. 50 Of 458,724 tons of freight transported in 1861, 107,892 came from the Pennsylvania Railroad. 5 1 A glance at the products carried from Pittsburgh to Baltimore would probably have led a stranger unacquainted with the fact of a civil war to guess that an army was encamped somewhere south of Baltimore. The tonnage figures showed that 30,247 tons of livestock, 13,854 tons of flour, 9,842 tons of salt meat and fish, 6,402 tons of tobacco, and 3,251 tons of whisky and alcohol traveled the rails from Pittsburgh to Baltimore in 1861. 62 By 1862 the troop traffic had declined somewhat, bringing in a revenue of $318,522.91, but the net earnings of the road had jumped from $734,144.86 to $927,341.09. B3 The road's total freight earnings had passed the million mark. 64 Even with its slight decline in troop revenue in 1862, the road reported so great a demand for its 28 passenger cars that it was "impos-

T H E NORTHEAST

51

siblc to take the cars from the trade long enough to renew the painting." 5 5 Passenger locomotives were piling up an average of 25,000 to 30,000 miles per year, the highest being 43,947 miles. 59 T r o o p transportation, no less in 1861 than in 1941, meant wear and tear on cur seuts und cushions; even in 1861 the road estimated t h a t it would require $10,000 j u s t to p u t the cars in first class condition. 57 Carrying troops brought also a good deal of interchange traffic, particularly with the Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia and Reading, and the Philadelphia and Erie. 5 8 Two years of prosperity brought deterioration not only to rolling stock, but to rails as well. The 1862 report estimated t h a t 3,000 tons of iron would be needed for new rails in 1863. 69 The report of 1863 showed an increase of 10.1 per cent in the operating ratio (ratio of operating expenses to income) to a high of 61.8 per cent, the road offering as the reason for this increase the advance in the price of labor and materials while rates remained constant in order not to endanger the Baltimore trade. 8 0 The tremendous increase in expenses meant t h a t , though gross receipts topped two million dollars, net revenue was only $435,216.78, considerably less than the two previous war years. From the government $185,364.11 was due but not yet paid. 8 1 Some of the increased business came from the lease of the Shamokin Valley and Pottsville Railroad ( t a p p i n g the anthracite coal region), and the Elmira and Williamsport Railroad. By means of traffic agreements with the Erie, the Northern Central could t a p trade as f a r north as Buffalo and Rochester. 8 2 But the amount of business accepted was limited by the inability of the railroad to move more over a single t r a c k ; and because officials were taxing the road beyond capacity in order to meet the requirements of the government, delays did occur. 83 Double tracking was in progress to meet the difficulty, and a train was put on to handle local on-line traffic because of delay to through

THE NORTHEAST

02

trains. The line made valiant efforts to increase its rolling stock. In 1863 it had a contract with Baldwin for two passenger engines, and with the New Jersey Locomotive Works at Paterson for ten ten-wheel freight engines. Besides these, 266 new freight cars and gondolas were added and contracts let for an additional 225 freight cars, 200 coal cars, and 215 gondolas.69 Damage inflicted by Lee's army in the Gettysburg campaign of June and July of 1863 caused considerable dislocation to the railroad. 66 From June 7, when Lee's intentions began to be clear, the line concentrated on military transportation and in preparing blockhouses for soldiers guarding the line. A week later, operations were partially suspended and most of the rolling stock moved north. Only troop trains and local freights moving property continued to run. Then on the 25th all shipments stopped. When communications with the Hanover Branch were interrupted, engines were fired to move rolling Btock concentrated at York north to Columbia. York fell to the rebels a day later. The enemy destroyed all twelve bridges between Hanover Junction and Goldsboro, and all nineteen on the Wrightsville Branch. Repairs commenced July 5 after Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, and ten days later all bridges were restored. The general superintendent of the railroad made the following estimate of damage: 64

Loss of trade Cars destroyed at York Cars destroyed at Gettysburg Scale and fixtures at York Ironclad car # 3 1 9

$109,000

12,000 5,600

1,800 800

When labor and materials necessary to construct the blockhouses and to repair the damage were added, the estimated loss totaled $234,900. After that interruption, business boomed again, up to 63 per

THE NORTHEAST

53

ccnt over 1861, the vast bulk of it south. In all, 483,036 tons were transported south in 1863, only 69,646 north. 87 The y e a r 1864 was even better. Gross receipts topped three million dollars, and though expenses edged toward two million, net revenue of $1,085,326.63 was the highest yet, an(J was recorded in spite of a net loss on the Elmira Division. 68 Actually, though its operating ratio went up to 64.75 per cent, the road was earning about 18 per cent on its capital stock, until the latter was doubled to provide funds for the second main line track. 6 9 Though the line did a large amount of government business, this latter was actually only about one sixth of the gross receipts, totaling $586,907.36. Except for the necessity of transporting government troops and supplies at rates one third less than 1861, the coal business might have increased 100 per cent, and coal receipts alone would, in that case, have met expenditures. The railroad thus considered itself handicapped in reference to roads not used for military purposes. 70 Fifteen miles of double track between Baltimore and Cockeysville were completed and in use, and the road purchased 12 passenger engines and 10 freight in 1864 to handle traffic and to replace worn out equipment. 71 But of the 85 locomotives now on the roster, only 41 were in first class condition, while 21 more could run. 72 In the course of the year, 619 cars were added to the rolling stock, making a total of over 3,500 cars to handle a record business of 602,380 tons of freight south, and 142,295 north. 73 B y this time both motive power and rolling stock were more than twice as large as in 1861. Though the year 1865 brought for many lines a definite receding from the peak, the Northern Central made more money than in any previous year. Here are the figures: receipts $4,242,388.18 (double 1 8 6 3 ) ; expenses $2,765,498.50; net earnings $1,476,889.68. The double track was completed to York,

64

THE NORTHEAST

and the road had eight passenger t r a i n s daily leaving Baltimore, three of which ran through to Sunbury. 7 4 T h e months a f t e r the war were used to make extensive repairs to engines and cars, plus repairing the damage done on the Elmira Division by the Susquehanna flood of M a r c h , 1865. 7 5 T h u s the wur brought prosperity to the Northern Central Railway. I t s net earnings increased every y e a r except 1863, the y e a r of Lee's invasion of M a r y l a n d and Pennsylvania. I t is interesting to note that the net earnings of 1865 ( $ 1 , 4 7 6 , 8 8 9 . 6 8 ) were a c t u a l l y more than the gross earnings of 1861 ( $ 1 , 4 1 7 , 9 7 7 . 0 6 ) . T h i s great increase came in spite of the handicap of being a North-South line with most of its business one w a y , with the result that many empty t r a i n s h a d to be run north. One should also note that the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of troops and m i l i t a r y supplies, an important source of income, was only p a r t l y responsible for greater revenue (the higher demand for coal and other products being equally i m p o r t a n t ) , and indeed was even listed as a handicap in the 1864 report. F i n a l l y , the tremendous expansion of the railroad through leases and traffic agreements, through additions to rolling stock, and construction of double t r a c k was p a r t l y responsible for the ability of the road to t a p new sources of income. Samuel Felton and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore encountered experiences similar to the Northern Central. Connecting the cities named, the 105-mile road (now the Pennsylvania R a i l r o a d ) was an essential link in the all-important supply line from New E n g l a n d and New York to Baltimore and Washington. As we shall note, much of Felton's time and energv were taken up defending the policies of his road and helping to defeat the authorization of a government railroad between New York and Washington. H i s position is, in l a r g e measure, iustified by the statistics contained in his annual reports.

THE

NORTHEAST

SB

With a rolling stock of 32 locomotives and 674 cars, the P W & B transported 1 5 4 , 3 0 3 troops from April 18, 1861, to the end of the fiscal year October 31. 7 6 A large number of sick and disabled troops were also carried, " f o r whose transportation we have not rcccived any p a y . ' " 7 T h e annual reports did not keep separate figures on troop earnings as distinct from ordinary passenger traffic. Passenger receipts for 1861 were $1,067,275.42, an increase over 1 8 6 0 of about $236,000. 7 8 T h e next year its rolling stock had increased to 37 locomotives and 801 cars, its passenger receipts jumped to $1,645,024.83, and its net earnings were above $1,000,000. 7 9 Thus the road had less rolling stock than the Northern Central, but carried on more business. Passenger receipts alone of the P W & B were more than the total receipts of the other road. In November, 1862, men furloughed from the Army of the Potomac crowded stations and trains all along the line. 80 Much of the surplus was still on paper, however. As Felton put it, " A considerable portion of the surplus is due from the United States government." 81 The increased earnings of the road occurred in spite of the fact that a large business in Western produce from the Baltimore and Ohio had been cut off by the war. 82 The P W & B was one of a number of railroads making experiments with coal as fuel and finding that the change-over from wood to coal would prove profitable in the long run. As far back as 1857 Felton took the initiative in inaugurating coal burning passenger locomotives on his line. 83 B u t at first the innovation did not work too well. Felton presented an engaging picture of some of the difficulties encountered. A want of practical knowledge among enginemen, and a natural prejudice against a change from old habits, for some time stood in the way of entire success. We were often mortified by the spectacle of a train coming to a standstill between two stations for want of

56

T H E NORTHEAST

steam, and comments of the passengers were in no way flattering to ourselves or to the task in which we were engaged. 84 B u t the difference in cost was important. Coal burners averaged about 6 cents per mile for fuel cost, against 14 cents for wood burners. 8 8 W i t h a gradual increase in practical knowledge, coal was found to be more economical and wood was gradually abandoned. W e shall note this change in the operation of other railroads. I t was not caused by the war itself, but a combination of circumstances during the war—increasing business, scarcity of wood and its rising price, opening up of coal fields on the lines of the Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and Reading, Lackawanna, and Lehigh Valley railroads—accelerated th feet high and the car was armed with a 6-inch revolving gun. 27 Sometimes the sides were higher and pierced with holes for use by riflemen or by a cannon on a pivot. Such a car was built by Baldwin and used on the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad. 2 8 A train of these armored cars was encountered on the B & 0 by Confederate raiders in August, 1864. The six cars and locomotive were protected by railroad rails, two cars had portholes for cannon firing, the others smaller apertures for infantry. The train was stopped when a Confederate artillery shot hit the locomotive boiler and unother shot entered a porthole on one of the cars. The raiders destroyed the train bv piling railroad ties around it and setting them afire. 29 These beginnings foreshadowed the great railway batteries for coast defense and long range artillery gunning developed in later years. 2. War Contribution.1 to the Scicnce of Railroading. The war demands on transportation facilities, urgent as they arc in all modern wars, forced the railroads to develop new ways of doing things and new materials for use in equipment and rolling stock.

THE WAR AND THE

RAILROADS

229

These developments were just as important to the railroads as their own contributions were to the military men. One of the new ways of doing things was the enforced cooperation among railroads to meet the demands of the war period. Previous to the war sonic meetings had periodically been held by groups of railroads for such purposes as arranging timetables, and these continued through the war. 30 But, generally speaking, competition was the rule. T h e existence of different gauges and the lack of through connections in many cities suggest that what cooperation existed among the railroads was of a limited extent. But the war, calling for transportation of troops and supplies over long distances and hence over more than one railroad, enforced cooperation. Fast freight lines were established to overcome slight deficiencies in gauge. The lines comprising the route from New York to Washington worked together to make improvements in service and even to establish a single superintendent for the whole route. T h e dramatic transfer of two army corps from Virginia

to Tennessee

necessitated

cooperation

among the several railroads comprising the route in order to complete the movement on schedule. Frequently railroaders got together on their own initiative for one purpose or another. In March, 1862, representatives of the Illinois Central, Galena and Chicago Union, Chicago and North Western, Chicago and Milwaukee, LaCrosse and Milwaukee, and Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien met at the Sherman House in Chicago to establish a uniform system of freight handling and the adoption of various rules governing passenger trains, rates, and other matters. 81 In 1863, representatives of 19 railroads led by Erastus Corning of the New York Central and Nathaniel Marsh of the Erie, met at Buffalo and decided that the four East-West routes should set up union ticket offices in New Y o r k and Boston, and recommended that other cooperating railroads do the same in the

230

T H E WAR AND T H E RAILROADS

larger citics of the Great Lakes arcu and the Middle West. 3 2 I t was through the increasing cooperation of the railroads during the war period t h a t the stage was set for the expansion of the postwar years, with the establishment of long through routes, frequently owned or controlled by one company. A second contribution was an outgrowth of this growing cooperation among lines. T h e vastly increased muil business brought about the establishment in 1804 of railway post office cars to distribute mail while en route and thus quicken its delivery. T h e use of these cars on the New York-Washington route was not an isolated circumstance. Heavy army concentrations a t such points as Cairo, 111., brought a sharp increase in this service. 33 Mail had been carried by railroads for a long time, but was first distributed in a car en route by William A. Davis in J u l y , 1862, on the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad. 3 4 T h e first ruilway postal route was established August 28, 1864, on the Chicago and North Western's Iowa Division to Clinton, Iowa. 3 5 T h e service expanded rapidly aflei that, being in operation by the end of the war on the New York-Washington run, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Chicago and Rock Island, the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, and the Erie. 3 6 T h e business on the New Y o r k - W a s h i n g t o n line required a full car, but on other lines it could frequently be hundled in less than a full car. 3 7 T h a t the development of this service was encouraged by the war is shown by the fact t h a t a heavy slump in mail business was experienced at the end of the war until after mail communication with the South had been restored. 3 8 But t h a t occurred quickly and the words "United States Railway Post Office" became a familiar sight on the railroads of America. 39 A third contribution of the war to railroading was the shift from iron to steel, particularly for rails. It is impossible to determine which railroad made the first, use of steel rails. Cer-

THE WAR AND THE RAILROADS

231

tuinly the experiments carried on by the Pennsylvania Railroad at the Altoona y a r d s in 1863 and 1864 were an important early indication of the necessity for finding some substitute for the universally used iron rail. Heavier wartime traffic and faster trains were wearing out iron rails a t a faster pace than they could be economically replaced, what with the rising cost of this item of equipment. Prosperity furnished the capital, and rising costs and heavy traffic the stimulus to experiment. Installation of steel rails was done a t high initial cost but their long life was enough to repay the investment. The use of steel rails did not become general during the war, but the war began the trend in that direction and proved the inadequacy of iron under new traffic conditions. Other railroads began to follow the Pennsylvania Railroad's lead. In 1864, the Lehigh Valley Railroad was using some steel rail on its Beaver Meadow Division, 40 and the same y e a r saw advertisements of steel rails being carried in railway periodicals. 4 1 A t first the rails were imported from Europe. It was not until after the war that the first steel rail was fabricated in America. 4 2 Experiments were made in other uses of steel, as for tires on locomotive wheels, und as early as 1862 the master machinist of the Pennsylvania Railroad was experimenting with steel fireboxes, having found iron unsuitable and copper too expensive. 43 Closely allied to the change from iron to steel in equipment was the change from wood to coal as fuel. This change was not a dircct result of war conditions, since it had begun before the war. The Central Railroad of New J e r s e y had been using coal us fuel since 1857, and consistently found it 35 per cent cheaper than wood. 44 Other railroads had also used coal as fuel before the war, but the wur accelerated the change. In a period of rising costs, particularly from 1863 on, most railroads tried to discover new means of economizing, and many of them found p a r t

232

T H E WAR AND T H E RAILROADS

of the answer in coal. Of course the price of coal as well as of wood rose during the war period, b u t coal would drive a t r a i n relatively f a r t h e r t h a n wood. Finally we may note t h a t the service of some men with the military railroads brought invaluable experience to various railroad companies with which these men found employment a f t e r the war. J . H . Devereux with the Cleveland and Pittsburgh, A d n a Anderson with the N o r t h e r n Pacific, E . C. Smeed with the K a n s a s Pacific, and F r a n k Thomson with the Philadelphia and Erie 4 5 were only examples of what must have been a large number of military railroad employees who sought and found railroad jobs a f t e r the war's end. T h i s relationship was reciprocal, too. McCallum from the Erie, H a u p t from the Pennsylvania, and P a r s o n s from the Ohio and Mississippi brought the value of earlier railroad careers to their military tasks. I n these many ways, railroads contributed to the prosecution of the war. and were in t u r n stimulated bv war activity toward f u r t h e r advances in their own technology. I t was a relationship from which both sides profited, for certainly the war would have dragged on f o r years longer without the help of railroad supply, and certainly, too, the advances in railroading would have been delayed years longer without the stimulation of wartime demands.

NOTES CHAPTER

I

1. Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census 1860, p. 104. 2. Henry V. Poor, Railroad Manual of the United States, 1868, p. 17. 3. Ibid. 4. Merchant*' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L I I I ( J u l y Dec., 1865), 278. 6. Ibid., pp. 429-30. 6. Ibid., p. 292. 7. Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census 1860, Table 38, "Railroads of the United States," pp. 214-37. 8. Carl R. Fish, " T h e Northern Railroads 1861," American Historical Review, X X I I , 781. 9. American Railway Review, J u n e 19, 1862. 10. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L I V ( J a n . June, 1861), 119. Freight which could use the rail route from Cairo to New York cost $16 a ton, whereas the cost by the river route via New Orleans was $20. American Railway Review, Feb. 7, 1861. 11. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L I V ( J a n . June, 1861), 782-83; American Railroad Journal, April 27, 1861. Came a London comment, " I f you can see your way . . . to a regulated cotton trade, through the U p p e r Mississippi and the New York railways . . . John Bull will be the close and faithful ally of the North. . . ." Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V (July-Dec. 1861), 208. 12. See Chapter V for further consideration of this subject. 13. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V ( J u l y Dec., 1861), 134; XLV I ( J a n . - J u n e , 1862), 376; American Railway Review, March 21 and 28, 1861. 14. Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, 1860, Table 38. 15. See the annual reports of these railroads, which will be cited in more detail in later pages. The Railroad Share List in the

234

NOTES: CHAPTER

I

American Railroad Journal listed 242 different r a i l r o a d s in existence in t h e N o r t h e r n states, Aug. 24, 1861. 16. 32nd Annual Report . . . of the Boston and Worcester Railroad, 1861, p. 3 ; Ibid., 1864, P- 3- E i g h t y - p o u n d rail means t h a t one y a r d of rail weighed 80 pounds. Rails grew progressively heavier in o r d e r to accommodate heavier and f a s t e r trains. T o d a y , some r a i l r o a d s with comparatively light traffic still use 80-pound rail, though the important through lines use rail weighing up to 151 pounds per yard. 17. 16th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1862, p . 3 6 ; United States Railroad and Mining Register, J u l y 2, 1864. 18. H e n r y M . F l i n t , The Railroads of the United States, p. 434. 19. American Railway Times, Dec. 24, 1864. 20. American Railway Review, M a r c h 28, 1861. 21. American Railway Review, Feb. 27, 1862; 24th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, p p . 10-11. T h e Central Railroad of New J e r s e y also used this p r o c e s s ; see its 16th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 13. T h e Chicago a n d Rock Island Railroad adopted it in 1865; see its Annual Report . . . April, 1866, p. 16. 22. American Railway Times, Dec. 24, 1864. 23. Ashcroft's Railway Directory for 1862, p p . 25-50. 24. Ibid., p p . 95, 97, 104. 25. Ibid., p p . 60, 6 4 ; so did the D e l a w a r e , L a c k a w a n n a , and W e s t e r n , and the Ohio and Mississippi. Ibid., p p . 86, 192. 26. Ibid., p p . 77, 80, 98 ; ibid., 1864, P- 58. 27. Ibid., 1862, p p . 76, 91, 96, 106. 28. Ibid., p p . 164, 165, 167, 169, 176, 177. 29. Such Ohio railroads were the P i t t s b u r g h , Columbus, and Cincinnati, Cleveland, Painesville, and Astabula, Little Miami and Columbus and Xenia, Cincinnati, Hamilton, a n d D a y t o n . Ibid., pp. 180, 181, 183, 189-91, 193, 202-3, 157. 30. Ibid., p p . 109-49, 160. T h e important Louisville and Nashville h a d a 5-foot gauge. Luckily for railroad operations in Virginia, t h a t s t a t e stuck p r e t t y much to 4 feet, 8 ^ inches. T o complete the variety, gauges of 4 feet, 9 1 /) inches and 5 f e e t , 4 inches were also used. American Railway Times, J a n . 1, 1861.

NOTES: CHAPTER I

235

31. Emerson D. Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War, pp. 56, 58; Annual Report . . . of the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad . . . March 1, 1865, p. 7. 32. Robert S. Henrv, Trains, p. 78. 33. Ibid. An example was the Crestline, Cleveland, and Lake Shore Fast Freight Line. 31. American Railway Review, Feb. 7, 1861. Opposition to the establishment of through connections sometimes reached the point of violence. Erie, Pa., was, for instance, the scene of such a "war." Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania. William Z. Ripley, editor, Railway Problems, chapter on "Early American Conditions" (taken from H. G. Pearson, John Murray Forbes), p. 77. 35. John T. Scharf, History of Baltimore City and County from the Earliest Period to the Present Day, pp. 788-89. 36. Frank H. Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War 1861-1865, map supplement; Winnifred K. Mackay, "Philadelphia during the Civil War, 1861-1865," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography (Jan., 1916), p. 15, note. N e w York Times, Feb. 5, 1863. 37. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V (JulyDec., 1861), 572-74. The six included lines radiating to Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, and Detroit. Transportation 38. Report . . . of the New Jersey Railroad and Co. 1860, p. 3. 39. American Railway Review, Jan. 23, 1862. 40. 1st Annual Report of Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railxvay . . . 1861, p. 11; Charles E. Fisher, "The Chicago Burlington and Quincy," Railway and I.ocomotive Historical Society Bulletin 24, March, 1931, p. 13; 15th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Feb. 1862, p. 12. 41. American Railroad Journal, Nov. 16, 1861. 42. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I I I ( J u l y Dec., 1 8 6 5 ) , 3 5 8 . 43. 25th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1862, p. 11. 44. 8th Annual Report . . . of the Northern Central Railway . . . 1862, p. 20.

236

NOTES: CHAPTER I

45. These distinguishing characteristics of a Civil War engine are evident on the Great Northern's William Crooks, and the Western and Atlantic's General, both exhibited at the Chicago Railroad Fair in 1948. See also, Railroad Gazette J a n . 11, 1907, pp. 39-43; T. W. Van Metre, Trains, Tracks, and Travel, p. 77; K. A. H e r r , The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1850-1942, pp. 191-92. 46. Diagram of a Camden and Amboy locomotive in American Railway Review, March 6, 1862. 47. Henry, Trains, pp. 62-63. 48. Report of the Boston and Maine Railroad . . . 1861, p. 20; 16th Annual Report of the Central Railroad of New Jersey . . . 1861, p. 19; Little Miami Railroad Co., and Columbus and Xenia Railroad Co., Ninth Joint Annual Report . . . 1864, P- 23 ; United States Railroad and Mining Register, J u n e 21, 1862. 49. American Railway Review, J a n . 9, 1862. 50. Two C R R N J engines ran 34.85 and 57.3 miles on a cord of wood, 28.05 and 52.26 on a ton of anthracite. 15th Annual Report, p p . 19-20; the Illinois Central got 40-42 miles on wood, 37 on coal; Illinois Central Railroad . . . Report, 1862, p. 5. Boston and Worcester engines ran 26-60 miles per cord of wood, 26-57 miles per ton of coal; 32nd Annual Report . . . of the Boston and Worcester Railroad, 1861, pp. 4-5. 51. American Railroad Journal, Aug. 24, 1861, letter from John W . Nystrom of Philadelphia. 52. Railroad Gazette, J a n . 11, 1907, p. 43. 53. Report . . . of the Boston and Maine Railroad . . . 1861, pp. 21-22; S6th Annual Report . . . of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1862, p. 68; United States Railroad and Mining Register, June 21, 1862; H e r r , op. cit., p. 178. 54. 16th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad, 1862, p. 31; American Railway Review, June 20, 1861 (Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad). 55. American Railway Review, May 16, 1861. 56. Ibid., March 13, 1862 (from Milwaukee News) ; H e r r , op. cit., p. 178. 57. American Railway Times, Feb. 11, 1865. 58. American Railway Review, May 29, 1862.

NOTES: CHAPTER

I

237

59. Van Metre, op. cit., p. 168; L. K. Sillcox, Safety in Early American Railway Operation, 1853-1871, p. 18; A Milwaukee man, A. I. Ambler, invented a car brake which would brake all wheels at the same time and could be controlled by the engineer. American Railway Review, March 20, 1862. There is no evidence that this brake was ever put to use on any railroad. CO. American Railway Review, March 14, 1861. A train of these iron ears proved their worth in preventing loss of life when the train ran into an open drawbridge. Ibid., March 28, 1861. 61. American Railway Times, J u n e 3, 1865. 62. Report . . . of the Michigan Central Railroad . . . 1862, p. 27. 63. Ibid., 1865, p. 36. 64. American Railway Review, March 21, J u n e 13, 1861 ; United States Railroad and Mining Register, Nov. 23, 1861; American Railway Times, J&n. 17, 1863. 66. Flint, op. cit., p. 170. 66. Letter from John W. Garrett of the B & O to Secretary of War Stanton, Oct. 6, 1863, Stanton Papers, vol. X V I I . 67. American Railway Review, April 4, 1861. 68. American Railroad Journal, May 24, 1862; Report . . . of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad . . . 1861, p. 34. Compare this with the typical loaded coal train of today, which on the Chesapeake and Ohio and other coal roads weighs 5,000 tons or more. 69. American Railroad Journal, April 12, 1862 (Report of the State Engineer of New York to the Legislature, Feb. 1862). 70. Report . . . of the New York and New Haven Railroad . . . 1862, p. 14. 71. For examples, see J^th Annual Report of the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway Co., 1861^, p. 41; Hth Annual Report of the Central Railroad of New Jersey . . . 1861, p. 21 ; Annual Report of the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co., 1862, p. 9. 72. American Railroad Journal, April 12, 1862; American Railway Times, July 4, 1863; Report . . . of the New York and New Haven Railroad, 1862, p. 14; S2nd Annual Report . . . of the Boston and Worcester Railroad, 1861, p. 4; 27th Annual Report of the Western Railroad, 1861, p. 20; Sir Samuel Morton Peto, The Resources and Prospects of America Ascertained during a Visit to the

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States in the Autumn of 1865, p. 290. Occasionally express trains attained 56 to 60 miles per hour. American Railway Time», Aug. 24, 1861. 73. Report . . . of the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Co 1861, p. 7. 74. Samuel R. Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, p. 60; 2,000 cars probably meant about 20,000 tons of freight or 80,000 men. See Robert S. Henry, This Fascinating Railroad Business, p. 422. 75. These were divided about evenly among the three railroads. 15th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . Feb. 8, 1862, pp. 24, 30; 1st Annual Report . . . of the Erie Railway . . . Dec. 81, 1862, p. 7; Annual Report . . . of the New York Central Railroad . . . 1861, p. 11. 76. American Railway Review, May 23, 1861; April 24, 1862; Flint, op. cit., pp. 47-48. Today this route, with the exception of Niagara Falls, is the New York Central's main line via Detroit. 77. Flint, op. cit., pp. 47-48, 188, 212; American Railway Review, May 23, 1861. These routes are not used today in these combinations. The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana is now the New York Central main line via Cleveland, the E r i e having its own line all the way to Chicago. One can no longer travel from Jersey City to Pittsburgh via Central Railroad of New Jersey without changing at Harrisburg. In the sixties, the C R R N J ran through cars, leaving New York at 8 P.M., arriving Pittsburgh at noon. When the East Pennsylvania and Lebanon Valley Railroad was opened in early 1862, the C R R N J route was the shortest mileage to Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. American Railway Review, J u n e 13, 1861, Feb. 20, 1862. The Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago is now the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad. 78. Letters 1858-1868 Gen. William J. Palmer, compiled by Isaac H . Clothier, p. 42 (Sept. 14, 1859). This road is now the main St. Louis line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 79. Documents 3 and 4 of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad (New York Public Library, undated) ; Flint, op. cit., pp. 48-50. 80. Flint, op. cit., pp. 261, 267; American Railway Review, May 23, 1861; United States Railroad and Mining Register, Nov. 16, 1861. The Chicago and St. Louis Railroad is now the Alton route

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of the G u l f , Mobile and Ohio, time now five hours. T h e L o g a n s p o r t line is now the Pennsylvania, time between Chicago a n d Cincinnati fi1/^ to 8 hours. T h e New York to W a s h i n g t o n run is now commonly m a d e in 4 hours. 81. A. B. H u l b e r t , The Paths of Island Commerce, p p . 170-71. 82. E . I). Fite, " T h e Canal and the Railroad f r o m 1 8 6 1 - 1 8 6 5 / ' Yale Review, X V , 199. 83. Ninth Census of the United States, Statistics of Population, Table I I I . 8 t. P e t o , op. cit., p p . 270-71, 277. 85. H a r m o n K. M u r p h y , " T h e N o r t h e r n Railroads of t h e Civil W a r , " Mississippi I'alley Historical Review, V, 324. A n exception to this local emphasis was the establishment, early in 1861, of a 3 day all rail mail and express route f r o m N e w York to N e w O r l e a n s , the operation of which was prevented by the outbreak of war. F. B. C. Bradlee, Blockade Running During the Civil War, p p . 418-19. C H A P T E R II

1. Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, T a b l e 38. T h i s was an increase of 14,769 over 1850. 2. American Railroad Journal, J a n . 7, 1865. P o o r , Railroad Manual of the United States, ( p . 19) gives the increase at 4,550 miles. Most construction was in Pennsylvania (926 m i l e s ) , with Ohio, N e w York, New J e r s e y , California, Illinois, a n d M i c h i g a n following, in t h a t order ( p p . 20-21). 3. 1st Annual Report of the Atlantic and Great Western Railway 1863, p. 22. 4. Ibid., pp. 9-11. 5. Ibid., p. 2 5 ; American Railroad Journal, Oct. 15, 1864. M c H e n r y alone financed 500 miles of t h e railroad ( 1 s t Annual Report, p. 3 8 ) . (i. American Railroad Journal, J u l y 9, 1864, J a n . 31, 1863; 1st Railroads Annual Report, pp. 10-12; see also H e n r y M. Flint, The of the United States, p. 194. 7. 1st Annual Report, p. 12. T h e bad feeling engendered between E n g l a n d a n d the United S t a t e s by the T r e n t Affair in Nov. 1861

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brought further, if temporary, obstacles in the financing of the enterprise, 1st Annual Report, p. 36; United State» Railroad and Mining Register, May 17, 1862. 8. 1st Annual Report, p. 36. 9. American Railroad Journal, Dec. 20, 1862, Oct. 15, 1864 ( f r o m London Times) ; United States Railroad and Mining Register, May 17, 1862. The town of Salamanca, N.Y., where the road joined the Erie, was named after its benefactor. 10. United States Railroad and Mining Register, May 17, 1862. 11. American Railroad Journal, Oct. 15, 1864. Workers also came from Canada. 1st Annual Report, p. 37. Agents were maintained in Canada and in Ireland to send laborers when needed. Flint, op. cit., p. 195. 12. American Railway Review, Jan. 23, 1862. 18. 1st Annual Report, p. 12; American Railroad Journal, J a n . 21, 1863, July 9, 1864; see also Flint, op. cit., p. 195. 14. 1st Annual Report, p. 18. Another branch, from Meadville to Oil City, finished J u n e 1, 1863, brought coal to the line. American Railroad Journal, July 9, 1864. 15. United States Railroad and Mining Register, Feb. 7, 1863 (from Meadville Republican) ; American Railroad Journal, Jan. 31, 1863. 16. American Railroad Journal, May 2, 1863, Aug. 6, 1864. 17. 1st Annual Report, pp. 15, 17. 18. The line had a contract with the Erie Railway as of May 1, 1863 (1st Annual Report, p. 30; 3rd Annual Report of the Erie Railway 1864, Pthe petroleum carried was only one third of the total production (1st Annual Report, pp. 1G, 19). Not much oil went out by water because the Allegheny River above Franklin was dangerous to navigation (Patrick Barry, Over The Atlantic and Great Western Railway, pp. 32-33.) 19. American Railroad Journal, July 9, 1864; 1st Annual Report, p. 22. 20. 1st Annual Report, pp. 19-21. 21. 2nd Annual Report, 186£, p. 11. McHenry was deeply involved financially. Much of the floating debt of between $400,000 and $500,000 was in his hands; with cash advanced and bond coupons, the road's debt to him totaled over $1,000,000. The line

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p a i d tribute to M c H e n r y f o r f u r n i s h i n g this capital, and to K e n n a r d f o r effectively overcoming the h a n d i c a p of labor and m a t e r i a l s scarcity. Ibid., p p . 5-6, 8, 20. 22. American Railroad Journal, J a n . 16, 1864; 1st Annual Report, p. 12. T h e line f r o m S a l a m a n c a to Galion is now p a r t of t h e main N e w York to Chicago route of the E r i e Railway. 23. 1st Annual Report, p. 41. 24. Ibid., p p . 43-44 ( l e t t e r f r o m K e n n a r d to Reynolds, A p r i l 6, 1864). 26. American Railroad Journal, J u n e 25, J u l y 9, 1864. 26. Ibid., S e p t . 3, 1864. 27. P e t o , op. cit., p. 294. 28. J u l y 2, 1864; 60-pound rail was later substituted. T h e road originally was not well b a l l a s t e d , a n d many cuts a n d e m b a n k m e n t s were too narrow. F l i n t , op. cit., pp. 199-200. 29. 1st Annual Report, p. 13. 30. Ibid., p p . 13-14. liy April 1864, four engines a month were being completed. Ibid., p p . 43-44. 31. Ibid., p p . 43-44. 32. 2nd Annual Report, p. 14. 33. Ibid., p p . 28-29. 34. B a r r y , op. cit., p p . 62-64, 66-67. T h e change was necessary because the Ohio and Mississippi was controlled by the L i t t l e Miami Railroad. 35. Ibid., p p . 80-81, 110, 112. This same observer thought t h e railroad lost much t r a d e t h r o u g h lack of a connection at Buffalo, subsequently corrected when the E r i e , with its Buffalo b r a n c h , came to control the A t l a n t i c and G r e a t Western. Ibid., 100-101. 36. American Railway Review, Feb. 20, 1862. 37. A p r i l 27, 1861. 38. 7th Annual Report . . . of the Northern Central Railway . . . 1861, p p . 55-56; 8th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 37. 39. 8th Annual Report . . . of the Northern Central Railway . . . 1862, pp. 4-5. T h e cars were to be delivered beginning in J a n . , 1863. Ibid., p. 2. 40. 16th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1862, p. 9. Both t h e P h i l a d e l p h i a and E r i e and the N o r t h e r n Central are now p a r t of the Pennsylvania.

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41. Poor, op. cit., p. 233; American Railroad Journal, Feb. 21, 1863. 42. 17th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1865, p. 8; American Railroad Journal, July 9, 1864. 43. American Railroad Journal, Sept. 3, Oct. 8, 1864. 44. 17th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1863, pp. 11, 2 4 ; 18th Annual Report . . . 1864, pp. 18-20. 45. 18th Annual Report . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1864, P- 546. 19th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1866, pp. 13, 21. A disastrous flood in March after heavy winter snows did much damage along the line. Ibid., pp. 113, 117. 47. Fite, op. cit., p. 60. 48. American Railroad Journal, May 14, 28, 1864. 49. Ibid., Feb. 11, March 11, 1865. 50. American Railroad Journal, March 19, 1864. See Chapter VI. 51. See Chapter V I I I . 52. Flint, op. cit., p. 224. 53. Fish, " T h e Northern Railroads 1861," American Historical Review, X X I I , 779-80. 54. F . H . Hodder, "Railroad Background of the Kansas Nebraska Act," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X I I , 3 ff. 55. Grenville M. Dodge, How We Built the Union Pacific Railway, p. 10. 56. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 57. Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 5, 1861, p. 252. 58. Ibid., p. 253. 59. Ibid., p. 255. 60. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 2, April 19, 1862, p. 1590. This Bill was only slightly different from the Curtis bill, See speech of Representative Campbell ( P a . ) , Ibid., p. 1579. A foreign war with Great Britain seemed much closer to reality a f t e r the Trent affair in Nov., 1861. 61. Ibid., 1594, 1579 (the latter Apr. 8, 1862). 62. Ibid., p. 1594. The military necessity argument was of course not the only one advanced in favor of a Pacific railroad. Others pointed to the development of commerce on the Pacific ocean, and

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to the agricultural development of the West. See American Rail road Journal, J a n . 3, 1863, J a n . 7, 1865. T h e one argument is emphasized here to show that the government was aware of the military importance of railroads. 63. Nelson Trottman, History of ike Union Pacific, pp. 8-9. 64. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., P a r t 3, pp. 1971, 2840, 3088; Dodge, op. cit., p. 9. 65. Dodge, op. cit., pp. 11-12; New York Times (supplement), March 12, 1864; American Railway Journal, Feb. 7, March 7, 1863. 66. Dodge, op. cit., pp. 13, 45, 48. The important work of Dodge did not begin until 1866, when he took the place of chief engineer Peter A. Dey, who had resigned. By the end of the war, the eastern connection of the U.P., the Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad, had reached only as f a r as Boonesboro, Iowa, about 130 miles east of Omaha. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, LIII (July-Dec., 1865), 440. 67. American Railroad Journal, Dec. 31, 1864; New York Times, April 2, 1865. CHAPTER

III

1. Edwin A. P r a t t , The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914, p. 9 ; Army and Navy Journal, J u n e 11, 1864, April 15, 1865. The use of armored trains for combat and reconnaissance was known somewhat earlier. Charles R. Kutz, War on Wheels, the Evolution of an Idea, p. 193. 2. Robert E. Riegel, "Federal Operation of Southern Railroads during the Civil W a r , " Mississippi Valley Historical Review, IX, 126.

3. Carl R. Fish, " T h e Northern Railroads 1861," American Historical Review, X X I I , 779-80; Carl R. Fish, The American Civil War, p. 155. This same argument was used in support of the act of Jan. 31, 1862, authorizing the president to take military possession of the railroads. See Chapter V I I . 4. Fish, " T h e Northern Railroads, 1861," American Historical Review, X X I I , 782. McClellan already had some railroad experience, having been previously connected with the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.

NOTES: CHAPTER III 5. McClellan to S t a n t o n , 1861 ( u n d a t e d ) , Stanton P a p e r s , Vol. I. 6. Lincoln to McClellan, Feb. 3, 18(53, Stanton P a p e r s , Vol. I I I . 7. George William Brown, Baltimore and the 10th of April 1861, p. 14. 8. Ibid., p. 15. 9. Ibid. W i n n i f r e d K. M a c k a y , " P h i l a d e l p h i a during the Civil W a r 18G1-1865," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, ( J a n . , 1946), p. 14. 10. Brown, op. cit., p. 17. 11. Ibid., p. 133. 12. F r a n k H . T a y l o r , Philadelphia in the Civil War 1861-1865, p p . 15-16. 13. J . Thomas S c h a r f , History of Baltimore City and County from the Earliest Period to the Present Day, p. 336. 14. Dictionary of American Biography, V I I , 163-64. 15. I n a speech a f t e r J o h n Brown's raid at H a r p e r ' s F e r r y . F e s t u s P. Summers, The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War, p. 45. 16. Ibid., pp. 47-48. See also 35th Annual Report . . . of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad . . . 1861, p. 6. 17. Summers, op. cit., p p . 49-50; American Railroad Journal, Aug. 16, 1862 ( f r o m Baltimore American). 18. The War of the Rebellion, a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies ( h e r e i n a f t e r cited as Official Records), Ser. I l l , I , 84. T h e secession of Virginia was a contributing factor in G a r r e t t ' s action. Samuel R. Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas Scott, p. 25. T h a t it was simply inability to r e n d e r service and not disloyalty on G a r r e t t ' s p a r t was emphasized by t h e Baltimore American, quoted in American Railroad Journal, Aug. 16, 1862. On the other hand, Thomas A. Scott, citing Dennison's t e l e g r a m and the failure of the B & O to provide decent t r a n s p o r t a tion between Baltimore and Washington, pointed out that a mass meeting of Baltimore citizens on J u l y 28, 1862, had claimed t h a t t h e controlling authority and a m a j o r i t y of employees of the B & O were disloyal. United States Railroad and Mining Register, Aug. 23, 1862, quoting Scott's letter of Aug. 15 to the New York Times. Since the activities of G a r r e t t during the war and the loyal service p e r f o r m e d by the B & O show overwhelmingly that the railroad was not disloyal, one must ascribe Scott's attitude to the hostility be-

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tween the Pennsylvania Railroad and the B & O. T h i s was p r o b a b l y a deeper basis of a n t i p a t h y t h a n the s h a r i n g of Cameron's views pointed out by Kamm, op. cit., passim. 19. Brown, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 20. T h e following account of the Baltimore riot of A p r i l 19 is based on S c h a r f , op. cit., p p . 788-90, a n d B r o w n , op. cit., p p . 43-53. 21. Dictionary of American Biography, V I , 507-8; H e n r y G. Pearson, An American Railroad Builder, John Murray Forbes, p. 115. 22. T h e Washington Brigade had l e f t Philadelphia first, at 3 A.M. on the 19th. I t was supposed to go through Baltimore at d a w n , but the railroad schedule was delayed. T a y l o r , op. cit., p p . 28-29. If the schedule had been adhered to, p e r h a p s t h e r e would have been no riot t h a t day. 23. J o h n G. Nicolav and J o h n H a y , Abraham Lincoln, a History, I V , 111. 24. Official Records, S e r . I, I I , 9-11 ( R e p o r t of t h e B a l t i m o r e Police Commissioner to t h e S t a t e Legislature, M a y 3, 1 8 6 1 ) . 25. Baltimore Sun, A p r i l 20, 1861, quoted in Nicolay a n d H a y , op. cit., p. 113. 26. One of the civilians killed was R o b e r t W . Davis, a p r o m i n e n t d r y goods merchant. Brown, op. cit., p. 52. 27. Quoted in S c h a r f , op. cit., p. 791. 28. Ibid. 29. Official Records, Ser. I, I I , 12-13. 30. Ibid., p. 578. 31. Summers, op. cit., p. 56. T h e Wheeling Intelligencer suggested t h a t G a r r e t t turn over his road to t h e government to p r e vent Letcher from t r a n s p o r t i n g troops. American Railway Review, May 9, 1861. 32. Account taken f r o m S c h a r f , op. cit., p. 130. 33. Scott to Stanton, Feb., 1862, S t a n t o n P a p e r s , Vol. I V . 34. United States Railroad and Mining Register, A p r i l 27, 1861, said 60 bridges were destroyed, the largest being 338' long. One of the parties was led by I. R. T r i m b l e , f o r m e r s u p e r i n t e n d e n t of t h e Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, who later became a Confederate m a j o r general and was c a p t u r e d at G e t t y s b u r g . Sifth Annual Report of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Rail-

NOTES: CHAPTER III road . . . 1SC1, p. 7 ; E d w a r d M c P h e r s o n , The Political History of the United. States of America during the Great Rebellion, p. 393. 35. E x t r a c t s f r o m m i n u t e s of t h e B a l t i m o r e P o l i c e C o m m i s s i o n e r s , in M c P h e r s o n , op. cit., p p . 3 9 3 - 9 4 . 36. 7th Annual Report . . . of the Northern Central Railway . . . 1861, p . 10. 37. Ibid., p p . 35, 37. 3 8 . 24th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1SG1, p . 7. 3 9 . Official Records, S e r . I , I I , 5 8 2 . 4 0 . S c l i a r f , op. cit., p. 1 3 0 ; N i c o l a y a n d H a y , op. cit., p p . 1 3 1 - 3 2 ; Official Records, S e r . I , I I , 6 8 4 . 4 1 . C o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n P a t t e r s o n a n d S c o t t , Official Records, Ser. I, I I , 585-87; Lincoln's letter to Gov. H i c k s and M a y o r Brown, A p r i l 2 0 , 1861, q u o t e d in C l a y t o n C. H a l l , ed., Baltimore, Its History and Its People, I , 178-79. F i t z J o h n P o r t e r " w o u l d m a r c h t h e m t o t h e N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l t h r o u g h B a l t i m o r e o r o v e r its a s h e s . " S e e A l e x a n d e r K . M c C l u r e , Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, p. 474. 42. Correspondence between Cameron, Thomson, and Felton, Official Records, S e r . I , I I , 5 9 6 - 9 8 . 4 3 . S a m u e l R . K a m m , The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, p . 31. 4 4 . Official Records, S e r . I , I I , 603. C a m e r o n ' s v i e w s w e r e gove r n e d b y his p o s i t i o n a s a d i r e c t o r of t h e N o r t h e r n C e n t r a l . 45. Dictionary of American Biography, X V I , 500-501. 46. W i l l i a m B. W i l s o n , History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, I, 416. 47. S t a n t o n t o V i c e - P r e s i d e n t H a m l i n , J a n . 27, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. I I . 4 8 . Official Records, S e r . I , I I , 609. F e l t o n took s o m e c r e d i t f o r t h i s n e w r o u t e , h a v i n g s u g g e s t e d it to W i n f i e l d S c o t t a s e a r l y as O c t . , 1860 ( K a m m , op. cit., p . 2 8 ) . S a i d t h e 2 4 t h A n n u a l R e p o r t of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore (p. 7 ) , " T h e road has t h u s e a r n e d , if it h a s n o t r e c e i v e d , t h e g r a t e f u l r e m e m b r a n c e s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t . T h o u g h a c o r p o r a t i o n , it d i d n o t f o r g e t its d u t i e s t o t h e c o u n t r y . . . . I t e x p e n d e d its m o n e y , its r e s o u r c e s , a n d t h e e n e r g i e s of all its e m p l o y e e s , a t a t i m e w h e n t h e f a t e of t h e c o u n t r y s e e m e d t r e m b l i n g in t h e b a l a n c e . "

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247

49. Kamm, op. cit., p. 36; Burton J . Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie, p. 106. 50. Official Records, Ser. I, I I , 635-36; Hall, op. cit., pp. 183-85; American Railroad Journal, May 18, 1861. 51. Hendrick, op. cit., p. 106. 52. Dictionary of American Biography, I I I , 499-505. 63. Hendrick, op. cit., pp. 106-9. 54. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I, 228. 55. Stanton to Vice-President Hamlin, J a n . 27, 1802, Stanton Papers, Vol. I I . 56. Slason Thompson, A Short History of American Railways, p. 153 ; H . W. Schotter, The Growth and Development of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, p. 54. 57. Scott's letter of. Aug. 21, 1861, to the President and the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad is quoted in Schotter, op. cit., pp. 55-56. 58. Wilson, op. cit., I I , 244-45. 59. Kamm, op. cit., pp. 9-11. 60. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I, 073-75. 61. See Chapter X. 62. Official Records, Ser. I, L I I, 704; In Memoriam—General Lewis Baldwin Parsons, p. 19; Memo of Transportation Department, Feb. 9, 1862, in Stanton Papers, Vol. I I . 63. In Memoriam, General Lewis Baldwin Parsons, pp. 17-18. 64. Official Records, Ser. I, L I I , 704-5. 65. Ibid., Ser. I l l , I I I , 398-99. 66. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I I I , 399. 67. See Chapter V I I . 68. C. W. Ramsdell, " T h e Confederate Government and the Railroads," American Historical Review, X X I I , 795, 799, 807. 69. Lincoln's awareness of the railroad's importance in war was demonstrated in his request of December, 1861, that a railroad be constructed from Kentucky to the loyal areas of Tennessee and western North Carolina to cement these border areas to the Union. The proposed road was never built, largely because of the opposition of Scott and the adequate capacity of other lines. Lewis H . Haney, A Congressional History of Railways in the United States, 18501877, p. 157; James D. Richardson, A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1907, V I , 46.

248

NOTES: CHAPTER IV CHAPTER

IV

1. American Railroad Journal, J u n e 1, 1861, quoting Railroaa Record. See also American Railway Review, April 18, 1861. 2. T h e Review noted t h a t railway passenger traffic was down, a n d new construction was stopped by t h e war. See also American Railroad Journal, 3an., 18(52. 3. New York Times, J u n e 8, 18(13, noted that the war was good f o r t h e railroads because it enabled them to get rid of their floating debts. See also Merchant»' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I 11 ( J u l y - D e c . , 1865), 177. T h e E r i e R a i l w a y reduced its 1861 debt of $2,725,600 to zero in 1863. T h e detailed comparisons in this and t h e following two c h a p t e r s of statistics taken f r o m the railroads' a n n u a l r e p o r t s a r e limited in value by the fact t h a t no s t a n d a r d methods of accounting existed. I n f o r m a t i o n included in annual rep o r t s varied considerably among the companies, making comparison difficult. Even information p r e s e n t e d is sometimes incomplete. For instance, it is not always clear to w h a t extent increases in revenue were due to rising rates or to rising tonnage. Items like gross income, net income, and o p e r a t i n g ratio were determined differently by different railroads. I n addition, fiscal years did not coincide for t h e companies (see b i b l i o g r a p h y ) . E v e n with these handicaps, however, the general effect of the war on railroad business is clear. 4. Actually, the tide had begun to t u r n before the war began. Of ten roads centering in Chicago, nine showed increased receipts in 1860 over 1859. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L I V ( J a n . - J u n e , 1861), 537. G r a i n receipts and shipments at Chicago in 1860 totaled 60,000,000 bushels, more than double 1859. Ibid., p p . 352-53. 5. T h e shortage was sometimes a g g r a v a t e d by the p r a c t i c e of using cars as warehouses. American Railway Review, J u l y 4, 1861, J a n . 23, 1862. 6. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I I I , ( J u l y Dec. 1865), 207. Profits of the H u d s o n River R R and the Cleveland a n d Pittsburgh more t h a n doubled in this period. Ibid., p p . 180-81, 207. 7. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I I, ( J a n . -

NOTES: CHAPTER IV

249

J u n e 1865), 137. An especially bad wreck killed almost 50 soldiers on t h e Philadelphia and T r e n t o n Railroad. New York Sun, M a r c h 9, 1865, quoted in Emerson D. Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War, p p . 74-75. In general r a i l r o a d s had a good s a f e t y record up to 1860. T h e B & O carried 5,000,000 p a s s e n g e r s in eight years with no fatalities. New York railroads in 1860 traveled 35.000,000 miles for each passenger killed. American Railway Review, M a y 23, 1861. 8. Report . . . of the Boston and Maine Railroad . . . Sept. 11, 1861, p. 3 ; ibid., 1862, p. 3. 9. Report . . . of the Boston and Maine Railroad . . . 1862, p. 3. 10. Ibid., p. 8. 11. Report . . . 1863, pp. 3-4. 12. Ibid., p p . 4-5. T h e B & M shared control of this line with t h e E a s t e r n Railroad. In 1863 the branch alone carried 14,000 troops, a n d could not find enough f r e i g h t cars to meet the demand f o r their services. 23rd Annual Report . . . Portland, Saco, and Portsmouth Railroad, p p . 6, 8 ; 26th Annual Report, p. 12. 13. Report . . . of the Boston and Maine Railroad . . . 1864, PIbid., 1865, p. 1. 14. Report . . . of the Boston and Maine Railroad . . . 1803, p. 19; 1864, p. 19; 1865. p. 19. 15. $13,800 to $37,500. Ibid., 1864, p. 16. Ibid., 1865, p. 1. 17. F o r all prices, see ibid., p p . 2-3. 18. Each a steady increase f r o m 1,600,000 p a s s e n g e r s and 193,000 tons of f r e i g h t in 1861. See the various annual reports. 19. 32nd Annual Report . . . of the Boston and Worcester Railroad . . . Nov. 30, 1861, p. 3. 20. Ibid., p. 3 ; 1862, p p . 3-4. 21. Ibid., 1862, p. 4. 22. Ibid., 1863, pp. 4 - 5 ; 1864, PP- 4, 11. Most of t h e f r e i g h t was interchanged with the W e s t e r n Railroad at Worcester. Six to ten freight t r a i n s left Boston daily, and 31 passenger trains. Ibid., 1864, p. 11. 23. Ibid., 1862, p. 4; 1865, p. 4. 24. Ibid., 1864, p. 5. B y 1865 it was 2.052 cents. 25. Ibid., p p . 3, 8 ; 1865, p. 5.

250

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26. Ibid., 1865, pp. 3, 4. 27. 27th Annual Report . . . of the Western Railroad . . . Jan. 1862, pp. 1 3 , 3 . 28. Ibid., p. 21. 29. 20th Annual Report . . . of the Western Railroad . . . 1864, p. 5. 30. Ibid., p. 3. 31. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 32. 31st Annual Report . . . of the Western Railroad . . . 1866, pp. 3, 9. 83. A shore line did exist, however, via the New Haven and New London, the Stonington Railroad to Providence, and the Boston and Providence. All of these lines with the exception of the Boston and Worcester, now make up the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad. 34. New York and New Haven Annual Report . . . March 31, 1862, pp. 6, 20. 35. Ibid., p. 7. 36. Ibid. 37. Annual Report . . . May 21, 180-3, pp. (i-7, 12. 38. Ibid., pp. 8, 13. 39. Annual Report . . . May 19, 186!,, pp. 4, 9. 40. Ibid., p. 14. 41. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 42. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 43. Annual Report . . . May 18, 1865, pp. 4-6; 1.800,000 passengers were carried. 44. Ibid., p. 10. A passenger train was added in May. lSk 45. These lines are now all part of the Pennsylvania Railroad. 46. 7th Annual Report . . . of the Northern Central Railway, 1861, p p . 2 8 , 11. 47. 8th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 20. 48. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 49. 7th Annual Report . . . 1861, p. 56. 50. Ibid., p. 34. 51. Ibid., pp. 50, 53. 52. Ibid., p. 54. 53. Ibid., p. 12; 8th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 17.

NOTES: CHAPTER

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251

54. 8 th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 17. 55. Ibid., p. 21. 56. Ibid., pp. 65-66. 57. 7th Annual Report . . . 1861, pp. 31-32. 68. 8th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 37. T h e Reading, finding that its tracks were not far enough a p a r t to accommodate heavy passenger traffic, had to move its rails in 1862. A. K. McClure, Old Time Notei of Penntylvania, p. 158. 59. 8th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 22. 60. 9th Annual Report . .. 1863, p. 10. 61. Ibid., p. 9. 62. Ibid., pp. 13-14, 30-31. T h e traffic agreement with the Erie was cancelled in 1865, because of the Erie's inconvenient six-foot gauge. An agreement with the Canandaigua Railroad was substituted. 11th Annual Report . . . 1865, p. 11. 63. 9th Annual Report . . . 1863, pp. 11,14. 64. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 65. Ibid., p. 25. 66. The following account is based on 9th Annual Report . . . 1863, pp. 31-32. 67. Ibid., pp. 32, 66. 68. 10th Annual Report . . . 1864, pp. 7-8. 69. Ibid., p. 9. 70. Ibid., pp. 7, 9-10. Compare the experience of the Michigan Central Railroad, Chapter VI. Troops moved in 1864 were more than twice the number in 1863. Ibid., p. 22. Coal was its chief item of transport, being almost one-third the total freight of 1862. 8th Annual Report... 1862, p. 19. 71. 10th Annual Report . . . 1864, p. 24. 72. Ibid., p. 41. 73. Ibid., pp. 24, 43. 74. 11th Annual Report . . . 1865, pp. 9, 20. 75. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 76. 2ith Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1861, p. 11; Charles E . Fisher, " T h e Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company," Bulletin 21, Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, Mar., 1930, p. 22. 77. 24th Annual Report. . . Oct. 31,1861, p. 11.

252

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78. Ibid., pp. 5, 19. 79. 25th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1S62, pp. 5, 6; Fisher, op. cit., p. 24. SO. Mary A. Livcrmore, My Story of the liar, pp. 2-11-1.2. 81. 25th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31,1862, p. 6. 82. 24th Annual Report . .. Oct. 31,1861, p. 11. 83. Fisher, op. cit., p. 17. 84. 25th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31,1862, p. 13. 85. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 21-22. Other railroads did not find so great a difference between the cost of the two fuels. 86. 25th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1862, p. 15; 26th Annual Report ...Oct. 31, 1863, p. 11. 87. 25th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1862, p. 18. A 9 per cent dividend was paid in 1862. 88. 26th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1863, pp. 6, 8. 89. 25th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1862, pp. 16-17. 90. 26th Annual Report. . . Oct. 31, 1863, p. 9. 91. Second track between the Susquehanna River and Baltimore laid in 1864 cost $3,000 a mile. American Railway Times, July 23, 1864. 92. 26th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1863, pp. 10, 11, 14. 93. Ibid., p. 14. 94. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 95. Ibid., p. 11. 96. 27th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, I864, pp. 4-5; Fisher, op. cit., p. 25. 97. $1,960,649.46 to $2,882,979.46. 98. 28th Annual Report . . . Oct. 31, 1865, p. 7; Fisher, op. cit., p. 34. 99. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 303-4, memo of Quartermaster General Meigs. The Northern Central got a good percentage of the westbound traffic. CHAPTER

V

1. American Railway Review, Jan. 31, 1861; Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I I I (July-Dec. 1865), 176, 177; George W . Stephens, "Some Aspects of Early Intersectional Rivalry

NOTES: CHAPTER

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253

for the Commerce of the Upper Mississippi Valley," Washington University Studies, X , No. 2, 2 9 6 - 9 7 . 2. Emerson D. F i t e , " T h e Agricultural Development of the West During the Civil W a r , " Quarterly Journal of Economics, X X (Feb. 1 9 0 6 ) , 261. 3. Fite, op. cit., pp. 264-65 ; Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V I ( J a n . - J u n e , 1 8 6 2 ) , 449. 4. Fite, op. cit., p. 260. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L I V ( J a n . - J u n e 1 8 6 1 ) , 3 5 2 - 5 3 ; X L V I ( J a n . - J u n e 1 8 6 2 ) , 363. 5. At Toledo, most grain receipts arrived by rail, and were shipped by water. In 1861, Toledo received 9 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 bushels by rail, 1,500,0 0 0 by water; the city shipped only 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 bushels east by rail, the rest by water. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V ( J u l y - D e c . 1 8 6 1 ) , 5 7 3 ; X L V I ( J a n . - J u n e 1 8 6 2 ) , 367. T h e American Railroad Journal (Sept. 7, 1861) thought the Toledo and Wabash Railroad grain storage facilities were among the best in the West. In New York S t a t e in 1861, the E r i e Canal carried 4 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons of freight, mostly lumber and vegetable foods, while the railroads carried 5,500,000 tons in animal products, manufactures, merchandise, and vegetable foods. Most railroad tonnage was transported by the E r i e and the New York Central. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V I I ( J u l y - D e c . 1 8 6 2 ) , 84. 6. 15th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . Feb. S, 1862, pp. 3-4. 7. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 8. Ibid., p. 5. 9. Ibid., pp. 86, 8». 10. Ibid., p. 12. 11. Ibid., pp. 5, 7. 12. Ibid., p. 21. 13. American Railway Review, May 2, 1861. 14. 15th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . Feb. 3, 1862, pp. 78, 22, 30. 15. Ibid., pp. 22, 34. 16. 16th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . Feb. 2, 1863, pp. 3, 1 7 ; American Railroad Journal, April 11, 1863. 17. 16th Annual Report . . . Feb. 3, 1863, pp. 19, 20.

264

NOTES: CHAPTER V

18. Ibid., p. 4. 19. Ibid., p. 10. 20. Ibid., p. 16. As early as the fall of 1861, the P R R established a temporary embargo on through freight to New York, Boston, and Baltimore because of inadequate rolling stock. American Railroad Journal, Oct. 6, 1861. E x t r a high rates were also used to discourage business. Ibid., Oct. 26, 1861. 21. 16th Annual Report . . . Feb. 2, 1863, pp. 23-24, 29. 22. Ibid., p. 27. 23. Ibid., pp. 30-31. 24. Ibid., p. 33. 26. 17th Annual Report . . . Feb. 16, 186b, PP- 6-6. 26. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 27. Ibid., p. 10. T h e latter had been authorized the year before to shorten by 24 miles the Pittsburgh-Cincinnati line (1862 report, p. 12). 28. Ibid., pp. 8, 12. 29. William B. Wilson, Hittory of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, I , 411. 30. Ibid., p. 412. 31. 17th Annual Report . . . Feb. 16, 1861t, pp. 41 ff. 32. Henry M. Flint, The Railroads of the United States, pp. 122-28. Fish plates, small pieces of iron to join rail ends securely together, were not used during the Civil W a r period. Sir Samuel Morton Peto, The Resources and Prospects of America Ascertained during a Visit to the States in the Autumn of 1866, p. 275. S3. 17th Annual Report . . . Feb. 16, 1864, PP- 12-13. 34. Ibid., p. 13. At this time steel rail was estimated by the American Railway Times to cost $112 a ton Bessemer process. Iron rail sold at inflated prices in later years of the war, but in 1863 cost about $68 a ton. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V I I (July-Dec. 1862), 442-43; 3rd Annual Report . . . of the Erie Railway . . . 1864, P- 8. 36. 17th Annual Report . . . Feb. 16, 1864, P- 37. 36. Ibid., p. 19. 37. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 413-16. Thomas A. Scott had charge of these parties, and communicated their information through Gov. Curtin to Washington. See also McClure, op. cit., I I , 100.

NOTES: CHAPTER

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255

38. 17th Annual Report . . . Feb. 16, 1864, PP- 24, 33, 37. 39. Ibid., p. 16. 40. 18th Annual Report . . . Feb. 21, 1865, p p . 1-3. 41. Ibid.., p. 3. About 1,000,000 tons of coal were moved. 42. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 11. 43. Ibid., pp. 11, 39. Using rails with steel wearing surfaces did not prove successful on a large scale. 44. Ibid., pp. 28, 29. Steel tires, established on E u r o p e a n railways, were introduced in the United S t a t e s on the Atlantic and G r e a t Western, and the Buffalo and S t a t e Line Railroads. American Railroad Journal, Dec. 27, 1862. 45. 19th Annual Report . . . 1866, p. 9. 46. Ibid., pp. 18-19, 22. 47. American Railroad Journal, April 27, 1861 ( f r o m P i t t s b u r g h Pott). 48. 6th Annual Report of the Pitttburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago Railroad Company . . . Dec. SI, 1861, p . 14. 49. Ibid., pp. 16, 18. 50. Ibid., pp. 19, 32, 42, 52. 51. 1st Annual Report . . . of the Pitttburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago Railway Company . . . Dec. SI, 1862, p p . 3, 30, 35-6. 52. Ibid., p. 58. 53. Ibid., p. 62. 54. Ibid., p. 79. 55. American Railway Review, J u n e 5, 1862. 56. 2nd Annual Report . . . Dec. SI, 1863, p p . 8, 11. 57. 3rd Annual Report . . . Dec. SI, 1864, PP- 7-8. 58. Ibid., p. 10. Of course this decrease was not because the a r m y was shrinking, but because it had other sources of supply in 1864. T h e directors felt t h a t the maximum through traffic had been reached because E a s t e r n roads could not c a r r y off all the business offered at Pittsburgh. Ibid., p. 16. 59. Ibid., pp. 9, 10. 60. Ibid., p. 11. 61. Ibid., p. 12. 62. Ibid., p. 13. 63. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 64. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

256

NOTES: CHAPTER V

65. Ibid., p. 37. This interdependence usually meant that cars of one railroad were freely used on other roads, provided their gauges did not prevent such use. Railroads did not keep track of where their cars were, and hence frequently did not have available all the rolling stock which they owned. See the article entitled, "Railroad Cars Astray," in United States Railroad and Mining Register, Dec. 14, 1861. 66. 4th Annual Report . . . Dec. 31, 1865, pp. 7, 9. 67. Ibid., p. 9. But local tonnage was up 8 per cent. Ibid., p. 17. 68. Ibid., p. 11. The iron lasted only three to five years. 69. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 70. American Railway Times, March 19, 1864. 71. 1st Annual Report of the Erie Railway Company . . . Dec. 31,1862, p. 6. 72. Ibid., p. 9. 73. Flint, op. cit., p. 183. 74. 1st Annual Report . . . Dec. SI, 1862, pp. 12-14. 75. Ibid., pp. 15, 16. 76. Ibid., pp. 15, 17. 77. Ibid., p. 31. Origins of these shipments is another illustration of the interdependence of the railroads. 78. 2nd Annual Report. . . Dec. 31,1863, pp. 6-7. 79. Ibid., pp. 8-9, 11. 80. Ibid., p. 16. 81. Ibid., pp. 11, 13. 82. Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 16. Seventeen locomotives and 257 cars were added to the rolling stock in 1863. Flint, op. cit., p. 183. 83. 2nd Annual Report . . . Dec. SI, 1863, p. 17. 84. 3rd Annual Report . . . Dec..31, 1864, P- 5. 85. Ibid., p. 8. This was typical. The Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railroad paid $115 in 1805. 5th Annual Report of the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway . . . 1865, p. 30. 86. 3rd Annual Report . . . Dec. 31, 1864, P- 15. 87. Ibid., p. 13. 88. Ibid., p. 14. 89. 4th Annual Report . . . Dec. 31, 1865, pp. 5-7. 90. Ibid., pp. 8, 14. 91. Ibid., p. 13.

NOTES: CHAPTER V

257

92. Annual Report of the New York Central Railroad . . . for the year ending Sept. 30, 1861 . . . to the State Engineer and Surveyor of the State of New York, p. 25. T h e road used the railroad b r i d g e at T r o y to carry cars to and f r o m the H u d s o n River Railroad. American Railway Review, April 4, 1861. 93. Quoted in American Railroad Journal, M a y 4, 1861. 94. Ibid., M a y 25, 1861. 95. Ibid., Nov. 16, 1861 ( f r o m Albany Atlas). 96. Ibid. 97. Annual Report of the New York Central . . . Sept. 30, 1862, p. 21. 98. Ibid., p. 23 ; 1861 report, p. 23. 99. T h e R o c h e s t e r - N e w York flour rate was raised f r o m 20 cents to 90 cents a barrel. This was one method of keeping t o n n a g e f r o m becoming too large for the rolling stock. American Railroad Journal, Oct. 26, 1861. 100. Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 1863, p. 37. F o r t h e first time the line's total earnings passed $10,000,000. Ibid., p p . 21, 23, 25. 101. Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 186b, PP- 13, 23. 102. Annual Report . . . Sept. 31, 1865, p p . 14, 15, 17, 19, 30. 103. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I I , ( J a n . J u n e , 1865), 349. See also American Railway Times, Aug. 8, 1863. F a r t h e r west even higher prices prevailed (see C h a p t e r V I ) . 104. 35th Annual Report . . . of the Baltimore and Ohio . . . 1861, p p . 27, 35. 105. Sometimes even Union troops gave headaches to t h e railroad. Some Ohio soldiers retreated f r o m Kearneysville on a f r e i g h t car which careened down a 10-mile g r a d e almost to H a r p e r ' s F e r r y station, endangering both lives and p r o p e r t y . J o s e p h B a r r y , The Strange Story of Harper's Ferry, p p . 154-56. 106. 35th Annual Report . . . 1861, p p . 6-7. T h i s r e p o r t was d a t e d Oct. 1, 1863. All the wartime reports were d a t e d two y e a r s a f t e r the fiscal year to which they applied. T h u s even the administrative machinery of this railroad was adversely affected d u r i n g the war. I t was 1870 b e f o r e this p a r t of the company was functioning normally. 107. Official Records, Ser. I, I I , 6 2 9 ; Summers, op. cit., p. 101. 108. Summers, op. cit., p p . 71-88; E d w a r d H u n g e r f o r d , The

258

NOTES: CHAPTER V

Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927, I I , 5-6. This campaign demonstrated the military importance of railroads. 109. E . G . Campbell, " T h e United States M i l i t a r y Railroads, 1862-1865," Journal of the American Military History Foundation, I I , 76; 35th Annual Report . . . of the B $ 0, 1861, p. 36. 110. Campbell, op. cit., p p . 75-6; Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., Battle» and Leader» of the Civil War, I , 122-28 ( J o h n D . I m b o d e n ) . 111. 36th Annual Report . . . of the B % 0 . . . 1861, p. 7. 112. Ibid., p p . 6 - 7 ; H u n g e r f o r d , op. cit., p. 8 ; Summers, op. cit., p p . 65-67; B a r r y , op. cit., p p . 120-21. T h e H a r p e r ' s F e r r y bridge was destroyed and rebuilt nine times d u r i n g the war. Ibid., p. ICO. 118. 36th Annual Report . . . of the B $ 0 . . . 1861, p p . 13, 30. 114. Ibid., p p . 27, 81. O f t e n main-stem rolling stock was transf e r r e d to the Washington Branch to accommodate the heavy traffic there. Ibid., p . 86. 115. Ibid., p . 47. 116. 36th Annual Report . . . Sept. SO, 1862, p p . 6-7, 10. 117. Ibid., p . 81. T h e Illinois Central Railroad made the same complaint. 118. Ibid., p p . 30, 6. 119. Ibid., p . 37. Of course both the main stem and the Washington Branch were used in these shipments. T h e census of 1870 gave Washington a population of 109,199. T h e 40 per cent increase since 1860 was more r a p i d t h a n in such cities as Baltimore and Philadelphia. Ninth Centus of the United States, Statistics of Population, p p . 97, 163, 254. 120. 36th Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 1862, pp. 41-42, 44. 121. Ibid., p . 49. Oct. 29, 1862, cooking fires got out of control and burned 23 carloads of hay. 37th Annual Report . . . 1863, p. 6. 122. 36th Annual Report . . . 1862, p p . 50-53. Loaded coal cars were sometimes placed on bridges to hold them in place. 123. Ibid., 55-56. Over $140,000 was spent for repair of mainstem bridges d u r i n g this fiscal year, more than half of it at H a r p e r ' s F e r r y . Ibid., p p . 59-60. 124. 37th Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 1863, p. 22. 125. United State» Railroad and Mining Register, Nov. 29, 1862, ( f r o m Baltimore Sun, Nov. 26, 1862).

NOTES: CHAPTER

VI

259

126. 37 th Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 1863, pp. 45-46. 127. Ibid., pp. 47-52. 128. Ibid., pp. 14, 23. 36th Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 26. 129. 37th Annual Report . . . 1863, pp. 62-63. 130. 38th Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 1864, p. 52. 131. Ibid., p. 51. 132. Ibid., p. 56. 133. Ibid., p. 62. Regular communication was interrupted for 36 hours. New York Times, J u l y 19, 1864. 184. 38th Annual Report . . . 1864, P- 35. T h e entire main stem was operated for about nine months of the year. 135. Ibid., p. 45. The report cited the untimely death by sickness of Alexander Diffev, supervisor, during his service in helping to forward Hooker's Corps from Washington to Chattanooga. 136. 37th Annual Report . . . 1863, p. 6. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r example was a f t e r the Gettysburg campaign. 187. 38th Annual Report . . . 1864, P- 56. I n December, watchmen were established along the line to sound a warning when a raid threatened. 39th Annual Report . . . 1866, p. 41. 138. 39th Annual Report . . . Sept. 30, 1865, p p . 21, 25. United States Railroad and Mining Register, J u l y 29, 1865. See also E d w a r d H u n g e r f o r d , Transport for War, p. 101. 139. 39th Annual Report. . . 1865, p. 52. 140. Address of John W. Garrett to the Board of Directors of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, Dec. 1868, p. 9. 141. F o r a convenient statistical summary, see Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I I I , ( J u l y - D e c . 1865), 176-181, for railroads in New York, 207 for railroads in Ohio. CHAPTER

VI

1. Report . . . of the Michigan Central Railroad . . . June 1861, pp. 8, 19, 23, 32-33. 2. Ibid., pp. 19, 28. Charles E . Fisher, " T h e Michigan Central Railroad," Bulletin of Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, No. 19 (Sept. 1929), p. 18. 3. Report . . . of the Michigan Central Railroad . . . 1861, pp. 18-19.

2O0

NOTES: CHAPTER

VI

4. Report . . . of the Michigan Central Railroad . . . 1862, p p . 7, 20. 5. Ibid., p p . 7, 9. 6. Ibid., p. 2 1 ; F i s h e r , op. cit., p. 19. 7. Report . . . of the Michigan Central Railroad . . . 1863, p p . 7-8. 8. Fisher, op. cit., p. 31. 9. Report . . . of the Michigan Central Railroad . . . 1864, p p . 7-8. 10. Ibid., p p . 11, 22. 11. Ibid., p. 22. 12. Ibid., p p . 24, 31, 34. 13. Report . . . of the Michigan Central . . . 1865, pp. 11, 23. Some of this loss was covered by the gain in local traffic. 14. Ibid., p. 25. 15. Ibid., p p . 11-12, 23. T h e crowded conditions of f r e i g h t traffic created long delays. Shipments out of Chicago sometimes took 25 to 40 d a y s to reach Buffalo, American Railway Review, March 6, 1862 ( f r o m Buffalo Express). 16. Ibid., p p . 7 - 8 ; F i s h e r , op. cit., p. 31. T h e increase of $700,000 in expenses was the highest for a single year. Report . . . 1866, p. 43. 17. Report . . . of the Michigan Central . . . 1864, P- 8. 18. Ibid., 1865, p p . 10-11; Fisher, op. cit., p. 21. 19. F i s h e r , op. cit., p. 31. 20. W h a t was then the Chicago branch is now the main line. 21. Illinois Central Report . . . 1861, p p . 1, 5-6. American Railway Review, J u l y 4, 1861. One train of 26 cars, pulled by two locomotives, l e f t Chicago to the accompaniment of cheers of thousands of onlookers and whistles of other locomotives. Livermore, op. cit., p. 103. 22. Illinois Central Railroad Report . . . 1861, pp. 1-2. 23. Ibid., p p . 2-3. 24. Ibid. Military companies of Illinois were t r a n s p o r t e d f r e e to Springfield by t h e Illinois Central, Chicago and Rock Island, Alton, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, Galena and Chicago Union, Chicago and N o r t h W e s t e r n , and Chicago and Milwaukee. American Railway Review, M a y 2, 1861. See also C h a p t e r I X . 25. Illinois Central Railroad Report . . . 1861, p. 3. 26. Ninth Census of the United States, Statistics of Population, p p . 3, 110.

NOTES: CHAPTER

VI

261

27. Illinois Central Railroad Report . . . 1862, p. 1. C o m p a n y shops were building 550 freight cars as fast as possible. Ibid., p. 5. 28. Ibid., p p . 2, 12. 29. Ibid., p. 12. P a s s e n g e r s carried one mile: 31,800,000; troops carried one mile: 30,700,000 30. Ibid., p. 5. 31. Illinois Central Railroad Report . . . 1863, pp. 1-2, 5. 32. Ibid., p. 5 ; 18G2 Report, p. 5. 33. Ibid., p. 12. 34. Illinois Central Report . . . 1864, PDoing government business at cost or less raised the operating ratio to 54 p e r c e n t f r o m 46 percent the previous year. Ibid., p. 4. 35. Ibid., p. 5. 36. 3rd Annual Report of the Chicago and North Western Railway Company, June, 1862, p p . 15, 22-23. 37. Ibid., p p . 2, 7. 38. 4th Annual Report . . . 1863, p. 3. 39. Ibid., p. 4. 40. Ibid., p p . 6 - 7 ; 3rd Annual Report . . . 1862, p. 11. Additions to t h e rolling stock were hampered by government requisitions f o r 70 f r e i g h t cars in 1863. W. H . S t a n n e t t , comp., Yesterday and Today, a History of the Chicago and North Western Railway System, p. 33. 41. 6th Annual Report . . . 1866, p. 29. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I 11, ( J u l y - D e c . , 1865), 444. T h e Peninsula Railroad was a land g r a n t road b e f o r e consolidation with the C & N.W. 42. F l i n t , op. cit., p p . 262-63. 43. 6th Annual Report . . . 1865, m a p insert. 44. Ibid., p. 41. 45. Ibid., p p . 46-47. 46. Ibid., p. 4 9 ; 1862, p. 25. 47. 1865 r e p o r t , p. 57. These were wages ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) , t r a c k r e p a i r s ( $ 8 1 3 , 0 0 0 ) , fuel ( $ 6 5 6 , 0 0 0 ) , car repairs ( $ 5 4 4 , 0 0 0 ) , and engine repairs ( $ 5 0 5 , 0 0 0 ) . 48. 1st Annual Report of the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway Co., 1861, p. 11. 49. Ibid., 17, 19.

262

NOTES: CHAPTER VI

50. Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 28. 61. Ibid., p. 11. 62. 2nd Annual Report .. . 1862, p. 7. 53. Ibid., pp. 11, 13, 14. 54. Ibid., p. 14. 55. 4th Annual Report . . . 1864, P- 656. Ibid., pp. 6, 7. T h e increase in expenses came chiefly from insurance, fuel, train and station supplies, and oil and waste. 57. Ibid., pp. 20-22, 25, 26. 68. Ibid., p. 27. 59. Ibid., p. 28. Other Western roads had similar experiences. In one year wood rose in price from $3.54 to $5.06 a cord. Annual Report . . . of the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co., April 1, 1866, p. 12. I n 1862, this same line paid $37 a ton for new rail; in 1865, $100 a ton (1862 report, p. 7; 1866 report, p. 16). 60. 4th Annual Report of the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway . . . 1864, PP- 80-31. 61. Ibid., p. 34. 62. Ibid., pp. 31-32, 46-47. 63. Ibid., pp. 31-32. T h e 7 passenger engines and 26 passenger cars in 1864 contrasted with 7 engines and 31 cars in 1861. Other roads were doing the same thing. Passenger business on the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad tripled between 1862 and 1865, but the number of passenger cars increased only from 40 to 72. Charles E. Fisher, " T h e Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad," Railway and Locomotive Historical Society Bulletin, No. 24 (March, 1931), pp. 13, 16, 43. 64. 6th Annual Report . . . 1866, p. 25. On other Chicago railroads, profits of the Chicago and Rock Island rose from $456,000 in 1860-61 to $1,892,000 in 1864-65; of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy from $820,000 in 1861-62 to $2,267,000 in 1864-65. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, L I 11, (July-Dec., 1865), 280-81, 482. 65. 6th Annual Report . . . 1866, pp. 27-30. This improving railroad was acquired in 1866 by the Milwaukee and St. Paul, headed by the outstanding Alexander Mitchell. August Derleth, The Milwaukee Road, p. 87.

NOTES: CHAPTER

VII

263

C H A P T E E VII

1. Kincaid A. H e r r , The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 186019Jf2, p. 16; American Railroad Journal, Nov. 16, 1861 (from L & N annual Report to J u n e SO, 1861). 2. H e r r , op. cit., p p . 16-17. Much of the produce was coming from Ohio farmers. Charles H . Ambler, A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley, p. 246. 3. H e r r , op. cit., p. 17. 4. John Leeds Kerr, The Story of a Southern Carrier, the Louisville and Nathville, p. 20. 5. Lincoln's plan to build a railroad from Kentucky to Cumberland Gap or Knoxville was opposed by Guthrie as impractical. Samuel R. Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, p. 95. 6. H e r r , op. cit., p. 17; R. S. Cotterill, " T h e Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1861-1865," American Hittorical Review, X X I X , 702-3. 7. H e r r , op. cit., p. 17; Kerr, op. cit., p. 21. I n 1862, the Treasury Dept. issued special licenses for trading with the South. American Railway Review, April 3, 1862. 8. American Railway Review, May 23, J u n e 20, 1861. 9. Kerr, op. cit., p. 21. 10. H e r r , op. cit., p. 17. 11. United States Railroad and Mining Register, J u l y 6, 1861. 12. I n September, the railroad further suffered the destruction of 11 engines, 11 passenger cars, and 159 freight cars. American Railroad Journal, Nov. 16, 1861. 13. The illegal and special trade in the Mississippi Valley is treated, but without special reference to the L & N, by E . M. Coulter, "Commercial Intercourse with the Confederacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1861-1865," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, V, 379 ff. 14. 86th Annual Report . . . of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad . . . Sept. SO, 1861, pp. 30-31. 15. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I, 121-22. 16. Howard G. Brownson, "History of the Illinois Central Railroad to 1870," University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, IV (Sept.-Dec., 1915), 66-67.

264

NOTES: CHAPTER

VII

17. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V I ( J a n . J u n e , 1862), 464. 18. Illinois Central Railroad Report . . . 1861, p. 3. 19. Report . . . of the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, 1861, p p . 6-7. 20. Little Miami Railroad Company, and Columbus and Xenia Railroad Company, Ninth Annual Joint Report . . . for the Year 1865, p. 6. 21. 36th Annual Report . . . of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad . . . Sept. 30,1862, p. 37. 22. Annual Report . . . of the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad . . . 1861)., p. 26. Italics are in the report. On the other hand, the Michigan Central Railroad thought the war had dislocated their business,, and they did not get enough government p a t r o n a g e to make up their losses. See Chapter V I . in the Civil War, p. 47; 23. F r a n k H . T a y l o r , Philadelphia W i n n i f r e d K. Mackay, "Philadelphia During the Civil W a r , " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, J a n . , 1946, p. 15. See also Chapter X I . 24. Official Records, Ser. I I I , I I , 794-95. 25. Znd Annual Report, United States Christian Commission, 1863, p p . 25, 275. 26. American Railway Review, J a n . 31, 1861. See also A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, p. 467. 27. American Railway Review, J a n . 31, 1861. 28. Report of the Secretary of W a r , J u l y 1, 1861, in Appendix to Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11; see also Official Records, Ser. I I I , I, 301-10. 29. Report . . . Dec. 1, 1861, p. 18; see also Lewis H . H a n e y , A Congressional History of Railways in the United States, 18501877, p p . 159-60. 30. Official Records, Ser. I I I , I, 807-8, Scott to Stanton, J a n . 23, 1862 ; Kamm, op. cit., p. 84. 31. Stanton Papers, Vol. I I , J a n . 27, 1862; Eva Swantner, " M i l i t a r y Railroads D u r i n g the Civil W a r , " The Military Engineer, No. 119 (Sept.-Oct., 1929), p. 435. 32. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., J a n . 28, 1862,

NOTES: CHAPTER

VIII

265

p. 506. Wade later became one of the leaders of the anti-Lincoln Radical Republicans. 33. Ibid., p. 508. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid., p. 509; this argument was echoed by J o h n Sherman of Ohio. Ibid., p. 515. 36. James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln, pp. 30-1, 36. 37. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., J a n . 28, 1862, p. 510. 38. Ibid., p p . 510, 512, 513. In June, 1862, Browning maintained this position in debate with Charles Sumner who contended that war powers stemmed from Congress, not from the executive. Randall, op. cit., p. 42. 39. Congressional Globe, J a n . 28, 1862, 511, 519. 40. This point of view has been sustained in the courts. Randall, op. cit., p. 37. 41. Congressional Globe, J a n . 28, 1862, p. 511. 42. Ibid., p. 548. Blair of Missouri guided the bill through the House. 43. Haney, op. cit., p. 158. 44. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I, 879. 45. United States Statutes at Large, X I I , 334-35. CHAPTER

VIII

1. Roger A. Barton, "The Camden and Amboy Railroad Monopoly," in Proceedings, New Jersey Historical Society, (Oct., 1927), new ser., X I I , 411. 2. Henry V. Poor, Railroad Manual of the United States, 1868, p. 32. 3. John E . Watkins, The Camden and Amboy Railroad, Origin and Early History, pp. 44-53. The Trenton-New Brunswick branch was much more important than the main line, which was restricted to freight carriage. 4. Shall the Extention or Recreating of the Camden and Amboy

266

NOTES: CHAPTER V i l i

Railroad Monopoly be permitted by the People of New Jersey, and made Perpetual? ( a n 1864 p a m p h l e t ) , pp. 2-10. 5. American Railroad Journal, Feb. 9, 1861, April 30, 1861; American Railway Rexneve, J a n . 9, 1862. This route was longer in mileage but shorter in time because of delays on the direct route at Philadelphia and Baltimore. T h e establishment of this secondary route, plus the fact t h a t the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad paid for its own repairs while the N o r t h e r n Central got them at government expense, made Samuel Felton resentful. Kamm, op. cit., p. 59. 6. 16th Annual Report . . . of the Central Railroad of New Jersey . . . Jan. 1,1862, p . 11. 7. Z^th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1861, p. 11. 8. 16th Annual Report .. . op. cit., p. 11. 9. Ibid., p . 12. About 80 per cent of the traffic used Felton's route. Kamm, op. cit., p. 62. 10. 16th Annual Report . . . 1863, p. 14. Receipts for government business in 1861 were $53,722.84; in 1863, $21,517.90. 11. American Railroad Journal, Oct. 5, 1861; 24th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1861, p. 7. T h e route was under the superintendency of T h o m a s H . Canfield of the R u t l a n d Railroad. Kamm, op. cit., p. 51. 12. United States Railroad and Mining Register, Nov. 16, 1861. An additional early evening train from New York was later added, and d e p a r t u r e times altered slightly. Ibid., Dec. 27, 1862. Local t r a i n s still required a change at both Philadelphia and H a v r e de Grace. 13. 24th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1861, p. 8. 14. Festus P . Summers, The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War, p p . 205-7; H a n e y , op. cit., 159-60. 15. T h i s general opposition was supported by the American Railroad Journal, which advocated that the P W & B should be required to double track its line and build a bridge over the Susqueh a n n a River ( J u n e 28, 1862, Feb. 27, 1864). On the other hand, t h e United States Railroad and Mining Register ( M a y 4, 1861)

NOTES: CHAPTER

Vili

267

suggested that the government should own a rail route out of Washington in order to make Annapolis an important shipping center to take the place of Baltimore. T h e Register was published in Philadelphia, and the fact that private companies were using the route via Harrisburg, thus by-passing Philadelphia, undoubtedly prompted the Register to favor a government line, which would use the direct route through Philadelphia. See issue of Dec. 14, 1861. The Army and Navy Journal (April 15, 1865) called the government failure to build the line "shortsighted." 16. History of the Railway Mail Service, p. 59. 17. Executive Document 79, House of Representatives, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess.; Summers, op. cit., pp. 207-8. T h e bill was sponsored by Washburne of Illinois and Van Wyck of New York. United States Railroad and Mining Register, Dec. 14, 1861. 18. Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X L V I ( J a n . June, 1862), 39. 19. Ibid., p. 40. T h e American Railroad Journal, Dec. 6, 1862, echoed these sentiments with the comment, " W a r is now dependant for its successes on railroads and Telegraphs." 20. T h e delegation consisted of Alderman Semmes, Emile Dupre, George P a r k e r , Pliny Miles, Col. Peter Force, George Lowry, Hudson Taylor, and Messrs. Perry, Jones, Van Vliet, and Riley. 21. Ibid., pp. 73-74. The American Railway Review added its voice to the hue and cry, claiming that New York-Washington transportation took 13 hours, when 7-8 would suffice, and that the $8 fare ( 3 ^ cents a mile) was exhorbitant ( J u n e 5, 1862). 22. Ex. Doc. 79, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 23. Ibid., p. 5. 24. Ibid., p. 3. 25. Summers, op. cit., pp. 213-14. 26. 24th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1861, p. 9. 27. Ibid., T h e American Railway Review approved these sentiments (May 29, 1802). 28. Appendix to Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 423. 29. 25th Annual Report . . . 1862, pp. 8 , 1 1 . 30. Report . . . of the New Jersey Railroad . . . 1863, p. 5.

268

NOTES: CHAPTER V i l i

Delivery was delayed until 1864 because the locomotive companies had government orders. United States Railroad and Mining Register, J a n . 2, 1864. 31. 25th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1862, pp. 11-12. 32. 26th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1863, p. 13. 33. 15th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 1862, p. 4 8 ; 25th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1862, p. 12 ; United States Railroad and Mining Register, Oct. 12, 1861. 34. Report . . . of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad . . . 1862, p. 13. 35. 26th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad . . . 186S, p. 13; 17th Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . 186It, p. 10. One of the assistant engineers on this project was Alexander J . Cassatt, later one of the Pennsylvania's outstanding presidents ( R a i l r o a d Gazette, J a n . 4, 1 9 0 7 ) . The first train on this route ran Nov. 28, 1863. United States Railroad and Mining Register, Nov. 28, 1863. See map in the New York Times, Feb. 5, 1863. Beginning about this time, the Times supported a government railroad, because existing companies had not carried through the necessary improvements (Feb. 6, 1863). 36. Considerations . . ., p. 1. 37. Ibid., p. 3. 38. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 39. Ibid., pp. 5-6. The emphasis in this whole controversy on the inadequacies of single track point up the importance of recent developments in Centralized Traffic Control, which can make the carrying capacity of a single-track railroad almost equal to that with a double track. 40. Ibid., p. 7. 41. Ibid., p. 8. 42. Ibid., p. 9. 43. Ibid., pp. 9-12. 44. Ibid., p. 13.

NOTES: CHAPTER

VII!

45. Ibid., pp. 13-14. In 1948 railroads claimed that they were taxed so heavily in New Jersey that they had to use revenue made in other states to p a y their New J e r s e y taxes. 46. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I V , 47. 47. Statement Made by the Railroad Companies . . . to the Postmaster General, p p . 3-4. T h e statement was dated J a n . 14, 1864. Most of its arguments were repeated by W. P. Smith of the B & O in a speecli at a Washington dinner given for guests who came on the first through mail train from J e r s e y City to Washington. American Railway Times, J a n . 9, 1864. 48. Ibid., pp. 5-6; American Railroad Journal, J a n . 2, 1864. 49. Statement. . . to the Postmaster General, p. 5. 50. This was completed by J u n e , 1865. United States Railroad and Mining Register, J u n e 10, 1865. 51. Statement . . . to the Postmaster General, pp. 7-10. 52. Ibid., pp. 10-12. 53. United States Railroad and Mining Register, M a y 21, 1864 ( f r o m Baltimore Sun, M a y 12), Sept. 3, 1864; American Railroad Journal, Sept. 10, 1864; Washington Evening Star, Aug. 31, 1864 (quoted in History of the Railway Mail Service, pp. 154-55.). 54. T h e exact d a t e of the inauguration of regular service on this route is difficult to determine. On Nov. 26, 1864, it was in operation, but it was the second in the country, the first being the Chicago and N o r t h Western to Clinton, Iowa, Aug. 28, 1864. T h e fall of 1864 is about as close as we can come ( H i s t o r y of the Railway Mail Service, p p . 83, 153). On M a r c h 3, 1865, the railway post office was recognized by act of Congress, and before the war's end R P O cars were operating between N e w York and Boston via Springfield, on the H u d s o n River Railroad to T r o y , and on the New York Central to Buffalo, on the E r i e to Dunkirk, on the Pennsylvania to P i t t s b u r g h , and on the Chicago and North Western, Chicago and Rock Island, and Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy. Ibid., pp. 83, 86, 160, 179; American Railway Times, J a n . 28, 1865. 55. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 48. 56. Ibid., p. 49. 57. Ibid. 58. Impolicy of Building another Railroad

between

Washington

270

NOTES: CHAPTER

Vili

and New York, p. 23. The American Railway Times thought that, if this occurred, neither the government nor the public would be as well served as at present (Feb. 27, 1864). 59. Impolicy . . . , pp. 7-8. 60. Ibid., p. 7. 61. Ibid., pp. 17-18. See also letter of Felton and W. H . Gatzmer of the Camden and Amboy, J u n e 26, 1861, to Boston Journal, reprinted in American Railway Times, J u l y 6, 1861. For hospital cars, see Chapter X I V . 62. Also called the Delaware and Raritan Day, the Raritan Bay and Delaware, and the Delaware and Raritan. 63. Barton, op. cit., p. 415. I t carried 17,248 troops and 806,000 tons of freight before it was closed. Emerson D. Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War, p. 171. 64. Report 31, March 9, 1864, House of Representatives, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.: Report of Mr. Deming of Committee on Military Affairs on petition of Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad, p. 1. 66. Barton, op. cit., p. 416; Deming, op. cit., p. 1. 66. Deming, op. cit., pp. 2, 4-5. 67. Message of Joel Parker . . . to the Legislature . . . Trenton, pp. 3-4. 68. Ibid., p p . 7-8. 69. Richard F. Stockton, Defense of the System of Internal Improvements of the State of New Jersey, p. 29. T h e second letter is also reprinted in the United States Railroad and Mining Register, J u n e 4, 1864. 70. Stockton, op. cit., pp. 10, 39 ff. T h e tax was 10 cents per through passenger and 15 cents per ton. See A Defence of New Jersey . . . , pp. 3-5 (Letters to New York Evening Post from "A citizen of New J e r s e y " ) . 71. Stockton, op. cit., pp. 43-44; the five routes were the ocean, the canal, the C & A direct, the C & A via Trenton, and the New Jersey Central via Harrisburg. 72. See speech of Rep. Sweat of Maine, April 2, 1864, in A Defence of New Jersey . . . , pp. 12-13. 73. Railroad Usurpation of New Jersey (1865), pp. 4-5 (Speech of Sumner in the Senate, Feb. 14, 1865). 74. Ibid., p. 11.

NOTES: CHAPTER

IX

75. Ibid., p. 12. 76. 37th Annual Report . . . of the Baltimore and Ohio road . . . Sept. SO, 1863, p. 11. 77. 38th Annual Report... Sept. SO, 1864, p. 49. 78. Ibid., pp. 61 ff. 79. 39th Annual Report . . . Sept. SO, 1865, p. 7. 80. 27th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington Baltimore Railroad . . . Oct. 31,1864, P- 4. 81. 28th Annual Report.. . Oct. 31,1866, pp. 6-7. 82. Summers, op. cit., pp. 219-22. CHAPTER

271 Rail-

and

IX

1. United States W a r Department, Military Railroads, Order Book of General Orders, Instructions and Reports (pages unnumbered) ; hereafter cited as Order Book. 2. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I , 325-26, Scott to M a j . Sibley, J u l y 12, 1861. Previously, railroad officials in Pennsylvania had resolved that, on accounts to be settled with the state, charges for passengers would be reduced by one third, but not below 2 cents a mile. American Railroad Journal, J u n e 15, 1861. 3. Kamm, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 4. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I, 698-708 (Cameron's Report, Dec. 1, 1861) ; Appendix to Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 17. 5. New Jersey Railroad . . . Annual Report . . . 1861, p. 7. 6. Appendix to Congressional Globe, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 18 ; Scott to Stanton, Feb. 2, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. I I (4 cents f o r passengers; 5 cents for f r e i g h t ) . 7. 24th Annual Report . . . of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad . . . 1861, p. 10. 8. Ibid., p. 10. T h e New Jersey Railroad said it was charging only I-IV2 cents for troops (1861 report, p. 6). This was in answer to the charge of the New York Tribune that the railroad should carry troops for less than the full fare. American Railway Review, J u n e 6, 1861. 9. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I, 749. 10. This was the "Castle Circular", issued by E . H . Castle,

272

NOTES: CHAPTER

IX

superintendent of railroad transportation in the military department of the West. Kamm, op. cit., p. 70. 11. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I , 751-52. 12. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I , 889-90. 13. T h i s military rate for troops was discontinued on Dec. 31, 1865. Army and Navy Journal, March 3, 1866. 14. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I I , 838-39. 15. Ibid., Ser. I l l , I I , 795. 16. See Chapter V for the effect of the d r a f t on the railroads. This section is concerned with government policy on the subject. 17. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I I , 294 (Aug. 5, 1862). 18. Ibid., pp. 309-10. 19. Ibid., p. 310. 20. Ibid., p. 315. "Other experts" probably referred to administrative personnel, who were j u s t as valuable as skilled labor. An item in the American Railroad Journal of Nov. 1, 1862, r e a d : "Among those d r a f t e d at Scranton, Pa., are J o h n Brisbin, Superi n t e n d e n t ; R. A. H e n r y , general freight agent; W. H . Fuller, ticket agent, and H . R. Phelps, paymaster—all of the Delaware, L a c k a w a n n a , and Western Railroad." The efficient operation of railroads was handicapped by sucli occurrences. 21. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I I , 322. 22. Ibid., p. 323. 23. Ibid., p. 334. 24. Ibid., p. 336. Sloan of the Hudson River Railroad also mentioned this danger. 25. Ibid., p. 337. 26. Ibid., p. 358. 27. Ibid., IV, 1049. 28. H a n e y , op. cit., pp. 171-72. 29. This was usually done by groups of railroads. Those in the Cincinnati area, for instance, agreed on the necessary raise to be charged the public. American Railroad Journal, Aug. 16, 1862. 30. H a n e y , op. cit., p p . 174, 176.

NOTES: CHAPTER

X

273

CHAPTEU X 1. R e p o r t of Bvt. lirig. Gen. D. C. McCallum, D i r e c t o r a n d General M a n a g e r of the M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s of t h e U. S., M a y 26, I860, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., H o u s e of Representatives E x e c u t i v e Document 1, p p . 37-38. H e r e a f t e r cited as McCallum's R e p o r t , it is also p r i n t e d in Official Records, S e r . I I I , V, 974-1005. 2. Control of the railroads in the military zone at first rested with the D e p a r t m e n t s of the A r m y in which the railroads were located. R. E . Riegel, " F e d e r a l O p e r a t i o n of Southern R a i l r o a d s d u r i n g the Civil W a r , " Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I X , 128. 3. M c C a l l u m ' s R e p o r t , p. 5. 4. E v a S w a n t n e r , " M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s during the Civil W a r , " The Military Engineer, X X I , 435. 5. New Y o r k Times, Dec. 28, 1878; E d w a r d H u n g e r f o r d , Men of V.rie, 139-40; Dictionary of American Biography, X I , 565-60. 6. S w a n t n e r , op. cit., p. 434. An act of Congress, a p p r o v e d J u l y 4, 1864, reorganized t h e Q M D e p a r t m e n t into nine divisions; the f o u r t h h a d charge of r a i l r o a d s a n d telegraphs. U. S. W a r D e p a r t m e n t , M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s , Order Book of general orders, instructions, and reports ( p a g e s u n n u m b e r e d ) . 7. Riegel, op. cit., p. 129. S. Ibid., p. 130; S w a n t n e r , op. cit., p. 435. 9. S w a n t n e r , op. cit., X X I I , 21. 10. American Railway Times, M a r c h 14, 1863. 11. McCallum Report, p. 5. Originally known as the W a s h i n g t o n and Alexandria Railroad, it was reorganized in 1862 as t h e W a s h ington, A l e x a n d r i a , and Georgetown Railroad. American Railway Review, M a y 15, 1862. 12. F o r t y cars were p u r c h a s e d f r o m t h e Boston and W o r c e s t e r Railroad and 50 from the Providence a n d Worcester. T h e government paid $ 5 0 0 for p l a t f o r m cars, a n d $600 for covered cars. American Railway Review, M a y 8, 1862. 13. McCallum Report, p. 6. 14. Ibid.j Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, p. 270. 15. H a u p t , op. cit., p. 43. 16. See H a u p t , op. cit., P r e f a c e .

274

NOTES: CHAPTER X

17. New York Timet, Dec. 15, 1905. There is a sketch of his career in Railroad Gazette, Dec. 22, 1905. 18. Samuel R. Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, pp. 47-48. 19. Occasionally he even made suggestions to Lincoln. See Haupt to Lincoln, Dec. 22 and 26, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. X. 20. Haupt, op. cit., p. 44. 21. Ibid., pp. 268-69. 22. Ibid., pp. 46, 48-49. 28. Ibid., p. 47. 24. Ibid., pp. 818, 185. 25. Ibid., pp. 54-58 ; Order Book, May 28, 1862. 26. Haupt, op. cit., p. 47. 27. Ibid., p. 45. 28. Ibid., pp. 58, 55-56. 29. Ibid., p. 269. 80. Ibid., p. 56. 81. Thomas A. Scott had previously expressed this same opinion to Stanton when he said that few army people knew anything about railroads and that transportation of supplies to army depots should not be in army hands. Scott to Stanton, March 1, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. IV. 82. Order Book. 88. Haupt, op. cit., p. 56. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid., p. 175. 86. Ibid., pp. 57, 58. 87. Ibid., p. 59. 38. Order Book, June 2, 1862. Only the superintendent and dispatchers could issue train orders. 89. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 214-16, 286; Edward Killough, History of the Western Maryland Railroad, p. 68. 40. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 64-66. 41. Ibid., p. 66. 42. Haupt to Stanton, May 28, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. V I I . 48. Haupt, op. cit., p. 69. 44. Ibid., p. 70. 45. Order Book.

NOTES: CHAPTER

27«

X

46. H a u p t , op. cit., p. 7 3 ; New York Timet, 47. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 74-76, 88-84, 185.

Aug. 29, 1862.

48. Ibid., pp. 76-77.

49. Ibid., p. 77. 50. Ibid.,

p p . 7 8 - 7 9 ; Robert U. J o h n s o n a n d Clarence C. B u e l ,

ed., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I I , 461 ( J o h n Pope, " T h e Second Battle of Bull R u n " ) . 51. H a u p t , op. cit., p. 80. 52. Ibid., p p . 80, 88 ( e n t i r e interview). 53. Order Book. S t u r g i s ' s name was removed f r o m t h e list of m a j o r generals in 1863. Nicolay to S t a n t o n , M a r c h 6, 1868, Stanton

Papers, Vol XI. 54. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 84-85.

55. Ibid., p. 88. 56. Ibid., pp. 89-90, 96.

57. Ibid., p. 90. 58. Ibid., pp. 196-96. 59. Ibid., pp. 94-95, 109 ; William R. Plum, The Military

Tele-

graph during the Civil War in the United State*, I, 223-24. 60. General Fitz John Porter'» Narrative of the Services of the Fifth Army Corps in 1862 in Northern Virginia, p. 58. 61. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 98-99, 103-4, 106, 110.

62. Ibid., pp. 100, 104, 107-8, 110, 114. 63. Ibid., pp. 98, 108-9, 129. 64. Rev. Lemuel Moss, Annals of the U. S. Christian

Com-

mission, p. 138 ( T e l e g r a m G a r r e t t to S t u a r t , T r e a s . of t h e Commission, Aug. 30, 1 8 6 2 ) . 65. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 116-18.

66. Ibid., pp. 126-27. 67. Ibid., p p . 129-30, 133-34.

68. Ibid., p. 135. 69. McCallum Report, p. 6. 70. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 138-39. Meigs issued these same o r d e r s

to QM officers, Oct. 1, 1862. Order Book. 71. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 139-40.

72. Ibid., p. 140. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., p. 143.

276

NOTES: CHAPTER

X

75. Ibid., pp. 144-46. 76. Ibid., p. 146. 77. Halleck to Stanton, Oct. 28, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. I X . 78. McCallum Report, p. 6; New York Time», Sept. 8, 1862. 79. Haupt, op. cit., p. 149. 80. Ibid., p. 154. 81. Ibid., p. 148. 82. Swantner, op. cit., X X I , 519. 83. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 154-55. 84. Ibid., pp. 155-56. 85. Ibid., p. 158. 86. McCallum Report, pp. 33-34. 87. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 158-59. 88. Ibid., p. 160. 89. Haupt to Stanton, Sept. 9, 1863, in Order Book. 90. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 160-63. 91. Ibid., p. 165. 92. McCallum Report, pp. 6-7; Official Records, Ser. I I I , I I I , 119-20. 93. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 165-66. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid., p. 179. 96. Ibid., pp. 167-68. 97. Ibid., p. 173. 98. Ibid., p. 168. 99. Ibid., p. 174. 100. Ibid., pp. 176, 272. 101. Ibid., pp. 184-85. 102. Official Records, Ser. I I I , I I I , 1-2. 103. Ibid., p. 119 (McCallum to Stanton, April 7, 1863). 104. Ibid., p. 120; the American Railway Times, April 18, 1863, reported that 1,200 passengers daily traveled the line. 105. Haupt to Stanton, Sept. 9, 1863, in Order Book. 106. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 186-87. 107. F. J. Crilly to D. H . Rucker, Aug. 17, 1867, in Order Book. 108. Haupt, op. cit., p. 196; Edwin A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914, p. 86. 109. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 204-5.

NOTES: CHAPTER

X

277

110. Ibid., p p . 205-6. 111. H a u p t was familiar with the territory involved in the Gettysburg campaign. H i s residence was on Seminary Ridge and one of Longstreet's batteries was set up in his f r o n t yard. Ibid., p. 311. 112. Ibid., p p . 208, 211. 113. Ibid., p . 212. 114. Killough, op. cit., pp. 5-13. 115. H a u p t , op. cit., p. 213. 116. Ibid.; H a u p t to Stanton, Sept. 9, 1863, Order Book. 117. McCallum Report ( J u n e 30, 1864), p . 5. 118. H a u p t , op. cit., p p . 214-16, 2 3 6 ; Killough, op. cit., p . 63. 119. Katherine P. Wormeley, The United States Sanitary Committion, pp. 128, 130, 145. 120. Plum, op. cit., I I , 16. 121. H a u p t , op. cit., pp. 220-21, 214-15, 244. 122. Ibid., p p . 220-21. 123. Ibid., pp. 222-23. 124. Ibid., p p . 224, 227-28. 125. Ibid., p. 2 3 8 ; McCallum Report, p. 8. 126. H a u p t , op. cit., pp. 236, 239-40. 127. McCallum Report, p p . 7-8. 128. H a u p t , op. cit., p. 243. 129. Ibid., p. 255. 130. Ibid., p. 248. For H a u p t ' s work in Virginia this final summer, see also Official Record», Ser. I I I , IV, 962. 131. Ibid., pp. 248, 251. 132. Ibid., p. 252. 133. Ibid., p. 254. 134. Ibid., pp. 256, 259. 135. Ibid., pp. 262-63. 136. Ibid., p. 264. 137. Ibid., p. 301.

278

N O T E S : C H A P T E R XI

C H A P T E R XI

1. McCallum Report, p. 7. T h e Manassas G a p Railroad to White Plains had been used for a few days to supply Meade on the march from Gettysburg to Culpepper. 2. Ibid., p. 8. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.; Official Record*, Ser. I I I , IV, 956. E . L. Wentz was superintendent and chief engineer. 6. Official Record*, Ser. I I I , V, 67 (Report of J . J . Moore). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., p. 6 8 ; Plum, op. cit., I I , 272-78. 9. Official Record*, Ser. I I I , V, 68. 10. Ibid., p. 69. 11. Ibid. 12. McCallum Report, p. 8; Official Record*, Ser. I I I , IV, 956. 18. McCallum Report, p. 9. 14. Official Record*, Ser. I I I , V, 70. 16. Ibid.; Battle* and Leader* . . . . IV, 677 (General Grant on siege of Petersburg, extract from report of July 22, 1866). 16. Ibid., p p . 70, 71. 17. Ibid., p. 71. 18. Ibid., pp. 71-72. 19. See Chapter X I I I . 20. Official Record*, Ser. I I I , V, 72. 21. Ibid., p p . 72-78. 22. Johnson and Buel, eds., Battle* and Leader* of the Civil War, IV, 708 (Horace Porter, "Five Forks and the Pursuit of Lee"). 23. Ibid., pp. 73-74, 682; McCallum Report, p. 9. The South Side Railroad is now part of the Norfolk and Western. 24. Dana to Stanton, July 1 and 3, 1864, Stanton Paper*, Vol. XXII. 25. Official Records, Ser. I I I , V, 101-2. 26. Ibid., pp. 78-74. The rolling stock had been shipped from the North to City Point, then diverted to Manchester for recon-

NOTES: CHAPTER X I I

279

ditioning, because of three months' deterioration on board. I t remained in storage ontil sold on Oct. 3, 1866. Ibid., p. 596. 27. Ibid., p. 76. 28. Ibid., pp. 75, 79. This line is now part of the Southern Bailway. 29. Ibid., p. 76. 80. Ibid., pp. 77-78; McCallum Report, p. 9. 81. Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 81. J . J . Moore estimated 1,207,474 tons for the Virginia railroads during the war, of which 785,981 were transported over the City Point and Army line. CHAPTER

XII

1. In Memoriam, General Lewi* B. Parsons, 28; Official Record*, Ser. I, LI I, 709. 2. Official Record», Ser. I, LII, 459-60, 709-10. This was General McClernand's expedition. 3. Ibid., p. 711. 4. See Chapter I I I . 5. With the exception of McCallum and Haupt, the members of the U.S.M.R. transportation corps and construction corps were civilians, a fact which sometimes hampered the efficient operation of railroad superintendents. Haupt to Stanton, Sept. 9, 1868, in Order Book. 6. William Pittenger, Daring and Suffering, A History of the Andrews Railroad Raid into Georgia 1862. This was one of the most spectacular exploits of the war. The captured engine, the "General," later did heroic service on the railroad, and in 1864 was the last to leave Atlanta before the evacuation by Hood. The engine is now kept on permanent display at Union Station, Chattanooga, by the Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Railroad. It was temporarily loaned to the Chicago Railroad Fair in 1948. 7. Haupt, Reminiscence*, pp. 188-89. 8. Ibid., pp. 189-90. 9. Dana to Stanton, Sept. 10, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. XIV. 10. Ibid., Sept. 16, 1863. In November, Dana complained that the railroad left subsistence sto/es waiting for days in the depot. Dana to Stanton, Nov. 3, 1863, Stanton Paper*, Vol. XIX.

280

NOTES: CHAPTER

XII

11. Official Records, Ser. I I I , I V , 879-80. 12. Stanton Papers, Vol. X V . 13. The story of this transfer is ably related in Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, pp. 166 ff.; Summers, The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War, pp. 166 ff.; see also Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, I I , 46 ff. 14. Kamm, op. cit., p. 165. 15. David H . Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, p. 174. 16. Ibid., p. 176; Kamm, op. cit., p. 166. 17. Summers, op. cit., p. 167. 18. Ibid., pp. 167-68 ; Kamm, op. cit., p. 165. 19. Bates, op. cit., p. 175. T h e total movement was actually 23,000. Ibid., p. 179. 20. Ibid., p. 177;' Stanton to Garrett, Sept. 23, 1863, Stanton Paper», Vol. X V . 21. Stanton to Boyle, Sept. 23, 1863, Stanton Papert, Vol. X V . 22. Boyle to Stanton, Sept. 24, 1863, in Ibid. 23. This was the Covington and Lexington Railroad. Bowler to Stanton, Sept. 24, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. X V . 24. Kamm, op. cit., pp. 167-69; Bates, op. cit., p. 177. 25. Bates, op. cit., p. 177. Order to Gen. Hooker, in James D. Richardson, A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V I , 178. 26. Scott to Stanton, Feb. 1, 2, 1862, Stanton Papers, Vol. I I . 27. Ibid.,

Feb. 7, 1862.

28. Meade to Halleck, McCallum to Stanton, Sept. 24, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. X V . 29. W . P. Smith to McCallum, Sept. 26, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. X V . 30. Smith to Stanton, Sept. 26, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. X V . 31. McCallum to Stanton, Sept. 26, 1863, ibid. 32. Garrett to Jewett, Sept. 24, 1863, ibid. 33. Ibid. A similiar concentration was ordered at Indianapolis because of the change of gauge. 34. Smith to Stanton, Sept. 27, 1863, ibid. 35. Bates, op. cit., pp. 419-20. Stanton also wired Smith to pay no attention to Schurz and to let laggards get along as best they could.

NOTES: CHAPTER X I I

281

Smith to Stanton, Stanton to Smith, Sept. 27, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. XV. 36. McCallum to Stanton, Smith to Stanton, Sept. 28, 1863, ibid. 37. Smith to Stanton, Sept. 29, 1863, ibid. 38. Garrett to Stanton, Oct. 4, 1863; Scott to Stanton, Oct. 5, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. X V I I . 39. Kamm, op. cit., pp. 176-77. 40. Smith to Stanton, Oct. 1, 1863, Stanton Paper*, Vol. X V I ; Scott to Stanton, Oct. 5, 1863, ibid., Vol. X V I I . 41. Scott to Stanton, Sept. 29, 1863, Stanton Papert, Vol. XV. 42. Kamm, op. cit., pp. 177-79. 43. Scott to Stanton, March 1, 1862, Stanton Papert, Vol. IV. Ibid., Oct. 9, 1863, Vol. X V I I . 44. Stanton to Scott, Sept. 27, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. XV. The change was accomplished days after construction began. Scott to Stanton, Oct. 17, 1863, ibid., X V I I I . 45. Scott to Stanton, Sept. 27, 1863, ibid., Vol. XV. 46. Gen. Allen to Watson, Sept. 28, 1863; Scott to Stanton, Sept. 29, 1863, ibid., Vol. XV. 47. Scott to Stanton, Sept. 30, 1863, ibid., Vol. X V I . 48. Hungerford, op. cit., p. 54. 49. Cole to Stanton, Oct. 6, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. X V I I . 50. Bates, op. cit., p. 179; Stanton to Dana, Sept. 24, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. XV. 51. Smith to Stanton, Stanton Papers, Vol. X. The memo is dated Oct. 5, and is placed with the 1862 papers, but the actual date must have been 1863, because it specifically mentions the baggage of the 11th Corps. See also Vol. X V I I I , papers dated Oct. 12-18, passim. 62. Smith to Stanton, Oct. 6, 1863, ibid., Vol. X V I I . 53. Dana to Stanton, Oct. 14, 1863, ibid., Vol. X V I I I ; Scott to Stanton, Oct. 16, 1863. The Cumberland River could also be used. Meigs to Stanton, Oct. 18, 1863. 54. Dana to Stanton, Oct. 18, 1863, ibid., Vol. X V I I I . 55. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 942-43. On the same day, Rosecrans was replaced by Thomas, and the three departments consolidated into the Military Division of the Mississippi. Plum, op. cit., 11,71.

282

NOTES: CHAPTER XII

56. Riegel, op. cit., p. 129; United State* Railroad and Mining Register, Nov. 2, 1861. Apparently Guthrie was satisfied with Anderson's work on the L & N. 57. Official Records, Ser. I l l , I I I , 1083-84. 68. Ibid., p. 1083. 59. Ibid., p. 1104. 60. Ibid., Ser. I l l , IV, 881. McCallum Report, p. 12. 61. Official Records. Ser. I l l , V, 934. The thrilling welcome given the first train into Chattanooga is described in Livermore, op. cit., pp. 528-29. 62. Stanton Papers, Vol. XVIII, Oct. 22, 1863. Johnson opposed Anderson's appointment because of disloyalty to the North and loyalty to Louisville interests. Johnson to Lincoln, Nov. 2, 1863, ibid., Vol. XIX. 68. Kamm, op. cit., pp. 181-82. 64. Rosecrans's superintendent of railroads had quarreled with both Guthrie and the B & O agent at Indianapolis; and Dana had recommended the removal of Rosecrans. Dana to Stanton, Nov. 1, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. XIX. 65. McCallum Report, pp. 12-13. 66. Official Records, Ser. I, LI I, 461. 67. Dana to Stanton, Nov. 19, 1863, Stanton Papers, Vol. XIX. 68. Battles and Leaders, I I I , 692-93; Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, I I , 46-48. Grenville Dodge had previously won the admiration of Grant and Sherman when he rebuilt the Mobile and Ohio Railroad swiftly and soundly in 1862 after its destruction by Confederates. A railroad engineer before the war, he reentered his profession in 1866 to become chief engineer of the Union Pacific. He once stated his policy for wartime operation of railroads as establishment of a regular schedule, and prohibition of army interference in train operation. Grenville M. Dodge, How We Built the Union Pacific Railway, pp. 101-4. These principles had been previously emphasized by Herman Haupt in Virginia. 69. American Society of Civil Engineers, Memoir of Albert Fink, Past-President, Died April 3, 1907 (pages unnumbered). 70. McCallum Report, p. 13. 71. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 219-20. 72. McCallum Report, p. 13.

NOTES: CHAPTER XII

288

73. Ibid.; Official Record», Ser. I l l , IV, 881, 943-44. 74. McCallum Report, pp. 13-14.

75. Ibid., p. 14. 76. Ibid., p. 14; Official Record», Ser. I l l , I I I , 1-2. 77. Order Book. Anderson.

Adna Anderson was no relation to J o h n B.

78. McCallum Report, pp. 14-16. 79. McCallum Report, pp. 15-16.

80. Official Record», Ser. I l l , IV, 957. 81. McCallum Report, pp. 16-17. 82. See Charles B. George, Forty Year» on the Rail, p. 121.

88. McCallum Report, p. 18. 84. McCallum Report (June 80, 1864), p. 15. 85. Of these, 86 were built by the three companies in Paterson, N . J . (Rogers & Co., Danforth ic Cook, New Jersey Locomotive Works). American Railroad Journal, J u l y 23, 1864 ( f r o m Paterson Regitter). The Paterson works had previously built 30 locomo-

tives for use in Virginia. United State» Railroad and Mining

Reg-

itter, May 31, 1862. 86. McCallum to A. Anderson, May 8, 1864, in Order McCallum Report (June 80, 1864), p. 16.

Book;

87. McCallum Report, p. 18. In service Feb. 4, 1864 From manufacturers From other railroads Total

47 locomotives 140 21

437 cars 1818 195

208

2450

88. Ibid., p. 19. 89. Ibid., p. 23; Official Record», Ser. I l l , IV, 881. 90. Order Book. Col. William P. Innes of the 1st Michigan Engineers was relieved.

91. Official Record», Ser. I l l , IV, 958; V, 948. 92. Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 944. 93. McCallum Report, p. 21. 94. Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 944-45. 95. McCallum Report, p. 23. Parsons at St. Louis did much to pile up water shipments of supplies at Nashville. Official Record», Ser. I l l , IV, 881.

284

NOTES: CHAPTER

XIII

96. Official Recordt, Ser. I l l , IV, 963. 97. Ibid., Vol. V, 935-37. 98. Riley E . Ennis, "Sherman on Supply vs. Mobility," Infantry Journal, X X X V I I (Sept. 1930), 297; Sherman's order of April 6, 1864, and Anderson's of April 10 in Order Book. Regulations concerning private travel were liberalized early in 1865. 99. Three engines were necessary to conquer the 2 per cent grade over Cumberland Mountain. New York Timet, Nov. 27, 1863. 100. McCallum Report, p. 2 2 ; Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 587. 101. Bulletin of the United State» Sanitary Committion, March 1, 1864, pp. 269-60; Aug. 1, 1864, p. 600. 102. McCallum Report, p. 22. Official Record», Ser. I l l , IV, 957; V, 941-42. 103. Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 943. 104. McCallum Report, p. 2 2 ; Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 956-58. 105. McCallum Report, p. 24. The work was done by the first division of the Construction Corps under L. H. Eicholtz. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 958. 106. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 955. 107. Plum, op. cit., I, 257. 108. These lines, along with the Vicksburg and Jackson, were located in the Division of West Mississippi. United States Railroad and Mining Register, Feb. 11, 1865. 109. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 958-59; McCallum Report, p. 25. CHAPTER

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

XIII

William T . Sherman, Memoirs, I I , 398-99. McCallum Report, p. 34. Ibid., pp. 34-5. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 958; McCallum Report, p. 21. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 951. Ennis, op. cit., pp. 298, 300. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 957. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 951-52; McCallum Report, p. 21. H a u p t , Reminiscences, p. 290.

NOTES: CHAPTER

XIII

285

10. Ibid., pp. 290, 293-95. 11. McCallum Report, p. 35; Official Recordt, Ser. I l l , V, 960. 12. Ennis, op. cit., p. 299. 13. McCallum Report, p. 36. 14. Ennis, op. cit., p. 299. 15. McCallum Report, pp. 21, 3 6 ; Official Record», Ser. I l l , V, 952, 954. 16. Swantner, op. cit., X X I , 518. 17. McCallum Report, p. 21. 18. Ibid. 19. Official Records, Ser. I l l , IV, 965. 20. McCallum Report, p. 21. 21. Ibid., p. 22. 22. Swantner, op. cit., X X I , 518. 23. Ibid. 24. McCallum Report, p. 22; Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 29. 25. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 87. Usually a 28-foot by 8-foot box freight car on the U.S.M.R. carried 10 tons, or 40 men. See report of F. J . Crilly, op. cit., Aug. 17, 1867; R. S. H e n r y , This Fascinating Railroad Business, p. 422. 26. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 89-90. 27. Ibid., pp. 47, 539. 28. McCallum Report, p. 35. 29. The United States Railroad and Mining Register, Dec. 3, 1864, gave most credit to Col. J o h n C. Crane of the QM Corps for the success of maintaining an efficient headquarters at Nashville. The locomotive and machine dept. alone employed 3,000 men in a main building 200 feet by 80 feet, which could rebuild locomotives from the boiler and wheels. The machine shop was equipped with lathes, drill presses, bolt cutting and gear cutting machinery. T h e blacksmith shop had 40 forges, and employed nearly 200 smiths. A paint, glass, and upholstery shop employed 100. The car dept. built a 50-foot armored headquarters car for Gen. Thomas, completely equipped with kitchen, dining compartment, sleeping compartment, toilet facilities, and office. Col. Crane spent over $2,000,000 monthly to operate these shops. See also New York Times, Nov. 22, 1864. 30. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 470-71.

286

NOTES: CHAPTER

XIII

31. Between Oct., 1864, and April, 1865, 1,680 feet of bridges was replaced on the Pacific Railroad of Missouri a f t e r rebel raids. McCallum Report, p. 27. According to the America* Railroad Journal, 8,402 feet of main line was destroyed on this railroad by rebel raids, plus rolling stock and buildings (issue of Nov. 26, 1864 quoting the St. Louis Republican). This railroad, the North Missouri, and the Iron Mountain R R were under Parsons's control to supply troops in Missouri. See Memo of Transportation Dept., Feb. 9, 1862, in Stanton Paper*, Vol. I I . 82. McCallum Report, p. 28. Sherman destroyed the Macon and Western Railroad, and the line of the Central Railroad and Banking Co. of Georgia from Macon to Savannah. 83. Ibid. 34. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 29 (Wright's Report). 85. Ibid., pp. 30, 970. 36. Ibid.; McCallum Report, p. 28; Jacob D. Cox, The March to the Sea, p. 147. 37. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 44. 38. Ibid., p. 30. 39. Ibid., p. 33 ; McCallum Report, p. 28. 40. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 540. 41. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 31, 44. 42. Schofield to Sherman, April 3, 1865, Stanton Paper*, Vol. XXV. 48. McCallum Report, p. 28 ; Cox, op. cit., p. 211. 44. The following material is taken from Battle* and Leader*, pp. 685-86 ( H e n r y W. Slocum, "Sherman's March from Savannah to Bentonville"). 45. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 31-2, 970. 46. Ibid., pp. 32, 966; McCallum Report, p. 28. 47. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 32. 48. Ibid., pp. 23-4. 49. Ibid., p. 541. 50. Ibid., pp. 33, 36; McCallum Report, pp. 28-9. I n addition to the lines mentioned, the North Carolina Railroad was used for a while as f a r as Hillsboro, 40 miles beyond Raleigh, to parole Johnston's army. From May 1 to J u l y 17, 1,747 loaded cars were received at the front. Official Record*, Ser. I l l , V, 541.

NOTES: CHAPTER XIII

887

51. Official Record*, Ser. I, X L V I I , Part 2, 219. 52. Ibid., p. 215. H e hoped to get from 200 to 800 cars from the Illinois Central alone. Ibid., pp. 289-40. 58. Ibid., pp. 216, 289-41, 278. 54. Ibid., p. 216. 55. Ibid., p. 248. 56. Ibid., p. 249. 57. Ibid., p. 216. 58. Ibid., p. 260. 59. Ibid., p. 278. 60. Ibid., pp. 261, 268-69. 61. Ibid., p. 271. 62. Ibid., pp. 216-17. The accident occurred 80 miles west of Baltimore. 68. Ibid., p. 284. 64. Ibid., pp. 218, 288. 65. McCallum Report, p. 88. The South also had important railroad movements. In Sept., 1868, 2 divisions of Longstreet's corps were transferred from Petersburg, Va., in 16 days to reinforce Bragg in Georgia, going by way of Wilmington, Augusta, Atlanta, and Ringgold. See Battle* and Leader*, pp. 745-46 ( E . P. Alexander, "Longstreet at Knoxville"). 66. McCallum Report, p. 82. 67. Ibid., pp. 82-88. Figures do not include rolling stock borrowed from northern railroads. Breakdown shows :

Locomotive* (419) 72 Virginia 88 North Carolina 260 Mississippi 14 Georgia 85 unused

Car* 1788 422 3388 218 579

(6880) Virginia North Carolina Mississippi Georgia unused

Also, about 26 miles of bridges were built or rebuilt ( 1 8 ^ in Mississippi, in Virginia, small amounts in North Carolina and Missouri), and 642 miles of track laid or relaid (433 in Mississippi, 177l/£ in Virginia, 31 in North Carolina). McCallum Report, p. 37. 68. McCallum Report, pp. 37-38. 69. Ibid., p. 30.

288

NOTES: CHAPTER XIV

70. Ibid., pp. 30-31. 71. Ibid.; Official Records, Ser. I I I , V, 962. 72. McCallum Report, p. 32. The mill's capacity was estimated at 50 tons a day, but since its production in six months was under 4,000 tons, it was not worked to capacity. Official Records, Ser. I l l , V, 687-88. 73. Official Record*, Ser. I I I , V, 26-28. 74. Ibid., pp. 40-42. 75. Ibid., pp. 234-35. 76. Ibid., pp. 355-56. 77. Ibid., pp. 296, 298-99, 595. 78. Ibid., pp. 596, 599. 79. Ibid., p. 357. 80. Ibid., p. 628. 81. McCallum Report, p. 26. 82. Official Record», Ser. I I I , V, 598. 83. Ibid., pp. 47, 99-101. 84. McCallum Report, p. 35. CHAPTER

XIV

1. 19th Annual Report . . . of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . Feb. 20,1866, p. 32. 2. See the various annual reports of the Illinois Central. 3. Unless otherwise noted, the figures in this section are taken from the annual reports. Other instances: Central Railroad of New Jersey, 1861, 27,000 troops, about 7 per cent of its 400,000 passengers; Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, 1861, 154,303 troops, about 25 per cent of its 629,098 passengers; Chicago and Rock Island, 1861, 10,384 troops, about 7 per cent of its 150,000 passengers; in 1865, 52,749 troops, about 11 per cent of its 463,866 passengers. 4. Other increases in passenger business: Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, 629,000 to 1,400,000; New Jersey Railroad, 2,300,000 to 3,700,000; Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, 273,000 (1862) to 842,000; Boston and Maine, 1,800,000 to 2,600,000; Boston and Worcester, 1,400,000 to 2,100,000 ( 1 8 6 4 ) ; New York and New Haven, 1,000,000 to 1,800,000.

NOTES: CHAPTER XIV

289

5. Similarly, the Northern Central, 459,000 to 745,000 ( 1 8 6 4 ) ; Chicago and Rock Island, 283,000 to 454,000; Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, 539,000 to 800,000; Western Railroad (Massachusetts), 508,000 to 694,000; New York and New Haven, 55,000 to 168,000. 6. Similarly, the New York Central could increase its engines only from 215 to 258, the Illinois Central from 112 to 133 ( 1 8 6 4 ) , and the New York and New Haven from 32 to 33. 7. Of course the early part of this expanded business served merely to absorb the part of the railroad plant unused since the panic of 1857. 8. American Railroad Journal, March 8, 1862; United State* Railroad and Mining Register, March 8, 1862. 9. Sir Morton Peto, traveling in the United States in 1865, found that through traffic on the New York Central, the Pennsylvania, and the Erie was about 65 per cent of their total business. Peto, op. cit., p. 290. See Chapter I for the contrast at the beginning of the war. 10. This was part of Haupt's work in Virginia. See also Charles B. George, Forty Years on the Rail, p. 121. 11. American Railway Review, May 29, 1862. 12. Katherine P. Wormeley, The Other Side of War with the Army of the Potomac, p. 129. 13. Wormeley, The United States Sanitary Commission, p. 287. 14. U. S. Sanitary Commission, Bulletin 9, March 1, 1864, p. 2 6 0 ; Wormeley, The U. S. Sanitary Commission, p. 174. 15. Sanitary Commission, Bulletin 9, p. 259. 16. Ibid., p. 260. 17. Ibid., pp. 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; Wormeley, The U. S. Sanitary Commission, p. 288. 18. Sanitary Commission, Bulletin 9, 260, 2 6 2 ; Wormeley, The U. S. Sanitary Commission, p. 288. A U. S. Army hospital car exhibited at the Chicago Railroad Fair in 1948 had 36 bunks in the main ward, 18 on each side arranged in three tiers. Further bunks at the end of the car could accommodate hospital personnel or extra patients. 19. Sanitary Commission, Bulletin 9, p. 259. 20. Ibid., Bulletin No. 19, Aug. 1, 1864, pp. 599-600. 21. Ibid., Bulletin No. 9, p. 261 ; Pratt, op. cit., p. 90. 22. Plum, op. cit., I I , 176-77.

290

NOTES: CHAPTER

XIV

28. Sanitary Commission, Bulletin 25, Nov. 1, 1864, p. 797. T h e L & N hospital train transported 11,880 cases through December, 1863. Bulletin 9, op. cit., p. 261. 24. Ibid., Bulletin 23, Oct. 1, 1864, p. 728. T h i s was some improvement over the springless boxcars. 26. Wormeley, The U. S. Sanitary Committion, p p . 124-45. 26. Ibid., p. 288; P r a t t , op. cit., p. 89. T h e government met most of the expense in fitting out the hospital cars ( S a n i t a r y Commission, Bulletin 31, Feb. 1, 1 8 6 6 ) ; T h e Sanitary Commission spent $9,275.79 on them ( N e w York Time*, Nov. 23, 1865). 2 7 . American

Railroad

Journal,

O c t . 18, 1 8 6 2 .

28. W i n n i f r e d K. Mackay, "Philadelphia during the Civil W a r , 1861-1866," Pennsylvania Magazine of Hittory and Biography, ( J a n . , 1946), p. 15; J o h n T . Scharf and Thompson Westcott, H i t lory of Philadelphia, 1609-1884, p . 764. 29. R. R. Zell, in " T h e Raid into Pennsylvania," Confederate Veteran, X X V I I I , no. 7, ( J u l y , 1920), 261, tells of a raid in which he took p a r t . 80. American Railway Review, April 10,1862. 31. American Railway Review, March 13, 1862 ( f r o m Chicago Tribune). 82. American Railroad Journal, May 9, 1863. 33. Clark E . Carr, The Railway Mail Service, p. 11. 84. Hittory of the Railway Mail Service, p p . 81-83; William H . S t a n n e t t , comp., Yesterday and Today, a Hittory of the Chicago and North Wettern Railway Syttem, p p . 44-45, gives 1869 as the date. 35. Hittory of the Railway Mail Service, p. 83. One of the origin a t o r s was the assistant postmaster at Chicago, George B. Armstrong. Carr, op. cit., p p . 12-14. 36. Hittory of the Railway Mail Service, p p . 83, 86, 160. T h e r e was similar service from New York to Boston; see New York and New Haven Railroad . . . Annual Report . . . May, 1865, p. 10. 37. Hittory of the Railway Mail Service, p. 154. 38. Ibid., p. 205. 39. T h e name was suggested by A. N . Zevely; ibid., p. 147. 40. Charles E . Fisher, " T h e Lehigh Valley Railroad," Rail-

NOTES: CHAPTER

XIV

291

way and Locomotive Historical Society, Bulletin 42, Feb., 1937, pp. 14, 53. 41. American Railway Timet, Aug. 13, 1864. 42. M a y 24, 1865, was the d a t e ; ibid., J u n e 17, 1865. 43. American Railway Review, April 10, 1862. 44. American Railroad Journal, Feb. 23, 1861, March 8, 1862. 45. A. K. McClure, Old Timet Notet of Penntylvania, I , 152-53.

BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY

SOURCES

Edwin W. Stanton Papers, Library of Congress. 1.

GENERAL

Ashcroft's Railway Directory, 1862, 1864, 1865. Barry, Joseph, T h e Strange Story of H a r p e r ' s F e r r y . Martinsburg, W. Va., 1903. Barry, Patrick, Over the Atlantic and Great Western Railway. London, 1866. Bates, David H., Lincoln in the Telegraph Office. New York, 1907. Benjamin, Charles F., "Recollections of Secretary Stanton," Century Magazine, X X X I I I , March, 1887. Brown, George W., Baltimore and the 19th of April 1861. Baltimore, 1887. Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, extra Vol. I I I . Considerations upon the Question Whether Congress Should Authorize a New Railroad between Washington and New York. Washington, 1863. Cox, Jacob D., The March to the Sea. New York, 1882. A Defence of New Jersey in Relation to the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Its Privileges. Washington, 1864. Dodge, Grenville M., How We Built the Union Pacific Railway. Council Bluffs, Iowa, no date. "Effect of Secession upon the Commercial Relations between the North and South, and upon Each Section." New York Time». New York, 1861. Felton, Samuel M., Impolicy of Building Another Railroad between Washington and New York. Philadelphia, 1864. Flint, Henry M., The Railroads of the United States. Philadelphia, 1868.

Garrett, J o h n W., Address to the Board of Directors of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, December, 1868. Baltimore, 1868.

294

BIBLIOGRAPHY

George, Charles B., F o r t y Years on the Rail. Chicago, 1887. Grant, U. S., Personal Memoirs. New York, 1866. H a u p t , Herman, Reminiscences. Milwaukee, 1901. Johnson, Robert U., and Clarence C. Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. New York, 1884, 1887, 1888. Livermore, Mary A., My Story of the War. H a r t f o r d , 1889. McClure, A. K., Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, 1905. McPherson, E d w a r d , T h e Political History of the United States of America during the Great Rebellion. Washington, 1864. Moss, Lemuel, Annals of the United States Christian Commission. Philadelphia, 1868. Nicolay, Jolrn G., and John H a y , Abraham Lincoln, a History. New York, 1890. Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, Documents 3 and 4. Undated. Palmer, William H . , Letters, 1853-1868, comp. by Isaac H . Clothier. Philadelphia, 1906. Parker, Joel, Governor of New Jersey, Message to the Legislature in Relation to the Bill Pending Before U. S. House of Representatives Concerning the Camden and Atlantic Railroad Company and the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad Company. Trenton, 1864. Peto, Sir Samuel M., The Resources and Prospects of America Ascertained during a Visit to the States in the Autumn of 1865. London and New York, 1866. Pittenger, William, Daring and Suffering: a History of the Andrews Raid into Georgia, 1862. 1887. Plum, William R., T h e Military Telegraph during the Civil War in the United States. Chicago, 1882. Poor, H e n r y V., Railroad Manual of the United States. 1868. Porter, Fitz John, Narrative of the Services of the F i f t h Army Corps in 1862 in Northern Virginia. Morristown, N. J . , 1878. Porter, W. E., "Keeping the B & O in Repair in War Time was a Task for Hercules," Book of the Royal Blue, June, 1907. Richardson, James D., A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1907. Washington, 1908. Shall the Extension or Recreating of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Monopoly Be Permitted by the People of New Jersey and Made Perpetual? 1864.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

295

Sherman, William T., Memoirs. New York, 1891. Statement Made by the Railroad Companies Owning the Lines between Washington and New York to the Postmaster General. Washington, 1863. Stockton, Richard F., Defense of the System of Internal Improvements of the State of New Jersey. Philadelphia, 1864. Sumner, Charles, Senator from Massachusetts, "Railroad Usurpation of New Jersey." Speech in the Senate, Feb. 14, 1865. United States Christian Commission for the Army and Navy, 2nd Annual Report. Philadelphia, 1864. United States Sanitary Commission, Bulletins. Vols. I - I I I , 18641865. Wormeley, Katherine P., The Other Side of W a r with the Army of the Potomac. Boston, 1889. T h e U. S. Sanitary Commission. Boston, 1863. Zell, Robert R., " T h e Raid into Pennsylvania—the First Armored Train," Confederate Veteran, X X V I I I , No. 7, J u l y , 1920. 2.

PERIODICALS AND

NEWSPAPERS

American Railroad Journal, 1861-1865. American Railway Review, J a n u a r y - J u n e , 18G1; J a n u a r y - J u n e , 1862. American Railway Timet, 1861-1865. Army and Navy Journal, June 11, 1864; April 15, 1865; March 3, 1866. The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, 1861-1865. New York Times, 1861-1865; Dec. 28, 1878; Dec. 15, 1905. United States Railroad and Mining Register, 1861-1865. 3.

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENTS

Census Board, Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, 1860, Joseph C. G. Kennedy, superintendent. Washington, 1862. Ninth Census of the United States, Statistics of Population. Washington, 1872. Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st Session; 36th Congress, 2nd Session; 37th Congress, 1st Session; 37th Congress, 2nd Session. House of Representatives, Executive Document No. 1, 39th Congress, 1st Session (final report of D. C. McCallum).

296

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Executive Document No. 79, 37th Congress, 2nd Session (letter of J o h n W. Garrett, February 9, 1862). Report No. 31, March 9, 1864, 38th Congress, 1st Session (Deming report on Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad). History of the Railway Mail Service. Washington, 1885. United States Statutes at Large, X I I . U. S. W a r Department, Military Railroads, Order Book of General Orders, Instructions, and Reports. Cited as Order Book. W a r of the Rebellion, T h e : a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, 1899. Cited as Official Records. 4.

RAILROAD R E P O R T S ( D A T E S R E F E R TO FISCAL Y E A R S )

Atlantic and Great Western Railway, 1863-1864 (December 31). Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1861-1865 (September 30). Boston and Maine Railroad, 1861-1865 (May 31). Boston and Worcester Railroad, 1861-1865 (April 30). Central Railroad of New Jersey, 1861-1865 (December 31). Chicago and North Western Railway, 1862-1863, 1865 (May 31). Chicago and Rock Island Railroad, 1862, 1865, (March 31). Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad, 1862, 1864-1865, (November 30). Cleveland and Toledo Railroad, 1865 (April 30). Erie Railway, 1862-1865 (December 31). Illinois Central Railroad, 1861-1865 (December 31). Little Miami Railroad and Columbus and Xenia Railroad, 1864 (November 30). Louisville, New Albany, and Chicago Railroad, 1865 (October 1). Michigan Central Railroad, 1861-1865 (May 31). Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad, 1861-1865 ( F e b r u a r y 28). Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway, 1861-1862, 1864-1865 (December 31). New Jersey, Annual Reports of the Railroad and Canal Companies of the State of, for the Year 1865. New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, 1860-1861, 1863, 1865 (December 31). New York and New Haven Railroad, 1862-1866 (March 31).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

297

New York Central Railroad, 1861-1865 (September 30). Northern Central Railway, 1861-1865 (December 31). Pennsylvania, Reports of the Several Railroad Companies of, Communicated by the Auditor General to the Legislature, J a n u a r y 22, 1863. Pennsylvania Railroad, 1860-1865 (December 31). Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 1861-1862 (November 30). Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, 1861-1865 (October 31). Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago Railroad, 1861 (December 31). Pittsburgh, F t . Wayne, and Chicago Railway, 1862-1865 (December 31). Portland, Saco, and Portsmouth Railroad, 1863 (May 3 1 ) . Western Railroad, 1861-1863, 1865 (December 31). SECONDARY

SOURCES

Ambler, Charles H., A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley. Glendale, Cal., 1932. Bacon, E. L., " H o w Railroads Helped Save the Union," The Railroad Man's Magazine, IX, J u l y , 1909. Barringer, Graham A., "The Influence of Railroad Transportation on the Civil W a r , " Indiana University Studies in American History Dedicated to James Albert Woodbum, Vol. X I I , Nos. 66-68, 1925. Barton, Roger A., " T h e Camden and Amboy Railroad Monopoly," Proceedings of New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., X I I , No. 4, October, 1927. Bradlee, F. B. C., Blockade Running during the Civil War. Vols. 61 and 62 of Historical Collection of the Essex Institute. Boston, 1925. Brownson, Howard G., History of the Illinois Central Railroad to 1870. University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, IV, September to December, 1915. "Camden and Amboy Railroad, The," North American Review, April, 1867. Campbell, E. G., " T h e United States Military Railroads, 18621865," Journal of the American Military History Foundation, Vol. I I , spring, 1938.

298

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Carr, Clark E., T h e Railway Mail Service, Its Origin and Development. Chicago, 1909. Century of Progress, A : History of the Delaware and Hudson Co., 1828-1923. Albany, 1925. Cotterill, Robert S., " T h e Louisville and Nashville Railroad," American Historical Review, Vol. X X I X , J u l y , 1924. Coulter, E. Merton, "Commercial Intercourse with the Confederacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1861-1865," Mittittippi Valley Hittorical Review, Vol. V, March, 1919. Derleth, August, T h e Milwaukee Road. New York, 1948. Ennis, Riley F., "General Sherman on Supply vs. Mobility," Infantry Journal, Vol. X X X V I I , September, 1930. Fish, Carl R., The American Civil War. New York, 1937. " T h e Northern Railroads, 1861," American Hittorical Review, Vol. X X I I , J u l y , 1917. Fisher, Charles E., " T h e Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad," Bulletin No. 24, Railway and Locomotive Hittorical Society, March, 1931. " T h e Galena and Chicago Union Railroad," Bulletin No. 27, Railway and Locomotive Hittorical Society, March, 1932. " T h e Lehigh Valley Railroad," Bulletin No. 42, Railway and Locomotive Hittorical Society, February, 1937. " T h e Michigan Central Railroad," Bulletin No. 19, Railway and Locomotive Hittorical Society, September, 1929. " T h e Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Co.," Bulletin No. 21, Railway and Locomotive Hittorical Society, March, 1930. Fite, Emerson D., " T h e Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil W a r , " in Quarterly Journal of Economict, Vol. XX, February, 1906. " T h e Canal and the Railroad from 1861 to 1865," Yale Review, Vol. XV, August, 1906. Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil W a r . New York, 1910. H a l l , Clayton C., ed., Baltimore, Its History and Its People. New York and Chicago, 1912. H a n e y , Lewis H., A Congressional History of Railways in the United States, 1850-1877. Bulletin No. 342, University of Wis-

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cons in, Economic and Political Science Series, V I , No. 1, 1-386, 1910. Hargrave, F r a n k F., A Pioneer Indiana Railroad. Indianapolis, 1932. Haydon, F. Stansbury, "Confederate B a t t e r y at Jacksonville, Florida, March 1863, Not the First Use of Railway Ordnance in the United S t a t e s / ' Journal of the American Military flittory Foundation, Vol. I I , spring, 1988. Hendrick, Burton J . , The Life of Andrew Carnegie. Garden City, 1932. Henry, Robert S., "Railroads and the Confederacy," Bulletin No. 40, Railway and Locomotive Hittorical Society, May, 1936. This Fascinating Railroad Business. New York and Indianapolis, 1942. Trains. Indianapolis, 1943. Herr, Kincaid A., The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 18501942. Louisville, 1948. Hulbert, Archer B., The Paths of Inland Commerce. New Haven, 1921. Hungerford, Edward, Men and Iron, the H i s t o r y of the New York Central. New York, 1938. Men of Erie. New York, 1946. T h e Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927. New York and London, 1928. T r a n s p o r t for War. New York, 1948. I n Memoriam—General Lewis Baldwin Parsons. 1908. Johnson, Emory R., American Railway Transportation. New York and London, 1912. Kamm, Samuel R., The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott. Philadelphia, 1940. Kerr, J o h n L., The Story of a Southern Carrier, the Louisville and Nashville. New York, 1933. Killough, E d w a r d M., History of the Western Maryland Railroad Company. Baltimore, 1940. Kutz, Charles R., War on Wheels, the Evolution of an Idea. Harrisburg, 1940. Mackay, Winnifred K., "Philadelphia during the Civil W a r , 1861-

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

301

Scharf, John T., and Thompson Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 1609-1884. Philadelphia, 1884. Schotter, H. W., T h e Growth and Development of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Philadelphia, 1927. Shannon, Frederick A., Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865. Cleveland, 1928. Shippee, Lester B., "The First Railroad between the Mississippi and Lake Superior," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. V, September, 1918. Sillcox, Lewis K., Safety in E a r l y American Railway Operation, 1853-1871. Princeton, 1936. Stannett, William H., comp., Yesterday and Today, a History of the Chicago and North Western System. Chicago, 1910. Starr, John W., J r . , Lincoln and the Railroads. New York, 1927. Stearns, F. P., "Vanderbilt and Lincoln," New England Magazine, Vol. XL, March, 1909. Stephens, George W., "Some Aspects of Early Intersectional Rivalry for the Commerce of the Upper Mississippi Valley," Washington University Studies, Vol. X, No. 2, Humanistic Series, April, 1923. Summers, Festus P., The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War. New York, 1939. Swantner, Eva, "Military Railroads during the Civil W a r , " The Military Engineer, Vol. X X I , No. 118, July-August, 1929: No. 119, September-October, 1929; No. 120, November-December, 1929; No. 121, January-February, 1930. Taylor, Frank H., Philadelphia in the Civil War, 1861-1865. Philadelphia, 1913. Thompson, Slason, Short History of American Railways. Chicago, 1925. Trottman, Nelson, History of the Union Pacific. New York, 1923. Van Metre, T. W., Trains, Tracks, and Travel. New York, 1939. Von den Steinen, Karl A., "Military Bridging in the American Civil War," The Mines Magazine, November-December, 1938. Watkins, John E., The Camden and Amboy Railroad, Origin and Early History. Undated address delivered at Bordentown, N. J . Wilson, William B., History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Philadelphia, 1899.

INDEX Akron, 0 . , 16 Albany, N. Y., 78, 74 Alexandria, Va., 38; railroad connection with Washington, 187; railroad terminus in 1862 and 1868, 145, 147, 148, ISO, 159, 160, 161; in 1864 and 1865, 170, 175 Allatoona, Ga., 208 Ambler, A. I., inventor of car brake, 287 Anderson, Adna, 161, 164, 166, 219, 282; superintendent of transportation and maintenance in West, 192, 198 Anderson, John B., 129, 182, 282; railroad director in Dept. of the Ohio, 136; general manager of railways in possession of government, 178, 186-87; on railroads between Louisville and Chattanooga, 188-90; relieved by Grant, 191 Andrew, John A., 80, 189, 167 Andrews, J . J., and raid on Western and Atlantic Railroad, 179, 279 Annapolis, Md., 84, 85, 36 Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad, 35, 36 Aquia Creek, Va., 159, 162 Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg Railroad, 138, 142, 155, 15861, 169, 175

Armored cars, use on railroads, 228

Army of the Cumberland, 18081, 188 Army of the Potomac, 141, 147, 152, 158, 159, 161, 168, 171, 181 Army of the Rappahannock, 146 Army of the Shenandoah, 170 Army of Virginia, 147, 152 Atlanta, Ga., 179, 199, 208, 219; and Sherman's campaign of 1864, 199-205 Atlanta and Macon Railroad, 198 Atlantic and Great Western Railway, 5, 6, 8, 73, 255 ; construction, 15-19; in 1861, 1617; Mahoning Division, 17; rolling stock, 18; finances, 240-41 Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad, 209, 212, 224 Baldwin Locomotive Company, 50, 52, 187 Baltimore, Md., 8, 27, 28, 111, 113, 168, 254; riot of 1861, 80-84 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 8, 164, 222, 245; income, 1861, 5 ; gauge, 7 ; terminals, 8, 161 ; western connections, 21; Washington Branch, 27-9, 101,

304

INDEX

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (conf.) 107, 118, 119, 125, 2 5 8 ; Conf e d e r a t e occupation, 3 0 ; and B a l t i m o r e riot, 33; government operation between Annapolis J u n c t i o n and W a s h i n g t o n , 353 6 ; effect of war on business, 74-82, 97, 2 5 7 ; s u p p l y of W a s h i n g t o n , 9 9 ; raid of Gen. J a c k s o n , 76-77; raid of Gen. E a r l y , 80-81; labor difficulties, 8 1 ; t r o o p t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 82, 128; M a r y l a n d campaign ot 1862, 154; Winchester B r a n c h , 155, 2 1 8 ; t r a n s p o r t a tion of 11th a n d 12th Corps, 182-83; t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of 23rd C o r p s , 213-14; armored cars on, 228 ; passenger t r a n s p o r t a tion, 249 B a n k s , N a t h a n i e l P., 33 B e a u f o r t , N . C., 172, 209 Bellaire, O., 182, 183, 184, 213, 214 B e l l e f o n t a i n e Railroad, 13, 17 Benwood, W . Va., 182, 183, 184, 213, 214 Big S h a n t y , Ga., 201, 202, 203 B o a r d of Public W o r k s , Virginia, 170, 173, 217, 218 Boston, Mass., 3, 4, 5, 11, 47, 229, 254 Boston a n d Albany Railroad, 139 Boston a n d Maine Railroad, 6, 249, 2 8 8 ; effect of war on

business, 44-46; Hoosac T u n nel, 139 Boston and Providence Railroad, 250 Boston and W o r c e s t e r Railroad, 6, 236, 250, 273, 288 ; effect of w a r on business, 46 Boston, H a r t f o r d , and E r i e Railway, 22 B r i d g e p o r t , Ala., 180-89, 197, 202

Bridges, railroad: over Potomac Creek, 142, 2 0 2 ; over T e n nessee River, 197-98; over Chattahoochee River, 201, 202 ; over R a p p a h a n n o c k River, 202; over Neuse River, 209 Brown, George W., 32, 33, 35 Browning, Orville H . , 104, 265 Buchanan, J a m e s : supports P a cific railroad, 22 Buffalo, N. Y., 5, 8, 9, 13, 19, 51, 73, 74, 229, 241 Buffalo, B r a d f o r d , and P i t t s b u r g h Railroad, 72 Buffalo, New York, and E r i e Railroad, 71 Buffalo and S t a t e Line Railroad, 255 Bull R u n , second b a t t l e of, 14752 Burke's Station, Va., 151, 169 Burkesville, Va., 173-74 Burlington and Missouri Railroad, 4

INDEX Burnside, Ambrose E., 140, 155, 181, 197; commander of Army of Potomac, 156; relations with Haupt, 157-58; and battle of Fredericksburg, 159-61 Butler, Benjamin F., 36 Cairo, 111., 4, 5, 86, 87, 95, 213 Camden and Amboy Railroad, 107, 110, 119, 223, 236, 265; monopoly on railroad transportation between New York and Philadelphia, 108-9, 12225 Cameron, Simon, 29, 33-35, 38, 102, 246; quoted, 37, 101; proposal for railway between Washington and Baltimore, 101, 110; and rates for transporting troops, 128, 129 Carnegie, Andrew, 35, 36 Cass, George W., 66, 131, 132 Cassatt, Alexander J., 268 Castle Circular, 271-72 Catlett's Station, Va., 148, 150 Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad, 243 Central Ohio Railroad, 21, 18284, 213, 214 Central Railroad of New Jersey, 5, 7, 10, 13, 109, 221, 231, 236, 238, 288 Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia, 286 Chamber of Commerce, New York: proposal for govern-

305

ment railroad from New York to Washington, 111-12 Chancellorsville, battle of, 162 Chapin, Chester W., 139 Chase, Salmon P., 181 Chattanooga, Tenn., 179-82, 18689, 191, 195, 197, 199, 202, 203, 205-7 Chicago, 111., 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 83, 89; grain shipments, 60; growth during war, 88; railroad convention, 1862, 229 Chicago and Alton Railroad, 260 Chicago and Milwaukee Railroad, 229, 260 Chicago and North Western Railway, 6, 7, 11, 222, 229, 260; construction, 21; effect of war on business, 89-91; Green Bay Branch, 89; rolling stock, 91; railway post office cars, 230, 269 Chicago and Rock Island Railroad, 4, 6, 7, 230, 260, 262, 269, 288, 289 Chicago and St. Louis Railroad, 11, 13 Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, 4, 6, 7, 9, 222, 230, 260, 262, 269, 288, 289 Chicago Great Eastern Railroad, 21 Chickamauga, Tenn., 180, 181 Cincinnati, O., 5, 13, 18, 19, 183, 213 Cincinnati and Chicago Air Line, 21

806

INDEX

Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton Railroad, 8, 184, 284; connection with Atlantic and Great Western, 17, 19; dividends, 49; transportation of 28rd Corps, 218 City Point and Army Railroad (City Point and Petersburg Railroad), 171-78, 225, 279 Cleveland, O., 11, 14, 17, 19, 71 Cleveland and Columbus Railroad, 184 Cleveland and Erie Railroad, 11 Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad, 4, 5, 219, 222-28, 282; transportation of 11th and 12th Corps, 188, 184; other troop transportation, 221 Cleveland and Toledo Railroad, 5, 11, 48 Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati Railroad, 4, 218 Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Railroad, 5, 48, 284 Coal: in commerce, 5, 12, 17, 19, 62, 72; as fuel, 10, 44, 55-66, 231-32, 236; price of, 45, 56, 73 Cole, Lewis M., 184 Columbus, O., 182, 218 Congress, United States, and railroad between New York and Washington, 115-18 Connecticut River Railroad, 223 Conscription, effect on railroad labor supply, 63, 180-88 Construction Corps, United

States Military Railroads: origin, 143; organization, 146, 166, 198-94; in Virginia, 155, 161, 167, 169-70, 172-73; methods of operation, 162, 224-25; in Gettysburg campaign, 165-66; in Tennessee, 188, 202-3, 206, 284; in North Carolina, 208-12; and rolling mill at Chattanooga, 216 Corinth, Miss., 25 Corning, Erastus, 100, 229 Corry, Pa., 16 Cotton, in railroad commerce, 5, 13 Council Bluffs, Iowa, 24 Covington and Lexington Railroad, 182, 280 Covode, John, 168 Crane, John C., and railroad facilities at Nashville, 285 Crittenden Compromise, opinion of railroads, 100-101 Culpepper, Va., 147, 169, 182, 190 Cumberland, Md., 76, 79, 80 Cumberland Valley Railroad, 153, 165, 166, 223 Curtis, Samuel R., 22 Dalton, Ga., 203, 204, 205 Dana, Charles A., 180, 181, 185, 186, 189, 217, 279, 282 Danforth, Cook, and Company, 48, 283 Danville, Va., 174 Dayton, O., 16, 17, 19

INDEX Decatur, Ala., 197, 205 Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad, 5, 272 Delaware and Raritan Bay Railroad, tee Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad Dennison, William, 29, 30, 76 Department of the Mississippi, 39 Detroit, Mich., 13, 86 Devereux, James A., 143, 145, 148, 161, 165, 167, 219, 232; quoted, 166-C7 Dodge, Grenville M.: repair of railroad between Nashville and Decatur, 189; in 1866, 243; repair of Mobile and Ohio, 282 Doolittle, H e n r y , 15 Douglas, Stephen, 22 Dunkirk, N. Y., 70, 71 Early, Jubal, raid on Baltimore and Ohio, 80-81 East Pennsylvania Railroad, 109, 238 E a s t Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, 197-98 E a s t Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, 174, 198, 209 Eckert, Thomas T., 181 Edgefield and Kentucky Railroad, 198 Elmira and Williamsport Railroad, 51, 71 Erie, Pa., 19, 20, 235 Erie Canal, 3, 13, 60, 253

307

Erie Railway: gauge, 7 ; connections with other railroads, 13, 15, 17, 51; dividends, 4 8 ; effect of war on business, 70-73 ; traffic, 72, 251, 253, 289; rolling stock, 72, 222; railway post office cars, 280, 269; finances, 248 Fairfax, Va., 151, 152, 169, 170 Falmouth, Va., 159, 160, 161, 169 Felton, Samuel M., 12, 27, 182, 246, 266; and Baltimore riot, 32, 35; quoted, 55-56, 57, 114, 128-29; and railroad from New York to Washington, 96, 114, 115, 121-22 Fessenden, William P., 103, 104 Fink, Albert, 190 Flour, in railroad commerce, 74, 257 Forbes, Frank H... 180 Forbes, John M., 30 Franklin Railroad, 165 Frederick, Md., 164 Fredericksburg, Va., 142; battle of, 159-61 Freight cars, 10, 11-12; on United States Military Railroads, 285 Front Royal, Va., 137, 143, 145, 155, 165 Fuel, locomotive, 10, 44, 55-56, 231-32, 236; cost of, 45, 46, 48, 49, 56, 62, 73, 75, 92 Fulton, 111., 21, 90

308

INDEX

Galena and Chicago Union Railroad, 229, 260 Galion, O., 17 G a r r e t t , J o h n W., 35, 100, 102 ; sketch of life, 2 8 - 2 9 ; a n d Baltimore riot, 33 ; relations with Thomas A. Scott, 37-38, 244-45 ; and J a c k s o n at H a r p e r ' s F e r r y , 7 6 ; quoted, 8 2 ; relations with national government, 9 7 ; and Metropolitan Railroad Company, 113-14; and movement of 11th and 12th Corps, 182-83 G e t t y s b u r g , battle of, 127, 145; and damage to N o r t h e r n Cent r a l Railway, 5 2 ; effect on Pennsylvania Railroad, 64 ; and United S t a t e s Military Railroads, 163-66, 2 0 2 ; use of hospital cars, 227-28 G e t t y s b u r g Railroad, 165 Goldsboro, N. C., 208, 209, 211 G r a i n : t r a d e to tidewater, 5, 61, 74, 83, 91, 248, 2 5 3 ; storage facilities, 9, 253; E u r o p e a n demand, 60, 222 G r a n t , Ulysses S.: in Virginia, 169, 171-73; in West, 180-81, 186, 188, 224; order relieving J o h n B. Anderson, 191; relations with United States Milit a r y Railroads, 192, 2 1 6 ; railroad supply in Vicksburg campaign, 198 G r e a t Western Railroad of Canada, 13

Guthrie, J a m e s , 29, 95, 96, 185, 188, 282 Hackensack a n d New York Railroad, 11 H a g e r s t o w n , Md., 154, 163, 165 H a l l e c k , H e n r y W., 140, 148, 149, 155, 158, 163, 165, 181, 186, 224 H a m p s h i r e and Loudoun Railroad, see Loudoun and H a m p shire Railroad H a n n i b a l and St. J o s e p h Railroad, 4, 230 H a n o v e r Junction, Pa., 165 H a r l a n , James, 23 H a r p e r ' s F e r r y , W . Va., 30, 79, 80, 155, 258; headquarters of Gen. Jackson, 76-77 H a r r i s , Elisha, 226 H a r r i s , Isham G., 96 H a r r i s b u r g , Pa., 13, 20, 34, 163, 165 H a u p t , H e r m a n , 137-42, 155, 156, 162, 176, 179, 180, 202, 223-24, 2 3 2 ; sketch of life, 138-40; and Hoosac Tunnel, 138-40; chief of construction and transportation in Dept. of the R a p p a h a n n o c k , 142-47; quoted, 142, 143-44, 145, 146, 149, 150, 153, 157-58, 161. 164, 168; in charge of railroads in limits of Army of Virginia, 147 ff.; and second battle of Bull Run, 147-52; quarrel with Gen. Sturgis, 149; com-

INDEX missioned brigadier general, 153; principles of operation in Antietam campaign, 153-54; relations with Gen. Burnside, 157; relations with Stanton, 158-59; and battle of Fredericksburg, 160-61; relations with Gen. Hooker, 1(51; and Gettysburg campaign, 163-66, 2 7 7 ; resignation, 167-68 H a v r e de Grace, Md., 34 Hicks, Thomas H., 32, 33, 35 Hood, John B., 196, 203-4, 205 Hooker, Joseph, 161, 162, 163, 180; movement of 11th and 12th Corps from Virginia to Alabama, 181-86, 259 Hospital cars, 122, 197, 225, 226, 227, 2 9 0 ; in 1948, 289 Hudson River Railroad, 13, 257, 269 Illinois Central Railroad, 4, 5, 7, 10, 236, 287 ; effect of war on business, 86-89; relations with government, 97-98, 222; regulation of rates, 129; troop transportation, 220, 260, 261; r a i l r o a d convention, 1862, 2 2 9 ; motive power, 289 Indiana Central Railroad, 182, 184 Indianapolis, Ind., 13, 14, 18, 182, 184, 185, 186 Ingalls, Rufus, 156, 158, 167, 173 Innes, William P., 184, 185, 283

309

Iron ore: in railroad commerce, 21, 90 Jackson, Thomas J . , 76-77, 143, 145 Jeffersonville, Madison, and Indianapolis Railroad, 182 J e r s e y City, N. J . , 8, 70, 71 J e r s e y City Locomotive Works, 18 J e w e t t , H. J . , 183, 213 Johnson, Andrew: m i l i t a r y governor of Tennessee, 188; in charge of construction of Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, 195, 196 Johnsonville, Tenn., 196, 202 Jones, Edward F., 3 1 ; quoted, 32 Junction Railroad, 115, 119 Kane, Marshall, 2 7 ; and Baltimore riot, 31-33 Kennard, Thomas W . , 15, 16, 17, 19, 241 Kentucky Central Railroad, 182, 195 Knoxville, Tenn., 197, 198, 202 LaCrosse and M i l w a u k e e Railroad, 229 L a k e Shore Railroad, 13, 238 Lebanon Valley Railroad, 109 Lee, Robert E., 173; and Gettysburg campaign, 163, 165, 166 Lehigh Valley Railroad, 5, 6, 7, 109; use of steel rail, 231

310

INDEX

L'Hommedieu, Samuel S., 184 Lincoln, A b r a h a m : , 165, 181, 186, 196; secret journey to Washington, 1861, 26-27; and act of 1862, 104; quoted, 142; proposed railroad into east Tennessee and western N o r t h Carolina, 183, 247, 263 Little Miami and Columbus and Xenia Railroad, 5, 21, 99, 184, 2 8 4 ; and transportation of 23rd Corps, 213 Locomotives, 10, 11; manufact u r i n g companies in New J e r sey, 283 Loudoun and H a m p s h i r e Railroad, 38, 153, 156, 170-71 Louisville, Ky., 95, 96, 181, 182, 185, 199, 213 Louisville and Lexington Railroad, 185, 195 Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 180, 190, 191, 195, 199, 2 3 4 ; t r a d e with Confederacy, 95-96; and movement of 11th and 12th Corps, 182-86; hospital cars on, 226, 290 Louisville, New Albany, and Chicago Railroad, 4, 5, 84-85 McCallum, Daniel C., 38, 177, 209, 232; sketch of life, 13536; military director of railroads, 135, 136; relations with H a u p t , 142, 161; and military railroads in Virginia, 151, 170, 173; principles of operation,

158, 207-8; in Tennessee and Georgia, 178, 188-98,202,208, '.'19; and movement of 11th and 12th Corps, 181-83; quoted, 190, 191, 200; appointed general manager of military railways in west, 191; and Chattanooga rolling mill, 216 McClellan, George B., 39, 140, 155, 157; quoted, 25, 2 6 ; campaign in Virginia, 1861, 76; P e n i n s u l a r c a m p a i g n , 137, 225 ; and second battle of Bull Run, 148, 151, 153; and Army of the Potomac, 152; connection with Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, 243 McCrickett, M. J . , 152, 170 McCullough, J . N., 132, 184 McDowell, Irvin, 140-45, 157 McGregor Western Railway, 92, 93 M c H e n r y , James, 15, 16, 19, 240-41 Macon and Western Railroad, 286 Mail, transportation of, 112, 116, 118-19, 269 Manassas, Va., 25, 26, 145, 150, 151, 158, 169 Manassas Gap Railroad, 137, 143, 155, 156, 166, 1C9, 170, 175, 216, 278 Manchester, Va., 174 Mansfield, O., 17, 19 Marsh, Nathaniel, 70, 100, 229

INDEX Martinsburg, W. Va., 77, 79, 80, 18S Maury, Matthew, 22, 26 Meade, George G., 168, 165, 167, 169, 173, 278 Meadville, Pa., 16, 18 Meigs, Montgomery C., 100, 158, 159, 166, 178, 180, 182, 186, 205, 217; quoted, 127, 180, 177 Memphis, Tenn., 4, 5, 177, 207 Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 197, 198 Memphis and Little Rock Railroad, 198 M e m p h i s , C l a r k e s v i l l e , and Louisville Railroad, 198 Metropolitan Railroad Company, 110-11, 113 Michigan Central Railroad, 3, 6, 7, 11, 13, 212; effect of war on business, 83-86, 221, 222, 260, 264; troop transportation, 84; dividends, 85, 86 Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 74, 99, 222, 238 Military Division of the Mississippi, 170, 179, 190, 193, 206, 207, 218, 219, 223, 224, 281 Military Railroads, tee United States Military Railroads Military Telegraph Corps, 35, 36 Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway, 6, 9, 223, 229, 256; effect of war on business, 91-

311

98; traffic, 91, 93; rolling stock, 98 Milwaukee and S t . Paul Railroad, 262 Mississippi and Missouri Railroad, 4 Mississippi Central Railroad, 198 Mississippi River, 4, 5, 59, 67, 88, 90 Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 95, 198, 282 Monocacy, Md., 154 Moore, J . J . , 166, 161, 171, 279 Morehead City, N. C., 208, 211, 212 Morley, R. N., 87-88 Murfreesboro, Tenn., 180 Nashville, Tenn., 180, 182, 189, 191, 195, 198, 202, 204-7, 215, 283 Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, 174, 180, 182, 186, 188, 189, 191, 196-97; in Sherman's campaign, 199, 204, 205 Nashville and Decatur Railroad, 205 N a s h v i l l e and N o r t h w e s t e r n Railroad, 195-96 Newbern, N. C., 208 New Haven and New London Railroad, 250 New Haven, Hartford, and Springfield Railroad, 47 New Jersey Locomotive Works, 52, 283

312

INDEX

New Jersey Railroad and Transp o r t a t i o n C o m p a n y , 5, 8, 10, 12, 98-99, 107, 108, 114, 119, 128, 223, 271, 288 N e w O r l e a n s , La., 5 N e w Y o r k , N . Y., 7, 11, 13, 17, 47, 229, 254 N e w Y o r k a n d E r i e R a i l r o a d , 3, 5, 16, 70 New York and Harlem Railroad, 187 N e w York a n d N e w H a v e n Railroad, 12, 288, 2 8 9 ; effect of w a r on business, 47-49 N e w York C e n t r a l R a i l r o a d , 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 73, 253, 269, 2 8 9 ; dividends, 4 3 ; effect of war on business, 74-75, 2 2 1 ; rolling stock. 74 N o r f o l k a n d P e t e r s b u r g Railroad, 174 N o r t h Carolina R a i l r o a d , 210, 211, 212, 286 N o r t h e r n C e n t r a l R a i l w a y , 5, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 27, 81, 128, 186, 222, 241, 252, 266, 2 8 9 ; and Baltimore riot, 33-34 ; effect of war on business, 4 9 - 5 4 ; rolling stock, 49-50, 53 ; d a m a g e d u r i n g G e t t y s b u r g campaign, 52, 163-66, 2 0 2 ; Hanover B r a n c h , 52, 165; W r i g h t s v i l l e B r a n c h , 5 2 ; E l m i r a Division, 53, 54 Ogden, H e n r y B., 24 O g d e n , William B., 90

Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, 4, 8, 13, 15, 17, 19, 232, 243 Ohio River, 4, 5, 27 Oil: in railroad commerce, 5, 1617, 18, 19, 50 Oil Creek Railroad, 16 O r a n g e and Alexandria R a i l r o a d , 37, 38, 217; p a r t of military railroads in Virginia, 137, 14548, 154-59, 162, 166-70, 182, 183, 190 Pacific Railroad of Missouri, 4, 7, 286 P a r s o n s , Lewis B., 39, 40, 41, 177-79, 232, 283, 2 8 6 ; a n d transportation of 23rd C o r p s f r o m Tennessee to North Carolina, 212-14 Passenger cars, 10-11 Paterson, N. J . , locomotive works in, 283 Pearce, J a m e s A., 103 Peninsula Railroad, 21, 90, 261 Pennsylvania R a i l r o a d : routes, 3, 5 ; track, 6, 7 ; terminal f a cilities, 8, 9; connections with other railroads, 13, 20, 21 ; and A n d r e w Carnegie, 3 6 ; and T h o m a s A. Scott, 3 7 ; effect of war on business, 60-66, 22122, 2 5 4 ; traffic, 50, 5 1 , 6 1 , 254, 289; rolling stock, 6 2 ; effect of d r a f t on labor s u p p l y , 6 3 ; experiments with steel rails, 63-65, 231; and G e t t y s b u r g campaign, 64, 164; and con-

INDEX nection to Washington, 125; troop transportation, 220; railway post office cars, 230, 269 Petersburg, Va., 171, 173, 175 Petersburg Railroad, 212 Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, 212 Peto, Sir Samuel Morton, 1G, 289 Philadelphia, Pa., 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 20, 21, 114-15 Philadelphia and Erie Railroad, 5, 50, 51, 61, 63, 222, 232, 241; construction, 19-20; t r a f fic, 19-20; rolling stock, 20; earnings, 20 Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 5, 7, 8, 12, 38, 51, 62, 164, 251; and miners strike, 99, 127, 170; and Junction Railroad, 115 Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad, 8, 107, 108, 115, 119,249 Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, 5, 6; terminal facilities, 8, 9 ; rolling stock, 12, 55, 110, 222; and Lincoln's journey to Washington, 1861, 27; and Baltimore riot, 30, 33-34; effect of war on business, 54-58, 22122, 288; bridge over Susquehanna River, 56-57, 58, 118, 125; and raid of Jubal Early, 81; relations with government, 96, 223; and route between

New York and Washington, 107, 114-15, 119, 125, 128-29, 266; armored car on, 228 Piedmont, Va., 143, 144, 169, 170 Pitkin Station, Va., 171 Pittsburgh, Pa., 3, 7, 11, 13, 60, 183 Pittsburgh and Steubenville Railroad, 21 Pittsburgh, Columbus and Cincinnati Railroad, 234 Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago Railroad, effect of war on business, 66 Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago Railway, 3, 6, 13, 17, 19, 60, 183, 238; effect of war on business, 66-70; troop transportation, 221 Pope, John, 137, 140, 146, 147, 152 Porter, Horace: quoted, 172-73 Portland, Saco, and Portsmouth Railroad, 45, 223 Prairie du Chien, Wis., 11, 91 Providence and Worcester Railroad, 273 Rail, 6, 44, 45, 51, 73, 75, 92, 234, 241; experiments with steel rail, 63-65, 70, 230-31; on Washington Branch of Baltimore and Ohio, 125; methods of destruction by United States Military Railroads, 155-56, 162, 210, 224-

314

INDEX

Rail (cont.) 25; price, on United States Military Railroads, 216; price, on other railroads, 252, 254, 262 Railroads: in 1861, 3-14; routes of travel, 4, 5; in South, 4, 7, 41; gauge 7, 8, 234; traffic, 8, 14, 50, 51, 61, 67-70, 221; terminal facilities, 8, 9; motive power, 10, 44, 221-22, 286; rolling stock, 10-11, 44, 22122, 256; capacity for handling troops, 12; routes between New York and Chicago and St. Louis, 13, 238-39; wartime construction, 14-24, 239 ; and national defense, 2223, 41; general effect of war on, 42-44; labor, 43-44, 45, 65, 68, 81; accidents, 44, 249, 257; routes between New York and Boston, 47, 250; project for government railroad between New York and Washington, 54, 96, 101-2, 107-26, 267, 268; effect of d r a f t on, 63, 130-33; routes on Atlantic and Great Western, 71; routes on Chicago and North Western, 90; relations with national government, 94-100, 222-23; and Crittenden compromise, 100; and act of 1862, 102-5, 114, 127, 135; route between New York and Washington, 107-8, 109, 110,

113, 266; and taxes, 108, 133, 269, 270; contributions to war, 220-28; war contributions to railroading, 228-32; cooperation among in war, 229-30; Chicago convention, 1862, 229; mail routes, 230; methods of keeping statistics, 248; see also individual railroads, and United States Military Railroads Railway post office cars, 49, 120, 230, 269 Raleigh, N. C., 210, 211 Raleigh and Gaston Railroad, 211, 212 Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad, 21, 122, 270 Rates, 87, 254, 271, 272; between New York and Washington, 118, 120-21; government regulation of, 127-80 Reading Railroad, see Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Reed, Rev. Alexander, 160 Relay House, Md., 28, 36, 76, 78, 183 Resaca, Ga., 201, 203, 204, 205 Reynoldsburg, Tenn., 188, 195, 196 Richmond, Va., 137, 138, 171 Richmond and Danville Railroad, 173-74 Richmond and York River Railroad, 137, 171 Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, 142

INDEX Rogers and Company, 283 Rosecrans, William S., 180, 181, 188, 281, 282 St. Louis, Mo., 13, 17, 89, 129, 177, 178 St. Paul, Minn., 11 Salamanca, N . Y . , 15-16, 18, 240 Sandusky, O., 72 Sargent, Aaron A., quoted, 28 Savannah, Ga., 208 Schofield, John M . : in North Carolina, 209; transportation of 23rd Corps from Tennessee to North Carolina, 212-14 Schurz, Carl, 184, 280 Scott, Thomas A., 36, 41, 163, 254, 274; sketch of life, 35; in charge of railways and telegraph, 37; relations with Garrett, 37-38, 244-45; Assistant Secretary of War, 102; suggestions for exemptions from draft, 130-31, 182; and movement of 11th and 12th Corps from Virginia to Alabama, 182-85 Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad, 174, 212 Seward, William H., 181 Shamokin Valley and Pottsville Railroad, 51 Sheridan, Philip H., 175 Sherman, John, 104, 265 Sherman, William T., 170, 172, 178, 177, 224; preparations for Georgia campaign of 1864,

315

195-98; Georgia campaign, 199-208, 228, 286; quoted, 199; in Carolinas, 208-12, 214 Sleeping cars, 11 Sloan, Samuel, 181, 272 Slocum, Henry W . , 201; quoted, 210 Smeed, E. C., 160, 162, 202, 209, 219, 225, 232 Smith, W . P., 154, 155, 182, 184, 185, 214, 269; diary cited, 78, 79, 80 South Side Railroad, 173, 278 Stanton, Edwin M., 26, 88, 102, 141, 151, 165, 180, 186, 187, 190; and exemption of railroad workers from draft, 18038; quoted, 185; relations with Haupt, 158-59, 167-68; and movement of 11th and 12th Corps, 181, 182; appeal to locomotive manufacturers, 194; disposal of military railroads, 217-18 Steubenville and Indiana Railroad, 213 Stockton, Richard F . : letter on Camden and Amboy Railroad, 123-24 Stone, Daniel, 142 Stonington Railroad, 250 Stuart, J. E. B., 147 Sturgis, Samuel D., 150, 275; quoted, 149 Sumner, Charles, 121, 2 6 5 ; quoted, on Camden and Amboy Railroad, 124

316

INDEX

Sunbury, Pa., 19, 20 Susquehanna River, 56, 114, 266 Tennessee River, 186 T e r r e Haute, Ind., 13 T e r r e H a u t e and Alton Railroad, 87 Thomas, George H., 188, 207, 217, 281 Thomson, Frank, 182, 232 Thomson, J . Edgar, 62, 63, 66, 100; and Baltimore riot, 32, 36, 37 Tilden, Samuel J . , 66 Toledo, O., 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 72, 74, 253 Toledo and Wabash Railroad, 9, 253 Track, see Rail T r a d e , with Confederacy in Mississippi valley, 263 ; see also Louisville and Nashville Railroad Trains, speeds, 12, 238; see also Railroads Trimble, I. R., 245 Troop transportation, 19-20, 2223, 29-30, 84, 117, 220-21, 249, 270; by river, 39, 177-78, 212-14; regulations concerning, 40; on the Northern Central, 50, 51; on the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, 55, 58, 109, 288; on the Pennsylvania, 61, 65, 84, 220; on the Pittsburgh, F t . Wayne, and Chicago, 66 ; on the Balti-

more and Ohio, 82; on the Michigan Central, 84, 85; through Canada, 85-86; on the Illinois Central, 87, 88, 98; rates for, 87, 98, 127-30, 271; on the New Jersey Railroad, 98; between New York and Baltimore, 109; in 1865 in Virginia, 174, 175; movement of 11th and 12th Corps from Virginia to Alabama, 181-86; in Tennessee and Georgia, 206, in North Carolina, 212; movement of 23rd Corps from Tennessee to North Carolina, 212-14; in Illinois, 260; on Southern railroads, 287; on the Central Railroad of New Jersey, 288; on the Chicago and Rock Island, 288 Tucker, John, 35, 37 Tunnel Hill, Ga., 201, 204 Union Pacific Railroad, 4 ; authorization, 22-23; construction, 24; arguments favoring, 242-43 United States Christian Commission, 160 United States Military Railroads, 7; early organization, 38, 39, 136, 137, 273; in Virginia, 134-176, 279; rolling stock and motive power, 13435, 190, 191, 194-95,212,215, 278-79, 285, 287; bridge over Potomac Creek, 142, 202;

INDEX principles of operation, 144, 145, 150, 153-54, 158, 166, 223-24; in second battle of Bull Run, 147-52; methods of demolition developed, 155-56, 162, 210, 224-25; Schuylkill barges, 159-60; in Gettysburg campaign, 163-66; in Division of Mississippi, 177-208; organization in west, 191-94, 279 ; transportation department, 192-93, 206, 212, 224; repair facilities at Nashville and Chattanooga, 195, 206, 285; bridge across Tennessee River, 197-98; bridge over C h a t t a h o o c h e e R i v e r , 201, 202; in North Carolina, 208212; expenditures, 216; liquidation, 215, 217-19; contributions to war, 223-25 ; see also Construction Corps United States Sanitary Commission, 226-28 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 187 Vicksburg, Miss., 177 Vicksbu'g and Jackson Railroad, 284 Virginia Central Railroad, 212 Wade, Benjamin F., 103-4, 265 Warrenton, Va., 137, 167 Washington, D. C., 4, 7, 13, 27, 29, 33, 36, 190, 258; strategic location, 40; growth in war, 78; railroad conventions, 100,

317

130; and proposal for government railroad to New York, 112-13, 267; railroad connection with Alexandria, 137, 273; and movement of 11th and 12th Corps, 182-84 Washington and Alexandria Railroad, 273 Watson, Peter H., 147, 149, 150, 157, 159, 168, 181 Weldon, N. C., 174 Wentz, E. L., 202, 207, 278; quoted, 134 Western Railroad of Massachusetts, 5, 249, 289; effect of war on business, 46-47 Western and Atlantic Railroad, 179, 198, 224, 279; and Sherman's campaign, 199-205; methods of defense of, 203; towns along, 201, 203 Western Maryland Railroad: in Gettysburg campaign, 145, 163-66 Westminster, Md., 163, 164 Wheeler, Joseph, 205 Wheeling, W. Va., 3, 29 White House, Va., 137, 171 Williamsport, Pa., 20 Wilmington, N. C., 211 Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, 211, 212 Wilson, Henry, 104 Winchester and Potomac Railroad, 170, 174-75, 218 Wood, as fuel, 10, 44, 56, 23132, 236; price of, 45, 75, 262

318

INDEX

Wright, W. W., 153, 188, 196, 2 0 2 ; superintendent and engineer of Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, 160-62; chief engineer of construction in west, 192; and reconstruction of Western and Atlantic Railroad, 2 0 1 ; on

military railroads Carolina, 208-212

in

North

Yellow House, Va., 171, 172 York, Pa., 52, 165 York and Cumberland Railroad, 151