The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948-1957: Community or Alliance? 9780773560000

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T H E N O R T H AT L A N T I C T R E AT Y O R G A N I Z AT I O N

1948–1957

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957 Community or Alliance? JOHN C. MILLOY

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston · London · Ithaca

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2006 isbn-13: 0-7735-3042-3 isbn-10: 0-7735-3042-8 (cloth) isbn-13: 0-7735-3043-0 isbn-10: 0-7735-3043-6 (paper) Legal deposit second quarter 2006 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Milloy, John, 1965– The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957 : Community or alliance? / John Milloy. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 0-7735-3042-3 isbn-10: 0-7735-3042-8 (cloth) isbn-13: 0-7735-3043-0 isbn-10: 0-7735-3043-6 (paper) 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization – History – 20th century. I. Title. ua646.3.m543 2006

355′.031′09182109045

c2005–906341–6

Typeset in 10/13 Sabon with Frutiger display by True to Type

Introduction

To my brother, Michael

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Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Abbreviations and Acronyms

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Introduction 3 1 Far More than an Alliance of the Old Kind? Article 2 and the Creation of nato 9 2 nato versus the oeec: The Problem of Closer International Association in the Western World 35 3 Losing Sight of the Farther Horizon: The Committee on the North Atlantic Community and Its Aftermath, 1951–1957 67 4 Being Put in the Dock before the Council: Consultation in nato, 1949–1954 97 5 Cooperating for Something Rather than against Something: The Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation, 1955–1956 131 6 The Limits of the Alliance: The Aftermath of the Wise Men Report, 1956–1957 165 Conclusion: An Alliance of the Old Kind 191 Chronology 201

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Contents

Notes 217 Bibliography 251 Index 265

Acknowledgments

I wish to greatly acknowledge the support of three individuals who helped make this work possible. As the origins of this work are to be found in my doctoral thesis, I owe a special debt to my thesis supervisor, Mr John Dunbabin, recently retired from St Edmund Hall, Oxford. The primary source of support and encouragement for taking the next step and writing a book on the subject came from Professor Norman Hillmer of Carleton University, who gave generously of his time and tremendous knowledge in seeing this project through to the end. He was joined by Professor John English of the University of Waterloo, who was always available to offer support, advice, and counsel at a moment’s notice. Lawrence Kaplan and John Young provided me with valuable guidance, while helpful advice was provided by Anne Deighton, Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Alan Milward. Despite all this academic support, I must claim any errors and omissions as my own. I also wish to thank the staff of the various archives and libraries where I worked. I particularly wish to mention Paulette Dozois, Rod McFall, and Maureen Hoogenraad of Library and Archives Canada. Paul Marsden did double duty, assisting me both in his capacity as an archivist at the lac in Ottawa and also later in his role as nato archivist. Madame Bidault kindly granted me access to her husband’s papers. I am also grateful to Pierre Milza of the Fondation nationale des

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Acknowledgments

sciences politiques, for allowing me to consult the Auriol Papers. Permission to quote from the Ismay Papers was given by the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. Permission to quote from the John Foster Dulles Papers at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library was given by the Princeton University Libraries. I wish to thank Mr Geoffrey Pearson for assisting me in consulting his father’s papers. I would also like to thank all those who agreed to be interviewed. Their names are included in the bibliography. Support for much of the research associated with this book was generously provided by the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Additional support was provided by the University of Oxford, the Arnold, Bryce, and Read Funds, and St Edmund Hall. I also wish to acknowledge the team at McGill-Queen’s University Press, especially Philip Cercone, whose patience and understanding knows no bounds. Elizabeth Hulse did yeoman service as the manuscript’s copy editor. I wish to express my appreciation for the many people who opened their homes to me during my frequent and often lengthy research trips. In particular I wish to thank Mary Cruden, Peter Donolo, Natalie Hanson, Paul Monlezun, Mark and Janice O’Neill, and Jim Oldham, who sadly, is no longer with us. I also wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my wife, Sara, my late mother, Cathy, and the rest of my family. Special thanks to my brother Michael, who did so much to make this work possible and to whom this book is dedicated.

Introduction

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

an aoc cro DCER

ddel DDF

dea DBPO

edc epu feb fo FRUS

Archives nationales, Paris Atlantic (Official) Committee, United Kingdom Dominion Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, United Kingdom Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, followed by year) Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans. France, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, Documents diplomatiques français (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, followed by year and volume) Department of External Affairs, Canada Documents on British Policy Overseas (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, followed by series number and volume number) European Defence Community European Payments Union Financial and Economic Board, nato Foreign Office, United Kingdom United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: US Government Printing Office, followed by year and volume)

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hstl lac lhcma mae na nac natis nato nsc oas oeec pro sgml State tcc tna wet weu

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London Ministère des Affaires étrangères, France National Archives, Washington North Atlantic Council nato Information Service North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Security Council, United States Organization of American States Organisation for European Economic Co-operation Public Record Office, now part of The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, nj Department of State, United States Temporary Council Committee, nato The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London Washington Exploratory Talks Western European Union

Introduction

T H E N O R T H AT L A N T I C T R E AT Y O R G A N I Z AT I O N

1948–1957

1

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Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty was the clear expression of the West’s search for military security following the start of the Cold War. However, security through a traditional military alliance was not the sole aim of Western leaders. Confronting the enemies within was as much a priority. In some countries, such as France and Italy, large and active communist movements posed an immediate danger. Even in those Western European countries without significant communist parties, severe economic hardships held the seeds of political disintegration. The United States and Canada, although relatively untouched by the war, understood the danger of a politically unstable and impoverished Western Europe. It quickly became clear that economic, political, and psychological security was needed to counter the lure of communism. These sentiments were expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty through its second article, marking an attempt to ground the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in something more than an external threat. Article 2 read: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.” It represented the belief that, for the alliance to survive, it had to celebrate

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

and enhance the special relationship that existed between the countries of the North Atlantic as a result of their common beliefs, ideals, and traditions. Ultimately, the reasoning went, the organization had to be more a community than an old-fashioned military alliance. Most of the treaty’s drafters, admittedly, did not initially see Article 2 as a key feature. In fact, it generated considerable opposition from those who believed it might duplicate or interfere with efforts to unify the West through other organizations. It was finally included through the efforts of Canadian negotiators, who insisted on it as one of their principal conditions for adhering to the treaty. Despite the intensity of the debate surrounding its inclusion in the treaty by the Canadian negotiators, their vision of Article 2 was never particularly clear. Although they spoke of the need to establish a “community” rather than an “alliance,” they did not provide a firm definition of the difference between the two. To them, the term “alliance” meant a relationship based strictly on a system of military guarantees and assistance in the face of an external threat. “Community,” on the other hand, meant an arrangement between countries that emerged from shared common beliefs, political systems, and economic ties. A community perspective saw the need to go beyond the establishment and enhancement of practical military ties between member countries to create and encourage more formal non-military relationships. The lack of precision surrounding this non-military concept meant that, once adopted, it could mean as little or as much as alliance members wanted and had the potential to take on a variety of meanings. This ambiguity quickly became clear as the alliance evolved and faced a series of vital and pressing international questions. How could Britain continue to ally itself with North America and Europe but still retain a level of independence from European integration? How could European integration be fostered without risking the development of a third force that would refuse to align itself with the United States or the Soviet Union? How could a system of states be created that would ensure the level of prosperity and contentment needed to withstand the sacrifices required to undertake massive rearmament? How could West Germany be brought into the noncommunist state system so that it served as a bulwark against communism but did not once again dominate or destabilize Western Europe? How could a level of trust be developed among members that would create the unquestioning discipline needed to react

Introduction

5

quickly and decisively in the face of a military threat? And finally, how could an alliance develop in such a way that it did not require a military threat to hold it together? To these questions, the development of some sort of formal Atlantic community held possible answers. Over the first eight years of its history, the development of the alliance’s non-military side was the subject of lively debate and exploration by nato’s leaders. But just as the lack of definition surrounding the term “community” allowed it to be proposed as a solution for many international concerns, so it also allowed other members to challenge its application in these cases. The analysis in this study does not proceed from theoretical discussions of “community” or “alliance” as they are understood by scholars. Instead, the concentration here is upon the ideas, events, and policymakers of the time. The very lack of a clear definition of direction and terminology is an important part of the story. The literature of nato is by no means silent on efforts to develop the alliance into a community during its formative years. Article 2 is seen, however, almost exclusively as an aspect of Canadian foreign policy.1 This book challenges the traditional picture by broadening the inquiry into a topic of international history. What emerges is a story that is richer and far more complex than was previously imagined. Other countries also saw tremendous value in the non-military development of nato and often took the initiative ahead of Canada. At times, Canada was ignored, or when consulted, reacted negatively to specific undertakings and in fact joined with other nato allies in hampering Article 2’s development. Britain became a strong advocate of Article 2 during the early 1950s. Wary of the moves toward European integration, its Labour government attempted to foster an alternative Atlantic framework for economic cooperation with little Canadian help or involvement. For different reasons, the United States recognized the usefulness of developing the alliance’s non-military side, although with Canadian participation. In the early 1950s, officials within the Truman administration believed that a greater sense of community among members could ease fears that nato was becoming over-militarized and evolving into little more than a US tool to further its own security needs. A different set of circumstances arose in the mid-1950s during the Eisenhower administration, following the death of Stalin. The new Soviet leadership set about to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, diminishing the threat that had served to unify nato. Alliance

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members were more willing to risk disharmony in this more relaxed atmosphere, and inter-member disputes began to surface. nato’s leaders, particularly US secretary of state John Foster Dulles, once again saw the need to develop and strengthen the alliance’s non-military side as a way of promoting cohesion. Two high-profile nato committees in 1951 and 1956 resulted from this interest. Despite much study and reflection, their recommendations produced little change, however. Placing little emphasis on the idea of economic cooperation, the committees instead focused on the value of increased consultation within nato. Few alliance members, however, especially its three major powers, were willing to place limitations upon their freedom of action by automatically consulting their nato partners when formulating foreign policy. By the end of 1957 the limits of non-military cooperation within the alliance had been set narrowly. The fluidity of the post-war world had diminished, and the framework for the West’s further development had been established. The signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 formally indicated that nato’s continental powers had chosen a European, rather than an Atlantic, path for their future non-military development. More specifically, that year marks the end of alliance deliberations on the conclusions of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation. This book takes a multi-archival approach, utilizing the contemporary records of those countries most closely associated with the alliance’s non-military development – Canada, the United States, Britain, and France. These archives not only reveal the nature of policy-making in their individual countries, but also say much about the developing interplay and discourse among nations of the alliance. The nato archives were closed when this research was done, but most of the significant nato documents and records were available in both the national archives and the collections of private papers that were consulted. This study corrects any notion that the manner in which the West was to organize itself following the onset of the Cold War was somehow preordained or inevitable. A European community supported militarily by the United States and Canada was not the only realistic option for the structural development of the Atlantic world. The study also confirms that some of the Atlantic idea’s early advocates were prescient in saying that an alliance would face difficulties if it was grounded in fear alone. The issue of nato’s non-military development achieved prominence at the height of the East-West thaw in 1955–56

Introduction

7

because of the realization that the alliance might not be able to survive diminution of the threat that held it together. This study also provides historical context for many of the debates and discussions that have occurred within nato over the last decade and a half. The dissolution of the Soviet empire, the rise of international terrorism, and perhaps most importantly, the unilateral nature of US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, have led to a renewed debate about nato’s meaning and purpose. As the alliance attempts to transform itself, the experiences of its early years provide some important lessons on how difficult it is to move beyond an alliance arrangement confined to military guarantees and a single geographic region.

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1 Far More than an Alliance of the Old Kind? Article 2 and the Creation of NATO

The origins of nato are traditionally found in British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin’s policy of Western Union. The policy, introduced in early 1948, was a direct response to the worsening state of East-West relations and what Bevin felt was a crisis of confidence within the West toward a communist threat. It therefore called for the creation of a Western European system of countries to counter the communist threat from both a military and a non-military perspective. Although Bevin never ignored the fact that the Soviets might attack Western Europe militarily, he believed that a more immediate threat came from internal communist subversion of the economically and politically weak countries of Western Europe. The foreign secretary gave a special emphasis therefore to strengthening Western Europe’s ability to resist communism while building upon its long-term military preparedness. As he explained to the British Cabinet in early January 1948, a “counter-attraction to the baleful tenets of communism” was required. He proposed working with France and the Benelux powers to develop a formal relationship that would provide “a core around which our development would run.” With Cabinet approval in hand, Bevin went on to successfully negotiate the Treaty of Brussels on 17 March 1948, establishing military and non-military links between the six signatories. In seeking the approval of the Cabinet, Bevin made no secret of his hope that the policy would ultimately lead to the creation of a third force equal in strength to both the United States and the

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Soviet Union. Britain would be its leader, recapturing and amplifying its pre-war prestige.1 The second part of the strategy outlined by Bevin was to obtain a military alliance with the United States to address Western Europe’s security needs and provide an umbrella under which the Brussels treaty system could develop. This second prong of his policy would eventually lead to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. nato’s success, coupled with the minimal role that Britain would ultimately play in the founding of the European community, makes it relatively easy to forget the first part of Bevin’s policy. The Brussels treaty is often thought of as merely a way to show the Americans that Europe was prepared to contribute to its own defence and lure it to offer assistance. It was, as Bevin later characterized it, “a sprat to catch a mackerel.”2 Such assertions (and indeed, Bevin’s own remark) ignore the tremendous importance the British placed during the negotiation of the Brussels Treaty on its non-military elements. As Bevin’s instructions to the British delegation stated, “I regard it of the highest importance that our discussions should not be bogged down even at this preliminary stage into an examination of defence problems merely; important though these are, but that the whole project of Western Union should be lifted at once on to a higher plane which will permit of the thorough examination of the economic (including the overseas territories) and indeed spiritual and cultural problems, the solution of which is essential to the success of the whole plan.”3 Throughout the months following the signature of the treaty, Bevin continued to see its non-military elements as a vital part of the project. Such developments should be gradual and not necessarily all occur within the Brussels system. Although he was anxious to have the treaty contain non-military elements, the British foreign secretary did not favour special machinery that would only duplicate the work of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (oeec), which had been formed by Western European countries in 1947 to administer Marshall Plan aid and foster greater economic cooperation between members. Hence the Brussels pact was given no specific economic role, although provision was made for meetings on financial matters. Bevin believed that machinery should only be created as required. His ultimate goal remained the gradual creation of a system of Western European countries bound by much more than military ties, but he recognized the need for military guarantees to support this system.4 He therefore approached Canada and the United States on 11 March 1948

Article 2 and the Creation of nato

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to suggest a meeting to discuss the formation of a regional pact of mutual assistance. He received their approval in principle, and talks were scheduled to begin two weeks later. the canadian vision of an atlan tic community Ironically it was the non-military rather than the defence aspect of Bevin’s proposal that caught the attention of the Canadian government, especially Escott Reid, the assistant undersecretary of state at the Canadian Department of External Affairs. Reid had himself been considering possible ways in which the West might establish an organizational framework, and he believed that any talks on a pact of mutual assistance should not be limited to defence considerations. He was attracted to the Brussels formula, arguing that the British plan of Western union “tried to offer Western Europeans a political ideal, to which they could bring a loyalty as great as that commanded by the Communist political ideal among so many Eastern Europeans.”5 The undersecretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, was receptive to Reid’s views and shared them with Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Pearson argued that two questions had to be considered in approaching the upcoming security talks: what countries should be invited to join the pact, and “what ground should the pact cover in addition to mutual guarantees of all out-aid against direct or indirect Soviet aggression?” In response to the second question, language was borrowed from the Brussels treaty and the communications surrounding Western union to argue that any alliance should provide the “basis for a positive liberal and democratic counter-offensive.” It should set out the way in which the people of the West would “make good their faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms,” thereby signalling that “this Pact is something far removed from the alliances and arrangements of the old kind.”6 King and his external affairs minister, Louis St Laurent, reacted favourably to this sentiment; in welcoming the signing of the Brussels treaty in the House of Commons a few days later, King described it as “far more than an alliance of the old kind” and made reference to some of its non-military provisions.7 Reid continued to push Pearson to negotiate a treaty that went beyond a simple military agreement, a stance that was not universally shared by the tiny group of individuals involved in the negotiations. The two men in charge of the Canadian embassy in Washington, Ambassador Hume Wrong and the embassy’s minister, Thomas Stone,

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believed that the crisis should be met by providing adequate defence for Europe and nothing more.8 But Reid’s view was to prevail. Not only was it shared by Pearson and endorsed by St Laurent, but it was enthusiastically embraced by Mackenzie King. The prime minister was concerned about the threat posed by the post-war trading barriers that had arisen between Canada and its two closest trading partners, the United States and Great Britain. In 1947 Canada had begun to experience a huge US dollar deficit, forcing it to introduce tariffs, quotas, and restrictions on US travel. In an effort to achieve a more permanent solution, the Canadians had secretly approached Washington to discuss the possibility of a free trade agreement. The Americans had been responsive, and by mid-March 1948 a tentative agreement had been negotiated. The negotiators had stressed the need for quick ratification, but King had reacted cautiously when faced with the stark possibility of free trade, always a potentially dangerous option in Canadian politics. As he explained to a group of senior ministers and officials on 22 March 1948, “no matter how good a thing might be, if the people were taken by surprise in its presentation, there was bound to be opposition to it.” King believed that there might be a way to place the issue within a more acceptable context. Swearing those present at the March meeting to secrecy, he told them of the exploratory negotiations on the regional security treaty that were opening in Washington that very day. If a pact were agreed upon by Parliament, it would be much easier to introduce a trade agreement by identifying it “as something which still further helped to further the object of the pact, namely the removal of restrictions to trade within the area arranged by the Pact. It might even lead to the U.S. and U.K. coming to more in the way of greater freedom of trade between them. I felt that both the U.S. and U.K. would go very far in the direction of anything that would disclose a closer unity of interest between them. That, later, certain other countries, France, for example, might be brought into a larger free trade area.” King’s meeting ended with an agreement that Pearson, representing Canada at the security talks, should be told of the Canadian interest in linking the two matters.9 There is no question that Pearson went to Washington that March to discuss an Atlantic pact with the intention of negotiating a treaty with strong non-military provisions. As he reported to King from the meetings, “I stated more than once that the document should not be exclusively military in character and that there were economic and

Article 2 and the Creation of nato

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even spiritual defences against communist attack and that should not be overlooked. I felt that the Brussels arrangements had taken these important factors into consideration and it was even more important that the North Atlantic Pact should do so.” A summary of the initial discussions, entitled the Pentagon Paper, was published at the close of the meetings. Although it made no specific reference to the potential inclusion of non-military terms in the treaty, Pearson’s lobbying had had an impact. The negotiators agreed that non-military provisions might be included when it came to the actual drafting of the treaty’s terms.10 Especially in light of the linkage he saw between the free trade agreement and the military pact, King was pleased with the outcome of the meeting. He asked Pearson to continue, insisting on the inclusion of “a sentence on economic cooperation in the preamble and an article on the same subject in the pact itself.”11 On 1 April, Ambassador Wrong told State Department official John Hickerson that the Canadian government wished to suspend the trade talks and concentrate on the Atlantic pact negotiations. As he put it, “It would be natural for trade discussions to be related to the pact, since they are concerned with measures for economic defence against aggression. It might also be desirable later to add the United Kingdom to such discussions.”12 Although State Department drafts of a possible treaty contained non-military provisions, the Canadian request forced the Americans to concentrate on the non-military potential of the treaty. Robert Lovett, Secretary of State George Marshall’s second-in-command, rejected the idea of creating specific links between the defence pact and the free trade proposals, which might cause American interests opposed to free trade to hinder the passage of the treaty. He did not, however, see any harm in a general provision along the lines suggested by Pearson during the first round of negotiations. In response, Wrong assured Hickerson that if Canada and the United States proceeded on both the security and the trade proposals, efforts would be made to “concert our tactics” to ward off any opposition.13 The outcome of these private discussions between the Canadians and the Americans strengthened the position of those within the Canadian government advocating non-military provisions. Reid’s and Pearson’s enthusiasm would have had considerably less impact if little interest had been shown by the prime minister. But because of King’s interest in the trade question and its potential ties to any alliance, the

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prime minister focused on this aspect of the treaty and became a keen supporter. This initial enthusiasm from the top was enough to make non-military provisions central to the Canadian position, even when interest in free trade began to dissipate in May. American reaction also sent a message concerning the approach the Canadian negotiators would have to take in putting forward their views. Although the Americans would not apparently stand in the way of non-military clauses, they would block attempts to have them too closely linked to specific proposals. Canadian officials would, therefore, have to advocate a general approach and leave specific applications to be worked out later. For St Laurent, Pearson, and Reid, the pact’s non-military potential went beyond trade. They saw the type of non-military activity outlined in the Brussels treaty as the first step in creating a Western counterattraction to communism. Non-military cooperation had the further benefit of ensuring the needed resources to undertake effective rearmament. As Pearson pointed out in a June memorandum to King, St Laurent, and Defence Minister Brooke Claxton, the people of Western Europe were suffering a crisis of confidence in the face of Soviet actions and “required a bold move to raise in the hearts and minds and spirits of all those in the world who love freedom that confidence and faith which will restore their vigour ... What is now needed is a treaty that is not merely a treaty of military guarantee ... it should contain provisions for closer political, economic and cultural cooperation; it should set up new international institutions; it should set forth the principles of Western society which we are trying not only to defend but to make the basis of an eventually united world.”14 St Laurent went even further. Mentioning the Brussels pact in a mid-March speech in Hamilton, Ontario, the external affairs minister declared that it might not only be the countries of Western Europe which would be “forced into a spiritual, cultural, economic and political union” to counter the Soviet threat.15 Pearson brought his hope for an Atlantic system of states bound both by military and non-military commitments to the so-called wet (Washington Exploratory Talks) discussions, which opened that July. The talks, attended by representatives of the United States, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, were charged with developing proposals concerning a potential Atlantic pact. Such a pact, Pearson told the assembled representatives on 7 July, “should have a positive, not merely a negative purpose.” A pact “tied too closely to Soviet

Article 2 and the Creation of nato

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intentions” might disappear if the danger was removed. Expanding on his thinking two days later, the Canadian undersecretary of state for external affairs noted that even if details of the new association of states would have to be worked out over time, there were “a few general principles on which we might find ourselves in agreement.” The treaty, he argued, should be closely connected to Article 56 of the United Nations Charter, which called on members to work together to see nations achieve a higher standard of living, find a solution to social, economic, and medical problems, and observe basic human rights.16 These rather general statements mark the only occasions on which Pearson shared his vision of the non-military potential of the alliance with his fellow negotiators. Clues to his thinking, however, exist elsewhere. Making the jump from the civil service to the world of politics, Pearson was appointed secretary of state for external affairs that autumn. In early October he outlined his vision of the Atlantic pact proposal to his cabinet colleagues. “It carries out the principle of pooling risks, of resources and of combined control over policy. It establishes a constitutional basis for a devolution of power in peace and war from the Grand Alliance to its organs and agents, as compared with the arrogation of power of the Big Two or Big Three in the last war. It creates a new international institution which will have within itself the possibilities of growth and of adaptation to changing conditions. The North Atlantic Community is today a real commonwealth of nations which share the same democratic and cultural traditions. If a movement towards its political and economic unification can be started this year, no one can forecast the extent of the unity which may exist five, ten or fifteen years from now.”17 Pearson’s presentation introduced the idea of the pact as a method of devolving power from the “Big Three.” As he had written to the Canadian ambassador to France, Georges Vanier, a fear existed “that the United States may press the Russians too hard and too fast and not leave them a way out which would save their faces. To lessen this danger, the Western European powers will have to exert a steady and constructive influence on Washington. The establishment of a North Atlantic union will give them additional channels through which to exert this moderating influence.” Pearson went on to tell Vanier that the treaty was expected to contain provisions calling for consultative mechanisms to create, “at least in outline, a semi-constitutional structure for the North Atlantic powers.”18 Pearson developed this idea in

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

his first speech as external affairs minister. He spoke passionately of his belief that the “sharing of risks, resources and obligations” under the North Atlantic pact must “be accompanied by, and flow from a share in the control of the policy.” He called for the creation of “some sort of constitutional machinery” that would allow member nations to determine “the policies of all that affect all.”19 The views held by Pearson and other senior members of the Department of External Affairs reflected popular thinking about Canada’s wartime experiences. The war had demonstrated to Canadians the common bonds that held North America and Western Europe together: Canadian soldiers had died to defend Western Europe. Canadians emerged from the war with an internationalist perspective and saw the important role that could be played by international institutions in preserving peace. Personal experiences should also be taken into account. All the leading Canadian players in the negotiation of the treaty – Pearson, Reid, Ambassador Wrong in Washington, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner in London – had studied at Oxford. Theirs was a world view that recognized Canada’s shared democratic traditions with the United Kingdom and Western Europe and the need to provide strong transatlantic support.20 Atlanticism had a popular following, thanks largely to the efforts of Clarence Streit, who had spent a decade as the New York Times correspondent at the League of Nations and painfully watched its demise. For Streit, a confirmed internationalist, the only way to prevent future wars was through a federal union of North Atlantic democracies. From this belief sprang the widely read book Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Leading Democracies of the North Atlantic. While the individual democracies would continue to be responsible for local matters, a “Union” government would have control over a common citizenship, the elimination of tariffs, defence forces, currency, and a postal union system. Originally issued privately in 1938, the book was published commercially a year later to wide readership. Over 250,000 copies were sold, and the volume was translated into several languages, spawning a movement that captured the public imagination. Streit himself became a popular figure and in 1946 started his own magazine, Freedom and Union, to advocate his views among foreign policy decision-makers. In early 1949 he helped to launch the Atlantic Union Committee in the United States under the chairmanship of former US Supreme Court justice Owen J. Roberts. This committee,

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which included former US undersecretary of state Will Clayton and former secretary of war Robert Patterson among its members, was to lead a far-reaching campaign within the United States for Atlantic integration.21 Streit’s work had a positive impact on a number of American negotiators interested in the non-military dimensions of the treaty, and it is quite likely that his influence was also felt in Canadian decision-making circles. Canada’s geographic position was another factor. Despite its great land mass, the country’s population and economy was dwarfed by its neighbour to the south, and it would always end up being the junior partner in any exclusive alliance with the United States. A larger alliance would balance American influence and provide potential allies in any inter-member struggles involving the United States. The Atlantic framework complemented many of Canada’s existing relationships beyond its ties to the US. Its evolution from colonial status had been peaceful and gradual, allowing it to maintain strong ties with Britain directly and through the Commonwealth. Canada’s predisposition for an Atlantic alliance with non-military elements is much easier to understand than the substance of that vision. Both Pearson and St Laurent (who replaced Mackenzie King as prime minister in the autumn of 1948) spoke of a political and economic union of the North Atlantic at one time or another, but it is doubtful whether either believed in an immediate federation or superstate. Their vision was much more gradual. As the Soviet threat increased, states within the free world would be forced to draw closer together on all levels, and this development needed to be supported by an appropriate framework. The United Nations was becoming increasingly deadlocked by the Soviet veto. An Atlantic organization of democratic states appealed to St Laurent and Pearson as a potential alternative. Pearson’s Atlantic idea was evolutionary in nature. When speaking of the creation of an Atlantic “community” or “commonwealth,” he always referred to it as growing out of the Atlantic pact. Pearson acknowledged the “imprecision” of his proposal, but said that it could be more understood by someone “reared in the British constitutional tradition.” By this he meant arrangements that were informal in nature, based on circumstances rather than a written document. The relationship would evolve over time, adapting itself to the changing world.22 St Laurent appeared to have defined his Atlantic vision in a similar way. As early as November 1947, he had publicly suggested

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

that the United Nations deadlock might be broken by small groups of states forming regional pacts. He continued this theme throughout 1948, undertaking what he referred to as his “crusade” to have an Atlantic pact, complete with a non-military aspect.23 Reid and Pearson make clear in their memoirs that St Laurent’s view was one of deep conviction. Both, however, admit that making the alliance more of a community did have a certain attraction to Quebec, the predominantly French-speaking province of Canada. During the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations, Quebec was led by an isolationist premier, Maurice Duplessis, who took great joy in portraying his follow Québécois, St Laurent, as a traitor to his province, one who had thrown in his lot with British imperialism. St Laurent had been humiliated in the summer of 1948 when the Quebec provincial wing of his Liberal Party had been soundly defeated by Duplessis. Having assumed the prime minister’s mantle, he knew that he would face similar challenges in Quebec during the next national election. Giving the treaty a non-military flavour would respond to accusations in Quebec that he was a colonial warmonger. 24 the po sition of the united states and the united kingdom Canada’s promotion of the non-military side of the treaty can be contrasted with the position taken by the United States. The vision of American officials differed considerably from those in Ottawa and was much closer to the British view favouring a third force in Western Europe equal in strength to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Such thinking was a by-product of reluctance within the United States toward the idea of establishing traditional spheres of influence in Europe or elsewhere. There was much popular support there for a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, with a pre-war isolationism existing in certain corners. At the same time, the US simply did not have the resources to establish significant outposts in Western Europe. When the idea of an American military arrangement with Western Europe was first raised with Hickerson by the British ambassador in January 1948, the American official had expressed surprise. The United States, he explained, was hoping to see the creation of “a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say ‘no’

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to both the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should seem so to require.”25 As the Atlantic pact talks progressed, the United States made an effort to link it to the concept of greater European integration, rather than the establishment of an American-led system of states. The US made clear from the beginning, for example, that it had no intention of joining the Brussels pact, as it saw it as as a vehicle for greater European unity. American officials even attempted to force the issue in early September by proposing that European countries must be members of the Brussels pact before joining the Atlantic treaty, an idea that was firmly rejected by both the Europeans and the Canadians.26 A number of Atlanticists existed within the State Department, but they were clearly in the minority. Prominent among them was Hickerson and his deputy in charge of Western European affairs, Theodore Achilles. Both men had been greatly influenced by the ideas of Streit and believed that Canadian efforts to have non-military provisions included in the treaty were in keeping with his vision. 27 Achilles went farther in 1976, confessing that he and Hickerson had only “given lipservice to the idea of European Unity”; their priority was for Atlantic Unity.28 Achilles’ most significant attempt to promote his Atlantic vision during the drafting of the treaty came in the summer of 1948. The State Department was attempting to draft its own version of a pact, and Achilles proposed that it have strong non-military elements, noting that one of the long-term objectives of the present pact was “to form a more perfect union,” just as the US constitution aimed to do at home. He suggested that any pact contain articles committing members to work for the objectives outlined in Article 56 of the UN Charter, including provisions for the creation of agencies to reach these goals.29 He failed to convince his colleagues; the American draft contained no non-military provisions.30 European unity remained the dominant theme within the State Department as well as in Congress, which saw the treaty as key to fostering greater integration. Few concerns were initially raised in any branch of the US government about how Canada’s Atlanticist musings might conflict with plans for European integration. There was a certain vagueness surrounding such terms as “union” and “unification” at that time which hindered detailed analysis. George Kennan, director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff,

20

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

argued that the Atlantic pact might compromise greater European unity, but he was almost alone in raising such concerns. For the most part, sentiments expressed about building a greater community through the Atlantic pact appeared to be little more than the type of positive rhetoric that would make it more palatable to the American public. The situation was so undefined within the United States that the staunch European unionist Senator William Fulbright also counted himself among the supporters of greater Atlantic unity. Achilles’ suggestion that the US push for strong non-military provisions may have been rejected, but throughout 1948 American officials consistently supported Canadian efforts to add non-military features to the treaty; no serious questions were raised about their implications for European unity.31 Initially, British officials also saw no harm in Pearson’s musings about the treaty being more than a defensive alliance. The British, anxious for an American commitment to help them create an “umbrella under cover of which ‘Western Union’ can take root,” were pleased to hear the Canadian official speak of drawing Western states closer together.32 However, by the time of the fifth meeting of negotiators in Washington, when Pearson spoke of creating a “new system,” the Foreign Office felt that he had gone too far. An end-of-July summary of the talks prepared for Bevin noted that an idea “seems to have crept in, largely on Mr. Pearson’s initiative, that any ‘Atlantic’ pact concluded should not only deal with defence but also with economic and other matters.” This, it pointed out, was “an old objective of the Canadians, who are entirely in favour of what they call the ‘Atlantic Community.’” “But it is difficult to reconcile with what has been thought up to now to be the main State Department objective of building up Western Europe – and eventually the whole of Europe – and the so-called ‘Third Power.’ In fact the two objectives appear to be quite irreconcilable. Ofcourse [sic] the Atlantic Pact, whenever it comes about, can be, ‘positive rather than negative’ and have some sort of preamble not unlike that of the Brussels Treaty, but it would seem definitely to be a mistake to provide for the same sort of machinery as was set up under the Treaty of Brussels.” The Foreign Office also objected to the bringing in of Article 56 of the United Nations Charter, concluding that “if we bring in Article 56 by way of saying that we intend to take joint action of a regional character with all these ends in view, we may be carried quite a long way.”33

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The answer, according to Foreign Office officials, was to oppose the Canadian efforts. During a mid-August meeting of negotiators, Sir Frederick Hoyar-Millar, the minister at the British embassy in Washington, argued that social and economic provisions in the treaty might conflict with the work of the oeec, which had been established to administer Marshall Plan aid. Canada found some support from George Kennan, who noted that the such provisions might remove some of the treaty’s anti-Soviet flavour. A compromise was reached. The treaty should have an article calling “for efforts to promote the general welfare through collaboration in economic, social and cultural fields,” as well as agencies to implement the terms of the treaty, including the “progressive development” of its non-military objectives. In deference to British concerns, however, these bodies were not to duplicate or “prejudice” the work of other international organizations working in the economic or social field but, instead, attempt to assist in their efforts. 34 Despite the compromise, the British remained unhappy. In late August, one of their most senior officials, Gladwyn Jebb, assistant secretary of state in the Foreign Office, arrived in Washington to participate in the negotiations. One of his goals was to have the entire Canadian initiative dropped. Bevin, he told his fellow negotiators, was concerned “over the emphasis in these Talks on the establishment of machinery for the solution to common economic and cultural problems.” The creation of new machinery would not only duplicate the work of existing agencies such as the oeec but would create “considerable confusion” in the international situation and “slow up” progress toward European union.35 Hume Wrong countered by arguing that the present discussions were about the long-term development of a multi-state organization. The oeec was only temporary and would end after the completion of Marshall aid in 1952. Wrong added that the Canadian proposal “was not intended solely or even mainly to bring about multilateral action under the agreement, but that its purpose was to give a general blessing to intimate collaboration between any or all of the parties in economic, social and cultural matters.” Kennan attempted to mediate, but he placed himself more in the British camp by arguing that no provisions in the treaty should jeopardize European unity. He was, however, hesitant about a pact whose focus was entirely military, suggesting that it contain non-military terms which would be “permissive in nature

22

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

rather than concrete in its terms.” Such activity would be possible but not necessarily encouraged through specific machinery.36 Exchanges over the non-military side of the treaty were only a small part of those that occurred over the summer, leading to the completion of a secret discussion document on 9 September 1948. This “Washington Paper” outlined the possible framework for an agreement between the Western states. It incorporated Kennan’s suggestion that a future treaty could contain a provision dealing with non-military cooperation as long as it did not force members to engage in non-military activity or overlap with the work of existing organizations.37 r e s p o n s e to t h e was h i n g to n pa p e r In late October the Brussels treaty powers, having agreed to accept the general terms of the Washington Paper, began the process of examining its details. The British position was firm: officials were told to “resist any proposal to extend the treaty to cover economic, social and cultural aims.” For Bevin, the North Atlantic Treaty would be a defence treaty and its provisions had to be distinguished from Marshall aid cooperation.38 In terms of organizational structures or machinery, they should be concerned only with military matters. The British position surprised French officials, who questioned the rationale for including non-military clauses in the Brussels treaty but not in an Atlantic pact. In Paris, Gladwyn Jebb told the French that the purpose of the Brussels treaty was to “lay the foundation for greater unity in Europe (or at any rate in Western Europe) in some kind of association with the British Commonwealth, that would form a third and balancing factor in world politics.” If positive machinery were set up to encourage an Atlantic community, it would prejudice this policy. Jebb repeated the same warning to Charles Ritchie, of the Canadian embassy in Paris, a few days later.39 The British were successful in convincing their European partners. The report agreed to by the five Brussels powers, the so-called London Paper, recommended that no provision be included in any proposed treaty that encouraged social and economic collaboration. Such an article might interfere with the work of existing organizations and risked weakening the notion of Western European unity, “which was at the basis of the Brussels Treaty.” Despite British objections, the continental Brussels powers did, however, insist that particular provision be made in the treaty for a body for political consultation, something

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not mentioned in the Washington Paper. Bevin believed that the North Atlantic Treaty, unlike the Brussels, was to be concerned strictly with defence. Only military bodies should be established.40 Bevin’s fear of upsetting the Americans was obviously part of the reason behind his opposition to the non-military side of the treaty. US support for European unity was a factor considered by every European power, and there was no question that the British foresaw the potential for a conflict between Atlantic and European unity. To limit British motivation to this one factor, however, ignores the great body of evidence that demonstrates Britain’s firm and sincere interest in leading a movement for greater European cooperation through the Western union policy. As Bevin explained to a meeting of Brussels treaty foreign ministers in October 1948, his ultimate goal was to “create some coherent defence system so that the five powers would not only stand on their feet militarily, but would maintain their independence and prestige.”41 There is also the simple fact that throughout the wet meetings, the Americans had supported Pearson’s suggestions. If the British had only wanted to appease the Americans, it would have made more sense to support the Canadian initiative. Yet Britain’s Western union policy did not encounter smooth sailing in Europe. Tensions had arisen within the Brussels Treaty Organization during the summer of 1948 over the question of whether its members should establish special economic machinery. On 19 July the treaty’s Consultative Council endorsed the idea, despite objections from Bevin that it would duplicate efforts of the oeec.42 Further conflict had arisen later that summer as the British raised objections to a French plan for the creation of a European assembly. These did not mean that the British had abandoned the policy of Western union or that it was merely a facade. Although it could be argued that some of the seeds of future British discontent with the European idea can be found in these debates, they chiefly reflect a conflict between two different visions of how Europe should be organized. British political culture envisaged an evolutionary approach to European unity and was hesitant about grandiose schemes that would interfere with sovereignty. Bevin had developed a strong aversion to any move that might see the duplication of international machinery. The oeec, for example, had only recently been established and appeared a concrete way for Europe to develop economic cooperation with American assistance. The establishment of new organizations under the umbrella of the Brussels treaty would surely confuse matters.

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

These concerns explain Britain’s opposition to Atlanticism as a concept, but the Washington Paper’s terms were so vague that it is difficult to see why so many objections were raised in the Foreign Office. One possibility was that it was a working document which was still open to significant change. Its vague wording, combined with the tone of discussions over the summer, made it impossible to be certain about the long-term implications of any non-military provisions. The lack of consensus about the meaning of the non-military provisions is made quite apparent through an examination of the view from Ottawa as it prepared to enter the final round of negotiations late in 1948. Jebb’s September intervention had not dampened Canadian enthusiasm. Wrong had written to Pearson that Kennan’s suggestion that any non-military provisions be permissive and not duplicate the work of existing organizations “will safeguard our basic interest”, while Reid recalls that the changes were “relatively minor.”43 Charged with drafting the formal instructions to the Canadian delegation to enter the final round of talks, Reid wrote of creating a “North Atlantic Community” complete with an assembly that would assume some of the duties of a deadlocked United Nations. He believed that the treaty should contain a dispute settlement mechanism as well as “effective provisions for consultation, cooperation and common action in the economic field.”44 These sentiments did not sit well with Wrong in Washington or, to a lesser extent, with the Canadian high commissioner in London, Norman Robertson. Both men believed that the treaty should be simple in nature and voiced concerns over the creation of complex organs such as an Atlantic assembly. Wrong went further, suggesting the jettisoning of all references to the term “North Atlantic Community” because “we are not establishing a federation but an alliance.” Although he acknowledged Canada’s interest in a non-military article, he saw no need for the new organization to establish any economic or cultural agencies. Canada should “stick to the central purpose in these negotiations, which is, the creation of a military alliance.”45 Wrong’s criticisms greatly upset Reid. Not only did they conflict with his view of the treaty’s purpose, but they contradicted the position taken by Pearson and the new prime minister, St Laurent. Reid ultimately put his case to Pearson without a great deal of success. The external affairs minister attempted to find a middle ground by instructing Reid to tone down the final instructions. Although Pearson believed that agencies such as an Atlantic assembly “may ultimately be

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desirable,” he directed Reid to draft a much simpler document emphasizing the military side of the treaty and omitting such terms as “Atlantic Community.” Pearson, like the rest of Canada’s leaders, recognized the central importance of the defence side of the treaty. This did not mean that the treaty’s potential for providing a non-military framework ought to be ignored. The final instructions approved by Cabinet in early December for the Canadian delegation negotiating the terms of the treaty argued that the creation of a North Atlantic security system “may well provide the basis on which it may be possible to build, in the course of this generation, a closer unity of the North Atlantic world.” Canada should work for treaty provisions championing “consultation, cooperation and common action in the economic field.”46 Reid’s thinking was more grandiose than that of Pearson or St Laurent. The assistant undersecretary of state clearly believed that it was much easier to move toward Atlantic union than did his political masters. Although still seeing the non-military aspects of the treaty as a cornerstone of the Canadian approach, Pearson had a more evolutionary view and accepted the realities of the situation outlined by Wrong and Robertson. resumption of talks As they reassembled in Washington in mid-December 1948 to resume talks on a proposed treaty, ambassadors were presented with the London Paper. Not surprisingly, the European opposition to the non-military side of the treaty within the paper was greeted with great disappointment in Ottawa. Wrong urged that the treaty at least mention economic collaboration, pointing out that peacetime economic cooperation had important military by-products. He also mentioned Canada’s interest in the establishment of a political organ under the treaty which could serve as a forum for consultation, a point endorsed by Lovett.47 Wrong’s efforts had some effect, and over the next few days the continental European powers involved in the negotiations began to withdraw their objections.48 Britain, isolated in its objections to both non-military articles and the formation of a consultative council, started to have a change of heart. Bevin relented first on the question of a consultative council. If there was no other option, he told Oliver Franks, the British ambassador in Washington, he would not block its creation. This concession paved

26

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

the way for Article 9 of the treaty, which created a representative council of the signatories of the treaty. Having exhausted all avenues of persuasion with his European allies, the foreign secretary also gave way on the question of a non-military clause. The article’s vague wording, which one Foreign Office official called “pretty harmless,” combined with its insignificance when compared with the treaty’s overall intent, made its acceptance somewhat palatable to the British. On 20 December, Bevin agreed that social, cultural, and economic provisions could be included in the treaty provided that there was no suggestion that any machinery be created to facilitate this collaboration. Some months later he told the British Cabinet that “it was recognised that this Article was unlikely to have any practical effect.”49 Bevin’s acquiescence meant that all European objections to a nonmilitary article had been withdrawn. None of the Brussels powers, however, were particularly enthusiastic. Gathering shortly before Christmas, the European members of the working group continued to object but told the Canadians that they would give their assent if they were assured that it did not involve the creation of new machinery. With the minutes of the meeting noting that the Canadians would have liked stronger wording, a draft article was eventually and unanimously agreed: “The Parties will encourage cooperative efforts between any or all of them to promote the general welfare through collaboration in the cultural, economic and social fields. Such efforts shall, to the greatest possible extent, be undertaken through and assist the work of existing international organizations.” The draft treaty’s official commentary noted that the Brussels powers had agreed to the draft on the condition that it not involve the duplication of existing machinery.50 The acceptance of this compromise article represented for Canada the foundation for the future political and economic framework for the North Atlantic. Britain and most of its continental allies, it would seem, believed it to be meaningless and instead concentrated only on the military side of the treaty. Since Pearson’s concept was not essential to the treaty, it could be treated as seriously as each individual nation wished. The few times Canada raised the matter during the summer wet talks, it became lost in the rhetoric of other representatives.51 Other participants spoke of a “community of interest” between North Atlantic nations, agreeing that the treaty had to have positive elements to ensure that it did not appear as simply an anti-Soviet document. Against this background, the only remarkable thing about Canada’s

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comments was its insistence on the formal expression of these sentiments in a treaty article.52 The closest Canada came to outlining its views was a commentary, prepared in addition to the formal instructions to the Canadian embassy, that Wrong was asked to circulate to the representatives of other involved nations in December.53 As well as commenting on its military aspects, the document spoke of the Atlantic pact’s potential to provide “a basis” to build “a closer unity of the North Atlantic world” and the need for the treaty to have non-military provisions. There is no record of the reactions of other powers to this part of the commentary, and the overall implication of its call for Atlantic unity was never discussed at the ambassadorial level. The lateness of its circulation, combined with its vague terminology, suggests that it had little impact.54 As Reid learned of the draft terms agreed to at Christmas, he began to lobby for stronger wording. He convinced Pearson that the economic side of the article should be strengthened. As a result, Ambassador Wrong was asked to push for the article to state that the signatories would “agree to make every effort in common to eliminate conflict in their economic policies and develop the greater possibilities of trade between them.” When Wrong’s soundings of his fellow negotiators met with negative reaction, Pearson and Reid pushed him to go farther. Not only should trade be added to the article, but it should also outline a commitment for members “to make every effort in common to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their people and greater economic and social justice, and to bring about a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization.” Wrong’s efforts to strengthen an article that few wanted in the first place backfired. He quickly cabled back to Ottawa that Canada was the sole country favouring “social and economic collaboration outside a reference in the preamble.”55 The source of this negative reaction may have been a change of heart on the part of the United States. In early February 1949 Dean Acheson had replaced George Marshall as the new US secretary of state. On assuming the post, Acheson had consulted Senate leaders Arthur Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the wording of the proposed treaty. They raised objections to Article 2, since it appeared to add responsibilities to those already assumed under the United Nations Charter and would therefore be politically unacceptable.

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

Connally added that “the general welfare clauses of the constitution had caused more trouble than any other single item in it.” The senators asked the State Department to “have another look” at the article. The department recommended “that no change be made and the Senators be reassured that the Article as drafted does not involve this government in any commitment.”56 When Wrong proposed that the wording be strengthened at the 8 February wet meeting, Secretary of State Acheson objected to its inclusion in the treaty and suggested that its sentiments be placed in the preamble. According to the official minutes, the secretary of state expressed concerns by senators that the article might detract “from the main purpose of the Treaty and get involved in social and economic questions which raise internal political problems.”57 The transcripts of the meeting provide a more blunt explanation. Acheson, it appears, was not as concerned about his private conversations with Senators Connally and Vandenberg as he was about his appearance in front of the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a few weeks earlier on 2 February 1949 to defend the Bogotá agreements creating the Organization of American States. He had been grilled by senators about the welfare clauses of the agreements: according to Acheson, these clauses, similar in nature to Article 2, contained “every worthy aspiration that ever occurred to any human being in it.” “[E]veryone was going to have a college education. Women were going to have the same rights as men. They have no discrimination on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and we were completely distracted from the purpose of that treaty by the sort of thing which led off by many of the Senators who said ‘This is the democratic party’s Bill of Rights put into it here’ and we are all tangled up with the internal democratic party politics.”58 Acheson’s comments can thus be best understood within the context of US domestic politics. Civil rights legislation, part of President Harry Truman’s 1948 election platform, had been introduced in the Senate in early January. Opposed by most southern Democratic senators, it was threatening to tear the Democratic Party apart. The Bogotá Treaty’s relationship to civil rights issues had been a point of significant discussion during the Senate hearings on 2 February, and Acheson was obviously anxious to avoid a link between the Atlantic pact and this emotional domestic debate.59

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When Acheson met again with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session on 18 February to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty itself, no mention was made of the relationship between the civil rights issue and Article 2. Confusion arose, however, over the article’s application. Acheson believed that it was intended by the Canadians to be merely an affirmation that treaty members would work through the United Nations and its agencies to foster greater economic and social cooperation, stating at one point that the Marshall Plan went beyond the type of cooperation envisaged. In reaction, a number of senators remarked that such a clause would be superfluous.60 The civil rights issue was not raised during these hearings, but Acheson still harboured concerns about a tie to Article 2. During a meeting with the treaty negotiators on 25 February, he continued to express reluctance towards any mention in its text of a commitment by signatories to work for “higher standards of living and greater economic and social justice.” The secretary of state noted that “beginning Monday morning you will hear more talk about social justice.” There is little doubt that he was referring to a well-publicized Senate filibuster by southern Senators that was to begin that Monday over the civil rights legislation.61 canada’s final push for a n on-military article in the treaty News of Acheson’s opposition caused Canadian officials to re-evaluate their position. Not wanting to drop the matter, they decided on a new course of action. Rather than stress Canada’s hope for the treaty to provide a framework for greater Atlantic unity, Pearson suggested that the argument be made that they were interested in a strong Article 2 because of domestic political concerns. The present draft of Article 2 was too weak to be acceptable to Parliament or the Canadian population at large. A straight military alliance would not find the same level of support in Quebec or with the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (ccf) party in Parliament.62 These new arguments formed the basis of a massive campaign directed at the other Atlantic pact nations. Wrong raised his government’s political problems with his American counterparts, and St Laurent even mentioned the matter during a meeting with Truman on

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

13 February.63 In their approaches to European powers involved in the negotiations, Canadian officials did not limit themselves to political arguments. Ottawa also encouraged them to use arguments outlined in the December commentary prepared by Reid (and softened by Pearson), which had spoken of the treaty as the basis for greater North Atlantic unity.64 Few of the governments involved in the negotiations, however, appeared to believe that the article was little more than rhetoric. Although French foreign minister Robert Schuman ultimately expressed his support for Article 2, it appeared to be more because his government wanted to “eliminate the aggressive character of the Treaty” than because of any interest in the Atlantic vision.65 There was a profound fear in the French government that the treaty would be seen as too muscular and thus ripe for exploitation by the significant number of communist deputies in the National Assembly. As senior Quai d’Orsay official Jacquin de Margerie told American officials in early November 1948, France believed that “cultural and economic clauses will be largely window dressing, but ... would serve a useful purpose in playing down the military character of the pact.”66 The unlikelihood of the French government having a sincere interest is borne out by the private fears of a number of its leaders, particularly Defence Minister Paul Ramadier, who was apprehensive that the Atlantic pact might lead to an association with the Americans which would be so close that it would compromise French independence. Both Ramadier and Schuman were also concerned that the pact not be seen as undermining attempts at greater European unity started by the Brussels treaty. In his memoirs, René Massigili, the French ambassador to Britain during this period, points out that although Schuman always attributed great importance to the article, the foreign minister never said how he would reconcile the Atlantic vision with the European one. Positive references to Article 2 by Schuman during the treaty ratification debate in the National Assembly, for example, appear to represent little more than an effort to impress the left-wing parties. French leaders, moreover, would have been unlikely to have accepted an Atlantic vision that anchored France more firmly to North America.67 Canadian political opinion was raised by Canada’s deputy high commissioner to Britain, Frederic Hudd, during a meeting with Gladwyn Jebb in early February. Although Jebb indicated that Britain would support the article in its present form but not a stronger ver-

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sion, Canadian officials were not prepared to abandon their efforts. Canadian high commissioner Norman Robertson saw a way of applying the article to the current state of Anglo-Canadian trade relations. As a member of the oeec, Britain could be forced to alter its trade links with non-European countries such as Canada in order to achieve an overall balance of payments with the United States. The matter could be resolved, however, if the United States agreed that Marshall aid could be used for certain non-European purchases such as Canadian wheat. Article 2, Robertson argued, might be used as the authority under which oeec policy could be modified.68 He presented these arguments to the British with Pearson’s permission but sensed that they had no real interest in the article. When told that Ambassador Franks in Washington had been directed to support the retention of Article 2 in the treaty, Robertson decided not to press the issue. As he reported to Ottawa, the British seemed to offer their support “because they want to meet our wishes and not because they had any special interest themselves in having such a provision in the treaty.”69 Robertson’s analysis was correct. The British were surprised by the new arguments, having fully subscribed to the view during the recent standoff with Acheson that Canada was merely trying to marry politics to the article. In a telling minute, Evelyn Shuckburgh, the head of the Foreign Office’s Western Department, acknowledged that Robertson’s trade argument dealt with a matter that was “important” from the British and especially the Canadian perspective. He noted, however, that “it is not surprising that the U.S. Senators should be very chary about putting such a clause in the Atlantic Pact. I think we should be bound to agree with them that this is hardly the place or occasion for raising so difficult and controversial a point.” Although Britain should do what it “reasonably can to support the Canadian point of view,” if only because it needed Canadian support for its own amendments, it should not press the matter too much in the face of American opposition. Certainly, this issue should not be a reason for delaying the signing of the treaty.70 The same day in Cabinet, Bevin mentioned American opposition to the article but made no mention of Robertson’s economic arguments. He shared his belief with his Cabinet colleagues that the article had little meaning but that the United Kingdom should support it because of Canada’s special interest. With Cabinet approval, Franks was instructed on 24 February to give “as much support as you can to the

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

Canadian proposal,” but was cautioned that it should not hold up the signing of the treaty itself.71 As well as French and British support, positive signals had also come from the three Benelux powers.72 Canada’s position had strengthened considerably. Yet this support for Article 2 had been gained by stressing the internal political difficulties of the St Laurent government rather than by convincing them of the importance of the Atlantic idea. As a short-term strategy, it was effective. Canada’s socialist ccf party had adopted a resolution supporting the treaty but only if it contained stronger non-military provisions.73 Reid recalls that, with a general election on the horizon, St Laurent and Pearson had become concerned about the difficulty of selling a strictly military alliance to the voters, especially in Quebec.74 As a longer-term strategy, it was much less effective. By ignoring the substantial arguments in favour of strong non-military provisions within the treaty, its signatories risked never agreeing to its later implementation. As Wrong admitted to Pearson on 21 February, to argue that the article allowed for the “possibility of closer economic collaboration between Canada, the UK and the US would not appeal to all Senators.” He believed that as politicians, they would give more credence to arguments coming from fellow politicians. “I have emphasized that from the U.S. point of view a general article is at worst harmless and that if it were used as a cover for further measures would be subject to the normal constitutional procedures here. I have also emphasized that there are undoubtedly a good many people in the U.S. who would welcome some enlargement of the pact so that it is not wholly a military agreement.”75 In the scramble to achieve support for the article, Canada had engaged in the self-defeating game of downplaying its usefulness, thus leaving a weak foundation on which to build its Atlantic vision. Assured of support from the European powers, Wrong now made a final appeal to the Americans. On 22 February he presented his US counterparts with a memorandum that balanced the political need for the article with other considerations, such as its usefulness in assisting with economic development that could help fight aggression or in countering propaganda against the treaty as a “War Pact.” He also stressed that the article would merely be “a statement of intention,” for which other agreements, such as the oeec, provided precedents. “Action to give effect to Article 2, if it involved the assumption of new obligations by any party, would be subject to normal constitutional

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arrangements.” Finally, Wrong threatened that “unless we could get an article on these lines in the Treaty the Canadian Government would have to review its position on the whole project.” This extraordinary statement, according to Reid, was the diplomatic equivalent of withdrawing from the treaty. It must have been sanctioned by Pearson and St Laurent in advance.76 Wrong succeeded. New wording was agreed to at the officials’ level, and approval was sought from Acheson as well as from congressional leaders. By the time the Atlantic pact negotiators reassembled on 25 February, an agreement had been reached on a non-military clause that ultimately became Article 2 of the treaty: “The parties will contribute toward further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”77 With a few minor drafting changes, the resulting article was included in the final version of the treaty, which was signed 4 April 1949. conclu sion In analyzing the outcome of the nato negotiations, it is perhaps telling to look at how the discussion over Article 2 was concluded at the end of this meeting. Franks, from Britain, had pointed out that the major reason this issue had arisen was because of domestic political problems in Canada. The task had been to find a solution that was both acceptable to other countries and also addressed the Canadian “difficulty.” To most of the assembled negotiators, Article 2 was a political device aimed at addressing domestic Canadian concerns and little more.78 This review of the circumstances surrounding the birth of Article 2 is crucial in understanding its subsequent development and many of the problems that it would encounter. Except for Canada, no signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty had a stake in the evolution of Article 2. For Ernest Bevin, it represented a potential challenge to his dream of a British-led Western union. For Dean Acheson, the article represented rhetoric that might be misunderstood by Congress as interfering in US domestic affairs. Both men were only willing to change their position when convinced that the article lacked any real meaning but was

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

important to Canada’s adherence to the treaty. Although the other states involved in negotiating the treaty did not necessarily share British or American fears, they had a similar perception of its nature. Its value was primarily for propaganda purposes, especially against the background of Canadian domestic politics. It was a permissive, rather than obligatory, article. No country needed to fear that the North Atlantic Treaty would be used to impose a resolution on a specific trade or other non-military dispute. nato was to face a multitude of problems and crises over the next decade, and the treaty’s non-military aspects would frequently be invoked as holding a solution to these difficulties. The lack of definition and common ownership of Article 2, however, would make it extremely difficult to realize its potential as the foundation for an Atlantic community.

2 NATO versus the OEEC

The Problem of Closer International Association in the Western World

The signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 marked the end of a lengthy and arduous set of negotiations. Unfortunately for the signatories, however, little thought had been given to the type of structure that would support the newly signed treaty. Article 9 of the treaty provided for the establishment of a council to “consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty” and to “set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary,” but the drafters had given little direction as to the specific meaning of this article. As has been seen, Britain had in fact only reluctantly allowed for its inclusion during the treaty negotiations. It was therefore not surprising that the signatories avoided organizational questions by skilfully referring them to a working group of representatives from member countries two days before the treaty’s signature.1 Pondering the question throughout the spring and summer of 1949, the Working Group came up with a series of modest recommendations, accepted at the first official meeting of the North Atlantic Council that September. No political bodies should be established, it concluded, “unless and until experience has demonstrated their need.” Instead the meeting agreed to establish a central council of foreign ministers that would meet at least annually. Members were able to remain in touch through informal meetings of their ambassadors in Washington. A number of other committees and planning groups were also established at the September Council

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meeting as well as at a further meeting held that November. These included a Defence Committee, to be made up of member defence ministers, and a Defence Finance and Economic Committee, to be composed of member finance ministers. A further sub-agency, the Military Production and Supply Board, was also established. It would be charged with examining issues surrounding the supply of military materiel. Both the Defence Financial and Economic Committee and the Military Production and Supply Board were to be supported by permanent staffs to be located in London.2 Despite the progress made in developing machinery to support the treaty, all the new agencies and committees were to deal with strictly military matters. The Working Group had been silent when it came to developing Article 2 and the non-military aspects of the treaty. This neglect of Article 2 issues, combined with the minimal nature of its political proposals, owe much to a combination of Canadian and American indecision about its development and outright British opposition to its inclusion during the drafting of the treaty. As the article’s sponsor, Canada had felt an initial obligation to push for the development of the pact’s non-military potential within the Working Group. The problem was that its leadership was unable to offer much in the way of specifics. Neither Reid, Pearson, nor any of his Cabinet colleagues offered any concrete suggestions,3 and when the new undersecretary of state for external affairs, Arnold Heeney, suggested the formation of some type of Atlantic pact economic committee, he was rebuked by Wrong in Washington. Before making such a proposal, the ambassador warned, “we should be ready to explain fully the relationship contemplated with other international economic agencies and the exact field to be covered. I should be loth [sic] to have the matter brought before the Working Group here, when the body begins to meet, without supporting the suggestion with definite proposals about the terms of reference and so on.”4 Wrong’s attitude was shared by many within the Canadian Department of External Affairs. The matter was further complicated by Canada’s opposition to an economic body within the alliance to deal with defence matters. It was feared that poorer members might try to obtain a greater Canadian contribution to the defence effort. Although this issue dealt solely with defence contributions, Canadian opposition to greater economic cooperation in defence weakened its overall positions.5

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Despite this lack of enthusiasm within External Affairs, the article was kept alive both by Pearson’s encouragement and from a certain sense of obligation among senior officials. There is little evidence of any other motivating factor. Writing many years later, Escott Reid speculates that the growing internal opposition to Article 2 may partly be blamed on the secrecy that surrounded the negotiation and drafting of the treaty. Normal consultation procedures were circumvented. Once they were reinstated upon the signature of the treaty, Reid argues, many individuals became involved “who knew little or nothing of the policies which Canada had pursued in the negotiations or the reasons for the policies. This was one reason why, after the treaty was signed, the Canadian government was half-hearted over implementing those non-military provisions of the treaty for which it had fought so hard during the negotiations.”6 Reid’s explanation is weak. To suggest that those involved in the treaty’s drafting had a better idea of how Article 2 should be implemented than those later involved in its development is simply incorrect. The individuals most closely associated with the negotiations were himself and Pearson in Ottawa and Wrong in Washington. Wrong opposed the development of Article 2 outright, while neither Reid nor Pearson was able to suggest any concrete measures that should be taken to foster the spirit that lay behind it. Canada was not alone in its confusion. A few days prior to the first meeting of the Working Group, Theodore Achilles admitted that the State Department had given some consideration to Article 2 and concluded that it would be premature for the alliance to create new machinery for economic or political cooperation at this early stage in the alliance.7 The Canadian government decided not to press the matter. It merely asked the Working Group to recommend that if any economic or financial machinery were established by the alliance, “the terms of reference should be broad enough to include the general objectives of Article 2.” Despite the innocuous nature of this suggestion, the American and British representatives raised objections, the British arguing that “the Working Group should not make recommendations on the broader questions of economic relationships between the signatories of the Treaty ... before respective governments and in particular finance ministers had consulted specifically on this matter.” Privately, the British expressed their concern about the impact of any new economic machinery upon existing economic arrangements and organizations. In the light of these objections, the Canadians agreed that

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Article 2 would not be mentioned in the Working Group’s final report.8 the chan ging international situation While nato’s non-military potential had initially been greeted with a certain ambivalence during the treaty’s first few months, it would quickly become a matter of considerable interest as the alliance’s leadership grappled with a variety of international problems. The most central issue facing the West during the early years of the Cold War was West Germany. It was imperative that the newly created state remained tied to the West. At the same time, real concerns existed, especially in France, that its integration into the Western bloc be done in such a way as to prevent a resurgence of German militarism. A more immediate international problem involved the future of European integration. The oeec, the European agency established in Paris to distribute Marshall Plan aid and hasten European economic cooperation, was experiencing significant problems. Little progress was being made in creating greater economic cooperation, and there did not appear to be much hope of eradicating the continuing trade deficit with North America. With Marshall aid ending in July 1952, many asked whether the oeec’s raison d’être might also cease, creating the need for a new Western economic organization. The German problem was closely tied to the European question because many planners, including Acheson, believed that a strong, economically united Europe could counterbalance a resurgent Germany and restrain its militaristic tendencies. As the continent’s leading power, Britain’s role in fostering European unity was crucial. By the autumn of 1949, however, the attitude of the Labour government toward the European idea had changed considerably. As it had become increasingly apparent that an allencompassing economic union with continental Europe would not be in Britain’s best interests, Bevin’s support for Western union had softened considerably. Limited forms of economic cooperation, rather than grandiose schemes, were advocated. Cooperation with Europe, Bevin and Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Cripps explained to the British Cabinet’s Economic Policy Committee in January 1949, must not put in jeopardy the country’s ability to survive independently. Should Europe collapse, Britain must retain its

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capacity to survive with assistance from the United States and the Commonwealth. Britain’s drift away from Europe picked up pace during the summer of 1949, culminating in the September decision to devalue the pound. In taking this decision, the British held lengthy consultations with the United States and Canada but ignored its European partners. It was decided that these tripartite discussions would continue, further reinforcing Britain’s emphasis on its relationship with its two North American allies over its European partners. Britain’s drift away from Europe was confirmed by a series of Cabinet decisions made that autumn. Especially in view of the recent sterling crisis, the United States and the Commonwealth would be given priority over relations with Europe. Although Britain would cooperate with Europe, it would not involve itself to the point where its other responsibilities were affected. Britain’s new focus would be Atlantic in nature, since the Atlantic framework contained the three main areas of British interest: the United States, Europe, and Canada.9 Britain’s growing coolness toward Europe fuelled concern within the State Department over what Acheson termed the “problem of closer international association in the Western world.”10 The devaluation crisis confirmed for Acheson that future planning would have to recognize that Britain would not fully integrate with Europe, and France would therefore have to take the lead.11 Such a realization did not mean, however, that the United States was prepared to see Britain abandon Europe. A consensus existed within the Truman administration that Britain should still play a major role in fostering greater integration even if it remained outside a united Europe. Although the director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, had toyed with the idea of some type of federation between the United States, Canada, and Britain over the summer of 1949, his plan had gone nowhere.12 By the autumn, there was general acceptance that if Britain did not fully integrate with Europe, it should still associate itself as closely as possible with the continent.13 This US attitude clashed with concerns within the British government. British willingness to support European initiatives fell far short of American expectations, and Anglo-US relations quickly began to cool over the next few months. By January 1950 the State Department reported to Truman that, in the opinion of the American embassy in London, the current state of tension between the two countries was “the most serious” it had been in the post-war period.14

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

A variety of issues had fuelled this tension: Anglo-American disputes over the appointment of a high-profile oeec administrator, oeec economic policy, and Bevin’s continuing prejudice against the Council of Europe. The latter organization had been formed in mid1949 by the Brussels treaty powers along with Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to help promote European unity. It was originally intended to be a type of “European Parliament,” where representative members from each country would decide on important issues by a majority vote. This concept had been watered down considerably as a result of British opposition, and what emerged instead was a consultative parliamentary body that would meet in public, complemented by a council of foreign ministers, which would meet privately. Article 2 appeared to hold many of the answers to the tensions facing the West. If the Atlantic pact were expanded to link the countries of Europe and North America economically and politically as well as militarily, a stable framework for German integration into the West could be created. The presence of both European and North American countries might also make it a better forum to deal with the growing dollar balance-of-payments problem and provide a replacement for the oeec once Marshall aid was complete in 1952. It might also provide a more attractive international forum for a British government growing colder toward the idea of European integration. canad ian planning for article 2 Article 2’s absence from the report of the Working Group did not prevent the matter from being raised when foreign ministers gathered that September for the first official meeting of North Atlantic Treaty countries. Despite the lack of direction Pearson had given to his department, he joined Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange and Schuman of France in urging members to consider Article 2 machinery in the near future. It was agreed, as a result of a suggestion put forward by Schuman, that the matter should be discussed at the next ministerial meeting of nato ministers.15 Pearson’s report to the Canadian House of Commons on the September ministerial meeting put a surprisingly strong emphasis on the non-military side of the alliance. “We have taken, I think, the first steps towards the widest possible military integration of the North Atlantic communities. What we must do now, I suggest, is to take as many steps

nato versus the oeec

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as possible, as quickly as possible, towards the widest possible economic collaboration between the North Atlantic nations and find out just what is involved in such collaboration.”16 The incongruity between Pearson’s comments and what had really transpired was a source of some embarrassment within External Affairs. A cable was quickly sent to Wrong asking him to raise the matter of Article 2 at a meeting of Atlantic pact ambassadors scheduled for the next day. “[W]e would hope that something could be said ... which would appear in the record of proceedings.”17 Wrong expressed some “doubts about raising the matter.” He followed his instructions, nevertheless, and asked that the Working Group (whose mandate had been extended at the September meeting of foreign ministers) prepare a report outlining its preliminary views on Article 2 for consideration at the next ambassador’s meeting. The Americans, who later privately admitted their annoyance at the question being raised before the next ministerial meeting, suggested that since Canada had raised the matter, it might propose the “terms of instruction” to the Working Group. As Wrong reported to Ottawa in mid-November, “All I could do was say that we would have a shot at this.”18 The Canadian government was once again faced with the problem of developing Article 2, but this time the prospect looked better. Doubts were emerging within External Affairs, the Bank of Canada, and the Department of Finance over the effectiveness of the oeec in bringing about European economic integration or addressing the European dollar shortage. Officials also questioned the motives of the Americans in advocating European integration and pressing for a European Payments Union. As Heeney commented in late 1949, many Canadian officials believed that the United States was encouraging European economic integration in part because it doubted whether it could realistically establish a system that would balance its large exports to Europe through increased imports and US investment in Europe. “[T]o many people here the attempt to set up Western Europe as a much more self-contained economic unit appears to be a subtle kind of neo-isolationism. The Americans are understandably insistent on bringing to an end the continual series of appropriations for Europe, which even now are very difficult, and which before long may become impossible to secure. If by 1952 or earlier Western Europe were ‘integrated,’ it could be set adrift with fewer qualms of conscience.” Heeney believed that the United States might simply

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

“swallow its losses” in Europe and leave the continent to its own devices economically, allowing Europe to further restrict its dollar imports as a means of dealing with its trade deficit. Such a policy, in Heeney’s opinion, might have little effect on the United States, which did not rely heavily on exports, but would have severe economic consequences for export-dependent Canada.19 For the Economic Division of External Affairs, the solution to these problems was the development of Article 2. An Atlantic-based economic organization would not only address many of the deficiencies of the oeec but would also give the Truman administration a “new gesture” to sell the idea of further Europe economic aid to Congress. “Fissures” would be prevented from opening between the United Kingdom and Western Europe and between Europe and North America. It would enhance the tripartite relationship that Canada had entered into with the United States and Britain following the devaluation of sterling and lessen resentment on the part of European countries at the exclusive nature of this cooperation.20 The Economic Division was overruled by an interdepartmental group from External Affairs, Finance, and the Bank of Canada. Although it recognized the problems associated with Western economic cooperation, the group concluded that the time was “not yet ripe to establish such machinery.” The Finance Department argued that it would be difficult to find competent personnel to represent Canada on a new Atlantic economic body. Such a body might also result in pressure for assistance to Western Europe, “for which we might not be prepared.” In addition, as the Finance Department pointed out, the tripartite machinery established between the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada following the devaluation of the pound had only recently been established and would take time to find its clear role. Finally, the problems being faced by the sterling area had to be resolved before the United Kingdom could associate itself with a European or Atlantic agency. The best place to address this problem, officials believed, was in the tripartite talks. The best course of action, it was recommended to the ministers that December, was to “stall for quite some time on our proposal for implementing Article 2.” Canada should instead advocate a small group of experts to “consider what might be the real content of economic cooperation between the North Atlantic countries, and also through what machinery this cooperation might best be effected.” Pearson reluctantly agreed, stressing that “we must be very careful ... not to give the

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impression that we are losing interest in Art[icle] 2 – which is not the case.”21 Throughout the spring of 1950 Pearson continued to push his department for a concrete set of proposals. A full-scale ministerial meeting had been planned for May 1950 at which the further development of the pact, “with particular reference to activities in the nonmilitary fields,” was to be considered, and Canada needed to formulate a position on the matter. In his memoirs, Pearson, like Reid, blames the opposition to Article 2, particularly from the Department of Finance, on a lack of understanding of the article. Absent from the policy formulation that had supported the treaty negotiations, officials in these departments were unaware of the Article’s full meaning. Pearson recalls, however, his continuing personal commitment to its development. “I was determined to do everything possible to bring about this closer integration through nato ... Without any illusion, I kept hammering away at the maximum possible application of Article 2 to further co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance. I remained on the side of Angels, however remote they were.”22 Pearson failed to define, in his memoirs or at that time, what he meant by “the maximum application of Article 2.” Since he was unable to give his officials any clear direction, it is easy to understand how his request for concrete proposals for the May meeting resulted in only more bureaucratic wrangling. External Affairs recommended the presentation of a cautious draft statement that focused on Article 2’s use as a general guide for national behaviour and suggested that from time to time the Council should discuss economic issues. As for specific machinery, the statement noted that there was a glut of economic organizations, but that there might be a role for Article 2 at the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952. As a result, it might be useful to establish a committee to look into the matter.23 Despite the anodyne nature of these recommendations, even they did not reflect a clear government-wide consensus. The Department of Finance had suggested that the statement be toned down considerably when it came to proposing the creation of new machinery. Wrong in Washington had continued to express doubts about Article 2 throughout the whole process, and he confided to US official Theodore Achilles that he had been attempting to “hold Mike Pearson down” on the matter.24 Wrong acknowledged that there might be a certain logic to the idea of nato assuming much of the work of the

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

oeec after the end of Marshall aid, but he believed that the economic problems facing the West could not be solved through regional arrangements.25 External Affairs was more forthcoming with advice related to more general non-military matters. Canada should support the formation of some type of central coordinating body to administer the alliance and provide a forum for political discussion similar to the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission. Caution was expressed since numerous proposals concerning such a body were being considered in nato capitals, and Pearson was advised to consider their various implications when they were discussed at the meeting.26 Despite the cautious nature of this advice, Pearson remained, at least publicly, the optimist. Although he told the Canadian Cabinet that he doubted “much progress would be made” on Article 2 issues at the upcoming meeting, he took a different line in a speech delivered in Belleville, Ontario, just prior to the opening of the North Atlantic Treaty ministerial meeting. “I hope at this meeting we shall do more than create a military alliance. I hope we shall begin a social and economic process that will produce a North Atlantic democratic union that will be above and beyond our sovereign states.”27 arti cle 2 an d the nato ministerial meeting in may 1950 Pearson’s rhetoric appears hollow when contrasted with the behindthe-scene discussions occurring in Ottawa. The views that he put forward in public were indeed much more reflective of thinking in other nato capitals, particularly London. Initially reticent toward Article 2, Britain was gradually becoming a keen supporter. As Britain attempted to grapple with problems associated with the future of the oeec and the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty’s non-military side appeared to hold the possible solution to many of the West’s problems. In a series of briefs prepared for the May ministerial meeting (to be preceded by separate meetings between the British, French, and American foreign ministers), the Foreign Office advocated the establishment of a North Atlantic Treaty commission, similar in nature to that established under the Brussels Treaty. The commission would deal with various political questions of common interest and engage in general consultation. Envisaged as being modest at first, the commission, as it evolved,

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45

could possibly take over much of the work of the oeec when Marshall aid ended in 1952. Eventually, it might be possible to establish smaller groupings or bodies of a non-military nature under the auspices of the commission, allowing non-nato oeec members such as Switzerland, Sweden, and of course West Germany to be involved with its operations.28 The Foreign Office plan was in keeping with a number of Britain’s overall foreign policy goals. It supported Bevin’s policy of placing Western relations on an Atlantic basis and provided an alternative to integrating with Western Europe. Speculation within Whitehall was that unless action was immediately taken, the residual responsibilities of the oeec would be assumed by the Council of Europe when Marshall aid ended in 1952. The Foreign Office plan was designed to prevent this by creating an Atlantic framework for economic cooperation through an organization in which Britain was an equal partner with the United States. To complete the picture, the organization was to be located in London. The plan complemented Britain’s German policy of tying the former enemy as closely as possible to the Western alliance and keeping it away from Soviet influence. Britain supported West German acceptance of a recent invitation to join the Council of Europe but saw it only as a first step. Although the next obvious step would be for West Germany to join the North Atlantic Treaty, Whitehall realized that at the present moment this was impossible because of expected French opposition as well as a potentially “violent” reaction from the Soviet Union. Under the Foreign Office plan, however, non-military “subsidiary organisations” could be established under the new North Atlantic commission to which West Germany could be associated. By this route, the Foreign Office argued, “awkward questions connected with German adherence to the Treaty itself can perhaps be avoided, at least for some time.”29 Foreign Office enthusiasm was tempered by the Treasury, which believed that the creation of Article 2 machinery would be premature, especially as nato membership differed from that of the oeec. The Foreign Office countered by saying that what was being proposed was only the establishment of a treaty body to consider how Article 2 should be developed. No one was advocating that the oeec’s work be ended before the termination of Marshall aid in 1952. At that point, however, a choice would have to be made about the direction of West-

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ern economic cooperation, and it was in Britain’s best interest to have the option of transferring much of the economic work to nato. The existence of a nato body that could study all these issues further, including the question of links with the neutrals and West Germany, would keep this option alive. The Foreign Office believed that time was of the essence. Planning for the creation of a treaty organization was underway, and the department believed that both France and the United States had a strong interest in the development of Article 2. If the Americans made a proposal and it was turned down by the British because they felt the oeec adequate, the United States might counter by urging Britain to concentrate on greater integration with Europe. The chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, was not wholly convinced by these arguments, but he acquiesced when assured that the Foreign Office was not advocating the absorption of the oeec by nato.30 Britain gave little consideration to the possible role that Canada, up to that point Article 2’s greatest advocate, might play in this debate. Ottawa had in fact been led to believe by its high commissioner, Dana Wilgress, that there was little private or public discussion in Britain over Article 2 and remained ignorant of British interest or planning.31 Just as Ottawa misjudged Britain’s position, so Whitehall had a flawed perception of American and French support for Article 2. This was understandable in the case of France. On 16 April, Georges Bidault, at that moment prime minister of France, had made a widely reported speech at Lyons calling for the creation of a “High Atlantic Council for Peace.” This Council, he proposed, would act to coordinate the economic and military policies of the Atlantic community with the hope that it would assume responsibility for political action in the near future. Bidault’s speech received wide press attention and generated considerable interest. His plan was vague (it was uncertain, for example, whether he envisioned the expansion of the Atlantic pact or the formation of an entirely new organization) but it apparently conveyed a belief that the West should address its current problems within an Atlantic framework.32 To the Foreign Office officials, this proposal appeared to be a clear indication that British and French thinking was progressing along similar lines.33 Bidault’s speech was made without consulting his Cabinet or seriously discussing the matter with his foreign minister, Robert Schuman.34 The fact that Schuman failed to promote Bidault’s proposal

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during the May ministerial meeting has led to the conclusion that this episode illustrated two differing visions of future Western development. Bidault’s Atlantic vision can be contrasted with Schuman’s European one, outlined in his dramatic May 1950 proposal for the establishment of a supranational European Coal and Steel Community as a step toward greater European cooperation and Franco-German reconciliation.35 But an analysis of Bidault’s approach shows that it did not significantly diverge from Schuman’s thinking. In conversation with the American ambassador a few days after his speech, Bidault confessed that he had no specific ideas to accompany his proposals other than his belief that the various Western organizations needed greater coordination and a small executive body should be created. Such a plan would allow Britain to have a greater association with Western Europe, and West Germany with the West. The second point was important because Bidault saw no other way to link Germany to the Atlantic community except through indirect means, such as this high council. It was impossible, he argued, for France to allow the former enemy state to join the Atlantic pact.36 The thinking of Schuman and the Quai d’Orsay was not radically different. The foreign minister and his officials supported the creation of central Atlantic pact machinery to coordinate North Atlantic activities, especially in the area of defence. The French were frustrated with the current military state of affairs and felt that rearmament and general military strategy should be examined on an alliance-wide basis, even to the extent of advocating a common nato defence budget.37 This central coordination should also be extended to non-military activities. In early May, French officials put to their nato counterparts in Washington a tentative plan for the creation of a Western council to coordinate nato’s work with that of other European organizations such as the oeec, providing a link between nato and neutral countries.38 Schuman, however, made a crucial condition. In an important telegram to Washington, he stressed that the oeec and the Atlantic pact must not be formally associated when Marshall aid ended. Not only would such a link alienate the neutral members of the oeec, but it would also tie Germany to the pact and inevitably would lead to its rearmament.39 As events unfolded, Schuman began to realize the unworkable nature of this plan, with its uncertain links between various organizations. As he privately told Acheson, it was unlikely that many non-

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nato members would want to associate themselves with a high council which, because of its links to the Atlantic alliance, would have military overtones. French thinking had therefore evolved. As France was anxious to see the oeec continue beyond the end of Marshall aid, US and Canadian association with the organization would be advocated.40 This would allow Western economic planning to be better coordinated but through a European-based organization with no overt military ties. The weeks following Bidault’s speech had therefore witnessed the development of French policy in direct opposition to British views. The British had also misunderstood US thinking on the matter. Signals from Washington over the previous year indicated that the United States was adopting a more Atlantic outlook that would allow Britain to distance itself from moves toward greater European integration. As well as Kennan’s musings about exploring the idea of a US-UK-Canada federation, positive signals had also come from Averell Harriman, the influential American special representative to Europe. In the light of the debate within the Truman administration over the future development of the West, Harriman had suggested that an Atlantic body be created under Article 2 which could replace the oeec. He shared these thoughts with Bevin in early March 1950, though stressing they did not reflect official thinking.41 There were other indications of thinking along “British” lines. Acheson himself, during a private dinner with the British ambassador, Oliver Franks, spoke of the chances of the Atlantic pact undergoing political development. At other points, the secretary of state privately lamented what he termed the current lack of dynamism in the West and expressed an interest in reinvigorating many of the Western institutions, including the Atlantic pact. Views similar to Harriman’s, on the possibility of developing Article 2, were also held by many senior State Department officials.42 Going even farther, the Policy Planning Staff developed a plan for a new “North Atlantic–European Community” that would provide an overall framework for Western cooperation and for the incorporation of Germany into the West.43 Politicians had also shown interest in the issue. Streit’s movement had found advocates among a number of prominent US political leaders, including Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. In the summer of 1949 Kefauver, along with twenty-six other senators, introduced a resolution calling on the president to “invite democracies that sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to meet in convention to explore how

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far they can apply among their people the principle of free federal union.” The matter had been referred to a Senate subcommittee for consideration beginning in the spring of 1950. Although no one in the State Department believed that the administration should endorse such an extreme resolution, many thought that the senators might be appeased by the United States advocating less-ambitious schemes for close union in existing frameworks such as the North Atlantic Treaty.44 Despite these positive expressions of support for the development of the Atlantic pact’s non-military side, there were few within the Truman administration prepared to advocate immediate action. Although some Atlantic pact machinery might be created, the general view was that the development of nato should be gradual: it was better to await future events before making any firm decisions about the pact’s role in administering Western policy and its relationship to such questions as European integration.45 The official State Department briefs prepared for the nato conference proposed that the alliance have a permanent, central, administrative body which could be charged with exploring the development of Article 2. Specifically, it might look at dollar-gap problems that could not be handled under the oeec as well as the encouragement of general economic growth within the North Atlantic area required to support rearmament. It was also proposed that the economic organization of the West following the end of Marshall aid in 1952 be examined. The document made clear, however, that “consideration should not foreclose continuation of [the] oeec but should recognize that its objectives represent essentially a North Atlantic problem and that the organizational arrangements to carry them out should take account of this fact.”46 On the surface, the American proposal was similar in nature to the Canadian and British ones. The North Atlantic Treaty members should establish a permanent organization that would consider the possible development of Article 2, especially in the light of the approaching end of Marshall aid. The difference between the positions was that, unlike Bevin and Pearson, Acheson had been non-committal. A private remark from one American official seemed to summarize his position. The secretary of state, the official noted, had gone through masses of State Department papers describing new agencies, many of which were designed to replace the oeec and the Council of Europe. In response, Acheson had said that “before the creation of

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

new machinery was examined, there must be a better meeting of the minds on the problems themselves and the directions in which solutions could be sought.”47 The British continued to develop their proposal for the establishment of a central treaty body to serve potentially as a framework for Western cooperation, unaware of the lack of American and French interest in proceeding. They were surprised, therefore, when French officials immediately rejected the idea during preliminary tripartite talks prior to the official North Atlantic Council meeting, arguing that oeec membership consisted of more than Atlantic pact signatories. Giving the treaty organization greater economic responsibility would mean excluding these countries from Western economic planning. The issue of West Germany was also raised. The British argued that their plan had the potential to solve the German problem. Germany would be linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but only on a non-military basis. This argument did little to persuade the French, who remained adamant that Germany never be allowed to associate itself with the Atlantic pact under any circumstances. The solution to the problem, French officials stipulated, was to have the United States and Canada associate themselves with the oeec.48 The British were livid. The French reaction had been totally unexpected, and to make matters worse, the Americans had failed to support the United Kingdom. Described as “totally barren of ideas” by one Foreign Office participant, US officials had tried helplessly to mediate between the two views without stating a strong preference either way.49 Bevin, whose heart problems and general failing health would force him to leave his post as foreign minister the following March, was at that moment in hospital. When briefed on the French plan, he immediately rejected it.50 He had earlier made it clear that he envisioned one, not two, organizations dealing with the affairs of the Western world.51 The British were not, however, to succeed. After considering the matter further, the Americans began to see the proposal’s merits, especially its use of existing machinery. Acheson therefore agreed to the association of the United States and Canada, albeit informally, with the oeec.52 The Canadians, who had not attended the pre-meetings between the major powers, found themselves in an awkward position, and it was recognized that it would have been easier to accept a proposal involving economic cooperation under Article 2.53 Nevertheless, Canada decided to favour the oeec option mainly because it came with firm

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backing from the United States, the linchpin of Western economic cooperation. Pearson and his officials in Ottawa failed to see that Bevin’s approach was very much in line with the Canadian policy of developing the Atlantic community in a gradual fashion. Whitehall had kept Ottawa informed of the general nature of its policy throughout the spring of 1950, but the policy had been too vague and imprecise in nature to have much of an impact. Had External Affairs officials known that Bevin was trying to take the first steps to establishing an Atlantic framework within which non-military cooperation among Western states could evolve over time, the Canadian response might have been different.54 The Canadians also believed that immediate North American association with the oeec was not incompatible with the goals of Article 2 in terms of greater Western economic association. More importantly, the Americans made clear that their decision to favour the oeec was to meet an immediate need; it was not intended to prejudice the ultimate decision about which framework should be used for European–North American economic relations.55 To this end, the United States promised that it would advocate the continuing study of economic cooperation by the alliance under Article 2.56 By the time the Atlantic pact signatories gathered for their official meeting a few days later, most decisions concerning Article 2 had already been taken in advance. As anticipated, a new treaty organization (to be established in London) was created, marking the formal birth of nato. To administer the organization, each foreign minister was asked to appoint a “deputy” who would represent the minister between ministerial meetings. These Council deputies would be considered to be meeting in continuous session and were authorized to begin establishing a staff to serve as a secretariat to the organization. As part of its mandate, the new organization was asked to determine what further action should be taken under Article 2. This decision was not without controversy. Despite support from the United States and nato’s other major powers for further study of the organization’s non-military side, firm opposition came from Dutch foreign minister Dirk Stikker. Stikker was chairman of the oeec and believed that this organization marked the only way forward for Western economic cooperation. A compromise was reached at the meeting: any nato study would consider the work of existing economic agencies in examining any possible role for the alliance.57 This arrangement

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appeased Pearson. Both the British and the French, with decidedly different reactions, suspected that ultimately the oeec framework would win favour.58 Despite these suspicions, the British were determined to ensure that interest in Article 2 was kept alive.59 the korean war and the continuing debate The start of the Korean War in late June 1950, a few weeks after the May nato ministerial meeting, brought about radical changes to the new organization that would impact the oeec-nato debate. Fearing that the Korean invasion might be the precursor to a European one, the United States put pressure on its allies to undertake massive rearmament. The structure of the alliance also underwent considerable changes. At the September ministerial meeting, the United States presented a proposal aimed at shoring up Europe’s defences. The proposal involved the establishment of an integrated force under a central commander, a major commitment of more American troops to Europe, and the rearming of Germany within this new force. Members agreed to the establishment of the new nato force and at their December 1950 ministerial meeting confirmed the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the new supreme commander of the Integrated nato Force. Although he would report to the Standing Group in Washington, made up of representatives of the chiefs of staff of nato’s three major powers, General Eisenhower was to establish a headquarters in Europe. There he would train and organize national units assigned to his command. The rearmament of Germany was not accepted as easily. Presented only five years after the end of the Second World War, the US proposal created significant controversy. It was immediately rejected by the French government, which eventually countered the American plan with its own proposal, the so-called Pleven Plan. Named after the French premier, René Pleven, the plan envisioned the creation of a federal European army containing German units. The army would be under the direction of a European parliament and European defence minister, who would direct the army’s activities and prevent the German units from acting independently. German rearmament would not occur until the new structure was in place. Although support for the plan from France’s nato allies was far from overwhelming, it was eventually accepted at the December Council meeting with some modifications. The United States would accept

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the idea of Germany rearming through a European army and not directly through nato, but the French would have to agree to the introduction of German forces into Europe before the administrative structure of the new European army was established. Over the next three years, nato’s European members would attempt to finalize and ratify a treaty creating this new structure, known as the European Defence Community (edc). These attempts would become a source of considerable tension. This overall push for the significant militarization of the alliance put tremendous pressure on its members. Massive rearmament threatened to undermine post-war economic recovery, cause severe shortages of goods, encourage inflation, and upset trade balances. As increasing military activity continued to put a strain on national economies, a number of nato’s leaders pointed out that some of the economic hardships could potentially be lessened through economic collaboration, something that, it could be argued, Article 2 was designed to facilitate. Yet nato lacked the immediate resources to develop an economic agency. In fact, the only organization with the experience, personnel, and resources to facilitate cooperation was the oeec. The presence in its ranks of a number of neutral countries, as well as West Germany, gave it a distinctive non-military character, which complicated the situation. Throughout the summer of 1950, Stikker, as chairman of the oeec, had advocated the establishment of a special committee in Paris, the home of the oeec, under the direction of the London nato representatives to examine economic issues. Its membership would be entirely composed of oeec representatives of nato countries, thus forming an unofficial type of “personal union” between the two organizations. Under Stikker’s plan, the committee would have very broad terms of reference and would be able to make recommendations to nato, the oeec, or individual member countries. There would be no formal link between the oeec and the nato committee, although there would be provisions for consultation to occur.60 At first, Stikker’s proposal served only to raise traditional antipathies between the British and the French over the oeec-nato question. The British opposed it because it gave too much prominence to the oeec and undermined their support for nato primacy in Western economic planning, but the Foreign Office stopped short of totally rejecting the plan. Whitehall suspected that the Americans might be thinking of merging both military and Marshall aid and would choose

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the oeec as the forum for distribution. The British government did not want to be seen as openly undermining American efforts. But even if such a situation emerged and the two types of aid were merged, the British still believed that nato might be able to play a role in international discussions concerning the amount and allocation of aid. With this in mind, the Foreign Office recommended to Bevin that he avoid making any commitments on the matter and perhaps try to have it assigned to a group of experts for further study. If Stikker’s proposals outlined a very gradual “step by step” approach that did not commit the organization, Bevin might find himself able to lend his support to the proposal.61 The French, on the other hand, saw Stikker’s proposal as giving nato too much of a voice in oeec activities. France was of course concerned about the effects of rearmament. Like all European countries, it feared that massive rearmament would place too much strain on European economies and believed that increased US aid was part of the solution (even to the point of calling for a common nato defence budget). French officials also recognized a need for economic cooperation to further reduce the negative effects of rearming. But such cooperation, the French government continued to believe, was best taken under the oeec, where all non-communist European powers, including neutrals, were members.62 The United States was obviously key to determining the outcome of the fight over the oeec-nato relationship. Initial State Department views were that, over the longer term, the oeec was not the right economic body to deal with rearmament. But for the moment, it remained the only economic organization capable of addressing the myriad of economic problems facing the West, a view that American officials found was held by many of nato’s smaller powers. As one US official described the situation, “nato itself must be regarded as still on trial” when it came to planning and implementing the major economic efforts being undertaken by the West.63 Stikker’s plan eventually prevailed at the September 1950 ministerial meeting. Schuman raised some concerns about not overburdening the oeec, but his criticisms quickly disappeared as it became apparent that Stikker had no interest in seeing the establishment of a separate nato economic organization. With Schuman now supporting Stikker’s proposal, there was little that Bevin in his isolated position could do but agree; he managed only to have any references to an oeec role in defence planning deleted from the resolution.64

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Despite passage of the resolution, the situation still remained unresolved. The resolution did not actually make specific mention of a committee. Merely recognizing the potential for the use of the oeec by nato, it left the specific organizational questions to be worked out by officials, with no indication as to which organization would ultimately be the focus of Western economic cooperation. Although an informal joint oeec-nato committee was eventually established, the long-term implications of the very question that nato was struggling with remained unclear. Foreign Office officials acknowledged that the final decision lay with the United States but continued to hope for a nato victory, for a series of well-rehearsed reasons that had more to do with politics than economics: “because it is impossible to separate defence questions from financial and general economic questions; because in N.A.T.O. the United States and Canada are equal partners in a way that is not the case in O.E.E.C. in spite of the changes that were made last June; and because they would be on the same footing and their resources subject to the same assessment as the European countries.” In fairness, the Foreign Office did not envision the disappearance of the oeec. Its scope would be “reduced to some extent,” but it would still have a role in such matters as internal financial stability, trade liberalization, the European Payments Union, and the development of European resources. The final “line of demarcation” however, would not be fixed until the United States determined how its aid would be allocated. In order to avoid overlap, there should be as much “interlocking of staff as possible between the N.A.T.O. Deputies and the O.E.E.C. delegation in Paris.” Although this line of reasoning seemed very close to Stikker’s, the Foreign Office believed that nato deputies would require their own economic staff, which would become the basis for a nato economic body. Such an organization should be located in London, close to nato activity, rather than near the oeec in Paris, as many advocated. In short, while Stikker viewed the passage of his motion as an opportunity to expand the role of the oeec, the British saw it as the potential first step toward building an economic arm for nato.65 Britain put forward this position throughout the remainder of 1950. Representations were made to American officials in Washington and those based in Europe. US thinking, however, was moving in a direction favouring the oeec. The United States had decided to have the director of its Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, undertake discussions

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with the British and the French on the establishment of a nato policy on the sharing of the defence burden. His final recommendation was for a nato working group of twelve representatives from oeec national delegations to undertake the needed analysis. Most of the job would be done in Paris, allowing for a “personal union” between nato and the oeec, as envisioned by Stikker.66 Another factor working against the British position was the attitude of the neutral members of the oeec. Since early September, representatives of the Swiss and Swedish governments had argued that the economies of neutral countries would also be strained by European rearmament. The difficulty should therefore be examined by the oeec. At a meeting of the oeec Council on 6 October 1950, the Swedish government called for the maintenance of the oeec as an important body for further economic cooperation and development. Sweden believed that the oeec had to prevent a shift in the “emphasis” of Western economic cooperation and planning to the Atlantic alliance.67 The incident that sparked the most controversy concerned raw materials. Rearmament threatened to cause shortages in crucial resources (such as steel, coal, and copper), leading to inflation and interfering with civil production. Throughout the 1950s the oeec directed much of its energy toward this problem. Its deliberations were thrown into total disarray with the announcement in early December that the United States and Britain, in consultation with France, had decided to establish an international raw-materials organization under their own leadership. Many within the oeec felt betrayed by this decision. Their efforts had been undermined in one fell swoop, and none of the powers involved had even given advance notice even to the Council. The move was particularly harmful to Britain’s reputation, appearing to confirm every suspicion that it wanted nato to absorb much of the work of the oeec.68 To further complicate the situation, an oeec delegation, including British official Sir Edmund Hall-Patch and French official Robert Marjolin, was in the middle of a visit to North America when the announcement was made. Before leaving the continent, the two men visited Canada, where they discussed the difficult state of relations between the oeec and nato. Hall-Patch’s solution was the amalgamation of the two organizations. Surprisingly, Marjolin advocated the same solution. They both saw that the marriage would be difficult, especially with neutrals in the oeec, but they believed that satisfactory relations could be devised. As Hall-Patch noted in one discussion with

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Canadian officials, the British preferred cooperation on an Atlantic basis for a set of very specific reasons. “In oeec, dealings with the United States had always been characterized by the suppliant/benefactor relationship. In nato all countries would be equal working members and this difficulty would disappear.” Both Marjolin and Hall-Patch hinted that a proposal for such a new organization might be more acceptable if it came from a North American country. There is no evidence of any particular Canadian interest in the idea. Since the May meetings, Canada appeared to have lost much of its enthusiasm for Article 2. Prepared to consider proposals put forward by other nato members, Ottawa seemed to have no interest in taking the lead on the matter. Canada had supported Stikker’s September proposal on the grounds that it seemed a practical way of coordinating oeec-nato relations rather than because it corresponded to an “Atlantic vision.”69 the big three and the oeec-n ato qu estion Canadian interest was a peripheral matter. The final decision ultimately rested with the United States. Washington was gravely concerned about what it termed the growing “demoralization” of the oeec. For the Americans, the oeec symbolized US commitment to Europe as well as an important vehicle for creating the economic conditions needed for rearmament. They had no illusions about the reasons behind British advocacy of nato over a European organization. As Acheson remarked to Spofford, it is “because [the] US [is a] full and equal partner in [the] former while Brit[ain] [is] among [the] ‘suppliants’ in [the] latter.”70 No firm decision had been made on the oeec-nato question, but many within the State Department believed that the current problems could be addressed through a de facto consolidation of the two organizations, including the transfer of all nato economic work to the same city as the oeec. oeec representatives of nato countries would be able to take an active role in the deliberation of nato’s economic arm and provide a permanent “personal link,” to borrow Stikker’s term, between the two. Arrangements could be made to use oeec staff members on nato projects. The duplication of work would be limited, and member nations would not have to maintain large, specialized economic staffs devoted to both organizations. The consolidation might

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serve useful in addressing the delicate problem of incorporating West Germany into the economic work of nato without actually having to address the thorny question of alliance membership. American policy planners realized that if the United States were to advocate such a course, it would mean transferring the oeec to London or nato to Paris. There were some arguments in favour of London, but it seemed technically easier to move nato to Paris. The oeec’s neutral countries would also raise fewer objections if it was the military, rather than the civil, organization that moved.71 As strong defenders of the oeec, the French naturally advocated a course of action similar to the Americans. But France had misread the US position. On the basis of reports from the British representative to the oeec, Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, the French had been led to believe that the United States favoured the merging of the two organizations. American comments may have been in that direction, but they had concentrated on the idea of “consolidation in practice” through the use of the same delegations and international secretariat. No one in the Truman administration had spoken of actually merging the two. In early January 1951 Schuman presented a paper on the subject to the French Cabinet based on this misperception of the American position. He argued that France should favour the maintenance of a strong oeec as a means of preventing German membership of nato and of placating fears of neutral oeec members. The merging of the two organizations posed a threat to the French view that the oeec should be maintained as the centre of Western economic cooperation. Believing that France was in conflict with the direction of American thinking, Schuman proposed an alternative course to the Cabinet. nato, he argued, should move to Paris so that the two organizations could work closely on various economic issues without having to merge membership. France had reached the same conclusions as the Americans on the issue.72 Britain, meanwhile, had also been exploring the issue through an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of the third secretary of the treasury, Edwin A. Hitchman. The committee, which quickly became known as the Hitchman Group, reported its findings in early January 1951 in the form of an extremely blunt policy paper. The paper freely admitted that Britain had been working to see the economic side of nato developed “both because we can in that organization sit as equal partners with the United States and because, by

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reasons of our world-wide interests, the Atlantic community is much more nearly the economic grouping which really concerns us than any European grouping.” It was fully realized that such a strategy would result in reduction in the “scope and importance of the oeec.” The Hitchman Group believed that the rearmament accompanying the Korean War had boded well for this strategy since its effects had become inextricably linked with general economic issues. nato therefore, as a military alliance, seemed the natural body to handle economic planning and cooperation. The only obstacle was something the paper identified as “European morale.” There were those countries that saw the oeec as the cornerstone for the future development of European unity. This view had grave implications for the British government. It could not simply advocate a policy of nato absorbing the oeec, getting rid of the neutrals, and having it become the alliance’s economic arm. nato would have to develop its own economic secretariat. The problem was that such a body would not include West Germany because of French opposition to nato membership for the former enemy. nato would have to wait until Germany joined before it could develop its full economic responsibilities. In the interim, it should prepare itself for its new economic role by laying the appropriate organizational groundwork. Britain had, however, no interest in duplicating international machinery. Rather unclearly, therefore, it was suggested that Britain advocate that the two organizations “stagger” their work and render it as complementary as possible until Germany joined nato. The impression should not be given that once Germany joined nato, the oeec would be totally destroyed. The Foreign Office ensured that the Hitchman Group’s conclusions clearly stated that the oeec would maintain fairly serious functions relating to European trade, some aspects of the European Payments Union, and overseas territories. Despite the significance of this list, the British clearly believed that the oeec would be in a minor position when compared to nato. The military alliance would have responsibility for minimizing the total impact of rearmament, something that currently touched upon every aspect of economic life in the West. The adoption of such a plan would have given the alliance carte blanche to involve itself in the coordination of all economic policy.73 In light of the pro-oeec sentiment of its other European members, the British position was totally unrealistic. The Hitchman paper noted

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that it would be “all important that the United Kingdom should pursue their agreed policy in such a way as to carry the majority of the oeec countries with them and minimise the impact on European morale.” In short, it was being suggested that Britain should attempt to undermine the oeec against the wishes of most of its members, but in such a way that everyone agreed. The Hitchman Group was advocating the impossible. The Washington raw-materials decision had placed most of the continental oeec members on alert against any further attacks on the European organization, and there seemed to be little possibility that Britain would succeed in its goal. Britain’s efforts would also be hampered by awareness on the part of other oeec members of the reasons why it was advocating nato. This fact was clearly brought to the attention of Foreign Office officials by Edmund Hall-Patch in a series of dramatic and lengthy messages. In a seven-page, single-spaced letter sent personally to Bevin, the head of the United Kingdom delegation to the oeec spelled out his fears about the direction of British policy. He stated that a perception existed that the United Kingdom wished to “transfer as rapidly as possible, the bulk of the work of economic discussion and negotiation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and away from the oeec.” No matter how often the British had tried to assure their European allies of their continuing interest in both organizations, the perception had persisted. Britain’s current promotion of nato had gone against the grain of European thinking, including that of the neutrals. These countries favoured informal cooperation between the two organizations, rather than the transfer of responsibilities from one to the other. Hall-Patch believed that Britain should therefore favour, and even promote, proposals for close cooperation between the two. Furthermore, as it appeared that the United States was about to make a proposal along these lines, Britain should either take the initiative by making this suggestion first or at least make it jointly with the United States and obtain part of the credit. Such a move might have the benefit of giving the United Kingdom a leading role in the new arrangements, and indeed in Europe itself. Hall-Patch believed that European countries were apprehensive at the thought of “an exclusively American leadership where the economic problems of Western Europe are concerned.”74 Whitehall was not to be persuaded by Hall-Patch. Considered by both the Hitchman Group and a committee of Foreign Office officials,

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his arguments were dismissed quite quickly. In the latter forum, the case against them was presented by Foreign Office official E.A. Berthoud. He commented that “the net effect of Hall-Patch’s proposals would be that N.A.T.O. would move to Paris, there would be the two Organisations, N.A.T.O. and O.E.E.C., alongside one another and that the O.E.E.C. would be enlarged and include the United States and Canada. At a meeting of the Hitchman Group that morning it had been agreed that if this was what Sir E. Hall-Patch intended then his ideas were unacceptable. They would have the effect of weakening N.A.T.O. and were politically wrong from the American point of view.” Berthoud’s contention that the proposal was “politically wrong from the American point of view” is somewhat misleading. HallPatch’s reasoning was much closer to American thinking than of anyone in Whitehall.75 Whitehall was by no means totally ignoring the oeec crisis. Hitchman was aware of the emotion on the continent, and he included a separate memorandum with his committee’s paper, proposing an interim strategy until the “emotional” period had passed. To avoid making its fellow oeec members even more suspicious, Britain should delay suggesting the establishment of a nato economic secretariat in London. Instead, it should advocate continuance of the work being undertaken by the Group of twelve nato-oeec members that had been established in Paris under the supervision of the nato deputies in London. Hitchman’s note stressed that this position in no way meant that the United Kingdom was rejecting the “thesis and long term objective of our paper.”76 The “tactical retreat” outlined in Hitchman’s memorandum was more realistic, yet it too contained the seeds of future problems. First, it sent conflicting signals about Britain’s position. The Americans had been advocating the establishment of a large economic secretariat to assist the deputies. Britain had opposed this plan when it was first suggested in late 1950, believing that it would solidify the division of nato economic functions between London and Paris. Hitchman stressed that Britain should one day welcome a large nato economic secretariat but for the moment it should continue to work against the duplication of oeec machinery and oppose the American plan. Recognizing the confusing nature of this proposal, he noted that the British position would have to be very carefully explained to the Americans. The other potential problem was much more serious. If Britain were to advocate the continued presence of the Group of Twelve in Paris,

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would this not strengthen the case for moving all of nato from London to Paris? This consideration had been raised at the final meeting of the Hitchman Group before the submission of its conclusions to the ministers. The group recognized that there was an argument in favour of such a move for reasons of efficiency, but it believed that there were stronger arguments in favour of maintaining the London location. There were doubts as to whether nato could even survive the move to Paris since it would be forced to live in the shadow of the large oeec and might even eventually be absorbed. As it had been decided that Eisenhower was going to establish his military headquarters in Paris, it was wise to keep the civilian arm of nato in another location in case one was overrun during hostilities. The main arguments, however, concerned the question of British prestige: “the removal of N.A.T.O. to the Continent would alter its character and diminish our influence and prestige in it. Having the seat of N.A.T.O. in London was a ‘catch’ for us, for which we had fought hard in the beginning: the loss of it might mean the loss of our unique position with a foot in Europe, an arm stretched to America and an interest in every part of the world.”77 Despite the rather confusing nature of the Hitchman Group’s interim strategy, it was accepted by Bevin and Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell, with disastrous results. As various British officials began to discuss their interest in the continuation of the Paris committee, everyone else started to assume that the British long-term strategy was to move the nato headquarters to Paris. It made no sense for the deputies and their staff, charged with running the civil side of nato, to be in one country, while their economic committee was in another. As the rumours grew, so did the Foreign Office’s annoyance, since its entire strategy appeared to be on the verge of collapse.78 British officials tried to quell rumours that they supported a move of the nato headquarters, but the proposal started to gain considerable popularity among other nato members, especially the United States. On 26 January 1951 Acheson sent a message to the American embassy in London noting that a general consensus seemed to be emerging that the deputies, the oeec, and the new nato integrated command under Eisenhower should all be in one location. As Eisenhower was included on this list, it meant that the location would have to be Paris. Before this decision was finalized, however, Washington was anxious to learn of British reaction to the proposal.79

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As would be expected, the response of the British government was hostile. The establishment of the organization in Paris might result in nato becoming absorbed by the oeec, it argued. It would weaken the Atlantic community. It would also weaken Anglo-American cooperation. In addition, doubts were expressed about French security. If nato were established in Paris, it would be open to “communist penetration.” Discussion also turned to Eisenhower’s plans to establish his headquarters in Paris (though no one ventured that it would be “penetrated by communists”). The deputies had no direct authority over Eisenhower (who was to receive his orders from the Standing Group in Washington), but their presence in the same location might lead them to interfere in his work. On more practical grounds, a move to Paris would be expensive for Britain. Administratively, it was also difficult to imagine how nato and the oeec could permanently work side by side. Differing memberships and functions would create long-term problems. Whitehall privately acknowledged that the move made sense from the standpoint of organizational efficiency. It also privately admitted that part of what lay behind its opposition was the simple question of prestige. If the French were to have both nato and the oeec in their capital, Britain’s role in the West would be weakened.80 As the Americans’ only concern was efficiency, the rather weak British arguments were dismissed and the Paris option appeared almost inevitable. Several key British officials, including Ambassador Franks in Washington, began to issue warnings that the United States was about to decide in favour of Paris. A proposal for a new nato financial body called the Financial and Economic Board (feb) was being developed in Washington. It was to have wide-ranging responsibilities, and to ensure it was able to work closely with the oeec, there was a good possibility that it might be made up of the oeec delegations from nato countries. If the United Kingdom was so concerned about losing nato, Franks argued, why did it not present the Americans with a positive plan for keeping the organization in London? If the British dropped their opposition to a nato financial arm but advocated that it be located in London rather than Paris, they might succeed. At first, Frank’s views had little effect upon Whitehall officials, who still believed that a firm stand by Britain might serve to block the move. As indications from Washington began to grow that the United States was about to make a formal proposal to Britain, the wisdom of adopting a modified strategy

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began to be recognized. At a meeting of the Atlantic (Official) Committee (an interdepartmental group of officials who met regularly to discuss nato matters and direct the UK delegation) on 23 February, agreement was reached that Britain might have to accept the creation of a nato economic secretariat in London in order to prevent the American initiative.81 The wisdom of this suggestion was lost upon the politicians. When the question came before the Cabinet Defence Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Clement Attlee himself, everyone agreed that nato could not be moved to Paris, where the “Atlantic concept would be forgotten in the atmosphere of European federalism” that reigned there, but the committee rejected the creation of the Financial and Economic Board. It was too early to judge how well the Group of Twelve organization was doing, but it was quite possible that it might “yield good results.” In addition, once the Nitze exercise was completed, there would be no economic tasks to be undertaken by nato. Committee members did not believe that any “countenance should be lent to the desire which a new organisation always exhibited for building up large empires, in which officials had no opportunities for justifying the emoluments which they drew.” The prime minister should tell the Americans that Britain wished simply to maintain the status quo and opposed not only the move to Paris but also the establishment of the feb. This was exactly the same position already rejected by the Americans.82 The British had little that was new in the way of arguments to present to the Americans, and it is doubtful whether their new representations would have been successful. A last-minute reprieve was granted, however, in the guise of a badly timed intervention by the French. In early March the French representative made an impassioned plea to the nato Council for greater coordination of rearmament and all its economic implications under Article 2. This move put considerable pressure on the Americans to proceed with their feb proposal. It appears likely, in light of the earlier Cabinet decision, that the French hoped that their intervention would force the Americans to decide the question of nato’s location in favour of Paris.83 Unfortunately for Quai d’Orsay officials, the US government had not yet made a final decision. While the State Department favoured the move to Paris, opposition was coming from the Pentagon. US military officials feared that the deputies might interfere in the day-to-day oper-

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ations of military activities, and they also took British concerns about the lack of French security quite seriously.84 The Truman administration would certainly have been able to resolve this difference of opinion eventually, but the fact that France forced its hand so early meant that it had to reach a hasty compromise. Not wishing to fight both the Pentagon and the British, the State Department decided to advocate the establishment of the feb in Paris, while leaving the deputies in London. Although the British continued to argue against the formation of the board on the grounds that it would establish “duplicate machinery,” they eventually agreed to its creation, and the proposal was endorsed by the entire North Atlantic Council. Organizational details were worked out by a special ad hoc committee, and the establishment of the feb was announced on 5 May 1951.85 Its establishment coincided with a number of other organizational changes to the alliance that saw the incorporation of the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee into the North Atlantic Council. Previously these committees had been the meeting place of member defence and finance ministers respectively. Under the new arrangements, however, member countries could designate any minister, including defence or finance, to represent them on the North Atlantic Council. con clu sion The retention of nato’s deputies in London marked an administrative victory for the British, but the matter of the alliance’s non-military role was far from resolved. Events over the preceding two years demonstrated the uncertainty that continued to exist among Western nations about the relationship of nato’s non-military development to their respective foreign policies. For the British, the alliance’s non-military development, especially in the economic sphere, provided an overarching framework for their “Atlantic vision.” The French, on the other hand, saw nato’s non-military development as a threat to their “European vision,” a position similar to the one initially taken by Bevin during the drafting of the treaty. Canada and the United States found themselves somewhere in the middle, wanting to see nato develop but unsure of its role vis-à-vis efforts to achieve greater European integration. The rearmament that accompanied the Korean War increased the alliance’s potential as a forum for economic cooperation. Although this

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development strengthened the British hand, uneasiness over the need to establish new international bureaucracies diminished the war’s overall impact on this type of thinking. Other established options, such as the oeec, provided a path of much less resistance. By the middle of 1951, it had become increasingly apparent that nato’s members lacked a sense of collective ownership when it came to Article 2. Without a clear commitment by the alliance’s leadership about how Western non-military cooperation should or might evolve within nato, more-developed avenues would continue to offer stiff competition. This pattern would be made clear as the nato-oeec fight continued to be played out, but also as attempts were made to use Article 2 to relieve other tensions appearing within the alliance.

3 Losing Sight of the Farther Horizon The Committee on the North Atlantic Community and Its Aftermath, 1951–1957

As rearmament continued in the face of the growing Korean crisis, the North Atlantic alliance came under further internal pressures. Not only did members face economic hardships, but nato’s rapid militarization began to place American leadership of the alliance in question. Constant pressure by the United States to establish American bases in Europe and North Africa, along with American approaches to Spain to assume a role in Western defence, resulted in the charge that nato policy was simply being designed to further US security interests. At the same time, many nato members believed that the United States did not take the interests of the entire alliance into consideration when it made foreign policy decisions. As one Canadian External Affairs official commented, American policy in Korea had exhibited a profound disregard for the views of the nato partners. The United States had often been quick to demonstrate intolerance “for any link of thought or action” that did not mirror American policy, even though this was “almost mercurial” in nature.1 The action that most symbolized US disregard for the alliance was the American proposal in mid-May 1951 that Greece and Turkey be invited to become full members of the alliance. The idea of Greek and Turkish membership was not new. It had been discussed at the September 1950 ministerial meeting but had been rejected, even by the United States, in favour of inviting the two countries to “associate” themselves with nato defence planning for the Middle East.

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The United States’ mid-May change of position was greeted unenthusiastically by most of the alliance. Arguments were made that Greek and Turkish membership could only be justified on military grounds and would interfere with the Atlantic community concept. nato could not develop into more than an anti-Soviet alliance if it allowed into its ranks two countries that, as one observer noted, were not seen as fully sharing “the common political philosophy and heritage of Western Europe and North America.” Greek and Turkish membership, it was argued, would also stretch the geographic area covered by the alliance and could lead to applications for membership from such countries as Spain, Iran, or even West Germany. Finally, membership for these two strategically sensitive countries might be seen as provocative by the Soviet Union. This risk was of particular concern to the French, anxious for a four-power meeting with the Soviets in the near future. In the light of this unhappiness, nato deputies decided in early June to study the political ramifications of the move while asking the Standing Group to look at the issue from a military perspective.2 Another problem facing the alliance involved increasing activity aimed at bringing the countries of Europe closer together. Six of nato’s European members (France, the Benelux group, Italy, and West Germany) had recently signed a treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community, based on Schuman’s May 1950 proposal. The six were also deeply involved in negotiations surrounding the European Defence Community (edc) which would see the rearmament of West Germany. This combination of increased nato militarization and an exclusively European focus when it came to Western non-military development was of particular concern to Dutch foreign minister and oeec chairman Dirk Stikker. In response, he began to advocate two courses of action in early summer 1951. The first, which he shared with the two key American nato representatives, Charles Spofford and Theodore Achilles, during a late May meeting, involved the strengthening of the concept of the Atlantic community, since he did not believe that any narrow grouping of European countries provided an adequate framework for long-term Western cooperation. He instead favoured greater cooperation on an Atlantic basis (allowing for smaller groupings to develop within this larger framework), which would include the United Kingdom and the United States.3 Stikker also raised concerns about the negative effects of rearmament, outlining his thoughts to another senior US official, Milton Katz,

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the American special representative to Europe. During a July meeting, the two men agreed that European leaders should assure their populations that the present escalation of rearmament would end in 1954. Thereafter, as long as Europe’s defensive strength was maintained, attention would be given to the raising of domestic living standards.4 Lester Pearson shared Stikker’s interest in seeing nato put on a more positive face and made it the theme of a lengthy European tour he took in the summer of 1951. Addressing the nato deputies in London, he stated that, despite the immediate focus on defence, there was “no reason” that nato “should lose sight of the farther horizon – the ultimate creation in the Atlantic area of a greater community of free nations.” Pearson was more blunt in private conversations, sharing with Spofford and Achilles his belief that nato’s increasing militarization, including the proposed Greek and Turkish membership, had put Article 2 in danger. The existence of various non-military agencies in the region served only to complicate the situation because “there seemed to be developing a confusion of machinery – oeec, Council of Europe, the F.E.B., all of which increased the temptation to restrict nato to military matters.” The solution, “tentatively,” might rest with the “idea of a complete overhaul, or at least a complete re-examination of all the machinery for European co-operation, economic, social and military.” Such a move might make it possible “to separate the military and nonmilitary aspects of nato, and to include in any agency which would deal only with the former, any country which wished to join and make its contribution to and accept the obligations of military collective action. This, of course, would be a return to the ‘Article 51 protocol’ idea of collective defence.” Under Pearson’s plan, countries such as Turkey and Greece could participate in the military side of the alliance, while neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland could join the non-military side. As well as sharing his views with the two Americans, Pearson outlined his plan to Stikker, British foreign minister Herbert Morrison (who had replaced Bevin in March 1951), Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange, and Danish foreign minister Ole Kraft. Most exhibited some interest in Pearson’s proposals, with Stikker and Lange being particularly enthusiastic.5 Pearson’s influence was felt within the debate over Turkish and Greek membership occurring in the Council of Deputies. The Standing Group had concluded that, from a defence standpoint, either Greece or Turkey should enter nato or some type of Mediterranean or Middle Eastern pact should be established; of the two solutions, the general tone of the

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report appeared to favour the first. Although full membership seemed to be quickly becoming the inevitable option, comments made during the 5 July 1951 nato Council meeting illustrate the lack of comfort many members were having with the decision. Arguing in favour of the regional pact option, both the Norwegian and the Danish deputy referred to the negative impact that full membership would have on the future of the Atlantic community. The Danish representative made specific reference to “the views which had recently been expressed by Mr. Pearson concerning the long-term goal of an Atlantic community of friendly nations united by a common culture and common traditions.”6 Tensions over rearmament, American foreign policy, and now the proposed entry of Greece and Turkey into the alliance did not go unnoticed in the Truman administration. For strategic reasons, the Americans were not prepared to alter their position on the Turkish-Greek question, and nato members would eventually agree to their accession to the treaty that November. The United States was, however, anxious to create a more positive environment within the alliance. The Atlantic community began to appear as a means of achieving this goal. As Achilles and Spofford noted in an early June communication to the State Department, a new emphasis on the “community” aspect of nato might “inspire confidence and hope”, in turn making it easier to win support for the necessary economic sacrifices needed for rearmament. The entry of Turkey and Greece into the alliance would be more acceptable to nato governments and their populations if the organization was given a greater non-military flavour. As tensions continued through the summer of 1951 within the alliance, the United States quickly realized the need for some sort of response. A nato ministerial meeting was planned for that September in Ottawa; and something was required to defuse the situation. By midAugust the Americans had developed a number of specific proposals. It was recommended that Secretary of State Acheson make a statement on the Atlantic community concept at the meeting and that the assembled ministers issue a declaration stating their interest in its development. In addition, it was suggested that a ministerial committee ought to be established to examine non-military cooperation, looking at such subjects as foreign policy coordination and specific Article 2 machinery for nato.7 Although realizing that a greater sense of community would help to ease some of the resentment toward rearmament, the State Department saw the Atlantic community and rearmament issues as separate. In order to counteract the economic problems of rearmament, the oeec

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should issue a statement based on the Stikker-Katz formula concerning an eventual stabilization in the level of rearmament in the next few years. nato could do its part by endorsing the oeec’s statement at the ministerial meeting. Stikker fully agreed with this strategy, and a statement on the subject of rearmament was accordingly released by the oeec during its 29 August ministerial meeting.8 planning for the n ato min isterial meeting in september 1951 Although the United States had seized upon the idea of appointing a Ministerial committee to look into Article 2 issues, ideas were less forthcoming when it came to identifying specific non-military initiatives. Anxious to receive any suggestions, American government officials began to approach their fellow nato allies in mid-August 1951. The United States was particularly interested in Canadian views on the matter, because of its traditional association with nato’s non-military side. Having overcome its initial reticence toward Article 2, External Affairs warmly welcomed the American overtures. Canadian officials were particularly interested in how nato might become more involved in political consultation. A number of officials, particularly Escott Reid, expanded upon suggestions originally made by Achilles, arguing that nato did not need new machinery but rather an expansion of consultation through “the development of certain conventions.” These would oblige members to consult with nato before taking any action that might have repercussions for the alliance.9 Canadian officials also looked at ways that Article 2 could foster economic cooperation. The US search for ideas coincided with discussions within External Affairs over the direction of European integration. A lengthy departmental policy paper on Western Europe and its relationship to the North Atlantic community had been circulated in mid-July. It raised the fear that European integration might undermine the Atlantic community by evolving into a closed trading bloc. Canada should encourage European integration, the paper argued, but only as part of a larger Atlantic framework. The further development of nato had the potential to lead “to a political commonwealth of the Atlantic which might be so close as to be a federation.” The memorandum, which was circulated widely, was described as representing views to which “the Minister had indicated his general agreement,” although it was “not intended to represent a rigid ‘party line.’”10

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Pearson may have supported the basis of the argument, but many of his officials viewed its conclusions with skepticism. Although there was general concern about European integration, there was little belief in the department that Atlantic federation held the answer. Such a move might eventually lead to a surrender of sovereignty to a central Atlantic body in which Canada would have minimal influence.11 Although US interest in Article 2 added to the debate within External Affairs, few thought that current American interest went as far as favouring federation. Instead, officials believed that the United States’ attraction to nato’s non-military side was based on a desire to assume a greater role in Western economic cooperation through the alliance. This belief derived from information passed on to Canadian Dana Wilgress and British official Evelyn Shuckburgh the previous April by Achilles. The American official had shared the summary of a recent telegram from Washington with his Canadian and British counterparts. The telegram had outlined State Department thinking on a Swedish proposal to merge the Council of Europe with the oeec and create a single organization with significant economic and political powers. It began by reviewing the present situation in Europe, including Britain’s unwillingness to involve itself in any aspect of European federation. It concluded: “Although it is clearly desirable to have a large measure of ‘market’ integration on [the] continent and developments such as [the] Schuman Plan which offer [a] genuine promise of such results sh[ou]ld continue to be given full encouragement, it is doubtful whether it is politically desirable to urge continental federation ... at least until the North Atlantic framework has been further developed, since without [the] UK and without [a] strong North Atlantic framework, there w[ou]ld be [a] risk of German domination or attraction to [the] ‘third force’ concept.” Given this situation and the fact that most Western economic matters related to the work of nato, it was “clear that [the] area of US primary interest will be nato and those oeec functions which are clearly supporting nato objectives.” The telegram went on to outline a number of “lines of development” open to achieve this Atlantic framework. The United States could advocate the merging of the oeec and nato, but this approach might cause the neutrals to withdraw. It could work for “an amalgamation with the nato of the closely related oeec functions and an amalgamation with the Council of Eur[ope] of the primarily ‘European,’ as distinct from North Atlantic, oeec functions.” The best course, however, appeared to be to encourage as close a relationship as possible between the oeec

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and nato, partly in the hope that the Swedes might find a way of associating with the alliance. Once it was known whether a close relationship could exist between the two organizations, it would then be appropriate to decide whether “the residual ‘European’ oeec functions should be transferred to the Council of Eur[ope], whether the Council of Europe sh[ou]ld be absorbed by the residual oeec, or whether the residual oeec and the Council of Europe sh[ou]ld be merged into a new European body.” For the United States, the most suitable outcome of this long-term development would be “one North Atlantic body working in all fields, not simply defense,” and a single European body in which the United States would not participate and “which would be the focal point for the evolution of [the] ‘European’ concept.”12 The approach outlined in the US telegram was welcomed by Canadian officials, who were anxious to prevent the creation of a closed Western European trading bloc. Although senior External Affairs officials believed that advocating a North Atlantic trading bloc was impractical, they also realized that international free trade was a long way off and that some interim concrete action was needed. As Undersecretary of State Arnold Heeney forcefully pointed out to Pearson, “It is not an attractive political proposition for the Europeans to discourage European economic integration, forbid East-West European trade and offer them in exchange vague generalizations about a North Atlantic economic community and the blessings of universal free trade. Indeed, we are fast coming to the point where any further talk about a North Atlantic economic community without some follow-up action will become derisory.” The answer suggested by Heeney and echoed by others in the department was not to advocate grandiose economic schemes, but to encourage economic collaboration as it related to specific situations, especially those involving defence. Although they did not go as far as advocating nato’s absorption of the oeec, they did believe that the issue of defence could be used to create greater Atlantic economic cooperation.13 Unsurprisingly, Britain reached a similar conclusion about the reasons behind American interest in Article 2. The State Department telegram could have easily been written in Whitehall, and as officials became aware of its existence, they demonstrated considerable enthusiasm. British foreign secretary Morrison announced that the Americans had shown “themselves to be thinking on very much the same lines as H.M.G. in these matters.” When it first heard news of the American proposal for an Article 2 study in August, the British

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Atlantic (Official) Committee concluded that it would deal with the oeec-nato relationship. A Foreign Office brief to the committee noted that the United States was in favour of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization complemented by a European organization dealing with local continental matters. The United Kingdom’s position, as the brief noted, was well established: it wished to see nato take over much of the work of the oeec. “These are not new ideas and indeed we know that the Americans have been thinking along these lines as we have. We had not however contemplated that they might have to be carried out as soon as this ... And since we must welcome any American initiative which directs attention towards the idea of the Atlantic community in its long-term and non-military aspects, so we can only welcome the implication that the N.A.T.O. in which we are on terms of equal partnership with the United States and Canada must soon supplant the O.E.E.C. in which we are not.”14 Unfortunately for the British and, to a lesser extent, the Canadians, there was a basic misreading of American interest in developing Article 2. Too much emphasis was placed on the April telegram, which clearly stated that it reflected only tentative US thinking. The Truman administration had by no means settled on the most suitable way in which Western development should take place, and the issue would continue to be discussed among American policy-makers throughout the summer.15 What these discussions revealed was that the oeec-nato question was not directly related to US interest in Article 2. The Americans realized that developing the Atlantic community had certain implications for the further development of European integration, but it was stressed that these were “in the background of our thinking.” The central goal of developing Article 2 was to assure Europe that the United States would not abandon it as soon as Europe could “stand on its feet militarily,” as well as facilitating the entry of Greece and Turkey into the alliance. Any initiatives under Article 2, it was made clear, must not prejudice “developments in wider frameworks such as UN or oeec, or smaller frameworks such as Eu[rope].”16 The April telegram should not be dismissed. It had been approved by Acheson, and both Spofford and Katz had expressed their general agreement with its sentiments. Both, however, had pointed out that the “missing component” in the telegram’s argument was the exact nature of the work that the Atlantic and European bodies were to undertake. Both ambassadors believed that the best solution was one already

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expressed in the telegram. nato and the oeec should move toward a closer association, which, in the course of time, would eventually reveal their complementary roles. As a result, the immediate and close association of the two organizations should be encouraged before any major decisions could take place, an outcome that the British were desperately trying to avoid.17 the committee on the north atlantic community The fact that the United States did not envision that any group looking into the Article 2 question would focus on the oeec-nato question was quickly confirmed at the September ministerial meeting. There agreement was reached on the American proposal to form a committee of nato ministers to look into ways in which nato might coordinate and consult on foreign policy and cooperate in the economic, social, cultural, and public information areas. Although economic cooperation was mentioned, it was made clear that the recommendations of the “Committee on the North Atlantic Community” were not to involve the alliance in work being done by another existing international organization. Despite the fact that the Americans had proposed the committee’s formation, they chose not to serve on the committee, whose membership was relegated to the foreign ministers of five of nato’s smaller members: Canada, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. The group quickly became known as the “Committee of Five.”18 That this committee was to have little involvement in the oeec-nato question was further confirmed by another US proposal made at the meeting concerning defence financing. In order to better meet nato’s military needs, a special committee, known as the Temporary Council Committee (tcc), was established to determine each member’s contribution to the defence effort in light of its individual economic and political situation. The work of such a committee severely limited the role of the Atlantic community committee in examining Western economic cooperation. The success of the Committee of Five’s work was greatly dependent on the attitude of nato’s great powers, and it appeared at first that US interest would continue. American representatives attended meetings of a working group of officials from each country charged with laying the preliminary groundwork for the ministers. A special committee was also struck within the State Department to review the matter. This enthusiasm

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did not translate into any specific recommendations. For the State Department, there were natural limitations confronting the development of Article 2. No initiative, it was believed, should duplicate the work of other organizations or give nato a direct role in managing the affairs of other international groupings. The alliance should not interfere with the responsibilities of nato’s major powers outside the Atlantic area.19 The State Department was nevertheless anxious to demonstrate some support for the Working Group’s deliberations and welcomed a suggestion by its deputy, Charles Spofford, that the United States favour a nato role in facilitating migration between member countries. Rearmament had caused shortages of labour in some nato countries, even though others, principally Italy, had large surpluses. Because this problem was causing considerable strain within Europe, the State Department agreed that it was appropriate for nato to examine the matter. Spofford lent US support to an Italian proposal that nato establish an organization to deal with the “movement of persons.”20 The British were less forthcoming and demonstrated little interest in the committee’s work, especially as it had become clear that the oeecnato relationship was not at the centre of its deliberations. Surprisingly, the United Kingdom was not disappointed by the lack of attention being given to this question. Although the British government was prepared to follow an American lead on the matter, it feared that too much discussion might raise fears about the future relationship of the neutrals and West Germany to nato. Britain instead believed that the issue should be decided by the “trend of events.” As current trends indicated that defence considerations were increasingly becoming the focus of Western economic cooperation, it was believed that there would be a growing role for nato in general economic matters. Beyond this question, Article 2 appeared to be of little concern to the British. Although a small role for the alliance was seen in the area of cultural cooperation, the Atlantic (Official) Committee judged that nato’s role in encouraging foreign policy consultation should not be substantially increased. Such discussions of this kind within nato were at their best often a “questionable use of time and at worst a hindrance to the development of national foreign policy.”21 Not only was the committee’s work hampered by a lack of direction from the United States and Britain, but it also had to contend with different philosophies toward Article 2 among the five foreign ministers. Pearson, who served as the committee’s chair, was by far the most enthusiastic. Although he had sent a message to Acheson that “he

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would not be pressing impracticable proposals” in the committee, the views he expressed to his department were grandiose. A departmental document noted the minister’s belief that “during the next fifty years, the nato countries and probably other free countries as well were bound to come closer together, perhaps into some form of loose federation, whether by the process of gradual growth or as a result of some cataclysm, and it seemed sensible and desirable to try to look ahead and foster this sort of tendency.” Pearson wrongly thought that the other four ministers held this view. He quickly learned from Canada’s nato deputy that this was not the case. Two of the four other representatives on the committee had indicated that they had no interest in the concept of an Atlantic federation, despite media speculation that this was the ultimate goal of the committee’s work. Indeed, Lange of Norway had made this position clear upon his return to Oslo.22 On 3 November 1951 the five ministers gathered in Paris to begin their deliberations based on the Working Group’s preliminary findings. Two proposals of special interest contained in its report were the Italian, concerning labour migration, and a Norwegian suggestion that parliamentarians be associated with nato. The ministers directed the Working Group to finalize its work with particular attention to the problem of migration.23 This special interest in migration illustrates American influence over nato. No other member had greeted the Italian proposal with much warmth. The Dutch had argued that existing international machinery was sufficient; Canada’s Department of Citizenship and Immigration was hesitant about outside interference from nato; Britain privately told its nato representative to try to have the whole matter jettisoned to avoid admitting Italian workers to the British coal industry.24 The State Department faced its own set of problems in promoting the migration proposal. Significant opposition existed within Congress to the idea of “liberalizing” American immigration quotas. Associating the idea with the concept of an Atlantic community might ease some of this opposition, but it might also lead to charges that nato was being given too much of a role in an internal domestic matter. The United States had also convened an international conference on immigration for that November in Brussels. It would examine how the resources of the International Refugee Organization might continue to be utilized after its operations ceased at the end of 1951. The Americans believed that this conference should be “regarded as an emergency

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salvage operation,” and they did not want nato action to interfere with its proceedings. The Working Group tried to address both these concerns by not referring to “migration” in its final report but instead talked of the movement of labour for purposes of defence. This approach would help the State Department persuade Congress to allow workers from nato countries to enter into the United States outside regular immigration quotas in order to assist in the defence effort. Once they were established in the country, there was a good chance that Congress could be further persuaded to allow them permanent resident status. Reference to the establishment of nato machinery to facilitate migration was omitted from the report in the hope that the Brussels conference would result in the type of infrastructure needed.25 These changes were incorporated into the committee’s interim report presented to the nato ministerial meeting in Rome in late November 1951.26 Tentative in nature, the report pleaded for additional time to allow further study. This was even the case for labour mobility, which the committee noted was a field where “a nato initiative may produce results even though the question has been considered by other international bodies.” This line of thinking was not apparent when it came to most other economic questions: “every important international subject” was currently covered by the work of some intergovernmental body, and it was undesirable for nato members to duplicate the work of these organizations. Nevertheless, nato should not avoid promoting economic collaboration. It certainly had a role in defence production and finance, and furthermore, the Committee believed that nato could do “useful work in the economic and financial field” as long as it was carried out “within certain limits.” The report went no farther, stating that comments from nato’s Financial and Economic Board were awaited. In addition, the committee recommended that the deputies examine the relationship of nato with other existing international organizations, bearing in mind any conclusions that might be reached by the Temporary Council Committee. In terms of fostering political consultation, the Committee of Five did not believe that nato needed to change its structure. Instead, consultation should be seen as a habit that had to develop over time. In order to assist in ministerial discussions, members might agree in advance to focus on certain issues and have material prepared in advance by the Council deputies. When ministers were not present, greater use should be made of the meetings of Council deputies as a

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forum for raising important matters. The committee hesitated to advocate the formation of a nato “bloc” in other international organizations, but it believed that members should discuss issues related to other groupings and generally keep the alliance’s interests in mind. Norway had suggested that nato examine the idea of seeking closer ties to national parliaments, but the committee believed that no immediate action could be taken. There were many potential problems associated with the creation of a nato parliamentary organ or the inclusion of parliamentary advisers within nato delegations. More optimism was shown when it came to cooperation in social policy, an area where progress had been made both within the Brussels Treaty Organization and between Nordic countries. Cooperation had taken place in such areas as labour codes, social security benefits, and activities related to health care. The committee admitted that it had not thoroughly examined the subject, but it was optimistic enough to ask the Council to agree to further study. Similar conclusions were reached when it came to cooperation in cultural matters and public information programs. Both were important nato activities, and members should be active in these fields, especially in developing programs that promoted “contacts between official bodies, private groups and individuals,” along with “exchanges of students, professors, editors, journalists and others capable of influencing public opinion.” Despite the preliminary nature of the committee’s report, its underlying vision is worth noting. The idea of an Atlantic community based on an institutional framework that would require members to tailor their actions to meet the needs of the entire alliance was dead. The building of an Atlantic federation was not in view, only marginal improvements in non-military cooperation within nato. continuing work of the committee of five As well as agreeing to Greek and Turkish accession to the alliance, the November 1951 ministerial meeting noted the interim findings of the Five Ministers. They were instructed to continue their work, giving special attention to cooperation in the labour mobility field. Once again, a working group of officials was charged with drafting recommendations for the five ministers to consider. In his memoirs, Pearson maintains that his committee’s work was hampered by the negative attitude of the major powers toward the development of Article 2.27 What he fails to acknowledge is that the

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reluctance shared by the great powers was often shared by the committee members themselves, including Canada. The labour question is simply one case in point. The Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration was clearly opposed to schemes involving “group movements of labourers,” merely because certain European countries were overpopulated. Its minister, Walter Harris, expressed his personal opposition to a nato immigration plan based on the racial makeup of these immigrants. Not only would it allow Turkish émigrés to Canada, but it might lead to requests from Asian Commonwealth countries that Canada absorb great numbers of their peoples. As the Working Group continued to grapple with the question of labour mobility following the November ministerial meeting, the Canadian representative received a clear message from Ottawa: “it remains to be seen whether nato objectives – military, political and economic – are sufficiently important to warrant trying to get a change in government policy.”28 Despite all these obstacles, the Working Group, once again charged with outlining some preliminary ideas, prepared a draft report for consideration by the five ministers which identified a link between labour mobility and defence production and proposed that nato sponsor a conference of experts on the matter. The Working Group even recommended that nato members “take such steps as are necessary, including the admission of foreign labour, to eliminate shortages hindering present or planned defence production whenever such shortages are shown to exist or to be imminent.”29 Such recommendations did not sit well with the British, who were anxious to avoid being forced to accept foreign workers. If labour issues were to be reviewed by the alliance, Britain hoped that its findings could be screened by the deputies to avoid anything controversial being proposed. The British were anxious to confine labour issues within nato to those related to defence production. This final point is important. The committee had thus far appeared reluctant to decide whether nato’s role in immigration should go beyond defence labour problems. The original Italian proposal encompassed general migration issues. The final wording of the interim report to ministers had mentioned a nato role in employment issues related only to defence, but it had been vague enough to apply to other circumstances. As a result of the British concerns, changes were made to the Working Group’s draft report. No mention was made of an expert conference. At the same time, members were no longer called upon “to take

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such steps as are necessary” to address labour problems related to defence. Instead, they were now to take all steps that were “necessary and practicable.” The question of nato’s role in addressing general immigration and labour problems beyond defence was left unresolved, with the report still directing the Council to “keep the problems relating to the freedom of labour under review.”30 US interest in cooperation among nato members in the labour area had been behind the Working Group’s initial findings, but American thinking had grown more conservative. Pleased with the British amendments, the State Department believed that the report might even be further softened. nato could identify general labour problems within the alliance and ask members to take action, but the State Department did not wish the alliance to have the power to “express its corporate judgement on the need for foreign labour in any of the member countries.” Although this position left only minor nato involvement, the United States felt that it would be enough to force the subject to be considered at the highest levels within national governments. If possible, it wanted the report to recognize a difference between the movement of labour within Western Europe, which was often temporary in nature, and across the Atlantic, which tended to be permanent.31 This distinction appealed to Ottawa, which was also growing increasingly cold to the entire idea of nato involvement in migration issues. As Heeney wrote to Pearson in late January, “Presumably, from a selfish, narrow point of view, our first position might be that we would not want to be faced with a recommendation which, if we did not want to be embarrassed by not complying with it, might require us to admit a certain number of foreign workers from time to time.” Canada should encourage any attempts to have the group focus solely on European migration. There was no interest on the part of nato powers to extend the alliance’s role in immigration beyond that related directly to defence production. Pearson endorsed these views, which were echoed by an interdepartmental committee established to consider the matter. Skeptical of the need for any nato role in migration matters, the committee acknowledged that for “political reasons,” the alliance “might be forced to establish a token organization.” It advised the minister to oppose the idea of an alliance-sponsored meeting of experts and instead work for the formation of a small unit within the nato Secretariat to deal with the issue. Instead of directing nato members to take action when labour shortages developed, they should merely be asked

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to keep the matter under review.32 Canada would therefore support nato action on labour mobility as long as it was not forced to take any new immigrants and the focus was kept mainly on European migration and labour problems associated with defence. It is interesting to note that both Canadian and American officials were aware that the oeec had attempted to create a committee on migration with a similarly limited mandate. It had failed to achieve any level of success.33 The Committee of Five’s final report, presented at the nato ministerial meeting in Lisbon in February 1952, reflected Canadian, British, and American concerns over labour mobility. It recognized that partly because of a lack of progress in other organizations, nato had a role in keeping the matter under review, especially as it related to defence. nato should suggest ways in which labour shortages could be eliminated, but the responsibility for taking action was to be left with individual member governments. There was no mention of a special committee of experts; nato’s role was to be peripheral.34 The alliance’s role in fostering labour mobility was given more encouragement in the report of the Temporary Council Committee. It warned that labour problems, such as those in Italy, were having negative economic ramifications on the alliance and made clear in its final paper, presented at Lisbon, that nato members had to address this problem. As in the Committee of Five report, however, no recommendations were made to give the alliance specific powers in this area. 35 The Committee of Five did not limit its focus to labour mobility, but the remainder of the recommendations based on those submitted by the Working Group were equally thin. On foreign policy consultation, the committee added little to the findings it had presented in its interim report the previous November other than asking that members attempt to give the idea of developing a greater habit of consultation in this area “practical application.” The idea of associating parliamentarians with nato was seen as best left to the entire Council to consider. The committee reversed itself on the area of social cooperation, noting that there appeared “to be little that could be done” by nato in this field that would not duplicate the work of other agencies. The only area where nato might have a role was in transatlantic cooperation. This would be difficult, however, because of the federal nature of both North American members, along with differences in social legislation. The alliance should keep the matter under review and no immediate action was recommended. Cultural cooperation fared better. The alliance was encouraged to

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consider the implementation of a number of programs such as student exchanges, the encouragement of travel by young people, and travel seminars. Information activities were also reviewed by the committee; during the drafting stage the Working Group had asked the nato Information Service (natis) to produce a list of appropriate projects that nato countries might undertake to increase public awareness of the alliance, and to look into the advisability of convening a meeting of experts. natis submitted a report asking for additional staff and funds to conduct its work, something that the Working Group believed was “clearly premature and out of place.” This frustration was expressed, beneath polite language, in the final report. The committee believed that the questions raised by natis in its submission were best dealt with by the alliance as a whole. Much of the final report was prepared by the Working Group of officials, and some ministers on the committee initially expressed disappointment with the Working Group’s findings. When four of them, along with Achilles, had examined a draft in early February, all agreed that it “was a negative and rather discouraging document.” Some, particularly Dutch foreign minister Stikker and Belgian foreign minister Paul Van Zeeland, believed that the document did not adequately address the question of nato economic activity. The Working Group had relied for its recommendations in this area on a report by nato’s Financial and Economic Board. The feb believed that nato had a relatively insignificant role to play in non-military economic cooperation. Members should simply be asked to keep the interests of the alliance in mind when working in other international organizations. Several members of the committee found such recommendations unacceptable. Raising the oeec-nato relationship, Stikker argued that nato had to assume some of the work of the oeec and involve itself with such issues as the liberalization of trade, production, and internal financial stability. nato and the oeec “had to come to some arrangement for cooperation.”36 The Working Group attempted to redraft its report in the light of these comments but ran into Canadian opposition. External Affairs officials failed to see how the West’s economic problems could be solved by transferring responsibilities from one organization to another. “In the final analysis, national governments themselves had to make internal policy decisions in order to address the Western economic malaise.”37 This attitude was manifested in more concrete form during the ministerial meeting itself, held in Lisbon in February

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1952. A number of External Affairs officials urged Pearson to raise the issue of American restrictions on dairy product imports. Even the Americans privately told the Canadians that they would not object to such a discussion, but Pearson decided that the atmosphere of the meeting made it an inappropriate forum in which to raise the matter.38 Faced with Ottawa’s reluctance, the committee decided not to incorporate Stikker’s suggestions in its final report. Remarking that it would be inappropriate for five of nato’s smaller economic powers to consider the question of its relationship with the oeec, the report simply referred the matter back to the entire Council.39 Even though it contained little in the way of substantial recommendations, the Committee of Five’s report was accepted by the ministers at Lisbon with little debate or discussion. Pearson remarked that its most “specific recommendation” was that the Committee of Five be abolished and its work transferred to the full Council. Non-military development required the participation of all members.40 Recalling the incident years later, Pearson chose his words carefully. The fact that the Committee of Five had no major powers in its membership is offered as the reason for its request to be “excused” from further activity. Pearson, however, was obviously aware that both Britain and the United States had made their views known throughout the exercise and that the Americans had actively pushed for nato to have a role in labour mobility. Nevertheless, the exercise had revealed that neither country was prepared to afford the alliance any role that would infringe upon its freedom of action. The two countries’ membership on the committee would not have changed this attitude; it really was little more than an excuse. Pearson also failed to remember that this opposition extended to Canada and other nato nations. Article 2’s effective development depended on abandonment of members’ fear of being linked to any program that might in some way require them to undertake a specific course of action or adopt a certain mode of behaviour. nato members may have ended the Lisbon meeting with a proud declaration on the importance of the alliance’s non-military dimension, but there was little in the way of substance to support this commitment.41 the afte rmath of the lisbon meeting The Lisbon meeting, which committed nato’s members to massive rearmament targets, was not an entire failure for nato’s non-military side. Far-reaching decisions on the organizational structure of the

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alliance were accepted which would allow for more efficient implementation of both military and non-military programs. An international staff under the direction of a secretary general would be established to take over the work of existing civilian agencies. Several weeks later Lord Ismay, the United Kingdom’s secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations and Churchill’s wartime chief of Staff, was named to the new post, becoming nato’s first Secretary General. The authority of the North Atlantic Council was increased. Deputies were to be replaced by “permanent representatives” who would have the authority needed to allow the Council to make substantial decisions between ministerial meetings.42 A decision was also made at the Lisbon meeting to move the nato headquarters from London to Paris. This further eroded Britain’s Atlantic policy, which had not significantly changed, despite Churchill’s victory in October 1951. Upon assuming office, the prime minister had commissioned the chief staff officer of the minister of defence, Sir Ian Jacob, to study the entire matter of inter-allied organizations. Churchill was planning a visit to Washington in early January 1952, hoping that a common position could be reached with the Americans. In the interim, he asked that Britain attempt to stifle discussion on the matter in the Atlantic community committee, the tcc, or among deputies.43 Jacob’s report, completed on 12 December and agreed to by Churchill and his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, confirmed Britain’s preference for the London location. nato, Jacob argued, must remain in London and maintain a separate identity from the oeec, which should only concern itself with regional European questions. To deal with nato’s many economic concerns related to defence, he called for a large economic agency to be established in London that would absorb existing bodies such as the feb. As this agency would lessen the work of the oeec, the European organization’s size should be reduced considerably.44 Although similar to the position adopted by the Labour governments on the oeec-nato question, the report toned down references to the long-term Atlantic vision of the Labour era. Eden did speak of London being “the true Atlantic capital,” but the main thrust of the Conservative argument was that the oeec and nato had separate responsibilities and the latter brought in Canada and the United States as full members. There was no mention of nato’s assumption of oeec functions. Eden privately told Churchill of his commitment to the

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oeec, which he believed performed important non-military economic functions.45 Events over the previous year had made it plain to the British that neither the Americans nor the continental countries were prepared to see the oeec wither. A certain degree of Western non-military economic cooperation would always occur within the oeec.46 This was something that the Hitchman paper had recognized a year earlier. Some hope lay in the fact that planning was already underway to have the oeec’s staff and expenditures cut in half. If nato were to remain in London and a large economic staff were created for it, it could potentially absorb these European resources. Britain’s goals could be fulfilled while it still exhibited sincere support for the work of the oeec. The United States, meanwhile, continued to call for the two organizations to be located in the same city, so that their relationship could “be developed” further. The US position had hardened considerably since the spring 1951 debates over the matter. Averell Harriman, serving as the American representative on the tcc, argued that the move would create greater efficiency in nato.47 There was also a renewed US interest in the oeec being given a more prominent role. In a telegram to Spofford, eleven days before the Lisbon meeting, Acheson bemoaned the British attitude toward the future organization of the alliance. The main preoccupations of the British, the secretary of state accurately argued, were to shift their dealings with the Americans as far away as possible from the oeec, where they felt inferior to the Americans, to nato, where they felt like equal partners. “They also regard oeec as a manifestation of US desire for Eur[opean] integration and regard nato as [a] safer forum in which to take coop[erative] action, not only because it helps meet [the] problem of their Commonwealth relationships, but also because they are confident that they can go as fast as we can in any move which may involve a sacrifice of sovereignty.” The British “obviously can not make clear these real reasons,” and their position was “extremely thin, unconvincing, and full of makeweight arguments, which will not stand scrutiny.” nato and the oeec must not be seen as “competing organizations”, especially as the latter contained many of Europe’s neutral powers. The two organizations had to work together to achieve the closest possible cooperation. Acheson’s telegram appeared to indicate that the long-term thinking put forward the previous April had been altered. The suggestion that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should coordinate Western non-military cooperation while a smaller

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European body focused on only continental matters was toned down considerably. The American change of heart was based on the elimination of many of the uncertainties in the European situation. The Truman administration had accepted the fact that Britain was not going to join any European federation. The negotiations surrounding the European Defence Community, which would see six European nato members move toward closer integration in military matters, had given the European idea without Britain a new lease on life. Finally, the negative findings of the Committee of Five on economic cooperation was also a major factor.48 The matter was not dealt with in any detail during Churchill’s visit to Washington that January, and no final decision was made until the Lisbon meeting itself. There, finding himself virtually isolated, Eden privately agreed to the Paris location, but still clung to the idea that nato might develop a large, separate economic organization.49 These hopes were dashed at the oeec ministerial meeting in March 1952, where the United States made clear its intention of seeing the oeec reinvigorated. In advance of the meeting, Acheson sent Eden a message stating his belief “that the oeec is in a very real sense an organization of the Atlantic Community” and asked that both the United States and the United Kingdom “emphasize the complementary roles of the two organizations” at the upcoming meeting.50 Eden responded positively to Acheson’s note, but he believed that nothing concrete would occur in this regard.51 He was shocked, therefore, when at the oeec meeting the Americans proposed that future oeec economic reviews be done in a way that would provide a basis for nato studies and avoid the duplication of tasks. The British tried desperately to have the matter postponed until nato had a chance to discuss the creation of a substantial economic secretariat, but the Americans refused to listen. The resolution was passed, and the British policy was finally laid to rest. A decision favouring a minimal role for nato in the economic development of the West had finally been made.52 arti cle 2 and nato’s workin g groups Interest in Article 2 demonstrated during the Committee of Five process did result in some further initiatives outside the economic sphere. The months following the Lisbon meeting saw the formation within nato of a series of working groups to deal with such non-military matters

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as labour mobility, social and cultural cooperation, and information policy. The group charged with examining labour issues was formed that September with representatives from the Italian, Greek, and American delegations. Despite the lukewarm reception given this issue throughout the Committee of Five process, the group undertook to send a communication to each member nation outlining the need for “practical action” within the Atlantic community to address the problems of labour shortages and surpluses. High unemployment was threatening to destabilize the internal political situation in some countries, and greater migration opportunities were needed. There were obvious socio-economic factors that limited how many new workers could be welcomed into a country, but member nations were asked not to limit immigration “to their immediate essential needs for foreign workers.” Rather, they should consider accepting as many immigrants as could possibly be absorbed without creating unemployment and discontent. They might also look for ways through other international organizations to encourage non-nato nations to accept immigrants. Member governments were asked to examine their immigration policies “at a high political level” with these considerations in mind and to respond “by indicating as explicitly as possible the policies and actions which they are pursuing, or may be prepared to undertake” in order to address the problems that had been outlined.53 nato members were not quick to respond to this strongly worded communication. By the April 1953 ministerial meeting, only seven countries had done so.54 Most nato members saw labour mobility as an “Italian issue” since Italy, faced with major unemployment, was at the forefront of every initiative. nato countries did not wish to be forced into altering their immigration policies simply because Italy had managed to wrap its domestic problems in Article 2. Britain, for example, consistently opposed nato involvement and attempted to prevent the establishment of the Working Group by arguing that the issue was already being examined by the oeec. Privately, however, it admitted its reluctance to having the issue examined at all, with Eden commenting that “many of the best of our young people are going to Canada, Australia etc.; it is fantastic to replace them with a steady stream of Italians who breed like rabbits. We must not do it.”55 Britain finally commented on the nato communication in late May, stressing the fact that it was not a country of underdeveloped geographic areas and therefore had no great capacity for more population.

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The fact that it had, nonetheless, accepted many immigrants immediately after the war made a further wave even more unwelcome. It would continue to accept skilled workers as required, but could promise very little when it came to the entry of more unskilled labourers.56 Canada was equally unenthusiastic. There was no question that it would continue to accept immigrants, but the country’s current employment, housing, and social situation made it impossible to expand its existing immigration program. The Canadian government believed that its present policies were “in full accord” with the Lisbon recommendations.57 US actions concerning labour mobility were more concrete. Following the 1952 elections, Congress appeared more favourably disposed to emergency immigration measures. The administration was able to secure passage of a bill in August 1953 to allow 214,000 additional immigrants into the United States over the next three years. Most of these would come from alliance countries, and it was reported to the nato Council that the conclusions of the Working Group had “stimulated to a large extent” these measures. The United States gave no special priority to immigrants simply because they came from nato countries, but the overall net effect was to welcome large numbers of Western European immigrants to that country.58 The US move marks one of the few concrete steps taken in the area of labour mobility under nato. No similar actions were taken by other alliance members; the responses by other governments to the communication were described by one British official as “not at all comprehensive.”59 Faced with this lack of interest, the Working Group struggled through 1953 attempting to develop recommendations on the matter. Proposals that nato countries be asked to give priority to nationals from member countries were rejected, as was the idea of tying immigration to land-development schemes. Canada was among the countries opposing both proposals.60 By the end of 1953 it had become clear that nato’s future role in labour mobility would be limited. The Working Group’s report for that year contained only a general request that members continue their efforts to liberalize their immigration policies toward nato countries with surplus population, as well as working to this end in other international organizations. The secretary general’s report for 1953 noted, “There is general agreement that nato cannot and should not become an executive agency in the field of labour mobility and migration where several other specialised international organizations are already

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operating. The Council, has, however, agreed that the nato Secretariat should review the trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and the action taken by member governments and international organizations.”61 The alliance would continue to examine questions of labour needs in the time of war or other emergencies, but nothing was done on the non-military front beyond the collection of data and issuance of an annual statistical report. Attempts, for example, by the Italians in 1955 to have members adopt a quota of nato immigrants were rejected.62 More progress was made by the Working Group on Social and Cultural Cooperation, which had sprung from the Committee of Five exercise. Reporting in late March 1953, it recommended that “existing national and international facilities” be used for cultural cooperation rather than having nato directly sponsor programs. The group produced a list of recommended programs that could be undertaken by individual countries, including the promotion of student and teacher exchanges and travel by young people and workers. The report admitted that there was little central role for nato in most of these projects, but it believed that at a “later stage activities in this field might be undertaken by nato itself.” In accepting the report, the Council agreed that it was by no means mandatory that members accepted the proposals.63 The Working Group’s mandate was broadened considerably in July 1953 when it was merged with the Working Group on Information Policy, which had been formed in June 1952. Significantly, cooperation in the area of social policy, which the Working Group had not yet examined, was dropped from the title of the new body. Its terms of reference set out that social policy questions could be “referred to ad hoc groups as the need arises”.64 Throughout the 1953–57 period, the Working Group on Information and Cultural Cooperation, in conjunction with natis and the nato Secretariat, was the forum that developed most of the alliance’s Article 2 activities outside political consultation. It was responsible for identifying cultural activities that might be suitable for cooperation, as well as what messages “should be brought home to the peoples of the Atlantic Community and the methods by which this could best be accomplished.” This mandate included exchanges of views on how to deal with Soviet propaganda. Once particular programs were identified, it was the role of the Working Group to bring them to the attention of the Council for its approval. natis could, if necessary,

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cooperate in the implementation of the programs, but the onus for carrying them out lay with individual governments. natis was forbidden from operating in nato countries other than through member governments.65 The list of projects developed by nato in the area of culture and information included the publication of a regular newsletter describing its activities. Films were made, the most notable being a series of fifteen entitled “The Atlantic Community – Know Your Allies.” Each served as a documentary on an alliance member and was made available to educational groups in member countries. Along similar lines, the alliance developed a mobile exhibit on nato called the “Caravan of Peace,” which toured a number of member countries. Particular emphasis was given to youth programs; and in the summer of 1955, forty-eight “youth leaders” from across the alliance gathered in Paris to learn more about nato and make informal contacts. The information arm of nato attempted to maintain good relations with the press and organized periodic tours for journalists of both nato headquarters and nato countries. It hosted regular meetings of government officials involved in public relations and information programs to discuss alliance publicity. A nato Fellowships program was established in 1955 and the first awards given the following year. The aim of the program, which has had a long life, is to “promote study and research (preferably leading to publication), which will either demonstrate the common traditions and historical experience of the Atlantic community of nations, or throw light on the present needs and possible future development of this community.”66 The rather modest nature of many of these activities may be attributed to a hesitancy on the part of many powers to give nato information activities much priority or funding. In 1955 nato’s budget for information was US$300,000, compared with defence spending by alliance members of $50 billion. One notable exception was the United States, which had consistently supported a greater role for nato since the creation of NATis in 1950. In 1955 it proposed a significant expansion of nato activities in the cultural and information fields based on an agreed cost-sharing formula. But despite a growing concern about Soviet propaganda, the US was unable to generate much enthusiasm. Many initiatives tended to become caught in endless discussion within the Working Group, and a certain parsimony appeared to affect many member countries when it came to even the most meagre amounts.67

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One of the most important non-military activities of the Secretariat was to encourage and maintain close ties with various voluntary and parliamentary organizations concerned with the alliance and the Atlantic community. A number of pro-nato national organizations were established soon after the treaty’s signature and brought together for a conference in Oxford in September 1952. The conference, hosted by the British Society for International Understanding, established the International Atlantic Committee. This umbrella group sponsored further conferences in Paris in June 1953 and in Copenhagen in September that year. As a result of the committee’s efforts, a constitution for a new international organization, the Atlantic Treaty Association, was passed on 18 June 1954 during a conference at The Hague. Its first full assembly meeting was held in Paris on 22–25 June 1955; it is an organization that has continued throughout the life of the alliance.68 These national organizations placed important emphasis on the need for nato cooperation in non-military fields. Support and encouragement was given for the exchanges, information programs, and educational projects. Much attention was given to Article 2, but efforts were also made to promote public support for nato as a military organization. Steeped in the prevailing Cold War culture, these organizations attempted to combat neutralism and create an awareness of the need to make sacrifices in order to stave off the communist threat. They tended to keep in close contact with alliance officials, with a number receiving money from their national governments.69 These organizations tended not to advocate radical forms of Atlantic Union. Although some advocates could be found in their ranks, their specific cause was put forward by more radical groups such as Clarence Streit’s Atlantic Union Committee. The alliance was much less enthusiastic about them, and their calls for federation were generally given little consideration. As the 1952 Oxford conference report noted, participants “who desired to advocate new international measures for the consolidation of the Atlantic Community were good enough to forbear pressing their views on this occasion.”70 One exception was the United States, where Streit’s group found support among a number of influential public figures as well as a significant number of senators and representatives. Between 1949 and 1957, three congressional resolutions were introduced calling on the president to call a convention of North Atlantic Treaty powers to consider steps toward a federal union. The State Department never endorsed these resolutions (none of which ever passed), but their exis-

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tence was a constant reminder of congressional interest in closer Atlantic unity. If federation was impossible, many State Department officials believed less grandiose measures designed to strengthen nato unity could be offered as a way forward.71 Other countries were not immune from this domestic pressure. Within Canada, opposition parliamentarians regularly asked why greater steps were not being taken to develop the alliance’s non-military side. One of Canada’s most enthusiastic Article 2 supporters was Senate speaker Wishart Robertson. When the North Atlantic Council decided in December 1953 to recommend that members encourage the formation of groups of parliamentarians, Roberston responded by forming the first such group, the Canadian Parliamentary Association. Not limiting its activities to Canada, Robertson proceeded to encourage the formation of parliamentary associations in other countries. In January 1955 his association passed a resolution recommending the holding of a joint meeting of all nato parliamentary associations at the treaty organization’s headquarters in Paris. The proposed agenda included consideration of the formation of an “Atlantic Consultative Assembly,” the implementation of Article 2, and the “effectiveness” of the control that parliaments had over nato armed forces.72 Robertson’s activities, which had been undertaken without the sanction of the Department of External Affairs, found little favour within nato circles. There was little objection to the idea of periodic visits of nato parliamentarians to the alliance’s headquarters to learn of its work and informally exchange views. But a general wariness existed over any attempts to formalize this procedure through the setting of a fixed agenda for discussion, as well as over efforts to develop any type of official body that might place itself in a position to make recommendations to the nato Council. One exception to this view were the Dutch, who had sent positive signals concerning their interest in an Atlantic assembly, but there is no evidence that they raised these views within formal nato discussion of Robertson’s proposal.73 The initiative was left to the legislators themselves. They could use the nato headquarters for their meetings but would have to do without official nato sponsorship. Pearson managed to persuade Robertson to drop the idea of specific agenda topics and simply hold an informal meeting of parliamentarians, rendering the situation more tolerable to the alliance membership.74 The meeting took place from 18 to 22 July 1955 and was attended by 190 representatives from fourteen countries. No controversial issues were raised, except for a brief mention of nato

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membership for Spain. The group decided to hold annual meetings, calling itself the nato Parliamentarians Conference.75 A list of nato’s attempts to foster non-military cooperation during the 1952–57 period in the areas of labour mobility, information, and cultural exchanges is hardly impressive. The collection of immigration data, the giving of tours of nato headquarters to parliamentarians, and the sending of newsletters to pro-nato voluntary organizations was not the stuff of an Atlantic community. Indeed, the interest shown by member countries in these activities was clearly limited.76 For real progress to be made, a significant, centrally directed program of action had to be developed in which all countries agreed in advance to participate. Some attempts were made. In 1953, member of the French national assemblyJean Paul David toured alliance countries to promote a nato information program. He found an urgent need for the alliance to enhance its information activities, but his solution was based on the coordination of national programs.77 A number of nato’s leaders offered reasons for the lack of progress on Article 2. In May 1952 Pearson privately cited the diversity of the alliance’s membership as one of the main obstacles to non-military cooperation. “I often think how much easier it would be in the field of nonmilitary co-operation if one or two of our present members were outside the fold and one or two of the European non-nato countries were inside. However, this is a personal observation which I would not like to have repeated.”78 Pearson’s explanation has merit. Economic cooperation would have been greatly facilitated if oeec members such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Ireland had been members of nato, while, on the other hand, Turkish membership was an obstacle to nato migration. Another explanation was offered by the Canadian chairman of the Working Group on Information and Cultural Cooperation, Arnold Heeney. He argued that much of the work of fostering an Atlantic community was taking place in other organizations. This comment is rationalization. At the beginning of the Working Group’s activities, the Canadian Department of External Affairs had recognized that some “overlapping” with the work of other organizations might be required. “[A]s one of the main objectives of cultural co-operation within nato is to develop the idea of the North Atlantic community, it may in some cases be both necessary and desirable for nato to encourage projects similar to projects sponsored by other organizations.”79 What Pearson and Heeney gloss over in their explanations is the simple fact that nato’s members were not interested enough in devel-

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oping the Atlantic community to undertake seriously the type of nonmilitary cooperation needed. The diversity of the membership, combined with the presence of other organizations, did create obstacles, but they were not necessarily insurmountable. Actions were taken on the military side, such as German rearmament, which conflicted directly with the national policies of France, one of the alliance’s key members. nato also assumed more of the military work of the Brussels Treaty Organization, and in its defence-related economic dealings, it often interfered with the work of international financial organizations. Cooperation was by no means perfect, but alliance members were willing, for military reasons, to direct their populations and national resources to meet goals set by nato as a whole; such a commitment was not forthcoming on the non-military side. There was no event to galvanize nato’s non-military face as the Korean War had promoted its military development. The irony of the situation was that Canada, apparently Article 2’s greatest advocate, was not immune from this lack of commitment. Pearson was pleased to discuss the benefits of Article 2 in the abstract but was usually slow to produce specific proposals of his own. Canadian enthusiasm tended to disappear when suggestions were offered by other countries. In early 1952 Canada rejected a proposal that national awards for study by overseas students be placed under nato auspices. Canada would not allow the alliance to have a voice in choosing the successful candidates since they had to be based on “Canadian needs.” Giving them a nato label would be only a “meaningless” gesture. A 1953 Belgian proposal to create a scientific register was rejected by the director of the National Research Council of Canada, who called it “impractical and undesirable.” According to the director, it overlooked the fact that “over a period of several hundred years very definite and well co-ordinated methods have been developed for exchanging scientific information.”80 A Norwegian idea that countries “designate” one of their institutions as a centre for Atlantic studies and attempt to have courses on “Atlantic” subjects taught in universities did not sit well with Canada’s Department of External Affairs. It believed that it was in no position to interfere in educational matters.81 With regard to travel by nationals, Canada was willing to encourage groups to sponsor exchanges, but it did not feel that it could ask that they emphasize exchanges limited to nato countries. Some interest was shown by a number of department officials in creating a nato postal union to allow letters to travel

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between members at a more uniform rate. Pearson, however, vetoed the idea as being unworthy of nato consideration.82 conclusion The Committee of Five exercise revealed the role that the Atlantic community concept could play in attempting to ease inter-alliance tensions. The “militarization” that nato underwent following the start of the Korean War raised numerous tensions. nato’s leaders, particularly those in the United States, hoped that these could be transcended through the development of Article 2. The problem of pursuing such a policy, as the Committee of Five experience illustrated, was that, consultation apart, there was little room for significant nato non-military cooperation without duplicating some of the work of other organizations. nato members were simply not prepared to increase the alliance’s responsibility in this way. Britain would have followed a US lead in having nato assume some of the functions of the oeec. Once it was made clear that the United States did not wish to have this question become the focus of nato’s examination of Article 2, however, the United Kingdom quickly lost interest in the exercise. Its Atlanticist interest was further weakened by the decision to relocate the nato headquarters to Paris and establish a closer oeec-nato relationship. Article 2 was not stillborn. Its acceptance in the treaty had not been accompanied by an agreement on its specific meaning, but it still offered the potential for nato to develop beyond a simple military alliance. In the period between the signature of the treaty and the February 1952 meeting in Lisbon, there was considerable interest in seeing nato develop in this regard. However, the existence of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation was a complication that could not be overcome. France’s success at linking the United States and Canada to the oeec in May 1950 meant that this organization could easily serve as the basis for Western economic cooperation. At the same time, the definition of the relationship between these two organizations automatically led to the involvement of all parties in the debate over the future of European integration. The determination and level of planning of those advocating greater European integration was much greater than that of those interested in the elaboration of the Atlantic community.

4 Being Put in the Dock before the Council Consultation in NATO, 1949–1954

By 1952 Article 2 had completed its initial stage of evolution. The emphasis that had been placed on its role as a major catalyst for economic cooperation had disappeared. The resolution of the oeec-nato question had determined that the European-focused oeec would direct much of the West’s economic activity. The Committee of Five had found no significant economic role for nato, bringing to an end a significant portion of its orginal purpose. Instead of emphasizing economic cooperation, the Committee of Five had recognized nato’s importance as a forum for greater foreign policy consultation. This conclusion was hardly surprising. Although it was a regional alliance, the threat that it was designed to counter was global in nature. That the foreign policy followed by individual members, even outside the Atlantic world, should not be detrimental to the alliance was therefore crucial. If each member could trust its nato partners to follow this rule, a sense of unity would be created to bind the alliance together. The differing capabilities and responsibilities of alliance members made this issue of trust complex. Smaller powers, with only limited involvement on the international scene, were concerned about nato’s three major powers, the United States, Britain, and France, with their vital interests throughout the world. For the smaller powers, it was incumbent upon the three to develop their foreign policy in consultation with the North Atlantic Council, first raising issues there and taking the views of their partners into consideration before acting.

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The great powers viewed the situation differently. Because of their international responsibilities, they expected smaller countries to have confidence in their actions and realize that, as the alliance’s leaders, they would do nothing to harm it. This did not mean that nato’s “Big Three” were against any foreign policy discussion within the alliance. nato’s major powers often saw political value in the approval of their Western allies. Such consultation, however, had to be done in a way that did not limit the Big Three’s freedom of action. The great powers would never agree to a system that compelled them to consult the Council before taking action or gave it a veto. The Committee of Five had recognized that these two different perceptions of consultation were the source of considerable tension within the alliance. Progress in the area of consultation relied heavily on a change of attitude within the Big Three. As the report concluded, “While all members of nato have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community.” early attempts at fostering political consultation The desire for greater consultation within the alliance had been present prior to the committee’s report and can even be traced back to the treaty’s origins. The treaty’s drafters had recognized the need for members to consult frequently on military aspects of the alliance. Article 4, for example, contained provisions for members to consult whenever there was a threat to their security anywhere in the world, including their overseas territories. This article did not, however, directly relate to the type of consultation identified by the Committee of Five. Rather than speaking of consultation in the face of an emergency, the committee referred to “exchanges of views on policy matters with a view to possible coordinated action.” Clearly implied in this definition was consultation even on matters that did not strictly relate to the defence of the North Atlantic. The general foreign policy of each member country could be a topic for discussion.1 Such interpretations of consultation were not used during the drafting of the treaty, with the exception of one brief discussion during the final days of negotiations. A representative of Norway, which had at that point only recently asked to accede to the treaty, asked whether consultation under Article 4 had to “be limited to instances where one

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of the parties felt threatened” or if it could occur “in connection with political matters.” Hume Wrong responded by explaining that political consultation would take place in the alliance’s administrative body, foreseen in Article 9 of the treaty. He stated that, under this article, members could consult on “any matters which they felt had a bearing on the execution of the treaty.”2 Despite Wrong’s quick answer, his belief that Article 9 provided for a consultative council ready to discuss general “political matters” did not reflect a view held by all members. Indeed, an examination of its wording reveals little more than the simple fact that a council was to be established which would have a role in defence issues. A considerable difference of opinion existed during the treaty negotiations on the question of a permanent central body. The matter was not resolved until May 1950, when during the London nato ministerial meetings, the leaders of nato’s Big Three advocated the establishment of more effective central machinery for the alliance. Despite differing views about the nature of this organization, especially when it came to its relationship with the oeec, representatives of nato’s three major powers all agreed that it should provide a forum for exchanging “views on political matters of common interest within the scope of the treaty.” Presented as a British resolution, the concept of a central alliance body was agreed to by nato’s other powers after two days of debate in which the consultative function was not mentioned.3 It is perhaps ironic that the proposal to form a council with responsibility for consultation had been first agreed to by nato’s three major powers in a series of private talks before being presented to their fellow alliance allies. The three had not only discussed alliance machinery during these private talks, but had devoted considerable attention to the general discussion of international issues. The adoption of this exclusive decision-making process by nato’s three major powers prior to the May 1950 nato meeting did not bode well for those lesser powers that hoped to influence American, British, or French policy. Opening statements at the meeting by the American, British, and French foreign ministers were surprisingly brief and lacking in detail, considering the major discussions that had just occurred. This slight to the remaining nato powers was remarked upon by Lester Pearson in his statement, along with a litany of outstanding problems that ought to be discussed by nato. Other ministers followed the Canadian example and provided their own list of issues. Acheson, chairing the session, suggested that they could be taken up later in the agenda, but no further opportunity arose during the course of the three-day meeting.4

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Despite the failure of the ministers to engage in satisfactory political consultation during the London meeting, it was agreed that the deputies should be given the responsibility to take part in ongoing consultation. Yet the attitude of the great powers, combined with the vagueness of the proposals adopted, gave little hint about what these discussions would involve. No guidelines had been agreed on other than that any issue raised should be related to the “scope of the treaty.” No indication had been given as to what stage in their domestic policy process members should bring a matter to the alliance or how far they were obliged to take into consideration the views of their partners. As the official Canadian report of the May 1950 meeting noted, “It is too early to say how such consultation will work out in practice, but clearly in a body containing representatives of twelve countries, there will be a limit both to the range of topics that can usefully be discussed and to the extent to which topics which are placed on the agenda can be fully ventilated ... Under these circumstances informal, and perhaps usually bilateral, discussions outside Council (or Deputy) meetings may well prove more fruitful for exchange of views on foreign policy than formal discussions in Council.”5 Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, the creation of a Council of Deputies was an important step in fostering greater foreign policy cooperation. The practice slowly began to take root. During an exchange of views on Yugoslavia on 22 January 1951, however, an embarrassing situation arose. Once discussion had taken place, no one was certain about the next step. On the basis of a suggestion by the Canadian deputy, a procedure was adopted that became the norm: instead of providing an official record of the meeting, a draft minute of the discussion was prepared; this was further considered by a working group of representatives, who in turn prepared a report to the Council deputies; after consulting their individual governments, deputies could use the report as a basis for further discussion. Many matters still remained unresolved. What status, for example, should be afforded these agreed minutes? Were they to represent some type of statement of common nato foreign policy? No member wanted to go that far. While nato’s major powers wished to preserve their independence to pursue their own foreign policies, the alliance’s lesser lights feared commitments by the Big Three that would have implications for the entire alliance. Such concerns resulted in the early acceptance by the deputies that the reports of discussion would not “represent a formal agreement for action” but would be “merely a record of

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the present consensus ... which might be helpful in assisting governments to determine their attitudes toward a common problem.” It was also agreed that when a particular government departed from the views indicated in the nato report, other deputies should be “informally” advised.6 Over the next year, deputies discussed a variety of issues. These discussions tended to focus on less controversial matters in which much common ground already existed. Topics almost exclusively dealt with the Soviet Union and its satellites, though Yugoslavia and the future of Germany featured on the agenda. Sessions usually involved an exchange of information on conditions within these countries, rather than a detailed discussion of Western foreign policy. In fact, a decision was made in June 1951 that one member could not raise another member’s specific foreign policy for discussion, although deputies were always free to outline their country’s position on a specific issue.7 Many of nato’s smaller powers questioned this process, believing that the Big Three paid little attention to the views being expressed. As a Canadian official studying nato consultation concluded in early 1953, “It is my impression that this exchange of views was interesting and informative to those taking part, but that neither the Council Deputies nor the Permanent Council has had any decisive influence on political developments in the matters discussed. The Three Powers (U.S., U.K. and France) agreed to consultation, listened attentively and politely to the views expressed by their colleagues, noted them, and then, for the most part, continued in their majestic tripartite course.”8 Unhappiness among nato’s smaller powers resulted from the three’s apparent lack of interest in their views, but also from the large number of issues that were not discussed in nato. This lack of sincerity from the great powers, combined with a growing list of unresolved international tensions, had been the prime motivation for the comments by the Committee of Five. By the committee’s own admission, there was little that it could do to resolve the problem. Its two reports, which noted that existing nato machinery was adequate to facilitate better consultation, could do no more than call on members to change their attitude. consultation following the report of the committee of five The first indication that a change of attitude was forthcoming came in early May 1952. A proposal from Stalin for a solution to the division

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of Germany had been received by the three Western occupying powers the previous month. The note caused a sensation in the West, with a considerable segment of public opinion believing that it might demonstrate a sincere Soviet desire for improved East-West relations. nato’s membership exhibited a keen interest, asking that the document be discussed within the North Atlantic Council. This request was not warmly welcomed by the alliance’s Big Three. As the British representative pointed out during one Council meeting, “the three governments [the United States, Britain, and France] still had particular responsibilities in Germany and that meeting [on the subject of Stalin’s note] would not be for policy consultation but essentially to keep the Council informed of the discussions and the decisions reached in London.”9 Such arguments failed to appease many of nato’s smaller powers. Germany’s future was a central issue in the Cold War, and allowing the occupying powers exclusive rights over the matter seemed unfair. Some members even questioned whether occupying status did in fact give the three any special claim above those of other nato powers. Once the European Defence Community’s treaty was ratified, Germany would be linked to nato, giving the alliance as a whole an equally strong case of having a special interest in that country. Ignoring this growing disquiet among nato’s smaller powers, the Big Three decided to present their response to Stalin’s note to the Council on 9 July 1952, but only in its final form. The result was an extremely unhappy gathering. Before the French representative, Hervé Alphand, could make an opening statement on the matter, he was challenged by his Dutch counterpart, who asked if the note was in its final form. Upon being informed that no changes would be allowed, the Dutch representative launched into a strong attack on the way in which the three governments had ignored the views of their allies in this important matter. This was followed by similar remarks from nearly every one of nato’s smaller powers. Led by Alphand, the Big Three attempted to respond to the barrage of criticism by pointing out that the reply had taken some time to prepare. There had not been an opportunity to bring it to the attention of the Council. Alphand reminded the other members of the special responsibility the three shared as occupying powers, especially since the European Defence Community had not yet come into being. The American representative, William Draper, reiterated Alphand’s position but took a softer line, stating that he saw no reason that the Council could not discuss the German question, despite the special respon-

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sibility of nato’s three major powers. He made a distinction, however, between “exchanges of views on broad lines of policy” and the actual drafting of notes. The British representative echoed these excuses. No one seemed convinced. nato’s new secretary general, Lord Ismay, expressed his unhappiness with the discussion, while both the Dutch and Norwegian representatives noted that this had not been the first time that issues of importance had not been discussed in the Council. The meeting agreed that, once the Soviet reaction to the Western note was known, the Council could meet to discuss the matter informally.10 The 9 July meeting led to an important change of attitude on the part of nato’s three major powers, particularly the United States. Too often portrayed as a lumbering giant, oblivious to the damage its movements caused among its friends, it was concerned about the decline in morale resulting from the handling of the note and attempted to rectify the situation. As a senior State Department official told a Canadian counterpart, the July criticisms had “provided a salutary jolt for the authorities in Washington.” “He said that Mr. Acheson had been very concerned by the reports he had received of the meeting, since he realized that, unless something were done to remove the reasons for dissatisfaction, the strength and cohesion of the whole North Atlantic alliance might be gradually sapped. The Secretary of State had given instructions that all aspects of this question should be studied as a matter of urgency with a view to laying recommendations before him for improvement.”11 The result was a State Department paper circulated in mid-September to US embassies in nato countries, stipulating the benefits of consultation as a way of creating an association of North Atlantic states that was more than a “medium term mil[itary] coalition” designed to deal with the Soviet threat. American interest in a strong Atlantic community was related to recent events in Europe. Throughout the summer of 1952, the six continental powers involved in the edc negotiations had been exploring proposals to create a European political community. The United States favoured this move toward closer European integration, but many in the State Department believed that such a grouping might potentially become a “third force or opposing force.” Such a likelihood could be prevented if the European grouping was closely linked to a strong Atlantic one. The encouragement of consultation was of direct importance to maintaining American leadership of the West. By explaining its actions and learning the views of its allies, the United States could build confidence in its foreign policy. Such confidence would be crucial in an

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emergency, when the US might have to demand prompt action from its allies with little room for discussion. Experience had shown, the State Department believed, that smaller powers tended to side with the positions of the United States rather than those of Britain or France. Finally, consultation would allow smaller powers to gain the confidence of their parliaments, by permitting governments to claim an influence in international decision-making. 12 The State Department, as the assistant secretary of state for European affairs told Acheson, believed that “political discussions in the nac seem to us a more likely means to this end than anything we are likely to do through economic means or through the Article 2 gimmicks we have sought in the past and which have proved thus far sterile or trivial.”13 This positive American attitude had been manifested since the July fiasco, and late that month the United States had sought agreement from its British and French partners that any future Soviet notes would be discussed in the North Atlantic Council at an early stage. The Americans stressed that the three would retain the ultimate responsibility for the response. London and Paris were negative. Eden maintained that, while Britain favoured general exchanges within the Council, it rejected the adoption of specific procedures. The three powers had special responsibilities toward Germany, and he resented nato interference. The French adopted an equally harsh view, seeing no reason to consult the nato Council. The three needed to retain “complete freedom of action.” The French saw the benefits of discussing “broad political problems in nato” but did not believe that nato should be consulted on specific proposals.14 The US lobbying effort continued. When another Soviet note was received on 23 August, London and Paris finally succumbed to US pressure and agreed to Council discussion of the matter, after assurances that it would occur in a closed session and not impair their “tripartite position of responsibility as occupying powers.”15 The outcome of the meeting, held on 29 August, confirmed that nato’s Big Three were not prepared to yield much to their smaller allies. Rather than focusing on the riposte to the Soviet note, the three, led by the United States, argued that the subject had to be examined within the context of the German question as a whole. According to one report, they “emphasized that, while they are prepared to welcome any views of other nato countries on the German problem as a whole, or as regards the Soviet note, their Governments had to (retain?) the responsibility for drafting the reply; the Council was not a proper forum for decid-

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ing on the terms of the reply.”16 Despite this qualification, nato’s smaller powers took advantage of the meeting (which was carried on a few days later) to make known their views on the future of Germany. Following the discussions, a consensus quickly emerged: the exchange of views was “the best that the Council had so far on any major issue.”17 Wishing to build upon the success of the exchanges on the August Soviet note, the State Department continued to examine further ways of encouraging consultation. In trying to devise new procedures, the United States had to take into account that its support for nato consultation could not be unconditional. Consultation, from an American perspective, could only take place in a way that preserved American freedom of action and incurred no risks to security. The US was hesitant to consider any suggestions that would result in a great power being singled out for criticism by nato’s smaller powers or, as one official termed it, “being put in the dock before the Council.”18 Control over the process of consultation was a US priority. This was well illustrated by the State Department’s belief in the usefulness of the nato Council’s weekly informal meetings as an appropriate forum for the exchange of information. These had limited attendance (each permanent representative could bring only one assistant), and no minutes or formal decisions were taken. The subject of discussion had to be agreed beforehand. As the State Department discussion paper on consultation concluded, this policy limited leaks and allowed the United States some control over the agenda as well as “how far discussion sh[ou]ld go.” Consultation ought not to be seen as a means of coming to a final agreement. The North Atlantic Council should not become a fourteen-country drafting body for position papers. The purpose was to exchange information, create a sense of participation, and generate support and “where feasible, common attitudes.”19 The task of choosing which topics should be raised for consideration could not simply be left to the Big Three. The United States recognized that its past hesitancy had caused the present concern. At the same time, to avoid topics that were embarrassing to the Big Three being raised, it rejected earlier Canadian suggestions that any power be given the unfettered right to ask that any topic be discussed.20 The Americans therefore proposed that the nato Secretariat be given the role of identifying issues and its assistant secretary general for political affairs be assigned responsibility for the exercise. This post had arisen through changes made to the alliance structure at the 1952

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Lisbon meeting. The assistant secretary general for political affairs was given responsibility for general political matters as well as issues related to the non-military development of the alliance. On the surface, the American proposal would give the appearance of a relatively disinterested third party being assigned the key responsibility, but it contained one caveat. The assistant secretary general would have to ensure that the discussion was in fact “feasible,” as to both timing and substance. He could do so through consultation with nato members, especially its three major powers. The State Department even went so far as to suggest the formation of a small committee with rotating membership composed of representatives of one of the big powers, along with two others, to provide guidance.21 The State Department plan reflected no firm or fast American policy, and the document itself outlined a number of problems that would have to be addressed before the proposal was implemented.22 The United States made a copy of the paper available to the Canadians for their comments and, toward the end of November 1952, asked them to propose such a procedure at the upcoming ministerial meeting at nato headquarters in Paris. American officials argued that an initiative from Canada, because of its place in the middle ranks of the alliance and close association with Article 2, might be better received than one from the United States.23 The American request placed the Canadians in a difficult position. Of all the powers involved in the consultation debate, Canada had the least faith in new organizational procedures as the panacea for nato’s problems. The Department of External Affairs believed that formal procedures were more apt to be manipulated by the big powers. The present plan was no exception because an issue had first to be cleared by both the assistant secretary general and any other interested nato powers. The Canadians favoured a more flexible and informal approach. A member country should be free simply to raise a matter provided that proper notice was given. How the matter should be dealt with should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Canadian officials consistently argued that there was no “cut and dried” procedure under which consultation should occur. In some cases those countries implicated in an issue might wish to discuss an issue. In others, it might be more appropriate for members on the periphery to take their allies to task over a particular action. Canada’s special relationship with Britain also made it hesitant about involving itself with the United States on this issue. The United Kingdom often privately shared details of great power discussions with

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Ottawa. Britain had been shocked at Canada’s criticism over the handling of the Soviet note in July because it had kept the dominion well informed of the drafting process. If it was seen as leading another revolt by the small powers, Ottawa feared that the British might suggest that Canada seemed to prefer discussing matters in nato rather than receiving information privately. This was by no means a remote possibility. Since the Stalin note, both the British and the French had exhibited a distinct coolness toward the encouragement of consultation. Canada had even privately approached the British on the matter of the American proposal and learned that they too questioned its suitability. Displaying their continuing suspicion of greater consultation, the British stressed that discussion in the Council should not be seen as a “substitute to bilateral conversations.” This was especially the case when agreement had been reached between nato’s three major powers on a particular matter. If it was raised in the Council and significant changes to the decision were suggested, “regrettable delays and difficulties” might occur.24 Canada was successful in avoiding pressure from the Americans to sponsor their proposal, and no specific item on consultation procedure appeared on the ministerial meeting’s agenda.25 The meeting did, however, engage in consultation. Ministers adopted a resolution on the conflict in Indochina, marking the first time the alliance formally commented on an out-of-area problem. The resolution also serves as an excellent example of a great power manipulating the consultative process, not to avoid discussing a matter but to receive nato sanction for actions that had already been decided. The passage of the resolution was a result of French machinations stretching back to the Lisbon meeting, where the then French prime minister, Edgar Faure, had called for nato to adopt a coordinated strategy to combat communism throughout the world that he termed the “Grand Plan.” The continuing struggle between the French and communist forces in Vietnam was an obvious place where this could occur. The matter remained unresolved at the Lisbon meeting, and the French government collapsed soon after. A new administration under Antoine Pinay decided to bring it up again in September 1952. Forgetting the objections the French had raised toward the issue of consultation on non-Atlantic issues throughout the summer, the French representative, Alphand, presented a paper on the subject to the Council on 22 September suggesting that nato take on a more international role. It was proposed that the Standing Group’s authority be extended to a

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global level and that responsibilities of nato members outside the North Atlantic area be taken into consideration when determining nato contributions to defence. Although it was not stated openly, such an approach would of course help to link the ongoing conflict in Indochina to nato and assist France in obtaining more long-term American aid. A few days before the 1952 December ministerial meeting, Alphand approached his American counterpart, William Draper, and raised the possibility of a nato resolution on Indochina. The French suggestion caused great consternation in the State Department, which not only feared future demands for more aid but also wished to avoid a precedent that could be use to pass further resolutions related to other out-of-area trouble spots such as Korea or Malaya. Realizing that it might be embarrassing for the Americans to oppose an anti-communist resolution, the State Department advised the US delegation to prevent its introduction. Acheson, who had been en route to Paris while the drama was unfolding, ignored this advice. He believed it possible to outmanoeuvre the French by having the United States introduce its own resolution on the matter, ensuring that its wording could not be used to demand more aid. After consulting the French, the US proposed a resolution acknowledging that the ministers had discussed the Indochina situation and expressed their admiration for those engaged in a struggle whose aims were in “fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community.” It concluded by noting that “the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the nato governments.”26 Acheson later expressed his belief that the resolution was entirely innocuous, but other nato members reached different conclusions. Canadian official Dana Wilgress argued that the apparently harmless resolution provided the French with a “plan for much more precise assistance in their Indochinese engagement.”27 Within only a few months of the passage of the resolution, the French approached the United States asking for increased assistance from their nato partners both to fight the war in Southeast Asia and to maintain a strong presence in Europe to balance Germany. By the end of 1952, consultation had become the dominant non-military issue facing the Western alliance, but it was a problem that remained unresolved. The desire of nato’s smaller powers to have a greater voice in Western foreign policy had clashed with the wish of the Big Three to maintain their freedom of action. The United States was

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prepared to encourage consultation as a way of quelling alliance disunity and firmly tying Europe to the West, but it would do so only on terms that gave it extensive control over the process. France demonstrated its willingness to have the issue of Indochina raised, not for the purposes of discussion, but to gain nato sanction and possible future aid. Once again, a lack of consensus on the parameters of non-military cooperation had revealed itself as one of the underlying problems in the further development of the Atlantic community. the i nau g u ration of eisenhower an d the death of stalin The problems faced by nato in 1952 were intensified the following year by changes in leadership of the world’s two superpowers. The inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president of the United States in January 1953 had been the source of much concern and speculation within the Western alliance. One of the major planks of the Republican Party’s platform during the 1952 election campaign had been a promise to cut defence spending in an effort to eliminate a large budget deficit. For other countries trying to cope with the significant commitments for increased defence spending made at Lisbon, Eisenhower’s promise raised major problems. Admittedly, most had privately abandoned hope of actually meeting the Lisbon goals, but they were still devoting a considerable proportion of their budgets to defence. American cuts would cause great domestic political difficulty in justifying these huge expenditures. In the long term, the administration’s pledge raised the question of whether future American generosity in providing military aid to Europe would diminish. Problems over the European Defence Community continued to plague the alliance. The treaty forming this new organization was still awaiting ratification by the French parliament, and the situation had been further complicated by René Mayer’s succession to the post of French prime minister in early 1953. Mayer had needed the support of Gaullist members of the National Assembly in order to form a government, and he had achieved this by making vague promises that the edc treaty would be modified. The Eisenhower administration exhibited a profound impatience, both privately and publicly, at the slowness of the ratification process. In a television appearances, newly appointed secretary of state John Foster Dulles threatened that “if there appeared there were no chance of getting effective unity [on the

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issue of edc] ... then certainly it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America’s own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe.”28 Eisenhower’s choice of Dulles had itself been the source of problems within the alliance. Throughout the 1952 campaign, Dulles had distinguished himself as a hardline cold warrior. His famous article in Life magazine, “A Policy of Boldness,” written in May 1952, had attacked the Democratic policy of containment and advocated a more hardline approach in which the United States should work for the liberation of the Eastern bloc. He stressed somewhat vaguely, however, that such a policy could be achieved peacefully, “not through bloody uprisings.”29 Dulles’s exposition of such a radical policy caused considerable consternation in a number of friendly quarters. The foreign press tended to portray him as a warmonger, and Eisenhower admitted in his memoirs that Eden privately expressed his wish that Dulles not receive the appointment of secretary of state.30 Upon taking office, Dulles did little to relieve these fears. His initial attitude toward consultation indicated that alliance tensions on the matter would probably not soon abate. During a meeting with Pearson in February 1953, Dulles outlined the administration’s determination not simply to react to communist actions but instead to put pressure on the Soviets. He admitted that such a policy would occasionally “create difficulties both for the United States Administration and for friendly governments.” Pearson questioned the approach, stating that it might often not be possible to create an “uneasiness” in the Kremlin without creating a similar feeling among the Western allies. Dulles agreed with this analysis but felt that the answer lay in increased consultation on an informal rather than a formal level. Using arguments that would often recur during his tenure in office, Dulles maintained that consultation had to be informal. The administration could not agree to consult each and every ally formally before taking an action, since this would be tantamount to giving each ally a veto. He contended: “If every move in this new policy which the United States might have to make had to be preceded by formal consultation leading to agreement, the United States and the Western alliance would have no other alternative but to react to moves as they were made by the Soviet Union. Indeed, it would probably be only in a moment of extreme crisis or danger that full agreement could ever be reached formally among all the allies on the necessity of action, which by then would have become self evident.” Congress, Dulles argued, would not

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allow the administration to assume a formal obligation to consult other nato powers before taking action, although he “fully intended to take the allies of the United States as fully as possible into his confidence.” Because this might have to be done on an informal basis, nato’s leaders might under certain situations be unable to say they had been formally consulted on a matter, even if they had been told about it on an informal basis.31 Dulles’s remarks indicated that there would be little change in American attitudes toward consultation. The position of the secretary of state appeared quite simple: consultation would only occur on terms established by the United States and in a forum in which it had full control over the process. In defending such a position, Dulles seemed to define consultation in its most extreme form, a habit, as it turned out, he would continue throughout his term in office. Consultation seemed to imply obtaining permission for action; if all members were not notified and their views considered, then a policy could not be implemented. Taken to their extreme, the complaints of nato’s smaller powers did appear trivial when compared to the great-power responsibilities of the United States. Yet only nato’s great powers insisted on defining full consultation as implying some type of veto. The alliance’s smaller nations realized they were in no position to demand a veto over any policies. What they wanted was respect for their position as allies with an equally important stake in the Cold War. This could be manifested by the great powers taking them into their confidence and alerting them to future foreign policy actions. Having informed the smaller powers, the Big Three should have seriously considered the views of their allies and, when a course of action was taken that did not correspond to that suggested, provide an explanation. Dulles’s apparent lack of interest in this approach was bound to become a source of friction within the alliance, and the death of Joseph Stalin on the evening of 5 March 1953 made this expectation a certainty. The entire nature of the Cold War changed overnight. The collective leadership that replaced the Soviet dictator attempted to portray its foreign policy intentions as peaceful, catching the West entirely by surprise. “There is no plan, there is no agreed upon position,” Eisenhower told his Cabinet, bemoaning the fact that the West had never decided how it would deal with a new leadership in the communist world.32 The Eisenhower administration did not accept the new Soviet approach as sincere, but it did see its potential to undermine popular support for the alliance. A non-threatening Soviet Union brought into

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question the great defence expenditures of European governments, the need for the ratification of the edc, and even the purpose of nato itself. As the permanent representatives in Paris prepared for the April nato ministerial meeting, many expressed concern over the international situation, stating their belief that the Soviet peace moves were the greatest challenge facing nato. 33 Yet the alliance had no intention of being swayed by the Soviet change of heart. When the ministers gathered in Paris on 24 April to discuss the international situation, their conclusions were clear: “unless and until Soviet moves were to be more concrete and provide clearer proof of conciliatory objectives,” nato should not change its policies.34 The Soviet situation was complicated by the Eisenhower administration’s commitment to cut American defence spending. If the West truly believed that the Soviets were attempting to undermine Atlantic unity, cuts in defence spending by nato’s leading power appeared to be the worst response imaginable. Dissatisfaction with the American policy was voiced during the meeting. As the minister of state in the British Foreign Office, Selwyn Lloyd, told Dulles privately, some of the Europeans viewed American cutbacks as “a return to isolationism.” “One Frenchman said yesterday that ‘this is the end of nato’ and [Belgian Foreign Minister] Van Zeeland also felt it was a radical change of policy involving serious repercussions. There is a serious danger of collapse in [the] carefully erected structure of European unity and defensive strength, which has been built up largely as [a] result [of] US leadership.”35 There was admittedly some hypocrisy associated with these criticisms. The force goals established at Lisbon had turned out to be hopelessly unrealistic. Discussions at the Paris ministerial meeting that April had revealed a paradoxical consensus. While ministers believed that the Soviet threat still existed, there was a deep desire on the part of all members to slash their defence spending. Within this atmosphere, which led to a decision by the ministers to abandon their Lisbon goals, it appeared inappropriate to challenge American cuts. nato and planning for the 1953 bermuda conference nato’s ministers left the spring 1953 ministerial meeting unhappy. The international situation remained in turmoil, and the alliance seemed on the verge of a crisis that would be difficult to avert because it was not the result of a direct military threat. The Soviet Union had changed its

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tactics, and the fear that had held the alliance together appeared to be dissipating. It was not long before an issue arose to trigger a crisis within the alliance. nato’s Big Three leaders had decided to hold a meeting in Bermuda that June to discuss the international situation. To nato’s smaller members, the calling of such a meeting appeared to indicate that, at a moment of crisis, they were being ignored as their senior partners retreated into a pattern of exclusive decision-making. This impression was further strengthened through a speech made by Churchill in the House of Commons on 11 May 1953, in which he called for a summit meeting of nato’s three major powers and the Soviet Union. This proposal, which captured the imagination of the Western world, led to further fears that the Big Three were about to prepare an approach to the Soviets at Bermuda without consulting their nato allies. Canada privately expressed concern over the holding of the Bermuda talks, but decided not to raise the issue at the Council because of the special relationship Canada had with both the United States and the United Kingdom. The Canadian permanent representative to nato noted that his government “was probably kept better informed both in London and Washington than most nato powers.” Anxious to take some action, the Canadian delegation approached Secretary General Ismay, suggesting that he mention the need for nato to have some input into the tripartite talks. Ismay responded positively, raising the matter during an informal meeting of representatives in late May. None of the representatives of the Big Three felt that they had any information on the conference to report, but they assured the Council that it would be properly informed. The matter was raised again during a similar session held in early June, with a number of smaller powers taking a more forceful stand. The Belgian, Italian, and Turkish representatives expressed their concern at the lack of pre-conference discussion within nato and urged that a series of informal meetings be held for that purpose.36 These efforts achieved some success. A meeting of representatives was held on 18 June. Rather than resulting in a purely routine exchange of views, it instead became the forum for an outpouring of pent-up frustrations by various members of the North Atlantic Council. Ismay opened by lamenting the sorry state of the alliance and the lack of enthusiasm of its membership. He warned of the dangers of the present international situation, pointing out that, despite the belief that Soviet moves were insincere, there had been no increase in the alliance’s defence effort, and the United States was actually engaged in

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spending cuts. Astonishingly, Ismay even commented on a fall in the “calibre” of the permanent representatives. He offered to bring a discussion paper to the Council on the entire issue to facilitate further discussion. Ismay’s words served to incite other permanent representatives to voice their concerns. Both the Canadian and the French representatives welcomed Ismay’s proposal for a paper. The Canadian mentioned that, as well as maintaining military preparedness, the alliance had to be economically viable. To this end, nato countries should liberalize their trading practices. This suggestion was greeted favourably by the United Kingdom representative, who expressed the importance of further nato involvement in the non-military side of the alliance and stressed the European interest in the easing of US trade restrictions. The Belgian and Netherlands representatives, placing emphasis on the need for greater consultation within the alliance, were concerned about the Bermuda meeting. Other nato members should be kept informed of the proceedings, and no important decisions should be taken unilaterally by the great powers. The Netherlands representative hoped that the North Atlantic Council “would not be informed of the results of [the] Bermuda meeting solely through [the] press communiqué.” The meeting ended with a promise by Ismay to present his paper to the representatives the following week.37 Ismay’s outburst and proposed paper were by no means unplanned. Prior to the meeting, it had been learned by the American delegation that the nato Secretariat was undertaking an internal review of the alliance. A secret paper had apparently been drafted by nato officials in early June expressing concern over the increasing divergence between alliance strategy and resources. It suggested that nato should undertake a review of the situation and look at the possible redistribution and reorganization of the defence effort. As well as nato attempting to use resources more effectively, the paper argued, changes should be made to the non-military side of the alliance, including more consultation. “[I]f nato is found [to] have inadequate resources, [it] will be increasingly necessary that [the] utilization [of] these resources be guided by [a] common and consistent policy. Finally, [the] foregoing would imply greater willingness on [the] part [of] nato members to confer on important policy decisions before these are taken in national capitals.” The paper was drawn up only in a draft, unapproved form, but the Americans were alarmed by its existence. Wishing to limit their contribution to nato, they did not want to start discussing the need for alliance

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capabilities to be re-evaluated. As their knowledge of the paper was based on a secret source, there was little they could do except hope that it died “a natural death” within the Secretariat.38 Such a strategy had not foreseen the rather turbulent meeting of 18 June, and the Americans responded to the situation with alarm. For the State Department, the presentation of such a paper was unthinkable. It would likely lead to a call for greater American military assistance, which was out of the question in the present atmosphere within Washington. At the same time, by focusing on American cutbacks, attention would be drawn away from the need for German rearmament and the speedy resolution of the edc issue. As Ismay’s outburst had ended with the promise of a paper, there was little that the State Department could do to prevent its presentation. The secretary general might, however, be persuaded to ignore military problems and instead concentrate on nato’s non-military development, especially as it related to more effective political consultation. The State Department directed its delegation in Paris to approach Ismay privately and encourage him to take this course. As to the question of non-military development, the department drew attention to a set of instructions that it had sent out earlier in June, outlining the American position on consultation as it related to the Bermuda conference. The instructions had given the American permanent representative permission to make a statement (assuming there was no objection from the British or French) assuring the other nato powers that consultation would take place in the North Atlantic Council before and after the Bermuda meeting. The conference itself would have no fixed agenda. It was expected that attention would be given to a wide range of subjects, with a special focus on the Soviet problem. In discussing this, the views of the other nato powers would be given full consideration, and “no decision would be taken affecting a nato country without consultations.”39 The documentary evidence does not demonstrate whether the American nato delegation was able to make a private presentation along these lines to Ismay. The paper he ultimately produced contained no reference to the need for a re-evaluation of defence needs. Even if the absence of this subject was not due to a direct approach by the Americans, there can be little doubt that Ismay’s decision was influenced by the realization that the Americans would react negatively to any mention of defence.40 His paper did paint a grim picture of the alliance and the international situation. He began by citing the dangers of the current Soviet peace offensives. These had placed unwanted pressure upon

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the alliance by persuading a significant portion of Western public opinion that the threat had diminished. Ismay pointed out that just as perceptions of the Soviet threat were changing, so a parallel view was evolving that the Atlantic organization was losing its importance. Not only were many countries decreasing their military budgets, but the edc ratification process was being delayed. Both these developments were giving the general impression that Atlantic defence was not a priority. Such an impression would only add fuel to those wishing to see a united and neutral Germany based on a recent Soviet proposal. The secretary general believed that disagreements in other parts of the world were also having negative effects on the alliance. As examples, he listed the hesitation in establishing the Middle Eastern Defence Organization and disputes over Trieste. The secretary general concluded his analysis with a dire warning that unless the alliance took a new initiative, the Soviets might, through a simple change of tactics, achieve their supreme goals of undermining nato and stopping European integration. Ismay’s paper suggested ways for nato to regain the initiative. In terms of the upcoming Bermuda conference, it proposed that the present concerns of nato members be formally communicated to the Big Three, which could make a strong statement in the conference’s communiqué that the alliance was an essential part of their foreign and defence policies. The three could also emphasize that the North Atlantic Council would be fully informed of the discussions at the Bermuda meeting. The secretary general believed that other nato foreign ministers should make public statements recognizing that the Soviet threat had not disappeared and there was still a need for an effective Western alliance. Moreover, both the ratification of the edc treaty and a continuing military buildup remained urgent. Ismay suggested other ideas: the next ministerial session could be opened by nato’s prime ministers, and the duration of the treaty could be extended for fifty years, together with a common commitment by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada that they would maintain their troops on the continent as long as a threat existed.41 The American delegation, relieved by the omission of any calls for a re-examination of military contributions, was not entirely pleased with the remaining suggestions, which it found too specific and in some cases inappropriate. Nevertheless, Ismay’s paper struck a responsive chord with the Americans in both Paris and Washington. As the leaders of the alliance, they believed that they had a special responsibility

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to ensure that nato prospered. Ismay’s paper might not hold complete solutions to nato’s problems, but it did provide a convenient opportunity for the United States to reassert itself and lead the alliance out of the trouble it was encountering. Such a thought occurred to the newly appointed American permanent representative, John Hughes, who believed that Ismay’s paper provided the United States with an opportunity to make clear it was still interested in nato. In a series of messages sent to Washington, Hughes argued that the Americans should ensure that the paper was used to generate discussion in the Council both on the topics raised by the secretary general and on “a number [of] important problems he has passed over.” Hughes believed that Ismay’s analysis was deficient because it failed to recognize as nato’s basic weakness its “failure to appreciate [the] seriousness and provide adequate armour against Soviet non-military aggression or subversion: e.g. peace offensive.” Ismay “failed to attack one fundamental cause of growing public and private lassitude toward nato, which, we believe is precisely over-concentration on military defense. Nothing could restore more speedily and convincingly faith in US leadership in [the] free world and nato in particular than our prompt filling of the gap in Ismay’s analysis and proposed remedies.” Hughes argued that a belief existed that nato had to be more than a military alliance to survive “beyond the immediate threat of military aggression.” The current Soviet peace offensives were proving this view correct, since nato appeared to be “cracking under the popular belief ... that [the] threat of open aggression [is] receding.” The permanent representative’s prescription to cure these problems was the further development of the “North Atlantic Community.” The United States had to go beyond what Ismay was suggesting and develop those areas of nato broadly covered by Article 2. Hughes believed that one initiative “likely to catch [the] public imagination, arouse popular interest and thus revive and accentuate public support for nato” would be the establishment of “some form [of] parliamentary association.” Such a body would have obvious benefits in increasing public interest in the alliance as well as involving key legislative leaders in each nato capital. The alliance had been discussing the idea of a parliamentary association for many years without reaching a consensus, but Hughes believed that it could be implemented if the United States took the lead. Hughes’s suggestions were welcomed in the State Department, which had been unclear as to how the United States should respond to Ismay’s

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paper. He was given permission to support the secretary general’s initiative subject to a number of reservations. These involved American doubts about the practicality of prime ministers opening the next nato meeting, a declaration concerning North American and British troops remaining on the continent, and the extension of the nato treaty’s duration to fifty years. More importantly, when it came to the suggestion that the outcome of the Bermuda conference be made known to the permanent representatives, the State Department stressed that only “relevant” aspects of the meetings should be reported. No definition of the word “relevant” was provided, but the inclusion of this reservation indicates that many of the State Department’s concerns about having control over consultation remained.42 Ismay’s paper was reviewed by the permanent representatives on 2 July with general support for its thrust. Hughes made no specific mention of Article 2 as a means of addressing nato’s problems, but the matter was not ignored. According to one report of the meeting, the “Chairman agreed with several representatives that progress in nonmilitary fields was highly important and said that nato had only paid lip service so far to Article 2.” No agreement was reached on whether any of the secretary general’s specific recommendations should be adopted. As a result, Ismay proposed that the international staff prepare a paper outlining more concrete proposals for “bolstering nato.”43 His paper resulted in few concrete changes, but it did draw the attention of the Eisenhower administration to the problems facing nato. Throughout the summer of 1953, a series of internal memoranda and discussion papers were produced on a variety of problems plaguing the alliance. Comments on strengthening its military side were made, but the focus was on the question of alliance unity; the conclusion was that one of the most important ways to deal with the present malaise within nato was to develop Article 2. In an important memorandum to Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston Merchant suggested that the American government “explore promptly with the Congress and our allies, particularly the Canadians who have consistently emphasized the importance of the non-military aspects of the Treaty, the possibility of developing a parliamentary association with the Council.”44 Eisenhower became involved in the issue, receiving in early June a lengthy report reflecting on the situation in nato from William Draper, the retiring US nato representative, whom Hughes was replacing. Draper painted a rather grim picture of an alliance lacking in unity. He

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did not believe that the present situation was without hope, and he outlined ways of overcoming both the military and non-military problems facing the alliance. Central to his non-military suggestions was the development of greater consultation within the Council, by calling on nato to work toward the creation of “a political cabinet of the fourteen powers, in which questions of mutual concern are discussed and agreed after reference to governments.” Draper revived the somewhat dormant notion of greater economic collaboration within the alliance. To address the current dollar gap in Europe on a long-term basis, the retiring US official suggested that the United States work for balanced trade through such measures as reducing its tariff and non-tariff barriers with Europe. He made a number of specific suggestions to this end, including the introduction of legislation that would limit tariff rates between nato members for a period of ten years.45 Eisenhower found Draper’s report of particular interest. He requested comments from Dulles, who in turn asked the State Department to analyze the report. The Department was hesitant about grandiose plans to freeze tariff rates for a decade, but it did support much of the sentiment behind Draper’s suggestions for nato’s non-military development. Dulles passed these comments to Eisenhower, confessing that he had only had a chance to glance at them. The secretary of state hoped to study them further and discuss them with the president in the near future.46 the us proposal for an atlan tic assembly It is uncertain whether Dulles ever discussed Draper’s report directly with the president. Regardless, the level of interest in nato’s non-military side among State Department officials was having a profound influence on the secretary of state. With the Bermuda meeting postponed because of illness on the part of Churchill, a series of foreign ministers’ meetings were held in Washington in July 1953 as an interim measure. During the course of discussions, Dulles stressed that because of the expected alliance-wide cutbacks in defence spending and the possibility of “a decrease in the Soviet military threat,” there might be a “possible slowdown in the military aspects of nato.” This might create a need for “placing more emphasis on its non-military functions.” Cautioning that his comments “constituted only tentative thinking and were not meant to be a definite proposal,” Dulles went on to float ideas about a nato parliamentary organ similar to those put forward by Hughes. “He said he had been thinking tentatively of attempting to

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establish some sort of parliamentary structure built around the North Atlantic Council which would include Congressional representatives. He referred to the constructive influence on individual Congressmen who had attended sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union whose meetings, he said, have been both useful and educational.” This proposal was “warmly welcomed” by Lord Salisbury, Britain’s lord president of the Council and former secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, who was representing an indisposed Eden. Bidault welcomed the general tone of Dulles’s statement, noting that the French had always felt that Article 2 should be given more importance. The specific idea of a nato parliamentary structure did not appeal to Bidault, who argued that “nato military meetings seemed to have already too many parliamentary aspects.” He invoked the longheld criticism of all international parliamentary bodies: there was often a “discrepancy between the views of these parliamentarians and the views of their respective Governments who must bear the responsibility of [the] implementation of their ideas.” Bidault preferred the idea of associating parliamentarians with the European political community linked with the edc. If something were tried in nato, a “way must be found of so doing which would not result in interference of these parliamentarians in matters belonging in the Governmental sphere.”47 Dulles’s attraction to nato’s non-military side was undoubtedly because of State Department suggestions, but his background also helps to explain his attraction. As a private citizen, he had been a leading commentator on American foreign policy and had associated himself with a number of organizations dealing with international issues. Believing, just prior to the start of the Second World War, that peace could only be preserved through the dilution of state power, Dulles had grown interested in the work of Clarence Streit and his group Union Now. He was never directly associated with the group. He did, however, develop a close personal relationship with Streit and lent the organization legal advice, even helping to prepare a draft congressional resolution on the matter in 1941, which formed the basis for the series of Senate resolutions on Atlantic union that were introduced regularly (albeit unsuccessfully) following the treaty’s signature.48 Dulles’s reluctance to join Streit’s group formally was based on doubts as to the practicality of the federal union proposal. The future secretary of state thought that the work of Union Now had great educational value but that public opinion in the West was not ready “for so drastic a step.”49 Closer cooperation would nevertheless be benefi-

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cial. Writing in June 1941, Dulles remarked, “Personally, I would favour economic and financial union, let the political union work out of them if and when this becomes a natural development.”50 During the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty, Dulles urged Acheson not to portray it as “merely a treaty of alliance between governments.” Instead, it should be used to bring “the peoples involved to understand better their interdependence.”51 He continued to advocate this positive view of the alliance, and during his brief tenure as senator from New York in the summer of 1949, he supported a resolution calling for Atlantic union, put forward by Streit supporters in the Senate.52 This is not to suggest that Dulles was in any way a closet “Atlantic unionist.” He maintained a close relationship with Streit throughout his life, including his time as secretary of state, but he was very guarded in how he responded to Streit’s many missives concerning the Atlantic union proposal. Tending to rely on draft letters prepared by State Department officials, Dulles was respectful of Streit’s efforts in his responses but not particularly supportive. Atlantic union was not, however, under discussion in nato at that moment. Instead, the alliance’s leadership was searching to strengthen it through closer cooperation. On this point Dulles’s past associations with the issue take on considerably more importance and help to explain his predisposition to proposals for greater non-military cooperation. But once these proposals became specific and it was revealed that they would entail some sacrifice on the part of the membership, his interest waned. His determination, as secretary of state, to preserve the United States’s freedom of action far outweighed any attraction he felt for the non-military development of the alliance. As a result, Dulles tended to enjoy speaking of nato’s non-military development as an indefinite concept rather than a concrete set of proposals. The one exception to this pattern was his suggestion for the creation of an Atlantic parliamentary body. It should be stressed, however, that there was no concrete recommendation behind the secretary of state’s July statement; he appeared to be basing his comments almost entirely on general suggestions made by State Department officials and, perhaps more importantly, by Hughes.53 Dulles had mentioned his interest in strengthening the non-military side of the alliance, possibly through the development of some type of parliamentary association, during a meeting with congressional leaders on 9 July. But he had raised the matter at the end of the meeting, leaving no opportunity for discussion.54 The attraction of Dulles and his officials to the idea is not difficult

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to explain. It entailed little US sacrifice, given the United States’s constitutional separation of powers. For an American secretary of state, used to congressional leaders often differing with the Executive and even greatly modifying or defeating presidential initiatives, such a body would pose few problems. This attitude can be contrasted with Bidault, who saw the proposal as providing little more than a forum for parliamentarians to embarrass and weaken their governments by holding their policies up for criticism. As a veteran of the machinations of the Fourth Republic, where National Assembly support for a government could literally change overnight, his fears are understandable. A number of European parliaments, particularly France and Italy, had significant numbers of communist deputies, whose presence in a nato assembly would only cause embarrassment. The difference between the two views is made clear in the proposal for an Atlantic assembly that was eventually produced by the State Department later that summer and made known to nato allies. It noted that it would be “inevitable that certain discussions in [the] assembly will be controversial.” Yet it was better “to have differences of opinion aired openly and discussed reasonably than to allow these differences to fester underneath the surface.” Neither the State Department nor Dulles had in mind establishing a major body that would have the ability to challenge alliance decisions. The department’s proposal, which received the endorsement of Eisenhower himself, envisioned the calling of an annual assembly of nato parliamentarians to be held under the authority of Article 2. The assembly, which would meet for only two weeks at the most, would have no authority. Its meetings, open to the press and public, would serve a consultative purpose, allowing discussion of “problems of common interest to nato countries.” In addition, resolutions could be passed “reflecting the general viewpoint or recommending measures to national governments.” In citing the benefits of the plan, the department concentrated on the important role the assembly would play in involving legislators with the alliance as well as increasing public knowledge and support for nato.55 Not mentioned in the proposal was a certain appeal of this approach to advocates of Atlantic union such as Senators Estes Kefauver and Guy Mark Gillette. The involvement of interested congressmen in some type of parliamentary body would provide an outlet for their energies and demonstrate the administration’s commitment to Article 2. Such reasoning was not specifically mentioned, since Dulles wanted to describe the plan to congressional leaders themselves.

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Most nato members did not share the State Department’s interest in the assembly idea. This was particularly the case for Canada, which the State Department had cast as a potential co-sponsor because of its traditional association with Article 2. Canada had already considered the idea of a nato assembly, as indeed had most other nato members. In mid-August the Norwegian representative circulated a formal proposal suggesting that “a conference of a limited number of parliamentarians from each of nato countries be arranged in the autumn of this year, preferably after the Ministerial meeting of the Council.” The conference would be informative rather than consultative and, if successful, might occur regularly, once or twice a year. The Canadians reacted coolly, believing that such a meeting might lead to calls for some type of nato parliament. An assembly might raise nato’s profile, but it might also engage in discussions and make proposals so unrealistic that they would lead to public confusion and disillusionment. Pearson took the step of raising the matter with the prime minister. Together they agreed that, instead of supporting the Norwegian proposal, Canada should endorse one recently put forward by the Italian and French representatives. This proposal, made during an informal meeting on 21 August 1953, suggested that nato sponsor visits of small groups of parliamentarians to Paris in order to study the work of the alliance. 56 The apprehension of Canada, Italy, and France about the Norwegian proposal was shared by the British, who discussed the idea in both the Atlantic (Official) Committee and Cabinet. Both forums recognized the potential benefits in raising parliamentary and public awareness but believed that these were far outweighed by a number of drawbacks. As nato was concerned primarily with defence, much of its work was believed to be unsuitable for public discussion. In addition, much of it was so vital to security that it could not be delayed through referral, even to a consultative assembly. Finally, another assembly might duplicate much of the work being done by the European Assembly in Strasbourg and cause public confusion. Presenting these arguments to Cabinet in late November, Eden stressed that efforts should be made to increase the interest of parliamentarians but that no nato assembly should be formed. nato should allow members of various national parliaments, at their own initiative, to visit its headquarters and welcome the recommendations that had been made at the Oxford and Copenhagen meetings of the Atlantic Treaty Association for the development of non-governmental national Atlantic committees.57

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The nato Secretariat had also given consideration to the subject of associating Parliamentarians with the alliance, producing a paper on the subject in early October. It recognized the benefits of keeping nato parliamentarians well informed but advised against an Atlantic assembly. The alliance should arrange a three-day tour of nato by parliamentarians during the spring of 1954. Its sole purpose would be to inform them about the work of nato, and it would have absolutely no consultative role.58 The State Department proposal would therefore face considerable opposition from its other nato allies. This fact was first made clear to the Americans in October when the US representative, Hughes, informally approached his Canadian counterpart, Dana Wilgress. Rather than giving the enthusiastic approval that the State Department had been expecting from a representative of the country most closely associated with Article 2, Wilgress expressed pessimism. He believed that most European powers would find it difficult to accept even the relatively harmless proposal being put forward by the Secretariat, let alone the more ambitious American proposal. Canada itself was having difficulty with the entire concept. What the Americans had to remember was the amount of embarrassment that European governments had experienced from their backbenchers in the Council of Europe. “He pointed out that European governments have not ... had the experience of differences with their parliamentarians and a certain amount of criticism back and forth as [a] routine part of governmental process as we have had in the US, and therefore approached with great temerity [the] establishment of [a] situation in which this might become possible.”59 The American proposal experienced a further setback a few days later when selected members of Congress were briefed on it by State Department officials. The reaction was decidedly negative, with members arguing that these types of bodies were often ineffective (as exemplified by the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, meeting at that time in Washington). Even if the assembly did achieve some degree of effectiveness, a fear existed that it might “injure prospects for European integration” or serve to fuel calls for an Atlantic federation. The congressional meeting did not end in total failure. The leadership agreed to consider the matter further and requested more information. With the matter still technically alive, the State Department told its delegation in Paris to support a proposal to have the subject referred to nato’s Information and Cultural Committee for further study. If nato members reached some consensus, it might be possible to convince

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Congress to endorse the matter. However, in the light of the initial reaction of members of Congress, the United States was in no position to take the lead on the matter.60 With no major power willing to assume leadership on the matter, the idea died a quiet death in the Committee on Cultural and Information Policy. At the committee, the Norwegians could muster the support of only the Belgian, Dutch, and Icelandic delegations for their relatively modest proposal. A race appeared to begin to find a proposal that was so innocuous that it would appeal to everyone. Abandoning the Norwegian idea for a week-long information conference, the committee turned its attention to a proposal from the Secretariat that asked nato governments to establish parliamentary groups in their own countries with an interest in alliance matters. Once established, these groups should be encouraged to make inter-parliamentary contact and visit other nato countries as well as the Paris headquarters. This approach appealed to most delegations as long as it was made clear that there was nothing mandatory about its implementation. There was still no consensus, however, because the American delegation refused to agree and suggested that the decision be postponed. Since the meeting with congressional leaders six weeks earlier, the State Department had grown increasingly wary of the idea of any nato involvement with parliamentarians. It also saw little value in creating a special committee of members of Congress interested in nato since there already existed official congressional subcommittees that dealt with the matter in some detail. As a result, the State Department wanted the entire matter dropped until a later date. With only the Turkish representative willing to agree to a delay, it was decided to modify the recommendations to the point where they verged on the meaningless. As a result of American objections, the recommendations were changed from indicating that member countries “should” encourage the establishment of parliamentary groups to “might” encourage their establishment. This wording was accepted by the full North Atlantic Council on 2 December, the chairman stipulating that member countries were “left to decide how best this can be achieved in their own country and the recommendations which are now submitted to them provide merely indications as to which schemes seem to us to be generally acceptable and suitable for this purpose.”61 Despite the failure of the Atlantic assembly proposal, efforts to increase consultation during this period were not totally fruitless. nato’s Big Three did show a greater sensitivity toward the desire of

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their smaller allies to be consulted. When a series of notes on Germany were exchanged with the Soviet Union during the summer of 1953, the three made every effort to consult the North Atlantic Council before finalizing their response. This approach would continue, and nato members were consulted on a number of East-West issues throughout 1954.62 This increased sensitivity on the part of the great powers was welcomed by nato’s smaller members. Nevertheless, it was not enough to counter completely the feelings of disunity caused by the hierarchical nature of the alliance and the strains produced by the changing international situation. Compared to these, a survey of members’ views on how to respond to the Soviet note appeared as a sop. As the British representative to nato told Eden privately, the contributions made by members on these occasions were not “very illuminating,” but that was partly because the business was uncontroversial. “It would be helpful if the Big Three could sometimes risk an argument between themselves in the Palais de Chaillot and I do not think the United Kingdom would be likely to lose by employing that forum.”63 Sentiments like these were rare, and the exclusive decision-making procedures of the Big Three appeared to continue unabated. nato and the bermuda meeting The Bermuda meeting of the heads of the three governments, finally held in December 1953, a few days before a planned nato ministerial meeting, illustrates some of the problems associated with nato consultation. In an effort to reduce anxieties among alliance members, the United States, after consulting with the other two major powers, invited Lord Ismay to attend that part of the conference dealing with nato matters. Instead of appeasing the alliance’s smaller powers, the invitation (and the fact that it was accepted by Ismay without consultation with the Council) caused consternation. In the minds of many of nato’s smaller members, particularly the Belgians, Canadians, Italians, and Dutch, the presence of the secretary general might suggest that decisions made privately by the Big Three had nato sanction. When the invitation was first raised during a meeting of the Council on 18 November, a very clear message was sent by many of the smaller powers. If the secretary general were to attend the meeting, he should “stress the importance of consultation within the Council on any problem which may face the alliance. In particular, he should urge that the

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Three Powers should not make and announce before the ministerial meeting any decision as regards the current issues affecting nato countries as a whole.” During an informal meeting of the four smaller powers most concerned with the issue the following day, it was agreed that it would be best to have the secretary general’s role confined to that of an observer. Ismay would be in a position to answer specific questions about the alliance, but would not be able to speak for the remaining eleven countries.64 The minutes of the Bermuda meeting itself indicate that the smaller powers had some reason for concern. Ismay was present during the discussions directly related to nato, but was not asked to attend any of the discussions of the international situation. When the secretary general joined the discussions, one of the first comments to greet Ismay after he entered the room came from Dulles. “It would be necessary to have some understanding reached between the Foreign Ministers and Lord Ismay on what phases of the discussions here could be reported to the other nations. He said that of course everybody was under a ‘seal of confidence’ and that everyone would have to have an understanding as to just what Lord Ismay could tell the representatives of the other nations when he returned to Paris.” The subsequent discussions touched upon certain aspects of nato administration and the procedure of meetings but dealt mainly about the issue of atomic weapons and their relationship to the alliance. Dulles instructed Ismay to keep these discussions to himself and not raise them with the remaining nato members.65 Big Three disregard for nato’s smaller powers was further manifested during the East-West conference on the Far East in the spring of 1954, which had grown out of the January meeting of Soviet and Western foreign ministers. The Americans rejected a Canadian proposal that a nato ministerial meeting coincide with the conference to allow smaller powers to express their views. The United States feared that this might give the impression that the West was “ganging up” on the Soviets, and instead favoured an earlier nato meeting to coincide with the alliance’s fifth anniversary. Some discussion of the upcoming East-West conference occurred at the nato meeting, but it appears to have been minimal. The crisis at Dien Bien Phu, for example, of grave importance to the alliance, appears to have been the topic of nothing more than a few perfunctory remarks praising the bravery of the French troops under siege by the Vietminh in Indochina. In their final communiqué, the ministers did nothing more

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than pay “tribute to the gallantry of the French Union forces fighting in Indochina.”66 nato an d the us “new look” policy Perhaps the most significant change within the alliance came as a result of the announcement of a new posture in American foreign policy, called the “New Look.” It involved the incorporation of nuclear weapons in the planning for all wars including those of a limited regional nature. Strong hints had been given to the United States’ nato allies about this shift in policy, but it was during a speech by Dulles in January 1954 that they first learned about it in any detail. According to the secretary of state, local defence throughout the world would be reinforced by “the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.” The decision of how to counter aggression, therefore, would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.” As well as placing a very heavy emphasis on the nuclear deterrent, the New Look strategy envisioned the creation of other regional alliances beyond nato to provide a local buffer to communism. This aspect of the policy was seen in September 1954 through the signature of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (seato), which brought together nato’s Big Three and Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. Certain non-member states were covered by the terms of the treaty, such as South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although members were only obliged to consult on issues involving communist expansion in that region.67 Among the enormous implications of the new plan for nato were whether the United States was now in a position to drag its allies into a nuclear confrontation without proper warning or consultation. This theme was picked up by Pearson in a speech on 15 March 1954 to the National Press Club in Washington. Pearson’s argument was simple: if the United States wished to have allied support for the New Look, it would have to agree to consultation before action.68 Procedure for using atomic weapons is an issue removed from questions of nato’s non-military development. At the same time, the consultative nature of the debate, which would rage on for many years within nato, is relevant. It fuelled the already existing tensions within the alliance between the United States and the smaller powers and maintained interest in general questions concerning consultation. Pear-

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son, building upon the sentiments expressed in his March speech, took the issue outside the nuclear context during the April 1954 ministerial meeting by proposing a general resolution on consultation that would have obliged members to consult nato when contemplating decisions, “especially those affecting [the] non-nato area, which would result in new policies, new proposals for action or new plans.” The Council accepted the resolution, but with reservations from the United States and France. Dulles stated that the United States attempted to consult allies before decisions were made, but “it was necessary to bear in mind that, taking into consideration domestic relations with [one’s] own government, members of Parliaments, etc., unless [the] desire for consultation is reasonably limited, there is [a] danger that there will be no capacity for action if we spend all our time talking. If we went through all [the] process of consultation, when [an] emergency arose it might never be met. Consultation is designed as a means to an end and not [an] end in itself.”69 Dulles’s opposition demonstrated that the problem surrounding consultation had a certain intractability which would take considerable effort to overcome. After three years of alliance study and debate on the issue, the position of the American government had changed little. Consultation could take place, but it would have to be limited to meet the concerns about freedom of action that so concerned the Americans and their two great-power allies. Another aspect of the New Look, its emphasis on regional alliances, posed challenges to nato by lessening its importance to the United States. In discussions of nato unity, Dulles was continually to raise American unwillingness to give one alliance priority over other regional commitments. The creation of these new alliances appeared to have institutionalized the traditional excuse that the United States had responsibilities more far-reaching than Western Europe and North America. Paradoxically, the amplification of the American alliance system increased many nato members’ interest in increased consultation on non-Atlantic issues. As Pearson commented on the signature of the Turkish-Iraqi pact in early 1955, a significant step toward the formation of the Baghdad Pact, “one member, Turkey ... has a pact with Pakistan and indirectly that brings nato a little further to Pakistan. Pakistan, however, is a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization and that brings nato’s interests a little further East still. In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, you have the United States, the United

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Kingdom and France and that brings us right back round the world again to nato, in Europe.”70 conclusion The post-Lisbon period had revealed an underlying lack of commitment to work toward greater non-military development. A number of nato’s members, particularly the United States, had seen Article 2 as holding a solution to many of the alliance’s ills. Unfortunately, many of the problems facing the alliance were caused by nato’s hierarchical nature, which gave prominence to its three major powers. Because of their far-reaching international responsibilities, these three demanded freedom of action in their foreign policy making. nato’s smaller powers viewed the great powers’ responsibilities differently. Believing that actions by the alliance’s Big Three in any part of the world could potentially have repercussions for the alliance, they saw an obligation on the part of the great powers to consult their nato allies. The incompatibility of these two positions was revealed when calls to develop Article 2 were translated into specific proposals on consultation. Attempts to develop guidelines for consultation following the debacle surrounding Stalin’s note of May 1952 resulted in only limited progress. Efforts over the summer of 1953 to form an alliance assembly might have led to a widened non-military role for nato. Largely because of the division of executive and legislative powers within their country, the Americans were the assembly’s strongest advocate. Most of nato’s other members, including its smaller powers, were concerned that such a body might interfere with their own freedom of action, demonstrating that even the alliance’s lesser lights were not immune from fears of unwarranted external pressure. In the end, the idea failed to gain much interest. nato’s non-military development faded into the background during 1954 as the alliance grappled with the crisis surrounding the ratification of the European Defence Community treaty. Once an alternative course was agreed upon in October, nato found itself again susceptible to the type of internal tensions that had hampered non-military development since the treaty’s signature. Yet these strains would cause Article 2 to become important once again, as the entire face of the Cold War changed.

5 Cooperating for Something Rather than against Something The Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation, 1955–1956

In 1955–56 nato found itself destabilized by the peaceful initiatives of its enemy. Ironically, an alliance that had been preparing itself against a communist military threat was unprepared to deal with attempts by communist leaders to convince the world of their pacific intentions. By the end of 1955, the Soviets had signed the Austrian peace treaty, presented an omnibus disarmament and troop withdrawal proposal, improved relations with Yugoslavia, and hosted visits to Moscow by Canada’s Pearson and German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. A July 1955 summit between the Big Three and the Soviets in Geneva had served to popularize the notion of an East-West thaw, captured by the term “the spirit of Geneva.” At the same time, growing public awareness of the existence of the hydrogen bomb raised the concern that, even if the West was victorious in war, the results would be too disastrous to contemplate. Western political leaders doubted the sincerity of the Soviet moves and worked to convince the public that the West should not drop its guard. It was difficult, however, to maintain the same sense of urgency when it came to security questions. In this climate, members were more willing to risk alliance disharmony. “Allies no longer feel the same compulsion,” Dulles pointed out in April 1956, “to submerge differences as when they faced together a clear and present danger.”1

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Of these differences, the most striking involved Cyprus. Strategically situated in the eastern Mediterranean, this British colony was quickly becoming a divisive issue between three alliance members. Since the early 1950s, the British had been attempting to find a suitable formula under which the island could be granted some form of independence. The vast majority of the Greek Cypriots, comprising approximately 80 per cent of the population, desired union with Greece. The 20 per cent Turkish population, fearful of its future as a tiny minority, demanded that union be forbidden. With Athens pressuring Britain on behalf of the Greek Cypriots and Ankara on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, no easy answer was in sight. The issue reached a crisis point in 1955 when factions of the Greek Cypriot community undertook terrorist acts against the British and Turkish community on the island. Anti-Greek riots in Turkey worsened the situation. France also challenged alliance unity in its attempts to end the Algerian insurrection. Large numbers of French troops were moved from Europe to North Africa, weakening the alliance’s continental strength. Public opinion in the West, particularly in the United States, saw France’s actions as that of an old-fashioned colonial oppressor. Even tiny Iceland caused inter-alliance conflict in early 1956 when it threatened to expel American troops from the important Keflavik base.2 More subtle strains arose within nato during this period over “la relance européene.” The refusal of the French government to ratify the EDC treaty in late summer 1954 had been a severe blow not only to efforts to rearm Germany but also to the entire European movement. Anxious to regain the momentum, nato’s six Western European powers had gathered in Messina, Italy, in June 1955. There France, Italy, West Germany, and the Benelux countries agreed to open negotiations on the creation of a European economic community as well as a European atomic energy community. Paul-Henri Spaak, the indefatigable Belgian foreign minister, had been charged with drafting a proposal. For a number of those outside the six, including Canada, these efforts threatened the formation of a closed economic bloc. Concerns were raised, too, within the six. The new French government of Edgar Faure feared that Germany might come to dominate an integrated Europe. As one Quai d’Orsay official remarked, “the question that was at the centre of the European debate is whether it is desirable to establish a community of interests between

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France and its European partners, at the risk of seeing Germany take a place in this community which could become dominant.”3 Soviet activities in the developing world were another source of concern. Rather than continuing their traditional support of communist and revolutionary parties in these regions, the Soviets had instead begun to provide both military and non-military aid to the existing governments of developing nations. The West, particularly the United States, saw such moves as designed purely to bring these countries into the Soviet sphere of influence. They had to be countered. Very quickly the developing world became a new battleground in which every Soviet “gain” was seen as a Western “loss.” nato’s military policy, based largely on the United States’ New Look strategy, was not adequate to address the new Soviet “peace offensives.” Even the formation of other regional alliances such as seato did not offer a clear solution. Defensive in nature, they provided nothing positive with which to rally non-communist states against communist influence. Especially in the face of the many internal problems facing the alliance, the adequacy of nato consultation continued to be questioned. Although political discussions had become commonplace by this point, they tended to focus on issues where a degree of consensus already existed. Discussion at the May 1955 ministerial meeting illustrated this point. Throughout that spring, Pearson had pushed for a meeting that would devote considerable attention to political matters. He was not disappointed and admitted afterwards that it was one of the most fruitful exchanges that ever took place within nato.4 The focus of the discussion, however, concerned East-West relations and the possibility of a summit, a proposal that would lead to the Geneva meeting between the Big Three and the Soviet Union that July. A Canadian report of the nato meeting noted that “there was broad agreement among all the nato countries on the approach adopted by the ‘Big Three.’” The only exception was Dulles’s insistence that the liberation of the Soviet satellites should be part of the agenda, a proposal that other nato members believed might jeopardize the success of the talks.5 This willingness to discuss the Geneva talks within nato continued, partly as a result of the urging of both the Canadians and the Italians. Presentations were made to the North Atlantic Council by representatives of the Big Three, and a special meeting of nato foreign ministers was convened on the eve of the summit as well as prior

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to follow-up discussions between the Big Three and the Soviet foreign minister held during October and November 1955.6 Although this openness by nato’s great powers to discuss the EastWest talks should not be discounted, a consensus in favour of negotiations with the Soviets already existed within the West. Things were different when it came to more controversial issues such as the offshore islands crisis of January 1955. In this case, the People’s Republic of China had overrun an island considered to be under Taiwanese control, threatening stability within the region. The United States, committed to the protection of Taiwan, found itself in the difficult situation of potentially having to intervene militarily against China. Despite the seriousness of the situation, Dulles’s statement on the subject at the May ministerial was not of a consultative nature. As the Canadian report wryly remarked, Dulles kept describing the discussions on this matter as “useful,” but the secretary of state “obviously regarded it as useful only in giving him a further opportunity of impressing the other ministers with the United States point of view ... and not in enabling him to hear and appreciate the points of views of others.”7 n ato ’ s g row i n g i n t e r e s t i n a rt i c l e 2 The growing strains within the alliance sparked a search for a way to reunify nato and counter Soviet peace offensives. For many nato members, the alliance’s non-military side held a possible solution. As the UK permanent representative stated in his confidential annual report for 1954, the alliance needed an economic and political basis in order to remain unified. “Under cold war conditions dynamism is not to be found only in civil defence or other preparations for the worst. It must be sought in a direction where the man in the street can see something positive and not negative for which to hope.”8 The new French government of Edgar Faure also saw the potential for the non-military side of the alliance. Outlining the basis of his government’s foreign policy in late March to the National Assembly, Faure noted that one of its cornerstones would be Article 2 of nato, allowing for “a true Atlantic community.”9 Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak also joined those advocating greater non-military development. During a visit to Ottawa in February 1955, he spoke with Pearson of the need to develop the alliance’s non-military side. Spaak followed up this discussion with a call at the May ministerial

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meeting for some type of “Atlantic Commonwealth,” described as “a loosely bound association of nations united by a common devotion to democratic ideals and common interests.”10 Italy, too, put much faith in Article 2, proposing that its discussion be placed on the December ministerial meeting’s agenda. Not surprisingly, Pearson also favoured developing nato’s non-military side as a cure for its malaise. A proposal by the Canadian permanent representative to nato, Dana Wilgress, caught the external affairs minister’s attention in late April 1955. The proposal, originally made that February, called on Canada to advocate the discussion of economic as well as political matters within the nato Council.11 It had originally received a lukewarm response from the Canadian Department of External Affairs as well as from the Departments of Finance and Trade and Commerce and the Bank of Canada. They argued that discussion of economic disputes might serve only to exacerbate existing tensions and do little to change entrenched positions. nato also lacked the necessary expertise to deal with economic matters, requiring it to call on the oeec to such an extent that it would merely duplicate the work going on in that forum.12 Pearson took a different view. He asked that the matter be considered further and raised it with Wilgress while in Paris to attend the May ministerial meeting. Wilgress countered many of Ottawa’s objections, arguing that the discussion of economic matters would lead to greater alliance cohesion and make it easier for members to reach agreements among themselves in other international forums.13 Pearson’s personal support of the initiative translated into much wider backing within External Affairs, which was concerned over the state of the alliance in the face of the Soviet peace offensives. In addition, genuine fears existed about European economic integration and the potential creation of a closed European trading bloc. In a letter sent to the Departments of Finance and Trade and Commerce and the Bank of Canada, External Affairs made the point that “some of the Europeans, who are quite vocal in supporting the establishment of a discriminatory regime for Europe (for all the European members of the oeec or for six members of the ecsc) might find it less appropriate to express such views in a nato Ministerial meeting where U.S. and Canadian Ministers would be present as full participants and where the conflict of such proposals with the objectives of nato would be readily apparent.”14 Despite initial support from the departments consulted, the matter

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was complicated in late September by the inflexible and protectionist attitude taken by the United States during trade discussions with Canada.15 Pearson believed that discussion within nato might help matters, a position that his ministerial colleagues in Finance and Trade and Commerce did not share. Such discussion, they argued, might put the Americans on the defensive and give ammunition to the Europeans to defend their own brand of trade discrimination. Neither minister was willing to veto the idea, however, leaving the final decision to Pearson.16 His enthusiasm for the idea appeared to be unstoppable, especially in the light of the deteriorating situation within the alliance. During Pearson’s visit to the Soviet Union in early October, Khrushchev had continually impressed upon him the view that nato would disintegrate under the burden of rearmament and internal tensions.17 In a Foreign Affairs article published that October, Pearson cautioned against “wishful but unrealistic thinking” in the post-Geneva period. “In this warmer climate of today,” he wrote, “we shall need to be resolute against the temptation to relax our vigilance or abandon our defence efforts.” At the same time, with the military threat lessening, the alliance had to find new sources of unity beyond a generalized fear. One concrete way in which this could be done would be through discussions of economic matters.18 The fact that Pearson’s interest in Article 2 was accompanied by a specific proposal, albeit vague in nature, made Canada an exception among the nato states preparing for the December 1955 ministerial meeting. None of the Big Three had developed any plans to advance nato’s non-military side, and France entered the meeting in the middle of a parliamentary election campaign, making it a pale participant. Even if Faure retained power, his government’s interest in Article 2 had dissipated considerably since the previous spring. Believing that it was too ambitious to try to create a non-military forum on an Atlantic basis, the French had set their sights on the Western European Union as the initial geographic framework for this type of cooperation. The weu had formally come into existence in the fall of 1954 through the Paris Agreements. These agreements had been the result of hastily arranged international negotiations that had come about that fall because of the failure of the French National Assembly to ratify the edc treaty. To find some way to bring West Germany into nato, a formula had been reached at the meetings whereby West Germany would

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first associate itself with the Brussels treaty. As has been seen, the Brussels treaty had been signed in March 1948 by Britain, France, and the Benelux countries as a measure against the Soviet threat. This initial grouping of six states had called themselves the Western Union, and had transferred their military responsibilities to nato upon the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Under the new agreement, West Germany would join the Western Union, which would be renamed the Western European Union. Under the terms of its membership, the weu would limit German rearmament and ensure that it never surpassed an established ceiling. West Germany would also commit to never producing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. With these safeguards in place, nato’s members agreed to formally accept West Germany as a new member of the alliance. Having given the weu a new life through the Paris accords, the French government floated the idea of developing the organization further in a non-military direction. Britain’s new foreign secretary, Harold Macmillan, was made aware of the proposal in late 1955 by his French counterpart, Antoine Pinay, and had greeted it with some interest. Macmillan’s views quickly changed, however, and he made it clear at the weu’s first ministerial meeting that it would be an organization with only a minimal role outside defence. This position left France with no option but to pursue its non-military interests through the Messina initiative, the main focus of nato’s other continental members.19 This lack of planning did not mean that there was no serious concern about the sorry state of the alliance. Ismay himself circulated a paper on the subject a few weeks before the December ministerial meeting. Cautious in nature, it recognized that many non-military functions were better performed by existing agencies. It did, however, mention Pearson’s suggestions, as outlined in Foreign Affairs, that nato might make a foray into economic matters.20 The Italians, too, showed a special interest in Article 2. As one of nato’s poorer countries, Italy was always suspected of seeing Article 2 as a means of obtaining economic aid; it had in fact requested aid in its submission to the Messina conference. This was certainly one reason for Italy’s interest, but its consistent advocacy of greater nato cooperation should not be forgotten. Italy had joined Canada in calling for greater consultation during the 1955 EastWest exchanges. In late September it had urged the North Atlantic

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Council to identify an effective Western response to the Soviet peace offensives. Part of this Italian desire for increased consultation stemmed from its secondary position within the international community. The former enemy state only joined the United Nations in 1955, and its representatives complained that the Italian public doubted its influence in Western affairs such as disarmament, currently under discussion by a United Nations subcommittee. Greater consultation within nato could only serve to increase the country’s prestige. Its motives notwithstanding, Italy proposed that an item on Article 2 be placed on the agenda for the December meeting. No specific title was provided, resulting in one suggested by the nato staff. Entitled simply “Implementation of Article 2,” it became a catch-all for any item deemed “non-military” and would be the source of future problems.21 In the immediate term, it appealed to the Canadians, despite a growing reluctance about suggesting that nato spend a session discussing economic matters. Privately, American and British officials had made it clear that they would not contribute much to such a session. The initiative at Messina would presumably therefore be the only positive economic development brought forward, leaving Canada no further ahead. In view of this fear, a more circuitous route was proposed. As the Italian initiative was extremely broad, the Canadians could simply raise their idea in a general form, suggesting that nato consider the idea of holding economic discussions in the future. A memorandum to this effect would be circulated in advance, outlining the proposal and mentioning an interest in a report on the outcome of the Messina conference from Paul-Henri Spaak about his progress in developing the proposal. Pearson would then be in a position to share Canadian fears about the direction of European economic integration.22 There was a certain unsoundness to the Canadian approach. The consistent thrust of Pearson’s vision was that nato members had to be prepared to discuss even the most difficult issues within the alliance if they threatened to interfere with its operation. As the Messina initiative was still in its early phases, full discussion might have sent a clear message to its six members about the limits of economic integration that would have been acceptable to nato. At first glance, ministerial discussion of Article 2 at the December meeting appeared to reap tremendous benefits. According to the US report, it produced a reaction that was “considerably more lively than

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expected, and indicated a general feeling among many nato members that more consideration than in the past should be given to the development of a collective policy in the political, economic, and psychological fields. Partly as a result of the recent change in Soviet tactics, and partly as a result of the need for types of cooperation other than military, many countries seemed to be groping for ways of implementing Article 2.”23 Despite this interest, the discussion was entirely unfocused, and the term “groping” is quite appropriate. Article 2’s lack of definition meant that an endless range of subjects could be raised. The Italians and the French spoke of the need for nato to assist alliance members that were economically weak as well as to coordinate aid to the developing world. Other speakers developed this theme and voiced their concerns about Soviet infiltration of the developing world. No one had any concrete ideas of how nato could assist, although both the Netherlands and Norway believed that this work should be done exclusively by other organizations. Even the French, who had initially raised the matter, privately admitted after the meeting that they were unsure whether nato, the UN, or perhaps the oeec was the appropriate forum in which to take action.24 Attacking the subject of Article 2 from an entirely different angle, Pearson presented the Canadian proposal by reiterating the need for greater consultation on economic issues within nato as well as raising concerns about efforts to create a European common market. His efforts to generate discussion on the latter topic were in vain. Spaak refused to deliver a report to nato, and the matter was only mentioned in passing by the Norwegian and Portuguese foreign ministers, who expressed concern about Messina, and by the Italian and Dutch ministers, expressing their support. To illustrate the breadth of discussion, the Danish and Norwegian representatives used the session to call for a Western European youth rally to counter one that had been held in Eastern Europe. Similar calls were made for better coordination of nato “propaganda” by the Turks, complementing a proposal made by Pinay that the alliance create a committee of experts to deal with counterpropaganda.25 With few specifics and no idea of the direction that nato should be taking in this area, the ministers passed an anodyne resolution of support for Article 2 and turned the problem over to the permanent representatives. The results of these discussions, held throughout the first

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four months of 1956, were disappointing. The only concrete proposal accepted was one put forward by Britain suggesting that nato undertake a survey of Article 2 activities both within and outside the alliance. Such a survey, based on a proposal put forward by the Atlantic Treaty Association, would provide valuable background information for nato to plan its future activities in this area. In addition, it might be possible to make a version of this study public in order to sway general opinion.26 p l a n n i n g f o r t h e n ato m i n i s t e r i a l m e e t i n g i n m ay 1 9 5 6 The permanent representatives’ lack of progress did not dampen alliance interest in Article 2. As myriad external and internal problems still strained nato unity, its leadership continued to give non-military issues serious consideration. A Canadian proposal to place the matter on the agenda for the next ministerial meeting, planned for May 1956, was readily accepted, and all members began to prepare their positions. Among the smaller European countries, Italy distinguished itself as the most enthusiastic. nato’s non-military development was made one of the major themes of speeches to the US Congress and the Canadian House of Commons by Italy’s President Giovanni Gronchi during a state visit to North America in late February and early March 1956.27 A joint communiqué issued at the end of a state visit by Gronchi and Italian foreign minister Gaetano Martino to France in late April underlined the resolve of the two countries to “act in concert” in developing nato’s “economic, social and cultural spheres in such a way as to give it its full meaning.” 28 But, as was the pattern, these bold public pronouncements by the Italians failed to translate into specific far-reaching proposals. Italy’s only concrete suggestion urged the Council to devote more time to economic matters and proposed that a committee of technical experts be established to undertake this task.29 nato’s newest member, West Germany, was a leading supporter of Article 2. Upon its formal entry into the alliance in May 1955, Chancellor Adenauer had privately told Pearson of his desire to see nato’s non-military side developed. In early March 1956 Adenauer publicly called for nato to coordinate the “political attitude and initiative” of the West toward the East and proposed that an item be placed on the

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agenda of the next ministerial meeting to deal with nato’s non-military side.30 Although West Germany was concerned about general political consultation, it also believed that the alliance should consider the state of Western assistance to the developing world. It privately put a number of ideas to other members on how the alliance could coordinate aid through consultation, analysis, and discussion. To avoid alienating developing countries and embarrassing nato members who were themselves recipients, it was stressed that the alliance itself would have no formal role or association with the actual dispensing of aid. Despite the level of discussion within the German government on the matter, no specific proposals were brought to the May meeting.31 Belgium shared German and Italian interest in nato taking on a role in coordinating development aid. In an effort to foster discussion on the matter, it circulated a proposal prepared in the nato Secretariat that the alliance establish a special development fund made up of a 2 per cent donation of the defence budget of each member country. The Belgians did not officially endorse the proposal, but said that it should be given strong consideration.32 France approached the problem of nato’s non-military development with a new government led by socialist Guy Mollet and Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau. Both men brought a new approach to international relations, publicly criticizing the West, especially the “Anglo-Saxon” powers, on the position they were taking on a variety of issues ranging from disarmament to Algeria. When it came to the Soviet Union, both believed that the line being taken was too firm and that there was considerable room for negotiation. During a well-publicized interview for the American magazine U.S. News and World Report, the French prime minister focused on the German situation, arguing against the current Western position that German reunification had to happen before disarmament occurred. This criticism was badly received in Western capitals and led the German government to issue an official statement criticizing Mollet’s remarks. French planning for the development of Article 2 tended to focus on aid to developing countries rather than consultation. The West, Mollet had pointed out in the same interview, gave a tremendous amount of aid yet received little recognition. Pulling no punches, he expressed his opinion on why this was occurring: “Because we do not know how to make known what we are doing, and because we do it badly;

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because our Anglo Saxon friends, and particularly the Americans, do not know the old Latin proverb, ‘the manner of giving is worth more than what one gives.’” Aid should not be given unilaterally but in common through an organization such as the United Nations.33 In light of this concern, a French proposal was drafted to be presented by Pineau at the nato meeting recommending the establishment of a World Economic Development Agency under the United Nations. Its role would be to analyze and determine which countries most needed international aid and channel funds to them though various United Nations agencies. It would keep detailed statistics to show the West’s contribution in relation to that of the Soviets, thereby undermining their influence in the developing world. Further credit would be given to the West, Pineau believed, if nato undertook the responsibility of establishing this body.34 The Canadian Department of External Affairs was not as enamoured with the idea of a significant role for nato in the question of aid to the developing world. The Canadians feared that too much nato activity might serve only to upset neutralist susceptibilities among many developing countries. The United Nations was the proper forum for distributing aid. After careful study, External Affairs concluded that the best way to strengthen nato was through “the enhancement of the authority of the Council so that its voice can be heard and its influence recognised.” Believing that “discussions in the Council tend to be diffuse and inconclusive unless its members are considering some specific and carefully formulated proposal or statement,” the department recommended the formation of working groups of experts to examine matters in advance and submit their conclusions to the whole Council.35 The departmental study mirrored Pearson’s thinking. Growing increasingly concerned over the state of the alliance, the secretary of state for external affairs had begun to see consultation as holding the key to a more unified nato. In a private letter to nato’s secretary general in early March, Pearson shared his desire to have divisive issues such as Algeria and Cyprus discussed in the nato forum. Ismay’s reply was hardly comforting. The secretary general did not believe that members would agree to have their actions outside the immediate nato area discussed within the Council, no matter how closely they affected the alliance. He also did not believe that countries would agree to allow nato to intervene in inter-member disputes, because doing so would give the alliance supranational powers.36

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As well as writing to Ismay, Pearson agreed that two concrete proposals be circulated to representatives of nato’s Big Three along with Belgium on an informal basis. One involved the establishment of “expert committees” while the second proposed that member governments encourage the establishment of a group of non-governmental experts to examine economic issues under the auspices of the nato parliamentary conference. The responses to these ideas were at best lukewarm.37 Not to be dissuaded, Pearson made his ideas public through an important speech given to the English-Speaking Union in London at the end of April, receiving significant press attention. He admitted that nato could not undergo any substantial organizational changes or attempt to take on responsibilities which could be better handled by other international agencies such as “special economic arrangements.” Yet progress could be made in the area of consultation: “nato is in truth at the crossroads of its existence ... the Council must become a more effective agency for consultation and cooperation than it has been. It must be given more authority and its meetings, with ministerial attendance, should be more frequent. Through the Council, consultation should be developed in an accepted custom, to the point where no member would think of taking action which affected the others in any substantial way – either politically or economically – without prior discussion with those members in nato.”38 Thinking within the British Foreign Office appeared similar to the Canadian approach. A Cabinet brief on the subject argued that nonmilitary development not only would unify nato but bind Germany firmly to the West, tie America to Western Europe, and prevent that continent turning inward as European unity developed. “[I]t is our best counter to the feeling implicit in the Messina plans and never entirely absent from American thinking that if only Europe could be set on her feet the United States of America need concern themselves no longer with this continent.” The paper continued by recommending that nato develop into a “forum for high-level exchanges of opinion on topical problems both in and beyond the North Atlantic area.” A strengthening of unofficial meetings of nato parliamentarians was favoured and, in the long term, an Atlantic assembly. But the sincerity of the Foreign Office views on consultation appears doubtful. Britain had never been particularly forthcoming in nato meetings, and this new

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position was not translated into any concrete action within the Council.39 The real British preoccupation in entering the May 1956 meeting was not about consultation but aid to the underdeveloped world. Britain was determined that any movement in this direction should be thwarted. It firmly opposed Council discussion of economic matters and believed that nato should have no role in coordinating aid. Alliance members, it was argued, were not in a position to give financial support, and many developing countries might resent aid from a military alliance. Unlike Canada, however, Britain did not feel that the matter should be left to the United Nations, and it recognized a need for coordination of Western aid. It recommended, therefore, that a group of Western “donor” countries be established in Washington to plot Western strategy. The British idea found little support in Washington. This was not because the State Department had any interest in seeing nato involving itself in aid. Rather, the opposite was true. The State Department believed that nato should be given no role in aid issues, beyond providing a forum for exchanging information. US objections were based partly on its dislike of the distribution of aid through multilateral arrangements. As there were only a few Western countries capable of funding major aid programs, all that these types of arrangements did was extend influence to those who had little to contribute. By keeping its aid arrangements on a bilateral basis, the United States would have total freedom of action in determining how its resources could best meet its national interest.40 Dulles, drawing upon the sentiments that had first brought him together with Streit in the early 1940s, felt that more had to be done to develop Article 2. During a private meeting with the American Council on nato in May 1956, he explained his personal interest in the alliance’s non-military side. The West had been plagued throughout history, the secretary of state argued, “by the inability of its members to live in peace with each other.” The great wars of history “have not been fought between the Western civilization and some other civilization, but among the members of the Western community itself ... as early as 1940 he had advocated genuine unity among the West and the members of the Atlantic Community so that strife between them would not cause the Western structure to burn down periodically.” Dulles believed that nato was the best means of promoting that unity now, particularly when European efforts were proceeding at “a snail’s

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pace”. The West could not allow “nato to collapse while some form of organic or political unity is being shaped in Europe.”41 How could this greater unity could be achieved? Dulles gave few details of his thinking on the matter, although he did make clear during a press conference in March that he opposed a formal nato role in economic cooperation.42 His chief public statement on the alliance’s non-military development was made to the annual luncheon of the Associated Press on 23 April. The speech began with an analysis of recent Soviet activities, which concluded that, despite the recent softening of attitudes, a threat still existed. Yet unity in the West was weakening under the Soviet soft line. Part of the answer was greater non-military cooperation within the Atlantic alliance; nato members had to place a greater emphasis on cooperating “for something” rather than “against something.” Citing common religious faiths, moral values, and political and legal institutions, along with similar economies and educational systems within the countries of the North Atlantic alliance, Dulles made a very vague and qualified plea for the development of nato beyond the military level. He refrained from making any specific proposals, praising, for example, nato’s role as a forum for political consultation but adding that some countries had certain “worldwide responsibilities” which ruled out consultation in many individual situations. As a result, consultation would have to be confined to ensuring “harmony in our viewpoints on fundamentals.” Dulles’s concluding remarks reveal the uncertainty of his position: “No nato member, I suppose, wishes to drift into some new and illdefined relationship which could be provocative of future misunderstandings. But the unanimity of our thinking upon the great basic issues makes it apparent that the time has come to advance nato from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning.”43 Some indication of Dulles’s thinking lay in a reference in his speech to the Organization of American States (oas) as a possible role model for nato. He had privately expanded upon this idea in a communication sent to the American nato delegation prior to his address. nato might be transformed from a defence organization to a regional one similar to the oas, which had provided an excellent forum for discussing issues of concern to the Western Hemisphere. The secretary of state had been particularly impressed by the organization’s “Caracas Resolution” of March 1954, which condemned communism and paved the way for further US action against Guatemala.44

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Dulles had a long-standing concern about inter-member disputes within nato and privately expressed the view that the alliance might be able to mediate the Cyprus dispute. As a result, he was particularly attracted to the oas comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism, believing that nato might adopt one of a similar nature. This mechanism made a variety of procedures available to members involved in inter-member conflicts. If these procedures proved unworkable, the matter would be submitted to an arbitral tribunal established by the oas Council. If we examine the issue from Dulles’s perspective, it is easy to understand his frustration over tensions within nato and his desire for a more congenial inter-alliance relationship, such as the one within the oas, where US hegemony went unchallenged. For Dulles, recent harping about nato’s non-military side had revolved around the two central issues of lack of consultation and aid to the developing world. He found both complaints ironic. Not only did the United States give considerable aid to the developing world (and there was little evidence that other nato countries wanted to increase their aid programs significantly), but the alliance membership had shown itself afraid to raise a number of foreign policy issues not directly related to US foreign policy. As Dulles confided to Pearson during an April telephone conversation, nato members “wanted to develop the pact if they thought it would bring them more money from the US or allow them to get a free ride on our policies, but yet with Cyprus, North Africa of vital concern to nato, all are afraid to touch it.”45 He was even more damning in private remarks to foreign service officers on the same day as his conversation with Pearson: “Every important country in the world wants to get more money out of the United States and when I go over to nato I am going to advocate the development of nato but I am not going to advocate it in the form which they want it, which is another way of siphoning more money out of the United States. You see, we have our bi-lateral programs. We have certain programs we carry out through the United Nations. And they all want to turn these collective security arrangements into a third method of getting money – not in place of any other two, but in addition.”46 Although Dulles’s interest in the oas provides some sign of the direction of his thinking, his ideas were far from developed. In proposing the oas route, the secretary of state, like Pearson, was placing considerable emphasis on the idea of consultation. During late May and early June, Dulles attempted to put together a “Think

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Piece” outlining his views on nato’s future.47 The secretary of state identified the harmonization of the actions and policies of alliance members as the key to alliance unity. Noting the many problems dividing nato, he concluded, “With common policies, much could be achieved in these matters.” “Without common policies, there is considerable danger.” Despite these positive sentiments, Dulles was consistently wary of the idea of greater consultation as the route to achieving these common policies, and there was no indication that his thinking had altered. His 23 April speech mentioned certain qualifications about consultation which he repeated at the May ministerial meeting. The alliance had to be careful when identifying areas suitable for consultation, even if they were of direct interest to the alliance. Certain issues “may vitally affect nato but have only a remote relationship to some of its members”.48 Even the secretary of state’s “Think Piece,” in its final form, was extremely fuzzy on the point of consultation. “We do not seek, or want, to introduce the principle of ‘unanimity’ which gives rise to a ‘veto power.’ Nor should there be such rigid consultation procedures as would enmesh the government in endless debates and exclude the possibility of rapid and decisive action ... the desired harmony can be obtained by simple procedures which will assure an opportunity for timely exchange of views, so that all will know the facts which each thinks relevant, and the conclusion which each draws from these facts.” By following such a formula, “harmony will come to pass, not as a result of artificial or arbitrary procedures, but as a result of a common conclusion from applying common principles to commonly accepted facts.”49 Dulles’s thinking might have been muddled, but his desire for a solution cannot be doubted. He would tell the May ministerial meeting that any group undertaking an examination of nato’s non-military side would be engaging “in as important a prepatory job as had been involved in the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty itself.”50 This comment appears genuine and is borne out by early drafts of his personal “Think Piece,” which spoke of the possibility of significant changes to the present nato structure that might provide the basis for a new Atlantic council which would deal with political problems, allowing the permanent representatives to address only military and security matters. Dulles felt that such changes to nato’s structure should be done by member countries consulting their respective parliaments. Although he believed that governments had the authority to

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act in these matters without parliamentary consent, he felt that requests to legislatures to adopt a new treaty or ratify changes made to the alliance structure would give parliamentarians a greater sense of participation in the alliance’s work. These sentiments did not survive to the final draft, which merely hinted at the idea of “one or two persons” who knew the thinking of their government exchanging views with their counterparts. Changing the treaty was a move that was far too radical for Dulles. Indeed, when other powers mentioned such a course, the United States had been quick to point out its impracticality. Dulles was not entirely averse to altering the alliance structure. He had spoken of adopting the oas model, but this idea also encountered problems. The American nato delegation to Paris found much to criticize in this model. Achilles argued that to change nato to a regional organization would involve its identification with Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. This had been debated by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the drafting stage, and concerns had been voiced that, if the Atlantic pact were seen as a regional organization, it might entail obligations under the UN Charter to advise the Security Council of its activities. As a result, the wording of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the matter had been “equivocal.” The treaty was primarily a defence arrangement under Article 51, but it might also act as a regional arrangement under Chapter 8. Achilles argued that those drafting the treaty had rejected the idea of a dispute settlement mechanism, since it would have been “incompatible” with the concept of an “alliance based on intrinsic common interests.” Achilles’s concerns were shared by the nato military commander, General Alfred Gruenther.51 The message was clear: opening up such issues as nato’s exact status as a regional organization or the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism would lead to a repeat of Senate debates and might serve only to weaken the US position further. the committee of three o n n o n - m i l i ta ry c o o p e r at i o n The net result of all these external factors was that Dulles’s desire for change did not translate into a clear policy for the May ministerial meeting. Instead, he decided to suggest that nato once again form a committee of ministers to look into the matter. The rather lacklustre nature of this proposal was unfortunate against the backdrop of the

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tremendous buildup that the meeting received in the media. Britain’s Daily Telegraph stated that the “Paris meeting will be one of the most important since nato was created,” while it received front-page attention in the New York Times, although the paper admitted its suspicions that there seemed to be a lack of practical proposals for transforming the alliance. The matter had even become a minor issue in the Democratic primary race in the United States. In a campaign speech a few days before the meeting, Estes Kefauver, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, challenged Dulles to work sincerely to broaden the scope of the alliance.52 Dulles’s proposal for a committee was greeted with some disappointment by other nato countries, especially when the secretary of state refused membership himself. He instead nominated Pearson as chairman and Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange and Italian foreign minister Gaetano Martino as the other two members. As Pearson complained to the assembled ministerial council, “there was a danger that the public might regard the proposal ... as a sign that the Alliance was taking refuge in the establishment of just another committee. On the other hand, it might also be thought that this group was being given an impossible task.”53 Pearson’s concerns about the feasibility of the study appeared justified. Not only had the United States distanced itself from the group, but Dulles made clear initial US thinking on the limits of non-military cooperation within nato. As well as concerns over consultation, he stressed that aid to the developing world should not bear a nato label and questioned the appropriateness of the United Nations as a forum to coordinate Western assistance, given the American preference for bilateral arrangements. Finally, he stressed that nato should be “very careful” about appearing to form a voting bloc in the United Nations.54 Despite the disappointment over Dulles’s proposal, there were few other courses available to ministers, and the idea of yet another internal nato study was accepted. Pearson found himself, for the second time in five years, heading a committee of ministers, quickly dubbed the “Three Wise Men,” which was charged with developing nato’s non-military side. Realizing that American support was crucial to the success of any nato imitative, Pearson made it his first order of business to discuss his work with the American permanent representative to nato, George Perkins, along with Livingston Merchant, the American ambassador

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to Canada, in early June. Pearson also visited Washington a few days later to discuss the matter with Dulles and Senator Walter George, the retiring Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had been asked by Eisenhower to direct the American contribution to the Committee of Three exercise. The outcome of both sets of conversations was inconclusive. Perkins and Merchant expressed interest in seeing consultation expanded, but Dulles outlined his many reservations about the process, stressing that as a major power, the United States often had to act quickly when matters arose and could not always consult its allies. Moreover, in Dulles’s mind, there were two types of international issues: those that directly affected the alliance and “worldwide policy matters which did not affect nato members more directly than other members of the international community.” The United States was prepared to consult in the first instance, but it refused to be bound to exchange views on the second category of issues, beyond offering explanations of US policy. In terms of economic consultation, the secretary of state repeated his belief that nato should not turn into an economic agency or involve itself directly with aid to the developing world. Discussions might take place, however, on broad economic issues that would assist in building up the economies of Western Europe in the face of rapid Soviet economic growth.55 Throughout the Canadian-US conversations, it was stressed that the American position was still tentative, and indeed, an Atlantic Community Working Group had been established within the State Department. Its report, circulated in early August, ran to almost two hundred pages. Length did not mean novelty or creativity. Its authors, like their political boss, spent most of their time justifying the need for greater non-military cooperation within nato, rather than developing concrete proposals. Such an exercise was not without value. In view of the movement toward closer integration that was occurring on the European continent, it is interesting that nato was given primacy as the forum for Western cooperation. “The strictly European movement offers some promise, but seems unlikely to advance significantly, or in a manner assuredly in the US interest, without continued US association through the broad Atlantic framework.” The working group’s report itself did contain some recommendations concerned mainly with consultation. In order to facilitate discussion, it recommended the appointment of high-ranking govern-

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ment officials by each member state to serve as “Ministerial Delegates” who would ordinarily be based in their home capitals. Permanent representatives could continue to meet on a regular basis, but these more senior delegates would also be available when issues of grave importance arose. In addition, the working group urged that greater responsibility be given to the secretary general and the international staff in fostering consultation. Perhaps more significantly, the report mirrored Dulles’s thinking in favouring some type of nato dispute settlement mechanism modelled loosely on the oas one. The working group’s findings on economic questions were limited. Like Dulles, it believed that existing organizations should be utilized, but it saw no difficulty in nato members undertaking discussions of major economic matters within the Council. The working group proposed that the United States should encourage forms of cooperation in the cultural and information fields, something that the US had traditionally supported. Little was offered, however, in terms of lasting solutions. The alliance’s failures in this area were largely caused by leaving initiatives to individual countries, yet at the same time, direct nato sponsorship was seen as impractical. All that could be suggested was that greater discussion and cooperation be encouraged. Underlying the working group’s report was an acknowledgment that real change in nato would come only through a change of attitude on the part of the alliance’s membership. “What will always be of paramount importance is the attitude of its members – their readiness to subordinate national prejudices, and even at times national prerogatives, to the urgency of the needs of the Atlantic Community today ... Above all, the success of the Atlantic consultation is likely to hinge upon the behaviour of the US Government, upon its demonstrated capacity for leadership and its readiness to entrust even matters of important concern to itself to the process of common deliberation and mutual counsel.”56 Dulles was not swayed. When the Committee of Three circulated a questionnaire to members, the United States cited consultation as key in enhancing nato unity but added the usual litany of qualifications about US great-power responsibilities and relationship with Congress. There was little in the response, beyond the call for some type of dispute settlement mechanism, which indicated a change of US attitude.57

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Britain approached the subject of non-military cooperation cautiously. As the matter came up for discussion among senior officials and eventually the Cabinet, the enthusiastic position taken by the Foreign Office in early May was replaced by a view that nato’s nonmilitary side should be developed only as far as it would aid in the Cold War. Economic and political consultation was therefore to be limited to East-West issues or the internal strengthening of the alliance so that it could meet the Soviet threat. The British could not agree to a general obligation to “consult in advance on every foreign policy issue.” Any idea of a nato parliamentary assembly was ruled out.58 France adopted a restrained approach toward the topic of consultation. No hard or fast rules on the subject could be developed, and each issue would have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The focus of France’s response was on economic affairs and reiterated its May call for nato to take a role in aid to the underdeveloped world through discussion and consultation. The actual programs themselves, such as Pineau’s World Economic Development Agency, would be administered by other bodies.59 The remainder of the responses were equally predictable.60 The wording of Article 2 may have dealt specifically with the ending of economic conflicts within the alliance, but no country appeared interested in nato as an economic agency. Most did agree, to varying degrees, that some general discussion and consultation could take place, especially when it came to ways of counteracting Soviet activity in the developing world. The exception was Denmark, which went so far as to state that nato did not have any role to play in the economic sphere unless it directly related to military spending. Rather than focus on economics, most of nato’s smaller members concentrated on political consultation. Led by Canada, they presented a view that recognized the right of all countries to freedom of action but emphasized the need for serious consideration of alliance views before acting. This opinion was a central theme of both the Italian and the German questionnaire responses. The Netherlands was also notable for its enthusiasm and was in fact the only member that expressed an interest in the development of a nato parliamentary assembly. Surprisingly, Norway demonstrated more reserve than might have been expected from a member of the Committee of Three. Not all of nato’s middle and smaller powers can be identified, however, with the interest and enthusiasm exhibited by this group. Den-

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mark, Portugal, and, to a certain degree, Luxembourg adopted a more cautious position toward nato’s non-military potential. The Committee of Three asked members their views on less-vital areas of non-military activity: cultural cooperation, the role of the nato information service, and organizational and functional questions. In terms of cultural issues, Canada, Norway, and Denmark expressed interest in the establishment of a research institute for Atlantic studies. The idea was rejected by the other members. The concept of a civilian defence college received more attention, with most countries stating a favourable opinion. All members agreed that nato should concern itself with the recruitment and training of scientists and technicians. As for the nato Information Service, most thought that nato should attempt to counter Soviet propaganda but were divided on how far the agency should go in offering opinions and analysis as well as strictly routine reports. There was a difference of opinion on the degree to which nato discussions should be made public. Some members argued that making the public more aware of the issues being discussed by nato would enhance support for the alliance, while others raised the issue of security and the effects that such a policy would have on the present practice of members being able to speak with a high degree of candour. When it came to possible changes to the structure of the alliance, most members seemed to believe that the existing organization was flexible enough to permit a high degree of consultation; what was required was a change of attitude on the part of the membership. A number of minor procedural suggestions were made, such as one by the United States and West Germany that special meetings should be held between ministerial gatherings at the deputy foreign minister level. Many countries suggested that the secretary general be encouraged to raise matters at the nato Council meetings that might not otherwise come up. t h e r e p o rt o f t h e c o m m i t t e e o f t h r e e After a review of the questionnaire responses, follow-up interviews took place to clarify the position of each of the powers. These were completed in late September, and the final report was prepared for presentation to the December ministerial meeting of the Council. In a bizarre coincidence, the final stages of the process took place in the

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shadow of the Suez crisis, which reached a critical point that October. The joint British-French military actions, undertaken against Egypt in response to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, were opposed by the Americans, placing the Western alliance under incredible tensions. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the report focused on the issue of consultation. As its covering letter noted, events in the Middle East had caused “divergencies” to develop within nato “without real efforts being made to overcome them by effective consultation.” The “committee therefore has had to take into account [the] present critical problems with which nato is confronted.”61 The report itself was divided into six chapters, with the first serving as a general introduction.62 Although about non-military cooperation, it recognized that the “first essential” of nato was the commitment of its members to collective defence, which could only be discharged when political and economic relations between members were “cooperative and close.” Taking a subtle swipe at the great powers, the report stated, “This will not be the case ... unless the member governments – especially the more powerful ones – are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and through nato for more than purposes of collective military security.” The report itself dealt first with consultation, stating that issues discussed should not be limited to the geographic area covered by the treaty. Efforts should be made to harmonize nato’s “policies in relation to other areas taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community.” “In following this course, nato can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy.” As to the actual exchanges of information itself, the report drew some harsh conclusions: “Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the nato Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.” The Three recognized that it would not always be easy to undertake consultation. But a real effort must be made. They recommended a set of “five principles and practices.” Members were asked to “inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance.” On a similar note, the right of any member (or

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the secretary general) to raise for discussion in the Council “any subject which is of common nato interest and not purely of a domestic character” was confirmed. Members were not to make major political pronouncements on matters affecting nato without first engaging in “adequate advance consultation.” This requirement could be waived if “circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible.” Once consultation had occurred, members “should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments,” even when no consensus was reached within the Council. Where a consensus was reached, “it should be reflected in the formation of national policies.” A country should provide an explanation to the Council if, for domestic reasons, it could not follow the consensus. The committee recommended that more planning be undertaken before Council meetings to facilitate discussion and suggested that a committee of political advisers, consisting of representatives from each member country, be established. The committee, aided by experts when required, could study major issues such as Soviet activities. The Three recommended that nato foreign ministers review the political progress of the alliance at their annual spring meeting. To this end, the secretary general should prepare an annual report on major issues affecting the alliance and the action taken by members thus far. Contrary to the wishes of a number of countries, the Three proposed a formula for settling disputes between nato members. When a dispute arose between two or more members that could not be settled directly, they were obligated to involve nato before submission to any other international agency. The sole exception was legal or economic disputes that were best left to a legal tribunal or specialized economic organization. Once the dispute was referred to nato, the secretary general could be empowered, with the permission of the countries involved, to act as a mediator, using up to three permanent representatives to assist him if necessary. If the dispute posed a threat to the solidarity of the entire alliance, it could be brought to the attention of the Council itself. The third chapter examined economic cooperation and concluded that the economic goals of the North Atlantic community did not have to be pursued exclusively through nato itself but could be sought through other international organizations. The Three recommended that nato not establish formal relations with other economic organizations or have its members form within them blocs that might

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alienate other “friendly” governments. However, there should be consultation within nato on economic issues of “special political or strategic importance.” If an economic dispute was to arise that threatened the solidarity of the alliance and could not be resolved through other economic organizations, a member might bring the dispute to nato’s attention through the dispute settlement process. The danger of the rising level of Soviet aid to the developing world was recognized, but nato was not seen an appropriate agency to administer competing aid. Each member state was encouraged to develop its own programs and to consult regularly with other nato members. The only concrete recommendation in this area was for the formation of a committee of economic advisers to undertake preliminary discussions of such questions. The third chapter also mentioned the need for greater scientific and technical cooperation. A conference of international experts should be convened to examine current Western programs and propose future activities that might be undertaken through nato or other organizations. The fourth chapter addressed the need for further cultural collaboration to foster a sense of Atlantic community, with members being asked to place a special emphasis on programs that developed links across the Atlantic. nato-sponsored seminars for teachers were suggested, along with other efforts in the educational field (such as scholarships and fellowships). It was proposed that a youth specialist be added to the nato staff to promote closer relations with youth groups. Exchanges of military personnel beyond normal training periods were also encouraged. The fifth chapter, on cooperation in the information field, advocated a coordinated effort to educate the public about nato’s role and achievements. A series of practical recommendations were included to help achieve a program of information dissemination to be administered jointly by nato’s Information Division and member governments. The final chapter dealt with administrative recommendations. No major structural changes were advised, but the report called for a series of procedural modifications to nato’s operation. Ministers were encouraged to attend meetings of permanent representatives. There should be more preparation before Council meetings, with members circulating basic position papers in advance. It was also suggested that more time be allowed for ministerial meetings so as to facilitate serious discussion rather than the delivery of “declarations of policy pre-

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pared in advance.” The committee urged the strengthening of the role of nato staff, in particular of the secretary general, who should chair ministerial meetings and was encouraged to propose items for nato consultation so that member governments would have a greater responsibility to keep him fully informed. r e s p o n s e to t h e c o m m i t t e e o f t h r e e r e p o rt The report cannot be described as startling or revolutionary. But reflecting the views of Pearson and many of nato’s other middle and smaller powers, it presented a clear vision of non-military cooperation based on effective political consultation. The report suggested a number of minor procedural and organizational changes, but this was not enough. To implement the report required the leadership and cooperation of nato’s three major powers. Yet during the entire questionnaire and interview period, none had exhibited any significant interest in pursuing the goal of effective consultation within the alliance. The Suez crisis demonstrates the absurdity of the situation. Here was an instance that seriously threatened the unity of the alliance, but the great powers chose not to use nato as a forum to inform or consult their allies or attempt to heal the developing rifts within the West. Although meetings of nato’s permanent representatives were held almost daily when the matter reached a critical point, there is no evidence of the matter being raised earlier. It is certain that Britain and France made no effort to inform the nato Council in advance of their military actions against Egypt.63 The sole exception to the silence within nato was a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 September, attended by a number of foreign ministers, which demonstrated that the Americans were as uninterested in nato consultation as the French and the British. The meeting had apparently been called to report on international discussions that had been taking place in London to resolve the crisis sparked by the canal’s seizure, but it achieved nothing in the way of real consultation. Going into it, the Americans privately voiced their concerns that associating the Suez canal question too closely with nato might offend non-Western countries involved in the talks and appear to be undermining their efforts. In an attempt to minimize any damage that might come from the meeting, informal approaches were made to a number of nato governments asking that they ensure that no far-reaching discussions occurred.64

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The United States appears to have been successful in blocking consultation. In advance of the meeting, it received assurances from a number of nato members, including Canada, that they would not enter into detailed discussions.65 Accounts of the gathering itself make little reference to substantive discussions. Most importantly, it is clear that the Americans refused to make a statement, enraging both Spaak and British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd. Without tangible American participation in the meeting, it can be certain that little in the way of a real exchange of views occurred.66 There was some justification to the American view that nato should not be engaging in substantive discussions before the outcome of the London meeting was known. However, internal American communications reveal a much more deep-seated prejudice against nato involvement in any stage of the crisis. A telegram sent to the American embassies in London and Paris on 29 August (for the information of American officials only) made it clear that the State Department believed it “important that [the] Council should not r[e]p[ea]t not gain [the] impression or be left to assume that [the] nac will be consulted in advance re[garding] future moves that may be necessary in the Suez situation.”67 Not only was the alliance virtually ignored during the buildup to the crisis, but the proceedings of the December nato ministerial meeting indicated that the views of the United States and Britain on consultation had changed little. Dulles objected to a formal discussion of the Middle East situation and only agreed to consultation on the matter when pressured by his nato allies. He took issue with the specific sections of the Committee of Three report dealing with consultation, claiming that the report’s statement that “there cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy,” if taken literally, went too far. It was true that disunity in foreign policy might on occasion “jeopardize defence,” but the secretary of state did not believe that the foreign policies of all members needed to be in harmony on all worldwide issues at all times. He did not believe that this was what was being suggested by the report’s authors. Dulles criticized the section of the report that called on alliance members to consult with the nato Council before adopting any foreign policy or making pronouncements that affected other members. He continued to stress both the wide range of American commitments and the constraints on policy-making imposed by its constitutional procedures. Both factors meant that issues often could not be raised in

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the North Atlantic Council until they had in fact become accepted US policy. Dulles also repeated his earlier sentiments about the United States’ worldwide responsibilities and its association, through other collective security associations, with thirty countries not represented on the Council. As a result, a matter of more direct concern to a nonnato ally could not first be discussed in the North Atlantic Council. In a dismissive tone, Dulles told the Council that the United States would not have an international “hierarchy of associations,” adding later that he could not see himself giving more time than he already did to nato Council meetings. Referring to his April speech, Dulles reminded the Council that he had warned against drifting into “ill-defined relationships”. If adopting this report meant that the United States would not be able to undertake any action in the world without first consulting the North Atlantic Council, the result would be “confusion in the future, misunderstandings and recriminations.”68 Reporting to the president a few days later, the secretary of state said that the biggest problem at the meeting had “been the desire of nato countries to have US policy made in the nato council.”69 To further complicate matters, copies of Dulles’s statement were leaked to the media and appeared the following day in a number of newspapers. “Dulles Rules Out Consulting nato in Time of Stress” ran the front-page headline of the New York Times, which reported that his statement had “set limits to a movement that has been growing within the Atlantic alliance for two years.”70 Dulles’s criticism, when taken to the extreme, may sound legitimate. But it is clear that he was ignoring the report’s underlying spirit and interpreting it in its most stringent form. Section 51, for example, which deals primarily with consultation, states that “a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members.” The proviso was added that this was to be the case “unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible.” The thrust of the report was positive and spoke of consideration for other members’ interests and views in making foreign policy. If a decision was made that did not reflect the general consensus, further explanation was to be provided to the Council. In his London speech, Pearson had spoken of the development of an accepted custom of consultation within nato, not of an infringement upon sovereignty.

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Dulles refused to see the report in this way and insisted on regarding it as an attempt by nato to exert some sort of control over the United States. British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd shared Dulles’s opinion of the report, stressing the United Kingdom’s difficulty in always undertaking consultation because of its “worldwide responsibility.” Selwyn Lloyd concluded that if the “consultation proposals mean every member [is] given the right to criticize and obstruct every decision, not much will be accomplished.”71 Pineau also challenged the report, but for very different reasons. According to the French foreign minister, it was too vague when it came to the need for nato to consult on issues outside the Atlantic area. Throughout the Suez crisis, the French had seen American actions as challenging nato solidarity, even though the area in question was not part of the North Atlantic. As his prime minister, Mollet, had stated in a speech in late October, “is it really possible to limit the North Atlantic Alliance to one area of the world? we do not think so ... solidarity is not divisible.”72 Pineau brought this view to the December ministerial meeting. The report could not be accepted until nato decided the obligations of members when issues arose in other parts of the world. If the report was passed on to the secretary general without this matter being clarified, Pineau believed that there would be insurmountable difficulties.73 In light of these concerns, the French foreign minister suggested that those conclusions of the report bearing on specific organizational and procedural changes be adopted by the Council. The remainder of the report should merely be noted. This proposal was agreed to, and the ministers invited the “Council in permanent session to implement, in the light of the comments made by the Governments, the principles and recommendations contained in this report.” Ministers also passed a resolution accepting the dispute settlement mechanism outlined by the committee.74 Despite the position taken by Pineau, it is questionable whether the French had experienced a change of heart on consultation. They had disregarded the nato Council when it came to the Algerian issue and during the buildup to Suez. What Pineau and Mollet appeared more concerned about was the lack of support for the Anglo-French position on Suez at the United Nations. Faced with a constant barrage of criticism in this international forum, they were happier to have the matter settled behind the closed doors of nato. In addition, an appeal

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for solidarity might stem some of the public debate. Once the Suez crisis subsided, however, France went back to its old ways. Following the meeting, alliance members moved quickly to implement the organizational recommendations contained in the report, and a Committee of Political Advisers and a Committee of Economic Advisers were formed, charged with examining issues prior to Council consideration. The question of their specific roles, however, became lost in lengthy procedural debates. Discussion concerning the Committee of Economic Advisers focused almost entirely on the question of its status in relation to other nato bodies, rather than on the work it would perform. Once formed in January 1957, the committee slipped into obscurity, merely commenting from time to time on technical questions referred to it by the Council. It was ignored during discussion on major political issues, including those with a high economic content, one instance being the question of nato organizing the sale of key crops from pro-Western Middle Eastern states.75 The Committee of Political Advisers, also established in January 1957, played a more prominent role in nato deliberations and met almost weekly throughout its first year. Although it considered a wide range of issues, they tended to be of secondary importance. Commenting upon the committee’s work in late 1957, the Canadian permanent representative to nato, Dana Wilgress, noted that discussion of most important issues had been dealt with exclusively by the Council. nato’s new secretary general, Paul-Henri Spaak, had “resisted any suggestion that they should be referred to the Committee of Political Advisers.”76 Other organizational changes recommended by the “Three Wise Men” concerned greater scientific and technical cooperation. Their report had proposed that nato convene a conference of experts from each member country to exchange information on problems surrounding scientific and technical development in nato and to propose a specific program for the alliance. But procedural difficulties were to mar the implementation of this proposal. Rather than proceed with the calling of the conference, the Council instead established a working group, which met on 14 March 1957. The United States, which favoured a strong nato role in this area, believed that the working group should proceed with the planning of the proposed conference as well as discussing the general role that nato could play in scientific and technical cooperation. Such an

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interpretation was not held by other members of the working group, who, it quickly became apparent during the course of the first meeting, were not only uncertain of the issues they were to discuss but even questioned whether the alliance was committed to holding a conference. Britain and, surprisingly, Canada voiced concerns about the advisability of a nato-sponsored conference since work was already being done by existing organizations. They bowed to American pressure, however, and reluctantly agreed to recommend to the secretary general that a task force be established to look into the holding of a conference “as soon as satisfactory preparation can be made.” The establishment of the task force in late April did little to resolve the growing divergence of views. Members agreed to it only after being assured that the question of a nato conference would be left open until a later date. The stalemate continued throughout the year. The United States (supported by the Netherlands and Greece) continued to call for a nato conference on science and technology, while Canada and Britain (supported by Norway, Italy, Denmark, and Belgium) still expressed doubts about its suitability and the extent to which nato should involve itself in this form of cooperation.77 The reason for strong US support for nato activity in the scientific and technical fields is easily understood. As a country that was investing huge amounts of money in research and development, it saw benefits in a greater harmonization of activity. Congressional interest was another important factor. Henry Jackson, an influential Democratic senator from Washington, had been appointed by the nato parliamentary conference in November 1955 to look into the question of scientific and technical cooperation among alliance countries. Although his committee was not officially linked with the US administration, Jackson was offered as much assistance as possible in formulating his report.78 Canada, meanwhile, took an opposite view, believing that nato’s scientific work should be limited. Ottawa even privately admitted that it would have been more vocal in its opposition to the holding of a conference had it not been so closely associated with the Committee of Three. Canada’s attitude stemmed from skepticism within its scientific community. Sufficient cooperation, it was felt, was already taking place through other organizations.79 Canada did not want nato initiatives in science and technology to exclude non-nato Western powers, a concern shared by the United Kingdom, whose representatives

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argued that other organizations, such as the oeec, were far more effective in this area. The British reaction can be partially attributed to a traditional dislike of any substantial overlap in the responsibilities of international organizations. Britain was also participating in negotiations leading to a European free trade area with a number of non-nato powers and may not have wanted to offend them by creating an exclusive nato bloc involved in scientific cooperation.80 conclusion The difficulties in implementing the relatively innocuous organizational recommendations of the “Wise Men Report” did not bode well for the future of non-military cooperation within nato. The EastWest thaw of 1955–56 had once again created a crisis within the alliance. A combination of inter-member disputes and increasing worries over Soviet activity in the developing world served to threaten the future of nato. US secretary of state Dulles had set out to have nato broaden its non-military role, but his vision was vague and fraught with contradictions. He placed tremendous emphasis on increased consultation as the key to the alliance’s future, but refused to alter the extremely qualified approach the United States took to discussing its foreign policy decisions with its allies. Unable to present a clear plan, Dulles put forward the idea of yet another ministerial committee, on which the United States once again refused to serve. The committee’s findings were quite predictable. Every power admitted that the alliance was facing grave problems and needed to concentrate on greater consultation. nato’s Big Three, however, made clear that they would do little to change their approach. The lack of consultation that accompanied the Suez crisis, which erupted during the Committee of Three’s deliberations, removed any lingering doubts that the United States or Britain was about to modify its attitude. Both complained about the inflexible approach to consultation taken by the committee in its report and asked that its implementation take their concerns into account. By contrast, France criticized the report as not being clear enough on the need for unity in areas outside the North Atlantic. Yet, in light of their past actions, it is unlikely that the French were sincerely interested in accepting longterm commitments to consult on international matters. Pearson recognized the nature of the challenge that still faced nato. In his memoirs, he speaks of his attitude as he prepared the

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report: “By this time experience confirmed beyond any doubt that the North Atlantic coalition, in spite of ringing public speeches and declarations by governments, could develop its non-military potential only as far as the United States and, to a lesser degree, Britain and France, were prepared to go. Middle and smaller powers can rarely lay down policies which greater powers will adopt unless it is clearly in their own interests to do so.”81 As, over the next year, nato’s members grappled with the implementation of the controversial sections of the report concerning consultation, the continuing lack of willingness on the part of all alliance members to change would become even more obvious.

6 The Limits of the Alliance The Aftermath of the Wise Men Report, 1956–1957

The criticisms and qualifications that had accompanied acceptance of the Committee of Three’s report in late 1956 tended to be forgotten when nato’s leaders referred to it publicly over the course of the next year. The wounds over Suez and other inter-alliance disputes would take time to heal, and any initiative aimed at keeping the alliance together was welcomed. “I believe,” John Foster Dulles wrote to Clarence Streit in late March 1957, “that at this time in the evolution of Western unity, we are on the right course in following up the recommendations of the Committee of Three.”1 Pearson expressed a similar sentiment when he told the Canadian House of Commons in January that year that a “significant aspect” of the recent nato meeting had been an “evident desire on the part of all members to strengthen the non-military side of nato.”2 There were reasons for some optimism. A briefing note prepared for the American delegation to the May 1957 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council enthusiastically described progress made in the area of broadening Council discussions of foreign policy issues. “In addition to the usual discussions on trends and policies in the Soviet Union, intensive exchanges of views have taken place in nato on such problems as aid to Hungary, relations with the Kadar regime, the Hungarian refugee situation, economic aid to Poland, relations between nato representatives and Soviet and Hungarian officials in Moscow and other capitals; German reunification and European security, the

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Soviet note of February 11 to the US-UK and France on the Middle East, and the more recent Soviet notes on European integration.” Consultation on a number of these issues, such as the reply to the Soviet note on the Middle East, led to the formation of a common Western approach. A large number of other foreign policy matters, including the Eisenhower doctrine, the results of the seato conference at Canberra, and the Anglo-American talks in March, had also been brought to the attention of the alliance by individual members.3 The Bonn ministerial meeting in May 1957 was the scene for a lengthy exchange of views on Soviet activities in the Middle East. Discussion also took place on disarmament proposals that had recently been put forward by the Soviet Union in the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in which the other members were the United States, Britain, France, and Canada.4 One very encouraging development for non-military cooperation was Paul-Henri Spaak’s appointment as nato secretary general in May 1957. The former Belgian prime minister and minister of foreign affairs saw the Wise Men Report as holding the answer to many of nato’s problems. In a press conference soon after he became secretary general, he declared that, “the charter that I will apply will be the report of the three wise men.”5 Spaak had a far-reaching idea of what foreign policy consultation entailed, publicly remarking in September that “diplomacy on a purely national scale is outmoded diplomacy.”6 He brought to the job great personal zeal, an incredible optimism about the degree to which non-military cooperation could be fostered, and a readiness to challenge those who disagreed. Spaak saw the challenges facing him in nato as similar to those posed by the Messina conference, when he had helped to negotiate the complex agreement that led to the Treaty of Rome. Under Spaak’s leadership, nato saw a number of successes in the field of political consultation during the second half of 1957. One of the most important was the continuing discussion by the permanent representatives of the UN disarmament talks that were occurring throughout the summer. The talks themselves broke down in September, but it was generally agreed by all members that the view put forward by the Western members of the subcommittee was based on extensive consultation with their nato allies.7 Spaak helped to arrange a loan to Iceland from West Germany and the United States to offset the financial difficulties that nato’s smallest member was experiencing. By raising the money from Western sources,

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the Icelandic government was able to refuse an offer by the Soviet Union to provide economic assistance.8 Under Spaak’s leadership, members of the alliance assisted two pro-Western Middle Eastern states to sell key crops in an effort to keep them tied to the Western camp. Much of Lebanon’s apple crop, suffering from a boycott by the pro-Soviet Syria, was purchased by the Americans and the French. Increased Western buying of Sudanese cotton also occurred; but with the exception of French purchases, this appeared to be more a result of price cutting than of Western altruism.9 Much of nato’s leadership believed that these successes were not sufficient, arguing that not much had changed since the acceptance of the Wise Men Report. Italy, for example, complained throughout the spring of 1957 that it was being ignored by nato’s great powers. Canada, meanwhile, voiced concerns about the lack of impact of the Committee of Three report. A March External Affairs memorandum noted that “changing conditions and the preoccupations both of a domestic and international character seem to have distracted governments’ attention from the importance which should be clearly attached to the non-military aspect of nato.”10 These sentiments were repeated later in the year by West German leader Konrad Adenauer in a letter to Dulles. “Never before have there been so numerous causes of conflict in the world. They are apt to put the alliance within a few hours before the question of war and peace. Only if we mutually agree in time and beforehand on all existing possibilities, can we preserve unity and prevent the alliance from disintegrating in the face of a question vital to us all.”11 Spaak, in his position as secretary general, joined in the chorus of those criticizing the lack of progress in implementing the Wise Men Report. More optimistic than the West Germans about the progress that had been made, he still believed that much more could be accomplished.12 Dulles, when pressed, agreed that part of the blame for the alliance’s troubles rested with the attitudes of its members, but he also criticized the report itself as being inadequate. The United States, he told British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd in March 1957, “had tried hard to make nato a more effective forum for political consultation,” but it believed that it had not “yet ‘struck oil’ in this field and that the tendency still exits for nato to operate on the old basis.” Dulles did not explain the specific reasons for his feelings. As many critics believed that nato’s problems stemmed from an unwillingness to implement the report, Dulles’s charge appears to be more of a defence against those

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criticizing the United States for not properly consulting with its nato allies.13 The State Department appeared to differ with Dulles’s analysis, citing the attitude of nato’s powers, rather than the Wise Men Report, as the problem. As a department brief outlining nato’s successes in the area of consultation was forced to admit, there was “still some reluctance on the part of member governments to consult fully in nato on developments that are of great importance to the Alliance ... Moreover, the information given to the Council on developments of interest to the Alliance, particularly by the Standing Group countries is not always meaningful or very informative in content.”14 cyprus Events during 1957 confirm the legitimacy of these criticisms. A number of issues of great importance to alliance members were either ignored or were the subject of only limited discussion. Of these, the continuing crisis over Cyprus remained a key example. As has been seen, the Three Wise Men had recognized the existence of such interalliance problems, and as a result of the recommendations contained in their report, nato had adopted a resolution outlining a dispute settlement procedure. Under this procedure, the secretary general would be charged with acting as a mediator and work to resolve disputes between members.15 By the spring of 1957, the Cyprus dispute appeared to be readymade to serve as the first case for nato mediation. A British proposal late the previous year for a gradual move to independence, but with no possibility of union with Greece, had been rejected by the Greek government. The debate had shifted to the United Nations in the spring, resulting in acrimonious exchanges and a British charge that the Greek government was arming the Cypriot guerrillas. The debate had resulted in a stalemate, with agreement on nothing more than the United Nations’ desire for the crisis to be resolved by peaceful means. Testing his new powers to mediate, Lord Ismay offered his good offices to Britain, Greece, and Turkey following the end of the United Nations debate in early 1957. Both Britain and Turkey publicly agreed to the offer of mediation; the former announced its acceptance in the House of Commons on 20 March. In his statement the British colonial secretary, Lennox Boyd, placed particular importance on the fact that this offer had come about as a result of the decisions surrounding the

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Committee of Three Report.16 Ignoring the obligatory nature of the dispute settlement resolution, Greece refused Ismay’s offer on the grounds that the Cyprus dispute should be negotiated between Britain and the people of Cyprus, in the spirit of the UN resolution. It maintained that Turkey had no claim to Cyprus and should be excluded from all discussions.17 As the Cyprus issue continued to simmer, Spaak, in his new capacity as secretary general, tried his hand at the problem. In June he submitted a memorandum to each of the three governments suggesting that Cyprus should become independent but under terms that would forbid union with any other country. Its security would be guaranteed by the interested countries, and it would contain a base to be controlled by either Britain or nato. Spaak’s initiative was not formally rejected by all countries, and Britain showed itself open to finding a solution through nato. The Turks, however, felt that their views had not been sufficiently considered in its preparation. As a result, a visit by Spaak to Ankara was postponed at the request of the Turkish government. A Turkish general election, along with another UN debate on the matter, led to further postponement of Spaak’s initiative. Despite this slow progress, the secretary general continued to work behind the scenes throughout the autumn of 1957, meeting with the Greek foreign minister in Paris in mid-November. A solution to the Cyprus problem was not to be found that year, but Spaak’s activities marked a sincere attempt to put the Committee of Three report into action. His continuing interest throughout 1958, including the formulation of the unsuccessful “Spaak Plan” for Cyprus, kept the lines of communication open between the various parties and led eventually to the Zurich agreement of 1959.18 other sources of in ter-alliance tension The massive reorganization of British defence that was announced in April 1957 through the Duncan Sandys white paper posed another challenge to nato unity. The new policy called for an increased reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces. The result of this policy, as Britain outlined to the Western European Union meeting in March, would be a cut in British forces on the continent by 30,000 men. The announcement of the reduction, without prior consultation, was greeted with acrimony by other nato members and served to increase inter-alliance disharmony.

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An additional source of tension within nato was the signature of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, creating the European Common Market and Euratom. Canada continued to have concerns about the treaty but External Affairs showed no interest in raising the matter within the nato forum. The department’s advice to Pearson was that Canada should oppose any wording proposed for the communiqué of the Bonn ministerial meeting which gave the treaty too “solemn a blessing” since “this might weaken our hand in opposing certain sections of the Common Market Treaty when it is reviewed elsewhere.”19 Another issue of great importance that received scant nato attention during this period was Algeria. As France continued to fight its protracted civil war in this African state, massive resources were being diverted from Europe. In the eyes of the developing world, the war was seen as a reassertion of colonialism; its unpopularity was tarring the entire alliance and hindering its efforts to keep the developing world out of the Soviet sphere. France raised the issue only twice during permanent representatives’ meetings. In February, comments were sought on a recent statement of policy by French prime minister Mollet. According to one report of the meeting, “when doubts were expressed regarding the effectiveness of that policy the French reaction was such as to make it clear that France was not prepared to take advice on the matter.” In September, France shared a proposal for the future political organization of Algeria with its nato colleagues. Perhaps in the light of past precedent, no comments were made by any member.20 Inter-alliance tension over Algeria reached a new high through the decision by the American and British governments on 14 November to sell arms to Tunisia without consulting France. This decision had been made in order to prevent the Tunisians obtaining arms from the Soviets, but the French believed that Tunisia was in fact supplying Algerian rebels. The agreement was made public on 15 November and led to a walkout by the French delegation attending the third annual nato parliamentary conference. The French had been aware that the United States and Britain had been contemplating this move and had held discussions on the matter, but they saw the final decision, made without consulting them, as a breach of nato solidarity. They had, however, never demonstrated any interest in using the North Atlantic Council as a forum to discuss the matter prior to the Anglo-American move and even pressured Spaak not to raise the matter. According to one observer, “the French Government’s subsequent actions and statements strongly suggest that, in its view, nato’s role in regard to Algeria is

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merely to provide a body of unquestioning support at the U.N. for France’s position, whatever it may be.”21 American moves to uphold the shaky regime of Jordanian king Hussein also added to inter-alliance tensions. Concerned with the seemingly pro-Nassar and pro-Soviet drift of his government, the young king had declared martial law in April 1957 and taken the country’s leftist leaders into custody. To show support for Hussein’s actions, the United States moved its Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean and airlifted arms to Jordan, with no advance warning to nato.22 Inadequate consultation concerning the Syrian crisis that erupted in August 1957 was the source of a more profound sense of disunity within nato. The roots of the crisis can be found in growing Western concern over Soviet influence in the Middle East, with Syria identified as a country fast being drawn into the Soviet orbit. This development appeared to be confirmed by the August announcement of a SyrianSoviet economic accord, followed a few days later by the expulsion of a number of American diplomats on the charge that they were involved in a coup to overthrow the Syrian government.23 Eisenhower and Dulles saw the Syrian situation as a threat to stability in the Middle East and resolved to take action. Indirect action was favoured to avoid charges of Western imperialism, drawing the Soviets into the region, or linking the matter to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The most logical plan envisioned some type of movement by Iraq against Syria, with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan acting in a diversionary capacity by massing forces on the Syrian border and preventing Damascus from concentrating its troops. The United States would support the move through arms transfers and diplomatic support (which would included preventing intervention by either the Soviets or Israel). In anticipation of such an effort, the United States readied its forces in the area and stationed the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. The Americans encouraged their pro-Western Middle East allies to take action and sent senior diplomat Loy Henderson to the region, but no firm plan materialized. Iraq, in particular, was lukewarm to the idea of direct intervention. Eisenhower and Dulles approached Turkey on the matter. In a highly secret communication sent on 10 September, they stated their position. The United States was not able to encourage Turkey to take action against Syria but would not discourage such a move. It was in fact willing to supply military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern state that wished to “meet” Syrian aggression. The Americans promised to support such action in the United Nations and

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would intervene if Turkey was attacked by the Soviets. Turkey responded to this offer by increasing its forces on the Syrian border, bringing the Middle East to the brink of war.24 Reacting to the rising tensions within the Middle East, the Soviet Union had jumped into the fray by engaging in a propaganda war against the United States, claiming (not that inaccurately) that the US was planning a military invasion of Syria. On 3 September, a week before the American note was sent to Turkey, the Soviets sent a note to nato’s Big Three requesting a joint declaration renouncing force and interference in the Middle East region. Dulles responded on 12 September, attacking the Soviets for their attempts to destabilize the region. Soon after, the Soviets anchored one of their naval squadrons off the Syrian coast. The already tense situation in the Middle East had become the focus of superpower rivalry. As the troop buildup continued in Turkey, the coalition of Middle Eastern states opposed to Syria began to disappear. The debate shifted to the United Nations and drew both superpowers into verbal conflict, which included a statement by Dulles that “if there is an attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union, it would not mean a purely defensive operation by the United States, with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary from which to attack Turkey.”25 The crisis finally faded away beneath the bluster of General Assembly debates, but for a few months it had been a major source of tension in Middle East relations and between the superpowers. During the crisis the United States had been in close consultation with Britain and Turkey but had virtually ignored nato. The issue was raised on only four occasions within the Council, and it was clear that the Turkish government was reluctant to take its allies into its confidence. Promises were made to furnish details of the extent of Turkish military preparations and troop movements, but they never materialized. The United States did not mention the movement of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and there is no evidence that its initial machinations either to create a regional response to the crisis or to allow Turkey to intervene were ever discussed. At a meeting of the permanent representatives on 12 September, two days after the US communication had been sent to Turkey, all that the American permanent representative, George Perkins, could report was that the United States would consider further arms shipments to the area on request. “It was their hope,” Perkins explained, “that if Syria’s neighbours were strengthened so that they could take care of themselves, neither Syria

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nor Egypt would provoke trouble.” As the Canadian permanent representative privately observed in reporting the meeting, “we here find ourselves quite unable to assess the situation in Syria and on its borders. Most other delegations seem in the same plight. In these circumstances there is a real need for reliable info[rmation] on which gov[ernmen]ts can base judgements. Possibly some nato gov[ernmen]ts can get such info[rmation] through diplomatic channels but we have seen little evidence of this in Council discussion.”26 Further comments by Perkins a week later failed to clarify the situation since they mainly focused on the extent to which Syria had fallen into the communist sphere. The West, Perkins recommended, should combat the situation by strengthening Syria’s neighbours economically and militarily, as well as continuing commitments to “safeguard the integrity and political independence of Syria’s neighbours.” In addition, it should undertake a major counter-propaganda campaign.27 On 17 October, Spaak proposed that the Council make a declaration on the Middle East confirming that “neither nato as a whole nor any one of its member powers contemplate an aggression in the Middle East directed at anyone.” Discussions on this issue, carried out without the Turkish representative, who suspiciously claimed illness, indicated little interest in having such a resolution passed. nato’s deliberations were eventually overtaken by the matter being raised by the United States and Turkey at the United Nations. Ironically, this was a decision that they had decided not to share with their nato colleagues in advance.28 the challeng e of political consultation The problems associated with political consultation throughout 1957 appeared to prove that the Wise Men Report had brought about little change. The extent to which issues were discussed depended primarily on the potential for consensus. An excellent example is provided by discussion of UN disarmament talks, which was often cited by various nato leaders as an example of the Wise Men Report at work. But even Spaak himself privately admitted that “the success of the operation should not be exaggerated since ... divergences were ironed out, but there had been no real difference of view.”29 When it came to controversial issues, nato’s leaders were less forthcoming. The more likely an issue was to create disagreement and controversy, the less likely it was to be raised in the nato Council. This had been the basis of the

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Committee of Three’s call for a new approach to foreign policy consultation based on Pearson’s famous formula that nato consultation should “be developed into an accepted custom, to the point where no member would think of taking action which affected the others in any substantial way – either politically or economically – without prior discussion with those members in nato.”30 nato’s leaders were simply not operating on such a basis. For real change to have occurred, members would have had to redefine their alliance relationship so that nato consultation was no longer seen as optional when formulating foreign policy. The concerns of other alliance members would have to be a central consideration in making every national policy decision that might have international repercussions. This did not mean a veto for nato over national policy, but its opinion had to carry considerable weight with national governments. In the rare instance when a national policy had to go against the wishes of other members, a proper explanation had to be offered. There were some broad statements that recognized this interpretation of the Committee of Three report. In a speech to the American Council on nato in late January 1957, Pearson expressed his belief that the key to more effective consultation was not new alliance machinery but a change in the “will of governments to use existing machinery. If we do not display that will, with something of the determination and desire – and even passion – that we show in national affairs, then nato will weaken and eventually die.”31 Spaak was more forthcoming in his first report as secretary general, asking whether member governments “realise that [the] method of prior consultation involves [a] fundamental change in traditional diplomacy,” including the fact that the discussion of issues by smaller powers may “lead them to assume new responsibilities.”32 Few, if any, of nato’s members were willing to undertake a “fundamental change in traditional diplomacy” and redefine the alliance relationship. Admittedly, the terms of this redefinition were somewhat vague and impractical. It seemed doubtful that many of nato’s smaller powers were willing to take on the additional responsibilities that might come through a more unified foreign policy. At the same time, as the example of Turkey’s reaction to nato consultation on Syria illustrates, many smaller powers were just as wary as the Big Three about involving the alliance to any great degree when formulating foreign policy. nato’s large number of members, many with diverse interests, was

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another source of problems. One of Italy’s major complaints involved the existence of the working group on German unification. This group, which had been formed in February 1957, had been asked to “embark on a review of the problem of German reunification on relations to European security.” The membership of the working group had been limited to the three Western occupying powers and West Germany, but with the understanding that the four powers would bring their findings to the North Atlantic Council. The exclusive membership of this committee raised fears within the Italian government that the nato forum was being circumvented and that some form of nato political directorate was being established. A major Soviet disarmament proposal dealing with Germany had been made only days before the Bonn meeting. Italy feared that the Western response to the offer might be developed within this group, rather than through nato as a whole.33 At first glance, Italy’s fears seem unfounded. There is no evidence that the working group on German reunification went beyond its mandate and attempted to act as some type of political directorate. Dulles devoted much of his time at the Bonn ministerial meeting to reassuring Italy both privately and in nato Council meetings of this fact.34 Italy’s concern was therefore explained away by the United States, and probably other powers, as an example of Italian resentment toward its constant exclusion from the highest councils of power and the special attention that Germany was receiving from the Big Three. This may have indeed been Italy’s motivation, but its concerns should not be dismissed so easily. Four of the alliance’s major powers were engaged in discussions of profound importance, to the exclusion of other alliance members. A similar argument could be made of the disarmament talks. nato was consulted, but the day-to-day negotiations were being carried out by only four of nato’s fifteen members. This approach was not conducive to a full and open discussion of issues before decisions were made. The alternative was just as unsatisfactory. It seemed ludicrous to suggest that all Western negotiations be conducted by fifteen governments. In conversation with Dulles in late October, Spaak complained about the futility of discussions involving smaller countries not closely associated with issues outside the North Atlantic area since they often found themselves with no set policy on many of the matters discussed. He spoke of the “heaviness” of the nato machinery, which required ambassadors to consult with their respective governments, a process that occurred at different rates of speed.35 Proponents of the Wise Men Report would argue that many of these

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practical difficulties arose only when the situation was taken to the extreme. nato members did not have to surrender their sovereignty to the alliance. What was needed, West German foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano told Dulles during a visit to Washington in late November, was measures to ensure that there were “no more unpleasant surprises” within the alliance.36 Actions by a number of nato powers, most notably the United States, had increased the danger of war; yet little had been done even to alert their nato allies of the situation. “If the nato allies are to have confidence in the United States [as leader of the alliance],” von Brentano told Dulles, “they must be informed of U.S. policy.”37 If there was common ground among these varying interpretations of consultation that would have at least partially resolved alliance unhappiness, no real effort was ever made to ascertain it. There simply was not an openness on the part of the Big Three, and even among some of the smaller powers, to find a workable solution. Paralyzed by its North African crisis, France was wary of nato consultation since it wished at all costs to avoid a debate on Algeria. Paris had been concerned about the lack of discussion that had taken place in advance of the AngloAmerican arms deal to Tunisia, but it saw the two situations as different. A senior Quai d’Orsay official explained the French position to a number of Canadian diplomats in early December. “In the French view, it was unacceptable that nato partners should adopt policies which were damaging to the national interest of other members, even in areas outside the nato sphere.” The Canadians asked whether this position implied a “willingness to discuss these national policies in nato and take into account the views of those nato partners whose support was being sought.” The French official replied that “this was not the French conception since what they would look for was not positive support but a renunciation of attitudes which would be harmful to the policies of individual members.”38 The British displayed a similar dislike for serious nato consultation by presenting their troop reduction plans as a fait accompli to their Western allies. They were also deeply involved in two other issues in which North Atlantic consultation was decidedly inadequate – the Syrian crisis and the Tunisian arms sale. brita in and the grand design The closest Britain came to espousing a redefinition of the alliance relationship was its advocacy of a “Grand Design” for Europe. This plan, first presented by British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd at the nato

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ministerial meeting in December 1956, called for the creation of a closer Western association that would include both nato powers and Europe’s neutral powers, along with the “rationalization” of European and Atlantic organizations. Under the design, nato would continue to “give the necessary high direction in the politico-strategic field,” while the weu would constitute an “inner circle within nato.” Selwyn Lloyd even proposed that the weu move from London to Paris to be administered by the nato permanent representatives. Such a plan, if adopted, would have indeed created a “European caucus” within the larger alliance. Economic matters under the plan were to be carried out by the oeec, which would regulate the proposed European free trade area. To complete the proposal, a general assembly was envisioned to deal with matters related to Western cooperation, replacing the weu Assembly, the oeec, and the Council of Europe as well as the nato parliamentary meetings. The general assembly’s work would be divided into a series of committees dealing with political affairs, economic matters, defence issues, and social and cultural cooperation. Although without executive power, the assembly could debate issues and make recommendations. The plan saw the six Common Market countries free to operate separately when it came to their internal matters but continue their economic relations with other Western nations through the oeec. Canada and the United States, by virtue of their nato membership and association with the oeec, would be welcome members of the new organization.39 The Grand Design was a total failure. Most of Britain’s Western European Union partners were still furious at its unilateral troop reduction. The primary problem, however, was that the six Western European governments saw the Grand Design as little more than an interference in their plans for the Common Market and Euratom, which might “drown Western Europe in the ‘greater whole’ of the Atlantic Community.”40 Many European federalists suspected that the proposal was intended to increase Britain’s international prestige by placing it at the head of a new European organization. Although the British never intended the Grand Design to destroy the Common Market, the Cabinet certainly saw the state of flux in Europe as an opportunity “to seize the leadership of Europe” and create a community very different in scope from the one contemplated by the six.41 The United States was cool to the idea. Not only was the American and Canadian role vague, but the Americans were wary of the suggestion that the Western European Union would constitute an “inner

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circle” within nato. It had been made clear upon West Germany’s entry into the alliance that nato, not the weu, would be the focus of political consultation. As Dulles warned Selwyn Lloyd, the United States “should not like to see a situation develop in which the weu would reach decisions first which the nato Council would then confirm on a pro-forma basis.”42 In retrospect, the Grand Design can be seen as a way forward for an alliance in search of redefinition. The plan presented an opportunity to create a Western framework that could potentially have facilitated political, economic, and social cooperation. Had there been support, it might have served as a starting point for a closer Western association. sputnik and the crisis in the west Little was forthcoming from the other side of the Atlantic in recasting the nato relationship. For the Eisenhower administration, the qualifications made by Dulles at the December 1956 ministerial meeting were an integral part of the Wise Men Report. It was in fact rare to find a copy of the report circulated within the American government unaccompanied by a transcript of Dulles’s statements.43 Nevertheless, he was concerned about the continuing inter-alliance tensions as well as increasing Soviet influence in the developing world, particularly the Middle East. These concerns were sharply intensified by the launch on 4 October 1957 of the Soviet satellite Sputnik, an event that was arguably to have one of the most profound effects on the West during the entire Cold War. This communist feat of technical superiority fed Western insecurities about the strength and sophistication of the Soviet war machine, and a consensus emerged that the West had to cooperate more fully to equal and eventually surpass Soviet scientific capabilities. As the new British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, wrote in his diary, the “Russian success in launching the satellite has been something equivalent to Pearl Harbor.”44 The launching of Sputnik and the crisis created in the West dominated a meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan in Washington a few weeks later. The result of this meeting was expressed in a joint statement entitled a “Declaration of Common Purpose,” which called on the West to work together in a spirit of “interdependence” to achieve “progress and safety” in meeting the Soviet threat. It proposed a greater sharing of responsibility for defence, especially on nuclear weapons, and contained a commitment by Eisenhower to request that

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Congress ease existing restrictions on the sharing of American atomic secrets with allies. A new emphasis was to be placed on scientific cooperation within the alliance, and “the expansion of current activities of the Task Force working in this field” was promised. The declaration also recognized the importance of cooperation in the field of economics. To complete the creation of this new spirit of “interdependence,” it proposed that an upcoming North Atlantic Council meeting (planned for Paris in December) be attended by nato’s heads of Government.45 The military repercussions of the decisions made by Macmillan and Eisenhower at their meeting have generally received the most historical attention. They led to American proposals to place intermediate-range ballistic missiles on European soil, which in turn raised public fears in Western Europe. Within the alliance, concerns grew about the possible use of these weapons and to what extent they should be employed to replace conventional forces. The debate was further complicated by an increase in the number of overtures from the Soviet bloc for a disarmament effort just prior to the December meeting. Overriding all these discussions, however, was a general concern about alliance unity on all levels. How could the West deal with the nuclear threat (including the important question of where the West should station its defensive weapon system) if there was disunity among its members? Sputnik caused a realization that the West, despite its resources and common bonds of history, was failing to work as a true community. Eisenhower expressed these sentiments in a toast to a visiting Queen Elizabeth in mid-October. “We are too much separated by things that concern us locally ... we have the power ... Our scientists must work together. nato should not be thought of merely as a military alliance. nato is a way of grouping ability – of our manhood, our resources, or our industries and our factories.”46 In a similar vein, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower soon after the Sputnik launch that each country in the Western world had a contribution to make, military, scientific, economic, or political. If they were coordinated, the West “will succeed where unco-ordinated effort is bound to fail.” Dulles expressed similar sentiments. During the course of a conversation with Macmillan and British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd about the need to create greater unity in order to facilitate nuclear strategy, the secretary of state remarked that Clarence Streit’s idea for an Atlantic union “was the same as that which we are now making, and that as a diagnosis it was impeachable, although impractical politically.”47

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Dulles’s longing for a non-military solution to help solve nato’s problems did not mean that he favoured those focusing on consultation. As he told a gathering of former State Department officials and American representatives to nato in early November, there was a difference of opinion between the United States and Europe on what constituted an alliance. Dulles saw nato as a “provisional substitute for action by the Security Council.” The Europeans, on the other hand, had “a broader concept of alliances.” “They tend to believe that allies should support each other on all political issues and in all places ... we could achieve an immediate strengthening of our nato defenses if we were prepared to follow the European theory of alliances. But then we would have to write off everything else in the world.”48 Dulles was simply not prepared to work for a system of consultation within nato that would give the alliance undue influence in US affairs. He shared these thoughts with West German foreign minister von Brentano and the West German representative to nato, Heinrich Blankenhorn, during their November, 1957 visit to Washington. According to Dulles, the United States did not want to give the impression that nato “has primacy over the rest of the world” in making decisions. The United States had relations with forty-two nations through various organizations such as the oas and seato. “We cannot give a veto power to each of the forty-two countries because this would result in immobility.” The United States often found itself in a position of having to act quickly and did not have the time to raise issues. It was sometimes also simply impolitic to get mired in discussions in the nato Council which often came to nothing. The secretary of state seemed ready to agree that more could be done by the United States to inform its allies of its foreign policy, but there had to be limitations. In “some cases,” he pointed out, “even officers of the United States Government are not brought into the picture, for various reasons. In such cases it would be unrealistic to expect us to do more for our nato partners.” Reacting angrily to the charge by Blankenhorn that the allies needed to be aware of American policy if they were to have confidence in its leadership, Dulles said “that was a serious statement and repeated that there are some cases where our allies must trust the United States. If our partners distrust our motives, that in itself should be discussed at the North Atlantic Council.” Khrushchev, argued Dulles, could be expected to undertake a policy of “probing” in an attempt to test the responsiveness of the members of the Atlantic alliance. If the United States was in a position where it had

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to hesitate and consult before reacting, these “probings” would “multiply around the world.”49 The question of trust lay at the heart of American reluctance to undertake greater consultation. Dulles believed that nato members had to have confidence that the United States would make the correct decision without prior discussion. He believed that, by constantly raising the issue of consultation, the United States’s nato allies were challenging American trustworthiness. As the secretary of state explained in a follow-up letter to Adenauer after his meeting with Blankenhorn and von Brentano, “our nations are in effect like a doctor prescribing a capsule for a patient. There are three necessary ingredients: consultation, capacity for quick action, and trust. The patient will die if we prescribe a capsule which has no content other than consultation and which excludes a capacity of quick action with a willingness to trust each other to some reasonable extent ... I know that consistently with this there can be a very large measure of useful consultation and follow-up information, and the United States is prepared to go to the limit in this respect.”50 No amount of lobbying was going to alter Dulles’s position on the question of consultation. Even musings by Eisenhower that the United States might consider giving its nato allies a voice in decisions when there was “a majority, two thirds, or three fourths” vote in the North Atlantic Council was dismissed skeptically by the secretary of state.51 Dulles and Eisenhower did not go to the heads of government meeting empty-handed. With the advent of Sputnik, the Americans were prepared to push for greater cooperation in scientific and technical fields. They were also ready to inflate the status of their permanent representative by allowing him to attend Cabinet and National Security Council meetings when he was in Washington. A further proposal suggested that when a nato member was involved in a crisis, it might occasionally be more expedient for the foreign minister of that country to provide background information to local ambassadors from nato countries rather than working through Paris.52 To address some of Dulles’s concerns about the United States’ many overlapping alliance commitments, his officials proposed that closer ties should be worked out between nato and other defence organizations. Such a plan might lessen criticism of American foreign policy by giving the United States’ allies a greater sense of its many responsibilities.53 Openness to greater consultation within the alliance on action in the less-developed world was also expressed. Dulles had been impressed by

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nato’s modest success in discussing international economic problems. The United States remained firmly opposed to nato distributing aid or staking out a “nato position” in international economic organizations, but the Americans believed that alliance members should increase their aid to the developing world on an individual basis. To set an example, Eisenhower planned to announce an increase in the United States’ Development Loan Fund by an additional $625 million, as well as his intention to ask Congress to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank by $2 billion. The United States was prepared to ask that the North Atlantic Council review economic matters and, when “weaknesses or gaps” were found in existing machinery, propose possible action to rectify the situation. The American position would not preclude the possibility of further direct ad hoc action to combat Soviet penetration of the developing world, such as the purchase of Lebanese apples. Nevertheless, there was little interest on Dulles’s part in going beyond these moderate proposals, and he assured the nsc before leaving that his December 1956 qualifications about the Wise Men Report would remain.54 Dulles’s constrained approach can be contrasted with Spaak’s enthusiasm. The secretary general, who had been present in Washington for a part of the Macmillan-Eisenhower talks, returned to Paris to take credit for the idea of the summit meeting, which he believed was a “great opportunity to strengthen the alliance.” “There were occasional moments in history, when outside developments ‘make the impossible almost normal’. It was necessary to make use of such moments.” Spaak hoped that the meeting would give the doctrine of interdependence concrete meaning and suggested a rather introspective agenda that included a “critical examination of the alliance its achievements after eight years and its present needs,” based on a report he would draft as secretary general.55 Even before early drafts of Spaak’s report became available, there was a suspicion that the secretary general would focus almost solely on consultation. During a speech to nato parliamentarians in November, he urged that “coordinated Foreign Policy” be made compulsory. One nato observer suggested that Spaak saw the Wise Men’s comments on consultation as having “the force of a treaty.”56 That Spaak would take such a line was confirmed with the circulation of the first draft of his report in late November. Profoundly negative, its basic conclusion was that the Committee of Three report had not been properly embraced by the alliance and that members had to

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make an effort to adhere to it more strictly. Looking back on his brief tenure of office, the secretary general listed four issues that had come before the Council for discussion during his term as secretary general. On one of these, disarmament, he believed that there had been success. Spaak was positive about Council discussion of the Middle East, although he pointed out that information was not always forthcoming from the relevant powers. Unknown to him, this was an incredible understatement. He reviewed two other issues, the decision by Belgium to reduce its military service and the Tunisian arms deal, which had not been brought before the Council until after decisions had been made. Based on these experiences, Spaak concluded that the Committee of Three recommendations would have to be implemented more firmly so that nato took a more common approach to foreign policy issues. The secretary general called for confirmation of the endorsement by the December 1956 ministerial meeting of the Wise Men Report, with members agreeing to “take whatever measures may be necessary to ensure full cooperation.” His report also examined economic cooperation, resurrecting the idea that an agency be established within nato or possibly some other framework “capable of dealing with certain situations as a matter of urgency and of settling problems in respect of assistance to given countries in light of their economic aspects, but guided by political necessities.”57 A large number of nato members, including the United States, were unhappy with the negative tone of Spaak’s findings. The Americans feared that news would leak out about the report, causing a public relations disaster. As their permanent representative told the secretary general, the United States “wanted the opening speeches to be constructive and positive in tone and to be forward-looking rather than backward-looking.” As a result of this concern, Spaak agreed to circulate his report in advance to ensure that it remained confidential and make a more positive statement during the opening session.58 The Canadian government was also critical of Spaak’s conclusions. A victory in June 1957 by the Conservative Party had resulted in a marked change of view on issues such as consultation. The Liberal Pearson was relegated to the opposition benches, and he was replaced as foreign secretary, first by the new prime minister, John Diefenbaker, and later in the year by Sidney Smith, someone of little experience. Smith quickly fell victim to those elements in the Department of External Affairs who took a cautious approach to the issue of political consultation.

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The Canadian embassy at The Hague proposed in mid-November that Canada should try to persuade the Big Three to declare a common policy on the Middle East and North Africa. The department reacted strongly against this proposal, advising the new minister that it raised “issues which in our view lie very close to the central problem now being faced by the nato alliance.” If Canada were to urge a statement of common policy, it would have to be assumed that Canada itself supported the announced policy. “Moreover, the urging of this objective by the smaller nato powers would carry with it the implication that unity is an end in itself and that, as a consequence, the smaller powers are prepared to foreswear the exercise of their independent judgement on the validity of a common policy.” The area under discussion was outside the North Atlantic. To argue that there must be “unity of policies everywhere” was carrying the case too far. Even if an out-of-area policy were relevant to nato, “it remains to be decided whether objectively the conditions in that outside area would permit the policy to proceed with advantage under a nato label.” This was the consideration to keep in mind when it came to the Middle East situation. “nato and the Middle East do not mix,” and any position taken by the Western alliance on the area would be seen by Arab leaders as an intrusion. nato could move in one of two directions: its legitimate responsibility could be “recognized as ending at the military defence of the nato area,” or it could be “converted into a vehicle for the execution of the global responsibilities of its senior members.” “The tacit acceptance as the central theme of the forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting of ‘interdependence’ of the global variety contemplated in the Anglo-American declaration of common purpose (or, as M. Spaak has put it, the idea of ‘making co-ordinated foreign policy compulsory’), has already gone a long way towards committing all nato states to an acknowledgement of the wider role described in the second alternative above. It is a disturbing thought that a development of this importance should be allowed to occur without serious prior examination of the issues at stake.” Smith agreed with these views and asked that they be communicated to The Hague, as well as to Canadian missions in other nato countries.59 To be fair, what lay behind this specific episode was a Canadian fear that the French would seek assurances from their nato partners that no action would be taken in the Middle East, such as the Tunisian arms deal, which would hinder their policies in Algeria. To prevent the French from doing so, the Canadians were using arguments that would

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have pleased Dulles. As the Canadian ambassador to France tried to explain to a Quai d’Orsay official, “as we understood the Canadian position it was not that we were against political consultation or attempts to coordinate foreign policy but that we were doubtful that nato with its specific and limited objectives was the appropriate body from which to seek general support for individual policies outside the responsibilities of the alliance.”60 Canada’s diplomatic representatives at The Hague, who had made the original proposal, took issue with the department’s new-found position. The ambassador, Thomas Stone, one of Canada’s original treaty negotiators, argued that all that was being proposed was that Canada urge nato’s Big Three to issue a statement on the Middle East, something that could be done privately. nato’s major powers needed to know the “grave concern with which the ‘junior’ members of the alliance viewed the disagreements and contradictions” in their policies. They should also be told “that in the execution of their global responsibilities they could do irreparable damage to the alliance unless their policies – and actions – were more in harmony.” As to the argument that “the Middle East and nato do not mix,” Stone pointed out that the admission of Greece and Turkey to the alliance, as well as France’s responsibility for Algeria, meant that nato by its very nature had some interest in the area. In addition, it could not be denied that conflicts between nato’s major powers over this region were having adverse effects on the alliance as a whole. Stone went so far as to suggest a possible declaration to be issued by the heads of government following the meeting. “Although nato, as an organization, has as its defined objective the defence of the nato area, members of nato have obligations that extend far beyond this defined area. Whenever these obligations have an effect upon the unity and strength of nato, and to the extent that they have such an effect, the necessary political consultation between members should take place.”61 Stone’s opinions were no longer fashionable in Ottawa. External Affairs advised the new minister to take a cautious approach. “Where Mr. Spaak seems to us to go too far is in his desire to push the Council beyond political consultations to decisions. He seems completely unaware of the danger of injecting nato as such into such sensitive areas as the Middle East. He takes the broadest possible interpretation of the recommendation of the Committee of Three which dealt with ‘collective decisions’ on ‘matters of common concern.’ He appears to

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consider it a virtue, rather than a danger, of nato political consultations that the smaller powers should be led towards assuming new and broader responsibilities, by having a hand in what might gradually become something closer to a nato foreign policy.” nato had to limit its activities outside the North Atlantic area. Were there an attempt to implement a common policy in an outside area, even in a critical situation, “the reaction may have adverse effects on the unity and co-ordination such consultations are intended to foster.”62 In taking this view of consultation, had Canada abandoned its position, or was it reacting to the extreme nature of Spaak’s report in an effort to head off disaster? The truth appears to contain elements of both propositions. Many of the department’s negative comments had arisen in direct response to Spaak’s report, but others had been formulated in reaction to proposals made by the Canadian embassy in The Hague, proposals that in Pearson’s day would not have been seen as particularly radical. The general attitude of the Diefenbaker government to Article 2 was of a cynical bent. The Opposition placed considerable pressure upon the government in the days leading up to the meeting to encourage the development of the alliance’s economic side. The prime minister was glad to oblige by telling the House of Commons prior to the meeting of his “hope that article 2 will be one of those matters that will receive extraordinary attention” and, upon his return from Paris, by reporting the great progress made on this front. Privately, however, he had informed the Canadian Cabinet before his departure that nothing was likely to arise under the economic provisions of Article 2 because of the lack of interest of both the United States and Britain.63 Diefenbaker was concerned about greater Atlantic cooperation. He had grave worries about the current trade situation in the light of what was occurring in Western Europe and the increasing shift of Canada’s trade toward the United States, but nato had no appeal for the prime minister as the proper forum to pursue these matters. The departmental official assigned to advise the prime minister on external affairs matters recalled years later that on assuming office, Diefenbaker believed that consultation was best done between political leaders rather than officials. As a result, he saw little potential in the idea of nato, with its bureaucracy and system of national representatives, acting as an ongoing forum for consultation. Perhaps more important was his legendary antipathy for Pearson. The Conservative leader had espoused nato’s non-military development when in opposition, but

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this appeared to be mainly political manoeuvring. Because the Wise Men Report had been so closely associated with Pearson, it was automatically suspect in Diefenbaker’s eyes.64 The one initiative in the non-military field undertaken by Diefenbaker at the heads of government meeting was a proposal that nato establish a food bank to pool members’ surpluses and distribute them to the developing world. It appears, however, that none of Diefenbaker’s officials were told of this announcement in advance. The prime minister could provide few details of his thinking other than that he desired the establishment of some type of relief organization to be set up through either nato or a group of nato countries. Such a move would help to combat Soviet activity in the developing world by clearly identifying the aid as coming from non-communist sources.65 It is likely that, as well as combatting international communism, Diefenbaker was also helping to shore up his support in the wheatproducing regions of Canada, where his own parliamentary seat lay. Large Canadian wheat surpluses were a problem on the political agenda, and Diefenbaker’s proposal sent a signal that he had not forgotten his constituents. Indeed, it had been one that he had made while in opposition.66 The proposal, however, seemed to raise little interest on the part of his nato partners. the he ads of government meeting Despite the buildup accompanying the heads of government meeting in December 1957, little was accomplished in furthering nato’s non-military development. Most leaders made perfunctory remarks about the need for greater consultation. They included Eisenhower, who quickly added, however, the usual American qualifications. Nevertheless, the US position was not totally inflexible. When it came to the section of the communiqué dealing with disarmament, the Americans modified their views as a result of pressure from their allies. Originally, the United States had simply wanted to reiterate the West’s willingness to negotiate with the Soviets at the upcoming UN disarmament talks on the basis of the Western proposals put forward the previous summer. The fact that the Soviets had stated their intention to boycott these meetings meant that the Americans were merely proposing the status quo. Many Western leaders, particularly the British, French, Belgians, and Italians, disagreed with this approach and were anxious to put forward a more substantial proposal that

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would address public concerns in the West. The Canadians, Norwegians, and Danes meanwhile were anxious for something even more far-reaching that might succeed in bringing the Soviets back to the bargaining table. After lengthy discussions, a proposal was agreed upon that was designed more to assuage Western public opinion than anything else. It was decided to express the West’s regret at the Soviet intention to boycott the UN disarmament talks, but to add that the West “would welcome a meeting at the Foreign Minister level to resolve the deadlock.”67 The Middle East also received considerable attention, with members expressing their concern for the area’s stability and stressing the need for nato governments to support pro-Western Middle Eastern states. There was no real discussion, however, of a general nato policy for the area. The French, desirous of some show of support for their activities in Algeria, insisted that Africa be mentioned in the communiqué. The vague and general reference to the entire continent, however, appeared to do little to achieve this end.68 The question of relationships with other defence organizations was raised by the Americans. Dulles’s suggestion that nato develop closer ties with other defence organizations was not warmly received. The Norwegians and the Canadians argued that liaison was best pursued by having those nato members who were also members of other alliances report informally on their activities. Dulles disagreed, contending that this approach might suggest that “nato [was] trying to run other organizations.” Instead, the alliance had to demonstrate that it felt other regional defence pacts were important. In response, they could provide nato with important information. Dulles’s position was supported by West Germany and the United Kingdom. Spaak, on the other hand, felt that matter was rather “delicate” and suggested that he be authorized to approach other organizations in confidence to ascertain their feelings. This recommendation was agreed to, even though Dulles felt that, as the American proposal was publicly known, Spaak’s activities might be difficult to keep confidential.69 nato scientific and technical cooperation was the central non-military item dealt with at the meeting. Both the nato task force and Senator Jackson’s committee had issued reports, and the French had tabled their own proposals for an “Atlantic Community Foundation for Scientific Research.” All three dealt with ways in which nato could promote scientific research and development in member countries through

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such measures as scholarships and seminars, as well as by facilitating cooperation between countries undertaking scientific research projects. The three reports were vague in nature, and there was still a difference of opinion, exemplified by the reluctance of the British and the enthusiasm of the Americans over the precise role that nato should undertake. As a result, a nato Science Committee was put in place and a scientific adviser appointed to explore the recommendation further.70 The Americans successfully proposed that the North Atlantic Council review economic matters. But the acceptance of such proposals was in no way intended to signal the fact that nato wished to expand its activities into the economic sphere or become an aid agency. From a non-military perspective, the nato heads of government meeting amounted to little more than a routine ministerial gathering. Many of the same problems, suspicions, and tensions that had brought about the Committee of Three remained. Through both word and deed, nato’s major powers, especially the Big Three, demonstrated their reluctance to redefine their relationship to nato and give their allies’ views significant weight when making policy decisions. Although this situation continued to disturb nato’s smaller powers, their attitude toward the alliance’s role was often not much more forthcoming. Even Canada, with a new government, was uninterested in seeing consultation significantly increase. conclu sion The Wise Men Report, which could have been used to ensure greater alliance unity, had generated only a lukewarm response. Some progress was made in implementing the report through the adoption of its administrative recommendations and through increased consultation on such matters as disarmament. Such measures were a welcome sign but were no indication that the alliance had embraced the spirit of the report. The implementation of the organizational side of the report had been marred by procedural wrangles and appeared to do little to increase the overall level of non-military cooperation. More effective consultation had been the major focus of the Committee of Three report, and it is in this area that progress was minimal. A significant amount of consultation did take place, but it almost always tended to be in areas where there was little chance of major disagreement. Controversial issues, such as Algeria, Cyprus, or the

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Middle East, were generally kept off the Council agenda, thus demonstrating that the report had changed the attitude of nato’s powers, especially the Big Three, only on the margins. By the autumn of 1957, the alliance had slipped into another malaise. Concerns over American leadership and the lack of effective nato consultation exacerbated tensions over nato’s nuclear strategy. The situation was worsened considerably by the launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in early October. This challenge to Western scientific and military superiority created one of the greatest alliance crises of the Cold War. Both the United States and Great Britain sought to address the crisis by trying to foster a new spirit of cooperation within the alliance, which they termed “interdependence.” Although much of this activity was to take place on the military scale, there was in theory a recognition that alliance members had to cooperate in other areas in order to stave off the Soviet threat. Little was to come of this side of the proposal, however. A series of often-used excuses and arguments were put forward by members, including the United States and United Kingdom, as to why this new approach could not be implemented in non-military fields. By the end of 1957, there was no question that the Committee of Three process had been a failure.

Conclusion An Alliance of the Old Kind

The North Atlantic Treaty did not attempt to meet the Soviet threat simply by organizing the West militarily. Article 2 of the treaty made provision for economic, social, and political foundations to complement the alliance’s military nature. There was, however, no great consensus about the alliance’s non-military meaning or potential. Throughout the treaty negotiations, Canada, under the leadership of Lester B. Pearson, went to great lengths to ensure the inclusion of an article that would lay the foundation for an Atlantic community of nations. Canada succeeded in these efforts but neglected to convince other signatories of the treaty’s potential role in achieving this end. Instead, it persuaded its allies of the article’s usefulness in domestic Canadian politics. The article did not lie dormant, however. It was given significant consideration during the autumn of 1949 and the spring of 1950, as the treaty’s signatories turned their attention both to the creation of an alliance structure and to addressing the many international problems facing the non-communist world. These included the reintegration of West Germany into the West, the ineffectiveness of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, and Britain’s reluctance to tie itself too closely to Europe. A belief existed that an alliance structure which linked Western Europe and North America economically and politically could provide a stable framework for German reintegration, as well as deal more effectively with Western economic problems. It

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might also serve as a replacement for the oeec, once Marshall aid was completed in 1952. Canada’s initial sponsorship of Article 2 was quickly transformed into indecision as it studied the possibility of developing the alliance’s non-military side and no concrete proposals were forthcoming. The United States found itself in a similar situation. But, Britain, wary of the moves toward European integration, embraced the Atlantic idea and went to the May 1950 nato ministerial meeting advocating the long-term development of Article 2, especially in the economic field. Its plan, which foresaw the possible association of West Germany with the non-military side of the alliance, was thwarted by the French, who believed that linking Germany with any aspect of the treaty would inevitably lead to its rearmament. Instead, France successfully proposed associate status for Canada and the United States with the oeec. Britain was not to be dissuaded by this decision, and its case was strengthened by the start of the Korean War in late June 1950. Rearmament led to shortages by diverting key resources and placed considerable strain on national budgets, creating serious economic problems. The United Kingdom continued to push for a greater role for nato in economic coordination, with the private hope that the alliance would one day assume much of the work of the oeec. Those opposed to British plans saw closer cooperation between the two organizations as a better way forward. Although informal links were established between nato and the oeec in the autumn of 1950, the problem remained unresolved throughout the following year. Rearmament created other concerns. Many nato members believed that the alliance was becoming over-militarized and evolving into little more than an American tool to further its own security needs. This concern was symbolized by US pressure to extend alliance membership to Greece and Turkey, two non-Atlantic countries. In an effort to curb this growing resentment and facilitate Turkish and Greek entry into the alliance, the United States advocated the development of the non-military side of the alliance. Primarily in response to Washington’s urging, a Committee of Five foreign ministers was established at the September 1951 ministerial meeting to suggest ways of implementing Article 2. Although much enthusiasm accompanied the committee’s creation, few specific suggestions for action were forthcoming. As a result, much of the committee’s work focused on the identification of areas where nato activity was considered inappropriate because it interfered or

Conclusion

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overlapped with the work of existing international organizations. This was particularly the case when it came to economic collaboration, which the committee believed could best be handled in other forums. The committee’s findings fuelled an increasing interest in Washington and other alliance capitals in moving the nato headquarters from London to the home of the oeec in Paris, to allow for closer cooperation between the two organizations. Despite opposition from the United Kingdom, which wanted to retain the nato headquarters in London and develop its economic side, the idea was accepted at the February 1952 ministerial meeting in Lisbon. The United States followed up this decision by obtaining general agreement at the March oeec ministerial meeting that the work of the two institutions be more closely coordinated. The idea of an Atlantic economic community under a nato framework was dead. Other areas had been identified by the Committee of Five for nonmilitary cooperation within nato. A series of working groups were established in the autumn of 1952 to examine nato cooperation in the fields of labour mobility and the creation of alliance-wide cultural and information programs. Yet a lack of willingness within the alliance’s membership to make sacrifices for this type of cooperation soon became apparent. As a result, the working groups lost momentum and were allowed to wither. The Committee of Five’s recommendations did not stop here. It had also placed considerable emphasis on the idea of foreign policy consultation as a means of developing the Atlantic community. Many of nato’s smaller powers were unhappy with the attitude of the alliance’s three major powers, the United States, Britain, and France. A variety of issues outside the immediate Atlantic sphere were of importance to the alliance, but the Big Three tended to give little credence to the views of their fellow nato allies. Beyond drawing attention to the problem, the Committee of Five could not directly compel alliance members to alter their attitudes. Some change began to occur in the summer of 1952. Criticism of the Big Three for responding to an important Soviet note on Germany without consulting their nato allies led to a correction of many of the more flagrant abuses. Thereafter the nato Council was consulted about major East-West exchanges, a change in attitude that had its limitations. The US, British, and French governments would agree only to a consultative process that allowed them maximum control over the nature of the discussions and rejected any interference in their freedom

194

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

of action. The United States also reserved the right to keep important international issues off the nato agenda when it felt discussion was inappropriate. In the light of this attitude, inter-alliance tensions continued to smoulder beneath the surface. Changes in the international system, notably the death of Stalin in 1953, only added to internal strains within nato. The new Soviet leadership set about convincing the world of its peaceful intentions, and the threat that had served to unify nato appeared to be diminishing. Although nato’s members were unwilling to accept the Soviet moves as sincere, the same sense of urgency no longer existed. Alliance members became willing to risk disharmony and the need to keep inter-member disputes buried was not as important. In an effort to deal with these pressures, nato’s American leaders once again showed a renewed interest in its non-military side. During the summer of 1953 the US government explored the possibility of creating an Atlantic consultative assembly. The idea was rejected by the Canadian and European governments, which saw in such a body a potential source of embarrassment. As the Soviet peace offensives continued, inter-alliance disharmony grew. Calls were made by nato’s leaders throughout 1955 for the development of the alliance’s non-military side. This interest did not result in the formulation of concrete proposals. Although the topic aroused considerable discussion at the December 1955 ministerial meeting, no agreement was reached on how to proceed, and the matter was turned over to the permanent representatives. Numerous proposals were generated, but the vagueness of the concept prevented focused discussion. nato’s leaders, particularly US secretary of state John Foster Dulles, ignored the many signs indicating that there was little hope of significant progress. Seizing the initiative in April 1956, Dulles publicly called on the United States’ allies to strengthen nato’s non-military aspect. His words, however, contained little in the way of substance. In the end, all that could be decided upon was that the United States would lobby for the creation of yet another committee of ministers to examine the matter further. The result of the work of this committee, known as the Three Wise Men, was hardly surprising. Led by Pearson, the Three established that the way forward for nato was to develop political consultation. This proposal, however, proved incompatible with the traditional positions

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held by nato’s major powers on this issue. At the same time, events surrounding the Suez crisis, during which nato was kept on the periphery, illustrated the lack of regard nato’s Big Three had for consulting their allies within the Atlantic Alliance forum. The Americans and the British criticized the committee’s report as inhibiting their freedom of manoeuvre. Believing that the alliance had abandoned them during Suez, the French objected to the report’s failure to properly recognize the need for nato to discuss policies related to areas outside the North Atlantic. Because of great-power objections, only the report’s recommendations on specific organizational and procedural changes were adopted by the Council. The Council and the secretary general were charged with determining the exact opinions of member governments about the remaining proposals. Nevertheless, the report was not forgotten, and some reform occurred. “nato positions” were reached on such issues as disarmament and the Western response to various formal communications from Soviet government on a number of international matters. Many of nato’s leaders remained privately unhappy, however, and believed that this progress was inadequate. They charged that discussions took place only when the potential for consensus was high. When it came to more controversial issues such as British troop reductions, Cyprus, Algeria, or Turkish relations with Syria, there was little or no effective consultation. The message of the Wise Men had been that nato must go beyond these limitations. Alliance members, particularly the Big Three, would have to allow nato considerably more influence in determining their foreign policies. No one suggested that the alliance be given some type of veto over national policy; rather, consideration for the position of other members should be seen as a major determining factor in formulating national policy. But such an attitudinal change would have required a considerable redefinition of the alliance relationship: countries would have had to be willing to adopt the habit of consulting their alliance partners in advance of any major foreign policy decision. No such willingness existed within nato. The successful launching of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in the autumn of 1957 gave the alliance another chance to reconsider its position on its non-military potential. Public calls were made by US president Dwight Eisenhower and the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, for nato members to recognize an “interdependence” within the alliance on military, scientific, economic, and political

196

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

fronts. There was, however, little behind their words. The nato heads of government meeting in December 1957 adopted a number of farreaching military initiatives, but little change was forthcoming beyond that. Why did the Atlantic idea fail? The most obvious reason is that Atlantic links were established, but through other organizations and on a bilateral basis. The European idea also posed a direct challenge. No matter how often nato’s leaders tried to square the circle by speaking of European cooperation within an Atlantic framework, post-war European integration, especially in economic matters, conflicted with the Atlantic vision and eventually won out. For the Atlantic vision to have succeeded, nato members would have had to make their alliance relationship a priority. Their focus would have had to shift to cooperation under the nato umbrella. The alliance’s members would not take such a radical step. There had been no general commitment to a common vision of the treaty’s Article 2 during its drafting. After that point, circumstances rarely encouraged the alliance to consider a move in that direction. The Korean War caused nato to re-evaluate its military side and led to such far-reaching decisions as the rearmament of Germany. There were, however, no similar circumstances that forced the alliance to create a non-military framework. The closest was the oeec-nato debate of the early 1950s. Here members were asked whether Western economic cooperation should take place on an Atlantic or a European basis. Through the acceptance of the French compromise, which associated Canada and the United States with the oeec, a choice against the Atlantic vision within the nato framework was made. What is perhaps most surprising about the history of Article 2 is the level of interest demonstrated by various alliance members. nato’s non-military side has traditionally been portrayed as a Canadian crusade. This study has attempted to rescue the narrative from an exclusively Canadian context and reveal the complex attitude of many of nato’s other powers toward the article. The British government made the building of an Atlantic community a key component of its European policy. The United States hoped that such an approach might facilitate the implementation of its foreign policy goals by creating greater Western cohesion. Canada, meanwhile, was not beyond impeding the non-military development of the alliance. Often gripped by indecision and a lack of concrete proposals, it also opposed a number of initiatives involving labour mobility, the for-

Conclusion

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mation of an Atlantic assembly, and numerous social and cultural proposals. The relationship between nato’s members was in some ways too broad and in other ways too narrow to allow for significant non-military development. The 1948–49 negotiations had concentrated primarily on establishing a military relationship. Such a narrow definition created grave difficulties for future non-military development. Yet Article 2 remained, and its existence served as a reminder that there was always the potential for a broader community. As nato came under both external and internal pressure, this potential appeared to hold an important key to alliance unity, partly because of a lack of definition. Article 2 could encompass everything from economic cooperation or a North Atlantic postal union to political consultation. Because of the breadth of its scope, general appeals for non-military development were easily supported by all members. Once proposals were identified, however, problems arose. Most were usually seen as being too restrictive and were either abandoned or watered down to innocuousness. The Atlantic vision symbolized by Article 2 also relied on the North American–Western European region as the centre of relations between non-communist states. The addition of Turkey and Greece to nato’s membership, along with the absence of key neutral European countries from its ranks, complicated suggestions for non-military development limited to nato members. Moreover, by 1957, the increasing importance of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa in international relations lessened the importance of the North Atlantic region as a Cold War theatre. The report of the Committee of Three and its immediate aftermath is therefore an end point in the history of nato’s non-military development. From 1948 to 1957 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization grappled with the limits it would set on its non-military cooperation. Would it be more than an alliance? Would it become a more formal community of nations? By December 1957 the answer was apparent. nato had evolved into an alliance of the old kind. nato’s leadership still views the report of the Committee of Three and the related decisions taken at the 1957 heads of government meeting as laying the foundation for non-military cooperation. The alliance’s potential in this direction was recognized through such further initiatives as the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance in 1967, the establishment of the Committee on the Chal-

198

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948–1957

lenges of a Modern Society in 1969, and the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations in 1974. It also received some prominence following the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s. The euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the realization that the alliance was facing a tremendous challenge. How could an organization established to counter the Soviet threat continue to exist when its raison d’être had disappeared? This was a central topic of discussion among the alliance’s leaders in London, England, in July 1990. Part of the answer, according to the declaration issued by nato’s heads of state and government at the meeting, was the recognition that “security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension.” nato could find meaning and be “an agent of change” by developing its non-military side, as outlined in Article 2 of the treaty.1 Since this bold statement in 1990, the alliance has faced numerous changes and challenges. It has seen significant growth in its membership as a number of former Eastern bloc countries have joined its ranks. It has forged new consultative and cooperative relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and a number of Mediterranean countries, and it has taken a very active role in peace support operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, nato invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. Standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States, it began the complicated process of re-evaluating its role in addressing the international threat of terrorism. All these events demonstrate an alliance trying to transform itself in light of both the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new adversaries. Although this transformation is far from over, any debate or current discussion about nato’s purpose and meaning certainly has to look at the question of what it is cooperating “for” as opposed to cooperating “against,” to use Dulles’s terms, and why this cooperation should take place within nato as opposed to other international organizations. At the same time, nato activity outside the strict territorial limits of its membership demonstrates a more formal recognition that the alliance’s interests are global in nature and that members have a responsibility to each other when they undertake activities anywhere in the world. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to transform and redefine itself, it is possible that Article 2 may receive some renewed attention. The February 2005 summit meeting of nato’s

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heads of state and government, held in Brussels, reaffirmed members’ commitment to “strengthening nato’s role as a forum for strategic and political consultation and coordination among allies.”2 Despite these developments and strong words, the overarching question facing nato at the moment is one of relevance. US decisions concerning the invasion of Iraq were made without alliance involvement. Although some member countries supported the action, nato as a whole embarrassingly stood by as major decisions were made without any formal alliance consultation. Recalling the debates of the early 1950s, some commentators have observed that the Americans need to recognize the difference between “consulting” their nato allies and “informing” them, if the alliance is to prosper.3 Although many parallels can be found between nato’s current transformation agenda and its early development, they are mainly focused on the alliance’s role as a forum for political consultation. No new vision is emerging that resembles the Atlantic one outlined by many of the alliance’s early leaders. nato remains a military alliance, a long way from the community that might have seemed possible in its formative years.

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Chronology

1948 22 January

British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin publicly proposes the policy of Western union during a speech in the House of Commons.

11 March

Britain approaches Canada and the United States to begin discussions on a regional defence pact.

17 March

Signature of the Treaty of Brussels.

22 March– 1 April

Initial discussion between the United States, Britain, and Canada on a possible Western alliance, resulting in the Pentagon Paper.

16 April

Establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (oeec) to administer Marshall Plan aid.

6 July– Washington Exploratory Talks (wet) between the 10 September United States, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, resulting in the Washington Paper. 26 July

André Marie replaces Robert Schuman as prime minister of France, Schuman is appointed foreign minister, replacing Georges Bidault.

202

5 September

Chronology

Robert Schuman becomes prime minister of France.

10 September Lester Pearson is appointed Canadian secretary of state for external affairs. 11 September Henri Queuille succeeds Schuman as prime minister of France. 25–26 October The Consultative Council of the Brussels treaty announces its agreement with the principals of an Atlantic pact. 2 November

Harry S. Truman is re-elected president of the United States.

15 November Louis St Laurent succeeds William Lyon Mackenzie King as prime minister of Canada. 26 November The Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission on the North Atlantic Pact agrees to the London Paper, rejecting non-military provisions in any potential treaty. 10–24 December

Representatives of the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, meet in Washington to prepare a draft treaty for a North Atlantic military alliance. 1949

10 January –28 March

Representatives of the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway (after 4 March) continue discussions in Washington, leading to the final drafting of the treaty.

21 January

Dean Acheson succeeds George Marshall as US Secretary of State.

8 February

Canadian ambassador Hume Wrong faces American objections when he calls for a strengthened Article 2.

13 February

Prime Minister Louis St Laurent visits President Truman in Washington and raises the need for non-military provisions in the proposed treaty.

Chronology

203

18 February

Acheson appears before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session to discuss the treaty. He tells senators that Article 2 was merely an affirmation by members to work through the UN and its agencies.

22 February

Canada presents a memorandum to the United States suggesting that it might reconsider its position on the treaty unless non-military provisions are included. UK Cabinet formally approves the treaty, noting that although Article 2 is unlikely to have any real meaning, its presence addresses Canadian political needs.

25 February

The negotiating powers agree to a strengthened version of Article 2 proposed by Canada.

15 March

The negotiating powers formally invite Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to sign the proposed treaty. Formation of the Atlantic Union Committee in the United States to promote the program of Clarence Streit for a union of the North Atlantic democracies.

2 April

Formation of a working group of member countries to determine what machinery should be created to implement the treaty.

4 April

The North Atlantic Treaty is signed.

5 May

A treaty forming the Council of Europe is signed by the Brussels treaty powers along with Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

26 July

Introduction in the US Senate of a resolution calling on the government of the United States to call a convention of North Atlantic democracies to explore the possibility of a union.

17 September First meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington; discussion of the report of the working group on treaty organization and machinery. 19 September The United Kingdom devalues the pound sterling.

204

28 October

Chronology

Georges Bidault again becomes prime minister of France.

18 November Second meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington. 1950 6 January

Third meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington.

16 April

French prime minister Georges Bidault calls for the creation of a “High Atlantic Council for Peace” in a widely reported speech in Lyons, France.

9 May

France proposes the creation of a Franco-German authority to deal with steel and coal production open to other nations (the Schuman Plan).

15–16 May

Fourth meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London; preceded by private talks between nato’s “Big Three” powers; creation of a structure for the treaty organization with Council deputies to meet in continuous session between ministerial meetings; authority given to establish a staff to support the alliance.

25 June

North Korea attacks the Republic of South Korea.

2 July

Henri Queuille again becomes prime minister of France.

12 July

René Pleven again becomes prime minister of France.

25 July

First meeting of Council deputies representing member countries.

15– Fifth meeting of the North Atlantic Council, New 18 September York; US proposal for West German rearmament is rejected by the French; decision to create an integrated nato force under a supreme commander; decision to form an informal oeec-nato committee to help coordinate alliance economic matters. 26 September Continuation of the fifth meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

Chronology

205

2 October

Turkey accepts an invitation to be “associated” with treaty defence planning.

5 October

Greece accepts an invitation to be “associated” with treaty defence planning.

24 October

French prime minister René Pleven calls for a unified European army with German units.

December

Announcement that the United States and Britain, in consultation with France, had decided to establish an international raw-materials organization.

18– 19 December

Sixth meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels; General Dwight D. Eisenhower formally appointed supreme allied commander, Europe. 1951

15 January

Senator Estes Kefauver reintroduces a resolution calling on the US government to pursue an international convention to examine Atlantic union.

6 January

Hitchman Paper presented to British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin and Hugh Gaitskell, chancellor of the Exchequer, arguing that the United Kingdom should adopt a strategy favouring nato over the oeec when it comes to future Western economic development; the paper is accepted by both ministers.

10 January

The French Cabinet approves a paper presented by French foreign minister Robert Schuman favouring the oeec over nato when it comes to future Western economic development.

22 January

First formal “exchange of views” on current political problems undertaken by Council deputies.

15 February

Conference opens in Paris between France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg (later joined by the Netherlands) to discuss potential European army.

9 March

Herbert Morrison replaces Ernest Bevin as UK foreign secretary.

206

Chronology

10 March

Henri Queuille again becomes prime minister of France.

18 April

Creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc) by France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries.

3 May

nato announces the establishment of a Financial and Economic Board (feb).

24 July

Paris conference on a European army issues an interim report calling for the creation of a European force.

11 August

René Pleven again becomes prime minister of France.

15– Seventh session of the North Atlantic Council, 20 September Ottawa; formation of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community (Committee of Five) and the Temporary Council Committee (tcc). 22 October

Council deputies agree to Greek and Turkish accession to nato, to come into effect in early 1952.

26 October

Winston Churchill succeeds Clement Attlee as prime minister of the United Kingdom; appoints Anthony Eden as his foreign secretary.

24– Eighth session of the North Atlantic Council, Rome; 28 November presentation of the interim report of the Committee of Five. 12 December

Sir Ian Jacob, chief staff officer of the UK minister of defence, presents a report to Prime Minister Churchill that favours the retention of nato headquarters in London over a move to Paris. 1952

20 January

Edgar Faure becomes prime minister of France.

18 February

Greece and Turkey formally join nato.

20– 25 February

Ninth session of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon; final report of the Committee of Five adopted; deci-

Chronology

207

sion to relocate nato headquarters to Paris; decisions made on the internal reorganization of treaty machinery, including the appointment of a secretary general, and the setting of significant rearmament goals for member states. 8 March

Antoine Pinay becomes prime minister of France.

12 March

Lord Ismay appointed first secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4 April

Formal establishment of a North Atlantic Council of Permanent Representatives to meet in Paris. The new Council replaces the former system of Council deputies, the Defence, and the Financial and Economic Board.

9 April

Soviet note is sent to the West proposing a new German peace treaty.

12 April

Provisional headquarters of nato opened at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris.

24 April

First meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Paris; General Matthew Ridgway appointed to succeed General Eisenhower.

27 May

Signature of the Treaty of Paris by France, Italy, West Germany, and the Benelux countries, establishing the European Defence Community, with an assembly of member representatives; the Assembly is to be charged with examining the further evolution of the edc structure in a federal or confederal direction to form what will become known as the European Political Community.

June

Formation of the nato Working Group on Information Policy.

9 July

Discussion of Western response to Soviet note at North Atlantic Council.

23 August

Arrival of a new Soviet note on a German peace treaty; discussed by permanent representatives, 29 August.

208

September

Chronology

Formation of nato Working Groups on Labour Mobility and Social and Cultural Cooperation.

7– British Society for International Understanding spon13 September sors the first International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community, Oxford, UK; the conference establishes the International Atlantic Committee. 23 September Formal Western response to the Soviet note. 4 November

Dwight D. Eisenhower elected president of the United States.

15– 18 December

nato ministerial meeting, Paris; adoption of a resolution on Indochina supporting French efforts in the region. 1953

8 January

René Mayer becomes prime minister of France, Georges Bidault is named foreign minister.

20 January

Eisenhower sworn in as president of the United States; he names John Foster Dulles as secretary of state.

5 March

Death of Joseph Stalin.

23–25 April

nato ministerial meeting, Paris.

11 May

Winston Churchill surprises his allies by calling for a meeting between the Soviets and Western powers during a House of Commons speech.

25 June

In the light of inter-alliance tensions, Secretary General Ismay presents a paper to nato’s permanent representatives, calling for greater consultation and cooperation within the alliance.

June 27, 1953 Joseph Laniel becomes prime minister of France. July

The nato Working Group on Information Policy is merged with the Working Group on Social and Cultural Cooperation to form the nato Working Group on Information and Cultural Cooperation.

Chronology

209

10–15 July

Meeting in Washington of US, British, and French foreign ministers as a result of the postponement of the proposed Bermuda conference between the leaders of the three nations.

27 July

signing of Korean Armistice.

August 30– 5 September

Second conference of the International Atlantic Committee, Copenhagen.

October

The US government informally proposes the creation of a nato parliamentary assembly, with little success.

4–8 December Bermuda conference between the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France, with Lord Ismay as an observer. 14– 16 December

nato Ministerial Meeting, Paris.

1954 15 January

US secretary of state outlines the American “New Look” policy in a public speech, talking about “the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.”

15 March

Pearson responds to Dulles’s January speech through a speech of his own to the National Press Club in Washington, stating that to gain allied support for the “New Look” policy, the United States has to agree to consultation before action.

23 April

nato ministerial meeting, Paris.

26 April

Opening of the Geneva conference between the United States, France, Britain, and the ussr to discuss Korea and Indochina.

17–18 June

Founding meeting at The Hague of the Atlantic Treaty Association, sponsored by the International Atlantic Committee.

18 June

Pierre Mendès-France becomes prime pinister of France and assumes the role of foreign minister.

210

29 August

Chronology

France rejects the treaty forming the European Defence Community (edc).

6–8 September Manilla conference leads to the establishment of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (seato). 28 September London conference of the United States, the United –3 October Kingdom, France, Canada, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries agrees to German entry into nato, as well as the creation of the Western European Union. 4 October

First Declaration of Atlantic Unity is made public, signed by over two hundred leading citizens from nine alliance countries; an organization is formed to promote its sentiments.

27 October

nato ministerial meeting, Paris.

17– 18 December

nato ministerial meeting, Paris.

1955 January

Offshore islands crisis between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.

20 January

Edgar Faure appointed foreign minister of France.

9 February

Third resolution is introduced in the US Senate calling for a convention to explore an Atlantic union.

17 February

Christian Pineau becomes prime minister of France.

23 February

Edgar Faure becomes prime minister of France and appoints Antoine Pinay as his Foreign Minister.

6 April

Eden succeeds Churchill as prime minister of the United Kingdom; Harold Macmillan is appointed foreign secretary.

8 May

West Germany is formally admitted to nato.

9–11 May

nato ministerial meeting, Paris.

10 May

The United States, Britain, and France propose a summit meeting to the Soviet Union.

Chronology

211

26 May 2 June

The ussr re-establishes relations with the Tito government after a visit to Yugoslavia by Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin.

1–3 June

Messina conference of European nations to discuss a common market and an atomic energy commission; Paul-Henri Spaak is charged with formulating a proposal.

22–25 June

First full assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association held in Paris.

16 July

nato ministerial meeting, Paris; exchange of views preceeding the four-power meeting in Geneva.

18–23 July

First conference of nato parliamentarians.

18–24 July

Geneva summit meeting between the leaders of the United States, Britain, France, and the ussr.

8– Adenauer visits the Soviet Union and establishes 13 September diplomatic relations. 30 September Pearson visits the Soviet Union. –12 October 25 October

nato ministerial meeting, Paris; exchange of views prior to the resumption of the Geneva summit.

27 October– Foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France, 16 November and the ussr meet in Geneva to discuss Germany and European security. 6 December

Ismay circulates an internal nato document to members entitled “Some Thoughts on the Non-Military Activities of the North Atlantic Community with Special Reference to Article 2.”

15– 16 December

nato ministerial meeting, Paris.

20 December

Selwyn Lloyd replaces Harold Macmillan as foreign secretary of the United Kingdom.

212

Chronology

1956 31 January

Guy Mollet becomes prime minister of France; appoints Christian Pineau as foreign minister.

24 February

Khrushchev’s secret speech denounces Stalin.

18 April

Dissolution of the Cominform.

18–28 April

Khrushchev and Bulganin visit Britain in an effort to encourage détente.

23 April

Speech by Dulles to the annual luncheon of the Associated Press calls for greater nato non-military cooperation.

30 April

Pearson outlines his views on non-military cooperation in a speech to the English-Speaking Union in London.

4–5 May

nato ministerial meeting, Paris; formation of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in nato.

26 July

Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal

19– Establishment of the Suez Canal Users Association in 21 September London. 13 October

UN talks on Suez crisis fail as a result of Soviet veto.

21– 24 October

Secret talks in France lead to an agreement between Britain, France, and Israel for military operations against Egypt.

29 October

Israel invades Egypt.

30 October

UN call for Israeli withdrawal from Egypt is vetoed by Britain and France.

31 October

Britain and France begin to bomb Egypt, against the publicly stated wishes of the United States.

5 November

Anglo-French forces arrive in Egypt.

6 November

Eisenhower is re-elected president of the United States. Britain and France accept a ceasefire in the Middle East.

Chronology

7 November

213

The UN agrees to establish an expeditionary force to intervene in the Suez crisis.

19– Second conference of nato parliamentarians at nato 23 November headquarters, Paris. 5– 22 December

Anglo-French forces leave Egypt.

11– 15 December

nato ministerial meeting, Paris; report of the Committee of Three; announcement of the resignation of Lord Ismay and the appointment of Paul-Henri Spaak as his replacement, effective May 1957; Selwyn Lloyd presents Britain’s proposal for a “Grand Design” for Europe. 1957

January

nato forms a Committee of Economic Advisers and a Committee of Political Advisers, as recommended by the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation.

10 January

Harold Macmillan succeeds Eden as prime minister of the United Kingdom.

14 March

First meeting of the nato Working Group on Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

20 March

The United Kingdom publicly accepts an offer from Lord Ismay to mediate the Cyprus dispute; the offer is rejected by Greece.

25 March

The Treaty of Rome is signed to create a European Economic Community (eec) and an atomic energy authority (Euratom) between France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Italy.

3 April

The Jordanian government moves to establish diplomatic relations with the ussr against the wishes of King Hussein.

10 April

King Hussein calls for the resignation of the Jordanian government, leading to internal instability; on 25

214

Chronology

April the United States sends the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean to quell the Jordanian crisis. 5 April

Duncan Sandys’s white paper on defence proposes that the United Kingdom decrease its conventional forces in favour of nuclear weapons.

2–3 May

nato ministerial meeting, Bonn, West Germany.

16 May

Paul-Henri Spaak succeeds Lord Ismay as secretary general of nato.

12 June

Maurice Bourgès-Manoury becomes prime minister of France.

21 June

John Diefenbaker becomes prime minister of Canada, personally assuming the post of secretary of state for external affairs.

3 September

The Soviets send a note to the US government requesting a joint declaration renouncing the use of force in the Middle East.

7 September

Dulles attacks pro-Soviet leanings of the Syrian government.

10 September The United States sends a confidential communication to Turkey saying that it would not “discourage” any moves against Syria. 13 September Sidney Smith is appointed Canadian secretary of state for external affairs. 4 October

The Soviets launch the Sputnik satellite.

12 October

Khrushchev accuses the United States and Turkey of conspiring to attack Syria.

16 October

Syria brings concerns over a potential Turkish threat to the United Nations, while the US government warns the ussr against any Turkish action.

6 November

Félix Gaillard becomes prime minister of France.

15 November The US and British governments publicly announce the sale of arms to Tunisia without consulting France; the French delegation attending the third conference

Chronology

215

of nato parliamentarians at nato headquarters, Paris, walks out. 25 October

A “Declaration of Common Purpose” is issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in Washington.

16– 19 December

nato heads of government meeting, Paris; in advance of the meeting, Secretary General Spaak circulates a report criticizing the alliance for not fully adhering to the Committee of Three report.

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Notes

n o t e o n t he c i tat i on o f t e l e g rams All telegrams are cited as sender, telegram number, and destination, followed by the date. If the identity of the sender is not relevant, the name of the foreign ministry involved and the city in which the embassy is located is used. In cases where telegrams are addressed to and from national delegations at international organizations (as opposed to the local embassy), the name of the organization is used (e.g., Canadian Department of External Affairs to the Canadian nato delegation would be cited as dea to nato). i n t ro du c t i on 1 See, for example, Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, 2; Pearson, Mike, 2; Eayrs, In Defence of Canada; English, The Worldly Years. Reid concentrates on the formation of nato but gives a brief overview of Article 2’s later development in Time of Fear and Hope; Geoffrey Pearson examines it only in the context of the treaty’s formation in Seize the Day; Sinisac explores the work of the Committee of Three but relies exclusively on Canadian archival sources in “The Three Wise Men” (1990). There are a number of notable exceptions where authors have touched on the issue from a non-Canadian perspective: Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, approaches the community side of the alliance, using primarily public

218

Notes to page 10 statements by nato leaders; a more traditional historical approach is taken by Heinemann, Vom Zusammenwachsen des Bündnisses. A number of important works have looked at the issue of inter-alliance consultation, but few identify it within the context of nato’s non-military development; see, for example, Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance. Campbell associates the question of consultation with Article 2 in Consultation and Consensus in NATO. Her work, however, deals with the period of the Nixon administration. c ha p t e r on e

1 tna/pro, cab 129/23, cp (48) 6, 4 Jan. 1948; cab 128/12, cm (48) 2, 8 Jan. 1948; fo371/73045/2323, Kirkpatrick Minute, 9 Jan. 1948; fo371/73045/2561, Bevin Minute, 12 Jan. 1948; Young and Kent, “British Policy Overseas”; Young and Kent, “The ‘Western Union’ Concept and British Defence Policy, 1947–48”; Kent, “nato, Cold War and the End of Empire”; Warner, “The Labour Government and the Unity of Western Europe”; Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–51, chap. 9; Kent, “Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of EuroAfrica, 1945–49.” 2 See, for example, Bullock, Ernest Bevin, 553–4; Schlaim et al., British Foreign Secretaries since 1945, 45. 3 tna/pro, fo371/73048/2135/g, fo no. 157 to Brussels, 18 Feb. 1948; see also mae, Z/Généralités/20, Chauvel-Harvey conversation, 31 Jan. 1948; tna/pro, fo371/73047/21308/g, fo no. 376 to Paris, 13 Feb. 1948; fo371/73048/21318/g, fo no. 396 to Paris, 16 Feb. 1948; cab 128/12, cm (48) 16, 23 Feb. 1948. 4 Bevin’s comments to Western Union foreign ministers following the treaty’s signature: tna/pro, fo371/2252/G, 17 March 1948; cab 128/12, cm (48) 29, 22 April 1948; fo371/73058/z/4215, fo to most British embassies, 6 May 1948; cab 128/12, cm (48) 35, 3 June 1948; fo371/73051/21934/g, Brussels no. 117 to fo, 7 March 1948. Britain feared that a permanent Council might result in “rival” machinery to the oeec and commit Britain to economic schemes it was not prepared to accept; see ibid., fo371/73051/2199/g, Kirkpatrick Minute, 8 March 1948. It was still interested in European economic cooperation, and Bevin even discussed the possibility of a Western Union bank and currency to make it more independent from the United States; see ibid., fo371/73048/2104/g, Roberts Minute, 9 Feb. 1948; fo371/73057/23412/g, Bevin-Auriol conversation, 17 April 1948.

Notes to pages 11–15

219

5 Reid prepared a draft “Treaty of Atlantic, Treaty of the Free World,” 14 March 1948 (revised 16 March 1948), which spoke of economic and cultural cooperation as well as an Atlantic parliament; see lac, rg 25, 283(s). See also mg 31, e46, vol. 6, folder 12, “Western Union, January 22nd to March 17, 1948,” 22 March 1948, although it is unsigned, Reid appears to be the author. 6 Pearson’s revisions to Reid’s memo, 14 March 1948: lac, mg 31, e46, vol. 46, folder 13; The final draft was sent to King on 15 March; see Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 135–6: DCER 1948, 430–2. 7 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 17 March 1948, 2303. 8 Between March and June 1948, the only individuals allowed to see telegrams concerning the Atlantic pact discussions were King, St Laurent, Pearson, Brooke Claxton (minister of national defence), General Charles Foulkes (chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee), Arnold Heeney (secretary to the Cabinet), and Escott Reid. See Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 11, 136–7; lac, rg 25, 283(s), Wrong to Reid, 17 June 1948. 9 lac, mg 26, j13, King Diary, 22 March 1948; the word “area” in the final sentence was replaced by the word “idea.” See also lac, rg 25, 288(s), King to Pearson, 6 May 1948; Cuff and Granatstein, “The Rise and Fall of Canadian-American Free Trade, 1947–48.” 10 lac, mg 26, j4, vol. 306, Pearson to King, 27 March 1948; see also ibid., j13, King Diaries, 26 March 1948; FRUS 1948, 3: 59–75. 11 lac, mg 26, j13, King Diary, 26 March, 1948; lac, rg 25, 283(s), Pearson no. ex-823 to Wrong, 29 March 1948. 12 FRUS 1948, 9: 411–12. 13 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 4, folder 25, Washington no. wa-904 to dea, 31 March 1948; lac, rg 25, 288(s), Washington no. wa-951 to dea, 3 April 1948; lac, mg 26, j13, King Diary, 30 March 1948. 14 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 4, folder 26, Pearson to King, 1 June 1948. 15 Canada, dea, Statements and Speeches, no. 48/13 (15 March 1948); for other public statements that stressed the treaty’s positive role, see nos. 48/22 (26 April 1948); 48/33 (8 June 1948); 48/34 (31 May 1948); 48/35 (11 June 1948); 48/59 (11 Nov. 1948). See also Canada, House of Commons Debates, 29 April 1948, 3438–540. 16 FRUS 1948, 3: 159; lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 4, folder 26, State Dept. Transcript, wet meeting, 9 July 1948, pp. B-12–B-13. Transcripts of the first four wet meetings do not exist; see Danchev, “Taking the Pledge,” 200n2. 17 lac, rg 2, b-2, vol. 245, folder c-20–5, Cab. Doc. 754, 4 Oct. 1948; ibid., A5a, vol. 2642, Cabinet Meeting, 6 Oct. 1948.

220

Notes to pages 15–21

18 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 13, Pearson to Vanier, 13 Aug. 1948. 19 Canada, dea, Statements and Speeches, 48/48 (21 Sept. 1948). 20 For a general discussion on how Canadian attitudes toward the “Atlantic World” were shaped by the war, see Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, chapter 7; for a more detailed discussion on how these attitudes shaped Canadian views toward an Atlantic pact, see English, “‘Who Could Ask for Anything More?’” 21 Streit, Union Now. 22 lac, mg 30, E101, vol. 6, folder 13, Pearson to Vanier, 13 Aug. 1948; lac, mg 26, N1, vol. 45, Pearson to MacBride, 22 Feb. 1949. 23 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 32–3. 24 Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 231–5. 25 FRUS 1948, 3: 11. 26 See, for example, FRUS 1948, 3: 65–5, 140–3, 178–9; Lovett’s comments at the first wet meeting, 6 July 1948: FRUS 1948, 3: 151; Kennan’s comments at the fifth wet meeting, 9 July 1948: lac, mg 30, E101, vol. 4, folder 26, State Dept. Transcripts of meetings, pp. C3–C6; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, chapter 10. 27 Achilles, Fingerprints on History, 13, 24. 28 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 134–5. 29 na, rg 59, 840.20/7–3049, Achilles Memo, 30 July 1948. 30 lac, rg 25, 283(s), Stone to Pearson, 6 Aug. 1948; Stone no. wa-2253 to Pearson, 13 August 1948. 31 See, for example, Lovett’s comments at the 7 July 1948 wet meeting: FRUS 1948, 3: 159–60. Although not noted in the official minutes, Franks reports Lovett’s support for Pearson’s position at the 9 July wet meeting; see tna/pro, fo371/73074/26140/g, fo memo on first five wet meetings (received in fo registry, 28 July 1948). 32 tna/pro, fo371/73071/25174/g, fo no. 6988 to Washington, 28 June 1948; fo371/73073/25669/g, Washington no. 282 to fo, 7 July 1948. 33. tna/pro, fo371/73074/26140/g, fo memo on first five wet meetings (received in fo registry, 28 July 1948). 34 lac, rg 25, 283(s), Pearson to Reid, 16 August 1948; Reid ex-2013 to Stone, 16 Aug. 1948; lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 27, “Notes on Working Group meeting,” 16 Aug. 1948; na, rg 59, 840.20/2–349, State Dept. Memo of meeting; lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 27, “Washington Exploratory Conversations on Security,” draft of 18 Aug. 1948; tna/pro, fo371/73075/26826/g, Washington no. 341 to fo, 17 Aug. 1948. 35 FRUS 1948, 3: 226.

Notes to pages 22–5

221

36 lac, mg 30, E101, vol. 5, folder 28, Wrong to Pearson, 4 Sept. 1948; Wrong Minute, 2 Sept. 1948; FRUS 1948, 3: 226. 37 FRUS 1948, 3: 237–48. 38 tna/pro, cab 129/30, cp (48) 249, 2 Nov. 1948, approved at cab 128/12, Cabinet cm (48) 68, 4 Nov. 1948; fo371/73081/29294, Mason to Jebb, 6 Nov. 1948. 39 tna/pro, fo371/73080/29136/g, Jebb to Kirkpatrick, 7 Nov. 1948; lac, mg 30, E101, vol. 5, folder 27, Ritchie to Pearson, 17 Nov. 1948; Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs, 1943–56, 138. Jebb’s memoirs claim Bevin was disinterested in the European vision during this period; see Gladwyn, The Memoirs, 208–27. 40 tna/pro, fo371/73082/2901/g, London Paper, 26 Nov. 1948; ibid., Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission Report on the Draft North Atlantic Pact, 26 Nov. 1948. Reid’s speculation that France’s agreement was gained by British promises to support the inclusion of Algeria in the treaty appear unfounded; see Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 170; tna/pro, fo371/73081/29295/g, fo no. 1689 to Washington, 29 Nov. 1948. 41 tna/pro, fo371/73065/29293/g, fo memo on Brussels Treaty meeting, 25–26 Oct. 1948. 42 tna/pro, fo371/73061/26511/g, Russell minute, 5 Aug. 1948. 43 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 28, Wrong to Pearson, 4 Sept. 1948; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 170. 44 See, for example, Reid’s draft commentary on the Washington Paper, 6 Nov. 1948: lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 30; rg 25, 283(s), “Draft North Atlantic Treaty,” 9 Nov. 1948; mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 30, “Draft North Atlantic Treaty,” 14 Nov. 1948; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, chapter 19. 45 lac, rg 25, 283(s), Robertson no. 1987 to Reid, 9 Nov. 1948; Wrong no. wa-2911 to Reid, 12 Nov. 1948; mg 30, e102, vol. 5, folder 30, Wrong no. wa-2912 to Reid, 12 Nov. 1948. 46 lac, rg 25, 283(s), Pearson (at the UN) no. 441 to dea, 21 Nov. 1948; rg 2, b-2, vol. 245, folder c-20–5, Cab Doc. 809; lac, rg 2, A5a, vol. 2642, Canadian Cabinet Conclusions, 1 Dec. 1948. For the final version of the dea instructions, 6 Dec.1948, see lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 31. 47 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 7, folder 37, State Dept. Transcripts of proceedings, 12 Dec. 1948; ibid., vol. 5, folder 31, Washington no. wa-3150 to dea, 13 Dec. 1948; tna/pro, fo371/73083/21027/g, Franks no. 547 to fo, 13 Dec. 1948; FRUS 1948, 3: 317.

222

Notes to pages 25–9

48 tna/pro, fo371/73083/21032, Washington no. 5744 to fo, 17 Dec. 1948; fo371/73083/210497/g, Washington no. 562 to fo, 18 Dec. 1948. 49 tna/pro, fo371/73083/210346/g, Bevin no. 13403 to Washington, 20 Dec. 1948; cab 129/30, cp (48) 249, 2 Nov. 1948; fo371/73083/210346/g, Makins to Treasury, 21 Dec. 1948; cab 128/15, cm (49) 14, 22 Feb. 1949. 50 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 31, Working Group minutes, 23 Dec. 1948; FRUS 1948, 3: 334–5, 337. 51 Canada only formally raised the matter at the ambassadorial level at the third (7 July 1948) and fifth (9 July) wet meetings. There was more discussion during the lower-level meetings of the working group of officials. Even here, during the summer months, non-military matters were only discussed during the 16 August and 2 September meetings. 52 See, for example, Franks’s statement, 6 July 1948, in FRUS 1948, 3: 153; Silvercruy’s statement, 7 July 1948, ibid., 160; statements by Kennan and Dutch Ambassador Van Kleffens at 9 July wet meeting, ibid. 177–8; and lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 4, folder 26, State Dept. Transcripts, pp. C3–C9. 53 See DCER 1948, 694. 54 Copies for circulation were sent by Reid to Wrong, 11 Dec. 1948: lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 5, folder 31; DCER 1948, 694. 55 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 171; DCER 1949, 774–8; lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 33, dea ex-300 to Washington, 7 Feb. 1949; ibid., Washington no. wa-322 to dea, 7 Feb. 1949. 56 na, rg 59, 840.20/2–49, Bohlen memo Acheson-Vandenberg-Connally conversations, 3 Feb. 1949; ibid., undated Bohlen memo, “Recommendations Concerning Changes Suggested by Senators Connally and Vandenberg.” 57 FRUS 1949, 4: 86; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 277. 58 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 7, folder 33, State Dept. Transcript, Ambassador’s Meeting, 8 Feb. 1949, pp. D-1–D-3. 59 Acheson and Daniels Testimony, 2 Feb. 1949, Senate Joint Resolution 36, in US, Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions, 81st Congress, 65–94; see especially comments made by Senator Lodge, 87–9. This explanation of why Acheson may have opposed Article 2 was first raised by Alan Henrickson, although without supporting evidence; see “The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948–1952,” 17–18; see also DCER 1949, 533–4. 60 Acheson Testimony, 18 Feb. 1949, in US, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, 97–8, 104.

Notes to pages 29–33

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61 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 7, folder 37, State Dept. Transcript, Ambassadors’ Meeting, 25 Feb. 1949; “President Calls on Congress to Enact His Program”; Whitney, “Southerners Open Filibuster Today.” 62 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 33, dea no. ex-300 to Washington, 7 Feb. 1949; Washington no. wa-337 to dea, 9 Feb. 1948; Wrong no. wa342 to Pearson, 9 Feb. 1948; FRUS 1949, 4: 85–6; tna/pro, fo371/79224/21245/g ,Washington no. 798 to fo, 9 Feb. 1948. 63 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 33, dea no. ex-330 to Washington, 9 Feb. 1949; rg 25, 283(s), Pearson to St Laurent, 9 Feb. 1949; rg 25, 318(s), Wrong to Reid, 15 Feb. 1949. 64 For a copy of the message sent to Canadian officials in Paris, Brussels, and The Hague, see lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 33, dea no. ex-40 to Washington, 17 Feb. 1949. 65 Ibid., Paris no. ex-466 to dea, 21 Feb. 1949. 66. na, rg 59, 840.20/11–948, Bonbright memo to Caffrey, 8 Nov. 1948. In his diary, Auriol records the French Cabinet as approving Article 2 without debate; see Auriol, Journal du septennat, 159. 67 Auriol, Journal du septennat, 536, 601–2; Massigli, Un comédie des erreurs, 1943–56, 136–7, 140–1; L’Année politique, 1950, 394. 68 lac, rg 25, 283(s), dea no. 267 to London, 9 Feb. 1949; tna/pro, fo371/79224/21245/g, fo no. 1717 to Washington, 11 Feb. 1949; Montague Brown Minute, 11 Feb. 1949; lac, mg 32, b5, vol. 112, folder “Washington Meeting and Western Europe–North Atlantic Treaty, Vol. iii,” London no. 337 to dea, 11 Feb. 1949; tna/pro, fo371/79225/21320/g, Hoyer-Millar no. 867 to Jebb, 11 Feb. 1949; lac, rg 25, 283(s), London no. 381 to dea, 16 Feb. 1949. 69 lac, rg 25, 283(s), London no. 381 to dea, 16 Feb. 1949; tna/pro, fo371/79228/21741, Bruce to Shuckburgh, 18 Feb. 1949; cro no. 219 to Ottawa, 22 Feb. 1949; lac, rg 25, 283(s), London no. 381 to dea, 16 Feb. 1949. 70 tna/pro, fo371/79228/21741, Shuckburgh to Jebb, 22 Feb. 1949. 71 tna/pro, cab 128/15, cm (49), 14, 22 Feb. 1949; fo371/79228/21741, fo no. 2149 to Washington, 24 Feb. 1949. 72 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 174. 73 See statement by ccf leader M.J. Coldwell, 31 Jan. 1949, in Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1949, 92. 74 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 171. 75 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 33, Washington no. wa-450 to dea, 21 Feb. 1949. 76 Wrong Minute, 22 Feb. 1949, with accompanying memo on the need for

224

Notes to pages 33–9

a non-military pledge in the treaty: lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 6, folder 33; see also ibid., Wrong no. wa-464 to Pearson, 22 Feb. 1949; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 175–6. 77 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 176. Acheson presented the article to the senators as “completely rewritten” during an executive session on 8 March 1949, and no objections were raised; see US, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, 130–1. 78 lac, mg 30, e101, vol. 7, folder 37, State Department Transcript of 25 Feb. Ambassador’s Meeting. c h a p t e r t wo 1 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954, 23. 2 lac, rg 25, 283(s), Working Group Report, 10 Sept. 1949. 3 In his unpublished memoirs, Canadian defence minister Brook Claxton expressed his doubts about the possibility of nato’s non-military side being developed; see lac, mg 32, b5, vol. 224, folder “Memoir Notes,” 55–6. 4 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Washington no. 1547 to dea, 3 June 1949; DCER 1950, 628. 5 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 177. 6 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 86. 7 lac, rg 25, 50030–40, Washington no. wa-2185 to dea, 16 Aug. 1949. 8 lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Reid to Pierce, 23 Sept. 1949. 9 See Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–51, chapter 13. Warner provides an excellent overview of Bevin’s “Atlanticism” in “The Labour Government and the Atlantic Alliance, 1949–1951.” 10 FRUS 1949, 4: 469. 11 See the overview provided in hstl, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary Files, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, folder “State Department File: Reports and Publications,” State Department Weekly Review, 26 Oct. 1949. 12 See Gaddis, The Long Peace, chapter 3, esp. 67–71; Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, chapter 19; Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944–1954, 710–11. 13 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, chapter 6; Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51, chapter 9; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, 730–4. 14 hstl, Truman Papers, Naval Aid Files, State Dept Briefs, State Dept Summary of Telegrams, 9 Jan. 1950.

Notes to pages 40–6

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15 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Washington no. wa-3173 to dea, 18 Nov. 1949; na, rg 59, 840.20/9–1749, State Dept. Verbatim Record of North Atlantic Council Meeting, 17 Sept. 1949. 16 Pearson, Mike, 2: 63. 17 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, dea ex-2774 to Washington, 17 Nov. 1949. 18 Ibid., Washington wa-3173, wa-3174, wa-3178 to dea, 18 Nov. 1949. 19 Ibid., Heeney to Wrong, 29 Dec. 1949. 20 The views of the Economic Division were circulated to other departments as dea memo on European Economic Cooperation, 21 Nov. 1949; see ibid. 21 Ibid., Memorandum for the Minister, 29 Dec. 1949 (Pearson wrote his comments). 22 Pearson, Mike, 2: 61–2. 23 A copy of the statement is attached to lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Dept. of Finance to Plumptre, 28 April 1950. 24 na, rg 59, 740.5/2–2450, Memo of Wrong-Achilles talks, 24 Feb. 1950. 25 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Wrong wa-918 and wa-919 to Heeney, 21 April 1950. 26 lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Memo for Pearson on Atlantic Treaty machinery, 28 April 1950. 27 lac, rg 2, a5a, vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions, 4 May 1950. Pearson’s speech was reported by the US embassy in Ottawa; see na, rg 59, 740.5/5–450, Ottawa no. 551 to State, 4 May 1951. 28 DBPO ii, 2: 45–7, microfiche calendar 16i, 35–6, 95–108. The plan was first shared with the US at the official level; see ibid., 115–18; FRUS 1950, 3: 71–2, 860–1. 29 DBPO ii, 2: 104–5, esp. 105; see also tna/pro, cab 128/39, cp (50) 80, 26 April 1950. 30 DBPO ii, 2: 129–31, 230–3. The British were anxious that the Atlantic pact machinery initially be modest in nature and believed that a French proposal made at the May meetings, to have a very powerful central organization with a “superman” to serve as secretary general, was premature; see ibid., 151–4. 31 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, London no. 767 to dea, 22 April 1950; rg 25, 50030–a-40, London no. 899 to dea, 20 April 1950. 32 For excerpts, see L’Année politique, 1950, 359–61, see also 92; na, rg 59, 740.5/4–1850, Lyon no. 85 to State, 18 April 1950; an, Auriol Papers, 57 dr2, Washington no. 1497–1500 to mae, 18 April 1950; mae, B/États-Unis/115, Chicago no. 95 to mae, 26 April 1950. 33 This point is clearly made in a UK brief for the meeting, despite reports

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34

35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42

43 44

45

Notes to pages 46–9

from Paris indicating that Bidault’s speech may not have represented Quai d’Orsay policy; see DBPO ii, 2: 71. Auriol, Mon septennat, 1947–1954, 259–60; na, rg 59, 740.5/4–1950, Paris no. 1792 to State, 19 April 1950; lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Paris no. 321 to dea, 25 April 1950; lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Paris no. 169 to dea, 25 April 1950. See, for example, Monnet, Memoirs, 300; Boussaut, La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944–1954, 740. FRUS 1950, 3: 61–2. an, Auriol Papers, 57 dr2, Schuman no. 3357–66 to Washington, 26 April 1950. lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Wrong no. wa-1023 to Pearson, 4 May 1950; FRUS 1950, 3: 75–7. an, Auriol Papers, 57 dr2, Schuman no. 3357–66 to Washington, 26 April 1950. mae, mae Internal Publication (Secret), Réunion des trois ministres des affaires étrangères des États Unis, de France et de Grande-Bretagne, 37; FRUS 1950, 3: 1014. For the presentation of the French position to the United States at the official level, see mae, uno\72\s.54.4.8. DBPO ii, 2: 11. DBPO ii, 2: 13–18, esp. 16; FRUS 1950, 3: 63–5, 638–40, 799, 1628–32. At a State Department–sponsored “Round Table Discussion” of outside experts on “Strengthening International Organizations” in the autumn of 1949, Theodore Achilles gave a detailed overview of how the Atlantic pact might be used to address the current international problems, although he stressed that this was only one option under consideration. See hstl, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, State Dept, Correspondence, 1948–49, folder 3-1949, Record of Round Table Discussion, 17–19 Nov. 1949. A copy of the plan, dated 6 May 1950, was sent by Nitze to Cabot on 30 April 1951; see na, rg 59, 740.5/4–3051. Szent-Miklosky, The Atlantic Union Movement, 109–10; na, rg 59, 740.5/3–2150, Hickerson to Kefauver, 25 March 1950; ibid., 740.5/1–2550, Achilles memo, “Atlantic Union Resolution,” 25 Jan. 1950. The January draft of Achilles’ paper was based on lengthy examination by the Policy Planning Staff; see rg 59, 840.20/12–2749, note on Kennan to Acheson, 27 Dec. 1949. See, for example, the State Department brief entitled “European Integration,” 15 March 1950, prepared for a March 1950 meeting of Western

Notes to pages 49–52

46 47 48

49

50 51 52

53 54

55 56 57

58

59

227

European ambassadors in Rome: na, rg 59, 740.5/3–1750; see also the Rome discussions themselves: FRUS 1950, 3: 797–803. The fact that Acheson believed any examination of Article 2 would be “preliminary” and “exploratory” in nature was made clear in a March message from Acheson to Bevin: see FRUS 1950, 3: 830–2. FRUS 1950, 3: 65–71, esp. 70–1. lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Washington no. wa-1016 to dea, 3 May 1950. DBPO ii, 2: 143–50, see also 249–51; FRUS 1950, 3: 844–7. For the French minute (27 April 1950), see mae, Z/Généralités/133. For subsequent discussions of the matter at the official level, see FRUS 1950, 3: 911–13. DBPO ii, 2: 183–5. US indecision is even made more apparent at further discussions of the matter between officials; see ibid., microfiche calendar 47i(c). Ibid., 198–9. Ibid., 205–6n4. Ibid., microfiche calendar, 47i, 267–1, 314–17, 318–19, 348–9, 380; FRUS 1950, 3: 1040–3, 1069–71; mae, mae Internal Publication (Secret), Réunion des trois ministres des affaires étrangères des États Unis, de France, et de Grande Bretagne, 63–7, 89, 108–9; DCER 1950, 1641–3. lac, rg 2–18, vol. 156, folder e-40–2 1950 (Jan. to June), dea no. 678 to London, 15 May 1950; DCER 1950, 1633–5. See, for example, lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, London no. 669 to dea, 6 April 1950; ibid., London nos. 802 and 814 to dea, 28 April 1950; rg 2, A5a, vol. 2645, Cabinet conclusions, 17 May 1950 and 5 June 1950; rg 2, b-2, vol. 156, folder e-40–2 (Jan.–June 1950), Cab. Doc. 142, 17 May 1950; rg 25, 50030–a-40 (File Pocket no. 1), dea Report on the London meeting, 15–19 May; DCER 1950, 1638–9. FRUS 1950, 3: 1069–71. lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, London no. 917 to dea, 16 May 1950; DCER 1950, 1636–7. lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, London no. 933 to dea, 17 May 1950; see also ibid., File Pocket no. 1, dea Report on the London meeting, 15–19 May 1950. See Makin’s comments to his US, French, and Canadian counterparts, 15 May 1950, contained in lac, rg 2–18, vol. 156, folder e-40–2 1950 (Jan. to June), London unnumbered to dea; an, Auriol Papers, 57 dr3, Paris no. 3993–4006 to Washington and other embassies, 23 May 1950. DBPO ii, 2: 368–9, 390–1.

228

Notes to pages 53–7

60 For more on Stikker’s proposal, see tna/pro, cab 134/37, aoc (50) 45, (memo) annex 1, 20 Sept. 1950; t225/183, Stikker-UK Minister of State for Economic Affairs conversation, 6 Sept. 1950; fo371/94149/m109/1, Hall-Patch to Bevin, 1 Jan. 1951. 61 tna/pro, cab 134/37, aoc (50) 45, 20 Sept. 1950 (memo); see also t/225/183, fo note on oeec-nato relationship, 15 Sept. 1950; ibid., Berthoud to Wilson, 2 Sept. 1950. 62 an, Auriol Papers 57 dr6, nato no. 10.085/88 to Paris, 3 Aug. 1950; mae, de-ce 467, “Note pour le President,” by the Service de coopération économique; ibid., unsigned memorandum, “Problemes économiques generaux poses par le réarmement du monde occidental,” 14 Sept. 1950; ibid., Note by Service cooperation économique, re: “Relations de L’O.E.C.E. avec les organismes du Pact atlantique,” 6 Sept. 1950. For more on the common defence budget, see Auriol, Mon septennat, 1947–1954, 281–3; na, rg 59, 740.5/8–450, London depto 41 to State, 4 Aug. 1950. 63 FRUS 1950, 3: 656–66, 668–72. 64 tna/pro, t225/184, Bevin no. 1105 to fo, 19 Sept. 1950; lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Can. nato Del. no. 15 to dea, 17 Sept. 1950; ibid., Can. Del. to nato meeting, no. 17 to dea, 18 Sept. 1950; na, rg 59, Lot m88, box 50, nato Summary of Meeting, 16 Sept. 1950; ibid., State Dept. Record of meeting, 18 Sept. 1950. 65 tna/pro, t225/184, fo no. 4199 to Washington, 21 Sept. 1950. 66 Ibid., Hall no. 817 to Hitchman, 1 Oct. 1950; lac, rg 25, 50030–C-40, Washington wa-2416 and wa-2417 to dea, 6 Oct. 1950; mae, dece/467, Quai d’Orsay “Note,” 30 Sept. 1950; na, rg 59, 740.5/10–2150, London Topol 119 to State, 21 Oct. 1950; mae, de-ce/467, London no. 21/30 to Paris, 24 Oct. 1950; tna/pro, cab 134/37, aoc (50) 57 (memo) 2 Nov. 1950. 67 tna/pro, t230/188, “Note of Discussion, nato and O.E.E.C.,” 17 Sept. 1950; mae, de-ce/467, Note by Service cooperation économique, “Relations de l’OECE avec les organismes du Pacte atlantique,” 6 Sept.1950; lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, Can. Del. to nato meeting, no. 11 to dea, 15 Sept. 1950; mae, de-ce 467, Swedish “Aide mémoire” (received in mae, 5 Oct. 1950); mae, de-ce/342, “Résumé d’une déclaration faite a la réunion ministérielle officieuse du 6 octobre 1950” (by Swedish representative). 68 tna/pro, fo371/94149/m109/1, Hall-Patch to Bevin, 1 Jan. 1951; FRUS 1950, 3: 688–91; na, rg 59, 740.5/12–1950, Stikker’s statement to nato defence ministers’ meeting, 19 Dec. 1950. 69 lac, rg 2, B-2, vol. 156, folder e-40–2 1950 (Aug.-Dec.), dea no. E214

Notes to pages 57–63

70 71

72

73 74 75

76

77

78

79 80

229

to oeec, 22 Dec. 1950; rg 25, 50030–a-40, dea no.1054 to London, 24 July 1950; ibid., Can. Del. to nato meeting, no. 11 to dea, 15 Sept. 1950. In his memoirs, Marjolin claims that he was firmly committed to ensuring that the oeec’s existence continued, although he was willing to see it cooperate with nato; see Marjolin, Architect of European Unity, 238–40. FRUS 1950, 3: 682. FRUS 1950, 3: 682–5; na, rg 59, 740.5/12–950, London Depto 305 to State, 9 Dec. 1950; ibid., State Todep 157 to London (drafted 12 Dec. 1950); rg 59, 740.5/12–1550, London Depto 344 to State, 15 Dec. 1950. mae, de-ce/577, “Crise de l’O.E.C.E.,” 2 Jan. 1951; a handwritten reference notes that it was approved by the Cabinet on 3 Jan. 1951. Auriol, Journal du septennat, 18, notes that Schuman raised the matter on 10 January. Both accounts record that the Cabinet opposed the fusion of the two organizations; see also Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne, 864–6; Bossuat, “France and the Leadership of the West in the 1950s.” tna/pro, fo371/94149/m109/15, Treasury and fo memo, “The Future Relationship of the O.E.E.C. and N.A.T.O.,” 6 Jan. 1951. tna/pro, fo371/94149/m109/1, Hall-Patch no. 1 to Bevin, 1 Jan. 1951; fo371/94149/m109/5, Hall-Patch to Strang, 2 Jan. 1951. tna/pro, fo371/94149/m109/2, Berthoud minute, 3 Jan. 1951; fo371/94149/m109/3, “Discussion in Strang’s room, 3 Jan. 1951” (dated 4 Jan. 1951); fo371/90943/au1071/1, Maclean Minute, 3 Jan 1951 (misdated 1950). tna/pro, fo371/94149/m109/15, Hitchman to the chancellor of the Exchequer, 6 Jan. 1951. A copy of this note was included in the submission to Bevin. tna/pro, cab 134/39, Dixon to Brook, 8 Jan. 1951; circulated as aoc (51) 4, (memo), 9 Jan. 1951; approved at aoc (51) 3rd Meeting, 19 Jan. 1951, cab 134/38. tna/pro, fo371/94149/m109/18, fo no. 92 to Washington, 9 Jan. 1951; fo371/94149/m109/7, nato. no. 4 to fo, 9 Jan. 1951; fo371/94149/m109/9, nato no. 5 to fo, 10 Jan. 1951; fo371/94135/m107/7, Berthoud-Richie conversation, 8 Jan. 1951 (misdated 1950); cab 134/38, aoc (51) 2nd meeting, 10 Jan. 1951. FRUS 1951, 3: 38. na, rg 59, 740.5/1–2951, London 4171 to State, 29 Jan. 1951; tna/pro, cab 134/39, aoc (51) 12, 27 Jan. 1951; cab 134/38, aoc (51) 4, 29 Jan.

230

81

82

83

84 85

Notes to pages 64–8

1951; t225/186, fo no. 477 to Washington, 31 Jan. 1951; FRUS 1951, 3: 38–40. tna/pro, t225/186, Washington no. 134 to fo, 12 Feb. 1951; cab 134/38, aoc (51) 8th meeting, 23 Feb. 1951; see also ibid., aoc (51) 7th meeting, 16 Feb. 1951; fo371/94135/m107/29, note of fo discussion, 15 Feb. 1951; FRUS 1951, 3: 43–6, 64; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–1651, State no. 3829 to London, 16 Feb. 1951; ibid., State no. 258 to London, 17 Feb. 1951; tna/pro, cab 131/11, Appendix to do (51) 19 (paper), 26 Feb. 1951. tna/pro, cab 131/11, do (51) 19 (memo), 26 Feb. 1951; cab 131/10, do (51) 4th meeting, 28 Feb. 1951. It appears that much of the opposition to feb came from the Treasury. Although approving of the Hitchman papers, Gaitskell told Treasury officials on 8 March that he believed there was no need for nato economic machinery. In the future, he argued, there might be a need for a new “free world” economic organization (not the oeec), which would have to include the Commonwealth; however, “the time was not yet ripe for this yet.” See tna/pro, t225/187, Hitchman note, 6 March 1951; cab 134/39, Annex C, aoc (51) 22 (memo), 9 March 1951. FRUS 1951, 74–7; lac, rg 25, 50030–a-40, London no. 489 to dea, 27 Feb. 1951; tna/pro, T225/187, nato no. 61 to fo, 27 Feb. 1951; cab 134/38, aoc (51) 9th meeting, 2nd March 1951; t225/87, oeec no. 49 to fo, 28 Feb. 1951. FRUS 1951, 3: 94. tna/pro, cab 134/49, aoc (51) 24 (memo), 15 March 1951; na, rg 59, 740.5/4–415, London no. 5229 to State, 4 April 1951; tna/pro, cab 134/38, aoc (51) 10th meeting, 16 March 1951; ibid., aoc (51) 11th meeting, 30 March 1951; FRUS 1951, 3: 100–1, 133–4, 142–5, 156–9. c ha p t e r t h r e e

1 lac, rg 25, 50080–40, Rogers to Reid, 2 April 1951. 2 lac, rg 25, 50030–v-3–40, Washington no. wa-1406 to dea, 11 April 1951; rg 25, 50030–v-40, dea Memo: “Admission of New Members to nato,” 17 April 1951; rg 25, 50030–v-3–40, London nos. 1375 and 1376 to dea, 6 June 1951, and London no. 1390 to dea, 7 June 1951; rg 25, 50030–v-3–40, Italian Government memo, 29 June 1951 (in dea files); an, Auriol Papers, 71, dr4, Washington no. 3661/3666 to mae; na, rg 59, 740.5/8–451, Jessup memo, 4 Aug. 1951. 3 na, rg 59, 740.5/6–151, London Depto 1045 to State, 1 June 1951.

Notes to pages 69–73

231

4 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Aide-mémoire by US embassy, The Hague, 17 August 1951 (dea copy); ibid., London no. 2113 to dea, 22 Aug. 1951. 5 Canada, dea, Statements and Speeches, no. 51/30 (25 June 1951); lac, rg 25, 50030–a-1–40, Diary of Pearson’s trip; Pearson, Mike, 2: 70–5. The UK record makes no mention of the proposed nato split; see tna/pro, fo371/91164/b31/31, Leishmann Minute, 2 July 1951. 6 lac, rg 25, 50030–v-3–40, dea Defence Liaison to Reid, 5 July 1951; ibid., London no. 1661 to dea, 5 July 1951. 7 FRUS 1951, 3: 172–5, 238–43, 244–6, 253–6; na, rg 59, 740.5/8–2351, London Depto 263 to State, 23 Aug. 1951; ibid., London Depto 286 to State, 28 Aug. 1951. 8 FRUS 1951, 3: 241–3; Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 208–14. 9 lac, mg 31, e46, vol. 6, folder 11, Reid to Pearson, 10 Sept. 1951; na, rg 25, 50030–a-1–40 (file pocket), dea Memo, “nato Foreign Policy,” 13 Sept. 1951. For US documents on the matter that impressed dea, see lac, rg 25, 50105–40, London no. 3529 to dea, 22 Aug. 1951; lac, rg 2, b-2, vol. 20, folder u-40–4–(p)-(d), US Memo, “Non-Military Objectives of nato” (in dea files). 10 lac, rg 25, 5296–a-3–40, “Western Europe and the North Atlantic Community,” 17 July 1951. 11 An appendix to the paper by R.A. Mackay challenging its conclusions was endorsed by Norman Robertson, clerk of the Privy Council; the Canadian ambassadors to the United States, Belgium, and West Germany; the chargé d’affaires in France; and Dana Wilgress, high commissioner to London (although Wilgress believed that federation might be a future possibility). See lac, rg 2, b-2, vol. 202, folder u-40–4, Rogers to Pickersgill, 21 Aug. 1951; rg 25, b2, vol. 2147, folder “Article 2,” Wrong memo, 15 Oct. 1951; rg 25, 50105–40, London no. 3709 to dea, 5 Sept. 1951; ibid., Brussels no. 566 to dea, 4 Sept. 1951; ibid., Bonn no. 736 to dea, 19 Sept. 1951. 12 na, rg 59, 740.00 (no item number noted), State no. 5245 to Paris, 4 April 1951. Canadian belief that this memo reflected American thinking was noted in the 17 July policy paper on the North Atlantic community. 13 lac, rg 25, 501050–40, Heeney to Pearson, 30 Aug. 1951; ibid., LePan to Pearson, 6 Sept. 1951; rg 2, B-2, vol. 204, folder u-40–4–(p)-(d), Economic Division Memo, “The North Atlantic Community–Economic Implications,” 31 Aug. 1951, discussed at officials’ meeting, rg 2, B-2, vol. 204, folder u-40–4–p-m-1950–5, 17 Sept. 1951; rg 25, b2, vol. 2147, folder “Defence North Atlantic Treaty Articles,” draft statement for Pearson for nato meeting, 13 Sept. 1951.

232

Notes to pages 74–8

14 tna/pro, fo371/94150/m109/40g, Morrison’s private secretary to chancellor of the Exchequer, 28 April 1951; cab 134/4, aoc (51) 26th meeting, 5 Sept. 1951; cab 134/39, aoc (51) 98, 7 Sept. 1951; cab 128/20, cm (51) 58, 4 Sept. 1951; FRUS 1951, 3: 257–8. 15 For opposition to the telegram, see na, rg 59, Lot 55d105, box 2, folder nato (General and Top Secret), van B. Cleveland memo, 12 April 1951. Spofford reported on 1 June that Italy was concerned about the lack of emphasis on European integration (no record exists of other countries= comments); see rg 59, 740.5/6–151, London Depto 1040 to State. The level of debate within the State Department is illustrated by rg 59, Lot 64d53, box 28, folder: Europe 1951, 28–33 to 28–59, Policy Planning Staff Draft Memo, “The United States Position toward Strengthening Ties among the Countries of Europe and the Atlantic Community,” 13 Aug. 1951. 16 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, US embassy memo, 29 Aug. 1951 (in dea files); FRUS 1951, 3: 240–3, 253–6; na, rg 59, Lot M-88, box 65, folder “North Atlantic Council Meeting, Ottawa, September 1951, ott Documents,” US brief, “Future Development of nato,” 12 Sept. 1951. 17 na, rg 59, 740.5/5–551, London Depto 889 to State, 5 May 1951. 18 na, rg 59, 740.5/11–2051, State Todep 371 to London, 20 Nov. 1951. 19 na, rg 59, Lot 55d105, box 2, folder “nato-Article ii,” Minutes of State Dept. Committee on Non-Military Matters, 3 Oct. 1951; rg 59, 740.5/11–2051, State Todep 371 to London, 20 Nov. 1951. 20 na, rg 59, 740.5/10–2351, London Depto 501 to State, 23 Oct. 1951; ibid., State no. 2287 to London (drafted 11 Nov. 1951); lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, dea brief, “Movement of Labour within the North Atlantic Community,” 6 Feb. 1952. 21 tna/pro, cab 134/38, aoc (51) 28th meeting, 26 Oct. 1951; cab 134/40, aoc (51) 114, 116 (memos), 25 Oct. 1951. 22 lac, rg 25, b2, vol. 2147, folder “Article 2,” Wrong to LePan, 25 Oct. 1951; rg 25, 50105–40, Plumptre to Ritchie, 18 Oct. 1951; mae, Z/Généralités/65, Oslo no. 325 to mae, 28 Sept. 1951. 23 The report’s contents were outlined in a dea memo to Pearson; see lac, rg 25, 50105–40, 1 Nov. 1951; ibid., London no. 2673 to dea, 2 Nov. 1951; na, rg 59, 740.5/11–51, Paris no. 2674 to State, 5 Nov. 1951. 24 lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, “Movement of Labour within the North Atlantic Community,” 6 Feb. 1952; ibid., London no.2760 to dea, 13 Nov. 1951; tna/pro, cab 134/38, aoc (51) 28th meeting, 26 Oct. 1951. 25 lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, “Movement of Labour within the North Atlantic Community,” 6 Feb. 1952; ibid., Washington no. wa-4006 to

Notes to pages 78–86

26

27 28

29 30 31

32

33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44

45

233

dea, 15 Nov. 1951; na, rg 59, 740.5/11–2351, State no. 2386 to Rome, 23 Nov. 1951. lac, mg 26, N1, vol. 15, folder: Streit, “Interim Report on the Committee on the North Atlantic Community.” nato Document c8-d/6, 26 Nov. 1951. Despite its secrecy, Pearson sent a copy to Streit. Pearson, Mike, 2: 76. lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, Harris to Heeney, 17 Dec. 1951; ibid., Pearson to Harris, 22 Jan. 1952; rg 25, 50105–40, dea no. 2961 to London, 5 Jan. 1951. lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, dea no. 208 to London, 23 Jan. 1951; ibid., dea no. 204 to Washington, 24 Jan. 1952. Ibid., London no. 269 to dea, 25 Jan. 1952; ibid., “Movement of Labour within the North Atlantic Community,” 6 Feb. 1952. Ibid., “Movement of Labour within the Atlantic Community,” 6 Feb. 1952; ibid., Washington wa-293 to dea, 29 Jan. 1952; ibid., Washington no. wa-333 to dea, 1 Feb. 1952. Ibid., Memo to Pearson on nato migration, 31 Jan. 1952 (Pearson’s comments are written on the memo); ibid., 10th Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration, 12 Feb. 1952 (dated 20 Feb.). Ibid., oeec no. 18 to dea, 29 Jan. 1952; ibid., Washington no. wa-293 to dea, 29 Jan. 1952. FRUS 1952–54, 5: 180–90. FRUS 1952–54, 4: 203–6, 211–20. DCER 1952, 683–90; lac, rg 25, 50105–40, oeec no. 10 to dea, 20 Jan. 1952; ibid., oeec no. 11 to dea, 20 Jan. 1952. DCER, 1952, 690–2. lac, rg 25, 10817–a-40, nat0 exl-eao 9 to dea, 19 Feb. 1952; rg 25, 50030–a-6–40, dea no. 15 to nato Delegation to Lisbon; rg 25, 50105–40, Plumptre to Isbister, 27 Feb. 1952. DCER 1952, 692–3. FRUS 1952–54, 5: 136–41. Pearson, Mike, 2: 76; Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954, 202–3. FRUS 1952–54, 5: 198–203. tna/pro, fo371/100161/m1019/3, Jupp minute, 16 Jan. 1952. tna/pro, prem 11/160, Jacob Report, “Inter-Allied Organisations,” 12 Dec. 1952; ibid., Eden to Churchill, 21 Dec. 1951; ibid., Butler to Churchill, 29 Dec. 1952; ibid., Cherwell to Churchill, 29 Dec. 1952; fo371/100161/m1019/1, Garvey Minute, 2 Jan. 1952. tna/pro, prem 11/160, Eden to Churchill, 21 Dec. 1951.

234

Notes to pages 86–9

46 The British, for example, told the Committee of Five that they were opposed to nato being given too large a role in trade issues, probably because of traditional British fear of duplicating international machinery; see na, rg 59, 740.5/2-1452, London no. Depto 1022 to State, 14 Feb. 1952. 47 tna/pro, cab 134/40, Plowden to Brook, 28 Nov. 1951, annex I to aoc (51) (memo). 48 FRUS 1952–54, 6: 2–5. Milward suggests additional reasons, related to military strategy, which caused the oeec to be favoured by most of nato’s members; see his “nato, oeec and the Integration of Europe.” The French consistently favoured the oeec over nato during this period; see mae, de-ce/467, mae “Note pour le Président – Réorganisation du nato,” 15 Dec. 1951; ibid., Parodi to Monnet, 10 Dec. 1951. 49 na, rg 59, 740.5/1–852, Makins-Perkins conversation, 8 Jan. 1952; tna/pro, prem 11/160, Washington no. 42 to fo, 7 Jan. 1952; ibid., UK Embassy Washington nos. 32 and 33 to UK High Commission, Ottawa, 14 Jan. 1952; hstl, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files, General Files, Churchill-Truman Meetings, folder “Churchill-Truman Meetings – nato and Other Military Matters,” State Dept. brief for Truman talks with Churchill: “Reorganization of nato,” 2 Jan. 1952; FRUS 1952–54, 5: 154–5. 50 tna/pro, fo371/100161/m1019/11, Acheson to Eden, 24 March 1952. 51 Ibid., fo no. 1356 to Washington, 26 March 1952; ibid., Berthoud Minute, 25 March 1952. 52 tna/pro, cab 134/1012, mac (52) 93 (paper), 3 April 1952; cab 134/1011, mac (52) 23rd meeting, 1 April 1953. 53 lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, dea Defence Liaison draft memo for Cabinet, 1 April 1953; tna/pro, cab 134/766, annex to aoc (53) 20th meeting, 8 May 1953. 54 lhcma, Ismay Papers, iii/21/12, “Report of the Working Group on Labour Mobility,” annex D to nato secretary general’s progress report for period 1 Dec. 1952 to 16 April 1953. 55 tna/pro, fo371/105907/m493/1, Christofas minute, 12 Jan. 1953. 56 tna/pro, cab 134/766, annex B, aoc (53) 20 (memo), 8 May 1953; cab 134/76, aoc (53) 6th meeting, 18 May 1953; fo371/105908/m493/39. 57 lac, rg 2, vol. 1894, Cab. Doc. 120, 9 May 1953; rg 2, a5a, vol. 2653, Canadian Cabinet Meeting, 11 May 1953. 58 na, rg 59, 740.5/4–2453, Paris no. Secto 4 to State, 24 April 1953; rg 59, 740.5/8–653, Paris Polto A-85 to State, 3 Aug. 1953.

Notes to pages 89–93

235

59 tna/pro, cab 134/766, aoc (53) 20th meeting, 8 May 1953. 60 lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, dea no. 844 to nato, 19 Nov. 1953; ibid., dea no. 861 to nato, 24 Nov. 1953. 61 lhcma, Ismay Papers, iii/21/3, “Secretary General’s Report for the Period 17th April to 3rd December 1953.” 62 The Working Group did not meet between November 1953 and January 1955; see lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, nato no. 30 to dea, 11 Jan. 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–1255, Paris Polto 1445 to State, 1 Feb. 1955; lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, nato no. 320 to dea, 2 Feb. 1955. 63 Heeney’s comments, 25 March 1953, lac, rg 25, 50105-c-40; lhcma, Ismay Papers, iii/21/2, “Secretary General’s Report for the Period 1 December 1952 to 16 April 1953”; lac, rg 25, 50105-c-40, nato no. 965 to dea, 25 March 1953. 64 lac, rg 25, 50105-c-40, “North Atlantic Council Action on Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty,” 6 Dec. 1952. 65 tna/pro, cab 134/764, aoc (52) 110 (memo), 11 Dec. 1952. 66 lac, rg 25, 10548–Bh-40, Note by nato secretary general on Fellowship program, 10 July 1957, and passim; Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952–1957, 173–97. 67 na, rg 59, 740.5/10–1955, State Topol 455 to Paris, 24 Oct. 1955; rg 59, 740.5/10–2655, Paris Polto A-266 to State, 26 Oct. 1955. The significant underfunding of the working group’s work led to bizarre debates over such matters as the per diem for students attending a nato summer course in Paris and whether nato could afford to serve wine when hosting visits from interested groups. See na, rg 59, 740.5/3–2455, Paris Polto A-155 to State, 24 March 1955; rg 59, 740.5/4–2355, Paris Polto A-603 to State, 23 April 1955; rg 59, 740.5/6–1755, Paris Polto A-717 to State, 17 June 1955. 68 British Society for International Understanding, NATO and the Peoples: Report of the First International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community (1952); International Atlantic Committee, Report of the Second International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community; na, rg 59, 740.5/4–155, London no. 2897 to State, 1 April 1955; rg 59, 740.5/6–2955, Paris Polto A-739 to State, 29 June 1955. 69 See, for example, the history and statement of goals of the Association française pour la Communauté atlantique” in an, Bidault Papers, vol. 27. 70 British Society for International Understanding, NATO and the Peoples, 4. 71 An equally influential organization to Streit’s was the Declaration of Atlantic Unity Group. Its name was taken from a declaration (released in

236

72

73

74

75

76

77

78 79 80 81

Notes to pages 93–5

October 1954) calling for the development of Article 2, a much less radical goal than the one advocated by Streit. See Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement. na, rg 59, 740.5/1–3155, Ottawa no. 530 to State, 31 Jan. 1955; rg 59, 740.5/2–855, Palmer-Olivier discussions and attachments, 8 Feb. 1955; rg 59, 740.5/2–955, Paris Polto 1528 to State, 9 Feb. 1955. For a copy of the resolution 27 Jan. 1955, see lac, rg 25, 10548-bf-40. na, rg 59, 740.5/2–1855, The Hague no. 725 to State, 18 Feb. 1955; rg 59, 740.5/3–1155, Palmer-van Baarda conversation, 11 March 1955; rg 59, 740.5/6–1755, The Hague no. 1166 to State, 17 June 1955. lac, rg 25, 10548-bf-40, nato no. 192 to dea, 15 Feb. 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/3–1755, Palmer-Leishman conversation, 17 March 1955, and lac, rg 25, 10548-bf-40, cro no. 151 to Ottawa, 15 Feb. 1955 (copy in dea files); lac, rg 25, 10548-bf-40, dea no. 171 to nato, 11 Feb. 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–2355, Hoover to Saltonstall, 23 Feb. 1955; rg 59 740.5/3–755, Merchant-Portuguese ambassador conversation, 7 March 1955. For more on this organization (still in existence), see Brumter, The North Atlantic Assembly; Charman and Williams, The Parliamentarians’ Role in the Alliance. By January 1955 the US representative on the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations had gone six months and eight meetings without receiving any instructions from Washington; see na, rg 59, 740.5/1–2055, Hughes to Merchant, 20 Jan. 1955. David initially reported to Bidault on 26 Nov. 1953; see AN, Bidault Papers, vol. 44, folder G. A motion based on the report was passed at the December 1953 ministerial meeting; see lac, rg 25, 50105-g-40, nato no. 928 to dea, 14 Dec. 1953. David followed up with an appearance before the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations in late January 1954. His oral recommendations were quite mild, while a written brief outlined a more radical, centralized approach. No major changes resulted from his presentation; see lac, rg 25, 50105-g-40, nato no. 256 to dea, 29 Jan. 1954; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–354, Paris Polto A-490 to State, 3 Feb. 1954. lac, mg 26, n1, vol. 5, folder “G-General,” Pearson to Gallagher, 16 May 1952. lac, rg 25, 50105-c-40, dea no. D-14 to nato, 8 Jan. 1953. Ibid., dea no. d-55 to nato, 30 Jan. 1953; ibid., nato no. 775 to dea, 11 March 1953; ibid., Stacie to Rogers, 26 March 1953. Ibid., nato no. 774 to dea, 11 March 1953; ibid., dea no. d-195 to nato, 14 April 1953.

Notes to pages 96–106

237

82 Ibid., dea d-195 to nato, 14 April 1953; ibid., Memo to Pearson on nato postal union (Pearson’s remarks written on memo), 21 June 1953. c ha p t e r f o u r 1 lac, mg 26, n1, vol. 15, folder: Streit “North Atlantic Community Interim Report,” 26 Nov. 1951. 2 FRUS 1949, 4: 161. 3 FRUS 1950, 3: 103–5, 114–20. 4 lac, rg 25, 50030-a-40 (File Pocket no. 1), dea Report of the London nato meeting, 9 June 1950. 5 Ibid. The term “foreign policy” never appeared in the resolution, although it was understood that this was to be the topic of “political consultation”; see DBPO ii, 2: 379–84. 6 lac, rg 25, 50030-a-40, London no. 349 to dea, 26 Jan. 1951; rg 2,b2, box 203, folder u-40–4-n, 1950–51, “Methods of Political Discussion in the nato Deputies and Their Possible Consequences – with Particular Reference to the Discussion of Yugoslavia,” 5 April 1951. 7 lac, rg 25, 50030-a-f-40, London no. 1527 to dea, 21 June 1951. 8 lac, rg 25, 50115-j-40, Collins memo, 31 Jan. 1953. 9 DCER 1952, 725–6. 10 na, rg 59, 740.5/6–752, State Topol 794 to Paris, 13 June 1952; rg 59, 740.5/6–1752, Paris Polto 1402 to State, 17 June 1952; DCER 1952, 729–33; FRUS 1952–54, 309–11. 11 DCER 1952, 734–7, esp. 735; na, rg 59, 740.5/2252, State Topol 59 to Paris (drafted 28 July 1952). 12 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 323–7. 13 na, rg 59, 740.5/9–1852, Perkins to Acheson, 18 Sept. 1952. 14 na, rg 59, 740.5/8–1152, State Topol 59 to Paris, 31 July 1952; lac, rg 25, 50115-j-40, Eden no. 46 to Hoyer-Millar, 14 August 1952 (copy in dea files); na, rg 59, 740.5/8–1152, Paris no. 905 to State, 11 Aug. 1952. 15 na, rg 59, 740.5/8–2652, Paris Polto 207 to State, 26 Aug. 1952. 16 DCER 1952, 746–7. 17 DCER 1952, 750–2; na, rg 59, 740.5/8–2952, Paris Polto 228 to State, 29 Aug. 1952; rg 59, 740.5/9–452, Paris Polto 260 to State, 4 Sept. 1952. 18 DCER 1952, 736. 19 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 326. 20 DCER 1952, 743–7. 21 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 323–7.

238

Notes to pages 106–20

22 Although there is no record of Acheson’s approval of the paper (FRUS 1952–54, 5: 327n9), the response from nato embassies was generally positive; see na, rg 59, 740.5/12–952, Adair to Parsons, 9 Dec. 1952; rg 59, 740.5/9–2252, Draper Polto circular 9 to State, 22 Sept. 1952; ibid., Merchant to Parsons, 22 Sept. 1952. In late June 1953 the paper was cited as reflecting US views on nato consultation; see FRUS 1952–54, 5: 414. 23 DCER 1952, 757–64. 24 Ibid., 759–64, esp. 764. 25 Ibid., 764–5. 26 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 330–4, 347–8, 351–3; Stuart and Tow, Limits of Alliance, 196; Melandri, “France and the Atlantic Alliance, 1950–1953,” 277; Faure, Mémoires, 1: 385–6. 27 DCER 1952, 811–13. 28 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 2: 49. 29 Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, chapter 9. 30 Eisenhower, The White House Years, 1: 142. 31 lac, mg 26, n1, vol. 4, folder: John Foster Dulles, Pearson-Dulles conversation, 15 Feb. 1953; FRUS 1952–54, 5: 2067–71. 32 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 2: 68. 33 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 366n6. 34 lac, rg 25, 50105-d-40, nato no. 1417 to dea, 5 May 1953. 35 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 385–8. 36 DCER 1953, 714–16. 37 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 410–12; DCER 1953, 716–19. 38 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 408–9. 39 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 413–14. 40 The American representative believed that the expected reaction of the Americans had guided Ismay’s drafting; see FRUS 1952–54, 5: 417–19. 41 an, Bidault Papers, 457ap, vol. 44, “Position présente de l’Organisation atlantique,” 25 June 1953; FRUS 1952–54, 5: 416–19, esp. note 3. 42 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 416–22. 43 Ibid., 423–7. 44 Ibid., 427–36; see also na, rg 59, 740.5/7–2953, Dillon to Matthews, 29 July 1953. 45 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 401–8. 46 Ibid., 432–6. 47 FRUS 1952–54, 5: 1689–95; tna/pro, prem 11/425, UK record of 5th tripartite meeting, 14 July 1953; ibid., fo Top Secret Publication on Salisbury’s visit to Washington, 9–15 July 1953.

Notes to pages 120–7

239

48 Streit reminded Dulles of this episode in late 1957; see sgml, Dulles Papers, box 123, folder: Streit, Clarence Streit to Dulles, 12 Nov. 1957. 49 Ibid., box 209, folder: Third Conference on Canadian-American Affairs, St Lawrence University, Canton, New York, Dulles speech, 20 June 1939, “A North American Contribution to World Order.” 50 Ibid., box 20, folder: Wilson, Hugh R., Dulles to Wilson, 13 June 1941, 51 Ibid., box 43, folder: re: North Atlantic Pact, Acheson-Dulles conversation, 14 Feb. 1949. 52 Dulles confirmed his support in a letter to Congressman Frank J. Becker; see na, rg 59, 740.5/1–1255, 28 Jan 1955. 53 ddel, Dulles Papers, Chronological Correspondence Series, box 4, Dulles to Hughes, 20 July 1953; sgml, Dulles Papers, box 70, folder: Hughes, John C., Hughes to Dulles, 25 July 1953. 54 na, rg 59,740.5/7–2453, State Circular Airgram ca-333, 24 July 1953. 55 ddel, Eisenhower Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File, 1953–61, Subject Series, box 46, folder: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2), Memo for Eisenhower on nato parliamentary association, 1 Oct. 1953. Eisenhower’s support is cited in na, rg 59, 740.5/10–853, Merchant to Dulles, 8 Oct. 1953. 56 DCER 1953, 771–5. 57 tna/pro, cab 128/26, cm (53) 70, 24 Nov. 1953; cab 129/64, C (53) 320, 17 Nov. 1953; cab 134/765, aoc (53) 38th meeting, 15 Oct. 1953; ibid., aoc (53) 13th meeting, 19 Oct. 1953. 58 na, rg 59, 740.5/10–1053, Paris Polto 550 to State, 10 Oct. 1953. 59 na, rg 59, 740.5/10–1253, Paris Polto 557 to State, 12 Oct. 1953. 60 na, rg 59, 740.5/10–1553, Paris Topol 360 to Paris, 15 Oct. 1953. 61 DCER 1953, 779–83; na, rg 59, 740.5/11–135, State Topol 535 to nato (drafted 17 Nov. 1953); rg 59, 740.5/11–2053, State Topol 565 to Paris (drafted 25 Nov. 1953). 62 DCER 1953, 728–9, 734–9, 745–6; na, rg 59, 740.5/1–1454, Paris Polto 1163 to State, 14 Jan. 1954; rg 59, 740.5/1–1654, Paris Polto 1169 to State, 16 Jan. 1954; ibid., State Topol 799 to Paris, 16 Jan. 1954; rg 59, 740.5/1–1954, Paris Polto 1177 to State, 19 Jan. 1954; rg 59, 740.5/2–1054, Paris Polto 1286 to State, 10 Feb. 1954; rg 59, 740.5/3–154, Paris Polto 1384 to State, 1 March 1954; DCER 1954, 551–88. 63 lac, rg 25, 50030–40, UK nato Delegation Annual Review for 1953, 3 Feb. 1954 (copy in dea files). 64 DCER 1953, 750–5. 65 ddel, Eisenhower Papers, Papers as President of the US, International

240

66

67 68 69 70

Notes to pages 128–34

Meeting Series, box 1, folder: Bermuda-Hagerty Notes, US minutes of meeting, 6 Dec. 1953. na, rg 59,740.5/2–2454, State Topol 955 to nato, 25 Feb. 1954; lac, rg 25, 50115–J-40, dea report on April ministerial meeting, circular doc. no. A 119/54, 19 May 1954; Ismay, nato: The First Five Years, 1949–1954, 199–200. For an overview of the policy, see Immerman, “Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist.” Canada, dea, Statements and Speeches, no. 54/16. FRUS 1952–54, 5: 518. lac, rg 25, 50102–J-40, Pearson press conference, 11 May 1955. chapter five

1 Address by Dulles, 23 April 1956; see Dulles, “Developing nato in Peace,” 708. 2 See Ingimundarson, “The Role of nato and the US Military Base in Icelandic Domestic Politics, 1949–1999.” 3 DDF 1955, 1: 547: “la question qui a été au centre du débat européen: est-il souhaitable de constituer une communauté d’intérêts entre la France et ses partenaires européens, quitte à voir l’Allemagne prendre dans cette communauté une place qui pourrait devenir prépondérante?” (my translation). 4 See Pearson’s comments at 11 May 1955 Press Conference: lac, rg 25, 50102-j-40. Dulles shared a similar view; see na, rg 59, 740.5/5–1255, Dulles Dulte 32 to Eisenhower, 12 May 1955. 5 lac, rg 25, 50102-j-40, nato no. 652 to dea, 17 May 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/5–955, Dulles Dulte 14 to Eisenhower, 9 May 1955. 6 na, rg 59, 740.5/6–355, Paris Polto 2434 to State, 3 June 1955; rg 59, 740.5/6–1355, Paris Polto 2493 to State, 13 June 1955; rg 59, 740.5/6–2055, State Topol 1867 to Paris, 21 June 1955; lac, rg 25, 50102-k-40, Rome no. 98 to Ottawa, 21 June 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/9–155, Dulles-Italian ambassador conversation, 29 Aug. 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/9–2755, State Topol 323 to Paris, 27 Sept. 1955. 7 na, rg 59, 740.5/4–2055, Brussels no. 970 to State, 20 April 1955; lac, rg 25, 50102–J-40, nato no. 652 to dea, 17 May 1955. 8 lac, rg 25, 50030–40, UK nato Delegation annual review for 1954, 18 Jan. 1955 (copy in dea files). 9 L’Année politique, 1955, 691 (26 March 1955): “une véritable communauté atlantique” (my translation).

Notes to pages 135–9

241

10 na, rg 59, 740.5/5–1755, Brussels no.1266 to State, 14 May 1955; lac, rg 25, 50102–J-40, nato no. 652 to dea, 17 May 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/7–1555, Brussels no. 70 to State, 15 July 1955. 11 lac, rg 25, 50105-e-40, nato nos. 216 and 217 to dea, 23 Feb. 1955. 12 Ibid., Defence Liaison (1) to Under Secretary dea, 4 March 1955; ibid., Plumptre to Leger, 21 March 1955; ibid., Isbister to dea, 25 March 1955. 13 Ibid., Pearson to Leger, 27 April 1955; ibid., Wilgress to Pearson, 22 June 1955; ibid., Halstead to Ignatieff, 26 May 1955. 14 Ibid., dea to Departments of Trade and Commerce, Finance and Bank of Canada (identical letters), 12 Aug. 1955. 15 Ibid., Finance to dea, 18 and 22 Aug. 1955; ibid., Bank of Canada to dea, 18 Aug. 1955; ibid., Trade and Commerce to dea, 31 Aug. 1955. 16 Ibid., Pearson to Min. of Finance and Min. of Trade and Commerce, 26 Sept. 1955 (identical letters); ibid., Min. of Finance to Pearson, 17 Oct. 1955; ibid., Min. of Trade and Commerce to Pearson, 19 Oct. 1955. 17 Pearson, Mike, 2: 191–211. 18 Pearson, “After Geneva,” 16–17. 19 DDF 1955, 1: 503–4. Although Pinay gave every indication that Faure’s remarks had been sincere, Faure tones down the Atlanticism of his March speech in his memoirs, wishing to link himself more with the successful European initiative, and he speaks of his fear of associating France too closely with the United States; see Faure, Mémoires, 2: 70. Massigli believes that Faure’s speech was designed to appeal to conflicting factions in the National Assembly and there was little behind his words; see Massigli, Une comedié des erreurs, 1943–56, 503, 508–9. 20 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, “Some Thoughts on the Non-Military Activities of the North Atlantic Community with Special Reference to Article 2,” nato Confidential Document po/55/985, undated but circulated 6 Dec.1955. 21 lac, rg 25, 50105-e-40, nato no. 1338 to dea, 21 Nov. 1955. 22 Ibid., nato no. 1338 to dea, 21 Nov. 1955; ibid., nato no. 1492 to dea, 13 Dec. 1955. The memo in question is entitled “(Draft) Memorandum by the Canadian Delegation-North Atlantic Treaty Organization Economic Discussions at nato Council Meetings,” ibid.; see also ibid., nato no. 1425 to dea, 5 Dec. 1955; ibid., “Notes for a Statement Made by Mr. Pearson on Item 4: The Implementation of Article II.” 23 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 41. 24 lac, rg 25, 50115-j-40, nato no. 1502 to dea, 15 Dec. 1955; na, rg 59, 740.5/12–1555, Elbrick to Wolf, 15 Dec. 1955.

242

Notes to pages 139–43

25 lac, rg 25, 50115-j-40, nato no. 1510 to dea, 17 Dec. 1955. 26 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, nato no. 115 to dea, 25 Jan. 1956; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–356, Paris Polto 1338 to State, 3 Feb. 1956; lac, rg 25, 50105–40, nato no. 174 to dea, 8 Feb. 1956; ibid., UK nato Del. no. 6 to Selwyn Lloyd, 9 March, 1956 (copy in dea Files); see also tna/pro, cab 134/1284, mac (56) 47 and 48 (memos), 28 Feb. 1956. 27 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1955–56, 14763A; Canada, House of Commons Debates, 5 March, 1956, 1829–33. 28 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1955–56, 14828B. 29 lac, rg 25, 50105-e-40, nato no. 536 to dea, 11 April 1956; ibid., nato no. 594 to dea, 20 April 1956. 30 lac, mg 26, n1, vol. 45, folder: “nato General File,” Pearson-Adenauer talks, 10 May 1956; na, rg 59, 740.5/3–256, Bonn no.1832 to State, 2 March 1956; na, rg 59, 740.5/4–356, State Topol 1228 to Paris, 5 April 1956. 31 lac, rg 25, 50102-n-40, Bonn no. 115 to dea, 20 April 1956; rg 25, 50105–40, Bonn no. 120 to dea, 27 April 1956. 32 lac, rg 25, 50105-n-40, nato no. 635 to dea, 26 April 1956; rg 25, 50105–40, “A nato Special Fund to Counter the Soviet Economic Drive in Under Developed Countries,” 22 March 1956. 33 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1955–56, 14815–16; DDF 1956, 1: 586–92. 34 For a copy of Pineau’s plan, see ddel, McCardle Papers, Conference and Trips, series 1, box 4, folder “nato May 1956 (1),” “Proposal for Setting-Up an Agency for World Economic Development Presented to the nato Council by M. Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs” (undated memo). 35 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Memos for the Minister, “Re-examination of Article 2 Activities in nato” and “Procedures for Following up Article 2,” 20 April 1956; ibid., dea dl-794 to Washington, 24 April 1956. 36 Wilgress communicated the message to Ismay on 19 March 1956; see lhcma, Ismay Papers, iii/12/32. Ismay’s response was in the form of a discussion paper entitled “Notes on the Present Situation as Regards Article 2”; see Ismay Papers, iii/12/34, 2 May 1956. 37 lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Pearson no. dl-794 to Washington, 24 April 1956; ibid., Washington no. 785 to dea, 27 April 1956; ibid., Paris (Can. Embassy) nos. 132 and 136 to Can. High Commission, London, 28 April 1956; ibid., London no. 579 to dea, 30 April 1956; na, rg 59, 740.5/2756, Memo of Conversation between State Department Officials and Can. Officials, 27 April 1956. The Belgians gave a more positive

Notes to pages 143–50

38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49

50 51 52

53 54

55

243

response; see lac, rg 25, 50105–40, Brussels no. 71 to dea, 30 April 1956. Pearson, “The Atlantic Community,” his Words and Occasions, 133–9; see also “Wider Scope Urged by Pearson.” tna/pro, cab 129/81, cp (56) 112, 1 May 1956. The Cabinet meeting scheduled to discuss the matter was cancelled; see prem 11/1342. tna/pro, fo371/120804/uee/ 1055/4g, Caccia to Coulson, 18 April 1956; fo371/120804/uee/10055/12, Coulson to Caccia, 23 April 1956; ibid., fo no. 2269 to Washington, 23 April 1956; fo371/12084/uee/10055/16 and passim, Washington no. 1055 to fo; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–356, State Topol 939 to Paris (drafted 4 Feb.1956). na, rg 59, 740.5/5–2256, Dulles meeting with American Council on nato, 22 May 1956. State Department Bulletin 34, no. 872 (12 March 1956): 413. Dulles, “Developing nato in Peace.” na, rg 59, 740.5/4–1756, State Topol 1299 to Paris, 17 April 1956. ddel, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4, folder: Memoranda of Telcon. General, Dulles-Pearson telephone conversation, 21 April 1956. sgml, Dulles Papers, box 106, folder: “Middle East 1956,” untitled Dulles speech, 21 April 1956. Various drafts can be found in ddel, Dulles Papers, Subject Series, box 5, folders: “nato ‘Think Piece’” 1956 (Drafts) [1] and (Drafts) [2]. lac, rg 25, 50105–40, nato no. 688 to dea, 6 May 1956. A final copy of the “Think Piece,” dated 11 June 1956, was presented to Pearson during his visit to Washington; see lac, rg 25, 50105-f-40 (File Pocket no. 1). lac, rg 25, 50105–40, nato no. 688 to dea, 6 May 1956. na, rg 59, 740.5/4–1956, Paris Polto 1867 to State, 19 April 1956; rg 59, 740.5/4–2156, Paris no. 4917 to State, 21 April 1956. lhcma, Ismay Papers iii/12/34, Ismay’s “Notes on the Present Situation as Regards Article 2,” 2 May 1956; see also “Dulles Departs for nato Parley”; “Kefauver Urges Dulles Be Bold.” lac, rg 25, 50105–40, nato no. 688 to dea, 6 May 1956. lac, mg 26, n1, vol. 45, folder: nato General File, “Appreciation of nato Ministerial Meeting, May 4–5”; rg 25, 50105–40, nato no. 688 to dea, 6 May 1956. na, rg 59, 740.5/6–556, Ottawa no. 855 to State, 5 June 1956; ibid., Ottawa no. 921 to State, 29 June 1956; lac, mg 26, n1, vol. 45, folder: nato General File, dea memo on Dulles-Pearson meeting, 15 June 1956;

244

56 57 58

59 60

61 62 63 64 65

66

67 68

Notes to pages 151–9

na, rg 59, 740.5/6–1156, State memo on Dulles-Pearson talks, 11 June 1956; Pearson, Mike, 2: 94. na, rg 59, 740.5/8–356, “Report of the Working Group on the North Atlantic Community,” circulated within State, 3 Aug.1956. lac, rg 25, 50105-f-40 (File Pocket no. 1), “US Answers to Questionnaire of the Committee of Three,” 20 Aug. 1956. tna/pro, cab 130/116, “Future of N.A.T.O.,” record of an informal meeting of officials, 4 June 1956; cab 129/81, cp (56) 142, 15 June 1956; cab 128/30, cm (56) 44, 19 June 1956. For the British questionnaire response, see lac, rg 25, 50105-f-40 (File Pocket no. 1). For the French response on 1 Sept. 1956, see lac, rg 25, 50105-f-40 (File Pocket no. 1); DDF 1956, 1: 936–41. The questionnaire responses and records of interviews comprise approximately 300 pages. Most can be found in lac, rg 25, 50105-f-40 (File Pocket no. 1), and mg 26, n1, vol. 46, folder “nato Committee of Three Documentation and Working Papers”; see also Sinisac, “The Three Wise Men” (1989) and (1990). na, rg 59, 740.5/11–2856, Paris Polto 1246 to State, 28 Nov. 1956; lac, rg 2, a5a, vol. 5775, Conclusions of Canadian Cabinet, 28 Nov. 1956. “Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in nato.” lhcma, Ismay Papers iii/21/9, “Secretary General’s Report for the Period 21 April 1956 to 30 Nov. 1956.” na, rg 59, 740.5/8–3156, State no. 530 to Ankara and all other nato capitals (various telegram numbers), 31 Aug. 1956. na, rg 59, 740.5/9–456, Ottawa no. 120 to State, 4 Sept. 1956; ibid., Paris no. 1053 to State, 4 Sept. 1956; ibid., Paris Polto 437 to State, 4 Sept. 1956 (Greece); rg 59, 740.5/9–356, Oslo no. 274 to State, 3 Sept. 1956; rg 59, 740.5/9–156, Luxembourg no. 48 to State, 1 Sept. 1956. lac, rg 25, 50015-j-40, nato no. 1425 to dea, 5 Sept. 1956; rg 2, A5a, vol. 5775, Canadian Cabinet Conclusions, 27 Sept. 1956; FRUS 1955–57, 16: 391; na, rg 59, 740.5/9–656, State Dept. Memo, “Spaak on Suez,” 6 Sept. 1956. Both Pearson and Spaak make mention in their memoirs of their efforts to have the matter discussed within nato. Spaak makes particular mention of his disappointment with the 5 September meeting. See Pearson, Mike, 2: 229–31; Spaak, Combats inachevés, 1: 226–30. na, rg 59, 740.5/8–2956, State no. Topol 305 to Paris, 29 Aug.1956. ddel, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Papers, International Trips and Meetings Series, box 3, folder: nato File no. 2 (2), Dulles statement to nato Ministerial meeting, 12 Dec.1956; na, Lot

Notes to pages 159–65

69 70 71 72 73 74

75

76 77

78

79

80 81

245

59d233, box 34, folder: Briefing Book for nato Ministerial Meeting, Paris, Dec. 1956, “nato Ministerial Meeting, US Position re: Work of Committee of Three.” FRUS 1955–57, 5: 164. Callendar, “Dulles Rules Out Consulting nato in Time of Stress.” FRUS 1955–57, 4: 140. FRUS 1955–57, 16: 767. lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, dea Memo by John Starnes, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2 Dec. 1957; DDF 1956, 3: 503–5. lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, dea brief for 1957 December nato meeting, “Item-ii-Report of Secretary General on Functioning of the Alliance.” A copy of the resolution accepting the report can be found in rg 25, 50102-p-40. na, rg 59, 740.5/1–1257, State no. Topol 1218 to Paris, 16 Jan. 1957; rg 59, 740.5/1–2657, State no. Topol 1291 to Paris (drafted 29 Jan. 1957); lac, rg 25, 50105-h-40, nato no. 203 to dea, 6 Feb. 1957; ibid., dea no. dl-174 to nato, 13 Feb. 1957; ibid., nato no. 254 to dea, 15 Feb. 1957; na, rg 59, 740.5/2–857, Paris no. Polto A-355 to State, 8 Feb. 1957; rg 59, 740.5/2–1457, Paris no. Polto 1872 to State, 14 Feb. 1957; lac, rg 25, 50105-h-40, nato no. 596 to dea, 1 Feb. 1958. lac, rg 25, 50102–S-40, nato no. 2178 to dea, 4 Dec. 1957. lac, rg 25, 50105–J-40, Malloch to Wilgress, 10 April 1957; ibid., dea no. dl-436 to nato, 23 April 1957; ibid., nato to dea no. 697, 24 April 1957; ibid., Malloch to Wilgress, 30 July 1957. In order to assist Jackson, the State Department established a special inter-agency committee; see ddel, US President’s Committee on Scientists and Engineers, Records, 1956–58, box 23, folder: nato (1), “Notes for American Advisory Group on nato Scientific and Technical Personnel Problems,” June 1957; ibid., folder: nato (2), Clark Memo, 8 Jan. 1957. lac, rg 25, 50105–J-40, dea no. dl-432 to nato, 20 Sept. 1957; ibid., McCordick to Pres. National Research Council of Canada, 25 April 1957; ibid., dea brief for nato Ministerial meeting on National Research Council views, 16 Dec. 1957. lac, rg 25, 50105-j-40, nato no. 697 to dea, 24 April 1957. Pearson, Mike 2: 95. c h a p t e r si x

1 na, rg 59, 740.5/4–457, Dulles to Streit, 29 March 1957. 2 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 14 Jan. 1957, 177.

246

Notes to pages 166–9

3 na, rg 59, Lot 59d233, box 34, folder: nato Ministerial Meeting, Bonn, May 1957, Part 2, State position paper on the Committee of Three Report, nmb-d-3/1. 4 ddel, Eisenhower Papers, Papers as President of the US, Dulles-Herter Series, box 8, folder “Dulles, Foster, May 1957,” Dulles Dulte 5 to Eisenhower, 3 May 1957; lac, rg 25, 50102-r-40, dea weekly divisional notes on ministerial meeting, 9 May 1957. 5 L’Année politique, 1957, 365: “la charte que j’appliquerai sera le rapport des trois sages” (my translation); see also Spaak, Combats inachevés, 2: 104–11. 6 Summary of the Findings of the Conference on the North Atlantic Community. 7 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 172n3. 8 lac, rg 25, 50105-g-40, nato no. 1700 to dea, 14 Oct. 1957; ibid., Defence Liaison (1) memo on political consultation, 15 Oct. 1957; rg 2, a5a, vol. 1893, Cabinet Conclusions, 29 Oct. 1957; rg 25, 50102-s-40, dea brief on Iceland, 3 Dec. 1957. 9 Crop purchases were not officially coordinated by nato, which only provided the forum in which the problem was discussed; see lac, rg 25, 50105-h-40, nato no. 1448 to dea, 12 Sept. 1957; ibid., nato no. 1524 to dea, 21 Sept. 1957; ibid., nato no. 81 to dea, 14 Jan. 1958; FRUS 1955–57, 4: 173. 10 lac, rg 25, 50030–40, Crepault to McCordick, “Lecture to Junior Foreign Service Officers,” 20 March 1957. 11 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 188–9. 12 Ibid., 172–81. 13 FRUS 1955–57, 27: 722–33; see also ddel, Dulles Papers, General Correspondence and Memorandum Series, box 3, folder: Strictly Confidential N-P (1), Dulles’s comments to meeting of retired State Dept officials, 6 Nov. 1957, sent by Paul Nitze, 16 Nov. 1957. 14 na, rg 59, Lot 59d233, box 34, folder: nato Ministerial Meeting, Bonn, May 1957, part 2, State position paper on the Committee of Three Report, nmb d-3/1. 15 See para. 57 of the Committee of Three report; ddel, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Papers, International Trips and Meetings Series, box 3, folder: nato File no. 2 (2) [1956–1957], Lay Memo. 16 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, 567: 392–400. 17 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1957, 15469a.

Notes to pages 169–76

247

18 lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, dea brief on Cyprus, 3 Dec. 1957; Spaak, Combats inachevés, 2: chapter 42. 19 lac, rg 25, 50102-r-40, dea S211 to Pearson in Bonn, 2 May 1957; rg 2, vol. 1891, Cab. Doc. 81, 9 April 1957; rg 2, a5a, vol. 1892, discussed 11 April 1957. 20 lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, dea brief on Algeria, 4 Dec. 1957. 21 Ibid.; lac, rg 25, 50102–S-40, Memo by John Starnes, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2 Dec. 1957. 22 Adenauer had particular concerns about this episode; see FRUS 1955–57, 4: 186. 23 See Lesch, Syria and the United States, and Seale, The Struggle for Syria. Although lacking direct evidence, Lesch concludes that the United States was involved in an attempted coup. 24 FRUS 1955–57, 13: 690–3. 25 Eisenhower, The White House Years, 2: 203–4. 26 lac, rg 25, 50105-g-40, nato no. 1456 to dea, 12 Sept. 1957. 27 Ibid., nato no. 1499 to dea, 19 Sept. 1957. 28 lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, Starnes, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2 Dec. 1957. nato commander Lauris Norstad was quite critical of US and Turkish actions in the area because, in part, of the tensions they were causing within nato; see ddel, Dulles Papers, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of Conversation – General – N through R (1), Norstad-Dulles Conversation, 28 Oct. 1957. 29 FRUS, 1955–57, 4: 172. 30 Pearson, Words and Occasions, 146. 31 Canada, dea, Statements and Speeches, 57/10 (29 Jan. 1957). 32 For a text, see lac, rg 25, 50105-h-40, nato no. 2172 to dea, 4 Dec. 1957. 33 na, Lot 59d233, box 34, folder: “nato Ministerial Meeting, Bonn, May 1957,” part 3, State background paper on Italian views on consultation, nbm b-11/57, 16 April 1957. 34 ddel, Eisenhower Papers, Papers as President of the US, Dulles-Herter Series, folder “Dulles, Foster, May 1957,” Dulles Dulte 1 to Eisenhower, 1 May 1957; ibid., Dulles Dulte 5 to Eisenhower, 3 May 1957; DDF 1957, 1: 732–3. 35 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 173. 36 Ibid., 199–200. 37 Ibid., 206–9. 38 lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, Paris no. 1154 to dea, 6 Dec. 1957.

248

Notes to pages 177–83

39 tna/pro, cab 129/84, cp (57) 6, 5 Jan. 1957; do35/7127, fo no. 23 to Certain Embassies; prem 11/1841, fo no. 282 to Bonn, 17 April 1957. 40 tna/pro, prem 11/1844, Jebb no. 102 to Selwyn Lloyd, 27 April 1957; do35/7127, Strasbourg no. 23 to fo, 2 May 1957; ibid., Paris no. 113 saving to fo, 18 April 1957; ibid., Bonn no. 738 to fo, 13 April 1957; DDF 1957, 1: 427–32. 41 tna/pro, cab 128/30, cm (57) 8 Jan.1957. 42 FRUS 1955–57, 27: 722–33. The United States expressed initial support for the proposal; see tna/pro, do35/7127, fo no. 1216 to Washington, 14 March 1957. 43 This circulation procedure was formally agreed to by Dulles; see na, rg 59, 740.5/1–757, Holmes to Dulles, 7 Jan. 1957. 44 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–59, 320; Divine, The Sputnik Challenge. 45 For a text, see Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–59, 756–9. 46 Eisenhower, The White House Years, 2: 214. 47 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–59, 315; ddel, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 5, folder: White House Correspondence General 1957 (2), Dulles–Lloyd–Macmillan conversation, 22 Oct. 1957. 48 Ibid., box 3, folder: Strictly Confidential, Dulles’s comments, 6 Dec. 1957, sent to him by Paul Nitze, 16 Nov.1957. 49 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 190–3, 208–9. 50 Ibid., 211–13. 51 na, rg 59, 740.5/12–1157, Dulles-Eisenhower conversation, 11 Dec. 1957. 52 ddel, Eisenhower Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File, 1953–61, Subject Series, box 47, folder: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, part 6, State background paper on nato political consultation, 4 Dec. 1957, prs b-2/63. 53 na, rg 59, 740.5/12–1157, State no. 324 to Lima, 11 Dec. 1957. 54 ddel, Eisenhower Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File, 1953–61, Subject Series, box 47, folder: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, part 6, State background paper on an economic role for nato, 10 Dec. 1957, prs b-2/64b; FRUS 1955–57, 4: 214–17. 55 lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, nato no. 1948 to dea, 12 Nov. 1957. 56 Ibid., Starnes, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2 Dec. 1957; ibid., undated dea brief for December nato meeting on Spaak’s report. 57 For Spaak’s report, see lac, rg 25, 50105-h-40, nato no. 2172 to dea, 4 Dec. 1957.

Notes to pages 183–99

249

58 na, rg 59, 740.5/12–1057, Paris Polto 1716 to State, 10 Dec. 1957; rg 59, 740.5/12–1257, Paris Polto 1741 to State, 12 Dec. 1957; lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, nato no. 2253 to dea, 10 Dec. 1957. 59 lac, rg 25, 50102–S-40, dea memo to Smith, “nato Heads of Government Meeting,” 22 Nov. 1957. Smith wrote his agreement on the memo; see rg 25, 50102–40, dea me-254 to Washington, 25 Nov. 1957. 60 lac, rg 25, 50102–S-40, Paris no. 1154 to dea, 6 Dec. 1957. 61 Ibid., Hague no. 488 to dea, 5 Dec. 1957. 62 Ibid., Undated dea brief on Spaak’s report. 63 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 11 Dec. 1957, 2177; 21 Dec. 1957, 2719–24; lac, mg 31, e83, vol. 8, folder: 8.4, Extended record of paras. 30–2 of Cabinet Conclusions, 12 Dec. 1957 64 Basil Robinson interview, 29 March 1993, Ottawa, Canada. 65 lac, rg 25, 50102-s-40, nato no. 2505 to dea, 17 Dec. 1957; see also Diefenbaker, One Canada, 2: 140–2. 66 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 13 Jan. 1956, 81; 12 March 1956, 2025. 67 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 244–51. 68 “Text of Communiqué and Declaration,” State Department Bulletin 38, no. 967 (6 Jan. 1958): 12–15. 69 FRUS 1955–57, 4: 249–51. Little progress was ever made in developing the idea. 70 lac, rg 25, 50105-b-40, nato no. 1936 to dea, 11 Nov. 1957; rg 25, 50102-s-40, nato no. 2142 to dea; ibid., nato no. 2188 to dea; ddel, Eisenhower Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File, 1953–61, Subject Series, box 47, folder: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, part 7, State position paper on nato scientific cooperation for Dec. nato meeting, prs d-3/1a, 6 Dec. 1957; lac, rg 25, 50105-j-40, nato no. 2311 to dea, 20 Dec. 1957. c o n c l u si o n 1 “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.” 2 “Statement Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in a Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels.” 3 See, for example, Bell, “nato’s Transformation Scorecard.”

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Szent-Miklosy, Istvan. The Atlantic Union Movement: Its Significance in World Politics. New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965. Thomas, Ian Q. The Promise of Alliance. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. Thomson, Dale C. Louis St. Laurent: Canadian. Toronto: Macmillan, 1967. Thorpe, D.R. Selwyn Lloyd. London: Jonathan Cape, 1989. Truman, Harry S. Years of Trial and Hope, 1946–1952. New York: Doubleday, 1956. Wall, Irwin. The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–54. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Warner, Geoffrey. “The Anglo-American Special Relationship.” Diplomatic History 13, no. 4 (fall 1989). – “The Labour Government and the Unity of Western Europe.” In R. Ovendale, ed., The Foreign Policy of British Labour Governments. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984. Whitney, Robert F. “Southerners Open Filibuster Today.” New York Times, 28 Feb. 1949, 1. “Wider Scope Urged by Pearson.” New York Times, 1 May 1956, 1. Young, John W. Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–51. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984. – France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–49. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990. – The Longman Companion to Cold War and Detente, 1941–91. London: Longman, 1993. Young, John W., and John Kent. “British Policy Overseas: The ‘Third Force’ and the Origins of nato – In Search of a New Perspective.” In Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill, eds, Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62. London, 1992. – “The ‘Western Union’ Concept and British Defence Policy, 1947–48.” In Richard Aldrich, ed., British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51. London: Routledge, 1992. Zeeman, Bert. “Britain and the Cold War: An Alternative Approach. The Treaty of Dunkirk Example.” European History Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1986).

Gay Rights Trump Freedom of Religion

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Acheson, Dean, 38, 74; on nato, 62–5, 148; and non-military issues, 27, 28–9, 33–7, 49–50; on oeec, 50, 86–7; and political consultation, 99, 103, 108; and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28, 29 Achilles, Theodore, 20, 83; and Atlantic community concept, 19, 68, 69, 70; and non-military issues, 37, 71, 72 Adenauer, Konrad, 131, 140–1, 167 Afghanistan, 198 Africa. See specific nations; North Africa aid programs. See specific countries and organizations; food aid; Marshall Plan Algeria, 132, 160, 170–1, 176, 188 alliance: definition, 4 Alphand, Hervé, 102, 107–8 American Council on nato, 144–5 Asia, 127–8, 197. See also specific nations “The Atlantic Community – Know Your Allies,” 91 Atlanticism, 16–17, 196–7; Britain and, 20, 22–4; Dulles and, 120–1, 179; in United States, 19, 48–9, 122. See also Atlantic Treaty Association Atlantic Treaty Association, 92–5, 140 Atlantic Union Committee, 16–17, 92 Attlee, Clement, 64 Australia, 128

Austria, 131 Baghdad Pact (1955), 129 balance of payments, 40, 41–2 Bank of Canada, 41, 42, 135 Belgium, 95, 183, 187–8; and Bermuda Conference (1953), 113, 114, 126; and non-military issues, 125, 134, 141, 162. See also Benelux powers; Committee of Five Benelux powers, 32, 68, 132–3 Bermuda Conference (1953), 112–19, 126–8 Berthoud, E.A., 61 Bevin, Ernest, 9–11, 22, 40, 54, 62; and Atlantic pact negotiations, 21, 50; and non-military issues, 23, 25–6, 31, 33–4; Western Union policy, 9–10, 38, 51 Bidault, Georges, 46–7, 120, 122 Big Three powers: and Committee of Three, 157; and non-military issues, 125–6, 189; and oeec-nato amalgamation, 56–65; and political consultation, 97, 99–100, 103–5, 107–8, 111, 176, 193–5; and smaller powers, 97–103, 111, 113, 125–8, 164, 175, 189; and Soviet Union, 102–3. See also Bermuda Conference; Britain; France; Geneva summit; United States

266

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Blankenhorn, Heinrich, 180 Bogotá Treaty (1948), 28. See also Organization of American States Boyd, Lennox, 168–9 Brentano, Heinrich von, 176, 180 Britain, 50, 144, 190; and Algerian uprising, 170; and Article 2, 52, 73–4, 140, 192; Article 2 support by, 5, 30–2, 44–6; and Atlantic community concept, 20, 22–4, 96, 196; Atlantic (Official) Committee, 64, 73–4, 76, 123; Cabinet Defence Committee, 64; and Canada, 16, 17, 20–1, 39, 106–7; and Committee of Five, 76, 84; and Committee of Three, 160; and Cyprus, 132, 168; and economic issues, 114, 192; and Europe, 5, 23, 38–9, 40, 176–8; and France, 48; and Germany, 45; Grand Design, 176–8; and labour mobility issues, 77, 80, 88–9; and military issues, 56, 169, 187–8; and nato headquarters location, 63, 85; and non-military issues, 5, 20–3, 25–6, 37, 65, 137, 152; and oeec role, 53–5, 57–64, 74, 85–7, 96, 192; and parliamentary participation, 123; and political consultation, 103, 104, 107, 157, 158, 163, 176; and scientific/technical cooperation, 162–3, 188; and Soviet Union, 103; sterling crisis, 39, 42; and Suez crisis, 154, 157; trade with, 12, 31; Treasury, 45–6; United States and, 18–19, 39–40, 61, 166; and Washington Paper, 22–4; Western Union policy, 11–18, 22–3, 38, 50, 51. See also Big Three powers; Foreign Office (British) British Commonwealth, 39 British Society for International Understanding, 92 Brussels Treaty Organization, 23, 30, 79, 95. See also Treaty of Brussels Cambodia, 128 Canada: and aid to developing world, 142–3, 187; Article 2 initiative, 4, 5, 24–5, 29–33, 36–8, 40–4; Article 2 support by, 57, 93, 95–6, 191–2; and Atlantic community concept, 73, 196–7; and Bermuda Conference (1953), 113, 126; and Britain, 16, 17, 20–1, 39, 106–7; Citizenship and Immigration, Department of, 77, 80;

and Committee of Five report, 83–4; and Committee of Three report, 167; and cultural cooperation, 153; and economic consultation, 114, 138, 139; and Europe, 30, 42–3, 73; Finance, Department of, 41, 42, 43, 135–6; and France, 184–5; and Geneva summit (1955), 133; and immigration issues, 77, 80, 81–2, 89; and military issues, 188; and non-military issues, 5, 24–7, 29–33, 65, 93, 135–6; and oeec, 31, 41, 42, 50–1, 57, 196; and parliamentary participation, 123, 124; and political consultation, 106–7, 152, 183–7; and scientific/technical cooperation, 162–3; trade issues, 12, 31, 42, 135–6, 186; and Treaty of Rome, 170; and United States, 17, 29–30, 32–3, 73, 136; World War ii and, 16. See also Committee of Five; External Affairs, Department of (Canada) Canadian Parliamentary Association, 93 Caracas Resolution (1954), 145 “Caravan of Peace,” 91 ccf (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation), 29, 32 China, People’s Republic of, 134 Churchill, Winston, 85, 87, 113 Claxton, Brooke, 14, 219n8 Clayton, Will, 17 Committee of Five on the North Atlantic Community (1951–52), 6, 75–84, 96, 101, 192–3; on cultural and information programs, 79, 82–3, 193; on economic activity, 83, 193; on labour mobility, 82, 193; on parliamentary participation, 79, 82; Pearson and, 76–7, 79, 84; on political consultation, 78–9, 82, 97–8, 193–4; report, 82–4; on social policy, 79, 82; United States and, 75–6, 84; Working Group, 76, 77–8, 80–1, 83 Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation (1956–57), 6, 148–63, 194–5; consultation process, 150–3; Dulles and, 148–9, 150, 158–60, 165, 167–8, 178; France and, 160–1, 163; Pearson and, 149–50, 163–4; on political consultation, 154–5, 161; report, 153–7; response to, 157–63, 167, 178, 182, 189–90; United States and, 149–51, 158–60

Index Common Market. See European Common Market community: definition, 4, 5 Connally, Tom, 27–8 Council of Europe, 40, 45, 72, 73, 124 Cripps, Stafford, 38, 46 Cyprus, 132, 168–9 David, Jean Paul, 94 Declaration of Common Purpose (US/Britain), 178–9, 184, 195–6 Declaration of Atlantic Unity Group, 235n71 Democratic Party (US), 28 Denmark, 70, 139, 152–3, 162, 188 Diefenbaker, John, 183, 186–7 Dien Bien Phu crisis, 127 disarmament, 138, 187–8; nato and, 173, 175, 183, 187–8; Soviet Union and, 131, 175, 187–8; United Nations and, 166, 173, 187–8 dispute settlement, 146, 151, 155, 160, 168–9 Draper, William, 102–3, 108, 118–19; report, 118–22 Dulles, John Foster, 109–11, 120; and Article 2, 144–8; and Atlanticism, 120–1, 179; at Bermuda Conference (1953), 127; and Committee of Three, 148–9, 150, 158–60, 165, 167–8, 178; and Draper report, 119–22; on nato role, 179–82, 188; and non-military issues, 6, 120–2, 144–8, 150, 194; on oas model, 145–7; on political consultation, 110–11, 129, 134, 145–50, 163, 175; on Soviet satellite nations, 133; and Soviet Union, 110, 131; and Suez crisis, 158; and Syrian crisis, 171, 172; “Think Piece” (1956), 146–7 Duplessis, Maurice, 18 edc. See European Defence Community Eden, Anthony, 85–6, 87, 88, 104, 110, 123 eec. See European Common Market Egypt, 154, 157 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: and Draper report, 119; as nato supreme commander, 52, 62, 63; and non-military issues, 118, 122, 181, 182, 187; and Sputnik crisis, 178–9; and Syrian crisis,

267

171. See also Declaration of Common Purpose Eisenhower administration, 5, 109–10, 111–12, 118, 178 Eisenhower doctrine, 166 Euratom, 132, 170, 177 Europe, Western: and Atlantic community concept, 22–3, 69–70; Britain and, 38–9, 40, 176–8; Canada and, 14, 30, 42–3, 73; military issues, 9–10, 52–3; and non-military issues, 25–6; United States and, 18–19, 109–11. See also European integration; rearmament European Coal and Steel Community, 47, 68 European Common Market, 170, 177. See also European Economic Community European Defence Community (edc), 53, 68, 87, 116; problems over, 109–10, 130, 132, 136 European Economic Community (eec), 132–3, 139. See also Treaty of Rome European integration, 68, 196; vs. Atlantic community, 71–5; Britain and, 5, 23, 38–9; Canada and, 71–2, 135; Soviet Union and, 116, 166; United States and, 19–20, 41–2, 103. See also European Economic Community; Organisation for European Economic Co-operation European Payments Union, 41 External Affairs, Department of (Canada): and aid to developing world, 142; and Article 2 issues, 71, 135; and Atlantic pact negotiations, 16, 51; and Committee of Five report, 83–4; and Committee of Three report, 167; and cultural cooperation, 94, 95; Economic Division, 42; and European integration, 71–2, 135; and non-military issues, 36, 41, 43, 44; and oeec, 41, 42; and political consultation, 106, 183–6; and Soviet peace offensives, 135; on Spaak report, 185–6; and Treaty of Rome, 170; and United States, 71. See also specific ministers and officers Far East, 127–8, 197 Faure, Edgar, 107, 132, 134 Fellowships program (nato), 91

268

Index

food aid, 167, 187 Foreign Office (British): and Atlantic community concept, 20, 31, 74; and Council of Europe, 45; and nato headquarters location, 62; and nonmilitary issues, 44–6, 143–4, 152; on oeec role, 53, 54, 55, 59, 60–1 Formosa crisis, 134 Foulkes, Charles, 219n8 France: and Article 2, 30, 40, 46–8, 136, 139; Britain and, 48; Canada and, 184–5; and Committee of Three, 160–1, 163; and disarmament, 187–8; and edc, 109, 132, 136; European role, 39, 68; on Greece and Turkey, 67–8; in Indochina, 107–8, 127–8; and Middle East, 167; National Assembly, 30; and non-military issues, 30, 47, 65, 134, 137, 141–2, 152; and oeec, 47–8, 52, 54, 58, 96, 192, 196; and parliamentary participation, 122, 123; and political consultation, 103, 104, 107–8, 129, 157, 176; and rearmament, 47, 52–3, 54, 56, 64–5, 95; and scientific/technical cooperation, 188; and Soviet Union, 141; and Suez crisis, 154, 157, 160–1; US aid to, 108; and Washington Paper, 22; and Western cooperation, 50; and West Germany, 38, 47, 52–3, 95. See also Algeria; Big Three powers; European Economic Community Franks, Oliver, 25, 31–2, 33, 48, 63 Freedom and Union, 16 free trade, 12–14, 73 Fulbright, William, 20 Gaitskell, Hugh, 62 Geneva summit (1955), 131, 133–4 George, Walter, 150 Germany: division, 101–2; reunification, 141, 165, 175; smaller powers and, 102–3, 105; Soviet Union and, 101–3, 104–5, 126. See also West Germany Gillette, Guy Mark, 122 Grand Design, 176–8 Great Britain. See Britain Greece: and Cyprus, 132, 168, 169; as nato member, 67–70, 162, 192, 197 Gronchi, Giovanni, 140 Gruenther, Alfred, 148 Guatemala, 145

Hall-Patch, Edmund, 56–7, 58, 60–1 Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (1967), 197 Harriman, Averell, 48, 86 Harris, Walter, 80 Heeney, Arnold, 36, 41–2, 73, 81, 94, 219n8 Henderson, Loy, 171 Hickerson, John, 13, 18–19 High Atlantic Council for Peace, 46–7 Hitchman, Edwin A., 58, 61 Hitchman Group, 58–62 Hoyar-Millar, Frederick, 21 Hudd, Frederic, 30 Hughes, John, 117, 124 Hungary, 165 Hussein i of Jordan, 171 Iceland, 125, 132, 166–7 immigration. See labour mobility Indochina, 107–8, 127–8 Integrated nato Force, 52 interdependence, 184, 190, 195–6 International Atlantic Committee, 92 International Refugee Organization, 77 Inter-Parliamentary Union, 124 Iraq, 129, 171, 199 Ireland, 94 Ismay, Hastings Lionel Ismay, Baron, 85, 137; and Bermuda Conference (1953), 113–14, 126–7; as mediator (Cyprus), 168–9; and political consultation, 103, 142; review paper (1953), 114, 115–17 Israel, 171 Italy, 132–3; and Article 2, 135, 137–8, 139; and Bermuda Conference (1953), 113, 126; and disarmament, 138, 187–8; European role, 68, 167; and labour mobility, 76, 77, 80, 88, 90; and non-military issues, 122, 123, 140, 152, 162, 175. See also Committee of Five Jackson, Henry, 162, 188 Jacob, Ian, 85 Jebb, Gladwyn, 21, 22, 24, 30 Jordan, 171 Katz, Milton, 68–9, 74–5 Kefauver, Estes, 48–9, 122, 149 Keflavik (Iceland) military base, 132

Index Kennan, George, 19–20, 21–2, 39 Khrushchev, Nikita, 136, 180–1 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 11, 12, 13–14 Korean War, 52–7, 65–6, 192, 196 Kraft, Ole, 69 labour mobility, 76, 77–8, 80–2, 88–90, 193 Lange, Halvard, 40, 69, 77, 149 Laos, 128 League of Nations, 16 Lebanon, 167, 171 Lloyd, Selwyn, 112, 158, 160, 176–7, 179 London Paper (1948), 22, 25 Lovett, Robert, 13, 25 Luxembourg, 153. See also Benelux powers Mackay, R.A., 231n11 Macmillan, Harold, 137, 178, 179. See also Declaration of Common Purpose Margerie, Jacquin de, 30 Marjolin, Robert, 56–7 Marshall Plan, 10, 21, 29, 31, 38 Martino, Gaetano, 140, 149 Massigili, René, 30 Mayer, René, 109 Merchant, Livingston, 118, 149–50 Messina Conference (1955), 137, 138, 139 Middle East: nato and, 167, 183, 184–5, 188, 197; Soviet Union and, 165–6, 171–3 Mollet, Guy, 141–2, 160, 170 Morrison, Herbert, 69, 73 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 154 National Research Council of Canada, 95 nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 51, 52, 68, 114–15, 198–9; administration, 156–7; budget, 75, 91; Committee of Economic Advisers, 161; Committee of Political Advisers, 161; Committee on Cultural and Information Policy, 125; Committee on the Challenges of a Modern Society (1969), 197–8; consultation in, 25–6, 97–130; Council of Deputies, 51, 63, 69–70, 100–1, 105; and cultural coop-

269

eration, 90–1, 156, 193; Defence Committee, 36, 65; Defence Financial and Economic Committee, 36, 65; and disarmament, 173, 175, 183, 187–8; and economic cooperation, 155–6, 161, 179, 189; and economic development, 87, 141–2, 146, 151–2, 156, 165; Financial and Economic Board, 63, 64–5, 83; Group of Twelve, 61, 64; headquarters location, 57–8, 61–5, 85, 193; information programs, 90, 91, 94, 156, 193; and labour mobility, 76, 78, 80, 82, 88–90, 193; 1949 meetings, 35–6, 40; 1950 meetings, 44–6, 51, 52–3, 54; 1951 meetings, 70, 71–5; 1952 meetings, 82, 83–4, 87; 1955 meetings, 136, 138–40; 1956 meetings, 140–9; 1957 meetings, 175, 187–9; 2005 meetings, 198–9; and Middle East, 167, 183, 184–5, 188, 197; militarization, 67, 68, 69, 116; and military cooperation, 178–9, 188; Military Production and Supply Board, 36; ministerial council, 35, 51; neutral powers and, 69, 94, 177, 197; and oeec, 35–66, 70–5, 83–6, 192, 193, 196; and other organizations, 78–9, 149; and parliamentary participation, 93–4, 117, 118, 119–26, 147–8; public awareness of, 117, 153, 156; and scientific and technical cooperation, 156, 161–3, 179, 181, 188–9; Secretariat, 90, 92, 105–6, 114–15, 124, 141; and social policy, 90; Soviet Union and, 5–6, 101, 116; Standing Group (Washington), 52, 63, 69–70; structure, 35–6, 84–5, 153; Suez crisis and, 154, 157–8; and Syrian crisis, 172–3; Temporary Council Committee, 75, 82; tensions in, 6, 38–40, 101, 130–2, 146, 168–73, 194. See also specific member countries, organizations, and committees; non-military issues (nato); North Atlantic Council; North Atlantic Treaty nato Information Service (natis), 83, 90–1, 153 nato Working Groups: on German reunification, 175; on Information and Cultural Cooperation, 90–1, 94; on Information Policy, 90; on Labour Mobility, 88–90; on organizational

270

Index

development, 35–8, 41; on scientific and technical cooperation, 160–1, 188; on Social and Cultural Cooperation, 90 Netherlands, 93, 139; and Bermuda Conference (1953), 114, 126; and non-military issues, 77, 102, 103, 125, 152, 162. See also Benelux powers; Committee of Five New Zealand, 128 Nitze, Paul, 54–5, 64 non-military issues (nato), 5, 6, 109, 197–9; Committee of Five and, 87–96. See also specific countries and individuals; North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2; political consultation Nordic countries, 79. See also specific countries Norstad, Lauris, 247n28 North Africa, 184–5. See also Algeria; Tunisia North Atlantic Council, 65, 85, 93; as political consultation forum, 102, 104–5, 119; and Suez crisis, 157–8 North Atlantic Treaty (1949), 3; Article 4, 98–9; Article 5, 198; Article 9, 26–7, 35, 99; negotiations on, 9–35; non-military provisions, 12–16; reactions to, 20–2, 29, 30, 121. See also North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2 North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2, 3–4, 118, 191–2; Big Three opposition to, 27–9, 79–80; Big Three support of, 5, 30–2, 44–6; as Canadian initiative, 4, 5, 24–5, 29–33, 36–8, 40–4; Committee of Five and, 76–7; confusion about, 4, 24, 29, 34, 65, 139, 197; 1950 meeting on, 51–2; 1955 meeting on, 138–40; ministerial committee on, 70, 71; neglect of, 36–8; obstacles to, 94–5; oeec role and, 96; smaller powers’ support of, 32, 57, 93, 95–6, 191–2; and Soviet peace offensives, 36–8; Working Groups and, 87–96. See also non-military issues (nato); political consultation North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See nato Norway, 70, 188; and cultural cooperation, 95, 153; and non-military issues, 40, 139, 152, 162; and parliamentary participation, 79, 123, 125; and politi-

cal consultation, 98–9, 103. See also Committee of Five nuclear weapons, 127, 128–9, 131, 169, 178–9 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (oeec), 10, 21, 82, 87; and economic cooperation, 23, 45–6, 53–5, 86, 177; European role, 53, 54, 55, 59, 60–1; and nato, 35–66, 70–5, 83–6, 192, 193, 196; neutral members, 56; North America and, 50–2, 192; and rearmament, 56, 70–1. See also specific countries Organization of American States (oas), 28, 145–7, 148, 151 Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations (1974), 198 Pakistan, 128, 129 Paris Agreements (1954), 136 Patterson, Robert, 17 Pearson, Lester B., 81, 99, 110, 138, 183; and Article 2 implementation, 94, 95, 135–6, 139, 191; and Atlantic community concept, 14–16, 17–18, 20, 30, 69–70, 77; and Committee of Five, 76–7, 79, 84; and Committee of Three, 149–50, 163–4; on cultural and information issues, 96; on Europe, 14, 71–2; and non-military issues, 24–5, 27, 29, 32–3, 37, 40–4, 165; and oeec, 51–2; and parliamentary participation, 93, 123; on political consultation, 128–9, 133, 142–3, 159, 174; Soviet visit, 131, 136; and Western Union policy, 11, 12–13, 51 Perkins, George, 149–50, 172–3 Philippines, 128 Pinay, Antoine, 107, 137, 139 Pineau, Christian, 141, 142, 152, 160 Pleven, René, 52 Pleven Plan, 52–3 Poland, 165 “A Policy of Boldness” (Dulles), 110 political consultation, 119, 133–4; Big Three and, 97, 99–100, 103–5, 107–8, 111, 176, 193–5; Committee of Five on, 78–9, 82, 97–8, 193–4; after Committee of Five report, 101–9; Committee of Three and, 154–5, 161; after Committee of Three report, 165–90;

Index on non-Atlantic issues, 160; obstacles to, 173–6; procedures for, 100–1; progress on, 166, 189–90; smaller powers and, 97, 104, 114, 129, 152–3, 174. See also specific countries and individuals Portugal, 139, 153 propaganda, 90, 91, 139, 153, 172 Quebec, 18, 29, 32 racism. See labour mobility Ramadier, Paul, 30 rearmament (of Europe), 52–3, 59, 65–6; concerns about, 68–9; effects, 53, 56, 70–1, 76, 192; raw materials for, 56, 60; in West Germany, 47, 52–3, 68, 95, 132, 137 regional alliances, 128, 129, 133, 145–7. See also specific organizations Reid, Escott, 11–12, 18; and Atlantic pact negotiations, 14, 16, 30; and nonmilitary issues, 24–5, 27, 37, 71 relief organizations, 187 Ritchie, Charles, 22 Roberts, Owen J., 16 Robertson, Norman, 16, 24, 31, 231n11 Robertson, Wishart, 93 Russia, 198. See also Soviet Union St Laurent, Louis, 11, 12, 18; and Atlantic pact negotiations, 14, 17–18, 24; and non-military issues, 29–30, 32, 33, 123 Salisbury, Robert A.J. Gascoyne-Cecil, Marquess of, 120 Sandys, Duncan, 169 Schuman, Robert, 30, 40, 46–8, 54, 58 seato. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Shuckburgh, Evelyn, 31, 72 Smith, Sidney, 183–4 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (seato), 128, 129–30, 166 South Vietnam, 128 Soviet Union, 17, 110, 141, 198; aid to developing world, 133, 182; Britain and, 103; and disarmament proposals, 131, 175, 187–8; and European integration, 116, 166; on Germany, 101–3, 104–5, 126; on Greece and Turkey, 67–8; and Middle East, 165–6, 171–3;

271

nato and, 5–6, 101, 116; peace offensives, 111–12, 115–16, 117, 131, 133, 194; satellite nations, 133, 198; after Stalin’s death, 5, 111–12. See also Geneva summit (1955) Spaak, Paul-Henri, 169, 173, 188; on Committee of Three report, 166, 167, 182–3; and European integration, 132, 138, 139; as nato secretary-general, 161, 166–7, 182; on non- military issues, 134–5, 158, 173, 174, 175, 183; report (1957), 182–4, 185–6 Spain, 67 Spofford, Charles, 68, 69, 70, 74–5, 76 Sputnik crisis, 178–87, 195–6 Stalin, Joseph, 101–3, 104–5, 111, 194 State Department (US), 144; and Atlantic community concept, 19, 49, 92–3; Atlantic Community Working Group, 150–1; and Committee of Five, 75–6; and Draper report, 119; and European integration, 19–20, 72; and Ismay paper (1953), 115, 117–18; and labour mobility, 77–8, 81; and nato issues, 64–5, 70–1; and non-military issues, 28, 37, 48; on oeec, 57–8; and parliamentary participation, 122, 124–5; and political consultation, 103–4, 105–6, 108, 168 Stikker, Dirk, 51, 52–3, 55, 57, 71; Committee of Five and, 83, 84 Stikker-Katz formula, 68–9, 70–1 Stone, Thomas, 11–12, 184–5 Streit, Clarence, 16–17, 92, 120. See also Atlanticism Sudan, 167 Suez crisis (1956), 154, 157–8, 160–1, 195 Sweden, 56, 73, 94 Switzerland, 56, 94 Syria, 167, 171–3 Taiwan, 134 terrorism, 198 Thailand, 128 Three Wise Men. See Committee of Three trade, 12, 13, 31, 114; in Europe, 41–2, 73; with Europe, 42, 119, 135–6. See also specific countries; balance of payments; free trade Treaty of Brussels (1948), 9, 10, 19, 137;

272

Index

Canadian response to, 11, 13, 14. See also Brussels Treaty Organization Treaty of Rome (1957), 6, 166, 170. See also European Economic Community Truman, Harry, 28, 29–30 Truman administration, 39, 64–5, 70, 87; and non-military issues, 5, 49; and Western development, 48, 74 Tunisia, 170, 183 Turkey, 113, 129; and Cyprus, 132, 168, 169; nato membership, 67–70, 94, 192, 197; and non-military issues, 125, 139; and Syrian crisis, 171–3 Ukraine, 198. See also Soviet Union Union Now, 120–1 Union Now (Streit), 16 United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations, 17, 138; and aid to developing world, 142, 149; Charter, 15, 19, 20, 148; and Cyprus, 168, 169; and disarmament, 166, 173, 187–8; and Syrian crisis, 172, 173 United States: and aid to developing world, 144, 146, 181–2; aid to Europe, 54, 108, 166; and Algerian uprising, 132, 170; and Article 2, 71, 72, 73–5, 192; and Atlantic community concept, 18–20, 50, 70, 92–3, 196; Atlanticism in, 19, 48–9, 122; and Bermuda Conference (1953), 126; and Britain, 18–19, 39–40, 61, 166, 177–8; Canada and, 17, 29–30, 32–3, 71, 73, 136; and China, 134; civil rights in, 28, 29; and Committee of Five, 75–6, 84; and Committee of Three, 149–51, 158–60; and cultural cooperation, 91; Development Loan Fund, 182; and disarmament, 187; and economic consultation, 181–2; and Europe, 18–19, 109–11; and European issues, 19–20, 39, 41–2, 52–3, 56, 103; Export-Import Bank, 182; foreign policy, 18, 128–30; and Greece and Turkey, 67–8, 70; and Ismay paper (1953), 114–15, 117–18; Korean War and, 52, 67; and labour mobility, 81, 89; and Middle East, 167, 171–3, 199; military activities, 67, 109, 132, 145; in nato, 62–5, 77–8, 128; and nato role, 67–8, 179–80, 181; and non-military issues, 5, 17, 27–9, 41, 48–50, 65,

194; and oeec, 50, 51, 196; and oeec role, 54, 55–8, 86–7, 96; Pentagon, 13, 64–5; and political consultation, 103–6, 129, 163, 167–8, 176, 187; and scientific/technical cooperation, 161, 162, 188; and Spaak report, 183–4; and Suez crisis, 154, 157–8; and trade, 12, 13, 119, 136. See also Big Three powers; Marshall Plan; State Department (US) United States Congress, 19, 92–3; and non-military issues, 77–8, 89, 124–5, 162 United States Senate, 32; Atlanticism in, 48–9, 122; and civil rights, 28, 29; Foreign Relations Committee, 28, 29, 148 USSR. See Soviet Union Vandenberg, Arthur, 27–8 Vanier, Georges, 15 Van Zeeland, Paul, 83, 112 Vietminh, 127 Vietnam, 128. See also Indochina Washington Exploratory Talks (wet), 14–15, 20–2, 25–9 Washington Paper (1948), 21–5 Western European Union (weu), 136, 137, 177–8 Western Union policy, 11–18, 22–3, 38, 50, 51 West Germany, 101, 166, 167, 188; European role, 45, 68, 132–3, 175; France and, 38, 47, 52–3, 95; and nato, 45, 59; in nato, 59, 136–7; and non-military issues, 140–1, 152; rearmament, 47, 52–3, 68, 132, 137. See also Germany Wilgress, Dana, 46, 72, 108, 124, 135, 161 World Economic Development Agency (proposed), 142, 152 Wrong, Hume, 11–12, 29, 36, 99; and Atlantic pact negotiations, 13, 16; on non-military provisions, 21, 24–5, 27–8, 32–3, 37, 41, 43–4 youth programs (nato), 91, 139 Yugoslavia, 100, 101, 131, 198 Zurich agreement (1959), 169