The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 B.C. 3515069178, 9783515069175

Citation preview

Julia Heskel

The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 B.C. Historia Einzelschriften 102

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

JULIA HESKEL

THE NORTH AEGEAN WARS, 360 B.C. 371–

HISTORIA ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE GESCHICHTE REVUE D’HISTOIRE · ANCIENNE JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY RIVISTA

·

DI STORIA ANTICA

·

EINZELSCHRIFTEN HERAUSGEGEBEN VON HEINZ HEINEN/TRIER FRANÇOIS PASCHOUD/GENEVE KURT RAAFLAUB/WASHINGTON · D.C. HILDEGARD TEMPORINI/TÜBINGEN

GEROLD WALSER/BASEL

HEFT 102

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

1997

JULIA HESKEL

THE

NORTH

AEGEAN 371–

WARS, 3 60

B.C.

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

1997

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

[Historia / Einzelschriften] Historia : Zeitschrift füralte Geschichte. Einzelschriften. – Stuttgart : Steiner Früher Schriftenreihe Reihe Einzelschriften zu: Historia NE: Historia-Einzelschriften H. 102. Heskel, Julia: The North Aegean wars,

371–360 B.C. –

1997 Heskel, Julia: The North Aegean wars, 371–360 B.C. / Julia Heskel. – Stuttgart : Steiner, 1997 (Historia : Einzelschriften ; H. 102) Zugl.: Harvard Univ., Diss., 1993, u.d.T.: Heskel, Julia: The foreign policy of Philipp II down to the peace of Philocrates 06917– 515– 8 ISBN 3–

ISO 9706

Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig undstrafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fürÜbersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung odervergleichbare Verfahren sowie fürdieSpeicherung inDatenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 1997 byFranz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck: Druckerei Peter Proff, Eurasburg. Printed inGermany

To MyParents, who taught me howto ask questions, andto Ernst Badian, whotaught mehowto ask newones

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface

11

Introduction

13

360 B.C. Part I. The War over Amphipolis, 371– Chapter I. TheChronology of the Warover Amphipolis I-1. The reigns of the Argeads I-2. The Amphipolitan command of Iphicrates 2a. Iphicrates’Macedonian expedition I– 2b. Iphicrates’ dismissal from the Amphipolitan command I– 2c. Timotheus’Samian expedition; Iphicrates’assumption I– of theAmphipolitan command 2d. Thealliance of Amphipolis andPtolemy; thealliance I– of Amphipolis andOlynthus I-3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus 3a. Timotheus’movements after theSamian campaign I– 3b. The Olynthian occupation of Amphipolis I– 3c. Perdiccas’alliance with Athens I– 3d. Timotheus’Chalcidian campaigns I– 3e. The warwith Perdiccas; Callisthenes’Macedonian I–

19 19

command; Timotheus’Macedonian command

3f. Events inPotidaea, 362/1 I–

II. TheWarover Amphipolis 1. Events fromautumn 371 to spring 365; thecommand of II–

Chapter

2. II–

19 22

22 25

26 28

29 29 30

31

31

32 36 38

Iphicrates

39

II–la. II–lb. lc. II– II-1d.

39 40

The origins of the war The outbreak of the war The succession struggle in Macedonia

Ptolemy, Amphipolis, andthehostages Events from summer 365 toautumn 360; thecommand of Timotheus 2a. The alliance of Amphipolis andOlynthus II– 2b. Timotheus’Chalcidian campaigns II– 2c. Thecommand of Callisthenes; thealliance of Amphipolis II– andPerdiccas; Callisthenes’Macedonian expedition

41 43

46

46

47

49

8

Table

of Contents

Part II. The War over Chersonese, 368– 360 B.C. III. The Chronology of theWarover Chersonese III–1. The outbreak of the War over Chersonese 2. Charidemus’ later career III– 2a. Charidemus’letter andrelated events; thecommand of III–

Chapter

Cephisodotus

2b. The hostilities at Perinthus andAlopeconnesus; the III– dismissal of Cephisodotus from the Chersonesian command.

3. Apollodorus, Diodorus, and the events of the 360s III– 3a. Apollodorus andthe events of 363– III– 362 3b. Diodorus, Epaminondas, andAlexander of Pherae III– 4. The revolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III– 4a. The revolt of Miltocythes: preliminary observations III– 4b. Events at Sestus; thecommand of Timomachus III– 4c. The commands of the Athenian generals stationed at III– Chersonese; Cotys’capture of Hieron Oros 4d. The Athenian recovery of Sestus andCrithote III– 4e. Ariobarzanes andCotys at Sestus; Cotys’siege of III– Hieron Oros;

thesieges of Assus andAdramyttium

4f. The Athenian decrees concerning Miltocythes and III– Cotys

III– 4g. The trials of Autocles, Timomachus, and Menon 4h. Miltocythes’ sieges of Sestus and Crithote and the III– command of Ergophilus; the outbreak of Miltocythes’

53 53 53

54 54

60 62 62 64 70 70

71 74 77

79 81 83

85 revolt 4i. The alliance of Miltocythes andAriobarzanes; thealliance III– 88 of Cotys andAutophradates Waragainst 4j. The“Waragainst Chersonese”vs. the“ III– Cotys”

4k. Iphicrates after his dismissal from the Amphipolitan III– command

5. Ariobarzanes andAthens III– 5a. The revolt of Ariobarzanes III– 5b. Tigranes, Timotheus, andSamos III– 5c. Thecommand of Timotheus III– 6. The recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis and III– Chersonese

89

89

94 94

98

100 101

101 6a. The evidence III– 103 6b. The Greek embassies to Susa III– 105 6c. The Congress at Susa III– 6d. The second Athenian embassy to Susa; the Great King’s III– 107 recognition of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis 109 6e. The second Spartan embassy to Susa III– 110 6f. The Spartan decision to send aidto Ariobarzanes III– 111 6g. The recognition of the Athenian claim to Chersonese III–

Table

of Contents

9

7. The later career of Philiscus andrelated events III– 7a. Philiscus’conquests andsevering of ties with III– Ariobarzanes; Timotheus’aidto Cyzicus

114

7b.The liberation of Lampsacus andPerinthus; Ariobarzanes’ III– recovery

of Lampsacus

114 117

8. Charidemus and the Satraps’ Revolt III– 8a. Charidemus in Asia III– 8b. Autophradates andArtabazus in Hellespontine Phrygia III–

118 118 119

IV. The Warover Chersonese 1. The Warover Chersonese, Phase I: TheWaragainst Chersonese IV– 362 B.C.) (368– IV-1a. Philiscus andthe Greeks IV-1b. TheCongress at Susa

123

Chapter

IV-1c. Ariobarzanes’Revolt IV-1d. The Second Congress at Susa; Timotheus at Samos IV-1e. Theban attempts at naval hegemony; Timotheus at Samos

IV-1f. Cotys’consolidation of the kingdom IV-1g. Athenian setbacks intheAegean andPropontis IV-1h. Cotys’first expedition against Sestus 2. The Warover Chersonese, Phase II: The Revolt of Miltocythes IV– 361) (362– 2a. The outbreak of the revolt IV– 2b. Crises in the Propontis IV– 2c. The retreat of Miltocythes IV– 3. TheWarover Chersonese, Phase III: TheWaragainst Cotys IV– 360) (361– 3a. Cotys’second expedition against Sestus IV– 3b. Timotheus’Chersonesian campaigns IV– 3c. Timomachus’campaigns in the Pontus andThrace IV– 3d. Cotys’third expedition against Sestus IV– 3e. Charidemus in Asia Minor IV– 3f. Charidemus’campaigns against Chersonese IV–

136 138 140 140

142 142 144 145 146 146

146 147 148 149 151

155

Conclusion Appendix: Chronological Table Chersonese

123 123 125 131 133

of the Wars over Amphipolis and

159

Maps

182

Select Bibliography

185

PREFACE This book has its origins in my Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, “ The Foreign Policy of Philip II downto the Peace of Philocrates” . I realized while revising the thesis that

Philip’s policies regarding Athens and the North Aegean could not be properly understood without an investigation of the events of the 360s. What began as a prolegomenon to an analysis of the reign of Philip, however, soon emerged as a self-contained study in its ownright, as it became apparent that the North Aegean during the 360s wasa hotbed of diplomatic andmilitary activity. The aid of a number of institutions wasinstrumental in the production of this book. The Center for Hellenic Studies, under the aegis of its co-directors Deborah Boedeker and Kurt Raaflaub, provided the ideal environment for wrestling with many of the chronological puzzles that I was forced to confront. A Grant-in-Aid from the American Council of Learned Societies made it possible for me to complete the book at Harvard University, where I was a Visiting Scholar. I also wishtothank theA.Whitney Griswold Fundof Yale University fora grant tocover the editing of the manuscript, andthe Classics Department of Harvard University for allowing mefull access to its computer facilities andto Widener Library. This study has greatly benefitted from the advice and criticism of a number of scholars: Deborah Boedeker, Eugene N. Borza, John Buckler, Paul Cartledge, Michael A. Flower, Edward M. Harris, Lisa Kallet-Marx, Christoph Konrad, Elizabeth A. Meyer, Margaret C. Miller, Kurt A. Raaflaub, Raphael Sealey, andHarvey E. Yunis. Gregor Anderson read the draft at various stages to check for errors. Cambridge University Press generously granted permission to reprint its maps of Macedonia/Chalcidice andAsia Minor from the Cambridge Ancient History Volume6, Second Edition (1994). I owebyfarmygreatest scholarly debttoErnst Badian, whopainstakingly read numerous drafts of each chapter and spent many hours discussing them with me. His ability to analyze ancient evidence andhis impeccably high standards were a constant source of inspiration. Words cannot express the tremendous gratitude I feel to himforthecare andattention hegave meformanyyears, from myfirst days as a student in his seminars to the completion first of mythesis andthen of this monograph. Suffice it to say I have learned far more from himthan this book will ever reveal. Finally, I would like to express mygratitude to myfamily andfriends. Their patience andencouragement were enormously helpful, especially inthefinal stages

of writing.

INTRODUCTION

It iswell recognized thattheAthenians’attempts inthefourth century toreestablish their fifth-century empire came to anend with the rise of Philip II. This development is imperfectly understood, however, because scholars have failed to pay sufficient attention to the decade before Philip’s accession, the 360s, when the Athenians made great efforts to recover the cities they hadonce controlled in the North Aegean. Although this region is generally viewed asperipheral tocentral and southern Greece, the abundance of literary andepigraphic references suggests that it was a major theater of action in this period. It is clear that a number of other powers besides Athens were involved inaffairs inthenorth atthat time, butnoone hasever done a comprehensive political study of the region. Previous studies have tended to concentrate on the policies of individual states that hadinterests in the northern Aegean. Buckler focuses ontheThebans’efforts tobuild a naval hegemony, and considers the actions of Athens, Macedon, and Persia where they are relevant to that policy.1 Similarly, Sealey discusses events in the north from an Athenian perspective.2 Borza focuses on events in Macedonia,3 whereas Hornblower examines only those events inwhich Mausolus played a part.4 Inpresenting theevents froma single perspective, eachof these works tells onlypart of thestory. A study that makes the north the central focus is needed to fill in the gaps in our knowledge. Anessential first step for a study of this sort is the construction of a systematic chronology of the events in this period, i.e., a discussion of the ordering anddating of all therelevant events forwhich there is evidence. TheAncient Evidence The nature of the ancient evidence makes this a difficult task. Ourchief literary sources are speeches delivered by the Attic orators Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Apollodorus, wholived contemporaneously with the events they describe. Three speeches areparticularly important forunderstanding theevents of the 360s. First, there is Demosthenes’ speech Against Aristocrates of 352/1,5 in which he narrates theearly career of Charidemus, whoatthetime wasbeing considered for a grant of personal protection. The second is Aeschines’ speech On the False Embassy. He delivered this inhisowndefense in343 after being charged withcollaborating with 1 2 3

4 5

362 B.C. (Cambridge, Mass. 1980). J. Buckler, TheTheban Hegemony, 371– R. Sealey, Demosthenes andHis Time: AStudy in Defeat (New York 1993). E. N. Borza, In theShadow of Olympus: TheEmergence of Macedon (Princeton 1990). S. Hornblower, Mausolus (Oxford 1982). For the date, see Dion. Hal. AdAmm. 1.4.

14

Introduction

Philip during the negotiations that led to the Peace of Philocrates in 346. In this speech Aeschines gives anaccount of the speech hedelivered to Philip during those negotiations. The third is Apollodorus’ speech Against Polycles ([Dem.] 50), in which he discusses his trierarchy in the Hellespont in the years 362– 1.Heprobably delivered this speech shortly after returning to Athens in early 360.6 All three of these speeches raise important problems of interpretation. First, the orators ingeneral mention only theevents that arerelevant to their case. Since their audience wasalready acquainted with thehistory of theperiod, there wasnoneedto fill in all the details. Apollodorus, for example, wasconcerned with defending his owntrierarchy and with attacking Polycles for his failure to succeed him at the proper time. For this reason hediscusses only those events that directly affected his command. Second, the orators present the events from a purely Athenian perspective. Athenian actions are generally cast in the most favorable light, andthe actions of Athens’enemies in the worst. Amphipolis appears only as anobject of the actions of other states, never as a state that pursued its ownpolicies. Related to this is a third problem of interpretation. Because each orator is interested primarily in making his owncase, the accounts of all three are riddled with personal bias. This is a complicated matter in the case of Demosthenes. Vehemently opposed to granting Charidemus personal protection, he wasintent on portraying the condottiere’s actions in the worst possible light. Wemust also take into account the fact that Demosthenes delivered this speech in thelate 350s, when the good relations Athens hadenjoyed with the Thracian king Cotys hadlong been forgotten, andhe wasremembered only as anenemy of the city. Interpretation of Aeschines’speech is noless complicated, however, because there thebias exists on twolevels: there is theversion of events thatheactually presented to Philip, andthe one that he gave the Athenians at his trial three years later. Then there is Apollodorus, whose interest in defending his trierarchy colors his account of the actions of the generals he served, some of whomhe later prosecuted.7 The other sources also have their biases, such as Isocrates, whoin theAntidosis presents anencomium of Timotheus, and Xenophon, with his encomium of Agesilaus in the essay of that name. Xenophon’s Hellenica, with its anti-Theban slant, omits manyevents crucial to ourunderstanding of theperiod, e.g., the liberation of Messene.8 Ouronly major literary source forthewhole of theperiod, theuniversal history of Diodorus Siculus, presents other problems of interpretation. Book 15 of his Library of History, which covers the 360s, is a brief summary of the non-extant accounts of fourth-century historians like Ephorus. Because Diodorus greatly compresses hissources, hetends togroup toomanyevents under theheading of a single year, andso it is often difficult to determine which events belong under which year. 6 7

8

J. Trevett, Apollodorus the Son of Pasion (Oxford 1992) 42 n. 25. See M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia: TheSovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians (Odense 1975) nos. 90, 91, 92, 94, 95. Sec the excellent discussion by G. L. Cawkwell, ed. in Xenophon. A History of My Times, tr. 46. R. Warner (Harmondsworth 1979) 7–

Introduction

15

Inscriptions, animportant contemporary source of information, are free of the problems that permeate the literary sources, but they pose other difficulties. Although they often provide information notcontained in the literary evidence, their value is limited bythefact that only a small number areinternally dated. Asa result, a certain amount of conjecture is involved in using them. Theproblems of interpretation involving boththeliterary andtheepigraphic evidence will betreated as they

arise. When all of the evidence is pieced together, it will become apparent that the 360s were a period in which the Athenians waged twowars simultaneously in the North Aegean, the War over Amphipolis andthe War over Chersonese. Several other powers besides Athens were involved in these wars. By establishing a firm chronological foundation, weare able to examine these wars from the perspectives of all the major powers involved: notonly of Athens, butalso of Sparta, Thebes, Olynthus, theMacedonian dynasty, King Cotys of Thrace, theGreat King of Persia, anda number of his satraps. It is only byexamining theevents in this waythat we can understand whythe Athenians lost both wars andconsequently failed to rebuild their hegemony in the north. Although the Amphipolitan andChersonesian Wars involved many of the major powers in the Greek andnon-Greek world, myaimis not to write a history of Greece in the 360s. Rather, I wish to examine howthe interests of these different powers converged in the North Aegean during that decade. It will become apparent that this region was, like southern and central Greece, a major theater of operations, andis equally critical toourunderstanding of fourth-century Greek history. For the sake of clarity, I examine the two wars in two separate units. Each treatment is divided into two parts, the chronological discussion of the events of that war, followed by a narrative based on the chronology. I have tried to discuss chronological points separately from the narrative as much as possible, though sometimes overlap is inevitable. All of the dates established in the chronology are summarized in the table in the Appendix. Works cited in the footnotes in abbreviated form are cited in full in the bibliography.

Historical Background

The Athenians’interest inAmphipolis andtheChersonese began inthesecond half of thesixth century andcontinued forthenext twohundred years. Thechief reason for this persistent interest is economic. Amphipolis, situated on a ford above the mouth of the Strymon River inwestern Thrace, offered access to natural resources that were essential for empire and trade. The abundant forests nearby and the plentiful gold andsilver mines of Mt. Pangaeum provided timber for shipbuilding and precious metals for coinage.9 The Thracian Chersonese, known today as the Gallipoli peninsula, was the gateway to the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) andthe 9

On the timber of Amphipolis and the importance of timber for the Athenian fleet, see R. 31. Meiggs, Trees and Timber in theAncient Mediterranean World (Oxford 1982) esp. 121–

16

Introduction

Pontus (Black Sea), andthus to Athens’major source of grain during theClassical Period.10 Moreover, there is reason to believe that both places were important sources of slaves, anessential part of the Athenian economy. This is suggested by the fact that Thrax andThratta were, as far as can be determined, common slave names in Athens.11 Athenian activity in theregions of Amphipolis andChersonese dates from the reign of Pisistratus, whomade expansion in these areas a major component of his foreign policy. His interest in Amphipolis can be traced to the mid-550s, when, driven into exile for the second time, he went to Mt. Pangaeum to collect money needed to effect his return to power. During the reign of Pisistratus, the elder Miltiades founded a colony on Chersonese andbecame its ruler, thus establishing family control over the region. Hewaseventually succeeded by his nephew, the younger Miltiades, whostrengthened Athenian control overChersonese. It wasalso in this period that Pisistratus sent his son Hegesistratus to establish a colony at Sigeum on the opposite shore of the Hellespont.12 The Athenians’expansionist activity in the north came to a halt when Darius decided toexpand hisrule into Europe. Failing to subdue theScythians, Darius left his general Mardonius to establish control over the Hellespont, Perinthus, and Thrace. Atthis time, Thrace became a Persian satrapy. After the Ionian Revolt, the younger Miltiades wasforced to evacuate Chersonese, andthe Persian navy occupied the Hellespont andBosporus. Chersonese remained under Persian rule until the end of the Persian Wars in 479, when the Athenians, led by Xanthippus, liberated Sestus andCardia.13 Expansion in the Strymon valley andChersonese wasa major component of Athenian foreign policy after the Persian Wars. In the second quarter of the fifth century, Athenians settlers tried to establish a colony on the Strymon at Ennea Hodoi, site of the later Amphipolis, butwere decimated byneighboring Thracians. Cimon in the 460s freed a number of Chersonesian cities which were still held by the Persians. Pericles, during the period of his ascendancy, followed upon these expansionist policies. As the first of the extant Athenian tribute lists indicates, the Chersonesian cities were tribute-paying members of the Delian League as early as 453.14 In the early 440s, Pericles sent out Athenian cleruchs to strengthen Chersonese against Thracian raids. Equally interested in furthering Athenian expansion in the Strymon valley, he sent out colonists, who in 437/6 founded the city of

10 See P. Garnsey, Famine andFood Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and 22. Crisis (Cambridge 1988) esp. 106, 108, 118, 120– 11 Antiphon 5.20; M. I. Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece (New York 1983) 167– 73. I wish to thank E. M. Harris for pointing this outto me. 75, 271– 6; For discussion see A. J. Graham, Colony 39; Marcellinus, Vita Thuc. 5– 95, 6.34– 12 Hdt. 5.94– 34, and the bibliography in and Mother City in Ancient Greece, 2nd ed. (Chicago 1983) 33– 508. CAH2Vol. 3 Part 3 (Cambridge 1982) 480, 488, 507– 46, J. P. Barron, ibid. 13 See A. Fol andN.G. L. Hammond, CAH2Vol. 4 (Cambridge 1988) 234– 55. 10, 842– 622, andthebibliography, esp. 801– 592– 14 B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, The Athenian Tribute Lists, Vol. 3 (Princeton 1950) 28.

Introduction

17

Amphipolis in conjunction with settlers from Argilus andprobably also ChalcidiansfromThrace.15 Both Amphipolis andChersonese played prominent roles inthe Peloponnesian War. The capture of Amphipolis by the Spartan general Brasidas helped convince theAthenians to make peace withSparta in421. Their failure toregain control over the city after the peace wasone of the reasons warwasresumed soon afterwards. After the Sicilian disaster, the Athenians wonimportant victories in the Hellespont that turned the warin Athens’favor andledto the restoration of democracy. Their final defeat in 404, however, resulted in the loss of the Chersonesian cities. Intheearly fourth century, the Athenians resumed their attempts to regain their empire in the north. During the Corinthian War, Thrasybulus made treaties of friendship and alliance with the Thracian kings Amadocus and Seuthes; he also made alliances with various cities off the coast of Thrace andin the Propontis. The King’s Peace, strictly enforced by Sparta, prevented the Athenians from taking any aggressive action against Amphipolis orChersonese. During the370s, they devoted their energies to building a newleague within the confines of the Peace. It wasnot until 371, whenthe King waspreoccupied withproblems within hisempire andthe Spartans were unable to enforce the Peace, that the Athenians found their longawaited opportunity, and began taking steps to recover their hegemony of the northern Aegean.16

38; D. M. Lewis, CAH2Vol. 5 (1992) 13–14, 127– 15 See Graham, Colony and Mother City 37–

28. 7. For bibliography, see Cawkwell, Xenophon 47– 16 Antiphon 3.15; Hornblower, Mausolus 184– 84; andthe 48; B. S. Strauss, Athens after the Peloponnesian War(London/Sydney 1986) 183– 29. extensive list in CAH2Vol. 5 (1994) 922–

PART I. THE WAR OVER AMPHIPOLIS, 371– 360 B.C. CHAPTER I. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR OVER AMPHIPOLIS

The chronology of theevents of theWarover Amphipolis is difficult todisentangle because there arefewactions that canbe securely anchored. Inorder to circumvent the problems of interpretation posed by the literary andepigraphic evidence, we need to begin byaddressing twomajor problems: first, thedates of thereigns of the Argeads fromAlexander II toAlexander III; andsecond, thedates of thecommands of the Athenian generals Iphicrates andTimotheus in the North Aegean andthe events associated with those commands.

I-1. Thereigns of the Argeads Diodorus states in a chronographic entry under thearchon-year 370/69 that Amyntas III died and was succeeded by Alexander II, who ruled for one year (Diod. 15.60.3). This would seem to put Alexander’s death in the following archon-year, 369/8. A problem arises, however, because there is noentry forMacedonian affairs under that year. Rather, in a chronographic entry under the year 368/7, Diodorus says that Ptolemy of Alorus murdered Alexander andruled for three years (Diod. 15.71.1). This seems to contradict his statement that Alexander ruled for oneyear. In order to solve this apparent contradiction, weneedto examine Diodorus’entries for the Macedonian kings from Amyntas III to Alexander III andthen compare them with the other transmitted regnal dates, the Parian Marble, Oxyrhynchus Chronicle, andEusebius tradition.

Diodorus

368/7

Amyntas III dies; Alexander II succeeds him and rules for one year. (15.60.3) Ptolemy of Alorus murders Alexander II andrules forthree years.

365/4

Perdiccas

370/69

(15.71.1)

III murders Ptolemy of Alorus andrules for five years.

(15.77.5) 360/59

336/5 335/4

Philip comes to the throne andrules for twenty-four years. (16.2.1; 16.1.3) Philip dies after ruling for twenty-four years, andAlexander succeeds him. (16.95) Alexander, having succeeded Philip, punishes the assassins of Philip. Herules for twelve years andseven months. (17.117.5)

I. The Chronology of theWarover Amphipolis

20

Parian Marble1 371/0 368/7

(no date)

Amyntas III dies andAlexander II becomes king. (A 72) Alexander II dies andPtolemy becomes king. (A 74) Philip becomes king; Artaxerxes dies andOchos becomes king.

(A 77)

336/5 324/3

Philip II dies and Alexander III becomes king. (B 1) Alexander III dies. (B 8)

Oxyrhynchus Chronicle2

336/5

Philip

II is assassinated; he is succeeded by Alexander III.

Eusebius tradition3 Length of reign Amyntas III 18 Alexander II 1 Ptolemy 4 Perdiccas III 6 Philip II 27 Alexander III 12

in years

It is clear from this table that Diodorus generally counted theyears of a king’s reign by whole archon-years anddiscounted any fraction of a year. Heappears to have calculated the length of the reigns of Alexander II, Ptolemy, Perdiccas III, and Philip II all in the same way. He counted the number of complete years in a particular reign; if the number of months of the accession-year andthe death-year came to more than twelve, he added one year to the total andomitted the extra months beyond the twelfth. Thus, Ptolemy ruled from some point in 368/7 to some point in 365/4, i.e., for twocomplete years andtwopartial years. Thetotal number of months of the twopartial years comes tomore thantwelve byDiodorus’scheme, andso he says that Ptolemy ruled for three years. Likewise, Perdiccas’ rule of five years can be understood as four whole years andtwo partial years, and Philip’s twenty-four-year rule consists of twenty-three whole years andtwopartial years. In the case of Alexander II, Diodorus counted one complete year, 369/8. The sumof the twopartial years, 370/69 and368/7, wasless thantwelve months, andso they were not included in his total. Alexander II thus ruled between one andtwo years, with his accession occurring sometime in 370/69 and his assassination sometime in 368/7. It is difficult to know the precise date of either because we cannot tell howmany months Diodorus cut off from his reign on either end. (But see below for Alexander’s death.) The year which the Parian Marble gives for Alexander’s accession, 371/0, must be incorrect. This discrepancy does notpresent 1 2 3

Marmor Parium, FGrH 239. Ox. Chron. FGrH 255 F6. R. Helm, Eusebius Chronik (Berlin 1956) 118.

1. The reigns of the Argeads I–

21

a problem forourinterpretation of Diodorus’dating method, fortheParian Marble is known forchronographic inaccuracies.4 Thecase of Alexander III appears tobe theexception to this rule. According to Diodorus, hereigned for twelve years andseven months. Since Plutarch gives the length of his reign as twelve years andeight months, it is possible that Diodorus’ method is in fact consistent on a different level. This time he simply rounded down to thenumber of complete months, rather than years, probably because his sources forAlexander weremoredetailed thanfortheother Argeads;5 Plutarch, bycontrast, counts a partial month as a whole month. Diodorus says in his general introduction to Alexander’s reign that he ruled for twelve years (Diod. 17.1). Here he is concerned with praising Alexander’s achievements rather than giving the precise length of his reign. Diodorus puts Philip’s death and Alexander’s accession in 336/5, and the Oxyrhynchus Chronicle (III.21) gives the same date. Wemust notbe misled by the fact that under the year 335/4 Diodorus speaks of the young king’s punishment of his father’s assassins. Since Philip waskilled in 336 (probably inOctober), Alexander will not have waited until the following summer to avenge his murder. This passage is not a chronographic entry andtherefore is not intended to indicate the precise date of these events. Rather, it reflects Diodorus’tendency to summarize a number of thematically related events under the heading of a particular year.6 This interpretation mayhelptoexplain the figures which theEusebius tradition assigns tothereigns of these kings: oneyearto Alexander II, fourto Ptolemy, six to Perdiccas, twenty-seven (viz. 26)7 to Philip, and twelve to Alexander III. The tradition assigns figures to Ptolemy, Perdiccas, and Philip that are each one year longer than the number of years which Diodorus ascribes to them; by contrast, it assigns thesame figures to thereigns of Alexander II andIII as those appearing in Diodorus. Notably, the Eusebius tradition’s figures for Ptolemy, Perdiccas, and Philip areeach twoyears longer thanthenumber of whole years that wecalculated for their reigns. This consistency suggests that Eusebius also had a system for recognizing partial years. Perhaps he counted each partial year as a whole year in those instances where the sumof months of two partial years came to more than twelve. Thus, Ptolemy’s reign of twofull years andtwopartial years is recorded as four years, andso on.Inthecases of Alexander II andIII, the sumof months of the partial years didnotexceed twelve, andso they were notcounted. 4

5

6 7

99. See F. Jacoby, FGrH Vol. II B, 694– Perhaps thechange intechnique reflects a change inDiodorus’sources: it maybe that Ephorus (or whoever was Diodorus’ source for the chronography in Books 15 and 16) counted the

Argeads’reigns bywhole archon-years. 3b. Fordiscussion of this technique, see Chapter 3, Section III– Schwartz has shown that the figure of 27 years assigned to Philip is a scribal error for 26 (E. , Abhandlungen der Göttingischen Die Königslisten des Eratosthenes und Kastor” Schwartz, “ 93). Fordiscussion of the various Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl. 40 [1894] 79– The Oleveni Inscription andtheDates dates ascribed to Philip’s reign, see M. B. Hatzopoulos, “ , in W. L. Adams/E. N.Borza (eds.), Philip II, Alexander the Great and the of Philip II’s Reign” 38. Macedonian Heritage (Washington, D. C. 1982) 31–

22

I. TheChronology of theWarover Amphipolis

To sumup,thedates of theArgead reigns of the360s areasfollows: Alexander II, 370/69 to 368/7; Ptolemy, 368/7 to 365/4, andPerdiccas ΙII, 365/4 to 360/59. We will attempt to date these reigns more precisely in the course of establishing the chronology of the commands of Iphicrates andTimotheus.

I-2. The Amphipolitan

command

of Iphicrates

Our two major sources for this chronology are Demosthenes’ speech Against Aristocrates of 352/18 and Aeschines’ speech Onthe False Embassy of 343. Both discuss events in the north by focusing on the actions of the Athenian generals there. We will begin with Aeschines’ account of Iphicrates’ Macedonian expedition, since it provides information on the general’s assumption of the command against Amphipolis. We will then examine the account of Demosthenes, who provides information onthelast year of Iphicrates’time atAmphipolis andonwhat happened after Timotheus took over theAmphipolitan command.

2a. Iphicrates’Macedonian expedition I– Aeschines, recounting the speech he made to Philip during the First Embassy of 346, says he related the history of Athenian services to thehouse of Amyntas. The orator claims he said the following: For the time was shortly after the death of Amyntas, and of Alexander, the eldest of the brothers, when Perdiccas and Philip were still children. Their mother Eurydice had been betrayed by those whoappeared to be their friends, andPausanias wasreturning for the throne –an exile, but powerful in that opportunity andsupported by many people. He possessed a Greek force, and had seized Anthemus, Therma, andStrepsa, andcertain other places. The Macedonians were notunited, butmost of them favored Pausanias. In these critical times, the Athenians elected Iphicrates as their general to go against Amphipolis –for at that time the people of Amphipolis were holding their city themselves andenjoying the free use of the land. After Iphicrates hadreached this region, with a fewships at first, for the purpose of examining Then,”I said, “your mother Eurydice sent for the situation rather than of besieging the city, “ him. As indeed all whowere present attest, sheputyour brother Perdiccas in Iphicrates’arms, andset youonhis knees (you were a young child), andsaid, ‘Amyntas thefather of these little children, when he wasalive, made youhis son, andenjoyed the friendship of thecity of Athens, so that it follows that youare, in a private capacity, a brother to these children and, ina public capacity, a friend tous.’After this shethenbegan toplead earnestly foryouandherself andthe inshort, fordeliverance. WhenIphicrates heard these words, hedrove Pausanias outof throne – ( Aeschin. 2.26– 29) Macedonia andpreserved the sovereignty for you.”

Like other parts of the speech, this section is highly rhetorical and attempts to obscure facts that were known to Aeschines’audience.9 Buthecannot hide the fact 8 9

Forthedate, see Dion. Hal.AdAmm.I.4. Forthegeneral reliability of Dionysius’dates, see R. 120. , REG68 (1955) 77– Dionysius of Halicarnassus andsome Demosthenic Dates” Sealey, “ Aeschines exaggerates the youth of the twoprinces forrhetorical purposes. Forananalysis of 71. See Chapter II, 18 of the speech, see E. Badian andJ. Heskel, “Aeschines”264– sections 12– 2c in this volume for further discussion of the fictitiousness of Aeschines’account. Section II–

I-2. TheAmphipolitan

command

of Iphicrates

23

that Iphicrates wasoriginally sent to the north to capture Amphipolis. The resolution of the Greeks in support of the Athenian claim to the city (Aeschin. 2.32) and the dismissal of Iphicrates after his failure to capture it (Dem. 23.149) made his command “against Amphipolis”toowell known foreven this orator to distort. It is clear, therefore, that Iphicrates wassent to Amphipolis first, andthat at some point after this hetook a force from there to Macedonia.10 We begin with the question of when Iphicrates went to Macedonia. It can be inferred from Aeschines that the general embarked on this campaign after the

following events hadtaken place: Ptolemy of Alorus assassinated Alexander II and became regent for Perdiccas; Pausanias thereupon returned from exile andseized Anthemus, Therma, andStrepsa andother places. All of these actions occurred in a fairly brief period of time. Pausanias will have made his challenge straight after Ptolemy’s coup, when the newking had not yet secured his position: Argaeus’ attempt onPhilip’s throne soon after his accession provides a good analogy.11 Soon after Pausanias launched hisattempt, Iphicrates will have answered thecall forhelp against him. As wehave noted, Diodorus 15.71.1 puts the assassination of Alexander II in the year 368/7. Although he does not specify when in the year it occurred, the events that took place after hismurder provide some chronological hints. Webegin by inferring that, because the military operations of both Pausanias andthe Athenians could have taken place only during the campaigning season, they should be dated inclose succession, toeither thesummer andautumn of 368 orthespring and summer of 367. The chronology of Pelopidas’second expedition to Macedonia makes it possible to narrow down the limits for these events a bit. He went there directly from Thessaly with mercenaries he had hired at Pharsalus; by the time he arrived, Ptolemy hadtaken the throne. After a brief confrontation, the twoleaders made an 3). Buckler is surely alliance andPtolemy gave Pelopidas hostages (Plut. Pel. 27.2– correct to see Pelopidas’expedition asa reaction to theonemade by Iphicrates: he could notallow Athenian influence to take hold in Macedonia.12 There is reason to believe theThebans went to Macedonia very soon after the Athenians, i.e., in the same campaigning season. The hiring of mercenaries at Pharsalus, rather than returning toThebes forrecruits, suggests great urgency onPelopidas’part. Hemay have felt especially pressed fortime because theendof thecampaigning season was drawing near. Given these considerations, wecandate his mission to autumn 368. By these calculations, Iphicrates’ expedition to Macedonia belongs in the period between Alexander’s assassination andPelopidas’ intervention, therefore, between July andautumn 368. Although Aeschines does notprovide dates forthese operations, wecansurmise that Iphicrates left operations at Amphipolis soon after hearing from Ptolemy. Weneedto allow time for Ptolemy’s ambassadors to travel to Amphipolis andnegotiate with Iphicrates andthen for the Athenians to prepare

2c below. 2b andI– 10 For thedates of Iphicrates’command against Amphipolis, see Sections I– 45. 6; see Heskel, “Philip II andArgaios”43– 11 Diod. 16.2.6; 3.3– 22. 12 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 121–

I. The Chronology of the War over Amphipolis

24

for their expedition andsail from their base, presumably onThasos,13 to Macedonia. Ptolemy’s ambassador will have travelled to Amphipolis over land. This journey wasapproximately 65 to 70 miles as thecrow flies, perhaps 80 to90 miles byland: travel byhorse would take a dayortwo.Wecanestimate another fewdays for Iphicrates to return to Thasos andmake preparations for the expedition. The time for the voyage canalso be estimated. The Athenians were in a hurry to reach Macedonia. Although we are not told howlong the voyage took, it is possible to estimate this on the basis of the evidence for Thucydides’ account of Mindarus’ journey from Chios to Rhoeteum in411. Hemade this voyage very quickly: it took him two long days to go 190 sea miles.14 Since the distance from Thasos to the Macedonian coast (probably Pella15) is approximately 250 miles, wecanestimate the travel time at approximately three days. By these calculations, the Athenian fleet reached Macedonia approximately two weeks after Ptolemy sent word to Iphicrates.

We can use these calculations to determine the chronology of Pausanias’ expedition. By the time Iphicrates arrived at the Macedonian coast, the pretender hadreached Strepsa. Since Pausanias didnotgetasfarasPella, wecaninfer thathis expedition lasted two to three weeks at most before Iphicrates appeared on the scene. The precise length of time of the hostilities that ensued is difficult to ascertain because the sources donotindicate thesize of either army. It probably did not take very long, however, for Iphicrates to drive Pausanias out of Macedonia. Allowing three weeks for Pausanias’ capture of Anthemus, Strepsa, andTherme andanother twoto three weeks for the showdown with Iphicrates, wecandate his expulsion to late summer 366. Pelopidas’expedition follows shortly thereafter, in early autumn. It is noteworthy that Aeschines in 2.27 refers to Pausanias as “having a Greek . This force andhaving seized Anthemus, Therme, Strepsa, andcertain other places” leaves little doubt that the pretender started from somewhere in Chalcidice, with Pella as his final destination. His Greek troops, therefore, were supplied by the Olynthians.16 Thus, the Olynthians, too, were involved in the Macedonian succes13 There is noevidence that indicates that Thasos wasanAthenian base at this time, only that it hadbecome onebytheautumn of 361, whenTimomachus returned there withhisfleet after an expedition to Stryme ([Dem.] 50.21). TheAthenians probably started using it as a base again when it joined the Second Athenian Confederacy in the 370s. Thasos does notappear in the 42. Decree of Aristoteles. For discussion see Cargill, Second Athenian League 35, 41– 14 Thuc. 8.101. J. S. Morrison andJ. F. Coates, TheAthenian Trireme (Cambridge 1986) 103– 105, have estimated that Mindarus averaged 6.9 knots over twodays, thesecond being a very long one.

15 In the mid-fourth century, theThermaic Gulf probably extended inland as far as Pella. See N. The Plain of Western Macedonia and the 149; J. L. Bintliff, “ G. L. Hammond, HM II. 148– NewApproaches to Human 62; id., “ Neolithic Site of Nea Nikomedia”PPS 42 (1976) 241– , in F. W. Carter, ed., AnHistorical Geography Geography. Prehistoric Greece: A Case-Study” 78; E. N. Borza, “Some Observaof the Balkans (London/New York/San Francisco 1977) 73– 15 tions on Malaria andthe Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity,”AJAH 4 (1979) 114– , in Adams/Borza, eds., Philip II, Alexander The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia” and“ 20, andIn the Shadow of Olympus 41. the Great and the Macedonian Heritage 1– 16 West, Chalcidic League 110.

I-2. TheAmphipolitan command of Iphicrates

25

sion struggle, andso their decision to intervene needs to be inserted into ourlist of events, between Alexander’s assassination andPausanias’expedition to Macedonia.

We thus arrive at the following tentative chronology: Ptolemy murdered Alexander inthesummer of 368. TheOlynthians quickly decided to intervene, andsent Pausanias to Macedonia bylate summer orearly autumn. Ptolemy notified Iphicrates at once, andthe Athenian fleet arrived at theMacedonian coast within twoweeks, by which time Pausanias hadmoved up the coast as far as Strepsa. After some fighting, Iphicrates’ forces overpowered the pretender’s. By late October he had defeated Pausanias andmade a settlement with Ptolemy. After Iphicrates returned to Amphipolis, Pelopidas wentto Macedonia, perhaps sometime in November. 2b. Iphicrates’ dismissal from the Amphipolitan command I–

We know next to nothing about Iphicrates’other actions in the north until the endof his command, andfor that period, we have only Demosthenes, whoprovides the details in his brief synopsis of theearly career of Charidemus: This man, first of all, washired byIphicrates, anddrewpayfrom himformorethanthree years. After youremoved Iphicrates from thecommand anddispatched Timotheus as general against Amphipolis and Chersonese, he [Charidemus] first handed over to the Amphipolitans the hostages of theirs whom Iphicrates hadtaken from Harpalus andhadgiven to himto guard, although youhadvoted that heconvey themtoyou.Andthis stood inthewayof thecapture of Amphipolis. Second, whenTimotheus inturn tried to hire himandhisarmy, hedidnottake up service with him, but left, sailing with your triaconters to Cotys, whohe well knew was the most hostile of mento you. Andafterwards, since Timotheus decided to prosecute the war against Amphipolis before the one against Chersonese, andhe wasnotable to do anyevil to you there, he again hired himself out to the Olynthians, who were your enemies and were holding Amphipolis atthat time. After hesetsail fromCardia, while proceeding to Amphipolis to fight against ourcity, he wascaptured byourtriremes. But dueto the current crisis andthe needfor mercenaries in the waragainst Amphipolis, hewasnotpunished for failing to deliver over the hostages and for deserting with the triaconters to Cotys, your enemy; rather, he 150) (Dem. 23.149– exchanged pledges andjoined inthecampaign withyou.

Wecanattempt to reconstruct the order of these events. Iphicrates wassent to the took” North Aegean, andhe hired Charidemus. At some point later, the general “ Amphipolitan hostages from a certain Harpalus. News of this action will have reached Athens quickly, within a week. Realizing that the hostages presented a unique opportunity for the capture of Amphipolis, the Athenians passed a decree ordering Iphicrates to send them to Athens. Before this order reached him, however, he hadprobably already entrusted the hostages to Charidemus andperhaps had commanded him to take them to Athens. It is important that Demosthenes claims toprovide evidence of hisassertions. Insection 151herefers to a letter from Iphicrates. Most likely, after receiving news of the decree, the general sent a letter indicating he had already given the hostages to Charidemus. As soon as the Athenians received this letter, they voted to dismiss Iphicrates from office and replace him with Timotheus. Now that Charidemus was no longer bound to an

I. The Chronology of the Warover Amphipolis

26

Athenian general, he was quick to capitalize on the opportunity the hostages presented, andsold the hostages back to their compatriots. Although Demosthenes does not provide a date for any of these events, we can establish generally when they occurred. The sequence –beginning with Iphicrates’ interception of the Amphipolitan hostages and ending with his dismissal from office –will have occupied a very short amount of time, perhaps two or three weeks, near the endof his command. Although wedonot know exactly when the command began orended, wedoknowthatCharidemus wasinIphicrates’employment for “more than three years” , i.e., for between three andfour years. This is probably close to the length of Iphicrates’ command, also, for he will have hired mercenaries soon after hisarrival at Amphipolis. Themost recent command before Amphipolis that is attested forIphicrates is theoneintheCorinthia, which is dated to the spring of 369.17 Since the sources say nothing more about his whereabouts until he went to the north, most likely Amphipolis washis next command, beginning in July of that year, after his re-election that spring. This reconstruction finds support inAeschines’assertion in2.27 thattheAthenians elected (ἐ χ ειρ ο τ η ό σ ν α ) ν Iphicrates general against Amphipolis. He probably set out for the north in late September, after the Etesian winds hadabated.18 At that time, he will have hired Charidemus. Since Iphicrates was at Amphipolis for more than three years, his dismissal belongs in theperiod of September 366 to August 365. It is also reasonableto assume that theAthenians will nothave voted forhisdismissal just before the elections were to be held, since they would simply elect someone different at that time. Therefore, thedecision todismiss himfromoffice will have occurred at least a fewweeks before or after theelections.

2c. Timotheus’Samian expedition; Iphicrates’assumption of theAmphipolitan I– command

Since it is impossible from this evidence to arrive at a precise date for Iphicrates’ dismissal, scholars have attempted to do so through dating the whereabouts of Timotheus in this period. It hasbeen generally assumed that hereplaced Iphicrates in 365, after completing the siege of Samos.19 This view is based onthree pieces of evidence. First, there is an inscription recording the Athenian decree concerning Erythrae, IG II2 108, which is dated to the fifth prytany of 366/5, or approximately [Σ Ε Ο Ι .... ]Θ ]ΤΕ Α December of 366. Kirchner restores lines 9 and 10 to [Τ Σ Ί Θ Ι Θ Α Η Ι Τ Η Ψ Ἐ , Σ Ό Γ Η [Τ Α Ρ Τ Σ Ὁ Σ ]Ο [Ε Θ ]Ό ΙΤΙ]-/[Μ ΕἾ Ε Π Ν Γ Ε Έ Λ Ν ῚὯ Ρ Π Ε · This theusproposed themotion. Regarding what can be -rendered, “ Η Ο]Λ Β Ι .20 · .21As a result of this the general Timotheus says, the Boule -- voted as follows”

̃

̃

89; Develin, Athenian Officials 251. 51; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 88– 17 Xen. Hell. 6.5.49– 18 Theabatement of thewinds canbedated toapproximately September 20. Forthedating of the Aeschines”66 n. 10. winds, see Badian andHeskel, “

19 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.98–102; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.194. 20 J. Kirchner, Inscriptiones Graecae II-III Part I (Berlin 1913) 50. 21 For discussion of this formula, see P. J. Rhodes, TheAthenian Boule (Oxford 1972) 65.

I-2. The Amphipolitan command of Iphicrates

27

restoration, some scholars believe thatTimotheus returned to Athens after thesiege and personally reported on affairs concerning Erythrae.22 But it is clear from Wilhelm’s reading of the stone that these lines are irregular stoichedon.23 Other restorations besides λ έγ ε ιare in fact possible, e.g., γρά ϕ ε ι(cf. IG II2 110). Moreover, as Davies points out, if Timotheus was in Athens at this time, it would be difficult to make the ten-month siege comply with Diodorus’ dates (see below).24 Therefore, wecannot saythat Timotheus wasinAthens at thetime this decree was enacted, only that hewasgeneral. Second, Isocrates states in 15.111 that the siege took ten months. This figure should not be interpreted too strictly. Since the orator wanted to glorify the deeds of Timotheus in this speech, he may have exaggerated the speed with which he captured Samos: it probably took between tenandeleven months. Third, Diodorus says under theyear 322 that theSamian exiles were restored to their homeland after more than forty-three years (Diod. 18.18.9). On the basis of this evidence, it is generally agreed that theoriginal exile, andtherefore theendof Timotheus’siege, belong in 365.25 The date of Samos’surrender, however, is not as

clear-cut. We need to consider a number of points. Habicht, using other evidence, shows convincingly that the return of the exiles belongs in the winter of 322/1 or beginning of 321.26 Thereturn took place over43, andprobably nottooclose to44, years after the exile. Wecan therefore confirm that theexile occurred sometime in 365, andprobably notat thevery beginning of theyear. It maybe possible to approach this problem from a different angle, namely the question of when Timotheus began the siege. Since the fleet would not have departed or returned in the winter, the siege must have begun in the period of approximately September 367 to August 366, andit will have ended ten to eleven months later, i.e., in the period of July 366 to June 365. This gives us the possibilities of (1) September 367 to July/August 366; (2) October 367 to August/September 366; (3) November 367 to September/October, 366; (4) May 366 to March/April 365; (5) June 366 to April/May 365; (6) July 366 to May/June 365; and(7) August 366 toJune/July 365. Since theexile of theSamians began in365, andprobably not too early in the year, we can eliminate the first three of these possibilities. It is therefore safe to saythat thesiege began between MayandAugust 366 andended between March andJune/July 365.27

22 E.g., Sealey, “Callistratos of Aphidna”160 n. 124. , Hermes 24 (1889) 117, lines 9–11: 23 A. Wilhelm, “Attische Psephismen” ...... O L O . AE ΟT P A Σ .Ο Ο .Ο This corresponds to the first half of each of lines 9 and 10 in Kirchner’s reading: [Σ Ο Ε TA]T EI· . ... ]Θ Σ Ο Γ Η [Τ Α Ρ Τ Σ Ο Σ ]Ο [Ε [Μ ]Ο Θ 30. 24 Davies, IG ii2 1609”329– 30). “ for discussion (ibid. 328– 25 See Davies 26 C. Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit,”MDAI (A) 72 (1957) 160. 43, dates the beginning of the siege to autumn 366 at the 27 Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.2.242– earliest andsummer 365 at thelatest.

I. TheChronology of theWarover Amphipolis

28

The fact that Timotheus waselected as Iphicrates’ replacement suggests that Samos capitulated shortly before Iphicrates’dismissal. Thesurrender of Samos and the dismissal of Iphicrates, therefore, belong in the period of late spring to early summer 365. Because thechain of events beginning with Iphicrates’capture of the Amphipolitan hostages andending with his dismissal took place in close succession, we should date them all to this period. Thedates of Iphicrates’Amphipolitan command canbesummed upasfollows. Hetook upthecommand inJuly 369 andsupervised operations atAmphipolis from approximately autumn 369 to late spring or early summer 365, when he wasdismissed from his command. Shortly before his dismissal, i.e., that spring, he acquired the Amphipolitan hostages from Harpalus. Charidemus also served at Amphipolis from autumn 369 to late spring orearly summer 365.28 2d. The alliance of Amphipolis and Ptolemy; the alliance of Amphipolis and I– Olynthus

We can now add to the beginning of this sequence two other events that are connected with it. Asnoted earlier, theseries began withIphicrates’interception of the Amphipolitan hostages from Harpalus. The name “Harpalus”is clearly Macedonian,29 andso wecan infer that before Iphicrates acquired these Amphipolitans, the Macedonians hadtaken them as hostages as part of the terms of a treaty of alliance. Since Iphicrates acquired thehostages inthe spring of 365, theMacedoniansmust have acquired them shortly before that. Inthespring of 365, Ptolemy was onthethrone, andsothere is nodoubt thatit washewhomadethetreaty of alliance with Amphipolis. Since the taking of hostages indicates that Ptolemy was the stronger of thetwopowers, it is certain thattheAmphipolitans asked theking foran alliance and not the other way around. By analogy, in 369 Alexander II asked Pelopidas for aidin his struggles with Ptolemy, andthegeneral took hostages as a condition of their alliance.30 Wecanconclude that intheautumn or winter of 366/5 the Amphipolitans had asked Ptolemy for support in the war with the Athenians, andthat during thewinter they heldnegotiations andconcluded a treaty. This raises thequestion of why, after three years of fighting, theAmphipolitans asked Ptolemy for aid against Athens. The most logical explanation is that Iphicrates hadrecently intensified the siege of Amphipolis, so much so that the Amphipolitans feared they would soonbe forced to surrender. Inall likelihood, theAthenians were able to intensify operations because they hadreceived outside aid. Asthechronology of the War over Chersonese demonstrates, in June 366 the Great King had agreed to support the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. Wecan be fairly certain that the King himself did not provide funding for the expedition, for that would surely have received mention in the sources. More likely, themoney came from Ariobar3a below. 28 For Charidemus’ service to Cotys, see Section I– 29 See Chapter II, n. 21. 5; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 117–18. 30 Plut. Pel. 26.4–

I– 3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus

29

zanes, whohadprovided funding once before, in 368.31 Since theintensification of the siege led the Amphipolitans to send to Ptolemy in late autumn or early winter 366/5, Ariobarzanes probably sent money to Iphicrates inthesummer of 366. Weare naturally ledto aska related question, namely, howthe Amphipolitans hadmanaged to keep Iphicrates andhis mercenaries outof their city for more than three years before making thealliance with Ptolemy in 366/5. This is quite a feat if we consider the fact that Samos, fortified by a Persian garrison, surrendered to Timotheus in less than eleven months. Surely the Amphipolitans hadobtained aid from a major power at some point during that three-to-four year period. There are reasons to think Olynthus wasthat power, andthat thetwostates formed analliance atsomepoint after theAthenians declared their intentions attheCongress atAthens in the autumn of 371.32 The Athenian claim to Amphipolis surely displeased the Olynthians, whohadpursued their ownambitions of hegemony in the 380s (Xen. Hell 5.2.17). It is also important that after Leuctra, the Spartans, whohadcurtailed those ambitions, nolonger stood intheway.These considerations suggest that soon after the Athenians announced their claim, the Amphipolitans sent an embassy to Olynthus to request aid andan alliance. Allowing time for negotiations, we can hypothesize that a treaty wasmade in the winter of 371/0.33

I– 3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus

3a. Timotheus’movements after theSamian campaign I–

We can nowattempt to date Timotheus’ actions after he wasappointed general 112 against Amphipolis andChersonese. Onthebasis of Isocrates’claim in 15.111– , scholars have Timotheus, sailing from Samos, captured Sestus andCrithote” that “ generally believed the general went to Chersonese directly after settling affairs on Samos.34 The problem with this statement, however, is that it makes no reference whatsoever to the campaign at Amphipolis, whereas, as Buckler points out, Demosthenes explicitly says in23.150 thatTimotheus decided to undertake operations against Amphipolis before moving against Chersonese.35 Most likely, Isocrates refrains from mentioning this Amphipolitan campaign of Timotheus, as well as the

6d. 31 See Chapter III, Section III– 32 Xenophon Hell. 6.5.1 puts this congress soon after thebattle of Leuctra, which wasfought in thesummer of 371. Forthedate of thebattle, see Buckler, Theban Hegemony 233. 33 Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.194, suggests the Amphipolitans made analliance with Olynthus after the Athenians stated their claim. There must have been twotreaties made with different provisions. It is clear from Aeschin. 2.27 that Amphipolis wasautonomous when Iphicrates launched his expedition in 369. Dem. 23.150, by contrast, indicates that the Olynthians had 3b taken over thecity bythetime Timotheus wasready launch operations there (see Section I– below).

34 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 2.88; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.194. 56. L. Kallet, commenting on the rhetorical nature of Isocra35 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 255– tes’claim, suggests Timotheus didnotgototheHellespont atall; rather, hereceived Sestus and Iphikrates”246). Fora rather Crithote fromAriobarzanes forhaving captured Samos (Kallet, “ different chronology of Timotheus’actions atChersonese, see Chapter III.

30

I. The Chronology of the War over Amphipolis

campaign of 360/59, in theeffort to suppress thegeneral᾽s failures. With thesame laudatory motives inmind, heexaggerates Timotheus᾽successes onChalcidice two sections later (see below). To determine theorder of Timotheus᾽movements, weneed first toascertain the chronological relationship between Charidemus᾽departure from Amphipolis for Chersonese andTimotheus᾽decision to take upthewaragainst Amphipolis before the war against Chersonese. According to Demosthenes, after Charidemus had gone to Cotys with some Athenian ships, he hired himself out to the Olynthians, ϕ ίπ ο λ ρ ινπ ὴτ ὸ ὸ νπ ό ςἈμ λ ἐπ ειδ ο εμ ρ νπ ό τ ερ ο νπ ο λ εμ εῖνεἵλ ε τ οΤιμ ό θ ε ο ςτ ο ῦ η σ ρ ρ ο ό ν ὸ ν ,κ π α ςΧ ερ ὶοὐ δ ὲ νεἶχ επ ο ιε μ ᾶ ῖνὑ ςἐκ ε ῖ κα κ ό ν(Dem. 23.150). This statement should be rendered “ since (or when) Timotheus decided to take upthe waragainst Amphipolis before thewaragainst Chersonese” . Timotheus thus decided to take upoperations against Amphipolis after Charidemus hadgone to Cotys. After the general᾽s decision became known, Charidemus arranged to take up service with the Olynthians at Amphipolis. This interpretation makes sense if we consider whyCharidemus went to Chersonese in the first place. Since it is fair to assume that the condottiere would work for whoever wished to pay him, wecan infer that Cotys managed to engage his services before Timotheus made the attempt, i.e., soon after Iphicrates᾽dismissal in the spring of 365. The reason is apparent. The king believed an Athenian invasion of Chersonese was imminent. When Cotys learned of Timotheus᾽decision to go to Amphipolis instead, he let Charidemus go. The Olynthians soon afterwards hired thecondottiere with similar reasons in mind: once they learned of Timotheus᾽decision, they realized they needed more forces to retain control of Amphipolis.36

3b. The Olynthian occupation of Amphipolis I– managed to gain control of Amphipolis. The Olynthians were holding the city when Charidemus hired himself out to them (Dem. 23.150). They must have gained control of it after Charidemus had sold back the hostages andbefore Timotheus had left Samos, therefore, in late spring or early summer 365. We may infer that the Amphipolitans heard that Timotheus wasto replace Iphicrates inhiscommand. Hisspeedy capture of Samos made them fear that he would be similarly successful at Amphipolis, andso they asked the Olynthians for aid. Thetwopowers concluded a newtreaty of alliance,37 and the Amphipolitans handed control of their city over to the Olynthians. The preliminaries to the alliance therefore belong in late spring or early summer 365; the subsequent events –the hiring of Charidemus by the Olynthians, his departure from Cardia, andhis capture by the Athenians –all belong in mid- to late summer

We now need to determine when the Olynthians

365. ετ ο , analternative translation is technically possible: 36 Because of theambiguity of theform εἵλ , etc. (Kühner-Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik “ since Timotheus hadchosen totake upthewar” 54, 169). The sense, however, is surely that Timotheus decided to move against 2.1, 153– Amphipolis after Charidemus hadgone toChersonese. 2dandn. 33 above. 37 See Section I–

I– 3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus

31

3c. Perdiccas᾽alliance with Athens I– This chronology can in turn help us to determine a tentative date for Perdiccas᾽ accession. Diodorus says in a chronographic passage under the year 365/4 that Perdiccas assassinated Ptolemy and ruled for five years (Diod. 15.77.5). As we have seen, this probably indicates that Perdiccas ruled for four full years andtwo partial years.38 Hecame to the throne, therefore, at some point after the beginning of the Athenian archon-year 365/4. We may be able to narrow down the date a bit further by examining the evidence for the policies Perdiccas followed during his reign. According to Demosthenes 2.14, “ Macedon helped Athens in the days of Timotheus” . The scholiast on that passage says that Perdiccas fought with theAthenians against the Olynthians (schol. Dem. 2.14 Dilts p. 66). Polyaenus 3.10.14 states that Timotheus waged war with Perdiccas against the Olynthians andmade coinage out of Macedonian silver coins andCypriote copper. This evidence of military andeconomic activity leaves little doubt that Perdiccas at some point made an alliance with Athens; moreover, Timotheus most likely wastheAthenian general whohelped arrange this alliance. Wemayinfer fromPolyaenus᾽statement that theOlynthian occupation of Amphipolis was the catalyst for the treaty of Perdiccas and Athens. Since the Olynthians gained control of Amphipolis in the summer of 365, the alliance of Perdiccas andAthens belongs after this, probably inthe second half of theyear.

3d. Timotheus᾽Chalcidian campaigns I– According to Diodorus, in the archonship of Timocrates (364/3), Timotheus captured Torone andPotidaea andsent aidto thepeople of Cyzicus under siege (Diod. 15.81.6). This evidence raises two possibilities: 1) Diodorus᾽ account begins in 365/4, i.e., Timotheus moved against Chalcidice in the second half of 365, or 2) Timotheus spent the remainder of the campaigning season of 365 at Amphipolis andwentto Chalcidice early the next year. The second interpretation is problematical, for it would mean that Timotheus did not spend any appreciable amount of time atAmphipolis after receiving thecommand andchoosing togothere atonce. It is more likely that hespent theautumn of 365 atAmphipolis, andwhenhesawthat he could not accomplish much with an Olynthian garrison in the city, made plans to move against Chalcidice in the spring of 364. Timotheus then spent the year 364 andat least the first half of 363 engaged in operations there. During this period, he captured Torone andPotidaea, andprobably a number of other cities, even if Isocrates᾽claim that he“reduced all theChalcidians”is anexaggeration. Wewill date the end of Timotheus᾽Chalcidian expedition when we examine the evidence for Callisthenes᾽Macedonian command (see below). Alcimachus, sent outby Timotheus, According to thescholiast onAeschines, “ failed to take Amphipolis and surrendered to the Thracians in the archonship of

38 See Section I–1 above.

32

I. The Chronology of the War over Amphipolis

Timocrates”(schol. Aeschin. 2.31 Dilts p. 64). We can infer from this statement that, after arriving at Chalcidice, Timotheus sent Alcimachus with some of the fleet to Amphipolis. Since Timotheus preferred to send someone else rather than go himself, hewasprobably inthemiddle of siege operations. Torone andPotidaea are twopossibilities, since Diodorus mentions them specifically in 15.81.6; if herefers to them inchronological order, Timotheus wasprobably atTorone. The question arises as to why Timotheus, who presumably needed as many forces as possible for these campaigns, sent Alcimachus to Amphipolis at that time. It stands to reason that he made this decision in reaction to changed circumstances there. Since the general wasunable to achieve much while Amphipolis wasunder Olynthian control, he will have sent Alcimachus there when he felt some progress could be made. Two possibilities come to mind: either that a party in Amphipolis wasabout to betray thecity, or that theOlynthian forces were nolonger present. There are reasons to believe the second alternative is the correct one, andthat the Olynthians hadwithdrawn their forces from Amphipolis. As wehave seen, by the spring of 364 at the latest, Timotheus, with Perdiccas as his ally, had launched an attack on Chalcidice. Once learning of Timotheus᾽invasion of Chalcidice, the Olynthians, concerned above all else to protect their territory there, will not have hesitated to recover their forces stationed at Amphipolis. We should therefore date the Olynthian withdrawal to the spring of 364. Timotheus will have sent Alcimachus to Amphipolis as soon as the city was left ungarrisoned, probably in the summer of 364.39

3e. The warwith Perdiccas; Callisthenes᾽Macedonian command; Timotheus᾽ I– Macedonian command

We turn nowto evidence for Athenian relations with Perdiccas in the late 360s. There is an inscription of the sixth prytany of 363/2, i.e., January 362, that in response to Timotheus᾽report records honors given to Menelaus thePelagonian for warwith the Chalcidians andAmphipolis”.40In addition, there are a his aidin the “ number of statements from the orators. Dinarchus 1.14 states that Timotheus . According to Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea andtwenty other cities” captured “ AeMethone. and Potidaea, Demosthenes 4.4, the Athenians once held Pydna, behalf on Athens against schines says that, after taking thethrone, Perdiccas fought of Amphipolis; when Callisthenes was general, Perdiccas was defeated and the Athenians made a truce with him; theDemos putCallisthenes to death, notbecause 30). These statements make it of the truce, but for other reasons (Aeschin. 2.29– abundantly clear that at some point Perdiccas took the side of Amphipolis against Athens, thus breaking the alliance he hadmade with the Athenians soon after his accession; Timotheus andCallisthenes ledforces against him; Callisthenes made a 39 For the date of Alcimachus᾽return to Athens, see below. ] ς ρ -[ο π ντ ν ὸ ο εμ λ ό ν π ὸ 40 IG II2 110 (= Tod no. 143); the date: line 3; the reference to the war: τ 9). (lines 8– ϕ ίπ ο ιν λ ὸ ςἈμ ρ ὶπ α έα ςκ ιδ κ Χ α λ

I– 3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus

33

truce with the king andwas later tried andconvicted. We need to determine the chronology of these events. Ourstarting point is the Menelaus Decree, with its reference to “ the warwith theChalcidians andAmphipolis” . This indicates that, at thetime of thedecree, the Athenians were at warwith Olynthus andAmphipolis, butnotwith Perdiccas. The warwith Perdiccas therefore began after approximately January 362. In order to narrow downthedate, it is necessary to establish thechronology of thecommands

of Callisthenes andTimotheus.

There is evidence that clearly indicates the chronology of Callisthenes᾽comFormengrowmildwhenthey have exhausted mand. Aristotle says thefollowing: “ their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus. For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they hadcondemned Callisthenes the day before”(Arist. Rhet. 1380b 10ff.). Since Ergophilus᾽ command can be firmly dated to 363/2, Callisthenes᾽ command should be dated to that year as well.41 Callisthenes, therefore, was probably elected at the annual elections, in the spring of 363.42 He will then have entered office at the normal time, i.e., at thebeginning of the archon-year 363/2.43 In principle, the archon-year began after the first visibility of the newmoon after thesummer solstice, though it is generally agreed that theAthenians didnotfollow this rule strictly.44 In 363, this newmoon became visible on 3 July.45 The archonyear, therefore, began about 4 or 5 July. There is noevidence that Callisthenes was general in theprevious year, andsothis date marks thebeginning of hiscommand. It is nowpossible to establish an approximate date for Callisthenes᾽trial. As will be demonstrated in the chronology of the Warover Chersonese, Ergophilus returned fromtheHellespont inlate spring 362; atthat time, hewasdismissed from hiscommand andprosecuted.46 Callisthenes, therefore, wasalso brought to trial in late spring 362. Aristotle implies that the Athenians were very angry with Callisthenes at this time. Their anger is easier to explain if the trial came soon after Callisthenes᾽return from Macedonia. Wemaysurmise that as soon the Athenians heard of the terms of Callisthenes᾽truce with Perdiccas, they dismissed himfrom thecommand; hethenreturned toAthens andstood trial. Aeschines, of course, does not include this information because he denies the truce was the cause of Callisthenes᾽conviction.47 Thetruce thusbelongs a fewdaysorsobefore Callisthenes᾽

53; Hansen, Eisangelia no. 86. 41 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 I.152– 68. According to the Athenaion Politeia, elections for the 42 Develin, Athenian Officials 267– generals were held in the first prytany after the sixth in which there were good omens, i.e., between mid-March and late June ([Arist.] Athen. Pol. 44.4). For discussion, see Rhodes, 37. Commentary 536– 74, and The Term of Office of Attic STRATEGOI”, AJP 61 (1940) 469– 43 See W. K. Pritchett, “ Rhodes, Commentary 537. 44 Plat. Leg. 6.767; Arist. Hist. Anim. 543 b; A. E. Samuel, Greek and Roman Chronology (Munich 1972) 64; E. J. Bickerman, Chronology 37. 45 Bickerman, Chronology 118. 4h. 46 For thechronology of Ergophilus᾽command andtrial, see Chapter III, Section III– 47 Hansen, Eisangelia no. 85, n. 4.

34

I. TheChronology of theWarover Amphipolis

dismissal, i.e., in late spring. By these calculations, Callisthenes᾽war with Perdiccas began after January 362 andcame to anendinthe late spring of that year. It thus lasted at most three to four months, fromFebruary to May. Ournext task is to establish the chronology of Timotheus᾽Macedonian campaigns. Although thesources clearly indicate that hewonimportant victories in this region, he is not associated with the truce with Perdiccas. This silence shows that Timotheus wasnot involved in the hostilities that ledto that truce. We mayinfer that he was still occupied with operations on Chalcidice when Callisthenes made thetruce with Perdiccas. Inthatcase, theAthenian decision to attack theking must also belong intheperiod of Timotheus’Chalcidian expedition. Given these considerations, it is likely that Timotheus᾽capture of Pydna and Methone postdate the truce of late spring 362. Relevant to this discussion are two other pieces of evidence pertaining to Methone in this period. First, Apollodorus says that Callistratus left “ Methone of Macedonia”forThasos ([Dem.] 50.46). This indicates that Methone wasunder the control of theMacedonian dynasty whenCallistratus wasthere, i.e., as late asearly December 361.48 Second, Diodorus, explaining whyPhilip besieged Methone, says that the Methoneans hadoffered the city to his enemies for use as a base (Diod. 16.34.4). Diodorus here is referring to Philip’s punishment of Methone for its support of Argaeus’ attempt on the throne in 360/59. His statement indicates that the city wasunder Macedonian control at thetime of Philip’s accession. Perdiccas hadpossession of Methone intheautumn of 361andretained possession fortherest of his reign (approximately one year49). Timotheus, therefore, must have captured Pydna andMethone at some earlier point. Wenowneedto narrow downTimotheus’capture of these cities more precisely within the limits of late spring 362 andautumn 361. The evidence for the war over Chersonese indicates that hewasinvolved inoperations at Sestus inthespring of 361.50 We can therefore date Timotheus’ siege and capture of Pydna and Methone to the spring andsummer of 362. It is difficult to ascertain the order of Pydna, these campaigns, for Demosthenes says that the Athenians once held “ , whereas Dinarchus says thatTimotheus captured “Samos, Potidaea, andMethone” . It is clear that these lists arenot Methone, Pydna, Potidaea andtwenty other cities” intended to be inchronological order.

48 [Dem.] 50.46. Weare told that Callistratus wasat Methone in exile before going to Thasos in 4b. Nosource indicates, howearly December 361. For the date, see Chapter III, Section III– ever, whenCallistratus originally went to Methone. AsHansen, Eisangelia no. 87, n. 1, points out, hewentthere inanticipation of hissecond trial, andafter serving Athens asanambassador D; Arist. (evidence for Callistratus’ ambassadorial activity: Nep. Epam. 6; Plut. Mor. 193 C– 27, believes CallisRhet. 3.17.14; Theop. Com. [FAC fg. 30]). Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.126– tratus served asanambassador toArcadia shortly before thebattle of Mantinea of 12Skiropho61). Cf. Buckler, who rion 362 (for the date of the battle, see Buckler, Theban Hegemony 260– argues that Callistratus served onembassies to thePeloponnese after thebattle (id. 313 n. 24). In either case, Callistratus’arrival in Methone belongs intheperiod of summer 362 to autumn 361. It is impossible to date either his flight orPerdiccas’recovery of Methone more precisely. 49 See Heskel, “Philip II andArgaios”43. 50

4d. See Chapter III, Section III–

I–3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus

35

Dating Timotheus’ Macedonian campaigns to the first half of 362 makes it possible to establish more precise dates for his Chalcidian campaigns of 363. Following Diodorus’ chronographic source, which puts the fall of Potidaea in 364/3, we can infer that Timotheus captured the city in the spring of 363; the first Athenian cleruchy to Potidaea, which wesurmised fromIG II2114, should also be dated to this period. Timotheus then spent the rest of the year 363 in operations against other cities onChalcidice. TheMenelaus Decree, prompted by a report by Timotheus, indicates that the Pelagonian was supporting the Athenians by the autumn of 363 at the latest. It is a logical inference that Menelaus provided aid to Timotheus’ campaigns on Chalcidice. Most probably, Timotheus requested aid from the Pelagonian at thebeginning of theChalcidian expedition, in the spring of 364, and Menelaus provided troops and money over the course of the next two years. It is clear from this discussion that theAthenians’warwith Perdiccas falls into two phases. The first phase of operations was led by Callisthenes from approximately February to late spring 362, when he made the truce with Perdiccas. Timotheus launched operations against Macedonia soon thereafter, capturing Pydna andMethone in the summer of that year. We are naturally led to ask what caused the breach in relations between Perdiccas and Athens in the first place. According to Aeschines, Perdiccas fought with the Amphipolitans against Athens (2.30). The two powers, therefore, must have made an alliance. It is generally agreed that thegarrison that Philip removed from Amphipolis in 360/59 (Diod. 16.3.3) hadoriginally been installed by Perdiccas. We maysurmise that Perdiccas installed a garrison in the city when the two powers formed their alliance. The alliance and garrison thus belong after the Menelaus Decree, in approximately February 362. Wecan nowreconstruct theevents that ledto the Amphipolitan alliance with Perdiccas. As wehave seen, Callisthenes waselected inthe spring of 363. Hewas surely thegeneral wholedAthenian operations against Amphipolis inthis year, for Timotheus was busy on Chalcidice. The last individual to lead forces against Amphipolis wasAlcimachus, whomTimotheus sent there in thesummer of 364.51 We do not know how long Alcimachus fought at Amphipolis, only that he was defeated by Thracians. It is conceivable that he remained there until the spring of 363. In that case, Callisthenes wasessentially his replacement (though it is uncertain if Alcimachus was a general). In the spring of 363, the Athenians elected Callisthenes general andgave himthe Amphipolitan command. Presumably, they wanted him to set sail as soon as he entered office in early July, and so they prepared the fleet in late spring. Callisthenes set sail in July and spent the next several months besieging Amphipolis. In the winter of 363/2, the Amphipolitans sent to Perdiccas foraid, andtheking installed a garrison inthecity in approximately February. Since it was now impossible to capture Amphipolis, Callisthenes decided to launch a diversionary attack onMacedonia.

3dabove. 51 Schol. Aeschin. 2.31 Dilts p. 64; see Section I–

I. TheChronology of the Warover Amphipolis

36

To sumup,inthespring of 363, theAthenians elected Callisthenes general and

gave him the Amphipolitan command. Callisthenes set sail in early July and launched siege operations against Amphipolis. In the winter of 363/2, the Amphipolitans, afraid they would soon be forced to surrender, asked Perdiccas for aid andalliance. Inapproximately February, thetwopowers madea treaty andtheking installed a garrison in Amphipolis. Since it wasnowimpossible to capture thecity, Callisthenes led forces against Macedonia. He was not able to accomplish much there, and in late spring decided to make a truce with Perdiccas in the hope that Timotheus would bring reinforcements. Furious with the terms of the truce, the Athenians immediately dismissed Callisthenes from his command. Hereturned to Athens andwasprosecuted soonafterwards. Timotheus, meanwhile, tookupoperations inMacedonia; bytheendof thesummer, hehadcaptured Pydna andMethone. In early autumn, he left operations in Macedonia to attend to various crises in the Hellespont andPropontis. Availing himself of the opportunity provided by Timotheus’absence, Perdiccas moved against Methone andregained control of it bythe autumn of 361. Hedidnot, however, recover Pydna: that wasa job left to Philip (Dem. 1.9; Diod. 16.8.3).

I– 3f. Events inPotidaea, 362/1

Wehave onemore piece of evidence that canbe securely dated. It is aninscription recording the decision of the Athenian assembly to send cleruchs to Potidaea, in response to a request of the officials of the Potidaeans (IG II2 114 = Tod no. 146). This decree is dated online 1 to the ninth dayof thepenultimate prytany of 362/1, therefore late Mayorearly June of 361, andso wecanalso date thedecision to ask

Athens for help earlier that spring. Because the request comes approximately two years after Timotheus’ capture of the city, it is likely that it marks the second cleruchy sent there: the Athenians would not have left the city unprotected and susceptible to an Olynthian attack.52 Therequest forcleruchs is unusual: clearly it wasbelieved that Potidaea wasin need of protection. It is a logical inference that the Olynthians hadrenewed their attempts to gain control of Potidaea, or that, at the very least, anOlynthian attack wasimminent. The reason for an attack at this time is apparent. The city wasleft unprotected whenTimotheus withdrew hisforces foruseagainst Perdiccas. Wecan date the Olynthians’ preparations to the winter and early spring of 361, with possibly an attack following later that spring. It remains to examine oneother inscription, IG II2 118, which records a decree enacted in praise of the Athenians for helping the Potidaeans defend their city. The date is not indicated. Since Kirchner, it has been fixed at 361/0, based on his μ ο ςin line 7. As a result, the communis opinio sees it in ίδ]η ρ α restoration of Χ conjunction with the decision of spring 361 to send a cleruchy to Potidaea andthe good relations that existed after that.53 Whitehead, however, pointing out the

52 See below. 53 J. A. Alexander,

Potidaea: Its History andRemains (Athens, Georgia 1963) 87.

I– 3. The Amphipolitan command of Timotheus

37

problems inherent in accepting Kirchner’s emendation, shows that thedate is byno means certain. Heposits twoalternatives, 364/3 and359/8.54 In determining which of these alternatives is preferable, weshould note that in 364/3 Timotheus was in the process of establishing the Athenian presence on the Chalcidian peninsula. It is hardly likely that the Potidaeans at this point hadreason to thank the Athenians. By 359/8, by contrast, the second Athenian cleruchy had been settled inPotidaea forabout twoyears andhadsuccessfully kept theOlynthiansoutof thecity. It makes farbetter sense todate theinscription tothis year, when thePotidaeans were understandably grateful.

54 As he remarks, it is uncertain that Charidemus was general in 361/0; moreover, there are numerous other Athenian names that can fit into this place in the line. See D. Whitehead, , TheAncient “ Secretaries, Charidemos, Poteidaia: The Date (and Personnel) of IG II2118” History Bulletin

3 (1989)

106. 102–

CHAPTER II. THE WAR OVER AMPHIPOLIS

It is generally acknowledged that theAthenians, after losing control of Amphipolis in the Peloponnesian War, made recovery of this city one of their chief foreign

policy goals in the mid-fourth century. Although they initiated efforts to regain Amphipolis in 371, scholarly attention hastended to focus onthe final phase of the conflict, when Athens was at war with Philip II. The chronology reveals, however, that the conflict was one of major proportions from its inception, involving the Athenians, Olynthians, and Philip’s Argead predecessors. During the 360s, these powers, each with expansionist aims in the North Aegean, were engaged in an intense struggle that focused on Amphipolis but affected affairs throughout the region. The Athenians’inability to recover control of Amphipolis wasdueinpart to the strength of their Olynthian andMacedonian rivals. But it was also dueto the policies that Amphipolis, as the object of prey of the greater powers, consistently pursued to maintain herindependence. These policies enabled herto avoid Atheniandomination throughout thedecade. This is notthefirst time a study of this subject hasbeen undertaken. A. B. West, in his dissertation of 1912,1 argued that the Olynthians tried to rebuild the Chalcidian empire during the 360s. Hesuggested that this attempt began in the mid-370s with expansion on the Chalcidian peninsulas; acquisition of Amphipolis was the next goal, and the Athenian claim to the city at the Congress of Sparta (sic) in 371 brought the two powers into conflict; the actual break came when the Athenians sent Iphicrates to capture Amphipolis atabout thesametime astheassassination of Alexander; the Chalcidians, taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the dynastic struggles in Macedonia to gain influence there, supported Pausanias, who wonoverAnthemus, Therma, Strepsa, andother towns; Eurydice called onIphicrates for help, and he drove Pausanias from the kingdom with the hope of Macedonian assistance against Amphipolis in return; Pelopidas, however, interfered andPtolemymade analliance with theThebans.2 Although West’s contribution hasnotbeenacknowledged bymainstream scholarship,3 there is muchmerit in his argument, particularly in hisemphasis onthe reemergence of theChalcidian Empire andtheimportance of Amphipolis fortheaims of both the Athenians and the Olynthians. But because he did not do a study of the chronology of the period, his narrative overlooks a number of important events alluded to by the orators, Diodorus Siculus, andvarious inscriptions. Consequently, he fails to see howthepolicies of Olynthus were related to those of Athens andthe Macedonian kings. It is thepurpose of this chapter tocomplete the study that West began. 1 2

3

114. West, Chalcidic League 108– 11. West, ibid. 110– Theonly exception, to myknowledge,

is Zahrnt, Olynth 98–104.

1. Events from autumn 371 to spring 365; the command of Iphicrates II–

39

1. Events from autumn 371 to spring 365; the command of Iphicrates II– II– 1a.Theorigins of thewar

Wecan trace the origins of the struggle over Amphipolis to the Congress held at Athens in the autumn of 371, whenthe Athenians stated their intention to recover control of the city. According to Aeschines, King Amyntas of Macedon, having sent a delegate to the meeting, voted in support of the Athenians’claim (Aeschin. 33). 2.32–

It is difficult toevaluate this information. Given theorator’s purposes in telling this story, it is likely that this is a distortion of analready tendentious speech meant tojustify Athenian claims to Amphipolis during thepeace negotiations of 346. We can believe, however, that in 371 Amyntas supported the Athenians, because Xenophon says that all states present at theCongress voted in support of the terms of thepeace except for Elis (Xen. Hell 6.5.1). Badian therefore is surely correct in suggesting that Amphipolis wasnotpresent.4 Olynthus wasprobably noteither, as events to be discussed later will show.5

For nearly two years after the Congress, the Athenians did nothing to bring their claim to fruition because their forces, led by the general Iphicrates, were occupied in defending the Spartans against the Thebans and their allies in the 51). TheAmphipolitans, however, reacted at once Peloponnese (Xen. Hell. 6.5.49– to thedeclaration, andin late 371began looking forallies whowould be interested inkeeping theAthenians atbay. TheOlynthians were theobvious power to turnto: they will have wanted to stem Athenian ambitions in the north, ambitions which their oldenemy, Sparta, supported. Moreover, the Olynthians hadtheir owngoals of hegemony inthenorth. Since thelate 380s, they hadbeen interested in western Thrace, in particular, the mines of Mt. Pangaeum (Xen. Hell. 5.2.17). With the eclipse of Sparta atLeuctra, they were nowfree to pursue these goals. Analliance with Amphipolis, however, meant a breach of the treaty with Amyntas, which specifically forbade friendship with this city (Diod. 15.60.3; Tod no. 111, line 19). Although thatmeant theloss of access toMacedonian timber,6 theOlynthians could notpass uptheopportunity to gaina foothold inThrace. Inthewinter of 371/0, theAmphipolitans andOlynthians heldnegotiations and formed analliance. Wecaninfer that theOlynthians sent forces to Amphipolis but did not install a garrison in the city or intervene in any other way, because Aeschines says that at the time of Iphicrates’ election, i.e., in the spring of 369, inthese critical times theAthenians elected Iphicrates Amphipolis wasautonomous: “ general against Amphipolis, since the Amphipolitans themselves then held their city and enjoyed the free use of their land”(Aeschin. 2.27). When news of the 4 5 6

Badian, ina paper delivered at themeeting of theAssociation of Ancient Historians, May, 1990. 44, points outthat Olynthus hadnotparticipated in the King’s King’s Peace”39– Ibid. Badian, “ The King’s Peace Peace of 387/6. OntheOlynthians andtheKing’s Peace, see R. J. Seager, “ , Athenaeum n.s. 52 (1974) 43. 362 B.C.” andtheBalance of Power inGreece, 386– Tod no. 111, lines 9–14.

40

II. The Warover Amphipolis

alliance reached the Athenians, they could not have been very pleased, but for the moment there was nothing they could do. They needed a large force to move against Amphipolis, and so they had to wait until Iphicrates was finished with operations in the Peloponnese. In 370, Amyntas died andAlexander II came to the throne (Diod. 15.60.3). Although the young king does not seem to have pursued any particular policy regarding Amphipolis, thechange inMacedonian rule hadanimpact onthepolitics of the North Aegean. Alexander focused his energies onexpanding his influence southwards, into Thessaly. Intervening on behalf of the Aleuadae against the tyrants of Pherae in 370, he putgarrisons in Larissa andCrannon. This success was short-lived, however: his forces were notstrong enough to hold thecities, while his control at home was threatened by Ptolemy of Alorus. Pelopidas intervened and forced Alexander to handovertheThessalian cities andmake analliance with him. The king then returned to Pella to reassert his right to rule. Since Ptolemy wasnot easily persuaded, Alexander called onPelopidas to fulfill hisendof theagreement. In the summer of 369, Pelopidas went to Macedonia andreaffirmed Alexander’s position. To ensure his ally in turn would remain loyal to Theban interests, he took as hostages Philip andthirty sons of Macedonian nobles. The Thebans nowhada foothold in Macedonia.7

II–1b. The outbreak of the war

It wasalso inthesummer of 369 that theAthenians were able toturntheir attention to the north. At this time, they appointed Iphicrates as general against Amphipolis (Aeschin. 2.27). This expedition would prove tobeanevenmoredifficult undertaking than they had expected, for not only were Amphipolis andOlynthus allies, but with the recent alliance of Alexander andThebes, the Athenians hadlost their only ally in the north. After making preparations fortheexpedition, Iphicrates setsail forAmphipolis in late September. Aeschines claims in2.28 that thegeneral arrived witha fewships at first, forexamining affairs rather thanforbesieging thecity. Possibly theorator is

exaggerating the small number of ships in order to dramatize Iphicrates’ victory over Pausanias (see below). However, there is reason tobelieve that thegeneral had a small force. He had probably been sent to Amphipolis with a few ships, i.e., with as large a force as could be mustered, and with instructions to hire as many mercenaries as he could afford. But weshould not believe that Iphicrates didnot intend to besiege Amphipolis at this time. The fact that soon after his arrival he hired Charidemus (Dem. 23.149) indicates that the general went there specifically to launch anoffensive against the city.

7

19;forthechronology, see Fordiscussion of these events, see Buckler, Theban Hegemony 117– 43. Foreign Policy”13– Heskel, “

1. Events II–

from autumn 371 to spring 365; the command of Iphicrates

41

II– 1c.Thesuccession struggle inMacedonia During the autumn of 369 and the spring of 368, Iphicrates supervised siege operations at Amphipolis without making muchprogress. That summer his attention was diverted to Macedonia, where the dynastic struggles of the previous year had led to Ptolemy’s assassination of Alexander (Diod. 15.71.1). This situation presented, as was usual in Macedonia, an open invitation to foreign powers to intervene. The Olynthians, eager to expand their sphere of influence in another direction, were the first to take advantage of the opportunity. Pausanias, a member of theroyal house (schol. Aeschin. 2.27 Dilts p.62), proceeded along theThermaic Gulf Coast from Anthemus to Strepsa (Aeschin. 2.27). Anthemus hadbeen under Argead control forgenerations (Hdt. 5.94), andit wasoneof theconcessions Philip would make to the Olynthians when they formed an alliance in approximately 357/6.8 These facts suggest that the Olynthians wanted Anthemus as early as 368, andthat they arranged a deal withPausanias: theywould support hisattempt onthe throne if he agreed to recover Anthemus for them.9 Given Aeschines’ purposes in presenting his account as he does, we need to disengage fact from rhetoric in his narrative ona fewpoints. The first concerns the nature of Pausanias’following. Although theorator stresses that most Macedonians supported the pretender, this simply cannot be true: if they had, Pausanias would not have hada purely Greek army. Second, weshould notfollow most scholars in accepting Aeschines’ statement (2.28) that Eurydice was solely responsible for procuring Iphicrates’intervention.10 Macedonian custom dictated that a male determined matters of domestic andforeign policy. Because both of Eurydice’s surviving sons were minors, Ptolemy hadbecome regent, i.e., an acknowledged ruler, immediately upon Alexander’s death. Aeschines, in fact, refers to Ptolemy as ρ ) only onesection later (2.29). Hehaddeliberately obscured this ο π ο ς ίτ π regent (ἐ point inhis speech to Philip. It wasobviously preferable to make Eurydice responsible for the invitation to Iphicrates, not only because Ptolemy was linked to Alexander’s murder, butmore important, because Eurydice wasPhilip’s mother. It makes better sense to conclude that Ptolemy, or perhaps Ptolemy and Eurydice together, asked forIphicrates’helpbyvirtue of Amyntas’previous alliance withthe Athenians and his special relationship with Iphicrates.11

8 Dem. 6.20; cf. Todno. 158. Theprecise date of this alliance is uncertain. 9 Onthis hypothesis, the Olynthians’ support of Philip’s half-brothers, Arrhidaeus andMenelaus, in 352/1 (Just. 8.3.10), appears all the more dangerous, andthe king’s reaction –namely, theexpeditions of 349 and348–all themoreunderstandable. Philip hadtoeliminate this threat permanently foratleast tworeasons. Obviously, hehadtoprotect hisownposition. Inaddition, having just survived a serious illness in Thrace (Dem. 3.5), he mayhave been thinking of the fact that he could die and leave his wife with a minor son –a situation that was an open

invitation to pretenders. 10 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 2.12; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.182; Geyer, Makedonien 132; Cloché, Histoire 124; Sealey, Demosthenes 78. Borza, Shadow of Olympus 193, attributes this . Hamofficially” action to Eurydice, though he acknowledges that a woman could not rule “ mond, HM2.184, more convincingly argues that Aeschines’statement is rhetorical invention. 11 Aeschines, the only source that says Amyntas hadadopted Iphicrates as his son, does not provide thecontext.

42

II. TheWarover Amphipolis

Finally, Aeschines would like tomakeit appear thatIphicrates simply agreed to Eurydice’s abject request without demanding anything in return, but we should infer that the two powers held negotiations at this time. Iphicrates will have demanded Athenian access to Macedonian natural resources, especially its timber.12 Even more pressing now, however, wasthe need for Macedonian forces at Amphipolis, since the Athenians after nearly a year there hadhad little success. They clearly could not have obtained enough mercenaries from Charidemus, and hadto find forces elsewhere. Ptolemy will have readily metthese demands: hewas notin a position to refuse. After arriving at the Macedonian coast inearly autumn 368, Iphicrates moved against Pausanias, who was probably approaching Pella by this time. Fighting between theAthenian andChalcidian forces ensued. Thehostilities lasted atmosta few weeks, andresulted in Pausanias’defeat andexpulsion. Where the pretender went after this is uncertain. By 360 heappears to have been inThrace, andto have plotted for the Macedonian throne with the help of a Thracian king.13 We may wonder if he first went to Olynthus, which would have been an obvious place for

himto go in 368.

Although Aeschines does not make much of these hostilities, they are, in fact, theearliest evidence wehavefortheoutbreak ofwarbetween Athens andOlynthus. The rest of ourevidence from the orators for this waris just as vague, despite the fact that the conflict was to reach very large proportions in the years that followed. Thereason is clear. By thetime Demosthenes andAeschines began referring to the struggle over Amphipolis in the late 350s, the Olynthians had taken the side of the Athenians against Philip. It would not have been tactful to remind the audience (especially after the destruction of Olynthus in 348) that not long ago this state had

been Athens’worst enemy. By late October 368, after negotiating an alliance with Ptolemy anddealing with Pausanias, Iphicrates returned to the fleet stationed at Amphipolis. Having added Macedonian support to theforces of Charidemus, he should nowhave been ina very goodposition tocapture thecity. Yethewasunsuccessful throughout the tenure of his command in this region, i.e., for almost three years. We need to ask why.

The answer lies in the events that took place in Macedonia after Iphicrates’ departure. In approximately November, Pelopidas arrived in Macedonia with mercenaries to contest Ptolemy’s alliance with Athens. According to Plutarch, Ptolemy hired awayPelopidas’mercenaries; fearing thenameandreputation of thegeneral, however, hesoon surrendered andwelcomed himtoMacedonia; heagreed toguard the throne for the brothers of the dead king and to make an alliance with the 12 On the importance of Macedonian timber for Athens in this period, see Borza, Shadow of 87. Olympus 186– 13 Diod 16.2.6, 3.4. The identity of this king is uncertain. Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.225 n. 1, 54, suggests Cersebleptes as a more likely Philip II”5 3– suggests it was Berisades. Badian, “ possibility. Ineither case, weshould interpret this move, like thatof theChalcidian League, not only as an attempt to gain influence in Macedonia, butalso as a means of curtailing Athenian influence in the region.

II–1. Events from autumn 371 to spring 365; the command of Iphicrates

43

Thebans, andhegave himhis sonPhiloxenus andfifty of the Hetairoi as hostages (Plut. Pel. 27.2– 3). Buckler, accepting this story, suggests that Ptolemy’s change of stance reflects his recognition of political realities. Hehadno interest in acquiring the Boeotian League as anenemy, norintheAthenian presence in Macedonia and Amphipolis; as a result, he pursued a policy in the north that wasfavorable to the Thebans’ interests, i.e., preventing the Athenians from expanding their interests there.14 Although Buckler surely is correct regarding the chronology andpurpose of Pelopidas’ expedition, the rest of his interpretation raises certain problems. It is difficult to believe that Ptolemy did an about-face so quickly, from bribing Pelopidas’mercenaries to welcoming the invading general. We should not take this “ welcome-scene”seriously: it is most likely aninvention by Plutarch, whotried to portray Pelopidas in the most favorable light possible.15 Ptolemy simply did not have theforces to resist Pelopidas inthefirst place. If hehadhadthem, there would have beenabsolutely noreason forhimtoagree toanalliance inwhich theThebans hadthe upper hand. Most likely Plutarch gotthestory backwards: Pelopidas went to Macedonia without many menandbribed away Ptolemy’s mercenaries. The king, unable to resist, made analliance that involved hostages anda garrison consisting of Pelopidas’ troops. Pelopidas could afford to leave his army in Macedonia because he hadtaken hostages to ensure Ptolemy’s loyalty.16 Alternatively, after sold”them to making the treaty, Pelopidas, no longer needing his mercenaries, “ Ptolemy as part of the effort to bolster his position. In either case, as Buckler recognizes,17 Ptolemy, like Alexander, was compelled tomakeanalliance withThebes inorder tostayonthethrone. Presumably as a result of this alliance, thekingwithdrew histroops fromtheAthenian campaign at Amphipolis. But, as would eventually become apparent, after Pelopidas left Macedonia, the king was not especially concerned to support Theban interests in the north. The events of 366 suggest, in fact, that hepursued policies quite independently of theThebans andtheAthenians.

II-1d. Ptolemy, Amphipolis, andthe hostages

Inearly July 366, theAthenians sentTimotheus tobring aidtoAriobarzanes inAsia Minor. Soon after his arrival, Ariobarzanes staged a revolt against the Great King. Under strict orders not to break the Peace, Timotheus withdrew from Asia and besieged Samos, which was garrisoned by the Persian hyparch, Tigranes (Dem. 15.9). Timotheus besieged the island with great success. Hemanaged to capture it after only ten to eleven months of fighting (Isoc. 15.108, 113). If the praise of

22. 14 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 121– 15 Cf., e.g., Plut. Pel. 16.1, 23.4, 33. 16 This would explain whyPelopidas hadnosoldiers withhimwhenhereturned toThessaly soon afterwards and, consequently, whyhewasimprisoned byAlexander of Pherae (Plut. Pel. 27.6). 23. 17 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 122–

44

II. The Warover Amphipolis

Isocrates and Demosthenes is any indication, this was regarded as one of the greatest victories of Timotheus’career.18 Athenian fortunes improved elsewhere inthis period. Intheautumn of 366, the fleet began to make progress at Amphipolis. Thereason forthis improvement after three long years is apparent. As the chronology of the War over Chersonese suggests,19 inJune 366 theembassies of a number of Greek states hadmetwiththe Great King in Susa to resume deliberations on the peace treaty first discussed the previous autumn. Artaxerxes, in response to the demands made by the Athenian ambassadors, removed Amphipolis fromthelist of states guaranteed autonomy and supported the Athenians’claim to thecity (Dem. 19.137). Athenian interests were further bolstered by the fact that Ariobarzanes, who had once before provided funding for their expeditions, sent a second installment of money that summer.20 With the King’s sanction and Ariobarzanes’ money, Iphicrates intensified siege operations at Amphipolis inearly autumn. The Amphipolitans hadbeen able to ward off the Athenians for quite some time, but the combination of Athens andAriobarzanes wastoo much for them to handle. Worried that they would soonbe forced to surrender, inlate autumn orearly winter 366, the Amphipolitans sent ambassadors to Ptolemy asking for analliance. The king seized the opportunity to extend his influence in the north. He sent to Amphipolis anembassy that wasledby a certain Harpalus.21 During the winter of 366/5, thetwopowers held negotiations andformed analliance. Theterms of their treaty clearly recognized the superior position of Ptolemy, for the Amphipolitans gave hostages to Harpalus to convey back to Macedonia (Dem. 23.149). The Amphipolitans’compliance surely indicates thattheybelieved they were extremely close to surrendering to Iphicrates whenthey asked Ptolemy foranalliance. Clearly they viewed control by the king preferable to control by the Athenians. But in view of the likelihood that the Amphipolitans had had an alliance with the Olynthians since the winter of 371/0, we must ask whythey sent to Ptolemy instead. Quite clearly, they wished to keep the Olynthians as well as the Athenians out of their city. TheAmphipolitans musthavebelieved thattheOlynthians’expansionist aims, seen most recently in Macedonia in 368, posed a serious threat to their city’s autonomy. Wecangeta goodideaof theAthenian reaction tothealliance from Aeschines, , andthen whosays first that Ptolemy committed an“ungrateful andheinous crime” (Aeschin. 2.29). that the king “worked against Athens on behalf of Amphipolis”

18 Fortherole of theSamian expedition intheWaroverChersonese, seeChapter IV, Section IV– 1e. 6d. 19 See Chapter III, Section III– 5a. 20 See Chapter III, Section III– 21 This is the only attestation wehave of this Harpalus. Droysen points outthat the name was in theElimiote royal family andsuggests that hewasthesonof Sirrhas andbrother of Derdas and Phila, who was later to marry Philip (J. G. Droysen, Gesch. des Hellenismus, Vol. 1 [2nd ed., Leipzig 1877] 87). The only other Harpalus attested in the fourth century is the son of Machatas, the companion of Alexander (Arr. 3.6.4; cf. H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich, Vol. 2 [Munich 1926] no. 143).

1.Events from autumn 371 to spring 365; the command of Iphicrates II–

45

Theking hadbetrayed hisalliance withtheAthenians, inwhich hehadpromised to help them recover Amphipolis. The Harpalus episode makes it quite clear that Ptolemy broke with Athens notonaccount of his alliance with Thebes, as Buckler suggests,22 butonaccount of his ownexpansionist aims. Furthermore, it raises the

possibility that the king planned to occupy Amphipolis after the Athenians had given upthere. The hostages would have given himjust the leverage he needed to assume control. Ptolemy, however, never got the chance to realize his aims, because he never gained possession of the hostages. After Harpalus left Amphipolis with the hostages, theyencountered theAthenians. According toDemosthenes, Iphicrates “ took” the hostages from Harpalus and gave them to Charidemus: τ ϕ ο ιπ ὺ ςἈμ ο λ ιτ ῶ ν ρ ή ο ικ υ ᾽Ἁρπ ρ η ά ά ςο λ ὓ ρ β τ ςἔδ ο ςπ μ ώ υλα νἸϕ α ὁ υ ω λ κ ά εϕ τ τ ε ινα (Dem. ῷ ὐ τ 23.149). It is worth noting that Demosthenes uses the aorist participle of λ β ά μ ν ω α to describe the manner in which the general acquired the hostages. Because this verb canmean“ to take forcibly”or “ to receive”,23there are twopossible ways of interpreting this action. Iphicrates may have forcibly seized the hostages from Harpalus ashewasreturning to Macedonia. Alternatively, Harpalus, a royal Macedonian in hisownright whocame from anarea that hadoften opposed the Argead kings, mayhave wished to sever ties with Ptolemy andestablish his ownrealm. In that case, he decided to use the hostages to procure support from Iphicrates, who will have eagerly complied. However, since there is no way of knowing which β meaning of λ ά ν μ Demosthenes is using in this passage, it is impossible to say ω α which interpretation is thecorrect one. The Athenians knew, in anycase, although

wedo not.

Regardless of this ambiguity, there can be no doubt that the Amphipolitan hostages presented Iphicrates with the opportunity he hadlong been waiting for. Confident that the surrender of Amphipolis wasnowwithin his grasp, he gave the hostages to Charidemus andperhaps ordered himto take them to Athens. Newsof thehostages reached Athens quickly, certainly within a week. TheAthenians acted at once: they, too, realized that a unique opportunity was at hand. At the next meeting of the Assembly, they passed a decree ordering Iphicrates to send the hostages to Athens (Dem. 23.149). To corroborate his account, Demosthenes has four documents read aloud: the decree concerning the hostages, a deposition, andtwoletters, one from Iphicrates 52). Hisreference totheletters is especialandonefromTimotheus (Dem. 23.151– ly important. Iphicrates’letter will haveconcerned events inwhich hehadanactive part, andthesame holds true forTimotheus’letter. Wecaninfer that Iphicrates sent a letter to Athens saying that he had“taken”the hostages from Harpalus andhad then entrusted them to Charidemus. It is unlikely that Timotheus’ letter concerned all of the events that Demosthenes lists. Probably it included only the most recent ones, i.e., the Athenians’ interception of Charidemus on his way to Amphipolis from Cardia (see below).

23. 22 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 122– ; II, , 1.b: “take by violence, carry off as booty” , I.1, “take hold of” , I, “take” ά ν ω 23 LSJ, s.v. λαμβ “ receive” .

46

II. The Warover Amphipolis

Upon receiving Iphicrates’ letter, the Athenians were convinced that he had made a fatal blunder in entrusting the hostages to Charidemus instead of bringing them to Athens himself. They voted at once todismiss himfrom office andreplace himwith Timotheus, whobythen (i.e., late spring 365) hadcaptured Samos. It was hoped that the illustrious general would complete the siege of Amphipolis just as quickly. Iphicrates left Amphipolis shortly after his dismissal. He probably went directly to the court of Cotys, where he helped the king in his efforts to consolidate

his kingdom.24

Charidemus, meanwhile, was suddenly left unemployed. Since he no longer hada source of income or ties to an Athenian general, he decided to capitalize at once on the opportunity presented by the hostages. The condottiere sold the Amphipolitans back to their compatriots, no doubt for an extortionate sum. The Amphipolitans found it a small price to payfor evading Athenian capture.

2. Events fromsummer 365 to autumn 360; thecommand of Timotheus II– 2a. The alliance of Amphipolis and Olynthus II–

The Amphipolitans’ troubles, however, were far from over. Timotheus, whowas busy settling Athenian cleruchs on Samos,25 haddecided to move against Amphipolis next rather than Chersonese, as originally planned (Dem. 23.150). In needof mercenaries (especially since some of his forces were to be left onSamos), he sent representatives to Charidemus to hire himfor the next round of siege operations. The condottiere, however, refused andwent instead to Cotys with some Athenian triaconters (Dem. 23.149). Anxious to procure aid against Timotheus, the Amphipolitans sent envoys to Olynthus. Their request well suited theOlynthians’goals, andinthesummer of 365

the two states concluded a treaty of alliance. The Olynthians, determined not to repeat their previous mistake, installed a garrison in Amphipolis. However much the Amphipolitans disliked having a garrison in their city, it was preferable to Athenian capture. TheOlynthians realized that, inorder toprevent Timotheus from gaining control of Amphipolis, they would have to obtain additional mercenaries, and so they contacted Charidemus at Cardia andoffered himemployment. As it turned out, Cotys did not need (and therefore was not paying for) Charidemus’ services in Chersonese at this time, and so the condottiere readily accepted the Olynthians’offer. Henever gotthechance to work for them, however. Soon after setting out for Amphipolis, he was apprehended by the Athenians andpersuaded to take upservice with them. It made nodifference to Charidemus whether he fought forthedefense orthecapture of Amphipolis: asfarashewasconcerned, itwasonly

a job.

24 See Chapter IV, Section IV-1f. 25 Heracl. Pont. Politeiai 10.7 (FHG 2.216); Diod. 18.18.9; Str. 14.1.18, p. 638. See Davies, IG “ ii.2 1609”330.

2. Events fromsummer 365 to autumn 360; thecommand of Timotheus II–

47

In Macedonia, meanwhile, Perdiccas assassinated Ptolemy andtook thethrone (Diod. 15.77.1). Hisfirst act of foreign policy wasto form analliance with Athens. Perdiccas wasobviously motivated bythoughts of self-preservation. But the Athenians were nottheonly threat hefaced atthis time. Hemusthave also beenalarmed bythegrowing power of theOlynthians who, after acquiring Amphipolis, might try again togain influence inMacedonia, asthey hadduring thereigns of Amyntas and Ptolemy.26 However unsavory analliance withtheAthenians mayhave been, it was Perdiccas’only wayto stop the Olynthians. Although weare nottold the terms of the alliance, the king must have been obligated to support the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. This is made clear by Aeschines’allusions to the later breach in their relations. In 2.29 hesaysthat “ Perdiccas after taking thethrone warred with Athens onbehalf of Amphipolis” , andin the very next sentence refers to the Athenians as maintaining a good attitude toward the king despite the fact that they hadbeen wronged (2.30).27 2b. Timotheus’Chalcidian campaigns II– After settling affairs at Samos, Timotheus led his fleet to Amphipolis. Even with thesupport of bothCharidemus andPerdiccas, however, hewasunable to wrest the city from Olynthian control. In the realization that continuing the siege would only waste valuable resources, Timotheus decided to try a completely different strategy. Hemade plans to launch a full-scale expedition against the power responsible for this situation, theOlynthians. Amove against theChalcidian cities might findthem denuded of adequate defensive forces andenable the Athenians to capture some of them. Atthe same time, such a move would force theOlynthians to withdraw their garrison from Amphipolis and give the Athenians an opportunity for a decisive attack onthe city. Withthis strategy, Timotheus hoped both to extend control over Chalcidice andto drive the Olynthian troops outof Amphipolis. Early in the spring of 364, Timotheus sailed to Chalcidice. In preparation for operations there, heobtained military andfinancial aidfrom Menelaus. Probably a member of the Pelagonian royal family,28 Menelaus wassupporting the Athenians as a loyal subject of Perdiccas. With his aidTimotheus would be able to launch a massive expedition against theChalcidians. Hewould first seize Torone, andthen move northwards until he reached Potidaea (Diod. 15.81.6). This plan was well

83. 3; Borza, Shadow of Olympus 182– 26 For Amyntas, see Diod. 15.19.2– 2c below. 27 For the breach itself, see Section II– 9. Menelaus’ status: see Ham28 Military and financial aid: IG II2 110 = Tod no. 143, lines 6– mond, HM2.20, whois probably correct inbelieving that Menelaus wasnotking because heis 62 not given this title in the inscription. See also M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens 60– 9. Beloch persuasively argues that this (T56); Papazoglou, Les villes de Macédoine, 278– Menelaus son of Arrhabaeus, citizen of Athens”who was honored in Menelaus is the “ approximately 359 for his services to Athens (SIG 188+ = Tod no. 148; Beloch, Griech. 34; cf. Hammond, HM2.20). 7, followed byTodpp. 133– Gesch.2 3.1.76–

48

II. TheWarover Amphipolis

conceived andbased on the strategic importance of Torone andPotidaea, which waswell recognized (Isoc. 15.108).29 TheAthenian invasion wascause forgreat alarm atOlynthus. Nowthat Perdiccaswasanally of Athens, theOlynthians hadnochoice buttowithdraw their forces from Amphipolis and concentrate their energy on protecting their territory in Chalcidice. They hadto act quickly, before Timotheus took over theentire region. The Olynthian withdrawal from Amphipolis provided the Athenians with the opportunity Timotheus had hoped for. Since he himself was occupied (probably at Torone), in thesummer of 364 hesent Alcimachus toAmphipolis with presumably a small number of land forces, i.e., whatever could be spared. Alcimachus didnot accomplish much, however. Hebecame engaged inhostilities withThracian forces andwasforced to surrender (schol. Aeschin. 2.31 Dilts p.64). Theidentity of these Thracians is unknown. This is rather intriguing, for it is theonly time Thracians are said to have been interested in Amphipolis. Danov suggests that Cotys sent these forces after forming an alliance with the Amphipolitans in 363.30 This theory, however, is ruled out by our chronology, which places the defeat securely in the period whenthe Athenians were supporting Cotys’efforts to consolidate his kingdom.31 More likely, these Thracians were Edonians dwelling in the area near Amphipolis. Since Alcimachus hadbeen sent to Amphipolis without a fleet, hewill have needed to procure supplies. Perhaps he attacked local Thracians, butbecause of inadequate forces wasdefeated. TheAthenians tooknofurther steps atthis point. In the summer of 364, Timotheus captured Torone andthen spent thenext two to three months working his way toward Potidaea. He probably began in the southern part of Pallene andcaptured a number of smaller towns there, e.g., Scione andMende. AsXenophon’s version of the speech of theAcanthian ambassador at Sparta in 382 indicates, thecities onPallene were likely to feel the greatest hatred for Olynthus andtherefore would be the most inclined to give over control to the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 5.2.15). Timotheus then moved against Potidaea, which he besieged over the course of the autumn and winter of 364/3. He paid for the campaign with funds he himself hadprovided as well as with tribute from the towns he had conquered in Thrace (Isoc. 15.113). Potidaea surrendered in the spring of 363 (Diod. 15.81.6), andprobably soonafterwards theAthenians installed acleruchy. We have evidence only for the cleruchy which they sent at the Potidaeans’ request in 361,32 but the model for multiple cleruchies to one city is provided by Samos, which after its capture wassettled three different times.33

29 30

31 32 33

Polyaenus 3.10.15 preserves thestory of howtheToroneans came toterms withTimotheus asa result of histactics, butwecannot judge thedifficulty of thesiege fromthis evidence. It simply illustrates the general’s talent for siege operations. Danov, Altthrakien 340. 1f. 3dandChapter IV, Section IV– See Chapter I, Section I– 2c below. See Section II– Timotheus installed cleruchs upon capturing Samos in 365. (See Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.194.) The scholiast onAeschines’speech Against Timarchus says that a cleruchy wassent to Samos in 361/0 (schol. Aeschin. 1.53 Dilts p. 27), andPhilochorus says another wassent in 352/1 (Philoch. FGrH 328 F 154).

2. Events from summer 365 to autumn 360; thecommand of Timotheus II–

49

Intheautumn of 364, theAthenian fleet wasneeded inthe Hellespont as well. Philiscus, intheattempt toexpand hisinfluence inthis region, hadrecently begun a siege of Cyzicus, and the inhabitants called on Timotheus for help.34 Again reluctant to leave operations on Chalcidice, he sent forces with another leader, whose identity is unknown to us.35 After settling affairs at Potidaea, Timotheus probably captured one or two additional Chalcidian cities (Isoc. 15.113). Since Olynthus was chiefly responsible for the Chalcidian League’s opposition to Athenian aims in the north, one would expect that it was his ultimate objective. Although normally it is dangerous to make inferences ex silentio, the failure of the sources to mention the siege of a city as important as Olynthus suggests that Timotheus didnotmake the attempt. Hemust have decided that he hadneither the military northe financial resources necessary for so great anundertaking. In early 362, after completing operations on Chalcidice, Timotheus sent a report to Athens which wasread outto theAssembly.36 Atthis time, the Athenians commended Menelaus for his military andfinancial contributions to the waragainst the Chalcidians andAmphipolitans, andvoted himvarious honors (Tod 143, lines 22). They also instructed “ the generals whoare around Macedo19, 21– 14, 18– 9– ]κ εδ ) –i.e., Timotheus and ν ο ία [ὶ Μ ν α ο ὺ τ α ο ὺ ερ ςτ ςὄν ςπ ο ὺ ςστρατηγ nia”(τ Callisthenes –to give Menelaus aid should he need it (line 15).37 One would like to know whether these instructions specified any particular kind of assistance or if this wassimply a wayof indicating that the Athenians would support Menelaus in the wayhe had supported them. The dearth of evidence makes it impossible to say. 2c. Thecommand of Callisthenes; the alliance of Amphipolis andPerdiccas; II– Callisthenes’Macedonian expedition

Meanwhile, despite Alcimachus’ defeat, the Athenians were anxious to try for Amphipolis while it was unprotected by a garrison. Since it was evident that Timotheus would notbeable togothere anytime soon, theydecided tosendanother general against thecity. Inthespring of 363, they elected Callisthenes general and gave himthe Amphipolitan command. Preparations were begun at once, so that he could set sail as soon as heentered office that summer. In early July, Callisthenes launched operations against Amphipolis. Without the encumbrance of a garrison, the siege progressed well over the next several 34 Dem. 23.142; Diod. 15.81.6. See Chapter IV, Section IV–1g for discussion. 35 See Chapter IV, Section IV-1g. suggests that Timotheus sent a letter rather than reported to the Assembly ω ίν ϕ α ο 36 Theverb ἀπ . ω ίν α ϕ ο inperson. L. S. J., s. v. ἀπ [ὶ ερ α ςπ τ ςὄν ὺ ο ὺ ςτ ο ο ὺ ςστρατηγ ὶ that τ ερ 37 It is clear from the use of the preposition π . Wemayinfer ν ία ν ο εδ κ α ὶΜ νis nottechnical terminology, which would be ἐπ ία ν ο εδ ]κ Μ α that these generals were appointed to a different region, probably Amphipolis, since it was nearby and the Athenians were quite active there in this period. In that case, the generals referred to in the inscription mustbe Timotheus andCallisthenes.

50

II. The War over Amphipolis

months. It appeared that the Amphipolitans would soon be forced to surrender. Little did Callisthenes anticipate, however, that the Amphipolitans would follow the same course of action they hadfollowed whenonthebrink of surrendering to Iphicrates three years earlier. Realizing thatthey would notsurvive anentire winter without supplies, they decided to obtain outside aid. Since the Olynthians were too busy fighting Timotheus on Chalcidice to be of any help, the Amphipolitans sent ambassadors to Perdiccas. Like Ptolemy, Perdiccas waseager for anopportunity to assert control over this prized city. In approximately February 362, they formed an alliance andPerdiccas installed a garrison in Amphipolis. The Amphipolitans were hardly fond of garrisons andtried to dowithout them as much as possible. Their request to Perdiccas indicates what steps they would take to keep the Athenians out of their city. Callisthenes knew that it would nowbe impossible to gain control of Amphipolis. Hissituation wassurely analogous to Timotheus’situation after the Olynthians hadinstalled a garrison inAmphipolis inthesummer of 365. Perhaps, then, it is not coincidental that Callisthenes decided to retreat from Amphipolis andlaunch an attack on the cities of Macedonia, just as Timotheus had attacked the cities of Chalcidice. If all went as planned, Perdiccas would be forced to withdraw the garrison from Amphipolis andcede thecoastal cities to theAthenians. Callisthenes sailed at once to Macedonia and launched operations against Perdiccas. Inlate spring 362, they madea truce. Ouronlyevidence forthese events comes fromAeschines’account of thespeech hedelivered toPhilip during theFirst Andafterwards I spoke about Ptolemy...and thenhowPerdiccas, Embassy in346: “ after he took the throne, fought against ourcity on behalf of Amphipolis. AndI claimed that, although you were wronged, you maintained your friendly attitude, saying that when you defeated Perdiccas in war in the generalship of Callisthenes, youmade a truce with him, always expecting just treatment in return. AndI tried to remove the slander, showing that the Demos putCallisthenes to death, notbecause 30). of the truce with Perdiccas, butfor other reasons”(Aeschin. 2.29– In evaluating this account, we should begin with the truce. It was obviously considered extremely injurious to Athenian interests, for it led to Callisthenes’ dismissal andconviction. Asthechronology demonstrates, thegarrison thatPerdiccas installed in Amphipolis remained in the city for the rest of his reign. It is a logical inference that the truce allowed Perdiccas to retain control of Amphipolis. In that case, it is highly unlikely that Callisthenes defeated Perdiccas as Aeschines asserts. This is butoneof thefictions heweaves inanattempt todissociate thetruce from Callisthenes’conviction; the Athenian generosity (philanthropia) in granting the truce is another. We sawthat Aeschines lied earlier in this account: he made Perdiccas andPhilip outtobelittle children atthetime of Iphicrates’intervention in Macedonia (2.28), although they must have been in their teens.38 Aeschines surely did not say any of these things to Philip, who knew the truth; most likely, he invented these embellishments after thefact to impress theAthenians.

2a. 38 See Chapter I, Section I–

2. Events from summer 365 toautumn 360; thecommand of Timotheus II–

51

The circumstances for the truce are nowapparent. After only a fewmonths of hostilities, Callisthenes realized that it would be very difficult to defeat Perdiccas. The general could not have hadmany troops with him, for most of the Athenian forces were onChalcidice andChersonese. Wemaysuggest that, rather than risk overwhelming defeat, Callisthenes decided to ask Perdiccas for a truce, which would buytime until Timotheus wasfree tobring hisarmyoverfromChalcidice. In these circumstances, Perdiccas will have dictated the terms of the truce. Callisthenes thus wasforced to accept theking’s claim to Amphipolis. News of the truce reached Athens a fewdays later. The Athenians in a rage dismissed Callisthenes from the command. They also dismissed Ergophilus, who hadrecently lost Sestus andCrithote toMiltocythes.39 Bothmenreturned toAthens andwere brought totrial, Callisthenes onedayandErgophilus thenext(Arist. Rhet. 1380b 10 ff.). According to Demosthenes, Ergophilus wascharged with “letting go of Thrace and the outposts”(Dem. 19.180).40 We may infer by analogy that Callisthenes was charged with something similar, i.e., letting go of Amphipolis.41 Aristotle says that Callisthenes wascondemned, but that Ergophilus was acquitted because the Athenians had spent their anger in the first trial. In all probability, Ergophilus managed to escape conviction because hehadtried to conserve Athenianresources.42 Callisthenes, by contrast, haddone the unpardonable: he hadgiven away Amphipolis. Determined to bring Perdiccas to his knees, the Athenians decided to resume operations in Macedonia. Fortunately, Timotheus was nowavailable, having recently completed operations onChalcidice. Inlate spring 362, hesetsail, andover the course of the next few months captured the cities of Methone andPydna. No doubt the general would have liked to remain inMacedonia until Perdiccas surrendered, butvarious crises in the Hellespont demanded his attention. In the autumn, Timotheus sailed with forces to Proconnesus to defend it from the Cyzicenes.43 Timotheus’ absence gave the Olynthians the perfect opportunity to reassert control in Chalcidice. In the spring of 361, they made preparations to gain possession of Potidaea. Panic-stricken, thePotidaeans sent anembassy to Athens inMay asking for cleruchs to reinforce those previously stationed in thecity. In response, theAthenians voted a decree providing fora second settlement of cleruchs.44 Since Athens’ forces were concentrated at Amphipolis, this was the easiest way to 6: oἱ maintain control of Potidaea. The city officials of the Potidaeans (lines 5– ἥ κ ο ), rather thanthepolis, sent the ν ς τ ]-[ί]α κ τ ιδ α ε ῶ ν Π ο τ ] ἐ[κ ο ρ ςδημ ὰ τ σ ία α ι[π embassy. The useof this term is unusual andsuggests that Athenian cleruchs were involved in the decision to send the delegation to Athens. Thus Potidaea, like 39 See Chapter IV, Section IV–1h. 40 As the chronology of his command indicates, he had failed to stop Miltocythes from gaining 4h. control of Sestus andCrithote. See Chapter III, Section III– 41 The sources for the trials of both generals arecollected in Hansen, Eisangelia nos. 85 and86. 64. See also Develin, Athenian Officials 263– 4h. 42 See Chapter III, Section III– 7a. 43 [Dem.] 50.5; see Chapter III, Section III– 44 IG II21, 114 = Tod no. 146.

52

II. TheWarover Amphipolis

Amphipolis, usedintervention byonestate toavoid capture byanother. Forobvious reasons, the Potidaeans preferred Athenian control, which, of course, the Amphipolitans wished to avoid at all cost. The Potidaeans managed to keep the Olynthians outof their city –for thetime being, at anyrate.45 The Olynthians were not the only power to take advantage of Timotheus’ absence. In the autumn of 362, Perdiccas began efforts to regain control of the Macedonian coastline. Bythefollowing autumn, hehadrecovered Methone ([Dem.] 50.46). He did not, however, recover Pydna (Dem. 1.9; Diod. 16.8.3). In late summer 360, the Illyrians invaded Macedonia andkilled Perdiccas and4,000 of his troops.46 It maywell be that the invasion forced the king to abandon efforts on the coast. Although Perdiccas failed to rid Macedonia of Athenian influence, he had achieved considerable success intheareaof foreign policy: hehadtriumphed inthe Warover Amphipolis. Despite the inferiority of his forces, hewasable to maintain control of thecity for approximately three anda half years, a feat which neither the Athenians andOlynthians could ever match.

45 In 356, Philip captured Potidaea and, after razing it, handed theterritory over to theOlynthians (Dem. 6.20; [Dem.] 7.10; Diod. 16.8.4).

46 This date is based oncalculations which putPhilip’s accession in approximately October 360. 45. , 44– See Heskel, “Philip II andArgaios”

PART II. THE WAR OVER CHERSONESE, 368– 360 B.C. CHAPTER III. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR OVER CHERSONESE Establishing thechronology of theWaroverChersonese is a major undertaking, far more difficult than establishing the chronology of the Warover Amphipolis. The Chersonesian War involved many more powers andindividuals in the Greek and non-Greek world, but the sources provide even fewer secure dates for its major

events. Moreover, it was intricately connected to the equally complex Great Satraps’ Revolt, the chronology of which has never been thoroughly understood. Working with the few anchors that do exist, we will attempt to date first the parameters of theconflict andthen theevents of theintervening period.

III–1.The outbreak of the Warover Chersonese

The first problem that confronts us is thedating of thebeginning of theWarover

Chersonese. This is more difficult to establish than the date of the outbreak of the Amphipolitan War, for whereas Aeschines provides a secure date of autumn 371 fortheAthenians’claim toAmphipolis, nosuchsource exists fordating their claim to Chersonese. Wecannot assume that they proclaimed their intention to recover Chersonese attheCongress atAthens. Rather, wemustdetermine thedate fromthe evidence concerning Athenian activity intheregion inthe360s. We begin with Demosthenes, whose speech Against Aristocrates is ourmajor source forthechronology of theChersonesian War. Inhisaccount of Charidemus’ general against Amphipolis andChercareer, hesays that Timotheus wassent as “ sonese” .1This statement provides a terminus ante quemfor the Warover Chersonese, for it indicates that the Athenians haddecided to recover their territory in Chersonese bythetime Timotheus wasappointed toreplace Iphicrates inthenorth in the spring or early summer of 365.2 Corroboration is provided by Demosthenes’ to take up the War against reference a few lines later to Timotheus’ decision “ Amphipolis before theWaragainst Chersonese”(Dem. 23.150), a decision which wedated to thesame period.3 Timotheus could have hadthis decision to makeonly if the Athenians hadalready voted to wage warover Chersonese. This interpretation also makes sense in light of Cotys’actions in that period. Aswehave seen, in the spring of 365, theking hired Charidemus in anticipation of warinChersonese.4

1

2 3 4

2b. 50.Forthetext, seeChapter I, Section I– Dem. 23.149– 2b. See Chapter I, Section I–

3a. See Chapter I, Section I– 3a. Dem. 23.149; see Chapter I, Section I–

54

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

Demosthenes also provides a terminus post quem for when the Athenians actually sent forces to the region. His claim that Charidemus hired himself outto the Olynthians at Amphipolis after seeing that he “could do no harm”to the Athenians atChersonese (Dem. 23.150) implies that theAthenians hadnotyetsent forces to Chersonese. Since, as we have seen, Charidemus took upemployment with the Olynthians in late summer 365,5 the first Athenian expedition to Chersonese belongs at some point after that.

2. Charidemus’later career III– 2a. Charidemus’letter andrelated events; thecommand of Cephisodotus III– 56, Demosthenes goes on to give an account In sections 153– Charidemus’career:

of the latter

part

of

After time hadpassed andthe waragainst Cotys wasalready going on, he sent a letter to you (rather, nottoyou, buttoCephisodotus: being well aware of whathehaddone, hefully realized that hecould notdeceive ourcity). In this letter hepromised torecover Chersonese forAthens, having decided to doeverything to thecontrary. Youmust hear whathappened concerning this letter (for indeed it is nota long story) andobserve this man’s character, especially howhehas treated youfrom thebeginning. Since hewasdischarged from theservice of Timotheus at that time, hewithdrew fromAmphipolis andcrossed over toAsia. Onaccount of therecent arrest of Artabazus by Autophradates, he [Charidemus] hired outhis army andhimself to the brothersin-law of Artabazus. After he had exchanged pledges, he held his oaths in light regard and broke them. Since the inhabitants of the land were off their guard onthe assumption that they were dealing with a friend, he seized their towns, Scepsis, Cebren, andIlium. After taking control of these strongholds, he experienced a misadventure of the sort that not even an ordinary man, let alone one whoclaims to be a general, would have failed to recognize. For although hehadnofortified position whatsoever onthecoast, normeans forproviding food for his soldiers, nor food in the towns, he remained within the walls instead of looting them and leaving, whenhewasdetermined to inflict harm. Artabazus hadappeared onthescene, after he hadbeen released byAutophradates andhadcollected forces. Hehadsufficient supplies from Upper Phrygia, Lydia, andPaphlagonia, since they were friendly, whereas Charidemus hadno other option butto face a siege. Realizing whattrouble hewasinandconcluding that he would be defeated by famine, if bynothing else...Knowing this hesent theletter to you, which it is worth your while to hear. Hewanted to obtain triremes from youandmake a safe escape from Asia, by means of a promise to recover Chersonese for youandbecause it seemed to himthat Cephisodotus, asanenemy of Cotys andIphicrates, wanted this.

63 can then be summarized as The events that Demosthenes narrates in 23.157– follows: Memnon and Mentor, advising Artabazus that he could not stop the Athenians from bringing Charidemus to Chersonese, persuaded himto release the

condottiere under truce; Charidemus crossed over from Abydus to Sestus, which Cotys held; hiring himself out to Cotys again, he besieged Crithote and Elaeus; the people of Abydus andSestus knewof Charidemus’intentions towork forCotys, for they received himin their cities. As proof of these events, Demosthenes has four letters readaloud: theonefromCharidemus andthree fromgarrison commanders in 5

3b. See Chapter I, Section 1–

III– 2. Charidemus’ later career

55

Chersonesian cities. Hethen continues with hisaccount: Python killed Cotys, who was the Athenians’ enemy; Cersebleptes andthe other sons of Cotys were little boys; Charidemus hadacquired control overaffairs because hewaspresent andhad a force; Cephisodotus had arrived as general, as had the triremes, which were supposed to rescue Charidemus whenhis release wasindoubt. In evaluating Demosthenes’ account, we begin by noting that he served as Cephisodotus’trierarch ontheexpedition referred to in section 163; whenCephisodotus wasbrought totrial, Demosthenes wasoneof hisprosecutors (Aeschin. 3.51– 52 and schol. Dilts pp. 115–16). Clearly, then, the orator was especially well acquainted with the events he relates here, and so his account of Charidemus’ actions is likely to be accurate, though hostile to Cephisodotus. Weturn nowto the

events themselves. Demosthenes refers to a great many events here butdoes notprovide specific dates foranyof them, nodoubt because they were known tohisaudience. Hismajor point in this part of his account is that Charidemus sent a letter to Cephisodotus to deceive the Athenians into sending him aid; consequently, this is the one event which the orator attempts to date. Charidemus sent the letter after a substantial 151–andthe interval hadpassed –i.e., since theevents described in sections 149– warwithCotys wasalready inprogress (23.153). Since, aswehave seen, theevents 151 belong in 365,6 the letter belongs at some point after this; by of sections 149– this time, the Athenians were at war with Cotys. This information is not very helpful, for Demosthenes does not say explicitly how long after 365 Charidemus sent the letter, or when the warwith Cotys began.7 However, the account provides twoother hints that point to a date: first, Charidemus sent theletter toCephisodotus 56); andsecond, Cephisodotus wasgeneral toobtain aidagainst Artabazus (23.153– when he went to Chersonese with triremes to bring Charidemus aid (23.163). Clearly, Charidemus wrote to Cephisodotus in particular because he had been elected general and given the command against Chersonese; in response to the letter, Cephisodotus sailed with the fleet to bring Charidemus aid. This means that Charidemus sent the letter after Cephisodotus was elected general andbefore he went to the Hellespont. We can narrow down the date of the letter a bit by noting an obvious fact. Cephisodotus set out to bring aid to Charidemus because the Athenians hadpassed a decree instructing him to do so. Therefore, it must be after Cephisodotus entered office that he received the letter and the Athenians passed the decree. We thus arrive at the following sequence: Cephisodotus waselected general andgiven the Chersonesian command; he began his term as general; Charidemus wrote to Cephisodotus to obtain aid against Artabazus; Cephisodotus received the letter and reported on it; the Athenians passed the decree instructing Cephisodotus to bring aidto Charidemus; Cephisodotus set sail forthe Hellespont. It is possible to establish approximate dates for these events, because the sources indicate clearly whenCephisodotus held the Chersonesian command. The

6 7

2c. 2b andI– See Chapter I, Sections I– For the date of Charidemus’ letter, see below. For discussion of when the war with Cotys 4j below. began, see Section III–

56

III. The Chronology of theWarover Chersonese

scholiast on Aeschines’ speech Against Ctesiphon says that Cephisodotus was general in 360/59 (schol. Aeschin. 3.51 Dilts p. 115). According to Demosthenes, he was dismissed from his command as a result of his truce with Charidemus, which they made after seven months of fighting (Dem. 23.165– 67). Although this figure is at best approximate (see below), it is certain that Cephisodotus held the command against Chersonese for only one year, 360/59. Demosthenes does not indicate any irregularities regarding Cephisodotus’ assumption of the command; presumably, he entered office at the normal time, i.e., at the beginning of the archon-year, which in 360/59 was 1 or 2 July.8 Therefore, Charidemus’ letter and the other events in Demosthenes’account belong after this point. In order to date these events more precisely, we must first establish when Cephisodotus set out to bring Charidemus aid. Demosthenes indicates in 23.163 that the general set sail with Athenian triremes. The fleet could notsail during the season of the Etesian winds, which blew from approximately 28 July to 20 September.9 This means that there were twopossible times whenCephisodotus could have set out, before the endof July or after the third week of September. If he left before the end of July, he had to make certain he arrived at the Hellespont before the 28th or so; since the voyage took three to four days, hewould have hadto leave Athens by approximately 24 July. In that case, theletter, thedecree, andthe preparation of the fleet would have to be dated to 5 to 24 July, a period of less than three weeks. We need to see if this is possible. Charidemus wrote to Cephisodotus because hewasintrouble, andso it stands toreason that heurged Cephisodotus tocome assoonaspossible. Thecondottiere’s promise to recover Chersonese for Athens wasquite a powerful inducement. Most likely, the Athenians responded to the letter in the very next Assembly meeting, and passed thedecree with theintention that Cephisodotus set sail atonce, i.e., assoon asthefleet could beprepared andconditions were favorable forsailing. Taking into account thefact thattheAssembly metapproximately fourtimes ineachprytany, or slightly less often than once a week,10 we should put the enactment of the decree at most a week or so after the arrival of the letter. In estimating the length of time required to prepare the fleet, we should note the inscription of 325/4 concerning Athenian preparations for founding a colony in the Adriatic. In the interest of sending outcolonists as soonaspossible, thedecree instructs thetrierarchs tobring their ships along thejetty before thetenth of Munichion andhave them readied for 74, andRhodes, Commentary 537. For discussion of 8 See Pritchett, “Attic STRATEGOI”469– 3e. According to how the beginning of the archon-year is dated, see Chapter I, Section I– Bickerman, Chronology 119, the first newmoon after the summer solstice in 360 occurred on 30 June. The year probably began oneto twodays later, on 1 or 2 July. 9 See Badian andHeskel, “Aeschines”266 n. 10. 10 [Arist.] Athn. Pol. 43.3. This matter is much disputed and cannot be discussed here. See 70, and “When Did the , GRBS 18 (1977) 43– Hansen, “ HowOften Did the Ekklesia Meet?” How Often did the 50; E. M. Harris, “ , GRBS 23 (1982) 331– Athenian Ekklesia Meet?” 77; and Hansen, “HowOften Did the , CQ N. S. 36 (1986), 363– Athenian Assembly Meet?” 50. All of Hansen’s articles can be , GRBS 28 (1987) 35– Athenian Ekklesia Meet? A Reply” found in his book, TheAthenian Ekklesia. A Collection of Articles (Copenhagen 1983).

2. Charidemus’later career III–

57

sailing; rewards are to be given to the first three to doso; the herald of the Boule is to proclaim their names attheThargelia, i.e., ontheseventh of Thargelion.11 Inthis

particular situation, speed wasessential, andthe ships were docked alongside the jetty from 10 Munichion until 7 Thargelion, i.e., approximately a month. By analogy, preparations of Cephisodotus’ fleet will have taken at least four weeks. The decree and preparations thus require a minimum of five weeks. Even if Cephisodotus received the letter in the first week of his term, there wasnotenough time forall of these actions tohave occurred before theadvent of theEtesians inlate July. It is therefore virtually certain that Cephisodotus setsail from Athens after the winds died downin late September. Wecan nowaddanother event to this series. Demosthenes says repeatedly in sections 153 to 161 that Charidemus did not intend to live up to his promise to recover Chersonese for the Athenians; rather, he intended all along to return to Cotys’service. Demosthenes wascertainly notin a position to knowCharidemus’ intentions. It is telling, however, that the people of Abydus and Sestus, both of which at this time were hostile to Athens, admitted the condottiere into their respective cities. That seems to indicate that by the time Charidemus arrived at Abydus, hehadalready agreed to workforCotys. It is a logical inference that when Charidemus wrote to Cephisodotus for aid, he wrote to Cotys as well. In that case, we should date Charidemus’ letter to Cotys to the same period as his letter to

Cephisodotus.

Ournext task is to date theevents listed in sections 158 to 163–Charidemus’ truce with Artabazus andrelease, thejourney from Ilium to Chersonese, Charidemus’taking up service with Cotys, the launching of the sieges of Crithote and Elaeus, Cotys’ assassination, and Charidemus’ taking charge of the kingdom on Cersebleptes’ behalf. We begin by noting that since Charidemus launched the sieges onCotys’behalf, the king must have been murdered after the sieges began; Charidemus, learning of the assassination, will have left operations at Crithote and Elaeus to take charge of the kingdom. Demosthenes’ ordering of these events, therefore, must be correct. All of theevents in this series belong after Charidemus sent theletter toCephisodotus andbefore thegeneral arrived at theHellespont, i.e., in the period of early July to late September 360. In order to date the events in Asia Minor and Thrace more precisely, it is necessary to correlate them with events in Athens, namely, the enactment of the decree concerning Charidemus, andthelaunching of Cephisodotus’expedition. We begin with two questions central to this chronology: when did Artabazus release Charidemus, andwhendidtheAthenians learn of hisrelease? According to Demosthenes, Artabazus released Charidemus under truce because Memnon andMentor convinced him that he would not be able to stop the Athenians from bringing the

mercenary captain over to Chersonese (Dem. 23.157). Demosthenes’ statement – clearly indicates that Artabazus made a truce with whatever thetruth of its details – Charidemus andreleased himafter learning of the Athenian decree. Hewill have 199. Onthedate of theThargelion, see H.W. Parke, TheFestivals of the 11 IG II2 1629, lines 174– Athenians (Ithaca 1977) 146.

58

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

done so at once in order to dissuade the Athenians from intervening in his affairs. The truce andthe release, therefore, belong perhaps a week or so after theenactment of the decree. Artabazus andCharidemus were probably engaged in negotia-

tions during the weeks prior to the truce. The order of events so far is as follows: Charidemus sent letters to Cephisodotus and Cotys; the Athenians passed the decree instructing Cephisodotus to bring aidto Charidemus; Artabazus, learning of thedecree, made a truce with Charidemus andreleased him; Charidemus left Asia for Chersonese. We nowturn to the question of when the Athenians learned of Charidemus’ release. Demosthenes again provides clues to the answer. Referring to a letter which the garrison commander of Crithote sent to the Athenians, he says: “after Charidemus, whohadpromised to recover the lost fortresses, crossed [the straits], the garrison commander of Crithote said that the city wasin greater danger than before”(23.161). Thegarrison commander clearly sentthis letter whenCharidemus wasontheverge of attacking Crithote, after hehadcrossed from Abydus to Sestus. Notably, Charidemus didnot pass through any pro-Athenian cities on the wayfrom Ilium to Sestus –i.e., cities that would have notified theAthenians of hisrelease, or of his plans to attack their Chersonesian holdings. Indeed, thepeople of Abydus and Sestus supported Charidemus inthisendeavor, asDemosthenes makes clear (23.159– 60). It wasonly after the mercenary captain’s arrival onChersonese, i.e., at Sestus, that the Athenians can have received word of his movements. Presumably, the garrison commander learned of Charidemus’presence inSestus immediately after his arrival, and notified the Athenians at once. Since the commander’s letter reached Athens ina fewdays, theAthenians learned that Charidemus hadtaken up service with Cotys a fewdays after the mercenary captain’s arrival at Sestus. Demosthenes does not say when Charidemus arrived at Sestus. He does, however, provide another useful piece of information: whenCephisodotus arrived attheHellespont, hewasa friend of Charidemus andthefleet hebrought wasmeant to help him; Charidemus, however, treated Cephisodotus as an enemy from the 65). Cephisodotus setsail moment theAthenian arrived atPerinthus (Dem. 23.163– from Athens withtheintention of bringing aidto Charidemus in Asia Minor andof obtaining his aidin recovering Chersonese. If the Athenians hadlearned before the fleet’s departure that Charidemus was working for Cotys, the Assembly surely would have instructed Cephisodotus totreat Charidemus asanenemy rather thanas a friend. Therefore, it must be after Cephisodotus’ departure that the Athenians learned that Charidemus hadgone to Chersonese andhadtaken upemployment with Cotys. The order of these events thus is as follows: the Athenians passed the decree; Cephisodotus set sail; the Athenians learned that Charidemus hadgone to Chersonese andhadtaken upservice withCotys. We return nowto the source of the Athenians’ information, the letter of the garrison commander at Crithote. Quite clearly, he wrote not only to inform the Athenians of the impending siege, butto obtain aidagainst it. There would have been no need for the garrison commander to send this letter if Cephisodotus had already arrived with the fleet in the Hellespont. Wecan safely say, therefore, that the garrison commander sent the letter to Athens before Cephisodotus reached

2. Charidemus’later career III–

59

Chersonese. It took about three to four days to sail from Athens to the Hellespont.12 That means that the garrison commander sent the letter to Athens noearlier than three days before Cephisodotus set sail andnolater than three days afterwards. We can narrow this downa bit. If the garrison commander wrote to Athens as early as three days before Cephisodotus set sail, there would have been as much as six or seven days’ time between his sending the letter and Cephisodotus’ arrival at Chersonese. If, however, thecommander wrote as late as three days after Cephisodotus set sail, there would have been only onedaybefore the Athenians’arrival at Chersonese, clearly not enough time for all the events in Demosthenes’ list, for which weshould allow a minimum of a fewdays. Thecommander, therefore, wrote to Athens no later than three or four days before Cephisodotus’ arrival at Chersonese, i.e., nolater than thedayheset sail from Athens. Since Cephisodotus set sail very soonafter 20 September, thegarrison commander wrote totheAthenians very soon after 20 September as well. He wrote immediately after hearing of Charidemus’arrival inSestus, andsowecandate this event tothesameday(oratmost, the

day before) the commander wrote to Athens. Ourdating of the garrison commander’s letter provides the basis for the dating of Charidemus’attacks onCrithote andElaeus, Cotys’assassination, andCharidemus’taking charge of the kingdom. Since these events all occurred after the garrison-commander wrote to Athens and before Cephisodotus reached Chersonese, they belong in the period of 22 to 26 September. These dates are at best approximate, because wecannot knowprecisely whentheEtesians abated that year and when Cephisodotus set sail. But it is perfectly possible that the events in question all occurred within three to four days. As noted earlier, it must have been immediately after hearing of theassassination that thecondottiere left the sieges to take charge of affairs. Hemayhave onlyjust launched thesieges whenhereceived thenews. There is evidence that Charidemus at some point married thedaughter of Cersebleptes.13 It is reasonable to infer that they concluded the marriage-alliance whenCharidemus took charge of thekingdom in late September. We can now date the events that precede the garrison commander’s letter: Charidemus’journey from Ilium to Sestus, andbefore that, his release byArtabazus. The trip from Ilium to Sestus will have taken no longer than a few days, perhaps two to three to go from Ilium to Abydus, andless than a day to cross over to Sestus. Since the journey belongs in the period just prior to the garrison commander’s letter, it should be dated to just before 21 or 22 September, i.e., to approximately 17 to 20 September. The condottiere no doubt went straight to Chersonese after making the truce with Artabazus. Wecan therefore date the truce andCharidemus’release to mid-September.

12 Casson estimates the average sailing speed of a fleet under sail to be 2 to 3 knots in favorable winds and 1 to 1 1/2 knots in unfavorable winds; the voyage of a fleet of triremes alone was faster than that of a mixed fleet, and averaged 4.5 knots per hour (L. Casson, Ships and 96). The voyage from Athens to Seamanship in the Ancient World [Princeton 1971] 292– Chersonese is approximately 230 nautical miles; if thefleet (presumably all triremes) sailed for fifteen hours perdayat4 knots, it tookjust under four (3.8) days to reach Chersonese. 13 Fordiscussion, seeChapter IV, n.49.

60

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

This discussion enables ustodateCharidemus’letters andtheAthenian decree. As we established earlier, news of the decree prompted Artabazus to release Charidemus. If therelease belongs inmid-September andit took perhaps a fewdays for the news of the decree to reach Artabazus, we should put the decree in the second week of September. Going back one step further, we can estimate that Cephisodotus received Charidemus’ letter no more than a week or so before the decree, therefore, in the first week of September. Charidemus sent the letter to Cephisodotus (andtheletter to Cotys, also) perhaps a fewdaysearlier, attheendof August or beginning of September. Thedating of the letter makes sense in light of Charidemus’aims: hewanted theAthenians tosendaidatonce, andwaswell aware that they could notdoso before theEtesians abated in late September. To sumup. In the spring of 360, the Athenians elected Cephisodotus general andsoon afterwards appointed himtotheChersonesian command. Inlate August or early September, Charidemus, trapped in Ilium, wrote to Cephisodotus asking for aidandpromising to help the Athenians recover Chersonese; at thesame time, he wrote to Cotys asking for aidandemployment. In response to Charidemus’ letter, theAthenians inthesecond weekof September voted tosendCephisodotus tobring aid to Charidemus. Artabazus learned of the decree about a week later, in midSeptember, andreleased Charidemus under truce. Themercenary captain left Ilium without delay and, crossing the straits via Abydus, arrived at Sestus a few days later. Atthis time, hetook upservice withCotys andmadepreparations tobesiege Crithote andElaeus. Learning of Charidemus’preparations, thegarrison commandersof Crithote andElaeus wrote onapproximately 21or22 September toinform the

Athenians of the impending siege of their cities. At this time, also, Cephisodotus, unaware of Charidemus’release or arrival in Sestus, set sail with the fleet to bring 25 Septemaid to him in Asia Minor. In the days that followed (approximately 22– ber), Charidemus launched operations against Crithote andElaeus, Python assassinated Cotys, andCharidemus, leaving the sieges, took charge of the kingdom on Cersebleptes’ behalf; at this time, Cersebleptes gave Charidemus his daughter’s hand in marriage. A day or two later, Cephisodotus arrived at the Hellespont with theAthenian fleet.

III–2b. The hostilities at Perinthus and Alopeconnesus; the dismissal of Cephisodotus from theChersonesian command

Our next task is to establish the chronology of the events that occurred after Cephisodotus’ arrival in the Hellespont in the last week of September 360. Demosthenes reports the following: the Athenians, having heard that Charidemus was nearby, anchored only tenships atPerinthus with a viewtoconducting negotiations with him; Charidemus attacked theAthenian forces there; the Athenians then went

where they engaged in hostilities with Charidemus’ forces; Charidemus andCephisodotus made a truce; as a result of that truce, the Athenians dismissed Cephisodotus from the command andbrought him to trial, fining him five talents; they elected Chabrias andgave himtheChersonesian command (Dem.

to Alopeconnesus,

71). 23.165–

2. Charidemus’ later career III–

61

We need to add some events to this series. Demosthenes says in section 171 that Chabrias sailed outto Chersonese with only one ship, andthat there wasno money for carrying on the war. This clearly indicates that Cephisodotus had brought the fleet with him when he returned to Athens. We may infer that he decided onthis action soonafter making thetruce withCharidemus: since there was little the Athenians could doinChersonese at this point, bringing the fleet back to Athens would atleast save thecity some much-needed money. It is noteworthy that whenCephisodotus wasbrought totrial, theAthenians fined himfive talents. Given the magnitude of his failure,14 this punishment wasrather lenient: Callisthenes, by contrast, wasexecuted in362 after making a truce withPerdiccas that wasunfavorable to Athens.15 The Athenians perhaps treated Cephisodotus more leniently because he hadtried to save them further expense. The sequence of events, therefore, reads as follows: the Athenians arrived at Chersonese; learning that Charidemus was at Perinthus, Cephisodotus anchored ten ships there in the hope of conducting negotiations with him; Charidemus attacked the Athenian forces; the Athenians went to Alopeconnesus, where they engaged in hostilities with Charidemus’troops; Charidemus andCephisodotus made a truce; Cephisodotus, realizing that hecould dolittle to advance the Athenian cause in Chersonese, returned with thefleet to Athens. Hereported onthetruce andconsequently wasdismissed from hiscommand. TheAthenians puthimontrial and, after deciding against execution, fined him five talents; they then elected Chabrias andgave himthe Chersonesian command. Dating these events is straightforward, because Demosthenes provides two useful indicators. First, hesays in section 165 that Charidemus made warwith the ῆ ν α ὲ νἅπ α ν ὸ ς τ νμ ν ο νμ αχρό all this time, seven months”(τ Athenian forces “ ). Demosthenes makes noclaim of accuracy here. In his eagerness to blacken ά τ ἑπ Charidemus’reputation, hecertainly would nothave understated thelength of time thecondottiere wasatwarwithCephisodotus, andhemaywell have overstated it.16 We should, therefore, estimate the hostilities andnegotiations to have lasted between six andseven months, from theendof September 360 to mid- to late April at 359. Since Demosthenes says that theAthenians anchored theships atPerinthus “ ρ χ ά ), most likely they spent the majority of the “seven ᾽ἀ ς α τ the beginning”(κ months”fighting Charidemus at Alopeconnesus. We would probably not go too far wrong toestimate a weekortwo(endof September tomid-October 360) atmostat Perinthus, five to six months (mid- October 360 to between mid-March andmidApril 359) at Alopeconnesus, andthenperhaps another twoweeks fornegotiations. Since Cephisodotus had probably launched the expedition very soon after 20

14

15 16

Demosthenes elsewhere groups Cephisodotus withErgophilus andTimomachus, generals who were tried andpunished for giving upThrace andtheThracian outposts (19.180). Fordiscus4g 4h and III– sion of the trials of Ergophilus and Timomachus, see respectively Sections III– below. 2c. Aeschin. 2.30; see Chapter II, Section II– Cf. 19.57, where Demosthenes states thattheSecond Embassy wenttoPella after theAssembly ratified the Peace of Philocrates on 19 Elaphebolion 346, andwasabroad for “three whole . In 19.155, however, hesays thattheEmbassy spent altogether fifty days–well under months” twomonths –travelling to Pella andwaiting for Philip to return from Thrace.

62

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

September 360, his truce with Charidemus belongs in mid- to late April 359. Cephisodotus then returned to Athens, whereupon he was dismissed from his command. Allowing a weektotendaysforhimto sail homeandreport onthetruce, we should date his dismissal to late April or early May 359. Second, Demosthenes says insection 171that attheelection of magistrates (ἐ ν ), the Athenians gave Chabrias the command against Chersonese. εσ ρ χ ις α ιρ ία ἀ The narrative makes it clear that Chabrias waselected general after Cephisodotus wasdismissed fromtheChersonesian command. AsDemosthenes’ useof theterm ρ ε χ σ α ιρ ίαindicates, Chabrias was elected general at the annual election of ἀ magistrates rather than at a special election. Theelections, therefore, should probably be dated to sometime in May. This date fits within the prescribed time for elections as set outin theAthenaion Politeia.17 The events, therefore, should be dated as follows: Cephisodotus arrived at Chersonese in the last week of September. Learning that Charidemus wasin the vicinity of Perinthus, he anchored ten ships there with a view to conducting negotiations. Contrary toAthenian expectations, however, Charidemus launched an attack. After a week or two, the Athenians went to Alopeconnesus, where they engaged inhostilities for five to six months withCharidemus’forces. Inlate March or April 359, Charidemus andCephisodotus held negotiations and made a truce. Cephisodotus, realizing there wasnowlittle hecould doonChersonese, brought the fleet back to Athens. Uponhisreturn in late April orearly May, hereported onthe truce, andtheAthenians dismissed himfromthecommand. They thenbrought him to trial, fining him five talents. At the annual elections in May, they elected Chabrias for 359/8 andgave himtheChersonesian command.

III– 3. Apollodorus, Diodorus, and the events of the 360s

362 III– 3a. Apollodorus and the events of 363–

Our next task is to establish the chronology of the intervening period, from the autumn of 364 to the spring of 360. We begin with Apollodorus’ account of his trierachy in the speech Against Polycles, because he provides the only specific dates forevents concerning Chersonese during this period: Onthe twenty-fourth dayof Metageitnion in the archonship of Molon, [in response to the

current crisis] the Assembly voted that the trierarchs launch their ships... Tenos had been seized by Alexander, andits people hadbeen reduced to slavery; ... Miltocythes hadrevolted fromCotys andhadsent ambassadors regarding alliance, calling onyoutocome to hisaidand promising to give back Chersonese; the Proconnesians, your allies, were begging youin the Assembly to come to their aid, saying that they were pressed bytheCyzicenes in waronboth land andsea, andnot to overlook them while they perished. You heard these things in the Assembly whentheambassadors themselves andtheir advocates spoke, andfurthermore, when the merchants andshipowners were ready to sail out of the Pontus, andthe Byzantines and

17 [Arist.] Athen. Pol. 44.4. Theelections were heldintheseventh prytany orlater, i.e., after midMarch. Fordiscussion, seeChapter I, n.42.

3. Apollodorus, Diodorus, andtheevents of the 360s III–

63

Chalcedonians and Cyzicenes were forcing the Athenian ships to dock at their harbors on account of their ownneed for grain. Andsince you sawthat grain wasrising in price in the Peiraeus andthere wasnotenough to be bought, youvoted that the trierarchs launch the ships andconvey themto thepier, that themembers of theBoule andthedemarchs make lists of the demesmen andhandina list of sailors, andthat a naval expedition bemadeas soonas possible andsent to the various regions. Andthe following decree of Aristophon waspassed. ([Dem.] 50.4– 6)

The decree of Aristophon, passed on24 Metageitnion 362, gives usa terminus ante quemfor a number of important events: Alexander’s capture ofTenos, Miltocythes’ revolt and embassy to Athens, the outbreak of war between the Cyzicenes and Proconnesians, and the Proconnesian embassy to Athens requesting aid. Before dating these events, weneed first to establish the approximate Julian equivalent of 24 Metageitnion fortheyear 362. As we noted earlier, the archon-year in principle began after the first visibility of the new moon after the summer solstice, though this wasnot a hard and fast rule.18 The year 362/1 maywell have beenoneof those exceptions, forthefirst new moon after the summer solstice occurred unusually early that year, on23 June, and the next moondidnotoccur until 22 July, which wasfartoolate.19 TheAthenians probably chose a time forthebeginning of theyear that wascloser to that of 363 or 361, years in which the first newmoon after the summer solstice occurred a bit later. In 363, the newmoonappeared on 3 July, with theyear beginning onthe 4th or 5th, andin 361 the newmoon appeared on 10 July, with theyear beginning on the 11th or 12th.20 Since the first month of the year, Hekatombaion, was probably thirty days long,21 24 Metageitnion came on the fifty-fourth day of the year. This gives us a date of 26 or27 August in 363 and2 or 3 September in361. Using these examples asmodels, wecanestimate thattheyear 362/1 began inthefirst orsecond week of July, andthat in362, 24 Metageitnion occurred inthelast week of August orthe beginning of September. We can nowattempt to date the various events listed in Apollodorus’account. This is notaneasy task, however, because hedoes notdistinguish theevents which the Athenians learned of in the Assembly meeting on24 Metageitnion from those which they had learned of previously. One clue is provided by the tenses of the verbs that appear in this passage. Apollodorus uses anaorist passive participle for ϕ θ εῖσ ), anaorist passive indicative for its enslaveα η α τ λ α the capture of Tenos (κ ), andpluperfect indicatives forMiltocythes’revolting from η ρ α π ο ν η δ δ ίσ θ ment(ἐ ξ ϕ ε ι). Since Greek ϕ μ ή κ εισ ε ι, ἐπ επ ό τ Cotys andsending ambassadors to Athens (ἀ prose authors frequently in narrative style used the aorist in place of the pluperη ν ρ δ α π ο η is probably equivalent in time to theverbs used for Miltoδ ίσ θ fect,22 ἐξ 18 See Chapter I, n. 44. 19 Bickerman, Chronology 118. 20 Ibid. 21 It wasalso possible that anygiven month wastwenty-nine days long. See discussion in W. K. 33. Pritchett andO. Neugebauer, The Calendars of Athens (Cambridge, Mass. 1947) 3– 22 The aorist can indicate action completed in the past: R. Kühner andB. Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Vol. 2.1 (2nd ed. Hannover/Leipzig 1898) 169; Schwy300. See Badian andHeskel, “Aeschines”268– zer-Debrunner, Griechische Grammatik 2.299– 69.

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

64

cythes’actions. By contrast, Apollodorus relates theevents concerning thePropontic andPontic states withanimperfect indicative (ἱκέτευ ) andpresent participles ο ν (ὄ ν τ ε ς ,λ ο ν τ έγ ε ). Whenspeaking of thevisit of theProconnesian ambassadors, he ς uses animperfect indicative with thephrase ἐ ῳ to indicate that they spoke μ ῷ ή δ ν τ in the Assembly on24 Metageitnion. Apollodorus thus makes it clear that Alexander’s capture and settlement of Tenos and the outbreak of Miltocythes’ revolt and his embassy to Athens occurred before the rest of the events in this passage. We needtoexamine theother evidence forthese events inorder todetermine thedate of each.

3b. Diodorus, Epaminondas, andAlexander of Pherae III– Diodorus, our most important continuous source for the late 360s, provides information that can help us narrow down the dates for the events which Apollodorus lists. Because Diodorus wrote a universal history that covered events in several regions, he tended to summarize a number of related events under theheading of a particular year. I would like to suggest that only the events that reflect the main theme of that passage canbedated tothatyear.23 Inthecase of Book 15,hedevotes most of his space to events in Sicily andto the Theban hegemony. Under the year 364/3, he gives an account of theThebans’attempt to build a naval empire (Diod. 79.2). Since his maintheme in that chapter is theleadership of Epaminon15.78.4– das and Pelopidas, the former’s role in that attempt belongs in that year.24 The events that precede, i.e., Epaminondas’speech, theconstruction of thefleet, andthe embassies to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, belong in the years before 364/3. Since a major expedition would normally be launched as early as possible in the campaigning season, most likely Epaminondas setoutwiththefleet inthespring of 364. After this entry Diodorus says nothing about Epaminondas’whereabouts until shortly before the battle of Mantinea, which should be dated to 12 Scirophorion 362.25 It is therefore possible that Epaminondas made a second expedition to the north during thecampaigning season of 363. It is more difficult to date the actions of the Theban fleet during this two-year period. Diodorus implies in 15.79.1 that Epaminondas was in the middle of the expedition when he encountered Laches andthe Athenian fleet, andafter forcing

93; C. Rubincam, “ The Organization andComposition of 23 See Heskel, “Foreign Policy”189– 28. Sinclair discusses themes inbooks , CMC/CV 31 n.s. 6 (1987) 313– Diodoros’Bibliotheke” 15, 16, and 17 to determine which sources Diodorus used, butdoes nottreat thequestion of his , PACA6 [1963] Diodorus Siculus andtheWriting of History” dating methods (R. K. Sinclair, “ 36– 45).

65; he puts the follows Hammond in dating the construction of the fleet to 366– launching of the expedition in 364/3 because 364 is theonly year until Pelopidas’death when 58; Hammond, both leaders were absent from Thebes (Buckler, Theban Hegemony 257– History of Greece3 503). Diod. 15.82.4; Xen. Hell. 7.5.14; Ps-Plut. Mor. 845e; IG II2 112; Plut. Mor. 350A; Buckler, 61, argues for accepting Plutarch’s date, andis followed by Sealey, Theban Hegemony 260– Demosthenes 251.

24 Buckler

25

3. Apollodorus, Diodorus, andthe events of the 360s III–

65

them tosail away, wentto Rhodes, Chios, andByzantium andmade them “friendly to theThebans” . Although this statement is toogeneral tobeof muchchronological use, Diodorus’ references to events in Heraclea, Cyzicus, andCos provide clues that canhelp usdate theThebans’movements. Webegin with the reference under the year 364/3 to events in Heraclea. After

discussing the battle of Cynoscephalae and giving his eulogy of Pelopidas, Diodorus ends his entry with a chronographic passage: Clearchus of Heraclea made himself tyrant andruled fortwelve years; Timotheus besieged andcaptured Torone andPotidaea andsent aid to the Cyzicenes under siege (Diod. 15.81.5– 6). These different events are more closely related than they at first appear. It is worth noting, first of all, that they all took place in the north. The case of Heraclea has been discussed with regard to the question of whether Diodorus’ dates for Clearchus’ tyranny arecorrect.26 More pertinent here is the question of whyDiodorus chose to mention Heraclea atall, since it hasnoapparent connection withtheother events he lists here, all of which involve Timotheus. Justin provides a hint: the Heracleans appealed for aid first to Timotheus, then to Epaminondas, and both refused their 4). Surely the Heracleans made these appeals when the two request (Just. 16.4.3– generals were inthearea.27 Butbecause neither Epaminondas norTimotheus chose to intervene inHeraclean affairs, Diodorus omits these andother related details. By contrast, Diodorus refers to affairs on Cyzicus because they played an important role in theTheban andAthenian contest fornaval hegemony. According to Apollodorus, the Proconnesian ambassadors asked theAthenians for aidagainst the Cyzicenes in the Assembly meeting of 24 Metageitnion 362. Moreover, there were reports that the Byzantines, Cyzicenes, and Chalcedonians were forcing 6). The Cyzicenes’antiAthenian corn ships to land at their harbors ([Dem.] 50.5– Athenian activity makes it clear that thecity hadturned against the Athenians and

their allies before 24 Metageitnion 362. It is a logical inference that the siege of Cyzicus which Diodorus lists under theyear 364/3 hadresulted inthecity’s turning against the Athenians andtheir allies. The overlap in time andplace with Epaminondas’naval expedition raises the possibility that the Thebans were responsible for this reversal inCyzicene foreign policy. The precise date of Cyzicus’surrender, however, is uncertain.28 3 that this It is clear from Diodorus’treatment of the affairs of Cosin 15.76.1– state also played a role in Theban affairs. Although it appears to be an isolated entry, it is preceded and followed by entries concerning Thebes: the capture of Oropus andthe settlement of the warwith Sparta (Diod. 15.76.1, 3). As Schaefer

, CQn. s. 22 (1972) 272 n. 1. 26 Cawkwell, “Epaminondas andThebes” 27 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 172. Buckler suggests that Epaminondas sailed to Heraclea. It is more likely, however, that theHeracleans sent embassies toTimotheus andthen to Epaminondas. Since these embassies predate Clearchus’assumption of thetyranny, which Diodorus puts in 364/3, wecan date them to the previous year. In the autumn of 365, Timotheus was at Amphipolis, near enough for theHeracleans to askhimforhelp, buttoo busy to send it. In the spring of 364, Epaminondas wasprobably at Byzantium inananalogous situation. 28 It is also possible that thereversal inCyzicene foreign policy should belinked totheexpansion of Philiscus. See discussion in Section III–7a below.

66

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

hasnoted, Diodorus’account of thegreat Coan harbor andcity walls suggests that Coswasoneof thenaval powers whose support wassought bytheThebans intheir

attempt to build a naval empire rivalling Athens’.29 There can be little doubt that Diodorus put his summary of Coan affairs under the year 366/5 because the synoecism wascompleted in that year.30 But it is also possible that he put it here because theThebans sent ambassadors to Cos in 366/5. A Theban embassy to Cos in this year is a reasonable conjecture because this city, like Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, later participated inthe Social War(Diod. 16.7.3, 21.1). Diodorus does notrefer to this embassy in 15.79.1 because it didnotresult in analliance between Thebes andCos. For the same reason, whendiscussing Epaminondas’ naval expedition under 364/3, he does notmention Cos along with the states that the general made “friendly to Thebes”(15.79.1). There wasclearly some anti-Athenian sentiment in Cos which the Thebans tried to encourage, but it didnot determine Coan foreign policy until the Social War. These examples illustrate some important features of Diodorus’ method of composition. Hesummarized a lengthy narrative andincluded all theevents that he considered to be most important. Subjects that had no significant impact on his central subject (Epaminondas andtheTheban hegemony, in this case) were abbreviated, and appear as brief chronographic entries. Another instance of this tech7, a chronographic passage at the end of the year 354/3 nique occurs at 16.31.6– concerning Philip’s capture of Methone andPagasae, theaccession of “ Spartacus” , theRoman-Faliscan war, andtheaccession of Callippus. If Diodorus’entries concerning Cos, Heraclea, andCyzicus doin fact have the chronological value that wehave assigned to them, it is possible to reconstruct the order andapproximate dates of theTheban embassies to thestates intheAegean. In 366, they went to the Greek states in the southern Aegean andworked their way north: Rhodes, Cos, Chios, Byzantium, and Heraclea, and probably others that 63, Epaminondas led the fleet of one hundred Diodorus fails to mention. In 364– ships to thestates that hadshown reluctance to form analliance with theThebans, andhecompelled orpersuaded themtorevolt fromtheSecond Athenian Confederacy and form an alliance with the Thebans. Cyzicus was one of these states; Byzantium andChalcedon were twoothers (Isoc. 5.53; [Dem.] 50.6). The date of the Theban encounter with Laches is more difficult to determine, since weare not told where it occurred. Like Epaminondas’other naval actions, it probably belongs 63. in the years 364– This discussion provides thebackground weneedforexamining theactions of Alexander of Pherae in the last years of the decade, in the attempt to determine more precisely when, before 24 Metageitnion 362, he captured Tenos. Under the year 364/3, Diodorus gives an account of the death of Pelopidas at the battle of Cynoscephalae. In the next sentence he refers to a subsequent battle between Alexander andtheThebans: 119. 29 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.118– 30 See S. M. Sherwin-White, Ancient Cos: AnHistorical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the 58. Imperial Period (Göttingen 1978) 43–

3. Apollodorus, Diodorus, andthe events of the 360s III–

67

But Alexander, after being defeated in a second battle andcompletely crushed, was forced according to anagreement to give back to the Thessalians the cities he hadreduced, to hand over the Magnesians andthe Phthiotic Achaeans to theBoeotians, andfor the future to be an ally of the Boeotians as the ruler of Pherae alone. (Diod. 15.80.6)

The battle of Cynoscephalae is generally agreed to be dated to mid-July 364.31 Scholars disagree, however, on whether the subsequent battle which Diodorus mentions here belongs in the autumn of 364 or thespring of 363.32 It is noteworthy that he does not insert a break between the two battles. This suggests that they occurred in the same campaigning season. By contrast, in his account of the battles of Philip and Onomarchus in Thessaly in 353/2, he distinguishes the end of the campaigning season of 353 from the beginning of the following season.33 It is therefore likely that the second battle, in which Alexander was defeated, took place inautumn 364, andthat thesettlement andtreaty were madeinthewinter of 364/3. Diodorus does not refer to Alexander again until fifteen chapters later, when Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, after he sent pirate under the year 361/0 he says that “ ships against the Cycladic islands, having forced some islands to surrender, took manycaptives, andhaving disembarked mercenaries onPeparethos, wasbesieging . The Athenians sent Leosthenes with forces to Panormus, where Alexanthe city” 2; see below). Clearly the attack on der won a major victory (Diod. 15.95.1–

Peparethos should be dated to 361/0 because it is Diodorus’ central theme in chapter 95. This inference finds support inhisuseof theimperfect tense of theverb (ἐ κ ρ π έ ω ρ ο κ ε λ λ ιο ι) to indicate continuous action in thepast. By contrast, he ιό π ο ρ κ ίευ ) for completed action, i.e., for theevents of theyears υ σ ν ε uses the aorist (ἐ before 361/0.34 There is thus a gapof a little morethanoneyearbetween Diodorus’ two entries concerning Alexander, from spring 363 to early summer 362. This is where we should put the first period of his Cycladic expedition, in particular, his campaign andcapture of Tenos. In this context, weneed to examine the Athenian inscription concerning relations with Iulis onCeos.35 This decree, securely dated to 363/2, wasmade after the Athenians hadquelled thesecond of Iulis’tworevolts andarranged a settlement.36

31

Diod. 15.80.2; Plut. Pel. 31.2. Both sources say that a solar eclipse occurred when Pelopidas andhis army were about to set out for Thessaly. Since the eclipse is dated to 13 July, the battle tookplace perhaps twotothree days later. SeeF. K. Ginzel, Handbuch derChronologie, Vol. 2 (Leipzig 1911) 527; E. vonStern, Geschichte der spartanischen undthebanischen Hegemonie vomKönigsfrieden bis zurSchlacht bei Mantinea (Dorpat 1884) 220; H.D. Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. (London 1935) 198; G. Reincke, RE 19 (1937), s. v. Pelopidas, 379;

76, 258. Buckler, Theban Hegemony 175– 32 Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.2.244, the only discussion of the chronology of the battle, puts it in the spring of 363 on the basis of Plut. Pel. 35 and IG VII. 2408. Most follow Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.123, in dating it to the second half of 364. Buckler, Theban Hegemony 239, uses this evidence to date Epaminondas’ naval expedition. 33 Diod. 16.35.3. See Heskel, “Foreign Policy”140. 54. 46, 153– 34 Kühner-Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik 2.1.142– 35 IG II2 111 = Tod no. 142. 36 The date: ibid. line 2; reference to the first revolt: line 8; reference to thesecond revolt: lines 11 for the people of Iulis to pay Athens in 42. On the basis of the instruction in lines 5– 27– Scirophorion, Todsuggests that thedecree belongs inthespring of 362 (Tod, p. 131, followed

68

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

This raises the question of when the people of Iulis staged the two revolts. The second revolt is fairly easy to date, for it occurred shortly before theconclusion of the treaty, therefore, most likely in 363/2. Staging a revolt for the second time was especially hazardous, for one would expect extremely harsh recriminations if it failed. Clearly, then, theIulietae will have staged the second revolt only whenthey could be confident of succeeding. It is notirrelevant that, according to ourchronology, Alexander’s siege andcapture of Tenos belong in theperiod of spring 363 to summer 362. Quite possibly, his attack onthe city induced the Iulietae to revolt in the hope that he would provide aid against the Athenians. We may tentatively suggest that Alexander attacked Tenos inthe spring or summer of 363 andthat the city surrendered in theautumn or, more probably, in theearly spring of 362, after a winter without food or supplies. Shortly after he launched operations, i.e., in the second half of 363, the Iulietae staged their second revolt. The Athenians putdown the uprising probably by the endof the year andthe two powers concluded a treaty in the winter or spring of 363/2. It is evident from even a cursory glance at the inscription that that the Athenians’ treatment of lulis is surprisingly moderate for the circumstances.37 There can be no doubt that they wished to ward off the possibility of a third revolt, a very real possibility if Alexander hadjust succeeded in capturing Tenos. The treaty of Athens andIulis, therefore, most likely belongs after the fall of Tenos inthespring of 362. We can now attempt to date the first revolt. The inscription indicates that Chabrias crushed it and concluded the resulting treaty with Iulis (line 18), and therefore, that heheldthecommand whentheIulietae staged theuprising. Heis not mentioned inconnection withthesecond revolt, andso wecaninfer that hewasnot general at Ceos when it was staged.38 This is noteworthy, given his success in quelling the first revolt. We may infer that the second uprising occurred when Chabrias was not available to go to Ceos, i.e., that he hadalready been sent elsewhere. That would only be possible if the second revolt began at least several months after the first treaty hadbeen concluded. Since the outbreak of thesecond revolt probably belongs in the second half of 363, Chabrias must have held the command atCeos before 363/2. Weknowthat hewasstationed atOropus andlater prosecuted fortheloss of thecity totheThebans.39 Since, asBuckler hasshown, the Thebans recovered Oropus in mid-summer 366, Chabrias held thecommand there in 366/5.40 That leaves the years 365/4 and 364/3 as possible years for Chabrias’ byCargill Second Athenian League 139). All wecan say, however, is that the decree belongs before Scirophorion (approximately June) 362.

37 Tod, ibid. 38 Aristophon may have been general at Ceos at the time of the second revolt, as Tod, ibid., 30), suggests. Heis said to have been general against Ceos (schol. Aeschin. 1.64 Dilts pp.29– andis probably theAristophon whoproposed thedecree. This is bynomeans certain, however, for nosource says that Aristophon wasgeneral in 363/2. 39

40

4. 23, 1411b 6–7; Diog. Laert. 3.23– Dem. 21.64 and schol. Dilts p. 183; Arist. Rhet. 1364a 19– MacDowell is probably correct in suggesting that he was acquitted (D. MacDowell, Demosthenes Against Meidias [Oxford 1990] 284; Hansen, Eisangelia no 84). 51, points out, it is unclear whether theThebans recovered AsBuckler, Theban Hegemony 250– Oropus in late 367/6 or early 366/5. We therefore cannot be certain if Chabrias held the command in 367/6, but wecan be certain that he held it in 366/5.

3. Apollodorus, Diodorus, andtheevents of the 360s III–

69

at Ceos andfor the first revolt of the Iulietae. It is difficult to narrow downthedate anymore precisely than that. We return nowto Alexander’s Cycladic campaigns. The next one after Tenos that we know of took place at Peparethos. Diodorus puts it under the year 361/0 (Diod. 15.95.1). From this account wecaninfer thefollowing events took place: 1) Alexander sent mercenary forces to Panormus; 2) the Peparethans asked the Athenians tosendaid, andthey agreed; 3) theAthenians sent Leosthenes, whoblockadedAlexander’s forces atPanormus; 4) Alexander’s men“unexpectedly”(ἀ π ρ ο σ δ ο ή κ ) attacked the Athenians andwona “surprise victory”(π τ ω ς ρ α ά δ ο ξ ο ςεὐη μ ερ ία ), in which he rescued the blockaded troops, captured five Athenian ships andone Peparethan, andtook 600 captives; 5) the Athenians condemned Leosthenes as a traitor andthen, electing Chares, sent himout(Diod. 15.95.1– 3). This account naturally leads ustoaska question which Diodorus seems tohave had as well: howwas Alexander able to win so great a victory from so great a disadvantage? Clearly he hadmanaged to obtain reinforcements, i.e., additional mercenaries, which he used to rescue his troops blockaded at Panormus. According to Demosthenes, Charidemus inhisletter toCephisodotus wrote thatAlexander had sent ambassadors to himbutthat hehadrefused to meet withthem (Dem. 23.162). Thus, theletter forwhich wehave established a terminus ante quemof late summer 36041 in turn enables us to establish a terminus ante quem of late summer 360 for command

the tyrant’s embassy to Charidemus. The reference to Alexander is curious in the context of thespeech Against Aristocrates, because Demosthenes here is narrating events that occurred in Thrace andAsia Minor. It canbest beexplained if Alexanderhadsent theembassy toprocure Charidemus’aidforthewarwithAthens when he really needed it, i.e., during the blockade of Panormus. The mercenary captain refused his request; since, however, Alexander’s expedition wasso successful, he must have searched for andobtained mercenaries fromother sources at this time. If this reconstruction is correct, we can date the embassy to Charidemus, and an embassy to at least one other source of mercenaries not named by the ancient sources, to the late autumn or winter of 361/0. Armed with newly hired mercenaries, Alexander inthe spring of 360 attacked the Athenians at Panormus andwona “ surprise victory” . There is little evidence fortherest of theevents of thewarbetween Alexander and Athens. The inscription recording the Athenians’ alliance of 361/0 with the Thessalian League indicates that the warwith the tyrant wasstill going on at that time,42 but it is difficult to place the negotiations and alliance in the context of known events. Although Diodorus does not say when the hostilities between Alexander and Athens came to an end, he provides hints that Panormus was the decisive battle of the war. As we have seen, it was after this battle that the Athenians condemned Leosthenes andelected Chares, who, notably, is notsaid to have gone to the Cyclades. Diodorus, in fact, emphasizes that the general went to Corcyra instead (Diod. 15.95.3). Although he is obviously using a hostile source 2a above. 41 See Section III– 34. 42 Tod no. 147, lines 31–

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

70

it is possible that Chares didnotgo to the Cyclades because there waslittle more for theAthenians to dothere. Panormus, therefore, wasthefinal campaign in a series of sieges that resulted in the Athenian loss of Peparethos. here,

4. The revolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III– 4a. The revolt of Miltocythes: preliminary observations III–

Wereturn to Apollodorus’list of Athenian crises. Nowthat wehave dated Alexander’s siege andcapture of Tenos to the period of spring 363 to early summer 362, wecan examine the events concerning Miltocythes: his revolt from Cotys andhis embassy to Athens which asked for support and promised to return Chersonese ([Dem.] 50.5). One point is immediately apparent. When Miltocythes sent the embassy to Athens, he must have held Chersonesian towns which the Athenians considered theirs, for that is the only wayto explain his offer to “return”Chersonese to Athens. Clearly, he had gained control of these towns before staging his revolt, and so we can be certain that he had captured them on behalf of Cotys. Miltocythes’capture of theChersonesian towns, therefore, precedes the first event in Apollodorus’series. The relative chronology of these events thus is fairly secure, but the absolute

chronology is another matter. If Apollodorus lists allof theevents inchapters 4 and 5 in strict chronological order, theoutbreak of therevolt belongs after Alexander’s capture of Tenos andbefore theProconnesian embassy of 24 Metageitnion 362, i.e., intheperiod of autumn 363 to summer 362. Butthepassage itself does notindicate if this is the case, nordoes it indicate when in thecourse of the revolt Miltocythes asked Athens for aid. The passage indicates only that his ambassadors appeared before theAthenian Assembly before 24 Metageitnion 362. Since newsof a change in Chersonese would have reached Athens in a fewdays at most, Miltocythes was still incontrol there aslate asapproximately 20 Metageitnion. Inorder todetermine whenheseized theChersonesian cities, staged therevolt, andsent ambassadors to Athens, weneedtoexamine theother evidence forevents inThrace inthelate 360s. We begin with Demosthenes’ reference to the revolt in the speech Against Aristocrates: After Miltocythes hadrevolted from Cotys, whenthe warhadalready lasted a long time, and Ergophilus hadbeendismissed andAutocles wasabout tosetsail asgeneral, some suchdecree wasproposed byyou.Onaccount of thatdecree, Miltocythes withdrew infear andbelieved you were not favoring him, andCotys gained control of Hieron Oros andits treasures. For indeed after this, Athenians, Autocles wasputontrial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, butthe time for prosecuting theproposer of thedecree hadpassed, andtheaffair turned outdisastrous-

ly for ourcity.

(Dem. 23.104)43

α ὶ ,κ υ ο έμ λ ο ῦπ ο ο ςτ τ ν ὄ ν ο ν ό ρ η χ δ ἤ ν ὸ ν , συχ ς ο υ τ ό ηΚ τ έσ η ςἀπ θ ύ κ ο τ ιλ τ εΜ 43 Dem. 23.104: ὅ ι ητ ϕ , ἐγρά ῦ ο ῖνστρατηγ ε λ υ κ λ έο ο ςἐκπ τ ὐ ᾽Α ο ςδ τ ν λ ο έλ ,μ ο υ ίλ ϕ ο γ νἘ ὲ ο μ έν υμ η λ γ ρ λ α ἀ π ὐ ᾶ μ ςο α ςὑ ίσ εὶςκ α ὶνομ θ η ϕ οβ ν ε θ λ ῆ π ν ἀ ὲ η ςμ θ ύ κ ο τ ιλ ὖΜ ι᾽ο ,δ ν ο τ ῦ ϕ ισ ιο μ ο α τ ή ᾽ὑ μ ῖν ψ ρ π α

4. Therevolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

71

This passage indicates that Miltocythes staged the revolt before Autocles set sail from Athens, and that the Athenians passed the decree referred to here when Autocles was about to set sail.44 Demosthenes’ statement thus confirms what we

learned from Apollodorus, namely, that Miltocythes’ ambassadors visited Athens before the fleet set sail. But it does more than that: it establishes Autocles’departure as a crucial event inthechronology of Miltocythes’revolt. Wecandetermine when 6 indicates that he left after the Assembly Autocles set sail, because [Dem.] 50.4– meeting of 24 Metageitnion 362 (probably late August). Allowing time forpreparations, wecan safely date the launching of the expedition to late September, when the fleet normally set sail for northern destinations. Clearly, Ergophilus’dismissal belongs at some earlier point. We will address that question later, when wedate Miltocythes’capture of the Chersonesian cities.45 Demosthenes’ statement raises another important point. The fact that Autocles was later tried for “having brought Miltocythes to ruin”indicates that he hadbeen sent to Chersonese to help him. The Athenians had voted to aid Miltocythes, no doubt in response to hispromise to handover theChersonesian towns. This decree, therefore, should be dated after Miltocythes’ embassy –which belongs before 24 Metageitnion 362 –andbefore Autocles’departure in late September. In order to narrow down the dates of these events, wefirst need to analyze the other evidence pertaining to Chersonese in thelate 360s, inparticular, thenumerous references in the sources to Sestus.46

4b. Events at Sestus; the command of Timomachus III– According to Xenophon, as a result of Agesilaus’ diplomacy, 1) Autophradates broke off his siege of Ariobarzanes at Assus; 2) Cotys broke off his siege of Sestus while it wasstill in the hands of Ariobarzanes; and3) Mausolus broke off his siege of both cities (Xen. Ages. 2.26). Polyaenus says in 7.26 that Autophradates besieged Adramyttium andimplies that he captured it. Cornelius Nepos states that Timotheus setoutwithAgesilaus to aidAriobarzanes, whogave theSpartan money and the Athenian, Crithote and Sestus (Nep. Tim. 1.3). According to Isocrates . HypereiTimotheus, sailing from Samos, captured Sestus andCrithote” 15.112, “ des4.1, listing various Athenian generals whowere indicted andwent into exile to

ὶ α .κ ο ετ έν ἐγ ν ῶ ρ υ α σ η θ ν ῶ ὶτ α ῦκ ο ῦἱερ ο υ ςτ ο ᾽ὄρ ο ῦτ ὴ ςτ τ ᾽ἐγκρα υ ςδ τ ό ,Κ ῷ τ ὐ α ιν ε έχ σ ο ρ π ύ κ ο τ ιλ ὼ ςΜ εκ λ ω λ ο π ςἀ ᾽ὡ θ ε νἐκρίν ὲ ῆ ςμ λ κ ο τ ὐ ι, Α ῖο α ν η θ ε ςἈ ρ δ ν ἄ ,ὦ ᾽ γ τ ρτ ῦ ά ε τ ὰ α τ ο ιμ ᾽ τ α μ γ ά ρ ὲπ δ ὰ ,τ ν α εσ θ ύ λ η ῆ ςἐξελ ϕ ῆ ςγρα ο ςτ τ ν ό ᾽εἰπ μ ισ ὸψήϕ ῦτ ο τ ὰ τ α ικ ο ν ὲχρό ν η ,ο ἱδ θ

44

ι. ε λ ό π ῇ ιτ ε λ ώ λ ω ἀ π

to refer to thetermination of Ergophilus’ ιν ε σ σ ά λ λ α π Demosthenes uses a form of theverb ἀ ῖνis ε ν ο τ ο ειρ χ ο π command. That he uses this verb interchangeably with the technical term ἀ ο π clear from his references to the dismissal of Cephisodotus later in the speech (23.167: ἀ ). It is therefore virtually ῖν ε γ η τ α ρ τ σ ῦ ο τ η γ ά λ λ η ; 23.169: ἀπ ν ό γ η τ α ρ τ σ ν ὸ ε... τ τ α σ ή ν ο τ ο χ ειρ certain that Ergophilus wasremoved from his command andreplaced by Autocles.

4h below. 45 See Section III– 46 See Sections III–4c andf below.

72

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

avoid conviction, calls Theotimus the one “ who lost Sestus” . Demosthenes 23.158 says that “Charidemus crossed over from Abydus to Sestus, which Cotys held” . It is possible to reconstruct the order of these events. The first in the series is Ariobarzanes’ assumption of control of Sestus andAssus. At some point afterwards, Cotys besieged Sestus andAutophradates besieged Assus. Since Agesilaus’ intervention resulted inthecessation of both sieges, Cotys andAutophradates must have conducted them simultaneously. Therefore, at some point before undertaking these operations, Cotys andAutophradates hadformed analliance; atthat time they decided to make a joint attack to gain control of places which Ariobarzanes currently held. Mausolus agreed to contribute 100 ships to their effort. It is clear from Nepos that Agesilaus andTimotheus intervened jointly.47 TheAthenians and Spartans must have agreed previously to work together to aid Ariobarzanes. After Agesilaus’ andTimotheus’ successful intervention, Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, andSestus andCrithote to Timotheus. Cotys later renewed his attack on Sestus andthis time succeeded incapturing it. Ournext task is to determine dates forthese events, noneof which aredated by the sources. Scholars have generally followed Schaefer’s chronology, which is based on the dating of Timotheus’ capture of Sestus to 366; his chief piece of evidence for that date is Isocrates’ statement in the Antidosis that “ Timotheus, , i.e., directly after the liberation sailing from Samos, captured Sestus andCrithote” of Samos.48 As Buckler points out, however, there are good reasons for preferring Demosthenes’ statement in 23.149 that Timotheus decided to take up the war against Amphipolis before the war against Chersonese.49 We therefore need to detach from the year 366 Timotheus’ expedition to Sestus as well as all events related to it, andbegin anew. Because of theevidence provided bytheDemosthenic corpus, weareonsurest footing with the last action in the series, Cotys’capture of Sestus. A terminus ante quem for the city’s surrender is provided by Cephisodotus’ arrival at the Hellespont, which, as we have seen, most likely belongs in the last week of September 18 provides a 360.50 Apollodorus’ discussion of his trierarchy in [Dem.] 50.17– anAthenian as functioning was that Sestus terminus post quem, because it indicates base during most of Timomachus’ Chersonesian command. Timomachus was general against Chersonese in 361/0 ([Dem.] 50.14); it is certain that he held the

74. 47 Hornblower, Mausolus 173– 48 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.100–101. Those who accept Schaefer’s chronology include: Ju201; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.2.245; M. Cary, CAH, Vol. deich, Kleinasiatische Studien 200– 6 (1927) 105; Glotz-Cohen, Histoire Grecque 3.168; Cawkwell, “Common Peace of 366/5”81; 35; C. M. Danov, Altthrakien (Berlin/New York 1976) 340– Notes on the Social War” ibid., “ 41; Hornblower, Mausolus 173–174, 201; Cartledge, Agesilaos 390; Weiskopf, “Revolt”46– 47; Hamilton, Failure 240; Ruzicka, Politics 69; Sealey, Demosthenes 81. 57, suggests that in 365Timotheus wenttoMethone, Pydna, 49 Buckler, Theban Hegemony, 255– andAmphipolis before sailing to theHellespont to aidAriobarzanes. Heis followed by Kallet, “ Iphikrates”246 andn. 24, whodoes not, however, believe that Timotheus also went to the Hellespont that year.

2a above. 50 See Section III–

4. Therevolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

73

command for that year only, forCephisodotus held the Chersonesian command in the following year. Apollodorus’account enables ustotrace theevents of Timomachus’command, and, at thesame time, events concerning Sestus in361/0. It wasafter Timomachus’ arrival at Sestus that he ordered Apollodorus to sail to Pontus. We can date their departure with some precision, because Apollodorus says that he went to Pontus and remained there “ for forty-five days, until the departure of the ships after Arcturus”([Dem.] 50.19). Since the heliacal rising of Arcturus in the Black Sea region (42°) occurred on 15 September,51 Apollodorus was in the Pontic region from approximately 10 August to shortly after 15 September 361. He says that he returned to Sestus after thePontic expedition, andsotheAthenians retained control of Sestus as late as the second half of September. An important fact that Apollodorus felt wastoo obvious to mention inadvertently comes to light here. If Timomachus set out for Pontus from Sestus by approximately August 10, he must have left Athens for Sestus in early August, at least six weeks earlier than a newly elected general normally set out with a fleet for the Hellespont. Apollodorus says that Timomachus didnot bring anysuccessors with him ([Dem.] 50.14), i.e., he didnot bring sailors or trierarchs. The reason is apparent. The Etesian winds, which began on approximately July 20,52 will have prevented a large fleet from sailing. Timomachus went to Sestus with one ship because he did not want to wait until late September to go to Pontus. These calculations also enable ustodate theseizure of theAthenian grain ships bytheByzantines andChalcedonians. Apollodorus says thatTimomachus sent him to Hieron to transport grain “since it hadbeen announced that the Byzantines and Chalcedonians were again bringing the ships into port andwere forcing them to unload their grain”([Dem.] 50.17). Since Apollodorus set out for Hieron by approximately August 10,mostlikely theByzantines andChalcedonians hadseized the Athenian grain ships in late July. We will return to this point later, when we discuss thechronology of Menon’s command.53 Apollodorus goes ontogive anaccount of theAthenian expedition from Sestus towestern Thrace: 1)thetowing of theMaronites’ships to Maronea, 2) thejourney to Thasos, 3) the attack on Stryme, 4) the battle with the Maronites, and 5) the around the return to Thasos. Since he indicates that the final battle took place “ setting of the Pleiades”([Dem.] 50.23)54, wecandate it to early November andall of the preceding events to late September and October. The return to Thasos, therefore, belongs inearly November. It wasshortly after this return that Timomachus received letters from Callistratus, in exile at Methone ([Dem.] 50.46). It cannot have been long after Callistratus’arrival atThasos that Timomachus sailed on Apollodorus’ ship to Sestus andthen ordered the trierarch to sail for Athens 3). Apollodorus says that he served for five months andsix days ([Dem.] 50.52–

51 Bickerman, Chronology 114. 52 See n.9 above. 53

4c below. See Section III–

Chronology 112, puts the cosmical setting of the Pleiades November. Western Thrace is approximately 41°, andso the setting should

54 Bickerman,

at 42° early on 5 bedated to the4th.

III. The Chronology of theWarover Chersonese

74

beyond the expiration of his trierarchy, i.e., until approximately 7 December 361. By these calculations, Callistratus arrived at Thasos in early December. During this entire period, Cotys didnotmove against Sestus, for, in that case, Timomachus surely would have returned there at once, even though hehadprobably secured it with a garrison before he left.55 Cotys will have renewed his attack on Sestus while the majority of Athenian forces were back in Athens between campaigning seasons, i.e., in early spring 360. Since Theotimus is said to be the one “ wholost Sestus” , Timomachus probably puthimin charge of this garrison before returning to Athens. Given the chronic shortages the Athenians faced in menand supplies, their garrison could nothaveheldoutthere verylong once Cotys attacked. We should, therefore, date the surrender of the city to late spring. At this time, Cotys managed tocapture Sestus butnotCrithote, because Charidemus is saidupon his return to Chersonese to have taken upservice with himagain at Sestus andto have attacked the Athenians’ “last remaining strongholds, Crithote andElaeus” (Dem. 23.158). According to Demosthenes, when Cephisodotus attacked Alopeconnesus intheautumn of 360, it wasunder thecontrol of pirates whowere clearly being supported by Charidemus (23.166). There is no doubt that Alopeconnesus wasin Thracian hands atthis point, andsowecansurmise that it hadbeen captured by Cotys. Since he moved against Sestus first, the capture of Alopeconnesus must belong shortly thereafter, i.e., in the summer of 360.

4c. Thecommands of theAthenian generals stationed atChersonese; Cotys’ III– capture of Hieron Oros Directly relevant to this investigation is theproblem of thedates of thecommands Athenian generals stationed at Chersonese during this period. The following excerpt from Apollodorus’account is ourchief source of information for these commands:

of the different

ForI received nopayfrom thegeneral foreight months, andI sailed home to Peiraeus with the ambassadors because myship wasthe best in sailing. Andthen again, whenI wasordered by the People to take Menon the general to the Hellespont in place of Autocles, whohadbeen dismissed, I set sail quickly... Then, after we came to the Hellespont, and the term of my trierarchy hadpassed, andpayhadnotbeen given to thesoldiers except for twomonths, and ([Dem.] 50.12, 14) another general, Timomachus, hadcome ...

Onthebasis of this passage, it is generally recognized that Autocles wasgeneral in 362/1 until Menon replaced him, andthat Timomachus wasgeneral in the following archon-year. Schaefer, reading this passage in conjunction with Demosthenes 23.104, suggested that Autocles wasgeneral for eight months andthen was dismissed for deserting Miltocythes; in his place the Athenians appointed Menon, whose command lasted approximately three months.56 This interpretation, how-

55 By contrast, Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.136, put Cotys’ move against Sestus between Timomachus’ departure for Thasos and his return to Athens, the latter of which he dated to approximately February

360.

49, suggested Menon covered thepayment to the troops for the 56 Schaefer, Demosthenes B. 148–

4. The revolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

75

ever, fails to take account of the references here and elsewhere in the speech Against Polycles that clearly indicate the chronology of Apollodorus’ trierarchy andAutocles’, Menon’s, andTimomachus’commands. We begin by noting that, in the passage quoted above, Apollodorus emphasizes howlittle payhereceived for his troops: hewent to Athens after notreceiving pay foreight months, and, at the time of his return to the Hellespont, his trierarchy had expired andhis soldiers hadbeen paid for only twomonths. This point appears in two other places in the speech. In section 10 Apollodorus has the clerk read aloud the record of the pay he, as trierarch, gave every month to the rowers and the receiving fromthegenerals subsistence money alone, except foronly two marines, “ months’pay, in a period of oneyear andfive months” .57Moreover, in section 1 he refers to his “ extratrierarchal expenses of five months and six days” . It can be inferred fromthese different statements that Apollodorus received payforonly two months of the year when he was trierarch, when normally he would have received payfor ten; after the expiration of his trierarchy, he served without payfor another five months and six days. We can attempt to establish dates for the different phases of Apollodorus’ service as trierarch. It is clear from his account that he collected the crew for his ship inresponse tothedecree of Aristophon of 24 Metageitnion 362. Since thetone of the decree indicates that the trierarchs were to make preparations at once, Apollodorus most likely collected his pay and began collecting his crew on 24 Metageitnion or shortly thereafter. Presumably, at this time hereceived payfor the first twomonths of his term inadvance, andusedthis money andhisownpersonal funds to hire troops. By these calculations, Apollodorus received pay to cover the period of late August/early September to late October/early November 362. Hethenwentwithout payforthenext eight months of histerm, fromlate October/early November 362 to late June/early July 361. After the expiration of his trierarchy, Apollodorus proceeded to serve another five months andsix days without pay. If the newarchonyear began on 11or 12July, heserved until 6 or7 December 361. All of these dates are provisional, owing totheuncertainty over precisely whentheyear 362/1 began. They are, however, accurate enough to be of usein establishing thechronology of the Chersonesian commands in 362/1 and361/0. We can now apply these figures to our chronology. Immediately after the decree of Aristophon wasenacted in approximately late August 362, Apollodorus received orders to collect his crew andanadvance of twomonths’pay. Heclaims he wasthe first trierarch to manhis ship ([Dem.] 50.7), andso heprobably set sail

57

more than two months”that Apollodorus refers to in [Dem.] 50.14; Autocles, period of “ therefore, served from Metageitnion to Munychion; Menon then served from Munychion to Metageitnion, at which time Timomachus replaced him. Scholars have generally followed this view, with little discussion. See Hansen, Eisangelia no.90; Develin, Athenian Officials 266. Apollodorus’claim that he received subsistence money, siteresion, for the entire period of his service butpay for only twomonths is corroborated in section 24. Here Euctemon is said to in addition to the subsisthave told Polycles of theexpenses Apollodorus incurred every day“

. ence money fromthegeneral”

76

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

for the Hellespont soon after the Etesian winds abated, in late September. In approximately late June 361, he returned to Athens with theambassadors. Having established the dates of Apollodorus’ movements, we turn now to a consideration that has not, to myknowledge, ever received attention in modern accounts of the period. Apollodorus says that he brought “ the ambassadors”to Athens andthen took Menon to the Hellespont to replace Autocles, whohadbeen dismissed. Most likely, Autocles hadnotyet been dismissed when Apollodorus left Chersonese with the ambassadors. It waswhile Apollodorus wasin Athens that the Athenians voted to dismiss Autocles from his command. Although no source indicates the specific reason for hisdismissal, Apollodorus’mention of “ theambassadors”is noteworthy, for, asTrevett points out, it mustbeasa result of their report to the Council andthe Assembly that Autocles wasdismissed.58 Apollodorus does not identify the origins of these ambassadors or the purpose of their mission because these facts were well known to his audience. Demosthenes, however, provides a clue. Aswehave seen, heclaims inthespeech Against Aristocrates that when Autocles wasabout to set sail as general, the Athenians passed a decree on account of which Miltocythes withdrew andCotys gained control of Hieron Oros andits treasures; later Autocles was tried for having brought Miltocythes to ruin (Dem. 23.104). This statement, taken inconjunction with Apollodorus’mention of “ the ambassadors”, strongly suggests that Miltocythes had sent the ambassadors that Apollodorus brought to Athens. It is a logical inference that the ambassadors related Miltocythes’ complaints about the support he hadreceived from Autocles, support that was so ineffective that he hadbeen forced to withdraw from Hieron Oros. There is reason to believe that Miltocythes’ loss of Hieron Oros was as serious as Demosthenes claims, i.e., that it signaled doom for the revolt. Aeschines’ account in his False Embassy speech of the events in Thrace in late Elaphebolion 346 provides a striking parallel. In the attempt to refute Demosthenes’ charge that he was responsible for the ruin of Cersebleptes, Aeschines discusses events that were occurring in Athens while Philip wasbesieging Cersebleptes at Hieron Oros. In2.90 herefers to a letter that Chares sent to theDemos saying that “Cersebleptes . hadlost his kingdom andthat Philip hadtaken Hieron Oros on 24 Elaphebolion” Since hehasthe letter read aloud andtwosections later refers to its contents again, there is no reason to doubt that it concerned Philip’s capture of Hieron Oros.59 Thus, when Philip captured Hieron Oros, heunequivocally defeated Cersebleptes. Atthis point, Aeschines implies, there wasnothing more theAthenians could doto stop Philip’s expansion in Thrace.60 This evidence, therefore, corroborates Demosthenes’ claim that Cotys’ capture of Hieron Oros foreshadowed the end of Miltocythes’ rebellion. To sumupevents inThrace sofar: bythetime Apollodorus setsail for Athens in approximately late June 361, the following events hadoccurred: Miltocythes, 58 Trevett, Apollodorus 132. 59 For discussion of howtheorators’useof evidence affects the veracity of their statements, see 16. Harris, Aeschines andAthenian Politics (New York 1995) 7– 60 See Badian, “Philip II”66.

III– 4. The revolt of Miltocythes and related events

77

anticipating a siege by Cotys, had withdrawn from Hieron Oros; the king had besieged andcaptured the fortress, thereby crippling the rebellion; andMiltocythes hadsent “ theambassadors”to Athens. Miltocythes’ ambassadors will have made their report to the Council andthe Assembly soon after arriving inAthens. Since theAssembly metslightly less often than once a week,61 wecandate Autocles’dismissal andMenon’s election toabout a week after Apollodorus’ return to Athens, therefore, to late June or early July. Apollodorus andMenon will have left Athens very soon after theelection, i.e., in the second or third week of July. They reached Chersonese a few days later, at which time Autocles presumably returned to Athens. This chronology enables us to make two important observations about the Chersonesian commands of this period. First, it is certain that Menon wasmeant to replace Autocles for the remainder of 361/0, not 362/1. Autocles, therefore, must have been re-elected general in the spring of 361. Second, Menon arrived at Chersonese in mid- or late July, only a week or twobefore Timomachus, whose arrival at Sestus we dated securely to early August.62 This fact suggests that Menon was not meant to fill in until Timomachus’ arrival: after all, Timomachus could have easily gone to Chersonese a bit earlier. Weshould infer that thetwogenerals weredispatched forentirely different reasons. This would explain whyApollodorus refers to Timomachus insection 14merely as “ another general” : hewasnotmeant to be Menon’s successor; rather, hewassent outinaddition to him. Menon is not mentioned elsewhere in the speech Against Polycles. It can be surmised that he remained at Chersonese only until Timomachus arrived there in early August, and then wassent elsewhere, perhaps Amphipolis. These findings make it possible to establish termini for Cotys’ capture of Hieron Oros. Since Autocles waslater blamed fortheruinof Miltocythes, therebel was still in control of the fortress at the time of the general’s re-election in approximately late March or April 361. By the time Apollodorus sailed to Athens in late June, Miltocythes hadwithdrawn from Hieron Oros. Therefore, Cotys must have captured it in the spring of 361, i.e., in the period of late March to late June. Wewill date thefall of Hieron Orosmoreprecisely after establishing thechronologyof events at Sestus andCrithote.63

4d.The Athenian recovery of Sestus andCrithote III– Apollodorus’account is also useful indetermining whenTimotheus gained control of Sestus andCrithote fromAriobarzanes. Aswehave seen, Sestus wasinAthenian hands bythetime Timomachus launched hisPontic expedition inearly August 361. Notably, it is the only city in the Hellespont that Apollodorus mentions by name in chapters 7 to 20, with theexception of Lampsacus, where hesent Euctemon to hire

61 See n. 10 above. 4b above. 62 See Section III– 4e below. 63 See Section III–

78

III. The Chronology of the War over Chersonese

sailors ([Dem.] 50.18). Clearly, Sestus hadbecome anAthenian base before Apollodorus went to Athens with the ambassadors in mid-July. In order to narrow down the date for the Athenian recovery of Sestus and Crithote still further, weneedto determine thedates of theevents that immediately preceded it, beginning with the intervention of Agesilaus andTimotheus on Ariobarzanes’ behalf. A terminus post quem for Agesilaus’ participation in Thracian affairs is provided by the battle of Mantinea, which Buckler has persuasively argued took place on 12 Scirophorion 362.64 Agesilaus, therefore, could not have left the Peloponnese until late 362. His expedition to Egypt on behalf of Tachos may be considered a terminus ante quem for his Thracian activity,65 but the uncertainty of the dates of his expedition and death make this point of little chronographical help.66 Apollodorus again provides useful information. Since his account makes it clear that the Athenians hadrecovered Sestus by mid-July 361 at the latest, negotiations between Athens andSparta, Agesilaus’diplomatic intervention, andTimotheus’ military intervention andrecovery of Sestus andCrithote all belong in the period of winter andspring 362/1. Timotheus, therefore, must have brought forces to Chersonese in the spring of 361. Asnoted earlier, Demosthenes in23.158 saysthatCharidemus besieged Crithote . This statement leaves the last of your [the Athenians’] strongholds” and Elaeus, “ no doubt that, in addition to Sestus andCrithote, Elaeus at some point wastaken over by the Athenians. This is very curious, for as the Decree of Aristoteles indicates, Elaeus hadlong been a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy.67 To explain howtheAthenians could havetaken possession ofElaeus, wemustinfer that it hadbeencaptured bysomeother power before theAthenians gained control. Once Elaeus lost its autonomy, the Athenians could capture it andtreat it as a mere possession, without granting theprivileges accorded anally of theLeague. Notably, Elaeus is notsaidtohavebeenliberated andreinstated, incontrast withIulis, which rejoined the Athenian Confederacy after its second revolt.68 Clearly Elaeus had, like Iulis, rebelled against Athens; most likely theElaeusians hadwillingly handed the city over to another power. Unlike lulis, however, Elaeus received harsh treatment from theAthenians, whothis time sawnoreason to forgive rebellion. We are naturally ledto ask 1) whenElaeus wasfirst captured andwhatpower captured it, and2) whenafterwards the Athenians gained possession of thecity. Webegin withthe Athenian capture, since a terminus ante quemis provided by Demosthenes’reference in23.158. This is theonly time intheDemosthenic corpus

61. 64 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 259– 65 This expedition washis last: he died onthejourney home (Xen. Ages. 2.31; Plut. Ages. 40.2). 66 Diodorus 15.93.6 puts the expedition and Agesilaus’ death under the year 362/1. Since the beginning of Agesilaus’participation intheexpedition is Diodorus’maintheme inthis section, we should date his arrival in Egypt to 362/1; his death must be much later. See Beloch, Griech. 217. Kienitz dates Agesilaus’ Egyptian expedition to 360 (F. K. Kienitz, Geschichte2 3.1.216– Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom7. bis zum4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende [Berlin 76). 1953] 175– 67 Elaeus wasone of the original members of the Confederacy. See Tod no. 123 = SVAno. 257, line 123. 3b above. 68 IG II2 111 = Tod no. 142. See Section III–

4. The revolt of Miltocythes and related events III–

79

that Elaeus is said to be an Athenian stronghold,69 and so it certain that the Athenians hadgained control of the city by the time the speech Against Aristocrates was delivered in 352/1. Two plausible scenarios come to mind. Timotheus may have captured Elaeus shortly after obtaining Sestus and Crithote from Ariobarzanes, i.e., in the first half of 361. It is notdifficult to find a time before that when another power could have taken over thecity. Onesuch occasion is provided by the Theban naval expedition of 364, when Epaminondas established good relations withthree other members of theAthenian Confederacy, Rhodes, Chios, andByzantium (Diod. 15.79.1). If the Elaeusians turned the city over willingly, it would not have been difficult to gain control. Alternatively, Elaeus mayhave defected from theConfederacy in the Social Warandlater been recaptured by the Athenians.

4e. Ariobarzanes andCotys at Sestus; Cotys’siege of Hieron Oros; the sieges III– of Assus and Adramyttium

We can now attempt to determine the chronology of the events that predate Agesilaus’ and Timotheus’ intervention on behalf of Ariobarzanes: 1) Ariobarzanes’assumption of control over Sestus andAssus, and2) Cotys’andAutophradates’ respective attacks on these towns. As we have determined, nine or ten months at most hadelapsed from the time when Miltocythes wasstill in control of Chersonese to when Timotheus received Sestus andCrithote from Ariobarzanes. Given the short spanof time, it is mosteconomical to posit that Miltocythes handed over Chersonese to Ariobarzanes, wholater gave it to Timotheus. It is notdifficult to determine when Miltocythes gave up Chersonese. By approximately 20 Metageitnion 362 he was desperate enough to have asked the Athenians for aid and could nothave retained control of theregion muchlonger. Heprobably gave it upto Ariobarzanes soon after that, inlate summer, andthen wentto Hieron Oros. This reconstruction leads to twoobservations. First, Miltocythes andAriobarzanes hadformed analliance at some point before late summer/early autumn 362; in all likelihood, Miltocythes requested the alliance soon after staging the revolt. Second, whenMiltocythes gave upChersonese, hewasin noposition to make new conquests, andso he must have gained control of Hieron Oros before this. Since Hieron Oros held the funds needed for military endeavors, most likely Miltocythes’ first step in staging the revolt wasto seize control of the fortress. Wewill establish more precise dates forbothMiltocythes’alliance withAriobarzanes andhiscapture of Hieron Oros when we narrow down the date of the outbreak of Miltocythes’ revolt.70 Wecan nowdetermine thedate of Cotys’first attempt onSestus. Heattacked the city while it was under Ariobarzanes’ control, therefore no earlier than the still in thehands of autumn of 362. Xenophon’s statement inAges. 2.26 that it was“ Ariobarzanes”clearly distinguishes this siege from Cotys’successful siege of 360.

69 Elaeus appears only oneother time inthecorpus, inthebracketed decree of theChersonesians in 18.92. It is notmentioned elsewhere intheorators. 70 See Section III–4h below.

80

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

In dating the first of these twosieges, Demosthenes’reference in 23.104 to Miltocythes’withdrawal andCotys’capture of Hieron Oros is of great importance. The orator is intent on blaming Miltocythes’ ruin on the decree that the Athenians passed whenAutocles wasabout tosetsail, andheis atpains toemphasize its worst ramifications, that is, the fall of Hieron Oros. Hisfailure to mention Chersonese in this context surely indicates that at this point Cotys hadnotyetcaptured Sestus or anyof theother Chersonesian towns. Andyetin order to explain whyMiltocythes handed over Chersonese to Ariobarzanes, we should postulate that the rebel believed Cotys would attack this region first. That may well have been the king’s original strategy, which heabandoned whenMiltocythes fled Chersonese andwent to Hieron Oros. At this point, Cotys decided to deal with Miltocythes first and gain control of the treasury. In all probability, therefore, the king’s first siege of Sestus came after thefall of Hieron Oros. At this time, however, Cotys did not succeed in capturing Sestus. Xenophon attributes this failure to Agesilaus’ diplomatic prowess, but that cannot fully explain why Cotys and Autophradates broke off their sieges, or why Timotheus recovered Sestus andCrithote.71 Cotys was unable to capture Sestus for military reasons, as Nepos says. Xenophon states explicitly that Agesilaus did not have forces with him, and so we should infer that he came only for diplomacy, while Timotheus brought the soldiers to defend the city. This interpretation helps to explain whyAriobarzanes later gave money to Agesilaus andhanded over Sestus andCrithote to Timotheus. The dating of these events is straightforward. Since Timotheus’ military intervention onbehalf of Ariobarzanes belongs in the spring of 361, Cotys’attempt on Sestus must also belong in that period. As wehave seen, the fall of Hieron Oros, which precedes the hostilities at Sestus, belongs in the period of late March to late June. Inorder to accommodate all of these events, weshould date Cotys’capture of Hieron Oros to early spring, his attack on Sestus to mid-spring, andthe Athenian recovery of thecity to mid- or late spring. It is nowpossible to determine when Cotys first moved against Hieron Oros. Our chronology of Miltocythes’ flight to andwithdrawal from the fortress enables ustodate theking’s attack tothis period. It is fair toassume that since thetreasury was located at Hieron Oros, the place was strongly fortified. Cotys cannot have captured it overnight: he did not have an army like Philip’s. Since the fortress probably fell inearly spring 361, Cotys will have launched thesiege inautumn 362. The operations continued through the winter, andMiltocythes withdrew in early spring, at which time Cotys gained control. The king then moved against Sestus. Our dating of Cotys’ first attempt on Sestus makes sense in light of the chronology of the events concerning Hieron Oros. As we have seen, by gaining control of Hieron Oros andits treasures, Cotys hadessentially crushed Miltocythes’ rebellion. Hethen moved against Sestus inthe attempt to regain what hehadlost in 71

69, expresses skepticism over Xenophon’s explanation forwhythesieges Ruzicka, Politics 66– were abandoned. He suggests that Autophradates broke off the siege (which he follows the communis opinio indating to 366) because Orontes hadrecently staged hisrevolt.

4. Therevolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

81

the revolt. By placing Timotheus at Sestus in the spring of 361, this chronology provides uswithanadditional criterion fordating Cotys’subsequent andsuccessful attempt on Sestus: he will have made certain to return there whenTimotheus was occupied elsewhere. Second, it corroborates Harris’ view that Schaefer’s date of 362/1 for the trial of Timotheus cannot be correct.72 Third, it indicates that Timotheus wasoccupied with affairs in the Hellespont in theperiod between the Macedonian expedition of spring 362 andthe Amphipolitan expedition of 360/59.73 Wecan nowdate the actions of Autophradates which are mentioned byXenophon andPolyaenus. The satrap wasbesieging Assus when Cotys wasbesieging Sestus. This puts the siege of Assus in the spring of 361. As noted earlier, Xenophon says in Ages. 2.26 that, as a result of Agesilaus’ diplomacy, Autophradates desisted fromthesiege. This statement suggests that Assus wasAutophradates’last campaign against Ariobarzanes in this period. If the rebel was at Assus when Autophradates launched thesiege inspring 361, hehadprobably just captured it. In that case, Ariobarzanes’ capture of Assus belongs in the autumn of 362. The proximity of Assus to Adramyttium makes it likely that Ariobarzanes captured Adramyttium shortly before moving against Assus. That puts his siege andcapture of Adramyttium in the first half of 362. Autophradates’ siege and capture of Adramyttium will have followed shortly thereafter, in the summer andautumn of that year.

4f. The Athenian decrees concerning Miltocythes andCotys III– This discussion raises the question of when the Athenians passed the decree that ᾽ έλ λ ν ο τ ο ςδ Demosthenes in 23.104 blames for Miltocythes’ ruin. The phrase μ γ ο ῦis so vague that it canmeanthat thedecree was ρ α τη τ σ λ ε ῖν υ υ τ ο κ λ Ἀ έο ςἐκπ passed weeks oreven daysbefore Autocles setoutinlate September. Furthermore, the orator wasso intent onblaming thedecree rather than Autocles fortheruin of Miltocythes that hemaywell have exaggerated howclose thegeneral wasto going outandrescuing himwhenthedecree waspassed. Allwecansayis that thedecree belongs shortly before Autocles’departure, in late summer 362. We mayhave greater success in solving this problem if wefirst establish the chronology of various diplomatic actions that Cotys took during the War over Chersonese. Demosthenes is ourchief source for these actions:

72

73

The Date of Apollodorus’Speech against Timotheus andits Implications forAthenian Harris, “ 43. 52; Schaefer, Demosthenes B.137– , AJP 109 (1988) 44– History and Legal Procedure” Schaefer’s viewhasbeenaccepted bymostscholars: see Harris fora convenient list (ibid. 45 n. 2). Harris, however, adduces compelling reasons for dating the trial to late 370/69, 369/8, or 367/6. Timotheus’ election to the strategia in the spring of 366 suggests that he was again enjoying great popularity at this point, andso the trial probably belongs in 367 at the latest. Schol. Aeschin. 2.31. For the chronology of Timotheus’ other actions in the Hellespont, see 7a below. Section III–

82

III. The Chronology of the War over Chersonese

But Cotys, Cersebleptes’ ownfather, whenever he wasinvolved in stasis, used to send his ambassadors andwasready todoanything, andthenhecould seethatbeing atwarwithourcity wasunprofitable; butwhenever heheldallThrace under hiscommand, hewould occupy cities, do mischief, anddischarge his drunken fury first on himself, then on us. He would bring the country under hiscontrol, andthesituation wasimpossible todeal with....I will read to youthe letter which Cotys sent when Miltocythes was in revolt, and the one which he, while holding theentire kingdom, sent to Timomachus, before heseized your strongholds... Here is a warning, menof Athens, which, if youwill be guided byme,youwill bear in mind; and, remembering also that, when Philip wasbesieging Amphipolis, he pretended to do so in order to handthe place over to you, butthat, whenhehadgotit, heannexed Potidaea into the bargain. (Dem. 23.114, 116.) Demosthenes sharply contrasts the occasions of Cotys’ communications with the Athenians. The king sent ambassadors to Athens whenever there was stasis in Thrace; at such times he saw that it was unprofitable to be at war with the Athenians. Cotys also sent twoletters, oneafter Miltocythes hadrevolted, andthe other after Cotys himself hadgained control of “ theentire kingdom” . Demosthenes goes on to liken Cotys’changing behavior to that of Philip: the Macedonian king first said hewasbesieging Amphipolis inorder to handit over to the Athenians, but after its surrender, hecaptured Potidaea as well. Thecomparison is instructive (it is irrelevant whether Philip in fact made such a promise). By referring to stasis, Demosthenes indicates that Cotys sent the ambassadors in the same period that he sent the first letter, i.e., after the outbreak of Miltocythes’revolt, when the king was conciliatory toward theAthenians. Cotys sentthesecond letter, bycontrast, after he had put down the revolt.74 It is this phase that Demosthenes describes in section 114: when Cotys had control of Thrace, he occupied cities, did mischief, and discharged hisdrunken fury against himself andAthens. Themosteconomical way to interpret this evidence is to posit that Cotys sent the first letter and the ambassadors to Athens simultaneously. We can attempt to date Cotys’ embassy and the letters more precisely. We begin with the second letter, since Demosthenes provides two useful pieces of information. First, Cotys is said to have sent this letter to Timomachus. This puts it either in theperiod after Timomachus’election to thestrategia or during his actual term of office, therefore in the period of spring 361 to early summer 360. Second, the king sent the letter “while holding the entire kingdom andbefore seizing the . This surely means that he sent it after capturing Hieron Athenian strongholds” Oros andbefore capturing Sestus, i.e., between early spring 361andlate spring 360. In order to satisfy the restrictions of each of Demosthenes’ statements, weneed to date the letter to the period of spring 361 to early spring 360. It is possible to narrow downthedate a bit further. As wehave seen, Cotys made anunsuccessful attempt

α ς , ρ ό μ ςτιν ν ιπ α ὲ τ ο σ α ιά σ ζ ίκ ν υ τ ,ἡ λ ς έπ ό τ ο υΚ σ οβ ό τ ερ ραὐ ςὁΚ ὴ ᾽ὁπ τ α λ λ 74 Dem. 23.114: ἀ λ ει ό π ὲ ῇ οὡ ὸτ ετ ςτ ν ελ ά ιτ ςἀ σ λ υ ᾽ᾐσθ τ α ὶτό ο ν ,κ ςἦ ιμ ο ἕτ ῖν ιε νἅπ ο α π ω ν τ π α β ε ιςπ έμ ρ έσ π ύ ω ν εθ ίκ δ ε ι, μ η νἔχ ᾴ κ ετ β ν ὰ α μ ςπ ό λ εις ο ι, κατελ ,ἠ ά ρ ϕα νΘ ὴ τ ῷ ὑ τ ᾽ὑ ὴδ ειδ , ἐπ εῖν εμ π ο λ ᾽ μ γ ᾶ ρ τ ο ῦ ,τ υ ὸπ ᾽ἑα ν ἐπ ρ ο ιε α ῖθ ν χ ώ ὴ μ ᾶ τ , ς ἡ α κ , α ὶ ν εἶτ ε ἰ ό τ ς μ ὑ ὲ ν ε ἰ α α τ ισ ά λ ς ν ῴ ε ιμ ρ α ἐπ ᾽ έclauses make it clear thatheis contrasting twodistinct periods, έ ν andδ ν ἦ . Theμ ή χ ν ν α ο μ ἀ first, onewhen there wasstasis, andsecond, onewhenCotys hadcomplete control of Thrace.

4. Therevolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

83

onSestus inearly or mid- spring 361, andthe Athenians gained control of thecity by mid-July of that year. Since Demosthenes implies Cotys sent the letter shortly before he succeeded in capturing Sestus, wecan eliminate from consideration the spring months of 361. This makes sense: it is likely that Cotys sent the letter to Timomachus during his actual term of office. We would probably not go too far wrong to date theletter to late 361 orearly 360. It is nowpossible to establish whenCotys sent conciliatory ambassadors with the first letter. Demosthenes indicates that the king sent them 1) when he was involved instasis, and2) whenhewasat warwith Athens. Although Demosthenes uses frequentative verbs here, it is clear that heis exaggerating forrhetorical effect: Cotys didnotrepeatedly lose andregain control of Thrace. Rather, there wasone period of stasis –Miltocythes’revolt –inwhich the king lost control of Thrace; at a later point he regained it. It is therefore certain that Cotys sent the conciliatory embassy andthefirst letter at some point after therevolt began. Atthisjuncture the king wanted to better relations with the Athenians anddidnotyet have control of

the Chersonesian towns that the Athenians considered theirs. Most likely, he requested aid andoffered to hand over these towns when Miltocythes was still holding them: this is the best wayto make sense of Demosthenes’ statement that Cotys was “ready to do everything”for Athens, andthe comparison with Philip. It is possible todate this embassy more precisely if it is considered inconjunction with ourkeypiece of evidence forMiltocythes’revolt, namely, Demosthenes’ assertion in 23.104 that theAthenian decree passed whenAutocles wasabout to set sail caused therebel to withdraw andbelieve that theAthenians didnotfavor him. Although the rhetorical bias makes interpretation more difficult, it is clear that the decree did not give wholehearted support to the rebel. But the fact that Autocles waslater brought to trial indicates that the decree didnotwholeheartedly support the king, either. It must have been more neutral than Demosthenes in retrospect would like to say. The most logical explanation for the ambivalence of this decree is that theAthenians received embassies fromMiltocythes andCotys inquick succession. As we have seen, after the outbreak of the revolt, Miltocythes asked the Athenians for help andpromised Chersonese in return. The Athenians wanted to support himbecause they believed they would recover Chersonese that way.Atthis time, they probably passed a decree tothat effect. Butsoonafterwards ambassadors arrived fromCotys, asking foraidand,nodoubt, promising Chersonese. Asa result of the king’s embassy, the Athenians passed an additional decree, in which they watered downtheir pledge of support for Miltocythes.

4g. The trials of Autocles, Timomachus, andMenon III– This discussion makes it possible to date the trials of the generals stationed at Chersonese. Webegin with the trial of Autocles, for which Demosthenes provides Forindeed after this, twopieces of evidence. Asnoted earlier, hesays in 23.104, “ Athenians, Autocles wasputontrial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, butthe time for prosecuting theproposer of thedecree hadpassed, andtheaffair turned out

84

III. TheChronology of the Warover Chersonese

disastrously for our city” . In the speech On Behalf of Phormio (36.53), he says that Apollodorus brought many to public trial, among them Timomachus, Callipus, Menon, Autocles, andTimotheus. Demosthenes’ statement in 23.104 provides our starting point, since it has specific chronological information. His use of technical terminology (ο ἱδ ὲχρό ν ο ι ᾽εἰπ ϕ ισ μ κ α τ όν ή ὰ τ τ ο ῦτ ο ὸψ ςτ ῆ ϕ ῆ ςγρα ςἐξελ η λ ύ θ εσ α ) makes it clear that he is ν referring here to the time limitation for bringing a graphe paranomon prosecution against the proposer of a decree. Inall probability, it wasoneyear.75 Autocles’trial, therefore, occurred more than one year after the enactment of the decree which favored neither Miltocythes nor Cotys. Since, by ourcalculations, the decree was passed in the summer of 362, the trial cannot have taken place before late summer 361. We know it washeld somewhat later, since Apollodorus himself indicates that he wasin the north in the summer andautumn of 361, anddidnotreturn to Athens until approximately 6 or 7 December.76 However, it would be wrong to assume, as Hansen does, that Apollodorus initiated the prosecution immediately upon his turned outdisastrously”for Athens that Autocles return.77 It wasnot until things “ wasbrought to trial. Demosthenes’allusion to a disastrous result surely refers to the Athenian loss of Sestus to Cotys, and with it, the chance to regain control of Chersonese. (The chronology confirms that Demosthenes was thinking only of the Athenians’ problems here, not Miltocythes’: as we have seen, his rebellion was effectively crushed when Cotys captured Hieron Oros in early spring 361, less than a year after the decree hadbeen proposed.) Autocles’trial, therefore, belongs soon after Cotys’capture of Sestus, probably in late spring or early summer 360. We can nowattempt to date the trial of Timomachus.78 Demosthenes does not provide any specific chronological information for this event, but he does provide an important clue in his speech Onthe False Embassy: “Ergophilus, Cephisodotus, Timomachus, and, long ago, Ergocles, Dionysius, andothers were executed or paid large fines for giving up Thrace and the strongholds”(Dem. 19.180). This statement cannot be completely true, for Aristotle says in Rhet. 1380b 10ff. that Ergophilus wasacquitted, andDemosthenes himself says in 23.168 that Cephisodotus wasfined five talents, which wasnota large fine. Butweknowthat all of these men held commands in the Hellespont,79 and so it is likely that they were tried for failures committed during those commands.80 Since thechief Athenian loss during

75 No evidence exists for the time limits established for prosecuting the proposer of a graphe paranomon. Wolff argues that it was one year on the basis of evidence for the time limits α ι. (H. J. Wolff, “Norῖν ε ή δ ειο νθ ὴνό μ ὴἐπ ο νμ ιτ ϕ α established for the proposer of a γρ , Sitzungsberichte der Heidelmenkontrolle undGesetzesbegriff in der attischen Demokratie” berger Akademie der Wissenschaften Phil.-hist. Kl. [1970] 10 n. 8.). This view is generally accepted. 4c above. [Dem.] 50.1. For the date, see Section III– 77 Hansen, Eisangelia no. 90 n. 12. 78 Hansen dates it to the winter of 361/0 (Eisangelia nos. 90 n.12; 91, n. 13; 92 n. 6; 95 n. 7). 79 Ergophilus’ trial must be dated in the context of Miltocythes’ campaigns against Sestus and 4h below. Crithote. See Section III– 80 Ergocles was tried for his command in the Hellespont in 390 (Lysias 28; Harpocration and ϕ ιλ ο ). Dionysius held a command in the ς ό ὶΕργ α ῆ ςκ γ λ κ ο ρ ῆ ; Photios s.v. Ἐ ς Suda s.v. Ἐ λ οκ γ ρ

76

4. The revolt of Miltocythes and related events III–

85

Timomachus’command wasSestus, wecan infer that, like Autocles, he wasmost likely brought to trial andconvicted after Cotys captured the city. For this reason, Timomachus’trial should be dated to the same period as the trial of Autocles, i.e., late spring orearly summer 360. Since Menon served asgeneral against Chersonese after Autocles’dismissal, his trial should be dated to this period also. The order of the trials cannot be known, though wemayspeculate that because Apollodorus had a personal grudge against Timomachus, he maywell have prosecuted himfirst.81

4h. Miltocythes’sieges of Sestus andCrithote andthecommand of ErgoIII– philus; the outbreak of Miltocythes’ revolt

Wecannowdetermine whenMiltocythes, onCotys’behalf, first attacked thetowns in Chersonese that the Athenians believed were theirs. As we have seen, Miltocythes hadcaptured Sestus andCrithote bythetime hestaged hisrevolt, forhe(and

probably Cotys also) offered to give them back to the Athenians in exchange for alliance and support.82 Miltocythes was in control of these cities as late as 20 Metageitnion (i.e., late August) 362.83 Wecandate Miltocythes’capture of Sestus andCrithote more precisely if we consider his actions in connection with the evidence for the command of Ergophilus. There are three pieces of evidence. First, Demosthenes says in 23.104, “ After Miltocythes hadrevolted from Cotys, when already the warhadlasted a long time, and Ergophilus hadbeen dismissed and Autocles was about to set sail as general, some such decree was proposed by you” . Second, as noted earlier, Demosthenes refers in 19.180 to Ergophilus as oneof thegenerals who“were execut. Third, Aristotle ed or paid large fines for giving upThrace andthe strongholds” For mengrow mild when they have exhausted their says in Rhet. 2.3.13 1380b: “ anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus. For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted . him, because they hadcondemned Callisthenes thedaybefore” Although these three pieces of evidence deal only with Ergophilus’ dismissal and trial, they provide important clues for the chronology of his command and Miltocythes’ actions in Chersonese. To begin with, Dem. 23.104 implies that Ergophilus wasAutocles’immediate predecessor. There is a slight possibility that the Athenians sent outa temporary replacement for Ergophilus after his dismissal;

81

82 83

Hellespont in 386. The circumstances of their trials are not known. See Judeich, Kleinasia97, 103. tische Studien 96– Hansen, Eisangelia no.93, suggests Apollodorus prosecuted Timotheus in 360 for hisdefeat at Amphipolis. This defeat is securely dated to 360/59 (schol. Aeschin. 2.31 Dills p. 64). As I demonstrate elsewhere, however, it should be dated to the spring of 359, after Philip’s with46). In Philip II andArgaios”45– drawal of the garrison from the city. (Diod. 16.3.3; Heskel, “ that case, Timotheus’ trials belongs no earlier than late spring or early summer 359, several months after the trials of Timomachus, Autocles, andMenon. 4a above. See Section III– 4a above. See Section III–

86

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

if so, however, it wasforsoshort a period of time thatDemosthenes does notbother to mention it. Since Autocles set sail in September 362, Ergophilus wasgeneral against Chersonese in the previous archon-year, 363/2.84 Ergophilus wasdismissed from his command and tried for “giving up Thrace and the strongholds” . As established earlier, Miltocythes had at some point captured Sestus and Crithote on behalf of Cotys, andwas in control of these cities as late as 20 Metageitnion (i.e., late August) 362.85 We may infer that Ergophilus was dismissed and tried for giving up Sestus and Crithote to Miltocythes, and that it was Miltocythes’ aggression against Chersonese that had prompted the Athenians to send Ergophilus to Chersonese in the first place. Demosthenes passes overthese facts because hedoes notwant to acknowledge that Miltocythes wasever theenemy of Athens. Wecannownarrow downthedate of Ergophilus’dismissal andtrial. Since he was tried for “giving up Thrace and the strongholds” , the trial was held after the Chersonesian towns had fallen into Thracian hands. This happened twice in the Warover Chersonese: whenMiltocythes captured Sestus andCrithote onbehalf of Cotys, andwhenCotys captured Sestus in the spring of 360. There are reasons for ruling out the second possibility. When listing Apollodorus’prosecutions, Demosthenes mentions Timomachus, Autocles, andMenon, butnotErgophilus. Clearly, if Apollodorus hadprosecuted Ergophilus, Demosthenes would nothave hesitated to include his name as well. Moreover, Aristotle’s account seems to indicate that the Athenians were quite angry with Ergophilus whenthey brought himto trial.86 This would suggest that the prosecutions were an immediate reaction rather than a response made twoyears after theevent. Wecan, therefore, be reasonably certain that Ergophilus wasdismissed from hiscommand andprosecuted soon after Miltocythes captured Sestus andCrithote. The trial must have been held before Milto: after that cythes’ambassadors visited Athens andoffered to “return Chersonese” recover Chersoto a chance had they that believed clearly Athenians the embassy, him. prosecute to nese, andno longer hadreason Apollodorus provides an important clue that can aid us in the attempt to determine more precisely when Ergophilus wasdismissed from his command and 7 indicates that, in accordance with thedecree of Aristoprosecuted. [Dem.] 50.6– phonenacted on24 Metageitnion, Apollodorus andtheother trierarchs whoserved under Autocles hired crews andmade other preparations for the expedition to the Hellespont. It is clear thattheAthenians didnothave forces stationed atChersonese at the time of Autocles’voyage in late September 362, andtherefore, that the fleet hadreturned to Athens at some earlier point. Since Autocles seems tohave succeededErgophilus in thecommand, it musthave been Ergophilus whobrought the fleet back to Athens. The likeliest time for his return is directly after the fall of Crithote, whenlittle could be done fortheAthenian cause inChersonese; similarly, Cephisodotus would bring the fleet home after making a truce with Charidemus in the

84 [Dem.] 50.12; Hansen, Eisangelia nos. 86 n. 2, 90 n. 5. 4a above. 85 See Section III– 3e. 86 We noted this earlier about Callisthenes. See Chapter I, Section I–

4. The revolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

87

spring of 359.87 Upon returning to Athens, Ergophilus was dismissed from his command andprosecuted forgiving upThrace andthe strongholds. The full sequence of events thus is as follows: 1) Miltocythes launched operations against Sestus; 2) the Athenians voted to send Ergophilus with forces to Chersonese; 3) Miltocythes captured Sestus; 4) he then attacked and captured Crithote; 5) Ergophilus returned with the fleet to Athens, whereupon he was dismissed fromhiscommand; 6) Miltocythes staged hisrevolt; 7) hesent ambassadors to Athens asking for aidandoffering to return Chersonese; 8) the Athenians passed the decree instructing Autocles to bring aid to Miltocythes; 9) Cotys sent ambassadors andhis first letter asking for aid andpromising Chersonese; 10) the Athenians passed the second decree concerning Miltocythes; 11) they passed the decree of Aristophon; 12)after making preparations fortheexpedition, Autocles set sail for Chersonese. Our next task is to establish dates for events numbered 1) to 6), all of which belong before 24 Metageitnion 362. We begin with events 3) through 5). As we observed earlier, there cannot have been a significant amount of time between Ergophilus’dismissal andAutocles’assumption of the command against Chersonese. Since Autocles took upthe command in September 362, it is rather unlikely that Ergophilus wasdismissed in the autumn of 363: if he hadbeen dismissed so early in his term, the Athenians surely would have sent outthe fleet with another commander in the spring of 362. It is far more probable that Ergophilus was dismissed in thespring of 362. In that case, the fall of Sestus andCrithote belongs in that period aswell. Wemayspeculate that Miltocythes besieged Sestus over the winter of 363/2 andit surrendered in early spring 362; he then went on to attack Crithote, which surrendered later that spring. Soon afterwards, in early or midsummer, Miltocythes staged his revolt; hewill have seized control of Hieron Oros immediately afterwards.88 Hethen sent ambassadors to Athens asking for aid. As wehave established, Miltocythes hadformed analliance with Ariobarzanes before handing Sestus and Crithote over to him in late summer 362;89 Miltocythes’ embassy to Ariobarzanes most likely belongs in the same period as his embassy to Athens. Cotys’embassy and first letter to the Athenians should be dated to this period as well. It is impossible to establish more precise dates for these events because we cannot determine whether Ergophilus was re-elected general in the elections for 362/1. We could make an intelligent guess if we knew when in the spring of 362 the elections were held. If, for example, they were held as early as March, Ergophilus wasprobably re-elected; if they were held as late as May, he probably was not. Wecannowattempt to date events 1) and2) in the series. Ergophilus held the command in 363/2 andthere is noevidence that he held the command before this. Presumably, the beginning of his term coincided with the beginning of the new

2aabove. 87 See Section III– 4e above. 88 See Section III– 4e above. 89 See Section III–

88

III. TheChronology of the Warover Chersonese

archon-year, which we have dated to 4 or 5 July 363.90 Ergophilus will have launched his expedition after this, possibly before the Etesians began blowing in late July, butmore probably after they hadabated in late September. Since Miltocythes’attack onSestus prompted Ergophilus’mission, wecandate that assault to the summer of 363. Miltocythes no doubt was well aware that his assault would result in Athenian intervention, andso he very likely launched his attack whenthe Athenians were unable to senda fleet. To sum up, in the summer of 363, Miltocythes, operating on behalf of Cotys, launched operations against Sestus. Upon receiving wordof the siege, the Athenians voted to send Ergophilus with forces to Chersonese, andhe set sail in early autumn. Inearly spring 362, Miltocythes captured Sestus; hethenattacked Crithote, which he captured later that spring. Realizing that nothing more could be done in Chersonese, Ergophilus returned withthefleet to Athens inlate spring. TheAthenians promptly dismissed himfrom his command. Shortly thereafter, they brought Callisthenes to trial, and the following day tried Ergophilus for giving up Thrace and the strongholds. In early or mid-summer, Miltocythes staged his revolt, and immediately seized control of Hieron Oros. Hethen sent ambassadors to Ariobarzanes andto Athens offering to return Chersonese. The Athenians voted to send Autocles out to bring aid to Miltocythes. Shortly thereafter, Cotys’ ambassadors arrived in Athens with a letter from the king asking for aidandpromising Chersonese. As a result, the Assembly passed a second decree, in which they watered down their pledge of support to Miltocythes. On 24 Metageitnion, the Athenians passed the decree of Aristophon. After making preparations for the expedition, Autocles set sail forChersonese in late September.

4i. The alliance of Miltocythes andAriobarzanes; the alliance of Cotys and III– Autophradates

Nowthat wehaveestablished approximate dates forMiltocythes’revolt, wecantry to date his alliance with Ariobarzanes. Because of Ariobarzanes’ proximity to Chersonese, he must have been one of the first whom the Thracian asked for support after deciding uponrevolt. Most probably Miltocythes sent toAriobarzanes requesting aid andalliance when he sent to Athens, i.e., in early or mid- summer 362. It also makes sense that he would ask for aid when Ariobarzanes was in a position to give it, i.e., after hehadrecovered Lampsacus andtheother Hellespontine cities. Aswewill see, Ariobarzanes’recovery of Lampsacus belongs in 363.91 Ourchronology also makes it possible to narrow downthe date of the alliance of Cotys and Autophradates. As we established earlier, they formed an alliance before launching the sieges of Sestus andAssus, which clearly belong in the spring of 361.92 There can be no doubt that it was Cotys who asked Autophradates for aid,

90 For the dating of the normal strategia, see Chapter I, n. 42; for the Julian equivalent of the 3e. beginning of theyear 363/2, seeChapter I, Section I– 7b below. 91 See Section III– 4b and III–4e above. 92 See Sections III–

4. Therevolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

89

rather thantheother wayaround. Theking will havemadethis request whenhewas ingreat needof money andforces, i.e., shortly after theoutbreak of therevolt, when Miltocythes hadcontrol of Hieron Oros. We mayconjecture that Cotys sent an embassy to Autophradates when he sent his first letter to the Athenians, inearly or mid- summer 362.

4j. The “War against Chersonese”vs. the “War against Cotys” III– It is nowpossible to understand an important distinction that Demosthenes makes in thespeech Against Aristocrates. Whenrelating theactions of Charidemus’early 51, he refers to the hostilities inThrace as the “ career in sections 149– Waragainst Chersonese”(23.150: “ after Timotheus decided to take upthe War against Amphipolis before theWaragainst Chersonese” ). Bycontrast, heintroduces theevents of Charidemus’later career in section 153 with thephrase “whentime passed and the Waragainst Cotys wasalready in progress” . Demosthenes’phraseology reflects the Athenians’view of these events, i.e., there were twodistinct phases, the “ War War against Cotys” . We have dated the events of against Chersonese”andthe “ 151 to 365 andthose of sections 153– 164 to 360. Ourchronology of sections 149– therevolt of Miltocythes nowmakes it possible to determine more precisely when . The Athenians War against Cotys” War against Chersonese”became the “ the “ Waragainst Chersonese”inearnest after Miltocythes launched operatook upthe“ tions against Sestus onCotys’behalf inthesummer of 363. Thelast major event in this phase wasCotys’capture of Hieron Oros inearly spring 361. Thesecond phase , began in mid-spring 361, when the king War against Cotys” of the war, the “ attacked Sestus andmade it clear to the Athenians that he wanted Chersonese for himself. Fromthis point on, theAthenians viewed thestruggle notsimply as a war to recover control of Chersonese butas a warwith Cotys over this territory.

4k. Iphicrates after hisdismissal fromtheAmphipolitan command III– Wecan nowattempt to establish dates for Iphicrates’ movements after Timotheus replaced him as general against Amphipolis. Our chief source is Demosthenes’ 32 of the speech Against Aristocrates: account in sections 130– ...nevertheless, he [Iphicrates] hadthe audacity to fight a battle at sea in opposition to your commanders indefense of Cotys, setting a higher value onthesalvation of that kingthanonthe honors hehadfrom you. If your anger hadnotbeen more moderate than his rashness, nothing would have prevented himfrom being themost miserable of men. Butstill, whenCotys, who owed his deliverance to Iphicrates and had hadpractical experience of his loyalty, believed himself to be permanently out of danger, he did not make an effort to reward him. Nor did Cotys ever doanything conciliatory to youthrough his [Iphicrates’] agency in the hope that he would win forgiveness for his past conduct. Completely to the contrary, he expected him [Iphicrates] tojoin in besieging the rest of your strongholds. Whenherefused, Cotys himself attacked the strongholds, taking with him both his barbarian forces and those collected by Iphicrates, andhiring Charidemus in addition. Hereduced Iphicrates to such a state of distress

90

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese that hewithdrew to Antissa, andafterwards to Drys, andlived there. Hethought that hecould notreturn to youhonorably, since hehadputyour interests second to those of a Thracian anda barbarian; butontheother hand, that it wasnotsafe to remain atthecourt of a king whohehad seen wasso negligent of his safety.

The relative chronology of the events is fairly straightforward. While Iphicrates wasatthecourt, hesuccessfully defended Cotys ina naval battle inwhich Athenian generals fought ontheother side. Atsome later point, Cotys began making plans to besiege the rest of the Athenian strongholds; it was probably then that he rehired Charidemus. Iphicrates refused to take part in these operations, andso the king forced him to leave the court. Cotys, supported by his ownbarbarian troops, the troops which Iphicrates hadcollected, andCharidemus’ mercenaries, attacked the Athenian strongholds. We begin with the obvious question of when Iphicrates went to Cotys’court. Aswehave seen, Iphicrates wasdismissed fromtheAmphipolitan command inlate spring 365.93 No source says specifically where he went afterwards. Since, however, Iphicrates was by this point related to Cotys by marriage,94 it is extremely likely that he went directly from Amphipolis to his court, where he could be certain of hospitality. For this reason, weshould date his arrival atCotys’court to immediately after Timotheus’assuming theAmphipolitan command inthesummer of 365. Ournext task is to determine whenIphicrates left Cotys’court. It is clear from Demosthenes’account that Iphicrates’departure belongs 1)after thenaval battle in which he successfully defended theking against a fleet under Athenian commanders; 2) whenCotys believed hewaspermanently outof danger; and3) whenCotys expected Iphicrates tojoin himin attacking the Athenian strongholds. It is necessary to establish dates for these three events. We begin with Cotys’ attack on the Athenian strongholds, since Demosthenes provides hints for the date of this expedition. He says that Cotys wanted Iphicrates λ “ λ ὰ ν ᾶ π τ tojoin himin besieging the rest of the Athenian strongholds”(ἀ ο ὐ ν α ν ); upon ίω ρ ν ω νχω έρ ετ νὑμ ὰλ κ ε ῖντ ο ιπ ῶ ρ ὰτ ιο μ π λ ο υ νσ ὲνα τ ίο τ ὸ ὐ ξ ίο νἠ υμ Iphicrates’refusal, the king besieged the strongholds himself with a combination of κ ρ ε ῖν μ π ο λ ιο υ forces, including those of Iphicrates andCharidemus. The phrase σ νis striking, because it is very similar to the phrase ρ ίω ω χ ν ω τ ὰ ετ λ έρ ο ιπ ὰ νὑμ τ ῶ Demosthenes uses in section 158to describe Charidemus’actions whenhereturned from Asia Minor andtook upservice with Cotys. Hesays that Charidemus, “again hiring himself out to Cotys, began to besiege your last remaining strongholds, έ νὑμετ τ ῶ α ιπ λ ο π ό ὰ ὑ ϊτ υ τ ό Κ ῷ ντ ὸ τ θ ὑ ισ ώ α σ ςα ινμ λ Crithote andElaeus”(π ά ρ ω ι); he goes onto say that Chariκ ρ ε νχω ιό λ ο ᾽ἐπ ρ τ α α λ ν η ιο ὶἘ ῦ ίω νκ ρ ιθ ώ νΚ τ demus hadcrossed over from Abydus to Sestus, which Cotys held. It is clear from

2b. 93 See Chapter I, Section I– 94 Iphicrates’eldest son, Menestheus, sonof hisThracian wife, served as general in 356/5 (Isoc. 67). If Menestheus fulfilled theminimum 15.129; Nepos, Tim. 3.5; Dion. Hal. Dein. 13, pp.66– agerequirement forAthenian generals, hewasborn in386, andsoIphicrates’marriage belongs in 386 at the latest. See Kahrstedt, RE 9 (1916), 2019, s.v. Iphikrates (1); Davies, Athenian 50. Iphicrates was most likely married to the daughter of Cotys; for Propertied Families 249– discussion, see Chapter IV, n. 49.

4. The revolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

91

the similarity of phrasing andthe involvement of Charidemus inthese twopassages that Demosthenes is referring to the same events in both. The second passage is a more detailed version which includes the names of the cities Charidemus besieged, Crithote andElaeus. By using the phrase τ ὰ ὑ π ό λ ο ιπ α in his account of Iphicrates in section 131, Demosthenes makes it quite clear that Crithote andElaeus were the objects of Cotys’ expedition that Iphicrates refused to join, and moreover, that

Cotys planned that expedition after gaining control of Sestus. This gives usa clear context for Iphicrates’break with Cotys. It belongs after Cotys hadcaptured Sestus andwhen he wasabout to besiege Crithote andElaeus. There aretwopossible times that fit these requirements. First, in the spring of 362, Miltocythes, working on behalf of Cotys, captured Sestus and then went on to capture Crithote.95 Second, in the spring of 360, Cotys captured Sestus and, in late September of that year, Charidemus launched thesieges of Crithote andElaeus on his behalf.96 Demosthenes says in section 130 that Cotys himself (α ὐ τ ό ) led the ς attack onthestrongholds after Iphicrates refused tojoin him. This enables usto rule out the first instance, since it was Miltocythes and not Cotys who attacked the Chersonesian cities at that time. We can therefore be confident that Iphicrates left Cotys’court in 360, after Cotys captured Sestus andbefore heattacked Crithote and Elaeus. It maybepossible tonarrow downthedate of Iphicrates’departure within these limits. Demosthenes says in23.156 thatCharidemus, trapped inAsia andpromising as anenemy of to recover Chersonese for the Athenians, wrote to Cephisodotus “ . On the basis of this statement, Schaefer suggests that Cotys and Iphicrates” Iphicrates severed ties with Cotys after Charidemus sent the letter to Cephisodotus.97 Wehave dated that letter tolate August orearly September 360 andsuggested that Charidemus also wrote to Cotys at this time. According to our chronology, therefore, Iphicrates severed ties with Cotys after Charidemus wrote to CephisodotusandCotys in late August orearly September 360. Demosthenes provides another clue that maybe of usehere. Heindicates that Cotys himself’ attacked theAthenian strongholds Iphicrates went to Antissa after “ (i.e., Crithote andElaeus) with his ownforces as well as those of Iphicrates and Charidemus. Aswehave seen, Charidemus wastheonewholaunched these sieges. Demosthenes’ statement, therefore, suggests that Iphicrates left the court after Cotys setouttojoin Charidemus onChersonese. Since Charidemus moved against Crithote and Sestus in the period of 22 to 26 September,98 Iphicrates’ departure from the court belongs in that period as well. This discussion raises anobvious question. If Iphicrates refused tojoin in the expedition against Crithote andElaeus, whydidhedidnotbreak withCotys sooner, i.e., when the king made preparations to attack Sestus in the spring of 360? The answer lies in Demosthenes’statement in 23.131 that Cotys never used Iphicrates’

4habove. 95 See Section III– 4b above; for Charidemus’ sieges of Crithote and 96 For Cotys’capture of Sestus, see Section III– 2a. Elaeus, see Section III– 97 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.138 n. 2. 2a above. 98 See Section III–

92

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

aid to obtain forgiveness from the Athenians for his past conduct; rather, he attacked the rest of the Athenian strongholds. There can be little doubt that the phrase “ past conduct”(τ ο ῖςπ επ ρ μ γ α έν ο ις ) is an allusion to Cotys’ capture of Sestus in the spring of 360. Demosthenes implies that the Athenians might have forgiven Cotys had he been willing to hand over Sestus; instead, however, he proceeded to attack Crithote andElaeus. The failure to connect Iphicrates with Cotys’capture of Sestus is rather noteworthy, given the tenor of theorator’s other remarks, andsurely indicates that Iphicrates didnottake part inthatcampaign. We may conjecture that in the spring of 360 Iphicrates was involved in operations elsewhere in Thrace. Hewasprobably away a year earlier also, when Cotys made his first attempt on Sestus. Nowthat wehave established whenIphicrates left Cotys’court, it is possible to determine the date of the naval battle which Demosthenes refers to in the passage quoted above. It is worth noting that heis extremely critical of Iphicrates, who“ had

the audacity”to defend Cotys against a fleet under Athenian generals.99 Andyet this is the most damning thing the orator can muster. Notably, he says Iphicrates fought when Athenian generals, not Athenian ships, were onthe other side. Moreover, he says nothing about a trial –an omission strongly suggesting that one was not held –and in fact acknowledges that the Athenian reaction was rather moderate.100 In order to explain howIphicrates could have defended Cotys against Athenian commanders with impunity, weneed to date thebattle to a period when theking wasnotofficially considered theenemy of Athens. The answer is apparent. The battle was fought when the Athenians were following the ambivalent policy of supporting both Miltocythes’ revolt and Cotys simultaneously. Aswehave seenfromexamining Demosthenes 23.104, theAssembly hadpassed a decree instructing Autocles to dowhat hecould for Miltocythes without damaging relations withCotys. It wasinthese circumstances that Iphicrates could fight in defense of Cotys without fear of prosecution. The king wasofficially a friend of Athens andremained so until he moved against Sestus. Therefore, we canbe certain that the battle wasfought before Cotys attacked Sestus in the spring of 361.101

It is possible to identify the Athenian commanders who, according to Demosthenes, fought in the naval battle against Iphicrates. The decree of Demosthenes 23.104 again provides the answer. This decree prevented Autocles from leading the Athenian fleet against Cotys, but it did not prevent him from lending Miltocythes commanders to command his Thracian fleet. As far as can be determined, Autocles wastheonly general available at this time to help therebel. There can be little doubt, therefore, that Autocles was the commander of Miltocythes’ fleet, andthat Demosthenes has exaggerated the number of Athenian “generals” arrayed against Iphicrates. This interpretation helps to explain whyIphicrates was not prosecuted for defending Cotys. Moreover, it is noweasier to see why the 99 Cf. Harris, “Iphicrates at the Court of Cotys”268. 48. Iphikrates”247– 100 Cf. Kallet, “ 4e above. 101 For the dating of this siege, see Section III–

4. Therevolt of Miltocythes andrelated events III–

93

Athenians blamed Autocles for the collapse of the revolt. His defeat by Iphicrates undermined Miltocythes’position at Hieron Oros andenabled Cotys to capture the fortress soon afterwards. These considerations make it possible to date the naval battle with some precision. It belongs after Autocles set sail for Chersonese in late September 362 andbefore the fall of Hieron Oros in early spring 361, therefore, in autumn 362. Quite possibly, Iphicrates left Cotys’ court for a new campaign after the naval battle, andbefore the king’s assault onSestus in mid-spring 361. We turn to a related question, which concerns the site of the naval battle mentioned in fragment 15of Isaeus: “whenI wastrierarch during thearchonship of Cephisodotus, andword wasbrought to myrelatives that I haddied in the naval battle then” . Cawkwell, arguing persuasively for dating this battle to 366/5, goes on to suggest that this was the episode in which Iphicrates fought on Cotys’ behalf against Athenian commanders.102 Ourchronology, however, gravely undermines this theory, which has been attacked on other grounds.103 We are left with two alternatives. Either this battle was part of the hostilities at Samos, as Rehdantz suggested,104 or it took place at Amphipolis during Iphicrates’ command. It is impossible to place it more precisely than that. Nowthat wehave established Iphicrates’time of service toCotys astheperiod of summer of 365 to mid-September 360, it maybe possible to date his actions which are mentioned in the Oeconomica: Iphicrates, advising Cotys onhowto raise funds for military operations, suggested that heorder his subjects to sowgrain and give him the profits from its sale ([Arist.] Oec. 2.2.26 1351a 18). Since Thrace certainly was not lacking in natural resources, this story is noteworthy. Cotys’need for money canbe readily explained, however, inthecontext of Miltocythes’revolt. If, as we suggested, Miltocythes seized Hieron Oros immediately after declaring independence,105 Cotys atthat point lost a major source of funds. Wemayspeculate that Iphicrates gave this advice in thewinter of 362/1, i.e., before the fall of Hieron Oros andin time for the next sowing of grain, which probably took place in the spring.106 After leaving Thrace, Iphicrates wenttoAntissa, andthento Drys. Hismove to Drys is said to have been a colonizing effort (Theop. FGrH 115 F161, quoted by ). Thecriteria for dating this settlement are the same as for ρ ύ ς Harpocration, s. v. Δ dating the foundation of Crenides, which Diodorus lists ina chronographic passage under the year 360/59 (Diod. 16.3.8). As Badian has pointed out, Cotys would not ϕ ισ ρ ο υ(the archon of 366/5) ο δ ώ η 35, shows that Κ 102 Cawkwell, “Notes on the Social War”34– ο ϕ ισ δ ο υ(the archon of 358/7). ό τ η wascorrupted to Κ IG ii2 1609”330. 66 andDavies,“ 103 See Pritchett, Greek State 2.64– 4. 104 Rehdantz, Vitae 126, followed byDavies, ibid. andRuzicka, Politics 72–

4e above. 105 See Section III– 106 As faras I have know, there is noevidence that indicates precisely whensowing wasnormally 84 that the harvest in central done in Thrace. It is clear from Hesiod Works and Days 383– Greece began at the rising of the Pleiades, i.e., inearly May, andthat sowing wasdone at the setting of thePleiades, i.e., in November. Further north there will have been considerable frost andsome snow in the winter, andso theground wasprobably notsowed until spring.

94

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

have permitted colonizing inanareathatwassostrategically important.107 Iphicrates must have gone to Drys at some point after the king’s death in the last week of September 360. That makes sense in anycase for, by ourcalculations, Iphicrates left the court in the second half of September; he then will have spent time in Antissa making preparations before going to Drys. Allowing time for those preparations, weshould putIphicrates’arrival at Drys noearlier than thespring of 359. It remains to determine the length of Iphicrates’ stay in Drys. He is not mentioned again by the sources until the Social War, when he was sent out as general along with Chares andTimotheus (Diod. 16.21.1). Harris surely is correct in suggesting that Iphicrates remained inThrace waiting for a time whenhecould return to Athens safely. The Social Warprovided just that opportunity: theAthenians, in need of his expertise, were happy to take himback.108 For this reason, we should date Iphicrates’ return to Athens to shortly after theoutbreak of the warin

the winter of 357/6.109

5. Ariobarzanes andAthens III– 5a. The revolt of Ariobarzanes III– Since the Great King and his satraps played important roles in the War over Chersonese, it is necessary to date a number of events that occurred inthePersian Empire inthe360s. Ourfirst task is todate theoutbreak of Ariobarzanes’revolt, the second in a series of rebellions against the Great King known collectively as the Great Satraps’Revolt.110 Theonly evidence that refers explicitly totheoutbreak of Ariobarzanes’ revolt is Demosthenes’ account in the speech On Behalf of the Liberty of the Rhodians: I will remind you...that you, Athenians, once sentTimotheus toaidAriobarzanes, adding to the . Timotheus, seeing that decree thephrase “provided hedoes notbreak thetreaty withtheKing” Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from the King and that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, whomTigranes, theKing’s hyparch, hadstationed there, resolved nottohelpthesatrap, (Dem. 15.9) butinvesting theisland andbringing aid, liberated it.

107 Badian, “Philip II”55. 71. 108 Harris, “Iphicrates at the Court of Cotys”270– 60; Cawkwell, “Notes on the Social War” 109 For the date, see Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 III.2.258– 40. 34– 239,divides theGreat Satraps’Revolt into three stages, 1) 110 Hatzfeld, “Agésilas et Artaxerxès II” therevolt of Datames in372; 2) therevolt of Ariobarzanes in366; and3) therevolt of Orontes 76, provides a more detailed version of these stages andis in 362. Hornblower, Mausolus 170– generally followed. Weare concerned here only with the second stage; thechronology of the entire revolt is a separate study in itself andcannot bediscussed infull. See Judeich, KleinasiaLaGrande 257; P. Meloni, “ 48, 254– 220; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.2.147– tische Studien, 193– 27; Weiskopf, Great , RSI 63 (1951) 5– 359 a.c.)” Rivolta dei Satrapi contro Artaserse II (370– 89. 97; Ruzicka, Politics 64– Satraps’Revolt, esp. 95–

5. Ariobarzanes andAthens III–

95

We begin by noting that Demosthenes implies a close chronological connection between three events: 1) the Athenian decision to send Timotheus to aid Ariobarzanes, 2) the outbreak of Ariobarzanes’revolt, and3) Timotheus’ siege of Samos. Since we have established that Timotheus moved against Samos in the period of May to August 366,111 it is possible to determine dates for the other two events. Twopoints areimmediately apparent. First, theAthenians voted to sendTimotheus to aid Ariobarzanes before the general went to Samos. Second, Ariobarzanes had

“ openly”revolted by the time Timotheus launched the siege. Therefore, we have a terminus ante quemof Mayto August 366 for both the decision to send Timotheus to aid Ariobarzanes andthe outbreak of the revolt. Wecan nownarrow down the dates of these events a bit further. Demosthenes’statement that theAthenians “ once sent Timotheus to aid Ariobarzanes”indicates that Timotheus had been elected general by the time the Athenians voted to send himon this expedition. According to ps.-Aristotle, the election of generals was normally held in the spring, in the period of mid-March to May.112 By these calculations, Timotheus was elected general no later than the spring of 366. As far as can be determined, he last held the strategia in 373/2.113 Timotheus, therefore, waselected general in the spring of 366 forthefirst time inseven years.114 This date provides a terminus post quemboth for theAthenian decision to sendaidtoAriobarzanes andfortheoutbreak of therevolt. Thus, in the period of mid-March to August 366, 1) the Athenians elected Timotheus general for the year 366/5; and 2) Timotheus launched operations against Samos. Between these two events, two other events occurred: A) the Athenians voted to send Timotheus to bring aid to Ariobarzanes; andB) Ariobarzanes staged hisrevolt. Wenowneedtodetermine whether A)or B) comes first –in other words, whether the revolt had begun by the time the Athenians decided to send aidto Ariobarzanes. Demosthenes indicates in 15.9 that Timotheus found out about the rebellion after setting sail from Athens. This is in all likelihood correct. Demosthenes hasnoreason to lie about these events in this speech. The Athenians, whohadupheld the Peace since its inception, will not have willingly jeopardized relations with theKing. Atthis point, infact, it wasespecially important to maintain those ties, as the chronology of the congresses at Susa will demonstrate below.115 We can therefore be fairly certain that in the period of mid-March to August 366, the events occurred in the following order: 1) the Athenians elected Timotheus general for 366/5; 2) the Athenians decided to send Timotheus to bring aid to Ariobarzanes; 3) Ariobarzanes staged his revolt; and4) Timotheus learned of the revolt andbesieged Samos. This discussion raises thepossibility that whenthe Athenians voted to send aid to Ariobarzanes, they knew that his revolt wasimminent. It is generally believed

2c. 111 For thechronology of Timotheus’siege of Samos, seeChapter I, Section I– 112 [Arist.] Athen. Pol. 44.4. See Chapter I, n. 42. 4, 7. See Ryder, Koine Eirene 82; 113 Xen. Hell. 6.2.11–12; Dem. 49.6, 13, 49; Diod. 15.47.3– Hansen, Eisangelia no. 80 n. 5. 5c below. 114 ForTimotheus’Chersonesian command, see Section III– 115 See Sections III-6c andd below.

96

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

that Ariobarzanes’plans were known atthetime of theCongress at Susa in 367.116 The chief piece of evidence for this view is Xenophon’s report that, during the deliberations, the Athenian ambassador Leon, dissatisfied with the King’s support of Theban interests, saidthat it wastime fortheAthenians “ to look forsome other friend besides the King”(Xen. Hell. 7.1.37). Judeich suggested that the friend in question wasnone other than Ariobarzanes.117 However, there aretworeasons why this view should be rejected. First, Leon’s statement, as recorded by Xenophon, does not refer explicitly to Ariobarzanes. Second, Leon could not have known of the satrap’s plans several months before the outbreak of the revolt. More likely, Leon simply meant what he said –that the Athenians would have to find other supporters if the King refused to look outfor their interests. Tachos of Egypt was possibly one; an Athenian alliance with him would be a real cause of worry for Artaxerxes.118

Weturnnowto thequestion of whatDemosthenes means whenhesays that the Athenians once sent Timotheus to bring aidto Ariobarzanes, ‘adding to the decree the phrase “provided that he (Timotheus) not break the treaty with the King” ’ (π ρ ϕ ο ρ γ ά ίσ μ σ μ α ψ τ ὴ λ ι“ η α ῷ ν ύ τ ο ψ ν ε τ α ςτ τ ὰ ςσπ ο ν δ ὰ ρ ςτ ). ὸ α ὰ ” σ ςπ ιλ ςτ νβ ὸ έα We first need to determine what thephrase π ϕ ίσ μ α ρ ά τ η ῷ ρ γ ψ ιmeans. ο ψ α σ ν τ ε ςτ ϕ ω to write besides, add in writing”.119 This as “ ρ ά γ ρ οσ LSJ defines the verb π leaves uswith twopossibilities: theAssembly added theclause either at thetime of the passage of the original decree or at some later point. Demosthenes presents so conflated an account in 15.9 that it is difficult to know from the passage alone ϕ ω heis using here. which meaning of π ρ ά γ ρ οσ ϕ ω elsewhere in Demosthenes, however, ρ ά γ ρ οσ Anexamination of the useof π is instructive. The verb appears another twenty-one times in his speeches. In thirteen cases, it is used to refer to a clause added to a law, deposition, ordecree at the time of its enactment.120 In seven cases, however, it is used to refer to a clause added at a later date.121 Two of these occur in the speech On the False Embassy, in passages where Demosthenes discusses the decree which the Athenians passed to reaffirm thePeace of Philocrates. Heblames Aeschines forthefact that theAssembly “added to the Peace”a clause that extended the treaty to include Philip’s 6c below, where the Congress is dated, independently of this discussion, to 116 See Section III– early autumn 367. 117 Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 199 and n. 1. See also Ryder, Koine Eirene 82; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 157. Judeich went so far as to argue that Ariobarzanes hadbeen planning revolt as early as 369/8, whenon behalf of the King he sent Philiscus to Delphi (ibid. 197). This 104; Cartledge, view has found general acceptance; see, e.g., Buckler, Theban Hegemony 102– 61; and Sealey, Demosthenes 81. However, there is no Agesilaos 386; Ruzicka, Politics 60– evidence that indicates Ariobarzanes wascontemplating revolt so far in advance. 118 See Xen. Ages. 2.29, which cites Tachos’ aid to Sparta as one of Agesilaus’ reasons for

agreeing to serve as his general. . Notably, the μ έν μ α , conditions added to a treaty” α ρ γ εγ ρ ο σ ὰ π ϕ ; Pass. τ ω ρ ά γ ρ ο σ 119 LSJ, s. v. π example given for the passive is Xenophon’s reference to theGreat King’s edict inHell. 7. 1. 37, where it wasproduced as anafterthought, i.e., after theoriginal edict andthe response to it. 120 Dem. 18.58; 20.2; 21.103; 23. 40, 48, 60, 75, 83; 24.44, 59, 81, 179; 27.42. Additionally, appears in a bracketed passage in24.42. ϕ ω οσ ρ π ρ ά γ 121 Dem. 19.56, 310; 22.71; 23.26; 24.100, 45.45; 46.11.

5. Ariobarzanes andAthens III–

97

descendants.122 The Athenians passed the decree extending the peace to Philip’s descendants on 16Scirophorion 346, approximately three months after ratifying the Peace.123 This evidence shows that π ρ ϕ οσ ρ γ ω ά in Demosthenes can refer to the adding of a provision to a decree by a separate vote taken at a later date. There is reason to believe that this meaning of π ρ ϕ οσ ρ ω γ is theoneweshould ά use for interpreting 15.9. The clause in question, notably, restricted the scope of whatTimotheus wasallowed to do.Once weaskwhythat restriction wasnotin the body of thedecree, the answer is obvious: the Athenians later obtained information that led them to put limits on Timotheus. It is reasonable to surmise that, after deciding to send aid to Ariobarzanes, they heard rumors of his impending revolt, rumors that led them to adda restrictive clause to the decree. This reconstruction helps explain whyDemosthenes says that Timotheus didnotbring aidto Ariobaropenly”revolted. His use of the word “ zanes after hearing that he had“ openly” α ν (ϕ ερ ῶ ) refers to the official outbreak of the revolt: Timotheus, like everyone ς else in Athens, hadheard rumors of revolt, butit wasonly after setting sail that he learned that it had actually begun. According to this chronology, Timotheus learned that the revolt had officially begun after setting sail from Athens andbefore moving against Samos. This raises two possibilities: Timotheus received the news on the wayto Asia Minor or soon after arriving there. This problem is insolvable, but it is not of critical importance for ourchronology. Since Timotheus could do little to help Ariobarzanes in Asia Minor without breaking thetreaty withtheKing, hespent little time there –at most a week or two–before going to Samos. Ariobarzanes thus staged the revolt only weeks before Timotheus besieged Samos. Since the siege began in the period of Mayto August 366, theoutbreak of therevolt belongs slightly earlier, in late spring or early summer of that year. Wemaywonder whytheAthenians voted to send forces to Ariobarzanes in the first place. No doubt, as Ruzicka has suggested, the satrap had sent ambassadors requesting aid; he probably sent them to the Spartans also, whomhe hadaided in 368.124 Wecan surmise that Ariobarzanes asked foraidin a local war: he knew that theAthenians inparticular would notagree tosupport hisrebellion. (Anaptparallel is provided by Cyrus the Younger, whoon the eve of his revolt requested and obtained support from a number of Greek sources; he told some he planned to attack Tissaphernes, andothers heplanned to attack the Pisidians [Xen. An. 1.1.8– 2.1].) In response to Ariobarzanes’ request, the Athenians voted to send him aid. Since there is noevidence that the Spartans responded inanyway, weshould infer that they did not commit themselves to sending forces to Ariobarzanes at this time.125

ν ὴ ρ ὸ ςτ ρ ά ιπ ψ α γ ο σ ρ ]π ν ο ερ τ σ ν[ὕ ᾽ἂ τ α είν ε εμ ῖςὑπ ᾽ὑμ θ ο νοὐδέπ υ οτοίν τ ῦ 122 Dem. 19.56: το ις... In 19.310 he says that Aeschines and his supporters added ο ν ό γ ο ῖςἐγ ὶτ α ν ,τ ὸκ η ν εἰρή ν... η ν ή εἰρ ν ὴ ε τ ν ς‹εἱς ρ α ά ψ γ ›τ σ ρ ο ᾽π ις ο ν γ ό ο ῖςἐγ α ὶτ this clause: ῾κ 123 Date of the second decree: Dem. 19.58. The Assembly ratified the Peace on 19 Elaphebolion (Dem. 19.57; Aeschin. 2.61, 82). 124 Ruzicka, Politics 64. 6f 125 For detailed discussion of the Spartan decision to send aid to Ariobarzanes, see Section III– below.

98

III. TheChronology of the Warover Chersonese

This chronology, if viewed in conjunction with the events of the war over Amphipolis, permits an additional observation. As we have established in the chronology of that war, Iphicrates intensified operations at Amphipolis in the autumn of 366.126 Hewasprobably able todosobecause hehadobtained additional funding. We mayinfer that when the satrap requested military aid from the Athenians twoyears later, he offered to send them money. That would help to explain both why the Athenians voted to send Ariobarzanes aid and why Iphicrates was able to intensify siege operations at Amphipolis.127 To sum up, the events should be ordered as follows: 1) the Athenians elected Timotheus general for 366/5; 2) Ariobarzanes sent ambassadors to Athens and probably also to Sparta requesting aid; 3) theAthenians voted to sendTimotheus to bring aid to Ariobarzanes; 4) upon hearing rumors of Ariobarzanes’ plans for revolt, the Athenians added to the decree instructions that forbade Timotheus from breaking the treaty with the King; 5) Timotheus set sail from Athens; 6) Ariobarzanes staged his revolt; 7) Timotheus learned that the revolt hadbegun; and8) he moved against Samos. We can attach tentative dates to these events, all of which belong in the period of mid-March to August 366. Theelections were held at the first auspicious time in the period of mid-March to May, therefore, probably in late March or April. Timotheus launched operations against Samos intheperiod of Mayto August, and so hisdeparture fromAthens andtheoutbreak of Ariobarzanes’revolt belong inthe weeks preceding the siege. Timotheus presumably set sail soon after he entered office in early July; since he wasnotresponding to anyparticular crisis, there is no reason to think heset outanyearlier than this. Most likely, the Athenians prepared his fleet so that he could set sail as soon as his term began, i.e., soon after 6 or 7 July.128 In that case, we can date the outbreak of Ariobarzanes’ revolt to shortly thereafter, inmid- or late July, andthelaunching of theSamian siege to late July or early August. Ariobarzanes’ embassy andthe Athenian decrees belong between Timotheus’election in late March or April andhisdeparture inearly summer, and so they should be dated to the spring.

5b. Tigranes, Timotheus, andSamos III–

We turn nowto questions concerning the last event in ourseries, Timotheus’siege of Samos. Demosthenes makes it clear that Timotheus moved against Samos after learning that Tigranes hadinstalled a garrison there. The launching of the siege in 2d. 126 See Chapter 1, Section I– 127 This wasactually thesecond time Ariobarzanes provided theAthenians with financial support. As wewill see shortly, he gave them money for their military expeditions in 368. See Section III– 6g below. 74; Rhodes, Commentary 537. On the method of 128 See Pritchett, “Attic STRATEGOI”469– determining theJulian equivalent of thebeginning of thearchon-year, see Chapter I, Section I– 3e. According to Bickerman, Chronology 118, the first newmoonafter thesummer solstice in 366 occurred on5 July. Theyear 366/5, therefore, probably began onetotwodays later, on6 or 7 July.

5. Ariobarzanes andAthens III–

99

the period of May to August 366 thus provides a terminus ante quem for the installation of this garrison. It is not clear whether Tigranes seized the city by invitation or, like Pericles, bysurprise (Thuc. 1.115.3). Ineither case, hewill have

established control in a matter of weeks. Tigranes, therefore, moved against Samos no later than July 366. We can nowattempt to narrow down the date further. According to Demosthenes, Timotheus decided to move against Samos after seeing that Ariobarzanes hadrevolted andthat Samos wasgarrisoned by Tigranes. This statement implies that the installation of the garrison belongs in the same general period as the outbreak of the revolt, but it does not indicate which event came first. It may be possible to deduce this from what we have already established, that 1) Timotheus learned of Ariobarzanes’ revolt before reaching Asia Minor, and decided to go straight to Samos; or 2) helearned of therevolt soon after reaching Asia Minor, and spent a week or two there before going to Samos. By either reconstruction, not much time elapsed between Timotheus’ departure from Athens andhis arrival at Samos –probably not enough time for the installation of a garrison, regardless of the manner in which it wasinstalled. It is therefore safe to saythat Tigranes putthe garrison inSamos before theoutbreak of therevolt, certainly inthefirst half of 366. Wearenaturally ledtoaskwhyTigranes installed thegarrison inthefirst place. Shahbazi argues persuasively that Tigranes washyparch of Ionia anda lieutenant of Autophradates, satrap of Lydia.129 His identification makes it virtually certain that it wasAutophradates whohadinstructed Tigranes to station troops inSamos. These instructions should therefore be dated to shortly before the installation of the garrison in the first half of 366. As weestablished earlier, Autophradates played a leading role in the loyalists’efforts to suppress that revolt in the years 363 to 361.130 56, hiswarwiththerebels can Aswewill seelater inanexamination of Dem. 153– be dated as early as the first half of 364, possibly earlier.131 It is, therefore, nottoo far a stretch to suggest he was involved in loyalist activities in the first half of 366, andto view his intervention in Samian affairs as part of those activities. Thus, by instructing Tigranes to install a garrison in Samos, Autophradates was acting in anticipation of the impending revolt. This discussion raises the question of whyAutophradates targeted Samos in particular. Perhaps Ariobarzanes had formed an alliance with the Samians. It is possible that he sent anembassy to Samos whenhesent Philiscus to Greece, i.e., in 368; there is, however, no evidence of contact before 366. A more likely reconstruction is that Ariobarzanes sent ambassadors to Samos when he sent them to Athens (and probably Sparta), in the spring of 366. In that case, Autophradates’ decision to seize control of Samos belongs slightly later that spring. Allowing time for Tigranes to collect forces, we should date his installation of the garrison to late spring. This discussion makes it possible to date more precisely when before Timotheus’departure inearly July 366 the Athenians added to thedecree theinstructions Tigranes”126. 129 Shahbazi, “ 4e above. 130 See Section III– 8b below. 131 See Section III–

100

III. TheChronology of theWaroverChersonese

that forbade him from breaking their treaty with the King. Since Tigranes installed the garrison in Samos in anticipation of Ariobarzanes’ revolt, it is a logical inference that the Athenians first heard rumors about the satrap whenthey learned of thegarrison. Thegarrison belongs inlate spring 366, andsotheAthenians heard the rumors about the revolt andpassed the second decree concerning Ariobarzanes in late spring as well. Since Ariobarzanes’ embassy to Athens and the first decree belong inthespring, nomore thana month canhaveelapsed between theenactment

of the two decrees. The order anddating of theevents thus appears as follows: 1) in late March or April 366, the Athenians elected Timotheus general for 366/5; 2) shortly thereafter that same spring, Ariobarzanes sent ambassadors to Athens, andprobably also to Sparta andSamos, requesting aid in a local conflict; 3) in response, the Athenians voted to send Timotheus to bring aid to Ariobarzanes, andthe Samians formed an alliance with the satrap; 4) Autophradates, learning of the Samian alliance and suspecting that Ariobarzanes planned to revolt, instructed Tigranes to seize control of thecity; 5) in late spring Tigranes installed a garrison in Samos; 5) uponhearing rumors of Ariobarzanes’ plans for revolt, the Athenians added to their decree instructions that forbade Timotheus frombreaking thetreaty with the King; 6) soon after 6 or 7 July, Timotheus set sail for Asia Minor; 7) in mid- or late July, Ariobarzanes staged his revolt; and 8) in late July or early August, Timotheus, learning of therevolt, moved against Samos.

5c. The command of Timotheus III– This discussion raises the question of Timotheus’military jurisdiction for theyear 366/5. According to Demosthenes, theAthenians sent himto aidAriobarzanes, but no ancient source indicates precisely what his title was. Iphicrates’command had apparently been limited to Amphipolis, judging from Aeschines’reference to him ίπ ολ ιν.132As we have seen, when Iphicrates wasdismissed in ᾽Ἀμϕ as general ἐπ ϕ (Dem. σ ίπ ο ν ο λ ιν κ α ὶΧερρόνη ᾽Ἀμ π late spring 365, Timotheus became general ἐ it was position, Iphicrates ’ 23.149). It canbe inferred thatwhenTimotheus received π ὶ ἐ command the i.e., in addition to the one he himself hadheld the year before, reference . This interpretation sheds additional light on Demosthenes’ η σ ο ν ρ ν ό Χ ερ to Timotheus’ decision to take up the War against Amphipolis before the War against Chersonese: in late spring 365, the general was about to move against Chersonese, butchanged his plans after Amphipolis wasadded to hisjurisdiction. Aswehave seen, it is probable thatTimotheus waselected general inthespring of 366 after a gapof several years. By this reasoning, he must have received the Chersonesian command after his election andbefore setting out from Athens for Asia, therefore intheperiod of mid-March toJuly 366. This finding is important for two reasons. First, we now have a more precise terminus ante quem for the Athenian claim to Chersonese. As seen earlier, Dem. 23.149 indicates that the 81. 132 Aeschin. 2.27; Cawkwell, “Common Peace”80–

III-6. The recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese

101

Athenians stated their claim to the region by spring or early summer 365.133 Since they musthave decided to sendanexpedition to recover Chersonese before assigning the command to Timotheus, we can move upthe terminus ante quem for the claim to theperiod of Mayto August 366. Second, wecannowbecertain thatTimotheus received instructions to recover

possession of Chersonese shortly before he received instructions to bring aid to Ariobarzanes. The chronological proximity of these decisions raises the distinct possibility that they were connected. Perhaps at some point before this, Ariobarzanes hadpledged to support the Athenians’aims in the north andhadgiven them money to back up that pledge. That would explain not only why the Athenians assigned Timotheus the tasks of recovering Chersonese andbringing aid to Ariobarzanes, but also why Ariobarzanes later handed over Sestus and Crithote to Timotheus. We will investigate this subject in greater detail shortly, when we establish the chronology of the recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese.134

6. Therecognition of theAthenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III– 6a. The evidence III–

We turn now to the much-debated question of when the Great King and the Hellenes recognized theAthenian claims toAmphipolis andChersonese. Ourchief sources onthesubject areXenophon, Demosthenes, andHegesippus. According to Xenophon, during the negotiations at Susa, Pelopidas, when asked bythe King what terms hewould like to have written in the treaty, said that Messene should be autonomous andthat theAthenians should draw uptheir ships; after these things were written down andread aloud to the ambassadors, Leon of Athens said that it wastime for the Athenians to seek some friend other than the King; when the secretary interpreted what he said, the King brought forth an additional writing that invited theAthenians to negotiate further with himconcerningthese provisions; uponreturning toAthens, Timagoras wasprosecuted byLeon for not sharing quarters with him and for supporting Pelopidas, and was executed (Xen. Hell. 7.1.36– 7). Demosthenes in his speech OntheFalse Embassy refers to these events: He(Philip) should have some friends among you, accomplishing andmanaging eachandevery thing forhim ... Nowif heheard that thepersons whotalked like that tohimhadbeencrucified ona plank immediately after they returned home, I fancy hewould have done thesame thing as the Great King. What wasit that he did? After he hadbeen deceived byTimagoras andhad given himforty talents, asthestory goes, whenhelearned thatTimagoras hadbeenputtodeath at Athens anddidnot have the authority to secure his ownlife, much less to do what he had promised himatthat time, herealized that hehadnotpaidthemanincharge of affairs. The first result was that he again made Amphipolis your subject, which he had put on his own list of 37) friends andallies; andsecond, that henever again gave money to anyone. (Dem. 19.136– 133 See Section III–1 above. 6g. 134 See below, esp. Section III–

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

102 Later

in the same speech hesays,

This man(Aeschines), on the other hand, surrendered andgave back Amphipolis, which the King andall the Greeks hadrecognized as yours, speaking in support of Philocrates whenhe moved this decree.

Hegesippus refers to the recognition speech OnHalonnesus:

(Dem. 19.253)

of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis in the

Apparently those who inhabited Amphipolis before Philip took it were holding Athenian territory, butwhen he has taken it, it is no longer ourterritory, buthis own, that he holds...Do younotsee that hisletter toyouis allcarefully calculated, sothat hiswords andhisactions may appear to conform to the universal standard of justice, while he has really shown supreme contempt for it inclaiming for himself anddenying to youterritory which theGreeks andthe King of Persia voted upon andagreed is yours? ([Dem.] 7.28– 9)

The Third Philippic contains the only reference to the recognition of the Athenian

claim to Chersonese:

Come now, when he (Philip) sends mercenaries to Chersonese, which the King and all the Hellenes recognized is yours, andagrees to sendaidandwrites these things, what is hedoing? (Dem. 9.16)

Two major stumbling-blocks immediately confront anyone who wishes to make sense of this evidence. First, no source refers to the recognition of the claim to Amphipolis andthe recognition of the claim to Chersonese together. Second, both Demosthenes andHegesippus mention the recognition by the King and the Helthe King and lenes in the same context. Demosthenes in the Third Philippic says “ all theHellenes”recognized theclaim to Chersonese (though intheFalse Embassy speech he speaks of the King’s recognizing the claim to Amphipolis anddoes not theHellenes andthe King of Persia” mention the Hellenes); andHegesippus says “ voted on the claim to Amphipolis. It is impossible to discern from these accounts when the King andthe Hellenes ratified each claim, andwhether they ratified the claims jointly or separately. These problems areapparent fromthescholarship onthesubject. Hampl argues that the King gave his consent when the Hellenes ratified the Athenians’claim to Amphipolis at the Common Peace of 375/4.135 Accame argues, contra Hampl, that the King and the Hellenes did not necessarily ratify the Athenians’ claims on the same occasion; heassumes, however, that the King ratified thetwoclaims simultaneously, asdidtheHellenes.136 Cawkwell accepts Accame’s viewthat the King and the Hellenes ratified the claims at different times. He argues, however, that the Hellenes ratified the claims to Amphipolis and Chersonese in decrees passed on two different occasions, each shortly before the commencement of operations against the place in question: they ratified the claim to Amphipolis in 369 and ratified theclaim to Chersonese as a term of a Common Peace concluded in 366/5; the King recognized the claims to Amphipolis and Chersonese in 366/5 in that Peace, which was a modification of the proposals made by Pelopidas at Susa the 135 Hampl, Die Griechischen Staatsverträge 18. Hedoes notdiscuss Chersonese in this context. 56, 165. 136 Accame, La Lega 155–

6. The recognition of theAthenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III–

103

year before.137 Although views vary on the chronology of these events, it is generally believed that the Great King’s recognition of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis, andprobably Chersonese also, belongs immediately after theConfer-

ence at Susa, i.e., in early 366.138 We can to some extent circumvent the problems of modern scholarship by piecing together what we know of the events with the chronology established

above. The key facts are as follows: during the negotiations at Susa, Timagoras supported Pelopidas; Leon, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the terms that Pelopidas hadproposed; theGreat King responded to Leon’s complaint byinviting theAthenians tosendanembassy forfurther discussion; theAthenian ambassadors reported on the negotiations upon their return to Athens; as Grote139 correctly points out, the Assembly responded to the news of the King’s invitation by voting to send another embassy to him; andthe King recognized the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. Most of these events can be dated with some precision. The King issued his invitation to the Athenians during the negotiations at the Congress at Susa. No source provides a date for this Congress, but Buckler, working outthe chronology of Pelopidas’movements in this period, adduces compelling reasons for putting it in the autumn of 367. By his estimate, after one to twomonths of negotiations, the Theban ambassadors returned home in March 366.140 These dates require slight modification, based on consideration of two problems: 1) when the King was present in Susa to receive theGreek embassies, and2) the length of time it took to travel from Susa to mainland Greece at different times in theyear.

6b. The Greek embassies to Susa III–

The sources disagree onwhere the king resided in different seasons, andhence are difficult to evaluate. According to Xenophon, Cyrus the Great wasaccustomed to spending three months each spring in Susa; hespent twomonths in Ecbatana at the height of summer and in the winter spent seven months in Babylon (Xen. Cyr. 8.6.22). This account probably to some extent reflects whatwascurrent practice in Xenophon’s day, i.e., during Artaxerxes II’s early reign; Xenophon clearly didnot 85) is Diod. 15.76.3, the only explicit Common Peace”81– 137 Central to Cawkwell’s theory (“ The King’s reference to theCommon Peace of 366/5. Although heis followed byR. Seager, “ 362 B.C.” , Athenaeum n.s. 52 (1974) 62, his Peace andthe Balance of Power in Greece, 386– arguments in favor of the conclusion of a Peace at this date are unconvincing. See Buckler, 55. Theban Hegemony 251– Die Anerkennung 138 Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 199; Ryder, Koine Eirene 81. M. Jehne, “ , Historia 41 (1992) 280, derathenischen Besitzansprüche auf Amphipolis unddie Chersones” interprets Dem. 19.137 as evidence for a bilateral treaty which the King offered to the Athenians at Susa in 367/6 andwhich wasformulated in the spring of 366. Schaefer, Demos97, follows Judeich’s sequence of events butdates theCongress to 368/7 andthe thenes2 1.96– Persian embassy to Athens to the first half of 367. 139 Grote, History 8.280 n. 2. 140 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 249.

104

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

have that kind of information about Cyrus. Athenaeus presents a somewhat differ-

ent calendar: the Persian kings spent winters in Susa, summers in Ecbatana, autumns in Persepolis, and the rest of the year (i.e., springs) in Babylon (Athen. 14). His schedule is too schematic to be strictly correct, but it Deipn. 12.8: 513– does corroborate Xenophon’s claim that the Great King spent the summer in Ecbatana where theweather wasthemosttemperate. Otherwise, however, there are major discrepancies, with Xenophon saying that Cyrus spent seven months in Babylon in the winter and Athenaeus putting him there in the spring. Moreover, whereas Athenaeus says the kings spent the autumn in Persepolis, Xenophon does not mention this city, nodoubt because it washistorically impossible for Cyrus to have gone there.

It is worth considering a passage in the Hellenica, which, to myknowledge, is the only piece of evidence that indicates when a Greek embassy expected to meet with the King in Susa. When discussing the aborted Athenian embassy of 408/7, Xenophon Hell. 1.4.1 says that Pharnabazus detained the ambassadors, whospent the winter in Gordium and continued their journey to the King at Susa at the beginning of spring. Hedoes notsaywhere theambassadors were whenthey were ontheir way” , i.e., some distance beyond intercepted, only that they were already “ Gordium. Presumably, they expected to find the King at Susa later that spring. Second, it is generally agreed that the King went to Persepolis in the spring for the New Year, in the period of March-April.141 It is likely that the visit was not a brief one, for the distance from Susa wasappreciable –ajourney of approximately four weeks.142 Since the Athenian ambassadors delayed byPharnabazus planned to arrive in Susa sometime in late spring 407, we may tentatively suggest that, in general, the King spent the first part of the spring in Persepolis andthe second part in Susa. Hewill have left Susa in late June andspent July andAugust (the hottest months) in Ecbatana. This reconstruction accords with Xenophon’s twostatements that putthe King in Susa in the spring. Since the King apparently preferred to spend part of thespring inSusa, wemay wonder if he also spent time there in the autumn, the other time of year when the climate was temperate. Perhaps he simply reversed the order of his travels but omitted Persepolis, going from Ecbatana to Susa to Babylon. To allow for this possibility, weshould posit that the King wasavailable to receive Greek embassies at Susa (the only place where heis attested as receiving them)143 inboth spring and autumn of each year.

die 141 See, e.g., G. Walser, Die Völkerschaften auf denReliefs vonPersepolis (Berlin 1966) 20: “ ; cf. K. Erdmann, Review of E. Zeremonie derköniglichen Neujahrfeier derNouruz derPerser” F. Schmidt, Persepolis, Vol. I, Bibl. Orient. 13 (1956) 56. 142 Diod. 19.21.2; see Badian, “Agis III: Revisions and Reflections”in I. Worthington (ed.), 80. Ventures into Greek History (Oxford 1994) 278– 52; Plut. Mor. 863 C 8. 36, 151– 143 E.g., Hdt. 7. 6, 135–

6. Therecognition of theAthenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III–

105

6c. The Congress at Susa III–

To date thedeparture of theGreek embassies forSusa, wemustrely ontheaccounts of Xenophon andPlutarch: AndnowtheThebans, whowerecontinually planning howthey might obtain theleadership of Greece, believed that if they should send to the King of the Persians, they would gain some advantage. Thereupon they immediately summoned their allies, on the pretext that Euthycles the Lacedaemonian was at the King’s court; and there went up Pelopidas of the Thebans, Antiochus thepancratiast, of theArcadians, andArchidamus of theEleans; anArgive also went with them. Andthe Athenians hearing of this sent upTimagoras andLeon. (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33) WhentheThebans learned thatambassadors fromtheLacedaemonians andtheAthenians were on their wayto theGreat King concerning alliance, they also sent Pelopidas there. (Plut. Pel. 30.1)

Xenophon’s account is generally preferred,144 butthere are reasons to believe that the account of Plutarch, as far as it goes, is closer to the truth. First, although Xenophon claims that theThebans decided to sendanembassy to the King ontheir owninitiative, it is clear even from his ownaccount that this wasnotthe case.145 Second, Xenophon tries to obscure the fact that the Athenians as well as the Spartans sent ambassadors to theKing first, because hedoes notwishto portray the Athenians as colluding with the Persians. This explains why he passes over the story of the King’s bribery of Timagoras, which appears in Demosthenes aswell as 7). We should conclude that the Athein Plutarch (Dem. 19.137; Plut. Pel. 30.6– nians andthe Spartans sent embassies to the King at the same time, andthat the Thebans sent anembassy after receiving wordof this. It is possible to establish fairly precisely whentheThebans sent envoys to the King, because Pelopidas participated intheembassy. Hismovements inthis period canbe summarized as follows: Pelopidas went to Thessaly to deal with Alexander of Pherae, whotook himprisoner; the Thebans sent forces to rescue him; after this attempt failed, they sent out Epaminondas, who succeeded in obtaining Pelopidas’ release; at this time, Pelopidas returned to Thebes; the Thebans, learning of the Spartan andAthenian embassies totheKing, sentembassies to their Peloponnesian allies; theThebans, Arcadians, Eleans, andArgives decided to sendambassadors to the King; Pelopidas andthe other ambassadors then set out for Susa (Xen. Hell. 30.1). 7.1.33; Plut. Pel. 28.1, 29– Buckler believes that Epaminondas didnotgoto Thessaly before the spring of 367, because there is no evidence that he led a winter campaign andbecause the Theban army haddone so badly in its first attempt to rescue Pelopidas. According to Buckler’s calculations, Pelopidas’release belongs in the spring or as late as the

98; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 144 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.94; Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 197– 89; Ryder, Koine Eirene 80; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 249; C. D. Hamilton, Failure 3.1.188– 237. For discussion of Spartan events omitted by Xenophon but included by Plutarch, see 69. Agesilaus andSparta”68– Cawkwell, “ 145 Hamilton, Failure 237.

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

106

early summer; Pelopidas andthe other ambassadors, therefore, didnotbegin their journey to Susa until mid-summer, andthey arrived there in the autumn.146 This scheme needs correction on some minor points. First, there is reason to believe that Epaminondas’ Thessalian campaign andPelopidas’ return should be going round ina circle, kept dated slightly earlier. Plutarch says that Epaminondas “ threatening [Alexander] with war, made preparations, andkept the tyrant in suspense with ultimatums andthreats” , andthat Alexander “quickly sent ambassadors (Plut. Pel. 29.3, 6). These statements indicate that Epaminondas to answer to him” did no actual fighting at this time; all he did was march around Pherae. Since Alexander surrendered quickly, Epaminondas’march mayhave lasted twoto three weeks. Pelopidas, therefore, probably returned to Thebes in late winter or early spring

367.

Second, the Thebans sent ambassadors to Susa after the Spartan andAthenian ambassadors were already on their way. We can approximate how much time elapsed between thedepartures of thedifferent embassies. TheThebans hadtohear of the Spartan andAthenian embassies, summon their Peloponnesian allies tojoin them in sending to the King, andthen prepare the embassy to Susa. Since it will have taken a bitof time toprepare theembassies andmeetwiththeallies, weshould allow twoto three weeks for these actions. TheTheban ambassadors, therefore, set out for Susa approximately three weeks after the departure of the Spartan and Athenian embassies. Wenowneedtoconsider these points inconjunction withtwofactors discussed above, the time required for theGreek embassies to travel to Susa, andthetimes of year when the King was likely to be in residence there. Herodotus estimates the journey from Sardis to Susa atthree months;147 wecanaddanother fewdays tothis figure to cover thejourney from mainland Greece to Sardis. Since the King may have spent time in Susa in both late spring andearly autumn, it is a reasonable conjecture that the Greek ambassadors will have set out with the intention of reaching Susa inoneof those twoperiods. Pelopidas returned home fromThessaly in late winter or spring 367, andso there cannot have been enough time for himto reach Susa before the King left for Ecbatana in late June. The Congress, therefore, must belong in the autumn. The Spartans andAthenians will not have wanted to arrive in Susa before the King’s return in September, andsothey setoutfrom their homecities inearly June attheearliest, possibly a bit later. TheThebans setouttwo to three weeks after the Spartans andthe Athenians, i.e., in late June or early July, and arrived in late September or early October. Serious negotiations, therefore, cannot have begun before early October 367. We can nowestablish the chronology of the ambassadors’ return to Greece. They left Susa after perhaps two to three weeks of negotiations, therefore in late October or early November. The embassies will have been travelling in the winter months, andso it is unlikely that they took the Royal Road through Asia Minor. Bad 49. 146 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 248– Zu den griechischen Gesandtschaften nach 147 Hdt. 5.50. On the actual route, see Hofstetter, “ 101. Persien”in G. Walser (ed.), Beiträge zurAchämenidengeschichte (Wiesbaden 1972) 100–

6. The recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III–

107

weather will have forced them to go by the coastal route instead, which took perhaps twoweeks longer than the outbound journey. If thejourney took between three andthree andone-half months, their return belongs in mid- to late February 366.148 It remains to date the rest of the events in the series. In view of the importance of the issues, the ambassadors will have given their accounts of the negotiations at the very next meeting of the Assembly, i.e., no more than a week after their return. Their reports, therefore, belong inthesecond half of February orearly March. The Assembly’s decision to send a second embassy to the King must follow shortly thereafter.

6d. The second Athenian embassy to Susa; theGreat King’s recognition of the III– Athenian claim to Amphipolis Dating the second Athenian embassy to the Great King is a bit more difficult, for there is noexplicit evidence that anyother state sent ambassadors atthis time149 and so we cannot use events elsewhere in Greece as criteria. Grote believes that the at the same time”as they sent Athenians sent the second embassy to the King “ Timotheus to thecoast of Asia Minor, andJudeich, accepting this chronology, dates these missions to early spring 366.150 There are, however, important reasons for rejecting this chronology. Webegin by noting that the second embassy, like thefirst, must have gone to Susa knowing when the King would be there. If the first Athenian embassy didnot return from Susa until mid-to late February 366, thesecond embassy cannot have setoutbefore early March. If they set outright away, they will have arrived in early or mid-June, whenthe KingwasatSusa; if they setoutanylater thanthis, they will have arrived when he wason his wayto Ecbatana or already in residence there. The only other alternative is that the ambassadors waited until June to set out, so that they would arrive in Susa after the King’s return in September. It is unlikely, however, that there was this much of a delay: Artaxerxes’ invitation had made the Athenians hopeful of getting better terms andeager to get an answer as quickly as possible. We should therefore date thedeparture of thesecond embassy from Athens toearly March and its arrival in Susa to early June. After perhaps two weeks of negotiations, i.e., before leaving for Ecbatana at the endof the month, the King agreed to support the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. If we allow a little over three months for the return journey, the ambassadors arrived back in mainland Greece in late September or early October 366. They were surely eager to announce the King’s

49, whoputs their return in March. 148 Cf. Buckler, Theban Hegemony 248– 6e below onSparta. 149 Butsee Section III– 150 Grote, History 8.280; Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 199. Grote puts these missions in 366 without specifying a time in theyear, andhedoes notsaywhenthe King recognized theclaim to Amphipolis. Glotz, Histoire Grecque 3.167, puts the King’s recognition of Amphipolis in thesummer of 366,just prior toTimotheus’siege of Samos. Hedoes notexplain, however, how hearrived at those dates.

108

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

sanction of theAthenian claim atthenextAssembly meeting, andsoweshould date their report to early October. We can now date the trial and execution of Timagoras. As we have seen, Xenophon says in Hell. 7.1.37 that when the ambassadors returned home, Leon prosecuted Timagoras, whowas putto death; andDemosthenes says in 19.136– 37 that the King recognized Amphipolis as Athenian after hearing of Timagoras’fate. It is a logical inference that theKing heard about Timagoras’trial fromthesecond setof ambassadors, whowished toimpress uponhimAthenian displeasure withthe terms of thePeace devised theprevious autumn. Inthat case, wecanbe certain that Leon brought Timagoras to trial before the second embassy left for Susa. Clearly, the conviction represents the Assembly’s immediate reaction to the unfavorable terms of the Peace which the first embassy announced upon its return to Athens, andso the trial belongs in late February orearly March 366.151 Combining these various findings with those concerning the outbreak of Ariobarzanes’revolt, wecome upwith the following sequence. In approximately midto late February 366, Leon andTimagoras returned fromSusa andreported onthe negotiations; in response, the Athenians voted to send a second embassy to the King. The second embassy set outfor Susa in early March. A few weeks later, in late March or early April, they elected Timotheus general. Not long after this, Ariobarzanes sent ambassadors to Athens requesting support, andthe Athenians voted to send out Timotheus to bring himaid andto recover Chersonese. In June, Tigranes, following instructions fromAutophradates, installed a garrison inSamos. In July, Timotheus set sail for Asia Minor. In mid-July, Ariobarzanes staged his revolt. Realizing that he could notbring aidto Ariobarzanes without breaking the Peace, Timotheus moved against Samos, probably in late July or August. The chronology thus makes it clear thattheAthenians voted tosendthesecond embassy to Susa before they elected Timotheus general andvoted to send him to aid Ariobarzanes. By ourcalculations, the Great King recognized the Athenians’claim to Amphipolis two to three months after they decided to send Timotheus out to recover Chersonese. It is tempting to infer, as many scholars have, that Artaxerxes recognized theclaim to Chersonese atthesametime astheclaim to Amphipolis. Butwe musttake into account Demosthenes’failure to mention Chersonese in 19.137. His point here is that theKing madea great concession totheAthenians after hearing of Timagoras’execution (the truth of this claim is, of course, another matter entirely, andis irrelevant here). Since Demosthenes’case would beevenstronger if hecould include Chersonese in his statement, it is fairly certain that the King did not recognize the claim to Chersonese at the time he recognized the claim to Amphipolis. Moreover, it is nowclear that Artaxerxes’ recognition of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis has no chronological connection with the Hellenes’ ratification of the claim, for their decree belongs over five years earlier, in the autumn of 371.152

84, points out, this is clear from Leon’s 7. AsCawkwell, “Common Peace”83– 151 Plut. Pel.30.6– accusation of Timagoras. 152 Xen. Hell. 6.5.1; Aeschin. 2.32. Scholars longbelieved that theAthenians stated their claim to

6. Therecognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III–

109

III-6e. The second Spartan embassy to Susa There is reason tobelieve that Athens wasnottheonlyGreek state tosenda second embassy to the Great King, butthat Sparta, andprobably other states dissatisfied withtheterms of thetreaty setforth atSusa in367, sent ambassadors toSusa inthe winter of 366/5. Thechief piece of evidence for this view is Xenophon’s reference to a letter that theGreat King sent to Agesilaus:153 When a letter concerning hospitality andfriendship came to him(Agesilaus) from the King, which thePersian whocame withCallias theSpartan hadbrought, hedidnotaccept it, butsaid to the one bearing the letter to tell the King that it was not necessary to send letters to him privately. If, however, he appeared to be a friend to Sparta andof good intent to Hellas, he (Agesilaus) himself would be a friend to himwith all hispower. “ But if” heis found , hesaid, “ plotting against them, let himnotthink that hewill have measa friend, however manyletters I mayreceive”... I praise that instance of his foresight, that believing it good forGreece that as many satraps as possible revolt fromthe King, hewasnotprevailed uponbygifts orbythepower of theKing to wish to accept his hospitality, but was careful not to become untrustworthy to those who wanted to revolt. (Xen. Ages. 8.3, 5)

Plutarch also relates the story: When, after thepeace wasconcluded, the King sent him(Agesilaus) a letter concerning xenia andfriendship, hedidnotaccept it, saying that thecommon friendship wasenough, andthat while it lasted there was no need of a private friendship. (Plut. Ages. 23.10)

Weneed to determine when theGreat King sent this letter to Agesilaus. Hatzfeld contends, quite rightly, that the King will have solicited Agesilaus’friendship when 1) a revolt involving a number of satraps was about to take place; and 2) the Spartans were an important power. The first criterion enables himto rule out the period before theoutbreak of Datames’revolt, because that wasa rebellion of only onesatrap. Onthe basis of the second criterion, herules outthe period of Ariobarzanes’ revolt, arguing that after Leuctra the King was not anxious to improve relations with Sparta, hence he supported Pelopidas’ terms at Susa. Hedates the letter to 362 or361, i.e., theperiod after thePeace of 362/1 hadbeenconcluded, and before thethird phase of theGreat Satraps’Revolt hadbegun; at this point, Sparta

53

Amphipolis at the congress at Sparta earlier that year. (See e.g., G. Busolt, Der zweite athenische Bund, Jahrbuch für classische Philologie Suppl. 7 (1873/5) 790; Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.74; E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums 2nd. ed. Vol. 5 (Basel/Stuttgart 1953) 406; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.2 3.1.162; and West, Chalcidic League 109. After Hampl, Die griechischen Staatsverträge 18, pointed out the problems with this view, Accame adduced arguments fordating theAthenian claim to369(S. Accame, La lega ateniese delsecolo IVa.C. 56. Accame’s view has been followed, in a modified form, by a number of (Rome 1941) 155– 82; andSea81; Jehne, “Anerkennung”272– Common Peace”80– scholars, e.g., Cawkwell, “ ley, Demosthenes 75. Xenophon’account, however, strongly suggests thattheHellenes ratified the claim at theCongress at Athens, whentheAthenians dictated the terms of the newpeace treaty. See Hornblower, TheGreek World 479 to 323 B.C. (London/New York 1983) 226. This story appears twice in Plutarch: Mor. 213D, which preserves all of the details of Xenophon’s account, andAges. 23.6, which is a paraphrased version.

110

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

wastheonly state that Artaxerxes could approach, since it wasa party neither tothe Peace norto the Reply to the Satraps.154 Although Hatzfeld’s interpretation is plausible in some respects, it has two serious problems. First, he does not explain Xenophon’s reference to the Persian ambassador who accompanied the Spartan Callias to Sparta. This reference is important, for it indicates that the Spartans hadsent anembassy to the King before he sent the letter to Agesilaus, and that Callias was the leader of that embassy. There canbe little doubt that it wasinresponse to Callias’embassy that Artaxerxes offered Agesilaus hospitality and friendship. Second, our chronology renders invalid Hatzfeld’s chief reason for ruling outtheperiod of Ariobarzanes’revolt as the time for theembassy. Wehave seen that during thenegotiations atSusa Artaxerxes did not support Theban interests as wholeheartedly as has been previously thought, but was eager to be on good terms with Athens as well. It follows that his policy of appeasement included other states dissatisfied with the terms of the treaty, andthat when he issued the invitation for further negotiations to Athens, he issued one to Sparta andprobably also to theother major states represented at theCongress. By this reasoning, when the Athenian ambassadors returned to Athens from Susa with news of the King’s invitation, i.e., in mid- to late February 366, the Spartan ambassadors returned to Sparta with aninvitation of their own. In response to Artaxerxes’overtures, the Spartans sent Callias andother ambassadors to Susa. Using the criteria used to date the Athenian embassy, we should put the Spartan embassy in Susa inearly June 366. As a result of the second set of negotiations, the King sent a Persian ambassador to Sparta to convey his letter for Agesilaus. Callias returned to Sparta with the Persian at approximately the same time as the second Athenian embassy’s return to Athens, i.e., in late September or early October 366. By mentioning Callias, Xenophon enables us to distinguish this Spartan embassy from the one sent to Susa in the autumn of 367, of which Antalcidas was probably the leader and Euthycles was also a member (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33; Plut. Pel. 30.6). Most likely, Callias replaced Antalcidas as the leader of the second embassy. This change lends support to the generally-held view that Antalcidas committed suicide as a result of his failure at Susa.155

6f. The Spartan decision to send aidto Ariobarzanes III–

Wecan nowattempt to answer the question of whenthe Spartans decided to send aid to Ariobarzanes. Xenophon provides the only evidence for this decision. In μ α χ ο ςof the Spartans when μ ύ Ages. 2.26 he says that Ariobarzanes was a σ Agesilaus aided him against Autophradates. It is worth noting that the term summa-

45. 154 Hatzfeld, “Agésilas et Artaxerxès II”239– , RE 1 (1894) 2345; Ryder, Koine Eirene 81; Ham155 Plut. Artox. 22.3; Judeich, “Antalkidas” Pharax andthe Spartan Embassy to Athens in mond, History of Greece3 502. Cf. D. J. Mosley, “ , CR 86 (1972) , Historia 12 (1963) 249; “Euthycles: One or Two Spartan Envoys?” 370/69” , Ancient Society 3 (1972) 12; Buckler, “Plutarch andthe 168; “Diplomacy inClassical Greece” 45; Hamilton, Failure 254. Fate of Antalkidas”, GRBS 18 (1977) 139–

6. The recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III–

111

chos does notnecessarily indicate thata formal alliance wasconcluded between the Spartans andAriobarzanes. It can indicate simply that good relations existed when theSpartans decided tosendaidtothesatrap. Since wehavedated Agesilaus’aidto Ariobarzanes to late 362 or early 361, the Spartan decision belongs before that point. Three possibilities come to mind. The Spartans could have made this decision in response to Philiscus’ visit in 368, when he granted them money and mercenaries. This reconstruction is somewhat problematical, however, for there is no indication that at this time Ariobarzanes requested aid from the Spartans, only that he offered it to them. A second possibility is that the Spartans decided to send aid in response to an embassy from Ariobarzanes requesting it. As we have seen, however, the lack of evidence makes it unlikely that they committed themselves at this time.156 There is a third solution. Perhaps the Spartan decision to send aid to Ariobarzanes came later, after they hadlost all hope that Artaxerxes would satisfy their demands. The most likely time for this decision is late September or early October 366, when the second set of ambassadors returned from Susa. As we have seen, they were accompanied bya Persian ambassador bearing a letter for Agesilaus. The conciliatory nature of this letter indicates that the King wished to placate Agesilaus. The reason is obvious. In the recent set of negotiations, Artaxerxes hadnotagreed to recognize the Spartans’claim to Messene. Heknew that they would be furious, and he hoped to soften the blow. The King’s attempt, however, did not work. After failing twice to obtain Artaxerxes’ recognition of their claim to Messene, the Spartans decided to provide aid to Ariobarzanes, who, by our calculations, had staged his revolt two to three months earlier. They hoped this move would help secure

a source of funding

while sending

anunambiguous

message

to Artaxerxes.

6g. The recognition of the Athenian claim to Chersonese III–

Weturn nowtothedating of theratification of theAthenian claim to Chersonese by the King andthe Hellenes. Unfortunately, the only specific reference we have is the King andall the Hellenes”recognized theclaim Demosthenes’ statement that “ to Chersonese (Dem. 9.16). There is, however, some other evidence that canaidin determining when the Hellenes ratified the claim. The Athenians’ treaty with the Thracian kings of 358/7 or 357/6 probably provides a terminus ante quem, for in it Chersonese

is recognized as Athenian.157 Demosthenes’ statement indicates that

5a above. 156 See Section III– 20; see also Dem. 23.170. Since Höck, the year 357 has 157 Tod no. 151 = SVAno. 303, lines 15– beentheaccepted date forthetreaty of Athens, Berisades, Amadocus, andCersebleptes (Höck, 105). The inscription, however, does notprovide a date; “ DasOdrysenreich inThrakien”101– 75, which indicates only that nor can it be discerned from Demosthenes’ account in 23.169– they madethetreaty whenChares wasgeneral, after hisreturn fromEuboea, therefore either in 358/7 or357/6. If, asI havesuggested elsewhere, thealliance wasa response toPhilip’s capture of Amphipolis, it belongs intheautumn or winter of 357 (Heskel, “Foreign Policy”80). Forthe 55. 54– Philip II” circumstances of the treaty, see Badian, “

112

III. The Chronology of the Warover Chersonese

theHellenes recognized theclaim ata Common Peace congress.158 Theonly time in the period of 366 to 357 when the Athenians were powerful enough to have the claim ratified wasafter Mantinea; at that point, theThebans could no longer stand in the way. Wecantherefore confidently date the Hellenes’decree to theCongress of 362/1.159 It is clear from the Reply to the Satraps that the Great King had been excluded from the Congress.160 Artaxerxes’ recognition of the claim therefore cannot be dated to this occasion. In thecase of Amphipolis too, where wefind the same phraseology, it turns outthat therecognition of theclaim bytheHellenes and the King didnotoccur simultaneously. It remains to determine whentheGreat King recognized theclaim. Thelack of evidence makes this the most vexing of all of the problems associated with the recognition of the Athenian claims. Some of the criteria that we have used to date theother acts of ratification inthis period arerelevant forthis undertaking. To begin with, it is reasonable to suppose that the King will have recognized the claim to Chersonese when he hadreason to buyoff the Athenians; the circumstances of his sanctioning the claim to Amphipolis provide an apt model. This means that Athens still hadto be a formidable power, a prerequisite wenoted for dating the Hellenes’ recognition of the claim to Chersonese. The outbreak of the Social War in the winter of 357/6161 thus provides a suitable terminus ante quem, for Athenian power declined greatly after that. The next step would be to find a time when the Athenians sent another (i.e., a third) embassy to Susa. This is difficult to do, for there is no evidence that they engaged in another set of negotiations with the King. Since one should generally avoid fabricating embassies when a simpler explanation is available, we need to consider the possibility that the answer is provided in the account of Demosthenes. It is highly unlikely that the orator simply lied outright about the King’s recognizingtheAthenian claim, forhisAthenian audience surely will have known a fact this important. But perhaps Demosthenes was not telling the whole truth. Perhaps Artaxerxes himself didnot recognize the claim to Chersonese. It mayhave been, rather, a loyalist satrap whorecognized theclaim onbehalf of Artaxerxes. Like the King, the satrap will have resorted to this form of bribery for a reason. This raises a slight problem, however. It is easy see whyone of the loyalist satraps would want to appease the Athenians after the outbreak of Ariobarzanes’ revolt, but there is no evidence that any of them did. The solution is apparent. Ariobarzanes recognized the claim to Chersonese while he was still loyal to the King. Demosthenes provides clues that can help us determine thedate. In his account of events concerning Ariobarzanes in the speech 53. 158 Ryder, Koine Eirene xvi; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 252– 159 Date of thebattle of Mantinea: see n.46 above. TheCongress is dated to 362/1 onthebasis of Diod. 15.89.1. Cf. the Reply to the Satraps (Tod no. 145 = SVAno. 292), which refers to the Common Peace byname. This inscription is notdated, but, as is generally recognized, belongs 44. in 362/1. Onthis Peace, see Ryder, ibid. 140– η : line 6; reference to the King: lines ν ὴεἰρή ιν ο 160 Tod no. 145 = SVAno. 292. Reference to a κ 17. 12– 4. For the date, see n. 109 above. 161 Diod. 16.7.3–

6. The recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis andChersonese III–

113

Against Aristocrates, hesays thattheAthenians granted citizenship toAriobarzanes and, on his account, to Philiscus (Dem. 23.141). A grant of this sort to a Persian satrap andhishyparch wasa really major distinction andrequires a major service to explain it. It is therefore certain that Ariobarzanes hadbeen a benefactor of Athens in some important way, andthat Philiscus wasworking for himat the time of the award.162

We know that Philiscus came into contact with the Athenians as well as the Spartans at Delphi during the winter of 369/8, when, acting on Ariobarzanes’ orders, heconvened thepeace congress.163 Thehyparch hadcome to Greece witha large amount of money, which he used to hire mercenaries. Xenophon tells of how the Spartans benefited from this: Philiscus recruited mercenaries anddonated 2,000 of them to the Spartan cause.164 Hedoes notsaywhat happened between Philiscus and Athens, for, as we have noted, he does not want to depict the Athenians as working with the Persians. Ariobarzanes, however, surely wasas keen to establish good relations with the Athenians as he was with the Spartans, their allies. For this reason, it is likely that when Philiscus gave mercenaries to the Spartans, he gave the Athenians a large sumof money for their military ventures. Moreover, we may suggest, he announced that Ariobarzanes on behalf of the King recognized their right to Chersonese, andthat the satrap would help them regain control of it. The Athenians responded immediately by awarding Ariobarzanes andPhiliscus citizenship andby voting to recover Chersonese. The dating of Philiscus’ visit to Athens is fairly straightforward. It will have taken himat least the entire summer after the Congress to recruit mercenaries. He will havegonetoAthens afterwards, perhaps inlate autumn 368/7. Thischronology also helps to explain twopoints established earlier, first, the Athenian decision in early 366 to send Timotheus outto aidAriobarzanes andrecover Chersonese, and second, Ariobarzanes’ handing over Sestus andCrithote to Timotheus in 362/1.165 Furthermore, it corroborates Plutarch’s report in Pel. 30.1 that the Athenians as well as the Spartans took the initiative in sending ambassadors to the King. As we have seen, they sent those embassies in late spring 367, i.e., at most only months after Philiscus hadreturned to Asia Minor. It is a logical inference that both states were acting in direct response to the pledges the hyparch hadmade during his stay in Greece. By these calculations, Ariobarzanes’ recognition of the Athenian claim to Chersonese onbehalf of theKingbelongs inlate 368, asdoes theAthenian decision 61, is essentially right in dating the citizenship grants to the year of the 162 Ruzicka, Politics 60– Congress atDelphi onthebasis that noother occasion is known thatmight explain theaward to 7a below. both men. ForPhiliscus’break withAriobarzanes, see Section III– 163 Xen. Hell. 7.1.27; Diod. 15.70.2. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 197, suggests that Ariobarzanes’plans forrebellion were evident asearly as this congress, andthat at this time Philiscus, working onhis behalf, established ties with theAthenian andSpartan representatives. It seems rather unlikely that theGreeks knewof therevolt this far inadvance, however. 164 Xen. Hell. 7.1.27; Diod. 15.70.2. Judeich, ibid.; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 104. 4d above. At this time there was no question of Ariobarzanes’ 5c and III– 165 See Sections III– revolting, though this is commonly said: see n. 117 above.

114

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

to recover control of theregion. Thus, there is a gapof approximately oneandonehalf years between the Athenian claim to Chersonese and the decision to send Timotheus there. We may compare the gap of two years between the Athenian claim to Amphipolis of autumn 371 andIphicrates’expedition of autumn 369. It is

also clear from this chronology that the King recognized (or, more accurately, was said to have recognized) the claim to Chersonese approximately two years before recognizing theclaim to Amphipolis inJune 366. This clearly is the reason whyno source refers to Artaxerxes’sanction of both claims in one statement.

7. The later career of Philiscus andrelated events III– 7a. Philiscus’conquests andsevering of ties with Ariobarzanes; Timotheus’ III– aid to Cyzicus Philiscus played an important role in Ariobarzanes’ revolt. To date the events in which he was involved, we must rely on Demosthenes’ account in the speech Against Aristocrates: theAthenians granted citizenship to Ariobarzanes and, onhis account, to Philiscus; using the forces of Ariobarzanes, the hyparch seized Greek cities, andentering them, committed manyoutrages; Thersagoras andExecestus of Lampsacus assassinated Philiscus to liberate their native city; they then wentto live atLesbos. Demosthenes goes onto speak of Philiscus “whenhepaidthemercenaries in Perinthus, whenheheld thewhole Hellespont, andwhenhewasthegreatest 42). of hyparchs”(Dem. 23.141– Intheattempt to liken Philiscus to Charidemus, Demosthenes gives anaccount of the hyparch’s ignominious behavior in the Greek cities in the Hellespont. He does not conceal, however, that initially Philiscus was acting on Ariobarzanes’ orders, asthephrase “withtheforces of Ariobarzanes”indicates. This makes sense: asthesatrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Ariobarzanes naturally looked toexpand his influence in neighboring regions first. Quite possibly, Philiscus began with Abydus, where he hadcontacts. The exaggerated description of Philiscus’ treatment of the inhabitants of the cities he captured suggests that hebroke with Ariobarzanes (and Athens) at some point after this. Wearenotgiven dates foranyof these sieges orfor the severing of relations, buttheevidence is suggestive. It is clear fromDemosthenes that Philiscus took Perinthus and used it as a base for his mercenaries.166 The hyparch will have taken this aggressive measure against a long-standing Athenian ally167 only after severing ties with Ariobarzanes. The capture of Perinthus was no easy task, as Philip II’s troubles were to demonstrate later.168 It is difficult to explain unless 166 Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.97. Sealey, Demosthenes 81, includes Perinthus among Philiscus’ encroachments, butdates its capture as well asthehyparch’s other conquests in theHellespont andPropontis to theperiod before theCongress at Delphi. 167 Perinthus appears in the list of members intheDecree of Aristoteles of early 377. Todno. 123 = SVAno.257, line 84; Cargill, Second Athenian League 34. 73. 76.4. Griffith, HM2.570– 168 Diod. 16. 74.2–

7. The later career of Philiscus andrelated events III–

115

Philiscus had received aid in the endeavor. Either he had support from within Perinthus, or it came from an outside source, i.e., the Thebans. We know that Epaminondas’Aegean expedition of 364 andprobably 363 wasdirected atbringing Athenian allies over to Thebes. After receiving thesupport of Artaxerxes atSusa in 367, the Thebans were happy to reciprocate by aiding in the attempt to quell the rebellious satraps.169 Since, however, Theban land forces would not have been much help in the siege of a coastal city like Perinthus, andthe Theban navy hadnot yet been built, it is more likely that Philiscus hadobtained aid from within the city. It may be possible to narrow down the date of the severing of ties between Philiscus andAriobarzanes. It is noteworthy that Autophradates didnot, as far we know, take measures against Philiscus, ashedidagainst Samos inthespring of 366. This suggests that the hyparch broke with Ariobarzanes soon after the outbreak of the revolt. Hemaywell have believed that dissociating himself fromtherevolt was the only way to prevent the loyalists from gaining control of the cities he had captured. We mayposit that, shortly after Ariobarzanes staged his revolt in July 366, Philiscus declared himself an enemy of Ariobarzanes and a friend of the Great King. If the Theban ambassadors travelling around theAegean made contact with the hyparch, they didso after this point. Wecanattempt to reconstruct theorder of Philiscus’campaigns after hisbreak with Ariobarzanes. There are reasons to believe his capture of Lampsacus belongs inthis period. Notably, Autophradates didnotattack Lampsacus whenheoccupied Samos. This is noteworthy, given the fact that Lampsacus wasthe most important city on the coast of Asia Minor after Abydus: it was, together with Callipolis, the only other place in this region where onecould cross the Hellespont.170 There is evidence that Philiscus mayhave captured at least oneother city inthe region. Aswehave discussed inthecontext of theWarover Amphipolis, Diodorus says under the year 364/3 that Timotheus besieged and captured Torone and Potidaea andsent aid to the Cyzicenes under siege (Diod. 15.81.6). According to Nepos, Timotheus liberated Cyzicus from siege (Nepos Tim. 1.3). It is not clear η σ ε νwhether Timotheus himself went to θ ή ο from Diodorus’ use of the verb ἐβ Cyzicus or sent aid there. But there are compelling reasons for putting his expedition against Chalcidice in364/3, andso it is likely that hesent forces toCyzicus in that year, just as he hadrecently sent Alcimachus to Amphipolis. Weare naturally led to ask why, when the general wasoccupied in hostilities over Amphipolis, he sent support to Cyzicus, which was not an ally of Athens. We have speculated that he took this action in response to Epaminondas’ naval expedition.171 It is possible, however, that Timotheus wasalso acting in defense of Ariobarzanes. His sense of urgency inaiding Cyzicus is more understandable if infact this state wasanally of the satrap andhadbeen attacked by Philiscus for that reason. Wecan surmise that Timotheus’efforts ultimately failed, for in the summer of 362, the Cyzicenes were engaged in anti-Athenian activity of at least twosorts: they attacked Proconnesus, 74. 61, 169– 169 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 160– 170 Str. 7 F 55; Leaf, Troy 361; Casson, Macedonia, Thrace andIllyria 220. 3b above. 171 See Section III–

116

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

anAthenian ally, andthey forced Athenian grain ships coming fromPontus todock at their harbor ([Dem.] 50.5– 6). The Cyzicenes’ surrender to Philiscus, therefore, belongs before the summer of 362. It remains to make sense of Nepos’claim that Timotheus freed Cyzicus from siege, for it appears to contradict theevidence provided by Apollodorus. Given the veracity of Nepos’ other statements concerning the general’s campaigns of the 360s, this problem bears scrutiny. There is an obvious solution. Timotheus did manage to liberate Cyzicus from siege, butPhiliscus later gained control of thecity. If Timotheus withdrew his forces for useelsewhere (e.g., in Chalcidice), Philiscus would have been able to resume siege operations after theAthenians’departure; the hyparch then would have captured the city quickly. As we have established, Timotheus sent aid to Cyzicus in the period of autumn 364 to spring 363. His “ liberation”of thecity, therefore, belongs in this period, andPhiliscus’resumption of siege operations belongs shortly thereafter, probably in the spring or summer of

363.

Although certainty is impossible, wecannowconjecture theorder of Philiscus’ campaigns. He began by capturing two or more cities on the coast of Asia Minor, since Demosthenes says he held “ the whole Hellespont” . His success in taking Perinthus suggests that he moved there next, before the Athenians could bring forces in large numbers: the summer would be one such time when this could happen. The hyparch then attacked Cyzicus. The capture of Perinthus, therefore, took place in the summer or possibly autumn of 364 and the siege of Cyzicus followed shortly thereafter, in the period of autumn 364 to spring of 363. At this time, Timotheus sent forces that succeeded in “liberating”Cyzicus. Philiscus resumed siege operations later in 363 andgained control of thecity soon afterwards, probably in the spring or summer of that year. There maybe one more chapter in the story of Cyzicus. It is worth noting that Apollodorus says that Byzantium andChalcedon again forced Athenian grain ships to dock at their harbors in 361 ([Dem.] 50.17), i.e., in July. His failure to mention Cyzicus here raises the possibility that it hadbeen brought over to the Athenians’ side for the second time. TheCyzicenes had, as wehave seen, forced theAthenian ships to dock at their harbor in July 362, and the Assembly was preparing to send forces outtodeal withthis problem inlate Metageitnion of that year ([Dem.] 50.6). Those forces most likely didnotset sail until late September, andso thereversal of Cyzicene policies belongs after that point, i.e., inthe period of October 362 to June

361.

We need to view this reconstruction in conjunction with Apollodorus’ statement that in theAssembly meeting of 24 Metageitnion, theProconnesian ambassadors called onthe Athenians to sendthem aidagainst theCyzicenes ([Dem.] 50.6). Apollodorus does not discuss Athenian aid to Proconnesus because he was not directly involved in that expedition. However, because Proconnesus wasanally of Athens, weshould still infer that this city wasoneof the places designated for aid by the decree of Aristophon. No source says which general was in charge of bringing aid to Proconnesus, but this can be deduced from ourchronology. Aswe have seen, Timotheus was involved in operations in Macedonia in the spring and

7. The later career of Philiscus andrelated events III–

117

summer of 362, when he captured Pydna andMethone,172 andhe wasat Sestus in the spring of 361.173 Wemayspeculate that in theinterim, i.e., inthesecond half of 362, Timotheus led an expedition to Proconnesus andsuccessfully defended the city against the Cyzicenes. He then went to Cyzicus to help restore the pro-

Athenian party

to power.

7b. The liberation of Lampsacus andPerinthus; Ariobarzanes’recovery of III– Lampsacus

Demosthenes in his summary of Philiscus’career goes onto say that Thersagoras andExecestus assassinated thehyparch andliberated Lampsacus; they then settled on Lesbos (Dem. 23.141). We need to establish, if possible, dates for Philiscus’ death andthe liberation of Lampsacus. Since we have dated Philiscus’capture of Cyzicus to the spring or summer of 363, his assassination belongs after that point. We maybe able to solve this problem by examining the evidence for the liberation of Lampsacus. A terminus ante quem is provided by Apollodorus’ statement in

[Dem.] 50.18 that hesent Euctemon to Lampsacus tohire sailors after Timomachus hadarrived at Sestus andbefore the trierarch himself sailed to Hieron, therefore in late July 361. By then Lampsacus wasclearly ongood terms with Athens, andso wecaninfer that it wasnolonger under Philiscus’control. Butit is also clear that it , for otherwise wecannot explain whyThersagoras and didnotremain “liberated” Execestus left forLesbos. Wemustinsert another event into thesequence andposit that after Philiscus wasassassinated, Lampsacus wasautonomous fora short while, andthenAriobarzanes gained control of Lampsacus. Thus, intheperiod of summer 363 to early summer 361, the following events occurred: Thersagoras andExecestusassassinated Philiscus andliberated Lampsacus; Ariobarzanes gained control of the city; andThersagoras and Execestus, unwilling to live under Ariobarzanes’ control, left Lampsacus for Lesbos. It maybe possible to date Ariobarzanes’recovery of Lampsacus more precisely. As weestablished earlier, he hadprobably gained control of Adramyttium and Assus in 362.174 Since Lampsacus was the most important of the Hellespontine cities that Philiscus captured, it is reasonable to assume that Ariobarzanes recovered it as well as the neighboring cities on the coast before moving against the cities on the western coast. In that case, Ariobarzanes regained control of the Hellespontine coast in thesecond half of 363 andpossibly early 362; hethen spent therest of theyear 362 inoperations against Adramyttium andAssus. We can addhere what is known about Perinthus. This city wasserving as an Athenian base bylate September 360, whenCephisodotus arrived there.175 Presumably, it too wasliberated at the time of Philiscus’death andwasrecovered by the Athenians as anally anda base. 3e. 172 Dem. 4.4; Din. 1.14. See Chapter I, Section I– 4d above. 173 See Section III– 4e. 174 See above, Section III– 2aabove. 175 Dem.23.16, 165; see Section III–

118

III. TheChronology of the Warover Chersonese

8. Charidemus andthe Satraps’ Revolt III–

8a. Charidemus in Asia III– We now need to date Charidemus’ actions which Demosthenes lists in sections 56 of the speech Against Aristocrates, quoted in Section III– 153– 2a above. After his discharge byTimotheus, Charidemus left Amphipolis andcrossed over to Asia. Since Demosthenes last mentioned himat Amphipolis in thecontext of events that occurred in the summer of 365 (23.150), it is difficult to say precisely whenhewas discharged. Timotheus had hired Charidemus because of the Athenians’ need for mercenaries at Amphipolis, andso hewill have discharged himwhen he no longer needed his services and wished to save the money. Most likely, Charidemus assisted Alcimachus in the battle at Amphipolis in the summer of 364 (schol. Aeschin. 2.31 Dilts p. 64). Since Timotheus continued to need mercenaries after this for operations at Amphipolis as well as Chalcidice, Charidemus’ departure cannot be attributed to Athenian military needs. The condottiere was motivated by the need to provide employment for himself andhis troops, andso he left Timotheus because something better came along. Memnon andMentor hadmuch more money at their disposal than the Athenians, and consequently were able to hire Charidemus away from Timotheus. The general, unable to compete, hadto let him go. Charidemus left Timotheus’ service, therefore, after Alcimachus’ defeat at Amphipolis, i.e., in approximately late summer or autumn 364. Anadditional hint is provided byDemosthenes’ statement in 23.154 that after , forit indicates that crossed overto Asia” leaving Timotheus’service, Charidemus “ he passed through Chersonese onthe way. Aswehave seen, it wasprobably inthe summer of 363 that Miltocythes, working for Cotys, attacked Sestus176 and so we are led to ask whether Charidemus took part in that campaign. Demosthenes’ silence here is noteworthy in light of hisemphasis onthecondottiere’s aidto Cotys in thecampaigns of 360 (Dem. 23.158). It surely indicates that in 363 Charidemus didnotengage in military activity onChersonese; inall probability, hewasalready working for Memnon andMentor at this time. In sections 154 to 156 of the speech, Demosthenes gives an account of the mercenary captain’s actions inAsia Minor, which canbe summarized asfollows: 1) Autophradates seized Artabazus; 2) Charidemus hired himself out to Artabazus’ brothers-in-law, Memnon andMentor, whowanted aid in the warwith Autophradates; 3) hebetrayed his agreement with them andmoved against Cebren, Scepsis, andIlium; 4) Artabazus, having beenreleased byAutophradates, besieged Charidemus; 5) Charidemus sent the letter to Cephisodotus. Clearly, Memnon and Mentor had sent to Charidemus to hire him before he went to Asia Minor in late summer or autumn 364. Their embassy thus belongs in the late summer or autumn. The battle in which Autophradates took Artabazus prisoner occurred shortly before the dispatch of that embassy, i.e., in the first half of 364. Their wartherefore began inearly 364 at the latest, possibly earlier than that. 4h above. 176 See Section III–

8. Charidemus andtheSatraps’Revolt III–

119

According to Demosthenes, Charidemus swore oaths with Memnon andMentor, butignored them andattacked Cebren, Scepsis, andIlium (Dem. 23.155). The condottiere had completed his siege of the last of the three towns, presumably Ilium, by late August or early September 360, when he wrote to Cephisodotus.177 Atthat point, hewasunder attack byArtabazus andwasfacing theprospect of siege andfamine. Theadvanced stage of this campaign makes it likely that the satrap had begun

a siege of Ilium as early as theprevious

spring.

III–8b. Autophradates and Artabazus in Hellespontine Phrygia

Wecan nowestablish tentative dates for theevents concerning Autophradates and Artabazus. Since the latter’s warwith Charidemus can be dated to the spring and

summer of 360, his collecting of forces belongs before that. It will have taken a few months to gather troops from Upper Phrygia, Lydia, and Paphlagonia, and so that activity can be assigned to the autumn and winter of 361/0. Going back one step further, we can date Autophradates’ release of Artabazus andtheir treaty to the summer of 361. In 360, Artabazus seems to have concentrated his attention on towns which Charidemus hadcaptured, notably inland towns. Weneedtocorrelate this observation with two others. First, Demosthenes 23.155 refers to Lydia as a source of supplies for Artabazus’ campaigns; Autophradates, as the satrap of that region (Diod. 15.90.3), must have provided those supplies. Second, since Autophradates hadimprisoned andreleased Artabazus, it wasmost probably Autophradates who haddictated theterms of their treaty. Asweestablished earlier, Autophradates had spent part of theyear 362 andthe spring of 361 besieging Adramyttium andAssus, coastal towns held by Ariobarzanes.178 Wemayinfer that, whenmaking the treaty, Autophradates compelled Artabazus to help him in his efforts to gain control of Hellespontine Phrygia. Artabazus’warwith Charidemus in the spring andsummer of 360 should be viewed as part of those efforts. It is also worth noting that Autophradates’andArtabazus’negotiations, heldin approximately summer 361, came shortly after Agesilaus’ andTimotheus’ intervention on behalf of Ariobarzanes, which we have dated to the spring of that year.179 This is surely more than coincidence: rather, it suggests a reason for Autophradates’ release of Artabazus, whom he could, after all, have simply murdered. Forced by Agesilaus’intervention to withdraw from Assus, Autophradates maywell have thought that working jointly with Artabazus against Ariobarzanes would make it possible to gain control in Hellespontine Phrygia. Wecannowattempt todatetheaidwhich theThebans senttoArtabazus during the Satraps’ Revolt. Our only evidence for that aid is the account of Diodorus, which appears under the year 353/2:

2a above. 177 See Section III– 4e above. 178 SeeSection III– 4d above. 179 SeeSection III–

III. TheChronology of theWarover Chersonese

120

While these things were going on, Artabazus, whohadrevolted from the King, continued to wagewaragainst thesatraps whohadbeendispatched bytheKing forthewar.Atfirst, when Chares the general of the Athenians was fighting alongside him, he [Artabazus] resisted the satraps courageously, but when Chares had gone and he was left alone, he persuaded the Thebans to send himanauxiliary force. Choosing Pammenes as general andgiving himfive thousand soldiers, they dispatched himto Asia. By bringing aidto Artabazus anddefeating the satraps in twogreat battles, Pammenes wongreat glory for himself andtheBoeotians. Nowit seemed an amazing thing that the Boeotians should be sending armies across the sea to Asia andforthemostpart beproving successful inthebattles, after theThessalians hadleft themin thelurch, andwhenthewarwiththePhocians wasthreatening themwithserious dangers. (Diod. 16.34.1– 2)

Badian adduces compelling reasons against dating Pammenes’expedition to Asia to 353/2, two of which are especially pertinent to our chronology. First, as even Diodorus notices, it is difficult to believe that the Thebans were able to spare five thousand troops in the middle of the Sacred War. Second, they had always been proud of their friendship with the Great King: not only hadthey profited from it only a fewyears earlier, butin 351/0 they would askfor andreceive funding from the King for the war against the Phocians. It is therefore highly unlikely that in 353/2, just over a year earlier, they hadrisked this friendship in hazardous support for a rebel. Even the Athenians withdrew support from that rebel whenthey were challenged; notably, we are not told that the Thebans were ever challenged. To remedy these problems, the expedition should be dated to the time when Artabazus wasdefending the King against rebellious satraps, specifically, to the period soon after Mantinea. This wastheonly time whentheThebans were free to send such a large number of troops abroad. Since they were notinvolved in a major warat the time, the expedition provided employment andat the same time enabled them to

lend support to Artaxerxes.180 The Thebans would not have been able send out five thousand troops in the months left inthecampaigning season after Mantinea, andsotheexpedition should be dated to 361 at the earliest. This, notably, is the year when Artabazus began working with Autophradates in Hellespontine Phrygia. Although wecannot ascertain theprecise date of Pammenes’expedition, there areother important inferences to be drawn from this chronology. The fact that Pammenes brought support to Artabazus after his release by Autophradates means that Artabazus, andtherefore Autophradates, were fighting on behalf of the Great King. Artabazus came to assume a leading role in the effort to suppress the Great Revolt, to the point where heledthe King’s army against Datames inCappadocia (Diod. 15.91.2).181 Wecan 59. More recently, Buckler, Philip II andtheSacred War(Leiden 1989) 180 Badian, “Philip II”58– 81, argues that Pammenes brought aidtoArtabazus’rebellion after meeting withPhilip at 176– Maronea in late 355. This reconstruction should be rejected, for it does not explain the improbability of the Thebans’ supporting a rebel andreceiving aid from Artaxerxes four years later.

181 Although Diodorus refers to this expedition under the year 362/1, its date cannot be deter7) relates the events of a battle in Cappadocia, in which Mithrobarmined. Hehere (15.91.2– zanes betrayed both Datames andArtabazus. This account immediately follows the story of Orontes’ betrayal of the Satraps’ Revolt (15.91.1), and it in turn is followed by the story of Rheomithres’betrayal of Tachos’revolt inEgypt (15.92). Orontes’betrayal is themain theme

III– 8. Charidemus and the Satraps’ Revolt

121

see whyDiodorus in section 31 calls Artabazus a rebel, andyet a few lines later goes on to say that he obtained aid from the Thebans. In providing a greatly compressed summary of the satrap’s career, he simply overlooked the period of

Artabazus’change of stance. It is thus apparent that Artabazus was fighting the loyalists for control of Hellespontine Phrygia until his imprisonment by Autophradates in the first half of 364. Hewasnottheonly rebel fighting inthat region. Aswehave seen, Autophradates wasinvolved in hostilities with Ariobarzanes probably as early as Tigranes’ occupation of Samos in the spring of 366. These hostilities continued at least until early 361, as our dating of the campaigns at Adramyttium (summer/autumn 362) andAssus (spring 361) hasmade clear.182 Because of these various chronological findings, wemustreject thecommunis opinio ontheevents concerning theSatraps’ Revolt, namely, the view that Artabazus wasa loyalist at warwith Ariobarzanes over Hellespontine Phrygia.183 Until his imprisonment by Autophradates, Artabazuswasjust as mucha rebel as Ariobarzanes. Artabazus wasaided in hisrevolt by Memnon andMentor, whotook charge after his capture by Autophradates. During Artabazus’ imprisonment, Charidemus provided mercenaries for the revolt and seized at least three cities in Hellespontine Phrygia. This arrangement came to an endwhenArtabazus joined theloyalists.184 Wecannowcorrelate theactivities of Ariobarzanes andArtabazus. Inthe first half of 364, Autophradates defeated Artabazus and took him prisoner. In late summer or early autumn, Memnon and Mentor hired Charidemus to aid them against Autophradates; in the autumn of 364 or spring of 363, they sent the

of Diodorus’account of events inthePersian Empire in362/1 andtherefore should bedated to that year. It is impossible, however, todate theepisodes concerning Datames andRheomithres based on this account, for they are included purely for thematic reasons. The betrayal of Rheomithres canbe dated because there is other evidence concerning Tachos’revolt that has chronological value, e.g., thestatements of Xenophon andPlutarch concerning Agesilaus’role

40). (Tachos’ revolt, however, is beyond the in the affair (Xen. Ages. 2.27; Plut. Ages. 36– scope of this study. For general discussion, see A. T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire 78.) In the case 21; andKienitz, Diepolitische Geschichte Ägyptens 173– [Chicago 1984] 417– of Datames, bycontrast, Diodorus gives nochronological indicator forthebetrayal, only that it μ ) to the betrayal of Orontes (15.91.2). Given this context, the ο ίω ς similarly”(ὁ happened “ vague temporal phrase which he uses in chapter 92.1 to introduce the story of Rheomithres, ις , is of little chronological use. Cf. Judeich, Kleinasiatische ο έν μ ο τ τ α ρ ιςπ ο ὲτούτ αδ μ ἅ Studien 206 andn. 1. 5b above; for the sieges of Adramyttium 182 For Tigranes’occupation of Samos, see Section III– 4e above. andAssus, see Section III– 183 The interpretation of thecommunis opinio is as follows: Artabazus, wrongfully deprived of the satrapy byAriobarzanes, returned fromexile toclaim it. Ariobarzanes wasafraid that hewould be replaced by Artabazus, whohadcome of age, andfor that reason staged a revolt in 366; Autophradates andMausolus, following orders of the Great King, putdown Ariobarzanes’ insurrection andenabled Artabazus to take possession of his rightful satrapy. Fora convenient list of scholars whoagree with this reconstruction, see Weiskopf, “Great Satraps’Revolt”30

n. 44. 184 Fordiscussion of thereasons forArtabazus’change of stance 3e. IV, Section IV–

toward Charidemus,

seeChapter

122

III. The Chronology of the War over Chersonese

condottiere against the inland towns of Hellespontine Phrygia andthey themselves probably devoted their efforts to the towns on the coast. In mid-summer 366, Philiscus severed ties with Ariobarzanes and took up the loyalist cause. After establishing control over some cities on the Asian coast of the Hellespont, the hyparch captured Perinthus andCyzicus; in the spring or summer of 363, he was assassinated. Ariobarzanes, having madelittle progress against Philiscus in364and early 363, spent the second half of 363 (and possibly early 362) recovering Lampsacus andother cities intheHellespont after thehyparch’s death. In362, hedevoted his attention to extending his influence on the western coast of Hellespontine Phrygia. We can see from this summary that both Artabazus and Ariobarzanes were experiencing much difficulty in late 364, and that in the following spring their forces were fighting in the same region butapparently didnotcome into conflict. The coincidence is suggestive. Quite possibly, Autophradates’final defeat of Artabazus in the first half of 364 led Memnon and Mentor to make a temporary arrangement with Ariobarzanes. They agreed to deal with the loyalists first; they could fight it out over Hellespontine Phrygia later. We mayspeculate that in the second half of 364 Memnon andMentor sent to Ariobarzanes, whowasfaring so badly against Philiscus that he readily consented. In this period, they also hired Charidemus to attack the inland cities of the satrapy. If this reconstruction is correct, the hostilities waged in Hellespontine Phrygia during theWaroverChersonese canbedivided into three phases. InPhase 1(366 to the autumn of 364), Ariobarzanes, Artabazus, andAutophradates each ledhisown fight for control of the region. This period ends with Autophradates’ capture of Artabazus. In Phase 2 (late 364 to thespring of 361), Memnon andMentor joined forces with Ariobarzanes to bring about Artabazus’ release andto gain control of Hellespontine Phrygia. In Phase 3 (summer 361 to late 360), Artabazus worked with Autophradates against Ariobarzanes.

CHAPTER IV. THE WAR OVER CHERSONESE

TheWarover Chersonese, like theWarover Amphipolis, resulted from theAthenians’decision to recover cities that they hadcontrolled during the height of their empire in thefifth century andhadlost during thePeloponnesian War. TheChersonesian conflict, however, was far greater in scope and complexity than its Amphipolitan counterpart. Demosthenes’ account in the speech Against Aristocrates speaks of the war in three distinct phases: 1) the War against Chersonese, 2) the Revolt of Miltocythes, and 3) the War against Cotys. Although these distinctions present the war from an Athenian perspective, they form a useful framework for understanding howthe nature of the conflict changed from one phase to the next. Throughout these phases, there was one constant: the Athenians and their chief adversary, King Cotys of Thrace, were determined to gain control of Chersonese andwould take whatever steps necessary to achieve that end.

1. TheWarover Chersonese, Phase I: TheWaragainst Chersonese IV– 362 B.C.) (368– IV–1a. Philiscus and the Greeks

As far as the evidence permits us to tell, the cities of Chersonese were made autonomous by the King’s Peace of 387/6,1 and for the next twenty years their status remained unchanged. It was, in fact, only when Artaxerxes’ authority was greatly undermined by thetremendous conflict known astheGreat Satraps’Revolt that the autonomy of the Chersonesian cities came into question. In this period of turmoil, the Athenians took active steps to regain control of theChersonesian cities that had once belonged to them.

We can trace the origins of the Athenian policy to the early 360s B.C. In 369/8 Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, sent his hyparch, Philiscus of Abydus, with a large sumof money to Greece.2 That winter Philiscus convened an international peace congress at Delphi onbehalf of the King. Although Xenophon and Diodorus present very condensed summaries of the Congress, they agree on certain facts: since the Thebans would notagree that Messene should be subject to Sparta, Philiscus collected a mercenary force in order to support the Spartan cause (Xen. Hell. 7.1.27; cf. Diod. 15.70.2). We can surmise that Philiscus’ purpose in 1

2

According to Xenophon Hell. 5.1.31, theKing’s Peace gave thecities inAsia, Clazomenae, and Cyprus to the Great King; the rest of the Greek cities were to be left autonomous, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, andScyros, which would belong to Athens. For a discussion of 54; “King’s this clause and the King’s Peace in general, see Cawkwell, “Foundation”52– 48. 83; andBadian, “King’s Peace”25– Peace”69– Identification of Ariobarzanes: Diod. 15.90.3; identification of Philiscus: Dem. 23.142.

124

IV. TheWaroverChersonese

convening the Congress wasto sponsor a peace that favored Spartan interests. He wasfollowing the policy that hadbeen in place since the King’s Peace. Artaxerxes wanted to establish peace in Greece in the easiest waypossible so that he could direct his attention to more pressing matters at home. The Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies, however, were in no way prepared to accept a treaty that nullified the liberation of Messene. There was nothing Philiscus could do at this point, andthe deliberations reached a stalemate. The Congress adjourned without producing a treaty of anysort, andthe ambassadors returned to their home cities.3 After theCongress, Philiscus remained inGreece todosome workforAriobarzanes. Autophradates, satrap of Lydia andcommander of the King’s forces, was currently occupied with efforts in eastern Anatolia to suppress the rebellion of Datames, satrap of Cappadocia.4 Ariobarzanes decided to use this opportunity to expand his control in Asia Minor. Accordingly, Philiscus spent the spring and summer months of 368 hiring mercenaries for Ariobarzanes andstrengthening ties with those states that might prove useful to his goals of expansion. Sparta was an obvious choice, not only because Ariobarzanes had long-term ties of xenia with Antalcidas, butbecause Agesilaus hadpreviously displayed his willingness to lead troops to Asia.5 Athens also belonged tothis category, because thecity hadinterests in the Hellespont andbecause its fleet could prove enormously useful to Ariobarzanes’military operations inthatregion. Philiscus waswell aware that theonly way to ensure the willingness –andthe ability –of these powers to support Ariobarzanes’cause was to promote their interests. That meant supporting the Spartans’ efforts torecover Messene andtheAthenians’efforts torecover their possessions in the north. In the autumn, Philiscus made a visit to Sparta, andannounced that Ariobarzanes would provide twothousand mercenaries andfunding to aidtheSpartans in their warwith theThebans. This report metwitha warmresponse. After theloss of many menin the war with Thebes, mercenary support wascrucial for recovering control of Messene. If Ariobarzanes’ aid did not enable the Spartans to regain Messene, Artaxerxes (unlike Philiscus) would havethepower to implement a Peace that would restore it to Spartan control. Hopeful that Persian support of some sort would help themregain their hegemony, theSpartans decided to sendambassadors to Susa the following year. Philiscus then directed his attention to establishing good relations with the Athenians. Heknewpersonally howdetermined theAthenians were toexpand their control inthenorth, andhowvaluable their presence could be inthe area. Chabrias, involved in efforts to bring Abdera and possibly other cities in Thrace and the Hellespont into the Second Athenian Confederacy inthemid-370s, hadbrought aid to Abydus under siege. It wasin commemoration of that aidthat Philiscus andhis troops granted anolive wreath to the general.6 Eight years later, the hyparch surely

3 4 5

6

7. Hegemony 103. Onthe liberation of Messene, see Buckler, id. 86– 59. 6. Fordiscussion, see Ruzicka, Politics 58– 4, 5– Diod. 15.90.3; Nep. Datames 7.1, 8.2– Ariobarzanes’ xenia with Antalcidas: Xen. Hell. 5.1.28; Agesilaus’ Asian expedition: Xen. 2.1. 29; 4.1.1– Hell. 3.4.1– This grant is recorded in one of the inscriptions on the base of the statue set upin honor of

Cf. Buckler, Theban

IV–1. The Warover Chersonese, Phase I

125

still hadcontacts in Athens. Wecan therefore assume that when Philiscus visited the city in the autumn of 368, he knew exactly how to engender good will. He announced that Ariobarzanes, on behalf of the Great King, recognized the Athenians’right to Chersonese andpromised to help them recover it. The hyparch gave the Athenians a large sumof money to support this endeavor andinvited them to sendambassadors to Susa to negotiate a newPeace that would favor their interests. The Athenian response to Philiscus’ report was extremely enthusiastic. Ariobarzanes’ funding was propitious in light of the city’s financial troubles, exacerbated bythelaunching of operations atAmphipolis a little over a year earlier. More important, the King’s recognition of Chersonese as Athenian would legitimize their claim in theeyes of theGreek world. Although Ariobarzanes hadhis ownreasons for pledging aid to the Athenians, they hadnoreason to doubt himwhen claiming to be acting in the King’s name –anymore than they would have doubted Pharnabazus, his predecessor. The Assembly immediately passed two decrees, one that awarded Ariobarzanes andPhiliscus citizenship (Dem. 23.141), andone that stated the Athenians’ intention to recover possession of Chersonese. Philiscus’ visit thus resulted in tangible benefits for Athens as well as for Ariobarzanes. While the Athenians hadacquired aid andsupport for their aims in the north, Ariobarzanes hadmade a powerful friend whose presence in the Hellespont could prove useful later. This transaction wasto have a profound influence onAthenian foreign policy. In the years that followed, Ariobarzanes’ money would finance the Athenians’ expeditions to theHellespont, andatthesame time would lead to their involvement in theSatraps’Revolt.

IV–1b. The Congress at Susa

With the help of mercenaries provided by Philiscus andDionysius of Syracuse, the Spartans defeated the Arcadians in the Tearless Battle in 368.7 The Spartans realized, however, that although this success improved their position in the Pelo-

ponnese, it would be impossible to recover control of Messene without further aid from Persia.8 They needed to obtain additional funding for military ventures but, evenmore important, they needed topersuade the King notto recognize Messenian independence.9 Encouraged by Philiscus to believe that Artaxerxes would support their interests, inthespring of 367 theSpartans decided tosendanembassy to Susa.

7

8 9

Chabrias. Burnett andEdmonson date the act to late 376 or 375 andargue against Schaefer, 59, thatChabrias rather thanTimotheus wasresponsible fortheaddition of Demosthenes2 1.58– Thasos, Samothrace, andElaeus, among others, to the Confederacy (A. P. Burnett andC. N. 91). , Hesperia 30 [1961] 74– The Chabrias Monument in the Athenian Agora” Edmonson, “ Although Diodorus 15.47.3 (under theyear 374/3) credits Timotheus with bringing manyallies inThrace into theLeague, there canbelittle doubt thatChabrias toowasinvolved inexpansion efforts in the north in the370s. 8; Mor. 218F. See Buckler, Theban 32; Diod. 15.72.3; Plut. Ages. 33.5– Xen. Hell. 7.1.27– 109. Hegemony 106– Plut. Artox. 22.6; Buckler, ibid. 151. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 197.

126

IV. The Warover Chersonese

Hoping to strengthen their case, they sent envoys to the Athenians to urge them to join them in this undertaking (Plut. Pel. 30.1). The Spartan request was well received. The Athenians naturally wanted the King’s aidinsuppressing Theban power inthePeloponnese andelsewhere. Butthe Athenians hadother, more pressing reasons for sending anembassy to Susa. Artaxerxes, as far as they knew, hadalready recognized their claim to Chersonese, but

he had said nothing about Amphipolis. It was essential that he recognize that claim as well:10 only then would the Greeks accept the Athenians’ right to reestablish their hegemony in thenorth. Anxious to resolve these issues, the Assembly voted to send ambassadors to Susa without delay. In June 367, the two embassies set out for Susa. The sources agree that the Athenians sent Leon andTimagoras.11 The question of whom the Spartans sent is more difficult to answer, however. The only name Xenophon mentions is Euthycles, whereas Plutarch says that the Great King gave Antalcidas the crown he had worn at the banquet.12 This detail places Antalcidas squarely at those negotiations and should not be rejected simply because Xenophon does not include it.13 The Spartans hadgood reasons for sending Antalcidas to Susa: notonly washe a xenos of Ariobarzanes, but he hadbeen on good terms with Artaxerxes for many years. The participation of Antalcidas in the deliberations at Susa is not the only fact that Xenophon chose to omit or distort. As thechronology demonstrates, the Athenians joined the Spartans in taking the initiative with the King. Xenophon’s failure to refer to Antalcidas’ presence at Susa is surely related to his silence regarding the role of the Spartans in the negotiations (see below). Wordof theSpartan andAthenian embassies reached Thebes a dayortwoafter their departure. The Thebans immediately sent ambassadors to their Peloponnesian allies –the Arcadian League, Elis, andArgos –to persuade them to send ambassadors to the King (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33). The Thebans’ chief concern was to obtain recognition of Messenian independence (Xen. Hell. 7.1.36; Diod. 15.66.1, 6). They also wanted to persuade theKing touphold theautonomy of Amphipolis andcurtail the expansion of Athenian naval power in the north (Xen. ibid.). They probably

wished to request financial assistance as well.14 The Theban embassies easily persuaded their Peloponnesian allies, who naturally wished to see the threat of Sparta permanently eliminated. It wasdecided that they would sendjoint embassies, with Pelopidas andHismenias representing the Thebans, Antiochus the Arcadian League, andArchidamus theEleans; anArgive wasappointed as well, buthis name is notrecorded (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33).

10 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 153. 11 Xen. Hell. 7.1.33; Plut. Pel. 30.1, Artox. 22.8; Nepos Pel. 4.3; Paus. 6.1.3, 3.9, 17.5. 3., where the story is told in the context of 12 Xen. Hell. 7.1.33; Plut. Pel. 30.6. Cf. Artox. 22.1– Artaxerxes’esteem for Antalcidas as a result of the King’s Peace. 13 As Cawkwell points out, Plutarch was well informed andpreserves a number of facts that 45, who be69). Cf. Buckler, “Plutarch”139– Agesilaus and Sparta”68– Xenophon omits (“ lieves that Antalcidas wasnotpresent at theCongress of 367/6. 14 F. Carrata Thomas, Egemonia beotica e potenza marittima nella politica di Epaminonda (Turin 81. 24; followed by M. Fortina, Epaminonda (Turin 1958) 80– 1952) 22–

1.TheWarover Chersonese, Phase I IV–

127

The various embassies reached Susa in approximately September 367. During the festivities, the King gave gifts to the ambassadors, as wascustomary. Plutarch indicates that Antalcidas, Pelopidas, and Timagoras received special treatment (Plut. Pel. 30.6– 13). His account suggests that Artaxerxes took special efforts to winovertheleaders of themostimportant delegations. Timagoras wastreated inan especially lavish fashion; even his shield-bearer received gifts (Plut. Pel. 30.9– 12; 12). Artaxerxes clearly wished to ensure that the Athenians would Artox. 22.9– support the newPeace.15 Xenophon, our chief source on the deliberations, preserves only what he considered to be the most important points: Pelopidas emphasized the Thebans’ long-standing loyalty to the Great King andtheir military superiority to the Spartans, demonstrated most recently at Leuctra; Timagoras spoke next, andasserted that Pelopidas hadspoken the truth; Artaxerxes, greatly impressed by Pelopidas’ arguments, invited himto addanyterms hewished included in thetreaty; Pelopidas said that Messene should be autonomous andthat theAthenians should beach their ships; if they refused to obey, the participants in the treaty would launch an expedition against them; if anystate didnot wish to participate, they would attack that state first. The King accepted the Theban proposals andhadthem included in the treaty; Leon spoke upat once, remarking to his fellow ambassadors that it was ; When the King’s secretary to look for some friend other than the King” time “ if the interpreted this statement, Artaxerxes added a clause to thedecree that said, “ Athenians knowof anything morejust than these terms, let themcome to the King 37). and inform him”(Xen. Hell. 7.1.34– It is clear fromXenophon’s account that Pelopidas wished above all else to put an end to both Athenian and Spartan hegemony. To do so, he would have to eliminate the means essential for each state’s success. The use of the fleet wasas vital to the Athenians’aims in the north as possession of Messene wasto Spartan control of thePeloponnese. It is notwithout significance that at least oneother antiAthenian provision seems to have been included in the treaty. Demosthenes states that the King again made Amphipolis subject to Athens after having enrolled it as his friend andally (Dem. 19.137). This statement suggests that Artaxerxes reaffirmed theautonomy of Amphipolis at theCongress at Susa in 367.16 There are two reasons for believing that this proposal also originated with Pelopidas. First, according toPlutarch, the King granted Pelopidas’demands, including theprovisions concerning the autonomy of the Greeks and the independence of Messene (Plut. Pel. 30.7). Second, theterms concerning Amphipolitan autonomy andtheAthenian fleet both were meant to nullify theresults of theCongress at Athens in theautumn of 371, when the Greeks sanctioned the Athenian claim to Amphipolis (Aeschin. 2.32). Xenophon does not bring out this connection simply because he does not consider the wars over Amphipolis andChersonese relevant to his story.

99; Buckler, 15 Cf. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 198– 55. mony 154– 16 Buckler, Theban Hegemony 156.

42; id., Theban Hege“ Plutarch”141–

128

IV. TheWarover Chersonese

It has long been the accepted view that Pelopidas’speech convinced the King to give his wholehearted support to the Theban cause.17 But Xenophon’s account indicates that this was not the case. Leon made it quite clear that the Athenians would look for other friends besides the King rather than agree to the pro-Theban

terms of the Peace. Artaxerxes responded by inviting the Athenians to partake in further negotiations, at which time they could indicate which provisions should be included in thetreaty. Heprobably extended this invitation to the Spartans andany other state that was dissatisfied with the terms that hadbeen worked out so far. Artaxerxes wasnotespecially keen to promote Theban interests. Hehadagreed to Pelopidas’proposals at first because, after Epaminondas’ Peloponnesian victories, theThebans appeared tobethestrongest power inGreece. ButtheKing already had reason to wonder if theThebans were capable of maintaining thePeace. Only a year earlier, they had displayed badjudgment in failing to re-elect Epaminondas;18 and Pelopidas hadcommitted a major blunder when hewentwithout forces to Thessaly to confront a hostile Alexander of Pherae.19 Artaxerxes was interested not in making Thebes theprostates ofthePeace, butinarranging a treaty thatallthemajor Greek states would support. This discussion helps toshedsome light ononeother issue that arose during the negotiations, the King’s funding of the Theban fleet. Buckler suggests that Artaxerxes offered the Thebans money to build a fleet which was meant to be a counterweight to the Athenian navy.20 There can be little doubt that the money came from the King. Given his concern to appease the Athenians, however, it is hardly likely that he initiated a blatantly anti-Athenian policy at this time. Surely Pelopidas was the one who brought up the subject of funding for the fleet, and the King agreed. Artaxerxes’ intention wasnotto help theThebans prevail over their rivals, butto maintain a balance of power among themajor states. By providing the Thebans with military funding, he wasonly doing what Ariobarzanes hadalready done for the Spartans andtheAthenians. Oddly enough, Xenophon gives no indication of what the Spartan ambassadors said during these negotiations, although hemusthave hadfull knowledge. Presumably, at least one of the ambassadors spoke out against Pelopidas’ proposals: the provision that guaranteed Messenian autonomy will have provoked the greatest objections, as it hadat Delphi. Antalcidas, like Timagoras, wasremembered forthe gifts he received from the King (Plut. Pel. 30.6, Artox. 22.2), and so we may presume that he also failed to stand upfor his state’s best interests. That would explain whyXenophon passes over himin his account of theevents.

96; Beloch, Griech. Gesch.23.1.189; Buckler, Theban 17 E.g., Schaefer, Demosthenes2 1.95– 157; Hammond, History of Greece3 502; Cartledge, Agesilaos 311–12, 387– Hegemony 154– 38. 88; Ruzicka, Politics 61; Hamilton, Failure 237– 45. 2; Plut. Pel. 25.3; Buckler, ibid. 143– 18 Diod. 15.72.1– 7; Mor. 194D; Theop. FGrH 115 F409; Dem. 23.120; Polyb. 19 Diod. 15.71.2; Plut. Pel. 27.5– 24, with a list of the scholarship onthe 9; Nep. Pel. 5.1; Paus. 9.15.1; Buckler, ibid. 123– 8.35.7–

subject at n. 24. 61. 20 Buckler, ibid. 155, 160–

1.TheWaroverChersonese, Phase I IV–

129

Inlate October 367, thevarious embassies began their journeys backtoGreece, each with a rather different interpretation of the negotiations with the King. Soon after arriving in Athens in mid- to late February 366, Leon, Timagoras, andtheir fellow ambassadors delivered their reports onthe Congress to the Council andthe Assembly. Timagoras spoke of hisfavored status, asdemonstrated bytheelaborate gifts the King had bestowed upon him. Leon provided a much fuller and more accurate version of theevents: Timagoras hadrefused to share living arrangements with him; to make matters worse, he had supported Theban interests and had received lavish gifts from the King; bycontrast, Leon’s ownvociferous opposition tothetreaty prompted Artaxerxes to invite theAthenians to senda second embassy for further negotiations (Xen. Hell. 7.1.38). The Athenians listened to Leon’s report with great interest. Although the King hadbeen inclined at first to give the Thebans preferential treatment, his invitation surely indicated that he wasamenable to altering the terms of the treaty in Athens’ favor. Hopefully, he would noweliminate the provision forcing the Athenians to beach their ships and, more important, he would agree to recognize their claim to Amphipolis. Eager to resolve these issues as soon as possible, the Assembly voted to send a second embassy to Susa without delay. It is a reasonable guess that Leon wasone of the menselected for this mission: he, unlike Timagoras, wasdeemed capable of standing upto the King. Before leaving Athens, Leon indicted Timagoras, whowascondemned andexecuted.21 With this example in mind, the members of the second embassy were hardly likely to repeat Timagoras’ mistakes. While the Athenians were making these arrangements, Antalcidas, Euthycles, and their colleagues returned to Sparta and reported on the Congress. Like the Athenians, the Spartans were alarmed by Artaxerxes’original inclination to favor Theban interests, but sawhis invitation for further negotiations as a positive sign. There wasnowreason to hope that he would support their claim to Messene and supply the funding they needed for their Peloponnesian operations. The Spartans arranged to senda second embassy to Susa, andmadeCallias its leader (Xen. Ages. 8.3). For the first time in over twenty years, Antalcidas was not to take part in negotiations with the King. This change in personnel reflects a major shift in Spartan policy. There are reasons to believe that it was the work of Agesilaus. 7) Antalcidas wasvilified by his enemies for his failure at Susa (Plut. Artox. 22.6– Wearenotgiven their names, butwedoknowthat Agesilaus hadbeenhisopponent since thedays of the King’s Peace.22 It is striking that after thesecond congress the King sent a conciliatory letter to Agesilaus inparticular.23 Andthere is thepresence of Callias in the embassy –probably the manwhohadserved under Agesilaus in Asia in the mid-390s and who was presumably one of his supporters now.24 We maysurmise that Agesilaus, frustrated at Antalcidas’ inability to obtain favorable 21 Xen. Hell. 7.1.38; Dem. 19.137; Plut. Pel. 30.9, Artox. 22.12. 3; Pelop. 15.2, Lyc. 13.6; Polyaen. 1.16.2; Cawkwell, “Agesilaus and 2, 26.2– 22 Plut. Ages. 23.1– 69; cf. Cartledge, Agesilaos 195. Sparta”68– 23 Xen. Ages. 8.3, Plut. Ages. 23.10; see below. 24 Xen. 4.1.15; Cawkwell, “Agesilaos andSparta”68 n. 29. Callias does notappear elsewhere in the sources.

130

IV.TheWaroverChersonese

terms for Sparta, advocated that thesecond embassy take a more aggressive stance with the King, andhis view prevailed. Theambassadors were instructed to inform Artaxerxes that the Spartans’ participation in a newPeace was contingent on his recognition of their claim to Messene. Soon afterwards, Callias andhis colleagues set out for Susa and Antalcidas, devastated by his disgrace, committed suicide (Plut. Artox. 22.6– 7). Meanwhile, the Theban ambassadors returned home from Susa accompanied by an ambassador of Artaxerxes. Pelopidas gladly reported that the King supported his proposals aimed at curtailing Spartan and Athenian power, and that he had agreed to provide the Thebans with funding for a fleet. Pelopidas then introduced the Persian emissary, whoread aloud a letter from Artaxerxes outlining the provisions that hadbeen worked outatSusa. It wasprobably atthis time thatEpaminondas called upon the Thebans to take the steps needed to secure their hegemonic position. Heurged them to begin construction of the fleet at once. Herecommended, moreover, that they sendoutambassadors tothemembers of Athens’League to persuade them to abandon their alliance with the Athenians and form one with Thebes (Xen. Hell. 7.1.39; Diod. 15.76.3). In response, the Thebans decided to convene aninternational peace congress andcall onthe major Greek cities to send representatives to Thebes (Xen. Hell. 7.1.39; Diod. 15.76.3). Moreover, they voted to build a fleet of one hundred triremes andto send embassies to Athens’allies in 79.1). the east andnorth Aegean (Aeschin. 2.105; Diod. 15.78.4– The decision to build a naval empire wasan oddone, in light of the fact that Thebes was not geographically positioned for such an undertaking. As Buckler rightly suggests, the major impetus for this move came from the desire to curtail Athenian naval power.25 Perhaps more important than the Athenians’operations at Amphipolis wastheir interest in Chersonese: once they hadrecovered the Cherso-

nesian towns, their hegemony inthenorth would be virtually unassailable. That spring, the Thebans began construction of the fleet andsent outambassadors to various members of theAthenian Confederacy. Taking steps to secure their position in mainland Greece at the same time, they invited theGreek cities to send representatives to swear to theterms of thePeace that hadbeenworked outat Susa. Although Xenophon says that all of the Greek cities were invited to participate in thecongress, he does notindicate which ones actually sent ambassadors. Theonly ambassador identified inhisaccount is theArcadian Lycomedes (Xen. Hell. 7.1.39– 40). Given the fact that the Athenians andSpartans hadjust (i.e., in early March) sent a second round of embassies to Susa, it is highly unlikely that either state participated in the congress at Thebes. There would have been little point in doing so whenthey stood to obtain farbetter terms from Artaxerxes. Xenophon provides a summary of the proceedings of the Theban congress. It began with the introduction of thePersian ambassador, whoread aloud theterms of the treaty as contained in the King’s letter. TheThebans then called onthose who wished to be friends of the King to swear tothese provisions. Therepresentatives of the various states, however, refused to take the oaths. They said that they hadbeen authorized only to listen, and that if the Thebans wanted oaths sworn, they should

25 Buckler, Theban

62 andn. 19. Hegemony 160–

1.TheWarover Chersonese, Phase I IV–

131

send ambassadors to each of the cities. Shortly thereafter, the Thebans sent ambassadors to obtain oaths from the cities that had participated in the Congress, only to discover they were unwilling to swear to the peace (Xen. Hell. 7.1.39–40). We can easily surmise whythe peace treaty was universally rejected. It was evident from the Congress at Susa that the King’s support of Thebes as the prostates of the peace wasnot as enthusiastic as the Thebans would have liked to believe. By issuing invitations for further negotiations to those states dissatisfied with the current terms of the treaty, Artaxerxes had indicated his willingness to reconsider the positions of the other major powers. Without his support, the Thebans were in no position to enforce the Peace or their position as hegemon. There was no point in swearing to the terms worked out at the first congress at Susa. It made far better sense to wait to see what happened atthe second.

IV– 1c. Ariobarzanes’Revolt While the Greek states were involved in these various diplomatic activities, Ariobarzanes wasbusy making plans of hisown.Inthespring of 366, hedecided to send embassies to a number of Greek states. Hisostensible reason wasto procure aidfor his expansionist efforts in Asia Minor, which so far had been quite successful. During the past year, he had sent Philiscus with forces to the Asian coast of the Hellespont, where thehyparch launched operations atstrategically important Lampsacus.26 The city surrendered later that year, paving the way for the hyparch’s capture of other coastal cities. This expansion putAriobarzanes in a strong position both politically and financially. He believed he now had the means to conduct a successful revolt against theKing. Thenext stepwastorequest alliances fromthose Greek cities whose aidwould be of usein hisrevolt. Presumably, hewould be able to convince the states that had already experienced his largesse; hopefully, he would be able to convince others in similar fashion. Ariobarzanes realized, however, that the Greek cities, Athens andSparta in particular, would notsendforces if they knew he wasplanning revolt. They would hardly jeopardize relations with the King when so much wasat stake. Andso the satrap instructed his ambassadors to say that he needed aidfor a local war. They were notto say a word about his real plans. The ambassadors made their way to Athens, where they spoke of the good relations Ariobarzanes enjoyed withthecity. They reminded theAthenians that less than two years earlier the satrap hadgiven them funding, which they put to good use at Amphipolis.27 He now wished to give them a second installment as proof of

42. Onthe basis of Strabo’s failure to mention the Lampsacus-Callipolis cross26 Dem. 23.141– . Such an inference in Hellenic times” 62, believes that it was not used “ ing, Leaf, Troy 361– cannot be correct, given the importance of Lampsacus during the late Archaic andClassical 27

periods. See Judeich, 278; Casson, Macedonia 220. The other, andmore important, crossingpoint was Sestus-Abydus, which also played a part in the events of this period. See below. See Chapter II, Section II-1d.

132

IV. TheWaroverChersonese

his continued support of Athenian interests. In return, Ariobarzanes requested from the Athenian fleet fora conflict in Hellespontine Phrygia. TheAthenians sawthat Ariobarzanes’funding would atlast make itpossible to mount a second major campaign inthenorth andrecover control of their Chersonesian possessions –a task madeeasier bythe fact that Ariobarzanes nowcontrolled the Asian coast of the Hellespont. The Assembly voted at once to send aid to Ariobarzanes andto undertake the recovery of theChersonesian cities. Timotheus wasassigned the command against Chersonese, undoubtedly because of his successes in Thrace in the 370s, whenhe hadadded a number of states to the League (Diod. 15.47.2). Preparations were begun for an expedition to Asia Minor, to be launched as soon asTimotheus entered office inearly July. After their successful visit to Athens, Ariobarzanes’ ambassadors made their waytoSparta, where they spoke of hisgenerous gift of money andmercenaries two years earlier, andpledged additional financial support for Spartan efforts to recover Messene. Although similar arguments hadconvinced theAthenians to sendaid, the Spartans were unwilling to sendforces atpresent because they could notspare any forces from the warinthe Peloponnese. Ariobarzanes did not limit his solicitations to states in mainland Greece. He waseager to obtain aidfromat least oneisland power, namely, Samos. Oneglance at the mapexplains why: its large harbor andproximity to Ionia would provide an ideal base for expeditions against the Asian coast. Ariobarzanes had reason to believe thattheSamians would beinterested ina treaty. Intheyears after theKing’s Peace, they had become wary of Persian expansion in Asia Minor, which had resulted in the loss of their peraea.28 This landwasincluded inthe satrapy of Ionia and was governed by the satrap of Lydia, whoat that time was Tiribazus.29 As noted earlier, his successor, Autophradates, ledthe King’s forces in the early 360s inefforts to suppress therevolt of Datames. By late 367 they hadarranged a ceasefire,30 andAutophradates wasfree toreturn towestern Anatolia and, presumably, to expand hisinfluence there. Capitalizing ontheSamians’fears, Ariobarzanes pledged that, inexchange foraid, hewould defend their autonomy; hemayalso haveoffered to helpthemregain control of their peraea. TheSamians would nothave passed up the chance for an alliance with a satrap whocould defend their interests. After conducting negotiations, thetwopowers madea treaty inthespring of 367. Wordof the alliance with the Samians soon reached Autophradates. Alert to the signs of revolt, he immediately ordered his hyparch, Tigranes, to take control of Samos. In

support

28 The Samians hadprobably lost their peraea to the Great King in the period of expansion in western Asia in the second half of the 380s. See Hornblower, Mausolus 128; G. Shipley, A 26. Tigranes”125– 36; Shahbazi, “ 188 B.C. (Oxford 1987) 135– History of Samos 800– 38; Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 118; Shahbazi, 29 Beloch Griech. Gesch.2 3.2.137– ibid. 126.

62. The dates 8. For discussion of Datames’revolt, see Ruzicka, Politics 58– 30 Nep. Datames 7– of boththeoutbreak of therevolt andthecease-fire areuncertain. Weiskopf dates thecease-fire of Autophradates and Datames to 368 (Weiskopf, “Achaemenid Systems of Governing in 217). Ruzicka, id.59– Anatolia”[Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1982], 214– 61, argues fora date of late 367 atthelatest.

1.TheWaroverChersonese, Phase I IV–

133

late spring, Tigranes installed a garrison in the city and stationed Cyprothemis there.31 Within days, the Athenians learned the news of the Persian occupation of Samos, and soon afterwards began hearing rumors of Ariobarzanes’ impending revolt. They nowfaced a serious problem: should they proceed with their plans to sendTimotheus outto aidAriobarzanes while their ambassadors were ontheir way to Susa to renegotiate the terms of the Peace with the King? Aid provided to Ariobarzanes in revolt without question would constitute a transgression of the King’s Peace. It was not worth jeopardizing relations with Artaxerxes when he could give the Athenians what Ariobarzanes could not–confirmation of their right to use their fleet, andrecognition of their claim to Amphipolis. (As wehave seen, they believed that he had already recognized their claim to Chersonese.) On the other hand, Ariobarzanes had already funded their northern operations once and hadjust pledged another installment. It would be foolish fortheAthenians to break ties with him when they did not know if he would indeed revolt, or if the King would agree to their demands. The Athenians devised an ingenious solution to their dilemma: they would adda provision to the decree they hadrecently passed on behalf of Ariobarzanes, stipulating “that he (Timotheus) notbreak the treaty with the King”(Dem. 15.9). If in fact the rumors about Ariobarzanes turned out to be accurate, Timotheus was to dissociate himself from the satrap at once. With this provision, the Athenians hoped to reap the benefits that both Ariobarzanes and Artaxerxes hadto offer.

IV-1d. The Second Congress at Susa; Timotheus at Samos

InJune 366, theGreek embassies arrived inSusa toresume deliberations regarding the Peace. It is notdifficult to surmise therequests that theAthenians andSpartans made at this time. The Athenians demanded that Pelopidas’ proposal concerning thebeaching of Athenian ships bestruck fromthetreaty, that Amphipolis nolonger be included in the states that were guaranteed autonomy in the King’s Peace, and that the King officially sanction theAthenian claim to thecity. TheSpartans asked the King to deny Messene autonomy andto provide military andfinancial aid for the warin the Peloponnese. Artaxerxes found himself in a difficult position, even more difficult than his position hadbeen at the previous Congress. He realized that the Athenians were determined torecover their northern possessions andcould refuse to take part inthe new Peace if he did not support their interests. The only way to assure a peace settlement was to satisfy their demands, even if it meant alienating the Thebans. The King didnot care which power wastheprostates of the Peace, as long as all the major powers agreed to the treaty. Hecould notafford at this point to alienate the Athenians. For this reason, Artaxerxes deleted from the treaty the provision concerning the beaching of the Athenian fleet, andhe removed Amphipolis from the 31 Dem. 15.9. Cyprothemis is otherwise

unattested

inoursources.

IV. TheWarover Chersonese

134

list of states guaranteed autonomy. Atthis time, healso declared hissupport forthe Athenian claim to Amphipolis. The King hoped that these actions would convince the Athenians to remain loyal to the Peace. When it came to the Spartans’demands, Artaxerxes wasfar less generous. He agreed to give themmoney fortheir military operations, forthat would demonstrate his good will while maintaining the balance of power in the Peloponnese. He refused, however, to recognize the Spartan claim to Messene, for that would jeopardize relations with the Thebans, who would already find fault with his treatment of the Athenians. In aneffort to salvage relations, Artaxerxes decided to appeal to Agesilaus directly. When theCongress came to anend, the King sent an ambassador to accompany Callias andhiscolleagues back to Sparta andto bring a letter to Agesilaus offering xenia andfriendship (Xen. Ages. 8.3; Plut. Ages. 23.10). While the embassies made their wayback to their home cities, the Athenians proceeded with their plans to send aid to Ariobarzanes. In the second week of July, Timotheus set sail for Asia Minor. We can infer from the figures given for his Samian operations that he set out from Athens with thirty triremes and, after reaching Asia, hired mercenaries.32 A week or twoafter Timotheus’arrival, Ariobarzanes staged his revolt.33 Since Timotheus could not continue to aid the satrap without breaking the King’s Peace, hewasforced to halt operations in Asia. Buthe wasquick to see that events onSamos provided anopportunity to aidAriobarzanes without incurring problems with Artaxerxes. Samos wasnotpart of Asia, andso it did not belong to the Great King. The Athenians therefore could arguably send forces there –as long as their actions didnotconstitute aggression.34 In late July orearly August, Timotheus left Asia Minor for Samos andimmediately launched a siege to dislodge Tigranes’ garrison from the city. This was a major undertaking, involving several thousand peltasts and thirty triremes (Isoc. 15.111; cf. Polyaen. 3.10.9). It was not an expedition that the Athenians could easily afford. We are told, in fact, that Timotheus himself paid all of his forces “ from the enemy country”(Isoc. ibid.). The author of the Oeconomica provides the details: Timotheus sequestered the Samian crops andhadthe inhabitants payforthe right to gather them.35 But this probably was not his only source of funding. A few months earlier, Ariobarzanes’ambassadors hadannounced his intention to provide the Athenians with more money for their military endeavors. As we have seen, Iphicrates then usedsome of themoney to intensify siege operations atAmphipolis in the autumn of 366.36 It is more than likely that Timotheus also used some at Samos. Although the Samian expedition forced the Athenians to postpone fulfillment of their Chersonesian goals temporarily, it washoped that lending support to

32 Isoc. 15.111 gives the number of mercenaries at Samos as eight thousand; Polyaen. 3.10.9 gives it as seven thousand. 33 Cf. Weiskopf, Great Satraps’Revolt 41–43, who suggests that Ariobarzanes did not in fact revolt, butthat Autophradates hadhimdeclared a rebel inorder to gain control of the southern Troad.

43. 73; Badian, “King’s Peace”42– 34 Xen. 5.1.31; Cawkwell, “King’s Peace”72– 5; Davies, IG ii2 1609”330. 35 [Arist.] Oec. 2.1350b 4– “ 36 See Chapter II, Section II–1d.

1.TheWaroverChersonese, Phase IV–

I

135

Ariobarzanes andhis allies would ultimately make it easier to recover Chersonese. Isocrates underlines theconnection between the Samian andChersonesian expeditions in the Antidosis. In his account of Timotheus’ successes, he says, “ sailing from Samos, he captured Sestus andCrithote” ; he then lists the general’s Chalci12). As the chronology indicates, however, Timodian campaigns (Isoc. 15.111– theus captured Sestus andCrithote after the Chalcidian cities. Isocrates’grouping of the Samian and Chersonesian expeditions together without regard for chronological order suggests that the Athenians considered them part of the same policy. Ariobarzanes was naturally less than pleased when the Athenians abandoned operations in Anatolia, but he soon experienced a setback that proved even more disconcerting. Philiscus, incharge of operations intheHellespont, decided tobreak ties with the satrap andembark on his ownpath of conquest. With Autophradates devoting his attention to suppressing the revolt, Philiscus realized that the only way to retain possession of the places he hadcaptured was to renounce ties with Ariobarzanes. Only by proclaiming himself a friend of the Great King could the hyparch hope to avoid a deadly confrontation with the loyalists and gain complete control of the Hellespont. In early October 366, the Greek embassies arrived home from Susa. The Athenian ambassadors returned toa reception that wasrather different fromtheone that hadgreeted the first embassy seven months earlier. The Athenians responded with nothing short of exultation when they learned that the King hadagreed to their demands concerning the Athenian fleet and Amphipolis. With the sanction of Artaxerxes andthe financial support of Ariobarzanes, they could be confident of recovering bothAmphipolis andChersonese. Before long Athens would berestored to the position it had known in the fifth century. The scene in Sparta was somewhat more somber. Callias reported on the proceedings at Susa andthen introduced the Persian ambassador, whosaid that the King wasconcerned to remain ongoodterms withSparta: as proof, hehadbrought a letter to Agesilaus offering xenia and friendship (Xen. Ages. 8.3; Plut. Ages. 23.10). Theambassador’s attempt atappeasement, however, fell flat. Nothing could change thefact that the King would notrecognize theSpartan claim to Messene. It would nowbeimpossible to recover their hegemony over thePeloponnese. Ingreat frustration, the Spartans turned to Ariobarzanes, who hadalready given concrete proof of his support. They decided to support his revolt, andpossibly formed an alliance with himsoon afterwards (Xen. Ages. 2.26). The Spartan response to the King’s actions is perhaps reflected in the story of his letter to Agesilaus: according to Xenophon, Agesilaus refused to accept the letter, saying there wasnoneedforprivate appeals for friendship; if theKing were a friend to Sparta, Agesilaus would be a friend to him; if, however, the King were found plotting against Sparta, Agesilaus would notbehisfriend, even if hereceived a great many letters fromhim. Xenophon goes onto saythat Agesilaus rejected the King’s overtures because hedidnotwant to appear untrustworthy to those satraps who wished to revolt (Xen. Ages. 8.3, 5). This is pure fiction. Agesilaus would not have turned down a chance to establish personal relations with the King when the Spartans so desperately needed Persian support. Agesilaus surely invented this after the fact, when the Spartans hadlost hope that the King would help them regain

136

IV. TheWaroverChersonese

Messene. Eager to boost his image at this point, Agesilaus claimed friendship with Artaxerxes contingent onhistreatment of Sparta.

he hadmade

IV– 1e.Theban attempts atnaval hegemony; Timotheus atSamos During the autumn of 366, the Athenians pursued their goals of expansion. The Thebans, meanwhile, continued their efforts to build their ownhegemony in the Aegean andweaken Athens’control over its League. By the endof the year, the Theban ambassadors hadvisited a number of states, including Rhodes, Cos, Chios, Chalcedon, Byzantium, andHeraclea.37 The embassies hadresulted in treaties of friendship, but little else. The ambassadors were simply unable to convince the allies of Athens to secede from the Second Athenian League andform an alliance with Thebes. Buckler no doubt is correct in suggesting that there was a general reluctance on the part of these states to incur Athenian reprisals.38 Ourchronology explains the reasons for this reluctance. While the Theban ambassadors were travelling around the Aegean, the Athenians launched operations to aid Ariobarzanes andto recover Chersonese.39 Moreover, they obtained favorable terms from the Great King concerning their fleet andAmphipolis40 and, as a result of Ariobarzanes’financial support, began making progress with operations at Amphipolis in the second half of the year.41 In short, the Athenians’efforts to rebuild their naval empire in 366 were going quite well –so well that their allies believed that any attempt to secede from the League would quickly be crushed. At this point, the Athenians were too strong fora revolt to succeed, evenwithTheban support. While the Theban ambassadors were making their way around the Aegean, Timotheus continued siege operations atSamos. InDecember 366, hehadcause to have dealings with Erythrae, recorded in the inscription IG II2 108 but never adequately explained. This report hasbeenlinked totwopieces ofevidence. First is the Erythraean inscription honoring Mausolus, probably set upby the oligarchs after the satrap hadprovided aidto thecity. Second is Demosthenes’ statement in the speech On the Chersonese (dated to 34142) that the Athenian generals visited places like Chios andErythrae looking for money.43 Onthe basis of this evidence, Hornblower suggests that Timotheus went to Erythrae to raise funds; the siege of Samos caused the Erythraeans to be concerned about Athenian encroachment; in this climate, the oligarchs, with the aid of Mausolus, staged a coup.44 Ruzicka, connecting theevidence to Isaeus’reference infr. 15to anAthenian naval defeat in 3b. 37 Diod. 15.79.1; Just. 16.4.3; see Chapter III, Section III–

38 Buckler, 39 40

41 42 43

44

73. Theban Hegemony 172–

5c. 5a andIII– See Chapter III, Sections III– 6d. See Chapter III, Section III– 2d. See Chapter I, Section I– Dion. Hal. AdAmm. 1.10. Tod no. 155 = Syll.3 168 = H. Engelmann andR. Merkelbach, Die Inschriften vonErythrai und Klazomenai Vol. 1 no. 8; Dem. 8.24 (for thedate: Dion. Hal. AdAmm. 1.10). 110. Hornblower, Mausolus 108–

1.TheWaroverChersonese, Phase IV–

I

137

366/5, suggests that Timotheus sent ships to Erythrae to aid the democrats in a struggle with the oligarchs, who were supported by Mausolus; the battle was

disastrous fortheAthenian forces.45 Although bothreconstructions areattractive insome respects, they also present serious difficulties. First, the inscription does notindicate that Timotheus actually went to Erythrae, only that hereported onrelations with thecity. Second, because theErythraean inscription honoring Mausolus is undated, it should notbe usedas a basis forreconstructing theevents of 366. Hornblower’s viewhasits merits butit is worth asking whether Demosthenes’ statement of 341 is likely to refer to events that occurred twenty-five years earlier. Ruzicka’s view is problematical for differentreasons. Isaeus’reference to anAthenian naval battle in366/5 does notspecify where this battle took place. More important, it is highly unlikely that Timotheus would have engaged in hostilities in Asia in December 366. He was careful to follow the Athenians’ instructions and avoid breaking the treaty with the King, especially since six months earlier Artaxerxes hadagreed to their demands regarding Amphipolis andthe fleet. Timotheus, therefore, musthave hadother reasons for dealing with Erythrae at this time. As wehave seen, Chios wasone of the states which the Theban embassies visited in their attempt to convince Athenian allies to secede from the Confederacy.46 If they went to Erythrae for the same purpose, Timotheus’actions were anattempt to maintain goodrelations with thecity. Since, however, so little of the inscription is extant, this andother such reconstructions must remain purely speculative. Timotheus continued thesiege of Samos over thewinter. By May365, he had dislodged Cyprothemis’ garrison (Isoc. 15.111, Dem. 15.9). The Athenians proceeded to install a cleruchy (Diod. 18.18.9). They realized that with this act they were transgressing thenon-aggression clause of thetreaty with theGreat King, and so they devised propaganda tojustify the Samian expedition. According to Dem. That osthenes 15.9, Timotheus, “investing the island andaiding it, liberated it” surely reflects thewaythe Athenians chose to regard this expedition. By claiming that Timotheus had liberated Samos, they tried to obscure the fact that they had transgressed the Peace. We may wonder how successful this propaganda was: certainly the irony of the“liberation”will nothave been lost onthe members of the Confederacy.47 After settling affairs onSamos, Timotheus began making preparations for his next campaign. There waslittle more hecould dofor Ariobarzanes at the moment. Timotheus could notattack anyof thecities Philiscus controlled in the Hellespont, since that would be encroaching on the King’s claim to Asia. Given these limitations, the obvious answer wasto begin the task of recovering Chersonese. Other affairs, however, intervened. Iphicrates hadrecently been dismissed from thecommandagainst Amphipolis, andtheAthenians haddecided to appoint Timotheus in his place, who would now be in charge of operations against Amphipolis and Chersonese simultaneously (Dem. 23.149). There canbe little doubt that theAthe-

74. 45 Ruzicka, Politics 72– 3b. 46 See Chapter III, Section III– 47 See Cargill, IG II2 1 andtheAthenian “

Kleruchy

32. , GRBS 24 (1983) 321– onSamos”

138

IV. The Warover Chersonese

nians chose Timotheus for the Amphipolitan campaign because of his speedy capture of Samos: frustrated after more than three years of fighting, they hoped he would beable tocapture Amphipolis just asquickly. Given theAthenian obsession with Amphipolis, Timotheus had little choice but to take care of that problem before moving against Chersonese (Dem. 23.150). After the arduous Samian campaign, Timotheus was in need of additional forces andso hecontacted Charidemus, whohadjust recently lost hisposition with Iphicrates.48 Thecondottiere refused theoffer of employment, however, because he hadalready been hired by Cotys, whofeared anAthenian invasion of Chersonese (see below). Charidemus promptly wenttoCardia withAthenian triaconters (Dem. 23.149). Despite this minor setback, Timotheus believed it would nottake long to capture Amphipolis, atwhich point hewould befree to attack Chersonese. True, an Olynthian garrison was holding the city (Dem. 23.150), but he had managed to expel a Persian garrison from Samos in less than eleven months (Isoc. 15.111). Little didTimotheus realize, however, what sort of conflict he wasentering, and how ferrently other powers besides Athens would fight to gain control of Amphipolis. Hewasto spend nearly three years fighting that waronvarious fronts without capturing thecity, andwould notin fact moveagainst Chersonese until early 361.

IV–1f. Cotys’consolidation of the kingdom Although Iphicrates was no longer in charge of operations at Amphipolis, he continued to play animportant role in Thracian affairs. After Timotheus assumed theAmphipolitan command inthesummer of 365, theex-general wentto thecourt of Cotys. Iphicrates could expect hospitable treatment fromtheking, since hewas his son-in-law.49 But clearly Iphicrates was also thinking about his future. He wanted to return to favor in Athens, andhoped service to the king would help him achieve that end. A glance at recent events suggests that Iphicrates went to Cotys’court at a time when relations between Athens andthe king were somewhat strained. In the first half of the 360s, Cotys hadbeen occupied with efforts to acquire control of the entire Odrysian kingdom, i.e., Thrace east of the Strymon. During that period, he

50; see Chapter II, Section II–1d. 48 Dem. 23.149– ή ) toIphicrates inthesame η δ ς εσ τ 49 According toDemosthenes (23.129), Cotys wasanin-law (κ way as Cersebleptes was to Charidemus. Kirchner argues that this means “brother-in-law” because Cersebleptes wastoo young to have a daughter at this point (J. Kirchner, RE 3 [1899] 36 s.v. Charidemos). Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 249, accepts this argument 2135– anddates the marriage connection of Cotys andIphicrates to the 380s. He adds that it is unlikely Cotys was old enough to have a daughter of marriageable age at this time. The difficulty with these arguments, however, is that they necessitate rejection of the unanimous later ancient testimony that Iphicrates married Cotys’ daughter (Nepos Iph. 3.4; Sen. Exc. Controv. 6.5; Athn. 4.131a). Moreover, wedo not know the dates of birth of either Cotys or Cersebleptes or, for that matter, the date of Iphicrates’ marriage. We should conclude that Iphicrates married thedaughter of Cotys andCharidemus married thedaughter of Cersebleptes.

1.TheWaroverChersonese, Phase IV–

I

139

enjoyed goodrelations withtheAthenians, whose pursuit of Amphipolis apparently did not conflict with his owninterests in the region. However, things changed in late spring 365, when Timotheus captured Samos and an Athenian assault on Chersonese seemed imminent. Concerned tokeeptheAthenians outof Chersonese, Cotys contacted Charidemus, who hadrecently been discharged from Athenian service at Amphipolis. The mercenary captain sailed at once to Cardia with Athenian triaconters. Shortly thereafter, Cotys learned that Timotheus had decided to move against Amphipolis first. There was no longer any need for Charidemus’ forces on Chersonese, andso the king decided notto hire him(Dem. 23.149– 50). These events show that in late spring 365 Cotys was willing to go to war with Athens to protect his rights onChersonese. (Wecannot be certain that at this point he wasplanning to take Chersonese forhimself, forhedidnotmove against Sestus until thesummer of 363.) Thanks to Athenian problems at Amphipolis, however, a major confrontation on Chersonese was averted for the time being, and Cotys continued to focus his attention onthe Odrysian kingdom. Upon arriving at the court, Iphicrates functioned as one of Cotys’top advisers. He aided the king in raising revenue for anarmy andin collecting troops ([Arist.] Oec. 2.2.26, 1351 a 18; Dem. 23.131). Iphicrates nodoubt believed that by helping Cotys expand his control in Thrace, he would serve Athenian objectives in the north. It would certainly beeasier to recover Amphipolis andChersonese if a friend (indeed, a citizen of Athens50) were ruling theneighboring regions. Since Iphicrates hadbeen dismissed from his command, he wasnotserving Athens in anyofficial capacity at this time.51 Clearly, however, the Athenians fully supported his actions.52 Notrace of this, of course, appears in the account of Demosthenes, who does not wish to admit that originally the Athenians hadwished to help Cotys in Thrace, and that this plan backfired when he decided to take Chersonese for

himself.

50

Dem. 23.118.

65. Cf. thecase 51 For a synopsis of scholarly views onthis issue, see Pritchett, Greek State 2.64– of Chabrias, who, according to Diod. 15.92.3, went to Egypt onhis owninitiative to work for Tachos inhisrevolt fromtheGreat King. ButseePritchett, id. 100; Hornblower, Mausolus 202 andn. 157; andBadian, “King’s Peace”42 n. 35, whopoints out, onthebasis of Diod.15.29.3– 4, that the Athenians recalled Chabrias later, when they wanted to improve relations with the Great King andPharnabazus. 52 Cf. modern studies that, largely because ofa misinterpretation of Dem.23.130, depict Iphicrates’ service toCotys as a betrayal of Athenian interests: e.g., C. Rehdantz, Vitae Iphicratis Chabri50; Schaefer Demosthenes2 1.157; U. Kahrstedt, ae Timothei Atheniensium (Berlin 1845) 149– , “Plato’s Academy anić “ Iphikrates” , RE9.2 (1916) 2020; A. Höck, “Odrysienreich”98; S. Duš , Chiron 10 (1980) 117. Pritchett, Greek State 2.66. 359 B.C.” and Timotheus’ Policy, 365– EvenDemosthenes, whohaslittle interest indefending Iphicrates, concedes thattheex-general left the court rather than aid the king in attacking Athenian strongholds (Dem. 23.131). I am essentially in agreement with Kallet’s view that Iphicrates had Athenian interests in mind (Kallet. “Iphikrates”239– 252).

140

IV. The WaroverChersonese

IV–1g. Athenian setbacks in the Aegean and Propontis During the years 366 and 365, the Thebans devoted considerable attention to constructing a fleet. With Epaminondas incommand, they set sail in thespring of 364 toconvert those states which hadpreviously shown reluctance to leave Athens’ league. Alarmed at this turn of events, the Athenians sent out Laches with a large fleet to stop them. Before Laches could attack, however, Epaminondas forced him to retreat. The Thebans proceeded with their plans. By the endof 364, they had persuaded or coerced several important states, including Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, andprobably Chalcedon, to form analliance (Diod. 15.79.1; [Dem.] 50.5). While theThebans were adding allies totheir roster, Philiscus wasprogressively expanding his control of the Hellespont. In the summer of 364, the hyparch moved against Perinthus, the Athenians’base in the Propontis. The Etesian winds made it impossible for the Athenians to send aid to the city, and it surrendered quickly. Philiscus proceeded to use it as a base for operations elsewhere in the Propontis (Dem. 23.142). That autumn helaunched siege operations against Cyzicus. TheCyzicenes sent atonce totheAthenians foraid. Although Cyzicus wasnot anally, thenewswasworrisome, fortheAthenians could notafford another state on the grain route to be turned against them. Timotheus wascurrently occupied with the siege of Potidaea, andcould notgotoCyzicus himself. Hesent whatever forces he could spare, perhaps those that had fought under Alcimachus at Amphipolis a few months earlier.53 By the spring of 363, the Athenian forces hadsucceeded in driving Philiscus’ forces from Cyzicus. This victory was not unlike Timotheus’ operations on Samos, where he also drove out the forces of a loyalist hyparch. Cyzicus was not free of Persian forces for very long, however. As soon as Timotheus withdrew his forces from the city for use in operations on Chalcidice, Philiscus resumed siege operations, andcaptured thecity inthe summer of 363. A year later, Cyzicus wasworking openly against Athens.54 Cyzicus seems to have been the last of Philiscus’conquests. Later that summer, Thersagoras andExecestus of Lampsacus assassinated him in an attempt to free their city (Dem. 23.141). The Athenians soon afterwards regained use of Perinthus as a base, andAriobarzanes regained control of Lampsacus andthe other Hellespontine cities (with the exception of Cyzicus55). By the endof the year, the satrap again held mostof thecoast opposite Chersonese. Frustrated intheir attempt to free Lampsacus of Persian rule, Thersagoras andExecestus withdrew to Lesbos (Dem. ibid.).

IV-1h. Cotys’first expedition against Sestus By mid-363, Cotys had consolidated his hold on the Odrysian kingdom. He was nowready to expand his control beyond its borders. The decline of the Athenians’ 2b. 53 See Chapter II, Section II– 2b below. 6; see Section IV– 54 [Dem.] 50.5– 2b below. 55 See Section IV–

1.TheWarover Chersonese, Phase I IV–

141

fortunes played nosmall role inhisdecision. Inmid-366, they seemed tobewell on their way to reestablishing their hegemony in the north. Subsequent events however, had weakened the Athenians’ position considerably. Various troubles at Amphipolis had kept the city out of the Athenians’ grasp. Thanks to the successes of the Thebans andPhiliscus, the Athenians hadalso lost a number of important allies. The fall of Perinthus wasespecially difficult, for it meant the loss of a crucial naval base. Laches’flight from Epaminondas (Diod. 15.79.1), moreover, didlittle to enhance Athens’reputation. Cotys decided to take advantage of Athenian weakness andgaincontrol of Chersonese (with theexception of Cardia, which healready held). Since this expedition would without question precipitate war, the king buttressed hisposition byobtaining alliances with cities inthearea that were hostile to Athens, e.g., Abydus (Dem. 23.158). This city was of critical importance, because together with Sestus, it constituted themaincrossing-point from Europe to Asia.56 In the summer of 363, Cotys sent Miltocythes, a Thracian of noble standing,57 with forces to Chersonese. With the Athenians currently involved in operations in Chalcidice andMacedonia,58 this wasa good time to launch anattack. Miltocythes decided to move first against Sestus, militarily andeconomically the most important of thecities claimed bytheAthenians. It hadlong functioned as their naval base onChersonese, nodoubt because it hadtheonly major harbor onthe Hellespontine side of the peninsula. Wishing to maximize his chances, Miltocythes launched his siege of Sestus in mid-summer, when the Etesians would prevent the Athenians from sending a fleet. The Athenians learned of the siege of Sestus with great alarm. Cotys, whom they hadhelped in his efforts to gain control of all Thrace, hadbetrayed them.59 Timotheus could do nothing to stop him, for he was occupied with the siege of Potidaea. Anxious to deal with this crisis immediately, the Athenians appointed Ergophilus to lead forces against Chersonese. Inlate September, Ergophilus set sail with a fleet for the Hellespont. Hespent the next several months defending Sestus but was unable to repel the Thracian forces from the city. The siege continued through the winter. Depleted of resources, the Sestians surrendered to Miltocythes inearly spring 362. The fall of Sestus wasa great loss to the Athenians. Deprived of their base on Chersonese, they were unable to stopMiltocythes fromattacking other cities inthe region. By late spring, he hadcaptured Crithote and the surrounding territory.60 Ergophilus realized that there was nothing more he could do at this point on

56 Casson, Macedonia 220; Buckler, Theban Hegemony 168 and n. 35. Charidemus was to use 3f. this crossing to return from Asia Minor in 360. See below, Section IV– 57 Miltocythes was probably a descendant of the only other attested Miltocythes, who led a regiment of Thracian soldiers atCunaxa under Cyrus and, after thebattle, deserted to Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab.2.2.7). 2c. 2b andII– 58 See Chapter II, Sections II– 59 Dem. 23.130. Demosthenes, whenit suits him, remarks emphatically thatChersonese was“not Thrace”(Dem. 23.166). 11. 60 Onthe site, see Kahrstedt, Beiträge 10–

142

IV. TheWaroverChersonese

Chersonese. Rather than waste more men and money, he decided to return to Athens with thefleet at once. Soon after arriving at Athens in late spring or early summer 362, Ergophilus reported onhis mission. Enraged bythe loss of Sestus andCrithote, the Athenians immediately dismissed him from the command andput him on trial. Ergophilus was not the only general to be prosecuted for errors committed during his command. A day earlier, the Athenians had tried and convicted Callisthenes for his truce with Perdiccas.61 Ergophilus, by contrast, wasacquitted. According to Aristotle, the Athenians were angrier with Ergophilus, but acquitted him because they had spent their anger onCallisthenes (Arist. Rhet. 1380b 10ff.). This explanation surely cannot be correct. In all likelihood, Ergophilus managed to secure an acquittal because hehadconvinced theAthenians that hedeserved one.Wemaysurmise that they were swayed by his decision to curtail operations and save the state undue expense. In a period of multiple campaigns, such arguments will have been quite compelling.

2. The War over Chersonese, Phase II: The Revolt of Miltocythes (362– 361) IV– 2a. The outbreak of the revolt IV– With Sestus and Crithote in his possession, Miltocythes was now in a very good position to take control of the rest of Chersonese. This was, he decided, the perfect opportunity to revolt from Cotys’rule. Inearly summer, Miltocythes seized Hieron Oros, where thetreasury waslocated (Dem. 23.104). Henowhadthe funds to hire

mercenaries andcover other expenses. During this period, Miltocythes also solicited alliances from foreign powers. An obvious choice was Ariobarzanes, whose own revolt was progressing quite well. Inthecourse of thelast year, hehadrecovered thecities onthe Asian coast of theHellespont. Hethenlaunched ajoint effort withMemnon andMentor: Ariobarzanes began acquiring control of various cities on thewestern coast of Asia Minor, while Memnon and Mentor concentrated on the island towns.62 Ariobarzanes readily agreed to a treaty with Miltocythes, for it presented the opportunity to extend his control to the European side of the Straits. Miltocythes realized, however, that Ariobarzanes would have todeal withthemoreimmediate concerns of his own revolt and that it would be wise to obtain aid from another source. One power immediately came to mind: Athens. Miltocythes knew, however, that after his capture of Sestus and Crithote, the Athenians would hardly be sympathetic to hisneeds. It didnothelp matters that Cotys wasanAthenian citizen whom they had supported in his efforts to unite the Odrysian kingdom. If Athens andtheking agreed tocombine forces, therevolt would notstand a chance. Inthese circumstances, Miltocythes’only solution wastoconvince theAthenians tosupport the rebellion. He would have to offer them the strongest possible inducement: he

2c. 61 See Chapter II, Section II– 3e below. 62 Polyaen. 7.26; Xen. Ages. 2.26; Dem. 23.154; see Section IV–

2. TheWarover Chersonese, Phase II IV–

143

would have to promise to give up Chersonese. In early or mid-summer 362, Miltocythes sent anembassy to Athens. Apollodorus refers to that embassy in his list of the crises the Athenians faced when they voted on 24 Metageitnion to send Miltocythes hadrevolted andhadsent ambassadors regardAutocles to the north: “ ing an alliance, calling onyouto send aidandoffering to give back Chersonese”.63 ι, with its μ ίδ ω π δ ο Apollodorus’ wording is noteworthy. His use of the verb ἀ reflects the Athenian point of ,64 owner ” rightful the to return restore or meaning of “ view, i.e., that they regarded the Chersonesian towns as theirs. But it must also indicate that Miltocythes used conciliatory language in the hope of eliciting a favorable response to hisrequest for alliance. The Athenians listened to Miltocythes’ request with great interest. His offer presented them with anopportunity to recover their Chersonese towns quickly and easily, a point that cannot have been overlooked after the years spent at Amphipolis. At this juncture, most Athenians apparently did not feel obligated to Cotys, despite his ties to thecity. The general view wasthat hehadbetrayed Athens when he sent Miltocythes against Sestus in 363. And so, with little hesitation, the Assembly voted to send Autocles with forces to Chersonese to aidMiltocythes. Perhaps only a week or two later, the Athenians received a second Thracian embassy, this time from Cotys, whohadhis envoys convey a letter (Dem. 23.114– 15). Upon learning of the revolt, the king hadtaken steps to obtain foreign aid. He sought an alliance with Autophradates, who had recently taken up operations against Ariobarzanes at Adramyttium (Xen. Ages. 2.26; Polyaen. 7.26). Autophradates readily agreed. Nodoubt he wasinfluenced by the fact that Miltocythes had recently concluded a treaty with Ariobarzanes: their alliance raised the possibility that the loyalist satraps would have to face Ariobarzanes in Europe and Asia simultaneously. Given those circumstances, Autophradates thought an ally on the other side of the Straits could prove quite useful. Since Autophradates’ priority was to suppress Ariobarzanes’ revolt, Cotys realized it would be necessary to find other sources of support against Miltocythes. Athens washis only real option. Theking waswell aware of theawkward position in which he found himself: after capturing towns which the Athenians claimed, he nowneeded their help to recover them fromMiltocythes. Cotys also knewthat the only way the Athenians would agree to send aid was if they were to receive control of those very same towns. And so he sent ambassadors to Athens with a letter asking for aidin themost conciliatory waypossible. Wecanbe certain that hemade therequest onthebasis of hisAthenian citizenship andother honors, andmoreover, that he promised to return Chersonese. Clearly this is whatDemosthenes means by his statement that the king, whenever involved in stasis, “sending his ambassadors was ready to do anything”(Dem. 23.114). On the face of things, Cotys had a good argument: he could claim that Miltocythes hadseized Sestus andCrithote without his authority. After Miltocythes’ revolt, some Athenians may well have believed

α μ ὶσυμ ερ ειπ ϕ μ ό επ ιςἐπ ε β έσ ρ ὶπ α ο ςκ υ τ ό ὸΚ π ιἀ ε κ ή τ ϕ εισ ’ἀ η ςδ θ ύ κ ο τ ιλ 63 [Dem.] 50.5: Μ ... For the context, see Chapter III, ς ύ ο ιδ δ ο π νἀ ο σ νΧερρόνη ὴ ὶτ α νκ ω εύ ῖνκελ ε θ η ο χ ία ς ,β 3a. Section III– ι, 1. μ ω ίδ δ ο π 64 L.S.J., s.v. ἀ

144

IV. TheWaroverChersonese

this wastrue. In their desire to recover Chersonese, they simply failed to see that Cotys wasprepared to promise anything togetwhathewanted. Cotys’entreaty puttheAthenians ina predicament. There were strong reasons for sending himaid. Many must have believed they could notopenly support the cause of a rebel against an Athenian citizen whohadasked for help. Besides, it would beeasier tojoin forces withthe king; together the Athenian androyal armies would quickly crush Miltocythes’ forces. After vigorous debate, the Athenians found a solution to their dilemma. The Assembly passed a second decree that was carefully worded to avoid giving official support to either side. We mayconjecture that it instructed Autocles to aid Miltocythes without damaging relations with Cotys in anyway.65 Despite Demosthenes’criticism of this policy, wecanunderstand thereasoning behind it. No matter which side the Athenians chose to support, the reward for success would be the same, namely, Chersonese. Orsothey might have believed: it depended on whose promises seemed more trustworthy andwhowould be able to carry themout. Demosthenes’comparison in23.116 of Cotys’behavior withthat of Philip makes it quite clear that Cotys turned out to have been insincere. We can surmise the same about Miltocythes: he did not survive long enough for the Athenians to find out for themselves. There can be no doubt that both Thracians wanted Chersonese for themselves and simply promised it to the Athenians to obtain much-needed military aid. The first decree shows hownaïve the Athenians were when Miltocythes asked them for aid. Clearly, however, when Cotys asked them for aidas well, they realized that Athens could regain control of Chersonese only if the Thracians became enmeshed in a long, drawn-out war. Above all else, wecan see howfar the Athenians would go to recover these cities.

2b. Crises in the Propontis IV–

The Athenians’ problems in Chersonese in the summer of 362 were compounded bya number of other crises in thenorth. Thanks to theThebans’efforts, mostof the major powers in the Propontis were now aligned against Athens. In July, the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Cyzicenes began forcing Athenian grain ships coming from the Pontus to dock at their harbors. This action precipitated a grain crisis. To make matters worse, the Cyzicenes hadrecently launched an attack on Proconnesus, andon 24 Metageitnion (approximately late August), Proconnesian 5). With Proconneambassadors entreated the Assembly to send aid([Dem.] 50.4– every last bit of losing of danger in were sushanging in thebalance, the Athenians That day proportions. major of crisis a was their influence intheregion. This indeed ApolloAlthough 50.6). ([Dem.] theAssembly voted to send forces “everywhere” the that clear it makes dorus does not specify their destination, the chronology to was Autocles Athenians decided to sendouttwocommanders to theHellespont. go to Chersonese to give limited aidto Miltocythes, andTimotheus was to go to the 65 Cf. theAthenians’instructions to Timotheus in 366 (Dem. 15.9; see Section IV–1cabove).

2. The Warover Chersonese, Phase II IV–

145

Propontis to deal with theCyzicenes. TheAthenians devoted thenext fewweeks to preparing the fleets for these tasks. In late September, Timotheus set sail for the Propontis. Immediately after arriving at Proconnesus, he launched anattack onthe Cyzicenes. Hedefeated their forces quickly andthen sailed to Cyzicus to begin anoffensive there.

2c. Theretreat of Miltocythes IV– While Autocles was readying the fleet for the voyage to Chersonese, Cotys marshalled hisforces foranassault onSestus andCrithote. Realizing that theAthenians would notarrive in time to save him, Miltocythes called on Ariobarzanes for help. The satrap, busy besieging Assus, sent forces to Chersonese. When they arrived, Miltocythes handed over Sestus andCrithote andfled to Hieron Oros to safeguard the treasury.66 In giving up Chersonese, he had sacrificed a great deal, clearly because he believed there was no other way to save his rebellion. Upon learning that Ariobarzanes hadgained control of Sestus and Crithote, Cotys reconsidered his plans to attack Chersonese. It would be foolhardy to launch an attack against Ariobarzanes, for that would most certainly bring on war with Athens. The king could nothandle a major conflict while Miltocythes wasat large. Cotys’ top priority was to suppress the rebellion; after that he could think about expansion inChersonese. Control of Hieron Oros wasvital to Miltocythes’military operations (Dem. 23.140). If theking managed to capture the fortress, hecould be virtually certain of putting an end to the revolt. There were other reasons for pursuing this strategy. The king was hard-pressed for money after years of campaigning andin fact hadalready commanded his subjects to sow their grain for profit ([Arist.] Oec. 2.2.26 1351a 18). Acquisition of Hieron Oros would give him the funds heneeded fora large-scale expedition against Chersonese. Autocles arrived at Chersonese in late September to learn that Ariobarzanes had assumed control of Sestus and Crithote and that Miltocythes had gone to Hieron Oros, where he was bracing himself for Cotys’ siege. The only hope for Miltocythes’ revolt lay in the Athenian fleet. Autocles, however, wasreluctant to lead forces against Cotys, for that would be a blatant transgression of the Assembly’s instructions. It was not worth arousing the Athenians’ ire: their treatment of Iphicrates, Callisthenes, and Ergophilus had made that all too clear. Autocles devised another solution. He would not involve the Athenian fleet in operations against Cotys, but would serve as a commander of Miltocythes’ fleet. This would allow Miltocythes to remain in charge of forces at Hieron Oros. Miltocythes was less than pleased with this strategy, for he was convinced that without the Athenian navy he hadlittle chance of defeating Cotys. However, since Autocles adamantly refused to contravene the Athenians’ orders, Miltocythes hadto accept the offer. Little is known of the battle itself. Demosthenes implies that Iphicrates saved the king from some sort of danger (Dem. 23.130). Quite possibly, he inflicted a decisive defeat onMiltocythes’fleet.

66 Xen. Ages. 2.26; Isoc. 15.112; Nepos Tim. 1.3; Dem. 23.104.

146

IV.TheWaroverChersonese

In late autumn 362, Cotys marched onHieron Oros andlaunched siege operations. By early spring, surrender wasimminent. Rather than face certain death at Cotys’hands, Miltocythes withdrew from Hieron Oros. Where hewentatthis time is unknown.67 With the rebel gone, the king quickly captured the fortress (Dem. 23.104).

3. The Warover Chersonese, Phase III: TheWaragainst Cotys (361– IV– 360) 3a. Cotys’second expedition against Sestus IV– Nowthat Cotys hadregained the treasury, his next step wasto recover theChersonesian towns which were inAriobarzanes’possession. Theking planned toconduct these campaigns in concert with Autophradates, who was currently involved in efforts to capture cities which Ariobarzanes held on the western coast of Asia Minor. So far Autophradates had captured Adramyttium (Polyaen. 7.26). Cotys would move against Sestus while Autophradates attacked Assus (Xen. Ages. 2.26). In thespring of 361, Cotys andAutophradates launched their sieges. Mausolus brought a fleet of onehundred ships to aidinthetwoassaults.68 Confronted onboth sides of the Hellespont, Ariobarzanes wasno longer fighting for mere territory: he wasfighting forsurvival. Heimmediately dispatched envoys toasktheSpartans for support. He sent to the Athenians as well, reminding them of their pledge of support andnodoubt (like Cotys) of his Athenian citizenship. In hisdesperation, Ariobarzanes offered powerful incentives, money to the Spartans and–like Miltocythes andCotys –Chersonese to the Athenians. This strategy worked. Forthe Spartans, this wasthe opportunity to acquire money that, after Mantinea, wasneeded more than ever before. For the Athenians, Cotys’ attempt on Sestus meant war in no uncertain terms. They would have sent forces there inanycase. Ariobarzanes’offer simply made it more likely that they would succeed. After conferring onthematter, theAthenians andSpartans decided to sendaidto Ariobarzanes jointly. Timotheus would bring themilitary forces andAgesilaus, byvirtue of hispersonal connections with Mausolus andArtabazus, would conduct negotiations.69

3b. Timotheus’Chersonesian campaigns IV– Agesilaus andTimotheus set out at once to perform their allotted tasks. Meeting with representatives of Autophradates andMausolus, Agesilaus convinced them to retreat. Howhe managed to do this remains a mystery, since the sources do not

67 Welose sight of Miltocythes foratleast oneandonehalfyears after this. Henextappears inour sources after the assassination of Cotys, i.e., in the second half of 360 or 359, whenhe hired Python andHeracleides of Aenus for warwithCersebleptes (Theop. FGrH 115F307). 202. 68 Xen. Ages. 2.26; Hornblower, Mausolus 174, 201– 74; Agesilaus’ xenia with Mausolus: Xen. 69 Joint aid: Nepos Tim.1.3; Hornblower, ibid. 173– Ages. 2.26;

hisxenia with Artabazus: id.4.1.39.

3. TheWaroverChersonese, Phase III IV– provide

147

the details. Meanwhile, Timotheus launched anattack onCotys at Sestus

(Xen. Ages. 2.26; Nep. Tim. 1.3). Unable tocontend withTimotheus’forces, Cotys quickly withdrew fromthecity. Ariobarzanes gave Agesilaus a large sumof money andhanded over Sestus andCrithote to Timotheus (Nep. ibid.). By Greek standards, the satrap hadpaida highprice forhisrescue, though heprobably thought he

hadridhimself of hisenemies rather cheaply. Nowthat the Athenians had control of Sestus, Timotheus could direct his attention to the other cities on Chersonese. In late spring, he led forces against Elaeus. With Cotys no longer present, Timotheus was able to capture the city without mucheffort. Elaeus is theonly oneof theChersonesian cities listed onthe Decree of Aristoteles.70 It is clear, therefore, that the Athenians’decision to recover Chersonese didnotinclude members of their League. The Athenians’treatment of Elaeus, coming not long after the establishment of cleruchies on Samos (365) and Potidaea (363), wasclearly harsher than Cargill hasargued.71 In late spring, Miltocythes, in hiding, sent anembassy to the fleet stationed at Sestus. Apollodorus, who was serving as trierarch at Chersonese, conveyed the ambassadors to Athens in late June orearly July ([Dem.] 50.12), andthey appeared before theCouncil andtheAssembly. Theambassadors complained that theAthenians hadnot stood behind their pledge to provide aidto the rebellion. Autocles had fought on Miltocythes’ behalf against Cotys but hadnot allowed the Athenian fleet to take part in the hostilities. The lack of Athenian support had forced Miltocythes to abandon Hieron Oros. Without the treasury, the rebellion was doomed (Dem. 23.104, 130). As we have seen, Miltocythes already hadhis supporters in Athens. Cotys’ attempt on Sestus confirmed what they already knew and convinced many who previously hadbeen non-committal. Miltocythes’embassy will have removed any doubts that remained. The Assembly dismissed Autocles from the command and appointed Menon as hisreplacement ([Dem.] 50.12). Autocles’dismissal wasquite

ironic. He was discharged precisely because of his insistence on following the Athenians’instructions to bring aid to Miltocythes without damaging relations with Cotys. If Autocles had actually engaged his forces with those of the king, the Athenian response would probably nothavebeenanydifferent. Hishands were tied the moment he set sail for Chersonese. Autocles’ position would have been far easier hadCotys attacked Sestus before Hieron Oros. By thetime the king attacked Sestus, however, it was too late to save Miltocythes.

3c. Timomachus’campaigns inthePontus andThrace IV– Apollodorus took Menon to Sestus at once. The situation in the Hellespont was quite urgent ([Dem.] 50.12). For the second summer in a row, the Athenians were facing a grain crisis. The Byzantines and Chalcedonians were forcing Athenian

70 Tod no. 123 = SVAno. 257, line 123. Cargill, Second Athenian League 133. 60. 71 Cargill, ibid. esp. 131–

148

IV. TheWarover Chersonese

ships to dock at their ports, as they hada year earlier.72 Menon would supervise operations in the Hellespont until Timomachus arrived with additional ships. As the crisis worsened, however, the Athenians realized they could not spare the time to prepare a fleet or to wait for the abatement of the Etesian winds. In late July, Timomachus set sail for the Hellespont with only one ship ([Dem.] 50.17). Upon his arrival, Menon took upoperations elsewhere, probably at Amphipolis ([Dem.] 50.14). As a result of this crisis, the Athenians were forced to postpone operations against the Chersonesian city that wasstill autonomous, i.e., Alopeconnesus. Timomachus instead hadto spend August andhalf of September escorting the grain ships from Hieron onthe Pontus ([Dem. 50.19). That autumn Timomachus again hadcause to postpone operations on Chersonese. TheMaronites hadsent envoys requesting that heconvoy their grain ships to Maronea. The general agreed, probably because hewould be paid for his services.73 In late September, Timomachus’ fleet towed the Maronites’ grain ships to their harbor. Hethen led the fleet to the Athenian base onThasos to prepare for a joint campaign with theThasians against towns onthe coast near Maronea. In October, the fleet launched operations against Stryme. We are naturally led to ask why. Apollodorus does notprovide ananswer because it wasnotrelevant to his case. A glance at the map, however, is instructive. Stryme is approximately equidistant from Amphipolis andChersonese. Control of this townwould give the Athenians a foothold on the Thracian coast and a base for challenging Cotys’ control of the region. This effort, however, didnotgetvery far. The Maronites arrayed their ships 22). in defense of thecity anddrove the Athenians away ([Dem.] 50.20– After returning to Thasos, Timomachus arranged for Callistratus, his brotherin-law, to be brought there from Methone.74 This action wasillegal because Callistratus hadgone to Methone as anexile. Apollodorus, of course, avoids explaining why Timomachus risked his position in this way, because that would engender sympathy for the general. We may speculate that Timomachus had brought him to Thasos to aid the Athenians’attempts to extend their influence in western Thrace. Perhaps the general hoped that Callistratus would be recalled if this strategy succeeded. Another year wasto pass, however, before the Athenians were able to gain a foothold in the region.75

3d. Cotys’third expedition against Sestus IV–

In early December, Timomachus returned to Chersonese. Leaving Theotimus in charge of a garrison at Sestus, hewentto Athens forthewinter (Hyper. 4.1; [Dem.] 53). Cotys, meanwhile, decided that he would try again for Sestus early the 50.52–

72 On the effect on the food supply, see P. Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco49. Roman World (Cambridge 1988) 146– 73 See A. Moreno, Senior honors thesis in Classics, Harvard University, 1995. 52. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 280, suggests that Timomachus was 74 [Dem.] 50.46– Callistratus’son-in-law rather than his brother-in-law. 3f below. 75 See Section IV–

3. The Warover Chersonese, Phase III IV–

149

following spring, whenmostof theAthenians forces would be absent. Hespent the winter making preparations. Shortly before launching operations, theking wrote to Timomachus, whowaspresumably in Athens at thetime. Atthis point, Cotys held the entire Odrysian kingdom; he had not yet seized the Athenians’ strongholds (Dem. 23.115). Wemaysurmise that in this letter hestated his intention of seizing thecities onChersonese that the Athenians considered theirs, i.e., Sestus, Crithote, Elaeus, andAlopeconnesus. In early spring 360, Cotys moved against Sestus. Timomachus sailed to Chersonese as soon as possible, but he could do little to stop the king. By late spring, Cotys hadcaptured the city, thereby paving the way for the conquest of the rest of Chersonese. Dismayed by the news, the Demos didnotreelect Timomachus to the generalship.76 They elected Cephisodotus instead, hoping he would recover the places Timomachus hadlost. The Athenians proceeded to prosecute Timomachus, along with the other generals they blamed for their problems on Chersonese, Autocles andMenon.77 Apollodorus ledtheprosecution of each (Dem. 36.53), thus capitalizing on the Athenian mood to boost his career.

3e. Charidemus in Asia Minor IV–

At this point, Charidemus reenters ourstory. In order to understand his role in the Chersonesian War in the last years of the 360s, we must rely on Demosthenes’ narrative in the speech Against Aristocrates of the condottiere’s exploits in Asia Minor fromlate 364 toearly 360.78 Interpretation of this account is morecomplicatedthan it mayat first appear. Demosthenes haspersonal knowledge of manyof the events he recounts because he served as a trierarch in Chersonese in 360/59 (Aeschin. 3.51– 52). At the same time, his aimhere, aselsewhere in this speech, is to portray Charidemus as a man incapable of loyalty, and so he deliberately suppresses anddistorts facts that might indicate otherwise. After Alcimachus wasdefeated at Amphipolis in the summer of 364, Timotheusplanned to useCharidemus’ services in operations against Chalcidice. Hewas not the only general who needed mercenary troops at this time. Memnon and Mentor wished to hire the condottiere for operations in Hellespontine Phrygia, where their brother-in-law, Artabazus, had recently revolted from the King.79 Artabazus’cause hadsuffered a major setback in the spring, when Autophradates defeated and took him prisoner (Dem. 23.154). Since Memnon and Mentor had considerably more funds at their disposal than Timotheus, Charidemus accepted their offer at once. 76 Dem. 23.153, 163; schol. Aeschin. 3.51 Dilts p. 115. There is no evidence that Timomachus wasdismissed by an apocheirotonia. See Hansen, Eisangelia no. 91. Most likely the annual election was held soon after the arrival of the news of the surrender of Sestus, and he was simply notreelected. 77 For the evidence for each of these trials, see Hansen, ibid. nos. 90 (Autocles), 91 (Timomachus), and95 (Menon). 2a for the text. 56. See Chapter III, Section III– 78 Dem. 23.154– 79 Ontherelationship of Memnon andMentor to Artabazus, see Diod. 23. 157; Diod. 16.52.4.

150

IV.TheWaroverChersonese

Memnon and Mentor realized that more than Charidemus’ mercenaries was needed at this point. Only by joining forces with Ariobarzanes did they have a chance against theenormous loyalist army; once theydefeated Autophradates, they could reassess the situation. In the summer of 364, Memnon and Mentor sent envoys to Ariobarzanes. Their request came at a goodtime for Ariobarzanes, who hadbeen having problems ever since Philiscus broke ties with himin mid-366; by late 364, as wehave seen, thehyparch hadgained control of a number of important cities in the Hellespont, including Lampsacus.80 Ariobarzanes agreed to coordinate his military operations with Memnon and Mentor. While Ariobarzanes supplied forces to Memnon and Mentor on the coast, Charidemus was to concentrate his attention on the interior.81 In the autumn of 364, the mercenary captain took up operations against Scepsis (Dem. 23.155). In the following year, Ariobarzanes’ fortunes improved dramatically. In the spring of 363, Thersagoras and Execestus of Lampsacus assassinated Philiscus.82 With the hyparch outof theway, Ariobarzanes soonregained possession of Lampsacus andtheother Hellespontine cities. Turning hisattention to thewestern coast of Asia Minor, hecaptured Adramyttium inthesummer of 362 (Polyaen. 7.26). He then led forces against Assus andcaptured it in the autumn (Xen. Ages. 2.26). Alarmed at Ariobarzanes’resurgence, Autophradates moved against Adramyttium in the spring or summer of 362 (Polyaen. 7.26). Hecaptured thecity later that year andlaunched operations atAssus inearly 361. Theintervention of Timotheus and Agesilaus, however, forced Autophradates to call an endto the siege.83 The satrap then reconsidered his strategy for dealing with Ariobarzanes andArtabazus. Their decision to fight jointly hadmade it more difficult for himto quash the revolt, andthe intervention of Sparta andAthens only exacerbated the problem. Autophradates realized that the only way to deal with this problem was to break up the coalition. If he offered strong inducements, it would not be difficult to convince Artabazus to abandon Ariobarzanes. Accordingly, inthesummer of 361, Autophradates formed a treaty with Artabazus andreleased him from prison. In return for supporting the loyalists against Ariobarzanes, Artabazus wasto be recognized as thesatrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Artabazus spent the next few months collecting forces. Now that he had the support of the loyalist army, he no longer hadany need of Charidemus. At this point, in fact, the condottiere could prove to be a real liability. In thepast year he hadcaptured two more cities, Cebren andIlium, andhadbecome an independent force in Hellespontine Phrygia. Artabazus realized that he had to rid himself of Charidemus before dealing with Ariobarzanes. In360, Artabazus ledforces against Ilium. After defeating Charidemus in battle that summer, hedrove himwithin the 55). walls andmade preparations tobesiege thecity (Dem. 23.154– atsurvival rested in chance Trapped inIlium, Charidemus realized that hisonly September, he early or hisescaping from Asia asquickly aspossible. Inlate August

80 See above, Section IV–1c. 81 Dem. 23.154; Xen. Ages. 2.26; Polyaen. 7.26. 82 Dem. 23.142; see Section IV–1gabove. 83 See Section IV–3b above.

3. TheWaroverChersonese, Phase III IV–

151

wrote to Athens asking foraidandemployment. Charidemus addressed theletter to Cephisodotus, whohadrecently taken uptheChersonesian command. Like Miltocythes andCotys, themercenary captain knewexactly whatto say. Hepromised to recover Chersonese for Athens, and boasted that Cotys would not “abide his attack” . As proof of his loyalty, thecondottiere said that he hadrefused to receive ambassadors fromAlexander of Pherae (Dem. 23.156, 162– 63). We can well imagine the scene in Athens when Charidemus’ letter was read aloud. Hisenemies vociferously opposed sending support to the manwhohadonly five years earlier betrayed the Athenian cause at Amphipolis; he had, moreover, refused to take upemployment with Timotheus, andhadgone to Cotys instead; it was hard to believe that nowhe was sincere in his wish to help the Athenians against theking. Despite this skepticism, however, manyAthenians believed Charidemus would helpthemrecover Chersonese. Some were simply naïve, as many had been about Miltocythes andCotys. After Cotys’capture of Sestus, however, the prevailing feeling in Athens wassurely one of desperation. The Athenians were willing to try any possible expedient, no matter how far-fetched it may have appeared at the time. Andso the Assembly voted to send Cephisodotus to Asia to extricate Charidemus from Ilium and then, with the condottiere’s aid, launch an attack onChersonese. Little didthe Athenians know that when Charidemus wrote to Cephisodotus, he also wrote to Cotys. Heprobably made a similar offer, i.e., if Cotys lent himsupport in Asia Minor, he would help the king on Chersonese. The letter came at a propitious time for Cotys, whohadrecently captured Alopeconnesus (Dem. 23.158) andneeded additional forces to continue his expansion on Chersonese. The king agreed to hire Charidemus. He did not, however, agree to send forces, simply because he could not spare them. Possibly, however, Cotys contacted his ally Autophradates to see if he could arrange for Charidemus’ release. There is not enough evidence to say for certain. A fewdays later, Artabazus learned of Cotys’decision to hire Charidemus and not long after that, he learned of the Athenian decree. The decision to send Cephisodotus wasnotwelcome news: thepresence of Athenian forces would only make it harder to deal with Charidemus. Artabazus realized that by allowing Charidemus to leave under truce, he would avoid hostilities with Cephisodotus while eliminating theneedto besiege Ilium, Scepsis, andCebren. This arrangement suited Autophradates aswell, forit enabled himtoprovide aidto hisally Cotys and indirectly harm Athenian efforts torecover Chersonese. After Timotheus’intervention onbehalf of Ariobarzanes, that wasnominor consideration. Inmid-September, Artabazus made a truce with thecondottiere andreleased him(Dem. 23. 157).

3f. Charidemus’campaigns against Chersonese IV– After securing Charidemus’ release andthe useof his services, Cotys marshalled his forces for his next round of Chersonesian campaigns. It was fortunate that Iphicrates had recently returned from campaigns elsewhere in Thrace. With his

152

IV. TheWaroverChersonese

knowledge of the Hellespont,84 he would be a real asset to the expedition. The Athenian, however, refused to accompany the king to Chersonese. Iphicrates’ reasoning is apparent: hewould be permanently branded as a traitor andwould be forced to spend the rest of his life in exile. His only chance of getting back to Athens lay in his leaving thecourt immediately. Infuriated bythis response, Cotys putIphicrates under guard: if herefused togotoChersonese, hewould certainly not be allowed to goanywhere else. In mid-September, Cotys setoutforChersonese. Iphicrates took advantage of the king’s departure to make hisescape. Although hewanted to return to Athens at once, herealized that this would beunwise. Intheuproar over thefall of Sestus, he would assuredly be brought to trial for his aidto Cotys as well as for the errors he hadcommitted while general against Amphipolis. Athenian frustrations from the two wars would make it quite difficult to defend his past actions, e.g., his entrusting the Amphipolitan hostages to Charidemus in the spring of 365, or his defense of Cotys against Miltocythes in the naval battle of autumn 362. It was better to wait things outfor a while in a place where hispresence would notbe subject to misinterpretation. Antissa, a loyal ally of Athens, provided thehaven he needed.85 In the months that followed, Iphicrates would continue efforts to support Athenian expansion in Thrace, helping to found the colony of Drys on the coast near Maronea in the spring of 359.86 Only a fewmonths earlier, Callistratus had aided the Thasians in the colonization of Crenides.87 Badian surely is correct in suggesting that the effort at Crenides was undertaken in an attempt to exploit Thracian weakness after Cotys’death.88 Nodoubt Iphicrates founded Drys for the same reason. Notably, heconcentrated hisattention ontheregion where Timomachus hadfailed inlate 361. Iphicrates thusdisplayed thesame interest inimproving theAthenians’position inThrace after Cotys’death that wedetected inhisactions as the king’s adviser. The similarity of the circumstances of the foundations at Crenides and Drys underscores the similarity of the positions of Iphicrates and Callistratus. Both were exiles of sorts, and both pursued actions beneficial to Athens in the hope of returning there oneday.89 Meanwhile, as Cotys marshalled forces to march onChersonese, Charidemus marched to Abydus andcrossed the Straits to Sestus. Taking upservice with the 60). king, he made preparations to besiege Crithote and Elaeus (Dem. 23.158– Athenians the betraying intentionally for Demosthenes criticizes Charidemus (23.161– 62), butthere is noreason to believe that thecondottiere wasobligated to Iphicrates wasstationed in theHellespont intheearly 380s. Fora convenient collection of the 17. evidence, see Develin, Athenian Officials 215– 85 Antissa is included in the Decree of Aristoteles (Tod no. 123 = SVAno.257, line 116; Cargill, 67, indicates Second Athenian League 36). The inscription IG II2 107, dated to the period 369– that Athens andAntissa remained ongoodterms inthe360s. ρ ύ . ς 86 Dem. 23.132; Theop. FGrH 115 F161, as quoted by Harpocration, s. v. Δ 87 Isoc. 8.24; [Skyl.] 67; Diod. 16.3.8; Zen. 4.34; Him. 6.2; P. Collart, Philippes, ville de 37. Macédoine (Paris 1937) 133– 88 Badian, “Philip II”55. 202. 89 For Callistratus’exile, see Sealey, “Callistratos of Aphidna”197–

84

3. TheWarover Chersonese‚Phase III IV–

153

them in any way. After all, the Athenians hadnothelped bring about his release, andso hedidnotowethemanything. Learning of Charidemus’arrival atSestus, thegarrison commander of Crithote immediately sent a letter to Athens to report that the Athenians’ “ existing posses-

sions were in greater danger than before”(Dem. 23.161). Heurged them to send forces to Chersonese as soon as possible, unaware that Cephisodotus hadalready setsail. Thefollowing dayCharidemus attacked Crithote andElaeus. Hedidnotget very far with these operations, however. A dayor so later, he received word that Cotys hadbeen assassinated by Python andHeracleides of Aenos (Dem. 23.119, 163). Miltocythes had probably engineered the deed.90 Since Charidemus learned of the assassination only a day or so after it happened, Cotys was probably murdered after reaching Chersonese. Charidemus acted quickly to take advantage of this turn of events. Heleft the sieges of Crithote andElaeus at once andled cavalry andinfantry to the capital, where he made a pact with Cersebleptes (Dem. 23.163, 165). Charidemus wasto marry Cersebleptes’ daughter and be the force behind his throne (23.129).91 According to Demosthenes, when Cephisodotus arrived in Hellespont, Charidemus wasnearPerinthus (Dem. 23.165). Thiscity is approximately 30 miles fromHieron Oros, less than two days’ march. We may speculate that, after securing Cersebleptes’throne, Charidemus madea dashtoseize thetreasury forthenewking. One last task remained, the elimination of Miltocythes. However, it would be nearly another year before the rebel wasapprehended, andthen only through treachery (Dem. 23.168).

90 Badian, “Philip II”54, suggests this onthebasis of Theop. FGrH 115 F307. 91 See n. 49 above.

CONCLUSION Thedecade of the360s wasa momentous period intheNorth Aegean, notonly for the Athenians, whosawthis as the time to reclaim their fifth-century empire, but also for several other major Greek and non-Greek states, which had their own ambitions of hegemony. It is, in fact, the expansionist aims of those powers that explains whythe Athenians, despite numerous attempts, failed to reestablish their primacy in this region. The recovery of Amphipolis wasthe Athenians’ foremost goal in this period. They devoted much energy to the siege of the city and, in the fourth year of Iphicrates’ command, nearly succeeded in capturing it. When this strategy failed, they made it a policy to go after those who had contributed to their failure: their

owncitizens (Iphicrates andCallisthenes) andtheir foreign enemies, Olynthus and the Macedonian kings. The desire to capture Amphipolis took precedence over all other matters of Athenian foreign policy in the north during this period. TheAthenians, however, were notunique intheir desire toacquire Amphipolis. Olynthus also wanted it. At first the Olynthians took a defensive stance: they took advantage of theAmphipolitans’antipathy towards Athens to make analliance that would keep the Athenians out of the city. It may be the case that they did not try to capture it for themselves because they didnot have the military strength to do so. The more the Amphipolitans dreaded Athenian occupation, however, the stronger the Olynthians’ position became. Finally, the Amphipolitans’ fear of Athenian conquest resulted intheOlynthians’gaining possession of thecity inthesummer of 365. Ironically, the Olynthians retained influence over Amphipolis only as long as they did not get too powerful. Their position was first threatened when the Amphipolitans sought an alliance with Ptolemy. If Harpalus had not lost possession of the hostages, the king would undoubtedly have made things very difficult for the Olynthians. This lesson was not lost on them: it can be no accident that in 365, when the Olynthians reaffirmed their alliance with Amphipolis, they took a step not taken in 371/0: they installed a garrison in the city. Timotheus’ Chalcidian campaign later threatened their holdonAmphipolis, forit forced themto withdraw their forces fromthecity. Despite these challenges, Olynthus remained themajor power in the north throughout the 360s andearly 350s, andit wasthe power that Philip most needed onhisside to consolidate his position in the region in 357/6. The Macedonian kings also hadclearly defined policies regarding the North

Aegean. Neither Ptolemy norPerdiccas waspowerful enough tocapture Amphipolis outright. They instead eachmadeanalliance withthecity andused force toback it up.Ptolemy tookhostages butdidnotinstall a garrison, probably because helost the opportunity doso. Perdiccas, by contrast, made certain to install a garrison in the city. Although this policy did not amount to much during Ptolemy’s reign, it

156

Conclusion

worked for Perdiccas, whose garrison andalliance with Amphipolis were still in place whenPhilip came tothethrone. The city of Amphipolis, the object of conquest, also followed a clear-cut policy during the 360s, allowing us to see how a Greek state behaved when it was constantly under attack fromdifferent sides. Amphipolis wascontinually defending itself against oneprimary threat, Athens, andforthis reason, it sought alliances with Olynthus andMacedon. Thus, the Amphipolitans met each situation by inviting another danger. Clearly, however, anysort of garrison, be it Olynthian or Macedonian, waspreferable to Athenian domination. The focus of the Amphipolitans’ attention changed in the early 350s, when it became apparent to them that Philip, notAthens, posed the greatest threat to their independence. Butthestrategy remained thesame: theystill sought protection from states that shared their common enemy. This is the best wayto explain the ironic situation in which theAmphipolitans found themselves shortly before thecity fell to the king in 357: nowthey were offering to surrender control of their city to Athens, after spending somanyyears trying toavoid doing just that. If theAthenianshadagreed to theoffer, this situation would have been perfectly analogous to the way in which the Olynthians hadgained control of Amphipolis in 365. Given the Amphipolitans’ hand-to-mouth existence, it is not surprising that they generally managed to deflect their aggressors only by chance. Thanks to Charidemus, they were free of theAthenians fora while, andthanks toTimotheus’ attack on Chalcidice, they were free of the Olynthians. They were relieved of the Macedonian garrison, also only by chance, when Perdiccas died andPhilip withdrew in anattempt at reconciliation with Athens. After Philip’s capture of Amphipolis, however, things were no longer left to chance. The Warover Chersonese also displays certain consistencies in the policies of its participants. The Athenians embarked ontheir attempt to recover theChersonesian cities they hadonce controlled aware that this task would notbe aneasy one, given their simultaneous commitment to recovering Amphipolis. They hadreason, however, to be optimistic, for they hadthe sanction of the Great King andPersian money. What they hadnot anticipated, however, wasthat a number of important powers were determined tocurtail Athenian expansion intheregion. Cotys, for one, had his ownplans of conquest. After consolidating his control over Thrace, his next step, naturally enough, wasto extend his borders to include Chersonese. At that point, it became paramount for him to rid the peninsula of Athenian influence. This policy succeeded for a year, during which Miltocythes captured Sestus andCrithote. When, however, Miltocythes revolted in362, theWar over Chersonese suddenly took ona newdynamic, as both rebel andking sought aid from Athens andthe Persian satraps. Although Miltocythes enlisted the support of Ariobarzanes and Athens (the latter, half-heartedly), his forces ultimately could not compete with those of Cotys. Once the revolt wascrushed, it wasrelatively easy for the king to take Sestus, whose capture then paved the wayfor the conquest of therest of Chersonese. Cotys wasaided inhisendeavor byother problems afflicting the Athenians during this period. Most important of these was the worsening of relations between Athens and her allies in the Propontis and, consequently, the growing tenuousness of herholdonthePontic grain route.

Conclusion

157

The Thebans, too, wished to curtail Athenian expansion in the north while building their own hegemony. They employed a variety of tactics to accomplish these aims. With diplomacy andcoercion, Epaminondas succeeded in detaching a number of Athens’ allies from her league. He mayhave also supported Philiscus andthe loyalist satraps in their efforts to suppress Ariobarzanes’ revolt. Although Thebes didnotbecome thegreat naval power thatEpaminondas hadenvisioned, his efforts were undoubtedly detrimental to Athenian interests: as is generally recognized, it is notcoincidental that only a fewyears later manyof the Athenian allies rose upin revolt. The roles of the various satraps in the War over Chersonese cannot be adequately understood, primarily because the Satraps’Revolt itself is so perplexing. It is clear, however, that Ariobarzanes, in his desire to make a friend outof Athens, provided thefunding that enabled thecity to undertake operations against Chersonese. Helater became directly involved intheChersonesian conflict after lending aid to Miltocythes’revolt, andatonepoint heldSestus andCrithote. Autophradates and Mausolus also took part in the war, through providing aid to Cotys. There can be little doubt that all three satraps were motivated by the commanding position of Chersonese intheHellespont andits proximity to thePersian Empire. In the face of resistance from so manysides, theAthenians developed certain policies which they used consistently. First, they relied on the opportunities provided by the rivalries of other powers. By playing off Miltocythes against Cotys, they hoped to maximize their chances of recovering Chersonese. Related to this is a second policy, the Athenians’ tendency to form ties with anyone whooffered to help them recover their Chersonesian possessions, regardless of his motives for making that offer. Both Miltocythes andCotys promised to restore Chersonese to Athenian control, although each hoped Athenian aidwould ultimately enable him to keep it for himself. Charidemus also promised to help the Athenians recover Chersonese –so that they would help him against Artabazus. Similarly, by maintaining good relations with both Artaxerxes andAriobarzanes, they obtained the King’s sanction for their claim to Amphipolis, funding for operations against Chersonese, andcontrol of Sestus andCrithote. Throughout this period, the Athenians remained true totheir goal of regaining thecities theybelieved were rightfully theirs. By mid-360, Cotys, the Athenians’chief adversary in the war, wasdead, but they were nocloser toregaining their Chersonesian cities thanthey hadbeen at the beginning of the conflict. Cephisodotus’ surrender andtreaty with Charidemus in 359 temporarily made recovery of Chersonese even more remote. Athenian fortunes in Chersonese improved dramatically in 357, whenCotys’successors recognized Athens’ rights in the region. This change, however, was only temporary. Philip’s interest in Thracian expansion made Chersonese a source of tension between him and Athens that was not resolved until Chaeronea. Thereafter, the Athenians no longer harbored hopes of controlling either Amphipolis or Chersonese.

APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE WARS OVER AMPHIPOLIS AND CHERSONESE

160 Date

Appendix

Macedon

371 Congress Athens

autumn

369

Chalcidice

at

Olynthus, Amphipolis formalliance

Amyntas II dies; Accession of Alexander II (Diod.15.60.3)

Iphicrates Corinthia

spring

summer

Thessaly

Thebes

(Xen. 6.5.1, Aeschin. 2.32)

371/0 winter

370/69

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Athens

in

(Xen. Hell. 51) 6.5.49–

Pelopidas aids Alexander; alliance made (Plut. Pel.

26.3f., Buckler, 117f.)

late September

Iphicrates to Amphipolis (Aeschin.2.28)

369/8 winter

Congress

at

Delphi

368 Philiscus recruits mercenaries

springsummer

early 368/7

= July

Ptolemy murders Alexander

(Xen. Hell. 7.1.27, Diod. 15.70.2)

(Diod.15.71.1) July/August

Pausanias attacks Anthemus, Therma, Strepsa

(Aeschin.2.27)

early autumn

Iphicrates to Macedonia; forms alliance with Ptolemy

(Aeschin.2.27)

Olynthians support Pausanias’bid forthrone

(Aeschin.2.27)

161

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

Date

371 autumn

371/0 winter

370/69

369 spring

summer

late September 369/8 winter

368

springsummer

early 368/7 = July

July/August

early autumn

162 Date

Appendix

Macedon

Athens

368 (cont.) mid-autumn

Iphicrates drives Pausanias

from Macedonia

(Aeschin.2.27)

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

Assembly grants Ariobarzanes, Philiscus citizenship

(Dem.23.141);

late autumn

Pelopidas to Macedonia; forms alliance with Ptolemy (Plut.Pel 27.6)

votes to recover Chersonese

winter

Pelopidas

Thessaly;

imprisoned by Alexander of Pherae (Plut.

367 springsummer

June September

Pel. 27.6) Embassy to Great King (Xen. Hell.

Embassies to Great King (Xen. Hell.

7.1.33)

7.1.33)

Leon, Timagoras return fromSusa; Assembly votes 2nd embassy; 2nd

Spartan embassy returns from

autumn?

366 mid-late

February

spring late March/ early April

to

Susa

emb.toSusa

2ndSpartan embassy to

(Xen.Ages.8.3)

Susa

Election of Timotheus (Dem. 15.9) Ariobarzanes’ embassy

Decree re: aid to Ariob.; Tim. given Chersonesian command (Dem.15.9,

23.149)

Ariobarzanes’ embassy Sparta

to

Embassy to Great King

(Xen. Hell. 7.1.33)

163

Appendix

Amphipolis/

Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/

Susa

Date

islands

368 (cont.) mid-autumn

late autumn

winter

367

spring-

Philiscus besieges Lampsacus (Dem. 23.141)

summer

June Congress

Fall of Lampsacus Philiscus

at

Susa (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33; Buckler, 249)

to

September autumn? 366

(Dem. 23.141)

mid-late

February

spring late March/ early April

Ariobarzanes sends embassies to Athens, Sparta, Samos; forms alliance with Samos (Dem. 15.9)

164 Date

Appendix

Macedon

Athens

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Thebes

366 (cont.) spring (cont.) Rumors re: Ariobarzanes’ revolt; 2nddecree re: Ariobarzanes (Dem. 15.9)

June

Timotheus to AsiaMinor (Dem. 15.9)

early July mid-late

July

Thebans send embassy to Philiscus?

late July early August

September

2ndembassy

early October

returns, announces

King’s

recognition of Athenian claim to Amphipolis

Decree re: Erythrae

December

(IG II2108)

late autumn/ early winter

Amphipolitan embassy requests aid against Athens

Thessaly

Chalcidice

165

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

366 (cont.) spring (cont.)

Autophradates orders

Tigranes to seize Samos; Tigranes seizes Samos, installs garrison (Dem. 15.9)

Great King recognizes Athenian claim to Amphipolis; sends letter to Agesilaus (Xen. Ages. 8.3)

Philiscus severs ties with Ariobarzanes (Dem. 23.141)

Iphicrates intensifies siege of Amphipolis

Ariobarzanes stages revolt

Amphipolis

to Ptolemy

June

early July mid-late

July

(Dem. 15.9); sends money to Iphicrates Timotbeus besieges Samos (Dem. 15.9,

late July early August

Isoc. 15.111. Diod. 18.18.9)

September

early October

Timotheus meets with Erythraeans sends embassy

Date

(IG II2108)

December

late autumn/ early winter

166 Date

Appendix

Macedon

Athens

365 winter/ spring

Ptolemy, Amphipolis form alliance

Newsofhos-

spring

tages reaches Athens; Decree ordering Iphicrates to

sendthemto Athens

May

Athenians receive Iphicrates’ letter; dismiss him andappoint Timotheus (Dem. 23.149) Athenian cleruchs to Samos

late spring

(Diod.18.18.9)

summer

Perdiccas kills Ptolemy; takes throne (Diod.

15.77.5)

mid/late summer

Perdiccas forms alliance with Athens (Dem. 2.14; schol. 2.14)

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

167

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

Date 365 winter/ spring

Ptolemy, Amphipolis

formalliance; Harpalus takes hostages

(Dem. 23.149) Iphicrates takes hostages

spring

from Harpalus; entrusts them toCharidemus

(Dem. 23.149) Iphicrates sends letter to Athens

Timotheus captures Samos

(Dem. 23.149)

(Isoc.15.112)

Charidemus sells hostages to Amphipolis

Timotheus installs cleruchy on Samos

(Dem. 23.149)

May

late spring

(Diod.18.18.9) Iphicrates to Cotys’court

Cotys contacts Charidemus; Charidemus to Cardia (Dem. 23.149)

Timotheus tries to hire Charidemus

(Dem.23.149)

Amphipolitans

summer

handcity over to Olynthians (Dem. 23.150)

Timotheus to Amphipolis

(Dem.23.150)

Olynthians

mid/late summer

hire Charidemus;

Charidemus

(Dem. 23.150)

sets sail from Cardia

(Dem.23.150)

168

Date

Appendix

Macedon

Athens

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

365 (cont.) mid-late summer

(cont.) autumn

364 spring

Timotheus besieges Torone

(Diod.15.81.6)

summer

July

Death of Epaminondas at Cynoscephelae

autumn

(Diod.15.80.2; Plut. Pel.31.2)

Fall of Torone

Thebans defeat Alexander of Pherae

Timotheus moves up Chalcidice

(Diod.15.81.6)

(Isoc. 15.113)

(Diod.15.81.6)

Timotheus besieges Potidaea

Perdiccas, Amphipolis formalliance

(Diod.15.81.6)

Thebans, Alexander of

winter

Pherae form

alliance

363 spring

Callisthenes, Ergophilus elected general (Aeschin.2.30; Dem.23.154)

Alex. Pherae toCyclades; besieges Tenos ([Dem.] 50.4)

Fall of Potidaea

(Diod.15.81.6)

169

Appendix

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

Date

365 (cont.) Charidemus apprehended by Athenians

mid-late

summer

(cont.)

(Dem. 23.150) Heracleans

sendembassy

toTimotheus (Just. 16.4.3)

Warof

Artabazus and Autophradates

autumn

364 Epaminondas toByzantium; receives Heraclean embassy (Just. 16.4.3)

Olynthians withdraw from Amphipolis

spring

Epaminondas toChalcedon

summer

July

Philiscus besieges and captures Perinthus (Dem. 23.142)

Charidemus Asia Minor

to

(Dem. 23.155)

Philiscus besieges Cyzicus; Cyzicenes ask Timotheus for aid; Timotheus sends aid

Autophradates imprisons Artabazus

autumn

(Dem. 23.154) Memnon, Mentor make

deal with Ariobarzanes;

hire Charidemus

(Dem.23.155)

(Diod.15.81.6)

Fall ofCyzicus ([Dem.] 50.5) winter

363 Assassination ofPhiliscus (Dem. 23.142)

spring

170 Date

Appendix

Macedon

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Athens

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

363 (cont.) spring (cont.)

Cleruchs

to

Athenian cleruchy established in Potidaea

Potidaea Revolt of Iulis;

summer

Aristophon Iulis

Callistbenes to Amphipolis; Ergophilus to Chersonese

autumn

to

Fall of Tenos

toAlexander

ofPherae

([Dem.] 50.4) Settlement of Tenos

winter

January

Menelaus Decree

Tod #143) February

spring

Timotheus besieges Pydna

(Dem. 4.4,

Ergophilus reelected? Callisthenes dismissed (Aeschin. 30) 2.29–

late spring

Din. 1.4)

Ergophilus returns from Chersonese; dismissed (Dem. 23.104)

late spring/ early summer

Timotheus captures Pydna (Dem. 4.4,

Trials of Callistbenes,

Din. 1.4)

Ergophilus (Arist. Rhet.

1380b 10 ff.)

Timotheus to Macedonia

171

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont Ariobarzanes recovers Lampsacus

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Athenians recover Perinthus

Susa

Date

363 (cont.) spring (cont.)

summer

Miltocythes besieges Sestus

Ariobarzanes captures Adramyttium

autumn

(Polyn. 7.26)

winter

362 Propontis

January

Perdiccas installs garrison in Amphipolis (Diod. 16.3.3)

February

Miltocythes captures Sestus; attacks Crithote

spring

Cyzicenes attack Proconnesus

([Dem.] 50.5)

late spring spring/ summer

Ariobarzanes besieges Assus (Xen. Ages.

2.26)

late spring/ early summer spring/ summer

Autophradates besieges Adramyttium (Polyn. 2.26)

172

Appendix

Macedon

Date

Athens

Sparta/ Peloponnese

362 (cont.) early

summer

(cont.)

Timotheus besieges Methone (Dem. 4.4,

Din. 1.4)

Miltocythes’ embassy; Decree re: Miltocythes (Dem. 23.104)

Cotys’ embassy; Decree amended (Dem. 23.104)

Battle of Mantinea (Plut. Mor.350A, Buckler, 360f.)

July

Timotheus captures Methone

(Dem. 4.4,

Din. 1.4)

24 Metageitnion (=

late

August)

Decree of Aristophon

([Dem.] 50.4)

late summer/

early autumn

early autumn

Autocles to Chersonese; Timotbeus to Proconnesus; Callisthenes to Macedonia ([Dem.]

50.4, 12)

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

173

Appendix

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Amphipolis/

Thrace

Propontis

c

n

a

Susa

Date 362 (cont.) early summer (cont.)

Byzantium, Chalcedon stopAthenian grain ships ([Dem.] 50.17)

([Dem. 50.4)

e

Asia Minor/ islands

Miltocythes revolts; seizes Hieron Oros; sends embassies to Ariobarzanes andAthens

Cotys sends first embassy, letter to Athens; (Dem. 23.115) sends embassy i l l toAutophradates

Pontus

a

Cotys, Autopbradates for

m

(XenAges.

July

2.26)

24 Metageitnion (= late August)

Miltocythes hands Chersonese

late summer/ early autumn

overto

Ariobarzanes;

goes toHieron Oros (Dem. 23.104) Autocles arrives at Chersonese

early autumn

174

Appendix

Date

Macedon

Athens

mi

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

d-a utumn?

early spring

mid-spring

WarAgainst “ begins Cotys” Athens, Sparta negotiate; agree tojoint effort

late May/

early June

Potidaean embassy Decree re: cleruchs

(Tod#146)

late

June

Apollodorus arrives with Miltocythes’ ambassadors; Autocles dismissed; Menon elected

362 361

([Dem.] 50.12)

Olynthians attack Potidaea; Potidaeans sendembassy to Athens

(Tod #146)

175

Appendix

Amphipolis

Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

Date

362 Iphicrates defends Cotys innaval battle with Miltocytbes andAthenian generals (Dem. 23.130)

mid-autumn? Timotheus defeats Cyzicenes; attacks Cyzicus; Cyzicus surrenders

Ariobarzanes captures Assus (Xen. Ages.

2.26)

Miltocythes flees Hieron Oros; Cotys captures it (Dem. 23.104)

early spring

Cotys attacks Scstus (Xen. Ages.

mid-spring

2.26) Agesilaus and Timotheus aid Ariobarzanes; Ariob. Hands over Sestus andCrithote to Timotheus (Xen. Ages.

Autophradates withdraws fromAssus

(Xen. Ages. 2.26)

2.26; Nepos Tim.1.2) Timotheus attacks and captures

Elæus (Dem.23.158)

Autophradates forms treaty

with Artabazus; releases him;

late May/ early June

Artabazus collects forces (Dem. 23.155)

Miltocytbes sends “ the ambassadors” to Athens

([Dem.] 50.12)

361 late June

176

Date

Appendix

Mactdon

361 (cont.)

July

Sparta/ Peloponnese

Athens

Menon sails Chersonese

Thebes

Thessaly

to

([Dem.] 50.12) late July

Timomachus toChersonese ([Dem.] 50.14)

early August

midSeptember Leostbenes to Peparetbos (Diod. 15.95.2)

autumn

Leosthenes blockades Panormus

(Diod.15.95.2)

early November

early December

winter

Callistratus toThasos ([Dem. 50.52) Timomachus receives Cotys’ letter (Dem. 23.115)

Alexander of Pherae sends embassy to Charidemus

(Dem. 23.162)

360

early spring March/April

Cephisodotus elected general

(schol. Aeschin. 3.51)

late spring

Trials of Autocles, Menon, and Timomachus

Chalcidice

177

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

Date

361 (cont.) July

Timotheus arrives at Proconnesus

late July early August

Apollodorus

toHieron

([Dem.] 50.19)

mid-

Apollodorus

toSestus

September

Timomachus’ fleet tows ships to Maronea; sails toThasos: attacks Stryme ([Dem.]

autumn

23) 50.21– Battle with

early

Maronites

November

([Dem.] 50.23)

early December

winter

Cotys sends letter to Timomachus (Dem. 23.115)

360 Cotys besieges Sestus (Dem.

early spring

23.115, 158)

March/April

Fall of Sestus to Cotys (Dem. 23.158)

Artabazus besieges Charidemus Ilium

at

(Dem. 23.155)

late spring

178 Date

Appendix

Macedon

Athens

360 (cont.)

late August/

early September

Cephisodotus receives Charidemus’ letter

2ndweek of

(Dem. 23.153) Decree re:

September

Charidemus

midSeptember

last week of September

Cephisodotus

sets sail (Dem. 23.168) Letters arrive fromgarrisoncommanders ofCrithote, Elaeus (Dem. 23.161) Peloponnese

Sparta/

summer

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

179

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/

Susa

Date

islands

360 (cont.) summer

Cotys besieges Alopeconnesus

Fall of Alopeconnesus (Dem. 23.158) Charidemus sends letters toCotys and Cephisodotus (Dem. 23.153)

late August/ early September

2ndweek of September Artabazus learns of

Athenian decree; releases Charidemus under truce; Charidemus to Chersonese (Dem. 23.158)

midSeptember

last week of September

Garrisoncommanders sendletters to Athens (Dem. 23.161) Charidemus besieges Crithote, Elaeus (Dem. 23.158) Charidemus toThracian capital; marries Cersebleptes’ sister

Cotys assassinated (Dem. 23.163)

Cephisodotus arrives at Chersonese;

sails to Perinthus (Dem. 23.163,

165)

Charidemus attacks Cephisodotus (Dem. 23.165)

180 Date

360 (cont.) October

Appendix

Macedon

Athens

Accession of Philip II (Diod. 16.1.2,

2.1) mid-October

359

spring

mid-/late

April

late April/ early May

Cephisodotus returns with

fleet; dismissed

from command (Dem. 23.168)

Chabrias elected general Peloponnese

Spana/

Thebes

Thessaly

Chalcidice

181

Appendix

Amphipolis/ Thrace

Chersonese/ Hellespont

Propontis

Pontus

Asia Minor/ islands

Susa

Date

360 (cont.) October

Cephisodotus

mid-October

to Alopeconnesus (Dem. 23.160) Cephisodotus besieges Alopeconnesus

(Dem. 23.167) Hostilities

with Charidemus

(Dem. 23.165)

359 spring

Thasians found

Crenides (Diod. 16.3.7) Charidemus, Cephisodotus negotiate truce

Iphicrates colonizes Drys

mid-/late April

(Dem. 23.167) Cephisodotus toAthens

late April/ early May

182

Map

Maps

University

1.

Press.) Macedonian

Maps

Map2. Western Asia Minor (Adapted with thepermission of Cambridge University Press.)

183

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, W. L. andBorza, E. N., eds. Philip Washington, D.C., 1982.

II, Alexander theGreat andtheMacedonian Heritage.

Badian, E. “ The King’s Peace” , Georgica: Greek Studies in Honor of George Cawkwell. BICS 48. Suppl. 58 (1991) 25– 71. ---------. “Philip II andThrace.”Pulpudeva IV (1983) 51– Badian, E. andHeskel, J. “ Aeschines 2.12– 18: A Study in Rhetoric andChronology” , Phoenix 41

71. (1987) 264– Beloch, K.J. Griechische Geschichte. 2nded. Vol. III. Berlin andLeipzig, 1922– 3. Bickerman, E. J. Chronology of theAncient World. 2nded.London, 1980. Borza, E. N. In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon. Princeton, 1990. Buckler, J. “Plutarch andthe Fate of Antalkidas” 45. , GRBS 18 (1977) 139– 362 B.C. Cambridge, Mass., 1980. ---------. The Theban Hegemony, 371–

Cargill, J. TheSecond Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1981. Cartledge, P. Agesilaos andtheCrisis of Sparta. Baltimore, 1987. Casson, S. Macedonia Thrace andIllyria. Humphrey/Milford, 1926. Cawkwell, G. L. “ 84. Agesilaus andSparta” , CQn.s. 26 (1976) 62– 86. , CQn.s. 11(1961) 80– The Common Peace of 366/5” ---------. “ 60. , CQn.s. 23 (1973) 47– The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy” ---------. “ 78. 254 – (1972), 22 n.s. CQ, , Thebes ” and Epaminondas “ ---------. 83. , CQn.s. 31 (1981) 69– The King’s Peace” ---------. “ 49. 34– (1962) 23 M & C , War ” Social the on Notes “ ---------. Cloché, P. Histoire dela Macédoine jusqu’à l’a vènement d’Alexandre le Grand. Paris, 1960. Danov, K. M. Altthrakien. Berlin/New York, 1976. 300 B.C. Oxford, 1971. Davies, J. K. Athenian Propertied Families, 600– 33. 309– (1969) 18 Historia , 1609 ” ii2 IG of Date The “ ---------. Develin, R. Athenian Officials 684– 321 B.C. Cambridge, 1989.

Geyer, F. Makedonien biszurThronbesteigung Philipps II. Oldenburg, 1930. Grote, G. B. AHistory of Greece. 3rded.Vol. XI. London, 1855. Hamilton, C. D.Agesilaus andtheFailure of theSpartan Hegemony. Ithaca, 1991. Hammond, N.G. L. AHistory of Greece. 3rded. Oxford, 1986. ---------. History Macedonia. Vol. Oxford, 1972. andGriffith, G.T. A History of Macedonia. Vol. II. Oxford, 1979. --------- Hampl, Die Griechischen Staatsverträge des4. Jahrhunderts v. Christ. Leipig, 1938. Hansen, M. H. Eisangelia: TheSovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. andtheImpeachment of Generals andPoliticians. Odense, 1975. 46. Agésilas et Artaxerxès II” Hatzfeld, J. “ , BCH70 (1946) 238– , diss. Harvard (Ann The Foreign Policy of Philip II downto the Peace of Philicrates” Heskel, J. “ Arbor, 1987). , in R. W. Wallace andE. M. Harris, eds., ---------. “Philip II andArgaios: A Pretender’s Story”

A

of

I.

186

Select Bibliography

Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360– 146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian (Oklahoma City, 1996) 37– 56. The Odrysenreich inThrakien imfünften undvierten Jahrhundert v. Chr.” Höck, A. “ , Hermes 26

(1891) 76–117.

Hornblower,

S. Mausolus. Oxford, 1982.

Judeich, W. Kleinasiatische Studien: Untersuchungen zur griechisch-persischen Geschichte des IV. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. Marburg, 1892. Kahrstedt, U. Beiträge zurGeschichte der Thrakischen Chersones. Baden-Baden, 1954. ---------. Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts.

Berlin, 1910. , GRBS 22 (1983) 239– 360 B.C” 52. Kallet, L. “Iphikrates, Timotheos, andAthens, 371–

Leaf, W. Troy: AStudy inHomeric Geography. London, 1912. Papazoglou, F. Les villes de Macédoine à l’époque romaine, BCHSuppl. 16. Paris, 1988. Pritchett, W. K. The Greek State at War. Vol. II. Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1974. 74. The Term of Office of Attic STRATEGOI”, AJP 61 (1940) 469– ---------. “

Rhodes, P. J. A Commentary on theAristotelian Athenion Politeia. Oxford, 1981. Ruzicka, S. Politics of a Persian Dynasty: TheHecatomnids in the Fourth Century B.C. Norman/ London, 1992. Ryder, T. T. B. Koine Eirene: General Peace andLocal Independence inAncient Greece. Oxford,

1965. 1887. Schaefer, A. Demosthenes undseine Zeit. 2nd. ed. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1885– 203. , Historia 5 (1956) 178– Sealey, R. “ Callistratos of Aphidna andhis Contemporaries” 1993. York, New Defeat. in Study A Time: His and ---------. Demosthenes , AJAH10(1985) 124– Shahbazi, A.Shapur. “ Irano-Hellenic Notes: 1.TheThree Faces ofTigranes”

36.

Tod, M. N.A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Vol. II. Oxford, 1948. Trevett, J. Apollodorus the Sonof Pasion. Oxford, 1992.

360 B.C. Historia Einzelschriften Vol. , 366– M. TheSo-Called “Great Satraps’Revolt” 63 (1989). West, A. B. TheHistory of the Chalcidic League. Diss. 1912; rpt. Madison: Arno, 1973.

Weiskopf,

Zahrnt,

M. Olynth unddie Chalkidier. Munich, 1971.

Herausgegeben

HISTORIA-EINZELSCHRIFTEN

vonHeinz Heinen, François Paschoud, Kurt Raaflaub, Gerold Walser

1. Gerold Walser: Caesar unddie Germanen.

Studien zur politischen Tendenz römischer Feldzugsberichte. 1956. XI, 104 S., kt. 00250–2 515– ISBN 3– 2. Edmund Buchner: Der Panegyrikos des

Isokrates. Einehistorisch-philologische Unter2 0251 – suchung. 1958. IX, 170 S., kt. 3. Wolf Steidle: Sallusts historische Monographien. Themenwahl und Geschichtsbild 9 0252 – (vergriffen) 4. Ulrich Kahrstedt: Die wirtschaftliche Lage Großgriechenlands in der Kaiserzeit. 1960. 0253–7 VII, 133 S., 1 Faltkte., kt. 5. Dieter Timpe: Untersuchungen zur Kontinuität des frühen Prinzipates. 1962. VIII, 133 0254–5 S., kt. 6. Hatto H.Schmitt: Untersuchungen zurGeschichte Antiochos’desGroßen undseiner Zeit. 1964. XII, 320 S. m. 9 Ktn., 1 Taf., kt.

7. Gerold Walser,

0255–3

Hrsg.: Neuere Hethiterforschung. 1964. VII, 144 S., 17Abb., 6 Taf., kt.

0256–1

8. Joseph Vogt: Sklaverei undHumanität. Stu-

dien zur antiken Sklaverei und ihrer Erforschung. (vergriffen) 0257 –X (siehe auch Nr. 44) 9. Eberhard Ruschenbusch: Solonos nomoi. DieFragmente dessolonischen Gesetzeswerkes mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte. Unveränderter Nachdruck 1983 der 8 0258 – Ausgabe von 1966. X, 140 S., kt. 10. Jakob Seibert: Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenisti6 0259 – scher Zeit. 1967. 138 S., kt. 11. Robert E. A. Palmer: The King and the Comitium. A Study of Rome’s Oldest Public X Document. 1969. XIII, 55 S., 5 Taf., kt.0260 – 12. Richard Alexander Baumann: TheDuumviri the in and Law in the Roman Criminal 8 HoratiusLegend. 1969. IV, 35 S., kt. 0261 – 13. Donald W.Knight: Some Studies in Athenian Politics inthe Fifth Century B. C. 1970. 0262–6 IV, 44 S., kt. 14. Joachim Szidat: Caesars diplomatische Tätigkeit im Gallischen Krieg. 1970. VIII, 162

0263–4 15. Kenneth Hugh Waters: Herodotos on Tyrants and Despots. A Study in Objectivity. 0264–2 1971. VI, 100 S., kt. 16. Charles W.Fornara: TheAthenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404. 1971. X, 84 S., kt. 0265–0 17. Justus Cobet: Herodots Exkurse und die Frage nachderEinheit seines Werkes. 1971. 0266–9 X, 207 S., kt. 18. Gerold Walser, Hrsg.: Beiträge zur Achämenidengeschichte. 1972. VI, 107 S., 0267–7 kt. 19. Peter J. Bicknell: Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy. 1972. VIII, 112 S., kt. 0268–5 20. Heinz Heinen: Untersuchungen zurhellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. ZurGeschichte derZeit des Ptolemaios Keraunos undzumChremonideischen Krieg. 0269–3 1972. XII, 229 S., 2 Ktn., kt. 21. Edmund F. Bloedow: Alcibiades re0270–7 examined. (vergriffen) 22. Derek J. Mosley: Envoys andDiplomacy in Ancient Greece. 1973. X, 97 S., kt. 1194–3 23. Philip Tyler: The Persian Wars of the 3rd S., kt.

Hildegard Temporini

und

Century A.D.andRoman Imperial Monetary 1915–4 68. (vergriffen) Policy, A. D. 253 – 24. John Pinsent: Military Tribunes and Plebe-

ian Consuls: The Fasti from 444 V to 342 V. 1899–9 1975. VIII, 83 S., kt. 25. Hans Armin Gärtner: Beobachtungen zu Bauelementen in der antiken Historiographie, besonders bei Livius und Caesar. 1869–7 1975. VI, 182 S., kt. 26. George John Stagakis: Studies inthe HomeX 1988 – ric Society. (vergriffen)

27. GaryA.Crump: Ammianus

Marcellinus

Military Historian. (vergriffen)

as a

7 1984 –

28. John Nicols: Vespasian and the partes 3 2393 – , 186 S., kt. Flavianae. 1978. Χ 29. Robert B. Kebric: Inthe Shadow of Mace-

don: Duris of Samos. 1977. XII, 99 S., kt. 8 2575 –

30. Getzel M.Cohen: The Seleucid Colonies: Studies inFounding, Administration andOrga-

2 2581 – nization. (vergriffen) 31. Joachim Szidat: Historischer Kommentar zuAmmianus Marcellinus BuchXX-XXI.Teil I: Die Erhebung lulians. 1977. 200 S., kt. 2642–8 32. EevaRuoff-Väänänen: Studies ontheItalian 0 2761 – Fora. 1978. X, 81 S., kt. 33. Jack M.Balcer: The Athenian Regulations forChalkis. Studies inAthenian Imperial Law. 4 1978. XIV, 145 S., 3 Taf., kt. 2773 – 34. Daniel Gillis: Collaboration with the 6 2786 – Persians. 1979. VIII, 87 S., kt. 35. Ralf Urban: Wachstum und Krise des Archäischen Bundes. Quellenstudien zurEntwicklung des Bundes von 280 bis 222 v. Chr. 7 2861 – 1979. IX, 236 S. m. 3 Ktn., kt. 36. Thomas S. Burns: The Ostrogoths. Kingship – 2967 2 and Society. 1980. IX, 144 S., kt. 37. Peter Funke: Homónoia undArché. Athen unddiegriechische Staatenwelt vomEndedes Peloponnesischen Krieges biszumKönigsfrie387/6 v. Chr.) 1980. XI, 197 S., kt. den (404/3 – 3007–7

38. Joachim Szidat: Historischer Kommentar XXI.Teil zuAmmianus Marcellinus BuchXX– II:DieVerhandlungsphase. 1981. VII, 104 S. m.

2 Ktn., kt.

39. Giovanni Brizzi: I sistemi

3474–9 dei

informativi

etàdelle conquiRomani. Principi e realtà nell’ 168 a. C.). 1982. XIX, 282 ste oltremare (218 –

S., kt.

3628–8

40. Heinz Heinen/ KarlStroheker/Gerold Walser, Hrsg.: Althistorische Studien. Hermann Bengtson zum70. Geburtstag dargebracht

vonKollegen undSchülern. 1983. VII,257 S. m. 4 3230 – 7 Taf., kt. 41. Herbert Graßl: Sozialökonomische Vorstellungen inderkaiserzeitlichen griechischen 3. Jh. n. Chr.). 1982. VII, 231 S., Literatur(1.– 9 3667 – kt.

42. Klaus M.Girardet: DieOrdnung derWelt: Ein Beitrag zurphilosophischen undpolitischen Interpretation von Ciceros Schrift De legibus. 1983. VIII, 260 S., kt.

3687–3

43. Karl-Heinz Schwarte: Der Ausbruch des Zweiten Punischen Krieges. Rechtsfrage

44.

und

5 Überlieferung. 1983. XV, 108 S., kt. 3655 – Joseph Vogt: Sklaverei und Humanität. StuErforihre und dien zur antiken Sklaverei schung. Ergänzungsheft zur2. erw. Aufl. (Historia-Einzelschriften, Heft 8). 1983. VII, 78 S.,

4 Taf., kt.

9 3877 –

45. Robert J. Buck: Agriculture andAgricultural Practice in Roman Law. 1983. 59 S., kt.

4 4040 –

46. Gerold Walser: Summus Poeniunus. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Großen St. BernhardPasses in römischer Zeit. 1984. 140 S. m. Katalog

m. 43 Abb., 18 Taf., kt.

4 4183 –

Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography. 1985. 128 S., kt.

47. Joseph Geiger:

4414–0 48. Gerold Walser: ViaperAlpes Graias. Beiträge zurGeschichte des Kleinen St. BernhardPasses in römischer Zeit. 1986. 97 S. m. 58 Abb. auf 40 Taf., kt.

49. Jack Martin Balcer: Problems in ancient

4 4541 –

Herodotus & Bisitun. Persian historiography.

5 4790 – 1987. 166 S. m. 7 Taf., kt. 50. Herbert Benner: Die Politik des P. Clodius Pulcher. Untersuchungen zurDenaturierung desClientelwesens inderausgehenden römi4672 –0 schen Republik. 1987. 189 S., kt.

51. Giuseppe Zecchini: II Carmen de bello Actiaco. Storiografia e lotta politica inetàaugu-

4887–1 stea. 1987. 109 S., kt. 52. John F. Drinkwater: The Gallic Empire.

Separatism and Continuity in the North-Western Provinces oftheRoman Empire, A.D.260

–274. 1987. 276 S., kt.

5 4806 – Hrsg.: Die Einsiedler Inschriftensammlung und der Pilgerführer durch Rom(Codex Einsidlensis 326). Facsi-

53. Gerold Walser,

mile, Umschrift, Übersetzung

undKommentar.

6 4912 – 1987. 230 S. u. 8 Taf., kt. 54. Edwin S. Ramage: TheNature andPurpose of Augustus’ Res Gestae”. 1987. 168 S., kt. 8 4892 – “ 55. Peter Herz: Studien zur römischen Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung. Die Lebensmittelver7 4805 – sorgung. 1988. 403 S., kt. 56. Waldemar Heckel: TheLastDaysandTesta-

mentof Alexander theGreat. AProsopogra2 5092 – phic Study. 1988. XIV, 114 S., kt. 57. Leonhard Alexander Burckhardt: Politische Strategien derOptimaten in derspäten römischen Republik. 1988. 296 S., kt. 5098–1 58. Binyamin Shimron: Politics and Belief in 2 5240 – Herodotus. 1989. IX, 126 S., kt. 59. Lukas Thommen: Das Volkstribunat der späten Römischen Republik. 1988. 287 S.,

5187–2 kt. 60. Heinz E. Herzig / Regula Frei-Stolba, Hrsg.: Labor omnibus unus. Gerold Walser zum70. Geburtstag dargebracht vonFreunden, Kollegen undSchülern. 1989. XVI, 278 S., kt. 4393–4 61. Raban vonHaehling: Zeitbezüge des T. Livius in der ersten Dekade seines Geschichtswerkes: Necvitia nostra necremedia pati possumus. 1989. 248 S., kt. 5117– 1 62. Martin Frey: Untersuchungen zur Religion ElagaKaisers des undzurReligionspolitik 0 5370– bal. 1989. IV, 125 S., kt. 63. Michael Weiskopf: The so-called „Great 360 B.C. Concerning , 366– Satraps’ Revolt“ Local Instability inthe Achaemenid farWest. 5 5387– 1989. 112 S., kt.

64. Thomas Grünewald: Constantinus MaximusAugustus. Herrschaftspropaganda inder zeitgenössischen Überlieferung. 1990. 320 S., 1 5568– kt. 65. Marinus A.Wes: Michael Rostovtzeff, Historian in Exile. Russian Roots inan American Context. 1990. XXXI, 106 S., Frontispiz u. 13

5 5664– Fot. auf 12 Taf. i. Anh., kt. 66. Edward Dabrowa: Legio X Fretensis. A Prosopographical Study ofitsOfficers (I-III Centu5 5809– ries A.D.). 1993. 128 S., kt. 67. Angelika Mette-Dittmann: Die Ehegesetze desAugustus. EineUntersuchung imRahmen der Gesellschaftspolitik des Princeps. 1991. 1 5876– 220 S., kt. 68. RalfUrban: DerKönigsfrieden von387/86 v. Chr.Vorgeschichte, Zustandekommen, Ergebnis undpolitische Umsetzung. 1991. 203 S., kt. 5 5924– 69. Stefan Link: Landverteilung und sozialer Frieden imarchaischen Griechenland. 1991. 7 5954– 189 S., kt. 70. Sigrid Mratschek-Halfmann: Divites et

praepotentes. Reichtum undsoziale Stellung inderLiteratur derPrinzipatszeit. 1993. IX,461 3 5973– S., kt. 71. Shlomo Berger: Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily andSouthern Italy. 1992. 123 S., 8 5959– kt. 72. Stefan Rebenich: Hieronymus und sein Kreis. Prosographische und sozialgeschichtli3 che Untersuchungen. 1992. 328 S., kt.6086– 73. Klaus Tausend: Amphiktyonie undSymmachie. Formen zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungenimarchaischen Griechenland. 1992. VIII, 1 6137– 273 S., kt. 74. William T. Loomis: The Spartan WarFund: IGV1,1 anda NewFragment. 1992.84 S., 17 9 6147– Taf., kt. 75. KarlStrobel: DasImperium Romanum im,3. Jahrhundert‘. Modell einer historischen Krise? 9 5662– 1993. 388 S., kt. 76. Christopher Tuplin: The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11– 1 5912– 7.5.27. 1993. 264 S., kt. 77. Charlotte Schubert: Die Macht des Volkes unddie Ohnmacht des Denkens. Studien

zumVerhältnis von Mentalität undWissenschaft im5. Jahrhundert. 1993. 200 S., kt. 9 6228– 78. Joseph Roisman: The General DemosthenesandhisUseofMilitary Surprise. 1993.84 7 6277– S., kt. 79. Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersuchungen zuEntwicklung undBeurteilung vonAlleinherrschaft imvorhellenisti5 schen Griechenland. 1993. 345 S., kt.6278–

80. Brian M.Lavelle: TheSorrow andthePity. A Prolegomenon toa History ofAthens under the 510 B.C. 1993. 147 S., kt. Peisistratids, c. 560– 8 6318– 81. Wolfgang Leschhorn: Antike Ären. Zeit-

rechnung, Politik undGeschichte imSchwarzmeerraum undinKleinasien nördlich desTau9 ros. 1993. XI, 576 S. m. 10 Taf., kt. 6018– 82. UweWalter: AnderPolis teilhaben. Bürgerstaat undZugehörigkeit imarchaischen Grie6 6370– chenland. 1993. 242 S., kt.

83. Michael Rostowzew: Skythien und der Bosporus, Band II. Wiederentdeckte Kapitel undVerwandtes. A.d.Grundlage d.russ. EditionvonV.Ju. Zuevm.Kommentaren u.Beitr. übers. u. hrsg. von Heinz Heinen. 1993. VIII, 263 S., 36 Taf. u. 4 Ktn. in Kartentasche, kt.

4 6399–

84. Julia Sünskes Thompson: Demonstrative Legitimation der Kaiserherrschaft imEpochenvergleich. Zur politischen Macht des stadtrömischen Volkes. 1993. VII, 103 S., kt.

6415-X

85. Werner Huß:Dermakedonische König und die ägyptischen Priester. Studien zur Geschichte des ptolemaiischen Ägypten. 1994. 4 6502– 238 S., kt. 86. Gerold Walser: Studien zur Alpengeschichte in antiker Zeit. 1994. 139 S. u. 10 Taf., kt. 2 6498– 87. David Whitehead, Ed.: From Political Ar-

chitecture to Stephanus Byzantius. Sources for the Ancient Greek Polis. 1994. 124 S., 11 5 6572– Abb., kt. (zugleich: Papers fromthe Copenhagen Polis Centre, Vol. 1) 88. Bernhard Kremer: DasBildderKelten bis in augusteische Zeit. Studien zurInstrumentali-

sierung eines antiken Feindbildes bei griechischen undrömischen Autoren. 1994. 362S., kt. 2 6548– 89. Joachim Szidat: Historischer Kommentar zuAmmianus Marcellinus Buch XX-XXI. Teil III: Die Konfrontation. 1996. 293 S., kt. 9 6570– (vgl. Bde. 31 u. 38) 90. Odile De Bruyn: La compétence de l’Aréo-

page en matière de procès publics. Des

origines romaine

de la polis athénienne a la conquête 146avant J.-C.). delaGrèce (vers 700– 3 6654–

1995. 226 S., kt.

91. Lothar Wierschowski: Dieregionale Mobilität inGallien nachdenInschriften des 1. bis 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. Quantitative Studien zurSozial- undWirtschaftsgeschichte derwestlichen Provinzen des Römischen Reiches. 5 6720– 1995. 400 S., kt. 92. Joachim Ott: DieBeneficiarier. Untersuchun-

genzuihrer Stellung innerhalb derRangordnungdesRömischen Heeres undzuihrer Funk8 6660– tion. 1995. 246 S., kt. 93. Andrew Drummond: Law, Politics and Power.Sallust andtheExecution oftheCatilinari8 6741– an Conspirators. 1995. 136 S., kt. 94. Heinrich Schlange-Schöningen: Kaisertum und Bildungswesen im spätantiken Kon4 6760– stantinopel. 1995. VIII, 189 S., kt. Herman Hansen andKurt Raaflaub Polis. Greek (Eds.): Studies in the Ancient 0 6759– 1995. 219 S., kt. (zugleich: Papers fromthe Copenhagen Polis Centre, Vol. 2)

95. Mogens

96. Martin Jehne (Hg.): Demokratie inRom? Die Rolle des Volkes inder Politik der römischen 0 6860– Republik. 1995. VII, 141 S., kt. 97. Valerie M.Warrior: The Initiation of the Second Macedionian War. AnExplication of Livy 8 6853– Book 31. 1996. 118 S., kt. 98. Raimund Friedl: DerKonkubinat imkaiserzeitlichen Rom. VonAugustus bis Septimius 6 6871– Severus. 1996. 417 S., kt.

99. Christopher

Tuplin: Achaemenid Studies. 1 6901–

1996. 226 S., kt.

100.Marlis Weinmann-Walser (Hg.): Historische Interpretationen. Gerold Walser zum75.Geburtstag dargebracht vonFreunden, Kollegen und Schülern. 1995. 212 S. m. 3 Taf., kt. 6 6739–

101. Leonhard A. Burckhardt: Bürger und Soldaten. Aspekte der politischen und militärischen Rolle athenischer Bürger imKriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. 1996. 300 S., 5 6832– kt. 102. Julia Heskel: The North Aegean Wars, 371– 8 6917– 360 B.C. 1997. 186 S., kt.

103. Lukas Thommen: Lakedaimonion Politeia. Die Entstehung der spartanischen Verfas6 6918– sung. 1996. 170 S, kt. 104. Luisa Prandi: Fortuna e realtà dell’opera di 6947-X Clitarco. 1996. 203 S., kt. 105.Jerzy Linderski, Ed.: Imperium sine fine:

T. Robert S. Broughton andtheRoman Re-

8 public. 1996. X, 234 S. u. 1 Taf., kt. 6948– 106.Karl Christ: Griechische Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. 1996. 238 S. m.7 1 6915– Taf., kt. 107. Eric. W.Robinson: TheFirst Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens. 8 6951– 1997. 144 S., kt. 108.Mogens Herman Hansen / Kurt Raaflaub,

Eds.: More Studies in the Ancient Greek 0 6969– Polis. 1996. 196 S., kt. (zugleich: Papers fromtheCopenhagen Polis Centre, Vol. 3) 109.Victor Parker: Untersuchungen zumLelan4 6970– tischen Krieg. 1997. 189 S., kt. 110. Ulrich Gotter: Der Diktator ist tot! Politik in Romzwischen den Iden des März undder Begründung des Zweiten Triumvirats. 1996. 5 6815– 316 S., kt. 111.François Paschoud / Joachim Szidat, Hrsg: Usurpationen in derSpätantike. Akten des , Staatsstreich undStaatlichkeit“ Kolloquiums „ 10. März 1996, Solothurn/Bern. 1997. 174 6.– 3 7030– S., kt. 112.Ulrich Huttner: Diepolitische Rolle derHeraklesgestalt im griechischen Herrscher7 7039– tum. 1997. IX, 385 S., kt. 113.Robert E.A.Palmer: RomeandCarthage at 0 7040– Peace. 1997. 152 S., kt. 114.HansBeck: Polis undKoinon. UntersuchungenzurGeschichte undStruktur dergriechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. 2 7117– Chr. 1997. 320 S., kt. 115. Heinz Bellen: Politik-Recht-Gesellschaft. Leonvon Hg. Studien zurAlten Geschichte. hard Schumacher. 1997. VIII, 323 S., 24 Taf., 4 7150– kt. 116.Carsten Drecoll: Die Liturgien im römischen Kaiserreich des 3. und4. Jh. n. Chr. Untersuchung über Zugang, Inhalt undwirtschaftliche Bedeutung der öffentlichen Zwangsdienste inÄgypten undanderen Pro2 7151– vinzen. 1997. 401 S., kt.

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart