The New Normal and Its Impact on Society: Perspectives from ASEAN and the European Union 9819705266, 9789819705269

Citation preview

The New Normal and Its Impact on Society Perspectives from ASEAN and the European Union Edited by Nurliana Kamaruddin · Aida Idris · Kevin Fernandez

The New Normal and Its Impact on Society

Nurliana Kamaruddin · Aida Idris · Kevin Fernandez Editors

The New Normal and Its Impact on Society Perspectives from ASEAN and the European Union

Editors Nurliana Kamaruddin Asia-Europe Institute Universiti Malaya Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Aida Idris Department of Management and Marketing Universiti Malaya Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Kevin Fernandez Asia-Europe Institute Universiti Malaya Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

ISBN 978-981-97-0526-9 ISBN 978-981-97-0527-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6 This book was produced as part of the Jean Monnet Center of Excellence project. Project Number: 586907-EPP-1-2017-1-MY-EPPJMO-CoE. Disclaimer: The project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Foreword

The New Normal and Its Impact on Society: Perspectives from ASEAN and the European Union brings together chapters by scholars from Asia and Europe analysing and discussing contemporary socio-political and economic issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the pandemic emerged in 2020 and spread rapidly around the globe, it has presented humanity with one of the greatest challenges of the era and was declared a non-traditional security threat in both Asia and Europe. Beyond its detrimental effect on public health, COVID-19 challenged each region’s capacity to cope with the aftereffects of the pandemic and tested member states’ commitment to regionalism. The nature of the pandemic and its consequences have been vast and examining the new normal and managing its challenges is imperative. This edited volume, a publication of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Project ‘ASEAN-EU in Dialogue: Learning from Each Other’, contributes to studies on the impact of COVID-19 on different regions. It analyses how ASEAN and the EU have dealt with the challenges arising from the pandemic, investigates what has hindered or facilitated successful regional cooperation, and identifies ways for more effective resolutions. As the title suggests, it focuses on post-pandemic mutual concerns and divergent views and approaches in the two regions. One of its key features is its emphasis on both ASEAN and EU perspectives on initiatives in selected domains. As such it is a valuable addition to the discourse on

v

vi

FOREWORD

post-pandemic challenges and comparisons of policies and practices in the two regions. The volume begins with a general introduction on the challenges and regional approaches in the new normal. This is followed by chapters on the lost generation arising from the lockdown, the impact on employment and work trends, cybercrime and cyber security, refugees and migration policies, and human capital, in the post-pandemic era. It concludes with suggestions on moving forward in the new normal taking into account earlier analyses. COVID-19 called for a collective response at both the regional and global levels. As established regional blocs, the EU and ASEAN have a responsibility to their members to coordinate measures and respond to the challenges of a post-pandemic world. The experience of the pandemic demonstrates that a collective response on a regional basis, rather than intervention on a narrow national basis, can best deliver effective remedies to unprecedented crises and their consequences. June 2023

Professor Emeritus Dr. Azirah Hashim Universiti Malaya Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Contents

1

1

The New Normal: Challenges and Regional Approaches Kevin Fernandez and Nurliana Kamaruddin

2

The Lost Generation 2020–2021: Action Plans in the New Normal in EU and ASEAN Wan Zokhri Wan Idris

11

Employment Opportunities and Work Trends Post-pandemic Niresh Kaur

25

Cybercrimes and Cyber Security Trends in the New Normal Razwan Mokhtar and Amran Rohaizat

41

3

4

5

Refugees and Migration Policies of ASEAN and the EU Nadia Kalinina and Kevin Fernandez

6

Developing Human Capital: Examining the Framework and Strategies of EU and ASEAN Jan Vincent Galas and Mark Salvador Ysla

7

Social Transformation in the New Normal: A Reflection Aida Idris and Stella Franciska Imanuella

Index

61

79 99

107

vii

Notes on Contributors

Kevin Fernandez is currently a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Business and Economics, Universiti Malaya, and is also attached to the Asia-Europe Institute. His research interests include identity politics, New Media and Political mobilization, misinformation, fake news and conspiracy theories, and non-state security threats. Jan Vincent Galas is an associate professor at Chung-Ang University’s College of Business and Economics and the Director of the Global Business Education Accreditation Center. He obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. in International Studies from Sogang University in South Korea. His research focuses on ASEAN and East Asian studies, particularly examining the intersections of constructivism, strategic culture, and theories of development, communication, and cooperation. Additionally, Jan has an established reputation as an international debating consultant, with practical experience coaching and training in East Asian countries. Aida Idris currently works as a professor at the Faculty of Business and Economics, Universiti Malaya (UM). Before entering academia, she had served as an engineer and a management consultant at several multinational corporations. She obtained her Ph.D. from the same university and now specializes in Cross-cultural Management and SME Development. In 2015, she was awarded a two-year scholarship by the Ministry of Higher Education, Malaysia, to pursue a postdoctoral program at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, where she collaborated with a team of

ix

x

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

European scholars on the subject of international education. Throughout her service at UM, Professor Idris has held a number of leadership positions, including as Director of the Academic Development Centre, Director of the Student Entrepreneurship and Development Centre, and Deputy Executive Director of the Asia-Europe Institute. She is an active researcher and has produced more than 100 publications in books, international journals, and conference proceedings. Stella Franciska Imanuella holds a bachelor of humanities from Universitas Indonesia and an M.B.A. from Anglia Ruskin University, UK. Presently, she is a Ph.D. candidate at Asia Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, researching a comparative study of social impact assessment on river development projects in ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and collaborates with local and international NGOs. Being involved in people development gigs in the business environment, Stella has developed a passion for social development issues, relationships between global, national, and local actors in contested strategies for development, and future directions of development strategies through social impact works. Nadia Kalinina holds two master’s degrees, in European Studies and ASEAN Studies. She has a deep interest in international relations, regionalism, and geopolitics and finds it important to look beyond the surface and narratives in order to uncover the real motives and drivers behind international events. She is a freelance interpreter by profession with experience working with the United Nations. Nadia is fond of languages and is currently learning Chinese. Nurliana Kamaruddin is senior Deputy Executive Director (Academic and Student Affairs) and lecturer at the Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya. She earned her Ph.D. in International Studies majoring in Development Cooperation at Ewha Womans University, Seoul and M.A. in International Cooperation at Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea. Nurliana was a recipient of the Korea Foundation ASEAN Fellowship (2013–2015) and the POSCO TJ Park Foundation Asia Fellowship (2009–2011). Her research interests include international development, non-traditional security, governance, and international cooperation with an area focus on East Asia. Niresh Kaur is a writer specializing in delivering insightful and accessible content concerning current issues and legal rights. Niresh graduated with

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xi

an LL. B (Hons) from the University of London and is currently pursuing her Master of Laws at Universiti Malaya. Formerly a legal editor, she possesses a keen attention to detail and a comprehensive understanding of legal intricacies. Drawing from her work experience in both a legal tech firm and a consulting firm, Niresh possesses a deep understanding of employment patterns, enabling her to provide unique perspectives on the subject. With a commitment to sharing valuable knowledge, Niresh contributes her voice to the industry through diverse platforms. Razwan Mokhtar has worked in the cyber security industry for more than 20 years. Since the beginning of his career, he has built a working relationship with Malaysia’s authorities. He began his career in cyber security at age 21 when he accepted an invitation to work as a consultant with the Royal Police Malaysia’s Cyber Crime Department. Along the way, he has consulted and worked on numerous cyber security issues in a variety of fields, including healthcare, telecommunications, finance, and the military around the world. He co-founded Nanosec Asia, the largest cyber security conference and community in Malaysia (www.nanosec.asia), while working for an Australian corporation for 6 years. He was also appointed as a fellow under the ELITE@UM program at Universiti Malaya in 2022– 2023. He spends his free time playing football or skating at the nearby skatepark in Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, Kuala Lumpur. Amran Rohaizat began his career in the creative field in 1998. Over the course of two decades, he has actively participated in diverse creative domains, encompassing design and advertising, television and film production, as well as publishing and writing. Despite being a former student who discontinued his studies in computer and software engineering, Amran’s inherent passion for technology endured, making him an ardent tech enthusiast. He consistently keeps abreast of the latest advancements and trends in computers and technology, continually observing and monitoring new developments. Eventually, he expanded his focus to include the cyber security industry and actively engaged in research activities while providing assistance at RPMY Security Solutions. He spends his free time reading blogs and internet articles that cover a wide range of topics. Wan Zokhri Wan Idris has held some academic positions in International Relations (IR) research and teaching, heralding as the Deputy Dean of Student Affairs at the Management and Science University. He had

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

served as a senior faculty member of Faculty of Business Management and Professional Studies (FBMP), MSU after completing his industrial attachment at Puncak Niaga Management Services as an assistant manager serving the Strategic Resources and Public Relations Division. His area of research focuses on the changing nature of diplomacy and sovereignty of developing nations, especially Malaysia. This leads to the establishment of Eirene Research, to explore leadership and diplomacy in International Relations. He co-founded ARUS, an avenue to nurture talents and empowerment for the Malaysian youth, and later holds affiliation to the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) as Director of External Relations. He was Chief Executive Officer of the Policy and Economic Affairs Centre of Malaysia Foundation (PEACE) and is currently Senior Fellow at Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi. Mark Salvador Ysla is a faculty member of the Department of International Studies at Far Eastern University, Manila, the Philippines. He teaches courses on globalization of world politics, theories of international relations, and international and regional organizations. He obtained his master’s degree in International Studies from Sogang University in Seoul, South Korea. He served as Associate Dean of the Institute of Arts and Sciences and the program chair of the Department of International Studies of Far Eastern University. He also has extensive experience working at the ASEAN-Korea Centre. His current research interests include intersections of global governance and the impact of international and regional organizations, ASEAN and Korea relations, refugee studies, Middle Eastern governance, and politics.

List of Tables

Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3

2030 ASEAN roadmap outcomes: Strategies and actions for five program areas ASEAN HRD status ASEAN government responses to strengthen human capital: Examples of good practices and initiatives

86 88 92

xiii

CHAPTER 1

The New Normal: Challenges and Regional Approaches Kevin Fernandez and Nurliana Kamaruddin

Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic has inexplicably altered global society, raising concerns about shifts in social, economic, and political patterns in the so-called “new normal”. The emergence of new challenges has placed pressure on all facets of human society, hindering a return to “business as usual”. Given the transnational nature of many of these challenges, regional cooperation has naturally gained significance. This chapter offers a brief glimpse into the study of regionalism, along with the cooperation between ASEAN and the European Union. Additionally, it presents an overview of the chapters featured in the book. Keywords New normal · Social challenges · ASEAN · European Union · Regionalism · Regional cooperation

K. Fernandez · N. Kamaruddin (B) Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] K. Fernandez e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_1

1

2

K. FERNANDEZ AND N. KAMARUDDIN

Introduction Without a doubt, the COVID-19 pandemic has inexplicably changed the global society. In recent years, governments worldwide have focused on issues of health management, vaccination, and the subsequent economic impact. Amidst these discussions, the impact that the pandemic and the prolonged lockdowns have had on societies beyond the issue of economic hardship has also gained traction. There is no denying that there is growing concern about changing social, economic, and political patterns in the so-called “new normal”. New challenges are putting pressure on all aspects of human society which prevents us from returning to “business as usual”. What is clear is that the current generation is facing challenges that their older peers did not know, and new feelings and concerns are coming to the fore. The sense of economic scarcity, irrevocable damage from climate change, and geopolitical survival have led to a new sense of speed in dealing with new demands and expectations. Be it from the changing work trends to new forms of security concern, these challenges are testing the readiness and resilience of the global society. Moreover, these challenges seem to require solutions beyond that of local and national governments. Considering the cross-border impact that many of these challenges pose, it seems natural that regional cooperation has increased in importance.

Regional Approaches to New Challenges Theoretical discussions of regionalism have taken place in two waves, the first in the late 1950s from the standpoint of a subfield of International Relations and the second in the 1980s from the standpoint of International Political Economy (IPE) (Breslin et al., 2002). Early arguments on regional integration, led by neo-functionalists, focused too much on the achievements of regional integration in Europe or the lack of integration in other regions of the world (Haas & Schmitter, 1964; Nye, 1970). However, this approach by the neo-functionalists was also criticized which led to the debate about whether regionalism was a study in its own right or whether it should be a study of interdependence (Breslin & Higgott, 2000). The publication of the White Paper on the Single Market in 1985 and the adoption of the Single European Act in the same year brought

1

THE NEW NORMAL: CHALLENGES AND REGIONAL …

3

about discussions concerning “New Regionalism”. This discussion led to the revival of regional initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the United States of America (USA), the creation of MERCUSOR in 1991, the development of ASEAN in Asia in the 1990s, and the start of APEC in 1989 (Breslin et al., 2002). The most notable effort in this area was the European Union’s Single Market Initiative. In the 1990s, it succeeded in achieving an unprecedented degree of monetary integration among most member countries. Bjoern Hettne (2002) later emphasizes the importance of understanding regionalism from both an exogenous perspective (regionalization and globalization are interrelated articulations of global change) and an endogenous perspective (according to which regionalization is shaped by a variety of different actors within the region). Börzel and Risse also argue that it is the “functional factors” that drive regional interdependence. Additionally, the capacity and role of the political elites in encouraging regional engagement which can draw support that the grassroots level also matters in how successful a regional organization can be (2019). How and why regional organizations form aside, what is clear is that regional approaches have become increasingly important in addressing new security and social concerns especially as there are increasing overlaps between these two fields. To that end, this book provides a comparative look at how ASEAN and the EU have approached selected issues. As arguably the two most comprehensive regional organizations examining how the EU-style regional integration versus what is characterized as loose and informal in Asia provides an important basis for comparison between models of regional integration (Söderbaum, 2013). More importantly, considering the differences in these two regional organizations when it comes to the level of integration and available mechanisms for cooperation, the EU and ASEAN approaches would allow readers to identify parallels, trends, and draw lessons from both regions.

ASEAN and the European Union (EU) Beyond the importance of examining ASEAN and the EU in their own right, it is also worth noting the long historical dimension of the two regions’ relationship. With the exception of Thailand, all ASEAN countries have been colonized by at least one EU country. This contributed to long-standing relations between many of the ASEAN countries with

4

K. FERNANDEZ AND N. KAMARUDDIN

EU member countries which continues to benefit economic and social ties between the two regions. ASEAN continues to consider the EU as a crucial trading partner. Based on ASEAN’s report, the total value of bilateral trade between ASEAN and the EU reached $268.9 billion in 2021 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2022a). This represents an 18.6 percent increase compared to the previous year’s total of $200.1 billion. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), the EU provided ASEAN with $26.5 billion in 2021, marking a significant 42.9 percent year-on-year increase and positioning the EU as the second-largest source of external FDI among all ASEAN dialogue partners that year (ASEAN Secretariat, 2022a). In 2022, the trade value between the EU and ASEAN exceeded 271.8 billion euros (European Union, 2023). This establishes ASEAN as the EU’s third-largest trading partner outside of Europe, ranking after China and the United States. Additionally, bilateral trade in services between the EU and ASEAN amounted to e82.4 billion in 2020. The EU primarily exports machinery, chemical products, and transportation equipment to ASEAN, while agricultural products, industrial and transportation equipment, and other industrial products constitute the majority of imports from ASEAN to the European Union (European Union, 2023). EU cooperation with ASEAN countries goes beyond being just a trading partner; it is also a mutually beneficial partnership, as demonstrated at the height of the pandemic in efforts to combat the global spread of COVID-19. Under “Team Europe”, the EU provided e820 million in aid to mitigate the impact of the disease in the ASEAN region, and another e20 million for the World Health Organization’s pandemic response and preparedness in Southeast Asia (ASEAN Secretariat, 2022a). According to statistics, in 2015, there were about 371 thousand people who held citizenship of an ASEAN country and were long-term residents of the EU-28. This represented approximately 4.8 percent of the total number of people who held citizenship of a non-EU country and were long-term residents of the EU-28 (Corselo, 2017). It is estimated that 76.4 thousand people from EU member states live in ASEAN member states. This represents 0.8 percent of all foreign-born residents in ASEAN and 2.6 percent of residents born outside ASEAN (Corselo, 2017). Protection for these individuals from both sides of the spectrum is critical. The two multilateral organizations have a long history of close cooperation, with the EU playing more of a big brother role in helping ASEAN become a full-fledged multilateral organization. One example of such

1

THE NEW NORMAL: CHALLENGES AND REGIONAL …

5

cooperation is in the area of human rights. Human rights have been a problematic issue in relations between ASEAN and the EU since the early 1990s, especially in the context of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which has played an important role in the gradual formation of ASEAN’s common identity as a regional space for communication on human rights (Manea, 2008). An important difference between ASEAN and the EU is that ASEAN, as a global organization, acts bilaterally, while both think multilaterally, according to Amitav Acharya (1998, p. 67). This hampers ASEAN as a multilateral organization as it lacks cooperation and coordination to make unilateral decisions on various issues affecting the region, including the changing culture affecting labour, cybersecurity, education, and especially irregular migration. As part of the European Union’s support for higher education in the ASEAN region (SHARE), the EU funds several programs to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, protect migrant workers, and enhance the quality of education through scholarships. Additionally, the European Union has provided assistance in various fields through the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) facility, which has been operational since September 2011 and will continue until September 2017. These fields encompass education, science and technology, environmental management, and disaster management (ASEAN Secretariat, 2022). An example of how the EU has helped to create a centre for disaster management is the establishment of the ASEAN Coordination Center for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) in 2011 and the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER or the Agreement) in 2015 are two examples of how ASEAN is working to develop systems similar to those of the EU (Pennisi di Floristella, 2015). The ASEAN Center for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA), working through the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS), has been instrumental in coordinating relief efforts in Myanmar, particularly in transporting medical supplies and equipment to directly assist COVID-19 (Arca, 2021). With the continued sporadic and harsh lockdowns that countries had to adopt, socioeconomic structures based on non-pandemic measures were severely disrupted, affecting all strata of society, particularly formal and informal lower and middle-income earners. According to a study by the Asian Development Bank Institute, Cambodia and Lao PDR had the lowest percentage of families in which at least one member lost their job or had their working hours reduced during the height of the pandemic

6

K. FERNANDEZ AND N. KAMARUDDIN

(Morgan & Trinh, 2021). In contrast, more than 70 percent of all families in the Philippines had at least one member who was laid off or had to work fewer hours due to the global economic crisis. Additionally, a relatively high number of people in the Philippines experienced temporary or permanent job layoffs (22.5 percent and 28.5 percent, respectively) (Morgan & Trinh, 2021). The pandemic accelerated the introduction and widespread adoption of the concept of working from home. The pandemic highlighted the importance of ensuring equal access to education and employment opportunities for all. The closures had a disproportionately negative impact on marginalized groups, such as lowincome people and people of colour, who may have limited access to the technology and resources needed for online learning and remote work. These groups were disproportionately negatively impacted by the closures (Hoehn-Velasco et al., 2021). As we move into the future, it is imperative to ensure that all people, regardless of their background or circumstances, have equal access to the labour market and educational opportunities. The effects of the COVID-19 issue were seen in the context of the EU as the percentage of people working from home more than doubled in 2020, reaching 12.3 percent, and there was a further rise in the percentage of people typically working from home in 2021, as it reached 13.5 percent (Eurostat, 2022). The Swedish capital Stockholm, for example, saw a dramatic increase in 2021, with two out of five workers (or 40.5%) working from home. Many companies that had previously resisted working from home were forced to adopt it during the pandemic, and many have since discovered the benefits of working from home, such as higher productivity and lower overhead costs (Chakraborty & Kar, 2021).

The Organization of the Book With this background in mind, this book explores some of the challenges that have intensified due to, and after, the pandemic. In Chapter 2, Wan Zokhri Wan Idris makes the provocative claim that we are living in a “lost generation” today, drawing on the five pillars of child well-being developed by UNICEF. These five pillars are (1) survival and thriving, (2) learning, (3) protection, (4) a healthy environment, and (5) equal opportunity. Wan Idris supports his claim that the current generation is a “lost generation” by pointing to these five pillars as evidence. He attempts to argue that the experiences of children and youth during the World War

1

THE NEW NORMAL: CHALLENGES AND REGIONAL …

7

and COVID-19 may be similar because the “lost generation” is essentially an “unfulfilled generation coming of age in a time of instability”. This is done through a thorough analysis and synthesis of the UNICEF report produced in 2021 and 2022. Niresh Kaur attempts to sketch the post-pandemic changes in employment patterns for both regions in Chapter 3, with a silver lining in terms of new directions and opportunities to explore. This chapter focuses on the positive aspects of the situation, such as the acceleration of digitization as a result of pressure on companies to embrace new technologies to facilitate remote work and online services. The structure of labour markets in many countries is expected to change further with the spread of flexible forms of work such as freelancing, part-time contracts, and gig-economy occupations. Kaur further delves into the reconfiguration of global supply chains due to remote work arrangements. In the context of increasing digitalization in almost every industry, this also means that virtually all aspects of human life now take place somehow or rather in cyberspace. A report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2021) highlighted during the height of COVID19 that there was no consistent data collection or reporting of cybercrime (particularly child sexual abuse and exploitation) in Southeast Asia and that online child sexual exploitation increased during the pandemic in the region. Lack of regulations and means of enforcement due to the nature of the internet meant that there is an increased vulnerability to cyber-based crimes and scams, particularly among the youth and elderly. Governments and private organizations alike are focused on enhancing their cybersecurity capacity but there is less focus on individual experience and preparedness. In Chapter 4, Razwan Mokhtar and Amran Rohaizat note that one reason cybercriminals successfully perpetrate scams during pandemics is that victims in this situation are more vulnerable to fraud due to heightened emotional states such as stress, depression, and anxiety. The overall chapter gives us a comprehensive overview of the different types of cybercrime and the various regional initiatives, as well as some recommendations for regional cooperation that ASEAN and the EU could adopt. The ASEAN Migration Outlook (2002b) highlighted how migrants were more vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19, in part because of the nature of their work and living conditions, and that this group of people also has less access to personal protective equipment and testing and treatment facilities, particularly undocumented migrants. Meanwhile,

8

K. FERNANDEZ AND N. KAMARUDDIN

tighter immigration rules in many countries have led to changes in migration and mobility patterns during the pandemic period. Even as countries begin to reopen their borders, local policies towards migrant workers, refugees, and other communities in the periphery have also changed in recent years. Migration triggered by poverty and conflict has become even more dangerous, exacerbated by the lack of medical care and welfare in these displaced communities. The fifth chapter by Nadia Kalinina and Kevin Fernandez offers an analysis of historical events that have influenced EU and ASEAN migration policies in the contemporary period. They recommend ASEAN to be more assertive in dealing with Myanmar and call out the EU of its dualism for being lenient in dealing with Ukrainian refugees and not so lenient in dealing with refugees from war-torn Muslim Arab states and Africa. According to the World Bank (2023), 70 million more people have been pushed back into extreme poverty, meaning millions of children face cuts in health care (vaccines, etc.); globally, 34 percent of pre-schoolers early language and literacy skills and more than 29 percent of math skills have been lost; school closures and ineffective distance learning have resulted in students missing out on learning and also forgetting what they have learned: for every 30 days that schools have been closed, students have missed an average of about 32 days of school; 40 million people who would have had jobs by the end of 2021 but did not get them because of the epidemic have exacerbated the trend towards youth unemployment. 25 percent of all young people in several countries were not in school, work or training in 2021. This group of people will account for 90 percent of human capital in 2050. In the sixth chapter, Mark Salvador Ysla and Jan Vincent Galas look at the issue of human capital development concerns in both regions. It first discusses the EU and ASEAN policy frameworks for addressing the disruptions caused by the pandemic. This is followed by the various strategies adopted by individual governments to further improve human capital development. The final chapter by Stella Franciska Imanuella and Aida Idris provides the conclusion of the book, looking at some of the lessons that can be drawn from the chapters.

1

THE NEW NORMAL: CHALLENGES AND REGIONAL …

9

References Acharya, A. (1998). Culture, security, multilateralism: The ‘ASEAN way’ and regional order. Contemporary Security Policy, 19(1), 55–84. Arca, R. J. (2021). ASEAN delivers medical support for COVID-19 response to the People of Myanmar. ASEAN. https://asean.org/asean-delivers-medicalsupport-to-myanmars-response-to-covid-19/ ASEAN Secretariat. (2022a). Overview ASEAN-European Union dialogue relations. ASEAN Secretariat Information Paper. https://asean.org/wp-content/ uploads/2022/10/Overview-ASEAN-EU-DR_as-of-20-October-2022.pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2002b). ASEAN Migration Outlook. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2022/08/ASEAN-Migration-Outlook-Final.pdf Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2019). Grand theories of integration and the challenges of comparative regionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8), 1231–1252. Breslin, S., & Higgott, R. (2000). Studying regions: Learning from the old, constructing the new. New Political Economy, 5(3), 333–352. Breslin, S., Higgott, R., & Rosamond, B. (2002). Regions in comparative perspective. University of Warwick. Chakraborty, A., & Kar, A. K. (2021). How did COVID-19 impact working professionals–a typology of impacts focused on education sector. The International Journal of Information and Learning Technology, 38(3), 273–282. Corselo. (2017). EU-ASEAN cooperation—Key migration statistics. EuroStat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Arc hive:EU-ASEAN_cooperation__key_migration_statistics&oldid=350199 European Union. (2023). Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). European Union. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationshipscountry-and-region/countries-and-regions/association-south-east-asian-nat ions-asean_en#:~:text=The%20EU%20is%20ASEAN’s%20third,accounted% 20for%20%E2%82%AC313.6%20billion Eurostat. (2022). Rise in EU population working from home. Eurostat. https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20221108-1 Haas, E. B., & Schmitter, P. C. (1964). Economics and differential patterns of political integration: Projections about unity in Latin America. International Organization, 18(4), 705–737. Hettne, B. (2002). The Europeanisation of Europe: Endogenous and exogenous dimensions. Journal of European Integration, 24(4), 325–340.

10

K. FERNANDEZ AND N. KAMARUDDIN

Hoehn-Velasco, L., Sabatier, R., & Livingston, N. A. (2021). Equity in the time of COVID-19: A multilevel analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on educational opportunity in the United States. American Journal of Community Psychology, 67 (3–4), 305–317. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12502 Manea, M. G. (2008). Human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe: ASEAN–EU relations and ASEM. Pacific Review, 21(3), 369–396. Morgan, P. J., & Trinh, L. Q. (2021). Impacts of COVID-19 on households in ASEAN countries and their implications for human capital development [ADBI Working Paper 1226]. Asian Development Bank Institute. https://www.adb. org/publications/impacts-covid-19-households-asean-countries Nye, J. S. (1970). Comparing common markets: A revised neo-functionalist model. International Organization, 24(4), 796–835. Pennisi di Floristella, A. (2015). Building the ASEAN Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Response: Is ASEAN learning from the experience of the European Civil Protection Mechanism? Freie Universitat Berlin Söderbaum, F. (2013). What’s wrong with regional integration. The Problem of Eurocentrism. The Problem of Eurocentrism. UNODC. (2021). CYBERCRIME and COVID19 in Southeast Asia: An evolving picture. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime COVID-19 Response. https://www.unodc.org/documents/Advocacy-Section/UNODC_CYBERC RIME_AND_COVID19_in_Southeast_Asia_-_April_2021_-_UNCLASSIF IED_FINAL_V2.1_16-05-2021_DISSEMINATED.pdf World Bank. (2023). Collapse & recovery: How COVID-19 eroded human capital and what to do about it. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/pub lication/human-capital/publication/collapse-recovery-how-covid-19-erodedhuman-capital-and-what-to-do-about-it

CHAPTER 2

The Lost Generation 2020–2021: Action Plans in the New Normal in EU and ASEAN Wan Zokhri Wan Idris

Abstract The ‘lost generation’ in the post-World War context was defined as an ‘unfulfilled generation coming to maturity during a period of instability’ and this definition can be applied to the generation of children who are now entering the post-pandemic scenario. Although the circumstances in the post-World War and COVID-19 are different, it argues that post-COVID complication fits the historical context of a lost generation. This chapter utilizes UNICEF’s five pillars of children’s well-being which include (1) survive and thrive; (2) learning; (3) protection; (4) environment; and (5) a fair chance to explore the ‘lost generation’ concept. It then focuses on the three most relatable measurements namely, children’s learning process, exposure to domestic violence and abuse, as well as a fair chance for children to succeed in pursuing their ambition. The analysis in the chapter will follow the segmentation of children’s demography according to the UNICEF Report, produced in 2020 and 2021. It will explain the striking data from both regions and the

W. Z. Wan Idris (B) Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_2

11

12

W. Z. WAN IDRIS

implications of those data to both the EU and ASEAN. Subsequently, it will provide a comparative analysis of EU and ASEAN’s regional response to the new normal. Keywords Lost generation · Children · Well-being

Introduction The existence of a lost generation is not new to Southeast Asia and Europe. The risks of having an ‘unfulfilled generation coming to maturity during a period of instability’ have been present long before the global pandemic struck. As a region that consists of developing and least-developed countries, ASEAN’s inequalities exist on multiple levels, including wealth inequality and unequal access to various socio-economic opportunities. When comparing Indonesia and Malaysia, the difference in their geographical sizes does not matter when measuring inequality. In other words, total population and land size are not conclusive factors that lead to a lost generation in both regions. The main consideration for inequality is whether national development is spread out to all parts of the territories. To elaborate further, in a study conducted by Warsono, Sarmini, and Nanik Setyowati (Warsono et al., 2021), national examination results between schools in Java and schools outside Java differ due to differences in infrastructure and education-based human resources. Additionally, the study finds that ‘socio-economic differences from the parents of students cause inequality in the learning process at home, which, in turn, has an impact on output in achievement’ (ibid., p. 148). This inequality in the learning process can be a multiplying factor in how children receive unequal opportunities from the beginning. On the other hand, Malaysia is a developing country and one of the top three largest economies in ASEAN. However, there are differences in education facilities between urban Peninsular Malaysia and Borneo’s Sabah and Sarawak. Fang’s findings showed that ‘the existence of a digital gap between rural and urban communities caused the community to struggle with access to telecommunication services, including landline and internet’ (Fang et al., 2022). The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this problem, as students and teachers were forced to carry out remote

2

THE LOST GENERATION 2020–2021: ACTION PLANS …

13

education without adequate capacity building. Even if the training was given to educate on virtual pedagogy in Southeast Asia, the serious lack of infrastructure, public services, and healthcare prior to the pandemic was clearly manifested during the pandemic. The European Union seems to display a similar pattern. Even before 2020, children from low-income households were already facing high poverty rates. Nanou and Ranson found that ‘one in four children in the European Union (EU) were already growing up at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ (Nanou & Ranson, 2020). Furthermore, a study conducted by Save the Children on the impact of COVID-19 on children in Europe had already highlighted the existing fault lines prior to the pandemic. From the 2021 study, we could identify: i. Around 200,000 children live in families at risk of poverty and an estimated 15,000 children do not have permanent homes in Sweden. ii. Spain already had 2.1 million children growing up in poverty before the pandemic, which recorded 26.8% of entire children in the EU. iii. Finland has 112,000 children living in poor/low-income households before COVID-19. iv. Romania recorded 595, 672 contracts suspended and 429, 585 terminated between March and May 2020. v. The Netherlands faced an income decline of about 20% among Dutch adults. vi. Italy records an increase of 1 million people under absolute property, towards the existing 1.2 million before COVID-19. vii. Bosnia and Herzegovina had 17% of its people living below the national poverty line with another 27% risk of falling into poverty. viii. Kosovo had 20.7% of children in the poverty rate. ix. Albania records unemployment at 12.3% in 2018 (Nanou & Ranson, 2020). The World Bank has reported that more than two hundred school days were lost by the end of 2021, which is equivalent to about a year and a half of school (Gill & Saveedra, 2022). During these absences,

14

W. Z. WAN IDRIS

vulnerable students were left unguided and faced various domestic challenges. Furthermore, households that experienced suspended or terminated income earners were under additional stress, which in many cases led to domestic violence and other negative outcomes. How can we draw similarities between the impact of COVID-19 on children and that of the World Wars? Historically, the term ‘Lost Generation’ was first used to describe the youth that had to fight in the World Wars. During those times, the uncertain outcome of the wars painted a bleak future for children, leaving them feeling hopeless and unable to pursue education. Children became less motivated and developed anxiety as they risked their lives to ensure their country’s victory, with education being deprived and economic activities being halted, leaving little room for the world economy to grow. During the Great Depression, which lasted for a decade from 1929 to 1939, national economic growth in Europe had to be reversed, restricting economic opportunities for young people. As a result, children born between the World Wars could be considered the Lost Generation, as they were not educated and nurtured for the workforce. Although the post-Covid situation is not as severe as during the nineteenth century, there are still similar factors that contribute to the creation of a lost generation. Firstly, an unfavourable systemic structure can hinder children’s development. Secondly, if there is no concerted effort to address this unfavourable structure, the population of vulnerable children can become wider and harder to mitigate. Thirdly, instead of focusing on assisting those in need, nation-states may prioritize other ‘pressing’ matters. Consequently, children can be left unattended and may experience violence, abuse, and degradation.

Implications to Both Regions COVID-19 has had three major impacts. The first is the mortality rate, with the EU losing 2196 lives and Southeast Asia losing 803,882 (WHO, 2023). The second impact is on the socioeconomic well-being of society, as many jobs have been terminated, resulting in a drastic reduction in income. This has led to a serious increase in unemployment and the widening of the extreme poverty class in both regions. The third impact is on children who have lost access to education, leading to exposure to domestic violence and mental illness. The Asia Poverty Reduction Report, 2020 affirms the direct causal relationship between the pandemic and

2

THE LOST GENERATION 2020–2021: ACTION PLANS …

15

income inequality (Asia Poverty Reduction Report, 2020). Experts such as Blasko and Schnepf (2020) and Blundell et al. (2020) have predicted that the sudden shift to online learning would lead to learning deprivation for students as academic curricula were not built for a completely virtual system. However, the implications for children in both regions are long term. Interruptions during learning will decrease children’s memory and attention to the academic syllabus. Especially during early childhood education, basic skills such as counting and reading would not be properly taught, and students will acquire skills much slower than those who have been regularly attending school. The inability to acquire basic skills will no longer be the driving factor when disconnection kills their motivation to learn. The interest in going to school will be damaged, and we will be facing children who see education as unimportant. The World Bank estimated in 2020 that a seven-month absence from school would increase the existing 53 percent ‘learning poverty’ to 63 percent (Azevedo, 2020). It should also be noted that some students are benefiting from virtual learning due to COVID-19. According to a joint survey by UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Bank, students from lower-middle-income and low-income countries missed more days of school compared to students in higher-income countries. In lower-middle-income countries, 68 days were missed, while in low-income countries, 62 days were missed throughout 2022. In high-income nations, only 27 days were reported to be missed (UNESCO-UNICEF-World Bank Joint Survey, 2020). Nonetheless, while governments quickly resorted to virtual learning, important stakeholders such as children and teachers were not ready to adapt. Educators struggled to adapt to technology and conduct virtual classes. Some syllabi were not designed to be taught outside of the classroom, especially subjects that demand practicality and scientific demonstrations. On the other hand, some students were deprived of internet access, particularly in areas with inadequate infrastructure. In 2020, Engzell conducted a study to find out about the internet access of low-income and lower-middle-income households worldwide during lockdowns. The study found that low-income households had less than 10% internet reach, while lower-middle-income households barely reached 10% (Engzell et al., 2020). This indicates that 90% of households in both low-income and lower-middle-income groups did not have access to the Internet during lockdowns, which means virtual education

16

W. Z. WAN IDRIS

was not an option for them. COVID-19 not only divides people physically but also divides the reach of digitalization between households. Students who had to rely on online learning were deprived of their right to education due to the lack of internet access. Engzell et al. (2020) also predicted that the longer students had to follow virtual studies, the more their learning loss would increase. This means that knowledge acquisition would be slower, and to some extent, would not take place at all, leading to learning loss. On the contrary, students who have been equipped with internet facilities will succeed in their studies because teaching and learning can happen without denying them access. Due to the digital gap, we can see further divisions in the comprehension and motivation of students between low-income, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income households. COVID-19 has created a situation where children are categorized according to their household’s economic income at an early age when their abilities were not nurtured on a level playing field with better income earners. Such categorization will continue to influence their motivations to pursue education in the later stages of their development. While the ‘lost generation’ primarily refers to children who have been put at a systemic disadvantage, the consequences of this will also influence their future prospects of employment. According to recent data up to December 2022, 2.862 million young people (15–25 years old) were unemployed in the EU, which is an increase of 209,000 in the EU and 156,000 in the euro area (Eurostat, 2022).

Action Plans via Comparative Analysis on Regional Response Towards Lost Generation This section of the discussion compares various documents, including frameworks from UNICEF Annual Reports, Save the Children Briefing Papers, and Human Development Reports in 2020 and 2021, as well as academic journals by Blaskó et al. (2022), Warsono et al. (2021), and Tamesberger and Bacher (2020). These resources are categorized into three parts, reflecting the global level, EU level, and ASEAN action plans. The UNICEF Annual Reports (2020 and 2021) propose a multilateral intervention to address the Lost Generation at the global level. Five action plans are identified as mechanisms to prevent children from becoming part of the Lost Generation: Ensure all children learn at the same time closing the digital divide.

2

THE LOST GENERATION 2020–2021: ACTION PLANS …

17

It has been proven that virtual learning is not sustainable in the long run when dealing with the disparity in the household income of students. To a certain extent, virtual learning is an elitist opportunity, only given to high-income households with excellent internet connection and devices. In closing the digital divide, access to education must be standardized, and teaching and learning must take place in schools. While digitalization is a trend moving forward, we must not sacrifice real experiences in communication between teachers and students for the sake of digital learning. Guarantee access to health and nutrition services and make vaccines affordable to every child. Schools serve as the primary learning environment for students, where they spend a significant time of their day. In areas where household poverty is widespread, schools can play a vital role in providing sufficient nutrition to children. However, the pandemic has limited poor students’ access to essential nutrients and health checks through school. Therefore, moving forward, schools must be equipped with better health facilities and nutrition programmes to ensure they are accessible to all students. Support and protect the mental health of children, and young people and bring an end to abuse, gender-based violence, and neglect in childhood. The socioeconomic downturn has caused turbulence in family relationships. In addition to months of lockdowns, tensions have increased in households across all socioeconomic backgrounds. Regular monitoring and counselling guidance must be provided to ensure that children’s development is not undermined by abuse, gender-based violence, or neglect. Specific attention must be paid to children’s developmental issues and should not be lumped in with adults for support services throughout the pandemic. Furthermore, addressing mental health concerns among students during the pandemic cannot be the sole responsibility of a single agency. It must be a collaborative effort across different agencies and sectors. Increase access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene and address environmental degradation and climate change. The need for access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene becomes more apparent when human populations are forced to observe lockdowns. Children who have been exposed to more of the inconveniences at home will develop a low immune system should this persist. The way forward is to eliminate the systemic risk of a lost generation by providing sufficient

18

W. Z. WAN IDRIS

living conditions. This will ensure that children are healthy and enable them for knowledge and skills learning. Reverse the rise in child poverty and ensure an inclusive for all. Child poverty can be reversed, and it does not necessarily involve material contributions. Governments must identify the stakeholders, especially children, who are affected by poverty and integrate them into a comprehensive strategy to reduce child poverty in phases. Inclusivity is key. Children must be provided equal access to escape from poverty, and monitoring and guidance must be provided through a functional institutional framework. Redouble efforts to protect and support children and their families living through conflict, disaster and displacement. Climate and sustainability should be regarded as crucial factors in regional development. It is essential to manage climate-related disasters effectively to minimize the impacts on children. In conflict-affected areas and displacement situations, humanitarian aid must be provided to offer education and skills transfer to students. Education should be made accessible to children in refugee settlements to prepare them as future human resources to join the economic workforce. Current regional efforts of the European Union demonstrate an adaptation of large-scale initiatives, including the reinforced Youth Guarantee, which provides 50 billion Euros per year. Since October 2020, EU countries have pledged their commitments to the implementation of the scheme. The initiative aims to provide excellent opportunities in employment, continued education, apprenticeship, and traineeship for youth under the age of 30. The distortion in implementing Europe’s Youth Guarantee during COVID has further exacerbated the programme’s success rate. However, we must realize that youth unemployment is a consequence of the lost generation syndrome occurring in both the European and ASEAN regions. In ASEAN, there has been no specific policy response to address the issue of the lost generation due to the pandemic. Instead, ASEAN launched its Comprehensive Recovery Framework in 2020 as a regional strategy to navigate member countries through the pandemic. While the digital integration framework aims to boost trade through online connectivity, it does not thoroughly consider the digital divide among children, particularly in rural areas. The six approaches listed in Fig. 2.1 primarily focus on the aspects of facilitating seamless trade, data protection, seamless digital payments, broadening the digital talent base, fostering

2

THE LOST GENERATION 2020–2021: ACTION PLANS …

19

Facilitate Seamless Trade • Accelerate progress on seamless logistics within and across ASEAN to facilitate digital enabled trade Protect data while supporting digital trade and innovation • Take into account the principles outlined in the ASEAN Framework for Personal Data Protection and international frameworks to stimulate SMEs' progress in digital integration Enable Seamless Digital Payment • Implement interoperable frameworks that use common global standards, messages and rules Broaden digital talent base • Partnering with the private sectors in designing the most relavant digital skills roadmaps and accelerate the roll out of these programmes Foster Entreprenuership • Simplify existing hurdles in setting-up and doing business for its MSMEs Coordinate Action • ASEAN Coordinating Committee on E-Commerce

Fig. 2.1 ASEAN digital integration framework (Source ASEAN Secretariat 2020)

entrepreneurship, and coordinating regional actions that benefit traders and business communities, with no specific mention of the importance of digital connectivity for children’s education. The comprehensive framework also highlights green initiatives for a resilient future but fails to address the potential consequences of the lost generation in the region. It appears that regional leaders are not yet aware of the gravity of this issue and the significant impact it could have on the region’s future. In contrast, the EU has acknowledged the impact of the pandemic on children’s education, health, and well-being and has implemented policy and financial responses accordingly. The action plans of both the EU and ASEAN can be distinguished by the intensity of their efforts. From the EU’s perspective, its Youth Guarantee is seen as a long-term effort to tackle the lost generation issue broadly and is not directly targeted towards the children affected by the pandemic outbreak. The Youth Guarantee has been in place since 2013 as a long-term strategy to solve the unemployment and underemployment issues faced by youth in Europe. It is targeted towards youth under 25 years old, and it is seen as a strategy to prepare them for economic stability from the age of 26 and above. Youth who have graduated from

20

W. Z. WAN IDRIS

the Youth Guarantee programme are expected to have a better standard of living. However, the Youth Guarantee does not deeply consider the impact of COVID-19 on children, specifically the Lost Generation. As explained, the pandemic has intensified the issue of the Lost Generation, and existing measures (including those pre-COVID) might not be suitable for excellent interventions. The Youth Guarantee programme only examines socio-economic issues faced by youth under 25 and creates interventions based on that. It does not track childhood development, which has been severely impacted during the pandemic years. Therefore, the Youth Guarantee only scratches the surface of youth issues and fails to diagnose the root problems effectively. ASEAN, similar to Europe, has struggled to address the issue of the lost generation resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, ASEAN’s regional framework failed to recognize the potential consequences of the pandemic, resulting in non-specific measures to solve the problem. Initially, ASEAN responded promptly to health, defence, and military issues during the early stages of the pandemic. Later, the region developed a comprehensive framework to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and protect its market and business operations. The region’s interdependence on trade and business facilitation made this a priority. ASEAN’s five responses to COVID-19 include (1) commitment to keep markets open and ensure the flow of trade, particularly for essential goods; (2) development of a regional reserve for emergency medical supplies; (3) establishment of a COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund; (4) standard operating procedures for future public health emergencies; and (5) developing a comprehensive recovery framework for the region. The lack of attention given to children affected by COVID-19 has resulted in insufficient efforts to address their issues. Member countries are left to find their own ways to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on the lost generation in their respective countries, depending on individual countries’ awareness. Malaysia is an example of a country that has been grappling with this issue. The Malaysian government closed schools for 37 weeks, one of the longest durations of school closures in the world. Discussions about the lost generation in Malaysia gained more traction in 2021 and onwards, following a series of digital discrimination incidents faced by school children. In an effort to close the digital divide among school children, the Malaysian government pledged in 2021 to distribute 150,000 laptops to school children since the pandemic outbreak. As of

2

THE LOST GENERATION 2020–2021: ACTION PLANS …

21

June 2021, only 13,000 laptops have been distributed to 95 schools through 51 state education departments (New Straits Times, 2021). Under the new government, Anwar Ibrahim’s administration has pledged to distribute an additional 50,000 laptops under its 2023 Budget, with a strong emphasis on implementation and quick distribution processes. The country still faces pressing issues such as the lack of data outreach to students in rural areas, where 3G and 4G infrastructure remains scarce outside urban regions, leading to limited data signals. The policy response in ASEAN is more focused on individual state approaches, with no concerted efforts across the region. Scattered data poses a significant challenge, making it difficult to mitigate risks and creating disproportionate responses to children categorized as the lost generation. This is a concerning direction that could lead to extreme differences in equilibrium among member countries if ASEAN fails to address the issue from the outset. Moving forward, data consolidation remains a significant challenge for both regions in addressing the lost generation, especially in ASEAN. States must update and consolidate recent data to gain a clear understanding of the issue and enable policy recommendations to be directed towards achievable solutions, moving both regions towards lost generation reduction. At the ASEAN level, more discussion is needed to identify the lost generation and its regional consequences, in addition to other pressing post-pandemic matters. The lost generation is a silent cancer that could attract more issues if not addressed at the preliminary stage.

Conclusion In conclusion, the impact of COVID-19 on children in Europe and ASEAN has brought about a significant issue of a lost generation due to the pandemic. The chapter has also looked at the potential economic implications if the issue is not addressed. The regional responses to the problem have been compared, highlighting a slower reaction from ASEAN. The issue is compounded by ongoing child poverty in underdeveloped countries, perpetuating the problem of the lost generation. It must also be remembered that COVID-19 has further exacerbated the gravity of the problem, as prolonged lockdowns in 2021 and 2022 have left more children unattended. The global society will need to take the matter seriously and focus not only on remedying the situation currently

22

W. Z. WAN IDRIS

but also on ensuring that safeguards are put in place should the world need to face another global disaster in the future.

References ASEAN Secretariat. (2020). ASEAN comprehensive recovery framework. https:// asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ASEAN-Comprehensive-Rec overy-Framework_Pub_2020_1.pdf Asia Poverty Reduction Report. (2020). Asia poverty under globalisation changes and public crises, 25. https://cirdap.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ Asia-Poverty-Reduction-Report-2020.pdf Azevedo, J. P. (2020). Learning poverty: Measures and simulations [Policy Research Working Paper No. 9446]. World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/ 10986/34654 Blasko, Z., & Schnepf, S. V. (2020). Educational inequalities in Europe and physical school closures during COVID19 (No. 4/2020). Blaskó, Z., Costa, P. da, & Schnepf, S. V. (2022). Learning losses and educational inequalities in Europe: Mapping the potential consequences of the COVID19 crisis. Journal of European Social Policy, 32(4), 361–375. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/09589287221091687 Blundell, R., Costa Dias, M., Joyce, R., et al. (2020). COVID19 and inequalities. Fiscal Studies, 41(2), 291–319. Engzell, P., Frey, A., & Verhagen, M. D. (2020, October 29). Learning Loss Due to School Closures During the COVID-19 Pandemic. https://doi.org/10. 31235/osf.io/ve4z7 Eurostat. (2022). Euro area unemployment at 6.6%. https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/documents/2995521/15893630/3-01022023-BP-EN.pdf/e90 7214e-5496-dfa0-cd00-2d68dbf62f2b#:~:text=In%20December%202022% 2C%202.862%20million,compared%20with%20the%20previous%20month Fang, Y. X., Gill, S. S., Kunasekaran, P., Rosnon, M. R., Talib, A. T., & Abd Aziz, A. (2022). Digital divide: An inquiry on the native communities of Sabah. Societies, 12(6), 148. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc12060148 Gill, I., & Saveedra, J. (2022, February 1). We are losing a generation: The devastating impacts of COVID-19. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldb ank.org/voices/we-are-losing-generation-devastating-impacts-covid-19 Nanou, K., & Ranson, R. (2020). The impact of COVID-19 on children in Europe: A briefing by Save the Children. Save the Children. https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/the_impact_of_cov id19_on_children_in_europe.pdf/ New Straits Times. (2021). Up to 13,000 laptops distributed to eligible children under CERDIK. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/ 696388/13000-laptops-distributed-eligible-students-under-cerdik-nsttv

2

THE LOST GENERATION 2020–2021: ACTION PLANS …

23

Tamesberger, D, & Bacher, J. (2020). COVID-19 Crisis: How to Avoid a ‘Lost Generation’. Intereconomics, 55, 232–238. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10272-020-0908-y UNICEF Annual Reports. (2020). Responding to COVID-19: UNICEF Annual Report 2020. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF Annual Reports. (2021). Protecting Child Rights in Time of Crisis: UNICEF Annual Report 2021. United Nations Children’s Fund. UNESCO, UNICEF, and The World Bank (2020). What We Have Learnt? Overview of the Findings from a Survey of Ministries of Education on National Responses to COVID-19, accessed via https://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/ files/documents/national-education-responses-to-covid-19-web-final_en_0. pdf Warsono, Sarmini, & Nanik Setyowati. (2021). The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the possibility of lost generation. In Advances in Social Science, Education, and Humanities Research (603). International Joined Conference on Social Science (ICSS). World Health Organization. (n.d.). WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard. https://covid19.who.int/

CHAPTER 3

Employment Opportunities and Work Trends Post-pandemic Niresh Kaur

Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on global labour markets, with wide-reaching consequences for employment patterns in both the ASEAN and EU regions. As of 2022, the job market remains uncertain for many workers in these regions, as economic recovery is still uncertain. Businesses have had to adapt, resulting in changes to their hiring practices to ensure operational continuity. This has involved reducing the workforce or freezing recruitment entirely. In the ASEAN region, there has been a surge in digital services, the rapid expansion of e-commerce and gig economy businesses, and an increase in remote work opportunities. On the other hand, the EU region has experienced an overall decrease in the unemployment rate. Many employers have also transitioned from traditional office setups to remote work arrangements, providing workers with greater flexibility in terms of their work location. Recent data indicates that industries in both regions have witnessed disruptions in their labour markets as companies restructure to

N. Kaur (B) Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_3

25

26

N. KAUR

meet evolving consumer demands. Automation and increased technology usage have led to shifts in traditional workforce roles. These changes highlight the importance of adaptation for employers seeking to remain competitive during uncertain times. The long-term implications of these shifts are yet to be fully understood, but certain trends are becoming apparent. Digitalization processes have accelerated, forcing businesses to adopt new technologies for remote work and online services. The prevalence of flexible forms of employment, such as freelancing, part-time contracts, and gig economy jobs, is likely to further reshape the structure of labour markets in each region. Keywords Work patterns · Remote working · Work trends

Introduction The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) are two distinct geopolitical and socioeconomic blocs with their own unique characteristics. ASEAN is a regional intergovernmental organisation comprising 10 countries in Southeast Asia, while the EU is a political and economic union of 27 member states in Europe. The pandemic has had a significant impact on both these regions. However, the impact has been different in each region, and as a result, have responded to the pandemic differently (Jetin, 2021). In the context of employment, the pandemic has led to widespread job losses and a sharp rise in unemployment. The impact of the pandemic on employment has been particularly severe in ASEAN and EU countries. The pandemic has led to a sharp rise in unemployment, which is likely to lead to a decline in economic growth. The unemployment rate in these regions soared to unprecedented heights in 2022 forcing both large and small businesses to shut down or scale back operations. The EU’s unemployment rate rose to 6.8%, the highest level since May 2014, while ASEAN’s unemployment rate rose to 3.6%, the highest level since February 2020 (Schreyer, 2022). On top of that, the pandemic has also led to a decline in social mobility, which is likely to lead to an increase in inequality. The ASEAN and EU countries

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

27

are taking steps to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on employment. These steps include providing financial assistance to businesses and workers and investing in education and training. This chapter will explore the modifications in employment patterns of both ASEAN and EU countries that follow with a particular focus on the differences between the two regions. A general overview of both ASEAN and EU countries will be provided, highlighting their distinctive qualities and distinctions. Then, a comparative analysis of the changes in job opportunities within these two locations since the height of the pandemic will be conducted to gain a deeper insight into how employment patterns have evolved. In order to attain a more comprehensive understanding of post-pandemic employment patterns, this chapter will also delve into the global supply chains reconfigured due to remote work arrangements.

Overview of ASEAN and EU Countries The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an intergovernmental organisation that comprises 10 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Established in 1967 for the purpose of regional integration and cooperation as well as promoting peace and stability in the region; ASEAN has had a tremendous impact on the socioeconomic development of its members. In ASEAN countries, the majority of employment opportunities are found in the informal sector such as agriculture, fishing, and small-scale retail trade. Although efforts have been made to industrialise the workforce, many people in this region still lack access to secure and well-paying jobs due to factors such as gender discrimination, the urban–rural disparity in income potentials, or disparities between different ASEAN member states. On top of that, there are a number of challenges that women in ASEAN countries face in accessing secure and well-paying jobs. These challenges include (ASEAN, 2022): . Gender Discrimination: Women are more likely to be employed in informal jobs than men. They are also more likely to be paid less than men for doing the same work. This is due to a number of factors, including cultural norms, occupational segregation, and lack of access to education and training.

28

N. KAUR

. Urban–Rural Disparity: Women living in rural areas are more likely to be unemployed or underemployed than women living in urban areas. This is due to a number of factors, including a lack of economic opportunities, poor infrastructure, and limited access to education and healthcare. . Disparities Between ASEAN Member States: There is a wide disparity in income and employment opportunities between ASEAN member states. The richer countries, such as Singapore and Brunei, have lower unemployment rates and higher wages than the poorer countries, such as Laos and Cambodia. This is due to a number of factors, including differences in economic development, natural resources, and human capital. The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union comprising 27 European countries that was established through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. It is home to some 500 million citizens representing one of the most diverse populations on Earth. The EU promotes peace, democracy, and human rights across its member states while focusing on economic integration by creating a single market with a common currency, the Euro. It has also implemented various policies and programs aimed at promoting employment such as increased support for workers’ rights and benefits such as unemployment allowances or occupational health and safety regulations (EC, 2021). Additionally, it has expanded its efforts to address transnational issues such as climate change and migration. The EU’s employment landscape is also highly diversified with sectors including manufacturing, service sector businesses such as hospitality or tourism, as well as technology companies operating alongside one another within its single market. With strong social safety nets in place compared to other regions globally, job security along with benefits for workers are relatively high making it desirable for many seeking out long-term work opportunities within Europe. Despite this, there are still disparities between different member states when it comes to access to jobs or unemployment rates where certain regions remain underdeveloped compared to others within the union. The socioeconomic divide between member states with regard to employment is a complex issue with a number of contributing factors. Some of the key drivers of this divide include (OECD, 2017):

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

29

. Income and Wealth Inequality: There is a significant gap in income and wealth between the richest and poorest members of society in many European countries. This gap has been widening in recent years, and it is one of the main factors driving the socioeconomic divide. . Education and Skills: People with higher levels of education and skills are more likely to be employed and earn higher wages. This creates a vicious cycle, where those from wealthier backgrounds are more likely to have access to better education and skills, which in turn gives them a better chance of getting a good job and earning a high income. . Discrimination: People from minority groups, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities, often face discrimination in the labour market. This can make it more difficult for them to find employment and earn a decent wage. . The Quality of Jobs: The quality of jobs in Europe varies considerably. Some jobs are well-paid and offer good opportunities for advancement, while others are low-paid and offer little security. The quality of jobs is often linked to the level of education and skills required for the job. In sum, both the ASEAN and EU regions have distinct employment patterns, with the EU having a more developed formal sector and a higher level of job security, while the majority of employment in ASEAN remains in the informal sector with significant disparities between different member states.

The Importance of Studying Employment Patterns The significance of studying changes in employment patterns postpandemic cannot be underestimated. Not only has the COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating impact on the global labour markets, but it has also caused drastic modifications in everyday life and employment patterns of both ASEAN and EU countries (Adamowicz, 2022). Therefore, by conducting a comparative analysis of job opportunities between these two regions since the height of the pandemic, we can gain a deeper understanding of how employment patterns have been affected.

30

N. KAUR

In particular, it’s important to examine the differences between ASEAN and EU countries when it comes to job opportunities postpandemic. Some countries have implemented reforms aimed at boosting employment opportunities such as job training programs or incentives for small businesses (Srinivasan & Eden, 2021)—all of which should be taken into consideration when exploring how employment patterns have changed in both regions post-pandemic. Finally, it’s worth noting that economic recovery will not happen overnight; thus it is crucial for governments and policymakers to take concrete steps towards sustaining long-term economic growth even amid current uncertainty. By closely examining how each region has adapted its respective models of employment post-COVID-19, we can come up with effective solutions that will benefit workers from both regions in the long run—leading to a successful economic recovery for all.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Employment Patterns The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment patterns in the ASEAN and EU regions was significant. Various reports and studies have shown that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on employment patterns in these regions, resulting in job losses, reductions in working hours, and the growth of remote work and the gig economy (Adamowicz, 2022). In the ASEAN region, sectors such as tourism, retail, and hospitality were particularly hard hit, as lockdowns and travel restrictions caused a sharp decline in demand. Many workers in these sectors lost their jobs, and there was a significant increase in unemployment rates in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Unemployment rate in ASEAN, n.d.). Likewise, in the EU, the pandemic also resulted in a sharp increase in unemployment, particularly in countries such as Spain, Italy, and France (Unemployment rate in EU, n.d.). The economic impact was also particularly severe in the hospitality, tourism, and retail sectors, as lockdowns and reduced consumer spending led to a sharp decline in demand. The EU has implemented various measures to support workers and businesses, including wage subsidies, loan guarantees, and measures to support remote work, but the impact of the pandemic on employment patterns is expected to be long-lasting. Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in significant changes to employment patterns in the ASEAN and EU regions, including job loss,

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

31

reductions in working hours, the growth of flexible working practices, and the gig economy. These changes are expected to have a lasting impact on the way people work and do business in these regions (International Labour Organization, 2020).

A Shift Towards Remote Work and the Gig Economy In terms of cultural changes, the pandemic has brought about a number of changes, including the growth of remote work, the decline of faceto-face communication, and the increased importance of technology in many aspects of life. These changes are likely to have a lasting impact on the way people live, work, and interact with each other, and are likely to shape the cultural landscape for many years to come. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced people to adapt to a world in which digital technologies play a central role in many aspects of life. The restrictions on face-to-face communication and the need for social distancing have led to a significant increase in the use of digital technologies, such as video conferencing, online collaboration tools, and social media. This has made people more digitally savvy, as they have had to learn new technologies and tools in order to stay connected with friends, family, and co-workers (Kliem, 2021). In addition, the shift towards remote work has increased the importance of digital technologies for work and business. Many people who previously worked in office environments have had to adapt to working from home, which has required them to become more familiar with digital tools and technologies. This has led to a greater emphasis on digital skills and a greater appreciation for the role that technology can play in enabling people to work from anywhere and at any time. The COVID-19 pandemic has also led to a greater focus on digital literacy, as people have had to become more proficient in using digital technologies in order to participate in online activities, such as distance learning and online shopping. Consequently, there has been an increase in digital skills and a greater awareness of the importance of technology in many aspects of life. This newfound digital savviness has birthed a new era whereby more and more people are leaning towards remote work and the gig economy. Although these are not entirely concepts, the COVID-19 pandemic has promoted them to become a norm. The increase in remote work has

32

N. KAUR

made it possible for people to work from anywhere, which has the potential to change the traditional employment model and the concept of the workplace. For example, in ASEAN, the number of people working from home increased from 20% in 2019 to 71% in 2020 (ILO, 2021); whereas in the EU, the number of people working from home increased from 11% in 2019 to 37% in 2020 (European Commission, 2020). With more people working from home or from remote locations, there may be a shift away from the traditional 9-to-5 workday, with people instead working flexible hours that suit their individual needs and circumstances. In fact, a survey by the European Commission (European Commission, 2021) found that 67% of employees in the EU would like to continue working from home at least part-time after the pandemic. The shift towards digital technologies has resulted in a greater focus on digital skills and a greater emphasis on the role that technology can play in enabling people to work from anywhere and at any time. This is likely to increase demand for workers with digital skills, such as software developers, data analysts, and IT professionals, and may lead to changes in the types of jobs that are in demand. Overall, it is likely that the COVID-19 pandemic and the greater emphasis on digital technologies will lead to changes in the employment pattern in the years to come. These changes are likely to be driven by the need for workers who are able to use digital technologies effectively and who have the skills to work in a rapidly changing digital landscape. By adapting to these changes and developing the necessary skills, people will be well-positioned to take advantage of the opportunities that arise in this new digital world.

Challenges Associated with Digitalisation The digital revolution has brought with it a new set of challenges for those individuals who are not digitally savvy. As more and more jobs require higher levels of digital proficiency, workers without the necessary skills are finding themselves at a major disadvantage when competing in the job market. This problem is particularly pronounced for older workers and those with lower levels of education and skill sets, who may struggle to compete in an increasingly automated job market.

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

33

The advent of new technologies has brought about a widening skills gap, making it difficult for those without the necessary digital capabilities to find employment (Srinivasan & Eden, 2021). Consequently, these individuals may experience greater difficulty securing financially viable positions, leading to feelings of social exclusion and poverty. In addition, traditional manual jobs that used to be widely available to middle-class workers are now being replaced by automation, reducing access to these types of employment opportunities even further. The shift towards digitalisation also carries wider implications beyond just the job market. It can be seen as a reflection of a larger socioeconomic trend that is affecting many parts of society—including education, health care, and leisure activities—all of which require varying levels of digital literacy in order to engage effectively. Furthermore, given that certain age groups and demographics are less likely than others to possess digital competencies due to cost or accessibility issues, this creates yet another layer of inequality when attempting to access employment opportunities or other services within society. The ramifications caused by failing to acquire the necessary digital skills can have lasting consequences for individuals within the job market and beyond. A 2020 study by the McKinsey Global Institute (McKinsey Global Institute, 2020) found that the digital skills gap could cost the global economy up to $8 trillion by 2030. While this is a prediction for the global economy, the possibility of the same happening within the ASEAN and EU regions should not be discounted. As such, it is essential that particular attention is paid to providing appropriate educational resources so that all members of society have equal access to technological knowledge needed for long-term success in a rapidly changing world.

Evolution of Employment Pattern Post-pandemic The ASEAN and EU regions have experienced dramatic shifts in their employment patterns due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Companies in the ASEAN region have adapted to new consumer demands by introducing digital services, such as e-commerce and gig economy businesses. This shift has not only opened up new opportunities for remote working but also enabled a restructuring of existing workforce roles through automation and technological advancement. Meanwhile, the EU region has witnessed a decrease in the unemployment rate since the onset of the pandemic.

34

N. KAUR

These changes are a direct result of the need for workers with digital skills who can effectively leverage technology to work from anywhere and at any time (Lund et al., 2021). For example, with more people being able to work remotely, there is likely to be a shift away from traditional 9-to-5 workdays towards flexible hours that are tailored to individual needs and circumstances. This newfound flexibility will undoubtedly benefit both employers and employees alike, allowing them more freedom to choose when they wish to work while still being productive. The increasing emphasis on digital technologies as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic may create challenges for those who are not digitally savvy. Those who lack digital skills may struggle to keep up with the rapidly changing digital landscape and may be at a disadvantage in the job market, where digital skills are becoming increasingly important. For some people, this may mean that they have difficulty adapting to the new digital-first world and may miss out on opportunities for work and professional development. It may also make it more difficult for them to participate in certain aspects of society, such as online shopping and distance learning, which are becoming increasingly common. It is therefore essential that all stakeholders remain cognisant of these changing trends so that all workers can benefit from this transition period regardless of their existing skill set or level of experience. Employers should keep abreast of evolving technologies so that they can provide their staff with necessary training where needed so that everyone is able to take advantage of these new opportunities created by changing business models during this unprecedented time. In addition, individuals should strive to stay up-to-date on current industry trends so that they are wellequipped to navigate an ever-changing labour market landscape without missing out on potential job opportunities or career advancements that could arise out of these shifts in employment patterns post-pandemic.

ASEAN and EU Policy Response to the Pandemic The governments of both the EU and ASEAN regions have taken steps to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment and the labour market. The European Commission’s Next Generation EU plan (NextGenerationEU , n.d.) and the ASEAN Secretariat’s ASEAN Skills and Employment Support (Amul et al., 2021) for the COVID-19 Pandemic are clear examples of government initiatives designed to address the changing employment patterns resulting from the pandemic.

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

35

The European Union’s e100 billion recovery plan (European Commission, 2022) was created with an emphasis on supporting economic recovery and addressing employment issues. This includes introducing short-time work schemes to support workers and prevent layoffs, as well as launching the European Skills Agenda to upskill and reskill workers so that they can better adapt to changes in the labour market. ASEAN member states have taken similar measures, such as providing wage subsidies, tax relief, and other forms of financial aid for businesses affected by the pandemic. In addition, some countries in the ASEAN region have introduced digital skills training programs aimed at helping individuals keep up with rapidly changing digital technologies in order to remain competitive in a job market that is increasingly dependent on digital competencies. It is clear that governments in both regions are aware of how drastically employment patterns have changed post-pandemic and are taking steps to ensure that all workers can benefit from this transition period regardless of their existing skills or experience. Employers should make sure they stay abreast of these trends so that they can provide necessary training where needed while individuals should strive to stay informed about current industry trends, so they don’t miss out on potential job opportunities or career advancements arising out of these shifts in employment patterns post-pandemic. With more people being able to work remotely due to advancements in technology, there is also likely to be a shift away from traditional 9-to-5 workdays towards flexible hours tailored for individual needs and circumstances—something which could prove beneficial for employers, employees, and society at large if properly managed.

Comparison of Policy Responses in These Regions The response to the pandemic has been different between the EU and ASEAN. The EU has adopted a more unified and centralised approach, with the European Commission introducing a e100 billion recovery plan (European Commission, 2022) called “Next Generation EU” (NextGenerationEU , n.d.) to provide support for workers and businesses affected by the pandemic. This plan includes measures such as short-time work schemes, digital skills training, and other initiatives aimed at reskilling or upskilling workers to adapt to changes in the labour market.

36

N. KAUR

On the other hand, ASEAN’s response has been more decentralised due to its regional nature since each of its member states has its own individual measures in place. These measures are mainly focused on providing digital skills training for workers and supporting businesses that were impacted by the pandemic. For example, in Malaysia, the government is providing incentives for training fees for gig workers to undergo upskilling programmes (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2023). Compared to the EU’s coordinated efforts, ASEAN’s response is seen as more fragmented due to its decentralised manner of implementation across all member states. Additionally, while both regions are taking initiatives to address the employment impact of this pandemic, it could be argued that there is an imbalance in their approaches whereby the EU may have a more comprehensive approach when compared to ASEAN’s more fragmented responses.

The Global Job Supply Chain Reconfiguration The COVID-19 pandemic has had a drastic and unprecedented effect on the global supply chain, particularly in the ASEAN and EU regions. Automation and digitalisation have been accelerated as a result of the pandemic, leading to job losses in some sectors while creating new job opportunities in others and some reconfiguration of work (Orlikowski & Scott, 2021). In the ASEAN region, there has been a severe impact on employment due to manufacturing and service sector losses, resulting in widespread job cuts and wage reductions. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) (ILO, 2022), these losses could reach up to 10.7 million by the end of 2020 across Southeast Asia. Additionally, a survey conducted by the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) discovered that over half of all businesses have had to adjust their workforce due to the pandemic. Nevertheless, with this crisis came an opportunity for growth in digital technologies across the region which subsequently created jobs in ecommerce, telemedicine, and related fields such as logistics, customer service, and marketing. Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company predict that the e-commerce market within Southeast Asia will reach $300 billion by 2025; providing numerous employment possibilities for those countries affected by job losses earlier on during its pandemic peak.

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

37

A similar story can be seen throughout Europe as well where millions of jobs have already been lost due to hospitality, retailing, and tourism cuts—with estimations from The European Parliament stating this figure could be up to 11 million by 2021. In response to this economic threat, initiatives such as The European Green Deal and The Digital Single Market have been set up by the EU government so as to provide support towards transitioning into a more sustainable economy; offering new roles involving renewable energy production, improved digital infrastructure systems and sustainable transport projects. It is clear that the pandemic has had a significant and widespread effect on employment patterns in both ASEAN and EU regions. While this crisis resulted in job losses, it has also created an opportunity for growth in digital technologies across these regions which have provided new jobs through e-commerce platforms as well as initiatives such as The European Green Deal and Digital Single Market. Both ASEAN and EU are taking measures to address the impact of COVID-19 on employment by providing support for workers, and businesses, reskilling, or upskilling them with digital skills training. It can be argued that although there is an imbalance between their approaches, they are making efforts towards providing adequate solutions to help mitigate the economic effects caused by this pandemic.

Conclusion The pandemic has led to an increase in demand for short-term, flexible jobs which has resulted in the rapid growth of the gig economy. While this change provides opportunities for more flexible working arrangements, it can lead to job insecurity due to unstable income streams and a lack of benefits compared with traditional forms of employment. It is essential these trends are monitored carefully so that we can develop effective policies to provide meaningful protection for workers while still allowing businesses access to labour when needed. Examination of employment pattern changes post-pandemic is necessary if we are going to be able to make informed decisions about how best to support workers and businesses during this time of uncertainty. Understanding these changes will help us identify existing inequalities within our workforce so that they can be addressed through policy initiatives such as minimum wage laws or affirmative action programs that aim at bridging pay gaps across genders or other protected categories.

38

N. KAUR

Furthermore, examining these shifts will allow us to create supportive environments where businesses feel secure investing capital while ensuring that employees receive fair wages commensurate with their skill level. With proper analysis, we can ensure that our workforce remains competitive yet equitable amidst an ever-changing global landscape. The pandemic has had a profound impact on employment patterns, forcing businesses and workers to rapidly adapt in order to survive and thrive. Traditional forms of employment have been significantly disrupted, leading to a shift towards remote work and the gig economy. Remote work offers greater flexibility and freedom but also poses new challenges, such as job insecurity and a lack of benefits. Meanwhile, the gig economy has grown in response to the increased demand for short-term, flexible work. These changes have not only impacted employers and workers but also exposed existing inequalities in the workforce such as gender disparities and unequal pay. It is therefore crucial to study these changes in order to develop effective policies to support workers and businesses in navigating this new landscape. The pandemic has accelerated the trend towards remote work, with many businesses now relying on remote employees in order to meet their needs. Remote work offers greater flexibility for employers and employees alike, enabling people to work from anywhere at any time. However, this shift also poses challenges such as job insecurity and a lack of benefits for those who are unable to find full-time or long-term work. It is important that we examine these implications closely so that we can better understand how the global workforce will continue to evolve in the post-pandemic world.

References Adamowicz, M. (2022). COVID-19 Pandemic as a change factor in the labour market in Poland. Sustainability, 14(15), 9197. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su14159197 Amul, G. G., Ang, M., Kraybill, D., Ong, S. E., & Yoong, J. (2021). Responses to COVID-19 in Southeast Asia: Diverse paths and ongoing challenges. Asian Economic Policy Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12362 Anwar Ibrahim. (2023). Belanjawan 2023. Ministry of Finance Malaysia. https://budget.mof.gov.my/pdf/belanjawan2023/ucapan/ub23-BI.pdf ASEAN. (2022, October 13). Advancing gender and business reporting to implement the Women’s Economic Principles (WEPs) as part of an inclusive

3

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND WORK TRENDS …

39

COVID-19 economic recovery. ASEAN. https://asean.org/asean-un-womencommit-to-advancing-womens-leadership-in-southeast-asian-businesses/ EC. (2021, June 28). Lex - 52021DC0323 - en - EUR-lex. EUR. https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021DC0323& qid=1626089672913#PP1Contents European Commission. (2020). Digital Economy and Society Index 2020. European Commission. (2021). 2021 Flash Eurobarometer 494: Attitudes towards the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. European Commission. (2022, May 17). Recovery plan for Europe. https://com mission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/recovery-plan-europe_en ILO. (2022). Trends 2022 ILO flagship report world employment and social outlook EMBARGO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_834081.pdf International Labour Organization. (2020, September). World employment and social outlook: Trends 2020. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. International Labour Organization. (2021, March). World employment and social outlook: Trends 2021. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. Jetin, B. (2021, March 10). How will the COVID-19 pandemic affect the regions? A comparative analysis of the EU and ASEAN [Working Paper No. 63 (2021), Institute of Asian Studies]. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3806322 Kliem, F. (2021). ASEAN and the EU amidst COVID-19: Overcoming the selffulfilling prophecy of realism. Asia Europe Journal, 19, 371–389. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10308-021-00604-8 Lund, S., Madgavkar, A., Manyika, J., Smit, S., Ellingrud, K., & Robinson, O. (2021, February 18). The future of work after COVID-19. www.mckinsey.com; McKinsey Global Institute. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/fut ure-of-work/the-future-of-work-after-covid-19 McKinsey Global Institute. (2020, October 20). The future of work after COVID-19: A rapid response. McKinsey & Company. NextGenerationEU . (n.d.). Commission.europa.eu. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-bor rower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu_en#:~:text=NextGenerationEU% 20is%20the%20EU OECD. (2017). The social divide in Europe: Background report. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264279235-en Orlikowski, W. J., & Scott, S. V. (2021). Liminal innovation in practice: Understanding the reconfiguration of digital work in crisis. Information and Organization, 31(1), 100336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2021. 100336 Schreyer, P. (2022, March 10). Unemployment rates, OECD update. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/unemployment-rates-oecd-update-march2022.htm

40

N. KAUR

Srinivasan, N., & Eden, L. (2021). Going digital multinationals: Navigating economic and social imperatives in a post-pandemic world. Journal of International Business Policy, 4, 228–243. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-02100108-7 Unemployment rate in ASEAN. TheGlobalEconomy.com. (n.d.). https://www. theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/unemployment_rate/ASEAN/ Unemployment rate in the European Union. TheGlobalEconomy.com. (n.d.). Retrieved February 7, 2023, from https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ran kings/unemployment_rate/European-union/

CHAPTER 4

Cybercrimes and Cyber Security Trends in the New Normal Razwan Mokhtar and Amran Rohaizat

Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the economies and internet-based digital services of countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). Both regions have witnessed a notable increase in internet and computer connectivity, with a rapid rise in the penetration rate of internet users. Nationwide lockdown regulations compelled nations and their populations to adopt digital means for managing business, professional, and personal aspects of life through the internet and digital services. These technologies have become essential not only in individuals’ daily lives but also for economic growth, various sectors, societal well-being, critical infrastructure, and national security. The mass shift of human activities to cyberspace presented significant challenges,

R. Mokhtar · A. Rohaizat (B) RPMY Security Solutions, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] R. Mokhtar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_4

41

42

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

exposing society to a higher risk of cybercrimes as dependence on technology increased. Throughout the COVID-19 period, businesses and society members fell victim to cybersecurity attacks at an unprecedented rate. One primary reason behind the thriving of cybercriminals during pandemics is that heightened emotional states, such as stress, depression, and fear due to the situation, make victims more susceptible to falling for scams. This chapter aims to provide an overview of cybercrime trends, changes in the “new normal,” measures to combat cybercrime, and Cyber Governance in both the ASEAN and EU regions. By understanding the factors influencing individuals, society members, and organizations’ susceptibility to cyberattacks, we can better prepare for the future. Keywords Cybersecurity · Cybercrimes · Cyber governance

Introduction The global lockdowns and quarantine measures put in place to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus have disrupted regular social and business operations. Consequently, the global economy has been plunged into a catastrophic recession, resulting in massive job losses and income reduction. Digital technology, the internet, and cyberspace have become indispensable to resuming the continuity of daily life and jump-starting economic activities. However, the increased reliance on technology has also led to a corresponding increase in cyber threats. There has been an emergence of cyber threat actors, including wellorganized and well-funded nation-state groups driven by Machiavellian motives, who have the ability to wreak international havoc and disrupt entire nations. Cybercrimes have become increasingly lucrative for criminals and crime syndicates, and they do not discriminate when it comes to their targets, ranging from governments and organizations to members of society worldwide. However, there are certain demographic groups that are more at risk than others. The challenges in securing regions, societies, and individuals from cyber threats are not just issues of technology or technical ability but are also interconnected with social, economic, sociological, psychological, and cultural factors. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) are two of the world’s most significant economic and geopolitical blocs. These factors

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

43

have marked ASEAN and the EU as profitable targets for cybercriminals. ASEAN and the EU have devised several initiatives and strategies to address the emerging threats in its region. This chapter will first establish an overview of the benefits and risks of digitalization, involving security concerns. Then examining the type of cyber threats and their implications, as well as the overview of trends in cybercrimes, and the impact on the targets of cyber-attacks. This is followed by an assessment of the challenges faced in securing the nations. Challenges include the lack of coherent implementation between member states, at the national level, the existing (and growing) digital divide, and the readiness of society. It concludes with some proposals for building a secure and resilient cyberspace. Digitalization: A Double-Edged Sword The digital age has massively changed the way we live, communicate, and interact with the world around us. We have access to a world of information at our fingertips, from multiple devices, from any location, which has made life more convenient and efficient. From a technology perspective, the COVID-19 crisis has unintendedly accelerated the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IR4) several years ahead than it should (McKinsey, October 5). It forced the rapid growth of the “all-digital” and the “all-remote” way of living, transforming the previously industrial society to becoming a more digitalized society. It has helped mitigate the risks to public safety from the contagion. Digitalization has enabled new opportunities, allowing growth and innovation. E-commerce, digital platforms, online payment, and online marketing have reenabled businesses and individuals to continue earning. Virtual classrooms, video calls, and online learning platforms have allowed students to resume their education. Access to healthcare services is facilitated through telemedicine, reducing the risk of infection for both patients and healthcare providers. Digitalization is accelerating to become more expansive and immersive with emerging technology integrations encompassing almost every aspect of life and living imaginable. However, increasing dependency on digital infrastructures and the economy raises the cost of failures when the infrastructure is what goes into lockdown. In this context, businesses or families that are unable to access their computers, data, or the internet due to cyber-attacks would be disastrous or even fatal (World Economic Forum, 2020, March 17).

44

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

In a worst-case scenario, massive cyber-attacks might trigger systemic infrastructure failures, rendering entire neighborhoods or cities offline and impeding healthcare services, public systems, and networks (World Economic Forum, 2019, September). The rapid transition that happened at such unprecedented speed and scale, without proper execution and management, had created a perfect storm that multiplied the attack vectors for cyber threats. The situation has allowed cybercriminals to take advantage of the situation (EY, 2021). While the digitalization age has brought about many positive changes, such as increased access to information and convenience, it is important not to overlook the negative consequences that come with digital dependency in the perspective of cybersecurity. Cyber Pandemic The pandemic has shown that global infrastructure and social structures are extremely vulnerable to disruption from viral pandemics and cyberattacks (World Economic Forum, 2020, June). Pre-pandemic, cyberattacks have long evolved from being a simple nuisance to a serious threat that can disrupt the stability of organizations and the entire country around the world (White House, 2023, p. 7). Cybercriminals themselves have gone through a significant transformation and digitalization, with organization, sophisticated tools, and techniques that outpaced the defenders (Security Magazine, 2021). Cyber threat actors now possess the sophistication, organizational structure, as well as technological and financial capacity to expand their threats to inflict multiple nations and the global community, simultaneously. The rapid growth in digitalization and interconnectivity during the pandemic has simply exacerbated the frequency and severeness of cyber threats. The attacks caused severe disruptions to a nation’s infrastructures, as well as economic and financial systems, leading to a rise in national security concerns and nationwide emergencies. Since the pandemic began, cybercrime activities have become exponentially more sophisticated, frequent, wider, and targeted (ENISA, 2020). Cybercriminals have become increasingly adept at instigating specialized attacks that target specific industries, organizations, groups of people, and social classes. Remote working increases the risk of cyber-attacks, as employees working from home are often using less secure networks and devices

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

45

and may not have access to the same level of IT support and security measures as in an office environment. This multiplies the opportunities for cybercriminals to exploit vulnerabilities in digital devices, software, weak security practices, misconfigured systems, unsecured devices, and remote access systems. Cybercriminals take advantage of these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to confidential information (Imperva, Cyber Security Threats). The increasing availability and access to online shopping and financial transactions also expose victims to threat vectors from phishing scams and online fraud. In an increasingly interconnected world immersed in digitalization, it is unquestionable that the capability of cyber threat actors to cast an even wider net will only increase. Cyber Threats and Its Implications Cyber threats are malicious activities carried out by individuals or groups to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems, networks, and data. Cybercriminals take advantage of the vulnerabilities of these devices to gain unauthorized access to confidential information. (Imperva, Cyber Security Threats) Cyber-attacks can have devastating effects on individuals and businesses, ranging from financial loss to reputational damage. Some of the prominent cyber threats are: • • • •

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Cyber Warfare Malware and ransomware attacks Social engineering • Phishing attacks

• AI-powered cyber threats Advanced Persistent Threat (APTs) APTs is an advanced, sophisticated, and well-coordinated type of cyberattack that is designed to gain unauthorized access to the computer system or network of specifically targeted organizations and remain undetected over an extended period. APTs are often carried out by state-sponsored actors or organized crime syndicates (Mandiant, Insight). APT perpetrators can steal highly classified information like intellectual property, military secrets, and data from governments and organizations, disrupt

46

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

critical infrastructure, and carry out espionage activities. The APT10 group was responsible for stealing sensitive information from several companies in the ASEAN region (Mandiant, Advanced Persistent Threats: APT 10). APTs can inflict massive financial and economic losses for companies and countries (CSO, 2019). The Carbanak hacking group’s APT attack on several EU banks in 2014 resulted in the theft of over $1 billion (Krebson Security, 2015). The BeagleBoyz APT group (also known as APT 38 & Lazarus Group) has attempted to steal nearly $2 Billion from targeted financial institutions in numerous regions including ASEAN and EU since 2015 (CISA, 2020). In addition, the breach of security can lead to political and diplomatic tensions between countries. For instance, the revelation of the US National Security Agency’s surveillance programs on EU leaders in 2013 caused major diplomatic tension between the two regions (The Guardian, 2013). In 2018, the APT10 group caused significant geopolitical implications and damaged trust between several nations against China (ZDNet, 2018). Cyber-attacks by APT group can disrupt critical infrastructure such as power grids, transportation systems, and financial networks. This can cause widespread disruption and chaos, leading to economic losses, and affecting the daily lives of citizens (Dark Trace, 2021). APTs can also be used to manipulate or disrupt the operations of a company or government agency. For instance, the NotPetya ransomware attack in 2017 affected several major companies worldwide, causing billions of dollars in damage (Wired, 2018). Cyber Warfare Cyber warfare refers to a set of actions using technology, specifically computer networks, to execute attacks on opposing country, governments, organizations or targeted individuals. It utilizes digital tools to perform actions like espionage, to steal or manipulate sensitive information, or sabotage, to intrude, disrupt, damage or destroy computer systems, networks, and infrastructure. Cyber warfare is conducted through hacking, malware attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, phishing, and social engineering (Fortinet, Cyber Warfare). One of the objectives of cyber warfare is to weaken a target country, government, or organization by destabilizing and causing destruction to its critical infrastructures. Threat actors such as the OceanLotus Group,

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

47

also known as APT32 has been implicated for involvement in cyber espionage to further the interest of the Vietnamese state against their opposition (Mandiant, 2017; The ASEAN Post, 2019). Malware and Ransomware Attacks Malware and ransomware attacks are some of the most prominent cyberattacks during the pandemic and the new normal. Malware is malicious software designed to infiltrate, and cause harm and damage to a computer system with viruses, worms, Trojans, and spyware. Cybercriminals use malware to steal information, encrypt data, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems (Palo Alto Networks, Malware). Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts data on a victim’s computer and demands a ransom payment to restore access to the data (Palo Alto Networks, Ransomware). Malware and ransomware cyber-attacks are known to cause significant disruption and damage to a nation’s critical infrastructure, financial institutions, healthcare facilities, and government agencies, resulting in significant economic and reputational harm. In 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack affected over 200,000 computers across 150 countries (Cloudflare, 2017). Universities and other educational institutions in China were among the hardest hit by Wannacry, preventing students from accessing their work, and people in various cities hadn’t been able to take their driving tests because some local traffic police systems were down. In Indonesia, two major hospitals in Jakarta were unable to access patient records causing delays to operations and treatment (Gov Insider). The country had also up to 12 institutions including plantation and manufacturing sectors affected (Antara, 2017). Social Engineering Social engineering is the act of exploitation and manipulation of people. It is used to deceive people into performing actions like disclosing confidential information that can be used by threat actors to gain access to sensitive information, systems, networks, physical locations, or for financial gains. Social engineering attacks can take many forms, including phishing, baiting, pretexting, and quid pro quo. Phishing involves attackers sending fraudulent emails or messages to lure victims into providing sensitive information. Baiting involves leaving an attractive item such as a USB drive in a public place, hoping someone will pick it up and connect it to their device, thereby giving the attacker access. Pretexting involves

48

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

creating a fake scenario or identity to gain a victim’s trust and extract information. Quid pro quo involves offering a benefit in exchange for personal information, such as offering a free software upgrade in exchange for a password (Tech Target, Social Engineering). “Microsoft tech support” scam is one of the major threats in the Asia Pacific (Microsoft, 2021). Threat actors utilize quid pro quo by calling the victim, pretending to be a representative of Microsoft or another tech company, and informing the victim that their computer is infected with a virus or other malware. The attacker then offers to help the victim remove the malware, but only if the victim provides remote access to their computer and pays a fee for the service. In reality, the attacker may install malware or steal sensitive information from the victim’s computer. A victim fallen for “love scam” in Malaysia have lost RM11,700, after being made to believe their “virtual lover” needed financial assistance for COVID-19 treatment (The Star, 2021). Phishing Attacks Phishing is the most common form of a social engineering attack. Phishing aims to trick individuals into providing sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, credit card numbers, and bank account details. These attacks are usually distributed via email, text message, or social media, and they often appear to come from a legitimate source. Once the attacker has obtained this information, they can use it to steal money, commit identity theft, or launch other attacks. Carbanak malware campaign targeted banks and financial institutions in several European countries, including Belgium, Spain, and Ukraine. The attackers used phishing emails to lure the user to open and run the malicious attachment that will infect the machine, allowing threat actors to gain access to the banks’ networks and compromise their systems. Similar tactics were also used by the Lazarus group on the Bank of Bangladesh in 2017. For individuals, falling victim to a phishing attack can result in the loss of money, identity theft, and other forms of fraud. The consequences for organizations and institutions can be even more severe, where data breaches can lead to the loss of confidential information, intellectual property theft, and reputational damage (Tech Target, Phishing).

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

49

AI-Powered Cyber Threats Cyber threats that are enhanced with Artificial intelligence (AI) pose exponential risks to businesses, organizations, and civilians operating and living in the digitally interconnected world. AI can accelerate, amplify, and expand the damage of cyber threats by enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness with automation. Automated cyber-attacks powered by AI can be difficult to detect and prevent, as it is able to continually learn and adapt to an organization’s security measures. For instance, an offensive AI can be trained to identify vulnerabilities in an organization’s digital network and data security systems, making it easier to infiltrate and exploit the vulnerabilities. Additionally, AI can be used to create sophisticated phishing attacks that can easily deceive unsuspecting individuals and organizations (Traficom, 2022, p. 10). Another significant AI cyber threat is the use of deepfakes. Deepfakes are synthetic media that use AI algorithms to generate images, videos, and audio. Cybercriminals can manipulate deepfakes to impersonate individuals or organizations, causing harm to reputations or stealing sensitive data (Traficom, 2022, p. 8). AI systems can also be used for social engineering attacks, a psychological manipulation to deceive individuals into disclosing sensitive information or taking specific actions. AI systems can be used to create highly targeted social engineering attacks that are difficult to detect and defend against (Traficom, 2022, p. 12). Overall this is still currently an emerging threat therefore, cybersecurity professionals, teams, organizations, and policymakers are preparing and actively on the lookout for the impending inevitability of AI-powered cyber-attacks. Cyber Victims: Everything, Everywhere, Everyone, All at Once Cybercriminals do not discriminate based on the size, industry, or demographic group of their target victims. Hospitals, universities, elderly people, or the poor are not spared. However, the impact on certain demographic groups can be more damaging than others. In the organization category, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) are the most vulnerable and fragile to cyber-attacks. In a report by IBM, the global average total cost of a data breach is $4.35 million (IBM, 2022), and in another report cited the average cost to recover from a cyber incident is $400,000 (Chubb, 2019). Such high costs can result in a catastrophic end for an SME. Being the biggest contributor to employment and added values,

50

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

SMEs are very important to a nation’s economy and social well-being (PwC, Europe Monitor). When it comes to the societal level, the context of cyber threats is broader than just damages and harm done to computers and digital devices, disrupting operations and causing financial loss to organizations and individuals. Arguably, disinformation, propaganda, online harassment, and cyberbullying are as devastating and should also be classified as cyber threats. These are threats done over cyberspace, involving circumstances or events with the potential to adversely impact the psychological, emotional, and even physical state of individuals or a society. Cyberbullying and online harassment can inflict severe emotional and psychological harm to its victims, with fatal implications such as committing suicide (Kapersky). In the social demographic, the elderly generation generally has less familiarity with the latest digital technologies and may be more susceptible to scams and phishing attempts. In a report by LexisNexis, analysis shows that youth under the age of 25 are more vulnerable to fraud attacks compared to the older generation, but the older generation age 75 and above suffered more financial loss from fraud, likely reason due to larger disposable incomes (LexisNexis, p. 48). The impact of financial fraud on elderly people can be more devastating, especially if they rely on their retirement savings to cover their living expenses. On the risks of cybercrimes and the challenges to secure the youth and women demographic, this is where it gets complex. There are multiple interconnected factors such as age group, gender, culture and social norms, social economy and geographic location. As for the impact, it can extend beyond computer damage and financial loss, which include serious consequences for their privacy, security, mental health, and personal safety. For instance, cyber threats on youth can be more severe due to the dramatic increase in online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The use of technology and social media platforms for child sexual exploitation and trafficking is a growing global concern. There has been a 106% increase in online sexual exploitation involving children or women (End Violence Against Children, 2021). Cyber-attacks can take many forms, including online harassment, cyberbullying, and pornographic harassment. Women in ASEAN are more vulnerable to such attacks due to cultural and societal norms that condone gender-based violence and discrimination. In contrast to their peers in the EU, with more strict legal enforcement and cultural advancement, women

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

51

in ASEAN face greater barriers to reporting such attacks and seeking justice in cultural norms that stigmatize the victims of such attacks. The difference in gender equality between ASEAN and the EU has significant implications for cyber-attacks against women. While some ASEAN countries have made significant progress in promoting gender equality, others still have a long way to go. On the other hand, the EU has made significant progress in promoting gender equality and has implemented a range of policies and programs aimed at addressing gender-based violence and discrimination. In addition, women in ASEAN have fewer outlets and access to support services and resources that can help them cope with the psychological and emotional impact following the aftermath of such types of cyber-attacks, as women in the EU. Cyberbullying and online harassment are a growing concern worldwide, but the impact can be more severe in ASEAN countries where the cultural stigma associated with mental health issues is more pronounced, and law enforcement coverage is lower than in Western countries and the EU (Rahamathulla, Abstract). Another prominent risk to the youth or younger generation is the rise of online fraud connected to cyber slavery syndicates. Victims are lured into believing they are being offered a legitimate job and end up finding themselves forced to commit acts of cyber scamming on behalf of the syndicates. Tens of thousands of people have been victimized by this scam. Scam centers reportedly are sprouting up all over Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar (The Daily Star, 2023; Al Jazeera, 2022; Nikkei Asia, 2021). Cyber-attacks against youth and women can have different impacts depending on their location, local government regulations, law enforcement, governance, and level of gender equality. It is important to be aware of the potential threats toward youth in both regions and protect them against technical and non-technical cyber-attacks. It is also crucial for parents, educators, and policymakers in both regions to take proactive measures to enhance online safety, raise awareness, and protect youth teenagers from cyber threats. This can be achieved through the development of better education and promotion of awareness programs around online safety and security, stronger legal frameworks, privacy laws and regulations, and more effective support systems for victims of cyberbullying, harassment, and online child sexual exploitation and trafficking. This includes teaching safe online

52

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

practices, monitoring online activity, and promoting responsible use of social media. It is important for women to be aware of the potential threats and to take steps to protect themselves against cyber-attacks. This includes using strong passwords, being cautious when sharing personal information online, and seeking support if they become the victim of a cyber-attack. In understanding the factors that make individuals, society members, and organizations more susceptible to cyber-attacks, it is not possible not to highlight emotional state and psychology. From a broader perspective, it is not just the flaws in technology infrastructure and architecture, or weak governance and best practices. It is also interconnected to the mental environment society is living in. Fueled by anxiety and curiosity, society thirsts for information about the virus and the need to be current about its progress. Uncertain economic climates, financial turbulence, shrinking income, job losses, rising interest rates, and costs of living, have driven people to be desperate for hope to make ends meet, rendering them gullible to online scams. The timing, unfortunately, presented cybercriminals with opportunities to exploit the emotional sentiment, using it as a vector for theme-based attacks with topics affiliated with COVID-19, cure, healthcare, online job offers, donations, and monetary assistance. Turbulent times can lead to sustained stress, depression, burnout, and cognitive overload. The pandemic has left millions of people traumatized over the tragic loss of their loved ones to the coronavirus, or by the absurdity of all things combined. Stress and fear can cause people to take actions that would be considered irrational in other circumstances. It drove millions of people to voluntarily quit their jobs, leading to the Great Resignation. Prolonged emotional distress can cause people to be indifferent, careless, or incapacitate their ability and judgment to take precautions to secure themselves from cyber threats. For reasons as simple as having their data stolen, or their social media account got hacked because of not activating two-factor authentication—is the least of their problems to care about. Cyber Governance in ASEAN and EU The ASEAN and EU have developed initiatives to counter cyber threats, including establishing the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy and the EU Cybersecurity Strategy. These initiatives aim to enhance

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

53

cybersecurity cooperation, information sharing, and capacity-building. The ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy 2017–2020 was developed to address the growing cybersecurity challenges facing the ASEAN region. The strategy focused on four key pillars: 1. Building a culture of cybersecurity awareness 2. Developing effective legal and regulatory frameworks 3. Enhancing operational collaboration 4. Promoting regional and international cooperation (ASEAN, 2017) The ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy 2017–2020 identified specific actions and initiatives that could be taken in each of these four pillars to enhance cybersecurity within the ASEAN region. Some of the key actions included developing a regional cybersecurity awareness campaign, enhancing cybersecurity incident response capabilities, and promoting information sharing among ASEAN member states. The ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy 2021–2025 builds on the achievements of the previous strategy and aims to further enhance cybersecurity within the ASEAN region. In summary, the new strategy is based on five key pillars: 1. Advancing cyber readiness cooperation 2. Establishing ASEAN regional Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 3. Establishing the ASEAN CERT information exchange mechanism 4. Promoting ASEAN cybersecurity norms and confidence-building measures 5. Enhancing ASEAN’s cybersecurity awareness and culture The EU Cybersecurity Strategy 2013 was the first comprehensive EU-level strategy on cybersecurity. It was designed to ensure a high level of cybersecurity across the EU, while also promoting the EU’s economic growth and the protection of fundamental rights. In summary, the strategy focused on five main priorities: 1. Achieving cyber resilience 2. Drastically reducing cybercrime

54

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

3. Developing cyber defense policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 4. Developing the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity 5. Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU (European Union External Action, 2013). The EU Cybersecurity Strategy for The Digital Decade, launched in December 2020, is an updated version of the 2013 strategy, with an increased focus on building cybersecurity resilience and strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy. The 2020 strategy also includes a number of new priorities, including: 1. Strengthening the security and resilience of critical infrastructure 2. Establishing a joint EU cyber unit to increase the EU’s capabilities to prevent, deter, and respond to cyber-attacks 3. Promoting the uptake of secure and trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) 4. Increasing the role of the EU in setting global cybersecurity standards 5. Enhancing the EU’s cyber diplomacy and its partnerships with third countries The EU Cybersecurity Strategy 2020 also acknowledges the new cybersecurity challenges that have emerged in recent years, such as the increased use of AI and the Internet of Things (IoT) and the growing importance of data protection and privacy. Overall, the EU Cybersecurity Strategy 2020 is a comprehensive and ambitious plan aimed at ensuring that the EU is well-equipped to address the cybersecurity challenges of the digital age (European Commission, 2020). Challenges in Securing the Regions Securing the EU and ASEAN from cyber threats is a complex challenge that requires a multifaceted approach. Despite the efforts, implementing the initiatives is another challenge. The challenge to execute any cybersecurity strategy is monumental, especially for geopolitical unions with

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

55

numerous members state such as the EU and ASEAN. Some of the notable issues are as stated below. Limited Resources Securing the EU and ASEAN from cyber threats requires significant resources, including funding, skilled professionals, and technological infrastructure. Limited resources are the most prominent factor that can hinder efforts to improve cybersecurity. Factors involving financial and income inequality could limit certain countries and their citizens from the options to invest more in cybersecurity, making it difficult to cohesively implement effective cybersecurity measures. The lack of resources can limit procuring of updated equipment and systems, training, and employing skilled cybersecurity professionals and services. (World Bank, 2022, Worsening inequality within and across countries) Rapidly Evolving Threats Cyber threats are evolving at an exponential rate, and new threats are emerging all the time. Keeping up with these threats and implementing effective countermeasures can be challenging, especially for countries with limited resources. Cybersecurity measures implemented by businesses, governments, and individuals are increasingly being rendered obsolete by the growing sophistication of cybercriminals. Cybersecurity Maturity Levels Cybersecurity maturity refers to the extent to which an organization or nation has implemented cybersecurity best practices and frameworks effectively. A nation with a high cybersecurity maturity level will have a robust cybersecurity infrastructure and culture that can effectively protect its citizens and organizations from cyber threats. On the other hand, a nation with a low cybersecurity maturity level is more vulnerable to cyber threats and is likely to be a target for cybercriminals. This could create disparities in the effectiveness of the strategy across the region. Fragmented Regulatory Landscape The regulatory landscape for cybersecurity in both the EU and ASEAN is fragmented, with varying legal frameworks and standards across member states. This can make it challenging to coordinate cybersecurity efforts and implement effective measures.

56

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

Fragmented Compliance with Regulations The EU has introduced several regulations aimed at improving cybersecurity in their region, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Network and Information Security Directive (NISD). However, ensuring compliance with these regulations can be a challenge, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs may not have the resources to invest in cybersecurity and may struggle to meet the regulatory requirements, leaving them vulnerable to cyber threats. Digital Divide and Knowledge Gap The digital divide is a gap between regions, nations, and individuals that have access to digital technologies, such as the Internet, and those who do not. The fragmented digital divide exacerbates the problem, creating a significant challenge for effective cybersecurity collaboration. Lack of access to knowledge resources can hamper the penetration of cybersecurity awareness and preparedness. There is a digital divide between urban and rural areas, with rural areas having limited access to digital technologies such as broadband internet (East Asia Forum, 2022). Cross-Border Cyber Threats Cyber threats are often transnational where attackers can easily launch attacks from one country to another. This made it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track down and prosecute cybercriminals. Some countries in the region may be reluctant to share sensitive information, which can hinder the collaboration necessary to protect the region’s cyberspace. This creates a challenge for both regions in terms of ensuring cybercriminals are brought to justice. Workforce Shortage With the rise of cybercrimes, there is an increasing demand for cybersecurity professionals. However, there is a global shortage of skilled professionals to fill these positions. In the year 2021, the shortage of cybersecurity professionals is 2.72 million (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020). Geopolitical Tensions Geopolitical tensions between countries could make it challenging to establish effective cybersecurity partnerships and information-sharing

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

57

mechanisms. (European Commission, 2020; The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade, p. 1).

Conclusion Overall, the new normal has highlighted the importance of cybersecurity and the need for individuals and organizations to take it seriously by taking necessary steps to protect themselves and operate securely in the digital world. Contrary to common understanding, cybersecurity is not just a tech or IT problem; it is a business, social, and cultural problem that affects people. Cybersecurity is interconnected to various aspects and factors, including sociology, social economy, and culture. Shared commitment and support from all levels of authority and society to enhance cooperative collaboration to counter cyber threats are critical in building a secure and resilient cyberspace for the benefit of all.

References Al Jazeera. (2022, November 11). Cambodia’s cyber slavery. https://www.aljaze era.com/features/longform/2022/8/11/meet-cambodia-cyber-slaves Antara. (2017, May 20). Wannacry ransomware affected 12 institutions in Indonesia: Minister. https://en.antaranews.com/news/111011/wannacryransomware-affected-12-institutions-in-indonesia-minister ASEAN. (2017–2020). ASEAN cybersecurity cooperation strategy 2017– 2020. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ASEAN-Cybersecu rity-Cooperation-Strategy.pdf Brooks C. Forbes. (2021, March 2). Alarming cybersecurity stats: What you need to know for 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2021/ 03/02/alarming-cybersecurity-stats-------what-you-need-to-know-for-2021/ Chubb. (2019). Cyber attack inevitability: The threat small & midsize businesses cannot ignore. https://www.chubb.com/content/dam/chubb-sites/chubbcom/us-en/business-insurance/cyber-attack-inevitability/documents/pdf/ 2019_01.31_cyber_whitepaper_chubb_r3.pdf CISA. (2020, October 24). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea’s BeagleBoyz robbing banks. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ aa20-239a Cloudflare. (2017, May 12). What was the WannaCry ransomware attack? https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/learning/security/ransomware/ wannacry-ransomware/ CSO. (2019, April 10). Cybercrime groups raise the bar for security teams by borrowing APT techniques. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3387943/ cybercrime-groups-raise-the-bar-for-security-teams-by-borrowing-apt-techni ques.html

58

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

Cybersecurity Malaysia. (2021). Cyber security outlook in South East Asian region from cybersecurity Malaysia perspective. https://www.cybersecurity.my/data/ content_files/26/2149.pdf Dark Reading. (2018, October 4). Inside the North Korean hacking operation behind SWIFT bank attacks. https://www.darkreading.com/perimeter/ inside-the-north-korean-hacking-operation-behind-swift-bank-attacks Dark Trace. (2021, July 8). How cyber-attacks take down critical infrastructure. https://darktrace.com/blog/how-cyber-attacks-take-down-criticalinfrastructure East Asia Forum. (2022, July 1). Addressing the digital divide in ASEAN . https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/01/addressing-the-dig ital-divide-in-asean/ End Violence Against Children. (2021, October 19). Global threat assessment 2021 shows dramatic increase in online child sexual exploitation & abuse. https://www.end-violence.org/articles/global-threat-assess ment-2021-shows-dramatic-increase-online-child-sexual-exploitation ENISA. (2020, October 20). ENISA threat landscape 2020: Cyber attacks becoming more sophisticated, targeted, widespread and undetected. https:// www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/enisa-threat-landscape-2020 European Commission. (2020, December 16). The EU’s cybersecurity strategy for the digital decade. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/euscybersecurity-strategy-digital-decade-0 European Union External Action. (2013). Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cybersecurity/cybsec_comm_en.pdf EY. (2021, July 22). Cybersecurity: How do you rise above the waves of a perfect storm? https://www.ey.com/en_gl/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-how-do-yourise-above-the-waves-of-a-perfect-storm Fortinet. What is cyber warfare? https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglos sary/cyber-warfare Gov Insider. (2017, May 15). Massive cyber attacks hit Asian hospitals, schools and universities. https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/ransomware-attackasia-wannacry IBM. (2022). Cost of data breach. https://www.ibm.com/reports/data-breach Imperva. Cyber security threats. https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-sec urity/cyber-security-threats/ Kaspersky. Cyberbullying: The cybercrime of the century. https://www.kaspersky. com/resource-center/preemptive-safety/cyberbullying-and-cybercrime Krebson Security. (2015, February 16). The great bank heist, or death by 1,000 cuts? https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/02/the-great-bank-heist-ordeath-by-1000-cuts/

4

CYBERCRIMES AND CYBER SECURITY TRENDS IN THE NEW …

59

LexisNexis. (2021). The LexisNexis® risk solutions cybercrime report July to December 2020. https://risk.lexisnexis.co.uk/insights-resources/research/cyb ercrime-report Mandiant. Insight: Advanced persistent threats (APTs). https://www.mandiant. com/resources/insights/apt-groups Mandiant. (2017, May 14). Cyber espionage is alive and well: APT32 and the threat to global corporations. https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ cyber-espionage-apt32 McKinsey. (2020, October 5). How COVID-19 has pushed companies over the technology tipping point—and transformed business forever. https://www. mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/howcovid-19-has-pushed-companies-over-the-technology-tipping-point-and-transf ormed-business-forever Microsoft. (2021, July 22). Tech support scams remain a threat globally and in Asia Pacific despite drop in encounters: Microsoft survey. https://news.mic rosoft.com/apac/2021/07/22/tech-support-scams-remain-a-threat-globallyand-in-asia-pacific-despite-drop-in-encounters-microsoft-survey/ New York Times. (2019, May 23). Hackers are holding Baltimore hostage: How they struck and what’s next. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/bal timore-ransomware.html National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (2020, July). Cybersecurity workforce demand. https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/ 2022/07/06/NICE%20FactSheet_Workforce%20Demand_Final_20211202. pdf Nikkei Asia. (2021, September 1). Cyber slavery: Inside Cambodia’s online scam gangs. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Cyberslavery-inside-Cambodia-s-online-scam-gangs Palo Alto Networks. What are ransomware attacks? https://www.paloaltonetw orks.com/cyberpedia/ransomware-common-attack-methods PwC. Europe monitor. https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/pwc-europemonitor-innovation-sme.pdf Rahamathulla, M. (2021, October 14). Cyber safety of children in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region: A critical review of legal frameworks and policy implications. https://link.springer.com/article/https://doi. org/10.1007/s42448-021-00087-5?#Sec15 Tech Target, Computer Weekly. Phishing. https://www.techtarget.com/search security/definition/phishing Tech Target, Computer Weekly. Social engineering. https://www.techtarget. com/searchsecurity/definition/social-engineering The ASEAN Post. (2019, October 4). Cyber warfare in Vietnam. https://the aseanpost.com/article/cyber-warfare-vietnam

60

R. MOKHTAR AND A. ROHAIZAT

The Daily Star. (2023, January 21). Sold as cyber slaves. https://www.thedailys tar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/sold-cyber-slaves-3226371 The Guardian. (2013, October 25). NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over contacts. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls The Star. (2021, January 8). Love scam: Woman loses RM11,700 to pay for ‘COVID-19 quarantine, treatment costs’. https://www.thestar.com.my/ news/nation/2021/08/01/love-scam-woman-loses-rm11700-to-pay-forcovid-19-quarantine-treatment-costs Traficom. (2022). The security threat of AI-enabled cyberattacks. https://www.tra ficom.fi/sites/default/files/media/publication/TRAFICOM_The_security_ threat_of_AI-enabled_cyberattacks%202022-12-12_en_web.pdf Security Magazine. (2021, June 15). The new threat economy: A guide to cybercrime’s transformation—And how to respond. https://www.securitymaga zine.com/articles/95387-the-new-threat-economy-a-guide-to-cybercrimestransformation-and-how-to-respond Wired. (2018, August 22). The untold story of Notpetya, the most devastating cyberattack in history. https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattackukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/ White House. (2023, March 23). National security strategy. https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Str ategy-2023.pdf World Bank. (2022). The economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. https:// www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2022/brief/chapter-1-introduct ion-the-economic-impacts-of-the-covid-19-crisis World Economic Forum. (2020, March 17). Why cybersecurity matters more than ever during the coronavirus pandemic. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/ 2020/03/coronavirus-pandemic-cybersecurity World Economic Forum. (2020, June 1). What the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us about cybersecurity—And how to prepare for the inevitable global cyberattack. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/covid-19-pandemic-tea ches-us-about-cybersecurity-cyberattack-cyber-pandemic-risk-virus World Economic Forum. (2019, September 30). Cities are easy prey for cybercriminals. Here’s how they can fight back. https://www.weforum.org/age nda/2019/09/our-cities-are-increasingly-vulnerable-to-cyberattacks-hereshow-they-can-fight-back ZDNet. (2018, December 21). Five other countries formally accuse China of APT10 hacking spree. https://www.zdnet.com/article/five-other-countriesformally-accuse-china-of-apt10-hacking-spree/

CHAPTER 5

Refugees and Migration Policies of ASEAN and the EU Nadia Kalinina and Kevin Fernandez

Abstract Over the past decades, the EU and ASEAN have shown a similar tendency for restrictive migration policies, albeit with regional variations, aiming to limit the number of migrant arrivals. During the COVID-19 pandemic member states of both regions did not hesitate to close the borders and implement some of the strictest immigration regimes, further complicating the movement of migrants and refugees alike. However, new developments after the pandemic highlight certain differences in ASEAN’s and EU’s approaches to refugees. An unexpected influx of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict has demonstrated that the EU is willing to accommodate a large number of refugees from the neighbouring countries when it fits its political agenda and when the refugees’ culture is deemed “European”. This is at odds with ASEAN’s approach where member states have been reluctant to shelter culturally

N. Kalinina (B) · K. Fernandez Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] K. Fernandez e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_5

61

62

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

close refugees from the neighbouring states. As the poverty amplified by the pandemic and related conflicts may lead to even more people migrating or taking refuge in ASEAN or EU countries, this chapter will take a comparative look at the migration policy tendencies in these two regions. Keywords Migration policies · Refugee policies · Refugee treatment

Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic and the policy response to the pandemic had a huge impact on immigration and travel worldwide, affecting mobility, employment opportunities, access to healthcare, protected rights and other factors (Migration Data Portal, 2022). Post-pandemic saw further exacerbation of imbalances between the rich and the poor, caused by inflation (a general increase in prices and interest rates) and a scarcity of jobs that could increase the possibility of conflicts or instability in poorer countries, which could contribute further to the push factors for people to migrate to developed countries (pull factors) (Sánchez-Páramo et al., 2021). In retrospect, it could be thought that migration could propel even further in the coming years due to global economic imbalances and other factors. We can expect therefore increased migration to ASEAN countries and the EU, directly and indirectly, caused by worldwide pandemic measures. However, at the moment other important migratory pressure forces have been at work in the two regions. The major recent source of migration to the EU has been refugees from the Ukraine war, which began in 2022, whereas the main recent source of migration to ASEAN has been refugees from Myanmar’s internal armed conflict, which itself was reignited by a coup in 2021. It is interesting to see how the two regions deal with refugees from these conflicts in their immediate regions. Both regions have established stringent migration regulations in the past decades, attempting to reduce the number of arriving irregular migrants, including refugees. Interestingly, while most ASEAN countries continue their low tolerance stance on receiving Rohingya refugees, the EU has completely shifted gears and been surprisingly welcoming of Ukrainian refugees.

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

63

Following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021 and the subsequent civil war, ASEAN countries have generally maintained their highly restrictive stance. The EU countries, on the other hand, changed their position and readily accommodated all Ukrainian refugees, offering them free services and unprecedented benefits. Adopting the descriptive thematic approach, this chapter will take analyse the developments in terms of migration policy in the EU and ASEAN and make projections on the future tendencies in these regions (Franzese, 2007). To that end, it will sketch out and compare the two regions’ refugee and migrant policies in light of Europe’s recent policy shift. It will also discuss how current policies may affect migration to the EU and ASEAN in the future.

Refugee and Migrant Policies in ASEAN and the EU Refugee and migrant issues in both regions have been widely reported in the media and politicized as a security threat to the sovereign state. Henceforth, in the past decades, migration policy in both regions has prioritised security over the protection of human rights, i.e. the agenda setting of the news has typically portrayed migrants (including asylum seekers and refugees) as a threat to internal security, and security is achieved by minimising refugee and migrant arrivals (Huysmans, 2000). Throughout its existence, the EU transitioned from a relatively lax approach to migrants and refugees to tougher restriction measures. ASEAN countries, on their part, have maintained their restrictive stance over the decades. Below, the policies of ASEAN and the EU will be analysed in more detail including the recent developments.

Policies in ASEAN Countries The main destination countries for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in ASEAN, in particular Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, are not parties to the Geneva Convention that ensures refugee rights and protection and have maintained restrictive immigration policies since the end of colonialism.1 Refugees and asylum seekers, especially the undocumented ones,

1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015). States parties to the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 protocol.

64

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

have limited or no legal ways to enter most of the ASEAN countries and apply for asylum due to the lack of a regional or national refugee protection framework. ASEAN itself does not have a regional refugee mechanism, and every destination country has developed its own sovereign policy, in most cases restrictive. The majority of ASEAN member states do not have a formal category of refugees. It means that refugees and other asylum seekers cannot count on shelter, protection and basic rights in these countries; in addition, those who arrive irregularly are criminalised. With the exception of the Philippines and Cambodia, the majority of ASEAN countries have yet to sign the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, which require the UNHCR to coordinate three long-term solutions for refugees: local integration in a host country, voluntary return to the refugee’s country of origin or permanent cross-border resettlement in a third country such as the United States. ASEAN Historical Context Historically, since ASEAN’s foundation in 1967, its members have been reluctant to take in refugees and asylum seekers, as demonstrated by the conflicts in Indochina and Myanmar. The Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) crises of the 1960s and 1980s occurred in the ASEAN region, of which these nations were not members. Over three million people fled their countries in Indochina over the course of two decades, with a large number of the refugees, known as “boat people”, settling in camps in ASEAN countries (Pugh, 2004). As the number of migrants in camps grew, so did xenophobia and out-group hate speech among the people of accepting Southeast Asian nations, prompting Malaysian, Thai and Singaporean officials to refuse admission to some of the boats bringing refugees. ASEAN countries issued a joint warning in 1979 about their refusal to accept new refugees. They finally agreed to shelter refugees under the condition of their prompt resettlement to third countries, while at the same time playing an active role in conflict resolution (Chapman, 1979; UNHCR, 2000). The reaction to Myanmar refugees has also been in line with ASEAN’s traditionalist restrictive stance on immigration. The ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar (formerly Burma) started in the 1970s when the Rohingya minority in the country was made effectively stateless, prompting violence and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

65

Rohingya, mainly to Bangladesh and, to some extent, to ASEAN countries. As a result, one of the world’s most prolonged refugee crises ensued (Nethery & Loughnan, 2019). Persecutions of minorities continued after Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, resulting in many migration flows, including the 2015 crisis. Thousands of migrants were refused access by sea that year, with Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian officials pushing their boats back to prevent Rohingya refugees from disembarking. This decision resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe, with people trapped at sea with no food or water (Tubakovic, 2019). Malaysia and Indonesia finally agreed to allow the boats, and the crisis led to some changes in refugee policy at both the national and ASEAN levels. However, as we will observe in this analysis, the general restrictive line has remained largely unchanged up to the present day. Current Policies in ASEAN Following the 2015 crisis, ASEAN attempted to improve its policies. A variety of efforts have been proposed at the regional level (both within ASEAN and outside the region) to address the issue of refugees and asylum seekers. Such measures were designed to handle the problem over time, rather than on a reactive, ad hoc basis, as was the case during the refugee crisis. Various meetings emphasised approaches based on refugee protection, such as search and rescue, disembarkation, and housing, as well as the possibilities of collaborating with Myanmar on refugee repatriation (McCaffrie, 2020). Nevertheless, none of these initiatives compels member countries to do anything, and each nation is free to pursue its interests. ASEAN, as a regional organisation, does not intervene in the policies of its members and lacks the resources to assist its member states in the execution of humanitarian obligations, thus nations might adopt feasible solutions over collective initiatives. As a result, the national migration policies of ASEAN’s primary destination nations give a clearer understanding of present and future trends, which will be examined more below. In order to deal with refugee problems, the primary receiving countries, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, revised their national policies in response to the 2015 crisis. These countries, however, are not inclined to provide standard refugee protection. None of the nations have signed the Convention for Refugee Protection, therefore asylum

66

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

petitions are handled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the state generally agrees not to deport individuals who have secured de facto refugee status. However, due to a lack of integration measures, refugees are disenfranchised from society, are not always protected from arrest or deportation, and are frequently victims of numerous abuses due to a lack of rights. Refugees cannot assert Convention-guaranteed rights such as the supply of basic necessities, the right to work, education, and healthcare. Thailand has no formal refugee policy; all undocumented migrants are considered unlawful migrants. Apart from temporary shelters with movement limitations, the Thai government does not extend any rights or services to refugees. Thailand made it simpler for migrants to seek employment and health treatment after the 2015 refugee crisis, and it pledged to eradicate statelessness for its half-million stateless persons by 2024. However, no precise definition of “refugee” exists, and Thailand continues to make it difficult to enter the country by boat. Similarly, Malaysia neither recognises nor guarantees refugee rights. Because there are no systematic protection measures, all decisions concerning refugees and asylum seekers are made on an ad hoc basis. Most decisions are now arbitrary and irregular, and they are subjected to ongoing revision (Mosiol, 2020). Refugees in both nations would fear imprisonment, expulsion, and maltreatment. Unlike Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia is primarily a transit nation for refugees and migrants en route to Australia. Following the 2015 crisis, Indonesia established a “refugee” definition. However, refugees have no rights in Indonesia, and because passage to third countries can take years, they are frequently stranded with no access to jobs or healthcare. Reactions to the Coup Soon after the COVID-19 outbreak began, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia implemented full-scale national lockdowns, securing their borders, and imposing stringent restrictions on incoming travellers. This aggravated the circumstances of refugees and other migrants in terms of job and healthcare availability. During the epidemic, there were reports of asylum seekers being arrested and deported, as well as refusals to accept boats carrying migrants owing to blocked borders, which contradicted regional initiatives (Fernandez, 2020).

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

67

Since the military takeover in Myanmar in February 2021, during the height of the epidemic, around 1.7 million people have been displaced by the ensuing violence, and a significant number of people have lost their livelihoods as a consequence of the lockdowns and coup (RFA, 2022). Out of the estimated 40,000 people fleeing Myanmar for the neighbouring states as of early 2022 (Strangio, 2022), approximately half crossed the border to Thailand (UNHCR, 2022a, 2022b). The refugees were placed in closed camps (‘safe areas’) on the border guarded by the Thai army with the intention of further repatriation or resettlement to third countries. Malaysia’s approach has been to deport asylum seekers back to Myanmar, where the violence is still ongoing (United Nations, 2022a, 2022b). Indonesia received around 900 migrants and declared its willingness to assist Rohingya refugees and support people in Myanmar; nonetheless, Indonesia continues to consider itself a transit nation for these refugees and does not grant services or rights to them (Tanamal, 2022). Even though there are a lot of refugees fleeing the violence in Myanmar, most of ASEAN’s main destination countries have kept their policies that limit access and rights for refugees and asylum seekers and try to keep people from coming. Similar to ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts in settling the Indochina conflict, ASEAN tried to solve the internal conflict in Myanmar. However, it has not been successful so far because, unlike Indochina, which was not part of ASEAN at the time, Myanmar is an ASEAN member and the ASEAN non-interference principle applies.

Policies in the EU Immigration and asylum policies in European countries have changed from generally permissive to progressively restrictive during the European integration project, which began in 1951. In such a development, the reaction to migrants fleeing the Ukraine crisis stands out from the current trend. This section will examine the evolution of European policy and contrast it with the most recent responses. In contrast to ASEAN members, all EU nations have joined the 1951 Geneva Convention and are committed to safeguarding refugees. However, a stringent stance on immigration has steadily imperilled refugee protection. The increasingly restrictive immigration policy is related to the growing number of migrants, which has recently been caused by instability in Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, along with

68

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

popular concerns related to employment, welfare, and cultural identity, as migrants and refugees predominantly come from culturally different and impoverished Middle Eastern and African countries. Historical Perspective from Europe A historical perspective on European migration policy helps one to understand the steady shift in public attitudes about migration and comprehend how immigration became a political and security concern. In the 1950s and 1960s, following World War II, most Western European countries saw migrants chiefly as an added labour force. Migrants were considered to be a source of cheap labour rather than a political issue at the time, and Western European nations implemented policies that favoured and promoted such immigration. However, immigration restrictions grew increasingly restricted beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the same time, migrants were still viewed as temporary workers, and the restrictions were mostly economic in design, aimed to safeguard domestic labour. That being said, as the number of immigrants increased, they became the focus of public attention and political vitriol (Huysmans, 2000). While migration was first viewed as a social and economic issue, it became increasingly political in the mid-1980s when a link was formed between illegal immigration and asylum as a route for economic migrants to enter the European market. Asylum becomes intertwined with migration policy, and eventually, not only with economic factors but also with terrorism and criminality (Kaunert & Leonard, 2016). With the growth of a more connected internal market and the adoption of unified laws governing the movement of third-country citizens in the 1970s, European regional institutions began to play a role in migration policies. The mid-1980s witnessed the commencement and institutionalisation of member-state cooperation on migration issues, as well as a surge in asylum petitions (Huysmans, 2000). During the 2015–2016 European refugee/migrant crisis, approximately 3 million individuals sought asylum in the EU, accelerating restrictive tendencies and contributing to deeper integration in migration and asylum policy. Currently, member states have national immigration policies; nevertheless, the single market and the external EU border are safeguarded by EU-wide rules.

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

69

Current Policies While the EU recognizes the right to asylum for refugees, its policies have developed into practices that effectively restrict access to the region for all kinds of migrants, earning the EU the title of “fortress Europe”. These tendencies accelerated after the surge in the arrival of refugees and migrants in 2015 following the crisis in Syria. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was the only EU leader who voluntarily accepted 1 million refugees in order to ease the difficult situation at the EU border and in the receiving states. The EU attempted to devise a method to transfer asylum seekers from the nations that absorbed them to other EU countries. However, this approach was unpopular, and certain states, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, refused to accept any asylum applicants, particularly those from the Middle East and Africa. To reduce the number of asylum seekers arriving, EU nations deploy a complex mix of border control, deportations and monitoring, while also reducing the number of legal entrance opportunities (Akkerman, 2018).Frontex, or the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, is a police-like institution that protects the EU’s external border from illegal immigration. The agency’s role has evolved from coordinating national efforts to doing things on its own, such as monitoring the border, combating crime, relocating illegal immigrants, gathering intelligence and dealing with associated issues (Hartwig, 2020). Frontex was prominent during and after the 2015–2016 refugee and migration crisis. Human rights organisations accused it of violating the right to asylum, such as intercepting and returning refugees and expelling them (Chastand & Stroobants, 2021). Border closures during the outbreak exacerbated the situation. The agency’s mission is complemented by agreements with refugee and migrant transit countries, including Turkey and Libya, under which transit nations prohibit asylum seekers from crossing their borders to reach the EU and receive those returned by the EU. Furthermore, the EU criminalises asylum seekers who enter its territory unlawfully and permits them to be detained and deported. Another example of current policy is the insistence of several EU nations on the forced return of Afghan refugees escaping the Afghan catastrophe in 2021 (Vallet, 2021).

70

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

Responses to the Ukraine Crisis In the context of contemporary European immigration policy, the response to refugees fleeing Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine stands out. To begin with, Ukrainians arriving in Europe are exclusively referred to as “refugees,” whereas the 2015–2016 influx is frequently referred to as the “migrant crisis” (see terminology discussion: Malone, 2015), even though the arriving asylum seekers were primarily Syrians fleeing the Syrian war. Another distinguishing element of this refugee tsunami was the cordial reception given to Ukrainians by all EU nations, including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all of whom had previously refused to take migrants. Indeed, the majority of migrants were welcomed with open arms by the Polish government and the people. The EU reinstated its Temporary Protection Directive, developed in the aftermath of the Yugoslav conflicts in 2001 but never implemented until 2022, which allowed for the issuance of residence cards without the need for asylum proceedings. In addition to equipped refugee shelters, Ukrainian refugees were given unprecedented benefits such as immediate residency permits, social protection, free public services such as transportation, mobile communication and medical care, free housing and hotel stays in some countries, and the right to work in the EU, recruitment support, allowances and other types of services (Eurofound, 2022). The Dutch royal family volunteered to host up to 30 Ukrainians at their castle as a display of solidarity (Prideaux, 2022). As of December 2022, about 4.5 million Ukrainian refugees are registered in the EU (European Council, 2022) out of about 7.9 million Ukrainians who left Ukraine from the start of the conflict (UNHCR, 2022a, 2022b). A number of media and pundits, particularly non-Western ones, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have drawn attention to the differences in refugee policies and attitudes regarding Ukrainian (European) and non-European migrants. Countless pieces contrasting the treatment of migrants during the two recent crises, accusing European politicians and media of borderline or openly racist remarks, as well as emphasising prejudice against non-Ukrainian refugees of Asian or African origin leaving Ukraine (see for example Asylum Access, 2022; Chakraborty, 2022; United Nations, 2022a, 2022b). Although the EU and its member states have gradually tightened their migrant and asylum policies in recent decades,

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

71

they demonstrated a complete reversal of these practices and an “open door” policy during the Ukraine conflict, including countries that were previously particularly hesitant to accept asylum seekers. Previously, the EU public was indifferent to welcoming refugees, and the 2015–2016 crisis fuelled the growth of far-right, nationalist groups throughout Europe. This time, though, Europeans showed tremendous sympathy for Ukrainians fleeing the war. The next section will analyse and contrast past refugee reactions in ASEAN and the EU, as well as provide some explanations for the EU’s present Ukraine stance.

Policy Contrast: ASEAN and EU’s Latest Responses ASEAN and EU member nations had developed stringent immigration and asylum policies before the onset of the most recent refugee flows. While these regulations differ by region, both regions ultimately strive to reduce the number of arriving asylum seekers and migrants. Continuing their traditional stance during Myanmar’s coup and military war, ASEAN nations held refugees in closed camps at the border awaiting repatriation, did not safeguard refugee rights, and engaged in boat push-backs. The EU, on the other hand, has shown an extraordinary willingness to open its borders and accept refugees from neighbouring Ukraine, practically giving them citizen status and free services in what appears to be a complete policy reversal for the EU. It should be emphasised that historically, the majority of refugees in ASEAN nations originate from the near vicinity and share a common culture, but the majority of asylum seekers in the EU often come from other areas and civilizations. However, we would argue that the ‘open door’ policy was influenced by factors other than the conflict’s closeness to EU borders. Unlike ASEAN and Myanmar, the EU is actively involved in the Ukraine crisis, openly backing one side and advocating for further military action until Ukraine defeats Russia. It is possible that hosting refugees is part of this agenda rather than a merely humanitarian endeavour. Certainly, factors such as Ukraine’s proximity, the refugees’ European origins, historical ties between Ukraine and Eastern European nations, and the shock of seeing a military conflict in Europe all play a part in attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees. These circumstances, however, do not give a complete rationale: the war in Ukraine is not the first in Europe after World War II—armed conflicts erupted in the former Yugoslavia in

72

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

the 1990s. During the Bosnian-Herzegovina conflict, European countries originally opened their borders and accepted thousands of refugees but proceeded to curtail such immigration. While European countries did not close their borders effectively, they took measures to contain the influx (Barutciski, 1994). The European origin of refugees in itself, therefore, does not guarantee a warm welcome in the EU. Besides, Ukrainians were not always viewed favourably in Eastern Europe where they would come for years as migrant workers (see account of Czech ex-president Vaclav Klaus, 2022). In addition, Ukraine had difficult historic relations with its neighbour Poland due to mutual massacres in the 1940s, with the Ukrainian leader of the massacres recognised as Ukraine’s national hero and 72% of Poles considering the massacre of Poles a genocide in 2018 (Kooschalka, 2022). Despite its many political issues, Poland was the EU member that took in the most Ukrainian refugees. The public’s opinion of Ukrainian refugees from the 2022 conflict might be strongly impacted by the EU’s unequivocal support for Ukraine’s leadership. Ukrainians are constantly depicted as heroes and Europeans battling for democracy and European ideals against the irrationality and imperialism of a “non-European” Russia by the media and politicians. The 1999 Kosovo conflict, in which the United States and the EU publicly supported the separatist territory of Kosovo against the Serbs in Yugoslavia, provides an example of the effect of media coverage on public opinion. There was a similarly sympathetic media campaign in favour of Kosovo Albanians in order to stoke public support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s intervention into Serbia (that included fabricated evidence, exaggerations, omissions, “heroification” of Kosovar fighters, demonisation of Serbs etc.) (Cockburn, 1999; Wolfgram, 2008). As a result, European public opinion supported the bombing of Serbia and was favourable towards Muslim Albanian refugees while negative towards Christian Serbian refugees (see account of a Serbian refugee in The Guardian: Bran, 1999). It is possible that fewer media coverage and non-partisan reporting would not create the same amount of compassion towards Albanian or Ukrainian refugees. One can suggest that the current welcome of Ukrainians comes from a mix of their European origin, politics, ideology, and compassion. In reality, the recent responses from neither ASEAN nor the EU have changed the fact that they are mostly against refugees and

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

73

migrants. ASEAN countries have been dealing with the Myanmar conflict for decades, and their policies have not changed much. What looks like a reversal of the EU’s migration policy may reflect European policy towards Ukraine and the EU’s involvement in that conflict. It uses the way refugees from Ukraine are treated as a political and ideological showpiece at both the regional and national levels. While welcoming Ukrainians, the EU continues to deter non-Ukrainian refugees and migrants.

Future Policies What can we expect from ASEAN and EU migrant policies in the future? Judging by the response to the Myanmar coup, ASEAN countries will continue to provide minimal assistance to refugees, while at the same time trying to reduce arrivals and promote repatriation. The EU is likely to pursue the same restrictive policy towards Middle Eastern and African refugees and migrants. As to Ukrainians, the EU leadership will continue their support, however, there is refugee fatigue settling in among some local populations and national governments due to various reasons, as the flow of refugees is set to continue in the future if the conflict is prolonged. Popular resentment and possible change of ruling governments may partially reduce the support at the national level (Rasche, 2022). ASEAN played an incisive role by calling for a 5-point consensus in 2021 but fell short of pressuring the Myanmar junta to keep to its pledge. The 5 points were: an immediate cessation of violence in the country; engagement across all stakeholders; the formation of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance from ASEAN; and a visit to Myanmar by the special envoy to speak with all parties. Some argue that Brunei in 2021 and Cambodia in 2022 lacked the strong leadership required to implement ASEAN consensus decisions on Myanmar (Takahashi, 2023). Currently, ASEAN’s selective engagement with Myanmar implies a reluctance to pursue a collective engagement policy despite Jokowi and Anwar Ibrahim (Malaysia’s 10th Prime Minister) pushing for it. This suggests differing opinions among ASEAN member states on the most effective approach towards resolving the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, which may impede their ability to take decisive action and achieve an agreeable resolution to the spillover refugee problems (Chongkittavorn, 2023). Additionally, this raises concerns about ASEAN’s unity and effectiveness when dealing with regional issues requiring cooperative efforts.

74

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

Overall, we can conclude that ASEAN countries are likely to continue the same policy providing minimal assistance to refugees, while at the same time trying to reduce arrivals and promoting repatriation.

References Akkerman. (2018). Militarizaton of European border security. Chapter 18 In The emergence of EU defense research policy (pp. 337–355). Springer. Asylum Access. (2022). How US and European media language used to describe the Ukrainian crisis reflect deeply rooted racism against Non-European refugees. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://asylumaccess.org/media-lan guage-and-racism-against-non-european-refugees/ Barutciski, M. (1994). EU states and the refugee crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Refuge, 14(3). Retrieved January 4, 2023, from file:///C:/Users/User/ Downloads/admin,+21820–22232–1-PB_E.pdf Bran, M. (1999). Nobody wants us, the pariah of Europe. The Guardian. Retrieved January 6, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 1999/may/03/6 Chakraborty, M. (2022). Ukrainians embraced but Asian refugees face icy welcome in EU. Nikkei Asia. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https:// asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Ukrainians-embraced-butAsian-refugees-face-icy-welcome-in-EU Chapman, W. (1979). Malaysia, in clarification, says it will not shoot refugees. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/ 06/19/malaysia-in-clarification-says-it-will-not-shoot-refugees/9a70a65e1e6f-4fd5-9aef-509cd5d260c1/ Chastand, J.-B., & Stroobants, J.-P. (2021, January 29). L’agence européenne Frontex fragilisée pas les accusations d’expulsions illégales [European agency FRONTEX weakened by alleged illegal expulsions]. Le Monde. https:// www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/01/29/l-agence-europeennefrontex-fragilisee-par-les-accusations-d-expulsions-illegales_6067995_3210. html Chongkittavorn, K. (2023, March 21). An ASEAN way to resolve the Myanmar crisis | East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/21/anasean-way-to-resolve-the-myanmar-crisis/ Cockburn, A. (1999). Where’s the evidence of Genocide of Kosovar Albanians? The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved January 7, 2023, from https://www.latimes. com/archives/la-xpm-1999-oct-29-me-27493-story.html Eurofound. (2022). Policies to support refugees from Ukraine. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/ article/2022/policies-to-support-refugees-from-ukraine

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

75

European Council. (2022). Infographics—Refugees from Ukraine in the EU. Retrieved December 30, 2022, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/ Fernandez, K. (2020). Three waves of hate speech spreading faster than the pandemic in Malaysia: An analyses of outgroup populist narratives and hate speech during the COVID-19. Geografia, 16(4). Franzese, R. (2007). Multicausality, context-conditionally, and endogeneity. In C. Boix & S. Stokes (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political science (pp. 29–72). Oxford University Press. Hartwig, S. (2020). Frontex: From coordinating controls to combatting crimes. Eucrim (2). https://eucrim.eu/articles/frontex-coordinating-controls-com bating-crime/ Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 751–777. Kaunert, C., & Léonard, S. (2016). The development of the EU asylum policy: Venue-shopping in perspective. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(9), 1396–1413. In J. Seilonen (Ed.), Fortress Europe—A brief history of European migration and asylum policy. University of Helsinki. https:// helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/169924/Fortress%20Europe% 20%20a%20brief%20history%20of%20the%20European%20migration%20and% 20asylum%20policy.pdf?sequence=2 Klaus, V. (2022). Václav Klaus pro MF Dnes: Proˇc nikdo neorganizuje vážná mírová jednání? [Vaclav Klaus for FM Dnes: Why is no one organising serious peace negotiations?] Vaclav Klaus official website. Retrieved January 6, 2023, from https://www.klaus.cz/clanky/4911 Kooschalka, B. (2022). Three quarters of Ukrainians have a better opinion of Poles since Russian invasion. Notes from Poland. Retrieved January 5, 2023, from https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/08/25/three-quarters-ofukrainians-have-a-better-opinion-of-poles-since-russian-invasion/ Malone, B. (2015). Why Al Jazeera will not say Mediterranean ‘migrants’. Al Jazeera. Retrieved December 29, 2022, from https://www.aljazeera.com/fea tures/2015/8/20/why-al-jazeera-will-not-say-mediterranean-migrants McCaffrie, C. (2020). Andaman sea crisis: Is the region really better off in 2020? Kaldor Centre, UNSW . https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/ andaman-sea-crisis-region-really-better-2020 Migration Data Portal. (2022). Migration data relevant for the COVID-19 pandemic. Retrieved February 12, 2023, from https://www.migrationdatapo rtal.org/themes/migration-data-relevant-covid-19-pandemic Mosiol, G. J. (2020). Immigration policies: A review focusing on Sabah’s Filipino migrants. University of Malaya Law Review. https://www.umlawr eview.com/lex-in-breve/immigration-policies-a-review-focusing-on-sabahs-fil ipino-migrants

76

N. KALININA AND K. FERNANDEZ

Nethery, A., & Loughnan, C. (2019). Regional responses to refugees: Insights from Asia. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal. Prideaux, S. (2022). Dutch royal family offer castle to Ukrainian refugees. The National News. Retrieved December 30, 2022, from https://www.thenation alnews.com/lifestyle/2022/03/25/dutch-royal-family-offer-castle-to-ukrain ian-refugees/ Pugh, M. (2004). Drowning not waving: Boat people and humanitarianism at sea. Journal of Refugee Studies, 17 (1), 50–69. Rasche, L. (2022). Ukraine: A paradigm shift for the EU asylum policy? Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre. Retrieved January 8, 2023, from https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/ukr aine-a-paradigm-shift-for-the-eus-asylum-policy RFA. (2022). Nearly 1.7 million new refugees of conflict in Myanmar since coup. Retrieved December 18, 2022, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/ myanmar/refugees-11162022182447.html Sánchez-Páramo, C., et al. (2021). COVID-19 leaves a legacy of rising poverty and widening inequality. World Bank. Retrieved February 12, 2023, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/covid-19-leaves-legacyrising-poverty-and-widening-inequality Strangio. (2022). Thailand sees fresh surge of refugees, migrants from Myanmar: Report. The Diplomat. Retrieved December 16, 2022, from https://thedip lomat.com/2022/06/thailand-sees-fresh-surge-of-refugees-migrants-frommyanmar-report/ Takahashi, T. (2023, February 19). Can Jokowi build a legacy out of Myanmar crisis? Nikkei Asia. Retrieved February 22, 2023, from https://asia.nik kei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Can-Jokowi-build-a-legacy-out-of-Mya nmar-crisis Tanamal, Y. (2022). Indonesia, Bangladesh reaffirm commitment to Rohingya refugees. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved December 18, 2022, from https:// www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/07/20/indonesia-bangladesh-rea ffirm-commitment-to-rohingya-refugees.html Tubakovic, T. (2019). The failure of regional refugee protection and responsibility sharing: Policy neglect in the EU and ASEAN. Refugee Research Online. https://refugeeresearchonline.org/the-limits-to-regional-refugee-pro tection-the-eu-and-asean/ UNHCR. (2000). The state of the world’s refugees, Chapter 4. https://www. unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.pdf UNHCR. (2022). Myanmar situation, inter-agency update. Retrieved December 17, 2022, from : https://reliefweb.int/report/thailand/myanmar-situationinter-agency-operational-update-9-february-2022 UNHCR. (2022). Ukraine refugee situation. Operational Data Portal. Retrieved December 30, 2022, from https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine

5

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF ASEAN AND THE EU

77

United Nations. (2022). Malaysia’s forced return of Myanmar’s most vulnerable must stop: UNHCR. UN News. Retrieved December 18, 2022, from https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129842 United Nations. (2022). UNHCR chief condemns ‘discrimination, violence and racism’ against some fleeing Ukraine. UN News. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114282 Vallet, C. (2021). Le sort des réfugiés afghan divise l’Union européenne [European Union divided on the fate of Afghan refugees]. Le Monde. https:// www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/08/14/le-sort-des-refugies-afg hans-divise-l-union-europeenne_6091417_3210.html Wolfgram, M. A. (2008). Democracy and propaganda—NATO’s war in Kosovo. European Journal of Communication, 23(2). Retrieved January 7, 2023, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258134879_Democr acy_and_propaganda_-_NATO%27s_war_in_Kosovo

CHAPTER 6

Developing Human Capital: Examining the Framework and Strategies of EU and ASEAN Jan Vincent Galas and Mark Salvador Ysla

Abstract Human capital is one of the critical drivers of the economy around the globe. It centres on skills acquisition, education and training, health, and the well-being of employees. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many companies were forced to operate on a remote setup, significantly affecting human capital development. EU has employed several strategies to further strengthen human capital. On the other hand, the ASEAN region still has to develop many areas to continue to maximize its economic growth and support its human capital development. Thus, this chapter aims to examine the policy framework of the EU and ASEAN to address the disruption brought about by the pandemic.

J. V. Galas (B) Chung-Ang University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] M. S. Ysla Far Eastern University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_6

79

80

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

This chapter will also discuss the different strategies employed by individual governments to further improve human capital development. This chapter will also outline the lessons that ASEAN can learn from policy development and techniques that can be employed to ensure the steady improvement of human capital across the region. Keywords EU · ASEAN · Human capital · COVID-19 · Skills and training · Well-being

Introduction Human Capital is a crucial driver of economic growth and development worldwide. It encompasses skills acquisition, education and training, health, and the well-being of employees. It is defined as “the development of lifelong learning systems that provide opportunities and incentives for people to continuously improve their skills, competencies, knowledge, and attitudes for employment and the realization of their potential, and as a contribution to prosperous, creative, and inclusive societies" (Foundation, European Training, 2021, p. 13). The European Union (EU) has implemented several strategies to strengthen the Human Capital of its member states, such as providing opportunities for people to acquire new skills and knowledge throughout their lives. The EU also promotes cooperation between universities and encourages the development of joint study programs; recognizes the importance of digital skills in today’s economy and aims to promote digital literacy and skills development across all age groups. This includes initiatives such as the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, which brings together public and private organizations to promote digital skills development; and supports adult learning through initiatives such as the European Agenda for Adult Learning, which aims to promote access to high-quality adult learning opportunities. This includes initiatives such as the European Skills Agenda, which sets out a framework for upskilling and reskilling adults. Similarly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has recognized the importance of Human Resources Development (HRD) for the region’s economic growth and development potential. ASEAN has developed a comprehensive approach to HRD through the ASEAN

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

81

Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Works and Its Roadmap and the HRD readiness study, which provide a regional HRD policy and a standard reference for the recognition of qualifications across ASEAN countries. This chapter examines and compares the EU and ASEAN policy frameworks in addressing the pandemic’s disruption on Human Capital Development. The article explores the different strategies individual governments employ to improve Human capital, focusing on ASEAN’s potential to maximize economic growth and support Human capital across various stages of a person’s life. It also outlines the lessons that ASEAN can learn from the EU’s Human Capital development strategies and techniques that can be employed to ensure the steady improvement of HRD across the region.

EU’s Policy Framework for Human Capital Development In 2019, the European Training Foundation published a report on the policies for human capital development which is a part of the European Training Foundation’s Torino process assessment. The Torino Process (TRP) is a collaborative procedure that results in an evidence-based evaluation of a nation’s vocational education and training (VET) policy. The Torino Process, which was established in 2010 and is conducted every two years, offers an assessment of the level of development of VET systems in the member countries of the ETF, as well as goals for the future (Foundation, European Training, 2021). The report outlines not just the possible human development strategies, but also presents the key drivers of change in the world which all European states should anticipate. According to the report, the key drivers of change worldwide are the following: (1) Technological and digital change looking at the disruptive impact of digitalization and artificial intelligence; (2) Globalization; market integration and connectivity. (3) Climate change demographic shifts. (Foundation, European Training, 2021) These global challenges had already affected all European countries but will continue to intensify in the coming years. In 2013, the European Commission released the social investment package explaining the social investment approach towards achieving the Europe 2020 targets, which intends to further enhance the human capital

82

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

of the region by providing people with the necessary skills and capabilities to participate productively in society;empowering and supporting individuals at every stage of their life, beginning in childhood; and preventative services prevent future costs to the economy and society from being higher (European Commission, 2015). Part of the integrated pillars is the investment that will be given to children and youth which was emphasized by the Council of the European Union in the Council Recommendations series of 2021 establishing a European Child Guarantee taking into account the essential requirements associated with the promotion of a steady growth in the level of employment, adequate social protection guarantee, preventing social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health (Council of the European Union, 2021). This shows the link between the enhancement of the different facets of human capital and the prevention of social exclusion in European societies. Furthermore, to combat social exclusion, the Council included in the recommendation the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, providing appropriate social protection, open communication between management and labor, and the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of social exclusion as part of the objectives of the European Union and its Member States (Council of the European Union, 2021). According to the European Commission, the investment that will be given to children and youth addresses the various risks that people face during different stages of their lives, which often compound over time. Hence, providing interventions, as early as possible, to mitigate the impact of the disadvantage and prevent it from getting worse is necessary; Child poverty policies, including early childhood education and care (ECEC); Youth guarantee schemes; Lifelong learning; and active ageing (European Commission, 2022). When we examine the social investment package and the identified key drivers of change worldwide, it can be inferred that the social investment package is future-oriented. However, the concern is how other countries in the EU will implement their respective national policy.

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

83

EU’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impact on Human Capital EU has been hit by an economic crisis and eventually COVID-19 pandemic in great proportions. These two crises have erased years of economic and social advancement and economic structural flaws in Europe (European Commission, 2019a, 2019b). One of the strategies that the EU emphasized is the enhancement of its citizens’ digital skills across the region. The digital revolution is accelerating and has an impact on many facets of life. Digital literacy is crucial because it serves as the foundation for how we communicate and do modern work (European Commission, 2022). The EU has responded by promoting the development of digital skills and infrastructure, as well as supporting the digitalization of businesses and public services. Now, various contemporary digital skills are simply fundamental life skills regardless of occupation. These are the digital competencies needed in the workplace: enterprises and organizations, whether public or private, anticipate most of them for the benefit of the workers. The more reliant we are on the internet and digital technologies; the labour force needs to adapt to changing skill demands. Without a good grasp of digital competencies, innovation cannot be accelerated while maintaining competitiveness. The whole public is similarly affected by will require digital abilities in their daily work or home lives (European Commission, 2022). The digital transition is a priority for the EU and the Member States. A digitally skilled workforce and the public are key to making it happen. The Path to the Digital Decade proposal reflects that salience alongside infrastructure, digital transformation of businesses, and public services. Specific targets are proposed to shape and encourage EU and Member States’ actions by 2030. The EU aims to equip at least 80% of people with at least basic digital skills and increase the number of ICT specialists to 20 million (around 10% of total employment), with convergence between men and women by 2030 (European Commission, 2022).

EU’s Response to Strengthen Human Capital Aside from the response the EU made to the COVID-19 pandemic vis-à-vis human capital development, the EU has further emphasized various strategies and measures to strengthen human capital and support

84

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

more sustainable economic growth in the region. European governments have implemented policies to improve access to education, including free primary and secondary education and subsidies for higher education. They have also invested in teacher training, curriculum development, and digital learning. Education, training, and lifelong learning are indispensable to creating a sustainability culture. In order to fully realize the potential of education, training, and culture as engines for job creation, economic growth, and social justice, EU leaders have committed to working towards a European Education Area by 2025 (European Commission, 2019a, 2019b). Moreover, the European Commission sets out the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan which is considered a social rule book that provides a foundation for building a more sustainable European society with a competitive market economy. This action plan also includes three EU targets to set the ambition for 2030 in the areas of employment, skills, and social protection (European Commission, 2021). As part of the strategy in education, the EU continuously promotes apprenticeships as a way to improve skills and reduce youth unemployment. They have implemented policies to support apprenticeships, including funding, regulation, and standards development. Furthermore, the EU already implemented mobility and exchange programs to promote cultural exchange and knowledge transfer. This includes the Erasmus program, which provides funding for students to study abroad, and other programs, which provide funding for research mobility. through mobility and people-to-people contacts and in particular through investment in developing young people’s skills (Foundation, European Training, 2021). EU also recognized the importance of lifelong learning and has implemented policies to support continuous learning and upskilling. This includes training programs for adults, recognition of prior learning, and flexible learning pathways. As part of their commitment to further elevate the role of women in achieving economic growth in the region, the EU emphasized the policies to promote gender equality in the workforce, including initiatives to reduce the gender pay gap, increase the representation of women in leadership positions, and promote work-life balance for women. The EU’s gender action plan 2016–2020 is the EU’s framework for promoting gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment in our external relations with third countries, as well as in international fora and agendas. The EU puts its gender action plan into practice through

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

85

the revised European neighbourhood policy and its development policy (European Commission, 2019a, 2019b). Despite all these efforts, it is worth noting that there are still challenges that need to be addressed in Europe, not just in terms of public spending on R&D and education, but also on how to exploit women’s human capital, particularly that of the most highly skilled personnel. The creation of groupings of nations with various structural traits demonstrated that in a climate of rising global competitiveness, the failure to use intangible assets of the potential level of the national economy’s development is constrained by knowledge, and to remain competitive and maintain strong growth rates (Nicola Mattoscio, 2014). Overall, European governments have recognized the importance of human capital for economic growth and have implemented various policies to promote the development of their citizens’ knowledge, skills, and abilities. Building a sustainable, competitive, and resilient society requires a strong commitment to education, career training, and lifelong learning. As they allow people to realize their full potential and unified Europe for the future at every stage of life, education and training are essential components of human development and are major forces behind the success of economic and social cohesion (European Commission, 2019a, 2019b).

Overview of ASEAN’s Strategies ASEAN publications, such as ASEAN Annual Report, Integration Report and Community Progress Monitoring System (ACPMS) Report, predominantly emphasize human resource development over human capital development. While the two concepts are related, human capital development covers a more comprehensive range of factors, such as health care and education. In contrast, human resource development is more narrowly focused on workforce development. This section will primarily focus on ASEAN’s current policy efforts, status, and challenges in HRD. Policymakers in the region recognize the need to invest in human capital and are taking steps to enhance workforce development through education and skills training, entrepreneurship programs, and other initiatives. However, challenges like unequal access to basic services and digital transformation continue to hinder progress. By prioritizing human resource development, ASEAN can address these challenges and prepare

86

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

its workforce for the future of work, thereby contributing to the region’s economic competitiveness and dynamism. In June 2020, the ASEAN Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Work was adopted during the 36th ASEAN Summit. The Declaration emphasizes the changing world of work due to technological advances, demographic transition, and greening economies that offer opportunities and challenges to the region’s economies, industries, and employment (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). Table 6.1 lists the five outcomes and program areas identified in the roadmap:

Table 6.1 2030 ASEAN roadmap outcomes: Strategies and actions for five program areas Outcomes

Program areas

1. Cultivated lifelong learning culture (LLL)

1. Public awareness 2. Policies and initiatives for lifelong learning 3. Utilization of all educational structures that provide lifelong and life-wide learning at all stages 1. Quality and accessibility of basic and compulsory education for all 2. Quality and accessibility of post-compulsory education 3. Quality and accessibility of skills training and job opportunities 1. Educational systems 2. Public–private partnerships 3. Labour market information systems 1. Labour, educational, economic policies, and institutional frameworks

2. Improved inclusiveness in education and employment for all

3. Demand-driven competencies and qualifications that meet labour market needs 4. More employment opportunities, better employability, higher quality of jobs and enterprise competitiveness 5. Sound HRD policies and financing

Source The ASEAN Secretariat (2020)

1. HRD national policies, action plans, and institutional frameworks 2. Financial resources

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

87

Current Status of Human Resource Development in ASEAN Despite progress in some areas, major challenges remain to be addressed to fully develop the human capital potential of the ASEAN region. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, the education and literacy rates in the region have progressed. Most ASEAN countries are achieving high primary school enrolment. However, educational access disparities remain, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups such as rural populations, women, and ethnic minorities (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021b, p. 87). ASEAN countries have reduced infant and maternal mortality rates and improved basic health services (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021a). But they face challenges with non-communicable diseases like diabetes and hypertension, as well as emerging threats like COVID-19 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021a). In terms of workforce development and employment, Southeast Asia lacks high-quality jobs and experiences a considerable skills mismatch. The informal sector employs numerous workers, resulting in low wages, unfavourable working conditions, and restricted social protection (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). Furthermore, the HRD status in ASEAN nations varies, with some having highly skilled workforces while others have lower education and technical literacy levels. This poses a challenge for foreign investors who need to assess the availability of talent and regulatory conditions before investing. The skilled worker shortage is also prevalent, particularly in technology, engineering, and construction (Ayman Falak Medina, 2022). Some ASEAN countries prioritize vocational training programs to enhance their workforce’s skills. See Table 6.2 for HRD status breakdown by area, status, and country examples.

Improvement Areas Inclusive Education: ASEAN should adopt a comprehensive approach to ensure inclusive education that addresses access, quality, and relevance. Collaboration with stakeholders and teacher training programs are key.

Status Varying levels of workforce readiness

Shortage of skilled workers

Human Resource Development (HRD)

Workforce in key industries

ASEAN HRD status

Area

Table 6.2

- Singapore: highly skilled workforce - Malaysia: highly skilled but expensive workforce - Cambodia: low education and technical literacy levels - Vietnam: developing workforce with skills and talent shortages - Indonesia: largest labour force but with shortage of skilled workers - Philippines: shortage of skilled workers in engineering, architecture, and construction - Indonesia: shortage of skilled workers in technology, engineering, and construction industries - Cambodia: low skill levels in manufacturing and production - Malaysia: shortage of skilled workers and over-reliance on cheap foreign labour - Vietnam: skills and talent shortages in technology and banking industries

Country examples

88 J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

Status Prioritization of vocational training programs

Area

Vocational training programs

(continued)

- Indonesia: prioritizing vocational training to strengthen the skills of their workforce - Vietnam: improving accessibility of on-the-job training programs in industries like technology - Philippines: collaboration between government and industry groups to develop a blueprint for upgrading the IT-BPO sector and creating new jobs

Country examples

6 DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

89

Efficiency-driven and factor-driven economies

Preparing workforce for uncertain future

Related services - Labour management

ASEAN’s roadmap for HRD

Source ASEAN Briefing (2022)

Status

(continued)

Area

Table 6.2

- Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines: competitively priced labour and basic regulatory infrastructure suited for the manufacture of complex goods and provision of limited value-added services - Cambodia: best positioned to provide basic manufacturing services and production of basic components as part of an extension of more complex production lines from countries such as China - Malaysia and Singapore: high-value manufacturing and professional services, and assembling complex components - Singapore: investing in upskilling/ retraining and transitional upskilling and employment facilitation to support workers impacted by COVID-19 - ASEAN countries: investing in human resources that align with digital transformation, equitable education, life skills, and vocational training

Country examples

90 J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

91

Coherent HRD Framework: Harmonizing education systems and improving skilled labour mobility can be achieved through a more coherent HRD framework. This requires aligning national policies with regional goals and ensuring quality assurance and accreditation. Future Skills Implementation: Future skills must be integrated into teaching and learning through relevant curriculum and teacher training. Professionalization of Teaching Personnel: Establishing clear standards for qualifications, compensation, and career progression, along with professional development opportunities and supportive work environments, can professionalize teaching personnel. Public-Private Partnerships: Collaboration between educational institutions and businesses requires communication, mutual interest, clear roles, and equity.

ASEAN Government Responses ASEAN member states have taken significant steps to promote HRD and address its associated challenges. The five themes identified in Table 6.3 highlight the key areas of focus for the governments in the region. The first theme, promoting a culture of HRD, emphasizes the importance of creating awareness and a culture of HRD that empowers people to become more resilient and adaptable to an environment of constant change. It underscores the need for an environment promoting lifelong learning and skills development. Singapore, for example, has established the Skills Future initiative, which provides training and development opportunities for individuals to acquire new skills and knowledge throughout their lives (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021f). The second theme, adopting an inclusive approach, highlights the need to provide specific programs and support for vulnerable groups at risk of being left behind. It emphasizes the importance of equity and inclusion in HRD initiatives. For example, the Philippines has implemented the JobStart Philippines Programme, which offers jobseekers technical and life skills training and opportunities to gain work experience (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021e). The third theme focuses on reinforcing supportive structures for HRD, including legislation, coordination, funding, and research on labour

92

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

Table 6.3 ASEAN government responses to strengthen human capital: Examples of good practices and initiatives Theme

Description

Example countries

1. HRD Culture

Promoting a culture of HRD that empowers people to be resilient for a constantly changing environment Specific programs and support for vulnerable groups at risk of being left behind Visible legislation, coordinated bodies and ministries, platforms of cooperation, funding and research on labour market developments Incorporating future skills into curricula, teaching and learning resources, and assessments in general, vocational and higher education Standards for training of teachers and in- company trainers that address the acquisition of future skills Strong links between state bodies and business sector for public–private partnerships in TVET and higher education

Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Vietnam Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand

2. Inclusive Approach

3. Enabling Structures

4. Modernizing HRD Programs

5. Professionalizing Teaching Personnel

6. Engagement of Business Sector

Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand

Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand

Source ASEAN Secretariat (2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, 2021f, 2021g)

market trends. It emphasizes the significance of institutional infrastructure in promoting coherent and systematic HRD initiatives. For instance, in Indonesia, the government has set up the Indonesia Professional Certification Authority (BNSP) to certify non-formal learning and skill acquisition (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021c). The fourth theme emphasizes the significance of modernizing HRD programs to include future skills in education and assessments. It aims to meet the changing demands of the job market. Vietnam’s National Skills Development Strategy is an example of this effort to enhance the education and training system and produce a skilled workforce (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021g).

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

93

The fifth theme emphasizes strong connections between the government and the business sector for HRD initiatives through public–private partnerships. Myanmar’s Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) promotes private-sector involvement in vocational training and skills development (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021d). Overall, while progress varies across the region, member states are taking steps to develop a skilled and adaptable workforce by promoting HRD culture, inclusivity, modernization, and business engagement. However, challenges like funding, limited access in rural areas, and low public perception of TVET and non-formal education persist.

Comparison of HRD Frameworks Between ASEAN and EU: Policy Recommendations The EU has a well-funded and established Human capital strategy, while ASEAN is still developing its framework. ASEAN can benefit from the EU’s experience in policy development, training programs, and knowledge-sharing. However, ASEAN’s unique circumstances require tailor-made policies. By adapting the EU’s best practices, ASEAN can improve its HRD policies and contribute to sustainable regional development. Education and Training The EU prioritizes education and training, resulting in a well-developed system. In contrast, ASEAN’s education system varies in quality and accessibility. Investing in tailored vocational training and apprenticeships, with public–private partnerships, can bridge the gap between education and employment, improving human capital development and leading to economic and social progress in ASEAN. Workforce Readiness High levels of education and training characterize the EU’s workforce readiness, and technical literacy, while ASEAN has varying levels of workforce readiness. For example, countries like Singapore and Malaysia have highly skilled workforces, while Cambodia and Vietnam have lower education and technical literacy levels. To improve workforce readiness, ASEAN countries should prioritize vocational training programs that

94

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

strengthen their workforce’s skills and improve the accessibility of on-thejob training programs in industries like technology. Prioritize vocational training programs to enhance the ASEAN workforce’s skills. Improve accessibility to on-the-job training in fields like technology. Skilled Labour Shortage Both the EU and ASEAN confront a dearth of skilled workers in areas like technology, engineering, and construction. To tackle this issue, the EU has implemented policies that encourage lifelong learning, skill advancement, and career growth. ASEAN can adopt similar measures that prioritize upskilling and reskilling of workers, starting with the creation of industry-specific training programs that meet its labour market demands. Inclusion and Diversity ASEAN can adopt EU policies promoting inclusion and diversity in the workforce to remove barriers for marginalized groups. Incentivizing companies to hire a more diverse workforce and promoting diversity in leadership positions can benefit industries where underrepresentation is prevalent.

Innovative Techniques for Improving Human Capital Development in ASEAN In addition to learning from the EU’s Human Capital strategy, ASEAN can also develop innovative techniques to improve human capital development. These techniques could be tailored to the unique circumstances of ASEAN and could potentially address specific challenges. Digitalization To enhance access to education and training, especially in remote areas with limited access to traditional methods, ASEAN could develop policies that encourage the adoption of online learning platforms, which have been increasingly utilized worldwide due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, promoting online learning platforms in remote areas is recommended.

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

95

Public–Private Partnerships Foster public–private partnerships to back human capital development initiatives. This can help bridge the gap between private sector requirements and public sector resources by enabling cost and benefit sharing for training and educational programs. Skills-Based Training To tackle skills gaps and create a more adaptable workforce, ASEAN should promote skills-based training programs as a complement to traditional academic education. Such an approach is better suited to workforce needs and can help develop an agile workforce capable of responding quickly to evolving job requirements. Gender Equality and an Inclusive Human Capital Development To ensure inclusive human capital development, ASEAN must provide education and training opportunities to all members of society, including women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities who may encounter additional obstacles to employment and education. Therefore, policies should be developed to promote inclusive human capital development and eliminate barriers for these marginalized groups.

Conclusion The ASEAN region confronts multiple challenges in human capital development, such as educational disparities, limited access to resources, skilled labour shortages, and the need for enhanced workforce readiness. In response, ASEAN has undertaken several strategies and initiatives, including the ASEAN Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Work, which seeks to foster a culture of lifelong learning, enhance inclusivity in education and employment, and generate demand-driven competencies and qualifications. Nevertheless, further progress is needed. By analysing the EU’s well-established HRD framework, ASEAN can glean valuable insights and adapt best practices that can suit its unique context. Crucial focal points encompass improving education and training, enhancing workforce readiness via vocational training programs,

96

J. V. GALAS AND M. S. YSLA

addressing skilled labour shortages, and advocating for inclusion and diversity in the workforce. Moreover, innovative approaches to further advance human capital development in ASEAN include adopting digitalization to broaden access to education and training, nurturing public–private partnerships to bridge gaps between private sector needs and public sector resources, endorsing skills-based training programs to cultivate a more adaptable workforce, and guaranteeing gender equality and inclusivity in human capital development endeavours. In summary, by drawing upon the EU’s experiences and implementing tailored policies and innovative techniques, ASEAN can more effectively tackle its human capital development challenges. This, in turn, will contribute significantly to the region’s economic competitiveness, dynamism, and sustainable development.

References ASEAN Briefing. (2022, April 26). Assessing the current human resources talent pool in ASEAN . https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/assessing-thecurrent-human-resources-talent-pool-in-asean/ ASEAN Secretariat. (2020, December). ASEAN declaration on human resources development for the changing world of works and its roadmap. ASEAN Main Portal. https://asean.org/book/asean-declaration-on-humanresources-development-for-the-changing-world-of-works-and-its-roadmap/ ASEAN Secretariat. (2021a, July). ASEAN annual report 2020–2021. ASEAN Main Portal. https://asean.org/book/asean-annual-report-2020-2021/ ASEAN Secretariat. (2021b, July). ASEAN development outlook 2021. ASEAN Main Portal. https://asean.org/book/asean-development-outlook/ ASEAN Secretariat. (2021c, August). Human resources development readiness in ASEAN: Indonesia country report. https://edeposit.perpusnas.go.id/collec tion/human-resources-development-readiness-in-asean-sumber-elektronis-ind onesia-country-report/54137 ASEAN Secretariat. (2021d, August). Human resources development readiness in ASEAN: Myanmar country report. https://sea-vet.net/images/Publications/ HRD/Myanmar_HRD_Country_Report.pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2021e, August). Human resources development readiness in ASEAN: Philippines country report. https://sea-vet.net/images/Publicati ons/HRD/Philippines_HRD_Country_Report.pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2021f, August). Human resources development readiness in ASEAN: Singapore country report. https://sea-vet.net/images/Publications/ HRD/Singapore_HRD_Country_Report.pdf

6

DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL: EXAMINING …

97

ASEAN Secretariat. (2021g, August). Human resources development readiness in ASEAN: Vietnam country report. https://sea-vet.net/images/Publications/ HRD/Vietnam_HRD_Country_Report_EN.pdf Ayman Falak Medina. (2022, April 26). Assessing the current human resources talent pool in ASEAN . ASEAN Business News. https://www.aseanbriefing. com/news/assessing-the- current-human-resources-talent-pool-in-asean/ Council of the European Union. (2021). Council Recommendation of 14 June 2021 establishing a European Child Guarantee. Official Journal of the European Union. https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-08/ celex_32021h1004_en_txt.pdf European Commission. (2015). Social investment in Europe A study of national policies. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/277e02d5b50d-11e5-8d3c-01aa75ed71a1 European Commission. (2022). Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022. European Commission. (2021). The European pillar of social rights action plan. Commission, E. (2019a). Europe 2020 a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. European Commission. Commission, E. (2019b). Reflection paper towards a sustainable Europe by 2030. European Commission. Foundation, European Training. (2021). Policies for human capital development eastern partnership an ETF Torino process assessment. European Training Foundation. Nicola Mattoscio, I. O. (2014). The contribution of human capital in the EU: Are there limits to the potential level of economic development? International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology, 4(1), 19–26.

CHAPTER 7

Social Transformation in the New Normal: A Reflection Aida Idris and Stella Franciska Imanuella

Abstract Throughout human history, there has been a great deal of uncertainty, resulting in social changes that persist to this day. The dimensions of this uncertainty have evolved into a complex state, encompassing various aspects, such as global health, which has had significant societal implications in different directions. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has compelled the world to pause rapid global mobility, leading to a global social transformation known as the “new normal”. Today, the term “new normal” has become widely recognized as the global recovery and rebuilding journey post-pandemic unfolds. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic being perceived as a setback, society continues to progress with significant shifts and acceleration. From a social transformation perspective, this chapter explores the changes in technology, people development,

A. Idris Faculty of Business and Economics, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] S. F. Imanuella (B) Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6_7

99

100

A. IDRIS AND S. F. IMANUELLA

and policy directions in the EU and ASEAN, particularly focusing on how society responds to and copes with the new normal. By outlining the changes and transformative effects of the new normal, this chapter emphasizes the fundamental essence of the new normal in the current and future outlook. Keywords New normal · ASEAN · EU · Post-covid

Introduction Less than a decade ago, the term new normal was not mainly associated with any shift in humans’ way of living. Fast forward to the current state of affairs, having emerged from the global pandemic with valuable lessons in the need for efficiency and effectiveness, the world has acknowledged the term new normal as a way of embracing the challenging and rapidly changing situations post-pandemic. As a result of the global stay-at-home policy during the pandemic, the world’s pause on rapid global mobility pushed a massive acceleration in other ways, leading to a new-normal social transformation globally. This social transformation has been studied in the fields of sociology, politics, economy, and other social sciences which refers to an extensive reformation of society’s way of thinking and living in all aspects of culture, politics, and economy. The concept of social transformation emerged from social change, which essentially refers to persistent changes in the social structure of a society, a majority of which take a longer pace than social transformation. In other words, social transformation is a more drastic version of social change. Various factors are responsible for social transformation throughout history, including biological, geographical, political, and technological factors (Macionis, 1997; N.a., 2017). In the new normal era, global health is the main factor that drives all the other variables in the acceleration of the world’s changes and transformations. With the pandemic, there have been serious disruptions and global shifts that have affected society in all sectors. From the EU and ASEAN standpoints, this book emphasizes the new-normal impact on society through (1) technology transformation, (2) human capital development transformation, and (3) policy transformation.

7

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NEW NORMAL …

101

Technology Transformation In the digitalization process, the world relied on universal and meaningful connectivity pull factors and organic growth, rather than a sudden push factor growth. With the COVID-19 pandemic as a push factor, global connectivity growth has accelerated along with a substantial increase in internet users, including individuals, business professionals, and governments. The growth in technology usage over the pandemic period has affected all aspects of how people rely on digital platforms to remain globally connected. However, rapid progress in technologies raises an issue of the widening digital inequality between social classes that should be addressed by the government. In the Asia Pacific, 70% of urban households have access to the Internet, but only 37% of rural households have equal facilities (ITU, 2020). In South Asia, 22% of urban children and young adults aged 25 or younger have internet connectivity, whereas in rural regions only 9% percent do (UNICEF and ITU, 2020). Although the pandemic has been hard-hitting, the new normal in technology transformation offers numerous far-reaching benefits for society. The use of digital platforms has enabled many businesses to continue running, regardless of employees’ location during the stay-at-home policy. The use of digital platforms has also been proven to significantly improve efficiency and productivity in various industries. It leads to bigger opportunities and job creation in digital fields such as telecommuting, ecommerce, and social media. In this book, Chapter 3 points out how the pandemic has hastened the employment trend towards remote work providing greater flexibility for both businesses and employees. Technology has improved communication, changed employment patterns and improved global connectivity, allowing the world to be more connected than ever through digital platforms. However, the growth of global connectivity also leads to a higher dramatic vulnerability among technology-dependent users to cybercrime. In Chapter 4, the authors highlighted how more businesses and members of society have become victims of cybersecurity attacks during the pandemic. With the great growth of digital usage, comes a great challenge in the increase of cybercrime. Quoting from the author, technology transformation post-pandemic is perceived as a double-edged sword. The impact of the new normal might adversely affect the way technology grows and how society reacts to it. In the ASEAN and EU regions, the new normal in technology transformation has changed the cybercrime

102

A. IDRIS AND S. F. IMANUELLA

countermeasures and cyber governance, emphasizing the importance of understanding the vulnerability of individuals, organizations, society, and other technology users and being ready for any similar technological challenge in the future.

Human Capital Development Transformation With the fast-growing technology and other social transformations, talent development has become essential to the global recovery and rebuilding journey, focusing on society’s growth and well-being in response to the new normal post-pandemic. People’s development and empowerment enable society, including the youth, to rebound from the pandemic with more resilient and adaptable skills to embrace new opportunities. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has left an indelible impact on people’s development, giving rise to what the author of Chapter 2 refers to as the “Lost Generation” in the post-pandemic era. These disruptions are caused by prolonged lockdowns, school closures, and economic downturns resulting in significant setbacks for young people entering the workforce or pursuing education, which may jeopardize their prospects in the long term. The EU has long implemented educational strategies to tackle broad youth development issues and solve unemployment and underemployment, which are not specifically developed to address COVID-19 challenges. As the pandemic has intensified the risks faced by the Lost Generation, existing measures may not be suitable to address this phenomenon in the new-normal era. Similar to the EU, ASEAN has also struggled to address the Lost Generation issue. In the early phases of the pandemic, ASEAN mainly focused on addressing health, defence, and military challenges and later on businesses and the socio-economy, neglecting the potential consequences of the pandemic on education and human capital development. Not only has it slowed down people’s development on an individual level, but the COVID-19 pandemic also threatens people’s development on the broader societal and economic implications. Chapter 6 explains how many businesses were compelled to function remotely during the pandemic, affecting the human capital development pattern. Anticipating the rapid technological transformation and the remote working implementation, the EU is committed to enhancing the digital skills

7

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NEW NORMAL …

103

of its citizens across the region to provide a digitally skilled workforce that contributes to their economic productivity and potential for societal growth. Similar to the EU, at the 36th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN launched a Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Work, emphasizing how the world of work is changing as a result of demographic changes, technological advancements, and a greening economy. People development transformation in the new normal both in the EU and ASEAN regions emphasizes digital readiness, flexibility, resilience, continuous learning, and future skills and capabilities possessed by individuals. Although there is no particular strategy for addressing a lost generation both in the EU and ASEAN, a quick shift in empowering individuals to be current with digital globalization shows how both regions are responsive to the changes caused by the pandemic and able to capture the opportunity at the point of time. By embracing these shifts, individuals can thrive in the new normal and address the threat of the lost generation. However, both EU and ASEAN should employ an adjusted strategy to accommodate the needs of human development at the individual and organizational levels, thus contributing to a more agile, innovative, and inclusive society in the new normal.

Policy Transformation The world in the new normal is transforming to adapt to the changing needs and realities of individuals and society. In contrast with the rapid transformation in technology and people development, government policies in the EU and ASEAN post-pandemic appear to be undergoing this transformation at different paces. This can be seen in government’s stance on migrants and refugees where the policies remain restrictive. Chapter 5 highlights that neither the EU nor ASEAN has had a major alteration in its policies towards migrants and refugees during and post-pandemic. Considering that ASEAN countries have been dealing with the turmoil in Myanmar for decades, the conventional migrant policies are being upheld with just modest alterations. Although there is a reversal in the EU immigration policy in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where national and regional governments are more open towards Ukrainian refugees, the EU continues to deter non-Ukrainian refugees and migrants. It is necessary to highlight that policies and practices within the EU and ASEAN countries may differ, as each country has their own policy

104

A. IDRIS AND S. F. IMANUELLA

frameworks and priorities. Policymaking regarding migrants and refugees involves addressing different historical, political and socioeconomic challenges, and thus national considerations are based on the uniqueness of each country. Regional coordination plays a critical role in the policy formulation in both the EU and ASEAN contexts when addressing the issue of refugees and migrants. Humanitarian values should be the key consideration in policymaking for both the EU and ASEAN, especially when providing humanitarian assistance in response to refugee crises and displaced individuals. Putting humanitarian values above all agenda and policy priority is critical, especially when the world faces global health threats, where refugees and migrants do not have any sort of certainty in resettlement and rehabilitation. In a nutshell, the new normal has not had a universal transformative effect on governmental policymaking, both in the EU and ASEAN. Policymaking in terms of migration and refugees involves many complex factors that have long-term implications for each country. Thus the decision-making process may take a long time while current policies on national development are more easily adjusted according to the needs of its citizens. In the meantime, this continues to create a dire situation for the refugees who have already suffered from not being welcomed elsewhere and are striving to overcome the hardships arising from the pandemic.

Closing Remarks In the course of social progress, long periods of relative stability are usually followed by unanticipated brief periods of abrupt and revolutionary change (Kavanagh et al, 2021; Gersick, 1991). This can be observed in most incidents of social change and transformation that have occurred throughout human history. Although it has taken centuries for humanity to be where it is today, the world will continue to transition and move forward in uncertainty. As a result of the recent pandemic, the dimension of uncertainty has evolved into what the UNDP (2022) refers to as a new “uncertainty complex” that has never been seen before. It does not mean that uncertainty impedes society from growing and progressing. Instead, it directs and accelerates growth trends. Society will always be in a constant state of change. It is just a matter of how fast and drastically each change happens. In the context of the COVID-19

7

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NEW NORMAL …

105

pandemic, the changes are accelerated at a global scale, forcing society to move along at a rapid pace worldwide. In retrospect, the COVID-19 phenomenon has brought with it some positive implications for social transformation. When the pandemic hit and the world stumbled upon global health obstacles, some of which still seem difficult to overcome and have caused us to regress further behind what we used to be, individuals, organizations and communities reacted collectively in a hopeful way to overcome the challenges. Looking ahead, society will continue to seek practical solutions to cope with the avalanche that has befallen it, not only in global health sectors, but also in technology, human development, and policy development discussed earlier in this book. Addressing lessons learned from the global pandemic, the world must be ready for any possibility. The COVID-19 pandemic is a wake-up call in an ever-changing world, reminding us that abrupt transformation can happen to any layer of society in any direction of life at any time. The social transformation that has occurred as a result of the pandemic is unlikely reversible. Especially when society undergoes substantial transformations, the resulting change is irrevocable (Galbraith, 1997; Rabie, 2013). In most cases, there is no turning back to the life we used to know pre-pandemic. With an eye on the future, under the range of the new-normal social transformation scenarios described in this book, technology, human capital, and government policy appear to be vital pillars in understanding the global shifts which have taken place during, and as a result of, the COVID-19 pandemic. The new normal is an expression of embracing the hardships that the world is going through, forcing the survival of the fittest in unfavourable and rough situations, yet striving towards a hopeful future collectively. The new normal is a meaningful way of bringing society together via social transformation both in the EU and ASEAN, leading to more sustainable development for mankind in an ever-changing world.

References Galbraith, J. K. (1997). The good society: The human agenda. HMH. Gersick, C.J.G. (1991). Revolutionary change theories: A Multi-level exploration of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm. Academy of Management Review, 10–36.

106

A. IDRIS AND S. F. IMANUELLA

International Telecommunications Union (ITU). (2020). ITU interactive terrestrial transmission/ESCAP Asia-Pacific information superhighway maps. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union. https://www.itu.int/itud/tnd-map-public/ Kavanagh, D., Lightfoot, G., & Simon, L. (2021). Are we living in a time of particularly rapid social change? And how might we know? Technological Forecasting & Social Change. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2021. 120856 N.a. (2017). Social transformation and problems. Indira Gandhi National Open University. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/18982 Macionis, J. J. (1997). Sociology. Prentice Hall. Rabie, M. (2013). Social transformation. Global Economic and Cultural Transformation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978113 7365330_4 United Nations Children’s Fund and International Telecommunications Union (UNICEF and ITU). (2020). How many children and young people have Internet access at home? Estimating digital connectivity during the COVID-19 pandemic. New York: UNICEF. https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/upl oads/2020/11/Children-and-young-people-digital-connectivity-COVID19_ English.pdf United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2022). Human development report 2021–22: Uncertain times. Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World. New York: UNDP.

Index

A Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), 45, 46 Apprenticeship, 18 Artificial intelligence (AI), 45, 49, 54, 81 ASEAN ASEAN Annual Report, Integration Report, 85 ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), 36 ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, 18 ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy, 52, 53 ASEAN Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Works and Its Roadmap, 81, 86 ASEAN Digital Integration Framework, 18 Asylum seekers, 63–67, 69–71

B Baiting, 47 BeagleBoyz, 46 Boat people, 64 C Carbanak, 46, 48 Child poverty, 18, 21, 82 Community Progress Monitoring System (ACPMS) Report, 85 Conflict, 8, 18, 62, 64, 67, 70–73, 103 Continuous learning, 84, 103 Convention for Refugee Protection, 65 Cyber attacks, 54 Cyberbullying, 50, 51 Cybercrimes, 42, 43, 50, 56 Cybercriminals, 7, 43–45, 47, 49, 52, 55, 56 Cyber governance, 102 Cyber pandemic, 44 Cyber readiness, 53 Cyber resilience, 53

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 N. Kamaruddin et al. (eds.), The New Normal and Its Impact on Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0527-6

107

108

INDEX

Cyber threats, 42–45, 49–52, 54–57 Cyber warfare, 45, 46

D Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, 46 Digital gap, 12, 16 Digitalization, 7, 16, 17, 33, 43–45, 81, 83, 94, 96, 101 Digital literacy, 31, 33, 80, 83 Digital platforms, 43, 101 Digital revolution, 32, 83 Digital technologies, 31, 32, 34–37, 50, 56, 83 Digital transition, 83 Displacement, 18, 64

E Employment landscape, 28 Employment patterns, 7, 27, 29, 30, 33–35, 37, 38, 101 EU Cybersecurity Strategy for The Digital Decade, 54 Europe’s Youth Guarantee, 18–20, 82 European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 69 European Education Area by 2025, 84 European Training Foundation, 81 European Union (EU), 3–5, 13, 18, 26, 28, 35, 42, 80

F Fourth Industrial Revolution (IR4), 43 Frontex, 69

G Gender discrimination, 27 Gender pay gap, 84

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 56 Geneva Convention, 63, 67 Green initiatives, 19 H Human capital, 8, 28, 80, 83, 85, 87, 93, 105 human capital development, 8, 81, 83, 85, 93–96, 100, 102 Human Resources Development, 80, 81, 86, 95, 103 I Immigration, 8, 62–64, 67–72, 103 J Job loss, 26, 30, 36, 37, 42, 52 Job market, 32–35, 92 K Kosovo conflict, 72 L Learning poverty, 15 Lifelong learning, 80, 82, 84, 85, 91, 94, 95 Lost generation, 6, 7, 12, 14, 16–21, 102, 103 Love scam, 48 M Malware, 45–48 Migration policy, 63, 68, 73 Mobility, 8, 26, 62, 84, 91, 100 Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), 93

INDEX

N Network and Information Security Directive (NISD), 56 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 72 NotPetya, 46 O OceanLotus Group, 46 Open door policy, 71 P Phishing, 45–50 Public Private Partnership, 91, 93, 95, 96 R Ransomware, 45–47 Refugee crisis, 65, 66 Refugees, 8, 62–74, 103, 104 Remote work, 6, 7, 27, 30, 31, 38, 101 Rohingya, 62, 64, 65, 67 S Skill gap, 33, 95 Skills Future initiative, 91 Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), 49 Social engineering, 45–49

109

T Temporary Protection Directive, 70 The Digital Single Market, 37 The European Green Deal, 37 The Torino Process (TRP), 81

U Ukraine war, 62 Ukrainian refugees, 8, 62, 63, 70–72, 103 Unemployment, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 26, 28, 30, 33, 84, 102 UNESCO, 15 UNICEF, 6, 7, 15, 16, 101 Upskilling, 35–37, 80, 84, 94 Urban-rural disparity, 27, 28

V Vietnam’s National Skills Development Strategy, 92 Virtual learning, 15, 17 Vocational education and training (VET), 81 vocational training, 87, 93–95

W Wannacry, 47 Workforce readiness, 93, 95 World Bank, 8, 13, 15, 55