The Nature of Philosophy 0847662470

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APQ LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY JOHN KEKES

1980

ROWMAN AND LITTLEFIELD TOTOWA, NEW JERSEY

©

X

American Philosophical Quarterly 1980

ISBN 0-8476-6247-0

Printed in Great Britain

for

Jean Y. Kekes

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ix

INTRODUCTION

xi

PART ONE: THE PROBLEM CHAPTER ONE: THE CASE AGAINST PHILOSOPHY I.

II.

III.

The Failure of Philosophy The Weakness of Excuses What is to Be Done?

3 3

8

13

PART TWO: PERENNIAL ARGUMENTS

AND WORLDVIEWS

CHAPTER TWO: PERENNIAL ARGUMENTS I.

II.

III.

Arguments Two Misinterpretations of Perennial Arguments

23

Conclusion

27

Characteristics of Perennial

CHAPTER THREE: PROBLEMS I.

II.

17

17

30

Introduction

30

Problems and Theories

31

Problems of Life and Problems of Reflection IV. Removable Problems and Enduring Problems

32

V. Enduring Problems and Perennial Arguments

39

III.

36

42

VI. Conclusion

CHAPTER FOUR: IDEALS

46

Introduction

46

A

46

I.

II.

Description of Ideals V

1 1

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

VI III.

Ideals

ami Presuppositions

IV. Conclusion

53

56

'

*

CHAPTER I.

II.

III.

WORLDVIEWS AND WISDOM

FIVE:

'

58

Worldviews

58

Wisdom The Autonomy

65

The State

of Philosophy

70

Argument

73

of the

PART THREE: PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION CHAPTER I.

II.

III.

six:

THE DOMAIN OF JUSTIFICATION

Introduction

79

The The

80

Distinction Between Discovery and Justification First

Argument: The Autonomy of Philosophy

IV. Criticism of the First

V.

79

81

Argument

83

The Second Argument: Philosophy

88

as Rational

Reconstruction VI. Criticism of the Second

Argument

89 92

VII. Conclusion

CHAPTER seven: JUSTIFICATION IN PHILOSOPHY: THE CONTEXT OF INTRODUCTION I.

II.

III.

95

Introduction

95

The Background The Two Contexts

96 99

of Justification

IV. Justification and the Context of Introduction

102

V. Conclusion

107

CHAPTER eight: JUSTIFICATION THE CONTEXT OF ACCEPTANCE I.

II.

IN

PHILOSOPHY:

Introduction

111

The Three Tests of Truth-Directedness

1 1

and the Context of Acceptance IV. Justification and Truth

III.

1 1

Justification

V. Conclusion

The State

of the

'

118 121

122

Argument

126

TABLE OF CONTENTS

vii

PART FOUR: PHILOSOPHY AND SOME OF ITS RELATIONS CHAPTER NINE; PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE

131

I.

Introduction

131

II.

Basic Beliefs

132

III.

Basic Beliefs and

IV.

The

V.

Justification

Common

Common Sense of Common Sense

Sense and Worldviews

CHAPTER ten: PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE I.

II.

III.

143

147 147

Problem-Solving and Science

149

Metaphysics and Science

155

and Science

158

V. Conclusion

162

CHAPTER ELEVEN: PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY II.

138

Introduction

IV. Worldviews

I.

135

164

Introduction

164

Historical Understanding and Philosophical

165

Justification III.

Historical Understanding

and the Improvement of

Worldviews IV. Historical Understanding and Sensibility V. Conclusion

The State

PART

Argument

II.

III.

179

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY: CONCLUSION

CHAPTER TWELVE: PHILOSOPHY AS THE CONSTRUCTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF WORLDVIEWS I.

174 177

of the

FIVE:

173

185

Introduction

185

The Ideal of Philosophy The Presuppositions of Philosophy

186

IV. Conclusion

191

200

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

viii

CHAPTER THIR-T^EN: PHILOSOPHY AND PERENNIAL

ARGUMENTS I.

II.

III.

Introduction

203 *

External Perennial Arguments about Philosophy Internal Perennial

IV. Conclusion

Arguments about Philosophy

203

206 213 218

NAME INDEX

219

SUBJECT INDEX

221

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book

is

my A

a sequel to

Stale University of

Justification of Rationality (Albany:

New York

Press, 1976). In the previous

develop a theory of rationality;

in this

book

book

I

apply that theory to

I

some inevitable repetitions. In Chapters Three, Five, and Eight I draw on material from Chapters Eight and Twelve of the previous book. The two books, however, stand or philosophy. This results in

fall

independently of each other.

In

Two and Five incorporate the two of my articles: both were

Chapters of

contents

I

Idealistic Studies, I

one

I

an article in

1979.

I

first

am

published

in

published in the Philosophy of the

first

Social Sciences in 1977. In Chapter Seven in

first

and revised

1977, the other in 1979. In Chapter Three

in

use portions of an article

published in Inquiry

partial

I

rely

1979. Finally, Chapter

published

in

the

on an

article first

Nine overlaps with

American Philosophical Quarterly

grateful for permission to

make

use of these articles.

William Hay, Joel Kupperman, Jack Meiland, and Stephen

Nathanson have read through the penultimate version of the manuscript. My debt to them is immense. They commented in detail, they gave me the benefit of their time, energy, and judgment, and they encouraged me. I have not always taken their advice, but the book benefited enormously from the comments I have heeded.

am

I

indebted to

Max

Black for suggesting the key term,

argument, around which the book revolves, and for helping me to think along the way. Stuart Brown, Josiah Gould, and Susan Haack read parts of the manuscript and I am grateful perennial

for their

comments and

criticisms.

The Research Foundation of the State University of New York provided two summer research grants, the College of Humanities and Fine Arts and the Office of

New York

expenses.

I

for

Research of the State University

Albany underwrote typing and duplicating gratefully acknowledge their support. Helen Somich at

typed two versions of the manuscript; her intelligence, patience, tact,

and precision are beyond the

everything. IX

call of duty,

and

I

thank her for

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

X I

is

dedicate thi? ifook to Jean Y. Kekes,

more

If this

to

me and

has done more for

book has merit,

it is

than

helped to do the work by being

first

wife and friend. She I

could possibly ask.

due to her, for she has which 1 can work, but also an audience, then a critic, and

to a great extent

not only created the conditions in

then an editor.

me

my

.

INTRODUCTION prompted by a concern about the absence of a satisfactory worldview in contemporary Western society. A worldview combines a reliable account of the nature of reality and a system of ideals. Having such a worldview makes the solution of problems possible, gives meaning and purpose to life, and thus creates the conditions under which life can be good. The problem, as I see it, is not about our knowledge of reality. The growth of scientific knowledge has been steady. As a result, we live longer, we are in better health, and enjoy higher living standards than ever before. These improvements, however, merely create some of the conditions under which life can be good: by This book

is

make it we lack.

themselves, they cannot of ideals; and

it is

this

We

so.

also need a rational system

Since our society does not provide them with such ideals, and since they

do not generate them

hollow

lives.

drugs,

they

To

fill

for themselves,

most people

live

them, they turn to mindless entertainment or

rediscover

the

thrills

magic by

of

flirting

with

mysticism, witchcraft, astrology, religious revivalism, and other

Many,

unworthy options, are left with a choice between despair, cynicism, and more or less obsessive pursuit of some sysiphean activity. The difficulty is not the absence of ideals. The Western tradition has ample supply of them. The difficulty is the rational justification and systematization of those ideals. What we lack is a coherent system of reasonable ideals. It is this lack which is mainly flowers of unreason.

rejecting these

many lives not being good. The ideals we hold should be rationally justified. If they are not, we have no way of knowing whether the policies we adopt in responsible for

accordance

them

with

can

be

solutions

satisfactory

problems. Thus the rational justification of ideals interest

rational

of those ideals

is

who

hold

required

them.

by

And

the

the

is

our

of

in the best

systematization

of

having

a

desirability

of

coordinated policy for dealing with problems, rather than respon-

ding

to

them piecemeal with the

jeopardize another. XI

risk

that

one effort

may

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

xii

Though we have

to

system of rational ideals makes

not, having a

ways that shape our shape our

effort to

cope with problems whether we

lives in directions'

it

like

it

or

possible to cope in

we have

chosen.

It

this

is

accordance with a system of rational

lives in

meaning and purpose to life. And success in the effort is what makes life good. The thesis of this book is that it is the task of philosophy to show how to live well by the construction and rational justification ideals that gives

of worldviews.

It

philosophy that one should look for a

to

is

coherent system of rational ideals that gives meaning and purpose to life

and

in

accordance with which

This view of philosophy

is

its

problems can be solved.

traditional. Its statement

would have

been a commonplace until around the beginning of this century.

my

Part of

defending

reason for restating

is

old,

I

is

is

that, while the

am

I

philosophical justification.

when people

turn to

them

for help, they fail to

it.

The book

divided into five parts.

is

The

against philosophy which the rest of the book

The charge, heard is

view

have some new things to say about the nature of

this traditional view;

get

now

Another part of the that many contemporary philosophers have come to reject

philosophy and reason

it

that

The

is

states the case

designed to meet.

frequently from both philosophers and laymen,

philosophy

responsibility.

first

is

incapable of discharging

its

traditional

history of philosophy, they charge, reveals no

progress and no knowledge; recurrent discussions of the

it

is

a history of futile, endless,

same kind of

and

questions. This, they say,

explains both the gradual recognition of the insignificance of the subject and the disinclination of philosophers to continue in the useless old

manner.

The second

part begins to meet this case by describing a type of

argument which

I

have come to

call

perennial.

The

practice of

philosophy occurs mainly through perennial arguments. They are indeed

endless

and recurrent discussions of the same type of

questions, but they are not futile. Their perenniality

a

fault.

is

a virtue not

For perennial arguments aim to solve those enduring

human problems whose persistent presence is an inevitable feature of human existence. The solution of such problems cannot result in their disappearance;

them

coping

with

policies

we come

in

it

in

can only continue to produce policies for

changing

circumstances.

to accept should enable us to

accordance with our

ideals.

interpret available ideals,

What

and how

Of

course,

the

cope with problems

ideals to be guided by,

to develop policies

how

to

which solve

INTRODUCTION enduring problems as they occur

in

Xlll

changing circumstances and

yet accord with acceptable ideals, are the questions to be

answered

by perennial argumentation.

The forms

which these enduring problems occur, the

in

rationally justified ideals available for solving them, the policies at

our disposal, change from age to age. Therefore each society must

form and reform

worldview. This, and not any inherent defect

its

in

what explains the crucial importance, as well as the endlessness and recurrence, of philosophical arguments. the subject,

The

is

fication. Its

key idea

not one, as

new theory of

provides a

part

third

philosophical justi-

that there are two contexts of justification,

is

generally supposed. Each context has an objective

is

standard of justification, and these standards are shown to be independently justified.

A

justified philosophical theory

the best

is

solution of an enduring problem in a particular problem-situation.

What makes it so is that it is more likely to be true than any of its rivals. An ideal worldview is composed of a cluster of philosophical theories

thus justified;

enduring problems

in

offers

it

a

rational

accordance with rational

philosophy, according to the traditional view

develop such a worldview

The

fourth part

is

The

The aim

defending,

is

of to

each age.

sense, science,

and

history.

to further elucidate the nature of philosophy

other pursuits.

ideals.

devoted to examining the relation between

common

philosophy and

in

for

am

I

solving

policy

contrast yields

It is

an effort

by contrasting

it

with

some conclusions about the kind

down

of considerations that must be stressed or played

in

the

and rational justification of our worldview. These conclusions are that the worldview which will provide ideals for a good life must redress the present imbalance by stressing common sense, historical understanding, and cultural concerns against the inflated claims made on behalf of scientific understanding, and that the importance of science to a good life has been overrated in contemporary philosophy. construction

The final

fifth part

account

is

worldviews and porary

rivals.

gathers the threads of the previous discussions. given

this

The

of the construction

account

is

defended against

picture that

emerges

humanistic enterprise whose conduct participation

in

a

rationally

and

is

in

justified

is

the

diagnosis that

of this book

we

is

main contem-

of philosophy as

common

worldview

necessary condition for the achievement of a good

The whole

of

justification

its

A a

good. For

provides

a

life.

informed by what prompted

it:

the

are in urgent need of a systematic and rationally

•

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

XIV

and that a humanistically interpreted philosophy is our best hope for providing it. In addition to this overall concern, there are several themes running through the book. One is that philosophy cannot be done in isolation from the historical, political, scientific, social, literary, and other cultural influences upon it. The appreciation of cultural influences, however, requires historical understanding. And this means that worldview

justified

the

construction

pocentric

of

inevitably

The importance

element.

siderations,

worldviews

involves

an

anthro-

humanistic con-

of these

however, does not change the fact that worldviews

must and can be rationally justified. The recurring emphasis upon the necessity and possibility of rational justification in philosophy is another theme of the book. The book is addressed to three groups. The first is composed of my colleagues, professional philosophers. I want to persuade them to return to the traditional view of the subject. The other group includes

troubled

nonphilosophers

who

turn

to

philosophy

answers and then are turned away again by philosophers.

I

for

want

to

them that they are right in their expectations, that philosophers are wrong in not meeting them, and that they should continue to demand what an improved philosophical practice will yield. hope to show them here how philosophy is still capable of assure

I

discharging

however, often

is

come

traditional

its

for the last group: to philosophy

and purpose of

life,

unsatisfactory.

come I

my

own.

hope,

because they worry about the meaning

the point of being rational, the nature of I

want

to the right subject, even if

hope that

this

book

will

education of a new generation of philosophers

than

highest

students of philosophy. Students

morality, freedom, social justice, and so on. that they have

My

responsibility.

its

to

show them

present state

contribute

who

will

to

is

the

do better

PART ONE

THE PROBLEM

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