The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe: A Global Historical Sociological Analysis 3031142934, 9783031142932

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MARX, ENGELS, AND MARXISMS

The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe A Global Historical Sociological Analysis

Attila Melegh

Marx, Engels, and Marxisms

Series Editors Marcello Musto, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Terrell Carver, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

The Marx renaissance is underway on a global scale. Wherever the critique of capitalism re-emerges, there is an intellectual and political demand for new, critical engagements with Marxism. The peer-reviewed series Marx, Engels and Marxisms (edited by Marcello Musto & Terrell Carver, with Babak Amini, Francesca Antonini, Paula Rauhala & Kohei Saito as Assistant Editors) publishes monographs, edited volumes, critical editions, reprints of old texts, as well as translations of books already published in other languages. Our volumes come from a wide range of political perspectives, subject matters, academic disciplines and geographical areas, producing an eclectic and informative collection that appeals to a diverse and international audience. Our main areas of focus include: the oeuvre of Marx and Engels, Marxist authors and traditions of the 19th and 20th centuries, labour and social movements, Marxist analyses of contemporary issues, and reception of Marxism in the world.

Attila Melegh

The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe A Global Historical Sociological Analysis

Attila Melegh Institute of Social and Political Sciences Corvinus University of Budapest Budapest, Hungary Demographic Research Institute Budapest, Hungary

ISSN 2524-7123 ISSN 2524-7131 (electronic) Marx, Engels, and Marxisms ISBN 978-3-031-14293-2 ISBN 978-3-031-14294-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Thankful Photography/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Titles Published

1. Terrell Carver & Daniel Blank, A Political History of the Editions of Marx and Engels’s “German Ideology” Manuscripts, 2014. 2. Terrell Carver & Daniel Blank, Marx and Engels’s “German Ideology” Manuscripts: Presentation and Analysis of the “Feuerbach chapter,” 2014. 3. Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, The History and Theory of Fetishism, 2015. 4. Paresh Chattopadhyay, Marx’s Associated Mode of Production: A Critique of Marxism, 2016. 5. Domenico Losurdo, Class Struggle: A Political and Philosophical History, 2016. 6. Frederick Harry Pitts, Critiquing Capitalism Today: New Ways to Read Marx, 2017. 7. Ranabir Samaddar, Karl Marx and the Postcolonial Age, 2017. 8. George Comninel, Alienation and Emancipation in the Work of Karl Marx, 2018. 9. Jean-Numa Ducange & Razmig Keucheyan (Eds.), The End of the Democratic State: Nicos Poulantzas, a Marxism for the 21st Century, 2018. 10. Robert X. Ware, Marx on Emancipation and Socialist Goals: Retrieving Marx for the Future, 2018. 11. Xavier LaFrance & Charles Post (Eds.), Case Studies in the Origins of Capitalism, 2018. v

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TITLES PUBLISHED

12. John Gregson, Marxism, Ethics, and Politics: The Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 2018. 13. Vladimir Puzone & Luis Felipe Miguel (Eds.), The Brazilian Left in the 21st Century: Conflict and Conciliation in Peripheral Capitalism, 2019. 14. James Muldoon & Gaard Kets (Eds.), The German Revolution and Political Theory, 2019. 15. Michael Brie, Rediscovering Lenin: Dialectics of Revolution and Metaphysics of Domination, 2019. 16. August H. Nimtz, Marxism versus Liberalism: Comparative RealTime Political Analysis, 2019. 17. Gustavo Moura de Cavalcanti Mello and Mauricio de Souza Sabadini (Eds.), Financial Speculation and Fictitious Profits: A Marxist Analysis, 2019. 18. Shaibal Gupta, Marcello Musto & Babak Amini (Eds.), Karl Marx’s Life, Ideas, and Influences: A Critical Examination on the Bicentenary, 2019. 19. Igor Shoikhedbrod, Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism: Rethinking Justice, Legality, and Rights, 2019. 20. Juan Pablo Rodríguez, Resisting Neoliberal Capitalism in Chile: The Possibility of Social Critique, 2019. 21. Kaan Kangal, Friedrich Engels and the Dialectics of Nature, 2020. 22. Victor Wallis, Socialist Practice: Histories and Theories, 2020. 23. Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, The Bourgeois and the Savage: A Marxian Critique of the Image of the Isolated Individual in Defoe, Turgot and Smith, 2020. 24. Terrell Carver, Engels before Marx, 2020. 25. Jean-Numa Ducange, Jules Guesde: The Birth of Socialism and Marxism in France, 2020. 26. Antonio Oliva, Ivan Novara & Angel Oliva (Eds.), Marx and Contemporary Critical Theory: The Philosophy of Real Abstraction, 2020. 27. Francesco Biagi, Henri Lefebvre’s Critical Theory of Space, 2020. 28. Stefano Petrucciani, The Ideas of Karl Marx: A Critical Introduction, 2020. 29. Terrell Carver, The Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels, 30 th Anniversary Edition, 2020. 30. Giuseppe Vacca, Alternative Modernities: Antonio Gramsci’s Twentieth Century, 2020.

TITLES PUBLISHED

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31. Kevin B. Anderson, Kieran Durkin & Heather Brown (Eds.), Raya Dunayevskaya’s Intersectional Marxism: Race, Gender, and the Dialectics of Liberation, 2020. 32. Marco Di Maggio, The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy, 2020. 33. Farhang Rajaee, Presence and the Political, 2021. 34. Ryuji Sasaki, A New Introduction to Karl Marx: New Materialism, Critique of Political Economy, and the Concept of Metabolism, 2021. 35. Kohei Saito (Ed.), Reexamining Engels’s Legacy in the 21st Century, 2021. 36. Paresh Chattopadhyay, Socialism in Marx’s Capital: Towards a Dealienated World, 2021. 37. Marcello Musto, Karl Marx’s Writings on Alienation, 2021. 38. Michael Brie & Jörn Schütrumpf, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary Marxist at the Limits of Marxism, 2021. 39. Stefano Petrucciani, Theodor W. Adorno’s Philosophy, Society, and Aesthetics, 2021. 40. Miguel Vedda, Siegfried Kracauer, or, The Allegories of Improvisation: Critical Studies, 2021. 41. Ronaldo Munck, Rethinking Development: Marxist Perspectives, 2021. 42. Jean-Numa Ducange & Elisa Marcobelli (Eds.), Selected Writings of Jean Jaurès: On Socialism, Pacifism and Marxism, 2021. 43. Elisa Marcobelli, Internationalism Toward Diplomatic Crisis: The Second International and French, German and Italian Socialists, 2021. 44. James Steinhoff, Automation and Autonomy: Labour, Capital and Machines in the Artificial Intelligence Industry, 2021. 45. Juan Dal Maso, Hegemony and Class Struggle: Trotsky, Gramsci and Marxism, 2021. 46. Gianfranco Ragona & Monica Quirico, Frontier Socialism: Selforganisation and Anti-capitalism, 2021. 47. Tsuyoshi Yuki, Socialism, Markets and the Critique of Money: The Theory of “Labour Notes,” 2021. 48. Gustavo Moura de Cavalcanti Mello & Henrique Pereira Braga (Eds.), Wealth and Poverty in Contemporary Brazilian Capitalism, 2021. 49. Paolo Favilli, Historiography and Marxism: Innovations in MidCentury Italy, 2021.

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TITLES PUBLISHED

50. Levy del Aguila Marchena, Communism, Political Power and Personal Freedom in Marx, 2021. 51. V Geetha, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar and the Question of Socialism in India, 2021. 52. Satoshi Matsui, Normative Theories of Liberalism and Socialism: Marxist Analysis of Values, 2022. 53. Kei Ehara (Ed.), Japanese Discourse on the Marxian Theory of Finance, 2022. 54. Achim Szepanski, Financial Capital in the 21st Century, 2022. 55. Stephen Maher, Corporate Capitalism and the Integral State: General Electric and a Century of American Power, 2022. 56. Rémy Herrera, Confronting Mainstream Economics to Overcome Capitalism, 2022. 57. Peter McMylor, Graeme Kirkpatrick & Simin Fadaee (Eds.), Marxism, Religion, and Emancipatory Politics, 2022. 58. Genevieve Ritchie, Sara Carpenter & Shahrzad Mojab (Eds.), Marxism and Migration, 2022. 59. Fabio Perocco (Ed.), Racism in and for the Welfare State, 2022. 60. Dong-Min Rieu, A Mathematical Approach to Marxian Value Theory: Time, Money, and Labor Productivity, 2022. 61. Adriana Petra, Intellectuals and Communist Culture: Itineraries, Problems and Debates in Post-war Argentina, 2022.

Titles Forthcoming

Vesa Oittinen, Marx’s Russian Moment Kolja Lindner, Marx, Marxism and the Question of Eurocentrism George C. Comninel, The Feudal Foundations of Modern Europe Spencer A. Leonard, Marx, the India Question, and the Crisis of Cosmopolitanism Joe Collins, Applying Marx’s Capital to the 21st century Jeong Seongjin, Korean Capitalism in the 21st Century: Marxist Analysis and Alternatives Marcello Mustè, Marxism and Philosophy of Praxis: An Italian Perspective from Labriola to Gramsci Shannon Brincat, Dialectical Dialogues in Contemporary World Politics: A Meeting of Traditions in Global Comparative Philosophy Francesca Antonini, Reassessing Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire: Dictatorship, State, and Revolution Thomas Kemple, Capital after Classical Sociology: The Faustian Lives of Social Theory Xavier Vigna, A Political History of Factories in France: The Workers’ Insubordination of 1968 Marie-Cecile Bouju, A Political History of the Publishing Houses of the French Communist Party Mauro Buccheri, Radical Humanism for the Left: The Quest for Meaning in Late Capitalism

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TITLES FORTHCOMING

Tamás Krausz, Eszter Bartha (Eds.), Socialist Experiences in Eastern Europe: A Hungarian Perspective Martin Cortés, Marxism, Time and Politics: On the Autonomy of the Political João Antonio de Paula, Huga da Gama Cerqueira, Eduardo da Motta e Albuquer & Leonardo de Deus, Marxian Economics for the 21st Century: Revaluating Marx’s Critique of Political Economy Zhi Li, The Concept of the Individual in the Thought of Karl Marx Lelio Demichelis, Marx, Alienation and Techno-capitalism Salvatore Prinzi, Representation, Expression, and Institution: The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Castoriadis Agon Hamza, Slavoj Žižek and the Reconstruction of Marxism Éric Aunoble, French Views on the Russian Revolution Terrell Carver, Smail Rapic (Eds.), Friedrich Engels for the 21st Century: Perspectives and Problems Patrizia Dogliani, A Political History of the International Union of Socialist Youth Alexandros Chrysis, The Marx of Communism: Setting Limits in the Realm of Communism Paul Raekstad, Karl Marx’s Realist Critique of Capitalism: Freedom, Alienation, and Socialism Alexis Cukier, Democratic Work: Radical Democracy and the Future of Labour Christoph Henning, Theories of Alienation: From Rousseau to the Present Daniel Egan, Capitalism, War, and Revolution: A Marxist Analysis Emanuela Conversano, Capital from Afar: Anthropology and Critique of Political Economy in the Late Marx Marcello Musto, Rethinking Alternatives with Marx Vincenzo Mele, City and Modernity in George Simmel and Walter Benjamin: Fragments of Metropolis David Norman Smith, Self-Emancipation: Marx’s Unfinished Theory of the Working Class José Ricardo Villanueva Lira, Marxism and the Origins of International Relations Bertel Nygaard, Marxism, Labor Movements, and Historiography Marcos Del Roio, Gramsci and the Emancipation of the Subaltern Classes Marcelo Badaró, The Working Class from Marx to Our Times Tomonaga Tairako, A New Perspective on Marx’s Philosophy and Political Economy

TITLES FORTHCOMING

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Matthias Bohlender, Anna-Sophie Schönfelder, & Matthias Spekker, Truth and Revolution in Marx’s Critique of Society Mauricio Vieira Martins, Marx, Spinoza and Darwin on Philosophy: Against Religious Perspectives of Transcendence Jean Vigreux, Roger Martelli, & Serge Wolikow, One Hundred Years of History of the French Communist Party Aditya Nigam, Border-Marxisms and Historical Materialism Fred Moseley, Marx’s Theory of Value in Chapter 1 of Capital: A Critique of Heinrich’s Value-Form Interpretation Armando Boito, The State, Politics, and Social Classes: Theory and History Anjan Chakrabarti & Anup Dhar, World of the Third and Hegemonic Capital: Between Marx and Freud Hira Singh, Annihilation of Caste in India: Ambedkar, Ghandi, and Marx Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, An Introduction to Ecosocialism

Acknowledgements

I started writing this book in January 2017, and many people have assisted me in this endeavor ever since. Diana Mishkova, the head of the Sofia-based Institute of Advanced Studies, invited me to be a guest for two months in 2017, which set me on this intellectual journey and was the actual starting point for the research that I summarize in this book. Chris Hann, who has always been a great inspiration for my ideas, offered me a four-month stay in Halle at the Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology in 2019, where not only him but also many of his outstanding colleagues commented on my early arguments, proving particularly formative. Ulf Brunnbauer has also been very helpful and assisted me in various ways as part of a collaboration with The Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg. I also owe a lot to some of my critics and readers. Just to name a few of them: Iván Szelényi, Antal Örkény, Tamás Krausz, Erzsébet Szalai, Raquel Varela, József Böröcz, Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, Péter Szigeti, György Lengyel, Lika Tsuladze, Ágnes Hárs, András Kováts, Márk Éber, Attila Antal, Katalin Kovács, Beáta Nagy, Endre Sík, Dorottya Mendly, Dóra Gábriel, Ayman Salem, Kari Polanyi Levitt, Dragana Avramov, Robert Cliquet, Sonia Lucarelli, Michela Ceccoruli, MIhály Sárkány, Joseph Salukvadze, Giorgi Gogsadze, Arland Thornton, Tamás Kiss, Radhika Desai, and Margie Mendell made valuable comments on my work in various phases. I owe a lot to two friends and colleagues who have sadly since passed away: I miss the conversations and, very importantly, the

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“vicious” remarks of Claude Karnoouh and Gy˝ oz˝ o Lugosi. It would have been so good to remain in further discussion with them. I am especially grateful to Margit Feischmidt, who, in addition to making careful and thorough observations about my text from both professional and linguistic points of view, has been a great, supportive, and patient companion throughout this period. I am also grateful to my colleagues who assisted me with data and methodological issues: namely, thanks to Marcell Kovács, Zoltán Csányi, László Zöldi, Attila Papp Z., Benedek Kovács, Csaba Tóth Gy., and Lajos Bálint. I owe a lot to my workplaces, my outstanding colleagues. Special thanks to Petra Aczél, Tamás Bartus, and Zoltán Szántó at Corvinus University, and Zsolt Spéder and Péter ˝ at the Demographic Research Institute. Their help was also essential. Ori My greatest respect is due to Ágnes Tör˝ o and Júlia Boros, who worked on the Hungarian version of the text, which helped me immensely with improving the English version as well. I also benefited from related joint research projects, during which I cooperated with Márton Hunyadi, Anna Vancsó, and Zoltán Ginelli, among others. Special thanks to the extraordinary community of the Polányi Center; they gave me a lot of inspiration. At the end of this book project, Kyra Lyublyanovics was not only an excellent translator, but her tireless editorial help and remarks shaped and sharpened my arguments and made this book a book. Concerning the final phase of editing, I would like to express my gratitude to Simon Milton, who polished the text and whose meticulous corrections have made the text readable and far more exact. I am also grateful to my kids, who not only helped me at certain points, but who were also patient with me. Nevertheless, none of the above persons can be blamed for any mistakes or confusion that remain in the book; this responsibility is solely mine.

Praise for The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe

“A timely and most sharp Polányian and Marxist unpacking and contextualisation of migration and population politics since the 1980s, Attila Melegh’s precious and thorough analytical intervention defogs migration issues from the pervasive false choice between chauvinistic delirium and callous utilitarianism that throttles the current public imaginary in much of the world. He accomplishes this politically important demystification by shedding much needed light on the ruthless capitalist roots behind the latest intensification of worldwide mass dislocations.” —Salvatore Engel Di-Mauro, Professor, Department of Geography, SUNY New Paltz. Editor-in-Chief of Capitalism Nature Socialism “Having passed from socialist modernization to capitalist peripherality, embattled nations in Eastern Europe have come to exemplify new patterns of exploitative mobility, accompanied by populist socio-political discourses linking migration to population management. Attila Melegh’s holistic approach to these dynamics is global in its coverage, rigorous empirically, sophisticated theoretically, and deeply humanist in its ethical inspiration.” —Chris Hann, Emeritus Director, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Fellow, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

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PRAISE FOR THE MIGRATION TURN AND EASTERN EUROPE

“An outstanding book that is extremely valuable from a scholarly point of view. It provides a global analysis of migration issues, on a Marxian basis, focusing on Eastern Europe. The author places the question of migration in the context of the universal development of the last half century, with extraordinary historical and theoretical knowledge. This is an indispensable book in the literature on the subject.” —Tamás Krausz, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Lóránd University, winner of the Isaac Deutscher prize in 2015 “This is an essential book. An interdisciplinary analysis of one of the most challenging and complex subjects of our time—migrations under decline capitalism. The book brings in-depth knowledge of migration theories, detailed empirical data, and numerous case studies from Eastern Europe.” “Attila Melegh is one of the most specialized author of migrations, with this book we have a Manual to understand the management of the world workforce; also, central, going beyond numbers, the impact in the way of live of millions of people in the world; the rise f central political questions (extreme right chauvinism and resistance to this); we find in this serious, dense oeuvre clues for transformation of the world in a sense of equality, the end of inequalities and solidarity.” —Raquel Varela, Labour Historian, Professor Universidade Nova de Lisboa “What has astonished me when reading Attila Melegh’s new book is that it succeeds in addressing so many of the key questions of contemporary migration studies, across a vast canvas, and yet remains highly accessible and readable—I devoured it in a single sitting. Whether in the interpretation of migration debates or analysis of migration data, Melegh’s book brims with insight and theoretical curiosity. His theses on migration in the age of global marketisation, and on the role of Eastern European regimes in promulgating a xenophobic response, are major contributions.” —Gareth Dale, is a Reader in Political Economy, Brunel University

Contents

1

2

Introduction: Trillion-Dollar Bill or a Nightmare? 1.1 A Polarizing Debate on Migration 1.2 Formulating the Problem; Overview of the Analysis 1.3 General Theoretical Questions and Hypotheses 1.3.1 A Dynamic Unity of Historical Processes 1.3.2 The Concept of Marketization 1.3.3 Lukács: Reification 1.3.4 Gramsci: Hegemony and Historical-Political Blocs 1.3.5 Polányi: Double Movement, Fictitious Commodity, and Embeddedness 1.3.6 The Social Background of Migration Conflicts and Competition 1.3.7 Inner Reflexivity Bibliography The Migration Turn and Demographic Discourses in the 1980s 2.1 The Migration Turn from the 1980s Onwards and Opening-Up to Globalization 2.2 The Internal Tensions and Contradictions of Global Population Discourses in the 1980s Concerning Migration

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CONTENTS

2.2.1

Historical Introduction. Free Markets and an Abortion Ban Instead of Progress: Neoconservatism and the New Era 2.3 Discursive Patterns of the Elites, Biopolitics, and the Opening-Up to Globalization 2.3.1 Biopolitics, Transnational Demography and Migration Discourses: A Note on Sources, Concepts, and Methodology 2.3.2 The Rise of Migration as a Distinct Discursive Category in the 1960s and 1970s: National Modernization and Urban Migration 2.3.3 Crisis and Coloniality: The Malthusian Discourses in Population Policy and Demographic Analyses 2.3.4 From Internal to External Migration: Immigration Panic and the Ambivalence of Migration as a Crisis Management Tool in Malthusian Discourse 2.3.5 Demographic Transition and Migration in the 1980s. Further Contradictions 2.3.6 Socialist Modernization Discourses and Demographic Sovereignty in the 1980s 2.3.7 Conservative Demographic Discourses and Migration in the 1980s 2.3.8 Ethnic-Narodnik Discourses Based on Ethnic Competition and the Question of Migration 2.3.9 Revitalization Discourses and Migration 2.3.10 Developmentalist Critical Discourses and Migration 2.3.11 Discursive Patterns in the 1980s: An Overview of Discursive Elements and Their Historical Consequences Bibliography 3

Historical Material Structures and Processes 3.1 Demographic Changes, Increasing Welfare Competition and Global Marketization 3.1.1 Market Euphoria

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3.1.2

3.2

3.3

Towards Historical-Materialist Macro-Models of Migration 3.1.3 Has Emigration Globally Increased? Changes in the Proportions and Number of Emigrants After 1990 3.1.4 The Rise in the Intensity of Migration and Population Aging: Shortages in Care Work and Increasing Competition for Welfare 3.1.5 The Rise in Migration and Cumulative Causation 3.1.6 Modernization Factors and Increasing Migration Capacity 3.1.7 Rising Levels of Migration: Factors Associated with World-Systems Theories 3.1.8 Further Potential Factors: Unemployment and the Evolution of Wage Differences 3.1.9 Opening-Up to Global Markets and Migration Levels: The Construction of Multivariate Historical Models Why Europe? Europe’s Place in the World’s Demographic, Economic, and Migration Processes 3.2.1 Key Macro-Processes Related to the Migration Turn in Europe 3.2.2 Net Migration on a Continental Level 3.2.3 The Historical Evolution of Global Migration Links Between 1990 and 2010: Changes in the Migration Network of Europe and the Other Continents 3.2.4 The Historical Conjunction Between the Increase of Migration, Population Decline, and Economic Marginalization 3.2.5 Was It Really Such a Great Shock? Some Spatial Aspects of the Most Recent Refugee Crisis and Europe’s Involvement in Granting Asylum Why Eastern Europe? The Place of Eastern Europe in the Demographic, Economic, and Migration Processes of the World

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3.3.1

Neoliberal Capitalism and the Eastern European Transformation: In the Footsteps of Polányi 3.3.2 Net Migration Patterns Within Europe 3.3.3 Eastern Europe and Marketization: Population Decline, Unequal Exchange, and Emigration 3.4 Varieties of Migratory Capitalisms Within Eastern Europe and Key Elements of a Potential Typology 3.4.1 East-Central European Countries in Defense of Relative Prosperity: The Shift from Sending Country to Destination Status in the Richest Countries of the Former Socialist Bloc (Type 1: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 3.4.2 Sending and Receiving: Fictitious Migration Exchange and the Migration Competition Hypothesis in the East-Central European Group, with Special Reference to Hungary 3.4.3 The Globalization Shock and Eastern European Countries in an Emigration Trap (Type 2: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania, and Serbia) 3.4.4 Diverging Migratory Capitalisms of Post-Soviet States: From Managed Neoliberalism to Total Collapse: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine (Type 3) 3.4.5 Transformation Crises in Ukraine, Moldavia, Armenia, and Georgia (Type 3) 3.4.6 Summary of the Historical Material Background Bibliography 4

Discursive Changes 4.1 Revolt of the Masses? Geo-Cultural Maps, Blocs, and the Evolution of Public Views in Eastern European Societies

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Growing Fears of Migration or Growing Dissent in Europe? Further Opinion Polls and Divisions on the Continent 4.3 Marketization and the Discourses of Global and Professional Elites 4.3.1 The Stagnating Importance of Migration as a Topic 4.3.2 Politics of Migration and Growing Polarization in Global Population Policies 4.4 International Migration as an Abstract Market Category and the Discursive Context of the Polarizing Debate 4.4.1 From National Migration Markets to Global Markets: Establishing Migration as a General Market Category 4.4.2 The Theoretical Background of Migration as an Abstract Market Category: Reification, Fictitious Commodities, Fictitious Exchanges, and Neoliberal Rationality 4.4.3 The Bloc in Support of Marketization, and Its Actors: Market Rationality and the Idea of Exploiting Migration as Supported by World Bank Documents 4.4.4 The Utilitarian Management of Migration and the Evolution of Population Discourses and Policies 4.4.5 The Anti-migrant Bloc: Fears and Changes Bibliography

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Conclusion 5.1 Eastern Europe and the Fear of Population Replacement 5.2 Global Implications Bibliography

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Appendix

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Index

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List of Figures

Fig. 1.1

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3

Fig. 2.4

Fig. 2.5

Fig. 2.6

Frequency of the term “migration debate” in Google Books database between 1960 and 2019 (Source Ngram Viewer, 2021) Relative changes in the number of migrants and global population, 1960–1990 (Source Global Bilateral Migration [2021]) Frequency of the terms “migration,” “emigration,” and “immigration” in digitized English-language books, 1800–2019 (Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) Relative and absolute number of documents in World Bank sources containing the term “migration,” 1947–1990 (Source World Bank [2020]) Changes in the relative frequency of the terms “migration,” “modernization,” and “urbanization” between 1960 and 1990 in the Google Books corpus (Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) Number of periodicals focusing on migration launched between 1960 and 1990, according to social scientific databases of libraries (Source Author’s calculations based on the Electronic Journals Library in the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Accessed: June 5, 2019) Number of papers according to geographical areas examined in the journal Demográfia, 1958–1968 and 1980–1990 (Source Author’s calculation)

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

Fig. 3.4

Fig. 3.5

Fig. 3.6

Fig. 3.7

Fig. 3.8

Fig. 3.9

Fig. 3.10

Fig. 3.11

Change in the proportion of the migrant stock living outside their country of birth to the total population (migration rate, %), 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stoc; United Nations 2019b]) Changes in global migrant stock living outside their country of birth, absolute numbers, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Absolute number of vulnerable people in the world, 1980–2019, UNHCR data (per thousand people) (Source UNHCR [2019] and United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock]) Proportion of refugees and asylum seekers in the total population and the total stock of migrants, 1990 (Source United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock]) Changes in per capita health expenditure and gross domestic product, 2000–2017 (2000 = 100%) (Source Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020]) Redistribution rates and changes in the old-age dependency ratio, 2002–2017 (2000 = 100%) (Source Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020]) Changes in the rural population and agricultural employment rates, 1990–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020]) Total global fertility rate and migration rate, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock, 2019b: World Population Prospects]) Global GDP per capita (constant 2015 USD) and emigration rates, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock] and UNCTAD [2020]) Inequality of world’s countries in terms of GDP per capita: Standard deviation (2015 constant USD) and relative standard deviation (%) of GDP per capita of world’s countries, 1995–2019 (Source Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD [2020]) Average number of years spent at school and global emigration rate, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock] and Wittgenstein Centre Human Capital Data Explorer [2022])

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.12

Fig. 3.13

Fig. 3.14

Fig. 3.15 Fig. 3.16 Fig. 3.17

Fig. 3.18

Fig. 3.19

Fig. 3.20

Fig. 3.21 Fig. 3.22

Fig. 3.23

Migration rate and inflow of foreign direct investment (9 year moving average) and inward stock 10 years earlier, as a proportion of GDP, 1990–2019 (Source UNCTAD [2020] and United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock, 2019b: World Population Prospects]) Exports as a proportion of GDP and global emigration rates, 1990–2019 (Source UNCTAD [2020] and United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock, 2019, 2019b: World Population Prospects]) Global labor-force participation rates for men and women aged 15–64, ILO model 1990–2019 (Source World Bank [2020]) Migration rate and unemployment, 1990–2019 (Source World Bank [2020]) FDI (inward flow) as a proportion of GDP, 1990–2018 (Source UNCTAD [2020]) Net migration rates in major regions, 1950–2015 (per 1000 inhabitants) (Source United Nations [2017b: World Population Prospects]) Proportion of migrant stock in Europe in relation to the total population, and the share of global migrant stock in the global population, 1990–2015 (Source United Nations [2015: International Migrant Stock]) Population, migration (migrant stock as related to the total population), and economic weight of Europe and Central Asia, 1990–2015 (Source Author’s calculations based on United Nations [2017a: Trends], World Bank [2020], and United Nations [2017b: World Population Prospects]) Regional distribution of refugee applications registered in Europe by country of origin, 1985–2018 (Source Eurostat [2019]) Refugee applications by geographical area as a share of total applications, 1985–2018 (Source Eurostat [2019] Absolute number of refugees crossing borders and asylum seekers in the world and in Europe (Source United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock, 2019]) First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2014 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 563,345) (Source Eurostat [2019])

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Fig. 3.24

Fig. 3.25

Fig. 3.26

Fig. 3.27

Fig. 3.28

Fig. 3.29

Fig. 3.30

Fig. 3.31

Fig. 3.32

Fig. 3.33

First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2015 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 1,257,150) (Source Eurostat [2019]) First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2017 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 654,900) (Source Eurostat [2019]) First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2019 by sending country, over 10,000 applications (Source Eurostat [2019]) Net migration of post-socialist Eastern European countries (per 1000 people), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) Net migration of countries within non-socialist Central and Western Europe, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) Net migration of Northern European countries in, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) Net migration of Southern European countries, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) Rise of emigration and increase in FDI (%) in Eastern Europe: FDI-to-GDP ratio (1980–2010) and outward migration stock ratios, delayed by 10 years (1990–2019) in Eastern European countries (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock] and World Bank [2020]) Population change in Eastern European countries between 1960 and 2019 compared to 1990 (1990 = 100%). Interannual estimates (Source World Bank [2020]) Taxes and social contributions as a proportion of GDP (%) in select Eastern European countries and the EU as a whole, 1993–2017 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020])

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.34

Fig. 3.35

Fig. 3.36

Fig. 3.37

Fig. 3.38

Fig. 3.39 Fig. 3.40

Fig. 3.41

Fig. 3.42

Fig. 3.43

Fig. 3.44

Fig. 3.45

Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP (%) in countries in Eastern Europe and in destination countries, 1999–2018 (Source OECD Social Spending [2021]) Proportion of foreign-born immigrants in the population, 1990–2019. For the Czech Republic, the data indicate foreign citizenship (Source Author’s calculation based on United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Proportion of emigrants born in Eastern Europe in relation to the sending population, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Net migration East-Central European countries (per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion of emigration stock to sending population in 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020], United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP, 1990–2010 (Source World Bank [2012]) Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in the Czech Republic, 2000–2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020]) Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in Slovakia, 2000–2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020]) Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in Slovenia, 2000–2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020]) Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in Hungary, 1980–2017 (Source Hungarian Central Statistical Office, demographic tables) Distribution of Hungarian emigrants by highest level of education compared to the resident population in 2013 (Labor-force survey) (Source Blaskó and Gödri [2014] and Melegh et al. [2014]) Distribution of Hungarian emigrants according to their activity in 2013 (Source Blaskó and Gödri [2014] and Melegh et al. [2014])

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Fig. 3.46

Fig. 3.47

Fig. 3.48

Fig. 3.49

Fig. 3.50

Fig. 3.51

Fig. 3.52

Fig. 3.53

Fig. 3.54

Fig. 3.55

Distribution of foreign-born population living in Hungary in 2016 according to their countries of origin (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016]) Level of education and competence in the Hungarian language for individuals aged 25–64 in 2016 (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016]) Share of population aged 25 and over having completed tertiary education by time of arrival and country of origin in 2016 in Hungary (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016]) Employment rates of immigrants in Hungary in the age group 15–64 according to time of arrival, country of origin, and Hungarian language skills in 2016 (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016]) Net migration in countries that remained sending regions (per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and proportion of emigrants relative to the sending population, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculations, World Bank [2020] and United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Net migration in countries that used to be destination areas but turned into sending regions (per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion of emigrants in 1990–2019 in Estonia (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020], United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects], and United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock]) FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion of emigrants in 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank (2020) and United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Net migration in countries that used to be immigrant destinations but turned into sending regions: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, and Armenia, 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

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Fig. 3.56

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 4.4

Fig. 4.5

Fig. 4.6

Fig. 4.7

Fig. 4.8

FDI-to-GDP ratio, 1980–2010 and share of emigration, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020] and United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) Proportion of respondents who indicated that they do not want immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors. Average national, population-weighted rates by region and period 1990–2020 (Source Author’s calculations based on European Values Study [2017a, 2017b] and Haerpfer et al. [2014, 2022]) Rejection of immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors. Average national rates for longer periods in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet member states, 1990–2020 (Source European Values Study [2017a, 2017b] and Haerpfer et al. [2014, 2022]) Weighted average proportion of respondents in comparable European countries answering that “Only few or no immigrants should be allowed to enter from non-European countries,” ESS 2002–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based on European Social Survey [2018]) Proportion of respondents who said that only few or no immigrants should be allowed to enter Europe from non-European countries, by country, ESS 2002–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based on European Social Survey [2018]) Changes in rejection of migrants from non-European poor countries, in 2002–2006 and 2016–2018 (difference in percentage points) (Source Author’s calculation based on the European Social Survey [2018]) Proportion of respondents considering migration an important European or national issue, 2004–2020 (Source Author’s calculation, Eurobarometer [2021]. *When two surveys existed, the rounded arithmetic average is shown in the figure) Attitudes towards migrants in Hungary, Romania, and in the Hungarian communities of Transylvania (Source Unpublished data provided by Tamás Kiss [2016]) Mentions of the words “migration,” “emigration,” and “immigration” in Google Books between 1960 and 2019 (Source Ngram Viewer [2021])

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Fig. 4.9

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Fig. 4.11 Fig. 4.12 Fig. 4.13

Fig. 4.14

Fig. 5.1

Number and proportion (%) of documents that used the term “migration” between 1991 and 2019 (Source World Bank [2019]) Proportion of articles on the topic of migration in the Population Index bibliography, 1986–1999 (Source Author’s calculation based on Population Index [2000]) Direction of immigration policies (Source World Population Policies [2015, p. 110]) Nature of emigration policies (Source World Population Policies [2015, p. 122]) Frequency of the terms “international migration” and “urban migration” in the Google Books database (Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) Launch dates of migration-themed periodicals, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation based on the Electronic Journals Library at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology) Prevalence of main discursive formations and themes in the Hungarian press dealing with migration, 2014–2018 (Proportion of occurrences in %; single articles may contain multiple formations) (Source Melegh et al., 2019)

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3

Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7

Table 3.8 Table 3.9 Table 3.10

Themes addressed and terms used in World Bank documents, 1947–1989 Themes of articles referring to Malthus in Population Index 1986–1990 Number of refugees and asylum seekers, 1980–2019 Estimated number of migrants (per 1000 inhabitants) within and between regions, 2005–2010 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) in East-Central European countries, relative to the world average (1990–2010) Agricultural employment as a share of total employment in the sample countries (1990–2010) Immigration of foreign citizens to Hungary, 1980–2010 Activity rates of 15–64-year-olds by country of birth in Hungary, 2016 Per capita GDP (in constant 2015 US dollars) for each country of this type relative to the world average (1990–2010) Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample countries (1990–2010) Estonia’s GDP per capita (constant 2015 US dollars) as a share of the world average (1990–2010) Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) of each country in this type relative to the world average (1990–2010)

42 50 115 159

190 193 199 209

214 217 221

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.11 Table 3.12 Table 3.13 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4

Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 4.8

Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample countries (1990–2010) Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) of Type 3 countries relative to the world average (1990–2010) Share of agricultural employment in the sample countries (1990–2010) Aggregate variables of attitudes towards immigrants in some European countries Themes and terminology in World Bank documents, 1990–2019 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following Malthusian discourses The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following the demographic transition discourse The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following socialist modernization discourses The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as conservative discourses The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following the revitalization discourses The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following the pro-development discourses

226 229 231 262 277 294

298 301 307 309 311

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Trillion-Dollar Bill or a Nightmare?

This book concentrates on a historical sociological analysis of the migration turn that has been occurring since the 1980s until the present day. In this global historical analysis, the ultimate focus will be on Eastern Europe, but in a global and historical context, in order to show what historical interactions have been evolving, and what historical role has been taken by various actors in the process we call the migration turn. In this book, the term “migration turn” means, on the one hand, that globally, and in many places locally, the intensity of emigration and immigration has substantially increased as a result of globalization and, very importantly, it means the further marketization of societies. On the other hand, the migration turn means that migration as a discursive theme and category has been reconfigured and has gained new meanings, and previous population discourses have been recomposed in the period concerned. The population discourses have not only changed, but certain discursive blocs have been created and the debate on migration has become increasingly polarized. Thus, migration has become not only a key public and scientific issue but also an engine of political change, dividing elites and public opinion throughout the world. In this multilayered and complex migration turn, Eastern Europe has played an active role, which historical contribution deserves special attention. This book

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9_1

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ventures to undertake this task via analyzing some key historical, sociomaterial, and discursive processes. Due to the heated and controversial debates presently ongoing, it was important to revisit some of the most basic data and their implications. This was an exercise not without its surprises.

1.1

A Polarizing Debate on Migration

In the last few years, the issue of migration has come into the focus of political debate worldwide, and a migration turn has taken place. Virtually all influential media outlets report on migration issues incessantly. Global TV channels, Western, Asian, African, Latin American as well as Russian and international newspapers and news outlets address on daily basis problems associated with migration and immigration, as well as emigration, migration politics, borders, walls, fences, migrant workers, and refugees. Analyses and reports show strong tendencies to polarization. Factions emerge, and debates become increasingly heated and vigorous. Migration as a process and migrants as abstract, en masse subjects are no longer embedded socially and discursively into their proper societal contexts, but have been elevated to a mythological status. During these debates, migrants and the groups allegedly supporting and controlling them have become mythical enemies or heroes of development who deserve recognition along with the social groups that integrate them. Concepts associated with migration and migrants embody and reflect complex phenomena in society—like the “great replacement,” the death of nations or of Europe, the borderless world, anti-globalization, racism, and market and developmental anomalies—in accordance with the faction that uses them. A growing number of political actors view the problems, processes, and agents of migration as a mythical battleground of identity politics, without real social context. The Economist, a newspaper dedicated to the free market, has argued in editorials and video reports that migration is not only acceptable, but may be a valuable asset, representing an easy means of supporting economic policies. The influential financial newspaper released a video entitled “How migration could make the world richer” in November 2019 (The Economist, 2019). This video demonstrates that, in their view, flinging the gates open to migrants is not only an economic and demographic necessity and a moral obligation in defense of the vulnerable, but has the potential to generate billions of dollars in profit. This migration

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should be properly managed in order to secure the gains and cohesion of societies and that of the European Union (The Economist, 2018). In a similar spirit, the George W. Bush Institute released another analysis in 2016 stating that the advantages of immigration outweigh its costs (Orrenius, 2016). In 2018, the ILO, a United Nations agency, and OECD, representing wealthy countries, tabled political proposals for developing countries that would enable them to exploit the “development potentials” inherent in immigration that otherwise are wasted in relation to the informal labor market (OECD, 2018). In addition to economic advantages, potential demographic benefits are also frequently brought up in connection with migration processes. The 2015 International Migration Report issued by the UN in 2016 stated that international migration significantly slows down or can even stop population loss in many parts of the world (IMR 2015, 2016). Thus, it slows down population aging and has the potential to remedy some of its consequences (IMR 2015, 2016, 22–23). Should migration take place in a regulated and well-managed way, it may contribute to the realization of millennium development goals (IMR 2015, 2016, 25). According to population projections about the European Union, growing migration itself is still insufficient and population aging must be tackled by the more efficient integration of immigrants as well as by addressing fertility problems (Amran et al., 2019). It is not only international organizations and research centers that focus on this problem, but investors and business circles also explore these issues. For example, financial policy analysts at the Swedish Riksbank argue that immigration has the potential to solve problems posed by the “pressures” of an aging population (“Citizenship Amendment Bill,” 2019). The online magazine Quartz that writes for business circles stated that for Eastern European countries that have lost a significant portion of their population, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania, immigration would be advantageous and a necessity (Mohdin, 2018). Views in support of so-called replacement migration have often been confronted with fierce opposition, and some consider migration a nightmare that will lead to a complete exchange of populations. In November 2016, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute re-published an opinion that had originally been written for the Huffington Post, in which the Rohingya refugee situation was interpreted as a migration nightmare (Coyne, 2016). From the early 2010s onwards, a theory by Renaud

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Camus called the Le Grand Remplacement (great replacement), which expresses fears of an exchange of “White Europeans” for migrants, has increasingly gained a foothold. This idea has become a central theme for many right-wing extremist parties and groups across North America and Europe. A notable example of the latter is the Génération identitaire, a now banned movement that started off in France in 2012 but which has since spread to many countries that aims to protect “white Christianity” by violent means. The fear of migration as a process of the demographic replacement of “races” is not limited to Western nationalists. It is also prevalent in the words and acts of politicians and groups supporting Hindu fundamentalism—e.g., in connection with the recent immigration laws in India (“Citizenship Amendment Bill,” 2019). It also occurs in Myanmar, where the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion (MaBaTha in Burmese) continuously fuels fears about immigration and differences in fertility (Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, 2017). Some are convinced that we are witnessing a new wave and upswing of nationalism on a global scale, which makes migration a key issue in the social and economic context of neoliberalism (Banks & Gingrich, 2006; Berezin, 2009; Feischmidt, 2014; Joppke, 2021; Kalb, 2011; Martínez Saavedra, 2019). In this global dispute, Europe, and particularly Eastern Europe, gained a prominent position at the beginning of the so-called refugee wave. CNN reported on “the beginning of Europe’s immigration nightmare” as early as in 2013 (Koser, 2013). An editorial in the New York Times on August 31, 2014, discussed “Europe’s migration crisis” (“Europe’s Migration Crisis,” 2014). Undefined “immigration” that poses a serious cultural, social, or security threat to “Europe” has become a recurring theme among politicians. Political actors and governments in Eastern Europe have taken the lead in this matter. Miloš Zeman’s 2018 election campaign in the Czech Republic used a “stop immigration!” slogan and conveyed the message that “we must protect our culture” against “an organized invasion” (Dražanová, 2018). The far-right Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) that made it to parliament in 2015 and joined the government in 2019 capitalized on concerns of a “demographic crisis,” dropping fertility rates and outmigration, and translated these topics into votes through a flare-up in distrust and repulsion of Russians and non-Europeans (Tiido, 2015, 45).

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Hungary’s majority government has become a key actor among Eastern European political forces that proclaim the fight against an “external enemy” and urge the solution of the demographic crisis by “internal” means. A statement by Hungary’s prime minister from January 2015 is illuminative in this regard: Immigration and its cultural consequences should be discussed much more openly and frankly, in a completely straightforward manner,” the prime minister said to a reporter from M1 News. “Economic immigration is a bad thing for Europe, it should not be viewed as potentially beneficial, because it brings only trouble and danger to the European people, and so immigration must be stopped; this is the viewpoint of Hungary…We don’t want to see any significant minority among us who have a cultural character and background different to our own, but we would like to keep Hungary as Hungary. (MTI, 2015)1

The following excerpt also shows how this perspective is composed and how it links the European and Hungarian “demographic crisis” to a biopolitical fight: Europe is getting weaker and weaker, and is on the brink of having to fight even for its regional status… Demographic crisis… A community that is unable to reproduce itself renounces its right to exist. This problem cannot be solved from the outside by means of smart tricks and settling down people, because through this we would give up our national identity… Our house is on fire, too. (Orbán, 2017)

The next excerpt from an interview with the Speaker of the National Assembly of Hungary also sheds light on the discursive elements in this argument: …the world as we have known it for thousands of years, based on a specific set of traditional values…this world is falling apart. And this has terrifying consequences; namely, the vision of the death of the nation that inspired the (nineteenth-century) literature of the Reform Era is actually very close now. Not only for Hungarians, by the way, but the situation is similar for all native populations of Europe, within reasonable time we won’t be able

1 All quotations from works listed in the bibliography as published in Hungarian were translated by Kyra Lyublyanovics.

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to stop the demographic decline, but sooner or later we will disappear… You can see that while the global population is increasing, and so in a certain way there is overpopulation, population decline is occurring only in Europe, and sooner or later this will lead to an invasion of people who see this place as a potential living space for themselves. (Interview with László Kövér, 2015)

In addition to these arguments for and against migration, there is a tertium datur perspective that sees the market system as the root cause of the so-called migration problem and emphasizes that capitalism creates paradoxical and tense situations and exploits immigrants. In this argument, it is not the negative or positive view of migration that is the key aspect but rather the aim of showing the systemic interrelations of migration processes and confronting free-market ideas and nationalist control. For example, Pröbsting puts it this way in a 2015 paper on migration and super-exploitation: Migration is a central issue in most advanced capitalist countries in the Western world. Today migrants represent a significant sector both of the labor force […] as well as of the population. Essentially, migration is part of the fundamental process of the super-exploitation of the so-called Third World by imperialist monopoly capital. Just as the monopoly capital extracts surplus profits from the semi-colonial world, there is also an appropriation of extra profits through migration. Imperialist capital draws profit by paying the migrant workers below the value of their labor force in several ways. As a result, migrants can be characterized as ‘a nationally oppressed layer of super-exploited labour force.’ (Pröbsting, 2015, p. 329)

Céline Cantat also scrutinizes the neoliberal turn, the internationalization of capitalism, and the creation of the Other in the ideological construction labeled as “Europeanism,” and explains what contradictions have led to the creation and rejection of a general “migrant Other” (Cantat, 2016). Accordingly, migration and migrants as a general category have become a focal point for ideas and associated with fierce debate. The intensity of the debate is reflected both in political clashes and in the growing interest and research in this topic in scholarly circles. This is difficult to demonstrate using empirical means. However, the relative frequency of the term “migration debate” in English-language academic books published around the globe (which have made their way into the

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vast database of Google Books) has been on the rise since the 1970s, and the frequency of the word “migration debate” reached a historic peak in the period of globalization from the 1980s onwards. The term “migration” accounts for 0.002% of all words in such publications in this period; that is, its frequency has doubled since the 1960s (Fig. 1.1; see also Fig. 2.1 later, in Chapter 2). Why is the migration debate intensifying during the period of globalization? Why has it become a central theme in political, public, and intellectual disputes in certain regions, and why this way, and this time? Why have anti-migrant discourses gained a foothold in certain regions, as opposed to open-border policies in others, and what historical conditions have facilitated these changes? Why has this occurred in this particular period, and through which historical mechanisms can these debates and their polarization be linked to the processes of marketization? These historical sociological and political-demographic issues make up the backbone of this book; these will be addressed both from a discursive and a historical and socio-material perspective. The whole debate and its flaring-up is the subject of my analysis because I believe—as opposed to many other scholars who conduct research into nationalism— that the interaction shall be examined in its entirety. The new wave of nationalism cannot exist without the pro-globalization, open-border policy arguments, and the discursive critiques that challenge it (Berezin, 2009; Feischmidt, 2014; Harvey, 2005; Kalb, 2011). Nationalist and

Fig. 1.1 Frequency of the term “migration debate” in Google Books database between 1960 and 2019 (Source Ngram Viewer, 2021)

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non-nationalist factions and their associated formations must be considered and analyzed jointly in the given historical and socio-material space and time.

1.2

Formulating the Problem; Overview of the Analysis

This book argues that the global migration debate and the radicalization of Eastern European, especially Hungarian, population discourses can be interpreted as a reaction to deeply embedded historical processes in a global–local space of interaction. The central statement in this book is that the migration turn and the polarized migration debate are a result of marketization and the role that market institutions now globally play in society. Marketization creates a global migration market both on a conceptual and on a material level and brings forth ideas and discourses about managing and controlling markets in the context of a given historical situation. The free movement of capital, the requirement of meeting global market demand, and the associated discourses of the elite play a key role in this turn, although, as will be demonstrated, changes in the public opinion also influence it. The ultimate focus is Eastern Europe, but a global perspective is maintained in order to avoid the trap of Eurocentrism. The radicalization of “anti-migration” discourses in Eastern Europe and some other parts of the world, as opposed to a “pro-migration” perspective, can be interpreted and understood on the basis of historical dynamics involving material and discursive changes. In addition to studies on new nationalism, other analyses of populism and elites in sociology and political anthropology are all relevant for my analysis (Antal, 2019; Best et al., 2012; Fabry, 2019; Hann, 2016, 2019; Körösényi, 2019; Krekó, 2018; Mihályi & Szelényi, 2019; Scheiring, 2020; Sík, 2016; Sík & Lázár, 2019; Szalai, 2014, 2019; Szelényi & Mihályi, 2019). Here I draw on all these approaches. Of course, the present book only involves a specific contribution from historical and political demography to the extremely complex and fertile intellectual debate on the political and social transformation, the rise of authoritarianism. Three major themes are discussed in the book. First, I look at the discursive scenario that existed at the beginning of the period of globalization based on an analysis of policy-related and academic literature on population development and migration. How was migration addressed, and what was the dominant framework within which concepts and ideas

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were formulated in the discourse of the elite and in demographic reports? Then I address societal changes in the past 30–40 years, with special emphasis on marketization and social disembeddedness until the 2010s. After examining the global historical and material conditions, I focus on historical and socio-material processes in Europe and, especially, in Eastern Europe. My starting point is an observation made by Karl Polányi: if the ideas and practice of a free market become predominant, then the demand for social control and nationalism will increase (Polanyi, 1945, 2001). For the case of Eastern Europe, Polányi was even more specific, writing the following as early as in 1945: If the Atlantic Charter really committed us to restore free markets where they have disappeared, we might thereby be opening the door to the reintroduction of a crazy nationalism into regions from which it has disappeared. We should not only be importing unemployment and starvation into the liberated regions simply by ‘liberating’ the local markets; we should also be burdening ourselves with the responsibility of having thrown back the people into the anarchy out of which, by their own exertions, they had just emerged. (Polanyi, 1945, p. 89)

This double movement can be forceful if the market system and marketization process are not met with an effective and integrated counterbalancing. I examine major demographic and migration processes on a global, a continental, and an Eastern European scale. I aim to answer the question what factors (e.g., foreign investment, changes in income levels, deruralization, etc.) drive outmigration (and, through it, immigration) in an age of globalization using a multivariate model, and I examine what focal points of tension have been formed globally and regionally. Furthermore, seeing the prominent role and fragmentary state of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet bloc in this process, I aim to identify concrete historical development trajectories in the region in connection with the rising levels of migration in the global model. I review the uniform yet in some ways varying reactions reflected by opinion polls and political debates in the societies of Eastern Europe. Finally, I connect the historical and socio-material analysis and its results to discursive changes in the period of globalization in order to pinpoint migrationand demography-related discursive transformations, contradictions, and their impact on historical processes. The final goal is to present a fair

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understanding of the intensifying and polarized conflict between promigration, pro-open-border policies, and the anti-migration nationalist faction as a multivariate, complicated process understood as a complex historical event. However, before I start my analysis, it is pivotal to address a few theoretical issues and aspects.

1.3 General Theoretical Questions and Hypotheses Below, I provide the general theoretical and conceptual background of my argument and historical sociological analysis. Specific methodological concerns and details on the use of empirical data will be reviewed when concrete analyses are described. Taken together, we have the following key theoretical assumptions: 1. Historical developments should be seen in their totality and unity. 2. The marketization of societies is a process in which market techniques and market discourses occur beyond the capitalist exchange of commodities. 3. This process leads to reification, as understood very clearly by George Lukács as early as in the first half of the 1920s. 4. The concept and the approach of Gramsci are also important for seeing how discursive blocs evolved as parts of historical-political blocs. 5. Polányi additionally provided key concepts for us via introducing the terminology of double movement, fictitious goods, and embeddedness. 6. Finally, conflicts around migration must be seen as outcomes of competition in societal spheres. 1.3.1

A Dynamic Unity of Historical Processes

The analysis that follows is a historical, historical sociological one. Demographic and migratory processes, related institutional frameworks and discourses, can only be understood as parts of wider social change (de Haas, 2010; Fairclough, 2001; Livi-Bacci, 2017). There is considerable difference in the analysis of historical processes between authors who write about the mechanisms of ideas and consciousness and those who focus on

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historical and socio-material developments. My study aims to break with this traditional disparity and reaches back to perspectives based on earlier Marxist interpretative models that stress the dynamic unity of material and ideational processes and structures. Beyond key ideas of Gramsci and Lukács, the social philosophical background of this study rests, first of all, on the historical framework created by Fernand Braudel and Philip Abrams. Braudel used the concepts of structural history and event history simultaneously, as well as the idea of “conjunctural history” (Braudel, 1980, p. 75). The latter could mean for us the rhythm of expansion and contraction, like the opening-up versus the closing-down phases in the era of globalization. I will demonstrate that concepts of opening-up and marketization cycles, when national economies are massively transformed via foreign direct investment and related institutional changes, are very useful for understanding rising levels of migration. The concept of structuration is also very important to us methodologically, as, according to Philip Abrams referring to Anthony Giddens, it contains. …a theory built round the idea of the ‘fundamentally recursive character of social life’ and designed precisely to express ‘the mutual dependence of structure and agency’ in terms of process in time. (Abrams, 1983, p. xvii, see also pp. ix–xiv, 190–192)

Through this, it becomes possible to capture the dynamics of discursive and material structures and the role of agency—most importantly, that of the political elites, in actively formulating competing historical-political blocs in the face of migration: selective cultural closure versus opening-up. Finally, we should also cite here Ulf Brunnbauer and Grandits (Brunnbauer & Gradits, 2013), who consider real “historical events,” including the rise of new nationalism, to be a consequence of complex connections between temporalities and structures. This analysis interprets the debate on migration and the transformation of Eastern Europe as a historical event and as the joint result of material and discursive structures. 1.3.2

The Concept of Marketization

In this book, marketization means the expansion of the market logic to social spheres previously not dominated by the market. As Karl Polányi put it, marketization means the further expansion of market society

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(Hann, 2018; Joppke, 2021; Polanyi, 2001). These relationships are not the ones of the “normal” supply-and-demand guided market exchange of market goods, but refer to the expansion of such models to other social spheres. This term implies various changes and developments in human societies. One of them is the privatization and market control of economic activity or services previously managed and coordinated under some form of social, communal, or state ownership. These include the marketization of pension, health care, and public utilities. I treat similarly the “externalization” of previously familial or household duties, like care for the elderly or other members of such groups. It may be equally important that certain social relationships, such as those facilitated by social media and infosociety, are increasingly dominated by market interests. In a certain respect, we should also consider the freer movement of foreign capital and that of foreign investment (the increasing role of global markets), as such processes are intimately linked to marketization and, most importantly, privatization. In these processes, due to inherent destruction and market and profit logic, the role of international migrants increases, and this we need to look at closely in this book. Among other changes, one crucial transformation is the rise of the global care industry. This also shows that this is a cumulative process (marketization leads to further marketization). Losing jobs due to privatization, the decline of welfare systems, the informalization of labor markets, and stripping people’s capacity to care about close family members leads to fictitious exchanges of care migrants, meaning that— for instance—women in Romania move to Italy to undertake such duties, while there is a need to “import” care workers for instance from the Philippines or from Ukraine (Aulenbacher, 2020; Gábriel, 2022; Melegh & Katona, 2020). We can observe the same marketization process when new market roles and tasks emerge, like those associated with international labor agencies, who for instance take over the role of organizing care work from social, religious, or other charitable organizations and actors. These are powerful and dynamic processes, which are inherently material and ideational at the same time. It is also important to note that there have been waves of marketization in global history, thus there have been historical periods of expansion and of contraction too (e.g., after World War II) (Braudel, 1980; Burawoy, 2020; Chase-Dunn et al., 1999, 2000; Hann, 2019). In this analysis, I focus only on the most recent cycle of opening-up, while

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I acknowledge that there were similar periods—for example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Brunnbauer, 2016). 1.3.3

Lukács: Reification

Lukács linked the analysis of consciousness to the expansion of commodity relations and the reification that inevitably follows from it. If the market dominates, the consciousness of society is imbued with commodity relations and rationalization, engendering a process of reification: … this development of the commodity to the point where it becomes the dominant form in society did not take place until the advent of modern capitalism… The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted essence when it becomes the universal category of society as a whole. Only in this context does the reification produced by commodity relations assume decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and for the stance adopted by men towards it. (Lukács, 1971, p. 86)

This means that marketization is a general process. It is expansive and it penetrates and informs social relations and associated forms of consciousness, including migration and the concepts associated with it. Among other aspects, it is also very important within this process that there is a tendency to rationalize social life in its totality: We are concerned above all with the principle at work here: the principle of rationalisation based on what is and can be calculated.… The capitalist process of rationalisation based on private economic calculation requires that every manifestation of life shall exhibit this very interaction between details which are subject to laws and a totality ruled by chance. It presupposes a society so structured. It produces and reproduces this structure in so far as it takes possession of society. (Lukács, 1971, p. 102)

One of the main claims in this book is that in this process of marketization, the market integration of migration advanced more and more, a global labor market emerged, and this is associated with a rational, abstract, and universalized market category in terms of its “management.” It was reified, to use Lukács’s term. Such processes have also happened earlier, in the later nineteenth century, but a new cycle started in this regard after 1980.

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It is important to note, before a more substantial analysis, that the scholarly literature on migration demonstrates the importance of this development. According to Xiang and Lindquist, the strengthening of the market infrastructure of migration is one of the key drivers of the increase in migration levels themselves (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). In an article from 2001, John Salt directly referred to an emerging global migration business: Finally, there are grounds for suggesting a rethink of the concept of international migration. An alternative view is that it is a diverse international business, wielding a vast budget, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs world-wide, and managed by a set of individuals, agencies and institutions each of which has an interest in promoting the business. (Salt, 2001, p. 32)

This leads to the reification not only in the market exchange of labor, but also in scholarly circles, governments, international organizations, and entities, which also applied a market language and mode of thinking when they started developing concepts like “managed migration.” It is important to clarify that science itself has an inherent tendency to create abstract categories, but here the point is not just abstractness but understanding the complex phenomenon, including family migration and seeking asylum, as based on or to be integrated into market rationality on collective and individual levels. In my view, this development transforms the discourse on migration and polarizes the debate. There are protagonists of such rationality and there are those who challenge this approach, at least partially (like nationalist isolation or the developmentalist critique of the market). Therefore, there are discursive blocs in support of market transformation and open borders, while there are also blocs that promote strict border measures and state control, and there are those blocs that call into question marketization and market relations due to their perceived cultural and social consequences. 1.3.4

Gramsci: Hegemony and Historical-Political Blocs

Gramsci’s train of thought was very similar to that of Lukács’ in this regard. The concept of a historical-political bloc that connects elements of structure and consciousness in a dynamic frame will prove useful in this analysis. Gramsci argues:

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One must therefore distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or ‘willed’. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organize’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. … The analysis of these propositions tends, I think, to reinforce the conception of historical bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces. (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 376–377)

From the point of view of this analysis, what is most important in this argument is that the concepts, perceptions, and interpretations of migration can only become a historical driving force if they fit the given material structures. Otherwise, they remain “phantasies” and propaganda. This is an important point for understanding the process of historical transformation: the discursive blocs analyzed in this book have the potential to develop into historical driving forces through their congruence with material structures in the era of globalization, thus becoming cornerstones of historical-political blocs. This connection was seen by Gramsci as a key element in hegemony and counter-hegemony, and for him it served as a foundation of the merger into historical-political blocs. In our case, this involves the transformation of migration- and marketization-related discursive perspectives into historical-political forces and their solidification into historical-political blocs of power, including ideological hegemony. Gramsci argues: Is it perhaps that the structure is thought of as something immobile and absolute and not rather as reality itself in movement? And does not the statement in the Theses on Feuerbach about the ‘educator who must be educated’ posit a necessary relation of active reaction by man upon the structure, affirming the unity of the process of reality? The concept of ‘historical bloc’ constructed by Sorel grasped precisely in full this unity upheld by the philosophy of praxis. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 194)

Thus, in this book, behind the radicalization and the struggle between discursive blocs I identify the long-term transformation of migration and demographic processes as well as political economic structures, coupled

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with a strong marketization wave that can be collectively labeled the opening-up cycle of globalization. Migration processes and structures associated with marketization have also reconfigured population and migration discourses. This debate and transformation cannot be explained by the short-term political interests and moves of politicians—even though they all had their share in shaping these complex developments. Instead, we need to identify the historical opportunities that opened up for the studied societies, regions, and political communities during the period of historical social transformation. We need to understand how the given historical actors have grasped these opportunities. This inner reflexivity is crucial because it helps to avoid relying on reference points that are non-immanent (i.e., external) to the given historical and material processes. 1.3.5

Polányi: Double Movement, Fictitious Commodity, and Embeddedness

The above-described developments all happen historically and one should see how different blocs emerge through a historical process. There is a certain historical dialectic between the different historical blocs and their discursive aspects. The abrupt opening-up phase in the 1980s and 1990s was dominated by pro-market discursive blocs, the hegemony of which was successfully questioned by nationalist forces only from the 2000s and, most importantly, after the 2008 economic crisis. These critiques appeared very soon, but they could not successfully challenge the liberal hegemony of the opening-up. Changes can thus be interpreted as “double movements” that gained momentum. It was Chris Hann who first drew attention to this aspect (Hann, 2016, 2019; Lengyel, 2017; Polanyi, 2001). Besides the rise of nationalist blocs, it is also important to understand why other types of double movements (the systemic critique of market mechanisms, not just their cultural aspects from an ethnocentric point of view) failed to gain a foothold in the analyzed period. I will stress that the actual strength and rise of double movements are shaped by national migratory, demographic, and political trajectories; in other words, by variations of migratory capitalism. Any simplistic claim to automatisms is not only futile but can be misleading. For instance, a wide variety of reactions can be detected in public opinions in Eastern Europe concerning

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migration, while many of the key structural features are similar and such “contradictions” need to be solved through a complex historical analysis. Some further ideas and approaches formulated by Polányi are also pivotal for understanding the migration turn. The concept of fictitious commodities is essential, because, just as Lukács pointed out the totalizing force of commodity relations, Polányi noted how something that is not produced to be a commodity may be turned into a fictitious commodity (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 71–81). Land, labor, and money were named by Polányi as examples of such, but many forms of migration can also turn into fictitious commodities. Migration is massively integrated into familial, household, and other forms of social relations—for example, in the case of family reunification, educational, or any kind of professional migration, care migration, the migration of the elderly, of refugees, or ecological migration. In these cases, migration is just partially market-oriented and migrants themselves reject seeing this as a cost–benefit exercise (Kovács & Melegh, 2001; Melegh et al., 2018). Thus, they can be marketized only in a fictitious way, while global organizations and other actors want to see and manage them exactly like this (Burawoy, 2020). One can also talk of a fictitious exchange of migrants (populations) when, following a market logic, there are ideas of exchanging immigrants for emigrants as demographic and economic assets of a country (Melegh & Sárosi, 2015). This idea is based on the abstract valorization of groups and can be linked to the politicized and culturally loaded concept of the far right called the “great replacement.” In addition to the perspectives detailed above, Polányi’s concept of embeddedness is also useful in the analysis of both migratory demographic processes and population discourses. In fact, the embeddedness of migration and demographic processes is the logical counterpoint of the above arguments about the fictitious nature of migration. Here, I stress only one further aspect. According to Hann, Polányi’s concept of embeddedness is more historic than is usually acknowledged in the scholarly literature of economic sociology and anthropology (Hann, 2021). In the latter approach, levels and forms of embeddedness versus disembeddedness historically change. This argument fits the interpretation of Polányi’s thoughts by Granovetter, who takes the view that some form of embeddedness is present in all societies, even in market-dominated ones (otherwise they would not be able to operate), but its form and level can change, and the shock of disembeddedness is also present (Granovetter, 1985; Hann, 2019).

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From a demographic perspective, embeddedness and disembeddedness are basic concepts, as it is the family, households, and other social units that bring up children and take care of the elderly and the sick in a reproductive process. Disembeddedness (more exactly, the decline and change of embeddedness) can lead to individual and family decisions that are rooted in some form of exclusion. The loss of jobs, the collapse of socialist industries and sectors, a rise in foreign ownership can increase the international migration of workers and families. This connection is also emphasized by household economics and network and world-systems theories about migration, although they sometimes fail to apply Polányi’s concept directly (Massey, 1999; Portes, 1995; Sassen, 1988). The deterioration of welfare systems is also an important issue, as it contributes to the growing intensity of mass migration (Hárs, 2016, 2019). 1.3.6

The Social Background of Migration Conflicts and Competition

It is a key hypothesis in this book, in connection with the polarization of the migration debate and the migration turn, that growing disembeddedness (the loss of social security and the security of jobs, increasing market exposure, and the decline of non-market-related social institutions) strengthens the perception of growing competition. The emerging insecurity then generates a need to protect already obtained resources and rights and to exclude newcomers by various measures. The sense of competition and its relationship to migration was considered a major issue as early as in the writings of Malthus and Marx (Barrows, 2010; Ghosh, 1963; Szreter, 2018; Woods, 1986). This problem was formulated in American urban sociology, and most importantly, in the intersection between racial and class relations in British sociology (e.g., Rex, 1970). At the same time, it has led to major debate when related to welfare and, lately, ecological conflict (Frey, 2011; Helbling & Kriesi, 2014; Lafleur & Mescoli, 2018; Razin & Sadka, 2005; Urdal, 2005). In the analysis below, I draw on the arguments of Dancygier that social conflicts about migration are particularly bitter when newcomers and immigrants are granted some access to community resources and welfare services (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017; Dancygier, 2010). As we will see, in the cycle of opening-up during globalization there is ample evidence of growing competition, as well as of an increase in the opportunity to obtain better social security, higher income and allowances through

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migration, and the growing entitlements of newcomers, as shown by the development history of the European Union (Andor, 2017; Dancygier, 2010; Joppke, 2021). All this happened in an era when levels of redistribution stagnated globally or decreased—e.g., in Eastern Europe— thus increasing the stress in already fragile social welfare systems. This competition is not necessarily caused by migration (or by the immigrants themselves), but declining welfare services can induce migration, which is clearly illustrated by the increase in the migration of care workers due to the limited welfare benefits given to families involved in caring (Andor, 2017; Melegh & Katona, 2020). 1.3.7

Inner Reflexivity

Beyond the inner reflexivity of the analysis that concerns the link between ideational and socio-material processes, I make a further effort to identify the immanent drivers and factors of global social change. I carry out a multilevel analysis, starting with global change and then moving on to European and East European levels and contexts, to see how local developments can be best contextualized within the frame of global structural potentials and developments. I also follow a strict historical logic. First, I look at discursive scenarios and changes in the 1980s to see what structures of meanings were available before the socio-material processes associated with the opening-up took effect. Then, analyzing demographic and migratory processes in a complex manner and clarifying possible links to discursive changes, I move on to the actual history of discursive changes in order to see how the interlinkage has been evolving and has created a new scenario. I take into account global hierarchies not only in terms of socio-material processes but also when examining how the discursive interaction has evolved concerning population development and how Western and non-Western forms of discourse have been interrelated; thus, I carry out transnational analysis (Glick-Schiller & Wimmer, 2005; Hartmann & Unger, 2014; Melegh, 2006). This book is a conscious attempt to offer a Marxist analysis of global social change. After all, this perspective is what made the classics of Marxism so special and so erudite—from Marx to Lenin, Lukács, Gramsci, and Ernst Bloch.

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Melegh, A. (2006). On the east-west slope. Globalization, nationalism, racism and discourses on Central and Eastern Europe. Central European University Press. Melegh, A., Gábriel, D., Gresits, G., & Hámos, D. (2018). Abandoned Hungarian workers and the political economy of care work in Austria. Szociológiai Szemle, 28(4), 61–87. Melegh, A., & Katona, N. (2020). Towards a scarcity of care? Tensions and contradictions in transnational elderly care systems in Central and Eastern Europe. In A. Melegh & N. Katona (Eds.), Towards a scarcity of care? Tensions and contradictions in transnational elderly care systems in central and eastern Europe (pp. 9–25). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Melegh A., & Sárosi A. (2015). Magyarország bekapcsolódása a migrációs folyamatokba: Történeti-strukturális megközelítés. Demográfia, 58(4), 221– 265. https://doi.org/10.21543/DEM.58.4.1 Mihályi P., & Szelényi I. (2019). Rent-seekers, profits, wages and inequality. The top 20%. Palgrave Pivot. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03846-5 Mohdin, A. (2018, January 24). The fastest shrinking countries on earth are in Eastern Europe. Quartz. https://qz.com/1187819/country-ranking-worldsfastest-shrinking-countries-are-in-eastern-europe/ MTI. (2015, January 12). A gazdasági bevándorlást meg kell állítani. Miniszterelnok.Hu. https://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/cikk/a_gazd asagi_bevandorlast_meg_kell_allitani Ngram Viewer. (2021). Google books database. https://books.google.com/ ngrams OECD. (2018). Settling in 2018: Indicators of immigrant integration. Organisation for economic co-operation and development. https://doi.org/10.1787/ 9789264307216-en Orbán, V. (2017, January 23). Orbán Viktor beszéde a Lámfalussy Lectures szakmai konferencián. Miniszterelnök.Hu. https://www.miniszterelnok.hu/ orban-viktor-beszede-lamfalussy-lectures-szakmai-konferencian/ Orrenius, P. (2016). Benefits of immigration outweigh the costs. The Catalyst. A Journal of Ideas from the Bush Institute, 2. http://www.bushcenter.org/cat alyst/north-american-century/benefits-of-immigration-outweigh-costs.html Polanyi, K. (1945). Universal capitalism or regional planning? The London Quarterly of World Affairs, 10(3), 86–91. Polanyi, K. (2001). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time (2nd ed.). Beacon Press. Portes, A. (Ed.). (1995). The economic sociology of immigration: Essays on networks, ethnicity, and entrepreneurship. Russell Sage Foundation. Pröbsting, M. (2015). Migration and super-exploitation: Marxist theory and the role of migration in the present period of capitalist decay. Critique, 43(3–4), 329–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/03017605.2015.1099846

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Razin, A., & Sadka, E. (2005). The decline of the welfare State: Demography and globalization. MIT Press. Rex, J. (1970). Race relations in sociological theory. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. Salt, J. (2001). Current trends in international migration in Europe (CDMG 33). Council of Europe. https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/migration/archives/ Documentation/Migration%20management/2001_Salt_report_en.pdf Sassen, S. (1988). Foreign investment: A neglected variable. In The mobility of labor and capital: A study in international investment and labor flow (pp. 12– 25). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO978051159 8296.002 Scheiring, G. (2020). Egy demokrácia halála. Az autoriter kapitalizmus és a felhalmozó állam felemelkedése Magyarországon. Napvilág. Sík, E. (2016). Egy hungarikum: A morális pánikgomb (tanulmányterv). Mozgó Világ, 10, 67–80. Sík, E., & Lázár, D. (2019). A morálispánik-gomb 2.0. Mozgó Világ, 11. Szalai, E. (2014). Autonómia vagy újkiszolgáltatottság: Tanulmányok és publicisztikai írások 2012–2014. Kalligram. Szalai, E. (2019). Hatalom és értelmiség a globális térben. Tanulmányok és publicisztikai írások 2015–2018. Kalligram. Szelényi, I., & Mihályi, P. (2019). Varieties of post-communist capitalism: A comparative analysis of Russia, Eastern Europe and China. Brill. Szreter, S. (2018). Marx on population: A bicentenary celebration. Population and Development Review, 44(4), 745–769. The Economist. (2018, May 15). Has migration gone too far? https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=xt-e8JQZmqw The Economist. (2019). How migration could make the world richer. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjKYtfpe1a0 Tiido, A. (2015). The Russian minority issue in Estonia: Host state policies and the attitudes of the population. Polish Journal of Political Science, 1(4), 45–63. Urdal, H. (2005). People vs. Malthus: Population pressure, environmental degradation, and armed conflict revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 42(4), 417–434. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305054089 Woods, R. (1986). Review: Coleman David and Schofield Roger, (Eds.), The state of population theory: Forward from Malthus. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.) Pages: 311. £29.50 (hardback). Continuity and Change, 1(3), 449– 451. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0268416000000369 Xiang, B., & Lindquist, J. (2014). Migration infrastructure. International Migration Review, 48(Suppl. 1 Suppl), 122–148. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre. 12141

CHAPTER 2

The Migration Turn and Demographic Discourses in the 1980s

2.1 The Migration Turn from the 1980s Onwards and Opening-Up to Globalization From the 1980s onwards, the world became increasingly mobile and the number of migrants started to grow rapidly. According to World Bank statistics, 93,634,000 people were living outside of their home countries in 1980, and this number reached 136,304,000 by 1990. This increase in migration exceeded the rate of growth of the world’s population after a period when it had remained below it. This change showed that a migration turn had started globally (Fig. 2.1). This increase occurred in “peacetime”—that is, at a time without global armed conflict that would have induced the movement of masses. Naturally, there were severe conflicts, and the number of violent clashes was on the rise, but the global wave of violence had not escalated into an intensive world war (Strand et al., 2019). However, the lives of tens of millions of people turned into living hell—such as for many in Afghanistan, Iran, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. As a result, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees reported an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers from 8.5 million to more than 23 million, which means that their number tripled. However, the main reason behind the migration turn was not this development, but rather the transformation of the global economic order, which is also associated with the surge in the number of violent conflicts. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9_2

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200% 180% 160% 140% 120% Global stock of migrants 1960=100%

100% 80%

World population 1960= 100%

60% 40% 20% 0% 1960

1970

1980

1990

Fig. 2.1 Relative changes in the number of migrants and global population, 1960–1990 (Source Global Bilateral Migration [2021])

As our multivariate macro analysis will show, the migration turn is a product of a more complex set of factors arising from global economic change. One of the most important elements of this historically emerging economic constellation is the increasingly free movement of capital in the world and the rise of global income levels. These processes, combined with the cumulative effects of past inequalities and a political shift towards a “free market,” have led to the collapse of the world’s non-capitalist systems (socialisms), the final decline of the peasant world, and the even deeper marketization of world societies, which factors have directly and indirectly increased levels of mobility around the world. The radical transformation of the world economy is clearly illustrated by the fact that in the 1980s the value of inflow of foreign capital barely reached half a percent of new value produced, while by the year 1990 it had reached 1% according to World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2020). The stock of directly invested capital also grew throughout this era. According to UNCTAD data, at the beginning of

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the period (in the 1980s), the stock of foreign capital barely exceeded 6% of world GDP, while by 1990 it had reached 10% (UNCTADstat, 2020). This opening cycle partly transformed the key institutions of the world economy, creating conjunctures in global history. It brought about profound changes in ownership and privatization; it changed the nature of redistribution by states, transformed welfare services in the wealthiest part of the world, and hampered their development in other places, while it reinforced the global organization of markets and associated profree-market ideologies (Chase-Dunn et al., 1999, 2000; Harvey, 2005; Joppke, 2021). As we will see later, the initial phase of this cycle of opening-up and more intensive capital/human mobility affected global society at a very specific demographic moment, and these processes were also interlinked. The 1970s also marked a demographic turning point in several aspects. It is important globally that, after previous stagnation, a radical decline in the total fertility rate from 5 to 2.5 persons occurred in the early 1970s. Largely as a result of this change but, to a lesser extent, to the increase in life expectancy (which can be attributed to a radical improvement in infant mortality), the median age of the population has risen since the 1970s, starting off from 21–22 years; this increase started accelerating from the late 1980s onwards (United Nations, 2019). This not only shows that in the period under study humanity was experiencing a slowdown in the radical growth that began in the eighteenth century, but it is also a good indication of the radical transformation of the age composition of the population. The peak in growth, at just over 2% per year, was visible between 1965 and 1970. The slowdown in the rate that started at that time only occurred slowly between the mid-seventies and the end of the eighties (United Nations, 2019). Thus, mankind entered a new demographic phase. Hence, the question is what interactions, mechanisms, and contradictions can be observed between and within discursive and material processes that help understand the turnaround of our times. Let us first look at the patterns of population and migration discourse of the 1980s; i.e., a new cycle of opening-up and the first stage of population aging and transformation, before embarking on a complex analysis of globalization dynamics and interactions.

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2.2

The Internal Tensions and Contradictions of Global Population Discourses in the 1980s Concerning Migration

During the 1980s, the ambivalence and the internal tensions associated with population discourses became very clear. Before humanity ventured on a neoliberal turn, internal biopolitical tensions built up and then erupted during the migration turn. It seems that market fundamentalism engendered the dichotomization and polarization of debates about how to manage population development globally and locally. 2.2.1

Historical Introduction. Free Markets and an Abortion Ban Instead of Progress: Neoconservatism and the New Era

Since its foundation, the UN has devoted considerable effort to addressing the demographic problems of the world; moreover, it considered the latter an issue of global governance. An important forum for these efforts was the series of World Conferences on Population, the first of which was held in Rome in 1954, followed by two meetings in Eastern European capitals (Belgrade in 1965 and Bucharest in 1974), and then in Mexico City in 1984. This conference, which, at least according to Cliquet, an eminent scholar of demography, placed much more emphasis on the results of scholarship than earlier ones, brought about surprises and an ideological turn (Avramov & Cliquet, 2016; Dobo¸s, 2018). Moreover, it was spearheaded by a country that no one had expected to make such a turn: the United States. The United States had been a major driving force behind the “family planning industry” that combined Malthusianism with eugenics and racist ideas and had a hegemonic position in many parts of the previously colonized world (Demény, 1988; Melegh, 2006, pp. 67– 68). Ronald Reagan and his government decided to back out of this and announced a neoconservative turn. Giving in to anti-abortion lobby groups, he refused to support programs that considered abortion to be an acceptable form of birth control and fertility reduction (Avramov & Cliquet, 2016). Debates in the 1970s were dominated by the ideological antagonism between progress vs. population control. The socialist countries in Eastern Europe, along with a number of countries outside Europe (such as Argentina, China, Cuba, and Peru) prioritized the transformation of

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society and economy and social planning as opposed to direct demographic interventions (Dobo¸s, 2018; Frey, 2011). By the early 1980s, this fundamental disagreement had paved the way to a peculiar discursive framework. Instead of nation-based capitalist or non-capitalist developmental models based on modernization ideologies, it was now the free market combined with ethnic and religious fundamentalisms that was viewed as a solution to the demographic crisis. In this ideological attack, all problems associated with historically inherited civilizational and racist mental hierarchies and material inequalities were ignored. A file of documents about the US government’s preparations for the population congress in Mexico, preserved in the Ronald Reagan Library, sheds light on the novel elements of the debate in this period (Cicconi, 2004). It is worthwhile examining these documents that, although accidentally put together, nicely represent the thematic linkages and structures of their time. They reveal some dynamics that impacted the discursive patterns of population and migration that were still prevalent at that time, which I will address in more detail in the next subchapter. The first document in the file is a statement issued by Human Life International, announcing that, under pressure from the United States Agency for International Development and an NGO called International Planned Parenthood, Honduras was about to legalize abortion. This statement, which attacked the liberal governmental elite, was followed by another from the spokesperson of the American Life Lobby. The latter document states that “communist” China and Iran, under the leadership of the Shah, had received support to perform forced abortions due to the prevailing “cultural imperialism” at the United States Agency for International Development. Then follows a vitriolic “whistleblower” paper addressed to Islamic pro-life groups “revealing” that some representatives of the above-mentioned US institutions are “detrimental to health” and were enforcing population control programs financed by these representatives and UN institutions. According to this paper, this was one of the main reasons why the Shah lost his power. Written in a style that resembles the aggressive language of present-day media, the document stated that sending one of the US functionaries to the world congress in Mexico was equivalent to “sending Adolf Eichmann to a Holocaust commemoration.” The next document in the file is an article from the Washington Post, which, in connection with urging a stop to support for population control, scourges “repressive economic policies” that allegedly

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“punish those who work, save and invest”; that is, those who oppose the free market. This neoliberal turn, introduced through addressing demographic problems, also appears in a historical essay published by Richard Tomlinson in the Wall Street Journal, which also made its way into this file of documents. Tomlinson’s critique of Mitterrand’s social democratic policies implies that despite—or, as he states, because of—direct governmental intervention, his administration had failed to find a reasonable solution to low fertility rates and the aging of the population. This failure, according to Tomlinson, posed a threat to French geopolitical influence, and even foreshadowed the decline of “Western civilization” as such (Tomlinson, 1984). That is, in spite of the state’s interference in demographic processes—similar to that of East Germany or Romania— the extreme, anti-marriage feminism promoted by the French government made it impossible to reverse the tendencies towards deterioration. This narrative of decline that is well-known from the 1930s was combined here with another, even more “hazardous” theme: immigration. This discursive connection is worth citing: Yet everyone agrees that the presence of immigrants is increasing, because the government cannot control their entry into the country and their birth rate is much higher than the rest of French society. Some demographers have predicted that within 20 years immigrants will constitute almost 25% of the population. (Tomlinson, 1984, p. 31)

In other words, he formulated a criticism against state intervention and urged counteracting seemingly uncontrollable immigration in the name of national and civilizational preservation and revitalization. Thus, anti-abortion and anti-immigration sentiments and the critique of liberal elites and NGOs were combined with a radical pro-market ideology and a vision of historical and civilizational decline. This combination reflects a conservative fundamentalist turn at a time when the migration turn was unfolding. This pattern is even more prevalent in other parts of this file of documents: in the proposals tabled during the preparation for the congress in Mexico, the authors continuously castigated pro-abortion views and the “ineffectiveness” of measures taken by the government. Moreover, in protecting “free market institutions, technological development and economic expansion,” they thematized “disruptive control over currency exchange rates” in these demography-related papers. This can be interpreted in only one way: they sought to challenge fixed exchange rates

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that restricted the flow of capital and held the view that the freedom of capital would represent the solution to demographic and social problems. In this respect, this file of documents and the material in it radically reconfigured discourses. In addition to foreshadowing of discursive patterns and concepts of the “enemy” that would become predominant by the 2010s, they also defined the interrelations and dimensions that facilitated a paradoxical combination of market and ethnic fundamentalisms and identity politics that emerged as a new constellation for the forthcoming period (Antal, 2019). To understand these developments, we need to examine what other discursive patterns of migration and population existed globally at that time, as these evolved historically through interactions with each other and with socio-material processes.

2.3 Discursive Patterns of the Elites, Biopolitics, and the Opening-Up to Globalization 2.3.1

Biopolitics, Transnational Demography and Migration Discourses: A Note on Sources, Concepts, and Methodology

In my analysis, I examine major population discourses as they appeared in texts and reports written by or associated with academic, political, and policymaking elites. I concentrate on types of texts that had a great impact on academic thinking and policymaking in the 1980s. These discursive patterns of local and global elites served as a basis for the interpretative framework within which the changes induced by globalization were understood. These standardized types of elite discourse never existed in a pure form or isolated from the outside world. It is difficult to assess how influential or widespread they were, and to what extent they facilitated real action in society, as it is hard to find direct evidence and data about this. It is challenging to measure how pervasive such patterns can be. Among other difficulties, most texts utilize more than one discursive pattern, and the latter may even interact with each other. However, it is necessary to examine this toolkit in order to obtain a better understanding of the historical dynamics of discursive (biopolitical) changes, and to see the discursive space in which the migration turn and the debate on migration started to unfold. The concept of biopolitics is important in this analysis. It is understood as a historical concept that cannot be simply attributed to the capitalist

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system, even though it was clearly brought about by capitalism and it was the capitalist system that determined its basic character. I use the word “biopolitics” to designate institutional administrative procedures, structures, and discourses that serve the economic order and involve the observation, categorization, and evaluation of mass processes and large social groups based on their “usefulness” in the given order. The basic meaning of this concept was defined by Michel Foucault, who drew attention to the fact that the main political dilemma inherent in this concept is the deliberation of “worthiness” based on mass statistics informed by biodemographic balances, and this political process necessarily leads to exclusion. Moreover, this is how racisms and related exclusions become inherent in modern political systems (Foucault, 1991). This also means that interventions by demographic policies may inherently lead to the institutionalization of such discourses. However, there is a precondition: it only works this way if the dominant social mechanisms are based on competition and marketization, and even if there is global rivalry between national economies and polities. I will demonstrate that the historical changes of biopolitical discourses (e.g., from fertility-focused views towards the migration turn) are interconnected with waves of marketization and the expansion of the market into further spheres of society, as well as reification (Lukács, 1971). This is especially important in terms of the migration turn. Population discourses must, therefore, be understood historically and globally (Bashford, 2014; Hartmann & Unger, 2014; Quine, 1996; M. S. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985; M. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998; Thornton, 2004). A constant feature of unevenly developing, global, and competitive capitalism is biopolitical competition; i.e., when states and political communities compete to acquire the demographic resources, they consider critical without changing or even challenging the fundamentals of the system. The main characteristic of this competition is that states and their associated elites consider the population as a resource to be tackled and regulated, and they intervene to secure the position of their own countries and groups. The discursive patterns thus created are defined by their relationship to each other and to the global hierarchies. In the period of modern capitalism, even non-capitalist societies followed these patterns. Under the state socialist system that competed with the West in the twentieth century, it was socialist modernization

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and biopolitical competition that informed the content, order, and operational mechanisms of interrelated demographic discourses (e.g., opposing American anti-natalism with socialist pronatalism, for instance). Population discourses are forms of knowledge production that interpret and define the key elements of “population development” from the point of view of the rationality of power within the logic of capital, while also identifying the interventions that can be used to define basic equilibria and create the “optimal framework for development” in a given situation (Mészáros, 2022). The range of instruments and measures available in demographic policy, which are also linked to different political purposes, is vast, and the options include pro-birth, anti-abortion, anti-birth and/or family support measures, sterilization, health policy measures, pro-admission migration policies, or forced displacement, and even mass murder. To mention a few examples in the 1980s: the system of family support was considerably expanded in Hungary, while this was also the period when the most severe anti-abortion measures were implemented by the Ceaus, escu regime, and when most of the German minority in Romania was “bought” by West Germany. The one-child policy was introduced in China in September 1980; this was also the period when the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was persecuted, and when member states of the European Economic Community started to coordinate their strategies on migration (de Haas et al., 2018; Greenhalgh, 2003; Kligman, 1998; Melegh, 2006). Of course, several different discourses may potentially influence a given political program, and these also intermingled. It is important to emphasize that these discourses interacted both nationally and globally, and therefore, they must be understood in a transnational context (Brunnbauer & Gradits, 2013; Hartmann, 2014; Kiss, 2010; Melegh, 2006, pp. 49–96, 2014, 2017). In addition to the above aspects, these discourses are also organized around general theoretical standpoints. Amartya Sen drew attention to the necessity of distinguishing between population theories that approach demographic behavior from the point of view of social situation (understood as demand oriented) and those from the population side (supply oriented). This is a key issue because theories and discourses that promote the priority of the social side infer completely different dynamics than those that consider population as something that has its own tendencies (Melegh, 2001, pp. 14–23; Sen, 1994, 1996, pp. 1044–1051). This distinction must be kept in mind during the analysis of the transnational demographic discourses.

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Migration policies and discourses have been analyzed and categorized in a variety of ways, independently of population discourses. Ideological categories have often been used (left wing, right wing, etc.), and various classifications of migration discourses and ideologies have frequently been constructed (Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006; Brunnbauer, 2009; Cole, 2000; Favell, 1998; Feischmidt, 1997; Geddes, 2003; Glick-Schiller & Wimmer, 2005; Gödri & Melegh, 2009; Joppke, 1999; Kovács & Vidra, 2004; Zolberg, 1999). One of the most important of these classifications, which had already been developed by the 1980s, can be summarized as follows. Multiculturalism is based on the acknowledgment of the right of different groups to maintain and protect their differences. This kind of politics, which mainly manifests in the educational system and in the cultural and public sphere, is rarely elevated to the level of official policies and very often appears only as de facto multiculturalism. This means that there is no discursive urge to create a homogeneous cultural and social environment, and different groups receive considerable state or civic support to facilitate their integration, while at the same time they are supposed to retain their own cultural character. Assimilation concentrates on the supposed homogenous equality of citizens instead of their differences. Citizens are part of the nation’s general mission and its values, regardless of background and migration. Neutrality is emphasized at the expense of suppressing differences. Assimilation assumes that “brought-in” identities are gradually given up, and there is a common identity that absorbs different kinds of distinctiveness. There is also a claim of full individual equality before the law, even if it does not mean the equality of exercise of available rights. It is important to note that the right to be “different,” along with forms of ethnic self-organization, is transferred or suppressed to the local level. Selective exclusion involves managing the residence of foreign citizens and their admission into the country for the purpose of employment or other forms of the common good; however, this discourse usually ignores their integration into the nation’s political community, and there are great legal and institutional difficulties involved with obtaining citizenship. There are serious legal conditions attached to obtaining residence; it is only on the basis of these conditions that someone can reside in a country and then only temporarily. Transnationalism involves stressing cross-border connections and has recently reconfigured discourses of international law, social policy, and

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theory. International legal regulations that are rooted in general human rights are becoming key topics and have supra-state validity as they are applicable even if someone fails to obtain a residence or work permit in a given country. Many analysts consider the spread of dual and multicitizenship as a related change, and this legal institution is being adopted by an increasing number of countries, even by those that had previously refrained from it. Initiatives aimed at facilitating the contact between ethnic minorities and their mother countries can also be counted here (Brubaker, 1995). This may involve extending citizenship to people who live outside the borders, and the latter may even be able to obtain it without moving to the country that offers the citizenship. Legal ties that guarantee institutionalized privileges for groups of a given ethnicity, regardless of citizenship, are also parts of transnationalism. One such example is the so-called status law in Hungary in the early 2000s, although this may also serve as an example of selective inclusion, as it points towards a kinship-based pattern of inclusion. However, I count it here as an institution of transnationalism (Melegh et al., 2021). The above approaches are usually not associated with population discourses, and migration policies and trends are discussed without mentioning these. However, these links must be taken into account and the analysis below takes a step forward in this regard. Migration discourses are part of demographic discourses, and certain topics, such as migration, fertility, mortality, and partnerships, cannot be separated, as these together form a discursive pattern in the given biopolitical milieu (Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001). In the age of global capitalism, all “elements of the population” can be abstracted and assessed, and these evaluations are interrelated and, as we will see, can lead to concepts like the “great replacement.” Even when the issue of migration is not made the focus of public discussions, the discursive patterns in a given society link the questions of demography with those of migration. This is necessarily so, because—even though different patterns of “population supply” exist—there are only two ways to become a member of a population: by birth or by immigration; and two ways to leave it: by death or by emigration. The main demographic discourses have the potential to integrate the issue of migration differently. As we will see in the typology, these discourses must be examined in the context of global historical processes in order to be able to categorize them into types that are historically useful for this analysis, and to be able to detect historical changes.

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During the analysis, I use a variety of empirical data as sources. The changes in migration and the associated processes, as reflected in discursive categories, can be measured and analyzed in various ways, but the methodology of observation inescapably remains problematic. Below, I base my arguments mainly on an n-gram analysis of the Google Books corpus that primarily encompasses scholarly literature written in English. The frequency of certain expressions and words can be checked in more than 40 million books in the database (Lee, 2019). The database itself can be described as follows. The free Google Books Ngram Viewer tool (http://books.google.com/ngrams) gives the frequency of n-grams, composed of five or less (n) elements (n-grams), in the Google Books digital corpus. By standardizing the distribution of each n-gram with the number of digitized books published in a given year, the database ensures the comparability of results over time. A detailed description of the tool is available in a study by Michel et al. (2011). The statistics for non-English-language books produced puzzling and hardly analyzable results, while it is clear that the analysis needs to be extended beyond the English language. I used data for other major languages too, but only as complementary datasets; English is the predominant language in global governance and global discourses. It is worthwhile noting here that a historical analysis of the expressions used in demography has been done before, and some excellent results have been disseminated in high-ranking publications (Bijak et al., 2014; Héran, 2013). Another important source for the joint analysis of demographic and migration discourses is the UN’s World Population Policies Database and the associated publications. The UN has collected population policies since 1975. These tables (United Nations, 2020), as well as the definitions used in the database (United Nations, 2018), are available online. In the first period (between 1976 and 1986) there were short written reports on each country, with discussion of whether they had a distinct population policy, and what was the basic position of policy makers on population matters and related interventions. Furthermore, reports on interactions with experts were also collected. At the same time, all information was included in a table, based on specific criteria as included in Appendix 1. A further source is the document collection of the World Bank from 1947 to 2018, available online (World Bank, 2019). From this online collection, which comprises more than 42,000 documents, I selected those that discuss migration or contain the expression “migration,”

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thus created a database of 1550 documents which were each available individually. I also used bibliographies of academic journals, including the Population Index database that was designed to cover the world’s demographic and population literature. The Population Index was published between 1937 and 1999 by the Office of Population Research at Princeton. This list monitored a wide range of demography-themed scholarly publications globally, including the Hungarian journal titled Demográfia. The list included some journals that focused exclusively on migration, such as Migration Studies, the International Migration Review, and International Migration. The changes were not related to the changes in the number of such publications in the database (on the database and the sources, see Population Index, 2000). In this analysis and typology, I also draw on previous historical analyses that explore the historical background and internal mechanisms of typified demographic discourses (see, among others, Bashford, 2007, 2014; Kiss, 2010; Melegh, 2006, 2014, 2017, 2019; Quine, 1996; M. S. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985; M. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998; Thornton, 2004; Turda, 2010; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001). 2.3.2

The Rise of Migration as a Distinct Discursive Category in the 1960s and 1970s: National Modernization and Urban Migration

The emergence and spread of migration as a distinct category in the twentieth century were preceded by the rise of the terms “emigration” and “immigration,” as evidenced by digitized English-language books. In the first phase, until the late nineteenth century, the term “emigration” was the key term, in accordance with European and Western trends of high levels of outmigration to colonies. Later, the term “immigration” caught up and surpassed the frequency of the word “emigration.” This change in frequency was related to the increase in immigration. The more general term “migration” started to be of importance only from the 1920s, and by the 1940s and early 1950s it had become the predominant expression in this context, and by this time the frequency of the term “emigration” lagged behind that of other terms, at least in the examined texts. In the pre-globalization era, migration as a category saw a significant increase in popularity according to the Google Books statistics, while the textual share of the terms “immigration” and “emigration” stagnated

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Fig. 2.2 Frequency of the terms “migration,” “emigration,” and “immigration” in digitized English-language books, 1800–2019 (Source Ngram Viewer [2021])

(Fig. 2.2). It should be noted that this imbalance was important from the point of view of migrant-sending areas, including Eastern Europe, as emigration problems were somewhat ignored. From the above tendencies, one can arrive at interesting conclusions. The rise and the smaller decline in the frequency of the term “migration” was not due to the mechanical effect of the rise of migration because the actual rise started only later. Also, it was not mechanically linked to the frequency of immigration and emigration or their simple combination. The causes of these phenomena should be sought elsewhere. The term “migration” gained in popularity due to the thematization of internal urban-rural migration. This linkage is clearly reflected in the themes in the World Bank documents (Fig. 2.3). The analysis reveals that the absolute number of documents that addressed the problem of migration rose until the 1980s, and there was a significant increase at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly to changes observed in the Google Books statistics, if the share of such documents in relation to the number of all World Bank documents is taken into account, there is a significant peak in the 1970s (i.e., in the number of documents containing the term “migration” in relation to the number of all documents). It is clear that this proportion was highest in the 1970s, and then it started dropping regardless of the increase in the absolute number of documents.

THE MIGRATION TURN AND DEMOGRAPHIC DISCOURSES …

180

8%

160

7%

140

6%

120 5% 100 4% 80 3% 60 2%

40

1%

20 0

0% Before 1960

1961-1970

Absolute number

1971-1980

41

Relative number of documents with migration topic

Absolute number of documents with migration topic

2

1981-1990

Relative number

Fig. 2.3 Relative and absolute number of documents in World Bank sources containing the term “migration,” 1947–1990 (Source World Bank [2020])

After the analysis of the major themes behind these changes in the documents, it is clear that the peak in the 1970s was connected to the problem of rural-urban migration, which, as we will see later, played a pivotal part in the discourse of modernization (Table 2.1). This means that in the pre-globalization era in these policy documents migration mainly referred to increasing urbanization and domestic rural-urban migration. World Bank experts used discourses that were primarily preoccupied with national-level development, while with regard to international migration they mainly used the words “immigration” and “emigration.” Directly after World War II, only a few documents dealt with migration, and the main theme and interpretational framework was international immigration—most importantly, the settling of “empty” lands. Between 1965 and 1979, however, the themes of internal migration and urbanization became prevalent. It seems that until the 1980s the World Bank and contemporary analysts interpreted migration mainly

75% 33% 22%

50% 27% 28%

50% 93% 100%

Source World Bank (2020); every tenth document containing terms related to migration

50% 33% 67%

50% 87% 39%

0% 7% 6%

0% 0% 56%

Immigration Emigration Migration Internal International Both migration migration only only

Internal International Both migration migration only only

50% 7% 6%

Terms used

Topic

Period

1947–1965 0% 1965–1979 60% 1980–1989 28%

Themes addressed and terms used in World Bank documents, 1947–1989

Table 2.1

4 14 18

Total: Every tenth document

42 A. MELEGH

2

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as a problem of internal development. The decline of the peasant world, the transformation and disembedding of rural societies, rural poverty, and the flow of people into urban areas were of interest to the World Bank analysts (de Haas, 2010, p. 232; Hobsbawm, 1995).1 Typically for this period, demographic texts focused on rapid population growth and did not contain a separate chapter or subchapter on international migration, and the term “migration” continued to arise in connection with urbanization (e.g., Clarke, 1971; Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, 1971). The editor-inchief of the renowned Population and Development Review, Pál Demény, expressed this interest clearly in his report on the world’s demographic situation, which had no chapter dedicated to the issue of migration: In addition to fertility, mortality and population growth, urbanization is a crucial demographic process. … The urban population is growing due to natural increase, migration from rural to urban areas, and the reclassification of rural settlements as urban settlements. (Demény, 1986)

This connection also means that, as we will see later, complex demographic discourses that highlighted rural and urban migration as well as the emigration from the rural areas were reinforced in this period, and modernization and the Malthusian discourses were fairly popular. The preoccupation with urbanization is also evident from the analysis of the English-language texts in the Google Books statistics. The frequency of the terms “urbanization,” “modernization,” and “migration” were all on the rise from the 1950s to the 1970s, while use of the term “urbanization” declined by the end of the 1970s, and this decrease in frequency was not followed by the terms “modernization” and “migration” (Fig. 2.4).2 In the 1980s, the decade preceding globalization, their popularity of migration and modernization stagnated in academic circles, which marked the beginning of a new era (Roberts & Hite, 2000, pp. 8–11). 1 This changed by the 1980s, and an abstract and general category was formed that included both themes. This term started to designate both domestic and international migration without specifying its direction, as the frequency of both the terms “emigration” and “immigration” remained low. This is a very important development that I will discuss in more detail in the discursive analysis of the later period of emerging globalization. 2 Using the term “urban migration” or extending the search to the terms “urban” and “rural” gives similar results.

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Fig. 2.4 Changes in the relative frequency of the terms “migration,” “modernization,” and “urbanization” between 1960 and 1990 in the Google Books corpus (Source Ngram Viewer [2021])

Similarly, there was little interest in migration as a general theme and category in the world of academic journals. As opposed to the 1990s and 2000s, launching new, migration-themed periodicals did not receive strong historical support at that time, according to the search engines of scientific journals. Only four migration-focused journals were launched per decade (Fig. 2.5). For further insights, nonetheless, a more thorough analysis of population discourses is needed with the key types in focus. In the next subchapters, I define and analyze seven types of the former in order to grasp the mental maps of the pre-globalization period: the Malthusian, demographic transition, socialist modernization, conservative, ethnicNarodnik, revitalization, and developmentalist types of discourse. 2.3.3

Crisis and Coloniality: The Malthusian Discourses in Population Policy and Demographic Analyses

This is one of the most important population discourses globally from the late eighteenth century onwards and clearly involved major contradictions, among which the tensions involving migration and fertility proved to be crucial in the migration turn. The strongly Eurocentric Malthusian discourse is centered around the themes of slowing down or halting

2

THE MIGRATION TURN AND DEMOGRAPHIC DISCOURSES …

45

4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1961-1970

1971-1980

1981-1990

Fig. 2.5 Number of periodicals focusing on migration launched between 1960 and 1990, according to social scientific databases of libraries (Source Author’s calculations based on the Electronic Journals Library in the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Accessed: June 5, 2019)

population growth and lowering fertility rates, while it promotes abortion, sterilization, and family planning. A central element of this discourse is that there is a need to balance resources and population, and in case of an imbalance there is a need to intervene on the population side. This mode of intervention to control the population follows from the position that social regulators (such as self-restraint arising from property relations; i.e., the postponement of marriage if resources are not adequate) do not work for large groups of the population. According to this discourse, a vicious circle of population growth and impoverishment is to be avoided which, as we will see later, clearly had contradictory implications for migration-related issues (Melegh, 2005, 2006). This discourse emerged in the eighteenth century, and institutions linked with it formed a broad and partly global network until the 1980s. Among the major organizations we could find the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), governmental institutions in the British colonial areas, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the Population Council, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Eugenics Society, large groups of demographers involved in family planning and birth control, along with high-prestige journals, such as the Journal of

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Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care and Studies in Family Planning (Cullather, 2014; Frey, 2011; Hartmann, 2014). In the 1980s, despite a massive institutional background, Malthusian arguments were on the defensive as we also saw with regard to the neoconservative turn of the Reagan administration. After the abuses linked to the so-called population emergency in India, Indian governments had to pull back in many respects and find more subtle ways to promote birth restriction policies. There were national changes in a number of countries—that is, despite the advice of foreign, mainly American, experts, local governments in countries such as Kenya and Turkey began to quietly sabotage Malthusian anti-natalist campaigns and increasingly sought to downgrade the problem of contraception to a healthcare issue (Dörnemann, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; Kavas, 2014; Melegh, 2019). This can be also demonstrated by the Google Books statistics, as from the 1960s one of the key terms in the discourse, “overpopulation,” started to rise in frequency, followed by a drop from the 1970s onwards. Malthus himself was mentioned less and less, and the use of the term “Malthusianism” also declined (Ngram Viewer, 2021). The terms “family planning,” and, in many respects, “birth control,” show similar patterns. Therefore, the golden age of this discourse had ended by the 1980s; as Demény put it, the population industry declined (Demény, 1988). As seen in Appendix 2, this discourse was present in more than sixty states at a governmental and population policy level in 1986. These states reported to the UN that they were directly intervening in population policy in order to restore the balance between population and resources, to slow down overly rapid population growth, and to decrease fertility rates. They also directly supported family planning, in accordance with the requirements defined by the Malthusian discourse (Demény, 1988; Melegh, 2006). Countries that reported their abstention from intervening in population growth or fertility issues but expressed support for the above-mentioned Malthusian construction in their attached reports (at that time, lengthy commentaries were made on key elements of population policy) were also included in this category. It should be stressed that two of these countries, the United States and the UK, respectively, played a pivotal role historically in disseminating Malthusian ideology. This connection is clearly demonstrated in the UN database—for example, by arguments in Algerian population policy about overly rapid growth that hinders development. In Bangladesh, population growth was seen as the most significant obstacle to progress, starting a vicious circle,

2

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according to experts. Ghana promoted family planning for the same reason. Discourse in Mexico was also centered around creating a balance and launching a family planning campaign. The colonial legacy and Eurocentric character of this discourse are clearly illustrated by the fact that except for the United States, the UK, and the Netherlands, all countries that promoted some form of Malthusian intervention were located in the so-called Third World, and had once been mainly Dutch or British colonies. This shows two things. On the one hand, these interventions targeted poor countries; it was their fertility rates that were considered too high, and, according to this discourse, one could not rely on other social factors in their cases. This is in line with Malthus’s original approach, as he considered such states to be “naturally unhealthy.” In the version of his essay on population published in 1803, he cited detailed empirical examples to support his ideas on intervening in population development (Melegh, 2005, 2017). In these arguments, the inverse ratio of positive checks (war, famine, epidemics) and negative checks (late marriage and prevention) creates the basis on which the world’s societies may be located on a global developmental scale in space and time. This categorization is anything but neutral, as at one end of the scale are located “naturally healthy” countries, while at the other end there are “naturally unhealthy” ones: …in countries either naturally unhealthy, or subject to a great mortality, from whatever cause it may arise, the preventive check will prevail very little. In those countries, on the contrary, which are naturally healthy, and where the preventive cheek is found to prevail with considerable force, the positive cheek will prevail very little, or the mortality be very small. (Malthus, 1826, p. 17)

These “naturally unhealthy” countries were non-European and “uncivilized.” Malthus formulated this relationship most clearly in the fourth edition of his Essay on the Principle of Population: …in modern Europe the positive checks to population prevail less, and the preventive checks more than in past times, and in the more uncivilized parts of the world. (Malthus, 1826, p. 534)

On the other hand, it was through these two colonizing states—namely the Netherlands and Britain—and their colonial officials that Malthusian

48

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ideas and policies reached other countries. In the above-described statistics of the mid- and late 1980s, 34 of the 63 countries that reported Malthusian interventions were ex-British colonies, while the most important Dutch colonies, including Indonesia, were also among them. There are also direct ideo-historical connections with colonialism, which were related to Malthus himself. He taught political economy and history at Haileybury, one of the educational institutions of the East India Company, an organization that spearheaded British colonization. In other words, he actively participated in the training of colonial officials prior to India’s British colonial rule. Thus, the views of Malthus, who trained early nineteenth-century colonial officials, easily made their way into colonial areas and were translated into direct population policies there (Bashford, 2014, pp. 44, 83; Melegh, 2005; Quine, 1996). This shows the ideological fractures and interactions on a global level, as, with some notable exceptions, Malthusianism does not feature prominently in other Western countries that do not have Malthusian discursive traditions (such as France or Italy) or in their colonies. Similarly, with a few exceptions, the former does not appear in socialist countries. Eastern European socialist countries generally fiercely opposed Malthusian ideology in the first few decades of their history, and they proudly proclaimed that they had changed social conditions according to the needs of the population, not vice versa (Melegh, 2006, p. 82; Petersen, 1988; Tolnai, 1950). In spite of this viewpoint, such discourses emerged in China, Vietnam, and, to some degree, in Yugoslavia (Greenhalgh, 2003). For example, in the Yugoslavian journal on demography Stanovništvo, an author promoted optimalization through planning and intervention in the early 1970s. This text also illustrates how the socialist modernization discourse tried to strike a balance between Malthusian arguments and socialist planning. In developed countries, population policies aim to improve the population structure. Recently, almost all demographers in the Soviet Union advocate [linking] economic planning to population policies in order to achieve a better composition of the population, to solve labor shortages in certain areas and to encourage developing countries with […] high population growth and rural overpopulation to adopt policies that ensure a decline in growth rates. In these countries, family planning, kept within reasonable limits, is in line with the everyday interests of the working class as well as of the economic development of the given country. (Krašovec, 1970, translated from Slovenian)

2

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It is important to note, however, that as opposed to colonizing states, in countries that also wanted to decrease fertility in the 1980s, the pro-abortion aspects of the Malthusian and especially neo-Malthusian discourses were not promoted (United Nations, 1995).3 Abortion was prohibited in most of the Muslim countries and in the strongly Catholic countries of Latin America. The reproductive rights of women were severely restricted in these countries, while the importance of population control was also advocated. So, in terms of population control, Malthusian arguments were often used, and policymakers considered it important to postpone the age of marriage, or particularly opposed teenage pregnancy. Such countries included Niger and Bangladesh, and the Dominican Republic in Central America. Tunisia, India, China, Vietnam, and Turkey were exceptions where abortion was not banned, and almost all elements of the Malthusian discourse were institutionalized. These contradictions illustrated the tension between global and local histories and such relationships being embedded into global inequality, gender relations, and coloniality. Going back to the academic journals, an examination of the database of the Population Index, which reviewed demographic periodicals between 1986 and 1990, reveals that of the more than 25,000 papers reviewed in this period, only 75 focused directly on Malthus and his legacy, at least according to the published titles and abstracts (Table 2.2; only titles and abstracts were published). The themes in these titles and abstracts illustrate that, beside Malthus and the movement that used his name, they focused on crisis, the imbalance between population processes and resources. This pessimism and fear of a crisis permeated these texts and sustained interest in Malthus’s ideas. In terms of the themes in the papers referring to Malthus, among the demographic processes, it was mainly fertility and mortality that was investigated. Migration was hardly mentioned and even less attention was paid to environmental issues. Only interest in genetical and eugenical matters was more marginal. This lack of interest in genetics shows that after World War II researchers tried to suppress the eugenic legacy, at least according to the papers in the Population Index database.

3 The database reflects the situation in the early nineties, and in 1992–1995 for each country, respectively. It can be assumed that the difference is not significant compared to the second half of the 1980s.

Crisis/population cycle resource

61%

Time

1986–1990

43%

Malthus/Malthusianism

Source Author’s calculation based on the Population Index (2000)

4%

17%

1986–1990

Family planning, population control

Fertility 1%

0%

Genetics

Migration 4%

100%

Total

11%

Mortality

7%

75

25,575

Total no. of papers

Family forming /marriage

Malthus as a theme, number of papers

Environment

Themes of articles referring to Malthus in Population Index 1986–1990

Time

Table 2.2

50 A. MELEGH

2

2.3.4

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From Internal to External Migration: Immigration Panic and the Ambivalence of Migration as a Crisis Management Tool in Malthusian Discourse

Before analyzing the Malthusian discursive context of migration and its internal contradictions in detail, we need to return to the theoretical basis laid out in the nineteenth century, as the main structural elements of this framework were formulated at that time. Malthus did not approach the reproduction of the population from the point of view of social embeddedness, and it was his anti-poor sentiments that advocated population control, the colonial “order,” and the supposedly eternal laws of population that made him a renowned author (Melegh, 2005; Thornton, 2004). Paradoxically, however, Malthus “embedded back” his own theories into society in a way by linking the theory of differential fertility to social differences. As an ideologue of colonialism and control over the lower classes, and as one of the founders of colonial discourses, he eventually linked the reproduction of “underdeveloped” European and non-European peoples to a social context. The key factor in this framework was the preservation of the position of certain groups and not the advancement of the whole of humanity. Namely, he believed that groups that used their economic resources “most optimally” and whose motivation lay in the protection of property and accumulation should be preserved and promoted. Those who are governed by other motives and have children “irresponsibly” not only make their own situation vulnerable, according to Malthus, but they indirectly endanger the success and prosperity of “appropriately” behaving groups. For Malthus then, the ultimate explanation for the “misbehavior” of the poor is the lack of property and associated prudential behavior. He provided a social context for his laws of population by arguing that classes existed “hereditarily.” In his global analysis, he sought the Hegelian spirit of history by depicting the behavior of the demographic and social groups of English property owners as a telos to be achieved through a process of linear development. He believed that those who have no property cannot behave “rationally” as they lack the rationality linked to private property; moreover, they would become more irrational if they received any kind of support (this was his critique of the poverty laws and hunger relief). With this normative approach, he essentialized the behavior of property owners and propertyless classes in a way so as to consider the differences in their conduct to be inherited (“natural tendency”). Or, as a liberal thinker, he

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required that people in the stigmatized group make their way into the superior group through diligence, stamina, and acquiring property (and through internalizing the appropriate “negative checks”). In the early nineteenth century, outmigration was already arising as a factor that had the potential to decrease “population pressure” and “overpopulation.” Thus, outmigration was desirable, as it could be linked to a decrease in the fertility rate of a local population and the easing of population pressures. This argument was historically rooted in debates that took place in England in the 1820s. At that time, this issue was rarely thematized by Malthusian authors; however, different actors had already linked Malthusian anti-natalism to the supply of a migrant workforce to the colonies as a form of demographic struggle against poverty. Malthus himself held these views. All the while, he advocated the restriction of fertility, while he found outmigration to be “useful” and “appropriate” in the face of sharp population growth. Malthus’s pen-pal Horton, Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, found emigration to be desirable in the longer term; he even wanted to introduce social policies in support of outmigration, especially for the rural but also for the urban poor, in order to “populate” the colonies (Ghosh, 1963). In reply, Malthus endorsed this plan, with the warning that the benefits of such a policy could be reversed in the longer term. This clearly illustrates that the anti-natalist policy of Malthus led to support for emigration. Interestingly, this was also connected with a fear of the immigrating poor from Ireland, which demonstrates the selective, ethnic, religious, and even openly racist biopolitical panic over immigration and the “overpopulation” of the poor. In the twentieth century, between the two World Wars, the Malthusian approach to emigration was already globally linked to the management of the geopolitical order. Explicit support was expressed at Malthusian conferences and in arguments for the expansionist territorial ambitions of, for example, Italy and Japan for the sake of peace, on the grounds that “overpopulation” would lead to wars, proponents claimed (Bashford, 2014, pp. 107–132). Serious resettlement plans were tabled and, in addition to emphasizing birth control in the case of India, China, and even Japan, it was seriously considered that new “outlets” must be found for a large number of societies in order to deal with population pressure (Bashford, 2014, p. 125). These plans and discourses (“hungry people, empty land”) persisted after World War II, especially in connection with

2

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food-to-population ratios, as also observed in the World Bank documents analyzed earlier (Bashford, 2014, p. 283). As opposed to earlier decades, in the 1980s the idea of a migration “outlet” that would help with dealing with the “overpopulation” crisis was considered only vaguely, and unlike earlier times it lacked widespread support. It remained unelaborated or focused on internal migration only. As seen in Appendix 2, of the 63 countries that actively advocated population control, 28 said that outmigration was a useful policy tool and should be maintained, or that it eased population pressure, and it might even be beneficial to increase it. This illustrates that a Malthusian link existed in these countries, at least in terms of population policy reports. In supporting active population control, several Asian and African countries considered high emigration levels to be appropriate. Or if outmigration rates were seen as being too low, countries aimed to raise them. These countries included Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, Korea, Pakistan, and Morocco. It is worth mentioning that in certain countries, these worries were translated into active policies, while, for example, in the Philippines, temporary outmigration was supported because of labor market tensions. Interestingly, certain socialist states also shared similar concerns. In the sixties, Yugoslavia actively supported anti-natalist and birth control measures for instance, and it was only in the mid-1970s when they first tried to slow down the outmigration that had been advocated earlier (Brunnbauer, 2009, pp. 44–47). Meanwhile, according to the population policy database, Tito’s Yugoslavia openly maintained a Malthusian discourse that aimed to diminish fertility differences between its internal regions via controlling high fertility in some backward regions. It seems that the most market-oriented socialist systems, even if half-heartedly, accepted parts of the Malthusian discourse concerning the link between migration and population. At the same time, in other parts of the world, many countries claimed that in- and outmigration were at satisfactory levels, and there was no need to intervene. It should be noted, however, that the need to control immigration was also repeatedly expressed in these types of countries (e.g., in Pakistan, Ghana, Gambia, and Zimbabwe). In a contradictory way, while advocating population control, many Latin American countries found the rate of outmigration to be too high and aimed to lower it. Population policies in Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras in Central America are examples of the latter; these countries, in opposition to their Malthusian fertility policies, took an anti-Malthusian viewpoint in terms

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of migration. Such ambivalence concerning migration is bought up as an important factor later on in the book. A closer analysis of key texts reveals the relative weakness and ambivalence of the link between migration and population. This is also illustrated by the fact that the highly influential Club of Rome report entitled The Limits to Growth, written in 1972 and considered to be the key Malthusian work of the 1970s, failed to even refer to migration in the context of overpopulation. Furthermore, even the thirty-year review of this book dealt only fragmentarily with migration and only with the immigration problem of rich countries (Meadows et al., 1972, 2004). Even in later works it is only implied, or a brief paragraph is dedicated to the view that rapid population growth in poor countries can lead to an emigration wave. Aurelio Peccei’s, 1981 work, One Hundred Pages for the Future, explores in more length the “flow of the masses,” which, in his view, is due to overpopulation, and social filters have no influence on it: Furthermore, an endemic state of crisis will be fostered in the years to come by the greatest migration in history. There can be no doubt that this will be an exodus of the underprivileged, and that it will occur principally in the South of the planet. The movement is already under way. The great majority of the world’s inhabitants has always been of peasant origin; it still is, but swelling floods of people are leaving the poor rural areas in search of a less poverty-stricken existence in towns, which appear more attractive but which will ultimately be even poorer and more impossible to live in. On this basis, it is estimated that, in about twenty years’ time, the world’s population will be divided almost equally between the country and the city. (Peccei, 1981, p. 39)

It is clear that in this discursive pattern migration is seen as a reaction to a deepening “crisis” which, in the form of induced immigration, makes itself felt mostly in the cities and wealthy parts of the world. As mentioned earlier, this urbanization-themed discursive pattern gave rise to migration as a general category in the 1960s and 1970s. When János Szentágothai, then President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, opened the Club of Rome conference in Budapest on 27–30 September 1983 with a similarly pessimistic attitude towards migration, he also reiterated the same narrative by referring to this “crisis.” It is important to note that he no longer considered administrative and police

2

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interventions to be sufficient in the face of the envisioned migration pressure: Everything points to the fact that new waves of migration from the poverty-stricken parts of the world to countries with better living conditions cannot be controlled by administrative or police means: who knows when these movements will turn into a catastrophe? (cited in Vándor, 1985, p. 12, translated from Hungarian)

At that time, outmigration was not seen as a general solution, not even by the American and global NGOs that advocated classic Malthusian birth control, but immigration was at the same time seen as a source of tension. The former included the Population Association of America and Planned Parenthood, US NGOs that had joined the United Nations Population Fund’s campaigns, which were known to have considered the fertility behavior of lower classes and immigrants to be a problem as early as between the two World Wars. They continued to hold this view, and it was in the 1980s that immigrants’ reproductive rights became a key problem (Demény, 1988; Hodgson, 1991; Szreter, 1993). Chinese population discourses founded on Malthusian principles (after the early 1980s) did not consider migration a means of eliminating an excess population, and as they institutionally restricted settling in cities nor did they view urban immigration as a viable alternative to be pursued under the given political system (Greenhalgh, 1996, 2003). In the pre-globalization era, however, Malthusian discourses incorporated the theme of migration in some form, albeit in a fragmented and ambivalent way. This usually happened in connection with rural poverty and the so-called Third World. Demographers and geographers engaged in long debates about the ways in which hunger had increased emigration in historical situations, like in the case of the Irish famine, or in the 1970s and 1980s in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Or they considered the main characteristics of this response and discussed whether it worked as a “safety valve” in times of crisis (Hugo, 1984). Typically, a Malthusian discursive pattern appeared in World Bank documents related to the Third World. According to these texts, part of a specific migration-versus-development discourse, the potential reduction or restriction of internal migration impeded development due to the factor of overpopulation:

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Despite the poor economic performance in respect of output and employment growth, and an increase in the working age population well above that of new job opportunities, the nature and dimensions of the unemployment problem have not changed much over the past 5-10 years. The percentage of the labor force recorded as unemployed was slightly lower in 1971 (13 percent) than in 1965 (14 percent). What prevented a further deterioration in the unemployment ratio was a heavy net emigration of adults, numbering at least 8,000 a year on average between 1965 and 1971. Indeed, during this period, more jobs were found by Trinidadians in the USA, Canada and Venezuela, than were created inside the country. (World Bank, 1973, p. ii)

In another paper from 1979 that discussed the Indonesian migration and labor market in length, the idea of a Malthusian crisis came up again, as well as its connection to migration. The authors, among them Chidambara Chandrasekaran, a leading figure in Malthusian family planning intervention policies, argued that a crisis was unavoidable and migration necessitated intervention: From these estimates, the problem Indonesia faces of providing productive employment for growing numbers of workers will be roughly of the same order of magnitude in absolute terms over the next 10-20 years as in the last decade and the most acute problems of growing labor supply pressure on densely populated Java will be eased only slightly by the relatively slower growth in the Javanese population and labor force. (World Bank, 1979, p. vii)

Such measures involved facilitating the transmigration of the labor force: In those severely depressed agricultural areas where the pressure of population on land resources [is] particularly high and the availability of alternative non-agricultural employment opportunities [is] particularly low, transmigration can provide much needed relief for families facing destitution. (World Bank, 1979, p. 103)

Malthusian ideas about migration fit these arguments well. The latter considered population growth as a source of rural poverty risk, and interpreted emigration as a rational and socially useful response from the point of view of the individual, and as an instrument of population policy. These discursive patterns reframed migration as an instrument of social and

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economic policy that could address negative social consequences, which could include the challenges linked to globalization and loss of jobs and poverty that were (partly) attributed to population growth. Key elements of such discursive frames were, for example, the arguments and studies in the 1980s that emphasized the poverty-reducing impact of remittances sent home by migrant workers. A piece of work from 1989 by Stark and Taylor is a characteristic example, of this in which, on the basis of Mexican data, the authors established that international migration helped the rural poor and improved the financial position of the sending households. This was later articulated as a positive effect of growing migration in a number of World Bank publications and related academic and/or policy studies (Ratha et al., 2011; Stark & Taylor, 1989). Thus, this shift was a decisive moment in the migration debate in the globalization era. Migration could be seen as economically beneficial. The Malthusian patterns of discourse and the related governmental, UN, and NGO statements declined in influence in the 1980s due to human rights abuses linked to the idea of Malthusian intervention and the curtailing of women’s reproductive rights. The decline in global fertility levels since the 1960s and the decrease in the total fertility rate may have played a key role in this shift, but it was also an important factor that often externally enforced biopolitical interventions aimed at lowering fertility rates were frequently met with internal resistance in the target countries. From the 1970s onwards, as migration came into focus, policymakers increasingly saw migration as a potential, albeit limited, solution to population problems, mainly within national borders. All the while, the interpretative framework promoted the lowering of fertility rates, and a more dramatic drop in the latter was even seen as acceptable or outright desirable in regions where these rates were high (Klitsch, 1987; Sharpless, 1995). Thus, the discursive framework became more suitable for use in support of freer migration as an instrument of social and population policy. However, the ambivalence of the discourse kept this element from becoming predominant, and this internal fracture is of key importance later. On the other hand, as a pretext aimed at sustaining global inequalities and protecting the allegedly civilization-related, ideologized privileges of the West, the idea of population pressure was preserved for the socalled underdeveloped or poorly developed states. As we have seen, in this interpretation migration was an inescapable consequence of population pressure, but the flow of people into richer states allegedly endangered

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Western countries and their cultural and social privileges and identities. This idea was already clearly formulated by the 1980s, which is no surprise as the fundamentals of such civilizational East-versus-West arguments had a long history. Moreover, the Malthusian interpretation was combined with a vision of a fierce struggle for resources, which fueled this fear. This was an important starting point for later discursive patterns that aimed to consolidate imaginary and real borders and collective and cultural identities. Accordingly, even though in this framework it was not migration but autonomous and “excessive” population growth that was presented as a major problem, this biopolitical discourse paradoxically and covertly fostered opposing ideas. It contributed to two emerging blocks: one that promoted opening-up to migrants and the market-based allocation of people, and the other that strengthened anti-migrant populist sentiment through thematizing the changing population composition on “defended” and “flooded” continents. This paved the way to the idea that uncontrollable “great migrations,” induced by demographic and/or ecological-climatic calamities, would inescapably come about. This discursive pattern approached all transformations from the point of view of population issues and therefore failed to take into consideration the autonomy of societies or to envision a social system that is not competition-based. This framework was unacceptable from a criticaldevelopmentalist perspective and seen as outright harmful. According to the latter, it fueled fears linked to population issues (Cullather, 2014). Nor did it fit the conservative (and, at that time, often religious) discourses in support of fertility, and these differences became manifest in serious conflicts in several parts of the world in the 1980s. Thus, Malthusian discourses were criticized from different perspectives, but they still proved strong enough to legitimize panic about population issues and/or support the idea of migration as a tool of crisis management. This ambivalence, as I have already noted, became important in an era of globalization. 2.3.5

Demographic Transition and Migration in the 1980s. Further Contradictions

The concept of the demographic transition also involves a strongly Eurocentric perspective. Besides Malthusianism, it was one of the most influential global discourses and interpretative frameworks in the history

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of demography. It also resembles the Malthusian discourse in that it developed a migration element only later in its history. It only addressed the migration issue in a very ambivalent manner from the 1980s onwards, and the theme of migration basically collapsed this framework at a certain point. As we have seen in Figs. 2.2 and 2.4, some discursive elements of migration peaked in popularity between the 1960s and 1980s, while the term “migration” itself was most frequently used in the early 1980s, while in the 1990s its importance remained obvious according to the Google Books statistics mostly due to the theory of the second demographic transition. The most important author in this regard, Frank Notestein, also reached the peak of his popularity between the 1940s and 1970s. According to Van de Kaa, the narrative of demographic transition had the most profound impact on demography as a science. It also framed the United Nations’s population programs and influenced the work of international developmental organizations (such as the World Bank) (van de Kaa, 1996). The basic context of the discourse is that at different times in different regions, the world has replaced population regimes as a result of the social transformation linked to modernization. This awareness led to the notion of demographic transition that brought to prominence three authors: Warren Thompson (1929a, 1929b), Adolphe Landry (1934), and Frank W. Notestein (1945). According to them, humanity gradually transited from an era of high mortality and high fertility to a system of low fertility and low mortality. First it did so in terms of mortality and then fertility; and this happened through changes in social conditions rather than through active interven˝ 2003). The most important tions (Melegh, 2006, p. 60; Melegh & Ori, factors in this transition were urbanization, industrialization, the rise in education and living standards, and an increase in individualism (Melegh, 2006, p. 60). As we will see in the analysis of the 1980s, this particularly diffuse theory of modernization encompassed a series of concepts and discursive patterns that were linked to the Malthusian interpretative framework as well as to conservative and socialist modernization discourses (to be discussed later) in various ways. This was mainly because these transition theories also operated with developmental hierarchies, hierarchical competition, and a clear Western focus or Eurocentrism. In a historical context, the significant drop in fertility in the 1920s and 1930s as well as in the mid-1940s in North America and Europe

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was a starting point for these theories. This foreshadowed relative population loss in the West from the beginning. But global population had been growing rapidly since the nineteenth century, and this turn urged policymakers to obtain better understanding of these processes and to find new forms of managing the population processes in a uniform way, which, however, gave room to locally different methods and pace. This global/local contradiction was at the heart of the problem, when major theoreticians (in many ways, on Malthusian grounds) feared that a shift in population figures would bring about a shift in control over land and resources in a regionally diverse way (Melegh, 2006, p. 63). They were worried that the carrying capacity of the Earth and the available food supply could prove insufficient in certain areas; therefore, they saw the need for profound and partially controlled social change in order to slow down population growth after the West had completed a pioneering, and as they understood it, organic transition (Bashford, 2014, pp. 267–328). The demographic transition discourse provides an explicit, regionalhistorical interpretation of such changes (Thornton, 2004). Just as in Malthusian discourse, the discourse of demographic transition also envisions a phased historical progression towards a state of low fertility and mortality that culminates in Northwest Europe and North America, especially in its urban and individualistic middle class. Just as with the Malthusians, these discourses thematized both regional-, class- and, in their own language, racial differences. This discursive pattern combined class, history, progress, and spatial aspects in a unique way (Melegh, 2006, 2014, 2017; Thornton, 2004). This discourse had a largely modernizing character and, in contrast to the Malthusian perspective, interpreted demographic behavior in terms of social status (urbanization, literacy, etc.), while its promoters ignored population pressure. Nevertheless, sometimes proponents of this discourse became advocates of Malthusian-style direct interventions, especially in relation to non-European populations (Melegh, 2006, pp. 62–63; Szreter, 1993). This modernization discourse and “belief system” can also be interpreted as “developmental idealism,” as shown by the renowned demographer Arland Thornton. In his view, this set of theories implied several discursive claims (Thornton, 2004, 2010; Thornton et al., 2015). One of these is that family life and demographic processes hierarchically develop towards modernity, spearheaded by Europe and the West. Certain demographic or family behaviors are seen as modern or traditional, and these

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behavioral patterns associated with different values interact with each other and with society. Thus, low fertility is seen as a developmental goal; a demographic behavior that is the product of modern society and contributes to social progress. Gender equality, the practice of married people moving out from their parents’ households, and the free choice of partners are also included in this interpretative frame. According to Thornton, this developmental idealism has gradually spread across the world in the past two hundred years, in which international organizations, globally influential political movements, elites that implement and force the adoption of modernization policies, and the power of cultural patterns have been instrumental (Thornton, 2004, 2010). In order to see the broader social context of this framework, it is worth examining where and how the elements of the demographic transition discourse occurred in population policies in the 1980s, as reported by experts (see Appendix 3). In the UN’s population policy database, this discursive pattern can be detected indirectly using the criterion that policymakers in a given country avoid direct intervention into population growth or fertility, either because they consider the ongoing processes to be satisfactory, or (and this was very important) because the detailed explanations in the report explicitly state that only social intervention is to be promoted and not direct intervention. Fostering literacy was also included among the policy goals in this respect; however, it was fostered without the radical transformation of the basic social institutions and remained within the scope of moderate reforms (on the more general modernization discourse, see Roberts & Hite, 2000, pp. 8–11). In this discourse, optimal development included further marketization of the economy, growing literacy, the improvement of schooling, and the rising living standards of families, which in many cases was linked to the availability of family planning services. The need for an alternative economic system was never raised as an option. However, as opposed to the Malthusian discourse, in this case it was not the population versus resource supply that counted, but the key issue was to ensure social progress without direct population control and intervention. Let us see a few national examples from Appendix 2. In this spirit, the Argentinean report rejected population or fertility interventions and sought to achieve its population policy goals by ensuring prosperity and agricultural development. Brazilian experts openly spoke of transition and promoted population growth in cities

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rather than in metropolises. Policymakers in the Finnish government considered population change only in the context of social development. Italian reporters identified an increase of living standards as a key policy tool. Myanmar rejected family planning and aimed to mobilize its population in order to accelerate economic growth. In many countries where this discourse was prevalent, raising the social status of women was also seen as a desirable instrument of demographic policy which, however, facilitated no major structural change. This was the case in Sweden, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Examining the geographical distribution of the patterns of this discourse, it is clear that in many respects it is the reverse of the geographical map associated with Malthusian discourse. Most of the Western or Westernized, so-called developed states used this discursive framework in their population policies, while only a few previously colonized countries chose to apply it. In other words, with the exception of cases when Malthusian ideas permeated policies, Western countries usually let social changes unfold freely, mainly because they had already undergone most of the stages of transition, and the social consequences of their consumption and accumulated wealth did not press them to intervene into population processes. In this discursive pattern, the issue of outmigration is almost absent in the rich countries that are considered to be at the peak of progress. With the exception of Japan, where Malthusian traditions were also present, no rich country wanted to increase (only to maintain and reduce) outmigration, since population growth was relatively low in these states and, following from this framework, there was no need to emigrate. However, according to the discourse, immigration could not be avoided in these countries, but very importantly, a selectively restrictive system needed to be established in the latter. This can be illustrated by the fact that in 10 of the 45 states in this category, one of the main policy objectives was to restrict immigration and/or make it strongly selective. Transition discourses that promoted selective migration as a means of compensating for historically inevitable low fertility were already present during the early period of globalization. It was in the mid-1980s that this shift towards selection took place, and it was manifest in the theory of the second demographic transition. In the 1980s, theories of demographic transition were numbered and the controversial theory of the second demographic transition emerged, ˝ 2003). As which now incorporated the issue of migration (Melegh & Ori,

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with earlier theory, the propagators of this Eurocentric discursive pattern argued that not only family life and fertility had changed since the 1960s, but certain “traditional” attitudes and values had gradually disappeared in the West, and this transformation involved the decline of marriage and the expansion of individualism in the midst of accelerating aging processes. In contrast to earlier demographic transition theory, which interpreted the decline in fertility as progress, here some concerns were voiced. The theme of migration was openly raised by proponents of this theory. The decline in European values was associated with a drop in fertility, the transformation of family life, and the rise of immigration in so-called developed countries (M. S. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985; M. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998). The approach was ambivalent, because these countries wanted to reap the demographic and economic benefits of migration, while they emphasized the defense of traditional values. In this ambivalence, the theory showed similarity to Malthusian arguments. Here, too, fears of the loss of population and identity are most clearly expressed in relation to growing immigration that “directly” threatens the “traditional” character and cultural composition of societies that are involved in the process of transition and therefore need immigrants to maintain their population: Foreign populations encompass a wide range of nationalities, but three or four usually make up a core. Sometimes these differ in religion from the host country and there are numerous instances of mosques converted from churches or synagogues or new mosques built and the amplified voice of the muezzin now calls followers to prayer in areas hitherto strictly Christian. (van de Kaa, 1987, 9. 42)

In the meantime, of course, immigration should be maintained due to the internal needs of these countries. But even the idea of mechanical replacement was refuted. The following summary of the debate on the consequences of low fertility in developed countries in the 1987 issue of Family Planning Perspective cites Ansley Coale, one of the advocates of demographic transition theory, and warns that it is an illusion to see immigration as something that automatically solves the problem, since the host society can simply adjust the fertility objectives of the incomers: Increasing the number of immigrants might resolve short-term concerns about population growth, at least in some models, but according to Coale,

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the long-term impact of increased immigration on the age distribution of the population will turn out to be small if immigrants from high-fertility countries soon adopt U.S. low-fertility norms. ‘To avoid a large increase in proportions at older ages, a decrease in the proportions at younger ages, and the attendant increase in mean age,’ he notes, ‘high fertility would have to be imported with the immigrants.’ (Klitsch, 1987, p. 130)

Demographic transition ideas were also complemented by discourses about the migration transition. The latter are particularly important because they were the theoretical precursors to the construction of migration as a general and abstract category. These include, for example, the discourses of migratory transition: these discursive blocs framed migration from the 1970s onwards as a historically inevitable shift towards greater and freer mobility. In this framework, progress towards greater mobility (in the developed states of the West) is presented as progress, in contrast to the Malthusian theory of population pressure. We find this most explicitly in the work of Wilbur Zelinsky, a geographer who drew on the idea of demographic transition that had been developed in the United States and Europe in the 1930s (Zelinsky, 1971). Zelinsky argued that mobility gradually increases with social progress as countries become increasingly involved in the process of migration through the socio-historical processes of modernization (i.e., mainly marketization) in a process of a linear development. Zelinsky, who had earlier dealt with the “overpopulation” of the Third World, formulated this connection in a paper from 1971: There are definite patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process. But it is more useful, perhaps, to offer eight related statements that, taken together, more adequately elucidate the hypothesis. (1) A transition from a relatively sessile condition of severely limited physical and social mobility toward much higher rates of such movement always occurs as a community experiences the process of modernization. (2) For any specific community the course of the mobility transition closely parallels that of the demographic transition and that of other transitional sequences not yet adequately described. A high degree of interaction may exist among all the processes in question. (Zelinsky, 1971, p. 222)

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According to Zelinsky, the migratory transition is part of the general process of modernization, in which the decline in fertility, the decline of industrial and agricultural sectors, and an improvement in schooling are key factors. Increasing levels of mobility eventually lead to a dominance of circular migration. Although the demographic transition was formulated in an ambiguous way (always with strong emphasis on the appropriate selection of immigrants), combined with the migratory transition framework it formed a major discursive bloc that considered migration to be a “natural” part of development. This bloc, which appeared in many forms in the texts of world organizations and professional forums, regarded migration and its growth to be an “integral” part of development. In a curious twist, it ignored the problem of unequal development at the systemic level and, like other transition theories, interpreted all processes in a Western and/or overtly race-centric way. It will come as no surprise that we later see how these ideas led the elites to create the concept of managed, regulated, and institutionalized migration at global and European levels. Migration was also seen as a market-building tool, while it was acknowledged that anti-migration sentiment created conflict. This discursive framework contained huge contradictions and tensions. On the one hand, it advocated the strong selection of migrants, while at the same time it considered the growth and persistence of immigration as inevitable. It could not, therefore, take a clear stand against anti-migrant positions in the future, since (contrary to the developmentalist critical discourse) it also promoted a system of selection and hierarchy among migrants often based on inherent and historically inherited racisms. It also failed to take into consideration the fact that these demographic processes were system-dependent (market and non-market systems), and it hypothesized that a general process of modernization would finally solve emerging problems. Instead of a systemic analysis, it, therefore, postulated a general demographic regularity that is present in all countries regardless of systems, within which framework the timing of the process was the only question. These discursive patterns conformed well to the long-term decline in fertility and the rise in migration in the 1980s, as well as the modernization and transformation of family life and sexuality. On the other hand, it was clear as early as in the eighties that the very issue of migration had created a trap. The theory of the second demographic transition attempted to “correct” the discursive framework on a partly conservative

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and/or Malthusian basis—for example, in relation to the exceptionally high level of immigration in Western Europe. The problem posed by particularly low fertility levels in the richest part of the world was also raised. Accordingly, these discourses took a culturally defensive position in relation to the West and maintained a hierarchical selection of immigrants. The background to all this was a conceptual frame of demographicgeopolitical competition. Advocating migration was based on the role of migrants as substitutes, because “the balance” would otherwise be upset (Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001, pp. 23–44). These contradictions would later play an important role in the loss of the hegemony of the opening-up arguments in Europe and the West. 2.3.6

Socialist Modernization Discourses and Demographic Sovereignty in the 1980s

The demographic transition discourses were not the only ones rooted in ideas about modernization. There were also other such discourses that have received limited attention until now. Such discursive patterns were typical of varying socialist systems and migration also played a special role in these formations, which actually later linked these discourses to anti-migrant nationalism.4 Politicians, planners, demographers, and statisticians in the Eastern European socialist bloc, and in many cases in socialisms outside Europe, originally employed a Marxist critique of Malthusian discourse, emphasizing social aspects and determinants of population development. Many elements of this critique also appear in the theoretical and discursive critique of the capitalist world system, which I will address later. However, policy experts and demographers of the socialist bloc abandoned this critical framework early on, and shifted towards a special, state-governed form of modernization based on the planning of social and population processes. These discourses, even though they emphasized social progress, also stressed direct population policy goals. The main target of intervention was to increase population size and especially fertility, as part of the socialist program of industrialization, economic development, and securing the bloc’s political and military potential. Countries advocating this discourse often adopted 4 The term “socialist modernization” also appeared in the academic and political dialogue in the 1970s, but by the early 1990s it had almost completely disappeared (Ngram Viewer, 2021).

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other patterns as well. China is a good example of this, as in the early 1980s it adopted Malthusian elements. Further examples are the antiabortion turn in Romania in the 1960s and Bulgarian “population panic” about minorities (Brunnbauer & Taylor, 2004; Greenhalgh, 1996; Haney, 2002; Kligman, 1998; Melegh, 2006, 2011). In the UN’s database of population policy, these countries were recorded as being dissatisfied with population growth and fertility (Appendix 4). In some cases, the experts who were interviewed reported to the editors of the UN database that the levels of the latter were satisfactory (often very high indeed), but in their detailed reports they considered pronatalist family policies desirable and complained about labor shortages or a decline in the number of children leading to severe aging. The newly emerging modernization discourses were very similar to those of the demographic transition, but there was a significant difference in the way the fertility decline was perceived. Although these discourses accepted the primacy of social structure and social position in demographic behavior, and the gradual progress through history, they did not expect that improvements in social and, in particular, income status would lead to a reduction in fertility, but rather to an increase, or at least to its stagnation. This is clearly illustrated by the UN’s population policy database, where, with the exception of China, Vietnam, and to some extent Yugoslavia (which countries adopted many Malthusian elements in their population discourses), socialist states overwhelmingly argued for increasing or maintaining high fertility. These states, especially the Eastern European ones, were united in this view, although it should be noted that Mongolia, Laos, North Korea, and Cambodia in Asia also had the same perspective on population growth or raising fertility levels. The key elements of twentieth-century socialist thinking involved prosperity and growth. However, in contrast to conservative or revitalization discourses, these countries remained open to birth control and abortion, and in most states even state-supported family planning existed, thereby creating very distinct models from a global point of view. According to these discourses, the rise in economic well-being was linked to the increase in fertility, despite the availability of family planning. This was justified on the grounds that within socialist systems, which were considered to be socially and morally superior, there would be greater inclination to have children, especially among the working classes, or there would be strong economic incentives to have children in a planned

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economy. Job stability, collective welfare benefits, paid vacation, nurseries, kindergartens, and public kitchens were supposed to increase fertility, beyond generating high levels of well-being. Thus social progress and the strengthening of pronatalist views went hand in hand in this discourse, and the socialist system was seen as winning against the decaying West (Melegh, 2006, p. 85, 2014, 2017). Despite this, the discourses of socialist states stuck to the idea of a teleological order of progress and maintained the view that there is an optimal form of population development, and sought the means to achieve this “balanced” form (Dobo¸s, 2018, p. 348). Huge work was done on the idea of a specific, permanent population optimum (with no change in fertility and mortality, and the same number of births and deaths): Presently, almost every country in the world is investigating what form of population growth is best suited to the current situation in order to achieve economic, social and cultural goals in the future. The results of different calculations, analyses and methodologies are more and more pointing to the general conclusion that for the world as a whole, and for the majority of countries, it would be most ideal to stabilize population size after a certain period of time. This means that a demographic situation should be achieved in which—on the basis of an optimal age composition, children, the working-age and old-age populations being represented in the most appropriate ratios from the point of view of the economy, workforce and labor supply—the number of births and deaths would be essentially the same each year. It would also mean that the size of each generation would be leveled off, and only at a biologically defined age would the slow, gradual decline of each generation begin. (Klinger & Monigl, 1981, pp. 410–411, translated from Hungarian)5

In this discursive order, population policy and the balancing of population processes are based on the distinctive authority and organizational capacity of the state. Population policy targets a general welfare order that unites economy and society through redistribution, as opposed to market allocation or other non-redistributive systems. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that this collective state rationality is necessarily

5 “Within the Labor Force and Living Standard Committee a working group on population development was formed that defines the goals of population policy (the assurance of simple reproduction, the control of imbalances in age composition) and the frames of a complex population policy” (Miltényi, 1975, p. 315, translated from Hungarian).

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limited in its scope and coexists with other social forms (Konrád & Szelényi, 1989; Nove, 1982). It is worth quoting at length from a document on the GDR’s population policy in the mid-1980s. In the discursive order that emerged here, and that also appeared in other socialist countries in Eastern Europe and outside Europe, one can identify elements that may have served as historical background to the later critique of globalization. In interaction with socio-material relations, such patterns of thought may have contributed to the later upswing and radicalization of demographic nationalism, including anti-immigrant populism: The GDR maintains its sovereign right to influence demographic processes in a targeted manner. The starting point is the experience that a population develops according to the needs that social and economic development allows and requires. Population policy aims to facilitate the harmonization of socioeconomic development goals and demographic processes in the interest of people and society as a whole. (cited in Káposztás & Klinger, 1987, p. 65, translated from Hungarian)

This statement suggests the maintenance of significant interventionism on behalf of the state and supports full demographic sovereignty. The limits of demographic sovereignty are set by social development itself, and a systemic approach is to be followed. Simple reproduction of the population is to be achieved within this framework along with the defense of the family, marriage, the harmonization of internal migration and economic needs, the reduction of mortality via improving health care and a rise in living standards. The authors intend to achieve this via welfare measures based on conservative values. The socialist population policy is implemented in the following way: a) through special protection of marriage, the family and motherhood, as well as their financial and moral support and recognition, with special attention to the further improvement of conditions so that women’s professional and social development is harmoniously integrated with their maternal and family responsibilities; b) through the common responsibility of society and the family for the next generation, and society increasingly taking over the costs and providing the benefits associated with the birth, care, and upbringing of children;

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c) through the realization of quantitative population reproduction through balanced demographic processes, and the establishment and maintenance of an optimal composition of population; d) establishing the material and ideological conditions related to the desire and realization of having children. This includes, first and foremost, promoting responsible family planning, improving the financial situation of families with children, and giving priority to families with children in terms of access to housing by ensuring low, stable rents, as well as meeting the need for childcare institutions; e) improving healthcare through an integrated approach to prevention, diagnostics, treatment and rehabilitation, and guaranteeing unrestricted access to all form of healthcare as a citizen’s right. (cited in Káposztás & Klinger, 1987, pp. 65–66, translated from Hungarian)

This quote, full of ideological phrases, demonstrates that many elements in this discursive order that could fit an isolationist, conservative discursive approach were already present. Among these were pronatalism based on a collective responsibility and putting families and childrearing in focus. Another such element is the total absence of the theme of international migration, which not only reflects that this topic was a taboo, but also that it was not expected to become a demographically relevant factor. The latter is an important element of the discourse’s later legacy because it tried to maintain a vision of an ideal situation where the state protects and organizes the welfare of families in a country, without the effects of migration or any external intervention. Thus, this legacy already existed at a time when opening-up to globalization began, and in an early phase. It already existed historically and could be made use of at any time. One of the most important aspects of this discursive order is that socialist population policy and planning were considered to be superior; a system that ensures simple reproduction and prevents population loss on “ethical and moral grounds.” The state harmonizes demographic and social processes using different proactive population policy measures, including elements that are seen as contradictory by other discourses, such as pronatalist support and family planning. This perspective is in line with the conceptual framework of competitive modernity, in which the goal is to transcend the West in terms of measurable social progress and morality (Melegh, 2006, p. 83). This is an important element, as it had the potential to serve as a historical basis for future resistance to and competition with the West and, particularly, Western morality.

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In addition, politicians acted on the grounds of the full sovereignty of the state in biopolitical matters and in the name of collective rationality, and collectively adopted the measures of economic planning, health care, housing, internal and managed migration, child care, etc. Planning could be limited only by the demands of social progress, at least at the level of population policy statements and not in social practice (for the Romanian case, see Kiss, 2010, pp. 48, 52). This concept of sovereignty played a very important role later, as this was one of the major elements of the concept of the unrestricted sovereignty of the state in connection with matters of migration and demography. This was so even in the more lenient socialist modernist discourses (e.g., in Hungary), as testified to in reports by the professional elite. It must be noted, however, that in the broader public discourse different views existed about the extent, measures, and goals of intervention (Monigl, 1990; the opinion by Rudolf Andorka is of special interest here). Yet the idea that the state should have strong autonomy in demographic matters was never called into question: As far as the comparison between capitalist and socialist countries is concerned, there are of course similarities between them, since the trends of technical and economic progress, such as urbanization, industrialization, the disappearance of traditional extended families, etc., are taking place in both social systems, even though they differ in many ways. However, data from the last ten years show that in socialist countries it is possible to influence population growth and to harmonize individual and family decisions with the needs of society to a certain extent by means of targeted population policy, which is increasingly becoming an integral part of long-term economic and social policy. Such interventions are obviously less feasible in capitalist countries, although in some cases, such as in France, effective population policies have been implemented. (Szabady, 1978, pp. 310–311, translated from Hungarian)

This high-level sovereignty of the state (or rather, the illusion of or need for sovereignty) was not formulated in other discourses, with the exception of states aiming at the revitalization of nations. In most discourses, social and demographic behavior was believed to be influenceable or even of being forced at certain moments, but not capable of being planned systematically. In the case of the fascist revitalization discourse, to be discussed later, it was the discipline and direct regulation of a population by the state under a capitalist regime that was formulated as a goal, while the idea of a complex social planning and emancipation

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was completely absent. In the light of the above, these two discourses cannot be confused in the least, unlike as claimed by misleading theories of totalitarianism. In the socialist discourse of modernization, the main aim of population policy was to ensure simple reproduction and to avoid population decline, and this had to be achieved on the basis of a sense of responsibility for social progress, on the one hand, and ethical and moral considerations, on the other. In this discourse, there was also a collective social body, the maintenance of which entailed moral and social obligations at a certain level. This, as we shall see later, will also be a major factor in discursive struggles. It is worth highlighting the “special” protection and promotion of “marriage, family and motherhood,” which was a conservative element, and which, thus removed from its original context, fit well with any form of conservative, fertility-focused nationalism that later emerged (Brunnbauer & Taylor, 2004). This ideological requirement was linked to the financial provision of an ever-widening range of social benefits. These social subsidies were a kind of allowance, and were clearly linked to biopolitical competition and the resulting paradoxical relationship between social emancipation (e.g., the eradication of the poverty of families with many children) and social exclusion. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was growing anger against groups of “undeserving,” as illustrated in analyses that speak of a “Foucauldian” turn in this sense in the late 1960s and 1970s (Haney, 2002; Melegh, 2011). The more marketoriented form of socialism and allowances in cash was probably more exclusionist at a discursive level than a system grounded on increasing collective consumption and the practice of meeting direct demand. It is particularly important that in these discourses migration was hardly addressed (in fact, this was taboo in most socialist countries for various political reasons). Appendix 4 shows that, almost without exception, socialist states considered the level of migration to be satisfactory, demographically irrelevant, and not to be increased, or, like Cambodia, wanted to further reduce existing outmigration. This is also noteworthy because there was an almost constant unmet demand for labor. Yet these states maintained very strong restrictions that served both political and economic-demographic objectives. This prohibition was particularly strong with regard to emigration. This was repeatedly voiced, according to the UN database, and Albania even advocated restrictions or a ban on

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international migration. One of the main reasons for this was the competition with the capitalist world system in political and military terms, including the number of military personnel, while the fight against labor shortages and the regulation of labor management, including restrictions on emigration, also played a major role. The demographic problem of labor shortages was clearly evident in Czechoslovakia and Ukraine. This discourse only encouraged the exchange of labor between “friendly” socialist countries. This had to take place in an organized manner, and almost all socialist countries stated that the only countries that could be considered for migration were those participating in Comecon, and this exchange could only be managed in a planned way. It is worth noting that initially many guest-worker programs were supported on the grounds of international solidarity, while later on they were increasingly based on labor shortages and economic considerations instead (e.g., population flow to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union from other Eastern European countries, or even from Cuba and Vietnam; see Alamgir, 2017; Kovács, 2008; Perez-Lopez & Diaz-Briquets, 1990). The countries committed to socialist modernization were also selective in terms of immigration. The doors were often flung open to left-wing political refugees (Greek or Latin American left-wing emigrants, etc.), and extensive university scholarships were offered to students from “friendly” and poorer countries, while other groups (such as former emigrants returning from politically hostile countries) were often criminalized. It is important to note that in this discourse, demographic processes were interpreted on a national basis, and population management was seen as a responsibility of the planning state at a national level. The “management and organization” of these processes could not be delegated. The idea of sovereignty in this discourse was indisputable (Tóth, 1993). Meanwhile, mental maps became increasingly focused on the home country and Europe, rather than adopting a more diversified approach that was more open both globally and to the immediate region. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.6, which shows that the most renowned and regionally oldest Hungarian journal of demography, entitled Demográfia, changed its mental map substantially from the 1960s to the 1980s. It became much more self-centered and turned away from global, Eastern European, or Third World topics. Overall, it became much more West-centric, even if the proportion of such topics declined. The idea of competition and isolationism had an effect by the 1980s, and a Narodnik-type approach, a counter-discourse based on ethnic

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80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

1958-68 1980-90

30%

20%

10%

0% Methodological, general

Global

West and Europe

Socialist countries Hungary or a part of Hungary

Third World

Fig. 2.6 Number of papers according to geographical areas examined in the journal Demográfia, 1958–1968 and 1980–1990 (Source Author’s calculation)

competition, which will be discussed later, became more and more powerful in the region. Competition-based discursive patterns concerning groups with “overly” low fertility versus, for example, “irresponsible gypsies” and “too prolific Muslims” became more and more prevalent across the region, from the Soviet Union to Hungary (Melegh, 2011; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001, pp. 33–37). In Hungary, this connection was particularly evident from the 1970s onwards. This illustrates the flaws and self-contradictions inherent in the discourse of socialist modernization, which became obvious when the old regime, based on state redistribution and forms of social ownership in a mixed economy, gave way to an experiment that targeted a socially unembedded market utopia at the turn of the 1990s (Hann, 2019; Polanyi, 2001). 2.3.7

Conservative Demographic Discourses and Migration in the 1980s

The conservative discursive formation also involved major contradictions in the 1980s. It opposed all the above discourses on several points, but it

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was hardly consistent concerning the topic of migration and population development. As historical analyses have shown, these non-Malthusian discursive patterns were also the result of the competition for population and economic power, as declining or relatively small populations were seen as falling behind in geopolitical, religious, and military rivalry (Melegh, 2006; Quine, 1996; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001, pp. 23–27). The discourse itself can be traced back to the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century it had already emerged in many parts of the world in defense of the family and traditional ways of life, in opposition to Malthusian and modernization ideas (Melegh, 2014, 2017). It was strongly manifest in the 1970s and 1980s, and shaped demographic debates. This is illustrated by the exponential increase in the use of terms such as “family values” in the Google Books database since the 1980s, among which one of the most important expressions is the term “traditional family values” (Ngram Viewer, 2021). Examining the books that use these terms in the Google Books database, one can see that some of them in fact challenge these terms; i.e., they make critical remarks. However, discussions and analyses in defense of strong family values appeared increasingly often. This pattern was distinct from both Malthusian and demographic transition discourses as regards its perspective about fertility, and especially abortion, although it should be noted that the cultural pessimism of the second demographic transition was similar to the type that had existed in the 1980s. In the 1970s and 1980s, the debates revolved around issues of sexual conduct and abortion. In many countries around the world (including, as noted above, many socialist states) “liberalism” in abortion, sexuality, and family life was met with increasingly fierce opposition. Since the 1980s, religious and non-religious conservative movements and discourses have regained their strength. It was an important new development, however, that global factors in support of control gained momentum in this period. The appearance of this discursive framework in population policies is shown in Appendix 5. Those non-socialist countries are located in this category that rejected radical social transformation, considered their growth and fertility rates to be low, and wished to raise the latter in order to maintain stability and morale in local society. For example, experts in Cyprus presented the issue of increasing fertility to the UN as a matter of

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national survival. Iranian reporters clearly rejected Malthusian intervention and advocated the preservation of Islamic law. In Chile, they spoke of a “new moral climate” in 1986 (United Nations, 1986, p. 124). Its biggest supporters were the conservative, and in many respects, religiously based states of the world, such as Iran, Israel, and the Vatican, of which Iran and Israel also promoted elements similar to the national revitalization discourses to be described later. These states were joined by some countries in Latin America (Nicaragua and Paraguay), Southern Europe (Cyprus and Greece), and some African states. Certain European welfare states also joined this discourse, such as France, Switzerland, and Germany, where conservatism was not prevalent in population policy values per se, but there was a fear of population decline that facilitated opposition to Malthusianism or demographic transition (M. Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998). The fear of population loss and fertility decline is the most important commonality in these discourses, while there appeared no intention to effectively intervene to improve the well-being and health of families. In many cases, emphasis was also placed on an old/new pro-birth and anti-abortion morality, and conservative global social movements and organizations took it upon themselves to develop and propagate these (e.g., the Pro-Life movement, the International Right to Life Federation, the conservative turn of Pope John Paul II, and support for the Opus Dei organization; see, e.g., Crane, 1994). A typical example is the aforementioned American pro-life and conservative neo-protestant movement that entered the global arena in the 1980s, while at that time it was not yet institutionalized in US population policy. Also associated with this movement is new forms of use of media (e.g., televangelism) and the launch of hate campaigns (McKeegan, 1993). Media and mail campaigns were started that sought to mobilize supporters and citizens through highly inaccurate, exaggerated, or even deliberately false misrepresentations. The following quote from the 1970s illustrates this method: …your tax dollars are being used to pay for grade school courses that teach our children that cannibalism, wife swapping, and the murder of infants and the elderly are acceptable behaviors. (McKeegan, 1993, p. 128)

This political-demographic terminology and linguistic strategy foreshadowed present-day anti-migrant language and media techniques. This

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strategy was coupled with a clear-cut pro-market attitude and religious fundamentalism, as discussed above concerning the ideological shift in the Reagan era. It is important to note that the issue of migration was not yet central to these discourses, although it is striking that there was a division in this matter. Migration was not really supported in either direction. The need to reduce outmigration and to limit and maintain immigration was often mentioned. The exceptions were Paraguay and Israel, countries that saw immigration as key to national progress. In the conservative view, “traditional” fertility, family formation patterns, and the mortality of the “indigenous” population must be adjusted to ensure “optimal” population development. This discursive order promotes an autochthonous form of development, and it considers it important to support “own human resources” (labeled as such according to ethnicity, but also nationality, country, etc.), while emigration and immigration must be severely restricted, if only because of their cultural consequences (Bashford, 2014). But very importantly, the marketization of society and the structural conditions of migration were not raised as problems, and even care migration and the support of families were often seen as suitable tools for maintaining familial values. In summary, the conservative discursive order was organized around the issues of fertility and abortion, and the issue of migration remained largely neglected until the onset of globalization. In certain aspects, the former approved immigration, although restrictions in all directions were not alien to these discourses. In fact, in the 1980s, as the different issues were combined, there was growing interest in family values and the possible conservatism of immigrants (see, e.g., Leman, 1987). This discursive pattern became radicalized with regard to the issue of abortion, as it promoted the defense of “family values” by banning and restricting abortion and representing a more traditional conception of family and gender roles. This discourse neutralizes the issue of ongoing population growth (i.e., unlike Malthusianism, it does not find it a valuable asset) and opposes, most of all, the state protection of pro-abortion groups, sexual minorities, and libertarian values, and rejects the further extension of human rights in this direction. The religious underpinning of these arguments is also extremely important, and this discursive order finds many allies worldwide in various religious fundamentalist groups that have been gaining a foothold since the 1980s (Castells, 2009, pp. 12–29, 87–144).

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This is clearly the case with Muslim, Jewish, and Christian fundamentalism, which sparked considerable, often global movements in the early 1980s, a turn illustrated by the Iranian revolution (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Lienesch, 1982). The radicalization of conservative discourses was an important milestone, along with conservative support for the neoliberal market turn. In the words of Karl Polányi, this discourse supported the new spread of a “market utopia” while it allegedly aimed to “defend life.” As I indicated at the beginning of this section, this reinforced a very strange pattern that appears to be a “double movement”: a form of social protection in the face of market expansion, which in fact functioned as an authoritarian pro-marketization ideology—and this contradiction has proven unsolvable concerning migration as well. 2.3.8

Ethnic-Narodnik Discourses Based on Ethnic Competition and the Question of Migration

This minor discursive pattern has always been full of contradictions and tensions, which in the longer term have subjugated it to other discursive forms and, most importantly, to the neoconservative bloc. It also represented an intermediate pattern between the conservative and the revitalization type, but it had links to the developmental version as well. The Narodnik/nationalist type of discourse was based on social liberation and ethnic rivalry, the presence of which in Eastern Europe in the 1980s has already been referred to in the context of socialist modernization discourses. This counter-discourse, which challenged dominant patterns, was often quite marginal and diverse, and was rarely or never institutionalized in population policy. It had its roots in the nineteenth century and became most significant between the two World Wars, when it had an impact through generating major debates and movements in several Eastern European states (Trencsényi et al., 2018, pp. 142–161). The key point of this discourse is that it advocates social reform or radical transformation in order to protect demographically and socially declining social and/or ethnic groups, most importantly, peasantry (associated with low fertility and/or high mortality, or even high outmigration rates). The so-called popular, “peasant,” or “Narodnik” thinkers of Eastern Europe argued fiercely, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, that there was a need to challenge existing powers due to the conservation of unjust social relationships. Ferenc Erdei, László Németh, Dimitri Gusti, Henri Stahl, and Imre Kovács can be mentioned here, among

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others, but also the Bulgarian peasant politician Aleksandar Stambolinsky and his followers. We also need to mention Alexandr Chayanov, as well as the leading figures related to the global agrarian crisis and related peasant resistance in Soviet Russia and around the world, and in many respects, Gandhi’s movement (Melegh, 2010; Tauger, 2010; Trencsényi et al., 2018, pp. 142–161). On the one hand, they brought into focus peasant crisis and advocated the promotion of the peasantry, and on the other, they represented the idea of the demographic protection of deteriorating groups who were often associated with certain ethnic and racial characteristics; they also spoke up for the preservation of more “traditional” demographic and social behaviors (Melegh, 2006, 2010; Némedi, 1985). An important feature of this discursive formation was that it aimed to change the social context of population processes in order to avoid a perceived and expected social and demographic catastrophe. Popular approaches interpreted processes in terms of the global demographic competition and struggle for resources, and promoted the empowerment of the national or ethnic group they saw as subordinated. This discourse saw progress in the rise of the oppressed peasantry. People who represented this discourse had firm views about Western ideas of progress (which they did not consider applicable to Eastern Europe), but they sought to go beyond a “national” demographic morality and aimed to achieve a social morality and a reduction in social inequality. In their view, the lack of sufficient land in the hands of the peasantry had led to inappropriate, “suicidal” demographic behaviors, which included migration to cities, abroad, or even overseas. And the former did all this in contrast to the fascist approach, which sought to control population processes through the artificial construction of demographic “forces” such as repression, eugenics/biological selection, and direct oppression. This type of discursive formation was based on the idea of socioethnic-demographic competition, and although it was present in many places around the world, it never had a global vision and was mostly concerned with local conflicts and the representation of minority and majority groups. In the 1980s, the conceptual framework of socio-ethnic rivalry was reinforced in many Eastern European countries (Brunnbauer ocs, 2017). & Taylor, 2004; Melegh, 2011; Vigvári & Ger˝ Through their interaction with socialist modernization and the decline of the peasantry, these discourses took a sharp neoconservative turn in general, especially in Eastern Europe, and, in fact, they began to merge

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into the radicalizing conservative discursive order or even into the revitalization pattern. This is what happened in Hungary, where the “child or car” (in Hungarian, “kicsi vagy kocsi”) debate in the 1960s started the re-construction and re-interpretation of popular discourses prevalent between the two World Wars. By the 1980s, the transformation of “power relations in the Danube Valley” and the “protection of Hungarians” were being presented as the most important problems that had emerged due to low fertility (see Heller, Némedi, and Rényi’s analysis of the late 1980s in Monigl, 1990). Moreover, this “defense of the nation” was formulated in opposition to the low-status Roma and even the “too prolific” “non-European” groups (Melegh, 2011). Like in US neoconservativism and in the religious fundamentalisms that had gained a foothold in many parts of the world by that time, abortion, and perceived undue leniency about “life” and sexuality became major issues in these discourses. This is illustrated by the abortion ban in Romania, where connections existed between interwar Narodnik ideas and Ceaus, escu’s population policy. One such connection was the work of the eminent Romanian demographer Vladimir Trebici, who maintained that the nationalist and even eugenic ideas promoted by some sociologists in Bucharest in the interwar period, the Gusti school, should be reflected or remembered in the demographic interventions of the socialist era (Kiss, 2010, pp. 37, 54). In Hungary, this neoconservative turn is vividly illustrated by the work of the writer Gyula Fekete, who obviously drew on the above-mentioned populist/Narodnik views. Even as early as the mid-1980s, he argued that Hungary was suffering because the world’s supposedly most serious “demographic crisis” was taking place in the country due to the change in its social structure. This social explanation had disappeared by the end of the 1970s. At the same time, he had been always hesitant concerning the question of abortion, but in the end he was clearly in favor of direct intervention. The conservative turn can be dated back to the mid-1970s. This is how Mária Heller, Dénes Némedi, and Ágnes Rényi commented on this shift in their work on population debates: A fierce debate was going on at the writer’s summer festival in Tokaj [a provincial city in Hungary] in 1983. [There, Domokos Varga, a Hungarian writer who published on popular history] and Fekete challenged not only expert interpretations, which in their view influenced public opinion in a harmful or sinful way, but they also made ascetic, antimodernist remarks

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against the reform of the system that was already widely discussed at that time. Gyula Fekete said that due to low birth rates, the bourgeoisie civilization was exploiting the future and was coming to a dead end, and ‘we have started copying this decaying and atomized bourgeoisie civilization.’ (Monigl, 1990, p. 74)

In his critique of the socialist system and political leadership, which he defended for a long time, he wrote that by the time of the regime change, the Kádár regime had carried out “mass murder on a Nazi level.” This is also an important and paradoxical connection for anti-immigration populism: Because the 1956 revolution was fought for national independence, the period of retaliation also brought to the fore global solutions that were intended to undermine the will of an entire population to live. There is an alarming coincidence with Himmler’s ‘Ost’ plan, which sought to settle the future of the Russian territories occupied by Germany. Even if it cannot be directly proven that the leaders of Hungary who came to power in 195657 deliberately adopted Himmler’s instructions to weaken the Hungarian people, they put all the essential elements of this plan into practice. Himmler writes: ‘Abortion must not be restricted in any way. The expansion of the network of abortion facilities must be supported by any means. For example, special retraining courses can be organized for midwives and midwives’ assistants, and they can be trained to perform abortions professionally. Doctors should also be allowed to perform abortions and this should not be seen as a breach of medical ethics. There should be no benefits of any kind for those with more than one child, no privileges, no salary supplements, no financial support; if there are, they should be ineffective. We must consistently disseminate the idea among the population, by means of successful propaganda, such as the press, radio, films, leaflets, lectures, etc., that it is harmful to have too many children. We need to point out the financial costs of educating children and what can be gained for that amount of money. For us Germans, it is important to disarm the Russian people to such an extent that they will no longer be in a position to prevent us from creating a German Reich in Europe.’ (cited in Bányai, 2008, translated from Hungarian)

With this turn, this discourse had already changed by the end of the 1980s and was moving increasingly in the direction of radical neoconservativism and revitalization that called for direct intervention to prevent

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“population change” and demographic decline. Thus, alongside the original concerns about migration and the population replacement of the ethnically “indigenous,” a neoconservative and increasingly nationalist revitalization ideology appeared in this discourse relatively early on. One cannot yet speak of a discursive hegemony in the 1980s, but only of a radicalizing and relatively marginal counter-discourse. At that time, these groups were the ones who complained most about their oppression, and both demographers and the political elites were often critical of this approach (Monigl, 1990). The rise of new discursive links is evident here, which, even before or at the beginning of marketization, referred to the aging of the population in more developed regions, the low level of fertility, and excessive individualism, in defense of the “national body,” fearing an accelerated population change due to immigration and emigration. This fear emerged in full strength in the early 1990s, when due to much higher levels of migration in the relevant social context, these discursive patterns were absorbed by the neoconservative and revitalization discourses. Previous Nardonik narratives basically lost their social component both in society and in their arguments. The idea of defending rural societies made no sense anymore and this discourse offered no ideas about how to restructure society after the decline of socialism. 2.3.9

Revitalization Discourses and Migration

The discursive formation is of primary importance in understanding the upcoming changes during the migration turn. It slowly became a driving force behind the nationalist anti-migrant bloc. This pattern emerged in the 1930s and sought ways to regain an imagined national biological “power” to compensate for geopolitical and territorial losses in the global struggle for resources. In doing so, it departed from the conservative or even the Narodnik discourses. In fact, its advocates were not conservative in their attitude, but promoted a modernist state-centered radicalism to defend biological power instead of traditions (Griffin, 2007). Italian and German fascism/Nazism are important examples of this type of discourse, but this pattern was much more common and appeared in many regions and countries of the world (Ipsen, 1993; Trencsényi et al., 2018, p. 225; Turda, 2010; Wanrooij, 2002; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001). The most important elements of securing biological power were direct eugenic interventions, the defense of “identity,” the struggle against plutocratic

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(Western) nations, and the creation of various old/new “empires,” and the redistribution of territories and resources. The basic components of the revitalization population discourse are amply demonstrated by Corrado Gini’s theoretical construct from the 1930s, which can also help us with understanding current phenomena. Gini was a widely read and quoted scholar who was part of various professional networks of demographers and statisticians. He was also an influential political figure (e.g., the head of the Italian National Institute of Statistics from 1926 to 1932), and for a time he assisted Mussolini as an adviser on population issues. He is also credited with Mussolini’s famous Ascension Day speech in May 1927 (Ipsen, 1993). Very early on, in the 1910s, he connected the issues of demographic growth and the redistribution of revenue. The titles of two of his papers illustrate Gini’s approach: Demographic Factors in the Progress of Nations (1911) and The Extent and Composition of the Wealth of Nations (1914). Although he also thought in terms of biopolitical competition, Gini’s construction differed significantly from the Malthusian, conservative, and demographic transition discourses. First of all, Gini (like Spengler and, to some extent, Pareto) believed in the cyclical nature of population development, and his originality lay in combining elements of regional demographic development with the study of demographic differences between nations and classes. But, unlike earlier thinkers, he did not explain social differences in terms of the discrepancies in the social and institutional setting available to different groups, but adopted a biological and eugenic interpretation of population change. He called this theory “demographic metabolism”; according to this hypothesis, the upper classes are destined to lose their biological potential and be replaced or taken over by biologically stronger lower classes. The core idea in Gini’s theory focuses on internal, biological dynamics—mainly the fertility differentials of various classes. In the first stage of the evolutionary cycle of a nation (race), the upper class is fertile, and its fertility declines as it evolves. In the process of so-called demographic metabolism, the population is replenished through the higher fertility of the lower classes. In the long term, however, their fertility also declines. Gini incorporated this local narrative into a regional-global story of “dying nations,” i.e., richer countries get “fresh blood” from other, poor nations. Population exchange can occur within the same race, especially the “white race,” in which Western and Northern Europe (together with North America, Australia, and New Zealand) represent the “upper

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class,” while the peoples in Eastern and Southern Europe are the “lower classes”; the latter still had high rates of growth, which, according to Gini, should be maintained and even increased. This type of revitalization discourse did not see the West (or Northern and Western Europe) as the peak of global development. It argued either that the region was in decline (either permanently or cyclically) or that its moral advancement was questionable. This approach focused on the biological and demographic rise of the community identified as “us,” in the struggle with the dominant powers. This “us” was rather ambivalently defined; it could be a nation or an ethnic group, Europe, a race or a class. Essentially, in this interpretive framework, demographic resources are managed on the grounds of biologically or culturally inherited ethnic/national/racial characteristics. Perceived racial collective morality was thought to evolve through oppressive measures even against individuals, and these types of interventions were considered necessary for national progress. Hereditary factors either directly manifested themselves in ethnic/national/racial types (i.e., they “revealed” the “true essence” of the group in question), or, if these characteristics became damaged or threatened, the goal of the biological revitalization of the group justified almost anything at the expense of other groups or internal enemies, including life-threatening interventions in the context of a biopolitical state or biopolitical nationalism (“racial health”) (Trencsényi et al., 2018, pp. 225–241; Turda, 2010, pp. 92–117). The discursive patterns that advocated for eugenic nationalism and “revitalization” gained a foothold beyond Europe, and in some cases were even used against European colonialists. An example of this is Phadke’s anti-colonial eugenics program in India in the 1920s (Ahluwalia, 2008, p. 35), and another is Vasconcelos’s concept of a “cosmic race” in Mexico, which proclaimed the supremacy of an otherwise despised “mixed race” (Stepan, 1991, p. 147). This is a crucial point, because it demonstrates that this train of thought was capable of mobilizing groups even at the lower end of imagined hierarchies and against the West, which is of crucial relevance to our era. In this discourse, migration appeared in the context of racial and ethnic hierarchies, and it represented a form of managing biological power. Except for the outmigration of undesirable “elements,” migration was not desirable in this framework or was accepted only to a limited extent. Migration was only promoted if it served as a means of imperial expansion, and all population policy measures had to be evaluated solely from

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the point of view of one’s own race and own ethnicity. According to this argument, those who had previously emigrated remained representatives of the national and imperial body, thus they had to be protected outside their country. An example is Italy’s population policy between the two World Wars, when immigration was permitted to some extent (selectively, and at a slow pace), but population loss was considered a major problem in terms of population size and “biological strength” (Ipsen, 1993, p. 79). Another excellent example of this discourse is Corrado Gini’s construction, according to which immigration must be evaluated from the perspective of the “nation,” “Europe,” and “race” at the same time, and as related to the “biological strength” of the historical subjects to be preserved (Melegh, 2014, 2017). After World War II, the idea of preserving a nation’s “biological strength” or engaging in direct revitalization measures was discredited as a discursive approach in its own right. Fascism in Europe and Asia was compromised to the extent that even the intellectual movements that drew on its legacy (eugenics movements, etc.) strove to cut all direct ties with it (Bashford, 2014, pp. 305–328). However, many discursive elements from the pre-war period were preserved, either disguised or scattered, and were reinvigorated in the 1980s, even though they hardly appeared at the level of state policies at that time. Taking a look at the UN population policy database for the 1980s, the early period of globalization, several interesting twists are evident in terms of this discursive pattern. As already noted, very few countries adopted elements of this discourse directly into their population policies. These countries indicated in the UN database that they wanted to increase population growth and fertility, but only the fertility of “locals,” a specific group, and that one of their main goals was to defend national identity against certain groups (especially a foreign workforce). This protection was based on discrimination and the main aim was to “raise quality” (Appendix 6). This discourse usually appeared in states and city states that had become extremely wealthy by the 1980s. They were often surrounded by much poorer countries and employed a foreign workforce that made up a large part of the population. The majority of these were Gulf states, along with Singapore. As I have already mentioned, Israel also belongs here to some extent, although in many respects it falls into the conservative category.

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These countries denounced any exercise of reproductive rights on religious and social grounds, and only considered “locals” in their population policies. These states saw themselves as islands of prosperity and progress in a poor region, and their main and immediate population policy objective was to protect this position and to defend and disseminate their own national and religious identity. This protectionism and expansion (e.g., “Omanization” in Oman, as stated in the UN database) were combined with highly restrictive and exploitative immigration policies, whereby immigrants are only allowed to enter for the time needed to do certain jobs, and they are marginalized through administrative means (Sarkar, 2017; Szelenyi, 2016). In Singapore, ideas of restriction and hierarchy led directly to the approval of a discourse of racial hierarchy and the idea of Chinese superiority over, for example, Malay ethnic groups, by the country’s authoritarian and populist political regime that dominated for three decades from the 1980s onwards (Barr, 1999). In the 1980s, eugenic ideas that had been discredited after World War II appeared again and in fact functioned as a marginal discourse, although they had less impact than in the pre-1945 period (Barrett & Kurzman, 2004; Stern, 2005). There was a direct political ban on these views; certain basic discursive elements were impossible to implement after World War II and could no longer be raised to justify a eugenics program. The most important of these were the concept of the hierarchy of human beings and the rationalization of open violence by the state. It is noteworthy that by the early 1980s this movement had been partially reorganized and become an active agent in the discursive turns of the 1980s, a historical change that in many ways foreshadowed the dominant discursive patterns of the 2010s. The issue of migration also became increasingly prominent in global eugenics debates (Bashford, 2014, pp. 305–328). This was particularly so in the 1980s in Europe and the United States. The newly emerging right-wing movement feared that their country or region would be “flooded” with migrants, or its population would become “overly mixed.” In this discursive space, largely outside the academic sphere, the idea of biological-national “survival,” competition, and the hierarchy of social groups gained ground. This was evident in West Germany, where groups that opposed perceived extreme immigration emerged, using a novel, biologizing terminology, and gained popularity especially among working-class people with precarious lives (Betz, 1990). Similar groups who generally “racialized” migration and

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raised the option of its direct control were on the rise in the 1980s in Southern, Northern, and Western Europe (Wodak et al., 2013). This globally present discursive pattern aimed at protecting “the strength of the nation,” which hardly ever manifested in academic discourses in the 1980s, gained new impetus with the onset of globalization started being expressed in the “populist” discourse of the new right, and even institutionalized in certain openly oppressive states. It was a crucial factor in the new rise of the revitalization discourse that the issue of migration came to the focus of attention in certain regions. The intensity of migration seriously increased in the 1980s and, in Europe in particular, it rose above global rates, while neoliberal reforms aimed at marketization were also gaining ground. It is also important to note that the far-right groups associated with these issues sought to “eliminate” through administrative means the identified source of the threat posed by migration and abortion. We saw a similar turn in the second demographic transition discourse (although in this case it was only concern about an “overly mixed” population that was mostly apparent). It was especially the popular Narodnik discourse, the discourses of socialist modernization, and neoconservative ideas that were radicalized in the 1980s, and their representatives increasingly challenged the allegedly excessive power of professional elites (e.g., Monigl, 1990). These anti-elite arguments, and the shift towards direct intervention in various, already institutionalized discourses paved the way to the emergence of discourses that were then considered extremist, but which gradually became part of the foundation of a neoconservative and right-wing historical and political bloc. 2.3.10

Developmentalist Critical Discourses and Migration

One may think that Marxist-rooted, anti-Malthusian, developmentalist discursive patterns could have avoided the contradictions and tensions around the topic of migration. But this was not been so, and some streams of these discourses actually perpetuated the polarization of the debate during the migration turn. Developmentalist discursive patterns aim at the radical transformation of the economy in the face of population-related tensions and problems (Appendix 7). According to such interpretative frameworks, it is the economy that should be put on a different developmental trajectory in order to produce enough resources both for population growth

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and investment. This argument was very strong after World War II, not only in Eastern Europe but also in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It clearly appeared, for example, in dependency and world-systems theories (Roberts & Hite, 2000). The creator of these theories, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), a specialized organization of the United Nations, investigated the causes of the persistent underdevelopment of Latin America and found the causes to lie in unequal exchange with Western economies and the related political mechanisms. One of the founders of these discourses, Raúl Prebisch, developed the related hypotheses in his background paper for the 1953 World Population Conference in Rome, in which he examined the interrelations between population growth, capital formation, and employment opportunities in “underdeveloped” countries (Prebisch, 1954). Elements of his line of thought were later to appear in the “anti-imperialist” critique of Malthusian interventions, the so-called family planning industry, in the 1960s and 1970s, when family planning was seen as an external attack on poor nations (Stycos, 1967). Eastern European Marxist demographers, statisticians, and politicians, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, used a much more simplistic theoretical framework. In contrast to the more sophisticated approach mentioned above, they used highly propagandistic vocabulary and constantly voiced their criticism of the West and praised their own development. In contrast to the Malthusian and interventionist discursive pattern, in 1947 the Yugoslav and Ukrainian delegates to the UN said in a debate on population: “I would consider it barbaric for the Commission to contemplate a limitation of marriages or of legitimate births, and this for any country whatsoever, at any period whatsoever. With an adequate social organization it is possible to face any increase in population” (Sauvy, 1969, p. 525) … “Cruelly, you [Western demographers] intend to adjust the population to the economy, while we Communists want to adjust the economy to the population.” (Sauvy, 1968, p. 34)

The Hungarian statistician György Tolnai argued in a similar vein in his 1950 paper on the population processes of socialism and capitalism in the journal Statisztikai Szemle (Statistical Review):

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Malthus’s supporters see epidemics and wars as a legitimate ‘providence’ of nature that eliminate overpopulation and the misery that follows from it. This theory seeks to serve the colonial policies and military aims of the imperialists. ... The bourgeoisie used demography to justify the misery of class society... The theories of Marx, in contrast to these demographic theories of the bourgeoisie, state that it is not population that defines the development of a society, but on the contrary: population trends are fundamentally determined by the material conditions of a society. (Tolnai, 1950, pp. 370–371, translated from Hungarian)

This criticism prevailed globally until the Bucharest Conference in 1974, when a heated political debate on family planning interventions emerged, according to a contemporary account: What actually happened [in] Bucharest was not a quiet discussion leading directly to agreement. Instead, to the surprise of some, the Conference became a political forum for ideological debates leading to the ‘politicization’ of population issues. Debate centered on the ‘development’ approach to population problems versus the ‘population regulation’ approach. The former emphasized the importance of overall social and economic development (developmentalism), minimizing population as such as a central problem. The latter emphasized the desirability of universal goals of reducing population growth and promoting the small family norm as the central objective of the Conference. (Hunter, 1976, p. 1)

When the definition of population policy was discussed at the Bucharest conference, a summary of the main claims of the developmentalist approach was provided by the Chinese delegation (this was formulated before the subsequent turn in Chinese population policy): We have learned from our experience that it is erroneous and untruthful to say that over-population is the main cause of the poverty and backwardness of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and that a population policy is decisive in solving the problems of poverty and backwardness. (United Nations, 1975, p. 67)

A similar argument was made by the delegates of the Soviet Union, although it is clear that they were increasingly moving in the direction of a form of modernization because they prioritized economic growth and industrialization over the radical transformation of social relations.

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The USSR believes that population growth makes specific demands on Governments to develop their productive forces further and improve the welfare of the whole population. Historical experience shows that population growth cannot be an obstacle to economic and cultural development. Since social life is based on the conditions and level of material production, the solution of the problem of harmonizing economic and social development and population growth consists not in adjusting population growth to the growth of the economy, as in the case of family planning but in ensuring rates of economic growth which will exceed population growth rates and guarantee a rise in the level of living of the people. (United Nations, 1975, p. 68)

In this debate, the countries of Eastern Europe, Latin America, and some Asian and African states (Argentina, China, Albania, Romania, Cuba, Peru, and Yugoslavia, among others) represented the developmentalist argument. They were opposed by the states of Western Europe, Iran, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among others—whose position demonstrated their place in the global system of inequality and the Malthusian fears of the wealthy states. It should be noted that the final document and the specific policies of individual countries were less clear-cut, as they were neither purely Malthusian nor purely developmentalist (Avramov & Cliquet, 2016). In the 1970s, this discursive frame and the Marxist-based critique lost its dominance in many socialist states and gave way to the socialist modernization discourse. By the 1980s, it had lost even more of its influence globally and left a void behind: the systematic transformation of the social and economic structure was no longer truly promoted in any discourse. It is interesting that dependency theory and worldsystems theory hardly had any impact on population-related discussions in the 1980s, while the theory itself gained ground in the debate about economic inequalities worldwide (Wallerstein, 2004). This developmentalist discursive frame appeared in the population policy of several countries, the main element of which was that radical and structural social transformation was needed to resolve population issues. This construct emerged in the 1980s, particularly in African and Latin American countries that started to become involved in more radical socialist experiments. These states generally departed from the approach of the Eastern European and Asian socialist countries, and often based their population policy considerations on some form of local development and communality (e.g., the Tanzanian Ujamaa system), while criticizing

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the West and Western expansionism based on a colonial background. This approach can be illustrated by the fact that, while fertility or even population growth in these states was often considered too high, these countries openly opposed any direct population and fertility interventions. They relied on social planning and the means of transformation, while, just as the Eastern European countries in the 1980s, they permitted family planning, and contraception and abortion (with the exception of Libya). In terms of migration, they considered outmigration, its negative effects, and the need for its control as a key policy target. In contrast to other demographic processes in general, migration became of major interest to the followers of these neo-Marxist theories from the 1980s onwards. Until the early 1980s they were most concerned with migration between urban and rural areas, just as we saw in the modernization discourses of demographic transition. In contrast to the discourses of modernization, however, developmentalists interpreted the urban-rural migration process as a relationship based on dependency and unequal exchange. Later, when international migration came into their focus, they were mainly worried about the “uprooting” process that took place in “traditional” agrarian societies when the forces of capitalism appeared; this critique resembled in many ways Karl Polányi’s argument about “disembeddedness” (Portes & Böröcz, 1989; Wallerstein, 2004). This discursive pattern, in contrast to rational-choice theories of migration, emphasizes the path dependency inherent in historical-colonial relations, the construction of networks, and the interaction between class positions in sending and receiving societies (Portes & Böröcz, 1989). The critique of the capitalist social system was intertwined with an understanding of the structural background and position of migrants, which contrasted with all previous discursive patterns that either treated migrants as abstract individuals seeking to maximize their own benefit, or as populations to be managed, or as the mechanical result of coercion (famine, overpopulation, etc.). Special attention was also paid to foreign capital as a prominent element in the migration process, as I have already indicated in the analysis of socio-material processes. It was Saskia Sassen who, as early as the 1980s, realized the need to analyze the complex social impacts of capital mobility and migration (Sassen, 1988). This critical discourse, which for the first time attempted to put the disadvantages faced by migrants into a global context, was already partly linked to a human rights-based critique of migration processes in the 1980s. Many elements of this discourse were present in UN and even

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World Bank papers, which shows that, in addition to its global criticism, fundamental work on migration (detached from the original Marxist arguments) also took place within this framework. This discourse strongly supported the rights of migrant workers and the legalization of illegal migration on human rights grounds. The outcome of this process was the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (United Nations, 1990), which was drafted in 1990 and aimed to codify the protection of the basic human rights of migrant workers and their families regardless of the legal form of the migration process (legal or illegal). Thus, this was a push for one of the most important global legal developments in the era of globalization; one towards the international, human rights-based regulation of migration. At the same time, a major problem of global governance was predicted—namely, that of advocating the rights of migrants and migrant workers in relation to nation states, with (or even without) a general critique of the system itself. Equally important was the rise of critical social sciences that addressed the consequences of colonialism, institutionalized racism, and gender inequalities. It is worth noting that population issues were rarely in focus, but migration received considerable attention. Researchers and intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s started significant qualitative sociological work on migration. They applied a reflective sociological, literary, and social-historical analysis of power, representation, and knowledge production, and a significant intellectual conglomeration emerged in support of a critique of the capitalist structural intersectionality of “gender, race, and class.” These advancements appeared to be a major progressive trend, albeit at that time they were only prevalent in certain segments of Western academia. A loose and often contradictory coalition of postcolonial critique, more radical feminism, and a critique of racism was created, all of which struggled with the problem of subordination, and this had an enormous impact on the later study of migration. The problem of migration was essential in this theoretical development in several respects. First, the above-described conglomerate involved a large number of migrants, and many people attributed the whole movement to the intellectual creativity of thinkers from the Third World who had arrived in Western, and especially American, universities. Such critical thinkers included Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, who, by migrating from the colonies to a metropolis, were confronted with cultural, discursive, and social practices that led them to criticize colonial discourses

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and to address discursive resistance as early as in the 1950s and 1960s, mainly on the basis of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (Césaire, 1972; Fanon, 2000). Key to this was the promotion and construction of the négritude movement, which disavowed the logic of assimilation. In many respects, their work was followed by that of Edward Said, a survivor of the Palestinian Nakba and a forced migrant who, together with Gayatri Spivak, conceptualized the crisis of non-European identities and cultural perspectives. They focused on the issue of discursive power and identities, and addressed such problems in a way that enabled them to interpret or reflexively assess their implications (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1990). Within this intellectual framework, linguistic and cultural hybridity, intermingling and borders became an important matter even in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in Homi Bhabha’s writings (Bhabha, 1983). Literature on racism in the 1980s also belongs here, including the impactful study by John Rex, which built heavily on the issue of migration and immigration as a structural condition and experience, in which racism is easily awakened and has serious consequences (Back & Solomos, 2000, pp. 4–5; Rex, 1970). The connection is also clearly illustrated by the fact that in a collection of texts on racism that drew mainly on the literature of this period, several authors (e.g., Robert Miles, Matthew F. Jacobson, and Avtar Brah) dealt at length with the issues of migration and diaspora even before the era of globalization (Back & Solomos, 2000). Critical discursive formations, especially those that operated with elements of identity politics, were later targeted by anti-migrant populism as an abstract enemy. However, these played a pivotal role in the later framing of issues of progress, poverty, social and gender inequality, and human rights in relation to migration. These perspectives have influenced many of the discursive processes of the globalization era. 2.3.11

Discursive Patterns in the 1980s: An Overview of Discursive Elements and Their Historical Consequences

It is clear that the discourses of the 1980s prepared the ground for the intensification of the migration debate and the rise of anti-migrant populism in many respects, directly or through unintended mechanisms, and some discursive elements in this period even predicted or foreshadowed the main elements of the later conflicts (Appendix 8).

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First of all, the discursive patterns of the 1980s (with the exception of the developmentalist critical discourse) all remained strongly biopolitical and operated with abstract notions of “population” and concepts of resources. They maintained that population dilemmas and/or the abstract and objectified requirements of market competition legitimize interventions. Most of these patterns ambivalently argued that, at the same time, immigration should be accelerated or maintained to compensate for population decline and possible labor shortages, or should be slowed down, ad absurdum stopped, in order to protect the cultural and economic well-being of the local population. They rarely argued that internal tensions should be reduced by structural transformation. Except for the latter case, these interventions were aimed at facilitating the appropriate demographic balance by means of hierarchical, selective, and differentiated support for social groups. Almost all discourses (with the exception of critical-developmentalist discourse) thus provided a basis for racist or essentializing exclusion, and for the objectification of migration as an inherent instrument of state-political intervention. Several discourses implied or even constructed a biopolitical panic; the idea of promoting severe and direct countermeasures against economic-demographic decline in the privileged West or Europe using pronatalist measures or via the protection of a particular community against groups that seemingly posed a threat to demographic, cultural, and social reproduction. Several discourses (such as socialist modernization or ethnic competition and national revitalization frameworks) placed strong emphasis on the demographic sovereignty of the state, and this defined an important historical precedent for the populism of today. By the end of the 1980s, discursive patterns based on a radical social critique or on the primacy of society had partly disappeared and/or merged into neoconservative or even revitalization ideas. As early as in the 1980s, anti-elitism, confrontation with NGOs and international organizations (or the perceived need for political action against these) had occurred in several places. The reason for this reorientation lay in the disintegration of the former historical geopolitical constellation after World War II. Most importantly, political change brought about the collapse of left-wing critical movements and of plans for social transformation, while the quasi-global consensus about modernization started to break down, and the idea and practice of global opening-up were reinforced. This was a new conjuncture, as understood by Braudel. In turn it necessitated a revision of population issues. From the 1980s onwards, the

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emergence and consolidation of the category of migration as an abstract and market factor that encompassed other forms of mobility served in this re-interpretation and reordering as historical processes moved forward.

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CHAPTER 3

Historical Material Structures and Processes

3.1 Demographic Changes, Increasing Welfare Competition and Global Marketization 3.1.1

Market Euphoria

In the early 1990s, the free movement of capital and people was widely celebrated even among population experts. This is illustrated, for example, by a meeting in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, in January 1993 in preparation for the UN Conference on Population in Cairo. It viewed the question of migration and the geographical distribution of population in the following way, as reported by Cliquet and Thienpont: The meeting recognised that population mobility was one approach to improving the life opportunities of a wide section of the world population and that improvements in transport and communications, growing mobility of capital and expanding social networks were all helping to increase permanent and temporary migration. … With regard to international migration, it was recommended that trade barriers be reduced and investment in the countries of origin be increased to reduce migratory pressures. In addition, governments were called upon to protect the rights of migrants and to ensure that national legislation and regulations did not discriminate against female migrants. Governments of host countries should allow families to be reunited, facilitate the naturalisation of non-nationals that have been residing in a country for a long time and second-generation

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migrants, take steps to combat xenophobia and racism and adopt effective sanctions against those who organize illegal migration and those who knowingly employ undocumented migrants. (Cliquet & Thienpont, 1995, pp. 82–83)

Not only does this document welcome greater freedom of capital and trade, but it also calls for increased levels of mobility for people in the frame of a liberal humanitarian utopia. It calls on governments to protect the rights of migrants and to improve the legal and political institutions supporting migration and the fight against xenophobia. This free-market optimism in population debates, associated with the openingup of global markets, shows the maturing of a discursive bloc that promoted the free market and the openness to migration. However, this was not only a discursive issue but a phenomenon intimately intertwined with material processes and structures. The question is to what extent can the link between rising migration levels and global marketization be demonstrated. In the next major section, I look at some important elements of the possible connections between migration levels and demographic and economic processes and structures at a historical and socio-material level. First, I conduct a descriptive statistical analysis of the connection between possible macro-level indicators of marketization and migration intensity in order to hypothesize the main possible causal links. Then, the main driving forces are identified through a multivariate analysis, which helps with understanding how certain historical processes may have contributed to the polarization of the migration debate—and within it, the spread of anti-migrant nationalism—by intensifying and recontextualizing migration in a cultural and political space wherein the discursive patterns discussed in the previous chapter prevailed.1 3.1.2

Towards Historical-Materialist Macro-Models of Migration

Since the 1980s, migration theories themselves have become more and more polarized along the lines of structure and agency, macro and micro.

1 While writing this book, I collaborated with Zoltán Csányi in the preparation of the multivariate analysis database and statistical model. However, the analysis I provide in this book is much more extensive, longer, and more complex, and thus, only some parts correspond to the joint study we published in Hungarian (Melegh & Csányi, 2021).

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There has been intensifying debate between those who attribute such mass processes to global economic structures and processes, migration and labor-market policies and social transformation itself, and those who perceive individuals as making rational choices or aligning with their local communal and familial histories within the above-described processes and inequalities (de Haas, 2010b; Massey, 1999; Sander et al., 2014). There have also been attempts to make links between structure and agency through a framework of aspirations and capabilities (de Haas, 2021). Of course, such migration theories themselves are firmly embedded in dominant discursive patterns and we need to see mass migration as part of historically evolving social change and not as a result of a structure created by timeless factors and/or patterns of individual behavior. Historical conjunctions and developments, as unique but plausible constellations, do help us in interpreting the intensification of migration and the overall migration turn. Thus, the migration process should be examined in light of global social changes, and besides micro- and medium-level developments, we need to find relevant macro-factors that help explain historical dynamics. There has been increasing debate on the developmental effects of migration and the migration-globalization nexus itself, with special emphasis on changes related to the opening-up to global markets and fostering foreign direct investment (Bang & MacDermott, 2019; Castles, 2011; Castles & Wise, 2008; Sanderson & Kentor, 2009; Sassen, 1988). This is a crucial point if we assume that marketization is a key factor not only on an ideational level, but also in the demographic and migratory processes themselves. In order to avoid pointless debates, we need to look at existing mechanisms embedded in historical and social contexts and test them. One such set of macro-level mechanisms is tested in this book. The increase in global emigration rates requires an explanation that takes into account not only the features of globalization and marketization and their effects on geographic mobility but also the cumulative nature of migration. The latter is of crucial importance, since international migration, being an integral part of global social change, is both the cause and the consequence of such transformations. Accordingly, no understanding of the migration processes seen in the last decades is possible without reference to such cumulative effects. Due to its importance, the theory of cumulative causation is the starting point of this analysis (Massey, 1999; Massey et al., 1998; Portes, 1995; Sík, 2011).

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Another theoretical approach involves transformative processes related to the levels of socioeconomic modernization. Theories of migration transition integrate changes in migration rates and migration patterns into more general modernization processes via the use of some specific indicators that measure the level of modernization (de Haas, 2010a, 2010b, Zelinsky, 1971). The empirical verification of these theories is nonetheless hampered by the lack of consensus about the nature and the measurability of the transformation process labeled as “modernity.” Another perspective involves some of the insights from world-systems theories. Such approaches are related to the quick and radical openingup of national, not fully capitalistic economies, as well as their structural position in the global, hierarchical system of market economies (Bang & MacDermott, 2019; Czaika & de Haas, 2014; Massey, 1999; Sassen, 1988). When examining such factors, the primary focus should be on the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the extent of participation in world trade and their socioeconomic impacts on migrant-sending communities. These effects are amplified by social disembeddedness, labor-market tensions, and the absence of social checks and balances, and throughout the analysis, marketization is expected to increase social competition. It is important to recognize that, due to the complex mechanisms and the historical embeddedness of migration phenomena, the above approaches inevitably overlap. Lacking other relevant criteria, the questions as to whether changes in relative incomes (in terms of their impact on global migration processes) should be linked to modernization theories or rather should be seen as parts of the structural relations as proposed by world-systems theories are hard to answer. Hypothesizing higher rates of outmigration from middle-income countries clearly illustrates how references to both conceptual frameworks might be equally valid. Example of this is the higher levels of emigration from middleincome countries, in line with “migration hump” theories (de Haas, 2010a; Faini & Venturini, 2008; Fassmann et al., 2014). In an attempt to deal with such dilemmas, beyond the models that correspond to each paradigm a complete model involving all related variables was also created, while special attention was paid to how the joint variables fit into different models. What makes the following statistical analysis special is its dual approach to temporality and historicity. On the one hand, the immediate, crosssectional migratory effects of each determinant are less important; instead,

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based on previous research (Sanderson & Kentor, 2008), such effects should appear later in time. Thus, the analysis was carried out using time lags of five, ten, and fifteen years. On the other hand, unlike in previous studies, change in the analyzed variables was taken into account for different time intervals instead of relying on the absolute values of variables. Change generates change, and this can prove to be far more important than the values themselves. As we will see, migration can be understood as a result of a unique conjunction of various processes. 3.1.3 Has Emigration Globally Increased? Changes in the Proportions and Number of Emigrants After 1990 The opening-up of markets and the economic policies which promote market transformation that enhance the mobility of capital are key elements of globalization (Bang & MacDermott, 2019; Harvey, 2005; Joppke, 2021). In this regard, the period between the 1980s and 2010s might be referred to as “the period of opening-up” as a historical cycle and conjunction (Braudel, 1980). From a historical perspective, this involved a new phase of globalization, along which demographic and especially migration processes underwent specific transformations. Such transformations brought about intensifying debate about how migration and globalization are related. As globalization progressed, the world’s fundamental demographic processes reflected a unique situation that can easily be linked to the intensification of migration-related debate. One of the key claims of my analysis is that migration processes have accelerated and have partly been transformed as part of a marketization process, and these developments have contributed to the polarization of the migration debate in the given historical discursive space and in a new demographic and economic context. During the period of globalization, the level of migration as a share of the population increased significantly. As shown in Fig. 3.1, it increased from 2.87% to 3.52%—an increase that is even more significant in absolute terms, as the total population also grew dynamically. The global migrant stock increased from 153 to 279 million, which means that it almost doubled and has been growing exponentially (Fig. 3.2). By the 1990s, the increase in the migrant population had caught up with or even exceeded the rate of population growth. Part of the increase

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Fig. 3.1 Change in the proportion of the migrant stock living outside their country of birth to the total population (migration rate, %), 1990–2019 (Note On a global level, migration rate is also emigration rate. In the analysis, when global data are presented I use the term “migration rate,” while in cases when only a group of countries is discussed I use the term “emigration or immigration rate.” Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stoc]; United Nations 2019b])

in migration was accounted for by so-called statistical migrants—i.e., due to a large number of people moving to other countries following the collapse and break-up of large countries such as the Soviet Union— although it should be noted that a significant number of these people became actual migrants later (Molodikova, 2008; Sander et al., 2014). As globalization progressed, from the mid-2000s onwards the growth in the stock of migrants outpaced population growth, and this gap had increased even more by the 2010s. By 2017, the stock of migrants had reached 3.4% of the world population, up from around 2.7% in the 1980s. Thus, in contrast to in the 1990s when Czaika and de Haas’s findings (that the level of migration relative to population size did not exceed the levels seen in previous decades) were still correct, the relative acceleration of migration since the 2000s is now clear (see Fig. 3.1 and Czaika & de Haas, 2014, p. 296).

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300000000 250000000 200000000 150000000 100000000 50000000 0 1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

Fig. 3.2 Changes in global migrant stock living outside their country of birth, absolute numbers, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock])

Obviously, changes in the number of asylum seekers within the total migration stock also played a role in the perception of migration. During the era of globalization, the flow of refugees both by sea and by land due to ongoing civil wars and military intervention became a central element in mediatized migration debates. Major, tragic armed conflicts have taken place since the 1980s, among other places in Indonesia, Nepal, Peru, Russia, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Iraq, El Salvador, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Colombia, Nicaragua, Yemen, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Myanmar, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Israel, India, Philippines, and Guatemala (see, e.g., The Economist, 2013). According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo, there were two peaks in the number of armed conflicts in the world since the 1950s, exceeding fifty. The first was in around 1990, a period linked to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialist regimes, and another during the surge that started in the early 2010s, which can be interpreted as the unfolding of the geopolitical and geostrategic tensions of the globalization cycle. In other words, the change in geopolitical positions and goals with the end

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of the opening-up cycle (the intensification of fights over markets) led to an extraordinary increase in the number of devastating conflicts in the world, which contributed to waves of refugees and a heightened sense of insecurity (Strand et al., 2019). The most recent war in Ukraine demonstrates this too well. It is necessary, however, to look at the actual number of refugees to see whether there was a radical change before the “panic”— at least in the relevant UN statistical data sources—which may justify the intensification of migration-related debate or the timing of these disputes. UN statistics show a steady increase in the number of refugees over the last three decades of the globalization period (Table 3.1). Refugees have consistently been present in the tens of millions over the past decades, and absolute numbers have been on the rise throughout; the world, and Europe in particular, has had to face these developments and cope with them. The combined number of refugees and asylum seekers, and in particular their proportion, has fluctuated and, according to UNHCR figures, rose from 10 million in the 1980s (2% of the population) to 20 million in the early 1990s (more than 3.5%). This rate later fell to below 15 million (2%) by the mid-2000s and rose again to 23–25 million (3.5%) by the time of the 2015 crisis (UNHCR, 2019). Thus, the number of refugees that existed around the time of the 2015 crisis was similar to that of the early to mid-1990s, both globally and in Europe. This means that the opening-up to global markets created major “crises” that have only periodically subsided. Although the relevant UN statistics show different figures, the trends are similar, and even the share of migrants in the total population shows similar dynamics. A different picture emerges from the absolute numbers of the total population at risk, which includes so-called internal refugees who do not cross borders, homeless persons, and other vulnerable groups (Fig. 3.3). These figures show a significant increase, far exceeding the rate of population growth. In the 1980s and 1990s, the total vulnerable population was less than 0.4% of the total populace, while since 2010 it has jumped to 1% of the world population. This increase is partly due to the new category of “internally displaced persons” that appeared in the UN vocabulary in the 1990s; the number of refugees registered in this category has grown the most radically since the Iraq and Syrian wars. The statistics show a rapid increase since the 2000s in the overall number of refugees, asylum seekers, and other vulnerable groups, and this upswing has become an important reference point in public debates for both defenders and opponents of refugee law.

1980

1985

20,356.5

1173.72

4286.69

21,866.4

1653.851

1136.547

5998.501

14,896.09 13,077.5

15,880.36

2010

21,049.96

33,924.44

3775.858

2820.348

63,907.66 74,791.94

1255.579 870.74

3687.764

3463.07

2383.651

2906.74

37,494.17 41,425.15

3120.859 2518.729

960.366

3503.284

19,336.25 23,863.85

1624.98

6616.791 14,697.8

28,711.53

2019

16,111.29 20,360.56

24,651

2015

837.445 3224.966

9464.168 11,387.13

802.174

8661.994 10,549.68

13,757.77

2005

HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Source UNHCR (2019) and United Nations (2019c: International Migrant Stock)

17,535.1

139.122

17,395.98

947.926

14,896.09 12,129.57

17,395.98

2000

18,142.32 16,503.72

1995

18,977.58

1990

Number of refugees and asylum seekers, 1980–2019

UN Refugees and asylum seekers (R + AS) UNHCR 8454.937 11,863.56 Refugees (R) UNHCR Asylum seekers (AS) UNHCR 8454.937 11,863.56 Refugees and asylum seekers (R + AS) UNHCR Internally displaced people (ID) UNHCR 774.81 393.646 Returning (RT) UNHCR Homeless (H) UNHCR Other UNHCR Total 9229.747 12,257.21 (R + AS + ID + RT + H + Other)

Table 3.1

3

115

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A. MELEGH

80000

70000

60000

50000 UNHCR Refugees and Asylum Seekers UNHCR Internally Displaced UNHCR Total

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

Fig. 3.3 Absolute number of vulnerable people in the world, 1980–2019, UNHCR data (per thousand people) (Source UNHCR [2019] and United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock])

If only the number of refugees and asylum seekers is taken into account, it is clear that both their proportion within the population and their total stock fluctuate, and the share seen in the mid-1990s was reached again from the 2010s onwards (Fig. 3.4). This means that in the long term these internal proportions show rather cyclical movement. Nevertheless, this still represents an increase in absolute numbers, as the refugee and asylum-seeker population has grown from 10 million in the 1980s to 30 million today. Moreover, this upswing occurred at a time when fertility continued to weaken in the long term, while population aging continued and mortality figures improved; that is, the overall demographic environment underwent significant change. Fertility continued to fall compared to the decades before the unfolding of globalization, although surprisingly, the rate of this decline slowed down. World fertility fell by 40% between 1960 and 1990, while this drop has been 20% since 1990. The decline is still

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0.40%

14%

0.35%

12%

0.30%

10%

0.25% 8% 0.20% 6% 0.15% 4%

0.10%

2%

0.05%

0%

0.00% 1990

1995

2000

Proportion of refugees and asylum seekers in the total population

2005

2010

2015

2019

Proportion of refugees and asylum seekers in the total stock of migrants

Fig. 3.4 Proportion of refugees and asylum seekers in the total population and the total stock of migrants, 1990 (Source United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock])

considerable even if we take it into account that in the 1990s fertility rates were already quite low. Another interesting aspect is that in the decline of fertility it was not the factors of globalization that had the strongest impact. The dynamic decline had begun even before the opening-up, regardless of whether world economic inequalities had been reduced, or whether the 200-yearold Malthusian prediction of forced population decline (due to wars, famines, or epidemics) had come true. According to Wilson, the total fertility rate of 6–7 children/woman in most of the “developing states” had dropped to 2–3 children, a number around which only the extremely rich capitalist and socialist states were previously clustered. As a result, in 2000, more than three-quarters of the world’s population had a fertility level of below 4, compared to less than one-third in 1950 (Wilson, 2001,

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p. 159). For developing countries, this proportion was 1% in 1950, rising to 50% in 2000 (Wilson, 2001, p. 161). In other words, there has been significant convergence in fertility behavior globally. Thus, during the era of globalization, humanity took even more efficient control over fertility, while the population continues to increase due to the historically evolving age composition. It is important to note that the third component of demographic trends, mortality, also improved significantly since the 1960s, although, interestingly, the improvement was more substantial before globalization than after. Thus, over the twenty-year period between 1960 and 1980, life expectancy at birth increased by almost 20% for both women and men, while since the onset of globalization there has been an overall improvement of barely 10%. However, as opposed to fertility, mortality has not shown any significant convergence, especially for the adult (under 50 years of age) population. This historical dynamic is of course also influenced by the declining rates of infant mortality, which played a major role before globalization but now have only a minor impact, except for in the poorest countries of Africa (Vallin, 2006). In sum, for historical and probably also structural reasons, during the period of globalization mortality rates declined at a relatively slow pace and fertility rates slightly slowed down, while the increase in migration accelerated, with a rise of more than 60% compared to 1990 (Vallin, 2006). Migration and mortality may be linked at several levels, as aging due to a low or declining fertility can pose major societal challenges. The size of the elderly population aged over 60 has almost quadrupled since 1960, according to UN data (United Nations, 2017b: World Population Prospects), rising from 237 to 906 million, or almost a billion, by 2015. The old-age dependency ratio (people over 65 years/people aged 15– 64 years) has increased from 10 to almost 13% globally (United Nations, 2017b: World Population Prospects). 3.1.4

The Rise in the Intensity of Migration and Population Aging: Shortages in Care Work and Increasing Competition for Welfare

The rapidly growing elderly population and the task of providing for elderly dependents place a heavy burden on younger generations, in terms of both caring responsibilities and the need to increase labor

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productivity. This challenge is connected to the rise in migration through a complex series of interactions (Aulenbacher et al., 2019; Melegh, 2020a, 2020c; Melegh & Katona, 2020, pp. 6–7). This relationship is not linear, although migration is an important element in the world of social and elderly care. The problem may be particularly grave if, while population aging accelerates, public redistribution at the global level fails to improve accordingly. A growing elderly population may require substantially more health and social spending, and all this in the face of a declining share of workingage population. This has been the case for some time. Several scholars, including József Böröcz, pointed out that social spending has been globally stagnating. However, he did not come to this conclusion on the basis of the combined ratio of tax revenues and social contributions, but only on contributions paid (Böröcz, 2016). Similarly, László Andor argues that welfare systems have reached their limits of growth (Andor, 2017). From a political demographic perspective, these tensions are illustrated by the fact that the redistribution rates remain unchanged while the population ages, and per capita healthcare costs have increased faster than per capita economic incomes since at least the 2000s, the period since which data started to be collected globally. From 2000 to 2016, growth in per capita economic income was 20 percentage points less than growth in per capita healthcare expenditure, the latter category excluding spending on buildings, IT, and engineering costs and epidemic-related extra expenses (Fig. 3.5). Meanwhile, as the population aged, the combined ratio of tax revenues and contributions to GDP (the redistributive level) remained unchanged and has declined sharply since the 2008 crisis. This means that the income needed for additional per capita health spending, which exceeded the level of economic growth, has been generated from extra private sources (i.e., people have used more and more of their own income to buy such services), and/or the share of non-health redistributive spending has decreased, and thus, more public money has been spent on healthcare services. This shift must have led to intensification in market and welfare competition for social and health services. This tension has been important for both states and their citizens, as this conflict constantly raises the issue of entitlement to access to community resources (Andor, 2017; Dancygier, 2010). Globally, therefore, the increase in the share of the elderly population and in per capita health expenditure exceeding economic growth since the 2000s has not been followed by an increase in the level of redistribution

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250%

200%

150%

100%

50%

0% 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Base index of global current health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international USD) (2000=100%) Base index of global GDP per capita (PPP, current international USD) (2000=100%)

Fig. 3.5 Changes in per capita health expenditure and gross domestic product, 2000–2017 (2000 = 100%) (Source Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020])

in terms of taxes and contributions. A closer look reveals that this tension became more pronounced during the economic crisis, when aging accelerated. Global redistribution ratios fell to a lower level during this period and have not changed since (Fig. 3.6). Until the 2010s, the rate of aging of the world’s population was slower than the increase in per capita GDP. So, even with stable redistribution ratios, in principle, resources increased to cover care for the elderly from public and private revenues. Since the 2010s, however, the increase in old-age dependency ratios has outpaced the growth of the economy. This could mark the beginning of a new phase of more limited social and healthcare provision worldwide. These changes can potentially increase migration globally in several ways. On the one hand, migrants may seek to purchase welfare services from their migrant worker wages or attempt to enter welfare systems

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Elosztási arányok, és az időskori eltartottsági szint változása 2002-2017 (2000=100%) 140%

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0% 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Base index of global tax revenue and social contribution as a % of GDP (2002=100%)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Base index of global old-age dependency (2002=100%)

Fig. 3.6 Redistribution rates and changes in the old-age dependency ratio, 2002–2017 (2000 = 100%) (Source Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020])

through immigration. Even in 2017, a huge share of the world’s population, four billion people, lived without any form of social security (International Labour Office, 2017, p. XXIX). On the other hand, states with well-established welfare systems may invite migrants who can potentially improve the imbalance between the need for social and health services and public expenditure through their taxes and social contributions. Alternatively, they can protect their citizens who may be fearful of “welfare migrants” and a surge in public spending, regardless of whether migrants really upset these balances (they do not). This tension may become particularly severe as a result of changes if we take into account the decline of the peasantry (Fig. 3.7). The “death of the peasantry”—to quote Hobsbawm—and the deterioration of agrarian-based social systems significantly reduce the role of socially institutionalized, family-based non-market care for the elderly (on the long-term transformation of agrarian societies, see Hobsbawm, 1995,

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60

50

40

30

20

10

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

0

% of rural population globally % of agricultural employees among all employees, ILO models

Fig. 3.7 Changes in the rural population and agricultural employment rates, 1990–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020])

p. 289; Tauger, 2010, pp. 138–180; on the relationship with aging, see Melegh, 2020a; Melegh & Katona, 2020).2 The latter involves the care of the elderly based on family labor—that is, the direct provision of food and material goods, as opposed to the acquisition of health and social services from the state and/or the market, including the purchase of services from local or migrant care workers. This shift, the decline of a peasant lifestyle for the masses, is one of the most significant recent transformations in human history—a decisive moment in the era of globalization. The peasant and household economy also operated with severe gender and social inequalities and tensions, and therefore, this shift is to be assessed without assuming any general progressive historical direction (Fraser, 2012). 2 In Hobsbawm’s words: “The most dramatic and far-reaching social change of the second half of this [20th ] century and the one which cuts us off forever from the world

of the past is the death of the peasantry” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 289).

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As the World Bank data show, in this period, for the first time in history, the rural population became a minority relative to urban dwellers. The mid-twentieth-century decline in agricultural employment continued rapidly during the era of globalization and has now fallen below 30% globally. This implies that the duties of care associated with population aging increasingly need to be resolved through the market and state redistributive systems, as opposed to the historically predominant village-family structures (Hobsbawm, 1995; Laslett, 1995, pp. 49–50). Meanwhile, social transfers within the family may also be at risk (Lee & Mason, 2011, pp. 3–30). As Lee and Mason conclude, “population aging will place great strains on any transfer system; and the family support system is as vulnerable as the public support system, and in some ways even more vulnerable” (Lee & Mason, 2011, p. 28). This is happening at a time when the demographic advantages enjoyed in recent decades, which created the basis of the relative growth in the working-age population, are slowly disappearing. The so-called support rates between the effective number of producers and consumers, the demographic dividends of Europe, North America, and East Asia, already ceased to improve in the 2000s. This shift is now taking place in Latin America and will continue in the next decade. In Africa, this transition will come about much later (Lee & Mason, 2011, pp. 3–30). Demographic change and aging may also increase the global competition for public and non-public care services within the given economic order, and this may directly impact public debates about migration. Namely, this demographic change can lead to paradoxical problems. Demand from aging populations in wealthier countries for migrant household labor may grow in relation to the need for care services (especially if public welfare does not expand or fails), and there may be a need to improve the proportion of working-age people to elderly dependents through immigration if fertility improvements or market instruments (savings, earnings, rents of individuals and families) are not sufficient. At the same time, host societies may also increasingly reject immigrants if these foreign domestic workers have access to public benefits and local resources (Dancygier, 2010; Melegh et al., 2018). Indeed, immigrants themselves may increasingly seek to enter the welfare systems of more prosperous countries because their own old-age “benefits” are doubtful or non-existent. Socioeconomic structures based on peasant family farming have been completely ruined in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (e.g., due to land grabs for plantations or the expansion of free

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trade), and community-based, public social welfare systems have failed to evolve or have developed only fragmentarily (Hall et al., 2017, p. 515; Lee & Mason, 2011, p. 14). As noted earlier, 55% of the world’s population had no social security of any kind in 2017 (International Labour Office, 2017). It is particularly noteworthy that in Africa (especially subSaharan Africa) and South Asia, where there used to be significant peasant populations, less than a quarter of the population above the mandatory retirement age receive any form of pension benefits—in contrast to Europe, North America, much of Latin America, and even East and Southeast Asia (International Labour Office, 2017). Tensions in the family care system are rooted in demographic as well as economic causes. The “traditional,” family-based care for the elderly in extended families in poorer societies around the world has also been jeopardized by the decline in the number of children (see, for example, the discussion about this connection in the case of China, where drastic birth restrictions were introduced; Laslett, 1984). These changes may require the development of more universal welfare for the elderly; however, the emergence of community care and the improvement of education may result in a further long-term decline in fertility (Caldwell, 2006, pp. 89–92). Thus, globally, there may be an increase in demand for comprehensive, publicly guaranteed health and old-age care, even in poorer countries or countries with income levels around the global average, where such systems have so far been incomplete and only partially developed. Migration may be a response to this yet unmet need, in addition to protest (such as occurred in Brazil ahead of the 2014 World Cup, see “Brazilian Anti-World Cup Protests Hit Sao Paulo and Rio,” 2014). People’s plans to migrate are also impacted by these factors, so they may also increase the inclination to move abroad. A good indicator of this correlation is the Gallup World Poll global survey (Migali & Scipioni, 2019). The data show that while the correlation between income and migration potential varies by region or continent (decreasing in Latin America as income rises, while increasing in Africa and Asia), there is a very clear and strong connection between satisfaction with local services (public services, health care, public education, etc.) and willingness to migrate. Everywhere, the propensity to emigrate increases significantly as the perceived quality of public services deteriorates, and this factor is more systematically correlated with migration potential than economic income (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2013). In an analysis from 2019 based on Gallup World Poll surveys from 2010 to

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2015, Migali and Scipioni explored this effect on both the willingness and preparedness of people to leave their country (Migali & Scipioni, 2019). Aging may increase migration globally through a complex set of interrelationships, but it is certain that it increases the importance of migration and the struggle for social benefits, a sphere in which migration may become an increasingly acute issue. However, a linear relationship at the level of countries should not be assumed, so this variable should not be included in the modeling that follows. 3.1.5

The Rise in Migration and Cumulative Causation

One of the core factors of the continuously increasing levels of migration is that migration itself is a self-evolving, cumulative process. Thus, the preexisting level of emigration influences the development of future migration processes. In line with social capital theories, the networks behind migration contribute to the dissemination of information and reduce the economic costs and psychosocial burdens of migrating, thus prompting new decisions to migrate (Collier, 2013; Massey, 1999; Portes, 1995; Portes & Böröcz, 1989; Salmenhaara, 2009; Sík, 2011). This cumulative causation can be combined with the factors arising from world-systems analysis, as the system of historically evolving migratory relations can be understood as being built into permanent historical inequalities, as well as colonial and migration relations of past periods (Portes & Böröcz, 1989). This is also compatible with factors of modernization, which emphasize the self-stimulating and self-sustaining processes of transformation. International migration processes are complemented by institutionalization, which also plays a role in the maintenance of mass migration processes. According to the institutionalist approach, migration develops in parallel with its formal and informal institutional framework, which, in addition to the legal and institutional context of the countries involved, includes the establishment of immigrant integration agencies, civil society organizations, and even human trafficking networks. Xiang and Lindquist described this as the development of migration infrastructure (Massey et al., 1998; Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). From an anthropological perspective, cumulative causation can also imply the emergence of emigration culture (Hárs, 2018; Klute & Hahn, 2007). According to this complex approach, individual societies develop

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cultural norms and beliefs about emigration and immigration based upon their interactions with incoming and outgoing migrants. The acceptance or rejection of emigration, involving the cultural legacy of historical experience or the sheer factuality that historically accumulated migration levels are high, can significantly impact the further development of migration. While through empirical analysis relevant factors are hard to measure due to intermediate effects that pose substantial obstacles, it is possible to control for cumulative causation, and for related non-quantifiable factors, by taking previous levels of emigration into account. This analysis does so and takes the changes in migration rates between 1990 and 1995 into account as explanatory factors for later changes in the levels of migration. 3.1.6

Modernization Factors and Increasing Migration Capacity

According to the migration transition theories of the 1970s, changes in migration should be interpreted as part of the comprehensive process of modernization (de Haas, 2010a; Zelinsky, 1971). According to these theories, the increase in mobility levels and the transformation of migration patterns (e.g., the expansion of international in relation to internal migration or of circular mobility over long-term, settling-purposed migration) must be interpreted as part of a general migration process. In my research, I focus on changes in international migration levels and therefore attempt to identify modernization factors that may justify the claim that “more developed” states, in a given interpretive frame, are generally characterized by higher levels of mobility. It is important to note, however, that some of these theories describe a certain level of development/modernization as an inflection point—a “migration hump” past which further development is no longer accompanied by increasing rates of emigration, but rather increasing immigration instead, and the consequent transformation of migration patterns (de Haas, 2010a; Faini & Venturini, 2008; Fassmann et al., 2014). Potential indicators of modernization include those referring to urbanization, the decline of agricultural work, individualization, rising income levels, declining fertility, increasing literacy and education, and the complex development indices that incorporate many of these factors (see, e.g., the Human Development Index). In my analysis, I look at just a few of these, before testing through multivariate analysis how changes in these processes, along with other historical transformations, have affected migration levels.

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3.1.6.1 Fertility As early as the 1970s, Zelinsky drew attention to the fact that, contrary to Malthusian reasoning, it is not population pressure stemming from high levels of fertility, but, counterintuitively, it is fertility decline that mobilizes humanity (de Haas, 2010a, pp. 12, 27, 30; Ghosh, 1963; Zelinsky, 1971). Hein de Haas confirmed this hypothesis when testing migration transitions by incorporating a decades-long time frame into the multivariate analysis of emigration levels. However, it should be noted that he did not consider all this to be valid on a causal level. He drew attention to real social reasons behind this phenomenon and reminded us of the overly strong relationship between the variables as a consequence of multicollinearity. As we have seen, migration levels increased in the era of globalization while there was a steady decline in fertility, and population growth has slowed down from 2005 onwards. These processes showed diverging dynamics, as the theory suggests. It should be noted, however, that fertility declined even more sharply before the era of globalization, while at that time mobility levels, at least in terms of the proportion of the emigrating population, did not increase with similar dynamics. Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between the two variables (total fertility rate and emigration stock as a share of the population). It can be assumed that the decline in fertility has been accompanied by an increase in population mobility due to the underlying processes—that is, the long-term decline of the rural sector and the improvements in education, especially for women. This transformation may also have been driven by urban migration and women’s liberation from rural power structures (de Haas, 2010a; Demeny & McNicoll, 2006; Sen, 1999; Wilson, 2001). It should be noted that these changes, which can also be linked to marketization, not only show a general trend to social modernization, but are also of importance for structural world-systems theories that emphasize the radical social transformative role of the capitalist market economy. As we shall see in the social-historical analysis, the contrast between these two theories needs more nuanced interpretation at several points. In any case, at the level of individual countries, this link is probably indirect and it is not worth including this variable into the model as a factor in its own right. Nonetheless, fertility control and low fertility should be seen as an indirect factor in the social transformation that promotes mobility.

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4.0%

4

3.5%

3

3.0%

3

2.5%

2

2.0% 2

1.5%

1

1.0%

1

0.5%

0

0.0% 1990

1995

2000

Migration rate

2005

2010

2015

2019

Total fertility rate

Fig. 3.8 Total global fertility rate and migration rate, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock, 2019b: World Population Prospects])

3.1.6.2 GDP Per Capita Growth of the world economy far exceeds that of the global population. In Fig. 3.9, we can see the relationship between the growth of world GDP per capita (expressed in 2015 constant US dollars) and the development of the global migration rate between 1990 and 2019. It is clear that from the 2000s onwards, these followed similar dynamics. It can be assumed that an increase in absolute incomes played a role in the increase of migration levels as it enabled more and more people to bear the costs of geographical mobility, at least when the costs did not grow faster than incomes (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). This growth in well-being is an important factor, and as I have already indicated above in the context of the boom in per capita spending, the world’s GDP per capita at current values more than doubled between 2000 and 2017 (see Fig. 3.5). Of course, these data series are not accurate, since the comparison over time must be made at constant prices due to fluctuations in exchange rates. The expansion of economic income in constant 2015 US dollars is also huge, as world GDP per capita increased by 60% between 1990 and 2019, and this could be linked to the increase in migration levels. Figure 3.9 shows that since the 2000s the two variables have shown very

3

129

HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

4.0%

12,000

3.5%

10,000

3.0% 8,000

2.5% 2.0%

6,000

1.5%

4,000

1.0% 2,000

0.5% 0.0%

0 1990

1995 Migration rate

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

GDP per capita (2015 constant US Dollar)

Fig. 3.9 Global GDP per capita (constant 2015 USD) and emigration rates, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock] and UNCTAD [2020])

similar dynamics, so it can be assumed that the increase in incomes has also played a role in the rise in migration. In addition to the absolute changes in incomes, another factor in modernization theories is the relative convergence/divergence of economic well-being.3 Concerning the growing intensity of international migration in the era of globalization, the following scenarios should be considered in relation to the evolution of relative incomes at a global level. (1) If income inequalities between countries have decreased (i.e., a convergence of GDP per capita can be observed globally in that period), then, following the general modernization change, we might conclude that modernization theories in fact provide an appropriate explanation. (2) If, on the contrary, the increasing migration has occurred alongside

3 It should be noted that, in an implicit or explicit way, almost all migration theories see income inequalities as one of the main drivers of migration (de Haas, 2010a, p. 14). Instead of income inequalities, criticism refers to people’s perceptions about income as a determinant of individual migratory decisions. Melegh et al. (2013, 2016) and Thornton (2012) suggest that people are generally aware of the developmental differences between countries and there is a great deal of consensus around these differences. Therefore, individual perceptions are not included in this study.

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rising global income inequalities, then the applicability of structuralist world-systems theories would prove to be more adequate. Based on the ratios of each country’s GDP per capita compared to the overall world average, we can deduce their relative income positions. When looking at these one by one, in contrast to the global considerations presented in the previous paragraph, the following theoretical contexts should be considered. – If emigration increases linearly with an improvement in relative income, then modernization theory is generally valid, as a relatively improving migration capacity points towards increasing emigration and global labor-market activity. – If the improvement in the relative income position is not linearly related to the change in the emigration rate of a given country (i.e., this relationship varies by income categories, and migration rates are the highest in the middle-income category), then the migration hump theory seems plausible. We should also stress that, in this case, structuralist world-systems theories might also apply: both theories suggest that the highest emigration rates characterize the middleincome, i.e., semi-peripheral, countries (de Haas, 2010a, 2010b; Melegh, 2012, 2013). If an increasing rate of emigration takes place with a relative decline in income position, or no significant emigration results from the loss of income position, it may be more appropriate to rely on alternative explanations. Figure 3.10 shows the absolute and relative changes in income inequalities around the world. At the beginning of globalization, both relative and absolute standard deviations increased. After that, relative differences decreased first slightly and then, from 2005 onwards, significantly, while average absolute deviations increased slowly until 2005 and then started decreasing. In terms of global levels of migration relative to population, we can see that these were also on the rise in the years following 2005. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. According to the first, a relative increase in inequality does not cause an immediate, population-proportionate increase in migration; however, a decrease in inequality does. This seems to reinforce the modernization hypotheses: global economic growth, if accompanied by convergence, can increase people’s mobility through a general modernization process. The second

3

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HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

0.6%

6,000

0.6%

5,000

0.5%

4,000

0.5%

3,000

0.4%

2,000

0.4%

1,000

0.3%

0 1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

Average distance from the global average expressed as a rate of global average Average distance from the global average

Fig. 3.10 Inequality of world’s countries in terms of GDP per capita: Standard deviation (2015 constant USD) and relative standard deviation (%) of GDP per capita of world’s countries, 1995–2019 (Source Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD [2020])

possible conclusion, argued on the basis of structuralist theories, is that the increase in income inequality has only a delayed effect; thus, we should count on a time lag of about 10 years when accounting for it. 3.1.6.3 Education In terms of demographic behavior, the increase in human capital (i.e., the average level of education) occupies a prominent place in the context of modernization. This factor has been given special emphasis, especially from the point of view of fertility. It was also taken into account in terms of the mortality rates of both sexes (Basten et al., 2014, pp. 40–86; Vallin, 2006; Wilson, 2001). Because of its indirect effect on migration, Zelinsky (1971) pointed out that education increases the ability to secure the information needed for migration. This variable is easy to interpret linearly and can be linked to the increase in migration. It is clear from Fig. 3.11 that while the increase in the level of migration came to a halt and stagnated in the 1990s, the level of educational had already started rising substantially by then. The two trends have shown the same dynamics since the 2000s, anticipating the potential benefits of associating these two global processes during the analysis.

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4.0%

10

3.5%

9 8

3.0%

7

2.5%

6

2.0%

5

1.5%

4 3

1.0%

2

0.5%

1 0

0.0% 1990

1995 Migration rate

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

Average number of years spent at school

Fig. 3.11 Average number of years spent at school and global emigration rate, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock] and Wittgenstein Centre Human Capital Data Explorer [2022])

3.1.6.4 Long-Term Decline in Agricultural Employment At the core of modernization theories is the disintegration of rural- and agriculture-based systems, the fragmentation of the peasant world, and the influx of population into cities. These processes are considered to be of tremendous importance not only in terms of affecting social and demographic behavior, but also in terms of increasing levels of mobility (Zelinsky, 1971). This factor is also a key one in world-systems theories, as the emergence of capitalism uproots people from local socioeconomic structures and makes them more mobile through the transformation of agricultural employment and the spread of wage labor. At the global level, the two processes follow each other in a scissor-like manner; that is, a decrease in agricultural employment is inversely reflected in an increase in the level of migration (see Fig. 3.7). 3.1.7

Rising Levels of Migration: Factors Associated with World-Systems Theories

As we saw in the chapter on discourses, in the 1970s historicalstructuralist explanations of migration emerged, highlighting the critical impact of the world’s structural imbalances and the spread of market

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processes on migration phenomena. According to these, rising migration levels are a consequence of the opening-up of countries to global markets and the emergence of institutions facilitating globalization and the freer movement of capital, labor, and goods (Bang & MacDermott, 2019; Massey, 1999; Sassen, 1988). Among other aspects, this market penetration also includes the transition from a non-capitalist to a capitalist system, the increase of the role of global markets within individual countries, an increase in the mobility of capital, as well as the expansion of a market logic into segments of society that had not been subordinated to market institutions before (e.g., care for the elderly and universities). Due to the very complex effects of all this change in the economic integration of individual societies, migration has been transformed and new patterns of mobility created. Earlier, I demonstrated as an example of the overlap between paradigms how some of the factors of modernization—in particular, changes in income and agricultural employment—can be interpreted within the framework of world-systems theories. Hence, in this subsection, I address only those factors that have not been discussed so far. 3.1.7.1

Opening-Up to Global Markets and the Increasing Mobility of Capital The historical change in the political demographic scene and the increase in migration can also be linked to other elements of the opening-up (globalization) cycle of the world economy. According to Chase-Dunn et al. (1999, 2000), the value of relatively well-accountable foreign direct investment (FDI), as related to total GDP, fluctuates in cycles, usually between half and ten percent (see also Solimano & Watts, 2005). The latest cycle of escalation began in the 1970s. This indicator may be important because of the sheer fact that, according to the world-systems theory of migration, a greater volume of foreign trade and a greater degree of market openness increase the intensity of migration overall (Massey, 1999; Sassen, 1988). In this respect, Sassen argues that as a result of globalization and the new international division of labor, the economic integration of countries into the world economy changes. Preexisting internal economic and labor structures go through massive transformation and, along with the disintegration of peasant economies, the process of individuals becoming wage laborers intensifies, while traditional agricultural self-employment declines. The agricultural sector becomes commercialized, labor flow

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from the countryside to cities increases, and the resulting labor-market tensions spread across the country. A significant increase in women’s industrial employment facilitates the process of new industrialization, which is also brought about by foreign capital inflow. If the process increases unemployment among men, it can lead to emigration, as instead of choosing unprofitable (or less profitable) agricultural work they may choose the path of emigration partly to maintain previous gender hierarchies. Furthermore, through investment, direct organizational working relationships can be established with foreign companies that contribute to the strengthening of cultural and ideological relations and the worldwide spread of consumption habits. It is clear that before the level and volume of FDI can increase, institutional and economic policy adjustments are needed to facilitate capital inflows. These include appropriate monetary policy, linking domestic and foreign prices, reducing national subsidies, increasing market autonomy, privatizing and acquiring competing firms previously in state hands, and ensuring the export of the profits of owners which lead to the further marketization of societies (Harvey, 2005). This development can be a real shock in countries where “protection” from global market influences was previously more substantial, or where non-capitalist economic systems operated, like in the socialist bloc (Éber et al., 2019; Fábry, 2019; Szalai, 2005). Thus, there is a preparatory phase of globalization before FDI appears (Melegh, 2012). It should be noted that the non-capitalist (socialist) systems that earlier existed in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Central America were heavily industrialized; thus, they did not resemble the situation in other semi-peripheric countries (Melegh, 2013; Melegh & Sárosi, 2015). Using the language of the migration literature, we explain the results of the neoliberal turn through the concept of uprooting, or “disembedding,” to use the language of Karl Polanyi (Block, 2001; Hann, 2018). Decision-making elites dismantle the more stable and non-market-based social safety net of given groups in order to promote marketization (Hann, 2019). From that point on, the intensity of migration may increase, although with a time lag. It is also important to see that once foreign capital or the relevant economic policy has partially “disembedded” relevant groups and shaken former local structures, mass migration will begin as a consequence and follow its own autonomous cumulative

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causal path in the global system of inequalities.4 To sum up, according to this macro-theory, the structural conditions of mass migration change as a result of globalization, while global migration processes also change, but with a time lag. Sanderson and Kentor (2008) confirmed this time lag using multivariate analyses. Studying an earlier period on a smaller sample, they demonstrated the lagged effects of both the accumulated level of foreign direct investment as a share of GDP and its annual inflow on the net migration of developing countries 10–15 years after the process started. It should be noted that, according to Sanderson and Kentor, the inflow pushed the negative migration balance in a positive direction in the short term, and the increase in the stock of foreign capital (capital stock/GDP, measured using absolute values) only shifted net migration towards the negative over a longer period. The lagged correlations in terms of FDI stock and flow are shown in Fig. 3.12 in terms of measuring the phenomenon globally regarding the last three decades. It is clear that the role of foreign capital inflow increased significantly across the globe from the mid-1980s, and then in the late 1990s and 2000s, until the financial crisis of the second half of the 2000s, according to UNCTAD data (on FDI definitions, see Endr˝ odi-Kovács & Hegedüs, 2012). We can also observe that, with some time lag, the level of global emigration has also risen. Thus, a delayed relationship between capital flows and migration can be hypothesized and will be explored later. 3.1.7.2 Exports as a Share of GDP Using another indicator of opening-up and the strength of global markets—that is, the relatively high value of imports per unit of GDP (called “trade globalization” by Chase-Dunn)—significant growth is observed globally, and this may also have had an effect on migration (Chase-Dunn et al., 1999, 2000). Similarly, we can do the same analysis for the proportion of exports to GDP. This approach might be more appropriate, taking into consideration the fact that world-systems theories

4 Sanderson and Kentor (2008) found that capital inflows to the primary sector have an

effect, while the opposite effect is found for the secondary sector. It should be noted that in the case of Eastern Europe, where a large socialist industrial sector collapsed, the effect may be reversed. This will be demonstrated later. It is also important to note that the migration balance is the dependent variable here and this may imply that foreign capital inflows increase immigration and thus “disturb” the migration balance.

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Fig. 3.13 Exports as a proportion of GDP and global emigration rates, 1990– 2019 (Source UNCTAD [2020] and United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock, 2019, 2019b: World Population Prospects])

link the increase in migration to the growth of export-oriented sectors that have triggered various significant labor-market processes, especially in the agricultural sphere. This migration-export link can take place indirectly through economic openness, trade globalization, and, more precisely, through “disembedding” processes (Stalker, 2000, pp. 35–58). Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 3.13, migration rates and export rates have followed distinct dynamics. Migration levels stagnated in the 1990s, while economic openness measured by exports increased during this period. In contrast, since 2005, the dynamics of the two processes have been direct opposites. Regardless of the lack of a global correlation, the link may still hold at the level of individual countries and, especially in semi-peripheral countries, a shift towards an export orientation may lead to or be associated with a major wave of emigration (Sassen, 1988). It is thus worth using this variable in the multivariate analysis. 3.1.8

Further Potential Factors: Unemployment and the Evolution of Wage Differences

Structural theories suggest that the evolution of labor-market tensions is one of the key factors and mediating variables in the relationship between

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structural change and migration (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1995). In the globalization cycle of the world economy, the role of labor is being transformed and diminishing. This is rooted in a number of factors: the decline of peasant economies based on households, the decline of industrial and agricultural jobs, the extension of time spent in education, the technological transformation, and other structural changes. Thus, the share of employed people aged 15–64 years has fallen for both women and men (from 56 to 52.5% and from 84 to 80%, respectively). The drop in the labor-market participation rate of the 15–24 age group (by 15 percentage points over the period), mainly due to the development of education, plays a major role in this process. The participation rate in higher education alone has increased globally from 14 to 38% (International Labour Office, 2017, p. 10; Kühn et al., 2019). The share of people in employment is falling (Fig. 3.14). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the number of people aged 15–64 has increased from around 3.2 billion to over 5 billion since 1990, and the proportion of both sexes has grown from 60–61 to 65%, while population growth still continues. In absolute terms, this means that the world’s population in search of a job has grown significantly, while employment in this group has dropped. This competitive situation in the labor market may also increase people’s inclination to migrate. However, it is important to note that analyses at micro- and macro-levels lead to contradictory results (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1995). At the micro-level, unemployment strengthens the propensity to migrate and even increases migration; however, this economic effect (the response to unemployment rates) is only experienced among unemployed people, while it does not manifest among those who are employed (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1995, p. 107). Therefore, this relationship may be uncertain at the macro-level. Perhaps a more precise measure of the perception of competition and insecurity could help explore these connections (Fig. 3.15). I decided to disregard this variable in my model. On a global level, several hypotheses among migration theories link the wage differences between the world’s major regions to the issue of migration. One of these is the Heckscher-Ohlin model. One of the key elements of this neoclassical, macro- and market-based explanation is that under free-market conditions, the prices of production in labor-abundant and capital-abundant economies converge. This means that wages in laborabundant, poor countries catch up and wages in capital-abundant, richer countries relatively fall or at least converge with the former, while the

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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

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Fig. 3.14 Global labor-force participation rates for men and women aged 15– 64, ILO model 1990–2019 (Source World Bank [2020])

process is reversed for the price of capital (e.g., Massey, 1999; Williamson, 1996). Migration is a key factor in levelling out the price of labor according to this theory. The theory also claims that this effect is generally confined and regulated by citizenship and migration control regimes, to the detriment of labor (Mihályi & Szelényi, 2019). Empirically, the question can be formulated as whether there is convergence that could reduce migration, or whether there is increasing divergence, which would explain the rise in migration. The available sets of data are fragmented and ambiguous; thus, it proves impossible to integrate relative wages into the model to test ideas about global market rationality so much supported by the discursive changes. Nonetheless, it seems that some convergence has taken place as a result of the opening-up to the global market, and this has reduced

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Fig. 3.15 Migration rate and unemployment, 1990–2019 (Source World Bank [2020])

the impact of the factors triggering migration. Over the period 2005– 2017, wage growth in developed countries was consistently below the world average, according to ILO modeling, while Asia (including China in particular), Africa, and Eastern Europe generally outperformed the world average. Of the sending regions, only Latin America showed very low wage growth. Yet the trends suggest that large regions benefited from this global labor-market competition and the diverging wage growth rates started to convergence, which is of particular importance from a migration perspective. A similar, limited convergence of wages, which of course still leaves hierarchies essentially intact but facilitates minor change, was observed by Scott Albrecht and Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz (2014). They argued that (before 2012) there had been substantial upward mobility among workers on the periphery, especially in those sectors the products of which could be sold on a global market. These workers improved their relative position as opposed to those involved in local services or producing for

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global markets in richer cities. There was some convergence of the wages in the core and periphery states after 1990, especially because of certain developments in China and other parts of the world. Thus, if such trends persist, wage advantages will be partially eroded in those parts of the world where immigration is prevalent and where there are globally privileged groups of workers with specific, historically given attitudes and identity elements, who may rebel against the policy of opening-up to global markets precisely because of this potential convergence of wages (Mihályi & Szelényi, 2019). Paradoxically then, they may also protest against increasing immigration on the grounds of a factor that works against economic growth due to the given structural conditions. 3.1.9

Opening-Up to Global Markets and Migration Levels: The Construction of Multivariate Historical Models

The main question the model addresses is what socioeconomic changes in the initial period of globalization had a systematic impact on the change in the emigration levels in later periods, expressed as a share of the total population of the countries concerned, that can help explain the historical material background of the migration turn. This work is necessary and crucial for understanding the interplay and history of the global and local and related historical conjunctions. It is rarely attempted, and no systemic history has been written yet. Although an earlier analysis by Sanderson and Kentor (2008) was taken as a starting point in several respects, the modeling below differs substantially from their work. While they looked at the period 1985–2000, the analysis below focuses on the decades between 1990 and 2010. It also differs from the work of Bang and MacDermott (2019). Very importantly, however, it is not the absolute values of relevant factors that are included in the model, but changes in these factors induced by the transformations in the first period of globalization (1990–1995), which later manifest themselves in the changes of emigration rates for three time periods: 1995–2000, 1995–2005, and 1995–2010. Another important difference is that the dependent variable is not the migration balance but the changes in the proportion of the emigrated migrant stock (those who left their country of birth) to the total population. (For the variables and data that were used, see Appendix 9–18.) The modeling confirms many of the above-described initial hypotheses, but it also led to some real surprises (for the results and coefficients of the

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modeling, see Appendix 19). Among the variables included in the historical statistical analysis, the change in the rates of emigration during the reference period (1990–1995), associated with the cumulative causation and non-observed determinants, was the one variable which showed very strong cross-period and cross-model effects. Thus, the extent of changes in emigration rates in the initial period had a large and significant effect on later changes in the same process, which clearly demonstrates the path dependence of migration trajectories. This effect was the largest within the world-systems and the joint models. In all cases, as compared to the joint model, it is the world-systems model that best integrates the variable in question (based on significance levels and strengths of the effect). At the same time, with the modernization model, this variable loses its significance in the medium and long term; that is, such association becomes random. The impact of the initial change of emigration rates increases over time in the world-systems model (Beta values increase from approx. 0.51 to 0.82). Cumulative causation (the strength of historical relationships and the culture of migration and network effects) has gradually more and more power over time. But this should be also attributed to the effect of non-observed variables included in the same variable. This clearly shows that previously built-up migration links and processes within the historically inherited system of inequality and the ongoing opening-up to global markets is the key driver of the later acceleration of emigration. From another perspective—approaching cumulative processes from a geographical perspective—the model suggests that the regional distribution of emigration levels may be important in later regional histories and developmental trajectories. In addition to the initial levels, the rise in global income as measured by GDP was also linked to marketization in terms of the growing market domination, wage labor, and market services instead of previously household-based activities, and the changing division of labor. As expected, changes in GDP per capita, relative to the world average, had a positive effect on the dynamics of outmigration between 1990 and 1995. This variable was statistically significant in the world system and in the joint model over both short and longer periods, while in the case of the modernization theory it showed some correlation with changes in migration levels only over a period of 15 years. This relationship is therefore linear, and the results seem to suggest that migration hump theory (which assumes a non-linear relationship) cannot be upheld (de Haas et al., 2018). It is also interesting because the results may suggest

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that the improvement in relative income in richer states would also lead to accelerated further emigration. It seems that growing relative incomes positively affected the ability to migrate within the given social and economic context, while worsening relative incomes during the reference periods (mostly in Eastern Europe and Africa) had a contrary effect. This surprising result shows us that, beyond the impacts of other determinants within the same model, increasing income also contributed to larger waves of emigration. Interestingly, within the modernization model, where we expected to find such a relationship, this was only significant in the longest term; using a 15-year-long time horizon. Once again, the world-systems model seems to be the appropriate context for this complex mechanism. An important indicator of modernization, mean years of schooling, increased, yet at significantly varying pace and equally varying baselines for all countries in the sample. Contrary to my expectations, however, this factor did not have a systematic effect on emigration dynamics. Growth in educational attainment and consequent improvements in human capital within the modernization model do not lead to an increase in emigration rates; thus, the former is not helpful when exploring migration transition ideas. In fact, this effect is negative and is even significant in the short term in the model that simulates world-systems theories. Thus, we might conclude that in countries where the level of education increased during the reference period, the level of emigration, ceteris paribus, decreased in the short term. A tentative explanation is that young people had better opportunities in domestic labor markets due to acquiring higher educational attainments, increasing their preference for staying in their home countries. This shows the strength of local societies during the massive opening-up process. Another surprising result was obtained concerning agricultural employment. Increasing migration after 1995 can be associated with rising levels of the former between 1990 and 1995. Its relationship with outmigration was positive in each model; that is, if the share of those employed in agriculture increased, the level of outmigration also grew in the medium and long term. This effect was observed in both the modernization and the world-systems interpretive frameworks in addition to the joint model. From a world-systems theory perspective, such a surprising result might mean that greater outmigration characterized those countries where, having all other variables under control, agriculture remained a very important employer in comparison with other sectors. In these countries, people reacted to shocks and tension caused by globalization and

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economic re-structuration (e.g., the loss of local industrial employment) by returning to work in the agricultural sector, and through growing rates of emigration, which was seen as an alternative option in the crisis. This can be interpreted as a shock effect: locals tried to tackle the consequences of structural changes brought about by the opening of markets, e.g., the decline of local industry, by trying to escape to the agricultural sphere and/or by outmigration (e.g., Horváth & Kiss, 2015). As we will see later for Romania, for example, re-agrarianization in the early 1990s meant that agricultural employment levels increased from 30 to 40%, while emigration rates skyrocketed by more than 100% between 1995 and 2005 (from 4.26 to 9.85%, respectively). Similar trends occurred in Tajikistan, Cambodia, and Venezuela. This modifies the world-system model, because it is re-agrarianization and not the decline in agricultural employment that brings about a rise in migration, as opposed to what was hypothesized. Thus, the opening-up to investment and the transformation of the local economy in the early 1990s increased migration in cases when the population failed to find work relatively quickly in the service sector. If they found new employment, the effect was more modest. A good example is China, where agricultural employment fell from 60 to 52% between 1990 and 1995, while emigration increased from 0.41 to only 0.55% between 1995 and 2005 (see Appendix 11 and 14). It should be noted that, on the other hand, internal migration within China intensified. One of the key actors, as expected, was the higher mobility of foreign capital as promoted by neoliberalism. Changes in the net inflow of FDI, in accordance with world-systems theories, had a significant effect, especially in the short term. Excluding the impacts of other variables, increasing FDI inflow positively affected the level of emigration (a weak yet systematic correlation). Thus, the results support the macro-level mechanisms hypothesized by Saskia Sassen (1988). It seems that increasing amounts of FDI during the opening-up phase of globalization played a significant role in the subsequent increase in global migration (Sassen, 1988). The effect was strongest in the short term, and this shortened the time lag identified by Sanderson and Kentor, as the correlation in the worldsystems model was found to hold not only over a ten-year, but also over a five-year period (Sanderson & Kentor, 2008). This relationship might have played an important role in Eastern Europe and the successor states of the Former Soviet Union, as well as in some (post-)socialist Southeast Asian countries (such as Vietnam,

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Cambodia, and China to some extent), where FDI inflows increased far above the world average in the first half of the 1990s; however, this effect was less relevant in African, South Asian, and Western European countries where the growth of FDI inflows was lower in the same period; that is, the FDI of these countries was closer to the world average. This also shows that systematic social correlations were at play in the case of this variable too, and these were strongest in the semi-periphery. It should be noted that in the case of China and Vietnam the exceptionally high capital investment did not lead to more outmigration than the world average (Melegh, 2020b). Changes in the levels of FDI stock, in contrast to the findings of Sanderson and Kentor (2008), were not correlated with later changes in emigration rates. Thus, one might say that it was not the accumulation of foreign capital but the inflows that took place in the opening-up phase of globalization that later affected migration dynamics. The initial shock was more impactful than the later integration into world economy, which shows once again that world-systems theorists were correct in saying that the penetration of global capitalism is key to understanding migration (Massey, 1999). In a similar way, no evidence was found that changing levels of exports during this period affected migration. A non-systematic relationship was found, and in my study, it had a negative sign; that is, the results suggest that increasing participation in foreign trade might reduce emigration (Stalker, 2000). That is, it was not the opening-up of the markets that alone caused a rise in migration, but the major factor was the transformative role of capital coupled with the given path dependence and marketization. Among the additional variables, initial population size showed no correlation with migration. In contrast, the peripheral dummy (i.e., GDP per capita as 10–49% of the world average) had an impact in the longest term, while the semi-peripheral dummy (GDP per capita as 50–149% of the world average) had a positive relationship even over a 10-year period. In other words, the previously stated associations appear to be the strongest in terms of semi-peripheral countries, which coincide with the predictions of world-systems theory again. It is no coincidence that Latin America and Eastern Europe became the major driving forces of emigration in the era of globalization. Concerning the explanatory power of these models, the highest values of adjusted R 2 occurred in case of the world-systems and joint models

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(for the period of 1995–2000 0.8236 and 0.8213; for 1995–2005 0.4686 and 0.4613, respectively). The explanatory potential of the modernization model was smaller for the same periods: 0.3216 and 0.0403, respectively. When examining common variables across different models, the results suggest that they “work” best within the framework of worldsystems theories, thus pointing to potential systemic associations during the decades of globalization in the 1990s and 2000s. Based on my analysis, the changes in indicators of modernization, together with the cumulative effects and changes in agricultural employment, are apparently still insufficient to explain fully the later increase in emigration rates. Furthermore, some variables, such as educational attainment and agricultural employment, affected migration in unexpected ways. These results should inspire us to rethink modernization. When explaining outmigration, theories of migration transition focus mostly on the relationship between changes in relative income and migration potentials. Modernization theories should not be discarded completely, since they still make an important contribution to migration theory regarding changes in both the composition and rhythm of migration (Fassmann et al., 2014)—this study, however, does not discuss these contributions; assessing this theoretical perspective would require further research. The opening-up of national economies in the early 1990s that brought about growing levels of foreign direct investment resulted in a systematic rise in emigration rates in the short term and even with a 10–15 year lag in the semi-peripheries. One might argue that the world-systems model prevails for certain structural positions of the hierarchical world economy, especially in semi-peripheral countries. There was a massive inflow of capital, causing important structural transformations in these countries, especially in relation to the size of the receiving economy. Thus, the opening-up resulted in profound transformations of economic structures, and this, coupled with internal and external inequalities, may have expedited outmigration. The opening-up phase of globalization triggered very complex and controversial processes, in which migration played a crucial role, being linked, however, to different development trajectories and structural pathways. In regions where uncertainties stemming from globalization were stronger and emigration was accompanied by other migration patterns (e.g., massive immigration flows, increasing waves of asylum seekers, or the emergence of new migration systems), these transformations probably had more serious political consequences too. In some regions where the

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shock and historical changes were strong, migration now embodies the tensions of the transformations linked to globalization. Maybe it is not the developmental effect of the historically specific neoliberal period that is most important in terms of the movement of capital or people, but how migration became the focus of tensions. The above historical and socio-material changes and factors, partly identified by modeling, are also spatially organized and it is therefore necessary to look more precisely at local and specific processes and their interaction with global developments. I will now focus first on Europe and then look at development trends and trajectories in Eastern Europe. In this way, it will become clear why the migration debate has flared up in Europe, especially in relation to active participation of Eastern Europe, and how historical and socio-material structures and processes have interacted with discursive patterns and changes.

3.2 Why Europe? Europe’s Place in the World’s Demographic, Economic, and Migration Processes One can claim without any Eurocentrism that in the interaction of demographic, migratory, and economic history, Europe as whole is truly special and its tensions are formidable. In the midst of the political transformation that is taking place throughout the world, the 2010s saw the rise of anti-migrant populist parties and governments in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The Visegrád countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, also took this trajectory. In the following section, I identify some of the specificities that could have had a major impact on the intensification and polarization of the migration debate: – Europe had more open economies and a freer market economy than other parts of the world. This situation was promoted by an institutional system that linked unequal regions together in a unique way, which in turn may have significantly increased already high levels and rates of migration. Path dependence and free-market transformation resulted in Europe becoming a destination for immigrants. – Europe became a permanent destination for immigrants only in the 1970s, as opposed to other target regions. During globalization, new routes of migration to Europe opened up for migrants and refugees,

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first with Eastern Europe, and later with Western Asia, the latter so strongly rejected in current public debates. – Europe has experienced sharp and unique tensions generated by the recent interconnection of aging, fertility decline, economic transition, and migration, which has also resulted from the different evolution of the continent’s role in migration and its economic importance. In this analysis, my focus is not only the European Union, for several reasons. First, Eastern Europe is still divided in terms of EU membership (among other countries Ukraine, Serbia, Moldova, and Georgia are all on the waiting list). Narrowing down the focus to only EU countries would be an oversimplification, as EU membership is subject to change (Böröcz & Kovács, 2001). Second, the EU has undergone historical changes during the era of globalization involving several waves of enlargement and the construction of new institutional arrangements that promote a free-market system. Third, Europe as a continent is historically deeply interconnected with the post-Soviet region and has its own specific system of migration links (Bonifazi, 2008; Massey et al., 1998, pp. 109– 133; Molodikova, 2008). This is clearly illustrated by the importance of Polish, Russian, Ukrainian Albanian, and Serbian diasporas across Europe. This approach is also justified by the fact that the majority (two-thirds) of immigrants living in the EU were not born in the EU. 3.2.1

Key Macro-Processes Related to the Migration Turn in Europe

Europe has been a key engine in marketization and globalization. Governments busily destroyed the welfare state in non-socialist countries and were jubilant about the demolition of socialist mixed economies. The free movement of capital, of goods, and also of labor has been guaranteed, and in some parts of the world, regardless of any inequalities, governments have introduced a common currency. In the words of Karl Polányi, Europe aimed for a market utopia that led not only to various double movements, but significantly different paths of development as well (Polanyi, 1945, 2001). Even after decades of neoliberal destruction, Europe still has welfare systems and welfare expectations that are unknown in many other parts of the world. Additionally, Europe has become the oldest continent (the old-age dependency rate being 20–25%), and high rates of redistribution

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have stagnated, while the age composition has remained fairly unchanged (World Bank, 2020). As opposed to average global redistribution levels (20–25% of GDP), Europe maintains a level of around 50%. The same figures for the European Union are even more extreme, and there are deep internal inequalities that explain mass migration on both the socalled supply and demand sides. At the same time, global statistics show little change in labor-force participation rates. These have remained relatively stable at around 60% (below the global average) following a minor decline. The EU rates are still less. In the case of both Europe and the EU, female employment has risen substantially and gender-specific levels have converged in a unique way. Further, Europe widely opened its economic borders especially during the 2000s and mid-2010s (Fig. 3.16). Such openness can be detected not only in the FDI/GDP ratios, but also in the weight of exports, which grew from 25 to 43%, while the same index globally rose only from 19 to 30% (World Bank, 2020). A privileged and demographically rapidly changing Europe has opened up its economies and has encountered the related social and economic 9.00% 8.00% 7.00% 6.00% 5.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.00% 1.00% 0.00% 1990

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insecurities. This historical experience has coincided with a migration turn, which has contributed to tensions building up. 3.2.2

Net Migration on a Continental Level

Europe has undergone a unique transformation over the past decades in the global context of migration processes. When taking a long-term view of the migration affecting Europe and its immediate demographic context, interesting correlations can be observed that may help explain why migration has become a particularly controversial topic in Europe during the 2010s. According to net migration statistics that disregard absolute levels of immigration and emigration and forms of migration, Europe was a sending region until the run-up to globalization in the 1970s, and only then did it become a destination area. Not only Southern and Eastern Europe, but even states such as the Netherlands were sending countries until the 1960s. Historically, this region is associated with very specific dynamics, and this shift was unique to the continent: a privileged, wealthy region that had operated a colonial system and organized its global connections through outward migration suddenly became a target region for immigrants. From the 1950s onwards, all other continents were either purely sending or purely destination areas. So, it was a specifically European historical experience that the continent started to produce figures similar to the positive migration balances of North America and Australia. Moreover, during the period of opening-up Latin America started becoming a sending region for migrants who traveled in increasing numbers mainly to North America, while Asia and Africa also became important sending areas on a global level (Fig. 3.17). In fact, the West-versus-non-West dichotomy emerged in terms of migration only in the 1970s, indicating that it was only in the period of market opening that the West emerged as a privileged region that served as a destination area for immigrants. This shift took place in the decade just prior to globalization, but Europe reached the immigration levels of North America or even of Oceania, including Australia, only in 2015. Only at the peak of the opening-up, in the 2000s, did net migration exceed 2%. Net migration estimates based on population change between two subsequent censuses range from plus 1 to 3% in Europe. This means that there was an annual average positive balance of one to three people

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10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0 -2.0 -4.0 Europe

Africa

Latin America and the Carrribean

North America

Oceania

Asia

Fig. 3.17 Net migration rates in major regions, 1950–2015 (per 1000 inhabitants) (Source United Nations [2017b: World Population Prospects])

per 1000 inhabitants over the period, based on relatively mechanical but comparable UN estimates. The positive annual balance for the continent as a whole represents an additional inflow of one-and-a-half million people annually, into a population of almost 750 million. Looking at regional balances from the point of view of sending regions, it is true that large and heavily populated continents such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America have shown a general trend to emigration. These balances had no major peaks or breaks in recent decades, and the trends are fairly stable. However, it should be noted that emigration rates have increased since the 1970s, the early phase of the globalization era. This was particularly noticeable in semi-peripheric Latin America, where the emigration wave was associated with a neoliberal turn in economic policy, the inflow of foreign capital, the disintegration of peasant societies, and other local processes (see also Massey et al., 1998, pp. 203, 207, 212–213, 220). This period after the oil crisis led to farreaching economic difficulties and significantly rearranged the economic

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and political discourses that had promoted state intervention and national modernization policies, bringing to the foreground a hitherto marginal free-market perspective (Desai & Levitt, 2020; Frank, 1983; Roberts & Hite, 2000, pp. 16–23). It was exactly in the 1970s that Europe was also transformed and became a destination for immigrants in terms of political and discursive processes. Europe was the only continent that had to face a radically new migration situation during the period of opening-up, which was justifiable in terms of both historical connections and income differentials. Change was, in fact, inevitable, yet due to its novelty, migration naturally became a central theme in public policy debate. 3.2.3

The Historical Evolution of Global Migration Links Between 1990 and 2010: Changes in the Migration Network of Europe and the Other Continents

Besides the changes in net migration discussed above, it is important to take into consideration the geographical distribution of migration flow (not migration stock). Changes in spatial arrangements are an important part of this historical transformation. Such shifts can also have a strong impact on mental maps and even on conflicts. It is a crucial issue how major regions are integrated into the global system of movement (as areas of outmigration or as destinations for immigrants), what kind of global historical experience is accumulated in these regions, and how these mental images may have changed during the era of globalization due to the transformation of the spatial structure of specific demographic processes. The world’s migration network underwent substantial change prior to the period under study (Abel, 2018; Massey, 1999; Massey et al., 1998; McKeown, 2004). Based on migration flows estimated from World Bank stock data, migration between major regions was relatively intense after World War II. These movements had the most impact on this period, but had declined by the 1970s and 1980s (Abel, 2018). The collapse of the European colonial system in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in a halt and reversal of the outmigration of European settlers to non-European parts of the world. Some of the colonial migration flows were thus reversed and numerous industrial workers arrived in Western European countries, which tried to meet the demand for industrial laborers in the 1960s and 1970s by employing “guest workers” from Europe, Turkey, and North

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Africa. In South Asia and Africa, there was significant internal migration flow as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system and changes in state borders. Major refugee movements took place around the world after World War II (in India and Pakistan, and later Bangladesh); Europe also experienced waves of refugees and forced settlements. The 1960s saw a similarly turbulent period in Africa as a result of post-colonial insecurities and, in many cases, war and/or famine (e.g., in Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan). The impact of these crises was felt mainly along migration networks within continents. From the 1950s, the international refugee protection system became institutionalized under the auspices of the United Nations. At the same time, international law evolved in line with the development of global governmental organizations. In the 1950s, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) began working; it changed its name in 1980 to the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, and in 1989, it was renamed again to the International Organization for Migration. Looking at the era of globalization and the period 1990–2010, it is worthwhile following Abel and Sanders’ estimation procedure based on census data (Abel & Sander, 2014).5 Abel and Sanders created their cited diagrams (Appendix 20–23) for the SEEMIG project under my leadership,6 which involved the following countries: Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Italy (in the chart labeled as SEEMIG countries). In these charts, both the color and width of the represented connections have a meaning: the color indicates the direction of flow and the width its magnitude. These diagrams will be compared with the stock data from the UN’s migration database, and I will examine over five year periods the stock changes that are significantly

5 These diagrams were also presented at the EPC conference in Budapest, June 2014, by Heinz Fassmann, Attila Melegh, Ramon Bauer, Elisabeth Musil, and Kathrin Gruber under the title “Migration cycles and transitions in South-East Europe: from emigration to immigration countries?” This discussion is, however, entirely my own interpretation. 6 Within the framework of the SEEMIG project that took place between 2012 and 2014, we analyzed the historical migration and statistical systems of eight southeastern European countries (Slovakia, Romania, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Hungary, and Serbia).

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above or below average.7 These observations will also be linked to data on refugees. This provides a general outline of the geographical shifts; my focus is on the changing forms of integration on the European continent in light of globalization. 3.2.3.1 1990–1995 In the early phase of opening-up, Africa and South Asia saw by far the greatest number of people migrating. Within Africa, large flows of migrants left the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Angola, which means large groups of refugees and, in the case of South Africa, the movement of workforce. From a global point of view, it was an important change that in Asia some of the displaced people from Afghanistan and Pakistan returned home as the war subsided. More than three million people born in Afghanistan returned to their country during this period. Meanwhile, these countries became increasingly involved in transcontinental migration towards both North America and Europe, demonstrating the two main routes of people fleeing Afghan territories. China’s emigrant population grew at more than average rates both in Asia and on other continents, and the size of the Chinese diaspora increased from 4 to 5 million globally. Within Asia, the number of emigrants from poor states of Southeast Asia (Nepal, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, etc.) increased, and they were the main source of labor for other industrializing countries in East and Southeast Asia. Other major countries in South Asia (India, Bangladesh) became more actively involved in the migration waves, mainly towards the Gulf region, North America, and, to a lesser extent, Europe. The wealthier, industrialized countries that served as destinations for migrants from poorer regions also increased their outward migration to East and South Asia at above-average rates, although in smaller numbers, also in connection with the process of industrialization. The migration from Latin America to North America is of particular importance globally, as this is one of the most significant and dynamic connections in the world’s network of relations. Emigrants from Central

7 I am aware that changes in the stock are interconnected with demographic processes in the given diaspora, and that an aging population can decrease even without outmigration (e.g., involving groups of elderly who live in Hungary but were originally born in Slovakia). However, changes that considerably exceed the regional average in five years’ time, in all probability signal significant immigration or outmigration.

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America and the northern and western states of the South American continent (Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and especially Peru) make the United States their main destination, but they have entered European countries as well at a rate above-average European population growth. During the first stage of globalization, Europe already had a complex and extensive network of immigration and internal connections, but the level of the movement through it remained relatively low compared to other regions. Thus, thanks to its former colonial links, Europe became a globally well-integrated migration hub, but it was a rather minor player in terms of intercontinental migration. There were much larger flows of people within and between former colonial territories during the period of opening-up. According to UN data, in 1990, the European region, including Russia, had 49,608,231 people living outside their country of birth, while by 1995 this number had increased by four million to 53,489,829 (United Nations, 2019a). The region was most affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of Eastern Europe, with major outmigration to Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America, as the social security and political stability of the socialist system were lost, and “disembeddedness” and market openness increased (Melegh, 2013). In a global context, the exodus from Eastern Europe thus coincided with the increase in migration levels from Latin America and South/Southeast Asia; therefore, from a North American and Western European perspective, these changes were seen as interlinked and interpreted as one global migration wave. On the other hand, Eastern European emigrants thus had to find their place in an intensified and more diversified global turmoil from the early 1990s onwards, which must have heightened the sense of competition between migrant groups. Beyond the opening-up to globalization, it was the war and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia that played the most important role in Eastern European outmigration. Emigrant populations from Bosnia and Croatia numbered 800,000, while Albania and, due to its previously resettled German ethnic groups, Kazakhstan also contributed to the increase in migration. As we will see below, the migrants from Eastern Europe who started leaving at that time often took advantage of the opportunities offered by asylum systems during this period, and almost 30% of asylum seekers in the refugee wave that hit Europe in the early 1990s came from Eastern Europe, and within it, Yugoslavia.

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3.2.3.2 1995–2000 Many of the processes that had started in the previous period intensified in the second half of the 1990s. The situation did not change fundamentally, although there were some important developments. As we have seen above, South Asia was originally one of the most important global players in the migration nexus. In the next five years, South Asia’s relative involvement in internal migration declined to some extent, because India, Iran, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh exchanged fewer migrants, although the stock of Afghan emigrants started to rise again both in this region and worldwide. This region was represented by above-average growth in European and, especially, North American immigration statistics in this period, which was one of the most important changes in the transcontinental network. It seems that it was progress towards market liberalization, the slow improvement in economic growth, and the household economic constraints of South Asian peasant economies in crisis that made this region one of the key migration actors in the globalization period. South Asia had the most intensive links with the Gulf countries of West Asia. From a global perspective, the emergence of West Asia as an actor in the migration flow is striking. This may have been due to a deterioration in the region’s prosperity and security; as a result, an increasing number of migrants left these countries, mainly for North America. On the other hand, the Gulf countries received migrant workers in growing numbers, mainly from Africa (e.g., Egypt) and South Asia (e.g., India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh). This migratory regime developed without the host countries allowing any form of residence other than for limited contractual work (Massey et al., 1998, pp. 134–159; Szelenyi, 2016; Szelenyi et al., 2018). West and South Asia thus became the driving force behind the development of transcontinental migration networks from the second half of the 1990s onwards, and contributed to relatively new links in the migration regimes of Europe and North America. North America became a true global hub in this period, much more so than Europe, although the latter’s global embeddedness also continued to grow, although at more modest rates. Africa played a similar role in this period. In fact, it is from this period onwards that a considerable system of transcontinental relations between Africa and Europe and between Africa and North America began to emerge. From a European perspective, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and a few small West African states were prominent, while in the case of

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North America it was primarily Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, and Algeria that had the most impact on the migration network. The number of migrants (including refugees and non-refugees) increased during this period, but growth was slightly slower, rising from 53.5 million to 57 million, an increase of 6% compared to 8% in the previous period. Outmigration from Europe remained low, while the external and internal mobility patterns of the continent diversified. Certain Asian countries, such as Iraq and Pakistan, appeared in migration networks, and links with certain Latin American countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Peru) were also reinforced. The complex migration flows related to the transformation crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist system in Eastern Europe also continued. The South-Eastern European region, including most countries in the region under study, was also involved in an increasingly sophisticated network of migratory links, although these were still mainly intra-European regimes; outside the continent, these countries appeared only in the North American migration network. 3.2.3.3 2000–2005 In the period 2000–2005, migration stock as a share of the world’s population started to rise drastically, and the 2000s marked the peak of the opening cycle in terms of the flow of both migrants and capital. Total migration increased by 10% in the first five years of the millennium. The changes observed in the previous period further intensified; that is, the opening cycle partially rearranged the geographical map of migration flows and reinforced transcontinental relations, which is certainly a remarkable development. This raises the possibility that this form of “globalization” increased tensions, especially due to the sense of superiority of the West (Cantat, 2016; Melegh, 2016). The position of Asia, especially South and Southeast Asia, in North American immigration was reinforced. West Asia also became an increasingly important actor, partly because of wars (including the armed conflicts in Iraq) and partly because of the rapidly increasing employment of South Asians in these countries, which indicated the region’s reassessment in terms of migration. It is worth noting that the migrant connection between West Asia and Europe remained weak in this period, which may be interesting from the point of view of the subsequent 2015 “shock.” An important change was the mass arrival of Latin American migrants in Europe and the rising number of South Asian migrants

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in Western European countries, as well as the growing importance and diversification of South Asia’s network of migratory connections. The Eastern European region became more Eurocentric and more “fixated” on Europe, with a very limited network of “external” connections, unlike the countries of EU-15 (Melegh, 2013; Melegh & Sárosi, 2015; Melegh et al., 2018). 3.2.3.4 2005–2010 This period brought about profound transformations in the spatial structure of migratory networks. By the end of the decade that preceded the “migration crisis,” the link between West Asia and South Asia had become the main axis in the world’s migration networks, followed by the connection between Latin America and North America (Table 3.2). The intra-African nexus remained very strong, while migration to Europe from this direction also increased. Western Europe’s “external” links were strengthened both towards Africa and Latin America, while at the same time the former exerted an increasing pull on the countries of Eastern Europe that had not been part of the Soviet Union. By this time, a massive, but in many respects, isolated migration system had developed in the former Soviet area. Despite the wars going on at the time, Europe had little contact with the West Asian region, especially with its destabilized regions, although more and more weight was given to West Asia from a global migration perspective. Overall, as globalization progressed, a stronger web of interconnections emerged in terms of intercontinental migration flows, and intraregional migration became less dominant (Africa, South Asia), although intra-continental migration still accounted for the largest share of the aggregate flow data. Over the twenty-year period of the opening cycle, new transcontinental linkages emerged while masses migrated along old routes as well. The historical determination of mass migration links and their path dependence that I demonstrated in the previous chapter remained evident. From the 2000s onwards, the expansion of the migration network may have intensified the resentment about migration that is likely to arise under certain historical sociological conditions. Stronger links were established between South and South-East Asia and North America (mainly as a result of the increasingly prominent role of migrant women), and between Latin America and the South and West of Europe, also largely on the basis of preexisting historical connections. In the meantime, a (mainly

61 96

3628

541 21 169 1508 1058 1000

8082

1763

2108 609 450 1390 469 772

11,178

North America

2401 1216

Europe

1244

12 1 9 7 35 8

879

16 277

Latin America

3828

3412 2 99 61 17 29

23

138 47

Africa

2200

5 1871 68 16 65 13

11

38 113

Former SU

7713

673 22 927 4902 3 881

39

136 130

West Asia

1381

0 0 14 1308 0 59

0

0 0

South Asia

1406

3 6 0 74 781 386

112

5 39

East Asia

3932

157 1 43 873 424 2167

39

134 94

Southeast Asia

Estimated number of migrants (per 1000 inhabitants) within and between regions, 2005–2010

Source Sander et al. (2014, p. 358). Data were not aggregated in the cited publication

Europe North America Latin America Africa Former SU West Asia South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia Total

Table 3.2

40,964

6911 2533 1779 10,139 2852 5315

6494

2929 2012

Total

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159

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male-driven) migration system emerged around the Gulf states (for the Gulf countries, see Sarkar, 2017; Szelényi, 2016; Szelényi et al., 2018; for the gender distribution see Sander et al., 2014). With the breakdown of earlier European relations, a more isolated post-Soviet migration system was established, also along the lines of prior historical and ethnic relations (Molodikova, 2008). Eastern European countries other than the former Soviet territories were further integrated into the migratory relations of the rest of Europe. It seems that the opening-up took place along solid historical links, and public attitudes and discursive patterns can also be interpreted in the context of spatial relations combined with historical inequalities. Preexisting historical links facilitate well-established psychological mechanisms on the part of both migrants and the recipient communities, but in the case of historically “shocking” migration flows, these mental maps may promote exclusion and the establishment of boundaries as residents in the host areas encounter largely “alien” migrants in large numbers. This was the case in North America—a region that experienced much a higher level of immigration from South Asia in this period than in the past—and in the Gulf countries, as well as in Europe, where masses (mainly from Asia, but also from Africa), who had a subordinate position in previous historical discourses and represented “significant otherness” in both religious and civilizational terms, were encountered by European residents in increasing numbers as a result of the wars that flared up in the 2000s (Cantat, 2016; Rajaram, 2016; Said, 1978). Europe, and especially Eastern Europe, experienced additional shocks in connection with migrants from West Asian societies or from Africa, particularly those who had left war-ravaged areas, not only because of the change in proportions but also because of the surge in absolute number. Moreover, taking into account the fact that the number of countries sending migrants increased over the period, while the number of purely receiving countries remained stable, this bottleneck in Europe and in the so-called Western countries in general may also have contributed to the increasingly fierce debate about migration (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). In order to gain a better understanding of the potential impact of this transformation, some of the issues must be addressed in more detail. These include the relationship between demographic change and migration processes in Europe, as well as some of the historical and socio-material specificities of the recent refugee wave.

3

3.2.4

HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

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The Historical Conjunction Between the Increase of Migration, Population Decline, and Economic Marginalization

The demographic and economic scenario of Europe is truly unique: the key figures for migration, population, and economic weight and processes show distinct patterns.8 In the globalization period, Europe hosted relatively large numbers of migrants. The European rates fluctuated at around one-third of the total global migrant population (Fig. 3.18). This proportion was much higher than the population weight, which decreased from 14 to 10%. The high and increasing number of small states had a role in these dynamics, along with the problem of “statistical migrants,” produced by the dissolution of larger federal states (Sander et al., 2014). Fertility rates in Europe are among the lowest ones globally, in sharp contrast to areas like North America, where fertility rates are close to the reproduction rate and where immigration rates are also high. Fertility rates in Europe are generally significantly lower than 2.1, the level theoretically sufficient to reproduce national populations. The fertility levels (and the relative proportions of the younger population) became this low exactly by the 1980s when Europe became an immigrant rather than an emigrant region. In other parts of the world, fertility rates are still above 2.1 or only dropped below it in the 2020s, like in India. In this historical scenario, any idea of demographic rivalry can lead to suggestions for intervention, and the means of control can include migration itself. Approximately one-third of the overall migrant stock lives in Europe, while in terms of migration inflow this rate was around one-quarter in the late 2000s (Sander et al., 2014, p. 358). Between 2005 and 2010, Europe was the destination area for 11 million people out of a global migratory flow of 40 million. Thus, this rate was above the global level and, most importantly, above the relevant population weight. Contrasting the different (migratory, economic, and demographic) weights presents us with a relevant historical conjunction (Fig. 3.19). As a result of relative population weight decline and the unchanging migration weight, the share of the foreign-born population grew from 7

8 The data are quite inconsistent. For Europe, the dataset usually covers the whole stock born abroad, while in the case of other countries the UNHCR’s data on refugees were mechanically added to the dataset that includes people born abroad and foreign citizens. However, these data are still sufficient to track the main trends in terms of proportions.

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12.0

10.0

8.0 Europe WORLD Poly. (Europe) Poly. (WORLD)

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Fig. 3.18 Proportion of migrant stock in Europe in relation to the total population, and the share of global migrant stock in the global population, 1990–2015 (Source United Nations [2015: International Migrant Stock])

to 10% in Europe, which is well above the global rate of 3–4%. The difference continues to grow. With regard to the EU, similar tendencies have emerged, and the proportion of foreign-born residents increased from 6 to 11%, showing 50% growth.9 These processes are related to economic changes and special characteristics explained above concerning the relative wealth and the cumulative effects of creating a free-market model. When comparing migration and population weight to economic weight, one can easily discern the huge structural change. According to World Bank statistics, expressed in USD at a constant 2010 rate, this economic weight was around 39% when socialisms collapsed in around 1990 and has now declined to below

9 By 2019, the proportion had reached 11%.

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HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

163

45 39

40

36 35

33

32

35 33

34

34

33

32

31

30

30 25

20 15

14

13

12

11

11

10

10

5 0 Proportion of migrants living in Europe as related to the global stock of migrants Population weight of Europe and Central Asia within the global population Economic weight of Europe and Central Asia within the global economy

Fig. 3.19 Population, migration (migrant stock as related to the total population), and economic weight of Europe and Central Asia, 1990–2015 (Note The analysis uses aggregate data from Europe and Central Asia due to the data source. This, however, does not interfere with the analysis of the above trends because of the low weight of Central Asian countries. Source Author’s calculations based on United Nations [2017a: Trends], World Bank [2020], and United Nations [2017b: World Population Prospects])

30%.10 The same data for the EU are even more distinctive as there was a decline from 33 to 24%.

10 Economic history has long been concerned with changes in demographic and economic weight (Bairoch, 1982, 1997, 2000; Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1995). József Böröcz pointed out in connection with global transformations that it is crucial to conduct a sociological analysis of the share of GDP. He demonstrated for the EU and the former socialist bloc the decline and the problem of preserving economic weight, but he did not link it to migration data (Böröcz, 2009). Böröcz used Maddison’s data, calculated from the 1990 Geary-Khamis USD. The data I present above are different.

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In around 2005, there was a turning point and the economic weight of Europe dropped below its migration weight. Thus, Europe’s migration weight exceeded that of its overall role in the global economy. These two weights are not related to each other directly, but if free movement is assumed, the relative amount of economic activity (production and consumption) does make a difference even in attracting migrants. Europe has shifted position in this respect. Earlier, a relatively small proportion of migrants resided in Europe, and the region’s relative economic weight was substantially larger. By now, Europe has become a less important region economically with very high levels of income and migration. This can lead to panic in the case of historically strong Eurocentrism and an awareness of competition (Amin, 1989; Böröcz, 2009; Böröcz & Kovács, 2001; Melegh, 2000, 2006; Wolff, 1994). This historical conjunction can explain the sharpening of the migration debate if public discourses operate in terms of economic and demographic competition (Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001, pp. 23–44). 3.2.5

Was It Really Such a Great Shock? Some Spatial Aspects of the Most Recent Refugee Crisis and Europe’s Involvement in Granting Asylum

Although overshadowed by global migration figures, it is hard to dispute that Europe faced a major wave of refugees in the early 1990s—a wave that was comparable only to the one after 2014, signaling the beginning and the end of the opening cycle. Indeed, in the early 1990s, well over half a million people from the former Soviet Union, Romania, the disintegrating Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria applied for refugee status in other European countries within a five-year period. In addition, citizens of Turkey, Iraq, Vietnam, and some East African countries also applied for asylum in large numbers. Over five years, Europe received around 2.5 million applications, according to Eurostat (Fig. 3.20). During the first phase of opening-up (i.e., in the first half of the 1990s), the European Union had already experienced a major wave of refugees, but mainly from Eastern Europe rather than from Asia and other “less known” countries. African states played a negligible role at that time (Fig. 3.21). Thus, while there was an 8% increase in the total number of immigrants, there was no significant shift in the migration experience of EU countries and in their perception of non-European countries at that time.

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HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

165

16,00,000 14,00,000 Total 12,00,000 Asia

10,00,000 8,00,000

Africa

6,00,000

Eastern Europe, Albania and former Yugoslavia

4,00,000 Key countries in Central America and the Carribean+ South America

2,00,000

1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

0

Fig. 3.20 Regional distribution of refugee applications registered in Europe by country of origin, 1985–2018 (Source Eurostat [2019])

In contrast to the 2015 wave, it was still the European “internal otherness” that was present and not the “non-European” masses who had been relegated to an even lower level of the mental hierarchy and ignored in previous colonial and orientalist discourses (Baki´c-Hayden, 1995; Böröcz, 1999, 2006; Melegh, 1999, 2006, 2020c; Said, 1978; Todorova, 1997; Wolff, 1994). It was mainly Eastern Europeans appearing at the gates, who occupied an intermediate position in the imaginary world of civilizational hierarchies. Thus, the refugee shock may have been “mild” at that time. It should be noted, however, that even then there were serious atrocities against Romanian Roma and Vietnamese immigrants, similarly to the riots in Rostock in the former East Germany in 1992. Unemployed East German working-class youths, who combined their own inferior position and hopelessness in post-unification Germany with

166

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120%

100%

80%

Difference due to other reasons % Cannot be disaggregated

60% Key countries in Central America and the Carribean+ South America % Eastern Europe, Albania and former Yugoslavia %

40%

Africa % 20%

Asia %

2017

2013

2015

2009

2011

2005

2007

2001

2003

1997

1999

1993

1995

1989

1991

1985 -20%

1987

0%

Fig. 3.21 Refugee applications by geographical area as a share of total applications, 1985–2018 (Source Eurostat [2019]. Data on country of origin cannot be fully summarized because there were many applications in the 1980s and early 1990s that cannot be classified by region, and there were other differences between the aggregated figures and the total)

a collective hatred of refugees and non-refugee migrants, started radicalizing.11 However, this racist “background noise” from a collapsing East German society could not be heard because, as we will see later, the narratives of opening-up were still dominant at that time and the region’s hegemony was almost intact. Global opening had only just reached the former socialist societies, and the press in the former bloc and in the West was full of “euphoria over the opening of the borders” amid the unfolding transformation crisis. We were still in the ascendant phase of the global opening cycle.

11 In 2014, Burhan Qurbani made an instructive fiction film entitled Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark, which illustrates the socio-psychological mechanism of aggression that can arise from competitive subordination (Qurbani, 2015).

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Concerning the weight of asylum seekers within the global flow, even though a considerable share of the overall immigrant stock lived in Europe, until 2019 the continent did not play a major role in the flow of asylum seekers (Fig. 3.22). It would therefore seem that the refugee numbers alone would not justify an escalation of the migration debate. Fears of a flood of refugees may have gained ground partly because of the wars that have taken place in the vicinity of Europe, especially since the Iraq war. A dramatic series of armed conflicts was triggered by the US intervention into Afghanistan and the second Iraq war, which led to the total or partial occupation of these countries and to a massive exodus of civilians either within the region (to Iran, Pakistan, Syria) or towards Europe. These protracted conflicts have been a source of much trouble in themselves; even in 2010, before the so-called Arab Spring, well over half of all the world’s refugees originated from Afghanistan and Iraq. This was followed by another series of extremely bloody and lingering conflicts in Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and Ukraine. Thus, the destabilization that

Refugee stock, absolute numbers

16%

3,00,00,000

14% 2,50,00,000 12% 2,00,00,000

10% 8%

1,50,00,000

6% 1,00,00,000 4% 50,00,000

0

2%

1990

1995

2000 World

2005 Europe

2010

2015

2019

Share of the refugee stock living in Eropue

18%

3,50,00,000

0%

Europe/World (%)

Fig. 3.22 Absolute number of refugees crossing borders and asylum seekers in the world and in Europe (Source United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock, 2019])

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took place near Europe’s wider borders led to a new cyclical wave of refugees. Libya, Syria, and Ukraine became key factors in the European refugee situation, and in addition to these crises, there has been turmoil and insecurity in some regions of North and East Africa. These countries are relatively close to the old continent. Although Europe is not the main destination for most refugees, they have been in close proximity to its borders and have appeared in huge numbers in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, as well as in a completely disintegrated Libya, from where there are direct routes to Europe. We can closely follow this in the detailed statistics. Before the 2013 refugee crisis, the majority of asylum seekers in the European Union were Syrians, who submitted more than 50,000 first applications, followed by Russians with more than 40,000 and Afghans with more than 20,000 applications (“BBC Graphics,” 2014). In 2014, 563,345 asylum applications were submitted, with Syria being the main sending country (almost 120,000 people), followed by Afghanistan, Eritrea, Kosovo, and Pakistan. Migrants from other countries submitted fewer applications (Fig. 3.23). 1,40,000 1,20,000 1,00,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0

Fig. 3.23 First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2014 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 563,345) (Source Eurostat [2019])

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The year 2015 represented a peak in terms of absolute numbers, especially for applicants from Syria (Fig. 3.24). The composition of asylum seekers in 2014 only slightly changed and the main hotspots remained (West Asia, former Yugoslavia, Russia-Ukraine, Eritrea, and some countries in West Africa). Another important point is that in 2015 an excessive number of refugee applications were submitted to countries that had no preexisting colonial links and were used to dealing with considerably fewer migrants. These included Hungary (174,435 applications) and Austria. In 2017, the number of refugee applications returned to approximately 100,000 more than the figures in 2014 and remained more-or-less stable, at least until 2019 (Fig. 3.25). The hierarchy of sending countries only slightly changed, although the appearance of Turkey and Venezuela on the list was an important development in terms of later events. Turkey became a sending region because of the Syrian crisis and the masses of Syrian refugees present in the country, while Venezuela appeared in Europe’s refugee network because of a persistent political crisis. Countries that had been major recipients earlier were the main players again, and countries such as Hungary and Austria were no longer significant 4,00,000 3,50,000 3,00,000 2,50,000 2,00,000 1,50,000 1,00,000 50,000 0

Fig. 3.24 First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2015 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 1,257,150) (Source Eurostat [2019])

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host regions. In their place, Greece received an above-average number of applications for asylum, along with Italy, France, and Germany. Two years later, by 2019, the map of refugee applications had barely changed, with only Venezuela emerging as an important sending country, alongside Afghanistan (Fig. 3.26). It is important to note that the press coverage of Venezuelan asylum seekers remained limited, a fact which should be taken into consideration when analyzing discursive changes. To sum up, Europe had no prominent place or weight in terms of applications for asylum. Not even during the most recent refugee wave did the number of asylum seekers entering Europe significantly exceed the continent’s population weight, let alone its substantial economic weight. The map of refugee inflows has not changed radically since the 2000s either, with the exception of Syria and, more recently, Venezuela emerging as a hotspot. Just like in the case of the overall migrant figures, as Fig. 3.20 shows, the most striking changes since the 1990s involve the increase in the number and share of asylum seekers from Asia and the decrease in the number of those from Eastern Europe. The latter region nonetheless became important as it was Eastern Europe that for 1,20,000 1,00,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0

Fig. 3.25 First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2017 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 654,900) (Source Eurostat [2019])

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90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

Fig. 3.26 First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States in 2019 by sending country, over 10,000 applications. Absolute numbers (total: 675,885) (Source Eurostat [2019])

the first time faced the problem of registering large numbers of asylum seekers under the EU’s system of rules. The limited, rapid, and relatively formal compliance with these legal norms became a serious problem at the time of EU accession (Melegh et al., 2021). As we will see later, the intermediate position of Eastern Europe in global mental hierarchies led to a radicalizing perspective in connection with migration and nationalist exclusion. Changes in the refugee situation were linked to demographic and socio-historical transformations—most notably, marketization and the resulting uncertainties set the stage for the subsequent political turn in the 2010s across Europe. Indeed, a heavily privileged continent and its freer market was shaken, and this transformed the discursive relations that had previously existed. However, before turning to an analysis of these discursive processes in light of historical and socio-material changes, let us take a closer look at the structural position of Eastern Europe in terms of globalization and migration.

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Why Eastern Europe? The Place of Eastern Europe in the Demographic, Economic, and Migration Processes of the World 3.3.1

Neoliberal Capitalism and the Eastern European Transformation: In the Footsteps of Polányi

Europe, a continent with high levels of openness, aging, income privileges, and high but stagnating redistribution rates, has integrated even socialist Eastern European countries into a market bloc. Thus, Polányi’s idea that market fundamentalism in the context of regional inequalities can give impetus to nationalism in the form of a potential double movement is more than plausible (Polanyi, 1945). Quite a few studies have been written on this subject. Chris Hahn referred to the Eastern European trajectory as the “Visegrád status”—a peculiar mixture of free-market utopia, privatization, and EU membership that has given strength to populist forces “monopolizing” resistance (Hann, 2019, pp. 293–317). According to Tamás Krausz, historical regression has taken place in terms of social development, and some countries, especially the Eastern European states, have moved from the neoliberalism that triggered the crisis and shifted from “a liberal globalism to a conservative-populist ‘ethno-nationalism’,” mainly because of the special position of the semi-periphery (as free-market ideas have never been historical driving forces here, and local nationalism has always had the tendency to develop in right-wing directions) (Krausz, 2018). In his historiographical analysis, Krausz demonstrates this specific link between Eastern Europe and non-left nationalism on the basis of the specificities of semi-peripheral development and the paradigms of catching up (Krausz, 2011, 2018, 2021). Also drawing on an ideo-historical analysis, Gáspár Miklós Tamás has stressed that, in contrast to nationalism organized on the basis of the common good and the public interest, a kind of ethnicist domination has emerged in Eastern Europe, in which, following its historical roots, “the only interest is self-preservation and self-identity,” as opposed to any kind of integrative nationalism (Tamás, 2016, p. 128). Márk Éber and his co-authors refer to the historical and socio-material roots of Eastern European political transformations in the global and local problems of capital accumulation that pertain to a process of economic history as “global descent,” and find that the transnational

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distribution of work and its changes account for the radical transformation of Eastern European economies (Éber et al., 2019). Ádám Fábry takes a similar position when he identifies the tensions in the accumulation strategy, driven by foreign capital, and the neoliberal turn, the long-term start of which he dates to the 1970s, as the root cause of the political earthquakes of the 2010s (Fábry, 2019). Gábor Scheiring links the authoritarian turn to the rise of the accumulating state (Scheiring, 2020). József Böröcz attributes the political transformation to a uniquely open semi-peripheral status, built upon the ruins of the socialist regimes that had been performing relatively well in global comparison, and the specifically Eastern European changes in networks of dependency (Böröcz, 2017a, 2017b). Erzsébet Szalai sees the root causes in refeudalization in the context of global and local constraints and traces the opposite (double) movements back to a systemic crisis she terms the “overdrive of capitalism” (Szalai, 2014, 2019). According to Attila Antal, global market actors and neo-nationalism have come to an understanding with each other at the expense of social security in a globally relatively weak region, and he interprets the roots of historical transformation on these grounds (Antal, 2019). György Csepeli and Antal Örkény see the causes of both the emergence and surge of nationalism as the constant power struggle (linked to a lack of trust and the acceptance of dominance) as well as in the determining nature of European historical trajectories (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017). Eastern Europe, they argue, is particularly vulnerable in this respect because of the combination of a kind of migration shock and the rejection of cultural patterns of modernization. In fact, like Mihályi and Szelényi, Csepeli and Örkény see the paradoxes of our time, including the intensification of Eastern European nationalism, in the clash between “unstoppable” migration and nation-states (Mihályi & Szelényi, 2019). Messing and Ságvári (2017, 2019) argue on the basis of a comparative analysis that the peculiarities in the perception of migration in Eastern Europe can be explained by a lack of trust, growing inequalities, and damage to the “social fabric” in general. Bozóki and his colleagues who research European populism also take as a starting point the uncertainty and ambivalence pertaining to globalization, and the damage to so-called national networks; factors that have proven to be very powerful drivers in Eastern Europe (Bozóki et al., 2019). László Andor also make a clear case that unequal exchange, income, and welfare gaps (“bad” systems) have led to political rebellion and repression of refugees (Andor, 2017).

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I have likewise approached the strengthening of anti-migration populism and demographic nationalism from the perspective of unequal exchanges, completing it with an understanding of migratory and demographic processes, as well as institutional and discursive history with reference to other authors’ fragmentary analyses (Melegh, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019a, 2019b; Melegh & Sárosi, 2015). Despite the existence of the important thought experiments mentioned above, there is no systematic model of this historical evolution. Patterns of development that involve specific, regional historical mechanisms and the differences and trajectories in Eastern Europe are lacking, especially from a global demographic and migration perspective. However, it would be of interest, including from a global historical point of view, to see what historical processes derive from these interactions and how they have become built into migratory processes. In the following, I aim to explore the historical dynamics and the trajectories of the variables examined earlier, which may shed light on why Eastern Europe and specific countries within it have taken the lead in polarizing the migration debate and rejecting immigration, and why these patterns have become socially reinforced. 3.3.2

Net Migration Patterns Within Europe

In the pre-globalization and globalization period, different regions and countries of Europe have experienced migration processes in a number of different ways. The net migration estimated by the United Nations provides important insight into which regions have not followed the general European trend of the continent becoming an immigrant area. According to estimated flow data on net migration, the former socialist Eastern European countries increasingly moved towards becoming sending regions at the end of the 1980s. Among these countries, net migration figures of minus 8–10 (out of 1000) were common, even reaching minus 27 in Albania in the early 1990s, while other countries had a slightly positive balance (Fig. 3.27). Russia is a special case, as it became the center of an autonomous migration system for the former Soviet republics. For this reason, I have excluded it from later analysis (Molodikova, 2008). As we will see below, the countries of Eastern Europe followed different development trajectories, but in the period of globalization they became the labor reserve for the rest of Europe as a whole. As a consequence of this overall negative balance, the region

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has faced a loss of population. Between 1990 and 2019, the stock of emigrants from Eastern European former socialist and post-Soviet states increased from 37 to 48 million persons. At the same time, the number of immigrants decreased from 32 to 29 million persons (United Nations, 2019a). This negative balance, combined with the extremely low fertility rates since the 1990s, is an extremely important element of the sociomaterial and demographic change in Eastern Europe and together with its social consequences could be grounds for a demographic panic if biopolitical competition is the framework (Melegh, 2016, 2019a; Melegh & Katona, 2020). In non-socialist Central and Northwestern European countries, net migration figures were in many cases positive as early as in the 1950s. From the 1960s onwards, well before the era of globalization, positive balances became common. There were cyclical waves of immigration into these countries in the 1960s and 1970s, in the early 1990s, and from 15.0 10.0 Bulgaria

5.0

Czechia

0

Hungary

-5.0

Poland Republic of Moldova

-10.0

Romania

-15.0

Russian Federation Slovakia

-20.0

Ukraine

-25.0

Albania 2010-2015

2015-2020

2005-2010

2000-2005

1995-2000

1990-1995

1980-1985

1985-1990

1975-1980

1965-1970

1970-1975

1960-1965

1955-1960

1950-1955

-30.0

Croatia

Fig. 3.27 Net migration of post-socialist Eastern European countries (per 1000 people), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

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the mid-2000s onwards. This means that these countries experienced the entry of migrants in several major waves, mainly due to their position in the global system of inequality, and their positive immigration balances repeatedly rose to levels of plus 5%, as in Germany in the first half of the 1990s and in the United Kingdom in the early 2000s. The perspective of these countries thus differs markedly from the migration experience of the majority of Eastern European states and even seems to be the exact opposite (Fig. 3.28). Most states in Northern Europe became destinations instead of sending regions later than those in Central and Northwestern Europe, and in fact, these states follow the main trend of the continent. In contrast to other regions that serve as destinations for immigrants, the positive trend here has been almost unbroken since the 1980s. Thus, these states have also experienced a different trajectory compared to that of Eastern European countries (Fig. 3.29).

Estimated annual balance, per 1000 inhabitants

12.0 10.0

8.0 6.0

Austria 4.0 2.0 0

Belgium France Germany Netherlands

Switzerland -2.0

United Kingdom

-4.0 -6.0

Fig. 3.28 Net migration of countries within non-socialist Central and Western Europe, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

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Estimated annual balance, per 1000 inhabitants

10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0

Norway Sweden

0

Finland Denmark

-2.0

-4.0 -6.0

Fig. 3.29 Net migration of Northern European countries in, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

In the immediate run-up to globalization, the trajectory of Southern European countries was similar to that of Northern European states, but from the 2000s onwards this positive trend (population surplus due to immigration) came to a halt and the former countries, with the exception of Italy, suffered temporary population loss due to emigration in the five years following the crisis (Fig. 3.30). As demonstrated above, it is the Eastern European, former socialist bloc that has been least in line with the main European trends and in many respects has been an “emigration hub” within Europe, in contrast to the countries in the central, northern, and northwestern areas of the continent. This difference is directly linked to inequalities within the continent and to the social processes in the globalization period. Juxtaposed with the free-market bloc of the European Union as an Eastern European antipode, an Eastern European frontier has emerged, whose countries have experienced population decline partially due to migration

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Estimated annual balance, per 1000 inhabitants

20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0

Greece Italy

-5.0

Portugal Spain

-10.0 -15.0 -20.0

Fig. 3.30 Net migration of Southern European countries, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

processes, in contrast to all other European regions under study (United Nations, 2019b). In many respects, Eastern Europe seems to be homogeneous; however, as is the case of the whole continent, different levels of observation reveal more diversity, which is relevant in our analysis. 3.3.3

Eastern Europe and Marketization: Population Decline, Unequal Exchange, and Emigration

In the context of global and European social change, Eastern Europe has become extremely vulnerable. Local changes and challenges are particularly shocking, especially in contrast to the region’s non-capitalist past.

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1. The Eastern European region has been exposed to high rates of foreign capital in relation to GDP, while its population typically participates in global and European production as part of the labor force, both locally and in other parts of the world (emigrant labor). In this relationship, there is massive inequality in power and revenue. 2. There is unequal exchange in terms of demographic development. The region is facing depopulation and aging, while continuously exporting a labor force that there is little replacement of internally or externally (Tóth, 2014). 3. There is unequal exchange in the field of care work and social and health services, which is enhanced by the marketization and commodification of the given social spheres (Melegh & Katona, 2020). 4. Regarding taxes and other contributions, the region is accumulating losses, even though it redistributes income on a lower level as a result of neoliberal economic policies. Looking at these tensions more closely, further implications arise on a regional level. As argued, a high level of emigration and a huge share of foreign direct investment was typical of the whole region (Fig. 3.31). All the respective states were especially open from the point of view of outward migration from the beginning of the period. With some individual exceptions, not even Latin American or Southeast Asian countries have shown such levels of openness during this globalization cycle. After the conclusion of the state-led development model of the socialist era, and in part because of the prospect of EU accession, Eastern European states flung their gates wide open to foreign capital, which now dominates their economies (Éber et al., 2019). As such, this path of development strongly diverged from that followed by Southeast Asian socialist states. China and Vietnam have never had “super-globalization” status, unlike Hungary (Melegh, 2020b). For various reasons, no other country in a semi-peripheral or peripheral position has experienced such levels of openness, let alone the most developed countries. Thus, a specific Eastern European globalization syndrome can be identified here, which is particularly enlightening in light of the nationalist turn of the 2010s. Depopulation, the care service crisis, and emigration are also sources of friction (Krastev, 2022; Melegh & Katona, 2020; Tóth, 2014). The former socialist countries of Eastern Europe have followed a very specific demographic trajectory (Fig. 3.32). After World War II, most of these

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The rise of emigration and FDI% increase in Eastern Europe 19902019 45% Albania

40%

Bulgaria Croatia

35%

Czechia Emigration rate

30%

Estonia Hungary

25%

Poland 20%

Republic of Moldova Romania

15%

WORLD 10%

Belarus Georgia

5% 0% 0.00%

Lithuania Slovakia 5.00%

10.00% FDI % of GDP

15.00%

20.00%

Ukraine

Fig. 3.31 Rise of emigration and increase in FDI (%) in Eastern Europe: FDIto-GDP ratio (1980–2010) and outward migration stock ratios, delayed by 10 years (1990–2019) in Eastern European countries (Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock] and World Bank [2020])

countries experienced relatively strong population growth until the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, after which time the population started to decline. A roughly 20–30% increase was followed by a 20–30% drop that lasted until the late 2010s. The only exceptions to this trend were the wealthier countries of the socialist bloc (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland), whose rates of population growth and decline were more moderate between 1960 and 2019. Some of these countries were able not only to stabilize their population but even to increase it compared to 1990, especially during the opening-up period, thanks to immigration. However, in general, countries with a growing population in the socialist period were faced with depopulation and its social consequences around the time of the regime change between 1989 and 1991, which was potentially interpreted within the given discursive framework as a decline

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120%

Népességszám relatív változás %-ban

100%

Hungary Czech Republic Estonia Lithuania Latvia Latvia Moldavia Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine Serbia Croatia Georgia Armenia Bulgaria Albania

80%

60%

40%

0%

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

20%

Fig. 3.32 Population change in Eastern European countries between 1960 and 2019 compared to 1990 (1990 = 100%). Interannual estimates (Source World Bank [2020])

of nationhood, and the vulnerability of the small language communities of biopolitical discourses prevailed. Eastern Europe had low fertility rates and emigration for a longer time; thus, its population decline was unavoidable (Sobotka, 2016). In global comparison, the population decline is the most pronounced in Eastern European countries. According to UN projections, Eastern Europe is home to countries with the most rapidly decreasing populations (United Nations, 2017a: Trends). In another projection, the Lancet estimated that the whole region (Central and Eastern Europe and Russia) has a population of slightly more than 300 million, which number will decrease to 180 million by 2100 (Vollset et al., 2020, p. 6). This presents a huge challenge from the perspective of social, health and care services, social security payments, retirement and other pension benefits, as well as for the labor market. As such, these estimates invite critical observation of ongoing developments, as it is clear that depopulation is a key

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element of the radicalization of anti-migrant populism and/or demographic nationalism in the context of the given social and discursive processes of current capitalisms. This demographic vulnerability may be understood as a historical consequence of historically developing unequal development within the world system, which became more pronounced after the collapse of socialism (Böröcz, 2009). As mentioned above, Europe is currently facing huge challenges with elderly care and health care. This phenomenon should be interpreted in the given regional, Central and Southern European migratory context, as the main destinations of migrating Eastern European care workers are the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, and Germany. The movement has been largely fueled by the steady difference in absolute income, which amounted to 20–30 thousand USD per capita per annum in the era of globalization.12 Due to commodification, differences in income, and preexisting migratory connections, individuals from Eastern European countries account for a large share of care workers in the destination countries, while the latter also struggle with aging and depopulation. Meanwhile, with the exception of Czechia and Slovakia—and, among the destination countries, Italy—Eastern European countries have lower labor-force participation rates, and after relative job security in the socialist era, they now face huge difficulties in terms of the labor market and employment, and these processes have been exacerbated more in these states than in the destination countries.13 Taken together, this creates a circle of unequal exchange, but the inequality is further complemented by other elements. The process is called “care drain” and has severe consequences (Gábriel, 2020, 2022; Turai, 2017, 2018; Uhde & Ezzeddine, 2020; Váradi, 2018). Eastern European countries with labor-market tensions have become increasingly integrated into the care, health and social service systems of wealthier European countries. The destination countries actively encourage the participation of these commuting workers as a means of decreasing the welfare costs of the recipient countries due to the former’s relatively lower salaries and unpaid elements of their work (leaving families behind, etc.) (Bahna & Sekulová, 2019; Fassmann et al., 2014; Melegh & 12 World Bank Development Indicators, GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) (World Bank, 2021a). 13 World Bank Development Indicators, Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) (modelled ILO estimate) (World Bank, 2021b).

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Katona, 2020; Melegh et al., 2018; Németh & Váradi, 2018; Turai, 2018; Váradi, 2018). At the same time, these countries have high rates of aging that have even accelerated recently (World Bank, 2020). In most countries, the proportion of people of over 70 years old in the working-age population is around 20%. In an abstract way, this means that caring for each person above the age of 70 requires the contribution of four working-age people via social or private financial transfers, or the direct provision of care. This proportion has doubled over the past twenty years; in some countries such as Poland, it has even tripled. These changes should lead to an increase in redistribution (an increase in the share of taxes and other contributions). However, as a result of neoliberal policies in the semi-periphery, the exact opposite can be observed. Right after the fall of socialisms, redistribution rates were close to the EU average in most Eastern European countries, but from the 2000s onwards they started to stagnate or decrease. Eastern European countries contribute to other countries’ welfare systems via emigration, while at home they collect tax revenues and other contributions at below the average level of redistribution in the EU (but higher than global levels). The most important reason for this is rivalry for investment and local capital accumulation. This development can be called the welfare loss of Eastern Europe that has emerged after the collapse of socialist systems that provided historically very high levels of redistribution and social security. This intra-European inequality has undermined the long-term sense of security in society and may have established a social context for the increase in emigration (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017; de Haas et al., 2018, pp. 23–24; Hárs, 2019). Figure 3.33 illustrates this phenomenon. This fact becomes particularly conspicuous when looking at the proportion of social expenditure for some sending and destination countries; this set of data also shows the inequality in welfare beyond income (Fig. 3.34). The situation becomes even more complicated if one considers that the countries of the region (with the exception of Czechia and Slovakia) have relatively low labor-force participation rates, similar to those of other European countries (World Bank, 2020). All in all, this means that the social costs that are emerging due to social and demographic change can only be covered by economic growth. This may lead to a vicious circle due to the given economic system and generate arguments not only for authoritarian control, but for keeping redistribution rates low to foster competitiveness and growth, especially in the current volatile economic

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56 55 54

53 52 51 50 49 48 47 46

European Union

2017

2015

2016

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2001

2002

2000

1999

1998

1996

1997

1995

45

BG, HR, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK

Fig. 3.33 Taxes and social contributions as a proportion of GDP (%) in select Eastern European countries and the EU as a whole, 1993–2017 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020])

environment. At the same time, the care sector may go through a severe process of marketization, meaning that care will be financed from the income of private households at the mercy of changing and tense labor markets. This will not only lead to social tension but possibly contribute to emigration. Emigration is often propelled by negative changes in the financial and health status of families; care work abroad becomes a means of dealing with such difficult situations due to the higher wages offered in destination countries (Gábriel, 2020, 2022). Having an overview of the tension associated with the increased openness and marketization of East European societies helps us to understand historical developments. These processes have increased the demographic vulnerability of Eastern European countries. The region is taking part in a competition which is characterized by growing demand for and a shortage of labor because of social transformations, aging, and the neoliberal policies of the age of globalization. Thus, Eastern Europe is losing its

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30.00

25.00 Austria 20.00

Hungary Poland Czeh Republic

15.00

Slovakia Italy 10.00

Germany United Kingdom Lithuania

5.00

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

0.00

Fig. 3.34 Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP (%) in countries in Eastern Europe and in destination countries, 1999–2018 (Source OECD Social Spending [2021])

labor force and resources to its own detriment (Melegh, 2020a; Melegh et al., 2020). This is how, amid the given social conditions associated with competition, the need to accept immigration becomes even more compelling, the latter which these very countries are trying to avoid at all costs on political grounds, especially in relation to non-Europeans. The situation is, of course, only apparently paradoxical, and it is perhaps in this very contradiction that the key to the political and discursive processes in question may be identified.

3.4

Varieties of Migratory Capitalisms Within Eastern Europe and Key Elements of a Potential Typology

Internal differences in development trajectories with a general Eastern European “condition” have played an important historical role in political

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transformation (Figs. 3.35–3.36). I construct and elaborate my developmental typology on the basis of the varying migration experiences and specificities of key factors of global capitalism from a historical perspective, thus constructing varieties of migratory capitalism (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; Szelényi & Mihályi, 2019). My key variables are the changes in net migration, the development of immigration and emigration, relative economic income levels, social redistribution rates, the share of foreign capital investment, the weight of the agricultural sector, and the composition of the emigrant and immigrant population relative to the resident one. Three key patterns of development (and related groups of countries) can be identified. I call Type 1 the welfare-protecting Eastern Central European group. This group (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) has not only moved from negative to positive net migration, but also 30.0% 25.0% 20.0%

15.0% 10.0% 5.0%

0.0%

1990

2005

2019

Fig. 3.35 Proportion of foreign-born immigrants in the population, 1990– 2019. For the Czech Republic, the data indicate foreign citizenship (Source Author’s calculation based on United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock])

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45.00% 40.00% 35.00% 30.00%

25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00%

5.00% 0.00%

1990

2005

2019

Fig. 3.36 Proportion of emigrants born in Eastern Europe in relation to the sending population, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock])

witnessed relatively low levels of outmigration (less than 10% of the population) and has accepted relatively large numbers of immigrants. Immigration has generally remained below the 5% threshold, although Slovenia had from the beginning a higher immigration level due to its former federal status in Yugoslavia; thus, immigration rates started from that level. As we will see below, a particular pattern and correlation emerge from the factors associated with migration that helps us understand why these countries have been among the most militant ones in terms of anti-immigrant populism. Type 2 comprises East European emigrant countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Romania, and Poland. Except for the countries of the former Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Croatia), these states have experienced very low levels of immigration as a share of their population, much lower than the countries in the first group. One of the most important features of this type is that they have much higher and continuously

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rising levels of outmigration as opposed to immigration, a feature which, as we will see later, fosters a number of specific mechanisms in relation to other factors associated with migration and, accordingly, the political and discursive responses in this group partly diverge from those in Type 1. Type 3 consists of the former Eastern European Soviet republics and includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. What these countries have in common is that, due to their former member status and relative well-being in the Soviet Union, they were usually home to larger numbers of people born elsewhere in the Soviet Union. During the period of globalization, the proportion of people born outside their borders dropped significantly, while the native population chose emigration in increasing numbers. However, as I will demonstrate, there is a high degree of internal divergence in the development trajectories and dynamics of these countries, and it is therefore essential to break down this group into subcategories. Within this type, I present and interpret three different trajectories based on social settings related to migration and other factors. In their development, these countries have either moved in the direction of what can be called the East-Central European welfare bloc—Estonia is one of these countries—or have become subject to sustained outmigration, such as Latvia and Lithuania. In the third version, their economic development either stalled, as in Ukraine, or they barely managed to recover from their lowincome state after the shock of the 1990s, as in the case of Moldova and Georgia. In fact, these latter countries have been detached from the semiperiphery of Eastern Europe and in many ways become peripheral. All this must be taken into account when interpreting the political and discursive reactions. As already indicated, I have excluded Russia from the analysis, mainly because it is at the heart of a particular migration system and has little connection with the migration systems of the rest of Europe. In a way, this country constitutes a separate type and should be analyzed separately. I have also left out Belarus because it has followed a very specific development trajectory and has barely become part of the European migration system. This is mainly because, as a former Soviet member state, it avoided a privatization shock and its socioeconomic development remained unique in all respects.

3

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East-Central European Countries in Defense of Relative Prosperity: The Shift from Sending Country to Destination Status in the Richest Countries of the Former Socialist Bloc (Type 1: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia)

Countries in this category followed the general European pattern in becoming immigrant countries. Those parts of Eastern Europe may be classified into this group that were considered the most privileged in the 1980s: Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. These countries were sending areas after World War II and became destinations mainly from the mid-1980s onwards (Fig. 3.37). This turning point occurred earlier in the case of Slovenia, still within socialist Yugoslavia. Importantly, relative income levels in these countries were fairly high in the initial period and economic well-being was above the world average (Böröcz, 2009). The level of prosperity was particularly high towards the end of the state socialist era, when these relatively advanced mixed socialist economies, pushed by both external and internal factors, embarked on 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 Czech Republic 0

Hungary Slovakia

-2.0

Slovenia

-4.0 -6.0

Fig. 3.37 Net migration East-Central European countries (per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

190

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further marketization and, in Polányi’s words, on the realization of a market utopia. Even though this prosperity was shaken in the early period, the crisis of the early 1990s did not substantially weaken the income position of these countries in the world economy in the longer term. They never fell below the world average and recovered their initial levels of prosperity from the 2000s onwards (Table 3.3). This also means that relative income growth could not have been a major driving force behind the rise in emigration. These countries had different levels of social spending, but they all lagged behind their key migration target countries, and increasingly so even during the boom during the 2010s. Only the low rates of spending of the UK were comparable to the trends in this sending region. In terms of redistribution rates (tax revenues plus contributions), these EastCentral European countries were slightly more similar to Austria and Italy, while Germany’s redistribution rate was well above that of this group. The Czech Republic and Slovenia have consistently had high levels of redistribution in terms of tax income plus social contributions and medium levels in terms of social expenditure. Slovakia has followed the Czech pattern in terms of social expenditure, while in terms of tax revenues and contributions it fell below the EU average from an initially high level after the 2008 crisis. Hungary is special in that it has redistributed income at slightly above the EU average in terms of tax revenues and contributions, while its social expenditure as a share of GDP was high in the 1990s and 2000s. From the 2010s onwards, however, the share of social expenditure started to decline and eventually fell below Table 3.3 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) in East-Central European countries, relative to the world average (1990–2010)

Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Slovenia

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%) 2019 (%)

175.43*

158.75

156.06

172.40

175.43

173.7

179.6

127.94 117.01* 253.15*

109.49 107.30 189.31

114.50 113.47 207.33

130.80 131.85 223.81

121.87 154.86 222.12

125.5 160.4 205.0

133.9 165.5 217.5

* Based on the chronologically most similar available information, or calculated using pro-rating

Source Author’s calculation based on the UNCTAD (2020)

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the OECD average. Accordingly, overall, these countries were characterized by more generous redistribution for welfare and economic purposes than the other countries in the region. Bohle and Greskovits rightly called this (using their terminology, Visegrád) type “embedded neoliberalism,” whereby governments that constantly maintained the neoliberal market order repeatedly attempted to create some kind of welfare contract and constantly renegotiated it in order to preserve, at least partially, the welfare gains of socialism (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). This welfare system, which remained limited under the neoliberal order but was more advanced than in other Eastern European countries, influenced social behavior and public opinion in various ways. As Hárs and de Haas pointed out, this may have curbed emigration in this group of countries (de Haas et al., 2018, pp. 23–24; Hárs, 2016, 2019)—which is why it is possible to talk about attempts to protect of welfare and income privileges in their case. This, in turn, may have significantly contributed to the strong historical momentum of anti-migrant populism in this group of countries. Despite this, employment levels remained unchanged in the whole region, and only after 2010 were these countries able to catch up with neighboring ones such as Germany and Austria. Thus, countries of this type needed to protect their relative prosperity, but this may have led directly to semi-peripheral social and employment traps, as the case of Hungary illustrates over a longer period of time. Since the 2010s, direct policy interventions have aimed at curbing redistribution, reducing employment in the public sector (redundancies, radical restructuring of public education, etc.) and increasing employment through workfare, which both increased social welfare competition and created authoritarian elements in the political system (Szombati, 2021). The states in this category initially had relatively low emigration rates compared to other former socialist countries (but still above the world average) and received significant foreign investment relative to the size of their economies (Fig. 3.38). The openness to foreign capital was particularly evident in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the 2000s and in Hungary over several periods. The influence of foreign capital in these countries far exceeded its impact on most regions, not only in Europe but also in relation to the rest of the world. The graph in Fig. 3.38 partly masks this extreme openness by using long-term moving averages. According to World Bank inflow data, in 2007 and in 2016 Hungary received foreign capital inflows that exceeded half of all annual economic income (Szelényi & Mihályi, 2019). These years were of course

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followed by substantial outflows. This situation can be labeled superglobalization, and it creates important context for the dynamics of this type of development, as it is interlinked with the protection of welfare privileges. This inflow of capital also increased emigration levels with a 5–10-year lag, and not too steeply, in line with the causation mechanism discussed earlier. The more moderate increase compared to the rest of the Eastern European region may also have been because these countries were not able to strengthen but only to stabilize their relative income positions in the longer term. Thus, the migration capacity of their societies did not generally increase in line with economic opening-up. In this respect, the situation of the Czech Republic stands out from the low emigration trends in the region, perhaps because both geographically and through previous historical connections its residents had better migration capacities than residents of other states from this group of countries. Emigration

Emigration rates, per 1000 inhabitants

9.00% 8.00% 7.00% 6.00% 5.00%

Czechia Hungary WORLD Slovakia Slovenia

4.00% 3.00% 2.00% 1.00% 0.00%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10% 12% FDI % of GDP

14%

16%

18%

20%

Fig. 3.38 FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion of emigration stock to sending population in 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020], United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock])

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(an increase in the emigrant stock, migration path dependency, cumulative causality) in this group remained steady after the 2008 crisis when foreign capital inflow fell significantly both here and globally. Thus, while these countries were very open to foreign capital, emigration levels did not soar as much as in other Eastern European societies. Thus, paradoxically, staying at home and participating in welfare competition in the context of these competitive and marketized societies may have posed an even greater dilemma for citizens of the latter than for inhabitants of those states that sustained or developed an emigration trajectory. Social and cultural support for emigration may have been much less obvious in the former socialist states of Central Europe than in Romania or Albania. As already observed in the analysis of development patterns at the global level, agricultural employment played a major role in the evolution of emigration levels in the first half of the period of globalization (Table 3.4). The relatively high-income countries with significant foreign capital inflow and higher rates of immigration already had fairly low agricultural employment at the turn of the 1990s, as the deterioration of the agricultural sector had already taken place. This sector was quickly destroyed and reorganized from cooperatives and state farms into private land holdings. It is thus not surprising that even during the privatization shock of the 1990s this sector did not attract large numbers of employees in these countries, unlike with other types of Eastern European development in which peasant and family farming remained more important (Hann, 2003). The low and gradually declining importance of this sphere in Table 3.4 Agricultural employment as a share of total employment in the sample countries (1990–2010)

Czech Republic Hungary Slovak Republic Slovenia

1990* (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

8.23

6.64

5.22

3.98

3.10

2.92

2.72

11.77 11.10

8.02 9.20

6.46 6.93

4.87 4.75

4.54 3.23

4.90 3.18

4.70 2.18

10.86

10.44

9.60

9.11

8.82

7.08

5.23

* Based on the chronologically most similar available information, or calculated using pro-rating

Source World Bank (2020)

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A. MELEGH

the national economies is also reflected in the share of the agricultural sector in GDP for three countries of this type for which relevant data were available (Fig. 3.39). In these countries, the service sector and the partial re-industrialization that took place from the 2000s onwards were able to absorb the mass of people who lost their jobs when the socialist economy collapsed, thus preventing major emigration and dampening the impact of marketization and globalization. Nonetheless, employment relations became more precarious and people who had previously been embedded in more stable social relations drifted between jobs, and sometimes decided to migrate at a later point—e.g., in the event of family financial crisis (Bartha, 2017; Éber, 2020, pp. 218–219; Melegh et al., 2019; Szalai, 2001). These factors together also enabled, at different stages of the globalization cycle, these states to attract immigrants from neighboring countries with ethnic or historical connections. Unlike other Eastern European states, in this group there were immigration-related issues, and emigration was not the only factor that posed a serious challenge. There was a network of migration links between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Slovakia and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Ukraine and 16 14 12

% of GDP

10 8 6

Hungary

Slovakia

Slovenia

4 2 0

Fig. 3.39 Contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP, 1990–2010 (Source World Bank [2012])

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195

Serbia. The estimated migration balance was above zero in these countries, showing that immigration counterbalanced increasing emigration to the West. Countries of this type constituted a transitional and economically very open region, which counted as a destination within Eastern Europe, and mainly attracted people and families from Ukraine, Romania, and Serbia. People from more distant parts of the world arrived only in limited numbers and mainly due to specific precapitalist historical reasons and connections. People from Vietnam and China were attracted to this region in particular (socialist labor exchange programs, higher education) (Alamgir, 2017). People from Germany and Austria also settled here due to the relatively cheap living costs and for reasons of capital investment (Illés, 2013). It is important to note that, with the exception of Slovakia, these countries received a larger number of immigrants (compared to other Eastern European countries) relatively early on, at the beginning of the globalization period. This, together with their openness and relative prosperity, may have been a historical and socio-material factor that contributed to a highly exclusionary public discourse during the refugee crisis that produced, to cite Hann’s expression, the Visegrád condition (Hann, 2019). According to analyses of the Czech Republic in the early 1990s, a relatively large number of illegal immigrants arrived in the country (Drbohlav, 1994). The figures are uncertain, but authorities estimated that there were tens of thousands of illegal border crossings by people lacking legal residence status, and some expert estimates reported figures in excess of 100,000. The Czech Republic experienced a new wave of immigration from the 2000s until the 2008 crisis, which was repeated again from the mid-2010s onwards (Fig. 3.40). These waves involved 60–100,000 people annually, which may have contributed to a small increase in the population, while the natural balance was negative or only slightly positive (Drbohlav & Janurová, 2019). The majority of immigrants came from Ukraine, Vietnam, and Slovakia (United Nations, 2019a). It is worth noting that the Czech Republic also dealt with tens of thousands of asylum seekers from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, but this number dropped to several hundred by the 2010s (Drbohlav & Janurová, 2019). Slovakia was less prosperous economically and therefore less attractive to migrants. As seen in the net migration chart (Fig. 3.37), it remained a sending country for a longer period of time than other countries in the region and has had a very small positive migration balance

196

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120000

10800000 10700000

100000 10600000 80000

10500000 10400000

60000 10300000 40000

10200000 10100000

20000 10000000 0

9900000 2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

Czech Republic population size

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Czech Republic inflow of foreign citizens

Fig. 3.40 Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in the Czech Republic, 2000–2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020])

since the 2000s (Fig. 3.41). The level of emigration was partly due to the fact that the Czech Republic, with a similar language and many decades of federal coexistence, was an attractive destination for the poorer Slovak population. There were no other historical connections that could have encouraged immigration, despite the country’s improving economic performance. Slovakia experienced a small wave of immigration in the 2000s, which subsided after the 2008 crisis, and despite the country’s economic advancement and joining the euro area, immigration has not increased substantially. However, the country’s population has been on the rise. As in the Czech Republic, asylum applications reached as many as 10,000 annually in the 2000s, but by the 2010s this had fallen to a few hundred (Vanˇ o et al., 2013). In summary, such trends make Slovakia a borderline case of the East-Central European type. Slovenia followed a very similar trajectory. However, the regionally above-average wave of immigration that started in the 2000s was

3

HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

197

5480000

9000

5460000

8000 7000

5440000

6000 5420000 5000 5400000 4000 5380000 3000 5360000

2000

5340000

1000

5320000

0 2000

2002

2004

2006

Slovakia population size

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Slovakia inflow of foreign citizens

Fig. 3.41 Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in Slovakia, 2000– 2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020])

preceded in this country by several other waves in the mid-1980s and the early and mid-1990s. Slovenia was also active in dealing with asylum applications. The Slovenian authorities dealt with thousands of applications from asylum seekers even during the Yugoslavian civil war, and also later in the early 2000s during the so-called refugee crisis (Cukut Krili´c et al., 2013). The country has been most attractive to migrants from Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Russia, and Ukraine (Fig. 3.42). Hungary is one of the most interesting cases. Table 3.5, which covers a long period of time, shows that immigrants arrived in Hungary in increasing numbers from the 1980s until the 2010s. In the 1980s, the country even had significant non-European connections (to Cuba, Libya, and Vietnam), but immigration from these areas declined later. Hungary experienced a major wave of immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the first wave, large numbers of ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania resettled in Hungary due to the long-term territorial and statehood link that existed until World War I, which historical-ethnic link

198

A. MELEGH

30,000

2100000 2080000

25,000

2060000 20,000 2040000 2020000

15,000

2000000 10,000 1980000 5,000 1960000 0

1940000 2000

2002

2004

2006

Slovenia population size

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Slovenia inflow of foreign citizens

Fig. 3.42 Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in Slovenia, 2000– 2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020])

is still very important today. In the second wave, the Yugoslavian civil war produced large numbers of refugees, especially from Bosnia. Likewise, there was a major spike in immigration during the economic crisis of 2008–2010. From 2016 onwards, immigration levels were mainly driven up by Ukrainians applying for Hungarian citizenship. In sum, Hungarian society saw smaller waves of immigrants during several periods of crisis who originated mainly from the immediate region. In addition, relatively large groups arrived from Germany, and even China and Vietnam. Immigration increased and the country remained an attractive destination, while the population continued to decline (Fig. 3.43). Of course, a few thousand immigrants per year can hardly be called significant immigration, and from a demographic point of view, this number of migrants only slowed down the population decline (Hablicsek, 2004; Hablicsek & Tóth, 2000). However, given the precarious, market-dominated social conditions, immigration may even have heightened the sense of competition associated with globalization. Moreover, concerns about immigration

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HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

199

Table 3.5 Immigration of foreign citizens to Hungary, 1980–2010 1980–1989 Romania Poland

50,517 11,730

Soviet Union DDR Cuba Czechoslovakia

7955 4440 4232 2783

Former Yugoslavia Vietnam

2075

Germany

1888

Libya First ten, total Proportion of the first ten most important sending countries in total (%) Total

1990–1999

2000–2009

Romania Yugoslavia (new) Ukraine China Germany Former Yugoslavia United States Soviet Union Russia

83,976 17,458

Romania Ukraine

92,170 27,913

12,091 11,276 5190 4456

Germany China Serbia Slovakia

13,509 9798 9710 7904

4291

United States 6122

3547

4923

1046 88,709 86.49

Poland

2627 148,329 81.63

Serbia and Montenegro Yugoslavia (new) Austria

102,566

Total

181,706

Total

232,855

2043

3417

3951 3292 179,292 77.00

Cumulated inflow data Source Author’s calculation; Hungarian Central Statistical Office, demographic tables

may have been exacerbated by the influx of Hungarians naturalized abroad without residing in Hungary, who, due to increasingly favorable citizenship laws, have not been treated as immigrants, although in many cases they are considered as such by society (Feischmidt, 2014; Melegh, 2019a; Pulay, 2006). In sum, unlike the other types, this relatively prosperous group of countries followed a path of having an extremely open economy and accepted, in several waves and in a recurrent manner, immigrants from their Eastern European neighborhood. Countries of this development type have—employing the idea of abstract valorization and comparison— partially made up for their own unequal exchange with the West by a fictitious exchange of populations with their neighbors that are ethnically and historically connected to the former (Melegh & Sárosi, 2015).

200

A. MELEGH

1,08,00,000

40,000

1,06,00,000

35,000

1,04,00,000

30,000

1,02,00,000

25,000

1,00,00,000

20,000

98,00,000

15,000

96,00,000

10,000

94,00,000

5,000

92,00,000

0

Hungary poulation size

Hungary inflow of foreign citizens

Fig. 3.43 Immigrating foreign citizens and population size in Hungary, 1980– 2017 (Source Hungarian Central Statistical Office, demographic tables)

Understanding this process critically, it is clear that this can be perceived as population replacement only in the framework of abstract marketized ideas; otherwise, we should see immigration and emigration processes as not being linked. However, even the structural possibility of such an interpretation has been crucial from a discursive point of view. Nonetheless, these countries have been among the most open economies in the world and remained attractive destinations for immigrants in the region, while the region’s population has been declining in terms of the death/birth ratio, which may only be slowed down by immigration. These historical and socio-material processes probably determined to a large extent how a sense of competition and antiimmigrant sentiment towards immigrants from outside the region grew under the given social and redistributive conditions and within the given discursive frameworks, and how these sentiments turned some of these countries into important representatives of anti-immigrant populism in Eastern Europe. As we will see later, data from the early 2000s show

3

HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

201

that this “radicalism” was already embedded into historical development. Isolationism already appeared earlier (not only in the mid-2010s), and countries of this type that received immigrants in the midst of the enormous social uncertainties surrounding the regime change, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary, were fearful of any (even fictitious) population change through migration (in both demographic and labor-market terms) as well as of labor-market challenges (Avramov, 2008; Gödri, 2010). 3.4.2

Sending and Receiving: Fictitious Migration Exchange and the Migration Competition Hypothesis in the East-Central European Group, with Special Reference to Hungary

As we have seen, Eastern Europe as a whole has been engaged in an unequal exchange in terms of sending a large number of migrant workers who are relatively young and well educated compared to the sending population. This has posed serious challenges for the whole region in terms of contributions, knowledge, and activity within a European freemarket bloc that relies on immigrants (Kováts & Papp, 2016). And in the regional context of the sending countries, the relatively prosperous countries of Central Europe have experienced relatively high levels of out- and immigration. These two processes of out- and immigration are interpreted by Márk Éber as class relations based on the relationship of capital and labor (Éber, 2020, pp. 124–138). This is a valid perspective, but these processes would not be comparable in terms of an exchange of abstract populations. What makes them comparable is a logic that measures everything in the form of competitive and abstract values. One can only speak of a fictitious exchange because congruent processes have been occurring, and according to the capitalist biopolitical logic, immigration and emigration can be compared as abstract, negotiated demographic-, care-, and labor resources. Eastern European societies, especially those in the East-Central European group that has experienced immigration, found it difficult to orient themselves during the opening-up. Apart from the late nineteenthcentury capitalist era (during a previous cycle of marketization), no strong tradition of managing immigration existed in these countries. Moreover, they faced an additional structural problem—namely that the successful integration of immigrants into the educational system and the labor market could potentially be understood as a competitive challenge to the

202

A. MELEGH

native population (on the competition for jobs, see Grossmann & Stadelmann, 2013; Hanson et al., 2009). Thus not only did immigrants appear in large numbers relative to the region, but they were also quite successfully integrated. I will address this in more detail through the example of Hungary, but before turning to this matter, it is worth reviewing the integration-related indicators of immigrants in Eastern Europe to see the East-Central European development pattern in this context (Kováts, 2013). Large international bodies (EU, OECD) that support free-market competition and the emergence of an ever broader global labor market have been measuring the integration of foreign-born people into the educational system and the labor market since the late 2000s using socalled Zaragoza indicators (Eurostat, 2011, 2020; OECD, 2014, 2018). Among these indicators, the difference between the proportion of people with tertiary education in the native and foreign-born populations, and the differences in their activity rates shed light on interesting details. In the European Union, the share of foreign-born immigrants with tertiary education is generally higher than the corresponding rate of the resident population. Such a difference has also been observed in Eastern European countries, almost without exception. According to surveys conducted between 2009 and 2019, only foreign-born 15–64-year-olds living in Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania were less likely to have completed tertiary education than the native population, while in all other countries the share was larger. Thus (with the important exception of Slovenia), countries of this type of development all experienced a “bias” towards immigrants. And, unlike in other Eastern European countries, immigrants in fact arrived in relatively high numbers. Eurostat and OECD reports also often mention that, in contrast to many countries in Europe and the West, there are parts of the Eastern European region where the employment rate of the foreign-born population is higher than that of natives (see, e.g., Eurostat, 2020). It is particularly relevant for the present analysis that, in the 2010s, in contrast to the development patterns observed in other Eastern European areas, immigrants in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (and Poland, which belongs to another type) consistently showed higher activity rates in the 15–64 and 20–64 age groups than the host population (Eurostat, 2020; Gödri, 2017; Gödri et al., 2013; Melegh & Papp, 2018; Melegh & Sárosi, 2015; OECD, 2014, 2018; Vanˇ o et al., 2013). Slovenia deviates from this East-Central European pattern, as labor-force surveys

3

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203

consistently measured lower activity and/or employment rates among the foreign-born than the native resident population (Cukut Krili´c et al., 2013, p. 65; Eurostat, 2011, 2020; OECD, 2014, 2018). These lower rates may also reflect the fact that immigrants in Slovenia mainly came from more traditional regions and areas of the former Yugoslavia (where inequality was a long-term problem) and that the labor-market activity of immigrant women was particularly low (Cukut Krili´c et al., 2013). Hungary is an interesting case of this type of development and of the fictitious migration exchange. As we have seen, after the relative prosperity and stability of the socialist Kádár regime, this country became one of the most open countries in terms of globalization in the 1990s and 2000s. As early as in the late 1980s, it experienced a wave of immigration from Romania that was substantial in an Eastern European context. However, before analyzing the composition of immigrants and migration “competition,” let us look more closely at the social composition of emigrants. Emigration from Hungary became very significant in the 2010s, although a wave of immigration also occurred in the early 1990s (Melegh & Sárosi, 2015). We know the composition of the emigrating population in the period preceding the so-called refugee crisis from the long-term analysis of labor-force surveys and the SEEMIG project, which focused on a single point in time but also revealed historical trends.14 The data reveal that a younger, male-dominated population with higher employment rates than the overall Hungarian population left the country on a more permanent basis. At least 70% of emigrants were below 40 when they left. The data also show that while 18% of the 18–74 age group who stayed in the country had completed tertiary education (university or college), this figure was 32% for the same age group of those who emigrated after 1989 (Fig. 3.44). In some respects, emigration from Hungary to different European countries showed different social profiles (no data were available about this for non-European countries). Men with vocational training left for Austria and Germany in particular. The masses that migrated to the UK were overwhelmingly female, younger,

14 The SEEMIG project that I led investigated emigration from Serbia and Hungary under the leadership of Zsuzsa Blaskó between 2012 and 2014 with new methodology connected to labor force surveys. Emigrants were those persons reported by non-emigrant household members as living abroad habitually. About the project results, see Blaskó (2014), Blaskó and Gödri (2014), and Melegh et al. (2014).

204

A. MELEGH

and better educated than those who left for Germany and Austria (Blaskó, 2014; Blaskó & Gödri, 2014). One can argue on this basis that the loss of highly educated people and of a skilled labor force and care workers through historical European migration links is not only a local phenomenon, but also illustrates the role of Austrian and German labor demand. Labor broker companies operate within this historical nexus, and wage and employment relations prevail that have a direct influence on the transnational labor market (Gábriel, 2020; Hárs, 2012; Melegh et al., 2018). It is an aspect of the unequal exchange that the young and relatively well-educated emigrating population is highly active and associated with employment rates far higher than the sending community (Fig. 3.45). This means that the emigrant population serves the labor needs of the receiving economies well, while capital inflow and the resulting economic structure have provided only limited stable employment for non-migrants, especially until the 2010s. This failure of globalization and openness, if 100% 90%

No data

80%

University

70%

College

60%

Matriculation

50% 40%

Vocational

30%

Maximum 8 elementary

20% 10% 0% Residing in Hungary

Emigrants

Emigrating after 2009

Fig. 3.44 Distribution of Hungarian emigrants by highest level of education compared to the resident population in 2013 (Labor-force survey) (Source Blaskó and Gödri [2014] and Melegh et al. [2014])

3

6% 3%

HISTORICAL MATERIAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

205

3%

4%

Work Study Household activity Not working for other reasons Unknown 84%

Fig. 3.45 Distribution of Hungarian emigrants according to their activity in 2013 (Source Blaskó and Gödri [2014] and Melegh et al. [2014])

only on the side of the sending countries, to a large extent fostered the political turnaround in the 2010s. Immigrants to Hungary largely come from neighboring states. This is a historical migration regime that, beyond ethnic relations, is a legacy of the regional economic inequalities that persisted throughout different periods (see also Éber, 2020, pp. 124–138). During the socialist era, Hungary actively developed relations with countries in the socialist bloc and in the so-called Third World. Among these, Vietnam remains an important link in the post-socialist period, while others (Poland, Libya, Cuba) declined in importance. This change in the pattern of relations was not rooted directly in the transformation of political relationships (although this was also a factor), but rather changes in the economic structure may have contributed to the diminishing importance of the latter countries. Hungary’s textile industry declined after the early 1990s; mines stopped operating and pits were closed down; and large investments such as the cement plant in Beremend, which employed a significant number of Polish workers, could barely be brought to completion (Kovács, 2008). On the other hand, Hungary lost its strong and active migration links with North African and Middle Eastern states, which illustrates the shortcomings of neoclassical theories, as prevailing economic inequalities have failed to ensure continuing mass migration. Hungary has therefore

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received migrants from countries that are themselves important sending areas towards the West in general—i.e., those which themselves face significant population loss. The higher levels of education and rates of employment among immigrants and the mechanism behind this phenomenon are clearly illustrated by the 2016 microcensus data, which are also very much in line with that of the 2000 and 2011 census (Gödri, 2017; Gödri et al., 2013; Melegh & Papp, 2018; Melegh & Sárosi, 2015).15 I have included in my analysis people born in the main sending countries, who account for more than three-quarters of the total immigrant population (Fig. 3.46). Immigrants born in neighboring countries account for 65% of the total immigrant population, and their share is complemented mainly by immigrants from China and Vietnam. German immigrants living in Hungary also represent a large group, but they are excluded from the analysis because of their specific social composition and the unique attitudes towards them. All other immigrant groups in the imaginary East-West hierarchy represent a “lower” level of civilization and development in the eyes of those living in Hungary (Melegh, 2006; Melegh et al., 2016; Pulay, 2006; Zakariás, 2018), which feature may be important because of the competition hypothesis. I have taken knowledge of the Hungarian language into account specifically and considered it a marker of an immigrant population with ethnic and historical bonds to the country, as opposed to those who do not have this competence. I have also paid special attention to the date of arrival, since it makes a huge difference if someone has been in the host country for less or more than ten years. In 2016, almost two-thirds of foreign-born people aged 25–64 spoke Hungarian, which shows that the country was most attractive to groups who are ethnically connected to Hungary. Among those from the neighboring countries of Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, the proportion of Hungarian speakers is over three-quarters, which may indicate that many language and cultural barriers do not apply to them. The generally higher level of education among the main immigrant groups compared with other factors reveals interesting and at first sight surprising mechanisms. On average, those immigrants who did not speak

15 I am indebted to the Population Statistics Unit of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (Marcell Kovács and others) for their help compiling the database. The results were first published in Melegh and Papp (2018).

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7% 8% 41%

9% 10%

25%

Serbia

Slovakia

Asia

Ukraine

Other

Romania

Fig. 3.46 Distribution of foreign-born population living in Hungary in 2016 according to their countries of origin (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016])

Hungarian were better educated than those who did: among the nonHungarian speakers, half had earned a tertiary diploma, while only one in three among those who spoke the language had achieved this level of education (Fig. 3.47). This “advantage” among non-Hungarian speakers varies significantly by country of origin (Fig. 3.48). Fewer non-Hungarians from Romania had completed tertiary education than those in the host community, regardless of their date of arrival. When linked to the time of arrival (arrived longer than ten years ago), this difference disappears in the case of Serbia. In 2016, immigrants from the main sending countries aged 15–64 were more liable to be in employment compared to the Hungarian-born population (Table 3.6). The observed differences are influenced to a large extent by the time of arrival and language skills. As shown in Fig. 3.49, the proportion of people born in Hungary but not speaking Hungarian was much lower than the share of people who spoke Hungarian (at least as a second language). This is of course a small population, but it shows that there could be serious integration problems. We can also see a relatively low employment rate among those who do not speak Hungarian that arrived

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50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Elementary or below

Secondary without final exam

Born abroad and speaks Hungarian

Final exam at secondary

Born abroad and does not speak Hungarian

Higher education Born In Hungary

Fig. 3.47 Level of education and competence in the Hungarian language for individuals aged 25–64 in 2016 (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016])

in the past ten years, which may be due to young people completing their studies. However, there may be problems other than the language barrier. Immigrants from Ukraine, Slovakia, and Serbia who arrived in the last ten years and who speak Hungarian have low employment rates, too. This may partly be due to schooling, but this observation also highlights the possibility of the lack of social capital or some form of discrimination, and the differences in historical relationships with these countries. The time of arrival is an important indicator of selection (migrating further) and/or integration, because after more than ten years of residence in Hungary employment rates increase for these age groups, and for immigrants from certain sending countries they get markedly better. In general, the statistics reflect the combined effect of several factors. Historical changes in migration patterns are one of these factors—e.g., when less skilled people arrive and have lower employment rates than

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120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Hungary

Ukraine

Slovakia

Serbia

China

Romania

Vietnam

Speaks Hungarian and arrived within 10 years Speaks Hungarian and arrived more than 10 years ago Does not speak Hungarian and arrived within 10 years Does not speak Hungarian and arrived more than 10 years ago

Fig. 3.48 Share of population aged 25 and over having completed tertiary education by time of arrival and country of origin in 2016 in Hungary (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016])

Table 3.6 Activity rates of 15–64-year-olds by country of birth in Hungary, 2016

Hungary Ukraine Slovakia Serbia China Romania Vietnam

Employed (%)

Unemployed (%)

Inactive earner (%)

Dependent (%)

Total (%)

67.5 66.2 68.5 68.9 71.4 77.1 79.7

3.8 5.1 3.4 4.3 0.5 4.2 0.0

15.3 13.6 11.3 8.8 3.1 10.5 3.2

13.4 15.1 16.9 18.0 25.0 8.2 17.1

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus (2016)

earlier immigrants (e.g., in the case of those from Vietnam), which may have an impact on Hungary’s attractiveness as a destination. It could also be argued that those who cannot find work will move on over time, thus tilting the balance towards members of more integrated groups, a

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120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Hungary

Ukraine

Slovakia

Serbia

China

Romania

Vietnam

Speaks Hungarian and arrived within 10 years Speaks Hungarian and arrived more than 10 years ago Does not speak Hungarian and arrived within 10 years Does not speak Hungarian and arrived more than 10 years ago

Fig. 3.49 Employment rates of immigrants in Hungary in the age group 15– 64 according to time of arrival, country of origin, and Hungarian language skills in 2016 (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016])

mechanism that could easily prevail due to further migration to other EU countries. The proportion of students and their movement can also influence the statistics. Therefore, it is crucial to conduct a multivariate analysis to verify the causal relationships between employment and other factors, and to see, based on logistic regression, what affects the employment odds ratio (Appendix 24). Using a logistic regression model, it can be demonstrated that the odds ratio for employment increases with an increase in the level of education if the immigrant was born in one of the main sending countries and speaks Hungarian. In fact, when the factors of the level of education and knowledge of Hungarian are statistically controlled, the employment odds ratio of the population born in the main sending countries is higher than that of the native population in general, but especially so for those born in Romania, China, and Vietnam. In other words, the probability of employment of immigrants born in these countries and the proportion of those with a tertiary education in this group are higher, and the resident population may perceive this as competition in the labor market, especially in

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the face of employment-related tension. This means that not only has Hungary experienced waves of immigration in times of social crisis, but competition with key immigrant groups also could have unfolded under given social conditions—and all this in a context of significant outmigration. For a population that is culturally isolationist, fearful of globalization and opening-up, and which tries to protect a former relative prosperity, this can clearly be interpreted as a complex process of loss for the whole nation, especially if citizens see “more Eastern” immigrants as competitors. A detailed analysis of development types thus brings us closer to a historical and socio-material understanding of this “panic,” which, when juxtaposed with the discursive changes, sheds light on the historical force of the interaction between material and discursive processes. Indeed, the shift towards authoritarianism and radical anti-migration is not simply the result of government propaganda in the respective societies, but there are social mechanisms behind it. 3.4.3

The Globalization Shock and Eastern European Countries in an Emigration Trap (Type 2: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania, and Serbia)

Countries that witnessed the second type of development started out in a similar way to those in Type 1, but in their case there was no prolonged period of positive migration balance, as one might expect in line with transition theories and the understanding of overall European development. This not only means that the validity of these theories is limited, but also that in an Eastern European context these countries followed a distinct pattern of development even under state socialism, but especially after the rise of competitive capitalism. These countries have become the major Eastern European sending regions within the EU migration system, together with the western parts of the collapsing Soviet Union. However, the latter countries have also remained an integral part of the Russian migration system and their development has its own specificities. In terms of general trends, the migration balance of these countries has usually been negative throughout. With the exception of a short and, in many respects, unique period (the Yugoslav civil war, the collapse of Ukraine in 2014, and massive migration towards Poland), the inhabitants of these countries have not experienced large or protracted inflows of migrants (Fig. 3.50).

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10.0 5.0 0 -5.0 Bulgaria -10.0

Poland Romania

-15.0

Albania Croatia

-20.0

Serbia

-25.0 -30.0

Fig. 3.50 Net migration in countries that remained sending regions (per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

Some of these countries suffered considerable population loss due to emigration during the socialist era. These migration patterns were linked to the semi-peripheral character of the region, complex ethnic relations, and state violence. In many ways, these historical precedents paved the way to the large-scale outmigration associated with the opening-up that occurred from the 1990s onwards. In socialist Bulgaria, excessive emigration was linked to the large-scale expatriation of the Turkish minority with a troubled history of coexistence (Rangelova & Vladimirova, 2004, p. 8). These emigration waves of Turks were only partly rooted in immediate ethnopolitical considerations, although the latter certainly played a role. The first wave was in the 1970s, when some 130,000 people left for Turkey; a destination country that was even poorer than Bulgaria at that time. However, this difference in prosperity had disappeared by the 1980s, with Turkey’s GDP approaching 80% of the world average based on comparative data from UNCTAD, while Bulgaria stagnated at

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60%. In other words, ethnic cleansing and the masses fleeing it may also reflect, behaviorally and ideologically, Bulgaria’s macroeconomic deterioration. This means that ethnic considerations, the disintegration of state socialism, the economic hierarchy, and the collapse of GDP per capita together created a situation that facilitated large-scale emigration. In all probability, similar historical development took place in the case of the Hungarian, Jewish, and German minorities in Romania, where state policies and economic inequalities were combined with ethnic issues (Horváth & Kiss, 2015). The shock of regime change brought about extreme levels of expatriation in the early 1990s, raising particularly important questions about the causes of massive emigration in these countries. Some states, such as Bulgaria and Albania, also faced globally extreme exoduses, with a 10–35% net negative migration balance. Romania’s better figures were probably due to “errors” in the census; that is, those who were absent were also counted as residents, and thus, actual emigration was greater than the censuses indicated (Horváth & Kiss, 2015). Only Poland escaped the rule of a shock-like collapse in the early 1990s, the reason for which was the country’s relatively successful and smooth opening-up to globalization. In the 1950s and early 1960s, these countries were very similar to those in Type 1. However, even in the early stages, some countries witnessed considerable average annual population loss due to migration, at around −5%. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period that was the peak of their relative prosperity under state socialism, Romania and Bulgaria seemed to follow for a while the migration transition seen in Type 1, despite the state-assisted and organized outmigration of small groups of people (Horváth & Kiss, 2015, pp. 96–99; Pacheva et al., 2013, p. 15). However, this improvement proved short-lived. Serbia followed a similar trajectory, but with the difference that it received a huge number of immigrants and ethnic refugees during the civil war in the early and mid-1990s and therefore had slightly positive net migration in the 2010s. However, Serbia experienced the same, shockingly high level of emigration in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s (Luki´c et al., 2013, pp. 11–14, 24). Historical changes in the relative income position of these countries partly explain the observed net outmigration and shed light upon why they have experienced the nexus of globalization and migration over the past 30–40 years differently to Hungary or the Czech Republic. The

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countries of this type, with the exception of Croatia, entered the era of globalization with relative income below the world average, partly due to economic crises during the last years of socialism (Table 3.7). Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania had to deal with grave shortages as early as in the 1980s, which led to overall political crisis. In Romania and Poland, external indebtedness, debt repayments, and the resulting market imbalance brought about serious social tensions. Unlike in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in these countries the regime change was not an interruption of a period of relatively stable prosperity, but rather a new stage in a series of disasters, with the promise that at least shortages would be resolved and political freedoms enlarged. The regime change deepened the social crisis, but after initial stagnation relative incomes started to rise and, unlike countries in the privileged Eastern European group, these states steadily improved their income positions since the late 1990s. There is less evidence of the relative stagnation observed in Type 1 countries. Croatia stands out from the group in many respects, and from this point of view this country instead follows the trajectory taken by countries in East-Central Europe in terms of strenuous efforts to improve welfare, a struggle that was hampered by the severe consequences of the civil war. However, with the exception of Poland, these states had a relatively low level of redistribution in terms of tax and social contribution revenues compared to other countries in the region and even the EU average. This was particularly the case in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania (World Bank, 2020). This means that they failed to follow countries in the group associated with embedded neoliberalism in maintaining relatively high Table 3.7 Per capita GDP (in constant 2015 US dollars) for each country of this type relative to the world average (1990–2010)

Albania Bulgaria Croatia Poland Romania Serbia

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

23.81 62.31 121.85* 76.05 72.25 45.89*

21.73 56.47 102.18 80.41 63.85 32.65

24.70 47.83 112.45 92.68 58.56 37.69

30.29 59.69 128.95 98.59 72.40 46.55

38.00 67.14 124.04 115.40 80.69 50.22

2015 (%) 2019 (%) 38.82 69.29 115.30 123.73 87.97 48.40

41.08 74.09 121.69 133.43 99.15 54.74

* Based on the most similar available information at the time, or calculated using pro-rating

Source Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2020)

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redistributive levels, and this may have provoked further emigration (de Haas et al., 2018, pp. 23–24; Hárs, 2016, 2019). After the severe crises of the 1980s and 1990s, in the midst of European open-market-based integration, societies in this group remained stuck in their position as sending countries, paradoxically also due to the long-term improvement in income levels, which increased migration capacity. More mobile groups in these societies experienced positive developments—they could travel more freely, and their income grew, in contrast to East-Central European societies that were mostly preoccupied with protecting their own, regionally privileged status. This could also have affected the way migration processes were perceived and experienced, as both the high levels of emigration and, consequently, less fierce welfare competition due to inadequate social security were important factors. This in turn affected public attitudes, as we will see later. The evolution of the share of FDI and emigration levels a decade earlier indicates a more varied pattern than was observed with the earlier type (Fig. 3.51).16 On the one hand, countries such as Albania and Croatia had very high levels of emigration even from 1990 to 1995. Foreign capital inflow was large but not exceptional compared to the world average, except for in Albania and Bulgaria. Typically for this group, there was a boom in the number of emigrants as a share of the population, partly due to the growing relative income level and a moderate rise in capital inflow. These countries were generally less open to capital, especially when compared with other Eastern European states like Hungary. It may be argued that, compared with countries defined as Type 1, these countries (with the possible exception of Romania) did not attract high amounts of global industrial capital in the longer term, so industry was unable to regain its economic importance (World Bank, 2020). One may say that from the point of view of industry, these countries were the real losers in terms of industrial jobs when the new international division of labor became solidified. In contrast, other states in the region (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) until the mid-2010s successfully strengthened certain sectors of their industry or at least partially recovered their capacity and built complex, albeit externally dependent, industrial systems (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012, p. 88; Éber et al., 2019). Socialist industry effectively collapsed in the sending countries, and industry was unable to 16 No FDI data are available for Serbia between 1990 and 2007 so this country was left out of the analysis.

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45% 40% 35%

Emigration rate

30% Albania Bulgaria Croatia Poland Romania WORLD

25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00%

FDI % of GDP Fig. 3.51 FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and proportion of emigrants relative to the sending population, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculations, World Bank [2020] and United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock])

regain its former economic importance for a longer period of time, despite abundant labor supply and favorable wage conditions (Melegh, 2013). Paradoxically, by being less open, these countries were able to preserve their development potential for themselves, as the evolution of relative income shows. Even so, their dependence on foreign capital was well above the European and global average, as was the case for the region as a whole. Compared to Type 1 countries, these countries were poorer and less attractive to foreign capital in the early 1990s and had a much higher share of agricultural employment (Table 3.8). In fact, during the initial crisis in the 1990s, this proportion even increased in several countries, which may have generated substantial outmigration according to our global model. Such countries were Serbia and Romania. Albania also had an excess of agricultural employment in the late 1980s, and the employment weight of this sector did not decline substantially further in the first

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half of the 1990s, while its economic importance actually increased due to the collapse of socialist industry (Melegh, 2012, p. 26). Similar trends were observed in Bulgaria and Poland in the 1990s. Thus, with the exception of Croatia, the shock of regime change was followed by a partial and temporary re-ruralization due to the fall of socialism and the openingup. This complex crisis in the respective economic and social structures facilitated outmigration. Horváth and Kiss formulated this mechanism in the case of Romania, where the collapse and privatization of industry that had been built during the socialist period mostly affected smaller cities, and where several processes took place simultaneously (Horváth & Kiss, 2015). The majority of those who had commuted from villages returned to rural peasant farms, and even some urban residents chose to do this, while the other option was emigration. Thus, re-ruralization was part of the social crisis along with outmigration as an alternative escape route from the crisis. As we will see, a similar transition took place in the countries of the ex-Soviet Union that became sending areas with the opening-up to global markets. With the exception of ex-Yugoslavia, immigration has not posed a real challenge in countries that remained sending regions all along and there has even been a decrease in the number of arrivals, which is only partly surprising. After all, these countries have improved their relative income positions in the long term. I have excluded the states of the former Yugoslavia from the statistics and used UN Migration Matrix stock data, which reveal that Type 1 and 2 countries started off with almost identical immigration levels (ca. 2% of the population was born outside the Table 3.8 Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample countries (1990–2010) 1990*(%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 2015 (%) 2019 (%) Albania Bulgaria Croatia Poland Romania Serbia

55.91 19.54 22.37 25.57 29.78 26.70

54.26 16.80 20.64 22.63 40.33 27.55

51.59 13.20 16.55 18.67 45.21 26.34

47.21 8.94 17.30 17.38 32.29 23.32

42.08 6.82 14.25 13.05 31.01 22.34

41.36 6.86 9.23 11.53 25.59 19.41

36.69 6.39 5.96 9.23 21.71 15.46

* Based on the most similar available information at the time, or calculated using pro-rating

Source UNCTAD (2020)

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borders), but while in Type 1 countries this share rose to 4%, it fell to around 1.5% in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Poland. Accordingly, one cannot speak of a wave of immigration in these countries in the same sense as with the first group of countries, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary. Thus, during the period of opening-up, these countries did not experience competition from immigrants, at least until the mid- and late 2010s when refugee waves hit the region. It is also noteworthy that Eurostat and OECD reports show that this group of countries was left out of migration-related competition also in another respect. With the exception of Poland, which, as already noted, showed similarities with Type 1 countries, the employment level of the foreign-born was not higher than that of the resident population in the corresponding groups in these countries (see, e.g., Eurostat, 2011, 2020; OECD, 2014, 2018).17 In the 2010s, immigrants to Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia, who posed a less significant challenge as they were relatively few in number, had lower activity rates in the age groups 15–64 and 20–64 than the host population. Therefore, there was no real basis for a fear of competition, and people from Moldova, Russia, Albania, etc., entering these societies did not represent a social “challenge” compared to immigrants in the Visegrád states, at least in the investigated period. Inhabitants of these countries may have only faced “imagined competitors” before the wave of refugees, while in Type 1 countries there was a real basis for this perception due to the given mental and material conditions. In any case, as we will see in the analysis of discursive processes, these countries were much less radicalized about the issue of migration than the East-Central European countries that aimed to protect their prosperity. Massive emigration from these countries may also have played a role in this, as they themselves experienced discrimination.

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Diverging Migratory Capitalisms of Post-Soviet States: From Managed Neoliberalism to Total Collapse: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine (Type 3)

The post-Soviet countries on the southern and western borders of the former Soviet Union underwent a specific pattern of development in terms of migration balance. They had a positive balance in the 1960s and 1970s; that is, they were destinations for migrants. The key immigrant groups were people from other parts of the Soviet Union who arrived in these countries in large numbers before the collapse in 1991. 15.0 10.0 5.0 0 -5.0

Republic of Moldova Georgia

-10.0

Armenia

-15.0

Ukraine Estonia

-20.0 -25.0

Latvia Lithuania

-30.0 -35.0

Fig. 3.52 Net migration in countries that used to be destination areas but turned into sending regions (per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) 17 No data are available for Albania, but according to the Albanian Statistical Office, a total of 14,162 foreigners were living in the country in 2018. A population of this size certainly does not pose a challenge or represent competition to native residents (Instat, 2020).

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These member states had high positive net migration—higher than in the “classical” destination countries of the West, mainly due to their federal structure, internal and state-assisted population transfers, and other internal movements (Fig. 3.52). In many ways, the Soviet Union was a huge melting pot wherein internal movement of the population was massively institutionalized. Between the 1930s and the 1950s, there were substantial population transfers, particularly in the context of warrelated security measures and Stalinist terror (Bade, 2003, pp. 181–216). However, in addition to state-enforced and organized migration, there were also significant migratory movements due to the ongoing economic and social transformation. People migrated in large numbers towards areas that were relatively well-developed were major beneficiaries of industrial investment and enjoyed significantly better living standards than the rest of the Soviet Union. These areas included the Baltic states and, to some extent, Ukraine. In other cases, destination states such as Moldova and Georgia had more advanced agriculture, which may have been a major attraction under the state socialist system because of food shortages. In addition to the above factors, there was also considerable mobility among people involved in state bureaucracy, the military, education, and culture. Another common characteristic of these countries is that the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a serious emigration crisis, with the relocation of the mainly Russian-speaking population and outmigration towards Russia and Europe. Since the 1990s, however, the balance has changed; thus, it is necessary to investigate the individual trajectories and the differences between them. 3.4.4.1 Estonia Following the East-Central European Countries The inequalities already present under socialism led to unprecedented divergence in the post-socialist development trajectories. One variant of these diverging pathways is represented by Estonia, which followed a trajectory different from that experienced by the other Baltic states from the perspective of migration. Since the mid-1990s, Estonia has followed a path similar to that of Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in almost all aspects: it continues to attract a considerable number of immigrants as opposed to the other Baltic states, and as a result, its net migration has recently turned positive again. This similarity in development, as we will see later, is also reflected in the politics and public attitudes of the country.

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Table 3.9 Estonia’s GDP per capita (constant 2015 US dollars) as a share of the world average (1990–2010)

Estonia

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

125.55*

102.53

127.44

170.20

157.99

2015 (%) 2019 (%) 172.69

189.48

* Based on the most relevant available information at the time, and adjusted for proportionality

Source Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2020) and United Nations (2019b: World Population Prospects)

Relative income in Estonia has mostly been in line with that of Hungary and Slovakia (Table 3.9). However, unlike the latter countries, it was able to improve its relative income position, even in the late 2010s. Estonia has seen its GDP per capita rise from 120 to 180% of the world average. This rise in relative income has naturally increased the population’s capacity to emigrate. Emigration levels have soared (from 8 to 16% of the population), and it became particularly easy to leave the country after EU accession when a new institutional background was established. Estonia has been a dynamically evolving country in terms of income levels, and unlike Slovakia, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, this country has gone beyond merely stabilizing its income position. The fact that Estonia has the highest income level of all the former Soviet republics surely created a particularly positive perspective for the enriching part of society. This, of course, may have been significantly different from the experience of the underprivileged, especially the elderly, who faced a relatively high risk of poverty (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012, p. 117). In addition to the migration links that were rooted in the federal past, people also took advantage of the freedom of mobility towards northern European countries, most notably Finland. Estonia pursued a radically neoliberal macroeconomic policy (much more radical than the one adopted by the East-Central European welfare group or the other Baltic states) in the 1980s and flung its doors wide open to foreign capital, which boosted the already high levels of emigration (Fig. 3.53; Bohle & Greskovits, 2012, p. 96). However, Estonia’s development path has been very similar to that of Slovakia or Hungary. The country became super-globalized and remained so in terms of capital investment rates even after the 2008 crisis. At the same time, Estonia maintained slightly lower levels of redistribution in terms of tax revenues

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and contributions than Hungary and other East-Central European countries, and followed an even more sophisticated neoliberal agenda in terms of social spending (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012, pp. 96–137; OECD Social Spending, 2021; World Bank, 2020). Estonia quickly liquidated its agricultural sector, and instead of later re-ruralization, former agricultural workers moved into the service sector relatively rapidly. From 19% in 1990, the share of agricultural workers dropped to below 10%, and by 2019, it had fallen to 3%. As we will see, the Baltic states underwent a slower and less radical transformation. Estonia followed the Hungarian, Slovakian, and Czech model in many respects as a tiny former Soviet republic whose population wanted to move on from the Soviet past and break free from its historical burdens. Strong concerns about migration were part of this separation, and this pattern ties the country even more closely to the Central European welfare state group. The conscious and radical neoliberal and 18%

Emigration rate, per 1000 inhabitants

16% 14% 12% 10% Estonia WORLD

8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

FDI % of GDP Fig. 3.53 FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion of emigrants in 1990–2019 in Estonia (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020], United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects], and United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock])

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anti-communist turn was linked to an exclusionary, “Europeanizing” nation-building project, as Bohle and Greskovits highlighted in their discussion of the development trajectory of the Baltic states (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012, pp. 96–107). Estonia to a large extent realized the neoliberal and neoconservative dreams of the 1980s, and this process became intertwined with the problem of population decline and the panic about immigration and citizenship at the time of independence. Many “Russian” inhabitants of Estonia and Latvia had immigrated to these countries during the Soviet era. This was mainly due to the high level of industrialization and the relatively high living standards. In the case of Estonia, their proportion reached ca. 25% in 1990, according to UN data. Thus, when the country became independent and engaged in a significant neoliberal marketization turn, one in every four inhabitants was labeled an immigrant by both local society and politics. This phenomenon also connects Estonia (and Latvia and to some extent also Lithuania) to the group of countries that have defended their welfare privileges, as they also experienced a major immigration wave amid growing social insecurity. The share of immigrants has declined over time, as in other former Soviet states, but is still above 15%, well above the European average. Estonia, as a minor state and an extremely small linguistic community, experienced continuous migration pressure during its exclusionist anticommunist nation-building after 1990, which predisposed the country to display a sensitivity to migration issues and reject immigration, exceeding in this respect the European average level, and partly replicating political processes in Hungary and the Czech Republic, as evidenced by various attitude surveys. Another factor shaping this similar trajectory was that, in addition to the concept of a fictitious migration exchange maintained by the economic system (both emigration and perceived immigration were significant), locals saw foreign-born people as competitors in terms of education and, until the mid-2010s, employment—provided that the Estonian public followed the biopolitical attitudes of the prevailing neoliberal capitalism (see, e.g., Eurostat, 2011, pp. 201, 202; OECD, 2014, 2018). Political concerns could thus be confirmed. In many respects, Estonia became an island of welfare, and its discursive processes were caught up in social isolationism involving a specific position between East and West.

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3.4.4.2 Latvia and Lithuania in the Grip of Emigration Latvia and Lithuania followed a very similar path to that of Estonia which could even be considered a Baltic model. Yet there were major differences in terms of outmigration and migration balance. These countries followed analogous trajectories until the early 2000s, but from then on, Latvia and Lithuania did not increase their net migration and both countries became predominantly sending regions, as did Poland and the countries in the Balkans. Estonia, on the other hand, turned into a destination country. The differences in the evolution of net migration are surprising. Latvia and Lithuania had neoliberal economies and redistributive policies very similar to the Estonian model, and they improved their relative income position after a significant initial drop (Table 3.10). Both countries increased their average economic income, reaching one-and-a-half times the world average. This could have increased the region’s attractiveness to immigrants, along with boosting the emigration capacity, as happened in Estonia. However, this did not happen, and these two countries lost the largest proportion of their population in Eastern Europe in the form of emigrants. In terms of the economic share of taxes, social contributions, and levels of redistribution, Lithuania and Latvia followed Estonia. The even harsher neoliberal character of their economic policy is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the proportion of social spending, direct cash benefits, tax cuts, etc., to GDP remained in the relatively low range of 15–17%. This was generally below the redistribution levels of the privileged welfare countries in—to use the wording of Bohle-Greskovits—the embedded neoliberal East-Central European group, and even below the post-2011 figures for Estonia. These proportions show enormous disparity compared to the wealthy Western destinations of migrants from these countries, as the latter states achieved higher levels of social redistribution combined Table 3.10 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) of each country in this type relative to the world average (1990–2010) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 2015 (%) 2019 (%) Latvia* Lithuania*

114.52 99.37

70.52 69.42

82.03 84.26

112.70 120.17

118.33 115.34

139.14 133.64

158.68 147.42

* Based on the most relevant information available at the time and adjusted for proportionality

Source UNCTAD (2020)

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with higher levels of income compared to the whole Eastern European region (OECD Social Spending, 2021). This welfare gap again seems to support the hypothesis that the absence or deterioration of welfare structures was a major force behind emigration in the former socialist region. Thus, states with improving income positions remained sending areas, as opposed to neoclassical economic reasoning (Hárs, 2019). Continuing emigration since the 1990s and its increasing dynamics raise pertinent questions about the role of FDI in these Baltic Republics. In contrast to Estonia or Hungary, in two very open economies, Latvia and Lithuania, the rate of FDI was lower in the observed period and has been declining or stagnating since the 2000s, while outward migration kept rising. A smaller increase in the capital inflow rate would, at least in principle and according to the global model, lead to lower levels of expatriation than in Estonia, yet the opposite seems to be the case. Several explanations are possible. It may be partly due to macroeconomic reasons—namely, lower social spending (de Haas et al., 2018, pp. 23–24; Hárs, 2019); another reason may be the improving income position and migration capacity of the population. Extreme neoliberalism associated with low redistribution rates and a reorientation of economic relations led to real exodus towards “Europe” (Fig. 3.54). The situation may be also related to the initial globalization shock to the population. In contrast to Estonia and the East-Central European group, these two Baltic states had higher levels of agricultural employment when they opened up their economies, and these levels declined only slowly, just as in the other Eastern European countries of emigration (Table 3.11). Lithuania had the largest proportion of agricultural workers among the Baltic states, and only from the mid-2000s onwards did their share start to decline considerably. Larger groups of workers were not able to leave the rural economy for other sectors. The “stay or go” question was thus even sharper. This may have been reflected in the extremely high emigration rates. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, in contrast to other non-post-Soviet sending countries (Romania, Albania, etc.), there was no evidence of major re-agrarianization here, which may have been the outcome of rural development in the Soviet Union which was characteristically different from in other parts of Eastern Europe (Hann, 2003). Of the two Baltic states, Latvia experienced very similar trends to Estonia. The share of people from other parts of the former Soviet Union was extremely large in the 1990s and started to decline only slowly; even

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25.00%

Emigration rate

20.00%

15.00% WORLD Lithuania Latvia

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%

0.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%

6.00%

FDI % of GDP

Fig. 3.54 FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion of emigrants in 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank (2020) and United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock])

Table 3.11 Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample countries (1990–2010) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 2015 (%) 2019 (%) Lithuania Latvia

22.6 18.6

22.0 17.5

19.2 14.9

14.3 12.1

8.8 8.6

9.1 7.9

6.9 6.8

Source UNCTAD (2020)

today, more than 10% of the population is foreign-born. In Lithuania, however, the proportion of non-natives was much lower, and recently, this rate has fallen below 5%. The share of immigrants dropped in both states, and this may be an important historical dynamic. Lithuania is slowly catching up with the extremely low levels of immigration from nonpost-Soviet sending countries, while emigration has reached staggering proportions, with Lithuania’s emigration stock rising above 20%.

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Immigration trends have been declining in this region, and none of these countries have had to face any kind of social competition posed by immigrants. The level of integration of foreign-born, working-age people into the labor market remains below that of the native population according to all available surveys and, in contrast to Estonia, this has always been the case. This suggests that Latvia and Lithuania are more similar to the group of Eastern European countries with their long-term emigration trends. Thus, the general relative income advantage of the Baltic states compared to their neighbors, their neoliberal economic and social policies with relatively low redistributive levels, and high initial levels of immigration may all explain the fears of immigration in these societies, but several factors have at least partially offset these effects. Thus, in contrast to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in particular seem to have followed the social trajectory of countries that permanently remained sending areas. It seems that they experienced the transformation of globalization but experienced less, albeit still strong, anxiety concerning welfare and competition than the East-Central European and Estonian examples. 3.4.5

Transformation Crises in Ukraine, Moldavia, Armenia, and Georgia (Type 3)

Of the surveyed Eastern European post-Soviet states, Ukraine experienced relatively stable (with a balance around zero) but at the same time very intense migration. Immigrants born in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, or the South Caucasian republics lived in Ukraine in large numbers and continued to arrive, while the country also became integrated into global migration networks as an important sending region. According to UN stock figures, almost 15% of the Ukrainian population was living outside the country’s borders in 2019, even well before the current war (United Nations, 2019a, 2019b). The other former member states, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, were faced with significant population loss after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of which involved foreign-born, Russian-speaking residents, while the already high emigration levels skyrocketed (Fig. 3.55). In Georgia, the emigration rate exceeded 20% of the sending population as early as in 2005. In Moldova, the proportion had risen to 25% by 2019, while in Armenia the share of the population living outside the country’s borders was over 32% (United Nations, 2019a, 2019b). Population loss in these countries has

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thus become an acute problem, especially in comparison with the steady population growth before 1990. These countries were very poor when they embarked on the process of further marketization in the first half of the 1990s. The limited statistical data that are available suggest that in the 1970s GDP per capita in these countries was still relatively high, above the world average (Maddison Historical Statistics, 2013). According to the Maddison database, even in the first half of the 1970s, Ukrainian, Moldovan, Georgian, and Armenian GDP was still at 120–150% of the world average calculated in 1990 Gharry-Khamis dollars, and this level stagnated until 1990 according to this database (based on two measurement points). Then, income levels plummeted, and per capita economic income halved, or even fell to a third. A grave crisis unfolded, poverty soared, care-related problems emerged, and mortality increased sharply, and these countries had to struggle hard to achieve the life expectancy they had experienced under 15.0

10.0

Estimated annual balance per 1000 inhabitants

5.0

0

-5.0

-10.0

Republic of Moldova Georgia Armenia

-15.0

Ukraine

-20.0

-25.0

-30.0

-35.0

Fig. 3.55 Net migration in countries that used to be immigrant destinations but turned into sending regions: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, and Armenia, 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects])

3

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late socialism, especially men. This is all the more surprising because life expectancy was already low at that time, and the shock of regime change, lifestyle problems, and the collapse of health care aggravated this situation even more (Meslé, 2004; Meslé & Vallin, 2017). Information in the UNCTAD database allows only an educated guess about this collapse; in the early 1990s, these countries’ GDP per capita fell below 50% or even 25% of the world average (Table 3.12). This was a tremendous globalization-related shock for the population and created a terrible social crisis that accelerated emigration and made it an important strategic objective (Melegh et al., 2010; Molodikova, 2008). These countries, with similarly high but somewhat different emigration rates, were open from a globalization perspective and attracted increasing amounts of foreign capital. In this respect, they were in the middle range among Eastern European countries, and the impact of foreign capital investment on their emigration rates was also clear (Fig. 3.56). While emigration was of course boosted by the entrance of foreign capital and its social consequences, it appears that cumulative effects, including the initial emigration levels, also played a role in their being caught up in an emigration trap, similarly to the other Eastern European countries discussed above. In the case of Georgia and Armenia, the improvement in relative income levels after the globalization shock may have also facilitated the fact that intentions to emigrate were translated into reality from the 2000s onwards. These factors, combined with the ethnic and migratory networks that exist among these countries, have predisposed their inhabitants to continuously consider the option of moving abroad. The crisis and shock of globalization is also demonstrated by the fact that re-ruralization took place in these economies during the first phase Table 3.12 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) of Type 3 countries relative to the world average (1990–2010) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 2015 (%) 2019 (%) Ukraine Moldavia Georgia Armenia

47.57 23.82 25.21 15.42

21.61 14.57 13.79 13.47

18.22 11.87 18.68 16.21

24.96 15.36 25.06 27.44

23.99 16.98 30.79 31.83

19.97 18.75 36.62 35.55

21.28 20.01 40.86 39.98

* Based on the most relevant available information at the time, or calculated using pro-rating

Source Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2020)

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35.00% 30.00%

Emigration ratio %

25.00% 20.00%

Republic of Moldova WORLD Georgia Ukraine Armenia

15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

FDI % of GDP

Fig. 3.56 FDI-to-GDP ratio, 1980–2010 and share of emigration, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020] and United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock])

of opening-up, like in the other Eastern European sending countries. In Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia, the former industrial sector effectively collapsed and the share of the agricultural sector in GDP rose to over 50%, from where it slowly decreased to below 15 or even 10% (Melegh, 2012, pp. 29–30; World Bank, 2020). Ukraine witnessed similar trends but with a smaller amplitude; its industry also proved to be more resilient until recently. Even in Ukraine in the 2000s a remarkably large proportion of the population earned their living from agricultural work, and in Georgia and Moldova, the share was at times as high as 50% (Table 3.13). This proportion is in line with, and even slightly higher than, the similar rates in other Eastern European states that have remained sending countries. One can say that countries that started as relatively industrialized socialist states and destinations for immigrants increasingly came to develop the economic and labor-market structures and development dynamics of poor

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Table 3.13 Share of agricultural employment in the sample countries (1990– 2010) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 2015 (%) 2019 (%) Ukraine Moldavia Georgia Armenia

23.9 43.0 48.6 44.8

25.1 45.2 48.5 45.4

25.1 50.9 52.2 43.2

22.1 40.7 54.3 38.3

20.3 27.5 48.1 38.6

15.3 34.2 44.0 35.3

14.5 35.9 41.8 29.6

Source UNCTAD (2020)

Latin American states. In this process, temporary re-ruralization is an indication that large groups in these societies sought an escape route in the face of an economic disaster they were unable to cope with. The experience of Ukraine differs significantly from that of the other countries in terms of immigration. The latter countries, with the exception of Georgia, were home to a high number of people born outside their borders—however, as mentioned above, the lion’s share of these people left these states when they became independent. Ukraine, however, followed a different path and because of its own economic strength and historical connections continued to host larger immigrant groups. Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia saw a decline in immigration, the level of which came close to those of the immigration experienced in Central and Eastern Europe. Their appeal to immigrants was clearly negligible, and in terms of emigration, these states became parts of two major migration regimes simultaneously: the European and the Russian one. Thus, only in the case of Ukraine may we ask to what extent did its inhabitants experience immigration as competition—i.e., to what extent did they share the fears of Baltic or East-Central European societies. Understanding the situation of migrants, and even making an assessment of the migration situation in Ukraine, is particularly difficult due to legal uncertainties surrounding immigration and the fact that the legal status of a huge number of people remains undetermined and unresolved (Kazmierkiewicz, 2011). The combination of social and migration-related uncertainty and economic decline, and more recently, even the breakdown of territorial integrity, has pushed Ukraine towards collapse. Failures of the neoliberal era have made Ukraine increasingly intolerant, even in terms of internal ethnic divisions, and mired in a myriad of tensions.

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As we have seen, this group of countries witnessed a tough trajectory in the context of both migration and globalization—a specific pattern that is distinct from other groups of countries in Eastern Europe. In the framework of the unequal exchange that characterizes the development of Eastern Europe, these countries comprise a particularly vulnerable periphery that is enmeshed in multiple migration regimes, while facing bitter struggles in terms of demographic issues, depopulation, nationalism, and economic challenges. 3.4.6

Summary of the Historical Material Background

Due to the intensifying competition generated by radical marketization, societies around the world, but especially in Europe, have faced grave competition arising from immigration and emigration, as well as manifold demographic and social problems combined with a crisis of welfare systems. In addition to these factors, the relative economic weight of Europe, a continent that had been in an extremely privileged position in terms of income, has considerably decreased, while new migration networks have emerged and the so-called refugee crisis started to unfold. European welfare systems have come under severe demographic and institutional pressure due to population aging as well as from marketization and neoliberal economic policies. It is likely that the aim of protecting welfare benefits, combined with historically inherited and preserved Eurocentric demographic and economic discourses, created the terrain on which a powerful historical bloc could emerge in the 2010s that opposed cultural and migratory openness. To use Polányi’s perspectives, socialist Eastern Europe, with its embedded mixed economy, was at the same time a victim, a servant, and an active participant of this market transformation and thus underwent a particular historical experience. Countries in the region faced aging, depopulation, and unequal exchange. These states served the needs of other European countries, and in particular the EU, in terms of capital investment, labor markets, and social services. At the same time, specific historical patterns can be observed in the relationship between migration and openness to globalization, and different groups of countries have followed different but typical trajectories. East-Central European countries underwent an intensive social and economic opening-up and had to cope with the social tension this generated in the form of major immigration waves—a phenomenon that,

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with the exception of Slovenia, had not been previously experienced in these countries. This was combined with the severe labor-market crisis of the early 1990s. In Hungary alone, for example, one-and-a-half million jobs were lost in a few years. The combination of openness and social shock may have shaped the background and subsequent evolution of attitudes towards migration from a historical and socio-material perspective. This initial stage was pivotal, as the East-Central European countries that entered the period with relatively high welfare levels constantly sought to make new welfare contracts in terms of social support and redistribution, while they repeatedly renounced these in the interest of competition for capital and macroeconomic, financial consolidation, thereby generating serious social discontent (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012, pp. 146–149; Fábry, 2019). This happened only on a social level, as political or labor movements and collective action basically never gained real momentum. This embedded neoliberalism, which sought to preserve former prosperity and security selectively and in a limited form, along with the ongoing debate around small-scale emigration and redistribution, almost predestined these societies to react sharply to migration issues, especially in the context of the current global and European social and institutional transformation. One of the key claims of this book is that, in the context of the specific global and regional European historical trends, it is precisely those Eastern European states that were already concerned about immigration before the refugee crisis due to the threat or loss of their former prosperity that became the main protagonists of migration debates. The states that became the main actors in this turnaround are not those that readily accepted the neoliberal turn during the phase of opening-up after previous crises and historical cataclysms (such as the Solidarity movement and the economic debt crisis, and the rule of Ceaus, escu and Enver Hoxha). Moreover, at the time of opening-up, these latter societies appreciated and accepted that mass emigration could be a real “solution” and, in many ways, a positive alternative in the midst of the calamities and industrial collapses of the 1980s and 1990s. However, these communities did not experience major immigration flows. Thus, the combination of specific historical processes and broader social and structural transformations may explain from a historical and socio-material perspective why globally and locally inherited discursive elements that provided interpretation and justification for exclusion and reinforced nationalism gained hegemony in certain societies and not in others in the region.

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This does not mean, of course, that the Eastern European sending countries or the former Soviet republics that started to become involved in the European migration system did not “defend” the “European” migrants against “non-European” migrants during the refugee crisis. In fact, this is how the coalition of Eastern European states’ rebellion against external migration was completed in the whole region. From a historical and socio-material point of view, the ground was already prepared, and the corresponding political and ideological change had already taken place in many parts of the world. Migration and the globalized labor market had become solid structures in a wide range of sectors in the world economy, and their operation was increasingly extended to previously unaffected spheres of society. Increasingly newer migration networks were continuously established around the world. Demographic change also led to increasingly intensive crossborder exchanges of skilled and unskilled labor, which phenomenon has incorporated gender and social inequalities as well as colonialhistorical experiences according to demand and profit-related interests. An increasing number of migration routes emerged globally, some of which were completely new for both migrants and host societies. One of these was set up between West Asia and Europe and passed through South-East Europe. All this happened in the midst of a demographic transition of virtually unprecedented scale and importance in human history, in which process Europe, and Eastern Europe in particular, faced the relatively grave challenges of aging and social care, and the vulnerability of economic, social security, and income privileges that had previously been globally decisive. This made the continent’s openness to migration and capital and its loss of industry unique, leading to a stressful situation of competition and uncertainty in otherwise rather rich populations. The rise of foreign capital and the associated neoliberal economic policies disembedded and transformed earlier structures in much of the world. The socialist mixed economies that combined redistributive and market elements collapsed, and the respective countries began to build market utopias and were reintegrated along specific historical trajectories in terms of production, capital, and migration. The fight over public welfare systems (i.e., to maintain preexisting ones or to create new ones) became amazingly fierce as a result of the aging of the population, the transformation of the associated institutions, and the decrease in the level

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of redistribution. In fact, the marketization of care, migration, and the decline in redistribution were interlinked phenomena. Thus, strong economic growth became a precondition for these developments, encouraging states to support capital investment while, paradoxically, the unfolding economic crisis was addressed through financial instruments, debt, and artificial stimulus. Super-financialization and globalization and migratory capitalism under such conditions, against the backdrop of a partially socialist historical legacy, led to countermovement, to use Polányi’s words. It should be noted that in a world economy struggling with demand problems after the 2008 crisis, the dynamics of globalization have recently reversed; since 2010, the importance of economic openness and foreign capital has declined or stagnated. As a cyclical effect, this has somewhat dampened the rapid increase in migration levels and reduced growth rates, while cumulative processes have maintained these. However, as we have seen from our model, the direct effect of globalization is limited, so that a cyclical decline in the capital investment rate alone cannot reverse the migration process due to other institutional trajectories, and in particular, cumulative effects. The importance of this cyclical effect perhaps lies in the decrease of globalization’s historical driving force that has allowed rightwing elites who culturally opposed globalization and radical marketization and were dissatisfied with previous policies to come to power. This situation is structurally similar to in the early 1930s. From the perspective of the crisis and anti-globalization, anti-capitalist sentiment, a change of attitudes in the wake of the 2008 crisis was almost inevitable. Lukács put this eloquently during the time of the Destruction of Reason in the 1930s: The reactionaries of monopoly capitalism were thus presented with a new task, the task of exploiting just these mass (anti-capitalist) feelings to establish their own command; and using them for support […] to found a new type of reactionary regime securing once and for all the absolute predominance of monopoly capitalism in all spheres of political and social life. (Lukács, 1980, p. 79)

It was in this context that the refugee crisis hit that part of the world that faced new challenges in the form of increasing conflict. The West assisted and played an active role in the disintegration of a previously colonized region, from North Africa to Pakistan. The wave-like emergence of

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a highly vulnerable and previously despised mass from this region aggravated migration-related tensions based on historical and socio-material factors and provided an excellent opportunity to thematize public opinion and public discourse. This was particularly so in countries where the mental framework of global hierarchies was affected by insecurity and tension—that is, where societies saw themselves as being in an intermediate, vulnerable, and highly competitive situation (Göncz & Lengyel, 2016). All this undermined the foundations of the institutional structures of asylum in the European Union that had been developed in the globalization era; thus, problems escalated in the decade following the economic crisis (Long, 2013). In order to shed light on these dynamics, let us now return to the discursive and cognitive processes that shaped and informed the framework and political aspects of the migration debate. Which discursive factors facilitated or hindered the migration turn, and how might these influence further developments? This is the question addressed in the last major part of this book.

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CHAPTER 4

Discursive Changes

4.1 Revolt of the Masses? Geo-Cultural Maps, Blocs, and the Evolution of Public Views in Eastern European Societies There is widespread belief that the new populism comes from the revolt of the masses—to borrow the term from the Spanish phenomenologist philosopher, Ortega Y Gasset. This statement needs to be recontextualized through answering some questions. Was there any systematic spatial and historical pattern behind the rejection of immigrants during the period of globalization in light of historical and socio-material conditions? How did the social perception of migration among the masses relate to elite discourses? When addressing these issues, a number of historical conjunctions are worth noting. Attitude surveys focusing on the opening-up to globalization and the nationalist boom—possible traces of double movements as described by Polányi—can shed light on whether there was a wave of rejection of migrants by the broader public. This makes a proper historical analysis possible and facilitates an understanding of blocs, hegemony, and counterhegemony, and their decisive historical elements. In order to obtain a better understanding of these phenomena, I conduct a historical overview of the rise and dominance of these attitudes in several steps, based on a subset of surveys. First, I look at the timelines of the World Value Survey, and then make use of certain datasets from the ESS and Eurobarometer © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9_4

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(Eurobarometer, 2021; European Social Survey, 2018; Haerpfer et al., 2014, 2022). The World Value Survey is one of the most important sources, taking the form of an open database that covers a long term and includes data on up to eighty countries. This series of surveys, launched in 1981, comprises interviews that use uniformly structured questionnaires, and among other items it examines in seven waves which of certain “problematic” and “marginal” groups (people of different “races,” languages, sexual orientations, etc.) are mentioned by respondents, and how often “immigrants and foreign workers” are identified as a rejected group at the level of neighborhoods. The question about this topic includes only two response options (“mentioned” and “not mentioned”), so a more precise assessment of rejection was not possible. The countries participating in the survey constantly changed, thus only fragmented time series could be reconstructed for individual countries. This makes historical analysis challenging. Nevertheless, the number and share of respondents in a country who indicated that they would rather not have a migrant or a foreign worker as a neighbor provides a basis for observations over a longer period (including three waves of interviews between 1990 and 2005 and another three between 2006 and 2020, Fig. 4.1). It is also possible to examine in which regions and periods the results deviated from the average of the sample and how these dynamics changed. Surprisingly, the World Value Survey data show little increase in xenophobia globally, measured through the question about neighborhoods. The proportion of interviewees who mentioned migrants increased by just one percentage point, which is at first glance is a startling result. In the first half of the 1980s, when the first wave of WVS data was collected, aversion to migrants must have been generally still low, as countries such as South Korea and Japan reported very low rates, while later they systematically produced high values. Of course, this is only an assumption, as the number of countries included in the survey was still very small at that time, and researchers in Hungary, for example, did not even ask this question during interviews. In the latter case, perhaps it was not considered meaningful because the phenomenon was still marginal: migration was not a serious and discursively important issue in socialist Hungary. We can, therefore, only conclude with certainty that from the 1990s onwards migrants were mentioned as neighbors to be avoided in these surveys at a fairly stable rate globally.

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35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990-2004

2005-2020

Asia (14 countries) Eastern Europe/Ex-SU (23 countries) Africa (6 countries) West (11 countries) Latin-America (7 countries) World (5-5.6 billion respondents) Linear (Eastern Europe/Ex-SU (23 countries))

Fig. 4.1 Proportion of respondents who indicated that they do not want immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors. Average national, population-weighted rates by region and period 1990–2020 (Source Author’s calculations based on European Values Study [2017a, 2017b] and Haerpfer et al. [2014, 2022])

Although there is thirty-year period of global stability in the survey results, an interesting picture emerges from the spatial distribution of the data. They reveal a particular geo-cultural tension between the “openness” and “tolerance” of so-called Western countries and, interestingly, of Latin America, and the relative “closedness” and exclusionist views in the rest of the world about this issue. It is as if a huge debate about migration between Asian, African, and Eastern European countries, and Western and Latin American ones had existed. Clearly, there are long-term historical dynamics at play here, but the determinants of such responses cannot be limited to the already analyzed evolution of net migration in the respective regions, but a much more complex set of factors can be assumed. In general (albeit certainly not without exception, we shall return to intraregional divisions in detail later), those former peasant societies were the most hostile that themselves had never colonized remote areas, or were

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not completely reconfigured during colonization. These countries, mostly situated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe (with the exception of states such as South Africa), are the heirs to peasant and agrarian societies which were very often victims of colonialism. Japan is an exception among Asian countries, having colonized large areas and having been historically expansive with a view to tackling the “overpopulation” problem brought about by the country’s capitalist transformation (Bashford, 2014, pp. 72–75). In contrast to the African and Asian regions in the surveys, the former peasant societies of Eastern Europe faced threats to their sovereignty and territories not from distant colonizers but from powers expanding on the continent in their neighborhood in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. In each of these “isolationist” regions, the capitalist period brought about a lack of political and social integrity and a radical transformation of preexisting state structures, even though no colonialists deprived the local populations of their statehood or tried to exterminate them completely. As opposed to in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, migration—and especially immigration—played a key role in the advancement and modern history of Western and Latin American countries. These interactions also involved populations that considered themselves superior. As European immigrants were agents involved in expansion and land grabs, through this they shaped perceptions (Mignolo, 2010). In Western and Latin American countries, especially from the point of view of the European colonizers, immigration may have been less of a concern—which does not mean that these countries never experienced periods of anti-migrant and nationalistic panic. The latter happened in the United States, for example, concerning migrant workers from China, and during the introduction of so-called national quotas in the 1920s (Bashford, 2014, p. 105). However, the WVS data from the globalization era show a more “open” attitude towards migrants compared to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—a region that strove to transform the peasant world into a socialist, embedded society and where market-based, forced, or voluntary international migration played a negligible role in the economy between the 1950s and the onset of globalization. Socialist Eastern Europe was built for and with the local population. As we have seen, the post-Socialist opening-up left Eastern Europe extremely vulnerable in terms of demographic problems and emigration, and the evolution of public views has been in line with these developments.

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Overarching historical changes that impact whole continents and large areas are particularly relevant for this analysis. Alongside Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union have been among the most exclusionist regions in the migration debate throughout the whole period of globalization, but especially in the mid-1990s and the second half of the 2010s. It is very important in our argument that negativity generally increased in Eastern Europe, as opposed to, for example, the overall “calming down” of public views in African countries (with the exception of South Africa, whose population retained their concern about migration). Indeed, the anti-migrant views of individuals from the former socialist bloc—which alone among the studied regions started off below the global average—eventually caught up with the average levels seen in Asian countries. The rise of anti-migration sentiment during the globalization period seems to be specific to Eastern Europe only, and this is consistent with our historical and socio-material analysis. It seems that this region perceived the biggest “shock” when it faced migration during an extremely rapid transition to globalization, even though the number of migrants arriving in this region—especially those from distant regions—remained small compared to that of other areas, except for a few countries. This is a paradox only at first sight. Unequal exchanges and the demographic transformation paved the way to the reinforcement of fears about immigration in a competitive capitalist, biopolitical context. This does not mean that continents produced completely homogeneous results in the opinion polls. Relative dispersion reveals that countries in Latin America and the West were consistent in this regard, and the average deviation from the average remained below 5% over the whole period under study. For the African countries included in the sample, the relative dispersion was much greater, falling from 13 to 6%, while for the Asian countries it was around 10–11%. For the Eastern European sample, relative dispersion increased from 7 to 11%, indicating that the differences had intensified here; in some Eastern European countries, there was a significant increase in the average level of rejection, while others did not follow this regional trend. Levels of tolerance measured in this way diverged and varied significantly across Eastern Europe. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Montenegro, and even Estonia show exceptional, globally high levels of rejection, with 30–50% of interviewees mentioning migrants as undesired neighbors, while results from other Eastern European countries and former Soviet member states do not testify to such levels of hostility, or

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only for shorter periods. The latter include Albania, Poland, and Romania, where the levels of rejection were low in the first period of globalization, and even decreased over time. Thus, in addition to the general historical trend, the internal distribution is also in line with historical and sociomaterial processes and development trajectories I have identified: it is precisely in the regions that counted as islands of welfare (Estonia, Central Europe, and the richest of the Baltic States) that the above-described trends of rejection and exclusion were amplified (Fig. 4.2).

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

Montenegro Czechrep Slovakia Serbia Hungary Azerbaijan Bulgaria Belarus Russia Estonia Lithuania Bosnia Macedonia Georgia Kyrgyzstan Armenia Ukraine Romania Croatia Moldova Slovenia Poland Albania

0%

1990-2004

2005-2020

Fig. 4.2 Rejection of immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors. Average national rates for longer periods in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet member states, 1990–2020 (Source European Values Study [2017a, 2017b] and Haerpfer et al. [2014, 2022])

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Growing Fears of Migration or Growing Dissent in Europe? Further Opinion Polls and Divisions on the Continent

The unique place of Europe in the world and the historical dynamics informed by the dissent and global transformation unfolding on the continent are key to understanding the consequences of globalization and marketization for societies worldwide. Although these are far from being the most important changes in the global arena, they are certainly important from a global historical perspective, as they reveal the consequences of a simultaneous transformation of formerly embedded socialist societies, the fragmentation of an expanding free market, and the provincialization of a formerly hegemonic Western Europe (Bairoch, 2000; Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1998; Böröcz, 2010; Chakrabarty, 2000; Melegh, 2012). The refugee crisis and migration conflict in the mid-2010s brought the underlying mentality of Europeans to the surface. It is, therefore, worth examining specifically how European public opinion about migration has evolved since the European continent has become one of the most important arenas in the migration turn and the respective bloc-related formation due to the historical and socio-material conditions outlined in the previous chapters. The issue of migration (usually limited to immigration) was of little interest to the European public before the opening-up to globalization, and opinion polls largely neglected this issue. The fact that many periodic surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, did not even address migration at first is telling. It was not until 1988 that this matter was first addressed in more detail after the launch of the survey in 1974. From then on, the free movement of workers became an important issue in relation to the “single market” and preparation for the Maastricht Treaty (Eurobarometer, 1988a, 1988b). It was an important development that the issues of the unrestricted free market, cross-border employment, and migration as a general category and problem became interlinked. Western Europe first started to develop an interest in migration-related issues in the early 1990s when “Mediterranean” and “Eastern European” migrants started arriving, and migration came into focus again in the 2010s with the refugee crisis. Data from related surveys reveal that in the early 1990s less than one-fifth of respondents (from twelve countries) in the European Community feared (on religious, nationality, or “racial” grounds) that immigration would have a negative impact on the “single

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market” (Eurobarometer, 1992, p. 64). Eurobarometer and WVS data suggest that the level of rejection remained more or less the same in the EU-15 during the 1990s, although there were some negative changes in attitudes in some respects (Fig. 4.1, European Values Study, 2017a; Haerpfer et al., 2014, 2022). In Eastern Europe, the third wave of the WVS surveys in 1995– 1998 showed the predominance of above-average rejection rates, while Western European countries had below-average results, with a few exceptions (Fig. 4.2, Haerpfer et al., 2014). Of the 23 Eastern European states under study, 15 showed rejection levels above the global average and eight were in the more tolerant group. Outliers with extreme levels of hostility included Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Lithuania, the former Yugoslavia, and the Czech Republic, while public opinion was more permissive in Albania, Croatia, Russia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. The high level of rejection in the former Yugoslavia was probably a result of the civil war, while in the case of the more tolerant states, migration following the collapse of the Soviet Union may still have been perceived by the public as a relatively acceptable state of affairs, being a result of previous coexistence. In any case, sharp division was emerging between Western and Eastern Europe and, in some respects, within Eastern Europe, according to the type of socio-material development. The East–West divide was also clearly visible in the early 2000s. The European Social Survey data showed the strong rejection of migrants in many European states, but especially in Eastern Europe when the question involved the admission of immigrants from poor non-European states (European Social Survey, 2002, 2006). For Europe as a whole, the ESS measured the strongest levels of hostility towards people from poor non-European countries between 2002 and 2006: the rejection rate of almost 47% that was measured in the mid-2000s remained unmatched even during the so-called refugee crisis of 2014–2018. So, according to these data neither globalization alone, nor the excessively mediatized 2014–2018 crisis, triggered automatically a major rise in rejection, at least among those who indicated that they would have liked to see few or no immigrants from poor non-European countries in their neighborhood (Fig. 4.3; see also Messing & Ságvári, 2017, 2019). The evolution of the internal divisions in Europe reveals that even at the beginning a group of Eastern European countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania) stood out in terms of their

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50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 2002-2006

2014-18

2016-18

Fig. 4.3 Weighted average proportion of respondents in comparable European countries answering that “Only few or no immigrants should be allowed to enter from non-European countries,” ESS 2002–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based on European Social Survey [2018]*)

level of rejection, while others (Slovenia and Poland) had results around or slightly below the continental average, very much in line with the identified development types and related problems (Fig. 4.4). These observations were confirmed by several other surveys. The PPA survey (Population Policy Acceptance, 2000–2003) analyzed by Irén Gödri in Hungary (Avramov, 2008; Gödri, 2010, p. 161) is particularly striking in this respect. According to the PPA questionnaire surveys that were examined as part of the Femage research project, citizens of Estonia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (and East Germany, measured separately at that time) held extremely negative opinions about immigration among the Eastern European countries, especially in comparison with other, non-Eastern European countries. This reflects the radicalization of public opinion in the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe in defense of their former prosperity. The aggregate ESS data reveal that for 2016–2018 all Eastern European countries rejected immigrants at above the average level, with only

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

2002-2006

2014-18

2016-18

2002-18

Fig. 4.4 Proportion of respondents who said that only few or no immigrants should be allowed to enter Europe from non-European countries, by country, ESS 2002–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based on European Social Survey [2018]*) Table 4.1 Aggregate variables of attitudes towards immigrants in some European countries Country

Czech Republic East Germany West Germany Estonia Hungary Austria Poland Slovenia Finland

Aggregate variable of positive attitudes towards immigrantsa

Aggregate variable of negative attitudes towards immigrantsb

2.6 3.2 3.5 2.3 1.9 4.6 2.4 3.0 4.2

6.1 6.2 5.1 6.0 6.9 3.2 4.4 5.2 6.7

a Standardized for items by country b Standardized for items by country and items of the aggregate variable of positive attitudes. Source

FEMAGE-MIG database, Avramov (2008) and Gödri (2010, p. 161)

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Slovenia slightly below the latter (Table 4.1). This trend was counterbalanced by the opposite tendency in the UK, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany, among others, in line with the analysis. Sorting the countries by the direction and extent of changes in attitudes, it becomes clear that almost all of the Eastern European countries display dynamics different from the average trend, with either a strong increase or a slight decrease in level of rejection compared to already high initial values (Fig. 4.5). Attitudes towards migration are also reflected in the Eurobarometer surveys. Interestingly, these data also show an escalation of debate in the European Union (Fig. 4.6). According to Eurobarometer data, immigration has been a growing concern since the 2000s but especially came into focus in the 2010s; even before the refugee crisis, the issue was at the forefront of public interest in the EU, a concern that has somewhat subsided in the last years. It is particularly interesting that respondents usually perceived immigration as a problem for the EU in general, not a national issue; i.e., they considered it at a regional European level. This may be related to the specificities of the socio-material-, demographic-, and migration-related 20% 10% 0% -10% -20% -30% -40%

Fig. 4.5 Changes in rejection of migrants from non-European poor countries, in 2002–2006 and 2016–2018 (difference in percentage points) (Source Author’s calculation based on the European Social Survey [2018]*)

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60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 20042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020 Main concern on European level*

Main concern on national level*

Fig. 4.6 Proportion of respondents considering migration an important European or national issue, 2004–2020 (Source Author’s calculation, Eurobarometer [2021]. *When two surveys existed, the rounded arithmetic average is shown in the figure)

processes in Europe. It is still one of the most important issues in the EU according to public opinion, and this outcome also shows that by the time these surveys were conducted the issue of migration had definitely become intertwined within the EU in terms of public opinion. According to a Eurobarometer analysis published in July 2016, the most important problems for Europe were immigration and terrorism (no questions about emigration were typically employed, as this was not a problem for the West), and since 2015 these issues have overshadowed all other matters in the public eye (Eurobarometer, 2016). Interestingly, the top five countries whose publics are most concerned with migration (with over 60% saying the latter is one of the most important issues) were Denmark and four formerly relatively prosperous Eastern European countries (Estonia, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Latvia), while a smaller proportion of people in Germany, Italy, and Sweden considered migration to be a significant problem, indicating that these results are not directly positively correlated with actual immigration rates (Messing & Ságvári, 2017). In some European states, such as Romania, Croatia, and Greece,

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the level of concern about migration was much lower (although the rank order was more or less the same). Something similar was observed in connection with the issue of terrorism, although the latter was less in line with the development types identified for Eastern Europe. It seems that, to cite the regional perspective of the famous Hungarian political philosopher István Bibó, the small Eastern European states, from Tallinn to Sofia, were most worried about this issue, while the populations of states that have in fact been impacted by terrorism (France and Belgium, for example) have been much more “relaxed” about the European “terrorism and migration” crisis (Bibó, 2015). Of course, the latter countries also joined the growing European trend to an increase in concern about terrorism. Some cognitive dissonance was also at play. When asked about the main problems in their own country, respondents identified unemployment as the major issue, and immigration only came second. In Eastern Europe— apart from in Estonia— in line with the emerging neoliberal tensions, healthcare and social security, unemployment, and rising prices were the issues that people were most concerned about. Immigration was not seen as a local problem; only a European one. Eurobarometer data from spring 2018 show a somewhat different picture; some of the contradictions seem to have been resolved. What is clear is that respondents continued to “worry about” migration in Europe in general, while migration was considered only the third most important problem at the level of individual states. Migration-related concerns had become commonplace by 2018, and almost all the surveyed countries identified it as the main concern for “Europe” as a whole. The controversy over whether respondents in Eastern Europe see immigration as a problem in their own countries remains, and with the exception of Hungary, concerns about issues, such as health care remained much stronger. In summary, the polls show that with the penetration of the free market, the issue of migration became intertwined with ideas about Europe and the European Union. The overall level of hostility towards migrants did not increase, but attitudes varied according to regional and sub-regional historical divides and patterns of development. While Western Europe tended to maintain some openness for historical, sociomaterial, and demographic reasons, Eastern Europe was radicalized in terms of anti-migration sentiment. Eastern Europe has played and continues to play, a key role in fueling and polarizing the debate. The

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Eastern European countries—partly in the European Union and partly on its borders—that became economically integrated into a free-market regime while retaining memories of a non-capitalist order started questioning the “European” hegemony and increasingly distanced themselves from the more permissive public opinions and historical trends prevalent in Western and Southern Europe. However, this revolt was not present throughout the whole of Eastern Europe. It is very important to see that, in line with historical and socio-material processes, these exclusionist attitudes became particularly dominant in the East-Central European and Baltic states—countries seeking to defend their former welfare privileges. Here the combination of an ethnocentric demographic anxiety and the previously discussed competition played a pivotal role. This is very well illustrated by Tamás Kiss’s research findings that, compared to Hungary, Romanian public opinion is more receptive to migration, while the Hungarian minority in Transylvania went through real migration-related panic without even seeing any refugees. These groups worried about losing members due to massive emigration and assimilation and adopted the discourses of Hungary which, combined with local, ethnic fears of decline, made these communities more closed and exclusionist than any other group in the country. This can be seen as another type of triangulation. An ethnic minority, mother country, and host country came to represent a triadic nexus in opposition to migrants from outside Europe (Brubaker, 1995; Zakariás, 2018). Here the “brave” anti-migrant Hungarian discourses were echoed and amplified by a national minority positioning itself “above” Romanians, and most importantly, above migrants, who reminded them of their own demographic fragility and the threat of being “eaten up” (Fig. 4.7). Even more, this Hungarian discourse was also related to the former becoming extra-territorial citizens of “greater” Hungary, as this allowed them to participate directly in Hungarian politics (Melegh et al., 2021). This also means that only a complex historical analysis can provide effective insight into these developments. Migration-related “panic buttons” are effective, and the above general correlations appear only when several (socio-material, historical, discursive, and attitudinal) factors are combined (Lengyel & Szabó, 2019; Sík, 2016; Sík & Lázár, 2019). A multifaceted historical analysis is needed to complement the comparative studies of attitudes, and thus, one which sheds light on what underlies the phenomenological sense of insecurity and loss of control, and why certain

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90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Immigration Immigrants are Immigrants take Immigrants increases crime useful in the away jobs from destroy national economy the locals culture rates

Hungary

Hungarian minority in Transylvania

The country should be tougher at preventing illegal migration

Romania

Fig. 4.7 Attitudes towards migrants in Hungary, Romania, and in the Hungarian communities of Transylvania (Source Unpublished data provided by Tamás Kiss [2016])

Eastern European countries have been radicalized (Messing & Ságvári, 2017, 2019). Nationalist political elites have consciously used these complex developments in public attitudes and the inherent political capital to further radicalize public opinion and build an anti-migrant historical-political bloc. Important background to this, as discussed in Chapter 2, is the discursive patterns that interpreted and justified exclusion in the defense of “European” and “Western” privileges and constructed cultural identities that had to be “protected” from migrant groups. The elites played a prominent role in shaping these discursive processes and frameworks. Accordingly, I move on to an analysis of texts by the elite that demonstrate how important it was in the background to all these debates that migration became a market category.

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4.3 4.3.1

Marketization and the Discourses of Global and Professional Elites The Stagnating Importance of Migration as a Topic

As we have seen, the relative rise in migration levels during the neoliberal economic opening-up from the 1990s, but especially from the 2000s onwards, was striking, and migration became a demographic factor of utmost significance after the dramatic decline in global fertility. One would expect the weight and relative frequency of terms associated with migration to increase in the relevant literature, but the situation seems paradoxical, as in the case of public opinion. Reactions were not mechanical in the sense that as migration patterns changed and migration intensified the migration issue came into focus in academic texts. Rather, it seems that the problem was reformulated and polarization intensified between blocs of elite discourse. International migration was reformulated as an abstract market category, and this shift pushed the debate further towards tensions and antagonistic blocs in the given socio-material and historical context. After the upsurge in the 1970s and early 1980s, the frequency of the term “migration” stagnated, at least in the studied discourses of the academic and political elites. It is noteworthy that, after the boom of the 1990s, by the 2010s use of the terms “migration” and “immigration” had largely returned to the levels of the early 1990s. The issue of emigration attracted, by definition, only minimal interest in English-language books in the Google Books database, and this interest was further diminished while migration itself intensified worldwide. This indicates serious tension. The strong and, in many ways, even hegemonic linguistic nexus treats emigration as an issue of marginal importance compared to immigration, which means that the emigration-related problems of sending countries remain underrepresented. According to Czaika and Haas, more and more countries are required to cope with emigration (Czaika & de Haas, 2014), while the number of destination countries has not changed. As we have seen, Eastern Europe is one of these massive sending regions, along with Latin America, and their problems remain largely ignored. It should be noted that the Google database of French-language academic books testifies to an even more significant decrease in interest in migration after the 2008 economic crisis (Ngram Viewer, 2021). The

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Fig. 4.8 Mentions of the words “migration,” “emigration,” and “immigration” in Google Books between 1960 and 2019 (Source Ngram Viewer [2021])

term “emigration” is used more frequently than “migration” in Frenchlanguage books, and both these terms are much less frequently used than the term “immigration.”1 At the same time, emigration received more attention than in English-language books. This pattern is also confirmed by the frequency trends observed in German-language books. Thus, a strange tension is observed: pundits of the neoliberal era that published in Western languages generally started to dedicate more attention to migration, while emigration became a marginalized issue compared to the concepts of immigration and migration in general (Fig. 4.8). This disinterest is noteworthy, since globalization, privatization, and foreign direct investment (FDI), for example, were very much in focus until the 2008 economic crisis and interest in these issues only partially declined afterward. Although migration is a key problem, attitudinal studies reveal that Western elites felt no major tension about this issue during the era of globalization, while emigration, which was a major concern for Eastern European societies as well as for many other regions of the world, especially failed to attract interest. Similar stagnation is evident in the frequency of this topic in other sources after the increase in the 1970s and 1980s. As in the analysis of

1 It is worthwhile noting that Héran came to the same conclusion in his analysis of the term “immigration” in French-language texts (Héran, 2013).

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the origin of the situation in Subchapter II.3.2, it is worth looking at World Bank documents that show how the world’s leading development bank and a key player in the globalization process responded to globalization-related changes. There is a positive correlation between the absolute number of times the word “migration” is used in the related documents and the advancement of the globalization process. The frequency of the term “migration” in documents increased significantly and the rise was particularly sharp at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s (Fig. 4.9). This latter may be crucial, as migration intensified globally at that time and the issue also received considerable attention in World Bank texts. The increase in the frequency of the word in these documents slowed down in the 2010s, and the share of documents that mentioned migration remained around 3%. Accordingly, we cannot talk about an “explosion” of migration as a hot topic in this context even in the 2010s when the “refugee crisis” and the transformation of migration networks were already having an impact. Thus, although the migration issue attracted increasing interest in the age of globalization, this topic never dominated the analyses at this highly influential international organization, nor did the relative attention paid to this problem increase. This part of the global

Fig. 4.9 Number and proportion (%) of documents that used the term “migration” between 1991 and 2019 (Source World Bank [2019])

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elite did not focus on migration processes and showed even less interest in it than in the 1970s. The Population Index, a searchable online database of the world’s demographic literature (1986–1999), has almost 80,000 (exactly 76,969) papers (at least their titles and abstracts), about 14% (10,897 papers) of which feature migration as a subject (Population Index, 2000). There was a slight but basically downward trend in the share of articles about migration: even in the case of demographers and experts on population science, the topic lost some of its importance compared to the initial period of globalization. There was no “boom” in the number of academic papers on the topic until the 2000s (Fig. 4.10). The issue of migration declined in importance (at least until the 2000s, as far as the effects of globalization can be tracked in these types of sources), but the overall interest it generated remained stable. Following the globalization boom of the 1970s, a significant proportion of texts focused on migration, as evidenced by the Google database of Englishlanguage books, the World Bank documents, and the Population Index bibliography. Thus, changes in awareness are not reflected in the increase in relative frequency, but in the content of discussions. Before addressing Total 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

Fig. 4.10 Proportion of articles on the topic of migration in the Population Index bibliography, 1986–1999 (Source Author’s calculation based on Population Index [2000])

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this question in more detail, however, it is worth examining what we find at the level of population policies as reported by governmental elites. 4.3.2

Politics of Migration and Growing Polarization in Global Population Policies

The disparities in the attention of policymaking elites and the connections of these to the discursive contexts are clearly illustrated by the UN Population Policy Database. This reveals that, during the period of the globalization-induced migration surge, there was an increase in the awareness of the need to develop migration policies. Fewer and fewer countries reported to UN data collectors that they were not intervening and/or had no policies concerning immigration and emigration (Fig. 4.11). In terms of policies, globalization increased awareness and also boosted the need for selection among migrants (de Haas et al., 2018). Figures 4.11 and 4.12 illustrate the strong interest in immigration and the relative disinterest in emigration in policymaking circles. While in the mid-1990s and 2000s more than fifty countries had no policy on emigration, the number of those which had no immigration policies was 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1996 Raise

2005 Maintain

Lower

2015

No intervention/no official policy

Fig. 4.11 Direction of immigration policies (Source World Population Policies [2015, p. 110])

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60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1996 Raise

2005 Maintain

Lower

2015

No intervention/no official policy

Fig. 4.12 Nature of emigration policies (Source World Population Policies [2015, p. 122])

always low (see Figs. 4.11 and 4.12 for the share of countries that said that they had taken no action). Countries around the world were slow at responding to the changes happening at the socio-material level; that is, to the increase in the number of sending regions Two things about these policy changes are particularly noteworthy. According to this database, efforts devoted to curbing immigration did not increase during the period of globalization, but were actually reduced (Fig. 4.11), which is consistent with de Haas’s hypothesis that a general opening-up took place following 1945 (de Haas et al., 2018). Between 1996 and 2015, the proportion of countries seeking to restrict or reduce immigration fell from 40 to 13%. More and more countries adopted population policies that sought to increase immigration outright, even if only to a small extent, while maintaining the level of immigration became a dominant policy (adopted by an increasing number of countries, rising from 4 to 12%). More recently, however, not only has the issue of emigration come into focus, but the number of states seeking to reduce emigration has also increased, although in some countries efforts have been made to maintain or even increase emigration rates.

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In conclusion, migration has become more established as an academic topic and as a sphere of policy in its own right; in other words, awareness about it has improved. Meanwhile, the world seems to have become more polarized about this issue; both pro-immigration and anti-immigration policies have become stronger and division has emerged between countries that see immigration as normal and those that are worried about emigration: some countries are in fact looking for immigrants, while others are increasingly seeking to restrict the departure of their own citizens. Eastern Europe is also involved in this debate: a lot of policy makers in the related countries are concerned about excessive emigration, while it is also apparent that, despite demographic concerns, they are unable or unwilling to intervene in these processes because of the EU’s institutional regime. It seems that globalization and the demographic changes it brought about have led to an increase in polarization among policymaking elites and the emergence of a large bloc that aims to control emigration, while the number of those who look to immigrate has also grown.

4.4

4.4.1

International Migration as an Abstract Market Category and the Discursive Context of the Polarizing Debate From National Migration Markets to Global Markets: Establishing Migration as a General Market Category

As we have seen in the analysis of the discourses of the 1970s and 1980s, migration as a separate concept had its roots in urban migration prior to the period of globalization. International migration, despite the increased interest after World War II, failed to merit similar attention in academic discourse until the onset of globalization. In the globalization era, however, international migration took over or at least complemented the role of internal migration to urbanized areas, thus a general and abstract category of migration per se was constructed in the discourses of the professional elite. This development, as I will demonstrate later, essentially dissolved and reorganized the population discourses. This discursive shift is clearly illustrated by the Ngram diagram of Google books, where the frequency of the terms that were used shows that the issue of urban migration was increasingly replaced by that of international migration. Over time, these became complementary themes (Fig. 4.13).

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Fig. 4.13 Frequency of the terms “international migration” and “urban migration” in the Google Books database (Source Ngram Viewer [2021])

During the modernization period, until the 1980s, local migration from the peasant and agrarian world to urbanized areas was an important matter for the elites that managed local markets, while in the era of globalization global migration networks attracted attention as a tool of global market management. During the globalization period, the term “migration” as such started to designate international migration without any specific reference to its direction—i.e., immigration or emigration. This may have been an important factor in the construction of a general and abstract category, which, precisely because it is general and detached from social relations, can be abstracted and mythologized as part of the market calculus. Thus, attitudes and opinions associated with it also became contentious. Such abstraction, for example, paves the way to the concept of fictitious population exchange (immigrants replacing emigrants, or meeting labor market needs), by conflating emigration and immigration. This abstraction also contributes to the rejection of migration en bloc on the basis of the perceived or real behavior of certain groups and related concerns associated with cultural or population policy (Melegh, 2016, 2019). The recombination of the concepts of migrants and asylum seekers, which are clearly separated in the Geneva Convention of 1951 (Long, 2013), played an important role in the development of the abstract category of migration. Long argued that after the convention was ratified (1951), NGOs and UNHCR mostly followed the rule that “refugees were not migrants” in order to protect asylum as an institution, despite the fact

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that the criteria for differentiating “refugees” and “migrants” were often vague (Long, 2013, p. 5). The author emphasized that from the point of view of refugees, this distinction was problematic, as the economic and demographic contributions of refugees in the migration/development nexus were completely ignored. Long argued that an economic openingup to migrants (in the asylum-migration nexus) should mean that they were automatically admitted, while she acknowledged that the type of refugee system that operated between the two World Wars led to a great deal of tension. She argued that: Studying the complex migration–refugee relationships that emerged during this period certainly suggests that facilitating refugees’ freedom of movement and prioritizing the economic, developmental, and demographic impacts of displacement are important avenues to (re)explore in the contemporary search for durable solutions to displacement. (Long, 2013, p. 23)

Later, we will see that the anti-migrant bloc reversed this very approach, saying that no migrants should be admitted. The evolution of the category of migration is also illustrated by the World Bank documents analyzed earlier. As Table 4.2 shows, the term “migration” became dominant and was used in almost all documents from the 1990s onwards, as opposed to the earlier period discussed in Chapter 2, when immigration and emigration, both as themes and as terms, were treated separately, and were only rarely regarded as one phenomenon, if at all. The terminology of migration can designate domestic movements— although the share of these has constantly decreased throughout the period of globalization—or can refer to international relocation, the importance of which is constantly growing. The relevant World Bank papers frequently refer to the total mobile population when they refer to migration. Thus, a general category of migration was created, and all mobility started to be interpreted as part of the same phenomenon. This generalization and the emergence of migration as a category in its own right are also reflected in the diversification and increase in the number of social science journals dedicated to specific migration-related topics, which change was also linked to the marketization of academia (Fig. 4.14). Until the 1980s, four such journals were launched every

Source World Bank (2019)

32% 26% 22%

14% 38% 38%

55% 36% 40%

23% 26% 33%

36% 21% 29%

95% 90% 91%

55% 31% 24%

9% 24% 27%

36% 40% 40%

Immigration Emigration Migration Domestic International Both migration migration only only

Domestic International Both migration migration only only

1990–1999 2000–2009 2009–2019

Terminology used

Theme

Period

22 42 55

Total: one in ten documents

Themes and terminology in World Bank documents, 1990–2019. One in 10 of all documents mentioning

Table 4.2 migration

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decade, while from the 1990s onwards social science bibliographies indicate that within thirty years their number had reached 80. It should be noted, however, that the enthusiasm for launching journals declined in the 2010s. By then, the earlier “migration momentum” seems to have faded. What is interesting in this process is not only the enthusiasm for launching such journals, but the appearance of a new, specialized “migration discipline,” with the creation of separate periodicals on the subject, often under the auspices of new organizations of migration policy, academic institutions, or NGOs. This was another step in the process of establishing migration as a general abstract category. In effect, the scholarship on migration was born in the context of the opening-up to globalization and marketization. Appendix 25 shows that a large number of journals have been published that deal with migration as a general category (e.g., Migration Information Source, Migration und Bevölkerung, Migration Trends, International Dialogue on Migration). Earlier migration processes are often revisited and analyzed (e.g., Asian and Pacific Migration Journal: APMJ, Central and Eastern European Migration Review, Nordic Journal of Migration Research, Comparative Migration Studies ). The topic of 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1991-2000

2001-2010

2011-2019

Fig. 4.14 Launch dates of migration-themed periodicals, 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation based on the Electronic Journals Library at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Accessed June 5, 2019)

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migration has also become increasingly interconnected with specific policy issues, such as integration, education, and employment, irrespective of the migrant group (asylum seekers or other migrants). This suggests, beside the emergence of an academic category, the need for some kind of global or regional governance for migration matters, as already indicated by the growing awareness of policymakers.. This development of the overall issue of migration can also be illustrated by additional events. The UN introduced International Migrants Day in 2000 (December 18) and World Refugee Day in 2001 (June 20). The UN and its related international organizations (ILO, IOM, etc.) are also using these awareness-raising events to take steps to protect these groups, to promote “safe, orderly and regular migration” by drawing up various conventions, and are organizing intergovernmental summits to promote international development and stimulate both sending and receiving economies. It should be noted that, to some extent, this move towards universalism backfired and facilitated national particularism and harsher selection. In other words, the legal convergence of migration, based on universal human rights and humanitarian law, was counterbalanced by specific and increasingly detailed rules of control over migrant groups and the reinforcement of national sovereignty (de Haas et al., 2018; Tóth, 2018). This means that an internal dialectical logic also strengthened polarization. Judit Tóth formulates this as follows: Interdependence and the universalism of human rights, as well as state sovereignty and national law that strives to insulate itself from adverse international processes, have now become the main paradox of the legal situation of foreigners. (Tóth, 2018, translated from Hungarian)

This paradox of universalism versus particularism and/or selection has been a major driving force behind the polarization of the migration debate and the changes in discursive frameworks. What emerged was not only a general and abstract academic and political category of migration, but also its restriction and negation on a nationalist basis. 4.4.2

The Theoretical Background of Migration as an Abstract Market Category: Reification, Fictitious Commodities, Fictitious Exchanges, and Neoliberal Rationality

Behind these trends we find the expansion of the global market and the associated changes and demands associated with mobility. Migration

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became a general and abstract element in a rational calculation. How migration became part of a market calculus, its marketization, and the concept of population replacement through migration are, according to Georg Lukács’ approach, consequences of intensifying reification under the dominance of capitalist markets. On this basis, the emergence of migration as a general and abstract market category can be seen as a new form of the marketization of previously non-market spheres of consciousness. It is worth using Lukács’s formulations to better understand the problem. Lukács begins his discussion of the phenomenon of reification with the following sentence: The essence of commodity-structure has often been pointed out. Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people. (Lukács, 1971, p. 83)

It is crucial that the different forms of migration can be understood as part of an incredibly rich phenomenon. Geographic mobility involves a large number of and complex relations between and among wanderers and sending groups, families, hosts, agents, authorities, and social organizations. In other words, migrant people are firmly embedded into a transnational social environment, and they can be reified and turned into part of the market calculus only by stripping them of these relations as part of the total marketization of society. In this process, the international division of labor, the transformation of labor into a global market commodity, the factors that spur the movement, uprooting and disembedding of populations through global inequalities (the free movement of capital and its penetration into non-capitalist systems, the collapse of the peasant world, wage labor, wage inequalities, the loss of jobs with the collapse of socialism, etc.) appear as externalities. At the same time, these changes in consciousness are seen as a necessary step towards an overall market rationality proclaimed by both local and global elites, and thus the manifold, complex situations that underlie migration essentially turn into a series of rational decisions on the part of both governments and individuals. This, as I have already indicated, was only possible through the construction of abstractions, and my main argument is that the current migration debate started to simmer in the context of this abstraction and

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rationalization, embodying both a desire for universalization and, with a dialectical relation to the latter, a desire for selective exclusion and a fear of population replacement through migration. The debate also draws on the desire for and the economic necessity of the free market and opening-up, as well as the need to restrict and regulate these. In this process, the added value and contributions produced by the labor of different migrant and non-migrant groups (e.g., immigrants replacing emigrants or compensating for population loss) are seen as comparable from a biopolitical point of view, thus establishing their formal equality. It is thus a process that can trigger counter-movements at both socio-material and conceptual levels. It is worth citing here how Lukács formulated the situation in relation to human labor, and we can translate this into the concepts of migrant labor and migrants’ contributions to society: Thus the universality of the commodity form is responsible both objectively and subjectively for the abstraction of the human labour incorporated in commodities. (On the other hand, this universality becomes historically possible because this process of abstraction has been completed.) Objectively, in so far as the commodity form facilitates the equal exchange of qualitatively different objects, it can only exist if that formal equality is in fact recognized—at any rate in this relation, which indeed confers upon them their commodity nature. Subjectively, this formal equality of human labour in the abstract is not only the common factor to which the various commodities are reduced; it also becomes the real principle governing the actual production of commodities. … We are concerned above all with the principle at work here: the principle of rationalisation based on what is and can be calculated. (Lukács, 1971, pp. 87–88)

Lukács raises very important points here about reification that are also relevant in the construction of migration as a general and abstract category. As we have seen in the section on historical and socio-material background—and as we will see in the rest of the discursive analysis— this process of reification and, more generally, marketization, polarizes discourses and public views about migration. Through its “phantom objectivity,” it creates the mental frameworks for fictitious population replacement through migration, or even the very opposite—the idea of a full market opening-up. Here the word “fictitious” is important, and a few additions should be made to Lukács’s reasoning. The basis of comparability is the abstraction of migrant labor, and of the social and cultural contributions of migrants, along the lines of what is

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considered necessary by society, which, as he writes, must also be realized in the process of production. And Lukács is right in this, since any calculation related to migrants and migration (remittances, increase in GDP, etc.) must be based on statistics and commodity production. However, it is also worth revisiting Karl Polányi’s notion of fictitious commodities, since, according to him, labor, money, and land are not commodities made for the market but become commodities and should, therefore, be considered fictitious. The “production” of population or even of migrants, the exchange of migrants to keep the labor market functioning, and raising these factors to the level of state policy are ultimately fictitious in a social sense (Hann, 2016; Polanyi, 2001, pp. 71– 80). However, the market constantly interprets processes and movements within this framework. This is why, during the wave of the opening-up to globalization and marketization, migration as a market category was reinforced, and migration itself increased as a result of socio-material and structural processes, which all contributed to further polarization. Joppke also draws attention to these developments in a recent book, where he identifies the essence of neoliberalism as market fundamentalism and the over-expansion of the market on both psychological and cultural levels, which is at the heart of the migration debate. This means, in a nutshell, that spheres of life that had previously been non-market based, including migration, are incorporated into a neoliberal market rationality (Joppke, 2021, pp. 13–17). Thus, migration is conceived as an investment and a benefit for companies, governments, and migrants. Joppke refers to Foucault’s analysis and argues as follows: In Foucault’s reading, this changes the focus of liberal economic theory from market-limited ‘exchange’ to universalized ‘competition’ in all spheres of human life. The result is Homo oeconomicus, who is not only an entrepreneur but ‘an entrepreneur of himself’, leaving out no sphere of his life. … But there are other examples, including migration: ‘Migration is an investment; the migrant is an investor.’ (Joppke, 2021, p. 15)

This process of marketization, he argues, causes a shift even in methods of governance, leading to the “quantification of the social”; to the domination of a market rationality (Joppke, 2021, p. 16). To this we can add that demography as a science was also important due to its creation of the idea of the related abstract biopolitical value of human beings and migrants from the point of view of perceived demographic and social imbalances,

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which work is done through population discourses. Thus, it is pivotal not only to explore the intensity and social–historical causes of migration, but also to consider them within the conceptual framework of reification, fictitious goods, and neoliberal rationality and the forms these take in relevant population discourses. 4.4.3

The Bloc in Support of Marketization, and Its Actors: Market Rationality and the Idea of Exploiting Migration as Supported by World Bank Documents

A general and global category of migration and mobility emerged in the era of globalization, when a more general idea of a “market for people”— a “migrant labor market”—was also created. According to the pro-market elites who advocated for opening-up and global migration, this was an important and above all useful step forward, since they believed that the marketization of this sphere would help to make better use of labor, boost economic growth, and also balance social and demographic processes. These elites include the forces that organize the global market and the flow of investments: experts and politicians at major international organizations, such as the UN, the IOM, the OECD, the World Bank, development investment banks (EBRD, etc.), the lion’s share of the policymakers in the European Union and other free-market blocs, as well as governments that have adopted policies along these lines, particularly during the first decades of the globalization cycle. They are opposed to and also complemented by groups that emphasize national sovereignty and call for isolation, or at least promote strong cultural and legal separation. It is important to note that advocates of isolation also tend to accept certain forms of opening-up to migration, and one can certainly speak of neoliberal nationalism, as Joppke formulated it (Joppke, 2021). In texts associated with the elites promoting marketization, migrants and their labor are no longer in Polányi’s terms a fictitious commodity, but in their eyes real commodities. This market turn is now global, and for the elites people become “migrants” and “migrant workers” without direction of movement or any social context. Thus, a heterogeneous crowd of migrant groups, with different motivations and levels of embeddedness, appears as a mass that can easily provoke both positive and negative emotions and raise both the idea of a universal market and law and the need for control. This is the result of a system of capitalism organized within the framework of nation-states or blocs. Factors, such as the increasing movement of capital, the rise in income levels, and the growing disembeddedness

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of the respective societies, have played a major role in triggering migration. In this respect, the increase in global capital movement is not just one of the overall processes that spark migration, as we have seen in previous chapters. However, some capitalist actors openly claim that this increased mobility is necessary and vital. Let me quote a study from 2016 by McKinsey & Company’s Business and Economics Research Institute, which illustrates how strongly business consultants argue for the benefits of global migration, particularly on the basis of the perceived interests of wealthier countries: About half of all migrants globally have moved from developing to developed countries—indeed, this is the fastest-growing type of movement. Almost two-thirds of the world’s migrants reside in developed countries, where they often fill key occupational shortages. From 2000 to 2014, immigrants contributed 40 to 80 percent of labor-force growth in major destination countries. Moving more labor to higher-productivity settings boosts global GDP. Migrants of all skill levels contribute to this effect, whether through innovation and entrepreneurship or through freeing up natives for higher-value work. In fact, migrants make up just 3.4 percent of the world’s population, but MGI’s research finds that they contribute nearly 10 percent of global GDP. They contributed roughly $6.7 trillion to global GDP in 2015—some $3 trillion more than they would have produced in their origin countries. Developed nations realize more than 90 percent of this effect. … Realizing the benefits of immigration hinges on how well new arrivals are integrated into their destination country’s labor market and into society. Today immigrants tend to earn 20 to 30 percent less than native-born workers. But if countries narrow that wage gap to just 5 to 10 percent by integrating immigrants more effectively across various aspects of education, housing, health, and community engagement, they could generate an additional boost of $800 billion to $1 trillion to worldwide economic output annually. This is a relatively conservative goal, but it can nevertheless produce broader positive effects, including lower poverty rates and higher overall productivity in destination economies. (Woetzel et al., 2016)

In this framework, migration is an all-encompassing category regardless of whether the affected individuals are refugees or non-refugees, or their direction and social context—and as discussed in the introduction to this book and in the video of The Economist that I have cited, global companies, such as McKinsey, have highlighted the potential for huge gains from the 2016 refugee crisis as a result of the general increase in

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mobility. The increasing mobility of capital contributes to rising levels of migration; moreover, the big global firms and their consultants promote the idea of a global migration market in order to reify and organize migration to increase global profit, which should be the trump card against nationalists, according to them. The extent to which migration as an abstract market category becomes part of the idea of market-based development and benefits beyond national borders is also illustrated by the World Bank documents that were analyzed. I focus on the World Bank, but other development banks can also be mentioned here, such as the EBRD. As one analyst prophetically put it, the question of how population is distributed spatially would become the most important demographic issues by the end of the twentieth century. He wrote this in 1984, at the beginning of the process, when reflecting on the period that came before: Population mobility has become one of the most pressing and confusing demographic and social issues of the latter part of the twentieth century, both a symptom of profound changes in productive structures, and in national and international divisions of labour, and a contributing factor to such changes. Governments of all political hues in most parts of the world have long come to regard population distribution as a greater cause of long-term concern than population growth per se, as revealed in the muchcited United Nations’ surveys of government perceptions. This is illustrated by the 1980 survey, which showed that in every part of the world more governments regarded the spatial distribution of their population as a cause of concern than their fertility levels. … Social scientists who have attempted to assess the phenomenon have been split. Some have regarded migration as growing at a rapid rate in recent years, contributing to ‘excessive urbanisation’ and the growth of huge ‘mega-cities’, to chronic urban-open unemployment, worsening income inequality, ecological stress, population maldistribution and a growing threat to the social fabric. Others have been far less alarmed, depicting mobility as a necessary part of economic growth, evidence of equilibrating tendencies, a factor facilitating industrialisation, improving income distribution, inducing technical change in agriculture, reducing population growth and easing social tensions, mainly but not only in those areas from which the migrants move. Overlaying those two admittedly extreme views are two ‘policy’ perspectives. There are those who readily admit that the evidence is far from conclusive that migration causes various adverse trends but that governments would be advised to check migration for some social, economic or political benefit. Conversely,

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there are those who admit there may be (short-term) adverse effects but that freedom of movement is a basic human right…. (Standing, 1984)

As early as in 1987, another study tabled a cost–benefit analysis of the information system associated with global labor allocation and proposed the creation of an indicator system that provides information about the “true skill level of international migrants…. and the pattern and quantity of international migration and [the] total output” (Stark & Katz, 1987). The language of neoclassical market economics and the idea of a single and unconstrained global labor market are also illustrated by the following quotation from the same paper by two Harvard experts, Oder Stark and Eliakim Katz: Our basic model is as follows: Consider a world consisting of a poor country P and a rich country R. Workers in P receive a wage Wp(A) where A is their skill level which is assumed to be perfectly identified by P country employers. If their true skill level is perfectly known to employers in R the P workers when in R receive their true marginal product WR(A) where WR(A) > Wp(A) for all A. (Stark & Katz, 1987)

In 1995, a comprehensive publication of the World Bank that assessed global development discussed global market processes and international migration according to a single framework (World Bank, 1995). The title of this volume, Workers in an Integrating World, is also revealing. The volume promoted market-based management of the situation of workers; the following section in the table of contents shows that international migration was seen in this discursive context as part of the “emerging global labor market.” Part Two: Is International Integration an Opportunity or a Threat to Workers? … 7 The Emerging Global Labor Market 8 A Changing International Division of Labor 9 Capital Mobility: Blessing or Curse? 10 International Migration (World Bank, 1995)

It is clear that the major concept here is of a single market-based political economy, with international migration being an integral part. This emerging conceptual framework is also illustrated, for example, by the

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book and series of analyses by ILO expert Peter Stalker, who examined how international migration had been linked to other global processes (Stalker, 2000). In his policy analysis, he raised questions such as the relationship between trade liberalization and international migration, the movement of capital, labor markets, and migration; whether migration evens out global inequalities; and what demand mechanisms exist in relation to international migrants. In a volume published by the World Bank Group, Özden and Schiff (Özden & Schiff, 2007) report on the creation of a single UN and World Bank global migration database (including refugees and non-refugees)— which in itself is a good indication of the strengthening of the abstract category—and list the major development-related questions. Do remittances sent home by migrants reduce poverty and improve human capital? Do migration and diasporas promote foreign capital investment in the sending countries? What are the demographic benefits of international migration? When combined, these questions illustrate the existence of a powerful interpretative framework that sees an increasingly open market and the growing migration associated with it as a single, consistent, and beneficial system. It is also normative in the way it describes change. This normative element of the texts by World Bank experts interprets migration as a positive process, and the increase in mobility is not only to be welcomed but also to be supported at the level of policies. This of course can have a potentially polarizing effect on the abstract category of migration as it disregards contexts and the potential hardships of various migrant groups, and thus may even promote further inequalities. As mentioned in the introduction, The Economist at one point referred to the potential of migration as a cheque for a billion dollars. Consultants and World Bank experts like to use cheques as a metaphor (a beautiful symbol of the profit of global capitalism), and they also like to quantify the benefits. As Ian Goldin put it in the following way in a publication entitled “Global Affairs for Global Citizens”: If international migration has the potential to provide economic gains for everyone involved, how large might those gains be? It is obviously difficult to estimate the impact of migration on a global scale, but one such estimate finds that even a modest increase in migration flows could boost global output by $150 billion a year. That may not seem an enormous payoff in a world economy that produces some $30 trillion a year, but

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even small improvements would yield gains equivalent to those predicted from liberalization of worldwide trade in goods. (Goldin, 2006, p. 106)

In this abstract framework of market and economic growth, migration and migrants can also become “desired goods” on the market, for whom states will have to compete with each other, or even with groups of countries. In a background analysis, Rainer Münz warns EU Member States that they could easily be left behind in this competition if they do not “Americanize” themselves: In the medium- and long-term the EU and its member states will have to compete with other OECD countries for attractive potential migrants. In this context Europe has a genuine incentive to compare its efforts and experiences with those of traditional countries of immigration—in particular with the US, Canada and Australia. And Europe should develop a genuine interest in becoming both more attractive for highly skilled migrants as well as more inclusive towards all employable migrants. (Münz, 2008, p. 2)

Inherent in these market-based considerations is the idea of an abstract market demand linked to aging and demographic differences, reflecting real socio-material conditions and, in particular, demographic change. As Özden and Parsons put it in terms of exploiting abstract demographic differences in relation to South Asia and the OECD countries: These divergent labour market and demographic trends in the two regions actually present the answers to each other’s challenges. The solution is one of the oldest and simplest ideas in economics; in the presence of supply and demand imbalances, free mobility of products and/or inputs will lead to a more efficient outcome. In this context, excess labour that is unabsorbed by the labour markets needs to move from South Asia to the OECD countries which are experiencing rapidly growing shortages and imbalances. In other words, large cohorts of working-age people in South Asia who are not being efficiently employed at home can fill the vacancies created in the labour markets of the West. Unfortunately, the window of opportunity is quite narrow. If the experiences of other developing regions (such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North Africa) are anything to go by, it will not be too long before the remaining South Asian countries complete their demographic transitions. Their fertility and population growths will start declining and the excess labour force will soon disappear. (Özden & Parsons, 2011, p. 138)

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In this short excerpt, the idea of labor market interaction and free migration is not only generally formulated, but also in terms of care for the elderly and the sick. The author’s viewpoint is that these problems can be solved by employing South Asian immigrants, and in a rather onesided and unilateral format. Asian migrants should deal with the families and the elderly of the West: It is mainly through migration that Asian labour can support ageing populations in the developed countries. Some policymakers and economists suggest that outsourcing and international trade can help move a large portion of the economic activity from the North to South Asia as the labour force shrinks in the former. However, there is a large range of non-tradable services that cannot be outsourced or traded and need to be locally supplied. Among these are healthcare and household services that will especially be in high demand as the populations in the North age. (Özden & Parsons, 2011, p. 124)

The increase in migration in Eastern Europe was also seen as a positive scenario and a policy objective to be supported, without taking into account various social contexts. For example, it was argued that stagnation in external and internal mobility in Eastern Europe would be disadvantageous; in a 1994 World Bank analysis, Jackmann and Rutkowski identified too little mobility as a flaw of the old socialist system: The final weakness of the old system was that international migration was very limited. Strong arguments suggest that surplus labor in one country can be productively employed in jobs which the population in another country is reluctant to undertake. Emigration and immigration in Central and Eastern Europe were formerly prohibited and then severely restrained. Since liberalization, restrictions on migration have been replaced by restrictions imposed by potential host countries. (Jackmann & Rutkowski, 1994, p. 136)

This abstract liberalization-based optimism about migration persisted in the second half of the 2000s, even when experts of the World Bank looked at demographic transformation in Eastern Europe (the aging and fertility decline analyzed in detail in previous chapters). It seems that these processes were seen as a reason for even more intense opening-up, even in the face of “political resistance,” as they put it. Chawla and his colleagues in a paper from 2007 entitled “From Red to Grey. The Third Transition

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of Populations in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” advocated for migration from countries with a younger population: “if political resistance is overcome, intraregional migration from younger countries can augment the labor forces of the aging countries” (Chawla et al., 2007, p. 14). A bit later, they add: “managing the situation will require labor market, pension, and education and training reforms, as well as better management of migration” (Chawla et al., 2007, p. 15). A few pages later, this pro-market study addresses the question where these immigrants might come from. In the case of countries that lag behind on the path to reform this is a politically sensitive issue, as whole regions may age and lose population while they serve other, older European countries2 : Attracting immigrants to fill the jobs needed for growth as the country’s labor force shifts is a deeply political issue. For the aging, early reformers, legal immigration is going to be difficult, partly because their neighboring countries in Southeastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are also aging—and partly because, at least in the next few years, they will lose migrants to the older EU states. But for the aging, late reformers, if economic growth accelerates and political barriers to immigration decrease, managed immigration is possible from the younger countries of Central Asia. (Chawla et al., 2007, p. 41)

In summary, the above-described documents of the World Bank illustrate the major themes in an openly pro-market bloc that advocates the usefulness of managed migration and perceives the management and market-oriented use of migration on national and global levels. Between the 1940s and 1980s, when migration and market-led development were more loosely linked, and after the disintegration of the colonial world, modernization was envisioned in national settings along the following lines: – land colonization from within and from outside, – facilitating migration between rural regions,

2 Countries that are early reformers, according to this study, are Albania and the new EU member states. The countries that started reforms later are all the other former socialist states, except for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (these are the young countries that started on reforms only later).

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– rural-urban migration, population pressure, climate, and rural poverty, – more optimal internal allocation of resources, managing the internal spatial distribution of populations, and tackling the consequences of migration, – connections between population development and migration. Later, during the period of globalization, the vision of a relatively open global labor market and the free movement of capital emerged. The World Bank made it a priority to integrate social factors—including population and migration issues—into the abstract category of migration, stripped of its external and internal social context. Thus, the following questions became the main policy concerns for this type of global elite: – How can migration be managed while the emerging global labor market is being built; what is the cost-benefit analysis (cultural, economic, welfare systems, etc.)? – What are the developmental benefits of migration in the sending countries, and in terms of improving competitiveness and poverty at national and regional levels? – How can migration be linked to economic, technological, and financial development in relation to other global processes (FDI, free trade)? – How can the knowledge and capital of the diaspora be better utilized, and how can the use of remittances in sending countries be optimized? How can investment be promoted in sending countries by facilitating immigration in destination countries? – How can migration be beneficial to both sending and destination countries in a context of inequality? – How can emigration turn into an important “escape valve” from unemployment and economic hardship? – How does free migration help people to use their skills optimally? – How does migration promote global convergence? – How can human rights be promoted in order to protect and effectively integrate refugees and legal migrants while maintaining the sovereignty of states? – How can female migration be harnessed and facilitated globally?

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This idea of reification and this whole discursive bloc were obviously not limited to World Bank experts, but it permeated all historical-political blocs which, in accordance with the ever-freer movement (and will) of capital and the dominance of market relations, tried to create new spaces in which these global market relations could prevail. Part of this attempt was the creation of an abstract category of migration which, removed from its social context, appeared to be a globally manageable phenomenon. The European Union served as a main experimental site for this historical-political bloc; this region was unique in that it attempted to integrate the former socialist states into the global order. As I have indicated in the Introduction, this market fundamentalism went hand in hand with the spread of a conservative approach to demographic issues. It was inevitable that a historical-political bloc would emerge in which various elite groups, without fundamentally questioning the market regime, would launch counter-discourses in the name of cultural traditions, or, more precisely, would take on a historical role through these counter-discourses. In retrospect, the timing of the 2008 crisis could not have been better in this regard, by making it clear on a global level that the opening-up to globalization and the liberal management of global markets was hampered and in crisis. This was also reflected in financial indicators, as the share of FDI, according to World Bank net inflows data, declined in the 2010s compared to during the crisis-free years of the 2000s (in 2018, FDI was 1.2% of the world GDP, the same proportion as in the early 1990s) (World Bank, 2020). This marked the end of the cycle of market opening and is the reason why the above historical-political bloc stalled. The period of globalization was always characterized by a paradoxical tension between universalism and particularism, but it was only in the 2010s that the radical right-wing historical-political bloc, which openly formulated anti-migration views and promoted the reorganization of global market relations to some extent, emerged as a successful counter-hegemony. With this political change, World Bank experts and local government actors were confronted with anti-migration sentiments to which they had limited answers—repeating the arguments that migration was beneficial on a macro-level, and that those who argued about the harm of the latter were simply using fake information.

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The Utilitarian Management of Migration and the Evolution of Population Discourses and Policies

The population discourses that were already present in the 1980s and their influence on population policy played a pivotal role in the development of the pro-market bloc. Both this bloc, and the one that sought to build a counter-hegemony against it, in a way reorganized and reassembled discursive elements and extracted those points and frames that were useful to them. In fact, the earlier discourses were divided in line with their internal tensions and contradictions by the emerging polarization. 4.4.4.1

The Pro-market Bloc and Elements Linked to the Malthusian Discourse: Migration as a Means of Tackling Poverty and Inequality In the analysis of the 1980s and the period before this, I demonstrated that the Malthusian discourse supports emigration as a national population policy instrument that can reduce population pressure and the poverty it causes. This arose mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries and their previous colonies (Appendix 2). In the 1960s and 1970s, experts mainly considered it a means of facilitating internal migration and thus alleviating agrarian poverty. It was easy to connect this theme to international migration, too; for example, a series of analyses was conducted along these lines during the first great emigration wave from Mexico and Latin America in the 1980s. This approach was reinforced through drawing on themes from other discourses and in terms of the reification of migration—such as migration as a form of capital accumulation, as development, and as market expansion. Before looking at the discursive changes, I will address the transformation that took place at the level of population policy guidelines (Table 4.3). Elements supporting migration were clearly present after the 1980s according to the population policy database. For the majority of countries classified as “Malthusian” in 1986, maintaining or even increasing emigration remained desirable in 2015 (World Population Policies, 2015). Compared to the other types of discourses, it was in this area that government policymakers were most likely (in 48 out of 62 countries) to say that emigration should be increased or maintained, or that they did not wish to intervene in emigration processes. This, therefore, represents a key population policy framework (a widespread policy practice) that basically supports an increase in emigration. It is also important to note that

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Table 4.3 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following Malthusian discourses Population policies, 2015

62 countries in 1986

Reduce emigration Maintain or increase emigration Reduce immigration Maintain or increase immigration Reduce fertility and maintain/increase immigration Reduce fertility and limit migration in at least one direction Maintain/increase fertility/no intervention and maintain/increase immigration Maintain/increase fertility and limit migration in at least one direction

14 48 10 52 29 12 16 5

Source World Population Policies (2015) (Yugoslavia is omitted as it ceased to exist as a country)

most countries of this type aimed to promote emigration as well as fertility reduction as parallel objectives in their population policies. This illustrates that, in this approach, the opportunities offered by migration are considered in a relatively open-minded way, despite or in addition to fertility reduction goals. It should be noted, however, that the general decline in fertility and the slowdown in population growth caused several countries to reverse these policies by the mid-2010s. This involved a partial or total abandonment of the previous policies of fertility limitation (Mauritius, Korea, South Africa, Turkey, Botswana, etc.) and a desire to reduce immigration or emigration, particularly in Latin American and African countries that were already experiencing significant emigration (Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, etc.). For these countries, the relatively better living standards in their region and their privileged position in their immediate geographical environment may have been important factors. Botswana and South Africa are excellent examples in this respect that highlight the role of competition for welfare and social security in the relationship between migration processes and population policy practices. It is also important to note that, in many countries, abandoning the goal of fertility reduction and maintaining an open attitude towards migration did not result in serious contradictions. This mainly involved formerly colonized countries, where colonialism had perpetuated the processes of forced migration well before globalization.

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The population policy framework associated with the Malthusian discourse could have led to restrictions on immigration (since, according to this argument, mass immigration takes resources from the local population). However, this was not the case; a general openness prevailed, and the level and composition of immigration did not cause policy problems for governments of this type. There were only ten states that considered introducing direct restrictions on immigration. It is clear that Malthusian population policy made a major contribution to the idea of the global labor market and the perception of migration on the grounds of cost–benefit analyses in general. This discursive framework compromised development-based approaches, shifting from the propagation of direct and, in many ways, authoritarian birth control (India’s sterilization program, China’s drastic birth control measures, etc.) to an emphasis on women’s reproductive rights and reproductive choices, which should be protected as individual rights. This turn was already taking place in the early 1990s and was made clear at the Cairo World Population Conference, while the restrictive powers of national governments were largely retained (Cliquet & Thienpont, 1995, pp. 78–79). The turn towards protecting women’s rights was also remarkable from a Malthusian, family planning perspective, as it later triggered fierce debate and conflict about migration, especially concerning the rights, reproductive and sexual health, and life chances of migrant women (see on this, e.g., Migrant Forum in Asia, 2019). This was certainly an important step, at least at the level of discourse: within this framework, international organizations created the image of individualized women freed from reproductive burdens who were now freer to take up jobs and move around the world, which pointed towards the more optimal allocation of labor according to the given market logic (M. Frey, 2011). In the globalization period, this discourse was crucial for making migration, emigration, and marketization inescapable instruments. According to this interpretive framework, the market is the only instrument that can sufficiently solve labor needs and tensions (e.g., the tragedy of the commons) on a global scale in the midst of ecological and demographic crises. The approach was a combination of Malthusian and neoclassical economic reasoning; a coupling of market institutions and market distribution (as a manifestation of collective human genius) that could resolve the tension created by scarcity such as Malthusian-style population pressure (Homer-Dixon, 1995).

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These Malthusian schools of thought go as far as to argue that the ultimate cause of any relative under- or overpopulation is government intervention into migration, thus they call for some kind of free migration market. This train of thought was elaborated in the 2010s, for example by Barrows, who quotes early market fundamentalists like Mises and his disciple Rothbard, who belonged to the Austrian school of economics and admired Malthus: …Rothbard discusses the concepts of over- and underpopulation in the context of human migration. In Power and Market, Rothbard emphasizes that overpopulation and underpopulation can only occur if there are ‘artificial government barriers to migration.’ If, for example, there existed a substantial disparity in the standard of living across two geographical areas, individuals would migrate until that disparity was substantially reduced. (Barrows, 2010, p. 1196)

This free-market dogmatism ignores the varying social contexts and social embeddedness of migration. From this perspective, all that matters is the distribution of income inequalities and the subjective sense of wellbeing, which can only be moderated by government intervention. This idea, echoed in World Bank documents, illustrates the internal inconsistency of Malthusian thinking in the 1980s and shows how the same conceptual framework can be used to arrive at the idea of free markets and completely free migration—or isolationism, if the idea of cultural and social supremacy and a more mechanical concept of resources versus population is taken as the basis by sending regions that are struggling with so-called overpopulation. This we look at when analyzing the nationalist bloc. 4.4.4.2

The Pro-market Bloc and Elements of Demographic Transition and Modernization Discourses: The Principle of Hierarchical Progress and the Migration Transition The discourse of demographic transition was also fraught with internal tension as early as in the 1980s. On the one hand, this embodied the idea of an uninterrupted increase in mobility as a form of progress, and on the other, it also included the idea of a second demographic transition, which called for a strong conservative turn in regions where fertility was low and immigration was high. This would later give rise, as we will see, to the idea of a third demographic transition, which turned

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into a radical discourse of revitalization. Accordingly, the interpretative framework of demographic transition, similarly to the Malthusian framework, fell apart with the advance of marketization. Before investigating the role of the discourse of demographic transition in the construction of migration as an abstract market category, let us look at the migration policies in countries that conceptualized their population processes within this discursive framework and adopted corresponding policies in the 1980s, mainly among developed and modernizing so-called Third World countries (Appendix 3). This can also generate important analytical perspectives in relation to the specific historical changes. As seen in Table 4.4, these countries were the least against immigration in 2015, with almost all of them (39 out of 42) favoring policies that aimed to maintain or increase it. They also remained open to emigration, so this group followed the open attitude to migration at the level of policies, especially in terms of immigration, in line with the global intensification of migration and the discursive changes discussed earlier. This is surprising only in the sense that the immigration-related concerns of the second demographic transition remain invisible in the policies. The first transition, an idea of modernization, presupposed both an increase in mobility and the institutionalization of migration, as well as a rise in the demand for immigrants as a result of the decline in fertility. This latter element was present such that several countries in this group indicated to the UN database managers that, in addition to labor market considerations, there was a demographic reason for their immigration policy, whereas this factor was almost absent in relation to the other groups of investigated countries, with the exception of the former socialist states. This was the case in Sweden, Brazil, Finland, and Australia. The demographic aspect of migration that there was a demand for immigrants due to workforce loss was an important argument behind all the pro-market and pro-mobility considerations reflected time and time again in the analyses by the World Bank, the OECD, and the European Commission (OECD, 2014, p. 39). From this perspective, immigration would only disrupt the natural order of processes if it changed the fertility regime. In terms of fertility, however, there was a shift in this group of countries: some of them no longer advocated non-intervention policies, but their population policy objective was to maintain or increase fertility. This was the case in eight out of twenty countries, including Spain, New Zealand, Japan, Italy, Austria, and Australia. A growing number of countries were concerned about fertility trends; i.e., they seemed to be moving away from the positions adopted in relation to the first demographic transition and non-intervention. It seems there was a slow shift towards the

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more pessimistic second demographic transition, and even towards the radically interventionist third one. The framework of demographic transition was also shaken in another respect. In 2015, some of the non-European countries in this group sought to reduce fertility; i.e., they found fertility levels to be too high. These countries included Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Mali, and Syria. This illustrates that the North–South divide had increased, and that the modernization framework had completely broken up in the face of demographic restructuring and its geopolitical-social interpretation. The image of the North fearing for its fertility would, as we shall see, be the starting point for the emergence of a discursive bloc that sought counter-hegemony as globalization progressed. To this extent, the historical change in this group of countries is clearly visible, and the related interpretative framework disintegrated due to the social–historical restructuring, internal ambivalences, and, above all, fixed Eurocentric hierarchies. This will be one of the historical outcomes of globalization and of the increase in migration. The failure of this discourse in the eyes of the professional elite is also supported by the fact that in a 2011 special issue of Population and Development Review, the demographic transition was no longer presented as a consequence of economic and social processes, but as their trigger, indicating a reversal of the original explanation (see also Reher, 2007). Within Table 4.4 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following the demographic transition discourse Population policies, 2015

42 countries in 1986

Reduce emigration Maintain or increase emigration Reduce immigration Maintain or increase immigration Reduce fertility and maintain/increase immigration Reduce fertility and limit migration in at least one direction Maintain/increase fertility/no intervention and maintain/increase immigration Maintain/increase fertility and limit migration in at least one direction

12 30 3 39 10 5 20

Source World Population Policies (2015)

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this framework, in contrast to previous discourses of demographic transition, the rise of migration (in all its forms) played an important and inescapable role. According to David Reher, the demographic transition took four forms: it changed the age structure, increased internal and external migration, reproductive efficiency, and life expectancy (Reher, 2011). Also in line with Malthusian arguments, the increase in migration was inevitable, if only because—he argued—population growth itself brought it about (Reher, 2011, p. 15). However, this was not a mere reaction, but a form of market allocation: “Migration is a more or less efficient form of redistribution of labor” (Reher, 2011, p. 15). Thus, the part of the conceptual framework of the demographic transition that was not adopted as an element of the conservative or revitalization ideas proclaimed that migration, which necessarily increases as populations change, is a process of market allocation and part of a worldwide economic redistributive system shaped by fluctuations in fertility and the movement of capital; thus the importance of migration must necessarily increase as population ages. Accordingly, the non-conservative proponents of the idea of demographic transition came to advocate migration as an abstract market category and market mechanism. The influence of this progressive discourse, which still retained some of the spirit of the first demographic transition, is also illustrated by the results of a survey of non-elites carried out under the leadership of Arland Thornton from the Developmental Idealism Studies research group. Similar questionnaires were implemented in a large number of countries, including China, Argentina, Egypt, Nepal, United States, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Taiwan, and Iran (Melegh et al., 2013, 2016; Thornton, 2004, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012). Representative polls conducted in the 2000s and 2010s suggest that a key element of the modernization discourse—namely the existence of a hierarchy of countries according to the development and the supremacy of the West over other regions, a key element of the pro-market bloc—was present in the public opinion of most countries. Western development was taken as a reference point by the public. There was a strong correlation between the ranking of countries in the hierarchy—regarding which very similar results were obtained globally—and GDP per capita, a measure of economic development, as well as the UN’s Human Development Index (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 1059). The latter includes infant mortality, the improvement and implications of which are crucial for the demographic transition discourse.

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Regarding other aspects of the demographic transition, however, there was divergence between European and non-European countries in terms of the extent to which fertility decline was accepted and seen as positive for societal development, again reflecting the North versus South divide. In the Eastern European countries that were surveyed, fertility decline was no longer a central element in the list of development factors cited by respondents (Melegh et al., 2016). In other, and especially poor countries outside Europe, the connection between fertility decline and development remained strong in the eyes of the public. Arland Thornton summarized this modernization nexus in relation to the demographic transition in the following way in an English-language issue of the Hungarian journal Demográfia: Recent surveys in Argentina, China, Egypt, Iran, Nepal, and the US document that low fertility is seen by great majorities to be correlated with development, a product of development, and a factor producing development. (Thornton, 2010, p. 31)

This means that many elements of the demographic transition’s modernization paradigm found their way into the vocabulary of the professional elites in the globalization period; moreover, parts of this paradigm became integrated into the complex system of public perceptions in many countries around the world. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the discourse of the progressive transition was able to survive into the globalization era, as it made an impact beyond professionals and pundits. It is worth noting, however, that in many countries, especially those with an Islamic religious majority, the perceived moral hierarchy was the inverse of the perceived hierarchy of development, which illustrates the mechanism by which conservative-dominated countries opposed to the West seek to challenge Western primacy on moral grounds instead of those of progress (Thornton et al., 2017). This, as we will see, is a key factor, because for the conservative bloc the defense of values and religion against intermingling was a paramount argument in the unfolding migration debate (Melegh et al., 2021). 4.4.4.3

The Pro-market Bloc and Remnants of Socialist Modernization in Eastern European Discourses It would be too simplistic to say that the idea of migration as an element of global market calculations was only inspired by the two

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major discourses discussed above. In fact, the other discourses (i.e., socialist modernization, revitalization, the conservative, and even the critical developmental discourse) also took similar trajectories at the beginning of the globalization cycle. The discourse of socialist modernization collapsed in Eastern Europe as well as in other socialist states around the world simply because the practice and idea of the planned state became obsolete or, more precisely, lost its economic foundations over a short period of time due to privatization. The idea of demographic sovereignty and optimal population development based on a planned economy now existed in a vacuum, although in a strange historical twist, this concept survived. The rise of migration and opening-up presented the region’s politicians and professional elites with a completely new situation, and, just as with the other discourses, previous discursive patterns disintegrated as a result (Table 4.5). A surprising finding is that, compared to the other groups of countries, policy elites in the former Eastern European and Asian socialist blocs were those that were most open to immigration in 2015, while they were pronouncedly against emigration. Support for immigration is an Table 4.5 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following socialist modernization discourses Population policies, 2015

(15 countries classified in 1986 as following a discursive pattern of socialist modernization; they had disintegrated into 32 countries by 2015)

Reduce emigration Maintain or increase emigration Reduce immigration Maintain or increase immigration Reduce fertility and maintain/increase immigration Reduce fertility and limit migration in at least one direction Maintain/increase fertility/no intervention and maintain/increase immigration Maintain/increase fertility and limit migration in at least one direction

15 16 1 30 2

Source World Population Policies (2015)

2 13 14

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important element for the more liberal bloc that promotes an open attitude towards migration as a market necessity, while the effort to reduce emigration is essential for the opposite bloc. A number of new, small states were established after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regime change, and the historical sociological significance of this fact has barely been taken into account in terms of both migration and the development of discourses. However, it was probably a crucial factor. The collapse of the larger socialist states and the emergence of new small ones, including dwarf states, and the exceptionally drastic opening-up of markets had a strong impact on demographic processes. After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, both the states that were unaffected and those that emerged as new countries attempted to restrict large-scale immigration, first by means of policy, which was an important contribution to the anti-migration turn reflected in opinion polls. It seems that in fact they had tried to resist some of the consequences of the opening-up. In 1996, politicians in eight states indicated that the intention of their governments was to restrict immigration. These included Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. In light of the socio-material processes, it is also apparent that many of the Central European, Eastern European, and Baltic countries that followed the trajectories discussed above tried to curb immigration following regime change for social, ethnic, or historical reasons (e.g., the Baltic states), or tried to restrict access to citizenship on ethnic and political grounds (Codagnone, 1998; Molodikova, 2008; Pilkington et al., 1998). This initial response changed, and marketization and EU accession played a major role in this shift, along with other external influences. The EU was very much in favor of building a new institutional system for migration that was capable of operating a single labor market, despite the fact that legal migration remained a national competence. This led to the privileged status of EEA nationals in this area and the granting of their freedom of movement. Moreover, countries were required to adopt a broader asylum regime as part of EU accession, which was accepted by the Eastern European states but with limited and not well-thought-out, constrained compliance (Back, 1999; Melegh et al., 2021). This reluctance was also due to the fact that in many countries, especially in Central European countries that sought to defend their welfare privileges, the native population perceived constant competition with legal and non-legal migrants, often even when they were of the same ethnicity, as we have

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seen in the analysis of socio-material relations. These interrelated structural and cognitive processes were also made manifest in the management of left-wing campaigns against the immigration of people of the same ethnicity, such as the Hungarian Status Law and the first dual citizenship referendum (Kántor, 2002; Melegh, 2006; Melegh & Hegyesi, 2003). As a combined effect, a Eurocentric and hierarchical immigration system was created to facilitate the immigration of preferred groups. A key element was ensuring the right of movement of EEA nationals, while also implementing ethno-historical preferences for the immigration of their “own” (Melegh, 2019; Melegh & Illés, 2009). Accordingly, such countries opened up to immigration associated with strong ethno-racial and class preferences (for “Europeans,” and “highly educated” people of their “own ethnicity”). This was the discursive component of market opening and the admission of capital, which factors, combined with other drivers, increased emigration and thus exacerbated demographic problems and vulnerabilities. As we have seen in the analysis of World Bank documents, this is why Eastern Europe may have become a model of fictitious population replacement through migration and raising mobility levels after the “overly closed” period of socialism (Melegh, 2016). In these post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, all this led to a discourse that considered it necessary to maintain or even increase immigration in response to demographic decline (due to low fertility and high emigration). A good indication of this demographic rationale is that the largest number of countries (13) which, according to the policy database, stated that aging and/or depopulation was a key consideration in the formulation of their immigration policy were of the former socialist group. Within the former socialist region, this characteristic appeared in almost all socio-material types of development, including the East-Central European type, the Eastern European emigrant type, and that of the Baltic States, together with some of the Western and Caucasian member states of the USSR. These states included Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Serbia, but also Belarus and Armenia. This conceptual framework can be illustrated by a number of demographic projections in the region that tried to demonstrate the positive demographic impact of migration. In Hungary, László Hablicsek and Péter Pál Tóth carried out this type of analysis several times (Hablicsek, 2004; Hablicsek & Tóth, 2000). It is worthwhile citing their findings from 2004:

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The role of migration has increased as a result of the continued immigration of foreigners in significant numbers in the 1990s. As Hungary became more and more attractive to immigrants, new people started coming in addition to compatriots who had previously emigrated and now returned. Hungarian and non-Hungarian nationals from neighboring countries, as well as citizens of other European and non-European countries, also arrived. Although the process is still in its early stages and it is not yet possible to say how intensively it will continue, there is no doubt that an increasingly sizable foreign-born population will emerge in Hungary in a demographically relevant period of time. ... We have taken the first steps in recent years at the Population Research Institute of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office to produce population projections that are extended to include international migration. Projections based on past data on the demographic impact of international migration and scenarios related to its future effects have become widely acknowledged. Both studies showed that external migration had a considerably negative impact on population development in the past, but will have an even more significant positive impact in the future, although it will not solve the problems of population loss alone. The Hungarian government’s population policy, which is currently being formulated, also devotes considerable attention to international migration, treating it in the same rank as fertility and mortality. (Hablicsek, 2004, pp. 300–301, translated from Hungarian)

Similar conclusions were reached by participants interviewed during the SEEMIG project that covered South-East Europe when we conducted predictive qualitative sociological surveys. Mýtna Kurekova summarized the perceptions of groups consisting of experts, government policymakers, migrants, and activists in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Hungary as follows: In Slovenia, a direct link was made between demographic growth and immigration where ‘the final positive consequence of immigration would be a richer, more diverse, numerous and therefore stronger society with a higher standard of well-being in 2025’. Slovak foresight imagined migrants from third-countries also integrat[ing] following the introduction of stronger integration policies. In Hungary, due to massive outmigration of the low skilled labour force and Hungarian companies’ search for a cheaper labour force abroad, immigration was seen as inevitable, also because wages were envisaged to grow and thus make the country more attractive to foreigners. (Mýtna Kureková, 2014, p. 19)

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This also shows that the economic transformation, the fragile existence of small states, persistently low fertility, accelerating aging, and intensifying emigration raised concerns about demographic “survival” among policymaking elites, while migration as an abstract market category was being constructed both at an institutional level and as a conceptual framework. This in turn created a rift: on the one hand, demographic necessities could justify openness, and on the other, they could be a breeding ground for a conservative turn and new hegemonies (Basten et al., 2014; Sobotka, 2016). These historically triggered, strong concerns about the demographic situation are illustrated by the fact that most member states in this region also made serious attempts to increase and maintain fertility (Spéder, 2003; Spéder et al., 2017; Tárkányi, 2002). The only other group of countries in which this was observed was the revitalization group that I discuss in the next subchapter. To a certain extent, pro-immigration views can be interpreted as a mechanical biopolitical calculation by policymaking elites, formally complying with requirements of the EU and other international actors, but also fraught with strong ethnic, racial, cultural, and class biases. This internal tension was an important and dynamic element that contributed to these countries becoming the most committed actors in the antimigration conservative bloc. It was probably this biopolitical imperative of a perceived population replacement through migration that some political actors—as opposed to experts—wanted to conceal or reformulate in the 2010s. The idea of a “fictitious exchange of immigrants and emigrants” seemed too obvious a solution in relation to the given market system and conceptual framework. It only adds to this paradox that it was mainly the countries that followed the Central European development pattern (Hungary, and the Czech Republic) that claimed before the refugee crisis that they were aiming to increase immigration. Moreover, not only did they accept the inevitability of immigration, but they also indicated, for various reasons, that they did not wish to and could not intervene in emigration. In other words, they considered their countries to be so deeply integrated into the free-market order of the EU, both from a socio-material and conceptual point of view, that they felt powerless to stop people leaving the country. This paradox and the complex political maneuvers associated with it are illustrated by the fact that, in Hungary for example, the migration strategy of the second Orbán government in 2013 deliberately avoided addressing

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emigration (despite advice from experts to do something about it), while formulating its perspective in relation to immigration: [the government]... supports all forms of legal migration, and through its legal instruments provides opportunities for long-term residence, settlement and the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship (naturalization). In the latter context, it pays special attention to the simplified naturalization of persons belonging to the Hungarian diaspora (as a privileged category) by waiving the obligation for those who initiate such a procedure to leave their place of residence. .... [the government] fulfils its international and EU obligations in terms of asylum, providing asylum seekers with the protection required by international and national standards… (Migrációs Stratégia, 2020, translated from Hungarian)

It is worth noting the phrase “fulfils its … obligations” (in Hungarian: “eleget tesz,” literally “does what is enough”), which shows that the Central European states reacted to the new situation by maintaining the tensions, while their extremely strong resistance to immigration was an additional issue. As a result, it was not only the above-mentioned tensions and forced compliance that posed a problem, but also the evolution of public views (increasing negativity) that in many countries increased the tension, especially for those classified into the so-called East-Central European welfare protection group, in contrast to the Western countries. This discursive complex can be described as the result of a top-down, ethno-, and Eurocentric opening-up, which at any moment could give way to a revitalization-conservative pattern under the influence of accumulating tension. This opening-up was accompanied by forced adaptations and fears within a discursive framework that was as fragile as the Malthusian or demographic transition discourses. 4.4.4.4

The Pro-market Bloc and Conservative and Revitalization Discourses Over time, the migration turn and the globalization of migration triggered counter-hegemonies and counter-movements along the lines of the tensions they generated. According to Karl Polányi, this could not have happened otherwise, since the market utopia is not sustainable socially (Polanyi, 2001). The only question was from where the strongest challenges to blocs promoting open borders would come in the given historical, socio-material, and discursive situation. This challenge may

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have originated from the nationalist, conservative side, or from the political formation on the left that was harshly critical of the system. Moreover, these rifts and the reshuffling of the discursive elements had the potential to shape the organization of counter-movements. Clearly, this challenge came from conservative and revitalization discursive frameworks, and the importance and popularity of these population policy orientations increased drastically. We have seen that some of the earlier proponents of both Malthusianism and demographic transition increasingly moved in a conservative direction—not to mention the countries of the former socialist bloc. As already indicated in the Introduction, it was precisely these tendencies that were given historical reinforcement by the marketization wave in the 1980s, a process that had ripened by the time of the 2008 crisis, the peak of the globalization period. However, there were splits in these discourses and they were not exclusively oriented towards an isolationist attitude; in fact, they were also impelled by the idea of opening-up to migration. Let us look at these discourses from the perspective of the opening-up to migration as well (Table 4.6). Similarly to the post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe, emigration was also of very strong concern to the conservative group, while there was a high degree of openness to immigration in these states according to reports by the policymaking elite. Thus, the global population policy trend that advocated an open attitude towards immigrants was prevalent Table 4.6 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as conservative discourses Population policies, 2015

15 countries in 1986

Reduce emigration Maintain or increase emigration Reduce immigration Maintain or increase immigration Reduce fertility and maintain/increase immigration Reduce fertility and limit migration in at least one direction Maintain/increase fertility/no intervention and maintain/increase immigration Maintain/increase fertility and limit migration in at least one direction

8 7 3 12 3 2 4

Source World Population Policies (2015)

6

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A. MELEGH

even in this group, although the urging to restrict migration increased with the advance of globalization compared to the 1986 reports. In this respect, Germany shows a very interesting developmental trajectory. As a conservative state that had considerable immigration but never identified itself as an immigrant country, Germany not only established a sophisticated institutional system and a legislation for immigration, but also built a new identity (Schierup et al., 2006, pp. 137–162; Zotti, 2021, pp. 228–232). The Merkel period saw the transformation of Germany from a country with a focus on ethnic ties, officially seeking to limit immigration and defining itself as a homogeneous nation-state, into a country that officially counts immigration as a demographic reserve (Schierup et al., 2006, pp. 137–162; Zotti, 2021, pp. 228–232). This shows that Germany, which has identified itself as the leader of the EU, adopted an increasingly tolerant institutional and discursive order in terms of migration, which eventually became known as Willkommenskultur. This shift was unique to this group of countries and illustrates that an open attitude towards migration can involve deeper transformation and not just superficial adaptation, as with the countries of the former socialist bloc that joined the EU. This made Germany a key player in the migration debate that unfolded in the 2010s in a historical-political bloc that made use of migration as a demographic and market tool. It is worth noting that the migration policy of pronatalist and anti-Malthusian France did not change as radically as that of Germany (where reducing immigration had always been an official goal) (Geddes, 2003, pp. 53–78; Heckmann, 2016). The historically anti-Malthusian and pronatalist discursive environment in France proved to be one of the breeding grounds for the conservative-revivalist bloc, which reintroduced the well-known idea of the Great Replacement (Joppke, 2021, pp. 47–48; Williams, 2017). The French model, which was based on a widely accepted republican and legal universalism until the 2000s, served in many ways as a standard for and forerunner to those EU regulations and discourses that promoted market opening. Again, political discourses tended to polarize even within a single country. It seems that the globalization-related processes and transformations within a given economic system resulted in rifts and tensions in previous narratives and discourses. It should be noted that in 2015 countries in this group that aimed to increase fertility were already keen to introduce restrictions on immigration (Table 4.7). In their case, therefore, the promotion of a market opening was less straightforward, and only Germany, the Vatican, and

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Chile indicated that in addition to pronatalist policies they were also in favor of opening the borders to immigrants. The opening-up to migration played a role in those African countries which, although their population policies were less conservative in matters of fertility, proclaimed conservative values in the documents from 1986. These countries had already associated fertility decline with the opening of borders to migrants. The revitalization framework was pivotal in the evolution of the neoconservative, new-right turn, and counter-hegemony. The loss of biological and demographic power, arguments that had been sidelined after the disasters of the 1930s–1940s, became the primal themes in this discourse. After World War II, immigration became the most important element in this discursive framework, pushing fertility into the background (Joppke, 2021). Even in the group of countries that I have defined as following the revitalization discourse in the 1980s, it is clear that immigration was the main concern, and only the UAE reported in 2015 that it would link pronatalist aspirations with opening its borders to migrants. These states are generally permissive about emigration, which is somewhat surprising, although Saudi Arabia advocated complete national isolation and intended to limit emigration. Official policies adopted in this group are thus not in favor of opening-up their markets to migrants, but in fact, these states massively exploited migration while they institutionally repressed the highly exploited immigrant masses, especially those from Table 4.7 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following the revitalization discourses Population policies, 2015

6 countries in 1986

Reduce emigration Maintain or increase emigration Reduce immigration Maintain or increase immigration Reduce fertility and maintain/increase immigration Reduce fertility and limit migration in at least one direction Maintain/increase fertility/no intervention and maintain/increase immigration Maintain/increase fertility and limit migration in at least one direction

1 5 5 1 0 0 1

Source World Population Policies (2015)

5

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South Asia (Sarkar, 2017; Szelenyi, 2016). This points to a paradoxical tension and indicates that marketization and the emergence of global labor markets shattered previous discursive frameworks. This tension also seems to favor and reinforce authoritarian turns and the rise of a new conservative hegemony termed neoliberal nationalism by Joppke (Joppke, 2021). 4.4.4.5

The Pro-market Bloc and Pro-development Discourses During the Age of Globalization This discursive framework, which existed only in a few developing countries in the 1980s, aims severe criticism at the market logic. Therefore, one would not expect to see any major support for promarket views here. Both world-systems theory and the conceptual framework based on the development of the so-called Third World condemn the capitalist system and market-based growth. This includes critical analysis of structural processes that trigger migration, impoverishment, the marginalization of the agrarian sector, and openingup to the global market; at the same time, this discourse examines at length the vulnerability, exploitation, and often overtly racist discrimination against migrants from the so-called Third World. Many see migrant workers as a new global working class whose rights must be protected. Castles is a prominent author in this regard, who puts it as follows: The neoliberal ideology of economic efficiency and shared prosperity masks the exploitation of labour on a global scale. The international mobilization of workers and their differentiation on criteria of gender, race, ethnicity, origins, and legal status are a crucial part of the global economic order. The neoliberal dream is dualistic: a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites; a world of barriers, exploitation, and security controls for the rest. (Castles, 2011, p. 311)

Thematizing the rights and protection of migrants within this discursive framework was of pivotal importance. It is, therefore, not surprising that in the pro-development population policy environment of the 1980s, the main focus was initially on reducing emigration while supporting an open attitude to migration. In African states in particular, the shift to a policy of direct fertility reduction and giving up on the previously proclaimed principle of “development rather than intervention”

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Table 4.8 The 2015 population policies of countries classified in 1986 as following the pro-development discourses Population policies, 2015

6 countries in 1986

Reduce emigration Maintain or increase emigration Reduce immigration Maintain or increase immigration Reduce fertility and maintain/increase immigration Reduce fertility and limit migration in at least one direction Maintain/increase fertility / no intervention and maintain/increase immigration Maintain/increase fertility and limit migration in at least one direction

0 6 0 6 4 0 2 0

Source World Population Policies (2015)

also testify to the transformation and the abandonment of radical social reforms (Avramov & Cliquet, 2016). Thus, this discursive framework and population policy environment accepts migration and is strongly supportive of migrants’ rights (Table 4.8). In many respects, the—often only verbal—defense of migrants’ rights replaced serious social reforms globally. International organizations such as the UN’s migration forum, the ILO, and the IOM (but often even the World Bank) took an active role in this, because this way they could demonstrate support for migrants while avoiding proposing more radical reforms. A common situation in the UN debates has been for developing countries and those that were more radical in this matter (e.g., the so-called G77) to take the lead in trying to stop the closure of the EU, the United States, and other Western state borders, especially to socalled illegal migrants and homeless persons. International and local NGO networks were often involved in this conflict. These organizations, citing multiple disadvantages and specific moral and international legal norms, seek to exert constant pressure on governments and other decisionmakers to end, or at least to take action to alleviate, the vulnerability of these groups, especially on human rights grounds. This creates a paradoxical combination in which human rights terminology is used to justify the opening-up to migration within a market-oriented discursive framework.

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This bizarre and tense situation was illustrated by the comments of the South African UN Ambassador, Andries Oosthuizen, on globalization and interdependence in 2006: Amongst other [things], the SG refers to the importance of enhancing the development impact of international migration, prevention of the exploitation of migrants, especially those in vulnerable situations and ensuring that migration occurs through legal channels. … The effects of international migration on economic and social development highlight the complex relationship between underdevelopment, poverty, social exclusion and migration. In pursuing our goals to meet the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), we must intensify our focus in addressing foreign direct investment, trade, foreign aid, and debt relief so as to reverse underdevelopment, poverty and skills flight. Meeting the MDGs is central to eradicating poverty and unemployment, placing developing countries on a path of sustainable development, reducing recourse to forced and irregular migration and thereby facilitating migration out of choice. (Oosthuizen, 2006)

What is interesting here is not only the language and the use of the general and abstract concepts of migration and migrants, but also how easily marketization (international capital investment), development, the protection of migrants’ rights, and migration policy are linked within this general developmentalist discourse. In pro-development and critical discourses, the general thematization of migrants’ rights and their vulnerability takes other forms too. This branch of critical discourses tries to see processes from the perspective of migrants as a general category by exploring the contexts of historicalcultural spaces and encounters and by situating the migrants’ perspectives of identity within them. In addition to exploring these issues, migrants’ rights are defended. These discourses appear in sociological and cultural analyses of identities, in exhibitions, films, and other cultural works, and a general migrant identity and perspective is linked to the protection of other vulnerable groups in order to reveal the deeper social and cultural mechanisms of vulnerability. This discursive pattern, while critical of the system, its contexts, and reification, is also indirectly and positively linked to the construction of a general and abstract category of migrants. On the one hand, it often uses this general category while focusing on those groups that experience

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mass vulnerability in the given market regime, trying to understand the processes from their perspective. These groups may be asylum seekers, domestic workers, manual laborers, or even online workers, and their structural position is juxtaposed with the interests and social and cultural practices of the states and market actors, and the often deeply racist historical-cultural stereotypes prevalent in the host society. This perspective is consistently represented by postcolonial critique and related social movements that perceive migrants from the perspectives of hybridity, disembeddedness, gender-related vulnerability, oppression, and resistance (Ashcroft et al., 1989). It is particularly noteworthy that postcolonial critique has historically located migration in the context of colonial legacies and relationships, and has undertaken to analyze the representational problems that arise from it (Böröcz & Sarkar, 2017; Bosma et al., 2012; Sarkar, 2017). While most effort is directed at differentiating migrant groups and gaining a better understanding of specific contexts, the aim is often to generalize the “migrant experience.”3 For example, Homi K. Bhabha, who dedicated his work to a phenomenology of the migration crisis, delineated the boundaries of his interest along the lines of the general migration concept. This is how he formulates the task of understanding and exploring the “migrant experience”: The conceptual framework of the humanities is particularly relevant to understanding the cultural and political lifeworlds of the migrant experience. Built around pedagogies of representation and interpretation, the humanities engage with the ‘deep’ history of shifting relations between cultural expression, historical transition, and political transformation: they play a mediating role in this three-way process. Humanistic disciplines articulate the changing relationships between cultural meaning and social value as they shape civic ‘agents’ who participate in the creation of public opinion and the definition of public interest. The ethics of citizenship, in our time, are defined as much by migration and resettlement as by

3 Among many other great papers, we find a beautiful and concise example of this approach in an article by Mahua Sarkar, who, even when breaking down general categories, formulates the goal elaborately: “Rather than evaluate circular migration in terms of the putative connection between migration and development, or as a problem of human rights abuse of workers—approaches that typically marginalize the workers as subjects—this paper brings together a historical and macro-structural theoretical framework with ethnographic research…” (Sarkar, 2017, p. 173).

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indigenous belonging, as much by international governance as by national sovereignty. … This text focuses on the discrimination and dishonor mobilized by contemporary forms of ‘barbaric’ nationalism to denigrate and humiliate minority populations… (Bhabha, 2018, pp. 7–8)

Following in the tradition of some postcolonial critiques, Bhabha focuses on the cultural context of the “migrant experience” in general in order to confront nationalisms that taboo openness and humiliate minorities. A similar discursive approach is evident in world-renowned museums such as the Museum of Memory and Tolerance in Mexico City. Here, the 2019 exhibition period concurrently commemorated the greatest genocides of the modern era, biopolitical horrors (including the mass killing of Armenians in Turkey, the Holocaust, the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia, and the mass murder of Mayans in Guatemala), the situation of “migrants” (in line with the principle of todos somos migrantes, “we are all migrants”), and violence against women. The aim was to strengthen tolerance and to reconstruct the voices and perspectives of the victims, on the postcolonial assumption that they had failed even to obtain their own discursive autonomy. This heroic work is, of course, of great assistance to those who are making systematic efforts to promote the protection and social acceptance of migrant groups under international law. However, these discursive patterns are often used by market-oriented groups as well, even though this type of discourse focuses on critique of the market order. Often even highly critical works contemplate a kind of legal universalism, a general humanist ideal without addressing the structural conditions, which in many ways fits with marketization and liberal humanitarian utopias. Moreover, as we have seen, this kind of universalism has a dialectical impact on the rise of provincial responses, and indirectly allows the experiences of highly diverse migrant groups and their interactions with non-migrants to be homogenized in these discourses, or for subgroups to represent the whole category. In this way, these discursive frames may indirectly contribute to the polarization of the migration debate from a historical perspective when there is no powerful tertiem datur pillar to support a systematic critique of capitalism, and only identity politics prevail.

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The Anti-migrant Bloc: Fears and Changes

Marketization and the opening-up to migration in the globalization period resulted in the further fragmentation of economic and labor processes, the further “flexibilization” of labor, and the domination of cross-border value chains. Moreover, it increased demand for transnational migrant labor, by now globally reified, integrated into massive fictitious exchanges and seen as a general market category. So the migration turn was completed, creating global migratory capitalisms all around the world. Naturally, these combined transformations radically challenged cultural patterns and communal mechanisms, thus affecting identities and interactions of various groups as well as nations. This was particularly important in certain regions, including Eastern Europe, where the socialist mixed economies (regardless of the differences among them) had collapsed, and where the globalization cycle within capitalism was only one of the many difficulties societies had to face. Capitalism itself and the related destruction was also a problem here. Thus nothing was “normal” or customary for decades. In addition, the decline in fertility, stagnation in redistribution, and social security tensions paved the way to conflict centered around the issue of migration, thus the emergence of an anti-migration bloc came as no surprise. In fact, given the combination of discursive and socio-material processes, the rise of this historicalpolitical bloc was fueled by actual historical driving forces within the system and should be seen as a real historical event in the conjuncture of globalization. The main actors in the anti-migration bloc are various nationalist and neoconservative movements, governments, and related expert and media elites that call for the restriction and strong control of migration in order to “protect” and “revitalize” the given country. These actors— including the French and Italian far-right, the Trumpist Republicans, the pro-Brexit British groups, the Bharatiya Janata Party led by Modi in India, Bolsonaro’s government, and the relevant political and intellectual elites in the Visegrád countries—focus on criticizing certain consequences of capitalism, especially its impact on culture and identity, without seeking to systematically revise or limit the new waves of marketization or the market system itself (Joppke, 2021). In fact, the actors and creators of this bloc have sought to impede possible alternatives to capitalism, and preferred a real/true form of capitalism, “enforced” as in the days of colonialism, as opposed to the current form that they perceive as too global, much too

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financialized and open, and, very importantly, dominated by “destructive” liberal elites. This means, as already indicated in connection with the 1980s, that they have looked for an ideal and unique combination— the joint protection of the capitalist market and conservative values. They feared for this imagined model built on previous class, race, and gender hierarchies that had been deconstructed by a liberal ideological complex that they perceived as unprecedented and unthinkably destructive. In this interpretative framework, this threat included the defense of gendered and racialized otherness, decolonization, and the opening-up of borders to migrants, the demonization and personification of whom was central to the texts produced by this bloc. In addition, this discursive framework operated by emphasizing certain elements of national sovereignty and by invoking militant anti-communist or traditionalist cultural and identity politics. It identified migrants as members of non-Western, nonChristian, non-white, illegal groups (“races”) and made no effort to look at socio-historical contexts. Beyond the issue of migration, this historicalpolitical bloc can be seen as an attempt to replace the elites and to control global capitalism in a novel way. It has had serious historical momentum as the historical, political, and demographic analysis shows. The historicaldemographic narratives and discourses that served as a backdrop to this bloc have been disintegrating throughout the period of globalization and, as we have seen, many of their elements were used in the debate, even for supporting opposing opinions. These can also be used in arguments for adopting a more open attitude towards migration, and I will now address how the anti-migration bloc has been able to incorporate these elements into its own framework. 4.4.5.1

The Anti-migrant Bloc and Elements of the Malthusian Discourse As we have seen in the analysis of the interconnections of various discourses in terms of the opening-up to migration, some mainly non-Western countries that had previously pursued a fertility-reducing Malthusian policy not only abandoned these principles, but also chose in 2015 to close their doors to immigrants. South Africa and Botswana are good examples of such countries. This indicates that relative prosperity and the significant migration affecting these countries that increased competition in terms of welfare and on the labor market led to heightened anti-migration sentiment and even violent conflicts there, which in turn affected the elites’ discourses. Indeed, the elites used them for their

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own ends. By the 2010s, for example, South Africa had become one of the most rejectionist countries, according to the World Value Survey, and violent conflict took place in the late 2000s and 2010s that left many victims. Human Rights Watch reported in 2020, based on interviews, that social groups that were facing the insecurity associated with a basic livelihood, poverty, and inequality were the major forces behind these riots, which also received support from various political groups (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Interestingly, similar tension emerged in India, where a paradigmatic shift in migration policies had already taken place in 2015. These shifts illustrate how the discussed socio-historical contexts, demographic transformations, and increasingly competitive socio-demographic situations triggered cognitive changes that divided earlier Malthusian discourses and in some ways used elements of the disintegrating pattern to bring about an anti-migration turn. It is also important to see that the Malthusian discourse, which has its roots in the historical legacies of the former British colonies, led to an anti-migration turn even outside the West and not just in the affluent continent of Europe. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that demographers and intellectuals who considered themselves superior and sought to defend European and Western prosperity also took this context as a starting point. One of the underlying assumptions and fears that the European and Western propagators of this bloc have is that—in taking structural conditions for granted, ignoring globalization-related factors such as capital movements or market expansion, and overlooking inequalities and differences in demographic trends—they interpret rising immigration rates as a sign of an unpreventable upsurge; a wave in migration towards Western and European states. The role of the market opening and market regulation systems is not reflected in this line of thought, but it focuses on so-called general pressures, population growth, and migration inertia. The Malthusian element, which will be discussed in more detail below and which is integrated into this discursive bloc, introduces into this framework a kind of an abstract rule, which is interpreted as a given factor in the case of the so-called Third World. This, coupled with the change in population ratios of continents, is presented as a kind of migration-civilization pessimism, which, according to the proposed anti-migration view, is one of the main legitimating principles for limiting mass immigration. Paul Demény’s lecture at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2015 illustrates this train of thought. Paul Demény is an important author

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for us, because he was the editor-in-chief of the influential US Population Council journal entitled Population and Development Review for many decades. It was particularly noteworthy in the lecture that this eternal Malthusian regularity is linked to the supposed decline of the West and the resettlement of large masses, which clearly connects this bloc to the conservative-fascist revitalization discourse of the interwar period. References to intellectual heritage can be illustrated with the following passage. Some 100 years ago, the German historian Oswald Spengler foresaw this process and called it the decline of the West. An appalling depopulation was beginning, he wrote, that will last for centuries. The decline of Europe’s population—and, with it, Europe’s geopolitical importance—was a correct prophecy, confirmed by today’s evidence. But forecasting depopulation was a wrong call. Lands and continents do not become depopulated, hence virtually empty: a difference in population pressure among countries or groups of countries tends to drive people from the high to the low pressure area. The potential force of this effect is multiplied if the area of low population pressure is relatively better-off in terms of man-made and natural amenities and in terms of personal safety and individual freedoms. (Demény, 2016, p. 113)

The link to the interwar world of thought is clearly illustrated by the theory of demographic metabolism, based on the concept of “biological force,” which is found in its purest form in Corrado Gini’s work from 1930 (Melegh, 2014, 2017). Gini (like Spengler and, to some extent, Pareto) believed in the cyclical nature of population development, and his originality lay in combining elements of regional demographic development with the study of demographic differences between nations and classes. But, unlike earlier thinkers, his explanation of social differences was not based on disparities in the social and institutional background of various groups, but on a biological-eugenic interpretation of population change. He called this theory “demographic metabolism,” whereby the upper classes lose their biological potential and are replaced or taken over by populations from lower classes who have higher potential, as in Demény’s equilibrium model. The only difference is that Demény operates using the Malthusian concept of population pressure, not directly with changes and disparities in biological potential. It must be noted that the combination of these elements with the above-described historical

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patterns is a key development in the period of the opening-up of the markets. It is also important to see that even in the interwar period population exchange driven by inequalities was a concern for those who advocated this framework, just as it was later an issue for Demény. The difference is that, according to Gini, replacement was inevitable, while Demény— and as we shall see, others in the global North—proposed to fight it. In Gini’s view, according to so-called demographic metabolism, population is replaced through the higher fertility of lower ranking groups. In the longer term, however, their fertility also declines. This is only a local phenomenon, which Gini incorporated into a regional-global narrative: the “dying nations”—i.e., the wealthier countries—get “fresh blood” from other, poorer nations. Population exchange can occur within the same race, especially the “white race,” in which Western and Northern Europe (together with North America, Australia, and New Zealand) represent the “upper class.” Eastern and Southern Europe is home to the “lower class,” which even in Gini’s time had high fertility rates, and the size of which could be maintained or increased. It is important to note that Gini used the terms “race,” “nation,” “class,” and “region” almost interchangeably, and at the same time drew a dividing line between Europe and non-Europe with explicit racial content. The white race, in his view, was superior to the others: “the Hindus, the Malays and the yellows.” In a paper in Population and Development Review entitled “Europe’s two demographic crises,” Demény accepts the idea of decline but rejects the concept of migration as a necessity. He says that the temptation to open up that comes from UN politicians (Kofi Annan in particular) must be resisted, and calls on governments to resist. This in itself shows that he associates a social process with concrete actors. He argues along lines that not only distinguish his perspective from Gini’s viewpoint, but in fact distance him both from the pro-opening argument and from Malthus, whom he otherwise regards as an essential theorist. This again shows that in the age of globalization previous frameworks fell apart and new ones were built, often through a combination of previously divergent discursive elements: First, Europe’s relative demographic marginalization is inevitable. If that is seen as a problem, immigration is not a solution for it. Europe cannot, and arguably ought not, engage in a demographic race with its immediate

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geographic neighborhood, let alone with sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. No plausible internal demographic revival could appreciably narrow the size differences that now exist between Europe and its neighbors, whether close or distant, or lessen the structural differences that will widen further during the coming decades. The large differences in average income levels (and in other social and political amenities inadequately measured by income) between the EU, on the one hand, and much of the rest of the world, on the other, will also persist and in many cases are likely to widen. A potentially very large number of would-be migrants from poorer countries trying to move to the EU is thus a likely prospect—one that the present migration crisis clearly demonstrates. Indeed it is virtually certain that in the absence of even the current weak barriers to immigration maintained by the EU, the number of immigrants would be much higher. But for migration to avert population decline in the EU or, especially, to counteract population aging, the inflow required would have to be on a scale that would radically change the social and economic characteristics of the populations in the receiving countries. From a demographic point of view whether an “open Europe” would indeed be a “fairer, richer, stronger, younger Europe” is, at the very least, highly questionable. (Demény, 2016, p. 117)

Demény, despite the Malthusian beginnings of his work, moves towards the theories of the second and third demographic transition, and also towards socialist and conservative pronatalism. This shows the breakup of earlier frameworks and the rise of new combinations. This process was not only driven by intellectual changes and the marketization and reification of migration, but also driven by the historical-demographic processes that took place during the globalization period. Equally important is the link between the idea of ecological crisis and population pressure in the historical transformation of the Malthusian framework. Climate crisis, drought, and ecological degradation make life increasingly unbearable, especially outside Europe, leading to armed conflicts between civilians, and exceptionally intensive emigration. This connection, which is frequently dismissed by experts who rely on empirical analyses, has nevertheless become an important part of the public discourse and the construction of this bloc (see, e.g., Urdal, 2005). As early as 2009 Reuveny and Moore wrote the following in connection with the growing interest in this issue:

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Stepping back from these cases to a broader picture, environmental migration is a central part of the environmental security literature, which argues that environmental decline can lead to violent conflict. The basic argument goes back to Robert Malthus, who suggested that global population growth would eventually lead to environmental decline, famines, and conflict over natural resources. In recent decades, observers have revived this paradigm in a neo-Malthusian view according to which environmental migration is one of the central channels leading from environmental decline to conflict, particularly in less developed countries (LDCs). (Reuveny & Moore, 2009, pp. 462–463)

The Malthusian idea of “population pressure” was thus reformulated, and the environmental conditions of the world’s poorer societies become a permanent “driving factor” of migration in particular, without holding the Western states or the wider economic structures and relations responsible. Migration is thus understood as an external threat in itself, while the interest in fertility that was previously at the forefront of this issue, is no longer the focus. This type of political demographic thinking is, generally, mechanistic. Through its uncritical approach that views phenomena outside of their context, it has been able to fuel fears of population replacement, thus linking Malthusian discursive patterns with revitalization and conservative discourses. It is worthwhile citing here a review of Demény’s work by János I. Tóth. He argues that the cessation of civil wars will not be sufficient to stop ecological migration: Many people—Prince Charles, Al Gore, Barack Obama—consider climate change and the drought in the region (2007–2010) to be an important factor in the development of civil war and migration. The complexity of the causes shows that simply ending the civil wars and armed conflicts in the region will not in itself stop mass immigration. (Tóth, 2017)

Stepping outside the circles of pundits, the prospect of this discursive connection is also clearly illustrated by the radical and utterly lunatic arguments of the Christchurch terrorist Brenton Tarrant, who juxtaposed “low” Western fertility with the “high” reproduction rates of Islamic immigrants, and connected these to the problems of population replacement and climate change. He argued that “overpopulation” and environmental catastrophe are caused by non-Europeans, and therefore, they should be resisted (Tarrant, 2019). I deal with the idea of the Great

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Replacement separately later, but it is important to see here that, in addition to the realities of the opening-up to immigrants, Malthusian elements play a key role in the anti-migration bloc. Thus, it has not been the discursive tradition per se that was essential, but the interaction of sociomaterial and discursive elements combined with biopolitical and market competition and the transformation of migration into an abstract market category. 4.4.5.2

The Anti-migrant Bloc and the Third Demographic Transition The demographic transition discourses were contradictory from the point of view of migration: their elements could be used as arguments for both opening-up and the necessity of control, especially in terms of migration as a general and reified category. As we have seen, in the discourses of the elites who thought within this framework (even in Eastern European countries), the link between the elements of the demographic transition discourse and the openingup to migration was generally stronger. In terms of population policies (and I consider this to be an important point), almost all Western states, but also the majority of non-European states, argued for maintaining or even increasing immigration in 2015. Portugal, Spain, and Austria emphasized having an open attitude, despite—or even in line with—the fact that they no longer considered fertility rates to be satisfactory and wanted to increase them. Thus, the context was not defined as native fertility versus immigration, but rather, through a kind of populationist argument, these were considered alternative ways of increasing population and labor force. Yet the idea of demographic transition was also instrumental historically in the rise of the culturalist, neo-nationalist, and anti-immigration bloc. This was, paradoxically, mainly due to the fact that the latter saw decreasing fertility levels as a historical necessity, which, in their view, made the given region attractive to migrants via establishing internal demand, as opposed to Malthusian external migration pressures. Following in the footsteps of Gini and Demény, David Coleman in a study from 2006 interprets migration processes in deterministic terms as equivalent to demographic pressures. This paper, also published in the Population and Development Review, described this as a third demographic transition. Here too, the author openly abandons any idea of progress and modernization and is only concerned with the consequences

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and negative effects of the demographic transition and its hierarchical and historically teleological evolution. Neither transition concept considers migration explicitly, or any consequent changes in the composition of populations, although van de Kaa (1999) assumes an increase in immigration to be a natural indirect consequence of the low fertility of the recipient countries. On the other side of that equation, emigration tends to be highest at the peak of population growth in the middle of the transition, as with Europe in the nineteenth century and the developing world today. (Coleman, 2006, p. 402)

According to Coleman, this automatically leads to a change in the “origins” of the population. This search for origins can be interpreted as a kind of mythicized impersonation that makes the host population a collective subject, in contrast to the migrant group that has a different origin, while the latter is also seen as a homogenous mass of one single category. According to him, the origin of certain populations has become radically altered by the mass immigration of people from distant geographical locations or of “specific ethnic and racial origins,” and this is coupled with declining fertility rates and the accelerated emigration of the natives: The processes described and projected here, resulting from low fertility combined with high immigration, are significant because they are changing the composition of national populations and thereby the culture, physical appearance, social experiences, and self-perceived identity of the inhabitants of European nations. (Coleman, 2006, p. 402)

Cultural and racial unity was thus disrupted in the era of globalization and, in Coleman’s view, European nations became diversified, even hybridized, to use the term of postcolonial criticism (but with negative connotations), while the sending countries were homogenized through the emigration of ethnic minorities. What is interesting here is not just the empirical justification (a huge methodological problem in itself), but the new radicalization and reformulation of the Eurocentric worldview inherent in the first demographic transition model. In this form, the West no longer represents simple historical supremacy, but the concept refers to qualitatively specific processes. Migration affects the Western world, the “European” nations, at the “deepest” level of “origin,” and threatens “European” nations with inevitable and grave consequences, while the nations outside Europe see hardly any negative outcomes. According

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to Coleman, the final acceleration of the process was due to hybridization and the resulting shift in political behavior, which also marked the transformation of the “external” threat into a political subject; an enemy within. In this interpretative framework, Coleman’s third demographic transition equals a post-transition crisis and infers a terminal result. This bears almost no resemblance to the original theory, which was initially a global theory of fertility and mortality decline. It is as if, with the help of Eurocentrism taken to extremes, it were an attempt to halt a process considered unstoppable; a tension that can only be described by means of war rhetoric. The discursive connections to World War II and even World War I; the Spenglerian and Nietzschean irrational concepts of civilizational destruction; the vision of an apocalyptic battle; and the lack of necessary resilience are, therefore, not accidental. We see this strong link even more sharply in the idea of the Great Replacement that gained ground in elite discourses and political public life. I would rather refrain from commenting on such Armageddon-style clashes, but it is clear that the theory of demographic transition that was thought to be progressive is now dead in elite circles—if not in social practice, where it still lives on. Elements of this theory have been reshuffled in referring to historicaldemographic processes and the provincialization of the West and were integrated into identity politics without any real critique of the system itself. This is exactly how Lukács described the process of the destruction of reason concerning the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—as an ordeal of irrationalism that reconfigured rational antecedents into the texts of modern anxieties (Lukács, 1980). It was a key moment in the reshaping of this discourse in the 2000s that the critique of the discursive elements in favor of opening-up to marketization and migration was formulated from the perspective of a fierce conflict. Demény also discussed at length why he believed that the arguments that drew on the demographic transition and advocated for opening-up were not true, and how this narrative, which was seen as hegemonic in the mid-1990s, was being reassessed and polarized through the disintegration of previously much more consensual intellectual settings (van de Kaa, 1996). Partly rejecting the need to take in extra population as predicted by the demographic transition model, Demény argued that mass immigration could only temporarily “rejuvenate” a population. Unemployment and low activity rates could be solved by internal institutional reforms, the distribution of the potential benefits of migration-driven economic growth would not be fair to

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the native population, and in general, immigration would only increase dissent instead of increasing “empowerment” (Demeny, 2016, pp. 117– 118). And this, he argued, should be connected to what he promoted as a strong pronatalism in rich countries with low fertility rates, which also implied a break with the demographic transition model. Demény recognized the effects that globalizing social processes had on demographic transition, which he also saw as pointing in the direction of increasing mobility and as making national population policies irrelevant. Despite—or perhaps because of—this, these pressures should be resisted. He wrote: The logic of economic globalization, allowing minimally impeded movement of goods and capital, also calls for free international mobility of labor, hence of population. It questions the relevance and appropriateness of population policies conceived for national entities with essentially closed borders, that is, precluding free and possibly large-scale net immigration. But the fundamental difference between people crossing national borders permanently and goods and capital moving across such borders will be increasingly recognized, and social and cultural considerations will tend to contradict purely economic arguments. (Demény, 2011, pp. 268–269)

The foundation of the resistance promoted by Demény did not involve questioning certain elements of the global market system, but restricting immigration, which showed very clearly that immigrants en bloc had become the embodiment and personification of market relations: The polar opposite would be the emergence of a broad consensus supporting an indefinite pause in mass immigration and adoption of policies to enforce such a pause. The latter outcome could eventually also undermine some other tenets of economic globalization, leading to a return to circumstances in which large countries or contiguous blocs of smaller countries seek greater self-sufficiency and industrial balance than present-day economic prescriptions would predict. (Demény, 2011, p. 269)

These arguments also show that, according to the discourse associated with this bloc, in order to avoid a civilizational “catastrophe” resistance to immigration involved the transformation of certain institutional foundations of globalization and, in fact, the need to return to an earlier,

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historical state of capitalism. What this bloc proposed in the early twentyfirst century was a kind of renewed, demographic “Bretton Woods” regulation system. They sought to slow down the progress of marketization in terms of migration, and to start a new phase that was based on earlier foundations. This goal indicated that they had recognized some social tensions and their historical scope. What we are dealing with here is not simply discursive changes or propaganda, but the interplay of sociomaterial and discursive relations in the sense of how Gramsci understood bloc formation. This can be identified as a kind of neo-nationalist, passive revolution looking for the new/old management of global capitalism. Thus, this bloc reflected on the tensions arising from the openingup to globalization without systematically exploring the major underlying processes. In this it established a logic of cultural “catastrophes,” or in the words of Demény, the logic of “bitter” transitions. It is worth quoting some of his paper, which also raised the problem of “viability” and “belated” pronatalism, at more length: Contrary to the benign assumptions just described, the lowest-fertility countries—those with a total fertility rate of 1.5 or below—instead of creeping back toward replacement-level fertility might stabilize at that level, or even shrink further. Such an outcome, impervious even to heavy application of pronatalist social policies, might also foreshadow reproductive behavior in countries in which fertility is still fairly close to replacement level. Should this happen—transition with a vengeance—it would create a qualitatively different demographic situation for which no precedents exist in modern history. It would represent a clear threat to the continuing viability of the countries affected. Compensatory immigration flows would have to be so large as to be inconsistent with any reasonable degree of cultural and ethnic long-term continuity. Alternatively, population aging in the absence of immigration would create virtually unsolvable economic and social challenges, and, in the case of formerly powerful countries, there would likely be a drastic loss of relative geopolitical status. Yet the economic and socio-cultural forces that reduced birth rates in the West and in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s to historically unprecedented levels, and did so somewhat later in many other countries, may not have run their full course. Further declines, sparked, for example, by major economic disturbances or further fertility-depressing cultural shifts, cannot be ruled out. Spontaneous homeostatic mechanisms may not come into play to save the day, or may do so too sluggishly to matter. A demographic collapse would then become a real prospect, and a radical rethinking of fertility policy

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would become a necessity for social and national survival. (Demeny, 2011, pp. 269–270)

This is an outline of a demographic cataclysm, which, in Demény’s view, was already well grounded and therefore almost inevitable. He took as his starting point real concerns about population aging, but put the blame on the global elites. This bloc, operating with ideas of historical and political dystopias and radical ruptures, ignored the structural factors associated with marketization and further reification. The reason for this was not only their aversion to certain intellectual trends, but also the Euro and Western-centric approach, which put this discursive framework on an almost inexorable trajectory, since the historical superiority of the West was to be defended, and processes and problems to be assessed from this viewpoint. The cited papers argued that the only way to alter the course of things was to replace the political elites in international organizations (in the European Union and in national institutions) who had hijacked “genuine” Western development; who were promoting the opening-up to globalization and migration; and who were misguided in their identity politics. According to this bloc, it is not global market processes and structures that had to be examined, but the personified pro-market leading elites of the West. This was then an attempt at elite and management replacement (a passive revolution, as Gramsci would put it), linked to socio-material changes. This bloc tried to turn to its own advantage the historical momentum of tensions arising from globalization and historical transformations, but without changing structures and hierarchies. In contrast to the other pro-market bloc, which proclaimed and defended the earlier openness without criticizing globalization, the anti-migration bloc emphasized frictions and had an advantage since real historicaldemographic and economic tensions had already built up. This bloc thus represented a real historical force, while it also reached back to earlier historical patterns. The situation was very similar to what Marx wrote about in The Eighteenth Brumaire about the political actors who use masks of historical figures to obtain the strength from them to carry out political change. The historical power of this anti-migration bloc stemmed from the fact that its proponents dared to respond to certain tensions brought about by globalization, albeit in a mythical form, and of course in an intellectual context that left intact the supremacy of the West, the hierarchies of world development, and the ideological demands of anti-left

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and anti-progressive sentiment. Theories of migration and mythical population replacement, based on the abstract exchangeability of populations and the personified elite actors behind them, proved to be quite beneficial for this bloc. Debate about the theory of the Great Replacement also increased in this period, a situation which we now need to address. 4.4.5.3

The Anti-migrant Bloc, Neoconservative and Revitalization Discourses, and the Great Replacement The globalization cycle had already begun with the neoconservative turn at the 1984 World Population Conference in Mexico. The whole period was characterized by internal fragmentation in each of the historically given population discourses, with the neoconservative or revitalization branch taking elements from the other ones in a new historical setting. The potential had been there for these elements to be used this way and reorganized as a kind of biopolitical counter-hegemony to opening-up to migration and its purely utilitarian interpretation. This was due to the effects of globalization and the associated demographic and social transformations, population aging, accelerated migration, and marketization, as a combined historical effect and consequence of these processes. It is important to argue that—in contrast to the developmentalist discursive tradition, which was basically critical of both the neoconservative and the revitalization discourses and came to promote opening-up to migration only indirectly—the anti-migration bloc worked as a counterweight or counter-hegemony within the given market system. The two big blocs, the pro-market and the anti-migration formations, were two biopolitical options within the same system. They partly presupposed, but also partly opposed each other. The bloc that emerged in the 2010s that combined the conservative and revitalization strands rewrote previous narratives along the lines of the disintegrating demographic discourses, and also capitalized on the collapse of socialism. The fear of population replacement played a key role in this during the 2000s and 2010s. The theory of the Great Replacement has a conceptual framework (originating in France in its present form) that merges or recombines very different discursive traditions and is clearly based on a personified critique of globalization. It became a specific, essentialized form of the critique of globalization that personified the danger as migrants and elite groups. It rebelled against migration as a purely market calculus, without systematic consideration of market institutions, using inherited or often ideologically alien critical vocabulary, while claiming that during globalization

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there was a massive and coordinated attempt to replace local populations with migrants. Its representatives were mainly far-right, neoconservative essayists, media intellectuals on the fringes of political life, political consultants, and opinion-leaders, while some pundits also joined them. The language they used tended to be “strong,” provocative, and generalized, overwhelming the reader. Renaud Camus, a Frenchman, was one of the most striking figures of this school of thought. In an interview published in Hungarian, Camus put his ideas as follows: The Great Replacement is not a theory, but a more or less appropriate name for a gigantic, indisputably real and catastrophic phenomenon: the replacement of populations, a genocide by substitution. Global replacement, however, is very much a theory, a worldview. I believe that the emblematic motif of post-industrial modernity is the action and the fact of substitution: replacing the true with the false, the real with the fake, the indigenous with the outsider, the natural with the artificial, the expensive with the cheap, the complicated with the simple, Velence in Hungary with Venice in Las Vegas, Paris in France with Paris in Beijing, Versailles with Disneyland, the real world with the tourist replica, stone and marble with chipboard, wood with plastic, literature with journalism, journalism with ‘news flashes’, art with science, science with ‘social sciences’, Europe with Africa, culture with entertainment, nature with buildings, urban and rural places with universal suburbia, music with thundering noise, mountains with mechanical elevators, man with woman, man and woman with robots, mothers with surrogate mothers, humanity with post-humanity, humanism with transhumanism, the human race with the Uniformed Human Matter—yes, man as a product, the human Nutella, that dubious, non-stop produced industrial mass. (Leimeiszter, 2018, translated from Hungarian)

What is interesting here is not only the extremely eclectic and confusing set of claims, but also the fact that the key element is the idea of a replaceable and interchangeable population, which clearly reflects the cultural critique of the abstract category of reified and replaceable people. It is, therefore, crucial to see that this conspiracy theory is not simply a theory in itself, but specifically informed by, or rather linked to, the market calculus of migration and the global labor market. It is a mythical and personified critique of a real social and discursive process:

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…what I call global replacement, and for some time now ‘Davocracy’, or rather ‘direct Davocracy’. The human zoo is run by Davos, you know, the Swiss town where the world’s financial leaders hold their annual Nuremberg Congress. The Marx of global replacement is none other than Frederick Winslow Taylor, and his Capital is titled The Principles of Scientific Management. The interests here are the same as economic interests, in two senses of the word: in addition to a purely economic, or rather financial, world view, we find the desire for cost-effectiveness, for the lowest possible price, for frugality, for the generalized inexpensiveness made possible by egalitarianism and standardization. To translate this into the language of cinema, we could say that global replacement equals Modern Times plus Metropolis plus Soylent Green. The hyper-rich, the capitalists who have distanced themselves from reality, have set themselves the goal of generalized dehumanization, which they achieve by forcing the intermingling of populations, and by grinding human raw material into a homogeneous, industrial mass. (Leimeiszter, 2018, translated from Hungarian)

It is a crucial point of the above argument that market rationality is not a social institution that affects the whole of society, including migrants, but a principle imposed by particular individuals and groups on the otherwise “innocent” masses through “Davocracy.” Authors associated with this discourse spoke of a perpetuated propaganda: according to them, a liberal, cosmopolitan elite was suppressing the basic instincts of the population by implementing and propagating a “genderist deconstruction,” thus making “white,” “European,” and “Christian” peoples vulnerable to invasion by Muslims and other non-European groups. Zémour argued at the Fourth Demographic Summit in Budapest that, in defiance of Tocqueville’s principle of sovereignty, the unsuspecting majority that was overly supportive of minorities had become subjugated to a minority and the lobbies that are implementing the Great Replacement (Földi-Kovács, 2021). The use and re-contextualization of the critical vocabulary of the left is also remarkable. An attempt was made to reinterpret leftist critical theories in a linguistic and intellectual context that was alien to them. The proponents probably found this critical vocabulary effective and convincing and therefore tried to exploit it for their own purposes. This also indicates that, in order to increase their discursive power, they adopted a mask that is not theirs, and thus simultaneously hijacked the power of other

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discourses and, as they believed, “defended” themselves against accusations of racism. In many cases this has led to absurd turns, so much so that they kept writing about anti-imperialism, colonialism, and a “Hitlerian” maneuver, while railing against the migration induced by market processes. This was in fact a projection, since they identified the undesirable social processes, personified by their opponents, with the mirror image projected onto them. As Renaud Camus said: In an essay I called Adolf Hitler’s second career the dictator’s inverted, omnipresent specter, a constant point of reference and deus ex machina. Hitler, in his own terminology, wanted to eliminate one or two races, and now the goal is to eliminate all of them (above all, of course, the white race, the rarest, the most privileged and the most sinful, to use the new terminology). This second career is more indirectly criminal than the first; it does not use gas anyone, but it is more massive and similarly industrial. The response, replacement, is less centralized than the earthquake itself, Nazism, but it covers much larger areas—this time affecting three continents and hundreds of millions of people through genocide by replacement. (Leimeiszter, 2018; translated from Hungarian)

It was obviously the white race that was suffering the most, according to these arguments, but there was also a conscious attempt to create a mass of people for the global market. This thought presupposed the globalized universalism of migration and presented itself as its critique. Thus, the anti-migration bloc accused the financiers of “Davocracy” and the associated secular elites of working deliberately to replace European and Western populations and to wield their influence to this end. This line of thought then became a particularly open discursive construct directly used and manipulated by political elites. As we have seen above, the analysis as well as the rejection of population replacement gained a foothold in papers published by the professional elite in the social sciences, so we can by no means say that such arguments were only nonsense hyped by low-quality journalism. The idea of demographic and cultural sustainability became increasingly prevalent in the context of population decline, and the mechanical and essentialized ethnic or racial identity complexes that were associated with it (W. H. Frey, 2020; Hablicsek, 2007; Myers & Levy, 2018; Sáenz & Johnson, 2018). Coleman and Demény, cited above in connection with the disintegration of discourses, have become important points of reference for the idea of population replacement, and they also have featured prominently

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in various neoconservative demographic summits. These demographic summits once again point towards Eastern Europe. As the final element of my analysis, I raise the question why Eastern Europe, and certain countries within it, have become a base for the anti-migration bloc and the fear of population replacement.

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Stalker, P. (2000). Workers without frontiers the impact of globalization on international migration. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Standing, G. (1984). Population mobility and productive relations. Demographic links and policy evolution (World Bank Staff Working Papers 695, Population and Development Series 20). World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank. org/curated/en/963661468740121375/text/multi0page.txt Stark, O., & Katz, E. (1987). Labour allocation across labour markets under different informational schemes and the costs and benefits of signalling (DRD Discussion Paper No. DRD280). Development Research Department, Economics and Research Staff, World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank. org/curated/en/756201468184150948/text/DRD2800Box37730nefits0of 0signalling.txt Szelenyi, I. (2016). Pakistani guest workers in the United Arab Emirates. Demográfia English Edition, 59(5), 5–47. https://doi.org/10.21543/DEE. 2016.1 Tárkányi, Á. (2002). A családpolitika változásának hatásai a termékenységre Közép-Európában. Demográfia, 45(1), 48–79. Tarrant, B. (2019, March 15). The great replacement. https://nex24.news/ 2019/03/the-great-replacement-by-brenton-tarrant/ Thornton, A. (2004). Reading history sideways: The fallacy and enduring impact of the developmental paradigm on family life. University of Chicago Press. Thornton, A. (2010). International family change and continuity: The past and future from the developmental idealism perspective. Demográfia English Edition, 53(5), 21–50. Thornton, A., Binstock, G., Abbasi-Shavazi, M. J., Ghimire, D., Gjonca, A., Melegh, A., Mitchell, C., Moaddel, M., Xie, Y., Yang, L., Young-DeMarco, L., & Yount, K. M. (2012). Knowledge and beliefs about national development and developmental hierarchies: The viewpoints of ordinary people in thirteen countries. Social Science Research, 41(5), 1053–1068. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.03.005 Thornton, A., Yount, K. M., Young-DeMarco, L., & Moaddel, M. (2017). Modernization,world system, and clash of civilization perspectives in lay views of the development–morality nexus in the United States and the Middle East. In M. Moaddel & M. J. Gelfand (Eds.), Values, political action, and change in the Middle East and the Arab Spring (pp. 101–132). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190269098.003.0005 Tóth I., J. (2017). Demény Pál a tömeges bevándoroltatás európai politikájáról. Valóság: Társadalomtudományi Közlöny, 60(4), 1–8. Tóth, J. (2018). Külföldiek és hontalanok. Internetes Jogtudományi Enciklopédia. https://ijoten.hu/szocikk/kulfoldiek-es-hontalanok

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Urdal, H. (2005). People vs. Malthus: Population pressure, environmental degradation, and armed conflict revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 42(4), 417–434. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305054089 van de Kaa, D. J. (1996). Anchored narratives: The story and findings of half a century of research into the determinants of fertility. Population Studies, 50(3), 389–432. Williams, T. C. (2017, December 4). The French origins of “you will not replace us.” The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/ 12/04/the-french-origins-of-you-will-not-replace-us Woetzel, J., Madgavkar, A., Rifai, K., Mattern, F., Bughin, J., Manyika, J., Elmasry, T., di Lodovico, A., & Hasyagar, A. (2016). Global migration’s impact and opportunity. McKinsey Global Institute. https://www.mckinsey. com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/global-migrations-impactand-opportunity World Bank. (1995). World development report 1995: Workers in an integrating world—Executive summary (Report no. 14867). World Bank. https://doc uments.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/ 632421468184149473/World-development-report-1995-workers-in-an-int egrating-world-executive-summary World Bank. (2019). Documents & reports. The World Bank. https://docume nts.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports World Bank. (2020). World development indicators & global development finance. DataBank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-ind icators World Population Policies. (2015). World population policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/ desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/WPP2015_Report.pdf Zakariás, I. (2018). Jótékony nemzet. Szolidaritás és hatalom a kisebbségi magyarok segítésében. Kalligram. Zotti, A. (2021). Germany’s ‘atypical’ leadership in the EU migration system of governance and its normative dimension. In M. Ceccorulli, E. Fassi, & S. Lucarelli (Eds.), The EU migration system of governance: Justice on the move (pp. 225–258). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53997-9_9

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

5.1

Eastern Europe and the Fear of Population Replacement

I started the book by asking why Eastern Europe—and especially Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia—had become the driving force and inventor of the conservative and revitalization bloc. How did all this become part of the historical event of an intensifying debate about migration through, in Brunnbauer-Gradits’ words (Brunnbauer & Gradits, 2013), the interplay of temporalities and structures? As we have seen, developments in Eastern Europe have proven crucial not only because the region has taken part in a major social–historical transformation, but also because the mechanisms at work there provide insight into transformation in other countries. First, the local narrative that reinforces the hegemony of the fear of population replacement has been rooted in global socio-material and ideational history. The global demographic transformations, the expansion of the global market into non-capitalist and/or social spheres, the regimes of globally prevalent discourses and their reformulations, and the emergence of migration as an abstract market category were developments that could have occurred independently of Eastern Europe. Yet Eastern Europe was not a passive outsider, but a rather active participant in this massive global change. One of the most important developments in the opening-up to globalization and marketization was that Eastern © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9_5

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Europe abandoned its non-capitalist mixed-economy experiments and embraced a quite fundamentalist version of the free-market model as early as during the late socialist era (Antal, 2022; Bockman, 2011; Hann, 2019). Thus, in contrast to the East Asian socialisms, the ideologically justified institutional changes undertaken to facilitate the market and the opening of borders to capital and goods were almost total and unconditional in this region. This model brought with it extremely high levels of foreign capital investment and vulnerability to external pressures by global standards, which set this region, already under demographic strain, on a path of permanent emigration and posed particular challenges for some Eastern European countries. This region, alongside Latin America, was, therefore, a textbook case and a prominent “practice yard” where migration became an abstract market category. The “shock therapy” of marketization radically changed economic processes and reshaped the everyday lives and life histories of people in Eastern Europe; moreover, it also created an intellectual environment that almost banned any form of criticism of the market system (Bockman, 2011; Böröcz, 1999). This has also marginalized critical discourses about population and migration, and thus amplified the importance of other discourses. It would, therefore, be a mistake not to see Eastern Europe as an agent, and to consider external, global impacts only. Seeing the region as a passive victim of global turmoil has been, moreover, one of the discursive devices of the anti-migration nationalist bloc that has operated with personified images of the “enemy” (negative characters and symbols of globalization, such as George Soros, Davos, or Kofi Annan). This has been a form of fearmongering used to justify the need for political intervention to handle an immediate “demographic emergency.” However, historical processes are much more universal, and in fact one should take into account not just certain consequences and fears, but totalities and the multiplicity of social relations that have been commodified and financialized (Éber, 2020; Éber et al., 2019; Joppke, 2021). In Eastern Europe, marketization and market utopia has eliminated the idea of reforming economic institutions, and in fact any demand for change that goes beyond market economies has become hidden (Hann, 2019, p. 35). This development indirectly supports the antimigrant discourses that speak of a demographic emergency detached from economic institutions: for example, one of the main arguments of pro-development critical discourses—that economic and market institutions should be amended to alleviate social problems such as the tension

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between migration and development—has become marginalized. The consequence of this lack of vision, according to a four-year media analysis, has been that humanist discourses were not linked in Hungary between 2014 and 2018 to critical discourses of social institutions, and thus they lost their social reference points, at least in relation to the issue of refugees, who were reclassified as “migrants” (Melegh et al., 2019). According to my analysis, in the press associated with either the Hungarian governing party or its opposition, discursive formations that focused on the need for a moral sense of solidarity with refugees and “migrants” became neglected in 2014–2018, while the anti-migrant bloc was able to produce and operate with an extensive network of topics by addressing the perceived and assumed cultural consequences of migration, potential forms of its restriction, and the EU’s biopolitical “mistakes” (Fig. 5.1). The Hungarian press, including the media under the influence of the governing and the opposition parties, is dominated by themes such as security, the chaos of EU’s supranational decision-making mechanism as opposed to Westphalian nation-state sovereignty, the decline of the West, biopolitical considerations, and the question of whose norms should be taken as the baseline (those of the West versus the East), all of which

Fig. 5.1 Prevalence of main discursive formations and themes in the Hungarian press dealing with migration, 2014–2018 (Proportion of occurrences in %; single articles may contain multiple formations) (Source Melegh et al., 2019)

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topics emphasize control, rivalries, and direct and repressive population management without critically addressing the social context and institutional background of the given situation concerning “migration.” This in turn isolates humanitarian formations and their immanent principles and justice claims, as the perspectives and agency of those concerned are not even considered, but the latter are only presented as reified (subjugated) targets. Due to this ignorance, there has been little dissidence in this media world: the press associated with the political opposition could only challenge the legitimacy and authenticity of the migration discourse or the political risks being taken, but had nothing to say about the embeddedness of migration (Bernáth & Messing, 2016; Feischmidt, 2020; Feischmidt & Zakariás, 2020; Rajaram, 2016). Moreover, not only were humanitarian discourses marginalized, but, shockingly, a significant part of the press was able to accept violations of humanitarian principles if this was perceived as protecting national sovereignty (Melegh et al., 2019). In the case of both asylum seekers and those who were admitted to the country, the denial of rights was seen as a viable or even desirable option in this discursive arena. This negative turn, however, can only be understood as the marginalization of humanitarian principles associated with the machinery of current forms of global capitalism and the structural crisis of capital and within states, where humanitarian ideas fail to serve as a counterweight to the themes of security, control, and the increasing value placed on national sovereignty and fighting back (Mészáros, 2022). Demanding legal protection for mythical migrants, or migrants in general, was thus difficult to interpret and left individuals vulnerable, who could then easily fall victim to racist stigmatization. This is how, in the words of Mihályi and Szelényi, the “counter-revolution” of the nation-state against universal law became unstoppable (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017; Szelényi & Mihályi, 2019). Second, the discursive processes can be understood as part of regional socio-material history, since the migration and demographic situation of the European continent changed significantly during the period of globalization. Eastern Europe has been integrated into one of the most open but economically and demographically less important regions, in line with free-market mechanisms and strong Eurocentric discursive hierarchies (Böröcz & Sarkar, 2017; Cantat, 2016; Melegh, 2016; Rajaram, 2016). Simultaneously with the region’s marginalization within Europe, new migration links have appeared and a new East–West migration system has emerged on the continent (Melegh & Sárosi, 2015). This external

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and internal openness also shook the EU’s institutional architecture itself, leading to the crisis that manifested in Brexit. One of the reasons behind this crisis was the promise of equal social and labor rights across the EU, which ran counter to historically fixed hierarchies (Böröcz & Sarkar, 2017; Cantat, 2016; Melegh, 2016). Moreover, no consensus could be reached about migration policy between Eastern, Western, and Southern Europe due to the different embeddedness of these regions in the migration routes and their specific economic and social contexts. The unequal exchanges between regions and the frustrations they created paved the way to new conservative anti-migration nationalisms in Eastern Europe that challenged preexisting hierarchies, and also facilitated open attacks on the migration policy of “Brussels,” in which the new idea of sovereignty once again proved to be a handy instrument of politics (Melegh, 2019; Melegh et al., 2021; Szelényi & Mihályi, 2019). Eastern Europe, and especially certain countries within this region, have a unique character that has contributed to the tension associated with global/local and socio-material/cognitive interactions and the formation of an anti-migration bloc. Let us address briefly these sociomaterial, discursive, and institutional conditions that may explain the strength of the biopolitical panic over population exchange. First and foremost, Eastern European societies had a history of a noncapitalist mixed-economy model, which made it possible for people to get and keep their jobs in a much less competitive system. This job security was fundamentally challenged by the regime change. This may be called a double wave of marketization, since there was an overall globalization cycle and a regime change in which the previous market relations of the socialist era (e.g., in Hungary the so-called second economy and the controlled exchanges of the so-called first economy based on bureaucratic control and bargaining over prices, wages, and regulations) collapsed immediately, and the non-capitalist structure was obliterated by a strong wave of marketization through changes of ownership (the creation of capitalist markets). As my model has shown, throughout Eastern Europe, the advancement of the market system and the dramatic expansion of foreign capital increased the disembeddedness and vulnerability of people, their willingness to migrate, and, above all, amplified levels of emigration, including to other countries within Eastern Europe. As we have seen in the analysis of the varieties of migratory capitalisms of Eastern Europe and the former socialist countries, the shift brought about by the regime change raised vexed questions especially

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where the opening-up to globalization was rapid and comprehensive, and where it was intertwined with the issue of immigration, especially from neighboring countries. Thus it was not those countries with considerable emigration that perceived migration as a key issue, but those countries in East-Central Europe and the Baltic region that feared for their former welfare privileges, experienced considerable immigration, and perceived migratory competition during the opening-up in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As we have seen, this was the case in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and to some extent, Slovenia. In two of these countries, since the 1990s all opinion polls about immigration have measured strong anti-immigrant sentiment in European and even global comparison. This problem of migration, in both its explicit and covert forms, has been a recurring theme ever since; a good example of which was the use by political forces that are now in opposition of the fear of immigrants taking over local jobs in Hungary in connection with the status law and dual citizenship, the former who did not in the least refrain from scaremongering in a migration context (Melegh & Hegyesi, 2003). This also demonstrates the hegemony of anti-migration attitudes and the fact that this was not a mere propaganda ploy against the global pro-market discourses cherished by the elites of international organizations. This negative public sentiment has characterized the whole region in the longer term, and as I have demonstrated, Central and Eastern Europe is the only region in the world that has shown growing concern about immigration and emigration, at least according to World Value Survey datasets. Thus, the societies of the region, unlike their elite groups in the 1990s and 2000s, have been worried and dismissive about population exchange through migration and the opening of the borders to migrants. For the majority of these societies, outmigration, immigration, and depopulation were not part of the abstract process that we find in the discourses of the pro-migration bloc or in population policy reports. Thus, there was a gap between the viewpoints of the elite and those of the wider public. This was evident throughout Eastern Europe, especially concerning the issue of globalization, while this disparity has always existed, for example, in East Asian societies, at least according to surveys (Melegh, 2008). Chris Hann, who in his anthropological fieldwork in the 1990s often witnessed the opposition to and misunderstanding of the pro-market and pro-migration bloc and related local groups, also draws attention to this discrepancy (Hann, 2019).

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This growing resistance, which separates this region from Western European and Western public opinion structures in general, shows that from a social point of view the pro-openness and pro-management discursive arguments of the EU’s migration policy fell on deaf ears in this region. This is not, of course, a sociological explanation; we need to see both what feeds this public opinion and how it is shaped by processes that earlier took place. One of these factors can be found in the elite discourse of earlier periods. It is also important to remember that the socialist mixed economy operated under significant state control, and the state took an active role both socially and in terms of family support. In the population policy texts of the time, as discussed above, “demographic sovereignty” and planning were emphasized in connection with demographic and, particularly, migration-related issues. The market transition broke and undermined this tradition as government influence on the economy and labor market became incomparably smaller, also hampering indirect demographic regulations through such means. However, the idea of stateinitiated demographic regulation and control remained alive with regard to various issues in almost all Eastern European countries, including the freedom of and constraints on migration. Almost all Eastern European states made demographic emergency plans that are almost inconceivable in most parts of the world without such traditions (see, e.g., Intellinews, 2021 on the Russian policy programs since 2007). State control over these matters has a stronger historical tradition in this area (even before socialism) than in Latin America or even in Western Europe on its own territory, with the important exceptions of fascisms and Nazism (Turda, 2013, 2014). Western Europe historically considered coercion and population intervention a policy to be pursued only in the colonies and against colonial populations, especially until the 1950s (Stoler, 1992, 1995). Perhaps this sheds light on the link between the Western promoters of conservative and revitalization arguments and Eastern Europe, in that the former want to reconstruct a West that still knows of the strong constraints imposed on colonial and so-called Third World peoples, and this is consistent with the historically grounded demand for state intervention in Eastern Europe. Another great Eastern European tradition, namely pronatalist policies and care services aimed at increasing local populations, a practice that was completely unknown in many countries of Western Europe until the 1980s and was mostly applied as state policy only in Germany and France, also contributed to this connection with

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the revitalization discourse. For example, Demény’s late writings seem to provide a synthesis of these traditions. In fact, this new consensus seems to be based on a (pre-)World War II experiment in which Italy, Vichy France, Germany, and even some Scandinavian states combined discursive elements of selection, population vitality, and the control and fear of migration, considering the longer-term implications (Quine, 1996). These are reflections that arise, for instance, at huge Hungarian conferences on family and population, which frequently host the authors of this tradition and show that certain expert and political groups in Eastern Europe are already very active and looking for new discursive allies for their own pronatalist traditions that promote sovereignty (demonstrated, for example, by the website of the Budapest Demographic Summit I–IV, https://budapestidemografiaicsucs.hu/en). However, there are probably even deeper factors at work in Eastern European societies. These are the newly emerging forms of competition with migrants for welfare, and the tensions that arise from these. Members of a society with a strongly embedded economic order may be particularly concerned about the extent to which their previously exceptional welfare and labor security privileges are becoming precarious, and they are worried about being put in a competitive position. As I have shown above, the societies that turned against immigrants (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) underwent a transformation in the 1990s during which they lost their safety and prosperity, while the immigrants they received were better educated and had better chances of employment than the native population (the same occurred throughout Eastern Europe). Competition posed by migrants made historically inherited cognitive hierarchies, which were also reinforced through institutions, even more rigid. Migrants were affected by this exclusionist attitude in many cases—even those who were of the same ethnicity as the natives. Moreover, emigration increased and a new post-socialist form of existence emerged, fraught with transnational issues of family and care work and intertwined with consumer demands, problems with the healthcare system, credit crises, language difficulties, and a sense of exploitation. From this perspective, the mass arrival of asylum seekers as represented in the new conservative media and discourse could easily lead to tension, alienation, and perplexity, the rejection of an open migration market and open borders, and the projection of globalization problems onto immigrants.

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Global Implications

At the time of finishing writing this book, after refugee and Covid-related shocks, Eastern Europe is facing two terrible crises, both of which demonstrate an enormous crisis of capital and of the relevant states, that also appear in migration processes (Mészáros, 2022). In December 2021, 12,000 Polish and British soldiers stood on the Polish-Belarusian border, “defending” the territory against masses who had been forced there due to geopolitical games and deprived of their social environment by war and chaos. Since February 2022, millions of Ukrainian refugees have fled a horrific war caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the frame of a global fight over the influence of huge economic blocs (United States, NATO, EU, and the Eurasian counter bloc). Not a day passes without border issues, refugees, and migrants coming under the spotlight. It seems that not only has a migration turn occurred, but a collision of historical events and structures is also underway. We are in a new epoch already, and migration-related issues and debates have been immanent engines leading to it. Humanity’s demographic history has reached a turning point from both a socio-material and a discursive point of view, and global capitalism is entering a new phase. In some parts of the world, capitalist societies face the enormous challenge of welfare redistribution and the need for new labor force. In these regions, caring for the elderly and the sick is of great concern and state services are weak, as was so clearly evident during the COVID-19 crisis. Thus, this care and welfare challenge must be met through market-based services. Within this process, migration, as we have seen, has become a key factor at the socio-material level. A much more global, much more open transnational labor market has been created, which is organized by multiple actors and dominated by a particular form of fictitious commodity production. We are entering the time of an extreme form of migratory capitalism in matters of work, care, nursing, education, and even scientific thought. Socio-material factors form the basis of this fundamental process that has also triggered huge changes in the discursive arena. The most important of these is the emergence of an abstract, decontextualized, and market-calculus-based concept of migration, which, because of the tensions inherent in the market order and its structure, has rewritten previous discursive regimes. Each of these discursive orders concerning population, which previously focused on fertility, is now grappling with

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the issue of migration. Along the lines of earlier internal tensions, these discourses have disintegrated and are constantly being recomposed. With the fall of socialism and the end of a mixed and planned economy rationality based on state regulation, certain discourses have shifted towards conservative and revitalization ideas. Other discourses have become promarket and pro-migration, while pro-development critical discourses that question global structures have been marginalized. Discourses are breaking up regarding the justification of opening or closing the borders to migrants and the question of control, while an unprecedented process of historical-political bloc formation has been set in motion, in which migration is one of the key issues. To use Gramsci’s conceptual system, these historical and political blocs have been created in line with the congruence of socio-material and discursive processes, with the pro-opening and pro-isolation versions having moments of hegemony and counter-hegemony. During the opening-up to globalization, the pro-migration and pro-opening bloc sought hegemony and, with the coordination of international organizations and free-market entities (EU), states and their policy elites were instrumental in the unfolding and institutionalization of these processes. In contrast, from the very beginning of globalization, an anti-migration, pro-restriction bloc started being organized, which never questioned the market system itself, and whose political representatives have used the historically grounded fears present within certain societies to gain power. A very cynical dialectics has evolved. These blocs, as I have demonstrated, all have a conformable disposition in relation to the system and only aim at changes at the level of individual actors, while they project their agendas and critiques onto generally conceptualized migrant groups and certain elites. A tertium datur, a third way, is, as things stand, only latently present, although it can by no means be said that there are no groups and masses critical of the basic institutions of the system and of the processes that drive migration. This is only natural under the given circumstances, since, as we have seen, migration processes are caught in the crossfire of market and welfare interests and their contradictions. Far from covering the whole spectrum of potentially existing discursive regimes, the biopolitical struggles between the proopening and pro-control blocs may serve as basis for further historical transformation. History never stands still, and socio-material and discursive changes and the tensions within and between them are immanent drivers that may pave the way to new historical conditions. No one can see

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into the future, yet it is worth articulating one or two areas of potential change. The 4.5 billion people living in the world today who are not covered by social security will, as a result of social-historical changes, strive to attain some form of this, even through migration and/or internal political transformation, and these moves will create historical forces that can potentially recompose the above-described scenario of hegemony and counter-hegemony. The historical role of European developments and discourses will be diminished as the continent continues to be marginalized. The fact that the discourses of the conservative and revitalization bloc will then clearly show that Europe and the West are becoming provincialized, losing influence and power, will also contribute to the above change. Many global questions will be raised and answered outside the West. This is also extremely important from the point of view of discursive transformations, as both the pro-opening and pro-control blocs intend to deal with these processes through some kind of Eurocentric politics, a biopolitical chess game, in which migration becomes a key piece on the board. The pro-opening side is working to preserve the economic and financial potential and contribution provided by immigrants and will rely on market processes to safeguard privileges. The anti-migration side is working to protect and revitalize perceived social and cultural ideals associated with earlier Western dominance, especially in situations when these ideals are threatened. With the escalation of this debate in the 2010s, the moment has come to consider very carefully earlier developments and global institutional regimes in light of the relevant historical dynamics, and look for emerging new historical forces. The author of this book has also sought to contribute to this reflection by attempting to interpret the changes in Eastern Europe—which, after a brief historical period in the late 1980s, again attracted the world’s attention—from a global perspective and in historical sociological terms. The results presented here show that it is time to thoroughly and collectively reassess the region’s global historical role and the global processes Eastern Europe is intertwined in, before we enter a new era. This will help us to understand global contradictions, evolving crisis situations, and our future perspectives.

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Appendix

Supplementary material 1. Variables in the population policy database (original terminology) Country name Country code Region Development level Least developed country View on growth Policy on growth Level of concern about the size of the working-age population Level of concern about aging of the population View on fertility level Policy on fertility level Level of concern about adolescent fertility Policies to reduce adolescent fertility Government support for family planning

Variables

Less developed, more developed yes/no Too low, too high, satisfactory No intervention, maintain, lower, raise No data available, minor concern, major concern No data available, minor concern, major concern Too low, too high, satisfactory No intervention, maintain, lower, raise No data available, minor concern, major concern No data available, yes, no Direct support, no support, indirect support (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9

357

358

APPENDIX

(continued) Country name

Variables

Grounds on which abortion is permitted View on life expectancy at birth View on under-five mortality View on maternal mortality Level of concern about HIV/AIDS Measures adopted to address HIV/AIDS View on spatial distribution

7 categories Unacceptable, acceptable Unacceptable, acceptable Unacceptable, acceptable Major concern, minor concern 5 categories Minor change desired, major change desired, satisfactory Policy on migration from rural to urban areas No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on migration from rural to rural areas No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on migration from urban to rural areas No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on migration from urban to urban No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, areas no data available Policy on migration into urban No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, agglomerations no data available View on immigration Satisfactory, too low, too high Policy on immigration No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on permanent settlement No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on temporary workers No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on highly skilled workers No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on family reunification No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy on integration of non-nationals No data available, yes, no View on emigration Too high, too low, satisfactory Policy on emigration No intervention, maintain, lower, raise, no data available Policy to encourage the return of citizens No data available, yes, no United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx

Too high

Antigua and Barbuda Bahrain

Lower

Lower

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Cabo Verde

Comoros

Djibouti

Dominica

China

Too high

Burundi

Lower

Lower

Lower

Too high

Botswana

Lower

Too high

Barbados

Bangladesh

Too high

Algeria

Policy on growth

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

View on growth

Country

Lower

Lower

Policy on fertility level

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Too high

View on fertility level

Direct support

Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support No support Satisfactory

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Government View on support for immigrafamily tion planning

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Too high

(continued)

Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory lower

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Lower

View on Policy on emigration emigration

2. Population policies promoting elements of the Malthusian discourse in different countries according to UN database, 1986

APPENDIX

359

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Too high

El Salvador

Fiji

Gambia

Ghana

Grenada

Guatemala

Honduras

India

GuineaBissau Haiti

Lower

Too high

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Too high

Dominican Republic Egypt

Policy on growth

View on growth

Country

(continued)

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Policy on fertility level

Too high

Too high Lower

Lower

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

View on fertility level Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Satisfactory

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Satisfactory Too high

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Policy on immigration

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Government View on support for immigrafamily tion planning Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

(continued)

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Lower

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

View on Policy on emigration emigration

360 APPENDIX

Satisfactory No intervention

Netherlands

Lower

Lower

Lower

Too high

Malta

Nepal

Too high

Liberia

Lower

Too high

Too high

Lesotho

Lower

Morocco

Too high

Kiribati

Lower

Too high

Too high

Kenya

Lower

Mexico

Too high

Jamaica

Lower

Mauritius

Too high

Indonesia

Policy on growth

No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

View on growth

Country

(continued)

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Policy on fertility level

Lower

Lower

Lower

Satisfactory No intervention

Too high

Too high

Too high

No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

View on fertility level

Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Indirect support

Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Indirect support No support

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Government View on support for immigrafamily tion planning

Lower

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Lower

Raise

Raise

Too low

(continued)

Raise

Satisfactory lower

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

View on Policy on emigration emigration

APPENDIX

361

Lower

Lower

Lower

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Pakistan

Papua New Guinea Peru

Philippines

Republic of Korea Rwanda

Too high

Too high

Lower

Lower

Saint Vincent Too high and the Grenadines Samoa Too high

Too high

Lower

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Too high

View on fertility level

Too high

Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia

Lower

Too high

Nigeria

Lower

Too high

Niger

Policy on growth

View on growth

Country

(continued)

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

No intervention Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Policy on fertility level

Direct support

Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Government View on support for immigrafamily tion planning

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Maintain

Raise

(continued)

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Raise

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

View on Policy on emigration emigration

362 APPENDIX

Lower

Too high

Too high

No intervention Satisfactory Lower

Lower

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Solomon Islands South Africa

Sri Lanka

Swaziland

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia

Turkey

Tuvalu

Thailand

Too high

Seychelles

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

No intervention Lower

Lower

Lower

Too high

Senegal

Policy on growth

View on growth

Country

(continued)

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

Too high

View on fertility level

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

Lower

No intervention Lower

Lower

Lower

Policy on fertility level Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Government View on support for immigrafamily tion planning

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Maintain

Lower

Lower

Raise

(continued)

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Raise

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

View on Policy on emigration emigration

APPENDIX

363

Lower

Too high

Lower

Lower

Direct support Indirect support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Maintain

Satisfactory

Too high

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory

Lower

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Too high

Satisfactory

Government View on support for immigrafamily tion planning

Lower Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

View on Policy on emigration emigration

Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx World Population Policies. (2015). World Population Policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/ WPP2015_Report.pdf

Zimbabwe

Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Too high

Policy on fertility level

Yemen

Lower

View on fertility level

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high Lower

Too high

Uganda

Policy on growth

United Satisfactory No interKingdom vention United States Satisfactory No intervention Viet Nam Too high Lower

View on growth

Country

(continued)

364 APPENDIX

Canada

Brunei Darussalam Burkina Faso Cameroon

Brazil

Belgium

Bahamas

Austria

Australia

Argentina

Policies on growth

Satisfactory No intervention Too high No intervention Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain

No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain

View on growth

Afghanistan Too high

Country name

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

View on fertility level

No intervention No intervention No intervention

No intervention No intervention

No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention Maintain

Policy on fertility level

Indirect support Direct support Direct support

Indirect support Direct support Indirect support Indirect support Direct support No support

Direct support No support

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Lower

Lower

Policy on emigration

Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Too high

View on emigration

3. Population policies with elements of discourse on demographic transition in countries around the world according to UN database, 1986

APPENDIX

365

Policy on fertility level

Government support for family planning

View on immigration

Policy on immigration

Satisfactory No intervention Costa Satisfactory No interRica vention Democratic Satisfactory No interRepublic vention of the Congo Denmark Satisfactory No intervention Ecuador Satisfactory No intervention Ethiopia Too high No intervention Finland Satisfactory No intervention Guyana Satisfactory No intervention

Central African Republic Colombia

No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

No intervention No intervention No intervention

Satisfactory

Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support

Direct support Direct support Indirect support

Too low

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Raise

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Satisfactory No interSatisfactory No interNo support Satisfactory Maintain vention vention Too high No intervention Too No intervention Direct Satisfactory Maintain high support

View on fertility level

Chad

Policies on growth

View on growth

Country name

(continued) Policy on emigration

Maintain

Lower

Too high

Lower

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

View on emigration

366 APPENDIX

Satisfactory No intervention

Myanmar

Mali

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain

Maldives

Malaysia

Malawi

Lebanon

Jordan

Japan

Italy

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high No intervention Satisfactory Maintain

Iceland

Policies on growth

View on growth

Country name

(continued)

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on fertility level

No intervention

No intervention Maintain

No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention Maintain

Policy on fertility level

Direct support Direct support Direct support Indirect support Indirect support Direct support Direct support Direct support Direct support Indirect support

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Policy on emigration

Lower

Raise

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Too low

Satisfactory Lower

Satisfactory Maintain

View on emigration

APPENDIX

367

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Sudan (including South Sudan)

Spain

No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention

Satisfactory

San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia

Portugal

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain

View on fertility level

New Zealand Norway

Policies on growth

View on growth

Country name

(continued)

No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention

No intervention No intervention No intervention No intervention Maintain

Policy on fertility level

Indirect support Indirect support Direct support Direct support

Direct support

Indirect support Direct support Direct support No support

Government support for family planning

Too high

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Lower

Lower

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Maintain

Policy on emigration

Lower

Lower

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

View on emigration

368 APPENDIX

Too high

Too high

No intervention

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory No intervention

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory

Too low

Satisfactory

View on fertility level

No intervention

No intervention

Maintain

No intervention No intervention No intervention

Policy on fertility level

Direct support

Direct support Direct support

Direct support Direct support Direct support

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Lower

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Lower

Policy on emigration

Lower

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

View on emigration

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx World Population Policies. (2015). World Population Policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/ WPP2015_Report.pdf

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Zambia

Syrian Arab Republic Togo

Sweden

Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention

Suriname

Policies on growth

View on growth

Country name

(continued)

APPENDIX

369

Too low

Too low Raise Satisfactory Too low Raise

Raise

Raise

Too low

Too low

Cambodia Czechoslovakia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea German Democratic Republic Hungary

Poland

Lao People’s Democratic Republic Mongolia

Too low Raise Satisfactory Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Bulgaria

Raise

Too low

Satisfactory No intervention

Raise

Too low

Raise

Satisfactory Maintain

Belarus

Raise

Raise

Raise

Raise

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low

Too low

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Policy on fertility level

Satisfactory Maintain

View on fertility level

Albania

Policy on growth

View on growth

Country

Direct support Direct support

Direct support Limits

Direct support

Direct support Direct support Direct support Limits

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain Maintain Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Policy on emigration

(continued)

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high Lower Satisfactory Maintain Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

View on emigration

4. Population policies with elements of the socialist modernization discourse in different countries around the world according to UN database, 1986

370 APPENDIX

Varies regionally

Varies regionally

Varies regionally

Direct support

Limits Direct support Direct support

Government support for family planning

Not significant

Satisfactory

Satisfactory Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain

Maintain Maintain

Policy on immigration

Policy on emigration

Too high

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain Satisfactory Maintain

View on emigration

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx World Population Policies. (2015). World Population Policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/ WPP2015_Report.pdf

Varies regionally

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too low Raise Satisfactory Maintain

Union of Soviet Republics Yugoslavia

Policy on fertility level

Satisfactory Raise Satisfactory Maintain

View on fertility level

Romania Ukraine

Policy on growth

View on growth

Country

(continued)

APPENDIX

371

Raise

Too low

Too low

Too low

Too low Satisfactory

Cyprus

Federal Republic of Germany France

Greece Holy See

Raise

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Mauritania

Nicaragua

No intervention

Raise Maintain Raise

Iran Satisfactory (Islamic Republic of) Iraq Too low Ireland Satisfactory Israel Too low

Raise No intervention No intervention

Raise

Too low

Congo

No intervention No intervention Raise

Too low

Policy on growth

Chile

View on growth

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Too low Satisfactory Too low

Satisfactory

Too low Satisfactory

Too low

Too low

Too low

Too low

Too low

View on fertility level

No intervention No intervention

Raise Maintain Raise

Raise No intervention No intervention

Raise

Raise

No intervention No intervention Raise

Policy on fertility level

Indirect support

Limits Limits Direct support No support

Indirect support

Indirect support No support Limits

Direct support Direct support Direct support

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory Satisfactory Too low

Too high

Too high Satisfactory

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain Maintain Raise

Lower

Lower Maintain

Lower

Lower

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Too high

Too high

Satisfactory Too high Too high

Too high

Satisfactory Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on emigration

(continued)

Lower

Maintain

Maintain Lower Lower

Lower

Lower Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Maintain

Policy on emigration

5. Population policies with elements of the conservative discourse in countries around the world according to UN database, 1986

372 APPENDIX

Satisfactory

Switzerland

No intervention No intervention

Policy on growth

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on fertility level

No intervention No intervention

Policy on fertility level

Indirect support Indirect support

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory

Too low

View on immigration

Lower

Raise

Policy on immigration

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

View on emigration

Maintain

Lower

Policy on emigration

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx World Population Policies. (2015). World Population Policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/ WPP2015_Report.pdf

Satisfactory

View on growth

Paraguay

(continued)

APPENDIX

373

Raise Raise Raise Raise

Raise Raise

low low low low

Satisfactory Satisfactory

Too Too Too Too

Policy on growth

Satisfactory Satisfactory

Too low Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory

View on fertility level

Raise Raise

Raise Maintain Maintain Maintain

Policy on fertility level

No support No support

No support No support No support Limits

Government support for family planning

Satisfactory Too high

Too high Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory

View on immigration

Maintain Lower

Lower Maintain Maintain Maintain

Policy on immigration

Satisfactory Satisfactory

Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory

View on emigration

Maintain Maintain

Maintain Maintain Maintain Maintain

Policy on emigration

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx World Population Policies. (2015). World Population Policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/ WPP2015_Report.pdf

Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore United Arab Emirates

View on growth

6. Population policies with elements of the revitalization and direct protection discourse in countries around the world according to UN database, 1986

374 APPENDIX

Policy on growth

Policy on fertility level

Satisfactory No intervention Too high No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Too high No intervention

View on fertility level

Direct support Direct support Direct support

Direct support Direct support No support

Government support for family planning

Maintain Maintain

Satisfactory Satisfactory

Lower

Too high

Maintain

Maintain

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Maintain

Policy on immigration

Satisfactory

View on immigration

Policy on emigration

Lower

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Lower

Satisfactory Maintain

Satisfactory Maintain

Too high

Satisfactory Lower

View on emigration

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1976–2015). Population Division World population policies/Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, N. Y.: United Nations (Population studies). Published biannually, 1976–2015. http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx World Population Policies. (2015). World Population Policies 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/374). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2015/ WPP2015_Report.pdf

Satisfactory No intervention Guinea Satisfactory No intervention Libya Satisfactory No intervention Madagascar Too high No intervention Mozambique Satisfactory No intervention United Too high No interRepublic of vention Tanzania

Cuba

View on growth

7. Population policies with elements of the developmentalist discourse in countries around the world according to UN database, 1986

APPENDIX

375

Eurocentrism, direct competition for resources

Excessive growth is a key problem; it must be slowed down

Historical and social assumptions

Population growth

The question of differences in population growth is slowly declining in importance, but convergence is assumed

Eurocentrism; socially governed convergence in demographic behavior in order to avoid fierce competition

The goal is zero growth and the population process must be optimized

Increasingly Eurocentric; state sovereignty and planning are the priority

Malthusianism Demographic Socialist transition modernization

Population growth is not a key problem and this discourse aims to remain neutral in this regard, but the idea of natural increase is prevalent

Eurocentric, reformist in protecting certain values

Conservative reformism

8. Discursive patterns in the 1980s: an overview of discursive elements

Eurocentrism; the demographic and ethnic struggle of Eastern European small nations is important, with an emphasis on social background Important issue in the case of socially “oppressed” ethnic groups

Narodnik, ethnic competition

Biological strength is manifested in population numbers of competing states, and one’s “own” group should be the dominant one

Extreme Eurocentrism; radical intervention is needed to protect identity and “biological strength”

National revitalization

(continued)

Economic growth and structural transformation are the key instruments for regulating population growth

Not Eurocentric; a transformation of structures and models has the potential to solve population problems

Developmentalist, critical

376 APPENDIX

Mortality and aging

Fertility control has the potential to decrease poverty. Aging is not a problem

Fertility decline will come about anyway, but in different historical situations and periods in each region. Fertility rates will become extremely low in certain countries and areas In developed countries, population import may be needed in order to tackle the aging of the population All demographic processes shall be optimized. It is pivotal to improve mortality rates, too

Fertility decline must be stopped if it goes below the reproduction rate, and fertility should not decrease as a result of the rise in living standards

Malthusianism Demographic Socialist transition modernization

Fertility decline It is of pivotal importance to decrease fertility and its decline should be facilitated directly

(continued)

Not thematized clearly; maintaining earlier fertility levels helps with tackling the aging of the population

Fertility rates should not be decreased by “violent” measures. The spread of abortion must be stopped. A significant drop in fertility must be avoided

Conservative reformism

Mortality and aging are natural parts of the process; if too high, it is a sign of the decline of society

It must be reversed in the case of oppressed or neglected ethnic groups

Narodnik, ethnic competition

Interpreted as part of biological decline. A young population means strength

Fertility decline is desirable only in the case of the “valueless” population; otherwise, a high fertility rate reflects biological strength

National revitalization

(continued)

Extremely high mortality rates are thematized as part of global inequalities

A decline in fertility is only acceptable if it is the result of social progress, and it is not necessarily unavoidable

Developmentalist, critical

APPENDIX

377

It may function as an ultimate “safety valve.” The money expats send home can help overcome poverty

Excessive immigration is a problem, and the country should be protected against it

Immigration

It is needed but only selectively, in accordance with the needs of the local middle class and the economy

It should be limited, organized, planned, and it must not involve exploitation

No interpre- Outmigration is tation not thematized, often treated as a taboo, and it is allowed only among socialist countries, in a planned way

Malthusianism Demographic Socialist transition modernization

Outmigration

(continued) Narodnik, ethnic competition

It is desirable only to a very limited extent and people who are let in should be strongly selected, apart from a few exceptions

It poses a threat to ethnic communities. Strong xenophobia

Must be Outmigration decreased, as it is seen as a erodes the loss in the power of ethnic tradition and competition society and must be controlled through economic means

Conservative reformism

It must be extremely selective and must be decreased in general. The local “biological” power and identity must be protected. One’s “own” community must be protected restrictively

This only serves occupational purposes, otherwise it is “a loss of blood”

National revitalization

(continued)

It is a serious problem and the result of inequal exchanges; it poses threat to development. The local economy should provide the necessary resources, structural transformation is needed It is not opposed; it may unlock new potential for development

Developmentalist, critical

378 APPENDIX

Migrant group and type of migration to be supported

(continued)

The outmigration of overpopulated groups and poor people should be supported

Migrant groups who fit into the economic and social order shall be supported, and they will adapt to local demographic norms

Skilled workers and expert intellectuals from socialist countries, left-wing refugees

Malthusianism Demographic Socialist transition modernization Only the emigration and immigration of small groups that do not threaten the moral and social order should be encouraged. Cultural proximity or rapid assimilation

Conservative reformism Immigrants of the same ethnic group, only in limited numbers

Narodnik, ethnic competition The immigration of people of the same race and ethnic group is to be supported if they represent the “proper” biological, essential power

National revitalization

(continued)

Both the internal and external migration of the rural and urban poor shall be supported

Developmentalist, critical

APPENDIX

379

Discursive interrelationships in the 1980s and their relevance for the subsequent debate

(continued)

Supports Eurocentric biopolitical competition. Supports migration but also maintains biopolitical panic in relation to immigration. Supports hierarchical selection and direct intervention

Supports Eurocentric biopolitical competition. Supports migration as a population and labor reserve, but is defensive about the issue of cultural mixing. Accepts the principle of hierarchical selection and supports indirect intervention

Partly supports biopolitical competition and a Eurocentric turn. Planned development, action against low domestic fertility. Prointerventionist. Assumes almost total state sovereignty and welfare development. Conservative turn in terms of the individualization of family welfare allowances. Rejects hierarchical selection

Malthusianism Demographic Socialist transition modernization Radicalization of the abortion issue and strong pro-market stance. New neoconservative turn against international organizations and NGOs. Religious radicalization. Protection of local processes and social groups against immigrants

Conservative reformism Loss of social perspective. The conservative turn and the thematization of fertility decline and excessive abortion. Shifts towards the conservative and partly the national revitalization discourse. Disapproves of migration in both directions to protect ethnic identity

Narodnik, ethnic competition Discursive form with a heavy historical burden. An anti-elitist and marginal discourse with a limited presence in the world. Protection of the local and one’s “own” group at all cost and fear of mixing in terms of biological/national power. Supports administrative and hierarchical anti-immigrant intervention in terms of race and culture

National revitalization

Critique of other discourses, but especially of Malthusian discourse. Critique of the social system from a migration perspective. The primacy of social development overpopulation issues. Thematizes the protection of migrants

Developmentalist, critical

380 APPENDIX

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2019

5,232,709 7,819,239 11,455,205 62,334,025 5,628,602

5,141,117 7,133,491

10,230,931 56,134,478

5,270,074

5,887,930

12,681,123 68,831,561

5,341,192 8,471,317

6,052,124

13,825,839 75,523,576

5,421,701 9,097,262

6,183,877

15,011,114 82,761,244

5,554,849 9,695,117

6,325,121

16,212,022 92,442,549

5,688,695 10,281,675

(continued)

6,453,550

17,373,657 100,388,076

5,771,877 10,738,957

3,286,070 3,112,923 3,129,246 3,086,810 2,948,029 2,890,524 2,880,913 25,758,872 28,757,788 31,042,238 33,149,720 35,977,451 39,728,020 43,053,054 32,618,648 34,828,168 36,870,796 38,892,924 40,895,751 43,075,416 44,780,675 3,538,164 3,217,349 3,069,597 2,981,262 2,877,314 2,925,559 2,957,728 16,960,600 17,993,083 18,991,434 20,178,543 22,154,687 23,932,499 25,203,200 7,723,954 7,990,113 8,069,276 8,253,656 8,409,945 8,678,667 8,955,108 10,151,135 10,077,606 9,871,635 9,562,083 9,420,576 9,439,424 9,452,409 10,006,545 10,186,304 10,282,046 10,546,885 10,938,735 11,287,931 11,539,326 6,864,839 7,622,334 8,418,270 9,232,301 10,048,597 10,869,732 11,513,102 149,003,225 162,019,889 174,790,339 186,127,108 195,713,637 204,471,759 211,049,519 8,841,466 8,379,305 7,997,951 7,686,964 7,425,011 7,199,739 7,000,117 27,541,323 29,164,153 30,588,379 32,164,313 34,147,566 36,026,668 37,411,038 13,274,617 14,380,864 15,342,350 16,182,713 17,062,531 17,969,356 18,952,035 1,17 6,883,681 1,240,920,539 1,290,550,767 1,330,776,380 1,368,810,604 1,406,847,868 1,433,783,692 33,102,569 36,421,438 39,629,965 42,647,731 45,222,699 47,520,667 50,339,443 3,119,436 3,545,524 3,962,369 4,285,504 4,577,371 4,847,805 5,047,561 4,776,370 4,616,763 4,428,075 4,378,066 4,328,163 4,232,874 4,130,299 10,340,877 10,358,190 10,289,374 10,258,165 10,536,514 10,601,390 10,689,213

1990

9. Population of the sampled countries (persons)

APPENDIX

381

Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands

(continued)

1,433,026 5,119,012 57,801,887 4,976,252 81,138,653 10,745,502 7,744,509 10,349,308 61,442,658 3,592,180 57,174,412 2,533,705 126,365,486 15,839,357 21,862,300 45,292,521 4,566,096 2,508,476 3,626,609 91,663,290 4,340,602 2,298,017 26,994,255 15,467,852

3,510,881 57,048,237 2,419,901 124,505,243 16,383,881 20,293,057

42,918,416 4,372,885

2,664,447 3,696,035 83,943,135 4,365,562 2,184,139 24,807,461 14,965,442

1995

1,565,246 4,996,220 56,666,861 5,410,400 79,053,984 10,225,990 7,037,915 10,377,135 56,366,212

1990

2,384,150 3,501,842 98,899,845 4,202,659 2,397,417 28,793,672 15,926,188

47,379,237 4,920,712

3,783,095 56,692,178 2,654,698 127,524,168 14,922,724 22,929,078

1,399,111 5,187,953 59,015,092 4,362,184 81,400,883 11,082,103 8,463,802 10,220,509 65,623,397

2000

2,251,996 3,344,259 106,005,199 4,159,296 2,526,429 30,455,563 16,367,153

48,701,069 5,075,340

4,141,218 58,281,209 2,740,000 128,326,115 15,402,803 23,904,167

1,355,650 5,258,933 61,120,128 4,210,158 81,602,739 11,224,800 9,195,289 10,085,942 69,762,345

2005

2,118,855 3,123,825 114,092,961 4,086,090 2,719,902 32,343,384 16,682,927

49,545,638 5,422,298

4,554,330 59,325,232 2,810,464 128,542,349 16,252,273 24,548,840

1,332,103 5,365,784 62,879,535 4,099,096 80,827,001 10,887,640 9,949,318 9,927,380 73,762,519

2010

1,997,675 2,931,872 121,858,251 4,070,705 2,998,433 34,663,608 16,938,492

50,823,087 5,959,126

4,652,420 60,578,489 2,891,024 127,985,139 17,572,010 25,183,832

1,315,330 5,481,128 64,453,194 4,024,180 81,787,411 10,659,737 10,695,540 9,777,925 78,492,208

2015

(continued)

1,906,740 2,759,631 127,575,529 4,043,258 3,225,166 36,471,766 17,097,123

51,225,321 6,415,851

4,882,498 60,550,092 2,948,277 126,860,299 18,551,428 25,666,158

1,325,649 5,532,159 65,129,731 3,996,762 83,517 ,046 10,473,452 11,263,079 9,684,680 82,913,893

2019

382 APPENDIX

New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan

(continued)

3,674,940 4,652,185 1,983,259 4,366,996 2,739,667 4,776,838 24,299,168 69,784,087 38,458,642 10,091,322 22,964,747 148,227,471 4,303,953 5,375,470 1,991,126 41,435,761 39,787,413 18,242,917 8,836,421 5,764,806 59,467,272 9,125,400 58,486,453 4,207,841

4,247,286 2,470,946 4,223,413 22,071,433 61,895,169 37,960,193 9,895,358 23,489,156 147,531,562

4,319,763 5,288,455

2,006,404 36,800,507 39,202,524 17,325,769 8,567,375 5,283,811 56,558,196 8,242,509 53,921,758 3,683,978

1995

3,398,175 4,173,435 1,996,218

1990

1,987,710 44,967,713 40,824,745 18,777,606 8,881,642 6,216,329 62,952,639 9,708,347 63,240,196 4,516,128

4,584,570 5,399,207

4,499,375 3,030,333 5,323,202 26,459,944 77,991,757 38,556,699 10,297,117 22,137,423 146,404,890

3,858,992 5,069,310 2,034,823

2000

1,994,979 47,880,595 44,019,118 19,544,988 9,038,627 6,789,318 65,416,189 10,106,778 67,903,461 4,754,652

5,645,629 5,398,962

4,632,359 3,330,222 5,824,095 27,866,140 86,326,251 38,368,957 10,508,494 21,417,287 143,672,125

4,135,353 5,438,692 2,060,280

2005

2,043,336 51,216,967 46,931,011 20,261,738 9,390,157 7,527,397 67,195,032 10,635,245 72,326,992 5,087,211

6,415,636 5,404,293

4,885,878 3,642,691 6,248,017 29,027,680 93,966,784 38,329,784 10,596,055 20,47 1,860 143,479,273

4,370,060 5,824,058 2,070,737

2010

2,071,199 55,386,369 46,671,919 20,908,024 9,764,949 8,454,019 68,714,519 11,179,951 78,529,413 5,565,283

7,171,909 5,435,614

5,199,827 3,968,490 6,688,746 30,470,739 102,113,206 38,034,076 10,368,346 19,925,182 144,985,059

4,614,527 6,223,234 2,079,335

2015

(continued)

2,078,654 58,558,267 46,736,782 21,323,734 10,036,391 9,321,023 69,625,581 11,694,721 83,429,607 5,942,094

7,813,207 5,457,012

5,378,859 4,246,440 7,044,639 32,510,462 108,116,622 37,887,771 10,226,178 19,364,558 145,872,260

4,783,062 6,545,503 2,083,458

2019

APPENDIX

383

50,903,783 57,932,450 265,163,741 3,224,275 21,931,087 11,410,721

252,120,309 3,109,598 19,632,665

10,432,409

1995

51,463,101 57,134,377

1990

11,881,482

281,710,914 3,319,734 24,192,449

48,838,058 58,923,305

2000

12,076,697

294,993,509 3,321,799 26,432,445

46,890,775 60,287 ,953

2005

12,697,728

309,011,469 3,359,273 28,439,942

45,792,086 63,459,801

2010

13,814,642

320,878,312 3,412,013 30,081,827

44,921,636 65,860,149

2015

14,645,473

329,064,917 3,461,731 28,515,829

43,993,643 67,530,161

2019

Source United Nations. (2019). World Population Prospects, 2019, Online Edition Rev. 1. United Nations Department of Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/index.asp

Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

(continued)

384 APPENDIX

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland France

180,284 921,727 430,169 899,649 303,696 506,088 1,767,606 365,360 224,693 500,392 613,093 998,163 493,026 4,231,648 1,009,935 69,711 425,807 277,260 201,761 466,216 214,008 1,322,178 1,242,075 113,905 250,765 1,215,895

1990 501,142 979,704 481,996 901,872 344,311 490,849 1,736,499 376,028 283,540 751,469 649,577 1,069,031 499,207 5,030,369 1,217,608 85,421 735,556 333,356 207,983 675,282 326,230 1,492,244 933,330 129,640 288,821 1,353,418

1995 824,413 1,038,048 555,587 876,470 385,120 478,831 1,685,652 400,064 344,713 970,453 688,832 1,148,499 512,014 5,885,006 1,436,444 105,682 907,454 400,971 218,071 897,785 446,391 1,708,513 949,270 141,883 316,039 1,555,610

2000

10. Emigrant population of the sampled countries (persons)

966,234 1,599,882 808,409 898,086 430,599 494,587 1,581,211 439,693 543,783 1,220,052 906,520 1,190,001 542,211 7,327,438 1,887,924 118,673 840,203 607,009 225,671 1,023,442 987,059 1,901,661 1,119,319 150,427 302,908 1,725,773

2005 1,120,305 1,656,453 938,087 917,350 487,844 520,152 1,465,141 487,203 780,095 1,518,343 1,106,684 1,272,338 570,644 8,733,242 2,526,525 133,027 822,331 782,250 234,437 1,185,546 1,152,628 2,611,870 1,337,458 160,489 290,411 1,957,969

2010 1,129,044 1,838,674 946,815 946,978 529,676 531,451 1,472,195 532,447 825,826 1,530,784 1,155,732 1,286,881 619,927 10,161,659 2,703,591 139,525 816,168 836,740 241,896 1,456,950 1,130,942 3,187,593 1,514,601 195,142 288,880 2,135,048

2015

(continued)

1,207,032 1,944,784 1,013,414 964,848 577,255 575,950 1,480,794 581,740 878,211 1,745,339 1,541,860 1,323,087 650,151 10,732,281 2,869,032 150,400 990,012 911,388 255,616 1,558,668 1,183,685 3,547,626 1,600,739 208,257 290,006 2,296,534

2019

APPENDIX

385

Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama

(continued)

919,454 2,929,448 1,022,459 528,873 387,514 631,339 917,286 3,351,006 589,010 608,921 2,971,639 39,784 1,624,729 522,578 215,134 341,050 4,395,365 625,683 24,466 1,748,251 723,638 388,173 442,126 432,296 138,536 134,743

1990 953,289 3,045,354 1,004,521 665,028 404,699 746,894 863,749 3,207,777 719,398 657,199 3,295,163 54,029 1,785,743 550,026 229,015 342,455 6,949,297 620,036 27,694 1,884,066 734,149 417,098 438,387 492,304 151,368 133,405

1995 967,024 3,235,354 983,006 805,430 421,411 831,372 820,902 3,067,571 858,815 712,768 3,554,491 72,414 1,952,161 566,319 238,691 348,620 9,562,929 602,782 30,649 2,077,160 755,052 490,020 502,243 532,531 164,243 137,430

2000 888,613 3,446,260 868,029 972,717 468,156 889,941 771,302 2,699,529 906,462 722,116 3,718,750 86,930 2,039,728 652,862 271,170 412,612 10,818,079 715,599 42,378 2,473,209 799,588 556,056 436,780 459,289 175,298 132,266

2005 813,454 3,727,333 792,872 1,123,759 513,838 989,560 730,771 2,563,339 989,512 760,479 3,803,375 96,575 2,309,955 726,917 279,368 519,665 12,414,825 827,763 57,766 2,863,810 866,675 662,996 610,902 527,075 181,698 140,609

2010 841,734 3,756,136 826,306 1,469,133 554,781 1,171,364 744,443 2,692,064 1,031,086 780,809 3,904,820 107,524 2,089,862 745,416 307,919 559,733 11,924,099 911,446 66,861 2,984,804 897,767 736,037 647,919 562,907 190,472 150,417

2015

(continued)

852,816 4,014,203 1,039,257 1,585,681 632,126 1,301,975 816,797 3,077,777 1,111,021 838,852 4,005,587 113,118 2,176,580 754,969 332,220 610,223 11,796,178 1,013,417 73,488 3,136,069 980,753 777,303 682,865 658,264 202,336 161,107

2019

386 APPENDIX

297,979 314,854 2,033,684 1,510,415 1,873,457 813,066 12,662,893 61,854 133,006 91,496 308,303 1,439,019 885,951 206,848 537,701 311,308 465,576 2,640,033 259,987 5,545,760 3,794,333 1,739,233 237,486 185,946 204,365

1990 336,064 509,283 2,508,005 1,776,628 1,922,320 977,495 11,621,262 457,828 191,650 108,668 386,225 1,362,439 925,755 226,803 555,428 417,273 476,954 2,771,722 243,524 5,606,432 3,713,904 1,839,745 233,993 242,811 288,001

1995 374,876 699,598 3,092,284 2,048,371 1,995,386 1,139,475 10,721,414 509,099 251,584 118,724 501,905 1,290,279 981,294 258,000 541,185 537,198 486,980 2,891,893 223,704 5,596,883 3,866,248 1,991,803 235,641 319,240 351,996

2000 545,839 973,644 3,712,857 2,887,741 1,744,741 2,108,741 10,358,533 147,931 272,294 119,620 602,433 1,113,967 1,137,286 270,865 586,243 637,455 579,219 2,749,962 229,249 5,567,629 4,148,316 2,291,218 299,038 438,692 499,882

2005 766,008 1,302,167 4,719,359 3,731,041 1,950,392 3,370,044 10,130,259 126,868 261,356 123,291 745,100 1,086,552 1,410,887 304,911 584,770 773,556 616,386 2,723,385 236,614 5,433,315 4,450,254 2,669,958 338,334 558,491 715,395

2010 842,425 1,387,590 4,947,011 4,004,328 2,461,470 3,362,050 10,194,421 171,734 301,269 138,082 754,644 1,271,020 1,498,852 327,091 602,976 930,185 759,817 3,199,215 257,988 5,740,765 4,028,281 2,982,435 598,965 690,683 836,920

2015

871,638 1,512,920 5,377,337 4,446,985 2,631,559 3,572,794 10,491,715 187,102 345,683 147,593 824,601 1,444,942 1,775,768 353,825 597,959 1,020,119 813,213 3,493,071 260,832 5,901,067 4,274,998 3,167,072 633,439 2,519,780 933,654

2019

Source United Nations. (2019). International Migrant Stock, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.

Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

(continued)

APPENDIX

387

388

APPENDIX

11. Emigration rates of the sampled countries

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

5.49 3.58 1.32 25.43 1.79 6.55 17.41 3.65 3.27 0.34 6.93 3.62 3.71 0.36 3.05 2.23 8.91 2.68 3.92 6.54

16.10 3.41 1.38 28.03 1.91 6.14 17.23 3.69 3.72 0.46 7.75 3.67 3.47 0.41 3.34 2.41 15.93 3.22 3.97 8.64

26.35 3.34 1.51 28.55 2.03 5.93 17.08 3.89 4.09 0.56 8.61 3.75 3.34 0.46 3.62 2.67 20.49 3.90 4.08 10.60

31.30 4.83 2.08 30.12 2.13 5.99 16.54 4.17 5.89 0.66 11.79 3.70 3.35 0.55 4.43 2.77 19.19 5.92 4.16 11.25

38.00 4.60 2.29 31.88 2.20 6.18 15.55 4.45 7.76 0.78 14.90 3.73 3.34 0.64 5.59 2.91 19.00 7.42 4.22 12.23

39.06 4.63 2.20 32.37 2.21 6.12 15.60 4.72 7.60 0.75 16.05 3.57 3.45 0.72 5.69 2.88 19.28 7.89 4.25 14.17

41.90 4.52 2.26 32.62 2.29 6.43 15.67 5.04 7.63 0.83 22.03 3.54 3.43 0.7 5 5.70 2.98 23.97 8.53 4.43 14.51

2.09 2.36

2.85 2.39

3.52 2.48

7.14 2.52

7.68 3.16

6.98 3.45

6.81 3.53

23.57 7.28 5.02 2.15 16.99 3.71 10.00 7.51 3.73 1.12

16.58 9.05 5.64 2.34 19.16 3.75 9.35 8.59 3.91 1.22

16.12 10.14 6.09 2.64 22.17 3.97 8.87 9.52 4.12 1.27

18.49 11.10 5.76 2.82 21.11 4.22 7.73 10.58 4.64 1.28

21.63 12.05 5.41 3.11 19.84 4.61 7.28 11.29 5.18 1.34

23.95 14.84 5.27 3.31 20.92 4.59 7.75 13.74 5.67 1.49

24.80 15.71 5.24 3.53 21.34 4.81 9.92 14.08 6.53 1.57

26.13 5.87 24.34 0.49 18.14

24.05 5.61 28.39 0.52 20.80

21.70 5.41 32.35 0.56 23.82

18.63 4.63 33.08 0.56 24.14

16.05 4.32 35.21 0.59 23.40

16.00 4.44 35.67 0.61 22.22

16.73 5.08 37.68 0.66 21.59 (continued)

APPENDIX

389

(continued)

Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

0.20

0.25

0.32

0.36

0.39

0.43

0.44

3.79 11.95

3.94 12.05

4.12 11.51

4.19 12.86

4.66 13.41

4.11 12.51

4.25 11.77

8.07 9.23 5.24 14.33 1.12 7.05 4.84 11.42 10.59 21.66

9.13 9.44 7.58 14.28 1.21 6.98 4.75 11.35 9.42 24.82

10.01 9.96 9.67 14.34 1.28 7.21 4.74 12.70 9.91 26.17

12.04 12.34 10.21 17.20 1.68 8.12 4.89 13.45 8.03 22.29

13.18 16.64 10.88 20.26 2.12 8.85 5.19 15.17 10.49 25.45

15.41 19.09 9.79 22.39 2.23 8.61 5.30 15.95 10.41 27.07

17.42 22.11 9.25 25.06 2.28 8.60 5.74 16.25 10.43 31.59

3.26 5.45 7.06 1.43 3.29 3.98 18.93 3.46 8.58

3.47 4.87 7.04 2.10 3.59 4.62 19.05 4.26 7.84

3.65 4.54 7.04 2.64 3.96 5.31 19.38 5.15 7.32

3.78 3.97 9.37 3.49 4.30 7.53 16.60 9.85 7.21

3.72 3.86 12.26 4.49 5.02 9.73 18.41 16.46 7.06

3.66 3.79 12.59 4.55 4.84 10.53 23.74 16.87 7.03

3.76 3.79 12.37 4.65 4.97 11.74 25.73 18.45 7.19

1.43 2.52 4.56 0.84 3.67 5.11 2.41 10.18 0.55 5.65 4.90 7.06 10.78 6.64

10.64 3.57 5.46 0.93 3.42 5.07 2.57 9.63 0.70 5.23 4.74 5.79 11.01 6.41

11.10 4.66 5.97 1.12 3.16 5.23 2.90 8.71 0.85 5.02 4.57 4.95 11.46 6.56

2.62 5.04 6.00 1.26 2.53 5.82 3.00 8.63 0.97 5.73 4.05 4.82 11.87 6.88

1.98 4.84 6.03 1.45 2.32 6.96 3.25 7.77 1.15 5.80 3.77 4.65 11.87 7.01

2.39 5.54 6.67 1.36 2.72 7.17 3.35 7.13 1.35 6.80 4.07 4.64 12.78 6.12

2.39 6.33 7.10 1.41 3.09 8.33 3.53 6.42 1.47 6.95 4.19 4.39 13.41 6.33

0.69

0.69

0.71

0.78

0.86

0.93

0.96 (continued)

390

APPENDIX

(continued)

Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

7.64 0.95 1.96

7.26 1.11 2.52

7.10 1.32 2.96

9.00 1.66 4.14

10.07 1.96 5.63

17.55 2.30 6.06

18.30 8.84 6.38

Source United Nations. (2019). International Migrant Stock, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. United Nations. (2019). World Population Prospects, 2019, Online Edition Rev. 1. United Nations Department of Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/dev elopment/desa/population/publications/database/index.asp

12. GDP per capita (constant USD 2015) of sampled countries as a share of world average

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep.

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

23.82 46.36 129.06 15.42a 493.43 462.09 47.74a 435.03 25.88 92.94 62.32 472.80 80.85 12.96 54.18 88.83 144.29a 175.43a

21.73 40.46 154.83 13.47 524.20 479.62 27.21 444.91 27.41 95.17 56.48 467.47 108.89 21.08 58.79 97.82 102.20 158.75

24.71 39.71 148.51 16.21 537.44 492.02 33.75 453.82 26.28 87.14 47.84 485.31 111.86 27.41 50.57 96.55 112.47 156.06

30.29 43.54 140.84 27.44 543.81 477.39 45.46 442.92 25.37 85.33 59.70 476.60 120.11 38.57 51.04 98.04 128.97 172.40

38.01 42.13 157.58 31.83 526.61 463.19 60.74 425.89 27.04 93.57 67.15 440.44 126.98 59.24 55.48 107.30 124.06 175.43

38.82 41.17 147.55 35.55 514.26 433.58 58.94 403.49 29.92 86.86 69.30 425.68 133.78 77.17 60.86 111.35 115.32 173.68

41.42 37.85 125.78 39.98 497.49 426.32 57.23 391.69 30.71 78.30 76.08 412.00 127.67 90.94 58.71 112.62 124.31 181.29

583.07 38.57

618.31 43.62

628.31 50.26

601.32 50.61

549.54 59.62

524.35 65.95

531.99 73.54

63.36 28.07

63.02 30.56

53.73 31.91

56.78 31.69

57.24 36.15

60.36 33.87

53.71 35.26

(continued)

APPENDIX

391

(continued)

El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

31.69 125.55a 463.78 435.61 25.21 438.87 230.40 14.82 127.94 48.96

38.52 102.53 426.08 438.03 13.79 453.70 224.41 11.43 109.49 49.89

38.27 127.44 482.47 443.25 18.68 443.83 232.70 10.59 114.50 50.45

38.03 170.20 492.41 423.06 25.06 413.46 252.77 8.63 130.80 54.96

37.00 157.99 468.23 396.93 30.79 410.13 237.50 7.67 121.87 58.60

36.52 172.69 421.79 373.77 36.62 404.94 181.75 7.70 125.51 49.40

36.67 189.48 423.09 367.42 40.86 395.35 181.42 7.05 138.89 44.90

342.15 406.05 69.27 410.88 89.36a 13.54

403.47 415.17 73.62 419.27 52.08 9.60

536.42 414.56 62.68 392.40 55.91 7.81

577.41 383.75 59.67 376.00 80.67 7.71

496.93 344.29 52.60 349.49 95.74 6.92

617.48 298.67 48.39 338.00 103.41 6.37

702.11 290.05 46.96 330.69 104.50 5.73

141.15 17.68

192.74 8.37

215.18 9.13

243.35 9.69

273.71 10.44

284.23 11.04

292.44 11.30

99.37a 114.52a 108.82 27.81 26.33 22.72 460.96 376.63 18.66 65.14a

69.42 70.52 105.43 14.58 20.86 21.04 480.54 391.16 17.59 41.37

84.26 82.03 113.04 11.88 20.55 21.28 516.14 385.63 18.44 41.73

120.17 112.70 102.97 15.36 24.27 23.32 488.16 398.01 18.26 41.32

115.34 118.33 95.41 16.98 28.59 27.02 475.19 376.25 18.05 46.31

133.64 139.14 94.67 18.75 38.62 28.77 445.25 379.01 20.20 47.70

147.42 158.68 90.19 20.48 40.20 29.63 451.72 386.55 17.85 49.35

737.09 77.24 52.72 40.05 24.94 76.06 218.07 72.26 119.02a

828.60 87.57 52.95 45.17 23.68 80.42 223.84 63.86 70.07

859.13 88.78 42.09 42.15 22.57 92.69 239.62 58.57 68.67

845.96 90.70 45.52 44.87 23.21 98.60 222.90 72.42 85.68

779.31 110.02 51.22 55.66 25.13 115.42 210.96 80.70 94.60

731.20 134.33 53.28 61.37 28.26 123.75 189.45 87.99 92.85

698.22 138.83 53.81 60.73 31.92 137.09 197.88 102.52 90.87

(continued)

392

APPENDIX

(continued)

Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

11.14 117.01a

8.33 107.30

4.10 113.47

5.51 131.85

5.7 9 154.86

5.84 160.38

6.06 166.75

253.15a 68.17 278.97 18.51 508.57 16.35a 37.28 29.41 79.16 53.79a 47.57a 451.78

189.31 60.80 284.95 22.05 490.80 6.68 51.28 30.89 82.23 28.39 21.61 469.46

207.33 57.47 303.49 24.49 521.70 5.55 44.90 34.04 83.10 29.42 18.22 487.10

223.81 59.23 300.79 26.05 530.52 7.33 51.21 36.85 88.90 32.58 24.96 497.63

222.12 59.76 274.17 31.72 519.28 8.39 55.52 40.39 90.70 46.22 23.99 448.93

205.03 56.48 252.36 37.99 508.30 9.16 57.55 38.06 107.90 63.84 19.97 438.23

219.59 51.20 259.88 39.62 500.40 10.21 60.70 36.19 108.90 71.12 21.28 425.39

581.33 117.48 154.79 14.01

603.84 133.11 157.91 13.08

627.75 128.70 132.87 11.12

618.83 118.02 125.43 7.99

572.09 144.44 129.56 11.94

562.91 153.88 112.83 14.24

560.26 150.34 47.42 13.08

a Imputed using the closest values in time or commensurately

UNCTADstat. (2020). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https:// unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/

13. Mean years of schooling in sampled countries (years)

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

8.12 4.63 7.86 9.58 11.26 9.71 8.99 9.44 5.92 5 9.4 11.97

8.54 5.66 8.26 9.88 11.61 10.16 9.44 9.84 6.43 5.45 9.74 12.33

9.09 6.54 8.66 10.19 11.97 10.5 9.93 10.21 6.98 5.87 10.06 12.66

9.4 7.34 9.06 10.49 12.35 10.79 10.38 10.58 7.58 6.32 10.31 12.95

9.68 8.09 9.43 10.75 12.72 11.07 10.79 10.9 8.16 6.81 10.54 13.21

10 8.75 9.81 10.82 13.17 11.54 11.04 11.38 8.81 6.73 11.33 13.06

(continued)

APPENDIX

393

(continued)

Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech RepubliclePara> Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

8.82 5.49 5.45 7.05 9.35 11.25 11.24 5.22 6.21 3.92 4.46 11.44 10.51 9.24 10.22 12.5 8.04 1.91 9.68 4.63 9.26 7.9 7.49 11.67 9.17 9.32 8.95 8.75 11.42 10.92 5.71 7.63 8.11 1.94 10.28 11.21 4.03 6.45 11.46 7.34 5.98 7.29

9.33 6.11 5.95 7.42 9.76 11.46 11.46 5.82 6.85 4.58 5.03 11.89 10.96 9.67 10.75 12.71 8.7 2.27 10.16 5.37 9.68 8.46 8.15 12.05 9.51 9.83 9.74 9.27 11.63 11.55 6.41 8.42 8.75 2.42 10.63 11.66 4.51 7.25 11.66 7.88 6.44 7.89

9.78 6.62 6.39 7.74 10.18 11.66 11.66 6.35 7.38 5.26 5.57 12.24 11.34 10.08 11.18 12.86 9.29 2.74 10.61 6.15 10.17 8.98 8.68 12.43 9.87 10.23 10.44 9.66 11.82 12.04 7.02 9.11 9.21 2.9 10.92 12.05 4.92 7.9 11.87 8.33 6.88 8.43

10.19 7.02 6.87 8.06 10.58 11.88 11.84 6.89 7.83 6.07 6.07 12.48 11.69 10.46 11.52 12.99 9.81 3.36 11.04 7.01 10.82 9.48 9.1 12.77 10.23 10.49 11 9.99 11.98 12.38 7.53 9.73 9.49 3.33 11.17 12.41 5.31 8.49 12.09 8.72 7.34 8.9

10.57 7.44 7.33 8.42 10.96 12.1 11.98 7.47 8.28 6.86 6.61 12.62 11.97 10.84 11.77 13.13 10.3 4.14 11.38 7.86 11.53 9.93 9.48 13.07 10.67 10.68 11.56 10.38 12.1 12.69 8.01 10.22 9.8 4 11.4 12.71 5.77 9.08 12.35 9.09 7.81 9.39

10.82 7.92 7.88 8.67 11.38 12.71 12.43 7.97 8.68 7.74 7.15 13.19 12.52 11.36 12.34 13.53 10.78 4.87 11.97 8.56 11.82 10.75 9.75 13.04 10.93 10.76 11.98 10.66 12.43 13.03 8.6 10.6 10.11 4.75 11.98 13.01 6.2 9.6 12.79 9.64 8.22 9.71

(continued)

394

APPENDIX

(continued)

Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7.34 10.89 4.33 8.92 8.23 2.05 11.19 10.72 6.88 7.21 6.79 10.22 9.68 7.8 3.68 5.41 10.13 8.48 11.55 11.66 7.18 7.39 7.05

7.74 11.16 5.02 9.44 8.74 2.37 11.43 10.9 7.49 7.85 7.49 10.65 10.43 8.27 4.41 6.05 10.56 9.09 11.79 11.9 7.59 7.96 8.01

8.08 11.43 5.77 9.87 9.23 2.73 11.65 11.08 8.11 8.48 8.24 11.02 10.96 8.63 5.17 6.67 10.89 9.57 12.02 12.1 7.98 8.43 8.83

8.44 11.7 6.55 10.25 9.66 3.03 11.9 11.27 8.61 9.11 8.94 11.36 11.32 9.01 5.95 7.26 11.08 9.99 12.25 12.25 8.32 8.87 9.53

8.78 11.96 7.17 10.57 10.05 3.51 12.17 11.49 9.08 9.59 9.6 11.69 11.58 9.4 6.91 7.82 10.9 10.33 12.49 12.4 8.62 9.3 10.05

9.08 12.7 7.75 11.04 10.2 3.95 12.96 11.8 9.62 10.35 9.98 12.21 11.67 9.67 7.79 8.36 10.71 10.61 12.87 12.8 9.01 9.6 10.67

Source Wittgenstein Centre Human Capital Data Explorer. (2022). http://dataexplorer. wittgensteincentre.org/

14. Agricultural employment as a share of total employed population in the sampled countries

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia

1990a (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

55.91 23.95 0.34 44.83 5.46 7.71 16.41 2.99 42.09

54.26 23.53 0.62 45.41 4.94 7.34 16.12 2.68 41.25

51.59 22.21 0.67 43.25 4.86 6.05 14.84 1.91 38.94

47.21 18.43 1.28 38.28 3.58 5.27 12.82 2.04 38.61

42.08 11.86 1.27 38.60 3.23 5.21 11.03 1.35 29.99

41.36 10.35 0.26 35.33 2.64 4.53 9.70 1.18 27.85

36.69 9.86 0.09 29.64 2.56 3.58 11.02 0.96 30.71

(continued)

APPENDIX

395

(continued)

Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic

1990a (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

18.98 19.54 3.49 19.09 59.70 23.13 18.03 22.37 8.23 5.46 21.74

18.14 16.80 3.15 15.70 52.20 22.41 17.67 20.64 6.64 4.39 20.34

16.48 13.20 2.52 14.44 50.01 22.33 16.30 16.55 5.22 3.67 15.60

16.62 8.94 2.12 13.16 44.80 20.60 15.25 17.30 3.98 3.18 13.68

12.65 6.82 1.81 10.60 36.70 18.38 11.41 14.25 3.10 2.42 12.42

10.20 6.86 1.64 9.38 28.58 16.01 12.31 9.23 2.92 2.50 10.05

9.22 6.39 1.45 9.00 25.36 16.61 12.11 5.96 2.72 2.19 9.02

29.26 39.29

28.91 33.99

29.67 29.63

30.35 30.94

27.88 28.28

26.19 25.82

29.20 23.79

28.56 19.25 8.89 5.74 48.62 3.50 22.09 38.79 11.77 24.63

26.77 10.18 7.76 4.89 48.46 3.17 20.43 38.70 8.02 23.98

21.61 6.36 6.21 4.14 52.17 2.64 17.40 36.82 6.46 24.53

19.99 5.19 4.82 3.64 54.34 2.37 12.16 35.49 4.87 24.75

20.78 4.22 4.44 2.91 48.09 1.65 12.40 33.56 4.54 19.22

18.11 3.90 4.22 2.74 44.05 1.39 12.90 30.31 4.90 18.03

16.28 3.18 3.61 2.44 41.82 1.21 11.98 28.66 4.70 17.95

13.81 8.30 28.04 6.73 38.68 55.52

12.01 6.58 23.20 5.70 38.77 56.33

7.95 5.23 20.85 5.09 36.60 56.31

5.91 4.20 18.10 4.46 32.41 54.39

5.75 3.77 17.81 4.07 28.28 53.53

5.34 3.75 17.75 3.63 18.01 52.01

4.62 3.68 15.93 3.42 15.80 51.30

14.61 35.50

11.77 47.19

10.60 53.08

7.94 38.50

6.60 32.34

5.11 29.31

4.88 21.17

(continued)

396

APPENDIX

(continued)

Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

1990a (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

18.59 22.59 25.94 43.03 43.52 47.46 4.28 10.76 34.00 25.79

17.53 21.95 23.48 45.19 46.14 47.09 3.83 9.67 33.63 25.93

14.93 19.24 17.41 50.87 48.64 45.11 3.28 8.70 31.53 24.34

12.05 14.27 15.03 40.65 39.88 45.48 3.70 7.16 28.89 20.79

8.61 8.83 13.92 27.52 33.53 40.53 3.06 6.74 29.41 18.61

7.94 9.07 13.43 34.15 28.45 37.20 2.32 6.14 30.98 17.86

6.75 6.87 12.61 35.93 27 .42 34.69 2.04 5.66 30.65 15.38

6.06 27.30 33.78 36.63 44.90 25.57 11.88 29.78 14.24

5.46 20.80 32.94 35.31 43.41 22.63 11.48 40.33 15.77

4.29 16.97 33.31 34.68 37.15 18.67 12.68 45.21 14.49

3.30 15.68 32.02 34.82 35.36 17.38 12.05 32.29 10.14

2.55 17.42 25.62 27.73 32.84 13.05 11.20 31.01 7.75

2.01 14.67 19.70 28.26 29.19 11.53 7.53 25.59 6.71

2.06 13.95 20.13 27.39 23.41 9.23 5.85 21.71 5.76

71.23 11.10 10.86 11.25 10.21 42.84 3.85 56.10 60.33 23.36 47.81 31.30 23.92 2.16

71.17 9.20 10.44 10.91 8.99 39.57 3.49 60.02 51.97 22.30 43.39 31.02 25.12 2.05

70.18 6.93 9.60 9.93 6.69 41.25 2.91 60.24 48.79 20.52 39.32 30.33 25.14 1.53

68.06 4.75 9.11 7.05 5.30 37.27 2.32 55.47 38.68 18.52 25.68 28.09 22.14 1.38

63.91 3.23 8.82 4.86 4.20 31.82 2.10 52.43 38.24 17.95 23.70 24.81 20.33 1.22

57.94 3.18 7.08 5.61 4.12 28.66 2.04 48.31 32.28 14.51 20.41 21.86 15.26 1.14

54.93 2.18 5.23 5.09 4.09 24.52 1.65 44.92 31.61 13.03 18.38 19.88 14.48 1.03

1.90 12.47 12.64 60.76

1.81 12.22 13.52 60.62

1.63 11.64 10.61 60.61

1.41 10.94 10.28 64.55

1.42 11.57 8.26 65.53

1.44 8.82 7.39 67.17

1.34 8.12 8.31 66.54

a Missing 1990 values were imputed using 1991 data.

Source World Bank Database. https://databank.worldbank.org/databases

APPENDIX

397

15. FDI inflowsa as a share of GDP in the sampled countries

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2.19 0.03 1.30 0.25 1.83 0.49 0.05 3.42 1.50 0.36 0.24 0.95 3.02 2.57 1.16 2.28 0.58 2.48

2.27 0.41 2.63 4.19 1.44 0.99 1.00 8.45 6.89 1.40 1.57 1.81 4.71 4.34 1.79 3.24 2.11 4.03

3.92 1.10 2.45 5.88 2.80 2.16 1.95 20.64 7.57 3.19 8.88 2.87 6.62 3.92 2.80 4.34 4.89 7.02

5.63 1.49 2.28 7.83 2.72 2.56 2.57 12.07 3.50 2.58 16.58 3.26 6.79 3.13 4.13 6.69 5.65 4.74

7.56 1.28 2.04 5.93 3.57 2.10 3.32 8.68 3.70 2.54 9.05 3.44 8.26 1.77 3.99 5.85 4.47 2.72

9.64 0.83 1.48 3.35 4.10 1.15 3.23 5.66 2.04 3.73 2.98 2.94 7.07 1.19 4.83 4.64 2.28 3.44

0.99 1.41

2.49 2.60

4.87 3.26

1.43 3.89

0.89 4.06

0.99 3.77

1.48 2.59

2.08 1.24

3.49 0.98

1.43 5.50

0.75 3.04

0.88 1.89

0.34 3.00 0.38 0.98 0.17 0.15 0.91 0.16 11.38 -0.06

2.36 5.44 1.98 1.48 5.26 0.52 0.65 0.26 20.82 0.04

2.98 8.58 4.14 1.57 7.07 2.29 0.74 0.28 45.98 1.01

3.65 10.11 2.30 1.18 11.05 1.24 0.90 1.03 32.24 1.08

2.41 7.25 2.33 1.07 9.99 1.11 0.86 1.71 54.12 0.61

2.03 5.58 2.11 1.14 9.57 1.06 1.39 1.73 82.90 0.80

1.44 0.30 1.89 0.02 2.18

6.09 0.34 3.48 0.05 4.90

12.09 1.02 5.14 0.13 10.94

2.51 1.14 6.74 0.20 11.40

12.13 0.97 4.80 0.13 7.70

20.26 1.29 4.65 0.18 4.23 (continued)

398

APPENDIX

(continued)

Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

0.01

0.13

0.13

0.08

0.47

0.49

0.38 0.94

0.58 4.10

1.28 4.15

1.00 5.55

0.86 7.77

0.74 7.07

1.38 0.26 1.42 0.41 0.32 0.83 1.94 2.57 0.53 0.77

4.81 3.85 2.55 1.92 0.85 1.56 3.52 3.35 2.71 1.21

4.39 4.32 2.58 5.40 4.29 2.92 7.79 2.06 4.01 4.66

4.69 3.82 2.84 7.37 10.02 3.17 5.21 1.21 4.90 5.78

4.68 2.88 2.67 5.14 23.21 2.79 3.91 1.75 7.13 3.96

3.21 2.02 2.79 3.64 12.57 2.79 8.91 1.53 6.01 3.47

0.79 -0.22 0.96 1.58 1.55 0.80 1.68 0.27 0.18

1.73 5.84 1.35 3.27 1.54 2.45 1.41 1.62 0.58

2.20 6.41 1.22 3.49 1.50 3.77 3.00 4.90 1.93

2.03 7.90 0.78 4.55 1.51 3.29 2.17 6.30 3.45

2.83 9.42 1.24 4.96 1.26 2.66 2.37 3.62 2.72

1.26 7.83 1.28 4.24 1.66 2.62 3.58 2.43 2.19

-0.98 2.09

0.02 3.69

1.71 10.74

3.35 7.46

13.10 2.69

9.37 1.75

0.76 0.03 1.49 0.88 1.01 0.43 1.70 1.99 0.26 2.95 0.20 1.59

0.78 0.61 1.75 1.11 5.38 1.16 1.92 2.31 0.34 5.34 0.80 2.44

2.11 1.42 3.89 1.04 6.86 5.75 3.76 2.62 0.54 3.51 2.61 3.14

1.73 1.73 3.14 1.28 4.42 9.12 3.42 4.37 1.99 6.94 5.44 3.60

1.07 1.48 2.56 1.26 3.15 5.76 2.48 3.99 1.96 11.94 4.76 3.31

2.17 1.36 2.24 1.25 2.28 4.29 1.65 2.47 1.57 7.62 4.25 2.65

0.76

1.22

1.49

1.21

1.42

1.54 (continued)

APPENDIX

399

(continued) 1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

0.62 1.35 0.15

0.58 3.06 0.94

1.06 2.75 1.00

5.47 1.15 0.63

5.32 0.55 2.00

1.90 0.55 2.17

Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe a Nine year averages

Source Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD Database: UNCTADstat. (2020). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https:// unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/

16. FDI stock as a share of GDP in the sampled countries

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

0.93a 2.53 5.93 2.09a 24.82 6.97 0.03a 28.44 21.07 9.13 0.54 18.93 46.13 5.24 6.21 18.23 0.92a 4.52a

8.82 3.98 10.01 4.81 28.46 7.88 0.35 39.22 23.30 6.15 2.35 20.33 32.54 13.76 5.86 3.56 2.21 12.30

7.08 6.18 21.94 25.17 29.77 15.84 12.12 82.65 61.77 15.69a 20.41 43.64 58.39 15.96 11.28 18.79 12.30 35.11

12.67 7.97 27.48 26.46 32.56 26.13 7.63 98.08 51.36 19.95 46.43 54.44 63.92 11.90 25.48 35.96 30.00 44.51

27.29 12.12 20.07 44.60 40.61 40.98 17.31 98.42 35.06 28.99 89.29 60.84 73.63 9.64 29.01 42.76 53.86 61.94

38.08 15.81 12.37 41.11 45.36 41.83 31.83 118.87 35.15 23.85 85.92 51.81 95.79 11.07 50.83 56.34 49.19 62.42

57.43 18.33 15.35 41.51 51.02 46.18 23.37 106.95 27.85 35.33 77.49 59.84 95.22 12.44 64.78 67.82 49.79 69.63

6.65 6.00

12.86 4.57a

44.82 6.98

27.38 24.97

29.86 35.35

30.39 44.41

30.44 50.31

10.67 30.68

14.82 22.34

34.59 20.86

23.76 30.58

17.05 34.06

16.02 29.68

18.17 39.69

4.40 1.82a 3.02

3.28 15.07 6.08

16.74 46.43 19.31

28.35 79.40 26.76

39.48 78.95 34.79

38.28 82.07 34.81

37.95 88.35 29.26

(continued)

400

APPENDIX

(continued)

France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

8.20 0.00a 12.79 5.80 4.81 1.53 2.12

14.53 1.13 12.09 8.01 1.21 24.34 2.00

13.50 23.69 24.24 10.71 2.58 48.43 2.33

17.24 35.52 22.49 11.78 3.72 54.09 7.07

23.82 69.24 28.14 11.70 9.32 69.41 5.90

28.12 92.03 23.26 12.25 15.14 69.26 11.46

32.11 109.78 24.96 19.18 23.22 61.48 9.68

76.95 5.10 14.98 0.31 4.10a 0.04

63.83 5.56 23.84 0.62 14.08 0.27

127.28 10.71 36.83 1.03 55.09 0.50

77.27 12.78 61.53 2.12 44.83 0.79

128.55 15.37 82.11 3.77 55.83 1.15

305.35 18.54 99.82 3.97 72.31 4.73

289.89 22.35 107.48 4.37 84.09 4.99

1.81 0.39a

3.19 9.67

7.59 31.52

11.22 25.49

11.84 35.41

12.25 69.45

14.34 66.26

2.53a 1.13a 7.48 0.46a 0.01 9.93 22.56 17.47 4.07 2.46a

11.42 5.25 11.42 4.59 2.24 13.24 24.49 40.74 9.33 1.84

21.31 20.23 17.19 29.03 13.77 22.73 58.53 44.27 27.77 14.31

29.02 32.32 28.28 34.40 126.36 33.18 69.98 38.44 39.06 33.34

45.66 41.42 36.83 42.40 117.46 48.36 69.47 40.75 53.44 46.25

54.37 38.28 42.89 38.24 176.14 49.09 182.76 37.46 70.82 47.60

52.34 37.88 49.69 40.80 166.01 56.18 193.25 39.57 92.85 50.81

10.34 36.84 6.94 4.57 6.66 0.17 12.20 0.00 0.03a

12.37 35.31 6.15 10.32 8.20 5.52 15.74 2.18 1.39

17.67 57.38 13.27 21.38 16.98 19.48 28.93 18.57 11.37

25.62 64.70 9.97 20.88 14.53 28.21 37.31 25.78 23.15

41.36 70.46 11.95 29.13 12.97 39.14 50.97 41.33 30.15

38.83 73.38 13.22 45.51 19.99 38.94 68.56 39.57 19.23

40.39 98.28 18.92 50.48 24.10 40.34 69.08 40.32 27.27

27.65 2.49a

20.53 6.47

32.99 33.64

18.17 60.36

18.70 55.81

24.53 52.02

47.89 56.65

(continued)

APPENDIX

401

(continued) 1990 (%) Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

12.15a 7.89 12.29 7.23 4.87 0.39a 9.32 56.32 5.38 0.00a 0.30a 18.65

8.47 9.66 17.20 8.47 11.70 3.28 10.45 55.40 6.41 18.95 1.78 14.89

11.77 31.86 26.19 13.09 35.89 15.82 24.48 53.76 6.89 19.24 11.97 26.51

19.49 37.51 33.34 12.43 44.59 0.76 32.44 52.18 14.24 16.88 19.28 31.05

22.15 47.84 44.23 10.91 71.19 21.73 40.83 71.20 24.41 59.52 38.87 43.15

29.34 39.93 46.99 12.43 63.02 29.01 45.67 73.59 18.49 82.38 47.26 52.27

34.01 42.92 54.39 15.25 64.48 36.70 46.94 76.16 21.62 83.87 31.90 73.63

9.00 7.27 8.22 2.04

13.09 5.29 11.01 4.48

26.98 9.15 30.29 14.20

21.48 16.38 30.59 19.24

22.68 30.98 9.17 15.07

31.27 59.21 8.17 19.87

43.93 50.31 11.82 23.50

a Imputed using the closest values in time or commensurately

Source Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD Database: UNCTADstat. (2020). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https:// unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/

17. Exports as a share of GDP in the sampled countries

Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bolivia Brazil

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

10.72 20.86 8.06 8.83a 12.28 24.71 25.86a 57.32 19.03 7.72

8.44 24.44 7.49 19.74 13.58 23.95 33.53 61.90 16.39 5.98

7.50 40.30 8.55 14.43 15.62 34.32 68.02 79.55 14.64 8.45

8.17 44.58 20.11 18.64 13.94 39.62 51.16 86.73 29.60 13.29

12.95 35.39 15.99 10.24 16.36 38.93 44.18 84.77 32.58 9.14

16.83 20.89 8.81 14.07 15.03 40.00 47.22 85.87 26.44 10.61

17.70 20.55 14.45 19.35 19.36 40.12 53.07 84.01 20.72 12.43

(continued)

402

APPENDIX

(continued)

Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Haiti Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania Mexico Moldova

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

24.27 21.41 23.98 15.74 11.92 19.95 30.83a 28.16a 26.67 22.79

28.20 31.72 21.34 20.26 9.27 30.21 20.15 36.28 27.52 24.00

36.63 37.14 24.51 20.57 13.18 39.13 20.45 47.20 31.17 23.94

39.30 30.73 33.56 33.33 14.60 35.22 19.33 57.32 32.19 17.30

40.96 23.96 32.54 25.92 13.88 25.35 19.74 64.09 29.95 12.70

50.11 26.35 25.43 20.64 12.16 17.20 26.10 84.50 31.54 13.72

49.77 25.78 24.85 17.57 12.41 19.17 28.64 81.13 31.89 13.40

17.82 7.18

17.64 5.22

26.89 5.51

24.33 13.67

25.15 12.32

18.46 6.72

20.59 9.09

12.08 13.66a 18.79 17.09 2.21a 23.77 8.28 5.18 26.89 20.03

18.52 41.17 30.18 18.82 5.31 20.25 8.07 4.09 27.70 16.05

24.96 67.21 36.58 23.94 10.04 28.33 8.90 8.67 59.71 25.75

23.25 54.74 31.98 21.06 12.83 34.12 6.97 11.62 55.71 24.84

24.39 58.85 27.90 19.78 13.70 37.07 9.34 8.63 72.81 20.63

23.50 55.69 25.50 20.71 14.74 39.46 14.52 10.55 79.12 17.86

22.30 51.78 27.44 21.12 21.78 38.99 17.94 14.48 77.67 11.09

48.10 14.48 21.95 9.18 16.36a 12.63

64.59 19.90 21.69 8.13 25.53 19.78

77.34 21.03 14.38 9.81 48.18 6.67

51.81 20.09 13.62 12.51 48.75 10.27

52.44 20.96 10.04 13.50 40.51 18.32

42.32 24.89 8.89 14.24 24.92 25.50

43.90 26.71 9.88 13.85 32.26 1.37

22.69 19.33a

21.92 27.41

29.90 37.29

30.42 27.31

40.77 36.62

35.94 21.58

32.58 23.30

17.45a 33.65a 13.57 21.25a

24.21 40.36 22.09 35.13

23.55 33.01 23.50 30.53

30.52 45.16 24.41 30.42

40.05 56.02 28.20 22.10

45.35 61.35 32.51 25.39

45.76 61.52 36.43 23.67

(continued)

APPENDIX

403

(continued)

Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua North Macedonia Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zimbabwe

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2019 (%)

38.52 14.07 41.40 20.67 9.30 35.97a

28.21 17.77 44.92 21.61 11.32 25.58

40.65 19.10 55.84 24.42 17.29 35.06

36.40 17.89 59.32 18.94 26.25 32.61

40.33 19.06 67.83 21.42 37.12 35.63

39.74 22.07 74.54 19.36 37.94 45.07

56.08 24.60 78.35 19.22 42.28 57.53

28.42 5.51 15.92 11.26 16.53 21.70 20.86 12.22 11.37a

27.62 6.80 19.34 10.29 21.31 16.11 19.29 21.01 20.49

35.07 7.28 23.95 13.44 47.00 18.47 20.54 27.81 40.16

33.59 44.86 27.88 22.83 40.03 29.22 19.35 28.12 31.60

30.47 37.32 23.88 24.27 25.80 33.32 20.77 29.83 26.02

26.93 20.98 23.11 18.14 20.09 41.69 27.62 34.06 24.99

24.79 15.69 20.07 20.87 19.42 45.03 28.66 31.92 24.68

15.65 31.26a 41.90a 20.18 10.35 20.36 22.16 7.48a 26.08 26.09 6.25 45.57a 13.20a 16.93

3.59 42.81 38.95 17.92 15.92 24.83 30.31 61.57 33.34 27.66 9.27 85.84 26.06 17.74

1.51 57.11 43.22 21.99 19.26 28.38 33.26 91.21 54.56 27.24 10.18 50.81 45.01 17.18

9.60 65.04 53.16 20.03 16.70 22.72 33.60 39.31 58.60 32.52 14.65 34.86 38.36 15.14

13.24 71.70 60.63 24.34 17.91 15.16 32.01 21.19 56.67 37.29 14.75 28.78 37.85 16.80

12.05 84.95 74.10 25.52 23.62 13.08 27.80 11.34 53.40 32.60 17.56 27.74 41.88 15.91

15.20 84.98 84.28 25.59 24.15 13.95 30.49 14.93 45.44 38.50 23.71 21.30 32.66 16.67

6.57 18.32 37.20 12.62

7.61 9.88 24.65 19.17

7.58 10.05 28.62 22.07

6.87 19.71 38.29 25.73

8.47 16.69 16.69 26.57

8.20 14.43 10.83 16.27

7.63 13.67 8.25 17.56

a Imputed using the closest values in time or commensurately

Source Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD Database: UNCTADstat. (2020). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https:// unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/

404

APPENDIX

18. Information on given variables used in each model

(a) Dependent variables: Changes in the emigration rates are expressed as the share of the total population of each sending country between 1995–2000, 1995–2005, and 1995–2010. The input data used to calculate these variables were taken from the UN DESA Population Databases.1 (b) Independent variables: (1) Changes in the emigration rates are expressed as the share of the total population of each sending country between 1990 and 1995. The purpose of using this variable was twofold. On the one hand, we used it as a proxy variable to examine cumulative causation. On the other hand, it was intended to at least partially address the biases caused by omitted/unobserved variables. In accordance with our cumulative causation hypothesis, this variable should have a positive effect on the subsequent increases of emigration over all three examined time periods. The input data used to calculate this variable were taken from the UN DESA Population Databases.2 (2) Changes in GDP per capita (held constant at the 2015 US dollar value) were calculated relative to the world average between 1990 and 1995. The hypothesis, derived from modernization theory, is that an increase in the value of this variable improves people’s capability to emigrate; that is, it has a positive effect on the dependent variable in all three time periods. However, this effect might be different at different levels of development. The data source used for creating this variable is the statistical database of UNCTAD.3 1 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/ind ex.asp. 2 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/ind ex.asp. 3 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/ For countries that are of particular importance for my analysis, but for which there was no data available for 1990 due to changes in national borders or the collapse of former state structures, I filled in the missing values by proxy, based on the chronologically most relevant available information.

APPENDIX

405

(3) Changes in the mean years of schooling were also recorded for the period between 1990 and 1995. In line with modernization theories, increasing educational attainment and human capital have a positive effect on emigration at all three time periods; however, this effect might be different at different levels of development. The source of the data is the Wittgenstein Center database.4 (4) Changes in the inflow of foreign direct investment are expressed as share of GDP between 1990 and 1995. According to world-systems theories, the inflow of capital increases the involvement of the local population in migration processes, through it catalyzes changes in the local economic structure. When creating this variable, partly to address issues arising from missing data and partly to eliminate extreme fluctuations with regard to some cases, we calculated nine-year moving averages using data taken from UNCTAD.5 (5) Change in the stock of foreign capital as share of GDP between 1990 and 1995. Similarly to the previous variable, it is anticipated that the accumulation of the stock of foreign direct investment contributes to the transformation of the local economic structure and thus indirectly triggers the emigration of the local population. The source of the data is the UNCTAD database.6 (6) Changes in the share of those employed in agriculture compared to the total population of employed people between 1990 and 1995: labor market restructuration, suggested by both modernization and world-systems theories, and the decline of traditional agricultural employment are expected to increase emigration. The source of the data is the World Bank database.7 (7) Changes in the share of exports and GDP, which, in line with world-systems theory, are expected to increase emigration due 4 http://dataexplorer.wittgensteincentre.org. 5 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/. 6 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/ I have filled in the missing values by proxy, based on the chronologically most similar available information. 7 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/ Data for the year 1990 were unavailable so I used data from 1991 when calculating the variables.

406

APPENDIX

to the opening up of the economy. The source of the data is UNCTAD database. (c) Additional variables8 : (1) The level of development or the rank occupied in the global hierarchy: since the impacts of independent variables might differ by level of development, as suggested both by modernization and the world-systems theories, two dummy variables were introduced, based on GDP per capita (held constant at the 2015 US dollar value), as compared to the world average. These are the “Peripheral” (if the GDP per capita of a country was less than half of the world average in 1990) and “Semiperipheral” dummy variables (if the GDP per capita of a country was between 50 and 150% of the world average in 1990).9 The reference category is the group of “Core” countries (the GDP per capita of which exceeded 150% of the world average in 1990). In accordance with both migration transition and the world-systems theories, the populations of ‘Semi-peripheral’ countries are more prone to emigrate. It is presumed that, in contrast to other categories, the explanatory variables would prevail in the case of “Semi-peripheral” countries. The source of data is the UNCTAD database.10 . (2) Population in 1995: trivially, the population size of sending countries affect outmigration rates, as well as ‘per capita’ variables, thus population size needs to be accounted for in the model.

8 It must be noted that, in addition to the additional variables listed here, the change in the emigration rate over the reference period, which I included as a factor to explain cumulative causality, can also be considered an additional control variable that compensates for biases caused by unobserved variables. 9 This partially corresponds to the scale used by Böröcz; however, I defined the criterium of semi-peripheral countries as having 150% of the world average GDP per capita, as opposed to Böröcz who set it at 200%. See Böröcz, J. (2009). The European Union and Global Social Change: A Critical Geopolitical Economic Analysis. Routledge. pp. 75–76. 10 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/

APPENDIX

407

Log-linear regressions were used to build three multivariate models for each time interval, based on the above-presented variables: the modernization and the world-system models, and finally, a joint model that integrates all enumerated variables. No separate model was created for cumulative causation. Instead, I included the change of outmigration rates according to the reference period. The following variables were common in the modernization and the world-system models: (a) changes in emigration rates between 1990 and 1995; (b) changes in GDP per capita relative to the world average between 1990 and 1995; (c) population size in 1995; and, (d) ‘Peripheral’ and ‘Semi-peripheral’ dummies. In addition, changes in terms of the mean years of schooling and in terms of agricultural employment in the reference period were included in the modernization model, while changes in FDI inflow, FDI stocks, and exports (as shares of GDP) were included in the market opening model. The analysis was carried out on a sample of 77 countries that, due to their specific demographic and economic characteristics, did not include: . countries with less than one-and-a-half million inhabitants, . the poorest countries in the world,11 in the case of which mass emigration as well as foreign direct investment is limited precisely because of poverty, . countries where sharp population growth made increases in emigration rates practically invisible. Accordingly, we left out those countries in which during the period concerned the population growth rate was among the highest (top 30%) of all observed countries. Basic data on the countries concerned are listed in the Annex. It is important to note that within our sample the migration processes of recent decades corresponded to global migration trends, with the exception of 1990. In 1990, the emigration rate in the sample was slightly lower than the world average.

11 Countries in which the GDP per capita was less than 10% of the world’s average in 1990 were not included in the sample.

408

APPENDIX

Fig. App.1. Emigration rates within the sample and at a global level, 1990– 2019.

United Nations. (2019). International Migrant Stock (Matrix), POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 19. Results of modeling Coefficients of the log-linear regressions explaining the populationproportionate emigration rate for the Modernization, World System, and Joint models over the three time periods considered (1995–2000, 1995– 2005, 1995–2010). Standardized Beta values are given in parentheses and standard errors in square brackets. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Change in share of agricultural employment in total employment between 1990 and 1995 (ln) Change in FDI inflows as a share of GDP between 1990 and 1995 (ln) Change in total foreign capital stock as a share of GDP between 1990 and 1995 (ln) Change in exports as a share of GDP between 1990 and 1995 (ln) Population in 1995 (ln)

0.00355 (0.00488) [0.04015] 0.0217*** (0.17637) [0.00693] 0.00051 (0.01498) [0.00196] −0.00744 (−0.02788) [0.01634] 0.00312 (0.03975) [0.00416]

0.00525 (0.06749) [0.00798]

0.06908** (0.17911) [0.02629]

0.51028*** (0.89551) [0.02983]

World System

0.06089 (0.15712) [0.04126] −0.41627* (−0.18072) [0.22432] 0.03193 (0.0439) [0.07422]

0.21196*** (0.57832) [0.03521]

Modernization

Model

Change in population-proportionate emigration rate between 1990 and 1995 (ln) Change in GDP per capita in relation to world average between 1990 and 1995 (ln) Change in average number of school years between 1990 and 1995 (ln)

1995–2000

Period Modernization

0.21341 (0.19583) [0.13711] −1.09099 (−0.16843) [0.74537] 0.4436* (0.21688) [0.24663]

0.0212*** (0.17226) [0.00709] 0.00036755 (0.01083) [0.002] −0.00852 (−0.03192) [0.01668] 0.00329 0.00808 (0.04188) (0.03692) [0.00421] [0.02651]

0.06917** (0.17935) [0.02647] −0.0606 (−0.02566) [0.15517] 0.00382 (0.00524) [0.04043]

0.50655*** −0.13616 (0.88897) (−0.13211) [0.03151] [0.11699]

Joint

1995–2005

0.05285* (0.19337) [0.02671] 0.00686 (0.09097) [0.00755] −0.02303 (−0.03887) [0.06301] 0.00249 (0.01428) [0.01606]

0.32772** (0.20241) [0.15483]

0.27943*** (0.32621) [0.10138]

0.72743*** (0.57475) [0.11503]

World System

(continued)

0.05095* (0.18644) [0.02735] 0.00633 (0.08397) [0.00772] −0.02707 (−0.04568) [0.06432] 0.00312 (0.01788) [0.01625]

0.27978*** (0.32661) [0.10207] −0.22705 (−0.04329) [0.5984] 0.32873** (0.20303) [0.1559]

0.71347*** (0.56371) [0.12151]

Joint

APPENDIX

409

Change in population-proportionate emigration rate between 1990 and 1995 (ln)

−0.17902 (−0.1308) [0.15469] Change in GDP per capita in relation to world average between 1990 and 1995 0.34518* (ln) (0.23852) [0.18129] Change in average number of school years between 1990 and 1995 (ln) −1.12121 (−0.13034) [0.98556] Change in share of agricultural employment in total employment between 1990 0.65452** and 1995 (ln) (0.24097)

Modernization

0.15129 [0.44404] 0.0403

Modernization

Model

0.00727 (0.03294) [0.01817] 0.00518 (0.02369) [0.01441] −0.03564 [0.07121] 0.8213

Joint

1995–2010

0.00288 (0.01307) [0.01419] 0.00321 (0.01469) [0.01341] −0.0361 [0.07072] 0.8236

World System

1995–2005

Period

Corrected R 2

Constant

Semi-periphery

−0.00065 [0.13363] 0.3126

Modernization

Model

Periphery

1995–2000

Period

(continued)

(0.19639)

0.43945*

0.81845*** (0.4679) [0.16617] 0.42308*** (0.35737) [0.14645]

World System

0.07667 (0.15648) [0.05473] 0.10561** (0.21755) [0.05172] −0.00335 [0.27272] 0.4685

World System

(continued)

(0.19714)

0.79511*** (0.45456) [0.17547] 0.42366*** (0.35786) [0.14738] −0.3796 (−0.05237) [0.8641] 0.44113*

Joint

0.0931 (0.19) [0.07007] 0.11298** (0.23273) [0.05557] −0.00164 [0.2746] 0.4613

Joint

410 APPENDIX

[0.3261]

Corrected R 2

Constant

Semi-periphery

Periphery

Population in 1995 (ln)

Change in exports as a share of GDP between 1990 and 1995 (ln)

Change in total foreign capital stock as a share of GDP between 1990 and 1995 (ln)

0.31078 [0.58712] 0.0486

0.00529 (0.01822) [0.03505]

[0.22367] 0.0669* (0.1771) [0.03858] 0.01285 (0.12331) [0.0109] −0.09449 (−0.11538) [0.09102] 0.0007 (0.00289) [0.0232] 0.15984** (0.23604) [0.07906] 0.17216** (0.25662) [0.07471] 0.06716 [0.39397] 0.4193

Modernization

Model

Change in FDI inflows as a share of GDP between 1990 and 1995 (ln)

World System

1995–2010

Period

(continued)

[0.22512] 0.06373 (0.16871) [0.03949] 0.01197 (0.11484) [0.01115] −0.10124 (−0.12362) [0.09288] 0.00175 (0.00724) [0.02347] 0.1873* (0.2766) [0.10118] 0.18448** (0.27498) [0.08025] 0.07002 [0.39653] 0.4118

Joint

APPENDIX

411

412

APPENDIX

20. Estimated migration flows between 1990 and 1995

Source Sander, Nikola D., Bauer, Ramon & Abel, Guy J. (2014). Visualizing global international migration flows. Paper presented at the European Population Conference 2014. Reproduced with permission of the authors.

APPENDIX

413

21. Estimated migration flows between 1995 and 2000

Source Sander, Nikola D., Bauer, Ramon & Abel, Guy J. (2014). Visualizing global international migration flows. Paper presented at the European Population Conference 2014. Reproduced with permission of the authors.

414

APPENDIX

22. Estimated migration flows between 2000 and 2005

Source Sander, Nikola D., Bauer, Ramon & Abel, Guy J. (2014). Visualizing global international migration flows. Paper presented at the European Population Conference 2014. Reproduced with permission of the authors.

APPENDIX

415

23. Estimated migration flows between 2005 and 2010

Source Sander, Nikola D., Bauer, Ramon & Abel, Guy J. (2014). Visualizing global international migration flows. Paper presented at the European Population Conference 2014. Reproduced with permission of the authors.

416

APPENDIX

24. Odds ratios for labor market integration based on logistic regression of factors affecting employment, Hungary, 201612 B Speaks Hungarian and another language (reference: Hungarian speakers) Non-Hungarian speakers (reference: Hungarian speakers) No information on language provided (reference: Hungarian speakers) Born abroad (reference: born in Hungary) Born in Romania (reference: born in Hungary) Born in Serbia (reference: born in Hungary) Born in Slovakia (reference: born in Hungary) Born in Ukraine (reference: born in Hungary) Born in Vietnam (reference: born in Hungary) Born in China (reference: born in Hungary) Went to secondary school but has no leaving certificate (reference: 8 yrs in primary school or less) Has secondary school leaving certificate (reference: 8 yrs in primary school or less) Has tertiary diploma (reference: 8 yrs in primary school or less) In the education system (reference: does not study) Arrived less than 10 yrs ago (reference: more than 10 yrs ago) Man (reference: woman) County towns (reference: capital) Other towns (reference: capital) Villages (reference: capital)

S.E

Wald

df

Sig

Exp(B)

−0.341 0.008

1672.968 1

0.000

0.711

−0.523 0.012

1962.396 1

0.000

0.593

−0.309 0.009

1194.851 1

0.000

0.734

−0.423 0.012

1155.947 1

0.000

0.655

0.775

0.014

3048.054 1

0.000

2.171

0.430

0.023

351.138 1

0.000

1.537

0.531

0.022

595.242 1

0.000

1.701

0.153

0.019

67.554 1

0.000

1.165

1.701

0.044

1481.708 1

0.000

5.477

1.127

0.027

1785.320 1

0.000

3.085

0.996

0.003 117,679.481 1

0.000

2.706

1.196

0.003 176,666.532 1

0.000

3.308

1.706

0.003 253,275.640 1

0.000

5.509

−4.921 0.012 155,749.268 1

0.000

0.007

−0.028 0.000 117,851.446 1

0.000

0.972

0.730 −0.116 −0.107 −0.118

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

2.075 0.891 0.898 0.889

0.002 130,202.278 1 0.003 1226.657 1 0.003 1229.867 1 0.003 1403.214 1

(continued)

12 I am grateful to the Population Statistics Unit of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (Marcell Kovács and Benedek Kovács) for their help in conducting this analysis.

APPENDIX

417

(continued) B Interaction effects In the education system, has 8 yrs in primary school or less In the education system, went to secondary school but has no leaving certificate In the education system, has secondary school leaving certificate Constant Nagelkerke’s R Square

S.E

Wald

df

Sig

Exp(B)

2.716

0.019

21,197.886 1

0.000 15.121

1.550

0.013

13,952.549 1

0.000

2.823

0.015

37,743.988 1

0.000 16.834

0.701

0.013

2753.525 1

0.000

4.710

2.016 0.346

a Variable(s) entered on step 1: Native languages, O_Magyar, O_Romanian, O_Serbian, O_Slovakian, O_Ukrainan, O_Vietnamese, O_Chinese, School 4, Studies, KEV, No, TTIP, Studies * School 4 Source Author’s calculation, based on HCSO Microcensus. (2016). Microcensus 2016— Hungarian Central Statistical Office. https://www.ksh.hu/mikrocenzus2016/

25. Title and launch date of journals specialized in migration since 1990 Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland Asian and Pacific Migration Journal: APMJ International Migration Bulletin Rural Migration News CMR Working Papers (Formerly: ISS Working Papers/Prace Migracyjne) Trends in International Migration Forced Migration Review Migrantenstudies: Driemaandelijks Tijdschrift voor Onderzoek naar etnische Minderheden en de Nederlandse Migration Migration und Bevölkerung Tendances des Migrations Internationales European Journal of Migration and Law Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health (Formerly: Journal of immigrant health) Migration Trends/Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (Formerly: Migration trends and outlook) Journal of International Migration and Integration Migraciones & Exilios Migration Research Series/IOM (Formerly: IOM migration research series/International Organization for Migration) Migraciones Internacionales

1991 1992 1993 1995 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 2001

(continued)

418

APPENDIX

(continued) Siskind’s Immigration Bulletin Cislennost’ i migracija naselenija Rossijskoj Federacii Diasporas: Circulations, Migrations, Histoire International Dialogue on Migration Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Emigration Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies (Formerly: Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Services) Migration Information Source Terra Cognita: Schweizer Zeitschrift zu Integration und Migration = Revue Suisse de l’Integration et de la Migration = Rivista Svizzera dell’Integrazione e della Migrazione Migración y Desarrollo Migraciones Migration Policy Issues Social Employment and Migration Working Papers/OECD Irish Migration Studies in Latin America Migration Letters: An international Journal of Migration Studies Migrationsbericht der Integrationsbeauftragten Treffpunkt: Magazin für Migration und Integration Yearbook of Immigration Statistics Forschungsbericht/Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care Journal of Migration and Refugee Issues (via Hein Online) Transit: a journal of travel, migration, and multiculturalism in the German-speaking world Working Paper/Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Formerly: Working papers/Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) Finnish Journal of Ethnicity & Migration (via EBSCO Host) Infodienst Migration und öffentliche Gesundheit Integration und Migration: Ein Wegweiser für Berlin Perspectives des Migrations Internationales Translocations: Migration and Social Change Faits et Chiffres: Aperçu de l’Immigration/Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada Journal of Identity and Migration Studies Migrations- und Integrationsforschung Politische Essays zu Migration und Integration Scritture Migranti (-2012) Andina Migrante/SIMA [Sistema de Información sobre Migraciones Andinas] Estudios Migratorios (via EBSCO Host) WZB Discussion Papers/Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Abteilung Migration, Integration, Transnationalisierung, Transnationalization Archiwum Emigracji Hommes & Migrations

2001 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002

2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008

2009 2009

(continued)

APPENDIX

419

(continued) Lengua y Migración Migration in Zimbabwe Migrazine.at Beiträge zu Migration und Integration Crossings: Journal of Migration & Culture (via EBSCO Host) OECD Reviews of Migrant Education Revista Internacional de Estudios Migratorios (RIEM) Estado de las Migraciones que atañen a la República Dominicana … (Formerly: Estado del arte de las migraciones que atañen a la República Dominicana) Migration Policy Practice Journal Nordic Journal of Migration Research Recruiting Immigrant Workers Central and Eastern European Migration Review Comparative Migration Studies IZA Journal of Development and Migration Migration Studies Journal on Migration and Human Security Migration news sheet: your reliable source of news, policy, and legal updates on migrants and refugees Migration, Integration, Asyl Odisea: Revista de Estudios Migratorios Wanderungsmonitoring: Erwerbsmigration nach Deutschland Anuario CIDOB de la inmigración Emigrantologia Słowian Hallesche Studien zum Migrationsrecht MiGAZIN: Migration in Germany Movements: Journal für Kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung PÉRIPLOS: Revista de Pesquisa sobre Migrações (Formerly: Cadernos OBMigra: revista migrações internacionais) Diritto Immigrazione e Cittadinanza (2017-) World Migration Report

2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2017 2018

Source Electronic Journals Library, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Accessed June 5, 2019

Index

A Abel, Guy.J., 152, 153 abortion, 30, 31, 45, 49, 67, 75, 77, 80, 81, 87, 91, 358, 376, 378 Abrams, Philip, 11 aging, 32, 63, 67, 82, 116, 118–120, 122, 123, 125, 148, 172, 179, 182–184, 232, 234, 288, 289, 303, 305, 327, 328, 357, 376 Albania, 72, 90, 155, 174, 187, 193, 213–218, 225, 258, 260, 299, 370, 379, 383, 386, 388, 390, 392, 395, 397, 399 Andor, László, 19, 119, 173 anti-natalism, 35, 46, 52, 53 assimilation, 36, 93, 266, 377 asylum, 14, 27, 113–116, 146, 155, 164, 167–171, 195–197, 236, 275, 276, 278, 302, 306, 313, 346, 350 B biopolitical competition, 34, 35, 72, 83, 175, 378

biopolitics, 33, 34, 84, 94, 181, 201, 223, 257, 281, 282, 305, 314, 322, 328, 345, 347, 352, 353 Bohle, Dorothee, 186, 191, 215, 221–223, 233 Böröcz, József, xiii, 91, 119, 125, 148, 163–165, 173, 182, 189, 259, 313, 344, 346, 347, 404 Bozóki, András, 173 Braudel, Fernand, 11, 12, 94, 111 Brunnbauer, Ulf, xiii, 11, 13, 35, 36, 53, 67, 72, 79, 343 Bulgaria, 35, 153, 164, 187, 211–215, 217, 218, 260, 299, 370, 379, 383, 386, 388, 390, 393, 395, 397, 400

C Camus, Renaud, 4, 329, 331 Cantat, Céline, 6, 157, 160, 346, 347 coloniality, 49 conservative demographic discourse, 74

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9

421

422

INDEX

Croatia, 155, 187, 202, 211, 214, 215, 217, 218, 260, 264, 379, 383, 386, 388, 391, 393, 395, 397, 400 Csepeli, György, 18, 173, 183, 346 cumulative causation, 109, 125, 126, 142, 402, 405 Czaika, Mathias, 110, 112, 160, 269 Czech Republic, 4, 147, 180, 186, 189–196, 201, 202, 213, 215, 218, 220, 221, 223, 257, 260–262, 264, 305, 343, 348, 350, 379, 383, 386, 388, 391, 393, 395, 397, 400 D Dancygier, Rafaela M, 18, 19, 119, 123 Demény, Paul, 43, 46, 55, 317–322, 324–327, 331, 350 Demográfia journal, 39, 73, 74, 300 demographic transition discourse, 60, 61, 66, 75, 83, 87, 299, 306, 322 dependency, 88, 90, 91, 173, 193 developmentalist discourse, 94, 312, 375 double movement, 9, 10, 16, 78, 148, 172, 253 E Éber, Márk, xiii, 134, 172, 173, 179, 194, 201, 205, 215, 344 Embeddedness, 10, 17, 18, 51, 110, 156, 283, 296, 346, 347 emigrant stock, 193 emigration, 1, 2, 37, 39–43, 52–56, 72, 73, 77, 82, 109, 110, 112, 125–127, 130, 134, 135, 137, 141–146, 150, 151, 177, 179, 181, 183, 184, 186, 188,

190–196, 200, 201, 203, 211–213, 215, 217, 218, 220, 221, 223–227, 229, 231–233, 256, 264, 266, 268, 269, 272–277, 289, 291, 293–295, 297, 298, 301–303, 305–307, 309–311, 320, 323, 344, 347, 348, 350, 358–375, 377, 402, 403, 405–407 Estonia, 188, 219–225, 227, 257, 258, 260–262, 264, 265, 302, 343, 380, 383, 386, 389, 391, 393, 395, 397, 400 ethnic-narodnik discourse, 78 Eurobarometer, 253, 259, 260, 263–265 European Union (EU), 3, 19, 148, 149, 162–164, 168, 171, 172, 177, 179, 183, 190, 202, 210, 211, 214, 221, 232, 236, 260, 263–266, 274, 283, 288, 290, 292, 302, 305, 306, 308, 311, 320, 327, 345, 347, 349, 351, 352 F Fábry, Adam, 173 fictitious commodity, 16, 17, 283, 351 fictitious migration exchange, 201 foreign direct investment (FDI), 11, 109, 110, 133–135, 144–146, 149, 179, 215, 225, 269, 291, 292, 312, 403, 405, 407, 408 Foucault, Michel, 34, 282 G Georgia, 113, 148, 188, 219, 220, 227, 229–231, 260, 380, 384, 386, 389, 391, 393, 395, 398, 400

INDEX

Ger˝ ocs, Tamás, 79 globalization, 1, 7–9, 11, 15, 16, 18, 29, 33, 43, 57, 58, 62, 69, 70, 77, 85, 87, 92, 93, 109, 111–114, 116–118, 122, 123, 127, 129, 130, 133–135, 137, 138, 141, 143–148, 150–158, 161, 171, 173–175, 177, 179, 182, 184, 188, 192–195, 198, 203, 204, 211, 213, 214, 225, 227, 229, 232, 235, 236, 253, 256–260, 269–276, 278, 282, 283, 291, 292, 294, 295, 298, 300, 301, 306–308, 312, 315–317, 319, 320, 323, 325–328, 343, 344, 346–348, 350, 352 Google Books, 7, 38–40, 43, 44, 46, 59, 75, 268, 274 Gramsci, Antonio, 10, 11, 14, 15, 19, 93, 326, 327, 352 Grandits, Hannes, 11 Great Replacement, 2, 4, 17, 37, 308, 322, 324, 328–330 Greskovits, Béla, 186, 191, 215, 221–224, 233

H Haas, Hein de, 10, 35, 43, 109, 110, 112, 126, 127, 129, 130, 142, 160, 183, 191, 215, 225, 269, 272, 273, 279 Hablicsek, László, 198, 303, 304, 331 Hann, Chris, xiii, 8, 12, 16, 17, 74, 134, 172, 193, 195, 225, 282, 344, 348 Hárs, Ágnes, xiii, 18, 125, 183, 191, 204, 215, 225 historical conjunction, 109, 141, 161, 164, 253 Hobsbawm, Eric, 43, 121–123

423

Hungary, 5, 35, 37, 71, 74, 80, 81, 147, 153, 169, 179, 180, 186, 189–191, 193, 194, 197, 199, 201–203, 205–211, 213–215, 218, 220–223, 233, 254, 257, 260–262, 264–267, 299, 302–305, 329, 343, 345, 347, 348, 350, 370, 380, 384, 386, 389, 391, 393, 395, 398, 400, 413 I immigrant stock, 167 immigration, 1–5, 9, 32, 37, 39–42, 51–55, 62–66, 73, 77, 81, 82, 85, 86, 93, 94, 121, 123, 126, 141, 146, 150, 155–157, 160, 161, 174–177, 180, 185–188, 193–201, 203, 211, 217, 218, 223, 226, 227, 231–233, 256, 257, 259, 261, 263–266, 268, 269, 272–277, 284, 288–291, 294–298, 301–309, 311, 317, 319–326, 348, 358–375, 377, 378 J Joppke, Christian, 4, 12, 19, 29, 36, 111, 282, 283, 308–310, 315, 344 K Kentor, J., 109, 111, 135, 141, 144, 145 Krausz, Tamás, xiii, 172 L Latvia, 3, 188, 202, 219, 223–227, 264, 302, 303, 380, 384, 387, 389, 391, 394, 396, 398, 400

424

INDEX

Lithuania, 3, 188, 202, 219, 223–227, 260, 302, 303, 380, 384, 387, 389, 391, 394, 396, 398, 400 Lukács, Georg, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 34, 235, 280–282, 324 M Malthusian discourse, 43, 44, 46, 49, 53, 55, 58–62, 66, 293, 295, 317, 378 Malthus, Thomas, 18, 46–52, 89, 296, 319, 321 marketization, 1, 7–16, 28, 34, 61, 64, 77, 78, 82, 87, 108–111, 127, 134, 142, 145, 148, 171, 179, 184, 190, 194, 201, 223, 228, 232, 235, 259, 276, 278–283, 295, 297, 302, 307, 310, 312, 314, 315, 320, 324, 326–328, 343, 344, 347 Messing, Vera, 173, 260, 264, 267, 346 migration competition, 201 migration transition, 64, 110, 126, 127, 143, 146, 213, 404 migration turn, 1, 2, 8, 17, 18, 27, 28, 30, 32–34, 44, 82, 87, 109, 141, 148, 150, 236, 259, 302, 306, 315, 351 migration weight, 161, 164 modernization theory, 130, 142, 402 Moldova, 148, 188, 218–220, 227, 230, 231, 260, 380, 384, 387, 389, 391, 394, 396, 398, 400 multiculturalism, 36, 415 N nationalism, 4, 7–9, 11, 66, 69, 72, 84, 108, 172–174, 182, 232, 233, 283, 310, 314, 347

neoclassical theory, 205 neoliberalism, 4, 144, 172, 214, 219, 225, 233, 282 neoliberal rationality, 279, 283 net migration, 135, 150–152, 174–176, 186, 195, 212, 213, 219, 220, 224, 228, 255

O OECD, 3, 191, 202, 203, 218, 223, 283, 288, 297, 415 old-age dependency, 118, 120, 148 Orbán, Viktor, 5, 305 Orientalism, 165 Örkény, Antal, xiii, 18, 173, 183, 346

P Poland, 147, 180, 183, 187, 199, 202, 205, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 224, 258, 261, 262, 303, 370, 381, 385, 387, 389, 392, 394, 396, 398, 401 Polányi, Karl, 9–11, 17, 18, 78, 91, 148, 172, 190, 232, 235, 253, 282, 283, 306 Population Index, 39, 49, 50, 270, 271 populism, 8, 69, 81, 93, 94, 173, 174, 182, 187, 191, 200, 253 postcolonial critique, 92, 313, 314 pronatalism, 70, 320, 325, 326

R racism, 2, 34, 65, 92, 93, 108, 331 Reagan, Ronald, 30, 46, 77 redistribution, 19, 29, 68, 74, 83, 119, 120, 148, 149, 172, 183, 186, 190, 191, 214, 221, 224, 225, 233, 235, 299, 315, 351

INDEX

refugees, 2, 17, 27, 73, 113, 114, 116, 117, 147, 153, 154, 157, 161, 164, 166–169, 173, 198, 213, 218, 266, 275, 276, 284, 287, 291, 345, 351, 377, 416 reification, 10, 13, 14, 34, 279–281, 283, 292, 293, 312, 320, 327 re-ruralization, 217, 222, 229, 231 revitalization discourse, 67, 71, 76, 82, 84, 87, 309, 318, 328, 350, 378 Romania, 3, 12, 32, 35, 67, 80, 90, 144, 153, 164, 187, 193–195, 199, 203, 206, 207, 209–211, 213–218, 225, 258, 260, 264, 267, 302, 303, 371, 381, 385, 387, 389, 392, 394, 396, 398, 401 S Ságvári, Bence, 173, 260, 264, 267 Salt, John, 14 Sander, Nikola, 109, 112, 153, 160, 161 Sanderson, M.R., 109, 111, 135, 141, 144, 145 Sassen, Saskia, 18, 91, 109, 110, 133, 137, 144 Scheiring, Gábor, 8, 173 selective exclusion, 36, 280 Slovakia, 153, 154, 182, 183, 186, 189–191, 194–196, 199, 202, 206, 208, 209, 215, 220, 221, 257, 302–304, 350, 370, 413 Slovenia, 153, 180, 186, 187, 189, 190, 193, 196, 197, 202, 203, 220, 233, 261–263, 302–304, 348, 381, 385, 387, 390, 392, 394, 396, 399, 401 socialist modernization discourse, 48, 59, 78, 90, 370 Stark, Oded, 57, 286

425

Szalai, Erzsébet, xiii, 8, 134, 173, 194 Szelényi, Iván, xiii, 8, 69, 139, 141, 160, 173, 186, 191, 346, 347 Szentágothai, János, 54

T Tamás, Gáspár Miklós, 172 Taylor, J. Edward, 57 Thornton, Arland, 34, 39, 51, 60, 61, 129, 299, 300 Tomlinson, Richard, 32 Tóth, Pál Péter, 73, 179, 198, 303 transnational demography, 33 transnationalism, 36, 37

U Ukraine, 12, 73, 113, 114, 148, 167–169, 188, 194, 195, 197, 199, 206, 208, 209, 211, 219, 220, 227, 229–231, 260, 351, 371, 382, 385, 387, 390, 392, 394, 396, 399, 401, 413 unemployment, 9, 56, 134, 137, 138, 265, 285, 291, 312, 324 unequal exchange, 88, 91, 173, 174, 179, 182, 199, 201, 204, 232, 257, 347 United Nations (UN), 3, 29–31, 38, 46, 49, 57, 59, 61, 67, 72, 75, 76, 85, 86, 88–92, 114, 118, 151, 153, 155, 174, 175, 178, 181, 195, 223, 227, 272, 279, 283, 285, 287, 297, 311, 319 urban migration, 39, 41, 43, 127, 274, 275, 291

V varieties of migratory capitalism, 16, 186, 347

426

INDEX

welfare competition, 119, 191, 193, 215

285–287, 289–292, 296, 297, 303, 311, 403 world-systems theory, 133, 143, 145 World Value Survey, 253, 254, 317, 348

World Bank, 27, 28, 38, 40–43, 53, 55–57, 59, 92, 123, 149, 152, 162, 183, 191, 198, 214, 215, 222, 230, 269–271, 276, 283,

Z Zelinsky, Wilbur, 64, 65, 110, 126, 127, 131, 132

W wage differences, 137, 138