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THE METAMORPHOSESOF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION
TheAquinasLecture,2004
THE METAMORPHOSESOF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION JacquesTaminiaux
Undertheauspicesofthe Wisconsin-AlphaChapterofPhiSigmaTau
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Taminiaux,Jacques,1928Themetamorphosesofphenomenologicalreduction /byJacquesTaminiaux.—1sted. p.cm.—(TheAquinaslecture;2004) Includesbibliographicalreferences. 1.Phenomenology—History.2.Methodology— History.I.Title.II.Series. B829.5.T292004 142’.7—dc22 2003027872
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©2004MarquetteUniversityPress PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Prefatory TheWisconsin-AlphaChapterofPhiSigmaTau, theInternationalHonorSocietyforPhilosophyat MarquetteUniversity,eachyearinvitesascholar todeliveralectureinhonorofSt.ThomasAquinas. The2004AquinasLecture,TheMetamorphosesofPhenomenologicalReduction,wasdeliveredon Sunday, February 22, 2004, by JacquesTaminiaux,ProfessorofPhilosophyatBostonCollege. JacquesTaminiauxwaseducatedattheUniversityofLouvain,whereheearnedaB.A.inPhilosophyin1948,DoctorJurisin1950,aLicentiate inPhilosophyin1951,aPh.D.inPhilosophyin 1954,andaMaîtreagrégéinPhilosophyin1967, withthedissertation,“LanostalgiedelaGrèceà l’aubedel’Idéalismeallemand.” ProfessorTaminiaux has been professor of philosophyatBostonCollegesince1989.Prior to that he was professor of philosophy at Louvain-la-Neuve. He was also visiting professor at UniversidadFederal,RiodeJaneiro,in1980,at UniversitéLavalin1970,andatBostonCollege, everyotheryearfrom1968to1990. ProfessorTaminiaux’s publications include the following books: Naissance de la philosophie Hégélienne de l’état: Commentaire et traduction
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de la Realphilosophie d’Iéna (1805-1806), Paris, 1984;DialecticandDifference:FinitudeinModern Thought,London,1985;Lecturesdel’ontologiefondamentale:EssaissurHeidegger,Grenoble,1989; LafilledeThraceetlepenseurprofessionel:Arendtet Heidegger;Paris,1992;Poetics,Speculation,and Judgment:TheShadowoftheWorkofArtfrom KanttoPhenomenology,Albany,1993;LeThéâtre desphilosophes:Latragédie,l’être,l’action,Grenoble, 1995,andSillagesphénoménologiques/Auditeurset lecteursdeHeidegger,Brussels,2002.Hehasalso publishedwelloveronehundredarticlesandhas deliveredmanyinvitedlectures. In1977ProfessorTaminiauxreceivedthePrix Francqui,whichisawardedannuallybytheKing ofBelgiumtothenation’soutstandingscholar.He isamemberoftheAcademieRoyaledeBelgique, theInstitutInternationaldePhilosophie,andof theAcademiaEuropaea,Cambridge,U.K.Hewas awardedamedalbytheNationalFoundationfor ScientificResearch,Belgium,in1990,andreceived anhonorarydegreefromthePontificiaUniversita CatolicadelPeru,Lima,in1996. ToProfessorTaminiaux’sdistinguishedlistof publications,PhiSigmaTauispleasedtoadd:The MetamorphosesofPhenomenologicalReduction.
TheMetamorphosesof PhenomenologicalReduction
by JacquesTaminiaux ThetitleIhaveannouncedis:“TheMetamorphosesofPhenomenologicalReduction.”Theword “metamorphosis”belongstoordinarylanguage;it meansachangeofformorofcharacterbydevelopment.Theword“reduction”isatechnicalword whichdesignatestheprincipalmethodologicalrule ofphenomenology.Hence,thetitleofmylecture ismeanttosuggestthatinthedevelopmentofthe phenomenological movement the methodologicalprocedurecalled“reduction”underwentseveral changesofcharacter. Inordertoanalyzeandelucidatethosechanges,I havedecidedtofocusprimarilyontwotopics,the bodyandthemind,becausethewaythefoundersofthephenomenologicalmovement—Husserl first,thenHeidegger—dealtwiththosetwotopics makesintelligiblethemetamorphosesatstake,i.e., notonlythechangesthatoccurredwiththetransitionfromthephenomenologicalworkofHusserl tothephenomenologicalworkofHeidegger,but alsowithsubsequentdevelopmentsandchanges thatoccurredinthewakeofthosetwoauthors, thankstotheirstudentsandreaders.Indeed,the
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treatmentbyHusserlandHeideggerofthetwo topicsIjustmentionedrevealsoncloseinspection severalblindspots,whichweretoarouseobjectionsandtoinciteotherapproachesthatclaimed tobemorephenomenological,morefaithfultothe phenomenathanthepreviousones.Iusereduction asapointofreferenceforasimplereasonthatI shallnowelucidate. I SinceitsinceptionwiththepublicationofEdmund Husserl’sLogischeUntersuchungenatthebeginning ofthetwentiethcentury,thephilosophicaltrend called“phenomenology”hasbeenanattemptto be the logos of all phenomena appearing within thescopeofhumanexperience,ortogivethose phenomenatheopportunitytoshowasprecisely as possible what characterizes them specifically. Focusingtherebyhisinvestigationsonthedescriptionofwhatappearsinthefieldofhumanexperience,Husserlrepeatedlyclaimedthattheonly possible method for the strictly descriptive way of doing philosophy that he was proposing was whathecalledreduction(Reduktion).Inorderto approachanytopicwhatsoeverwithinthesphere ofhumanexperiencewithoutprejudice,without systematicdistortion,withouttakingforgranted traditional theses—let alone prevailing Weltanschauungen—withoutsuccumbingtofascination
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forthesuccessesofmodernscience,andinorder toallowthetopicatstaketodisplayitsdistinctive characteristics,itisnecessary,Husserlrepeatedly claimed,topracticeagainandagainareduction. Nobodycanbecomeaphenomenologistwithout practicingreductionasamethodologicalprinciple foranydescriptiveinvestigation. Itisimportanttonoticethatthemethodological rule of reduction combines two moves: a negativeone,andapositiveone.Thenegativemove consistsinsuspendingwhatblocksthewaytothe phenomena.Thepositivemoveisareturn—areductio—tothespecificmodeofappearingofthe phenomenon. LetuspayattentionfirsttothewaythephenomenologicalreductionoperatesinHusserl’swork. Hecallsthenegativemoveofsuspendingbythe nameepochaGreekwordthatdesignatesapause,a cessation,oranabstention,whereasheinsiststhat thepositivemoveofreturntothematteritself(die Sacheselbst)initsspecificwayofgivennessconsists ingettingaviewofarelationshipcalledintentionality,arelationshipthatcharacterizesconsciousness assuchintheentirerangeofitsmodes. OnemaywonderattheoutsetifthecharacterizationbyHusserlofthesetwomovesonastrictly methodologicallevel,inhisinitialarticulationofa definitionofthephenomenologicalwayofdoing philosophy, does not already involve a certain
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notionofthebodyaswellasacertainconception ofthemindpriortothethematizationofthese twotopics,thankstoadescriptiveinvestigation. I, therefore, propose to deal successively with thesetwopoints,i.e.,1)toinquireintotheimplicit presenceofacertainnotionofthebodyandof themindinHusserl’stheoryofmethod,and2) tointerrogatetheexplicitthematizationbyHusserlofthebodyandofthemindonthelevelofa descriptiveinvestigation. 1a) As far as methodology is concerned, it is wellknownthatHusserlpracticedhisresearchin aspecificfieldofinvestigationbeforereflectingon themethodofhisresearchandbeforeattempting tocharacterizehisphilosophicalproject.Thatfield was the one upon which German philosophers werefocusingduringthelastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury,afieldtheycalledErkenntnislehre, theoryofknowledge.Withrespecttothatfield, theGermanthoughtatthetimewasdividedinto twomajortrends:Empiricismandneo-Kantianism. Having been trained as a mathematician, Husserl spontaneously borrowed his conceptual toolsfromoneofthosetwotrendswhenhefirst begantoreflectphilosophically.Indeed,inhisearly attempts to provide an answer to the question: Whatmakesarithmeticpossibleasascience?,he moreorlessnaïvelyadoptedtheviewsofempiricism.Now,itturnsoutthatmanyrepresentatives
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ofempiricismintheGermanicworldwerestrongly indebtedtotheteachingofJohnStuartMill,who clearlysubscribedtoaspecificnotionofthebody andofthemind. Letmeexplain.Establishingatheoryofknowledgerequiresaninvestigationintothefoundations of logic considered in its twofold sense: formal logic taken as a study of the inner consistency of cognitive assertions and their connection, andmateriallogictakenasanelucidationofthe claimthattheseassertionsandreasonings“reach” realityand,therefore,aretrue.Accordingtothe empiricisttheoryofknowledge,theinvestigation intothesefoundationsdependsonastrictlyinductiveobservationoffactsinconformitywiththe method that was supposed to have assured the obvioussuccessesofthesciencesofnature,above all,thetremendousadvancesofphysics.Asaresult of this methodological principle, the empiricist theoryofknowledgetookitforgrantedthatthe factsliabletoclarifythefoundationsofknowledge inthetwofoldsenseofformallogicandmaterial logicwereobservablefactsoccurringinthemind, thementalfactseachofusisacquaintedwith,facts thatinthelastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury were focused upon by a new empirical science, empiricalpsychology,adisciplinewhichaspired tobecomeaphysicsofourmentallifeconsidered asaregionofnature.
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Oncloseinspectionitappearsthattheempiricist conceptionofthetheoryofknowledgepresupposes adefinitenotionofthemindthatisitselfatranspositionofadefinitenotionofthebody.Thenotion ofthebodyuponwhichtheempiricistnotionof themindismodeledderivesfromDescartes.Itis thenotionoftheresextensa,whichisofferedpartes extrapartestotheresolutive-compositivemethod described in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii andinTheDiscourseonMethod.Indebtedtothe teachingofJohnStuartMill,Germanempiricism wasbythesametokenhistoricallyindebtedtothe theoreticalimpulsethathasitsrootsinThomas Hobbes’admirationforDescartes’mathesisuniversalis and in Hobbes’ refusal of the Cartesian metaphysics. More precisely, the debt at stake consistsmorepreciselyinthedecisiontakenby theauthorofLeviathantodiscardtheCartesian dualismoftwofinitesubstances—rescogitansand resextensa—andtopreserveonesubstanceonly, matter,andconsequentlytoenvisagethelifeofthe mindasasystemofelementsthatarethesubjective effectsofmaterialmotionsandthatarethemselves linkedtogetherbydiversemotions. But whatever the relevant previous historical developmentsmaybe,whatevermaybethepart playedafterHobbes,byJohnLockeandDavid Hume,thereisnodoubtthattheempiricismof John Stuart Mill looked for the foundations of
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knowledgeinelementarymentaloccurrences,such assense-impressions,linkedtogetherthroughspatialandtemporalassociations,whichwerethemselvesofastrictlyfactualnature. Of course, it would be simplistic to enclose withinthelimitsofsuchaframeworktheempiricismwhichinspirestheearlyphilosophicalresearch ofHusserlontheconceptofnumberandonthe foundationsofarithmetic.Asamatteroffact,he waslessinfluencedbyMillandhisdisciplesinthe GermanspeakingworldthanbyFranzBrentano, whose peculiar empiricism was more nuanced than the movement just described. Indeed, in theworkwhichforgedhisreputation,Psychology fromanEmpiricalStandpoint(1874),insteadof defining mental facts as subjective by-products ofphysicalfacts,Brentanoattributedtotheman intentionalcharacterofwhichthereisnotracein physicalfacts.Moreover,insteadofdecomposing themrightawayintoelementarypartsinconformitywiththerulesoftheresolutive-compositive method,heinsistedthattheydeservedacareful description. Finally, instead of stubbornly celebrating the merits of induction, he underlined theimportanceofintuition(Anschauung)inthe study of mental life. Nevertheless, despite these nuancesinBrentano’swork,inhisearlyresearch Husserlseemstohavesharedwiththeempiricist theory of knowledge the idea that the founda-
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tionsoflogic,eitherformalormaterial,aretobe foundinmentalfactssuchastheyareobservedby empiricalpsychology.Inotherwords,heseemsto havetakenforgrantedthattherootsoflogicare psychological,andthusatleasttothatextenthe submittedlogictopsychology.Whenheclaimed, for instance, that the origin of the concept of numberistobefoundinamentalprocedureof collectivelybindingtogether,whichitselfderives fromapsychologicalpenchantforunification,by thesametokenhedeprivedmathematicalobjects oftheirintrinsicconsistency,andturnedtheminto by-productsofcausalpsychologicalevents.More precisely,hedeprivedmathematicsofitsnecessity anduniversalitybyreducingittocontingentand arbitrarypsychologicalevents,suchasinterest.In his review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic, PartI(1894),GottlobFregeconcludedhisvery criticalappraisalwiththefollowingwords: Ifageographerwasgivenanoceanographic treatise to read which gave a psychological explanationoftheoriginoftheoceanshewould undoubtedlygettheimpressionthattheauthor hasmissedthemarkandshotpastthething itselfinamostpeculiarway.Thepresentwork hasleftmewithexactlythesameimpression.. ..Readingthisworkhasenabledmetogauge the extent of the devastation caused by the irruptionofpsychologyintologic,andIhave
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takenittobemytasktoexhibitthatdamage intheproperlight(Frege1984,209).
1b) Phenomenology as a specific field of research had its origins in Husserl’s meditation on these objections. Phenomenology emerged whenherealizedthathisearlypsychologismwas akindofreductionismandthatthereisindeed, as Frege claimed about numbers, an objectivity otherthanthatofthenaturalbodies,anobjectivity that is not physical but ideal; and when he realizedsimultaneouslythatthelifeofthemind, insteadofbeinglimitedtoaflowofcontingent factualoccurrences,hasitsownconsistencyandis articulatedinadiversityofmodesofintentionality whichhaveaspecificessenceliabletobeintuited anddescribedassuch.Asaresultofthatreversal, the birth of phenomenology introduces a sharp oppositionbetweentwoconceptionsofthemind. Asopposedtotheconceptionpropagatedbyradicalempiricism,aconceptionaccordingtowhich themindisasubjectivetranspositionofadefinite pictureofnatureintermsoffactualjuxtapositions andsequencesofinfinitesimalmaterialelements relatedtooneanotherbydiversemotions,Husserl’sincipientphenomenologyproposesaviewno longerfactual,butessentialist,inwhichthemind insteadofduplicatingmatterandmotionisindependentofnatureandrelatedtoaquitedifferent
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sphereofanidealcharacter.Thissharpdistinction isthebackboneofHusserl’sfirstphenomenologicalwork,LogicalInvestigations.Itisfullyoperative evenbeforetheauthorattemptedtoarticulatea theory of the phenomenological method, i.e., themethodologyofreduction.Indeed,thesharp distinctionIjustevokedunderliesalltheaspects ofthecritiqueofpsychologismthataredeveloped byHusserlintheProlegomenatohisfirstbook. And the same distinction underlies the descriptiveinvestigationsinthebookitself.Theopposition in question is clearly expressed by Husserl atseveralplaces,forexampleinInvestigationII entitled“TheIdealUnityoftheSpecies,”when hewarnsagainstwhathetakestobeatypicalflaw ofempiricistepistemology: the mixture of two essentially different scientific interests, one concerned with the psychologicalexplanationoflivedexperiences, theotherwiththe‘logical’clarificationoftheir thought-contentorsense,andthecriticismof theirpossibleachievementasactsofknowing.Intheformerregardweseektoestablish empiricalbondstyingthethought-experiences inquestiontootherfactsinthefluxofreal happenings,factsresponsibleforthemcausally, oronwhichtheyexerteffects.Inthelatter regardweareintentuponthe‘originofthe concepts’thatpertaintoourwords.Weseek
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toclarifytheir‘truemeaning’orsignificance throughplainlyestablishingtheirintentionin thesenseoftheirfulfillments,whicharefirst realizedwhensuitableintuitionsareadduced. Tostudytheessenceofthesephenomenologicalconnectionsistolaybaretheindispensable foundation for an epistemological clarificationofthe‘possibility’ofknowledge(Husserl 1970b,348).
Butitispreciselythesharpnessofthatcontrast whichisquestionable.Atanyrate,thehistorian ofthephenomenologicalmovementcannotavoid askingwithregardtoHusserl’scritiqueofpsychologismwhetherthesharpcontrastbetweenfactsand essencesinsisteduponbysuchcritiquedoesnot runtheriskofrevivingthedualismsofPlatonism, or at least the Cartesian opposition between res extensaandrescogitans.IsitnotappropriatetosuspectthatsomesortofCartesiandualismunderlies thecarewithwhichHusserlattheverybeginning ofthefirstInvestigationdistinguishesexpressions astheyfunctionincommunicationfromexpressionsastheyfunctioninsolitarylife,theformer kindofexpressionbeinglimitedbyanintimating or indicative function, whereas the latter is purelyattunedtotheidealityofameaning?Isit notappropriatetosuspectthatthesamedualism likewiseunderliesthecarewithwhichthesixth Investigation distinguishes categorial intuition
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from sensible intuition? If it is true, as Husserl claims in the first Investigation, that expression asindicationmerelyannounceswhatitexpresses and,therefore,offersamerelyputativegraspof whatitexpresses,whereasexpressionasmeaning isadequatelyofferedtoafulfillingintuition,are wenotallowedtosuspectthisdistinctiontobe atranspositionofDescartes’distinctionbetween thebodyasaselflessentitysubmittedpartesextra partes to an endless exteriority and the cogito as anentityessentiallypresenttoitself,whateverthe diversityofitscogitata?Dowenotfindasimilar transposition in the emphasis put by the sixth Investigation on the radical difference between sensibleintuitionandcategorialintuition,ifitis thecase,asHusserlclaimedthere,thatthesensible intuitionisgovernedbytheaposteriorireception ofahyleticflowofsense-data,whereascategorial intuition does not in any way suffer from such adispersionbecauseitactivelybestowsmeaning uponwhatisintendedbyitandisabletoreacha fulfillinginsightofthatmeaning? 1c)Whathappenstothisdualisticframework when phenomenology, after having been first practicedintheLogicalInvestigations,subsequently undertakestodefineitsmethodology,whichisto saytojustifythenecessityofthecelebratedreduction,consideredinitstwofoldmoveofsuspension ofmisleadingapproachesandofdeliberatereturn
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tothephenomena?Thisjustificationtookplace sixyearsafterthepublicationoftheopusmagnum, inaseriesoffivelessonsthathavebeenpublished as The Idea of Phenomenology, but which were originally given as an introduction to a lecture coursewhosetopicwastheconstitutionofspatiotemporalthings. Oncloseinspectionitturnsoutthattheterms usedbyHusserlinthesefivelessonstocharacterizethetwomovesofphenomenologicalreduction involveasharpdualitybetweenadefinitenotion of the body and a definite notion of the mind. ThebasictermsselectedbyHusserlinhisattempt toexhibittohisstudentsthespecifictraitsofthe phenomenological method are “transcendence” and“immanence.”Themeaningheattributesto thesetwonotionsmakesmanifestthedualityin question.Letmetrytoclarifythisbyfollowing brieflythetrainofthoughtofthefivelessons. Letusnotefirstthatadualityisintroducedright awayinthefirstlessonwhenHusserldistinguishes betweenascienceofthenaturalsort,originating fromwhathecallsthenaturalattitudeofmind, and a philosophic science, originating from the philosophicattitudeofmind.Ofcourse,thephilosophicsciencehehasinmindisphenomenology itself. His purpose is to demonstrate from the outsetthattheprevailingphilosophyofhistime cannotpretendtobeaphilosophicsciencebecause,
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insteadoforiginatingfromastrictlyphilosophic attitude,itremainstrappedwithinthenaturalattitudeofmind.Thenaturalattitudeofmindisa wayofintuitingandthinkingwhichisoperativein everydayperceptionaswellasinallofthesciences: sciencesofnature,culturalsciences,andformal sciences,suchasmathematicsorpuregrammar.All thosemodesofthenaturalattitudearefocusedon existingobjects,on“actualities”(Wirklichkeiten), eitherofarealcharacterorofanidealone,andfor allofthemtheknowledgeoftheseexistingobjects isamatterofcourse.AsHusserlwrites,“Thus, naturalknowledgemakesstrides.Itprogressively takes possession of a reality at first existing and givenasamatterofcourseandassomethingonly tobeinvestigatedfurtherasregardsitsextent,its elements,itsrelationsandlaws”(Husserl1964,18). Thetroublebeginswhenthatnaturalwayofthinkingstartsreflectingontherelationshipofcognition andobject.Sincethenaturalattitudeisfocusedon existingactualities,thereflexioninquestionturns knowledgeintoasequenceofexistingactualities occurring in the mind. Consequently, the very possibilityofbreakingoutofthesphereofthose mentalprocessesinordertoreachobjectsbeyond thembecomesenigmatic.Aninclinationtoskepticism,withallitscontradictionsandabsurdities,is unavoidablewhenthereflectiononthepossibilityofknowledgeisbasedonthenaturalattitude,
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morepreciselywhenitisbasedupontheresults ofnaturalsciences,suchaspsychology,biologyor anthropology.Phenomenologyclaimstobeable toavoidallofthesedifficultiesbybasingitselfon astrictlyphilosophicattitude,whichratherthan focusingonexistingactualitiesfocusesinsteadon essences and deliberately disregards and refrains “fromusingtheintellectualachievementsofthe sciencesofanaturalsortandofscientificallyundisciplinednaturalwisdomandknowledge”(Husserl 1964,24). Thisdeliberatedisregardisthenegativemove calledepocheintroducedbyHusserlinthefollowingmanneratthebeginningofthesecondlesson: “At the outset of the critique of cognition the entireworld,nature,physicalandpsychological,as wellasone’sownhumanegowithallthesciences which have to do with these objective matters, areputinquestion.Theirbeing,theirvalidityare suspended”(Husserl1964,29).Theepochethus discardseverypresupposition,morepreciselyall “pregiven”knowledge,itsownincluded.Atthis pointitmightseemthatthetheoryofknowledge cannotgetunderway.Onthecontrary,however, Husserlclaimsthattheeliminationofeverypregiven cognition taken from elsewhere does not makeitimpossibletoacknowledgeaprimalselfgiven cognition. Recalling the Cartesian doubt, Husserlwritesthat“itisatonceevidentthatnot
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everythingisdoubtful,forwhileIamjudgingthat everythingisdoubtful,itisindubitablethatIam sojudging....Andlikewisewitheverycogitatio” (Husserl1964,30).Thisacknowledgmentofthe absoluteandindubitablegivennessofthecogito along with the entire range of its cogitationes makespossiblethesecond,positivemoveofthe phenomenologicalmethod.InHusserl’slanguage, thenegativemoveofepochesuspendsalltranscendence,andthepositivemovethatopenstheway tophenomenologyisareturntoimmanence.The pointistorealizethatthesewordsdonothavein phenomenologythemeaningtheyhaveinthemisleadingpsychologistictheoriesofknowledge.For thepsychologistictheoristofknowledge,cognition is immanent in the sense of a sequence of facts thatactuallyoccurswithinthemindandthatcan beevidentlyseenasfactsalongwiththeirfactual components. On this interpretation, the object thatcognitionclaimstoknowistranscendentin thesensethatitisneitheractuallycontainedasa factualcomponentinthemindnorseeninit.Asa consequence,thepossibilityofknowledgebecomes problematic.Bycontrast,forthephenomenologist immanenceisanappropriatepointofdeparture freeofpuzzlementbecauseitisnotasequenceof factsoccurringinthemindandtobeexplained from without by what the sciences teach about naturalfacts.Itisinsteadanarticulatedvarietyof
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essencesthatareofferedtothephenomenological seeingasintrinsicallyrelational,inthesensethatit belongstotheessenceofeachtypeofcogitatioto beopentoaspecifictypeofobject.Theemphasis putonessencesofferedtoapeculiarseeing,the Wesenschau,allowsHusserltocharacterizethepositivemoveofthephenomenologicalmethodasan “eideticreduction,”i.e.,asareturntotheessence ofeachtypeofcogitatio,consideredinitsspecific relationalorintentionalcharacter. Itisimportanttonote—foritdeterminesthe entiredevelopmentofHusserl’sphenomenology uptoTheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciences—thatthe dualitiesIhaverecalled—naturalattitudeversus philosophicattitude,transcendenceversusimmanence,actualfactsversusessences—areprimarily, andperhapsevenexclusively,concernedwiththe distinctiontobemadebetweentwowaysofknowing.Indeed,theepocheofthenaturalattitudeis describedlessasareflectivesteppingbackfromthe diversifiedrangeofrelations(ethical,pragmatic, aesthetic,erotic)tooneself,totheOther,andto thethingsthatdetermineoureverydayexperience thanasadenialofacertaintypeofknowledge, theknowledgethatisnotenlightenedbyaclear and distinct view of itself and of its intentional correlates.Butitisonethingtocriticizetheonesidedness of the theories of knowledge that by turningcognitionintoafactualepiphenomenon
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offactualnaturalcausessimplyabolishintentionalityandtheverypossibilityofknowledge.Andit isanotherthingtoclaimthattherecognitionof intentionalitydemandsaCartesianabsoluteand indubitablegivennessofthecogitotoitself.Such a claim runs the risk of introducing an inverse one-sidedness, an immanence so purified of all transcendence,thatthecogitotendstobecomea selfwithoutanydependenceuponanythingelse (theworld,thebody,theothers,history). 2)Consideringthediversityofthedescriptions carriedoutbyHusserlassoonashehadopened thefieldofhisnewphilosophicalscience,onemay wonderwhethertheturnstakenbyphenomenological reduction in his own work do not have muchtodowiththefactthattheverypractice ofdescriptionmadehimrealize—onthejobasit were—thattheconcreterequirementsofdescriptiondidnotperfectlyfitinwiththecleardualities Ihavepointedout.Tobesure,ifthegoalistothematizethebasiccategorialnotionsandstructures belonging to pure logic, a very general conceptionofthecogitoasauniversalvantagepointand function of transparency may suffice. But if all cogitationesdeservetobecarefullydescribed,the consciousnessofferedtoinspectionisnolonger merelyauniversalandanonymousfunction;itis thelivedexperienceofeveryindividual,anditis onthebasisofindividualErlebnisse,unpretentious
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thoughtheymayseem,thateachofusisinvited toreachtheWesenschauofhisintentionallife. AmongthesemodestErlebnisse,itiswellknown thatperceptionisgiventoppriorityamongHusserl’sdescriptions.Butonecannotseehowacogito asauniversalfunctioncouldperceive,ifitistrue, asHusserlrightlyclaims,thattheadumbrations throughwhichtheperceivedthingpresentsitself tomyeyesdonotcallforththeintellectualsynthesisofaformlessmanifoldofsense-data,buta powerofbodilyexplorationofcorporealentities that straightaway manifest themselves from the outset as identifiable totalities.The perceived qua perceived does not appeal to an “I think,” buttoan“Ican,”andthecorporealcharacterof thatpotentialitydoesnotbelongtoaKörperwith clearlydefinablepartesextrapartes,buttoaLeib, whichislessaportionofmatterorapartofspace amongotherpartsthananindividuatedpowerof approachingorwithdrawing,ofmovingfreelyin various directions. Moreover, such individuated potentialityisnotsomuchsituatedwithintime asitisasourceoftemporalization,forperception hasitsownduration,adurationinwhichtheperceivingindividual,whileexploringtheperceived, combines a retention of just past Abschattungen withaprotentionofimminentadumbrations.In other words, perception is a phenomenon that compels us to qualify the duality of body and
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mind. In addition, the same phenomenon does not fit with the definition of the entire sphere construedintermsofanimmanencecharacterizedbyasolitaryselfhood.Indeed,theperceiving consciousnessisimmediatelyawarethatthesides ofthethingthatremainhiddentoitareofferedto thegazeofotherperceivingindividuals.AsHusserlhimselfinsisted,wedonotperceivealonebut miteinander,withoneanother.Finally,ifitistrue thattherangeofthecogitationesislinkedtolived experiences,hencetothelifeoflivingindividuals,reductioncannotsimplyentailaretrievalof Cartesiandualism.Onthecontrary,itrequiresthat werecognizethattheCartesianconceptofnature asmatterandmotionisanabstractionandnota phenomenologicalcharacteristicoftheworldin whichourperceptionoccurs.Itrequiresthatwe acknowledgethatourintentionallifeisrelatedto aLebenswelt,alife-worldsharedincommonwith other intentional lives than ours. And since life asaphenomenonisinconceivablewithoutliving beingswhoarebornfromotherlivingbeingsand destined to disappear after a short while, it is necessaryinordertobefairtothephenomenato acknowledgethatthereisagenesisandahistory oftheintentionalcogitationes,includingthepurest andapparentlymostatemporalmodesofrationality,suchasmathematicalconceptsanddeductions.
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Thereis,toquoteafamousHusserliantitle,an “originofgeometry.” Iapologizeformakingthoseremarksatrandom. Theironlypurposeistosuggestthatthephenomenological reduction is not the precondition of a system of infrangible theses, but an opening to a constellation of flexible approaches. Merleau-Ponty, who repeatedly found in Husserl’s manuscriptsaninspirationforhisownphenomenologicalresearch,wasright,Ibelieve,toclaim thatthemostimportantteachingofreductionis thatitcannotbefullycompleted.Inoneofhislast lecturecoursesattheCollègedeFrance,duringthe academicyear1958-59,Merleau-Pontyobserves that there is something paradoxical in Husserl’s methodofreduction,foritturnsoutthatwhat reductionaloneisabletorevealis“somethingthat wealreadyknewthankstothe‘thesisoftheworld’ in the natural attitude” (Merleau-Ponty 1970, 149).The ‘constitution’-by-the-mind towards which reduction is oriented meets a resistance withinitsownphenomenologicalfieldinsofaras “itseemsdifficultto‘constitute’fromattitudesand operationsofconsciousness,”suchastheoretical ideation,“thecorporealinfrastructureofourrelationwiththethingsandwiththeothers”(MerleauPonty 1970, 149). Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty observes,theactualpracticeofphenomenological reduction turns out to be paradoxical, not only
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because on close inspection the practice reveals that“reductionismuchlessamethoddefinedonce forallthananindexforamultitudeofproblems” (Merleau-Ponty,1970,149),butalsobecausethe transcendentalphilosopherhastorealizethathe isunabletoovercomeradicallythe“naïvebelief ” intheintersubjectiveworldtowhichhebelongsas anempiricalman(Merleau-Ponty1970,149). A similar paradox is noticeable, I believe, in Husserl’shandlingoftopics,suchastheperson andethicalvalues.Whenhearguesintheframeworkofrigoroussciencefortheprincipleofpure immanenceasphilosophicalground,hedefendsa strictlyegologicalnotionofthepersonandofthe axiologicaljudgmentsorientingpersonalconduct. Inthiscontextitseemsthatethicalvalues,taken tobeintentionalcorrelatesofapureegowithout situationandcontingency,arestrictlyparallel,in thepracticalrealm,totheidealcategoriesofthe logicalrealm;onthisinterpretationitwouldseem, then,thatwhatmakesitpossibleforsomeoneto bearesponsiblepersonwouldbethemereconsequenceofapureWesenschauofmoralnormsin thesolitudeofhisimmanence. ButHusserldoesnotargueinthesetermswhen heacknowledgesthattheuniversalaimsofpracticalreasoncannotbedissociatedfromahistory whichisinconceivablewithouttakingintoaccount
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intersubjectivity,i.e.,theinteractionofaplurality ofintentionalagents. Thistensionisnoticeableinthewritingsofthe lastperiod,whichgravitatearoundTheCrisisof EuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology.Ontheonehand,thereareseveralechoesin these texts of the views of Hegel about the distinctiontobemadebetweenanabsolutescience, which is philosophy itself, and the naturalistic andobjectivisticconceptofsciencevindicatedby theAufklärung.Againstthenaïvetéofnaturalism, whichdefinesthemindasanannexofthebody havingaspatialandtemporalrealitywithinnature, andtherebyfailstonoticethatthesubjectivitythat createsscienceshasnolegitimateplaceinthem, HusserlseemstobetemptedbyarevivalofHegel’s conceptionofhistoryasateleologyprogressively absorbingtheAnSichintotheabsolutenessofan ultimateFürSich.Insuchaperspectiveitseems thathumanindividualsbecomepersonsbybeing thefunctionariesofaprocesswhichoverwhelms themandofwhichtheyaretheorgans. Butontheotherhand,Husserl’swritingsthat meditateontheEuropeancrisisinsistonatopic thatdoesnotfitwiththeprincipleofanimplementationbySpiritofablueprintofself-knowledge. That topic is the Lebenswelt, the lifeworld. On close inspection it turns out that the lifeworld, whichisobliteratedbytheexclusivelyobjectivistic
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tendencyofnaturalism,againandagainprovides newresourcesnotonlytothevarioussciences,but tophilosophyitself.Merleau-Pontyperceptively acknowledgedthat,assoonastheyaretranslated intermsoflifeworld,thedualitiesorantinomies ofHusserl’sthoughtarenolonger“hopeless”: Thepointisnolongertounderstandhowon thebasisofitsabsolutesolitudeafor-itselfis abletothinkanotherone,orhowitcanrealizethattheworldispre-constitutedevenas thefor-itselfconstitutesit.Experiencetaken asawholeissuchthattheinherenceofthe SelftotheworldoroftheworldtotheSelf, oftheSelftotheOtherandoftheOtherto theSelf,whatHusserlcallstheIneinander,is silentlyinscribedinit.Experiencecomposes those incompossibilities, and philosophy becomestheattempttodescribebeyondthe givenlogicanditsvocabularyauniverseof living paradoxes. Reduction is no longer a returntotheidealBeing;itleadsusbackto thesoulofHeraclitus,toastringofhorizons (Merleau-Ponty1970,152).
When Husserl’s meditation is focused on the lifeworld, it is not far from acknowledging that thehumanindividualbecomesapersonbybeing insertedwithinapluralityofinteractionsandshar-
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ingsofwordsinsteadofbybeinganagentofan overwhelminguniversal. At any rate, once understood in terms of the Lebenswelt, reduction is less a return to pure immanencethantherecognitionthatconsciousnessbelongstoacommonworldofappearances. II Whataboutthesecondfounderofthephenomenologicalmovement,MartinHeidegger,towhom Husserl,accordingtolegend,oncesaid:“Youand I,wearephenomenology.” It is difficult to imagine how, without taking upagainthemethodof“reduction,”Heidegger wouldhavebeenableinBeingandTimetomake theexplicitclaimthathisresearch“wouldnothave beenpossibleifthegroundhadnotbeenprepared byEdmundHusserl,withwhoseLogischeUntersuchungenphenomenologyfirstemerged”(Heidegger 1962,§7).Moreover,Heideggeraddedthefollowingprecisioninafootnote:“Ifthefollowinginvestigationhastakenanystepsforwardindisclosing the ‘things themselves’ the author must first of allthankE.Husserl,who,byprovidinghisown incisivepersonalguidanceandbyfreelyturning overhisunpublishedinvestigations,familiarized the author with the most diverse areas of phenomenologicalresearchduringhisstudentyears inFreiburg”(Heidegger1962,§7v).
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Itissurprising,therefore,thattheword“reduction”isnotevenmentionedinBeingandTime. Asaresult,severaldistinguishedscholars—JeanLuc Marion among them—did not hesitate to conclude that Heidegger’s phenomenology was a phenomenology without reduction. However, the publication during the last decades, in the Gesamtausgabe, of the lecture courses given by Heidegger,firstinFreiburg,theninMarburg,at thetimehewaspreparinghisopusmagnum,makes itclear,onthecontrary,thatreductionwasatthe coreofhistheoreticalproject.Inotherwords,the negativemoveofsuspendingwhatblockstheway tothephenomenon,aswellasthepositivemoveof returntothematteritself,remainnolessdecisive forHeidegger’sinvestigationthantheywerefor Husserl’s.Thisdoesnotmeanofcoursethatthe twofoldprocedureinquestionremainsidentical inthetwothinkers. Heidegger himself underlines both the differences and the kinship in the introduction to a lecturecourseonTheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology,whichhegaveattheuniversityofMarburg inthesummerof1927,theyearofthepublication ofBeingandTime.Hereiswhathewrote: We call this basic component of phenomenologicalmethod—theleadingbackorreductionofinvestigativevisionfromanaively
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apprehended being to being—phenomenological reduction. We are thus adopting a centraltermofHusserl’sphenomenologyin itsliteralwordingthoughnotinitssubstantiveintent.ForHusserl,thephenomenological reduction,whichheworkedoutforthefirst timeexpresslyintheIdeasTowardaPurePhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude ofthehumanbeingwhoselifeisinvolvedin theworldofthingsandpersonsbacktothe transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematicexperiences,inwhichobjects areconstitutedascorrelatesofconsciousness. For us, phenomenological reduction means leadingphenomenologicalvisionbackfrom theapprehensionofabeing,whatevermay be the character of that apprehension, to theunderstandingofthebeingofthisbeing (projectinguponthewayitisunconcealed). Likeeveryotherscientificmethod,phenomenologicalmethodgrowsandchangesdueto theprogressmadepreciselywithitshelpinto the subjects under investigation. Scientific method is never a technique. As soon as it becomesoneithasfallenawayfromitsown propernature”(Heidegger1982,21).
Itremainstobeseenwhetherthismetamorphosisofthephenomenologicalreductiondoesnot
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alsoentaildifficultiessimilartothosedetectable inHusserl.Heideggerhimselforientsustowards a clarification of the issue. Indeed, immediately afterthelinesjustquotedheaddsanimportant precision. Reduction, he says, considered in its newmeaning“isnottheonlybasiccomponent ofphenomenologicalmethod.”Itmustbecombinedwithtwoothercomponents:construction anddeconstruction. Phenomenological construction, Heidegger claims,ismadenecessarybythefactthatBeingis notsimplyfoundinfrontofuslikeabeing.Ashe remarks,“itmustalwaysbebroughttoviewina freeprojection”(Heidegger1982,21-22).Because theunderstandingofthebeingofbeingisaprojectfocusedontheunconcealmentofbeing,the phenomenologisthastodevelopaconstructionin whichtheontologicalstructuresofthatprojectare madevisible.Theseontologicalstructuresarethe ‘existentials’whicharticulatethatproject. Thethirdcomponentofthemethod,phenomenological deconstruction, is required because “allphilosophicaldiscussion,eventhemostradicalattempttobeginalloveragain,ispervadedby traditionalconceptsandthusbytraditionalhorizons and traditional angles of approach, which wecannotassumewithunquestionablecertainty tohavearisenoriginallyandgenuinelyfromthe domain of being and the constitution of being
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theyclaimtocomprehend”(Heidegger1982,22). Deconstruction consists in bringing down (i.e., reducing)thetraditionalconcepts“downtothe sourcesfromwhichtheyweredrawn”inorderto determinewhetherornottheycorrespondtothe ontologicalstructureswhichgenuinelydetermine the understanding of being (Heidegger 1982, 23). Itiswellknownthatthankstotheconjunctionof thesethreecomponentswhosedefinitionisgiven inontologicalterms,Heidegger’sphenomenology isintendedtobea“fundamentalontology,”i.e., aninvestigationfocuseduponBeingintheverbal senseoftheword.Itisalsowellknownthatinthat newcontext,theconstructiveanddeconstructive reductionisnolongerareturntotheintentionality ofconsciousness,butratherareturntotheprojectivewayofbeingofthehumanDasein.Thecentral positionofhumanDaseininphenomenological ontologyisduetothefactthatthehumanbeing istheonlybeingforwhom“tobe”isanissueand who,therefore,isintimatelyawareofthemeaning ofBeingandabletorespondtotheSeinsfrage.The useofthewordDaseinasanappellationofthe humanbeingismeanttodesignatethatintimate connection,sincetheword“dasein”inGerman isaverbwhichsimplymeans“toexist”or“tobe there.”
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Consequently, the primordial task of fundamentalontologyistoanalyzerigorouslytheway ofbeingofDasein. This analytic demonstrates that the Dasein, which now replaces Bewusstsein as the vantage point of phenomenology, instead of being a universalandneutralcriterionlikethecogito,is consideredasradicallyindividuated,experienced ineachcaseandoneachoccasionasmine,somuch so that the question, What? has to be replaced bythequestion,Who?Thepointisnolongerto disregardthefacticalinordertoreachtheessential, but to approach the central phenomenon oftheinvestigationinitsfacticalcharacter.The analyticalsodemonstratesthattheDaseincannot beconceivedasanimmanencepurifiedfromall interminglingwithapregiventranscendence,for itisthrownintheworld,essentiallyrelatedand opentotheworld,thankstotheindividualproject that characterizes its existence, so much so that theword“transcendence”becomesitsdefinition. Moreover,theanalyticdemonstratesthatmeanings,insteadofowingtheirorigintoaconstitution performed by a transcendental Ego, emerge on thelevelofthefacticalmobilityofthediversified project that animates existence in the world. It is by dealing with the world that the projective Daseindisclosesandapprehendsmeanings,interpretsthem,andexpressestheminsuchorsucha
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discursivemodality.Thereby,Being-in-the-world amountstoBeing-in-truth,providedthattruthis understoodasaletheia,orunconcealment.Finally, theanalyticofDaseininitsfacticallifedemonstrates that the projective character of existence is torn between, on the one hand, an everyday concernwhereinattentionispaidbytheDasein toentitiesotherthanitselfandtotheaveragecharacterofentitiesateachtimepubliclyavailableto everybodyandnobodyinparticular,todasMan, totheTheyand,ontheotherhand,anauthentic careinwhichDaseinconfrontswhatisproperly itsown,itsownmostpotentiality-for-Being,which is its Being-towards-death. By letting everydaynessprevailuponitsownmostpotentiality,Dasein fallsawayfromitsownmostBeingandallowsan averageconceptofBeing—eitherintermsofpresence-at-hand(Vorhandenheit)orintermsofreadiness-to-hand(Zuhandenheit)—tocoverupitsown finiteness.Inthefinalanalysis,suchfallennessleads to a conception of time as an infinite sequence of nows, thereby covering up the only possible horizonfortheintelligibilityofBeing,anhorizon thatisaquitedifferenttemporalitydeterminedby opennesstoafutureendand,therefore,essentially ek-staticaswellasfinite.Hence,thetitleunder which that fundamental ontology is developed: BeingandTime.
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It remains to be seen whether this metamorphosis of phenomenological reduction does not entaildifficultiesconnectedwiththeemphasisput byHeideggeronseveraldualitieswhich,although they are no longer identical to the antinomies insisteduponbyHusserl,neverthelessbyreason ofthesharpdichotomiesthattheyintroducelikewiseweighheavilyuponthedescription.Sincethe difficultieswedetectedinHusserl’simplementationofreductionwereultimatelydependenton thestubbornproclamationoftheprivilegeofthe Self,thequestiontoberaisednowis:Arewenot allowed to suspect in Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions a commitment to a similar privilege? Whatmotivatesoursuspicioninthefirstplaceis thefactthat,despitethesignificantmetamorphosis wehavejustevoked,HeideggerinBeingandTime claimsthathisownresearchtakesforgrantedthe teachingofHusserl’sfirstandsixthLogicalInvestigations.Thisdeservescloseexamination. AsImentionedwhenIwasdealingwithHusserl, thefirstLogicalInvestigationdrawsaneatdistinction between two types of sign: the sign as the expression(Ausdruck)ofameaning(Bedeutung) and the sign as a mere indication (Anzeichen). Husserl applies this distinction to language, i.e.,tothemediumthatpurelogiccannotavoid using, at least provisionally. Hence, the distinc-
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tionbetweenthelinguisticexpressionsuchasit functions in ordinary communication, where it remainsimpurebecauseitisburdenedbyindication, and, on the other hand, a pure linguistic expression which offers the pure intuition of a meaning to a solitary consciousness. Such intuitionisthecategorialintuitionthatisthetopicof thesixthLogicalInvestigation.Husserlhereclaims thatevenordinarylinguisticexpressions,inwhich wearticulatewhatweperceivethroughourstatementsandwhich,therefore,seemtobethemere mirroringofwhatweperceive,involveasurplusof meaninginregardtowhatisintuitedbyoursenses. Forexample,whenIsay,“Thispaperiswhite,” themeaning-intentionofwhatIamsayinggoes beyondmysensuousintuitions.AsHusserlsays, “Theintentionoftheword‘white’onlypartially coincideswiththecolour-aspectoftheapparent object;asurplusofmeaningremainsover,aform which finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it” (Husserl 1970b, 775). Husserl adds that I do not mean simply the colour-aspect of whatisofferedtomyeyeshereandnow.Imean “white” as a general adjective, which could be attributedaswelltosomethingelsethatIdonot perceivenow.Likewise,Idonotsimplymeanby thenoun“book”thisperceivedentity;Imeana substanceofacertaintypetowhichseveralother accidentalproperties,suchas“red”or“black“or
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“blue”maybeattributedaswell.Likewise,forthe word“is”aboutwhichHusserl,inagreementwith Kant’sdictum,“Beingisnorealpredicate,”writes thefollowing: Icanseecolour,butnotbeing-coloured.... Beingisnothingintheobject,nopartofit, no moment tenanting to it, no quality or intensityofit,nofigureofitornointernal formwhatsoever,noconstitutivefeatureofit howeverconceived.ButBeingisalsonothing attachingtoanobject:asitisnorealinternal feature,soalsoitisnorealexternalfeature (suchastherightandtheleft,thehighand thelow,theremoteandthenear,etc.)and thereforenotintherealsense,a‘feature’at all....Foralltheseareperceptible,andthey exhausttherangeofthepossiblepercepts,so thatweareatoncesayingandmaintaining thatbeingisabsolutelyimperceptible”(Husserl1970b,780).
However,thoughitcannotbeintuitedasapercept,being,liketheothermeaningsmentioned before, is nevertheless offered to an intuition, a non-sensuousone,whichHusserlcallsthecategorialintuition. InhislastseminartowhichIhadthehonorto beinvited,Heideggerdidnothesitatetoclaimthat Husserl’sdiscoveryofcategorialintuitionwasfor
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himdecisive.Asheputit,Husserlunderstoodthat themeaningofBeingisbeyondthewhatnessof beings:“Husserl’stourdeforceconsistedprecisely inthispresencingofBeingmadephenomenally presentinthecategory.Bymeansofthistourde force,Iwasfinallyinpossessionoftheground.” (Heidegger1976,315). Heideggerappropriatesthesetwoteachingsof the Logical Investigations in his own theoretical project. But because his research, instead of being focusedonpurelogic,isfocusedonfundamental ontology,theappropriationentailsametamorphosisofHusserl’stheses.Sincethebasicquestionof fundamentalontologyisthequestionofthemeaningofBeing,whichisanissueforeachhuman beingthrownintheworld,thecentralpointof referenceisnolongerintentionalconsciousness. ItisrathertheprojectingDaseinconsideredinits comprehensionofBeing. Once oriented and transformed by that new pointofreference,reductionalsotransformsthe distinctionbetweenindicationandmeaningthat HusserlpointedoutinthefirstLogicalInvestigation,andtransformsaswellthefunctionattributed tocategorialintuitioninthesixthLogicalInvestigation.Indeed,reductionfromnowon,instead of being a suspension of the natural attitude of cognitionandareturntointentionalconscious-
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ness, is rather a moving away from the average apprehensionofthebeingofbeingsprevailingin theeverydaydealingswiththemandisareturn totheownmostcomprehensionofBeing,which groundstheprojectthateachDaseinis.Accordingly,thenewreduction,whilemakingitsown Husserl’steaching,demonstratesitsrelevancefor thedescriptionofthecontrastbetweeneveryday projectsandownmostproject,betweenwhatHeideggercallsconcern(Besorgnis)andwhathecalls care(Sorge). As a result of this transformation, Heidegger claimsthatthediscourseofthespeakingDasein istornbetweenindicationandgenuinemeaning, or between what Aristotle called the semantikos andtheapophantikos,theformerofwhichoccurs withoutintuitivefulfillment,whereasthelatteris offeredtoinsight. Itisineverydaynessthatindicationdefinitely prevails over genuine meaning. Because an essentially practical concern rules Dasein’s dealingswithusefulentitiesanditscooperationwith otherusersforavarietyofgoalstobereachedin asurroundingworld,theeverydaynessofBeingin-the-worldcanbedescribedas“anon-thematic circumspectiveabsorptioninreferencesorassignmentsconstitutiveforthereadiness-to-handofa totalityofequipment”(Heidegger1962,§16).In suchcircumspectionanunderstandingandinter-
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pretationofwhatisready-to-handisatwork.But Heideggerinsiststhat“whenDaseinisabsorbed intheworldofitsconcern—thatis,atthesame time,initsBeing-withtowardsothers—itisnot itself ” (Heidegger 1962, §26). Dasein becomes itselfbymovingawayfromthetotalityofinvolvements,thankstowhichanyentityready-to-handis assignedtoa“towards-which”ortoa“for-which,” andbyreachingadeeperunderstandingwherein the point is no longer to interpret, but to see immediately that “the totality of involvements” itselfgoesbackultimatelytoa“towards-whichin which there is no further involvement”—for it isnolongera“towards-which”butaprimordial “for-the-sake-of-which.”Thisprimordialandsole authentic“for-the-sake-ofwhich”istheveryBeing ofDasein,“forwhich,initsBeing,thatveryBeing isessentiallyanissue”(Heidegger1962,§18). Such a contrast between the “towards-which” andthe“for-the-sake-of-which”inducesacontrast betweenordinaryandauthenticdiscourse.Ordinary discourse is communication with another. Butincommunicationthereliesan“averageintelligibility”or“averageunderstanding,”whereina genuine relationship to the entity talked about tendstogetlost,for“itisonthesameaverageness that we have a common understanding of whatissaid.”Hence,incommunicationdiscourse runstheconstantriskofbecominga“Gerede,”an
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“idletalk,”inwhichwhatisdecisiveis“thedominanceofthepublicwayinwhichthingshavebeen interpreted”(Heidegger1962,§35).Bycontrast, authenticdiscourseisapurelyontologicalresponse bytheconscienceofasolitaryDaseintothesilent calladdressedtoitbyitsownmostpotentiality-forBeing,apotentialitywhichisessentiallyfiniteforit pertainstoitsBeing-towards-death.Thisoriginary discourseisnotonlyamonologueofconscience; itisalsointimatelypervadedbyaclearviewofan ultimatemeaningwhichisthatverypotentialityfor-Being. It is here that Heidegger’s metamorphosis of Husserl’s categorial intuition into an ultimate ontological insight reaches its summit. Indeed, that potentiality-for-Being, which is, as Heideggersays,aBedeutungthat“Dasein‘signifies’ (bedeutet)toitself ”(Heidegger1962,§18),isnot onlyinapositionofsurpluswithrespecttowhat theDaseinis,hencebeyondany“realpredicate” attributabletoit;itisalsothethemeofaspecific “sight” (Sicht), the deepest one, that Heidegger calls“transparency”(Durchsichtigkeit)(Heidegger 1962,§31). It is not an exaggeration to claim that the contrastIhavejustsketchedentailsasmanydifficultiesasthoseimplicitinHusserl’sconceptof reduction. In fact, the subsequent development ofthephenomenologicalmovementintheworks of the early students of Heidegger may best be
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interpreted as a reply to these difficulties and a reaction against several biases in his notion of reduction, despite their expressions of gratitude fortheinspirationheprovidedtothem.Therefore, itisnotanexaggeration,either,toclaimthatinthe wakeofHeidegger’steachingthereoccurrednew metamorphosesofphenomenologicalreduction. Allow me to evoke briefly these post-Heideggerianmetamorphoseswithreferencetothetopics IhavediscussedinmyanalysisofHusserl:body andmind,theperson,values. SinceHeidegger’snotionofauthenticityobviouslyentailstheprimacyoftheSelfasopposed tothefallennessofDaseinunderthedominance oftheTheyineverydayness,letmestartwiththe notion of the person. In the final analysis the Daseincannotbeproperlyindividuatedineverydayness.Itbecomesirreplaceablequaindividual by withdrawing from the everyday sharing in deedsandwordsofaworldcommontoapluralityofhumanbeings.Thequestion,Whoisthe Dasein?whichreplacesHusserl’squestion,What isBewusstsein?,findsitsonlypossibleanswerin thesolitaryvisionbyDaseinofitsownmortality. ThismeansthatthequestionWho?isaddressed totheindividualDaseinbyitselfandconsistsin aninterpellationbyone’sownmostpotentialityfor-Being.
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Tothisnotionofindividuationtherearestrong objections made by the philosophical work of HannahArendt,whohadbeenamongtheearly studentsofHeideggerinMarburgandwhoonseveraloccasionsclaimedthatsheconsideredherselfa phenomenologist.Inherbook,TheHumanCondition,ofwhichshewroteinalettertoHeidegger (May8,1954)thatthebookwouldnothavebeen possiblewithoutwhatshehadlearnedfromhim inheryouth,shedescribesaquitedifferentform of individuation. Instead of being focused on deathandontheultimatesolitarycontemplation oftheontologicalrootofmeaningoccurringin theconfrontationwithone’sownmortality,her description is focused on natality and plurality, whoseinterplayisthespecificconditionofaction understoodastheconductbyhumanindividuals oftheirownlife.Inthisnewcontext,thequestion “Who?”takenbyArendt,asitwasbyHeidegger, tobemoreessentialthanthequestion“What?” undergoes a significant transformation. Indeed, thequestionisnolongerraisedbytheSelf,but byOtherswhoinviteallindividuals,assoonas theyareinserted,thankstonatality,intoawebof interactionsandinterlocutions,toshowinwords andindeeds,i.e.,byexpressingtheirviewsand bytakinginitiatives,toshowtotheirhumanfellowswhotheyare.Inthisnewcontext,reduction remainsinplaysinceArendt’sanalysisisacareful
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descriptionofphenomenaldistinctions,oftenconcealed but nevertheless necessary, between basic modesofactivity,suchaslabor,work,andaction. Byshowingthatcommunicationandinteraction withinapluralityofindividuals,allalikebutall different, is what makes individuation possible, ArendtwasledbythesametokentotieherreductiontoadeconstructionofHeidegger’sretrieval ofseveraldualisticbiases,abovealltheantinomy betweenaletheiaanddoxa,whichemergedatthe verybeginningofthephilosophicaltraditionand whicharecondensedintheparableofthecave, whereinPlatodrewasharpcontrastbetweeneverydaynessandwhathetooktobetheonlyauthentic existence:thebiostheoretikos. Withregardtothebody,theimpactofthedualitybetweeneverydaynessandauthenticityisnoless obvious.Inaway,thebasicontologicaltermsof Heidegger’sdescriptionofeverydaynesssuggest, at least implicitly, the universal presupposition of the body. Indeed, once it is focused on the projective Dasein, Heidegger’s phenomenology demonstrates that the ontological character of theentitiesdealtwithprimarilyandmostofthe timebytheeverydayconcernisreadiness-to-hand. Buthandsareorgansofalivingbody.Hence,the verynotionofreadiness-to-handreferstoaliving bodymovinginasurroundingworldwhereitdeals withavailabletools.Thebodyisalsoreferredtoby
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Heidegger’sdeconstructionoftraditionalontology. Indeed,deconstructionclaimsthatinitsattempt todefinetheBeingofbeings,traditionalontology repeatedlyunderstoodsuchBeingintermsofa presence-at-hand,anotionthatonceagaindoes notmakesensewithoutreferencetothehuman body. Because the constructive and deconstructive reductionismeanttoleadbackfromtheeveryday concerntowardstheauthenticcare,phenomenological investigation demonstrates not only that presence-at-handresultsfromafallingawayfrom readiness-to-hand, but also that the dominance of readiness-to-hand results from a falling away fromtheonlytrulyfundamentalmodeofBeing, whichistheek-statictranscendenceofexistence. Atthisjuncture,whenownmosttranscendenceis facedinthetransparencyofasolitaryconscience,it looksasthoughDaseinhasbecomedisembodied. How could embodiment remain relevant if the uncanninessthatisrevealedtoconscienceinthe attunementofanxiety“putsDasein’sBeing-in-theworldfacetofacewiththe‘nothing’oftheworld, andifitisinthefaceofthis‘nothing’thatDasein confronts its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (Heidegger 1962, §57)? By being without any home,theauthenticSelfturnsouttobebodiless aswell.
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Thisimplieddisembodimentoccasionedmany objectionsamongthesuccessorsofHeideggerin thephenomenologicalmovement. One of these objectors is Hans Jonas, who hadbeenoneofthebeststudentsofHeidegger in Marburg. In his first work Jonas had used conceptualtoolsprovidedbyBeingandTimeto interpretancientGnosticism,buthesubsequently cametorealizethatthedualitiesemphasizedin theanalyticofDaseinresultedinanewversionof Gnosticism.AccordingtoJonas,theHeideggerian focusonapurifiedSelfinduceswhathecallsinThe PhenomenonofLifean“anthropologicalacosmism” (Jonas1982,216),whichinvolves,aswasthecase inGnosticism,asortofcontemptforourbelongingtoorganiclifeandevenfornatureasawhole. SuchafocusonadetachedSelftendstooverlook thesimplefactthatdeathisprimordiallyanessentialpossibilityoflife,intheorganicsenseofthe word.Tobesure,inBeingandTimeHeidegger acknowledgesthat“deathinthewidestsense,isa phenomenonoflife”andthat“lifemustbeunderstoodasakindofBeingtowhichtherebelongsa Being-in-the-world,” but such acknowledgment isimmediatelyqualifiedbyhiminthefollowing terms:“OnlyifthiskindofBeingisorientedin aprivativewaytoDaseincanwefixitscharacter ontologically”(Heidegger1962,§49).Thismeans that“theexistentialinterpretationofdeathtakes
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precedenceoveranybiologyandontologyoflife” (Heidegger1962,§49).Jonasreactedagainstthis referencetoDaseinasaparadigm.Heattempted toshowthat,onthecontrary,inaconcretephenomenologyofBeingtheparadigmoughttobethe organismconsideredsimultaneouslyinitsmetabolismwithnatureandinitsspecificopeningtoan externalenvironment.Hetherebyrevivedinanew waytheteachingofAristotle’sDeanima,inwhich lifeisunderstoodintermsofahierarchyoflevels, which all preserve, while also transforming, the lowerlevelsonwhichtheydepend.Inthecontext ofthisnewparadigm,Jonasclaimednotonlythat Heideggerhadoverlookedtheorganicbasisofthe lifeofthemind,butalsothatheremainedprisoner of the legacy of Descartes’ dualism between res cogitansandresextensa(Jonas1980,xii-xiii). Another significant objector to Heidegger’s notion of the body is Emmanuel Levinas, who had been a fascinated auditor of Heidegger in Freiburgandwhoalwaysrecognizedhisdebtto Being andTime. Although he found considerable inspiration in Heidegger’s claim that the taskofontologyistoinvestigatetherelationship thatman,asanexistingbeing,sustainswithits Being or its existence, he objected very early to Heidegger’sdefinitionofthisrelationshipinterms of an ekstatic project.The very title of his first book,Del’existenceàl’existant,isquitesignificant
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in this regard. Indeed, it indicates a reversal of Heidegger’s problematic since the point in his fundamental ontology is to manifest a process thatleadsfromtheexistenttowardsexistence,that is,fromaconditioninwhichthehumanDasein isanentityamongotherentitiesdeterminedby themfromwithoutinsuchawaythatitsmode ofbeingisnotproperlyitsown,towardsamode ofbeingwhichisproperly“existence”understood asDasein’scareforitsownmostpotentiality-forBeing.InLevinas’languagesuchaprocessmoves awayfromtheconditionofa“substantive”towards theconditionofa“pureverb.”Inhisfirstbook, Levinas’meditationisanattempttodemonstrate thatanontologicalinvestigationshouldtakethe reversedirectionanddemonstratefirstofallhow thehumanbeingemergesasasubstantiveoutof aconditionwhichisprimarilyverbal.Thisiswhy hefocuses,indeliberateoppositiontoHeidegger’s emphasisontheek-stasis,onaphenomenological descriptionofwhathecalls“hypo-stasis,”aword whichliterallymeans:“stayingunder.”Thisnotion isintroducedinordertoshowthattheprimary relationofthehumanbeingtoBeingcannotbe understoodintermsofa‘project’.Onthecontrary, ithastobeunderstoodasapositionhereandnow whichisnotprimarilyprojective,butrepeatedly subjected or submitted to the overwhelming embrace of an anonymous and neutral “There
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is.”The description of this subjugated position showsthatbothHusserlianintentionalityandthe Heideggerian‘project’overlookwhatisdecisivein embodiment:thefactthatitentailsaburden.This ismanifestedinphenomenasuchasfatigue,laziness,insomnia,whichhadnoplaceintheearlier phenomenologyforthesimplereasonthatthey donotfitwiththethemesofintentionalityand ‘project’:onecannotintendorprojecttoundergo insomnia.However,thesesignsofsubjugationtoa burdenarenottheonlycharacteristicsofembodiment;theyaremerelythelatentpresupposition ofBeing-in-the-world.Beyondsuchsubjugation, another aspect of embodiment, also overlooked byHeidegger,hastobetakenintoaccountinthe descriptionoftherelationofthehumanexistent withtheworld.Thisaspectisthephenomenonof contentmentorsatisfaction.Atthisjuncture,LevinasonceagainobjectstoHeidegger’sdescriptionof thedualitybetweeneverydaynessandauthenticity. Andthedefinitionoftheformerasafor-which fallingawayfromthefor-the-sake-of-whichdefiningthelatter,failstorecognize“thesecularnature andcontentment”ofBeing-in-the-world;itfailsto recognizethattheworldis“abountifulnessofterrestrialnourishment”(Levinas1978,42),offered toourdesiresandfulfillingthemwithoutbeing inanywayawebofmeansforfurtherends.As hesays,thereisnofallennessineatingone’sdaily
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bread,indwellinginahome,inwearingclothes. Bycallingallofthateverydayandcondemningit asinauthentic,Heideggerfails“torecognizethe sincerityofhungerandthirst.”Or,toputtheissue inontologicalterms,Heideggerfailstorecognize thatthissecularworld,“farfromdeservingtobe called a fall, has its own equilibrium, harmony andpositiveontologicalfunction:thepossibilityof extractingoneselffromanonymousBeing”(Levinas1978,45).ItisimportanttonotethatLevinas considersthatinhisowndescriptionheremains faithfultothetwofoldmoveofreduction:epocheandreturntothematteritself(Levinas1978,42) This contrast with Heidegger’s description does not mean, of course, that the contentment of Being-in-theworldisthelastwordinLevinas’phenomenology.Thiswouldsubstituteanewversion oftheSelfhoodoftheSelffortheanalysisofthe authenticpotentiality-for-Being.Onthecontrary, theemphasisputbyLevinasonpositionandon contentmentisprovisionalandmeanttointroduce aradicalbreakwiththepreviouspredominanceof theSelfinphenomenologicalthought.Herewe reachthepointwhereanothercontroversialtopic mustbeintroduced,thatis,theissueofvalues, morepreciselyofethics. Asregardsvalues,itisobviousthatthesubstitutionofDaseinforBewusstseinprotectsHeidegger fromthetemptationofdeveloping,likeHusserl,
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anaxiologywhichwouldbeparallelinthepracticalrealmtowhatpurelogicisinthetheoretical realm.Thecradleofallvaluationisnolongerthe cogito, but Being-in-the-world. But here again thedualitybetweeneverydaynessandauthenticity poses a difficulty. Heidegger claims that in everydaynessthepracticalcircumspectionwhich orientsordinaryconcerniswhatrevealsvaluesto Dasein.Atoolisgoodorbadwhenitallowsusto performornottoperformthetaskassigned.Itis inthepursuitofavarietyofendsinthesurrounding world that things and other human beings demonstratevaluepredicates.Butsuchvaluesare inapositionoffallennesswithrespecttotheonly authenticvaluation,whichfortheDaseinconsists intheconfrontationfacetofacewithitsownmost potentiality-for-Being and the recognition and resoluteacceptanceofitsoriginaryguilt(Schuld) orresponsibleindebtedness. In this context Heidegger makes his own the famous motto of Plato about the Good—to - ousias—provided that it be agathon epekeina tes understood in a strictly ontological sense and consequentlytranslatedintothecentralformula offundamentalontology:Daseinexistsforthesake ofitself.ItisobviousthatHeidegger’sretrievalof Plato’s motto is therefore entirely encapsulated withinthesphereoftheSelf,withoutanyessential openingtotheOther.
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It is significant that in his first book Levinas alreadyattributestoPlato’smotto,whichhetakes to be “the general guideline” of his preparatory phenomenologicalinvestigationameaningwhich is not primordially ontological but ethical. In a deliberateobjectiontoHeidegger,hewritesthat Plato’s motto means that the Good is beyond Being,andhespecifies:“themovementwhichleads anexistenttowardtheGoodisnotatranscendence bywhichthatexistentraisesitselfuptoahigher existence,butadeparturefromBeingandfrom thecatagorieswhichdescribeit:an‘ex-cendence’ (Levinas1978,15).Thisfirstbookwasapreparationforafurtherphenomenologicaldescription whichwascarriedoutafewyearslaterinTotality andInfinity,abookinwhichthedeparturefrom thecircleofBeingisthecentralissue. Thelatterbookshowsthattheprimordialfaceto-facedoesnotoccurinthecircularrelationshipof theSelfwithitselfbutinanasymmetricalrelation offacinganotherwithoutpossibilityformyselfof reachinganultimateinsight,becausetheotherness oftheOtherisaheightwhichremainsinvisible andbreaksfromabovethetotalizingtendencyof theSelf.Thisface-to-faceencounterisforLevinas “thematteritself ”towhichthephenomenological reductionopenstheway.Asaresultoftheprimacy oftheOtherovertheSelf,itturnsoutthatethics hasaprecedenceoverontology.Consequently,this
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bookisaphenomenologicalrevisionofalmostall thebasicnotionsoftheanalyticofDasein. InsteadofbeingacallthatDaseinaddressesto itself,theconditionforthepossibilityofdiscourse isademandcomingfromtheOther,whoismy ethical teacher. Similarly, instead of being the ontologicalindebtednessofmyfreedomregarding my ownmost potentiality-for-Being, guilt is nolongerafeatureoftheautarchyoftheEgo;on thecontrary,itisimposeduponmebytheOther, whoseethicaldemandistheonlyjustificationof myfreedomandisits“investiture.”Likewise,the originoftruthisnottobefoundinthedisclosing characterofmyprojectbutinjustice,thatis,in thewelcomingoftheOther.Finally,itgoeswithoutsayingthatinthisethicalphenomenologythe egologicalprivilegeoftheoriaisputintoquestion: IftheothernessoftheOtherinfinitelytranscends all thematization, an ultimate transparency no longermakessense. Ihopetheseremarksareenoughtosuggestthat theadventureofthereductionintheworkofthe twofoundersofphenomenologyentailedintheir wakeeverrenewedmetamorphoses.
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WorksCited Arendt,Hannah.1958.TheHumanCondition.Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress. Arendt,Hannah,andMartinHeidegger.2002.Briefe 1925-1975undandereZeugnisse,ed.U.Ludz.FrankfurtamMain:VittorioKlostermann. Brentano, Franz. 1973. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,trans.A.C.Rancurello,D.B.Terrell,and L.L.McAlister.London:Routledge&KeganPaul. Frege,Gottlob.1984.CollectedPapersonMathematics, Logic,andPhilosophy,ed.B.McGuinness,trans.M. Blacketal.Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time, trans. J. MaquarrieandE.Robinson.London:SCMPress. ———.1982.TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, trans.A.Hofstadter.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress. ———.1986.Seminare(1951-1973),ed.C.Ochwadt. FrankfurtamMain:VittorioKlostermann. Husserl,Edmund.1964.TheIdeaofPhenomenology, trans.W.AlstonandG.Nakhnikian.TheHague: Nijhoff. ———.1970a.TheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology,trans.D.Carr.Evanston: NorthwesternUniversityPress. ———.1970b.LogicalInvestigations,2volumes,revised edition,trans.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge& KeganPaul,1970. ———.1970c.PhilosophiederArithmetic,2ndedition, ed.L.Eley(HusserlianaXII).TheHague:Nijhoff.
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———.1983.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenology andtoaphenomenologicalphilosophy,BookI,trans. F.Kersten.TheHague:Nijhoff. Jonas,Hans.1980.PhilosophicalEssays.FromAncient CreedtoTechnologicalMan.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. ———. 1982. The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress. Levinas,Emmanuel.1978.ExistenceandExistents,trans. A.Lingis.TheHague:Nijhoff. ———.1979.TotalityandInfinity,trans.A.Lingis. TheHague:Nijhoff. Merleau-Ponty,Maurice.1970.ThemesfromtheLectures attheCollègedeFrance1952-1960,trans.J.O’Neill. Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress. Taminiaux,Jacques.1991.HeideggerandtheProjectof Fundamental Ontology, trans. M. Gendre. Albany: StateUniversityofNewYorkPress. ———.1997.TheThracianMaidandtheProfessional Thinker/ Arendt and Heidegger, trans. M. Gendre. Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress. ——.2002.Sillagesphénoménologiques/Auditeurset lecteursdeHeidegger.Brussels:Ousia.
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TheAquinasLectures PublishedbytheMarquetteUniversityPress MilwaukeeWI53201-1881USA 1.St.ThomasandtheLifeofLearning.JohnF.McCormick,S.J.(1937)ISBN0-87462-101-1 2.St.ThomasandtheGentiles.MortimerJ.Adler(1938) ISBN0-87462-102-X 3.St.ThomasandtheGreeks.AntonC.Pegis(1939) ISBN0-87462-103-8 4.TheNatureandFunctionsofAuthority.YvesSimon (1940)ISBN0-87462-104-6 5.St.ThomasandAnalogy.GeraldB.Phelan(1941) ISBN0-87462-105-4 6.St.ThomasandtheProblemofEvil.JacquesMaritain (1942)ISBN0-87462-106-2 7.HumanismandTheology.WernerJaeger(1943) ISBN0-87462-107-0 8.TheNatureandOriginsofScientism.JohnWellmuth (1944)ISBN0-87462-108-9 9.CicerointheCourtroomofSt.ThomasAquinas. E.K.Rand(1945)ISBN0-87462-109-7 10. St.Thomas and Epistemology. Louis-Marie Regis, O.P.(1946)ISBN0-87462-110-0 11.St.ThomasandtheGreekMoralists.VernonJ.Bourke (1947)ISBN0-87462-111-9 12.HistoryofPhilosophyandPhilosophicalEducation. ÉtienneGilson(1947)ISBN0-87462-112-7 13.TheNaturalDesireforGod.WilliamR.O’Connor (1948)ISBN0-87462-113-5 14.St.ThomasandtheWorldState.RobertM.Hutchins (1949)ISBN0-87462-114-3
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15.MethodinMetaphysics.RobertJ.Henle,S.J.(1950) ISBN0-87462-115-1 16.WisdomandLoveinSt.ThomasAquinas.Étienne Gilson(1951)ISBN0-87462-116-X 17.TheGoodinExistentialMetaphysics.ElizabethG. Salmon(1952)ISBN0-87462-117-8 18.St.ThomasandtheObjectofGeometry.VincentE. Smith(1953)ISBN0-87462-118-6 19. Realism And Nominalism Revisted. HenryVeatch (1954)ISBN0-87462-119-4 20.ImprudenceinSt.ThomasAquinas.CharlesJ.O’Neil (1955)ISBN0-87462-120-8 21.TheTruthThatFrees.GerardSmith,S.J.(1956) ISBN0-87462-121-6 22.St.ThomasandtheFutureofMetaphysics.Joseph Owens,C.Ss.R.(1957)ISBN0-87462-122-4 23.ThomasandthePhysicsof1958:AConfrontation. HenryMargenau(1958)ISBN0-87462-123-2 24.MetaphysicsandIdeology.Wm.OliverMartin(1959) ISBN0-87462-124-0 25.Language,TruthandPoetry.VictorM.Hamm(1960) ISBN0-87462-125-9 26. Metaphysics and Historicity. Emil L. Fackenheim (1961)ISBN0-87462-126-7 27.TheLureofWisdom.JamesD.Collins(1962) ISBN0-87462-127-5 28.ReligionandArt.PaulWeiss(1963) ISBN0-87462-128-3 29.St.ThomasandPhilosophy.AntonC.Pegis(1964) ISBN0-87462-129-1 30.TheUniversityinProcess.JohnO.Riedl(1965) ISBN0-87462-130-5 31.ThePragmaticMeaningofGod.RobertO.Johann (1966)ISBN0-87462-131-3
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32.ReligionandEmpiricism.JohnE.Smith(1967) ISBN0-87462-132-1 33.TheSubject.BernardLonergan,S.J.(1968) ISBN0-87462-133-X 34.BeyondTrinity.BernardJ.Cooke(1969) ISBN0-87462-134-8 35.IdeasandConcepts.JuliusR.Weinberg(1970) ISBN0-87462-135-6 36.ReasonandFaithRevisited.FrancisH.Parker(1971) ISBN0-87462-136-4 37.PsycheandCerebrum.JohnN.Findlay(1972) ISBN0-87462-137-2 38.TheProblemoftheCriterion.RoderickM.Chisholm (1973)ISBN0-87462-138-0 39.ManasInfiniteSpirit.JamesH.Robb(1974) ISBN0-87462-139-9 40.AquinastoWhitehead:SevenCenturiesofMetaphysics ofReligion.CharlesHartshorne(1976) ISBN0-87462-141-0 41.TheProblemofEvil.ErrolE.Harris(1977) ISBN0-87462-142-9 42.TheCatholicUniversityandtheFaith.FrancisC. Wade,S.J.(1978)ISBN0-87462-143-7 43.St.ThomasandHistoricity.ArmandJ.Maurer,C.S.B. (1979)ISBN0-87462-144-5 44.DoesGodHaveaNature?AlvinPlantinga(1980) ISBN0-87462-145-3 45.RhymeandReason:St.ThomasandModesofDiscourse. RalphMcinerny(1981)ISBN0-87462-148-8 46.TheGift:Creation.KennethL.Schmitz(1982) ISBN0-87462-149-6 47.HowPhilosophyBegins.BeatriceH.Zedler(1983) ISBN0-87462-151-8
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48.TheRealityoftheHistoricalPast.PaulRicoeur(1984) ISBN0-87462-152-6 49.HumanEndsandHumanActions:AnExplorationin St.Thomas’Treatment.AlanDonagan(1985) ISBN0-87462-153-4 50.ImaginationandMetaphysicsinSt.Augustine.Robert O’Connell,S.J.(1986)ISBN0-87462-227-1 51.ExpectationsofImmortalityinLateAntiquity.Hilary AArmstrong(1987)ISBN0-87462-154-2 52.TheSelf.AnthonyKenny(1988) ISBN0-87462-155-0 53.TheNatureofPhilosophicalInquiry.QuentinLauer, S.J.(1989)ISBN0-87562-156-9 54.FirstPrinciples,FinalEndsandContemporaryPhilosophicalIssues.AlasdairMacIntyre(1990) ISBN0-87462-157-7 55. Descartes among the Scholastics. Marjorie Greene (1991)ISBN0-87462-158-5 56.TheInferenceThatMakesScience.ErnanMcMullin (1992)ISBN0-87462-159-3 57.PersonandBeing.W.NorrisClarke,S.J.(1993) ISBN0-87462-160-7 58.MetaphysicsandCulture.LouisDupré(1994) ISBN0-87462-161-5 59.MediævalReactionstotheEncountersbetweenFaith andReason.JohnF.Wippel(1995) ISBN0-87462-162-3 60. Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine. Roland J. Teske,S.J.(1996)ISBN0-87462-163-1 61.SimplicityAsEvidenceofTruth.RichardSwinburne (1997)ISBN0-87462-164-X 62. Science, Religion and Authority: Lessons from the GalileoAffair.RichardJ.Blackwell.(1998) ISBN0-87462-165-8
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63.WhatSortofHumanNature?MedievalPhilosophy andtheSystematicsofChristology.MarilynMcCord Adams.(1999)ISBN0-87462-166-6 64.OnInoculatingMoralPhilosophyagainstGod.John M.Rist.(2000)ISBN0-87462-167-X. 65.ASensibleMetaphysicalRealism.WilliamP.Alston (2001)ISBN0-87462-168-2. 66.EschatologicalThemesinMedievalJewishPhilosophy. ArthurHyman.(2002)ISBN0-87462-169-0 67.OldWineinNewSkins.JorgeJ.E.Gracia.(2003) ISBN0-87462-170-4. 68.TheMetamorphosesofPhenomenologicalReduction. JacquesTaminiaux.ISBN0-87462-171-2.
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AbouttheAquinasLectureSeries TheAnnualSt.ThomasAquinasLectureSeriesbegan atMarquetteUniversityinthespringof1937.Idealfor classroomuse,libraryadditions,orprivatecollections, theAquinasLectureSerieshasreceivedinternational acceptance by scholars, universities, and libraries. Hardboundinmaroonclothwithgoldstampedcovers.Uniformstyleandprice($15each).Somereprints with soft covers. Complete set (67Titles) (ISBN 087462-150-X)receivesa40%discount.Newstanding ordersreceivea30%discount.Regularreprintingkeeps allvolumesavailable.Orderinginformation(purchase orders,checks,andmajorcreditcardsaccepted): MarquetteUniversityPress 30AmberwoodParkway P.O.Box2139 AshlandOH44805 OrderToll-Free(800)247-6553 FAX:(419)2816883 EditorialAddress: Dr.AndrewTallon,Director MarquetteUniversityPress Box1881 MilwaukeeWI53201-1881 Tel:(414)288-7298FAX:(414)288-3300 email:[email protected].
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