The Making of Identities in Athenian Oratory 0367228203, 9780367228200

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The Making of Identities in Athenian Oratory

Focusing on extant speeches from the Athenian Assembly, law, and Council in the fifth to fourth centuries BCE, these essays explore how speakers constructed or deconstructed identities for themselves and their opponents as part of a rhetorical strategy designed to persuade or manipulate the audience. According to the needs of the occasion, speakers could identify the Athenian people either as a unified dēmos or as a collection of sub-groups, and they could exploit either differences or similarities between Athenians and other Greeks and between Greeks and ‘barbarians’. Names and naming strategies were an essential tool in the (de)construction of individuals’ identities, while the Athenians’ civic identity could be constructed in terms of honour(s), ethnicity, socio-economic status, or religion. Within the forensic setting, the physical location and procedural conventions of an Athenian trial could shape the identities of its participants in a unique if transient way. The Making of Identities in Athenian Oratory is an insightful look at this understudied aspect of Athenian oratory and will be of interest to anyone working on the speeches themselves, identity in ancient Greece, or ancient oratory and rhetoric more broadly. Jakub Filonik is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland. Brenda Griffith-Williams is Honorary Research Associate in the Department of Greek and Latin at University College London, UK. Janek Kucharski is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland.

Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies

Titles include: Fantasy in Greek and Roman Literature Graham Anderson Piracy, Pillage, and Plunder in Antiquity Appropriation and the Ancient World Edited by Richard Evans and Martine de Marre Romans at War Soldiers, Citizens, and Society in the Roman Republic Edited by Jeremy Armstrong and Michael P. Fronda The Discourse of Kingship in Classical Greece Carol Atack Emotional Trauma in Greece and Rome Representations and Reactions Edited by Andromache Karanika and Vassiliki Panoussi The Representation of Slavery in the Greek Novel Resistance and Appropriation William M. Owens Memories of Utopia The Revision of Histories and Landscapes in Late Antiquity Edited by Bronwen Neil and Kosta Simic The Making of Identities in Athenian Oratory Edited by Jakub Filonik, Brenda Griffith-Williams and Janek Kucharski For more information on this series, visit: www.routledge.com/classicalstudies/ series/RMCS

The Making of Identities in Athenian Oratory

Edited by Jakub Filonik, Brenda Griffith-Williams and Janek Kucharski

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Jakub Filonik, Brenda GriffithWilliams, and Janek Kucharski; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Jakub Filonik, Brenda Griffith-Williams, and Janek Kucharski to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Filonik, Jakub, editor. | Griffith-Williams, Brenda, editor. | Kucharski, Janek, editor. Title: The making of identities in Athenian oratory/edited by Jakub Filonik, Brenda Griffith-Williams and Janek Kucharski. Other titles: Routledge monographs in classical studies. Description: New York City : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge monographs in classical studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019040827 (print) | LCCN 2019040828 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367228200 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429277023 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Oratory, Ancient. | Rhetoric, Ancient. | Greek literature—History and criticism. Classification: LCC PA3264 .M35 2020 (print) | LCC PA3264 (ebook) | DDC 885/.009—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019040827 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019040828 ISBN: 978-0-367-22820-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-27702-3 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Notes on contributors Abbreviations Introduction

vii ix 1

JA NE K KUCHARS KI, B RENDA GRIFFIT H-WILLIAM S, AN D JAKUB FIL ONIK

PART I

The politics of naming and individuals’ rhetorical identities 1 Civic and local identities in Athenian rhetoric

13 15

RO GER BROCK

2 The two Mantitheuses in Demosthenes 39 and [Demosthenes] 40: a case of Athenian identity theft?

32

B RE NDA G RIF FITH- WILLIAMS

3 Constructing the identity of Timarchus in Aeschines 1

47

RO SALIA HATZILAM BRO U

4 Constructing gender identity: women in Athenian trials

63

KONSTANT INOS KAPPARIS

PART II

The rhetorical construction of civic identities 5 Athenian identity and the ideology of autochthony: an institutionalist approach M ATTEO BARBATO

81

83

vi Contents 6 Lysias and the rhetoric of citizen honour

102

BE NJA MIN KEIM

7 Archaism, performance, and civic status in Lysias 10 Against Theomnestus

122

A LEX PET KA S

8 Seeing others as Athenians in Demosthenes’ third Philippic

137

J UDS ON HERRMAN

PART III

Social and material dimensions of Athenian identities 9 The rich and the poor, conflicts and alliances: socio-economic identities and their uses in the Demosthenic corpus

151

153

L UCIA CECC HET

10 Prosecutorial identities and the problem of relevance

171

JANE K KUC HARSK I

11 Space, place, and identity in Antiphon On the murder of Herodes

191

C HR IS TINE PLASTOW

Index Index locorum

206 210

Notes on contributors

Matteo Barbato is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the University of Birmingham. His work currently focuses on the institutional reality and ideology of political power in Athenian democracy as well as on honour in Athenian politics and society. He is the author of a forthcoming monograph entitled The ideology of democratic Athens: institutions, orators and the mythical past. Roger Brock is Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of Leeds, coeditor of Alternatives to Athens (2000, with Stephen Hodkinson) and Defining citizenship in archaic Greece (2018, with Alain Duplouy), and author of Greek political imagery from Homer to Aristotle (2013) and numerous articles on Greek history and literature. Lucia Cecchet is Lecturer in Ancient History at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz. She is interested in the social and cultural history of the Greek world from the classical to the imperial period, with a focus on poverty and citizenship. Her most recent publications include Poverty in Athenian public discourse (Steiner 2015), Citizens in the Graeco-Roman world (with A. Busetto, Brill 2017), and The Ancient war’s impact on the home front (with Ch. Degelmann, M. Patzelt, Cambridge Scholars 2019). Jakub Filonik (PhD University of Warsaw 2015) is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Silesia in Katowice. He has published on Athenian oratory, Greek tragedy, ancient impiety trials, metaphors in Greek political discourse, and liberty ancient and modern. He was a visiting researcher at University College London, Indiana University Bloomington, Royal Holloway University of London, and the Jagiellonian University in Kraków and a Fulbright fellow at the University of Chicago. Brenda Griffith-Williams is Honorary Research Associate in the Department of Greek and Latin at University College London. She has published A commentary on selected speeches of Isaios (Leiden, 2013) and several articles on Athenian law and rhetoric. She is co-editor, with Chris Carey and Ifigeneia Giannadaki, of Use and abuse of law in the Athenian courts (Leiden, 2018).

viii

Notes on contributors

Rosalia Hatzilambrou is Assistant Professor in the Department of Classics at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She is the author of Isaeus’ On the estate of Pyrrhus (2018). Her PhD thesis on a selection of unpublished Greek papyri was published in separate volumes of The Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Her research interests include Attic oratory, Greek rhetoric, and Greek papyrology, and she has published a number of articles in each of these areas. Judson Herrman is Frank T. McClure Professor of Greek and Latin at Allegheny College. He is the author of three books: Athenian funeral orations (Focus, 2004), Hyperides: Funeral oration (Oxford, 2009), and Demosthenes: selected public speeches (Cambridge, 2019). Konstantinos Kapparis is University of Florida Research Foundation Professor and Director of the Center for Greek Studies. His research interests include the Attic orators, ancient Greek social and cultural history, and ancient medical literature. Recent and forthcoming publications include Athenian law and society (London 2018), Prostitution in the ancient Greek world (Berlin 2018), and Women in the law courts of classical Athens (forthcoming). Benjamin Keim is Associate Professor of Classics at Pomona College. His research interests include ancient and modern concepts of honour, ancient democracy, the Attic orators, and Greek historiography. He has published a number of articles on these topics and is currently working on a monograph project: City of honor: the politics of honor in democratic Athens. Janek Kucharski is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Silesia in Katowice. His main research interests include Greek rhetoric, law, and tragedy, while occasionally he also ventures into more exotic domains such as Greek magic or Byzantine reception of antiquity. He has published a Polish translation of Hypereides, completed another one of Antiphon and Dinarchus, and is currently working on a similar project related to selected works of Demosthenes. Alex Petkas is Assistant Professor of Classics at California State University, Fresno. His research focuses on Greek rhetoric of all periods, with an emphasis on the classicizing authors of late antiquity. He is working on a book on the letter collection of the philosopher Synesius of Cyrene and has co-edited a volume on Synesius’ teacher, Hypatia of Alexandria. Christine Plastow is Lecturer in Classical Studies at the Open University. She has published on various aspects of Athenian forensic rhetoric, as well as classical reception and Classics pedagogy. She is currently completing her book Homicide in the Attic orators (Routledge).

Abbreviations

General ed. edn eds esp. fr. MS trans.

edited by/editor edition editors especially fragment Manuscript translated by

Ancient authors and works Aeschin. Andoc. Antiph. Ar.

Arist.

Athen. Ath. Pol. Cic. Dem. Din.

Aeschines Andocides Antiphon Aristophanes Ach. Acharnians Eq. Knights Plut. Plutus Ran. Frogs Thesm. Thesmophoriazusae Vesp. Wasps Aristotle Pol. Politics Rh. Rhetoric [Rh. Al.] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum Athenaeus [Arist.] Athēnaiōn politeia Cicero Nat. D. De natura deorum Demosthenes Dinarchus

x

Abbreviations

Dion. Hal.

Eur.

Gorg. Harp. Hdt. Hom. Hsch. Hyp.

Isae. Isoc. Lex.Seg. Luc. Lycurg. Lys. Paus. Pl.

Plaut. Plin. Plut.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus Dem. De Demosthene Lys. De Lysia Euripides El. Electra Heracl. Heraclidae’ Or. Orestes Supp. Suppliants Gorgias Harpocration Herodotus Homer Il. Iliad Od. Odyssey Hesychius Hypereides Ath. Against Athenogenes Dem. Against Demosthenes Epit. Funeral oration Dion. Against Diondas Eux. In defence of Euxenippus Lyc. In defence of Lycophron Tim. Against Timandrus Isaeus Isocrates Lexica segueriana Lucian Dial.meret. Dialogi meretricii Lycurgus Lysias Pausanias Plato Ap. Apology Crat. Cratylus Criti. Critias Lg. Laws Menex. Menexenus Resp. Republic Symp. Symposium Plautus Bacch. Bacchides Pliny NH Naturalis historia Plutarch Dem. Demosthenes Lyc. Lycurgus

Abbreviations

[Plut.] Quint. Schol. Soph. Theophr. Thuc. Xen.

[Xen.]

xi

Mor. Moralia Sol. Solon X Orat. Vitae decem oratorum Quintilian Scholia or Scholio Sophocles Ant. Antigone Theophrastus Char. Characters Thucydides Xenophon Hell. Hellenica Mem. Memorabilia Oec. Oeconomicus Ath. Pol. Respublica Atheniensium

Journals Abbreviations of journal titles follow the usage of L’Année Philologique, with the exception that TAPA = Transactions of the American Philological Society.

Modern works BNJ FGrH IG LSJ PCG

I. Worthington (ed.), Brill’s new Jacoby F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker Inscriptiones Graecae Liddell, Scott, Jones, Greek-English lexicon R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), Poetae Comici Graeci

Introduction Janek Kucharski, Brenda Griffith-Williams, and Jakub Filonik

Identities and rhetoric Is it possible at all to speak about ancient Greek identities? The question itself may sound perverse, given how much scholarly effort has been devoted to this subject in the last four decades or so. Greek identities have been studied from numerous vantage points, such as ethnicity (Hall 1997, 1999); cultural change (Goldhill 2007); archaeology (Marcon 1997; Lomas 2004; Demetriou 2012); literary strategies (Smith 2007; Whitmarsh 2011); regional (Whitmarsh 2010) and cultural history (Lee 2015); and, most importantly, given the scope of the present volume, in the collection of papers by Boegehold and Scafuro (1994), which deals with the legal and social aspects of Athenian citizenship in the classical period. But at its core the initial question taps into a non-negligible problem: classical Greek, before Aristotle, has no word to denote identity as such. And in the literature which postdates him, the term tautotēs is nonetheless limited chiefly to philosophical and scientific discourse. Does this mean that for the Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE the question of identity or identities did not exist? This would be a valid inference based on the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (also known as the theory of linguistic relativity),1 which holds that language is not just a passive reflection of objectively existing categories, but in fact creates them by providing its users with a notional grid which organizes the otherwise shapeless continuum of reality. Take the celebrated example of Inuit vocabulary for snow, which (purportedly) shows how different their worldview is from that, say, of English-speaking people: to the latter ‘snow on the ground’ is a purely incidental manifestation of the same phenomenon as ‘falling snow’; to the former, however, the two (aput and qana respectively) count as distinct linguistic categories, and therefore two distinct things. An Englishman, therefore, will never be able to appreciate ‘snow on the ground’ in the way that his Inuit friend would. By this token, one might assume that the question of identity not only was never a topic of reflection for the ancient Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, but perhaps not even ‘a thing’ at all. It is, of course, easy to disprove such a naïve theorem. Not only do the aforementioned studies (a rather small, and avowedly biased, selection) provide ample

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practical proof to the contrary. On the level of theory, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its strong, yet melodramatically appealing version (as it tapped into the everattractive stereotype of the ‘noble savage’)2 was disproved3 and relegated to the domain of pop-culture mythology.4 The ancient Greeks of the classical period were well aware of the sense of belonging and discrimination, on which the idea of identity is founded, and that on multiple levels. They clearly distinguished themselves, Greeks, that is users of a certain language (despite its dialectical variations), from non-Greek people. They had a very well-pronounced sense of affiliation to their polis (or ethnos) and, within it, to a socio-economic class. Granted, in many cases on the micro-level we find these categories deconstructed, their boundaries fuzzy, their principles subverted. We shall find many examples of this in the chapters of this volume. But deconstruction always presupposes a structure, and the structure which will provide the analytical framework for this volume is social identity theory. Social identity theory began with the seminal works of Henri Tajfel published in the 1970s.5 His first discovery may not seem so very contentious to us: humans are hard-wired towards in-group bias (that is to favouring people who belong to the same group as they do), at the expense of the out-group. His other finding was, however, much more perplexing: the categorization into groups, which led to the said favouritism, could be completely arbitrary, without any grounding in the personal attributes of individuals making up those groups (as in a random assignment of subjects into cohorts, based on lot). Social identification therefore is less a matter of mutual attraction and cohesion and more one of discrimination.6 To refer to Tajfel again, ‘the definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there are other groups around’.7 And, as aptly observed by Stuart Hall in a more recent study, ‘Identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render “outside”, “abjected”’.8 The fundamental, basic step of such identification by exclusion is providing someone with the essentials of personal identity, such as name and family name. Although personal identity was frequently seen as a phenomenon sharply distinct from its social aspect,9 this differentiation has been rightly disproved in more recent studies.10 The reason for this is intuitively obvious: the details of one’s personal identity serve no other purpose but to distinguish one from others. Without social interaction, there is no need for personal identity. As noted by Martin Ehala, ‘there is no Self without socialization, and socialization means becoming authentic in terms of external social verification’.11 A particularly apt illustration of how personal identity is at the same time a social matter comes from no better historical place than ancient Athens. There, one’s formally recognized personal identity consisted of a proper name, a patronymic and a demotic (an issue frequently raised in the following chapters, as in Brock, Griffith-Williams, Hatzilambrou, and Keim). Such identification, however, not only served to distinguish one person from another, but also fixed him or her in a certain social group: Athenian (male) citizens, as opposed to metics (who had no demotic), slaves (identified by the name of their owner),

Introduction

3

and women (identified by the name of their guardian). Giving a name was therefore tantamount to defining one’s role and place in a society. Recognizing that identity is primarily a social phenomenon presupposes, to quote Richard Jenkins, ‘that it is somewhat negotiable and flexible’.12 A particularly useful way of thinking about social identity in these terms is by way of a spatial metaphor, as suggested by Pierre Bourdieu – as a distinct place within a social space: Agents who occupy similar or neighbouring positions [within the social space] are placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, and therefore have every chance of having similar dispositions and interests.13 To move this observation from ‘the stratosphere of grand theory to the more oxygenated altitudes’ (Jenkins’ bon mot), one could bring up a slightly modified example provided by Bourdieu himself: those who usually drink champagne have a much higher chance of having antique furniture, playing golf at country clubs, and riding horses for recreation than those who drink beer.14 Most importantly, however, social space is a space of constant shifting and renegotiation of places, that is, identities. This may be done either by playing the game, that is moving up or down the social ladder, or breaking it through revolution (which need not necessarily take the form of a violent upheaval) and the reassignment or dissolution of pre-existing categories. In any case, as stressed by Bourdieu, the primary means of negotiating such change is through discourse; to ‘make groups’ requires symbolic power, and symbolic power ‘is the power to make things with words’.15 The ancient Greeks – the Athenians in particular – were acutely aware of this power. Probably the most explicit and haunting instance of this awareness is Thucydides’ description of the Corcyrean revolution (stasis), where the chaos of appalling violence brings about a redefinition of categories and values (3.82.4); prudence came to be regarded as cowardice, and recklessness as bravery, and so on.16 But, as already noted, the power to alter the social space is by no means limited to such paroxysms of brutality. In fact, in ancient Athens as today, it was subject to a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation in the numerous venues for public discourse, such as the theatre, the Assembly, other religious festivals with public performances, and – most importantly for the purposes of this volume – the law-courts. This power, to manipulate the social space of the ancient polis, to forge or twist the social identities which constitute it, is a recurrent theme in the following chapters, in particular in the contributions of Kapparis, Cecchet, Barbato, and Petkas. It would be wrong, however, to assume that social identities can only be negotiated by means of discourse. In fact, the language of identity is a polysemiotic system, which comprises not only verbal communication but an entire plethora of other types of signification, most notably (in terms of Peirce’s philosophy) indexes and symbols.17 An index is a type of sign which remains in

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a relation of spatial, temporal, or causal contiguity with its object: smoke, for instance, is an index of fire. Symbolic communication, by contrast, is based on a purely arbitrary association between the sign and its denotatum; granted, its most obvious example is language itself, but hardly the only one. Take for instance the aforementioned example: drinking champagne is on the one hand an index, used by an individual (or in his or her representation) to communicate membership of the champagne-drinking upper class. However, the association of drinking champagne with that particular social group (or social place, in Bourdieu’s terms) is nonetheless an arbitrary one and therefore belongs to the domain of symbolic signification. Many historical communities had an established, formal code of communicating identities by way of such indexical and symbolic signification. In ancient Sparta for instance, the helots were expected to wear a dogskin cap (kunē) and a leather jerkin (diphthera) as marks of their status.18 In democratic Athens, however, no such official requirements were enacted (much to the displeasure of the Old Oligarch),19 although a clear system of less formalized signs of identity, such as tattoos on the one hand and long hair on the other, were frequently seen in action. Many of those will be found in the chapters of this volume, most clearly (though not exclusively) in the contributions of Hatzilambrou, Petkas, and Keim. This volume, nonetheless, is concerned primarily with identity as a very specific rhetorical construct: how speakers in the Athenian law-courts and political institutions discursively constructed or deconstructed their own and others’ identities, individually or collectively, as part of a rhetorical strategy designed to persuade their audiences that they had a stronger legal case or a more advantageous policy proposal than their opponents. In this particular respect a brilliant simile proposed by Ehala provides a revealing vantage point: One can compare the game of chess with a debate over some issue where two sides try to convince a jury (or each other) whose position is right. Something similar goes on in chess, too, where players use the language of chess to convince the opponent that they are superior.20 In chess, every piece has a double identity: with respect to the ‘team’ (black or white) and with respect to their distinct functions (pawns, bishops, rooks, knights, queens, etc.). But the board and pieces are nothing more than dispensable props: what matters is the ‘dialogue’ of chess itself, a form of discourse founded on a distinct, identity-based sign-system, which happens to materialize in the form of the game’s physical attributes. It has been frequently stated that chess is indeed a model of human society; not exclusively a mediaeval society (to which it is compared most frequently), but any society, with different actors, identities, teams, and hierarchy. Unlike the pieces, however, human beings are endowed with numerous overlapping identities, not just two. And as in a game of chess, these can be played out one way or another in the context of a public judicial (or any other, for that

Introduction

5

matter) hearing. In the age of the orators, the Athenians identified themselves, individually and collectively, from a range of antithetical perspectives, such as citizen/slave, Athenian/foreigner, male/female, legitimate/illegitimate, public speaker/private citizen, and so on. A skilful deployment and manipulation of these identities could spell victory or defeat in a court-room – and success or failure in the Assembly. This forensic or deliberative background of such manipulation is present in all the contributions to this volume, but put to the fore in the chapters by Herrman, Plastow, and Kucharski. Most of the chapters of this book are based on papers presented by members of a panel on ‘The rhetoric of identity in Greek oratory’ which we organized for the tenth Celtic Conference in Classics (Montreal, July 2017). In defining our topic, both for the conference panel and for the published volume, we were aware of the need to distinguish identity from other rhetorical constructs such as character (ēthos) or role. Character, in particular, was recognized as a means of persuasion (pistis) by Aristotle and other ancient rhetoricians and has long been a focus of interest for modern scholars interested in the rhetorical features of Athenian oratory. To be sure, a character is a social phenomenon as well, a discursive representation of a given person, of an agent in a historical or fictitious narrative. As such, however, it is not tantamount to a particular (social) identity, but rather to an amalgam of identities. And bearing in mind that a character is not a person, but only a representation of a person, we should stress that it will never appear as a perfectly rounded phenomenon: certain identities, which it includes, will necessarily be given prominence over others, according to the exigencies of the narrative in which the character comes to life. As observed by John C. Turner, some identities will become more salient than others, just as they regularly become in historical periods of crisis (e.g., civil or tribal wars).21 Accordingly, for the ancient Athenian orators and logographers, creating persuasive characters was – to use the chess example mentioned above – a complex game of identities, some of which were nonnegotiable, such as gender or political status, while many others were malleable and therefore subject to a considerable degree of manipulation.

The scope of this volume Part I of the volume, ‘The politics of naming and individuals’ rhetorical identities’, focuses on the rhetorical construction (or deconstruction) of personal identities for individual Athenians. Deme membership was fundamental to the identity of an Athenian citizen, and an adult male was formally identified by his given name, patronymic, and demotic; but, as Roger Brock points out in Chapter 1 (‘Civic and local identities in Athenian rhetoric’), the demotic occurs surprisingly rarely in forensic speeches. Its use, as Brock argues, is not random, but deliberate and calculated: when it goes beyond the basic function of distinguishing between homonyms, the demotic tends to identify an individual as a legal personality such as an arbitrator, a surety, or a witness. It is also commonly used of someone involved in commercial or financial dealings, or

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for the assertion of a legal status such as marriage, and sometimes as a mark of respect. Moving on to the wider implications of deme membership, Brock suggests that the most salient characteristic of the ‘rhetorical deme’ is solidarity – as evidenced, especially, in the willingness of demesmen to testify on one another’s behalf – and concludes that ‘one might say that the prerequisite for being a good citizen was to be a good demesman’. In Chapter 2, ‘The two Mantitheuses in Demosthenes 39 and [Demosthenes] 40: a case of Athenian identity theft?’ Brenda Griffith-Williams analyzes the notorious dispute between two half-brothers who both claimed the same identity for themselves: Mantitheus, the son of Mantias of Thoricus. Mantitheus, the speaker of the two extant speeches, insists that he alone is entitled to the name Mantitheus, while his opponent was named Boeotus by their father. The speaker, as Griffith-Williams argues, seems to feel that his own identity is threatened by the ‘rival’ Mantitheus, but there may also have been a political dimension to their hostility. When Mantias was ‘forced’ (as Mantitheus claims) to acknowledge Boeotus as his legitimate son, Boeotus acquired a public identity as both a member of his father’s oikos and an Athenian citizen. Mantitheus seeks to deconstruct that identity by identifying Boeotus as an outsider who inveigled his way into the family by fraud. The speeches thus illustrate the close connection between personal and political identity in democratic Athens. Rosalia Hatzilambrou’s chapter (Chapter 3, ‘Constructing the identity of Timarchus in Aeschines 1’) reveals how the prosecutor, Aeschines, on the one hand deconstructs aspects of Timarchus’ public identity as a respectable citizen and public speaker (name, oikos/family, gender, ideology, status, and friends) while on the other hand constructing for him a rhetorical identity as an addict to shameful desires. Aeschines gradually reveals that the nickname pornos (‘prostitute’) had been attached to Timarchus for years, thus depriving Timarchus of an important aspect of his civic identity: Timarchus, son of Arizelus of Sphettus, becomes Timarchus the Prostitute. Throughout the speech, Aeschines emerges as a representative of the democratic values of ‘moderation’ (metriotēs) and ‘self-control’ (sōphrosunē), thus constructing a shared cultural identity between himself (the prosecutor) and the judges while alienating them from Timarchus and his associates. The quarrel between the two sons of Mantias of Thoricus features again in Chapter 4, by Konstantinos Kapparis, ‘Constructing gender identity: women in Athenian trials’. Here the focus is on Boeotus’ mother, Plangon: Mantitheus’ hostile portrayal of her, according to Kapparis, shows ‘how to call a woman a whore without saying the word’. Seeking to convince the judges that Plangon was a hetaira, not a wife, and so could not have brought a dowry into Mantias’ household, Mantitheus subtly constructs her identity as a dangerous seductress – a Circe or a Siren, who has led Mantias to insidious mistakes. Kapparis uses two more case studies to develop his theme of female identity as it was constructed by male speakers in the Athenian courts. In the case of Phryne, who was prosecuted for impiety around the middle of the fourth century, he argues that the identity on trial was that of the legendary hetaira rather than

Introduction

7

the real woman or any illegal actions she took. Similarly, when Aristagora was accused of violating immigration laws by not having a prostatēs (sponsor), it was her constructed identity as a hetaira, lewd and dangerously seductive – not the vulnerable woman she really was – that went on trial. Kapparis concludes that the construction of identities for these women was not merely a matter of assembling gender stereotypes but an imaginative array of topics creating images which (even if they bear little resemblance to the real person) appear to be truthful, real, and persuasive. Part II, ‘The rhetorical construction of civic identities’, contains four studies of speeches constructing the collective identities of the Athenians and other civic or ethnic groups. An essential and distinctive feature of the Athenians’ collective identity was the myth of autochthony: the belief that they, uniquely among all the Greeks, were born from the very soil of their land, Attica. In Chapter 5, ‘Athenian identity and the ideology of autochthony: an institutionalist approach’, Matteo Barbato notes the varying scholarly responses to the inherent contradictions in this notion. Addressing the issue from the perspective of discursive institutionalism, Barbato explores how the Athenians managed to construct a coherent ideology of autochthony and shows how the discursive parameters of three Athenian institutions (the state funeral, the dramatic festivals, and the law-courts) influenced the conceptualization of autochthony in, respectively, the extant funeral speeches, Euripides’ Ion, and Apollodoros’ speech Against Neaera. In Chapter 6, ‘Lysias and the rhetoric of citizen honour’, Benjamin Keim argues that just as citizenship was an honour, so holding office was an honour, and thus it was in the interests of the Athenians to scrutinize their colleagues before giving them additional recognition and (representative) authority. After an introductory survey of the Athenian conception of ‘honour(s)’ (timē/timai) and ‘scrutinies’ (dokimasiai), the chapter explores how the claims and negotiations of honour shape the creation of forensic identities in the four surviving political dokimasia speeches by Lysias. The speaker of Lysias 31 Against Philon, as Keim argues, simultaneously constructs a collective identity for the current Council as an honour group and creates a group from which Philon should rightly be excluded. Taken together, Lysias 25 On a charge of overthrowing the democracy and 26 Against Evandrus present complementary sets of contrasting arguments about the worthiness for office of two Athenian citizens who remained in the city during the regime of the Thirty. While the speaker of Lysias 25 constructs an identity for himself as a ‘good remainer’, worthy of being honoured by the dēmos, the speaker of Lysias 26 wants to identify Evandrus as one of the ‘bad remainers’ who sympathized or collaborated with the Thirty. The defendant in Lysias 16 For Mantitheus has been chosen to serve on the Council, but was undermined by accusations of collaboration with the Thirty. Unable to deny his philotimia, he works to establish his identity as a good philotimos rather than a bad one. Alex Petkas’ contribution (Chapter 7, ‘Archaism, performance, and civic status in Lysias 10 Against Theomestus’) takes issue with the perception of modern

8

Janek Kucharski et al.

scholars that expert legal knowledge was invariably frowned upon in classical Athens. In a prosecution for kakēgoria (defamation), the speaker claims that Theomnestus slandered him by accusing him of killing his own father. Theomnestus evidently denied this on the basis that he did not actually use any of the ‘forbidden words’ specified in the law, so the point at issue is how the archaically worded law should be interpreted. Both the specific circumstances of the case and the legal framework, as Petkas argues, turn on the question of who belongs fully to the citizen community and how people can be effectively forced out of that community. The speaker portrays Theomnestus as someone who has not bothered to learn the basics of Athenian law and legal culture, implying that working familiarity with the legal institutions is a mark of good citizenship – and one which the jurors as well as the speaker have acquired. Drawing on Aristotle’s stylistic theory, Petkas examines the relation in the speech between linguistic archaism and civic identity and considers the dynamics of how the speech was performed. He concludes that a literal performance of the laws constituted a metaphorical performance of civic identity. The centrepiece of Judson Herrman’s contribution (Chapter 8, ‘Seeing others as Athenians in Demosthenes’ Third Philippic’) is a close reading of Demosthenes 9.53–69, a historical account of recent events in Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus. Demosthenes’ third Philippic, of which this passage forms part, is one of the two Assembly speeches he delivered in early 341 – the culmination of a decade in which the Athenians had come to view Philip as an increasingly imminent threat. Demosthenes, as Herrman argues, adopts a rhetorical technique conflating the identities of the peoples of the three cities with that of the Athenians; concentrating in his accounts on interactions between corrupt leaders and a gullible dēmos, he reinforces this focus by adopting specific Athenian terminology to describe the internal affairs of other Greek cities. By describing the fall of Olynthus and the stasis on Euboea in Athenian terms, and identifying the dēmos of those states with the Athenians, Demosthenes subtly underscores his argument that the same thing could happen in Athens. Part III, ‘Social and material dimensions of Athenian identities’, brings together chapters dealing, first, with the rhetorical manipulation of socioeconomic identities, second with the various identities assumed by (or attributed to) prosecutors in the Athenian courts, and third with space and place as factors shaping the identities of the participants in a homicide trial. In Chapter 9 (‘The rich and the poor, conflicts and alliances: socio-economic identities and their uses in the Demosthenic corpus’), Lucia Cecchet discusses the exploitation of common assumptions about ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’ in the rhetorical construction of group and individual socio-economic identities, based on a number of speeches in which Demosthenes and Apollodorus re-define the conventional binary opposition to manipulate the sympathies of the judges. In Against Meidias (Dem. 21), Demosthenes is anxious to identify himself with the judges, but he faces the problem that they belong to ‘the poor’ while he, like his opponent, belongs to ‘the rich’. So he identifies Meidias as a ‘bad rich man’, aligning himself (as a ‘virtuous rich man’) with the judges as representatives of

Introduction 9 the 'virtuous poor' whose values he claims to share. Apollodorus, as the son of a former slave who was granted Athenian citizenship by decree, faces a different problem. Seeking to construct his own identity as a rich citizen, he knows that, for native Athenians, 'good wealth' means inherited wealth derived from land, so by stressing how generously he has used his wealth for the benefit of the polis, he hopes to make the judges overlook the origin of that wealth in banking. The starting point of Chapter 10 ('Prosecutorial identities and the problem of relevance'), by Janek Kucharski, is the idealized prosecutorial identity assumed by Lycurgus in his Against Leocrates.Lycurgus' model of the prosecutor as a public-spirited individual, motivated solely by the interest of the polis, resembles the modern idea of the criminal prosecutor as a disinterested public servant, but differs sharply from the identities assumed by 'volunteer prosecutors' (or attributed to them by their opponents) in the majority of extant speeches from Athenian public lawsuits. Kucharski first identifies three positive identities constructed by prosecutors for themselves: the 'concerned citizen', the 'quiet enemy', and the 'benefactor', then three negative ones deployed by defendants: the 'sykophant', the 'criminal double', and 'the degenerate and the buffoon'. Turning to the vexed question of how (if at all) these identities were relevant to the issues on trial, Kucharski concludes that the rhetorical persona of the prosecutor in fact served a different purpose: to establish (or undermine) the credibility and integrity of the prosecutors in a system that left them vulnerable to attack. Christine Plastow's chapter (Chapter 11, 'Space, place, and identity in Antiphon On the murderof Herodes') shows how the speech composed by Antiphon for the defendant (Euxitheus) in a homicide trial deploys concepts of space and place, in the narrative about the sea voyage on which Herodes went missing, which are designed to distance him from his perceived identity as a murderer. But the physical space of delivery (the court-room) can also be used to shape the identities of those present at the trial, and Antiphon adopts the rather risky strategy of playing with Euxitheus' potential identity as a polluted killer in order to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the dicastic court (rather than a dedicated homicide court) as the venue for the trial. Euxitheus, moreover, also needs to defend his father, whose identity as a loyal Athenian citizen has evidently been questioned by the prosecution because of his periods of residence away from the city.

Notes 1 For which see Whorf (1956) 134-159 (based on the earlier work of E. Sapir and F. Boas). The theory made its way to Classics quite early: it is already found in Snell (1953), esp. 1-22. 2 As evident fron1-Wharf's famous remark: 'English compared to Hopi is like a bludgeon compared to a rapier' (1956) 85. 3 In particular by Berlin and Kay (1969), who den1-onstrate that colour tern1-inology has universal, culturally independent constraints.

10 Janek Kucharski et al. 4 The weaker version (that language influences,but does not determine,the way its users perceive the world) fared much better and has now been taken up by cognitive linguists; cf. Lakoff (1987) 304-337. 5 e.g., Tajfel (1972), (1974), (1978), (1982). 6 Tajfel (1972) 276, 279, Hall (1996) 4, Gilroy (1997) 301; cf. Turner (1982) 15-17 (social cohesion vs social identification). 7 Tajfel (1974) 71-72. 8 Hall (1996) 5. 9 See, e.g., Goffman (1968) 105-139, Turner (1982) 18; also presupposed in the works of Tajfel; cf. Jenkins (2014) 116. 10 Jenkins (2014) 17-28, 39-50, Ehala (2017) 110-112. 11 Ehala (201 7) 111. 12 Jenkins (2014) 20. 13 Bourdieu (1989) 18. 14 Bourdieu (1989) 19-20. 15 Bourdieu (1989) 23. 16 For a re-evaluation of the traditional understanding of this passage, as 'words changing their meaning', see Wilson (1982); cf. also Isoc. 7.20; for an outline of Peirce's semiotics see Peirce (1932) 134-185. 17 Barth (1969) 14, Bourdieu (1989) 20, cf. Ehala (2017) 56-57. 18 Myron FGrH/BNJ 106 F2; cf. David (1989) 8-9, Ducat (1990) 111-113. 19 [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.10; cf. Marr and Rhodes (2008) 76-77. 20 Ehala (2017) 67. 21 Turner (1982) 19-20, 26; cf. Ehala (2017) 19-20.

Bibliography Barth, F. (1969) Ethnicgroupsand boundaries:the socialorganizationofculturaldifference(Boston) Berlin, B. and Kay, P (1969) Basiccolorterms: their universalityand evolution(Berkeley) Boegehold, A.L. and Scafuro, A.C. (eds.) (1994) Athenian identity and civicideology(Baltimore, MD and London) Bourdieu, P (1989) 'Social space and symbolic power', SociologicalTheory 7, 14-25 David, E. (1989) 'Dress in Spartan society', AncW 19, 3-13 Demetriou, D. (2012) Negotiatingidentity (Cambridge) Ducat, J. (1990) Les Hilotes (Athens) Ehala, M. (2017) Signs ofidentity: the anatomy ofbelonging(London) Gilroy, P (1997) 'Diaspora and the detours of identity', in K. Woodward (ed.) Identity and difference(London) 299-343 Goffn1an, E. (1968) Stigma: notes on the managementofspoiledidentity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Goldhill, S. (2007) Being Greek underRome (Cambridge) Hall, J.M. (1997) Ethnic identity in Greek antiquity (Cambridge) Hall, J.M. (1999) Hellenicity(Chicago) Hall, S. (1996) 'Introduction: who needs identity?', in S. Hall and P du Gay (eds.) Questions ofculturalidentity (London) 1-1 7 Jenkins, R. (2014) Socialidentity, 4th edn (London) Lakoff, G. (1987) Women) fire) and dangerous things: what categoriesreveal about the mind (Chicago) Lee, M.M. (2015) Body dressand identity (Cambridge) Lomas, K. (2004) Greek identity in the westernMediterranean(Leiden) Marconi, C. (1997) Templedecoration(Cambridge) Marr, J.L. and Rhodes, PJ. (2008) The 'Old Oligarch):the constitutionofthe Athenians attributed to Xenophon, with introduction, translation and comn1entary (Oxford)

Introduction 11 Peirce, C.S. (1932) CollectedpapersofCharlesSandersPeirce(Cambridge, MA) Smith, S.D. (2007) Greek identity in Chariton (Groningen) Snell, B. (1953) The discoveryofthe mind, translated by T.G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford) Tajfel, H. (1972) 'La categorisation sociale', in S. Moscovici (ed.) Introductionala psychologie sociale,vol. 1 (Paris) 272-302 Tajfel, H. (197 4) 'Social identity and intergroup behaviour', Social ScienceInformation 13, 65-93 Tajfel, H. (1978) Differentiationbetweensocialgroups:studies in the socialpsychologyofintergroup relations(London) Tajfel, H. (ed.) (1982) Socialidentity and intergrouprelations(Ca1nbridge) Turner, J.C. (1982) 'Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group', in Tajfel (1982) 15-40 Whitmarsh, T. (2010) Localknowledgeand microidentities(Cambridge) Whitmarsh, T. (2011) Narrativeand identity (Cambridge) Whorf, B.L. (1956) Language) thought) and reality: selectedwritings of Benjamin Lee Whoif, edited with an introduction by J.B.Carroll (Cambridge, MA) Wilson, J. (1982) "'The customary meanings of words were changed" - or were they? A note on Thucydides 3.82.4', CQ 32, 18-20

Part I

The politics of naming and individuals' rhetorical identities

1

Civic and local identities Athenian rhetoric

in

Roger Brock

Membership of a deme was an essential part of the identity of an Athenian citizen: formally speaking, his identity consisted of name, patronymic, and demotic, 1 and his status was officially validated through registration in his father's deme by vote of the demesmen, under oath, that he was of age, free, and born according to the laws, 2 as we learn from Ath. Pol. 42.1, 3 and thereafter by the maintenance of the deme registers, which constituted the only comprehensive record of citizens which democratic Athens possessed. Deme membership was thus essential for citizen identity: 4 in this chapter I want to look at how the local identity in the deme - and occasionally and insofar as limited evidence permits, other civic subdivisions - functioned in Athenian rhetoric. In practice this very largely means forensic rhetoric: the political sphere is reflected in passages in which office-holders are identified by demotic, as is quite commonly also the case in inscribed decrees, 5 and a fragment ofHypereides Against Demades (fr. 76) contains a parody decree in which Demades as proposer is identified by patronymic and demotic, 6 but demegoric speeches themselves make little reference to civic subdivisions, although that is less surprising if one considers that they are directed to the citizen body as a whole. 7 To begin with formalities, the civic identity and status of citizens were reflected in the legal procedure, and so the name and demotic of the litigants featured in the plaint (enklema or graphe)which formed the basis for litigation: thus, for example, 'Euctemon of Lousia indicted Demosthenes of Paeania for desertion of his post' (Dern. 21.103, cf. 45.46 and, for the form, 13.5). Likewise, the testimony read out in court identified the witnesses in the same way, for example, 'Satyrus of Alopece, Saurias of Lamptrae and Diogeiton of Acharnae depose that they effected a settlement between Stephanus and Phrynion when acting as arbitrators in the matter of Neaira, the defendant in this case; and that the terms on which they effected the settlement were such as Apollodorus produces' ([Dern.] 59.47). 8 That procedure is echoed in the citation of the deposition of Canon's witnesses at Dern. 54.31, perhaps to underline their notoriety, 9 and occasionally elsewhere we seem to hear the formal documentation evoked when orators make reference to other cases, as, for example, when Hypereides discusses the relative appropriateness of prosecutions in his defence of Euxenippus and identifies many of the parties in question by

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demotic, including Alexander of Oeon, who previously prosecuted his opponent Polyeuctus (Hyp. Bux. 12, 28-29, 34-35). Aeschines does the same thing when discussing celebrated impeachments (3.194-195), as well as maliciously naming the cousin, Demomeles of Paeania, whom Demosthenes prosecuted (2.93, 3.51), and Isaeus names Xenocles of Coprus, kurios of the claimant Phile, who was convicted of perjury (3.2) .10 However, such echoes of official language are rare, although perhaps we should not expect more given the amateur ethos of the Athenian courts. What is surprising is how relatively infrequently citizens are identified by demotic in the speeches themselves; I count fewer than 200 passages, and though some of those do refer to multiple individuals that is still a rate of only a handful per speech on average. That would suggest that whereas in formal procedural terms there are no distinctions made in the naming of citizens, once speakers start speaking, the use of demotics is deliberate and calculated. That is not to say that it is always manipulative, and the commonest purpose for which demotics are used is, unsurprisingly, to distinguish between homonyms: since Athens was far from being a face-to-face society in reality, 11 jurors would never have been familiar with everyone mentioned in the course of a trial and could reasonably expect some assistance. So, for example, the two politically prominent individuals named Thrasybulus both feature in Aeschines Against Ctesiphon and are duly tagged as 'of Collytus' (3.138, cf. Dern. 24.134) and 'of Steiria' (3.195), although the latter was enough of a celebrity for Lysias' client Mantitheus to allude to him in his lifetime or shortly thereafter as 'the pretentious man from Steiria' (16.15); contrariwise, Andocides needs to label 'Alcibiades of Phegus' to distinguish him from the more famous homonym lurking behind On the Mysteries (1.65) .12 There were, however, other ways of doing the same job: as well as patronymics, the other obvious option, we find references to trades, as, for example, 'Meno the miller' in Dinarchus 1.23 or 'Cleainetus the chorus-trainer' and 'Timesitheus the runner' in Aeschines Against Timarchus (1.98, 156). The demotic was therefore neither essential for identifying individuals nor the only possible means of doing so: indeed, it is intriguing that while patronymic and occupation are quite prominent in Eleanor Dickey's study of forms of address, there is only one such usage of the demotic, and that in a Platonic context which defies easy explanation. 13 In fact, I would suggest that in the majority of cases where demotics are used, there are more specific and pointed reasons. One such reason, I think, is the evocation of the individual in question as a legal personality: so, for example, those who act as arbitrators are often assigned a demotic, for example, Nikomachus of Bate, whom Isocrates names in Against Callimachus (18.10), or the panel of three specified in Against Apaturius ([Dern.] 33.14). 14 That speech also names sureties by demotic ([Dern.] 33.15, 22), as does Isaeus in an instance where the other surety had been one of the speaker's opponents (Isae. 5 .18), perhaps to underline the official status of an adjudgment which in the event was not adhered to, and Isaeus and Demosthenes sometimes handle those with whom documents were deposited in

Civic and localidentities 17 the same way (Isae. 9.5, [Dern.] 43.7, 48.11). Witnesses are also sometimes so identified, although less often than one might have expected, and usually with a further agenda: thus at Isaeus 3.22-23 the demotics distinguish the first pair of witnesses, both public figures, whom Xenocles took along for a commercial transaction, from the chance figures used for an allegedly important deposition; again, Ariston provides a demotic for his friend Phanostratus of Cephisia, who is his only witness to Canon's assault, but not for Pamphilus the fuller or any of Canon's other companions at the time. 15 Here the demotic seems intended to imply a difference in respectability and so credibility; 16 when Aeschines calls on Amyntor of Erchia to attest to a conversation with Demosthenes, on the other hand, it looks like a gesture of respect to a man he fears might not be prepared to give evidence on his behalf (2.67-80). Another common use of demotics concerns financial or commercial dealings. Here too one can surmise that the underlying agenda is to imply both the reality and the regularity of the contract, loan, sale, mortgage, or whatever: 17 when Lycurgus provides demotics for (almost) all those involved in the liquidation of Leocrates' assets, it is not only to cover for the unavailability of one of them, Amyntas, since deceased, but also to underline that this was no temporary or improvised measure but a considered withdrawal from Athens (1.22-24). Again, Demosthenes contrasts the settlement of an estate properly leased by Theogenes of Probalinthus with the chicanery of his own guardian Aphobus (27.58), while in the case of Athenogenes the detailed specification of those involved is perhaps intended by Hypereides to imply a contrast between the formality of the contract and the chicanery which it was intended to conceal (5 [Ath.].8-9). 18 As with the other uses of demotics I have so far discussed, practice is never fully consistent: when Aeschines discusses the dissipation of Timarchus' estate, he provides some demotics, but also records that his house in the city was sold to Nausicrates the comic poet, who sold it to Cleainetus the chorus-trainer (1. 98-100). That speech also supplies a unique case concerning a related issue, the vindication of an individual's freedom: Aeschines names as Glaucon of Cholargus the man who intervened on behalf of Pittalacus (1.62-65) when Hegesandrus claimed that he was his own slave.19 Here we have a mixture of contract and ownership (or its absence) and status, and that brings me to another important role for demotics, namely the assertion of legal status. 20 One context in which demotics are commonly specified is marriage. In Lysias' speech On the property of Aristophanes, for example, the speaker provides this information for the husbands of his sisters and the father of his own wife, as well as a patronymic for the father of his mother, in a passage (19 .15-16) which is clearly intended to reflect exemplary behaviour. On the other hand, when Demosthenes specifies that Aphobus married the daughter of Philonides of Melite (27.56, 29.48), the emphasis on a regular marriage to someone else underlines his failure to marry Demosthenes' mother, despite having appropriated her dowry. Not surprisingly, this is a common motif in Isaeus (2.9; 5.5, 26; 7.18; 8.8; 10.4), where it can interact with the niceties of naming women highlighted by Schaps (1977):

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thus in speech 6 the mother of Philoctemon and wife of Euctemon is properly identified indirectly as the daughter of Meixiades of Cephisia, whereas the purported mother of the rival claimants to Philoctemon's estate is first allegedly said to have been a Lemnian and then named, according to the claim of the opponents, as Callippe daughter of Pistoxenos. 21 Pseudo-Demosthenes plays a similar game in the second speech against Boeotus, giving a full account of the marital history of the speaker's mother, 'the daughter of Polyaratus of Cholargus', while bluntly naming 'Plangon, the mother of these men' ([Dern.] 40.6-8; cf. Dern. 39.9). 22 Demotics are also in play in references to adoption, as again in Isaeus 6.3, where Philoctemon of Cephisia is named as the adopter of the claimant Chairestratus; in similar vein, pseudo-Demosthenes makes extensive play with the two demes, Prospalta, the deme of Macartatus' mother into which he was adopted (43.77-78), and Oeon, identified as Hagnias' deme at the beginning of the narrative. 23 The final exploitation of demotics to be addressed here can be seen as cognate, since it also concerns the handling of naming as a mark of respect. This has been implicit in some of the cases already mentioned, for example in the presentation of witnesses, but also occurs in contexts where there is no such obvious and immediate agenda, and in this form the tactic would seem to be a particular characteristic of Aeschines. We encounter it early in the narrative of the career of Timarchus, when he states that 'there is a certain Misgolas, men of Athens, of the deme of Collytus' (1.41); there is no need for disambiguation here, since as Fisher (2001) says in his note, only two Athenians of that name are known, and the fact that Aeschines goes on to style him kalos k)agathos ('fine and good', i.e. a gentleman) strengthens the implication that the form of naming is intended to express respect. That may be partly because he intends to challenge Misgolas to give evidence, like Phaedrus son of Callias ofSphettus, so named at 43, whom he does seem to have persuaded to testify (50); since Aeschines prepares quite elaborately for a refusal, however - and so Fisher infers that that is what happened - it cannot have been his only objective. Rather it seems to be part of a pattern whereby he uses naming as a token of esteem to separate Timarchus and his close associates from more reputable figures in the case, such as his uncle Arignotus, whom he had - on Aeschines' account treated appallingly (104). Another clear example of this comes with his survey of celebrated boy-lovers of the past: a number of those deemed respectable are identified in 156-157 by demotic, or else by patronymic or profession, whereas in the rogues' gallery of 158 we have only nicknames. 24 Aeschines does this elsewhere in his allusions to Hegesippus, brother of Timarchus' lover, Hegesandrus. Both of these were prominent politicians at the time, but Hegesippus was the more important of the two, and so likely to carry weight with the jury in defence of Timarchus: Aeschines therefore seeks to undermine him by never mentioning him by name and instead referring to him throughout as 'Crobylus', i.e. top-knot. 25 Other orators deploy the same tactic: Isaeus combines a clarifying demotic with a disrespectful nickname in his mention of 'Diocles of Phlya, surnamed Orestes' (8.3), 26 while Lysias' reference to 'Theocritus, the

Civic and localidentities 19 one called Elaphostictus (" deer tattoo")' marks an associate of Agoratus as of foreign and/or servile origin (Lys. 13.19). 27 This of course is a speech where status is very much at issue: hence it has what is a more or less unique mention of the opponent's demotic, Anagyrasios(13.73), 28 but of course the mention is only made by Lysias because the identification is self-fashioned and spurious; that, too, is why Aristophanes of Cholleidai, who went surety for Aphobus, is so denoted, to mark him out, despite slurs on his citizen status, as a proper and decent Athenian citizen and quite unlike the defendant, whose victim he became (13.58-61). To return to Aeschines, we can see the same techniques at work in the later speeches: even a controversial figure like Philocrates is given his demotic (2.13, 3.54) as an opponent of Demosthenes, as are victims of his like Nicodemus of Aphidna (2.148) and the cousin mentioned earlier (above, 16), and it is also a feature of the roll-call of earlier pro-Thebans in 3.138-139. Above all, though, it is a feature of his treatment of the respective parentages of the two litigants in both speeches, twisting the citation of demotics with reference to marriage to give a particular edge to the forensic and comic topos of the illegitimacy of politicians, but employing demotics with reference to his own family to imply an antithesis he therefore does not need to spell out (2.78, 3.171-172). In fact, though, the speech in which this technique is most prominent is Apollodorus Against Neaera, where it is implemented with what one might consider characteristic heavy-handedness: this speech alone accounts for around a tenth of all passages in which demotics are used. This is another speech in which citizen status is the central issue, and so Apollodorus pretty systematically summons his witnesses by name and demotic 29 and similarly labels arbitrators and the parties to marriages, as well as incidental characters; almost everyone is identified by demotic and, occasionally, patronymic, although in a couple of instances their genos is used as a substitute, while non-Athenians are identified by ethnic or, in the case of Lysias, activity: 30 the sole exception 31 is Stephanus, who is thus subliminally isolated from the citizen community while his alleged manipulation of legitimate status in deme and phratry is being described. The demotic as label is thus a flexible and powerful rhetorical tool; what about the wider implications of deme membership? I would suggest that the most salient characteristic of the rhetorical deme is solidarity: speakers reflect a consistent expectation that demesmen will support and look out for one another. 32 The most obvious and best attested expression of this is in acting as witnesses, which I will come to in a moment, but it is evidently not regarded as surprising or particularly controversial that Diopeithes of Sounion, the appointed arbitrator in the case of Pittalacus, should have kept deferring judgment as a favour to his demesman Hegesandrus (Aeschin. 1.63). As Apollodorus' mention of 'the sailors enrolled by the deme' ([Dern.] 50.7) reminds us, deme members would serve together on campaign, where solidarity would certainly be essential: Polystratus' son appeals to his demotai as suneidotes('sharing knowledge') ofhis steadfast service (Lys. 20.23), and Menecles' adopted son speaks of having served in his adopted tribe and deme on all the campaigns of

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the period in question (Isae. 2.42), while Mantitheus cites material support of his demesmen as part of his portrait of a dutiful soldier (Lys. 16.14). By contrast, the failure of Philon either to bear arms himself in the fight against the Thirty or to equip any of his demesmen, as many others unable to serve had done, is clearly a black mark, and attested by Diotimus of Acharnae and others 'appointed to arm the demesmen' (Lys. 31.15). 33 The case of Agoratus at the same time was similar: no one would share his tent or table, and the taxiarch did not station him in the tribal formation (Lys. 13.79). 34 There are similar although sparser indications of solidarity at the tribal level: we have already noted the tribal element in warfare, 35 and the speaker in Lysias 21 suggests that shared tribal membership would be a factor in a commander's choice of ship (21.6). Demosthenes argues that one of his witnesses might have been expected to support Aphobus, being a member of his tribe (29.23), and one of Lysias' clients implies that tribal affiliations might influence the judging of choral contests (Lys. 4.3-4); 36 indeed, there is evidence that tribes might supply advocates to support litigants (Andoc. 1.150; Dern. 23.206; Hyp. Bux. 12); perhaps the small size of many demes made it impractical to operate such a scheme at that level. Besides the motif of support for military activity, Polycrates' son remarks on his father's failure to contribute to the fine imposed on his fellow demesman Phrynichus (Lys. 20.12), and we see a broader expectation of contribution to both tribe and deme that mirrors the civic ideal which is reflected in the routine enumeration by litigants of their liturgies and eisphorai:at the tribal level this typically entails acting as a choregosor gymnasiarch, 37 while at deme level we find specific mention of support for the Thesmophoria (Isae. 3.80). 38 The flip side of this is the potential of tribes and demes as a source of honour: they might elect members to office, as Polystratus is said to have been chosen by his tribesmen hos chrestoson ... peri tous demotas ('as being a good man in regard to the demesmen': Lys. 20.2), which incidentally points to interaction between the different subdivisions, and not only among men: Isaeus defends the status of his client's mother, which had been attacked by his opponents, by citing her joint election to preside at the Thesmophoria as a mark of acceptance and esteem that she would never have received had the wives of the demesmen had reservations about her (8.19-20); elsewhere, he mentions the deme both as a source of, and as an audience for, the praise of individuals (Isae. 2.18, 36). Finally, there were the crowns, the proclamation of which Aeschines discusses in the legal preliminaries of his case against Ctestiphon (3.41, 44). There were material benefits to deme membership, too, particularly participation in sacrifice, the meat from which would be shared among deme members, so that non-participation is an argument against being a member of a given deme (Isae. 9 .33). The deme also controlled the distribution of the theoric fund, which Leostratus tried to muscle in on at Otryne ([Dern.] 44.37); a little earlier in that speech the speaker refers to his attempt to metecheinton koinon (share in the common things) ([Dern.] 44.35), and sharing in hierakai hosia (religious and civic acts: Isae. 9.13, Dern. 39.35) is something that binds together the deme community as it does the polis as a whole. 39

Civic and localidentities 21 The sense of community solidarity is most conspicuous in the provision of witnesses for fellow demesmen, which seems to be much less common at the tribal level. 40 We have seen that the military shortcomings of Philon are supported by deme testimony, and the reverse is implicit for Polystratus, but deme evidence is most prominent in the corpus of Isaeus. Here demesmen witness to the legitimacy of adoption (2.14-17, 44; 7.27-28), the absence of a marriage and the obligations it would have triggered (3.80), the legitimacy of children (6.10), and a wife's holding deme office (8.20 - implied), while the absence of deme witnesses can be appealed to as implying that a will is forged (9.8-9), and demesmen can attest to the ineligibility of a purported son to share their sacrifices (9.33). Similarly, pseudo-Demosthenes appeals to a deme's knowledge of its membership to prove that an opponent has returned from his adoptive to his native deme and tribe (44.44), and Lysias invokes the knowledge of the Deceleans as well as that of the Plataean community to refute the claims of Pancleon to civic status (Lys. 23.3-8). It should be noted that what demes attest to is therefore the characteristic military and cultic activity of their communities, together with the membership in good standing of their members (or not in the case of impostors) which they have originally validated. That they are appealed to as a source of knowledge is clear from the account which the speaker gives of his researches in Against Pancleon:'I went to the barber's near the Herms, which is frequented by the members of Decelea, and asked those of the Deceleans I met there whether they knew any deme member from Decelea called Pancleon. None of them claimed to know him' (23.3, trans. Todd 2000). It is also worthy of note that he seeks out Euthycritus, the oldest Plataean, as likely to be best informed (Lys. 23.5), and this is a motif which recurs elsewhere: Aeschines claims that the questionable circumstances of Demosthenes' registration are known to 'the older demesmen of Paeania' (2.150), and Isaeus in the fragmentary Against Epicrates(fr. 10a Thalheim) says, 'I will produce ... a written deposition from Myronides, who was the eldest of the demesmen'. In the same way, Euxitheus claims that the older Halimousians know about the machinations surrounding the loss of the previous deme register (Dern. 5 7. 60), and the implication of mentioning their absence when he was struck off is that their knowledge would have prevented it (57.10). More generally, Aeschines claims in support of his appeal to common knowledge of Timarchus' misdeeds that if a deme states that it has struck off a member in the recent diapsephismos simply on the basis of their personal knowledge, jurors hearing the appeal will reject it out of hand (1.77-78); the passage is obviously highly tendentious, but the underlying belief in the deme as a community of record on which it relies must have been widely accepted. 41 We should in passing register what demes as such do not bear witness to, namely particular events, for which litigants more typically appeal to the knowledge of neighbours: the well-known passage in the speech On the olive stump alludes to 'neighbours who not only know what is open for all to see, but even get information of what we try to keep hidden'. 42 Just as that speech deals with the specifics of farming, the speaker in Lysias 17 appeals to the

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neighbours for their knowledge of a property dispute (17.8), and the neighbours of the speaker of Demosthenes 55 testify to the local hydrology (55.21), but neighbours knew about other things too: in Isaeus 3 they testify to a disorderly house (3 .13) and in pseudo-Demosthenes 4 7 to the invasion of the speaker's property by Euergus and Theophemus (47.60), while it is again to neighbours and local residents that Lycurgus appeals for the details of Leo crates' flight (1.19). Of course, neighbours will often have been demesmen too, but there is, I suggest, a good reason for the distinction: neighbours are by definition on hand to witness events, and so have a distinct spatial identity that is missing from all but the smallest deme, a point nicely brought out by the use of the word proschoroi('those nearby') for the witnesses to the uprooting of olive trees at [Dern.] 43.70. 43 By contrast, a deme's members must have been to a greater or lesser degree spread out across its territory, at least outside the city, whether we incline to a belief in more dispersed or more nucleated settlement, not to mention the perennial problem of the proportion of members who had migrated to live elsewhere, which generates as a corollary the likelihood that some neighbours are not demesmen. 44 It is the spatially dispersed character of the deme which obliges Pancleon's prosecutor to visit 'the barber's near the Hermae which is frequented by the Deceleans' (Lys. 23.3) if he wants to tap into deme knowledge: only social or political gatherings provide it with any specific locus - and in this case that locus is of course not in the deme itself. It is intriguing that in the one instance where deme members are canvassed as possible witnesses to a specific incident, in this case a violent affray resulting in a fatality, the speaker says that 'many of the Araphenians who were also farming at the time could perhaps bear witness for me' (Isae. 9 .18), but evidently they do not: if the demesmen and fell ow farmers are imagined as amounting to the same thing 45 - and the small size of Araphen, with a bouleutic quota of two, makes that conceivable - it is possible that in the absence of witnesses of any kind the speaker is attempting to promote the more transitory testimony of specific neighbours to the status of deme knowledge, 46 but at all events this passage would seem to be a one-off. 47 There is also an important conceptual distinction to be made between neighbours and demesmen as regards relationships. Neighbours belong to a realistic world in which it is hardly feasible to be on friendly terms with everyone: 48 the speaker in Lysias 7 presents it as commonplace that he is friendly with some of his neighbours and at odds with others, so that there were bound to be hostile witnesses to any misdemeanour available to Nicomachus (7 .18-19), and Demosthenes speeches 53 and 55 contain narratives of deteriorating neighbourly relations, the speaker in the latter claiming in his peroration that he is being driven out of the deme by their harassment (55.35). The deme, on the other hand, is to a considerable extent idealized as uniform, sharing knowledge and bound together by solidarity: that is surely implicit in the testimony of demesmen qua deme members as well as the practical expressions of support mentioned above. When it is claimed that Polystratus as katalogeus (registrar) enrolled 9,000 individuals in the Five Thousand 'to avoid quarrelling with any

Civic and localidentities 23 of the deme members' (Lys. 20.13), that must reflect normative expectations; demesmen may make appeals for clemency (Lys. 27.12), shared deme membership is canvassed along with kinship or friendship as a possible motivation for acquitting Andocides (Lys. 6.53), 49 and the intervention of Hagnodorus of Amphitrope to save his fellow demesman Menestratus under the Thirty (Lys. 13.55) is a marked example of such support. By contrast, willingness to testify againsta demesman can be adduced as proof of the veracity of the evidence, for who would bear false witness against a demotes ([Dern.] 52.28)? A final element of idealization of the deme is that just as they are regarded as internally harmonious and homogeneous, so demes seem for rhetorical purposes to be treated as all essentially similar: although particular demes are mentioned in particular contexts, there is, as far as I can see, none of the kind of individual characterization or evocation of associations which Whitehead discusses with regard to comedy, 50 and apart from Euxitheus' appeal to 'those of you [jurors] who are from the large demes' (Dern. 57. 5 7) there is not even any acknowledgement of the wide disparities in population and location which are bound to have made demes far from uniform in reality. 51 I would the ref ore argue that the deme in Attic oratory is to a significant extent an ideological construct; however, this brings with it some inevitable problems in the real world. Deme solidarity can be twisted to suggest guilt by association: that tactic is reflected in the response of Polystratus' defence to the prosecution's attempts to tie him to his demesman Phrynichus, which includes trying to dilute it by extrapolation to the level of the polis.52 A more acute difficulty appears when the deme itself becomes the locus of dispute. At one level there is an obvious discomfort in dealing with division in what is supposed to be a harmonious community, as we can see from the proem oflsaeus' lost speech Against the Demesmen) Concerningan Estate (fr. 4 Thalheim), which is worth quoting in full: My desire, judges, would have been never to suffer injustice at the hands of any one of my fellow citizens; or, if that were impossible, to find adversaries to quarrel with whom would cause me little concern. As it is, the most grievous thing possible has happened to me: I am the victim of injustice at the hands of my fellow demesmen, whose robbery I cannot easily pass over in silence, yet with whom it is unpleasant to be at enmity, since I am obliged to share their sacrifices and attend their common gatherings. It is difficult to defend oneself at law against a large body of adversaries, for their mere number contributes in no small degree to give their statements an appearance of truth. Nevertheless, since I have confidence in the facts, though many difficulties beset me, I think I ought not to shrink from trying to obtain justice at your hands. I beg you, therefore, to excuse me, if at my early age I have ventured to address a court of law; it is those who are wronging me who constrain me to act thus in a manner alien to my natural character. I will try to put my story before you from the beginning in the briefest possible words. (trans. Forster)

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There is a striking similarity, as Whitehead rightly notes, 53 with the rhetorical common places about the undesirability of having to go to law with family, but it is also worth noting the specific mention of communal activities and of the number of opponents, suggesting an unequal contest between the speaker and the otherwise united deme. The problem becomes even more acute when the dispute is not merely about money, but concerns the citizen status itself of an individual, of which as we have seen the deme was the arbiter. We have details of two such disputes arising from the diapsephisisof 346/345 in Demosthenes 57 and Isaeus 12: both are appeals against the deme judgment, a process in which we know that the odds were weighted in the deme's favour, since if the appellant succeeded the deme would have to enrol him, but if he lost he would be sold into slavery (Ath. Pol. 42.1). Robin Osborne drew attention to Euxitheus' emphasis in Dern. 57 on family-based arguments and the testimony of kin and suggested that his links with the deme of Halimous may have been weak and that perhaps he was not even resident there; 54 that may well be right, but it is striking that in the case of Euphiletus in Isae. 12 the pattern is the same: the evidence in the portion of the speech which we have relies entirely on relatives and the phratry, and while there is no indication of the kind of political feud underlying Demosthenes 5 7, the deme has refused to reinstate him despite two prior verdicts in his favour. There seems to be an implication that in such cases the deme would close ranks and that it might be very difficult to find witnesses other than the closest of kin who were willing to risk opposing the community consensus, given the choice between going against one's whole deme or one now ex-demesman. It may therefore be that phratries functioned in part as a safety-net which could be invoked in cases such as this; in particular, the marriage feasts which newly-wed members gave for their phrateres furnished some kind of formal acknowledgement, which could later be witnessed to if needed, of the status of women, who were not in a strict sense members of the deme. 55 The other conspicuous difficulty was to come up with plausible explanations for the failure of the system. It would hardly have been possible to call it into question as a whole, although Euxitheus observes that the existence of a right to appeal implies that it is imperfect (Dern. 57 .6, 60): we have already noted Aeschines' appeal to the soundness of deme knowledge, and even Euxitheus himself is obliged to concede at the outset that 'many men have justly been expelled from all the demes' (Dern. 57 .2) and that spurious registrations had caused anger (57.49); 56 but equally, it would have been completely illogical to seek readmission to a community by arguing that it was fundamentally dysfunctional. Hence the blame had to be diverted to individuals; if the problem was simply internal this might be either the demarch, whose authority made him a natural suspect, as in the case of Euboulides or the unnamed demarch of pseudo-Demosthenes 44, in both cases with associates who are stated or implied to be a small minority ([Dern ..] 44.37, 39; contrast 'all the demesmen' at 57.61-62), or perhaps individual enemies (their position is not

Civic and localidentities 25 clear in Isae. 12). Alternatively, it was possible to put the blame on the deceit of outsiders like Timarchus (Aeschin. 1.114) or Boeotus, who allegedly had the effrontery to register himself (Dern. 39 .5) ;57 in fact, the case of Leostratus is presented in pseudo-Demosthenes 44 as a combination of the brass neck of the individual and collusion by insiders ([Dern.] 44.35-40; cf. 57 .59), although the former is emphasized and the plaintiff is at pains to emphasize that the deme did the right thing in the end, since of course he himself has a stake in it as a member. 58 These purportedly exceptional instances of the malfunctioning of associations at Athens also gesture towards the ideal from which they are a departure. What - in the view of Athenian litigants - makes a good demesman, and is he distinct, or different, from the good citizen? One feature which has emerged from the preceding discussion is the affinities between the deme and the oikos: not only is there an expectation of the same kind of homonoia, but the knowledge that demes qua demes have of their members and bear witness to is very much tied up with the oikos. Most of the material covered so far has been concerned with aspects of legitimacy such as marriage, birth, and legal recognition, but the other end of the life cycle is also important: there is a recurrent emphasis on proper attention to the dead in the performance of ta nomizomena, the 'customary rites', and again this is linked to the demes, most markedly when it is missing: in Against Macartatusthe speaker relates how the female relatives of his opponent had no place at the burial of Hagnias because they belonged to a different deme; similarly, Isaeus has a client appeal to a lack of local knowledge of such matters, challenging his opponent to produce 'the demesmen and the phrateres, if they have ever heard or have any knowledge that Euctemon performed any services [ti ... leitourgesanta]on behalf of her [his purported wife], and furthermore where she is buried, and in what kind of tomb and who has ever seen Euctemon performing the customary rites'. 59 At first sight, one might perceive a disjunction between the oikos-centred behaviour expected of the demesman and the exemplary citizen who enumerates his service to the city in liturgies, eisphorai,and campaigns served, 60 but the same verb, leitourgein,can be applied to either (cf. Isae. 3.80), and in any case, there were also deme liturgies, as we have seen; we have also observed that military service was very much a matter of tribes and demes, and if there was little or no overlap between participants in politics at the level of the polis and of the deme, 61 the two spheres were strongly linked through the questions asked of candidates for office at their dokimasia,where a citizen's ancestry and legitimacy and his local cults and family tombs were of key importance: 62 looking at things in that light, one might say that the prerequisite for being a good citizen was to be a good demesman. In this regard, then, civic and deme identities meshed tidily on the ideological level, but in rhetorical contexts the picture that has emerged is a little more complex: the function of deme identity and the demotic as a basic and universal constituent of civic identity is reflected in echoes of procedure, but demotics appear surprisingly sparsely in the speeches themselves, and then as

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a device deployed to particular ends; likewise, if orators typically work with a normative model of demes as uniform, homogenous, and harmonious, it is hardly surprising that in court-room settings we frequently catch glimpses of the messiness, tensions, and friction of everyday life in real demes. 63 Notes 1 Hence the arguments in Dern. 39.7-18 about the administrative chaos which would result if two individuals were to have the same name, patronymic, and demotic (N.B. 39. 9 for the lack of any further discriminator): the speaker's focus is on civic affairs such as liturgies, office-holding, litigation, and legal liability, to which a citizen's formal identity was gern1-ane, though there is son1-erhetorical exaggeration (see Carey and Reid (1985) ad loc.), and in day-to-day reality alternatives such as identification by trade were available, as we shall see. Ath. Pol. 21.4 asserts that Cleisthenes' intention was that the demotic should replace the patronymic, but if so this was evidently a failure: see Rhodes (1981) ad loc.,Whitehead (1986) 69-72 andn.4 below. 2 i.e. of citizen descent on both sides, in accordance with Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0 (Ath. Pol. 26.4); the passage does not make clear whether those parents had to be legally married and there is scholarly disagreement on the matter: Rhodes (1981) 496-497, 499-500. 3 See Kierstead (2017) for a recent discussion which defends the strict accuracy of Ath. Pol.'saccount of the respective roles of deme, courts, and Boule. 4 Meyer (1993) has highlighted the huge increase in Athenian epitaphs which give a demotic (and in the vast majority of cases a patronymic: 111 and n.31) fro1n the end of the fifth century, when Pericles' law was re-enacted (Dern. 57.30), and argued that this was directly connected to the ideology of citizenship. 5 Trierarch: [Dern]. 50.41, 52, 53 (cf. Lys. 21.9, with a mention of a general at 21.8); sundikoi: Dern. 20.146; symmory: [Den1-.] 47 .22; Pylagorai and hieromnemon:Aeschin. 3.115; bouleutes:Dern. 22.40; ambassador: Dern. 24.13, 116; con1-pare the naming of 'Meidias of Anagyrous' for any available appointment (Dern. 21.200). In decrees, those so identified tend to be particularly the grammateusand epistates(suggesting a concern with correct procedure and record), magistrates with financial responsibilities, and generals: Kahrstedt (1934) 202-211; there are some illuminating similarities with forensic use of demotics which will be further explored below. 6 As was the norm from c.350, perhaps as a result of legislation: Kahrstedt (1934) 208209, cf. Aeschin. 2.83, 3.187, [Dern.] 7 .42. 7 Compare the retort of Alcibiades (Thuc. 6.18.6) to what he represents as Nicias' 'attempt to set the young against the old' at 6 .13 .1. 8 The authenticity of the docun1-ents in this speech has been n1-uchdiscussed (Carey (1992) 20; for the wider principles note also the sceptical treatment of Canevaro (2013)), but even if they are forgeries, one would expect such witness statements to follow conventional practice: N.B. Carey (1992) on 59 .23 and 25. 9 See Carey and Reid (1985) ad loc.;it perhaps also prepares for the prosopopoeiaputting scurrilous words in the mouths of those witnesses at 35. 10 Further mentions of litigants by demotic at Hyp. Dem. 26, Aeschin. 2.148, Dern. 24.134, 138; [De1n.] 47.28, 58.6; cf. the use of the same style for state debtors: Dern. 22.60, and note the use of the den1-otic in [Dern.] 25.7 for Ariston of Alopece, who registered Aristogeiton as a debtor; one might compare the full naming in the Attic Stelae of the Hermocopids whose property has been confiscated (Osborne and Rhodes (2017) no. 172). 11 Osborne (1985) 64-65, 89, (2011a) 217-218. 12 'Pretentious' is Todd's translation for semnos((2000) 183). Disambiguation seen1-sto have been the only regular reason for assigning a demotic to the eponyn1-ous arch on, when

Civic and localidentities 27

13

14

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16 17

18

19

20

21

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two men of the same name held office in close succession: Kahrstedt (1934) 201, Henry (1977) 9, 71. Dickey (1996) 52-56 (patronyn1-ics); she discusses the unique demotic at Pl. Symp. 172a in the wider context of address by ethnic (17 4-177); for addresses by occupation or activity, see 177-184, esp. 183-184 for single individuals identified by profession. Further examples at Aeschin. 1.63, Dern. 21.83, [Dern.] 40.16, 47.5, 59.45; compare the naming with demotic of the arbitrators in the decree of the Salaminioi (Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 37.6-8). Den1-. 54.7. Besides the labelling of Pamphilus by profession, two are given patronymics, so are presumably meant to be recognized by some members of the jury, but Diotimos tis is more straightforwardly dismissive. Cf. Aeschin. 2.155, Dern. 27.14, 54.10; [Dern.] 50.17, 47, 58.33, 37, 59.25, 32, 40, 47-48, 54, 84. There are again similarities with documentary sources: financial officials are particularly likely to be identified by demotic (Kahrstedt (1934) 202-205), but there is a tendency for the other parties named in accounts and similar documents to be given their demotic too: the prescripts of the Athenian Tribute Lists are a notable instance, but see also, e.g., Osborne and Rhodes (2017) no. 148 (payments for the Corcyra expedition of 433); 180 (payments from the treasury of Athena in 410/09); Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 28 (payments of the Athenian Amphictyons of Delos); 36 (sales of public property). The distinction between the existence of the contract and its fairness is the main point of this speech: see Hyp. Ath. 13-20 and cf. Whitehead (2000) 296-297 and 269-271 for the underlying rhetorical strategy. For other instances cf. Isae. 2.29, Dern. 37.4; [Dern.] 40.52, 42.28, 49 .14, 31, 50.17, 52.20, 53.13, 20; demotics also appear in disputes over property in Lys. frr. 167.89-90 (partially restored) and 217 Carey. There is no use of the demotic in the case of Pancleon (Lys. 23. 9-11), though that might be because, if we follow the suggestion of Todd ((1993) 168-169, (2000) 246-247), the speaker does not want to appear too close to Nicomedes, with whom he is colluding; [Den1-.] 58.19 refers to a failed aphaeresis(the technical term for such intervention) by the opponent's father which resulted in a fine and debt to the state. Contrast Dern. 18.129, where Phorn1-ion's owner is given as Dion of Phrearroi, implying a contrast with the blunt naming of Aeschines' father as Tromes. Status distinctions are clearly important in the building accounts of the Erechtheum (Osborne and Rhodes (201 7) no. 181), where citizen craftsmen are identified by demotic, metics by the 'living in' forn1-ula (for which see Whitehead (1977) 31-32) and slaves by ownership; con1-pare also the late fifth-century list of trireme crews (Osborne and Rhodes (2017) no. 190). Isae. 6.10, 13, the latter without demotic; one might compare the play made with the nan1-e of the alleged epikleros(heiress) Phile or Cleitarete in speech 3.30-34: if Phile is a pet name (for which N.B. next note) the dilemma Isaeus tries to create here may be based on misrepresentation. The mention of the demotic of the first husband of Dioxippus' sister at Hyp. Lye. fr. 4 is presumably intended to lend support to the argun1-ent that his child was legitimate and so entitled to inherit his estate. Plangon is a pet name ('Dolly'), the use of which implies an even greater lack of respect: see Carey and Reid (1985) on 39.9, comparing [Dern.] 59.121, where the allusion to Neaira's daughter as 'Phano known as Strybele' plainly has the same intent, and Isae. 3.30-31. On the naming of Plangon in Dern. 39 and [Dern.] 40, see Kapparis in this volun1-e. 66-67. See also D em. 5 7. 3 7-3 8, 4 3, 6 8, [44] .9-10, 17, [5 9] .5 0, 5 8. On Aeschines' nicknan1-e for Timarchus, 'Pornos' ('prostitute) see Hatzilambrou in this volun1-e, 56. Fisher (2001) 188-189, 203-204 discusses the political standing of the two; he also suggests that the hairstyle in itself 'could carry powerful negative associations' (203). Davies (2011) offers a sympathetic portrait of Hegesippus (including his hairstyle: 17) and includes a draft entry on the whole fan1-ilyfor a future edition of Davies (1971).

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Roger Brock

26 Todd (2007) on Lys. 4.4 reports that there are 238 individuals named Diocles listed in the LGPN volume for Attica, and a homonyn1- is referred to in section 19 of this speech; for the nickname Orestes, see Wyse (1904) ad loc. 27 On the implications of the tattoo, see Jones (1987), esp. 145-146. 28 The other instance of which I am aware is Demosthenes' opposition of Battalus of Painaia to Oenon1-aus of Cothocidai (18.180): for the rhetorical tactics here see Yunis (2001) ad loc.,who sees a combination of self-deprecation and puncturing of his oppo. nent 's pretension. 29 [Dern.] 59.25, 32, 40, 47, 48, 54, 84. The identification ofHipparchusjust as 'the actor' n1-aybe because he is, or is being represented as, a reluctant or hostile witness (N.B. Carey (1992) ad loc.for possible deceit here), while Xenocleides the poet has been disenfranchised and so lacks proper citizen status (59.26-28). 30 Arbitrators: 45; marriages: 50, 58; incidental characters: 22, 24, 30, 33, 39, 43; substitution of genos: Theogenes of the Koironidai (72), Archias the hierophant (116-117); non-Athenians: e.g., 18, 24, 29; 'Lysias the sophist': 21. 31 Almost: his political associates Cephisophon and Apollophanes are also mentioned by name alone in Theomnestus' preliminary address (10). 32 On deme solidarity in general see Whitehead (1986) 223-234, also 301-313 and Osborne (1985) 41-42, 138-146. This is of course an idealising perspective: for the potential for problems in reality see below, 23-25. 33 On civic identity in Lys. 16 and 31, see Keim in this volume, 108-111, 114-118. 34 Cf. also Theophr. Char. 25.3 with Whitehead (1986) 226 for demesmen can1-paigning together. 35 Of which the tribal organisation of casualty lists is a conspicuous illustration: Osborne and Rhodes (2017) no. 129 with commentary; on tribes as communities of memory see Steinbock (2017), esp. 106-109. 36 The complexities of the context are discussed by Todd (2007) 351-353, with additional references. 37 Antiph. 6.11, 13, Isae. 5.36 and 6.60 with Wyse 1904 ad lace., 7.36, Dern. 21 passim; for deme choregoisee Whitehead (1986) 215-219 (and n.38 below), Wilson (2000) 244-252, 282-283. 38 Whitehead (1986) 234-252 discusses deme honours and the parallel cultivation of philotimiain den1-eand polis; see also Daverio Rocchi 2016 for the reciprocal economy of euergetism in the den1-esas relieving social tensions. 39 For deme administration of the theorikonsee Whitehead (1986) 110, for deme expenditure on sacrifices 163-169, and for the likelihood that participation was largely restricted to den1-esmen, 205-206. Metechein ton koinon ('sharing in the common things') covers both communal activity, especially cult, and its material benefits, while the formula hiera kai hosia (literally 'holy things and actions acceptable to the gods') embraces the key aspects of civic life; Blok's discussion of the sharing of hierakai hosiain citizenship is now fundamental: Blok (2017) 47-99. 40 Isae. 7 .36 is the only exan1-ple I have registered; for the demesman as witness see also Whitehead (1986) 227-228. 41 Scafuro (1994) 165-170 discusses the role of deme testimony in the demonstration of citizen status in court (and N.B. 158-165 on the key communal events involved). 42 Lys. 7 .18, cf. 28; Carey (1989) ad loc. cites a proverb that 'neighbours see more keenly than foxes'. 43 Todd (2007) 533 likewise suggests, with reference to the debate over settlement patterns in Attica (next n.), that perioikousin('live round about') in Lys. 7 .28 implies residence. 44 The literature is extensive: see, e.g., Osborne (1985) 15-63, Whitehead (1986) 352358, Jones (2004) 17-47 (with the retort of Osborne (2005)), Osborne (2010c), Kellogg (2013) 26-34, 51-71 (with further references); doubtless there was considerable variation between demes.

Civic and localidentities 29 45 Which entails bracketing the second kai in the MS reading kai Araphenion kai polloi ton tote sungeorgounton,as Wyse does (Forster (1927) follows the MS but n1-istranslates). 46 Whitehead (1986) 228 cf. 300, 312 suggests that the demesmen may have been reluctant to give evidence against Thudippus or his family, though again, the implication of intimidation could be simply a cover for the lack of actual testin1-ony but it also cleverly insinuates a deplorable breakdown in normal deme solidarity - in reality individuals would surely be afraid as much qua neighbours as qua demesmen. 47 There are indications that sussitoi(messmates) could function in a sin1-ilarmanner in the military sphere: Lys. 13.79-82, Isae. 4.18, Den1-. 54.4. 48 I would therefore want to qualify slightly the position of Whitehead (1986) 231-232, who hints at an identification between demesmen and neighbours as a source of solidarity, since his illustrations (231 n.37) come only fron1-comedy: the subsequent identification of demotai and philoi is much more straightforwardly normative (though contrast 33 7-338, recognizing the scope for conflict in reality); likewise Scheid- Tissinier (2011) 280-284. 49 Though this is Blass's en1-endation for the MS dikasten:see Todd (2007) ad loc.for some reservations. 50 Whitehead (1986) 327-345, esp. 331, 333-334 for allusions to local character traits and produce in Old Comedy; N.B. also 292-293 for allegations of corruption in particular demes. A possible exception is Lysias frr. 251-252, 254 Carey, from a prosecution of Nicides for argia(idleness: MacDowell (1978) 155, or perhaps dissipation of property: Todd (1993) 106,245), each the nan1-e of a deme: the third, Potamus, is not just identified by Harpocration but glossed with reference to comic allegations of its readily accepting corruptly enrolled citizens, so it is conceivable that play was made with the reputations of all three. 51 Acknowledgement of the inherent diversity of demes and the danger of generalisation is one of the key principles of Whitehead (1986), esp. 56-63, and more recently Osborne (2011 b) has pointed to the likelihood of wide differences in community and experience; on the other hand, the essential similarity in the n1-odalities of their political activity, especially with regard to citizenship (Osborne (2010b), cf. Whitehead (1986) 92-96) may be a factor in the way they are represented in forensic oratory. 52 Lys. 20.11-12; N.B. Whitehead (1986) 229. 53 Whitehead (1986) 330; con1-pare, for exan1-ple, the beginning of Lys. 32, which we also owe to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 54 Osborne (1985) 147-151. 55 Lambert (1993) 36-37, 178-188 discusses the gamelia (marriage feast) and the limited evidence for the occasional introduction of girls to phratries; on the ambiguous position of won1-en in the demes see Whitehead (1986) 77-81. Scheid-Tissinier (2011) 284-291 stresses the potential for conflict in the deme and argues that the oversight of citizenship exercised by the polis functioned as a safeguard against the possibility of injustice. Note the mention of the phratry in Lys. fr. 258 Carey, from a defence against a graphexenias; sin1-ilarly,orgeonesappear as witnesses alongside phratry n1-embers in Isae. 2.16-17, 44 and gennetaiin 7 .15-17, and thiasotaion their own at 9 .30. 56 For the controversy of 346/5 and the problen1- of malpractice in the deme see Whitehead (1986) 291-301. 57 Though this looks distinctly tendentious, since there n1-ust always have been an issue when a man's father died before he went through his dokimasia:presumably in such cases, which cannot have been uncom1non, the evidence that the father had presented the infant to the oikos and phratry would have to have served as a proxy for his endorsen1-ent at the dokimasia,and the deme will have had to make a judgment. 58 In theory Lys. 8, a prosecution of sunousiastaifor slander, with its vivid portrait of backbiting, disloyalty, and unfairness in what should likewise have been a harn1-onious association, would form an instructive point of contrast, but the speech is aln1-ostcertainly

30

59

60 61 62

63

Roger Brock post-classical: Todd (2007) 541-552; if it were a product of the Second Sophistic it might possibly be drawing on classical sources, but even so it is best left to one side. Absence of ta nomizomena: [Dern.] 43.64, Isae. 6.64-65, and cf. Lys. fr. 415 Carey; for due performance see, e.g., Isae. 1.1, 2.10, 36-37, 7.30, 8.21-26; [Deni..] 48.6-7, Din. 2.18. See Griffith-Williams (2012) 146, 158-160 for the force of these arguments; Meyer (1993) 117-118 argues that proper burial and comn1.emoration came to be regarded as 'a fundamental Athenian right' after the rule of the Thirty. Dover (197 4) 293 helpfully collects the evidence. Osborne (1985) 64-92, Whitehead (1986) 301-326. Ath. Pol. 55.3; note that the same term, dokimasialdokimazein is used of the scrutiny of new citizens (cf. n.3 above) and diapsephizesthaiof the voting procedure (42.1, 55.4 with Rhodes 1981), and both were handled in the courts by the thesmothetai(59.4). I am grateful to the editors for their invitation to participate in the original CCC panel, to my fellow panellists and the audience in Montreal for helpful suggestions, and to the editors again for their valuable comments on this expanded version of my paper, as well as for saving me from a nun1.ber of errors.

Bibliography Blok, J.H. (2017) Citizenship in classicalAthens (Can1.bridge) Canevaro, M. (2013) The documentsin the Attic orators:laws and decreesin the public speechesof the Demostheniccorpus(Oxford) Carey, C. (1989) Lysias)selectedspeeches(Cambridge) Carey, C. (1992) ApollodorusagainstNeaira: [Demosthenes]59 (Warminster) Carey, C. (2007) Lysiae orationescumfragmentis, Oxford Classical Text (Oxford) Carey, C. and Reid, R.A. (1985) Demosthenes:selectedprivate speeches(Cambridge) Daverio Rocchi, G. (2016) 'Political institutions between centre and periphery, between public and private in 4th century Athens: constructing shared civic identity', in C. Tiersch (ed.) Die Athenische Demokratieim 4. Jahrhundert:zwischen Modernisierungund Tradition (Stuttgart) 163-183 Davies, J.K. (1971) Athenian propertiedfamilies) 600-300 B. C. (Oxford) Davies, J.K. (2011) 'Hegesippos of Sounion: an underrated politician', in S.D. Lambert (ed.) Sociableman: essayson ancientGreek socialbehaviourin honourofNick Fisher(Swansea) 11-23 Dickey, E. (1996) Greekforms of address(Oxford) Dover, K.J. (197 4) Greekpopular moralityin the time ofPlato and Aristotle (Oxford) Fisher, N. (2001) Aeschines)againstTimarchos(Oxford) Forster, E.S. (1927) Isaeus (Cambridge, MA and London) Griffith-Williams, B. (2012) 'Oikos, family feuds and funerals: argun1.entation and evidence in Athenian inheritance disputes', CQ 62, 145-162 Henry, A.S. (1977) The prescriptsofAthenian decrees,Mnemosyne Supp. 49 (Leiden) Jones, C.P (1987) 'Tattooing and branding in Graeco-Ro1nan antiquity', JRS 77, 139-155 Jones, N.F. (2004) Rural Athens under the democracy(Philadelphia, PA) Kahrstedt, U. (1934) Staatsgebietund Staatsangehorige in A then (Stuttgart & Berlin) Kellogg, D.L. (2013) Marathonfighters and men ofmaple: ancientAcharnai (Oxford) Kierstead, J. (2017) 'Associations and institutions in Athenian citizenship procedures', CQ 67, 444-459 Lambert, S.D. (1993) The phratriesofAttica (Ann Arbor, MI) MacDowell, D.M. (1978) The law in classicalAthens (London) Meyer, E.A. (1993) 'Epitaphs and citizenship in Classical Athens',JHS 113, 99-121 Osborne, R. (1985) Demos: the discoveryofclassicalAttica (Can1.bridge)

Civic and localidentities 31 R. (2005) Review of Jones (2004), CR 55, 585-587 R. (2010a) Athens and Athenian democracy(Cambridge) R. (20106) 'The demos and its divisions in classical Athens', in Osborne (2010a) [Originally published in 0. Murray & S. Price (eds.) (1990) The Greek city:from Homer to Alexander (Oxford)] Osborne, R. (2010c) 'The potential mobility of hun1-an populations', in Osborne (2010a) 139-167 [Originally published in OJA 10 (1991) 231-252] Osborne, R. (201 la) The historywritten on the classicalGreek body (Cambridge) Osborne, R. (2011 b) 'Local environn1-ent, memory and the formation of the citizen in classical Attica', in S.D. Lambert (ed.) Sociableman: essayson ancient Greek socialbehaviourin honourofNick Fisher(Swansea) 25-43 Osborne R. and Rhodes, PJ. (eds.) (2017) Greek historicalinscriptions478-404 BC (Oxford) Rhodes, PJ. (1981) A commentaryon the AristotelianAthenaion Politeia(Oxford) Rhodes, PJ. and Osborne, R. (eds.) (2003) Greek historicalinscriptions)404-323 BC (Oxford) Scafuro, A. (1994) 'Witnessing and false witnessing: proving citizenship and kin identity in fourth-century Athens', in A.L. Boegehold and A.C. Scafuro (eds.) Athenian identity and civicideology(Baltimore) 156-198 Schaps, D. (1977) 'The won1-an least mentioned: etiquette and women's names', CQ 27, 323-330 Scheid-Tissinier, E. (2011) 'Les den1-es,lieux de citoyennete, lieux de conflits', in V Azoulay and P Ismard (eds.) Clisthene et Lycurgued)Athenes: autour du politique dans la cite classique (Paris) 275-291 Steinbock, B. (2017) 'The multipolarity of Athenian social memory: polis, tribes and demes as interdependent men1-ory communities', in K. Hofmann, R. Bernbeck, & U. Son1-mer and historicalperspectives (eds.) Between memory sites and memory networks:new archaeological (Berlin) 97-125 Todd, S.C. (1993) The shape of Athenian law (Oxford) Todd, S.C. (trans.) (2000) Lysias (Austin, TX) Todd, S.C. (2007) A commentaryon Lysias)speeches1-11 (Oxford) Whitehead, D. (1977) The ideologyofthe Athenian metic (Cambridge) Whitehead, D. (1986) The demes of Attica 508/7 - ea. 250 B.C.: a political and socialstudy (Princeton, NJ) Whitehead, D. (2000) Hypereides:theforensicspeeches(Oxford) Wilson, P. (2000) The Athenian institution of the Khoregia: the chorus)the city, and the stage (Cambridge) Wyse, W (1904) The speechesofIsaeus (Cambridge) Yunis, H. (2001) Demosthenes)on the crown(Cambridge) Osborne, Osborne, Osborne, 39-63

2

The two Mantitheuses in Demosthenes 39 and [Demosthenes] 40 A case of Athenian identity theft? Brenda Griffith-Williams

Introduction: personal modern worlds

identity

in the ancient

and

Many of the chapters in this book are concerned with aspects of public identity, exploring how members of social or civic groups not only identify themselves by reference to values, beliefs, or characteristics they have in common, but also distinguish themselves from outsiders or members of other groups who do not share these features. But every member of such a group also has a personal identity, including a name, which allows them to see themselves and be seen by others as unique individuals. Fundamental to the idea of personal identity is membership of a kinship group or family; while some aspects of our identity are fluid, blood relationship remains unchanged throughout our lives. Sociologists recognize the importance of kinship, and of names, in personal identity. As Richard Jenkins puts it in his classic book Social identity: Kin-group membership epitomises the collectivity of identity, locating individuals within a field that is independent of and beyond individually embodied points of view. Naming, the identification of individuals in terms of collective antecedents and contemporary affiliations, is central to kinship and is given substance by the rights and duties of kin-group membership. Kinship identity establishes relations of similarity with fellow kin in terms of descent; it differentiates the individual from non-kin and, in classificatory terms, other members of the descent group .... Looking at the internal-external dialectic, her individual name is among the earliest things a child learns. 1 Personal identity, then, is rooted in an individual's name and membership of a family, but it needs to be publicly established and acknowledged because its significance extends beyond the private domestic sphere. In the modern world parents are required to register the birth of a child, whose identity is confirmed by the adoption of a family name or surname in combination with one or more individual forenames. When formal proof of identity is required in later life - in relation to such matters as employment, health care, legal proceedings,

The two Mantitheuses 33 or migration - all of us can produce documentary evidence such as a birth certificate or passport, and in disputed cases this can be supported by biometric evidence such as fingerprints. It is by no means unusual for more than one person to have the same name, and in most cases any confusion this causes is easily resolved, but in some cases one person may 'steal' another's identity for criminal purposes - usually with a view to fraudulently obtaining money. Victims commonly suffer not only financial loss but also emotional effects such as stress, anxiety, or anger. The basis of an Athenian citizen's personal identity was membership of an oikos: a household or family. Only legitimate children - that is, those whose parents were Athenian citizens legally married to each other - could be members of their father's oikos; for a man in fourth-century Athens it was particularly important to be identified as a legitimate son because this gave him an automatic right to inherit a share of his father's estate, as well as confirmed his status as an Athenian citizen. The process of acquiring that identity - that is, being publicly recognized as a legitimate son and a citizen - happened in stages; if there was any dispute about someone's status he would be expected to produce witnesses who could testify that various events had taken place. 2 The first was a private family celebration, called the dekate because it was held on the tenth day after a baby's birth, at which the father formally acknowledged and named his son. Next, at the annual autumn festival of Aplaturia, the young boy was introduced to his father's phratry, a kinship group which admitted only legitimate sons of its members. Then, when the young man reached the age of 18, he was introduced to the phratry for a second time, and finally he was registered as a member of his father's deme, one of the districts of Attica created by the reforms of Cleisthenes in the sixth century. His full name had three components: the personal name given to him by his father, a patronymic, and a demotic, 3 a combination which in normal circumstances would have created a unique identity for every living Athenian, enabling him to be distinguished from other members of his family and of the wider community.

Mantitheus

and Boeotus:

a crisis of identity?

The speaker of Dern. 39 and [Dern.] 40 identifies himself as Mantitheus, son of Mantias of Thoricus. His father, Mantias, who died several years before the speeches were delivered, was a well-known politician with a record of public service: he had served as treasurer of the shipyards and as a trierarch, and he may have been the Mantias who was a general in 359 BCE. Mantitheus says that his mother was Mantias' legally married wife, a daughter of the wealthy Polyaratus of Thoricus, and she had previously been married to Cleomedon, whose father was the fifth-century demagogue Cleon. Mantitheus was born around 380 BCE. His parents also had a younger son, who died in infancy, and Mantitheus was still a child when his mother died. Mantitheus calls witnesses to confirm that Mantias celebrated the dekate for him after his birth, introduced him to his phratry as a child, and enrolled him in his deme when

34

Brenda Griffith-Williams

he came of age. In accordance with Athenian custom, he says, Mantias gave him his paternal grandfather's name, Mantitheus, because he was Mantias' firstborn son. 4 So Mantitheus seems to have grown up, at least for the first few years of his life, with a secure identity as a member of a prominent Athenian family and, as an only son, in the expectation that he would inherit the whole of his father's estate. But then he encountered a problem. His opponent in the litigation, whom he calls Boeotus, also identifies himself as Mantitheus, son of Mantias of Thoricus, although by a different mother: Plangon, a daughter of the disgraced general Pamphilus. (For the sake of clarity I shall follow the usual scholarly convention, referring to the speaker as Mantitheus and his opponent as Boeotus.) Boeotus says that Mantias celebrated the dekatefor him, but Mantitheus denies this, claiming that Boeotus' witnesses are not reliable. What is agreed between them is that Mantias did not acknowledge Plangon's sons, Boeotus and Pamphilus, while they were children, and refused to introduce them to his phratry as his legitimate sons, so when Boeotus became an adult he took legal action against Mantias to force him to acknowledge him. Mantias did, eventually, introduce both Boeotus and Pamphilus to his phratry, but according to Mantitheus he did not do so willingly. Wanting to avoid the embarrassment of a public trial, he made a private arrangement with Plangon: he would challenge her to confirm on oath that Boeotus was his son, and she (for a payment of 30 minae) would refuse to take the oath, so putting an end to Boeotus' claim. But Plangon tricked him: when the case came before the arbitrator, 5 she broke her promise by accepting the challenge and swearing that Boeotus and Pamphilus were Mantias' legitimate sons. 6 So Mantias was forced to acknowledge them by introducing them to his phratry, but he died before he could complete the formalities of recognition by enrolling them in his deme. Boeotus then had himself enrolled under the name Mantitheus - apparently claiming that Mantias had named him Boeotus, after a brother of Plangon, as an insult, and that he, as Mantias' oldest legitimate son, was entitled to take the name of his paternal grandfather, Mantitheus. The structure of ancient Greek families and inheritance systems encouraged disputes between half-brothers of different mothers. 7 On the one hand, remarriage after divorce or the death of a spouse was common, and if a man had legitimate sons by more than one wife they were all entitled to an equal share in his estate after his death - an obvious source of rivalry and disputes if an estate had to be divided into several small shares. On the other hand, Athenian men (but not women) enjoyed considerable freedom to engage in more informal sexual unions before, during, and after marriage - and some of these non-marital relationships inevitably resulted in the birth of illegitimate children (nothoi), but illegitimate offspring had no right to inherit anything more than a very limited amount. 8 It is not surprising, then, to find disputes between halfbrothers, in which one party typically identifies his opponent as the illegitimate child of his father's concubine or mistress, not the son of a lawfully married Athenian wife. 9

The two Mantitheuses 35 The litigation between Mantitheus and Boeotus was apparently not typical of disputes between half-siblings, because the question of inheritance had already been decided, at least in principle: once Mantias had publicly acknowledged Plangon's sons, Mantitheus had no choice but to recognize them as his legitimate half-brothers and share his father's estate with them. But it is clear that he never really accepted the situation, and disagreements about the disposition of Mantias' estate dragged on for many years. The two surviving speeches, both prosecution speeches delivered by Mantitheus against Boeotus, give us some insight into the nature of their dispute, but they need to be seen in the context of the long-running litigation between the two men. 10 In or around the year 358, probably not long after Mantias had died, Mantitheus prosecuted Boeotus and Pamphilus for the restitution of his mother's dowry from Mantias' estate. Boeotus and Pamphilus retaliated with a demand for the dowry of their mother, Plangon, evidently asserting that it was Mantitheus' mother who was not a legitimate wife of Mantias. By agreement, the case was submitted to a private arbitrator, Solon of Erchia, but he died, after long delays, without reaching a decision. Boeotus and Pamphilus then prosecuted Mantitheus again, and he responded with another prosecution against Boeotus, whom he named in the official documentation as 'Boeotus' because, as he says, 'that was the name my father gave him' (40.16). The prosecution by Boeotus and Pamphilus against Mantitheus was referred to a public arbitrator, who found in favour of Mantitheus, and the two prosecutors accepted that decision without referring the case to court. Then Mantitheus' prosecution against Boeotus also went to public arbitration, but Boeotus did not attend the hearing and the arbitrator decided against him in absentia.Boeotus ignored the decision and refused to hand over the dowry, claiming that the case had nothing to do with him because the defendant had been named as Boeotus but his name was Mantitheus. So Mantitheus prosecuted him again, this time for wrongly using the name Mantitheus, and Dern. 39 is the speech he delivered at the trial, probably in 348 BCE. Mantitheus lost this case and started yet another prosecution against Boeotus - this time under the name Mantitheus - for the restitution of his mother's dowry (40 .18). [Dern.] 40 is the speech he delivered in that case in the year 347, 11 years after the death of Mantias. 11 We do not know the result of this case, but it may not have been the final stage in the dispute about Mantias' estate, and it almost certainly did not put an end to the personal enmity between Mantitheus and Boeotus. In Dern. 39, the speech about the name, Mantitheus' aim is clearly to stop Boeotus from calling himself Mantitheus, but the legal basis of the action is more obscure. It was apparently not illegal for an Athenian to give the same name to two of his sons, although it must surely have been very unusual; Mantitheus' rhetorical challenge, 'Show me one Athenian who has ever given the same name to two of his children' (39.32), was probably a reflection of normal practice. Formally, it seems, the prosecution was a dike blabes, or action for damages, so in order to win the case Mantitheus would have to prove that he had suffered some harm from Boeotus' use of his name. In fact, he uses the

36

Brenda Griffith-Williams

verb blaptein,'to harm', twice (39.5, 13) in claiming that Boeotus has harmed both him and the polis by having himself registered in the deme under the name Mantitheus. He begins by describing the potential harm to the polis: what will happen, he asks rhetorically, if the state decides to assign a liturgy to Mantitheus, son of Mantias of Thoricus? How will anyone know which of the two half-brothers is intended? What if the generals are enrolling members of a syndicate, or appointing a trierarch, or making an appointment to some other office? Perhaps, he suggests sarcastically, Boeotus could be identified as 'Mantitheus, son of Plangon', and Mantitheus himself as the son of his own mother, but that would be unprecedented; the only legal way of distinguishing two men with the same first name is by adding their patronymics and demotics. What if a lottery is being held to select members of the Boule or the Board of Thesmothetes? Perhaps one of their two ballots could have a distinguishing mark, but even that would not help because no one else would know which ballot belonged to which Mantitheus. In short, 'the result will be complete chaos' (rcoAA11 -rapaxricruµ~aivc:t,36.10). Moving on to the harm (actual or potential) to him personally, Mantitheus first complains that Boeotus has associated with some disreputable people, including Mnesicles and Menecles, whom Mantitheus describes as sykophants, and his activities could incur a fine from the state. If that happened, how would anyone know which Mantitheus was liable for payment? Moreover, Boeotus might be prosecuted in a dike exoules (an action for ejectment), or he might default on his property taxes or be involved in some other kind of litigation or scandal. If any of these things happened, how would it be possible to distinguish between two men called Mantitheus who had the same father? In fact, Boeotus has already caused problems when he was summoned for desertion from the army, and Mantitheus had to accept the summons in his own name. What is more, Boeotus has already been a defendant in litigation which brought discredit to Mantitheus because they have the same name, and he has claimed to be entitled to an office to which Mantitheus was elected. We may wonder how significant all this 'harm' really was. Even in the Athenian context, where the coincidence of names would have been more unusual than it is in the modern world, much of the confusion described by Mantitheus was hypothetical. When there was genuine ambiguity, there must in practice have been ways of resolving it, even without bureaucratic record systems or modern scientific evidence; for example, an Athenian might have been identified by his trade, 12 or place of residence, or perhaps by some physical characteristic. Was there, then, something more behind the dispute about the name than what Mantitheus explicitly mentions in the speech? Douglas MacDowell conjectures that there may have been a financial motive for the quarrel: Why was Boeotus so keen to be titheus so keen to prevent him? motives given in the speech .... to feel that he ought not to be

called Mantitheus, and why was ManWe should not necessarily dismiss the It was not unreasonable for Mantitheus subjected to such embarrassments. On

The two Mantitheuses 37 the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that something else was at stake besides the name. It is possible that some money or property was owed to 'Mantitheus son of Mantias of Thoricus', and Boeotus and Mantitheus both wanted to claim it. But, if so, Mantitheus carefully avoids mention of that in his speeches and we cannot identify the advantage which he hoped to obtain. 13 While MacDowell's suggestion cannot be ruled out, it seems to me unlikely that, if there had been such a motive for the litigation, Mantitheus would have omitted to mention it. On the other hand there does appear, as Chris Carey suggests, to be an emotional as well as a practical basis for the dispute: 'Mantitheus bases his argument on the potential for confusion and the consequent practical problems for both of them and for the city, but it is difficult not to detect more emotional rivalries and family bitterness at work as well' .14 If (and this is of course still no more than conjecture) Mantitheus really had been brought up to think of himself as Mantias' oldest son, then found that identity threatened by someone he had not even regarded as a relative, the psychological impact on him might well have been profound. His claim that Boeotus has 'robbed' him of the name given to him by his father (39 .20) is, if taken literally, an exaggeration, and there is no hard evidence of criminal intent on the part of Boeotus, such as would be expected in a modern case of identity theft. The strength of feeling expressed by Mantitheus suggests, nevertheless, that he sees Boeotus' assumption of his name as a threat to his own sense of identity.

Mantitheus

and Boeotus:

political

rivals?

As Mantitheus observes, Boeotus, when Mantias finally acknowledged him, acquired not only the identity of a legitimate son entitled to a share of Mantias' estate, but also that of an Athenian citizen, entitled to participate in the public affairs of the polis (ci TT)