The Making of an Alliance: The Origins and Development of the US-Israel Relationship 1108427197, 9781108427197

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The Making of an Alliance

Laying the foundation for an understanding of US–Israeli relations, this lively and accessible book provides critical background on the origins and development of the ‘special’ relations between Israel and the United States. Questioning the usual neorealist approach to understanding this relationship, David Tal instead suggests that the relations between the two nations were constructed on idealism, political culture, and strategic ties. Based on a diverse range of primary sources collected in archives in both Israel and the United States, The Making of an Alliance discusses the development of relations built through constant contact between people and ideas, showing how presidents and prime ministers, state officials, and ordinary people from both countries impacted one another. It was this constancy of religion, values, and history, serving as the bedrock of the relations between the two countries and peoples, over which the ephemeral was negotiated. david tal is Professor and Yossi Harel Chair in Modern Israel Studies in the Department of History at the University of Sussex. A historian of diplomatic and military history, he has published extensively on Israeli diplomatic and military history, and US diplomatic history and disarmament policies. He is the author of books including Israel’s Conception of Current Security: Origins and Development 1949–1956 (1998), War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy (2004), The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945–1963 (2008), and US Strategic Arms Policy in the Cold War: Negotiation and Confrontation over SALT, 1969–79 (2017). He is the editor of The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East (2001) and Israeli Identity: Between Orient and Occident (2004).

The Making of an Alliance The Origins and Development of the US–Israel Relationship

david tal University of Sussex

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108427197 DOI: 10.1017/9781108551472 © David Tal 2022 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2022 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Tal, David (Historian), author. Title: The making of an alliance: the origins and development of the US-Israel relationship / David Tal. Description: Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021034145 (print) | LCCN 2021034146 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108427197 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108445887 (paperback) | ISBN 9781108551472 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Jews–Politics and government. | Zionism. | Religion and politics. | International relations and culture. | Strategy. | United States–Relations–Israel. | Israel–Relations–United States. | United States–Politics and government–20th century. | Israel–Politics and government–20th century. | BISAC: HISTORY / Middle East / General Classification: LCC E183.8.I7 T35 2022 (print) | LCC E183.8.I7 (ebook) | DDC 327.7305694–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021034145 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021034146 ISBN 978-1-108-42719-7 Hardback ISBN 978-1-108-44588-7 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To – our children, Omer, Marva and Eynav.

Contents

Acknowledgements

page viii

Introduction

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The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

26

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Friendly Impartiality, 1949–1958

53

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Strategic Change, 1958–1968

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From Friendship to Strategic Alliance, 1969–1989

168

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Friendship and Strategic Alliance

301

Conclusion: What Lies in the Future?

354

Bibliography

365

Index

385

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Acknowledgements

It is impossible to launch a project of this magnitude without the assistance of many people and institutions. When I commenced this journey, I was a faculty member in the history department at the University of Calgary in Canada, where I held the Kahanoff Chair in Modern Israel Studies. This was (and I’m sure still is) a great place to be. I was fortunate to benefit from the friendship of dear colleagues in the department and generous financial contribution from the department and the faculty of art that allowed me to embark on my research. My good fortune continued with my move to the University of Sussex in the UK, where I was appointed the Yossi Harel Chair in Modern Israel Studies in the history department. The department provided – and still provides – me with a great academic environment that somewhat eased the burden of writing. No less important was the university’s generous financial support that enabled me to conduct the main part of my research work. Every historian knows how exhilarating it is to walk into the research room in archives and review the carts loaded with boxes containing the great treasure, the documents. I have felt that way many times during my visits to a fair number of archives and libraries in the United States and Israel. Every visit has been fruitful, and I enjoyed the hospitality of the staff on each visit. The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives (AJA) has awarded me the American Council of Judaism Fellowship (2017–2018), which enabled me to work at the archives and benefit significantly from its rich and important collections. I would like to thank the Archives’ team for their generosity – Dr Gary Zola, the Executive Director of the Jacob Rader Marcus Center; Mr Kevin Proffitt, Senior Archivist for Research and Collections and the Director of the fellowship programs; the Archives’ reading room team who were so kind for their help with my work; and the management and staff of the Sisterhood Dormitory

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for hosting me during my stay at the Archives. It was a most valuable experience. I have visited several presidential archives –Truman’s, Eisenhower’s, Kennedy’s, Johnson’s, Nixon’s, Ford’s, Carter’s, Reagan’s, and Clinton’s – and in all of them I met a dedicated staff, all of whom were eager to help. I’m grateful to all of those who were so supportive. I would also like to thank the team of the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem for their help. I’m also grateful for the help I got from the Israel State Archives’ Director Dr Yaacov Lozowick and the Archives’ team. I would like to express special thanks to my friend Dr Hagai Tsoref, who helped me with advice and in our conversations. Rami Ginat, Elie Podeh, and Yoram Schweitzer were most helpful interlocutors, with whom I consulted whenever I hit a wall. Their wisdom helped me in moments like this and allowed me to continue the craft of writing, for which I am thankful. I was a research fellow at the S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University, during the years 2011 and 2020. I would like to thank the Center’s Director, Professor Raanan Rein, and its staff, for their support. I would like also to thank the Cambridge University Press team for helping me to convert a manuscript into a book. Maria Marsh was there from the very beginning, for which I’m grateful – thank you Maria! Atifa Jiwa was just as much help, as were the production team – thank you all. And finally, as always, I would like to thank my partner, Dali, with whom I shared my thoughts, doubts and ideas.

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Introduction

On 27 December 1962, Foreign Minister Golda Meir met President John F. Kennedy in the White House. This was their first meeting, and it produced one of the more known statements made by an American president regarding Israeli–American relations: ‘The United States has special relations with Israel, as we have had and still have with Great Britain.’1 Though no student of Israeli–American relations will deny that there were and are special ties between the two nations, the debate was: Since when were Israeli–American relations special? The answers varied depending on the scholar’s approach and understanding of the causes of those relations. Some emphasize realism, while others see ideals as factors that drive and underpin the relationship between the two countries. Melvyn Leffler summarizes the difference between these schools of thought. The ‘realist theories focus on power and survival and dwell on the distribution of power in the international system’; the idealists believe that foreign policy was driven by ideas, ideologies, and historical memories.2 The realists assume that the relations between the two countries are underlined by strategic considerations, and these determine the date on which special relations between the two countries began. Thus, most proponents of the realist school of thought mark the 1967 June War as the turning point in American–Israeli relations. Following its outstanding victory, they argued, the United States came to regard Israel as a strategic asset. A few scholars have suggested that the 1958 crisis in the Middle East was the point of change. Following the crisis, the Eisenhower administration came to view Israel as a stalwart ally in a volatile region. Others cite 1970 as the date of change, when Israel acted, under American request, to save King Hussein of Jordan from the threat of Syria. There are those who 1

2

Minutes of Meeting of Foreign Minister Mrs. Meir with President Kennedy, 27 December 1962, Israel State Archives [henceforth ISA], FO 4317/8. Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 6.

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Introduction

go as far as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, after which the Nixon administration provided Israel with unprecedented military and economic aid.3 This line of argument is problematic. Basing Israeli– American relations on interests and power makes it difficult to explain why President Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration in 1917; why his successors and members of congress supported the Balfour Declaration and the idea of a Jewish national home throughout the interwar years; and why President Harry S. Truman actively supported the idea of a Jewish state. After all, a quick glance at the Middle East’s map lays bare where the American interests laid, and interests would have dictated that the Americans would shy away from the Zionists. It is more probable that idealism is a better explanation. Compared to the relatively homogenous realist school of thought – its proponents differ on timing but agree on substance (i.e., that strategic interests decided the course of the Israeli–American relations) – the proponents of the idealistic school of thought are more heterogeneous. They offer three different approaches to the factors underlying the special relationship. One is ‘political culture’, which is a combination of religion, values, and self-identity.4 Another feature is the study of 3

4

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘The United States and Israel since 1948: “Special Relations?”’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1998), 232; Warren Bass, Support Any Friend (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3; Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2011), 14; Arlene Lazarowitz, ‘Different Approaches to a Regional Search for Balance: The Johnson Administration, the State Department, and the Middle East, 1964–1967’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 2008), 25; Zach Levey, ‘The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 2004), 256; Douglas Little, ‘The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68’, Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25 (1993), 563–564; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 4–23; David Rodman, ‘Phantom Fracas: The 1968 American Sale of F-4 Aircraft to Israel’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November 2004), 140–141; Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.–Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015); Nadav Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 448ff. Walter Russell Mead, ‘The New Israel and the Old: Why Gentile Americans Back the Jewish State’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), 28–46; Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1968), 501–523; Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States–Israel Relations after the Cold War

Introduction

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Israeli–American special relations through cultural representations such as media, films, and literature.5 Another subfield is the distinct, rich, and flourishing study of the history of Christian Zionism. It encompasses the relations between Protestants and Zionists from the seventeenth century to the end of the twentieth century and their impact on the American relations with the Zionist movement and Israel.6 The idealists, with their wide variety, offer a time frame that extends from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present. However, some of them limit the discussion to the 1910s and 1920s, while others start their discussion in the post-1967 June War period or even later. While idealism seems to better explain American–Israeli special relations, still, the fractured time frame presented by the various scholars and their divergent approaches lead to more questions. After all, religion and political culture remained significant forces during the years missing from the present literature. In addition to that, the

5

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(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 4–6; Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab–Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 28; Elizabeth Stephens, US Policy toward Israel (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), ix; Michael Thomas, American Policy toward Israel (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–3. Amy Kaplan, Our American Israel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005); Shaul Mitelpunkt, Israel in the American Mind: The Cultural Politics of U.S.–Israel Relations, 1958–1988 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Hilton Obenzinger, American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and the Holy Land Mania (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). Irvine H. Anderson, Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 1–19; Yaakov Ariel, On Behalf of Israel: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Ariel, An Unusual Relationship: Evangelical Christians and Jews (New York: New York University Press, 2013); Frank Brecher, Reluctant Ally (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 10; Caitlin Carenen, The Fervent Embrace: Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, and Israel (New York: New York University Press, 2012); Eric R. Crouse, American Christian Support for Israel, 1948–1975 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015); Hertzel Fishman, American Protestantism and a Jewish State (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1973); Samuel Goldman, God’s Country (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018); Daniel G. Hummel, Covenant Brothers (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); Paul C. Merkley, Christian Attitudes towards the State of Israel (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001); Jason M. Olson, America’s Road to Jerusalem (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018); Stephen Spector, Evangelicals and Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Faydra L. Shapiro, Christian Zionism: Navigating the Jewish– Christian Border (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015); Timothy P. Weber, On the Road to Armageddon (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004).

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Introduction

separation between the various components of the idealist school of thought, political culture, cultural representations, and history of Christian Zionism, seem artificial. Or maybe it was the Jewish, or the Israeli lobby, as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt suggested in their controversial book, that decided the course of the Israeli–American relations. This is undoubtedly a point worthy of careful consideration – which will be reviewed throughout the next pages. But once again, President Woodrow Wilson’s endorsement of the Balfour Declaration, which was followed by sweeping congressional support for the Declaration in the following years, suggests otherwise. To talk about the Israeli or Jewish lobby in 1917 and the rest of the 1910s and 1920s is to overstretch the idea and meaning of the lobby. Hence, there must be other explanations. In this book, I will propose a structure that draws upon all of the previous and add to it. Employing an integrative approach that will synthesize existing literature and primary sources, I will suggest that the relations between the two nations were based on idealism, political culture, and strategic ties. Suggesting that the Zionist and later Israeli– American relations resemble a tangled web that consist of multiple threads woven together, my intention is to explore those various threads. Based on primary sources collected in multiple archives in Israel and the United States, I will discuss the development of relations built through the constant contact between peoples and ideas. The book will show how presidents and prime ministers, state officials, and ordinary people from both countries impacted each other. This influx was possible as the relations between Israel and the United States were based on constants, over which the ephemeral was negotiated. The constants were religion, values, and history, serving the bedrock of the relations between the two countries, and, more importantly, between the two people. The ephemeral, which was American interests, was negotiated against those constants. But can values and ideas supersede interests and power considerations? Scholars of international history grappled with this question. The proponents of the idealist school have an answer. They went to the archives, read the documents, the memories, the testimonies, and came back convinced that ideas matter. Leaders and politicians justified their actions with ideas and ideology, and their deeds validated the

Introduction

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legitimacy of their reasoning.7 I think so, too. The book examines the forces which shaped the relationships as well as the people and institutions who gave meaning and content to the special relations. These will include presidents, senior officials, members of congress, members of media, religious figures, people of influence, words and arts, and members of the security, intelligence, economic, and industrial communities. Their labour laid the groundwork for the special relations and filled them with content in various fields of interest and point of connection. By integrating these components and the constant contact between the people from each country – from the President down – it is possible to understand how deep, intense, and pervasive the ties between the two countries were – and, as of 2021, still are. The underlying thesis of this book is that constants – religion, values, and history – set the course of the relations as well as their development and structure, whereas the ephemeral – the interests – were weighed against the constants. In order to show the longevity of the constants, I will apply a long durée approach. I will start in 1917 when the constants had yielded, for the first time, an actual political action and will end the discussion at the present (2021). This extended time frame will make it possible to comprehend the scope and breadth of the Israeli–American special relationship. My broad spatial and temporal approach will also allow me to overcome a significant obstacle, which is the lack of primary sources for the period beginning in the late 1980s. The vast majority of the archival documents pertinent to this book became available to the public twenty-five to thirty years after their creation.8 By this reasoning, the book should have ended with the Reagan administration and the first Shamir government. I did not do that for 7

8

Akira Iriye, ‘Culture and International History’, in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 241–256; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 8–9. In many cases throughout the book, I present an American position or statement based on Israeli sources. This is possible because the Israeli diplomats were in constant touch with American officials and diplomats in the Department of State and White House as well with members of Congress and, of course, friends of Israel, Jews and non-Jews, who had access to the president. The Israeli diplomats reported back to Jerusalem what they heard in Washington, allowing the researcher a glance into what happened behind closed doors also from the American side, where American sources were not available.

6

Introduction

two main reasons. First, this is a study of New Diplomatic History, which means that I embarked on a quest that involved exploring issues beyond the realm of state-produced diplomatic documents. That serves my argument that the Israeli–American special relations have been and continue to be forged not only by diplomats and heads of state but also by people within and without the government, involved in the cultural, economic, and strategic issues. Their actions are recorded in documents deposited in state archives, and beyond. Moreover, my argument is that the bedrock of these relations were constants. I will show how the constants were in operation during the ‘documented’ period and how they were still applicable, mainly through performance, in the ‘undocumented’ period. Thus, the long durée approach will allow me to show the sources, the development, and the prevalence of the constants and the dimension of continuity that dominated the relations between the two nations.

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The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

Celebrating Thanksgiving in 1799, the pastor of the First Church in Haverhill, MA, Abiel Abbot, delivered a ceremony which was dedicated to the comparison of the people of the United States to Ancient Israel. ‘No nation, since the world was peopled, has been remarkable in so many and important respects, as the posterity of Abraham’, preached Abbot. ‘It has been often remarked that the people of the United States come nearer to a parallel with Ancient Israel than any other national upon the globe. Hence, OUR AMERICAN ISRAEL [sic] is a term frequently used; and common consent allows it apt and proper.’ This American Israel was founded on religion, political institutions and constitution.1 Religion, political institutions, and regime separated the United States from the rest of the world. These would become the themes that would connect the Americans and the Zionist movement and later Israel. ‘Many American Christians perceived in Israel and Israeli Jews a better, more heroic version of themselves. By projecting American ideals and identities onto the biblical landscape, they also promoted those principles at home. To that extent, they could regard themselves as honorary citizens of God’s country’, argued Samuel Goldman.2 Religion, shared values and history were the foundations upon which the Zionist and later Israeli–American special relationships were forged.

Religion The first Americans justified the creation of their new homeland in religious, civil and republican terms. These terms were driven from

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Abiel Abbot, Traits of Resemblance in the People of the United States of America to Ancient Israel (Haverhill, MA: Moore & Stebbins, 1799), 5–6, 13–14. Goldman, God’s Country, 124.

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The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

and, to a great extent, related to the Jewish Bible – the Old Testament – and heritage. Puritans and their descendants explained and interpreted their deeds and predicament in biblical language and imagery.3 The Old Testament was not only a source of inspiration to seventeenth and eighteenth-century Americans, it was also the spring from which they drew what they considered to be truths that served the new American civic, republican society. This treatment of the Bible and the Jews brought Americans to see in the Jews a mirror reflection of themselves; it was affirmation of their own identity, values and commitment to freedom and democracy. God ordered their arduous journey across the wilderness to the new Promised Land, just as was the sons of Israel’s journey from Egypt to Canaan to their new home, where they would build a new society based on biblical commandments. In reverse, the American support for Israel was ‘a way of legitimizing [their] own status as a country called to a unique destiny by God’, and ‘the restoration of the ancient, fallen nation was a powerful trope of emerging nationalism that, because of the close typological identification of the settler-colonial project with the Israelites, was essential to the assertion of American identities’.4 In other words, the Old Testament and the people of Israel were a source of self- identification for the Americans. The Protestant churches – not a homogenous organ – identified with the Zionist and Israeli aspirations for several reasons. Protestant eschatology that envisioned apocalypse was one reason. Known also as premillennial dispensationalism, this Protestant denomination believed that the Jews would have a vital role in Christ’s second coming, and for that to transpire, the Jews should first return to the Holy Land and rebuild their national home, the state of Israel.5 It was William E. Blackstone from Chicago who made premillennial dispensationalism popular in the United States. Presenting his ideas in Jesus Is Coming, in 1878, the book became a best seller, and significantly

3 4 5

Eran Shalev, American Zion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 5. Obenzinger American Palestine, 33–34. Anderson, Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy, 19–20; Ariel, An Unusual Relationship, 40–45.

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promoted the case of premillennialism in the United States.6 Blackstone was a link in a chain which connected past premillennialists such as Charles Spurgeon (1834–1892) and Dwight Moody (1837–1899) to more recent premillennialists such as Billy Graham (1918–2018), Jerry Falwell (1933–2007) and John Hagee (1940–).7 The second, and not necessarily disconnected from the first, current within Protestantism that preached the return of the Jews to their homeland in Palestine were the fundamentalists, who believed in the inerrancy of the Bible. The fundamentalists, who all in all are part of the evangelical church, although not necessarily identical with the premillennialists, believe that the Bible contains eternal truths to be taken literally. They argued that God’s promise to Abraham and his descendants in the Book of Genesis, ‘I will give you and them the land in which you are now a foreigner. I will give the whole land of Canaan to your family forever’ (17:8), was a historical truth.8 Many Americans remain firm believers in the inerrancy of the Bible. In 1985, about 40 per cent of Americans believed in the Bible inerrancy, and a poll made in 2013 reveals that 55 per cent of American Christians believe that God gave Israel to the Jewish people. These messages were assimilated among the believers through Sunday schools, where they learned about God’s promise to Abraham and the other stories about the sons of Israel.9 Public figures such as Harry S. Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were among the American presidents who visited Sunday schools and were raised in churches committed to fundamentalism.10 The story that the former state department diplomat, Evan Wilson, tells says it all. In 1947, during a discussion in the state department over Palestine and the partition resolution, his secretary, Marilyn Woods, ‘remarked one day in bewilderment: 6

7 8

9 10

William E. Blackstone, Jesus Is Coming (Chicago: Fleminkg H. Revell Company, 1908); Jonathan D. Moorhead, Jesus Is Coming: The Life and Work of William E. Blackstone (PhD dissertation, Dallas Theological Seminary, May 2008), 23. Ariel, An Unusual Relationship, 15. Mark R. Amstutz, Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 124; Barry Hankins, American Evangelicals (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 30–31; George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3. Anderson, Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy, 39. Paul C. Merkley, American Presidents, Religion and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 25, 54; Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1973), 52.

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The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

“Mr. Wilson, I don’t understand why you let yourself go so bothered about Palestine when everyone knows it says in the Bible that the Jews are going back there some day.”’11 The third thread in evangelical Protestantism is ‘Brotherhood’. The Brotherhood covenant theology’s emphasis is on what is common and uniting Judaism and Christianity. The covenant theology views Judaism and the Old Testament as the source, and Christianity as the continuation, rather than as a substitute or replacement. Within covenant theology, Israel is a marker of identity for evangelicals.12 The covenant theology is based on Genesis 12:3, ‘I will bless them who bless you. I will curse him who curse you. This is God talking about Israel.’ The Jews are the intermediaries through which God’s blessings are communicated to all humanity. It was this idea that led Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) to state on the senate floor following the 9/11 attacks, ‘one of the reasons God had blessed our country is because we have honored his people’.13 These were the foundations of the JudeoChristian tradition, which represents the shared values and the common fate of Judaism and Christianity, both based and reliant on the Torah – the Old Testament – which provided Western civilization and American exceptionalism’s foundations.14 The Bible was a living matter for the Americans also through its sites. The names of villages and cities that got their names from the Bible dot the United States’ map. There are at least eleven villages and cities called Palestine in the United States; twenty-four Bethels (the biblical Bet-El), seven Bethlehems, fourteen Canaans, eighteen Hebrons, twelve Jerichos, four Jerusalems and more than fifty Salems – which is short-hand for Jerusalem – ten Carmels, four Mount Olives, four Nazareths, more than fifty Shilos and seven Mount Zions.15 Palestine’s geography was conveyed to Americans also physically, through models. A Palestine Park was built in Chautauqua, 11

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14 15

Evan M. Wilson, A Calculated Risk (Cincinnati, OH: Clerisy Press, 2008), 40–41. Daniel G. Hummel, ‘His Land and the Origins of the Jewish-Evangelical Israel Lobby’, Church History, Vol. 87, No. 4 (December 2018), 123; Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 3. Quotation in Robert O. Smith, More Desired than Our Owne Salvation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7. Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 41. Moshe Davis, America and the Holy Land (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 135–143.

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NY, in 1874, the first of many Holy Land models throughout the United States. Jerusalem’s Old City was reconstructed in St Louis World’s Fair in 1904.16 The American public was also informed about Israel at the local level by pilgrims who returned from Israel and spoke about it to members of their communities. Community members would be invited to listen to lectures or to view slides presented by pilgrims who have returned from Israel. Local newspapers would advertise such events, inviting the public to attend. The Hendrickson Avenue Bible Church in Lynbrook, New York, invited the public to the screening of Billy Graham’s His Land in January 1973. The film gave the people of Lynbrook the opportunity to ‘[s]ee graphically the fact that Israel today is a living testimony to the words of the prophets when they proclaimed that Israel would take her place among the nations of the world.’17 In December 1973, The Herald from Provo, Utah, invited its readers to Dr Spencer Palmer’s lecture on ‘Latter-Day Israel: Who and What?’18 In the same month, the Seymour Daily Tribune from Seymour, Indiana, reported on a talk, ‘[accompanied] with slides’, that Mrs T. P. Cordes delivered about her tour with a group of pilgrims in Israel in late April of the same year.19 The local newspapers served also as a venue for reports from Israel about the Holy Land. Apart from the common reports dealing with military and political issues, the local newspapers also published reports with an emphasis on Israel as a Holy Land. Thus, the Austin Daily Herald in 1952 published an article titled ‘Israel Find Bible History in Old Cities’.20 Alice M. Dick shared her impressions from the pilgrimage she made to the Holy Land with the readers of the Salt Lake Tribune in 1958. ‘I want to bring you something from that ancient land; some of the impressions of my own eyes, . . . little details for you to cull as you will from the curious sights which all pilgrims to the Holy Land must bemuse’, she wrote.21 Reverend John Wm. Pistone told the readers of the Tahoka Lynn County News of his trip to the Holy Land in 1963 that “[i]t is for 16 17 18 19 20 21

Kaplan, Our American Israel, 211. ‘Church News’, Lynbrook Helm Independent Review, 3 January 1973, 4. ‘Latter-Day Israel Topic for Lecture’, The Herald, 4 December 1973, 5. ‘DAR Told the Holy Land’, Seymour Daily Tribune, 15 December 1973, 9. ‘Israel Find Bible History in Old Cities’, Austin Daily Herald, June 11, 1952, 16. Alice M. Dick, ‘My Trip to the Holy Land’, Salt Lake Tribune, 28 September 1958, 19.

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The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

me a privilege and honor to be visiting the land of the patriarchs and prophets. It gives a new look at the Bible.’22 It was the target audience of these publications that lent importance to these reports. These local papers were directed to the common American reader, unlike national newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times that were directed mainly to the elite. With that, the message of Israel as the Holy Land spread beyond the elite, reaching a broader segment of American society. The reference to the Bible as justification for the establishment of the state of Israel, and later for its existence and for the American support for Israel, had continued throughout the whole period discussed in this book. Referring to his contribution to the Zionist cause, President Wilson stated, ‘to think that I, the son of the manse, would be able to help restore the Holy Land to its people!’23 Four decades later, President Truman referred to his role in the establishment of the state of Israel by describing himself in November 1953 as Cyrus.24 Another four decades passed, and another American president used theological rhetoric to justify American support for Israel. President Jimmy Carter, who at a certain point became critic of Israel, wrote in his memoirs, ‘I considered this homeland for the Jews to be compatible with the teaching of the Bible, hence ordained by God. These moral and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable.’25 President Bill Clinton recalled how, when he was the governor of Arkansas, his ‘old pastor and mentor’, W. O. Vaught, told him, ‘Bill, I think you’re going to be President someday . . . there’s one thing above all you must remember: God will never forgive you if you don’t stand by Israel.’26 In May 2008, President George W. Bush addressed

22

23

24 25

26

‘Rev. Pistone on Holy Land Tour’, Tahoka Lynn County News, 9 August 1963, 9. Brecher, Reluctant Ally, 10–11; Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 67; Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, 521; Schulte Nordholt and Herbert H. Rowen, Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 1. Quoted in Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel, vii. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1982), location 5086. William J. Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 464.

Religion

13

the Israeli Knesset, describing the establishment of the state of Israel as ‘the redemption of an ancient promise given to Abraham and Moses and David – a homeland for the chosen people: Eretz Yisrael’.27 The power of the evangelical preaching and doctrine is not only in its sway over religious communities but in the fact that it became part and parcel of what James Silken referred to as ‘political theology’ and ‘civil religion’. The Puritan heritage that suggested that the Americans were members of ‘a city set on a hill to be a light to the nations’ permeated the American civic society, regardless of religious denomination or belief. It became part of the American national identity, and premillennialists, fundamentalists and mainline Protestants shared the civil-religious faith ‘that god had chosen America to be the kind of new Israel that helps shepherd the survival of the Jewish state, so that Christ’s return will come about as prophesied’. This vision of America’s place and role had an intrinsic quality that affected also American foreign policy in general, and in its attitude towards Israel in particular.28 It should be noted that it took quite a while before the Protestants’ interest in the Zionist vision had been translated into meaningful political activity. Since the 1925 Scopes Trial, evangelicals turned inwards, concentrating on personal sin and self-reflection, while refraining from engaging in politics. Adding to this were internal conflicts during and after the First World War, which further alienated evangelicals from politics, leaving the field to mainline Protestants.29 In addition to their absence from the political stage, the Christian Zionists had to face the challenge of anti-Zionist Christians. There were Protestants who rejected the Jewish claim that their return to Palestine was justified by their right of self-determination, arguing that the indigenous people of the land, the Palestinian Arabs, had that

27

28

29

George W. Bush, ‘Remarks to Members of the Knesset in Jerusalem’, 15 May 2008, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-members-the-knessetjerusalem. Accessed 25 June 2021. James W. Skillen, ‘The CFIA Forum: Evangelicals and American Exceptionalism’, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2006), 45–46. Joseph D. Harder, ‘Heal Their Land’: Evangelical Political Theology from the Great Awakening to the Moral Majority (PhD dissertation, University of Nebraska, May 2014), 57–58; McAlister, Epic Encounters, 167–168.

14

The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

right.30 Protestant groups also followed with concern and indignation the fate of the Palestinians who fled and were expelled from their homes during the 1948 war, and supported their demand to return to their homes.31

Shared Values US foreign policy’s ideology(ies) was based on two intertwined pillars: religion and Enlightenment-inspired idealism.32 Religion had provided the Americans with a strong sense of uniqueness that justified their work as missionaries that implemented decrees of the Enlightenment about freedom, individualism and the promotion of liberty – that is, the idea that people should be free to choose their form of government.33 American liberal republican ideology was not only a means justifying the separation of the colonies from the motherland across the ocean, it also became the signifier of the American national identity. The new nation lacked what old nationalities had: common ancestry, common history and common territory. The liberal republican ideology substituted those definers of nationalism. Therefore, American foreign policy evolved also around the causes of liberalism and republicanism.34 The Americans came to believe that their destiny was to spread the message of liberal universalism – or as some scholars referred to it, American ‘universalistic nationalism’. ‘We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people – the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world’ wrote Herman Melville in 1850.35 President Wilson and his successors, as well as American politicians, 30

31 32

33

34 35

Charles Israel Goldblatt, ‘The Impact of the Balfour Declaration in America’, American Jewish Historical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4 (June 1968), 471; Joseph L. Grabill, Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810–1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 4–10. E. Epstein to M. Shertok, 2 February 1949, ISA, FO 2308/8. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002); Anne R. Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry S. Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Jeremi Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama (New York: Free Press/ Simon & Schuster, 2011). Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 17. Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Knopf, 2006), 42. The quotation is in Obenzinger American Palestine, 30.

History

15

reiterated that message whenever they explained why the United States should support Zionism and Israel. President Truman, President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and President Ronald Reagan were among those that justified American support for Israel by the fact that Israel was (and is) a democracy.36 The notion of ‘shared values’ extended also to include what Americans conceived as common to the two nations. The settler, the pioneering image of the Jewish national movement, had special appeal to the Americans. Following the Balfour Declaration, the Washington Post’s George R. Brown described Palestine as ‘virgin field for the pioneer [Jewish] homeseekers’, who were returning ‘to the land of their fathers after twenty centuries of wandering over the face of earth’.37 During the discussions in April 1922 on House Resolution 52, calling for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, the discussants repeatedly referred to the Zionists working the land of Palestine as ‘pioneers’.38 This would become a common theme during Israel’s first years of existence. Hillary Clinton presented that idea a bit differently, but with the same power: ‘In Israel’s story we see our own, and the story of all people who struggled for freedom and the right to chart their own destinies.’39 John Kerry, her successor as Secretary of State, wrote that every time he visited Israel, ‘I felt like I was visiting a branch of America’s family that had made their home in the desert of the Middle East.’40

History Jewish history provided another justification for American support for Zionism and Israel. Biblical history was interpreted as a concrete 36

37

38

39 40

Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 367; Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2007), 55; Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), 11–12; Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 410. George Rothwell Brown, ‘Autonomy for Zion’, Washington Post, 12 December 1917, 1. Establishment of a National Home in Palestine: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Sixty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, on H. Con. Res. 52, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922. Hillary R. Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 304. John Kerry, Every Day Is Extra (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), 446.

16

The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

political decree, a call to action. It coalesced with thousands of years of Jewish history of persecution, for which Christianity bore responsibility. American Protestants expressed guilt over Christianity’s treatment of the Jews and the ‘unspeakable cruelties’ they had suffered at the hands of European Christians for two millennia.41 Carl H. Voss, head of the American Christian Palestine Committee, stated in January 1950 that ‘Jewish homelessness and anti-Semitism are Christiancreated, and therefore are Christian responsibilities.’42 President Eisenhower, who was not known as a devout Christian, wrote in his diary in early 1956, following Egypt’s announcement that it had received a large amount of modern combat jets and tanks from Czechoslovakia, that Israel had ‘a very strong position in the heart and emotions of the Western world because of the tragic suffering of the Jews throughout twenty-five hundred years of history’.43 President Barack Obama made a similar comment when he justified the existence of a Jewish state, and the need to take measures to ensure its security.44 The Holocaust only strengthened that sentiment. Many Americans, mainly Protestants, were horrified not only by the unprecedented magnitude of the catastrophe. It was also because it touched a chord among Protestants. Germany provided in the past intellectual leadership to the American academy in general and to the Protestant Church in particular.45 The passive support of the German Protestant church and its followers for the Nazi regime deeply appalled American Protestants. The consternation and horror further increased with the discovery of the death camps and the extent of the mass murder of the Jews.46 Reinhold Niebuhr published an article during the war, calling 41 42

43

44

45

46

Mead, ‘The New Israel and the Old’, 34. ‘Jewish Homelessness Blames on Christians’, Los Angeles Times, 24 January 1950, 20. Dwight Eisenhower Diary, 8 March 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [henceforth: DDEL], Abilene, KS, Dwight D. Eisenhower [henceforth: DDE] Diary Series; Diary, 13 March 1956, ibid. Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘“Look . . . It’s My Name on This”: Obama Defends the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The Atlantic, May 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2015/05/obama-interview-iran-isis-israel/393782/#Israel. Accessed 19 September 2020. Shalom Goldman, God’s Sacred Tongue (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 137–138. Carenen, The Fervent Embrace, 11; Mead, ‘The New Israel and the Old’, 39–40; Amy Weiss, Between Cooperation and Competition: The Making of American Jewish Zionist Interfaith Alliances with Liberal and Evangelical Protestants,

American Orientalism

17

for the settlement of the Jews in Palestine after the war. He described it as the democratic world’s duty, as ‘we should be overwhelmed by a sense of guilt in contemplating those aspects of the problem which Hitler did not create but only aggravated’.47 President Truman was ‘of course, horrified by the Holocaust’,48 and President Jimmy Carter stated that ‘memories of the Holocaust are still alive . . . There is sympathy and some guilt because of the incredible silence in Washington during Hitler’s persecution of the European Jews.’49 Ronald Reagan was just as much committed: ‘The Holocaust, I believe, left America with a moral responsibility to ensure that what had happened to the Jews under Hitler never happens again. We must not let it happen again. The civilized world owes a debt to the people who were the greatest victims of Hitler’s madness.’50 History played a role also in a somewhat different manner. American advocates of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel argued that such a measure was sanctioned by the valid international organizations and bodies, and hence it should be respected. Truman told Israel’s foreign minister Moshe Sharett in 1952 that ‘he had studied very carefully the promises made to the Jewish people in the first world war’, and he was glad to see ‘that the promises had indeed been kept’.51

American Orientalism The American support for the Zionist aspiration had another side to it: the contempt of things not western. From the very first days of the American republic, the Americans viewed the Islamic world as anathema to theirs. Islam, along with Catholicism, were perceived by Protestants in Europe and America as two heads of the Antichrist battle ‘for imperial supremacy’. For many Protestants, the Ottomans were seen as an embodiment of the Islamic struggle against

47

48 50 51

1898–1979 (PhD dissertation, New York University, September 2014), 117–119. Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘Jews After the War: 1’, The Nation, Vol. 154, No. 8 (21 February 1942), 214. See also Henry A. Atkinson, ‘The Jewish Problem Is a Christian Problem’, Christianity and Crisis, Vol. 3, No. 11 (28 June 1943), 3–4. 49 Clifford, Counsel to the President, 7. Carter, The Blood of Abraham, 55. Reagan, An American Life, 410. Minutes of Meeting with Harry S. Truman, 1 July 1952, ISA, FO 2424/27.

18

The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

Protestantism.52 It was also beset by ‘oriental despotism, economic squalor and intellectual stultification’. The growing encounters of Americans with the Orient – the Near East – during the nineteenth century only strengthened the resentment and disdain.53 Mark Twain played a special role in underpinning the Arabs’ image as repulsive and backward in his The Innocent Abroad, the story of his travel to the Middle East in the 1860s. The Muslims – Moorish in his book – were incompetent, ‘degenerated’ and ‘savages’.54 As against that image of the Arabs, Americans cherished the contribution of the Jews to the backward Middle East. President Wilson decided to support the Zionist cause after learning from Judge Louis Brandeis that the Zionists would act to change the nature of the territories that were subjected for centuries to Ottoman tyranny.55 The National Geography helped to strengthen an image of the Jewish community as a force turning backward Palestine into ‘a Western outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean’. A December 1938 article depicted the way the Zionists ‘had converted a vast expanse of scrub brush and sand dunes into “the world’s first new made, 100-per-cent Jewish city”, Tel Aviv.’56 In August 1946, a Time magazine reporter contrasted the way Jews had brought the land to life with the way Arabs had treated it. While the Jews were tilling the land, the Arab was lying ‘in the hot streets, too weak, sick and purposeless to roll over into the shade’.57 President Truman repeated the same theme in a dinner of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in May 1952, when he commended the Fund for its contribution to the ‘reclamation of a desert valley called the Valley of Death. Today that valley is being brought back to life, and so is the whole of Israel.’58 52

53

54

55

56 57 58

Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 153; Smith, More Desired than Our Owne Salvation, 126–127. Douglas Little, American Orientalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 11–13. Mark Twain, The Innocent Abroad (Hartford, CT: American Publishing Company, 1869), 86. Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, 507; Memorandum of Conversation, 6 May 1917, Central Zionist Archives [henceforth CZA], A404/51. Little, American Orientalism, 17–19. ‘The Promised Land’, Time, 26 August 1946. Harry S. Truman, Address at a Dinner of the Jewish National Fund, 26 May 1952, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230792. Accessed 20 May 2021.

America in Zionist/Israeli Eyes

19

America in Zionist/Israeli Eyes Standing on the Knesset’s podium during a discussion on Israel’s foreign policy, held in November 1951, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion stated, ‘Israel’s foreign policy is not determined by its attitude toward a foreign country’s ideology but based exclusively on its own internal values and historical needs.’59 Subjecting Israel’s foreign policy to its security needs, Ben Gurion underscored what was the main trait of Israel’s foreign policy, pragmatism and realism.60 Ben Gurion thus laid the foundation for an Israeli realist foreign policy that was underpinned by the necessity of maintaining Israel’s security. This was based on the belief that a permanent existential threat was hovering over Israel, and the eternal existence of a diabolic enemy. Once it was Egypt’s Nasser. Then it was Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and at the writing of these pages, it was Iran. It is very probable that cultivating the notion of an eternal threat was, and is being, ventured to serve inappropriate political purposes. Yet, it was sufficient to bring realism and pragmatism to Israel’s foreign policy, which also applied to Israel’s relations with the United States. Ben Gurion neither trusted nor was ready to rely on American values and ideals as a basis for the American support for Israel. He was well acquainted with the United States, visiting there several times between the years 1915 and 1945, and spent much time studying the United States.61 During his first visit, he spent a considerable amount of time in the New York Public Library reading books about the history of American political parties, the means of swaying public opinion, and the function of bureaucracies.62 Reading and observing American society and politics, he came to the conclusion that public opinion

59

60

61

62

Minutes of 15th Meeting of the Knesset, 5 November 1951, Divrei HaKnesset, 326. And see Uri Bialer, Israeli Foreign Policy: A People Shall Not Dwell Alone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020), 73. Entry for 22 July 1950, David Ben Gurion Diaries [henceforth: DBGD], David Ben Gurion Archives [henceforth DBGA]. Zohar Segev, ‘Myth and Reality, Denial and Concealment: American Zionist Leadership and the Jewish Vote in the 1940s’, Israel Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014), 351. Ben Gurion’s visits to the United States are recorded in his diary. Allon Gal, David Ben Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1985), 15–17; Shlomo Grodjenski, ‘Thoughts on Ben Gurion’s Personality’, Davar, 27 August 1965, 4.

20

The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

and mass organization were powerful forces with great influence on American politics. He was soon contemplating ways in which Jewish public opinion could be stirred to promote the Zionist cause in the United States. In 1920 there were approximately three million Jews living in the United States, a small number among the 100 million Americans, but still, ‘they could have an impact in public life, in the press, among workers, in the intellectual life’, and they had the power to ‘influence American policy regarding the fate of the Jewish people, sometimes even decisively’.63 Ben Gurion was not worried by the discrepancy between the two countries – a superpower and a tiny country. He resisted the idea that small states were helpless against the great powers, or incapable of making their voices heard. As ‘the sun pulls the earth, so the earth pulls the sun’, stated Ben Gurion. ‘We are omnipresent in international affairs, and our claims are based not only on justice, but also on our power in the international arena.’64 And indeed, push and pull forces shaped the relationship between Israel and the United States.

Jewish Vote The American Jews, were, indeed, an influential group within American politics. However, it is utterly unclear whether a Jewish Vote existed. It was also unclear to what extent Jews voted for a candidate based on their position towards Zionism and Israel. As will be seen later, Jews resented the claims that they voted as a bloc, fearing anti-Semitic reactions.65 At the same time, Jews encouraged the image – or reality – of the Jewish Vote to advance Jewish/Zionist interests. One thing is sure, politicians believed that the Jewish Vote existed.66 The statistics also showed that when it comes to presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections, the Jewish Vote exists. Since 1924, the

63

64

65 66

Minutes of Meeting of Mapai National Council, 5 March 1941, DBGA, MS; L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (editors) Jews in American Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 472. Minutes of Meeting of Mapai Center with Mapai’s Knesset Members, 22 July 1949, DBGA, MS. Segev, ‘Myth and Reality, Denial and Concealment’, 352. Rafael Medoff, Jewish Americans and Political Participation (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002), 181–183.

Jewish Vote

21

majority of Jews voted for the Democrat candidate. That though, was not enough to ensure the Democrat candidate’s victory. In 1968, Hubert Humphrey got 81 per cent of the Jewish vote but still lost to Richard Nixon. In both Nixon election campaigns he did not get the majority of the Jewish votes (in 1972 he got 35 per cent), but still, he won the elections, and in a landslide in 1972. In 2000 and 2004, the Democrat candidates, Al Gore and John Kerry, got 79 and 76 per cent of the Jewish votes, respectively, but still they lost to George W. Bush.67 The problem was that while the Democrats could expect to receive a greater number of Jewish votes than the Republicans, the actual numbers varied. In swing cases, the Jewish shift from the Democrat to Republican candidate, even though small in percentage, could be significant, and that, probably, was an important factor in the way candidates viewed the Jewish vote. Assuming that the political battlefield was (and remains) the arena of the unknown, no presidential candidate could take any vote for granted. It was that uncertainty that fed the myth of the Jewish Vote. Was it all enough to give the Jews the power to make presidents and legislators to change their decisions on matters pertinent to Israel? Would politicians make foreign policy decisions to please the Jews? That seemed unlikely. Aaron D. Miller, who served on the peace teams of several administrations, emphasized that domestic politics could have a role in determining policy, but it did not have a veto right.68 More significantly, presidents and legislators supported Israel because religion, values, and history made (and still do) it the right thing to do. President Nixon made that point clear when he explained why he supported Israel, ‘we’re right on the issue’.69 The power of the Jewish community was not so much in their voting pattern but in their willingness to point out issues that they believed needed to be addressed. They met presidents, members of Congress, and people from all walks of life who were ready to join a struggle or campaign

67

68

69

‘U.S. Presidential Elections: Jewish Voting Record’, Jewish Virtual Library, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-voting-record-in-u-s-presidential-elections. Accessed 17 October 2016. Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab–Israeli Peace (New York: Random House Publishing, 2008), 77. William Safire, Before the Fall (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 565–566.

22

The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

for a cause that they thought was justified and encouraged them to get involved.70 The most notable example of presidents acting in accordance with what they believed was the American interest, even in the face of pressure from the Jewish lobby, was their stand on arms sales to Israel. American presidents, from Truman to Kennedy, refused to supply major arm systems to Israel, or alternatively, insisted on supplying arms to Arabs, as did Carter and Reagan for example, despite the heavy pressure exerted on them by Israel, American Jews, and members of Congress. At the same time, portraying members of Congress as people subjected to the power of the Jewish Vote, devoid of their own views and opinions, is misguided. CBS‘ George Herman made the point in the clearest manner, when he hosted Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AS) a day after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in Face the Nation. Fulbright stated that ‘Israelis control the policy in the Congress . . . On every test, on everything the Israelis are interested in, in the Senate the Israelis have 75 to 80 votes.’ To this, Herman responded: ‘it is a fairly serious charge to say that your colleagues in the Senate – some 70 of them – are controlled by a power group rather than by their own vision of what they think are proper principles of freedom and right.’ Fulbright retreated, but just a bit: ‘They have been persuaded that this is in our interest. I don’t know these niceties of semantics, perhaps I could withdraw it and rephrase it. It still comes out with the fact that influence is dominant.’71 Fulbright’s reaction to the reactions to his comments in Face the Nation proved, too, that members of Congress followed the dictate of their conscience. Fulbright’s constituents tried to change his mind by appealing to him through faith, biblical references, and petitions. The clerk of the Baptist Missionary Association of Arkansas notified the Senator that the church supported the government backing of Israel in the war, noting that the Association was over 300 churches strong. Fulbright remained unmoved by these appeals.72 70

71

72

See, for example, Elihau Eilat, ‘Roosevelt and Zionism’, Molad, Vol. 30, Nos. 243–244 (Spring 1975), 454. Quoted in I. L. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981), 300. Mitchell Smith, Woes of the Arkansas Internationalist: J. William Fulbright, the Middle East, and the Death of American Liberalism (MA thesis, University of Arkansas, May 2013), 61–63.

The Department of State: Anti-Zionist? Anti-Semitic?

23

The discussion on Jewish involvement in American politics cannot be concluded without considering a more mundane and pragmatic concern – their money. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and with them the Democratic party, relied heavily on Jewish money in their election campaigns. In 1912, Bernard Baruch, Abram Elkus, Hy Goldman, Charles Guggenheim, Henry Morgenthau Sr., Jacob Schiff, James Speyer, Nathan Strauss Sr., and Samuel Untermyer contributed 24 per cent of the total funds collected by the Democratic party in New York state and 7.5 per cent of funds raised nationally.73 Abraham (‘Abe’) Feinberg, Truman’s Jewish friend, helped to raise the money that allowed Truman to rent a train with which he rode across the United States and conducted his 1948 presidential campaign.74 The more recent case of Sheldon Adelson, who was known as ‘one of the GOP’s largest donors’ is yet another example to the place of Jewish money in American elections.75 However, the money did not give the Jews the ability to shape policy but only to deliver the message. Money, suggested Michael Cohen, ‘did not buy votes or sway officials against their constituents’ wishes, [but] did ensure easier access’ to congressmen, senators and presidents.76 The money helped the Jews to try and bring the people who most closely aligned with their interests into positions of power. It was not enough to give them power over policy.

The Department of State: Anti-Zionist? Anti-Semitic? Within the general trend of support in the Zionist cause in the United States, the state department stood out as an organization that advanced a position that the American Zionists and Jews found to be

73

74 75

76

Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman, FDR and the Jews (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 14. Abraham Feinberg Oral History Interview, HSTPL. Leigh Ann Caldwell, ‘GOP Kingmaker Sheldon Adelson Continues to Snub Donald Trump’, NBC News, 22 August 2016, www.nbcnews.com/politics/ 2016-election/gop-kingmaker-sheldon-adelson-continues-snub-donald-trumpn635636. Accessed 20 May 2021; Dan Eggen and Phil Rucker, ‘Romney’s Fundraising Outpaces Obama’s in May’, Washington Post, 7 June 2012. Michael J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), 70.

24

The Sources of the American Support for Zionism

anti-Zionist or even anti-Semitic.77 Although these accusations seemed excessive, it is quite clear that for many years, the state department viewed American–Zionist and American–Israeli relations in a less sympathetic manner than the politicians. There were several reasons for that. First, the state department officials were usually professionals, and hence, their values and perspectives were different from those of the politicians as a result of their organizational affiliation. Second, the diplomats were more familiar with the Arab world than with Jewish Palestine or Israel – and here the numbers count. Given the numbers of diplomatic posts in the Arab world, compared to those available in Israel, the odds of serving as an American diplomat among Arabs were much higher than among Jews. Consequently, American diplomats were more aware of the Arab environment and situation, and in many cases, they developed sympathy and understanding of the Arab cause. When they returned to Washington, DC, the diplomats grew not only sympathetic to the interests of the countries they served but also came to identify with that country as well. James Baker called it ‘“clientitis”, an officer’s tendency to identify more with the interests of the host country (the “client”) than with Washington.’78 The case of Parker T. Hart, who in 1952 was appointed as the Department of States’ head of Near East Affairs office is a conspicuous example. He started working in the state department in 1937. In 1944 he was appointed as third secretary and deputy consul in Jada, Saudi Arabia. Later that year he moved to Dhahran, where he served as deputy consul and later as consul, and in 1955 he travelled to Cairo, Egypt, where he served for two years as advisor. In 1958 he was appointed as minister in the US embassy in Damascus, Syria, and from there he went back to Washington, DC, to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East and South Asia Affairs. In 1961 he was appointed as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and in 1965 he became the US ambassador in Turkey. In October 1968, President Johnson appointed him Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East and South Asia affairs, a post he held only for a few months, as after Richard Nixon became president he was removed from that position. A few months later he 77 78

Minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, 6 October 1942, DBGA, MS. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 29; Evan M. Wilson, ‘The Palestine Papers, 1943–1947’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Summer 1973), 36; Wilson, A Calculated Risk, 41.

The Department of State: Anti-Zionist? Anti-Semitic?

25

resigned from the state department. Jacob Herzog, the minister in Israel’s embassy in Washington in 1968, described him as ‘sympathetic, smart but most dangerous to us’.79 Hart provided an interesting glimpse into the way American diplomats viewed the service in Israel in the early 1950s. Writing to a diplomat that was on his way to serve in the American embassy in Israel, Hart – who never served in a diplomatic mission in Israel – described the assignment as ‘one of the most difficult in the Near East . . . You will find problems of an intricacy and importance far beyond anything usually associated with a small Mediterranean country.’ Hart described the Israelis as manipulatives, yet resourceful ‘completely without precedent’ – and it is not clear if he meant it to be a compliment.80 79

80

M. Elitsur, Foreign Office, Jerusalem, to General Director, 17 September 1968, ISA, FO 4155/9; D. Pomerantz, Foreign Office, Jerusalem, to Minister, Washington, DC, 29 September 1968, ibid., 583. P. T. Hart to I. B. White, Esq., 5 August 1953, United States National Archives [henceforth USNA], RG59, Lot File 57D298.

|

2

Friendship From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

What would have been the history of Zionism had President Wilson not rummaged through his pockets on 13 October 1917 and found a note that Colonel Edward M. House, his loyal aide, had left for him a few days earlier? The note contained a message from Lord Robert Cecil, British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, asking that the president endorse a British declaration of support for establishing a Jewish Homeland in Palestine.1 The president did find the note and agreed to support the British declaration.2 With that, the president set the course of history in the direction we now know it to be. It was also a crowning moment in the history of American Zionist Jews. President Wilson’s agreement to endorse the Balfour Declaration was the first political act by an American president in support for the Zionist cause, and a Zionist leader helped convince the president to do so. Still, the president’s agreement to endorse the Balfour Declaration was not the result of Jewish political power as much as it was the result of his beliefs.

Zionism in the United States When Judge Louis Brandeis played a role in the process that would change Jewish history, he was a member of the Zionist movement, a minority within the Jewish community in the United States. In 1917, there were about three million Jews in the United States, most of them arrived recently. There were no more than 250,000 Jews in the United States in 1881. During the years, millions of Jews emigrated from eastern Europe. While they were trying to find their way in their new 1

2

Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, 4 October 1917, United Kingdom National Archives [henceforth UKNA], CAB/23/4. Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American–Palestine Relations (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1949), 167–169; Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, 513; Diary entry for 16 October 1917, Edward Mandell House Papers, Series II, Diaries, Vol. 5, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.

26

Zionism in the United States

27

homeland, the Jews were busy organizing their lives around congregations, synagogues, and organizations. Gradually, Jews also integrated beyond the bounds of their communities, taking political positions, either elected or appointed. With time, they took part in national party undertakings in which they fought anti-Semitic propaganda, helping Jews who had difficulties in the United States as well as in Syria, Morocco, central and eastern Europe, and especially Czarist Russia.3 The Zionists were a minority among the American Jews at the turn of the twentieth century. Several reform Rabbis established in 1898 the Federation of American Zionists (FAZ), which, by the turn of the century, had 125 societies, with a total of 10,000 members. This was a drop in the ocean – most American Jews were either indifferent or hostile to Zionism.4 The emergence of Zionism in the United States was not an obvious phenomenon. After all, American Jews enjoyed full civic rights as citizens, and even if they sometimes faced anti-Semitic discrimination, they were not subjected to any kind of persecution or discrimination on the scale of eastern European Jews. The American Jews were free to practise Judaism, and they could celebrate their faith without hindrance. They did not need the Zionist movement to provide them physical or spiritual shelter. The American Zionists did not think otherwise of the United States. They did not consider the United States to be an exile, a diaspora. They were at home. They rejected the notion that establishing a national home for the Jews should lead to the termination of their presence in the United States. Nevertheless, Zionism spread significantly in the United States, with American Zionists pointing out that Zionism was the outlet for Jews subjected to discrimination and persecution because of their faith or ethnicity.5 That is, where Jews were not permitted to live freely, they should have the option to immigrate to Palestine – and later Israel – where they could live as free people. Accordingly, the American Zionists, unlike Ben Gurion and Chaim Weizmann, saw Zionism and diaspora as

3

4 5

Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of the United States, 1654 to 2000 (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004), 113, 160–180. Diner, The Jews of the United States, 160–182. Louis D. Brandeis to the Editor of the Daily News, 5 November 1915, CZA, A83/ 4; Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man’s Life (New York: The Viking Press, 1946), 445.

28

Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

compatible and complementary.6 At the same time, the mere existence of a Jewish state, where Jews would be the majority, would inspire pride and confidence in Jews everywhere, even if they did not intend to migrate to that state.7 The first American Zionists also addressed the question of dual loyalty. While insisting that the Zionist state would be the state of the Jews from all over the world, Judge Julian W. Mack, president of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), distinguished between nationality and citizenship. ‘An individual can have more than one nationality, although one will, ordinarily, be predominant.’ However, this individual could be a citizen of one state only, and his political allegiance would be given only to that state. In his case, Mack stated, he was an American citizen, and hence he pledged allegiance to the United States of America. At the same time, by nationality, Mack was both a Zionist and an American; one did not exclude the other.8 As a community, the American Zionists had very little impact on the American political system in 1917. Where they had an impact, it resulted from the placement of individual Jews in positions of influence. This was the case with Judge Louis Brandeis, who was close to President Wilson and his adviser on foreign affairs, Colonel Edward M. House. Judge Brandeis met Wilson for the first time in August 1912. A lawyer from Boston, progressive in mind, Brandeis endorsed Wilson’s presidential candidacy and campaigned on his behalf among his friends. Brandeis became close to Wilson, and in 1916 Wilson appointed Brandeis to the Supreme Court.9 When the British government sought President Woodrow Wilson’s support for the declaration they intended to send to Lord Lionel W. Rothchild, Brandeis explained to Wilson ‘the general Zionist policy’, using terminology with which the president could sympathize. He told the president that the Jews would establish in territories subjected for centuries to Ottoman tyranny a democratic government ‘under which an oppressed nationality would be free to seek cultural and economic development’. Brandeis’ 6

7

8

9

William Lasser, Benjamin V. Cohen: Architect of the New Deal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 39. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Zionist Politics in Wartime Washington’, in Henry Hardy (ed.), Letters 1928–1946 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 665. Julian W. Mack to Nathan D. Kaplan, 20 August 1915, CZA, A 405/113; Marc L. Raphael, Abba Hillel Silver: A Profile in American Judaism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), 28. Bruce A. Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 26–31.

Zionism in the United States

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emphasis on the Zionist movement’s national dimension and its democratic nature attracted Wilson, and he promised Brandeis that he would support the Zionist cause, which he did.10 For the Zionists, Woodrow Wilson was the right man at the right time in the right place. The twenty-eighth American president grew up in a religious family. His father was a Presbyterian minister, and so was his grandfather – his mother’s father. The influence of his Calvinist upbringing stayed with Wilson throughout his life.11 His religious devotion led him to articulate ‘deep Christian sentiment favouring the fulfilment of Biblical prophecy’. He expressed his ‘warm’ appreciation of the Jewish Bible, the Old Testament, and the Jews’ unwavering attachment to the land that they once occupied. Wilson took pride in the role he played in advancing the Zionist cause. On one occasion, he said that ‘the Jewish Homeland was one of the two primary achievements that would come out of the war’.12 Values also played a role in Wilson’s decision to support the Zionist movement’s aspirations. He saw it as America’s, and hence his, highest mission to pursue ‘the perfecting of democratic constitutional order’. Wilson conceived of democracy as both an end and a mean – representing a people’s freedom, while also facilitating a community of nations.13 According to Wilson, the nation was a body of people united by ideas and thoughts, not by institutions or physical attributes. Only such a nation should have the right to determine its destiny, free of the yoke of imperialism.14 Finding these qualities in the Zionist movement, Wilson accepted that the Jews were a nation and should have the right to self-determination.15 10

11

12

13

14

15

Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, 507; Memorandum of Conversation, 6 May 1917, CZA, A404/51. Brecher, Reluctant Ally, 10; Derek Heater, National Self-determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), 15. Brecher, Reluctant Ally, 10–11; Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 67; Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, 521; Nordholt and Rowen, Woodrow Wilson, 1. ‘The Bible and Progress’, Address of Hon. Woodrow Wilson, in the Auditorium, Denver, Colorado, 7 May 1911; Thomas J. Knock, Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the League of Nations (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1992), 38. Heater, National Self-determination, 25–26; Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry S. Truman, 83. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, 67; Ned Lebow, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration’, 520–521.

30

Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

American Christians hailed the declaration and the call for a Jewish home in Palestine.16 The Missionary Review of the World’s editor greeted the Jews and compared the Balfour Declaration to the Cyrus decree. His motive, though, was pure Christian eschatology: ‘We may expect the Hebrew to become a great Christian missionary force to complete the Evangelization of the world.’17 American press joined greetings. The New York Herald, Columbus Dispatch, the Indianapolis Star, the New York Globe, the Boston Transcript, the Pittsburgh Gazette Times, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Philadelphia Public Ledger, the St. Paul News, the Washington Herald, the New York Evening, and the Los Angeles Times all published throughout May 1917 editorials and reports supporting the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.18 Members of Congress also expressed their support for the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In response to Zionist leaders’ request, Democratic representative George Lunn from New York submitted to the House in early December 1917 a proposal that praised the British government for the occupation of Jerusalem and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration.19 Sixty-one senators from forty-three states and 239 representatives from forty-four states and three territories issued in June 1918 statements of support in the declaration.20 Like President Wilson, the congress members cited religion, history, and values to explain their support for the Balfour Declaration. Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware, the Senate’s president pro tempore, stated that the declaration ‘is a happy fulfillment of the prophecies of the Bible’.21 Frank B. Kellogg, the future secretary of state (1925–1929), explained his support in similar terms.22 Representative Louis B. Goodall of Maine suggested that the Jews’ 16 17 18 19

20

21 22

‘Favor Jewish Homeland’, New York Times, 6 January 1920, 13. Quoted in Goldblatt, ‘The Impact of the Balfour Declaration in America’, 471. Goldblatt, ‘The Impact of the Balfour Declaration in America’, 458–459. Jacob DeHaas to Louis D. Brandeis, 11 December 1917, CZA, A404/53; Robert L. MacDonald, ‘A Land without People for a People without a Land’: Civilizing Mission and American Support for Zionism, 1880s–1929 (PhD dissertation, College of Bowling Green, OH, 2012), 120. The American War Congress and Zionism: Statements by Members of the American War Congress on the Jewish National Movement (New York: Zionist Organization of America, 1919), 5–6, 14–20. Ibid., 28. Ibid., 45. In ibid. there is a whole list of members of Congress explaining the reasons for their support for the Zionist cause.

Zionism in the United States

31

return to their ancient homeland was the right solution to their persecution throughout history. It was ‘a good plan for the Jewish people to have a country which will be for them a national home, and which will be their refuge when persecuted by other nations’, he explained his support for the idea of a Jewish state.23 Representative Albert B. Rossdale of New York mentioned the similarity between the American and the Zionist pioneers. During the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on a resolution ‘expressing satisfaction at the recreation of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish race’, conducted in April 1922, Rossdale argued that the resettling of Palestine has created a situation somewhat akin to that of the American colonist in his struggle with the American Indian. For like the early American settler on this continent, the Jewish colonist frequently has to till the soil with a rifle in one hand and a hoe in the other. The nomadic Arab raisers, on a smaller scale are fighting the civilization of the Jewish settler as the Indians fought the American settler on this continent in the early days.24

Rossdale’s Orientalism was repeated by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, who stated that ‘Palestine and the Holy Places of both the Christian and Jewish religions should be forever removed from Turkish control’.25 Cabot Lodge’s support is particularly noteworthy, considering the fact that he was one of Wilson’s most outspoken opponents, and opposed the ratification of the Versailles peace agreements, which was a central theme of Wilson’s international policies, which included the establishment of the International League of Nations. Nevertheless, he supported the Balfour Declaration and Jewish national claims to Palestine wholeheartedly. The discussions in the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee ended with a joint session of Congress endorsing, on 30 June 1922, Resolution 323 (Lodge–Fish joint resolution), which stipulated that ‘the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’. President Warren Harding approved the resolution on 21 September 1922.26

23 24 25

26

The American War Congress and Zionism, 114. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on Resolution 52, 20. ‘By Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts’, The American War Congress and Zionism, 43. House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 1038, 3.

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The hearings and the statements of support by members of Congress defies later statements about the political power and influence the Israel lobby could exert on American politicians. The Jewish electorate and political power are unlikely to have influenced Congress to support the Balfour Declaration and the joint Senate-House motion to establish a Jewish national home. Not only were the Jews a small minority within the US population but only a small percentage of them were Zionists or inclined to Zionism. The only way to explain the support of senators and representatives from Ohio, Delaware, Nebraska, or West Virginia for the Balfour Declaration is that they genuinely believed that the Jews deserved statehood. Congress members cited religion, values, and history as the reasons for their support for the Zionist cause, and it seems that, indeed, they meant it, as presidents did. The presidents’ support for the Balfour Declaration was especially significant, considering the State Department’s opposition. American diplomats around the Middle East and in Washington opposed the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine, first among them Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lansing argued that the Jews were not a nation and that ‘many Christians and sects and individuals would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to the absolute control of the race credited with the death of Christ’.27 While Lansing cited religious reasons for his opposition to the American support for Zionism, American diplomats and ambassadors stationed throughout the Middle East saw the Zionist settlement in Palestine as a threat to American interests in the region. They did not call to object to the Zionist settlement in Palestine but to avoid being involved and identified with such a venture. American diplomats were also sceptical about the ability of the Zionists to achieve their goals.28 Therefore, they questioned the logic of investing in support for the Zionists and alienating the Arabs.29 Consecutive American presidents had chosen ideals over interests. Acting against what their foreign policy experts had deemed as ‘US interests’, the presidents continued to support the Zionist aspirations.

27 28 29

The Secretary of State to President Wilson, 13 December 1917, FRUS 1917, 71. Manuel, The Realities of American–Palestine Relations, 277. Lawrence Davidson, ‘The State Department and Zionism, 1917–1945: A Reevaluation’, Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 1 (October 1999), 28; Manuel, The Realities of American–Palestine Relations, 277.

In the Aftermath of the British White Paper (May 1939)

33

At the same time, presidents and members of Congress were not required to translate declarations into action. American involvement in Palestinian and Middle Eastern affairs, except for Saudi Arabia, was minor. With the apparent encouragement of the State Department, the US government remained distant from Palestine, leaving it to the British. Consecutive American presidents issued statements of support for the Zionist project, but these statements had not been followed up on.30

In the Aftermath of the British White Paper (May 1939) On 17 May 1939, the British government published a White Paper that practically and ideologically marked the British government’s renunciation the commitments it made in the Balfour Declaration. The White Paper stated that the establishment of a national home for Palestine’s Jews had been accomplished since the number of Jews in Palestine was over 450,000. The government declared ‘unequivocally’ that it was no longer its policy to help the Jews to establish in Palestine a Jewish state. Instead, the government would act to make Palestine an independent state within ten years. Considering the fact that there were in Palestine more than a million Arabs, it was a foregone conclusion that Palestine would be an Arab state.31 Indeed, the British played an important role in the demographic, social, economic, and political growth of the Jewish community in Palestine during the interwar years. In November 1931, there were about 174,000 Jews in Palestine, five years later the number had bourgeoned to more than 400,000 Jews. This meant that the percentage of Jews in the general population rose from 18 to nearly 31. That growth was partly natural, but most of it resulted from the migration of Jews mainly from east Europe, and since 1933, mostly from Germany. The Jewish democratic institutions in Palestine

30

31

For a list of pro-Zionist statements issued by Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, see Reuben Fink (editor), America and Palestine: The Attitude of Official America and of the American People toward the Rebuilding of Palestine as a Free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1944), 32, 56, 88. British White Paper of 1939, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ brwh1939.asp. Accessed 1 June 2021.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

also blossomed, allowing the Jewish people to run an autonomous social, cultural, political, and economic life.32 Despite obstacles, arguments, and struggles along the way, the British government eventually helped the Jewish Yishuv to expand and grow. The winds of war blowing in Europe changed it all. The British government concluded that it could not afford to fight in Europe and deal with Arab and Muslim resistances at the same time. Thus, the threatening geostrategic circumstances dictated that the mandate’s terms be retracted.33 The Zionists were ready to fight back. They called for help from American Zionists and Jews, expecting them to convince President Roosevelt to assist them in the fight against the White Paper. FDR seemed to be the right person for the task. Roosevelt was born in 1882 to a patrician family in Hyde Park at the Hudson Valley, New York. His mother, Sara Delano, was an offspring of a Huguenot family who arrived in America in the seventeenth century on companionship to the Mayflower.34 FDR believed in the superiority of the Aryan race, and anti-Semitism was common in the social circles into which he was born. However, his father, James Roosevelt Sr, who worked with Jews, held contempt for anti-Semites and raised his son in this spirit.35 The family belonged to the Episcopalian Church, and Roosevelt remained a member of the church all of his life. However, religion was not part of his public life. He kept it private, and his religious beliefs hardly influenced his politics.36 In his public statements, Roosevelt occasionally mentioned Jewish ties to Palestine. When he did, he used humanitarian and cultural arguments to justify the Jewish aspirations to Palestine. Thus, he stated that the American sympathy for the Jewish claim to Palestine was based on America being ‘ever zealous in the cause of human freedom’. He also mentioned that Palestine was the ancient home of the Jews not in a religious context but cultural-historical – they sought ‘to reestablish Jewish culture in the

32

33

34

35

Moshe Lisak et al. (editors), The History of the Jewish Community in the Land of Israel since the First Alyia (Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1995), 303–307. Michael J. Cohen, Britain’s Moment in Palestine (London: Routledge, 2014), 287–304. Michael S. Bell, The Worldview of Franklin D. Roosevelt: France, Germany, and United States Involvement in World War II in Europe (PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2004), 15. 36 Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews, 8–9. Ibid., 9–10.

In the Aftermath of the British White Paper (May 1939)

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place where for centuries it flourished’.37 In October 1944, the president mentioned the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and justified it in the four freedoms he presented in his State of the Union address of January 1941. These were freedom of speech and expression; the freedom ‘of every person to worship God in his own way’; freedom of economic freedom and well-being; and freedom from the fear of war and aggression.38 The Democratic party plank called in July 1944 to ‘the establishment [in Palestine] of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth’.39 Roosevelt had several influential Jews around him prior to his election as president and during his many years in the White House. Fifteen per cent of his administration’s appointments were Jewish, most of whom held middle-level jobs, but some were close to Roosevelt. Those included Henry Morgenthau, Benjamin Cohen, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Judge Louis Brandeis, Samuel I. Rosenman, and Felix Frankfurter, whom Roosevelt appointed to the Supreme Court in 1938. Through these persons, the Zionists had advocates with access to the president.40 It is hard to say whether Jews supported Roosevelt because he employed and appointed Jews to high-ranking positions or because of his policy, especially the New Deal, which was devised in conjunction with Jewish advisers, most notably Benjamin Cohen. Either way, the Jewish community got closer to the president. Wise’s biographer cites a pun made by Republican Jonah J. Goldstein: ‘the Jews have three Velten (worlds): die velt (this world), yener velt (the world to come), and Roose-velt!’41 The American Zionists and non-Zionists were ready to help in the fight against the White Paper. Assuming that the British were concerned by the American Jews’ ability to harm Britain’s relations with 37

38

39

40 41

Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Greeting to the United Palestine Appeal’, 6 February 1937, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/greeting-the-united-palestineappeal. Accessed 25 June 2021. Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union’, 6 January 1941, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-messagecongress-the-state-the-union. Accessed 25 June 2021; President Roosevelt to Senator Robert F. Wagner, 15 October 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. 5, 615. Democratic Party Platforms, 1944 Democratic Party Platform, 19 July 1944, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273222. Accessed 1 June 2021. Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews, 15–17, 32, 65–66. Melvin I. Urofsky, A Voice that Spoke for Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 255.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

the United States, the American Jews turned to convince the president to pressure the British government to keep Palestine’s doors open to Jewish immigration.42 It did not really work. The American Jews waged the struggle vigorously, mobilizing the Jewish community and prominent Jewish figures to exert their influence with the president. In response to Jewish leaders’ requests, tens of thousands of letters flooded the White House at the rate of about 10,000 telegrams per day, demanding that the president act against the closure of Palestine’s gates.43 Responding to the appeal of the American Jewish leaders, Catholics and Protestants turned to the president.44 Dozens of editorials had appeared in Chicago, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and ‘other great cities’’ daily newspapers, propagating the Zionist cause.45 The New York Post asked, ‘will Palestine be the second Czechoslovakia?’46 A Philadelphia Inquirer editorial urged Britain to ‘Keep Her Pledge’ to the Zionists. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (12 October), the New York Post (13 October), the New York World Telegram (13 October), and the Philadelphia Evening Public Ledger (12 October) were among the papers that denounced the British plan to curb Jewish immigration to Palestine, in defiance of its commitment to the Balfour Declaration and the mandate.47 Dozens of Congress’s members joined the campaign.48 A group of senators met the president and asked him to see that Palestine’s gates would remain open. The 42

43

44 45 46

47

48

Stephen S. Wise to Chaim Weizmann, 25 October 1936, Chaim Weizmann Archives [henceforth WA]. Record of a Meeting, 8 October 1938, American Jewish Archives [henceforth AJA], MS 203, box 1; Albert K. Epstein to Chaim Weizmann, 18 October 1938, CD, DBGA; Solomon Goldman to Chaim Weizmann, 26 October 1938, ibid. ‘Catholics Appeal for Palestine Aid’, New York Times, 20 October 1938, 8. Albert K. Epstein to Chaim Weizmann, 18 October 1938, CD, DBGA. ‘Will Palestine Be the Second Czechoslovakia?’, The New York Post, 13 October 1938. ‘Britain Must Keep Her Pledge’, Philadelphia Inquirer, 11 October 1938. Newspaper clips are in AJA, MS 203, box 1. Congressmen to President F. D. Roosevelt, October 1938, AJA, MS 213, box 1; Albert K. Epstein to Chaim Weizmann, 18 October 1938, CD, DBGA; Representative Robert L. Ramsay to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 12 October 1938, President’s Secretary’s Files [henceforth PSF]: Palestine, box 16, F. D. Roosevelt Presidential Library [henceforth FDRPL]; Millard E. Tydings and George L. Radcliffe to President Roosevelt, 14 October 1938, ibid.; ‘Legislators Make Plea on Palestine’, New York Times, 1 November 1938, 18; ‘51 Senators Sign Petition on Palestine’, Washington Post, 1 November 1938, X6.

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president expressed support in continuing the unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine and promised that he was doing ‘everything’ to prevent the closure of Palestine’s gates.49 It turned out that the president’s ‘everything’ was not that much. It also transpired that the Zionists overestimated both the Jewish influence on the president and the British concern over their impact on the American–British relationship. The president did not go to great lengths to convince the British to keep the gates of Palestine open. Throughout those turbulent years, especially since 1936, the president instructed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to convey to the British government his disapproval of the measure taken against the Jewish immigration to Palestine but made it clear that the appeals should be presented as informal, leaving it to the British government to decide whether or not to accept the American request.50 The British government made it clear that the United States had no say as to whether it could change the terms of the mandate in a way that would violate the terms of the Balfour Declaration.51 With that, the British government implied that it would not allow American Jewish public opinion to influence the British Palestine policy. Although the president felt pretty strongly about the Jews’ right to self-determination and immigration to Palestine, he did understand the reasons for the British conduct. He talked against it but stopped short of action, allowing Secretary Hull to handle the matter in a much less sentimental manner. Ben Gurion understood all of that and did not blame Roosevelt for his failure to prevent the British government from issuing the White Paper. ‘Roosevelt, undoubtedly, is a friend to the Jews’, stated Ben Gurion. It helped that he was surrounded by Jewish advisers, ‘some of them important and influential’, 49

50

51

‘Roosevelt Asked to Help the Jews By Urging Britain to Keep Pledge’, New York Times, 12 October 1938, 1; ‘Wagner Confident on Jewish Protest’, New York Times, 23 October 1938, 27. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 27 July 1936, FRUS 1936, Vol. 3, 444; The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 27 April 1937, FRUS 1937, Vol. 2, 881–882. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) of a Conversation with the Head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office (Rendell), 1 June 1937, FRUS 1937, Vol. 2, 884–886; The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1937, ibid, 891–892.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

such as Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Benjamin Cohen. However, Ben Gurion understood that there was a limit to the president’s power. First, he was not a single ruler, and American public opinion was lagging behind him in its attitude towards international affairs – the American people were still isolationists in principle. The president would not alienate the Americans by acting against their will. No less important, Roosevelt was also ‘a great friend’ of Britain, and he understood the reasons for their recent anti-Zionist actions and measures. He would not pressure the British government at a time when Britain had to manoeuvre between opposing forces when war seemed imminent.52 On 1 September 1939, German troops crossed the border with Poland, starting the Second World War. Ben Gurion defined the Jewish dilemma and lack of options in a simple way: ‘We should help the [British] army as if there was no White Paper, and we should fight the White Paper as if there was no war.’53 However, there would be no ships full of immigrants going to Palestine. There would be no struggle against the White Paper. With Britain involved in a war against Hitler, it was clear that the Yishuv would adhere only to the second part of Ben Gurion’s most quoted proverb.

In the Shadow of the Holocaust When Harry S. Truman became president in April 1945, he almost literally had to carry the world’s gravest problems. War was still raging against Germany, and the Pacific War seemed to have no end in sight. When he took his seat in the Oval Office, the new president learned about the most kept secret of the time, the existence of a bomb that the world had seen nothing like before – and soon, he would have to decide whether to use this ultimate tool of death. And he had to deal with the news about the fate of the Jews in Europe and with those who survived the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, the persecution, and massacres perpetrated by those who assisted them throughout the war and in its aftermath. Truman would look at the ashes of the great

52 53

Entry for 22 March 1939, DBGA. Minutes of Meeting of Mapai Central Committee, 12 September 1939, DBGAProtocol Section.

In the Shadow of the Holocaust

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fire as a humanitarian problem, but the wheels were already being turned by those who sought a political solution for the Jewish humanitarian crisis. The Zionists were knocking on the White House’s doors, asking the president to help them establish a home for the survivors and all of the Jews who were looking for a place that they could call ‘home’. That place was in the heart of the Middle East, and with Truman gradually deepening his involvement in the Jewish problem and Zionism, sometimes unwillingly, the United States progressively became entangled in the politics of a region it so far had shown little interest in. For most of the first half of the twentieth century, the United States was hardly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. The region had a romantic and mystical aura, but this was confined to the few Americans who were acquainted with the Middle East, mainly missionaries who had arrived in the region since the mid-nineteenth century. It was only with the discovery of oil fields in the arid deserts of Arabia that brought an increasing number of Americans to the region, yet the American government showed little interest in the region’s affairs. The change occurred under President Truman, or more accurately, was forced upon him. In the wake of the Cold War, the area became increasingly important to the West because of its fortune and strategic location. Oil fields were crucial for European and American economies, and therefore, it was imperative to deny the Soviet Union access to the oil fields. The military bases in the region, and most conspicuously those in Egypt, became strongholds for operations against the Soviet Union, in the event of armed conflict. Therefore, it was essential to keep the region under Western influence and to keep the Soviet Union at bay. Great Britain was the hegemonic power in the Middle East, and should have been responsible for the region’s defence, whereas American interests lay in Europe and the Pacific. However, Great Britain, a failing imperial power, could no longer sustain its hegemonic position in the region and acted to draw in the United States. In a gradual process, the United States joined Britain in preserving the Western stand in the region, and thus became entangled in the region’s affairs.54 The burgeoning American embroilment in 54

C.O.S (47) 144th Meeting, 21 November 1947, UKNA, PREM 8/841; The Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, 9 December 1947, ibid.; Washington Talks on Middle East and Eastern

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

Zionist and Jewish affairs further deepened American involvement in the Middle East. The United States supported a dream and a vision that was met by rage and opposition from the same people that the United States wanted to keep in the Western camp and prevent them from opening the region’s gates to the Soviet Union. When the extent of the Jewish extermination became known, and until shortly after the war, the primary effort of the American Jewry was to see that displaced Jews would be able to find refuge in the United States and elsewhere.55 They were less concerned with Palestine’s political fate than with the necessity to find a humanitarian solution to the Displaced People’s plight. However, the Zionists did not completely shun politics. During the war, for the first time in the history of the Zionist movement, it made a clear statement as to the Zionist purpose. From 9 to 11 May 1942, hundreds of American Zionists gathered at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, and declared that the Zionist movement’s goal was the establishment of ‘a Jewish Commonwealth’ in Palestine.56 The conference was also a statement explicitly made by some speakers that Britain would no longer be the major power with which the Zionists would collaborate to achieve their goal. It was now the United States.57 Ben Gurion marked the course of change already in September 1939, when he told the American Jews that they were the only power that could help the Jews in Palestine.58 In 1941 he argued that the epicentre of the Zionist activity had shifted from Britain to the United States. ‘We must storm the American people, the press, the congress – senate and house of representatives, the churches, the union leaders, the intellectuals – and when these will be with us, the government will be with us, and Roosevelt will help us. The path to Roosevelt goes through the American people’, he stated.59 The Biltmore conference and programme were the natural outcomes of that process.

55 56

57 58 59

Mediterranean [undated], ibid.; Peter Hahn, Caught in the Middle East (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 20–23. Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews, 216. Gal, David Ben Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State, 198–201. Emanuel Neumann, In the Arena (New York: Herzl Press, 1976), 169. David Ben Gurion, ‘Looking Forward’, Davar, 22 September 1939, 2. Minutes of Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 16 February 1941, DBGA, MS.

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While the Zionists were anxious to bring President Roosevelt to support the Biltmore programme, the president had kept ambiguity as to his thinking on the Palestine question, conveying conflicting messages. In December 1942, he said that he ‘made up his mind’ that 90 per cent of Palestine would be Jewish. Arabs would have to move out of Palestine to elsewhere in the Middle East to give room to massive Jewish immigration, which would lead to the establishment of an independent Jewish state.60 A few months later, the president promised to King Ibn Saud that ‘no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews’.61 The ‘full consultation’ did not mean dismissal of the idea of a Jewish state. It only meant that the Arabs and Jews would be consulted, not giving the Arabs (or Jews) the right of veto. During the 1944 presidential election campaign, Roosevelt authorized Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver to announce that ‘the American government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939’, and that ‘when future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home’.62 Cordell Hull quickly explained that the president used the lesser abiding term ‘Jewish national home’ rather than the more compelling ‘Jewish commonwealth’. While he did say that the American government had never agreed to the White Paper, the American position remained that any solution in Palestine would be reached only after ‘full consultation with both Arabs and Jews’.63 The pendulum continued to swing when both FDR and the Republican presidential candidate, Thomas E. Dewey, endorsed publicly the Zionist programme in 1944.64 Governor Dewey announced on 12 October that he ‘is for the reconstitution of

60 61

62

63

64

Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews, 246. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt, 26 May 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. 4, 787. Nancy MacLennan, ‘Roosevelt Backs Palestine Plan as Homeland for Refugee Jews’, New York Times, 10 March 1944, 1. The Secretary of States to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk), 15 March 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. 5, 590–591. Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith, With Firmness in the Right: American Diplomatic Action Affecting Jews, 1840–1945 (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1946), 397–398. On the AJC dissenting position, see Minutes Meeting of AJC Administrative Committee, 4 October 1943, DAJC.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth’.65 President Roosevelt did not lag, and a few days later he pledged that ‘we favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth’ – now he used the explicit word ‘commonwealth’. The president added that he was ‘convinced that the American people give their support to this aim, and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization’.66 Yet again, during his meeting with Ibn Saud, on 14 February 1945, he promised that ‘he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people’.67 This sounded like a clear evasion of his promises to the Jews, but in fact it wasn’t. The president did not say that he was against a Jewish state in Palestine, nor did he promise not to aid the Jews in achieving that goal. All he was ready to say was repeating, in another letter to Ibn Saud, his pledge that ‘no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews’.68 Between the meeting and the letter, the president met Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver and signed a statement stating that he did not change his position on the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.69 Therefore, it is no wonder that historians are arguing whether Roosevelt supported the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine.70 However, it seemed that despite the conflicting messages coming

65

66

67

68

69

70

The statement is in: The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 21 October 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. 5, 617, note 21. Statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Senator Robert F. Wagner, 15 October 1944, CZA, Z6/296. Memorandum of Conversation between the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Al Saud) and President Roosevelt Aboard the U.S.S. ‘Quincy’, 14 February 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, 2. President Roosevelt to the King of Saudi Arabia, 5 April 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, 698. Memorandum of Conversation, Stephen S. Wise and President Roosevelt, 16 March 1945, CZA, Z6–296; ‘President Again Asks Palestine’s Freedom’, New York Times, 17 March 1945, 13. See conflicting opinions in Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews, 260; Amitzur Ilan, America, Britain and Eretz Israel (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, 1979), 134–136.

Truman and Zionism

43

from the White House, Roosevelt was closer to the Zionist position than to the Arab’s – or, and more importantly, to the State Department’s and his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, and his successor, Edward Stettinius. When he spoke to the Zionists and on Zionism, Roosevelt carried a simple message reaffirming his support for a Jewish commonwealth. When he talked to the Arabs, he, and more frequently, the secretary of state, would undercut the president’s blatantly pro-Zionist statements, but would not alter them. It is safe to say that when reading the entirety of Roosevelt’s contradictory statements and comments, the more profound and evident theme of them all was his pro-Zionist posture. The simple fact that his pro-Zionist statements were never tested in actual trials makes this difficult to accept. The war was Roosevelt’s constraint – or shelter, depending on the reader’s view. It limited his freedom of action, but given this constraint, his proZionist statements seem even more remarkable. American diplomats serving in Arab countries, the senior members of the department in Washington, and foremost, the secretary of state all urged the president not to make pro-Zionist statements. Roosevelt disregarded them all. The president’s ambiguity about Palestine did not harm him in the elections. He won them, for the fourth time, with 80 per cent of the Jewish Vote. Obviously, it is impossible to say whether they voted for Roosevelt because of his pro-Zionists’ statements. That he was not anti-Zionist certainly helped. In any case, Roosevelt did not live long enough to celebrate his success. He died on 12 April 1945, leaving it to his vice president, Harry S. Truman, to continue. Or to start anew.

Truman and Zionism When he heard the news about Roosevelt’s death, Ben Gurion got worried. He was concerned by the death of a president he appreciated as a great friend of the Jews and the ascendancy of the man from ‘the Midwest’. Ben Gurion doubted whether the new president had ‘any connection and link with and to Jews’, and was concerned that ‘our friends in Washington’ would no longer have access to the new president as they did with FDR. He consoled himself by reasoning that ‘the value of the public opinion in the United States was more important

44

Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

than ever before’.71 Ben Gurion had no reason to worry. The man from ‘the Midwest’ was well versed in the Zionist aspirations and dreams, and he did have links and connections with Jews. During his years in the Senate, Truman supported the Balfour Declaration and Jewish national home, and he played an essential role in the inclusion of a pro-Zionist statement to the 1944 Democratic plank. Religion was one force behind his support for Zionism. Truman had ‘intimate knowledge of the bible’. For him, it was ‘neither legend nor myth, but literally, the story of everyday, God-fearing people’.72 When he was a sixteen-year-old high school student in Independence, Missouri, young Truman wrote in an essay that the Jews were ‘a distinct people’. After two thousand years, the Jews were ‘a nation apart from nations . . . persecuted for their religion’, still ‘waiting for a leader’ to gather the ‘scattered people’.73 His political advisor, Clark Clifford, tells that the president used to cite a verse from Deuteronomy (1:8), justifying the Jewish claim to Palestine, ‘Behold, I have given up the land before you; go in and take possession of the land which the Lord hath sworn unto your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and Jacob.’74 In July 1946, Truman argued that the Jews would get ‘the best part of Palestine, . . . all that section where their historical background is [italic in source]’.75 In a meeting with Israel’s foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, in July 1952, President Truman said that ‘his attitude to Israel was the result of his own knowledge and study of Israel’s history from the days of Abraham’.76 Shortly after becoming president, Truman met Stephen Wise. He looked forward to the meeting, knowing that the subject would be Palestine, ‘one part of the world that has always interested me, partly because of its Biblical background, of course’. Recalling the meeting, 71 72 73

74 75

76

Ben Gurion to Bernard Joseph, 14 April 1945, DBGA, CS. Cohen, Truman and Israel, 6. Michael Beschloss, Presidential Courage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 199–200. The quotations are from Truman’s essay. Clifford, Counsel to the President, 9. Entry for 26 July 1946, Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 604. Minutes of Meeting with Harry S. Truman, 1 July 1952, ISA, FO 2424/27; Merle Miller, Plain Speaking, an Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1974), 215–216; Harry S. Truman, Year of Decision (Garden City: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955), 71–72; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 1946–1953 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), 141–143.

Truman and Zionism

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Truman continued, ‘I’ve done considerable reading of the Bible. I’d read it at least twice before I went to school. I liked the stories in it. I never cared much for fairy stories or Mother Goose . . . The stories in the Bible, though, were to me stories about real people, and I felt I knew some of them better than actual people I knew [italics in original].’77 Combining religion with values, when Sharett argued that one of Israel’s missions was to serve as a beacon of democracy in the Middle East, Truman responded, ‘[Israel] had already been once an example of democracy in antiquity. Were not the Judges of Israel the first rulers anywhere in the world to have been elected by their people?’78 To that, Truman added legalism, stating that ‘he had studied very carefully the promises made to the Jewish people in the first world war, and he said to himself: “these promises must be kept”’.79 Another reason for Truman’s support for Zionism was the wide support that the movement enjoyed in America. On 10 November 1945, four American ambassadors in Arab states warned Truman that the United States was losing ground among the Arabs because it supported Zionism; he replied, ‘I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.’80 This bold statement is consistent with another remark he made when he rejected the Morrison–Grady plan to cantonize Palestine and not to establish a Jewish – or Arab – state. Truman argued that ‘in view of the extreme intensity of feeling in centers of the Jewish population in this country, neither political party would support this program’.81 The president meant by these comments that he was acting to fulfil the will and wishes of the American people. As the American people supported the Zionist cause, it was his duty to act accordingly. 77 78 79 80

81

Miller, Plain Speaking, 213–214; Truman, Harry S. Truman, 52. Minutes of Meeting with Harry S. Truman, 1 July 1952, ISA, FO 2424/27. Miller, Plain Speaking, 187. William A. Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud (Vista, CA: Selwa Press, 2005), 35. There is no record of this meeting at the Truman Presidential Library or at the American National Archives, but the president’s appointment schedule for 10 November 1945 confirms that the meeting in the president’s office took place. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library [henceforth HSTPL], President’s Appointment File. I’m grateful to archivist Randy Sowell from the HSTPL for his help in this and other issues. Memorandum of Conversation, 30 July 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, 674.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

Ben Gurion also did not have to worry about Truman not being acquainted with Jews. Like Roosevelt, Truman had Jews around him, working for him and with him. He inherited from FDR Judge Samuel I. Rosenman and David K. Niles, both Jews, and both advised Truman on Jewish and Zionist-related affairs.82 And then, there were also Ed Jacobson, Truman’s old friend from Independence, Missouri, Abraham (Abe) Feinberg, and Edward Kaufmann, the owner of the Kay Jewellery stores, a very close friend of Niles and a staunch admirer of Truman. Another friend of Truman and the Zionists was the non-Jew Bartley C. Crum, a San Francisco lawyer. Crum was a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (1946), and his experience with the committee, and the sights he saw, turned him into a passionate Zionist. Later he became an important conduit between the White House and the Zionists.83 Ben Gurion had no reason at all to be worried by the ascendance to power of the man from the Midwest.

The Struggle for a Jewish State With a new president in the White House and the Second World War almost over, the State Department and the Zionists fought for Truman’s heart. The secretary of state and State Department officials warned the president that a Jewish state would destabilize the Middle East, suggesting instead establishing trusteeship over Palestine. They reminded him of Roosevelt’s continued pledge to the Arabs that the US government would make ‘no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews’.84 82

83

84

Entry for 31 December 1941, DBGD; Elihau Eilat, ‘Samuel Irving Rosenman and His Role Prior to the State’s Establishment’, Molad, Vol. 7, Nos. 37–38 (Autumn 1976), 448–449; Allis Radosh and Ronald Radosh, A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 43–45. Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain: A Personal Account of AngloAmerican Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East (London: V. Gollancz, 1947), vii–xi; Neumann, In the Arena, 216–217. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), 6 April 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, 698–703; The Secretary of State to President Truman, 18 April 1945, HSTPL, PSF b. 161; Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to

The Struggle for a Jewish State

47

The Zionists fought against the State Department’s trusteeship plan. When the horrors of European Jewry’s destruction and exterminations were known, an increasing number of American Jews – Zionist and non-Zionist – came out in support for Zionism’s demand for a Jewish state and mass Jewish immigration to Palestine. A poll conducted after the Second World War showed that 80 per cent of all American Jews supported establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.85 In the struggle between the State Department and the Zionists, Truman supported the latter almost instinctively. He resented the pretension of the ‘“striped pants boys” in the State Department’ to decide the course of US policy in Palestine. To ensure that policy would be formulated and executed according to his will, Truman assumed personal control over the Palestine case. He would consult, of course, with the State Department – Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson was within the president’s inner circle – but the president was determined to be in charge of making US policy on Palestine.86 That said, Truman turned his attention to what he considered the more pressing issue, the plight of the Jewish Holocaust survivors. In spring/summer 1945, the president argued that the time was not right yet for a decision on a Jewish state, for several reasons. First, he believed that establishing a Jewish state would lead to violence that would require American military intervention, and he was unready to commit American military troops for that task.87 Second, since Palestine was under British responsibility, the British government would not agree to share a decision as to the fate of Palestine with

85

86

87

President Truman, 1 May 1945, ibid.; Memorandum for the President, 28 May 1945, ibid; Memorandum for the President, 16 June 1945, ibid. Eliahu Eilat, The Struggle for Statehood: Washington 1945–1948, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1979), 74–75; Waldo Frank to Abba Hillel Silver, 9 May 1947, CZA, A123/207. It is unclear if this is the famous author Waldo Frank; Menahem Kaufman, An Ambiguous Partnership: Non-Zionists and Zionists in America, 1939–1948 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1991), 201; Minutes of a Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 10 February 1946, DBGA, MS. The President’s News Conference, 31 January 1946, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ documents/the-presidents-news-conference-438. Accessed 25 June 2021; The Secretary of State to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, 17 August 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, 686; Abba Hillel Silver to David Ben Gurion, 11 October 1946, DGBA, CS; Miller, Plain Speaking, 215–216; Truman, Year of Decision, 71–72. Harry S. Truman, ‘The President’s News Conference’, 16 August 1945, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-495. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

the United States.88 That is, at this stage, the option of a Jewish state was not on the table, and it was still a remote and hypothetical idea. At the same time, Truman would not speak against the idea of a Jewish state. Shortly after he sat on the president’s chair, he allowed Wise to tell the press that ‘Mr. Truman endorsed the late President Roosevelt’s most recent statements on Zionism, including advocacy of a free and democratic commonwealth in Palestine.’89 Imitating Roosevelt’s behaviour in such a situation, Truman reiterated to Arab leaders that any decision concerning the Palestine issue would be decided through ‘full consultations with both Arab and Jews’.90 However, as mentioned, this obligation was not at odds with the American commitment to assist the Jews in establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Roosevelt and Truman committed to consulting the Arabs, not to give them the right of veto. Contemplating possible solutions to the Palestine question, the president kept asking David Niles, ‘What do the Jews really want?’ He got his answer in August 1946. The Jewish Agency endorsed a plan for ‘a viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine’.91 This plan differed from the Biltmore programme, which proposed the establishment of a Jewish state in all of Palestine. The Jewish Agency opted for a more minimal plan, offering to consider the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine. After David Niles, Secretary of Treasury John Snyder and Secretary of War Robert Patterson – both pro-Zionists – American Jewish Committee’s (AJC) Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, and most important, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, agreed to support the plan, the president summarized, ‘Dean, if you think so,

88

89

90

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Meyer Weisgal to Chaim Weizmann, 29 September 1945, WA; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 155. President’s Appointment File, 20 April 1945, HSTPL, PSF, Personal File 1058; James E. Chinn, ‘Truman Tells Diplomatic Corps U.S. Hopes for Amity with All’, Washington Post, 21 April 1945, 7; ‘Truman Will Support Roosevelt’s Stand on Palestine’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 22 April 1945, www.jta.org/ 1945/04/22/archive/truman-will-support-roosevelts-stand-on-palestine-asksproskauer-monsky-to-white-house. Accessed 1 June 2021. Harry S. Truman to Amir Abdullah ibn Hussein, Transjordan, 17 May 1945, HSTPL, OF, n. 913. Eilat, The Struggle for Statehood, 379; Minutes of the Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 4 August 1946, DBGA, MS; Minutes of the Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 5 August 1946, ibid.; Dr. Goldmann’s Mission to Washington, 6 August 1946, DBGA, MS.

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then we will do it.’92 That was the moment, in August 1946, when President Truman subscribed to the idea of a Jewish state. He told Stephen Wise and Senator Herbert Lehman on 20 September that he would support the partition plan because it appeared ‘sensible and just’, and because American public opinion, Congress, and many other ‘important people’ supported it.93 That is, the president reiterated here the theme that he had made in the past, that he would act in accordance with the people’s wishes. Truman announced his new policy also to the British prime minister, Clement Attlee,94 and later to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. In his letter to Ibn Saud, the president stated firmly and decisively that ‘the United States . . . took the position . . . that Palestine should be the site of a Jewish national home’, since Palestine was the ‘land which for thousands of years had been regarded by Jews as their spiritual home’.95 The letter was more than a policy statement, it was also a statement of priorities. The president emphasized values over interests in the conduct of his foreign policy. James Forrestal, the secretary of the navy (and later secretary of defense), persistently argued against the American support for a Jewish state, retorting that Saudi Arabian oil was vital to the American economy because American oil reserves were rapidly depleting while consumption was on the rise. The Palestine issue should be viewed through these lenses, insisted Forrestal.96 Truman ignored the recommendation. The president never initiated a discussion over the pros and cons of supporting the idea of a Jewish state. He merely stated what appeared apparent to him, that the Jews deserved a national home, and the United States had been committed 92

93

94

95

96

Memorandum of Conversation, 7 August 1946, DBGA, MS; The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United States (Harriman), 12 August 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, 679–682; Minutes of the Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 13 August 1946, ibid; Minutes of the Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 13 August 1946, DBGA, MS; Minutes of the American Jewish Committee Executive Meeting, 15 September 1946, DAJC. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United States (Harriman), 12 August 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, 679–682; Eilat, The Struggle for Statehood, 410–411. President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee), 10 October 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, 706–707; Eilat, The Struggle for Statehood, 425. President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia, 24 January 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, 1012–1013. Entry for 7 October 1947, James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries (edited by Walter Miller) (San Francisco: Lucknow Books, 2014), 312.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

to this idea since Wilson’s days. He saw no reason to break that commitment. Interests mattered, but they would not determine the course of US foreign policy. The embryonic plan the Jews presented to President Truman, and which he endorsed, was presented to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly by the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The committee was established in May 1947 to suggest to the assembly solutions to the Palestine problem, and it submitted its report at the end of August. The majority of the committee members recommended to part Palestine and to establish independent Jewish and Arab states ‘with economic union’, with Jerusalem and its vicinity placed under international trusteeship.97 The report would be presented to the UN General Assembly in September, and the Zionists prepared for their next struggle, bringing about the approval of the partition plan at the UN. It was clear to the Zionists that in order to get enough votes in the General Assembly, the United States should state its support clearly. Thus, at this last stage, the Zionist diplomacy’s goal was first, to make sure that the American delegation at the UN would vote in favor of the majority report, and second, that the president and Secretary of State George Marshall would express their clear support for the partition plan.98 It was a difficult task, to bring President Truman to speak out in support for the partition resolution. Truman made it a matter of principle not to interfere when Palestine was discussed in an official forum. He said in the past that he would not speak in public on this matter, and he would not see people who wished to talk with him about Palestine.99 The committee’s recommendation was filed with the General Assembly, and Truman was determined not to intervene. He would not make a statement on Palestine ‘until after United Nations

97

98

99

Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Supplement no. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Volume 1, Lake Success, New York, 1947. Minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine, 28 September 1947, DGBA, MS. Rabbi Baruch Korff to President Truman, 5 November 1945, HSTPL, OF, b. 914; Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President to Rabbi Baruch Korff, 6 November 1945, ibid. See another similar case: James H. Torrens to Matthew J. Connelly, 23 January 1946, ibid.; Matthew J. Connelly to James H. Torrens, 31 January 1946, ibid.

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had made its finding’.100 What was not known at the time was the fact that the administration had actively worked to persuade UN members to vote for the partition resolution. The American delegation at the UN realized that a two-thirds majority was not secured and reached out to various delegations to convince them to support the partition resolution. The Americans worked quietly and behind closed doors, as they were afraid of counter-reaction, if their activities were made public.101 President Truman argued that the intervention of American members of Congress and the diplomatic corps undermined the authority of the UN. For that reason, explained Truman, he ‘refused to make statements to any country of the subject of its vote in the United Nations’.102 Still, the evidence indicates that the president, or at least the White House, was very much involved in the campaign to convince hesitant or reluctant representatives and governments to vote for the majority report.103 After the vote, Truman boasted to Jacobson that he ‘alone was responsible for swinging the votes of several delegations’.104 In a letter he sent to Emanuel Neumann, the ZOA president, in June 1948, Truman recalled with pride how ‘the United States was privileged to play a leading role’ in the UN’s vote for the partition of Palestine.105 And indeed, the vote in favor of the partition resolution had passed with seven votes beyond the necessary two-thirds majority, and the UN endorsed Resolution 181, which called for the establishment of Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. Celebrating the 100

101

102

103

104 105

Entry for 8 August 1947, Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 294; Telephone Report by Mr. Shertok of Conversation with Dean Acheson, 8 May 1947, DBGA, MS; Eliahu Epstein to Members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 11 September 1947, WA. Minutes of Meeting, American Section of Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 5 October 1947, DBGA, MS; Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 124. Memorandum by President Truman to the Acting Secretary of State, 11 December 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, 1309; Moshe Shertok to Golda Myerson, 24 October 1947, DGBA, CS; Minutes of Meeting, American Section of Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 26 October 1947, DBGA, MS; Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, 10 December 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, 1306. Nahum Goldmann, Autobiography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 245; Joel Levitch and Laurel Vlock, ‘The Diary of Eddie Jacobson’, Washington Post, 6 May 1973, C3; Wilson, A Calculated Risk, 242–246. Levitch and Vlock, ‘The Diary of Eddie Jacobson’, C3. President Harry S. Truman to Emanuel Neumann, 29 June 1948, CZA, F38/ 1346.

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Friendship: From Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman

outstanding achievement soberly, Ben Gurion mentioned that without the United States’ help, ‘we could not get the 2/3 majority, perhaps not even simple majority’.106 After the passing of the partition resolution, Truman was committed to the Jewish state’s idea. When Civil War erupted in Palestine on the morning after the General Assembly’s vote, the State Department again proposed replacing the partition resolution with a trusteeship regime. Truman vehemently rejected the idea, insisting that the United States should remain committed to the partition resolution.107 As a token of his support for the Jewish state, President Truman granted de facto recognition to the new state eleven minutes after its establishment, despite the adamant opposition of his venerable secretary of state, George Marshall.108 On their part, the Israelis deeply appreciated Truman’s contribution to the establishment of the state of Israel and dedicated a new settlement to the president, calling it Kfar Truman.109 106 107

108

109

Minutes of Meeting, Mapai Center, 3 December 1947, DBGA, MS. Harry S. Truman, Off the Record, The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (edited by Robert H. Ferrell) (London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), 127. Memorandum by the President’s Special Counsel (Clifford) to President Truman (item 32), 8 March 1948, HSTPL, Clark Clifford File, b. 13. And see, FRUS 1948, Vol. 5, 690, note 1; Clifford, Counsel to the President, 4–6, 11–12. Harris J. Levine, President of the JNF to President Harry S. Truman, 31 May 1950, HSTPL, Papers of David N. Niles, b. 30.

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3

Friendly Impartiality, 1949–1958

The transition from the Yishuv to a state was a dramatic event in the history of Zionism, but in reality, it mostly meant a change of plaque. The head of the Jewish Agency changed the plaque on his door to prime minister. The head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department became Israel’s foreign minister. The Jewish Agency’s special representative in Washington became, soon enough, the Israeli ambassador in Washington. The more meaningful transformation was the one which transpired in the relationships between the new state and the United States. Israel became a state, and since 11 May 1949, a member of the United Nations (UN). The Israeli leaders no longer required the services of intermediaries – Americans who were close to the administration – when they wanted to talk with American officials. Israeli diplomats and state officials talked with their American counterparts directly, being on an equal footing. One sign of the change that the establishment of the state brought was the transfer of responsibility for the management of Israeli–American relations from the White House to the Department of State. The shift in responsibility wasn’t surprising, since relations between sovereign states are conducted through the foreign offices of the respective countries, and the reassignment of responsibility meant a normalization of the relationship between the two countries. However, the wish to normalize the relations between the two nations revealed also the true nature of the relationship between the two countries, as the president was not really ready to treat Israel as any other state. The president would get involved in crucial junctions along the road in a way that proved that the American–Israeli relationships were special. Yet, presidential intervention was reserved for the most exceptional cases, as David Niles explained to Moshe Shertok in January 1947. The president would intervene only on issues of great importance to the Zionist cause.

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Friendly Impartiality, 1949–1958

Otherwise, the Zionists should turn to the Department of State.1 Niles’s explanation was also germane after the establishment of Israel. Usually, Israeli diplomats made things work while conversing with their American counterparts. However, when there was a genuine need, President Truman would get involved. Truman’s appointment of James G. McDonald as the American ambassador to Israel was a sign of his continued interest in Israel, even from a distance. McDonald was a staunch pro-Zionist, and the Department of State protested both the process and the choice. Nevertheless, the president rejected the objections, explaining to McDonald that he wanted to have in Israel ‘his own man’.2 Israel could not ask for a better person for the job, both on his merit and past deeds, as well as for having the president behind him. The move was met with an enthusiastic response from the thousands of Israelis who applauded him when he arrived in Tel Aviv in August 1948.3 It was easier for the president to leave it to the Department of State to deal with Israel because he trusted the new secretary of state, Dean Acheson, who was appointed on 21 January 1949, replacing the ailing George Marshall. When he was undersecretary, the president consulted with Acheson on Palestine and trusted his judgement.4 As secretary of state, Acheson acted faithfully to implement the president’s policy on Israel. Before the establishment of Israel, Acheson was antiZionist. He was very close to Judge Frankfurter, but Zionism was ‘the only topic Felix and I had by mutual consent excluded from our farranging daily talks’. Palestine was for him ‘Arab Palestine’.5 However, when he was appointed secretary of state, Israel was a fact, and there was no point opposing its existence. In any case, Acheson put the

1 2

3

4

5

Eilat, The Struggle for Statehood, 37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by the Under Secretary of State, 22 June 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. 5, 1131–1132; James G. McDonald, My Mission in Israel, 1948–1951 (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1951), 6, 14–15. Entry for 12 August 1948, Envoy to the Promised Land: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1948–1951, edited by Norman J. W. Goda et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017) [hereafter: DPJM], 57; ‘US Representative Comes to Israel’, Davar, 13 August 1948, 1. The Secretary of State to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, 17 August 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, 686; Abba Hillel Silver to David Ben Gurion, 11 October 1946, DGBA, CS; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), 169–170. Entry for 6 February 1949, DPJM, 374; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 169.

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55

president’s choices and political needs first. Acheson knew that the Jews mattered to Truman, and he acted on that basis.6 On 25 January 1949, Israel held its first elections to the Knesset. Following the election, the administration granted de jure recognition to Israel.7 The Israelis appreciated the gestures. The New York Times correspondent in Tel Aviv reported that ‘Parties celebrating the United States’ de jure recognition of Israel went on until bars closed at midnight.’8 The Israeli liberal daily, HaBoker, stated that the act filled the Israelis with ‘joy and self-esteem’.9 Shortly after that, the president decided to elevate each country’s diplomatic representations to ambassadorship, and despite Department of State pressures, he reappointed McDonald as ambassador, as an expression of American friendship to Israel.10 *** The American press also celebrated the establishment of the new state, conveying to the American people the message that supporting Zionism was a worthwhile act, and it should continue. Particular emphasis was placed on the similarities between the two people, mainly the pioneer spirit common to the American and Israeli people and the modernity that the Jews brought to the land. The New York Times’s Gertrude Samuels commended the ‘spirit and mood’ of the Israeli people and expressed admiration to the settlers who turned the ‘once stony deserts and swamplands’ into flourishing gardens and fields.11 Celebrating Israel’s second year of existence, the Washington Post explored the achievements and progress of the nascent state. The newspaper cited ‘milestones’, which included a dramatic rise in the number of Jews; the establishment of ‘hundreds of new farming settlement’; ‘thousands of new housing projected have been completed’; ‘the tourist business is picking up’; ‘theatres and cinemas are flourishing’; 6

7

8 9 10

11

See, for example, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 6 December 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 6, 1522–1523. Press Release, 31 January 1949, HSTPL, Papers of David Niles, b. 30; Editorial Note, FRUS 1949, Vol. 6, 713. ‘Israelis Toast Truman’, New York Times, 1 February 1949, 9. ‘A Puzzling Assumption’, HaBoker, 2 February 1949, 2. E. Eilat to M. Sharett, 1 February 1949, ISA, FO 2308/8; Entry for 11 February 1949, DPJM, 385–386. Gertrud Samuels, ‘Report from Dafne in Galilee’, New York Times, 18 December 1949, SM11.

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and ‘internationally known concert artists are coming to Israel in increasing numbers. Every concert is sold out months or weeks in advance.’12 Three years after its establishment, Robert Hartman of the New York Times was impressed ‘with the modern condition of life, the tremendous pace of building activity, the energy and enthusiasm with which the people attack seemingly hopeless problems’ that he saw in Israel. Referring to the pioneer myth, Hartmann was also impressed with the rate of growth of the Israeli agriculture settlements, which ‘proves that Jews can succeed as tillers of soil’.13 On the occasion of Israel’s fifth year of independence, Dana Schmidt referred to the Negev, Israel’s desert in the south, as ‘the frontier’, echoing Manifest Destiny and the biblical language that the Puritans used to justify the conquest of America. There ‘may still be seen traces of the times of Abraham and Solomon, of the rise of and fall of the Kingdom of Judea, and the long struggle to conquer the kingdom which was won at last by the Israeli army in 1949’. And he continues: ‘When the Israeli army occupied the Negeb, the Israelis had little but the Bible to tell them what they had won.’ And those who acted to turn the desert into arable land were ‘pioneers’.14 Seven years after the establishment of Israel, a Harvard professor compared in the Boston Daily Globe the Kibbutzim – the communal settlements – to the American frontier settlements.15 Nearly ten years later, a thrilled reporter described Israel as a ‘powerful country with a true pioneer spirit’.16 The message coming from the reports, that the Americans were right in their support for Israel, also laid the ground for the continued American support for Israel. The message was not well received by the administration.

12

13

14

15

16

Larry Allen, ‘Israel Marks 2-Year Gains – and Tighten Belt’, Washington Post, 21 May 1950, B2. Robert T. Hartmann, ‘Israel’s Farmers Upset Old Doubts’, New York Times, 7 November 1951, 2. Dana A. Schmidt, ‘Israel’s Epic: Men against Desert’, New York Times, 27 April 1952, SM12. Howard M. Jones, ‘Settlements Likened to American Frontier’, Boston Daily Globe, 5 July 1955. Anital Philips, ‘Tel Aviv–Jaffa Israel Israel’s Melting Pot for Jew, Arab’, Los Angeles Times, 1 February 1959, E9.

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Friendly Impartiality A month after Eisenhower was inaugurated as president, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles summoned the Department of State staff for a briefing. During his presentation, the secretary said, ‘We shall not be prisoners of Israel any longer.’ The American official who informed Israeli minister Esther Herlitz of Dulles’s comments added that Dulles intended to block Israel’s path to the White House. ‘We won’t be able to get away with running to the White House’s over everybody’s head’, was the message coming from the secretary of state.17 David Wainhause from the Department of State’s UN division concluded ‘bad winds are blowing in the state department’.18 The message was clear. The new administration ventured to change what it perceived as the Truman administration’s too-friendly attitude towards Israel. Dulles was especially worried and concerned about the Israeli embassy using American Jews to press the president.19 The Israeli embassy and the American Jews planned to fight the shift, but Maxwell Rabb, an advisor to President Eisenhower, told Ambassador Abba Eban that there was no point in such a fight since Eisenhower and those around him concluded that they did not expect that the American Jews would support the Republican party, even if the president gave Israel everything it wanted. The only way to stop the change, of course, argued Rabb, was by more Jews turning to support the Republican party.20 Scholars have coined the phrase Friendly Impartiality when referring to what seemed to be Eisenhower’s new policy.21 However, 17 18 19 20

21

E. Herlitz to E. Eban, 20 February 1953, W4625, ISA, FO 358/3. G. Refael to A. Eban, 20 February 1953, ISA, FO 358/3. E. Herlitz to E. Eban, 20 February 1953, W4625, ISA, FO 358/3. A. Eban to M. Sharett, 21 February 1953, W553, ISA, FO 2310/1; P. Aliav to US Division, 26 August 1953, PA339, ISA, FO 358/2. Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1993), 37–38, 101–102; Etta Bick, ‘Transnational Actors in a Time of Crisis: The Involvement of American Jews in Israel–United States Relations, 1956–7’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (July 2003), 147; Alice A. Butler-Smith, Imitations of Influence: Eisenhower, the Jews and the Middle East (PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 2004), X; Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 164; Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, 348; David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 92–122; Asaf Siniver, Abba Eban, a Biography (New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2015), 130–131; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israel Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), 50–57; Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab

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Eisenhower and Dulles did not use these words to describe their policy towards Israel, and their portrayal as anathema to Truman, who was supposedly much friendlier towards Israel, is inaccurate. In their approach and policy towards Israel, the similarities were greater than the differences, and in many ways, Eisenhower was following in the footsteps of Truman. Contrary to commonly held belief, Eisenhower was not the first president to try to apply an even-handed policy in the Middle East. Truman was the one who attempted it first. And they both failed. With the establishment of Israel and the end of the 1948 war, the Truman administration sought to keep the peace in the region, assuming that if the hostilities between Arabs and Jews resumed, the United States would have no choice but to stand by Israel. The Arabs most probable reaction would be turning to the Soviet Union – an eventuality the administration sought to avoid. Hence, it considered it essential to maintain good relations with both sides and to prevent a war between Israel and the Arab states.22 The wish to avoid Arab antagonism was a recurring argument made by American officials to justify their objection first to a Jewish state and next to a favourable American attitude towards Israel. The truth of the matter is that the fear was unfounded. The United States had never faced more than pale protests when it took pro-Zionist or pro-Israeli measures. Still, the Truman administration insisted on pursuing an even-handed policy, avoiding showing favouritism towards Israel. The even-handed policy was put into test soon enough. In October 1949, Ben Gurion recorded in his diary that food supplies in the government depot would suffice for a few months only.23 In July 1950, Sharett told Ambassador James McDonald that Israel’s ‘economic plight would soon become desperate’.24 In January 1951, Israel’s minister of treasury, Eliezer Kaplan, reported that the food situation was ‘dire. In two months, there will be no bread.’25

22

23 25

Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC: Brassey’s, 2004), 29. Department of State: Policy Statement, Israel, 6 February 1951, USNA, RG 59, 611.84a/2-651; A Report to the President by the NSC on USA Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel, 14 March 1951, National Security Archives Digital [henceforth DNSA]. 24 Entry for 3 October 1949, DBGD. Entry for 7 July 1950, DPJM, 943. Entry for 2 January 1951, DBGD; D. Ben Gurion to A. Eban, 2 January 1951, IWA71, ISA, FO 2308/15; A. Eban to Secretary C. Brannan, 19 January 1951,

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In summer 1951, Moshe Sharett depicted Israel’s need for foreign aid as a matter of ‘life and death’ and that it was on the verge of ‘financial abyss’.26 Israel turned to the United States for help at these adverse times. There was no question that the United States would help. When Ed Jacobson raised an Israeli request for help with the president in January 1951, the president agreed to help.27 The problem was how to accomplish that while attempting to appear even-handed. The United States would help Israel but in the most inconspicuous manner possible and based on official and universal criteria. Or that at least was the plan. The economic crisis in Israel was exacerbated by the cost of the 1948 war and the influx of Jewish immigrants to Israel. During the war, and more so in its aftermath, Jewish refugees from Cyprus, East Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa arrived in Israel by the hundreds of thousands. Within six years, Israel’s population has doubled at a daunting economic cost. The Israeli government dealt with the grave economic situation by imposing an austerity regime, food rationing, and price controls, and by stewarding a fiscal policy which was based on large monetary deficit. The austerity policy ended in 1951, but not because Israel’s economic problems had been resolved.28 The Israeli government, struggling with the unrelenting economic crisis, turned to the United States for assistance. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations were ready to help, but they tried to do so in an impartial manner. Thus, Secretary Acheson recommended avoiding a bilateral aid programme specifically designed for Israel. Instead, he proposed preparing a regional aid plan, which would also include Israel.29 Likewise, Eisenhower’s Department of State opposed

26

27 28

29

ibid., FO 342/34; Ester Herlitz to Israel Consulate, Los Angeles, 31 January 1951, AR/2/6-10, ibid. M. Sharett to E. Eilat, 3 September 1951, State of Israel, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel [henceforth DFPI] 1951, Vol. 6, 606; M. Sharett to W. Eytan, 13 October 1951, WIA 496, ISA, FO 2309/3. E. Herlitz to the USA Division, 24 January 1951, DFPI 1951, Vol. 6, 61. Nachum Gross, ‘The Economic Regime during Israel’s First Decade’, in S. Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas (eds), Israel – The First Decade of Independence (Albany: State University New York Press, 1995), 231–237. Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 5, 594–597; Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [undated], ibid., 599–600; Memorandum by Charles B. Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff, ibid., 608–610; Israel Embassy,

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a grant request from Israel, based on the same reasoning.30 It did not really work. Israel continued to be accorded special treatment in the way its aid requests were handled and in the size of the aid. The administration’s help came through various tools, some universal, applicable to all of those entitled of American aid, and some devised especially for Israel. In response to food shortages, the American government sent to Israel extraordinary food shipments during the years 1949–1953 that included wheat, milk powder, egg powder, sugar, flour, and butter.31 When drought hit Israel in winter 1957–1958, and due to the resulting loss of crops, the Israeli economic delegation in the United States applied to the Department of Agriculture for an emergency request of 100,000 tons of feed grains and 30,000 of wheat. Both the Departments of Agriculture and State approved the request.32 The United States also helped Israel to deal with the severe shortages in foreign currency. In early May 1950, David Horowitz, director general of the Israeli Ministry of Finance, reported that Israel’s foreign currency reserves dwindled so much that it was expected that factories would shut down, and famine would spread.33 Israel turned, once again, to the administration, for help, and again, the administration used universal tools to do so. However, when necessary, American officials bent the rules, indicating that Israel had a unique standing in the United States. The aid had arrived in three forms: loans, grants, and donations. Between the late 1940s and early 1950s, the main source of loan was the Export-Import Bank (EIB). Before independence, the Jewish Agency had already applied to the Bank for a $100-million

30

31

32

33

Washington, DC, to USA Division, 5 April 1951, W874, ISA, FO 2309/1; Report of Meeting with Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 5 April 1951, ibid., FO 342/25. Special Economic Aid for the Near East and Africa, 29 July 1953, USNA, RG 59, Lot File 57D298. Samuel to Palgi, Food Control, 9 June 1950, W125, ISA, FO 2308/18; D. Horowitz to E. Kaplan, 5 July 1950, W186, ibid; Entry for 26 October 1950, DBGD; M. Keren to USA Division, 16 February 1951, ShN/5/14-32, ISA, FO342/34; Kalkalit, Jerusalem to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 20 October 1953, IWA772, ibid., FO 2309/15. A. Salmon to A. Eban, 19 June 1958, EC-305-as-142, ISA, FO 422/7; A. Salmon to US Division, 19 June 1957, WNT432, ISA, FO 3091/2. Entry for 8 May 1950, DBGD.

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loan.34 Shortly after Israel’s declaration of independence, the new president, Chaim Weizmann, sought the assistance of President Truman in obtaining the loan. Truman assured the new president that there would be no problem, as he trusted that Israel would pay the loan. ‘The Jews always paid their debts’, he wrote, clearing the way for the approval of the Israeli request.35 The EIB announced on 19 January 1949, a few days after the end of the 1948 war, its decision to grant a $100-million loan to Israel.36 The approval of the loan was a significant vote of confidence and a message. The amount Israel received was exceptionally large. Afghanistan, Turkey, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia combined got $86,470,000.37 In 1950, Israel applied for an additional EIB loan of $35 million to double its agricultural productivity. This time, Israel needed to use pressure to get the loan approved. The Israeli embassy launched a public campaign involving messages to the president through Niles, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan, and Ed Jacobson. The campaign succeeded, and the EIB approved the loan request in December.38 While complying with the Israeli requests for aid, the Americans pressed Israel to deal with its ailing economy. In response to an Israeli request for grants in higher sums than was common in the American universal special aid programmes, Secretary Acheson recommended approving the Israeli request on the condition that Israel slow down the pace of immigration and present a date for the end of the American grants to Israel.39 Under his recommendation, an American economist, 34

35

36 37 38

39

Meeting: O. Gass to B. Bell, 18 May 1948, DFPI 1948, Vol. 1, 32; E. Epstein to M. Shertok, 21 May 1948, ibid., 54. Memorandum by the President of the Provisional Government of Israel to President Truman, 25 May 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. 5, 1043; From O. Gass to E. Kaplan, 25 May 1948, ibid., 982–989; E. Epstein to M. Shertok, 7 June 1948, DFPI 1948, Vol. 1, 132; E. Epstein to M. Shertok, 22 June 1948, ibid., 1, 203; Harry S. Truman to Robert A. Lovett, 16 August 1948, HSTPL, PSF, b. 158. Editorial Note, DFPI 1948–1949, Vol. 2, 384. M. Keren to USA Division, 17 August 1950, ISA, FO 377/31. Memorandum, United States Assistance for the Financing of Israel Agricultural Development, 6 September 1950, HSTPL, Papers of David Niles, b. 30; A. Eban to USA Division, 11 September 1950, W318, ISA, FO 2308/19; A. Eban to H. E. Gaston, 18 September 1950, DFPI 1950, Vol. 5, 543–544; M. Keren to A. Eban, 25 September 1950, HSTPL, Papers of David Niles, b. 1; O. Gass to E. Kaplan, 21 December 1950, W534, ISA, FO 2308/19. I.L. Kenen to L. Lipsky, 4 March 1951, ISA, FO 342/39; Y. H. Levin to R. Allen, 21 March 1951, IN-5-38-24, ISA, FO 343/1; Summary of Note Presented by the Ambassador of Israel in Washington to the Secretary of State, 22 March 1951,

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Professor Raymond Mikesell of Virginia University, visited Israel in July 1952 to study the Israeli economy, and his conclusions were grim. Mikesell concluded his survey by noting that Israel’s dire economic situation were due to a ‘complete disregard [of] elemental financial principles and failure to establish system accounting controls’. He felt that providing Israel with financial assistance would be pointless without making it part of a broader economic recovery programme. Otherwise, such a grant would only delay the inevitable outcome. Mikesell’s report included a three-page list of recommendations for the Israeli government, which primarily called for the creation of a much more controlled economic structure.40 The Israeli government had to acknowledge that if it wanted to improve its economic performance, it had to endorse what might be termed capitalist values and models. The Israeli acceptance of these premises was due in large part to the involvement of the American government but the real cause for the acceptance was the intellectual flexibility of the Israeli leaders. Even though the Israeli socialist government was ideologically opposed to the US capitalist system, it was willing to utilize what was needed, even if it meant postponing or denying national and socialist goals – to a certain limit. Mikesell’s recommendations also suggested that immigration to Israel be restricted. Ben Gurion rejected this idea, saying that the government would not refuse entry ‘to people in need’. At the same time, he said that the rate of immigration had declined.41 In 1953, the government took more drastic measures to reduce expenses and avoid deficit even at the cost of practically restricting Jewish immigration to Israel – a policy never stated out loud but actually was executed.42 The EIB directors appreciated the government’s measures to remedy Israel’s

40

41

42

ibid.; Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 21 December 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 5, 971–972. The Ambassador in Israel to the Department of State, 25 July 1952, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 969–970; E. Avriel to A. Eban, 28 July 1952, IW527, ISA, FO 2309/6; The Ambassador in Israel to the Department of State, 27 July 1952, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 971; T. Kollek to Office, Tel Aviv, 5 August 1952, W401, ISA, FO 2309/6; M. Shalit to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 2 August 1952, W397, ISA, FO 2309/10. The Ambassador in Israel to the Department of State, 27 July 1952, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 970. Haim Barkai, The Beginning of the Israeli Economy (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1990), 54–59.

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economy, and agreed in 1954 to lend Israel $10 million every year for the next three years.43 The administration, too, showed generosity that contravened its stated goal of treating Israel even-handedly. With the president’s agreement and congress’s involvement, during the years 1952–1954, Israel received a total of $234.7 million in economic aid.44 Another source of funding available to Israel during those dire years was the American Jewish community. The American Jews had established throughout the years several fund-raising organizations such as the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC, 1914), the United Palestine Appeal (UPA, 1925), and the United Jewish Appeal (UJA, 1935).45 While the donors were private people and organizations, mostly Jews, these fund-raising organs were also additional means of American governmental aid, as the donations were tax-deductible. That meant that part of any donation was actually American tax-payers’ money, with the administration’s approval.46 John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s secretary of state, appreciated too the Israeli measures and suggested that the United States would help Israel meet its financial obligations and keep it from defaulting. Dulles believed that providing such assistance to Israel was economically and strategically beneficial – he thought that Israel’s economic difficulties could have an adverse effect on its attitude towards its Arab neighbours. Thus, the department sought ways to assist Israel, although, once again, in a manner that would not anger the Arabs.47 This was accomplished by providing Israel with economic assistance through the funds allocated to the Middle East under the Mutual Security Program (MSP).48 The administration also changed the structure of the aid. Most of it was disbursed in the form of a loan and only a small part of it was a grant. During the years 1954–1961, Israel got nearly $492 million in economic aid, $191.6 million of it in grants. Thus, the level 43 44

45

46

47

48

Minutes of 32nd Government Meeting, 28 February 1954, ISA, 3. Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Congressional Research Service- 75700, RL 33222, 4 December 2009, 21. Marc L. Raphael, A History of the United Jewish Appeal, 1939–1982 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1982), 1–3. M. Sharett in Minutes of Mapai Political Committee, 3 January 1952, DBGA, MS, 6. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, 24 March 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 1156–1157. A. Eban to M. Sharett, 9 March 1953, W6, ISA, FO 2310/1; A. Eban to M. Sharett, 16 March 1953, W30, ibid.

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of annual aid during the Eisenhower administration was higher than during the Truman administration, but a larger portion of it was loans.49 Yet Eisenhower’s impartial friendship showed less partiality and more friendliness in its handling of Israel’s economic needs. The way in which Israel made its requests for economic aid was interesting. Its representatives did not view those requests as charity but rather as if they deserved it. When Sharett explained in May 1952 to the Israeli government that the American grant-in-aid programme was reduced and addressed the claim that Israel’s deficit was increasing, he blamed the Americans for not providing it with the funding it had asked. Sharett described the Israeli tactics in approaching the administration: ‘we come to Washington as if we deserve it, and they oblige to do so, using the terminology of debt collectors, as if coming to collect a debt, putting a lot of pressure and pretending as if they owe us and not that in fact, we are asking for charity’.50 Similarly, when Israel sought American economic aid after the 1958 crisis (see later), the Israeli diplomats used ‘I deserve it’ rhetoric. Moshe Arel from the Israeli embassy in Washington explained, ‘The Americans know deep down that they owe us their support and aid [italics added].’51 Three decades later, in 1991, Israel ‘demanded’ American guarantees for $10 billion of loans that it intended to raise for the absorption of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. The Bush administration imposed conditions on the supply of the guarantees, which Israel refused to accept, but what upset the administration more than anything else was the language used by the Israeli ambassador, Zalman Shoval. He ‘demanded’ rather than ‘requested’. Shoval thought that ‘his wording was not offensive’.52 Either tactically or genuinely, Israel was unready to take ‘no’ for an answer. It would fight against a ‘no’ forcefully, using a mixture of political pressure and cries of Gewald (help in Yiddish). According to the Israelis, their economic or security situation was always dire. A financial catastrophe was just about to happen, and a significant security threat awaited. These convictions were held even if the evidence showed otherwise. Thus, when the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) high command concluded in December 1959 that the military balance 49 50 51 52

Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 21–22. Minutes of 50th Government Meeting, 20 July 1952, ISA, 9. M. Arel to P. Aliav, 3 November 1959, M/277, ISA, FO 6451/1. Zalman Shoval, Diplomat (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2016), 192.

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between Israel and the Arab countries was definitely in Israel’s favour, Ben Gurion was in doubt. ‘The position of the staff officers is too optimistic’, he wrote in his diary, ‘with time, the quality gap between us and the Arabs will gradually dissipate, and then quantity will become the determining factor’.53 Two months later, Ben Gurion asked the general staff whether Israel could win a war that would erupt within three to four years. The answer was unilaterally positive. Some officers claimed that Egypt would never close the military gap with Israel.54 This estimation did not stop Ben Gurion’s or other Israeli officials’ catastrophic rhetoric. *** Getting the grants and loans was never an easy ride. Usually, members of congress supported Israel’s request for economic assistance, but still, there were those who opposed the Israeli requests, all or in part.55 American diplomats stationed in Arab countries also expressed their opposition to providing financial aid to Israel or that of the government to which they were accredited.56 The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that aid to Israel would hurt the American strategic position in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia.57 To overcome these voices of opposition, the Israeli embassy and American Jewish agencies put in operation an efficient lobbying and advocacy machinery. Isaiah (‘Si’) Kenen was hired to lobby in congress and was made the director of the American–Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which became ‘by far the most effective citizen-ethnic lobby’ in the United States. It was not the only citizen-ethnic lobby, as there were also active Greek, Irish, Chicano, Hungaro-Romanian, Chinese, and other lobby groups, but AIPAC was the most prominent and influential. The organization’s success was partly based on the profound support of pro-Israel members of Congress, willing to listen 53 54 55

56 57

Entry for 31 December 1959, DBGD. Entry for 18 February 1960, DBGD. I. L. Kenen to L. Lipsky, 12 March 1951, ISA, FO 342/37; R. B. Long to I. L. Kenen, 13 March 1951, ISA, FO 342/39; S. L. Holland to E. D. Stone, 13 March 1951, ibid.; G. M. Gilette to E. D. Stone, 13 March 1951, ibid.; M. Mansfield to S. Rivlin, 21 May 1951, ISA, FO 343/4. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 79–80; Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, 75–80. State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 2 May 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 5, 665.

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and to help on issues related to Israel. Another reason for AIPAC’s success was its staff’s knowledge of Congress. Kenen knew Congress inside and out, as did his successor, Morris Amitay, who was Senator Abraham Ribicoff’s legislative aide. Congress members and White House staff had close ties with AIPAC, which led to a flow of information both ways. Members of Congress and White House staff would leak to AIPAC information pertinent to Israel, which enabled AIPAC to prepare its positions and opposition in advance, if necessary. Thus, when the Nixon administration planned to supply to Jordan fourteen Hawk batteries, Amitai obtained a top-secret copy of a Chief of Staff report, recommending supplying Jordan with only six batteries. Amitai alerted the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee and helped its members to prepare embarrassing questions for General George Brown, the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who appeared before the committee. Eventually, the administration supplied Jordan with fewer Hawks than originally planned.58 The exposure of Jonathan Pollard, the Navy analyst who spied for Israel, was quite shocking. Still, Israel and the pro-Israeli lobby did not need spies to get access to American secrets. There were enough sympathetic officials from the Pentagon, Department of State, congressional offices, the National Security Council (NSC), and even the US intelligence agencies, who provided Israel and the pro-Israeli lobby with crucial information pertinent to Israel, without asking for anything in return.59 Information flowed in the other direction as well. AIPAC possessed an effective research division that provided legislators who lacked staff resources with information, papers, and speeches. Members of Congress received a factsheet from the AIPAC’s research division every Monday morning before the Department of State sent its own. Thus, AIPAC managed to ‘set the theme for the ensuing debates’.60 AIPAC

58

59

60

Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 186–188. The most detailed study on Israel’s advocacy in the United States is in Natan Aridan’s excellent book Advocating for Israel: Diplomats and Lobbyist from Truman to Nixon (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017). Charles R. Babcock, ‘Israel Uses Special Relationship to Get Secrets’, Washington Post, 15 June 1986, A1. Franck and Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress, 188.

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also set the tone and agenda for the broad Jewish community through memos and messages sent to the grassroots American Jewish communities, as described throughout this book. The pressure campaigns on behalf of Israel in the United States raised the sensitive issue of Israeli interference in American domestic politics. Ambassador Eban discussed with Jewish leaders protest measures scheduled for October 1954, shortly before the midterm congressional elections. Wishing to avoid criticism of the Israeli ambassador interfering in American domestic politics, Eban decided that the embassy would not get involved in the protest.61 That did not prevent C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times from blaming Israel, on the eve of the elections, for conducting a ‘powerful propaganda campaign’, which ‘amounts to a bet on a Democratic election victory’.62 AIPAC was one answer to that problem. It was a means to advance the Israeli case without the Israeli government’s explicit and direct involvement. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations served a similar purpose. The Conference was established in 1955 by the presidents of eighteen Jewish organizations, in response to Henry Byroade’s complaint that he had to meet various Jewish leaders who raised the same topics with him. He suggested that it would be more effective if the leaders worked together to raise the issues with the administration. His advise was heeded, and what had started as an informal powerful advocacy group for Israel, became in June 1966 an official organization.63 The Israeli embassy had considerable influence over these groups, but the Israeli diplomats were careful to stay out of the limelight.

The Quest for Military Assistance The Truman and Eisenhower administrations were more successful in applying an even-handed policy to arms sales to Israel. They were

61

62

63

A. Eban to US Division, 20 September 1954, W681, ISA, FO 2310/11; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to Y. Herzog, 1 October 1954, W937, ISA, FO 2310/12. C. L. Sulzberger, ‘Foreign Affairs: Israel’s Bet on the U.S. Elections’, New York Times, 3 November 1954, 28. Goldmann, Autobiography, 325; Kenen, Israel’s Defense line, 111; Philip M. Klutznick, Angels of Vision (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991), 164–166; ‘Jewish Set Up Body on Major Issues’, New York Times, 12 June 1966, 122.

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determined not to make the United States a major arms supplier to Israel, and this was also where the pressure of Israel’s friends bore no fruits, a demonstration to the limit of the impact of public opinion and pressure on American presidents. Israel accepted that, if grudgingly, but never quit seeking ways to change that policy. For Israel, the end of the 1948 War of Independence did not bring an end to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The war ended with armistice agreements signed during 1949 between Israel and Egypt (24 February), Lebanon (17 March), Jordan (3 April), and Syria (20 July). Iraq, who also participated in the war, refused to sign an armistice agreement with Israel. While different in content, all of the agreements included an article claiming that the agreements were signed ‘[w]ith a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine.’64 This did not happen, and tensions and violence continued along Israel’s borders. The UN suggested a mechanism for Israeli–Arab negotiations, the Palestine Conciliation Committee (PCC), established in December 1948. The United States saw here an opportunity. The unofficial head of the Committee was the American Mark Ethridge, appointed by Truman. The president hoped that the American support would help Ethridge to succeed in his mission. Despite the president’s interest in the operation of the PCC, it failed to achieve its goal. Several months of negotiations came to a close without agreement, and the Israeli and Arab delegations returned to their homes. With that, the PCC ended its mission, not officially, but practically.65 Israel’s borders became a source of tension when infiltrators crossed its borders, stealing, robbing, and killing Israeli citizens. The Israeli government responded vengefully to what it viewed as a violation of the armistice agreements. Soldiers acted to seal the borders with fire, while IDF units crossed the borders from time to time to launch retaliation attacks, aiming to force the Arab authorities to prevent the infiltrations into Israel. Besides the border clashes, the Israeli government was sure that the Arabs did not come to terms with the defeat in the 1948 war. The Arab states around Israel maintained the state of belligerency, and the Arab League imposed an economic boycott on Israel that shunned businesses that traded with Israel. Egypt barred Israeli ships from passing through the Suez Canal – an international

64 65

The Israeli text says ‘Israel’ instead of Palestine. Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 57–211.

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maritime lane.66 On top of all of these problems, Prime Minister Ben Gurion was sure that once they would feel able to do so, the Arab states would resume the fighting against Israel to avenge their defeat in the 1948 war and to undo the results of the war. Israel was strong enough during the immediate years after the war to hold off an attack. However, argued Ben Gurion, whereas the Arabs could endure countless defeats, the first defeat would ultimately be the last for Israel.67 Therefore, Israel had to acquire and maintain military superiority while acting to prevent American and British arms sales to the Arabs. Israel turned to the Americans for arms, arguing that the British government was planning to supply arms to Egypt and Iraq, and those arms would be used against Israel. When the Americans declined the Israeli requests, the Israelis insisted that the Arabs should also be denied arms.68 Israel sought American weapons not only for military purposes but also for political reasons, as American shipment of arms to Israel would also be a message that the United States was standing behind Israel. This was one of the main reasons for the American refusal to comply with the Israeli request. The Pentagon and the NSC insisted that there was no reason to arm Israel due to the British arms sales to Egypt as there were no signs that the Egyptians were planning to attack Israel. In any event, since the British would have full control over Egypt’s armaments, the Egyptians would be unable to utilize the arms without British authorization.69 Acheson also explained that the Arabs would receive a limited number of arms which would ‘constitute no danger to Israel’s security’, as Israel was militarily superior to the Arabs.70 At the same time, the Department of State presented a reason 66

67

68

69

70

David Tal, ‘Israel’s Armistice Wars, 1949–1956’, in Mordechai Bar On (ed.), A Never-Ending Conflict: A Guide to Israeli Military History (Westpoint, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 69–86. David Ben Gurion, Uniqueness and Destination (Tel Aviv: Maarchot, 1980), 219–221; Minutes of 18th Government Meeting, 20 January 1952, ISA, 23–24. David Tal, ‘Weapons without Influence: British Arms Supply Policy and the Egyptian–Czech Arms Deal, 1945–55’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2006), 370–376. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 January 1950, HSTPL, Secretary of State File, Acheson Papers; D. Acheson to J. K. Javits, 12 January 1950, ibid., Papers of David Niles, b. 30; A. Liverhant, Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to USA Branch, FO, 10 May 1950, W33, ISA, FO 2308/18; NSC 65/3, 17 May 1950, DNSA. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 January 1950, HSTPL, Secretary of State File, Acheson Papers; D. Acheson to J. K. Javits, 12 January 1950, ibid., Papers of

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for supplying arms to the Arabs – since the Middle East was important to the West’s security, it was ‘desirable’ that the region’s states – and this meant the Arab states – would get arms from ‘reliable and friendly sources’.71 For years, American and Israeli officials debated the extent of the threat that Arab countries posed to Israel, and the extent to which Israel needed American weapons. Until 1955, Israeli diplomats presented to the Truman and Eisenhower administrations reports about Arab, mainly Egyptian, intentions towards Israel and their attempts to purchase arms that skewed the military balance in their favour.72 American Jewish organizations, members of Congress, and the public joined the campaign to appeal the White House and the Department of State, urging the sale of arms to Israel and protesting against the sale of arms to the Arabs.73 In 1954, 240 candidates for Congress signed a

71

72

73

David Niles; A. Eban to USA Division, 8 November 1952, W665, ISA, FO 2208/ 24. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 January 1950, HSTPL, Secretary of State File, Acheson Papers; D. Acheson to J. K. Javits, 12 January 1950, ibid., Papers of David Niles; E. Eilat to M. Sharett, 17 February 1950, W742, ISA, FO 2308/16; Account of Conversation between the Secretary of State and a Group of Congressmen on the Subject of the Near East Armament Situation, 28 March 1950, ISA, A347/21. President Chaim Weizmann to President Truman, 3 January 1950, USNA, 784.02/1-350; ‘Israel Says Arab Arming Increases Defense Needs’, New York Times, 25 January 1950, 10; ‘Text of Statement on the Shipment of Arms to the Arab States’, 25 January 1950, ISA, FO 2455/1; United States Branch, Foreign Office to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 9 February 1950, ISA, A347/21; E. Eilat to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 13 February 1950, ibid; A. Eban to USA Division, 5 January 1953, WTE26, ISA, FO 2313/4; M. Sharett to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 29 July 1953, IWA586, ISA, FO 2309/14; M. Sharett to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 30 July 1953, IWA596, ibid. ‘Acheson Disputed on Arming Arabs’, New York Times, 29 January 1950, 23; ‘Guarantee by U.S. for Israel Sought’, ibid, 30 January 1950, 3; Memorandum of Conversation, 15 February 1950, HSTPL, Secretary of State File, Acheson Papers; M. Youval to E. Eilat, 20 February 1950, ISA, A347/21; E. Eilat to M. Sharett, 17 February 1950, W739, ISA, FO 2308/16; E. Eilat to Office, Tel Aviv, 2 March 1950, W784, ibid.; A. Eban to M. Sharett, 29 December 1952, WTEA24, ISA, FO 2313/4; E. Eilat to M. Sharett, 21 April 1950, W949, ISA, FO 2308/16; M. Keren to A. H. Silver, 26 April 1950, ISA, A347/21; Memorandum of Conversation, 10 March 1950, HSTPL, Secretary of State File, Acheson papers; Memorandum of Conversation, 28 March, ibid.; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., to Elihu D. Stone, 30 March 1950, ISA, A347/21; M. Keren to United States’ Department, Foreign Office, 4 April 1950, ibid; ‘Jews Protest British Arms Supply to Arabs’, Los Angeles Times, 8 May 1950, 16; ‘Curb on Arms Sale to Arabs is Urged’, New York Times, 9 May 1950, 12;

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declaration against arming the Arab states, and 76 issued their own statements – 180 of them were elected.74 Cabinet members were asked, too, to act against the shipment of arms to the Arabs, or supplying arms to Israel. Secretary Brannan and Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, for example, discussed the matter with Acheson, but with no real success. Acheson insisted that the British arms deliveries ‘involve vital political and security interests’ for Britain and the United States.75 Israel also used emissaries to convey its message to the president. Oscar Ewing, one of Truman’s closest political associates, Philip Murray and William Green, presidents of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Bart Crum, Jacob Blaustein, the American Jewish Committee president, and Abe Feinberg – all, at one point or another, turned to President Truman, asking him to prevent arms shipments to the Arabs, or supplying arms to Israel.76 President Truman’s reply was typical. He promised Eddie Jacobson in September 1950, ‘Don’t worry, Israel would get plenty of arms if they needed them. Hopes they never will.’77 The president actually meant that first, it had to be clear that Israel was under an imminent threat of attack and second, that it did not possess

74

75 76

77

R. Shiloah to US Division, 8 August 1954, W755, ISA, FO 2310/11; Memorandum of Conversation, 19 August 1954, USNA, RG59, 611.84A/81954; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to A. Eban, Jerusalem, 20 August 1954, W780, ISA, FO 2310/11; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to US Division, 20 August 1954, W783, ibid.; ‘Jews Ask for Delay in Arming Arabs’, Washington Post, 26 October 1954, 15; A. Eban to US Division, 26 November 1954, W148, ISA, FO 2310/12. Y. H. Levin to A. Eban, 5 November 1954, ISA, FO 391/4. At the same time, 654 candidates refused or did not reply, ibid.; AZC for Public Affairs: ‘Memorandum for Action #14’, 10 November 1954, ibid. E. Eilat to Office, Tel Aviv, 24 February 1950, W757, ISA, FO 2308/16. Entry for 26 June 1948, DPJM, 19, note 55; E. Eilat to M. Sharett, 1 February 1950, W684, ISA, FO 2308/16; David Niles to M. Connelly, 6 February 1950, HSTPL, PSF, b. 158; For Immediate Release, 10 February 1950, ibid., Papers of David Niles, b. 30; A.F.L., C.I.O. Protest on Arms to Arabs’, New York Times, 11 February 1950, 7; E. Eilat to Office, Tel Aviv, 17 March 1950, W823, ISA, FO 2308/16; E. Eilat to USA Division, 14 April 1950, ibid.; Jacob Blaustein to President Harry S. Truman, 10 May 1950, HSTPL, PSF, b. 158; E. Eilat to USA Division, 20 May 1950, W70, ISA, FO 2308/18; M. Yuval to M. Keren, 2 June 1950, ISA, FO 377/16; Harry S. Truman to Abraham Feinberg, 7 June 1950, HSTPL, Papers of David Niles, b. 30. Eddy Jacobson, diary entry for 28 September 1950 quoted in Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict, 47, footnote 131.

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the arms it needed to defend itself. Dulles responded to similar calls in 1954 by saying Israel was still stronger than all of the Arab armies combined, and the United States would ensure that it remained so.78 Secretary Acheson’s initial response to the pressure appeared promising to Israel since it appeared that the administration was concerned about the pressure. During his meeting with Secretaries Brannan and Chapman, Acheson complained about the Israeli and Zionist pressure, which he claimed only ‘complicates issues’.79 Following his meeting with Acheson on 31 January, Ambassador Eliahu Eilat felt that the secretary was ‘interested in preventing further progress public campaign’ against the arms shipments to the Arabs.80 Eilat could be right in his assessment, but the public pressure did not lead to a change in policy. In fact, the outcome of the campaign can serve as a rebuttal to those who accused the Jewish/Israeli lobby of abusing its political power to compel the administration to apply a policy that harmed American interests. Truman would not budge, stating that Israel should solve its security problems by making peace with its enemies rather than seeking arms.81 This was not the last time that Israel heard from a president and his secretary of state that peace was a better solution to Israel’s security problems than the acquisition of arms. More important than the generous American advice was the president’s persistent rejection of the pressure to supply arms to Israel. When the president thought that the Israeli/Jewish requests did not justify sacrificing American interests, he would not succumb to the Israeli/Jewish pressure. It was only when a president was convinced that the Jewish and Israeli arguments were justified – on any given issue – would he comply, even at the expense of American interests. In this case, the president believed that the Jewish and Israeli claims were unjustified. Until the long-awaited peace arrived, the administration presented a more manageable measure to deal with the Israeli pressures. In 78

79 80 81

A. Eban to M. Sharett, 4 August 1954, W730, ISA, FO 2310/11; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, 4 August 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 1600–1602; A. Eban to M. Sharett, 7 August 1954, W750, ISA, FO 2310/11; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, 7 August 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 1604–1606; R. Shiloah to Y. Herzog, 12 October 1954, W971, ISA, FO 2310/12. E. Eilat to Office, Tel Aviv, 24 February 1950, W757, ISA, FO 2308/16. E. Eilat to M. Sharett, 31 January 1950, W680, ISA, FO 2308/16. M. Eilat to USA Division, 5 May 1950, W14, ISA, FO 2308/18.

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conjunction with the British and the French governments, the administration presented a controlled weapon sales regime in the Middle East. Committing themselves to the prevention of the development of an arms race, the three powers issued in May 1950 the Tripartite Declaration. It stipulated that arms would be provided to Middle East countries for self-defence and internal security purposes, ‘and in accordance with the contribution of the recipient nation to regional security’; and the three Western powers pledged to prevent, even by force, the violation of the armistice lines between Israel and its neighbours.82 The Declaration did not satisfy Israel. The article regarding participation in the defence of the Middle East would allow the sale of arms to the Arabs, while it was clear that Israel would not be invited to participate in the defense of the Middle East, and would therefore receive no arms. The other provision for getting arms was self-defence, and Ben Gurion predicted that Britain and the United States would argue that Israel was no under no danger that justified selling arms to Israel for self-defence.83 The Declaration also raised the sensitive matter of the nature of the relationship between Israel and the United States. As mentioned in the Introduction, the Israelis do not appreciate the idealistic foundation of Israeli–American relations. They believed that these relations would last only if they were founded on a solid, concrete, strategic basis. The article in the Declaration stipulating that states in the region would get arms ‘in accordance with the contribution of the recipient nation to regional security’ opened the door for Israel to argue that it would contribute more than the Arabs to the defence of the Middle East. The Israelis claimed that the Arabs would not fight with the West against the Soviet Union but would use their arms only against Israel, while Israel (along with Turkey) was the only country in the Middle East that would fight with the West in case of a world war.84 Neither the Truman nor the Eisenhower administrations contested Israel’s arguments about its military value to the Middle East’s defence and the 82

83 84

Joint Statement by the Government of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, 25 May 1950, Department of State, Bulletin, 5 June 1950, 886. Entry for 28 May 1950, DBGD. US Ambassador in Israel to the Secretary of State, 31 July 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 5, 960–961; US Consul in Jerusalem to the Secretary of State, 13 November 1950, USNA, 682.84A/11-1350; Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State, 23 December 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 5, 1079–1081; Entries for 18 April 1950 and 27 January 1951, DBGD.

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futility of relying on the Arab countries. That, though, was not the point. The invitation to the Arab countries to join a regional military organization aimed to serve a political, not military, purpose. The United States and the British did not expect the Arab states to contribute militarily to the Middle East’s defence. The provision aimed to keep the Arabs within the Western camp.85 Israel had more success in its quest for military assistance, other than arms. The Israeli military attaché in Washington, DC, asked US Army headquarters to admit two Israeli officers to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, five to West Point, and five to the Infantry Training Center. The Pentagon announced in December 1949 that Israel could send five soldiers to train in one of forty-seven courses. However, the list did not include weapons, artillery, tactical, or general staff courses, only engineering, messaging, transportation, ‘horsemanship’, adjutant general administration, finance, medicine, and signals.86 Israel Air Force (IAF) soldiers were admitted to American schools where they would be qualified as air force technicians and other aviation professions.87 With that, a routine was established, and Israeli officers regularly attended military training courses in the United States.88 The failure to get the arms tells only part of the story. It was clear to both the Israelis and the Americans that the request for American arms was intended to serve a political rather than military purpose. The more important aspect of the Israeli futile quest for American arms was the discussions held between Israeli and American officials. The negotiations, debates, and conversations between officials from both countries at various levels were a mark of the American–Israeli special relationship that existed already at this early stage. Israeli diplomats had full access to senior administration members, and they felt free to express their views, rage, and frustration whenever they deemed it

85

86

87

88

Entry for 15 October 1951, DBGD; Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion–M. B. Davis, 15 October 1951, DFPI 1951, Vol. 6, 708–711. Report No. 1 of Military Attaché in the United States, 12 January 1949, ISA, FO 4372/16; E. Ben Arzi to H. Herzog, 5 December 1949, W584, ISA, FO 2308/16. E. Eilat: Report No. 8 (October 1949), 12 December 1949, ISA, FO 2382/22; E. Ben Arzi to Office, Tel Aviv, 20 December 1949, W600, ISA FO2308/16. Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to Office, Tel Aviv, 11 October 1951, WIA474, ISA, FO 2309/3.

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necessary. The American officials tried to apply an even-handed policy, but they would listen to what the Israeli representatives had to say and would respond to them. This was a mark of an unusually intimate relationship which already existed during Israel’s first years of existence. Ambassador McDonald got the gist of it when he claimed that the United States was the only ‘great power which was willing to let its friendship for Israel play in a role in shaping its policy’.89 The Israeli foreign office general director, Walter Eytan, to whom McDonald said those words, agreed, ‘time had come for [Israel] to appreciate that the United States was the only power which was ready to help her even against [US] own interests, and where the head of state was always approachable and ready to lend a friendly ear’.90 There are no better words to describe the nature of the American–Israeli relationship throughout the whole period covered in this book.

The Eisenhower Administration Sometime in 1954, during the race for Congress, a senatorial candidate named Walter I. Sundlun met with President Dwight Eisenhower at the Oval Office. Sundlun was taken aback by the Democrats’ claim, according to which the Republican party, President Eisenhower, and particularly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, were not inclined to aid Israel to overcome the Arab countries’ hostility. As the claim might affect his campaign, Sundlun raised the matter with the president. In a letter he sent to Prime Minister Meir, about sixteen years later, Sundlun described his meeting with the president. ‘Eisenhower’, he wrote, Was standing behind his small desk in his private office, carefully listening to what I had told him. With a quick movement of his body and a determined expression on his face, he turned to me and looking me squarely in the eyes, he said, ‘Walter Sundlun, whenever or wherever you find the need, you can say that you were told by me as the President of the United States that ISRAEL SHALL NEVER STAND ALONE’. [capitalized and underlined in original]91

89 90 91

Entry for 11 December 1949, DPJM, 750. W. Eytan to M. Sharett, 11 December 1949, HK2, ISA, FO 2329/14. W. I. Sundlun to Prime Minister Golda Meir, 17 July 1970, ISA, G 6525/1.

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Sundlun did not win a Senate seat, but his exchange with the president demonstrated the gap between appearance and reality. There is no question that Eisenhower was not as warm and friendly towards Israel as Truman was, but the difference was more in appearance rather than substance, and the dimension of continuity was more substantial than change. The Israelis did not have strong ties with Eisenhower before his election. Ben Gurion met him the first – and only – time in Washington, DC, in October 1945 and was impressed by his ‘deep humanity and goodwill’ towards the displaced people, and his ‘sincere wish to help them’.92 Since then, no contact had been made between the two. After Eisenhower’s election, Ben Gurion got worried. He expected that the new president would change the course of the American Middle Eastern policy and would veer it sharply towards the Arabs. On the morning after the elections, Ben Gurion wrote in his diary: ‘A significant change happened in Israel’s situation: until now, only one side had access to the White House – the Israeli. From now on, the Arabs also gained access.’93 The Israel embassy in Washington had no ties with Eisenhower the way it had with President Truman, and Eisenhower seemed to disregard domestic considerations. That is, Israel would have much less access to him and no leverage over him.94 Eisenhower’s history of relations with Jews seemed to confirm the Israeli concerns. Before his election, Eisenhower had never occupied an elected position, and he had never engaged with issues pertinent to Jews and Zionism. His attitude towards Jews, Zionism, and Israel was no different than that of the average American who learned about Jews and the state of Israel from his church and Sunday school. As he admitted to Sharett when the two met in London in February 1952, until the age of twenty-five years old, all Eisenhower knew about Jews was what he read in the Bible: ‘Actually, I wasn’t sure there were Jews in the world. I read in the Old Testament about angels, and I thought it was a fairytale, and I thought the same thing about the sons of Israel. I had no idea they existed.’95 Eisenhower’s first meaningful meeting with Jews took place under horrific circumstances. It happened at the end of the Second World 92 93 94 95

Entry for 29 October 1945, DBGD; Entry for 4 November 1952, ibid. Entries for 25 November and for 7 December 1952, DBGD. Minutes of 15th Meeting of the Government, 31 December 1951, ISA, 8. Minutes of 59th Meeting of the Government, 17 February 1952, ISA, 59–60.

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War, when, as the Allied Supreme Commander and following the final defeat of the Nazis in May 1945, he visited a German death camp near Gotha. The things he saw and heard from survivors sickened him. Eisenhower insisted on visiting every site in the camp, explaining to George C. Marshall, ‘I made the visit deliberately in order to be in a position to give first-hand evidence of these things, if ever in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these things merely propaganda.’ At the same time, Eisenhower treated and regarded what he saw as a humanitarian issue that had to be dealt with and resolved as such. That is, for Eisenhower, the lesson and conclusion from what he saw was not the establishment of a Jewish state but finding a humanitarian solution to the grievances of the Holocaust survivors.96 Nonetheless, in his message to the American Jews on the eve of Rosh Hashana in September 1952, during the election campaign, he referred to the establishment of the state of Israel as ‘part of the miraculous history of the Jewish people’, in which the United States also played a part. He mentioned the ‘growing an ever-firmer friendship between America and Israel . . . Basic to this friendship are the aspirations we share in common with all freedom-loving people’, and promised that if elected, to continue supporting Israel.97 On 15 October, he sent a telegram to the dinner arranged by the Greater New York Committee for State of Israel Bonds, in which he defined Israel as ‘a democratic outpost in the Middle East’.98 It sounded like a standard presidential campaign line for every presidential candidate, but can be read differently, considering Eisenhower’s remarks two days later on the US–Soviet rivalry. In his speech, Eisenhower said, ‘Democracy is the only just way of life . . . It is the idea of human freedom, that glorious gift of our JudeoChristian tradition. This idea, democracy, is not a mere sentimental mood, nor some casually inherited persuasion. It is a doctrine of life and a definition of a man.’99 Eisenhower viewed democracy as an integral part of the American political culture, following in a long tradition of Americans who regard democracy as a distinctive aspect of the American spirit and identity. By associating democracy with the 96 97

98 99

Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel, 28–19. ‘Eisenhower Cites the Miracle of Jewish Survival and Praises the Growth of Israel’, New York Times, 18 September 1952, 24. ‘Eisenhower Calls Israel an “Outpost”’, New York Times, 15 October 1952, 13. Texts of Gen. Eisenhower’s Addresses at Waldorf Astoria Dinner and in Paterson Armory’, New York Times, 17 October 1952, 18.

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Judeo-Christian tradition, Eisenhower underscored the close ties between the United States and Israel that are part of this tradition and share the values emanating from it. Like many presidents before and after him, Eisenhower was raised in a religious family. Unlike many presidents before and after him, he did not speak much about it. His parents were Bible-reading devoted members of their church, the River Brethren Church, which was fundamentalist, and later joined the pacifist Jehovah’s Witnesses. Dwight Eisenhower did not follow his parents’ footsteps and dissociated himself from things religious. ‘Until elected president’, wrote Eisenhower in his memoirs, ‘I had never had a formal connection with any specific church’. After his election, he joined his wife’s Presbyterian church and added to his inauguration address a pray that he composed.100 Accordingly, Eisenhower spoke about Israel in religious terms only once, and indirectly. Mentioning in March 1956 the threat Egypt posed to Israel, Eisenhower referred to the ‘tragic suffering of the Jews throughout twenty-five hundred years of history’.101 This was the most ‘religious’ comment related to Israel that Eisenhower made. At the same time, he accepted the fundamentals of Israel’s narrative of the Arab–Israeli conflict. They both agreed that the Arabs planned ‘to drive Israel into the sea’.102 Eisenhower also demonstrated his concern for Israel’s security and welfare. Shortly after taking office, he told Dulles that he was ‘Extremely hopeful that we can improve the political and economic position of Israel.’103 Eisenhower had no one around him in the White House who could play the role people like David Niles, Abe Feinberg, and Eddie Jacobson played in the Truman administration. Jacob Blaustein and Abba Hillel Silver had access to Eisenhower, and they met with him when necessary, but their impact was relatively low, and they were not

100

101

102

103

Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (London: Heinemann, 1963), 100–101. Dwight Eisenhower Diary, 8 March 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [henceforth DDEL], Dwight D. Eisenhower [henceforth DDE] Diary Series; Diary, 13 March 1956, ibid. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (London: Heinemann, 1966), 21; Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 24 July 1958, DDEL, DDE Diaries Series. D. D. Eisenhower to John F. Dulles, 12 March 1953, DDEL, XIV, 96.

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included in his inner circle.104 The only Jews who were in the president’s inner circle were Maxwell Rabb, advisor to the president for minority affairs, Jack Martin, the White House liaison with Congress, and Arthur Burns, Eisenhower’s economic advisor, but none served or functioned as a clear and distinct representative of Jewish or Israeli interests. The initial lack of contact with Eisenhower’s team did not deter the Israeli embassy. Gradually, the embassy established ties with Rabb and Martin Burns, as well as Vice President Richard Nixon and Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s chief of staff.105 The embassy also maintained good relations with General Walter Bedell Smith, who served as Eisenhower’s chief of staff during the Second World War. The general demonstrated pro-Israeli proclivities. He often met with Israeli diplomats and apprised them of the prevailing mood in the administration. At various junctures of tension between Israel and the United States, he tried to soothe the strain, defending Israel’s position in his talks with the president. Thus, for example, when the president complained about the timing of the Israeli attack on Egypt, on the eve of the 1956 presidential elections, Smith argued that the decision was made solely on military grounds. ‘If I were instead of Ben Gurion, I would do the same thing’, said Smit to the president.106 Eisenhower’s secretary of state had complicated relationships with the Jews. Dulles was no stranger to Zionism and Israel. He was a member of the American delegation to the UN’s sessions that voted for the partition resolution, and in his conversations with Jewish leaders, he prided himself on his support for the Zionist cause.107 In his attitude towards Israel, Dulles compounded religion with pragmatism. Religiously, Dulles often referred to the Judeo-Christian civilization as the basis of the Israeli–American relations. The idea of the Judeo-Christian civilization gained popularity in the United States in the 1950s, at the dawn of the Cold War. It was part of a religious revival that swept the United States during that time, with the JudeoChristian civilization pitted against the godless communists. It also 104

105 106

107

See, for example, A. Eban to US Division, 18 August 1953, DFPI 1953, Vol. 8, 592. R. Shiloah to Y. Herzog, 2 February 1955, RSh/93, ISA, FO 4374/9. R. Shiloah to G. Meir, 18 July 1957, W749, ISA, FO 2312/4; R. Shiloah to G. Meir, 23 July 1957, W770, ibid. Minutes of Meeting of American Division of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 5 August 1947, DBGA, MS.

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attributed special place for Israel as a site whose roots were in the Bible, populated by the Chosen People, the inheritors of prophets, warriors, and the simple people who inhabited the Bible’s stories. This vision romanticized Israel at the expense of the Arabs, and with Israel fighting the ‘foes outside the Judeo-Christian family, Israelis seemed just like Americans’.108 That shared heritage led Dulles to argue that although there were occasions when the relations between the two countries strained, the constant was more robust than the ephemeral. The relationships between the United States and Israel were based on ‘[a] sense of common destiny – a common faith in the destiny of man and his origin in the hands of God’.109 In a brief to the Department of State officials, Dulles said, US support for the establishment of the state of Israel had not been the result of only political considerations; the people of Israel and the American people share cultural, religious, and moral heritage. The establishment of the state of Israel was a tremendous historical event of people returning to the homeland. Israel in the Middle East is a centre of power for the free world. Israel’s neighbours, out of revenge sentiments and fear from the influence of a modern democratic regime want to see it destroyed. The United States is utterly unready to stand by and view indifferently the attempts to undermine Israel.110

As was mentioned earlier, Eisenhower, too, referred to the JudeoChristian tradition as the source of the Israeli–American relations. ‘Our common Judeo-Christian civilization’ was the bond that tied the United States and Israel together, he said.111 The message underpinned in the idea of Judeo-Christianity was introduced to the American people also through popular culture. Frank Slaugher’s novel The Song of Ruth: A Love Story of the Old Testament (1954), and such films as Samson and Delilah (1949), The 108

109

110 111

Michelle Mart, ‘The “Christianization” of Israel and Jews in 1950s America’, Religious and American Culture, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2004), 109. Meeting at Dinner of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior and Senior Officials with J. F. Dulles and the U.S. Delegation, 13 May 1953, DFPI 1953, Vol. 8, 370–371; Meeting: D. Ben Gurion and M. Sharett – J. F. Dulles and the U.S. Delegation, 14 May 1953, ibid., 379. R. Shiloah to M. Sharett, 9 March 1954, ISA, FO 4374/5. Address at the American Jewish Tercentenary Dinner, 20 October 1954, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-american-jewish-tercentenarydinner-new-york-city. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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Prodigal (1955), and The Ten Commandments (1956) all spread a message of the monotheism that the Jews adopted and spread, and which the Western world, foremost the United States endorsed and embraced.112 Notwithstanding his religious stance towards Israel, Dulles advanced an American pragmatic policy in the Middle East in general and towards Israel in particular. Dulles suggested a non-judgemental and non-tilted narrative on the Arab–Israeli conflict, treating the protagonists as carrying equal blame for not achieving peace. Thus, Dulles called to take measures that would ‘allay the deep resentment against [the United States] that has resulted from the creation of Israel’.113

Friendly or/and Impartiality? President Eisenhower already presented the fundamentals of the policy that scholars associated mainly with him, the Friendly Impartiality, during the election campaign. Then he indicated that he would take a more balanced position towards the Middle East. When he talked about extending economic aid to Israel, he did that in the context of the whole region, which should also include the Arab states and especially the Palestinian refugees. The Republican plank’s foreign policy part, which was written by Dulles and approved by Eisenhower, expressed the party’s commitment to continued aid to the Near East, with particular reference to aid for Israel and the Palestinian Arab refugees. Eisenhower also repeated his intention to take a broad approach towards aid to the Middle East in a conversation he had with Abba Hillel Silver.114 As president, he was more explicit in his intention to pursue an even-handed Middle Eastern

112

113

114

Michelle Mart, Eyes on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 97–98. Radio Address by John F. Dulles, Secretary of State, on His Recent Visit to the Near East and South Asia, 1 June 1953, Department of State, Bulletin, 15 June 1953, 834. C. P. Trussell, ‘Committee Agrees on A Foreign Plank’, New York Times, 7 July 1952, 8; Luncheon with General Eisenhower – Commodore Hotel, 28 August 1952, ISA, FO 2382/22; A. Eban to M. Sharett, 2 September 1952, AA/368, ISA, FO 2414/27; D. D. Eisenhower to Abba Hillel Silver, 17 October 1952, ISA, FO 2389/1.

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policy. In an NSC meeting in July 1953, he stated that ‘under no circumstances would the United States favour the Israelis above the Arabs or vice versa’.115 Eisenhower and Dulles anticipated a hostile Israeli and American Jewish reaction to the new policy, but Eisenhower and his aides stated that the administration did not have to take into account the Jewish response to that change of course. As the Jews did not give their votes to Eisenhower and had no impact on his election, the president was impervious to their pressure. Dulles made that point, arguing that Eisenhower owed no debt to the Jews, as he was elected ‘by the overwhelming of the people of the U.S.’.116 Eisenhower, too, dismissed the Jewish pressure, relying on a comment made by ‘a highly respected friend of mine’, who claimed that the Zionists were a minority among American Jews. ‘Except for the Bronx and Brooklyn, the great majority of the nation’s population is anti-Zionist’, told Eisenhower to Dulles.117 Apparently, the friend was ill-informed. Yet, Eisenhower ‘agreed that we should continue our present policy of impartiality and should not be deterred by political pressure’.118 Given their dismissive reactions to Jewish pressure, it was odd to see how sensitive the president and his secretary of state were to this pressure. Thus, for example, Eisenhower and Dulles were anything but indifferent to the American Jewish protests against the president’s pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai.119 The president took the trouble of studying and analysing the telegrams that flooded the White House, learning that Jews sent 90 per cent of the mail, and out 115 116

117

118

119

NSC Minutes Meeting, 9 July 1953, DDEL, XIV, 573. D. Goitein to USA Division, 7 May 1953, DG/383, ISA, FO 358/3; Meeting: D. Ben Gurion and M. Sharett – J. F. Dulles and the U.S. Delegation, 14 May 1953, DFPI 1953, Vol. 8, 379, 383–384; USA Division to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 14 May 1953, 316, ISA, FO 2309/13; Visit of Dulles and Stassen’s Delegation in Israel, 18 May 1953, ISA, FO 2414/28. D. D. Eisenhower to J. F. Dulles, 28 October 1953, DDEL, Ann Whitman Files, Dulles and Herter Series, Dulles, J. F., b. 1. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 21 April 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 1528–1529. And see Telephone Call to Mr. Byroade, 8 June 1954, DDEL, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, b. 1. The documents on the congress, American Jews and public opposition to the punitive measures are too much to cite. One useful source is A. Eban: ‘The Diplomatic Campaign in the United Nations and the United States in the Wake of the Sinai War, October 1956–March 1957’, ISA, G 7276/3.

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of that percentage, only 10 per cent supported him, while 90 per cent of the senders were against him. Dulles noted that ‘practically all the response was Jewish’.120 And indeed, unlike the image he sought to advance, the president was very much thin-skinned to the Jewish pressure. As Dulles admitted during a conversation with Representative Jacob Javits (R-NY), the president would not ‘want to fly in the face of the Jewish people in the US’.121 When Life magazine editor Henry Luce asked Secretary Dulles not to support sanctions against Israel, the secretary lamented how ‘almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews. Marshall and Forrestal learned that. I am going to try to have one’, and he added, ‘that does not mean I’m anti-Jewish, but I believe in what George Washington said in his farewell address, that an emotional attachment to another country should not interfere’ in the making of foreign policy.122 Dulles complained that Jewish influence had also reached Congress and that it was ‘almost impossible to get congress to do anything [the Jews] don’t approve of’. The Jewish community was not acting on its own accord, added Dulles, they were acting on orders of the Israeli embassy who ‘practically dictating to the congress, through influential Jewish people in the country’. It came to pass that Dulles claimed that Ben Gurion ‘can control our government policies through the Jewish pressure here’.123 Dulles went even further in describing the scope of Jewish influence. In what can be viewed as verging on the brink of anti-Semitism, he believed that the Jews and Zionists had influence ‘around the world’.124 At the same time, Dulles embarked a campaign in defence of the even-handed policy, in which he made two main arguments. First, that it was not at Israel’s expense, and it even served Israel’s interests, and second, that the new policy by no means meant that the administration was drifting away from Israel. Dulles was offended when Eban told him that the feeling in Israel was that ‘a cloud had fallen over [Israel– 120

121 122

123

124

Telephone Call to Roswell Barnes, 22 February 1957, DDEL, J. F. Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, b. 6. E. Evron to Sh. Bendor, 9 September 1953, EE/68/4621, ISA, FO 2414/27. Telephone Call from Mr. Luce, 11 February 1957, DDEL, J. F. Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, b. 6. Telephone Call to Roswell Barnes, 19 February 1957, DDEL, J. F. Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, b. 6. Memorandum of Discussion at the 262nd Meeting of the NSC, 20 October 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. XIV, 621.

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US] relationship, and that the traditional atmosphere no longer prevailed’.125 The secretary insisted that the administration, just like the American people, ‘ascribed to their friendship with Israel a special importance’, which was not like anything the United States had with any other state. One reason for that deep sentiment was the American appreciation of the Jewish contribution ‘to the fundamental concepts of American culture and morality’, which he defined as the ‘JudeoChristian heritage’. In addition, added Dulles, the American people admired Israel’s military, political, and economic development accomplished ‘after two thousand years during which the Jewish people had had no state and no homeland’. The secretary told Eban that the American goal, which he was sure Israel shared, was to bring peace to the Middle East, which would undoubtedly benefit Israel. The United States could accomplish this only if it was seen as friendly to both Israel and the Arabs.126 However, if America had to choose between standing by Israel or its other interests in the ‘vast Arab world’, Dulles told Foreign Minister Sharett during their meeting in November 1955, it would stand by Israel, ‘come hell and high water’.127 Seemingly, Dulles’ pledges were hollow, as was demonstrated by the Eisenhower administration’s reaction to the Suez War. Through the threat of using economic sanctions, Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied during the war. However, more than Israel, Eisenhower’s concern was the UN, and in that, he followed the footsteps of President Truman. In 1951, Israel started irrigation works in the Israeli–Syrian demilitarized zone (DMZ). Brig. General William E. Riley, the UN Truce Supervision Organization chief of staff, who was observing the armistice regime between Israel and its neighbours, stated that Israel was violating the Israeli–Syrian armistice agreement. In response, the United States, along with Britain, France, and Turkey, sponsored a Security Council resolution demanding that Israel cease the construction works in the 125

126

127

Minutes of Meeting of the Secretary of State J. F. Dulles with A. Eban, 25 September 1953, ISA, FO 2414/27. Minutes of Meeting of the Secretary of State J. F. Dulles with A. Eban, 8 October 1953, ISA, FO 2414/27; Memorandum of Conversation, 8 October 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, 1340–1344. A. Eban to W. Eytan, 23 November 1955, DFPI 1955, Vol. 10, 710; Minutes of 21st Government Meeting, 21 December 1955, ISA, 26. In the second part of the sentence, Dulles said that for that reason, Israel should do anything that could put the United States in such a position.

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disputed area. Israel protested the American support for an anti-Israeli resolution at the UN, but President Truman explained to President Weizmann that ‘the fundamental consideration in this resolution is the strengthening of the . . . authority of the United Nations Chief of Staff in dealing with the points at issue regarding the Demilitarized Zone’.128 This was precisely the rationale behind the two clashes between Israel and the United States during the Eisenhower presidency, which scholars cited as evidence that demonstrated the Eisenhower administration’s unfriendly attitude towards Israel. The first was the suspension of the financial assistance to Israel in October 1953, and the second, the administration’s reaction to the Israeli attack on Egypt in October 1956. In both cases, the harsh American response stemmed from what the administration argued were violations of the UN’s decisions and Charter. In October 1953, the administration reacted to Israel’s refusal, once again, to stop irrigation works along the Israeli–Syrian DMZ. Dulles explained that ‘[t]here was a United Nations authority involved, and this authority had given a ruling’ to which Israel must abide.129 The same rationale – Israel’s violation of the UN Charter and the UN’s armistice agreements and line – prompted Eisenhower’s reaction to the 1956 Suez War. Eisenhower warned Israel before the war began that the United States would not support Israel if charged as responsible ‘for bringing about an unjust war’ in violation of the UN Charter.130 Dulles insisted that Israel could not use acts of terrorism and murder that originated in Egypt as an excuse to attack Egypt, as resorting ‘to force in settling international disputes’ would severely damage the standing of the UN. ‘The whole United Nations would go down the drain’, stated Dulles.131

128

129

130

131

USA Division to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 18 May 1951, ISA, FO 338/ 10; President Weizmann to President Truman, 18 May 1951, DFPI 1951, Vol. 6, 1951, Ed. Yemima Rosenthal (Jerusalem, 1991), Doc. 184; M. B. Davis to President Weizmann, 1 June 1951, ibid., Doc. 206. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Syria, 11 September 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Doc. 663; Minutes of Meeting with the Secretary of State J. F. Dulles with A. Eban, 25 September 1953, ISA, FO 2414/27. Memorandum of Conversation among the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State, 11 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. XVI, Doc. 327; Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 15 October 1956, DDEL, J. F. Dulles Papers, WH Memo Series, b. 4. Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 1 November 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. XVI, Doc. 455.

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Thus, the administration’s reaction should be viewed beyond the narrow perspective of Israel–US relations. The decisive factor was the importance that the United States attributed to the UN. Furthermore, throughout those tense days, Eisenhower did his best to avoid confrontation with Israel and acted to end it without causing irreparable damage to the US–Israel relationship. He pressed Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, sometimes even with great force, but always kept the door open. Eisenhower had substantial tools at his disposal, mainly economic sanctions against the country that relied heavily on American economic assistance, but he stopped short of using them. Until Israel’s final withdrawal in March 1957, Dulles and Eisenhower referred implicitly to the possibility of sanctions while trying to minimize its meaning. In his more explicit reference to the sanctions, Dulles branded the measures as a ‘mild slap on the wrist’, aiming to prevent the need to introduce more severe measures.132 In this vein, the president described the argument with Israel over the 1956 Sinai War not as a conflict between adversaries but as a conflict between family members. The United States viewed Israel as a special and unique nation, which was why Israel and the Soviet Union were treated differently despite the Soviet act of aggression against Hungary that occurred around the same time. Making that point, the president said: There can, of course, be no equating of a nation like Israel with that of the Soviet Union. The people of Israel, like those of the United States, are imbued with religious faith and a sense of moral values. We are entitled to expect, and do expect, from such people of the free world a contribution to world order which unhappily we cannot expect from a nation controlled by atheistic despots.133

Thus, while insisting that Israel should comply with the UN’s resolution, Eisenhower claimed that he was making demands from Israel based on the values both nations shared. And there was yet one more aspect to Eisenhower’s actions; Eisenhower regretted forcing the Israelis out of the Sinai. He attributed 132

133

Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 1 November 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. XVI, 908–913. ‘Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in the Middle East’, 20 February 1957, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radioand-television-address-the-american-people-the-situation-the-middle-east. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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his action to the lack of a Jewish adviser beside him when he made that decision. In 1965, the former president told Max Fisher, the Jewish philanthropist, chairman of the UJA, ‘Max, if I had a Jewish adviser working for me, I doubt I would have handled the situation the same way. I would not have forced the Israelis back.’134 When looking at the balance sheet’s bottom line, it is quite apparent that the Eisenhower administration was more friendly to Israel than it wished to appear. The Eisenhower administration provided Israel with more generous economic assistance than the ostensibly more friendly Truman administration, and it was given to Israel as an outright grant, unlike the financial support Israel got from the Truman administration.135

Israel in American Eyes (1) The Sinai War marked a low point in the Israeli–American relationship. At the same time, it strengthened tendencies existing in the United States towards Israel. The way the Jews managed to achieve independence, to conquer and cultivate the land, and to absorb millions of immigrants, added, at the end of the 1956 Suez War, a great appreciation for the IDF’s impressive victory. Even Eisenhower, who attacked Israel for going to the war, expressed his admiration for Israel’s military achievements on the battlefield.136 Israeli military achievements were also celebrated in books quick to appear, most notably Robert Henriques’s 100 Hours to Suez, whose subtitle is ‘the Epic Story of Israel’s Smashing Victory in the First Sinai Campaign’.137 In his review of the book, Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times’s military editor, showered the Israeli soldiers with praise – their spirit, ‘excellent leadership’, ‘aggressive spirit’, and ‘fighting heart’. The Israeli soldier was much better than his Arab opponent, concluded Baldwin.138

134

135

136 137 138

Quoted in Peter Golden, Quiet Diplomat (New York: Cornwall Books, 1992), xviii–xix. More on this see David Tal, ‘United States–Israel Relations (1953–1957) Revisited’, Israel Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 2021), 24–46. A. Eban to US Division, 13 March 1957, W298, ISA, FO 2312/2. Robert Henriques, 100 Hours to Suez (New York: Viking, 1957). Hanson Baldwin, ‘Men, Not Machines, Fight a War’, New York Times, 31 March 1957, 250.

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Press reports continued celebrating Israel’s development, with the Israeli victory adding more power to the reports. The themes were the same as before, admiration of the Israeli pioneer’s spirit, the continued development of their country, and, with more than a hint of Orientalism, patronization, and appreciation of Israel’s rich cultural life. The famous columnist Drew Pearson wrote with a lot of appreciation about an Israel tractor spreading fertilizers so close to the Israeli– Jordanian border that some of the fertilizers blew across the border ‘to enrich the fields of his Arab neighbours’.139 Pearson certainly intended to deliver here not only an episode but also a metaphor. Nine years later, Pearson celebrated the ‘modern miracle which the Jewish people have wrought in their ancient homeland’.140 A Los Angeles Times editorial marked Israel’s thirteenth anniversary, expressing admiration for Israel’s economic and social progress. ‘Hundreds of thousands of acres of desert land had been reclaimed’, and Israel managed to achieve self-sufficiency in most food products. An editorial discussed the Arab states’ hostility towards Israel, mentioning that ‘the basic problem’ was ‘Arab objections to a westernized state in the very middle of the Middle East’.141 This trend continued into the mid-1960s, with the major American newspapers suggesting to their readers a view of Israel, which might be depicted as Orientalism in reverse. The reports sent a message of admiration of the Sabra who ‘built Israel. He tilled it, blackened the sand with his sweat, fought the Arabs, served time in the army at $7 a month, put his tallies on a home on Friday evenings, and prayed to God who listened.’142 A Los Angeles Times article praised Israel’s burgeoning education system, describing it as ‘one bootstrap by which the country is lifting itself above its Middle East neighbours and is making its voice felt in the family of nations’.143 Gertrude Samuels described in April 1959 the new campus of the Hebrew University,

139

140

141 142 143

Drew Pearson, ‘Ike’s Middle East Proposal Hailed’, Washington Post, 2 January 1957, B17. Drew Pearson, ‘Israel Works Modern Miracle’, Washington Post, 11 January 1966, C17. ‘Israel: The Continuing Challenge’, Los Angeles Times, 20 April 1961, B4. Jim Bishop, ‘Israel Revisited’, Variety, 6 January 1965, 156. Peter Grant, ‘Israel Makes Big Gains in Educational System’, Los Angeles Times, 1 December 1958, 4.

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which replaced the now-unoccupied Mount Scopus campus as a spiritual centre. The reawakening Hebrew University would serve Israel, so wrote Samuels, ‘as a centre of study and research, to serve the Jewish people everywhere – as a spiritual centre for world Judaism, to serve humanity by extending knowledge’.144 Alongside this spiritual centre laid the ‘oasis of science in the Mideast’, the Weizmann Institute of Science, which had been described as ‘contributing to both mankind’s knowledge and a new nation’s material well-being’.145 In a veiled contrast to the situation in the United States, the New York Times dedicated in November 1958 four pages of its Sunday magazine to feature an article on how Israel managed to integrate Jews from Arab, Asian, and North African countries who had continued flooding the country. Israel’s success in absorbing new immigrants was contrasted with the American civil rights movement’s struggle to eliminate racial barriers in the United States.146 Israel was mediated to the Americans also through art, literature, and cinema. In an article about the Israeli theatre, the reporter marvelled at the large number of theatres, which many Israelis frequented.147 A Los Angeles Times’s report revelled in the ‘literary renaissance nurtured in Israel’, discussing the ‘pretty wonderful, even enviable’ emergence of Israeli literature, created by people coming from diverse places and experiences to produce a large number of high-quality books in a language that ‘only a small fraction of these 2,000,000 Israeli can easily read and appreciate’.148 Under the influence of the successful fight for independence and the heroism of the few Jewish-Israeli soldiers who defeated the many Arab military forces, fiction and movies produced during the later 1940s to early 1950s portrayed the Jewish hero as physically rugged and masculine, as

144

145

146

147

148

Gertrude Samuels, ‘Hebrew University Rises Again’, New York Times, 19 April 1959, SM22. Gertrude Samuels, ‘Oasis of Science in the Mideast’, New York Times, 29 November 1959, SM22. Gertrude Samuels, ‘Still They Come to Israel’, New York Times, 16 November 1958, SM24; Jeffrey Shandler, While America Watches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 153. Harold Clurman, ‘From “Richard III” to “Virginia Woolf”’, New York Times, 7 August 1966, 89. Holmes Alexander, ‘Literary Renaissance Nurtured in Israel’, Los Angeles Times, 16 December 1958, B4.

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opposed to their non-Jewish feminine opponents. In Samson and Delilah, powerful and muscular Samson faced and won the feminine philistine governor. Shalom Asch’s Moses had ‘a powerful neck and . . . broad shoulders, and . . . arms like two hammers’. Pharaoh is described in opposite terms: ‘his fleshy body fell into folds, rising and falling as he breathed’.149 The one cultural event that made a lasting impact on the way the American people viewed Israel during those years was Leon Uris’s Exodus. The book, published in 1958, tells the story of the Jewish people’s recovery and the establishment of a state as an action tale. While criticized by literary critics, it became a best-seller, read by millions of Americans, and made Israel popular and an object of admiration.150 Breaking the ‘post-Holocaust stereotypes about Jewish weakness and vulnerability’, Uris’s Exodus told its reader about brave and vigorous Israelis who, against all odds, survived a horrible past and gained freedom and independence through bravery and deeds. It was a story that matched Judaism and Christianity (JudeoChristian heritage, all over again) and ‘symbolized America’s developing love affair with Israel’s pioneering frontier democracy’.151 Amy Kaplan argued that the book became so attractive to millions of American readers because it ‘resonated with myths of American origins, which also included the presentation of Israel as “frontier”’. And she concludes: ‘One cannot overestimate the influence of Exodus in Americanizing the Zionist narrative of Israel’s origins . . . It forged the popular American identification with Israel for decades to come.’152 Secretary of State John Kerry was among those impressed by the film Exodus. ‘It was the story of people fighting for a place in the world, a struggle for survival and recognition’, he wrote in his memoirs.153 The book became a film, and the lyrics added to the musical theme of the movie, composed by Evangelist Pat Boone, strengthened the power and impact of Exodus:

149 150

151 153

Mart, Eyes on Israel, 100–101. Matthew M. Silver, Our Exodus: Leon Uris and the Americanization of Israel’s Founding Story (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2010), 5–6, 10. 152 Silver, Our Exodus, 8–10. Kaplan, Our American Israel, 59–60, 74. Kerry, Every Day Is Extra, 444.

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This land is mine God gave this land to me This brave and ancient land to me ... With the help of God I know I can be strong. To make this land our home If I must fight I’ll fight to make this land our own. Until I die this land is mine!

The song became an immediate success and was recorded repeatedly by such artists as Pat Boone, Eddie Harris, Andy Williams, Edith Piaf, and others.154 The story of an American couple who was on its way to Switzerland for a vacation in summer 1959 demonstrates the book’s impact. When they held their bon-voyage party in New York, someone gave them a copy of Exodus. ‘They had read it by the time they reached Switzerland’, reported the New York Times, and ‘then and there’ decided to change their whole itinerary and travel to Israel instead. And the couple was not alone. The number of tourists arriving in Israel in 1959 up to October was nearly 11 per cent higher than during the same period a year earlier, which was Israel’s tenth anniversary. The growth was attributed directly to the impact the book had on American readers. Israeli tourist guides reported that tourists were asking about villages that they read about in the book or the location of battles depicted in the book.155 The Israelis appreciated that the book contributed to the creation of a strong and positive image of Israel. During her fundraising tour in the United States in March 1959, Foreign Minister Meir felt first-hand the book’s impact. ‘There was no meeting where the book was not mentioned’, she said admiringly, ‘More important than ministers’ tours, sixty years of Zionism, of all the propaganda – is the work of one American guy who wrote a book, which many of us think it has a lot of kitsch’, the Exodus. People told her that after reading the book, they attended their first Jewish meeting associated with Israel.156 154

155 156

Lawrence Davidson, America’s Palestine (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 215. Seth S. King, ‘Exodus and Israel’, New York Times, 4 October 1959, XX1. Minutes of 29th Government Meeting, 23 March 1959, ISA, 9–11.

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The American film industry continued presenting to the American people an image of Israel that justified the American support for Israel, as well as providing additional reasons to do so. Such was the movie Cast a Giant Shadow, dedicated to the life of Colonel David Marcus. Marcus volunteered to help Israel in its war of independence, and Ben Gurion appointed him as the commander of the Jerusalem area. In June 1948, he was shot by an Israeli soldier who mistook him for an Arab trying to infiltrate the camp. The film’s cast included Hollywood stars such as Kirk Douglas, who played Marcus, Yul Brynner, John Wayne, and Senta Berger. The New York Times’s report about the film, which was shot in Israel in 1965, depicted Marcus as ‘The Lafayette of Israel’, with that, setting the tone for the American people.157 The Americanization of (the American) Marcus – that is, the use of American symbols to justify his participation in Israel’s War of Independence – was evident also in the argument used in the film by the Haganah operative trying to recruit Marcus. When he tried to appeal to his Judaism, Marcus declined; ‘I’m an American’, he responded. Only when the Haganah operative invoked the American Pledge of Allegiance, asking Marcus, ‘What are you say in your school? Liberty and justice for all – is it only for all of you?’ did Marcus relent. Rodney Wallis found in Marcus’s response to the agent’s request an echo to Kennedy’s New Frontiersman, who ‘pays any price, bears any burden, meets any hardship, supports any friend, opposes any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty’. Marcus, argues Rodney Wallis, was an American, carrying the American mission on his shoulder.158 Another event worthy of the Hollywood treatment that captivated the American imagination and admiration of Israel was the capture of Nazi Adolf Eichmann by Mossad agents in Argentina in 1960 and his subsequent trial. Eichmann, one of the prime architects of the Holocaust, was tried in Jerusalem from April to December 1961, sentenced to death, and executed in May 1962. The capture, and even more the trial, attracted world media attention, foremost American. The American networks covered the trial extensively, presenting the testimonies of the Holocaust survivors almost daily.159 The capture 157

158

159

‘American Jew Became the Lafayette of Israel’, New York Times, 20 July 1965, A7. Rodney Wallis, ‘John Wayne’s World: Israel as Vietnam in Cast a Giant Shadow’, Journal of American Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2019), 731. Shandler, While America Watches, 93–97.

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and trial offered the American people several representations of Israel. First, the Israelis’ courage and vengeance, who spared no effort to bring to justice one of the major culprits of the mass extermination of the Jewish people. Second, Israel appeared as the proud representative of the Jewish people, thus validating the need for and justification for a Jewish state. Third, and in connection with the second point, the American people heard the story of the Holocaust survivors in great detail, once again justifying the need for a Jewish state, strong and capable of preventing a recurrence of such a horrific event. Since then, American movies and TV programmes such as NBC’s 1978 television mini-series Holocaust, watched by close to 100 million Americans, and Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List mediated to the American people the state of Israel as the ultimate answer to the horrors of the Holocaust.160 160

Elizabeth Stephens, United States Policy toward Israel (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 122–123.

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4

Strategic Change, 1958–1968

The Changing Strategic Landscape Standing in front of a crowded meeting on 27 September 1955 for the opening of a military exhibition in Cairo, Egypt’s Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that Egypt signed an arms-for-cotton agreement with Czechoslovakia. The arms deal had radically altered the military balance in the Middle East and had undermined the Western Middle Eastern strategy. Egypt would receive 200 modern tanks and 100 jet combat planes, and it gave the Soviet Union access to the Middle East.1 With that, a prime pillar of the United State’s Middle Eastern strategy collapsed. The seeds of the division between the United States and Nasser’s Egypt were sown during Dulles’s trip to the Middle East in May 1953. Following his conversations with the Egyptian leaders, the secretary concluded that Egypt would not join a Western regional defence organization.2 Instead, Dulles turned to Iraq. The Western turn to Iraq meant that Iraq, Egypt’s regional foe, would become the linchpin of a Western defence organization, and that Egypt would not be eligible to get arms from the West, as stipulated in the Tripartite Declaration. In response, Nasser turned against the West’s hegemony in the Middle East, and against the Western emerging alliance with Iraq, known as the Baghdad Pact. Egypt sought arms from the Soviet Union, which resulted in the Soviets receiving a foothold in the Middle East. Nasser also acted to prevent other Middle Eastern countries, mainly Jordan, from joining the Baghdad Pact. With

1

2

Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 64. On the history of the Egypt–Czech arms deal, see Rami Ginat, The Soviet Union and Egypt (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 207–219. Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, 30 July 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. 9, 406.

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that, the United States came to view Nasser’s Egypt as a destabilizing element in the Middle East and a Soviet protégé.3 Nasser’s alliance with the Soviet Union also led to a change in the way the United States perceived Israel’s place in its Middle Eastern policy, but that was still a matter for the future. In the immediate aftermath of Nasser’s announcement, Israel had to deal with what seemed to be a significant threat to its existence, as it had nothing even close to the kind and number of arms Egypt would receive.4 Seeking arms that would restore the arms balance, Israel turned to several arms manufacturers, among them the United States. The American reaction was disappointing. Dulles admitted that the arms deal skewed the military balance against Israel but turned down the Israeli requests for arms, arguing that considering Israel’s demography and geography, it could not match the amount of armament the Arabs could absorb.5 President Eisenhower mentioned the 1,700,000 Israelis against the 30,000,000 Arabs to make the same argument.6 These arguments were rather disingenuous given Israel’s recent success in the war against the Arabs. Ben Gurion reminded Eisenhower that in 1948, 600,000 Jews, ‘having the essential minimum of arms, withstood the combined forces of five Arab states successfully’.7 Eisenhower did not really mean to leave Israel alone. In December, he told Dulles that the United States should help Israel obtain defensive arms and encouraged Canada and Nicaragua to sell warplanes to Israel.8 More significant was France’s agreement to provide Israel with 3

4

5

6 7

8

Elie Podeh, ‘The Perils of Ambiguity’, in David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (eds), The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics and Ideologies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014), 90–110. Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the Knesset, 18 October 1955, Divrei HaKnesset, 86–88; Mordechai Bar-On, Challenge and Quarrel (Sde-Boker: David Ben Gurion University Press, 1991), 11–23; Shimon Peres, The Next Phase (Tel Aviv: Am Ha’Sefer, 1956), 23. A. Eban to M. Sharett, 1 October 1955, WI353, ISA, FO 2311/4; Memorandum of Discussion at the 262nd Meeting of the NSC, 20 October 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 14, 622; ‘Text of Dulles Statement on the Mideast’, The New York Times, 25 February 1956, 2. Memorandum for the Secretary, 1 March 1956, DDEPL, Subject Series, b. 10. D. Ben Gurion to D. D. Eisenhower, 16 March 1956, DDEPL, AWF, International Series, Israel, b. 32. Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State, 8 December 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 14, 837; K. Salmon to Office, Jerusalem, 7 September 1955, W252, ISA, FO 2311/3; From Stockholm to US Secretary of State, 9 February 1956, USNA, RG 59, 784A.56/2-956;

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major arms systems that would restore the arms balance between Israel and its neighbours. The administration gave its tacit blessing to the deal, which was concluded in November 1955. The shipment that included tanks and jet planes arrived in 1956.9 With that, the military balance between Israel and Egypt had been restored. Israel, though, kept the war-scare alive. One reason for that was the wish to bring a change in the American arms sale policy towards Israel. Under Ben Gurion’s instructions, Israel submitted a procurement list to the United States in November 1955 that included air and anti-tank defence weapons, field artillery, small arms, aerial electronic equipment, merchant ships and coastal defence, forty-eight F-84 jet planes, and sixty Patton tanks.10 Eisenhower saw clearly through Israel’s intentions. In his diary he wrote, ‘the Israelis general slogan is . . . incessant demand for arms. Of course, they could get arms at lower prices from almost any European nation, but they want the arms from us because they feel that in this case, they have made us a virtual ally in any trouble they might get in the region.’11 Eisenhower was right, of course. Israel sought arms from the United States because of the implication of making the United States Israel’s principal arms supplier. At the same time, Eisenhower thought that the United States had a moral obligation to support Israel, ‘a tiny state, surrounded by enemies’, and contemplated the idea of

9

10

11

Memorandum of Conversation, 28 March 1956, ibid., 784A.56/3-2856; Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1958), 146; Klutznick, Angels of Vision, 193; Michael B. Oren, ‘Canada, the Great Powers, and the Middle Eastern Arms Race, 1950–1956’, International History Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May 1990), 283–300. Entry for 25 October 1955, Jacob Tsur, An Ambassador’s Diary in Paris (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968), 187; Office, Jerusalem to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 29 October 1955, W224, ISA, FO 2310/16; Department of State to American Embassy to Paris, 18 January 1956, USNA, RG 84, 784A.56/1-1856; From Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1955, ibid., 784A.56/13056; Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, 16 February 1956, ibid., 784A.56/2-1656; Bar On, Challenge and Quarrel, 124–127. Y. Herzog to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 13 November 1955, TNWA/ 186, ISA, FO 2312/9; K. Salmon to Office, Jerusalem, 16 November 1955, WI511, ISA, FO 2311/4; Memorandum of Conversation, 16 November 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 14, 773–776; R. Shiloah to Y. Herzog, W512, ibid.; K. Salmon to Office, Jerusalem, 21 November 1955, WA522, ibid.; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to Office, Jerusalem, 22 November 1955, WA/560, ISA, FO 2311/4; Bar On, Challenge and Quarrel, 107–108. Entry for 13 March 1956, DDEL, DDE Diary Series.

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signing a treaty with Israel that would guarantee Israel’s borders. ‘In fact, I know of no reason why we should not make such a treaty with Israel’, confided Eisenhower to his diary.12 Dulles knew reasons why not to make such a treaty, telling the president that he did not believe that Congress would approve sending American troops to the Middle East in the case of a war.13 It was a slow process, but Eisenhower and Dulles gradually realized that the American Middle East policy was undergoing a fundamental change. In 1956, the president and secretary concluded that Nasser had become a menace to the Western interests in the Middle East. At a certain point, Eisenhower compared Nasser to Hitler and another time to Mussolini. He depicted the Egyptian leader as someone with a ‘long record of provocations’ that went unnoticed. Consequently, the president and Dulles acted to isolate Nasser.14 While acting during and after the 1956 Sinai War to preserve the status quo antebellum, Eisenhower and Dulles’s hostility towards Nasser only increased.15 The process was finalized in 1958. The Middle East was in turmoil since February 1958, with the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a union of Egypt and Syria. Pro-Nasserite elements stirred, for a few months, political unrest, mainly in Lebanon and Jordan. In Iraq, military officers toppled the pro-Western Hashemite regime in July 1958. Dulles 12

13

14

15

Memorandum for the Secretary, 1 March 1956, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library [henceforth SGMML], Subject Files, b. 10; Entry for 8 March 1956, DDEPL, AWF, DDE Diary Series; Diary, 13 March 1956, ibid. J. F. Dulles to A. Dean, 27 March 1956, DDEPL, J. F. Dulles Papers, 1952–9, Subject Series. Secretary of State to the Department of State, 8 March 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 15, 325–326; Entry for 8 March 1956 DDEPL, AW Files, DDE Diary Series; Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 15, 419–421; Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, 9 May 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 17, 608–610; Memorandum of Conversation, 12 August 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, 26 July–31 December 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 16, Ed. Nina J. Noring (Washington, DC, 1990), Doc. 79; D. D. Eisenhower to W. S. Churchill, 27 November 1956, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, vol. XIV (edited by Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) [henceforth PDDE], 17, 2413; Memorandum of Discussion at the 304th Meeting of the NSC, 15 November 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 16, Doc. 577. A. Eban to US Division, 13 March 1957, W298, ISA, FO 2312/2.

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attributed the unfolding events to the pro-Soviet Nasser. He also compared the Egyptian leader to Hitler. ‘Nasser’s Pan Arabism’, he told Eban, was ‘like the Pan Germanism or Hitler’. He depicted the crisis as ‘a flood which is running strongly. We cannot successfully oppose it, but we can put up sandbags around positions we must protect- the first group being Israel and Lebanon.’ The flood was Arab nationalism that under Nasser threatened to drown the whole of the Middle East. Dulles came now to link the Arab–Israeli conflict to the Cold War, arguing that the Soviets were encouraging the Arabs in their desire ‘to drive Israel into the sea’. In the face of Soviet actions, the United States was compelled to organize its ranks in the region. This time with Israel standing on the Western side.16 In July 1958, US Marines forces landed in Beirut to secure Lebanon’s President Camil Chamoun’s regime, while British troops came to the rescue of King Hussein. The Israeli involvement in the rescue operations was minor, but the crisis provided Israel an opportunity that it would not miss. Eisenhower and Dulles acknowledged Israel’s strategic importance for the United States, and Eisenhower reached the conclusion that Israel was indeed under an existential threat in the volatile Middle East. The change led the administration already in 1957 to use a more conciliatory tone towards Israel. As if wishing to convey the message that the American assault on Israel during the Sinai War was an aberration, Dulles and the Department of State’s senior members told Israeli diplomats that things would be better from now. The change had also led to the opening of new channels of communication between the two governments. Israeli and American officials had begun to consult one another on broad issues pertinent to the Middle East, and not only matters germane to Israel–US relations. Dulles stated, ‘with much more warmth’ that ‘we now talk with more intimacy and confidence than we had even before . . . This was the basis for greater trust in the future.’17 The administration had committed to Israel’s security as it had not done before. Dulles made a commitment on behalf of Eisenhower to Israel’s independence and integrity.18 For a moment, it appeared that 16

17

18

Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 24 July 1958, DDEPL, DDE Diaries Series; A. Eban to D. Ben Gurion, 24 July 1958, W66, ISA, FO 2313/5. Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 17, 703; A. Eban to Y. Herzog, 7 August 1957, W829, ISA, FO 2312/4. David Tal, ‘Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 2001), 142–158.

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the president would take one more step and would agree to supply Israel with major arms, as he pledged to provide Israel the means ‘to deter an attempt at aggression by indigenous forces, and are prepared to examine the military implications of this problem with an open mind’.19 Ben Gurion understood these words as an explicit commitment to provide arms to Israel and finance their procurement.20 That did not happen. This was indeed the president’s intention, but under pressure from Dulles, he backed off. Instead, the administration turned to the old practice, of encouraging other countries – in this case Britain – to provide tanks and two submarines to Israel.21 The president did make one concession – he agreed to sell to Israel what the Israelis termed a ‘firing weapon’. This was a first. The Israelis asked for recoilless guns, explaining their military value, being simple to operate, inexpensive, and suitable to arm the Israeli border settlements. No less important for Israel, an American agreement to sell the cannons would ‘break the ice’, as it would be the first time that the United States would sell Israel a firing arm.22 Dulles agreed to supply Israel with 100 recoilless guns out of the 350 requested. In order to make the purchase more straightforward, the secretary decided to give Israel $1 million credit and suggested ways to help Israel purchase arms in Europe.23 The

19

20

21

22 23

Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, 1 August 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 13, 78; A. Eban to D. Ben Gurion, 3 August 1958, W148, ISA, FO 2313/5-8. Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, 1 August 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 13, 78; A. Eban to D. Ben Gurion and G. Meir, Jerusalem, 3 August 1958, W141, ISA, FO 2313/5-8; Memorandum of Conversation, the Secretary of State and Mrs. Golda Meir, 29 September 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 13, 202–203. Minute by D. Hammond, 22 August, UKNA, DEFE 7/1288; Entries for 30 August and 29 September 1958, DBGD; Z. Shack, Israel Embassy, London, to Western Europe Department, Office, Jerusalem, 4 September 1958, ISA, FO 4327/11; A.W.P./M (58) 38th Meeting, 9 September 1958, UKNA, DEFE 7/ 1289; A.W.P/ M (59) 23rd Meeting, 22 September 1959, UKNA, DEFE 7/1295; ‘Supply of Tanks to Jordan and Israel’, 9 October 1959, ibid.; S. Lloyd Memorandum, 1 December 1959, ibid. Y. Herzog to US Division, 21 August 1958, W222, ISA, FO 2313/5. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1958, USNA, RG 59, 784A.56/8-2258; Acting Secretary of State to American Embassy, Israel, 26 August 1958, No. 12935, ibid., 784A.56/8-2658; Memorandum of Conversation, 26 August 1958, ibid.

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administration permitted and even encouraged Israel to use American civilian aid to purchase weapons. Where required, the administration authorized the provision of weapons systems to Israel by third parties, as it had been doing since 1955.24 Beyond the material achievements Israel gained out of the 1958 crisis, the crisis underlined, once again, the close Israel–US relationship. During the crisis, Dulles, Eban, and senior diplomats from both countries held conversations and consultations, encompassing not only matters of immediate concern for the two countries; they also addressed regional issues, such as the fate of Jordan and Lebanon. Israeli diplomats met with Department of State officials during the crisis daily, usually more than once a day, to exchange views and information and coordinate matters of mutual interest.25 The crisis also brought both countries closer in their understanding of the existing conditions in the Middle East, where Israel was the most trusted Cold War ally of the United States in the Middle East and democracy in an area where ‘military juntas’ were the more common form of regime.

President John F. Kennedy On 27 December 1962, President John F. Kennedy met Foreign Minister Golda Meir and told her, ‘The United States has special relations with Israel, as we have had and still have with Great Britain.’26 On its face, it seemed a bit surprising that President Kennedy was the first American president to make such a comment.

24

25

26

Entry for 13 August and 29 September 1958, DBGD; Memorandum of Conversation, Meir-Dulles, 2 October 1958, No. 01334, USNA, RG 59, 784A.56/10-258; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State, NEA (Rountree) to the Secretary of State, 9 October 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 13, 98–100; Memorandum of Conversation, Eban-Rountree, 17 October 1958, ibid., 101–103; Entry for 28 October 1958, DBGD; Memo to the Prime Minister: ‘Ben Gurion Visit, Arms for Israel’, 15 March 1960, UKNA, PREM 11/3400. Folder FO 2313/5 in the ISA is full of documents that record the meeting of Israeli officials, mainly Y. Herzog, with their American counterparts. These meetings took place every day during the crisis period, several times a day. Minutes of Meeting of Foreign Minister Mrs. Meir with President Kennedy, 27 December 1962, ISA, FO 4317/8.

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He was the first Catholic American president – the next Catholic president, Joe Biden, would be elected seventy years later. That meant that Kennedy did not receive the religious education that had prompted other American presidents to support Israel. And indeed, Kennedy initially appeared to be unsupportive of Israel. As a senator, he abstained from participation in the debate over the sanctions that the Eisenhower administration contemplated over Israel after the 1956 Suez War. Kennedy explained that he was ignorant of matters relating to the Middle East, and hence he felt that he could not form an opinion, and then he added that it was despite his ‘natural sympathy’ for Israel.27 In the years that followed, Kennedy became increasingly vocal about his support for Israel. In February 1958, he delivered a speech in which he spoke, for the first time, in a positive manner on Israel.28 During the 1960 election campaign, he told the Zionist Organization of America that the ‘Friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter. It is a national commitment’, intending to make the support for Israel very much a partisan issue. Kennedy would not miss an opportunity to mention the traditional Democratic support for the Zionist movement from Wilson to FDR and Truman. He pledged to be another link in this chain, and ‘to continue this great democratic tradition, to be worthy of it, to be associated with it’.29 The message was clear: the Americans supported Israel; the democrats even more. The speech achieved its goal. Eighty-two per cent of the American Jews voted for Kennedy in 1960. A higher percentage of Jews voted for him than Roman Catholics.30 This level of support was not readily apparent. During the campaign, some were worried about Kennedy’s Catholicism and his father’s alleged pro-Nazi proclivities.31 Kennedy was well aware of the role of the Jewish vote in his election and appreciated it. David Ben Gurion recalled that during his meeting with President Kennedy on 30 May 1961, the president took him aside, and said, ‘I was elected by the Jews. You know, I was elected by the Jews. 27 28 29

30

31

Y. Meroz to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 10 June 1957, ISA, FO 3088/10. Y. Herzog to US Division, 4 March 1958, YDH73, ISA, FO 3088/11. Text of Senator Kennedy’s Speech before the Zionist Convention, The New York Times, 26 August 1960, 10. Edward Shapiro, ‘Right Turn? Jews and the American Conservative Movement’, in Maisel and Forman (eds), Jews in American Politics, 153, 199. Homer Bigart, ‘Parties Worried by “Jewish Vote”’, The New York Times, 1 September 1960, 1.

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I have to do something for them . . . I will do something for you.’ Ben Gurion was utterly surprised. He did not respond and returned with the president to the other participants in the meeting.32 Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy was well acquainted with Jews and their politics. As a member of the House of Representatives (1947–1953) and later Senate (1953–1960), he gained quite a lot of experience with the Jewish electorate. Jews were also around him in the White House. Kennedy’s administrative advisor, who became his special councillor on Jewish affairs, Myer (‘Mike’) Feldman, played a role similar to that David Niles played in the Truman administration, and was, to a great extent, Israel’s unofficial ambassador in the White House. Feldman told Ambassador Abraham Harman that the president asked him to follow the relations with Israel closely.33 There was also Philip Klutznick, who, during the campaign, acted to ease the Jews’ aversion of Kennedy because of his father, arguing that Kennedy should be judged based on his merits.34 Kennedy appointed Klutznick as the representative to the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council at the ambassador’s rank, but Klutznick maintained his influence in the White House, too.35 Another influential Jew was the veteran Abraham (‘Abe’) Feinberg, who came back to the White House. In Kennedy’s cabinet were two Jews – Arthur J. Goldberg, secretary of labor, and Abraham Ribicoff, secretary of health, education, and welfare.36 It became easier to bring to the president’s attention issues of which Israel wanted the president to be aware of.37 Kennedy was less familiar with the Israeli leaders. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion met John F. Kennedy for the first time in the early 1950s. The Israeli prime minister did not remember the meeting, but he 32

33

34 35 36

37

David Ben-Gurion, recorded interview by E. A. Bayne, 16 July 1965, 1–2, 7, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library [henceforth JFKPL], Oral History Program. A. Harman to G. Meir, 20 May 1962, IR346, ISA, FO 6451/7; A. Harman to G. Meir, 7 June 1962, IR418, ibid.; A. Harman to Y. Meroz, 8 June 1962, IR434, ISA, FO 4312/5; G. Meir to A. Harman, 10 June 1962, IR328, ibid.; G. Refael to G. Meir, 10 June 1962, ibid.; A. Harman to Y. Meroz, 11 June 1962, IR439, ibid. Klutznick, Angels of Vision, 241–243. Klutznick, Angels of Vision, 249–251. Maisel and Forman (eds), Jews in American Politics, Roster A: Jewish Cabinet Officers, 445. Minutes of 38th Government Meeting, 13 May 1962, ISA, 5.

President John F. Kennedy

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had a photo to prove that the meeting did take place. The two met again in March 1960, on a Saturday morning. Senator Kennedy was running for the presidency, and he certainly had the American Jews in his mind when he met the prime minister of the Jewish state.38 As mentioned, the two met once again in May 1961, and throughout Kennedy’s tenure they exchanged letters. However, their relationships remained formal, lacking warmth. Kennedy’s secretary of state, Dean Rusk, was a typical Department of State professional, which meant that he was aloof and detached in his attitude towards Israel. However, he was careful to uphold the policy outlined by the president towards Israel. In May 1961 he met with a delegation of the Conference of Presidents that came to see him to discuss issues pertinent to the Israel–US relationship. He told the delegation that the American policy towards Israel was ‘very friendly’. There were disagreements, but they were ephemeral. ‘Israel knows that in the final analysis, the security of Israel depends on the U.S.’39 In a meeting with Israeli reporters after Kennedy’s assassination and Johnson’s entry into the White House, Rusk stated that President Johnson was a friend of Israel, and the United States was a friend of Israel not only at the president’s level but also down the ladder.40 When it came to lobbying for Israel, Rusk was less forthright. He was not original in resenting the American Jews’ involvement in matters relating to Israel – this had already happened in the past during the Truman administration. He described the Jewish lobby as aggressive, ready to make threats – political threats, of course – forcing the administration to make decisions that were not always in America’s best interest.41 During the conversation with the Conference’s delegation, Rusk referred, more than once, to ‘your government’ when he spoke about the Israeli government. Members of the delegation protested the comment, stating that their government was the American government, but Rusk repeated the comment, nonetheless.42 38

39

40

41 42

David Ben-Gurion, recorded interview by E. A. Bayne, 16 July 1965, 1–2, 5, JFKPL, Oral History Program. M. Gazit to Office, Jerusalem, 21 May 1962, IR349, ISA, FO 3379/18; H. BarOn to US Division, 28 May 1962, ibid., 405. Israel Delegation to United Nations to A. Harman, 5 December 1963, ISA, FO 3377/6. Rusk, As I Saw It, 126, 131. M. Gazit to G. Avner, 3 May 1961, MG/T/274, ISA, FO 3294/7.

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Strategic Change, 1958–1968

In Israel, the election of President Kennedy was accepted with satisfaction. Israeli newspapers recited the promises Kennedy made during the years to Israel. Davar’s political reporter assumed that there was a ‘justified solid basis’ to believe that the new administration would consider the existence of Israel and its welfare as ‘an integral part of the American foreign policy’.43 The new American ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour – Kennedy’s appointee – only enhanced the new administration’s prestige in particular and that of the United States in general. Barbour was an exceptional figure within the diplomatic corps in Israel. He was one of the longer serving in this position – from 1961 to 1973 – and he became a public figure and ‘celebrity’ way before the term was invented. Mira Avrech, the social affairs reporter for Israel’s most popular daily Yediot Aharonot, introduced him to the Israeli public through her columns, making him one of the most popular diplomats from among the foreign diplomats serving in Israel. Not every American ambassador to Israel was celebrated the way Barbour was, but every American ambassador to Israel had the potential to become a celebrity. Some, like Barbour, realized that potential. Another conspicuous example was Samuel Lewis (1977–1985), of whom many Israelis became very fond. He, in turn, reciprocated. Samuel became a very popular figure in Israel, frequenting the press’s political and social columns.44 Despite his almost instinctive but politically well-calculated proIsraeli proclivity, Kennedy attempted to maintain a balanced policy towards Israelis and Arabs. As part of his even-handed approach, Kennedy tried to improve US relations with Egypt but failed.45 Wishing to avoid another failure, Kennedy decided to avoid presenting a peace plan. Rusk had tried in the past to walk through the minefield called the Arab–Israel peace process and got burned. ‘I got kicked in the shanks by both the Arabs and the Jews’, he

43

44

45

M. Tavor, ‘Kennedy Promised Friendly Policy toward Israel’, Davar, 10 November 1961, 1. Nahum Barnea, ‘America in Israel: Who Is the High Commissioner of Who?’ Koteret Rashit, 5 January 1983, 12–14. Memorandum of Conversation, 26 April 1962, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 17, Doc. 257; Rusk, As I Saw It, 323–324.

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summarized. That was an experience that he did not wish to repeat, and the president concurred.46 Still, and on his aides’ advice, President Kennedy acted against his better judgement, and made hesitant incursions in an attempt to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. In 1961, he appointed Joseph Johnson, the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to negotiate with Israel and the Arabs a solution to the refugee problem by closing the refugee camps and resettling the refugees.47 However, the president had little faith that such an attempt would succeed, believing that the attempts to end the refugee problem were futile. In a meeting with Jewish leaders in October 1961, he said that he did not expect to see any progress on the refugee issue.48 His predictions proved right.

Breakthrough: Hawks When President Kennedy told Meir that the United States had special relations with Israel, he had already taken steps that proved that he meant every word of it. Kennedy provided Israel with what it was seeking from its establishment, an American major arms system. It was not quite everything Israel sought, but it was certainly a start. Since its establishment, and more so after September 1955, Israel had a consistent dialogue with the American administrations regarding the state of the Arab–Israel military balance. Two questions were on the table. First, whether the Soviet Union’s continuous arming of Egypt and later Syria upset the military balance, and second, whether Israel could obtain the weapons that would restore the military balance from other sources, with American help. After it succeeded in convincing the Eisenhower administration to sell to Israel a firing arms system, the recoilless guns, Israel turned to the next goal, getting the Hawk ground-to-air missiles.49

46

47

48 49

Rusk, As I Saw It, 322; A. Harman to Office, Jerusalem, 26 February 1961, IR133, ISA, FO 2314/2. S. Bar-Haim to US Division, 23 August 1961, ISA, FO 3294/7; Editorial Note, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 17, Doc. 96. A. Harman to Office, Jerusalem, 26 October 1961, IR705, ISA, FO 2314/4. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, to the Secretary of State, 12 February 1960, FRUS

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Strategic Change, 1958–1968

The Israeli politicians were more interested in the Hawks than the military men. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) high command was divided over the need for the Hawks. Chaim Laskov, the chief of staff, thought that the missiles would play an essential role in securing Israel’s skies as well as creating deterrence. However, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) commander, General Ezer Weizmann, and the IAF high command resisted the purchase of the Hawk missiles, arguing that the IDF did not need them and that they would interfere with the IAF build-up plans. Weizmann was also afraid that with the Hawks’ arrival, the government would adopt a defensive doctrine and fail to endorse the IDF’s war plans based on a pre-emptive air strike ahead of an armoured assault.50 The air force’s objections were overruled, as Israel could present a compelling case to justify its need for a defensive weapon. Israel sought to break the wall of the American refusal to sell to Israel major arms systems, and the Hawk seemed the right tool to do so. There was no question that the Arabs were getting many combat planes and bombers, and Israel could and would argue that a Hawk system was available only in the United States. Israel asked the missiles first from the Eisenhower administration, but it turned down the request. The Eisenhower administration did agree to supply the early warning electronic systems and help Israel get the arms it needed in Europe.51 The campaign for the Hawks resumed when a new president entered the White House. Ben Gurion prepared the ground towards the request during his meeting with the president on 30 May 1961, in New York. Resorting to Holocaust rhetoric, Ben

50

51

1958–1960, Vol. 13, 264; Memorandum of Conversation, 16 February 1960, ibid., 265. Entry for 8 December 1960, DBGD; Yitzkhak Greenberg, Defense Budgets and Military Power (Tel Aviv; Maarchot, 1997), tables 20–23 and 25; Ezer Weizman, The Sky Is Yours, the Land Is Yours (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1975), pp. 226–227. Memorandum of Conversation, 10 March 1960, DDEPL, WHO, Office of Staff Secretary, International Series, b. 8; Memo of Conversation, 11 April 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 13, 306–309; A. Harman to the US Division, 12 April 1960, RI705, ISA, FO 2313/10; Memo by the Assistant Secretary of State, NEA (Jones) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 7 July 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 13, 344–348; Memo by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1960, ibid., 349–350; Memo of a Meeting, the Secretary and his Aides, 27 July 1960, ibid., 356–357; Memo to the President, 3 August 1960, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952–61, International Series, b. 8.

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Gurion explained that ‘Nasser’s declared aim is to destroy, not just to defeat, Israel. If they defeated us, they would do to the Jews what Hitler did.’ The reference to the Holocaust was specifically relevant, as Eichmann’s trial had begun just a month earlier in Jerusalem, and the testimonies of Holocaust survivors were all over the place. Kennedy remained unconvinced. Israel was strong enough and did not need the Hawks. Still, he added a clause, ‘If Israel were faced with a critical break-through of weapons on the other side’, promised Kennedy, ‘[w]e would not want Israel to get into such a position of inferiority that an attack on it would be encouraged’.52 In essence, the president said in his voice what the Israelis were hearing from American officials before, that Israel would get the Hawks if there was a change in the arms balance against her. Therefore, during the following months, Israeli and American officials exchanged information and lists to prove their respective arguments.53 Israel’s work this time was easier not only thanks to a president that was ready to consider the option of supplying the Hawks but thanks to members of the National Security Council (NSC) who thought that Israel should get the missiles, and thanks to Nasser. McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national security advisor, believed that Israel was vulnerable to surprise air attack. Arguing that the Hawks were ‘purely’ defensive weapons, he was inclined to agree to provide the missiles to Israel.54 Another NSC member, Robert Komer, a former CIA employee, with ‘[s]harp pen, keen wit, abrasive spirit, and ceaseless energy’,55 stated that arming Israel would not exacerbate the conflict in the Middle East, but on the contrary, it rather would create deterrence

52

53

54

55

Memorandum of Conversation, 30 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 17, Doc. 57; Meeting of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion, 30 May 1961, ISA, FO 3294/7. M. Gazit to A. Levavi, 16 February 1961, IR97, ISA, FO 2314/2; M. Gazit – A. Meyer Conversation, 10 August 1961, ISA, FO 3294/7; M. Gazit – A. Meyer Conversation, 14 August 1961, ibid.; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to the Secretary of State, 22 November 1961, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 17, Doc. 143; Department of State to Embassy in Israel, 28 May 1962, JFKPL, NSF, 118; Memorandum for the Record, 16 June 1962, ibid.; ‘The Strengthening of Egypt with Soviet Arms’, ISA, FO 3504/13. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 17, Doc. 43. Bass, Support Any Friend, 63.

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that would prevent a conflagration.56 The Department of State’s Near East and Asia (NEA) office opposed the deal. It argued that Israel was not under the threat its spokesmen argued it was, and it would be enough to supply the electronic early warning systems that were on Israel’s procurement list. These systems would significantly reduce the threat of an aerial surprise attack on Israel. In any case, the ‘splendid’ IAF was capable of dealing with the Egyptian air force. And if push came to shove, the Sixth Fleet was close enough to intervene.57 While the NEA and NSC were arguing, an additional step in strengthening the two countries’ strategic relationship was taken. An Israel–US committee to evaluate the military balance was established in July. The head of the Israeli delegation was the Israeli ambassador, and one member of the delegation would be IDF’s deputy head of intelligence Colonel Aharon Yariv. The American delegation would be comprised of Department of State officials, headed by William Phillips Talbot. Yariv presented all of the arguments that justified the Israeli request for the Hawks. Those arguments were confirmed by the Pentagon, which provided an updated estimation that backed up the Israeli intelligence report.58 With that, the military barriers to approving the sale were removed. Wishing to strengthen the power of the Israeli delegation’s arguments, Ben Gurion re-invoked the memory of the Holocaust. Israel was experiencing ‘a unique security problem’, he wrote to President Kennedy on 24 June 1962, It is not our democratic system or our borders and independence, which are threatened, but our very physical existence is at stake. What was done to six million of our brethren twenty years ago with the participation of Palestinian Arab leaders, among them the ex-Grand Mufti and his henchmen, could be done to the two million Jews of Israel, if, God forbid, the Israel Defence Forces are defeated.59 56

57

58

59

Memorandum from R. T. Komer of the NSC Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Counsel, 31 May 1962, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 17, Doc. 282. Considerations Bearing on Israel’s Request for Hawk Missiles, 16 February 1961, JFKPL, NSF, 118. M. Gazit to S. Arad, 11 July 1962, ISA, FO 3504/13; Letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 16 July 1962, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 3; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to S. Arad, 17 July 1962, IR419, ISA, FO 3504/13; S. Bar-Haim to S. Arad, 18 July 1962, ibid. D. Gen Gurion to J. F. Kennedy, 24 June 1962, ISA, G7274/12.

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Ironically, it was Nasser who gave Israel the winning card. On 21 July, Egypt launched a ground-to-ground rocket, and two days later, ten such missiles were introduced in a military parade in Cairo.60 As if to confirm Ben Gurion’s gloomy prediction, the rockets were built with the assistance of German former Nazi scientists, which gave the missiles an additional, morbid, meaning. Israeli intelligence assumed that the Egyptian missile programme was bogus, and the assumption proved to be true.61 However, this was not the aspect of the missiles that Israel emphasized. Instead, Israel used the introduction of the missiles quite effectively. The American press also sounded the alarm. The Washington Post criticized Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman sharply for dismissing the rockets’ threat and ‘ignoring the plight of Israel. Here is a tiny country wholly surrounded by nations that have sworn its elimination’, wrote the editor, and Egypt ‘is on the verge of developing ground-to-ground missiles that could rain terror on Israel’. The United States should not dismiss the threat but should ‘see that Israel has an adequate deterrent capacity’.62 Taking all of these factors into account and following the Pentagon’s recommendation, Secretary Rusk recommended that the president approve the sale of Hawk missiles to Israel.63 Accepting the verdict, Talbot tried to get the best out of the inevitable and make a linkage between the sale of the Hawks and Israel’s acceptance of Joseph Johnson’s plan for resolving the Palestinian refugee problem.64 The president opposed the linkage. He did not want to commit to a plan that had a very slim chance of succeeding, as the price he would pay for it, domestically, could be too high.65 Nonetheless, he sent Mike Feldman to introduce the plan to the Israeli government. Feldman presented the plan while announcing that Israel would get the Hawks. The Israeli response was hardly a surprise. It 60

61

62 63

64

65

‘Israel Will Ask in the West Air-to-Ground Missiles’, Maariv, 22 July 1962, 1; ‘Missiles Were Introduced in a Military Parade This Morning’, Maariv, 23 July 1962, 1. Amos Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2013), 120–121; Isser Harel, Security and Democracy (Petach Tikva: Idanim, 1989), 411–412, 426–432. ‘Israel’s Security’, Washington Post, 13 April 1963, A6. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 7 August 1962, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 14. Memorandum for the President, 7 August 1962, JFKPL, NSF, 118; P. Talbot to M. Feldman, 9 August 1962, ibid. Notes of Conference, 14 August 1962, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 19.

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rejected Johnson’s plan and expressed gratitude for the missiles. The president was not stupefied. He accepted the Israeli arguments against the plan, and the Hawk deal was underway.66 The Israeli government hailed the American agreement as a significant achievement. ‘This is the first time America is ready to sell us something like this’, rejoiced Meir in a government meeting. She re-emphasized to her colleague that the most important meaning of the deal was, ‘[t]he Arabs should know that Israel has a great friend in the White House, and his policy is to help Israel in any possible way . . . Feldman is an outstanding Jew’, she summarised, ‘his children are enrolled in a Hebrew school in Washington’, as if it explained everything.67 The whole deal supplied Israel with 215 missiles, a ten-year credit for $25 million for the Hawks, and $2 million for early warning and communication equipment.68 The president was quick to collect the dividends. In a meeting at the White House with the participation of Feinberg, Feldman, and Klutznick, it was agreed that Feinberg would summon twenty-six Jewish leaders to the White House on 13 September and the president would personally bring them the news and would express his concern for Israel’s welfare and security.69 The meeting transpired as planned, with the president spending about ten minutes with the Jewish leaders, bringing them the news.70 Of course, the nature and timing of the announcement were directly related to the midterm congressional elections in November. As if this was not apparent enough, Feinberg asked the Israeli embassy that Ben Gurion would publish a statement after the public announcement on the deal in which he would comment on

66

67 68

69

70

Minutes of meeting at Prime Minister’s House, 19 August 1962, ISA, FO 4312/ 6; Y. Meroz to A. Harman, 19 August 1962, 2538, ISA, FO 3377/7. Minutes of 56th Government Meeting, 26 August 1962, ISA, 4–5. P. Talbot to Mr Johnson, 29 March 1963, USNA, RG 59, DEF 12 ISR; Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 4 April 1963, No. 576, ibid., DEF 192 ISR. Office, Jerusalem to Israel Embassy, Copenhagen, 7 September 1962, MI27241, ISA, FO 3377/7; M. Comay to H. Yahil, 8 September 1962, 290, ibid. Memorandum for the President, 13 September 1962, JFKPL, Myer Feldman Personal Papers collection, box 58, ‘Israel: White House meeting, 13 Sept 1962’; ‘U.S. May Help Israel on Balance of Power: Tel Aviv Reports Action’, Los Angeles Times, 24 September 1962, 4.

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the Hawks’ contribution to Israel’s security, and would ‘praise the importance of American friendship’.71 Ben Gurion did not do that. In early October 1962, Feldman met about sixty Jewish leaders and answered their questions, in what turned out to be a checklist of the Kennedy administration’s pro-Israeli decisions. These included the Hawks’ sale; the financial assistance (‘the highest in the last ten years!’); American support for Israel’s request to join the European Economic Community and other international organizations; and American support for Israel’s water plans. Talk was that ‘the relations between Israel and the United States on the highest levels are excellent’, ‘[t]he Arabs were told clearly that if they attack Israel, the Sixth Fleet will be in Haifa within 24 hours’, and without saying it in so many words, Feldman reiterated US support for the Israeli position on the Johnson plan.72 This was indeed an impressive list, which Feldman introduced to the Jews in order to cash in. A similar meeting, aiming to achieve the same goal, took place in Brooklyn, where Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) presented in early October to about 150 Jewish leaders Kennedy’s actions for Israel.73 Even the not-sofriendly-to-Israel Talbot joined the campaign, and in late October he met the Conference of Presidents, presenting to them Kennedy’s proIsraeli actions.74 While, of course, the list was impressive, there was one caveat. Feldman boasted of the economic aid that the Kennedy administration provided to Israel. He neglected to mention that the loan portion in the financial support was higher than before, and the level of direct grants was reduced.75 During Kennedy’s presidency, Israel got $259.2 million in military and economic aid, only a fraction of it – $22.6 million – as a grant.76

71

72 73 74 75

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M. Gazit to H. Yahil, 11 September 1962, 75, ISA, FO 3377/7; M. Gazit to H. Yahil, 13 September 1962, 111, ibid; A. Harman to H. Yahil, 14 September 1962, N/29796, ISA, FO 377/6; Katz to A. Harman, 14 September 1962, N/ 29799, ibid. To M. Gazit, 16 October 1962, ISA, FO 3379/19. E. Avriel to Office, Jerusalem, 17 October 1962, 172, ISA, FO 3377/8. K. Katz to A. Harman, 24 October 1962, 247, ISA, FO 3377/8. M. Gazit to A. Levavi, 16 February 1961, IR97, ISA, FO 2314/2; M. Gazit to G. Avner, 20 June 1961, MG/T/366, ISA, FO 3294/7; US Division to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, November 1961, ibid., FO 3293/43. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 22.

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The first Hawk missiles batteries would be supplied to Israel in November 1964.77 While it represented a significant change in America’s arms policy, in reality, the decision to provide the missiles to Israel was consistent with the way every administration since Truman took office treated Israel's request for arms. Truman and Eisenhower both declared that they would not allow Israel to be militarily inferior to the Arabs. During the Truman administration, the issue did not come up, as all in all, the military balance between Israel and the Arabs remained in favour of Israel. When the military balance shifted against Israel during the Eisenhower administration, the administration helped Israel to get the arms in order to tilt back the military balance. Eisenhower made the point that the United States would supply arms directly to Israel only if the military balance tipped against her, and it could not obtain arms from non-American sources. When Israel finally presented convincing evidence that this was the case, they got what they had sought since the establishment of the state of Israel, an American major arm system, and no less important, a pledge to continue selling weapons to Israel if Egypt acquired additional, advanced weapons from the Soviet Union. Still, the administration preferred that Israel acquire the arms it needed elsewhere, with the blessing and assistance of the United States. Thus, in June 1962, Rusk approved an Israeli request to purchase 100 American-owned M4 tanks from Iran.78 There was still one difference between Kennedy and his predecessor, which was more a matter of appearance than substance. Kennedy made things easier for Israel. Eisenhower struggled to prove that he was not succumbing to Jewish pressure. Kennedy, on the other hand, acted out of a deep sense of gratitude to the Jews, who voted so massively for him – and he made no secret of his feelings. In this context, it is noteworthy that although Israel used various means to convince the administration that it needed the Hawk missiles, the Israeli embassy and Kenen did not mobilize their cohorts in Congress nor in public and did not publicly press the administration to supply

77

78

Y. Prihar to IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, 25 January 1963, 46, ISA, FO 3504/13; A. Harman to G. Meir, 15 February 1963, 25, ISA, FO 4317/8. Secretary Rusk to American Embassy, Tehran, 6 June 1963, No. 04092, USNA, RG59, DEF 12-5 ISR; American Embassy, Tehran to Secretary of State, 1 July 1963, ibid.

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Israel with the Hawk missiles.79 This was the most apparent mark as to how much Israel needed the Hawks. Israel wanted the missiles, but not because it was under a grave danger that justified a major public campaign. Despite Ben Gurion’s Holocaustic rhetoric, Israel was under no actual threat. At the same time, mainly through Feldman and Feinberg, the Israeli embassy was kept apprised of the positions, debates, and decisions made in the various offices and the White House. This information, of course, was transmitted back to Jerusalem, which is how we know. While the general trend of Israel–US relations was improving, one cloud still hovered over the relations. President Kennedy was pressing Israel to allow American inspectors access to the Dimona site, while Israel evaded this as much as it could. The demands and the evasions persisted until Kennedy’s assassination. When the pressure became too harsh, Israel would succumb and allow the inspectors a visit, subjected to many restrictions. The inspectors always confirmed that the plant was not used for military purposes, but Kennedy kept pressing for regular visits every six months.80 While not admitting that Israel was engaged in nuclear development, Ben Gurion implied that Israel would not rule that option out. During his meeting with President Kennedy in May 1961, the president mentioned that the inspectors who visited the Israeli Dimona reactor recently confirmed that the facility had been built for peaceful purposes. Ben Gurion stated that ‘for the time being, the only purposes are for peace’, but as to future developments, ‘we will see what happens in the Middle East. It does not depend on us’.81 In 1963, Ben Gurion offered an indirect justification for the Israeli nuclear programme. At that year, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq announced their intention to sign a unity pact. Ben Gurion did not

79

80

81

H. Yahil to US Division, 12 August 1962, ISA, FO 3504/13; Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, 165–166. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 99–174; Zaki Shalom, Between Dimona and Washington (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 2004), 48–128. Meeting of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion, 30 May 1961, ISA, FO 3294/7; Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion, 30 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 17, 134–136; see Avner Cohen, ‘Kennedy, Ben Gurion and the Battle over Dimona, April–June 1963’, Iyunim Bitkumat Israel, Vol. 6 (1996), 113–114.

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mince words when he described the meaning of the pact for Israel. An article in the federation’s charter stated that a major goal of the federation would be the ‘liberation of Palestine’, which, in a letter to Kennedy, Ben Gurion described as ‘the first time’ that an official Arab document laid down as one of its objectives ‘the obliteration of Israel’, which could be achieved only by ‘the total destruction of the people in Israel’. The pact’s charter reminded Ben Gurion of ‘Hitler’s declaration to the world that one of his objectives was the destruction of the entire Jewish people. The civilized world’, blamed Ben Gurion, ‘in Europe and America, treated [Hilter’s] declaration with indifference and equanimity’. The result was known – ‘six million Jews . . . men and women, old and young, infants and babies, were burned, strangled and buried alive’. Now, Nasser was making similar threats against the Jewish people, and not only that the world did not respond to the threats, but Nasser was getting help from many countries, including from the United States.82 Ben Gurion did not say that, but it was almost apparent that the Israeli nuclear programme aimed to prevent such an eventuality. He created an equation that included only one variant: the prospect of a second holocaust. Ben Gurion did not mention how Israel would prevent such a catastrophe, but it seemed evident that the magnitude of the threat could be met with only one measure – a nuclear weapon’s shield. It may be appropriate to add that the failure of the suggested federation did not produce another letter from Ben Gurion to Kennedy, in which the Israeli prime minister amended his predictions, concerns, and requests *** On 16 June 1963, David Ben Gurion announced that he was retiring from the government and the Knesset. His explanation was straightforward: he was retiring out of ‘personal needs, which are disconnected from any problem or deed’. Per his request, the resignation was effected immediately.83 With Ben Gurion’s resignation, an era in

82

83

D. Ben Gurion to J. F. Kennedy, 25 April 1963, No. 172, ISA, FO 7326/1; Elie Podeh, ‘To Unite or Not to Unite – That Is Not the Question: The 1963 Tripartite Unity Talks Reassessed’, Middle East Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2005), 150. Minutes of 37th Meeting of the Government, 16 June 1963, 48–55, ISA.

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Israel’s history ended. This is not the place to conclude Ben Gurion’s place in Israel’s short history – many others have done so. As to the Israel–US relationship, Ben Gurion was the architect of those relations from the Israeli side, but as mentioned, he was ambivalent in his attitude towards the United States. On the one hand, a profound principle in Ben Gurion’s thinking was Israel’s need to be linked with a great power, and the United States seemed to him the most natural ally. He based that view not on the same reasons that led the United States to view Israel in a special way. For the Americans, it was religion, values, and history that made Israel special. Like many Israelis, Ben Gurion did not recognise these as a solid enough basis for the American support for Israel. He also did not think that Israel should rely on the United States because of its values. Ben Gurion believed that interests were a driving force in the conduct of foreign policy, and as such, the American presidents were inclined to be friendly to the Arabs, even at the expense of Israel. It was the political power of the American Jewish community that could ensure the protracted American support for Israel. Ben Gurion could not be blamed for that, but he did not develop personal relations with American presidents – to a great extent, it was the contemporary American presidents who preferred to keep their contact with the Israeli government low key. No American president officially invited Ben Gurion to the United States and to the White House. He exchanged letters with American presidents, but those were hardly friendly letters, although the exchange and the content reflected the friendship between the two countries. And for Ben Gurion, that was enough.

The Heirs Within a short period, the two allies’ heads of states were no longer in office. One resigned, and the other was assassinated. Their heirs were two elderly politicians, who were thrusted to their positions of importance, not really against their will but in circumstances that neither welcomed. The first to come to office was the Israeli minister of the treasury, Levy Eshkol. The sixty-seven-year-old (in 1963) Eshkol, with rich experience as a parliamentarian and in the executive branch, had gained a lot of experience in the economy, treasury, security, and foreign relations. In the various roles he served, Eshkol took part in

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discussions over issues relating to Israel’s foreign policy, frequently visited the United States, and was knowledgeable on the various aspects of Israel–US relations.84 As minister of the treasury, he was intimately familiar with the importance of American economic aid but gave a higher priority to Israel’s security needs, even at the cost of risking that aid. When Eisenhower demanded that Israel withdraw from all of the territories it had occupied in the 1956 Suez War, threatening economic sanctions if it did not comply, Eshkol was against succumbing to Eisenhower’s demands. He told Ben Gurion that Israel could hold on for about three months in a case of American sanctions and suspension of transfer of money to Israel.85 That is, Eshkol would not back down from confronting the American president when he thought that an Israeli firm stand was justified. Eshkol was ready to confront the American president when he held the reins of power, as well. After his appointment, he had to deal with the crisis Ben Gurion escaped from when he retired, a sharp and unequivocal letter from President Kennedy that demanded that American inspectors be allowed to visit Dimona. If Israel declined the request, warned Kennedy, ‘this government’s commitment to and support for Israel could be seriously jeopardized’.86 Eshkol did not cave in. He made it clear to Ambassador Barbour that he was very disappointed by the president’s threats, but ‘Israel would do what it had to do for its national security and to safeguard its sovereign rights’. Consistent with the argument Ben Gurion presented to Kennedy in their Waldorf Astoria meeting in May 1961 (‘we will see what will happen in the Middle East’), Eshkol announced that Israel would not abrogate its nuclear programme since the situation in the Middle East might develop in a way that would ‘made it necessary for [Israel] to embark on a nuclear weapons program’. The United States should accept the ‘word of a sovereign government’ that it was not developing nuclear weapons at the present, concluded Eshkol.87 Nonetheless, because of the ‘special intimacy of the relations’ between the two countries, Eshkol agreed to allow American inspectors’ visit, but under 84

85 86 87

Arnon Lammfromm, Levy Eshkol: Political Biography, 1944–1969 (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2014), 234–235, 314. Entry for 7 January 1957, DBGD. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Israel, 3 July 1963, DNSA. S. Arad to A. Harman, 17 July 1963, No. 101, ISA, FO 3377/9; American Embassy, Israel to Secretary of State, 17 July 1963, DNSA.

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a timetable and terms decided by Israel. With that, Eshkol declined Kennedy’s demand that the visits be conducted regularly every six months. Eshkol also requested that the results of the inspections, those already completed and those yet to be completed, not be forwarded to Nasser. It would be worthwhile to keep Nasser in the dark about Israel’s nuclear plans and capabilities, creating a ‘useful deterrent effect against any Egyptian adventures’.88 Kennedy was satisfied with Eshkol’s letter, although he did not give up his hope to see regular visits in the future. The president also would respect Israel’s request not to pass on the information to Nasser, but he thought it would be better to convey the information to reduce tension and alleviate fears.89

President Lyndon B. Johnson After taking the oath of office in front of a grieving nation, and during the reception after John F. Kennedy’s funeral, Johnson held Foreign Minister Meir’s hand and said: ‘I know that you lost a friend, but I hope you understand that I’m a friend, too.’ To Zalman Shazar, the Israeli president who represented Israel at the funeral, he said, ‘Mr. President, Kennedy was a great friend of Israel, and I want you to know, and tell it to your people – there won’t be a change. If there will be a change, it will be for the better. It will be in further tightening the relationships.’ These words were significant by themselves; no less meaningful was the fact that Johnson said that to Meir and Shazar in the presence of Dean Rusk and William Phillips Talbot, delivering the message also to the members of his administration.90 The president’s message did not come as a surprise to the Israelis. Johnson’s reputation as a friend of Israel exceeded him. In his youth, Johnson hardly met Jews. However, due to his family’s religious proclivity and political inclination, interest in Jews was a common matter, in which little Lyndon was also engaged.91 Johnson’s grandfather, ‘Big 88 89

90 91

American Embassy in Israel to Secretary of State, 19 August 1963, DNSA. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 26 August 1963, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 319. Minutes of 12th Meeting of the Government, 1 December 1963, ISA, 17–19. Louis S. Gomolak, Prologue: LBJ’s Foreign-Affairs Background, 1908–1948 (PhD dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1989), 12–18.

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Sam’, Ealy Johnson, a member of a millennial church, told young Lyndon, ‘Take care of Jews, God’s chosen people. Consider them your friends and help them in every way you can.’ After he died, Aunt Jessie Johnson Hatcher became the dominant figure in Johnson’s life. She ‘never failed to impress on him her belief that Jews must return to Israel, and that he would help them’, a belief borne out of her millenarian conviction, recalled Aunt Jessie’s daughter. ‘If Israel is destroyed, that day the world ends’, Aunt Jessie told young Lyndon.92 A direct line can be drawn between this background and the speech President Johnson delivered in 1968 to the B’nai B’rit conference, in which he emphasized his Christian education, and the impact it had on his attitude towards Israel: ‘All of you have deep ties with the land and people of Israel, as I do, for my Christian faith sprang from yours. The Bible stories are woven into my childhood memories, as the gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution is woven into our souls.’93 Johnson became acquainted with actual Jews when he turned to politics. He owed his successful entry in to politics in 1948 to Abraham (‘Abe’) Fortas, a committed Zionist and attorney. Fortas remained close to Johnson in the following years, and in 1965 the president appointed him to the Supreme Court. Johnson continued to consult with Fortas and sometimes invited him to take part in policyplanning meetings in the White House.94 The Israeli embassy turned to Fortas for help when it needed to deliver messages or apply pressure on the president, or just wanted to keep him informed.95 Throughout his career, Johnson got to know more Jews, who helped him in his election campaigns. These included David Dubinsky and Arthur Krim, United Artists’ president, who contributed money to Johnson’s election

92 93

94

95

Gomolak, Prologue, 7–11, 18. Lindon Johnson, ‘Remarks at the 125th Anniversary Meeting of B’nai B’rith’, 10 September 1968, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-125thanniversary-meeting-bnai-brith. Accessed 25 June 2021. Robert D. Johnson, Lyndon Johnson and Israel: The Secret Presidential Records (Tel Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center, Tel Aviv University, July 2008), 16–17; Merkley, American Presidents, Religion and Israel, 56. See, for example, A. Harman to L. Eshkol and G. Meir, 22 January 1964, No. 201, ISA, FO 3504/12; A. Harman to L. Eshkol and G. Meir, 25 January 1964, No. 238, ibid.; M. Gazit to A. Harman and M. Bitan, 6 March 1965, No. 67, ISA, FO 7285/4.

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campaign.96 Krim and his Israeli wife, Mathilde, both staunch supporters of Israel, became close friends of the Johnson family. When he became a vice president, Johnson befriended Feldman and David Ginzburg, a New York lawyer.97 As president, Johnson announced that he would keep Feldman in his position and expressed his wish to continue seeing Philip Klutznick.98 Another close associate of President Johnson was Arthur Goldberg, who remained in his post as secretary of labour until his appointment in July 1965 to the Supreme Court. Goldberg and his undersecretary at the Department of Labour, John F. Henning, publicly identified as Zionists. In May 1965, at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) annual conference, Goldberg did just that, while Henning declared in August 1965 at the Hadassah convention that even though he was not a Jew, he ‘would proudly assert his political Zionism’.99 President Johnson’s attitude to the Jews was demonstrated when he accepted an invitation to take part in the dedication of a new synagogue in Texas shortly after his inauguration as president. Feldman advised him not to do so, as he would be swamped with numerous such requests. Johnson insisted that he had to go because ‘these people helped me very much to get elected at the time. I owe them my career.’100 Johnson supported Zionism and Israel also because of his political liberalism. He was liberal in his domestic politics and policies, as well as in his international outlook. Johnson shared his predecessors’ belief that the United States should assume moral leadership in promoting liberal democratic values, which would serve both righteous causes and strategic interests. Johnson’s liberal and humanitarian values and his outstanding attitude towards the Jews were clearly demonstrated by his assistance to hundreds of Jews who managed to escape from Nazi-controlled Europe to find shelter in the United States, despite the very restrictive American immigration laws.101 96 97

98 99

100 101

Johnson, Lyndon Johnson and Israel, 17. Olivia Sohns, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Arab–Israeli Conflict (PhD dissertation, Cambridge University, 2014), 86. A. Harman to L. Eshkol, 6 December 1963, No. 26, ISA, FO 3377/10. ‘Justice Goldberg Tells Conference He Is Zionist’, The New York Times, 4 May 1965, A13; Irving Spiegel, ‘Labor Under Secretary Praises Political Zionism to Hadassah’, The New York Times, 17 August 1965, 25. A. Harman to L. Eshkol, 6 December 1963, No. 26, ISA, FO 3377/10. Sohns, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Arab–Israel Conflict, 35, 42–43. Tom Segev argues that the story of Johnson helping Jews to escape from Nazi Germany

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Like many Americans, President Johnson appreciated the resemblance of the new Jewish project to the American. He commended the Israelis’ pioneering spirit, their achievement in conquering an arid land, and their commitment to democracy. He expressed these sentiments in a letter in which he wrote that ‘the development of their country in the sphere of agriculture, industry, housing and social services, [the Israelis] remind us of the heroism of our own pioneering era during the early phases of American history’. Johnson also believed that ‘Israel has become a showcase for democracy, and it is up to all believers in democracy everywhere to support Israel in every possible way’.102 A story about the president’s attitude towards Jews was that he once told an American friend of Israel: ‘I want to see the person who can point to me a Jewish fool.’103 As was the case with Kennedy, the Israeli embassy refrained from turning to the American Jews during Johnson’s presidency in campaigns to advance the case for Israel, especially since there seemed to be no need for such pressure. President Johnson acted to support Israel economically and militarily, sometimes against the advice of his lieutenants. At the same time, there was an evident decline in American Jews’ interest in matters relating to Israel, mainly among the rank-offiles. The investigation into foreign agents’ activities conducted in 1962 by then Senator Fulbright might partly account for the Jewish reserved attitude towards Israel. AIPAC was high on his list. Fulbright argued that AIPAC was receiving a significant amount of money from the Israeli government, and hence it should be qualified as a foreign agent. Fulbright managed to initiate an FBI investigation over this issue, but the investigation found no evidence supporting the senator’s allegations.104

102

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104

never happened. Tom Segev, 1967 (Jerusalem: Keter, 2005), 136. Sohns claims otherwise and discusses the matter extensively. It seemed that there is more than grain of truth in the story. L. B. Johnson to Cook, 4 November 1960, LBJL, Foreign Relations – ME, b. 68. Minutes of 89th Meeting of Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs, 31 October 1967, ISA, A8161/9, 6. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, 109–110; K. Katz to S. Arad, 22 October 1962, ISA, FO 3379/19; K. Katz to S. Arad, 4 June 1963, ISA, FO 3380/2; G. Green to S. Segal, 5 August 1963, ibid.

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During and after the inquiry period, the Zionist leaders’ spirits were low. Jewish organizations suffered from a decline in contributions that slowed down their activities. Outside of the big cities, Jewish Zionist organizations were hardly active. In 1963, a study on the American Jewish links to Israel found that the complete solidarity with Israel was no longer essential to Jewish identity in America. The American Jews were primarily concerned with their social, economic, judicial, and cultural integration within the United States and recognition that the Jews were a distinct ethnic or religious group within the pluralistic American society. Solidarity with Israel was a component in the Jewish group identity, but it did not define the American Jewish identity, as Israeli officials incorrectly assumed. Thus, the American Jews viewed themselves as Americans and were involved in American politics, which meant that they would not always raise their voice in support for Israel. Many young American Jews and donors preferred to invest time and money within their communities, certainly during calm times, as was the case since the 1956 Suez War.105 All of that meant that the level of popular, bottom-up support for Israel during those years was not expected to rise, and to the contrary. Fortunately for Israel, it did not need the Jewish support as they had needed it in the past (and will need in the future), as the White House was occupied by a pro-Israeli president. What also helped was that he and his aides believed that the American policy towards Israel would be a factor in the way the American Jews would vote.

The Quest for Tanks With the entry of a new president to the White House, Eshkol presented his perspective on the relationship between the two countries. The tone and spirit of Eshkol’s message were one of Gewald. As was the Israeli leaders and diplomats’ practice in the past, Eshkol preferred to see the glass as half empty. Conversing with Ambassador Barbour, the prime minister praised the US–Israel relationship and declared his intention to make them even closer. However, the main crux of his conversation was an emphasis on the points of difference. Barbour celebrated US economic aid to Israel, while Eshkol preferred to 105

‘The Linkage of American Jews to Israel’s Political and Security Problems’, 25 December 1963, ISA, FO 3380/3.

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concentrate on what Israel did not get. He emphasized how Israel’s economy was still not faring well, mainly due to the rising securityrelated costs and the continuation of immigrants’ flow to Israel. This put a growing burden on Israel when US economic assistance to Israel was changing for the worse. Initially, stated Eshkol, the Americans gave Israel grant-in-aid; these were transformed into loans that Israel could remit in Israeli currency, and then into loans that had to be paid in dollars. The problem with these changes was not only economic, emphasized Eshkol, but also political. Since the United States refused to sign a formal security pact with Israel and refused to supply Israel with arms free of charge, ‘the economic assistance you have given us has in effect demonstrated your commitment to Israel’. The waning economic assistance could send the wrong message about Israel–US relations, warned Eshkol. ‘Have you considered the fact that we are now coming to a phase where there is no formal treaty, no staff arrangements, no really military assistance, and next year a prospect of very little economic assistance? You must make a special effort to help us to overcome this impossible burden of security’, urged the prime minister.106 Eshkol’s conclusion from the increasing cost of Israel’s security needs was to not cut the defence budget but ask for more arms from the United States. Thus, when Dean Rusk invited Golda Meir to send an Israeli military mission to Washington in early November 1963 to discuss the Egyptian missile programme, Rusk expected the discussions to be limited to the Israeli claims about the Egyptian missile programme. This was not the Israeli military delegation’s plan.107 The Israelis came to discuss the entire Egyptian arms procurement, which would justify Israel’s request for major arms systems.108 In preparation for the Israeli delegation’s presentation, Eshkol sent Kennedy a letter in which he claimed that in order to keep up with the growing Egyptian 106 107

108

US Division to A. Harman, 25 December 1963, No. 1497, ISA, FO 3378/1. A. Harman to L. Eshkol, 30 September 1963, No. 270, ISA, FO 3377/10; Memorandum of Conversation, 30 September 1963, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 331; M. Gazit to S. Arad, 15 October 1963, No. 249, ISA, FO 3377/6; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 16 October 1963, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 339; Secretary of State to American Embassy in Israel, 2 November 1963, JFKPL, NSF, 119. A. Eban to G. Meir, 28 October 1963, ISA, FO 3377/10; Memorandum of Conversation, 29 October 1963, JFKPL, NSF, 119; American Embassy in Israel to Secretary of State, 2 November 1963, JFKPL, NSF, 119.

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military power, Israel needed ground-to-ground missiles, tanks, and naval power. As a finale, he asked for American help in financing the purchase of those weapons.109 The Israel–US dialogue was intense and intimate, demonstrating, once again, the special nature of relations between the two nations. The Israelis presented their case, and the Americans listened attentively and with an open heart. On 12 November, the Israeli delegation, headed by Yitzhak Rabin, IDF head of operations branch and deputy chief of staff and Aharon Yariv, IDF deputy commander of Intelligence, came to Washington. The delegations discussed the arms balance in the Middle East and Israel’s military situation. The Israeli delegation argued that in order to counter the increase in the Egyptian military might, Israel needed 500 Patton tanks, 100 Skyhawk subsonic jets, and ground-to-ground missiles.110 Initially, Rusk was unwilling to discuss the list, but once it had been presented, the Israelis successfully convinced the Americans of the justness of their arguments. Komer recommended that President Kennedy approve Israel’s request for the tanks while declining the request for ground-to-ground missiles. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the CIA – even Secretary of State Rusk – agreed that Israel needed and should get the tanks.111 It was the new president who had to make the decision, as shortly after the Israeli delegation left Washington on its way back to Israel, John F. Kennedy was assassinated. 109 110

111

S. Arad to A. Harman, 4 November 1963, No. 797, ISA, FO 3377/10. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, 13 November 1963, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 359; Memorandum for the Record, 14 November 1963, FRUS 1961–1962, Vol. 18, Doc. 360; Conversation between Y. Rabin and R. Komer, 15 November 1963, ISA, FO 7326/2; Meeting between Y. Rabin and M. Feldman, 18 November 1963, ibid; M. Gazit to G. Meir, 18 November 1963, No. 308, ISA, FO 3377/6; Memorandum for Record, 18 November 1963, JFKPL, NSF, 119; Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 128; Yitzhak Rabin, Service Note (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979), vol. 1, 114; Rephael Yakar, Israel–US Relation: The Aspect of Arms Procurement, 1955–1967 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1995), 83–84. Memorandum for the President, 5 November 1963, JFKPL, NSF, 119; CIA, Office of Current Intelligence: ‘Current Intelligence Memorandum’, 6 December 1963, LBJL, NSF, Robert Komer, Israel, November 1963– December 1964; Memorandum for the Record, 10 January 1964, LBJL, NSF, RWK, Israel, November 1963–December 1964; Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 15 February 1964, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 13.

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President Johnson endorsed his lieutenants’ recommendations and agreed to supply tanks to Israel. However, it would take time before the final decision, to provide American tanks directly to Israel, would be made – the concern of an angry Arab reaction was mentioned as a reason for the delay.112 At this point, at least one American official was ready to admit that the administration’s even-handed policy was a sham. Robert Komer explained to Shimon Peres that ‘The American talks about a policy of indiscrimination between Israel and Arabs – “even-handedness” – are a screen of smoke. The real substance of the American policy toward Israel is a complete preference of Israel over the Arabs, but it is doing so in a way that would preserve the cover of objectivity . . . The United States managed to trick the Arabs, so the trick of even-handedness worked nicely.’ After the meeting was over, Komer realized the meaning of his confession, and he called Gazit, who took the meeting’s notes and begged him to keep his words completely secret.113 A few months later, when the tanks’ deal was concluded, Barbour repeated Komer’s argument, ‘We had never been as close to Arab states as to Israel’, he stated.114 It was an accurate description of the Israel–US relationship from even the days before the establishment of the state of Israel and after. The American natural proclivity was towards Israel. The decision to stir the pendulum and to introduce the even-handed policy was based on cold political calculations rather than genuine sentiment. Another change the new president brought to US–Israel relations was his invitation to the Israeli prime minister to visit the United States. Eshkol arrived in the United States on 1 June and the president and prime minister liked each other pretty quickly.115 The importance of the visit lay in its very existence, as matters of substance were concluded ahead of the meeting. Eshkol was the first Israeli prime minister to receive an official invitation to visit the United States. Furthermore, Johnson did not conceal and minimize Eshkol’s visit, but rather to the 112

113

114

115

Memorandum from President Johnson to His Deputy Special Counsel, 15 May 1964, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 55; Memorandum for the Record, 16 May 1964, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 57. Conversation between Shimon Peres and Robert Komer on 5 June 1964, 9 June 1964, ISA, FO 3501/13. Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 5 February 1965, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 134. Interview with Arthur B. Krim, Tape 2 of 2, Interview II, LBJL Oral History, 14.

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contrary. It is easy to connect the invitation to the coming presidential elections with the president seeking the Jewish vote. It is hard to tell whether Eshkol’s visit and the friendly reception he got from President Johnson impacted the Jewish vote, but 90 per cent of Jews voted for him. The circumstances surrounding the elections – the heir of the beloved assassinated president was running for the presidency – certainly played a role. Only President Roosevelt received that number of votes in the race for presidency in 1936. Among the wider public, 61 per cent of Americans voted for Johnson.116 It certainly helped that the Jewish community voted for him en mass, but Johnson was pro-Israel. Election considerations did not influence his policy towards Israel, and even if these existed, their impact on his politics was marginal. Johnson had demonstrated his deep commitment to Israel through his deeds. Both sides concluded the visit as a great success. The president and the prime minister agreed to continue the strategic dialogue. Eshkol agreed that the Americans would reassure Nasser about Dimona, and would put the Soreq plant under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. At the same time, the president did not bring up the issue of the Israeli nuclear plant in Dimona, much to the Israelis’ delight.117 The conclusion of the talks also brought to light the cultural differences between the Israelis and Americans on matters of decision- and policy-making. While celebrating the successful visit, the Israelis also felt frustration by what they described as the slow-paced progression of the talks over the supply of the tanks to Israel. Rusk explained that the Israelis were just impatient. They expected things to happen fast, which was not the way the American system worked. Most of the issues raised by the Israelis required discussions that took time to conduct and complete.118 This was a clash of cultures. The Israelis worked in a wholly disparate timescale from the Americans, and their methods of 116 117

118

Maisel and Forman (eds), Jews in American Politics, 153. Memorandum for the President, 3 June 1964, LBJL, NSF, Files of RWK, Visit of Prime Minister Eshkol; H. Yahil to A. Levavi, 7 June 1964, ISA, FO 3504/ 12; Memorandum for the Record by M. Gazit, 9 June 1964, ISA, FO 3501/13; Minutes of 42nd Government Meeting, 18 June 1964, ISA, 13; Minutes of 42nd Government Meeting, 18 June 1964, ibid 3–4, 46–47; Secretary of State to Several US Missions, 25 June 1964, LBJL, NSF, Files of RWK, Visit of Prime Minister Eshkol, 5/31-6/10/64. A. Harman to L. Eshkol and G. Meir, 23 September 1964, No. 137, ISA, FO 3504/12; Memorandum of Conversation, 23 September 1964, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 95.

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making decisions were utterly different. Israel was (and still is) a relatively small country, where everyone knew everyone. With a short history of orderly state-based bureaucracy, the Israelis had little regard for formalities and procedures – officials from various offices who knew each other settled things quickly and with minimum bureaucracy and orderly procedure. Many Israelis used a keyword, ‘improvization’, which was also a euphemism for a lack of an orderly decision-making process and taking shortcuts whenever possible. Even if from a managerial point of view these methods were faulty, they helped to move things along faster (as well as creating opportunities for corruption and faults). In a different context, the Israeli minister in Washington defined the Israeli leadership style as ‘dynamic and aggressive’, qualifications that repulsed the Americans.119 In the United States, things were done entirely differently. There were hierarchies and procedures. Decisions were made based on an orderly process of following straightforward guidelines without using shortcuts. What was measured in Israel in terms of minutes was measured in the United States in terms of hours. What took in Israel a day or two to accomplish would take weeks and months in the United States. The size of each country, its demography, its managerial traditions and practices, all were translated into a wholly different conception of time and procedure. Raymond Hare, director of the Department of State’s NEA, explained on one occasion the delay in giving answers to Israel, ‘our government is very big and large, and things take time’.120 Eventually, even the most tedious bureaucratic machine completes its work, and in early 1965, the administration approved the Israeli request for the tanks.121 One obstacle had been removed when the administration came to the conclusion that there was no point fighting to prevent an arms race in the Middle East. Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon made that point when he dismissed the American claim against the supply of the tanks to Israel under the excuse that it would exacerbate the arms race in the Middle East. ‘We should not feel badly about an arms race in the Middle East because it is going on and 119

120 121

M. Gazit to M. Bitan, 15 December 1964, No. 717, ISA, FO 4301/4; Charles D. Freilich, Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 71–74. D. Yinon to M. Bitan, 14 January 1966, No. 32, ISA, FO 4301/5. Memorandum of Conversation, 14 January 1965, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 121; Memorandum of Conversation, 21 January 1965, ibid., Doc. 124.

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we cannot control it’, he commented wryly.122 Of course, Dillon was right. The United States was trying to close the stable door after the horse had bolted. Since 1955, the arms race in the region was a fact that consecutive administrations refused to acknowledge. Eisenhower and Kennedy still insisted that abandoning the policy of arms sales’ restraints would only alienate the moderate Arab states and drive them to get Soviet arms. That is, Eisenhower and Kennedy hoped to keep the Arab–Israeli conflict separate from the Cold War. This, too, was no longer possible, as the lines of division coalesced and eventually merged. President Johnson approved the sale of tanks to Israel in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was signed on 10 March 1965 by the Israelis and the Americans. The MoU marked a significant change in US policy towards Israel. In the Memorandum, Israel pledged not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East; the United States notified Israel of its intention to sell tanks to Jordan, and that King Hussein pledged not to deploy the tanks in the West Bank; the United States would preserve Israel’s deterrence capabilities, and would sell to Israel 150 M48 tanks on ‘favourable credit terms’; the United States would also consider favourably the supply of combat planes to Israel; and the two countries would keep the details on the American agreement to sell arms to Israel in complete secrecy until decided otherwise.123 Golda Meir described the MoU as ‘a historical turning point in the United States’ policy’. That was correct, of course. It was indeed a historical document, confirming for the first time ‘in 17 years’ of Israel’s existence that the United States had agreed to become Israel’s major arms supplier.124 The Israelis, in their usual fashion, did not give for a moment the impression that they were on the receiving end. They were demanding and tenacious, as if they had the upper hand, seeking to play their better cards in the negotiations. It was not only typical behaviour for the Israelis; their friends in Washington encouraged them to do just that. Feldman, Fortas, and Feinberg repeatedly argued that the Israelis had leverage over the president as he was eager to conclude an agreement 122

123 124

Summary Note of the 544th Meeting of the NSC, 1 February 1965, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 130. Memorandum of Understanding, 10 March 1965, ISA, FO 3504/10. Minutes of 29th Government Meeting, 28 February 1965, ISA, 6–7.

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with Israel that would allow him to sell tanks to Jordan.125 The three proved to be right. At the same time, as was the case during the Kennedy administration, in the campaign for the tanks, Israel did not go beyond the three – Feldman, Feinberg, and Fortas, and sometimes Klutznick. The negotiations were tough and on the verge of collapse several times, but the Israelis did not turn to the American Jews or Congress to pressure the president or Rusk. The Israeli diplomats in Washington were in constant contact with Feldman, Feinberg, Klutznick, and Fortas, seeking their advice and exchanging information, and delivered through them messages to the Department of State and the White House, but they did not go beyond that.126 The president appreciated the fact that Israel did not turn to the American Jews to pressure him. He would not mind facing a ‘tough’ Israeli position. He just resented being put under pressure by pressure groups.127 In this context, the president made an interesting comment during a meeting with Feinberg and Komer in May 1965. He told them that ‘the Jewish people suffered a lot for thousands of years. Jews like you, who are in positions of influence, should see it as a great honour that they can help’ – the president did not mention to whom, but the meaning was pretty straightforward.128

Strategic Exchanges Assuming that the US–Israel relationship would be standing on a solid basis only if the United States would acknowledge Israel as a strategic asset, the Israelis were thrilled by the agreement reached between Eshkol and the president to have meetings at the political and military levels for mutual exchange of all matters of concern between the two

125

126

127 128

M. Gazit to A. Harman, 7 March 1965, No. 78, ISA, FO 7285/4; M. Gazit to A. Harman, 7 March 1965, No. 80, ibid. See, for example, A. Harman to M. Bitan, 25 February 1965, No. 332, ISA, FO 7285/4; A. Harman to G. Meir, 27 February 1965, No. 364, ibid.; A. Harman to M. Bitan, 1 March 1965, No. 14, ibid.; M. Gazit to A. Harman and M. Bitan, 6 March 1965, No. 67, ibid.; M. Gazit to A. Harman and M. Bitan, 6 March 1965, No. 69, ibid.; M. Gazit to A. Harman, 7 March 1965, No. 84, ibid. A. Harman to M. Bitan, 19 March 1965, No. 188, ISA, FO 3504/10. A. Levavi to A. Harman, 26 May 1965, ISA, FO 3504/12.

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countries.129 The Israeli and American delegations agreed to hold such meetings every nine months, and a few months after his meeting with Johnson, Eshkol and later Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban reminded the Americans that it was time to prepare the first meeting. First, Rusk was evasive. He denied that there was an agreement to have such meetings regularly and argued that the American intention was to have ad hoc meetings when developing events would call for such a meeting. The secretary believed that Israel wanted the meetings in order to tie-up the United States and present it as siding with Israel. He also declined Israeli suggestion of holding the meetings at the foreign ministers’ level, arguing that there was no outstanding issue to discuss that a lower-level, informal meeting could not solve.130 Of course, Rusk was right. Israel suggested the periodic meetings very much for the reasons Rusk cited, and the agreement to have the meetings did not include a reference to a delegation level. However, Israel continued to press, and Rusk eventually gave up. He agreed to have a meeting in February or March 1966 and to hold them regularly.131 At the same time, as Rusk suggested, ad hoc meetings took place when high-ranking Israeli officials from the IDF and the defence ministry visited the United States.132 Another step towards the further strengthening of the Israel–US strategic relationship was the American purchase of services and products in Israel, which the Americans paid for in Israeli currency. The United States sold surplus agricultural commodities to Israel, through the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, which later became Public Law 480 (PL480). Israel paid for the commodities in local currency, so it did not have to spend their scarce American dollars.133 The Americans agreed that the Israeli liras would be spent on procurement of goods by the American armed forces in Israel. Bedek, the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) predecessor, 129

130

131 132

133

Memorandum of Conversation, 1 June 1964, ISA, FO 3501/13; Memorandum of Conversation, 1 June 1964, LBJL, NSF, Files of RWK, Israel, Memos & Misc., Vol. II. H. Yahil to A. Levavi, 7 June 1964, ISA, FO 3504/12; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 1 January 1965, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 118. M. Bitan to A. Harman, 4 January 1965, No. 22, ISA, FO 4317/9. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Department of State, 30 March 1966, No. 845, USNA, RG59, DEF 12 ISR. A. Manor to S. Garnett, 5 July 1955, ISA, FO 421/20.

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provided services to the American military. During its early years of existence, Bedek primarily provided plane repairs. In early 1965, the Pentagon negotiated with Israel an agreement to repair American planes stationed in Europe and the Mediterranean in Bedek. While it was not clear whether Bedek was cheaper than similar companies in Italy, for example, Bedek’s advantage was that the Americans could pay in Israeli liras. Bedek had started repairing American aircraft, and the payment was 65 per cent in dollars and 35 per cent in liras. The total expected orders for 1965/1966 ranged from $1 million to 2 million.134 Nothing was special and unique about the Americans use of offshore procurement’s practice in Israel. However, for Israel, this was of significant importance. It was not only the economic value of providing services to the American military. It was also an additional contribution to the ties between the two countries. It was yet another demonstration of the fact that the relationships between the two countries were based not only on the large, visible issues, mainly the sale of arms, but on a complex web of connections that included bigger and smaller facets of life. These added depth and content to the special relationships, and at the same time, were drawn from these relationships. Another symbolic measure that indicated the alleviation of Israel– US strategic relations was the visits of senior IDF officers and the defence ministry to the United States. In March 1966, the Acting Chief of Staff Brigadier General Chaim Bar-Lev and the head of the IDF intelligence branch Brigadier General Aharon Yariv visited the National War College.135 Senior IDF officers also visited the Sixth Fleet.136

Skyhawks While negotiating with the administration the terms of the tank supply, Israel was already working on the next target, the acquisition of 134

135

136

Memorandum of Conversation, 18 October 1964, USNA, RG59, POL 1 ISRUS; M. Gazit to M. Bitan, 11 January 1965, No. 23, ISA, FO 3502/9; M. Bitan to G. Meir, 12 January 1965, No. 23, ISA, FO 3504/12; A. Talbar to S. Siton, 4 May 1965, No. 287, ibid. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Department of State, 30 March 1966, No. 845, USNA, RG59, DEF 12 ISR. Memorandum of Conversation, 18 October 1964, USNA, RG59, POL 1 ISRUS.

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American combat aircraft. In the MoU, the United States pledged to sell to Israel twenty-four combat planes if it did not get them in Europe. What was conclusive for the Americans, was the starting point for the Israelis. Israel wanted more than twenty-four planes, and better ones than those discussed with the Americans. Analysing Israel’s future battlefield, the IAF planners reached the conclusion that for the years 1968–1970, the IAF optimal plane would be the American F-4 Phantom II. The Skyhawk was also on the list, but as second best.137 McDonnell Douglas were willing to sell the Phantom to Israel (and to other Middle Eastern countries), but Komer regarded the Israeli demands as a ploy aimed at ‘taking the whole arms when we extend a hand’.138 In this spirit, Rusk insisted that the planes would be provided as stipulated in the MoU – that is, the Americans would help Israel to acquire twenty-four jets in Europe. The United States would sell Israel aircraft only if it was unable to find suitable planes in Europe. In any case, the United States would not sell Israel supersonic aircraft – reference to the Phantoms.139 The Israelis refused to adhere to the MoU’s terms. They were determined to move on to the next phase in their strategic relations with the United States and obtain American aircraft. The Israelis insisted that the American planes were better than those available in Europe. When the Americans argued that the quality of the Israeli pilots compensated for the inferior European planes, Ezer Weizmann, the IAF commander, argued that even the best pilots needed good airplanes, and that the IAF was losing its qualitative edge to the Arab air forces.140 As a demonstration of the change in Israel–US strategic relations, but also in order to convince the Americans that Israel needed their better planes, Weizmann was unusually candid with his American 137

138

139

140

Z. Dinstein to A. Herman, 10 June 1965, No. 22, ISA, FO 3504/10; Haim Genizi, ‘How to Choose an Aircraft: First Combat Planes from the United States’, in Zeev Lachish and Meir Amitai, A Decade of Disquiet (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1995), 388–392. C. H. Hartley to R. N. Margrave, 30 July 1963, USNA, RG59, DEF 12 ISR; Memorandum from R. W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 21 January 1966, LBJL, NSF, Files of RWK, Israel, January 1965–March 1966. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 5 June 1965, No. 1254, USNA, RG59, DEF 12-5 ISR; Aide Memoire, 15 June 1965, ISA, FO 3504/10; A. Harman to M. Bitan, 15 June 1965, No. 114, ibid. Transcript of Proceedings, 12 October 1965, 09:35am–12:07pm, ISA, FO 3504/1.

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interlocutors. During his visit to the United States in October 1965, Weizmann elaborated on the state of the Arab and the Israeli air forces in great detail. This was a change. For years, the IDF refrained from exposing to Americans its order-of-battle. Now, Weizmann did just that. Israel was ready to pay that price for improving its strategic ties with the United States.141 In his presentation, Weizmann requested much more planes than mentioned in the MoU – he asked for 210 planes. Weizmann was persuasive enough to get Komer to accede to the idea that the United States should supply the aircraft to Israel. From here, Komer retreated to the second trench line, adhering to the original number stated in the MoU.142 Komer was still alone in accepting that the only possible source of planes for Israel was the United States. Secretary Rusk continued to resist such a deal, and the Israelis turned to exert moderate pressure on the president to approve the sale of the planes. Israel would not turn to the Jewish community or Congress but exerted indirect pressure on the administration. In a speech in the Knesset on 29 December, Minister Meir claimed (not for the first time, not for the last time) that Egypt ‘continued to adhere to its declared goal to destroy Israel’.143 The speech was part of the Israeli struggle for American recognition in the security risks Israel was facing, aiming to lead to well-defined goals: the supply of planes to Israel, economic assistance, and the continuation of the tanks’ supply. The president understood the message. He was ‘annoyed’ that Meir made such a public statement, which was an indirect attack on him, and he asked ‘to call off the dogs’.144 Rusk described Meir’s speech as a ‘very serious matter’.145 These were all signs to the Israelis that they were doing the right thing, and 141

142

143

144

145

Transcript of Proceedings, 12 October 1965, 09:35am–12:07pm, ISA, FO 3504/1; Secretary of Defense to Various American Embassies, 15 October 1965, USNA, RG59, DEF 12-5 ISR. Memorandum from R. W. Komer of the NSC Staff to President Johnson, 25 October 1965, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 246; Memorandum from R. W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 21 January 1966, LBJL, NSF, Files of RWK, Israel, January 1965–March 1966; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 24 January 1966, No. 186, ISA, FO 7331/10. Minutes of 16th Meeting of the Sixth Knesset, 29 December 1965, Divrei HaKnesset, 283; M. Bitan to Several Missions, 7 January 1966, No. 60, ISA, FO 4301/5; M. Bitan to A. Harman, 9 January 1966, No. 63, ibid. A. Harman to M. Bitan, November 1965, ISA, FO 4301/5; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 9 December 1965, No. 476, ISA, FO 7331/10. A. Harman to G. Meir, 29 December 1965, No. 192, ISA, FO 3502/8.

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evidence that the campaign was effective.146 The question now was whether Israel should call off the drive and rely on the president’s goodwill, or whether ‘should . . . try to help history along’. Ambassador Harman thought that Israel should continue what it had done in the past, engage in frank discussions with the American officials while using selected private friendly channels to convey to the president and his advisors Israel’s messages.147 The signals coming from the White House indicated that additional pressure was not required. In fact, these were the president’s words to Feldman and Feinberg. He stated that there was no need for the pressure, since he was inclined to approve the Israeli request for combat jets.148 When pressed by members of Congress who came to talk with him about Israel, the president insisted that he did not need any persuasion to act for Israel. He was doing so on his own accord, will, and belief. ‘You need to trust Lyndon Johnson’, he told Eban, ‘I’m your full-fledged friend . . . You will have no troubles as long as I’m here.’ If there was anything to discuss, the Israeli government should do so directly with him, not through the press or Congress.149 No less significant than the president’s promise was the change he suggested in US policy regarding the meaning of the arms sales to Israel. The president now indicated that maintaining the arms balance could be the best way ‘to avoid unrest in the region’.150 It was not only the sheer agreement to sell arms to Israel that meant a change of policy, it was also the logic behind the decision that made it more meaningful. So far, the United States’ main argument for denial of arms to Israel was that the sale of arms would create a spiral arms race in the Middle East and instability. Now, recognizing that an arms race was already in motion, the president suggested that selling arms to Israel would create an arms balance, and consequently, stability in the Middle East. This was a profound change in the American doctrine, which only enhanced the 146

147

148 149 150

A. Harman to M. Bitan, 5 January 1966, ISA, FO 4301/5. Komer referred to John W. Finney, ‘US an Arms Merchant to the Middle East’, New York Times, 2 January 1966, 136; John W. Finney, ‘U.S. Considers Bid by Israel for Food’, ibid, 5 January 1966, 8. J. H. Gilbert to President Eisenhower, 6 January 1966, USNA, RG59, DEF 12 ISR. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 18 January 1966, No. 140, ISA, FO 7331/10. Minutes of 20th Government Meeting, 20 February 1966, ISA, 21. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 February 1966, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 268.

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shift that was taking place in the American policy towards sale of arms to Israel. Of course, the change did not happen overnight, but the principle was established, and it would also decide the reality. The first step in this direction was the president’s instruction to Secretary McNamara to conclude a package deal with the Israelis: Israel would get forty-eight Skyhawks and financial aid, and in return, it would ask the members of Congress to stay silent about the sale of planes to Jordan.151 This was how the deal was carried out. The financial aid came soon enough. It was part of the ongoing economic assistance, although, during 1966–1967, it had more significant importance. On 1 August 1965, the Israeli ambassador received a brief cable from Foreign Minister Meir, which said, ‘Our financial situation is extremely grave, and there is a real danger of actual collapse.’ Meir asked Harman to arrange meetings with Harriman, Humphrey, and Fortas, to discuss how the United States could help Israel.152 The Gewald was utterly justified this time, as the Israeli economy was in a grave situation. In 1963, the government tried to implement a new economic policy. Failing to adhere strictly to the new plan, Israel’s economy sustained a heavy blow that led to the onset of an economic recession. The next two years saw the Israeli economy virtually stagnate, with unemployment on the rise to 11.4 per cent by early 1967.153 The recession ended more than a decade of fast economic growth which began in 1954 thanks to the reparations from Germany and the assistance from the United States. The aid continued during 1965, and the Israeli embassy was busy securing aid for the next year through three main channels, Development Loan Fund (DLF) loans, PL480 – the surpluses programme – loans on particularly favourable terms, and Export-Import Bank loans. Thus, in 1964 Israel had received surpluses of $34–40 million and a $20 million DLF loan; they hoped to get the same amount in 1965.154

151

152 153

154

Memorandum for Record, 11 February 1966, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 270; D. MacArthur II to Representative J. H. Gilbert, 11 February 1966, USNA, RG59, DEF ISR. G. Meir to A. Harman, 1 August 1965, No. 10, ISA, FO 7331/9. Nachum Gross, ‘Israel’s Economy’, in Tsvi Tsameret and Hana Yablonka (eds), The Second Decade, 1958–1968 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, 2000), 42–45. Report of Lunch, 7 October 1964, ISA, FO 3504/17; A. Harman to L. Eshkol and G. Meir, 23 October 1964, No. 991, ibid., FO 3502/9.

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From the American viewpoint, the state of the Israeli economy did not look that bad. Israel became a symbol of American success in providing economic assistance, and of a country that no longer needed American aid, especially under the favourable terms of the DLF, which was reserved for developing countries. The Bank of Israel’s large foreign currency reserves, the rising income per capita, and 12 per cent annual growth of the GNP – all were indicators that led the Americans to argue that it was time to end the economic support to Israel.155 Thus, the administration did not consider the recession in Israel as a crisis requiring aid but as a natural stage in the Israeli economy’s improvement. The American reaction was no reason for Israel to withdraw its request. The Israeli government insisted that Israel still needed economic aid, especially considering the rise in security expenses. The director of the Foreign Office’s American division presented a list of Israeli requests. The language used in each item is telling: ‘We demand’, ‘you must insist’, ‘you should demand’. In two articles ‘we request’ was used.156 In Washington, the Israeli diplomats turned to Israel’s friends within the administration, such as Max Kampelman, Feinberg, Ginzburg, and Goldberg, asking them to speak in support for Israel’s appeal for economic and military aid, which they did.157 Walt Rostow, Johnson’s national security advisor, recommended to the president to consider the Israeli requests favourably and included a detailed package in his recommendation.158 In response to the requests and recommendations, all of the relevant agencies agreed on an aid package and presented it to the president. It was less than what Israel asked for, but, as Rostow concluded, ‘we’ve been as responsive as possible given our limitations’. The

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N. Shamir to S. Arad, 19 June 1964, ISA, FO 3503/1; Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 10 October 1964, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 99; A. Harman to L. Eshkol and G. Meir, 23 October 1964, No. 991, ISA, FO 3502/9. S. Arad to M. Gazit, 20 July 1964, NO. 758, ISA, FO 3504/10. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 31 January 1967, No. 195, ISA, A7458/2; Memorandum from the Joints Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 2 February 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 378; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 10 February 1967, No. 87, ISA, A7458/3; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 16 February 1967, No. 176, ibid. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 15 March 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 395

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package included loans and the president’s promise that he would instruct the Pentagon to increase offshore procurement in Israel.159 The package also included most of the military items the Israelis requested. Thus, Israel would get 100 armoured personnel carriers for $3.7 million, a $2 million cash sale of tank spare parts, $14 million military credit at 5 per cent interest for Hawk and tank spare parts, $20 million in EIB loans – no DLF – sale of $27.5 million in food at 2 ½ per cent interest, $5 million for Israeli assistance plans in Africa, and agreement to offshore procurement for US aid programmes.160 All of that was dwarfed by the news appearing on 15 May 1967 that the Egyptian army had crossed the Suez Canal, heading to the Sinai desert. The move precipitated a chain of events that ended up in a war that changed the Middle East forever.

War The three weeks of waiting and six days of war that changed the face of the Middle East were also days of trial for the Israel–US relations. Israel could barely conclude the result of the test as a success. When the Egyptian military forces amassed in the Sinai, in violation of the agreements that led to the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957, the Sixth Fleet did not rush to Haifa, despite Kennedy’s pledge that ‘the Sixth Fleet will be in Haifa within 24 hours’. When Nasser closed the Tiran Straits again on 23 May, the Johnson administration did not take action to fulfil Eisenhower’s pledge that the United States would act to keep the straits open, even without the participation of the UN or other nations. Instead, in a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on 18 May, President Johnson expressed sympathy and understanding for Israel’s predicament, but at the same time urged Israel to keep ‘the closest consultation between you and your principal friends’. He warned Eshkol that the United States would not take responsibility for ‘situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not

159

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Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 7 April 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 401; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 8 April 1967, No. 57, ISA, A7436/13. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 8 May 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 416, note 6.

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consulted’.161 The president repeated the warning also on 26 May, in a meeting with Eban. Then he said, ‘I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to do it alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision.’162 However, in these two messages, the president did not only warn Israel not to act alone, he also made a promise. While warning that if acted alone, the United States would not stand behind Israel in the aftermath of such action, it also meant that if acted in concert with the United States, then the United States would stand by Israel.163 Israel understood the message. It mobilized its forces, and at the same time waited to hear back from the president. The president tried to involve the international community in ensuring that the straits would remain open. An American admission that the president failed in his mission would be a clear message to the Israelis that they were free to act.164 While the administration was hesitant, refraining from making a clear statement of support for Israel, the American people, Jews and non-Jews, responded forcefully to the danger looming over Israel. Jews from all over the United States, organizations and individuals, sent messages to governors, legislators, the president, and the Department of State, urging the United States to stand by Israel.165 Barbara Tuchman, the prominent historian and granddaughter of Henry Morgenthau, Sr, published a letter in the New York Times in which she deplored the Johnson administration’s inaction. She argued that the United States needed to take action not for Israel but for herself, as it would be in defence of the country that was the source of the JudeoChristian tradition.166 Martin Luther King and Protestant leaders 161 162

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L. B. Johnson to L. Eshkol, 18 May 1967, ISA, FO 4091/23. Notes of a Meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson and Foreign Minister A. Eban at the White House, 26 May 1967, ISA, FO 5937/30. E. Evron to Office, Jerusalem, 23 May 1967, No. 242, ISA, FO 4078/4; A. Harman to A. Eban, 20 May 1967, No. 201, ibid. David Tal, ‘Paving the Road to War: Israeli Diplomacy and the 1967 Crisis’, in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon Klieman (eds), Global Politics (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 201–218. M. Arnon to US Division, 19 May 1967, ISA, No. 273, A7458/10; Ben Yaakov to US Division, 19 May 1967, No. 4, ISA, FO 4078/3; C. Avital to M. Bitan, 21 May 1967, No. 218, ibid.; M. Arnon to US Division, 22 May 1967, No. 334, ISA, A7458/12; The AJC 61st Meeting, 18–21 May 1967, ISA, FO 4078/3. Barbara Tuchman, ‘Guns of May?’, New York Times, 30 May 1967, A14.

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Reinhold Niebuhr and Franklin Littell were among the signatories of a call of support for Israel. The call denounced Arab actions against Israel and delated that ‘men of conscience all the world bear a moral responsibility to support Israel’s right of passage through the strait of Tiran’.167 This represented a broader trend of Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Christian leaders to lend their support to Israel at this dire hour.168 One thousand five hundred clergy signed a similar call in support for Israel.169 In contrast to these voices, two powerful umbrella Christian organizations, the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, with which Jewish leaders had conducted numerous dialogues over the past years, remained silent, to the chagrin of the Jews.170 The American Sailors Association, the United Automobile Workers, and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO) also separately urged the president to keep the straits open.171 On 3 June, a petition signed by 4,000 American professors, expressing their support for Israel, was published.172 In Congress, the situation was more complicated. Throughout the entire crisis, the ambassador and his staff frequently met with members of Congress, seeking their support.173 While General Attorney Robert F. Kennedy made a statement of support for Israel,174 Congress’s initial reaction was divided. Vietnam was in the air, and Congress members preferred to see the UN taking the lead in dealing with the crisis.175 Under Kenen’s request, Senator Javits tried to organize a strongly worded petition directed to the White House, signed by the 167

168 169 170 171

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M. Arnon to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, and Consulates, 30 May 1967, ISA, FO 4078/3; Judith H. Banki, Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis (New York: AJC, Institute of Human Relations, undated), 2. Banki, Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis, 2–3. A. Avihai to General Consul, New York, 27 June 1967, ISA, A7464/11 Banki, Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis, 3 A. Eran to US Division, 1 June 1967, No. 5, ISA, FO 4078/6; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to Office, Jerusalem, 1 June 1967, No. 12, ibid.; A. Eran to Various Israeli Embassies, 2 June 1967, ibid. M. Arnon to US Division, 3 June 1967, No. 93, ISA, FO 4078/6; Rabbi I. Miller, AZC to Local Zionist Council Leadership, 4 June 1967, ibid. A. Eran to Office, Jerusalem, 23 May 1967, No. 255, ISA, FO 4078/4. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 19 May 1967, No. 181, ISA, FO 4078/4. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vol. 6, 90th Congress, First Session, 1967, 2007, 539.

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Republican leadership, but failed. Senator Stuart Symington (D-MI) explained to Ambassador Harman that he had doubts about the American ability to act alone. On the other hand, eighty-seven members of Congress signed a petition organized by Representative Emanuel Celler, calling the administration to make a clear statement of support for Israel and reiterate its readiness to act against anyone planning on destroying Israel. He obtained 110 signatures, but some members withdrew their names from the petition because Celler refused to include a reference to the UN.176 Over time, as the situation escalated and no solution seemed to emerge, members of Congress became more willing to stand by Israel. In addition to those who signed Celler’s petition, more members of Congress made statements in support for Israel on the Senate and House floors. Congress sent a clear message to the president, urging him to act unilaterally to open Aqaba’s straits.177 While many of these activities were spontaneous and initiated by the American organizations and individuals, the Israeli embassy and consulates did not leave things to chance. They were deeply involved in stimulating the Jewish public to contact members of Congress, the White House, and the Department of State, urging the administration to stand by Israel. The consulates and the embassy also initiated the publication of editorials promoting the Israeli case.178 The president did not like the pressure and the telegrams. He asked Ginzburg to ‘do anything to moderate US public opinion for a short period’. Under instructions from the Israeli embassy, Ginzburg replied that it was ‘unrealistic and non-realizable’, as no Israeli government would comply with such a request. He said that the Israelis were concerned about the messages emanating from the administration, bewildered by the course that the administration seemed to take on what for Israel was a matter of life and death.179 When Rostow 176

177

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A. Harman to M. Bitan, 23 May 1967, No. 274, ISA, A7460/8; A. Aran to Office, Jerusalem, 24 May 1967, No. 259, ibid., FO 4078/3; Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, 196–197; Rusk, As I Saw It, 329. D. Arbel to A. Harman, 1 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to Office, Jerusalem, 1 June 1967, No. 7, ibid.; D. Arbel to A. Harman, 2 June 1967, ibid. C. Avital to M. Bitan, 21 May 1967, No. 209, ISA, FO 4078/3; Shamir to P. Sapir, 25 May 1967, No. 430, ibid.; A. Harman to A. Levavi, 1 June 1967, No. 10, ISA, FO 7460/8. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 22 May 1967, No. 237, ISA, FO 4078/4.

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warned the Israeli embassy that the president ‘resents being pushed around’, he was told that the public protests were ‘natural and spontaneous, reflecting a sincere expression of’ concern.180 The flow of cables to the White House and congress continued unabated.181 To vent Israel’s pressure, the president decided to approve the package’s shipment discussed since late 1966 and instructed on 29 May to provide Israel a new aid package that would address Israel’s growing expenses due to the mobilization of its reserves.182 The most painful and striking revelation for Israel was the recognition that it could not rely on practical military help at a time of need, even from its closest ally. Eban described Israel’s situation as ‘apocalyptic’ in his conversations with Rusk and President Johnson. Still, the secretary of state pointed out that the president could not state that an attack on Israel would be perceived as an attack on the United States because such a statement and an act required Congress’s approval. The president told Eban, ‘We are fully aware of what three past presidents have said, but this is not worth five cents if the people and the congress did not support the president.’183 The Israelis did not really expect American soldiers to fight for them. All the Israeli government wanted was American clear approval and support for an Israeli attack. The Israelis remembered the lesson of the last war very well, when the administration reacted with anger to the Israeli attack on Egypt, forcing Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai under the threats of sanctions. President Johnson and his lieutenants were well aware of these concerns. They also realized that they failed to bring the Security Council to diffuse the crisis, and their attempts to create an international flotilla that would open the Tiran straits came to naught. It was now clear that Israel had no choice but to act. The president never told Israel that it could go to war, and he could not do that, but he left Israel with enough indications that the administration would consent to such an act. The admissions came one by one. First, the president admitted on 27 May that it seemed that Israel would have to make a 180 181 182

183

E. Evron to A. Levavi, 26 May 1967, No. 304, ISA, A7460/8. M. Arnon to US Division, 3 June 1967, No. 93, ISA, FO 4078/6. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 23 May 1967, No. 248, ISA, A7458/12; A. Harman to L. Eshkol, 29 May 1967, No. 402, ISA, A7460/8. Memorandum of Conversation, 25 May 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 64; Memorandum of Conversation, 26 May 1967, ibid., Doc. 77.

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decision – he did not spell out what that decision would be.184 Next, Rusk conceded on 1 June that Nasser’s closure of Tiran’s straits constituted a casus belli.185 In Cairo, the embassy ‘reluctantly’ acknowledged on 2 June that the only way to bring Nasser to retreat from the straits’ closure would be through military action.186 And this was how the American consent to Israel’s decision to go to war was made. When it was a ‘No’, the message was clear (‘do not act alone, unless you want to stay alone’). The notification of approval was intangible and implicit. The IDF intelligence branch thought that, in fact, the message was clear. Aharon Yariv assigned an officer, Avraham Liff, to closely monitor the administration’s signals regarding its attitude towards the possibility that Israel would attack. Analysing his findings, Liff was convinced that the Americans gave Israel the ‘green light’. He told Yariv that the Americans did not understand why Israel was prodding for their approval to start the war. They estimated that Israel would defeat the Egyptians and wondered what the Israelis were waiting for.187 This was the message that the Mossad’s director, Meir Amit, heard from Secretary of Defence McNamara. Amit was sent to Washington to hear clear disclosure of the administration’s failure to build an international armada; the implication of such an admission was clear to both sides. Amit met McNamara, who admitted that the ongoing diplomatic campaign led nowhere and that there would be no Armada. When Amit informed him that ‘I’m personally going to recommend that we take action, because there’s no way out, and please don’t react’, McNamara did not answer directly but said, ‘it was all right, the president knows that you are here, and I have a direct line to the president’.188 A few days 184

185

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187 188

Memorandum for the Record, 24 May 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 54; Memorandum from the CIA’s Board and National Estimates to Director of CIA, 26 May 1967, ibid., Doc. 79; E. Evron to A. Levavi, 27 May 1967, No. 315, ISA, A7460/8; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 28 May 1967, ibid., Doc. 91; M. Bitan to A. Harman, 29 May 1967, No. 352, ISA, A7460/8. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria, 1 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 125. Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR to the Department of State, 2 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 128. Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 274, 276. Memorandum for the Record, 1 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 124.

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later, Secretary Rusk sent a message to US ambassadors in the Arab countries to which the Israelis did not have access, but they were certainly happy to read, ‘You should not assume that the United States can order Israel not to fight for what it considers to be its most vital interests.’ Thus, Rusk seemed to be resigned to the possibility that Israel would attack.189 And indeed, for Amit, there was only one way to understand what he heard in Washington. He returned from his mission on the eve of 3 June and presented his conclusion to the government. After hearing his report, the government voted on 4 June for a resolution that ordered the IDF to act to ‘relieve Israel of the ring of aggression tightening around her’.190 Almost twenty-four hours later, at 7 am, the prime minister and the new minister of defence, Moshe Dayan, gave the IAF the order to carry out its plan of attack. The war ended the siege on Israel and improved Israel’s strategic environment in the most profound manner. It not only proved Israel’s unquestionable military superiority but it also provided Israel with new strategic assets, foremost strategic depth. The small and almost claustrophobic Israel expanded its original size three times, and no Israeli house was within the firing range of hostile forces. However, the outstanding achievement was also a curse, or as author Shabtai Teveth depicted it, The Cursed Blessing.191 The war changed Israel, and not always for the better. Furthermore, the victory boosted Israel’s self-confidence up to a level of arrogance, as was revealed six years later.

Israel in American Eyes (2) Harry C. McPherson, Jr, a special assistant to President Johnson, who replaced Mike Feldman as the conduit to the American Jewish community, was on tour in Vietnam during the Waiting period. On his way

189

190

191

Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Arab Capitals, 3 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 141. Meir Amit Report of the Visit to the United States, 4 June 1967, ISA, FO 6445/ 7; Minutes of Meeting of Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, 4 June 1967, 12:30 PM, ISA, 7, 31; Meir Amit, Head On . . . (Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi Publishing House, 1999), 240–243; Abba Eban, Chapters of Life (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), 379. Shabtai Teveth, The Cursed Blessing (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970).

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back home, he made a stop in Israel, seeking to view the unfolding events. He arrived on 5 June, 3 am local time, but did not sleep a lot that night. Air raid sirens woke him up at 8 am. McPherson stayed in Israel for four days, during which he ‘had a glorious time’. Upon his return, he sent a detailed report to the president, in which he described what he saw and his impressions. There were two notes he made in his letter that deserve direct quotation, as they reflected not only the general tone of his message but also the huge impact that the war had on McPherson, and most probably on people like him: The spirit of the army, and indeed of all the people, has to be experienced to be believed. After the doubts, confusions, and ambiguities of Vietnam, it was deeply moving to see people whose commitment is total and unquestioning . . . Israel at war destroys the prototype of the pale, scrawny Jew; the soldiers I saw were tough, muscular, and sunburned. There is also an extraordinary combination of discipline and democracy among officers and enlisted men; the latter rarely salute and frequently argue, but there is no doubt about who will prevail.192

Indeed, the Six-Day War further strengthened and aggrandized the image of the Israelis in American eyes. The decisive and swift victory of little ‘David’ over the mighty ‘Goliath’ thrilled the American people. The American military attaché in Israel did not hold back in paying praise to the IDF. He called its achievement ‘phenomenal’, attributing it to ‘meticulous training, brilliant intelligence, outstanding leadership at all levels’, and very high motivation. The attaché deemed it worth mentioning that ‘in their years of service here in Israel the service attaches have never seen a drunken soldier’.193 The extent of the IDF achievement was also measured against the US military performance in Vietnam. Senator Ribicoff told Minister Amos Eran that a popular joke in the Senate was that the United States should swap McNamara with Dayan.194 Vietnam did indeed become a point of reference in the discussions over Israel–US relations after the war, with the American involvement in Vietnam being used as a 192

193

194

Memorandum from the President’s Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson, 11 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 263. US Defense Attaché Officer, Tel Aviv to RUEPJS/DIA, 27 June 1967, No. 0977, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. A. Eran to M. Bitan, 7 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6.

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justification for American support for Israel. Barbara Tuchman argued that if the United States deemed it right to intervene in Vietnam, certainly it should assist Israel: ‘it seems to me obvious that [Israel’s] integrity and security, not to say its survival, is a closer concern of ours than that of South Vietnam’.195 A comparison was also made between what was presented as a war for the wrong versus the right cause. The landscapes of the two arenas served as metaphors of unjust and just wars. The forested, murky, and hidden-from-the-sun Vietnamese warzone, where the enemy was invisible, became a symbol of a war that no one understood. It stood in stark contrast with the bright, sunny landscape of the Middle East, which symbolized the clarity of cause of the Israeli fight. In Vietnam, television footage showed bombers dropping bombs from a distance on a hidden enemy and targets, while in the Middle East, the viewers could see lucid images and video clips of the IAF planes bombing Arab planes lying in the open for everyone to see. Using an image as a statement of the state of each theatre, Amy Kaplan proposed a comparison between two photographs of Israeli and American soldiers. She depicted the Israeli soldier who appeared on the front page of Life magazine as follows: A tanned, lanky soldier stands in the Suez Canal with water up to his chest. His face grimly from battle and black curls tousled, he wears a shirt that shows off his muscular physique and hoists his rifle into the air. He loos skyward into the bright sun, white teeth shining . . . It is a picture of military triumph and virile sexual appeal.

The American soldier appeared on the cover of Time, and Kaplan described him that way: ‘[He] curled up in a fetal position inside a trench, clutching his helmet with his bare arms. The banner reads “Rising Doubt about the War.”’196 This was what the American people saw on the covers of their leading magazines, and this was how the meaning of each war and each soldier was presented to them. The Israeli soldier was not only a symbol of sexual virility, he also represented a different kind of a soldier in another type of society, compared with the United States. While the Vietnam war raised concerns in the United States about the place of the military in society, the American media presented an image of the Israeli soldier as a civic 195 196

Tuchman, ‘Guns of May?’, A14. Kaplan, Our American Israel, 101–104.

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soldier, who, even when serving, was not acting as a professional soldier.197 Strengthening that image of the Israeli soldier/civilian, commentators and reporters emphasized and marvelled at the sloppy appearance of the Israeli soldier. Commending the ‘egalitarian and unifying qualities of Israel’s people’s army’, Americans compared it with the ‘American spirit of the citizen-soldier’ that the American soldier used to be, but ‘had disappeared in Vietnam’.198 With the American experience in Vietnam in their minds, the American press expressed their admiration for the Israelis following the sweeping victory. While emphasizing the Israelis’ better military capabilities and their better mastery of technology, a recurring theme was that the Israelis’ highest moral stand and spirit and their military leaders’ high personal qualities won them the war.199 Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times military commentator, commended Israel’s remarkable will to fight and their offensive spirit.200 Pentagon officials’ background briefing inspired some of these reports, which described the Israeli military achievements as ‘brilliant in planning and execution’.201 The Israeli victory drew comparisons not only with the American experience in Vietnam but also with the state of the Arabs. Against the Western, technological, highly motivated Israelis stood the Arab nations, who ‘are still essentially feudalistic in social structure’, explained Baldwin.202 A New York Times editorial attributed the Israeli victory to a higher moral ground. The Israeli ‘offensive spirit, a will to fight, a high morale and good leadership’ defeated the Arabs, who lacked ‘soldiers of equal heart and spirit, men trained as masters of their technology, and above all, leaders who led’. The Arabs ‘have never shown the advanced training or technology necessary to conduct a mechanized war of manoeuvre’, concluded the editorial.203

197

198 199 200 201

202 203

Mitelpunkt, Israel in the American Mind, 2. The Israelis used to quip that every civilian is actually a soldier on a break until they are called back to reserve service. Kaplan, Our American Israel, 104–106. ‘Hero of the Israelis: Itzhak Rabin’, New York Times, 8 June 1967, 16. Hanson W. Baldwin, ‘Why Israel Prevailed’, New York Times, 8 June 1967, 16. D. Patir to US Division, 8 June 1967, No. 107, ISA, A7460/11; Y. Geva to Ts. Tsvi, 14 June 1967, No. 239, ISA, FO 6454/12. Baldwin, ‘Why Israel Prevailed’, 16. ‘The Four-Day War’, New York Times, 9 June 1967, 44.

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A member of the New York Times editorial board explained simply that ‘Americans admire efficiency and competence, and they have the distinctive impression that . . . the Arabs are neither efficient nor competent.’204 Against these voices of enthusiasm and identification with Israel, other voices started to emerge. Israel was no longer the underdog it was for nearly twenty years. Israel was on her way to becoming a regional power, which led to a change in how Israel was viewed and perceived in the world. Until and during the war, it was David who slew Goliath. At the end of the war, David embarked on a journey that would turn him into a Goliath.205 Israel could no longer assume the position of the victim, argued/warned Ambassador Barbour. It was now the ‘top dog’, and hence, the world, which included, of course, the United States, expected Israel to be the generous party making concessions that would allow progress.206 The French scholar Raymond Aron made that point during his conversation with Prime Minister Eshkol soon after the war, ‘Israel had so far a certain image in the enlightened world, but if it will become an occupier, its image in the world will change.’207 This was a prediction that will come true in the not too distant future.208

American Jews in the Wake of the 1967 June War Naturally, the 1967 June War had a strong impact also on American Jews’ attitudes towards Israel. After nearly a decade of declining involvement in Israel’s affairs, the American Jewish community came back to life. Arthur Hertzberg summarized the Jewish experience before and after the war: ‘the immediate reaction of American Jewry to the crisis was far more intense and widespread than anyone could

204

205 206

207

208

William V. Shannon, ‘U.S. Politics and the Middle East Crisis’, New York Times, 12 June 1967, 44. A. Avidar to A. Harman, 13 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6. American Embassy in Israel to Secretary of State, 7 August 1967, No. 00391, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Eitan Haber, ‘Today War Will Break Out’: The Reminiscences of Brig. Gen. Israel Lior (Jerusalem: Edanim Publishers, 1987), 266. See also extended discussion over this issue is in Kaplan, Our American Israel, 116–118.

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have foreseen. Many Jews would never have believed that grave danger to Israel could dominate their thoughts and emotion to the exclusion of all else.’ Victory was exhilarating, ‘Israel’s military victory brought elation and pride, but, even more, release from tension, gratitude, a sense of deliverance.’ The Jews were proud, but it was ‘a new kind of pride in being a Jewish, . . . in the changed image of the Jews, no longer seen as victim or the historic typification of persecuted people.’209 Dennis Ross, who served as senior advisor to presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama, wrote in his memoirs that his ‘interest in Israel had been very much awakened by the Six Day War in 1967’.210 Author Paul Auster, whose involvement in matters relating with Israel was minimal, described in his memoirs the impact that the war had on him: ‘it was the Six-Day War in the Middle East that alarmed you deeply, so deeply that during the short time when the outcome of the war was in doubt, you actively entrained the notion of enlisting in the Israeli army, for Israel was not a problematical country for you back then, you still looked upon it as a secular, socialist state with no blood on its hands.’211 Israeli consuls from across the United States reported the exciting responses of people in their area to the unfolding events, the wish to help, and demonstrations in support for Israel.212 There was also a significant increase in the most meaningful symbol of Jewish support for Israel, the financial donations. These were significantly higher after the war.213 From the beginning of the crisis to the end of the war, the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) had raised more than $100 million; within weeks, it would raise an additional $400 million. Campaign officers complained that they were unable to keep up with the pace of the donations, and ‘Banks hired scores of temporary employees to help the UJA to catch up.’214 Prime Minister Eshkol received sixty cheques that

209

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211 212

213 214

American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Year Book, vol. 69 (New York: Springer, 1968), 203–205. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 6. Paul Auster, Report from the Interior (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), 191. Y. Ben Yaakov, Philadelphia, to A. Harman, 12 June 1967, No. 254.1, ISA, FO 4078/6; Caspi, Los Angeles, to US Division, 12 June 1967, No. 73, ibid. Shamir to Z. Sherf, 6 June 1967, No. 208, ISA, A7460/9. Marianne R. Sanua, Let Us Prove Strong: The AJC, 1945–2006 (Waltham, NE: Brandeis University Press, 2007), 142.

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American Jews sent directly to him, totalling $450,000. In order to comply with monetary regulations, Eshkol had to sign each cheque on its back before handing it to the state’s treasury.215 The war affected even anti-Zionist Jews or those who had loose ties to Judaism and Israel. Henry and John Loeb, two – Jewish brothers, investors, and philanthropists, were anti-Zionists- Henry served as the vice president of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism’s (ACJ). However, during the war, the two brothers reached the conclusion that they needed to do something for Israel and asked the economic minister at the New York consulate to whom they should send money. The minister asked them to contact UJA, which they did.216 Given the Council’s vehement anti-Zionist stand, this amounted to nearly a conversion, a powerful sign of the extraordinary impact the war had had on American Jews. A similar transformation took place in the Jewish community in Louisiana. The community had a reputation of being ‘Zionist haters’ and was affiliated with the ACJ. However, following the war, ‘something has been broken among the anti-Zionist Jews’, wrote the Israeli general consul in the south-east United States. A Baton Rouge synagogue made a dedication to Israel, which they sent to the Israeli prime minister. The dedication praised ‘our people’ who, ‘after almost 2,000 years’, were at home again, and ‘to those gallant and heroic people who have made the Return to Jerusalem a reality’. The dedicating congregation obliged ‘to support our brothers in the state of Israel and throughout the world’.217

Christian Zionists L. Nelson Bell was a missionary and Billy Graham‘s father-in-law. When he heard the news that Israel had occupied the Old City of Jerusalem on 7 June 1967, Bell wrote in Christianity Today ‘that for the first time in more than 2,000 years Jerusalem is now completely in the hands of the Jews, gives a student of the Bible a thrill and a renewed

215 216 217

Segev, 1967, 595. N. Shamir to A. Harman, 9 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6. Benjamin Boneh to General Director, Prime Minister Office, Jerusalem, 14 September 1971, ISA, FO 4550/7; Dedication, n.d., ibid.

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faith in the accuracy and validity of the Bible’.218 And indeed, the Evangelicals celebrated the Israeli victory. Following the 1948 war the prophecies seemed to come true, as a mother from Alabama told her young children. She asked them to remember the day of the establishment of Israel ‘as the most significant event since Jesus Christ was born. With Israel again a nation, Jesus could come at any moment.’219 The Israeli victory in the 1956 Suez War also excited Evangelicals. In February 1957, the Shiloh Baptist Church’s minister in Philadelphia read the events unfolding in the Middle East as the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies about the onslaught of Satanic forces, which included the Arabs, the Soviets, Britain and France, the Asian–African bloc, and even the UN, against God’s chosen people.220 The victory also raised the interest and sympathy of the Evangelical Southern Baptist Alliance, with eight million members in the late 1950s. The Alliance was not particularly pro-Israeli, but it followed the Suez War with great interest, and after the war, more members took an interest in Israel and visited the country.221 Therefore, they considered Eisenhower’s pressure on Israel to withdraw as blasphemy. For George T. B. Davis, a premillennialist, ‘American policy in the recent crisis amounted to a curse’.222 Still, Evangelical’s enthusiasm and excitement were limited in scope and depth. First, the territory of the state established in 1948 did not correspond to the biblical land of Israel. Modern Israel stretched along the coast and southern desert, but the heart of the biblical land, Judea and Samaria’s hills, and the Jewish Temple site remained under foreign rule. Second, Israel turned out to be a secular state, which raised the concern that the Israeli Jews would not see it as their mission to rebuild the temple, which was an essential requirement for the fulfilment of the prophecies. To that added the fact that the Evangelicals still refrained from getting involved in politics, while mainline Protestants remained even more distant from the Jewish state.223 218 219

220

221 222 223

Quoted in Weber, On the Road to Armageddon, 184. Quotation in Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 187; William L. Burton, ‘Protestant America and the Rebirth of Israel’, Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1964), 205; Carenen, The Fervent Embrace, 8. W. H. R. Powell, ‘The Gathering Strom in the Middle East and What It Portends to Christian People’, 17 February 1957, ISA, FO 3088/9. N. Esther to Y. Dorot, 11 December 1957, ISA, FO 3088/11. Weber, On the Road to Armageddon, 174–177. Carenen, The Fervent Embrace, 117–120.

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The dramatic victory in 1967 and the expansion of Israel’s borders served as a reconfirmation of the prophecies, and this time, Israel also had biblical Land of Israel and the Mount of Temple under its control. Evangelicals read the news as if it were a direct incarnation of the biblical stories. Carl McIntire, who belonged to a premillennialist church, wrote to Prime Minister Meir in January 1970, and again on 3 December 1973, that Israel should not return any part of the territory it occupied since, according to the Bible, it all belonged to Israel.224 More significantly, the Evangelicals‘ excitement turned them from observers and interpreters of history to active players in the shaping of history. Acting with the confidence of those who proved their belief to be true, they started their journey back into American mainstream politics, seeking to take an active part in shaping American society and influencing US foreign policy. The growing self-confidence of the Evangelicals led them to reclaim their position within American society. This happened also due to social and demographic changes underway within the Protestant churches. Before the 1960s, mainline Protestants, represented by the NCC, were the larger, more prosperous, and more influential group among Protestants. This had changed during the 1960s, when the number of church-going Americans from New England and the mid-Atlantic – traditional bastions of mainline Protestantism – declined, while Americans from the South and Southwest, most of them belonging to Evangelical churches, began pouring into the churches that they had built with their growing wealth. By the early 1970s, the ten largest churches in the United States were located in the South, the West, and the Midwest, and nearly all of them were Evangelicals.225 Concurrently, there was an increase in the involvement of Evangelicals from the apocalyptic and fundamentalist schools of thought in public affairs.226 With that, the number of Protestants belonging to churches inclined to support Israel grew from the late 1960s. An American Jewish Committee (AJC) report from March 1970 showed that a change was taking place in Protestants’ general attitudes towards Israel. More Evangelicals

224

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S. Dinitz to S. Argov, 6 January 1970, No. 72, ISA, FO 4548/11; C. McIntire to Prime Minister Meir, 3 December 1973, ibid., G 6523/1. Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of The Christian Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 93–94. McAlister, Epic Encounters, 167–168.

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showed a greater understanding of Israel’s security needs and increasingly supported Israel’s sovereignty.227 A noteworthy example of the juxtaposition between the declining and rising forces within Protestantism and the rise of the Christian Zionists was the editor of the Christian Science Monitor, Erwin Canham. The journal, which was based in New England, a hub of mainline Protestants not friendly to Israel, had a history of antagonism towards Israel.228 However, in December 1968, Canham addressed the Hadassah donor’s lunch and spoke with great enthusiasm about Israel, from which he had recently returned. He understood and justified Israel’s attitude towards peace and the occupied territories and reassured his audience that ‘the State of Israel will survive’ despite the challenges facing her. He said that due the biblical prophecies, ‘I would be the last to ignore the profound significance of Biblical prophecy’, which provided the ‘ethical’ basis for the existence of the state of Israel.229 At the same time, the Christian Science Monitor’s editor’s transformation did not herald a change in the newspaper’s dominant line, which remained a hub of anti-Israeli criticism. Mainline Protestants continued to advance anti-Israeli campaigns, originating to a great extent from Protestant clergymen and missionaries stationed in Arab states. They disseminated literature of various kinds which found its way also to the general and religious press, blaming Israel for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem; characterizing Israel as a militaristic, expansionist state; and regarding Zionism as ‘narrow tribalism, or racist chauvinism, or contradiction or corruption of the “noble universalism of prophetic Judaism”’. The other side of this coin was the sympathetic view of Arab nationalism and, in some cases, romanticizing the Arab ‘fedayeen terrorist groups’, branding them as ‘freedom fighters’.230 The NCC called to put Jerusalem under international control.231 This was one example of broader phenomena, of mainline

227

228 229

230 231

Irving Spiegel, ‘Christians Views of Israel Studied’, New York Times, 1 April 1970. Y. Cohen to M. Offer, 22 August 1968, ISA, FO 4157/5. Address of Mr. Erwin Canham to Hadassah Donor’s Luncheon, 1 December 1969, ISA, FO 4157/3. Rabbi M. H. Tanenbaum to AJC Members, 2 April 1969, ISA, FO 4159/8. Carenen, Fervent Embrace, 134-138.

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Protestant leaders making statements and publications denouncing Israel, blaming her for the 1967 June War.232 However, mainline Protestantism was in decline, while Evangelical Christian Zionism was on the rise. They gained popularity also through the use of media and popular culture. One means through which they spread their message was books. One of the first that marked to some extent the introduction of the Evangelicals into national consciousness and their entry into the public sphere was Hal Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth, published in 1970. The book demonstrated how the Bible predicted the historical events that would lead to the apocalypse and Jesus’s second coming. Lindsey showed how the 1948 and 1967 June Wars fitted into the Bible verses, and from there, he forecasted tomorrow’s news. The timing of the publication was fortunate. The war in Vietnam, the Cold War and the threat of a nuclear war, the social upheavals, and turbulences that shook the United States in the late 1960s to early 1970s – all made Americans susceptible to the message Lindsey was delivering to them. The book’s fluent and clear language made it easy to read, and its message fitted into the rising tide of literature on parapsychology, astrology, and science fiction – for example, the best-seller Chariot of Gods, which sought to solve the world’s mysteries. The Late Great Planet Earth became the best seller of the 1970s, translated into over fifty languages, and sold more than thirty-five million copies. Riding on Lindsey’s success and the SixDay War’s symbolism, ‘the Bible-prophesy field exploded’, wrote Weber. The next best-selling book from the same genre was Tim LaHaye’s Left Behind twelve-volume fiction book, published in the mid-1990s. Its success was extraordinary, once again translated into sales by the millions.233

Tourism Diplomacy The newly occupied territories of the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and especially the West Bank became exciting destinations for Israelis and

232 233

Banki, Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis, 5–6. McAlister, Epic Encounters, 165–167; Weber, The Road to Armageddon, 188–196.

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tourists alike. The tourists, especially Christians, provided Israel with an opportunity to engage in Tourism Diplomacy, through which it could advance its position in the world. Tourism Diplomacy did not start in 1967, but the war gave it a significant impetus. Palestine, and later Israel, had been a popular tourist destination for American pilgrims and tourists even before the establishment of Israel, and it remained so after 1948.234 Until 1967, the pilgrimage involved a cumbersome journey across two belligerent countries and crossing a hostile border, Jordan’s West Bank and Israel. Things changed after the 1967 June War, with the removal of the barriers, and tourists did not have to cross borders to see Nazareth and the sites in the Galilee, where Jesus performed miracles, Bethlehem, where he was born, and the Old City of Jerusalem, where he was crucified, buried, and resurrected. All of the holy sites were under Israel’s control. The change was evident in the increasing number of American tourists who visited Israel. During the 1960s, the average annual number of American tourists visiting Israel was 269,000. In the 1970s, the yearly number of American tourists visiting Israel spiked to 772,000 on average. In 2017, 800,000 Americans, most of them Evangelicals, visited Israel.235 Appreciating the power of the Holy Land tours, the Israeli government controlled and encouraged it. If the Foreign Office regarded a visiting group as important, it would arrange the entire tour, from booking rooms to the travel arrangements, meals, and meetings. Sometimes the Foreign Office participated in financing parts of the tour.236 Thus, on 25 June 1951, a group of twenty delegates, led by Reverend Karl Baehr of the American Christian Palestine Committee, arrived in Israel through the Mandelbaum Gate in Jerusalem, after spending two days in Lebanon and three days in Jordan. The group stayed in Israel for ten days, during which Foreign Office officials, who 234

235

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Hillary Kaell, ‘Pilgrimage in the Jet Age: The Development of the American Evangelical Holy Land Travel Industry, 1948–1978’, Journal of Tourism History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010), 25–27. Melani McAlister, The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 109–112; ‘Christian Evangelicals from the US Flock to Holy Land in Israeli Tourism Boom’, Independent, 6 April 2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ Middle-east/us-christian-evangelicals-israel-tourism-holy-land-jerusalema8290521.html. Accessed 30 January 2020. P. Colbi to Y. Almog, 1 June 1952, ISA, FO 1623/12.

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arranged the visit, accompanied them. The group members varied in their attitude towards Israel, and included critics of Israel, as well. ‘The tour in Israel rectified significantly the impression they got in the Arab states’, concluded the Foreign Office official in charge of foreign relations. One group member told the Foreign office official that initially he planned to write an anti-Israeli article in the Christian Century but changed his mind after the tour. During the tour he realized that he had prejudices against Israel and promised to tell his readers about Israel’s positive role in the Middle East.237 Such tours were recurring events in the Foreign Office schedule, and they included, in addition to sightseeing, meeting with academics and officials, preferably with the prime minister or the foreign minister.238 The government also encouraged Holy Land tourism by showing gratitude when necessary. Thus, Roy W. Gustafson, the head of the Holy Land tour group and a close associate of Billy Graham, led scores of Evangelical pilgrimages to Israel and spoke to audiences in North America and Europe about Israel. He was part of a network of Evangelical organizers who joined forces with the Israeli government to promote tour organizers and guides after the 1967 June War to expand Evangelical interest in Israel through Holy Land tourism. In recognition of his contribution, the Israeli government presented him with the ‘Terra Sancta Award’ in January 1970. Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem, awarded him the ‘Jerusalem Medallion’ later that year.239 The Israeli message was also indirectly delivered to the tourists through the mediation of licenced Israeli tourist guides who showed the tourists the holy sites, presenting the Israeli narrative to them, and trying to turn the tourists into Israel’s goodwill ambassadors upon their return home. Anthropologist Glenn Bowman tells that during a tour he made in Jerusalem, the guide 237

238

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Y. Avnon to Hotel Kata-Dan, Tel Aviv, 7 June 1951, No. 134097, ISA, FO 1623/12; Y. Avnon to Supervisor of Food, Acre, 22 June 1951, No. 134097, ibid.; Y. Avnon to the General Director, Foreign Office, 10 July 1951, No. 88627, ibid. S. Bendor to US Division, 7 February 1952, No. 52/1673, ISA, FO 1623/12; Y. Almog to General Director, Foreign Office, 5 May 1952, No. 134097, ibid.; Y. Almog to General Director, Foreign Office, 22 July 1952, ibid.; K. Baehr to S. Bendor, 7 October 1953, ibid.; Dr. A. K. Bar to Y. Herzog, 21 June 1956, ibid.; Y. Tal to Dr. U. Hed, 6 July 1956, ibid. Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 102.

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led his group to the remains of the Solomonic gate on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif ) and quoted to them a passage from Kings 1 about Solomon’s building of the Temple. Telling them to lay their hands on the stones referred to in the passage, he said ‘if anyone ever tells you the Jews don’t have a right to this land, you tell them you touched these stones’.240

Israel’s Tourism Diplomacy not only targeted leading members of churches and communities but also grassroots movements, where people from all venues of life were involved. The goal was explicitly to ‘reinforce US–Israel links’. This was achieved by expanding tourism to Israel and organizing large Christian conventions in Israel, which government officials welcomed warmly. In 1955, more than 1,500 clergymen, who attended the Baptist World Alliance Conference in London, continued to Israel. In 1966, 1,000 Pentecostals attended the Sixth World Pentecostal Conference in Jerusalem. In June 1971, the Jerusalem Conference on Biblical Prophecy was held in Jerusalem, attended by 1,500 Evangelicals.241 In March 1974, the Christian Holy Spirit organized a gathering in Jerusalem in which 4,500 members of churches worldwide participated, 2,600 of them from the United States. This was the largest event of its kind to take place in Israel, and the minister of tourism, Moshe Kol, welcomed the guests, expressing his wish to see 10,000 visitors next year. Kol appreciated that the gathering was important to Israel’s economy, as well as to Israel’s public relations.242 An Israeli official who reported that a Christian group he was accompanying had no people of ‘big calibre’ among them sparked a debate over the nature of the visitors that Israel should welcome. A diplomat at the Israeli consulate in New York responded to the report/complaint that the lack of ‘big calibre’ figures was not a disadvantage. The intention was to bring to Israel also people from deep America’s small cities who would return and share their experience with their congregations.243 One such not ‘big calibre’ was Mrs William Grissom, ‘a fifty-year-old Virginia housewife’, and a ‘teacher 240

241 242

243

Glenn Bowman, ‘The Politics of Tour Guiding’, in David Harrison (ed.), Tourism and the Less Developed Countries (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 127. Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 106, 109. M. Kol to Minister of Education and Culture, 11 March 1974, ISA, G 6523/1; R. P. Straus to Prime Minister Rabin, 12 December 1974, ISA, G 6731/13. Z. Zinder to Y. Avnon, 20 July 1951, No. 301, ISA, FO 1623/12.

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of the Adult Bible class’ at her church, who returned from a Holy Land tour in Israel in April 1973. Deeply excited, she wrote to Prime Minister Meir that she visited with a group organized by the Christian Zionist singer Pat Boone, and ‘it was a once in a lifetime experience for me. I have lived in the history of your country so long that I felt that I had been there before, that I never felt so at home.’244 The Israeli Tourism Diplomacy hence achieved its goal ‘to promote a political agenda’. The tourists were ‘potential agents, won-over carriers who can propagate desired political messages upon returning to their countries and communities’.245 Naturally, Israel also invested in ‘big calibre’ guests. The Israeli government welcomed warmly members of Congress and senior public servants, as well as public opinion makers. Israeli diplomats in the United States would inform the Foreign Office about the planned dignitaries’ arrival, and the Israeli Foreign Office would host them. In May 1953, Adlay Stevenson planned to visit Israel. The Israeli ambassador, Abba Eban, described the visit as ‘the most important event in the development of the Israeli–American relations’ due to Sevenson’s impact on millions of Americans. That is, Eban expected Stevenson to become an ambassador of goodwill on behalf of Israel. Stevenson arrived in Israel on 8 June through the Mandelbaum Gate in Jerusalem, and his arrival was front-page news. Teddy Kollek, the general director of the prime minister’s office, and Y. Ben-Dor, the director of the US division in the Foreign Office, welcomed him. He stayed five days, during which his hosts showed him Israel, and the Israeli president and prime minister accepted him.246 This pattern continued for the next years. For example, in December 1975, ten leaders of state senates visited Israel. The group spent ten days in Israel, and it seemed that the visit made a significant impression on the guests. Most of them had no commitment to Israel prior to the visit. At the time of their return, nine of them were willing to speak on behalf of Israel before the press, Jewish and non-Jewish audiences, and introduce and pass legislative resolutions during the 1976 legislative sessions. The Senate’s Speaker William B. Clayton, 244 245

246

Mrs W. Grissom to Prime Minister Meir, 4 May 1973, ISA, G 6523/1. Eldad Brin, ‘Politically-Oriented Tourism in Jerusalem’, Tourist Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (December 2006), 216. A. Eban to US Division, 28 May 1953, No. 270, ISA, FO 2310/2; ‘Adlay Stevenson Arrived’, Haaretz, 8 June 1953, 1.

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a Southern Baptist from Texas, with no Jewish constituency, ‘found he had deep ties to the Holy Land and expressed a strong pro-Israeli stance’. Minority leader, Senator Denis A. Carpenter of California, a very rigid conservative with limited ties to Jews, ‘is now pro-Israel insofar as U.S. support for arms-aid’. The group’s escort appreciated that ‘a visit of this kind can change attitudes or reinforce attitudes’.247 Prospective senior officials and presidents who visited Israel were also welcomed ceremoniously. Their future was not always clear, but hosting them seemed like a worthwhile investment. Among such visitors were Richard Nixon, who visited Israel in 1966, along with his advisor, Pat Buchanan, and once again in June 1967, after the SixDay War.248 Hillary and Bill Clinton came with a group of pilgrims in December 1981, and John Kerry, a United States Senator at the time, visited in 1986 with a group of fifteen Jews from Massachusetts. All remembered their visits fondly.249

Post-war Diplomacy When the canons of war silenced, the diplomats took over. Israel was determined not to allow the repetition of the 1956–1957 experience when it was forced to withdraw from the Sinai without any tangible achievement. Any future arrangement should be based on the lessons Israel had learned from the ordeal of the last three weeks and six days.250 One lesson, which only confirmed an old Israeli truth, was that Israel could not rely on external powers to come to her help. In 1948, the UN had shown helplessness when it failed to enforce the partition resolution, leaving Israel to fight to implement the UN’s resolution. Now, despite all promises and pledges, the United States, too, failed Israel at the time of the test. The Israelis did not speak about it loudly, but Eshkol complained to Mapai’s secretariat on 10 June that

247

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D. Ben Dov to U. Bar-Ner, 14 December 1975, No. 1204, ISA, FO 8440/4; Y. Levy to U. Bar-Ner, 30 December 1975, ibid. Leonard Garment, Crazy Rhythm (Tel Aviv: Da Capo Press, 1997), 116; Rabin, Service Note, vol. 1, 221; M. Bitan to A. Harman, 23 June 1967, No. 253, ISA, A7461/11. Clinton, My Life, 385–386; Kerry, Every Day Is Extra, 445. Press Conference Held by Foreign Minister of Israel, 6 September 1967, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR.

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President Johnson ‘promised great things’ but ultimately, Israel stood alone against the Arab armies.251 On the other hand, Israel received the most needed diplomatic support from the United States during and after the war. Unlike Eisenhower in 1956–1957, the Johnson administration did not act against Israel but rather cooperated with Israel and acted in accordance with its viewpoint. As much as it accepted the Israeli narrative as to the origins of the war and its outcome, the Johnson administration was keen to learn the terms on which Israel would return the territories it had occupied in the war. On 11 June, Arthur Goldberg asked Ambassador Eban about Israel’s plans for the occupied territories and peace.252 The question forced the Israeli government to make decisions that it would otherwise prefer to defer. Israel divided the occupied territories into two categories. The Sinai and the Golan Heights were treated as bargaining chips, to be returned for peace. The fate of the West Bank, which had religious and emotional meanings for Israel, and which bordered Israel’s major population centres, remained undecided. Within a year, the Israeli government changed its position as to the extent of the withdrawal from the Sinai and the Golan Heights. At first, and in response to Goldberg’s query, the government decided on 19 June 1967 that Israel would withdraw from the Sinai and the Golan Heights to the international border in return for a peace agreement and appropriate security arrangements. The peace agreement would include full diplomatic relations, guarantees for free passage through the Tiran Straits, and the Suez Canal, and the demilitarization of the Sinai and the Syrian plateau. Syria would be required to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of water from the sources of the Jordan River to Israel. Until the conclusion of peace agreements with Syria and Egypt, Israel would remain in the territories it occupied. As to Jordan, discussions over the fate of the West Bank would be postponed until further notice. Prime Minister Eshkol emphasized that the proposals would be kept secret and presented to the Americans only.253 In public, Eshkol declared that Israel would not come up with a peace plan but would 251 252

253

Minutes of Meeting of Secretariat of Mapai, 8 June 1967, DBGA, PD. The Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 9 June 1967, No. 5675, USNA, RG 59, POL ARAB-ISR; G. Refael to A. Eban, 11 June 1967, No. 392, ISA, A7460/11; Minutes of 47th Government Meeting, 11 June 1967, ISA, A8164/5, 66–67. Government’s Resolution No. 563, 19 June 1967, ISA, A7060/6.

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rather meet Arab representatives at the negotiating table to discuss peace.254 On 1 September, the Arab League passed a resolution that contained the famous (or infamous) Three No’s: No peace with Israel, No recognition of Israel, and No negotiations with Israel.255 On 22 November 1967, the Security Council endorsed Resolution 242 which called on Israel to withdraw from territories it had occupied in the war. The resolution ‘emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’ and called the belligerents to base their relations on ‘peace within secure and recognized boundaries’. That is, the resolution institutionalized the principle of peace for territory and the need to establish borders that would guarantee the security of the contracting countries. The resolution also called on the UN secretary-general to appoint a special envoy who would act on his behalf to implement the resolution.256 Responding to the Khartoum conference’s Three No’s, and based on the term mentioned in Resolution 242, the government revised its peace plan on 31 October 1968. The new plan stipulated that Israel would withdraw to a ‘secured border’ that would not correspond to the 5 June lines as part of a peace agreement. The Gaza Strip would remain under Israel’s control, as well as Sharm El-Sheikh while maintaining control over the passageway from Israel to Sharm El-Sheikh, ‘and other vital security arrangements’.257 Eban informed Rusk of the government’s decision.258 The Arabs did not join the negotiations table, and the gap between Israel and the Arabs as to the meaning and means of implementation of Resolution 242 remained wide.259 Israel acted from the very first days of the war to convince the administration and American public opinion that it would withdraw from the occupied territories only for a full peace agreement. The embassy asked Jewish and non-Jewish officials to convey to senators 254 255

256

257 258 259

‘What Next for Israel’, U.S. News & World Report, 10 July 1967, 29. Yoram Meital, ‘The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 June War: A Reexamination’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter 2000), 64–66. UN Security Council, S/RES/242 (1967), 22 November 1967, unispal.un.org/ unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136. Accessed 27 October 2014. Resolution No. 95 of the Israeli Government, 31 October 1968, ISA, A 7060/6. A. Eban to L. Eshkol, 3 November 1968, No. 36, ISA, A 7431/6. David Tal, ‘Who Needed the October 1973 War?’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 52, No. 5 (2016), 737–753.

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and representatives the message that Israel’s goal was to use the war achievements in order to get peace.260 Jewish organizations endorsed the idea and advocated for it.261 Members of Congress, too, accepted that position, as did the AFL-CIO executive board.262 Secretary Rusk and Walt Rostow, too, thought that the armistice regime ended its role, and that Israel should withdraw from the territories it occupied only when the Arabs would renounce the state of belligerency and accept Israel’s right to exist.263 The question was what the American role would be in such a process. Should the administration come up with a peace plan, or should it offer its services as a go-between? The president provided an answer, at least partially, on the same day that the Israeli government concluded its peace terms. President Johnson presented what became known as the Five-Point plan for the Middle East. The points became the cornerstone of the administration’s Middle Eastern policy and its efforts to settle the Arab–Israeli conflict. The problem, though, was that they were too vague and left too much room for interpretation, as did Resolution 242. The president referred to the need to find different arrangements between the Israelis and the Arabs that would replace the armistice regime, but he did not say the exact word ‘peace’. Neither did he rule out the return of Israel to the 4 June lines. The president also did not suggest that an agreement would be achieved necessarily through direct negotiations. More than a plan, the points were a general call to the parties to negotiate peace.264

260 261

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Avidar to C. Avital, 6 June 1967, No. 11, ISA, FO 4078/6. Resolution Adopted by the Executive Committee, AJC, 12 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6; Conference of Presidents’ Announcement – D. Ariel to Office, Jerusalem, 12 June 1967, No. 455, ibid.; Memorandum of Conversation, 12 June 1967, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR; AJC Statement, 13 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6. A. Eran to M. Bitan, 7 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/6; Representative J. J. Howard to President Johnson, 14 June 1967, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR; Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO Executive Board Statement on MidEast Crisis, 29 June 1967, ISA, FO 4078/8. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 5 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 166; Memorandum for the Record, 7 June 1967, ibid., Doc. 194; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 7 June 1967, No. 86, ISA, A7460/11; Memorandum of Conversation, 16 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 301. Address at the State Department’s Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, 19 June 1967, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-statedepartments-foreign-policy-conference-for-educators. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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Despite of the vaguness of both the president’s Five-Point plan and Resolution 242, it was clear that the United States accepted the principle of peace for territories. The administration insisted that Israel should withdraw from the territories only for an agreement that would ensure its security, while the parties involved would decide the extent of the withdrawal.265 It was also apparent that the administration accepted Israel’s interpretation as to the meaning of ‘secured peace,’ and that it was reluctant to force Israel’s hand. President Johnson – and his successors – tried to persuade Israel to endorese positions that the administration deemed right, but they never pushed Israel to the wall. When Israel insisted, the Americans backed off. President Johnson, in his unsubtle way, made that point clear: ‘You can tell a man to go to hell, but making him go there is a different thing entirely.’ He rejected the notion common among the Arabs that the United States could and should force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. ‘Making Israel pullback is easier said than done’, said the president.266 The annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel demonstrated the limitations of American clout on Israel. The Israeli government decided on 11 June to annex East Jerusalem to Israel and to unify the city.267 Secretary Rusk ‘strongly recommended’ to Ambassador Harman that Israel would not do this.268 Prime Minister Eshkol rejected Rusk’s warning, and a special Knesset session voted for a law that sanctioned the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel.269 The American reaction was tepid. Rusk commented on the need to consider ‘the special interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem’, and that the United States would not recognize Israel’s annexation of

265

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267 268

269

Circular Telegram from D. Rusk, 11 July 1967, No. 5731, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR; Secretary of State to American Ambassador, Israel, 24 July 1967, No. 014236, ibid.; Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Various US Delegations, 11 August 1967, No. 19843, ibid. Memorandum of Conversation, 4 October 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 456. Minutes of 47th Government Meeting, 11 June 1967, ISA, A8164/5, 53. Secretary of State to American Embassy in Israel, 17 June 1967, No. 212218, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR; Summary of Telegrams, 17 June 1967, ISA, A7461/3. A. Eban to M. Levavi, 27 June 1967, ibid., A7461/11; Minutes of 53rd Government Meeting, 27 June 1967, No. 1085, ibid., A8164/11, 17.

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the city.270 And that was it. The American response to the annexation of East Jerusalem was an example of the nature of the American response to Israel’s actions that exceeded what was acceptable to Washington. The administration would not take concrete action to make Israel stop its actions. At the same time, the Israeli and the American governments worked closely on the diplomatic process. Officials from both countries, on various levels, met and exchanged views on every issue pertinent to the Arab–Israeli conflict and Israeli–US relations. By itself, this, of course, was not new. The only difference from the past was the level of intimacy and intensity of the contacts between the officials, which were closer and deeper.271

The Race for the Phantoms During the Waiting period, while seeking American support, Israel did not ask for American arms. This changed when the war was over. With the losses in the war, on the one hand, and the French embargo on arm shipments to Israel, mostly on the supply of fifty Mirages for which Israel had already paid, on the other hand, Israel turned to the United States, thinking mainly of the Phantoms. For the Israelis, it was also one more step along the path to make the United States Israel’s principal arms supplier. To accomplish this goal, Israel had to convince the administration that first, it needed the Phantoms to maintain the arms balance with the Arabs, and second, that it could get a Phantom-like plane only from the United States. Thus, the Israelis argued that the French denied them supersonic planes, the kind that the Soviet Union was supplying to the Arabs.272 The Americans were well informed of the resumption of the Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and Syria.273 They did not monitor the 270

271 272

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Circular Telegram by Secretary of State, 27 June 1967, No. 218177, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Minutes of 56th Government Meeting, 9 July 1967, ISA, 7–8, 14. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 12 June 1967, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 19, Doc. 266; Y. Geva to Ts. Tsur, 14 June 1967, No. 239, ISA, FO 6454/12; A. Harman to M. Bitan, 14 June 1967, No. 229, ibid., A7460/11. N. Katzenbach to All Diplomatic and Circular Posts, 14 June 1967, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR; Secretary of State to Various American Delegations, 16 June 1967, No. 211879, ibid.; Circular American Diplomatic Posts by

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Soviet arms shipments in order to justify the sale of arms to Israel (although it did) but rather because the Arab–Israeli conflict conflated into the Cold War. The Soviet arms shipments were perceived as a measure that aimed to strengthen not just the Arab side of the Arab– Israeli conflict but also the pro-Soviet camp in the Middle East. It did not follow that the United States would automatically comply with the Israeli requests for arms. In fact, the administration was (still) trying to avoid such a linkage. The leaders of the Arab radical countries acted to discredit the leaders of the Arab moderate countries, foremost Jordan and Saudi Arabia, because of their ties with Israel’s main arms supplier, the United States. Therefore, the United States sought to keep moderate countries from being too exposed to criticism and, therefore, avoided becoming Israel’s primary arms supplier as much as possible. This, of course, did not weaken US–Israel relations, but it was used to justify supplying military aid to its Arab allies, for example, or delaying, as long as possible, a shipment of weapons to Israel.274 Once again, it was a process of bargaining, in which Israel would make its case for the Phantoms, while the Americans would try to postpone a decision. President Johnson attempted to avoid the sale of Phantoms through an agreement with the Soviets on a freeze of arms sales to the Middle East. Trying to advance the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, the president invited the Soviets to negotiate an agreement on strategic arms limitation. As part of the negotiations, he hoped to convince the Soviets to stop the supply of modern planes to the Arabs, making it unnecessary to sell the Phantoms to Israel.275 Nevertheless, the president pledged that should his talks with the Soviets on freezing arms sales to the Middle East fail, Israel would receive the Phantoms by January 1970, regardless of the timing of his eventual decision – even if it was very close to the deadline.276

274

275 276

Secretary of State, 17 June 1967, No. 212725, ibid.; American Embassy, Athens to Secretary of State, 30 June 1967, ibid.; Secretary of State to Various US Delegations, 11 July 1967, No. 5751, ibid. Secretary of State to Various American Delegations, 16 June 1967, No. 212139, USNA, RG 59, POL 27 ARAB-ISR; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 28 June 1967, No. 365, ISA, A7461/11. Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 555. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 January 1968, Session III, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 20, Doc. 41; Meeting in President Johnson’s Study at the Ranch on 8 January 1968, Following Lunch, ISA, FO 6800/10.

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Israel was frustrated by the delay, but the debate over Israel’s request for the Phantoms led to the stepping up of the strategic cooperation between the two countries. Representatives from both countries launched discussions in order to decide whether the IAF needed the Phantoms, but the delegations made inroads into broader issues, deepening the strategic relations between the two countries.277 The Israeli and American delegations met in March. Their discussions yielded a Memorandum of Cooperation signed by Yariv, Lt General J. F. Carrol, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Walt Rostow. The memo, called CYR – the three signatories’ initials – stipulated that Israel and the United States would exchange information on military issues, and that happened soon enough. In March, Israel asked the DIA for aerial photographs of large targets in Egypt, while the DIA asked for information on the order of forces, deployment, and ammunition of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and on the Soviet deployment in the Middle East, including the Soviet forces in the Mediterranean. The DIA also asked for information on Russian scientists and military men involved in military-related projects in the Soviet Union and its satellites. A DIA delegation arrived in Israel in September 1968 for ten days of discussions with their IDF counterparts.278 The Americans also asked to study the Soviet weapons that the IDF had captured in the war. The Israeli military intelligence made these weapons available to various American military delegations that came to study Soviet armaments, tanks, planes, communication, and so on. Major-General George J. Keegan, former chief US force intelligence, said that Israel supplied the United States with Soviet weaponry captured in the war worth $10 billion, and that all of the information that the United States had on Soviet weaponry was gained thanks to Israel.279 Israel also lent to the Americans a MIG-21 that an Iraqi defector flew to Israel in August 1966. The pilot brought with him the manual of the most advanced Soviet plane and helped the Israeli teams learn how to maintain and operate the plane. Now, during the negotiations on the supply of 277

278

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Levi Eshkol Presentation in the Government Meeting, 21 January 1968, ISA, A 7437/4; Information Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 6 February 1968, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 20, Doc. 70. Gili Dinstein, The Official (Hevel Modi’in: Kineret Zmora-Dvir, 2020), 104–105; Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 362–363, 376. Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 368; Tz. Kaspi to US Division, 9 April 1979, No, 355, ISA, FO 8463/7.

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the Phantoms, Israel lent the plane to the Americans for three months.280 The strategic exchange became a routine. Every year, Israeli and American military delegations would meet in Washington and Tel Aviv for several days to share and compare intelligence on the Middle East and the growing Soviet involvement in the region.281 *** The campaign for the Phantoms also became an issue during the 1968 election campaign. Both the Republican and the Democratic parties released calls in April that urged the president to supply the Phantoms to Israel.282 Members of Congress from both parties joined the campaign. The House minority leader, Gerald Ford (R-MI), presented to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs a resolution calling for the supply of the aircraft to Israel. One hundred representatives added their signatures.283 Richard Nixon, candidate for the presidency, told Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin that he strongly supported the sale of the Phantoms to Israel and that the congressional decision was made with his full approval.284 President Johnson would not budge. He kept promising his Jewish friends that Israel would get the Phantoms in January 1970, as he promised to Eshkol, but he would make the announcement in good time.285 While promising Krim that 280 281

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284 285

Dinstein, The Official, 104–105. Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 426, 483–484; S. Argov to M. Bitan, 21 May 1969, No. 198, ISA, A 7058/4; Department of State to Various US Missions, 1 June 1969, No. 92964, USNA, POL 17 ISR-US. Press Release: Republican Coordinating Committee Recommends Arms for Israel in Absence of Arms Control Agreement, 3 April 1968, ISA, FO 4155/6; Avidar to Office, Jerusalem, 3 April 1968, No. 2, ibid.; Republican Coordinating Committee: Continuing Crisis in the Middle East, 19 March 1968, ibid. A. Aran to US Division, 24 April 1968, ISA, FO 6454/12; 90th Congress, 2nd Session, H.R. 16730 in the House of Representatives, 23 April 1968; A. Eran to US Division, 10 July 1968, No. 162, ISA, FO 6454/13; H. Res. 1243, 2 July, 1968, Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 90th Congress, 2nd Session; ‘Final Action on Bill Requesting Sale of Phantom Jets to Israel’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 5 August 1968, 2; Congressional Records, Extension of Remarks, 26 September 1968, E8325–E8293; Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, 219; John P. Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945–1992 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 135–136. Y. Rabin to M. Bitan, 19 July 1968, No. 137, ISA, FO 6454/13. A. Yaffe to Y. Rabin, 31 March 1968, ISA, FO 4155/6; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 3 April 1968, No. 16, ISA, A 7429/4; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 1 May 1968,

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‘Eshkol and Feinberg will not be disappointed’, the president still waited for the outcome of his discussions with Alexei Kosygin on the limitation of arms sales in the Middle East. He did not believe that something would come out of it but he certainly could not ask for such a meeting while announcing the Phantoms’ sale to Israel.286 The meeting with Kosygin was disappointing. The Soviet leader rejected the president’s proposal, insisting that Israel should ‘go back to their borders’.287 ‘Kosygin ignored my reference to the arms race’, the president lamented to Krim, ‘Instead, he gave me a lecture on our policy in the Middle East. This strengthens my hand’ on Israel’s request for the Phantoms.288 Another kind of ‘strengthening’ was NSC’s Harold Saunders’s almost reluctant admission that Israel was losing its military advantage and that it did need the Phantoms.289 When the announcement on the American agreement to supply the Phantoms to Israel seemed inevitable, some members of the administration thought that linking the supply of the Phantoms to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be a good idea. Israel consistently rejected American pressure to join the Treaty. Ambassador Rabin’s response to the calls that Israel would join the NPT was that he was ready to declare only that Israel would not use the Phantoms as nuclear weapons’ carriers, and that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into

286

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No. 802, ISA, A 7454/1; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 4 May 1968, No. 19, ibid.; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 14 May 1968, No. 77, ISA, FO 4155/8; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 15 May 1968, No. 807, ibid.; Office, Jerusalem to Israel Embassy, Paris, 4 July 1968, No. 49, ISA, FO 7310/1; S. Argov to M. Bitan, 10 July 1968, No. 834, ISA, FO 7312/8; Y. Rabin to A. Eban, 12 July 1968, No. 98, ISA, FO 7310/1. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 1 May 1968, No. 802, ISA, A 7454/1; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 4 May 1968, No. 19, ISA, A 7429/4. Information Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 22 January 1968, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 20, Doc. 58. E. Evron to M. Bitan, 14 May 1968, No. 77, ISA, FO 4155/8; E. Evron to M. Bitan, 15 May 1968, No. 807, ibid. Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders of the NSC Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 21 May 1968, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 20, Doc. 179; Y. Geva to Tz. Dinstein, 27 June 1968, No. 164, ISA, FO 6454/13; Information Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to Secretary of State, 26 July 1968, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 20, Doc. 224.

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the Middle East.290 With that, the last barrier towards the sale of Phantoms to Israel was removed.291 The conclusion of the deal marked yet another significant step forwards in the deepening of the Israel–US strategic relations, with the United States agreeing to sell Israel the most advanced and sophisticated frontline aircraft. For the Americans, the Phantom also meant the introduction into the IAF a bit of America. From the very beginning of the talks about the Phantoms, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke told Rabin that along with the Phantoms, Israel would get all of its ammunition, even the most secret, as they would not want to see a Phantom being shot down by an MIG-21, even if it carried the IAF’s flag.292 On 27 December, the Department of State issued a formal statement that announced the sale of fifty Phantoms to Israel that would be delivered before the end of 1969 and through 1970.293 With 1968 coming to an end, Feinberg confirmed to the Israeli minister Shlomo Argov that the president had assured him that Israel would receive the first Phantoms in September 1969. Warnke concurred, adding that Israel would get two to three Phantoms every month.294 Israel and the United States’ strategic interests had not aligned yet, but the agreement to sell the Phantoms indicated that the United States was treating Israel as a very close ally. The first steps towards the shift from friendship to strategic alliance were taken. 290

291

292 293 294

Y. Rabin to A. Eban, 8 November 1968, No. 77, ISA, A 7431/5; Memorandum of Conversation, 8 November 1968, USNA, RG59, POL ISR-US. Y. Rabin to A. Eban, 12 November 1968, No. 93, ISA, A 7431/5; Memorandum of Conversation, 12 November 1968, USNA, RG59, POL ISR-US. Y. Rabin to H. Bar-Lev, 22 December 1968, No. 158, ISA, A 7429/5. S. Argov to M. Bitan, 27 December 1968, No. 195, ISA, FO 6454/13. S. Argov to Y. Rabin, 31 December 1968, No. 235, ISA, A 7431/10; S. Argov to M. Bitan, 2 January 1969, No. 21, ISA, A 7436/4; Y. Rabin to M. Bitan, 7 January 1969, No. 66, ibid.

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5

From Friendship to Strategic Alliance, 1969–1989

President Richard Nixon Richard Nixon’s first visit in Israel was in 1966. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel Defence Forces (IDF) chief of staff, was invited to a dinner at the American embassy in Nixon’s honour. Rabin was the most senior Israeli official in the room – none of the Israeli ministers and senior officials that were invited attended. Rabin conversed with Nixon during the dinner and then invited him and his adviser, Pat Buchanan, to a tour as IDF guests. That placed Rabin ‘in Nixon’s permanent memory bank under the heading “Friends”’.1 Three years later, the president demonstrated his friendship to Rabin. On 26 December 1969, Ambassador Rabin was in a meeting with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, when the telephone rang – President Nixon was on the line. He asked Kissinger to come to his office, and when Kissinger told the president that he was sitting with Rabin, he requested Rabin to come too, ‘to shake hands’. When the two came to the president’s office, he instructed Kissinger, in the presence of Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird, to treat Israel’s economic and military requests ‘with sympathy’.2 Nixon proved to be a good friend not only to Rabin but also to Israel, and he explained his support for Israel in no uncertain terms: ‘we’re right on the issue’.3 ‘Right on the issue’ included religion. It may not be evident from how Nixon ended his tenure as president and his penchant for profanity found in White House tapes, but Nixon had a strong religious bent. He tells in his memoirs that ‘years of training in the home and church had their effect on my thinking. My parents, fundamental Quakers, had ground into me, with the aid of the church, 1 2

3

Garment, Crazy Rhythm, 116; Rabin, Service Note, vol. 1, 221. Telephone Conversation between the President and HAK, 26 December 1969, DNSA, Telcon; Memorandum for the Record, 26 January 1970, DNSA, 00091. Safire, Before the Fall, 565–566.

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all the fundamental ideas in their strictest interpretation. The infallibility and literal correctness of the Bible, the miracles, . . ., all these I accepted as facts.’ And he continues: ‘I still believe that God is the creator, the first cause of all that exists.’4 The Quakers were critical of Israel, but as a president, Nixon became closer to the Evangelical church, especially to Billy Graham.5 Graham, one of the most known Evangelical preachers in the United States and beyond, was a staunch supporter of Israel, whom Prime Minister Golda Meir regarded as ‘a true and noble friend of Israel’.6 According to Graham, the president often inquired about Israel’s role and destination and the significance of its return to Zion and liberation of Jerusalem – from a Christian theological point of view. Graham answered that ‘this is literally a Messianic epoch’.7 Nixon also regarded Israel as a Cold War ally. The president thought that the United States should deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, as no one would take the United States seriously if it were a second-rate power. Therefore, he promised to stand firm against the Soviets, but out of this position of strength, the United States must acknowledge that the Soviet Union was a force to be reckoned with. This was the rationale behind Nixon’s global policy towards the Soviet Union that became known as détente.8 This way of thinking led him to argue that only strong Israel could prevent war and would be able to achieve peace with the Arabs. For this reason, he emphasized during the election campaign that he would maintain 4

5

6 7 8

Richard Nixon, RN, the Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), location 359. Noam Kohavi, ‘Joining the Conservative Brotherhood: Israel, President Nixon, and the Political Consolidation of the “Special Relationship”, 1969–73’, Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2008), 449–480; Williams, God’s Own Party, 89–103. G. Meir to B. Graham, 11 March 1970, ISA, A 4239/11. S. Argov to M. Bitan, 2 July 1969, No. 139, ISA, FO 7283/4. Letter from President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, 4 February 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 12, Doc. 10; Entry for 20 March 1969, H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, Inside the Nixon White House: The Complete Multimedia Edition (Santa Monica, CA: Sony Electronic Publishing Co., 1994); A Meeting with President Nixon, 26 September 1972, MMFA, M. M. Fisher Correspondence, Nixon, Richard M., Re-Election Campaign & Jewish Votes, 1972; A. Eran to US Division, 27 September 1972, No. 309, ISA, FO 7312/2; Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1979), 60–64; Nixon, RN, vol. I, 425–429; Safire, Before the Fall, 136.

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Israel’s military superiority.9 Nixon also ruled out a peace settlement guaranteed by external powers such as the Soviet Union and the United Nations (UN). He emphasized that a peace settlement should be based solely on both sides’ agreement. Without such an agreement, it would be better to leave things as they were.10 Like his predecessors, Nixon was also determined to prevent a Soviet takeover of the Middle East. Unlike his predecessors, he regarded Israel as a Cold War ally. For the first time in the history of Israel–US relations, an American president referred to Israel explicitly as a strategic asset when he contemplated how Israel would take part alongside the United States in case of Soviet aggression in the region. Nixon told Kissinger in July 1970, ‘I’m for Israel, for reasons. I want to let a little country survive – can’t let the Russians come in and control the crossroad of the world.’11 He assumed that as long as the Soviet Union was siding with Israel’s enemies, it was in the US interest to ensure that Israel would be able to defend itself and deter further Soviet encroachment in the region.12 Interests played a role in Nixon’s perception of Israel as an ally, but there was more to it. The president summarized the reasons for the United States – and his – support for Israel: the relations ‘go far beyond any written piece of paper’, and they were based on mutual interests and ideals.13 Declaring his unconditional support for Israel, Nixon argued that he was making those statements ‘as an American leader, not as a candidate seeking Jewish votes’.14 In this case, it was easy to believe the president. Nixon had no illusions as to the political benefits he would gain from such statements. He knew that his pro-Israeli statements would not win him the Jewish vote. After making one of those statements in support for Israel, Nixon told William Safire, his speechwriter, ‘you’ll see, there won’t be a single vote in this for me. They [the American Jews] will cheer and applaud, and then vote for the 9 10

11

12

13 14

Rabin, Service Note, Vol. 1, 222–223; Safire, Before the Fall, 565–566. S. Dinitz to US Division, 22 October 1968, No. 130, ISA, FO 4155/10; M. Ron to Office, Jerusalem, 3 March 1969, No. 9, ISA, A 7496/7. Minutes of an NSC Meeting, 1 February 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 4; Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 7 July 1970, DNSA, Telcon. Memorandum from President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, 26 May 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 233. Golden, Quiet Diplomat, 192–193. S. Dinitz to US Division, 22 October 1968, No. 130, ISA, FO 4155/10.

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other guy, they always do. But we’re right on the issue, and it wouldn’t hurt to say so.’15 And he was right. Most of the Jews did not vote for Nixon. Winning the election with a very close margin, Nixon got only 17 per cent of the Jewish vote, while his competitor, Hubert Humphrey, got 81 per cent.16 Nixon’s pro-Israeli statements did not persuade the Jews to vote for him, as first, they perceived the Democratic candidate, Humphrey, as equally committed to Israel. More significant, Israel was not the prime reason the Jews voted for a presidential candidate. Two days before the 1968 election, twentytwo American Jews signed an ad that appeared in the New York Times, explaining ‘Why We Believe in Hubert Humphrey.’ The signatories included Jacob Blaustein, Abe Feinberg, Rose Halpern, Philip Klutznick, and Robert Nathan. They gave six reasons why the Americans should vote for Humphrey in the race against Richard Nixon: his commitment to law and order, to human rights, for social reforms, to world peace, to peace in Vietnam – and to Israel.17 Israel was one reason to vote for a candidate, but one out of six. Then, there were also Nixon’s anti-Semitic comments. With the publication of the White House tapes and the uncensored Haldeman Diaries, Nixon was heard talking about ‘the f***ing Jews’ and ‘the c****king Jews’ more than once. He also shared anti-Semitic comments with Billy Graham.18 However, Nixon was not a racial antiSemitic. The context of his anti-Semitic remarks was, in many cases, political. Just like the presidents before him, Nixon resented the Jewish pressure, which was applied against him several times during his tenure. Furthermore, like Eisenhower, Nixon believed that the Jews had no right to push him since they did not vote for him. He made one of his stern reactions against Jewish pressure in late January to early February 1970, following Jewish protests against French President Georges Pompidou, who sold Mirages to Libya, while denying the same jet planes from Israel. He told H. R. Haldeman, his chief of staff, ‘This is unconscionable. The f***ing Jews think they can run the

15

16 17 18

Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 66–67; Safire, Before the Fall, 565–566. The quotation is from Safire. Maisel and Forman, Jews in American Politics, 153. D. Aritel to US Division, 7 November 1968, No. 4/191, ISA, FO 4159/7. Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 90–91; Merkley, American Presidents, Religion and Israel, 63.

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world.’19 This was Nixon’s way to say what Dulles said more subtly, at the time. In both cases, what generated the sharp reaction was the sense of offence both felt because of what they considered to be undue Jewish pressure. As presidents stated before him, Nixon resented suggestions that domestic politics had an impact on his decisions on the Middle East. He deemed that important enough to send a memorandum to Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, demanding them to ignore ‘domestic political consideration’ when discussing US Middle Eastern policy. The only consideration affecting his decision on foreign policy would be the United States’ security interests.20 Thus, Nixon’s eruptions against the Jews were not racial, and they demonstrated, more than anything, Nixon’s complex relationship with the American Jews. He knew that they did not like him, and he did not expect them to vote for him.21 When Secretary of State William Rogers was on his way to the Middle East in April 1971, the president asked him to tell Prime Minister Meir that he would continue to maintain the military balance between Israel and its neighbours ‘despite the fact we have no political support from the American Jewish community’.22 Nixon still expected to at least receive some expressions of gratitude for his support for Israel, which was only humane. He tried to appear as indifferent to the Jewish pressure, but he actually was offended by the Jewish attacks against him. Thus, while disillusioned about the level of support he could get from the Jews, he sought ways to win over their hearts. He maintained close ties with Jewish organizations and leaders and had Jews as advisors around him. He told the Conference of Presidents that the White House’s doors would always be open to them, and his actions proved his words. Nixon also had two advisers who served as liaison with the Jewish community: Leonard Garment – a very close friend – and Max Fisher.23 Another friend of Israel in the

19 20

21 22

23

Quoted in Merkley, American Presidents, Religion and Israel, 66. Memorandum from President Nixon the Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 22 February 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 9. M. Yeger to S. Argov, 9 October 1969, No. 704/71, ISA, G 6525/1. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant, 22 April 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 225. S. Dinitz to US Division, 22 October 1968, No. 130, ISA, FO 4155/10.

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White House was Robert Finch, secretary of health, education, and welfare (HEW) until 1970, and since then, special counsel to the president. Finch was not a Jew but he was pro-Israeli and kept close contact with the Israeli embassy.24 He was a close associate of Nixon – who described him as ‘my closest friend in politics’. A friend of Finch described him as ‘the only window to Nixon’s mind’.25 And of course, there was Henry Kissinger. When counting the Jews in American administrations, Kissinger was, without a doubt, the most prominent. The National Security Advisor-turned-superstar-Secretary of State captured headlines and world attention during his tenure. Based on his education and experience as a professor at Harvard, and the publications that gained him a reputation prior to joining the Nixon administration, he was considered a master of diplomacy. But Kissinger was also a Jew. It is hard to tell to what extent this was a factor in his dealing with Israel, but one episode may provide a clue on what was hiding behind Kissinger’s unyielding baritone. On 9 October 1973, he discussed with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz Israel’s request for arms as a replacement for the weapons Israel was bleeding in the October War. Towards the end of the meeting, Dinitz reported, Kissinger said, ‘in a choking voice: “as long as I’m here I will not abandon Israel”’.26 Did Kissinger speak as a Jew? As an American? Essentially, Kissinger did not say here anything that presidents had not said before. However, none of them said that in a ‘choking voice’. Furthermore, Kissinger used his Jewishness as a shield. In March 1975, following the failure of the first round of the talks between Israel and Egypt on an interim agreement, President Ford, under Kissinger’s advice, blamed Israel for the failure. The announcement was met with a fierce backlash against Kissinger, who defended himself, saying that ‘as a Jew, he would never allow that any harm to come to Israel’.27 He

24 25

26 27

S. Argov to M. Elitzur, 1 January 1969, No. 962, ISA, FO 7283/8. Nixon, RN, vol. I, 386; D. Patir to US Division, 27 February 1969, No. 201, ISA, A 7432/4. S. Dinitz to M. Gazit, 9 October 1973, 20:30, ISA, A 4996/3. S. Dinitz to General Director, Foreign Office, 2 April 1975, No. 26, ISA, FO 6859/8. On Kissinger’s meetings, see Memorandum of Conversation, 31 March 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 24, Doc. 169; Bernard Gwertzman, ‘Kissinger Asks Public Figures for Negotiating Ideas’, New York Times, 2 April 1975, 3.

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made that point repeatedly during the days and weeks following the announcement on the failure of the talks.28 Israel’s prime minister, Golda Meir, appreciated Nixon and his friendship towards Israel very much, and went along well with him. She marked him as exceptional in his help to Israel. ‘We have always had Presidents good to us, Truman, Johnson, but President Nixon’, she told pollster Harris in June 1971, ‘no matter what will always be remembered as special’. She told Harris that she kept telling American Jewish visitors ‘without reservation how good president Nixon had been to Israel’, and she estimated that ‘there might be some surprises in the Jewish vote in 1972, which is always supposed to go heavily to the Democrats’.29 Meir succeeded Prime Minister Levy Eshkol, who passed away on 26 February 1969 of a heart attack. She was seemingly one of the most ‘American’ prime ministers among Israeli prime ministers. Meir was born in Russia in 1898 and moved to the United States with her mother in 1906. The family settled in Milwaukee and was ‘rapidly Americanized’. Meir acclimated well to life in the United States, and when she left the United States for Palestine in 1921, she was bilingual, mastering Yiddish and English. According to Meir, she gained from her experience in the United States ‘an understanding of the meaning of freedom, an appreciation of the choices available to individuals in a free democracy, and everlasting attachment to the great beauty of the American landscape’.30 The Americans liked her. During her visit to the United States in September 1969, she visited her hometown and was greeted with great enthusiasm. Governor Warren Knowles attributed some qualities he found in Meir to her time in Wisconsin. ‘Your achievements certainly mark you as an outstanding product of both your family and your community’, the governor said with pride and admiration. ‘You stand as an example of the courage and dedication that has motivated Wisconsinites from the pioneer days on the frontier to the present’, he added.31 The Omaha World-Herald praised her for being 28

29

30 31

S. Dinitz to Y. Rabin, 4 April 1975, No. 67, ISA, FO 6859/8; S. Dinitz to General Director, Foreign Office, 5 April, No. 82, ibid.; S. Dinitz to General Director, Foreign Office, 8 April 1975, No. 84, ibid. L. Harris to General Haig, 21 June 1971, Richard Nixon Presidential Library [henceforth RNPL], NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 609. Golda Meir, My Life (Tel Aviv: Maariv Press, 1975), 53. W. P. Knowles to G. Meir, 29 September 1969, ISA, G 6488/6.

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a shrewd and most capable politician who stood up to the challenges of leadership in a state like Israel, where there was ‘intolerance for failure’. But ‘Grandma Golda’ would not fail, marvelled the paper. ‘The leader of the Israelis has captured the imagination of many Americans!’32

New Administration Old Challenges The heritage that President Johnson left for Nixon regarding Israel and the Middle East comprised of two intertwined elements: first, greater commitment to Israel’s security and US agreement to become Israel’s main arms supplier. Second, the change that took place in the nature of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The local, regional conflict evolved into a Cold War conflict, with the United States and the Soviets supporting each side to the conflict. The new administration would use this heritage as the cornerstone of its policy. Under the president’s instructions, the National Security Council (NSC) launched studies on various aspects of US foreign policy in the Middle East. The NSC concentrated primarily on the peace process, and it concluded that peace could only be achieved if the United States actively engaged in the affairs of the region and the peace process.33 The NSC argued that the key to peace was in the hands of Israel, and while it would be impossible to impose peace on the parties, the United States and the Soviet Union should press Israel and Egypt respectively, to be more flexible.34 Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird thought so too. He believed that the American priority should be to avoid war with the Soviet Union, and hostilities in the Middle East augmented the risk of such a war. Hence, the administration should be more stringent in its attitude towards Israel and pressure it to be more flexible in its demands to allow progress in the peace progress. Laird suggested using American 32 33

34

‘Grandma Golda’, Omaha World-Herald, 4 October 1969, 4. NSICIG/NEA 69-1A, 24 January 1969, RNPL, Review Group, Middle East, B. H034. NSICIG/NEA 69-1A, 24 January 1969, RNPL, Review Group, Middle East, B. H 34; Memorandum for Dr Kissinger, 24 January 1969, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, b. 644; Summary and Comment: ‘The Arab–Israeli Dispute: Principal U.S. Options’, 28 January 1969, ibid., Review Group, Middle East, B. H 34.

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arms deliveries as a tool of pressure, although not at any cost. This could be done only if an agreement could be reached with the Soviet Union on the limitation of arms sales to the Middle East.35 The answer to the American expectations for Soviet cooperation in the peace process came soon enough. The Soviets stated that they had only limited influence over Egypt, not enough to change its attitude towards the peace process.36 It was apparent that the Soviets represented the Egyptian position with quite a vigour. They repeated the Egyptian arguments, foremost, demanding that Israel withdraw to the 4 June lines before anything else.37 Secretary Rogers was determined to follow through the NSC’s recommendations, and to facilitate peace between Israel and (mainly) Egypt. The president and Kissinger were not as sanguine and followed his efforts from a distance with scepticism.38 Still, the president could not entirely disengage from the peace process. In addition to Rogers, the UN envoy, Gunnar Jarring, was also trying to broker peace, and the president could not just ignore their efforts. Thus, he delivered contradicting messages as to his attitude towards the peace process. He would sometimes state firmly his conviction that Israel must flex its position to allow progress, even if it meant taking actions to force Israel’s hand, but these random statements were never followed by actions. Most of what the president did was to delay an announcement on arms shipments to Israel. More often, he would make it clear that he had no intention to force Israel to make concessions. Thus, in April 1969, Nixon argued that Israel must make concessions to achieve peace, as it was essential for its security. Israel could not rely on the United States to come to its help if attacked, and hence, Israel’s security interests also dictated the need for concessions. At the same time, the president stated to the NSC that in case of agreement, the United States should see to it that Israel would continue to ‘maintain the edge’ militarily.39 On another occasion, in January 1973, the president told Kissinger that Israel should relax its position. ‘The time 35 36

37 38

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Minutes of NSC Meeting, 4 February 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 5. Notes from Lunch between the Assistant to the President and the Soviet Charge, 29 January 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 12, Doc. 8. Y. Tekoa to A. Eban, 31 January 1969, No. 456, ISA, A 7432/3. Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, 15 November 1971, RNPL, NSC Files, Country Files, ME, Vol. IV 10-12/71. Minutes of NSC Meeting, 25 April 1969, DNSA, 00019.

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has come that we’ve got to squeeze the old woman’, he told Kissinger, referring to Golda Meir.40 However, this was just Nixon being rhetorical and letting off steam. When he met Prime Minister Meir two months later, Nixon told her, ‘I have kept our commitment to you and did not squeeze you. That will continue.’41 And, indeed, this was the case. Nixon did not believe that peace was possible, and he had no intention to pressure Israel to make concessions from which, so he thought, only the Soviets would gain. He and Kissinger also believed that the gap between the sides was too wide to bridge. The president assumed that engaging in fruitless efforts to bring Egypt and Israel together would generate high expectations that could not be met and would only antagonize both countries. Therefore, the president preferred that his secretary of state engage with the peace process in the Middle East and take the blame for the inevitable failure.42 Responding to Israel’s sharp criticism of the Rogers Plan, the president encouraged Meir to speak against it. Leonard Garment met with Meir when she was in the United States, and conveyed to her a message from the president, ‘slam the hell out of Rogers and his plan’, which Kissinger described as ‘Bill Rogers’ Middle East insanity’.43 Furthermore, the president essentially accepted the fundamentals of Israel’s approach to the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In a letter to Meir from 3 December 1970, President Nixon wrote: We will not press Israel to accept the positions of the UAR [United Arab Republic] that there must be total Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to the pre- June 5 lines . . . We will also adhere strictly and firmly to the fundamental principle that there must be a peace agreement in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the other and that no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved.44 40

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Conversation between President Nixon and Army Vice Chief of Staff Haig, 23 January 1973, FRUS 1969–1973, Vol. 25, Doc. 6. Memorandum of Conversation, 1 March 1973, FRUS 1969–1973, Vol. 25, Doc. 35. Memorandum for the President from Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 2 July 1971, RNPL, NSC Files, Country Files, ME, Vol. III 7/71-9/71. Phone conversation between Kissinger and Garment quoted in Garment, Crazy Rhythm, 192; Minutes of Meetings between Prime Minister Meir and President Nixon, 25 and 26 September 1969, ISA, A 4239/1. President Nixon to Prime Minister Meir, 3 December 1970, ISA, A 7068/4.

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That is, President Nixon accepted Israel’s terms for peace almost in full. Even Rogers, who took the heat from Israel, insisted that his premise was the special relations between Israel and the United States. Of course, he insisted that all he was doing was meant to be for Israel’s benefit, but beyond this paternalistic statement, Rogers worked closely with the Israelis. Throughout the discussions between the Israelis and Americans, Rogers repeatedly stated that he was acting as ‘your friend and ally’.45 Rogers would argue with the Israelis, as was the case when he differed with Israel over the meaning of Resolution 242, but he emphasized that what was most important was that the United States was acting in full cooperation with Israel. ‘Israel and the US enjoy a special relationship. We cherish and attach great importance to this special relationship.’ For that reason, the administration was determined to consult with Israel ‘all the way along’, and to invite Israel’s comments ‘on a day-to-day basis’ with the hope that it would be possible to make progress. All he was asking, pleaded Rogers, that given the last twenty years of American support for Israel, Israel would be less critical about the American steps and give it more credit.46 Rabin and Foreign Minister Eban appreciated Rogers’s efforts to avert crisis and rift and found their conversations with the Americans to be serious, thorough, and useful.47 Rogers’ frequent reference to the Israel–US special relationship is interesting as while members of previous administrations used to refer to the special relationships between the two states, during the Nixon administration American officials reiterated this theme more frequently. It was used when American officials spoke with Israeli officials, sometimes as a sweetener for a bitter pill. It was also used in internal correspondence, justifying measures officials thought the administration should take. Thus, following the request from the Israeli embassy to arrange the visit of Prime Minister Meir to the United States in 1969, the Department of State had reservations 45

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Memorandum for the President, 12 March 1969, USNA, POL ISR-US; Y. Rabin to G. Refael, 13 March 1969, No. 110, ibid., A 7496/8; A. Eban to M. Bitan, 13 March 1969, No. 124, ISA, FO 7310/3; Ben Yohanan to G. Refael, 13 March 1969, No. 118, ibid.; Eban-Rogers Meeting #3, 14 March 1969, ibid. The final American peace plan is in Y. Rabin to G. Refael, 14 March 1969, No. 136, ibid.; Minutes of NSC Meeting, 25 April 1969, DNSA, 00019. M. Elitzur to Y. Rabin, 10 May 1969, No. 185, ISA, A 7432/5. S. Argov to M. Bitan, 24 March 1969, No. 212, ISA, A 7496/8.

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about the timing of the visit but concluded that ‘given the special US–Israeli relationship’, the president should approve the request.48 For Israel, the more significant sign and demonstration of Israel–US special relations during the Nixon administration were the president’s designation of Israel as a strategic ally. While the two states’ strategic ties were tightening up since the late 1950s, President Nixon was the first American president to acknowledge that fact. The juxtaposition of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Cold War gave Israel a different meaning, turning her from a friend that relied on American help into an ally fighting alongside the United States as a participant in the Cold War. The shift in status was not smooth and not without hindrances. While the United States started to view of Israel as a strategic ally, it still weighed its broader interests when assessing Israeli requests for arms, and Israel still had to convince the administration that the tilting arms balance justified the request for planes. Thus, when the administration discussed Israel’s request for the combat planes in 1969, the Pentagon suggested making the aircraft and equipment delivery contingent on assurances that Israel would not develop nuclear capabilities.49 Kissinger saw no problem with Israel’s nuclear programme, and he rejected the idea of making the linkage suggested by the Pentagon. He thought that maybe not pushing Israel on this issue would make it more amenable to give up territory. As he saw it, the Israelis would be ready to give up on one of the two, but not both territory and nuclear weapons. Kissinger was also concerned that the Pentagon’s plan to hold up the Phantoms as a pressure tool would make the American Jews ‘run amok and make a public confrontation’. The Israelis might just ‘tell us to go to hell’.50 Kissinger won the debate, and the president accepted his position.51 The issue was resolved during Meir’s visit in 48

49

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S. Argov to M. Bitan, 24 March 1969, No. 212, ISA, A 7496/8; Memorandum for the President, 19 May 1969, USNA, POL 7 ISR. Memorandum from Secretary of Defence Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 22 July 1969, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, b. 644. Memorandum for the Record, 20 June 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 35; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 19 July 1969, ibid., Doc. 38. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 19 July 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 38; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to Acting Secretary of State Richardson, 22 July 1969, ibid., Doc. 40;

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September. Nixon and Meir agreed that Israel would remain opaque about its nuclear programme – that is, it would adhere to its policy of not being the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.52 That brought to a close long-standing American pressure on Israel to stop its nuclear programme and to put it under American and international inspection. It also ushered in a new policy of ‘ambiguity’ for the Israeli nuclear programme, under the blessing of the Nixon administration and successors. It did not resolve the matter of Israel’s request for planes. The president wanted to approve the request, but there was a consensus among the major American agencies – the Department of State, Defence, and the NSC – that Israel did not need them yet.53 In the face of the consensus amid his ranks, and despite his earlier commitment, the president had no choice but to postpone the decision on the sale of additional planes to Israel.54 The Israeli reaction was typical, even if a bit drastic. The War of Attrition was raging on, and Israel was bleeding men and planes. Thus, the Israelis did not mince words in their response to the president’s decision. ‘Horrifying’, ‘Abandoned to those after her’, ‘Israel lonely and isolated’, the decision ‘un-understandable and most dangerous’, ‘needless to mention the mental results in Israel of the decision’ – were only a few of the responses.55 It did not really matter that the president did not stall the actual shipment of planes to Israel, only a decision on the sale of the next batch of aircraft. The president’s decision forced him to face two problems: the Jewish community’s rage and his broken promise. His first line of defence was casting doubt on the Jews’ right to question the president’s decisions. Attorney General John Mitchell told Max Fisher that ‘Jewish

52

53

54 55

Memorandum of Conversation, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, Israel, b. 605; Y. Rabin to G. Meir, 29 July 1969, No. 249, ISA, A 7432/9. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 6 November 1969, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 605; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 7 October 1969, ibid.; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 8 October, ibid.; Memorandum of Conversation, 15 October 1969, ibid. Israel’s Requests for Military and Economic Assistance, 2 January 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 605; Response to Israel’s Arms and Economic Assistance Requests, 11 February 1970, ibid. Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 6 March 1970, No. 518, ISA, A 4239/11. A. Eban to Y. Rabin, 8 March 1970, ISA, A 4239/11.

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Diplomacy’ could not decide on foreign policy matters.56 Kissinger denounced the ‘Jewish control of the press’, and urged Rabin not to fight the president’s decision, implying that it would be a mistake to turn to the Jewish community.57 The president’s second line of defence was to insist that Israel should trust him. He stated that he supported Israel because it was the only pro-freedom state in the Middle East and the only true adversary of Soviet expansion. Kissinger should tell Rabin that he and Meir ‘must trust RN completely [sic]’, as he was fully committed to Israel’s security and existence, and he would ensure that Israel would always ‘has an edge’.58 To his cabinet, Nixon stated that despite the American Jews’ opposition to him, he was doing a lot for Israel. He provided Israel with ‘a very very large economic package, much larger in fact than we are providing most countries, taking sized and other factors into consideration’; the administration was committed to maintaining the military balance; and should the Soviet Union escalated, the United States would come to Israel’s assistance.59 The Soviets did escalate the situation, and it did result in a change. The Soviets began to provide Egypt with advanced ground to air missiles – the SAM 3, as well as additional combat planes. ‘This is no longer a question of a UAR-Israeli military balance’, complained Rabin to Kissinger, but an Israeli–Soviet military balance.60 The Americans were not convinced that the data Israel presented was accurate, and Kissinger suggested to Rabin that the controversy over the accuracy of Israel’s intelligence report be settled by bringing together Israeli and American specialists to study the issue.61 The meeting of the experts was successful – at least from the Israeli point of view. The Israeli delegation convinced both the Pentagon and the CIA that, indeed, the Israeli figures regarding the number of the Soviet planes supplied to 56

57

58

59

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Mossad Representative in the United States to Mossad, 11 March 1970, No. 745, ISA, A 4239/11; Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 11 March 1970, No. 748, ibid. Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and HAK, 3 March 1970, DNSA, Telcon; Memorandum of Conversation, 12 March 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 612. Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from the President, 17 March 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel-Aid, b. 652. This Morning’s Cabinet Meeting, 18 March 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 612. Memorandum of Conversation, 25 April 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 606. Memorandum of Conversation, 12 March 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 612.

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Egypt were accurate. On their part, the Americans shared with the Israeli delegation all of the information they had on the SAM 3 – which was not much.62 The strategic meetings between Israeli and American delegations continued, mostly in a routine manner, and sometimes, like the April 1970 meetings, ad hoc, in the next months and years. The deepening of the strategic cooperation led to Israel’s deeper trust of the Americans.63 The dialogue continued during the Ford administration, when, for example, during the civil war that broke out in Lebanon in March 1976, Israeli and American intelligence officials shared information and coordinated moves pertinent to the crisis.64 With the Americans agreeing that, indeed, the military balance was tilted to Israel’s disadvantage, the president agreed to supply the Phantoms. Viewing the arms supply not only as a measure to strengthen Israel’s military power against Egypt but also as part of the Cold War, Nixon regarded Israel also as a proxy for bold American action. The Soviets‘ activities in Egypt were not only a challenge to Israel; ‘they are testing us, no doubt’. Thus, Nixon decided to supply the planes to Israel, so ‘we could go to the Russians for a confrontation telling them the Israelis have enough to clobber you’. ‘It screws the Russians’, he stated, and encouraged Eban and Rabin to hit the SAM batteries ‘as hard as you can . . . Every time I hear that you go at them, penetrate their territory, I am delighted’, rejoiced the president, ‘I hope you knock them out. You can’t let them build up.’ At the same time, the president wanted to keep the decision to supply the planes quiet, ‘without fanfare’.65 This time, the bureaucracy backed the president.66 The administration approved Israel’s requests, which was quite extensive. It included 56 Phantoms; 72 Skyhawks; 100 M48 tanks and 150 M60 tanks; bombs and armour; an anti-missile package that included 62

63 64 65

66

Y. Rabin to G. Meir, 7 April 1970, No. 49, ISA, A 7041/25; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 7 April 1970, No. 51661, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 606; Minutes of Political – Security Discussion, 9 April 1970, ISA, A 7041/25; Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 494. Y. Rabin to G. Meir, 8 April 1970, No. 62, ISA, A 7434/10. E. Evron to Y. Alon, 20 April 1976, No. 24, ISA, FO 8478/14. Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 18 March 1970, No. 774, ISA, A 4239/11; Conversation between the President and Israeli Ambassador Rabin, 18 March 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel-Aid, b. 612. Memorandum for the Record, 28 May 1970, DNSA, 00143; Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, 9 June 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, b. 645.

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electronic devices that would be installed in the planes and would block the SAM’s electronic signal tracking; air-to-surface Shrike missiles with a homing device against the SAM radar systems; and Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) to hit the missile batteries. The Pentagon also decided to supply Israel with reconnaissance planes and equipment – on 12 August, the first two reconnaissance planes, electronic countermeasure equipment, the CBUs, and the Shrikes arrived in Israel.67 The firing across the Suez Canal died out on 7 August 1970, after the Israeli and Egyptian agreement to the cease fire brokered by Secretary Rogers.68 The fighting ended, but the seeds of the next major crisis were shortly sown when the Egyptians started pushing SAM 3 batteries close to the Suez Canal, beyond the standstill line, as defined by the cease-fire agreement. Israeli and American teams studied together the situation across the Suez Canal to track violations in the implementation of the cease fire.69 President Nixon retorted sharply, calling Egypt an ‘aggressor’, and warned that the United States and the Soviet Union were on the verge of war that neither wanted.70 Following additional talks with Prime Minister Meir, the president instructed the secretaries of defence and state to start discussions ‘promptly’ with Israeli representatives to develop ‘a suitable further package of military equipment’ to offset the military advantages gained by Egypt through its violations 67

68

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Y. Rabin to Office, Jerusalem, 23 April 1970, No. 163, ISA, A 7434/12; Memorandum of Conversation, 30 April 1970, DNSA, 00124; Telephone Conversation between the President and HAK, 2 July 1970, DNSA, Telcon; Y. Rabin to G. Meir, 3 July 1970, No. 907, ISA, A 7074/5; Telephone Conversation between Y. Rabin and Colonel R. Kennedy, 4 July 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 607; Dror to Deputy Minister of Security, 14 July 1970, No. 483, ISA, A 7074/5.; Memorandum for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from Al Haig, 27 July 1970, ibid.; Y. Rabin to G. Meir, August 1970, A 7074/8; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 12 August 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 607; Y. Rabin to G. Meir, 13 August 1970, No. 130, ISA, A 7464/3; Anti-missile Package Useful and Availability, October 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 607; Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 530. Foreign Office General Director Office to Various Israel Missions, 31 July 1970, No. 674, ISA, A 7040/9; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 4 August 1970, No. 125220, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 607. Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 527–537. A Conversation with the President About Foreign Policy, 1 July 1970, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/conversation-with-the-president-about-foreignpolicy. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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of the military standstill and discuss Israel’s long-term needs for the years 1971–1972.71 Despite being content with the president’s decision, the Israelis felt frustrated as they had to return every few years and repeatedly ask for additional weaponry. This mechanism also exposed Israel to pressure – providing arms conditioned upon Israeli compliance with various American demands. Israel sought to change this state of affairs by establishing a continuity line that would remove the need to renegotiate Israel’s request for arms every few months. This was precisely the reason for the implicit American resistance to the idea. The most recent example of such practice was the American attempt to convince Israel to accept Rogers’s 1971 initiative for an interim agreement to open the Suez Canal. The initiative failed due to the deep gap between the Israeli and Egyptian positions, and the administration used, even if implicitly, the Israeli request for the continuation of the planes’ shipment as a tool of pressure.72 On 26 May, President Nixon sent to Secretary Rogers a letter that was exceptional in its poignancy. The president declared that he was ‘always’ a supporter of Israel since his days in Congress. His support for Israel was never based on political calculations, and he always put US national interests first. However, ‘as a result of the enormous influence of the Jewish lobby in the United States, . . . we have often subordinated U.S. security interests to the interests of Israel’. He would not accept that. President Nixon insisted that he would make Middle East policy decisions based only on American interests. No domestic political considerations would interfere with these decisions. In defining the US interests in the Middle East, the president distinguished between two situations. When it came to the Soviet involvement in the region, the American and Israeli interests aligned, and the United States sided with Israel. However, when it came to the Arab–Israeli conflict, American policy must be more even-handed, as the American interest was to side with 100 million Arabs rather than with 2 million Israelis. Under these 71

72

Minutes of the Prime Minister’s Conversation with the President, 18 September 1970, ISA, A 4239/1; Memorandum the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence from President Nixon, 23 September 1970, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 607. Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 25 May 1971, No. 295, ISA, A 7053/7; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, June 1971, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 609.

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circumstances, stated the president, ‘it is essential that no more aid programs for Israel be approved’ until they would agree to ‘some kind of interim action on Suez or some other issue’. ‘From now on’, declared the president in an NSC meeting on 16 July, ‘it is quid pro quo’.73 The American Jews fought back. Under AIPAC’s virulent leadership, the Jews turned to their congressional representatives, asking for their help, and once again, the congressmen raised their voice in support for arms deliveries to Israel. The signing of the Egypt–Soviet Pact of Friendship in May 1971 provided more impetus to the Jewish and congressional campaigns.74 Eighty-six senators voted in midOctober for the shipment of Phantoms to Israel.75 The House of Representatives approved the resolution on 21 October.76 Billy Graham joined the campaign, too, asking Kissinger on 4 October to convey to the president that Israel was concerned about the delay in the supply of the Phantoms. He also told Kissinger that Prime Minister Meir wanted to come to the United States to talk with the president.77 It was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco who put things into perspective. Progress in the peace process was not really reliant on Israel alone, but rather also depended on Egypt, and as was the situation in summer 1971, none seemed to move in the right direction.78 If one would have judged the state of Israel–US relations during Summer–Autumn 1971 based on the cables exchanged between the Israeli embassy in Washington and the Foreign Office and the prime minister’s office in Jerusalem, or if one read the contemporary Israeli 73

74

75

76

77

78

Memorandum from President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, 26 May 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 233; Memorandum for the Record, 16 July 1971, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 609. Your Minnesota Representative Reports the Following Activities, June 1971, ISA, FO 4550/6; S. Ramati to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 24 June 1971, No. 102.4, ibid., FO 4548/3; W. P. Mondale to L. Lerman, 29 June 1971, ibid., FO 4550/6; Statement by Senator Jackson, 12 July 1971, ISA, FO 4548/3. A. Eran to Office, Jerusalem, 6 October 1971, No. 36, ISA, FO 4549/8; A. Eran to US Division, 13 October 1971, No. 99, ibid., FO 4548/9; A. Eran to Y. Rabin, 15 October 1971, ibid., FO 6807/1; John W. Finney, ‘78 Senators Ask Phantom Jets for Israel’, The New York Times, 16 October 1971, 3. News Release from Congressman Ben Blackburn, 21 October 1971, ISA, FO 5295/1; A. Eran to US Division, 22 October 1971, No. 207, ibid., FO 4548/9. Telephone Conversation between B. Graham and HAK, 4 October 1971, DNSA, Telcon. Telephone Conversation between J. Sisco and HAK, 20 July 1971, DNSA, Telcon.

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newspapers, one could conclude that the relations between the two countries were hitting rock bottom. Eban reported on 15 October that ‘a rift is building up between Israel and the United States’.79 Davar warned on 2 September that the American attempts to stop the arms race in the Middle East by denying planes from Israel would fail. In another editorial, the paper reiterated the prime minister’s message that denying planes from Israel would not bring Israel to succumb to the American political pressure.80 In the Knesset, Prime Minister Meir stated that Israel ‘strongly’ rejected the link between helping Israel meet its ‘vital’ security needs and the ongoing negotiations with Egypt or the United States.81 Ray S. Cline, director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, told the minister in the Israeli embassy on 9 November that ‘for the first time since the establishment of Israel’, he felt that the special relationship between the two states was in real danger, with both countries carrying the onus of blame.82 In the broad scheme of things, it looks as if the real reason for the delay was not the administration’s wish to use the planes’ delivery as a pressure tool but the problem the Americans were having with the delivery of the planes to Israel. Throughout the whole period, the shipment of other weapons such as tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, electronic equipment, and the like continued without hindrance. Only the delivery of the planes was delayed, and the real reason for the delay was the shortage of available planes this time. The American military’s need for planes exceeded the pace of production, which meant that the supply of aircraft to Israel would be made at the American military’s expense. Hence, the Pentagon pushed for rationing the shipment of planes to Israel. It did not hurt that the delay could be presented as a response to Israel’s position on peace.83 That is, it was not the attempt to force Israel’s hands on the peace process that

79 80

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82 83

A. Eban to G. Meir, 15 October 1971, No. 390, ISA, A 7459/6. ‘Unilateral Shipments’, Davar, 2 September 1971, 7; ‘Very Clear Message’, Davar, 27 October 1971, 7. Prime Minster Announcement on the Political Situation, Minutes of the 222 Meeting of the 7th Knesset, 26 October 1971, Divrei HaKnesset, 12. A. Idan to M. Gazit, 10 November 1971, No. 97, ISA, FO 6807/1. Y. Rabin to M. Gazit, No. 21, 3 June 1971, ISA, FO 7413/1; M. Gazit to A. Eban, 3 June 1971, No. 12, ibid.

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led to the delay in the planes’ supply, but since there was a delay, it could also be used as a means of pressure. The crisis – if a crisis it was – ended when intelligence indicated that the Soviets would provide to Egypt ten missile-carrying TU-16 aircraft that would give Egypt deep strike capability against Israel, 100 MIG 21s and a squadron of MIG 23s.84 The president was offended by the news, as the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko promised him that the Soviets would not supply arms to Egypt in the coming months. He compared the Soviet promise to the Soviet promise during the Cuban crisis that ‘there were no missiles in Cuba’.85 A Pentagon delegation arrived in Israel in November for the annual strategic meeting with the IDF intelligence branch and heard reports about the continued supply of Soviet arms to Egypt. To strengthen the Israeli argument, Tzvi Zamir, head of Mossad, met CIA director Richard Helms in Washington in early December and gave him a protocol of Anwar Sadat‘s conversation with Leonid Brezhnev in October, in which the Soviet leader promised to supply Egypt with advanced planes.86 The official and public end of the crisis, again, if crisis it was, was celebrated formally during the meeting between Prime Minister Golda Meir and the president on 2 December. Given the tensions, the harsh Israeli criticism of the administration, and the president stated determination to bend Israel’s hand, the meeting was expected to be unpleasant. Nothing like that had occurred. The vile spirit that tainted Israel– US relations during recent months vanished. Nixon was amicable and cordial. At the beginning of the meeting he told Meir, ‘You know that I always kept every promise I made to you, and I intend doing so in the future, too. I repeat and promise that you will get the planes, and I’ll personally see to it.’ The president pledged not to press Israel to accept any peace plan, but it was imperative to maintain a semblance of negotiations. And then he concluded: ‘I give you assurances’ on the arms supply, and ‘I will not squeeze you’ on the peace process.87 The 84 85 86

87

Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 14, Doc. 5. Shomron to Office, Jerusalem, 15 October 1971, No. 141, ISA, FO 6807/1. Y. Rabin to M. Gazit, 26 October 1971, No. 236, ISA, A 7413/3; Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 24 November 1971, No. 341, ibid., A 7055/2; Gilboa, Mr. Intelligence, 588. Memorandum of Conversation between Prime Minister Meir and President Nixon, 2 December 1971, ISA, A 4239/3.

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president also confirmed his commitment to Prime Minister Meir that the Rogers Plan was no longer part of US Middle Eastern policy.88 Meir returned to Israel carrying a promise for forty-two Phantoms and eighty-two Skyhawks for 1972–1973.89 Then Rabin turned to the next challenge, ensuring a loan that would cover the planes’ full payment. Here, too, he met goodwill on the administration’s part.90 However, like the repeated ebbs and flows of the sea, it all started all over again in January 1973. The administration was contemplating an additional peace initiative. Israel rejected the American peace plan. The president was determined to bend Israel’s hands, telling Alexander Haig, deputy national security advisor, ‘The time has come that we’ve got to squeeze the old woman’, referring to Golda Meir. Then the president met Golda Meir on 1 March 1973. Forgotten were all the harsh words and plans. Greeting Meir, the president was forthcoming and ready to please. He reiterated his commitment not to press Israel and not to create a linkage between the political process and military aid supply. The president also promised to supply Israel with additional planes.91 Kissinger recommended that the president supply Israel during 1974–1977 fortyeight Phantoms and forty-two Skyhawks, and the president approved.92

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Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, 9 February 1972, PPP–Nixon, 289–295; Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 8 February 1972, No. 162, ISA, A 7074/11. Hagai Tsoref (editor), Golda Meir, the Fourth Prime Minister (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2016), 399; Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 29 December 1971, No. 422, ISA, A 7052/20; Memorandum of Conversation, 29 December 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, Doc. 271; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 17 February 1972, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 609. Y. Rabin to M. Gazit, 4 February 1972, No. 42, ISA, A 7074/11. Conversation between President Nixon and Army Vice Chief of Staff Haig, 23 January 1973, FRUS 1969–1973, Vol. 25, Doc. 6; Memorandum of Conversation, 1 March 1973, RNPL, 1 March 1973 – Nixon, Kissinger, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir; Conversation of Prime Minister Meir with President Nixon, 1 March 1973, ISA, A 7062/8; Secretary of State Rogers to Ambassador Y. Rabin, 9 March 1973, ibid. Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 29 May 1973, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 610; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 4 June 1973, No. 106798, ibid.

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While those moments of crisis attracted attention, overall, the strategic relations between the two counties and the military cooperation had strengthened. The relations between the two countries also consisted of less visible modes of cooperation and sharing, which were accumulated into a complex web of ties and links. This was the case with the Israeli request for American technology and equipment for improvement of the Mirages. The Mirage planes were becoming obsolete, and Israel sought to upgrade its systems and to bring them up to date. Israel sought American engines, which were similar to the Phantom’s, basing the request on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 1 November 1971. There, the Americans pledged to assist Israel to increase production level of its equipment and spare parts. Encouraged by the White House, the Pentagon expressed its readiness to participate in the programme in what became known as Operation Salvo.93 The Pentagon agreed to supply Israel with the licences and equipment necessary for the Israeli development of aircraft, and on 29 August, two Israeli generals, one of them the commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), and two IAF technical experts met with senior Pentagon officials to discuss Israel’s plans for a new plane.94 The president approved the provision of equipment, engines, and knowledge for ‘at least’ 100 planes.95

The Yom Kippur War It was never said in so many words, but one reason for the administration’s complacent attitude towards Israel’s firm – some would say 93

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Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 3 July 1972, No. 764, ISA, A 7061/3; Y. Rabin to M. Gazit, 25 July 1972, No. 211, ibid., FO 7312/1. The MoU is in Memorandum for the Record, 29 August 1972, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 609. Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 7 August 1972, No. 950, ISA, A 7061/4; Y. Rabin to S. Dinitz, 8 August 1972, No. 956, ibid.; C. W. Tarr to K. Rush, 10 August 1972, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 609; Undersecretary of Defence to Maj. Gen. A. M. Haig, 29 August 1972, ibid.; Memorandum for the Record, 29 August 1972, ibid. Conversation between President Nixon and Army Vice Chief of Staff Haig, 23 January 1973, FRUS 1969–1973, Vol. 25, Doc. 6; Memorandum of Conversation, 1 March 1973, RNPL, 1 March 1973 – Nixon, Kissinger, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir; Conversation of Prime Minister Meir with President Nixon, 1 March 1973, ISA, A 7062/8; Secretary of State Rogers to Ambassador Y. Rabin, 9 March 1973, ibid.

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rigid – peace terms was the assumption that ultimately, time played in Israel’s favour. After all, Israel held the assets, the territories, and she was strong enough to deter, and if deterrence failed, to defeat any Arab attack. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger accepted Israel’s argument that the Arabs should accept Israel’s terms of peace, and not the other way around. This assumption was most evident during the first days of the Yom Kippur War. When he got the news that the Egyptian and Syrian armies had launched a surprise attack against Israel, Kissinger was dumbstruck by what he thought was an injudicious act. When he thought that it was still possible to prevent the Egyptian–Syrian attack, Kissinger warned the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, ‘if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack, the Israeli response will be extremely strong’.96 When it became apparent that the Egyptians and Syrians had attacked Kissinger told General Haig, ‘the Israelis are certainly going to hit back hard’, and the Arabs ‘will be on their knees begging us for a cease-fire’.97 To the president, Kissinger promised on 7 October, ‘tomorrow, the Israelis would reverse the trend’.98 That assumption decided the course of the initial American response to the Israeli request for arms to replace weapons lost and damaged in the fighting. Nixon and Kissinger tried to avoid sending a massive airlift to Israel, wishing to be seen as neutral. ‘We don’t want to be so pro-Israel’, told President Nixon to Kissinger on 7 October.99 However, when Ambassador Dinitz argued that as Israel needed urgently military supplies, including jet planes and tanks to win the war and to deal the Syrians a decisive blow, the president complied. On 14 October, the giant American Galaxies began flying to Israel, loaded with plenty of military supplies. Planes arrived in Israel every day for the next weeks, until the end of November.100 Dinitz’s argument was well calculated. The Israeli government wanted the arms because the IDF sustained heavy losses during the 96

97

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Telephone Conversation between A. Dobrynin and HAK, 6 October 1973, 6:40 am, DNSA, Telcon. Telephone Conversation between General Haig and HAK, 6 October 1973, 8:35 am, DNSA, Telcon. Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and HAK, 7 October 1973, 2:07 pm, DNSA, Telcon. Telephone Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, 7 October, 10:18, Henry Kissinger, Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 89. David Tal, ‘A Tested Alliance: The American Airlift to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War’, Israel Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2014), 29–54.

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first days of the war, especially in aircraft and tanks, but also in ammunition. At one point during the fighting, the IAF commander, General Benny Peled, said that the force was losing so many planes that they were approaching a red line, beyond which the Israeli planes would be restricted to defensive missions, and would not be able to help to the forces on the ground.101 The Israelis would not make such an argument to the Americans to justify a request for arms. They did not take it for granted that the United States would provide Israel with all of the help it needed. Ignoring the American idealistic commitment to Israel, believing that American foreign policy was driven by power and interests, the Israelis were afraid to show signs of weakness. Prime Minister Meir emphasized the need to maintain Israel’s image as strong. ‘There is no greater sin for a small nation than being weak’, she told the Knesset’s Foreign and Security Committee, ‘This is a crime, an unforgivable offense.’ Meir assumed that Israel’s strength was the determining factor in the Israel–US relationship. ‘A great friend told us: “you must win!”’ Meir told the committee members, referring to Kissinger. ‘If, God forbid, we were hit, there is no friendship.’ No one, including the United States, would seek Israel’s friendship if it were weak. Victory in the war was imperative not only for the obvious reasons but also to save Israel’s alliance with the United States.102 Dayan agreed, ‘They will say, you are a paper tiger.’103 Thus, when preparing to ask for military supply from the Americans, the Israeli government contemplated how to communicate the situation to Kissinger. There had to be a delicate balance between Israel’s difficulties and urgent need for weapons against the need to avoid giving the impression that Israel was weak. After the failure of the Israeli counterattack in the Sinai on 8 October, the issue became more acute. The extent of the blow Israel sustained was almost frightening, but Israel could not – or would not – spell it out to the Americans. Dinitz came up with the solution, suggesting that the arms were required not in 101 102

103

Hanoch Bartov, Daddo (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), 536. Consultation with the Prime Minister, 7 October 1973, 09:10, ISA, https:// archive.kippur-center.org/discussions/d-pm-07101973-0910.pdf. Accessed 25 June 2021; Protocol of the Knesset Foreign and Security Committee Meeting, 9 October 1973, ISA, A 8163/8, 22–23. Discussion with the Prime Minister, 7 October 1973, 14:50, ISA website, https://archive.kippur-center.org/discussions/d-pm-07101973-1450.pdf. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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order to avoid an Israeli defeat but to ensure a decisive Israeli victory, which Kissinger had been pressing Israel to achieve. And it worked. Operation Nickel Grass was underway.104 Dinitz did not leave it only to his power of conviction to do the job. He also turned to the Israeli cohorts in the United States, who were more than ready and willing to join the struggle for American arms shipments to Israel. Dinitz used his ties with politicians and public figures to pressure the administration to provide arms to Israel, even if implicitly and indirectly. Thus, he talked with senators and Jewish leaders and orchestrated a resolution in Congress calling on the administration to ‘bolster and equip Israel’.105 Members of Congress also called and wrote to the White House, expressing their support for supplying arms to Israel.106 The American Jews needed no stimulation, only guidance. They were shocked by the news. ‘The shocks that marked its outbreak on Saturday, 6 October 1973, were not likely to be forgotten by . . . oversea Jews who viewed the war from afar’, wrote Philip Klutznick in his memoirs.107 Jewish organizations arranged rallies in all major US cities that were attended also by Congress members, mayors, and public figures. Demonstrations were also held on university campuses. The organizations also called supporters of Israel to send letters and cables in support for Israel to the White House and the Department of State, demanding ‘to provide all supported assistance to Israel to the extent and nature required(sic)’. Israeli consuls provided extensive briefing to editorials and commentators and appeared on dozens of radio and television stations.108 The American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, many of whose members were Nobel laureates, published in the New York Times an ad on 19 October, in which they 104 105

106

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Tal, ‘A Tested Alliance’, 42–48. S. Dinitz to M. Gazit, 8 October 1973, 21:30, ISA, A 4996/3; S. Dinitz to M. Gazit, 9 October 1973, 14:00, ibid., A 7520/5; S. Dinitz to M. Gazit, 9 October 1973, No. 999, ibid., A 4996/3. Telephone Conversation between Senator F. Church and HAK, 9 October 1973, 11:48 am, DNSA, Telcon; ‘Nixon Urged to Send Planes to Israel’, South China Morning Post, 11 October 1973, 4; ‘Nixon Urged to Step-Up War Supplies To Israel’, South China Morning Post, 12 October 1973, 3; Telephone Conversation between Senator Humphrey and HAK, 12 October 1973, 2:30 pm, DNSA, Telcon; Z. Rafiah to US Division, 18 October 1973, ISA, FO 6805/12. Klutznick, Angels of Vision, 302. S. Adar to A. Avidar, 8 October 1973, 20:30, ISA, FO 7334/9.

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denounced the surprise attack on Israel and called on the United States to supply it with arms. Another group consisting of TV and music critics, singers, writers, playwrights, dancers, painters, sculptors, and an astrologer, published another ad in the same volume of the New York Times, stating that it was ‘America’s moral duty to support Israel at this critical time . . . The world must not stand by as a long-tortured nation’s last bastion is assaulted!’109 Polls indicated that the American people strongly supported Israel at that moment. A sixty-six-year-old Florida cab driver said, ‘the Arabs have been taking potshots at Israeli since time began. Why don’t they lay off?’110 The president did not mind the calls. If anything, he could always use public pressure as justification for his decision to launch the airlift.111 While encouraging him, even if implicitly, to send arms to Israel, the president resented calls blaming him for inaction. These were difficult times for the president. He was fighting at that point on two fronts – his vice president, Spiro Agnew, was facing fraud charges and was about to resign. The president himself was deeply mired in the Watergate affair, and did not wish to add to his problems attacks directed against him for abandoning Israel. ‘Dinitz has to keep the pro-Israel group off our back’, he snapped on 9 October.112 Kissinger told Dinitz that ‘[i]t is absolutely essential that Senators and Congressmen don’t go around attacking the President’.113 When reports emerged in the press that the administration was reluctant to support Israel, the president exploded. He suspected that the Israeli embassy was instigating the adverse reports and told Kissinger on 11 October ‘to lean very hard on the Israeli ambassador that I’m very distressed about these stories . . . I will not tolerate this, and if I hear any more of this, I will hold [Dinitz] responsible. Will

109

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111

112

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‘Aggression in the Middle East’, New York Times, 19 October 1973, 37; ‘Israel Is Fighting for Her Life. Bring Peace to the Middle East’, ibid, 19 October 1973, 22. The Gallup Poll: ‘Sympathies with Israelis in Mideast Conflict’, 16 October 1973, ISA, FO 7334/9. Telephone Conversation between Senator Javits and HAK, 15 October 1973, 9:45 am, DNSA, Telcon. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 October 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 25, Doc. 140. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 October 1973, DNSA, 00840.

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you tell him? . . . They think it helps the Israelis, but it does not.’114 Ten minutes later, Kissinger was on the phone with Dinitz, conveying the president’s message.115 Christian churches’ reactions to the 1973 war were divided. The mainline Protestant churches reacted in restraint. The heads of the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches (NCC) released general statements, calling for peace and an end to the shipments of arms to both sides. Local NCC branches diverged from the line set by the church leadership, deploring the Arab attack during the most sacred Jewish day, and supporting American military assistance for Israel. Reverend Richard N. Hughes, executive director of Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon, stated, ‘I’m tired of the people who stand aloof and with either wilful disregard of history or indifference to moral issues pretend to “objectivity” and refuse to confront the agony of the worlds’ greatest social democracy in this hour of her trial’.116 Evangelical officials and ministers were more direct and vociferous in their support for Israel. Dr A. Jase Jones of the Southern Baptist Convention invoked morale and history in his appeal for support for Israel: ‘Israel has been pursuing an enlightened moral policy’. The Church had a ‘heavy moral obligation to support Israel because of the long history of persecution for the Crusades to Auschwitz’. Hence, the ‘millions’ of Christians who ‘strongly sympathize with Israel’ should raise their voice at this time in support for Israel.117 Evangelicals also saw the war as a crucial stage in the fulfilment of the prophecies. With the United States and the Soviet Union on the brink of nuclear conflagration during the war and with the oil crisis in the aftermath of the war, Evangelical authors predicted that Armageddon would be precipitated by the oil crisis and The Coming Russian Invasion of Israel.118 The process that led the administration to launch the airlift can serve as a concrete example to some main features of Israel–US special 114

115

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117 118

Telephone Conversation between the President and HAK, 11 October 1973, 11:00 am, DNSA, Telcon. See John W. Finney, ‘Soviet Could Spur Move to Aid Israel’, New York Times, 11 October 1973, 93. Telephone Conversation between Ambassador Dinitz and HAK, 11 October 1973, 11:10 am, DNSA, Telcon. Judith H. Banki, Christian Responses to the Yom Kippur War (New York: AJC, Institute of Human Relations, undated), 28–34. Banki, Christian Responses to the Yom Kippur War, 44. McAlister, Epic Encounters, 173. See also Thomas S. McCall and Zola Levitt, The Coming Russian Invasion of Israel (Chicago: Moody Press, 1974).

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relations. First, even when arguing and debating, it was clear to both the Israelis and the Americans that the United States would help Israel. There was no question about that. The only question was the timing. Second, the connection between Dinitz and Kissinger was extraordinarily strong. Kissinger’s door was always open to Dinitz, and Kissinger would listen patiently and attentively to Dinitz, even when he repeatedly made the same request. Third, the president’s agreement to supply the planes and tanks to Israel shed light on the bare nature of Israel–US relations. Egypt was changing its course of alignment – cutting ties with the Soviet Union and getting closer to the United States. The president, assuming that it was in US interests to see that change happening, preferred not to be seen as taking clear side in the Israeli– Egyptian conflict. However, after Dinitz convinced Kissinger – and the president – that, indeed, Israel needed the planes and the tanks urgently in large numbers, the president sacrificed US regional interests to ensure Israel’s security. This was a line that no American president would cross. The Nixon administration treated Israel’s requests for economic aid with similar sympathy and with great generosity. In fact, it increased the military and civic financial assistance dramatically. In preparation towards the requests for civic economic aid from the new administration, Israel sought to change the support structure. Most of the aid to Israel during the Johnson years came as loans – Israel got no grants. Trying to alleviate the burden of the loans, which, after all, had to be repaid, Israel asked, before the 1973 War, to be included in a grant programme called Supporting Assistance, which aimed to help lessdeveloped nations threatened by Communism. Countries that got Supporting Assistance included Korea, Laos, Thailand, Jordan, Bolivia, and South Vietnam.119 The problem was that American legislation permitted grants only to underdeveloped countries, and Israel did not belong to that category.120 It took a struggle in which the Jewish community and AIPAC were involved, as well as Congress, to bring the Nixon administration eventually to agree to include Israel in

119

120

Proposed Economic Assistance Programs, FY 1967, US Agency for International Development, 203–204; P. Sapir to G. Meir, 10 February 1971, No. 118, ISA, A 7464/6; Y. Cohen to A. Eban, March 1971, ibid., FO 7310/12. IDF Intelligence Branch to Office, Jerusalem, 25 June 1971, No. 51, ISA, FO 7459/3.

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the programme.121 The president approved in March 1972 Israel’s request for Supporting Assistance, and Congress appropriated to Israel $50 million.122 Throughout the years 1969–1973, Israel got military assistance of $1.2 billion in loans and $245.5 million economic aid in loans.123 The real change came after the war, when the president asked Congress on 19 October 1973 to allocate to Israel a $2.2 billion grant for the military assistance provided by the United States. Congress approved the request at the end of 1973. Added to this was $300 million in military credit and $36.5 million for the resettlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants.124 The special grant heralded the change in the structure of the American economic aid to Israel in the subsequent years. The figures would measure in billions of dollars, and the vast majority of that money, if not all of it, was given in the form of grants. *** The Yom Kippur War shook Israel. Even if it was not entirely right, Israel’s image as an invincible military power seemed to have been shattered. This was also how Nixon and Kissinger viewed the war and its outcome. They no longer could rely on Israel’s military superiority as a factor in managing the Arab–Israeli conflict. Nixon concluded that Israel could not afford another war, which would be more like the recent one, not like the Six-Day War. ‘The Arabs can fight, and the old policy is not enough’, he said. He was convinced that Israel would prevail in the next round as well, but at a too high 121

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S. Ramati to A. Eran, 9 July 1971, No. 102.4, ISA, FO 4548/3; A. Eran to Y. Rabin, 22 July 1971, No. 315, ibid., FO 7459/4; A. Eran to Y. Rabin, 27 July 1971, No. 435, ibid., FO 4548/3; S. Alexandroni to Y. Rabin, 29 July 1971, No. 398, ISA, FO 7459/4; A. Eran to M. Gazit, 4 August 1971, No. 20, ibid.; A. Eran to M. Gazit, 4 August 1971, No. 27, ibid.; A. Eran to US Division, 4 August 1971, No. 31, ibid., FO 4549/8. S. Alexandroni to Y. Rabin, 15 March 1972, FO 5294/9; A. Eran to Office, Jerusalem, 24 May 1972, No. 201, A 7042/3; M. Nave to P. Sapir, 4 June 1973, No. 34, ibid., FO 6805/10. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 22. Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Requesting Emergency Security Assistance Funding for Israel and Cambodia, 19 October 1973, The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/255444. Accessed 16 June 2021; ‘Emergency Appropriations for Aid to Israel,’ 5 November 1973, S19980, Congressional Records – Senate, Vol. 119, No. 168; American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 75, 1974–1975, 178.

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price. It would cost also to the United States dearly, since, as the October War demonstrated, Israel won the war in great measure thanks to the American generosity in supplying arms and financial aid. Also, the war brought the United States and the Soviet Union too close to a nuclear war. Nixon did not forget that he had to put the American forces under nuclear alert in order to deter a Soviet intervention in the war. Hence, a change of policy was required. This would be based both on keeping Israel strong and ensuring that the Arabs were not able to defeat Israel, as well as convincing the Arabs that the only way for them to regain their territory was through diplomacy under American leadership.125 The path towards peace, though, would be slow. Nixon and Kissinger still thought that peace was unattainable, and the only way to move forwards would be by taking small, incremental steps that would eventually lead to peace. The first and immediate step was disengaging the belligerents.126 As soon as the cease fire was announced, Kissinger orchestrated disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt (January 1974) and Syria (May 1974). With that he accomplished what was the American goal since the first day of the Nixon administration, making the United States the focal point of the peace talks between Israel and the Arabs.127 While the Israeli– Syrian disengagement was the end of a process, the Israeli–Egyptian agreement was the first one, followed by a second, deeper, and more extensive interim agreement. This phase of the negotiations was conducted by a new president, who met a new Israeli prime minister.

President Gerald Ford The Yom Kippur War ended on 23 October, but its consequences were felt in the days, months, and years that followed. One of its consequences in Israel was demonstrations against the government, which

125 126

127

Memorandum of Conversation, 24 April 1974, DNSA, 01115. Minutes of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, 27 November 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 25, Doc. 360; ‘Report on Discussion Between Henry Kissinger and a Group of Jewish Intellectuals’, 6 December 1973, The Max Fisher Archives, Reuther Library at Wayne State University [henceforth MMFA], Correspondence, Kissinger, Henry A., 1969–1973. Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement, 31 May 1974, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 88; Yinon Shlomo, ‘The Israeli–Syrian Disengagement Negotiations of 1973–74’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2015), 636–648.

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ultimately led Meir to step down. The Israeli public blamed Meir’s government for what they perceived as the 1973 War failure, and the public pressure bore fruit. In April 1974, Golda Meir resigned, and Yitzhak Rabin, minister of labour in Meir’s government, was elected as prime minister, starting his job on 3 June.128 In about two months, he would deal with a new occupant in the White House, Gerald Ford, following the resignation of President Nixon in August. Nixon selected Senator Gerald Ford as his vice president in December 1973, after the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew, who was suspected of tax evasion and fraud. With Nixon’s resignation in the wake of the Watergate scandal, Ford became president. On its face, Israel could only be content with a president who had a long history of supporting Israel. In March 1972, Ford even suggested that the United States recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s ‘legal and historic capital’, and expressed the hope that President Nixon would come to Israel in 1973, to celebrate Israel’s twenty-fifth anniversary, and inaugurate the new American embassy in Jerusalem.129 Ford conflated values and religion in his attitude to Israel. He was a born-again Christian, close to the Evangelical church. Raised up in a very religious family, Ford attended Sunday school. His wife, Betty, was a Sunday school teacher.130 Explaining his attitude towards Israel, the president told members of Congress on 28 March 1975, ‘I have always liked and respected the Israeli people . . . They are dedicated to their religion, their country, their family, and their high moral standards. I admire them and respect them.’131 Ironically, he said that when he summoned Congress’ leaders to explain his decision to impose punitive measures on Israel. Still, President Ford outlined here the religious and ideal underpinnings of his feelings towards Israel. He also mentioned his notion of debt to Israel, stating that the United States owed its values to the JewishChristian heritage. Israel was a ‘kindred nation’, which shared with the United States ‘basic principles of democratic self-government

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‘The Fifth Prime Minister’, Maariv, 3 June 1974, 1. Philip Ben, ‘Republican Leader: The United States Should Recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital,’ Maariv, 19 March 1972, 1. Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel, 83. Minutes of National Security Meeting, 28 March 1975, Gerald Ford Presidential Library [henceforth GFPL], NSC Meeting, 3/28/1975, National Security Adviser, NSC Meeting File.

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which distinguish these two nations from most other nations in today’s world’.132 With such a background, no one could anticipate that his presidency would be wrought with struggles and controversies with Israel. Under Kissinger’s vigorous leadership, and with the president’s determined backing, the disengagement agreements were concluded. These were followed by the interim agreement, concluded in September 1975, which led to a deeper withdrawal of the IDF in the Sinai and the creation of a large, demilitarized buffer zone between the Israeli and the Egyptian military forces.133 Kissinger achieved these not without struggle. Following the Israeli government’s refusal to move from the first phase of the disengagement to the second, and under Kissinger’s advice, President Ford announced in March 1975 that his administration would re-assess Israel–US relations.134 Kissinger’s recommendation reflected an evident change in his attitude towards Israel following the 1973 War. He seemed to be angry with Israel, hurt by the IDF performance in the war and the shattered image of Israel as invincible. Two things seemed to be clear, Israel proved his pre-war strategy wrong, and he often criticized the Israeli policy in ways he hadn’t done before. It began even before the failure of the talks in March. He complained in October 1974 to Dinitz that ‘there is no longer a confidential relationship between our governments’.135 After his mission ended in failure, Kissinger attacked Israel furiously. ‘Every Department is to be instructed to end the special relationships [with Israel]’, he declared.136 He did not follow through with his declaration, nor did he act on it – but it was a demonstration of the way Kissinger felt towards Israel. He also no longer considered 132

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Gerald R. Ford, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, 13 May 1976, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/258285. Accessed 16 June 2021. Prime Minister Rabin to Foreign Minister Alon, 2 August 1974, ISA, A 7031/5; Memorandum of Conversation, 11 September 1974, DNSA, 01320; G. Avner to Prime Minister: Government Resolution No. 38 (11 October 1974), 13 October 1974, ISA, A 274/4. Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, 21 March 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 156; Louise Fischer, ‘Turning Point on the Road to Peace: The Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt (Sinai II)’, Israel Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2014), 55–68. Memorandum of Conversation, 5 October 1974, DNSA, 01354. Memorandum of Conversation, 24 March 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 161.

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Israel a strategic asset, a bulwark against Soviet expansion. If anything, it was to the contrary. With President Sadat pushing away the Soviet Union and getting closer to the United States, the danger was that Israel’s intransigence would push Sadat back into the Soviets’ arms. Israel’s main strategic importance for the United States after the 1973 War was the real estate it was holding, which the United States could use to advance its strategic interests in the region, if Israel would not hamstring the move. Kissinger stated now that the prime reason for the American support for Israel was idealistic, or in his words, ‘sentimental’.137 Kissinger was equally unhinged in his response to the Israeli and Jewish Jewry’s reaction to his attacks, claiming that they were seeking his head. In October 1974, he blamed ‘enough elements of your government’ for promoting the campaigns against him. Kissinger equated himself to Rogers, whom Israel emasculated, suspecting that Rabin, with the help of the American Jews, was ‘conducting a systematic campaign to reduce my authority’, so he would not be able to make demands from Israel.138 Things worsened after the breakdown of the talks in March 1975. ‘I think the Israelis are after me’, he told the president on 14 May. Ten days later, he told the president that ‘war veterans are being sent to American Jewish committees to talks against you and me’ and described the 22 May’s seventy-six senators’ letter against the re-assessment as ‘one of the most unpatriotic, outrageous things I have seen’. ‘I think they feel they have to get you out of the White House’, Kissinger told Ford.139 It was not only Kissinger who had shown anger and resentment towards Israel. It was also the other way around. The negotiations and their conclusion created a gradual change in the Israelis’ attitude towards the United States in general and Kissinger in particular. Seeking to avenge what the Israelis considered Egypt’s treacherous attack, Israelis blamed the administration, and particularly Kissinger, of depriving Israel of victory by not allowing the IDF to destroy the Egyptian Third Army, a claim which Meir herself raised during her

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Memorandum of Conversation, 15 June 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 189. Memorandum of Conversation, 5 October 1974, DNSA, 01354. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 August 1975, Gerald Ford Presidential Library – Digital [henceforth DGFPL].

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meeting with President Nixon.140 In a survey of 1,480 letters sent by Israelis between 30 October and 4 November 1973, and opened by the Israeli censor, 315 dealt with the war, most of them expressing rage and frustration over the American pressure on Israel not to destroy the Third Army. A typical sentence was ‘the government’s decision to supply the [Egyptian] Third Army was the result of an American diktat. The government’s hands are tied.’141 Maariv published on 23 October a cartoon by Kariel Gardosh (‘Dosh’) that depicted a bruised Israeli soldier holding a knife in one hand and in his second hand a Sadat figure, while a hand symbolizing the great powers emerges from outside of the frame, holding the Israeli soldier’s leg, preventing him from inflicting the final blow on Sadat.142 During his visits to Israel, protesters welcomed Kissinger with Chamberlin-like umbrellas and signs reading, ‘your peace plan will eliminate Israel’ and ‘Go Home Mr. Chamberlin’.143 The Chamberlin and umbrella themes were a constant companion of Kissinger throughout his visits to Israel.144 Kissinger became the target of attacks not only because he was the most visible figure representing American foreign policy, it was also because of his Jewishness. According to those in charge of Kissinger’s security in Israel, ‘We have never witnessed such hatred’.145 Kissinger encountered criticism also in the United States. While he was in the Middle East, ten American Jewish leaders of educational organizations expressed on 7 November 1973 their ‘shoulder to shoulder’ solidarity with Israel.146 Members of Congress also joined the protests. In December 1974, seventy-one senators demanded

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Peggi Polak, ‘General Adan Said, ‘I Never Heard about Supplying Food to the Enemy’, Maariv, 30 October 1973, 2; Memorandum of Conversation, 1 November 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 25, Doc. 306. Censor Office for Postal and Cables, Office of the Censor: ‘Reactions and Mood Among Israeli Residents’, Survey No. 7, 7 November 1973, ISA, G6499/2. Maariv, 23 October 1973, 5. Rachel Primor, ‘Protesters Waited to Kissinger in Lod’, Maariv, 17 December 1973, 3; Joseph Waxman, “Go Home”, Shouted the Demonstrators when Kissinger Arrived in Jerusalem’, Maariv, 13 October 1974, 3. ‘Students Dressed in Black Will Hold Umbrellas in Front of Kissinger’, Maariv, 19 August 1975, 3. Joseph Waxman and Aharon Priel, ‘We Have Never Witnessed Such Hatred’, Maariv, 19 August 1975, 3. American Zionist Federation Press Release, 7 November 1973, ISA, FO 7334/9.

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President Ford not to abandon Israel.147 Following the re-assessment announcement, Congress members blamed the president for succumbing to Arabs and the ‘Arab oil lobby’. On 22 May 1975, seventy-six senators urged the president not to cut-off the military and economic aid to Israel. Only strong Israel would prevent war in the Middle East, they asserted.148 This came about not without the hard labour of the Israeli embassy. Dinitz met members of Congress and public figures frequently, outlining Israel’s stand on the peace process and its military and economic needs and stressing the concessions Israel made along the way to the disengagement negotiations.149 The embassy’s vigorous campaign was not aimed towards a reluctant Congress, nor did Dinitz force Congress members to stand by Israel. Members of Congress and the other officials Dinitz was speaking with were ready and willing to hear him out and join the campaign. Dinitz did not need to change the mind of members of Congress. Their minds were made already, and the letter of the seventy-six senators to the president on 22 May was an example of that. The senators signed the letter because they believed it was the right thing to do, and Senator Clifford P. Case (R-NJ), one of the signatories, made it clear to the president on 6 June that ‘The letter was representative of the true feelings of the Senate, not the pressure of Jewish groups . . . We do not want to see pressure put on Israel to withdraw to borders that are not defensible . . . I don’t want this letter to be seen in the context of domestic politics. It was not an irresponsible action by the Senators. It does represent the true feeling of Senators concerned with Israel.’150 Another signatory of the seventy-six senators’ letter, Senator Robert Morgan from North Carolina, told Dinitz on 18 June that he was ‘more hawkish than you are’.151 It could not be said more clearer than that. 147

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Committee on International Relations, Congress and Foreign Policy-1975 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 166–167; Bilateral Check List for our Visit in Israel, March 1975, DGFPL. Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger, 22 May 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 175. S. Dinitz to General Director, Foreign Office, 20 January 1975, No. 327, ISA, FO 6813/8. File ibid. is full of Dinitz reports about his meeting with members of Congress and public figures during February–April 1975. Memorandum for the Record, 11 June 1975, DGFPL. S. Dinitz to General Director, Foreign Office, 18 June 1975, No. 304, ISA, FO 6820/8.

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Thus, the president and Kissinger were mistaken when they estimated that ‘if [the Israelis] think they can sell the Congress today as they did in 1973, they can’t’.152 The majority of Congress supported Israel, as did the American people. When asked in January 1975 with whom she or he sympathized more, 52 per cent of the total public answered with Israel, and 7 per cent chose the Arabs. These results were similar to those of the NBC network that asked the same question in April.153 The Israeli claims against the re-assessment were bolstered by the deterioration of conditions in Vietnam. After the 1973 peace agreement which gave Kissinger the Nobel Peace Prize, the North Vietnamese army launched a campaign against South Vietnam in April 1975, which proved to be decisive. On 30 April 1975, Saigon’s fall was transmitted to the world through the famous photo of the helicopters extracting escapees from the American embassy’s rooftop. The Israeli press presented the Vietnam events as a warning for the administration in its attitude towards Israel.154 An Israel commentator saw the silver lining in the fall of South Vietnam. Following the collapse of the pro-American regime to the pro-Soviet regime in Vietnam, the United States could not afford another defeat of another pro-American ally. Thus, despite the reassessment, the United States would continue supporting Israel and would strengthen its military power.155 President Ford was offended by the way the Jewish community referred to him. Fisher presented to the president on 30 April the letters he received from Jewish leaders, which portrayed the president as impervious to Israel. The president strongly denied those accusations, but Fisher commented that ‘perceptions are not always accurate’.156 The president’s reaction to Israeli and Jewish pressure was similar to the reaction of his predecessors who were in the same situation, ‘anyone who knows me, and those who do not shall soon know that inequitable, unfair pressures are exactly the wrong way of trying to change my 152 153

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Memorandum of Conversation, 28 April 1975, DGFPL. Louis Harris and Associates: A Survey of the Attitudes of Americans toward the Arab–Israel conflict and toward Jews in the United States, January 1975, AJA, MS 780, G16/7; Rapoport to Hasbara, Foreign Office, 10 April 1975, No. 221, ISA, FO 6859/8. Meir Bareli, ‘The American President’s Initiative’, Davar, 6 May 1975, 8. Moshe Zak, ‘With No Peace and With No Honor’, Maariv, 2 May 1975, 13. Private Meeting with President Ford and Don Rumsfeld, 30 April 1975, MMFA, M. M. Fisher Correspondence, Ford, Gerald R., Meetings with Fisher, 30 April 1975; M. Fisher to President Ford, 30 April 1975, ibid.

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views’.157 And this was true. The senators’ letter, the urges of members of Congress, the calls of Jewish leaders, and the pro-Israeli editorials – all of these did not change the president’s mind. He did not end the reassessment and the suspension of the arms sales to Israel. It ended only after Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy produced on 4 September an agreement that was signed in Geneva.158 As had been done by his predecessors, President Ford, too, outlined the limitation of the power of the Israeli and Jewish lobby and its impact on US foreign policy. Still, as the day wore on, Kissinger was able to accomplish his mission and convince the Israelis and Egyptians to sign the interim agreements despite the heated exchanges. In retrospect, it was an important stage along the road to peace between Israel and Egypt. *** Not for the first time, and not for the last time, the Arab–Israeli conflict caused discord in Israel–US relations. The president and Kissinger spoke bitterly about what they considered Israel’s intransigence, and the Israelis reacted with rage and fury, all because of the Arab–Israeli conflict. However, the tensions and mutual anger did not truly reflect the real nature of the relations between the two countries, even when the president withheld the shipment of military equipment to Israel. Overall, Israeli-US relations had further deepened, and the United States continued to offer generous aid to Israel. From 1974 to 1976, the Ford administration gave Israel a total of more than $6 billion, nearly $3.4 billion in a grant.159 In September 1974, the two governments established a Joint Committee on Trade and Investment chaired by Secretary of Treasury William E. Simon and Israeli Minister of Finance Yehoshua Rabinowitz, which discussed issues such as measures to encourage foreign investments in Israel and the US government’s role in facilitating US private investment in Israel, the US–Israel business council, US offshore procurement, and stockpiling raw materials in Israel.160 157

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Memorandum of Conversation, 15 May 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 174; Memorandum of Conversation, 24 May 1975, DGFPL. M. Shalev to Y. Rabin, 20 June 1975, ISA, FO 5978/8; Fischer, ‘Turning Point on the Road to Peace’, 70–72. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 22. Status Report on the 17 June 1974 Joint Communique Undertakings, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 610; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 29 August 1974, No. 190337, NARA-AAD, RG 59;

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The joint committee also created the US–Israel Cooperation and Development Research Programme, which financed joint research by Israeli and foreign academics. American economic aid for research in Israel had already commenced in 1966. Then, the American government granted $1 million to the School of Social Work at the Hebrew University for research on invalids.161 After the Six-Day War, the federal government allocated 25 million IL ($7 million) for research through programme PL 480. This sum amounted to 25 per cent of the total civic research budget in Israel. The money was given to the Weizmann Institute, the Technion, and the Hebrew University. Out of a scientific community of about 3,000, some 1,100 Israeli scientists relied on the American programme for their research. Some of the studies financed by the American money were ‘Deeper Understanding of Human Behaviour in Situations of High Pressure’ and ‘The Impact of Heat on the Humane Body’. When there was a danger that the allocation for the FY 1969 would be reduced, the Foreign Office’s Moshe Bitan described such an eventuality as ‘holocaust’.162 The support for Israeli research continued for the next few years. In 1985, the programme approved fourteen projects, one of them, for example, was titled ‘The Double Stranded NRA Viruses of Fungi and the Regulation of Virulence of Plant Pathogens’. The grantees were the Tel Aviv University in collaboration with the Forest Research Institute in Kumasi, Ghana, and they received $149,850. The total of the grants for 1985 was about $2.1 million.163 The industrial and trade relations between the two countries were also deepening. Already in 1957, Israel asked for a loan to finance the establishment of a bank for industrial development, with the aim of helping entrepreneurs to develop industrial projects. The American embassy in Tel Aviv enthusiastically supported the initiative. The Americans attributed great importance to industrial development and helped foreign countries, such as India and Turkey, to develop banks

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G. Elron to S. Dinitz, 31 October 1974, ISA, FO 6816/14; Z. Sher to Y. Rabinowitz, 12 December 1974, ibid., FO 6818/6; A. Atherton to Secretary Kissinger, 9 February 1975, DGFPL. Uri Cohen, Alma-Mater: The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 1948–1967 (Sde Boker: Ben Gurion Institute Press, 2020), 256–257. A. Kenan to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 6 February 1968, No. 43, ISA, FO 4155/16; M. Bitan to Y. Rabin, 10 May 1968, No. 235, ibid., FO 4155/8. T. Pickering to D. Kimche, 24 September 1985, ISA, FO 6835/7.

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for industrial development. Their only condition was that the government would not own the bank. Pinhas Sapir, the minister of trade and industry, accepted the American terms and recommended that the government retain 21 per cent of the bank shares, with the rest being held by other commercial financial institutions.164 The trade between the two countries was also thriving. In 1976, the United States was Israel’s largest single trading partner. The traffic of goods in both directions had grown progressively. There was always, though, trade gaps, with Israel importing from the United States more than it exported. From 1948 through 1975, the trade gap was estimated at $85 billion. In 1976, Israel ranked number 18 among the top 45 top markets purchasing goods from the United States.165 The economic and trade cooperation between Israel and the United States was further cemented by the signing of the agreement that established the Israel–US Industrial Research and Development Foundation during Simon’s visit in March to the second meeting of the US–Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade. Israel expressed its appreciation for Simon’s contribution to the deepening of Israel–US relations by awarding him an honorary doctorate from Tel Aviv University.166 The Committee met once again in October 1977, with the new Israeli Minister of Treasury Simcha Ehrlich, and his American counterpart, Michael Blumenthal, in Jerusalem. The minister and the secretary approved ‘[a] program for further cooperation’.167 An additional step towards deepening the economic ties between the two states was the visit of a group of industrialists from Pittsburgh in December 1976. The group came to study options for investment and cooperation with Israeli industrialists.168 Another venue for advancing Israel–US special relations was the participation of an American delegation in the international Yarid 164 165

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Yitzhak Greenberg, Sapir (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2011), 126–127. Ministry of Commerce and Industry: ‘U.S.–Israel Trade Relations, 1949–1975’, 23 February 1976, ISA, FO 8443/15. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 3 March 1976, No. 1582, USNA-AAD, RG 59; A. Kiryati to Various Addressees, 14 March 1976, ISA, FO 8443/15. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 28 October 1977, No. 8464, USNA-AAD, RG 59. Z. Sher to A. Gafni, 23 July 1976, ISA, FO 8479/9; A. Naim to US Division, 24 November 1976, ibid., FO 8479/10; Y. Azuri to A. Naim, 15 December 1976, ibid.; G. Elron to A. Naim, 26 December 1976, ibid.

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Hamizarkh (Orient Fair) that took place every two years in Tel Aviv since 1962. Delegations from around the world participated in the fair, and during his visit to the United States in November 1961, Pinhas Sapir, minister of trade and industry, concluded with his counterpart, Luther H. Hodges, that the Department of Commerce would send a delegation. It was clear to Sapir and Hodges that more than serving an economic purpose, the participation of the American delegation would serve a political purpose and a message of defiance against the Arab economic boycott of Israel and companies trading with Israel. In a message to the fair, President Kennedy congratulated the Israeli people on the fair’s success and stated that ‘[t]his Trade Fair is a link in the chain of friendship and trade that connects our two countries’.169 The American delegation to the 1964 Yarid showcased ‘the achievements of the electric industry’. It displayed in a ‘conspicuously large pavilion’, a model of a spaceship. ‘It will undoubtedly attract a large audience’, estimated an Israeli news reporter.170 Howard Samuels, undersecretary of the Department of Commerce, led an American delegation to the 1968 fair, which included forty-eight American companies displaying various industrial equipment.171 In January 1975, the American Department of Commerce decided not to participate in the Technology ‘75 Fair organized by the Yarid. The Israeli Foreign Office was worried about the consequences of the cancellation of the American delegation. For years, the American pavilion was one of the most popular and was considered a public and commercial success. The Foreign Office asked the Israeli embassy in Washington to press the administration to help in bringing American companies to participate in the fair. The exhortations helped, and an American delegation participated in the technological fair.172 The US–Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade also discussed measures to encourage private business enterprises to pursue opportunities to expand the economic ties between the two countries. 169

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Haim Yaari, ‘An American Commercial Delegation Will Participate in the Yarid Hamizrach’, Davar, 15 November 1961, 2; ‘President Kennedy Congratulates Yarid Hamizrach’, Herut, 12 June 1962, 3. ‘What in the Yarid HaMizrach’, HaBoker, 16 June 1964. ‘US’ Undersecretary of Commerce Visits Israel’, HaTsofe, 29 May 1968, 4. E. Evron to M. Shalev, 23 January 1975, No. 501, ISA, FO 6813/8; ‘Technology 1975’ Fair Opened in Ganei Ha’Taarukha’, Maariv, 21 May 1975, 11.

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The delegations agreed to establish a Joint Business Council to accomplish that objective. The delegations signed an agreement to avoid double taxation, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recognized the purchase of the Israeli government’s compulsory loan bonds as a tax-deductible expense. No taxes would be collected on grants given to American entrepreneurs who invested in Israel under the law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an American government development finance institute, would provide loans to American investors for authorized investments in Israel; it would participate in financing industrial projects in Israel by purchasing the project’s bonds. It would also publicize and help to find partners for existing factories. Israel was likewise approved as an Offshore Procurement supplier for the Department of Defence. Two Israeli exporters were invited to supply Israeli-made components to the Pentagon, one producer of parts for tank torrents and the other, Iscar, a producer of aeronautic components.173 The delegations also started working on granting to Israel preferable custom terms, and the Joint Committee agreed to create an American–Israeli Council for Industrial Research and Development with representatives from both countries. The secretary and the minister agreed to hold these meetings at least once a year.174 The meeting and the agreement meant a lot to the Israelis. In the midst of one of the most severe crises between Israel and the United States, with the president’s announcement on re-assessment, the signing of the agreements indicated that ‘there is no freeze on expansion of Israel–US relations’.175 *** If the events leading to the signing of the interim agreement marked a low ebb in US–Israel relations, the agreement alleviated Israel–US strategic ties. The interim agreement contained a confidential annex that stated that there would be no more interim agreements, and Israel would not be required to carry out additional withdrawals – other than 173 174

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A. Kiryati to Y. Boneh, 18 March 1976, No. 233, ISA, FO 8443/15. US–Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade, 13 May 1975, ISA, FO 3281/1; Rabinowitz–Simon Joint Statement, 8 July 1975, ibid. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 15 May 1975, No. 2992, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D750172–0144.

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as part of a final peace agreement. The Americans also pledged to help Israel meet its military, economic, and energy needs caused by the interim agreement.176 More than new ideas, the agreement further consolidated Israel–US special relations. Militarily, it confirmed that the United States would continue supplying Israel with advanced arms. With the American airlift coming to end in November 1973, Israeli and American intelligence teams were set to study Israel’s needs. The Pentagon sent to Israel a team to study Israel’s losses in the war and to estimate Israel’s repair and replacement capabilities and needs.177 During the deliberations between the military delegations, Israel discussed its next combat plane. The way the request was handled marked the change that took place in the Israel–US strategic relationship. The Americans regarded the Israeli request as natural, offering Israeli pilots the opportunity to experience the two most advanced contemporary American aircraft, the F-14 and the F-15. An Israeli commander of a Phantom squadron headed a four-pilot team accompanied by a technical team that came to the United States to evaluate the planes and recommend which one would be Israel’s nextgeneration aircraft. The tests, which involved dogfights with Israeliflown jet planes, proved the F-15 to be a better fighter and more advanced technologically. It was also cheaper both to purchase and to maintain than the F-14.178 The IAF chose the F-15, and the first three advanced planes arrived in Israel on 10 December 1976.179 Even as the debate over the reassessment was raging, President Ford approved an ‘Urgent List’ Israel submitted of priority equipment worth $950 million. The list included four Lance missile battalions, laser-guided bombs, CBUs, twenty-five Cobra helicopters, personal anti-aircraft missiles, and more, and the items were supplied by April 1975.180 176

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Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of Israel and the United States, 1 September 1975, ISA, A 279/6; President Ford to Prime Minister Rabin, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 234. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 28 October 1973, No. 212642, RNPL, NSCF, Country Files, ME, Israel, b. 610; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 31 October 1973, No. 8814, ibid. Shlomo Aloni, Israel F-15 Eagle Units in Combat (London: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 12–16. Yaakov Erez, ‘The F-15 Acrobatic Exercises Were Performed by Special Arrangement’, Maariv, 12 December 1976, 1. Memorandum of Conversation, 29 July 1974, DNSA, 01261; Memorandum of Conversation, 12 September 1974, GFPL, 12 September 1974- Ford, Kissinger, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Memoranda of Conversations; NSDM 270,

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Kissinger also concluded with Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger to add 200 tanks to the list and urged the military men to agree to a $1 billion package.181 *** In 1976 the United States celebrated its 200th anniversary, and Israel joined in the celebrations. Robert Slater wrote that Bicentennial fever had ‘overtaken Israel’, and reported that ‘the sights and sounds of the Bicentennial are in evidence everywhere around the Jewish state’.182 And indeed, the Israelis expressed their profound gratitude to the United States by commemorating the event and joining the festivities. They started celebrating the Bicentennial already in mid-January. Prime Minister Rabin and Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek dedicated a park in Jerusalem where a replica of the American Liberty Bell would be erected.183 The Jewish National Fund invited 75–100 American dignitaries, senators, representatives, governors, and others to Israel to take part in the laying of a Bicentennial Park foundation stone. Aharon Yadlin, the minister of education, initiated an essays competition among high school students on the subject ‘200 years of American independence’. The winners would be announced in a ceremony in September.184 The Philatelic Service issued a special stamp to mark the Bicentennial, and the minister of communication presented the stamp to the American ambassador in a special ceremony.185 Universities and other private institutions also prepared events such as exhibitions,

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24 September 1974, GFPL, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, b. 1. Telephone Conversation between Secretary Schlesinger and HAK, 5 August 1974, DNSA, Telcon; Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, 30 August 1974, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Doc. 98. R. Slater, ‘Bicentennial Fever Has a Strong Grip on Israel, Too’, Chicago Daily News, 30 June 1976, 5. Y. Ben Yaakov to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 2 February 1976, ISA, FO 8482/12. American Consul, Jerusalem to Secretary of State, 14 January 1976, No. 63, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D760016–0044; M. Raviv to Deputy General Director Foreign Office, 7 April 1976, ISA, FO 8479/8; Memorandum of Conversation, 31 July 1976, CIA Digital Archives, LOC-HAK-161-8-22-0. Internal Correspondence, Foreign Office, 26 March 1976, ISA, FO 8482/12; M. Bavli to E. Evron, 23 April 1976, ibid.

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conferences, and studies dedicated to the Bicentennial.186 With the financial assistance of the American administration, the Israeli Ministry of Education and Culture and the Israel Festival organized the visit of what the Israelis termed ‘Two major Bicentennial events’, the visit of the Merce Cunningham Dancers and the Roger Wagner Chorale in August, to perform at the Israel Festival.187 The chief rabbinates conducted a prayer of gratitude on 3 July, performed by Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren.188 On 12 July, the Israeli Knesset held a special session to commemorate the Bicentennial, with the participation of the Israeli president Ephraim Katzir. The Knesset speaker used rhetoric the Americans were familiar with when he compared the arrival of the first pioneers in America to the Jewish Exodus and the settlement of Canaan. He mentioned how the Americans who fought for independence 200 years ago were inspired by the vision of ‘Israel’s prophets’ and how they tried ‘to study and embrace the Biblical Hebrew’. The speaker mentioned the inscription on the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, taken from the Old Testament, ‘Proclaim LIBERTY Throughout all the Land unto all the Inhabitants Thereof’ (Leviticus, 25:10). In his blessing speech, Prime Minister Rabin, too, underscored the similarities between Israel and the United States and the importance of the Old Testament in the formation of the moral and political thinking that the United States was founded and developed on. He stated that Israel–US relations were based not only on interests but also ‘on joint sources and heritage, on similar historical experience, on values and ideals uniting together our nations’.189 The Israeli National Library held an exhibition titled ‘Proclaim Liberty’, dedicated to the Israeli aspects of the Bicentennial, such as the influence of the Bible and biblical terms on American society, Hebrew study during the Colonial period, and the adoption of biblical names by American settlements.190 186

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M. Yeger to A. Rapoport, 24 June 1976, ISA, FO 8482/12; Y. Arieli to M. Bavli, 25 November 1976, ibid. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 20 February 1976, No. 1243, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D760064–0040; Ruth Eshel, ‘Concert Dance in Israel’, Dance Research Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer, 2003), 75. Internal Correspondence, Foreign Office, July 1976, ISA, FO 8482/12. Minutes of the 317th Meeting of the Knesset, Divrei HaKnesset, 12 July 1976, 3475–3477. ‘The Bicentennial Exhibition’, Maariv, 19 July 1976, 32.

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President Ford was delighted with the Bicentennial celebrations in Israel and agreed that the two states shared a lot in common, such as ‘Both nations were born in the face of armed opposition. Both nations are a haven for people fleeing persecution. Both nations find their vitality and their vision in a commitment to freedom and to democracy.’191 As a token of gratitude, the American government presented the Israeli government with a bronze statue of Abraham Lincoln. The statute was donated by Leon Gildesgame, a Jewish industrialist and philanthropist, and was placed in Ramat Gan. President Ford signed the dedication of the statue as a gift from the American people to the people of Israel.192 Israelis also participated in the Bicentennial events in the United States either trough Israeli initiatives or in response to American invitations. Thus, the governor of Washington, Daniel Evans, invited the Israeli embassy to send Israeli representatives to the Bicentennial World Marine Festival, which was planned to take place between May and October. The festival aimed to bring together international and national visitors to salute seafaring men.193 Israel did not participate in the festival, but two Israeli missile boats took part in an international flotilla in New York. The boats visited some additional cities along the East Coast, in celebration of the Bicentennial.194 In Philadelphia, the committee organizing the Bicentennial celebration invited Israeli musicians and marching groups to take part in the celebrations in the city. The Israeli general consul suggested that the Foreign Office accept the invitation, and send a group of IDF soldiers to the parade, as this would serve ‘important Hasbara purposes’.195 The Foreign Office organized the visit of the Israeli Philharmonic orchestra and an ethnic folklore group to the United States, to participate in the Bicentennial celebrations. The folklore group visited the United States in June, and performed in Washington, DC, Los Angeles, El Paso, Philadelphia, and New York 191

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Gerald R. Ford, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, 13 May 1976, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/258285. Accessed 16 June 2021. U. Bar Ner to General Consuls, USA, 21 May 1976, ISA, FO 8482/12; Foreign Office, Jerusalem to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 24 May 1976, ibid. D. Evans to S. Dinitz, 2 January 1976, ISA, FO 8482/12. U. Bar Ner to Office, Jerusalem, 17 June 1976, No. 384, ISA, FO 8482/12; U. Bar Ner to S. Argov, 15 July 1976, No. 296, ibid. S. Foster to E. Shimoni, December 1975, ISA, FO 8482/12.

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City.196 The Philharmonic orchestra conducted a festive concert in Tel Aviv and performed American music in July, and after that it flew to the United States.197 While the Israelis joined the Americans in celebration of the Bicentennial, the Americans joined the Israelis celebrating a daring Israeli military operation. On the very day that the United States celebrated its Bicentennial, an Israeli commando rescued Israeli hostages held at Entebbe airport in Uganda. The two events conflated aboard the aircraft carrier Forrestal on 5 July. President Ford hosted the Bicentennial event with Ambassador Dinitz as one of the guests. Soon enough, Dinitz became the main attraction. The president greeted the ‘brilliant operation’, while Vice President Nelson Rockefeller repeatedly said, ‘you are marvelous’. Kissinger came ‘specially’ to greet Dinitz, ‘expressing his enthusiasm’. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld commended the ‘brilliant operation’, and Secretary of Treasury Simon was ‘all excited’. Members of Congress greeted Dinitz, as did many foreign ambassadors.198 The American press hailed the event as a success, stating that ‘Israel gave the United States the most beautiful gift for the Bicentennial’.199 Hollywood saw an opportunity to combine money with idealism, and Hollywood producers swamped the Israeli embassy with requests for help preparing a script and movie on the operation. An American producer described such a film as ‘a first-rate PR opportunity that would raise Israel again to the level of Exodus, if not higher’.200 The Foreign Office’s Shlomo Argov became confused with the abundance. He asked for Dinitz’s ‘urgent intervention’, as the Foreign Office continued receiving offers ‘almost every day’.201 196

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U. Bar Ner to Office, Jerusalem, 15 June 1976, No. 305, ISA, FO 8482/12; Y. Allon to Management of the Philharmonic Orchestra, 30 July 1976, No. S/ 272, ibid.; Y. Faran to U. Bar Ner, 10 September 1976, ibid. A. Bar-Ner to Israeli General Consuls, USA, 21 January 1976, ISA, FO 8482/ 12. S. Dinitz to S. Avineri, 5 July 1976, No. 77, ISA, FO 8478/15. A. Pazner to S. Argov, 5 July 1976, No. 78, ISA, FO 8479/9. S. Dinitz to S. Avineri, 5 July 1976, No. 79, ISA, FO 8479/9; H. Heffer to Z. Baram, 7 July 1976, No. 17, ibid.; M. Ben Yosef to Office, Jerusalem, 8 July 1976, No. 21, ibid.; Rapoport to S. Argov, 20 July 1976, No. 728, ibid.; Rapoport to S. Argov, 22 July 1976, No.767, ibid. S. Argov to S. Dinitz, 8 July 1976, No. 197, ISA, FO 8479/9; S. Argov to S. Dinitz, 9 July 1976, No. 227, ibid.

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Two years later, Hollywood hosted a major pro-Israeli event in celebration of Israel’s thirtieth anniversary, which ABC aired on 8 May 1978 under the title The Stars Salute Israel at 30. The show was held at the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion in Los Angeles, where, for two hours, about thirty of the best-known actors and singers paid tribute to Israel’s achievements. There were, among many others, Sally Struthers – Gloria in All in the Family, who opened singing ‘Happy Birthday’ – and Barry Manilow, Paul Newman, Henry Fonda, Natalie Wood, George Burns, Gene Kelly, Sammy Davis Jr, Kirk Douglas, and Barbara Streisand ‘provided a powerful and emotional finish to Hollywood’s salute’ to Israel’s anniversary.202

President Jimmy Carter In 2006, former President Jimmy Carter published a book titled Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid.203 The book criticized Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and in one interview, he described the Israeli policy in the occupied territories as ‘instances of apartheid worse even that those that once held sway in South Africa’.204 Considering President Carter’s criticism of the Israeli policy of settlement, the book and comments seemed natural. However, the book and the comment overshadowed four years during which President Carter only added additional layers to Israel–US special relationships. Carter’s conclusion of his first encounter with Israel was utterly different from the way he viewed Israel in his apartheid book. He visited Israel for the first time in May 1973 and travelled across the country, declaring that he was a friend of Israel. The visit ‘made a great impression on me’, he wrote in his memoirs. He stated that Israel

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Jim Harwood, ‘Hollywood Turns Out for Warm Tribute to Israel’s 30th’, Variety, 10 May 1978, 291; Giora Goodman and Tony Shaw, Hollywood and Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, in press), introduction. Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). ‘Jimmy Carter: Israel’s “Apartheid” Policies Worse Than South Africa’s’, Haaretz, 10 December 2006, www.haaretz.com/1.4938644. Accessed 23 October 2020.

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should continue holding the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and Sharm ElSheikh and establish more settlements there.205 When he ran for president, he pledged that if elected, he would not press Israel to withdraw from those territories and would not utilize military aid as a means to pressure Israel to do so.206 This was a promise he kept faithfully, even though he sometimes appeared to regret making such commitments. Carter’s view of Israel was formed not only based on what he saw but more on what he believed in. His religiosity defined his attitude towards Israel. He expressed his deep commitment ‘As a human being, as an American and as a religious person’, to a nation whose birth was a fulfilment of a biblical prophecy.207 In his memoirs, he wrote, ‘the Judeo-Christian ethic and study of the Bible were bonds between Jews and Christians which had always been part of my life . . . I considered this homeland for the Jews to be compatible with the teachings of the Bible, hence ordained by God. These moral and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable.’208 When he was already a president, and met Prime Minister Rabin on 8 March 1977, Carter referred to the Bible and the prophecies to justify his support for Israel. ‘This is quite aside from politics’, he stated, and hence, his support for Israel was not based on ephemeral considerations but the permanency of the Bible.209 To the list of reasons for his support for Israel, Carter added that Israel’s establishment was sanctioned by the UN, which the Arabs did not accept and fought against. Hence, the dangers facing Israel filled Carter with a deep sense of responsibility to equip the Israelis with the means to defend themselves.210 And there were also interests. Carter also viewed Israel relations with the United States in the context of the Cold War, stating that Israel was the key to keep the Middle East ‘stable and at peace’ and to keeping the Soviet Union off the region. Thus, ‘Israel was a strategic 205

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‘Jimmy Carter’s Visit in Israel, 24.5.73–30.5.73’, 4 April 1976, ISA, FO 8447/ 17; Carter, Keeping Faith, location 5075. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ‘Courting the Jewish Voter’, Washington Post, 13 March 1976, A19. David E. Rosenbaum, ‘Carter and Two Rivals Differ on the Economy’, New York Times, 2 April 1976, 1; Tz. Rafiach to General Director, Foreign Office, 12 May 1976, No. 239, ISA, FO 4784/2. Carter, Keeping Faith, locations 5081–5086. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 March 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 20. Carter, Keeping Faith, locations 5081–5086.

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asset to the United States’. At the same time, Carter admitted frankly that he had no ‘strong feelings’ about the Arab countries. He never visited any Arab country, and he never met an Arab leader.211 In the 1976 election campaign, Carter’s religiosity was a topic, an unusual phenomenon in American politics. Both presidential candidates – Republican Gerald Ford and Democrat Jimmy Carter – presented themselves as born-again Christians, a claim made by one-third of all Americans. This phenomenon caught pundits by surprise. They struggled to comprehend this new segment of the electorate, starting at the top with the candidacy of Jimmy Carter. Newsweek magazine depicted the religiosity of the two candidates as an expression of a broader phenomenon and the year 1976 as the ‘Year of the Evangelicals’.212 And indeed, it turned out that the 1976 elections marked the Evangelical movement’s transition from the margins of the American intellectual, cultural, and political life into the mainstream of American society. After several decades of staying away from politics, the Evangelicals were on their way to become a prominent political and cultural force. The shift was denoted in the increase in articles discussing politics published in the leading Evangelical journal, Christianity Today, during the 1970s. In 1969–1970, only twelve articles were devoted to political issues – 5.5 per cent of the total – while in 1979–1980, thirty-two articles discussing politics were published – 15.4 per cent of the total. More than that, the earlier-period essays were critical towards involvement in politics, whereas the laterperiod articles encouraged participation in politics. This trend was seen in other Evangelical periodicals as well. It was also the time in which televangelism blossomed. Preachers appeared in TV religious broadcasts, increasing the extent and reach of Evangelical involvement in politics. The religious broadcasts had started in the 1950s, but only a small number of preachers broadcasted to a small number of audiences. This had changed during the 1970s when the number of people listening and watching the broadcasts increased. Evangelical groups with a clear political agenda joined the political process, with state chapters of groups such as Christian Voice and Moral Majority participating in the 1980 congressional elections, with the intention to 211 212

Carter, Keeping Faith, location 5092. Kenneth L. Woodward, ‘Born Again! The Year of the Evangelicals’, Newsweek, Vol. 88, 25 October 1976, 68–78.

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oust liberal members of Congress. They contributed funds and worked with local pastors to mobilize Evangelical voters.213 As the number of Evangelicals involved in politics had augmented, so did the number of Christian Zionists, who came from both grassroots movements and the Evangelical elite. Martin Marty, a Protestant theologian and Church historian, argued that ‘the most significant religious development of 1977 was the growing support for Israel by Evangelicals’. Reverend Marty viewed the growing support for Israel among Evangelicals as part of their rising political awareness and activism and their departure from the position of disengagement and aloofness from politics.214 The Israeli government welcomed that trend. ‘It is clear that pragmatically, we must rely on any friend, regardless of his motives, [underlining in original]’, stated the Israeli consul in Houston, discussing one of the local Evangelical groups.215 Prime Minister Menachem Begin embraced the Evangelicals as no prime ministers before, being the first prime minister to practise ‘Christian public diplomacy’. He was the guest of honour in the Evangelical’s International Congress for Peace in Jerusalem (31 January–2 February 1978), and made close association with Jerry Falwell, who represented the change in the Evangelical movement and its growing involvement in active politics.216 Begin met with Falwell several times, and the front page of a Moral Majority report titled ‘America Must Stand Firm in Support for Israel’ featured a joint photo of Falwell and Begin taken at the prime minister’s office.217 The prime minister was well aware of the concerns and opposition of Jews to his association with the Evangelicals but he had a pragmatic response, ‘if a man or group reaches out his hand and say, “I am a friend of Israel” I will say, “Israel has strong enemies and needs friends”. Reverend Falwell is a very strong friend.’218 213

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Robert Wuthnow, ‘The Political Rebirth of American Evangelicals’, in Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (eds), The New Christian Right (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983), 172–174. David E. Anderson, ‘Theologian Notes Support for Evangelicals for Israel’, Washington Post, 6 January 1978, D10. D. Zohar to D. Ephrati, 21 January 1981, No. 5, ISA, FO 8470/15. Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 159, 215–216; Merkley, Christian Attitudes towards the State of Israel, 168; Y. Perato to M. Pargai, 3 February 1978, No. 43, ISA, FO 8462/12. Y. Levy to A. Arazi, 6 March 1981, No. 13, ISA, FO 8470/15; Moral Majority Report, 16 March 1981, ibid. Martin Schram, ‘Jerry Falwell Vows Amity with Israel’, Washington Post, 12 September 1981, A1.

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Israeli officials and diplomats sought ways to contact Evangelical communities and increase their activities on behalf of Israel. They made contact with local pro-Israel churches in their areas of assignment and acted to recruit them to Israel’s advocacy. One such a case was the contact the consul in New York made with the Faith Bible Chapel near Denver, Colorado. The community consisted of about 2,000 members, most of whom were of the upper-middle class, some of them quite rich. From what the consul heard, he concluded that the church members’ raison d’etre laid in their love for Judaism and Israel, and he saw an opportunity to mobilize the church to serve as a liaison with other Evangelical communities and to advance Israel’s cause with their help.219 The awakening of the Evangelicals also led to suggestions to create an organized Evangelical lobby for Israel.220 One group took up the task. While not declaring itself explicitly as an Evangelical lobby, the National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel (NCLCI) played that role. The NCLCI was founded in 1978 by some 400 Evangelical Christians who gathered in Washington, DC, to celebrate Israel’s thirtieth anniversary. Comprised of Evangelicals who had advocated Israel in the past in various organizations, the NCLCI defined its goal as organizing conferences to advocate the Israeli cause, publishing newsletters, disseminating literature, arranging group tours to Israel, and ‘coordinating and supporting the efforts of the dozens of local and regional Christian groups for Israel’. The group was still very active in 2020.221 The Protestant pastor and televangelist, John Hagee, founded Christians United for Israel (CUFI) in 2006 as a pro-Israel Evangelical lobby, with 8 million members. Hagee established the lobby during the very pro-Israeli presidency of George W. Bush. However, taking on the role of Prophet Jeremiah, Hagee told his followers when he founded CUFI, ‘we will know why we are here’. His prophecy came true with the election of the ostensibly much less friendly to Israel President Barack Obama, and the need for CUFI became evident.222 219

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G. Shomoron to Church Division, Foreign Office, 1 June 1981, ISA, FO 8470/ 15. H. Fishman to E. Eyal, 6 June 1978, ISA, FO 8462/13; D. Ephrati to M. Pragai, 22 November 1978, No. 683, ibid., FO 8470/14. F. H. Littell to Friends of Supporters of CCI, 8 June 1979, ISA, FO 8460/2; Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 163–164; About the NCLCI, www.nclci.org/ copy-of-who-we-are. Accessed 18 April 2020. Sean Durbin, ‘“I Am an Israeli”: Christian Zionism as American Redemption’, Culture and Religion, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2013), 324–329.

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The more common feature among Evangelical communities, though, was a few congregations acting together, or even one congregation acting independently, as advocates for Israel. In 1983, the Israeli Foreign Office counted hundreds of pro-Israeli Christian Zionists acting on Israel’s behalf across the United States.223 The Evangelical movement, on its various branches and chapters, became a political force to be reckoned with, and even if not in an organized manner, it served as one large lobby for Israel. While voting for Carter in larger numbers than for his competitor, there were Jews who were discontent with Carter’s blatant religiosity. It could go both ways, explained Rabbi Herschel Shechter. Carter’s religiosity could place him on Israel’s side but it could also take him to the other side, implying a fear from religiosity-based anti-Semitism.224 Other Jews found Carter’s zealot Christianity threatening: ‘I don’t like Christian crusades; they always end the same way: killing Jews’.225 Countering these concerns, Southern Jews argued that ‘Carter’s support for Israel is biblical. It’s deep. He doesn’t have to be convinced there ought to be a Jewish state. He knows that in his heart.’226 Eliot Levitas, a Jewish representative from Atlanta who was close to Carter, promised that the Jews should not fear Carter. He was a devoted Baptist fundamentalist who believed the Jews were the Chosen people, and Israel was Zion, just as the Bible said.227 Considering Carter’s ties with Jews, the American Jewish fears seemed misplaced. The new president had Jews around him who strengthened his claim that he was attentive to the American Jews and Israel’s wishes. Besides him, he had the aforementioned Levitas and Robert Liphshutz, Jr, an early Carter supporter who served as Carter’s campaign treasurer for both the gubernatorial and the 1976 presidential campaigns. After taking office, Carter appointed Liphshutz as a White House counsel, a position he held until 1979. Then Liphshutz returned to Atlanta but remained close to the president. Liphshutz visited Israel frequently and was an active member of 223 224 225

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Hummel, Covenant Brotherhood, 178. M. Raviv to S. Dinitz, 23 May 1976, ISA, FO 7295/7. Richard Reeves, ‘Is Jimmy Carter Good for Jews?’ New York Magazine, 24 May 1976, 10. Eli Evans, ‘Southern Jews, and Baptists, and Jimmy Carter’, New York Times, 20 October 1976, 45. Tz. Rafiach to US Division, 22 June 1976, No. 287, ISA, FO 8479/8.

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the Atlanta Jewish community. The Israeli general consul met Carter and Liphshutz in December 1975, and the two asked the consul to organize a meeting between Carter and the Jewish community, as Carter wanted to convince them that he was a true friend of Israel.228 Another Jew close to Carter was Stuart E. Eizenstat, who served as the president’s assistant for domestic affairs and policy. He was in constant contact with the Israeli general consul in Atlanta and used to assure him, before and after the elections, that Carter was a good friend of Israel.229 Carter had beside him one more ally of Israel, Vice President Walter Mondale, who had a strong record of friendship towards Israel. During the campaign, he met Israeli officials more than once, promising them that Carter was ‘a loyal friend of Israel’.230 Mondale’s pro-Israeli proclivity, some of it derived from political acumen, led him to clashes with the president’s advisors, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. Especially he opposed the public conflicts with Begin, assuming that those, along with the general American confrontational attitude towards Israel, were damaging the president’s domestic political prospects.231 At the moment of truth, the Jewish concerns over Carter’s religiosity did not change their traditional voting pattern. The elections’ results had shown that the Jews voted for an idea more than for a person. Carter got more than 70 per cent of the Jewish vote, against Ford’s 30 per cent. At the same time, President Ford was also pleased with the Jewish vote. He considered getting about 30 per cent of the Jewish vote an achievement, given the traditional Jewish reluctance to vote for the Republican candidate.232 Carter’s relations with the Israeli leaders were complicated. He did not get along well with Prime Minister Rabin. Carter invited Rabin to visit Washington in March, which he described as a gesture because of

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N. Ester to E. Ben-Zur, 16 January 1976, No. 1039, ISA, FO 8479/7; Maisel and Forman, Jewish in American Politics, 379. N. Ester to S. Dinitz, 1 December 1976, No. 215/539, ISA, FO 8479/10; E. BenZur to M. Raviv, 6 December 1976, No. 126, ibid.; Maisel and Forman, Jewish in American Politics, 328. S. Dinitz to S. Avineri, 30 July 1976, ISA, FO 8479/9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983), 25. E. Benzur to M. Raviv, 17 November 1976, No. 53, ISA FO 8452/2; Maisel and Forman, Jews in American Politics, 153.

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‘the special relationship between Israel and the United States’.233 Carter intended to discuss with Rabin the beginning of the peace process, but both leaders were disappointed by the experience. Rabin thought that Carter was naïve, driven by religious zeal and inexperience, while Carter thought that Rabin lacked courage and imagination.234 In May 1977, Israel went to the polls, and the relationship between the United States and Israel became a controversial issue during the election campaign. Since the 1974 disengagement agreements, rightwing voters came out against what they depicted as Israel’s subordination and over-dependence on the United States. They argued that Israel became an American satellite, succumbing to American whims.235 The criticism increased even more after senior members of the administration, including President Carter, talked about the future of the West Bank and the Palestinians in a way that arose the suspicion of many Israelis, mainly from the right wing, as to the intentions of the administration.236 The answers of Israelis to questions posed to them in a survey conducted on the eve of the elections, on 15 May, led the pollster to conclude that the Israel–US relationship should worry the Labour party.237 In a debate between the two candidates for the premiership, Shimon Peres and Menachem Begin, the latter expressed concern about what he regarded as a return to the Rogers Plan and the talks in the United States about ‘homeland for the Palestinians’. Nevertheless, Begin pledged to deepen the friendship with the United States.238 The Labour, in a bid to avoid being perceived as prone to succumb to American pressure, added an article to its platform stating that while acting to pursue peace, the party would prepare the people in Israel to meet pressures and resist an imposed settlement.239 The 233 234

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President Carter to Prime Minister Rabin, 14 February 1977, ISA, FO 8452/3. Carter, Keeping Faith, locations 5191–5199; Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979), 229–231. Saul Bellow, To Jerusalem and Back (New York: Secker, 1976), 209–210. ‘Brzezinski on “Palestine”’, Maariv, 6 February 1977, 1. ‘The Corruption and the Strikes Were High in the Priority List that Will Effect the Elections – the Peace Negotiations in Decline’, Maariv, 15 May 1977, 17. ‘Peres: The Procurement Important as Advocacy; Begin: We Will Deepen the Friendship with the United States’, Maariv, 16 May 1977, 3. ‘Alon Expects Carter’s Clarifications on “Homeland” to the Palestinians’, Maariv, 25 April 1977, 3; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 25 April, No. 2873, USNA-AAD, RG 59; M. Raviv to S. Dinitz, 26 April 1977, No. 441, ISA, FO 8452/4; Arieh Kinerty, ‘Alignment Plank: Pursuit of Peace

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warning against possible American pressure did not stop Peres from using in his election campaign the words of praise president Carter bestowed on him. A photograph of Peres conferring with President Carter adorned an Alignment’s election ad.240 After winning the elections, Begin was anxious to prove that his election did not impair the relations with the United States and that he was capable of maintaining good relations with the president. And indeed, after their first meeting on 19 July, Carter was pleasantly surprised to find that he liked Begin. ‘I found him to be quite congenial, dedicated, sincere, and deeply religious’, wrote Carter in his diary. ‘He is a strong leader’, continued Carter in his observation, ‘quite different from Rabin, who is one of the most ineffective persons I’ve ever met’.241 In Israel, the consensus was that the visit was a success.242 Over time, Carter might still held to his opinion of Begin, but he would add to it some less-flattering designations. The two of them would become embroiled in sharp arguments over Israel’s peace policy. That by itself would not necessarily reflect on the personal relations between the two. In this case, though, it did. Carter came to distrust Begin and expressed disdain towards him. In his diary, he blamed Begin for misleading him and ‘breaking his word of honour to me’; described a speech Begin gave as ‘ridiculous and abusive’; and berated him as a ‘small man with limited vision’.243 Peace remained the main source of friction between Israel and the United States, but in the grand scheme of things, with all the differences between President Carter and his Republican predecessors, Carter’s attitude and policy towards Israel represented more continuity than change. That was true for both the positive and negative aspects of relations with Israel. The difference was mainly in style and emphasis,

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and Preparing the Nation to Face Pressure and Imposed Arrangement’, Davar, 4 May 1977, 1. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 6 May 1977, No. 3219, USNA-AAD, RG 59; Secretary of State to Various US Missions, 10 May 1977, No. 106078, ibid.; Davor, 13 May 1977, 28. Entry for 19 July 1977, Jimmy Carter, White House Diary [henceforth WHD] (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 71. Avi Shilon, Menachem Begin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 278. Entry for 10 January 1978, WHD, 162; Entry for 17 January 1978, ibid., 164; Entry for 30 January 1978, ibid., 167; Entry for 1 May 1978, ibid., 193.

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especially when it came to the peace process. Carter was explicit where Nixon and Ford were implicit. He articulated his views on Resolution 242, the 4 June lines, and the Palestinian and settlements issues in a clear and unequivocal fashion. It was over these issues that President Carter had the most persistent quarrels with Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Settlements and Palestinians Like his predecessors, Carter, too, thought that peace was urgent as a means to keep the Soviet Union at bay and further solidify the American position in the region. In his pursuit of peace, the president made two significant pledges. First, not to impose a settlement on the parties and second, that he would not make a linkage between the peace process and the assistance to Israel. As much as his decision hurt him, he kept his promises. Carter had a clear vision as to the peace settlement’s structure, and seeking to achieve that, he went beyond what his predecessors thought was possible. He thought that peace meant an agreement that would lead to normal relations between Israel and its neighbours, which would include trade, free movement of people, diplomatic relations, ‘and other suggestions that the Prime Minister might make’. In return, Israel would withdraw to ‘mutually agreed and recognized borders’. The settlement would also include the establishment of a Palestinian entity and security assurances. The Palestinian entity would remain demilitarized, maintaining ‘economic and social relationship with Israel’.244 This was new. No American administration so far had called for a full, contractual peace agreement that would result in robust relationships between the signatories. President Carter was the first to do so. Begin and his government appreciated President Carter’s peace structure but not its application in the West Bank. The Labour governments strongly opposed the idea of a Palestinian national entity, and with similar vigour, denied any role for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in a peace process. The Nixon and Ford administrations accepted these Israeli positions. They did not accept Israel’s 244

Message from A. Ribikoff, 19 July 1977, ISA, A 4313/1; Memorandum of Conversation, 19 July 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 52.

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right to settle the occupied territories but were lenient in their response to the Israeli settlements’ relatively low-key profile activities.245 Kissinger thought that more than the United States’, it was Israel’s problem. ‘We don’t care if Israel keeps the West Bank if it can get away with it’, he told Jewish leaders.246 The Carter administration brought about a change in attitude and policy towards the Palestinian issue and the settlements. Carter regarded the Palestinian problem as political and humanitarian issues that required a solution. He sympathized with the suffering and endurance of the refugees who were ‘mistreated’ in some of their host countries and the ‘plight’ of those under Israel control.247 In March 1977, Carter declared in a public statement that ‘there has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees’.248 The president did not speak explicitly about a Palestinian state but he viewed the Palestinian issue not as a ‘refugees’ problem,’ as stipulated in Resolution 242 but rather as a national problem. Carter even tried to bring in the PLO. The administration tried to convince the PLO to accept Resolution 242 and accept Israel’s existence, which would allow the administration to include the PLO in the peace process. All of the efforts to achieve that goal failed. Yasser ‘Arafat refused to change the organization’s attitude towards Israel.249 Grudgingly, the president honored Nixon and Kissinger’s commitment to Israel that the United States would not talk to the PLO so long as it did not recognize Israel’s right to exist in peace. He thought that the commitment was a mistake: ‘It was absolutely ridiculous’, he wrote in his diary, but he still honoured the pledge.250 245

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Memorandum of Conversation, 28 November 1975, DGFPL; Memorandum of Conversation, 31 July 1976, CIA, LOC-HAK-161-8-22-0; Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, Can We Settle This: The Role of Settlements in U.S.–Israel Relations, 1967–1981 (PhD Dissertation, University of Calgary, September 2017), 63–290; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), location 6072; Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 229–230. The Secretary’s Staff Meeting, 21 January 1974, DNSA, 1007; Memorandum of Conversation, 8 February 1974, ibid., 01023. Carter, Keeping Faith, locations 5132–5137. Answer Session at the Clinton Town Meeting, 16 March 1977, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243090. Accessed 16 June 2021. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 102–103; William Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2016), 104–106. Entry for 15 August 1979, WHD, 352.

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Carter’s interest in the Palestinian issue was borne out also from his approach to human rights. Eleanor Roosevelt was among the more prominent initiators of the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but President Carter was the first American president to incorporate human rights within American foreign policy.251 Coming from the racially divided South, Carter witnessed the end of segregation and was deeply moved by the change. By combining moral principles with deep religious faith, Carter saw it as the United State’s vocation to make human rights a fundamental principle of US foreign policy. He was determined to evaluate US relations with foreign countries based on their human rights record. This, for example, became a factor and a yardstick for US relations with the Soviet Union.252 Carter’s vision for human rights became a policy with the approval of PRM/NSC-28 Human Rights, a lengthy document that suggested definition as to the meaning of human rights and how to apply policy based on human rights criteria.253 From this perspective, Carter argued that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the measures to enforce it were ‘[c]ontrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of both our countries’. Denying the Palestinians rights of vote, assembly, debate, ownership of property, and the right of freedom from military rule was ‘an indefensible position of a free and democratic society’. Carter was determined to resolve that problem and to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem.254 One step towards a solution was to define the Israeli settlements as illegal. A Jewish delegation from Houston challenged Carter’s statement, arguing to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on 19 June 1979 that there were well-known jurists who argued that the settlements were legal. Brzezinski’s response was ‘even a murderer convicted to die in an electric chair can get an attorney to defend him’.255 251

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Itai Sneh, The Eclectic Badge of Honor: How the Carter Administration Integrated Human Rights into American Foreign Policy and to What Extent (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2003), 1–2. Carter, Keeping Faith, locations 2616–2794. PRM/NSC-28 Human Rights, 8 July 1977, www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/ assets/documents/memorandums/prm28.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2020. An elaborate discussion of PRM/NSC 28, see Sneh, The Eclectic Badge of Honor, 127–190. Carter, Keeping Faith, locations 5137–5143. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 March 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 20; Lior to Tz. Brosh, 27 June 1979, No. 2492, ISA, A 4339/8.

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Prime Minister Begin vehemently opposed Carter’s attitude and premises regarding the West Bank. He argued that Israel had a right to settle the West Bank, which he called by its biblical name, Judea and Samaria, and made three arguments in support for this right. First, he rejected the application of Resolution 242 to the West Bank, arguing that the Resolution did not call for ‘withdrawal on all fronts’. He also claimed that there was no mention of a Palestinian homeland in the Resolution. Begin stated that the clause in the Resolution about the ‘inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war’ could not be applied to Israel, as it was never charged with aggression for going to war in June 1967.256 Second, the Jews had a strong historical and religious attachment to the West Bank, and it would be inconceivable to prevent them from returning to their patrimony.257 Prime Minister Begin thought that the reference to the Jewish religious attachment to the West Bank would appeal to religious Carter, as ‘[h]e is a truly Southern Baptist. I’m told that he prays privately several times a day and that each night, before retiring, he and his wife study the Bible together’.258 Third, the West Bank was not an occupied territory at all. Jordan illegally occupied the West Bank during the 1948 War as part of its effort to destroy the newly established Jewish state (a false argument by itself ). In June 1967, Israel asked King Hussein not to join the fighting, but he did so, nonetheless. In response, Israel acted in self-defence and ‘reached the Jordan River . . . Judea and Samaria are the heart of our land, the land of our forefathers. We have a perfect right to live there and settle there’.259 Evangelicals, too, appealed to Carter’s religiosity when they urged him to support Israel’s claim to the West Bank. In a letter to the president, a group of Evangelical Christians protested on 5 June 256

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American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 13 February 1978, No. 13154, USNA-AAD, RG 59, P840137–2058; Meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Carter, 21 March 1978, ISA, A 4349/7; Second Meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Carter, 22 March 1978, ISA, A 4349/7; Entry for 22 February 1978, WHD, 173; H Bar-On to M. Dayan, 23 March 1978, No. 454, ibid.; Entry for 12 September 1978, WHD, 234–235; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 30 April 1979, No. 300952, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D790196–1048. Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the Knesset, Divrei HaKnesset, 27 July 1977, 466; Memorandum of Conversation, 17 August 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 82. Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers (London: The Toby Press, 2010), 388. Prime Minister Begin to President Carter, 6 November 1978, ISA, FO 6913/6.

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1978 against his reference to a ‘Palestinian homeland’, and suggested that Israel would hold the West Bank for religious reasons. ‘More is at stake to a Christian’, they argued. Carter’s political plan defied ‘threefold purposes of God . . . , the restoration of Israel; the consummation of the Church; and the establishment of God’s peace and justice’. As a Christian, it was the president’s duty to celebrate the restoration of God’s people in their homeland and especially in ‘the vital areas of Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, and the Golan’. Acting in accordance with God’s will would benefit ‘you and your presidency more than all the oil the Arabs will ever pump’, they promised.260 A petition signed by pastors and lay persons urged Carter, ‘as a Bible believer, to recognize by your actions and statements that God has given Israel title deed to Samaria and Judea . . . Every Bible believer knows it.’ The signatories made it clear to the president that his re-election prospects were ‘dependent on your attitude with respect to God’s word and Israel’.261 Carter, though, distinguished between religion and politics. While accepting the Jewish attachment to the land of Israel, he rejected the idea that political borders should be drawn based on the Bible.262 The debates and arguments also evolved around what was President Carter’s most conspicuous achievement in his pursuit of peace. He masterfully orchestrated the summit held in Camp David in September 1978 and the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, signed in March 1979. However, as much credit as Carter deserved, the whole process demonstrated that making peace relied foremost on the parties involved rather than on American peace plans. The preparations for Sadat’s dramatic visit in Jerusalem in November 1977 and the visit were made directly between Israeli and Egyptian officials. The United States had no part and role in the process, and it only became involved when the parties started to discuss details.263 Moreover, Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem disrupted President Carter’s plans for comprehensive peace 260 261 262

263

A Letter to President Carter, 5 June 1978, ISA, FO 8462/13. H. Leighton-Floyd to Mr. Jimmy Carter, 28 August 1978, ISA, FO 8462/15. Truda Feldman, ‘Special Interview with President Carter’, Maariv, 11 May 1979, 13. Three excellent studies, among many others, on the Israeli–Egyptian negotiations and peace agreement are Louise Fischer, The Shaping of Israel’s Foreign Policy in the Peace Negotiations with Egypt, 1973–1979 (PhD Dissertation, University of Haifa, December 2014); Quandt, Camp David; Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999).

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in the Middle East, which evolved around the Geneva Conference.264 With the creation of the Sadat–Begin channel, the administration’s peace strategy collapsed. It had to adjust itself to the changing circumstances, and fortunately, the protagonists were ready to assign a role for the United States in the process. Israel and Egypt assigned the United States the role of mediating at times of crisis, which led the United States to believe that it played a crucial and leading role in the process. Carter and his senior aides did not comprehend that it was all in the hands of the protagonists, and that they were only conduits and middlemen. For Carter and (mainly) Brzezinski, it was an American peace process, or in Brzezinski’s words, ‘our peace efforts’.265 There was a debate in Israel whether to involve the United States in the Israeli–Egyptian peace talks. Ezer Weizmann, minister of defence, thought that Israel got an opportunity to deal directly with Egypt, leaving the United States a minor role to play, if any. He also believed that the United States would take the Egyptian side at moments of crisis. As things turned out, Weizmann’s concerns were justified. At the same time, the American involvement was essential indeed, as Weizmann reluctantly admitted.266 Moshe Dayan, minister of the Foreign Office, favoured the involvement of the administration in the Israeli–Egyptian negotiations, as he thought that this was called for, considering the strong ties between Israel and the United States. He believed that Israel–US relations were indispensable, and Israel could rely on the United States militarily, economically, and politically. Dayan emphasized that point against those in Israel who viewed the United States as an enemy – Dayan’s description.267 Dayan’s way prevailed, and Carter was given a prominent role in the peace process, walking with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat along the path toward the agreement. However, the way he did that left the Israelis exasperated. They appreciated his contribution but complained that whenever the Israelis and the Egyptians disagreed, President Carter sided, in most cases, with the positions presented by Sadat.268 This was 264

265 266 267

268

Entry for 20 November 1977, WHD, 140; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 25 November 1977, No. 282029, USNA-AAD, RG 59. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 251. Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1981), 178, 308–309. Minute of a Meeting with Deputies, Foreign Office, 9 January 1979, ISA, FO 6914/3. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 24, 93.

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not an unwarranted charge. The president would criticize Sadat’s actions and positions from time to time but he accepted Sadat’s basic premises regarding the nature of the peace settlement, while disagreeing with the fundamental points upon which the Israeli position was based. Carter publicly expressed his frustration and disapproval of the Israeli position, putting him on a direct path of collision with Begin. Thus, for example, during a press conference on 26 June 1978, President Carter described Israel’s position on the peace process as ‘disappointing’.269 The Begin–Carter arguments stirred reactions from among American Jews and in Israel. On 5 June 1977, Alexander Schindler, the president of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, stated that the American Jewry would stand as one behind the Begin government. A week later, he announced, ‘We’ll fight Carter . . . Jews will not vote for him in 1980. You can’t scare the American Jews.’270 Arthur Hertzberg, the World Jewish Congress’ president, defined himself as a dove but emphasized that Carter’s plans, which he equated with the Rogers Plan, were unacceptable.271 Responding to the American Jewish leaders’ call, Jews and Israel’s supporters sent a flurry of letters to the White House denouncing the president’s support for a Palestinian homeland and Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories.272 The president’s advisors, who were close to the Jewish community, warned him of the disdain and the anger simmering among the Jews due to his attitude towards the Palestinians and the PLO. Concluding from reports of recent national Jewish organizations’ meetings and ‘numerous telephone conversations’, the advisors warned that the Jews were losing faith in President Carter.273 269

270

271

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The President’s News Conference, 26 June 1978, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ node/248967. Accessed 16 June 2021. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 10 June 1977, No. 134280, USNA-AAD, RG 59; Phillip Ben, ‘American Jews Will Fully Support Begin’s Government’, Maariv, 5 June 1977, 3; Phillip Ben, ‘We’ll Fight against Carter’, Maariv, 13 June 1977, 1. ‘Hertzberg: No Jewish Leader Will Support Carter’s Plan’, Davar, 5 June 1977, 2. Bernard Gwertzman, ‘President Is Seeking to Overcome Strong Criticism among the Israelis and Their American Supporters’, New York Times, 17 June 1977, A3; Entry for 15 December 1978, WHD, 266. E. Sanders and R. Lewis to H. Jordan and R. Liphshutz, 19 September 1977, AJA, MS 727, b. 18/1.

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Not all of the American Jews agreed with the criticism against President Carter’s position on the occupied territories and Palestinians. What was once a relatively solid wall of support behind Israel no matter what the issue was, was gradually crumbling. In the past, even when they disagreed with the Israeli government’s policy, American Jews did not make their criticism public. Things started to change in the early 1970s, when left-wing Jews attacked Israel for its ‘imperialistic alliance’ with the United States and its ‘colonial subjugation’ of the Palestinians. A prominent group among them was Breira (Alternative), founded as reaction to the 1973 October War. The group that existed until 1977 called for the establishment of a Palestinian state and the conclusion of comprehensive peace agreements with the Arab countries based on territorial concessions. The group’s importance lay not only in its message but also in the fact that it exposed the divisions within the American Jewish community.274 Now, in the wake of the Israeli–Egyptian peace process, more and more Jews argued that it was necessary to speak out in a clear voice in support for peace. Saul Bellow explained that while in the past, there were good reasons for standing as one behind the Israeli government, at present, as ‘the obstinacy’ of the Israeli government ‘thickened’, ‘open discussion became unavoidable’.275 A decade later, liberal, leftwing American Jews tried to present an alternative to AIPAC. In 2007, they established an organization, J Street, but failed to attract prominent American or Israeli politicians to its conferences. President Obama sent his national security advisor, General James L. Jones, to attend the conference, but the Israeli embassy and members of Congress who were invited declined the invitation.276

274

275 276

Marjorie Hyer, ‘U.S. Jews Beginning to Go Public in Criticism of Israel’, Washington Post, 3 May 1976, A2; Ofira Seliktar, Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and the Peace Process (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002), 37–39; Michael E. Staub, Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 280–308; Ben Ari to General Director, Foreign Office, 17 May 1976, No. 472, ISA, FO 7295/ 7; I. Shimoni to M. Arad, 1 June 1976, ibid. S. Bellow to Professor Werblowsky, 24 May 1978, ISA, FO 8463/9. Neil A. Lewis and Mark Landler, ‘A Moderate in America’s Jewish lobby Causes a Stir’, New York Times, 31 October 2009, A5. On the argument within the Jewish community over Israel, see Dov Waxman, Trouble in the Tribe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

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Still, most of the Jewish community, certainly the mainstream leadership, closed ranks behind the Israeli government, even when they had criticism against the government’s policy. American Jewish Committee’s (AJC’s) Hyman Bookbinder used a cautious tone to express his and the AJC’s criticism of Israel’s settlement policy: ‘while continuing to give Israel our full support on external matters, there are serious misgivings about some of its policies . . . Begin is not unaware of these misgivings.’277 Schindler, too, criticized Begin’s settlement policy, while publicly defending the Israeli government, refraining from letting the rift become public. Schindler believed that Israel’s strength depended on the support and unity of the American Jewish community and its standing behind Israel. Hence, the American Jews should publicly align themselves with Israel. Criticism should only be made behind closed doors.278 The American press endorsed Carter’s stance towards the settlements’ build-up. Critical reports on the Israeli settlements grew in intensity and scope even before Carter’s election and later Begin’s. In a review of the American press, Avi Pazner from the Israeli embassy in Washington reported already on 7 May 1976 that ‘in recent weeks, the media was preoccupied almost exclusively with two issues pertinent to Israel, the unrest in the West Bank and the settlements’. Pazner pointed out that the continued reports challenged the traditional Israeli argument that the Palestinians in the occupied territories were ready to live peacefully under Israeli rule. Even friendly commentators and pundits raised concern as to the impact of the settlements on the peace process.279 In the next days, weeks, and months Pazner continued feeding the Foreign Office similar reports about critical reports and editorials in American newspapers regarding the Israeli policy in the occupied territories, especially regarding the settlements.280 The Israeli 277

278 279 280

Quotation in Sol Stern, ‘Menachem Begin vs. the Jewish Lobby’, New York Magazine, 24 April 1978, 60. Stern, ‘Menachem Begin vs. the Jewish lobby,’ 61–62. A. Pazner to S. Argov, 7 May 1976, No. 99, ISA, FO 8479/8. A Pazner to Office, Jerusalem, 11 May 1976, No. 265, ISA, FO 8479/8; A. Pazner to S. Argov, 11 May 1976, No. 192, ibid.; A. Pazner to Office, Jerusalem, 12 May 1976, No. 311, ibid.; A. Pazner to Office, Jerusalem, 17 May 1976, No. 463, ibid., A 281/19; A. Pazner to S. Argov, 21 May 1976, No. 413, ibid., FO 8479/8; General Director, Foreign Office to Foreign Minister, 10 June 1976, No. 224, ibid., FO 8440/5; A. Pazner to US Division, 10 January 1978, No. 99, ISA, FO 8463/4; Navon to S. Arad, 23 January 1978,

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diplomats tried to reverse the tide by complaining to the newspaper editors about the reports. The editors explained the reasons for the critical publications, and one stood out above the others. The editor stated that he and his colleagues viewed Israel as a very close state and akin to the United States, an ‘almost the 51st state’. As such, the editors expected from Israel higher standards and were disappointed when these were not met.281 The president’s advisors argued over the degree of pressure the United States should exert on Israel to stop the settlements’ build-up. Brzezinski and Vance recommended that the president act forcefully.282 The more politically oriented Vice President Mondale and Jordan Hamilton, Carter’s chief of staff, thought that the president should be more subtle.283 However, the president tied his own hands when he promised, more than once, that ‘there never will be an agonizing reappraisal’, a reference to Ford’s re-assessment. Carter pledged that he would never make a linkage between the American military and economic aid to Israel and the peace process, and he kept his promise.284 It seemed that President Carter also reckoned that this was a fight he had a good chance of losing, and losing would be more costly than a victory’s gains. The resistance in the United States to Carter’s attacks on Israel because of the settlements were not limited to one group. The steadfast standing of the Israeli government and the public seemed to convince the president that it would be better not to push Israel too hard. President Carter would make his views known, but he would refrain from going beyond that. The most that he would

281 282

283 284

No. 276, ibid., A 7380/10; A. Pazner to US Division, 30 January 1978, No. 421, ibid.; Terence Smith, ‘Israel Is Said to Have Altered Dayan Pledge to Carter on Settlements’, New York Times, 31 January 1978; A. Pazner to S. Arad, 1 February 1978, No. 20, ISA, A 7380/10; ‘Settlements or Settlement?’ Washington Post, 2 February 1978, A18; A. Pazner to S. Arad, 3 February 1978, No. 30, ibid.; S. Dinitz to M. Dayan, 3 February 1978, No. 81, ibid., FO 8464/5; A. Pazner to Office, Jerusalem, 11 February 1978, No. 223, ibid., A 7380/10; A. Pazner to S. Arad, 8 March 1978, No. 139, ibid., FO 8463/4; A. Pazner to Office, Jerusalem, 13 June 1979, No. 7389, ibid., FO 8463/1; ‘Will Israelis Speak Up?’ Christian Science Monitor, 5 June 1979. A. Pazner to S. Argov, 21 May 1976, No. 413, ISA, FO 8479/8. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 87–99, 251; S. Dinitz to E. Evron, 24 February 1978, No. 447, ISA, A 4173/4. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 88, 97–98. Tz. Rafiach to General Director, Foreign Office, 6 July 1977, No. 160, ISA, FO 5988/13; White House Meeting with Jewish Leaders, 6 July 1977, ibid., FO 8454/6; S. Dinitz to M. Dayan, 12 October 1977, No. 198, ibid., FO 6862/7.

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do was to order the American representative to the Security Council to abstain from a vote against the settlements.285 Another minor measure demonstrating the administration’s disapproval of the settlements was the prohibition on the use of benefits and grants provided by the US–Israel Binational Fund for Research and Development to entrepreneurs acting in the occupied territories (President Donald Trump receded the ban in October 2020).286 The IRS waived the exemption from tax to donations aimed at the settlements.287 Another source of funding that was banned in the Occupied Territories was the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). Since 1973, the State Department’s MRA Account provided Israel with assistance for the settlement of migration to Israel. Between 1973 and 1991, the United States gave Israel about $460 million to help resettle Jewish refugees. However, Israel was forbidden from using the funds in the occupied territories.288 Thus, the American mild and feeble reaction certainly did not deter Israel and did not stop the settlement project. Administration after administration protested, objected, and made statements – but none of them went any further. Israel had never had to face the consequences of its actions in the occupied territories, at least not in the United States. It was not only because of the Jewish lobby. It was also because Israel had counterarguments that members of Congress, for example, were ready to listen to. The members of Congress agreed that security considerations justified the establishment of settlements even though they argued that not all of the settlements were built for security reasons.289

285

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287 288 289

Memorandum from Robert Hunter of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 17 July 1979, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 9, Doc. 267; US Mission, New York to Secretary of State, 25 July 1979, No. 252232, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D790341–0981. S. Belkind to Y. Horowitz, 8 November 1977, ISA, FO 8464/5; US Embassy, Jerusalem, Press Release, 28 October 2020, https://il.usembassy.gov/u-s-israelexpand-reach-of-binational-foundations-and-establish-new-scientific-andtechnological-cooperation-agreement/. Accessed 29 November 2020. Nehoshtan to US Division, 7 August 1979, No. 3145, ISA, FO 8464/11. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 25, 27. E. Evron to Y. Ciechanover, 14 June 1979, No. 8092, ISA, FO 8463/1; Tz. Rafiach to Y. Ciechanover, 21 June 1979, No. 8160, ibid.

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The president was surprised by the strong response of the American Jewish community to his attacks on Israel’s settlement policy and by the ‘widespread and spontaneous concern of the grass-roots level’. He was mainly worried by the presentation of his criticism as an all-out attack against Israel, which was never his intention. The president met with Jewish leaders, hoping to allay their fears ‘without compromising administration policy’ and convince the American Jews that his peace terms fit the Israeli demands.290 The president promised the Jewish leaders that he was deeply devoted to Israel, and all he was trying to do was to improve Israel’s security and well-being.291 In a meeting with members of Congress, the president stated, ‘I’d rather commit suicide politically or otherwise than betray Israel’.292 Sometimes, the meetings seemed to work. One participant noted that the meeting gave him ‘what my children call “good vibes”’. He believed that the president and the other speakers cared and understood ‘Israel’s safety, security, yearnings, aspirations, and fears’.293

Economic and Industrial Aid While the confrontations between the Carter administration and Israel left a significant public impact, they represented only the tip of the 290

291

292

293

E. Sanders to H. Jordan and R. Lipshutz, the White House, 1 July 1977, AJA, MS 727, b. 18/2; H. Jordan to President Carter, 6 July 1977, ibid.; White House Meeting with Jewish Leaders, 6 July 1977, ISA, FO 8454/6; Memorandum for the Files of a Meeting with President Carter, 7 July 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 49; S. Dinitz to General Director, Foreign Office, 10 July, No. 135, ISA, ibid.; M. Raviv to General Director, Foreign Office, 14 July, ibid. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 March 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 21; Bar-On to E. Evron, 18 March 1977, No. 361, ISA, FO 8452/4; J. J. Shestack to E. Winter, 22 March 1977, AJA, MS 727, b. 18/2; B. Navon to S. Avineri, 28 March 1977, No. 524, ISA, FO 8452/4; Report on Meeting at the White House, 23 March 1977, AJA, MS 272, b. 13/1; B. Navon to E. Evron, 25 March 1977, No. 482, ISA, FO 8452/4; Bar-On to E. Evron, 25 March 1977, No. 483, ibid.; Memorandum of Conversation, 16 May 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 34; Entry for 8 February 1978, WHD, 171; T. R. Mann to A. D. Chernin, 9 February 1978, ISA, A 7380/10; Entry for 9 May 1978, WHD, 194; Navon to S. Arad, 14 February 1978, No. 259, ISA, FO 8464/5; S. Dinitz to E. Evron, 24 February 1978, No. 447, ibid., A 4173/4. Notes from Meeting with President Carter, 6 October 1977, ibid., FO 8454/7; Tz. Rafiach to General Director, Foreign Office, 7 October 1977, ibid.; Tz. Rafiach to General Director, Foreign Office, 30 October 1977, No. 460, ibid. J. L. Weinberg to E. Sanders, 11 April 1977, AJA, MS 272, b. 13/1.

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iceberg that obscured the true nature of Israel–US relations. The main body of the iceberg laid beneath the water, not visible to the public, but this was the place where the relationships between the two nations were thriving. Thus, the cooperation between the two countries on various issues continued unhindered, as was the case with the exchange of intelligence on captured Soviet weapons and the performance of American military equipment in actual combat conditions. The Americans appreciated the cooperation, which they considered essential to R&D in the United States.294 The Americans helped to advance Israeli industry by continuing the initiatives suggested by the American–Israeli Council for Industrial Research and Development. On 6 May 1977, Israeli and American officials met in Washington, DC, to discuss a plan for raising American capital for industrial research and development in Israel. Following the discussions, the US–Israel Binational Industrial Research and Development (BIRD) was established with a $60 million endowment, each country contributed half of this total. BIRD’s objective was to promote and support non-defensive industrial research and development activities. The primary beneficiary from the agreement was the Israeli industrialists, as the United States had much more to offer to the Israelis in terms of market and technology than the other way around. Acting to achieve one of BIRD’s goals, the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry was busy reaching out to the American market through government-sponsored channels and networks established by the private industry.295 Another joint Israeli–American initiative was the Binational Agricultural Research and Development (BARD) fund, offering grants and loans to support agricultural research and development. The agreement for its establishment was signed on 25 October 1977, with each government contributing $40 million to the fund.296 During its 294 295

296

Talking Paper, 14 January 1977, DNSA, 2160. E. Raf to Ministry of Finance, 6 May 1977, No. 120, ISA, FO 8443/16; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 13 May 1977, No. 108275, USNA-AAD, RG 59; New Release, 18 May 1977 ibid.; E. Raf to General Director, Ministry of Finance, 18 May 1977, No. 320, ISA, FO 8443/16; Y. Cohen to D. Rotlevy, 4 September 1979, ibid., FO 8464/11; Lior Yahalomi, Promoting International Cooperation As a Strategy for Economic Development: A Case Analysis of Israeli and U.S. High-Technology Partnerships (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1991), 95. E. Raf to General Director, Ministry of Finance, 2 September 1977, No. 60, ISA, FO 8443/16; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State,

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first three years of existence, the fund supported 160 projects out of 380 submitted by Israeli and American institutions. The fund’s success led its management to increase it by $20 million.297 In November 1978, Joseph A. Califano Jr, the United States secretary of HEW, visited Israel and signed an MoU on education aimed at advancing joint projects and exchanges in education.298 The MoU expired in 1982 and was not resumed. The Israeli government invited the American secretary of HEW several times to Israel to renew the MoU, but the visit did not transpire. Discussing the renewal of the MoU, the American culture attaché in the American embassy suggested in 1986 the intensification of American studies in Israeli high schools, beyond the part allocated to it in the regular history curriculum. The Ministry of Education endorsed the idea, and the American embassy donated $40,000 to support the project. Teachers would be trained in Israeli universities, and six senior educators would be sent to American universities to acquire skills necessary for creating a national plan to disseminate and deepen American studies in high schools. The programme would begin in four schools, one of which would be Arab.299 The MoU had not been renewed, but one of its programmes continued to operate. As part of the MoU, the American Department of Education provided funds for American schools to hold seminars on Israeli history. The department continued to sponsor the seminars even after the expiration of the MoU. Graduates of the seminars, American teachers, not necessarily Jews, prepared a programme titled Ancient and Modern Israel, which was taught in 120 high schools, and eight colleges across the United States during 1987.300 The Carter administration also continued the appropriation of generous economic aid to Israel. Carter received an inheritance of a military aid package totalling $1 billion, half in grant, and $500 million

297 298

299

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28 October 1977, No. 8465, USNA-AAD, RG 59; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 10 February 1978, No. 36205, ibid. Y. Avni to M. Arens, 2 March 1982, ISA, FO 9345/1. American Consul, Jerusalem to Secretary of State, 15 November 1978, No. 151733, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D780470–0565. A. Shoval to Minister of Education and Culture, 1 December 1986, ISA, GL 18681/1; Ministry of Education and Culture, the Spokesman Office, 24 June 1987, ibid., GL 18681/4. L. Chian, Senior Program Officer to A. Shoval, 7 November 1986, ISA, GL 18681/1.

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Supporting Assistance from the departing administration. These figures were not final, and the Carter administration could change them.301 As a goodwill gesture and seeking to create a favourable political atmosphere towards Secretary Vance’s visit to Israel, the administration decided to add to the Supporting Assistance $285 million.302 Eventually, Israel received even more than suggested. It received in 1977 nearly $2.5 billion, $845 million in civic assistance, and $635 million in military aid.303 For 1978, the president planned to give Israel $1 billion for military purchases and $785 million in economic aid. About half of these figures were grants.304 Israel also expected American economic aid that would compensate for the assets and property that were lost due to the Israeli–Egyptian peace agreement. The support was needed, especially given the deterioration of the economic situation in Israel. The Begin government liberalized the Israeli market, shifting it almost without restraint to an open capitalist market. The move was made shabbily and recklessly, and the result was inflation and an increase in the deficit and the balance of payments.305 The growing economic difficulties, the evacuation of the military bases in the Sinai, and the need to rebuild bases led the Israeli government to ask for additional financial assistance from the Carter administration. The Americans did not turn down the Israeli requests. They proposed a package that included $3 billion over three years to construct two airbases in the Negev and assist in meeting other relocation or equipment purchase expenses. It totalled nearly $4.9 billion for 1979 in military and economic aid.306 The administration also provided Israel support for the absorption of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union at $10–15 million and in food surpluses of

301 302

303 304

305

306

M. Bavli to M. Raviv, 19 January 1977, ISA, FO 8443/15. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 4 February 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 8, Doc. 3; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 8 February 1977, No. 964, USNA-AAD, RG 59. Points for Attention, 15 February 1977, ISA, FO 8443/16. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Cairo, 11 March 1977, No. 54188, USNA-AAD, RG 59. Moshe Foxman, ‘Thirty Years to the Economic Change’, The Marker, 29 October 2007, www.themarker.com/markets/1.461291. Accessed 22 April 2020. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 22.

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$7 million.307 The Senate’s Subcommittee on Appropriations added $40 million for BARD.308 Israel also got ‘substantial quantities’ of additional military equipment to modernize the IDF. These included 600 AIM 9L air-to-air missiles, 600 Maverick missiles, 200 M60 A3 tanks, 200 M109 Howitzers, 14 Phalanx gun systems, and Harpoons. In addition, the United States accelerated the shipment of F-16, so the first planes would arrive in January 1980, rather than October 1981, as originally agreed. In recognition of ‘the high degree of proficiency in the Israeli research development and military production communities’, the United States signed with Israel a memorandum of agreement for cooperative research and development and Military Procurement. The agreement would remove barriers so Israeli companies could compete in the American defence market and would allow augmented research and development exchange between the two countries.309 More evidence of the Carter administration’s attitude towards Israel was the agreement the two countries signed on mutual reduction of customs on 6 February 1979, in Jerusalem. The agreement provided an average decrease of nearly 70 per cent of the customs on about 620 major export items out of 800. The Israeli exporters would save about $15 million a year and were expected to increase the level of export to the United States. That indeed happened, and Israeli exports to the United States increased in subsequent years. In 1981, the value of Israel’s export to the United States was $1.27 billion, a 30 per cent increase from the 1980s’ $977 million. The government trade centre projected further growth in 1982, to be $1.4–1.5 billion. The main component of the exported items was no less impressive. In addition to

307

308 309

E. Raf to Office, Jerusalem, 12 July 1978, No. 154, ISA, FO 8464/7; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 26 August 1978, No. 11004, USNAAAD, RG 59, P850070–1560; Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to President Carter, 30 August 1978 FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 9, Doc. 18. Senator T. F. Eagleton to S. Dinitz, 25 September 1978, ISA, FO 8464/8. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 20 March 1979, No. 69017, USNA-AAD, RG 59, D790128–0343; E. Evron to M. Rosen, 4 April 1979, ISA, FO 6834/1; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 6 August 1979, No. 1154, USNA-AAD, RG 59, P840090–2491; A. Pazner to US Division, 7 August 1979, No. 3141, ISA, FO 8462/2.

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the mainstay of export, cut diamonds, and electrical products, Israel also exported medical scanners and telecommunication equipment.310 Confrontational rhetoric aside, Israel–US special relations continued to thrive also during President Carter’s tenure.

President Ronald Reagan During the 1980 presidential campaign, Max Fisher met with President Nixon, and the two discussed Ronald Reagan’s attitude towards Israel. Nixon was unequivocal: ‘of all the presidents since 1948, Ronald Regan had the strongest emotional commitment to the Jewish state’.311 Even if this was hyperbole, it was certainly not a complete exaggeration. As then Israel’s foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir testified, ‘[i]t was clear that he liked us’.312 Reagan had shown his sympathy and attachment to and with Israel already when he was a governor. During the Six-Day War, Reagan organized a sizeable rally in Hollywood in support for Israel.313 In 1971, he signed a law authorizing banks and savings institutions to invest in Israel bonds. Reagan was honoured at a Bonds dinner in Los Angeles in recognition of his contribution.314 Reagan had made Jewish friends during his days as an actor in Hollywood. ‘Reagan was the first Republican president since Teddy Roosevelt to count Jews among his personal friends’, wrote Jeffrey Goldberg315 While President Reagan did not have a dedicated person serving as liaison with the Jewish community in the White House, he had Jews around him who did just that. George Klein, United Jewish Appeal director, vice president, and co-chairman of the Coalition to Elect Reagan-Bush in 1980, was one of these people. Thus, for example, Klein took an active role in trying to improve the relations

310

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313 314

315

Y. Cohen to E. Rubinstein, 12 February 1979, ISA, FO 8464/9; ‘Israel’s Export to US Climbed 30 percent Last Year’, Wall Street Journal, 17 June 1982, 34. Golden, Quiet Diplomat, 424. Deborah H. Strober and Gerald S. Strobe, The Raegan Presidency: An Oral History of the Era (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2003), 146. M. Ravid to M. Bitan, 14 March 1968, No. 219, ISA, FO 4155/6. Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 243–244. Jonathan J. Goldberg, Jewish Power (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996), 214.

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between the president and the Jewish community in the wake of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) affair (see later).316 Reagan’s support for Israel was based on idealism and interests. He genuinely appreciated the similarities between the United States and Israel. Both were democracies, and both were unique in being a melting pot, the destination for people from around the world in pursuit of freedom. Reagan also cherished Israel, which was ‘the Holy Land to a great many of us’. All of these led him to almost instinctively endorse the Israeli narrative as to the meaning and nature of the Israeli–Arab conflict. The tale that he recounted in his memoirs of the history of the Jewish people and Israel could have easily adorned any propaganda book about Israel. While acknowledging the plight of the Palestinians who became refugees with the establishment of the state of Israel, Reagan traced the origin of the Jewish claim to Palestine – the land of Israel – to biblical times, when ‘a great Hebrew civilization blossomed . . . and flourished’ in its ancient home, until ‘the Jews were overrun by successive armies’. Zionism appeared in reaction to European anti-Semitism, and the Jews asserted ‘their right to reclaim this ancient territory as a national homeland’. With the establishment of the state of Israel, ‘the Arab world declared war on Israel’. Three times, in 1948, 1967, and 1973, ‘the tiny new country courageously drove back its enemies. Throughout its brief history, Israel has had to live in a perpetual state of war as the constant target of Palestinian terror, a small country fighting for the acceptance of neighbors sworn to destroy it.’ As he described Israel’s retreat from the Sinai as part of the peace agreement with Egypt, his sympathy for Israel is evident in every word: ‘These were occupied territories taken from other countries, yes; but Israel had won the Sinai during a war started by the other countries. In giving it up, Israel would surrender a strategically buffer between itself and enemies sworn to destroy it.’ Reagan sympathized with the Israeli settlers who were evacuated as part of the peace agreement: ‘it would be giving up territory where Israeli settlers since 1967 had built homes, cultivated farms, built schools, raised families’.317 Those Carter dismissed with contempt, Reagan appreciated for their work. 316

317

U. Bar-Ner to US Division, 18 December 1981, No. 674-105, ISA, FO 8466/6; Nicholas Laham, Crossing the Rubicon: Ronald Reagan and US Policy in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2004), 3–16. Reagan, An American Life, 407–408, 420.

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Reagan was as close as a president could possibly be to being a Christian Zionist, which could be explained by his association with the American Evangelicals, particularly with the Christian right. In August 1980 in Dallas, Reagan told to a gathering of 15,000 Christian leaders, among them Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and the president of the Southern Baptist Convention – all staunch supporters of Israel – ‘I know you can’t endorse me, but I want you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing’. Reagan was referring mainly to domestic politics and issues such as abortion, the sexual revolution, communism, and moral decay, and hailed a new moral vision for the nation as a ‘shining city upon a hill’.318 However, Reagan shared the Evangelical view of history and Israel’s place in it. Reagan read with great enthusiasm Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth and argued in 1971 that with the foundation of Israel and the development of nuclear weapons, the stage for the final battle was ready. ‘For the first time ever, everything is in place for the battle of Armageddon and the Second Coming of Christ’, he stated.319 On the eve of the conclusion of the negotiations on the Israeli–Lebanese peace agreement in 1983, the NSC discussed the Syrian intransigence. In his diary, Reagan wrote that ‘Syria is poisoning the well’, and that the possibility of war between Israel and Syria ‘plus Soviet’ seemed plausible. And then the president wrote, ‘Armageddon in the prophecies begins with the gates of Damascus being assailed’.320 It is unclear whether the president considered Armageddon a real option, or whether he was just contemplating. However, given his record on this issue, it seems that the first option was more likely. Along with his view of Israel’s role in the apocalypse, Reagan also accepted the Covenant approach, which holds that those who benefit Israel would be benefitted. In a meeting with Jerry Falwell, the reverend told the president that ‘God deals with nations in regard to how those nations deal with Israel . . . So, if there is one thing that you as a president must never compromise, it is our commitment to Israel.’ The president’s answer, according to Falwell, was ‘I believe that’.321 Reagan shared many values with the Evangelicals. Supporting Israel was one of these values. 318 320

321

319 Williams, God’s Own Party, 187. McAlister, Epic Encounters, 177. Entry for 4 May 1983, The Reagan Diaries (edited by Douglas Brinkley) (London: Harper Press, 2007), 149. Strober and Strobe, The Raegan Presidency, 189.

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Like presidents before him, Reagan regarded the Holocaust as a primary reason for Israel’s existence, justifying Israel’s deep security concerns. Reagan was exposed during his military service to films shot at the concentration camps during their liberation by American troops. The images in the films of the concertation camps’ survivals and the dead ‘engraved images on my mind that will be there forever’.322 The Holocaust also explained President Reagan’s relations with Prime Minister Begin. He admitted that he ‘had many difficulties’ with Begin, but ‘my heart went out especially to Begin . . . As a survivor and near victim of the Holocaust, he knew from personal experience the depth of the hatred and viciousness that can be directed at Jews simply because they are Jews.’323 Reagan’s sympathy and closeness to Israel were also influenced by the emergence of neoconservatism - the neocons - in American society and politics. The neocons, many of whom were Jews converted from communism and liberalism, made their initial appearance already in the 1940s, but gained momentum and became a prominent movement in the 1960s.324 Still, its main sway was limited to intellectual and elite circles, at least until the late 1970s. Then, while having strong social and economic agendas, the neocons had also developed a stand on foreign policy, which was vehemently anti-Communist. In 1980, prominent neocons such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Ben Wattenberg, Elliot Abrams, Max Kampelman, and Elmo Zumwalt still acted within the Democratic party. They became disenchanted with President Carter’s Cold War policy and turned away from the Democratic party. The neocons were directly involved in Reagan’s election campaign, and many of them joined his administration.325 There was one more thing they shared, their support for Israel. They had that reputation, but the neocons did not shape Reagan’s thinking and policy. Reagan was a neocon in the way he saw and understood the world, and he invited them to take part in carrying out 322 324

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323 Reagan, An American Life, 99. Reagan, An American Life, 420–421. Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 28ff. Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution, 151–153; Alexander M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 71; Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 397–398.

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a policy that the president wanted to see implemented. The neocons were not driving American foreign policy to where they wanted it to go; they executed a policy shaped by the man in charge of making the decisions. It was another senior member of the administration who accurately phrased what was a fundamental value of American foreign policy. In justification of the American initiation of the war coalition against Iraq in 1990–1991, Secretary of State James Baker wrote, ‘like George Bush, I was of a generation that embraced wholeheartedly the concept of Pax Americana, an America engaged as a force for creative and obstructive change around the world’.326 Reagan’s neocons were the right people to implement such a policy. Despite Carter’s excellent record in his overall attitude towards Israel, perceptions were stronger than reality. Carter received only 45 per cent of the Jewish vote, slightly more than the president got from the general public (41 per cent). Reagan’s rhetoric seemed more convincing, and 50 per cent of the Jews voted for him in 1980, an unprecedented level of Jewish support for a Republican candidate, and significantly more than the general public voted for Reagan – 41 per cent. Things changed in 1984 when he endorsed the fundamentalist Moral Majority during his election campaign. That worried Jews, and despite Reagan’s excellent record of support for Israel, only 30 per cent of the Jews voted for him. In an NBC TV exit poll on election day, 20 per cent of the Jewish voters said that ‘the support for the fundamentalist Moral Majority for Mr. Reagan was a key factor in their support’ of the Democrat candidate.327 A poll conducted by the AJC in 1984 found that about 46 per cent of the American Jews believed that ‘most’ or ‘many’ fundamentalists were anti-Semitics.328 And there was one more lesson from the results of the elections – the prime reason for the American Jews voting for candidates was American domestic politics, and less their attitude towards Israel. This was especially true when considering that the Jews never had to make a choice between a pro- and anti-Israel candidates.

326 327

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Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 276. John Dillin, ‘Jewish Voters Remain Consistently Loyal to Democratic Party’, The Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 1987, 5. Naomi Cohen, ‘Natural Adversaries or Possible Allies? American Jews and the New Christian Right’, AJC, January 1993, 14; ‘U.S. Presidential Election: Jewish Voting Record,’ Jewish Virtual Library.

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Reagan’s prime lieutenants were divided over their attitude towards Israel. Alexander M. Haig, Jr, Reagan’s first secretary of state was a staunch supporter of Israel. Haig emphasized especially Israel’s strategic importance for the United States, arguing that the special relations between Israel and the United States were based not only on ‘moral grounds’ but also on strategic consideration. As ‘the strongest military power in the Middle East’, Israel served as a deterrence against Soviet aggression, stated Haig.329 Reagan’s secretary of defence, Casper Weinberger, was more forbidding in his attitude towards Israel. He had no prior affiliation with Israel and gained his knowledge of the Middle East through his association with a company called Bechtel Corporation, which operated in the Gulf states between 1975 and 1980. His work at the corporation brought him into contact with the leaders of these countries, and since the company had no business dealings with Israel, he knew no one there. Weinberger’s experience affected his geostrategic views. As secretary, he became one of the more Arabists among America’s foreign policymakers, seeking to use his ties with the Gulf Arab leaders and Saudi Arabia to advance American interests there. Weinberger did not initiate the controversial arms sales to Saudi Arabia that brought the administration to a direct clash with the American Jewish community and Israel in 1981 – the AWACS affair – it was the Carter administration that started the whole thing – but he pursued the arms deal vigorously, refusing to cave to Jewish and Israeli pressures.330 The American Jews and the Israelis were convinced that Weinberger was anti-Israeli. Eitan Haber, a consultant of Yitzhak Rabin, minister of defence (1984–1988), made a simple division: ‘Weinberger was the bad guy; Reagan was the good guy’.331 Weinberger denied the allegations. On 13 May 1983, he told the AJC that the claims that he ‘personally, have some animus against Israel’ were false. ‘I want to say, as forcefully as I can, that this is simply not true.’332 Speaking in 329

330

331 332

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Closing Address at Banquet in Honor of H. Irwin Levy, 26 October 1979, ISA, FO 9356/10; Knei-Tal to US Division, 15 January 1981, No. 182, ibid.; Lior to US Division, 16 January 1981, 10:55am, ibid. Robert Howard Wieland, Direct Responsibility: Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi, December 2013), 19, 21, 172. Strober and Strobe, The Raegan Presidency, 196–197. Quotation in Wieland, Direct Responsibility, 174.

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public on Israeli–US relations – which he did scarcely – Weinberger repeated the regular rhetoric about the two nations’ closeness. Talking with the American Jewish Press Association in May 1984, Weinberger said that the ties between Israel and the United States were based on more than strategic interests. ‘We are bound by other ties. We are both democracies. We share a heritage of freedom and a pioneering spirit. We have strong religious, cultural, even family ties between our two nations’, he said.333 The fact that he said that during an election year to representatives of the American Jewish press can raise some suspicion as to Weinberger’s motive and intentions. Most likely, Weinberg was not anti-Israeli, but he did not condone the favourable attitude towards Israel. Like many before him, Weinberg thought that the United States should be more even-handed in its treatment of the Arab countries and Israel. He argued that bringing the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia closer to the United States also served Israel’s security, as Israel could not rely exclusively on money or arms for its security, but must develop friendly relationships with its neighbours, and he was not the first to make this point. The secretary was hoping that America’s good relations with Arab states would make it easier to bring them closer to Israel. He had no intention to ‘undermine the Israeli–American alliance at all’, but to create the conditions that would allow Israel to live in peace with at least some of its neighbours.334

From Crisis to Crisis It is rather ironic that the administration many considered as one of the friendliest towards Israel would get into some bitter fights with Israel. During the first year and a half of the Reagan administration, the two governments moved from crisis to crisis, straining the relations

333

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Remarks by Secretary Weinberger to American Jewish Press Association, 23 May 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library [henceforth RRPL], Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency File, b. 3. Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 19 November 2002, Washington, DC, Miller Center of Public Affairs, Presidential Oral History Program [henceforth POHP], http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2002_1119_ weinberger.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2021.

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between Israel and the United States in an almost unprecedented manner. This strain was caused partly by measures taken by the United States and partly by Israel. And one prime reason for the strain was the personality of Israel’s prime minister, Menachem Begin. His reactions, too, exacerbated the situation in an unprecedented manner. The first crisis arose as a result of the administration’s intention to supply Saudi Arabia with AWACS aircraft. The Israelis strongly objected to the sale of the AWACS and got a lot of help from the Jewish community and Congress in the fight against the deal.335 The struggle in Congress did not foretell its conclusion, as during the months of debate, from April to October, Senate and House committees, as well as the House, all voted against the deal. It was only in the very last vote in the Senate plenum that the president managed to tilt the scales, with fifty-two senators voting in favor of the deal, against forty-eight senators who voted against it.336 The administration insisted that the deal would serve American national interests, without impairing Israeli security interests. In the midst of the crisis, Secretary Haig wrote to Prime Minister Begin that ‘a close strategic partnership’ existed between the two states, and that the administration recognized ‘the fundamental strategic value of Israel, the strongest and most stable friend and ally we have in the Middle East’.337 Despite the Israeli defeat, the struggle over the AWACS demonstrated the extent of congressional support for Israel. Vote after vote, members of the House and Senate raised their hands in favour of the Israeli position. It was only after the president had cast the full force of his weight and personally pressed dozens of senators, and only after he had made explicit promises that aimed to ensure that the planes would not pose a security threat to Israel, that he managed to change the minds of a few senators. This was a personal achievement for the 335

336

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Geoffrey Kemp to Richard Allen, 30 March 1981, RRPL, Kemp, Geoffrey File, RAC, b. 4; Avilea to Foreign Minister Office, 2 April 1981, No. 73/13, ISA, FO 6872/7; N. Perlmutter to ADL National Commission, 14 April 1981, ibid., FO 8466/16; ‘Jewish Republicans Deplore Saudi Sale’, Los Angeles Times, 4 September 1981, B15; Reagan, An American Life, 411–412. ‘Senate AWACS Roll Call’, Los Angeles Times, 29 October 1981, B9. On the AWACS deal and the fight over it, see Nicholas Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America’s Competing Interests in the Middle East (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002). Secretary of State Haig to Prime Minister Begin, 10 July 1981, ISA, FO 9356/ 10.

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president, but it also demonstrated that both houses, not just the Senate – the traditional hub of Israel supporters – stood by Israel, and that the members of Congress were ready to engage the president head-on. The AWACS affair taught the administration that the Jewish lobby could be a forbidding antagonist, as it could be a formidable friend.338 The campaign marked ‘the end of AIPAC’s national obscurity and the beginning of a revolution in Jewish politics’. The American people were exposed to AIPAC and the Jewish lobby in an unprecedented manner. AIPAC’s budget rocketed, for example, from $750,000 in 1978 to $6.1 million in 1987 just to cover pro-Israel issues.339 An example of AIPAC’s rising power was the president’s request for assistance from the organization in congressional matters that were not related to Israel. Recognizing AIPAC ties and connections with Congress members, mainly Democrats, Reagan enlisted AIPAC’s help with bills that the administration had difficulties passing. Presidents had employed that practice before. This happened during the Nixon administration, when Congress raised obstacles to the administration’s ability to supply foreign military aid. The administration reached out to the Jewish lobby to exercise its influence on Congress to eliminate its objections. Reagan did so again, when he encountered opposition in Congress over his policies in places like Central America or subSaharan Africa. AIPAC intervened, telling Democratic members of Congress that helping the president on these issues would secure American support for Israel. Usually, it worked well.340 *** While the AWACS crisis raged on, the next crisis transpired. On 7 June 1981, Israeli F-16s attacked and destroyed an Iraqi reactor near Baghdad.341 The president dismissed the Israeli claim that the attack was an act of self-defence, a pre-emptive measure, since the plant was meant to be used against Israel.342 However, he also understood the 338 339

340 341

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Goldberg, Jewish Power, 213. Hendrick Smith, The Power Game (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 217; Edward Tivnan, The Lobby (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 138. Goldberg, Jewish Power, 214. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 7 June 1981, No. 9059, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 37. Entry for 9 June 1981, Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 24; ‘Israel Bombs Iraqi A-Reactor; U.S. Protests Attack: U.S.-Built Aircraft Used in Raid Outside

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reasons for the Israeli attack and justified it, ‘Iraq is technically at war with Israel, and I believe [the Iraqis] were preparing to build an atom bomb’.343 After nearly ten days of public silence, the president said that in his own voice in a press conference, ‘I do think that one has to recognize that Israel had a reason for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has never signed a cease-fire or recognized Israel as a nation, . . . It does not even recognize the existence of Israel as a country.’ In his diary, he wrote that Saddam Hussein ‘was trying to build a nuclear weapon. He called for the destruction of Israel and he wants to be the leader of the Arab world.’344 Reagan, displaying public dismay over the incident, and especially of the use of American planes, suspended the supply of F-16 jets to Israel for a short period of time, and supported a Security Council resolution denouncing the Israeli attack. But he did that just as a ‘show of displeasure’. All in all, as the president confided in his diary and later in his memoirs, ‘I sympathized with Begin’s motivation, and privately believed that we should give him the benefit of the doubt’.345 ‘We did the minimum we could do under our law’, almost apologized the president to Ambassador Ephraim Evron, and emphasized that the United States was neither re-evaluating nor re-assessing its relations with Israel.346 At the end of February 1991, when Operation Desert Storm was over, Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney placed a phone call to David Ivry, who was the IAF commander at the time the attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant took place. Cheney thanked him for destroying the plant. ‘Without Israel’s courageous action, we may well have had to face a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein in 1991’, wrote Cheney in his memoirs.347 The next crisis occurred in December 1981, when the Israeli government voted for Begin’s suggestion to apply Israeli law over the Golan

343 344

345 346

347

Baghdad’, Los Angeles Times, 8 June 1981, B1; Harold Jackson, ‘White House Anger at Surprise Raid’, The Guardian, 9 June 1981, 1. Entry for 10 June 1981, The Reagan Diary, 24. Entry for 11 June 1981, The Reagan Diary, 25; The President’s News Conference, 16 June 1981, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/247092. Accessed 16 June 2021. Reagan, An American Life, 413. Memorandum of Conversation, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Subject File, b. 48. Dick Cheney, In My Time (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011) 227.

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Heights.348 The resolution came as a surprise to the president, which he resented. When the crisis over the attack on the Iraqi plant had passed, the president assumed – or better said, hoped – that Israel would not surprise the United States and would not take unilateral measures without consulting with the United States first. Israel did just that – surprising again the administration. To make matters worse, it was shortly after Israel and the United States signed an MoU on strategic cooperation (see later).349 Begin explained that he did not discuss the matter with the administration in advance ‘because we had no doubt that our friends the Americans would say “no” to us’. That was absurd. In the Knesset, Begin took pride in the mutuality of the MoU.350 That was also how President Reagan understood the MoU’s meaning, a document formalizing mutual understanding and cooperation. The mutuality worked until it did no longer served Israel’s purposes. The Israeli unilateral act offended the administration, and Reagan stressed it in his reaction. As Israel did not fulfil its part in the MoU, the United States suspended the MoU’s implementation. In addition, the president imposed some economic sanctions, including withholding the purchase of $200 million worth of Israeli-made defence items, and suspended the permission given to Israel to use up to $100 million in foreign military sales credit to purchase defencerelated goods and services.351 The Israeli reaction to the American measures was particularly outraged. Begin, in the spirit of ‘I deserve it’, responded sharply to the sanctions, which were enacted for the third time since June. Speaking with Ambassador Samuel Lewis, Begin rejected the idea of sanctions against what he called a ‘sovereign country’. Not mincing his words, he asked, ‘what are we, a vassal state, a banana republic? [Is the Israeli government] composed of boys 14-years old, punished if they don’t behave, have to be knuckled on their fingers, scolded?’ Begin argued that the administration should talk and convince, and not take 348 349

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Avner, The Prime Ministers, 578. ‘Israel–United States: Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation’, International Legal Materials, Vol. 20, No. 6 (November 1981), 1420–1423. Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the Tenth Knesset, Diveri HaKnesst, 14 December 1981, 778, 780. Secretary of State to Various American Missions, 18 December 1981, No. 3543, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 18 December 1981, No. 333551, ibid.

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punitive measures. ‘Threats will not frighten’ the Israeli government ‘at all’. As if standing by itself, without context, Begin rejected what he described as turning Israel into a hostage of the MoU. ‘Mr. Ambassador’, he declared, ‘the Jewish people lived for 3,700 years without a memorandum of understating with the United States, and the Jewish people will live for another 3,700 years without that memorandum’. As Israel understood it, said Begin, when it announced that the talks on the MoU were suspended, the United States renounced it.352 On 20 December, the Israeli cabinet decided to cancel the MoU on strategic cooperation.353 Furthermore, Prime Minister Begin argued that the decision to impose economic sanctions on Israel was not only a clear breach of a promise the president made to him but it also was anti-Semitic. Begin referred to Evelyn Barker, the commander of the British forces in Palestine after the Second World War, who, in 1946, following an attack on British headquarters, forbade the British soldiers from frequenting Jewish cafes, stating ‘that race can be punished only through hitting at its pocket’.354 Demonstrating deep self-righteousness, Begin ignored completely the implications of the Israeli actions on the American strategic interests. Using anti-Semitism and Holocaust rhetoric as justification for every act Israel took, Begin treated the mutuality in Israel–US relations as a one-way street. ‘If you want to cooperate with us, we shall cooperate with you. If you don’t want to cooperate with us, ce la vie [sic].’ The United States should cooperate with Israel, and then Israel would reciprocate. Therefore, it was imperative that the United States support Israel whenever ‘our enemies and your enemies’ – the Soviet Union, Syria, and Third World countries – assailed Israel’s actions, and regardless of the damage those actions caused to American interests. The very fact that ‘our enemies and your enemies’ denounced Israel for applying Israeli law on the Golan Heights was, in Begin eyes, the very reason that the United States should support Israel.355 Adding insult to injury, the prime minister published his 352

353

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Meeting between the Prime Minister Begin and US Ambassador Lewis, 20 December 1981, ISA, FO 8466/6. Memorandum for the President from J. S. Nance, 20 December 1981, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38. Meeting between the Prime Minister Begin and US Ambassador Lewis, 20 December 1981, ISA, FO 8466/6. Meeting between the Prime Minister Begin and US Ambassador Lewis, 20 December 1981, ISA, FO 8466/6.

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message to President Reagan shortly after delivering the message to Ambassador Lewis. Lewis heard the details of the message he was asked to deliver to the president while he was on his way from the prime minister’s residence to the embassy.356 Israeli prime ministers and American presidents clashed and argued, and the sides did not always adhere to strict diplomatic protocol. Never before, though, had American presidents faced attacks such as those launched by Begin against President Reagan. Philip Habib assumed that it had to do with Begin’s sensitivity to Israel’s honour. Begin, a man of grand gestures and (some would say hollow) rhetoric, was overly sensitive to his own as well as his government’s honour. But there was more than that to it. It was also Begin’s mental state. Kept as a state secret at the time, Begin suffered from bipolar disorder, which could explain his unstable behaviour, and ups and downs.357 Begin’s bravado diminished when he and the government realized the consequences of the American response. The economic consequences of the sanctions would be severe as thousands of Israeli defence industry employees could lose their jobs as a result. Ministers voiced – typically anonymously – strong criticism towards Begin, accusing him of escalating the situation.358 Two days after his stormy conversation with Lewis and after the public cancellation of the MoU, the Israeli prime minister called the ambassador again, asking him – in not so many words – to find a save-facing solution that would allow a revival of the MoU. ‘His call to me was plaintive and worried, demonstratively friendly though not apologetic’, wrote Lewis, ‘apologies are not in Begin’s nature, no matter how much he may regret something he has done’.359 With the third crisis melting down, the fourth, and the most severe, was in the offing. Both the Israelis and the Americans attributed the outbreak of the recurring crises to the lack of communication between 356

357

358

359

Daniel Bloch, ‘The Reaction Annales’, ibid., 21 December 1981, 1; Avner, The Prime Ministers, 587. Judy Sieget-Itzkovich, ‘Begin Center Furious over Revelations of Former PM’s Mental State’, Jerusalem Post, 23 May 2018, www.jpost.com/health-science/ begin-center-furious-over-revelations-of-former-pms-mental-state-558182. Accessed 25 May 2020; Shilon, Menachem Begin. ‘Damage to Defense Industries and Layoff of Thousands of Employees’, Davar, 20 December 1981, 1; Daniel Bloch, ‘The Reaction Annales’, Davar, 21 December 1981, 1. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 22 December 1981, No. 1771, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38.

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them. Each government blamed the other for taking actions that affected their national interests without informing the other country. Thus, more than the substance of the matter, it was the unannounced unilateral steps taken by each country – mainly Israel, one has to admit – that hurt each other. The conclusion was that each government should update the other before taking action that might affect the other government’s interests.360 Therefore, Israel flooded the administration with reports about its problems with the Palestinians in Lebanon. This was not new, of course. In July 1981, Philip Habib brokered a cease fire between the PLO and Israel in Lebanon, but Israel continued complaining about attacks perpetrated by Palestinian militias against Israeli targets inside and outside Israel. In response to continued American requests for restraint, Prime Minister Begin pledged to President Reagan that Israel would not attack ‘unless attacked in clear provocation’, a rather flexible clause.361 Wishing to make the point clearer, the prime minister explained that ‘clear provocation’ referred to attacks against Israelis originating not only from South Lebanon.362 That is, according to Begin, any attack by a Palestinian against Israelis would constitute a ‘clear provocation’, which would justify an Israeli response. President Reagan accepted this category as a justification for an Israeli attack.363 It is unclear whether President Reagan meant that, but for Begin, an attack by a Palestinian group that was an enemy of the PLO was a good justification for an Israeli attack against the PLO, and this was exactly what happened on 3 June 1981. On that day, a member of a 360

361

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363

Minutes of Conversation: Minister of Security – Senator Percy, 1 January 1982, ISA, FO 6834/2. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 2 January 1982, No. 0016, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38; Prime Minister Begin to President Reagan, 16 January 1981, No. 488, ISA, FO 6834/2; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 25 January 1982, No. 01235, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38; Entry for 30 January 1982, The Reagan Diaries, 66; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 4 February 1982, No. 030130, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38; Memorandum from A. M. Haig to the President, 6 February 1982, ibid.; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 9 April 1982, No. 7533, ibid.; Nehushtan to Office, Jerusalem, 17 May 1982, No. 320, ISA FO 6834/2. American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 22 February 1982, No. 3177, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38. Entry for 6 February 1982, Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 67.

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Palestinian splinter organization, an enemy of the PLO, made an attempt on the life of the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov. Three days later, Prime Minister Begin wrote to President Reagan that the government ordered the IDF to ‘push back the terrorists to a distance of forty kilometers to the north so that all our civilians in the region of Galilee will be set free from the permanent threat to their life’.364 The fourth crisis was on its way. The main source of conflict was what became known as a War of Deception, the IDF’s progress beyond the promised 40-kilometre limit and the bombing of Beirut, which aimed to force the PLO out of Lebanon. Some of these bombings prompted the president to denounce Israel in very harsh words. In one case, he called Begin personally and expressed his strong dismay over the bombings in Beirut.365 The war was conducted not only on the ground or the air but also in the media. Journalists armed with pens and cameras closely followed the events, relaying to the Americans reports and images from the war zone. The American people witnessed every evening the destruction and deaths wrought by American-manufactured war machines used by Israeli soldiers and pilots on Lebanese cities, mainly Beirut.366 It was challenging to counter those images, but nonetheless, the American people retained their basic sympathy for Israel and understanding of its security needs. Pollster Louis Harris summed it up, ‘[t]he erosion of American support for Israel as a result of Israel’s military action in Lebanon seems to have been seriously overestimated’.367 364

365

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Prime Minister Begin to President Reagan, 6 June 1982, RRPL, Executive Secretary, Heads of State File, Records 1981–9, Israel, Prime Minister Begin, b. 17. Memorandum of Conversation, 21 June 1982, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 4 August 1982, No. 216939, ibid.; Telephone Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister Begin, 12 August 1982, 11:14, RRPL, Kemp, Geoffrey File, RAC, b. 5; Telephone Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister Begin, 12 August 1982, 11:45, ibid.; Entry for 12 August 1982, The Reagan Diaries, 97; Shimon Golan, Israel’s War in Lebanon (Ben Shemen: Modan, 2017), 546. Manny Paraschos and Bill Rutherford, ‘Network News Coverage of Invasion of Lebanon by Israeli in 1982’, Journalism Quarterly (Autumn 1985), 462. Attitudes toward Israel Since June 1982, The American Jewish Committee, Information and Research Services, 1 November 1982, AJA, MS 780, G box 33; Louis Harris, ‘American Support for Israel Remains Strong’, Washington Post, 23 August 1982, A10.

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This duality – between understanding the reasons that led Israel to invade Lebanon and the images of destruction and death – was also evident in the attitude of the American Jews, members of Congress, and commentators. The Jewish community had shown an understanding of the reasons behind Israel’s attack and supported it. There was a general agreement that the PLO was a genuine enemy of Israel and even of the Jewish people, and hence, they justified the military campaign that aimed to eliminate the threat that it was posing to Israel.368 Henry Kissinger, too, justified the Israeli attack on the PLO as selfdefence.369 The Jewish leaders did not ignore the reports about the massive killing of civilians, but they responded that if anyone was to be blamed for the killing, it was the PLO. Rabbi Alexander Schindler quoted Golda Meir’s famous and self-righteous remark, ‘we are angry at the Arabs not so much for killing our sons, but for forcing [our sons] to be killers’.370 Still, there were Jews who criticized the attack. Philip Klutznick defined in an op-ed the Israeli invasion as the victory of ‘devastation over diplomacy, violence over compassion, emotional despair over political creativity’. He urged President Reagan to stop the Israeli attack and to have the Israeli forces withdrawn, as the first step that would lead to the opening of Israeli–PLO talks.371 Klutznick followed up on his words when he met Issam Sartawi, an advisor to PLO Yasser ‘Arafat, at the end of June in Paris. Following the meeting, he issued a joint statement with Nahum Goldmann calling for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO.372 Four hundred Jews from the San Francisco area published a denunciation of Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Another group of sixty-seven American Jews, which included Saul Bellow, Irving Howe, Alfred Katzin, Seymore Martin 368

369

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Bernard Weinraub, ‘Arabs Meet Bush on Israel Invasion’, New York Times, 11 June 1982, A12; Norman Podhoretz, ‘Our Aims and Israel’s’, New York Times, 15 June 1982, A29; Alvin J. Steinberg, ‘Israel: War and Beyond’, Washington Post, 16 June 1982, A14. Henry Kissinger, ‘From Lebanon to the West Bank to the Gulf’, Washington Post, 16 June 1982, A15. David Hoffman, ‘US Jews Shift Thinking After Lebanon Invasion’, Washington Post, 17 June 1982, A22. And see Marjorie Hyer, ‘Anguish of US Jews Key Rabbis’ Session’, Washington Post, 2 July 1982, A2. Philip M. Klutznick, ‘America Must Act in the Mideast’, Los Angeles Times, 10 June 1982, G11. ‘3 Jewish Leaders Urge Mutual Recognition by Israel and PLO’, Los Angeles Times, 3 July 1982, A7.

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Lipset, and Michael Walzer, published an ad in which they expressed their disdain for the war, which they claimed was undertaken in order to achieve Begin’s vision of Greater Israel and the annexation of the West Bank.373 Protestant churches were also divided in their response to the war. The Southern Presbyterian general assembly called the administration to halt military aid to Israel until it stopped the war in Lebanon. Also, the assembly called on the United States to initiate contact with the PLO, provided it would acknowledge Israel’s right to exist within secured borders.374 At the same time, 104 Christians published a petition in the New York Times on 1 August, carrying the selfexplanatory title ‘Christians in Solidarity with Israel’. The group expressed its belief that ‘it is the basic right and duty of every government to ensure the safety and security of its citizens’. For that reason, they supported the Israeli attack against the PLO and the Syrian forces in Lebanon. The group, which included Reverend Karl Baehr, Professor Roy Eckardt, Reverend Jerry Falwell, Arnold Olson, and Carl Hermann Voss, asked the American government to work together with Israel to free Lebanon from the PLO’s yoke and to allow the Lebanese to live in peace.375 Israel also acted to bring Evangelicals to raise their voice in support for Israel. During his visit to the United States amidst the war, Begin telephoned the new president of the Southern Baptist Convention, urging him not to forget ‘the land the Jews have rebuilt’ and invited the president and the church members to visit Israel.376 Congress was more unified in its acquiescent with the rationale behind the Israeli attack. The attack took place while the mid-term election campaigns to the Congress were at their prime. A news report cited an anonymous lobbyist who stated that ‘nobody wants to appear anti-Israel during an election’.377 However, there seemed to be also a genuine acceptance of Israel’s right to act. Representative Stephen 373

374 375 376

377

‘San Francisco Jewish Group Denounces Israeli Invasion’, Los Angeles Times, 24 June 1982, B9; ‘American Friends of ‘Peace Now’: A Call to Peace’, New York Times, 4 July 1982, E7. ‘Southern Presbyterians’, Washington Post, 19 June 1982, B6. ‘Christians in Solidarity with Israel’, New York Times, 1 August 1982, E22. ‘Don’t Forget Israel, Begin Tells Baptists’, Los Angeles Times, 17 June 1982, A2. David Wood, ‘Little Support Reported in Congress for Halting Military Aid to Israelis’, Los Angeles Times, 12 June 1982, A6.

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J. Solarz (D-NY), a long-time supporter of Israel, who visited the country almost every six months, explained the relative lack of criticism from among Congress members, ‘most people understand the legitimacy of the military purposes Israel was pursuing’. Even Representative Paul Findley (R-IL), a fierce critic of Israel, conceded that Congress generally supported Israel’s goals.378 In its meeting in June, the national Democratic Conference endorsed the proposal of the former aide of President Carter, Mark A. Siegel, to issue a statement hailing the Israeli attack as a setback to international terrorism and Soviet influence in the Middle East. Some delegates criticized the proposal, but it was nonetheless endorsed.379 The war also raised questions about Israel’s standing as a moral beacon. Begin branded the war almost proudly as a ‘War of Choice’, which could not be justified as a response to an imminent threat to Israel’s existence.380 As mentioned earlier, this sense of disillusionment with Israel came shortly after the Six-Day War, when Israel was seen as an occupier and colonialist state. The war in Lebanon only exacerbated that tendency and brought it to a new height, mainly due to the violence inflicted on civilians and what seemed to be, and not always unjustly, lies being told by the Israeli leaders. At least among some of its supporters, Israel was losing its unique status as a beacon of justice and high morale. Richard Cohen lamented that Israel had become no different from other nations when it was meant to be ‘a special case’, a place where ‘truth was told, where idealism thrived, where things were different from other countries’.381 Alfred Friendly, former managing editor of the Washington Post and a Pulitzer Prize winner, wrote during the Lebanon War that after the Six-Day War, he saw Israel as ‘a nation that cherished values beyond the mere material and consisting of achievements of the intellect and the spirit . . . Their arguments were made of words of reason, not by mouth-foaming. Their standards . . . exalted decency, truth-telling, 378

379

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David Hoffman, ‘US Jews Shift Thinking After Lebanon Invasion’, Washington Post, 17 June 1982, A22; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, Oral History [henceforth ADST], 245. Adam Clymer, ‘Democrats Open Parley by Assailing Reagan’, New York Times, 26 June 1982, 1; Adam Clymer, ‘Democrats Offer Job Plan Enhanced by Cap on Tax Cut’, New York Times, 27 June 1982, 2. Menachem Begin, ‘A No-Choice or a Choice War’, Maariv, 20 August 1982, 20. Richard Cohen, ‘Israel’, Washington Post, 27 June 1982, B1.

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compassion, tolerance and honor and made me proud of an inheritance I shared with them.’ Then he was ‘unaware’ of the Begins and Sharons. However, with the continuation of the occupation, the expansion of the settlements and the war in Lebanon, Israel became ‘merely a nation like any other, its unique splendor lost’, lamented Friendly, like other liberal Americans.382 A New York Times editorial assailed the disillusioned. Why was it wrong for Israel to threaten tens of thousands of civilians in West Beirut to force a few thousand PLO fighters out of Lebanon but not wrong for the PLO fighters to find shelter among those tens of thousands of civilians? Why was it wrong for Israel to try and bring about the recovery of a once-friendly Christian power in Lebanon but not inappropriate for the PLO and Syria to destroy that power? Why was it wrong for Israel to fight against PLO turning Lebanon into its base but not wrong for Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to support the PLO’s build-up ‘on someone’s else territory’ and at Israel’s expense? Why ‘in short, should Israel held to higher standards of moral conduct when Arab states still deny it even the lowest attribute of nationhood, safe borders and legitimacy?’ Israel’s actions were excessive, but ‘by fair standards, . . . Israel deserves understanding for its plight.’383 The Janesville Gazette in Wisconsin also published similar criticism against the attacks against Israel. The newspaper reported that a group of fourteen Christian scholars condemned the criticism against Israel as a double-standard and anti-Semitic. ‘The history of anti-Semitism demonstrates that the world has too often remained silent in the face of atrocities except where Israel stands accused’, reported the newspaper.384 The debates over the just of the Israeli attack on Lebanon was carried out along the dividing line between liberals and conservatives. American liberals started to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative and national rights. They argued that Israel’s recognition of the Palestinian right of self-determination would allow Israel to recover its moral values and guarantee its political survival. Conservatives condemned the criticism of Israel as anti-Semitism and denied the legitimacy of the 382

383 384

Alfred Friendly, ‘Israel: Recollections and Regrets’, Washington Post, 29 June 1982, A17. ‘Judging Israel’, New York Times, 1 July 1982, A18. ‘Condemning Israel a Double Standard: Christian Scholars’, Janesville Gazette, 5 November 1982, 15.

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Palestinian claim of self-determination. They even denied the existence of Palestinian nationalism.385 The liberals, though, did not separate themselves from Israel, only anguished its moral decline. Thus, following the horrendous Sabra and Shatila massacres, the American liberals took comfort in the reaction of shock that swept large components of the Israeli society and in the anti-war demonstrations as a sign of a redemptional soul searching. On the other hand, conservatives denied any Israeli involvement in the massacre, insisting that the American press tarnished Israel’s image. They treated the war as a public relations problem that could be remedied through the effective use of Hasbara.386 The remedy seemed to appear two years later. An unknown journalist, Joan Peters, published a 600-page book, From Time Immemorial. Based on what appeared to be meticulous research and the use of Ottoman and British archives’ demographic data, she argued that the Palestinian people never existed, and that Palestine was virtually empty until the Zionists’ arrival. Only after the Zionists had settled the land and cultivated it did Arabs from neighbouring countries immigrate to Palestine to enjoy the economic prosperity that the Zionists generated.387 The book became a hit. It was published in seven prints and won the 1985 National Jewish Book Award. Scholars and pundits such as Saul Bellow, Yehuda Reinharz, Daniel Pipes, Barbara Tuchman, Martin Peretz, Lucy Dawidowicz, Arthur Goldberg, and Elie Wiesel praised and endorsed it.388 The book’s immense success helped the Israeli Hasbara when, following the war in Lebanon, questions about the sources of Palestinian refugee problem daunted the public. The Israeli narrative about the sources of the problem was undermined by the appearance of Palestinian refugees in American homes during the war, through the mediation of the media. The American people heard the story of the Palestinian refugees in a manner that they had never heard before. In the academia, the work of revisionist historians known as the New Historians, who debunked what they called the Israeli myths about the 1948 War, including the

385 386 387 388

Kaplan, Our American Israel, 138. Kaplan, Our American Israel, 153–154. Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial (London: Joseph, 1984). Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel–Palestine Conflict, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2001), 21–22.

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Palestinian refugee problem’s origins, became popular, permeating the public sphere.389 Against those voices, Peters appeared to solve a painful Hasbara problem for Israel through what seemed to be a well-researched study that attracted a wide audience. In the American public mind, the book entrenched the notion that Israel stood on the right side of history, and that it was indeed the just and pure state that it sought to be. The controversial political scientist Norman Finkelstein debunked the book’s arguments one by one a few years later, undermining the book’s credibility among academics.390 However, it was too late. The book’s message persisted, as was evident by the statement of former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, in December 2011, ‘we’ve had invented Palestinian people who are in fact Arabs’.391 At the end of the day, the war demonstrated the unique nature of Israel–US relations. In the course of its fight in Lebanon, the IDF relied almost entirely on American weapons and equipment. Despite that, the administration’s response to the Israeli attack was moderate. President Reagan pledged before the beginning of the war that he would not link controversy with the aid to Israel, a lesson from the troubling days of 1981. The president probably did not mean to give Israel a free hand for action in Lebanon but he kept his promise when Israel launched the attack. President Reagan responded sharply to specific occurrences, from time to time, but he did not follow the angry telephone calls or messages to Begin with threats or punitive measures, and the Israeli reaction usually quelled the protest. All in all, the president accepted the Israeli narrative as to the reasons for the war and its expansion, and he did not use at any moment the complete Israeli dependency on the American aid to try and stop the fighting. ‘It is not that we have no control over Israel’, stated an anonymous former Pentagon official, ‘It’s that we have chosen not to exercise that control.’392 Even during the fighting, ongoing deals continued as usual, without interruption.

389

390 391

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David Tal, ‘What Is New in the First Arab–Israeli War? A Historiographical Discussion’, Alei Zait Ve’Herev, No. 15 (2015), 65–89. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel–Palestine Conflict, 23ff. David Remnick, ‘Newt, the Jews, and “Invented” People’, New Yorker, 11 December 2011. Dan Morgan, ‘Israel, the Customer, and America, the Armorer, Sway Each Other’, Washington Post, 21 July 1982, A16.

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Furthermore, the war in Lebanon led to the deepening of the relationship between Israel and American military industries. The invasion strained the relations between Israel and the United States, but it also led to the restoration of the IDF’s prestige among Americans. After the blow that the IDF sustained in the October 1973 War, the IDF’s performance in the 1982 Lebanon War, particularly against the Syrian forces, led pundits to laud the operation of the troops; the careful and meticulous planning; the efficiency of logistics; and the successful mobilization of reserves. Factors that poorly functioned in 1973 were utilized most efficiently in 1982. The American press surveyed the Israeli achievements on the battlefield with admiration. Israeli tanks destroyed hundreds of Syrian and PLO tanks, and on top of it, the IAF destroyed Syrian SA missile batteries deployed in Lebanon and shot down nearly a hundred Syrian MIG 21s and 23s, with the IAF planes sustaining no casualties. Using their aircraft brilliantly, with the sophisticated electronic equipment installed in the American planes, the Israeli pilots excelled in their performance. Also remarkable was the outcome of the encounter between the Israeli Merkava tanks – with American components – and the most advanced Soviet T72 tanks.393 The Israeli ‘smashing success against Soviet weaponry’ in Lebanon gave the operation a Cold War dimension. The departing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, said that the Israeli success ‘must be generating some second thoughts in the Kremlin’ as to the ability of its planes, tanks, and antiaircraft missiles to stand against the American weapons.394 The remarkable IAF success in the war was attributed to the quality of the Israeli pilots, but to no small extent to the high-tech instruments installed in the planes and the missiles the IAF pilots used. ‘Israeli Pilots Flying US-Made Planes: A Winning Team in Lebanese Air Battles’ was the title of a report on the remarkable Israeli success.395 393

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Jack Foisie, ‘Invasion Restores Prestige of Israeli Forces’, Los Angeles Time, 17 June 1982, B14; William Claiborne, ‘Victory Gives Israel New Power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 20 June 1982, A1; ‘US Arms Used in Lebanon War Outstrip Soviets’, Wall Street Journal, 5 August 1982, 7; ‘US General Acclaims Israelis’, New York Times, 6 September 1982, 5. George C. Wilson, ‘Israel Proves US Arms Effective, General Says’, Washington Post, 17 June 1982, A31. Leslie Wayne, ‘High-Tech Companies Cashing in On Today’s Computer Battlefields’, New York Times, 20 June 1982, F4; Jack Foisie, ‘Israeli Pilots Flying US-Made Planes: A Winning Team in Lebanese Air Battles’, Los Angeles Times, 29 June 1982, B12.

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But it was not only American technology allowing the Israeli performance. Israel also contributed technologically to the United States. Scientists from the two countries studied the lessons learned during the fighting and acted upon them. Israel also developed key improvements for the F-15, which included mounting extra fuel tanks and pods on the aircraft’s outer surface to increase the plane’s combat range by more than 550 miles.396 The Americans were also very much interested in the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Israel put into use during the war. The Israeli industry was a pioneer in the development and manufacture of UAVs, which the IDF used in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat missions. After the war, US Navy and Marine Corps delegations came to Israel to study Israel’s use of the UAVs during the fighting. It was the beginning of a wonderful cooperation that lasted for many years to come. The American Army bought dozens of UAVs from Israel, and these were used in the 1991 and 2003 Iraqi campaigns, in Bosnia, and Afghanistan. Over time, the American military built and strengthened its UAV force, becoming a world leader in the production and employment of UAVs. This was done both in cooperation and in competition with Israel, as the military, while manufacturing UAVs independently, continued to purchase Israeli UAVs or based American UAVs on Israeli models.397

Back on Track On 1 September 1982, President Reagan published a peace plan which precipitated yet another clash between Israel and the United States. Israel disapproved of the general outline of the plan, but it was offended even more by the fact that despite earlier promises, the administration did not consult Israel during the preparation of the plan. To add insult to injury, the administration consulted and informed King Hussein of the plan during its preparation. As for substance, the Israelis rejected it, arguing that it was in violation of the Camp David accords – which was not the

396

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Dan Morgan, ‘Israel, the Customer, and America, the Armorer, Sway Each Other’, Washington Post, 21 July 1982, A16. Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, How the United States Benefits from its Alliance with Israel. A Washington Institute Strategic Report, Strategic Report #7, September 2012, 15–16.

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case.398 The real reasons for the vehement Israeli rejection of the plan were that it did not recognize Israel’s claim to the West Bank, and it called for a freeze in the construction of settlements during the negotiations. President Reagan made contradictory statements regarding the settlements. On the one hand, he refused to define the settlements as illegal, and in February 1981, he stated that he believed that ‘Jewish people should be free to settle wherever they like’.399 On the other hand, he did not intend to alter the US position on the West Bank. The United States would not acknowledge Israel’s right to the occupied territories, and with the autonomy talks faltering, and following the PLO’s setback in Lebanon, President Reagan thought that a new opportunity had emerged to negotiate a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. He based his plan on three premises: no Palestinian state, no PLO involvement, and no Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories. Israel would grant the Palestinians a five-year autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which would lead to a negotiated settlement between Israel, the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and in association with Jordan. Israel would put a freeze on the build-up of new settlements, but existing settlements would not be evacuated. All in all, the plan was pretty close to the Camp David agreement’s terms in letter and spirit.400 The Israeli cabinet rejected Reagan’s plan, but Israel did not have to deal with the consequences of the plan’s rejection, as in January 1983, Jordan and the PLO rejected the plan too.401 The plan and the reaction to the plan were only minor interruptions in the general course of improvement of Israel–US relations. The cooperation between Israel and the United States on a vast array of issues continued and 398

399

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American Embassy, Amman to Secretary of State, 25 August 1982, No. 7113, RRPL, Kemp Geoffrey File, RAC, b. 1; Memorandum for the President from Secretary Shultz, 26 August 1982, ibid.; Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, to General Director, Foreign Office, 1 September 1982, No. 6790, ISA, FO 6834/ 2; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 215–216. Agreed Guidance, Israeli Settlements, [undated], RRPL, Kemp Geoffrey File, RAC, b. 5; David K. Shipler, ‘Israeli Is Satisfied with His “Skeleton” of Settlements’, New York Times, 19 February 1981, A2; D. J. Feith to R. V. Allen, 27 May 1981, RRPL, Kemp Geoffrey File, RAC, b. 5, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 37; D. J. Feith to R. V. Allen, 16 June 1981, ibid. Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1 September 1982, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246261. Accessed 16 June 2021; H. Bar-On to B. Netanyahu, 1 September 1982, No. 731, ISA, FO 6834/2. Resolution of a Special Meeting of the Cabinet, 2 September 1982, ISA, FO 6834/2; Prime Minister Begin to President Reagan, 5 September 1982, ibid.; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 234.

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increased. Even as the tensions persisted, Secretary Weinberger expected that Israeli and American teams would meet to discuss the lessons of the Lebanon War. Of particular interest for the United States were the clashes with Syria, in particular the way the IAF destroyed the Soviet-made SAM batteries and the aerial fights between the Israeli and Syrian jets – American versus Soviet planes. The Pentagon showed greater willingness to remove obstacles in response to various requests from Israel.402 The improvement in the relations between the two states continued during 1983, and one of the reasons for this was the removal of the controversial Ariel Sharon from the Ministry of Defence in February 1983 as a consequence of the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Moshe Arens, whom the Americans regarded with respect, replaced Sharon, whom they despised. The new secretary of state, George Shultz, saw Arens’ appointment as minister of defence as an opportunity to further improve the relations between the two countries.403 Another reasons for the improvement were the Arabs’ rejection of the Reagan plan, the Syrians’ continued refusal to withdraw their forces from Lebanon, and their continued meddling in Lebanese affairs. The administration decided that it was time to work more closely with Israel.404 One of the prime architects of the decision to end the rift with Israel and to move closer to Israel was Secretary Shultz. Schultz, who succeeded Alexander Haig in July 1982, initially viewed Israel with suspicion. Gradually he became one of the most pro-Israel secretaries of state ever, and the signing of the Israeli–Lebanese peace agreement in May 1983 played an important part in the change. He thought that along with the peace agreement with Egypt, the Israeli–Lebanese agreement was a further demonstration for the Arabs that Israel was not expansionist, and it was ready to exchange territory for peace. The Arabs could no longer argue that it was impossible to negotiate peace with Israel.405 Shultz was still concerned about 402

403

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M. Arens to Foreign Ministry, 27 August 1982, No. 5432, ISA, FO 6835/1; American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 19 March 1983, No. 4334, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38-39; R. Sabel to Office, Jerusalem, 3 June 1983, No. 5872, ISA, FO 6835/2. Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz, 22 February 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38–39. Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam and Ambassador Arens, 29 December 1982, ISA, FO 6835/1; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 242-243; Karen I. Puschel, U.S.–Israeli Strategic Cooperation in The PostCold War Era: An American Perspective (London: Routledge, 1992), 65. A Meeting of the AJC with Secretary Shultz, 23 May 1983, No. 38, ISA, A 4328/12.

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the Israeli position on the West Bank, but with the resignation of Sharon and then that of Prime Minister Begin in October, he hoped that it would be easier to find an accommodation with the new prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yitzhak Shamir and Minister of Defence Arens. Underscoring the change, Secretary Shultz approved Arens’ request for licences for items Israel required for the development of the Israeli-made Lavi airplane.406 Next, Shultz was planning to travel to the Middle East near the conclusion of the Israeli–Lebanese peace negotiations. He set it as a goal of the trip to have an ‘in-depth’ conversation with Prime Minister Begin about ‘putting our relationship on a more cooperative long-term basis’. As part of the old-new dialogue, Shultz suggested to the president that he would approve the shipment of the F-16 to Israel with the signing of the Israeli–Lebanese peace agreement – the delivery of the planes was suspended in July 1981, following an Israeli massive air attack on Palestinian targets in Lebanon that resulted in the death of hundreds of people.407 The president agreed – the first F-16 C/D, an advanced version of the plane, out of the seventy-five agreed upon, arrived in Israel in February 1987, making Israel the only other nation equipped with this more advanced airplane.408 The president also agreed to the increase in financial aid to Israel suggested by Congress, which was in excess the amount proposed by the administration.409 Israel got military aid of $1.7 billion, half in a loan, half in grant, and economic aid of $910 million.410 For FY 1985, the president suggested that all military assistance to Israel would be given as a grant. Israel got $1.4 billion military aid and $1.1–1.2 billion in economic aid, all in grants.411

406

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Secretary of State Shultz to Minister of Defence Arens, 17 April 1983, ISA, FO 6835/2. Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz, 21 April 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSPG 60-85A b. 91306. ‘First US-Made F-16Cs Delivered to Israel’, Washington Post, 10 February 1987, A11. Memorandum for Mr. William P. Clark, 27 April 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 38–39. ‘Senate Committee Backs Higher Sum for Aid to Israel’, Washington Post, 29 April 1983, A17. Remarks by Secretary Weinberger to American Jewish Press Association, 23 May 1984, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency File, b. 3; Economic Discussions with the American Government, 31 July 1984, ISA, P 2660/16.

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Strategic Asset At least until the 1970s, Israel certainly was more of a strategic liability than an asset for the United States. For years, the United States attempted to maintain close relations with Israel while also acting to keep the Arabs’ friendship. Israel’s ‘upgrade’ to the position of a strategic asset occurred due to changes in the strategic environment in the Middle East, and recognition of the fact that the ideals-based Israeli–American alliance created a reality that placed the United States alongside Israel and the Arabs on the Soviet side. This was not only a geo-strategic division but also military-strategic, as American arms met Soviet arms during the war of attrition and more forcefully during the 1973 October War. Israel–US strategic relations had begun much earlier. The common argument, which I discussed in the Introduction, is that the Israel–US special relationships had begun when changes in regional circumstances led to a change in the attitude of Americans towards Israel and, as such, deemed it a strategic ally. Actually, the process unfolded the other way around. As was presented up to this point, Israel–US relations were special since long before the establishment of Israel. American administrations tried to avoid that, at least publicly, but these special relationships decided the course of the American policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, and with that, led to the emergence of two camps, one rallying around the Soviet Union, and the other around the United States, with Israel as part of that camp – because of the special relationship between the two nations. Taking place under the radar, Israel and the United States maintained strategic relations at least since the late 1950s. After the 1973 War, the Americans were very interested in the performance of the American weapons provided to Israel and the operational use against Soviet tanks and weaponry. Uzi Eilam, the director of the R&D Unit (RDU), which served the IDF and the Ministry of Defence, used to inform the Americans of the performance of the American weaponry during the fighting, through the Israeli military attaché in Washington. In addition, several American delegations arrived in Israel during the war in order to gather data in real-time and study the results of the encounters between the American and the Soviet weapon systems, the effectiveness of the enemy’s weapons, and the Israeli lessons from the war.412 The cooperation and mutual learning of the war lessons had continued after the war ended. American and Israeli teams conducted 412

Uzi Eilam, Eilam’s Arc (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2009), 203–204, 213–214, 239–240.

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conversations and workshops dedicated to the study of the lessons of the war and data on war manoeuvres, the engagement with Soviet weaponry, and intelligence on Soviet arms systems the Israelis encountered on the battlefield. For the Americans, the flurry of institutional and high-level personal contact between the two military forces was a unique experience, unmatched by links that they had with other US allies and was of high importance. In the mid-1970s, most American officers hardly had any experience in conventional warfare. The United States was getting out of Vietnam, where the military was mainly engaged in counterinsurgency activities, and attention was drawn to the possibility of fighting against the Soviet Union in Europe. The IDF was the Western-style military force most experienced in conventional warfare and was thus most qualified to train the American military for that kind of challenge. Attributing highest importance to the learning of the Israeli lessons from the war, the Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams cut short the visit of two generals in the UK and ordered them to travel to Israel, and especially tied the visit to an impending decision as to the Army’s future tank. The Israeli response to the visit of the two generals demonstrated the deepening relations between the two countries. The Israelis were most forthcoming, complying willingly with the two generals’ requests and queries. The visits were followed by additional visits that deepened the level of cooperation between the two military forces. The meetings had a significant impact on the American military doctrine, organization, and weapons development such as the M1 Abrams tank. Many lessons of the 1973 War were assimilated into the American military doctrine and had a meaningful impact on the military operations in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.413 Similarly, the war substantially influenced the US Air Force equipment, training, tactics, and doctrine.414 President Carter also regarded Israel as a Cold War strategic ally, and this view of Israel was furthered following the 1979 revolution in 413

414

Saul Bronfeld, ‘Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 2007), 465–498; Eilam, Eilam’s Arc, 229–231; Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the US Benefits from its Alliance with Israel, 14; Ethan Orwin, ‘Not an Intellectual Exercise Lessons from U.S.–Israeli Institutional Army Cooperation, 1973–1982’, Military Review (January–February 2020), 46–50. Joseph S., The Yom Kippur War and the Shaping of the United States Air Force (MA Thesis, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 2016), 99.

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Iran. With the fall of the pro-American Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the coming to power of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruholla Musavi Khomeini, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979, Iran was lost to the West. The revolution was a major setback for the American regional interests and Israel, which had strong economic and strategic ties with Iran. However, alongside the setback, the revolution also benefitted Israel, since it strengthened Israel’s strategic position in the United States. Like in 1958, in an area swept by turbulences that adversely affected US interests, Israel was perceived as the United States’ stable and formidable ally in the region. The proximity of the elections in the United States to the Iranian debacle prompted American politicians to re-emphasize Israel’s strategic value for the United States in the wake of the revolution in Iran.415 Edward Kennedy, the presidential candidate, declared on 1 December, ‘the debacle in Iran reminds us that . . . Israel is – and will continue to be a sure and certain ally’, and that ‘the security of Israel is indispensable to the security of the United States’.416 The message seemed to permeate within the administration. President Carter wrote to Prime Minister Begin on 6 February that ‘we attach great value to the contribution a stable, strong and democratic Israel can make to the security’ in the Middle East.417 Enhancing the weight of this statement were the president’s instructions to the Secretary of Defence Harold Brown, towards his visit in the Middle East, in the wake of the Iran crisis. The president wanted Brown to lay the groundwork ‘for security collaboration among the US and key states in the region, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.’418 In compliance with the president’s instructions, Secretary Brown introduced the weapons that the United States agreed to sell to Israel. The list included AIM 9L air-to-air missiles, the Phalanx – an anti-aerial defence system – and the anti-ship Harpoon missile. Not less important was the decision to create American and Israeli teams to engage in strategic discussions to conclude an MoU on cooperative 415

416

417 418

Halperin to Minister of Finance, 4 December 1979, No. 3472, ISA, FO 8464/ 13. Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, 1 December 1979, ISA, FO 8464/ 13. President Carter to Prime Minister Begin, 6 February 1979, ISA, A 4348/6. Letter from President Carter to Secretary of Defence Brown, 9 February 1979, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 9, Doc. 170.

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research and development.419 The decision to broaden the strategic cooperation between the two countries indicated that the Pentagon valued Israel’s strategic partnership mainly in the fields of intelligence and strategic assessments, cooperation that had started already in the end of the 1950s and deepened and expanded since then. President Reagan continued treating Israel as a strategic ally but was the first to tell the American people in a clear voice that he regarded Israel as a strategic asset. During his campaign for president, Reagan published an op-ed in the Washington Post, in which he called to ‘recognize the Israeli asset’. America’s main interest in the Middle East was to prevent the falling of the region into Soviet hands, and the United States was failing to understand the challenge and to meet it adequately. ‘The Iranian debacle is the most recent example’ of the United States’ ‘indecision and ignorance’, he stated, as if the events in Iran had anything to do with the Soviet expansion or as if the United States could really do anything to prevent it. Reagan also stated that the Soviet Union took advantage of the division and rivalry among the region’s countries, deepening its grip on the area, and threatening the free flow of oil from the region. Israel, ‘with a democratic political system like our own’, was an island of stability amid a sea of turmoil and the only state in the region capable of facing the Soviet challenge. Reagan went beyond the usual, clichéd rhetoric in describing Israel’s importance to the United States, mentioning that Israel’s strategic contribution to the United States also included its intelligence, which provided crucial and essential information to the United States on the Middle East situation. Also noteworthy was the Israeli ‘technical know-how of her specialists’, which could provide service for American equipment at a time of crisis. Israel’s facilities and airfields also could be used at a time of emergency. Reagan even suggested that Israel’s superior military power could counter Soviet military engagement in the region. All of that meant, argued Reagan, that the United States should treat Israel as a strategic asset.420 Congress and the Department of State concurred.421 The Jewish community also joined 419

420

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American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 21 February 1979, No. 211855, USNA-AAD, RG 59, P850061–2320. Ronald Reagan, ‘Recognizing the Israeli Asset’, Washington Post, 15 August 1979, A25. H. Con. Res. 19, Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to the Strategic Importance of Israel to the United States, 5 January 1971, 97th

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the campaign to acknowledge Israel’s strategic importance for the United States. With the crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, AIPAC launched an orchestrated campaign in 1980, outlining Israel’s strategic contribution to the United States. AIPAC also emphasized Israel’s role as a force promoting American ideals and interests. Israel was inextricably linked to the West, its political stability, commitment to democracy, ‘proven military capabilities and reliability as an ally’ – all made Israel an indispensable strategic ally of the United States.422 In their presentation of Israel’s strategic importance for the United States, Reagan and the other proponents of the idea concentrated on the two aspects typifying Israel–US relations, ideals, and interests. As for idealism, Israel’s strategic importance lay in its being a long arm of the American ideals, being a democracy ‘like us’, and sharing values with the United States. Strategically, the administration argued that Israel served American interests. Here the arguments mixed reality with hyperbole. Israel was not the bulwark against Soviet expansion the Americans wanted it to be, and it would not serve as a deterrent against Soviet military involvement in the region. The talks about Israel’s strategic infrastructure, airports, and other facilities that could be used during emergency were also hollow. In Israel’s strategic thinking, the Soviet Union was a threat mainly as a supplier of arms to Israel’s enemies and the shield it provided to them during a war. All of that did not mean that Israel assumed that it could go to war against the Soviet Union. Israel also never saw itself as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. When the Soviet Union sent threats to Israel in 1956 and during the July 1958 crisis, the Israeli leaders were anxious, seeking American protection. Of course, Menachem Begin thought so, too, but he did not hesitate to play the anti-Soviet card during his meeting with President Reagan. Then he presented Israel as ‘America’s most reliable and stable ally of freedom against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East’. This was a useful catchphrase, even though it was hollow.423

422

423

Congress, 1st Session; A. P. Drischler to Chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations, March 1981, RRPL, Kemp Geoffrey File, RAC b. 4. AIPAC Memorandum, January 1981, AJA, MC 727, b. 1/1; M. J. Amitay to AIPAC members, 21 January 1980, ibid. Avner, The Prime Ministers, 570.

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Israel’s association with the American struggle against the Soviet Union provided a strategic structure to an ideological alliance. The shared values that made the relations between the two countries special were also those uniting Israel and the United States in their opposition to the Soviet Union. Partly out of genuine belief and partly wishing to justify the extent of American support for Israel, American presidents since Nixon started also using strategic rhetoric when they described the Israeli–American alliance. In other words, the strategic alliance did not create special relations between the two countries but was the outcome of those special relations. Within the strategic relations between the two countries, Israel contributed its share. The Israeli contribution to the American intelligence and industries has already been and will be explored further. In addition to that, the cooperation extended beyond the Middle East. Thus, as part of American attempts to push back the Cuban forces from Africa and mainly from Angola, they encouraged Israeli involvement in the region. The two countries also cooperated in other parts of Africa. Israel wanted to resume diplomatic relations with African countries such as Chad, Zaire, Kenya, and Angola-Namibia, while the United States was interested in enhancing pro-American influence in these regions. To accomplish both countries’ goals, Israel and the United States cooperated and shared information on their activities in these countries.424 Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger discussed the idea to create an American–Israel foundation for the development of the Third World with David Kimche, the general director of the Foreign Office in June 1983. Shultz supported the idea. In November 1984, the US Agency for International Development’s director announced to Ambassador Meir Rosen the creation of the US– Israel Cooperative Development Programme that would fund research projects with Israeli and Third-World researchers’ participation.425 Although he appreciated the tightening of the strategic relations between the two countries, Prime Minister Begin, whose world was made of words, resented the use of the term ‘strategic asset’ to describe Israel–US relations. Asset, he stated, was patronizing. Israel was an ally of the United States, not an asset. In recognition of Israel’s status as an 424 425

D. Kimche to Y. Shamir, 20 June 1983, ISA, FO 6835/2. Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz, 13 October 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSPG 60-85A, b. 91306; M. Peter McPherson to Ambassador Meir Rosen, 2 November 1984, ISA, FO 6834/3.

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ally, Prime Minister Begin sought a formal agreement of strategic cooperation with the United States, based on ‘our common interests’, fighting against Soviet expansionism.426 The administration had an answer to Begin’s complaint and a debate on his suggestion/request. As to Begin’s complaint, Reagan and Haig had already described Israel–US relations that way, talking about the mutuality of Israel–US strategic relations. On 24 February 1981, at their meeting in the White House, Reagan told Foreign Minister Shamir that the United States was not patronizing Israel, and ‘[t]he relationship was a two-way street from which we both derive benefits’.427 As to Begin’s request to formalize the strategic relations of the two countries, the Pentagon, and mainly Casper Weinberger, objected to the idea. Weinberger thought that a formal strategic agreement between the two countries would harm American relations with Arab countries. Reagan and Haig, though, endorsed the idea, and negotiations over the agreement began.428 The argument that getting too close to Israel would harm American relations with the Arab countries was not new and was baseless. When the United States did get closer to Israel throughout the years, no reverberations from Arab countries were recorded. There could have been protests, but no Arab leader ever took action in response to an American close measure of friendship and strategic association with Israel. Nevertheless, as an argument, the concern from the result of relations that were too close dictated policy, and Weinberger watered down the agreement. The Israeli delegation to the talks presented various ideas on how the strategic cooperation should be accomplished, but Weinberger had none of it. He reduced the agreement into a document that dealt solely with the Soviet challenge. Israel helped him with that, as the Israelis played the Soviet card as hard as they could during the negotiations over the strategic cooperation agreement. That said, Israel was not really worried by the words that cast a spell on the Americans – Soviet Expansionism. However, realizing 426 427

428

Avner, The Prime Ministers, 569–570. Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1981, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Subject File, b. 48. Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 29 October 1981, No. 288580, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 37–38; Prime Minister Begin to President Reagan, 30 October 1981, ISA, FO 9346/24; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 173–174.

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the power of these words, the Israeli delegation hammered them up during the negotiations that took place in Washington, DC, in November 1981.429 Eventually, Weinberger got his way. The final draft did not include any of the articles that the Israelis suggested, and which would have added broader scope to the agreement. The MoU on strategic cooperation was aimed directly against the Soviet Union, as was stated in its preamble, ‘the Parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region’.430 It was typical that the agreement was signed without the presence of the press, an indication to the importance – or lack thereof – of the agreement. The memorandum was no more than a piece of paper. Its main value was symbolic, as it changed nothing and added nothing to the strategic relations between the two countries. This though was good enough for Begin, who valued words and gestures no less, and perhaps more, than deeds. Ambassador Lewis described concisely the meaning of the MoU for Begin, a ‘signed piece of paper was much more important than the content. He wanted a symbol of the alliance’.431 At the same time, the strong anti-Soviet tone of the MoU made it easier for Israel to discard it, following the aforementioned American suspension of the MoU following the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. The strategic relations between Israel and the United States strengthened due to developments on the ground, rather than on a piece of paper. The Syrian refusal to comply with the terms of the Israeli–Lebanese peace agreement led the administration to view Syria not as part of the solution to the problems in Lebanon but rather as part of the problem. The Americans were also worried by the Soviets’ supply of arms to the Syrians and their greater involvement in Syria.432 With that, Secretary Shultz came to believe that it was in America’s interest to keep Israel strong and resolute. The experience in Lebanon appeared to demoralize the Israelis, and their will to engage in Lebanon’s affairs seemed to weaken. With Syria increasing its influence 429

430 431

432

Ariel Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 411–414; Avraham Tamir, A Solider in Search of Peace (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988), 264–268. ‘Israel–United States’, 1420–1423. Sharon, Warrior, 414; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 174–175. R. Sabel to Prime Minister Office, 2 June 1983, No. 5463, ISA FO 6835/2.

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in Lebanon under Soviet auspices, it was necessary ‘to bolster Israeli strength and self-confidence’, so that Israel would become, ‘once again, a decisive deterrent to Syrian and Soviet ambitions’. To achieve that, it was necessary to tighten the relations and cooperate more closely with the Israelis. Shultz wanted to discuss with the Israelis how they could take ‘a stauncher deterrent posture against the Syrians in coordination with us’. In terms unheard before from any secretary of state, Shultz expressed concern over what seemed to be the Syrian show of aggression and intention to achieve strategic parity with Israel. The United States should not allow that to happen, wrote the secretary to the president, as American inaction in response to measures such as the supply of Soviet SS-21 to Syria would only ‘invite further Soviet/Syrian boldness’. Therefore, despite the Pentagon’s objection, the administration should ‘give priority treatment’ to all of the Israeli requests for the Lavi project, including the use of military aid for R&D in the United States. The administration should also be ‘more forthcoming with respect to the renegotiating’ the 1979 MoU on defence cooperation and procurement and intensify the sharing of military technology and intelligence with Israel, especially concerning Soviet weaponry in Syria. An immediate measure of symbolic and practical nature would be carrying out the planned visit of the General John W. Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Israel. The general postponed his visit, which was already scheduled, and Shultz suggested that the general visit Israel promptly. The visit took place in January 1984.433 The winds of change reached also Secretary Weinberger, when he announced in June publicly the revival of the MoU on defence cooperation.434 Practical measures were already taken in this direction. The Americans were worried, for example, about the SAM-5s that were deployed in Syria and had North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airports in Europe within their range. Undersecretary of Defence Fred Ikle suggested that a joint American–Israeli team would examine the meaning of the threat. Another team comprised of representatives from the Department of State, Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Israeli officials reviewed Israel’s requests to use military aid funds in the United States for the 433

434

Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz, 13 October 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSPG 60-85A, b. 91306; Puschel, U.S.–Israeli Strategic Cooperation in The Post-Cold War Era, 88. Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 253.

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Lavi’s R&D, as well as defensive means against Soviet weapons, mainly tanks.435 In addition to the formal agreement, the president sent Lawrence Eagleburger to Israel, wishing to give a more personal touch to the deepening strategic relations between the two countries. The visit did not aim to achieve a specific goal but to allow Eagleburger to convey to the Israeli government the president’s wish that Israelis and Americans from the level of prime minister/president would confer to discuss the strategic cooperation between the two countries on their respective levels. With that, the president hoped to ‘put roots down so securely that even when there are differences’ between Israel and the United States, ‘the tree remains healthy’.436 The message was well received by the new prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, who succeeded Begin in October. Shamir thought that differences and arguments that sometimes clouded the relations between the two countries had never overshadowed Israel’s deep American friendship. He trusted America and especially President Reagan’s goodwill and intentions towards Israel, even at a time when disagreements were strong.437 In order to manage the strategic relations, Israel and the United States decided to establish a Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to facilitate the building of a joint and agreed upon strategy and policy. Representatives of the Pentagon and the Department of State would discuss with their Israeli counterparts ‘how to counter threats to the region, and then we will look at the implications of their conclusions’. The JPMG discussed contingency plans in case of a war with the involvement of NATO; Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf; Syrian aggression with Soviet support against Israel, Jordan, or Lebanon; joint military exercises – planning, communication, and storages; a dialogue on US security programmes towards the moderate Arab countries; Israel’s future submarine requirements, and ways to jointly develop weapons systems that would meet the needs of both countries’ 435

436

437

R. Sabel to Prime Minister Office, 3 June 1983, No. 5872, ISA FO 6835/2; Meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers with President Reagan, 28 July 1983, No. 376/534, ibid.; M. Rosen to Office, Jerusalem, 10 August 1983, No. 8027, ibid., FO 6853/3. Meeting between Prime Minister Shamir and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, 2 November 1983, ISA FO 6834/4; E. Rubinstein to Office, Jerusalem, 6 November 1983, No. 6994, ibid. Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 116–118.

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military establishments; and coordinating the Israeli military assistance to countries in Africa.438 The establishment of the JPMG marked a change in the way the strategic relations between the two countries were presented to the public. For years, the Americans refused to give visibility to the strategic relationship between the two countries. The Israelis felt that the Americans were unwilling ‘to take a photo with us on the main road’.439 That changed with the establishment of the JPMG. Secretary Shultz chose the AIPAC annual meeting as the venue to announce the group’s establishment, stating that ‘[s]trategic cooperation between the United States and Israel has become a formal, institutionalized process’.440 Naturally, the discussions remained confidential. Israel–US strategic relations extended to include more areas. The Americans funded and cooperated with Israel in the development of a new class of missile attack vessel, Saar 5, which was equipped with advanced American and Israeli weapons systems. In December 1983, Israel and the United States signed an agreement for the treatment of US military personnel in Israeli medical facilities. The agreement was soon put into action. In one instance, a wounded marine, injured in an accident, was taken for treatment to a Tel Aviv hospital. ‘Our people quite frankly didn’t think he would pull through’, reminisced Weinberger, ‘but he did, thanks to the superb care he received’. In another case, a premature baby born to a US air force family stationed in Turkey was rushed to Israel ‘for successful treatment’. Another means of cooperation was the revised memorandum of agreement on research and development that Weinberger signed on 19 March 1984. The agreement secured the continuation of the cooperation between the two countries on research and

438

439

440

Meeting Between Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger and Prime Minister Shamir and Defence Minister Arens, 28 November 1983, ISA, FO 6834/5; H. Bar-On to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 6 December 1983, No. 3381, ibid.; Meeting Minister of Defence – Secretary of State, 5 June 1984, ibid., FO 6834/6; Remarks by Secretary Weinberger to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1 November 1984, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency, b. 3; E. Rubinstein to Office, Jerusalem, 11 September 1985, No. 5758, ISA, FO 6835/7. Meeting between Prime Minister Shamir and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, 2 November 1983, ISA FO 6834/4; E. Rubinstein to Office, Jerusalem, 6 November 1983, No. 6994, ibid. Address by George P Shultz, Secretary of State Before the Annual Policy Conference of AIPAC, 21 April 1985, ISA, FO 6834/3.

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development, procurement, and logistics.441 Navy planes aboard American aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean trained in Israeli bombing ranges in the Negev, and joint American–Israeli anti-submarine exercises were held in the Mediterranean. Anti-terrorist teams from the two countries trained together.442 With the change in climate, the president had shown more tolerance and understanding to Israel’s measures against terrorists. In November 1984 Israeli forces attacked an Iranian Shiite camp believed to be responsible for the car bomb attacks against the Americans in Beirut and Syrian targets on Beirut–Damascus road. The president expressed satisfaction with the Israeli attacks.443 In early October 1985, Israeli jets bombed Al-Fath base in Tunisia, after Al-Fath’s Force 17 unit murdered Israelis a few days earlier in Cyprus. The president expressed support for the attack, stating that ‘the Israelis hit those responsible for terrorism’.444 Another demonstration of the new American attitude towards terrorism was the veto the American representative cast against a Security Council resolution denouncing Israel’s interception of a Libyan plane on 4 February 1985. Israeli intelligence got information that George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Abu Nidal, the leaders of two organizations that carried many international attacks against Israeli targets, were on board a plane flying from Libya. Israeli combat jets forced the plane to land in Israel, but it turned out that the two Palestinian leaders were not aboard. The Security Council discussed a resolution condemning Israel for what was termed an ‘[a]ct of aerial hijacking and piracy’. Vernon Walters, the American representative to the Security Council, denounced the Israeli act, yet vetoed the resolution, on the grounds that the United States could not accept a principled rejection of the right of nations to intercept planes ‘under exceptional circumstances’.445 Ironically, a few months later, American jets intercepted 441

442

443 444

445

Remarks by Secretary Weinberger to American Jewish Press Association, 23 May 1984, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency File, b. 3. David K. Shipler, ‘For Israel and U.S., a Growing Military Partnership’, New York Times, 15 March 1987, 190. Entries for 16 and 20 November 1983, The Reagan Diaries, 197, 199. Oded Granot, Ran Dagoni, and Refael Man, ‘The Israelis Hit Those Responsible for Terrorism’, Maariv, 2 October 1985, 1; Doyle McManus and Norman Kempster, ‘Israeli Jets Attack PLO’s HQ in Tunis: U.S. Endorses Retaliation for Terrorism,’ Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1985, A1. ‘U.S. Vetoes Anti-Israeli Move’, New York Times, 7 February 1986, A6.

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an Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers of the Cruise Achille Lauro, who killed an American citizen. Israel had an opportunity to reciprocate, when most of the representatives to the General Assembly voted in favour of a resolution condemning the United States, while Israel, ‘our staunchest ally’, voted against it.446 The Israeli government contributed its share to the improvement of strategic relations between the two countries by refraining from launching campaigns against the supply of American arms to moderate Arab states. In 1985 the administration planned to ship to Jordan arms and store it in special logistic centers and supply another round of arms to Saudi Arabia. The Israeli government refrained from raising a voice against the deal. Alas, Israel’s friends in the United States proved to be more adamant than Israel, and they acted to impede the arms shipment even when Israel did not fight against it. Sixty-four senators sent a letter to the president, expressing opposition to the sale.447 AIPAC, too, turned out to be more aggressive than Israel in its attitude to the sale of arms to Jordan, despite Prime Minister Peres lukewarm reaction to a question on this subject directed to him by an AIPAC delegation.448 The administration was determined to carry on with the arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but it tried to avoid public criticism. Shultz and senior officials talked to Jewish leaders and Congress members, explaining the importance of the arms sale to Jordan for the American regional interests. The Jews and the members of Congress remained unconvinced, and fearing defeat in Congress, the White House decided to withdraw the bill for the sale of arms to Jordan while still trying to see through the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia. The president explained to AIPAC delegates the reasons for the supply of arms to Saudi Arabia. He rebuffed their claim that this would jeopardize Israel, repeating his pledge that Israel would never ‘be outgunned’.449 This time, the president succeeded, but not without a cost. AIPAC agreed to remove its opposition to the proposed deal for 446 447

448

449

‘Most Nations Vote against US: Walters’, Los Angeles Times, 15 May 1986, 2. M. Rosen to L. Eagleburger, 20 February 1984, No. 504, ISA, FO 6834/6; Y. Lamdan to General Director, Foreign Office, 10 September 1985, No. 235, ibid., FO 6835/7. Meeting between Prime Minister Peres and AIPAC delegation, 8 January 1986, No. 374, ISA, FO 6835/9. Entry for 26 February 1986, The Reagan Diaries, 394; Y. Lamdan to H. BarOr, 16 January 1986, No. 6021, ISA, FO 6835/9; E. Rubinstein to H. Bar-On, 17 January 1986, No. 5978, ibid.; Y. Lamdan to H. Bar-On, 27 January 1986,

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three reasons. First, the tacit Israeli acquiescence. Second, the administration diluted the arms list, removing the tanks and helicopters, and only retaining missiles of the kind the Saudis already had. Third, and perhaps most important, out of appreciation for the administration’s friendliness towards Israel.450 A peculiar situation happened when Israel and AIPAC decided not to oppose the Saudi arms deal – Congress seemed to be more zealous about a matter relating to Israel’s security than Israel and the American Jews. A former AIPAC official depicted it that way: ‘Pro-Israel sentiment on Capitol Hill seemed to have taken on a life of its own, independent of the wishes of AIPAC or Israel.’451 And indeed, the Senate and the House voted against the deal. The vote in the House was particularly painful for the president, 356-62.452 The president and his advisors attributed the vote to the pressure of Congress members’ Jewish constituents. The immediate association of the members of Congress with the Jewish constituents seemed stereotypical. Attributing the vote of senators and representatives to the Jewish impact, the White House ignored – as many did, and not for the first time – the genuine pro-Israeli sentiment of the members of Congress. Trying to reverse the vote, the president invited some of the senators who voted against the arms deal and tried to convince them to agree to the deal.453 He also summoned once again Jewish leaders and asked them to help him lean on senators to vote in favour of selling the missiles to Saudi Arabia.454 AIPAC was ready not to oppose the Saudi arms deal but the president’s request that the Jews actively act to advance the bill for the sale of the arms in Congress was too much to ask. David M. Gordis, AJC’s executive vice president, said that the

450

451

452

453

454

No. 8741, ibid.; T. Herzl to US Division, 28 January 1986, No. 749, ibid.; Y. Lamdan to D. Kimche, 30 January 1986, No. 261, ibid. ‘Israeli Lobby Dropping its Objection on Saudis’, New York Times, 22 March 1986, 14; David Friedman, ‘AIPAC Official Asserts that US–Israel Relations Have Entered a ‘Revolutionary Era’, JTA, 9 April 1986, 3. Richard B. Strauss, ‘Israel’s New Super-Lobby in Washington: Reagan and Co.’, Washington Post, 27 April 1986, C1. ‘House Joints Senate, Rejects Aras Sale to Saudis, 356-62’, Los Angeles Times, 7 May 1986, 1. Entries for 13 and 15 May 1986, The Reagan Diaries, 410, 411; Meeting with Jewish Leaders on Saudi Arms Sale, 19 May 1986, RRPL, Green Max Files 1981–1985, b. 36. ‘Reagan to Lobby Jewish Leaders’, Los Angeles Times, 14 May 1986, 1; Meeting with Jewish Leaders on Saudi Arms Sale, 19 May 1986, RRPL, Green Max Files 1981–1985, b. 36.

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White House’s request was ‘beyond what we consider realistic’.455 Eventually, and as happened with the 1981 AWACS deal, a presidential concession led to the senators’ change of heart. The president further trimmed what was already a shrunken deal by removing the controversial Stinger ground-to-air missiles from the list. Consequently, a few senators agreed to change their vote, and the president’s proposal was approved by a majority of one.456 This became a pattern in the coming years, with the administration planning to supply arms to Jordan or Saudi Arabia (or both), but due to congressional opposition, it would either drop the idea or dilute it to make it more acceptable to the members of Congress. Sometimes it looked as if the original proposal would include excessive parts, with the implicit intention to take out the more sensible arms, in what was presented as a concession to Congress, in return for the approval of the rest of the package. This happened several times during the years 1985–1987 when the administration backtracked on its intention to supply arms to Jordan and Saudi Arabia or significantly diluted the original deal.457 As suggested, Reagan’s problem was not so much with Israel, but with an overly zealous Congress that stepped ahead of Israel in opposition to the suggested arms deals. *** In August 1986, the Washington Post published a four-article series under the theme ‘The Special Relationship’.458 The series presented 455

456

457

458

Steven V. Roberts, ‘Jewish Groups Resisting Overture by White Hose Over Saudi Arms’, New York Times, 15 May 1986, A4. Sara Fritz, ‘President Trims Saudi Arms Deal’, Los Angeles Times, 21 May 1986, A1; David Shirbman, ‘Senate Vote Clears Arms Salle to Saudi Arabia’, Wall Street Journal, 6 June 1986, 29. Robert S. Greenberger, ‘US May Sell Arms to Jordan, Saudi Arabia’, Wall Street Journal, 10 February 1987, 1; Entry for 18 February 1987, The Reagan Diaries, 475; Norman Kempster, ‘Reported Plan to Sell F-15s to Saudis Sure to Draw Fire’, Los Angeles Times, 16 May 1987, SD1; ‘Proposed F-15 Sale to Saudis Put on Hold’, ibid, 21 May 1987, 2; Paul Houston, ‘Saudi Arms Deal is Off, Reagan Says’, ibid, 12 June 1987, A28; John M. Goshko, ‘U.S. Drop Maverick Missiles from Saudi Arms-Sale Proposal’, Washington Post, 22 September 1987, A8; Entry for 29 September 1987, The Reagan Diaries, 535; Don Oberdorfer, ‘Push for Saudi Arms Sale Likely Despite Hill Rebuff’, Washington Post, 30 September 1987, A23; Smith, The Power Game, 221–222. Charles R. Babcock, ‘U.S.–Israeli Ties Stronger’, Washington Post, 8 August 1986, A1; Charles R. Babcock, ‘How U.S. Came to Underwrite Israel’s Lavi Fighter Project’, ibid, 6 August 1986, A1; Charles R. Babcock, ‘Pro-Israel

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and marked deepening Israel–US relationships. Israel was getting generous financial support in the form of grants; it gained access to American markets and technologies; and the Israeli and American security and intelligence agencies worked closely and tightly. Something was still missing, though. As Israel was not a member of NATO, and it was not attached to the United States through a formal defence alliance, it was not entitled to the privileges accorded to the United States’ formal allies. These included collaborative defence programmes, two-way defence trade, R&D and production opportunities, access to offshore procurement, and more. President Reagan pledged to fill the void, and the JPMG discussed the possible options for closer security cooperation between the two countries. In September 1986, following the visit of Minister of Defence Rabin to the United States, the administration decided to grant Israel the status of a ‘major nonNATO ally and friend’. Under this status, Israel would get access to various means of assistance available to NATO, although not always in the same way.459 In April 1988, the two countries signed the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Joint Political, Security, and Economic Cooperation. The new status placed Israel in the same category as South Korea and Japan in terms of its military relations with the United States and allowed the Israeli industry to bid on US defence contracts.460 Another addition to Israel–US strategic relations was the Defence Policy Advisory Group (DPAG), established by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak in July 1999. The DPAG aimed to consolidate and strengthen the coordination and cooperation between the American Department of Defence and the Israeli Ministry of Defence

459

460

Lobbyist Target of U.S. Arms to Arabs’, ibid, 7 August 1986, A1; Charles R. Babcock, ‘Israel Has Complex Bond with Jewish Americans’, ibid, 8 August 1986, A1. Untitled Document, 3 July 1986, RRPL, Teicher Howard File, b. 2; Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP), September 1986, ibid.; R. W. Murphy and H. A. Holmes to Undersecretary Schneider, September 1986, ibid.; Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 29 September 1986, No. 306094, ibid. Dan Fisher, ‘US Is Granting Israel Non-NATO Ally Status’, Washington Post, 16 February 1987, 1; Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of American and the State of Israel Regarding Joint Political, Security and Economic Cooperation, 21 April 1988, https://israeled.org/resources/ documents/moa-us-israel-regarding-joint-political-security-economiccooperation/. Accessed 25 June 2021.

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on issues related to weapons of mass destruction and fighting nuclear proliferation to countries that could threaten Israel, theatre missile defence and counterterrorism. The two leaders also agreed to establish a Strategic Policy Planning Group (SPPG) composed of senior members of the national security institutions of both countries. The SPPG would develop and submit recommendations on measures to bolster Israel’s defence and deterrence capabilities, and bilateral cooperation to meet the strategic threats facing Israel. It would report to the president and prime minister every four months. The two leaders also agreed to meet in joint session at regular intervals.461 Thus, what was once a rare occasion, the meeting between an Israeli prime minister and an American president, was institutionalized into a regular occurrence. In 2001, the SPPG was replaced by a new forum, the annual Interagency Strategic Dialogue. The forum including representatives from the diplomatic, defence, and intelligence communities from both countries, and it engaged with a wider variety of issues, including regional threats, challenges, and opportunities, as well as the topics suggested for the SPPG. The talks were suspended briefly in 2003, in response to Israeli sale of arms to China, of which the United States disapproved. The talks resumed after the resolution of the issue in November 2005.462 Another outcome of the cooperation agreements was the opening of the American military industry to Israeli industries. In October 1987, Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI) received a $21.3 million Navy contract for F-21A aircraft support services. A joint IAI–Tel Aviv University company won a US military bid to manufacture satellite components.463 *** 461

462

463

Statement Regarding the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel Concerning Ballistic Missile Threats, 31 October 1998, US Department of State, FOIA, Case No. F-2017-06190, Doc No. C06545405; Joint Statement by the President and Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel, 19 July 1999, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226880. Accessed 16 June 2021. Chen Kane, W. Seth Carus, and Nima Gerami, Scoping Study of a U.S.–Israel Security Dialogue (US National Defence University, 2016), 6; Carol Migdalovitz, ‘Israel: Background and Relations with the United States’, in David J. Dukata (ed.), Flames of War (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 125–126. ‘Israel Aircraft Industries Award’, Wall Street Journal, 14 October 1987, 38; ‘Back to Defense-Related Business with the United States’, Koteret Rashit, 11 November 1987, 11.

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One of the most striking manifestations of the Reagan administration’s concern for Israel was its cautious response to the economic crisis in Israel that hit a bottom low in 1979. In that year, the Israeli economy had been crippled by staggering and constantly rising inflation, when the annual inflation rate was 100 per cent, and it grew every year. By 1984 it reached nearly 600 per cent. The Likud governments tried several measures to curb the inflation but failed. Secretary Shultz, an economy professor at MIT and the University of Chicago, followed the economic crisis in Israel with concern. During the discussions over American financial aid to Israel for the FY 1984, Shultz promised to consider Israeli requests favourably but warned that Israel should take steps to fix its dwindling economy.464 He did not simply issue warnings but formed an advisory group of American economists to suggest a remedy for the Israeli economy.465 The experience was odd. An American secretary of state getting involved in devising plans to recover a foreign country’s economy, discussing not only broad principles but also elaborated details. But that was precisely what Shultz did, taking an active role in making the steps that would lead to a change in the structure of the Israeli economy. The core ideas of the plan devised by the American experts were a cut in the government spending, temporary control over prices, and a sharp devaluation of the shekel. The Israeli government agreed to act on these recommendations. Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who headed a unity government formed in September 1984, and Shultz concluded to establish a Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) consisting of American and Israeli private economists and government officials. The group would study the American recommendations and ways to implement them.466 The JEDG continued to meet and discuss matters pertinent to the 464

465

466

Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers with Secretary Shultz, 27 July 1983, No. 506/360, ISA, FO 6835/2. Stanley Fischer, ‘Recollections of the United States Role in the Israeli Stabilization Program’, November 1995, www.piie.com/fischer/pdf/Fischer164 .pdf. Accessed 2 July 2020. Message to Prime Minister Peres, September 1984, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Israel, b. 39–40; Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary Shultz and Prime Minister Peres, 9 October 1984, ibid.; Memorandum of Conversation Between Undersecretary Wallis and General Director of Defence Office Meron, 8 October 1984, ibid.; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Oral History, ADST, 271; Fischer, ‘Recollections of the United States Role’.

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economic relations between the two countries even after the recovery of the Israeli economy and was still active in 2020.467 Wishing to help Israel to recover from the crisis, the president decided to give Israel a special grant for the recovery of the Israeli economy of $1.5 billion in recognition of the ‘close bond of friendship and mutual respect which unites us’.468 In addition to that, Israel got economic aid for FY 1986 totalling $1.2 billion; $12.5 million for the absorption of immigration from the Soviet Union and East Europe; and $1.8 billion military aid. Out of this sum, $500 million was allocated for the development of the Lavi in the United States and $300 million for the Lavi development in Israel. All the aid would be given as grants. The economic and military aid for 1987 would remain the same and also would be given as a grant.469 American assistance also came in the form of an agreement to create an American–Israeli Free Trade Area (FTA). Beyond the obvious economic benefits for Israel, the FTA also served as a symbolic demonstration of the American commitment to Israel. The agreement would give Israel by January 1995 full no-tax access to the American market. With that, Israel became the only country with free-trade agreements with two major economic regions, the European Community and the United States. This would come at a cost. The agreement would rob the local Israeli industry of its protection, via import taxes, opening them up to external competition. Of course, this would also reduce revenues from import taxes. Israel would also be required to eliminate all subsidies for Israeli industrial exports within six years.470 Considering each market’s size and impact, it was apparent that the Israeli market would have to adjust to the changes accrued by the agreement. At the same time, the FTA created opportunities for those industries that would be able to compete in the American market while exposing the Israeli market to a more robust American economy. The House and Senate voted unanimously in favour of Bill H.R. 2268, 467

468 469

470

M. Dovrat to Minister of Economy and Communication, 10 February 1988, ISA, GL 14587/9; US–Israel JEDG Meeting, November 1989, ibid.; Opening remarks by the Bank of Israel’s Governor at JEDG, 9 November 2020, www .boi.org.il/en/NewsAndPublications/PressReleases/Pages/9-11-2020.aspx. Accessed 14 November 2020. George P. Shultz to Prime Minister Peres, 2 May 1985, ISA, FO 6835/5. B. Ram to US Division, 13 January 1986, ISA, FO 6835/9; M. Green to M. Masent, 29 October 1986, RRPL, Green Max Files, 1981–1985, b. 37. Y. Alster to E. Rubinstein, 30 November 1984, ISA, FO 6834/3.

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United States–Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, in early June, and the president signed the bill on 7 June.471 The agreement’s results became evident quickly. Israel began to shift some of its trade focus from Europe to the United States, and the United States began to consider Israel as a serious trading partner rather than just a charity case. Israel’s exports to the United States grew by nearly 10 per cent in 1986 to $2.5 billion. Non-military imports from the United States to Israel increased from $1.6 billion in 1985 to almost $1.8 billion in 1986.472 The figures skyrocketed in the next few years, and the importexport balance trend changed. In 2011, Israel exported more than it imported to the United States – it was worth $23 billion in exports and $14.72 billion in imports. The changes in gains for each country were also noticeable in three bodies established in the 1970s to facilitate the cooperation between Israeli and American entrepreneurs and investors, BARD, BIRD, and the Binational Scientific Foundation, founded in 1972. In the first years of the three organizations’ activities, the Israelis were eager to find American partners, while the Americans were slow to join. Since the late 1990s to early 2000s, the trend had changed. Israelis continued to seek American partners, but now American companies were eager to work with Israeli companies. The three foundations generated direct and indirect American-based production and global sales of $5 billion and somewhere between 18,000 to 50,000 jobs for the American economy. One example is Cornell University’s partnership with the Israeli Technion in 2011 to establish a new New York tech campus. The project was designed to serve as a magnet to promote the transformation of New York into the Silicon Valley, in order to attract technologically talents and entrepreneurs from around the world. The project was expected to create 600 high-tech companies, 30,000 permanent jobs, and generate $23 billion in economic activity within 30 years. The Cornell Tech campus opened in 2013 on Roosevelt Island in the East River in Manhattan. Since then, it became ‘one of the most visible symbols of New York City’s booming technology sector’.473 The attraction of Israeli technology is 471

472

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Memorandum for the President, 6 June 1985, RRPL, Executive Clerk, WHO Series 1, b. 58; Statement by the President, 7 June 1985, ibid. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Accord with Israel Yields Trade Gains’, New York Times, 12 October 1987, D8; ‘Cheap American’, Maariv, 15 February 1991, 1. Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the US Benefits from its Alliance with Israel, 31; Winnie Hu, ‘This Graduate School Helped Make New York Appealing to Amazon’, New York Times, 17 December 2018.

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also demonstrated by the fact that American companies had acquired Israeli startups in record numbers. During the 2010s, tech giants such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, Intel, Microsoft, and Apple purchased Israeli start up companies. During that decade, Intel alone purchased ten companies at a total of $17.7 billion. The total sales of Israeli hightech companies to American companies from 2005 to 2014 was $160 billion.474 In November 1986, the harmonious relationship between Israel and the United States was interrupted when an Israeli navy analyst, Jonathan Pollard, was arrested for spying for Israel and sentenced to life in jail in March 1987. However, tension created by the affair soon dissipated. While American officials, members of Congress, and Jewish leaders expressed deep discontent over the Pollard affair, the Department of State and the CIA continued conducting business as usual with Israel, ‘maintaining the intimate relationship that has grown up around military cooperation, usually agreed intelligence sharing and joint weapons research’. As annoying as the Pollard affair was, it was no more than an irritant in the broader picture of Israel–US relationships.475 Another bump in the road was the first Palestinian Intifada erupted in December 1987. Dialectically, the Intifada laid the ground for the eventual PLO’s recognition of Israel in November 1988, and later to the September 1993 Oslo Accords that were supposed to lead to an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. The Intifada began as a spontaneous and widespread eruption in the Gaza Strip, and spread throughout the occupied territories. What gave this event its unique feature was its relatively non-violent nature and the participation of Palestinians from all walks of life, women, children, and elderly, as well as young people, all of whom confronted barehanded or with stones an army equipped with weapons. It appeared as if a non-violent popular eruption was met with a lethal response.476 The administration criticized, even if cautiously, Israel’s response to the Intifada. The 474

475

476

Gali Weinrab and Tali Tsipori, ‘In the Last Decade, Israeli Companies were Sold at 160 Billion dollars’, Calcalist, 30 October 2014; Meir Orbach, ‘2019 Was a Record Year for Israeli Exits’, Calcalist, 14 January 2020. Mary Curtius, ‘Israel Show “Garrison Mentality” in Spy Case’, The Christian Science Monitor, 6 March 1987, 1; David K. Shipler, ‘For Israel and U.S., a Growing Military Partnership’, New York Times, 15 March 1987, 190. Helena Cobban, ‘Once Again, Palestinians Must Die for Attention’, Los Angeles Times, 17 December 1987, C11.

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most noteworthy measure of criticism was the American abstention in the Security Council vote on a resolution condemning Israel’s actions in the occupied territories. However, abstaining on the vote did not mean that the White House sided with the Palestinians over the Israelis. The White House issued a statement denouncing both the violent Palestinian demonstrations and Israel’s ‘harsh security measures’ to quell the riots, while the American deputy representative to the UN explained that abstaining from the vote meant to send a message of support in Israel. He explained that the resolution ‘ignores the fact that Israeli lives are also at risk, and that Israeli forces have been faced by provocations and in some cases, by life-threatening situations’.477 Israel could live with the statement and clarification. Both put the occupation and the resistance to it side by side and did not indicate an intention to press Israel to end or mitigate its harsh measures.

War on Terror The term ‘War on Terror’ is most commonly associated with the war declared by President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against US targets by Al Qaeda terrorists. However, the American War on Terror had actually been announced two decades earlier. Following the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979, the Americans frequently used the term ‘international terrorism’. The hostage crisis and subsequent events, more notoriously, the suicide bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 associated with Iran, generated what Melani McAlister called ‘the discourse of terrorist threat’. Through politicians’ rhetoric and the mediation of the media, the United States was portrayed as standing at the war’s front line against Islamic terrorism.478 The American encounter with terrorism added another thread to Israel–US relations, and one more layer. This Israel–US bond was manifested in rhetoric and action. The leaders of the two

477

478

Dan Fisher, ‘Use Less Force, U.S. Tells Israel’, Los Angeles Times, 23 December 1987, 4; David B. Ottaway, ‘U.S. Abstains as U.N. Vote Faults Israel’, Washington Post, 23 December 1987, A1. Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1981, www.presidency.ucsb .edu/node/246336. Accessed 16 June 2021; McAlister, Epic Encounters, 199–200.

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countries shared concepts and rhetoric, as well as intelligence and means of operation. The hostage crisis in Iran amplified both Israeli and American feelings that they were facing a common enemy. Israel and the United States were the targets of enraged Iranian crowd chanting anti-Israeli and antiAmerican slogans, Israel being the small Satan and the United States the big Satan. The song that concluded ABC’s a special broadcast series, America Held Hostage served as symbol of the link between the two countries. The broadcast ended with a young marine, dressed in full uniform, singing ‘Go Down Moses’, which is also known as ‘Let My People Go’ – Moses’ demand from Pharaoh (Exodus 8:1), asking him to let the enslaved people of Israel to leave Egypt and to go to their homeland.479 The phrase, ‘let my people go’ became an almost universal call for freedom. This was the slogan that was used in the campaign that called upon the Soviet government to allow Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union to Israel. Now, the words that marked the Jewish struggle against the Egyptian yoke had become the call to free the American hostages. The hostage crisis introduced a new term, ‘militant Islam’, into the American lexicon. This encapsulated that whole region in one, unified identity. With the permeation of the terms to the American audience by TV networks covering the hostage crisis, it was easier for Israel to explain its struggle in the Middle East in these terms. Secretary Shultz stated that terrorism was ‘a form of political violence’ aimed against ‘us, the democracies, against our most basic values, and often our fundamental strategic interests [italics in original]’. He also identified the states that supported and used terror organizations to further their interests. In this list of terror-sponsoring states, he included Iran and the Soviet Union. Shultz stated that the fight against international terrorism should be global and based upon cooperation among ‘all free nations’. It should consist of defensive measures, such as economic sanctions ‘and other forms of pressure’ on states that support terrorism. However, defensive measures alone were not sufficient. It was necessary to take ‘appropriate preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups before they strike [italics in original]’.480 With that, Shultz was nearly twenty years ahead of Bush when he introduced a doctrine calling for 479 480

McAlister, Epic Encounters, 211–212. George P. Shultz, ‘The Challenge to Democracies’, in Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.) Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1986), 18–22.

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the use of pre-emptive measures to combat terrorism. In his presentation, Shultz laid the groundwork not only for the American strategy and measures in its fight against terrorism but also added another layer to the shared values and strategic alignment with Israel. For one, the Shultz doctrine was in practice in Israel even before its establishment, of taking pre-emptive measures when a threat was identified to attack Jews or Israel.481 Israeli–American shared values and experience in the fight against terrorism were also presented to the American people through popular culture. Inspired by the hijacking of a TWA flight in July 1985, with references to the Entebbe rescue mission and the hostage rescue in Iran, a movie, The Delta Force, offered an alternative, heroic, path for the United States and Israel. The film depicted a Delta Force team called to rescue the passengers of American Travelways Airlines – ATW 282 enroute from Athens, hijacked by Arab terrorists. The movie re-enacted the TWA hijacking events, including the travels from Beirut to Algeria and back and the beating and killing of an American navy diver on board. There were two significant differences, though, between the actual events and the movie. The first was the way it was resolved. Unlike the original hijacking, the film ended up with a Delta Force unit carrying out a successful rescue operation, and the American force in the movie sustaining one fatality, as happened to the Israeli rescue force in Entebbe. The other difference was the depiction of the close cooperation between the Americans and the Israelis. While in reality Israel was not involved with the American response to the TWA hijacking, the filmmakers brought Israel into the story. When the fictitious ATW plane flew back to Beirut from Algiers, the Delta Force team, which followed the flight to Algiers, was instructed by the American general supervising the mission from Washington, DC, to fly to Israel. The Delta Force commander was puzzled about the order, and the general told him ‘Israel is our best friend in the Middle East’. And indeed, the Delta Force unit trained in an Israeli military camp to take over a hijacked plane. The Israeli intelligence provided immediate assistance to the Delta Force by pinpointing the kidnappers’ hideouts in Beirut and the kidnapped passengers. When the Delta Force succeeded in its mission, and rescued all of the passengers, the 481

David Tal, ‘Israel’s Concept of Preemptive War’, Syracuse Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2007), 601–618.

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hijacked plane and the Delta Force flew from Beirut to Israel, from which the Delta Force’s silent heroes boarded their C-130 transporters on their way back to the United States. As could be expected, the general tone of the movie is pro-American and Israel and anti-Arab. In reference to the Judeo-Christian civilization facing the Islamic world, there is a scene in the movie, in which the terrorists’ leader observed in Beirut a Christian Orthodox funeral – ‘Another funeral – another Christian’, he quipped to his friend with satisfaction.482 The movie demonstrated and reflected the close ideological proximity between the two countries in their approach to the war against terrorism. The reference to the cooperation between Israel and the United States in the War on Terror was, too, not entirely fictitious, as the Israeli intelligence collaborated quite closely with the Americans in the war against terrorism. Two examples from Reagan’s era illustrate the level of cooperation between the Israeli and American intelligence agencies. In April 1986, American combat jets bombed targets in Libya in retaliation for a terror attack against Americans in Berlin a few months earlier. In preparation for the airstrike, Mossad agents infiltrated the designated targets’ areas, providing vital intelligence. The attack was carried out on 14 April, and the Israeli intelligence was there to help. According to the biographer of the former CIA Director William Casey, the Israelis parked a Boeing 707 reconnaissance aircraft at Tripoli airport and relayed last-minute intelligence. With the commencement of the attack, the Israeli plane took off.483 In another case, Israel provided the Americans the intelligence that terrorists who hijacked an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, and killed an American Jewish citizen were on board an Egyptian plane. Based on that information, warplanes from the US 6th Fleet intercepted the plane and captured the Palestinian hijackers.484 The cooperation between the Israeli and American intelligence communities had started much earlier. James J. Angleton, the head of the CIA’s counterintelligence unit, established contact with Mossad in the early 1950s. When Ben Gurion visited the United States in May 1951,

482

483

484

The Delta Force, 1986, www.imdb.com/title/tt0090927. Accessed 16 June 2021. Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), 498–499. ‘Israel Aid to US in Hijack Reported’, Los Angeles Times, 3 August 1986, A6.

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Angleton arranged a meeting between Ben Gurion and the CIA director, Walter Bedell Smith. Ben Gurion offered to provide the Americans with intelligence regarding the situation behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA had a limited presence there and had difficulty obtaining information. In contrast, Israel had better contacts behind the Iron Curtain. Following the meeting, Mossad Head Reuven Shiloah travelled to the United States to draft an agreement between Israel and the United States on intelligence cooperation. Israel’s primary source of information about what was happening beyond the Iron Curtain was the new immigrants who migrated to Israel from there. Arriving in Israel, the new immigrants provided security service agents intelligence about military installations, factories, and rail networks, as well as information on the mood of the people, their economic conditions, and their attitude towards the regimes. The information was passed to the Americans. The most dramatic event that significantly increased the Mossad’s reputation in the eyes of the CIA was its successful acquisition of a copy of Nikita Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin speech to the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1956. Israel received the report from a Polish Jewish journalist, Victor Grayevsky, whose family survived the holocaust and made Aliah. Victor remained a devoted Stalinist–Marxist and stayed in Poland. His girlfriend held a high position in the Polish Communist Party. While visiting her office, he noticed a file bearing the title ‘Khrushchev’s speech’. He photocopied the file and, horrified by Khrushchev’s description of Stalin’s atrocities, handed it to the Israeli embassy in Warsaw. The embassy sent the file to Israel in a diplomatic pouch, and Isser Harel, the head of Mossad, forwarded the file to the CIA. Consequently, the CIA leaked the file to the New York Times, who published it in June 1956.485 The cooperation between the Israeli and American intelligence communities continued in the following years. The CIA and Mossad held joint discussions in September 1973 on the prospects of a war in the Middle East. The intelligence officers concluded that a coordinated Egyptian–Syrian attack on Israel was unlikely. Three years later, 485

Ephraim Kahana, ‘Mossad–CIA Cooperation’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 14 (2001), 410–412; ‘U.S. Has the Text: Will Make It Public’, New York Times, 4 June 1956, 1; Harrison E. Salisbury, ‘Khrushchev Talk on Stalin Bares Details of Rule Based On Terror’, New York Times, 5 June 1956, 1.

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Shlomo Gazit, director of IDF Military Intelligence, inquired whether the American intelligence community observed any changes in the Arab attitude towards Israel. The answer was no, about a year and a half before Sadat made his historic speech about his readiness to go to Israel. In the following years, Israel asked for American help in obtaining intelligence on developments in Arab states. CIA Director George Bush instructed to provide to Israel images obtained by American satellites of Arab countries, mainly those away from Israel, such as Iraq. The flow of intelligence was disrupted following the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant. Nonetheless, the new CIA director, William J. Casey, described as the ‘most pro-Israeli director of the CIA ever’, still provided Israel with real-time intelligence, even if scarcely. These were known as ‘Casey’s gift’.486 Casey’s biographer implied that Casey also provided useful intelligence to Israel about the Osirak nuclear site. Casey came to Israel to see if it would be possible to allay Israel’s concerns about the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia. When Casey asked the Israeli Mossad director, Yitzhak Hofi, how he could help, Hofi asked for information about the Iraqi nuclear plant. The biographer did not elaborate on what exactly was Casey’s reply but only concluded that the two heads of intelligence reached an accommodation.487 As described, information flowed both ways. Major General Gorge F. Keegan stated in 1978 that ‘today, the ability of the US Air Force in particular, and the Army in general, to defend whatever position it has in NATO owes more to the Israeli intelligence input than it does to any other single sources of intelligence, be it satellite reconnaissance, be it technology intercept, or what have you’.488 During the unrest in Poland that resulted from the establishment of Solidarity, the trade union movement, the CIA sought intelligence that would allow its analysts to determine whether the Soviet Union would invade Poland, as it had done in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Mossad seemed to be the place to obtain reliable intelligence concerning the situation in Poland, so Casey sought assistance from Mossad in 1981. Two years later, Casey asked Israel for help in 486

487 488

Kahana, ‘Mossad–CIA Cooperation’, 414–416; Wolf Blitzer, ‘Mossad–CIA Ties Legacy of Casey and Angleton’, Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1987, 18. Persico, Casey, 253. Quoted in Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, 89.

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obtaining intelligence on Iran.489 In 1984, a top CIA operative was kidnapped by a pro-Soviet group in Ethiopia. The CIA was unable to locate him, and Casey requested Mossad assistance. Mossad’s agents managed to locate him, and the CIA operative was released in a daring rescue operation. Mossad also cooperated with the CIA in locating the CIA chief in Lebanon, William Buckley, who had been kidnapped. The effort failed, and Buckley was murdered after being tortured. After Casey’s death in May 1987, there were fears that his successor, William Webster, would change course and would demote the level of cooperation between the two agencies. However, top CIA officials felt that the agency was getting from the Israelis no less than it was giving, and hence, they kept the level of cooperation the same as before.490 The cooperation continued in the following years. While Ephraim Halevy was head of Mossad (1998–2002), he frequently met CIA Director George Tenet and the two exchanged information and assessments regarding the situation in various Middle Eastern countries.491 Mossad and the CIA, along with the German intelligence services, cooperated in foiling Iranian-inspired terror attacks targeting American and Israeli targets in Europe in October 1988. Operation Autumn Leaves resulted in the arrest of a Palestinian terrorist that planned to attack Israeli and American airlines. Earlier the same year, Mossad ran a joint operation with the CIA and the FBI, intercepting Hezbollah members planning a terror attack on American soil.492 On 3 January 2002, Israeli navy captured a freighter – Karine A – loaded with arms bound for the Palestinian authority-controlled Gaza. The seizure was made possible also due to tracking support from the United States. Following the event, George W. Bush came to view ‘Arafat as a terrorist, with whom peace was impossible to achieve.493 The more recent case of cooperation between Mossad and the CIA was the struggle against Iran’s nuclear programme. Through the use of 489 490

491 492

493

Persico, Casey, 236, 368. Wolf Blitzer, ‘Mossad–CIA Ties Legacy of Casey And Angleton’, Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1987, 18. Ephraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows (Tel Aviv: Mater, 2006), 198. Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (New York: Free Press, 2008), 129, 206–208. George W. Bush, Decision Point (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 400; Condoleezza Rice, No Greater Honor (New York: Broadway Books, 2011), location 2548.

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sabotage methods such as transfer of defective items and equipment and the introduction of malware such as Flame and Stuxnet into the Iranian nuclear programme computer network, the two intelligence agencies were able to postpone Iran’s nuclear programme for several years.494 The War on Terror continued during the Clinton administration. The spate of terror attacks in Israel in the aftermath of the Israeli–PLO Oslo Accords, during which American citizens were also killed, led to greater cooperation between the American and Israeli intelligence communities in the fight against Palestinian terrorism. One of the measures in the joint fight against terrorism was the signing in April 1996 of the Anti-Terrorism Cooperative Agreement, which earmarked $50 million towards the fight against Palestinian terrorism.495 War on Terror as American and Israeli themes re-surfaced during the George W. Bush presidency. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the president delivered his famous address to a joint session of Congress on 20 September, in which he declared War on Terror. ‘It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated’, he stated. Bush also marked the means to be used in the war, attack and prevention. That is, President Bush noted that the United States would not only pursue perpetrators but also those planning an attack, a mode of operation Israel used for many years.496 Discussing the War on Terror, Bush made it also a feature Israel and the United States shared, depicting the two countries as victims of terrorism. When preparing the ground for an attack on Iraq in 2003, the president repeatedly mentioned Saddam Hussein’s harboring terror leaders and organizations who acted against Israel and the United States. The president also directly compared and drew conclusions from the American and Israeli wars on terrorism. After Hamas terrorists committed suicide attacks during the second Intifada and Israel’s fierceful response, President Bush backed the Israeli response. ‘My views came into sharper focus after 9/11’, he wrote, ‘[i]f the United States had the right to defend itself and prevent

494 495 496

Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the US Benefits from its Alliance with Israel, 11. Clinton, My Life, 709. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 20 September 2001, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/213749. Accessed 16 June 2021.

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future attacks, other democracies had those rights too’.497 In the same vein, Bush branded the Israeli war with Hezbollah in 2007 as an ‘ideological struggle’, which explained and justified Bush’s unequivocal support for the Israeli attacks on the Hezbollah.498 Evangelicals also linked the 9/11 attacks and Israel’s War on Terror. Even prior to the attacks, Jerri Falwell stated that ‘Islamic Fundamentalism is one of the most dangerous movements on the face of the earth’.499 John Hagee argued that Mohammed advanced Islam by the killing of those who refused to submit to Islam. ‘Islam not only condones violence; it commands it. A tree is known by its fruit, and the fruit produced by Islam is fourteen hundred years of violence and bloodshed around the world [italics in original],’ he stated. It was this form of Islam that produced and was the driving force behind groups such as the PLO, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, who ‘spread terrorism throughout the Middle East and the world’. Israel was a victim of radical Islam, just as the United States was.500 Naturally, the Israeli–American cooperation in the fight against terrorism continued after the 9/11 attacks. The cooperation included not only intelligence sharing but was also operational. American military officials appreciated Israel’s experience in dealing with homeland security. They argued that the challenges facing the United States since 9/11 were quite similar to those faced by Israel, and thus the United States had a lot to learn from the Israeli experience.501 The Israeli experience in combatting terrorism was presented to the American people in CBS’ 60 Minutes broadcast in November 2001, titled, ‘An Eye for An Eye’. The programme depicted the Israeli response to the Munich Massacre in 1972, the launching of Operation Wrath of God, which targeted those responsible and in charge of the massacre, planners, and executioners. The programme had clear context and purpose, presenting to the American people an example of how the United States should deal with its current terrorism challenge.502 497 499

500 501

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498 Bush, Decision Points, 235–236, 400. Bush, Decision Points, 414. Merrill Simon, Jerry Falwell and the Jews (New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1984), 53. John Hagee, In Defense of Israel (Lake Mary: Frontline, 2007), 65–73. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Tasha L. Pravecek, Comparative U.S.–Israeli Homeland Security. The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 34 USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2006, 1. Kaplan, Our American Israel, 248–249.

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The Americans found useful the tactics and means the IDF had developed in order to combat Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada, and used them during their fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan and Iraq’s cities and roads. Israeli innovations which the American endorsed included a real-time fusion of information accumulated from various sources by various agencies; targeted capture and killing of terrorists; novel tactics for military operation in urban areas; and population control measures, such as checkpoints, roadblocks, and security barriers, to hinder the movement of terrorists. An example of a lesson learned was the use of D-9 armoured bulldozers. Israel often used D-9s to demolish buildings of enemy snipers and combatants hiding inside, without placing soldiers in harm’s way. The Americans bought a dozen D-9 armour kits for the forces in Iraq.503 The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) – a Washington, DC, based think-tank – was established in 1981 in order to instil those ideas among Americans. As part of its activities, it created the JINSA’s Generals and Admirals (G&A) Programme to ‘educate recently retired U.S. generals and admirals – representatives of the country’s most credible institution, the military – about Israel’s unique security challenges and the importance of a strong U.S.–Israel relationship for America’s national security’. The ‘cornerstone of the program’ was (and still is, as of 2020) a trip to Israel, during which participants would meet top Israeli military, intelligence, and government officials, including the Israeli prime minister, Israeli minister of defence, IDF chief of staff, and director of Mossad. Participants also visited key strategic sites to learn about Israel’s defence capabilities and security challenges. Upon completion of the visit, participants often engaged ‘in important policy initiatives through JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy that strengthen U.S. national security and the U.S.–Israel security relationship’. From 1981 up to 2020, JINSA arranged the visit of more than 370 retired senior military officers, most of them at the rank of general and admiral. The topranking military officers were ‘sought because they remain influential opinion-molders and often serve as U.S. government consultants’.504 After 9/11, big-city cops and country sheriffs, police chiefs from across the United States, FBI, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 503 504

Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the US Benefits from its Alliance with Israel, 15. https://jinsa.org/jinsa_program/general-admirals-trip-israel/; Andrea Adelson, ‘Lessons from Israel’, Jewish Journal, 2 October 2002, https://jewishjournal .com/orange_county/6769/. Both Accessed 23 September 2020.

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Explosives agents travelled to Israel for week-long course on terrorism. ‘Israel is the Harvard of antiterrorism’, said US Capitol Police Chief Terrance W. Gainer. Another police officer stated that ‘[n]o experience in my life has had more of an impact on doing my job than going to Israel’. Concurrently, an Israeli police delegation, headed by a former police chief of Jerusalem, visited the United States. The delegation travelled across the United States, meeting hundreds and thousands of law enforcement officers, sharing with them the Israeli experience of dealing with terrorist attacks and combatting terrorism.505

Technological Cooperation On 23 March 1983, President Reagan presented to the American people a plan for the research and development programme of a defence system against strategic nuclear missiles. The project aimed to revise the prevailing concept that the best form of defence against Soviet nuclear attack was American retaliation power. Instead, Reagan suggested that US deterrence should rely on an active defence system that would shield the United States from a Soviet missile attack, and with that the threat of attack would become obsolete.506 In March 1985, the administration invited the United States’ NATO allies, Japan, Australia, and Israel to participate in the research of such systems. Israel was invited to join the project for three reasons. First, it was assumed that the inclusion of Israel in the project would decrease the opposition to the project in congress. Second, the project administration appreciated the rapid pace of the Israeli military development and the ability of the Israelis to override red tapes. Thus, the expectation was that the Israeli scientists would come up with ideas quite quickly. Third, the invitation aimed to sweeten the bitter pill of the American pressure on the Israelis to stop the production of the Lavi.507

505

506

507

Sari Horowitz, ‘Israeli Experts Teach Police on Terrorism’, Washington Post, 12 June 2005, C1. Address to the Nation on Defence and National Security, 23 March 1983, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/262125. Accessed 16 June 2021. Uziel Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in its Strategic Environment: Missile Defense as a Test Case (PhD dissertation, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, August 2018), 57.

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Naturally, Israel accepted the invitation with enthusiasm, although it was not the project per se that appealed to the Israelis. At that time, Israel’s security conception underrated the value of active defence, giving more weight to an offensive strategy. However, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) project would allow Israel to engage in research that would position it at the forefront of technology, and even better, this would be done in partnership with the United States. Israel sought technological cooperation with the United States already following the break in relations with France after the 1967 June War. Before the 1967 June War, Israeli scientists studied in the United States, but Israel operated in the technology sector primarily in Europe. After the Six-Day War, the ties with Europe had greatly diminished. The apparent address, even if by default, was the United States, and the role of creating and nourishing those relations had been assigned to the RDU.508 The RDU made first contacts, but the breakthrough occurred after the October war. As one of the war lessons, the IAF wanted to build a communication system that would allow its forces to operate independently. In 1974 it invited two Israeli companies, Tadiran and Elta, to submit preliminary proposals, and added a clause that the project should be carried out in partnership with an American firm. Hence, each company made contact with an American company and prepared a proposal. In 1978, the IAF approved the joint bid of Elta and the American company, and the project took off.509 The technological cooperation between the two countries continued with the manufacture by Israel of the Merkava tank and jet planes, the Nesher, Kfir, and later the Lavi. While based on Israeli planning, the technology and hardware used in these projects were Americans.510 The degree of cooperation between the Israelis and the Americans during the Lavi project was exceptionally high. The two governments collaborated in the construction of the plane, as well as in the discussions regarding the need for the project. The decision to shut off the Lavi project was also the result of close and intimate talks that served 508 509

510

Eilam, Eilam’s Arc, 166–167, 173. Moshe Or-Tas, The Challenge beyond the Horizon (Tel Aviv: Contento, 2015), 120–121. Yitzhak Greenberg, ‘Economic and Security Aspects in the Decisions to Manufacture a Plane and a Tank in Israel’, Iyunim Be’Toldot Israel, Vol. 12 (2002), 175–194; Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in Its Strategic Environment, 33.

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as evidence of the growing strategic cooperation between the two nations.511 Israeli politicians were slower than the scientists and military men in making their mind up about the invitation to join the SDI project. While the former was still contemplating the matter, the IAI prepared plans that its managers presented to General James A. Abrahamson, the director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), during his visit to Israel in February 1986. One of the projects was an antiballistic missile, and General Abrahamson liked the idea that would get the name Arrow. In May 1986, the Israeli government approved the project and Rabin and Weinberger signed the agreement for Israel’s participation in the SDI project on 6 May 1986.512 The agreement stipulated that the United States would cover 80 per cent and Israel 20 per cent of the project’s costs, which amounted to $125 million over thirty months. The Israelis ran the project independently but remained in constant and intimate contact with the SDIO, sharing the joys of success and frustrations of failures. The probability phase ended successfully in 1994, following several successful interceptions.513 While working on the missile project, the last vestige of scepticism regarding the need for such a rocket vanished when Iraq acquired SCUD missiles and extended their range from the original 300 kilometres to 600 kilometres and beyond during its war with Iran (1980–1988). The successful launch of ballistic missiles from Iraq to Tehran alarmed Israel, since the missiles could reach Israel if launched from western Iraq. For the first time in its history, Israel was exposed to the threat of ballistic missiles. The threat to Israel increased after Syria and Libya also acquired ballistic missiles.514 The threat of a missile attack on Israel materialized in 1991, when Iraq launched forty-one 511

512

513

514

On the Lavi project and its termination see Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Dov Zakheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside a U.S.– Israeli Crisis (Washington, DC: Brasseys, 1996). ‘Jeffrey M. Parness, ‘Israel and SDI’, AIPAC, 20 August 1985, RRPL, Green Max Files, 1985-1988, b. 13; U.S. Israel Sign ‘Star War’ Pact’, Los Angeles Times, 6 May 1986, 1. ‘U.S. to Aid Israel Missile Project’, Los Angeles Times, 31 December 1987, 1; Or-Tas, The Challenge beyond the Horizon, 293–310; Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in Its Strategic Environment, 81–83. Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in Its Strategic Environment, 70–78.

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ballistic missiles against Israel during the first Gulf War (January– February 1991). The United States, in an attempt to prevent Israel from striking back, sent to Israel Patriot missile batteries with American crews that were supposed to provide defence against ballistic missiles (more on this later). The Patriot missiles failed to achieve their goal, causing more damage than good. The Patriots’ failure not only gave the Israeli Arrow project a boost, but it also put the project on par with the American industry, which was seeking an answer to the ballistic missile challenge. The Americans had learned that they did not have an adequate response to the threat posed by ballistic missiles, while the Israelis were making significant progress towards a solution. Israeli–American cooperation in the development of anti-missiles and anti-rockets continued with the development of the Arrow 3, which was designed to protect Israel against an Iranian missile attack. The system was developed jointly by Boeing and the IAI, and was completed and handed over to the IAF in January 2017. The development of the Arrow 3 provided Washington with ‘a front-row seat’ in developing a most sophisticated system, the kind of the United States did not possess.515 The two countries also worked together to develop anti-rocket systems, aiming to provide a defence against rockets used by Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel. One system was David Sling, aiming to intercept heavy rockets and cruise missiles, while another system, Iron Dome, was designed to intercept shorter-range rockets. David Sling was developed together with the Missile Defence Agency that replaced the SDIO in 1993. In Israel, the IAF assumed responsibility for the project and Israeli and American companies worked together to develop the system, which was declared operational in April 2017.516 The second weapons system aimed to deal with the Hamas and Hezbollah’s rockets. The Israeli Ministry of Defence funded the first stages of the R&D with no American involvement, but when the system proved viable, and the IAF started to receive Iron Dome batteries in March 2011, Israel turned to the United States to ask for 515

516

Eilam, Eilam’s Arc, 414; Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the US Benefits from its Alliance with Israel, 12; Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in its Strategic Environment: Missile Defense as a Test Case, 111–115, 118–125. Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in Its Strategic Environment, 140–150.

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financial aid for the construction of additional batteries. Initially, the Americans were sceptical of the effectiveness of the system, but after a joint American–Israel team studied the system thoroughly, the Americans agreed that the system was effective. However, the Bush administration refused to allocate funds for the build-up of additional batteries. Israel received $3 billion in annual military aid for several years, and the Pentagon argued that Israel should use those funds for the construction of the additional batteries. Only when Barack Obama became president did the Americans grant additional funding to the Iron Dome. Obama intended to put a price tag on the grant, hoping that Israel would be ready to freeze the build-up of settlements. Israel did not fulfil its part in the agreement, which never existed. It did not halt the construction of settlements but did get an additional $205 million to manufacture more batteries. With that, the Iron Dome became, like the Arrow and David Sling, a joint American–Israeli project.517 The American contribution to the Israeli active defence systems was most generous. Technologically, the systems were the product of joint effort and work, but it was the Americans who invested the major bulk of the money – Israel got from 2006 to 2019, for the development of the David Sling and Arrow, a total of $5.6 billion.518 The return for the Americans was the partnership of the Israeli manufacturers of the missiles with the American Raytheon. This partnership provided jobs and allowed the Americans to preserve the US defence-industrial base in a time of reduced defence budgets, and of course, provided an operational and effective means of defence for the United States and its allies against rockets, which it did not possess.519 517

518

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Rubin, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in Its Strategic Environment, 161–168. Congressional Research Service, US Foreign Aid to Israel, RL33222, 7 August 2019, 19. Eisenstadt and Pollock, Israel Defense Establishment’s Adaptability to Abrupt Changes in Its Strategic Environment, 13.

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6

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President George H. W. Bush When drafting his position paper on the Middle East and Israel in July 1988, candidate for president, George H. W. Bush had to deal with the high bar set by President Reagan in his attitude towards Israel. Bush was the vice president of one of the friendliest presidents towards Israel, and he stated that he had no intention to be anything less than that. His position paper on the Middle East read as if it were written by the incumbent president. ‘America’s relationship with Israel is strong and steadfast’, declared the vice president. ‘In the years ahead, I will maintain our special relationship with Israel to guarantee Israel’s qualitative military edge and its economic well-being’, he pldedged, and commended Israel for being ‘a bulwark of democracy’. Furthermore, ‘Israel remains a light of hope for millions, as well as our faithful ally in the Middle East’. Repeating the Israeli narrative, candidate Bush mentioned how ‘for four decades, Israel has withstood hostile forces on all sides’, Vice President Bush recalled the memory of the Holocaust as justification for ‘the determination of Israel’s leaders to ensure the survival of the Jewish state. Never again must the Holocaust happen!’ he announced.1 Prime Minister Shamir heard a similar message from the then President Bush during their phone conversation on 25 January, a few days after inauguration, and he was thankful for it. ‘I was delighted to hear the words of friendship in the spirit of the tradition that has already been established, of friendly relations and cooperation between the United States and Israel’, 1

Howard Rosenberg, ‘Bush Adopts Policy Paper Urging Expanded Strategic Ties with Israel’, JTA, 25 July 1988, 3; Statement of Vice President George Bush [undated], George H. W. Bush Presidential Papers, White House Press Office, Stephen Hart Subject File, [VP] [Campaign ‘88] Position Papers. I would like to thank Douglas Campbell from the George Bush Presidential Library for making the document available to me.

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commented Shamir.2 Two months later, during their meeting in Washington, President Bush repeated his objection to the establishment of a Palestinian state.3 It seemed as though nothing could possibly go wrong with a start like that. But something did go wrong. For the first time since 1967, an American president took actual measures against the Israeli settlement project. President George H. W. Bush declined Israel’s requests for guarantees for loans Israel planned to take for the settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants unless Israel would agree to freeze the settlements’ build-up in the occupied territories (see later). To make things worse, his secretary of state, James Baker, made some strong comments against Israel and the American Jews. On 14 June 1990, Baker made a blunt public statement, telling the Israeli government, ‘When you’re serious about peace, call us.’ Baker did not remember the Department of State’s telephone number, so he gave the one he remembered, that of the White House switchboard, 1-202-456-1414.4 If that was not enough, than on 6 March 1992, Secretary Baker told Republican leaders at a closed meeting, ‘F**k the Jews; they didn’t vote for us anyway.’5 These actions and statements led scholars and pundits to the conclusion that Israel–US relations during the Bush administration were at an almost unprecedented low ebb.6 This impression is somewhat misguided, as it is based on one aspect of Israel–US relations, which was the peace process. As said, this was always an irritant. Some administrations took a more challenging stance on the matter, while others were more complacent. The Bush administration was one of the former. Still, the arguments over the peace process were only the tip of the iceberg. As will be seen, Israel–US special 2

3

4 5

6

Ariyeh Bender, ‘Bush Called to Shamir from the White House’, Maariv, 26 January 1989, 3. Memorandum of Conversation, 6 April 1989, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library [henceforth GHWBPL], Memcons and Telcons, https://bush41library .tamu.edu/archives/memcons-telcons. Accessed 20 June 2021. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 131. Leslie H. Gelb, ‘The Anti-Israeli Leaks’, New York Times, 20 March 1992, A33; Craig Horowitz, ‘The Zion Game’, New York, 6 November 2000, https://nymag .com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/citypolitic/4022/. Accessed 29 August 2010. Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama, 178; Douglas Jehl and William J. Eaton, ‘Bush Vows Veto of Israel Aid Bill: Middle East: Angry President’, Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1991, A1; Norman Kempster, ‘Bush Using Aid to Put Leverage on Israel’, Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1991, A11; Ross, Doomed to Succeed, 217–218.

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relations during the presidency of George H. W. Bush continued to thrive, despite the crisis over a specific issue that was detached from the broader issues uniting the two countries. Like Ronald Reagan, President Bush was a conservative. Unlike Reagan, Bush was not an ideological but rather moderate conservative, who was susceptible to pragmatism, and upholding the status quo.7 Times also rendered ideology less important. In a process that began with Reagan, the Cold War came to an end in 1989. Premises that were central to the American Middle Eastern policy were no longer valid, and ties with countries in the Middle East were no longer measured in terms of ‘with’ or ‘against’ us. The pro-Soviet states, Syria foremost, lost their patron, leaving the United States the only influential superpower in the region. Yet, the end of the Cold War did not bring a change in Israel–US relations, as the Cold War was not the reason for the special relations between the two nations in the first place. It was Vice President Dan Quayle who phrased it succinctly, ‘since the U.S– Israeli relationship was not a product of the Cold War, it won’t be diminished by the end of the Cold War’.8 Bush differed also from Reagan in his attitude towards Israel. Where Reagan was empathic and warm, even during times of disagreement and conflict, Bush was cold and distant even at the best of times. Unlike Reagan and other presidents before him, his religiosity did not foretell a strong commitment to Israel. President Bush was a devoted Protestant, belonging to the Episcopal Church, a mainline Protestantism that did not serve as a bedrock for Christian Zionism. This could explain why the president eschewed using theological expressions as an explanation for his support for Israel.9 At the same time, whenever the subject came up, and as already stated, the president denied that he was not committed to American special relations with Israel. When Max Fisher presented the strong feeling widely shared by American Jews that the president was less committed to supporting Israel, Bush vehemently denied the allegation. He insisted that his commitment to Israel’s security remained as strong as ever.10 7 8

9 10

Stephens, US Policy toward Israel, 205. Remarks by the Vice President, 33rd Annual Policy Conference, AIPAC, 7 April 1992, M. M. Fisher, correspondence, 66.31. Merkley, American Presidents, Religion and Israel, 176–177, Memorandum from Howard to Max [Fisher], 9 March 1992, M. M. Fisher, correspondence, 38.9; Memorandum of Conversation, 10 March 10992, ibid.

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As will be seen later, Bush’s insistence that he was committed to Israel’s security just as the previous administration was well founded but the friction existed, no question about that. It was his and his secretary of state’s insistence to try and reconcile Jews and Arabs, even if it seemed to be at Israel’s expense, that left a more durable impression. The setting was unfavourable at the outset due to the animosity between the president and Prime Minister Shamir. They did not get along well, and they treated each other with distrust and disdain.11 Their personal differences notwithstanding, it was their different politics that caused tension and friction. The Shamir government refused to accept the Bush administration’s stand on the structure of peace, its insistence that Resolution 242 applied to the West Bank, and that the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories were illegal. Baker’s call at the ‘lion’s den’, AIPAC annual meeting, on 22 May 1989, to the Israeli government to ‘lay aside once and for all the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel’ certainly did not help.12 The Israeli reaction was incensed, with Prime Minister Shamir decrying Baker’s advice at the AIPAC meeting as ‘useless’.13 In light of these differences and exchanges, a rupture seemed inevitable. Secretary Baker described/ admitted that the reality of the countries’ relations was one of ‘steady deterioration’.14 The division became evident when the Bush administration expressed its demur of the settlements by taking punitive measures against Israel for the first time in the history of the relationships between the two countries. That happened when Israel asked the administration in 1990 guarantees for $10 billion loans for the settlement of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. President Bush saw in the Israeli request an opportunity to extract profound concessions and demanded that Israel pledge to freeze the settlements’ build-up in return for the guarantees.15 The American pressure and the Israeli refusal to comply generated tensions also between the administration

11 12

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14 15

Miller, The Much too Promised Land, 215–216; Shamir, Summing Up, 274. Address by the Honourable James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State before AIPAC, 22 May 1989, M. M. Fisher, 214/3. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Israeli Leaders Rebuff Baker on Call to Forgo Expansion’, New York Times, 24 May 1989, A8. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 130. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 22 February 1990, GHWBPL, Memcons and Telcons; Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 127; Miller, The Much too Promised Land, 214–216.

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and Israel’s friends in the United States. It started already during and in the aftermath of Baker’s AIPAC speech. While left-wing Jews were pleased with the address, many others in the audience were offended. They objected to the message that Israel should abandon the Greater Israel dream, but more than that, they objected to what they perceived was a call for Israel to make concessions while making no such demands from the Arabs.16 ‘The American Jewish community was in uproar’, was how Baker described the reaction of the Jews to his AIPAC speech.17 A New York Times editorial protested, too, Baker’s claim that Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were equally responsible for the impasse. ‘Given the history of the threats against Israel, the initial burden of proof has to rest on the Palestinians’, stated the editorial, ‘to hint or suggest otherwise treats that history unfair’.18 The feeling that the administration was inimical towards Israel was intensified when several Israeli requests were rejected. Each rejection seemed to have its rational reason, but the accumulation created a feeling that there was food for thought for the paranoid. The list was opened with the rejection of the Israeli requests for the guarantees – in June 1991, Baker told an Israeli radio reporter that Israel should choose between the guarantees and the settlements, and the Shamir government chose the settlements.19 With the move to phase two in the Arrow project, the Americans reduced their financial participation from 80 to 50 per cent; Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) was denied access to a significant bid in the United States at the last minute and without warning; Israel was one of three countries seeking supercomputers from the United States. India and Brazil had their requests approved, while the answer to Israel remained withheld; Israel was supposed to get the better model of the Patriot missiles, but the Pentagon was trying to supply an inferior model. In addition to that, while the missiles were given for free, the Americans billed Israel for various related expenses that amounted to $40 million; a plan to store fuel in Israel was put on hold due to the Navy objections. ‘The 16

17 18 19

Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Baker, in a Middle East Blueprint, Asks Israel to Reach Out to Arabs’, New York Times, 23 May 1989, A1; Friedman, ‘Israeli Leaders Rebuff Baker on Call to Forgo Expansion’, ibid, 24 May 1989, A8. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 122. ‘A Mideast Speech to Remember’, New York Times, 24 May 1989, A30. Shoval, Diplomat, 205.

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accumulation, even if unintentional, led to uncomfortable feeling’, summarized the minister in the Israeli embassy who compiled the list.20 The minister failed to mention the American vote against the PLO admission to United Nation (UN) agencies in May 1989.21 When he sent the letter, the minister did not know yet that the United States would also lead a move, at the end of 1991, to repeal the UN’s resolution that equated Zionism with racism. To this list, Israel could also add the struggle over the compensation Israel should receive for the damages caused by the Iraqi missile attacks during Operation Desert Storm in January–February 1991. Seeking to prevent Israel from responding to an expected Iraqi missile attack, the Americans promised to compensate Israel for damages and expenses incurred due to the missile attack. When the war was over, Israel demanded $1 billion, but the administration argued that since Israel did not participate in the war effort, it would only receive $200 million. Eventually, Secretary Baker suggested giving Israel $650 million and Patriot batteries – some of which had already been deployed in Israel – worth $400 million.22 President Bush contributed his share to the uncomfortable feeling that his administration was changing the course of relations with Israel. AIPAC and Israel’s friends in Congress were involved in the struggle for the guarantees, and the president seemed to delegitimize the pressure put upon him. In September 1991, during a press conference, the president presented himself as ‘one little guy’ standing against ‘a thousand lobbyists’ on Capitol Hill. ‘There is an attempt by some in Congress to prevent the President from taking steps central to the national security’, blamed Bush, implying that forcing his hand on the guarantees would be a step against US national security interests.23 The message was two-fold. It demonstrated the depth of President Bush’s disapproval of the Israeli settlement policy, and it was an attempt to draw the line between legitimate and improper 20 21

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M. Shilo to E. Benzur, 6 January 1991, 2051, ISA, FO 9354/3. Statement of Behalf of James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State on PLO Application to UN Agencies, 1 May 1989, M. M. Fisher Correspondence, 38.9, William J Eaton, ‘Panel Votes Israel 650 Million War Aid’, Los Angeles Times, 6 March 1991, A13; Shuval, Diplomat, 184–186. Douglas Jehl and William J Eaton, ‘Bush Vows Veto of Israel Aid Bill: Middle East: Angry President’, Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1991, A1; R. W. Apple Jr, ‘Peace Hopes Cited: The President Complains of “Powerful Political Forces” at Work’, New York Times, 13 September 1991, A1.

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intervention in the president’s decisions on foreign policy by Congress and lobbyists. Bush’s willingness to take actual measures in the struggle against the settlements was unprecedented. No administration so far – and in the future – complemented the political pressure against the settlements in actual measures. The problem was that the Bush administration – like previous administrations and more so the next – had tactics, but no strategy. Israel had strategy, but no tactics in its attitude towards the occupied territories. Almost every administration was trying to make peace between Jews and Arabs, with various levels of involvement and intensity. After the Israeli–Egyptian peace agreement, the Americans focused mainly on the fate of the West Bank and the Palestinians. Here they faced the Israeli determined opposition against any solution that was based on an Israeli complete withdrawal from the West Bank, or for measures that could imply such a move. This was mainly the position of the Likud governments, which were more years in power since 1977 than the Labour party, but even the Labour party was reluctant to accept a solution based on the complete withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank. The Americans pushed for interim measures to alleviate the conditions of lives of the Palestinians and to pave the road towards a future solution, which they did not define. The Israelis looked at the possible outcome of such a process and curtailed any measure they suspected would lead to undesired results, the ending of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Therefore, they suggested more modest and limited measures. And in the midst of all of this were the Palestinians. Their goal was simple, as a minimum, the end of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, if not the complete obliteration of the Jewish state. In this triangle, Israel was the strongest side. Even if they wanted to object to Israeli measures in the occupied territories, the Americans would not act against those measures unremittingly. Bush’s denial of the guarantees was an unprecedented move, but far from being sufficient to force Israel’s hand, and he would do no more than that. There were several reasons for the American feeble reaction. First, domestic politics. But it was not the concern of presidents and members of Congress from the reaction of their constituents – Jews and non-Jews – to harsh measures against Israel. Presidents and members of Congress as well as the American people accepted the Israeli narrative. Even when opposing the settlements, the Americans, including the Bush administration, accepted the

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Israeli arguments as to the nature of its security concerns, not to mention those who justified the Israeli hold of the territories for religious reasons. Thus, despite the fact that he had in his arsenal more painful measures, President Bush would not go beyond the denial of the guarantees. Second, as much as they wanted to see Israel making concessions, the Palestinians presented a position and acted in ways that justified the Israeli claims against such concessions. Peace was beyond reach not just because of Israel, and all in all, the Americans recognized that. The problem was that American administrations got involved in the peace process even against their better judgement, refusing to accept that peace lay with the protagonists, not in their hands. One root of the problem was the establishment of a peace team, headed by Dennis Ross. Until 1989, American administrations were involved in the peace process only sporadically. Whenever an opportunity presented itself, the administration would get involved, recording more failures than successes. This changed in 1989. When Ross joined the Bush administration, Secretary Baker assigned for him the role of peace facilitator. Ross assembled a small team consisting of Baker’s confidant, Robert Zoellick, Dan Kurtzer, and Aaron Miller. Ross remained the prime peace facilitator also under President Clinton and President Obama.24 The existence of such a team meant that peace was an American official matter. The administrations would not wait for the sides to come up with ideas on peace but rather, now there were people who were on the government payroll, tasked with engaging in peace. This was a formula for frustration, repeated over and over again. Scholars and contemporary pundits referred to the arguments between the Bush administration and the Shamir government as a major crisis in Israel–US relations. This judgement did not match both the way in which the president preferred to present the crisis and the reality of Israel–US relations. President Bush was very explicit about separating the contentious issues and the special relations between the two nations. ‘Whatever happens’, he wrote to a Republican activist in the Jewish community, ‘it is essential that this issue not be allowed to weaken, much less cast doubt upon, the core relationship between’ the two nations. ‘No one should permit disagreement over this or some 24

Miller, Much too Promised Land, 203–205. Ross summarized his experience in peace making in his two books, The Missing Peace and Doomed to Succeed.

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other policy to affect the foundation of a relationship that has served both countries well . . . I, for one, will do my part to make sure it does not.’ Bush took pride in the measures his administration took that proved the strong ties between the two countries. These measures included securing the immigration of Jews from Ethiopia and the Soviet Union to Israel; repealing the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism; defeating one of the most ardent enemies of Israel, Saddam Hussein; and setting in motion the peace process through the Madrid conference – it is not entirely clear how grateful the Shamir government was about this last point. ‘My guess is that historians will look at today’s controversy and wonder what much of the fuss was about’, concluded the president.25 At least the undersigned historian concurs with the essence of the president’s evaluation. Baker marvelled, too, in the ‘five significant contributions to Israel’s well-being and security above and beyond what our predecessors had accomplished’. To Bush’s aforementioned list Baker added that the Bush administration enabled Israel to absorb hundreds of thousands of Russian, Syrian, and Ethiopian Jews; and the administration also was instrumental in helping Israel establish diplomatic relations with forty-four countries, including the Soviet Union.26 Bush and Baker were convinced that the constants, the foundation upon which Israel–US special relations were grounded, outweighed the ephemeral, the contemporary arguments that cast a shadow on those relations. It was not only the rhetoric that demonstrated the separation of the ongoing debates over the settlements from the other aspects of the relationship between the two countries. It was also the actual performance of those relations. The strategic cooperation between the two governments continued as if there were no fights and disagreements over the peace process. Preparing the ground towards the Gulf war, President Bush promised to Prime Minister Shamir in December 1990 to set-up a mechanism for information exchange and updates that would be operational during the fighting. When the war started, American high-ranking officers arrived in Israel and held regular meeting with Israel Defence Forces (IDF) officers, discussing the day’s

25

26

George Bush to George Klein, 19 March 1992, in George H. W. Bush, All the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 2013), 553. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 540–544.

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events and were in direct contact with the coalition HQ.27 A hotline, codenamed Hammer Rich, was installed to create a direct connection between the Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and Minister of Defence Arens.28 On the American side of the hotline were two individuals who were most sympathetic to Israel. Secretary Cheney was a strong supporter of Israel, lending sympathetic ear to Israel’s security needs.29 Alongside Cheney was Collin Powell, the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in an address to AIPAC annual conference in March 1991, reminisced how he visited Israel in July prior to the war. This was not his first visit to Israel. When he met with his IDF counterparts in July, he felt that he was merely picking up from ‘where I had left off, sitting down with Israeli officials to discuss our joint efforts, to review developments in the region and to reaffirm our close ties’. The conversation flowed smoothly. There was no need for introductions or orientation. ‘We spoke in shorthand, the kind that develops among close and dear friends.’30 By 1991, the Israel–US strategic channel was well paved and greased and those who followed it were able to do so with ease and without effort. The same line of continuity applied to the United States’ economic and military aid supplied to Israel during those years. From 1989 to 1992 (inclusive), Israel received a total of $12.9 billion from the United States, half of it for military purposes and a half for civic purposes – all in grants. In addition to that, the Bush administration gave Israel $182 million in grant money for the settlement of Jewish immigrants. Israel also received $16.5 million grants for school and hospital construction and $56.3 million as Cooperation Development Grant, aiming to promote economic growth and economic cooperation between Israel and its neighbours.31 Another form of aid was the permission given to Israel to use $400 million of the military aid in Israel. From 1991 to 1998, the amount was increased to $475 million.32

27

28 30

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Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 388–390; Cheney, In My Time, 215–217; Shamir, Summing Up, 222. 29 Cheney, In My Time, 207. Cheney, In My Time, 214. Remarks of General Collin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the AIPAC, 19 March 1991, ISA, FO 9354/3. Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel’, Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), 274–275. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: History & Overview, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ history-and-overview-of-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel. Accessed 20 June 2021.

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Prime Minister Shamir took no notice of all of these manifestations of the special relations and concentrated on his arguments with Bush. He did not appreciate the president’s statements that the arguments over the settlements and the guarantees were a mere passing matter compared to the solid basis upon which Israel–US relations were built. In the 1992 elections, Yitzhak Rabin, the Labour party leader, defeated the Likud, and Shamir felt that he was paying a political price because of the confrontation between the two governments. The Likud blamed the Bush administration’s use of the guarantees against the Shamir government to help Rabin win the election.33 The charge did not appear to be unfounded. When he became prime minister, Rabin announced that his government would suspend the build-up of new ‘political settlements’. The distinction between political and nonpolitical settlements – that is, military-strategic settlements – was not always clear, but the Americans were ready to accept, even if reluctantly, that distinction, agreeing by implication to the continued buildup of new ‘strategic’ settlements. It was as if the administration was willing to comply with the construction of settlement under the label ‘security’, rather than the label ‘biblical and historical rights’. The Bush administration rewarded the new government’s policy by approving in August 1992 Israel’s request for the $10 billion in loan guarantees, forgoing the demand to halt the construction of new settlements.34 Baker, too, attributed the Likud loss of the elections to the rift with the United States. ‘Proper management of the US relationship is a must for any Israeli government to succeed’, he noted. The ‘chill’ in the two countries’ relations cost the Likud ‘dearly’. At the same time, Baker flatly denied that the Americans acted to achieve that goal. ‘This is simply not true’, he wrote.35 Baker played the naïve. It was no secret that Bush preferred Labour over the Likud. Serving as Reagan’s vice president for eight years, he was well aware of the Likud political rigidity. Martin Indyk wrote to Max Fisher in April 1990, ‘the president has a large stake in seeing 33

34

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Zeev B. Begin, Minutes of the 390 Meeting of the 12th Knesset, Divrei HaKnesset, 26 February 1992, 3305; Ehud Olmert, In Person (Rishon LeZion: Miskal, 2018), 453; Shamir, Summing Up, 249. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 556–558; Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 205–206. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 555.

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Peres succeeded; he dislikes Shamir; he disagrees fundamentally with Likud ideology; his Arab friends prefer Labour’.36 Fisher heard directly from the president and Secretary Baker that they ‘have a clear preference for a Labour government’.37 Shamir could find some comfort in the results of the 1992 presidential election in the United States. President Bush lost the elections to William Jefferson Clinton. American Jews contributed to the defeat of Bush and Clinton’s victory. In the 1992 election, about 11 per cent of the Jews voted for Bush, a drastic decrease from the 35 per cent of the Jewish vote in 1988. Clinton got 80 per cent of the Jewish vote, almost twice the number of votes he received from the general public.38 Another indication of Bush’s decreased popularity among Jews was the state of Jewish donations to his electoral campaign. During his 1988 election campaign, Jews contributed about 40 per cent of the total contributions for the campaign. In 1992, Jews barely contributed money to the president’s election campaign.39 Samuel Nussbaum, a seventy-two-year-old plumber from Shawnee Mission, Kansas, a member of AIPAC, told a Washington Post reporter that in 1988 he voted for Bush, but in 1992 ‘his biggest dream is to oust Bush’. ‘He is not an ally of ours’, he said, and by ‘ours’ he meant Israel. ‘I’m planning to vote for any Democrat who runs against him. I don’t care who it is.’40 A Jewish leader wrote to Fisher in March 1992 that ‘a powerful wave of anxiety and frustration is passing through the Jewish community’. Even those who strongly criticized Shamir and the settlements joined the attack on the president’s stand on Israel. Max Fisher shared with the president the deep sense of anger and anxiety spreading among the Jewish community on 10 March.41 The president ‘vehemently denied’ that he had weakened his support for Israel and told Fisher that he would meet Jewish leaders and deliver that message to

36

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38 39 40

41

Memorandum from Martin Indyk to Max Fisher, 7 April 1990, M. M. Fisher, Correspondence, 8.12. Memorandum of Conversation, 11 April 1990, M. M. Fisher, Correspondence, 8.12. Maisel and Forman, Jews in American Politics, 153. Shoval, Diplomat, 220. Gary Lee, ‘Jewish Activists Unhappy with Bush’, Washington Post, 8 April 1992, A7. Memorandum from Howard to Max [Fisher], 9 March 1992, M. M. Fisher, Correspondence, 38.9; Memorandum of Conversation, 10 March 10992, ibid.

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them. Fisher agreed that the president’s image among the Jews was unjustified, considering what the president did for Israel. However, there was a gap between the perception and the reality, and unfortunately, perception proved stronger than reality.42

William (‘Bill’) Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin I mentioned earlier how when W. O. Vaught,, the pastor of the Immanuel Baptist Church, was lying on his deathbed in December 1991, summoned the then Arkansas governor Bill Clinton. Vaught, Clinton’s ‘old pastor and mentor’, swore him to stand by Israel. ‘Bill, I think you’re going to be President someday’, said the dying pastor, ‘I think you’ll do a good job, but there’s one thing above all you must remember: God will never forgive you if you don’t stand by Israel’. And Clinton added in his memoirs: ‘He believed God intended the Jews to be at home in the Holy Land.’43 Clinton fully complied with the pastor’s request. Beyond his deep religious belief, which gave Israel a central place in his thoughts, Clinton was not known for having Jewish acquaintances before he was elected president. Arkansas had a small Jewish community, and there is no record of Jewish friends that Clinton made during his years in Arkansas. Despite that, an unprecedented number of Jews served in his administration. One of the members of his campaign team was Rahm Emanuel – a Jew and former Israeli citizen – a fact Clinton deemed worthy of mentioning in his memoirs. Rahm served as the director of political affairs in Clinton’s White House. Five cabinet members were Jews, as were the US ambassador to the UN, his national security advisor, Samuel Berg, and the Office of Management and Budget’s director. Clinton appointed two Jews to the Supreme Court, one of them Ruth Bader Ginsburg.44 This was no indication of Clinton’s attitude towards Israel; it was only a sign of the growing involvement of Jews in national politics. At the same time,

42

43 44

Memorandum for Sherrie Rollins, 18 May 1992, M. M. Fisher, Correspondence, 38.9. Clinton, My Life, 464–466. Clinton, My Life, 495; William ‘Bill’ Clinton, Jewish Virtual Library, www .jewishvirtuallibrary.org/william-quot-bill-quot-clinton. Accessed 3 September 2020.

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Clinton did not need pro-Israeli Jews around him to stand by Israel. Clinton himself was that advocate, and, as was mentioned enough, the American Jews appreciated that. Clinton was well aware of the extensive support he received from the Jewish community and appreciated it. It was ‘a remarkable display of support, and I am deeply grateful’, said Clinton.45 Beyond his pro-Israeli proclivities, President Clinton found it easier to perform pro-Israel policy also because his Israeli counterpart was an amicable partner from the Labour, rather than a contrarian Likud prime minister. After years of tension between American administrations and Likud governments over the settlements and the occupied territories, Rabin was less dogmatic and ideologist in his attitude towards the Occupied Territories and an outspoken opponent of the settlements’ expansion. That was the kind of prime minister President Clinton was happy to work with. And indeed, the relations between the young president (forty-six years old in 1992) and the elder prime minister (seventy years old) were unique. Clinton ‘admired’ Rabin and was thrilled by ‘the greatness of his leadership and his spirit. I never met anyone quite like him’, wrote the president in his memoirs. Concluding his relations with Rabin, Clinton wrote ‘[i]n the two and a half years we had worked together, Rabin and I had developed an unusually closer relationship, marked by candour, trust and an extraordinary understanding of each other’s political positions and thought processes. We had become friends.’46 Clinton’s words of farewell on Rabin’s grave, Shalom, Chaver (goodbye, friend), were and still are well etched in Israel’s collective memory. President Clinton inherited from his predecessor the wish and the means to broker peace between Jews and Arabs. Secretary Baker’s peace team, headed by Dennis Ross, continued its work also under President Clinton. The team attempted to revive the peace process, but the agreement occurred behind the team’s and Clinton’s back, when in 1993 the Israeli government and the PLO secretly reached an agreement to negotiate peace. Only after they reached an agreement, the Israeli government and the PLO involved the administration. In a symbolic gesture to the American president, the signing ceremony of the Agreement of Principles, also known as the Oslo Accords, was held 45 46

Bill Clinton to Edward Sanders, 17 November 1992, AJA, MS 272, b. 13/5. Clinton, My Life, 620.

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on the White House lawns, on 13 September 1993, with President Clinton hosting Prime Minister Rabin and the PLO chairman, Yasser ‘Arafat.47 This pattern would transpire in the following years. The Israelis and the Palestinians would talk with each other without American involvement. The Israelis would usually keep the Americans informed, but would leave them out of the actual negotiations. Prime Minister Rabin assigned the Americans a minor role in the on-going process; they should remain in the background, ‘helping but not negotiating for the parties’. When necessary, the Americans would help to facilitate the talks. Thus, they hosted two Israeli– Palestinian summits – the 2000 Camp David and the 2007 Annapolis summits, but these were the exceptions.48 In most cases, the Israelis and Palestinians would meet one another without the involvement of the Americans.49 Similarly, the negotiations on an Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty were conducted between Rabin and King Hussein without the Americans’ knowledge and involvement.50 Where they were involved, the Americans tried to conduct the peace process as objectively and even-handedly as possible. That was an exercise in futility. As Aaron Miller mentioned, the American ‘natural tendency’ was to view the Arab–Israel conflict from the Israeli perspective.51 The Americans sympathized with the Palestinian predicament and believed that it was vital to find a solution that would allow the Palestinians to live free from Israeli occupation. At the same time, President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, his successor Madeleine Albright, and Ross’ dedicated team for peace all assumed that any solution should be based on the just of the Zionist and Israeli cause. That was the starting point that set the course of the negotiations and its outcome.52 This was also evident at the 2000 Camp David summit. The Oslo Accords did not live up to their expectations. They did lead to an Israeli–Jordanian peace agreement (October 1994), but the Israeli– Palestinian peace talks reached a dead-end. Palestinian suicide 47

48 50 51 52

Warren Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime (New York: Scribner, 2001), 198–199; Ron Pundak, Secret Channel (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2013), 39ff. 49 Ross, The Missing Peace, 265. Olmert, In Person, 797. Ehud Yatom, The Confidant (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2009), 276–283. Miller, The Much too Promised Land, 204; Pundak, Secret Channel, 178–179. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 288–289; Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 194–195.

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bombings, ‘Arafat’s refusal to take firm measures against Hamas – that initiated the attacks – the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and the coming to power of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 – a vehement opponent of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process – all led to the collapse of the Oslo process. Throughout all of these years, Clinton’s peace team tried to turn back the tide and revive the peace process. A possible breakthrough seemed to take place, once again, through the initiative originating from the protagonists. In 1999, Ehud Barak defeated Netanyahu in the elections and, as prime minister, made what turned out to be a last-minute attempt to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. He suggested that he and Yasser ‘Arafat would repeat Begin and Sadat’s experience, being locked up together for a limited time, and leaving only after they concluded a final Israeli–Palestinian agreement. The United States was called to host such a meeting, and the 2000 Camp David summit was on its way. The summit failed. It did not end with an agreement, and subsequent attempts to achieve an agreement also failed. The whole experience exploded with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in October 2000. Scholars and pundits struggled with the question, who was to be blamed for the failure?53 Barak asserted that the summit revealed ‘Arafat’s true nature and his refusal to end the conflict, despite what Barak depicted as the most generous offer any Israeli leader ever made to the Palestinians. His lesson from the summit, which became his heritage, was ‘there is no partner for peace’.54 President Clinton accepted Barak’s observation and verdict. ‘[Barak‘s] deal was so good I couldn’t believe anyone would be foolish enough to let it go’, wrote Clinton in astonishment. When ‘Arafat bid farewell to the president and praised him as a great man, Clinton erupted ‘I am not a great man, I am a failure, and you have made me one.’55 Clinton and his aides endorsed in full the Israeli narrative as to why the 2000 Camp David summit failed, putting the blame utterly on ‘Arafat.56 53

54

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A concise composition presenting the main arguments of both sides is Danny Rubinstein et. al., Rashomon Camp David (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2003). Tomer Shadmi and Linoi Bar Gefen, ‘Barak: There Seems to Be No Partner for Peace’, Ynet, 7 October 2000, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-162228,00 .html. Accessed 5 September 2010. Clinton, My Life, 944. Benni Morris and Ehud Barak, ‘The Camp David Summit and Its Aftermath’, in Rubinstein et al., Rashomon Camp David, 99–123, 146–152.

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Clinton was not alone in his almost instinctive endorsement of the Israeli narrative. He was one link in a long chain of American politicians who aligned themselves with the Zionist and then the Israeli narratives. It did not mean a complete acceptance of the Israeli claims, it meant accepting Israel’s premises of the Arab–Israeli conflict, upon which policy was based and implemented. President George W. Bush and his senior lieutenants endorsed, too, the narrative as to ‘Arafat’s culpability and his role in the failure of the Camp David summit.57 Therefore, explained National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, President Bush did not continue the peace process. ‘It simply flies in the face of reality to believe that there was any room for negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis in 2001 or for some time afterwards. Yasser Arafat had demonstrated that he would not or could not make peace.’ Acting under that premise, which further strengthened after the September 11 attacks, the president supported ‘Israel’s right to defend itself . . . The president was disgusted with Yasser Arafat, whom he saw, accurately, as a terrorist and a crook.’58 President Bush paid the necessary lip service of expressing disapproval of Israel’s settlement build-up, but it was clear that he was tepid on this issue. In a letter to Prime Minister Sharon in April 2004, Bush put much more emphasis on the Palestinian authorities’ need to fight against terrorism and asserted that Israel had the right to defend itself. Bush supported the establishment of a Palestinian state beside Israel, but ‘[i]n light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centres’, it would be unrealistic to expect that Israel would return to the 4 June lines.59 Other than the bickering around the peace process, by the 1990s, the two countries were connected in an intricate web of ties spreading across a wide spectrum of undertakings – military, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic – some of it already described. President Clinton made this point in response to a letter sent to him by seventy-eight senators in July 1993, in which they called on him ‘help Israel maintain her qualitative military edge and economic viability’. The letter had only symbolic value, since the administration was 57 58 59

Bush, Decision Point, 399; Clinton, Hard Choices, 302–304. Rice, No Greater Honor, location 1137–1144. George W. Bush to Ariel Sharon, 14 April 2004, https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html. Accessed 4 January 2017.

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already doing exactly that without being pushed.60 During Clinton’s presidency, Israel received $1.8 billion military aid and $1.2 billion economic aid – all in a grant every year.61 Israel also got funds to use for offshore procurement. In 1995, Israel got $474.7 million that was used, among other things, for Merkava production, army maintenance, and Phantom upgrades.62 During Prime Minister Barak’s first visit to the United States in July 1999, the two agreed to establish a working group consisting of Israeli and American senior officials who would meet twice a year and discuss strategic issues and other issues of interest. The two also agreed that the United States would not surprise Israel by presenting a position to the Arabs that had not been cleared with Israel first.63 These measures proved, once again, that Israel–US relations were not dependent on ephemeral interests. By this time, the Cold War was over, and the first Gulf War altered Israel’s strategic landscape dramatically. The Soviet Union ceased to exist, and Soviet planes were no longer shipping tanks, combat jets, and missiles to Arab states, mainly Syria. Israel had a peace agreement with Egypt, who became an ally of the United States. With the submission of Saddam Hussein and the restrictions imposed on his regime, the threat to Israel from the Eastern Front that could include Syria, Iraq, and Jordan no longer existed. The resulting diminution of the security threats did not diminish Israel’s hunger for security and for additional arms, and now Israel no longer had to undergo endless discussions with American officials to convince them that it needed the arms. Israel was the most powerful state in the region, and it could purchase the most advanced weapons from the United States, paid with American dollars. This state of affairs was institutionalized with the signing in 1999 of a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on US aid to Israel. The MoU included a commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 billion in total economic and military aid – of that, $21.3 billion was in military aid. In 60

61 62

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Seventy-Eight Senators to President Clinton, 9 July 1993, William J. Clinton Presidential Library [henceforth BCPL], Little Rock, Arkansas, Clinton Presidential Records (CPR), NSC Records Management, OAIID – 154; Memorandum for Anthony Lake from David M. Satterfield, 2 August 1993, ibid.; President Clinton to Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, 30 August 1993, ibid. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 21–23. Audit Report: ‘Israel Use of Offshore Procurement Funds’, Department of Defence, 22 November 1996. Yatom, The Confidant, 204.

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2007, the Bush administration and Israel signed a second MoU consisting of a $30 billion military aid package for the 2009–2018 period – which no longer included economic aid. Out of this total, Israel was permitted to use up to 26.3 per cent on equipment manufactured in Israel. A third MoU was signed by President Barack Obama on 14 September 2016, for the years 2019–2028. Under the terms of the agreement, Israel would receive $38 billion as military aid and fifty F-35 jets. The United States also agreed to make reciprocal purchases of defence equipment from Israeli companies. As of 2017, Lockheed Martin purchased components for the F-35 from Israeli firms worth more than $1 billion. One such company was Elbit, which worked with US counterparts to design and supply a special helmet for the F-35 pilots.64 Under the terms of the MoU, Israel had to spend about 75 per cent of the grant in the United States, so in the final account, the American government subsidized its military industry through the grants to Israel. American defence contractors could keep their employees and to create new jobs, while profitting from the fruits of the highly innovative and high-tech Israeli equipment that enhanced American military qualitative edge and saved lives, as was the case with the Israeli-developed armour that protected armoured personnel carriers and tanks. Israeli firms benefitted from the grant as well, as they cooperated with American companies, gaining access to the larger and more profitable US military market.65 What in the 1950s and on was the American commitment to prevent a shift in the military balance to Israel’s disadvantage, became, since the 1990s, a pledge to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). Secretary of Defence Robert Gates reiterated in April 2007 the pledge that the United States would preserve Israel’s QME when he met the Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert.66 In 2008, Congress provided the legal basis for the American commitment to maintain Israel’s QME when it passed a bill (P.L. 110-429) that required the president to carry out an ‘empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel’. In 2012, 64 65

66

Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 5, 9–10. Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the United States Benefits from its Alliance with Israel, 17–19. Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 183–184, 192.

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Congress passed the United States–Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act (P.L. 112-150), which, among other things, reiterated the call to ensure Israel’s QME. The call was repeated in the United States–Israel Security Cooperation Act (P.L. 113-296), which Congress passed in 2014. An article added to the Act required the administration to explain, in the case of a sale of major arms systems to Arab states, what would be ‘Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by such sale or export’. P.L. 113-296 also required the administration to report on the QME every two years, and not four, as articulated in the 2008 Act.67 For many years Israel asked various administrations to stockpile military supplies in Israel for use in wartime. In 1989, the Americans agreed to build munition stockpiles in Israel that the Americans could use at the time of war, and, with American permission, by Israel, in emergency situations. Through a programme called War Reserves Stock Allies – Israel (WRSA-I), the United States’ European Command (EUCOM) stored missiles, armoured vehicles, and artillery ammunition in Israel. Israel treated the stockpiles as an emergency depot for her to use. And indeed, in the summer of 2006 war with the Hezbollah, Israel requested an emergency delivery of precisionguided munition, and the Bush administration allowed Israel to use such weapons from the WRSA-I stockpile. In July 2014, during the war with Hamas, Israel turned once again to request 120 mm tank rounds, and 40 mm illumination rounds fired from grenade launchers.68 The Israeli and American military also corroborated on strategic thinking. During the second half of the 1990s, Israeli and American delegations held seminars discussing new means and warfare methods. The workshops were dedicated to the study of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which addressed the changes taking place with the growing role of technology in the battlefield, on the one hand, and the changing face of the battlefield, where conventional battles were giving way to what was called Low-Intensity Conflict, the kind of Israel had to deal with in its fighting against Hezbollah and Hamas, on 67

68

Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 2–4; William Wunderle and Andre Briere, US Foreign Policy and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2008, Policy Focus #80), 1–7. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, 20–21.

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the other hand. The trigger for the discussion was the 1991 Gulf War. The Israelis were impressed by the decisive American victory, but not so much with the war’s success as with the technology used during the war. The Israelis thought that the Iraqi forces did not pose a real military challenge to the American sophisticated and mighty war machine. It was the means and doctrine the Americans used and applied during the war that impressed the Israelis. This was done through the introduction of the RMA, and it became the subject of the joint seminars and workshops, which had a profound impact on the IDF doctrinal thinking.69 Hence, when Israel’s minister of defence, Ehud Barak, told his American counterpart Gates in March 2011, that ‘the security relations between Israel and the United States had never been stronger’, he was not exaggerating.70 *** The close relations also continued between the Sharon government (March 2001–January 2006) and the George W. Bush administration. This closeness was not self-evident. The Israelis were afraid that ‘like father like son’ – that George W. Bush, the former governor of the oil state, would walk in his father footsteps in his attitude towards Israel. His vice president, Richard Cheney, was also expected to take a proArab stance. The vice president hardly had ties with the Jewish community from his days as a Wyoming congressman, secretary of defence, or businessman in Dallas. His work in Texas only increased the suspicion that he would tilt towards the Arabs.71 Israelis and Jews would be surprised, and Arabs disappointed, as the ties between the two governments turned out to be one of the warmest in the history of Israel–US relations. Dov Weissglas, Sharon’s chief of staff, and Condoleezza Rice, then serving as a national security advisor, would talk with each other almost daily, exchanging information and opinions on matters pertinent to the two countries. One such issue was the disengagement plan – the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four settlements 69

70 71

Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 103–104; Eitan Shamir, ‘Israel’s Post-heroic Wars: Exploring the Influence of American Military Concepts on Israel’s Adaptation of Post-heroic Warfare,’ Israel Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2018), 693. Gates, Duty, 532. Elliot Abrams, Tested by Zion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 8–9.

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in the north of the West Bank that took place in summer 2005. Weissglas coordinated the disengagement with Saeb Erekat of the Palestinian authority,72 and at the same time, the Sharon government worked very closely with the administration, mainly through the Weissglass–Rice channel.73 The disengagement also brought one unprecedented achievement, a change in the traditional American policy towards the settlements and the final solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. President Bush – whose mother asked him in June 2002, after he delivered a pro-Israeli speech in the White House’s Rose Garden, ‘How’s the first Jewish president doing?’74 – sent Sharon a letter on 14 April 2004, in which he expressed his commitment to the two-state solution and stated that the Palestinian refugee problem should be solved through their resettlement in the Palestinian state, rather than in Israel – that is, the president rejected the Palestinian demand for repatriation. He also argued that considering the ‘new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centres [in the Occupied Territories], it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949’. The final settlement ‘will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities’. Congress approved the letter by an overwhelming majority.75 The letter did not approve (or disapprove) the continuation of settlements’ build-up, but it did imply that Israel could build within the ‘existing major Israeli populations centres’.

72

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Weissglas – Erekat Meeting Minutes, 1 June 2005, Tel Aviv, Crown Plaza Hotel, Al Jazeera, The Palestine Papers, http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/ thepalestinepapers/201218211635453657.html. Accessed 20 June 2021; Weissglas – Erekat Meeting Minutes, 15 June 2005, Jerusalem, Dan Panorama Hotel, ibid. Giora Eiland, Autobiography (Rishon LeZion: Miskal, 2018), 344–347; Rice, No Greater Honor, 280, 381–382; Dov Weissglas, Ariel Sharon – A Prime Minister (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2012), 156–158, 212–222, 226–236. Bush, Decision Point, 404. George W. Bush to Ariel Sharon, 14 April 2004, https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html. Accessed 4 January 2017; H.Con.Res.460 – 108th Congress (2003–2004), Concurrent Resolution Regarding the Security of Israel and the Principles of Peace in the Middle East, 23 June 2004 and in the Senate of the United States, 24 June 2004 www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/460/text/ rfs. Accessed 14 September 2020.

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The Netanyahu Era Benjamin Netanyahu was not a stranger to the United States. His family left Israel in 1962, when he was fourteen years old. He became an American citizen, changed his name to Ben Nitai, and studied at an American high school and university. At the age eighteen, Netanyahu returned to Israel to serve in the IDF. After completing his military service, he returned to the United States, planning to remain there. He changed his plans and returned to Israel after his brother, Yoni Netanyahu, was killed during the Entebbe Operation in June 1976. Equipped with perfect English, and a strong attachment to the Republican party, he returned to Israel in late 1978. In 1982, Moshe Arens, then the ambassador to the United States, recruited him to serve as a minister in the embassy. It was then that he renounced his American citizenship, as required by American law. In 1984, he was appointed as an ambassador to the UN.76 Netanyahu’s Americanization was evident not only in his biography but also in his political and economic coherent agenda, which placed him among the neoconservatives (neocons). Like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan’s neoconservatism, Netanyahu’s neoconservatism integrated ‘nationalism, family values and law, and order, with an ideological commitment to the classical free-market approach to economics’.77 Acting on the basis of American models, Netanyahu took steps to disseminate neoconservatism in Israel, and with the backing of wealthy Americans, he helped establish a think tank, the Shalem Center. Founded in 1994, the center was inspired by American think tanks such as the Conservative American Enterprise and the Project for the New American Century. Its explicit goal was to advance neocon ideas and philosophy and to thrust them into the Israeli political and cultural discourse. Echoing Allan Bloom’s Closing of the American Mind, Shalem’s founder, Yoram Hazony, argued that ‘Israel is currently in the midst of ideological degeneration, which must be stopped and reversed in the ideological battlefield’.78 The centre sought to do so 76

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Eynat Berkovitz and Biranit Goren, ‘Netanyahu – Solving the Riddle Script’, Kol Ha’ir, 21 June 1996, 50–85; Ben Caspit, The Netanyahu Years (Miskal: Rishon LeZion, 2018), 18–53. Jonathan Rynhold, ‘In Search of Israeli Conservatism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002), 201. Allan Bloom, Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Orfi Ilany, ‘With Money and Resilience, Shalem Center Took Over the

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by producing policy papers, providing a stage for publication in its journals (Azore in English and Tchelet in Hebrew), and by translating titles from among the best of the conservative and neoconservative libraries. These included Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Milton Friedman, On Capitalism and Liberty, Fredrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, and Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History. Fellows of the centre took positions in government as advisors to Prime Minister Netanyahu and other ministers. The migration of members of the centre to governmental functions was in line with the centre’s policy of integrating academic promotion of neocon ideas with actual involvement in implementing those ideas.79 With the dominant presence of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Netanyahu chose neocon politics which adhered to the status quo, up to the point where the status quo took a heavier toll than a change. Only then, Netanyahu would embrace the change, even if cautiously. Hence, despite his strong opposition to the Oslo Accords, which he made central to his 1996 election campaign, he nevertheless implemented its provisions when he withdrew from Hebron and 13 per cent of the West Bank, for example. Knowing the price Israel would have to pay if it did not fulfil its share in the agreements, Netanyahu abandoned the Likud’s Greater Eretz Israel vision for a neocon-style hawkish-pragmatic policy.80 Throughout his tenure in power, Netanyahu fluctuated between rigid ideological rhetoric in an attempt to gain the support of the settlers, and more flexible and pragmatic policies, dictated by what was possible and reasonable. Economically, Netanyahu adhered to the neocon emphasis on free markets. In an interview with Businessweek, Netanyahu argued in July 1997 that ‘[t]his is probably the first time in Israel’s history that you have a Prime Minister who is genuinely committed to free markets as a number one priority’.81 However, as was typical to his lengthy tenure, there was a wide gap between his rhetoric and actions. Usually, he

79 80 81

Government’, Haaretz, 15 May 2009, www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1 .1261272. Accessed on 20 September 2020. Ilany, ‘With Money and Resilience’. Rynhold, ‘In Search of Israeli Conservatism’, 204. Quoted in Guy Ben-Porat, ‘Netanyahu’s Second Coming: A Neoconservative Policy Paradigm?’ Israel Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 2005), 236–237.

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would subject his ideology – political and economy – to his political survival and personal needs. When he became prime minister for the first time in 1996, he overturned his free-market economy principles, as his coalition partners demanded. He succeeded applying his neocon economic agenda only as minister of the treasury, under the Ariel Sharon premiership (2003–2005). Netanyahu, despite being second only to Golda Meir as Israel’s most ‘American’ prime minister, hurt Israel–US relations in a way no other prime minister had done before. He managed to irritate American officials, including presidents and cabinet members, and he made American relations with Israel a partisan matter. Throughout Israel’s history, prime ministers and officials were adamant about making Israel–US relations a bi-partisan issue. When it came to Israel, the consensus in Congress and the American public transcended political boundaries. Netanyahu was the first Israeli prime minister to undermine that structure. American officials expressed distrust and irritation towards Israeli prime ministers, but Netanyahu topped them all. Even before becoming prime minister, he irritated American officials, both Republicans and Democrats. When he was Israel’s deputy foreign minister, Netanyahu met Robert Gates, then the deputy national security advisor in the George H. W. Bush administration, in the White House. Gates ‘was offended’ by Netanyahu’s ‘glibness’ and ‘arrogance and outlandish ambition’. Gates advised National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that ‘Bibi ought not be allowed back on White House grounds’.82 James Baker also had strong misgivings about Netanyahu. Netanyahu was quoted as saying ‘[i]t is astonishing that a superpower like the United States, which was supposed to be the symbol of political fairness and international honesty, is building its policy on a foundation of distortion and lies’. Secretary of State Baker was furious. ‘His language was unacceptable for a senior diplomatic from a friendly country’, wrote Baker in his memoirs. In response, ‘I promptly banned him from the State Department’. Netanyahu sent a letter of apology, arguing that he had been ‘misunderstood’. Baker rescinded the ban but did not meet Netanyahu in the department throughout his tenure.83 Aaron Miller summarized Netanyahu’s relations with some of the American presidents and officials: ‘Madeleine Albright described him 82

Gates, Duty, 388.

83

Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 129.

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as an Israeli Newt Gingrich (and it wasn’t a compliment). Bill Clinton emerged from his first meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 (then serving his first term as Prime Minister) more than a little annoyed by his brash self-confidence. “Who’s the f***ng superpower here?” Clinton exclaimed angrily.’ And Miller concludes, ‘Netanyahu is the first Israeli premier to trigger truly bipartisan recoil’.84 Dennis Ross characterized Netanyahu as ‘overcome by hubris’. Describing Prime Minister Netanyahu’s first meeting with Clinton referred to earlier, Ross wrote, ‘[i]n the meeting with President Clinton, Netanyahu was nearly insufferable, lecturing and telling us how to deal with the Arabs’.85 Madeleine Albright was exasperated by Netanyahu’s unreliability: ‘We would think we had reached an understanding and were moving towards an agreement, only to find that wasn’t his intention at all.’86 In her subtle and gentle way, Albright referred to Ehud Barak winning over Netanyahu in the premiership elections in 1999, ‘although the administration had been officially neutral, Barak’s election was greeted with smiles from the Oval Office to the corridors of Foggy Bottom [the State Department HQs]’.87 Joe Brennen, the CIA director under President Obama, said that Netanyahu was a person without principles and ethics.88 President Obama was angered by Netanyahu’s tendency to preach to him arrogantly.89 Obama was also concerned that Netanyahu was subverting one of the pillars upon which Israel–US special relations were based – the shared belief in democracy and democratic values. It was Netanyahu’s warning, during the March 2015 election, that the Israeli Arab voters were ‘moving in huge numbers to the polls’, as if there was something wrong with Israeli Arabs exercising their civic duty, and voting. This worried Obama:

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Aaron David Miller, ‘The Curious Case of Benjamin Netanyahu’, Foreign Relations, 30 May 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/30/the-curiouscase-of-benjamin-netanyahu. Accessed 10 August 2020. 86 Ross, The Missing Peace, 259–260. Albright, Madam Secretary, 295. Albright, Madam Secretary, 474. Yossi Melman, ‘Ex-CIA Chief: Israel Helped Kill Bin Laden, Netanyahu Is Not an Ethical Man’, Haaretz, 3 December 2020, www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/ .premium.HIGHLIGHT-MAGAZINE-1.9344605. Accessed 20 June 2021. Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April 2016, www .theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525. Accessed 19 September 2020.

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There was discussion in which it appeared that Arab-Israeli citizens were somehow portrayed as an invading force that might vote and that this should be guarded against – this is contrary to the very language of the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which explicitly states that all people, regardless of race or religion are full participants in the democracy. When something like that happens, that has foreign-policy consequences, and precisely because we’re so close to Israel, for us to simply stand there and say nothing would have meant that this office, the Oval Office, lost credibility when it came to speaking out on these issues.90

Obama expressed concern that Netanyahu was driving Israel away from the United States on issues that were common to the two nations, and what was in the heart of their special relations. But there was also politics. The most blatant act of partisanship Netanyahu took was almost openly endorsing the Republican candidate for the presidency, Mitt Romney, who ran against the incumbent Barack Obama in 2012. ‘He inserted himself into the election by presenting himself essentially as a GOP politician’, described a journalist.91 Former Ambassador Dan Kurtzer commented on the gravity of the relations between Netanyahu and Obama: ‘This is the longest period of hostility in relations (between the two countries), and I do not know how to restore the relations as long as this president and this Prime Minister are in office.’92 Two former officials from the George W. Bush administration argued that the break between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration could result in a significant rupture in Israel–US relations, and repair was urgently needed before it was impossible to repair.93 Of course, Netanyahu was not the first Israeli prime minister to quarrel with American presidents and officials. The difference, though, 90

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Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘“Look . . . It’s My Name on This”: Obama Defends the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The Atlantic, May 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2015/05/obama-interview-iran-isis-israel/393782/#Israel. Accessed 19 September 2020. Jordan Michael Smith, ‘After Favouring Romney, Netanyahu Hurries to Make Nice with Obama’, MSNBC, 8 November 2012, www.msnbc.com/msnbc/afterfavoring-romney-netanyahu-hurries-m. Accessed 13 September 2020. Yitzhak Ben Hurin, ‘Not Clear That It Is Possible to Restore Netanyahu-– Obama Relations’, Ynet, 5 August 2014, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L4555027,00.html. Accessed 17 September 2020. Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon, Repairing the US–Israel Relationship, Council Special Report No. 76, November 2016, 3–14.

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was that so many American presidents and officials came to distrust the prime minister and he made Israel–US relations a blatantly partisan matter. At the same time, beyond the personal clashes, there was also substance. The two issues over which Netanyahu clashed publicly with Barack Obama were the settlements – President Obama pressed Netanyahu to freeze the build-up of settlements to allow progress in the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks. Netanyahu refused to do so.94 The two were also divided about the best way to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme. Netanyahu pressed for harsh measures to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, while President Obama advocated diplomatic measures that would lead to an agreement with Iran to curtail its nuclear programme. It was not so much the argument between the two that caused the friction as it was how Netanyahu conducted the debate. Netanyahu addressed Congress in March 2015, accepting an invitation from Obama’s political opponents. While standing on Congress’ podium, he attacked the president’s plan to reach an agreement with Iran. The speech was a direct call of challenge launched from the Israeli prime minister to the American president, and it brought the rift between the two leaders to a new low. The president refused to invite Netanyahu to the White House during that visit – another low. Another sign of the rift was the boycott of the speech by dozens of Democrats. The response to Netanyahu’s speech clearly demonstrated that it was more of a Republican event than anything else.95 Turning Israel–US relations into a partisan matter also worked in the other direction. At this point, it was apparent that the Democratic party was inclined to support the Labour party, while the Republicans backed the Likud. Just a few days before the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, in November 1995, Newt Gingrich said explicitly to David Obey: ‘Dave, you have to understand, I’m Likud; I’m Likud.’96 94

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Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama, 316; Michael B. Oren, Ally (Tel Aviv: Lamiskal, 2015), 89; Zaki Shalom, Israel, the United States, and the Debate Over the Settlements, 2009–2010 (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2015). Dan Williams and Matt Spetalnick, ‘Israel’s Netanyahu Draws Rebuke from Obama over Iran Speech to Congress’, Reuters, 3 March 2015, www.reuters .com/article/us-usa-israel/israels-netanyahu-draws-rebuke-from-obama-overiran-speech-to-congress-idUSKBN0LZ0BS20150303. Accessed 13 September 2020. David Obey, Raising Hell for Justice: The Washington Battles of a Heartland Progressive (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 308.

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One outcome of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s act of defiance was the termination of the close cooperation between the Americans and Israelis over the nuclear agreement negotiations with Iran. According to Ram Ben Barak, former Mossad deputy director, up until this point, the Americans consulted with the Israelis, and in many cases accepted the Israeli comments and suggestions on the agreement’s articles. However, following Netanyahu’s speech, the Americans immediately cut contact with the Israelis, and continued the negotiations without Israeli involvement. Prime Minister Netanyahu read about the agreement that the Obama administration had reached with Iran in the newspapers, like the rest of the Israeli people.97 The partisanship evoked by Netanyahu was more personal than principled. In their attitude to Israel and American relations with Israel, both Republicans and Democrats had expressed their unqualified support for the special relationship between the two nations. On 26 March 2010, 333 members of Congress signed a letter of support for Israel, when the debate between the administration and the Israeli government heated up over the American demand that Israel freeze the building of settlements. The members of Congress wrote to Secretary Hillary Clinton that they ‘reaffirm our commitment to the unbreakable bond’ between the two countries which was based on ‘a shared commitment to core values including democracy, human rights and freedom of the press and religion’. The members of Congress mentioned that the two countries were ‘partners in the fight against terrorism and share and important strategic relationship. A strong Israel is an asset to the national security of the United States and brings stability to the Middle East’. Hence, they were worried by ‘the highly publicized tensions’ between Israel and the United States. Clinton’s response to the letter was swift, confirming that the commitment of President Obama ‘and the entire administration to Israel’s security and Israel’s future is rock solid’.98

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Dan Margalit in Personal Conversation with Member of Knesset Ram Ben Barak, 14 March 2021, www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v= 871472820093559&ref=search. Accessed 15 March 2021. Three hundred thirty-three Members of Congress to Hillary R. Clinton, 26 March 2010, US Department of State, FOIA, Case No. F-2015-11929, Doc. C05899521; R. R. Verna to S. H. Hoyer, House of Representatives, 13 May 2010, ibid.

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Obama repeated that pledge in his own voice at the AIPAC Policy Conference in May 2011.99 Pundits were sure that the rupture in Israel–US relations was inevitable. ‘The thing about Bibi is, he’s a chickenshit’, an unidentified official told Jeffrey Goldberg, who was known to have close ties with Obama’s White House. Goldberg’s conclusion was unequivocal: ‘relations between the Obama and Netanyahu governments have moved toward a full-blown crisis’. Goldberg foresaw the form that the crisis would take: ‘This also means that the post-November White House will be much less interested in defending Israel from hostile resolutions at the United Nations.’100 Well, that did not happen. The Security Council discussed, on 18 February 2011, a resolution calling to denounce Israel for its settlement activity. The American representative to the Security Council voted against the resolution – that is, Susan Rice cast a veto.101 The Democrat congressman from Arkansas, Tim Griffin, a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, justified the vote, arguing that ‘Israel is a long-time ally of the United States, and I am a strong supporter of the partnership between our countries. No third party, including the U.S. or the U.N., can impose an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.’102 Many members of Congress felt the same way and supported the veto. The vote is noteworthy for two main reasons. First, Israeli spokespeople repeatedly portrayed President Obama as particularly hostile to Israel, pointing to his repeated demands from Israel to halt the building of settlements as a sign of his hostile attitude towards Israel. In his memoirs, then Ambassador Michael Oren made that a prime theme in his presentation of President Obama’s attitude towards Israel.103 However, at the 99

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Barack Obama, Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee Policy Conference, 22 May 2011, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/290281. Accessed 20 June 2021. Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Crisis in U.S.–Israel Relations Is Officially Here’, The Atlantic, 28 October 2014, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/ 10/the-crisis-in-us-israel-relations-is-officially-here/382031/. Accessed 24 September 2020; Ilai Z. Saltzman, ‘Not So “Special Relationship”?: US– Israel Relations during Barack Obama’s Presidency’, Israel Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Spring 2017), 50–75. Security Council Report: The Security Council Veto, September 2019. Griffin on US Veto of Israel Resolution; Will Be ‘Steadfast Supporter’ of Israel in Congress; Rep. Tim Griffin (D-AK) News Release, Congressional Documents and Publications, 18 February 2011. This theme is all over Oren, Ally.

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time of the test, the administration stood by Israel even over what was a source of contention between the two countries. Second, Oren says that senior officials from the National Security Council (NSC) and Department of State warned him, before the vote was cast, that if the United States vetoed the resolution, the reaction all over the Arab world would be harsh and violent. ‘A million Egyptian demonstrators will erupt from the Tahrir square and will attack the adjacent American embassy’, they warned.104 That fit into the recurring argument, according to which American’s overly close relations with Israel would undermine America’s standing in the Arab world. Susan Rice raised her hand against the resolution, and the water in the Middle East remained calm. No storms, no marches, no eruptions. In fact, Obama’s commitment to Israel was an unusual demonstration of the undercurrents that determined the nature of Israel–US special relationships. Nothing in his biography indicated that Obama would follow the path paved by his predecessors in his attitude towards Israel. Unlike his predecessors who had no prior knowledge of Arabs and no understanding of the Muslim world, Obama was unaffected by the prejudice prevalent among the American people in their view of the Muslim world and culture. In his story of the unconventional, maverick, life of his mother’s parents and his mother, there is no Sunday school, no reading of the Bible every night. What can indeed be found in the story is a tale of an adventurous mother who eagerly travelled with her son, introducing him to people and cultures far removed from his own, while his was different to others when he was in the United States, as a black person. Thus, instead of reading the Bible, Obama read literature that educated him about what it meant to be a black individual in the United States.105 His mother was a white woman from Kansas and his father an African from Kenya who abandoned his family when Barack was two years old. Young Barack spent a number of years in the relatively multi-cultural and multi-racial Hawaii, and a few years in Indonesia, among Muslims, experiencing and absorbing foreign culture and environment. Encountering foreign culture, young Barack’s mother taught him to acculturate, to ‘disdain the blend of ignorance and arrogance that too often characterized 104 105

Oren, Ally, 217. Barack Obama, Dreams from My Father (Windsor: Three River Press, 1995), 104–105.

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Americans abroad’. When he returned back to the United States from Indonesia, Barack Obama was confronted with implicit and explicit racism, making him painfully aware of the colour of his skin.106 His life experience led him to acknowledge and appreciate the contribution of the Islamic civilization to the advancement of mathematics, science, and the arts. He also was well aware of the devastating effect colonialism had on many people of the Middle East. Especially, Obama was well aware of the ‘searing humiliation endured by Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories’. At the same time, Obama thought that while the Palestinians deserved a state, they should not get it through violence but through negotiations. He did not ignore the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and rejected the ‘systematic’ repression of women so prevalent in the Muslim world.107 Obama’s tenacity, brightness, and resilience helped him to overcome the hurdles that his tumultuous upbringing and childhood threw in his path, and to ascend from one summit to the another, until occupying the White House. Nothing in this journey foretold that he would become such an ardent supporter of Israel. Nothing, except the fact that he was an American, perhaps an unusual one, but an American, nonetheless. His autobiography contains clues to that American side of him. Here he made casual references to his grandmother’s family belonging to the Methodist church, and to his grandfather’s family being ‘decent, God-fearing Baptists’. And when the family moved to Hawaii, how his grandfather enrolled the family in the local Unitarian Universalist congregation. It is also in passing that Obama mentions the fact that his grandfather ‘counted a number of Jews he’d met’ in the furniture store he was working at ‘as his friends’.108 That is, while analysing almost with candid cruelty the complicated circumstances of his life, Obama refers, almost as an after-thought to the features that were common to many Americans, presidents and politicians. These features included also strong awareness to the Holocaust, which made Obama committed ‘to the security of Israel and the Jewish people’.109 While viewing the Holocaust as justification for the establishment of a Jewish state, Obama maintained a relatively balanced view of the causes and consequences of the Arab–Israeli conflict – looking at both sides’ 106 107 108 109

Obama, Dreams from my Father, 36–64. Barack Obama, A Promised Land (London: Penguin Books, 2020), 358. Obama, Dreams from my Father, 16, 20. Obama, A Promised Land, 367–368.

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perspectives. There were the Jewish people, for whom the establishment of Israel ‘was a dream fulfilled’, having ‘a state of their own in their historic homeland after centuries of exile, religious persecution, and more recent horrors of the Holocaust’. But that did not come without a price. ‘For the roughly seven hundred thousand Arab Palestinians who found themselves stateless and driven from their lands, the same events would be part of what became known as the Nakba.’ While acknowledging the Palestinian suffering, he accepted, in broad terms, the Israeli perspective on the nature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Thus, ‘Arab politicians routinely denounced Israel, often in explicit anti-Semitic terms’, and most of the region’s leaders embraced Yasser ‘Arafat as a freedom fighter, ‘even as his organization and its affiliates engaged in escalating and bloody terrorist attacks against unarmed civilians’. At the same time, Obama’s account of the stormy period from the Oslo Accords to the Second Intifada is a story of two people trying to make peace and failing and fighting each other with vengeance. There is no one clear culprit and victim.110 Against the advice he was given, Obama decided to attempt to make peace between Israelis and Palestinians. While taking as a given that Israel was ‘a key U.S. ally’, he was convinced that it was a prime American interest to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. But beyond politics, Obama felt that he was compelled to work towards peace, for similar reasons that caused him to feel strong affiliation with the Jewish experience as it was embodied in the idea of the Jewish state. Obama was impressed by the experience of American Jewish authors such as Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, and Norman Mailer, who ‘tried to find their place in America that did not welcome them’, and was ‘intrigued’ by the influence of Jewish philosophers like Martin Buber on Martin Luther King. He ‘admired’ how the American Jews were more progressive than other ethnic groups and mentioned that some of his ‘most stalwart friends and supporters’ had come from among Chicago’s Jewish community. Obama believed that ‘there was an essential bond between the Black and Jewish experiences’ – exile and suffering, which made him ‘fiercely protective of the right of the Jewish people to have a state of their own’. At the same time, it was these ‘shared values‘ that made Obama ineligible to ignore the hardship under which the Palestinians were forced to live. Denouncing the resort to terrorism 110

Obama, A Promised Land, 623–624.

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by the Palestinian leaders, Obama stated that this should not negate the fact that millions of Palestinians were living under occupation, devoid of self-determination, without basic rights ‘that even citizens of nondemocratic countries enjoyed’, and subjected to arbitrary whims of ‘blank faced, rifle carrying soldiers, demanding to see their papers at each checkpoint they passed’.111 Obama was well aware of the criticism against him in the United States and Israel because of these beliefs and his wish to act upon them. However, his actions proved him as committed to Israel, and the special relations between the two nations blossomed and thrived under his administration no less than under his predecessors. A president with a balanced and sober view of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was no less pro-Israeli than a president that was ready to disown the Palestinian suffering. Like his predecessors, Obama would push the peace process of his own making up to a point, but not beyond that. This point was sufficient to portray him as hostile to Israel in the eyes of his opponents in Israel and the United States, but it was not sufficient to make Israel succumb to his peace plans. Obama was more articulate than President George H. W. Bush, for example, about the need to end the occupation, but he would not do more than Bush, for example, actually did to accomplish that goal. Israel–US relations (also) remained special during Prime Minister Netanyahu’s tenure – not because of him, but despite him. The ties between the two countries were stronger than the bonds between the two persons – an intransigent prime minister and a president. Ehud Barak pointed out that personal chemistry in a political relationship was overrated, although it could help at moments of tension and crisis.112 Obama referred graciously to his confrontations with Netanyahu. He told Steve Kroft of CBS’s 60 Minutes that the Israeli prime minister ‘fired up repeatedly during the course of my presidency’, but ‘despite all the noise and hullabaloo – military cooperation, intelligence cooperation, all of that has continued. We have defended them consistently in every imaginable way.’113 The relations between the two countries were more robust than the sour relations and quarrels 111 112 113

Obama, A Promised Land, 626–628. Ehud Barak, My Country, My Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018), 331. Steve Kroft, ‘Barack Obama: Eight Years in the White House’, CBSNews, www .cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-barack-obama-eight-years-in-the-white-house/ . Accessed 17 September 2020.

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between Netanyahu and the Obama administration’s senior members. President Obama explicated his commitment to Israel in an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2011. ‘America commitment to Israel’s security is unshakeable. Our friendship with Israel is deep and enduring. And so, we believe that any lasting peace must acknowledge the very real security concerns that Israel faces every single day’, he said.114 The actual measures he took in support for Israel proved this right.115

‘The Sleeping Giant of Christian Zionism Has Awakened’ On 19 January 1998, Prime Minister Netanyahu arrived in the United States to discuss the faltering peace process with President Clinton. As soon as he landed, Netanyahu went directly to a gathering of the Voices United for Israel (VUfI), a coalition of conservative Jewish and Christian organizations. It’s organizing committee included Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and Ralph Reed from the Christian Coalition. Netanyahu arrived in the middle of Jerry Falwell’s speech, who saluted him as ‘the Ronald Reagan of Israel’. Later, Netanyahu conferred with Falwell privately.116 This was not Netanyahu’s first association with the VUfI. In April 1997, he addressed the annual conference of the organization, attended by about 3,000 Evangelicals.117 The reception and meeting elicited mixed responses. To start with, the president did not like it. Jerry Falwell was considered an ‘outright enemy’ of President Clinton, and it was reported that in his meeting with Falwell, ‘Mr. Netanyahu apparently angered President Clinton’.118 Members of the Jewish community also expressed disdain.

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Barack Obama, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 21 September, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/296950. Accessed 20 June 2021. Olmert, In Person, 666. Steven Erlanger, ‘Netanyahu, in Washington, Courts Conservatives: Netanyahu, in U.S., Woos Conservatives’, New York Times, 20 January 1998, A1. Seliktar, Divided We Stand, location 2603; Donald Wagner, ‘Reagan and Begin, Bibi and Jerry: The Theopolitical Alliance of the Likud Party with the American Christian “Right”’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Fall 1998), 33–34. Erlanger, ‘Netanyahu, in Washington, Courts Conservatives’, A1; Laurie Goodstein, ‘Evangelicals for Israel’, New York Times, 21 January 1998, A6.

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It was not so much the Evangelicals’ eschatology that deterred American Jews but their conservative agenda and position on domestic matters such as school prayer, vouchers for private and parochial schools, and abortion. The Anti-defamation League’s Abraham Foxman called Netanyahu’s meeting with Falwell ‘crude’ and ‘insensitive behaviour’. David Harris of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) described Netanyahu’s courting of conservative Evangelicals as ‘tricky, very tricky’. Another AJC official was more rigorous in his reaction to Netanyahu’s visit to the rally and his meetings there, ‘these meetings, with these people, at the time, under these circumstances, were a mistake’.119 As was his way, Prime Minister Netanyahu was unmoved by the president’s disdain and American Jewish criticism. The Evangelicals’ support for Israel and its hold over the occupied territories was important enough for Netanyahu to ignore the contentious voices. Hence, Netanyahu probably listened more attentively to the voices coming from neocon Jews, such as Irving Kristol, who supported the alliance with the Evangelicals not only as a matter of expediency but also in terms of content. Kristol sympathized with the conservative message of Evangelicals such as Jerry Falwell, who went against ‘a moral and spiritual crisis as well as a crisis in Western secular-liberal thought’.120 Netanyahu claimed to identify with Falwell’s and his followers’ attack on the liberals, but more so, he saw them as allies in the fight against those who sought to dislodge Israel out of the occupied territories. John Hagee declared at the AIPAC Annual Conference in 2007, ‘[t]he sleeping giant of Christian Zionism has awakened’.121 And indeed, the Christian Zionists raised their voice, this time, against the continued implementation of the Oslo Accords. Jerry Falwell and his fellow Christian Zionists cherished Menachem Begin’s advocacy of Greater Israel, and they remained close to the Likud governments that succeeded him, admiring the ‘unabashed Republican’ Netanyahu.122 119 120

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Goodstein, ‘Evangelicals for Israel,’ A6. Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 181; Seliktar, Divided We Stand, locations 1719–1724. Mairav Zonstein, ‘Christian Zionist Philo-Semitism Is Driving Trump’s Israel Policy’, Washington Post, 28 January 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/ outlook/2020/01/28/trump-thinks-supporting-israel-means-letting-it-dowhatever-it-wants/. Accessed 15 September 2020. Connie Bruck, ‘Friends of Israel’, New Yorker, 1 September 2014; Hummel, Covenant Brothers, 160–161.

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Seeking to prevent further Israeli withdrawal from cities in the West Bank, Jerry Falwell promised to mobilize 200,000 Evangelicals to lobby Congress to stop pressure on Israel to cede any more land to the Palestinians.123 On 18 April 1997, a group of Evangelical leaders, which included John Hagee, pastor of the Cornerstone Church in San Antonio, Texas, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson, published an ad in support of a united Jerusalem. The leaders who claimed that they were ‘communicating weekly to more than 100 million Christian Americans’, stated that Israel should retain sovereignty over the entire city of Jerusalem. The ad included a slip for their supporters to fill out and send to President Clinton, demanding the president to acknowledge Israel’s ‘biblical mandate’ over Jerusalem, and not to press Israel to concede to the idea of dividing Jerusalem.124 Netanyahu and the Likud saw the Evangelicals also as a force that could provide Israel with financial assistance that American Jews denied Israel. In protest of the Likud policy, and mainly its association with Orthodox parties, an anathema to Reformed and Conservative Jewish communities in the United States, Jews reduced their donations to the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). The Likud turned to Evangelicals to offset the losses, and the Evangelicals rallied to help. Hagee announced, on 4 February 1998, that his church would donate $1 million to Israel, and the money would be used mainly for the resettlement of the Soviet Jews in settlements in the occupied territories. Hagee interpreted the arrival of the Soviet Jews as ‘a fulfilment of Biblical prophecy’. When asked if he realized that settling Jews in the occupied territories contravened the official American policy towards the settlements, Hagee replied, ‘I am a Bible scholar and a theologian and, from my perspective, the laws of God transcends the law of the United States government Department’.125 In gratitude for his support for Israel, John Hagee was invited to take part in the ceremonial relocation of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem on 13 May 2018. On his side was another controversial Evangelical pastor, Robert Jeffress, the head of the First Baptist Church, who had a long history of support for Israel and delivered a 123

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Seliktar, Divided We Stand, location 2603; Wagner, ‘Reagan and Begin, Bibi and Jerry’, 33–34. Display Ad 12, New York Times, 18 April 1997, A13. Wagner, ‘Reagan and Begin, Bibi and Jerry’, 46.

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prayer at the ceremony. The presence of the two, especially Jeffress, also marked the strong link between the Evangelicals and President Donald Trump, who ordered the relocation of the embassy. This link was the basis for President Trump’s staunch support for Israel, as was the case with his predecessors. It only helped that Trump’s vice president Michael R. Pence and his secretary of state, Michael R. Pompeo were both Evangelicals.126 With that, at least symbolically, past and present came together. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Donald Trump did not seem to have much in common. However, they shared the belief that, for religious and idealistic reasons, the United States was committed to Zionism and later the state of Israel.

America in Israel When Benjamin Netanyahu won the 1996 election and defeated, against all odds, Labour’s Shimon Peres, it was someone with expertise and knowledge in this field that pinpointed one of the reasons for Netanyahu victory in the elections. While watching the election returns, President Clinton explained that Netanyahu won by using ‘American-style television ads, . . . that were made with the help of Republic media advisors from New York’.127 He did not mean it, but President Clinton observed the ushering of the Americanization of Israeli politics, which was one component within the broader phenomenon – the Americanization of Israel. The Americanization of the Israeli political system had already begun in 1977, when American political campaign experts were hired and employed techniques and methods that were used in American political

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Dan Hummel, ‘Robert Jeffress Was a Natural Choice to Deliver the Invocation at the New U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem’, Washington Post, 15 May 2018, www .washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/05/15/mitt-romneymay-not-like-it-but-robert-jeffress-was-a-natural-choice-to-deliver-theinvocation-at-the-new-u-s-embassy-in-jerusalem/?noredirect=on; Matt Korade, Kevin Bohn, and Daniel Burke, ‘Controversial US Pastors Take Part in Jerusalem Embassy Opening’, CNN, 14 May 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/ 2018/05/13/politics/hagee-jeffress-us-embassy-jerusalem/index.html. Both accessed on 14 September 2020; Zonstein, ‘Christian Zionist Philo-Semitism’. Clinton, My Life, 714. Nicholas Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America’s Competing Interests in the Middle East (Westpoort, CT: Praeger, 2002).

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campaigns. However, at that time, the impact of American campaign experts was limited, as while they set the form of the campaign, the politicians made the decisions on substance. Two developments that took place in the early 1990s made the political campaigns even more similar to the American. The first was Yitzhak Rabin’s decision to run for the Labour leadership and then for the 1992 election premiership. Rabin suggested that the party’s candidate for prime minister would be selected not by a party committee, as was the practice from 1948, but by the registered members of the party in American-style primaries. The party approved the new method, and Rabin won the party leadership in the first-ever primaries in a political party in Israel. Rabin added an American flavour to his campaign when he put himself in the spotlight. It was no longer the party leaders who sought to lead the country, as had been the practice in all previous election campaigns. It was now Yitzhak Rabin and not a party representative who was running for the party leadership and later for the premiership.128 The second development was the passing of the law of direct elections for prime minister in 1992. In the past, the vote was for a party, and the leader of the party with the greatest chance of forming a government was given the mandate to do so. In 1996, the voters cast two ballots, one for prime minister and one for the parties. That gave the elections a much more personal touch, bringing them closer to the American model. The elections were covered by more than one TV channel, which added, too, to the visual appeal of the elections. The election campaign that year was even more similar to American campaigns due to the participation of the American campaigner Arthur Finkelstein, who was hired by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud candidate. Finkelstein was the most influential figure during the campaign, keeping the politicians at bay. He determined not only the form but also the content of the message, and the message was delivered American-style, through short television ads repeated continuously, a practice previously unheard of. The campaign also put the person, Netanyahu, in the limelight, rather than the idea. Shimon Peres, who ran against Netanyahu, also hired American campaign managers, but he could not convince key Israeli advisors to give the consultants the central role Netanyahu gave to Finkelstein in running the campaign. In 128

Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), 424–429.

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1999, two competing American teams ran the election campaigns, each associated with an American party, Democrat or Republican. Ehud Barak hired James Carville, Stanley Greenberg, and Robert Shrum, letting them decide the campaign’s strategy and conduct. Finkelstein continued with the Likud. These two teams, minus Carville, continued during the special elections for prime minister in 2001. In the years to follow, the American consultants’ involvement varied, but the methods they brought with them endured. The strategic polling, voter targeting, concept television advertising, and resorting to newer American methods, such as the turn to social media and viral Internet campaigns all became part and parcel of an Israeli election campaign.129 After winning the election in 1996, Netanyahu planned to mould the prime minister’s office into a White House-like construct. He planned to relocate various divisions from other ministries so he could exercise a presidential-style leadership. This included the creation of an NSC that would circumvent the Ministry of Defence, and his political advisor, Dore Gold, was supposed to head a political desk that would bypass the Foreign Office. A team of lawyers prepared a draft for constitutional changes aimed at transforming the Israeli executive system into a presidential system. However, being the poor manager he was, none of his plans came to fruition.130 Still, even if these measures failed, they nevertheless were an indication of the strong American clout over Netanyahu and Israel. Americanization was an all-encompassing phenomenon, affecting many countries, and it was connected to globalization.131 Israel was a conspicuous case where forces of push and pull drove its Americanization. America came to Israel, and Israel embraced America. While the immediate and more conspicuous demonstration of Americanization is through images and symbols such as Coca-Cola, Levy jeans, and McDonald’s, the Israeli Americanization had started in a more nuanced and subtle manner. The term Americanization was used in Israel’s early years, usually in a derogatory way. Author Aaron 129

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Baruch Leshsm, ‘The Americanization Process in the Television Election Campaign in Israel’, Kesher, No. 34 (2006), 145–150; Dahlia Scheindlin, ‘Impact of American Political Marketing on Israeli Society, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2017), 33–38. Caspit, The Netanyahu Years, 118–119. Ulrich Beck, Natan Szanider, and Rainer Winter (editors), Global America? (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 2.

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Meged expressed his disapproval of Americanization in his play I Like Mike in the late 1950s. The play was about an American tourist from a wealthy Texan family visiting Israel. He was introduced to a young Israeli woman, and they decided to get married. The woman’s family celebrated their upcoming move to the United States, where they expected to find a new life with the groom’s rich family. Alas, the tourist, Mike, fell in love with the Negev and decided to stay in Israel and build a cattle ranch. His bride refused to join him, and the wedding was cancelled when Mike let his pioneer sentiment prevail. A reviewer of the play commended it as ‘very educational’ since it explored afflictions spreading around the country, such as ‘the descended and desertion from the country and the Levantine depreciation against anything with an American scent. We are in the midst of an Americanization in many aspects of our life, and it is good that this new malign disease is ridiculed.’132 While being an anti-Americanization manifesto, the play did have America in it. It presented the frontier and pioneer, two strong American themes, embodied in the path the American Jew took when he went to the Negev, the Israeli frontier, and became a pioneer. In 1962, LaMerhav, the left-wing paper, complained about the ‘demonstration of Americanization’ in daily conduct and culture.133 Masha Shapira, a columnist on house and family affairs for Al HaMishmar, suggested a concrete example of Israeli society’s degradation due to Americanization. She recalled how ‘we read with disgust and a sense of superiority’ Herman Wouk’s portrayal in Marjorie Morningstar of a ‘snobbish’ Bar Mitzva ceremony in the United States. Much to her chagrin, she was invited to a Bar Mitzva of an Israeli child that ‘resembled like two drops of water’ Wouk’s Bar Mitzva. ‘It is impossible to justify’ such an extravagant and expensive ceremony lamented Shapira.134 However, these complaints could not stop the tide. America was coming to Israel, and one means through which America pervaded into Israel was the economy. The connection between economic aid and the spread of the American way of life was made evident with the Marshall Plan. Michael Hogan discussed how the plan also had ‘attributes of a 132 133 134

‘I Like Mike on HaBima Stage’, Herut, 28 September 1958, 4. This Day, LaMerhav, 12 June 1962, 2. Masha Shapira, ‘The House and Family Column’, Al HaMishmar, 7 November 1962, 3.

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cultural crusade on behalf of the “American way”’.135 The same process had been evident in Israel since the second half of the 1950s. With American economic aid, the United States introduced and demanded the application of productivity methods, which included measuring production, efficiency-based lay-offs, and ‘scientific’ management – all measures typical of the American capitalist market and alien to Israel’s socialist market.136 One tool of influence was the Point Four plan – the fourth point in Truman’s inaugural speech in January 1949 – which aimed to make American scientific and industrial knowledge available to underdeveloped countries in order to aid their development.137 Israel was already the recipient of economic support based on Point Four in 1950. As a supplement of the programme, until 1959, about 100 American experts visited Israel, offering help and guidance in various fields – agriculture, industry, transportation, mines, public administration, health, education, construction, and more.138 The experts provided not only pure professional advice. By implication, they also introduced the American way of doing things and the American economic and business language and values. Israel resisted the attempts to apply sweeping private, free-market values on the Israeli economy, arguing that Israel’s special conditions would not allow that.139 Still, Israel endorsed some of the American experts’ principles, such as recommendations on the improvement in production and development of managerial skills, which meant the creation of a managerial ‘class’. These values were introduced by the American experts who presented methodical and professional means for improvement of production and managerial methods. Complementing these measures was the establishment of a business management department at the Hebrew University in mid-1955. The programme expanded 135

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Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 143. Avner Molcho, ‘Capitalism and the “American Way” in Israel’, in Avi Bareli, Daniel Gutwein, and Tuvia Friling (eds), Society and Economy in Israel (Sde Boker: The Ben Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2005), 265–266. President Harry S. Truman Inaugural Address, 20 January 1949, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-4. Accessed 25 June 2021. US Division to Israel Embassy, Washington, DC, 25 October 1950, TNW93, ISA, FO 2312/8; Review of the American Economic Support [undated], ISA, FO 3502/11; Molcho, ‘Capitalism and the “American Way” in Israel’, 269. M. Sherman to G. Meir, 16 September 1957, ISA, FO 3091/1.

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to include the establishment of an industrial engineering department at the Technion and a programme for developing managerial skills in the industry – that is, to actual managers – both in 1957. While the programmes did not instil the ‘American way’ into the Israeli economy and industry, still, American values permeated the Israeli economy and industry, and the Israeli industry endorsed in growing measure the existence of professional and skilled managers. Thus, alongside the objection to what was considered alien to Israel’s socialist ethos, ideas originating from the American capitalist system found their way into the Israeli market and economy.140 Some opposed the message emanating from the universities. Trade union officials complained about ‘the heresy’ that Hebrew University professors of economy presented to their students. The union officials blamed the professors for introducing Americanized economic terms, creating a school of thought that ‘denies the achievements of the Labour movement’. The middle-class Haaretz economic editor agreed with the professors’ approach, arguing that it met the needs of the Israeli market.141 American values were also introduced to the Israelis through a special programme for the distribution of American journals. Israel joined the programme in 1952, and it received from 1953 to 1959 a total of $10 million in loans from the American government to purchase American magazines and journals. Israel would have to pay for the journals in Israeli liras.142 In 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the allocation of $3.5 million for scientific and humanitarian projects in Israel. The project, which operated in twelve countries, included the establishment of chairs in American studies at Israel’s major universities and scholarship funds for studies in fields that ‘will contribute to closer U.S.–Israel understanding’. The US Information Agency (USIA) and the American embassy’s library would provide literature that would advance American ideas in Israel. Thus, the programme would house an American law library for the Israel Bar Association. The programme would also provide assistance with the translation and publication of American textbooks and technical manuals. Other projects would promote the teaching and use of the English language, while other projects would introduce courses on 140 141 142

Molcho, ‘Capitalism and the “American Way” in Israel’, 278–292. ‘Economic Diary’, Haaretz, 11 September 1957, 4. Review of the American Economic Support [undated], ISA, FO3502/11.

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American history and literature.143 Concurrently with this programme, on 26 July 1956, Israel and the United States signed an agreement that put into operation a programme of educational exchange, the US Educational Foundation in Israel (USIEF), which later became known as the Fulbright programme.144 The programme, which became a law in 1946 (Public Law 584, 79th Congress), authorized the secretary of state ‘to conduct a broad program of educational activities and exchanges through grants to students, professors, and specialists in countries all over the world’.145 When he proposed the academic exchange programme, Senator J. William Fulbright envisioned it as a means for promoting world peace. Foregoing ulterior motives, the programme was also intended to promote the American ‘way of life’, and was being viewed as part of American Exchange Diplomacy, or Scholar Diplomacy. The Cold War, whose onset coincided with the inauguration of the Fulbright exchange programme, gave the programme some political hues. The programme became part of the American Cold War arsenal and became a tool in the war for freedom and against Communism.146 Another goal of the programme was the strengthening of the ‘[e]xisting bonds of mutual understanding between the people of the United States and Israel’.147 This is a text found routinely in the case of Israel–US relations, and it was more than merely rhetorical. The academic exchanges brought the United States to Israel, even when Israeli academics travelled to the United States. As suggested, the Israeli impact on the United States was more profound, relating to the very nature and identity of the American people, while the American impact on Israel was more concrete and immediate, carried out by agencies such as the Fulbright programme. In this spirit and as an extension of the goal to export ‘the American way of life’, in 143

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Department Announcement, 17 July 1956, Department of States Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 893, 6 August 1956, 223. ‘United States and Israel Sign Educational Exchange Agreement’, 26 July 1956, Department of States Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 893, 6 August 1956, 224–226. Isabel Avila Ward, ‘The Fulbright Act’, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 16, No. 17 (24 September 1947), 198. Molly Bettie, The Fulbright Program and American Public Diplomacy (PhD dissertation, the University of Leeds, May 2014), 67–69, 78–79; Molly Bettie, ‘The Scholar as Diplomat: The Fulbright Program and America’s Cultural Engagement with the World’, Caliban, Vol. 54 (2015), 233–252. Annual Program Proposal of the United States Educational Foundation in Israel, 21 December 1965, ISA, GL4835/8.

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May 1958, Ambassador Edward B. Lawson signed an agreement for American financing of the translation of literary masterpieces into Hebrew – half of the books should be written by American authors.148 Culture, as an agent of dissemination of American values, was central also to the activities of the American Fund for Israel Institutions (AFII). Although it was not the explicit aim of the AFII to serve as an agent of dissemination of American values in Israel, the very nature of the Fund’s activities made it such an agent. The AFII was established in 1942 when it was called American Fund for Palestine Institutions. Its goal was ‘the promotion of the existence and development of institutions’ that were acting in the education, culture, and social welfare areas that were not supported by one of the larger American funds. The Fund served as a hub for donations from Jewish organizations across the United States.149 As such, it was not different from other Jewish fund-raising organizations, such as the UJA. The difference was in some of its methods. After the establishment of Israel, while supporting educational and cultural institutions, it also engaged in cultural exchange between the two nations. It brought to Israel American artists and performers and arranged the visit of Israeli artists and performers in the United States. That way, the AFII was involved in introducing to the Israelis American culture and values. Thus, in June 1949, the Fund supported an exhibition, ‘American artists in Israel’, displaying in Tel Aviv approximately 150 paintings and sculptures made by American artists. James McDonald, the American ambassador to Israel, stated that the exhibition aimed to showcase American cultural creativity to the Israeli people. AFII planned to present the works of Israeli artists in the United States in the autumn of 1949.150 Jerome Robbins, the famous American choreographer, visited Israel in July 1951, under the auspices of the AFII, with the intention of sharing his experience and knowledge with Israeli dancers and choreographers. Robins returned to Israel in April 1952 to conduct a three-week dance workshop.151 148 149

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Entry for 23 May 1958, DGBD. Review of the Activities of the American Fund for Palestine Institutions, 1944, ISA, FO 1082/12. ‘“American Artists in Israel” Exhibition Opened’, Davar, 20 June 1949, 4; Z. Shazar to K. Newman, 11 November 1949, No. 2683, ISA FO 1082/12. AFII: Announcement to Dancers and Choreographs’, Haaretz, 24 July 1951, 3; ‘Mr. Jerome Robbin’, Davar, 13 April 1952, 3.

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The Martha Graham ballet group visited Israel in February 1956, with the vigorous support of the AFII.152 The Fund also planned to sponsor summer seminars for music and theatre with renowned American artists.153 The Israeli Ministry of Culture appreciated the arrival of experts like Robbins, stating that Israel was lacking in qualified pedagogical forces, therefore, professional musical education in Israel was lagging behind. The Ministry representative asked the Fund to help bring more American music educators to Israel to help students gain better musical education and improve their skills.154 The Fund made it its explicit goal, at its own expense, to send to Israel ‘excellent artistic forces’ to educate the Israeli artistic community, which the Fund compared to the American and UN universal technical support programmes.155 The Fund also sponsored the visit of Israeli artists to the United States to perform and to study and absorb American values. As part of this programme, the Fund launched in 1954 a competitive fellowship programme designed to provide young musicians, painters, and sculptors the opportunity to spend six to ten months in the United States.156 In February 1957, the AFII changed its name to the American–Israel Cultural Foundation. As of 2021, it is still active. In its statement of purpose the AFII was more explicit about its intention to leave an American mark on Israeli culture. It explained that the change of name reflected the Foundation’s new objective ‘to build a two-way cultural bridge between Israel and America’ and ‘to support and nourish the cultural life of Israel’ through the introduction of American artists and performers.157 The infusion of American methods raised, once again, controversy in 1960, when the national broadcasting authority, Kol Israel, requested an authorization to air commercials. The government discussed the

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‘Party on Behalf of the Martha Graham Group’, Haaretz, 19 February 1956, 2. E. Perri to Representative of the Ministry of Education and Culture, 28 April 1952, ISA, FO 1082/12 F. Pelleg to H. Costs, AFII, 14 August 1950, ISA, FO 1082/12. A. Herman, ‘The AFII Activities’, 7 December 1952, ISA, FO 114/26. The Edward Norman AFII’s Stipends, 15 September 1954, 3; ‘Fellowships to Young Talents’, Lamerhav, 24 February 1956, 6. AFII Announcement, 12 February 1957, ISA, G 5549/24; A. J. Lelyeveld to N. Rosenberg, 7 May 1957, AJA, MS0398.

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request, and ministers belonging to left-wing parties regarded the move as Americanization ‘that deprive us from our special experience and character’. There was more to it in the ministers’ objection. They opposed what they perceived as the first step towards the appearance of commercial, private broadcasting service that would replace the government-owned one and deprive the government of controlling the content of the broadcasts.158 Americanization – the actual and conceptual – prevailed. The government approved the introduction of commercials, accepting with that the principle that the free market should seize territories that belonged to the government. The same approach was evident after the minister of agriculture approved in May 1960 technologies that would improve the labour productivity among farmers and land cultivators. Responding to charges of Americanization and pointing out that the measures would result in rising unemployment, the minister stated that Americanization was not necessarily evil but to the contrary. It meant maximizing production processes, a worthwhile move, even if it meant lay-offs.159 The minister of agriculture’s response represented the prevailing mood in the Israeli society. The Israelis liked America and wanted America. In a process that took about two decades to develop and culminated in the 1977 elections, the hegemonic culture that was ambivalent about Americanization gave way to an alternative culture based on individualism. The free market was given the role played in the past by the state for the country’s economic and social development. A rising and expanding middle class, composed of the elites of the public administration, the public economic sector, the business sector, the press, the cultural and artistic establishment, the legal community, and academia, worked closely with ‘parallel elites in the United States’. An Israeli pundit argued that ‘America has become Israel’s alter-ego, politically, economically, and culturally. America has become the teacher, the towering father figure who watches over us; in fact, it holds the keys to life in Israel, the keys of existence.’160 Within two generations, the Israeli hegemonic class transformed its 158

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Y. Bitzor, ‘Commercial Broadcasts at the Price of 1500 IL per Hour’, Maariv, 25 January 1960, 2. ‘Economic Diary’, Haaretz, 31 May 1960, 4. Quoted in Tom Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 50; Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 113.

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identity and cultural perception. From socialism and state involvement in the economy to neoliberalism, capitalism, free market, and ‘small’ government; from ‘cherishing values of collectivism and contribution and sacrifice, to individualism, self-realization, and hedonism’.161 The Likud was the major agent of the transformation, which was one of its primary goals. The Likud represented a world view that, in some respects, diametrically opposed the Labour values. The Likud stressed the importance of the individual, stating that ‘[m]an was not created to serve the state; the state was established to serve man – to guarantee his natural rights, his liberty, his security, and progress’. Devoted to economic liberalism, the Likud advocated the infusion of private capital to advance a ‘self-sustaining, modern and progressive Israeli economy’. With the establishment of the Likud-based government, it removed many economic and market barriers and regulations that freed the Israeli economy and market.162 Truth be said, Begin’s Likud was not utterly neoliberal. Alongside the liberalization of the Israeli economy and the diminishing of government involvement in the economy, the Begin government also saw it as its task to fight poverty. By running projects such as the Neighbourhood Renewal Project, the government tried to improve the living conditions of poor people.163 However, the measures that aimed to liberalize the Israeli economy succeeded in laying the ground for a profound shift in the nature of the Israeli economy and society, eventually leading to the abandonment of the socialist ethos of the Israeli society in favour of a liberal, and later neoliberal, social and economic regime. This was made with profound American involvement. As discussed, the Reagan administration was actively involved in helping Israel overcome the adverse results of the poorly handled transition from a socialist to a liberal economy. The secretary of state and American officials, along with senior economists, were deeply immersed in the discussions and preparations of the recovery plan. Shultz thought that Israel should abandon what remained of its socialist economy and commended the moves taken towards the solidification of an open market economy, or in other words, a capitalist 161 162

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Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel, 114. Moshe Fuksman-Sha’al, ‘The Herut Movement’s Socio-economic Philosophy and Its Implementation after the 1977 Political Upheaval’, Israel Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 6 (2018), 1010–1019. Ben-Porat, ‘Netanyahu’s Second Coming’, 233.

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economy. He also commended the sharp reduction of subsidies, which he thought was an important measure towards the creation of a market free of government intervention. With that, he echoed Reagan’s core message that ‘government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem’.164 The Israelis and the Americans worked closely in devising and implementing the Stabilization plan, which succeeded in ending the era of economic instability and marked Israel’s shift to social and economic neoliberalism. Israeli culture had also undergone a process of Americanization. As mentioned, in 1960, the Voice of Israel radio station started to broadcast commercials; on the foundations of a legendary high school, the first skyscraper decorated Tel Aviv’s landscape in 1965; the Hilton Hotel opened; and Uri Avneri, the editor of HaOlam HaZe, invented a life of glamour in Tel Aviv, Hollywood style. His message was not that life in the United States was better than life in Israel, but that life in Israel could be as good as life in the United States. An American-style country club opened its doors in 1965 on the outskirts of Tel Aviv. Its name was Country Club – in Hebrew transliteration. In 1968, CocaCola entered the Israeli market and a commercial in which a muscular guy was playing tennis became ‘a salient mark of Americanization’.165 The shift was also cultural-economic. One of the first examples of Americanization was the introduction of supermarkets and shopping malls. It was as a gradual process, and not without opposition. The first supermarket was opened in Tel Aviv in 1958 by a company named Super-Sal. At the time it was opened, it was criticized as an example of the Americanization that spread through Israel. However, four years later, Super-Sal was awarded the Kaplan Prize for the advancement of production in the workplace. The award committee commended the supermarket Americanization. Compared to the ordinary grocery shops, ‘sometimes clean, sometimes not, and almost always crowded and smelly’, Super-Sal stood out as testament that the Americanization was actually a blessing. The adoption of the American model led to the 164

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George P. Shultz to Prime Minister Peres, 13 February 1985, ISA, FO 6834/5; Ronald Reagan Inaugural Address, 20 January 1981, www.presidency.ucsb .edu/node/246336. Accessed 22 June 2021; Stanley Fischer, ‘Recollections of the United States Role in the Israeli Stabilization Program’, November 1995, www.piie.com/fischer/pdf/Fischer164.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2020. Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem, 57–58; ‘Tel Aviv Country Club Inaugurated in Plan L Area’, Davar, 22 September 1965, 6.

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development of comfortable and well-designed stores, where, due to the implementation of ‘modern labor systems’, sales expenses declined, leading to a reduction in prices, while new marketing methods were created.166 The first Israeli mall, the Dizengoff Centre, opened in 1977, and since then malls became common features in Israeli economic, social, and cultural landscapes during the 1980s and 1990s. International companies had taken over the malls, replacing the local companies. The Azrieli Mall in Tel Aviv, for example, features many domestic companies and restaurants, but also Billbong, American Eagle, Pull&Bear, Hanes, the North Face, Mango, Nike, H&M, Zara, Adidas, Foot Locker, Desigual, Samsonite, Zara, Il Makiage, Swarovski, and, of course, McDonald’s and Burger King – all American brands or brands popular in American malls.167 Under American influence, a new image of youth emerged. Youth was not presented as a stage along the path towards adulthood but as a distinct category carrying a distinct name – teenagers. This phase ended around the age of thirty, after which, life no longer had meaning. The rise of the teenager was accompanied by the development of a unique consumer market designed and structured especially for them. There was a distinct youth fashion, as well as technologies that were created especially for youths. These technologies, along with other cultural symbols such as the jeans and rock ’n roll, became international codes of the youth culture.168 American popular culture was also introduced to the Israelis through American-imported TV series such as Benson, Lou Grant, and Love Boat. None gained the popularity of the soap opera Dallas, broadcast since February 1981 on Channel 1, the only channel in Israel. The series gained tremendous popularity in Israel, and it reached its pinnacle in March 1982 when some of the series’ actors visited Israel. Prime Minister Begin welcomed

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‘Super-Sal-More Commodities in Less Expenses’, Al HaMishmar, 27 July 1962, 8. ‘Dizengoff Center Will Open Today in Tel Aviv’, Maariv, 8 December 1977, 7; Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem, 59; www.azrielimalls.co.il/. ‫אביב‬-‫תל‬-‫עזריאלי‬/1/‫חנויות‬. Accessed 22 June 2021; Uzi Rebhun and Chaim I. Waxman, ‘The “Americanization” of Israel: A Demographic, Cultural and Political Evaluation’, Israel Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000), 80. Oded Hilbrooner, ‘Dissonance: Resistance and Urban Subcultures of Israeli Youth from the late 1950s to the 1990s’, Iyunim Bitkumat Israel, Vol. 8 (2014), 54–59.

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them in his office and was photographed wearing a cowboy hat that he received from one of the actors.169 The Americanization of the Israeli society accelerated in the 1990s with the introduction of commercial TV channels and cable and satellite networks, along with the accelerated entry of American and international companies to Israel with the termination of the Arab boycott on Israel.170 The first Israeli television network to air commercials was Channel 2, which began its commercial broadcasts in November 1993. Many commercials were stripped of Israeli identifiers, with American ones. The American flag replaced the Israeli in various commercials, even for products manufactured in Israel, aiming to give the product a quality brand, as if to indicate that ‘Made in America’ was better than ‘Made in Israel’. English replaced Hebrew. It was not only the English SALE sign that was used, it was also the name of companies, which carried English names, in many cases, scribed in Hebrew, such as Best Buy, Best Deal, Look, Image, Milk Man, Hyper Neto, Super Center, and Super Deal. The general manager of Toys “R” Us in Israel explained that ‘Israelis are very comfortable with everything that symbolizes America. This is why the Israeli Toys R Us store’s signs are written in both Hebrew and English. It adds something to the special atmosphere.’ An advertiser stated that ‘the Americana so much took us over, that some of the names we give to Israeli made products are deliberately sounded American’. Commercials also used photographs of American presidents, and at least in two cases, President Clinton actively participated in Israeli commercials. A commercial for the American Amana refrigerator stated: ‘[a]n American grant to Israel: one-time gesture by Raytheon, the manufacture of the Patriot [missile] and Amana’. Here the commercial raised several motives: the Made-inAmerica theme; the American support for Israel; and, especially, the reference to the missiles that ostensibly defended Israel during the 1991 Gulf War. The commercials also mixed boundaries, presenting cross-border spaces. Thus, one commercial stated ‘RCA is Coming Home. From America’. Another commercial unified Israel with the United States when it stated ‘5,206 branches in the United States, and one near your home, Ace.’ A commercial for a Buick car said ‘I Buy 169 170

Yediot Aharonot, 14 March 1982, 1. Anat First and Eli Avraham, ‘Jerusalemite Longing for New York: The Manifestation of American Imagery in Israeli Advertisement,’ Megamot, Vol. 42, No. 4 (September 2003), 653.

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American’. Of course, the original intent of the phrase was precisely the opposite – it was used in the United States to encourage customers to buy domestic products. When it was presented in Israel, it conveyed two messages. First, the Israeli consumer was like the American, and second, only ‘Made in America’ was of high quality.171 The introduction of McDonald’s to Israel in 1993 marked a high point in the Americanization of Israel. ‘McDonald’s was more than a hamburger restaurant’, commented an Israeli scholar, ‘[i]t was identified as a cultural institution, and the golden arches became a symbolic statement of cultural reorientation’.172 The introduction of McDonald’s in Israel represented the pull force in operation in the Americanization of Israel. It was a demonstration of ‘Empire by Invitation’, the idea that more than stepping in, America was pulled in by domestic forces who were eager to see America among them.173 An interesting outcome of the Americanization was the change in attitude towards immigration from each country to the other. A young American woman told Thomas Friedman that as a young girl, whenever she visited Israel, people asked her why she stayed in the United States, telling her, ‘this is [Israel] your home. What kind of life do you even have in America?’ Eventually, she made Aliya, only to be asked, ‘why on earth did you leave America? They act like I am some kind of freak.’174 It also worked the other way around. Immigration from Israel was called Yerida – descending. It was viewed as deplorable, as Prime Minister Rabin expressed it in May 1976, when he defined Israeli immigrating to the United States as ‘the refuse of society’.175 In the 1980s, this was hardly the case. As the supposedly fifty-first state of the United States, ‘the Israeli who made it in America’ became the role model. They were no longer Yordim, but ‘Israeli Americans’.176 Evidence of the change in 171

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First and Avraham, ‘Jerusalemite Longing for New York’, 660–665. The quotations are in ibid, 662. Maoz Azaryahu, ‘McIsrael? On the Americanization of Israel’, Israel Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000), 56. Geir Lundestad, ‘“Empire by Invitation” in the American Century’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1999), 189–217. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘America in the Mind of Israel’, New York Times, 25 May 1986, SM22. ‘Rabin: The US’s Position on The Palestinian Issue Is Likely to Erode’, Davar, 6 May 1976, 3. The translation of Nefolet shel Nemushot used here is Tom Friedman’s in Friedman, ‘America in the Mind of Israel’. Friedman, ‘America in the Mind of Israel’.

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the status of Israeli immigrants in the United States was Prime Minister Shamir’s meeting with them during his visit to the United States in February 1987. ‘In an impassionate speech that brought tears to the eyes of many of his listeners’, Shamir urged the Israeli expatriates living in Los Angeles to return to ‘their homeland’.177 177

Patricia Klein, ‘Shamir Urges Israeli Expatriates Living in L.A. to Return Home, Help Country’, Los Angeles Times, 23 February 1987, C1.

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Conclusion What Lies in the Future?

On 3 November 2020, one of the most heated and controversial presidential campaigns in American history ended when the American people elected Joe Biden to be their 46th president. The results of the election did not end the controversy, which continued to the very day of inauguration, on 20 January 2021. America was torn between the supporters of the departing – and most controversial president – Donald Trump, and his opponents, all at a time when the United States was struck by an international pandemic, Covid-19. Israelis followed the election campaign and its outcome with great interest. Their main concern though was not how the United States, a world power, would rebound from the grave divisions wrought by the Trump presidency, or from the disastrous handling of the pandemic by the departing administration. The main question that preoccupied Israelis was whether President Biden was good for Israel, or not? This question is a ritual. Every four years, Israelis weigh the candidates for presidency, asking, ‘who is better for Israel?’ Apparently, the reader of this book knows the answer: it doesn’t really matter, as every president is bound to be good for Israel. Isn’t that the central theme of this book, that for more than a century constants determine the course of American–Zionist, and later Israel, relations? Haven’t I argued repeatedly that the constants, the ideals, override the ephemeral, the interests? Thus, can Israelis rest assured that whoever occupies the White House will be devoted to the special relationship as were their predecessors? Dennis Ross asked the same question, but he was unsure about the answer, because according to him, there were forces within each administration who were not ‘enthusiastic about doing so’.1 Abraham Ben-Zvi, one of the most prominent scholar of Israel– US relations, was even more decisive in expressing his concern about the future of Israel–US relations after Obama’s tenure. In his book, 1

Ross, Doomed to Succeed, xi.

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subtitled ‘the rise and the beginning of the fall of the Israeli–American relations’, he argued that the Obama administration was the precursor of a trend of erosion in Israel–US relations.2 Another pundit suggested that with the Obama administration, ‘[t]here is a significant process of change in Israel–US relations. This is a slow, gradual change, and ongoing. We are in the midst of a transition period, a kind of diskette replacement from a special relationship for a more selective, ambivalent, balanced, and critical relationship.’3 But then Donald Trump came along. Didn’t the policy of Obama’s successor had demonstrated that the constants do indeed determine the course of Israel–US relations? The answer is ‘yes’, the constants do matter. Religion, values, and history were the driving forces behind Israel–US special relations even before Israel existed. These, though, were not forces of nature, and there is nothing inevitable or deterministic about them. The deep sympathy for Israel in the United States is the result of American history and political culture. For Americans, the story of Israel and the Jews entangle with the story of the American people and their experience. Americans identified with the Jewish experience, and later Israel, making it part of their own story and sense of identity. Many of them read the Bible the same way that they read the newspapers and watch news reports on television. Thus, Americans treated God’s decree to Abraham, ‘I will give the entire land of Canaan, where you now live as a foreigner, to you and your descendants. It will be their possession forever’ (Genesis 17/8), as a call for action. The biblical stories were a reality which they experienced through their values – democracy was not merely a civic-political idea but resulted from a religious mandate. They experienced the biblical stories through geography – they imagined Palestine and gave their cities biblical names. They lived the Bible through the Jewish experience and re-lived it with the Jewish repatriation. They viewed the biblical past as part of their heritage not only through the use of the biblical stories as a metaphor for the American situation but also through the assumption that the Jewish Bible was an integral part of their belief. The Old and New

2 3

Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama, 260. Nimrod Goren, Cracks in the Special Relations: Israel–US Relations During Obama and Netanyahu Period (Jerusalem: Mitvim, 2015), 8.

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Testaments were part of the same story and history, which generated the Judeo-Christian civilization. The place of religion within Israel–US relations had evolved over time. Until the 1970s, religion provided mainly the intellectual and emotional basis for American support for Zionism and Israel. A few religously-motivated Americans took actual political action, while the majority of Evangelicals abstained from involvement in the making of the American policy towards the idea of a Jewish state, and later, towards Israel. Since the mid-1920s, Evangelicals refrained from getting into politics, and they did not break their isolation even for the Zionist movement and Israel. During the 1970s, Evangelicals made inroads into American politics, gradually increasing their involvement until they became a major force that used its rising political power to advance their causes, one of which was Israel. With that, and alongside the Jewish community, Evangelicals were a major force in the promotion of the case for Israel in the United States. Thus, for Americans, religion became a bedrock for of their support for Israel, and a tangible political power that shaped policy. American Jews resented the connection between Israel and Evangelicals, but Israeli governments welcomed them with open arms. In fact, Israel actively sought to reach out to Evangelical communities, even during the period of their seclusion. Since the 1950s, Israeli diplomacy acted in two ways to advance Israel’s cause among Evangelical churches. Israeli diplomats reached out to Evangelical communities and forged relationships with them. In Israel, the Foreign Office encouraged pilgrims to visit the country, and actively helped them in their journey. Of course, the Foreign Office welcomed all tourists, acting to make them ambassadors of goodwill, but the office invested particularly in Evangelical tourists. Government officials, including prime ministers, participated in the campaign to reach out to Evangelical leaders and communities. Golda Meir befriended Bill Graham, but Menachem Begin was the first prime minister to strongly embrace Evangelical leaders such as Jerry Falwell. The rise of Evangelicals as a political power juxtaposed with the coming to power of the Likud. What brought them together most was their mutual devotion to the idea of the Great Land of Israel. The Likud promoted the idea and worked to implement it, while Evangelicals provided the Likud with political backing and financial support.

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Americans hailed the values both nations shared, and mainly democracy, which, for them, was not only a formal system of governance but also the embodiment of a civic religion derived from the Protestant ethic. They treasured what they regarded as the similarities between the Zionists and later, Israelis, and themselves, the pioneer spirit and the conquest of the wilderness. Zionists and Israelis brought a new spirit to a god-forsaken land, as the first colonialists did. With more than a grain of salt, Americans were practicing Orientalism in their dismissal of the region’s indigenous people when they celebrated the successful Jewish efforts to cultivate and nourish territories that they regarded as having been neglected for generations. Americans sympathized with the Jews’ suffering of two millennia and felt that it was time to rectify the historical injustice. This predilection was one reason for the American support of the Zionist movement already before the Holocaust, and it strengthened in its aftermath. History was meaningful for Americans, as Jewish history also resided within their own heritage. The story of Puritans’ travel from Europe to America drew on the biblical story of the Jewish escape from Egyptian enslavement and the gruelling journey to Canaan. Thus, the reference to history as justification for the Zionist cause carried not only ‘historical’ meaning but also, and once again, biblical. American people from various walks of life, from presidents to officials, to members of Congress, members of the media, and many American ordinary people shared these sentiments. Americans drew from Israel – not the state, but the idea – values and concepts. The attitude to the Bible, the Judeo-Christian heritage, the existence of Israel as a justification of beliefs, and a source of self-identity – all led Americans to feel that they were in debt to the state of Israel. While the past provided a strong anchor on which the relations between the two nations rested, Israel was further mediated through various mediums and through the passage of the years to the American people. News reports, books, and films, all conveyed to the American people images of Israel that evolved over time, thus delivering the message of their ally in the Middle East who fulfilled the biblical prophecies; the pioneers exploring the frontier; David beating up Goliath; a regional power, serving as a close US ally in the Middle East; a state sharing with the United States common goals, most recently the War on Terror; and a modern nation that became a hub for innovation, the Start-Up Nation.

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With that, the ideological basis upon which the relations between the nations rested continued to expand and grow. The view of the American people was also that of presidents – from Wilson to Trump. Presidents did not respond to public opinion or interest groups on Zionist- or Israeli-related matters but shared with the American people values, thoughts, and beliefs that informed their thinking on Zionism and Israel. Of course, presidents had to make decisions based on various factors and reckon with interests. With the onset of the Cold War, American administrations sought to keep the Middle East under Western clout, and with the Soviet entry into the region in 1955, to prevent the spread of the Soviet influence furthermore. To do so, presidents and their lieutenants practiced what they depicted as an even-handed policy towards Israel and the Arabs. This was a sham, though, as the American approach was never really even-handed. As mentioned, Robert Komer candidly admitted that the even-handed policy was ‘a screen of smoke’, a ‘trick’ the United States used to create an appearance of ‘objectivity’. The trick worked ‘nicely’, but the truth of the matter was that ‘[t]he real substance of the American policy toward Israel is a complete preference of Israel over the Arabs’.4 This was the case in 1965, as it was in 1950 or 1956. The Americans had shown their preference for Israel in various ways. In a gradual process that took about twenty years to complete, the United States became Israel’s principal arms supplier. The United States also came to Israel’s rescue when it encountered acute economic difficulties during its first years of existence. It would do so under the guise of universal aid plans, but in fact, the Americans provided Israel with a level of aid that was unproportionally high to its size compared with what other recipients of American economic aid would get. And there were the special aid programmes that were assigned to Israel alone. With the passing of time, even the pretext of universal aid plans was no longer used. Economic aid, which was complemented in the 1960s with military aid, swelled to almost monstrous proportions. Economic and military aid was a conspicuous feature of the special relations between the two nations. But no less important was the process by which Israel got the support. Israeli and American

4

Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 5 February 1965, FRUS 1964–1967, Vol. 18, Doc. 134.

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diplomats and officials talked freely with each other, with no hindrance. They had almost unfettered access to the corridors of power both in Jerusalem and Washington, DC, arguing, exchanging views, and making suggestions – and each side would listen and respond. The American ambassador and his staff frequently met with Israeli officials – at all levels, and Israeli diplomats and officials received the same treatment in the United States. The Israelis, though, had an advantage, as they had more venues through which they could send messages to the administration. There were the American Jews, and there were members of Congress, and there was the American public, and there were officials who were close to the president and could convey to him the Israeli message. Throughout all the years, the dialogue, which was very close and intimate, only deepened, increased, and expanded. Things looked quite different from the Israeli perspective. Israeli foreign policy was solidly realistic. Zionists, and later Israelis, did not appreciate American values and ideals. Assuming that the relations between the two states would be stronger if based on interests, Israelis acted to persuade American administrations that Israel could serve American regional military and strategic goals better than the Arabs. While there was no question that militarily Israel could contribute more than the Arabs in case of a Cold War confrontation in the Middle East, it was the oil fields and the Middle East’s key strategic location that skewed American strategy towards the Arabs. At the same time, Israeli claims that it would serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East were hollow. President Carter was the first to talk about Israel’s contribution to America’s Cold War effort, and the presidents that succeeded him made the same point as well. Israel had no intention to actually expose itself as an opponent of the Soviet Union. First, the Israelis knew very well that they stood no chance in a military conflict with the Soviet Union. Second, Israeli governments hoped that the Soviet government would let the Soviet Jews immigrate to Israel, and no Israeli government would jeopardize that opportunity, as meagre as it was. Thus, if measured in terms of power, economy, and geostrategic considerations, there was no doubt that American interests were aligned with those of the Arabs. The change that took place in the strategic relations between the two nations did not come about because the Americans changed their mind about Israel’s value as a strategic ally. Israel’s strategic importance was not the reason for the special relationship between Israel and the

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United States, but its result. In other words, the existence and endurance of those relationships were not (and are not) determined by strategic interests. As said throughout the book, officials from both countries held close discussions over various issues. Initially, it was mainly about Israel’s economic need. However, the proximity led to the expansion of the issues Americans and Israelis discussed and gradually included strategic issues. This had started even before the two states viewed their relations as strategic. While not presented as such, the strategic relations between the two countries began with intelligence corroboration, and with time and in response to concrete events, the strategic relations expanded. Thus, the two countries studied the lessons of the Israeli–Arab wars jointly, shared information on the performance of American and Soviet weapons on the battlefield, and studied together means, methods, and tools of combat. At the same time, the two countries deepened their economic and industrial ties which in turn led to an increase in the level and intensity of the conduct of joint military-industrial projects. The two countries signed agreements for collaborative projects in various fields – cultural, economic, and industrial. The joint work on the anti-ballistic missile systems originated from the American Star War project was one high point in the strategic relations between the two countries. Relations between the two countries have evolved into an intricate web in which ideals and interests wove and intertwined, mutual feelings of closeness mixed with collaborations in many and varied fields – military, civil, strategic and industrial, cultural, and educational. There was hardly an aspect of life in which the two nations were not connected. All of that does not mean that it was all harmonious and idealistic. Reader of newspapers over the years often found news stories about sharp divisions between the Israeli and American governments and reports about a crisis clouding the relations between the two countries. Sometimes, those reports were even true. The quarrels and arguments revolved mostly around the peace process in general, and particularly the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Successive administrations based their approach to the peace process on two premises. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict was an open wound that tarnished US relations with Arab countries, and hence, the United States should intervene to find a solution. Second, the Israeli settlement project was a major obstacle along the road to peace. While the second premise sounded logical, the first certainly was false. Almost every

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administration since President Truman has argued that the relations with Israel, or aspects of those relations, would have an adverse impact on the American position among Arabs. This prediction was proved wrong time and again. The American struggle against the settlements was problematic, too. Until President Trump, every president since President Johnson did not acknowledge Israel’s right to build settlements in the occupied territories. The degree of opposition to the settlements varied. President Nixon was somewhat perfunctory, while Democrat Carter and Republican Bush the father were the most strident in their objection to the settlements. Neither though used heavy guns in the fight against the settlements. George H. W. Bush’s refusal to give Israel guarantees was the harshest measure taken in protest against the settlements, and even that was little more than a symbolic measure which did not deter the Israeli government. The Americans lost the battle against the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, when there was a battle, not only because of Israel’s stubbornness, but also because of their acceptance of the Israeli narrative as to the meaning and nature of the Israeli–Arab conflict. Every administration acknowledged what Israel called its security needs, which included an agreement, even if tacit, that security and strategic reasons were sufficient reasons for the build-up of settlements. Some presidents suggested that the better solution for Israel’s security problems would be peace, but they recognized that it was not in Israel’s hands alone. Since the 1967 June War, almost every administration has presented a peace plan, and every such plan has failed. Beyond the specific reasons for the failure lay the profound reason which was that peace was only achieved when the parties wanted it. And then, they achieved peace on their own. The Americans were invited to join, but only as facilitators. There is no question that the Arab–Israeli conflict deserves ample discussion. However, the abundance of words dedicated to the place of the conflict in the Israel–US special relationship distorts the actual nature of the relations. The arguments, debates, controversies, plans presented, and plans rejected were just the tip of the iceberg, when the iceberg is Israel–US special relationships. As suggested, those relations were made of much more than the discussions over the Israeli–Arab conflict. There were the ideals both nations shared, the deep sense of sympathy and identification both nations felt towards each other, and the cooperation over so many issues, encompassing so many fields,

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from cultural exchanges to the development of anti-ballistic missiles. The relations were based not only on how presidents, prime ministers, members of cabinet and members of Knesset and senior officials saw them and set its course. It was also the way Americans and the Israelis saw and see each other, sharing a deep sense of sympathy and commitment, while working together on so many issues. It is this notion of joint enterprises in so many aspects of life that led Antony Blinken, Joe Biden’s secretary of state, to state that he had no doubt that the Biden administration would continue walking along the same path of its predecessors, working together with Israel on the many things that they were corroborating on.5 What was the place of what was known as the Jewish or Israeli lobby? Was it really their political power that made administrations endorse pro-Israeli policy, even when it went against American national interests? Were the American legislators and politicians acting with the Jewish vote hovering as a sword over their heads? Presidents and members of Congress answered that question, in action and in words. Most of the time, presidents responded positively to the various Israeli requests, sometimes even against American interests. However, when they thought that it better served US interests, presidents did not succumb to the pro-Israeli pressures, as ferocious as it might be. This was the case when presidents decided that American interests called for denying Israel arms, or supplying arms to Arab. Members of Congress were no less, if not more so, susceptible to public opinion, and hence, were ostensibly more prone to succumb to the pro-Israeli lobby. Senator Case, one of the signatories of the letter signed by seventy-six senators in support of supplying arms to Israel – which was already mentioned – had an answer worth recalling – ‘[t]he letter was representative of the true feelings of the Senate, not the pressure of Jewish groups’.6 These words may be dismissed as mere rhetoric, but there is enough evidence to indicate that members of Congress simply supported Israel. First, the support goes back to a time when there was no Israeli lobby, and the political power of the supporters of the Zionist movement and Israel, hardly existed. Second, even members of Congress from states where there was barely a Jewish constituency 5

6

Itamar Eichner, ‘From the Palestinians, Via Iran to the UN: Biden’s Vision of the Israeli Issue’, Ynet, 6 December 2020, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/ ryqS6uKiv#autoplay. Accessed 22 June 2021. Memorandum for the Record, 11 June 1975, DGFPL.

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that could have an impact on the political fate of the member of Congress supported Israel. Third, there were several members of Congress who were critical of Israel, and still, they were elected and served in Congress for quite a while. Most known among them was Senator Fulbright or at a time when these words are written, the three members of the House of Representatives known as ‘The Squad’, Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Ilhan Omar (MN), and Ayanna Pressley (MA), who along with an additional fourteen members of the House voted against a resolution condemning Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) in July 2019.7 That is, presenting a pro-Israeli stand was not the only strategy for survival in Congress. The most convincing argument explaining the presidents and members of Congress’ support for Israel was the fact that this was the prevalent sentiment among Americans. The American people supported Israel, and presidents and members of Congress were just as American. They did not respond to public opinion or interest groups on Zionist- or Israelirelated matters but shared with the American people values, thoughts, and beliefs that shaped their thinking on Zionism and Israel. They all shared the same feelings towards Zionism and Israel, which was based on the constants. The Israeli people were grateful for the American support. Unlike the Israeli government’s pragmatic attitude towards the United States, Israelis loved America. There was a short period, during the early years of the nascent state that America was a derogatory symbol, but the trend changed pretty fast. American mass consumption’s values and bureaucratic concepts permeated into Israeli society and the economy through various agencies. Israelis had endorsed with enthusiasm everything that was American, and culture, politics, the media, and the economy had undergone Americanization. America was for the Israelis a source of abundance in which they wanted to take part, cherishing the shift from socialist values to American-style neoliberalism. They consumed American goods and values, and they saw the United States as a destination to aspire. Just as the East European Jewish immigrants sought to get to the United States, Di Goldene

7

Aiden Pink, ‘Here Are the 17 Members of Congress Who Voted against Condemning BDS’, Forward, 24 July 2019, https://forward.com/fast-forward/ 428179/congress-bds-aoc-tlaib-omar/. Accessed 22 June 2021.

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Medine (the Golden Land), so their ancestors who arrived in Israel, sought to make the same journey, in actuality or in idea. So, what does the future hold? Paradoxically, a clue can be found in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s sour relations with American presidents and senior officials. As mentioned, Netanyahu irritated many American officials who found him arrogant, and untrustworthy. Fortunately, President Obama cared more about the integrity of Israeli–US special relations than Prime Minister Netanyahu. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with whom Netanyahu also argued endlessly, summarized, ‘even when we disagreed, we maintained an unshakeable commitment to the alliance between our countries’.8 And indeed, this is the case. The relations between the two nations did not depend on the relations between a prime minister and a president, for the better or for the worst. The constants, religion, values, and history, which were strengthened by concrete measures that brought the two countries even closer, were more robust than individuals who soured the relations. As long as the American people abide by the constants, and the Israelis will prove to be the people the Americans believed they are, Israel–US relations will continue to be special. 8

Clinton, Hard Choices, 307.

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Index

Abbot, Abiel comparing the United States to Ancient Israel, 7 ABC America Held Hostage, 287 The Stars Salute Israel at 30, 214 Abraham the Patriarch, 7 Abrahamson, James A., 298 Abrams, Creighton, 266 Abrams, Elliot, 242 Abu Nidal, 276 Acheson, Dean, 54, 59, 61, 71–72 arms sales to Arabs, 69–70 Israel, 54–55 Jewish lobby, 72 partition plan, 48 Zionism, 54 Achille Lauro, 277, 289 Adams, Sherman, 79 Adelson, Sheldon, 23 Adlay Stevenson visit in Israel, 156 Adolf Eichmann, 92–93 Afghanistan, 61, 261, 295 AFII, 345–346 AFL-CIO, 71, 160 Agnew, Spiro, 193, 198 AIM 9L air-to-air missiles, 181, 238 AIPAC, 65–67, 119–120, 185, 195, 230, 247, 277–278, 304–306, 310, 312 arms sales to Jordan, 277 Congress, 66, 247 Israel as strategic asset, 269 White House, 66 AJC, 48, 71, 150, 231, 243–244, 278, 336 Al Fath, 276 Al HaMishmar, 341

Al Qaeda, 286, 294 Alabama, 149 Albright, Madeleine Israel as democracy, 15 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 325 Algeria, 288 All in the Family, 214 America, 374 American, 380 American Christian Palestine Committee, 16, 153 American conservatives Palestinian self-determination, 257 American Council for Judaism. See ACJ American Fund for Israel Institutions. See AFII American Fund for Palestine Institutions. See AFII American Jewish Press Association, 245 American Jews 1967 June War, 146–148 1973 October War, 185 1982 Lebanon War, 254 anti-1982 Lebanon War, 254–255 anti-Semitism, 243 AWACS, 244, 246 Bush, George H. W., 303 Carter, Jimmy, 220, 229, 233 Congress, 185 critic of Begin, Menachem, 230 displaced people, 40 Evangelicals, 356 Falwell, Jerry, 335 Israel, 121 Israel as strategic asset, 268 Jewish state, 47 Kennedy, John F., 101 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 336 political power, 115

385

386 American Jews (cont.) public opinion, 37 public pressure, 71–72, 82–83 Reagan, Ronald, 243 Weinberger, Casper, 244 White Paper, fighting the, 35–36 American liberals Israel, 258 Palestinian self-determination, 257 American press fight the White Paper, 36 Israel as pioneer, 55–56, 88 American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, The, 192 1973 October War, 192 American public opinion 1973 October War, 193 American Sailors Association, 138 American–Israel Cultural Foundation. See AFII American–Israel Public Affairs Committee. See AIPAC Amit, Meir, 141–142 Amitay, Morris, 66 Angleton, James J., 289 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (1946), 46 Angola, 270 Annapolis Summit, 2007, 315 anti-Semitism, 24, 27, 34, 83, 219, 240, 250, 257, 333 Anti-terrorism Cooperative Agreement, 1996, 293 apocalypse, 8, 150, 152, 241 Arab League, 68 Khartoum Resolution, 159 Arab–Israel conflict, 68–69, 78, 98, 127, 160, 162, 177, 184, 204, 265, 317, 361 1948 War, 14, 52, 59, 61, 68, 92, 149, 226, 258 1956 Suez War, 79, 85–87, 97–98, 101, 116, 149 1967 June War, 1, 3, 146, 152–154, 157, 196, 205, 256, 297, 361 1967 June War compared to Vietnam War, 142–146 1973 October War, 2, 22, 195, 198, 200, 265, 297

Index 1982 Lebanon War, 251–254, 256, 258–259 2014 Protective Edge, 320 armistice agreements, 68, 85 Cold War, 163, 182 Lebanon War, 2006, 320 military balance, 64, 70, 94–96, 105–108, 112, 123, 133, 162, 172, 179, 181–182, 319 War of Attrition, 180, 183 Arabs, 22, 24, 32, 34, 42–43, 46, 63, 70, 72, 78, 82, 84, 95, 98, 106, 110–112, 115, 145, 149, 159–160, 162–163, 169, 184, 190, 196, 202–203, 215, 227, 263, 304–305, 314, 318, 321, 326, 331, 359, 361 immigration to Palestine, 258 Middle East defence, 73 Arafat, Yasser, 224, 254, 292, 315–317, 333 Hamas terror attacks, 316 Arel, Moshe, 64 Arens, Moshe, 263–264, 310, 323 Argentina, 92 Argov, Shlomo, 167, 213, 253 Arrow, 298–300, 305 Asch, Shalom, 90 ATF, 296 Atlanta, 219 Atlee, Clement, 49 Auster, Paul, 147 Australia, 296 Avneri, Uri, 349 Avrech, Mira, 104 AWACS, 240, 244, 246–247, 279, 291 B’nai B’rit, 118 Baehr, Karl, 153 Baghdad Pact, 94 Baker, James, 24, 243, 302, 304–306, 308–309, 311–312, 314, 325 American Jews, 302 Greater Israel, 304 Israel, 302, 304–318 Baldwin, Hanson, 145 Balfour Declaration, 15, 26, 30–31, 36 Bank for Industrial Development, 205 Bank of Israel, 135 Baptist Missionary Association of Arkansas, 22

Index Baptist World Alliance Conference, 155 Barak, Ehud, 280, 316, 318, 321, 326, 334, 340 Barbour, Walworth, 104, 116, 121, 124, 146 BARD, 235, 238, 284 Barker, Evelyn, 250 Bar-Lev, Chaim, 130 Baruch, Bernard, 23 Bedek, 129–130 Begin, Menachem, 217–218, 220–223, 226, 228–229, 231, 237, 242, 246–253, 255, 264, 267, 269–272, 274, 316, 336, 348, 350 Carter, Jimmy, 226 Falwell, Jerry, 356 mental state, 251 Reagan, Ronald, 248–253 Resolution 242, 226 suspension of Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation, 1981, 250 US–Israel strategic relations, 271 War of Choice, 256 Beirut, 253, 257, 276, 286, 288 Bell, Nelson L., 148 Bellow, Saul, 230, 254, 258, 333 Ben Barak, Ram, 329 Ben Gurion, David, 19, 27, 37–38, 43, 46, 52, 58, 62, 65, 69, 73, 76, 79, 83, 92, 96, 99, 102, 109, 111, 113–114, 116, 289 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 76, 95 Holocaust, 106, 108, 113–114 Israel’s foreign policy, 19 John F. Kennedy, 101–102, 106, 108 public opinion, 19–20, 43 resignation, 114 Truman, Harry S., 46 United States, 19–20, 40–41, 114–115 Ben-Zvi, Abraham, 354 Ben-Dor, Y., 156 Berg, Samuel, 313 Berger, Senta, 92 Berlin, 289 Bethel, 10 Bethlehem, 10, 153 Bible, 30, 56, 118, 148, 150, 152, 169, 215, 219, 226, 331, 337, 357

387 Book of Genesis, 9–10 Inerrancy, 9 Bicentennial World Marine Festival, 212 Biden, Joe, 101, 354, 362 Biltmore Hotel, 40 Biltmore Programme, 40, 48 Binational Agricultural Research and Development. See BARD Binational Industrial Research and Development. See BIRD Binational Scientific Foundation, 284 BIRD, 235, 284 Bitan, Moshe, 205 Blackstone, William E., 8 Blaustein, Jacob, 71, 78, 171 Blinken, Antony, 362 Bloom, Allan, 323 Blumenthal, Michael, 206 Boeing, 289, 299 Bookbinder, Hyman, 231 Boone, Pat, 90–91, 156 Bosnia, 261 Boston Daily Globe, 56 Boston Transcript, 30 Bowman, Glenn, 154 Brandeis University The Schusterman Centre for Israel Studies, 359 Brandeis, Louis, 18, 35, 38 Wilson, Woodrow, 28–29 Zionist movement, 26 Brannan, Charles F., 61, 71–72 Breira (Alternative), 230 Brennen, Joe Netanyahu, Benjamin, 326 Brezhnev, Leonid, 187 Brotherhood Covenant, 10 Brown, George R., 15, 66 Brown, Harold, 267 Brynner, Yul, 92 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 220, 225, 228 settlements, 232 Buber, Martin, 333 Buchanan, Pat, 168 visit in Israel, 157 Bundy, McGeorge, 107, 123 Burns, Arthur, 79 Burns, George, 214 Burns, Martin, 79

388 Bush, George H. W., 147, 287, 291, 302–304, 309, 312, 325, 334, 361 American Jews, 312–313 Holocaust, 301 Israel, 301–304 Israeli narrative, 301 Jewish lobby, 306 settlements, 301–304, 361 Shamir, Yitzhak, 301, 304, 308–309 Bush, George W., 21, 64, 218, 239, 243, 286, 292, 300, 317, 320–321, 327 Israeli narrative, 317 peace process, 317 settlements, 317, 322 War on Terror, 293–294 Zionism, 12 Byroade, Henry, 67 Cairo, 109, 141 Califano, Joseph A. Jr, 236 Camp David Summit, 1978, 227 Camp David Summit, 2000, 315, 317 Canaan, 8–10, 211 Canada–Israel arms sales, 95 Canham, Erwin, 151 Carmel, 10 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 105 Carpenter, Denis A., 157 Carter, Jimmy, 214–216, 219–225, 227–229, 231–234, 236, 238–240, 242–244, 256, 267, 359 American Jews, 234 Arms sales to Arabs, 22 Begin, Menachem, 222, 228 Congress, 234 Holocaust, 17 Israel, 214–216, 220–222 Israel and Cold War, 266 Israel as democracy, 15, 267 Israel–Egypt peace, 227 Judeo-Christian tradition, 215 Palestinians, 224–225 Peace, 223–228 Rabin, Yitzhak, 222 religion, 216, 219 Sadat, Anwar, 228 settlements, 232–233, 361

Index West Bank, 221, 226 Zionism, 12 Carville, James, 340 Case, Clifford P., 202, 362 Casey, William, 289, 291 Cast a Giant Shadow, 92 CBS, 22 60 Minutes, 294, 334 CBU, 183, 209 Cecil, Robert, 26 Celler, Emanuel, 111, 139 Chamoun, Camil, 98 Chapman, Oscar L., 71–72 Chariot of Gods, 152 Chautauqua, New York, 11 Cheney, Richard (‘Dick’), 248, 310, 321 American Jews, 321 Israel destroying Osirak nuclear reactor, 248 chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 66 China, 281 Christian Century, 154 Christian Coalition, 335 Christian Holy Spirit, 155 Christian Science Monitor, 151 Christian Voice, 216 Christian Zionism, 3, 13, 151–152, 156, 217, 219, 226–227, 241, 303, 336 1967 June War, 148–152 Greater Israel, support of, 336 Oslo Accords, opposing, 336 Christianity, 367 anti-Semitism, 16 persecution of Jews, 16 Christianity Today, 148, 216 Christians United for Israel, 218 Christopher, Warren, 315 CIA, 107, 123, 181, 187, 285, 289–292, 326 Clayton, William B., 156 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 30 Cline, Ray S., 186 Clinton, Bill, 147, 280, 308, 312–317, 326, 335, 337–338, 351 American Jews, 313–314 Israeli narrative, 316 Jewish vote, 312 military aid to Israel, 318

Index Netanyahu, Benjamin, 326, 335 Oslo Accords, 315 peace, 314–317 Rabin, Yitzhak, 314 visit in Israel, 157 War on Terror, 293 Zionism, 12 Clinton, Hillary, 15, 329 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 364 visit in Israel, 157 Closing of the American Mind, 323 Cluster Bomb Units. See CBU Cobra helicopter, 209 Coca-Cola, 340 Israel, in, 349 Cohen, Benjamin V., 35, 38 Cohen, Michael, 23 Cohen, Richard, 256 Cold War, 39, 79, 98, 100, 127, 152, 169–170, 175, 179, 215, 242, 260, 303, 358 end, 318 Columbus Dispatch, 30 Coming of Russian Invasion of Israel, 194 Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, 67, 103, 229 Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, 111, 172 Congress, 5, 21, 30, 33, 36, 49, 51, 66, 75, 83, 97, 112, 128, 132–133, 138–140, 156, 160, 165, 184, 192, 195, 198, 202, 204, 213, 217, 247, 279, 285, 290, 293, 296, 306–307, 320, 322, 325, 330, 337 1982 Lebanon War, 254–255 AWACS, 246 Balfour Declaration, 2 Israel, 22–23, 202–203 Israel as democracy, 329 Israel as strategic asset, 268 Jewish lobby, 22, 32 Jewish national home, 30–32 letter to the president, 1967, 139 letter to the president, 1974, 201 letter to the president, 2010, 329 QME- P.L. 110-429, 319 Resolution 323 (Lodge–Fish joint Resolution), 31

389 Congress, members against arms sales to Arabs, 70–71 Congress–Israel economic aid, 63, 65 military aid, 196, 264 Cornell Tech campus, 284 Cornell University, 284 Covid-19, 354 Crum, Bartely C., 46, 71 Cuba, 270 Cyprus, 59, 276 Cyrus, 30 Czechoslovakia, 36, 291 Davar, 104, 186 David, 357, 370 David Sling, 299–300 Davis, George T. B., 149 Davis, Sammy Jr., 214 Dawidowicz, Lucy, 258 Dayan, Moshe, 142–143, 191, 228 United States, 228 Decter, Midge, 242 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 164 Defence Policy Advisory Group. See DPAG Delta Force, the, 288 Democratic party, 21, 23, 35, 44, 67, 75, 165, 242 Labour party, 328 Department of Defence arms to Israel, 180 Department of State, 24, 33, 53, 55, 57, 59, 66, 70, 108, 139, 178, 192, 274, 285 a Jewish national home, 32 anti-Zionism, 23 arms to Israel, 180 Israel as strategic asset, 268 Jewish state, 46 Zionism, 23–25 détente, 163 Development Loan Fund. See DLF Dewey, Thomas E., 41 Dillon, C. Douglas, 126 Dimona nuclear plant, 113, 116, 125 Dinitz, Simcha, 173, 193, 195, 199, 202, 213 1973 October War, 185–190 American Jews, 192 Congress, 192

390 Dinitz, Simcha (cont.) Kissinger, Henry, 194–195 Operation Yonatan, 213 disengagement agreements, 1974, 221 disengagement, 2005, 322 DLF, 134, 136 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 190 Douglas, Kirk, 214 DPAG, 280 dual loyalty, 28 Dubinsky, David, 118 Dulles, John Foster, 57–58, 63, 72, 75, 79–86, 95, 100, 172, 343 1958 Crisis, 97 Arab nationalism, 98 Arab–Israel conflict, 78, 81 Jews, 79 Judeo-Christian tradition, 79–81, 84 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 98 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 270, 274 visit in Israel, 274 East Europe, 26, 59 Eban, Abba, 67, 83, 98, 100, 129, 133, 137, 140, 156, 158, 186 EEC, 111 Egypt, 8, 19, 24, 39, 61, 65, 68, 78, 96–97, 104, 109, 113, 132, 136, 140, 158, 164, 173, 175, 177, 182–183, 186, 195, 197, 200, 228, 240, 267, 277, 287 ground-to-ground rocket, 109 missile programme, 109, 122 Nazi scientists, 109 Soviet Union, 94 Third Army, 200 Egypt–Czechoslovakia arms deal, 16, 94 Egypt–Soviet Pact of Friendship, 1971, 185 Ehrlich, Simcha, 206 EIB. See Export-Import Bank Eichmann, Adolf, 107 Eilam, Uzi, 265 Eilat, Eliahu, 72 Eisenhower, 76 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1, 57–59, 63, 67, 70, 73, 75, 79, 81–82, 85, 101–102, 105, 112, 116, 127, 136, 149, 158, 171

Index 1956 Suez War, 84, 87 arms sales to Israel, 106 friendly impartiality, 64 Israel, 76–78, 96 Israel’s strategic importance, 98 Israeli narrative, 78 Jewish history, 16 Jewish state, 77 Jews, 76–78 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 97 religion, 78 Sunday school, 9 United Nations, 84, 86 Zionism, 76 Eizenstat, Stuart E., 220 El Paso, 212 Elbit, 319 Elkus, Abram, 23 Elta, 297 Emanuel Neumann, 51 Enlightenment, 14 Entebbe, Uganda, 213 Eran, Amos, 143 Erekat, Saeb, 322 Eshkol, Levy, 117, 136, 146, 148, 157–158, 161, 165, 174 Johnson, Lyndon B., 128–129 United States, 115–117, 123–125 Ethiopia, 61, 292 Jews, 309 Ethridge, Mark, 68 Europe, 34, 99, 106, 114, 119, 130–131, 154, 266, 273, 283–284, 292, 297, 357 Evangelical Church 1967 June War, 150 Evangelical lobby, 218–219 Evangelical pilgrimage, 154 Evangelicals, 9, 149–150, 152–153, 155, 169, 194, 218, 241, 255, 336–337, 356 1948 War, 152 1956 Suez War, 149 1967 June War, 149, 152 1973 October War, 194 1982 Lebanon War, 255 Carter, Jimmy, 226–227 Israel, 216–217 Israel’s thirtieth anniversary, 218

Index missionaries, 14, 39 Occupied Territories, 336 War on Terror, 294 Evans, Daniel, 212 Evron, Ephraim, 248 Ewing, Oscar, 71 Exodus, 90–92, 211, 213 Export-Import Bank, 60–62, 136 Eytan, Walter, 75 F-14, 209 F-15, 209, 261 F-16, 238, 247 F-35, 319 F-4 Phantom II, 131, 162–165, 179, 182, 185, 188 F-84 jet planes, 96 Face the Nation, 22 Faith Bible Chapel, 218 Falwell, Jerry, 9, 217–218, 241, 255, 294, 335–336 Israel, 335–337 FBI, 120, 292, 295 FDR. See Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Federation of American Zionists, 27 Feinberg, Abraham (‘Abe’), 23, 46, 71, 78, 102, 110, 113, 127–128, 133, 135, 165, 167, 171 Feldman, Myer (‘Mike’), 102, 109–111, 113, 119, 127–128, 133, 142 special councilor on Jewish affairs, 102 Finch, Robert, 173 Findley, Paul, 256 Finkelstein, Arthur, 339–340 Finkelstein, Norman, 259 First Baptist Church, 337 First Church, 7 First World War, 13 Fisher, Max, 87, 172, 180, 203, 239, 303, 311–313 Fonda, Henry, 214 Ford, Gerald, 165, 173, 182, 197–201, 204, 209, 212–213, 216, 220, 223, 232 American Jews, 203 Evangelicals, 198 Israel, 194–198 Israel as democracy, 212 Jerusalem, 198

391 Judeo-Christian tradition, 198 reassessment, 199, 202–203, 208–209, 232 religion, 194–198 Sunday school, 198 Forrestal, James, 49, 83 Fortas, Abraham (‘Abe’), 118, 127, 134 Foxman, Abraham, 336 France, 73, 84, 149, 162 France–Israel arms embargo, 162 arms sales, 95 Frankfurter, Felix, 35, 38, 54 Friendly, Alfred, 256 From Time Immemorial, 258 Fulbright, J. William, 22, 120, 363 Gainer, Terrance W., 296 Galilee, 55, 153, 253 Gardosh, Kariel (‘Dosh’), 201 Garment, Leonard, 172, 177 Gates, Robert, 319, 321, 325 Gaza Strip, 159, 262, 285, 321 Gazit, Shlomo, 124, 192, 291 Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy, 295 George C. Marshall, 77 Germany, 33, 38, 77, 134 Gildesgame, Leon, 212 Gingrich, Newt, 259, 326, 328 Ginsburg, Ruth B., 313 Ginzburg, David, 119, 135, 139 God’s promise to the Jews, 9–10, 13, 355 Golan Heights, 152, 158, 215, 272 Gold, Dore, 340 Goldberg, Arthur, 102, 119, 135, 158, 258 Goldberg, Jeffrey, 239, 330 Goldman, Hy, 23 Goldman, Samuel, 7 Goldmann, Nahum PLO, 254 Goodall, Louis B., 30 Gordis, David M., 278 Gore, Albert, Jr., 21 Goren, Shlomo, 211 Graham, Billy, 9, 148, 154, 169, 171, 185 Graham, Martha ballet group, 346

392 Grayevsky, Victor, 290 Great Britain, 1, 26, 28, 30, 33, 35–40, 47, 49, 71, 73–74, 84, 98, 100, 149, 250, 258 arms sales to Arabs, 69 Balfour Declaration, 33 in the Middle East, 39 White Paper, 1939, 33–34 Great Britain–Egypt arms sales, 69 Great Britain–Iraq arms sales, 69 Great Britain–Israel arms sales, 99 Greece, 61 Green, William, 71 Greenberg, Stanley, 340 Griffin, Tim, 330 Grissom, William, 155 Gromyko,Andrei, 187 Guggenheim, Charles, 23 Gulf War, 1991, 299, 309, 318 Gustafson, Roy W., 154 Haaretz, 343 Habash, George, 276 Haber, Eitan, 244 Habib, Philip, 251–252 Haboker, 55 Hadassah, 119, 151 Haganah, 92 Hagee, John, 9, 218, 294, 337 AIPAC annual meeting, at, 336 American embassy in Jerusalem, at, 337 Israel, 336–337 Haifa, 111, 136 Haig, Alexander, 188, 190, 244, 246, 263, 271 US–Israel strategic relations, 271 Halevy, Ephraim, 292 Hamas, 293, 299, 320 Hamilton, Jordan, 232 Hanson Baldwin, 87 HaOlam HaZe, 349 Harding, Warren, 31 Hare, Raymond, 126 Harel, Isser, 290 Harman, Abraham, 102, 133–134, 139 Harriman, Averell, 109, 134

Index Harris, David, 336 Harris, Eddie, 91 Harry S. Truman, 45 Hart, Parker T., 24 Hartman, Robert, 56 Hatcher, Jessie Johnson, 118 Hawk ground-to-air missiles, 66, 105–113, 136 Hazony, Yoram, 323 Hebrew University, 88, 205, 342 Hebron, 10, 324 Helms, Richard, 187 Henning, John F., 119 Zionism, 119 Henriques, Robert A Hundred Hours to Suez, 87 Herlitz, Esther, 57 Herman, George, 22 Hertzberg, Arthur, 146 Carter, Jimmy, 229 Hezbollah, 292, 294, 299, 320 Hitler, Adolf, 17, 38, 97–98, 107, 114 Hodges, Luther H., 207 Hofi, Yitzhak, 291 Hogan, Michael, 341 Hollywood, 92, 239 Israel’s thirtieth anniversary, 213 Operation Yonatan, 213 Holocaust, 40, 47, 77, 90, 92, 108, 114, 241, 250, 357 Holy Land, 11, 32, 157, 240, 313 Horowitz, David, 60 House of Representatives, 30, 102, 160, 165, 278 AWACS, 246 Committee on Foreign Affairs, 31, 165 Free Trade Area (FTA), 283 Phantoms to Israel, 185 Resolution 52, 15 support of Balfour Declaration, 30 House, Edward M., 26, 28 Howe, Irvine, 254 Hughes, Richard N., 194 Hull, Cordell, 37, 41, 43 Humphrey, Hubert, 21, 134, 171 Hungary, 86, 291 Hussein, King, 1, 98, 127, 226, 261, 315

Index I Like Mike, 341 IAEA, 125 IAF, 74, 106, 131, 142, 144, 167, 189, 209, 248, 297, 299 1982 Lebanon War, 260, 263 IAI, 281, 298–299, 305 Ibn Saud, 41–42 IDF, 64, 164, 238, 261, 266 1956 Suez War, 87 1967 June War, 141–143 1973 October War, 190, 199–200, 260 1982 Lebanon War, 253, 259–260 1991 Gulf War, 309 Bicentennial, 212 Hawks ground-to-air-missiles, 106 retaliation attacks, 68 United States, 132 War on Terror, 295 Ikle, Fred, 273 Immanuel Baptist Church, 313 Independence, Missouri, 44, 46 India, 205 Indianapolis Star, 30 Indonesia, 331 Indyk, Martin, 311 Inhofe, James, 10 Institute for National Security Affairs. See JINSA Interagency Strategic Dialogue, 281 Intifada, first, 285–286 Intifada, second, 295, 316, 333 Iran, 19, 112, 267, 286–287, 292, 294 hostage crisis, 286–288 Islamic revolution, 267 seizure of American embassy, 286 Iran–Iraq War, 298 Iraq, 19, 68, 94, 97, 113, 164, 243, 248, 291, 293, 295, 298, 318 Iron Dome, 299 Iscar, 208 Israel, 369 1982 Lebanon War, 253 Africa, 275 American art and literature, 89–93 American Experts in, 342 American-imported TV series, 350 Americanization, 338–353 American-style advertisements, 338–352

393 bombing of Osirak nuclear reactor, 247 Bonds, 77, 239 Cold War, 359 Defence Ministry, 130 economic aid, 59–60, 236–238 Egypt–Czechoslovakia arms deal, 95 Evangelicals, 218 foreign policy, 19 Golan Heights Law, 248, 250 Holy Land tours, 153–156 in movies, 92 in the press, 55–56, 231–232 Iran nuclear programme, 327–328 Jewish immigration to, 59, 61–62, 64, 237, 283, 309 Johnson (Joseph) plan, 110 Judeo-Christian tradition, 79–80 Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments, 208 Lebanon, 272 melting pot, 89 member of the United Nations, 53 moral values, 45, 146, 256–258 national library, 211 neoliberalism, 347–348 New Historians, 300 nuclear programme, 113–114, 116, 127, 179, 292 peace, 158–160 pilgrimage, 152–153 PLO in Lebanon, 252–253 public opinion, 201, 221 SDI, 297–299 Soviet Union, 269 tourism diplomacy, 152–157 Weinberger, Casper, 244 Israel–Jordan peace agreement, 315 Israel Air Force. See IAF Israel Defence Forces. See IDF Israel lobby, 72 Israel–Egypt interim agreement, 1975, 208 peace, 200 peace agreement, 263, 318 Israeli–Syrian DMZ, 85 Israeli Aerospace Industries. See IAI Israeli embassy American Jews, 57, 65, 67, 112, 118, 120, 128, 139, 159

394 Israeli embassy (cont.) Congress, 202 US military aid, 61 Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty, 315 Israeli–Syrian armistice agreement, 84 Israeli–Syrian DMZ, 85 Israel–Lebanon peace agreement, 1983, 241, 263 Israel–PLO Oslo Accords, 314 Israel–Syria disengagement agreement, 1974, 197 Israel–United States. See United States– Israel Ivry, David, 248 J Street, 230 Jacobson, Edward (‘Eddie’), 46, 51, 59, 61, 71, 78 Japan, 280, 296 Jarring, Gunnar, 176 Javits, Jacob, 83, 138 JDC. See Joint Distribution Committee Jeffress, Robert, 337 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 78 Jericho, 10 Jerusalem, 10, 50, 92, 107, 151, 153–156, 169, 210, 215, 217, 227, 233, 238, 296, 307, 337, 366–367, 370 British occupation of, 30 Jerusalem Conference on Biblical Prophecy, 155 Jerusalem, East annexation, 161 Jerusalem, Old City occupation of, 148 Jesus Is Coming, 8 Jewish Agency, 48, 53, 61 Jewish Homeland, 26, 29 Jewish lobby, 4, 22, 72, 103, 184, 204, 233, 247, 362 Jewish money, 23 Jewish National Fund. See JNF Jewish state, 30 Jews, 368 immigration to United States, 26–27 national home, 15, 27, 31, 33, 41 philanthropy, 27 self-determination, 29 Zionism and diaspora, 27

Index JINSA, 295–296 JNF, 18, 52, 210 Johnson, Ealy, 117 Johnson, Joseph, 105, 111 Johnson, Lyndon B., 103, 109, 117, 119–120, 123, 132–133, 135–136, 139–140, 142, 158, 160, 163, 165, 174–175, 195, 361 American Jews, 118–119 arms sales to Israel, 124, 127 Eshkol, Levy, 124–125, 128–129 Five-Point plan, 160 Israel, 117, 119–120 Israel as democracy, 120 Israel as pioneer, 120 Jewish vote, 125 peace, 160–161 religion, 117–118 Sunday school, 9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 65, 310 Joint Committee on Trade and Investment, 204 Joint Distribution Committee, 63 Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG), 282 Joint Political-Military Group. See JPMG Jones, David C., 260 Jones, James L., 230 Jones, Jase, 194 Jordan, 1, 66, 68, 94, 97, 100, 153, 158, 163, 195, 226, 257, 262, 267, 274, 318 JPMG, 274–275, 280 Judaism, 27, 92, 151 Judeo-Christian tradition, 10, 77, 79, 90, 356–357 Kampelman, Max, 135, 242 Kaplan, Amy, 90, 144 Kaplan, Eliezer, 58, 144 Karine A, 292 Katzin, Alfred, 254 Kaufmann, Edward, 46 Keegan, George J., 164, 291 Kellogg, Frank B., 30 Kelly, Gene, 214 Kenen, 65 Kenen, Isaiah (‘Si’), 66, 112, 138 Kennedy, Edward, 267

Index Kennedy, John F., 1, 100–105, 108, 110–111, 113, 116–117, 120, 122–123, 127–128, 136, 207 American Jews, 102 arms sales to Israel, 22, 110 Ben Gurion, David, 107 even-handed policy, 104 Israel’s nuclear programme, 113–114 Jews, 110–112 Middle East, 101 New Frontier, 92 Palestinian refugees, 105 Kennedy, Robert F., 138 Kerry, John, 15, 21, 90 visit in Israel, 157 Kfar Truman, 52 Khomeini, Sayyid Ruholla Musavi, 267 Khrushchev, Nikita, 290 Kibbutzim, 56 Kimche, David, 270 King, Martin Luther, 137, 333 Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, 242 Kissinger, Henry, 168, 170, 172–173, 176–177, 179, 181, 185, 188, 190–191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203–204, 210, 213, 224 1973 October War, 173, 189–190, 196, 199 1982 Lebanon War, 254 American Jews, 179, 181, 201 Dinitz, Simcha, 195 disengagement agreements, 1974, 196–197, 199 interim agreement, 1975, 199 Israel, 199–201 Judaism, 173–174 Nobel Peace Prize, 203 shuttle diplomacy, 204 Klein, George, 239 Klutznick, Philip, 102, 110, 119, 128, 171, 192 1982 Lebanon War, 254 PLO, 254 Knesset, 13, 19, 55, 132, 161, 186, 191, 211, 249 Knowles, Warren, 174 Kol Israel, 346 Kol, Moshe, 155 Kollek, Teddy, 154, 156, 210

395 Komer, Robert, 107, 123, 128, 131–132, 358 Kosygin, Alexei, 166 Krim, Arthur, 118, 165–166 Krim, Mathilde, 118 Kristol, Irving, 336 Evangelicals, 336 Kroft, Steve, 334 Kurtzer, Daniel, 308, 327 Labour party, 221, 223, 307, 311–312, 314, 339, 343 LaHaye, Tim, 152 Laird, Melvin, 168, 175, 183 Israel, 175–176 LaMerhav, 341 Lansing, Robert Jewish national home, 32 Laskov, Chaim, 106 Lavi plane, 273–274, 283, 296–297 Lawson, Edward B., 345 League of Nations, 31 Lebanon, 68, 97, 100, 153, 257, 262, 264, 274, 292 1958 Crisis, 97–98 1976 Civil War, 182 Leffler, Melvyn, 1 Left Behind, 152 Lehman, Herbert, 49 Levies, 340 Levitas, Eliot, 219 Lewis, Samuel, 104, 249, 251, 272 Liberty Bell, 211 Libya, 171, 276, 289, 298 Life, 83, 144 Liff, Avraham, 141 Likud party, 282, 307, 311, 314, 324, 328, 336, 339, 348, 356 Americanization of Israel, 348 Lincoln, Abraham, 212 Lindsey, Hal, 152, 241 Liphshutz, Robert Jr, 219–220 Lipset, Seymore Lipset, 255 Littell, Franklin, 138 Lockheed Martin, 319 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 31 Loeb, Henry, 148 Loeb, John, 148 Los Angeles, 212 Los Angeles Times, 30, 88–89

396 Louisiana, 148 Luce, Henry, 83 Lunn, George, 30 Lyndon, B. Johnson, 24 M1 Abrams tank, 266 M109 Howitzers, 238 M-4 tanks, 112 M48 tanks, 127, 182 M60 tanks, 182, 238 Maariv, 201 Mack, Julian W. nationality and citizenship, 28 Madrid Conference, 309 Mailer, Norman, 333 Mandelbaum Gate, 153 Manilow, Barry, 214 Mapai, 157 Marcus, David, 92 Marjorie Morningstar, 341 Marshall Plan, 341 Marshall, George C., 50, 52, 54, 83 Martin, Jack, 79 Marty, Martin, 217 Maverick missiles, 238 McAlister, Melani, 286 McDonald, James G., 54–55, 58, 75, 345 McDonald’s, 340, 350 Israel, in, 352 McDonnell Douglas, 131 McIntire, Carl, 150 McNamara, Robert, 123, 134, 141, 143 McPherson, Harry C., 142–143 Mearsheimer, John, 4 Mediterranean, 18, 25, 130, 164, 276 Meged, Aaron, 341 Meir, Golda, 1, 75, 91, 100, 102, 105, 110, 117, 122, 127, 132, 134, 141, 150, 156, 169, 172, 174, 177–179, 181, 183, 185–188, 191, 198, 200, 254, 325 1973 October War, 198 and pioneer, 174 Graham, Billy, 356 Nixon, Richard, 174 Melville, Herman, 14 Memorandum of Agreement for Cooperative Research and Development and Military Procurement, 1979, 238

Index Memorandum of Agreement on Defence Cooperation and Procurement, 1979, 273 Memorandum of Agreement on Research and Development, 1984, 275 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Joint Political, Security, and Economic Cooperation, 1988, 280 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative Research and Development, 268 Memorandum of Understanding on Education, 1978, 236 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation, 1981, 249–250, 272 Memorandum of Understanding on US aid to Israel, 1999, 318 Memorandum of Understanding on US aid to Israel, 2007, 319 Memorandum of Understanding on US aid to Israel, 2016, 319 Memorandum of Understanding, 1965, 127, 130–132 Memorandum of Understanding, 1971, 189 Merkava tank, 260, 297 Middle East, 18, 32, 39, 41, 45–46, 58–59, 63, 65, 73, 77, 80, 84, 97–98, 100, 107, 113, 123, 136, 144, 149, 154, 160, 163–164, 166, 172, 175, 177, 180–181, 201, 215, 244, 246, 256, 264–265, 268, 270, 287–288, 290, 294, 301, 329, 331 1958 Crisis, 1, 97 arms race, 73, 126–127, 133, 166, 186 defence of, 39–40 MIG 21, 164, 167, 187, 260 MIG 23, 187, 260 Mikesell Report, 62 Miller, Aaron D., 21, 308, 315, 325 Milwaukee, 174 mirage, 162, 171, 189 Missile Defence Agency, 299 Missionary Review of the World, 30 Mitchell, John, 180 Mondale, Walter, 220, 232 moral majority, 216–217 Morgenthau, Henry, 23, 35, 137

Index Morocco, 27 Morrison–Grady plan, 45 Moses, 90 Mossad, 92, 141, 187, 289–292, 295 Mount of Temple, 150 Mount Olive, 10 Mount Scopus, 89 Mount Zion, 10 Munich Massacre, 1972, 294 Murray, Philip, 71 Muslims, 331 Mussolini, Bennito, 97 Mutual Security Programme, 63 Nakba, 333 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 19, 94–95, 97–98, 107, 109, 114, 117, 125, 136, 141 Nathan, Robert, 171 National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel. See NCLCI National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 138 National Council of Churches, 138 National Geography, 18 National Security Council. See NSC National War College, 130 NATO, 273–274, 280, 291, 296 Nazareth, 10, 153 Nazi, 16, 92, 101, 119 NBC, 93, 203, 243 NCC, 138, 151, 194 NCLCI, 218 Negev, 56, 237, 276, 341 neoconservatism, 242–243 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 316, 323–330, 335–336, 338–340, 364 addresses Congress, 328 Americanization of Israel, 338 Evangelicals, 335–337 Iran’s nuclear agreement, 329 irritate presidents and officials, 325–327 neoconservatism, 323–325 Netanyahu, Yonatan, 323 Neumann, Emanuel, 51 New Diplomatic History, 6 New York City, 40, 91, 213, 284 New York Evening, 30 New York Globe, 30

397 New York Herald, 30 New York Post, 36 New York Public Library, 19 New York Times, 55, 67, 87, 89, 91–92, 137, 145, 192, 257, 290, 305 New York World Telegram, 36 Newman, Paul, 214 Newsweek, 216 Nicaragua–Israel arms sales, 95 Nickel Grass, Operation, 192 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 138 Zionism, 16 Niles, David K., 46, 48, 53–54, 61, 78, 102 Nixon, Richard, 2, 21, 24, 66, 79, 165, 168–171, 173–184, 187–188, 190, 193, 195–196, 198, 201, 223–224, 270 1973 October War, 189–190, 193–194, 196 American Jews, 171–173, 180–181 anti-Semitism, 171 Cold War, 169–170 Congress, 247 even-handed policy, 184 guest of IDF, 168 Jewish lobby, 247 Meir, Golda, 187–188 Middle East policy, 170, 184 Reagan, Ronald, 239 religion, 168–169 settlements, 361 Sunday school, 9 visit in Israel, 157, 168 White House tapes, 168, 171 Non-proliferation Treaty, 166 North Africa, 59 NSC, 66, 82, 107, 166, 176, 185, 225, 241, 340 American Middle East policy, 175 arms to Israel, 180 Nussbaum, Samuel, 312 Obama, Barack, 147, 218, 230, 300, 308, 319, 327, 329–330, 335, 354, 364 AIPAC policy conference, at, 329 American Jews, 333

398 Obama, Barack (cont.) Arab–Israel conflict, 332 Holocaust, 332 Israel, 330–331 Israel as democracy, 326 Israel narrative, 333 Jewish history, 16 Middle East, 332 Muslim world, 331 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 328, 334 Occupied Territories, 332 peace, 332–338 settlements, 328–329 United Nations’ General Assembly, at, 335 Occupied Territories, 233, 360 Old Testament, 76, 149, 211 Olmert, Ehud, 319 Omaha World-Herald, 174 Operation Autumn Leaves, 292 Operation Desert Storm (1991), 248, 266, 306 Operation Salvo, 189 Operation Wrath of God, 294 Operation Yonatan, 213–214, 288, 323 Oren, Michael, 330 Orientalism, 31, 88 Osirak nuclear reactor, 291 Oslo Accords, 285, 293, 314–315, 324, 333 Ottoman, 18, 28, 31, 258 Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, 267 Palestine, 9–10, 15, 17–18, 26–27, 33–38, 68, 114, 153, 174, 240, 250, 258, 355 Arabs, 33 Jewish State, 33–38 Palestine Conciliation Committee, 68 Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, 214 Palestinian refugees, 81, 109, 151, 224, 240, 258, 322 Palestinians self-determination, 334 Patriot missiles, 299, 305 Patterson, Robert, 48 Patton tanks, 96, 123 Pazner, Avi, 231 Pearson, Drew, 88 Peled, Benjamin, 191

Index Pence, Mike, 338 Pentagon, 66, 69, 74, 108–109, 130, 136, 145, 179, 181, 187, 189, 209, 259, 271, 273–274, 300, 305 arms to Israel, 183 Israel as strategic asset, 268 Phantoms to Israel, 186 Peres, Shimon, 124, 221–222, 277, 282, 312, 338–339 Carter, Jimmy, 222 Peretz, Michael, 258 Peters, Joan, 258 From Time Immemorial, 258–259 PFLP, 276 Phalanx, 238, 267 Pharaoh, 90, 287 Philadelphia, 149, 212 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 36 Philadelphia Evening Public Ledger, 36 Philadelphia Inquirer, 36 Philadelphia Public Ledger, 30 Piaf, Edith, 91 Pioneer, 245, 341, 357 Pipes, Daniel, 258 Pittsburgh Gazette Times, 30 PLO, 223–224, 229, 252, 254, 257, 260, 262, 285, 293–294, 305–306 Podhoretz, Norman, 242, 254 Poland, 38, 290–291 Pollard, Jonathan, 66, 285 Pompeo, Michael R., 338 Pompidou, George American Jews, 171 Powell, Collin visit in Israel, 310 Premillennial dispensationalism, 8–9, 13, 117, 149 Proskauer, Joseph M., 48 Protestan Church Palestinian self-determination, 13 Protestant Church, 151 anti-Israel, 151–152 anti-Zionism, 13 Brotherhood, 10 fight the White Paper, 36 fundamentalism, 9–10, 13, 78, 150, 219 Germany, 16 Holocaust, 16–17 Islam, 17 Jewish state, 13

Index mainline, 13, 149–150, 152, 303 Zionism, 8–13 Protestant Churches, mainline 1973 October War, 194 public opinion, 9, 47, 68, 156, 243 Puritans, 56, 357 American exceptionalism, 13 Bible, 8 Jews, 7–8 Qualitative Military Edge (QME), 319 Quayle, Dan, 303 Rabb, Maxwell, 57, 79 Rabin, Yitzhak, 123, 165–168, 178, 181–182, 188, 198, 200, 209–211, 215, 220, 244, 280, 298, 311, 314–316, 328, 352 Americanization of Israel, 339 Occupied Territories, 314 United States, 315 Rabinowitz, Yehoshua, 204 Rahm, Emanuel, 313 Raymond Aron, 146 Reagan, Ronald, 5, 239–245, 247, 249, 251–252, 254, 259, 261–262, 268–269, 273–274, 279, 283, 289, 296, 301, 303, 311, 323, 335, 348 ‘recognize the Israeli asset’, 268 1967 June War, 239 AIPAC, 247, 277 American Jews, 240 Aramaggedon, 241 Arms sales to Arabs, 22 Begin, Menachem, 198, 259 Evangelicals, 241 Golan Heights Law, 249 Holocaust, 17, 242 Iran, 268 Israel, 239–243, 268–271 Israel as democracy, 15, 268–269 Israel attack on Osirak nuclear reactor, 248 Israel War on Terror, 276 Israel–Arab conflict, 240 Israeli narrative, 240 Israel, shipment of F-16 to, 264 Jewish friends, 239 Jews, 243–244 moral majority, 243

399 Neocons, 242–243 peace, 261–262 Peace plan, 1981, 263 Saddam Hussein, 248 SDI, 296 Senate, 246 settlements, 262 suspension of F-16, 248 Reed, Ralph, 335 Reinharz, Yehuda, 258 Republican party, 21, 23, 57, 75, 81, 165, 327 Likud party, 328 Resolution 181. See United Nations: partition resolution Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 320 Ribicoff, Abraham, 66, 102, 143 Rice, Condoleezza, 317, 321–322 Rice, Susan, 330, 331 Riley, William E., 84 River Brethren Church, 78 Robbins, Jerome, 345 Robertson, Pat, 241, 335, 337 Rockefeller, Nelson, 213 Rogers, William, 172, 176–178, 183–184, 200 1971 interim agreement, 184 Israel, 176–178 Rogers Plan, 177, 188, 221, 229 Romney, Mitt, 327 Roosevelt, Eleanora, 225 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 23, 34, 36–37, 40–43, 46, 48, 101 Episcopalian Church, 34 Jewish national home, 34–35, 37 Jews, 34–35 Palestine, 40–43 religion, 34 Zionism, 43 Roosevelt, James Sr., 34 Roosevelt, Sara Delano, 34 Roosevelt, Teddy, 239 Rosen, Meir, 270 Rosenman, Samuel I., 35, 46 Ross, Dennis, 147, 302, 308, 314–315, 326, 354 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 326 Rossdale, Albert B., 31 Rostow, Walt, 135, 139, 160, 164

400 Roth, Philip, 333 Rothchild, Lionel W., 28 Rumsfeld, Donald, 213 Rusk, Dean, 103–104, 109, 112, 117, 122–123, 125, 128–129, 131–132, 140–142, 159, 161 American Jews, 128 Israel, 103–104 Russia, 27, 174 Saar 5, 275 Sabra and Shatila massacres, 258, 263 Sadat, Anwar, 187, 201, 227–228, 291, 316 Soviet Union, 200 United States, 200 visit in Jerusalem, 1977, 227 Saddam Hussein, 19, 293, 309, 318 Safire, William, 170 Salem, 10 SAM 3, 181–183 Samson and Delilah, 80, 90 Samuels, Howard, 89, 207 Samuels. Gertrude, 55, 88 Sapir, Pinhas, 206–207 Sartawi, Issam, 254 Saud, ibn, 49 Saudi Arabia, 24, 39, 49, 61, 65, 163, 245, 257, 267, 278 Saulsbury, Willard, 30 Saunders, Harold, 166 Schiff, Jacob, 23 Schindler, Alexander, 93, 229, 231, 254 Schindler’s List, 93 Schlesinger, James, 210 Schmidt, Dana, 56 Scopes Trial, 13 Scowcroft, Brent, 325 SCUD missiles, 298 SDI, 296 Second World War, 38, 40, 46, 77, 79 secretary of state, 166, 304 Senate, 36, 44, 76, 102, 156, 204, 246, 277–279 1967 June War, 143 AWACS, 246 Foreign Relations Committee, 66 Free Trade Area (FTA), 283 Jewish lobby, 22 letter to the president, 1975, 202

Index letter to the president, 1986, 277 letter to the president, 1993, 317 Phantoms to Israel, 185 Subcommittee on Appropriations, 238 support of Balfour Declaration, 30 September 11 terror attacks, 293–294 Shalem Center, 323 Shamir, Yitzhak, 5, 239, 264, 271, 274, 302, 304–305, 309, 311–312, 353 Baker, James, 304 Bush, George H. W., 310–313 Reagan, Ronald, 274 United States, 274 Shapira, Masha, 341 Sharett, Moshe, 17, 44–45, 53, 58, 64, 76, 84 Sharm El-Sheikh, 159, 215 Sharon, Ariel, 257, 263–264, 317, 321–322, 325 Bush, George W., 321–322 Shazar, Zalman, 117 Shechter, Herschel, 219 Shertok. See Sharett, Moshe Shilo, 10 Shiloah, Reuven, 290 Shiloh Baptist Church, 149 Shoval, Zalman, 64 Shrum, Robert, 340 Shultz, George, 263–264, 270, 272–273, 282, 287–288, 348 AIPAC annual meeting, 275 American Jews, 277 Begin, Menachem, 264 Congress, 277 international terrorism, 287 Israel, 263–264, 282–283 Israel–Lebanon Peace Agreement, 1983, 263–264 Israel, shipment of F-16 to, 264 Lavi airplane, 264 West Bank, 263 Siegel, Mark A., 256 Silicon Valley, 284 Silken, James, 13 Silver, Abba Hillel, 41–42, 54, 78, 81 Simon, William E., 204, 206, 213 Sinai, 82, 86, 136, 140, 152, 157–158, 191, 199, 237, 240 Sisco, Joseph, 185 Sixth Fleet, 108, 111, 130, 136

Index Sixth World Pentecostal Conference, 155 Skyhawk, 123, 131, 134, 182, 188 Slater, Robert, 210 Slaugher, Frank, 80 Smith, Walter Bedell, 57, 79, 290 Snyder, John, 48 Solarz, Stephen J., 256 Soreq Nuclear Plant, 125 South Korea, 280 Southern Baptist Alliance, 149 Southern Baptist Convention, 194, 241, 255 Southern Presbyterian general assembly PLO, 255 Soviet Union, 39, 58, 64, 73, 86, 95, 98, 149, 162–164, 169–170, 175, 177, 180–183, 187, 194, 215, 223, 225, 237, 250, 265, 268, 271–272, 283, 287, 291, 304, 309, 318, 359 Afghanistan, invasion of, 269 arms sales to Arabs, 127 Egypt, 176 Jews, 309, 337, 359 Middle East, 94 Middle East policy, 269 Persian Gulf, 274 Soviet Union–Egypt arms sales, 105, 112, 162, 181, 187 Soviet Union–Syria arms sales, 105, 162, 272, 318 Speyer, James, 23 Spielberg, Steven, 93 Spurgeon, Charles, 9 SS-21, 273 St Louis World’s Fair, 11 St Paul News, 30 Stein, Kenneth, 227 Stettinius, Edward, 43 Stevenson, Adlay, 156 Strategic Defence Initiative. See SDI Strategic Policy Planning Group, 281 Strauss, Nathan Sr, 23 Streisand, Barbara, 214 Struthers, Sally, 214 Suez Canal, 68, 136, 144, 158, 183–184 Sulzberger, C. L., 67 Sunday school, 9, 76, 331 Sundlun, Walter I., 75

401 Super-Sal, 349 supporting assistance, 237 Switzerland, 91 Symington, Stuart, 139 Syria, 1, 24, 27, 68, 97, 113, 158, 164, 197, 241, 250, 257, 263, 274, 276, 298, 303 Israel–Lebanon peace agreement, 1983, 272 Lebanon, 263, 272 SAM-5, 273 T72 tank, 260 Tadiran, 297 Talbot, Philip, 108–109, 111, 117 Technion, 205, 284 Tel Aviv, 18 Tel Aviv University, 205–206, 281 Tenet, George, 292 Teveth, Shabtai, 142 Thatcher, Margaret, 323 The Cursed Blessing, 142 The Innocent Abroad, 18 The Late Great Planet Earth, 152, 241 The Prodigal, 81 The Song of Ruth: A Love Story of the Old Testament, 80 The Ten Commandments, 81 Time, 18, 144 Tiran Straits, 136, 138, 140, 158 Tripartite Declaration, May 1950, 72–74, 94 Truman, Harry S., 17–18, 23, 38–40, 43–45, 54–55, 58–59, 61, 64, 70–73, 76, 78, 84, 87, 101–102, 174, 342, 361 Acheson, Dean, 47 as Cyrus, 12 de facto recognition of Israel, 52 DPs, 47 even-handed policy, 58 Holocaust, 17 Holocaust survivors, 38–39 Israel, 57 Israel as democracy, 15, 45 Jewish national home, 44 Jewish state, 2, 47–52 Jews, 46 Palestine policy, 47 Sunday school, 9

402 Truman, Harry S. (cont.) United Nations, 85 Zionism, 12, 43–46 Trump, Donald, 233, 338, 354–355, 358, 361 Evangelicals, 338 TU-16 aircraft, 187 Tuchman, Barbara, 137, 144, 258 Judeo-Christian tradition, 137 Turkey, 24, 61, 73, 84, 205, 275 Twain, Mark, 18 UJA, 63, 87, 147, 239, 337, 345 United Arab Republic, 97, 177 United Automobile Workers, 138 United Jewish Appeal. See UJA United Nations, 68, 86, 102, 136, 170, 330 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 225 General Assembly, 50, 52 partition plan, 49–50 partition resolution, 9, 51, 79, 157 Resolution 242, 159–160, 178, 223–224, 304 Security Council, 84, 140, 159, 233, 248, 276, 286, 330 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 50 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 84 United Palestine Appeal, 63 United States, 164, 203, 292 1967 June War, 140–145 1973 October War, 196, 266 American Jews, 277–279 anti-Semitism, 20 Arab–Israel conflict, 307 Arabs, 45, 265 arms sales to Arabs, 69, 71 even-handed policy, 161, 358 exceptionalism, 7 foreign policy, 14 idealism, 3, 14, 32, 240, 269 image of Arabs, 18 interests, 32, 240, 269 Israel, economic aid, 60–65 Israeli narrative, 307, 317, 361 Jewish history, 357

Index Jewish vote, 20–23, 101, 170–171, 174, 220, 243, 312, 362 Jews, 35–36, 111, 146, 148, 172, 240, 254, 285, 289, 305, 314, 356 Liberal republicanism, 14 Middle East, 32, 39–40, 69–70, 76, 175–176, 188 Middle East policy, 81, 94–95, 97–98, 303, 358 Migration and Refugee Assistance Account (MRA), 233 militant Islam, 287 military aid, 115–122, 183 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 94 Orientalism, 17–18, 357 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the, 208 Palestine geography, 10–12 Palestinian narrative, 257 peace process, 104–105, 308 PL480, 129, 134, 205 political theology, 13 presidential campaign 1948, 23 public opinion, 38, 49, 139, 159, 203, 243, 358, 362 recognition of Israel, 55 religion, 14 Saudi Arabia, 33 settlements, 233–234, 304–305 Soviet Union, 266 strategic relations, 179 trusteeship plan, 46–47, 52 United Nation’s resolution on Zionism, 306 Vietnam, 266 Zionism, 7, 15, 17, 26, 32–34, 40 United States–Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act (P.L. 112-150), 320 United States–Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act, 1985, Bill H.R. 2268, 284 United States–Israel Security Cooperation Act (P.L. 113-296), 320 United States–Israel 1956 Suez War, 87 1958 Crisis, 97–100 Africa, 270

Index arms sales, 22, 67, 99, 318 Bicentennial, 210–213 Binational Fund for Research and Development, 233, 235 Cooperation and Development Research Programme, 205 Cooperative Development Programme, 270 Council for Industrial Research and Development, 208 defence of the Middle East, 73–74 economic aid, 59–61, 188, 195–196, 282–285, 310–311 economic and industrial cooperation, 235 Free Trade Area (FTA), 283 idealism, 2, 191 industrial and trade relations, 205–208 Industrial Research and Development Foundation, 206 intelligence sharing, 289–293 interests, 215 interests, 2 Iran’s nuclear programme, 328 Joint Business Council, 208 joint military exercises, 274 military aid, 69–72, 74, 98–100, 112, 130–136, 186–188, 238, 319 military cooperation, 263, 320–321 military stockpiles, 320 mutual reduction of customs agreement, 1979, 238 offshore procurement, 130, 135–136, 204, 280, 318 Point Four Plan, 342 Qualitative Military Edge (QME), 319–320 shared values, 7, 10, 14–15, 270, 288, 333, 357 Soviet Union, 269 strategic relations, 108, 128–131, 164–165, 182–183, 187, 189, 208–210, 260–261, 265–276, 309–310, 318, 359–360 supporting assistance, 195 technological cooperation, 297 War on Terror, 288–289, 294–296

403 United States–Jordan arms sales, 66, 127–128, 134, 277, 279 United States–Saudi Arabia arms sales, 244, 246, 277–279, 291 United States–Soviet Union 1973 October War, 197 unmanned aerial vehicles, 261 Untermyer, Samuel, 23 Uris, Leon, 90 US Information Agency (USIA), 343 Vance, Cyrus, 220, 237 settlements, 232 Vaught, W. O., 12, 313 Vessey, John W. visit in Israel, 273 Vietnam, 138, 142–146, 152, 171, 195, 203 Vietnam, South fall of, 203 Voices United for Israel (VUfI), 335 Voss, Carl H., 16 Wainhause, David, 57 Waiting period, 1967 Congress, 138–139 Johnson administration and, 136–137 popular support, 137–138 Wallis, Rodney, 92 Walt, Stephen, 4 Walzer, Michael, 255 War Reserves Stock Allies – Israel (WRSA-I), 320 Warnke, Paul, 167 Washington (state), 212 Washington DC, 212, 218, 235, 272, 295 Washington Herald, 30 Washington Post, 15, 55, 109, 256, 279, 312 Washington, George, 83 Watergate affair, 193 Wattenberg, Ben, 242 Wayne, John, 92 Weber, Timothy, 152 Weinberger, Casper, 244–245, 263, 271–272, 275, 298

404 Weinberger, Casper (cont.) Israel, 244 Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation, 273 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation, 1981, 272 Middle East, 244 on US–Israel relations, 245 Saudi Arabia, 244 US–Israel strategic relations, 271 Weissglas, Dov, 321–322 Weizmann Institute of Science, 89, 205 Weizmann, Chaim, 27, 61, 85 Weizmann, Ezer, 106, 131–132 United States, 228 West Bank, 127, 152, 158, 223, 225–226, 231, 255, 262, 304, 307, 322, 324, 337 White House, 1, 36, 46, 51, 53, 57, 70, 82, 102, 106, 110, 115, 118, 121, 138–139, 189, 192, 198, 200, 229, 239, 277, 279, 286, 302, 313, 325, 354 White Paper 1939, 35 Wiesel, Elie, 258 Williams, Andy, 91 Wilson, Evan, 9

Index Wilson, Woodrow, 14, 23, 26, 28–30, 50, 101, 338, 358 Balfour Declaration, 2, 4 religion, 29 Zionism, 12, 18, 29–30 Wise, Stephen, 35, 41–42, 44, 49 Wood, Natalie, 214 Woods, Marilyn, 9 World Jewish Congress, 229 Wouk, Herman, 341 Yadlin, Aharon, 210 Yarid HaMizrakh, 206 Yariv, Aharon, 108, 123, 130, 141, 164 Yediot Aharonot, 104 Yishuv, 34, 38, 53 Zamir, Tzvi, 187 Zionism, 8, 18, 20, 27–30, 32, 37, 83, 91, 240, 258, 309 Pioneer, 15, 31 Zionism, anti, 38, 148 Zionist Organization of America. See ZOA ZOA, 28, 51, 101 Zoellick, Robert, 308 Zumwalt, Elmo, 242